Domination, Development, and Drought:
A Study of Two Chikunda Settlements in Dande, Zambesi Valley, Zimbabwe

Fernanda Maria Claudio

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Anthropology
The London School of Economics and Political Science

2005

UMI Number: U513449

UMI

Dissertation Publishing

UMI U513449

ProQuest

Abstract

The principle theme of this study is an examination of the relationship between political and economic domination, and development and drought in the Dande area of the Zambesi Valley, Zimbabwe. To this end, two settlements, a centralised polity and an area of shallow and dispersed lineages, were researched and compared. While the populations of these areas comprised different clans and lineages, particular attention is paid to the Chikunda group whose dominant clan in Dande, the *marunga rosario andrade*, controlled a longstanding centralised chieftaincy.

Political process in Dande was until the 1990s viewed as the performance of two forms of chieftaincy, autochthonous and conquering. Autochthonous chiefs were believed to be supported by the people and to act in benevolent ways, while conquering chiefs were expected to act in the interests of their own clan and lineage. Particular attention is paid to the issue of chieftaincy through an examination of the formation of centralised Chikunda polities which derived from a Portuguese land tenure system. Accounts of *marunga* conquest of Dande and the Chapoto chieftaincy of the 1990s are examined with regard to domination. In comparison, the importance of land spirits in the discourse of chieftaincy is highlighted in terms of centralised and decentralised polities.

While the significance of chieftaincy as a political discourse in Dande was high, during the 1990s the introduction of state policies of structural adjustment and development altered political and economic practices. Serious drought in 1991-92 exacerbated longstanding inter-generational conflict which led to a split of outlook on issues of kinship, political organisation, and livelihood practices.

The occurrence of serious drought and associated hunger and illness, coupled with social pressures brought by development, caused local populations to express the belief that the Zimbabwean state, which had been installed through the will of the people, was no longer for the people. The trajectory of the Zimbabwean state from its role as autochthonous ruler to that of conqueror in little over a decade after Independence is examined through discussion of land spirit ceremonies performed during and after drought.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3

Acknowledgements

It is to the Chikunda people of the Zambesi that I am most indebted for generously sharing their time and experience with me in the harsh and demoralising context of a drought. In Chikafa and Kanyemba my greatest debt is to September Shereni, my field assistant and translator. This project benefited immeasurably from his education, skill, endless goodwill and patience. Through him I saw something of the dilemma of being young and hopeful in the Zambesi.

In Chikafa, I was welcomed by the late Lazarus Zhuwao and his wife Stella. Others who enabled my work were: Sabhuku Chikafa and the Village Chairman; Ward Councillor Mutsvairo; Noel and Eva Kambure who built my house; and, Pleasure Jani who taught me about the local environment. The late Chief Chapoto welcomed me to Kanyemba and shared stories of his long life. I would also like to thank Ward Councillor Zakias Kanyemba, Antonio Chipesi and his wives, Alick Chimata, Mirion Rovera and his son, Weston Vhadiyu, and Sabhuku Chiyambo.

In Harare, I would like to thank the late David Beach for facilitating a Research Associateship in the Department of History, University of Zimbabwe. Also, Professor Ngwabi Bhebe and Marshall Murphree. In Darwendale, George, Margaret, and William Kluckow offered hospitality and taught me much about commercial farming in Zimbabwe. From Lee and Phil Vermaak I learned of the tragic impact of the War of Independence on young whites and the terrible dilemmas they encountered.

In London, I was inspired by David Lan who shared some of his fieldwork experience. Henrietta Moore provided invaluable guidance in the early stages of research, particularly during fieldwork. Peter Loizos believed in my abilities and in the value of this study and saw the thesis through to completion. I am grateful to friends at LSE: Cecilia Busby, Mark Harris, Mark Jameson, Leonie Kindness, Kepa F. de Larrinoa, Andrew Long, Margaret Taylor, Alison Tierney, and Yasushi Uchiyamada.

This thesis was supported by the "Fonds des Chercheurs et pour l'aide a la Recherche" of the Government of Quebec, the Leverhulme Trust, a University of London Travel Grant, and the London School of Economics.

I am grateful to staff members of: The National Archives of Zimbabwe; The

Illustrative Materials

Maps:

Figures:

Illustrations:

Appendices

Abbreviations:

AGRITEX	Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services, Government of Zimbabwe
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CMB	Cotton Marketing Board
DERUDE	Department of Rural Development Division
DC	District Commissioner
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development
MZP	Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Development Project
REWS	Regional Early Warning System
SADC	Southern African Development Community
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army

Map 1: Sacred Areas in Chikafa

The mhondoro of southern Dande. c. 1960 (adapted from Garbett. 1977)

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 9

Figure 10

Kahonza
Dhatya
Chikawo
Kunumpumhu
Bangomwe   Mwera   Mutota   Dzivaguru

                                                                                                              Musuma

        Madzomba   Nyajore/Nyachava   Nehanda   Nebedza

                                Biri   ?

                                                                        Nyahuma

        Chimombe   Nyamapfeka   Chikuyo   ?

                                                                                            Seremwe

    Kanyemba   Katuu

                                                                        Chivere

            Maria   Chigua   Chidyamauyu   Nyamasoka   Chiodzamamera

                                                                        Mukombwe

                        Chimhako   Chiwawa

    Chief   Chief Chapoto   (Dema)   Chief Chisunga   Chiefs   ?   (Tavara)
    Matsiwo (Chikunda)   (Korekore)   Chitsungo
    (Tande)   Kasekete
                                                                               Chiweshe
                                                                               (Korekore)

Ties of kinship between the main mhondoro *of Dande (bold type indicates*
the senior mhondoro *of each lineage)*

26

Genealogy : Perpetual Relations among
Korekore, Chthonic and Chikunda Regional Cults

Kingsley Garbett

LOCAL GOVERNMENT **GOVERNMENT** ⟶ ⟵ **PARTY**

3 Senior Ministers — Local Govt. & Rural Development
(2 Vice Presidents)
— Economics & Finance
— Political Affairs

President = Party President & First Secretary
+ 2 Deputy Presidents
& Second Secretaries

appoints

Cabinet

Politbureau

members

Congress - met 1963,
1984 & 1988 (Unity)
- theoretically supreme

Ministry of Local
Government

Secretaries for
- Finance
- Organisation
- Development etc.

Central Committee
- meets quarterly

elected

Provincial
Governor

Provincial
Planning
Officer

(8 Provinces + Harare)

delegates

Provincial
Executive

Provincial Planning
Committee

District
Council

District
Administration

District Planning
Committee

District
Executive

Ward Development
Committee
(Ward Co.)

Branch
Executive

Village Development
Committee
(Vil. Co.)

Village/Cell

Party organisation

Youth   Women

28

Introduction:

This study is about the issues of domination, development, and drought which characterised the period of intensive fieldwork I conducted in the Dande area of the Zambesi Valley in Zimbabwe in 1992 and 1993. During this time I witnessed how people wove a political discourse based on notions of conquest and resistance in order to grapple with the forces of development, central government, and drought. These issues will be addressed by recounting the case of Kanyemba and Chikafa, two settlements in Dande, which are populated by a number of clans, but ruled by conquering Chikunda lineages that arrived in the latter part of the 19th century. I will approach the theme of domination by juxtaposing the cultural logic of conquest in Dande with the arrival of development projects and the intensification of government interest in the area to examine local responses to change. In this way, domination is a primary issue, part and parcel of the way in which the Chikunda placed themselves in Dande society. Development is a recent feature, devised by a combination of international and state interests, which joined the political arena in the late1980s. Drought is a contingent and largely unpredictable circumstance which disrupts Zambesian society and periodically highlights inequalities in social organisation.

The Zambesi Valley, historically a marginal and neglected area, grew to prominence in the imagination of Zimbabweans during the War of Independence when local communities supported guerrilla soldiers. A decade later, during the drought of 1991-92 which affected Southern Africa, Zimbabweans refocused attention on the area when central government asked senior resident land spirits to perform ceremonies which would bring rain. However, these cases were exceptional. Although the actions of Zambesians were considered by many to be instrumental in the achievement of the Zimbabwean state, and the moral authority of its spirits to be supreme, the fact remained that since Independence the people of the Zambesi had gained little influence in Harare. Inhabitants of the two areas in Dande where I worked believed that they had little representation within the national government; a circumstance they thought was well demonstrated by the

29

implementation of development projects without widespread local consultation. Many local people felt both angry and powerless at the thought that while the Zambesi played a pivotal role in the War of Independence, they did not receive the schools, clinics, roads, and livelihood opportunities which they believed the ruling party had promised. In wider Zimbabwean society, the Zambesi continued to be considered backward, dangerous, and an easy target for jokes and the occasional negative article in the national press.

Because they had been left alone for so long, the sudden appearance of development schemes as well as greater involvement on the part of the state in the late 1980s came as a surprise to many inhabitants. In the decade between Independence and the arrival of development projects, the Zambesi Valley had been mostly ignored by central government. While the area was incorporated into the ZANU-pf party organisation which extended from the role of President to the local Village Development Committee (VIDCO), much of people's lives remained as before Independence. In both research areas, ZANU-pf representatives were members of established lineages whose position did not challenge the hierarchy of Chiefs, headmen, and land spirits. Instead they simply came to parallel the authority of lineage leaders, at times cooperating in crucial decisions. During this uneventful period the influence of land spirits, so important during the Independence war, also seemed to wane. Harvests had been good, the pattern of labour migration to the plateau continued, and ex-combatants were re-integrated into communities. Without the occurrence of dire problems, the role of land spirits receded to that of rain-making and adjudication of minor breaches of the moral order.

In light of their steady marginalisation, it was surprising for many inhabitants when two large-scale development projects were introduced into the Zambesi Valley during the late 1980s. The Mid Zambesi Valley Rural Resettlement Project (MZP) and the Communal Areas Management Project For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in combination yielded radical changes to the physical landscape, re-settlement of people into new villages, the introduction of widespread cotton-cultivation, and the prohibition from hunting wild animals. Development planners began to hold meetings to recruit local representatives to organise the

implementation of these schemes and new migrants arrived from other parts of Zimbabwe. One interpretation of the sudden interest in the Zambesi Valley as the land of opportunity was the increasing shortage of farm land elsewhere in Zimbabwe. The ruling party, ZANU-pf, had received much popular support during the Independence War because of its political platform of returning land to Black Africans. Ten years after the end of the military struggle, and with a drastic increase in the population of Zimbabwe, the party felt compelled to deliver on this promise. At the same time foreign institutions, in this case the African Development Fund and the World Wide Fund for Nature, contributed money to transform the Zambesi into a place that, according to their perspectives, would be more inhabitable, more productive, and with a sustainable environment. For ZANU-pf, these foreign institutions provided a timely opportunity to reconsider the area as a safety valve for the unemployed and landless from other parts of the country.

Another government initiative implemented during this study sought to re-map the Zambesi Valley by changing place names from those associated with local lineages to labels holding no local meaning. For example, Chikafa was to become Ziwere (a swamp) and the MZP denoted new settlements with letters instead of place names. Some local people believed that the government wished to break their connection with their past, and their ties with their conquering lineage ancestors whose names demarcated the surroundings.

A serious drought struck the area during the 1991-92 growing season, shortly after the first effects of the MZP and CAMPFIRE began to be felt. At this time there was total dryland crop failure which meant that there would be no maize, millet, or sorghum to store for the following dry season. Vegetables and some maize grown in riverine gardens prevented famine, as did food aid, migration, the consumption of wild foods, and rationing within households.

The arguments within this study reflect a preoccupation with the central issues of domination, development, and drought in Dande during the 1990s. There is a long history of domination in the Zambesi by strong African polities such as the Munhumutapa State, Portuguese and British colonisation, the Rhodesian state, and in the 1990s, the Zimbabwean state in conjunction with foreign organisations. The

31

issue of domination is central to the thesis, as a concept for discussing structured relationships, such as those between the Portuguese and Africans, the Chikunda and their subordinate clans, and the state and the inhabitants of Dande. It is essential background to understanding the impact of development policies in Dande, and to how the people of Dande reacted to a severe drought.

The thesis is organised into nine chapters which both reflect the pre-eminence of the issue of domination and how it relates to development and drought. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical orientation through discussions of hierarchy, power, and change coupled with a debate on the nature of Chikunda group identity. Chapter 2 describes fieldwork methodology adopted in the context of disaster to illustrate how domination enhances the voices of some informants but diminishes that of others. Chapter 3 examines the motif of domination through a discussion of the history of Chikunda activity in the Zambesi, firstly within the Portuguese land-tenure system, then as conquerors of Dande, and finally as ruling lineages in Kanyemba and Chikafa. In Chapter 4 the theme of autochthony and conquest is adopted as a device to understand the differences in social organisation between the settlements of Kanyemba and Chikafa during the 1990s. Chapter 5 is an examination of the structure and role of the system of land spirits which underpins the power of chiefs and headmen. Chapter 6 interprets the involvement of Zambesians in the Independence War as a seminal act in which expectations of benevolence from the state were created to then be challenged by development and administrative practices during the 1990s. The last three chapters address the themes of development and drought by postulating that these constitute a form of social disruption providing both hardship and opportunity for locals depending on factors such as age, lineage affiliation, and gender. Chapter 7 argues that while development projects observed in the Zambesi Valley contained a discourse of individual and community empowerment, their application produced great social disruption through which people had to devise both their own opportunities and coping strategies. Chapter 8 discusses the serious drought of 1991-92 by examining responses to crop failure and ensuing illness, and describes locals' interpretations of its causality. Chapter 9 is an examination of a witchcraft accusation which took

place in the wake of the combined effects of development and drought. I argue that this particular case of witchcraft illustrates how the residents of Chikafa village understood the effects that political domination, in the form of development and central government administration, had on their individual lives and on their community.

Chapter 1: Domination, Development, and Drought: Some Theories

i. Centralised and Acephalous Societies: The Meanings of Affiliation

African society is often depicted in anthropology as fluid, open-ended, and oscillating between strong polities which exist for a time, and sets of descent groups who share a social space while there is mutual interest. In this view, polities are temporary and contingent on political and economic circumstances. They are very heavily based on idioms of kinship, with particular attention drawn to fluctuations between a centralised Chieftaincy and a dispersed rule by lineage elders. Centralised societies are characterised by a unified history, a strong Chief, the presence of autochthons in counterpoint to conquerors, and a powerful rain-maker. Acephalous societies are denoted by the rule of headmen, shallow and dispersed genealogies, many histories, and fragmented allegiances. There are a number of implications in this approach. For one, this argument suggests that the shape of polities is dependent on whether a leader can maintain a following and exact tribute. Also, in this dichotomy social identities are dependent on relations of power. In a hierarchical organisation with a powerful leader at its summit, names denoting affiliation will be important. But, in a circumstance of dispersed power, social identifications become more flexible as people strive to keep networks open.

In his collection, *The African Frontier*, Kopytoff argued that African society has historically been fluid with constant movement of people between, what he refers to as, the metropole and the periphery. In his view, a society with an official history which appears unitary and has an account of its beginnings, "is belied by the individual histories of its separate kin groups that show their ancestors coming from different areas at different periods" (Kopytoff 1987:5). In his view, African society is flexible because people were compelled to move toward the margins. These migrations were characterised by people moving in kin groups and in leader-follower relationships. The new polities constructed in the peripheries of larger states had a number of attributes such as a dual model of the legitimate authority of first-comers coupled with political control by latecomers, ruler-subject interdependence evidenced in royal ritual, and a degree of incorporation into pre-existing societies (Kopytoff 1987:17).

34

In a similar vein, Amselle in his book, *Au coeur de l'ethnie: ethnies, tribalisme et etat en afrique*, explained that the phenomenon of ethnic group was a creation of colonialism in order to "disarticulate", in his words, the existing relations between local groups. He suggested that pre-colonial African society was made up of four types of social space, called, "chains of societies", which delineated relationships between people. These were: fields of exchange; spaces demarcated by states, politics and warfare; linguistic spaces; and, cultural spaces (Amselle 1985:24). In his view, the periodic appearance of strong clans, such as those of the Chikunda, was related to a pervasive theme in African society: "that state and segmentary societies, far from corresponding to two types of societies, are nothing but the poles of an oscillating process" (Amselle 1993:25).

In his study of Tanzania, Feierman (1990) found a parallel between a strong state symbolized by the presence of a powerful rain-maker and political stability. But he also argued that homogeneity in African society was the result of the political and economic processes of colonialism which set out to achieve governable coherent groups. In effect, he argued that to grasp history, "the study of intellectuals, of their discourse and practice, leaves us with a strategy for dealing with the dissolution of a spatially coherent ethnographic object-the end of the 'tribe', the 'ethnic group', the 'ethno-linguistic community'" (Feierman 1990:34). Accordingly, he argued that politics in Tanzania took the form of an oscillation between powerful states in which a king or Chief passed the office down to his children and a fragmented system of sub-chiefs and headmen who were half-brothers or father's brothers whom he could not depose (Feierman 1990:92).

According to Lancaster (1974), centralised states in the Zambesi are characterised by the power of their rain-makers who have the moral authority of autochthons, unified histories, chieftaincy, a political hierarchy that extracts some form of tribute from the local populations, and strong group affiliations. Acephalous or decentralised societies have shallow genealogies, are ruled by a number of headmen, have competing histories, a profusion of healers who deal with local or domestic problems, and a diversified economy.

In my view, Zambesian society of the 1990s was the sum total of a number of

influential forces. After a quiet decade between the Independence War and the late 1980s, suddenly a great deal of foreign attention was paid to the area. The prevalent political style, characterised by an oscillation between centralisation and decentralisation, influenced how these populations confronted change. It was against this backdrop that residents of Chikafa and Kanyemba dealt with the arrival of development projects, the extension of the state, the influx of immigrants, and the distress and disruption of drought.

In the continuum between Zambesian centralised and decentralised social forms, Kanyemba fell closer to the former, while Chikafa was certainly nearer the latter. Characterised by both a strong longstanding Chieftaincy and a rigid social stratification divided into *marunga* and non-*marunga* clans, Kanyemba in the 1990s was the incarnation of a centralised polity. In contrast, the power-sharing arrangement between Chikunda and Korekore people in Chikafa meant that economic and political life was less controlled. These two forms of organisation, one characteristically dominant, the other fragmented, meant that each settlement managed development and drought differently. While CAMPFIRE consolidated *marunga* control of Kanyemba, the MZP further dispersed loci of power in Chikafa. As these two development projects took hold in the Zambesi, the drought brought with it new potential for social disruption or affirmation of existing structures. The encroachment of the Zimbabwean state into these two settlements was dealt with in Kanyemba by incorporation, and in Chikafa as conquest.

The trend toward centralisation in the Zambesi, with its monopolies and stratifications, created fertile ground for resistance. Forms of dissent depended on the degree of hierarchy and on mechanisms for social control. For instance, in Chikafa there was the opportunity for voicing opposition to the MZP and the state through the land spirit. But in Kanyemba, rather ineffective opposition to the *marunga* clan was voiced through localised lineage-based minor land spirits such as those representing the Korekore and the *tembo mvura*. It was also disclosed in confidential interviews to me. In centralised polities, the fragmentation of dissent is evidenced by the profusion of mediums and healers who deal with lineage-based or domestic problems.

The Zambesi of the 1990s was an exciting place in which to research and my

focus on the Chikunda people was fortuitous. If I had conducted fieldwork only in Kanyemba as initially intended, I would have missed rich comparative material gathered in Chikafa. The differences in the way Chikunda people lived in each of these settlements, their sense of the past, and their relationships with members of other clans provided an introduction to social and political organisation in the Zambesi during the 1990s.

ii. Domination:

Domination of a territory is often equated with a strong centralised state where there is a discernable political hierarchy which controls the economy and generates a justificatory set of ideas about the legitimacy of its supremacy. In this view, the opposite of domination is decentralisation in which power is fragmented, clans and other interest groups compete for resources, and ritual specialists do not make rain but, instead, deal mostly with individual affliction rather than questions of morality.

The theoretical opposition of centralised and decentralised societies provides an umbrella under which to consider the pervasive oscillation between autochthony and conquest that characterised so much of political discourse in Dande in the 1990s. The view that the oscillation between domination and freedom from political constraint is a longstanding theme in Zambesian social life is echoed by a noted Portuguese historian who hypothesised that, "the binary opposition of occupation-resistance monopolises the historiography of the colonisation of the Zambesi Valley in the 19th century" (Capela 1988:7).

The seminal act in the construction of a polity in the Zambesi Valley is conquest. For conquest to be successful, the incoming conquerors must appropriate land, install themselves and their lieutenants, marry local women, exact some form of tribute, and appropriate the rain-making function. Ideally, domination must be territorial, political, of the kinship system, of ritual power, and involve marginalisation of autochthons. In their discourse, both Chief Chapoto and rain-making land spirits describe their lineage's authority over their territories in terms of complete conquest. This issue is elaborated in Chapter 3 which is about the roots of Chikunda domination in Dande. However, conquest is an ideology of appropriation of

land and people generated by ruling clans to ensure their continued dominion. In Dande, once I heard the multitude of voices of my informants, I soon realised that in strict terms, no area had been completely conquered. For example, while in Kanyemba the Chikunda clan of *marunga rosario andrade* controlled the political structure and the economy, their land spirits had no rain-making power whatsoever, instead deliberating on issues of succession and administration. Similarly, a number of individuals disagreed with Chief Chapoto's ruling style and the position of the Chikunda ruling clan, but they had little opportunity to express their dissent.

In Chikafa, where the political structure was shared between Chikunda and Korekore and the economy more diversified, the land spirit was considered to be a powerful rain-maker. One interpretation of his power, and this is discussed in Chapter 5, is that in an area of diversity, land spirits provide a rallying point for communities. This thought can certainly be supported by the fact that there was a peak of interest in land spirits during the liberation struggle (Lan 1985), a period of weaker involvement after Independence, and then a resurgence of interest with the arrival of the MZP and the drought.

Domination of a polity is also dependent on a strong and enduring ideology of ruling clan legitimacy. In Kanyemba, the *marunga rosario andrade* clan promote an account of the past which depicts complete control over the office of chief stemming from conquest. *marunga* oral histories depict three lines descending from each of three brothers who originally conquered Dande. The rule of succession requires that the Chieftaincy alternate between the lines of the three brothers' descendants, but Chief Chapoto's line monopolised the role for half a century. The strength of a system of clan ideology is that it maintains a rigid hierarchy over time by excluding all other groups from access to political process and the economy. The drawback is that the ruling line is under perpetual threat from classificatory father's brothers. In Chikafa, a place of shallow genealogies, clan ideology was somewhat different and took two forms. First, the dominant Chikunda and Korekore groups enunciated stories of common arrival in the area coupled with economic alliance in the past. In some accounts the Korekore clan, the *nzou samanyanga,* is said to have accompanied the *marunga rosario andrade* to Dande, in others they were already there. Another notion

of clan is one promoted by the land spirit as a device to unite all local inhabitants under his influence. In chapter 5 I will describe how the idea of the pangolin clan, to which all human beings belong, is used as a way to build a sense of community.

Political domination is accomplished by appropriating means of representation and decision-making. In Kanyemba, all but one of the political positions was controlled by the Chikunda. The Chieftaincy was held by one line of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan, while the Village Development Committee and the Wildlife Committee were held by another line of that same clan. The non-Chikunda representative was *sabhuku* Chiyambo, headman of the *tembo mvura* people who lived on the marginal western side of the settlement. Judging by the lack of land and extreme poverty of his constituents, Chiyambo had very little influence in political process in that region. The Chief held a court in which he ruled in conjunction with six male councillors, all *marunga*, but of two different lines. The oldest and most vocal of these councillors was from the line contesting the Chieftaincy. Thus, political process was controlled by the *marunga* clan who excluded members of other lineages. Disputes regarding rule were kept within the clan which meant that important issues such as land allocation and access to resources remained outside of the reach of subordinate clans.

In Chikafa, political process was shared between the Chikunda and Korekore groups. The Chikunda headman and the Korekore Village Chairman held meetings together and shared decision-making. Both supported the land spirit, and both disliked the MZP. Various village committees were stacked with men from these two groups. The land spirit, Nyamanindi, his medium, and assistants were also all Korekore.

Economic supremacy is another way in which to dominate an area. In Kanyemba, the *marunga* controlled most of the fertile land which was situated on the eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River. They hired labour from the eastern side of the river, mostly the *tembo mvura* people, for very meagre payment in unground maize. Through their control of local structures linked to central government, such as the Wildlife Committee, they also managed to affect policies regarding access to resources. For example, at one meeting a *marunga* supported a proposal to erect a game fence which would further restrict the amount of land available to *tembo mvura*,

in one stroke, affecting their access to food and making them increasingly dependent on the dominant clan for maize.

In Chikafa, most land was owned by the Chikunda and the Korekore and, unsurprisingly, they had the highest yields of maize and other grain. Also, they owned the most domestic animals, particularly goats. Brick houses, denoting financial success, tended to belong to members of these two groups. Because they were long-term dwellers of the Chikafa area, their residential patterns in clusters of kin attached to the homesteads of senior men enabled greater success in farming. Most trade between Mozambique and Chikafa was also carried out by these two groups. Thus, up until the first effects of the MZP, the economy had been firmly under the control of Chikunda and Korekore people.

In Chapter 6 I will explore the attempts at centralisation by the Zimbabwean state and hypothesise that these increased its domination in the Zambesi. I will discuss my view that the Zimbabwean state aspired to consolidate its power during the 1990s by creating oppositions between autochthons and newcomers, developing a unified history which obscured regional stories, destabilising local economies through the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, and redefining the relationship between people and the state along kinship lines. Chapter 7 will explore the issue of development as a further extension of the state into the Zambesi.

In sum, domination involves conquest, an ideology of ruling clan legitimacy, control over political process, and a firm grip on the economy. In Dande, to dominate, the *marunga* did not need to control ritual. Instead the character of ritual life, whether an area is graced by a powerful rain-maker or a proliferation of weaker spirits, is an indication of method of domination. In Kanyemba, where the *marunga* clan had a monopoly on political process and the economy and appropriated control of CAMPFIRE, dissent was articulated through weak land spirits. In Chikafa, despite the power-sharing arrangement of the Chikunda and Korekore, their authority had been continually under threat until it began to be destroyed by the MZP in 1991. There, the rain-maker became quite powerful in 1992 when possession ceremonies were used as a means by which locals articulated their sense of ownership of land and relationship with each other in opposition to foreigners. Strikingly, these rituals also started to

40

express local disagreement with the MZP and national government.

These issues will be further developed in Chapter 3 with a review of the roots of Chikunda domination in Dande, Chapter 4 which presents an ethnographic account of the populations I encountered in Chikafa and Kanyemba, and Chapter 5 which discusses the cult of land spirits and the issue of rain-making.

iii. Rain-Making and Drought:

In the Zambesi, drought is a contingent aspect of the environment which occurs in cycles of 5 to 15 years. Serious drought producing famine, illness, and death occurred three times in the 20th century with the last episode having taken place during research for this study. In Zambesian cosmology, the occurrence of drought is construed as a symptom of disorder in the social world. If rain-making is related to power over territories and their inhabitants, then a drought can be interpreted as a weakening of the established order. Scholars have understood challenges to power in the Zambesi as "a dynamic tension between, on the one hand, the chthonic spirits and their mediums, and, on the other, the spirits of conquerors and their mediums; and this tension centres on who ultimately controls the fertility of the earth, the autochthons or the conquerors" (Garbett 1992:12). One explanation of the 1991-92 drought, which I explore in Chapter 8, is that it was the result of a breach of a moral contract which the people of Dande believed they had made with the guerrilla movement during the Independence War. In the possession ceremony discussed in that chapter, senior land spirits complained that after the war, President Mugabe had left the Zambesi full of "wandering spirits", and added that he should make the rain himself. In *Peasant Intellectuals*, Feierman drew a similar conclusion regarding the issues of power and rain-making when he suggested that the cultural notion of "harming the land", was associated with conflict between rain-makers rather than between peasants who had no power (1990; 80).

To inhabitants of the Zambesi, serious drought highlighted the ever-present oscillation between local and foreign sources of power, between autochthons and conquerors. The myriad responses of Zambesians to drought were interesting in that they addressed both the terrible immediacy of hunger as well as its cosmological

implications. When crop failure became imminent inhabitants found alternate ways to procure food such as migration, trade, and intensification of work in riverine gardens. However, as the scale of the drought became evident, Zambesians were led to question the integrity of the state they had supported during the Independence War. They felt betrayed by development projects which both exacerbated the effects of the drought, and were implemented without consultation. In local discourse, the perceived neglect by the state coupled with development schemes, particularly the MZP, were both spoken about as a challenge to the established order.

Chapter 8, which describes the serious drought of 1991-1992 by examining local reactions to hunger, social disruption and illness, culminates in a rain-making ceremony where the accepted moral order is examined by local inhabitants.

In a number of studies, rain-making power is equated with a strong polity in which one ruling clan holds firm control over a given area (Feierman 1990; Lancaster 1981; Garbett 1966). In contrast, in areas of weaker leadership, often exemplified by shallow genealogies, there will be a proliferation of lessor spirits who deal with individual illnesses and domestic matters but hold no greater ritual power. This dichotomy was reversed in Dande in the 1990s. In Chikafa, where political power was fragmented and people talked about ancestral home rather than lineage, the local rain-making land spirit could command huge audiences at possession ceremonies. On the other hand, in Kanyemba where the *marunga* clan had a firm grip on politics and economy, there was no strong rain-maker but instead a number of land spirits who catered mostly to their own clans. The answer resides, I think, with the different character of domination in each of these places, an issue I will explore in Chapter 4.

iv. Development:

During the 1970s, the Rhodesian government made failed attempts to cultivate cotton in the vicinity of Mushumbi Pools in Dande. According to informants this scheme was soon abandoned and had very little impact on the local population. It was not until the late 1980s that development projects, in the form of land resettlement and resource management, were again attempted by interests outside of the Zambesi Valley. In this study I will explore development as one way in which the state sought

to extend itself into the Zambesi Valley. For instance, the design of the MZP involved a further social fragmentation of the Chikafa area through its method of land allocation. Similarly, the model for CAMPFIRE proposed a devolvement of control over the environment to local communities, but in Kanyemba it served to solidify the established hierarchy and further impoverish the population. Chapter 6 and 7 will provide an in-depth analysis into the growth of the Zimbabwean state and the meaning of development for the inhabitants of Dande.

The Chikafa area was the recipient of both the MZP and CAMPFIRE, while Kanyemba was host to the latter project. The MZP was a land resettlement and villagisation scheme which aimed to move local populations away from rivers to plots of arable land which also included a small residential stand. The overall objective of the MZP was to encourage cultivation of cotton for sale in Harare. But by doing so it would also transform the economy from its base in subsistence agriculture supplemented with trade and wage labour to cash-cropping of a very laborious crop (see Appendix I). Another feature of this scheme was that it dissolved a long-standing residence pattern of relatives clustering around the homestead of a senior male, thereby affecting the source of political influence of established lineages. Furthermore, the MZP designated sacred areas and shrines for cultivation thereby sidestepping the loci of power of land spirits.

While the methods and design of the MZP constituted a massive disruption to social life in Chikafa for everyone, people from subordinate lineages and new immigrants believed that it also brought a wealth of opportunity for them. A great deal of local objection to the MZP came from the established rulers, the land spirits and the headman and senior males from Chikunda and Korekore lines. They disputed the threat to their position as leaders and majority landowners (see Appendix II). The rain-making land spirit, with whom they ruled, articulated their concerns in cosmological terms which prescribe procedures for the proper incorporation of newcomers into their areas. According to these rules, immigrants to Dande could arrive through marriage which meant they would compensate the bride's family either through brideservice or brideprice and thereby enter the established economy. If the settlers did not marry locally, they should enter into a *sabwira* relationship with a

family of long-term residents. Neglecting to fulfil either of these two criteria for settlement and incorporation into local society would constitute a threat to the community. In the rain-making ceremony depicted in Chapter 8, the land spirits articulated how the established powers construed the MZP as a conqueror and usurper.

The CAMPFIRE program was a resource management scheme whose purpose was to turn wildlife into a profitable concern for neighbouring settlements. By relinquishing their rights to hunt and fish with nets, local communities were to receive a portion of profits from hunting camps established for wealthy clients. These payments were to be used to build schools, clinics, roads and other infrastructure in local villages. While CAMPFIRE had little impact in Chikafa as there were few wild animals, in Kanyemba the scheme had a huge impact on both the ruling *marunga* clan, and the subordinate clans who experienced its drawbacks more fully.

While the MZP provided opportunities for members of less important lineages to acquire wealth and influence, CAMPFIRE served to further solidify the pre-existing social hierarchy.

v. Who Are the Chikunda?

The Chikunda clan of *marunga rosario andrade* played an important role in the political and economic life of Dande. Their rule of Kanyemba area was characteristic of a centralised society in which they controlled both political process and the economy, and had an elaborate story of arrival along with a strong clan ideology. In Chikafa, the Chikunda shared power with the Korekore clan of *nzou samayanga* but their monopoly was continually under threat from outsiders. The fact that the Chikunda could maintain its identity in both centralised and decentralised polities is worthy of exploration.

Throughout the past five centuries there existed in the Zambesi Valley groups of people who have been referred to as *vanyai, sipai, achicunda,* Chikunda, and *marunga.* The people I encountered in the early 1990s were organised into patrilineal clans who ruled both Kanyemba, and to a lessor degree, Chikafa areas. Chief Chapoto called the Chikunda a 'tribe' and said that they were the most powerful group in Dande because they had arrived by conquest. His oral history accounts depicted a century of

rule in Dande in which his particular clan, the *marunga rosario andrade*, took possession of Dande through force, subjugation of existing populations, control of the economy, alliance, and ritual. These issues will be discussed in depth in Chapters 3 and 4.

Chief Chapoto was in his eighties when I met him and suffering from respiratory illnesses. His imminent death would precipitate a heated succession dispute already brewing at the time of this study. His main concern was that the story of his branch, the descendants of Chihumbe, be recorded as the factual history of the Chikunda in Dande area thereby consolidating his sons' claim to the Chieftaincy. Understandably, Chief Chapoto wanted his life's work of decades of successful rule to be acknowledged and continued. At a glance, it seems hard to dispute the Chief's skill in governing the population through British, Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean rule, and in protecting villagers during the Independence War and their internment in the 'keeps' or concentration camps. However, a number of people in Kanyemba area disputed his version of accounts and the pre-eminence of his lineage. The descendants of two other branches of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan provided histories that agreed with the Chief's version of conquest and *marunga* supremacy, but disputed his line's claim to perpetual rule. Similarly, a number of descendants of subjugated clans who were long-term residents of Dande, while making no claim to the Chieftaincy, disagreed with Chapoto's version of the past, and by association, with the social organisation of their own community.

Internal disputes regarding the constitution of communities and the affiliation of its residents indicate a fragmented past. This is a fact which I think has contributed to the different perspectives of historians and anthropologists regarding the nature of Chikunda identity. While the former describe a clear social hierarchy and historical trajectory for this group, the latter argue that identity is fluid in the Zambesi and that the label 'Chikunda' is situational.

vi. An Historian's Perspective:

While this is not an historical study, I feel that it is important to review the work of historians as their insights inform my central arguments regarding the nature

of political domination in Dande. Discussion of Chikunda history in the Zambesi, particularly with regard to the nature of the Chikunda political unit, can lend insight into the ways in which hierarchies are created, maintained, and deal with challenge to their power.

The prominent historian, Allen Isaacman, considered the Chikunda to be a discrete group who were socially and politically organised in a distinctive way. Much of his work over the past thirty years pieces together a 400 year version of Chikunda history through his reading of Portuguese colonial record and analysis of oral history interviews conducted with elder male Chikunda. Although he does not prescribe a label to the Chikunda, he argues for their social cohesion over time through a variety of transformations in their social organisation.

Isaacman's thesis is based in the Portuguese land tenure system called *prazos da coroa*, installed in the 17th century, which contained a rigid social hierarchy of leaders, labourers, and warriors often referred to as *achicunda* or *sipais*. With the decline of the *prazos* in the 19th century, the Chikunda, who had acquired a social organisation and livelihood strategy as warriors, mercenaries, and traders struck out on their own as separate groups under strong leaders. Isaacman argued that the Chikunda were uniquely characterised in the Zambesi by their origins within Portuguese colonialism coupled with their ties to the African populations with which they made alliances of marriage and trade.

Isaacman's corpus of work suggests that a concept of Chikunda identity took shape during the long duration of the Portuguese *prazo* system. He believes that the social organisation within the *prazos* laid the foundation stone for a concept of Chikunda group identity. In a brief overview of Isaacman's arguments in his book, *The Africanisation of a European Institution* (1972), he described a functional *prazo* to include a number of distinctive features. These were: A Portuguese or mixed race overlord holding privileges and prerogatives formerly held by an African chief in a given area; an African population living in a traditional manner on the land-holding; a slave population which owed its allegiance to the landholder; theoretically fixed frontiers based on the historic boundaries of the indigenous unit before the arrival of the land-holding system; and, the existence of a contractual relationship between the

land-holder and the Portuguese Crown.

In this book the author suggested that, instead of remaining a new and alien form of social organisation in the Zambesi, the *prazo* system owed its longevity to its insertion into existing African polities. The author argued that *prazeiros* (landowners) behaved like African chiefs by organising labour, commanding armies of warriors, and marrying to form alliances. Several features, however, distinguished a *prazo* from a chief's realm. First, the objective of the *prazo* system was to produce commodities for sale on the international market which required the availability of a productive labour force. Secondly, this population had to be organised and supervised to labour in fields or mines. Thirdly, the boundaries of the *prazo* had to be protected from the expansionist ambitions of neighbouring *prazeiros*. The *prazo* system was socially complex, but its most notable feature was it could not function without strata of warrior and policing slaves, initially referred to in colonial texts as *achicunda,* who protected the interests of their Portuguese masters. Slave armies in the *prazos* were organised into regiments (*butaka*), each led by a *muzakambo*. They were further subdivided into squads (*nsaka*) led by a *tsachikunda* who was appointed by the *prazeiro* (Isaacman 1972:54).

The crux of Isaacman's argument for the consolidation of Chikunda corporate identity within the *prazos* rests with his contention that the social organisation of the regiment, where warrior slaves of various origins lived together, provided an opportunity to develop common interests. He suggests that factors such as fixed residence and isolation, mutual defence against the excesses of the *prazeiro*, struggle for collective rights and security, and day-to-day experience created a sense of common purpose amongst *achicunda* warriors.

The deterioration of the *prazo* system in the late 18th century provided an opportunity for organised Chikunda slaves to gain independence. The harsh climate, illness, inability to produce a surplus for export, endemic warfare, and a lack of administrative support from Lisbon took their toll on landowners. By the early 19th century *prazos* began to be transacted frequently either through the Crown or through straightforward military conquest. The notable feature of the early to middle period of the *prazo* system is that the efforts of *prazeiros* to maintain and consolidate their

control over their land-holdings led to marriage alliances with the families of local chiefs. Also, as the *prazo* system declined, the economy of the Zambesi became increasingly dominated by trade in gold, ivory, and slaves. Those who participated in this violent economy were leaders who could command groups of warriors. Regiments of slaves were first and foremost loyal to their *muzakambo* (Isaacman 1972: 40-41). Thus, the *prazeiros* who had inter-married with local African women became warlords whose means of livelihood resided in the control of trade. During this time some Chikunda remained loyal to their mixed race overlords, but others chose to escape military existence into a more informal life.

Isaacman (1972) suggested that from the mid to late 19th century Chikunda corporate identity was further consolidated when leaders and their warrior slave followers struck out on their own. Some groups of former slaves sought refuge with established indigenous chieftaincies such as the Manganja, Chewa, Tawara, and Nsenga, while in other instances "autonomous bands of 5-10 men, probably the remnants of Chikunda *butaka*, retained their corporate identity" (Isaacman and Rosenthal 1988:229). Other groups remained close to Portuguese towns, such as Tete, offering their services as tradesmen, and above all, as hunters and warriors to local merchants who wished to expand their trade networks (Isaacman and Rosenthal 1988:230). It was with the growth of the ivory trade, however, that groups of Chikunda warriors developed a strong sense of group cohesion. Ivory "provided the economic basis of a unique but temporary autonomy in the history of Chikunda relations with the merchant and land-holding community of the interior. This window of freedom between the eras of slavery and state-sanctioned forced labour gave many Chikunda the opportunity to forge their own destiny" (Isaacman and Rosenthal 1988:230).

According to Isaacman's analysis and my own oral historical data, these men are the ancestors of the ruling *marunga* clans I encountered during the early 1990s. The *marunga rosario andrade* are but one among a number of these clans. In Tete province I was told that a number of areas were ruled by clans such as the *marunga disuza, marunga desfrip* and others.

In sum, Isaacman's arguments for a clear and defined Chikunda identity hinge on a notion of late 19th century clan structure dependent on success in trade, hunting,

and the appropriation of land by leaders. He gathered oral histories from senior Chikunda males who, in the disruption of civil war in Mozambique during the 1960s and 1970s, may have found it opportune to emphasise the importance of their own affiliations.

While Isaacman's erudite arguments for a clear and defined Chikunda identity certainly resonated well with Chief Chapoto's accounts, and to a large degree complement my own ethnographic work, I also accept that these have been disputed by scholars of the Zambesi whose primary focus has been ethnographic. Chet Lancaster, for instance, has argued that identity in the Zambesi is fluid, and that ethnic labels are situational and often defined by the primary occupation of a given group. This interpretation of identity finds common ground with accounts I gathered from members of non-ruling lineages in Kanyemba and Chikafa. It seems peculiar that Africanist scholars should arrive at seemingly opposing conclusions which leads to me to suspect that they have examined different aspects of the same issue: the nature of group affiliation in the Zambesi Valley.

vii. An Anthropologist's Perspective:

In his analysis of populations in the Gwembe area of the Zambesi Valley, Lancaster contended that "the changing ethnic labels they have applied to themselves and to others at varying times have been symbolic statements relating to empirically verifiable facts of history, habitat, social structure, and politics" (1974;709). He first conducted fieldwork in the 1960s in the wake of the enormous displacement caused by the building of Kariba dam. The population he encountered were of mixed origin, many were recent arrivals in the area, and others could only recount shallow genealogies. In his survey of 209 respondents regarding their ancestral home, Lancaster found that 80% were from the Zimbabwean highlands, and 20% from the eastern part of the Zambesi Valley and Mozambique (1981;16).

From an ethnographic point of view, his field site very much resembled my own at Chikafa: subsistence agriculture with some trade, a ruling lineage whose legitimacy could be construed as tenuous, a population of diverse origin who tended to move around, and a matrifocal/brideservice ethos losing ground to brideprice and

neolocality. In terms of political organisation, Lancaster's comment that Zambesian settlements were composed of two realms, a chiefly realm and a number of subsidiary realms also made sense with regard to my own research. He observed that the chiefly realm contained the homestead of the chief and his councillors, and a ritual area with spirit huts and a sacred grove. The subsidiary realms he depicted as headed by sub-chiefs and composed of kinsmen, former slaves, and trade associates who had clustered together. These residential clusters also included land shrines which "provided a hierarchy of appeal through which the inhabitants of allied spirit realms could seek ritual protection" (Lancaster 1981:129). Thus, these land shrines provided a form of social and political organisation to what were really a disparate group of people sharing common residence.

With regard to Chikunda identity, Lancaster hypothesised that the label simply referred to Africans associated with the Portuguese. He said that, "the Chikunda were never a tribe in any strict sense" (Lancaster 1974:722), but instead people living in areas frequented by the Portuguese who became their followers and with whom they engaged in trade.

The disparity between Isaacman's view of the Chikunda group and Lancaster's cannot be explained away as differences in the orientations of their two disciplines, or even of their methodologies. I find it unsurprising that Isaacman would argue for a 400 year old Chikunda ethnic identity since his work is primarily based in Portuguese colonial archives, which contain reports of life in the *prazos*, as well as first hand accounts of dealings with Chikunda warriors and traders[1]. Also, his interviews with Chikunda elders in Tete, Mozambique yielded genealogies ascending into the 19th century. I also obtained similar data of established lineages who had maintained rule over specific areas. In contrast, Lancaster formulated his arguments based on ethnography conducted in an area of recent migration where no entrenched rulers

---

[1]The published works of Father Dialer, Magalhaes e Solla and Carl Wiese provide depictions of Chikunda activity in the Zambesi.

existed and no significant change had occurred to challenge or modify ongoing social organisation[2].

The very different forms of social organisation in Kanyemba and Chikafa provided clues to the differences in Isaacman's and Lancaster's orientations. Kanyemba provided a case study of entrenched social hierarchy, discussed in depth in Chapter 3, where the conquering clan had ruled since the late 19th century. There I obtained both deep genealogies, as well as strong opposition to Chief Chapoto. In Chikafa area, although all the headmen were Chikunda, and Chikunda elders widely respected, there existed a diversity of clans and most people could only depict shallow genealogies. Perhaps these authors' seeming opposition was based on two sets of observations of the same populations living in the same type of social system, but at different times.

It seems that each of these authors observed different poles of a local political system in the Zambesi which oscillates between a strong Chieftaincy, legitimated by an idiom of conquest which supports the ruling clan, and weak leadership in which group affiliations shift and appear undetermined. The former circumstance is characterised by long genealogies, definitive stories of conquest, claims of long-term residence, and ritual control. The latter instance includes shallow genealogies, undefined notions of ancestral home, weak claims to land, and disinterest in ritual. There are a number of reasons for this oscillation. One possible interpretation is the dichotomy Lancaster (1974) makes between centralised and non-centralised societies.

viii. Summary:

In this first chapter I have introduced domination, development, and drought as the three central issues of this study. Domination has been framed in terms of conquest, a strong ideology of clan, rain-making power, economic supremacy, and political control. The two development schemes, as experienced by residents of Dande, had a multi-faceted influence. For instance, in Chikafa these schemes challenged established hierarchies, particularly that of the land spirits and the headmen who serve them, and

---

[2]For example, new churches, development projects, or other foreign influences.

thus provided opportunities for individuals and families who had been previously disenfranchised by that system. In Kanyemba, CAMPFIRE was administered by the dominant *marunga* clan who used it to further marginalise the *tembo mvura* clan and reinforce their entrenched dominance. With regard to the power of state government, in Chikafa where local leadership was weak, both development and new committee positions precipitated a further dilution of power. In Kanyemba, despite the succession dispute, the power of the *marunga* clan was such that they managed to both keep dissent within the clan as well as appropriate control of the development scheme and state-derived committee positions. In sum, development was disruptive in Chikafa, but reinforced the entrenched rule of the *marunga* clan in Kanyemba.

The availability of scholarly accounts of the Chikunda, both historical and anthropological, provides in itself a compelling reason to adopt this group as a case study of social life in the Zambesi. However, transformations of their social and political organisation over time also illustrate an oscillation between compliance with domination and resistance making this population especially useful in understanding life in the Zambesi Valley in the 1990s. In this chapter I have argued that the Chikunda provide a good case study of the three pervasive issues in contemporary Zambesian social life. Particularly useful is Lancaster's (1974) thesis that acephalous societies tend to have fluid social structures in order to keep networks open, while centralised societies present with ethnic groups whose affiliations and loyalties are prescribed.

The following chapter is about methodology and will include discussion of fieldwork in the context of drought and social disruption. I thought it would inform this account to articulate some of the issues of fieldwork in an environmentally challenging setting at the periphery of the Zimbabwean state.

Chapter 3 reviews Chikunda domination in the Zambesi, describes the arrival of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan in Dande and its subsequent conquest of the area.

Chapter 2: Methodology:

"He was always comfortable in someone else's landscape, enjoyed being taught the customs of a place."

Michael Ondaatje, *In the Skin of a Lion*

i. Chikafa and Kanyemba: Fieldsites and First Encounters

The objective of this study is to convey an understanding of how processes of domination affected the life of inhabitants of the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s. To this end I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Chikafa and Kanyemba, two settlements of contrasting political and economic organisation. Chikafa was characterised by power-sharing between two dominant lineages, a varied economy, and a population of diverse origin. Kanyemba was the seat of a longstanding Chieftaincy which consolidated power within a dominant clan, had a subsistence economy, and a population organised into a rigid social hierarchy.

The principal challenge of working in the Zambesi during the 1990s resided with unpicking mechanisms of political and economic control while also listening to discourses of resistance and compliance. The application of development projects and the occurrence of drought intensified attempts at control and created new ways to resist the established order. People spoke and acted in many new and confusing ways during my time with them. For instance, it came as a surprise to me when a spirit possession ceremony ostensibly to make rain turned into a protest of the Mugabe presidency. For me, this was a time to be on high alert, both intellectually and physically.

The Zambesi is a harsh place at the best of times. The rainy season is muddy and miserable, and the dry season is desolate and suffocatingly hot, especially nearer the rains. The roads were terrible and the drive from the plateau into the escarpment nerve-wracking. It was a place with no phones or well-supplied clinics, no electricity, and not much personal security in the face of serious threat. During the drought, it became the home of hunger, hardship and distress for nearly everyone, particularly the marginalised.

But the Zambesi was also a place of great resilience and courage. People,

whose everyday lives were challenging even in the best of years, mobilised to deal with changes brought by land resettlement and drought. And so, after the initial shock had worn off, I saw my role as an attempt to record aspects of continuity and change in that very interesting, very emotionally involving place.

I first visited the Zambesi Valley in March of 1992, but eventually moved to the area in June of that year. My first fieldsite was in Chikafa where I stayed between June 1992 and June 1993. At that time there was a serious drought and I did not find the social and physical environment I had come to expect from reading previous studies. Not only were people continuously hungry and anxious about the immediate future, the social activity of regular years was greatly disrupted. With no rainfall, there was little farming to do, and thus the flow of social life associated with the agricultural calendar did not take place. For example, the return of relatives to help with harvesting was delayed. Because the local Manyame River, a tributary of the Zambesi, was reduced to a few pools, there was little fishing that people could do. The absence of a dryland crop of maize meant no beer-making rituals to propitiate the ancestors. Thus, funeral and other ceremonies which involved the brewing of beer from locally-grown maize were delayed until the next harvest.

The drought was also a time of temporary emigration to the plateau where Zambesians looked for food and work. Several homesteads in the area lay empty while others were occupied by the very old. In some households people remained to wait for drought relief and hoped for remittances from departed family members.

In the midst of the drought I soon realised that the conditions depicted in David Lan's book, *Guns and Rain*, my inspiration for the study, had changed substantially. While key concepts in his analysis, such as the myths of arrival, kinship relations, and the role of land spirits remained as he saw them, people's relationship with the environment and the state had changed, precipitating a cascade of new ways and ideas.

In contrast, my second fieldsite, Kanyemba, at the confluence of the Zambesi and Mwadzamutanda Rivers, was almost exactly as I had come to expect from the literature. It was a heavily forested settlement of dispersed clusters of households organised around the homesteads of male lineage elders. There was a Chief who owned brick houses and a granary full of maize. He was attended by councilors and held a Customary Law court. My first informants described deep genealogies, and

there seemed to be clear and longstanding group affiliations. Chief Chapoto was welcoming and accorded me a number of interviews. He recounted an elaborate story of his ancestors' arrival in the area which he embellished as time went on. In contrast to Chikafa, Kanyemba appeared orderly and people's lives reassuringly predictable. After the jumble of Chikafa, the appearance of a defined social organisation, though hierarchical, was soothing to me. I hoped this fieldsite would be easier to study.

Kanyemba turned out to be a challenge. The long distances between homesteads often meant hours of walking in the heat of day. Because the settlement lies between two national parks, the profusion of wild animals required knowledge of their habits and much vigilance. Also, the quite veneer of life-as-usual soon gave way to the conflicts of the succession dispute. Finally, the more people I met, the more I heard stories of dispossession and marginalisation.

Kanyemba and Chikafa were both complicated fieldsites, but in different ways. This ethnography of the Zambesi encompasses the contrast between these two places and thus presents a story of domination and resilience.

I take ethnography to be "a research process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records, and engages in the daily life of another culture-an experience labelled as fieldwork method-then writes accounts of this culture, emphasizing descriptive detail" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:18). Ethnography is, then, the written product of the relationship between the ethnographer and her informants. It is also a statement about the way in which the anthropologist has understood the political and economic context in which her informants live. Ethnography represents a moment in time, depicted in a text which situates research findings in historical and theoretical context.

ii. Methods:

Since I could speak neither Chikunda nor Korekore, my first task in the Zambesi was to find a field assistant. This proved to be a fraught process as the first person I hired did not have a good grasp of the Chikunda language and we eventually disagreed about the job at hand. My second assistant, however, was the making of this study. The friendship I made with him was the most important relationship I had in the field. September Shereni acted as translator, companion, teacher, and occasionally,

nurse. He was instrumental in my acceptance by the local people. As well as interpreting the life ways of the locals to me, he also explained my peculiarities to them. September, was well-educated but unemployed, and struggled to reconcile the world of the village with the global world he had learned at school. He was educated by Catholic priests from Canada at one of Zimbabwe's best-known mission schools. When we first met I was surprised to find that I had travelled to Zimbabwe thinking I knew something of the Zambesi, only to find there someone who knew even more about where I came from

September and I did most of the research for this study together. In the mornings we conducted an interview, reviewed the previous day's notes, paid a visit, attended a meeting or walked to the fields and gardens. In Chikafa, he would go home to his mother for lunch or else cook *ntsima* (thick maize meal porridge) at my house. In the afternoon we repeated the pattern of the morning. If there was a spirit possession ceremony during the night, then September accompanied me. Through him I met many of the young people in the village, including his best friend who knew about medicinal plants, iron-work, hunting, fishing, and many other activities. It was through their concerted efforts that I finally managed to gain a working knowledge of the Chikunda language. I mastered greetings, learned to ask questions using the present tense, and acquired a sense of the accuracy of translations.

When we moved to Kanyemba, September's workload increased. Our interview schedule was much the same as in Chikafa. We lived in tents, and so it became his job to do the household chores in the evening while I organised the day's notes. Kanyemba settlement is 140km from September's home area. Although he belonged to the ruling Chikunda clan, he really did not know anyone very well and, for once, we were in the similar position of 'outsider'[1]. In September I was fortunate to have found someone whom I could trust to be thorough and meticulous in our work, and who understood that the main job he would do for me was to interpret between my world and theirs.

---

[1] September belonged to the *marunga rosario andrade* clan, his father was a Chikunda born in Kanyemba, but who lived in Chikafa.

I conducted household surveys of Chikafa in 1992 and 1993, which was before and after the drought. The first survey was very difficult as people were hungry and not particularly interested in discussing livelihoods or life-histories. It was also awkward attempting to draw people on strategies they used to cope with the drought. Survey I illustrated very much how locals experienced drought as a suspension of normal life. At that time one informant told me that people in Chikafa could not give the drought a name as they were still thinking about it. He said I should return later (at an unspecified time) to ask the same questions. Survey II was done a year later once it had rained and there had been a harvest. In this instance, people were happy to discuss the previous year. My surveys contained background information regarding household composition, clan and sub-clan affiliation, livelihood, and religion.

The interviews I conducted fell into three categories: oral histories; lineage and life-course interviews which included recording of genealogies; and, queries about a particular subject (for example, metal work, the spirit world, healing, and making canoes). These interviews were usually conducted at the informants' homestead and over a time of about two hours. I asked questions in English which were then translated by my assistant. Questionnaires were organised according to themes and consisted of open-ended questions. As I grew to understand more of the Chikunda language it became possible to discuss informants' responses with my assistant according to, for example, their use of a particular key term, the tone with which they answered questions, or tactics to avoid discussing certain subjects.

Both villages researched were multi-lingual. In Chikafa predominant languages were Korekore which is a variant of Shona, and Chikunda. Locals also spoke English, chiZezuru, chiChewa, and chiNyanja. Villagers who lived in a nearby settlement in Mozambican territory also spoke Portuguese. In Kanyemba, the predominant language was Chikunda, but all of the above-mentioned languages were also understood. Initially I spoke English and Portuguese with informants, but eventually learned to speak rudimentary Chikunda which was enough to appear sociable and important to set a friendly tone for interviews. In addition to attempting spoken Chikunda, I recorded a lexicon in that language relating to the environment and social practice.

Initially I explained to Zambesians that my study was about the history of the

area and about the Chikunda people in particular. Through observation of my daily pursuits locals started to form an idea about the work I was aiming to do and, slowly, the names of individuals who knew about the past or held particular specialised positions in the area began to be mentioned in conversations. It was then expected that I would visit these people for an interview. At the same time I also attended rain rituals, spirit possessions, drought relief distribution meetings, village meetings and other gatherings. With time, locals began to invite me to their homes to learn about such activities as beer-making, basketry, healing, iron-work, for meals, and for no reason other than to visit.

The serious drought of 1991-92 caused me to revise the aim of this study. From a primary focus on oral history, settlement patterns, kinship relations, and political structures, I shifted attention to circumstances precipitated by the drought. Because of the extent of the drought, it coloured almost every aspect of the lives of my informants and caused me to shift inquiry almost exclusively to their immediate preoccupations. For instance, instead of oral history, people discussed the relationship between the MZP and the lack of rain.

Although I was more than willing to interview any willing participant, prior research experience with Portuguese immigrants in Montreal led me to seek out individuals who would not readily come forward. While headmen, local politicians and senior women made themselves heard, the elderly poor, younger women, and men from subordinate lineages had to be sought and drawn out. The importance of their voices in a study about political and economic domination cannot be overstated.

Adopting a fieldwork method where the researcher gains knowledge by following the lead of local subjects is often referred to as participant-observation. The term 'participant-observation' is odd because it connotes a state of being close enough to the observation to understand it but far enough to be objective. In an interesting piece, Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) compared the work of anthropologists with that of psychiatrists by suggesting that each discipline had a propensity to translate human experience, for example suffering, into its own categories which, at the same time, reproduced the discipline and neglected the subject. These authors contended that a shortcoming of ethnography was that it participated "in this professional transformation of an experience-rich and -near human subject into a dehumanized

object, a caricature of experience" (1997:170).

The Kleinmans were interested in the issue of individual suffering which they had encountered in their fieldwork in China. They argued that the inclination in anthropology to categorise suffering as role, strategy, or symbol belonged to the same moral dimension as the way in which psychiatrists produced "pathologizing reconstructions within biomedicine" (1997:170). In this way, both disciplines delegitimised the experience of the subject.

I liked the Kleinmans' approach because it lent voice to the suffering I encountered in the Zambesi. This suffering shattered my preconceptions about the field and humbled me as a researcher, and in so doing taught me to follow informants and engage with them on their time and in their terms. To illustrate this approach, these authors suggested that, *"experience* may, on theoretical grounds, be thought of as the intersubjective medium of social transactions in local moral worlds. It is the outcome of cultural categories and social structures interacting with psychophysiological processes that a mediating world is constituted. Experience is the felt flow of that intersubjective medium" (1997:170-171). In this view, the knowledge that a researcher gains through experience in the field is, "both a cross-sectional slice through the complexity of ongoing priorities and a part of the temporal flow of changing structures of relevance" (1997:170). The result is that an ethnographer can only describe a local moral world, "for which the relative validity of observations must be regularly recalibrated" (1997:170).

In adopting subjective experience as the central concern of ethnography, Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) attempted to modify a number of orientations in anthropology. First, they argued that the basic question of research should be "what is at stake?". Responses to this question would be experience-near (local categorisations) and much more relevant to ethnography than discipline-generated categories (1997:171). Second, they suggested that, "the ethnographer's focus move back and forth" between the experience-near perspective and the historical and cross-cultural viewpoints which showed pattern (1997:172). This movement would mirror more closely, "the dialectical structure and contingent flow of lived experience than reductionist ways of knowing which by definition distort the existential conditions of life" (1997:172). Third, these authors submitted the "idea of experience as an

interpersonal medium of mediation" (1997:190). By this notion these authors meant to shift notions of experience from the idea that it is something which an individual or a collective 'has' to the concept of "an interpersonal medium shared by, engaged in, and also mediating between persons in a local world" (1997:189). Thus, in my understanding of their argument, Kleinman and Kleinman indicated that experience occurs between subjects, and that it is experience which constructs further experience, like two mirrors each reflecting the other's reflection endlessly.

In short, the thrust of the Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) position resided with two key ideas: first, that the researcher allow the informant to outline the parameters of his or her world (i.e. experience-near categorisation); and, second, that the ethnographer accept that data obtained is the result of a mediated interaction with informants hinging on the issue of what is at stake for each party.

It would have been possible in both fieldsites to conduct questionnaire-driven research, where the object of inquiry would be preset by the author. There was a good chance that politeness would ensure a response from informants. However, as an anthropologist I new that local knowledge was the point of the exercise. Besides, with development schemes, the influence of the state, and their own local hierarchies, the Zambesi in the 1990s was full of structures which told individuals who they were and what to do. My task, as I saw it, was not to reify those structures which were so visible that even a foreigner could see them, but instead to achieve an understanding of how people responded to them.

One particularly gratifying aspect of research was the interest that Chikunda informants took in my Portuguese background. Members of the *marunga* clan, who claimed descent from Portuguese colonisers, were especially welcoming as they explained that we shared a similar background. Chief Chapoto even went so far as to suggest that we were related because he and my father shared a given name. No member of the *marunga* clan refused to speak to me about history, genealogy, politics, or livelihood.

Chikunda individuals interpreted my Portuguese origins in a number of ways. First, it was a way to be white different from that of the British whose colonial presence was fresh in the minds of Africans. Also, in Chikunda cosmology, the Portuguese were ancestors who married Africans and inter-related with them in

mundane ways, such as sharing food, and speaking a common language. Mozambicans I encountered spoke Portuguese as their own language, often as fluently as their African mother tongue. A phrase commonly repeated to denote the closeness between these two groups was that "the Chikunda walked with the Portuguese".

In the context of the succession dispute in Kanyemba, members of the *marunga* clan were only too happy to instruct me in their version of history. Chief Chapoto saw me as a conduit for his accounts and, by association, his line's continued claim to the Chieftaincy. In retrospect, the symmetry of a person of Portuguese background writing about a Chikunda Chief probably warmed his heart.

Ready acceptance by those in power certainly made research in Kanyemba easier; however it also sounded alarm bells with regard to those whose voices were silenced. While I interviewed many *marunga* clan members, I also sought out others who had different, often opposing, accounts of life in Kanyemba.

iii. Oral Histories:

Oral histories are a discourse-based exercise in which the informant recounts stories regarding his or her own life experiences and interprets the collective history of his or her social group. In a society in which knowledge is transmitted through conversation and oratory, there is large scope for gathering information through the analysis of narrative. Oral histories also tell a story of power in which dominant groups have a monopoly over the past, and the subordinate are silent. In Kanyemba, the Marunga clan shared an account of conquest, but the two lineages competing for the Chieftaincy each held their own versions of the order succession since that time.

There are a number of points which bear examination regarding oral history interviews I conducted. First, in their stories, many informants juxtaposed personal time with societal time. For example, one female informant related her age to me by stating that she had small breasts when the current Chief came to his position. Secondly, informants related cyclical with linear time. In one instance, an informant said that it had become increasingly difficult to grow maize on the riverbanks as the flooding level of the river had progressively dropped with each passing year. In a place where most of the older people held no identification papers and owned no

calendars, the only way they could satisfy a western request for chronology was to establish relations between events in their own society.

In the Zambesi, members of important clans were concerned with unified accounts of the past in which the relative positions of all characters were clearly described. For example, the key theme of Chief Chapoto's story of Chikunda conquest of Dande is the supremacy of the *marunga* clan, followed by the importance of his own lineage ancestor in the early days of settlement. Similarly, senior members of the *marunga* clan who claimed descent from the two other conquering brothers also had elaborate tales of the past which favoured their own claim or the Chieftaincy. Members of subordinate groups were not concerned with long genealogies or detailed accounts of the past, a fact which reflected their politically position in the settlement.

The historian, Trouillot, argued that people exist in three capacities with regard to history as a social process: "1) as *agents*, or occupants of structural positions; 2) as *actors* in constant interface with a context; and, 3) as *subjects*, that is, as voices aware of their vocality" (1995:23). This analysis provided a helpful way to frame the types of oral histories I gathered. Furthermore, it also helped to avoid dichotomies such as those between old and young, powerful and weak, men and women, and other structural features which might make sense to the researcher but were not overly important within the social context of the research.

Another important attribute of oral history research is the relationship between authority and silence. An interesting idea is that the association between history and power is expressed in what is said and in what is silenced (Trouillot 1995: 23). Similarly, it is interesting to contemplate the idea that silence permeates a collective history by entering the process of historical production at four moments: at *sources*, when facts are created; in *archives*, when facts are assembled; in *narratives*, when facts are retrieved; and, in *history* which is retrospective significance (Trouillot 1995:26). With regard to the issue of silence in Dande, the stories of the powerless lineages were virtually absent from these four features of historical production. For instance, the Dema people whose clan is the *tembo mvura* feature in the Marunga accounts of arrival in Dande, but their own version of their past does not feature in local collective history.

Researchers have perpetuated these pockets of silence in the history of Dande

by neglecting to search out individuals who might generate accounts which are discordant with the versions of collective history espoused by the visible and confident members of dominant clans. To be fair, it is partly a matter of luck whether one is able to find a willing and vocal member of a subordinate lineage. Also, the history of influential clans and lineages may predominate because the subordinate do not care about the past as it is an instrument of their own subordination. In other words, "the value of the historical product cannot be debated without taking into account both the context of its production and the context of its consumption" (Trouillot 1995:146).

In Dande, for an historical account to predominate, it had to fulfil certain measures of credibility within a lineage, a clan, or a community. In Kanyemba, the *marunga* story of conquest was promoted as official history because it suited those in power. But in Chikafa, where two lineages shared tenuous power, it was the land spirits who held monopoly of the past. Following this logic, an attack on the discourse of the *mpondoro*, or simply neglecting to attend possession ceremonies to listen to him, would signify a challenge to his version of the past, and by association, a repudiation of the social and political order he represented.

For both the Chikunda and the Korekore, chieftaincy was usually accompanied by the support of mpondoro who declaimed an account of the past in which the chief's lineage and the accomplishments of its real and mythical ancestors predominated. But even in the case of Chief Chapoto, who had lost the support of the local Chikunda *mpondoro*, the position of Chief held enough authority for his views of history to carry weight locally[2]. It is reasonable to raise the criticism that ethnography can rely too heavily on the voices of those in authority. At the same time, it is also a practicality of fieldwork that the researcher must, in a sense, work with the hierarchy and appear to pay lip service to it. For this reason, I conducted seven interviews with Chief Chapoto in Kanyemba. On the one hand, he was the Chief of the area and even his enemies agreed that it was right and proper to speak with him. On the other hand, by virtue of his age and position, he could recount a history of the area

---

2

Chapoto was a descendant of Chihumbe, while the *mpondoro* represented Kanyemba who has been Chihumbe's brother in life. Chihumbe's *mpondoro* had no medium in the 1990s. The dispute over who would succeed Chapoto hinged on a tussle between the descendants of Chihumbe and Kanyemba.

which included the major events since the Second World War, even if his own position in these predominated. One methodological consideration I had to bear in mind was that, because Chiefs in Zimbabwe can enforce Customary Law, Chief Chapoto would have been in a position to implement his own views which would then be passed on as fact. Thus, in his recounting of past events, the debate which had led up to final judgments could be obscured from the final account.

It was because authority was blatantly confined within the three lineages of the dominant *marunga rosario andrade* clan, that I sought out informants of other clans and lineages in order to learn their views. In this case, the silence was deafening. While non-*marunga* had been politically and economically marginalised, their history had also been obscured. Interestingly, I also found that the way in which people from these subordinate clans staked their claims locally was not by creating a sense of their own clan, lineage, or interest group identity, but rather by aligning themselves behind one of the *marunga* factions involved in the contention of the moment. Thus, during the succession dispute, no non-*marunga* made a claim for political power, rather many of these people supported Chief Chapoto's opposition. Some did so by citing a version of local history which argued that the Chief's rule was illegitimate. I found the relationship between the ruling *marunga rosario andrade* clan and subordinate clans and lineages to be that of patron-client. This idea is supported by the fact that, to my knowledge, no interest groups had emerged outside of the political arena dominated by the three *marunga rosario andrade* lineages. Even in circumstances of great threat to livelihood, such as the persistent geographical and social marginalisation of the *tembo mvura* clan (the Dema people) by the Chikunda, there arose no organised opposition.

Silence stands in counterpoint to a discourse of oppression. A master narrative will cloak other narratives which, through their own invisibility both support the dominant view and negate themselves. For this reason, in obtaining Chief Chapoto's account of history in the context of an ongoing succession dispute, I also set the groundwork for searching out dissent. That Chapoto obscured the position of the follower lineages that live in Kanyemba indicated a tacit admission of their potential threat to his position.

In the Zambesi, the subordinate often used the opportunity presented by their

social invisibility to participate in an alternate ritual life. Although, this may look like resistance, it was also a way of coping with a demoralising condition of social inferiority. An example of these alternate behaviours was the increasing participation in the newer churches appearing in the Zambesi Valley. Whilst the longer established Catholic and Anglican churches allowed for participation in the cult of land spirits, these newer churches did not. In other words, they presented alternate belief systems separate from those which existed previously and, thus, a chance at a different life.

In striving for alternatives to the established social order, the disempowered, in effect, attempted to re-organise their positions within it. Whilst chiefs, *sabhuku*, and *mpondoro* declaimed history from the standpoint of the established power structure to which they belonged, the participation by the weak in other orders was their attempt to be "linked to differing concepts of the person, of the cosmos, of morality" (Bloch 1996:220).

In such a society, the relationship between visibility and invisibility depended on much more than economic and political oppression. For a relationship of dominance and subordination to have existed for as long as it has done in Kanyemba area, there has had to be a degree of complicity between the Marunga and their subjects. Given the longevity of the social order in that area, it can be argued that "power does not enter the story once and for all, but at different times and from different angles. It precedes the narrative proper, contributes to its creation and to its interpretation" (Trouillot 1995:29-28).

By recording the thoughts of a variety of individuals regarding their circumstances and place in local collectivities, I hoped to build a window into their present. The past is not a monolith but rather the "variety of narrators is one of many indications that theories of history have a rather limited view of the field of historical production. They grossly underestimate the size, the relevance, and the complexity of the overlapping sites where history is produced, notably outside of academia" (Trouillot 1995:19).

iv. Fieldnotes:

Although access to informants is of primary importance, it is from fieldnotes that ethnographies are written. After the immediacies of the field have receded and

when there is nothing left of the experience but memory, the quality of fieldnotes becomes of primary importance.

The possession of fieldnotes is the proof of 'having been there' and the justification for positions taken in texts produced post-fieldwork. The idea of a fieldnote seems quite straightforward, yet as Lederman (1990) suggested, they are a 'bizarre genre' part both of the doing of fieldwork and the writing of the ethnography. She suggested that there existed no established models for fieldnotes (1990:72). Also, that fieldnotes were "not a fixed repository of data from the field but a reinterpretable and contradictory patchwork of perspectives" (1990:90). Thus, in thinking about the position of fieldnotes in the anthropology, it is helpful to keep in mind that these are very personal, not least because each researcher must often devise his or her own method of note-taking. Also, since fieldnotes record and represent a particular context, they cannot be read without invoking that circumstance. At the same time as fieldnotes are a source of authority, they are also like floodgates which once opened inundate the researcher with a combination of memory and recording characteristic of ethnography.

I organised my fieldnotes occurred in two steps. First, there were the notations made by hand in the field, recopied and revised in consultation with my assistant. These reflected the day's work. Once in London, I typed and organised these notes into neat folders. This post-field classification was the first step in acquiring a sense of the data outside of the field and an attempt to gain control over a body of very diverse data.

It can be argued that what one understands from fieldnotes changes over time. The original notes of interviews written on cheap yellowing paper encrusted with dead insects and smelling of a campfire certainly evoked different thoughts to those of the version typed on clean white paper. In my case, recopying of notes took place within a context of discussion with fellow students, and of further reading of anthropological texts. The more I learned of the world outside of the notes, the more meanings and possibilities I saw within them.

Other types of fieldnotes I took included a daily journal which reflects more obviously the pattern of my data collecting, a plant catalogue, lists of songs, recipes, language notes, maps, aerial photographs, and photographs of people and the physical

environment.

v. The Issue of Ethnographic Authority:

The issue of ethnographic authority has implications not only for the anthropologist who is concerned to translate her field experience, but also for informants who told their stories also in hopes of representation. Therefore, it is important transpose what happened in the field into an authoritative text to be read in the outside world.

Traditionally there have been two ways in which anthropologists assert their authorial control within the texts they write. The first is 'having been there', and the second is disappearing from the narrative (Moore 1994:112). To be credible an account must contain a metaphor of travel in which both the ethnographer and the reader can pass from their familiar home world, in which they are ignorant of the other, into a situation of foreignness (usually abroad) where knowledge would be acquired (1994:113). In order to fulfil these disciplinary requirements, the anthropologist had to create a stable self in order to depict stable others (1994:116-117).

Another way to assert one's authority is by depicting access to informants as successful and almost unproblematic. Although many ethnographies discuss the issue of access in broad terms, very seldom does one read about problems in making contacts, even when these problems are beyond the control of the researcher. It is unfair that methodological impediments can be transformed into intimations of personal incompetence. My reality in the field was that problems with making contacts, obtaining access to informants, coping with physical and emotional hardship, fending off danger, and ultimately making a few good friends engaged a sizable amount of my time and energy. In researching the Chikunda I encountered obstacles which were beyond my control. Initially I felt overwhelmed, confused, and frightened. Loss of control, often in the form of a sense of loss of self is intrinsic to fieldwork in harsh settings and is part of the process of gaining knowledge. I do not think that it detracted from my authority as an ethnographer, but rather informed it. For this reason I argue that, along with theory, survey methods, audio-visual skills, and other fieldwork methods, students should be prepared for the psychological realities of conducting fieldwork abroad. Post-colonial settings are full of natural disaster, war,

hunger, disillusionment, and aggression. These are the hurdles the anthropologist has to overcome and the conditions which the discipline needs to acknowledge because hardship is the everyday reality of societies which young anthropologists are sent to study.

vi. Working in Disaster:

Many events take place during fieldwork which both deter from the goal and enrich the account. In the instance of this study, it was often difficult to separate one from the other. I think that few young anthropologists who have grown up in relative comfort in places safe from hunger or fear can be prepared to apprehend a field situation of disaster. In his book, *L'Ecriture du Desastre*, the writer Maurice Blanchot described the encounter with upheaval: "Le *desappointement* du desastre: ne repondant pas a l'attente, ne laissant pas faire le point, l'appoint, hors toute orientation, fut-se comme desorientation ou simple egarement" (1980:81).

As Blanchot described, confronting a situation of disaster is very disorienting for the observer. He or she may feel betrayed and alienated by it. My first contact with the drought in Chikafa village in 1992 left me bewildered and confused. And once I had a certain amount of time to apprehend the extent of the situation and the impact it was having on people, I felt profound shame. I thought that I had no place as a witness to the suffering of others and no business making a subject of upheaval of that magnitude.

Remaining in a fieldsite where there is disaster is not an obvious choice. During those first few months in the Zambesi, I created many reasons to leave. For example, one night I became convinced I had contracted malaria and promptly rushed to Harare for treatment only to have the symptoms disappear upon arrival in the city. My problem then was the belief that I could endure neither the dignified silence of people who were hungry, nor their hopelessness at having their livelihoods at the mercy of forces beyond their control.

Encountering a fieldsite where there is disaster is disorienting almost to the point where the reason one stays is because of ambivalence as to what to do. I cannot explain why I did not abandon fieldwork, except to say that once one comes to know people who share what little they have, then it is almost impossible to leave. Persisting

in a circumstance of disaster takes place almost by default. During my first few weeks in Chikafa, each day that passed brought me further into their world and farther away from my own.

How can one justify anthropological research in the context of disaster? First, I believe that interviews and conversations with informants provide a helpful opportunity for people to display their knowledge, and by extension, regain a sense of self. In the case of the older people whose traditional positions of influence and power were challenged by a younger generation, they welcomed the chance to have their say. Second, my own feelings of displacement heightened my empathy with informants and contributed to the creation of a comfortable space where they could make their disclosures.

By considering the drought to be more than the sum of economic policies, natural disaster, and inadequate relief distribution, and seeing it for the human tragedy that it was, I allowed myself to better understand how people coped and recovered. When the first rains fell the morning after an all-night rain ritual in November 1992 and people rushed out of their houses with hoes and sticks to scratch at the earth, I could see that their actions meant more than a willingness to grow food. Rather, these were an affirmation and a hope that the world was back on course.

For me, the Zambesi was a setting of huge contrasts. While some days were spent in cracking boredom, others brought so much new information that I felt overwhelmed and fantasised about adopting simpler research questions, such as fishing methods or classification of types of maize. In a field situation of great sensory stimulation, especially hunger and distress, where one attempts to account for every new piece of information just because it might be important, the temptation to simplify in order to cope is a dragon that must be slain on a daily basis. Deference to the ethnographic context in the form of the courage to truly listen is, I think, perhaps the key to telling a more representative story in which the ethnographer avoids playing into the hands of dominant groups.

In "The Third Space", an interview with Jonathan Rutherford, Homi Bhabha discussed the avoidance of hegemony by listening to the multiplicity of voices in an encounter with the 'other'. He argued that encounters between people constitute an intersubjective reality in which:

"The articulation of cultures is possible not because of the familiarity or similarity of *contents,* but because all cultures are symbol-forming and subject-constituting, interpellative practices".

(Rutherford 1990:210).

He suggested that translation is "a motif or a trope...for the activity of displacement within a linguistic sign" (Rutherford 1990:210). In other words, languages are structurally disposed to convey shifts in meaning. For this reason he stated that cultures: "are only constituted in relation to that otherness internal to their own symbol-forming activity which makes them decentred structures" (Rutherford 1990:210). Thus he made way for the possibility of the concept of *Third Space,* which he suggested: "displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom" (Rutherford 1990:211).

In Bhabha's argument culture does not lend itself to categories. Instead, it is about constant change of ideas and practices through intersubjective acts of communication. For culture to exist thus requires "a non-sovereign notion of self" (Rutherford 1990:212), an idea which is not dissimilar to the erosion and reconstruction of self anthropologists experience in the field

The idea of the 'Third Space' is attractive because it is not proposed as a psychological, social, or geographical space separated from the continuity of social life. Instead, it is a notion about the process of culture-making, about the normality of a contingent self, and about the abstraction of a mythical cultural destination ever-receding with each intersubjective encounter. The avoidance of *a priori* labelling is a humanist approach to the other because it allows for the possibility of renewing an understanding of things previously known. Kingsley Garbett, Chet Lancaster, and David Lan wrote inspiring accounts of the Zambesi which played a large part in my decision to work there. But in the 1990s, conditions were different, and I had to understand the place anew. I found the sort of approach which Bhabha espoused to be both natural and gratifying because it permitted me to know the Zambesi and my informants on our own mutual terms.

70

Chapter 3: The Roots of Chikunda Domination: The Making of Kanyemba's House in Dande

i. An Introduction to the *Marunga Rosario Andrade* Clan:

Conquest and domination are important issues in this study because they help to interpret the patterns of social life in the past that have shaped the way in which Zambesians understood and dealt with change in the 1990s. The Chikunda provide a good case study of domination in Dande area because of their long-term control of political process and economy. In this study, they stand in counterpoint to other clans and lineages that were less well-structured. The key to Chikunda supremacy was their social organisation. The Chikunda I lived with in Chikafa and Kanyemba were organised into two strata: the *marunga rosario andrade* clan composed of three lineages who ruled; and, a number of subordinate clans of shallow genealogy who claimed origins from a variety of ancestral areas.

Chikunda hierarchy enabled three crucial circumstances which consolidated the group's power. First, the Marunga clan always ruled a centralised polity, a fact which allowed them to control trade and exact labour or tribute. During the 1990s, they used this hierarchical approach to monopolise political process and to control the local committees who administered the CAMPFIRE scheme in Kanyemba. Secondly, Chikunda hierarchy facilitated alliance with other powers. Those who the Chikunda could not subjugate they made their allies, especially the presence of the state in the Zambesi. For example, the *marunga rosario andrade* clan was well connected with the Portuguese during the late 19th century as was evidenced by the fact that its leader, Jose do Rosario Andrade held the *capitania* (Portuguese regional administration) of Zumbo, a town at the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambesi Rivers. When the Portuguese Crown and the British South Africa Company formed administrative boundaries during the 1890s, the clan split with Jose do Rosario Andrade (also known by his African name of Kanyemba) moving into Portuguese territory, and Chihumbe, the elder brother staying within designated British land. Chief Chapoto harnessed the potential of Chikunda social structure to maintain friendly relations with the successive regimes of the British Crown, the Rhodesian state, and the Zimbabwean state. For instance, he acted as administrator for the British and provided labour when

it was demanded. He also worked with the Rhodesian District Commissioner during the Independence War to mediate the tenuous relationship between the population and the pressures exercised by both the guerrilla movements (ZANLA and ZIPRA) and the Rhodesian forces. In the 1990s he accepted the Zimbabwean state, adjudicated with the local police, and even compared President Mugabe with Kanyemba the conqueror. The third feature of Chikunda monopoly is the fact that their strong leadership could command a compliant following which enabled the acquisition of tribute, and the ability to provide labour for the state. The ability to command a population has been a feature of Chikunda leadership during the duration of *marunga* occupancy of Dande.

Together with their monopoly of resources, the Chikunda liked to accentuate their higher status as *marunga* through social markers. In the numerous stories I gathered for this study, the clan term '*marunga*' was associated with legitimate conquest of the area, long-term residency, relative wealth and power. The language to indicate superior rank was articulated in local clan histories which alluded to alliances and experiences with colonial power, particularly that of the Portuguese.

In a general sense, *marunga* status was heightened by the assertion that exclusive membership was available only to clans associated with *azungu ntsuwa* ancestry ('whites of the islands'). The story of *ntsuwa* identity sheds some light on the position of Chikunda clans in the Zambesi at the end of the 19th century. Before the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam east of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, there existed a number of islands on the Zambesi River populated by Chikunda clan chiefs. These were individuals of mixed Portuguese and African ancestry who acted as middlemen between Mozambican coastal exporters and local populations who produced trade goods. Of note was the *marunga* monopoly in trade of elephant tusks, particularly as it provided the context for the establishment of a relationship with the Korekore clans now known as the *nzou samanyanga* (elephant, keeper of tusks). This association was quite strong during the 1990s when the Chikunda headman in Chikafa shared rule of the area with the Korekore Village Chairman. Livingstone (1857) mentioned having stopped on these islands whilst crossing from the north to the south shores of the Zambesi River and acknowledged the control which island leaders exercised over traffic there.

A number of *marunga* individuals liked to distinguish themselves from other clans by their Catholicism. In the 1990s, most members of this clan supported both the Catholic Church, as well as a land spirit. Unlike newer churches such as the Faith Apostolic Mission or Jehovah's Witnesses, the Catholic Church did not prohibit participation in local spirit-based forms of belief. This is an unsurprising fact as the Catholic Church first arrived in the Zambesi in the 1500s. Its survival is undoubtedly due to a co-existence with other forms of worship. For example, in Chikafa, the son of a Chikunda headman would occasionally preach at Sunday Mass. In Kanyemba, Chief Chapoto went to lengths to indicate his pious belief in the Catholic Church. On one particular occasion he crossed himself and bent his head theatrically in prayer before a meal. Also, past generations of Chikunda boys of the *marunga* clan traditionally attended the Catholic Miruru Mission in Mozambique.

Historically, the Chikunda have been associated with the Catholic Church through the Portuguese land-tenure system. The *prazeiros* of the past were Catholic and a number of *prazos* had been owned by Dominicans and Jesuits. In an article about the famous Chikunda diarist Jose Fernandes Jr., Leisegang (1991) described his baptism at the age of twelve as a type of initiation. He wrote that Chikunda boys could be called *muzungu* after their baptisms and that "baptism must have been considered as a form of initiation to the world of Europeans" (Leisegang 1991:5). But during the 1990s, in the face of social change brought by immigration and development, it is possible that Catholicism became another aspect of local identity harnessed to denote long-term residence and, therefore, greater claim to land and resources.

Portions of the Chikunda lexicon, terms of address, customs, and even personal preferences associated with the Portuguese were considered indicators of high *marunga* status. A number of nouns in the Chikunda language derive from Portuguese, for example, the word for 'sweet potato' is *mbatata* (from the Portuguese word for 'potato') in contrast to the Korekore term *bambaira*. Chikunda greetings are also in Portuguese. For example, the Chikunda would instead say 'Bom Dia' (good morning) in the Portuguese way, whilst the Korekore morning greeting is 'marara sei?' (How have you slept?). Food preparation through extra refinement of flour, and longer cooking hours for fish was also depicted as of higher status. Finally, professed

preferences for saluting (in the way of Chikunda soldiers) instead of African hand clapping, and for perceived Portuguese foods such as tea and biscuits, can be interpreted as an allusion to notions of a preferential relationship between colonial powers and *marunga*.

Lineages subordinate to the *marunga* clan in Kanyemba liked to recount stories of their ancestors' association, as soldiers and hunters, with a *marunga* leader. In doing so they reiterated their position as collaborators in the original act of conquest of Dande, rather than as conquered people. In effect, these people wanted to position themselves as allies of the Chikunda power rather than as either *kaporo* (slaves) or autochthons, both of whom are the classificatory conquered. The Chikunda name derives from the verb *kukunda* (to conquer) and thus conquest is important as a marker of group identity. For the non-*marunga*, the importance of historical identification as *marunga* followers resided with a greater claim to land, resources, and marriage partners during the 1990s. This approach to history was an attempt to limit marginalisation by the all-powerful *marunga clan*, and to participate, in perpetuity, in the spoils of conquest.

In order to better situate the Chapoto chieftaincy I encountered during fieldwork and to understand how the *marunga* clan came to conquer Kanyemba and rule Chikafa, it is useful to examine the tradition of Portuguese colonialism from which they emerged.

ii. Portuguese Colonisation of the Zambesi: The *Prazo* System and Slavery

In comparison to the extensive Portuguese domination of the Zambesi over the past five centuries, the Chapoto chieftaincy in Kanyemba area seems insignificant. However, Chief Chapoto's style of rule, and his clan and lineage's affinity with domination all had their roots in early Chikunda history. Important features of contemporary Chikunda social life such as their two-tier social hierarchy, their propensity to subjugate, and ability to collude with state-level power are entwined with oral histories depicting a privileged closeness with the Portuguese. A number of informants reiterated the saying, "the Chikunda walked with the Portuguese" to denote this special relationship. In this section, I will discuss the relevance of the *prazo*

system, the issue of slavery, and early relations with African populations to provide a background for later discussion of the ethnographic data I gathered.

The Portuguese encountered the Munhumutapa State during their first incursions into the Zambesi and found that the Mutapa controlled a number of tributary chiefs and a state-level polity with a system of communication and an army. The key moment of early Portuguese colonisation of the Zambesi was the Barreto expedition of 1569-75 in which Muslim plantations and settlements were occupied and the Karanga Chief ceded tributary Tonga chieftaincies. By the early 17th century Jesuits and Dominicans were awarded lands. By 1629 the Munhumutapa ceded sovereignty to the Portuguese Crown. This concession of power by entrenched Zambesian authorities was good news for Portugal, except that it did not have the resources to rule these vast conquered areas. In order to maintain a degree of influence, the Portuguese Crown turned to established Afro-Portuguese families and their private *chicunda* armies. While hiring these armies seemed a useful way to sub-contract control, it turned out to be a double-edged sword for the Portuguese. At the same time as the *prazeiros* fulfilled their military contracts with the Portuguese Crown, they also reinforced their own strength by using their newfound legitimacy to extract tribute from local populations. The Portuguese tacitly authorised this system of land acquisition because the *prazeiros* paid their soldiers in women captives and trade goods. This pattern of effective conquest by the *prazeiros* took the form of forcibly invading a chieftaincy, gaining permission form the Munhumutapa to settle, then petitioning the Crown for title to the area. Because it served the Portuguese Crown's interests, these titles were granted (Newitt 1995:218-221).

The Portuguese Crown applied three legal models in its attempts to stake out land in the Zambesi. In effect, these were attempts to attract Portuguese settlers to what was a very harsh climate for Europeans. The first model was that of the *sesmaria*, which consisted of rights to vacant lands granted under the principle of emphyteusis or inheritance through the female line for three generations. These grants were usually made to female relatives of Crown servants as a form of dowry in a system where the monarch performed a parental role. The objective of this system was to encourage Portuguese settlement by attracting couples to these land grants who would makes

attempts at economic development.

The second type of grant was that of the *capitania* (captaincy) of an area. In this case, grants were made to the head of a local Afro-Portuguese family who was given the title of captain. In return he was required to raise taxes, administer justice, and undertake defence. The benefits to the recipient were seigneurial rights over the land, and the position to create trade monopolies. These grants were also hereditary. Jose do Rosario Andrade, the conqueror of Kanyemba area who installed the *marunga rosario andrade* clan there, was made *capitao-mor* of Zumbo in the late 19th century. The third legal model of land concession was basically administrative in character. It applied to land title in the form of grants of villages made to religious orders in order to support a Crown office in their jurisdiction (Newitt 1995:223).

Although these legal models seemed to indicate that the Portuguese Crown had a measure of control over areas claimed under its name, and could collect taxes, their effect was the opposite:

> "The huge extent of the *prazos*, the length of the leases, and the fact that they involved control over a subject peasantry all combined to frustrate these intentions and reinforce the feudal relationships of the Afro-Portuguese families with their clients and peasants on the one hand and with the Crown on the other".
>
> (Newitt 1995:225)

Considering that the *prazo* system lasted almost 400 years, from its formalisation in 1646 when a letter from the King of Portugal to the Viceroy of Mozambique described the system of emphyteusis, to the early 20th century, there was plenty of time for *prazeiros* to develop a social organisation to maintain power over subject populations. To this end three overlapping systems of authority were devised for the *prazos*: in the first tier there would be the *prazo dona* (lady by title who held rights by emphyteusis) and her family who provided services to the Crown, kept *chicunda* soldiers, paid a quit-rent, developed land, received tribute and labour, and performed chiefly duties to the settled African population; in the second tier, there were the *colonos* or free population whose leaders were *fumos* (headmen) and paid *mussoco* (tribute) in grain, ivory, or gold dust; in the third tier, there existed the regiments of soldier slaves referred to as *achicunda* who supervised labour and defended the *prazo* against attack

(Newitt 1995:232-234).

The consolidation of a Chikunda identity began on the *prazos*. *Prazeiros* acquired large amounts of slaves "through various clientship arrangements which might involve the exchange of labour service for the eventual acquisition of cattle or wives" and thus encompassed people in a relationship of "reciprocal obligation" (Newitt 1995:234). With the need both for protection and internal policing of the peasant population, *prazeiros* created the category of soldier slave. These slaves, or *chicunda*, were organised along military lines and lived in regiments in defined areas in the *prazos*. They had a chain of command at the pinnacle of which stood the *prazeiro*, followed by a *mocazambo* (captain), a *sachikunda* (deputy), and then the soldiers. Newitt argued that a strict hierarchy provided the opportunity for the *chicunda* to acquire a strong identity where, "they came to see themselves as attached to a particular *prazo* rather than a particular *senhor*, and as a result it was crucial that whoever was granted a *prazo* should be able to establish control over the *chicunda*" (Newitt 1995:235).

There were many factors which bound *achicunda* to particular *prazos* and patrons, including protection from further enslavement, the opportunity to acquire wives, a role in trade, and a position of relative power to other slaves and to the established peasant populations. At the same time, the fact of living in a defined form of social organisation over long periods of time also provided ample opportunity for the creation of group interests not always in agreement with those of their *prazeiro* patrons. As we saw in Chapter 1, there is debate regarding Chikunda group identity and cohesion, however it is undeniable that the importance of *chicunda* regiments within the *prazos* increased over time, not least because they were needed both by the *prazeiros* to protect their interests, and by the Portuguese to further theirs. The relevance of the *prazo* system to contemporary Chikunda people is that it contributed to the social organisation I encountered in which chiefly *marunga* clans controlled subordinate follower and conquered lineages.

After a history of warfare and economic failure, the *prazo* system saw its demise in the early 20th century. The final blow to the power of the Afro-Portuguese *muzungu* was dealt by legislation enacted in 1890 in Portugal, "embodying a

comprehensive restructuring of the *prazos* and with them the whole colonial administration of central Mozambique" (Newitt 1995:365). By these laws *prazos* deemed to be pacified (in other words, where there was no political turmoil and no warfare) were to be leased for 25 years, a specified amount of land was to be cultivated, and half of the tax collected had to be in the form of labour obtained from the resident population. It was the intention of the Portuguese government that the colonial administration of Mozambique would become more systematised and that this would bring about economic development. Under this new legislation production within the *prazos* would pay for the new infrastructure of rule. The historian Malyn Newitt speculated that these laws aimed to encourage settlement, but instead most land concessions were granted to commercial companies. For example, "in the Tete district 126 out of the 134 *prazos* were leased to the newly-formed Zambesia Company" (Newitt 1995:367). In effect, at the beginning and at the end of the *prazo* system the Portuguese government attempted legislation of the colonial policy without having the means to enforce it. At both times, Portugal needed to form local alliances, in order to attempt to government their dominions.

While the structure of the *prazo* system alludes to contemporary Chikunda hierarchies, an examination of the issue of African slavery goes to the heart of conquest and subjugation in the Zambesi. In a broad sense, the Chapoto Chieftaincy articulated both *marunga* historical ease with hierarchy, and its ideology of social control. It is these issues which I explore with regard to slavery.

As a theme, slavery is very broad, but in the Zambesi it is related to two overarching preoccupations of the incorporation of strangers and their exclusion. In the 1990s, informants defined *akaporo* (slaves) as people who had no one to bury them. In other words, without kin, *akaporo* stood alone in the world. *Akaporo* did not have blood or uterine relatives, and they did not have the *sabwira* relationship essential to a proper funeral and burial ceremony. Fundamentally, to my informants, the denomination of 'slave' was synonymous with classificatory outsider as it connoted a human being with no history and no residence, who was essentially situated outside of time and space. In their minds, *kaporo* (slave) was the opposite of *muntu* (person). Thus, the term '*kaporo*' denoted relations of clientship, subjugation, and social

exclusion practised within the Zambesi over the time of Portuguese colonialism, and certainly within the duration of *marunga* settlement in Dande.

During the 1990s, Zambesians were greatly preoccupied by issues of social incorporation and exclusion. Clan, lineage, and the locally-used term, 'tribe', functioned as labels to situate individuals in a community. The cult of land spirits also described many more mechanisms of incorporation than of exclusion. For example, newcomer families who were readily welcomed by their neighbours could perform the beer rituals that allowed them to build a homestead and acquire a *sabwira*. Men were accepted if they paid the required brideprice in instalments, the preferred method in the areas where I worked as it entailed an ongoing relationship of obligation to the bride's family. I also noted instances of temporary adoption of distant members of families in Chikafa during the drought of 1991-92. These arrangements often involved children who performed household services in exchange for food and shelter. There were also patron-client relationships of various types ranging from seniors mentoring and providing opportunities to the young, to families placing girls with a local shopkeeper as maids during the 1991-92 drought. That these young girls provided domestic and sexual services to the shopkeeper, in an arrangement similar to that of wives, resonates with the practice of wife capture practised in the Zambesi in the past. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the ultimate form of inclusion in the Zambesi was when individuals, households, lineages or clans became members of the pangolin clan.

Witchcraft stood in counterpoint to the cult of land spirits because witches represented disorder and affliction. Witchcraft was the premier instrument of exclusion and, as a rule, always emanated from within the collectivity. Thus kin, neighbours, and newcomers could all be targets of witchcraft which mediated where a person stood on the continuum of *kaporo* and kin. Unsurprisingly, within the kin group, affines were potential sources of witchcraft. Affines were, by definition, perpetual newcomers, and considered to be dangerous. Members of clans and lineages who were ranked as latecomers to the area were also in danger of becoming targets of sorcery. Also, recent arrivals in Chikafa and Kanyemba ran the risk of witchcraft accusations in times of stress, especially if their clan names were foreign. In Chapter 9 I will describe one such incident which played out the distress caused by the

combination of the MZP the drought of 1991-92.

In their everyday discourse, Zambesians spoke of *akaporo* as the hopelessly excluded. However, these categorical statements must be tempered with the knowledge that I researched during a time of stress when social structures were under threat from immigration, political and economic changes, and drought. During the 1990s, to label others as *akaporo* became a shorthand for social exclusion and legitimation of marginality. Its use was also a clue to me of the pressure which the succession dispute in Kanyemba, and drought and development in Chikafa had placed on inhabitants.

However Zambesians perceived the issue of *akaporo*, attention should be paid to the issue of African slavery because it provides insight into Chikunda clan identity. Miers and Kopytoff (1977) argued that the difference between slavery as a lineage affair and an inferior status determined social mobility. In their view, slaves absorbed into a lineage by a relationship akin to marriage, would experience greater affective closeness, kinship integration, and a possible privileged position. Also, these slaves could assume the demeanour of members of their new households such that outsiders would find them indistinguishable. In contrast, the slave acquired to fulfil a particular structural position within a society might develop common allegiances with other similarly placed people rather than with the household to which they were attached. Social mobility would be enacted differently in these two circumstances. In the first case, there was the possibility of freedom for slave children, whereas in the second case, a disturbance of social rules might have been necessary.

African systems of slavery are concerned with the issue of rights-in-persons. In slavery, "such phenomena as kinship, adoption, the acquisition of wives and children are all inextricably bound up with exchanges that involve precise equivalences in goods and money" (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:11). There were a variety of ways in which people became slaves. For example, there was the practice of voluntarily placing oneself under the patronage of a powerful person in times of strife such as war or hunger. During the 19th century, individuals joined Chikunda warlords by enacting a ritual called *mitete* in which the candidate demonstrated his subjugation by breaking a worthless possession belonging to the patron and, thus symbolically placing himself

in debt. Additionally, individuals were given in compensation, became kidnapping victims, and were captured in wars and raids. In places of social upheaval such as warfare and drought: "Political and social power rested with those who could command a large number of kinsmen and dependents, whether clients, followers, or 'slaves'" (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:14). The Afro-Portuguese *prazeiros* were well aware that the acquisition and maintenance of large numbers of slaves, primarily *achicunda* warriors, strengthened their economic and political power.

In African systems of slavery, the key issue in the resolution of individuals' marginality was their incorporation into a society. The initial status of a newcomer would be dependent on how they arrived in the new society and on the position of their patron. Over time, marginality could be reduced in three dimensions. These were based on the newcomers' formal status, informal affective relationship with masters, and worldly achievement and success (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:19). The amount of social mobility experienced by a slave could, thus, represent their degree of incorporation into the receiving society. If a person had been acquired by a lineage, then "their position in its hierarchy reflects a balance between their authority as members and their vulnerability as wealth" (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:24). In the case of women slaves, their value often resided with reproduction for their master's lineage. If the new society was patrilineal, then the woman slave might be married or enter into a role of concubinage with the master or a male member of his lineage. Her role would be to have children for the master's line, a situation in which no bridewealth would be transacted. In these cases her children would belong to the new lineage and might be accepted on par with children of free mothers. Where the master married off the female slave, he would receive the bridewealth paid for her. If the new society was matrilineal, the slave woman's children also belonged to her master as she would have no kin to make claims on her progeny. In either case, a reduction of marginality could be achieved by female slaves becoming kin through their children (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:29-32).

In essence, Miers and Kopytoff (1977) argued that slavery in Africa had its origin in kin-based societies where a primary objective of acquiring individuals was to broaden a lineage. This conclusion is the point of debate with Meillassoux (1986) who

contended that exploitation of members of one's own lineage (into which reproducing slaves enter) is incompatible with a functioning model of kinship. Whereas Miers and Kopytoff (1977) argued that slavery and kinship exist on a continuum, Meillassoux asserted that these were two separate realms which could not inter-relate in ways where one would cause the perpetuation of the other.

In the first chapter of his book, *Anthropologie de l'Esclavage* (1986), Meillassoux was at pains to demonstrate the difference between kin and slaves. He believed that the impetus to slavery was not couched in the need to broaden a lineage or support base of retainers, but instead in economic reasons which made renewal of productive individuals more attractive by capture rather than through reproduction. He distinguished between social and biological reproduction by comparing the role of the male outsider in both patrilineal and matrilineal societies. In patrilineal societies the social and biological roles of father coincided in that for a man to be a father, he only needed to be the husband of the children's mother (Meillassoux 1986:30). However, in a matrilineal society, a man's social role as a senior male hinged on his relationship with his sister's children. In this case:

> "L'homme etranger ne peut remplir de *fonction* reproductrice que s'il est,
> lui aussi, apparente, accepte comme 'pere sociale', c'est-a-dire s'il recoit
> de ces hotes la capacite formelle de reproduire ou d'etendre les
> structures-plutot que les effectifs-de sa communaute d'accueil".
> (Meillassoux 1986:30)

In this case, a man in a matrilineal society may become a father only if he is incorporated through marriage. Simple biological reproduction is not enough in these circumstances. In a way, I think that Miers and Kopytoff (1977) neglected to make two essential distinctions: that between blood and uterine kin; and that between social and biological reproduction. As a result, their thinking became focussed on manumission through biological reproduction rather than through achievement of social position.

In a chapter on children of mixed slave and free person unions Meillassoux addressed a series of ideas relevant to the problematic of Chikunda clan identity. After deliberating on the various combinations of possible unions between slaves and receiving societies, he concluded that mixed marriages could result in the creation of independent lineages which would exist side-by-side with established lineages. He suggested that the liminal position of new slave-founded lineages enabled them to

fulfil ritual and administrative functions within the larger society (Meillassoux 1986:133). Additionally, the principle of "monolineal succession" permitted the constitution of a new social strata, neither slave nor free person, perfectly situated to carry out essential bureaucratic and ritual roles by virtue of a structural seniority with relation to other outsiders in that society (Meillassoux 1986:135-136).

The relationship between the rigid social structure promoted within Portuguese *prazos* and the African approach to slavery was crucial in the development of Chikunda clan identity in the Zambesi Valley. There is a strange symmetry between the position of powerful slaves on the *prazos* during the 17th and 18th centuries, and habits of conquest and subjugation during the 19th century. But rather than argue that the *marunga* clans who live in the Zambesi today have their origins in the *prazo* system, I will instead submit that the *prazos* simply provided the conditions for the creation of corporate identities based on power and mediation.

Specifically, if the *prazos* provided the conditions for the creation of an *achicunda* (warrior-slaves) corporate identity, then African slavery practices, which the *prazeiros* put to use, contributed to its logic and meaning. For instance, the issue of incorporation and exclusion of foreigners to polities was a very important aspect of *marunga* clan identity in the 1990s where Chapoto embraced the Zimbabwean state but excluded the *tembo mvura*. Similarly, the concept of former slaves who create new independent lineages specialising in bureaucracy and ritual also resonated with the position of Chief Chapoto who displayed ambivalence between his alliance with the state from which he had traditionally derived his power, and the local population with whom he lived.

In sum, the *marunga rosario andrade* clan I encountered in the 1990s embodied a duality of influences through their clan ideology of exclusive corporate identity and experience of oscillation between subjugation and alliance with others. In a sense, their everyday life was a performance of their origins where, "l'esclavage, meme lointainement herite, meme tempere par le 'sang' des francs, nourrit une ideologie puissante de discrimination et d'arbitraire" (Meillassoux 1986:138).

iii. Chikunda Migration to Dande: The Cultural Logic of Conquest

Historians place Jose do Rosario Andrade as *capitao-mor* (Portuguese administrator) of Zumbo town during the late 19th century, and describe him as a warlord of note who controlled numerous *prazos* along the Zambesi River. However, he was also known by the African name, Kanyemba, and in Chikunda oral history, is considered to be one of three brothers belonging to the *marunga rosario andrade* clan who conquered the present-day areas of Chikafa and Kanyemba in Dande. The eldest of these brothers was Chihumbe, followed by Kanyemba, and then Nyanderu. Their parents were Chowufombo, an individual of mixed Portuguese-African parentage, and Maria.

According to Chief Chapoto, the first of the three brothers to arrive in Kanyemba area was Nyanderu. He traveled on a reconnaissance trip to gather information regarding the suitability of the area for settlement and the availability of elephant tusks for trade. Upon arrival he found the Sori people hunting elephant with *madipa* (spears), killing them, taking the meat but leaving the tusks. Nyanderu then sent word to his father, Chowufombo, who was in Nyungwe, to come to the area and bring beads, cloth, and hoes. When Chowufombo arrived he gave the people cloth. He asked who the owner of the area was and the people replied that it was Nyawanga. Chowufombo then took a *peca* (length of cloth), *mbadzo* (hoes), and *usanga* (beads) which he gave to Chief Nyawanga. Shortly thereafter Nyawanga was possessed by the land spirit Nyamaqwete. The spirit was given cloth, after which Nyawanga, acting as medium for Nyamaqwete, took a lump of soil and gave it to Chowufombo. He also planted a *mutuwa* tree. After these things were done the spirit told Chowufombo that the land was his.

The dramatic climax of this story, when Chowufombo is given a lump of soil, is a statement regarding conquest. More importantly, the planting of a sacred tree symbolises the legitimacy of this conquest as it alludes to the relinquishing, by the established authority, of ritual power. These two acts in legend were apt metaphors for Chapoto's predicament during the 1990s. On the one hand, it was true that his clan controlled land use in the area and held a monopoly of the economy and political process. On the other hand, their ritual power was almost nonexistent as support for

marunga land spirits had become fragmented along lineage lines due to the succession dispute. The result was that the *mpondoro* Kanyemba was supported by members of his lineage, while the *mpondoro* Chihumbe did not have a medium. The key tension I observed in Chapoto Chieftaincy existed between a strong *marunga* clan identity which enabled their power and the interests of descendants of Chihumbe and Kanyemba who competed for the chieftaincy. The Chief's story of conquest should be seen in light of this circumstance.

Chapoto's story depicts the three themes central to Zambesian cultural logic of conquest: the symbolism of cloth, hoes, and beads. In Chikunda lore, these items are important to *marunga* life in the Zambesi and symbolise civilisation. First, the gift of cloth to the Sori people and to their leader Chief Nyawanga was recounted as the proper way in which to approach a territory. Cloth was the prescribed gift for obtaining an audience with the land spirits. In the 1990s one gave black or blue cloth, symbolising their rain-making role, to the mediums of land spirits as payment for the performance of a ceremony. It was also an appropriate gift for the wives of *sabhuku* and chiefs because it showed deference to their social status and position of authority.

In Chief Chapoto's account, cloth was also symbolic of new forms of exchange introduced into the area by the Chikunda. Oral histories described a time in the past when elephant tusks were traded for pieces of cloth of the same length. For the Chikunda, presentation of cloth to local authorities meant the expansion of their trade networks. Also, in Chikunda lore, if a local population exchanged their bodily coverings made of skins or pounded bark for clothing, this meant that they had accepted Chikunda authority. Importantly, that the Chikunda had offered cloth upon arrival was mean to convey that Chikunda conquerors acted appropriately, and so their rule was legitimate. Thus, cloth was highly symbolic of domination.

The story of the introduction of hoes to Kanyemba also supported *marunga* domination in the area. In the first place, hoes symbolised cultivation of food crops. The Chikunda opposed cultivation to the gathering of wild foods which they mocked as inefficient because people could not gather enough to store. Several senior Chikunda said that the absence of granaries in *tembo mvura* households was an example of their inferiority. The gift of hoes to local people and their acceptance of

these could also refer to economic subjugation of the local population by the *marunga* clan

It is also important to note that hoes symbolised brideservice. In the 1990s, notions of the ideal Chikunda marriage involved the husband moving into the bride's parent's homestead to farm and build houses for two to three years (and/or until the wife became pregnant). After that time the man was expected to take his wife to his parent's household where they would settle and build their own *gwangwa* (granary). For a couple to possess their own granary was symbolic of their ability to reproduce and rear children and thus ensure patrilineal continuity. In this way, a marriage conducted according to prescription would have a man performing brideservice to compensate his wife's line for providing the means by which children, who will belong to his line, could come into the world. Once an independent granary was built patrilocally, the ability to rear the children was demonstrated and the couple would have entered fully into adulthood. Problems of inter-generational conflict had arisen in the 1990s when young Chikunda, as well as their Korekore counterparts, rejected the idea of brideservice by either marrying outside of the area, or making cash payments to their in-laws.

In Chikunda oral histories, the idea of newcomers presenting hoes to a conquered population alluded to an inversion of the proper relations between a bridegroom, who must pay compensation, and the bride's family, who have the right to expect it. In conquest, the Chikunda arrived in an area as newcomers, appropriated women and subjugated men. In doing so they inverted the proper order of the marriage process because not only had they appeared as grooms to the wife-giving clans of the conquered locality, by subjugating the men, they also symbolically collected brideservice. In the proper process of marriage, a groom should compensate his wife's clan for her loss, and thereby enter into an alliance of mutually beneficial exchange over time. In Chief Chapoto's story of arrival in Dande, the Chikunda refused to enter into a set of obligations with the local wife-giving lineages, in addition to which they also refused to acknowledge the autochthons ritual superiority.

In contrast to Chief Chapoto's Chikunda story, David Lan interpreted Korekore myths of arrival in Dande in the following way: "the Korekore transform themselves

from fathers-in-law into sons-in-law, whereas the autochthons start off as sons-in-law and are fathers-in-law by the end" (1985:84). In this way, the Korekore adopted local marriage customs which implied a set of ongoing obligations to wife-giving lines, and accepted the ritual importance of the autochthons that provided both women and water and were therefore the source of fertility (Lan 1985:86). As this author explained:

> "If one lineage supplies another with the fertility it needs to perpetuate itself, it will be partially reciprocated by a marriage payment or labour but the debt is so great that the wife-giving lineage remains in a position of superiority with a call on the services of the wife-takers when the initial exchange has been completed".
>
> (Lan 1985:86).

In some oral histories, *marunga* lineages intermarried exclusively when they first arrived in Dande, but later took brides from the local population. When I asked about marriage, all informants responded that the *marunga* preference was to "marry our neighbours". I was told that *marunga* ignored the practice of brideservice and brideprice common in the Zambesi because they would not place themselves in situations of social inferiority. In the Zambesi, the marriage prescription was the following: newcomer=groom=brideservice. For *marunga* clans, the marriage rule inherent in conquest was: established population=grooms==brideservice.

There is a significant gender angle in the story of introduction of hoes to conquered populations. At the same time as hoes represented domination through the symbolic brideservice of subjugated people, they also made a statement regarding the type of economy that *marunga* rule entailed. In oral histories *marunga* men were hunters, traders, and warriors who circulated in the Zambesi looking for wealth. Women stayed in their home areas and farmed food crops, had children, and maintained the integrity of the household. In this way, *marunga* domination was characterised by the movement of men and the geographical fixity of women. That women stayed at home to provide for all necessities would make it seem that the forcefully patrilineal form of kinship the *marunga* installed had reverted back to matrilineality and matrifocality. This, in fact, was not the case, but rather a way to cope with the absence of men whilst maintaining families. In Magomero, Landeg White described a similar situation in which the *thangata* system of forced labour caused men to leave the area while women remained behind. The resulting social organisation,

where women found other affiliations, resembled a return to a matrifocal society when, in fact, "custom became an alternative form of resistance, a doctrine thrust in the face of reality" (1987:167).

In effect, the apparent alternation between patrilineal and matrilineal systems of kinship was really a function of the economy in which women compensated for the prolonged absence of men. Chapoto recounted that his father had married a number of wives in order to have enough labour capacity in his household to maintain his status as Chief.

The fixity of women during early *marunga* settlement is inscribed in the local belief system with the phrase to explain the word for sunset, *kudoka*, "when the sun is going to its mother's womb". The vivid imagery of land as womb signified well women's reproductive role as well their association with the earth. On one visit to a Chikunda household, being short of mat space, the senior woman offered me her place and sat on the ground. When I protested she grasped soil in her fist and stated that she liked the bare earth because it was the source of many good things including field mice.

An important division of labour in Dande occurred between activities which transform and organise. Women were primarily responsible for the gestation and supervision of children, a great amount of farming, cooking and beer-making. Men's responsibilities included organising social events, political decision-making, discussion regarding settlement of disputed claims, and building the frames of houses. From males flowed not only an individual's identity, but also group identity. As men organised collective action, women transformed raw materials into finished social products. One example of differences in gender roles was that most local committees (for example, the Village Development Committee, the Wildlife Committee, and the Borehole Committee) were comprised exclusively of males. With the demise of the male meeting house (*dare*), local meetings of these committees became the fora for the discussion of social organisation.

The division of male and female social spheres was highlighted by the behaviour of women who were past child-bearing, who made a point of subverting the proper gender division of activity. For example, older women engaged in male

activities such as making rope. They attended as many ritual beer parties as possible, danced salaciously or in unprescribed ways, and drank beer until they were drunk. One interpretation is that this behaviour was the antithesis of the format of a *mpondoro* possession ritual in which male and female roles were arranged to represent the sexual division of activity, where males organised and women transformed. For one, land spirits were almost all male, as were the overwhelming majority of their mediums and assistants. Also, in possession rituals, women brewed beer from local maize, and it was a woman, perhaps the medium's assistant's wife, who prepared snuff consumed by the medium during trance. Women's participation in the unfolding of the ceremony required that they dance in a prescribed pattern, sing established songs regarding the spirit, and ululate when the spirit arrived. Consultation with the *mpondoro* usually involved male members of a family. It could be argued that women were marginal to dealings with the *mpondoro*, whose role was to ensure the social and physical continuity of the area. In other words, males dealt with the source of fertility, women with providing its conduit. In contrast, by getting drunk on ritual beer, dancing and speaking outside of convention, smoking tobacco and taking snuff, older women rejected their subjugation as conduits for male design rather than participants in the ongoing dominant cultural discourse. The perceived audacity that accompanied these behaviours only served to illustrate the separation between the sexes, and women's association with land as symbolic of their transformative powers, and their geographical fixity.

The rich meaning of hoes in Chapoto's story of *marunga* arrival described a symbolic feminising of the subjugated population by their refusal to perform brideservice, while at the same time it entailed an economic division of activities which older females ritually subverted by their performance of oppositional acts in their old age.

The introduction of beads to Kanyemba area by the *marunga* provided another interesting story of domination. In Chief Chapoto's story, Chowufombo gave beads to Chief Nyawanga. Complementary oral history accounts of other Chikunda informants supported the belief that their ancestors, the *marunga* conquerors, introduced the practice of marrying with a bead. One Chikunda male elder described the practice in

the following way. In the past the patrilineal Chikunda married within their own clan in order to avoid the Tande and Korekore people who lived close by. At this time the ideal marriage for a female was to her father's brother's son. Prescriptively, all marriages were to take place between members of the ruling Chikunda lineages who all belonged to the *marunga nkangaiwa* (pigeon) clan. The result was that women and their children remained within the clan. The advantage also being that Chikunda of the *marunga* clan (the ruling clan) were neither bride-takers nor bride-givers, which meant that they did not enter into obligation-creating affinal relations with outsiders. Oral history accounts about Chikunda activity before the conquest of Kanyemba described Chikunda ancestors both serving and trading with the Portuguese in a mutually beneficial relationship. At the same time, they also depicted a relationship of economic inequality between Chikunda and local peoples. One prominent feature of tales of conquest was the subjugation of conquered peoples and their disappearance from the narrative.

Oral history accounts of Chikunda conquest were unmistakably about subjugation. In contrast, accounts of settlement in Dande shifted gears to allude to a measure of social interaction with non-*marunga* clans in the long-term. One example of this change was the shift in the marriage prescription from marrying within one's clan to the preference for ego to father's sister's daughter. For the patrilineal Chikunda this formula meant marriage to a woman of another clan, and constituted an innovation in their approach to social relations. According to informants, at the time that the Chikunda adopted this practice they paid no brideprice and did no brideservice. Instead the criterion for marriageability was the possession of beads. To acquire these beads a man had to be a follower of a senior Chikunda male (which meant a warlord) such as Kanyemba, Nyanderu, or Chihumbe. These beads were then given to the bride's parents as a form of brideprice. In other words, the groom would have had a role in the conquest of the area in order to be eligible to "marry with a bead". Only men in these sub-leadership roles were able to choose from the local women.

In these stories, marriageable women were confined to those from prominent families (who were worth marrying for alliance purposes). The point of this argument is that, symbolically, male Chikunda wanting to marry non-Chikunda women did their

90

brideservice to their leaders who then gave them a bead as a proof of status which was then given to the woman's parents. It was a way in which the local population was symbolically constructed as brides to the Chikunda conquerors. In the logic of brideservice and brideprice, the lineage that acquired a woman's labour and future children compensated her lineage for their loss. By doing so marriage became an alliance between equals. In Chikunda accounts of their arrival in Dande, conquest feminised local populations by inverting the practice of compensation to the appropriation of reproduction and labour.

Although not mentioned in Chief Chapoto's story, guns constituted the fourth significant introduction that the Chikunda made to Dande. The association between Chikunda and guns was often mentioned by members of other clans. The Chikunda gun, *guguda*, was homemade and said to be used for hunting big game such as elephant. The gun placed the Chikunda in opposition to both the Korekore and the *tembo mvura* whose specialty was the manufacture of spears. There were two reasons why the gun was crucial to Chikunda power in the Zambesi. First, firepower made it easy for small groups of Chikunda men to force local populations to do their bidding. Second, and more importantly, the possession of guns permitted the Chikunda to control trade in elephant tusks in the area.

Trade in elephant tusks was one of the sources of livelihood for Chikunda warlords and their followers. In oral accounts it was also given as a reason for Chikunda territorial expansion. One story described early Chikunda trade in tusks in the following way: When the Chikunda first arrived in Dande they hunted and killed elephant. The Korekore were allowed to keep the meat in exchange for carrying the tusks to the town of Tete from where they would be shipped out of the valley. What is significant about this relationship is the division of labour. Some Chikunda today say that the Korekore acted as the slaves of their ancestors. While the Korekore totem/sub-totem (*mutupu/chidau*) is *nzou samanyanga* or 'elephant, keeper of the tusk', these people did not say that they were subjects of the Chikunda, but rather partners in the ivory trade. In Chief Chapoto's view, when the Chikunda arrived in Dande, they gave the Korekore cloth in payment for carrying tusks. In other Chikunda accounts, the trade item was meat. In Korekore accounts, reference to a particular trade

item was imprecise, probably because meat and cloth were not significant in the construction of Korekore worldview. But it is important to note that the difference between Korekore and Chikunda accounts of their mutual relationship in the past is that the former described partnership whereas the latter described subjugation.

These differences in Chikunda and Korekore versions of their past relationship represented a significantly different outlook on their relative positions within Dande during the 1990s.Whereas Chikunda adhered to their ideology of clan superiority, Korekore accounts were tempered by the knowledge that, at least in Chikafa, they shared power with a Chikunda clan.

In the early 1990s, the possession of guns symbolised not only power, but more significantly, danger. In Dande, guns were associated with the Chikunda who were considered to be specialists both in their production and use. Since possession of guns as well as hunting was prohibited in Dande, people were reluctant to discuss the use of guns within Zimbabwean territory. For this reason, I was told that the information people had about guns related to their use in nearby Mozambique. In the 1990s, some guns were made out of the steering shaft of old Landrover cars, while gunpowder was made from fertiliser. No one would readily admit to possession of a gun or appear in public with one.

In Chikafa and Kanyemba, guns were very much symbols of danger because of the two decades of civil war in neighbouring Mozambique, and the ways in which Mozambican government officials who legally possessed guns were said to abuse their power. For example, there were stories about Mozambican officials intercepting travelers at gunpoint along paths (*nzira*) in order to steal their possessions. One informant described a trip to Chinthopo, a town on the Mpanyame River in Mozambique, to obtain game meat. He said that on his way back to Chikafa he was stopped by a local Mozambican official who pointed a gun at him and forced him to give up the meat he was transporting. The sight of guns also reminded people of the Independence War, the violence of guerrilla warfare, and the trauma of their time in the concentration camps at Mushumbi Pools where they were patrolled by armed Rhodesian soldiers.

Chief Chapoto's story of conquest emphasised *marunga* domination of

Kanyemba area through subjugation of established populations and appropriation of the economy by the introduction of trade. He recounted his views of the past in a context of a succession dispute in which his lineage could lose control of the chieftaincy, and at a time of significant change in the Zambesi brought by development.

iv. Chikunda Migration to Dande: The View from Chapoto's Opposition

While Chief Chapoto's account of arrival told the story of *marunga* domination of Dande, his interpretations derived from his position as the leader of the Chihumbe lineage that controlled the disputed chieftaincy. His opponents emanated from the Kanyemba lineage also in contention for the Chieftaincy and their non-*marunga* supporters who disliked the Chief.

In contrast to Chapoto's story, an elderly man of the Kanyemba lineage depicted Chikunda arrival in Dande in the following way. He said that in the past there existed no 'tribe' called the Chikunda. Instead the name applied to people who were soldiers of Kanyemba. They did not clap in greeting but rather saluted or shook hands. Chikunda "ancestors were coloured, were used to *chirungu* (European culture)". In his view the Chikunda became black by marrying with the Chirenje who were the followers of the *marunga* clan. The Chikunda brought clothes to Dande. When the informant's ancestors arrived in the area "the people living here were wearing animal hides". He said that "Kanyemba came here looking for elephants", and that the area was under the Portuguese. The Chikunda traded clothes for ivory. But they also hunted for elephant in order to obtain tusks which they traded to the Portuguese for cloth and *missanga* (beads).

In this individual's view, the first member of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan to arrive in Dande was Nyanderu who stopped at Bawa (a settlement across the border from Kanyemba), obtained tusks and returned to Tete. Some time later he returned to Kanyemba area with his parents, Chowufombo and Maria, and his brother Chihumbe. At this time, Kanyemba was away at war and consequently arrived later with followers who consisted of his sub-commanders and their warriors. Among these groups were the Tanda whose commander was Chicoa, and Guvheya, an African who

led his own soldiers. This informant added that Kanyemba also brought the Tenjera, Atipwe and Mwalongo clans from the area of Ruwenya River close to Tete[1].

In this informant's story, when the *marunga rosario andrade* clan arrived in Dande they found the VaSori, who's chief was Mburuma, living close to the Mwadzamutanda River. They also found the *tembo mvura* clan whom he claimed had originated in the region of Songo Mountain, further east along the Zambesi River. The Korekore, whom the informant described as the original inhabitants of the area, were to be found at the nearby Angwa River. He added that Kanyemba fought with Mburuma but not with the Korekore because "they had no power to fight Kanyemba so they paid taxes instead". He said that at one point Kanyemba helped the Shona to fight the Ndebele and so conquered territory all the way to Bulawayo, but that this area was lost when the British arrived.

While this informant commented upon the same themes of civilisation and the superiority of Chikunda power as had Chief Chapoto, he also discussed Chikunda identity in the Zambesi and emphasised the role of Kanyemba in the conquest of the Mwadzamutanda River area. His comment that the Chikunda were not a 'tribe', and that the term applied to soldiers who followed Kanyemba is a statement about social hierarchy. At the time of this study 'Chikunda' was a label denoting rank, invoked by residents of Dande, to describe the social hierarchy characteristic of areas where the *marunga* ruled. The informant who was elderly and quite senior in the Kanyemba lineage took pains to accentuate the superiority of the *marunga*. He said, for example, they did not clap hands in the African way, but instead saluted. Clapping hands was a custom used in greeting individuals who were socially superior such as elders, teachers, and other individuals who were respected. The Chikunda did not clap because they acknowledged no social superiors. The informant also mentioned that the Chikunda were acquainted with western ways or *chirungu*, a reference to the *marunga* past association with Portuguese influence. When he stated that the Chikunda had become black by marrying their subordinates, the Chirenje, he meant to say that not only was

---

[1] I did not find any informants of these clans (*mutupu*) during my research.

the *marunga* clan superior, but that it had married into subordinate lineages. Another interesting aspect of his account was the description of the diversity of clans which the Chikunda subjugated or incorporated. In mentioning these people in his history he tacitly acknowledged their presence within the social milieu of Kanyemba area.

Not surprisingly for a descendant of Kanyemba, this informant made repeated mention of his ancestor. By placing Kanyemba at the centre of the act of conquest of the area, at the same time as obscuring the role of Chihumbe, he staked a claim for his line's eligibility to the chieftaincy.

v. *Marunga* Settlement of Chikafa:

The story of the settlement of Chikafa was recounted by Chief Chapoto. At the time of this study, although the area was governed by an alliance between the Chikunda headman and the Korekore Village Chairman, it had long ceased to be under Chapoto's jurisdiction and was currently under Chief Chitsungo, a Korekore. According to Chief Chapoto, in 1912, during the reign of his father, Chapoto (I), the boundaries of his chieftaincy extended south of Kanyemba area to the Manyimo River from Mpedzapasi, to Chikafa, and Gonono. At the time of conquest, he first of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan to arrive in Chikafa was Basiyao. He was one of Chihumbe's soldiers. The second soldier to arrive was Guvheya, and the third was DiSuza. The fourth soldier to arrive there was Chikafa who was Ntsereru, but who had married one of Guvheya's daughters. These four men founded the cluster of settlements that formed the greater Chikafa area. Between foundation and 1945 there were seven *sabhuku* ruling in the area. These were: Guvheya, Basiyao, Musuzandare, Chowufombo, and Zhuwao who were Chikunda, Chikafa who was Ntsereru, and DiSuza who was Chewa.

By 1945 there were six Chikunda *sabhuku* in Chikafa, Zhuwao having left to be Chief in Kanyemba for a short time after the death of Chapoto (I). In the early 1990s there were also six *sabhuku* in the area: Chikafa; Kamunga; Basiyao; DiSuza; Guvheya, and Chowufombo. *Sabhuku* Chikafa obtained his position because his mother was descended from Nyanderu. When asked what had happened to the Chikafa line, he replied that "the sons died".

95

According to oral history Chikafa area was clearly part of the original *marunga rosario andrade* migration into Dande. A number of lieutenants of the three conquering brothers were installed as headmen in conquered areas, and founded their own lineages. However, it also seems that with the distance from the seat of the Chieftaincy at Kanyemba, it became a difficult area to rule. In addition, Chikafa area had been subjected to different political, economic, and ecological circumstances which differentiated it from Kanyemba area. For example, it is closer to the plateau of Zimbabwe and had experienced more migration to and from commercial farms and towns. There was an Evangelical Mission there for many years, which closed during the War of Independence when the local population was sent to a concentration camp near Mushumbi Pools (a town within the middle Zambesi Valley). With increased population in the area, and development schemes, Chikafa experienced hunger in years of low rainfall prompting yet more migration. These and other factors made Chikafa an area of great social diversity as well as contributing to a more changeable political structure. As Chief Chapoto lamented "the people in Chikafa are now foreigners and no one knows the history properly...the big men all died and their children don't know anything". In other words, the allegiances of the people of Chikafa do not fall firmly within *marunga* clan monopoly of politics.

I could see that the issue of Chikafa posed a dilemma for Chief Chapoto during our discussions. On the one hand, he was at pains to emphasise *marunga* sovereignty over the area and described meticulously the various individuals who settled and governed it. On the other hand, it was quite clear that Chikafa had not been under *marunga* domination for some time and that this clan had no discernable superiority there. Political process was shared with the Korekore, whose land spirit, Nyamanindi, was supported by a number of disparate lineages. Also, the fact that the area was under the jurisdiction of Chief Chitsungo, who, although particularly uninvolved in the area, was considered to be the supreme authority. It was clear in our conversations that Chikafa represented the slow slippage of power which the Chapoto Chieftaincy had experienced over time and was a subject the Chief did not discuss at length. Rather, he liked to accentuate the nearly absolute power of the *marunga* in Kanyemba area and discuss the benefits of his line's rule there.

96

vi. Chihumbe, Kanyemba, and Nyanderu as Symbols of *Marunga* Domination:

Stories of the military prowess of the three brothers who conquered Kanyemba functioned as a form of propaganda for the *marunga* political cause in Dande. Accounts of Kanyemba, vividly described him as a powerful and frightening warlord who did not hesitate to use violence against his enemies.

In one version of history, a male informant of Chihumbe's line recounted the following story about how the three conquering brothers obtained their names. In his account, the brothers originally had Portuguese names but acquired their African names through qualities of violence which they possessed. One day, as the three brothers played *ntsoro* (a board game played with stones), they began to boast. Antonio said that he was like *chihumbe*, a violent attack of diarrhea, which kills the person once it seizes the body. Zuze said that he was like the poisonous bean *kanyembanyemba* which is known to kill unsuspecting goats. Manuel said that he was like a *dzodzo*, a poisonous beetle which is black with red stripes and eats the flowers of a shrub called *nkungudzi*. In this way, the three conquerors, Chihumbe, Kanyemba, and Nyanderu are said to have acquired their imposing warlord titles.

Although legend depicted the three brothers each as powerful and inspiring fear in other men, Kanyemba was by far known as the most violent and frightening of all. Chief Chapoto recounted that "Kanyemba used to order people killed by cutting the head and having it brought to him", and "when Kanyemba saw a clever person he would have him castrated". In addition, the Chief also mentioned that Kanyemba "was interested in killing people and the Portuguese used to tell him to kill people....even the Portuguese were afraid of him".

An elderly descendant of Nyanderu also related stories of Kanyemba's superhuman qualities. He said, "Kanyemba was a great warrior, when someone threw a spear on him, it would break...if you shot him, the bullet wouldn't go in". He also described how Kanyemba had special medicine which both protected and made him powerful. At the same time, he added that Kanyemba had banished *n'anga* (healers) from his territories saying that he "didn't want to live with n'anga who could reveal his secrets".

In a similar vein, an elderly man (in his 80s) from Chitete settlement, close to

97

the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, described Kanyemba as a dangerous man. He said that the warlord killed the husbands of desirable women, and maintained his power by eliminating adversaries. In the informant's words, Kanyemba's "wives put together would be bigger than the village of Chitete".

Individuals from a diversity of positions all agreed on the basic features of the warrior Kanyemba. In a way, his legend presented an archetype of the *marunga* warlord because of the attributes of power and invincibility. At the same time, the qualities ascribed to Kanyemba were also occasionally mentioned in conjunction with soldiers who become famous in newer conflicts such as the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. One informant observed that FRELIMO soldiers were sometimes referred to as Chikunda.

Important themes within the stories of the three brothers fall into line with key features of *marunga* mythology. For instance, the story that the brothers devised their own *noms de guerre* alludes to the *marunga* notion that the clan is self-contained and needs no outside influence to govern. The mention of Kanyemba's persecution of traditional healers also implies an attempt to silence all potential opposition to non-*marunga* rule, especially from those wit ritual or autochthonous power. That Kanyemba was impenetrable to bullets also connotes the infallibility of the *marunga* clan.

Stories of Kanyemba's power supported the *marunga* conviction of historical social superiority. By suggesting that Kanyemba was invincible, had huge territories, many wives, controlled local economies, and was not only friendly but also related by descent to the Portuguese, the *marunga* clan made an unequivocal statement regarding domination of Kanyemba area.

vii. The 'Giving of Boundaries' in Dande:

The setting of boundaries in Dande proved to be a crucial act in shaping the nature of the *marunga* chieftaincy in Kanyemba because it set the tone for potential points of conflict, at each succession, between Chihumbe's and Kanyemba's line.

During the second half of the 19th century competition between European nations for territories in Africa intensified. Whilst alliances were forming and

98

disintegrating locally in the Zambesi, treaties between European nations were also being made and broken. The bounty of dominion over African territories was to be natural resources and agricultural products to service and feed industrialising European cities. On the global scale, during this time Britain and Portugal were in competition for opportunities to control areas which would generate wealth, but locally in the Zambesi the European scramble for Africa threatened to bring a radical change to political and economic life. Both Portugal and Britain proposed to introduce greater administrative control of the Zambesi as well as modern forms of production. To this end the Companhia de Mocambique set up by the Portuguese entrepreneurs de Sousa and de Andrada, and Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company entered into competition. The Portuguese Crown based its claims to territories in Africa on the longevity of their presence there, whilst Britain argued that effective occupation should be the deciding factor in international recognition of a country's ownership of a colony (Newitt 1995:341). At the Berlin Congress of 1884-85 Portugal proposed a 'Rose-Coloured Map' in which it staked claim to a wide band of territory extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific and including all of the Zambesi Valley. Significantly, it also included a large part of present-day Zimbabwe, covering all of the eastern part of the country as far south as the Limpopo River. The Portuguese government managed to have the map appended to the Berlin Act by 1887, but it was never recognised by Britain which continued to support Cecil Rhodes' endeavours in southern Africa (Newitt 1995: 343). With the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891, Portuguese territory on the south bank of the Zambesi River was reduced to a narrow strip at the point where present-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique meet.

The ambitions of European governments and their entrepreneurial nationals posed a serious threat to the Zambesian way of life. Both Portugal and Britain began to devise plans to administer the Zambesi more effectively. For one, the feudal system of land tenure where *prazeiros* held absolute control over their territories was to be usurped by the instalment of large concession companies. Similarly, the existing decentralised system of rule was to end with the holding of censuses as a prelude to the introduction of taxation (Newitt 1995:337). For the Afro-Portuguese warlords, the advent of greater colonial control through concession companies would deal a death

blow to their power and their livelihood based on trade and raiding.

Whilst European nations argued over territories at the Berlin Congress, the Afro-Portuguese warlords were involved in finding a place within the larger dispute between Portuguese and British interests. Portugal's territorial claims as outlined in the 'Rose-Coloured Map' were based on the number of informal treaties which a number of powerful individuals, under nominal Portuguese influence, made with Shona chiefs. In a review of the personal correspondence of de Andrada, a Portuguese adventurer and entrepreneur, the historian David Beach described the circumstance of Portugal in the late 1800s:

> "The creation of a network of treaties with Shona rulers across the central and northern Zimbabwean plateau in 1889 that, had they been properly exploited, would have given Portugal a reasonable claim-by the standards of the Scramble for Africa-to a western frontier to their Mocambican province running from the modern Kariba Dam area to the east and south-east of modern Zimbabwe, up to 350 kilometres beyond the modern frontier
>
> (Beach 1992:3).

Beach further asserted that the area between Zumbo (in present-day Zambia) and Tete town (in Mozambique) was effectively controlled by four Afro-Portuguese warlords, "notably *Kanyemba* Jose do Rosario Andrade, *Matekenya* Jose do Araujo Lobo, *Mutopa Gudo* Firmino Luis Germano and *Chimbangu* Vicente Jose Ribeiro da Fonseca" (Beach 1992:8). Oral accounts gathered for this study claimed that Jose do Rosario Andrade, the founder of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan which I encountered in the 1990s, had at one point laid claim to territory as far south as the River. He had also been *capitao-mor* (captain-major) of Zumbo, a Portuguese administrative position. In effect, his sympathies lay with Portuguese interests. It can thus be argued that he would have been among a number of powerful individuals who were allied to Portuguese interests and served their territorial claims vis a vis British claims. Below I will discuss oral history accounts regarding Kanyemba and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891.

There are a number of oral accounts of Kanyemba's activities at the time of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty (1891) when the boundaries between Portuguese and British territory were set. Versions of Kanyemba's movements at the time were invoked in the 1990s in order to support or dispute claims to the chieftaincy of Kanyemba area. These

stories fell into two broad categories: that Kanyemba was an inveterate Portuguese supporter and fled to Portuguese East Africa when "the *muzungu* gave boundaries"; and, that he decided to stay in present-day Kanyemba area (which became British territory) and eventually died there.

One widely respected elderly man, whose family had provided mediums for the *mpondoro* of Kanyemba area for at least two generations, recounted a version of Kanyemba's activities which alluded to the political issues created by boundary-making. He stated that when Chihumbe and Nyanderu died, Kanyemba became owner of all the conquered territory which extended into present-day Mozambique. When boundaries were set, Kanyemba traveled across the border to live, but said that Chihumbe's son should remain to be Chief in British territory. Kanyemba became Chief in Mozambique, died there, and was succeeded by his son Antonio Muondoka. This informant said that parallel Chikunda chieftaincies were created in the original conquered area because of the boundary. In Mozambique the succession passed from Kanyemba to his son, Antonio Muondoka who was in turn succeeded by his son Manwere Kanyemba. In British territory Chihumbe's son Chapoto became chief, was briefly succeeded by his brother Basiyao, and then by Manwere Chapoto whom I encountered in the early 1990s. With this story, the informant related two ideas. First, that in the general area of Kanyemba, all the leadership belonged to the same clan, the conquering *marunga rosario andrade*, and that, therefore, power in the form of claims to the chieftaincy should be confined to its members. Secondly, he qualified this assertion with the declaration that "Kanyemba made Chief Chapoto". Not surprisingly, he also supported the current medium of the *mpondoro* Kanyemba claiming that she was authentic.

Whilst this informant appeared to be a supporter of the Kanyemba line's claim to the chieftaincy, his account also illustrated the basic ongoing tension of leadership of Kanyemba area. At the same time as he recounted that Kanyemba left the area in the hands of Chihumbe's son, he also suggested that the Chikunda of the general area (including those in Mozambique) all belonged to one initial conquest. Thus, the leadership belonged to one clan. But, he added that the proper order of succession was that the ruling chief's sons should inherit the position, after which it should pass back

101

to the original chief's sons (the rule is that inheritance should occur horizontally, then vertically). In effect, the chieftaincy should alternate between the three lineages founded by the three original *marunga rosario andrade* conquering brothers. In this case, the lineage comprised of the descendants of Nyanderu would be overdue for the chieftaincy as no member had ever been chief. The acknowledgment of a third group of contenders would complicate the succession dispute as the debate was mostly centered on very keen candidates from the Kanyemba and Chihumbe lineages.

Another informant, a member of a subordinate clan whose ancestors originated in Malawi, claimed that Chapoto (II) did not rule legitimately as the first Chief Chapoto had tricked Kanyemba into returning to Mozambique when the Europeans drew up the boundaries. In his words, Chapoto (I) "said the (British) *azungu* coming here were not good so they should go back to Mozambique". He also claimed that at this time Chapoto (I) prepared to depart to Mozambique but instead chose to remain in British territory, while Kanyemba completed the journey across the border. According to his story, when Europeans arrived in the area, there were four *sabhuku* there by the names of Kabareti, Pondo, Marama, and Zhuwao. The Europeans asked Pondo about Kanyemba, but when they were told that he was in Portuguese territory, they enquired after other relatives. It was then that Chapoto made himself known and became Chief. What was interesting about this account is the appearance of the subordinate Chikunda lineages in past events. Pondo, I was told, was Kanyemba's second-in-command, and was left behind by him. The third-in-command was Chikohwa, and the fourth-in-command was Murizafesa. Both Pondo and Chikohwa were of the Chirenje clan, and came to the area as Kanyemba's warriors. This informant believed that "the Chikunda named Chirenje liked war too much, their Chief was Chikohwa". He also said that the "Chirenje clap to *marunga* because long ago they worked for *marunga* and clapped to thank for payment". This informant supported the Kanyemba lineage's claim to the chieftaincy probably because, as he believed, his grandfather had come from Malawi to fight under Kanyemba. In this case, the informant's position as a member of the Chikunda dominated community would have been tied to his ancestor's original role as a warrior attached to Kanyemba.

The way in which this eloquent individual expressed his structural position in

this account of legitimacy to the chieftaincy elucidates the important issue of subordinate identities within the Chikunda group. His account also illustrated how the succession dispute was about so much more than contention between the candidates of three dominant lineages, in that it also involved the fate of classificatory followers. Additionally, it suggested that the alignments between individuals at the time of conquest became reflected in the relative positions of lineages in Kanyemba and Chikafa areas in the 1990s.

viii. The Chapoto Chieftaincy:

There was one Chikunda Chieftaincy in Dande in the 1990s, and it was held by Chief Chapoto (II) (see Figure 8). He was elderly at the time and has since died. During my fieldwork period, when the Chief was infirm but still active, a succession dispute was underway between three eligible lineages. It was a fact that most of the oral history I gathered for this study contained the predominant theme of *marunga* supremacy and political legitimacy due to this clan's conquest of the area in the late 1800s. But the issue the eventual demise of Chief Chapoto would elicit was the way that rule was to be allocated. Of three suitable lineages, Kanyemba, Chihumbe, and Nyanderu, only the first two presented viable candidates for the Chieftaincy. Claims to the position of Chief were made through the device of oral history. Earlier I discussed the importance of the theme of boundary-making in local Chikunda history. I demonstrated how, in the 1990s, ideas of where important *marunga* settled at the time of the creation of the boundary between Portuguese and British territory affected the legitimacy of their current position within the Kanyemba polity.

Other themes permeated the succession dispute. For example, the role of the District Commissioner in past selection of candidates was mentioned. But competition for the Chieftaincy really existed between two camps aligned behind candidates from Chihumbe's and Kanyemba's lines.

Chief Chapoto was adamant that one of his sons should succeed him to the Chieftaincy. In his genealogy, he described himself as the grandson of Chihumbe, the eldest of the three conquering brothers. According to the rule of succession, the Chieftaincy should alternate between the three lines descending from the three

brothers. The dispute centered on whether the rule of inheritance should be observed and the Chieftaincy passed to one of Kanyemba's descendants or whether one of Chapoto's sons, who was familiar with the role of Chief and had represented his father in Harare, should inherit.

In terms of strict social prescription, Chapoto did not have a valid argument as the Chieftaincy had been held by descendants of Chihumbe since boundaries were set. There had been a brief interlude after the death of Chapoto (I) during which Zhuwao of the Kanyemba lineage was Chief. But it was generally agreed at the time that he was unsuitable, possibly due to mental illness, and so Chapoto (II) was installed in the position.

The other factor against the Chief's claim was that the *mpondoro* Kanyemba was in favour of someone from his own lineage taking the Chieftaincy. At a possession ceremony, when the *mpondoro* was questioned about the succession, he stated the following: "Chihumbe is my brother from the same mother and father. There is no difference in giving Chapoto or my child but Chapoto is the eldest of them all. This is why I gave him the post. But when their turn is over I will turn to my children". Chapoto countered with the view that the medium was a prostitute and a fake. In addition to which he also suggested that Kanyemba was said to have so many wives that he could not have had children with them all, thus calling some of his opponents illegitimate. But the fact is that, theoretically, the greatest supernatural support the Chief would obtain would be from the *mpondoro* Chihumbe who at the time had no medium. The reason for this may have been that local support for the Chihumbe line was waning. I also noted that members of subordinate Chikunda lineages did not support the Chief, probably due to a history of exploitation under his long rule.

In Chapoto's favour was the fact that his lineage had ruled the area for over 100 years and so had weathered many changes. His life-history paralleled important regional and international events which affected the area. For example, he was himself a migrant worker on the plateau before he was called to be Chief, an experience he shared with many Zambesians. He engaged in regional travel, having brought banana trees from Malawi in the 1940s. He witnessed the guerrilla war and worked in conjunction with the District Commissioner in attempts to thwart its effects locally. In

addition to his length of experience in events of the area, there is also the fact that he lived through the transition to Independence and the installation of Chiefs as dispensers of Customary Law entrenched in the Zimbabwean constitution. Finally, he had groomed one of his sons for the chieftaincy.

In my estimation, the Kanyemba camp had the greater number of supporters. Not only were there a number of venerable elders who could be put forward as candidates for the chieftaincy, there were also a number of active young members who were involved in several committees. For example, a senior member of this lineage was one of the Chief's councilors who advised him at the Customary Law court, while a young member was the Ward Councilor. In this way, members of the Kanyemba lineage had a greater hold on both the longstanding and newer forms of political life in the area.

According to the rule of inheritance, this lineage was also in line for the next position of chief. The traditionalists amongst the local population supported upholding the social prescription. A number of members of subordinate lineages described Chapoto's rule as unsanctioned, stating as proof versions of the past in which Chapoto's father had tricked a number of opponents into fleeing the area.

As I explained above, the *mpondoro* Kanyemba had a medium, in itself a sign of local support, who was vocal in supporting the claims to the Chieftaincy of the Kanyemba lineage. Judging by the attendance at ceremonies, a large number of people supported this spirit. Interestingly, the *tembo mvura* and Korekore groups supported neighbouring Korekore land spirits. For subjugated and conquered clans, the only means to participate in political life was to align themselves behind a *marunga rosario Andrade* clan member. Otherwise, there was the option of dropping out of political life altogether, a practice evidenced by attendance at the shrine of a neighbouring *mpondoro*[2].

_____

[2]Locals attended ceremonies at the shrine of a Korekore *mpondoro* in the neighbouring Angwa River area.

In this chapter I have reviewed three features of Marunga domination in Dande: centralised political organisation; a propensity to seek alliance with the powerful; and, the ability to recruit a following in light of their conquest of Dande and the subsequent installation of a chieftaincy. To this end, I introduced the *marunga rosario andrade* clan who ruled Kanyemba area and then discussed the Portuguese *prazo* system which provided the conditions for the formation of Chikunda corporate identity. Next, versions of Marunga arrival in Dande were recounted from the points of view of Chapoto and opponents, and the mythology surrounding the three conquering brothers was also briefly mentioned. Finally, the process of boundary-making in the 1890s between the British and the Portuguese was discussed along with its implications for the Chapoto Chieftaincy which was disputed during the 1990s.

The following chapter plunges into the ethnography of Chikafa and Kanyemba with a discussion of social relations within these settlements.

Chapter 4: Autochthony and Conquest: The Ethnographic Present of the 1990s

i. The Multiple Meanings of Dande:

The opposition between autochthony and conquest is a central preoccupation in Zambesian cosmology which underpins the social and political organisation of settlements. This dichotomy is dependent on an idiom of kinship which structures social relations through incorporation or subjugation. In order to properly address the central issue of domination, it is important to review ethnographic data gathered during the 1990s. In this study, I compare Chikafa, characterised by shallow and dispersed lineages where political control is shared between Chikunda and Korekore groups, with Kanyemba, which is governed by the dominant *marunga rosario andrade* clan.

In Chapter 3 I introduced the cultural logic of conquest in Dande through a description of conflicting local accounts of Marunga settlement there. Also, the problematic of African slavery was discussed with a view to providing a first glimpse of the issue of incorporation. In this chapter, I begin by introducing a social map of Dande, proceed to discuss kinship, and then describe the populations of both settlements researched for this study. Because kinship is so important to social organization in the Zambesi Valley, it will be the primary focus of this chapter. Discussions of political structure and economy will be better placed in Chapters 6 and 7 to provide a background for the impact of development and drought.

During the 1990s four conceptual maps existed of the area of the Zambesi where my two fieldsites were located. First, according to the logic of autochthony and conquest, the area was characterised by a number of spirit territories established in the mythological past. In this instance, the area was called Dande, a reference to the autochthonous Tande who held ritual power. Secondly, there were Chieftaincies also installed through the logic of autochthony and conquest, but a number of which had been reinforced by the colonial and subsequently, the Zimbabwean states. Thirdly, post-independence, the Zimbabwean state mapped the area into VIDCOs (Village Development Committees), Wards, and Districts in a

chain of responsibility linked to the President's Office. Fourth, the African Development Fund, which financed the MZP, proclaimed the area 'the Mid-Zambesi Valley'. Each label represented a particular philosophy regarding social organization and power structures.

Dande includes all the land delineated by the Mavuradhona mountains to the south, the Zambesi River to the north, Chewore Safari area to the west, and the Musengezi River to the east. Dande was situated within the Zambesi Valley which is the lowland area adjacent to the Zambesi River. The two fieldwork sites discussed in this study, Chikafa and Kanyemba, are situated within Dande. Typically, to Zimbabweans, the Zambesi Valley was a mystical and marginal place whose inhabitants they thought backward and uncivilised. To support these ideas, the *tembo mvura* people (also known as the Dema) were often mentioned in conversation and in the national press because some members had a genetic disorder which caused a bifurcated two-toed condition. In some pejorative accounts of Dande, inhabitants were thought to be terrible farmers. Other stories depicted the area as dangerous because of its wild animals, witches, incompetent people, unbearable heat, tsetse fly which prevented the keeping of cattle, and dense bush.

In addition, Zimbabweans believed that Dande did not have decent roads, marketplaces, churches, shops, or male meeting sites[1]. For them, the area was a hinterland relevant as a source of labour, a place for wild animals, and powerful rain-makers. In short, in the popular imagination, the Dande area, and the Zambesi Valley, stood in counterpoint to the civilized plateau. For the most part, during the colonial and post-independence periods the area was left alone. However, during the early 1990s, because of the introduction of development schemes, Dande and the Zambesi became a site for economic opportunity and extension of state-level political influence.

---

[1]

In the past these male meetings places consisted of *dare*, special huts where men met to discuss local issues. At present, the main meeting place for Zimbabwean men is the beerhall which does not exist in the Zambesi Valley.

The cultural logic of this change in attitude toward the Zambesi can be understood as a transformation of the area from the place of autochthons who gave legitimacy to the new Zimbabwean state, to a conquerable area vulnerable to the incursion of new forms of dominance. Thus, in Zambesian cultural logic, during the 1990s the Zimbabwean state transformed itself from autochthonous, reflecting the will of the people, to that of conqueror which, by definition, is a foreign form of dominance. I adopt the term 'cultural logic' from Garbett (1992) who took it to mean the relations between cultural categories and between sets of cultural categories.

Social change is not a new feature for the Zambesi Valley. Its history of migration is a testament to the constant influx of new people, ideas, and practices. Historical studies have discussed the effect of migration in the area by describing the introduction of new lineages, clans, and large polities into the area (Beach 1980, 1986, 1992; Bourdillon 1978, 1987; Mudenge 1988).These migrations have occurred over the centuries because of war, colonial demand for labour in mines and commercial farms, pressure on land and resources, the need for cash to pay taxes and purchase consumer goods, and to escape droughts which strain food resources from time to time. For example, during the drought of 1991-92, I observed a marked emigration out of Dande which reversed with the arrival of rains. In Chikafa village, Survey I conducted in 1992, during the drought, counted 306 individuals living in 60 households with an average of 5.1 people per household. In 1993, after the rains, and well into the growing season, Survey II counted 353 individuals in 76 households at an average of 4.64 people per household. The population difference is accounted for by emigration of adults for work and children sent to live with relatives. The difference in household size is attributed to relatives grouping together to share scarce food.

However, migrations which do not greatly disrupt social life are easy to deal with through the mechanism of incorporation discussed in the previous chapter. As I outlined earlier in this study, conquest is a good thing only for the conquerors. Autochthonous people and long-term residents who are subjugated tell stories of

social marginalization with terrible implications for the quality of their lives.

In sum, by bringing development into Dande, the Zimbabwean state divested itself of the legitimacy it derived from popular support during the Independence War and became a conqueror. This perceived act of conquest was dealt with differently in Kanyemba and Chikafa because of the contrasting forms of social organization in these two settlements, and also the nature of each development scheme. In Kanyemba, the century-long entrenched rule by the *marunga* clan betrayed a history of alliance with the state. There, rulers incorporated CAMPFIRE into their political structure by appropriating its decision-making process, thereby further consolidating both their power and the marginalization of the *tembo mvura* clan. In contrast, Chikafa, with its tenuous power-sharing political structure, experienced the MZP as great disruption which prompted renewed interest in *mpondoro* as loci of resistance. This chapter discusses the kinship system and relations between groups in both settlements which underpin these greatly contrasting approaches to social change to be discussed later in Chapter 7 about development.

ii. Kinship in Dande: The Importance of Clans and Lineages:

Until the new migrants who came with the MZP arrived in Dande during the early 1990s, kinship was the primary way in which people were related to each other. Immigrants who had no family members in Dande, and who did not acquire kin once settled, brought new forms of identification, such as church membership and citizenship of Zimbabwe. These types of affiliations became important as land resettlement took hold, and I will discuss these in Chapter 6 which focuses on the state. Kinship relations in Dande stem from a system of clans and lineages which is organized according to two principles – patrilineal descent, and the principal of first arrival. Thus clans could be autochthonous holding the power to make rain, conquerors in control of governance, and latecomers who were either incorporated or posed a threat to this hierarchy. Lineages were technically sub-divisions within clans where different lines each claimed to be descended from a particular ancestor, such as in the case of the *marunga rosario andrade*.

110

During the 1990s, all clans I encountered were patrilineal bride-givers with an ideal of virilocality which, in practice, meant neolocality. Each clan was founded by a mythological male ancestor who traveled to Dande from elsewhere. In practice, distinctions between clan and lineage were made for political reasons. A simple rule of thumb I used to distinguish clans from lineages was the notion of a common ancestral home, and a shared food prohibition. For example, all members of the *marunga* clan were *marunga nkangaiwa* referring to the baby pigeon, which was their food prohibition, and all claimed to have come from Nyungwe (Tete). Thus *marunga rosario andrade* and *marunga robo* were of the same clan, the pigeon, but descended from different male ancestors and were, therefore, of different lineages. David Lan described clans in Dande in the following way: as exogamous, patrilineally inherited, named after an animal or after an object which constituted the food prohibition, associated with geographical areas, and, "dispersed with no corporate or ritual functions" (1985:23). In effect, in this definition, clan was equated with lineage because the primary criterion for membership was a patrilineal link. As Lan argued, "clan members are said to experience a sense of relatedness to each other in more or less the same way as members of the same lineage" (1985:23). Although he did not deny the importance of descent in reckoning patrilineal kin, he believed that members of the same clan were defined by their common food prohibition. In this way, clan membership was demarcated by "common substance with other members" of one's clan (1985: 23). Thus, for the Korekore, the belief that eating one's totem could make one ill related to the notion that what was being ingested was of the same substance, effectively oneself.

The case of the *marunga* clan contrasted with Lan's findings regarding the Korekore. Although, principles of common substance did apply to *marunga* notions of clan membership, these were not the most important means of inclusion. Among the *marunga rosario andrade* clan I encountered, and according to oral histories regarding other Marunga clans in Tete, the most important factors in clan membership were the notion of common ancestral home and association with Portuguese *azungu* in the past. It is true that, like the Korekore, the *marunga* of Kanyemba mentioned an original ancestor who founded their clan. However,

unlike the Korekore, they had no elaborate stories about him. Also in contrast to the Korekore, a concept of common substance was mentioned but not emphasized.

The reasons for these differences were couched in *marunga* mythology of conquest and in their practice of domination. The *marunga* concept of clan was very different to that of the Korekore in one crucial point: in their concept of common substance. While Lan's observations of the Korekore were of a number of dispersed lineages organized into territorial allegiances by powerful land spirits, my focus on the *marunga* yielded a powerful and entrenched clan in Kanyemba area. While I did not have the opportunity to interview members of other *marunga* clans in Mozambique, it did seem to me that clan members in Kanyemba held a very powerful notion of clan identity which superceded all other forms of affiliation. It seemed to me that *marunga* conceived of a supra-clan affiliation organized through a concept of common substance couched in the term *nyamatanga* (white flesh), related to the social category of the Afro-Portuguese Zambesian land-holders with whom they all claimed affiliation. Additionally, *marunga* ascription to the term, *ntsuwa*, meaning "whites from the islands" was a consolidation of the exclusivity of clan membership. Thus, the various *marunga* clans, such as *marunga dabreu*, *marunga desfrip*, and the *marunga rosario andrade* each claimed a male ancestor of mixed Portuguese and African parentage.

For *marunga*, individual clan identities were a statement on territoriality, supra-clan identity was an expression of an ideology of unmitigated supremacy through a story of association with Portuguese colonial power. Lineage identities, as I observed in Kanyemba, related to mundane issues of governance. In sum, the supra-clan concept, *marunga*, provided the ideology of conquest and inherent superiority, particular *marunga* clans articulated a concept of conquest of a territory such as Dande, and patrilineal lineage referred to the business of governing appropriated land. Because of this logic, while this group might pay lip service to autochthons, they really had no need for their rain-making power in order to govern. In Kanyemba, even during a period of drought, I never heard mention of a rain-maker.

The clan and lineage structure I describe above comprised an ideal concept of group organization. In reality, while the ideology of clan power justified rule, members of the *marunga* clan shared social spaces with other groups, participated in their everyday practices and shared many kinship concepts to be discussed below.

It is useful at this point to mention ethnic group terms used by both Zambesians and scholars of the area. As I mentioned previously the English word, *tribe*, is employed by Shona speakers in Dande People conceptualised *tribe* or ethnic group as an umbrella term which covered a cluster of clans and lineages with similar attributes For example, individuals I interviewed belonging to the *marunga rosario andrade* clan, said that they were of the upper strata of the Chikunda *tribe*. In the early 1990s there were 13 ethnic groups living in the two settlements in Dande where I researched. Chikafa was by far the most ethnically diverse with 12 ethnic groups recorded in the second of two surveys conducted (see Appendix 2). In Kanyemba there were three major ethnic groups: the Chikunda, the Korekore, and the Dema. All groups listed reckoned descent patrilineally, except for the Ntsenga, who claimed to hold a matrilineal ideal.

In Chikafa, at times, the term *tribe* was used interchangeably with clan (*mutupu*) and lineage (*chidau*). At other times, it was loosely applied to new groups in the area such as the Shona. In truth, in Chikafa there was no standard way of referencing groups of people. Sometimes groups were referred to by their *mutupu*, at other times *tribe*, occasionally by occupation (such as *sabhuku*, nurse, Ward Councilor), and even by father's name (as the son of x).

The Chikunda denomination encompassed two strata. First, there was the *marunga* clan divided into lineages each claiming descent from a male ancestor of mixed Portuguese *nyamatanga* and African parentage. *Marunga* clan members shared the food prohibition of baby pigeon (*marunga nkangaiwa*), descent from Portuguese males, and ancestors who lived on islands in the Zambesi River

(*ntsuwa*)2. In other words, the group's defining features were based on a relatively weak idea of common substance, patrilineal descent, and a sharing of a type of geographical and social space (the prazo, the conquered territory) which over time became encoded with notions of prestige. The second strata of Chikunda did not possess the common defining features of clan or lineage membership. Instead their claims to being Chikunda were self-ascription and a history of association with *marunga* lineages. These people were not *marunga,* had food prohibitions other than pigeon, and were of lineages associated exclusively with African parentage. Additionally, they also made no claim to having ancestors associated with islands in the Zambesi. Often they said that their ancestors came from Malawi area. Members of the dominant *marunga* clan often reiterated their true Chikundaness, and their legitimacy as conquerors of Kanyemba.

Among the Chikunda I studied, marriage was primarily patrilocal, or in some instances, neolocal. Brideprice (*mari akuroora*) was paid to the bride's parents in installments. If the bride's parents died before all payments were made, the groom and his kin transferred these payments to the bride's father's next oldest brother. As recently as the preceding generation, marriage involved a system of brideprice paid in installments as well as a period of uxorilocality and brideservice. Some people lamented that the introduction of large amounts of cash into local economies had adversely affected this practice. Brideprice, in the 1990s included combinations of cash payment, goats, clothes, and household items. Although there existed prescriptions, the amount and length of payments were negotiated in each particular case. The preferred marriage was ego to father's sister's daughter so as to marry outside of one's lineage. Accordingly, in both cases, *mari akuroora* or *lobola* (brideprice) was paid in installments to the bride's parents, and later to her father's brother should the former die before all payments had been transacted. Brideprice included money, clothes, household goods, and goats. Additionally, there was a pattern of virilocality in all groups and, with changing land tenure practices in

---

2 A number of powerful 19th century warlords used islands in the Zambesi River, later submerged by the Cahora Bassa and Kariba Dams., to control the flow of trade. Thus, for a lineage to be associated with these islands alluded to power and prestige.

Chikafa, of neolocality. Older people disliked the fact that brideprice had become more popular than brideservice. One older man lamented that "any man can now come and take my daughter", and had likened girls to prostitutes because they could be exchanged for payments in cash. There are various ways to interpret this opinion. For one, brideprice shifted the balance of power and wealth away from the bride's family. At the same time, the combination of brideprice and neolocality also shifted power and social control away from older people and into the hands of the young. Furthermore, it deprived affines of male and female labour which would contribute to the maintenance of their homestead and ensure steady cultivation of their fields. In the early 1990s it was not uncommon to see older people living in dilapidated homesteads, a symbol of their declining power.

Although clan was the dominant idiom of relatedness in the Zambesi Valley, analytically there were five different types of kinship relations. Each individual existed in a web of kinship the importance of which depended on moralized role expectations, rights, and duties, he possibilities produced by circumstance, and personal and group aspiration. Similar to other sources of identity, the five types of kinship relations I will describe below provided both ways for an individual to become situated in the social world, and sets of possibilities for their future.

First, there was patrilineal kin, known as *wagazi ibodzi* (of the same blood). Second, there was uterine kin, called *wamimba ibodzi*. Third, there were *varoora*, or relatives by marriage. Fourth, was the *sabwira* relationship, a type of 'fictive kinship'. Fifth, there were ancestors, also known as *midzimu*. The first two types were locally acknowledged to be of a biological nature, to have to do with substances within individual bodies which originated in other bodies and thus created the relationship. The second two types were constituted primarily of social relations creating alliances between different lines of kin. And the last form of kinship related to living members of lineages acting in ways beneficial to its integrity.

Clans were constituted by patrilineal kin where an individual shared blood with his father, his father's father, his father's father's father and so on, and also

115

with any brothers of each male ancestor. Additionally, an individual was constituted by *mbeu yamamuna* (seed of a man), the source of life, derived entirely from a biological father or genitor. Blood shared by patrilineal kin constituted the strongest social bond of all. Obligations to patrilineal kin took precedence over all others. Brothers had a moral obligation to look after each other's widows and children. Lineage names (*chidau*) were equivalent to patrilineages who shared the same blood. The Chikunda believed that it was preferable to marry outside of one's *chidau*, while the Korekore did not seem to care. For example, inter-marriage frequently occurred within the Korekore totem, *nzou samanyanga*. But amongst the *marunga* Chikunda, although the preferred marriage was within the clan, there was little marriage between people of the same lineage. Thus, while *marunga* preferred to marry other *marunga*, there was subtle preference for marriage between different lineages. For example, *marunga rosario andrade* intermarried infrequently, preferring to marry *marunga* from other clans and lineages lineages.

Chikunda and Korekore conceptualised patrilineal kin differently. The Korekore described early arrival in Dande through an elaborate genealogy culminating in a pivotal mythical ancestor. The Chikunda, on the other hand, believed that conquest was the means to landownership, and that lineages became important in that way. Because they arrived in Dande after the Korekore, Chikunda royal genealogies were much shallower. There exists colonial record, both British and Portuguese, of the 19th century activities of ancestors of the Chikunda I encountered. In contrast, Korekore ancestors were so remote as to be mythological. The further the ancestor from his descendants, the less important the concept of blood as a means of inclusion and exclusion into a given group. For the Korekore who displayed shallow genealogies, the concept of the pangolin clan, as articulated by mpondoro was important. This idea will be reviewed later.

The other substance received from the genitor, the seed, was different in nature to blood. The idea of one seed for one child spoke to individuality. Thus, in a chain of blood relatives, each ready to fulfill prescribed obligations, the concept of seed stood as a way to create individuals. People were united by food prohibition

(clan) and by blood (lineage), but differentiated by seed. In a milieu where most kinship relations spoke to the constitution and fortification of group affiliation, the concept of seed symbolised individuality. Although individualistic acts were discouraged, the concept of the seed as a separate substance could indicate that the idea of the individual was inherent in local cosmology and not strictly an import from the outside[3]. The articulation of the individual voice in local debate, particularly with the advent of development, posed a serious threat to established hierarchies in Chikafa.

Uterine kin were individuals from the same womb, *wamimba ibodzi*. They were also referred to as *mwana wakumai* (children of the same mother). It was more important to be made of seed from the same origin than to be of the same womb. The womb provided the shelter for seed to grow, in the same way that a woman in a polygynous household possessed her own cooking fire. By acting as a shelter for seed to grow into infants, the role of women was to provide a circumstance for the transformation of substance. In other words, women provided vessels for seed from men to become children who shared their father's blood. Women were also the processors of food which allowed children to grow. A woman's womb and her fire enabled the transformation of the raw materials of male semen and maize meal into the finished social products of children and *ntsima*, porridge. Where men were the source of life, women were its "transformers". Female roles carrying high status were all transformative roles. For instance, once a woman gave birth to a child, she was no longer addressed by the term *sisi* (young girl, Miss) but instead as *amai* (mother). To this title was added the eldest male child's name. So if the first child's name was William, the woman would be known as "amai William". Once a

---

3

In times of strife, problems were framed locally as a tension between individual interests emanating from foreign areas and those of the community. Thus, a common theme in witchcraft accusations was that of individual interests in competition with the good of the community. In this way, when individual initiatives conflicted with the power of Chiefs, represented by the local land spirit, these were framed as negative foreign influences rather than as legitimate components of local debate.

woman's children had children of their own she became *ambuya* (in Korekore) or *ayavhu* (in Chikunda), a term of address generally used for senior post-menopausal women. The transformative role of mother had been the principal way in which a woman could gain status until the MZP brought female land ownership in its design and a number of business opportunities for women.

Another high profile female role in Dande was that of *nchembere*, a ritual specialist responsible for the organisation of menarche and marriage ceremonies, as well as a marriage broker. Post-menopausal women usually filled this position. One former responsibility of the *nchembere* had been to conduct virginity tests of prospective brides. Also, she organized the menarche ceremony which involved a girl spending time in a hut at her parents' homestead for the duration of her first menstruation. During this time the *nchembere* taught the girl skills regarding the absorption of menstrual blood with cloths (which in the past had a ritual significance), and about sexual relations with her future husband. In the past, this instruction was couched in a beer-ritual which involved sexually suggestive dancing on the part of the *nchembere* and much drinking of beer, both activities considered unacceptable for women of child-bearing age. I did not attend a menarche ritual as these were rare in the 1990s, although specialists were available if requested.

Perhaps a significant point to emphasize is that the *nchembere*'s role as organizer of female rituals could be filled by a senior uterine relative (usually mother's elder sister). It is also important to note that in some newer Christian churches, the role of the *nchembere* in preparing girls for marriage was fulfilled by pastors' wives, often women of child-bearing age. Interestingly, pastors' wives derived their status from their husbands' position, not through age or apprenticeship with a female relative. One interpretation of this change could be that a locus of female power, maintained through a ritual role, had been appropriated by newer male-dominated belief systems.

If we accept the social role of females as primarily transformative, brideservice and brideprice can be considered as compensation paid to a girl's

118

family for the loss of her labour. Girls performed many household tasks, such as cooking and gardening, which enabled the continuity of members. When a woman left her parents' homestead, there was no loss of substance (blood or semen) but instead a loss of labour. Her new role in her husband's family became a conduit for the perpetuation of his line, through nurturing of his seed, and cooking for his relatives. Thus *nkuni*, the marriage payment compensating a woman's family for wood cut to keep her warm in childhood, symbolized the groom's willingness to pay for his bride's transformation into adulthood, and alluded to her future role as a conduit for the continuation of his lineage.

Marriage relatives were called *varoora.*. At first glance marriages seemed to be economic and political alliances to perpetuate a man's line. However, within these parameters existed many partnerships constructed by social convention but cemented by love, affection, and shared experience. Statements such as, "Felipa is old now, but when she was young she was beautiful" depicted the admiration which created bonds enabling couples to endure the droughts, deaths of children, and migrations which made life in the Zambesi Valley difficult. Marriage practices changed over time with influences brought by trade, migration, and other circumstances related to livelihood. They have also varied according to shifting moral conventions. Generally, interest in custom was greater in lineages of higher rank. For example, in Kanyemba area, a non-Marunga woman told me that her "husband" had not made payments to her family, and that she had simply started to live with him. She also emphasised that "marriage is for rich people". Thus, if no status and no property were at stake, then there existed little interest in marriage prescriptions. Although ideal rules of marriage and locality were articulated by informants, it is important to keep in mind that affect and rank greatly affected whether these were put into practice.

Sabwira relations, a form of fictive kinship, are established between members of different lineages. *Sabwira* are inherited, but a measure of acceptance of newcomers is that an established family agrees to enter into that relationship with newcomers. A close examination of *sabwira* relations can show patterns of

119

settlement in areas, as well as degrees of acceptance of newcomers. The function of this type of relationship is to situate individuals in space and time, ie. make them kin. I was told that, without a *sabwira*, a person is like a slave. Ideally, the *sabwira* relationship was one of mutual burial responsibility. It was also described as a mutual aid agreement but, I was told it was rarely put into practice as people turned first to their patrilineal kin in times of need. During the drought, when I asked people if they had approached their *sabwira* for help, invariably the reply was that the *sabwira* was also in need and could not respond. In these terms this was a relationship based on equity of position and circumstance. It was also a relationship crucial to the local construction of personhood. *Sabwira* played a pivotal role in funeral procedures which ensured that the spirit of the deceased made the appropriate journey into the realm of the ancestors. Thus, to have no *sabwira* meant that a proper life-course stage could not be accomplished, and that the person had no social support. Some informants in Chikafa mentioned that, with changes in settlement patterns brought about by the MZP, people in other areas were beginning to strike up *sabwira* relations as a substitute for blood or uterine kin.

The fifth type of kinship relation is couched in an idiom of clan and concerns the relationship between local people and their *mpondoro* (land spirit). In this instance, the focus is not on relationships between members of clans or lineages, but rather on a connection made between a land spirit and the people who live within his territory. The relationship between the living and spirits is articulated through the idiom of clanship where the spirit is 'father' or primary male ancestor and the locals are his children. This important relationship can, nevertheless, become tenuous depending on current circumstance. Athough the Zambesi Valley was mapped according to spirit territories, these spirits only existed through the auspices of locals. If at a given time local people supported *mpondoro* and his medium, then the connection with the pivotal ancestor would become relevant. But if the shrine was not supported then *mpondoro* would be dormant until there was renewed support. Generally, in difficult circumstances when people felt some anxiety, there would be support for all ancestral spirits, including *mpondoro*. In the Zambesi, ancestors became important during both the

Independence War and the drought of 1992.

iii. The People of Kanyemba:

Cutshall(1990) conducted a survey of Kanyemba area in which he noted the existence of three main ethnic groups: Dema; Korekore; and Chikunda. The Chikunda were the largest group and dominated political and economic life. Their group consisted of the ruling *marunga rosario andrade* clan which was subdivided into three lineages which should have ideally alternated control of the Chieftaincy. Chief Chapoto, the head of the Chihumbe lineage had, in fact, ruled Kanyemba area since the 1940s.

Kanyemba was the seat of the only Chikunda chieftaincy in Zimbabwe, a circumstance which resulted from the creation of a boundary between Portuguese and British territories during the late 1800s. Chief Chapoto, who is now deceased, ruled from 1945 until 1997(see Illustration 1). *Marunga* owned most of the arable land on which they grew mainly maize, as well as some vegetables (see Figure 2). They also owned the greatest number of goats. Most headmen in Kanyemba were Chikunda (either descendants of *marunga* conquerors or descendants of their lieutenants). In fact, members of this group held most of the influential positions available which included both the longer established roles of Chief and headman, and the new administrative jobs of Ward Councilor[4], VIDCO chairmen, and game warden. Chief Chapoto ruled through Customary Law, which is entrenched in the Zimbabwean constitution, and his networks of supporters. During fieldwork there was a dispute regarding succession to the chieftaincy. At first glance the argument seemed to rest on differing interpretations of the rules of inheritance, which stated that the chieftaincy should alternate between descendants of the three sons of Chowufombo, the founding *marunga* ancestor. But, in truth, the descendants of Kanyemba had consolidated quite a base of influence through their appropriation of almost all committee positions in the area.

---

[4]

Between 1980 and 1993 there were five Ward Councillors, four of which were Chikunda from the *marunga rosario andrade* (chiefly) line.

Chief Chapoto's ancestor, Chihumbe, was the elder brother of the warlord, Kanyemba, who was known to have brought the Chikunda people from Tete province to Dande. Specifically, Kanyemba, brought with him various lieutenants who were described as Chikunda but who bore non-*marunga* clan names. These were the people who settled the area along the Mwadzamutanda River and who later became *sabukhu*. In 1945, at the beginning of his reign, Chief Chapoto had 17 *sabukhu* under his rule in Kanyemba, 1 in the adjacent Angwa area, and 6 in Chikafa area. In the 1990s Chapoto's rule was limited to the Kanyemba area where there were 13 *sabhuku* (headmen). The Chief listed the 'tribes' of 10 of these sabuku: 3 Tande; 1 Chewa; 2 Shangwe (from Karoi); 2 Chikunda of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan; 1 Tavara (from Mozambique); and 1 Dema (*tembo mvura*). All of these headmen, with the exception of the Dema individual, could also be locally classified under the rubric "Chikunda" because all came into the area at the time of conquest.

It is useful to remember that the name 'Chikunda' derives from the verb 'kukunda', meaning 'to conquer'. Because there was some local debate as to whether the Dema preceded or arrived in Dande with the Chikunda, this group was not classified under that umbrella. That male individuals from such disparate 'tribes' could fall under the same category of Chikunda illustrated the nature of the group's social organisation: that the *marunga rosario andrade* people were the military leaders and decision-makers and that the other groups consisted of their followers. According to *marunga* lore, these followers were acquired as Chikunda warlords moved through the Zambesi Valley conquering territories. Thus the present-day Chikunda label refers to a group of people organised into a two-tier social system of rulers and followers, whose relative positions and relationship during the 1990s were set at the time of conquest. As a result of this longstanding hierarchy, most *sabukhu* were descendants of either the conquerors or of their lieutenants.

In Kanyemba, decision-making with regard to land use and dispute settlement was overwhelmingly in the hands of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan.

The Korekore did not figure in these older forms of authority simply because they had no role in the initial conquest. Although there was one Dema (*tembo mvura* clan), the *sabukhu* had very little influence in the area. For one, there was the fact that the people he represented cultivated the poorest land in the settlement and existed in an economic relationship to Chikunda which was disadvantageous. At the same time, their marginalisation continued post-Independence as they held no positions within the newer administrative structures. For instance, it would have been crucial to the interests of the Dema to be represented on the Wildlife Committee because of its influence over the CAMPFIRE scheme which greatly affected their livelihood. Little account was taken of the effects of this scheme on the lives of the *tembo mvura*. During one meeting of the Wildlife Committee at which the Chairman, the Ward Councillor, and a Senior Ecologist from the Parks Department were present, relocation of *tembo mvura* households to build a campsite for tourists was discussed without any representation from their group.

In Kanyemba, as stated earlier, *marunga* controlled both the Chieftaincy and post-Independence administrative positions. For example, between 1980 and 1993 there were 4 individuals who filled the position of Ward Councillor, 3 were *marunga rosario andrade*. The exception to this monopoly was the membership of a Korekore man of the *nzou samanyanga* clan, whose position was due his group's classification of long-term residence. Also, this individual was a local shopkeeper and in a position to be well-informed, as well as quite popular.

The Korekore, also agriculturalists, constituted the second largest group in Kanyemba. In local stories, their presence pre-dated the arrival of Chikunda conquerors. Chief Chapoto said that long ago the Korekore had worked as agricultural labourers for the Chikunda. But this was probably his way of saying that the Korekore were of lower status. By other accounts, the Korekore acted as intermediaries between the Chikunda and traders from the east coast of Mozambique in the lucrative ivory trade during the 19th century. A few informants stated that the Korekore, along with the Sori people were in Kanyemba area before the arrival of the Chikunda. They named the Sori Chief as Mburuma, who fought

against Kanyemba and lost. There was at least one Sori lineage left in the area, as my neighbour was a member. The Korekore of Kanyemba supported a Korekore mpondoro in the Angwa region to the southeast.

The smallest of the three major groups, the *tembo mvura* had been hunters, fishers and gatherers in the past. Because they had been forcibly settled during the Independence War, and because the CAMPFIRE program forbade hunting, many *tembo mvura* had little choice but to work for the Chikunda as field labourers. The only *tembo mvura* headman in the settlement lived in Chansato VIDCO, on the western side of the Mwadzamatanda River, along with his followers.

By some oral accounts, the *tembo mvura* pre-dated the Chikunda in Kanyemba. However, other stories depicted various patterns of migration and settlement into the Kanyemba area, and into the social space that was shared with the dominant Chikunda. Prominent Chikunda described the Dema as originating in Tete and having arrived in Kanyemba with the Chikunda leaders who were their masters. For example, Chief Chapoto said that Chowufombo, the founding ancestor of his lineage, took the *tembo mvura* from their original place on Songo Mountain in Mozambique. But that it was Chowufombo's son, Chihumbe (one of three brothers who conquered Kanyemba area), who brought the Dema with him as porters when he came into Kanyemba from Nyungwe (Tete). Other informants, particularly of the *tembo mvura* group, recounted that the people followed their own leaders (mostly lineage elders) to the area either from Tete or unspecified places. The current *tembo mvura sabhuku* told me that his father was the first to hold the position, and that he had brought the *tembo mvura* people to the Kanyemba area

What seems certain is that the fortunes of the *tembo mvura* people have fluctuated over the past century. What I can glean from oral histories is the following. The first generation of *tembo mvura* existed in a better relationship with other inhabitants of Kanyemba than they did in the 1990s. They also lived then on the western shores of the Mwadzamutanda River and into the mountains. One account stated that the *tembo mvura* "have one father" called Nyamupango, who

used to be their leader but died and became *mpondoro* of Chewore area. But since Nyamupango's death was said to have occurred after Kanyemba's, the latter became the senior *mpondoro*. Thus, Nyamupango's spirit territory resided within Kanyemba's. The junior relationship of one *mpondoro* to another was indicative of the relative status of their followers: that the Chikunda were superior to the *tembo mvura* irrespective of how the groups had come into contact. In another account, a Chikunda *sabhuku* said that the *tembo mvura* used to clap to (ie. support) *mpondoro* in Angwa area who called Chinyenzva. The informant did not specify if this spirit was related genealogically to the *tembo mvura* people or whether he was Korekore. But since the death of this *mpondoro*'s medium, no new candidate had emerged and so the *tembo mvura* began to clap to Chikwamba who was also a Korekore *mpondoro*. It seems that the *tembo mvura* do not want to be under Chikunda domination, look for alternate means of representation, but remain crucially tied to them for their livelihood.

At the time of this study the allegiances of the *tembo mvura* seemed to be divided between the Korekore who were generally considered to have preceded both the Chikunda and the *tembo mvura*, and to whose land spirit they clapped, and the Chikunda Chief who held the power to allocate land, and through whom they were ruled by the state, directly through Customary Law, and indirectly through the huge effect that CAMPFIRE had on their lives. In this way, they lived socially, economically, and politically marginalised lives, within the jurisdictions of others, but outside of their families. In other words, they had avoided incorporation into ruling lineages in opposition to other Zambesians, ie. alliances of marriage, warfare, trade, or friendship. This position had led them to be constructed as 'other', existing in the balance between identification with the Korekore who did not accept them, and the Chikunda who considered them to be inferior.

Tembo mvura informants seemed to give contradictory accounts with regard to their recent past. On the one hand, I was told that the current generation of elderly *tembo mvura* man in Kanyemba had possessed cultivatable land in the past from which, in conjunction with the procurement of wild foods, they had made

a living. Other accounts stated that in the previous generation *tembo mvura* had lived in the mountains to the west of the Mwadzamutanda River. In these stories people pointed to their birthplaces situated at a number of streams in this mountain range. During the Independence War, *tembo mvura* people were forced to settle in Kanyemba area as part of the Rhodesian government's policy of concentrating African populations in definable areas. In the early 1990s these people lived in the most marginal parts of Kanyemba area. The two different versions of the *tembo mvura* past point, I think, to a pattern of livelihood which incorporated hunting and fishing in what became the Chewore safari area, mixed with enough farming to provide a basic supply of cereal. As hunter-gatherers the *tembo mvura* would have moved within whatever was their ranging area at the time of the year which would account for the birth of some members in the mountains. Thus, I believe that the *tembo mvura* had in the past a more varied livelihood due to better access to local resources, but were gradually deprived of mobility and agricultural land so that in the 1990s they found themselves at the mercy of the Chikunda rulers in Kanyemba.

It is difficult to discern when the gaping opposition between Chikunda and *tembo mvura*, and 'civilised' and 'wild', became important in Kanyemba. The denomination, *Dema* (a pejorative term applied to the *tembo mvura*), appeared in Portuguese colonial records, and was applied to individuals in Dande who preferred to be known as Chikunda, Korekore, Ntsenga or as members of other groups[5]. These people were in a difficult position because they were classified by others with a label that they themselves rejected because of its undesirability. Yet this particular group exhibited characteristics which differentiated them from the Korekore. Although their principal language was chiKorekore, which some people thought they spoke with a distinctive accent, they used Chikunda for work and local

---

[5]

In his memoir, "Divagacoes Historicas Sobre o Distrito de Tete" (Historical Wanderings in Tete District), 1944, the Portuguese adventurer, Jose Fernandes Jr., wrote that the Dema people lived near Cabora Bassa in the Nhanterezi mountains. He wrote that in the past, "it was said that they were a peaceful people who would pay tribute to aggressors without offering resistance" (1944:19, my translation).

126

meetings. Perhaps most significantly, the clan name of this group was not shared by either Korekore or Chikunda. The stated food prohibitions associated with this label were related to big game. For example, the *tembo mvura sabhuku* said that he once ate elephant and broke out in spots, a condition which had also affected his parents. Similarly, he did not eat hippopotamus. On the other hand, his father's father who originated in Tete area could eat elephant without experiencing dire consequences. It would seem, then, that the food prohibition attached to the identity of *tembo mvura* developed with the process of settlement into Kanyemba area and the social, economic, and political hierarchies that this process entailed. The versions of oral history presented by the dominant Chikunda clearly stated that big game hunting was the preserve of their ancestors who brought guns into the area. These Chikunda stories underlined the notion that other peoples used spears to hunt smaller animals and were therefore inferior. It is unclear from oral histories why the *tembo mvura* settled in Kanyemba in earlier times, when the present-day social composition of the area was beginning to take shape. However, it was clear from their position in the 1990s that they were socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged.

The genealogy of the *tembo mvura sabhuku* was three generations deep whereas those of the various Chikunda sabhuku spanned five or six generations. Many *tembo mvura* were not interested in discussing genealogy. In fact, it was very difficult to obtain interviews with members of this group as they believed that outsiders wanted information which would compound their image as socially inferior, and serve to exploit them further. Their concern with public image was not related to social prestige, but rather to the anxiety that the more known about them, the more they could be constructed as peculiar and not deserving of a fair share of resources. As a result, the contact I had with these people was mostly in the guise of informal visits to homesteads, of men dropping by my camp, at local meetings such as for food aid distribution, and in the vicinity of the clinic. Whereas members of the Chikunda group, and particularly of the ruling *marunga rosario andrade* clan, were very interested in imparting their views to me, the *tembo mvura* searched for invisibility.

127

Tembo mvura informants claimed that their parents and grandparents hunted *kasenye* and *pembwe* (antelope), but that they did not hunt elephant because this was not possible with spears, their principal hunting weapon. Their ancestors did not make guns, they said, a feature which distinguished them from the Chikunda who claimed that they brought gun-making technology, acquired from the Portuguese, into Kanyemba area. According to both *tembo mvura* and Chikunda accounts, these people used to eat wild plants and honey in the bush. In the 1990s, a *tembo mvura* person would not volunteer any knowledge about wild foods in the belief that this could contribute to their image as uncivilised. They also worried that exposing knowledge of the bush might infer that they had been in the bush poaching. However on visits to *tembo mvura* homesteads I saw foodstuffs, such as wild okra and *ntsapani* (the leaves of a shrub). Although illegal and despite the danger of imprisonment, some hunting was conducted with spears and by setting traps. The *tembo mvura* cultivated small parcels of land (half an acre or less) on which they grew maize and vegetables such as rape, pumpkin, and sweet potato. There was some fishing with poles, the use of nets also being illegal. Fishing with nets was the cultural preserve of the Chikunda who described particular methods of cooking fish as markers of group identity[6]. The CAMPFIRE program prohibited residents of Dande from fishing with nets.

In the 1990s, the *tembo mvura* lived in homes of meager construction, on small parcels of land. Along with the economic activities described above, they also laboured in fields owned by Chikunda for payment in money, maize, or goods. A few men acted as trackers at the safari hunting camp, and there was occasional pot-making for sale to foreigners. The *tembo mvura* were the poorest of the inhabitants of Kanyemba. They inhabited and cultivated the most marginal land in the area. According to their *sabhuku*, Chief Chapoto's control over land allocation had been disadvantageous to his constituents. Their access to wild food was

---

[6]

Chikunda say that fish must be cooked with water in a clay pot between sunrise and midday until the bones become soft enough to eat.

128

impeded by the CAMPFIRE program. They held no influential political positions, although they were represented by a headman. They earned very little maize by working for Chikunda farmers, about one small vegetable basket of dried maize kernels per day. They were contracted mostly for weeding and paid either by the day or by the line of maize plants they finished per day. The pay was usually in the form of maize, an item of clothing, or rarely money.

It was difficult to know what *tembo mvura* informants thought of other groups. In contrast, the Chikunda held quite emphatic and highly vocalised views regarding the *tembo mvura*. In general, these opinions related to the *tembo mvura* unsuitability as partners in social, political, and economic relationships. But, as strong as the impulse to marginalise the *tembo mvura* was, there were exceptions to their exclusion in the form of occasional marriages, and *sabwira*[7] relations. Because of their infrequency, these relations might appear to be token gestures, but they were important because they were proof, despite the rhetoric, of the ongoing relationship between Chikunda and their long-term neighbours. One of Chief Chapoto's "policemen" (men who acted as informants, guards, and enforcers of his rules) was from that subjugated clan. I learned that he did not advise the Chief but rather kept him informed with regard to Chansato VIDCO, the *tembo mvura* area.

In constructing the *tembo mvura* as inferior, the Chikunda found an opportunity to create a group opposition which better served their aims as rulers. Although the Chikunda thought they were socially superior in Dande, their construction of the *tembo mvura* as "wild" facilitated their own self-image as civilised. At various times I was told that before the arrival of the Chikunda, local people had no notion of cultivation because they spent their time poking at their fields with digging sticks whilst wearing skins and bark. When their ancestors arrived, Chikunda informants related, they brought metal implements for more

---

[7]

This is a relationship which is created by a beer ritual. It involves lineages in mutual burial responsibilities. It is also a mutual assistance agreement and a joking relationship. Essentially, it is a way to incorporate suitable outsiders into the local community.

effective cultivation, cloth so that people could be properly clothed, guns that would facilitate hunting, and beads for the purposes of marriage. In their accounts of the past, the Chikunda stressed the opposition between civilisation and wildness.

In order to illustrate the perceived inferiority of the *tembo mvura*, one Chikunda informant began a story with the assertion, "their *gwanga* (granary) is the hoe and the axe". He then explained that in the morning the man took his axe, the woman picked up her hoe and that they then walked in different directions. In other words, the implication was that the *tembo mvura* lacked both the technology and the social organisation to farm effectively. This informant also described the practice of women gathering wild plants and men hunting animals and looking for honey as unproductive. The Chikunda perceived the *tembo mvura* as unable to produce stores of grain and ridiculed them for this, thus articulating the notion that this clan did not deserve good land and that it was not unfair to exclude them from its distribution. In addition, this particular Chikunda informant regarded the fact that *tembo mvura* women had started to make pots for sale as an improvement in their lifestyle and attributed this change to the beneficial influence of his own group.

In a discussion about marriage, another Chikunda informant was very clear in distinguishing between the suitability of Korekore and *tembo mvura* wives. He said that the Chikunda preferred to marry Korekore women because the *tembo mvura* were considered dirty. He also stated that most Korekore looked to marry other members of their group and that they would travel to the neighbouring Angwa area to do so. With this statement he articulated the notion that, regardless of tembo mvura aspirations to be considered Korekore, the fact remained that this group did not consider them to be suitable marriage partners. In other words, although people of the *tembo mvura* clan might claim to be of the Korekore group, actual Korekore (ie. *Nzou samanyanga*) regarded them as outsiders.

Social hierarchy in Kanyemba was easily identified. Two tiers of the Chikunda group, the *marunga* and their historical followers, occupied the top strata while the Korekore occupied the middle level, and the *tembo mvura* resided at the

130

bottom.

iv. The People of Chikafa:

Chikafa is a village situated on the shores of the Mpanyame River close to the Mozambican border. It was part of a Village Development committee comprised of six villages (VIDCO). It was administrated by a Chikunda headman and a Korekore Village Chairman. Technically, Chitsungo was Chief of the area but, because he resided elsewhere, had no influence locally. The hereditary headman and the Village Chairman enjoyed a friendly relationship and worked well together. They made major decisions, particularly regarding land distribution, in conjunction with local *mpondoro*.

Physically, Chikafa area is relatively flat. To the east lies a forested area, to the west the Mpanyame River, to the south a cluster of villages, and to the north Mozambique and Chikafa's sister village of Chitete. Cross-border relations were frequent during my stay. In the early 1990s Chikafa had a primary school, a clinic, several boreholes, a soccer field, and a main dirt road leading into Mozambique. The American Evangelical Mission built the school and clinic, but departed in about1970 as the Independence War reached Chikafa. Services in Chikafa were used by Mozambicans on a regular basis. Nurses' aides at the clinic said that they often treated people who did not possess Zimbabwean identity papers. Similarly, during the drought of 1991-92 some Mozambican families received maize from Zimbabwean drought relief programs.

I conducted two surveys of Chikafa village, during the drought in 1992 and afterward in 1993. Although Survey II includes more information and is better elaborated, comparison of the results of these two surveys illustrates demographic and livelihood changes which occurred as a result of drought[8].

Survey I counted 60 households, 28 of which were Chikunda and 20 of which were Korekore.. The remaining 12 households were of at least 4 other ethnic

---

[8] Data from surveys I and II are available in Appendices 1 and 2.

groups, taking into account that 6 households did not respond. Of the Chikunda households, 16 were of the *marunga* (pigeon) clan, 3 of the *nzou* (elephant) clan also associated with the Korekore ethnic group. A further 3 clan names were ascribed to groups from northeastern parts of the Zambesi Valley. Of the Korekore households, 7 were of the elephant clan, the largest within that group, 6 of the monkey clan, 2 of the zebra clan, and 2 of the eland clan. The last three clans were minorities within the Korekore ethnic group and represented people who migrated to the area from the northeast of the Zambesi Valley. In 1992 the most popular religion was the cult of the *mpondoro* Negomo. 27 of 60 households surveyed included members who attended possession ceremonies. Roman Catholicism, the second most popular religion, allowed members to support the *mpondoro*.

Survey II counted 76 households, 42 Chikunda and 28 Korekore. The remaining households were of 6 different ethnic groups. Of the clans listed, 25 were *marunga*, 17 *nzou samanyanga*, and 10 *tembo mazvimbakupa*. Of the religions practiced in 1993, 18 households supported a combination of the Catholic Church and the *mpondoro*, 13 attended *mpondoro* ceremonies, 6 were Evangelical and *mpondoro*, and 1 was Jehovah's Witness and *mpondoro*. Hence, 38 households supported Nyamanindi. The greatest number of households which did not support the land spirit belonged to the new Johan Masowe Church.

Both during and after the drought about half of Chikafa households supported Nyamanindi, the local *mpondoro*, an unsurprising fact as his primary function was rain-making. Another reason for Nyamanindi's popularity was that the *mpondoro*'s cult became the focal point for political process at a time of both great social change as well as little opportunity to challenge the government.

During the drought many residents left Chikafa in search of work and trading opportunities, thus the ratio of Chikunda to Korekore was closer in 1992 than in 1993. Drought ended when rain fell in November of 1992, followed by a harvest in 1993. By the time I embarked on Survey II many residents, including departed Chikunda, had returned to their homes and fields.

Chikafa was an interesting study in social organisation and political life.

Although ruled by a Korekore land spirit, an elected Korekore Village Chairman, and falling into the area of a Korekore Chief, the majority of residents were Chikunda, as was the *sabhuku*. Political process was shared between the Chikunda *sabhuku* and the Korekore headman. A variety of committees held proportionate numbers of Chikunda and Korekore. While the Chikunda headman had the support of the majority of the population since these were Chikunda, the Village Chairman had been elected and also enjoyed significant support. However, the fact that the majority of the population believed that ultimate power resided with the *mpondoro* represented a common interest shared by the Korekore and the Chikunda. When foreign development schemes arrived in Chikafa in the early 1990s, collective support of Nyamanindi and Negomo, a neighbouring senior *mpondoro*, provided the basis for the identity of 'long-term' resident which developed in relation to the arrival of new migrants.

Landownership was perhaps the greatest indication of the shared interests of Chikunda and Korekore in Chikafa in the early 1990s. Of a total of 323.25 acres, the Chikunda owned 166 acres and the Korekore 133 acres. These patterns of landownership had been set during the early 20th century as the result of conquest, subordination and migration, and were felt to be greatly threatened by development. Whereas in Kanyemba, primary identities resided with clan and lineage, in Chikafa the overarching opposition was between long-term resident and newcomer. So powerful was the shared identity of long-term resident that the historical differences between these two groups became obscured. Korekore individuals, with their shallow genealogies of three generations, had in the past rallied around Negomo, and that spirit's declamations of a glorious mythological past, to be situated within broader Korekore society in the Zambesi. They had also adopted newer positions provided by the ZANU government. In contrast, elder Chikunda recounted family genealogies five generations deep and past allegiance to a Chikunda conqueror in support of their rights to land and power. But, in light of the perceived threat posed by development and new immigrants, these two longstanding groups had put their differences aside to present a united front to foreigners. In Chapter 9 I will discuss a witchcraft accusation which illustrated the

133

overwhelming preoccupation with foreigners in Chikafa and the unity between lineage elders of the Korekore and Chikunda groups.

The pattern of settlement of Chikafa was similar to that of Kanyemba. In oral history accounts, at the time of the Chikunda conquest of Dande, 7 lieutenants of the warlord Kanyemba traveled south to conquer the Chikafa area. Of these 7 men, 5 were *marunga rosario andrade*, 1 was Ntsereru and 1 was Chewa. The Chikafa area fell under the jurisdiction of Chief Chapoto until the 1970s when locals voted to be governed by Chief Chitsungo who was Korekore. In the 1990s the local headmen were Chikunda, and the practice of rule established at the time of conquest remained. It is important to note that Chikunda rule was never as firmly entrenched in Chikafa as it was in Kanyemba area because their conquest there was incomplete. According to oral accounts, Chikunda shared power with the Korekore since their arrival. That both groups support the *mpondoro* who acts as an organizing principle in Chikafa society is indicative of the relatively equal balance of powers between these two groups.

Since the establishment of the post-colonial state and the creation of positions falling under its governing structure, the influence of members of the Chikunda group had become further diluted. For example, the Ward Councilor, the Village Development Committee chairman, and the Village Chairman were all Korekore. These were the influential decision-making bodies in Chikafa as they deliberated on land use, placement of mills and boreholes, food aid, clinic business, and, very importantly in light of the land resettlement scheme, the terms of eligibility for residence. In Chikafa village, although the authority of the Chikunda *sabhuku* was both moral and practical, because of power-sharing with the Village Chairman, the moral dimension tended to carry the heavier emphasis. He consulted with the mpondoro regarding rain-making, disputes between people, and land allocation. However, decisions were made after lengthy discussion with the Village Chairman. The relationship between sabhuku and Village Chairman was amicable because these two men had compatible personalities, had lived in the same area for a long time, and, as long-term residents had interests in common.

The Chikunda ruled differently in Chikafa and Kanyemba. By not having appropriated the shrine of the land spirit in Chikafa as they had in Kanyemba, the nature of their conquest there was forever incomplete with the consequence that a certain measure of power-sharing with the Korekore had become necessary. Marriage patterns were one indication of a longstanding alliance between Chikunda and Korekore in this area. The easy relationship between the *sabhuku* and the Village Chairman was also an example of this association. In Chikafa, the organisation of identities into constellations of fluid relationships between long-established lineages differed significantly from the patterns of power in Kanyemba. While clan, lineage, and *tribe* were of some relevance in Chikafa in the 1990s, identity began to be couched in the oppositions between local and foreign interests, inter-generational conflict, and changing gender relations. These new identities were underpinned by innovative and ideas regarding land and ecology, political process, and livelihood

v. Summary:

I began this chapter by suggesting that to best understand the different ways in which inhabitants of Kanyemba and Chikafa dealt with innovations brought by development, it was important to grasp the cultural logic of autochthony and conquest pervasive within the Zambesi. I suggested that the trajectory of Dande area from marginal and magical to inhabitable was mirrored in the Zimbabwean state's journey from autochthon to conqueror in the minds of Zambesians. In order to apprehend the full meaning of this change it was important to understand the system of kinship in Dande and the nature of the populations in both fieldsites.

Chapter 5 expands on issues of domination and representation by examining the cult of *mpondo*ro in Chikafa and Kanyemba. While these land spirits represented moral order, particularly in their rain-making capacity, they also contributed to the nature of political organisation in each of the settlements researched.

Chapter 5: Spirits and Chiefs: The Cult of the *Mpondoro*

i. *Mpondoro*: An Introduction

Chapter 4 discussed issues of autochthony and conquest through an examination of how kinship relations affected social and political organization in Chikafa and Kanyemba. In it I argued that it was important to address variants of kinship because these articulated the principles of incorporation and subjugation through which local societies dealt with change brought by foreign influence. It was also suggested that the basis of Zambesian disenchantment with the Mugabe regime during the 1990s resided with the perception that their support of guerillas during the Independence War had been betrayed by the state through its promotion of development schemes. In this way, the ZANU regime which was constructed as autochthonous at Independence became represented as conquerors a decade later.

During the 1990s, the system of *mpondoro* or land spirits expressed preoccupations with autochthony and conquest, in this way playing a crucial role in political process. In this chapter, I argue that while *mpondoro* represented moral order, the system was predominantly a philosophy of governance through Chieftaincy. Through the structure of each shrine, land spirits gave voice to a localised discourse of Chieftaincy. In Chikafa, Chiefs and mpondoro represented a moral order to which all Zambesians belonged. In Kanyemba, the only active land spirit represented one faction within a succession dispute. During the 1980s David Lan found that this system expressed an opposition between African and European, while in the 1990s I observed that it gave voice to the conflict between local and foreign interests in Chikafa, but served as an instrument of domination in Kanyemba.

All *mpondoro* belonged to one system in the Zambesi (see Illustration 2); however, they existed in a hierarchy related to functions of rain-making, territoriality, and bureaucracy. Because research for this study extended to two settlements, I had the opportunity to encounter *mpondoro* who performed each of these important functions. In Chikafa, Negomo had rain-making power while Nyamanindi represented a principle of territorial integrity. In Kanyemba area, the land spirit Kanyemba

personified lineage interests with regard to the *marunga rosario andrade* monopoly (see Maps 3 and 4).

Because this study is about domination, I will examine two ways in which land spirits supported Chieftaincy. In Chikafa, *mpondoro* supported a political process characterised by a power sharing arrangement between a Chikunda headman and a Korekore Village Chairman who ruled in place of the absentee Chief Chitsungo. With the arrival of development, and then drought, this alliance was severely tested. There the resurgence of interest in spirits during the 1990s served as focal point for a discourse of regional identity in opposition to foreign influences. In Kanyemba, rule by the *marunga rosario andrade* clan was reinforced by the *mpondoro*, who at the same time promoted his own lineage for control of the Chieftaincy. In this instance, the spirit deliberated exclusively on localised lineage and clan matters. Whereas in Chikafa, *mpondoro* articulated a discourse of Chieftaincy by alliance, in Kanyemba the active land spirit espoused Chieftaincy as legitimate domination through conquest.

In addition to its political dimension, the system of *mpondoro* also functioned both as a source of advice about morality as well as the business of everyday life. For instance, it was not unusual to hear Negomo declaim a set of rules regarding proper social conduct and then give instructions that trees should not be cleared from a certain area. Of course, moral authority was directly related to a spirit's rain-making power, which gave Kanyemba no footing to deliberate on those matters.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the knowledge of *mpondoro*, particularly as it related to issues of cosmology and bureaucracy. Then there will be an examination of their interactions with Chiefs and function as producers of discourses of Chieftaincy. Shrines could not function without the work of mediums and assistants, both roles to be examined. Finally, I will examine the structure of possession ceremonies in order to demonstrate how the integrated system of spirits, mediums, assistants, and constituents functions to produce the discourse which supports the specialised function of each land shrine, whether rain-making, territorial or bureaucratic.

The whole of the Zambesi Valley is mapped into "spirit provinces" (Garbett

137

1969) (see maps 1, 2, 3 and 4). Within these provinces, which were demarcated by physical boundaries such as rivers and mountains, resided a *mpondoro* believed to be the spirit of the dead Chief who was said to have conquered the area. Sacred places within these territories such as pools, groves, burial grounds, and the medium's homestead were a testament to the conquering Chief's stewardship of the environment and its inhabitants.(see map 1).

One elderly informant described the land spirits as "people who lived and died and came back to life *(kuramuka)*...in the place where they lived". Throughout the Zambesi Valley the cult of *mpondoro* was uniform in terms of the structure of the shrines, the procedure for possession ceremonies, the participation of ritual specialists, and the necessity for supporters. However, because there were three categories of mpondoro, ranked in importance according to the principles of autochthony and conquest, there were also differences in the roles they fulfilled within communities.

Within the Zambesi Valley the hierarchy of spirits was based on Korekore myths of arrival, but also included the more recent Chikunda conquerors (see Genealogy 3). In this schema the senior rain-making figure was the Korekore Mutota, however ultimate rain-making power resided with the autochthonous Musuma. Lan collected five Korekore myths of arrival in the Zambesi Valley which described how the Korekore encountered the autochthons (1985: 75-83). In his analysis, Lan noted that in all of these myths the conquering Korekore deferred to autochthons' superior rain-making powers. The Korekore also took wives from autochthons thereby transforming them into bride-givers, and themselves into sons-in-law. The logic of this practice was well-illustrated by Lan:

> "If one lineage supplies another with the fertility it needs to perpetuate itself, it will be partially reciprocated by a marriage payment or labour but the debt is so great that the wife-giving lineage remains in a position of superiority with a call on services of the wife-takers when the initial exchange has been completed"
>
> (1985:86).

In these stories, autochthons became a source of ongoing fertility to the conquerors which formed the basis of their rain-making power.

In his pioneering work in the Zambesi, Garbett described land spirits as existing in cognatic and affinal relations within a hierarchy (1969:113). Autochthonous *mpondoro* were positioned in the spirit realm as classificatory sister's sons (*vazukuru*) (1969:107). This relationship was mirrored in the *marunga* marriage prescription where the preferred bride was ego to father's sister's daughter. In other words, the marriage principle of the settled conqueror was one of male exogamy and relegation to the position of affines, thus placing them in perpetual obligation.

An important reason why autochthons held superior ritual power in the Zambesi Valley was their role as classificatory *sabwira* to the conquerors. As discussed earlier, *sabwira* were "fictive" kin whose primary function was to perform funerary rites. The fear of witchcraft which could accompany the death of a relative is one explanation for this role. Lan depicted witches as either members of one's own clan or close affines. He also described the pervasive fear that "witchcraft will strike from *within*" (1985:36-37). *Sabwira* existed between lineages, were inherited patrilineally, and were interacted with on an everyday basis within joking relationships. Often *sabwira* formed agreements of mutual aid.

During the serious drought of 1991-92, informants said that the mutual aid which characterised the *sabwira* relationship had broken down because of widespread suffering. Thus, the *sabwira* relationship alluded to a common predicament and a common destiny, translated by *mpondoro* in the 1990s into a sense of local identity. Additionally, *sabwira* provided a ritual and moral link for new immigrants to a community. In Chikafa, *vazukuru* and *sabwira* were considered autochthonous, a classification based on a principle of first arrival. This was an important mechanism of inclusion because of the history of immigration within that area, a feature accelerated in the 1990s by the MZP. Headmen and *mpondoro* were particularly keen to support this system as it helped to consolidate political process under their tutelage.

In Kanyemba, *sabwira* relations between lineages were of longstanding duration and spoke less to a sense of local community, than to patron-client relations characteristic of political domination. For example, a number of *marunga* were *sabwira* to *tembo mvura*, however, in contrast to Chikafa, these were not relations of

equality or shared predicament. Rather, this association seemed important mostly with regard to funerary rites, where the marginal *tembo mvura* were elevated from classificatory slaves (*akaporo*), linked to their historical subordination, to that of legitimate social participants. Several *marunga* informants were emphatic in the opinion that to have no *sabwira* was to be like a slave, an unacceptable condition where a lineage existed in a community unanchored by kinship. They all believed that it was proper to have *sabwira* who performed the appropriate funerary rites.

There existed a division of labour amongst *mpondoro* dependent on their seniority in the Zambesian pantheon. Senior rain spirits were the autochthonous Dzivaguru, Karuva (Bourdillon: 1978), Musuma (Lan: 1985) and Madzomba. The senior rain-making Korekore spirits were Mutota and Chimombe. The Chikunda spirit I dealt with, Kanyemba and the others I was told about, Chihumbe, Muondoka, and Nyanderu represented later arrival and so dealt with localised issues of a political nature. Autochthonous, Korekore, and Chikunda *mpondoro* could be classified by their respective roles of rain-making, territoriality, and bureaucracy.

Because this study is about domination, I am concerned to examine the role of the cult of *mpondoro* in political process, especially with regard to the opposition between autochthony and conquest intrinsic to that system. Concepts of autochthony can serve to incorporate foreigners into a locality thereby consolidating a sense of common purpose. At the same time, classification as conquerors places newcomers in tenuous hierarchies entailing mechanisms of superiority and subjugation. In one study, Bourdillon suggested that spirits served to unite people against a common enemy, for example, Nehanda and Kaguvi mobilised Africans against Europeans in both wars of liberation 1978:239) (see Illustration 2 and Map 2). Similarly, Garbett argued that the linkage of separate spirit realms through the kin relations of *mpondoro* provided a way for the whole system to mobilise in times of external threat, such as during the rebellion against the British in 1896 (1966:143). I believe that this is the case for rain-makers and territorial land spirits whose incorporation into areas as well as longevity allowed them the power of autochthons. However, Chikunda land spirits were not well ensconced within the kinship system of *mpondoro*, and their rigid social

organisation precluded incorporation. Thus, while they controlled areas they were not, as Garbett described the Korekore, *varidzi vepasi* (owners of the earth) (1966:141). Chikunda *mpondoro* were relegated to the position of conquerors in perpetuity, exercising control over areas and their inhabitants, but neither 'ownership' in the Zambesian sense of the concept which entailed responsibility for social continuity, nor representation outside their clan and lineage.

One important feature of political process in the Zambesi is that the support land spirits receive from constituents waxes and wanes with circumstance. For example, I was told that after the Independence War and throughout most of the 1980s, people in Chikafa lost interest in *mpondoro*, but that their support renewed with the arrival of development and drought in the early 1990s. Similarly, in Kanyemba, in the build-up to the succession dispute, Chief Chapoto's ancestral spirit, Chihumbe remained without a medium, while his rival lineage was represented by the vocal *mpondoro* Kanyemba. Since the 1890s, people in the Zambesi have encountered several foreign states, namely the British, Rhodesians, and the Zimbabwean of the 1990s, which they could not incorporate into their political systems. In these cases, *mpondoro*, even if their powers of representation were limited, provided a form of representation.

ii. The Knowledge of Mpondoro:

In his Ph.D. thesis, *Making History*, David Lan argued that:

"By the nature of their profession, spirit mediums can never be controlled or contained by any one set of political institutions. The *mhondoro* live forever outside and far above the transitory world of human ambition and desire. The only demand they make of their earthly substitutes is that they take care of their descendants and protect the land. Should they fail, they will be abandoned and some other group or class will find itself charged with the care of the community".

(1983:309-310)

Among Korekore rain-makers there is a strong discourse of impartiality with regard to the world of humans. *Mpondoro*, such as Negomo, espoused the view that they were keepers of definitive cosmological knowledge regarding the history of the

141

Zambesi Valley and appropriate moral behaviour which ensured social continuity. In addition, Korekore mediums were construed as bodies to be possessed by their land spirit, but who did not hold any opinion or indeed memory of his actions once out of trance.

Lan's research took place shortly after the Independence War when the cult of *mpondoro* had found strong purpose as a focus of opposition to the Rhodesian army. This was a time of outstanding support from local populations who invested great expectations for political and economic empowerment in this system of belief. Because of their renewed power, the sacredness of *mpondoro*, in the form of stronger social prescriptions and a greater distance from the world of humans, was increased. In light of my own research, I believe that Lan's conclusions regarding the sacredness of these spirits were greatly heightened by the dire predicament of their host populations during the guerilla war. The Independence War encompassed all of the Zambesi Valley, and presented therefore a situation, not seen since the coming of Europeans in the 1890s, in which the whole of the hierarchy of *mpondoro* could be mobilised. With the involvement of rain-makers, territorial spirits, and bureaucrats the system was in a position to produce an integrated discourse. It was this account of the spiritual mobilisation of the whole Zambesi Valley which Lan depicted so eloquently.

My time in the field was characterised by very different circumstances. For one, although the MZP encompassed a large part of the Zambesi Valley, its influence did not extend as far as that of the War. Since Independence, political process had diversified with the introduction of new structures tied to the state (to be reviewed in Chapter 6). Immigration to the area had produced localities which were socially fragmented, despite local mechanisms of incorporation such as the *sabwira* relation. Development schemes introduced contained intrinsic philosophies of decentralization (ideas to be developed in Chapter 7). Also, the nature of the terrain of dense bush, grasslands, and bad roads also lent itself to pockets of remoteness. The Zambesi Valley I encountered consisted of dispersed loci of power where the discourse of Chieftaincy was still relevant, but quite in tune to local issues. In Chikafa, I witnessed renewed interest in *mpondoro* in the wake of the MZP, which increased dramatically

142

as the serious drought took hold. The territorial spirit possessed a medium whose shrine grew in stature with the support of Negomo, a rain-maker, and the campaigning of two vocal assistants. A number of ceremonies took place which gained the support of locals. Slowly, I understood that a discourse of local identity was being constructed which affirmed the power-sharing arrangement of Chikunda and Korekore in existence since Independence.

The case of Kanyemba was different in that the area had been less affected by change. However, Chieftaincy remained in the form of domination by one clan which had ruled for at least a century. In tandem with this situation, the *mpondoro* of that area was concerned with the maintenance of clan rule. Thus, in both fieldsites, the cult of land spirits addressed local concerns, some sacred and some mundane, but never the all-encompassing issues generated by the War. In Chikafa, Negomo and Nyamanindi deliberated on rain-making and territoriality, and in Kanyemba area, Kanyemba addressed clan and lineage interests.

Regardless of the way in which the cult of *mpondoro* is manifested at a particular time, it is an elaborate belief system which contains a number of defining features. First and foremost it has a political function in that it articulates a discourse of Chieftaincy. In the absence of Chiefs, it is believed that rival powers will take over, a concern raised by Negomo with regard to the MZP. Chieftaincy existed differently in the two areas studied and will be discussed below. *Mpondoro* also gave voice to the cultural logic of autochthony and conquest so important to social organisation in the Zambesi. But mostly, the knowledge of land spirits is related to the primary function of each.

Cosmology was the preserve of rain-makers such as Negomo who recounted local histories and spoke about moral issues. However, because he was not a senior rain-maker in the order of the autochthonous spirits such as Musuma, his deliberations of sacred knowledge sounded like localised cosmologies. I noted an interesting juxtaposition between cosmological and mundane knowledge in Negomo's speeches. For example, at a rain-making ceremony in Kanongo, Chikafa area, November 1992, Negomo began by reciting the names of past conflicts within Dande, scolded people

with regard to the importance of sacred areas, then dealt with local problems related to cutting trees and a case of incest.

The relationship between cosmological and mundane knowledge is important to examine in the context of 1990s Zambesi where the sacred role of *mpondoro* seemed somewhat diminished to me. Cosmology, as defined by *The Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, is "the science or theory of the universe" (Allen: 1990). In his book, *Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte*, Lambek discussed the relationship between practice and cosmology by demonstrating how religious and healing practices on the island of Mayotte formed a local theory of knowledge. In his argument, he juxtaposed the objectified knowledge of Islamic text (sacred knowledge), to which a limited number of specialists had access, with the embodied knowledge performed in spirit possession accessible to non-specialists (which he called cosmology or worldly knowledge). In his view these two types of knowledge served as a critique of each other. Thus, a specialist of Islamic texts who spent most of his time on the written word might be a respected specialist but not wise-in-the-world. In this study, Lambek made no assumptions about either form of knowledge, other than to submit that, "knowledge has an indexical, personal function; what one knows is not fully distinguishable from what one does or who one is" (1993:6). In this way, cosmologies were for all, not just the preserve of specialists.

In the Zambesi, there was no sacred text associated with *mpondoro*, and no specialists who might control its interpretation as, for example, in the tradition of the West African *griot* (Stoller 1989; 1995). Instead, the shrines of land spirits encompassed current affairs and generated an account of these for their constituents to which they tendered or withdrew their support. Unlike Lambek's specialists of Islamic text whose sacred knowledge did not need direct rapport with lay people, the importance that *mpondoro* accorded to sacredness (of historical events, areas, or ritual materials) depended very much on the political and economic circumstances of their supporters. The Independence War gave Musuma as well as lesser rain-makers great powers of representation during the 1970s associated with the complex cosmologies Lan recorded. During the 1990s, political fragmentation gave way to a dispersal of the

system and a localised approach to representation.

The production of sacred knowledge was the preserve of rain-making and territorial *mpondoro* who gauged their constituents' degree of acceptance. Generally, land spirits were in tune with the wishes and requirements of local inhabitants through mechanisms such as the relative sacredness of specialist knowledge, and the incorporation of newcomers and new concepts. However, occasionally knowledge arrived which could not be framed within the local shrine. The greatest example of an innovation incongruent with local knowledge was the arrival of the MZP in Chikafa. The implications of new concepts are, "that the knowledge of any given system (or person) cannot be fully linked within a single system-that incommensurability is a critical feature of most forms of knowledge" (Lambek 1993:8). Unlike post-colonial state structures introduced into the Zambesi in the 1980s, the incongruence of new knowledge brought by the MZP with the capacity of *mpondoro* to integrate it posed a problem for that system. However, for a number of residents in Chikafa, new concepts couched in the language of development were dealt with at the various meetings which took place there in parallel with activities of the shrines. These events posed a threat to *mpondoro* who scolded the audiences at ceremonies for their divided loyalties.

One way that *mpondoro* remained relevant was through their commentary on mundane matters of land allocation, cutting down of trees, domestic disputes, boundary problems, and various forms of inappropriate social behaviour. With the political fragmentation characteristic of the Zambesi in the 1990s, which resulted in a localisation of issues, it made sense that specialist knowledge also narrow in focus. As Lambek suggested, "systematizing has been our concern, grounded in our epistemology and social order...their models were tacit or unconscious; they knew what they were doing and, when asked, could readily explain themselves, but they rarely stopped to consider how all their actions fit together" (1993:27). Thus, the search for coherence in other systems of knowledge does not necessarily lead to a fruitful interpretation. During the 1990s, the cult of land spirits was fragmented, a reflection of the decentralization of political process and the lack of local consultation characteristic of development schemes.

The primary function of the cult of *mpondoro* was governance through a discourse of Chieftaincy. In Kanyemba, the connection between land spirits and Chiefly rule was clear and devoid of confounding cosmological concepts. There two bureaucratic *mpondoro*, the dormant Chihumbe and the active Kanyemba, affirmed Marunga clan rule and represented their own lineages. In Chikafa, the form of Chiefly rule was more complicated for a variety of reasons including the diverse nature of clans and lineages, political fragmentation, and the sudden implementation of the MZP. There, a discourse of Chieftaincy rallied around a number of features of the land spirit cult including cosmology, territoriality, and constitution of the shrine of Nyamanindi. These issues will be discussed in the following section.

iii. The Structure of the Chief-*Mpondoro* Relationship:

The ideal relationship between *mpondoro* and Chiefs is an alliance of benevolent rule where the interplay of cosmology and bureaucracy exists in balance. Within a given territory *mpondoro*, the Chief, and the population are linked by the principle of descent. The land spirit is the classificatory ancestor of the area whether his genealogy links him explicitly or mythologically to the actual human Chief. Populations within a territory are linked to the land spirit by an idiom of clan put into practice either genealogically or through the device of the pangolin. Lan described the Chief-mpondoro relationship in the following way:

> "In life a chief should look after all his followers. He should provide them with grain from a common store in times of drought and maintain the peace by enforcing law through his court. When a chief dies he is transformed into a *mhondoro* and becomes the source of fertility of the land itself. He provides rain for the fields and protects the crops as they grow. Rain will only be withheld if the mhondoro's laws are disobeyed. If incest, murder or witchcraft takes place drought follows and the crops will fail. But if the descendants of the *mhondoro* obey his laws and perform his ceremonies in due time, they will live in peace and plenty".

(1985:32)

While Lan's interpretation of the relationship between Chiefs and *mpondoro* relied heavily on cosmology, where notions of the order of the social and natural worlds predominated, I encountered Chieftaincy in tenuous circumstances in both fieldsites.

146

In Chikafa, a reinvigorated shrine for Nyamanindi, supported by the rain-maker Negomo, worked in alliance with the power-sharing arrangement of Korekore and Chikunda lineages. Because of the absence and disinterest of the actual Chief of the area, a discourse of Chieftaincy was articulated by Nyamanindi with the approval of the headman and the Village Chairman. In Kanyemba, while the office of Chief was itself not under threat, competition between two lineages of the ruling clan caused a fraught atmosphere of name-calling, rumour, and alignments by the resident population.

In Chikafa, the 1990s was a time of rapid social change and of great threat to established Chiefly rule. The area was home to a population of diverse origins for whom the principle of descent meant not a long genealogy, but instead a vague notion of ancestral origins. Chikunda and Korekore clans had ruled in alliance since the area was conquered in the late 19th century, and these two groups formed the majority of the population. Chief Chapoto had ruled until the 1970s when the area was transferred to the control of Chief Chitsungo, a Korekore who took no part in local political process. Until the early 1990s, support for *mpondoro* had waned, however, the territorial spirit Nyamanindi possessed a new medium, and his shrine was re-invigorated by two ambitious assistants. The arrival of the MZP caused great upheaval to the established order because it offered new forms of social organisation which bypassed Chiefs and *mpondoro*. Also, importantly, the project brought immigrants who had no local allegiance and who proved unwilling to be incorporated under the umbrella of the ruling alliance.

Because of its scale, established rulers considered the MZP to be a conqueror which meant that it could not be incorporated into the established structure. Negomo lamented at a rain-making ceremony in 1992 that people had cleared sacred areas, delineated these for cultivation, and had begun to work the lands. He also asked why villagers from Chikafa and surrounding areas had neglected the spirits and if they were being told to stay away. In light of such change, the established political structure endeavoured to remain relevant by re-incarnating itself as a locus of opposition to the MZP. A number of features of the cult of mpondoro were rallied to gain larger support,

147

reiterate a discourse of Chieftaincy, and express opposition to change.

First, the shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was re-established in Chikafa with a new young medium. A new homestead was built for the medium containing the requisite ceremonial huts; he was given land, and married a local girl. Both the hereditary medium's assistant and an appointed assistant worked to build and then promote this new shrine. Prescriptions for proper behaviour at ceremonies were reiterated and the behaviour of participants monitored. A neighbouring rain-maker, Negomo, participated in ceremonies with Nyamanindi in which he displayed the control and benevolence which are characteristic of senior spirits. During ceremonies, Negomo deliberated on history and social rules while Nyamanindi mostly agreed with him, thereby enacting a division of labour between cosmology and territoriality. This renewed presence caused one informant to comment that there were a lot of spirits in Chikafa, a statement which I took to mean that there was competition for political control.

One way in which spirits constructed local identity was through the pangolin clan, considered to be sacred knowledge, which demonstrated principles of incorporation and common identity. Pangolin were thought to be elusive animals that, if caught, should be brought to the local mpondoro. Lan (1983; 1985) argued that the prescription for bringing a pangolin to a *mpondoro* alluded to the way a new wife should be introduced into an area. According to the cult of *mpondoro*, hunters who catch a pangolin must offer it silently to the land spirit, much in the way that a new wife should perform menial tasks silently before she is acknowledged. The comparison between pangolin and new wife hinted at the expected submission of foreigners to local ways, before they should be granted acceptance. Pangolin also represented the universal food prohibition uniting disparate populations living together in a spirit territory into one lineage. Pangolin were only be eaten by chiefs or mediums because these individuals carried ritual authority. As Lan suggested, "while the pangolin found within a particular spirit province is being eaten, it is as if all those who live within that province become members of the pangolin clan" (1985:117). He added that, "the 'pangolin clan' combined the principle of common substance with the

principle of territoriality to overcome the divisiveness inherent in the principle of descent" (1985:117). In this way, in an area of multiple affiliations, the pangolin provided a common unifying element. In Chikafa, at a rain-making ceremony, Negomo asked why the state had taken all the pangolin as these animals could only be eaten by *mpondoro*. In doing so, this spirit articulated local concern regarding who, in light of the restructuring precipitated by the MZP, was in charge of looking after the population.

In contrast, Kanyemba was ruled by an established Chieftaincy monopolised by one clan since its foundation. A rigid social hierarchy dividing Marunga clan members from non-Marunga kept political process contained within that clan. For the most part, foreign influence had been incorporated into the status quo. This had been the case both with committees installed by the post-colonial state in the 1980s, and the newer CAMPFIRE scheme. In Kanyemba, Chieftaincy was a focus of local domination of politics and the economy. For this reason, the Chikunda *mpondoro* was predominantly preoccupied with bureaucratic issues pertaining to the administration of the area. Kanyemba held a ritually inferior position to neighbouring *mpondoro* such as Chikwamba, commanded no sacred knowledge and had no power over fertility. The activities of the Chikunda *mpondoro*, Kanyemba and the dormant Chihumbe were confined within their own territories (see map 4).

The following excerpts from audiences with Kanyemba and Negomo illustrate the different functions of their shrines.

From an audience with the *mpondoro* Kanyemba:

It seems as if Chapoto's son will be the next Chief. What is your observation?

Kanyemba: If we talk about that whilst Chapoto is still alive he will know what to do but let us wait until he dies. If he says his son will be the Chief I don't agree with him because I am the one who appoints the next Chief.

What criteria do you use to appoint the new Chief?

Kanyemba: That is only known by me, no one else. What will happen if Chapoto's son takes over? That will not happen but if he comes and tells me his plans maybe I will hear him, but if he doesn't, I am the one who is going to appoint the next Chief.[1]

---

[1] I am indebted to Lazarus Zhuwao who conducted this interview and provided me

And with the mpondoro Negomo: (an excerpt from a longer statement)

Negomo: If people are properly settled after the war there will be no more wandering spirits, once there is a black government and the colonial system is removed. Wandering spirits are of people who died during the war...Negomo is a true spirit...When Negomo wants to arrange things he calls the villagers and listens to suggestions, but Mugabe does things without consulting us. Why does he consult us for rain then? For the war we did things together...If people listened to spirits now the way they did during the war there would be no problem with rain...I don't want witchcraft in my territory...I don't want incest in my territory...If anyone practices witchcraft they will be killed.

These two brief excerpts from longer audiences with Kanyemba and Negomo suggest the different approaches to Chieftaincy in the two fieldsites. On the one hand, Kanyemba discussed the succession to the chieftaincy, his wish to control the selection process, and his reluctance to unveil his strategy for doing so. He was authoritarian and mystified the process of succession indicating that it was an issue to be obfuscated from the community. Kanyemba offered a representation of Chieftaincy as domination whereby rulers controlled a political process closed to outsiders.

In contrast, Negomo's utterances suggested a vision of Chieftaincy based on moral authority and paternalism. His comments with regard to witchcraft and incest were related to ideas of moral order in which fulfilling social prescription was tied to rain-making. The idea of consultative political process was juxtaposed, somewhat ironically, with mention of President Mugabe. Also, "wandering spirits", interpreted as competitors for political influence, were compared to Negomo who affirmed that he was a true spirit. In all, Negomo's speech represented a view of benevolent Chieftaincy delivered through an alliance of *mpondoro*, headman, and Village Chairman. The contrast between Negomo as Chief and the state indicated an opposition between locality and foreign influence, or autochthons and conquerors.

A feature particular to Chikunda *mpondoro* is that stories about their lives as

---

with a transcript.

Chiefs are couched in terms of social memory rather than events of the mythological past. Informants could provide personal details of Kanyemba as Chief which they said had been passed on from grandparents and great-grandparents. Stories of Kanyemba's life contained elements associated with conquest rather than incorporation. For instance, many informants mentioned his interest in herbal medicines (*mankwara*), the consumption of which was a prerequisite for chiefly resurrection (*kuramuka*) as a land spirit. Kanyemba's interest in herbs had additional significance in that he was said to have consulted *n'anga* (African healers) in order to be impervious to bullets. Perhaps the most significant detail of these stories is that Kanyemba killed healers once he had obtained their knowledge. One informant named a number of soldiers retained by Kanyemba solely to kill discarded healers. One interpretation of Kanyemba's legendary murders of healers is that, as a conqueror, he was preoccupied with controlling knowledge of the moral order, the source of power of autochthons. However, in the 1990s, Kanyemba area was dependent on neighbouring Korekore and autochthons *mpondoro* for rain-making. While the Marunga promoted their strong clan ideology characterised by stories of supremacy, the fact remained that their *mpondoro* had no rain-making power meaning that their conquest remained incomplete.

Precisely because Kanyemba had not acquired the moral authority of autochthons in the way of Korekore Chiefs, the Chieftaincy he founded was forever open to question. This was a paradox because, in reality, the Marunga-ruled Chieftaincy in Kanyemba was much stronger and more stable than that of Chikafa where the land spirit was respected. Members of subordinate lineages challenged the legitimacy of the Marunga clan while remaining powerless to usurp it. The Chieftaincy was also plagued by internal tension. Generally, Chapoto challenged the opinions of the *mpondoro* Kanyemba by disrespecting the memory of the dead Chief. For instance, Chapoto pointed out several times that the human Kanyemba was well known for his promiscuity, implying that with such a large number of liaisons it would be hard to know who were his legitimate children. In this way, Chief Chapoto challenged the legitimacy of his opponents by implying that they fell outside of the parameters of kinship (patrilineal descent). In addition, Chapoto's mention of the human

Kanyemba's sexual activities hinted at his lack of personal morality. While he spoke of Kanyemba as promiscuous and immoral, he emphasised his own Catholicism by crossing himself before meals and describing his sons' education at a Catholic mission school. Given Chapoto's attempts to discredit Kanyemba, it became evident that this *mpondoro* held tenuous moral authority. The Chief challenged the importance of the spirit's pronouncements, the moral character of his personage, and the personal integrity and ritual legitimacy of his medium.

Because the preoccupations of the *mpondoro* Kanyemba were lineage-based, in times of political crisis, his constituency narrowed down to his descendants. I was told that before the succession dispute came about, the *mpondoro* had been a better representative of the interests of the Marunga clan. While staying firmly in the realm of local politics, Kanyemba's oscillation between lineage and clan interests could weaken his position if the mood of the population was not well gauged. It was probably safe to promote the interests of the Marunga clan as non-Marunga had no political or economic power. However, to explicitly advance the claims of one Marunga lineage over another could result in a great deal of social disruption. Chapoto understood this danger and sought to exploit it by discounting the human Kanyemba, and the shrine of his *mpondoro*, as immoral. At the same time, Chapoto advanced notions of his own Marunga stature by invoking a Portuguese identity by means of pious Catholicism. In sum, Chapoto played with various notions of Chikunda identity, including links to Portuguese ancestry, morality, legitimate descent, and experience of rule to argue that his children were best fit to succeed him.

It can be argued, then, that amongst the Chikunda *mpondoro* their moral authority was significantly less established than that of their Korekore counterparts. Not only were the mpondoro less well-established in the pantheon of Zambesian land spirits, they also had very little rain-making power. If their pronouncements were not well-received then they could be open to criticism aimed at their character as spirits, and because oral histories of their time as humans existed, their activities then could also be open to re-interpretation. Additionally, when there was disagreement with the spirits' stated opinions, the person of the medium could be attacked both

152

professionally and personally. All this spoke to a closeness to the world of the living. In contrast, the mediums of Korekore land spirits were conceptually separate from the spirits they embodied and, thus, beyond reproach because of their high moral authority. If people disagreed with the spirits' pronouncements, lack of authenticity of the medium could be blamed. There were no grounds on which to discredit the *mpondoro*, the land of the living being conceptually distant from that of the spirits.

Until the 1990s, Chieftaincy had been the primary vehicle for political rule in the Zambesi Valley. Forms of Chieftaincy depended on whether a society was centralised such as in Kanyemba, or dispersed as was the case of Chikafa. In both areas, relationships with *mpondoro* affected the character of the working chiefly political structure. In Kanyemba area, a *mpondoro* of low moral authority both affirmed clan domination of the Chieftaincy, and challenged the lineage (of three possibilities) who ruled. However, a relationship between land spirit and Chief was not necessary to maintain rule as a rigid social hierarchy ensured political stability. In light of his standing outside of the realm of cosmology, the *mpondoro* Kanyemba functioned as a bureaucrat whose preoccupation lay with mundane administrative affairs.

In Chikafa, the established alliance between two longstanding Chikunda and Korekore lineages was thrown into question with the arrival of development schemes whose effects were compounded by serious drought. In response, there was renewed interest in the role of *mpondoro* as classificatory Chiefs of the area, with the result that the shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was revived. The strengthening of the relationship between land spirits and earthly rulers provided long-term residents in Chikafa with a substantial local political apparatus which could better focus and promote their regional interests.

iv. Mediums:

The roles of medium and the medium's assistant formed the cornerstone of political process in chieftaincies. A medium's job was to enter into trance and act as a vessel for the land spirit he or she embodied. The medium and the *mpondoro* were considered to be two separate social beings never existing concurrently. It was

153

believed that, in possession, a medium loaned his or her body to the spirit and was, therefore, absent from possession ceremonies. This division of roles was well evidenced by the practice of greeting the medium once he or she emerged from trance. With regard to events having taken place during possession ceremonies, mediums always referred inquiries to their assistants, saying that they had no memory of the time they were in trance.

To the observer, the medium possessed by the spirit and the medium out of trance appeared as two distinct personalities. The speech and manner of mediums resembled that of any other person living in the Zambesi and their behaviour was usually age and gender appropriate and, as such, indistinguishable from that of other locals. But when possessed, mediums adopted characteristics attributed to the spirit they embodied. Because *mpondoro* were older male chiefs, the manner of possessed mediums was gruff, authoritarian, superior, and bearing eccentricities associated with the elderly. In effect, two social beings inhabited the same body of the medium. These characteristics applied both to Chikunda and Korekore *mpondoro*.

Mediums were, by definition, individuals from outside of the spirit's territory. It was only when an individual realised that he or she was possessed by a *mpondoro* and the possession accepted as authentic, that the journey was made to the spirit's territory. Becoming a medium followed a prescribed process technically out of the individual's control. The following is a story, related to me by Tafire, of how he became Nyamanindi's medium:

> In 1986, when he was a schoolboy, Tafire became physically ill and mad. He stopped eating and drank only water. His relatives became worried, which prompted them to consult a spirit medium regarding his illness. When he went to see this medium he had a vision of a spirit of an ancestor approaching him. The experienced medium then gave Tafire snuff and showed him how to clap to appease the ancestors. He also explained that his condition would improve. Afterward, beer was brewed and his condition was explained to people.

Nyamnindi's medium told me that when he first fell ill he felt upset and unhappy because he was still at school and thought the illness would badly affect his life. But once the illness was diagnosed, he said, he felt relief and was, "happy because

I know when the spirit will come, before it was only when I was sleeping on a mat. Now I can make a living being a medium". In other terms, he described the transition from the uncertainties of mentally illness to acceptance as ritual specialist who exercised his profession according to a prescription (i.e. he knew when the spirit would appear), and could support himself by doing so. Tafire expressed satisfaction at having gained an acceptable social role.

As this brief account illustrated, the process of becoming a medium began with repeated episodes of physical and mental illness which interfered with everyday life. Once the illness became a problem, the person's family consulted specialist healers for an explanation. The afflicted described the early stages of illness as a time of great anxiety because of the inability to live normally and an unknown future. Once a diagnosis of possession by a land spirit was made, the affected individual took steps to gain acceptance within that spirit's territory, first by the local *kambande/mutapi* (medium's assistant), then by the local ruling hierarchy.

Candidates for the position of medium were tested locally through a prescribed procedure. Crucially, they had to gain support from the hereditary medium's assistant in order to be considered as serious candidates. Once this happened the medium was tested by a neighbouring *mpondoro* who judged the authenticity of the candidate's trance. If it was accepted, the candidate would be asked by the examining *mpondoro* to recite both the spirit's genealogy and life-history. Finally, if the medium could identify the spirit's paraphernalia and if the local population were in general agreement, the medium would be invited to settle locally.

In theory mediums were apolitical because they had no knowledge of the spirit and could not, therefore, accept responsibility for events which occurred during trance. Also, as foreigners mediums were supposed to have no political interests in the new locality. These characteristics placed the medium at the crossroads of political process in the Zambesi. Lan summed up this ritual role when he stated that "the authenticity of the mediums is constantly reaffirmed by the authority of their *vatapi* which derives from the chiefs whose own legitimacy was established by one of the *mhondoro* who possess the medium" (1985:63). It was precisely because of their position in the

155

structure of governance that the medium's role could be tenuous. It was a contradictory role because while mediums were supposed to be impartial, their involvement in the territory of the land spirit, the need to gauge local expectations for behaviour, of acquiring local support, and performing an acceptable incarnation of the *mpondoro* meant that it was impossible to sidestep politics. Thus, through the medium's body and structural position flowed political discourse and performance. In Chikafa, Nyamanindi's medium had found local acceptance, I believe, because equilibrium had been struck between the shrine of the land spirit (administered by the medium's assistant) and the local political leadership consisting of the *sabhuku* and the Village Chairman.

In Kanyemba area, the low moral authority of the land shrine meant that the position of its medium was uncertain. The presence of the *mpondoro* Kanyemba and the absence of Chief Chapoto's ancestor, the *mpondoro* Chihumbe reflected popular opinion of the succession dispute. Chief Chapoto was upset by this lack of support from the population and so, in a shrewd maneuver, had made an attempt to influence the shrine of Kanyemba by supporting a female candidate from Mozambique for the position of medium. The Chief helped the woman to obtain Zimbabwean residency, but soon turned against her when, while possessed, she claimed that the descendants of Kanyemba should succeed to the Chieftaincy. Angered, Chapoto insisted that the medium was a fake and a prostitute, in one statement disputing her ability to mediate for the *mpondoro* by implying that her services were for sale.

In contrast, amongst mediums of Korekore *mpondoro*, the person of the medium and his individual behaviour when not possessed did not affect the respect that people had for the spirit. One time in Chikafa I witnessed a medium stumbling out of the clinic building so drunk he could barely stand. When I expressed surprise at the spectacle, my assistant told me that the medium and the spirit were two different beings and that, consequently, the medium's behaviour was his own.

In David Lan's writings (1983; 1985), he depicted an opposition between black Africans and Europeans (*muntu asvipo* and *muntu murungu*) by adopting the Zambesian concepts of autochthony and conquest. In this dichotomy, the physical

appearance of Korekore mediums embodied notions of African chiefs by the fact that they wore cloth skirts or tunics of black and blue which symbolised the chiefly role and rain-making ability of *mpondoro*. Mediums also shaved their heads or, more commonly, wore their hair in dreadlocks. They wore sandals made locally of old tires, instead of commercially produced footwear. Around their necks were strung beads indicating possession by spirits[2]. Sometimes they carried a walking stick in the tradition of old men. These mediums would not wear watches or any other adornment connected to the world of Europeans. They avoided traveling by car or bus (although strict adherence was difficult), and expressed a preference for locally brewed maize beer over the bottled variety from the plateau. They spoke chiKorekore and avoided English. In short, Korekore mediums represented a notion of chieftaincy which was exclusively African and devoid of foreign influence. This was not a historical representation, as the Portuguese made contact with the Munhumutapa State in the 1500s, and other Europeans traveled and traded in the area for centuries. Instead, Korekore mediums depicted local Zambesian identity, constructed during the Independence War as particularly African in counterpoint to the European colonizer whom they fought for freedom.

During the 1990s, the conceptual opposition between autochthony and conquest in the Zambesi was no longer represented by the African/European dichotomy. While local identity remained conceptually fixed on essentialist notions of African identity, conquerors were no longer framed as European. Instead, the Zimbabwean state took on the role of conqueror, an argument I will develop in the following chapter. As an example of the changed role of Europeans in Dande, two Korekore *mpondoro* I consulted welcomed me by stating that, in life, they had been accustomed to seeing white people in the Zambesi. One of the land spirits actually congratulated me for consulting him as he said that it was proper for newcomers to make themselves known to *mpondoro*. Thus, during the 1990s, my white European appearance did not carry the political implications it might have done during the 1970s.

---

[2] Wearing beads indicated that a person was possessed by mashave (animal spirits).

In contrast to Korekore depictions of mythological chieftaincy, the Chikunda medium I met represented a different set of distinctions. As conquerors, Chikunda *mpondoro* had weak moral authority and did not embody local identity, instead representing clan and lineage interests. The Korekore opposition between African and European was illogical amongst the Chikunda as their own ancestors were said to be of mixed African and Portuguese parentage. In appearance the Chikunda medium swayed between displays of African and European influence. At the time, she wore a dress of black which was representative of the autochthonous principle of rain-making. I could not find a reason for this attire as Chikunda *mpondoro* cannot make rain. On other occasions, the medium wore white cotton which the Chikunda associated with Portuguese ethnic identity. Although Kanyemba's medium was Korekore, she called herself Mozambican and said she could speak Portuguese. In trance, however, her grasp of the language seemed tenuous. As a representative of Kanyemba, she did not regard an association with Europeans, or European things, as a breach of conduct. Rather, her association with local notions of Portuguese ethnic markers was a prerequisite for her position.

It was difficult to believe that Kanyemba's medium was impartial with regard to the succession dispute. While in theory the mediums of Chikunda *mpondoro* should follow the same rules as those of the Korekore, Kanyemba's medium took sides. In trance, it was not surprising that her utterances should uphold the claims made by Kanyemba's lineage as she embodied their ancestor. However, while out of trance she associated mostly with members of that group. Although there was local expectation that Kanyemba's medium support the claims of his line, it was considered unseemly for her to align herself overtly with these people when not in trance.

While the primary role of mediums was to bring the *mpondoro*, the classificatory "father" of the locality, to the local people, the medium's assistant held the influential role of interpreting his utterances during possession ceremonies.

v. Assistants:

Although the cults of Korekore and Chikunda *mpondoro* performed the

different functions of territoriality and bureaucracy, the role of the assistants who maintained their shrines was remarkably similar. Chikunda assistants were referred to as *kambande*, while those of the Korekore were called *vatapi* (pl) or *mutapi* (s).

In *Guns and Rain*, Lan suggested that "the medium is by convention entirely passive, so the *mutapi* is his active counterpart" (1985:60). I was also told that this was the ideal behaviour for a medium. Assistants performed a number of important functions for the land shrine. They were responsible for welcoming new mediums and for their continued care, especially during possessions ceremonies which were physically very demanding. Assistants received constituents at the medium's homestead who sought consultations with the *mpondoro*. They organised possession ceremonies both at locals' request and during the prescribed times for rain-making. Most significantly, mediums' assistants interpreted the often incomprehensible utterances of the *mpondoro* during ceremonies. Nyamanindi's shrine had two active assistants, one who had inherited the position and another who was appointed by Negomo. The criteria for appointment of an individual involved support by the community and knowledge of system of land spirits, particularly the local shrine.

Mediums and assistants complemented each other as one embodied the spirit while the other interpreted for him. By convention, mediums were outsiders while assistants came from amongst the local population. Principal assistants were of an established line which had long service to the ruling clan.

The assistant mediated between the *mpondoro* and his followers in three important ways. First, he interpreted the spirit's utterances and reformulated these into intelligible language. This was an important task because often the *mpondoro* made pronouncements incomprehensible to his general audience. It was sometimes said that spirits spoke in their own language, but in my observation, assistants never failed to understand their utterances. The role of the assistant was not really one of translation because there seemed to be no consistency to the way *mpondoro* garbled their speech. Rather, the assistant interpreted what he believed to be the appropriate sense of the *mpondoro*'s statements. The assistant's position was crucial because he gauged local opinion, and then ensured that the land spirit's pronouncements were not irretrievably

159

discordant with these popular views. In this way, the assistant maintained equilibrium between the prevalent opinions of local people and political climate, thus ensuring the integrity and continuity of the shrine.

Secondly, assistants mediated between the medium and the spirit, who although they shared one body, were actually two separate social beings. In effect, the local image of the spirit was formed by the relationship between the style of the medium's embodiment of the spirit, and the assistant's verbal interpretation of what the spirit said. Thus, by negotiating an acceptable version of the spirit, the medium and the assistant kept the shrine alive and relevant. Earlier I argued that, for Korekore spirits, the behaviour of the medium had no impact on how people regarded the spirit because they were considered to be separate. In contrast, the person of the assistant was associated with the entity of the land spirit. For one, the assistant cared for the medium and promoted the land spirit. He also acted as a liaison between the chief and headmen and the spirit. If the advice that the spirit offered was not considered to be pertinent by either the rulers or the people, then the spirit might be ignored. It was, therefore, in the interest of the hereditary assistant's line for the ongoing symbiotic relationship between assistant and land spirit to be cultivated in relevant ways.

In the third place, assistants had an important role as public relations officials for their shrines. Assistants helped mediums to settle in the new area and organised the building of the medium's homestead which included ceremonial huts used in possession rituals. They also promoted the medium to locals and found suitable marriage partners, as was the case with Nyamanindi's medium. Importantly, assistants also aided the medium in procuring a livelihood by arranging, for example, the cultivation of his fields.

In Chikafa there were two assistants to Nyamanindi, one appointed and the other hereditary. The hereditary assistant was Korekore. The division of labour between the assistants was not always clearly demarcated, but it seemed that the hereditary *mutapi* was responsible for activities to do with social continuity and cosmology, whereas the appointed *mutapi* was active in politics and interpretation. The hereditary *mutapi* was less knowledgeable about the hierarchy of spirits in Dande

160

than his appointed colleague. Consequently, he spent most of his efforts on ritual activities such as carrying fire to symbolically eradicate the illness that was thought to have caused a cholera outbreak. He also knew of ritual drumming and instructed junior drummers at ceremonies. His sister provided services to the shrine such as grinding snuff for the *mpondoro* as well as reciting Christian prayers before village meetings. The hereditary *mutapi* was possessed by *mashave* (animal spirits), in his case a baboon, but said that this was not a prerequisite for his role. As part of his ritual function, before rain-making ceremonies, he was responsible for providing an old woman with millet to make porridge for the medium. The consumption of this special porridge took place under a sacred *mutowe* tree after the medium had clapped to the *mpondoro* in a gesture of submission. This ritual was performed before the first rains as a gesture of appeasement to the land spirit. It was interesting to note that millet was considered to be an indigenous food, pre-dating maize. In the past it used to be a key ingredient in food prepared for ritual consumption such as the above-mentioned porridge and beer. Although of higher ritual value, in the 1990s, millet was often substituted with maize products in Chikafa.

Another function of the hereditary *mutapi* was the organisation of audiences with the land spirit at the request of paying constituents. The hereditary *mutapi* in Chikafa was considerably older than the medium and, as a result, dealt with him in a fatherly way. He moved his own homestead so as to be closer to the medium, helped him to establish fields and a garden, and tended carefully to the medium's homestead which contained the ceremonial huts used for possession ceremonies. While it was obvious that medium and *mutapi* got on well, the reconstitution of Nyamanindi's shrine could also be interpreted as a way to enhance local politics.

The appointed *mutapi* in Chikafa claimed his role to be the same as that of his colleague. His comment that they shared responsibility for arranging mats for the land spirit before a ceremony, and for keeping the medium supplied with snuff during possession, indicated that he believed his role was also of ritual significance. However, he claimed, that he understood the spirit's speech, a role of political importance. In public, the appointed *mutapi* stated that he regarded his position as secondary to that

of the hereditary *mutapi* and deferred to the latter's status. This was a worthwhile interpretation as the hereditary *mutapi* represented a principle of autochthony through the longevity of his lineage's association with the line of the *mpondoro*. In a way, the good working relations between hereditary and appointed *vatapi* reflected the alliance between the headman, who represented long-term residence, and the Village Chairman whose position was gained by virtue of the state.

The Chikunda *mpondoro*, was also served by two assistants (*kambande*), however they were both appointed. One *kambande* interviewed said he was of the *tembo mbizi* (zebra) line. He could not describe ancestral home as his father had been born in Kanyemba and he did not know his genealogy any further. It was interesting to note that because he was not Marunga, his family would not have been directly involved in the succession dispute. This informant had been *kambande* for six rainy seasons when I spoke with him. He said that *mpondoro* had two assistants for practical reasons, for example, if one fell ill, the other would be available to work. His job entailed the preparation of materials used during possession ceremonies such as laying out reed mats and the white bed and pillow on which Chikunda *mpondoro* reclined. Additionally, he stated that it was important to prepare a white cloth so that the *mpondoro* could wipe his face of snuff during the ceremony as, unlike other land spirits, Kanyemba did not like his face to appear smeared.

The second *kambande*, also appointed, was Changara and had previously assisted the *mpondoro* Chihumbe before his medium died. One interpretation of the ability of a professional *kambande* to shift support between rival lines was that the allegiance of classificatory subordinates in Kanyemba was primarily to the Marunga clan. Because Marunga rule was always based on lineage interests, it followed that a *kambande* should be flexible so as to serve whichever *mpondoro* currently possessed a medium.

The *kambande* of Chikunda *mpondoro* were appointed because their shrines functioned primarily as political vehicles devoid of any moral or ecological role. The role of *kambande*, like any other relationship the Marunga had with subordinates, was based on a patron-client arrangement whose basic principle was the enhancement of

the position of the superior clan. Hereditary *vata*pi of Korekore spirits represented a principle of autochthony which would not make sense in the shrine of a Chikunda spirit. Rather the appointment of assistants followed the logic of settlement of the Chikunda: that the *marunga* negotiated and maintained their achieved positions through alliances with subordinate followers (as the *Tembo mbizi* no doubt were) from whom they acquired wives, labour, and military or political support. The Chikunda leadership maintained its superiority by cultivating relationships of dominance and subordination with members of weaker groups.

Regardless of the land spirit assistants served, their roles in maintaining shrines and acting as spokespeople for their *mpondoro* played a significant role in the acquisition of local support.

vi. Possession Ceremonies:

In a book chapter entitled "Past Imperfect: Remembering as Moral Practice", Lambek suggested that possession: "refers to the relations that particular disembodied creatures ("spirits") engage with particular human hosts, such that the host is periodically "absent" from her own body, replaced by the voice and persona of the spirit" (1996: 236).

There existed two broad categories of possession ceremony in Dande. The first type followed established patterns of the agricultural calendar and of funeral obligations, and was associated with rain-making and fertility. The second type of possession consisted of ceremonies conducted for a specific purpose, such as the resolution of a witchcraft accusation, and related to social order.

The Zambesian cult of land spirits was performed through a particular form of possession ceremony. These events were usually held at mediums' homesteads in two specially designed ceremonial huts. The first hut, *imbayesvikiro* (chiKorekore) or *nyumbayamvura* (Chikunda) sheltered the medium whilst he or she became possessed, an activity which took several hours. The second hut, *dendemaro*, usually an open structure consisting of poles topped by a thatched roof, was used by possessed mediums for addressing their audiences.

The organisation of ceremonies was the responsibility of medium's assistants. This involved setting a time and place, and gathering various items belonging to the *mpondoro*, including an elephant hair hat, ceremonial axes and spears, articles of clothing, and baskets. Also, it was important to prepare a ceremonial calabash with snuff made from locally grow *rabu* tobacco which the spirits snorted throughout a ceremony. Additionally, the medium's assistants also ensured that the ceremonial drums were in good working order and that expert drummers were available. If the spirit was Korekore, the wife of the hereditary assistant organised the brewing of beer.

Possession ceremonies were laden with rules and prescriptions, which in my reading of Garbett, Bourdillon, and Lan, seem to not have changed in the past forty years. Ceremonies began at sunset when locals gathered at the medium's homestead as specialist drummers started tuning four ceremonial drums by tightening the skins with burning grass. These four drums, *jenje*, *mupanje*, *nyaruwo*, and *usindo* were made of hollowed out trunks over which the skins of wild animals had been stretched. These drums were beaten with wooden sticks or, preferably, antlers. As the rhythm of the music intensified, the medium entered the first ceremonial hut (*imbayesvikiro/nyumbayamvura*) where he became possessed. Meanwhile women started dancing and singing songs which called to the *mpondoro*. Occasionally the music would be interrupted so that the drums could be tightened. Some people took naps at this time (see Figure 4).

Possession ceremonies entailed a sexual division of labour where the men stood near the drums to drink beer, whilst women and children sang and danced. During these ceremonies three spheres of inter-related activity could be observed: the singing and dancing women which constituted the focus of attention; separate groups of male and female drinkers who chatted softly; and, people who rested or slept on reed mats at the periphery of the main activity. Generally, individuals moved between these three arenas until the possessed medium sprang from the hut and jumped into the circles of dancing women. As the medium appeared, a swell of ululation emanated from the assembled women in a gesture of welcome to the *mpondoro*.

Possession ceremonies were very sensual events. The rhythmic sound of the

drums playing various songs, combined with the rough singing voice of the *mpondoro*, set in relief a background of soft female voices. The *mpondoro* sounded hoarse, throaty, and plaintive whilst the women responded in soft tones interspersed with high-pitched vocal moments as they reassured the spirit of their support. The spectacle of women's bodies moving in semi-circular formations to established choreography, and raising clouds of red dust as they stamped the earth hard with their bare feet, depicted a practiced synchronicity. The spirit danced amongst these women, twirling and flaring his skirt and weaving in and out of the lines of moving bodies. There was also a medley of smells: the sweetness of burning *mopane* wood, the sourness of homebrew maize-meal beer, and the pungency of women's smoke-saturated perspiring bodies. Finally, as people became thirsty with the activity of dancing, there was the taste of warm beer and the sweet borehole water shimmering with minuscule clay particles. These sensual experiences, combined with increasing fatigue as the night progressed, contributed to the heightened emotional state in which participants addressed the *mpondoro* at sunrise.

Once dawn broke, and the eastern horizon glowed orange and pink, the dancing and singing subsided. The spirit took his place on a reed mat laid out in the second ceremonial hut, the *dendemaro*, and the crowd sat around him in a semi-circle. With his ceremonial articles displayed throughout this open hut, the medium reclined on his side and rested his arms on wide flat baskets. The Chikunda medium also reclined on a mat, but hers was covered with a white cloth and had a white pillow. Assistants placed *ntekwe* (calabash) full of snuff tobacco from which Korekore spirits grasped handfuls to snort and spread across their faces. In contrast, although the Chikunda *mpondoro* also took snuff, any excess was wiped off the medium's face by the *kambande* who used a white cotton cloth. The Chikunda *mpondoro* did not possess calabashes, but was instead surrounded by porcelain items. In either case, if two or more spirits were present at the same ceremony there would be a seating arrangement based on seniority and kinship. Spirits of the same hierarchical position shared mats, inferiors each had their own mat.

Assistants sat close to the medium in trance in order to attend to his needs and

interpret his speech. Constituents spoke to the spirit directly or else addressed the assistant who mediated for them. Spirits might respond to questions in clear language, but often assistants were required to interpret their utterances. As spirits addressed their audiences, the tone of their voice changed from the plaintive sounds of the night's singing to paternal and admonishing tones. Occasionally Korekore *mpondoro* roared like lion, an act symbolic of ancient chieftaincy. I never witnessed the *mpondoro* Kanyemba roar, nor make references to lion. At all possession ceremonies the spirits made introductory speeches summarising histories and broaching current issues. Korekore land spirits reminded audiences of their genealogies and illustrious past. Then they affirmed social rules and reminded the audience of proper moral behaviour required within their territories, including admonishments against witchcraft, desecration of sacred areas, incest and violence.

The Chikunda *mpondoro* also gave an introductory speech extolling his past accomplishments and affirming his ownership and control of sacred areas. There was, however, almost no deliberation regarding cosmology. After these short utterances, the Chikunda *mpondoro* entertained questions regarding local matters. During this part of the possession ceremony, the crowd was divided into men and women who sat in a semi-circular pattern around the *dendemaro*. Individuals who wished to discuss private matters sat close to the hut.

Possession ceremonies ended at the *mpondoro*'s cue, usually two hours after sunrise. To be released from trance, mediums re-entered the first ceremonial hut, after a while emerging sleepy and extremely tired. Upon seeing the medium, people greeted him or her with the words "marara sei?" ("How did you sleep?" in Korekore) or "bom dia!" ("good morning" in Portuguese for the Chikunda spirit). In offering this greeting, locals acknowledged the transition from the social being of spirit to that of medium. At this time, the crowd began to disperse along various pathways (*nzira*) leading to home villages. Assistants then tended to the body of the medium who would be thirsty, hungry, tired and occasionally sick after the night's activities.

Customarily, mediums had no intellectual recollection of trance, but the sensations experienced by their bodies left resonances of the night's activities. Thus,

the conceptual difference between the beings of medium and *mpondoro* was a social feature for the community, but an act of embodiment for the medium. Conceptually and cognitively separate, medium and *mpondoro* functioned through one body. For example, although very different in demeanor and language use, the medium and the Korekore *mpondoro* affected the same style of dress and deportment. Furthermore, there existed prescriptions of conduct for mediums, out of trance, which related to their sacred roles. These included avoidance of the colour red, because of its association with fertility, and things European such as buses. Additionally, the medium's attire and general appearance represented contemporary ideas about how ancient Chiefs looked.

For Chikunda *mpondoro*, the same social and cognitive distinction existed between the person of the medium and that of the mpondoro. Similarly, there was continuity in the appearance of the spirit and the human because both represented the same cult. However, as discussed earlier, the medium of a Chikunda spirit was vulnerable to attack because of the lesser moral authority that the shrine of the Chikunda land spirit carried.

Possession ceremonies played an integrative role in communities because they provided a platform for the expression of collective sentiment. For example, *mpondoro* expressed the opinion that the serious drought was the result of social breaches perpetrated by development. In the Zambesi, land spirits represented identities related to locality, ethnic group, clan, and lineage. The spirit world contained ancestors, witches, and animals which were believed to occasionally possess human hosts, however, *mpondoro* were the only spirits who spoke for communities.

vii. Summary:

In this chapter I reviewed the Zambesian cult of *mpondoro* through an examination of the three primary functions of rain-making, territoriality, and bureaucracy which I encountered among these spirits during fieldwork in 1992-93. The overarching theme on which this system of belief hinged is the conceptual opposition between autochthony and conquest through which most of social life in that

area is understood. Through work in two fieldsites, I was able to compare the place of land spirits in a decentralized society characterised by a fragmented social organisation with a centralized Chieftaincy in which one clan dominated a rigid social hierarchy. The predominant model of governance in the Zambesi was Chieftaincy, a feature which I found required the support of *mpondoro* in both settlements studied.

Chikafa area, an acephalous society defined by a power-sharing alliance between Chikunda and Korekore elders, faced a grave challenge from development schemes in the early 1990s. There *mpondoro* produced a discourse of Chieftaincy based on notions of autochthony to mobilise local populations against social, political, and economic change. In Kanyemba area, tight control of rule maintained by the dominant Marunga Rosario Andrade clan relegated political process entirely within three lineages. There a discourse of Chieftaincy supported a hierarchy in existence since conquest of the area at the end of the 19th century, and was based on a language of domination.

In the following chapter I would like to extend the Zambesian conceptual opposition of autochthony and conquest to an analysis of the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe. During research for this study, *mpondoro* became a focal point for opposition to the state in Chikafa area where development had brought great change. In Chapter 6 I will examine how over the course of a decade the Zimbabwean state made the transition from autochthon (put in place by the will of the people) to conqueror.

Chapter 6: The State in Zimbabwe during the 1990s: Some Influences on Dande

i. The Autochthonous State Becomes Conqueror: An Introduction

The preoccupation with domination and development in this study has two inter-related strands. In preceding chapters I have argued that domination in the Zambesi Valley is conceived of and experienced through an opposition between autochthony and conquest. A comparison of two settlements suggested that this dichotomy is, in fact, manifested through a discourse of Chieftaincy where a centralised society is more apt to dominate, and an acephalous society is more prone to be dominated. It was through this local lens that Zambesians viewed the arrival of development projects in the late 1980s. Their gaze intensified with the occurrence of serious drought in 1991-92 when the combination of changed social organisation and environment was associated with acute distress and precipitated a re-evaluation of local beliefs about the state. While the Dande area of the Zambesi Valley is particularly remote and had mostly been left alone since Independence, the installation of development projects extended the influence of the state into that area.

In this chapter, I propose to examine the reasons why Zambesians stopped believing in the state as autochthon and Mugabe as Chief, and began, instead, to see it as conqueror. How did the Zimbabwean state, which started out as "the victory of the autochthons" (Lan:1985), become "the betrayal by the conquerors"? To address this crucial issue I will examine how people were governed in the Zambesi during the 1990s. Political process has changed over time and it is important to describe the cumulative effects of the British, Rhodesian, and Zimbabwean states on the area. Similarly, although local economy was based mostly on subsistence agriculture, post-colonial changes in the national economy, particularly the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, had an important impact on the Zambesi.

It is my intention that this chapter should serve as a pivotal point between the two strands of this thesis: the first five chapters which disclose the cultural logic of social organisation in the Zambesi through a comparison of a two settlements in which the Chikunda stood in counterpoint to other groups; and, the last three chapters, respectively, about development, drought, and witchcraft which depict how the impact

of the state in this corner of Zimbabwe, was interpreted in Chikafa as great social disruption and betrayal, and in Kanyemba as an influence to be incorporated. Chapter 7 will examine the insertion of development into the Zambesi, the changes these precipitated, and the different sense of upheaval and opportunity these brought to individuals and families. Chapter 8 will focus on the impact of serious drought in 1991-92, on coping strategies, and ways in which this disaster was interpreted locally. Chapter 9 discusses a witchcraft accusation as a local response to new forms of impoverishment and accumulation which Zambesians observed in the wake of development and drought. In all these chapters, Chikafa and Kanyemba settlements will provide comparative material.

As with most things, Zambesians viewed the state in their own way. The concept of *nyika*, translated as "territory", referred to the land area dominated by a leader, usually a Chief who lived there or, a land spirit representing a real (Chikunda) or a mythological (Korekore) conqueror. Governance for Zambesians involved a discourse of Chieftaincy based on the principles of autochthony and conquest, in which a Chief was related to his constituents through principles of descent (real or mythological) or through the inclusive device of the pangolin clan. In Kanyemba, a discourse of Chieftaincy was generated by an ideology of *marunga* clan supremacy, and put into practice by two lineages which had held the office of Chief since conquest in the late 19th century. In Chikafa, Chieftaincy was enacted by the *mpondoro* Nyamanindi, the designated owner of that territory, whose advice was enacted by a Chikunda headman in collaboration with a Korekore Village Chairman.

After Independence, in the Zambesi, the concept of *nyika* was extended to include all of Zimbabwe, while President Mugabe was thought of as *mambo*, or Chief. As such, Zambesians believed that since he had ascended to his position through the support of their land spirits, and the sacrifice of families, he would enact a role of Chief whereby their welfare would be under his care. In the early provision of a small amount of infrastructure such as schools, clinics, and roads, work opportunities on the plateau, food in times of drought, and post-war peace, Mugabe did enact a role which resembled that of legitimate Chief, or autochthon. Chief Chapoto stated, in an interview conducted in August of 1993, that President Mugabe was *mambo* of all

Zimbabwe, in the same way that Kanyemba had been *mambo* of all of Dande.

A number of issues contributed to the long process of disenchantment with the Zimbabwean state experienced by people in the Zambesi Valley. In an immediate sense, demobilised guerrillas were sent home and left to the care of their families and communities. Their reintegration took place at the local level through time-honoured mechanisms of incorporation such as Chief's or headmen's gifts of land, and also through marriage. Some guerrillas became members of newly formed village committees, where they introduced the voice of a younger generation into political process heretofore dominated by the elderly. Sub-Chief Neshangwe, who represented Chief Chitsungo in Chikafa area, was an ex-combatant. After the war, these former soldiers expected economic aid to the Zambesi in the form of schools, clinics, and roads, but very few of these expectations materialised.

The irony of these individuals' sacrifice to the common project of building the Zimbabwean nation coupled with their lack of inclusion in the spoils of victory was not lost on Zambesians. In a similar vein, in a discussion of memorialism and the postcolony, Richard Werbner suggested that the monument and cemetery in Harare, Heroes' Acre, created a selective view of the value of individuals' contribution to the construction of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly since inclusion was within the gift of the Politburo of ZANU, a highly centralised and mystified way of delivering favours. As Werbner suggested: "Such memorialism puts the stamp of state hierarchy negatively...at the bottom of the hierarchy, the *povo* or masses are expected to bury their own dead. The regime's lesson for them is that they need to look after themselves or, in the current development-speak, it is a matter of self-help" (Werbner 1998:78). In other words, the state would not enter into a role of mutual aid and obligation, the role of *sabwira*, with ex-guerrillas and their communities which was the proper way for newcomers to forge social connection. And, in contrast to the way of *sabwira*, the state also did not bury all war dead, instead selecting for a heroic few. In the Zambesi, the ranking of heroism, the lack of continuity between local and national level commemoration of the war effort, and the absence of tangible improvement in their everyday lives over the long-term, caused Zambesians to lose faith in the state.

Werbner's (1998) argument that the post-colonial state constructed a hierarchy

171

of important contribution to the Independence effort which promoted a differentiation between elites and the *povo*, and the state and kin, holds well for the Zambesi. The refusal of the state to be *sabwira* to communities that had suffered much disruption as a result of their support for guerrillas, and their disenfranchisement from opportunities for advancement led to a simmering sense of betrayal. In the 1990s I noted a degree of resignation, amongst informants, with the post-colonial neglect of their communities. People made derogatory jokes about government officials, calling them "fat cats", and referred to ministers and other government officials as "chefs", a reference to the new elite. In a way, because the Zambesi, particularly Dande, had always been so remote, expectations of improvement in quality of life probably dissipated more quickly than elsewhere. Life in both Chikafa and Kanyemba was mostly uneventful during the 1980s. There was no serious drought to disrupt the subsistence base of their livelihood, the insertion of party structures did not upset the balance of power in either settlement, and there were no schemes or policies to change social life. The fact of weak support for *mpondoro* could, in of itself, indicate low stress.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MZP in Chikafa and CAMPFIRE in Kanyemba brought changes to political process and access to resources in the environment. These innovations created anxiety and a degree of hardship for members of both communities. However, it was the arrival of serious drought in 1991-92 which precipitated mass discontent in the Zambesi. While post-colonial structural changes to local political process were, for the most part, incorporated and life went on as usual, it was the assault on their subsistence livelihood by development and drought which really brought Zambesians to reconfigure the state as conqueror.

A strong contributing factor to the high levels of anxiety which people experienced during the 1990s was the ambiguous language of centralisation and decentralisation which the state used. These were not new ideas for Zambesians as they understood well processes of domination within their own local systems of Chieftaincy. The strongly centralising style of the Chapoto Chieftaincy was generally accepted, even if subordinates were not happy. The fragmented type of leadership in Chikafa was also dealt with through the centralising ideology of the cult of *mpondoro*. In both villages, inhabitants understood power as a discourse of Chieftaincy. However,

the oscillation of the state between intimations that it was a Chieftaincy without actually acting as one and the discourse of self-empowerment and local responsibility proved to be confusing.

The ZANU-pf government came to power through a centralising idea of Chieftaincy which had support from the population. But, while the government continued to capitalise on popular support, it did not take long to implement decentralising policies. In 1984, in the prime minister's policy statement on Provincial Governorship and Decentralisation (which became the Provincial Councils and Administration Act) the orientation of government shifted toward decentralisation and self-help:

> "The aim of the strategy was to forge hegemonic links between development, accountability, and state authority in rural development. The objectives of the decentralisation policy, cast in terms of technical rationalisation and efficiency, were to strengthen the link between development planning and implementation, and to broaden the base of accountability by bringing local authorities and communities into policy planning and implementation processed under the aegis of the national state".

(Munro 1998:243-44)

It was within this policy that Ward Development Committees, Village Development Committees, Provincial Councils, and District Councils had their beginnings in 1985. People in Dande participated in these new structures, for example, they turned up to vote and individuals campaigned as candidates. Members of subordinate lineages, the young, and women saw new opportunities to bypass the power of Chiefs and headmen, and to have attention focussed on issues which affected their lives. However, the language of self-empowerment and local community responsibility seemed contradictory to the other major idea espoused by the government, a discourse of Chieftaincy. This was not the intention of the government as it sought "to make VIDCOs and WADCOs the moral, political, and institutional core of community life" (Munro 1998:246-47). The greatest flaw of this policy with regard to the Zambesi Valley, was that while its intention was to give voice to localities in a "bottom-up" approach, the achievement of this goal was clouded by the fact the policy did not account for pre-existing social hierarchies. In Kanyemba, post-colonial political structures were appropriated by the dominant clan and were used in the inter-lineage

173

conflict of the succession dispute. In Chikafa village, which emerged from the war socially and politically fragmented, there was more scope for traditionally weak groups to become involved in politics. But even there, it took the arrival of development schemes in the late 1980s for representation to extend to previously disenfranchised groups.

During the 1990s, after waiting a decade for the benefits of liberation to reach Dande, mostly people there became resigned to the fact that their lives would not be improved through the actions of the state. Not only this, it seemed that development schemes threatened their relationship with the environment, which formed the basis of their subsistence livelihood. This change caused some tension locally, but people made attempts to work through problems via the various committees, headmen, and Village Chairmen. A true sense of betrayal by the state took place with the hunger and despair which accompanied the drought of 1991-92 when, not only did crops not grow, but access to the bush was also impeded. At that time, any notions of benevolent Chieftaincy that Zambesians may have held with regard to the state were utterly shattered. It was then that they began to visualise the state as conqueror. But, due to different political structures, the sense of betrayal by the state was experienced differently in Chikafa and Kanyemba.

The contradiction between the discourse of centralisation of the state and the decentralising language of development proved confusing for Zambesians such that they lost faith in the state. These inconsistencies played havoc with expectations and livelihoods to the extent that dissent was manifested in Chikafa through a witchcraft accusation mediated by a *mpondoro* ceremony to be discussed in chapter 9. In order to understand the level of disruption associated with the confluence of development and drought during the early 1990s, it is important to have a background view of political process in the two settlements researched and state economic policy which affected livelihoods there.

ii. Political Process in Dande: Local Structures During the 1990s

During the 1960s Garbett observed that:

"The Valley Korekore have a complex political system on to which a modern administrative superstructure has been imposed. The imposition

174

> has modified the traditional political system, and has added a new
> dimension to it. Alongside the modern administrative system large parts of
> the traditional political system continue to function intact."
>
> <div align="right">(Garbett 1966:140)</div>

During the 1990s, the political system in the Zambesi Valley continued to be characterised by a combination of structures which had been installed at various junctures in history. But, while Garbett would have observed a relationship between colonial administration and a system of Chiefs and land spirits, governance during the 1990s had become more complex. The system of Chiefs and land spirits continued to be crucial because it provided the dichotomy of autochthony and conquest through which most political process was understood. A network of representation linked to the party structure of ZANU was installed on to this system which was itself partially a product of colonialism. This dual system functioned harmoniously in Chikafa until the early 1990s when it was threatened by land re-distribution and resettlement. In Kanyemba, post-Independence, new party structures were appropriated by members of the *marunga* clan, and thereby inserted into the existing hierarchy. The common thread in both Chikafa and Kanyemba was that new political structures of the 1980s were easily inserted into already existing hierarchies, and did not threaten to upset established order.

In *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla Warfare*, Ranger noted that:

> "At the same time that the committees established peasant power at village
> level as it had never been exercised before, they also represented a return to
> a pre-war situation. Those elected to the village committees were the
> resident junior elders, the sort of men and women who had been dominant
> in peasant nationalism before the war but whose influence had had to take
> second place to that of the guerrillas and their adolescent helpers during the
> war itself".
>
> <div align="right">(Ranger 1985:292)</div>

The difference in political representation between colonial times in which Garbett researched, and the post-Independence era, was that, as Ranger suggested, after the war positions within the existing structures were made available to younger members of the elite. In both Chikafa and Kanyemba, almost all of committee work was in the hands of young lineage members of the conquering Chikunda and their traditional allies with whom relationships originated with conquest.

<div align="center">175</div>

During the early 1990s, rule in Dande was characterised by three conceptually distinct spheres of influence. First, there was the Chief who ruled either directly or through a system of *sabhuku*. Secondly, there were ZANU-pf party structures in the form of Village organisations represented by a Village Chairperson, and youth and women's representatives. In the third sphere, there were the new state-level structures which were ultimately responsible to Cabinet such as District Council and Ward and Village Development committees (see Illustration 4).

In the following sections I will discuss the origins and function of each of these important spheres of rule in the Zambesi Valley to show how, together, they contributed to the very different forms of rule encountered in Chikafa and Kanyemba which determined how populations dealt with the extension of the Zimbabwean state through development projects.

iii. Chiefs and Headmen:

The most important function of chieftaincy in the Zambesi Valley was that it provided an idiom of governance couched in terms of an opposition between autochthony and conquest. This local view of chieftaincy was articulated through the cult of *mpondoro* where a benevolent Chief ensured fertility of the land and social continuity through just rule of his followers. Ideal chieftaincy was related to rain-making and the ritual power of autochthons. Chieftaincy based on social hierarchy, where community members were marginalised and exploited was believed to be governance by conquest. It was in the oscillation between these two poles that social innovations in the Zambesi were understood.

In Zimbabwe, chieftaincy has been an important form of rule since the beginning of European colonisation because its centralised format contributed to better control over disparate populations. The prime objective of early British rule was to ensure a supply of indigenous labour to work in farms acquired by white settlers. The policy of 'Indirect Rule' which consolidated the position of male lineage elders by providing these with state-sanctioned judicial powers, proved to be successful in achieving this end. Chiefs whose rule was consolidated by alliance with the state were believed to be conquerors, with little or no rain-making ability, because their primary

176

interests did not lie with the welfare of the population but, instead, with external needs.

The opposition between autochthony and conquest has been the primary theme in Zambesian political process since the 1890s, when the British first installed their rule. For instance, a notion of benevolent rain-making chieftaincy was invoked through the cult of *mpondoro*, both in the 1890s and 1970s to resist British colonisation and, later, the Rhodesian government. At the same time, chieftaincies, such as that of Chapoto, which worked with the state to the detriment of certain groups in the population, were considered to be bureaucratic and of no rain-making power.

The two settlements researched exemplified the oscillation between notions of autochthony and conquest. First, in Kanyemba area, the Chapoto Chieftaincy had a long history of alliance with the state. It was supported by the British and Rhodesian governments, but had its roots in Portuguese colonialism. In Chapter 3 I reviewed the history of Chikunda group identity and local stories regarding the origins of the Chapoto Chieftaincy. While Korekore Chiefs derived their position from the state while espousing an ideology of autochthony, Chikunda Chieftaincy had always expressed conquest. The term "achikunda" refers to "people who conquer". Research for this study involved contact with two very different versions of Zambesian Chieftaincy. In Kanyemba, Chief Chapoto ruled a centralised polity dominated by one clan since conquest in the late 19th century, where political process was relegated exclusively to three lineages.

In contrast, in Chikafa area, political process involved a power-sharing arrangement between the old and young generations of long-term residents where a Chikunda headman and a Korekore Village Chairman represented the elderly, and a number of junior members of these groups did most committee work associated with the post-colonial state. While the titular head of the area, Chief Chitsungo lived elsewhere, a principle of benevolent Chieftaincy was created during the drought by renewed interest in the shrine of Nyamanindi, the local *mpondoro*, who was ritual owner of the area. Chieftaincy, as represented by Nyamanindi during possession ceremonies, was benevolent rule where the interests of constituents, mostly land in this case, were of primary concern.

While benevolent chieftaincy was associated with rain-making, the

177

exploitative chieftaincy related to bureaucratic *mpondoro* originated in alliances with the state. For scholars of southern African, the notion of chieftaincy is connected to the British colonial policy of 'Indirect Rule', a measure which came about to support capitalisation of the economy of Southern Rhodesia, a territory administered by the British South Africa Company between 1890 and 1923. This policy extended directly into localised lineage politics by formalising the position of senior male members who were given powers under a number of legislative acts. For example, Native Regulations of 1989-1910, and the African Affairs Act of 1927 turned African methods of conflict resolution into "courts of record" which enhanced the position of designated leaders (May 1987:45-46). The judicial power of Chiefs was integrated into the national system with the African Law and Tribal Courts Act of 1969 which allowed for unresolved issues of customary law to be brought to the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia. In post-colonial times, the Zimbabwean state maintained the continuity between local adjudication and state law with the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act of 1981 which placed village courts and Community courts, presided over by elected officials from Ministry-approved lists, as the primary form of local dispute resolution. These courts were answerable to the District Magistrate's court and then to the Supreme Court. The objective of this legislation was to transfer the power of chiefs into the hands of ex-combatants, but instead positions were taken up by the same people who had presided at headmen's courts (May 1987:47-48), thus keeping power concentrated amongst prominent lineages. In 1988 the state returned some judicial power back to chiefs, although not to headmen. This policy was later formalised by the Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990. Chief Chapoto certainly enforced his powers under national law, holding his Chief's Court with some regularity and allowing his senior counsellors to formulate rulings and dictate sanctions.

Policies of 'indirect rule' served a number of purposes. First, the primary objective of early British colonialism in southern Africa was to create an export economy for which African labour was required. The consolidation of compliant chieftaincies in which senior males recruited labour and collected taxes was one way to accomplish this end. Central to 'indirect rule' was the marginalisation of male juniors

who would provide export labour and women who maintained rural agricultural production and produced children. The cycles of migratory labour which developed within the British colonial project had important consequences for local communities:

> "State officials discouraged African women from settling in the towns and on the mines. On principle, they opposed the growth of a permanent, potentially explosive, African population in urban areas. Moreover, European industrialists paid men barely enough to support themselves, let alone a family. They counted on women and children to subsidize male wages through agricultural production at the rural homesteads...European capital and the colonial state expected rural-based women to bear the social costs of production, caring for the sick, disabled, and retired workers and raising the next generation of labor".
>
> (Schmidt 1992:54).

The social costs of Chieftaincy were borne by women who ensured the continuity of the African family on which the colonial economy was based, and the labour of male juniors who returned home with few savings.

Secondly, Leroy Vail argued that the simultaneous emergence of 'indirect rule' and tribal identities in newly conquered British territories served to quell any large-scale opposition from African populations. He said that:

> "Administrators assumed that Africans were naturally 'tribal' people. If the natural ethnic units could be strengthened, it would help ensure their continuation as discrete 'tribal' groups and prevent the emergence of 'detribalized' Africans of whom whites were deeply suspicious. This, in turn, would slow the emergence of any potentially dangerous territory-wide political consciousness that might develop".
>
> (Vail 1989:13)

This type of political mobilisation was preciously what David Lan (1983; 1985) depicted with regard to the way in which the cult of land spirits was used to create a large-scale opposition to Rhodesian armed forces in the Zambesi Valley. During the 1990s, a notion of Zambesian local identity in opposition to the foreign MZP project was also created through the cult of Nyamanindi. However, in Kanyemba, Chief Chapoto presided over a centralised polity where Chikunda local identity was strong, leaving very few means by which to express dissent toward either rulers or CAMPFIRE, a development scheme disadvantageous to subordinate lineages.

Post-Independence structures were easily absorbed into local communities during the 1980s and caused very little disruption to established social hierarchies.

However, further extension of the state through development schemes in the 1990s renewed the importance of Chieftaincy as a response to these innovations. Headmen, the traditional lieutenants of Chiefs, also saw their power increase as they were called to perform a greater number of services toward the consolidation of the Chief's power.

The population of Chikafa, of myriad origins and depicting shallow lineages, rallied around the idea of chieftaincy though the local *mpondoro* in response to the social disruption brought by the combination of development and drought. This area had been ruled by a succession of headmen dating to Chikunda conquest. When it was under Chief Chapoto between 1945 and the early 1970s, he lived elsewhere. Once Chief Chitsungo was installed in the 1970s, his residence elsewhere also meant that he ruled through sub-Chief Neshangwe and headmen.

Although tension existed within the long-term alliance between Chikunda and Korekore in this area, these two groups shared political power. The headmanship was held by an elder male Chikunda who derived his position from his mother's line. The Village Chairman was an elder male Korekore. These men worked well together, engaging in a number of informal encounters before meetings, as well as generally arriving at agreement regarding the business of the day.

The Chikunda headmanship was installed at the time of conquest during the late 19th century, as depicted in Chapter 5. Chikafa had been made headman in the early1970s before Chief Chapoto lost the area to Chief Chitsungo. When I asked Headman Chikafa what had precipitated this change, he replied that, "long ago we were under Chapoto, when war came, Chapoto invited the people of this area to go to Kanyemba. The people refused, then the people decided to have Chitsungo as Chief". His appointment came about, he said, because he was the only available descendant of Guvheya, one of Kanyemba's lieutenants who had settled in the area a century previously. The *sabhuku*'s interpretation of the change of Chief referred to a dispute regarding political power in Chikafa area which took place during the war.

While I gathered no oral history depicting discontent with Chief Chapoto's rule of Chikafa during the thirty years that he controlled the area, it seemed likely that local Korekore used the experience of life in the 'keeps' (concentration/internment camps), in which a number of villages from Dande were enclosed together, to further

consolidate their Korekore identity. Chikunda influence over Chikafa had slowly decreased during Chapoto's reign, a fact evidenced by the diminished economic circumstances of a number of prominent families. For example, one family who had owned cattle in the 1950s and several brick structures, were in the 1990s reduced to a small homestead comprised of thatched huts.

The headman's responsibilities included allocation of land to villagers, dealing with boundary and domestic disputes, resolving rape charges, settling situations in which a man refused to marry a woman he had impregnated, and making representations to the *mpondoro*. *Sabhuku* Chikafa lamented that he had lost power since Independence, and that the Village Chairman took precedence over him, although I witnessed their collaboration many times. He also said that his most important function was a ritual one, whereby he maintained the relationship of the population with the *mpondoro*. During the 1990s, he was instrumental in reviving the cult of Nyamanindi as a local representation of autochthonous chieftaincy in response to the threat posed by development to the long-standing alliance between the Chikunda and Korekore groups. *Sabhuku* Chikafa's comment that, "beer is my church", illustrated his allegiance to the rituals of *mpondoro*, and his rejection of newer philosophies which had marginalised his role.

In Kanyemba, each incursion by the state resulted in further strengthening of *marunga rosario andrade* clan rule. There, the longevity of a strong centralising polity ensured that change was absorbed into existing structures. Chapter 3 discussed the role and history of the Chapoto Chieftaincy, so I will here focus on Chapoto's relationship with headmen. One of the means through which Chapoto dominated was by maintaining strong links with a number of lineage elders he designated as headmen. He claimed to have sixteen headmen under his rule in the Kanyemba and neighbouring Angwa areas, while only about eight usually attended village meetings. In his view, the primary role of headmen was to keep him informed about current issues and to refer most matters to him. His authoritarian approach to headmen caused discontent amongst lineage elders who were not included in political process. For example, in an interview in August of 1993 a headman, who represented a subordinate lineage, complained that Chapoto had always chosen his headmen from among men who had

large families so that they could provide more taxes. It seems that in this area there were a number of long established lineages whose elders were potential headmen, but that the actual designation was in the gift of the Chief. The apparent fluidity of headmanship contributed to consolidation of *marunga* clan supremacy because it allowed the Chief to determine who would be included in political process. The *tembo mvura* headman held a different view as he reiterated that his position was inherited from his father and legitimated from Guruve "after the Chimurenga War" (i.e. by the post-colonial government). It was understandable for this individual to cling to his headmanship as his lineage had no other means of representation in Kanyemba area, and suffered terrible economic oppression by the Chikunda. Their poverty stemmed from the fact that, as forcibly settled former hunter-gatherers, alienation from the bush had resulted in a dependence on the Chikunda for land. But no *tembo mvura* household seemed to have more than half an acre of cultivated land which meant that they needed to work for the major landowners, the Chikunda, in order to have enough food to eat.

If the Zimbabwean state, through the person of the President was ever considered to be part of the system of chieftaincy in the Zambesi, it lost its position during the 1990s. Renewed interest in local chiefs meant that the population was interested, once again, in local identities. The irony was that, through its explicit policies of decentralisation, the state also diluted its own influence in the area. These ideas will be discussed below.

For the most part, neither war nor the introduction of party structures greatly affected chieftaincy in Chikafa and Kanyemba. One reason was that chiefs and *mpondoro* supported guerrillas and so these positions were incorporated into ruling lineages. Another is that these changes did not affect the distribution of land in the Zambesi, the source of power of chiefs and headmen.

iv. The Independence War and Changing Allegiances:

The Independence War changed allegiances within the Zambesi Valley, not least because it had huge impact on the lives of its residents. For one, the population supported both ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas through the provision of food and shelter, and the participation of their youth as soldiers and *mujiba* (children who acted

182

as messengers). Importantly, villagers also participated in the overall aim of the war, to liberate the country of white minority government by supporting a constellation of *mpondoro* whose shrines gave both guidance and ritual approval to the actions of guerrillas. It is not surprising, then, to find that the war created a sense of allegiance and belongingness to the newly conquered *nyika* that became Zimbabwe.

If the impact of the war was such that it could create local allegiance to a new state, then it would surely reconfigure affiliations at the local level. Re-alignment of interests did take place, but the degree of change within communities depended very much on the strength or fragility of pre-existing structures, the degree of hardship experienced during the war, and the nature of local leaders. Notably, time spent in the 'keeps' fractured old relationships based on residence and social position in home villages and created new ones.

While residents of Kanyemba suffered terribly during the war, Chikafa was more affected socially and economically. For one, Chikunda lost the economic power which they had managed to maintain for over a century. During the 1940s and 1950s Chikunda had owned shops, grinding mills and cars, but no businesses were owned by this group in the 1990s. In Chikafa, post-Independence the economic power of the Chikunda group decreased at the same time as political alliance with the Korekore increased, particularly with their traditional allies, the *nzou samanyanga* lineage. In oral histories regarding conquest, these two groups were depicted as trading partners by the Korekore, and as subordinate hunters hired to procure tusks by the Chikunda. Before the war, Chikafa was governed through a partially fragmented political system because it was ruled by a string of Chikunda headmen whose leader, Chief Chapoto, lived more than 100km away. They maintained power through the fact that Chikunda headmen controlled the distribution of land. The fact that the population elected to replace Chief Chapoto with the Korekore Chief Chitsungo was a reflection of changing allegiances. Chikunda lost exclusive control over Chikafa due to a fragile system of governance through headmen, and the community's experience of the 'keeps'.

In Kanyemba, Chikunda power remained unchanged probably due to Chief Chapoto's strong leadership throughout the war, certainly because of the rigid hierarchy which gave no opportunity to subordinate lineages, and also because

Kanyemba village was placed into one 'keep' where their contact with people from other settlements was limited to the few hours when they were allowed out to tend their gardens.

In the 1970s, both settlements were placed into concentration camps called 'keeps' in a town called Mushumbi Pools which is situated near the escarpment leading to the plateau. There were three camps designated according to Chieftaincies: Chapoto; Chitsungo, and Matsiwu. While whole populations were placed in detention, their Chiefs did not join them, instead spending time under the protection of the Rhodesian regime.

In 1975, Chikafa village was relocated to Mushumbi Pools, in order to distance the population from guerrilla activities. At that time, the American Evangelical Mission, which had operated since 1947, was closed and the missionaries left the Zambesi Valley. Between 1975 and 1978 displaced villagers attempted to make a living in Mushumbi Pools through cultivation, particularly of vegetable gardens, and occasional work picking cotton at a nearby commercial farm. In 1978 the population of Chikafa was forced into a 'keep'. An informant related how families were woken early one morning, told to gather belongings and congregate at the local primary school. Their huts were burnt that day along with the possessions they had not managed to carry. They stayed behind barbed wire for a year surviving on the gardens they were allowed to tend and wild foods gathered between sunrise and midday. Conditions were crowded and sanitation poor with, "people dying of diarrhoea, no medical care, but there was traditional medicine and the security forces knew first aid". In this account, internees were questioned by the Rhodesian forces with some regularity, while beatings were frequent. Guerrillas who approached villagers through the wire to be fed were shot. This informant's family left the camp in 1979 after intervention from the Red Cross and spent some time on the plateau where he completed his education at a mission school.

While the stories of the 'keeps' I gathered were recounted by Chikunda informants from Chikafa, it is clear that all inmates from diverse clans and lineages shared an experience of physical and emotional hardship which further diluted already tenuous allegiance to Chikunda rule of Chikafa area. The combination of common

internment in the 'keeps' along with the pre-dominance of the Korekore in the guerrilla movement, conspired to break Chikunda hold over the Chikafa area. When people were finally resettled in Chikafa at the end of the war, although they went back to their pre-war settlement patterns of clustering around patrilineal elders, the Korekore brought with them new claims for a larger part of political process. Particularly with the installation of government and ZANU party structures, the Korekore saw a chance at better representation.

Residents of Kanyemba also had a fraught experience of the Independence War which affected the area from 1966 until they went into the 'keeps'. By 1967 both ZANLA and ZIPRA were recruiting adolescents there which they then took to Mozambique and Zambia. According to informants life was very difficult at the time because the population was interrogated by both guerrilla movements and the Rhodesian army, a situation which placed individuals in constant danger of being beaten or shot. One informant depicted circumstances in the following way: "Rhodesian forces would track ZANLA and ZIPRA. If these people came to your house you had to report to the authorities. But if you reported to the Rhodesian forces, then the rebels would kill you". By 1970 people were so frightened of being in their houses at night that they slept in their fields. In 1976 the Rhodesian government required the population to move into the camps at Mushumbi Pools where they stayed for three years. Their routine in the camps was the same as that of inmates from Chikafa. They were let out early in the morning to cultivate gardens and then had to return. Chief Chapoto was taken to Sipolilo (Guruve) by airplane, for his own protection, he said, because the Rhodesian government thought that he might be killed as a collaborator. People returned to Kanyemba in 1980 to find that wild animals had overrun houses, fields and gardens. They cleared land and re-established themselves with the help of food aid which they continued to receive into the 1990s.

While the war experience served to divide the population of Chikafa along lineage lines, common residence in the 'keeps' and the survival of the Chapoto Chieftaincy meant that residents of Kanyemba strengthened their common clan bond at that time. Once new government and party structures arrived in the area, these were also subsumed under *marunga rosario andrade* control. Chikafa experienced further

political, social and economic fragmentation in the post-war period, but eventually alliance between Chikunda and Korekore based on common economic interest created stability which endured until the advent of development.

v. District, Ward and Village Councils:

The real source of power during the 1990s resided with new councils due to their administrative functions, but also because of their membership. The ZANU Congress of 1984 re-organised and expanded party structures to extend representation within Zimbabwe through a set of parallel structures. The party organisation was positioned separately from local government structures and made accountable to Politburo. Local government structures were placed under the wing of the Ministry of Local Government which was answerable to Cabinet and included District Councils, Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) (see Illustration 4) (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:76-83).

Once again, the impact of these new structures on the populations of Kanyemba and Chikafa was very different. While their implementation produced a shift of power toward the younger generation of established lineages and their traditional allies who filled new positions, subordinate groups remained disenfranchised. In Chikafa, power was further eroded from the conquering Chikunda group, a fact which placed them in a relationship of equality with the Korekore. State-level political structures consolidated *marunga* clan supremacy in Kanyemba, while opening the door for participation from lineage juniors. In fact, committee work permitted the Kanyemba line of the dominant clan to launch a two-prong offensive on the office of Chief because it gave power to junior members whose political activities enhanced those of lineage elders who were campaigning for the position.

In Chikafa, the Village Chairman was an elderly Korekore whose family had been in the area for generations. Interestingly, he was not of the dominant *nzou samanyanga* lineage, but instead *tembo mazvimbakupa*. He was elected to his position by the population, and, in 1992, had been in office for five years. That a Korekore individual of a less important lineage should accede to office in Chikafa meant that the loss of Chikunda control which had accelerated during the war, continued into the

1980s and 1990s. However, it was not usual for subordinate lineages to hold these important positions. The Village Chairman described his role as the same as that of *sabhuku* because "they talked to each other". Dispute settlement and decisions were agreed upon between these two parties in conjunction with the Village Committee.

People in Chikafa area were well aware of the structures under which they were governed. While they knew the name of the Governor of Mashonaland Central Province, and of the Provincial Administrator, most attention was focussed on structures from District Council level and below. Decisions to do with implementation of development schemes were made from District Council and so this structure was of interest. At the local level, Chikafa belonged to Zvaitika Village Development Committee (VIDCO) comprised of six villages, each with its own *sabhuku* and Village Chairman. The Zvaitika VIDCO Chairman was a young Korekore who, once elected, vowed that he "would also listen to the advice of elders". Of the six VIDCO chairmen elected between 1985 and 1993, four had been Korekore and two Chikunda. At the next level, Neshangwe Ward was lead by a Korekore Ward Councillor and encompassed a number of VIDCOs. Local level structures took on great importance from the early 1990s because it was through these that issues to do with drought and development projects were discussed.

The VIDCO Chairman was elected by the people of the six villages he represented. In ordinary years he would be responsible for overseeing the good order of roads, primary school, clinic, grinding mill, borehole, and also government employees such as schoolteachers and the nurse's aides who worked in the clinic. His role involved consultation with the various government entities who contributed to infrastructure of the six villages under his supervision. With the arrival of the MZP, VIDCO Chairmen had had to mediate between disgruntled villagers who objected to relocation, and attempt to intervene, often unsuccessfully, with officers of the project. Once the drought became serious, they were also responsible for overseeing drought relief distribution when it arrived. It was their responsibility to take local matters which they or the *sabhuku* and Village Chairmen could not solve, to the Ward Councillor. In the instance of crime, the police were called to take statements, and the matter was referred to the Magistrate's Court in Guruve.

187

One especially noteworthy aspect of representation in Chikafa area during the 1990s was that, while headmanship and ZANU representation was in the hands of elders of long established lineages, administrative government structures were controlled by junior members of these same lineages. In most cases, there was a respectful relationship between young and old, especially as the economic interests of long-standing Chikunda and Korekore lineages were similar. They owned the greatest amount of land, the better houses, and the most goats. This political arrangement was reminiscent of brideservice, where junior men, here conceptualised as grooms, performed labour for elders, while these controlled important decision-making.

Beside these formal administrative structures, there were also a number of committees which maintained the local infrastructure. For example, in Chikafa area there were committees responsible for the primary school, the clinic (although this was dissolved in 1992 after a dispute with a newly appointed nurse), boreholes, and the market. Committee membership consisted mostly of Korekore and Chikunda lineages, but there were young and old and a number of women.

In Chikafa area, old and new structures of rule worked well together mostly because these were dominated by two Korekore and Chikunda lineages of long established residence. Elders agreed on issues of land distribution and adjudication, while younger members administered the day-to-day maintenance of infrastructure. This arrangement was put to the test with the arrival of development in the form of resource management and land resettlement. While the resource management scheme, CAMPFIRE, did not have much impact on livelihood in Chikafa as there were few wild animals there, it did, however, change the notion of social ecology. Within the cult of land spirits, proper stewardship of land and animals was linked to social behaviour which strengthened community. CAMPFIRE stipulated that wild animals were off limits. Under CAMPFIRE, the value of animals was reconfigured as a cash value. Similarly, the MZP took control of land out of the hands of the ruling alliances within Chikafa and changed the balance of power with the introduction of new migrants. These issues will be developed in the next chapter.

At the same time as it appeared that development precipitated an opposition between long-term residents and new migrants, the fact was that social organisation

became fragmented along a number of lines. I have emphasised throughout this study that Chikafa is characteristic of an acephalous society where, despite a ruling alliance between Chikunda and Korekore, control of political process was tenuous. Development demonstrated the fragility of this arrangement by splitting the interests of junior and senior members of these elite lineages. This was accomplished by removing control of land out of the hands of lineage elders and into the power of the state. But in this process, juniors who controlled local government structures mobilised their positions to maximise their share of allocated land. They saw the MZP as an opportunity to obtain land outside of the control of elders. By 1993 a number of young leaders had been allocated desirable plots of land by the MZP causing widespread unease.

In Kanyemba, while political process also included long established chieftancy and headmanship, post-Independence party structures, and newer committee work, it functioned somewhat differently from that of Chikafa. For one, chieftaincy was very strongly entrenched and mechanisms for dissent almost non-existent. Power was concentrated within two of three lineages of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan. Chief Chapoto, a descendant of Chihumbe, controlled the office of Chief during the 1990s, and had done so since 1945. The Ward Council and its head Councillor belonged to the Kanyemba line of the ruling clan. Politics in this area was distinguished by the domination of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan.

Post-colonial government structures were also dominated by the *marunga* clan through its junior members and the junior members of traditionally subordinate lineages which dated back to conquest. The most prominent of these new structures were the Ward Council and the Wildlife Committee. The Ward Council was composed of four members, all Chikunda, who oversaw a number of committees responsible for the school, grinding mill, wildlife, development, and liaised with District Council. The Wildlife Committee, composed of seven members, oversaw the functioning of CAMPFIRE, a position which had become very important as the project had a huge effect on the livelihood of the population at the same time as it brought in money to be used by the community. According to the Ward Councillor the project had increased its takings from clients ten-fold between 1991 and 1993. Interestingly, the head of the

Wildlife Committee was a male Korekore of the *tembo mbizi* clan, a fact which indicated a small amount of power-sharing amongst the younger generation.

Ward Council meetings were well-attended affairs where a number of local committees reported on their activities. The Chief did not attend these but senior members of Kanyemba lineage did so in an advisory capacity as they held no formal role. As the Ward Councillor once said, "we should choose old and young for the committees, the young can read and write, the old give advice". One interpretation of this attitude is that incorporating young and old into committee work would bring together two bases of power of the Kanyemba lineage: domination of post-colonial political structures and the Chieftaincy which they hoped to soon control. One elderly man who attended many meetings was from Kanyemba's line and held a position as counsellor at Chapoto's Court. Of six Ward Councillors since 1980, five had been *marunga*. At most meetings there were very few complaints about political process, rather statements such as, "the committees are working well for the people" were common. If problems arose, such as misdistribution of meat obtained from animals killed by clients of the safari camp, individuals were blamed, but no serious sanctions were applied. At a meeting in 1993 one contender for the Chieftaincy stated that: "leaders should call other leaders and share ideas". In other words, decision-making should remain within the circle of established representatives. Those excluded from Ward level political process were the *tembo mvura* (Dema), and most Korekore except for the *tembo mbizi* clan. All committee work was dominated by the *marunga* clan, but there appeared to be a further consolidation of power amongst descendants of Kanyemba in preparation for a strong claim to the Chieftaincy.

The Wildlife Committee was another powerful instrument of *marunga* domination in Kanyemba area. Although its Chairman was not *marunga*, he was young, educated, versed in the technical language of development, and involved in the Faith Apostolic Mission for which he collaborated on a translation of the Book of Mark into Chikunda. He belonged to a lineage associated with the original *marunga* conquest of Dande, and had become a senior member of the Faith Apostolic Mission where his wife had taken over the role of initiating young girls in menarche ceremonies. Both his background and position within a growing church made him a good ally for the

marunga cause.

The Wildlife Committee was probably the most powerful political instrument in Kanyemba area during research for this study because it oversaw functioning of the CAMPFIRE project. This committee controlled local distribution of funds obtained from Zambezi Hunters, the hunting concession owners who serviced the project. It also made important decisions regarding designated hunting territories, employment of locals in the safari business, and the distribution of game meat.

The financial clout of this committee was hard to underestimate. In August of 1993, the Ward Councillor told me that the safari operator had contributed Z$1.2 million to District Council in 1992, Z$91 000 of which was given to Chapoto Ward. Part of that money was divided up amongst households, so that each received Z$192. At a Ward Council meeting in August of 1993, a sum of Z$11000 of total monies was said to have been given for improvements to the primary school. In truth I could not track distribution of money within Kanyemba area, and it was hard to know how much of the money was reinvested by the committee in local infrastructure and services

Another source of power for the Wildlife Committee was that it had decision-making power with regard to the designation of land to be used for safari hunting. At a meeting held in August 1993 with an ecologist from the Parks department, discussion centred on whether the community should build a campsite to attract tourists to the area. In order to build this attraction, land would have to be claimed on the eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River and a game fence erected to protect people from the herds of wild animals which descended on the river at night time. The area under question was populated by *tembo mvura* people, 108 families to be exact, who would need to be relocated elsewhere. The ecologist suggested that these people could be employed as anti-poachers. At this meeting both the Ward Councillor and the government official did not give any thought to the difficulties that moving their homesteads would pose for these families, nor to their sudden loss of livelihood once they became separated from the forest which supplied them with wild plants and animals. Because this scheme would remove their means of livelihood, the *tembo mvura* would have no choice but to become even more dependent on Chikunda landowners for work in order to obtain food. The CAMPFIRE project, which I will

191

discuss in detail in the following chapter, had begun a process of removing members of this lineage from their forest environment so that, in 1993, they were greatly dependent on the Chikunda. Any extension of hunting or tourism in the area would further encroach on their territory and way of life.

Through the Wildlife Committee, the *marunga* clan managed to control a development project which seriously affected not only the livelihood of the *tembo mvura*, but also of other subordinates, such as fishers, who made their living through the natural environment. Their involvement in the finances of the project also allowed them decision-making power over which infrastructural issues to privilege. In short, of the post-colonial political structures implemented in Kanyemba area, the *marunga* had managed to appropriate those which provided the opportunity to consolidate their power by further marginalising historically subordinate clans.

In Kanyemba, processes of domination originating with the state were not perceived as threatening because *marunga* already presided over a centralised polity which was able to incorporate and use to its advantage any new initiatives. They did not conceive of the Zimbabwean state as a traitor, rather they had always understood the issue of conquest and never conceptualised the state as autochthonous in the way of the Korekore. For the Chikunda, whose very name speaks of conquest, the state was never anything but a conqueror.

In the 1990s, the impact of the state on political process in Chikafa and Kanyemba was very different. Chikafa, a settlement distinguished by a tenuous power-sharing arrangement between Chikunda and Korekore lineages, experienced further fragmentation. In this area, the conquering Chikunda had ruled through headmen for most of the 20th century, but lost a great deal of influence during and after the guerrilla war. For one, guerrilla war in Dande was based on the support of a pantheon of autochthonous and rain-making land spirits in which Chikunda *mpondoro* featured as outsiders. Also, the experience of villagers in the 'keep' at Mushumbi Pools served to consolidate Korekore identity in opposition to their white jailers. The slippage of power from Chikunda hands was further evidenced during the 1980s when Korekore took up ZANU representative positions. During the early 1990s both groups owned most of the land in Chikafa, and so shared an interest in maintaining political

control of representative structures. However, once land resettlement took hold, new opportunities arose for junior elders and new migrants to the area. Whilst capable, these people did not manage to bring local opinion to development managers. When the drought occurred in 1991-92, the combination of a highly decentralised political arrangement, fragile environment, and the threat of imminent resettlement resulted in a sense of deep betrayal by the state. Thus, while the Zimbabwean state had been construed as legitimate during the 1980s because it had been built by popular support, it was viewed as traitorous during the 1990s when villagers found themselves with political structures which did not represent their opinions, development schemes which threatened their livelihood, and a drought which brought anxiety and hunger.

The impact of the state was very different in Kanyemba. This settlement had been ruled by the same clan since the 19th century, and the same Chief, a member of one of three ruling lineages, since 1945. Because of a rigid social hierarchy, subordinate lineages did not have opportunities to participate in politics, except in alliance with *marunga*. All other clans and lineages were impeded representation, and there existed no channels for dissent except support of a neighbouring Korekore *mpondoro*, which proved ineffectual. The effect of post-colonial state structures was to consolidate *marunga* control over the population. The Ward Council, VIDCOs, and the Wildlife Committee were monopolised by this clan. A secondary effect of state intervention in this area was that, through their participation in new political structures, junior members of the Kanyemba lineage strengthened their power base against their rival for the Chieftaincy, the Chihumbe lineage. In sum, the Zimbabwean state consolidated *marunga* rule in Kanyemba area because, as a centralised polity for over a century, rulers there knew that political innovations were best incorporated under their wing.

vi. Structural Adjustment: Some Effects on Dande

Post-colonial political structures in Dande resulted in further dispersal of power in Chikafa, while in Kanyemba, these reinforced a pre-existing hierarchy. Kanyemba was similarly less affected by structural adjustment, but this may have been due to its distance from the plateau, the smaller amount of labour migration there, and

certainly the fact that it was not subject to the MZP which encouraged cash-cropping of cotton. It was a different story in Chikafa where structural adjustment, combined with land resettlement and drought, contributed to loss of livelihood and anxiety amongst residents. There were a number of reasons for this including its relative proximity to the plateau, the longstanding pattern of labour migration, increasing monetarisation of local economy through cotton farming, the introduction of the MZP, and crop failure due to serious drought.

As with most foreign innovations, structural adjustment was interpreted, by locals, in terms of the Zambesian discourse of Chieftaincy which understood political and economic behaviours through the dichotomy of autochthony and conquest. In this section, I will argue that the structural adjustment policies of the 1990s affected the Zambesi Valley in two important ways: First, structural adjustment changed longstanding labour migration practices through reduction of job opportunities on the plateau. Labour migration had long served as a safety valve in the event of crop failure and was a source of cash to purchase seed, chemical, and other items used in cultivation. Cash earned also paid for school fees, household needs, building materials, transportation, medicines, and other goods and services. Secondly, changes in the state-organised marketing system made difficult both production and sale of surplus maize and cotton cash crops. While the remoteness of Dande usually meant that the effects of government policies were not immediately felt in the area, unlike the political structures introduced during the 1980s, structural adjustment had strong and almost immediate repercussions because it affected livelihood. The impact of the drought was exacerbated by structural adjustment because usual coping mechanisms became unavailable.

Until the 1990s, Zambesians did not engage in significant cash-cropping. Their livelihood was confined to subsistence cultivation of approximately two acre plots and kitchen gardens, and the tending of small numbers of goats and chickens. Household incomes were supplemented with seasonal or life-course labour migration, trade in fish or game meat, and products and services associated with special skills such as healing or building. It is difficult to gauge the impact that Zambesians had on the Zimbabwean national economy through their work on the plateau. However, the state

has had long impact on the Zambesi through its wars and labour requirements. Dramatically, during the 1990s, state-sanctioned development projects were introduced which changed land use and the relationship with the environment at the same time as structural adjustment was applied. Local economy in Chikafa and Kanyemba will be discussed in Chapter 7 where it provides background material to the impact of development projects. In this section I will summarise the structural adjustment program and then discuss its effect on livelihoods in Dande.

The impetus toward structural adjustment was provided by the World Bank during the mid to late 1980s when it found fault with the practice that Zimbabwe had "pursued policies favouring stabilisation rather than growth" (Gibbon 1996:349). While, overall, policies of economic growth seemed to make sense for a country which appeared to be politically stable, and had strong industrial and farming sectors, the fact remained that post-independence infrastructure had been built on borrowing, that job creation was low, and there were also low levels of private investment (Gibbon 1996:349). Despite these caveats, a structural adjustment program based on trade liberalization was introduced in 1990-91 which targeted price controls, wage regulation (except for farm and domestic workers), government employment, and import controls. These changes were all based on the notion that the market is self-regulating and that growth would be, therefore, inevitable. In the same way that development schemes were unilaterally accepted by the Zimbabwean government, structural adjustment was adopted without consultation amongst affected parties. Trade unions, farmers, and others concerned were not involved in the decision-making process. Protests from trade unions, churches, and students were quashed through imprisonment of leaders and banning of demonstrations. Locally, the acronym for the Economic Structural Adjustment Program, ESAP, became known somewhat bitterly as "Europeans Suffer, Africans Perish", or simply as "Hapana sadza" (no porridge). There were very important reasons for these interpretations as ESAP was associated with widespread hunger and despair during the 1990s.

While changes to funding of infrastructure may have had an important impact on the plateau, people in the Zambesi were used to lack of roads, schools, clinics and other facilities. For them, ESAP disrupted their lives because its agricultural and

195

industrial policies affected their livelihood. The agricultural policies of ESAP unraveled a number of positive steps for African farmers taken by the ZANU-pf government during the 1980s. Most significantly, there were benefits from the incorporation of African farmers into "the state-marketing system...through marketing depots, crop collection points and extension services in the communal area and making modern crop development packages available through Agritex" (Gibbon 1996:365). Because of the collection and distribution facilities provided by the Grain Marketing Board and the support received through AGRITEX, in the late 1980s African farmers produced approximately half of Zimbabwe's export maize, and a large portion of cotton. However, by 1991 the World Bank made two crucial objections to the GMB. In the first place, it argued "that GMB services to farmers in communal areas, and the control associated with them, were uneconomic and counter-productive" (Gibbon 1996:365). Secondly, it also believed that there were:

> "Large diseconomies involved in maintaining the strategic grain reserve and disposing of excess stocks in boom years and in maintaining the centralized system for shipping maize from the remoter depots to a small number of urban-based mills, before shipping it back to these same remote areas in the form of meal".

> (Gibbon1996:365)

As a result of these complaints, the GMB was made to reduce the number of grain collection points around the country to almost none by 1992, to cut staff costs, and to reduce its maize stocks. In effect, "because of crop failure during the 1991-92 crop season it obliged the GMB to undertake massive imports in the 1992-93 marketing season" (Gibbon 1996:367). In addition to modifications of the GMB, the World Bank also asked for market deregulation including partially decontrolling trade in the staple white maize (to enhance the position of independent traders), and "to eliminate all controls and restrictions in the trade in beef, dairy products, cotton, oil seeds and yellow maize" (Gibbon 1996:368).

There were widespread repercussions of these measures for the whole farming sector in Zimbabwe. Commercial farmers found it more profitable to switch from maize crops to tobacco (from 31% cultivating tobacco to 79%), as well as engaging in horticulture to produce vegetables and flowers for export. This sector employed 300 000 workers and so any changes which affected employment would have important

repercussions for communal areas, whose residents engaged in labour migration. In one instance, a young white farmer who managed a tobacco farm some 50 km outside of Harare expressed regret at the farm owner's choice of crops, saying that he would prefer to grow "food" (meaning maize).

Communal areas, already suffering from the effects of serious drought, also lost their grain collection points. This caused many problems for producers, "as marketing through the GMB became more physically difficult for them more and more turned as anticipated to small-scale private traders" (Gibbons 1996:369). This situation made small farmers, without their own means of transport and in the absence of local cooperatives, quite vulnerable to the exploitation of traders.

ESAP also affected the Cotton Marketing Board, and in the years from 1989 to 1992 cotton prices fell. For one, the post-drought cotton input package offered to farmers carried a 31% interest rate out of reach of most people. Also, with a new market-driven approach, the CMB found it more profitable to sell cotton lint overseas rather than to supply local spinners in Harare, thereby putting the spinning sector in financial difficulties and risking job cuts. Political intervention avoided this circumstance, but this case also illustrated the drawbacks of a purely market-driven approach (Gibbon 1996:371).

ESAP rejected the protectionist approach which the industrial sector had inherited from the Rhodesian regime because of structural problems which it said prevented growth. Pre-Independence and well into the 1980s, the industrial sector had had access to local capital and benefited from foreign exchange controls. In response, the program prescribed a rejection of protectionist foreign exchange policies and encouraged liberalisation of foreign investment, restraint within budgets, and investment in re-equipment. In other words, ESAP suggested a restructuring of production which would include reduction of employees and, in all probability, computerisation. These changes entailed social consequences as employment in industry fell by 25 000 jobs between 1991 and 1993. These figures represent full-time employees and not the scores of people on short-term contracts (Gibbon 1996:374).

It is hard to understand why the Zimbabwean government adopted a structural adjustment program of which repercussions would be felt so immediately and so

deeply at the social and economic levels. It is possible that the political implications of loss of popular support were also not taken into consideration. In the Zambesi Valley, ESAP compounded existing hardship caused by land resettlement and serious drought by affecting available jobs on the plateau, the traditional safety valve in times of strife. Furthermore, modifications to GMB and CMB policies also resulted in difficulties with the production and marketing of maize and cotton, the latter forming the backbone of the MZP. But, perhaps the most profound impact of structural adjustment was that it shattered people's hopes for a better standard of living for their families.

For the better part of the 20th century labour migration was a common practice amongst residents of the Zambesi Valley. There were two patterns of migration: a seasonal movement to the plateau with a return at harvest time; and, a migration of several years duration during which workers attempted to save money to build brick houses. In addition, migration was an option in times of stress such as food shortages, family troubles, or in cases where life at home became untenable. Both men and women participated in these cycles in the settlements studied. During the drought of 1991-92, migration accelerated as evidenced by the presence in Chikafa of 60 households in 1992 and 76 in 1993.

One elderly informant in Chikafa described how he worked on the plateau, mostly at commercial farms for nearly thirty years, returning for one month each year to help his wife's father with the harvest. His wife stayed with her family during that time. He said that for the most part, he enjoyed working away from Chikafa, particularly during the first ten years which he said he spent *"ndakuya pleasure"* (eating pleasure). From the appearance of his homestead and the size of his fields, it was clear that he had accrued no savings from his time away and made no investments in business, land, or buildings. It is possible that he made small contributions to his wife's parents household over those years and so was unable to amass savings. He paid a long period of brideprice and also engaged in brideservice at harvest time. In contrast, a younger informant said that he used the opportunity to work on a commercial farm to escape a call-up to join the Rhodesian army.

In 1991 and 1992 a number of people in Chikafa went to the plateau in search

of work. Most went to commercial farms where they seemed to have done odd jobs, including weeding and other low status activities characteristic of short-term employment. Most came back with no savings saying that pay was very low and that they had just managed to survive. The only work one informant could manage to find was picking peas on a commercial farm for 25 cents/kg at 20 to 30 kg each day. He could not send money to his wife who had remained behind and survived the drought by eating bush foods and relief maize. Migrants, who returned toward the end of 1992 in time to prepare fields for planting, were rewarded with a harvest in April of 1993. Others who stayed longer and did not plant crops relied on relatives for food. No informants found work in an urban area, due to a lack of jobs I was told, but probably also because they lacked skills. Although at least sixteen families from Chikafa, but probably more, tried migration as a response to drought, shortage of jobs and poor remuneration led many to return before the drought ended, and most with no money at all.

Crop failure during the 1991-92 drought coupled with the inability to find employment left many households with few resources to grow cotton. People in Chikafa thought it peculiar that after so much encouragement to grow cotton, particularly from agencies such as AGRITEX, the price of agricultural inputs should rise at the same time as it became more difficult to sell the bales they produced. While the cash earned from cotton cultivation was attractive, it strained the resources of people in Chikafa who found it to be expensive and labour-intensive. However, most cotton growers were starry-eyed with regard to the promise of a cash income, and soon found themselves in a cycle of demand for labour and expense which they had not anticipated. Because energy had been diverted away from food cultivation, the income from cotton was needed to supplement local food sources. Also, with near-total crop failure in 1992, any income from the subsequent 1993 harvest was welcomed.

Cotton cultivation in the Zambesi Valley had historically been a doomed prospect. In the 1970s, commercial cotton cultivation was attempted in Mushumbi Pools town, the site of the 'keeps', but failed for a number of reasons, including poor soils, large amounts of water required and small yields. In Chikafa, people started growing cotton during the 1980s. In 1992, the CMB provided 100% credit on cotton

seed in the Zambesi, an offer accepted by a number of growers in Chikafa.

The economics of cotton cultivation made people's tenacity to grow it hard to understand. In the early 1990s it was an expensive crop to grow, paid few returns and took scarce labour away from food crops. In 1993 there were 93.5 acres under cotton cultivation as compared to 152.5 acres of maize. 40 households grew cotton which meant that the average size of plots was 2.3 acres. The price of cotton seed increased from Z$12.50/25kg in 1991 to Z$57/25kg in 1993. About 20kg of seed was required for each acre. In addition, AGRITEX recommended the use of fertilizer which cost about Z$76/acre, and pesticide which varied in price between Z$27/acre to Z$80/acre. Cotton was complicated to sow, having to be done in two stages. Also, this crop required constant weeding between December and mid-March which led a few growers to hire workers to whom was paid 50 cents per line of cotton plants (most people averaged 15-16 lines of weeding per workday). Households yielded between one and three bales of cotton which was taken to a collection point in Mahuwe, a settlement situated at the bottom of the escarpment on the main road leading to the plateau. From there bales were to be taken to Bindura town where a contract had been struck with a local ginnery to buy the cotton at Z$150/bale. In 1993, part of the cotton crop was destroyed by pests, so yields were lower than anticipated.

Of great concern to producers in Zvaitika VIDCO was their distance from the collection point at Mahuwe village which was situated on the main road out of the Valley. In 1993 they campaigned to move it to Mushumbi Pools from where they could also collect seeds and empty bale packets. Without control of distribution of their cotton bales, growers in Chikafa were at the mercy of intermediaries who struck deals with spinners on their own terms and for their own interests. If the return on cotton was not good, then there would be no money to buy seed, fertilizer, and pesticides for the following year. A number of farmers had sold goats to finance cotton growing. Cotton cultivation continued in Chikafa in 1993 because of financial aid from AGRITEX, and because of people's hopes that it would eventually be grown successfully and provide cash. In truth, only households which could pool their land and labour resources managed to grow cotton effectively. In 1993, my last observations of cotton cultivation in Chikafa indicated a potential for new social

stratification based on relative success in growing the crop.

In sum, the effects of ESAP in Chikafa were two-fold. The shortage of jobs on the plateau due to shifts in commercially farmed crops, and cut-backs in industry made labour migration ineffectual. Zambesians needed other ways of supplementing their subsistence livelihood, which they attempted to do through the cultivation of cotton. This proved to be an expensive and labour-intensive endeavour which was difficult to market and yielded little return during the early 1990s. In a way, for many farmers in Chikafa, cotton symbolised freedom from the cycle of labour-migration in which they had seen their parents and grandparents caught. It also offered the promise of cash to buy desirable consumer goods which people interpreted as a release from the tenuousness of subsistence farming. But not everyone believed cotton to be a viable livelihood alternative. In the midst of AGRITEX meetings at which the wonders of cotton cultivation were espoused, and the pressures from the MZP to grow the cash crop, many people started to wonder about the consequences of recent social and economic changes in Chikafa. These uncertainties were articulated through a witchcraft accusation which was resolved through intervention from local *mpondoro* depicted in Chapter 9.

vii. The Zimbabwean State and Domination in Dande:

It did not take long after Independence for international organisations to offer opinions on the state of Zimbabwe's economy and way in which it was governed. The World Bank and later the International Monetary Fund objected to a longstanding approach to economy which privileged stabilisation over growth, and suggested that an overall change to economic policy based on growth and foreign investment was preferable. On the other hand, it was not difficult to understand why the post-colonial state introduced new governing structures throughout Zimbabwe. A network of representatives elected by local people but answerable to central government (and to the Politburo) corresponded well with the socialist ideology of ZANU. It would also mirror images of Chieftaincy, familiar to most Zimbabweans, in which a Chief or King governed through tributary polities. After Independence, many parallels were drawn between the Munhumutapa state and the new Zimbabwean state. Books by Mudenge

(1988) and Randles (1979) on this subject became available in Zimbabwe, an unsurprising fact as these depicted a view of the past in accordance with the image of Zimbabwe constructed by ZANU.

The idea that Zimbabwe had been re-conquered from white colonisers by Zimbabweans and, therefore, belonged to all was shattered by the introduction of the philosophy of decentralisation. This was done on political initiatives while structural adjustment was the result of pressure from international financial institutions which promoted the renewed dominance of market principles.

The confusing language of centralisation, embedded in ZANU party structures, and decentralisation promoted in development schemes has its origins in ambiguities inherent in the Zimbabwean state. Munro (1998) argued that this imprecise language of governance is common to post-colonial African states which have a historical tradition of nationalism based on political inclusion coupled with romantic notions appealing to the cultural integrity found in tradition. For Zambesians it proved to be a confusing combination of messages. A history of political domination in the Zambesi by centralised chieftaincies would have helped people to understand a state which behaved like a conqueror. But a government of mixed messages which emphasised an ideology of participation through new elected representative structures at the same time as it supported a language of self-help and individual empowerment, proved to be untenable. During the 1990s, the lives of residents of Dande changed dramatically with the conjunction of development, drought, and ESAP. Unfortunately these features compounded each other's effects to produce a circumstance of acute hardship beyond the control of most individuals and families.

In response, Zambesians began to view the state as conqueror after a decade in which it dismantled any grounds it had possessed to being an autochthonous chieftaincy. The government took a number of steps which, interpreted through the cultural logic of a Zambesian discourse of chieftaincy, were construed as conquest. During the war, the support of *mpondoro* for guerrillas and the sacrifices made by families involved the population in the construction of a new state grounded in legitimacy. By the mid 1980s, the Zimbabwean state promoted a hierarchy of heroism in which some guerrillas became more deserving of commemoration. The symbolism

of Heroes' acre broke the ties of kinship invested in the *sabwira* mutual aid and burial relationship. This was crucial in the minds of Zambesians as any relationship between locals and newcomers unmediated by *sabwira* ties was believed to lead to discontinuity between ancestors and their living descendants. That the hierarchical Chikunda maintained *sabwira* relations with the *tembo mvura* people, whom they oppressed so consistently, spoke volumes about the importance of this relationship. By designating ranks of heroism, and in the Zambesi, the label "ex-combatant" to denote a hierarchy of important contribution to Liberation, the state signaled its refusal to be *sabwira*. The sense of betrayal felt in Chikafa was articulated at a *mpondoro* ceremony in mid-1993 when a land spirit lamented that the valley had become full of wandering spirits (of the improperly buried).

The dismantling of the Grain Marketing Board and the dissipation of grain stocks, as recommended under structural adjustment, was also interpreted as another refusal by President Mugabe to play an appropriate Chiefly role. A proper Chief, even an oppressive one like Chapoto, maintained a granary with surplus maize for those inevitable times of strife. That the state failed to do so was another indication of betrayal. In the Zambesi, during the drought, I heard people say that even the *muzungu* (Rhodesians) gave food aid. Well into the drought, when food aid did arrive in Chikafa, a number of people told me that it was "Mugabe's food", regardless of provenance. I interpreted this view to mean that, in local terms, donated food, even if it was inadequate and late coming, must be from the Chief.

In Chikafa, the belief that the state had lost its claims to autochthony finally gelled with the implementation of the MZP. During the 1980s, when the alliance between Korekore and Chikunda had been strong, land distribution was controlled by the *sabhuku* and the Village Chairman. By taking land out of local control, the MZP disrupted a number of important social relations. For one, marriage payments were shortened and brideservice rendered irrelevant since obligation to affines became no longer a prerequisite to land ownership. An elderly informant lamented to me that girls had become like prostitutes because they could be taken with one payment and no ongoing obligation on the part of the groom. Also, patrilineal ties were tested as patrilocal residence was rendered difficult by the scheme. New couples would live

neolocally, a feature which made obligations to blood kin less obvious. On the small scale, *sabwira* relations, which incorporated newcomers into established settlements, were also diluted by the MZP which acknowledged no ritual authority in Dande.

In sum, post-colonial structures introduced into the Zambesi Valley by the Zimbabwean state and international organisations caused a great deal of disruption in Chikafa and threatened the very basis of chieftaincy there. Both the Independence War and ZANU government structures introduced during the 1980s weakened Chikunda economic power which led to a power-sharing arrangement with the Korekore group. During the 1990s, ESAP was associated with weakening of the labour migration cycle and difficulties with cotton cultivation. Development, to be examined in the following chapter, changed land use patterns and undermined the Chikunda/Korekore ruling alliance formed during the 1980s. Serious drought in 1991-92 highlighted the fragility of the changing economy through the occurrence of widespread hunger, distress, and illness. Perceived failure on the part of the Mugabe government to behave like a chieftaincy led residents of Chikafa to feel betrayed and to view the state as conqueror. In response to this dire circumstance, there was a revival of the shrine of the local *mpondoro*, Nyamanindi, in an attempt to recreate a notion of appropriate governance. Through renewed support of land spirits, people in Chikafa recreated a notion of locality and long-term residence which they deployed to oppose both the MZP and new migrants. By mid 1993, when a post-drought cholera epidemic claimed well over thirty lives, a witchcraft accusation took place, of which resolution through spirit possession ceremonies articulated the high level of stress which a decade of economic and political changes had brought to Chikafa.

In contrast, the longstanding rigid social, political, and economic hierarchy of Kanyemba settlement enabled absorption of post-colonial innovations which averted disruption. Residents of that area had had long experience of domination through the highly centralised Chapoto Chieftaincy which had been installed in 1945. To most residents of Kanyemba, from the Chief to the most subordinated clans, the post-colonial state had always been a conqueror. Never had they imagined that the state was their *sabwira*, or ritually installed and legitimate. For them, Mugabe was a conqueror in the same mould as their great ancestor, Kanyemba.

204

Chapter 7 will continue to examine the central issue of domination in the Zambesi Valley of the 1990s by examining local response to the implementation of resource management and land resettlement schemes.

Chapter 7: Development Schemes in the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s: Empowerment and Control

"They should come and kill us; we don't want to go".

Sabhuku Chikafa speaking about his village's planned relocation under the Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Resettlement Project

"There was more relish before the war, people could hunt and fish with nets. It is impossible to get fat now".

Resident of Kanyemba discussing access to food sources

i. Critique of Development:

In the west, the notion of development alludes to the progress and betterment of the predicament in which disadvantaged peoples are found. For the Zambesi Valley of the early 1990s, development became a term of widespread use which resulted in it acquiring a set of local meanings not necessarily in line with the aims of providers. In this chapter I will describe the different meanings of development in the west and in the Zambesi Valley by juxtaposing the ideology of development with the circumstances of its application. I will argue that the benevolent language in which development is couched masks a profoundly western-based paradigm which becomes problematic when faced with local worldviews. In the Zambesi, I became aware of development ideologies, local acceptance and resistance to their realisation, and the power relations which ensued between local individuals and groups.

In Chapter 6 I outlined political institutions in Dande to demonstrate how in a centralised polity, like Kanyemba, existing rulers used their position to appropriate new structures to their advantage. At the same time, in a fragmented settlement such as Chikafa, new political structures eroded the position of the most powerful, and provided opportunities for formerly disenfranchised groups. The introduction of development schemes in the Zambesi Valley in the late 1980s, whilst impoverishing most people, aided domination by the Chikunda of Kanyemba settlement, and state

domination of politically weak Chikafa area. In doing so, the state lost the popular support it had gained during the Independence War, locally framed as autochthonous and legitimate power, to become considered a conqueror whose interests did not coincide with those of local people.

In this chapter I will analyse the role that development projects played in the lives and livelihoods of residents of Chikafa and Kanyemba, the ways in which these came to inhabit their imagination, and the ways in which these were encountered locally. The CAMPFIRE resource management scheme was applied to both Chikafa and Kanyemba areas, but had most impact on the latter. The notable impact of CAMPFIRE in Chikafa was that it had helped to create a significant problem with regard to the destruction of fields by elephant which could not be culled by locals under the project's regulations. The MZP scheme was introduced to Chikafa area in the late 1980s where it planned to re-organise the distribution of land and local economy. The common thread between these two different projects was that both proposed to re-organise people's relationship with their environment through both changed cultivation activities and relationship with bush resources. In order to interpret my observations of the impact of development in Dande area, I will invoke the work of Arturo Escobar who examined power relations and development, and James Ferguson who argued that development is characterised by its unintended results. To describe the effect of drastic modification of land use practices in a subsistence economy, I will invoke Tim Ingold's notions of skills, dwelling, and livelihood which argued that the type of relationship which people have with environments depends on interactions at any particular moment. In this view, if a relationship changes or ceases to take place, then skills and knowledge will also change. These issues are important to consider in the context of development schemes which worked to transform subsistence cultivators into cotton cash-croppers (MZP), and former hunter-gatherers into subsistence farmers (CAMPFIRE).

It is important to review the language of development in order to understand how the Zambesi was brought into global processes which resulted in inequality. Arturo Escobar is amongst the most vociferous critics of the development paradigm.

207

His book, *Encountering Development* (1995), began with an examination of how the post-World War II dream of development turned into a nightmare in which "the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression" (Escobar 1995:4).

Escobar described the notion of development as having come about in the period after World War II, at the same time as the Marshall Plan. He related both of these schemes to an American foreign policy initiative rooted in the Truman Doctrine of 1949. In Escobar's words the doctrine's manifesto was:

> "to bring about the conditions necessary to replicating the world over the features that characterized the 'advanced' societies of the time—high levels of industrialization and urbanization, technicalization of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and the widespread adoption of modern education and cultural values".

(Escobar 1995:3-4)

He suggested that the good intentions of Truman's ideas resulted in an 'enframing' of the world by "a regime of objectivism in which Europeans were subjected to a double demand: to be detached and objective, and yet immerse themselves in local life" (Escobar 1995:7). He further stated that "this regime of order and truth is a quintessential aspect of modernity and has been deepened by economics and development" (Escobar 1995:8). This author held the strong view that the west created a set of foreign policy ideas, couched in the language of benevolence, which greatly disadvantaged the countries to which they were applied. More specifically, in his critique he argued that the development paradigm contained three key axes: forms of knowledge; systems of power; and, forms of subjectivity (Escobar 1995:10).

With regard to forms of knowledge, Escobar contended that the development paradigm required a vocabulary of concepts which created client categories as recipients of aid. For example, he believed that the classification 'poverty' with its attached ideas of mobility, vagrancy, promiscuity, frugality and ignorance laid the groundwork for the objective of managing the poor through education, healthcare, hygiene, morality, employment and child rearing (Escobar 1995:23). The trope of

208

'village' was also a similar label masking notions of control. The label 'peasantry' was another category with which this author took issue. He believed that the persistence of the idea of peasant and its associated concepts 'small farmer' and 'landless labourer' was associated with "a broad range of economic, political and cultural, and discursive processes" (Escobar 1995: 106). Furthermore, he argued that the relationship which takes place between clients and aid providers "is structured by bureaucratic and textual mechanisms that are anterior to the interaction" and is emblematic of the power relations within development (Escobar 1995:127). The author called this last point "documentary practices" and believed it a way to manufacture knowledge about intended recipients in order to meet the needs of the providing organisation.

During the colonial period, both British and Rhodesian states devised new categories with which to refer to African populations. I discussed earlier in this study that categories such as 'tribe' were created to encompass networks of extended kin in a given geographical area, the position of Chief was created from the more flexible role of lineage elders for the purposes of colonial administration of rural areas, and that in chieftaincies, sons-in-law (i.e. junior males) were transformed into labourers as required by the state. During the 1990s, development brought into the Zambesi its own defining vocabulary which was a reflection of a new capitalist worldview. The term 'development' began to be used within the local Chikunda and Korekore languages as an allusion to bettering one's economic circumstance through adoption of foreign innovations. This re-orientation of personal and household objectives was one of the aims of CAMPFIRE and MZP. Increased use of the term 'village' to denote settlement signalled distancing from the primary binding feature of home: the fact of clusters of households situated around the homestead of a patrilineal elder. Also, the transformation of fields, gardens, and homesteads in Chikafa into 'arable plots' and 'residential plots' indicated a new organisation of livelihood centred on cash-cropping instead of the complex agricultural practices of keeping a number of fields, crop rotation, and intercropping which ensured subsistence in marginal land.

While there was much to criticise with regard to the new vocabulary of development, some formerly disenfranchised people were happy to adopt new terms

and worldviews if these promised improvements for them. For example, junior men and immigrants to Chikafa were quick to adopt the new technocratic language of the MZP because it was associated with land ownership free of the constraints of ongoing affinal obligations and the power of headmen. Similarly, women who were not represented by men, such as widows, divorcees, single mothers, or the childless, could own land and make a living outside of social constraints. I observed these women to have a particularly hard time making a living in Chikafa as acts of economic emancipation, such as success in selling vegetables, were greeted with accusations of prostitution.

Escobar's second axis of development was power achieved through the workings of western economics. He argued that development aimed to re-organise local economies by changing production so that it was oriented to the market, by a commodification of land, labour, and money, and by the "invention of the economy as an autonomous domain" (Escobar 1995:60). In short, in his own words, this author argued that:

> "Economic men and women are positioned in civil societies in ways that are inevitably mediated, at the symbolic level, by the constructs of markets, production, and commodities. People and nature are separated into parts (individuals and resources), to be recombined into market commodities and objects of exchange and knowledge".

(Escobar 1995:61)

He also argued that, because it was in the nature of post-Fordism to selectively connect to and disconnect places from the world economy to which they were linked, this "disconnection not infrequently presents attractive opportunities from poor people's perspectives" (Escobar 1995: 217).

Both development schemes in the Zambesi were premised on a re-organisation of local economies. The MZP was explicit in its goals of achieving a cash-cropping economy in places which had subsistence economies. CAMPFIRE, although less explicit in its economic goals, also sought to transform forested areas into sources of cash for adjacent communities. I will describe below how development disrupted livelihoods by contrasting the skills and knowledge required to survive in Chikafa and

210

Kanyemba with the changes brought by new schemes.

While development has become inevitable in many places, Escobar believed that hybridisation occurred in people's everyday adaptation to a market-driven economy and in the livelihood strategies they adopted when the market did not deliver the intended result. In his view:

"Paradoxically...the groups with a higher degree of economic autonomy and 'insertion' into the market have at times a better chance of successfully affirming their ways of life than those clinging to signs of identity the social force of which has been greatly diminished by adverse economic conditions".

(Escobar 1995:219)

The idea of 'hybridisation' is useful in cases, such as that of Dande, where the Chikunda were able to manage CAMPFIRE to their advantage, while other groups suffered economic and political loss. In Chapter 3 I described the relationship between Chikunda clans and the Portuguese and the survival of the Chapoto Chieftaincy during British and Rhodesian rule. The Chikunda had a long association with the state and so their identity, which was in turns, military, commercial, and administrative, resulted from experience of engagement with a state and a global economy. Whilst their neighbours the Korekore and the *tembo mvura* suffered more from development schemes, the Chikunda fared better. The reason for this situation was that over time this group had turned their original, to use Escobar's term, subjectification by the Portuguese as slaves, into an identity centred on domination.

Escobar's third axis of the development paradigm he called forms of subjectivity. He wrote that the Third World was the recipient of forms of representation including colonial, European modernity, and, post-colonial and post-Independence national projects which included regimes of violence. He argued that these encounters had suppressed, for example, local cultures, women, local identities, and local histories (Escobar 1995:214). In a way, this third dimension of the development paradigm incorporated other aspects discussed earlier. By changing how people and their surroundings were categorised and reifying those labels through the production of documents, and in altering how people made their living, a process of subject-making favourable to development took place.

The idea that strong polities, economic organisations, militarised groups, or religious institutions create subjects is not new. But Escobar offered an interesting viewpoint regarding subjectification of the weak by the powerful by saying that new terms, while often readily adopted, carried hidden significance with regard to local worldviews. For example, in Kanyemba, a male member of the *tembo mvura* clan was identified by his social group primarily as a hunter. This was an important label as it was related to the ability to survive in that environment. Restrictions imposed by CAMPFIRE turned men of that clan into poachers if they attempted to apply their skills, or highly unsuccessful farmers as they possessed little land and did not have the social supports required to farm well. Similarly, while young men in Chikafa readily adopted the role of cotton farmer because it included a land grant, the season of cotton farming which I observed demonstrated the high level of cash investment and labour required to make a return. In both cases, whether roles were forced upon people or readily adopted, new labels incurred a change in social relationships and, in the case of people engaged in subsistence livelihoods, of new links with the natural environment.

In sum, Escobar suggested that although development had produced underdevelopment, the reason it persisted as a discourse and practice was that it had constructed "hegemonic forms of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, pre-constituted subjects...and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World" (Escobar 1995:53). This was certainly the case for Dande, where certain groups viewed development as domination, while others used it to dominate.

The three main ideas espoused by Escobar, forms of knowledge, re-organisation of local economies, and subjectification of recipients of development, are useful tools with which to explore the impact of the MZP and CAMPFIRE schemes in Dande. Although project outlines may appear coherent, implementation of these projects depends on a number of often unpredictable variables.

ii. Development and Intentions:

While Escobar delivered a strong critique of the failure of the development paradigm suggesting that hope lay with cultures which had had experience of foreign incursion, James Ferguson offered a different, but complementary view. In his book, *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1994), Ferguson proposed that rather than analysing development by comparing stated objectives with intended outcomes, the researcher instead consider each case on its own merits by examining its historical particularities, circumstances, and contingencies. He began his book by dismissing what he considered to be the two dominant approaches in development. The first approach is the task to reform "an institution whose fundamental beneficence they take as given" (Ferguson 1994:13). The second approach is the neo-Marxist which argues that development is basically about the establishment of centre-periphery relations. Instead, he believed that it is better to take the view that "a structure always reproduces itself through a process, and through a sense of struggle" (Ferguson 1994:13). He argued that, for example, a concept such as 'rural development' could be analysed "not in terms of its own proclamations, but as a social institution in its own right, supported and maintained not by 'capitalism' in the abstract, but by historically specific political and economic interests in each case" (Ferguson 1994:14).

In his work on Lesotho, Ferguson argued that development discourse about that country was full of false constructs which would never stand up to academic scrutiny. He went on to suggest that the information written into development reports is relevant to the development structure, and that if its standards diverge from those of the academy the reason is that there exist "two different sets of rules of formation for discourse...two different problematics" (Ferguson 1994:28). He further argued that it is more useful to examine what theoretical functions particular types of discourse fulfil, and why these maintain their qualities.

Ferguson also observed that, in Lesotho, development did not bring about a reduction of poverty or new relations of production and that, instead of simply concluding that the paradigm did not work, it would be better to examine why it persisted and what unintended effects it may have had. In order to achieve these ends,

Ferguson submitted a number of interesting points of view. For instance, he argued that instead of getting bogged down in the language of development, it was better to focus instead on the apparatus doing the developing in a particular setting. He also suggested we consider that structures do not represent but are "multi-layered, polyvalent, and often contradictory, and that economic functions and 'objective interests' are always located within other, encompassing structures that may be invisible even to those who inhabit them" (Ferguson 1994:17). In addition, he thought it would be useful to shift analysis toward a decentred conception of power where "the outcomes of planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never even recognized, but are all the more powerful for being 'subjectless'" (Ferguson 1994:19). Finally, he contended that outcomes of development projects can be manifest:

> "As unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that
> has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power
> while simultaneously exerting a powerful de-politicizing effect". It is this
> last point which alludes to the theme of the book, the "anti-politics
> machine".

<div align="right">(Ferguson 1994:21)</div>

In effect, Ferguson's approach is one which divested development of any moral quality, coherent structure or intentionality. Instead it was to be viewed as an apparatus with many parts, encompassing many different people, and applied to places with their own inner workings which affected the outcome of schemes. In his view, development was not a monolith but instead a fragmented body of ideas in which separate parts may not be recognisable as belonging to the whole.

Ferguson highlighted a number of important points to consider when analysing the impact of development schemes. His idea that development could yield unintended results is interesting in light of the fact that the project outlines for both the MZP and CAMPFIRE neglected to consider important features about the sites of their application. For instance, the project outline for the MZP omitted many crucial, and well-documented, attributes of the Zambesi Valley. There was no mention of patterns of labour migration, of social organisation, political structure, or livelihood practices which could be found in a number of ethnographies and histories of the area. Also, no

consideration was paid to soil quality or sources of water when planning areas designated for resettlement. Similarly, the glaring omission in the CAMPFIRE scheme was neglecting to account for the social and political organisation of recipient communities, including the presence of social hierarchies. For example, the emphasis on the issue of consensus with regard to a community's ability to manage the project locally obscured the ways in which it could be used as an instrument of domination.

Ferguson's suggestion that the outcomes of development schemes were often the result of contingencies and unintentional occurrences explains the disruption which the drought of 1991-92 caused to the implementation of the MZP. For one, the drought highlighted increased fragility of the relationship between people and environments which then prompted opposition to the project. These issues will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. But also, it demonstrated the shortcomings of a land resettlement project which did not account for sources of water and quality of designated land, thus creating great vulnerability to climactic change, particularly the pattern of cyclical drought which occurs in the Zambesi Valley.

In sum, Escobar and Ferguson both accentuated a number of important features regarding hegemonic attributes of development as well as contingencies involved in implementation of schemes. Importantly, they illustrated the discrepancy between project outlines and their application. These ideas resonated with my observations of how CAMPFIRE was appropriated as an instrument of domination by the Chikunda in Kanyemba area, while the MZP could not be implemented as the unintended effects of the drought unfolded.

iii. Developing the Zambesi:

In the Zambesi Valley of the early 1990s development was a contentious subject which greatly affected people's lives. It was an innovation which caused anxiety in both Chikafa and Kanyemba not least because of its scale and the fact that schemes had been implemented without significant local consultation. Development also involved confusing messages with regard to issues of local empowerment, because while people were told that they had a voice through committees, the truth

was that decisions with regard to the application of MZP and CAMPFIRE were taken regardless of local opinion. Part of the problem of representation was that committees did not necessarily express local views. Stress caused by development was based on a perceived contradiction. On the one hand, development promised a better standard of living, while on the other hand, people felt apprehensive about life-altering changes which had been devised without taking into account how they made a living, related to one another, and to their surroundings.

In this section I will review how the Zambesi Valley was viewed by the British and the Zimbabwean states and suggest reasons why two large-scale development schemes were adopted in the late 1980s. I will propose that processes of domination were inherent in the implementation of CAMPFIRE and the MZP, both within recipient communities and in the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and localities. Development became a question of inequalities of power as a result of discrepancies between project design and the circumstances of recipient communities. To address this problem I suggest that Tim Ingold's approach to the relationship between people and environment provides a useful alternative view to that of development.

During the late 1980s the Zambesi Valley became a focal point for development in Zimbabwe. Although over time there had been attempts by British and Rhodesian administrations to introduce schemes for the betterment of people in the area, the projects conceived during the 1980s had no historical precedent in scale, financing, and technical design. The Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Resettlement Project (MZP) and Communal Areas Management Project for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) were quite different in scope and objective. The MZP aimed to resettle subsistence farmers in order to encourage cotton cultivation, while CAMPFIRE focussed on resource management with the objective of conserving wildlife by transforming it into a capital asset for local people. Both of these projects entailed a drastic re-organisation of local economies with the unintended result of internal disruption to communities.

In his book, *Missionary Travels* (1857), Livingstone described aspects of local

216

life in the Zambesi Valley with the sort of detail, interest, and empathy that would fuel the imagination of Europeans for decades. The dangers of elephant hunting were written about in the same manner as a friendly encounter with inhabitants who offered food and shelter. Politics, trade, war, tsetse fly, transport, hunting, and the environment were all related to the reader in a manner that could only be described as compelling. As the first British person to record his experience in the Zambesi Valley, Livingstone started a tradition of writing also encompassed by Richard Thornton (1858-63) who accompanied him as a geologist, and Frederik Selous. From these authors emerged, amongst the readership, an imaginary view of the Zambesi Valley which persists to this day. From these first key writings the idea was born of the Zambesi as ecological fantasy and potential playground for Europeans. In this place lived large and dangerous wild animals to be hunted only at great peril, undisturbed bush, sparkling rivers, and strange but compliant inhabitants. In short, in the British colonial project for south-central Africa, the Zambesi Valley would come to stand in counterpoint to the civilising and commercialising efforts applied to the less harsh and mystified surroundings of the plateau.

In Southern Rhodesia, policies of land use and social delineation introduced on the plateau had little or no impact in the Valley mostly because they were not aimed at the area. Instead the whole of the Zambesi Valley was considered to be a bounded African area following the same conceptual rule as that for Tribal Trust Land or African suburbs situated in the hinterlands of urban areas. During the early colonial period an opposition in spatial definition was created between African and European areas. The Pass Laws demonstrated the boundary between these. The Zambesi Valley was considered to be an African area, but because it also contained National Parks (Chewore and Mana Pools), it became a tourist destination. In a way, for Europeans to make an annual trip to one of the National Parks, became a pilgrimage in which the boundaries between identities were confirmed. Travelling from their racially-exclusive areas to the perceived exoticism and danger of the Zambesi served to confirm the spatial and social order of the Southern Rhodesian colony and later of the Rhodesian state.

217

Until the 1980s the Zambesi was considered to be marginal and not fit for development. Sporadic colonial era projects such as an attempt at cotton cultivation in Mushumbi Pools during the 1970s had not been successful. Besides its position as an African area, there were other reasons why the Zambesi was left alone. First, there was the presence of tsetse fly which made keeping of cattle impossible. Oral history suggested that tsetse fly arrived in the Zambesi during the 1920s. The very old told me that cattle and goats were kept by their parents when they were young and that it was elephant which brought the pests from elsewhere. Another reason for not developing the Zambesi was lack of infrastructure. Transport was a major problem. Until the early 1990s roads consisted of dirt tracks, often corrugated from overuse, the viability of which depended on season and on the condition of the road. In 1993 a paved road running down the escarpment at Mahuwe was under construction. In the early 1990s there were no telephones and no electricity. Except for the Zambesi, rivers flowed seasonally and were only navigable by small boats such as the locally-made *mwadia* (dug out canoe).

In the early 1990s schools, clinics, and shops were few and for the most part badly outfitted. The clinic in Chikafa, for example, was staffed by nurse's aides who treated a myriad of conditions despite the persistent shortage of medicines. One time I gave my supply of emergency malaria medication to treat an afflicted child as the clinic had run out of its own supply. A mission doctor made infrequent visits to the area because he was the only doctor working in the whole of the middle Zambesi Valley and simply could not leave his mission station. The environment was another reason the Zambesi was left alone. The combination of poor soils, extreme heat, malaria-carrying mosquitos, and profusion of wild animals made conceiving of dense human habitation difficult.

Given these inhospitable conditions, it is interesting to review reasons why in the late 1980s the Zambesi Valley was suddenly considered to be inhabitable. The most obvious reason was population pressure on the plateau. Many Communal Areas had become deforested and with poor soils and inadequate water. Also, with a young population and insufficient employment, there was a need to find places for people. In

light of the perceived crowdedness of the plateau, the Zambesi looked empty. In addition, the ZANU government had achieved power by fighting a guerrilla war based on the issue of control over land. During the Independence War the liberation forces had received crucial support from the countryside based on the very idea of equitable land distribution. The fact that the African Development Fund financed a land resettlement program a decade after Independence, dovetailed nicely with the government's own political agenda of distributing land. But this meeting of objectives was only the beginning of the development story in the Zambesi Valley.

As I have outlined above, there existed a variety of ways in which to approach development. In the western economic approach, the idea behind development was to liberalise an economy so that it became mediated by the market. For proponents of sustainable development, the idea was to enable local people to support themselves whilst maintaining the integrity of their environment. These two understandings of development both shared the same flaw: they were based in foreign philosophies and practice. It follows that in order for a foreign entity, such as a state or an international funding organisation, to apply projects beneficial to recipients it would need to include local perspectives in their design.

Local perspective was not a consideration in the design of either CAMPFIRE or the MZP, as I will illustrate below. Instead, the implementation of both schemes, whether intentional or not, appeared to be about hegemony of the state over the Zambesi Valley and of domination of strong over weak groups within localities. The opposite of domination would be consideration for local requirements in project design, including knowledge of local economic practices, social organisation, political process, and worldview.

In a book entitled *The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (2000), Tim Ingold proposed a model to explain relationships between people and surroundings. He introduced his theory by reviewing his own earlier contention that humans were both organisms existing in environments, and persons within systems of social relations. He then dismissed this argument as unsatisfactory in view of that fact that it did not take into account cognitive aspects

which he believed mediated the movements of human beings within a given setting. He believed that human beings and environments moved and changed in mutual relationship, and that there was not a distinction between people, land and social relations. In short, in this book he argued that 'the person is the organism'. To support this view he defined the concept of human being to be:

> "Not as a composite entity made up of separable but complementary parts, such as body, mind and culture, but rather as a singular locus of creative growth within a continually unfolding field of relationship"
>
> (Ingold 2000:3-4).

In this way, Ingold's approach suggested a shattering of long-established concepts such as person or land, and the assumed boundaries which separated them. Instead he proposed an orientation which encompassed the mutually essential relationship of humans 'in/as part of' the world. This idea had three facets: first, a shift of attention from the idea of cultural variation to that of *skills*; secondly, that skills were not transmitted but instead "*regrown* in each (generation), and incorporated into the *modus operandi* of the developing human organism through training and experience in the performance of particular tasks"; and, thirdly, adopting a 'dwelling perspective' which situated the anthropologist "in the context of an active engagement with the constituents of his or her surroundings" (Ingold 2000:5). In sum, this approach hinged on the notion that people were connected to their surroundings through continuous engagement which developed skills necessary to livelihood at a particular time. If either surroundings or people's engagement with it changed, then so would livelihoods.

This approach is valuable in order to appreciate the depth of the impact of development schemes on Chikafa and Kanyemba. Because of their subsistence livelihood, people in both settlements experienced the re-organisation of access to surroundings as a loss of skill and knowledge. In Kanyemba, the *tembo mvura* could not hunt without risking arrest, and everyone had to stop fishing with nets. Both activities entailed knowledge of the forest and rivers, and of specialist skills which were learned through example and practice. Similarly, in Chikafa, the drought of 1991-92 highlighted the need for familiarity with bush foods as a survival mechanism.

If people's time was taken up with cotton cultivation to the detriment of food sources, then there would be greater risk of starvation in times of drought.

In echoing Escobar, I would submit that if Zambesians followed the propositions of the two development schemes, they would lose their connection with the environment and, therefore, their local identity to become 'peasants', 'cash-croppers', and 'villagers'. There would be a loss of the specialist skills acquired through interactions between individuals, communities, and surroundings. Without their local identities, related to clan and residence, people would become as unskilled and interchangeable in the Zambesi as they had been during labour migration on the plateau. Without a sense of social and ecological fixity, Zambesians felt vulnerable to domination. This sense of exposure led to expression in witchcraft accusations, a case which I will illustrate in Chapter 9.

The impact of development in Chikafa and Kanyemba was very different due to contrasting social and political organisation. Chikafa settlement was characterised by a number dispersed clans of shallow genealogy and a power-sharing arrangement between long-standing Chikunda and Korekore clans. Kanyemba had been dominated by a Chikunda clan for over a century which controlled local economy and political process.

iv. CAMPFIRE: Design

CAMPFIRE was a resource management program applied in several areas of Zimbabwe. I observed this program in Kanyemba settlement in northern Dande. There a company held a lease to a hunting concession in Chewore National Park where the business operated between May and October. The concept behind this program was the conservation of wildlife through its market value: That if people received monetary compensation for not killing wild animals which lived adjacent to settlements, they would participate in their conservation. The broad concept of the program was the following. In areas where there existed an abundance of wild animals who might compete with people for food and water, the adjacent forested area would be leased to a safari operator who paid a fee for animals hunted and killed. The lessee paid a

percentage of takings to Rural District Council which then allocated this money three ways. A portion remained with the RDC as a council levy. Another portion would be allocated for wildlife management costs. A third part would be given to wildlife producer Wards who divided this income three further ways: 1) to cover Ward level management costs; 2) for Ward level projects; and, 3) as household dividends. In the CAMPFIRE scheme, "the revenue devolved to sub-district levels, mostly to wards, provides the financial incentive for individuals and households to participate in the common management of wildlife" (Bond 2001:229). In design, the objectives of CAMPFIRE seem advantageous because, in return for refraining from killing animals for food or profit, households were each to receive a dividend, and to benefit from infrastructure such as schools and clinics which the Ward would build from its own dividend. Furthermore, conservation of animals ensured that viable populations would exist for the benefit of future generations. In Kanyemba it was understood that the safari hunter would provide game meat to the community to be shared amongst inhabitants.

Community conservation, which was at the heart of CAMPFIRE, had four conceptual foundations. The first of these was economic instrumentalism in which wildlife was made into an economically competitive form of land use. Secondly, there was the idea of devolution where a cash-strapped central government allocated the responsibility for conservation to local areas. Third, the notion of collective proprietorship termed a "communal property regime" in which the conservation of the area was believed to be in everyone's best interests. Fourth, the project was an experiment in policy termed 'adaptive management' in which implementation compromises were made over time (Jones and Murphree 2001:44-45). CAMPFIRE fell under the rubric of "sustainable development".

While this brief outline of CAMPFIRE is a simplification of a complex program, it describes the broad framework in which localities ceded rights to wild animals in exchange for a household dividend and the promise of infrastructure in their communities. In theory it turned the bush into a source of cash, with the promise of more income with the further development of tourism, as was anticipated for

222

Kanyemba area. A primary goal of this scheme was also to devolve political process to localities.

Kanyemba is located at the confluence of the Zambesi and Mwadzamutanda Rivers. To the west lies a mountain range which includes the Chewore National Park (837 700 acres), an area officially consigned to safari operators who hold leases under CAMPFIRE. To the east lies the Mozambican border. To the north is the Zambesi River and Zambia, and to the south, forest. Kanyemba is a long thin settlement with most households located on the eastern side of the Mwadzamutanda River, and a smaller amount on its western side. According to the Ward Councilor, there were 281 households of various sizes, dispersed throughout the area. Small clusters of households built around the homesteads of senior males, usually a *sabhuku* (headman), were situated within walking distance from one another.

In the early 1990s the environment in Kanyemba provided a variety of food sources and people's diets, for the most part, derived from a combination of wild and cultivated foods. The Chikunda tended to eat the greatest amount of cultivated food, but that was simply because they owned the most land. The predominant crop was maize, but sorghum, millet and groundnuts were also grown. In riverine gardens, people grew pumpkin and sweet potato of which they ate both the fruit and the leaves. They also grew rape, tomatoes, and onions which were fried and eaten as a complement to maize meal porridge. Other foods grown in gardens included two varieties of beans, and *rabu* tobacco for local consumption. Chief Chapoto possessed banana trees he brought from Malawi in the mid-40s which still yielded fruit. Some people grew sugar cane which was chewed to obtain the juice. Informants claimed that in the past they had eaten a variety of wild meat to which they no longer had access.

In the early 1990s meat was rarely eaten, but sources included chickens, field mice, tins of corned beef, and occasionally game meat obtained illegally in Zimbabwe or Mozambique. Both oral history and colonial record described widespread hunting in Kanyemba up until the 1970s. The Chikunda had held a monopoly of elephant and other big-game hunting because they possessed guns, and for reasons to do with entrenched trade practices and food prohibitions. Chikunda ate all large game with the

223

exception of crocodile. Oral histories described the *tembo mvura* and Korekore as experts in hunting smaller game such as kudu, baboon, and a variety of buck with spears. The *tembo mvura* were also known for hunting with traps and the game meat was eaten immediately or dried and often traded to the Chikunda for maize or goods. The consumption of field mice was common during the 1990s, and according to Kingsley Garbett, was also practiced during the 1960s at the time of his major fieldwork in the Zambesi Valley[1]. At the time of this study, hunting was illegal. A few men had been caught hunting and had been sent to Chinhoyi prison.

The Chikunda recounted that fish was one of their traditional dishes and that the way they cooked it set them apart from others. During fieldwork, Chikunda described two methods for fishing with nets. The first technique, called *kokota*, involved two men to position a net in a u-shape into a pool in a river. While one person stood on the river's edge with one end of the net, the other swam in a u-shape until he returned to shore. The net was then pulled in with the catch. This method was practiced during *chirimo*, the part of the dry season between September and October. Another method of net-fishing was called *kasasa* and involved two ways of spreading a net in the current of a river. In the first way, the net was suspended between two poles stuck into the river bed. In the second case, two people paddled into the river in a *mwadia* (dugout canoe) and suspended a net between two floaters made of wood called *chabobo* which floats like cork. With the *kasasa* method the nets were kept in place for several days and checked twice daily. This method was practiced in the Zambesi at the end of the rainy season when the river flooded. During this study, most fish eaten locally had been caught with poles, in the afternoons when the temperature was hottest and the water still, or had been traded from Mozambique. Fishing with poles yielded less fish but could be done all year round and was legal.

It was not surprising that fish consumption had reduced significantly after nets were outlawed. A Chikunda informant related how his father and ten other men had been arrested for fishing with nets and made to spend several days in Chinhoyi prison. He said that the men were denounced by a neighbour. Another informant, a *sabhuku*

---

1 Personal communication, Adelaide, Australia, 2003.

of a subordinate lineage whose family was known for expertise in fishing, complained about a fishing business operating in the area. He said that Zambians from across the Zambesi River provided Mozambicans with fishing nets yielding large catches of fish which were dried and traded to Zimbabweans for items unavailable in Zambia. Examples of this exchange included four fish for a loaf of bread, eight fish for one kilogram of sugar, and varying amounts of fish for yeast and soap. This informant found it unfair that Zimbabweans were prohibited from fishing with nets while Zambians and Mozambicans profited from doing so. His view was that his children, and not foreigners, should profit from local resources. Although this man was vocal, he was from a subordinate clan and I had witnessed the futility of his attempts to make claims during a session of the Chief's Court.

Since Kanyemba is situated between Chewore National Park and a Mozambican game area, farming was made difficult by the proliferation of wild animals. During the growing season people slept on platforms in their fields where they pounded metal pots and gongs to frighten elephants away. Similarly, most households owned a variety of spears with which they killed baboons which entered into their fields. Although elephants and baboons were most threatening to crops, birds eating sorghum also taxed farmers. Also, animals traveled at night to drink from the Mwadzamutanda and Zambesi Rivers trampling fields and feeding on crops which lay in their path. The safari company holding the hunting lease in Kanyemba was responsible for 'problem animal control' but informants said that it had neither the time nor the resources to fulfill this obligation. Thus, locals were left to cope with problem animals without firearms or permission to kill them. One sad example of the dangers of wild animals, which occurred the year before my study, involved a leopard which entered the settlement and dragged away a baby who slept on a mat next to its mother. Locals complained that, without guns, they could not protect themselves in these cases. Also, because hunting was prohibited, it was a skill which the younger men would have no chance of practicing.

Because hunting and net-fishing were illegal and tsetse fly prevented the keeping of cattle and goats, the diet of all Kanyembans derived mostly from plant

sources. Consumption of wild plants was widely practiced, but varied from group to group. The *tembo mvura* knew the most about wild plants as these comprised a great part of their diet. They ate a number of roots which were soaked, boiled, and pounded, as well as the boiled leaves and fruit of wild okra. Everyone ate *masao*, a fruit resembling crab-apple, which was consumed fresh, dried, pounded into a paste (*chinkobo*), or distilled into a potent spirit called *kachasu*.

Despite the general shortage of food, Chikunda mocked the fact that the *tembo mvura* had a wide knowledge of and consumed bush foods. The Chikunda opposed the forest to cultivated land which they saw as the difference between wildness and civilisation. The Chikunda believed that they had learnt their 'civilised' ways, intrinsic to their identity, from the Portuguese. In accounts of the eating habits of ancestors who "walked with the Portuguese", Chikunda described European customs such as drinking tea and eating biscuits as their own. One Chikunda woman proclaimed knowledge of Portuguese eating habits, saying that they favoured soft cooked foods instead of stiff maize meal porridge[2]. Additionally, it was thought that the conqueror, Kanyemba, preferred European food served on porcelain crockery.

Significantly, in both Chikafa and Kanyemba the most desirable form of maize flour, *chipere chakusvura*, was highly processed. In Chikafa, of the nine women who produced this maize flour, seven were Chikunda. The remaining two experts were Korekore who had supposedly learnt the skill from Chikunda. *Chipere chakusvura* was thought to be a better accompaniment to fish than less refined maize meal. In short, the Chikunda associated themselves with cultivated, highly processed, and cooked foods as a marker of status and rejected wild foods which they deemed inferior. By equating highly processed/cultivated food with civilisation and bush foods with wildness, the Chikunda adopted European food classification. In practice, bush foods, particularly roots, had to be highly processed in order to be consumed. Thus, the Chikunda practice of ranking of food with degrees of civilisation was not a statement about skills, but rather about political hierarchy. In this way, the *tembo mvura*, who procured and processed wild foods, were marginalised. As part of their domination of

---

2 Whenever I felt ill, my assistant cooked dilute maize meal porridge because several older women had

Kanyemba area, the conquering Chikunda controlled markers of status.

Oral histories as well as colonial record described greater availability of relishes in the past. A 1965 Rhodesian government report on the Chapoto chieftaincy stated that, "people are quite clearly happy in that they are reasonably well fed (maize, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, etc., two crops a year; bananas, pawpaw, sugar cane throughout the year)", (BPK/JC; Sept. 1965). In the 1990s, locals recounted that the variety of food had decreased, even in years of adequate rainfall. People perceived that there was generally less water in the environment in the 1990s and that flooding levels of the Mwadzamutanda River had been low with less pools during the rainy season. Informants mentioned places where pre-existing pools had dried up. Also, they said that with lower flooding levels, the Mwadamutanda River provided less water for cultivation and for pole-fishing which is done in pools. Damming of rivers on the plateau in order to irrigate commercial farmland resulted in decreased flow of water into the Zambesi Valley. One elderly informant stated that there was less water in the 1990s than in the 1960s.

The prohibition placed on hunting and fishing with nets under the CAMPFIRE scheme effectively altered the local diet. It was difficult to maintain livestock as these were vulnerable to snakes, wild animals, and tsetse fly. For example, households possessed a variety of coops raised on platforms to keep chickens safe. Also, destruction of crops by wild animals from the protected areas went unchecked and affected available quantities of food.

In addition to cultivation, complementary sources of livelihood included trade, paid employment as in the case of teachers, nurse's aides, and the few positions available at the safari camp. Labour migration became an option during British administration and remained so. Some individuals sold pots and handicrafts to safari camp clients. In truth there existed few alternatives to subsistence farming in Kanyemba.

There are a number of reasons why I describe livelihood practices in

---

told him that Europeans had weaker stomachs than Africans.

Kanyemba in such detail. For one, it is important to understand the challenges and circumstances of food procurement in such an area. Secondly, it is also important to highlight the skills of agriculture, hunting, fishing and their associated local technologies which were needed in order to survive in such an area. Most importantly, examining livelihood practices lends insight into livelihood opportunities which CAMPFIRE had removed. As I will describe later in this study, livelihoods which are fragile in years of regular rainfall have less margin to cope with disasters such as drought which leave people exposed to hunger and distress.

v. Social Organisation and CAMPFIRE in Kanyemba:

Although the objectives of CAMPFIRE were to transform the bush into a source of cash as a form of conservation, and to transfer political process to localities, the consequences of the program in Kanyemba were wholly unintended. As I described earlier, under this scheme access to food sources decreased as a result of the prohibition on hunting and fishing with nets. Also, because the 'problem animal control' component of the agreement with the hunting company went unfulfilled, fields were trampled and crops damaged. In this section, I will demonstrate how CAMPFIRE consolidated Chikunda economic and political domination, at the same time as it yielded few benefits either to households or to the community as a whole.

CAMPFIRE was administered in Kanyemba by the Wildlife Committee composed of seven members, all Chikunda. Although most meetings of the Wildlife Committee were open to local residents, attendance was usually comprised of the Committee, the Ward Councillor who was a descendant of Kanyemba, any number of *sabhuku*, most of whom were also Chikunda, and Village Development Committee (VIDCO) chairmen. The Korekore were generally under-represented in relation to their numbers in the area. The *tembo mvura* were spoken for by their *sabhuku*. The result of the imbalances in representation was that discussions about the workings of CAMPFIRE were conducted entirely without consultation with the people it most affected, the subjugated clans.

Their under-representation in political structures had grave consequences for the *tembo mvura* as was well illustrated by a Wildlife Committee meeting in August

of 1993 which I reviewed earlier in Chapter 6. There, the topic of discussion was fencing a portion of land on the western side of the Mwadzamutanda River in order to build a campsite for future tourists. The purpose of the fence was to prevent wild animals from crossing into inhabited areas. The people most affected by this proposal were the *tembo mvura* clan who's dispersed households on the western side of the settlement would have to be concentrated closer to the river. These people, already disadvantaged by the prohibition on hunting, ate a great deal of wild foods which required their proximity to the bush. If they were to be moved closer together in a defined area, their dependence on the Chikunda for food would increase as they also had little land to cultivate.

At the local level, the design of CAMPFIRE proposed a complementary relationship between communities and the safari operators who held leases to adjacent wildlife areas. These lessees had two responsibilities toward communities. First, the meat from animals killed by clients was to be distributed to locals. In Kanyemba there were a number of problems with the distribution of meat. Mostly animals were killed far from the settlement, and I was told that the safari operator did not have the resources to cut up the animals and transport these closer to Kanyemba. Also, there had been a number of problems with equitable distribution within the community. The second responsibility of the safari operator was to kill problem animals that threatened fields or people. I was also told that this part of the agreement had not been complied with. In both these instances there was no available mechanism to enforce these important understandings while fields continued to be trampled by elephant and hippopotamus at night.

For a number of structural reasons, there was very little resistance to CAMPFIRE in Kanyemba. The Chikunda controlled all representative structures, including the Wildlife Committee and they also controlled the economy as they were majority land-holders. The *mpondoro* represented Kanyemba, and so was of no use to members of subjugated clans. Although individuals who had incurred serious losses to livelihood complained in private, there was no vocal or active resistance to the program. The only complaint brought to light during my study regarded households

missing out on dividends from the program. Otherwise, as the Ward Councillor said at a Ward Council meeting held in August of 1993, "the committees are working well for the people, so the wildlife committee should also work well". That in all committees most places were held by Chikunda was a basic local understanding. CAMPFIRE benefited the Chikunda who ruled Kanyemba because it was group members who managed the program locally. But the greatest advantage accruing to the Chikunda was that the program helped to consolidate their power in the area.

Earlier in this chapter I introduced Escobar's idea that it was people who had experience of the market and a degree of economic autonomy who fared better under development (Escobar 1995:219). I also said that the Chikunda had an advantage over neighbouring groups in that their identity was based on a historical experience of exchange with larger and more powerful groups, notably the Portuguese. In the early 1990s the Chikunda had a ruling apparatus in place in Kanyemba which could encounter new influences and re-work these to their advantage. The most poignant example of this structure was the issue of the fencing off of areas inhabited by the *tembo mvura*. The Chikunda Ward councillor supported this plan at a meeting held with a Senior Ecologist of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management in1993. That the *tembo mvura* would surely lose what little economic independence they enjoyed at the time was not considered. The Chikunda, however, would be able to maintain their hold on decision-making.

One of the aims of CAMPFIRE was decentralisation from the state to the community. However, the two main interest groups in CAMPFIRE areas to benefit from this orientation were the traditional authorities and arms of the state such as District Councils who received a percentage of the revenues (Duffy 2000:93).

An attempt by the Chikunda to consolidate their power in Kanyemba was nothing new given the group's history of conquest and subjugation in the area. That one group should profit disproportionately from CAMPFIRE was, however, in contradiction to the objectives of that scheme. One important component of the program was the notion of 'institutional development' which meant the creation of new forms of communal conservation where there would be equitable benefit from

230

wildlife. In the program, community conservation was "part of wider processes of social change and about attempts to redistribute social and political power" (Hulme and Murphree 2001:4-5). This objective sought to devolve power from central government to localities which would then have a stake in the management of wildlife. However, the forms that local power structures took, and the question of why wildlife management in of itself would prompt localities to adopt democratic models of government was not accounted for in project design. In effect, the decentralisation which took place benefited District Council rather than the communities which had sacrificed access to game meat. The simple reason for this situation was that District Council kept a portion of wildlife levies charged to safari companies. Thus, the supposed benefits of decentralisation, as outlined by CAMPFIRE did not trickle down to the communities who formed the backbone of the project.

The CAMPFIRE Association was established in the mid-1990s after the first financial success of the whole of the national CAMPFIRE program. Its aim was to promote the wildlife interests of the Rural District Councils. Jones and Murphree (2001) submitted that:

> "The Association played an important role in making communal land wildlife producers an important constituency of the government, a dimension often neglected in community conservation programmes in other countries".

<div align="right">(Jones and Murphree 2001:48)</div>

I think these authors confused the ability to generate sizeable overall revenues from the program, a portion of which went to government, with equitable distribution. I found no evidence for fair distribution of revenues from CAMPFIRE. According to the Ward Councillor, in 1992 Chapoto Ward received Z$91 000 from District Council in CAMPFIRE dividends. Of this sum, each of 281 households received Z$192, which meant that there was a difference of Z$37 348 not accounted for. I was told that a portion of money was used for the school, Z$2400 to be precise, but could not trace the rest. It was difficult to understand how exactly local people were compensated for having relinquished their rights to natural resources.

CAMPFIRE did not assess the costs to people of conserving wildlife. In

Kanyemba, these costs were couched in a decreasing diversity of livelihood practices. Diverse activities were what people professed to having done in the past and, in the early 1990s after a short experience of CAMPFIRE, were what they still believed to be in their best interest. They felt that engaging in a variety of economic practices such as agriculture, fishing, labouring, migrating, and trade ensured that there would always be access to food and necessities. Also, a combination of these activities would provide the cushions necessary to overcome times of shortage due to cyclical drought or war. In times of shortage of food, it was both social relations and the skill to engage in a variety of livelihood practices which ensured households' ability to survive.

There was a presumption in the CAMPFIRE philosophy that institution-building in designated areas would take place based on the mechanism of community consensus. I believe this notion of community introduced into the Zambesi is a western construct, imported into the area by interests supporting CAMPFIRE. Consensus was not a part of political process in Kanyemba.

In sum, CAMPFIRE had a profound impact on Kanyemba area. In terms of diet, everyone experienced a reduction in the variety and quantity of foods they consumed. From a mixed diet of cultivated and bush foods, including ample sources of meat and fish, residents became dependent on cultivated crops such as maize and garden vegetables. The *tembo mvura* suffered particularly as they owned almost no land (half an acre per household) but were prohibited from hunting, their traditional source of food. While hunting and fishing with nets was prohibited under CAMPFIRE, agriculture also became more challenging as people were not allowed to shoot animals which trampled their fields or ate their crops at night. Several households owned spears with a barbed point which they surreptitiously used to kill baboons which chewed through maize crops. Distribution of game animals killed by safari camp clients, as promised under the scheme, did not take place regularly or equitably. For these sacrifices, residents of Kanyemba saw no improvement in their standard of living. Access to food became more limited, while in 1993, there were no visible improvements to infrastructure.

Whereas CAMPFIRE was associated with Chikunda domination of Kanyemba

area and further oppression of long-standing subjugated clans, the MZP in Chikafa precipitated a further fragmentation of social organisation resulting in confusion, distress, and the emergence of new claims to resources from formerly disenfranchised groups.

vi. Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Development Project (MZP): Design

According to the "Appraisal Report: Mid Zambezi Valley Development Project Zimbabwe" (1986), the objectives of the project were the following:

> "To develop the Mid-Zambezi Valley, a communal area, in accordance with Government policy contained in the Five- Year (1986-1990) National Development Plan; to settle 3000 families and to improve the living conditions of these plus the 4600 families already resident in the project area through the provision of agricultural services, and physical and social infrastructures; to increase crop production thus insuring self-sufficiency in food and cash incomes for the farming community and contributing to the earning of foreign exchange for the economy through exports; and to conserve and utilize the natural resources of the area".
>
> (African Development Fund1986:24)

The MZP was a resettlement program which aimed to move 4600 resident families into new areas as well as resettling 3000 new families within the mid-Zambesi area. Each household was to be given 12 acre plots to cultivate, and a .5 acre residential plot. The incoming 3000 families were to be settled in 130 villages of between 20-25 households (ADF 1986:36). The boundaries of the project area were from east to west, 10 km east of the Manyame River to10 km east of the Musengezi River, the Mozambican border to the north and the escarpment to the south. This area fell within the districts of Guruve and Muzarabani in Mashonaland Central Province. Because the methods for assessing available land and numbers of people were flawed (the census was outdated and land was demarcated by using aerial photographs), by the start of the project, in addition to the 7600 households planned for, there existed another 2500 households (Derman 1993:8)

The MZP was administered through the Ministry of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) and the Department of Rural

Development Division (DERUDE). In the Zambesi, the MZP was managed by the Project Manager whose office was located in Mahuwe, a town at the foot of the escarpment. His job included overseeing Resettlement Officers and Agricultural Planners who demarcated land throughout the project area.

The origins of the MZP resided with an FAO proposal regarding land use in the Zambesi which was submitted to the African Development Bank and accepted. The objectives of the project coincided with the ideology of land for Africans which the ZANU party had fought for in the Independence War. The demarcated project area "was a strategic area during the war and important for the victory of the liberation forces. Both Zanu and Zapu were very active here" (Derman 1990:6). That the Zambesi was a hotbed of guerilla warfare is undisputed. I also gathered information about the role of Zambesians in the Independence War: the time in concentration camps; all-night political information *pungwe*; areas where different guerilla groups were active; and, numbers of children recruited. It is not surprising that the ZANU government considered the Zambesi to be a site deserving of betterment and perhaps even recompense for the war effort. However, it is hard to imagine how crowding the Zambesi Valley could possibly be considered a reward for supporting guerrillas.

Within the MZP design, new villages, clinics, and schools were to be constructed near boreholes. Each village was to have a communal grazing area, and numbers of animals were to be controlled through a permit system (ADF 1986:36).

In short, the MZP aimed to change the system of land ownership. Land allocation procedures changed in 1985 with the creation of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act. Before this legislation, land was distributed by headmen and land spirits speaking through their mediums. After 1985, these decisions were made by the Ward Councilor and Village Development Committee (VIDCO) chairperson. During the early 1990s in Chikafa, land assignment was carried out by both *sabhuku* Chikafa and the elected Village Chairman. They also consulted the local land spirit in this regard. Land tenure in the Zambesi Valley had been based not on individual or household property rights, but on usufruct right. The Natural Resources Act of 1942 contained a Streambank Protection Regulation which stated that cultivation within

100 feet of a stream bank or river was prohibited. The reason was to prevent soil erosion. The MZP reserved this land for grazing. Over the past few decades there had been a tension between government rulings and local ways of using land. The difference with the introduction of the MZP was that, instead of the population being submitted to general laws regarding land use, which were open to local interpretation, they were told precisely where and how they could farm.

The stated rationale of the MZP was to give people a better standard of living through the provision of infrastructure, nevertheless, a major objective was to encourage cash-cropping of cotton. In this way, Zambesians would become part of the national economy as producers rather than simply as labourers. While CAMPFIRE made wildlife profitable to government through the system of levies on money received from safari lessees, the MZP would have people engaged predominantly in cash-cropping cotton which would earn foreign exchange for the national economy.

As I outlined early in this study, Chikafa was one of six villages which belonged to Zvaitika VIDCO, one of four VIDCOs within Neshangwe Ward. At the time of this study, Zvaitika VIDCO was headed by a man who lived in Chikafa settlement and held an auxiliary position at Chikafa clinic. In an interview in July of 1993, he told me that during the previous year the former Ward Councilor accompanied Ministry of Works employees to Chikafa so that pegging of new arable and residential plots could commence. Land designated for residents of Chikafa was an area about 5 kilometres west of the settlement called Karinyanga where 200 fields (278 in another account) of 12 acres each were marked. When I was in Chikafa this area was still forested as the residents had refused to move there complaining of poor soil and lack of water. In response, the MZP officer had given them the choice of four other areas, but these also did not meet with local approval.

At one point locals became tired of the constant anxiety of whether they would have to leave their fields and homes to move to a new area. They organised and rallied a number of politicians within the administrative hierarchy of the Zambesi to finally gain the support of the provincial governor, the M.P. and AGRITEX in their attempts to avoid resettlement to a new area. Sabhuku Chikafa told me that the locals would

235

never move to Karinyanga because, "there is no *sadza* there". By July of 1993, 4 blocks of 90 fields each (12 acres/field) had been demarcated in a neighbouring area. A number of residents of Chikafa took up the fields and began to cultivate. This area was situated on the western side of the Manyame River and could only be reached by canoe when the river flooded during the rainy season. In 1993 the budget for the MZP had finished and with only a few families allocated usable land in Chikafa area. However, with a 3 year extension of its budget, 180 fields were 'pegged' in Karinyanga, the place where residents of Chikafa said farming was impossible.

Recipients of land in Chikafa area were of two groups. First, 10 fields which were demarcated in fertile soil close to Chikafa were set aside for influential residents. Of this group, 4 were Korekore, 4 Chikunda, 1 was Karanga but quite vocal, and the last field was reserved for the local shopkeeper who had emigrated from the plateau. These recipients were all involved in the political or economic infrastructure of Chikafa area and most were junior elders. The second group of settlers arrived in 1992 from Mutoroshanga, an area on the plateau where a mine had recently closed. In the wake of the MZP and migrations taking place into the Zambesi Valley, they crossed the border into Mozambique and asked the Village Chairman for fields for 39 families. He complied and they started to farm as much as was possible during the drought. One reason for crossing the border was that only residents of Guruve or families that had been officially resettled were allowed access to MZP-designated land. But this story illustrates both how economic pressures on the plateau lead people to try their luck in the Zambesi Valley and how far word of land grants had traveled.

For the most part, the MZP was not welcome in Chikafa area. While 10 influential individuals eventually accepted land after a number of years of refusal and anxiety, the established population did not benefit from any aspect of the project. Successive offers of poor lands by the MZP administration, and the ongoing battle to avoid resettlement took their toll in anxiety and distress. Locals could not understand why they should move away from rivers where they cultivated the gardens which sustained their families during the dry season, and had ensured their survival during the serious drought of 1991-92. The MZP also required that long-term residents within

the project area move to new designated areas and change their farming methods and livelihood practices.

Below I will describe long-standing land-use and agricultural practices in Chikafa in order to illustrate the great demands for change made upon residents by the MZP.

vii. The MZP, Land Use, and Livelihood in Chikafa:

Chikafa village, situated along the Manyame River, falls within the MZP area. The MZP placed demands upon the people of Chikafa settlement in terms of a shift in livelihood practices and settlement patterns. In order to understand the magnitude of these demands it is important to understand longstanding economic practices of inhabitants prior to the MZP.

The primary economic activity of Chikafa village was diversified agriculture. At the time of my study cash-cropping of cotton was beginning to occupy more of local people's time. There had been various incentives on the part of the Zimbabwean government to impel people to concentrate on the cultivation of cotton, mostly through AGRITEX and cash loans. Primarily, people saw growing cotton as a way to earn cash which could be used to purchase services such as schooling, health care, transportation, and items such as household wares, clothes, soap, sugar, and fuel. Not every household could cash-crop cotton effectively as this activity required investment capital which most families did not possess. Additionally, it was more labour-intensive than growing maize and for that reason required a greater amount of time and labourers than most households had at their disposal. Of the 93.5 acres of cotton under cultivation in Chikafa in 1993, 39.50 (42%) were owned by the Chikunda and 44.50 (48%) by the Korekore. Cotton farming was not considered a major source of income but it did require more time than maize cultivation. It was still at an experimental stage in the early 1990s because no household seemed to have made a profit from cotton cultivation (see Appendix II).

In the Zambesi the importance of maize cannot be overstated. During the rainy season, inhabitants of Chikafa cultivated maize both in dryland and riverine fields. For

Zambesians, maize was synonymous with food. If there was relish but little maize, people would point to their granaries and state that there was no food. Two types of maize were grown in Chikafa, one variety growing faster than the other thus ensuring a longer period of availability. Maize was processed into flour which was cooked into *ntsima*, a stiff porridge eaten with a stew of vegetables occasionally including meat or fish. Maize was also brewed into beer which was drunk at various ritual occasions such as spirit possession ceremonies, menarche celebrations, funerals, and the opening of new homesteads. During the drought of 1991-92, all beer parties and possession ceremonies which were not strictly to do with rain-making were delayed until the onset of rains. There were152.50 acres of maize cultivated in Chikafa in 1993. Of these 83.50 acres were owned by the Chikunda (55%) and 57.50 (38%) by the Korekore see Appendix II).

Millet and sorghum were also grown and processed into porridge. Sorghum was preferred for beer as it was considered to be of greater ritual value. Often households grew half to one acre of these crops as an insurance against failure of their primary maize crop. In most cases farmers intercropped cucumber, pumpkin, beans, okra and watermelon with these cereals in their dryland fields. Both these crops attracted birds which made cultivation difficult so that they were grown on the same patch of land where they could be looked after at the same time.

Almost every household kept a riverine garden which provided households with vegetables year-round. People divided their gardens into three portions which were respectively burned, tilled, and left fallow. These portions were rotated annually with the result that particular vegetables were grown on different soil each year. Gardens produced a variety of vegetables including two kinds of cabbage and sweet potato, four types of tomato, three types of beans, onions, various types of leafy green vegetables, and chilies. Most vegetables were boiled or fried in commercial cooking oil because domestic production of peanut oil was no longer practiced. Also, both the leaves and the fruit of sweet potatoes and pumpkin were eaten. The cultivation of a garden, although labour-intensive because of the constant watering and weeding required, was a household's insurance against hunger in years of bad rainfall (see

Figure 5).

Although gardens were considered to be the preserve of females, I observed men, especially the aged, working in these either alone or alongside their wives. It is unclear to me whether this shift in the gender division of labour took place suddenly as a result of the increased importance of the garden during the drought. It is also possible that with changes in the weather and with decreased water supplies, the garden had slowly taken on more importance in the overall diet. It would be interesting to see whether this pattern will change with the increased demands of cotton cultivation. In 1993, locals were heard to complain that growing both sorghum and millet which attracts birds, and cotton which is labour-intensive was extremely difficult. It is possible that the cultivation of cotton will affect household production of food in ways similar to that of drought: maize crops will decrease and the importance of garden produce in the local diet increase. In the case of a drought, it is lack of rainfall which impeded the cultivation of maize. In the case of cotton cultivation, it is the lack of time and labour which may have the same effect (see Figure 6).

In addition to vegetables, many households in Chikafa also grew two types of tobacco (*fodya*) in their gardens. The first, *rabu*, was dried and shaped into cakes which were ground into snuff and sold to a merchant from Harare. A certain amount of this tobacco was kept for local consumption, particularly by the elderly and the spirit medium. The second type of tobacco grown was the commercial Virginia variety which was smoked locally.

Farm animals comprised another source of relish in Chikafa. Many households owned domestic animals. 51% of households owned chickens and 22% owned goats. Other domestic animals in Chikafa included ducks, and there were negligible (less than 1%) amounts of turkeys, pigs, and pigeons. A few households had cats or dogs (4% of domestic animals), which is probably not representative of pet-owning as many dogs had died during the drought (see Appendix II).

A few families owned goats for meat. Of a total of 24 goats in Chikafa, 11 were owned by Chikunda households and 11 by Korekore. In terms of goat ownership by

239

clan, the *marunga* came up slightly ahead of the *nzou samanyanga* at 7 to 6 goats. One Chikunda household in Chikafa obtained milk from their goats which they mixed with both tea and porridge. Goats had become a source of problems in Chikafa in 1992 and 1993 as they tended to wander about the settlement eating their way through crops. No goat-owning household kept their animals enclosed. Goat ownership was also associated with elevated social status and wealth. The goat-owning Chikunda headman said that he did not see these animals as a problem.

Although there was a CAMPFIRE program in place in Chikafa, there were not many wild animals, beside elephant, and so very little hunting. Elephant had become a problem which prompted farmers to sleep in their fields to protect crops. At a CAMPFIRE meeting held in July of 1993, locals complained that they had not gotten any money from the sale of wild animals. Obtaining meat was a problem in Chikafa. Hunting for game was prohibited under CAMPFIRE. At the same time keeping cattle was also prohibited as the village was situated too close to a game fence to be sure that there would be no contact with buffalo carrying tsetse fly. Also, farmers complained that without the draught power provided by cattle, they could not farm well under the MZP.

Although some wild food was eaten, it was not on the same scale as in Kanyemba. Field mice (*mbewa*) were a popular source of meat in Chikafa when I was there. Mice were usually procured by children who made a game of finding and trapping them. They were prepared by boiling whole in water for several hours, or else roasted on skewers. The only wild game eaten in Chikafa was obtained from Mozambique. According to locals, there was a hunting area at a certain location on the Mpanyame River somewhere between the Zimbabwean border and the confluence with the Zambesi River. Although hunting was illegal in Tete province, this business thrived because rifles were easily available in Mozambique and there was a ready market for dried game meat in Zimbabwe. Fishing was only permitted with poles (see Figure 7).

During the drought I asked women if they had obtained wild plants from the bush. There were two types of answers. First, that they did not really know anything

about the bush. Second, that the bush was also dry and so would yield no plants. Several months after the drought had ended, I was instructed about bush foods. These included several varieties of edible and medicinal plants, as well as various insects which were eaten roasted. I interpreted the initial withholding of information on the part of local women as their reticence to being associated with the bush and therefore considered unsophisticated. Chikafa was a place with good access to the plateau as it was on a bus route, and so local people were well aware of outsider's stereotypes of them. Mostly older individuals knew about bush foods and their preparation. For this knowledge to be communicated to the young there needed to be access to the bush and use of hunting and trapping techniques which were forbidden under the CAMPFIRE scheme.

In Chikafa there was no great difference between the eating habits of different clans. Although the Chikunda did claim to be better at cooking fish and processing maize, there was nothing to indicate that they ate more of either of these foods. Rather, food preparation techniques and ownership of knowledge regarding certain types of food were used as ethnic markers. As in Kanyemba, Chikunda professed knowledge of European food as a sign of social status.

The MZP project design espoused a discourse of empowerment through the economic promise of cotton cultivation. Yet, at its very beginning this scheme created hardship for people who were resettled and great tension and uncertainty for those who managed to stall its implementation in their area. The occurrence of a serious drought in 1991-92 served to both exacerbate the weaknesses of the project and highlight the fragility of people's relationship with the environment. In the Chikafa area the project ran out of time and money before the entirety of the design could be implemented. Yet the effects of the MZP were greatly felt because of new migrants, anxiety at fragile livelihood, and inter-generational conflict which resulted.

On one level, the MZP united residents of Chikafa against the project because of lack of consultation. Not only were Zambesians upset about the decision to move whole settlements to areas of poor soil and uncertain water supply, they were also angry that some new migrants had been allocated good land. For locals it was shocking

that foreigners should be moved into the Valley without following the proper procedures of incorporation into localities. Many people protested that the Valley belonged to long-term residents. Thus, the first opposition created was that of long-term resident versus newcomers. These two labels did not refer to length of residence of individuals or even households, but of lineages. Most residents of Chikafa were long-term residents. A few newcomers had settled before the MZP by following the proper channels. In Chikafa newcomers could be identified by their lineage names.

A discrepancy which I noticed toward the end of my fieldwork was couched in gender terms. Widows were given 2 ½ acres of land irrespective of their ability to farm. Some widows were young and had the available labour in their own households to be able to farm more land. Also, the MZP assumed that households were headed by men, when some households were headed by women while their husbands worked elsewhere. Additionally, women complained about fields being located far from residential plots which would require a long walk each day. Women worked both fields and gardens each day and so needed these to be close to each other. Other problems regarded the location of sources of firewood and water.

Another issue which entered the arena of debate in Chikafa was that of inter-generational tension. Historically this tension had been resolved by the emigration of young people, sometimes married couples, who returned only to help with harvesting and to retire. The stated reason for these migrations was to gain enough capital and goods to be able to live and farm successfully. This meant paying off brideprice. But in effect the migration of younger people allowed for the social hierarchy, based on lineage and seniority, to remain largely undisputed.

With the MZP the differences in outlook between the young and the old became pronounced. Because the project did not consider age of recipients and the investments they had made in the areas where they lived, land was allocated on equal terms to male heads of households. The result was that many of the young were quite happy because they were given land outside of the usual channels of paying a high brideprice and brideservice. One aged informant told me that girls had become like prostitutes because any man could arrive with money and take his daughter. In other

words, he could no longer enforce the types of marriage obligations that he had had to comply with. Also, the MZP gave young people the notion that land could be obtained without the authorisation and blessing of the gerontocracy of headmen and land spirits.

While the MZP caused great distress within Chikafa, especially as its implementation in neighbouring areas coincided with a serious drought, the greatest effect that the project had on the area was socio-political. Not only were inter-generational conflicts exacerbated, but the ruling triumvirate of headman, Village Chairman, and land spirit was challenged. The most obvious way in which this occurred was by the fact that the MZP tried to implement its re-location scheme without consulting these authorities. The MZP used a state apparatus which bypassed headmen, chiefs, and spirits. In doing so it not only overlooked individuals who had become used to power, but more importantly it also ignored a whole system of social relations which was well entrenched. Although internally contested, the collaboration of chiefs and land spirits constituted a system of social and moral order.

As far as they were concerned, the project breached many norms of appropriate conduct, but the pegging of sacred sites especially angered the spirits. The *mpondoro* Negomo was particularly incensed by this act and stated at a ceremony in 1992 that the MZP had, "pegged the gravesites and these were cleared and people work them, it is a curse on the people". If one followed the logic of the system of land spirits, desecration of sacred places meant conquest. Therefore, the installation of new human 'chiefs' would eventually translate into new spirits in the Zambesian pantheon. Negomo protested this challenge.

The mpondoro protested at threats to their authority through the mechanism of the pangolin. As discussed in Chapter 5, the pangolin was considered to be a sacred animal, to be eaten solely by chiefs and mediums, and which symbolised the kinship binding constituents of a particular *mpondoro*. In the rain-making ceremony of 1992, Negomo lamented that food was no longer brought to the ceremonies and that the pangolin was no longer brought as relish. Instead he said, "pangolin are being taken from the forest and are being eaten by the government". Another *mpondoro* present added, "if they do this on their own, why must they consult us about the rain?". The

statement regarding the absence of the pangolin related to discord among locals as the animal was a symbol of unity. The notion of the government taking the pangolin was an admission by the *mpondoro* of a challenge to their authority. A refusal to make rain meant unwillingness to cooperate with new authorities as was shown by the *mpondoro* Karembera's contention that, "if the government brings back the pangolin and removes the pegs then we can work together".

In sum, the MZP was a villagisation program which aimed to settle people according to its own logic based in western notions of economic empowerment. Before the project, settlements in the Zambesi were all of diverse form, depending on the number of kin settled around the homestead of senior men, and essentially followed the contours of the river valley. Rivers were desirable settings for the building of homesteads as they provided fish, transportation, and fertile soil for gardens. The MZP stipulated that arable plots should all be of the same size, and that fields were to be situated away from rivers. Another feature of the MZP was that the names of settlements, which often reflected the ruling families, were changed and replaced with descriptive terms or letters. People felt that this was a way for the government to take away their local identities and confuse long-term with new residents.

As I described above, agricultural practices in Chikafa were quite diversified which maximised the ability of households to weather difficulties such as drought. The MZP proposed to change all this by encouraging the cash-cropping of cotton and the abandonment of riverine gardens. After a number of years of political activism and anxiety, only a small number of households were allocated land by the MZP. However, one of the effects of the project was the arrival of new migrants to the Chikafa area who competed for resources which were already stretched such as the school, clinic, boreholes, the bus service, shop, sources of firewood, resources from the bush, and the Manyame River. Political organisation also underwent a transformation, as younger members of established lineages and influential newcomers such as the local shopkeeper began to have greater voice within existing structures. For example, a great deal of opposition to the various unsuitable areas demarcated for residents of

244

Chikafa was articulated by younger members of old lineages. However, the arrival of outsiders also meant that political and economic power was further eroded from these old lineages. In social terms, new forms of land allocation meant that affinal obligations were cut short by the demise of brideservice and shorter period of brideprice payments.

viii. Development in the Zambesi Valley: Resistance and Acquiescence

In the Zambesi Valley, development schemes hoped to capture people's imagination and to alter their livelihood practices by changing both their circumstances and their symbolic relationship with each other and with their surroundings. Impeding access to long-used resources and attempts to change how people made a living were one side of the coin of change. The differential impact of programs within areas, and the debates which this elicited, were the other side of the same coin. Ingold's (2000) ideas of skills, livelihood and dwelling was a useful way to approach the relationship between humans and environment, to consider the re-organisation which development brought to the Zambesi, and whether projects could provide the sustainable development they promised.

Because both the MZP and CAMPFIRE were based in western development dogmas, they included ideas such as consensus within political process, the individual and the household as economic unit, the environment as conceptually separate from humans, and assumptions about the form that settlements should take. In doing so they obscured the established symbolic constructions that locals had with surroundings and the practices which made sense to them. By promoting their development views wholesale to the Zambesi Valley as if it were some sort of terra nulis, these schemes created hardship for the already structurally weak, and, in some cases, strengthened the powerful. Thus the 'empowerment' aspect of development did not come to pass.

Each project provided different attempts of state government policy of decentralisation (Derman 1993:16). CAMPFIRE aimed to devolve authority to localities, whereas MZP bypassed local power structures while fragmenting communities. In effect, in Kanyemba, CAMPFIRE strengthened entrenched authority

and made wildlife a taxable commodity, while in the Chikafa area the MZP attempted to standardise farming practices and encourage cotton growing. In both cases, decentralisation meant making communities participants in the national economy by the levies on income from wildlife, and the foreign currency potentially earned by marketing cotton.

Both projects implied a standardisation of the concept of the person. For one, neither scheme accounted for age, gender, and skill-based differences of their clients. The MZP gave the same size arable plot to household regardless of composition3. In neither case was the infrastructure of schools, clinics, nor boreholes built as promised by each project. Thus the lot of women and children was not improved. Neither project accounted for the different needs and abilities of local inhabitants.

Both schemes demonstrated a disregard for local histories. The MZP did so blatantly, while CAMPFIRE professed to be community-based but was so encumbered by various levels of bureaucracy and its own discourse of equitableness, that it failed to address the fact that local communities were stratified.

Specifically, in Kanyemba, through its control of political process and ownership of land, the ruling *marunga rosario andrade* clan managed to appropriate control of CAMPFIRE so that the project contributed to consolidation of its power. While everyone suffered in Kanyemba due to the limited diet imposed by the scheme, the *tembo mvura* clan lost a great deal of their livelihood as this had been based on access to the forest.

In Chikafa, the MZP project had profound impact as the debate around its implementation in the area and the arrival of migrants precipitated changes in social organisation, economic practices, and political process. Most notable of these changes was the idea that land need not be obtained from elders, a fact which broke a cycle of long-term affinal relations as well as the power of lineage elders. Previously disenfranchised groups such as single women and widows realised that they could obtain land on par with senior males under the MZP scheme. Cotton cultivation slowly

---

3 Polygynous households were given an extra 21/2 acres of land under the MZP.

encroached on the time people spent on food crops, which contributed to problems with food security during drought. Also, active participation by young men in negotiations regarding implementation of the MZP led to their greater political involvement in day-to-day decisions regarding administration of the settlement.

Loss of skills associated with the forest was noticeable in both settlements. In Kanyemba area, the prohibition of hunting and fishing with nets meant that these skills were not practiced and not taught to young men. Suspicion of people who ventured into the bush meant that technologies associated with the processing of wild foods were suppressed and hidden for fear of accusations of poaching. In Chikafa area, the time taken up with cultivation, particularly of new cotton crops meant that people had less time to dedicate to products from the bush. I found only one young adult who had extensive knowledge of bush plants and animals. Ignorance of this alternate resource meant greater vulnerability in times of drought.

Mostly, development in the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s was about domination. The state attempted to dominate the Zambesi through its confusing policies of decentralisation coupled with the authoritarian way in which development was implemented. People could not understand whether the state was acting as autochthon, in which case it should be benevolent, or as conqueror where it would do as it pleased. In Kanyemba, the imposition of CAMPFIRE was managed by invoking long-standing processes of internal domination of historically subordinate clans. In Chikafa, the ruling alliance between Chikunda and Korekore elders was eroded by the inclusion of foreigners and junior elders in political and economic power.

In the following chapter I will extend discussion of processes of domination and exclusion by focussing on the serious drought of 1991-92 and its social impact on the Dande area.

Chapter 8: The Impact of the Serious Drought of 1991-92 in the Zambesi Valley

"A person's a person, no matter how small".

Dr. Seuss, from Horton Hears a Who!

i. The Serious Drought of 1991-92: An Introduction:

In discussing drought it is tempting to describe crop failure, dry riverbeds and other physical aspects of the phenomenon. However, the fact is that drought, although an environmental occurrence and ostensibly an act of God, is also a social experience with ramifications for individuals, communities, and polities. The serious drought of 1991-92 in the Zambesi Valley had a profound impact on social organisation, political systems, exchange and livelihood, and individuals in the forms of hunger, anxiety, illness, and death.

While two settlements were researched for this study, this chapter focuses on Chikafa area because it was most profoundly affected by the serious drought of 1991-92. Drought also affected Kanyemba area but, because the settlement was situated at the confluence of two rivers and heavily forested, it was generally wetter and so crops grew. Also, this area was excluded from the MZP design which meant that longstanding mechanisms to deal with shortage of rainfall were not disrupted. The great difference between these two settlements, however, was their political and social organisation. Kanyemba was governed by a centralised Chikunda chieftaincy which presided over a longstanding rigid social hierarchy, while Chikafa was characterised by a power-sharing arrangement between Chikunda and Korekore which ruled over a socially fragmented area. In Chikafa, changes to political hierarchy after Independence, social influence from the plateau, increasing emphasis on cotton cultivation, and the implementation of the MZP contributed to a fragile environment as well as to tenuous social organisation. Because of its weak internal structure, Chikafa was prone to domination from without. Drought provided an opportunity to test new forms of social and political organisation in Chikafa.

During the early 1990s, the combination of development, structural adjustment, and drought resulted in increased difficulty with making a living in the Zambesi Valley. In Chikafa, an area which had supported the guerrilla movement during the Independence War, residents began to construe the state as no longer their benefactor, but rather as conqueror. Certainly, the *mpondoro* of the area blamed the serious drought on the MZP suggesting that it had precipitated disruption in the community which caused the absence of rain. *Mpondoro* blamed the actions of humans with regard to land for the lack of rain and resulting infertility of cultivated and bush plants. In their view, Mugabe was to blame for 'pegging' sacred areas in the Zambesi, and its residents were responsible for attempting to cultivate these demarcated areas. Consequently, in Zambesian cosmology, drought was associated with the politics of humans. In this way, *mpondoro* were in line with de Waal's (1997) belief that famines were the result of a lack of 'political contract' between states and localities. While this author construed 'political contract' in terms of democratic government, the *mpondoro* of Chikafa area believed that the arrangement Zambesians had made with Mugabe at Independence was one of autochthonous chieftaincy in which rule had been legitimately acquired through the support of the population. The scale of the drought was believed to be an indication that the interests of Zambesians were not promoted by the state which, instead, acted in its own interest very much in the way of conquerors.

In this chapter, I will argue that the serious drought of 1991-92 associated with acute hunger, anxiety, illness and death was viewed by Zambesians as an indication that the state had breached a contract of partnership which many believed had been struck at Independence. To pursue this issue I will examine the scale of the drought and the nature of the disruption of social life it entailed in Chikafa area. Drought is a fact of life in the Zambesi, but the factors involved in this serious drought were such that a number of coping strategies were required to deal with everyday practicalities of survival. Next, I will consider the impact of the drought on body, mind, and community through a discussion of suffering and anxiety experienced by individuals in Chikafa. Such a huge socio-environmental disruption precipitated renewal of interest in the cult of *mpondoro* as a means of explanation. To this end, I will describe an important rain-making ceremony, in November of 1992, which articulated local

understandings of the drought. Finally, the actions of the Zimbabwean state before and during this drought will be reviewed in order to shed light on the opinion of many Zambesians that it had behaved as a conqueror.

In the Zambesi Valley there are two types of drought. The first is typical drought which occurs in cycles of five to fifteen years causing crop failure and hunger (Illiffe:1990). The second type is severe drought which affects the whole environment including low water levels in rivers, total dryland crop failure and a shortage of available bush foods. Oral history accounts describe three severe droughts in the 20th century, the 1991-92 episode being the severest in living memory. A typical drought occurs when there has been little or no rain for one calendar year, and entails dryland crop failure. In normal years, the landscape of the Zambesi Valley varies greatly between the wet and dry seasons. During the wet season, the bush is green, the seasonal rivers rise up so that dugout canoes (*mwadia*) are necessary for navigation, dryland fields are cultivated with maize, sorghum, and millet, and intercropped with pumpkin, cucumber, and watermelon. In these years, riverine gardens produce a variety of vegetables as well as tobacco for sale. Chickens and goats thrive, the grass grows tall and the trees leafy and shady. There is fruit on the *masao* trees (a fruit similar to crabapple) and the bush is abundant with a number of shrubs, fruits, insects, and leaves which supplement cultivated foods and supply medicines.

During a usual dry season, the bush turns yellow and brown, and the dryland fields are left fallow. Riverine gardens, which retain moisture from the swollen rivers of the wet season, continue to produce a variety of relishes. If the rainy season has been good, granaries in homesteads will be full of dry maize cobs, and women will have stores of maize meal flour. Adequately fed chickens will produce eggs regularly. During this season there may be migration to the plateau for wage-labour, with individuals returning for planting and harvesting. Livelihoods are also supplemented with trade and bush foods such as field mice, insects, fruits, shrubs, and roots. In years of mild drought, Zambesians shift the procurement of livelihood toward non-agricultural options such as employment on the plateau, and an increase in consumption of wild foods, fish, and trade.

In the instance of an exceptional drought, such as that of 1991-92, there will

have been no rainfall at all during the rainy season with the result of total crop failure. Toward the end of the drought, in July and August of 1992, people in Chikafa pointed to their empty granaries when asked if they had food. During the drought, gardens became a crucial source of food which meant a meager diet of green leaves, tomatoes, and sweet potatoes. Toward the time of the rain-making ceremony described below, land was desiccated, stream- and riverbeds dry, the level of boreholes low, trees leafless, and the air hot and dusty. A survey of Chikafa in June and July of 1992 counted sixty households, while a similar survey conducted after a successful rainy season in 1993 counted seventy-six households. The difference was accounted for by migration to commercial farms, urban areas, and the homes of relatives who lived elsewhere. Remaining households were often headed by women, and contained a large number of children and elderly. At this time people survived through the consumption of garden vegetables, a limited amount of trade, pole-fishing, and drought relief. In truth, vegetables from riverine gardens kept Chikafa from famine, as other forms of livelihood did not prove reliable.

Serious drought appeared to be the result of environmental catastrophe, and there was no doubt that in the minds of Zambesians that severe drought was the opposite of life. However, the impact of drought on people is very much mediated by their actions. There is no direct correlation between lack of rainfall and famine. Instead, the actions of states, local leaders, families, and individuals play an important part in the crucial difference between hunger and famine.

In a book on famine in Zimbabwe, Iliffe examined droughts which occurred between 1890 and 1960. His main point was that famine occurred mostly as a result of human activity and not because of natural disaster. He described three phases of famine in Zimbabwe. The first phase, between 1896 and 1922, was mostly due to violence in the form of resistance to the northern advance of the British South Africa Company. The second phase, which took place after 1922 and lasted well into the 1940s, "was a result of the triumph of European settlement" and "appeared first and most severely in the area most disrupted by European scarcity" although there was endemic malnutrition (1990:10-11). The third phase happened after 1960 because, he argued, the settler economy could not absorb the extra labour available in time of

drought and so was unprepared (1990:11). At this time relief became a necessity. Throughout his book, Iliffe reiterated the point that in all times of drought, with the exception of the pre-colonial period, famine occurred for structural reasons separate from the fact of crop failure. For example, he suggested that during the drought of 1933, there was hunger due to the gradual decline of African grain production resulting from the White Agricultural Policy. In his words:

> "Instead of acute famine concentrated in the most remote areas, South Rhodesia experienced a widespread and lingering scarcity which was serious both in isolated regions like the Sabi Valley and in areas of intense European pressure like Matabeleland".

(Iliffe 1990:90)

Similarly, the serious drought of 1947, which Zambesians call *Mwantoto*, resulted in hunger and endemic malnutrition because of overpopulation and excessive cattle in the Reserves. In addition to hunger, there were also outbreaks of measles and smallpox (Iliffe 1990:101-102). Another example of structural problems causing famine was demonstrated during the drought of 1960 when, Iliffe argued, the hunger that ensued from crop failure was a result of increasing alienation of land from Africans and the expansion of the capitalist economy (1990:108). This drought coincided with the displacement and forced resettlement of the Tonga people away from the Zambesi River. In the absence of produce from riverine gardens to substitute for failed maize crops, hunger ensued (1990:105).

In a book on the Malawi famine of 1949-50, Megan Vaughan arrived at a similar conclusion that there was no simple correlation between drought and famine. She reviewed several theories of 'food crises' to arrive at the conclusion that hunger and famine are associated with drought when there are intervening structural reasons. For example, if there had been a decline in food production due to cash-cropping, the creation of labour reserves to service European commercial endeavours, the formation of class divisions, or commercialisation in which Africans became dependent on market exchange rather than primary food production, then there would be hunger (Vaughan 1987:9).

The serious drought of 1991-92 displayed many of the characteristics which Iliffe elicited in his analysis of colonial era famines in Zimbabwe. For instance,

increasing time and labour spent on cotton cultivation since the late 1980s meant that food crops, including those grown in riverine gardens had been somewhat neglected. In the same vein, the lack of access to markets had also discouraged the production of maize for sale to the plateau. The MZP also affected access of households to diverse sources of food. Families which had accepted arable plots away from rivers, found themselves in a situation of crop failure compounded by the lack of a garden to provide vegetables. Scarcity of food in the Zambesi prompted a number of families in Chikafa to disperse and search for food elsewhere, particularly in towns and commercial farms on the plateau. Many residents of Chikafa returned from these migrations with no money, having been offered subsistence wages or having found no work whatsoever. Difficulty in finding employment, as I reviewed in Chapter 6, was associated with structural adjustment which required a reduction of jobs in both private and public sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. Also, Iliffe's observation that illness follows famine was certainly borne out in Chikafa when a cholera epidemic occurred several months after the first harvest of 1993. Although no government official had an explanation for the appearance of this illness in Chikafa, low levels of water in the Manyame River meant that the population obtained its water from a small number of boreholes that occasionally ran dry during the drought.

The serious drought of 1991-92 certainly shared characteristics with previous droughts in Zimbabwe. However, it also took place at a particular time in Zambesian history when there had been rapid change. The conjunction of ESAP which affected labour migration patterns, and land resettlement which affected livelihoods, provided an unprecedented set of conditions with which residents of Chikafa faced a serious drought. For this reason it is useful to examine issues such as differential impact of drought within Chikafa, the nature of coping strategies, approaches to suffering, interpretations of the drought of 1991-92, and particular actions of the state. In doing so, it becomes possible to view the experience of residents of Chikafa during that difficult time on its own terms.

Both Iliffe and Vaughan elicited structural reasons for the occurrence of famine in drought-stricken areas, however the central argument of Vaughan's book is that, within a given population, drought affects particular groups more severely than

others. In an analysis of the Malawi famine of 1949, this author argued that women and children suffered most. Crop failure in local areas meant that people relied on trade and wild foods. However, men were far more mobile than women with children, and the resulting separations meant that existing marriages broke down, fewer marriages were contracted, and there were fewer births (Vaughan 1987:33-36). In short, Vaughan argued that the differential impact of the 1949 drought was particularly manifested along gender line.

Similarly, in Chikafa, consequences of drought were varied amongst groups as people suffered in different ways. For instance, women's work increased as the importance of the garden rose. The pressures of rationing food also took their toll in stress and hunger, as women were often the last to eat. Pregnancy became difficult to bear with the constant hunger. Children suffered socially as households were shattered and dispersed, while hunger kept many out of school. Old people remained behind as their children left to find work elsewhere, sometimes struggling to look after themselves. Men traveled to the plateau in search of work or to Mozambique in search of food. These were the immediate consequences of drought. However, long-term effects on social organisation, political process, livelihood, and health also became manifested in the months following the first harvest in March of 1993.

ii. Local Response to the Drought: Practical Strategies

Local response to drought in Chikafa was manifested in two ways. First, people were concerned to survive through the increasing hunger they experienced throughout 1992. Secondly, they were anxious about maintaining the integrity of their families, livelihoods, social position, and fields. In short, people in Chikafa devised coping strategies during the drought which they hoped would ensure their return to familiar circumstances once the hardship had passed. In 1992 informants could not say what they thought of the drought and had difficulty articulating the ways in which they dealt with it. During interviews for Survey I in June, July, and August of 1992, I visited all 60 households in Chikafa to find that most people could not speak about the impact of drought, seemed shocked by its extent, and asked me to come back later when they

would have thought of a name for it. My impressions of this time unfolded from clues gathered during the first survey, observations, and conversations with local representatives and educated young adults. In this way, I was able to envisage the short-term impact of the 1991-92 drought in Chikafa as a scramble for survival, and the long-term impact as a political struggle between the established order and newcomers.

In his book, *Famine that Kills*, de Waal argued that famines should be interpreted on their own terms if anything is to be learned from each individual case. To this end, he described a lexicon for famine devised in Darfur, Sudan comprising three categories: a shortage of grain implying hunger; a reference to wild foods implying a short-term change in status (bush foods being the province of the poorest); and, mass destitution relating to a temporary suspension of normal social life (1989:73-74). Appended to these three designations was the conceptual dichotomy of 'famine that kills' and that which did not. Death was measured not in terms of quantity, but against usual levels of mortality for particular age groups. This rationale shifted the focus from a simple correlation between perceived severity of the conditions of famine and outcomes in terms of aggregate deaths, to a localised view of a moral community. For example, there was an acceptance that small children had, at all times, a likelihood of dying, so that their deaths were not construed as famine-related, but instead expected (1989:75). In Darfur, locals conceived of drought in three phases: hunger, destitution, and death (1989:77). These were moral delineations which referred to people's capacity to plan for the time after drought. In this way, death ensued after attempts at reconstitution of social life through various strategies had been exhausted, usually after a number of years of drought.

Similarly, drought in Chikafa had many more meanings than the simple absence of rainfall and a harvest. Strategies employed to cope with hunger depended very much on perceived social position and economic factors. Also, because of the pattern of cyclical drought in the Zambesi Valley hunger was not unprecedented and there were methods of dealing with it. The striking feature of the 1991-92 drought was that its scale threatened to disorganise local society entailing change in unpredictable ways.

One of the most immediate coping strategies deployed included dispersal of family members during the hungriest months. In these cases, children were sent to live with relatives who had more resources, men and older sons migrated to the plateau in search of work, women might travel with the men or else stay behind to look after the garden, and old people always stayed. Families who engaged in this practice were successful farmers who owned enough land to feed members and produce surplus maize, were of established lineages, and held a relatively high social position.

The case of a Chikunda household of eleven members presents a good example of this coping strategy. This particular family was relatively successful at farming in normal years, cultivating a mixture of maize, sorghum, millet, garden produce, tobacco, and cotton. They were also major goat-owners and kept chickens. They were Catholic and also supported the *mpondoro*, features which denoted both long-term residence and interest in maintaining the Korekore/Chikunda alliance in the area. The sons were well-educated by local standards having completed secondary school on the plateau and also being knowledgeable with regard to local customs such as iron-working, fishing, and the social meanings of flora and fauna. One son of this family compiled a plant catalogue for me with translations of each entry into three languages. During 1992, the men of the family traveled to the plateau to look for work while a young sister was sent to live with relatives elsewhere. The mother stayed behind to look after the gardens and animals. Individual members had returned by late 1992 in order to prepare fields for planting. By adopting a strategy of dispersal this family managed to maintain the integrity of the household, and their position as long-term residents and successful farmers while withstanding months of hunger.

Rationing was another common way in with which people coped with drought. Women decreased the numbers of meals and sizes of portions in order to stretch maize supplies. Drought relief, which I will discuss below, was disorganised and inadequate and, for the most part, people scrambled to devise their own resources. The little aid maize which arrived in Chikafa, between 5kg and 10kg/adult/month had to extend to also feed children. Women cooked aid maize, which was yellow, into thick porridge (*ntsima*) which they served with garden vegetables or on its own. Young children were often fed a thinner form of this dish. By November of 1992, some impoverished people

in Chikafa were dipping their porridge into salt or sugar water in lieu of relish. I learned of this practice through my assistant at the time. People did not eat this way out in the open as it would denote loss of status. One polygynous family headed by a builder, provided a sad example of rationing during 1992. During work for Survey I, my assistant noticed that there was quite a discrepancy between the household of one wife who seemed to be better supported than that of her co-wife who lived next door. The second wife was visibly thinner and her homestead appeared to be depleted of resources. There were no animals, the absence of a granary and a dearth of household items. Her one mat, which she offered to me, was old and torn. She said that her garden had not produced enough vegetables as she had had problems with insects. Instead she and her five children survived on food aid which she rationed.

The issue of bush foods was contentious as certain types of these foods were associated with low status. For the Chikunda, even in Chikafa, bush foods were thought to be the preserve of subordinate *tembo mvura* people whom they associated with 'uncivilised' hunting (with spears) and gathering practices. In contrast, the Chikunda liked to emphasise their association with highly processed maize and sorghum, and their cooking techniques with fish. During 1992 hardly anyone would tell me about bush foods, and it was only after the first harvest in 1993 that stories of these foods were disclosed.

There were two types of uncultivated foods in Chikafa. First, there was high status food associated with high levels of skill for procurement and preparation such as fish and game. Also in this category was food such as field mice which denoted a connection to soil and fertility, and *masao* fruit which could also be processed into a number of finished products. In the second category there were plants and insects related to low status groups who owned less land and had a weaker claim on cultivation. These foods included grass seeds, insects, roots, shrubs, and certain fruits.

During 1992 a number of households ate low status bush foods such as porridge made with grass seeds and baobab leaves. Various grubs and insects were also procured and cooked over fires. I never observed these practices but was subsequently informed in 1993 by many informants. At least two types of insects were eaten during 1992, including *nkuruzi* (big white ants) and *nyenze* (similar to a cicada),

both roasted and eaten as a relish. The leaves of shrubs such as *runi*, *chamburuzi*, *ntsapani*, and *nduwe* were eaten mostly boiled as an accompaniment to porridge. Two forms of wild okra, *tobve* and *terere yanyenje* were also eaten, as well as *punde*, a leaf found near swamps very similar to the greens of sweet potatoes. Although a variety of bush foods were eaten during the drought, quantities were low as informants emphasized that the bush had also been very dry at that time. A case in point was that of fish. The low level of the Manyame River, with its shortage of pools, meant that most fish eaten in Chikafa in 1992 had been traded from Mozambique.

In short, it was impossible to gauge how much bush food was eaten in Chikafa during the drought. High status families would not discuss this issue because they were reticent to lose prestige, and poorer households seemed to not know about the bush. It is also possible that there had been a loss of knowledge about the bush. I met very few younger people who were able to discuss resources from the forest. Many young adults had been to school on the plateau, were born during cycles of labour migration, or simply did not want to be associated with 'traditional' ways instead focusing on cotton cultivation and entrepreneurial activities.

While bush foods supplemented meager diets, riverine gardens kept Chikafa from famine throughout 1992 and until the harvest in March of 1993. In 1992, most households, except for the very poor, kept a garden of about half an acre. A variety of vegetables were grown which included greens, tomatoes, sweet potato, pumpkins, cabbage, onion, okra, beans, and a few maize plants. Tending of gardens was usually the preserve of women and girls, but during drought men also participated. As with cultivation of fields in years of rain, the success of gardens depended on the quality and quantity of inputs such as seed and fertilizer, size of plots and their position, the skill of the cultivator, and number of workers. Families which pooled labour had better yields. Successful gardeners during the drought included the household of a senior Chikunda man whose garden was tended by his wife and two adult daughters who lived in adjacent huts.

In 1992 I observed households in which members ate vegetable relish in the place of porridge. Often vegetables were simply boiled or dry-fried as most people had no money for cooking oil. Occasionally children were given a boiled or roasted maize

cob to nibble on. But the truth is that while gardens kept people from starvation, they did not supply adequate calories and protein and so individuals grew thin and children listless. In Chitete settlement across the border in Mozambique, I saw children with distended bellies and light hair characteristic of malnutrition. It is important to emphasise that there simply was no surplus from gardens. During 1992 I had almost no luck buying vegetables for my own consumption.

One of the factors which kept starvation at bay in Chikafa was food aid, although this was disorganised, did not arrive with regularity, and was prone to theft and corruption at the local level. For these reasons, people could not plan their food consumption around drought relief food. In theory there were a number of food aid programs in Chikafa. There was maize distribution from early 1992 to July of 1993 with amounts offered varying between 5 and 10kg/adult /month. A 'Food for Work Program' was also installed with the double objective of building community facilities such as Blair (long-drop) toilets and providing maize to workers. However, amounts of compensation changed over time so that it was hard to gauge the work-to-maize equation. Similarly, since a number of arable plots had been designated by the MZP in 1992, there had been contention as to which drought relief list these new landowners belonged to. There had been incidences where families received aid twice, but the issue was difficult to resolve as boundaries of jurisdictions were in flux. Toward the end of 1992, quantities of government relief maize dropped off by half because the Grain Marketing Board depot at Mahuwe had become depleted. Locals took this as a sign that the government, in the person of the President, did not look after them as a proper chief would do.

Special needs groups designated by government and donor organisations were also the recipients of food aid. Schoolchildren were given a nourishing drink called Nutresco which the local Member of Parliament delivered at a ceremony on 21st September, 1992. In his speech he promised a phone for Chikafa village, entreated people to be fair with regard to relief food, and stated that the government was trying hard to ensure that no one died of hunger as a result of drought. On 5th November, the headmaster of Chikafa School said that his pupils were to have 200ml of Nutresco drink/day until supplies ran out. He said that any aid that had come to the school from

Lower Guruve Development Association and a Christian charity had been one-off acts. He said that a number of children had remained at school as a result of extra feeding. However, other informants told me that children were simply underfed to the point that many were too tired to go to school.

Pregnant women were also provided with extra food, as were the elderly. But, once again, these programs were applied erratically so that it was difficult to gauge whether they actually had any impact. I know from both my surveys, conducted in mid 1992 and mid 1993, that drought relief did not play a large part in their food consumption unless the household was very close to destitution. An instance in which aid was redirected in Chikafa area was indicative of problems with equitable distribution where local authorities exploited their position. In one episode which took place in 1992, the VIDCO Chairman at the time and an accomplice stole 4 of 106 50kg bags of beans donated by a Christian aid organisation. He then gave these beans to his wife to sell in a neighbouring settlement in Mozambique. 8 local young men decided this theft was intolerable and so made a complaint to the police station at Mushumbi Pools. The police asked for proof of the crime which the young men produced by sending one of their number to Mozambique to purchase beans. With evidence in hand, the police arrested the VIDCO Chairman and he was sent to Chinhoyi prison for 5 months to serve out a sentence for theft.

This story of corruption is interesting in that it provides a good example of inter-generational conflict elicited by circumstances surrounding drought. On the one hand, the VIDCO Chairman in 1992 and his accomplice were both older and of the established Korekore group and active supporters of ZANU. They represented the melding of established gerontocratic political power with new government structures introduced during the 1980s. The VIDCO Chairman was said to be particularly corrupt as he had also been involved in the theft of school funds and in unfair adjudication of a boundary dispute related to the MZP. On the other hand, the 8 young men who denounced the theft were also of established lineages, but were imbued with notions of fairness and proper political process. One among their number became VIDCO Chairman in 1993, and by all appearances acted equitably on behalf of his constituents in difficult circumstances of cholera and the MZP.

Alex de Waal (1989) argued that the actions people take during drought are related to their attempts to maintain the social world with which they are familiar. In this way, they may undergo periods of destitution in order to keep resources to regain their previous social status. Also, he contended that the only way to understand the impact of droughts on societies was to look at the particular conjunction of circumstances relevant to each occurrence.

During the 1991-92 serious drought, the population of Chikafa area engaged five strategies to manage crop failure and depletion of their natural environment. These included the strategic dispersal of family members, so that some left in search of work and food, and others stayed to maintain the integrity of the household and its fields and garden. In this way, there was a temporary attenuation of the household's prominence in the settlement, but not long-term loss of social position. Secondly, most households rationed food which accentuated hunger, but ensured a continued, if survivalist, food supply and the ability to preserve a homestead in Chikafa throughout the drought. Thirdly, a number of households ate bush foods, but because of the stigma attached to doing so, particularly amongst the established Korekore and Chikunda, it was hard to gauge the actual extent of this practice. In the fourth place, and most importantly, the cultivation of riverine gardens ensured a supply of vegetables which supplemented meager quantities of maize meal. The importance of these gardens broke down usual gender division of labour as all family members participated in cultivation. Lastly, aid food from the Zimbabwean government and donor organisations contributed to keeping famine at bay. However, irregular delivery and fluctuations in quantities meant that it was difficult for households to engage in rationing strategies to stretch maize to the next delivery. The way food aid was managed locally provided opportunities to articulate an increasing disparity between governing styles of old and young.

Perhaps most tellingly, the coping strategies which residents of Chikafa employed to survive the drought were differentiated according to high and low status. High status households of established Korekore and Chikunda lineages adopted plans which would ensure their continued presence within Chikafa settlement. This orientation was especially important in light of the fact that the MZP continued to

allocate land during the drought, and under pre-MZP practices, control over land depended on usufruct right. Thus, if a homestead and fields were abandoned for a time, the family could lose claims to future designated land. In the end, this did not matter as the project ran out of money in 1993 and was abandoned. However, the ways in which families coped with drought demonstrated the relative importance of belonging to a locality.

iii. The Impact of the Drought on Body, Mind, and Community:

The practical strategies which residents of Chikafa adopted during drought functioned as more than a mechanism to ensure physical survival, they constituted ways in which households ensured continuity in a climate of great social upheaval. Established Korekore and Chikunda lineages strove to maintain their social position which they knew hinged on ownership of land. That the drought coincided with implementation of the MZP only exacerbated their anxieties. Members of newer lineages with shallow genealogies who did not own much land left Chikafa during the drought and abandoned homesteads. Upon their return in 1993, after the drought had ended, they managed to acquire land through local authorities, and hoped that the MZP would eventually designate an arable plot for them.

The experience of famine in Darfur documented by Alex de Waal (1989) held a number of parallels with that of residents of Chikafa. Particularly, his contention that foremost in the minds of his informants was the shape of the 'moral geography' of their community. It was this feature which informed how they classified famines and devised coping strategies. For instance, in Darfur agriculturalists and pastoralists held different notions about social organisation. For the former "the creep of the desert is a symbol of the awful power of the encroachment of all that is wild and hostile to life, the desert, into all that is homely and supportive of life, the sower" (de Waal 1989:89). For the latter, their concept of spatial social organisation resembled a chessboard with places for farmers and for themselves, including the notion that environmental change entailed movement (1989:89-90). Thus for farmers, with drought and "ecological change has come an insecurity of community identity and relations" (1989:89).

In the same way, with the drought in Chikafa, members of established lineages felt great anxiety at losing their foothold in social hierarchy, while newer groups envisaged opportunity in the midst of disruption. During normal years Chikafa is an area of tenuous leadership and fragmented social organisation. However, during 1991-92 the combination of drought, the MZP, and structural adjustment brought the community new challenges. As I described in Chapter 7, implementation of the MZP was fraught because land was designated three separate times, and in the third instance the scheme was only partially accepted by residents. At the same time, structural adjustment encouraged the very difficult task of cotton cultivation while reducing jobs on the plateau and disrupting labour migration patterns. These changes brought much anxiety to residents of Chikafa. Established families saw their power slipping away, and poorer families suffered destitution during the drought. All were victims of forces beyond their control and all experienced degrees of suffering.

In this section I will discuss the impact of routine suffering and social suffering on the bodies and minds of residents of Chikafa by examining hunger, anxiety, and illness associated with the drought of 1991-92. Both types of suffering are connected with state policies, the difference being that routine suffering results from lack of intervention while social suffering is the outcome of explicit actions by the powerful. The purpose of examining suffering is twofold. First, it is important to acknowledge the physical conditions in which people live and their effects on the body and mind. Secondly, suffering is one outcome of authoritarian government policy, and often it is through the body that individuals express their experience of it.

Life is hard in the Zambesi Valley and there is much routine suffering in the mundane experience of its inhabitants. The promised infrastructure, which locals expected to arrive after Independence, failed to materialise in this marginal corner of Zimbabwe. In the 1990s there was a great short of health care so that many ailments such as infections, animal bites, cuts, toothache, eye problems, appendicitis, complications with childbirth and a number of treatable complaints had to be endured for lack of clinics and medicines. Malaria was endemic in the area, yet Chikafa clinic was often out of anti-malarial drugs. Accident victims were treated by nurse's aides despite having no pain relief stronger than paracetamol, and a shortage of sutures and

dressings. In a place where snakebite was common, there was no anti-venom medicine and no transport to hospitals on the plateau. In 1992, a young woman died after being bitten by a snake while working in her garden. Another aspect of routine suffering was the seasonal hunger experienced at the end of each agricultural year when grain supplies were diminished. Routine suffering which could be assuaged through proper infrastructure, including health care and the stockpiling of maize by the state, was left unchecked during the 1990s.

Social suffering was also connected to actions by the state, however, unlike routine suffering which ensued from the absence of care, it was the direct result of policies. Earlier I reviewed the work of Illiffe (1990), Vaughan (1987), and de Waal (1989) who argued that it was through the actions of the powerful that drought transformed into famine. I will add to this idea by arguing that the conjunction of drought, development, and structural adjustment in Chikafa precipitated social disruption in which ruling clans felt threatened and the powerless saw opportunity within new power structures crystallising within that society. As I proposed in Chapter 1, because Chikafa was an acephalous society, it was easier to disrupt which then made it prone to domination from the exterior.

The concept of social suffering is pertinent to the context of Chikafa because it suggests a way to understand power and domination in that area. 'Social suffering' is a term coined by Kleinman, Das, and Lock (1997) to elucidate processes of control at work in disrupted societies. It is associated with cultural representations, social experiences, and political and professional processes. For instance, these authors argued that the media appropriates images of suffering so that these become commodified to fit the objectives of particular institutions or interest groups (1997:xi-xii). The repetition of images of distress, packaged for public consumption, over time come to pass as unmediated representations of actual social experience (1997:xi-xii). These abstractions then obscure experiences such as the pressure placed on livelihoods by development and structural adjustment which I encountered in the Zambesi. Kleinman et al. argued that "social suffering results from what political, economic, and institutional power does to people, and reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to social problems" (1997:i).

Social suffering is the result of the forces of domination which the powerful impose upon the powerless, and of the representations and interpretations that are applied to these circumstances. The poor are thus doubly disempowered by their lack of voice. Kleinman et al. suggested that "as we 'master' nature...the form that suffering takes, the construction of needs and deficiencies, is actually created by the very technology designed to alleviate suffering" (1997:xix). The development schemes in the Zambesi conformed to this description in that they proposed an improvement in living conditions, which was delivered in a climate of authoritarianism, and local expression was constrained by parameters of compliance. These parameters included a mastery of technocratic language linked to development which proved difficult for non-English speakers, and the fact of living in a one-party state which permitted very little expression of opinion.

The serious drought of 1991-92 transformed routine suffering in Chikafa into social suffering because of the way in which it was managed by the state. Although it is almost inevitable that total crop failure would produce hardship, it was the limitation of coping mechanisms which precipitated hunger. Equally, the cholera outbreak which took place in June of 1993 was not a usual feature of drought in the Zambesi, and occurred for the first time in combination with the MZP. Earlier I reviewed the limitations placed on time-tested coping methods usually deployed during cyclical droughts common to the Zambesi. For instance, migration to the plateau for work was not very successful in 1992 due to reduction of jobs linked to ESAP. Also, Zambesians had come to expect relief maize in times of drought because the Rhodesian regime had also provided relief, and because they believed that President Mugabe would enact his proper role of Chief and provide help. As it turned out, delivery of relief maize was inadequate because ESAP required a reduction of national grain stores and the state had made no contingent plans. Thus, it can be argued that a shortage of maize during the drought was not simply the result of crop failure at the local level, but also a consequence of the political choice of structural adjustment and support for development at the national level. Hunger in Chikafa was compounded by a language of empowerment and local responsibility, adopted at meetings, which suggested that individuals and families were to blame for their own misfortunes. People knew that

265

this discourse meant to mystify processes of control from outside the community and obscure the lack of responsibility displayed by the state. Many individuals displayed their dissatisfaction by renewing support for the territorial *mpondoro*.

An outbreak of cholera in June of 1993 was one sign that social and physical circumstances had changed in Chikafa during the previous year. The nature of the incidence of this illness, and local and state response to it demonstrated the dire impact of environmental and structural changes within the settlement. At the same time, the divergent way in which it was understood by locals and state officials was symptomatic of the level of disruption in Chikafa.

On 5th June 1993 a local representative told me that 32 people had died of cholera in the Chikafa area. I observed this outbreak of cholera at close proximity because my hut was situated a few meters from the clinic which treated patients, and the borehole used by their relatives. In this position I was able to follow the rhythm of illness and death by observing the activities of relatives, hearing their news, and listening to the sounds of their mourning. Each day, as the sun rose I would help women to pump water from the borehole nearby. The well was low from overuse, so that it would often require two people to pump a bucket of water. Cholera victims required a large amount of water because their bodies dehydrated quickly and diarrhea meant frequent washing. It was distressing to observe how the hopefulness of relatives displayed in the mornings sometimes gave way to wails of sadness during the night. In a journal entry for 7th June, 1993 I wrote:

> "The cholera problem looks like it is getting worse. There are a lot more patients outside the clinic today. A man just passed by the house wheeling a woman sitting in a wheelbarrow. The borehole has run dry. Jimu (the clinic general hand) said he was trying to pump water and nothing came out. People have been getting water for sick relatives all yesterday and this morning".

Strikingly, at the time of its occurrence, I encountered few explanations for the cholera outbreak from any source in the Zambesi. The nurses at Chikafa clinic and the Environmental Health Technician sent by the state believed it was caused by low water levels in the river and spread through beer parties. The doctor who worked at Chitsungo Mission was at a loss saying that June and July were the wrong months of

the year for the illness. Similarly, neither *mpondoro* nor local healers immediately came forward with explanations for its causality, although they did offer an opinion at a ritual to resolve a witchcraft accusation to be discussed in Chapter 9. It seems likely that limited water sources used by many people, few pools in the Manyame River and a shortage of boreholes used by many, provided a facilitating milieu for cholera. A resurgence of ritual beer parties after the first harvest and the sharing of drinking vessels may also have produced circumstances conducive to transmission of this illness. Characteristics of the occurrence of cholera in 1993 pointed to its being a new phenomenon to Chikafa, associated with drought and concentration of limited water sources. According to the *Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy* (1992): "In endemic areas, cases usually occur during warm months and the incidence is highest in children; in newly infected areas, epidemics may occur during any season and all ages are equally susceptible" (1992:110). This outbreak of cholera occurred during the dry season and its victims were adults, including a number of the elderly. From direct observation, I would suggest that cholera was unprecedented in Chikafa and occurred as a result of new social and environmental conditions in the area.

The government's response to the cholera outbreak in June 1993 was to treat it as a technical problem. To this end it provided additional nurse's aides to Chikafa, an Environmental Health Technician (EHT) who advised on measures to prevent transmission of the disease, medicine, and tents to shelter the patients. A 'cholera prevention meeting' was held on 8th June, 1993 which was attended by locals from Chikafa, including the *sabhuku*, Village Chairman, VIDCO Chairman, and clinic nurses. At this meeting the issue of brewing beer merited the most discussion. The elderly, including *sabhuku* Chikafa, were concerned that beer rituals for the *midzimu* (ancestral spirits) should be held as there had been a harvest. The younger generation, represented by the EHT, VIDCO Chairman, and nurses argued that cholera had been transmitted by lack of sanitation, the sharing of food and cups, and contaminated water from the rivers. Their concern was with the construction of Blair toilets, boiling of water, and location of tents for patients. While the *sabhuku* and his elderly supporters argued for the importance of beer rituals which would articulate a sense of social continuity in community, younger adults discounted these views and instead suggested

267

that cholera was a matter of individual responsibility.

The debate during this meeting illustrated the divergent worldviews of the older and younger generations. The preoccupation of the elderly with the proper beer rituals alluded to a belief system where drought and illness resulted from breaches in the moral relationship between ancestors, humans and their surroundings. In other words, the ancestors needed to be addressed for the world to become right again. During June and July of 1993, many beer parties, which had been put off during the drought, were held in Chikafa. During that time several interviews with older individuals were canceled because of beer parties. The elderly considered beer rituals to be of such great importance that they overlooked the risk of contracting cholera from sharing drinking vessels. They believed that cholera could be dealt with by propitiating the ancestors through the use of a ritual fire called *moto akusika*. In this ritual, a medium's assistant makes fire by rubbing together two pieces of wood from the *msika* tree. The resulting fire is then used to light fires in households which want to prevent members from contracting cholera. In contrast, their children, ambitious farmers in their twenties and thirties, professed to not liking beer parties. For the younger set, cholera also had a moral dimension, couched in the language of science, in which non-compliance with the scientific worldview constituted the breach.

Local reactions to the conjunction of events which precipitated acute hunger and cholera in the Zambesi were not uniform. Although it is true that *mpondoro* provided a voice of common rejection of these schemes which reinforced a sense of regional Zambesian identity, responses also crystallised according to clan, lineage, gender, and age groups. Kleinman et al. proposed that "the normal, instated through bureaucratized norms and institutional practices of regulating bodies and behavior, advances the bureaucratic state's quest for order, control, and efficiency" (1997:xix-xx). In other words, development shifted the notions of how to live and what was desirable by packaging these as normative, and defining differences of opinion as non-compliance.

While routine suffering is a feature of life in the marginal Zambesi Valley, the 1991-92 drought was characterised by the advent of social suffering. In this section I have discussed the processes of domination which mediated state actions during that

drought and led to new forms of suffering. Shortage of relief maize as a result of diminution of national grain stores contributed to acute hunger which, coupled with anxiety related to loss of social position, took their toll on the health of individuals. State support for development which led to the use of boreholes as a primary source of water also seems likely to have been conducive to a cholera outbreak resulting in at least 32 deaths. Understandings of this illness led to inter-generational disparities in which the old believed that beer rituals signifying the integrity of the community needed to be performed, while the young thought that cholera was a matter of individual responsibility. Thus, the device of social suffering is helpful because it suggests that domination by the state promoted further disruption of Chikafa, a place where social organisation had already been rendered fragile by drought.

iv. A Rain-Making Ceremony in Chikafa: A Case Study of Spirit Possession

Rituals of ancestor worship were performed in Chikafa throughout the year for a number of reasons. The most important beer party of the year was held at the end of the dry season, in November, for the purposes of rain-making. Additionally, ancestors were invoked at funerary rites, the opening of new homesteads, and to resolve matters of social disruption such as witchcraft accusations. The rain-making ceremony I will describe in this section was held in November of 1992, after a year of absence of rain and total crop failure. At a glance, the performance of this ceremony appeared simply to be a matter of carrying out social prescription. However, the conjunction of drought, development, and structural adjustment precipitated a crisis of interpretation between older and younger generations. Inter-related experiences of foreign domination which deepened social disruption in the settlement, and hunger and anxiety resulted in a polarisation of interpretations of drought. The older generation, particularly senior members of established Chikunda and Korekore lineages, perceived drought as a symptom of the slippage of the power of chiefs in which they were invested. For this reason, they and their followers turned to mpondoro as interpreters of local identity. In contrast, younger members of these established lineages as well as newcomers seemed to see the drought as a natural phenomenon of which effects were exacerbated by mismanagement on the part of the state and individuals. While they respected the

opinions of their elders, and co-operated with these in matters of local administration, young people did not believe that the drought was invested with a moral dimension. The crucial difference between the generations was that the old viewed social change as a matter of upheaval, whereas the young thought it presented a wealth of opportunity. It is perhaps important to emphasise that the ceremony described below took place several months before the cholera outbreak which exacerbated local sense of disruption.

The following ceremony took place at the homestead of the *mpondoro* Nyamanindi, the territorial spirit of Chikafa area. The land spirit's medium was new and had recently moved to the area. Since this shrine had been recently reconstituted, Nyamanindi was supported by the senior land spirits, Negomo, a territorial neighbour, and Karembera. Attendance at this ritual was high because it included members of six settlements in the area. There was a mixture of young and old. While there can be various interpretations of this ceremony, the primary concern of the land spirits was to articulate a principle of local identity coupled with an affirmation of the value of chieftaincy.

The horizon turns brilliant orange and pink as the light from the setting sun filters through dispersed clouds of dust. This evening spectacle is characteristic the end of the dry season. The skies are particularly spectacular in November of 1992 as there has been no rain for one full year and the bush has become very dry. A number of inhabitants from six villages in the Chikafa area are gathering at the homestead of the medium of the mpondoro Negomo. The imbayesvikiro (hut where the mediums become possessed) and the dendemaro (hut where possessed mediums hold audiences) have been prepared by the mutapi (medium's assistant). As the light fades specialists set up ceremonial drums and start a fire in order to light bundles of grass with which the skins of the drums will be heated and tightened throughout the night-long ceremony. In another spot close by a large pot of maize-meal beer is being stirred and cups readied. All around the homestead people are laying down mats and taking the opportunity to rest before the ceremony begins. Because of the drought, there will be three mpondoro present at this ceremony. Their mediums enter the imbayesvikiro where they will become possessed. Boys who have been practicing on the ceremonial drums during preparations now make way for the senior men who are specialists. As the rhythm picks up, women start to dance in prescribed patterns and sing songs which call out to the mpondoro. As the evening progresses, the drumming, dancing and singing produce a constant rhythm. At this point the ceremony takes on a sensual character with the women's swaying torsos, the stamping of their feet producing small clouds of red dust, the scent of the sweet mopane firewood, their hot bodily smells, and

the high pitched supplications to the mpondoro to appear. As the performance achieves a smooth level of coordination, the possessed medium of Negomo leaps out of the imbayesvikiro and into the crowd of women. He is shortly followed by the possessed mediums of Karembera, and Nyamanindi. Negomo is the senior land spirit and so leads the dancing and singing with the women. The men stand by drinking beer and talking. Negomo leaps in amongst the circles of moving women and coaxes little girls to follow him. The dancing mpondoro threaten reluctant dancers with a thin branch. Occasionally the revolving circle of women breaks into three or four groups whilst the land spirits run amongst them carrying ceremonial spears, axes, and walking sticks. They wear skirts of cobalt blue and black striped cotton symbolising their rain-making abilities, and on their upper bodies strings of black and white beads which reference the spirit realm. Karembera wears a feather headdress, Negomo wears an elephant hair hat as he is a senior spirit, and Nyamanindi is bare-headed. The dancing and singing carry on throughout the night until dawn approaches.

With first light, the mpondoro adjourn to the dendemaro where they lie on reed mats facing forward onto flat baskets. Nyamanindi and Negomo share a mat while Karembera lies apart. All mpondoro are covered with blue and black cloth. They occasionally smear their faces with snuff which is provided in small calabashes. At this time participants in the ceremony gather around the dendemaro while the medium's wives sit inside. The men sit facing the spirits on the left, and the women on the right. As the spirits prepare to speak, the men clap their hands in greeting and the women ululate.

Negomo starts the audience by calling out the names of the sabhuku in the area. He looks at me and says that he is glad that I clapped hands as other visitors before had not done so. He sings a song which states that people not present should be beaten or cast out of the area. A mutapi asks why there were so many people present when they did not usually participate in such large numbers. Negomo then lists the wars that had affected the area, including those involving Kanyemba, the Ndebele, and Makokowa, the latter a reference to the coming of the British. He asks why people from the Chikafa area and neighbouring Mozambique do not come to his ceremonies and wonders if they have taken another spirit. He asks if a VIDCO chairman is telling people to stay away. Negomo wants to know why people have cleared sacred areas, including a number of graves of a local family. He asks why people cultivate in the sacred areas pegged by the Mid-Zambesi Valley Rural Development Project and proclaims that it is a curse on the people. He continues by lamenting that sacred trees are cut as these provide bees for honey, shade, and commemorate dead people. In his opinion, cutting these trees shows a lack of respect.

Negomo then complains that people no longer bring the pangolin to ceremonies, and that they (the mpondoro) used to have this animal for relish. He says "if you see a pangolin, take it to the chief or medium because it is royal, they can eat it. Pangolin are being taken from the forest and are being eaten by the government". At this point Karembera adds that if they can do this on their own than why must they consult the mpondoro regarding rain. He describes the expanse of his territory and reminds everyone that he is powerful. He then turns to me and says that I am better than the people in Chikafa because I understand that I must see the spirit. He adds that there is

no time at present to answer my questions but that I could visit him anytime during the following week. He grumbles about the recent lack of attendance at ceremonies. Karembera then bemoans a request by the state to the mpondoro of the Zambesi Valley to perform rain-making ceremonies. In his words, "Mugabe said that the spirits must do as he says". The three mpondoro all say that they refused this request because no money was provided for the transportation of the mediums and mutapi, and "the government does a lot of things by itself without consulting the spirits, so it can resolve the rains by itself". The reasons given for the refusal to comply with this request were that in the past, when animals were killed, the Rhodesians would take the skins but leave the meat and that now "if people are seen with meat from game, they are arrested if they don't report the meat". They also objected to the government forbidding people to fish in rivers with nets, as well as the pegging of land. Karembera says, "I will do nothing to pray for rains as the government asks because now everybody is for Mugabe without the mediums being consulted". He says that if the government brings back the pangolin and removes the pegs, then they can work together and adds that "when the government took the pangolin, this made the spirits angry".

Since the aim of the ceremony was to pray for rains, there was some discussion as to whether these local spirits should join in a larger effort as requested by the government. Participants agreed that the request had not been made through the appropriate channels, i.e. through a senior Zambesi Valley land spirit who then contacted his juniors, and so the local mpondoro thought they should stay at home. At this point Negomo states that "if people are not properly settled after the war there will be more wandering spirits, once there is a black government" and the colonisers are gone. He says that wandering spirits belong to people who died during the war. He then asks the women to speak. He returns to discussion of the government's request to make rain and states that "Mugabe does things on his own without consulting us. Why does he consult us for rain?". He adds that "if people listened to the land spirits like they had during the war there would be no problem with rain". He complains that because his medium's area was pegged he now must also move away from a particular sacred tree.

Negomo then tells a man who had cut down a sacred tree that he has to pay a fine, which is reduced because he belongs to the spirit's line. My assistant whispered that if the man had been a migrant he would have had to pay a heavier fine such as a goat. The mpondoro then proclaims that he does not want witchcraft and incest in his area. He says that if anyone practices witchcraft they willed be killed. Nyamanindi agrees. He also says that he does not want anyone to have to leave the area because of incest.

At this point it is mid morning and there is grumbling in the crowd that people are hungry and want to go home. Negomo says that the beer must be shared amongst the inhabitants of various villages and names these. They are told to drink beer until the drums stop.

The mediums retire and the ceremony is finished.

My assistant and I start the walk back to Chikafa. I am very thirsty so we stop at someone's homestead and I am given a drink of water. As we continue on our way, a light rain starts to fall. Men and women appear in fields with hoes and scrape at the

earth.

This ceremony articulated a number of issues which all proceeded from the primary preoccupation of *mpondoro* with the tension between centralisation and decentralisation. In this ceremony, a centralised polity in Chikafa area would be represented by a principle of chieftaincy put into practice by an alliance of representatives of established lineages and land spirits. In this system, *mpondoro* would control sacred knowledge so that adjudication of local matters would reside within their shrines. Because of the fragmented nature of social organisation in Chikafa in which residents belonged to a variety of new and older lineages, the device of the pangolin would be used to integrate the community by a principle of inclusion through common clan affiliation. If rule were to be concentrated amongst the established authorities, then the community would be in order and rain would fall.

On the other hand, *mpondoro* depicted apprehension with changes to land use practices, perceived threats to their power by other local authorities such as the VIDCO, and by the state in the form of pegging or designation of land, symbolic removal of pangolin, and requests for rain conducted through improper channels. These actions would remove power from *mpondoro* and result in drought. In effect, the ceremony depicted above expressed a great deal of misgiving with regard to new forms of authority, not least because these were unfamiliar and seemed incompatible with the established system.

Rain-making ceremonies in the Zambesi Valley were performances of perfect knowledge which stood at the summit of a hierarchy of knowledge in the Zambesi Valley. It was believed that perfect knowledge could only be achieved after death. Lineage ancestors possessed important knowledge, but *mpondoro* were considered to possess ultimate knowledge which existed for the benefit of all. For example, *mpondoro* were consulted to identify affliction, or "when a person reaches the limits of her or his knowledge, or when the limits of the knowledge they feel it legitimate to admit to" have been exhausted (Lan 1985:54). Rain-making was the prime example of equilibrium in social relations between the living and the dead in the Zambesi Valley. "Rain will only be withheld if the *mhondoro*'s laws are disobeyed. If incest, murder or witchcraft take place drought follows and the crops will fail. But if the descendants of

273

the *mhondoro* obey his laws and perform his ceremonies in due time, they will live in peace and plenty" (Lan 1985:32).

Fertility is one important function of land spirits which is highly imbued with notions of territorial integrity. Fertility occurs through incorporation of outsiders in the form of exogamy, or in times of threat to the community through a principle of incest to preserve the integrity of the community. In his analysis of three myths describing rain-making in Dande, Lan arrived at the conclusion that the role of *mpondoro* as provider of rain "is a gift made by father's-in-law to their conquering sons-in-law of natural fertility or rain" (1985:87). At the same time, the fertility that rain-making represents can also emanate from a female principle embedded in the cult of the *mpondoro* through the notion of a primordial incest. In one myth of the Korekore conquest of Dande, Nebedza has intercourse with his sister Nehanda. By doing so he ensures that his own "lineage can supply itself with fertility, biological and natural" (1985:88). In this way, Korekore as conquerors have no need of autochthons to supply them with fertility and thus remove themselves from the position of son-in-law. As Lan concluded "wives come and go but mother is always there" (1985:91). Thus, rain refers to fertility and to the social continuity of communities which results from adherence to the cult of the land spirits. The story of incest refers to the possibility of community self-sufficiency in matters of its own reproduction. Incest is a referent for endogamy, and thus a contingency plan for times of outside threat to the community. *Mpondoro* are primarily interested in the continuity of life in their areas over time, and the opposition between incest and exogamy is another way to express the ongoing tension between centralisation and fragmentation.

Mpondoro also represent regional and local identities. During the ceremony, *mpondoro* alluded to the following identities. First, all land spirits are genealogically linked and each claim a geographical territory within which reside their constituents. This pan-Zambesian web of *mpondoro* created a sense of regional identity. Second, local neighbourhood and community identity was delineated by the territories of each land spirit. After the Independence War these notions of kinship were extended to the Zimbabwean state as *mpondoro* and the populations in their territories had provided support for guerrillas.

Although attendance at ceremonies has waxed and waned over the years, perhaps the reason why the *mpondoro* obtained support in the Zambesi was that, in the face of a succession of colonising powers, the system maintained a meaningful moral and political contract with people. Each new and powerful entity to the Zambesi had in the past promised a better life through trade, new technologies, political change, new infrastructure and a better life. Over the years, the benefits promised by larger powers and central states never arrived and so it is not surprising that Zambesians continued in their allegiance to chieftaincy as represented by *mpondoro*.

In the rain-making ceremony described above *mpondoro* re-affirmed regional identity by their vehement opposition to the MZP and CAMPFIRE, both programs which had been applied in various places in the Zambesi Valley. Specifically, they denounced 'pegging' (demarcating) land for resettlement and prosecution of people for possessing game meat. This is not surprising as agriculture, fishing, and hunting have been dominant modes of livelihood for centuries, and the opportunities for trade and pan-Zambesian movement which these presented have underpinned the idea of a regional identity.

Issues of moral order, common history and regional identity were all important to the continuity of land spirit shrines, however, I think that the foremost preoccupation of *mpondoro* resided with political control of the Chikafa area. Specifically, the rain-making ceremony of 1992 expressed local anxiety with regard to the historical oscillation between principles of autochthony and conquest. At Independence, the system of *mpondoro* represented local belief that a contract of benevolence had been struck with the new government in which Chikafa would be integrated into a national polity built on notions of kinship and mutual obligation. This arrangement would mirror the organisation of Zambesian *mpondoro* in which all territorial spirits belonged to the same hierarchy. In a circumstance of high political integration, *mpondoro* would produce rain with regularity.

In contrast, during the 1992 rain-making ceremony, *mpondoro* expressed the opinion that the political contract struck with ZANU at Independence had been

breached. Negomo and Karembera both denounced state interference in matters of land allocation and access to bush resources stating that these destroyed sacred areas. In other words, disruption of powers of land allocation invested in headmen and lineage elders coupled with the obliteration of commemoration for the dead both indicated an attempt on the part of the state to usurp local political control of Chikafa as well as a sense of common history and mutual obligation.

The most poignant statement of anxiety regarding social disruption was the concern that the government had taken the pangolin, a great symbol of local kin relatedness. In the cult of land spirits, absence of pangolin denoted social fragmentation, disorder, and ultimately drought. In the rain-making ceremony, *mpondoro* articulated the apprehension of some residents of Chikafa that drought was a symptom of a disintegration of a relationship of inclusion within the state they believed had been struck at Independence. The notion that the state had relinquished its ties of autochthony to the Zambesi, and instead adopted the demeanor of conqueror was a great preoccupation of older people. The actions of the state during the drought and in its aftermath added to this opinion.

v. The Role of the State During Drought:

Earlier in this chapter I reviewed the work of Illiffe (1990), Vaughan (1987), and de Waal (1989) who argued that there is no direct correlation between lack of rainfall and the occurrence of famine. Instead, they believed that the relationship between drought and famine was mediated by the actions of states. The case of the 1991-92 drought in the Zambesi Valley was no different because a number of structural features exacerbated a condition of absence of rain so that acute hunger ensued.

Although Zambesians were well accustomed to droughts and counted on a number of coping strategies which they invoked at such times, in 1992 these proved inadequate as a result of new state policies. As I reviewed above, the implementation of ESAP disrupted labour migration and caused the government to wind down its maize stores. At the same time, the MZP and CAMPFIRE both changed land use patterns and access to the environment. The combination of structural adjustment and

development schemes obstructed the functioning of available coping structures which would aid in avoiding acute hunger. Instead, the combination of absence of rain, crop failure, and state policy contributed to acute hunger and illness suffered by residents of Chikafa area.

In response to the serious drought, the Zimbabwean government installed a number of food aid programs from the beginning of 1992 to mid 1993. These included the delivery of donor maize and beans, a 'Food for Work' program, child feeding program implemented at Chikafa School, and relief food targeted at pregnant women and the elderly. While on paper these initiatives appeared to be generous, the fact remained that the infrequency of their delivery and fluctuations in quantities resulted in recipients' inability to plan their diet so as to avoid acute hunger. In this way, routine suffering which was an unfortunate feature of the harsh environment and political marginality of the Zambesi Valley, gave way to 'social suffering' (Kleinman, Das, and Lock: 1997) perpetrated by state policy and neglect.

To be sure, the Zimbabwean state participated in measures to manage drought. For example, there was membership in the SADC Regional Early Warning System. In an article on the 1991-92 drought written by John M. Rook of the FAO and the SADC REWS in Harare, he concluded that "various studies and workshops...all acknowledge that responsible government and sophisticated logistics enabled food imports to be ordered and delivered in record time and without significant congestion. These factors ensured a relatively rapid response to the crisis" (1997:1). In the same paper, he added however, that:

> "responses to initial warnings concerning the depletion of grain stocks over the 12-month period leading up to the drought were generally slow and late. It was not until such stocks had dropped to critical levels that reactions were initiated, by which time it was already too late to avoid maize shortages which hit countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe during the early part of 1992"

(1997:2).

The apparent contradiction in these statements is reconciled by adopting the author's standpoint that although maize shortages occurred in the SADC countries, the REWS worked as intended. This article is a good example of what Alex de Waal (1989) termed the 'technical fix' approach common in international humanitarianism:

problems are reduced to a set of technical concepts, and aid is applied by organisations which set their own goals and terms of success irrespective of the problem they purport to address. While the state participated in the SADC REWS, this system had no impact whatsoever on the situation of drought in the Zambesi Valley.

In contrast, de Waal (1997) argued that in order to best deal with famine it was necessary for countries to have a strong 'political contract' in which governments would be accountable to the population. In his opinion, the greatest impediment to successful famine management was the combination of corrupt and unaccountable government, often authoritarian and 'minimalist' in their policies, and external pressures wrought by the application of neo-liberal economic policies (1997:3). He added that international humanitarianism served to confound the political context of famine through a discourse of moral imperative. In his words: "the struggle against famine cannot be the moral property of humanitarian institutions. An important step in that struggle is for those directly affected by the famine to reclaim this moral ownership" (1997:5). In de Waal's view, charitable organisations should be relegated to an ancillary position rather than "as subcontractors in the large-scale delivery of basic services such as health, agricultural extension and food rations" (1997:53).

The near disappearance of state benevolence from the lives of residents of Chikafa during the 1991-92 drought and the cholera outbreak of 1993 prompted local re-evaluation of the nature of the 'political contract' (de Waal 1997) struck with government at Independence. Residents of Chikafa wondered at the nature of new forms of rule in their settlement and felt anxiety with regard to their consequences. The old felt comfortable with chieftaincy, particularly the oscillation between autochthony and conquest characteristic of this system. While they believed that President Mugabe had undertaken an association of mutual obligation couched in terms of kinship, the *sabwira* relationship, with the Zambesi Valley, they could also imagine government through conquest. After all, Chief Chapoto in Kanyemba had no illusions that the ZANU government was anything other than a conqueror. The difficulty for the aged, particularly members of established Chikunda and Korekore lineages, was the state of social disruption in which Chikafa settlement found itself from 1991 to 1993, which was during the serious drought and its aftermath.

In contrast, young people easily dispensed with chieftaincy to adopt the new language of development which preached self-help and individual empowerment through education and acquisition of technical skills. While many of the young attended *mpondoro* ceremonies, they found their true forum at local committee meetings. They rejected the beer rituals of ancestor worship to, instead, participate in organisations which promoted individual or group interests. In this way, they welcomed release from long-established relations of obligation formed through the marriage process.

Young people also had a different memory of war as they had been children when the local communities rallied to the cause of guerrillas. They did not interpret development as a breach of a political contract with government, but instead as an opportunity. The young also tended to join new churches in which positions of authority formerly held by elders, were assigned to the young. For example, pastor's wives acted as *nchembere*, a role formerly held by aged women who initiated girls at menarche. Pastors also tended to be young men, some of whom had attended religious lessons in Harare.

In mid 1993, social life in Chikafa was polarized between the elderly who believed in a system of chieftaincy in which they controlled land and marriage relations, and the young who wanted to break free of gerontocracy. The newly re-constituted shrine of Nyamamnindi, the territorial spirit, was one locus of power of lineage elders. It was through this shrine that opposition to innovations associated with social disruption in Chikafa was articulated. At the same time, the young who saw new opportunity with the MZP and committee work discussed their views at meetings.

Problems inherent in social disruption such as unclear processes of land distribution with the demise of the MZP, the suffering perpetrated by the combination of drought and structural change, and new migrations of people competing for decreasing resources had begun to overwhelm local resources for dealing with change and conflict resolution. These tensions culminated in a witchcraft accusation in mid-1993 in Chikafa which involved members of old lineages and newcomers, *mpondoro*, the police, and youth. This issue will be addressed in the next and final chapter.

Chapter 9: "They Fix Each Other with Crocodiles": Resurgence of Witchcraft in Chikafa in 1993

i. Introduction: A Crisis of Social Reproduction in Chikafa

In July of 1993, a young man from Chikafa happened to mention that people in Mushumbi Pools, a town southward on the road to the escarpment, were engaged in many disputes. When I asked him how they resolved these issues he replied: "They fix each other with crocodiles". After further enquiry I was told there had been a spate of minor witchcraft accusations in the area probably due to increasing population and competition for resources. As it turned out witchcraft had also experienced resurgence in Chikafa settlement with an accusation aimed at a local shopkeeper and his wife who was a businesswoman. In this instance, a schoolteacher fell ill and became unable to walk. A spirit possession ceremony was organised at the homestead of a local man at which three territorial *mpondoro*, Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti, and Chidziyo were present. Chidziyo is a land spirit from Mozambican territory, and Mutandabuti is a senior spirit from within Zimbabwe. During this possession ceremony Mutandabuti made an accusation of witchcraft against the local shopkeeper's wife. The following week there was another possession ceremony. This time the three *mpondoro* were joined by Nyamaqwete, a land spirit specialising in witchcraft, who was called to determine the cause of the schoolteacher's affliction. The police were also asked to attend the ritual. During this ceremony, Nyamaqwete found the source of the witchcraft to emanate from neighbouring Mozambique.

While this accusation of witchcraft involved most residents of Chikafa settlement as well neighbouring Chitete in Mozambican territory and addressed issues of integrity of the community, it also contained a personal dimension. In the first place, the man who hosted the first ceremony and the shopkeeper were in dispute regarding a marriage arrangement in which a young daughter of the former was to marry the latter. The girl had refused to marry the shopkeeper protesting that he was too old, but her father had accepted a payment of brideprice which he would not refund. Secondly, the afflicted schoolteacher and the shopkeeper's wife had had a quarrel over non-payment of a grocery bill which had ended in blows. The striking feature about

these disagreements was that the shopkeeper and his wife were newcomers to Chikafa, and had been prosperous throughout the drought and in the period afterward. In light of the fact that most people in Chikafa area had suffered during that same period, it was not surprising that these businesspeople would come to symbolise contradictions and ambiguities of recent impoverishment and wealth with which locals had been faced.

In a recent article set in the Taita Hills of Kenya, Smith discussed the case of a community which hired a well-known 'witchdoctor' to:

> "Ameliorate a perceived crisis in local social reproduction-such as declining fertility, increased mortality, and falling economic productivity-typically said to be brought about by moral failures in the form of malicious actions by kin and neighbours"
>
> (2005; 142)

The case of Chikafa was very similar. As I have reviewed in the previous chapters, the area was the site of several important influences which had changed livelihood practices, family relations, and political process. Locals also experienced these changes as a double pressure. On the one hand, loss of jobs with ESAP and the labour demands of cotton cultivation at home meant that labour migration as a means of release from the constraints of life in Chikafa became less of an option. On the other hand, development had changed access to land and many people said that farming had become increasingly difficult at home. Thus, for residents of Chikafa, the relationship between the two worlds of plateau and Dande which had defined cycles of agriculture and labour migration and contributed to the rhythms of marriage and settlement, were radically disturbed. The connection between plateau and Dande started with the first labour migrations in the early part of the 20th century and had been in existence for three generations at the time of this study. It became apparent that sudden rupture was shocking to Zambesians as it seemed to disassemble established possibilities for social reproduction.

It is because of the crisis of social reproduction which precipitated the witchcraft accusation in Chikafa in mid 1993 that the relationship between the plateau and Dande merits elaboration. Also, the issue of the relationship between the Zambesi and the state, which had been redefined as autochthonous in character at Independence, seemed to locals to have changed abruptly into one of domination.

Residents of Chikafa told many stories of labour migration, but the common theme in all depictions was that the plateau served as a safety valve and an escape from the constraints of life in Dande. One informant referred to his time in Harare as a young man as "eating pleasure" before his return home to marry and farm. Labour migration was remembered fondly if individuals found jobs as house servants or tractor drivers where they had enjoyed higher status and a less taxing workload. Mostly, work on 'maprazi' (large commercial farms) was remembered as a necessary time of hardship to earn money to invest in future houses and agriculture in Chikafa. However, the crucial feature of migration was that it addressed the important issue of inter-generational difference by offering an alternative to potential conflict. From the inception of British rule until the Independence War, access to land, marriage and political process was directed by lineage elders through practices of brideprice and brideservice, and through their control of land and the local judiciary. With the advent of ESAP and the reduction of job opportunities on the plateau, migration there became less of an option.

At the same time, circumstances in Chikafa also changed dramatically on a variety of fronts. During the 1980s, the introduction of committees had fostered an alliance between lineage elders and junior members through a new division of labour whereby the former ruled and the latter administered. With the advent of the MZP, the importance of the administrative work of committees increased and the power of the elderly eroded further in favour of the skills of the young. For one, proficiency with the English language was essential in order to grapple with new technical terms associated with mechanisms of land resettlement. Also, skill related to quantification became necessary as fields were measured and 'pegged', food relief was also measured, and agricultural chemicals were applied in exact doses. Organisational work also required a high degree of mobility within the Zambesi and to Guruve District offices on the plateau which the young found easier. Importantly, elderly leaders such as the *sabhuku* and the Village Chairman experienced a greater loss of influence with the MZP which removed control of land allocation out of their hands.

A shift in political process from the domain of lineage elders to that of lineage juniors was one crucial aspect of social change in Chikafa. Another equally important

feature was the change in livelihood options. There was general agreement that farming had become more difficult as the abolition of marketing boards had rendered returns from cotton cultivation and surplus maize unpredictable. The tension between cash-cropping cotton and food production also became pronounced in 1993 as the work required to do both increased. Specifically, food cultivation had become more difficult with the drought, in terms of the project design of the MZP, and with the local CAMPFIRE program which hobbled locals' ability to control problem elephant destructive to fields. As the pressures on farming increased, markedly successful economic activity could be seen amongst newer polygynous families which commanded a good supply of labour, and shopkeepers whose business flourished in 1993. The shopkeepers in Chikafa were particularly disliked as they became perceived as a necessary evil within the community. There were two reasons for this attitude. First, the male shopkeeper's behaviour during the drought was considered particularly abhorrent as he had re-sold, at inflated prices, maize bought previously, and had accepted in his household a number of impoverished servant girls with whom he slept. Locals called him "stupid" for taking advantage of the girls. Secondly, in the emerging economy based on cash-cropping cotton, the male shopkeeper and his wife played a role akin to mediators between the need and desire of locals for consumer goods and food, and the increasing difficulties in their ability to repay debt by farming. The shop provided credit on grocery purchases which was often difficult to repay, and they offered Z$10 worth of goods in exchange for a 20 litre bucket of unground maize which was then re-sold when household supplies ran low. This practice was a cause of disputes with locals and contributed to the perception that foreigners had grown rich at the expense of established families who were finding life increasingly difficult in Chikafa.

Other modifications in Chikafa society which were cause for comment included an increase in violence and illness, new forms of inequality, and extension of state presence. Local residents seemed to have the resilience necessary to deal with any of these occurrences if they happened one at a time, however, it was the combination of notable changes which caused distress and disorientation. For instance, people in Chikafa had memories of violence from their experiences during the Independence

War and they also were also accustomed to the occasional drunken brawl. However, the presence one morning of a young man who had been hit over the head with a brick during a dispute was new. People attributed this escalation of violence to the proliferation of bottled beer. More seriously, a dispute over land allocation under the auspices of the MZP in another area in Dande had resulted in a murder, an occurrence not seen since the War.

People also noticed that there was an increase in deaths during 1993 mostly associated with the cholera outbreak, but others due to unspecified illnesses. In probability, deaths resulting from mysterious illnesses indicated the first signs of AIDS in Chikafa. Shortly before I left the Zambesi in late September 1993, I was told that the afflicted school teacher at the centre of the witchcraft accusation had been found HIV positive at a hospital on the plateau. The cholera deaths were also shocking, not just because of their numbers, but because the illness did not follow any recognisable patterns for locals. In the Zambesi, it was expected that young children would be vulnerable to diarrheal illnesses and I had noticed toddlers who wore strings of beads and threads to ward off sickness. Also, it was considered normal that old people should fall ill with both respiratory problems (which was the case with Chief Chapoto) and lingering infections. However, cholera as well as mystery illnesses struck adults of productive age and seemed to kill these quickly.

Although new ZANU party structures had been welcomed into the Zambesi and inserted into local political process during the 1980s, in 1993 people began to comment on the increased presence of the state as well as on notions that it was no longer a benevolent force in Dande. Youth referred to ZANU party members as "thugs" and associated corrupt residents with the party. However, it was not the actions of a few ZANU members which changed people's opinion about the state, but instead the wholesale re-structuring of the land tenure system and the new migrants brought by the MZP. The refusal by MZP administrators to engage in local consultation, and the apparent support of the project by the state, led to the idea that President Mugabe had ceased to act as a benevolent chief and had, instead, begun to behave as a conqueror.

By mid 1993, residents of Chikafa were confronting changes to governance, livelihood, kin relations, illness and death, inequality, and new migrations. The power

of elders seemed to be eroding with each passing week, yet the new technocratic language of administration adopted by their sons, proved to be mysterious. A number of people, both old and young, began to wonder who was in charge and where did guidance come from. In other words, there occurred a crisis of social reproduction as a result of increasingly ambiguous social organisation. Foremost in people's minds was the question of with whom knowledge resided. Lineage elders and their followers believed that *mpondoro* were the keepers of ultimate knowledge about the social and natural worlds. In this light, the witchcraft accusation and its resolution through the auspices of land spirits could be construed as an opportunity for this system to appear relevant with regard to rapid change. At the same time, the preponderance of committee meetings and the rejection by many youth of the beer parties intrinsic to ancestor worship, along with their increasing support for new churches, meant that the cult of *mpondoro* was faced with unprecedented threat to its existence.

It was apparent that there was a clash of worldviews between the older and younger generations, however, considering recent upheaval in Chikafa, they each sought answers to similar preoccupations: the nature of exchange and property; land use; adjudication; and the social symptoms of disorder in the world. If the idea that drought as a symptom of disorder was accepted, then technocratic language that framed it as a feature of weather patterns would be rejected and with it much of the new ideas which had so affected the area.

In this chapter I argue that development, structural adjustment, and drought during the early 1990s altered fields of exchange precipitating witchcraft accusations which re-organised established social spaces or "chains of societies" (Amselle 1985). In a study on domination, it is important to examine whether witchcraft is an instrument of control or a means to diagnose and repair 'disarticulations' within communities. To this end, I will review the relationship between witchcraft and the state, the meanings of witchcraft in Kanyemba and Chikafa, and provide analysis of the witchcraft accusation and its resolution.

Witchcraft (or sorcery) is a term which, popularly, implies malevolence and jealousy. Yet in Africa, this concept is part and parcel of social life because of its function in explaining modern forms of wealth accumulation and power. While

285

witchcraft can be disruptive, it can also be constructive in its guise as a form of protection and a reinforcement of authority (see Geschiere 1997).

While witchcraft in the Zambesi has its own particular structure and style, it holds similarities to the use of the supernatural in other places. In this study, witchcraft is taken:

> "To cover those practices, often described as magical, that are concerned to harness and manipulate those energies and forces which are centred in human beings and which extend from them to intervene-heal, harm, or protect-in the action and circumstance of other human beings".
>
> (Kapferer 1997:8)

In the Zambesi witchcraft is both part of a belief system in which a breach of social or natural order precipitated problems, as it is "a matter of social diagnostics" (Moore and Sanders 2001: 4). The latter point refers to the contextual manifestation of the occult in which it becomes an instrument to understand and manage stressful social circumstances.

The concept of witchcraft or sorcery commonly used in the Zambesi, *ufiti*, is of Nyanja origin and is employed by all groups including the Chikunda people. In this same language a witch is called *mfiti*. According to informants, increased witchcraft took place in Chikafa area in 1993 in the wake of social disruption. At that time, it became apparent that the young and the old had different outlooks with relation to social change. The elderly believed that ancestors, particularly *mpondoro*, could explain change and upheaval. To this end they spent a great deal of time attending beer parties which had been suspended in 1992 during the drought. Housewarmings, as the homesteads of returned migrants were built, were one type of popular party. Beer was the conduit to communicating with ancestors, and as one informant pointed out, when old people got drunk, they sang like the *mpondoro*. In June and July of 1993 many interviews with the elderly had to be cancelled because, as informants sometimes shouted at me, they were drunk. For the elderly, *mpondoro* and their perfect knowledge stood in opposition to witchcraft and its intimations of rupture, but both forces could be explained within the same system. In contrast, young adults rejected *mpondoro* as a primary explanatory model of how the world functioned. Instead they

looked to new administrative practices and committee work and the new churches for guidance.

ii. Witchcraft and the State in Africa and Zimbabwe:

In a study about domination, it is important to review the relationship between witchcraft and the state. While attitudes to ancestor worship were a point of difference between the younger and older generations in Chikafa, the fact remained that adherence to a belief system in which witchcraft exemplified both disorder and its resolution was a way to form a local locus of power. In this order of reasoning rejection of ancestors was also a way to remove a source of contestation of new forms of social organisation. In this section I will review the relationship between witchcraft and the state by examining a number of writings regarding witchcraft as a way of apprehending social and economic change.

The supernatural and the state have had a long association in Zimbabwe. During the colonial period there was anti-witchcraft legislation, so healers and mediums were restricted so that and opposition to 'indirect rule' could only be expressed through trade unions. In the 1980s, spirit mediums and *mpondoro* constituted an important feature of decolonisation (Lan: 1985; Alexander et.al.:2000). Similarly, during the 1990s, with the perception that the state was behaving a conqueror, the population returned to their ancestors for explanations.

Peter Geschiere has written extensively on witchcraft and the post-colonial state. His work was based in Cameroon where the occult had a greater national public presence than in 1990s Zimbabwe where it was localised. However, his argument that the increase in witchcraft in post-colonial Africa is linked to new forms of wealth and impoverishment holds true for 1990s Zambesi Valley. Particularly, this author does not view witchcraft as specifically a form of opposition to inequality, but as a way to participate in an overwhelmingly capitalist world order. In collaboration with Cyprian Fisiy, he wrote: "there seems to be a surprising convergence between discourses on the occult-with their emphasis on individual accumulation and debt-and a capitalist worldview" (1996; 194). For these authors, post-colonial witchcraft had a variety of functions. For instance, while there was a levelling aspect in which visibly increasing

individual wealth is dealt with, it can also be used to aid and protect this accumulation (1996:195). Elsewhere, Geschiere stressed the idea of "representations of witchcraft as a precarious balance between 'levelling' and 'accumulative' tendencies" (1997:16). But in the same work, he also emphasised that witchcraft discourse "relates the familiar context of home and family to the modern changes that have so deeply affected domestic relations" (1997:24). In effect, witchcraft had become a culturally-contextual way to deal with ambiguities related to new forms of enrichment and dependency. Since witchcraft is a moral discourse which uses the notion of desirable and undesirable kinship relations as a metaphor for appropriate social relations, it also expresses, in localised terms, acceptable and unacceptable forms of change. In Chikafa, widespread impoverishment associated with drought and ESAP stood in stark contrast to the prosperity of the shopkeepers and larger families of new migrants.

As well as playing an important role in dealing with capitalism, post-colonial witchcraft also addressed longstanding tensions between kinship, communitarian control, and individual autonomy. Fisiy and Geschiere argued that new forms of exchange, related to the opportunities provided by capital, exacerbated these anxieties which might then translate into violence. They submitted that:

> "Local discourses on witchcraft and sorcery have always centred on power and inequality, on the tension between individual ambition and communitarian control, and on the spectre of the 'sovereign subject' who tries to emancipate him/herself from this control in a way which may be secret, but certainly not reprehensible".
>
> (1996:194)

The witchcraft accusation at the centre of this chapter elicits the tension between individual ambition and control by the community. In the recent past, lineage elders controlled young men through land allocation practices and marriage payments. Difficulties with this system were resolved through temporary migration of young adults. The erosion of the power of elders and a new economy based on cotton cultivation opened up opportunities for individual action divorced from older forms of social constraint. Not least to seize the moment were divorced women and widows who accepted parcels of land through the MZP and embarked on or expanded business

288

ventures such as the sale of beer, vegetables, or the highly potent *kachasu* spirit. While some men said these independent women were *mahure* (whores), they were allowed to continue their businesses unimpeded. Younger women also benefited from the shrinking importance of marriage payments which meant less control by elders who might choose older men, willing to make greater payments, as their husbands.

The witchcraft accusation in Chikafa certainly addressed a number of tensions and ambiguities characteristic of the post-colonial situation in the form of: increased state control coupled with decreased state responsibility; obscuring local voice through new and confounding structures of governance; and, the interference of market-mediation in affairs of family and lineage. With this approach in mind, the expression of witchcraft through *mpondoro* ceremonies was in line with the view that:

> "ritual, as an experimental technology intended to affect the flow of power in the universe, is an especially likely response to contradictions created (and literally) engendered by processes of social, material, and cultural transformation, processes represented, rationalized, and authorized in the name of modernity and its various alibis ('civilization', 'social progress', 'economic development', 'conversion' and the like)".
> (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xxx).

Over the years British, Rhodesian, and post-colonial governments tried to eradicate, or at least control, witchcraft because the practice was deemed to be a potential site for power and, thus, dangerous to the state. One way to contain the power of expression of witchcraft was to adopt the attitude that the state regulated from without whereas witchcraft regulated from within. This was certainly the attitude of Zambesians. It was also an orientation which worked well with the system of 'indirect rule' where local matters, even if these encompassed responses to influences from outside communities, were placed under the control of chiefs and headmen. Chief Chapoto dealt with witchcraft in his area as a matter for his Court which was dominated by *marunga* clan elders.

Similarly, ZINATHA, the Zimbabwe National Association of Traditional Healers, prohibited witchcraft accusations. Formed in 1980, this organisation aimed to promote and regulate the work of *n'anga* (traditional; healers). Its stated exclusion from issues of witchcraft was a public statement that it would not work in opposition

to the national government. *N'anga* formed their first professional association in 1957 which split, reformed and finally became ZINATHA. In this organisation applicants were approved by a council which was also empowered to strike off individuals (Gelfand et.al.1985:6). If *mpondoro* in the Zambesi had conformed strictly to the rules of this association they would not have participated in the witchcraft accusation described below and would have withdrawn from the political arena at a time when various interest groups jostled for position in the emerging order. Clearly, in the 1990s, there was a difference between the state's attempts to regulate ritual life, and local response to re-organisation of social life.

The view that witchcraft posed a danger to colonial power was one reason for its suppression, however, the late 19th century was also a time of renewed interest in the scientific paradigm. Shortly after British conquest of Southern Rhodesia, the state implemented The Witchcraft Suppression Act (1899) which punished both people who made accusations of witchcraft and those who were said to practise it. In a review of British colonial records for Lomagundi District, which encompassed Kanyemba and Chikafa areas, I found no cases of witchcraft having been brought to the attention of the authorities. Cases brought before the Assistant Native Commissioner at Sipolilo (now Guruve) during the 1920s included arson, possession of firearms, illegal entry into the district, murder, and even sodomy, but not witchcraft. Similarly, records for Feira (now Zumbo in Zambia) show no cases of witchcraft. Incomplete records may be one explanation, but it is also possible that witchcraft was dealt with away from the authorities. Another reason for the absence of witchcraft from colonial relates to a conjunction of features of early British colonisation[1]. Kapferer argued that:

> "Anthropological interest in sorcery and magic took root at a time of Western expansion and colonial domination. It arose in a scientific climate alive with the spirit of Darwinism and concerned with the application of evolutionist thought to cultural, social, and political matters. The investigation of sorcery and magic...was part of a philosophical and growing anthropological enterprise with huge political undertones. Their study was integral to the more general engagement of knowledge in the legitimation of the imperial domination of the West (the site of reason) over the subordinated rest (the site of unreason)".
>
> (1997:9)

---

1 Case 19/21 K9/21; Case 121 S625; L.J. Tweedy 1921.

As this author suggested, the issue of witchcraft deviated from the Crown's objective of a tidy system of governance based on Enlightenment ideals. That this conceptual dichotomy also enabled re-arrangement of local economies to satisfy market ideology proved fortuitous. In this way, events of the 1990s in the Zambesi Valley were very similar because a language of science and quantification, seemingly devoid of moral content, was expressed as an alternative representation of local economy and social life.

Perceptions of witches have changed over time in Zimbabwe. During the Independence War witches were equated with sell-outs because both were considered to work against the greater good. However, these were often individuals caught in political crossfire and misunderstanding. In Matabeleland executions of witches "are remembered as deeply traumatic, and certainly had a lasting impact on intra-familial and intra-community tensions" (Alexander et. al. 2000:173). From Lan's (1985) account, it seems that during the 1980s witches emanated from within the family, and were preoccupied with lineage and interpersonal matters. In ways similar to Matabeleland, during the war witches in the Zambesi constituted the conceptual opposite of mediums in that they were thought to work against community values. However, while interpretations of community will during the 1970s are usually focussed on collective support of the Independence War, during the 1990s communities such as Chikafa were fragmented, a situation which allowed for individual action.

The relationship between the state and witchcraft was mediated by the system of *mpondoro* in Chikafa in 1993. Land spirits did not attempt to contain witchcraft but rather harnessed social disorder and fragmentation to highlight their importance in the emerging political order of the area. Foreign policies, supported by the Zimbabwean state in the 1990s, had changed local economy which resulted in new forms of inequality. ESAP and development had also contributed to disassembling of familiar institutions, such as the rule of elders, and concomitant rise of individual action which resulted in greater political fragmentation. The resulting disorder provided spaces of ambiguity as well as opportunities for increased state control over the area. Witchcraft

was the local response to perceived chaos and distress. Just as it had provided a focal point for local identities during the First and Second Chimurenga, the system of land spirits once again mobilised to address social change and threatened fragmentation of communities. The acephalous character of Chikafa, in comparison to the centralisation of Kanyemba, made it a vulnerable place for the advent of development.

iii. The Meanings of Witchcraft in Dande: Kanyemba and Chikafa Compared

What is most striking about witchcraft in the Zambesi of the 1990s is the difference in meanings it held for old and young. For the older generation, witchcraft was part of a larger moral universe in which spirits and humans co-existed in a mutual relationship of cause and effect. For the younger set, witchcraft was viewed as somewhat separate from the world of ancestors, and more to do with the new forms of wealth and disparity resulting from recent political and economic changes. Many young people rejected ancestor worship as the province of the old and as symbolic of the power of lineage elders who controlled land and marriage. In a comparison of witchcraft in Chikafa and Kanyemba, the notable difference is that it was accepted as a form of expression of local concerns in the former, and as dissent to be quashed in the latter. These divergent approaches can be attributed to the contrast in political organisation and economy between these areas. While Kanyemba was a highly centralised polity where potential inter-generational conflict was diffused through power-sharing between old and young members of the dominant *marunga* clan, Chikafa was an acephalous society of fragmented political process and rapidly changing economy over which no one exercised control. In this section, I will review the different meanings of witchcraft in these two settlements in order to provide a context for the witchcraft accusation in Chikafa to be discussed later in this chapter.

The history of Chikafa and Kanyemba is characterised by conquest and migration, and for that reason there has been a longstanding preoccupation with appropriations of wealth and power. However, the notion of conquest permeated most stories about Kanyemba area. The legend of the Chikunda warlord Kanyemba described him as taking *muti* (medicines) in order to acquire dominion over conquered areas. In Chief Chapoto's account, "Kanyemba was interested in *mankwara* (magic)"

292

and would persuade *n'anga* to disclose their knowledge of herbs with which to kill enemies. Once the information was proffered, Kanyemba would ask one of his lieutenants to kill the healer. Another way in which Kanyemba is said to have acquired power was by castrating men in conquered areas. In the words of another elderly informant, "Kanyemba won wars, castrated men, (and) didn't want men to look at women". The acquisition of power through occult means, and the suppression of fertility of conquered men are two pervasive themes in stories about the person of Kanyemba. Chief Chapoto described Kanyemba as a figure representing absolute power and compared this historical figure to President Mugabe in terms of the untouchability of his position. The story of Kanyemba and the supernatural is interesting in that it illustrates very much the appropriation of control over the conquered population and the principle of centralised power.

In contrast, concepts of witchcraft in Chikafa carried an implication of potential disorder, disruption, and danger. Old people would barely discuss the issue of *ufiti*, and recoiled at any suggestion that it might occur in the area. In Chikafa, the social world was divided into the parallel realms of humans and spirits. Each realm was further divided into hostile and friendly, inside and outside beings (Lan 1985:35-39). Witchcraft was perpetrated by the actions of hostile beings, both living and dead. In the realm of spirits, *midzimu* were the friendly ancestors who remained so as long as their descendants remembered them. They represented order and continuity. Hostile spirits took two forms. The *ngozi* were spirits of people who were unhappy in life and wandered through the village, angry and malicious, spreading harm. "A *ngozi* is unmarried or childless, unburied or done to death. For such a person death is not an enhancement but a degradation" (Lan 1985:35). Owing to their unsatisfactory lives, *ngozi* could not take their place amongst ancestors. They were forever reminders of unhappiness, inequity, and lack of fulfilment in life.

Muroyi (witches), on the other hand, were humans who either became possessed by a *shave*, the animal spirit of the hyena who hunted by night and ate dead creatures, or made a free choice to apprentice in witchcraft (Lan 1985:36). Similarly, Bourdillon distinguished between two types of witches: ancestral witches who were thought to enjoy evil and did not seek to be cured; and, sorcerers who harnessed evil,

293

often through the use of medicines, for a specific purpose (1987:178-179). This author assumed a difference between witchcraft and sorcery amongst Shona in that the former referred to an ongoing condition of inherent evil, whereas the latter suggested a goal-oriented and finite villainous act (1987:179). While this distinction is noteworthy, I did not encounter it during my fieldwork as the term *ufiti* was used to denote all actions perpetrated by *mfiti* (witches). During the 1980s, Lan noted that "witchcraft will strike from *within*, that evil lies, sharp-toothed, poised to pounce, just where you most expect and need affection, ease, support, and care" (1985:37). In his work, he described witches as emanating from within the lineage or from amongst one's affines, whose archetypal work was eating dead people as the result of envy of riches or fertility (Lan 1985:35-37). Ordinarily ancestors offered protection against witches, but only if the proper beer rituals were performed by their descendants.

During 1993 there was an unusually high amount of beer parties in Chikafa. Part of the reason for this occurrence was the return of new migrants and the opening of reconstructed homesteads. The number of funerals of cholera victims was another reason. For much of June and July of that year it was difficult to find elderly persons who were sober enough to give a coherent interview. So important were beer rituals for the aged that they ignored warnings of cholera transmission to the point where a ritual to combat cholera was organised in an attempt to arrive at a compromise with the viewpoint of the old.

The tenacity of the old for ancestor worship spoke to an adherence to the belief that the world of spirits must be appeased if normal life was to continue. The fact of drought along with political and economic changes in Chikafa coupled with new migrants, all contributed to a sense of disorientation for the old.

In his study, *The Shona Peoples* (1976/1987), Michael Bourdillon described the resemblance between witches and healers in that both were possessed by powerful *mashave* (animal spirits). He argued, as I encountered in Chikafa, that healers were often reluctant to discuss witchcraft for fear of being thought witches. In his estimation there was a fine line between healing and witchcraft because of similarities in both the ability to host a spirit and use medicines (Bourdillon 1987:177). In the case of a serious illness in a community, often a witch would be sought because, "a witch or

sorcerer is believed to know the antidotes to his or her poisons" (Bourdillon 1987:187). In other words, the circumstances which caused illness also contained means to a resolution. Healers, mediums, and non-specialists possessed by spirits were all in a tenuous position with regard to others in their community. If the activity of their possessing spirit was not properly harnessed for the collective good, they risked being labelled as witches, or in some cases, as frauds.

In order for the dead to protect the living there had to be a cycle of proper beer rituals which expressed allegiance to lineage ancestors and local *mpondoro*. Lack of ritual provided an opportunity for *ngozi* to rise up and was one indication of social rupture. During the possession ceremony discussed in Chapter 8, the *mpondoro* Negomo complained that the Zambesi was full of "wandering spirits" of people who had not been properly settled after the Independence War. There were a number of ways in which this statement could be analysed, but one interpretation was that descendants of had not honoured the dead. In other words, the sacrifices of members of individual lineages had not been remembered at the same time as the collective effort to change governments in Harare had been forgotten. Top-down implementation of policy and the observable growth of wealth in some quarters, as well as rapid impoverishment in others were reasons often cited for the assumed preponderance of *ngozi*. Weak support for the *mpondoro* and the system of *sabhuku* and chiefs, as well as increased interest in committee work and cash-cropping among the young was another factor contributing to the belief in disquiet amongst ancestors. The witchcraft accusation to be discussed below took place after a period of repeated misfortune and suffering, in the form of famine and cholera, so that an episode of serious individual illness took on wider meaning for the locality.

While in 1993 the disorganised nature of social life in Chikafa and the number of contingencies led to a serious case of witchcraft, in Kanyemba, a smaller case of witchcraft was easily dispatched in a session of Chief Chapoto's court in August of that year. At the time two cases were heard by Chief Chapoto, relating to witchcraft and to domestic violence. Other issues that the Chief dealt with at Court included theft, incest, and boundary disputes. The Court session took place as follows:

Chief Chapoto and his retinue of four elderly male Chikunda councillors, a

male Chikunda clerk, two 'policemen' who are respectively Chikunda and tembo mvura, and one of the Chief's sons arrive at the old District Commissioner's house which is now used as a Courthouse. Two cases are to be heard today, starting with that of a witchcraft accusation. The accused, A, four plaintiffs by the names of Maria, Antonia, Wilson and Innocent are present. One witness, John, is also there. My assistant and I are the only observers.

A begins arguing his case. He says that he was paid a large sum of money by two white men to find people who could perform mapipi (a miracle or astonishing performance). He added that the clients were also interested in taking pictures of hyenas, crocodiles, and tortoises. Now, he said, people were accusing him of being hired to point out witches. Antonia, in particular, had cried at a beer party that he had pointed her out as a witch and that now the gossip at these occasions was that he pointed out witches. He finished by saying that the two white men had told him that they had gone to an area on the plateau looking for people who performed mapipi and had been supplied the names with no trouble.

Maria speaks next. She says that A told her that two white men were looking for witches to photograph and that he had suggested she should have her picture taken. In her words, "A is my sabwira so I thought he was joking, but then I saw he was serious". She reports that A went on to tell her that if she sees a hyena or a crocodile she should ask for her picture to be taken so that she can earn money.

Antonia then accuses A of having called her a witch and says that she confronted him at a beer party where she asked him if he had given her name to the white people. He refused to answer her. Then Wilson adds that he had seen Maria and Antonia at a beer party and found out that he was also included in the pointing out of witches by A. Innocent then says, "I was told that A had pointed me out as a witch". He explains that he had reported this accusation to Chief Chapoto previously who had told him to go away, cool down and wait for the Court session to find the truth. A then interjects "X can witness that the two white men asked me to point out people with crocodiles. They wanted to take pictures". Councillor no. 1, an elderly Chikunda, then stirs in his seat and announces to A, "mapipi means witchcraft so you were pointing out witches, you should pay for pointing out witches". A insists that he needs to know who started the witchcraft rumours. Councillor no. 1 then asks where other witnesses for the plaintiffs are.

Chief Chapoto speaks next. He says that many people have come to him with the same problem and that his advice to them has been to go away and cool down. He says that if he had had the opportunity to ask the white men if they had been taking pictures of people who perform mapipi, or carry dipa (spear), or ukano (axe), they would deny it. His son then suggests that the case be postponed as two witnesses are missing. The Chief ponders out loud what to do. A says that he needs one more witness. But Councillor no. 1 interjects that A brought rumours of witchcraft by soliciting business from the two white men in question. The witness, John, then relates how he told Maria that white men were looking for n'anga who could do mapipi for healing, and that they were taking pictures of witches. Councillor no.1 then states that A has spread rumours of witchcraft to white people. A retorts that if the Court finds the case too difficult to solve, it should be taken to the police. Councillor no. 1 asks Maria for her opinion to which she answers that he should judge the case as she does not know

what to do and has no personal quarrel with A. The Chief reminds everyone that he wants to judge the case fairly but is also prepared to hand it to the police. The Chief's son then proclaims, "A, you bring rumours of witchcraft so you are guilty". He adds that it is not the business of A to deal with the white people, but it is instead the job of the Ward Councillor who deals with outsiders to the area. Finally, Councillor no. 1 announces that A and John are both guilty of witchcraft. He says that these two men pointed out Maria as a witch before Nyamaqwete (the specialist witch-finding land spirit) could do so. In addition to which he thinks they should apologise to Maria. He adds that it is the Ward Councillor's job to deal with outsiders, not A. Maria interjects that she has no quarrel with A. Councillor no. 1 says that A "is a respected person, a sabhuku, so he should not spread rumours". Innocent then asserts "A, you are younger than me so you should not play with me. You should pay a fine". Councillor no. 1 then tells Innocent that if he wants compensation from the accused, they should discuss this matter at his house. He declares the Court session closed.

This session of Chief Chapoto's Court reflected the ruling *marunga* clan's approach to witchcraft: that an accusation was best settled early and the matter subdued before it became a matter of public debate. The Court meeting was held in relative privacy with only villagers directly involved in the case present. There were a number of reasons why this witchcraft incident was held in private and resolved with very little debate.

First, in Kanyemba witchcraft was a feature of social control. A's role in the witchcraft accusation discussed above was a good illustration of this feature of *marunga* centralised control. As discussed previously in this study, the ruling hierarchy established at the time of conquest remained until the 1990s. The lineages of two of the three conquering brothers, Chihumbe and Kanyemba, had alternated possession of the Chiefship throughout the 20th century. Also, the succession dispute to do with Chief Chapoto's imminent demise was contested between the descendants of Chihumbe and Kanyemba. The descendants of the third conquering brother, Nyanderu, had not presented any candidates. Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 6, control over new positions and new committees organised under the auspices of development schemes and central government were in the hands of younger Chikunda from the ruling lineages. When I arrived in Kanyemba area the Ward Councillor came to see me to object to my presence, but was appeased by the knowledge that I had interviewed an elderly descendant of Kanyemba whom he called "father". The reason

for briefly recapitulating the social structure of Kanyemba area is to provide background for discussing A's role in the witchcraft accusation tried by Chapoto's Court.

A was a *sabhuku* whose lineage could be traced to the time of the original conquest of Kanyemba. His clan was crocodile and he identified himself as Korekore. He claimed descent from Msumpa, Chihumbe's powerful wife whose father was from Gokwe but settled in Kanyemba area at the time of conquest. His paternal grandmother's brother, a *marunga* from Mozambique, was taken to Lisbon for *chibaro*, and given a nickname to do with this experience which both A's father and A also used. The name in question was derived from Portuguese and would lead an observer to believe that A was actually of the *marunga* clan, however, his ancestors included conquered Korekore who intermarried with Chikunda of the marunga clan, as well as the influential Shona branch of which Msumpa was a member. Needless to say, A's family could be considered as a long-term residents of Kanyemba by virtue of their long, if subordinate, association with the ruling lineages.

As an individual, A was quite entrepreneurial and politically vocal. He was an expert fisherman who possessed a vast knowledge of the craft. He farmed four acres of dryland crops which included cereals and groundnuts, and had a garden which grew fruit and vegetables. He occasionally earned extra money by catching crocodiles and fishing with nets for foreign film-makers who came to the Zambesi. He was also quite active in a fishing co-operative starting up at the time and was a critic of the CAMPFIRE program because he said that Zambians and Mozambicans were coming to the south side of the Zambesi River to fish with nets while he was not allowed to do so. He lamented that his children went hungry while outsiders profited from Zimbabwean resources.

As discussed earlier in this study, Chief Chapoto descended from Chihumbe. Councillor no.1 descended from Kanyemba and was a possible candidate for the Chieftaincy. Although it might seem paradoxical that he would be a close advisor to the Chief in matters of customary law, history shows that power had been shared between the descendants of Chihumbe and those of Kanyemba. While there was a dispute between these two lines regarding inheritance of the Chieftaincy, they closed

ranks when classificatory outsiders attempted to social mobility, as A had repeatedly attempted through his economic ventures. In effect, the witchcraft accusation levelled against A by none other than his *sabwira*, was an exercise to remind him of the consequences of ambition. Although the implication during the Court session was that A had called the women crocodiles, and therefore witches, no official gave indication that he took the accusation seriously. Also, the accuser let the matter drop easily once it had been heard by the Court, and there was no imposed fine. A's threat that the matter be placed before the police, in effect taken out of the power structure of the locality, was not carried out.

Although in Kanyemba area, people subscribed to the same cosmology as in Chikafa, witchcraft accusations carried much less weight and were not thrust into the public forum of the *mpondoro* ceremony. One reason might be that social hierarchy in Kanyemba was so well-entrenched that patterns of accumulation of wealth and poverty were not subject to significant change. For example, while the Chief told me that he was happy the *tembo mvura* people earned money from selling pots to safari camp clients, he never condemned their exploitation by senior land-owning Chikunda, a fact which ensured that these subjugated people remained in their position of inferiority. At the same time, any new opportunities for greater wealth and influence, such as committee work and development schemes were quickly appropriated by junior members of the two ruling lineages. In his survey of Kanyemba, Cutshall noted "that if there is a core of 'intelligentsia' within the community, it is most likely to be composed of 'younger' adult males of Chikunda extraction" (1990:8). Besides migration, the disenfranchised of Kanyemba had very little opportunity to change their social or economic position. In this area, members of subordinate lineages, even if they were *sabhuku* such as A, had no means of representation. Their involvement in political process was limited to support of the two dominant lineages of the *marunga* who acted in their own clan and lineage interests to the detriment of outsiders.

In light of this circumstance, the variant of witchcraft observed in Kanyemba in the 1990s seemed to be hardly post-colonial as it served to reinforce a social hierarchy established at the time of conquest. While there was plenty of room for individual accumulation of wealth for members of the Kanyemba or Chihumbe lineages, other

persons were kept in their structurally determined positions. This particular instance of witchcraft was resolved by retaining the equilibrium of the status quo, and therefore of the clan which ruled Kanyemba area.

In comparison, the term *ufiti* prompted strong reaction from older individuals in Chikafa where the great amount of social disruption was perceived as a threat to social reproduction. For these people, witchcraft indicated the possibility of restless *ngozi* who required appeasement as they represented discontinuity. In order to apprehend perceived disorder symbolised by the illness of a male schoolteacher, the shrine of the territorial spirit, Nyamanindi, was mobilised to represent local concerns and arrive at a reconciliation of possible breaches of moral order. In this way, elder residents of Chikafa re-affirmed their belief that *mpondoro* were the repositories of perfect or ultimate knowledge.

iv. A Witchcraft Accusation in Chikafa Area:

Although Chikafa was conquered by the Chikunda shortly after Kanyemba area and a series of lieutenants to the conquering brothers were installed as headmen, the structure of power and wealth there had been vigorously contested over time. Not only was the area under the governance of the Korekore Chief Chitsungo in the 1990s, various committee positions, the Village Chairmanship, and the VIDCO chairmanship were held by Korekore. Genealogies were shallow and rules of inheritance not enforced. For example, *sabhuku* Chikafa acquired his public position from his mother's line. There had also been significant immigration in the wake of the MZP. Cotton cultivation and the effects of ESAP on labour migration had changed local economy from subsistence to cash-cropping. Inter-generational conflict had become pronounced as young people found they could not migrate for work easily, while they were also more proficient at interpreting the new language of development. In short, during the 1990s, social life in Chikafa was defined by disruption and contingency.

As I mentioned earlier, in mid 1993 a possession ceremony was organised in Chikafa so that land spirits could hear cases of individual affliction. The *mpondoro* Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti and Chidziyo were invoked to attend. As discussed earlier in this study, Nyamanindi was the spiritual owner of Chikafa area. Mutandabuti's

300

territory was in Chitete, an area adjacent to Chikafa which was in Mozambique. Chidziyo's territory was on the Mozambican side of the Musengezi area, far to the east of Chikafa. Amongst the illnesses discussed with the land spirits, there was the case of a young schoolteacher in Chikafa who was struck with a debilitating illness and became unable to walk. This circumstance resulted in a witchcraft accusation aimed at a shopkeeper in his early 50s and his wife which required a second possession ceremony at which Nyamaqwete, a *mpondoro* specialising in witchcraft was present. In the Zambesi, for witchcraft accusations to have community-wide implications they must be made, or confirmed, by *mpondoro*. Otherwise, identifying individuals as witches remained a matter of a particular lineage, and so had no relevance for others.

Through their highly visible business activities, the shopkeeper and his wife had become associated with undesirable aspects of new forms of wealth and accumulation which emerged in Chikafa during 1993. Because of their apparent prosperity it was not surprising that the shopkeepers should become the target of a witchcraft accusation. Their practice of buying maize stocks which they then resold in difficult times for a profit was considered abhorrent, as was the male shopkeepers' requests of sexual favours from hungry girls. In addition, their foreignness, and the fact that they had not created any kinship links locally resulted in suspicion. In Chikafa, tensions between old and new forms of economy, the slippage of political control and influence over family matters experienced by the elderly, and the increasing power of the young became pronounced with this witchcraft accusation.

The witchcraft accusation addressed two levels of social life. First, tensions between individuals and interest groups which had occurred in the aftermath of great change were played out. Secondly, locals expressed their frustration at the inaccessibility of the state. In short, internal and external tensions were performed publicly in these two ceremonies.

The first ceremony is held in early June 1993 at the homestead of Mr. X. A makeshift dendemaro (hut for audiences with mpondoro) was built, drums set up, and a large fire for drying drum skins throughout the night is made. Junior players start to play shortly after sunset, while men and women drink maize-meal beer. Mediums and their assistants sit on reed mats. All three mpondoro are Korekore and the dress of their mediums refers to African chiefs of the past. They wear skirts of blue and black cloth which signify their rain-making role, and strings of beads which indicate

possession by spirits. Mutandabuti and Chidziyo also possess sable horns which are blown to announce their presence. All recline on black cloth. Women and young girls dance and sing. Occasionally a mpondoro chases girls in circles. As the three mediums become possessed, the crowd of dancers and drinkers sit on the ground to listen to their wisdom. At this point Nyamanindi's assistant asks people who have used strong soap to stand back as the mpondoro do not like perfume.

Mutandabuti first offers thanks to Mr.X who is hosting the ceremony. He then affirms that he has come to accompany people at this time, but not for any specific task such as pointing out a witch. He states that if someone is a witch, then he or she should leave their witchcraft behind. He then describes his territory by saying that, when he was a live chief, he had a boundary with Kanyemba. When I asked him about his life, he replied that his father was killed by Kanyemba and so they do not speak. He also says that he used to see white people at Zumbo and is therefore not surprised to see me. When questioned about the Chikunda he replies that they used to be his slaves through conquest. He added that he never had good relations with Kanyemba, and so they made a treaty to not invade each other.

After my brief audience with Mutandabuti both men and women drank beer while people had private audiences with the mpondoro regarding a number of illnesses. A local school teacher who had been ill for months and had lost the ability to walk was brought to the mpondoro in a wheelbarrow. The proceedings were kept hushed.

The second possession ceremony is held seven days later. It is morning. The three mpondoro from the first ceremony are present as well as Nyamaqwete, a land spirit specialising in solving witchcraft accusations (see figure 10). *The ceremony starts at the home of Nyamanindi's medium where all the mediums become possessed, and then proceeds to the site of the first ceremony. The procession is headed by the possessed medium of Nyamaqwete, who is followed by the possessed mediums of Nyamanindi, Mutandabuti, and Chidziyo. Behind walk locals amongst whom a Mozambican mutapi blows a sable horn to announce the presence of the mpondoro. Bringing in the rear, are the local shopkeeper and policemen from a town nearby. At their destination Nyamaqwete instructs Mr. X, who is an expert drummer, to begin playing. Mutandabuti and Nyamaqwete begin to dance amid much singing and ululation. Several elderly people are drunk. One woman dances with Nyamaqwete. Nyamanindi's assistant provides water for the dancing mpondoro. Nyamaqwete demands that the drums be beaten faster. He calls for Mr. X., and then rolls on the ground, past mats laid out for the ceremony and then rolls back to the crowd. He then picks up his walking stick and runs into long grass. The crowd follows singing. Mr. X is asked for a hoe. Nyamaqwete, followed by the crowd, arrives at the road that leads from Chikafa into Chitete in Mozambique. Nyamaqwete instructs a man to dig a hole in the road. He does so and strikes a bunch of roots as well as a bundle tied with string to which is attached a British coin.*

The mpondoro and the crowd repair to Mr. X's homestead. Mr. X asks the policemen if they have seen the bundle, to which they reply in the affirmative. Nyamaqwete then declares that he has completed his task and that the matter is in Nyamanindi's hands. The latter proclaims that "these herbs are from Chitete". He

302

adds that Nyamaqwete is his muzukuru[2]. Nyamaqwete then asks the crowd if he found the herbs in a house to which the crowd reply in the negative. The shopkeeper then asks Nyamaqwete to point out the witch. He adds that if no witch can be found, then the herbs should be burned at the police station.

The crowd disperses, leaving behind a few drinkers. The ceremony is over.

This witchcraft accusation placed into the public forum two great themes of social life in Chikafa in 1993: internal tensions wrought or exacerbated by new avenues to wealth and impoverishment; and, external tensions created by top-down government policy which was perceived to bring both economic hardship and new migrants who competed for resources into the area. Internal tensions comprised the issues of the position of ancestor worship and healers in the new social order, a dispute between the afflicted schoolteacher and the accused shopkeeper's wife, and a problem where Mr.X had promised his daughter in marriage to both the shopkeeper and another man and had accepted bride-price payments. Anxiety brought by external forces included interrogations as to whether people such as the shopkeeper had used supernatural forces to grow wealthy during recent times of hardship. At the same time there was the perception that foreigners were becoming wealthy, while long-term residents became poorer. To compound these perceptions, long-standing inter-generational conflict seemed to widen with modified fields of exchange.

One aspect of internal tension in Chikafa was the increasing ambiguity of the role of the cult of *mpondoro* and by association, the role of headmen. The most observable threat to the cult of land spirits had come from external forces in the form

---

2

Muzukuru is a kinship term which refers to ego's sister's son. But it is also a term which can be used to refer to anyone descended from any woman of one's own lineage. In short, muzukuru denotes a person who is outside of one's patriline, but is a relative. A muzukuru is someone with whom there is ease and joking as they cannot be embroiled in patrilineal issues, but are still close enough to be counted on.

of land resettlement which ignored sacred areas, and new structures of governance which by-passed authority based on ancestral links between spirits and chiefs. Also, I was told that support for Nyamanindi, as well as for neighbouring *mpondoro*, had decreased in Chikafa for some years as young individuals became involved in committee work and in the MZP's promise of equitable allocation of land regardless of age, gender, lineage, length of residence or previous farming ability.

In light of increasing ambivalence toward *mpondoro* in Chikafa, the witchcraft accusation provided an opportunity for the shrines of the four *mpondoro* involved to demonstrate their relevance within the emerging order. Some people in Chikafa believed that the seriousness with which *mpondoro* had taken the witchcraft accusation betrayed a financial ulterior motive on the part of their shrines. A number of individuals observed that mediums and their assistants had been seen drinking together for days before the first ceremony at which the accusation was made. Also, Nyamaqwete's specialty in witchcraft was said to allow his medium to earn large sums of money resolving accusations for commercial farmers[3]. Some informants believed that Mutandabuti had created the current accusation by interpreting the schoolteacher's affliction as witchcraft. This circumstance then led to the need for Nyamaqwete who had the appropriate skills to resolve the matter. Rumours circulated that the shopkeeper and his wife, who had been accused of witchcraft, paid Nyamaqwete and Nyamanindi to find her innocent. A boy had told a number of people that he had seen a bundle of money in the shop while the mediums were at the shopkeepers" house which was adjacent. He said he did not believe the shopkeeper's wife when she said the money was hers, and thought that she had prepared it for the mediums.

Regardless of the motivation for the involvement of *mpondoro*, one outcome of these ceremonies was that the relevance of land spirits as respected elders and keepers of sacred knowledge was reconfirmed and their place in Chikafa society prolonged. Much of the political and economic change in early 1990s Chikafa bypassed *mpondoro*, and so it was unsurprising that shrines attempted to create a relevant space within the emerging social order of the area. Nyamanindi's shrine was

---

[3] Nyamaqwete's medium was said to have earned Z$500 for his work in Chikafa.

well supported by two medium's assistants (*mutapi/kambande*), one hereditary the other appointed, who were popular and respected. After the drought, the hereditary assistant, who was also a builder, constructed two homesteads adjacent to each other for himself and Nyamanindi's medium. The latter was young and personable and seemed to be well liked in Chikafa area. His personal and professional behaviour was impeccable. As a medium he adhered closely to protocol, dressing the part, avoiding English because it was not an African language, and placing himself under the guidance of the assistance. Personally, he was polite and deferential, which was the appropriate behaviour for newcomers, and not known to drink. In short, he ran little risk of causing offence. His demeanour could be interpreted as that of someone in a tenuous circumstance who was attempting to find a place in local society.

Nyamaqwete's medium stood in counterpoint. While the *mpondoro* was respected because of both his place in the Zambesian pantheon and specialist skills, the medium was thought a fool. Locals said that he was greedy, and that his wife had left him because, in the words of one informant, "she didn't want to be married to someone who wears skirts". Besides personal attributes, the striking difference between these mediums was that Nyamaqwete had become established before the changes of the early 1990s while Nyamanindi had done so during that difficult time. With hindsight it is clear that Nyamanindi's medium tried to bridge the increasing gap between young and old. On the one hand, he embodied the mpondoro and thus represented the order of chiefs and ancestors. On the other hand, he was young, had recently started farming, was not seen to drink which was in line with most ambitious young men, and left all political issues to his *kambande* who was old enough to be his father. In these ways, he could find a foothold within both age groups and demonstrate the relevance of Nyamanindi's shrine to changing circumstances within Chikafa.

While one outcome of the witchcraft accusation was that the shrines of land spirits became newly relevant, another was the performance of the ambivalence which residents of Chikafa felt toward newcomers who appeared to become wealthy at the expense of established households. Nowhere was this situation better demonstrated than in opinions concerning the shopkeepers. On the one hand, people felt grateful to the shopkeeper because he had exchanged food for various goods and services during

305

the drought. On the other hand, he had accepted the services of young women in return for food, when his wife had been away on buying trips, and was disrespected and thought stupid as a result. But more importantly, locals were very suspicious of the shopkeepers because they had prospered during the drought when almost everyone else had suffered. Attitudes toward these businesspeople, who provided desirable consumer goods and credit, mirrored the general unease toward the social changes which took place in Chikafa in the early 1990s, in particular those brought by foreigners. In essence, the prosperous shop constituted another nucleus of power and influence in Chikafa because it provided goods which were both desired and suspected, and was a source of credit which, although useful as a last resort during the drought, indicated that local economy was not prosperous.

The shopkeeper's wife had also been the target of mixed emotions as she was a strong and large woman and a symbol of personal prosperity at a time of strife. It was no surprise that Mutandabuti's accusation of witchcraft was aimed specifically at her. But it was also known that she and the afflicted schoolteacher had come to blows over his refusal to pay for groceries obtained on credit. According to this story, during the fight his hat had fallen off and she had kept it. Later, she was thought to have hired a *n'anga* to tie herbs to the hat which was said to have caused the man's illness. After the first *mpondoro* ceremony described above, the woman sent word to the police of the accusation against her and hired two land spirits to resolve the issue. In effect, she had used both local and state authority to protect herself from any further threat, thus reflecting the ambiguity in loci of power and authority.

The third sphere of internal tension represented in this accusation regarded Mr. X's involvement. At first glance, it seemed peculiar that Mr. X should provide his homestead as venue for the possession ceremonies. But I later discovered that he had promised a daughter to both the shopkeeper and another man and had accepted preliminary bride-price from both. The girl had refused to contemplate marriage to the shopkeeper who was much older and had threatened to run away. Since the shopkeeper's payment had been in groceries, Mr. X could not return these, and so found himself in debt to him. Mr. X was a long-term resident and well-established. It gave the shopkeeper an air of credibility to have the case against his wife heard at Mr.

X's house. Mr. X's situation with the two men also illustrated the problems associated with a system of marriage payment based entirely on the exchange of money and goods for women. With a shortened cycle of obligation between wife-givers and wife-takers, it was possible to avoid forming relationships between families. One elderly Chikunda man lamented in interview that bride-price without bride-service had made prostitutes of girls. He said that with current practice any man could go to his house and pay for his daughter which he found to be immoral. In effect, payment of bride-price meant avoidance of uxorilocality and, thus, of control by the bride's family.

At the same time as the witchcraft accusation brought to the fore a number of tensions which had been seething in Chikafa, it also provided a platform for anxieties concerning foreign influences. The most important of these apprehensions regarded the perceived accumulation of wealth by recent arrivals in the area. With regard to the local shopkeepers, people wondered if they had not used the supernatural to become rich, an opinion reflected in the witchcraft accusation. Also, in areas surrounding Chikafa, locals had observed that newly settled people from outside the Zambesi seemed to be farming successfully[4]. At the same time they had been subject to a spate of outsiders such as project planners, health workers, and government officials who had spoken to them about development projects and then helped to implement and enforce them. That some younger Chikafians had embraced these ideas was considered a way of appropriating what was local, and perhaps a version of the idea that witchcraft strikes from within.

Since attempts to resist land resettlement and resource management instigated by foreigners had not been very successful locally, inhabitants of Chikafa turned their anxieties into anger aimed at Mozambicans, their closest neighbours. A great source of worry was the fact that a number of miners from Mutoroshanga had moved to Mozambique to start farming. At one level, a number of people held the view that Mozambican territory really belonged to Zimbabwe. One explanation was that, at the

---

4

This is particularly true of newer churches which encouraged polygamy, a fact which allowed for pooling of resources and the provision of more labour required to cash-crop cotton.

time of Chikunda conquest of Dande, the area along the Mpanyame River from the confluence of the Zambesi to Chikafa was ruled by headmen who had been loyal to Kanyemba. Oral histories also suggest that the Chikunda were quite influential until the Independence War when internment in camps and the re-organisation of the jurisdiction of chiefs weakened their power. It is possible that some people tried to revive old boundary claims in the early 1990s as a reaction to hardship.

Another interpretation of ire toward Mozambicans was that, despite the existence of many family ties across the border, people in Chikafa had wearied of sharing their resources. Mozambicans used the clinic, boreholes, attended the school, made purchases in the shop, and used the buses whose last stop was Chikafa. Locals complained that Mozambicans used their facilities without contribution, and caused the roadblocks faced by bus travellers on their way to the plateau as police looked for people without documentation. Also, locals in Chikafa feared that Mozambicans would get land through the resettlement project. Importantly, they also said that Mozambican girls were cheaper to marry as their parents required a small brideprice when they married Zimbabweans. In effect, the chance to live in Zimbabwe had been factored into the marriage payment.

The fact that Nyamaqwete found the bundle of herbs said to have caused the teacher's illness on the road to Mozambique, reflected local opinion that many nefarious influences emanated from across the border. They blamed Mozambicans for prostitution, increased drunkenness caused by *kachasu*, cholera, and bandits which caused bus roadblocks. Nyamaqwete's 'discovery' was, in effect, a signal that new boundaries were being demarcated in the area. Once he had identified the source of the witchcraft, Nyamaqwete turned the ceremony over to Nyamanindi in acknowledgement of the latter's sovereignty over Chikafa area. With that gesture he indicated that not only was Chikafa separate from all the new and undesirable social changes represented by Mozambican opportunists, but that it was still meaningfully ruled by a *mpondoro*.

v. Summary: Social Disruption and Justice

The early 1990s was a time of significant change in the Zambesi Valley.

Longstanding practices related to livelihood, political process, and kin relations were disrupted through the introduction of a structural adjustment policy nationally in Zimbabwe and development schemes in Dande. ESAP disrupted established patterns of labour migration which had provided a safety valve from the pressures of inter-generational conflict at home. At the same time, development schemes centred on cotton cultivation and curtailment of access to the natural environment modified considerably the ability of residents of Chikafa to make a living. The absence of jobs on the plateau kept the young in Dande, while the MZP allocated land equally regardless of age, gender, farming experience or length of residence in the area. This project bypassed the power of elders to influence marriage practices and land use thereby disrupting relationships with affines made through marriage alliances, and with patrilineal kin made through a system of primary obligations. Ironically, as the MZP disrupted kin obligations, it also encouraged cotton cultivation which was labour intensive and expensive and could only be achieved successfully through the pooling of resources.

Coupled with pressures on family relations and livelihoods, residents of Chikafa also wondered at the nature of their relationship with the state. They believed that, through their participation and sacrifices during the Independence War, they had achieved a relationship of mutual benefit with the state. Because of support from Zambesian *mpondoro*, people believed that the state had been imbued with autochthonous power which meant that it would act benevolently toward Chikafa. The authoritarian way in which the MZP and CAMPFIRE were introduced to the area, and the consequences that these projects had for social life led to the belief that the state had turned into a conqueror. The inadequacy of drought relief and the perception of greater state control along with less political representation compounded the sense that the state would not be munificent.

The occurrence of the worst drought in living memory and its aftermath of illness and death were interpreted by the aged as a sign that the cycle of life, in other words, social reproduction, was in crisis. The combination of ruptured kin relations, particularly affinal ties, coupled with stifled local voice when the area had contributed so significantly to the creation of the state, precipitated local questions regarding how

309

their community was constituted.

It was unsurprising that a witchcraft accusation occurred at this time, as locals searched for a meaningful way to apprehend the scale of change which had affected their lives so dramatically. To this end they recruited their territorial spirit along with more senior and specialised *mpondoro* who would provide the required knowledge to understand impoverishment, new wealth, illness, death, and foreign influence. The conclusion that all terrible powers emanated from Mozambique confirmed the integrity of Chikafa as a community by creating an opposition with the traditional neighbours. The definition of Mozambique as foreign was perhaps the greatest influence that the Zimbabwean state had on Chikafa in 1993 because it helped to create a symbolic boundary through established economic and kin relationships.

Throughout the political, economic, and social changes which contributed to the hardship and upheaval experienced by many residents of Chikafa, many of their social actions could be interpreted as a quest for social justice. It was on this one crucial point that the old and young generations agreed. The old attempted to apprehend disruption through ancestor worship in beer rituals and through renewed support of the local *mpondoro*, Nyamanindi. In Chapter 8 I described how a group of young men had brought theft of aid food to the attention of the police out of outrage for the callousness of the crime at a time of dire local need. In this sense, both generations sought to participate in a coherent social milieu where rules of morality applied.

The description of a witchcraft accusation in Kanyemba was provided as an example of the depth of domination in that area. The way that a local *sabhuku* was accused of witchcraft and the nature of adjudication by a Court controlled by the conquering *marunga* clan, depicted a society in which a rigid hierarchy precluded significant social disruption. Chikafa, on the other hand, had a fragile social organisation which proved vulnerable to change. The scale of the witchcraft accusation there, which involved most residents of Chikafa settlement as participants and spectators revealed the depths of disruption and change there.

In his article on the Taita Hills of Kenya, James Smith, whom I cited earlier, asserted that disarticulations prompted a return to "collective historical experiences" (2005; 56). Similarly, the reassertion of *mpondoro* as keepers of ultimate knowledge in

310

Chikafa could be interpreted as a renewal of the relevance of a local institution with enabled residents to confront important questions of social relationships and continuity. Despite the new language of personal empowerment and individual achievement which arrived with development, people in Chikafa remained true to the worldview of the *mpondoro*.

Conclusion:

It was fortuitous that I was able to conduct research for this study in two very different settlements in the Zambesi Valley. Although Chikafa and Kanyemba are both within the Dande area and shared kinship relations, a similar economy based on subsistence agriculture, and a common past of Chikunda conquest, they had contrasting forms of social organisation and very different responses to changes and innovations which arrived with the postcolonial era. This difference was accounted for by the nature of the Chikunda chieftaincy of Kanyemba which was highly centralised and controlled a rigid social, political, and economic hierarchy thereby ensuring the continued dominance of the *marunga rosario andrade* clan. Chikafa, in comparison, was loosely governed by an agreement between longstanding Chikunda and Korekore allies which represented the melding of 'traditional' and postcolonial authority structures.

This study addressed three important issues in the Zambesi Valley of the 1990s, domination, development, and drought, by examining the Zambesian concept of chieftaincy as an oscillation between autochthonous rule and conquest. Autochthonous rulers were considered to be legitimate because they had the support of the people, and benevolent because they acted in the interest of communities. For these reasons they were believed to have rain-making abilities. In contrast, conquerors were thought to have achieved their rule by force through usurping the power of pre-existing authorities. Conquerors were not expected to act for the population they governed but, instead, in their own interests. These leaders held no ritual power whatsoever, confiding their activities to administrative issues outside of the realm of morality.

The advent of development highlighted the very different forms of rule in each settlement. In Kanyemba, the ruling clan, as represented by its titular head, Chief Chapoto, controlled the implementation of a resource management scheme and worked it to their advantage so that it actually reinforced their power. In contrast, because of the fragmented nature of its social organisation, including its political structure, a land resettlement program applied to the Chikafa area caused further splintering of its population.

Similarly, the serious drought of 1991-92 had a profound effect on Chikafa society in that it precipitated a great deal of disruption. Notably, interpretations of the drought, coping strategies, and attitudes toward the cholera outbreak that followed a few months later were split between older and younger generations.

This study is composed of nine chapters which represent the breadth of experience, both historical and contemporary, with which residents of each settlement confronted their everyday lives. For instance, longstanding Chikunda familiarity with colonial governments facilitated their dealings with Zimbabwean government policies of the 1980s in the form of new government structures which they controlled, and the development initiatives of the 1990s which they also turned to their advantage. Similarly, experience in the 'keeps' at Mushumbi Pools during the guerrilla war, enabled residents of Chikafa to interact with members of different clans and lineages. This study begins with a discussion of the nature of 1990s Zambesian society as exemplified by the case of Chikafa and Kanyemba settlements, and concludes with a local response to overwhelming social disruption. Throughout I have depicted the response of Zambesians to the important events of development and drought through the 'cultural logic' (Garbett 1992) of the oscillation between autochthonous and conquering chieftaincy.

Chapter 1 began with a discussion of the differences between centralised and acephalous societies, represented by Kanyemba and Chikafa settlements respectively. The oscillation between centralised and acephalous polities is a pervasive theme in African studies. A number of scholars (Kopytoff 1989; Amselle 1985; Feierman 1990; Lancaster 1974) suggested that political life in African society depended on where each polity was situated on this spectrum. In a general sense, centralised societies were characterised by a strong chief, a unified history, and rain-making power whereas acephalous societies were governed by headmen, had shallow and dispersed genealogies, many histories, and fragmented allegiances. Since the oscillation between state and segmentary society (centralised and acephalous) was nothing more than an expression of opposite poles of the same political continuum, African societies fundamentally shared the same characteristics and could change over time. Thus a chieftaincy could lose its

grip on power and become fragmented into a series of dispersed lineages without a common sense of the past while a strong ruler could unify an area of disparate lineage-based allegiances into a centralised polity.

In a circumstance of potential fluidity, the issue of domination addressed the question of how societies developed social hierarchies which controlled political and economic processes. Kanyemba provided a good example of how a dominant Chikunda chief rallied a number of features in support of his clan's near absolute rule of that area. Chieftaincy does not happen by chance and the mitigating circumstances are always based in the here-and-now. By the 1990s, Chief Chapoto had had 50 year tenure of Kanyemba which he governed through principles of a dominant historical account of *marunga* clan conquest of the area, a strong clan ideology which negated any other histories, and a rigid social hierarchy based on clan and lineage interests, and firm control of the economy and political process.

In comparison, Chikafa did not exemplify any of the characteristics of strong leadership. Its residents displayed shallow and dispersed lineages, the settlement was ruled by a tenuous power-sharing arrangement between Korekore and Chikunda longterm residents, and there was a great deal of movement of the population. The area was owned by a rain-making *mpondoro* who provided a unifying principle through the concept of the pangolin clan (the clan to which all humans belong). However, his shrine had only recently been reconstituted after a period of little local support.

In light of its fragmentation, Chikafa settlement became vulnerable to disruption when the MZP and CAMPFIRE were installed. In the first place, lack of political organisation meant that the area was not initially in a position to voice opposition to land resettlement, although residents did ultimately refuse to move to designated arable plots. Secondly, fault lines existing within families between the control of elders and the aspirations of the young were exacerbated by the MZP which promised equitable land distribution based on an identification card rather than on gifts from headmen or brideservice. Thus, the old in Chikafa viewed development as disruption and the young thought it provided opportunities to break from gerontocracy.

314

In Kanyemba, the CAMPFIRE program did not cause interference with established *marunga* clan power but instead contributed to its further consolidation during the 1990s. Appropriation of the project was achieved through the ruling clan's control of all forms of governance in the area, both older structures and post-colonial committee work. In this way, Chikunda controlled the implementation of the project and its relative effects on members of the population. There was no question of inter-generational conflict as *marunga* clan supremacy of the area was achieved by an alliance between senior males who controlled the chieftaincy and the Chief's Court, and junior members who sat on all post-colonial representative structures.

The contrast in social, political, and economic organisation between Kanyemba and Chikafa settlements provided clues as to why historians and anthropologists held opposing views of the nature of Chikunda identity. Historians such as Allen Isaacman (and also Capela and Rosenthal) had long argued for the existence of a strong and discernable Chikunda ethnic identity. At the same time, notably the anthropologist Chet Lancaster who has done extensive research in the Zambesi expressed a strong opinion that the Chikunda were not an ethnic group but rather an occupational term based on particular types of economic association with the Portuguese.

Isaacman gleaned his knowledge of the Chikunda from Portuguese colonial archives and a number of interviews with Chikunda senior males in Mozambique. He has argued that the Chikunda identity was consolidated through a common historical experience of warrior-slavery within the colonial Portuguese land-tenure (*prazo*) system. Also, he believed that this group solidified its sense of identity in the mid to late 19th century when the decline of the *prazos* caused stratified bands of Chikunda warriors to strike out on their own under the wing of strong leaders who later became warlords. During this time, Chikunda developed the specialties of hunting, ivory trade, and freelance work for the Portuguese as intermediaries which provided the basis of their power in the Zambesi Valley.

These features of early Chikunda history were echoed in the solid clan structure I encountered during the 1990s in Kanyemba settlement. For that reason, I believe that the reason Isaacman found an ethnic group while Lancaster did not was because they each

encountered people who called themselves 'Chikunda' under different circumstances. Isaacman had a firm notion of the group from his historical work and interviews with elders, while Lancaster researched during the 1960s and 1970s when the Zambesi Valley was disrupted by building of the Kariba and Cabora Bassa dams and guerrilla warfare. In fact, what each scholar found were two poles of the same political system viewed in different social, political, and economic contexts.

It was precisely because fieldwork for this study encompassed two disparate locations that I believed that Chapter 2 should be devoted to methodology. There is no doubt that it would have been easier to work in only one fieldsite, especially as the period of introduction to a new area can be the most stressful time of research. However, had I done so there would not have been the opportunity for the comparisons which this study depicts. Had I stayed in Chikafa, there would not have been the chance to observe Chief Chapoto's rule and record oral histories of dominant and subordinate lineages. If Kanyemba has been my only fieldsite, I would not have known the experience of great disruption and hardship which drought and development wrought on the people of Chikafa. In short, the study of two sites enabled a better understanding of the breadth of social organisation within the Zambesi Valley during the 1990s.

Chapter 3 was concerned with the beginnings of Chikunda domination and the historical circumstances which led to the installation of the Chapoto Chieftaincy I encountered during the 1990s. In this piece, my intention was to depict continuity between common experience within the *prazo* system, where corporate identity of warrior-slaves was created, and the strong centralised polity of the Chapoto Chieftaincy. To do so, this chapter provided a review of Chikunda migration to Dande and the Chief's version of his clan's conquest of the area during the late 19th century. In this story, the basis for the legitimacy of *marunga rosario andrade* clan rule was depicted as a 'civilising' mission in which they brought cloth, beads, and hoes to established populations who had been living in the wild. These three material innovations also constituted metaphors for the extension of Chikunda influence and the perceived superiority of their social, political, and economic structure. Cloth represented the expansion of trade networks to the area as this was the primary trade item provided in

316

exchange for elephant tusks during the ivory trade of the late 19th century. Beads were an allusion to changed marriage patterns in the context of conquest. In this case, brides could be taken exchange for a bead as Chikunda did not pay brideprice or engage in brideservice. The imagery of hoes was particularly powerful in Chapoto's depiction as it provided him with the opportunity to reiterate the idea that only the Chikunda are worthy of access to land. The meaning of the imagery of hoes as an instrument of conquest related to appropriation of land and subjugation of resident populations in Kanyemba area.

Of course, members of subordinate lineages, particularly the *tembo mvura*, had contrasting accounts of the legitimacy of Chikunda rule. While there existed few ways for subjugated people to express dissent, some individuals were happy to contradict Chapoto. One common form of opposition included the contention that Chapoto' ancestor, Chihumbe, had acquired the chieftaincy through trickery, and that, therefore the Chief did not legitimately occupy his office.

Through the description of the *prazo* system and oral histories of *marunga* rule in Kanyemba area, I hoped to demonstrate how the social organisation encountered during the 1990s came about. The hierarchy which formed the backbone of Kanyemba society was distinct: the top strata consisted of members of the three lineages which made up the *marunga rosario andrade* clan; and the bottom strata were made up of members of subordinate lineages. The dominant *marunga* clan contained three lineages made up of descendants of three brothers who conquered the area. These three brothers were Chihumbe, who was Chapoto's ancestor, Kanyemba, whose descendants claimed the chieftaincy, and Nyanderu who had little representation locally. Subordinate lineages consisted of the descendants of groups of followers who arrived with the Chikunda or who were subjugated at the time of conquest. All political process was contained within the confines of the *marunga* clan which banded together when faced with threats from without, and split into lineage interest in the case of internal disputes such as access to the Chieftaincy.

Chapter 4 brought the issue of the oscillation between centralised and decentralised societies into the 1990s with descriptions of the populations of both

317

fieldsites. Furthermore, the question of why the Zambesi Valley had become a subject of national interest during the 1990s was addressed. For a long time the area had been left outside of the sphere of state action and interest, a fact which suited many of the older generation who saw the valley as a home area which provided respite from the pressures of labour migration.

In contrast to Kanyemba, the population of Chikafa was characterised as disparate, emanating from a number of lineages which described shallow genealogies and mythical origins. Most informants there portrayed their origins in terms of a place rather than a pivotal ancestor. For example, some individuals said that they were from Nyungwe, the mythologised seat of Chikunda identity. Others simply stated that their relatives came from Malawi or "over there" as they pointed to Mozambique. There were no strong political allegiances in Chikafa, a fact reflected in its weak form of governance through an alliance between the elderly *sabhuku* and Village Chairman. In Kopytoff's terms, this settlement would be an area of open networks. In this way, it was very different to the rigid social structure which characterised Kanyemba.

While, an opposition between centralised and acephalous social forms was clear from comparisons of Kanyemba and Chikafa, the role of the system of land spirits in each locality did not follow this dichotomy. According to Feierman (1990) a centralised polity would have a rain-making land spirit as a reflection of integration within the society, whereas a fragmented polity would have disparate healers who dealt with domestic affairs. The reverse was, in fact, true in my observation of Zambesian society which I discuss in Chapter 5.

In Zambesian cosmology, land spirits or *mpondoro* are expressions of ideal chieftaincy. They are legitimate and benevolent because they have the support of the population, and can make rain. Their power encompasses rights over the natural and social worlds among which they strive to maintain equilibrium. The pantheon of land spirits in the Zambesi Valley encompassed rain-makers who represented principles of autochthony, Korekore conquerors, and latecomers such as the Chikunda spirits. In ideal terms, Zambesian cosmology was in accordance with Feierman's arguments that centralisation leads to rain-making.

318

However, in my research I found that in Kanyemba, where Chapoto ruled a centralised polity, the local *mpondoro*, called Kanyemba, represented solely the interests of his lineage and was predominantly preoccupied with bureaucratic affairs to do with the succession dispute. Other *mpondoro* who had territories in that place also dealt with lineage affairs. The spirits of Chihumbe and Nyanderu, the other two *marunga* conquering brothers, were not represented by mediums in 1993. The predominant characteristic of Chikunda *mpondoro* was their proximity to the world of the living as typified by oral histories depicting events in their lives, and genealogies placing them in the near past.

The territorial spirit of Chikafa area, Nyamanindi, and his neighbour, Negomo, each represented Korekore chiefs from the mythological past. While I have no doubt that this area was characteristic of an acephalous society, its land spirits were powerful and could make rain. One interpretation of this seemingly incongruent feature was that people supported their shrines precisely because they represented the only principle of ideal chieftaincy available to the local population. This proposal appears likely in that the importance of *mpondoro* increased with the implementation of the MZP and the occurrence of serious drought which precipitated further fragmentation.

Chieftaincy is discussed in three chapters of this study, the formation of a Chikunda chieftaincy, principles of governance among populations in Chikafa and Kanyemba, and the role of *mpondoro*, in order to illustrate the lens through which Zambesians viewed political process until Independence. Before the 1980s, populations in the Zambesi Valley had been governed by variants of chieftaincy, either through headmen or chiefs whose power had been consolidated through British colonial policy of 'indirect rule'. However, during the 1980s the ZANU government installed new structures throughout Zimbabwe which paralleled those of chieftaincy. Chapter 6 discusses the role of the post-colonial state in Dande. Its principle concern is with the notion that, while at Independence the Zimbabwean state was believed to be the culmination of the power of autochthons (as depicted by David Lan), during the 1990s its actions were that of a conqueror. In 1992 and 1993 this notion was articulated by *mpondoro* at possession ceremonies in Chikafa who lamented that "Mugabe" had taken

the pangolin (a symbol of the clan which encompasses all humans), and 'pegged' sacred areas. In other words, through mpondoro, people expressed their sense of betrayal by the state in view of its policies, such as the MZP project which had caused anxiety and increased difficulties with livelihood.

There were a number of reasons why people in the Zambesi believed that state became a conqueror during the 1990s. One reason was that the conflicting messages of centralisation and decentralisation were confusing for locals. On the one hand, state agencies such as AGRITEX taught people to be self-sufficient in farming and various committee meetings discussed concepts of self-empowerment. On the other hand, the MZP was implemented in an authoritarian way which resembled the practice of centralised chieftaincy. In other words, the perception of the intensification of state control coupled with the withdrawal of state services such as schools, clinics, and roads, and the absence of representation resulted in the opinion that the state had turned into conquering chieftaincy.

During the 1980s there was not much disruption to local life. The new system of Village, Ward, and District Councils installed then had been incorporated into Chikafa society with little friction. The position of Village Chairman was filled by Korekore who ruled in alliance with established Chikunda headmen in the area. Other council and committee work was taken up by junior elders of established lineages who administered while their seniors ruled. This arrangement between the generations seemed to work well until a conjunction of events in the early 1990s exacerbated longstanding inter-generational conflict.

Foremost amongst these measures was the adoption by the Zimbabwean government of a policy of structural adjustment. While Dande is a marginal and isolated area of Zimbabwe, this policy had important effects on local livelihoods and perceptions of the role of the state. The two main effects of ESAP were the disruption of longstanding labour migration practices and the removal of marketing boards. Labour migration had typically been a safety valve for conflict between elders who controlled access to land and to marriage, and young men who wanted a period away from the control of relatives. Also, labour migration was an important source of cash and an

alternative form of livelihood in years when cyclical droughts struck. ESAP prescribed a reduction in state jobs and precipitated restructuring within the commercial farming sector, both sources of the menial and unskilled jobs which many Zambesians filled. Without the option of work on the plateau, young men engaged with increased interest in local administrative affairs, sometimes clashing with the interests of their elders.

In short, the state lost ground in the esteem of Zambesians through its apparent withdrawal of services and representation, and increase in control. The demise of the Grain Marketing Board and the dissipation of grain stores were also perceived as abandonment by the state because of the idea that benevolent chiefs always kept a granary for difficult times. But the greatest blow to people's trust in the state was the implementation of the MZP during the late 1980s.

Chapter 7 deals with the introduction of two development schemes to Dande, the MZP and CAMPFIRE. The MZP was a land resettlement program which proposed a wholesale re-organisation of local communities through the allocation of arable plots and residential plots equally regardless of age, gender, and farming experience. This scheme was an initiative of the African Development Bank of which underlying premise was the gift of land to Zimbabweans. The idea of land distribution was palatable to the ZANU government which had achieved power on that political platform. At the local level, the MZP was experienced as great disruption, not least because the project had demarcated land for Chikafa settlement three times, each attempt meeting with refusal to move on the part of the population. This ambivalence caused great distress among people whose primary source of livelihood was subsistence farming.

The problems caused by the MZP related to social, economic, and political changes. With equitable distribution of land, lineage elders lost their base of power which had resided with allocation of land and control over marriage. If access to land was no longer an issue, then brideprice payments could be shortened and brideservice would become obsolete. This feature intensified inter-generational conflict as elders construed the MZP as disruption, while their children saw it as a fountain of opportunity. The complexities of negotiating the complicated implementation of the project in Chikafa also increased the importance of the administrative work which the young

321

performed through committees. Also, the project's encouragement of cotton cultivation precipitated competition with food crops, required cash for agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilisers, and pesticides, and increased the demand for labour to plant and weed. It soon became apparent in 1993 that only families who could pool their resources would be able to farm cotton for profit. These successful farmers were sometimes newcomers to the area, particularly members of new churches which organised rental of tractors and pooling of labour. Unfortunately, these changes took place toward the end of my time in Chikafa and I did not have the opportunity to conduct interviews with regard to new farming practices.

The implementation of the CAMPFIRE project in Kanyemba had the opposite effect of the MZP in Chikafa. Rather than disrupt social organisation, CAMPFIRE consolidated Chikunda rule. This scheme proposed to transform wild animals living in areas adjacent to human settlements into marketable commodities which would bring cash income into communities. To this end, forested areas were leased out to safari hunting companies which provided hunting holidays to clients who paid a daily rate in addition to which they also paid a trophy fee for each wild animal they killed. A percentage of these monies were then paid to District Council which then compensated local communities according to a pre-arranged formula. Communities which participated in this scheme forfeited their right to hunt wild animals and to fish with nets.

It is important to note that the project actually impoverished all residents of Kanyemba at the same time as it increased Chikunda control over the economy. Quantities and variety of food were reduced due to decreased access to animals, and the inability of locals to shoot animals which trampled fields and ruined crops. Also, skills of net fishing linked to Chikunda identity were in danger of being lost as the knowledge was not passed on to young men. But to understand the full impact of the CAMPFIRE scheme on Kanyemba area it is necessary to examine the depth of the loss suffered by the subordinate *tembo mvura* lineage. These people were hunter-gatherers who had been slowly and forcibly settled beginning at the time of the guerrilla war. They lived in the most marginal area of the settlement and owned nearly no land. Their diet consisted mostly of bush plants and small animals. The separation from the bush entailed by the

implementation of the scheme caused their sources of livelihood to further decrease with the result that they become more dependent on the Chikunda, who owned most land, for casual work (often paid in maize kernels). The *tembo mvura* had no voice with regard to CAMPFIRE as their only representative, a *sabhuku*, had no influence in political life.

Because of its rigid social hierarchy, the Chapoto Chieftaincy succeeded in working CAMPFIRE to its advantage. Local implementation of the project was supervised by junior elders of the *marunga* clan who controlled administrative committees. Further marginalisation of the *tembo mvura* allowed for increased Chikunda economic control.

The results of development in the Zambesi were an attempt at devolution which backfired. For instance, instead of enriching local communities which sacrificed access to the bush for cash, CAMPFIRE benefited District Council which received payments from hunting companies. Also, the MZP which was supposed to exemplify equitable distribution of land actually came to symbolise loss of political representation for residents of Chikafa

Chapter 8 is about drought. The occurrence of serious drought in 1991-92, one of three such events which took place during the 20th century, was experienced as extreme hardship in Chikafa area. Kanyemba was not greatly affected by drought as it was heavily forested and situated close to two rivers which provided enough water for agriculture. The serious drought of 1991-92 caused total crop failure in Chikafa. Residents responded by splitting up families and dispersing to other areas in search of food or work, eating bush foods, tending their gardens, and waiting for relief food. But these strategies, adopted during years of mild drought, failed to work in the face of environmental degradation due to increased population and the MZP. Besides suffering hunger, locals also experienced a high degree of anxiety due to fear of resettlement when they felt at their most vulnerable.

The occurrence of an outbreak of cholera in June and July of 1993, during the dry season and after a harvest, caused further disruption to Chikafa society. Interpretations of drought and its after effects in the form of illness where split between the older and younger generations. The elderly believed that the drought was a symptom

of social disorder, and insisted that beer rituals associated with ancestor worship needed to be performed. In this view, drought was the result of improper human behaviour such as the MZP, and illness was the work of *ngozi* (the spirits of the unhappy dead) who needed to be appeased. In contrast, young adults saw the drought as an environmental issue which needed to be effectively managed through equitable distribution of relief food and future planning. Cholera was similarly a technical problem to do with hygiene and overuse of water sources.

Inter-generational conflict was one dimension of the serious drought which caused disruption in Chikafa society. Changes to social relations, economy, and political process brought by the MZP also added stressors to local life. The slippage of power from within the hands of elders caused distress as their control over family life was also their insurance to be looked after when they could no longer farm. The competition between cotton cultivation and food crops and the increased time spent in fields in 1993 was another source of strife. The arrival of newcomers into the area who had not been incorporated through the longstanding mechanism of the *sabwira* relation (a form of fictive kinship) also caused worry. These people were perceived as competitors for resources such as water sources, firewood, the school, the clinic, and land.

Chapter 9 focuses on resurgence of witchcraft in the Chikafa area in mid 1993 in the wake of perceived betrayal by the state, land resettlement, drought, and cholera. While witchcraft accusations also occur in Kanyemba area, and I provide an example in this chapter, these are about social control and are dealt with quietly through Chapoto's Court. In Chikafa, witchcraft articulated issues related to social and moral order. In mid 1993 a prosperous female shopkeeper was accused of causing a debilitating illness in a schoolteacher with which she had had a disagreement over a grocery debt. This accusation was made by a *mpondoro* at a possession ritual which meant that it had social and cosmological implications. Resolution was obtained through a further ritual in which another *mpondoro* specialised in resolving witchcraft was involved. In his statement this land spirit described witchcraft as emanating from Mozambique along with cholera. This opinion echoed the opinions of local residents who were becoming weary of sharing dwindling resources with their neighbours.

324

Perhaps the point of this accusation was that it articulated a perceived crisis of social reproduction on the part of the elderly. The cumulation of loss of control over social and political life in Chikafa, coupled with the seriousness of the drought, had caused the aged to worry over continuity of life. The resurgence of support for *mpondoro* which occurred concurrently with the witchcraft accusation was one way for this age group to reclaim a version of chieftaincy which they understood. In contrast, the younger generation, similarly concerned with continuity, believed the answer to inequality lay with exposing corrupt individuals and endeavouring to behave equitably and fairly in committee work.

While each age group in Chikafa adhered to different ways to redress perceived breaches of a moral universe, their endeavours had a common purpose: the search for social justice in the midst of disruption. In this area, domination, development and drought exposed a fault line between old and young generations within an already fragmented society. However, in dealing with external pressures these two new interest groups found common purpose in the conviction of their members that they wanted to pursue fairness in their everyday lives. It was in their methods that they differed.

Domination was the key issue in the study of Kanyemba settlement. The Chikunda clan which conquered the area during the late 19th century provided an important case study of the resilience of centralised chieftaincy. Further work would be needed to better understand the nature of the continuation of the rigid social hierarchy with which that area is governed. An in-depth discussion of the rich Portuguese colonial record for that area fell outside the scope of this study but merits attention. Similarly, the case of the *tembo mvura* lineage, particularly of reasons why they have remained in a subjugated position since the late 19th century also merits study.

Appendix 1:

Questionnaire for Survey I:

1. Name of household head.
2. Name of wife (maiden).
3. Ethnic group of each spouse.
4. Number of houses at residence.
5. Number of children living in the household.
6. Number of wives at present time.
7. Numbers of others living in the household.
8. Mutupu/chidau of each spouse.
9. Religion(s) practised in the household.
10. Economic activities of members of the household.
11. Comments.

Survey I: 1992

Chikafa: Household heads by Ethnicity	
Chikunda	28
Korekore	20
Tande	1
Chewa	3
Shona	1
Manyika	1
no answer	6
Total	**60**

Survey I: 1992

Chikafa: Mutupu of Chikunda & Korekore Household Heads		
Chikunda:	marunga	16
	shumba	1
	nzou	3
	phiri	2
	no answer	6
Sub-total		**28**
Korekore:	nzou	7
	tembo	2
	tsoko	6
	shava	2
	no answer	3
Sub-total		**20**

Survey I: 1992

Chikafa: Inter-ethnic marriage		
1. Chikunda with:	Chikunda	17
	Korekore	3
	Chewa	1
	Ntsenga	1
	Zezuru	1
Widowed		3
Don't know		2
Sub-total		**28**
2. Korekore with:	Korekore	5
	Chikunda	11
	Chewa	1
	Rozvi	1
	Ntsenga	1
Don't know		1
Sub-total		**20**
3. Tande with	Chikunda	1
4. Chewa with	Chikunda	3
5. Shona with	Chikunda	1
6. No ethnic group name supplied		7
Total		**60**

Survey I: 1992

Chikafa: Livelihood Practice	
Vegetable garden	35
Remittances	11
Sale of masao (wild crabapple)	2
Barter	1
Drought relief	17
Back payments from CMB	7
Selling of tobacco	3
Selling of labour	3
Selling of clothes	1
Selling of cotton	5

Survey I: 1992

Chikafa: Religion by Household	
mpondoro	27
Roman Catholic	6
Jehovah's Witness	3
Evangelical	3
humbekumbe	1
mpondoro/Roman Catholic	3
mpondoro/Johan Marange	2
mpondoro/Faith Apostolic Mission	1
Roman Catholic/Zion	1
no answer	13
Total	**60**

Appendix 2:

II. Questionnaire for Survey II:

1. Name of household head.

2. Name of spouse of household head.

3. Name of ethnic group.

4. Mutupu/chidau of each spouse.

5. Number of houses within the residence.

6. Number of children living in the household.

7. Churches in which members of the household participate.

8. Sources of livelihood: a. sources of money

                            b. sources of food, clothing and other necessities.

9. Has the household had enough food lately?

10. What crops does the household grow during the rainy season?

11. What crops does the household grow during the dry season?

12. Does the household have a garden? What is grown in the garden? Do they have animals?

Ethnicities of Household heads

Tande (1.32%)
Sena (1.32%)
Ntsenga (1.32%)
Ndau (1.32%)
Manyika (1.32%)

Korekore (36.84%)

Chikunda (55.26%)

Karanga (1.32%)

3-D pie chart showing the ethnicities of the head of each household

Totemic Group by Household

don't know (3.95%) — Chirenje kasinjere (1.32%)
Tsoko wafawanaka (7.89%) — Chirwa (1.32%)
Tembo mbizi (1.32%) —

Tembo mazvimbakupa (13.16%) — Marunga (32.89%)

Shumba nechinanga (1.32%) —
Shava mutendeswana (1.32%) —
Shava mofugemukoro (1.32%) —
Phiri sematope (5.26%) —
Phiri nguruve (1.32%) —
Nzou samanyanga (22.37%) —

Matete (1.32%)
Moyo ndizvo (1.32%)
Ngoma (1.32%)
Nguruve (1.32%)

3-D pie chart showing the totemic group of the household head

334

Crop acreage by ethnicity

Tande (1.39%)
Sena (0.93%)
Ntsenga (0.62%)
Ndau (1.55%)
Manyika (1.62%)

Korekore (41.14%)

Chikunda (51.35%)

Karanga (1.39%)

3-D pie chart showing the percentageof total crops by ethnic group

Crop acreage by totemic group

don't know (2.32%)
Tsoko wafawanaka (7.73%)
Tembo mbizi (1.39%)
Chirwa (2.32%)
Tembo mazvimbakupa (16.55%)
Marunga (28.46%)
Shumba nechinanga (0.93%)
Shava mutendeswana (2.78%)
Shava mofugemukoro (0.77%)
Phiri sematope (7.81%)
Phiri nguruve (1.55%)
Matete (0.93%)
Moyo ndizvo (1.55%)
Ngoma (0.31%)
Nguruve (0.62%)
Nzou samanyanga (23.98%)

3-D pie chart showing the acreage of crops farmed by totemic group of the household head

Maize crop by ethnicity

Tande (1.64%)
Sena (1.31%)
Ntsenga (1.31%)
Ndau (1.64%)
Manyika (1.64%)

Korekore (37.70%)

Chikunda (54.75%)

Cotton by Ethnicity

Sena (1.07%)
Ndau (2.67%)
Manyika (2.67%)

Chikunda (42.25%)

Korekore (47.59%)

Karanga (3.74%)

3-D pie chart showing the ethnic group of the household heads growing maize

Percentage of animals by Household

turkeys (0.93%)
pigs (0.93%)
pigeons (0.93%)
none (15.89%)

chickens (50.47%)

goats (22.43%)

ducks (4.67%)
domestic pets (3.74%)

Ethnicity of Goat Owners

Sena (4.17%)
Ndau (4.17%)

Chikunda (45.83%)

Korekore (45.83%)

3-D chart of ethnic group of the head of the households that own goats

Archival Sources:

Arquivo Historico de Mocambique, Maputo:

Dialer, Padre Luis Gonzaga S.J
    1909   Costumes e Historia do Zumbo e Miruru.
    Seccao Especial, no. 44 a-c

De Eca, Filipe Gastao de Almeida
    1950   Gamitto (1806-1866): Noticias Bigraficas Acerca do Grande
            Explorador, com Subsidios Ineditos para a Historia de Mocambique.
            Lisboa
            Cota B316

Magalhaes e Solla, Augusto da Fonseca de.
    1907   "Apontamentos Sobre o Zumbo", in Boletim da Sociedade de
            Geografia de Lisboa, no. 7-12, 25th series.

Provincia de Mocambique.
    1909   Relatorios e Informacoes: Annexo ao "Boletim Official". Lourenco
            Marques: Imprensa Nacional.
            Cota B186

Provincia de Mocambique.
    1910   Relatorios e Informacoes: Annexo ao "Boletim Official": Lourenco
            Marques. Imprensa Nacional.
            Cota B186

Secretaria Geral do Governo da Provincia de Mocambique.
    1907   Regimen dos Prazos da Coroa. Lourenco Marques: Imprensa Nacional.
            Cota C615K

Wiese, Carl.
    1891   Memorandum Acerca das Expedicoes Realisadasna Zambezia
            Septrional Durante os Annos de 1885 a 1891. Lisboa: Imprensa
            Nacional.
            Cota (b)B375

National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka:

BSAC Report, year ending 31st March
    1919

KSV 6/1/3

Feira: District Notebook (excerpts from)
      1913-1954
      KSV 4/1

Feira: District Travelling (Tour Report)
      Feb.-Mar. 1927
      Jul.-Aug. 1927
      Aug.-Sept. 1927
      Oct.-Dec.1927
      Jun.-Jul. 1928
      Jul. 1928
      Aug. 1928
      Sept. 1928
      Oct.-Nov. 1928
      Mar. 1929
      Aug. 1929
      Sept. 1929
      KSV 6/4/1

Feira: Native Commissioner, Annual Reports
      1908-09
      1910-11
      ISV 6/1/1

      1911-12
      1912-13
      SSV 6/1/2

      1919
      1920
      1921
      1922
      1923-24
      KSV 6/1/3

Feira: Tour Reports by Native Commissioners
      1926-1931
      KDC 6/4/2

Kafue: Sub-district Feira
      Census data 1928; 1929; 1930; 1931; 1932;

National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare:

Great Britain Command Papers
    1890   Correspondence Respecting the Action of Portugal in Mashonaland and in the Districts of the Shire and Lake Nyassa. London. H.M. Stationery Office (Africa no.2 1890)no.66-72; 77-79; 103-105; 109-111; 157-160; 238

Native Commissioner's Office
Correspondence regarding N.C.'s camp at Kanyemba
Apr.-Sept. 1910
No.24/221/10

Native Commissioner's Office, Mazoe
Correspondence regarding Portuguese natives entering BritishTerritory for trading and visiting
1915-16
N3 25/1-3

Report on the Chapoto Chieftainship: Dande Tribal Trust Land: Sipolilo District.
    1965
        JO 8/1/5

Sipolilo: Assistant Native Commissioner
    1921   Rex vs. Juawo, Arson and Malicious Injury to Property.Case19/21
        K9/21

Sipolilo: Court of the Magistrate of Salisbury
    1924-7 The King vs. Guveya, Possession of Guns by Natives and Asiatics.
        Case 121.
        S625

Tweedy, L.J. (A.N.C.)
    1920   "Notes on Native Arts and Crafts in the Feira Division of the Luangwa District"

Tweedy, L.J.
    1933   "Chikunda Inheritance Customs", Feira District
    (1918) No. 4/1/1/6

References

African Development Fund.
    1986   "Appraisal Report: Mid Zambezi Valley Rural Development Project,
            Zimbabwe". Agriculture and Rural Development Department.

Alexander, Jocelyn, McGregor, JoAnn, and Ranger, Terence.
    2000   *Violence and Memory: One Hundred years in the 'Dark Forests' of
            Matabeleland*. Oxford: James Currey.

Allen, R.E.
    1990   *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford: Clarendon
            Press.

Amselle, Jean-Loup.
    1985   *Au coeur de l'ethnie: ethnies, tribalisme et etat en afrique*. Paris: Editions
            La Decouverte.

Amselle, Jean-Loup.
    1990   *Logiques metisses: Anthropologie de l'identite en Afrique et ailleurs*. Paris:
            Editions Payot.

Amselle, Jean-Loup.
    1993   "Anthropology and Historicity", in *History Making in Africa* (series:
            History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History) Beiheft 32, V.Y.
            Mudimbe and B. Jewsiewicki (eds.). Wesleyan University.

Beach, D.N.
    1980   *The Shona and Zimbabwe 900-1850*. Gweru: Mambo Press.

Beach, David N.
    1992   "The Origins of Mocambique and Zimbabwe: Paiva de Andrada, the
            Companhia de Mocambique and African Diplomacy 1881-91". History
            Seminar Paper no.89, Dept. of History, University of Zimbabwe.

Blanchot, Maurice.
    1980   *L'Ecriture du Desastre*. Paris: Gallimard.

Bloch, Maurice.
    1996   "Internal and External Memory: Different Ways of Being in History", in
            Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory. P. Antze and M.
            Lambek (eds.). pp. 215-33.

Bond, Ivan.
2001 "CAMPFIRE and the Incentives for Institutional Change' in African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation. London: James Currey.

Borges Coelho, Joao Paulo Constantino.
1993 "Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982): A History of State Resettlement Policies, Development and War". Ph.D dissertation, Department of Social and Economic Studies, University of Bradford.

Bourdillon, M.F.C.
1978 "The Cults of Dzivaguru and Kasuva Amongst the Northeastern Shona Peoples", in *Guardians of the Land: Essays on Central African Territorial Cults*, in J.M. Schofeelers (ed.). Gwelo: Mambo Press. pp. 235-255.

Bourdillon, Michael.
1987 *The Shona Peoples*. Gweru: Mambo Press.

Capela, Jose.
1988 *A Republica Militar da Maganja da Costa (1862-1898)*. Maputo: Nucleo Editorial da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

Colson, Elizabeth
1958 Marriage *and the Family Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia*. Manchester University Press.

Colson, Elizabeth
1960 *Social Organization of the Gwembe Tonga*. Manchester University Press.

Comaroff, Jean.
1985 *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*. University of Chicago Press.

Comaroff, John and Comaroff, Jean.
1992 *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John.
1993 *Modernity and It's Malcontents: Ritual Power in Postcolonial Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cutshall, C.R.
1990 "Kanyemba/Chapoto Ward: A Socio-Economic Baseline Survey of Community Households". Centre for Applied Social Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

De Waal, Alex.
    1989   *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

De Waal, Alex.
    1997   *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*.
            Oxford: James Currey.

Derman, Bill.
    1987   "Preliminary Reflections on Research Issues and Strategies for a
            Long-Term (Five Years or Longer) Study of Common Property and
            Natural Resource Management with Particular Emphasis upon the
            Zambesi River Basin". Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of
            Zimbabwe.

Derman, Bill.
    1990   "The Unsettling of the Zambezi Valley: An Examination of the
            Mid-Zambezi Rural Development Project". Centre for Applied Social
            Sciences, University of Zimbabwe.

Derman, Bill.
    1993   "Recreating Common Property Management: Government Projects and
            Land Use Policy in the Mid Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe". Centre for
            Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe.

Duffy, Rosaleen.
    2000   *Killing for Conservation: Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe*. Oxford: James
            Currey.

Escobar, Arturo.
    1995   *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
            World*. Princeton University Press.

Feierman, Steven.
    1990   *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*. Madison:
            The University of Wisconsin Press.

Fernandes Junior, Jose.
    1944   *Divagacoes Sobre o Distrito de Tete*. Republica Popular de Mocambique.
            Arquivo Historico de Mocambique.

Ferguson, James.
    1994   *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization, and
            Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
            Press.

Fisiy, Cyprian and Geschiere, Peter.

    1996   "Witchcraft, violence, and identity; different trajectories in postcolonial Cameroon", in *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. R. Werbner and T. Ranger (eds.). London: Zed Books. pp.193-221.

Gamito, Major A.C.P.

    1937 (1831 and 1832) *O Muata Cazembe e os Povos Marvas, Chevas, Muizas, Muembas, Lundas e Outros da Africa Austral.* Republica Portuguesa, Ministerio das Colonias, Divisao de Publicacoes e Biblioteca, Agencia Geral das Colonias. Vol. II.

Garbett, G. Kingsley.

    1966   "Religious Aspects of Poltical Succession among the Valley Korekore (N. Shona)", in *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*, E. Stokes and R. Brown (eds.). Manchester University Press. pp. 137-170.

Garbett, G. Kingsley.

    1969   "Spirit Mediums as Mediators in Valley Korekore Society", in *Spirit Mediumship and Society in Africa*, J. Beattie and J. Middleton (eds.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 104-127.

Garbett, G. Kingsley.

    1992   "From Conquerors to Autochthons: Cultural Logic, Structural Transformation and Korekore Regional Cults", in *Social Analysis: Journal of Culture and Social Practice*, no.31, July.

Gelfand, M., S. Mavi, R.B. Drummond, and B. Ndemera.

    1985   *The Traditional Medical Practitioner in Zimbabwe: His Principles of Practice and Pharamacopoeia.* Gweru: Mambo Press.

Geschiere, Peter.

    1993   "Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing Chieftaincy, French and British Style", in *Africa*, 63:2. pp. 151-175.

Geschiere, Peter.

    1997   *The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa.* Translated by P. Geschiere and J. Roitman. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Geschiere, Peter.

    1997   "Kinship, Witchcraft and the Market: Hybrid Patterns in Cameroonian Societies", in *Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*, R. Grinker and C. Steiner (eds.). pp. 340-358.

Gibbon, Peter.

    1996   *Zimbabwe: 1991-94, in Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic Liberalization, 1986-94.* P. Engberg-Pedersen, P. Gibbon, P. Raikes, and L. Udsholt (eds.).Oxford: James Currey.

Hulme, David and Murphree, Marshall.
    2001   "Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction", in *African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation*. D. Hulme and M. Murphree (eds.) Oxford: James Currey. pp. 1-8.

Iliffe, John.
    1990   *Famine in Zimbabwe 1890-1960*. Harare: Mambo Press.

Ingold, Tim.
    2000   *The Perception of the Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill*. London: Routledge.

Isaacman, Allen F.
    1972   *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution, The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Isaacman, Allen.
    1972   "The Origin, Formation and early History of the Chikunda of South Central Africa", in *Journal of African History*, XIII, 3. pp.443-461.

Isaacman, Allen and Isaacman, Barbara.
    1983   *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution. 1900-1982*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Isaacman, Allen and Rosenthal, Anton.
    1988   "Slaves, Soldiers, and Police: Power and Dependency among the Chikunda of Mozambique, ca. 1825-1920", in S. Miers and R. Roberts (eds.) *The End of Slavery in Africa*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. pp. 220-253.

Isaacman, Barbara and Isaacman, Allen
    1977   "Slavery and Social Stratification among the Sena of Mozambique: A Study of the Kaporo System", in *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*. S. Miers and I Kopytoff (eds.). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. pp.105-120.

Jones, Brian and Murphree, Marshall.
    2001   "The Evolution of Policy on Community Conservation in Namibia and Zimbabwe", in *African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation*, D. Hulme and M. Murphree (eds.). Oxford: James Currey. pp.38-58.

Kapferer, Bruce.
    1997   *The Feast of the Sorcerer: Practices of Consciouness and Power*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kleinman, Arthur and Kleinman, Joan.
    1997   "The Appeal of Experience; The Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times", in *Social Suffering*, A. Kleinman, V. Das, and M. Lock (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press. pp.1-23.

Kleinman, Arthur, Das, Veena and Lock, Margaret.
    1997   "Introduction", in *Social Suffering*, A. Kleinman, V. Das, and M. Lock (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. ix-xxvii.

Kopytoff, Igor (ed.)
    1987   *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kopytoff, I. And Miers, S.
    1977   "African 'Slavery' as an Institution of Marginality", in *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives.* S.Miers and I. Kopytoff (eds.). Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. pp.3-81.

Lambek, Michael.
    1993   *Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte: Local Discourses of Islam, Sorcery, and Spirit Possession.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lambek, Michael.
    1996   "The Past Imperfect: Remembering as Moral Practice", in *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory.* P. Antze and M. Lambek (eds.). New York: Routledge. pp. 235-54

Lan, David.
    1983   "Making History: Spirit Mediums and the Guerrilla War in the Dande Area of Zimbabwe". Ph.D. thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Faculty of Economics.

Lan, David
    1985   *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe.* London: James Currey.

Lancaster, C. S.
    1974   "Ethnic Identity, History, and 'tribe' in the Middle Zambezi Valley", in *American Ethnologist*, 1:707-730.

Lancaster, C. S.
    1977   "The Zambezi Goba Ancestral Cult", in *Africa* 47(3):229-241.

Lancaster, C. S.
    1981   *The Goba of the Zambezi: Sex Roles, Economics, and Change.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Lancaster, C. S.
>   1987   "Political Structure and Ethnicity in an Immigrant Society: The Goba of the Zambezi", in *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, I. Kopytoff (ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 102-120.

Lederman, Rena.
>   1990   "Pretexts for Ethnography: On Reading Fieldnotes", in *Filednotes: The Makings of Anthropology*, R. Sanjek (ed.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Leisegang, Gerhard
>   1991   "Jose Fernandes JR., CA.1872-1965: Testemunho do Periodo Mercantil e da Implantacao do Imperialismo Colonial na Antiga Zona de Influencia de Tete", in *Arquivo* 10: 49-82.

Livingstone, David.
>   1857   *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*. London: Ward, Lock, and Co. Limited.

Loewenson, Rene.
>   1992   *Modern Plantation Agriculture: Corporate Wealth and Labour Squalor*. London: Zed Books.

Magalhaes e Solla, Augusto da Fonseca de.
>   1907   "Apontamentos sobre o Zumbo" in *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*. 7-12, segunda serie.

Marcus, George E. and Fischer, M.J.
>   1986   *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

May, Joan.
>   1987   *Changing People, Changing Laws*. Mambo Occasional Papers-Socio-Economic Series No.22. Harare: Mambo Press.

Meillassoux, Claude.
>   1986   *Anthropologie de l'esclavage: le ventre de fer et d'argent*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Meillassoux, Claude.
>   1991   "Introduction: La genie social en Afrique du Sud", in *Genie social et manipulations culturelles en Afrique du Sud*. Paris: Arcantere editions. pp. 13-28.

Mitchell, J. Clyde.
>   1956   *The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia*. Manchester University Press.

Moore, Henrietta L.
  1994   *A Passion for Difference*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Moore, Henrietta L and Sanders, Todd..
  2001   "Magical Interpretations and Material Realities: An Introduction", in
         *Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, Witchcraft and
         the Occult in Postcolonial Africa*. H.L. Moore and T. Sanders (eds.).
         London: Routledge. pp.1-27.

Moore, Henrietta L. and Vaughan, Megan.
  1994   *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the
         Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990*. London: James Currey.

Mudenge, S.I.G.
  1988   *A Political History of Munhumutapa c. 1400-1902*. London: James
         Currey.

Munro, William A.
  1998   *The Moral Economy of the State: Conservation, Community Development,
         and State making in Zimbabwe*. Athens: Ohio Center for International
         Studies.

Newitt, M. D. D.
  1969   "The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo
         System", in *Journal of African History* X, I. pp.67-85.

Newitt, M. D. D.
  1981   *Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years*. London: C. Hurst and Co.

Newitt, Malyn.
  1995   *A History of Mozambique*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Nhira, Calvin.
  1989   "A Socio-Economic Appraisal Study of the Chapoto Ward, Guruve
         District". Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe.

Randles, W.G.L.
  1979   *The Empire of Monomotapa*. Gwelo: Mambo Press.

Ranger, Terence.
  1985   *Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe*. London: James
         Currey.

Ranger, Terence.
  1996   "Colonial and Postcolonial Identities", in *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*,
         R. Werbner and T. Ranger (eds.). London: Zed Books. pp. 271-281.

Rook, John M.

    1997   "The SADC Regional Early Warning System: Experience Gained and Lessons Learnt from the 1991-92 Southern Africa Drought", in *Internet Journal for African Studies*, issue no. 2, March 1997.

Rutherford, Jonathan.

    1990   "The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha", in *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference*. J. Rutherford (ed.). London: Lawrence and Wishart. pp. 207-221.

Santos Junior, J.R. dos

    1939   "Anomalias dos Membros em Negros da Zambezia Portuguesa", in *Mocambique* 17. pp.37-72.

Santos Junior, J.R. dos

    1947   "Anomalias prodigitais no tribo dos Demas (Moc.)", in *Estudos de Morfologia Oferecidos em Homenagem ao Professor J.A. Pires de Lima*. Porto: Univerisdade do Porto, Faculdade de Medicina.

Schmidt, Elisabeth.

    1992   *Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870-1939*. London: James Currey.

Schneider, David M.

    1984   *A Critique of the Study of Kinship*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Schoffeleers, J.M.

    1978   *Guardians of the Land*. Salisbury: Mambo Press.

Secretaria Geral do Governo da Provincia de Mocambique.

    1907   *Regimen dos Prazos da Coroa*. Lourenco Marques: Imprensa Nacional.

Selous, Frederik

    1877   *A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa*. London: R. Bentley and Son.

Smith, John H.

    2005   "Buying a Better Witchdoctor: Witch-finding, Neoliberalism, and the Development Imagination in the Taita Hills, Kenya", in *American Ethnologist*, vol.32, no.1.pp.141-158.

Stoller, Paul.

    1989   *Fusion of the Worlds: An Ethnography of Possession Among the Songhay of Niger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stoller. Paul.
    1995   *Embodying Colonial Memories: Spirit Possession, Power and the Hauka in West Africa.* London: Routledge.

Stoneman, Colin and Cliffe, Lionel.
    1989   *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society.* London: Pinter Publishers.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph.
    1995   *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Vail, Leroy.
    1989   "Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History", in *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa.* London: James Currey. pp.1-19.

Vaughan, Megan
    1987   *The Story of an African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth-Century Malawi.* Cambridge University Press.

Werbner, Richard
    1991   *Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family.* Edinburgh University Press.

Werbner, Richard.
    1998   "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, Memory, and Reinscription in Zimbabwe", in *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power*, R. Werbner (ed.).London: Zed Books. pp. 71-102

White, Landeg.
    1987   *Magomero: Portrait of an African Village.* Cambridge University Press.