INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT
THE LOCAL LEVEL: A STUDY OF THE
LONDON   BOROUGH   OF   CAMDEN

CAROL   A   VIELBA

Submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
London School of Economics
University of London

April 1992

UMI Number: U062744

UMI

Dissertation Publishing

UMI U062744

ProQuest

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Acknowledgements

My grateful thanks are due to my Supervisors George Jones and Patrick Dunleavy for their help and guidance in undertaking this doctorate.

Thanks are also due to colleagues at City University Business School who have contributed in many different ways to the completion of this dissertation.

I must next thank the officers and members of Camden Council and the eighteen other authorities studied for their generous contribution of time and assistance in providing information.

Last but not least my thanks must be given to Frank, Carlos and Isabel who put up with this research for a very long time.

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the relationships between the local authority and 18 other public authorities providing services in the London Borough of Camden. It is based on qualitative data collected by interviewing 70 individuals who were either senior managers or members of the authorities studied. The fieldwork was carried out between 1985 and 1987.

The study identifies the lack of a well-defined body of literature or theory of horizontal inter-governmental relations at the local level. The research design draws upon previous studies in the fields of operational research, local government studies, policy studies, political theory, organisational studies and inter-governmental relations.

The study demonstrates that the provision of public services in Camden was highly functionally fragmented. There were high levels of interdependence among the authorities studied explained by the socioeconomic environment of the area and the distribution of powers within the local government system. Interdependence was complex and multi-dimensional. The extent of linkages among public authorities was not great. Ad hoc and informal linkages played an important role. The patchiness of linkages could be explained by organisational and political factors. The local authority did not play a central co-ordinating role in the network.

Authorities pursued a hierarchy of overlapping goals. Inter-authority activity was sustained by a process of mutual goal fulfilment. Relationships between public authorities were seen to be highly desirable but very difficult to undertake. The public authority network

was widely regarded as ineffective in tackling complex public service issues.

A number of wider conclusions are drawn from the study. These include the utility of the concepts of a public authority network and the process of mutual goal fulfilment. The need for revision of theories of the interdependence of public authorities and the nature of the network linking local authorities and other public authorities is demonstrated. The study also raises questions about the validity of policy makers' assumptions about the way local and other public authorities behave and casts doubt on the ability of some local authorities to perform an enabling role.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

READER'S GUIDE TO THE DISSERTATION

THE FRAGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRAGMENTATION AT THE
SUBNATIONAL LEVEL IN BRITAIN

FRAGMENTATION AS AN ENDURING FEATURE OF
BRITISH SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT

> Lack of constitutional clarity
> Ultra Vines
> Lack of an intermediate view of
> government
> Nationalisation
> Privatisation
> The scale of modern government
> The role of special agencies
> The role of the professions
> Central government desire for power
> and control
> Why functional fragmentation persists

THE NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION

THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITY NETWORK

> The co-ordinating roles assigned to
> local authorities

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

The subject of this dissertation is intergovernmental relationships (IGR) at the local level. It deals with horizontal relationships between local authorities and other public authorities providing services in the same geographical area. The research on which it was based was carried out in the London Borough of Camden. Camden Council professed considerable concern for the general welfare of its citizens and for the public services provided within its boundaries; yet it experienced great difficulty in developing relationships with other public authorities.

The dissertation begins with a discussion of the structural factors which give rise to intergovernmental relations at the local level in Britain. The discussion distinguishes between geographic and functional fragmentation. Geographic fragmentation has been reduced substantially over the last hundred years by various reforms of local government. Functional fragmentation, whereby responsibility for the provision of public services is divided amongst specialised authorities, has increased over the same time period. As functional fragmentation has increased so has the need for public authorities to develop relationships with each other at the local level.

Chapter 1 begins by tracing the cyclical pattern of growth and decline in functional fragmentation which has characterised British local government over the last hundred years. Functional fragmentation is shown to be currently at a high level. To understand the context in which relationships are developed between authorities in a fragmented system, it is necessary to examine the social and political factors which give

rise to functional fragmentation. Multiple factors are involved. The constitutional position of local authorities together with the pursuit of group interests by central government politicians and professionals within the public services have led to toleration, and at times active encouragement, of high levels of functional fragmentation within local government.

The discussion in the second half of the chapter focuses on co-ordination and the role of local authorities within the public authority network. The need for integration of a fragmented system of government or administration is discussed theoretically and in relation to examples of complex public services. Two models of co-ordination, explicit and spontaneous co-ordination are identified. Explicit co-ordination has been favoured historically, spontaneous co-ordination has been favoured by central government since the eighties.

As multi-functional bodies and the focus for democratic politics outside Westminster, local authorities expect and are expected to play a key role in coordination of public services at the local level. The extent to which local authorities can perform such a role is limited by structural and political factors. Several models of local authority-based coordination are discussed including the concept of enabling.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on intergovernmental relations at the local level. The large literature on central-local relations (vertical IGR) is contrasted with the patchy work done on intergovernmental relations at the local level (horizontal IGR). There is no well-defined body of literature or theory on

horizontal IGR and the survey draws on a wide range of disciplines and studies. The discussion begins with operations research, the discipline which gave rise to the only major empirical study of horizontal IGR in Britain (Friend et al, 1974). Next the chapter reviews the contribution of local government studies in the form of case studies of local politics, prescriptive models of local governance and detailed studies of particular inter-authority relationships. The first part of the chapter concludes with a discussion of the contribution of policy studies to the study of horizontal IGR. While the concepts of policy communities and networks are useful, none of the networks identified in the literature (Rhodes, 1988) corresponds to the public authority network researched here.

The discussion in the second part of the chapter is organised around a three level model of theoretical explanation. At the broadest level, macro-theories about the state and society offer explanations of governmental fragmentation and models of integration. Pluralism, elite theory, the work of the New Right and Marxism are all demonstrated to contain concepts which can be used to understand patterns of horizontal IGR.

At the middle-level, theories about interorganisational relationships and intergovernmental relations offer explanations of the way public authorities relate to each other at the local level. Four concepts relevant to horizontal IGR which are elucidated by middle-level theories are discussed. The first concept is the environment which comprises four layers: the organisation itself, other organisations in the network, the governmental system and the nature of society as a whole. The second concept is that of a network. Third, the concept of organisational

interdependence based either on resource dependence or distribution of powers. The fourth and final concept is that of process, the nature of interorganisational behaviour. Exchange theory, games, bargaining and partisan mutual adjustment are reviewed.

Chapter 3 describes the way that the research on intergovernmental relations in Camden was designed and carried out. The model which informed the design of the study drew heavily upon an earlier study carried out by the author on county-district relations. Like the earlier study, the Camden research aimed to map the relationships between the local authority and other public authorities serving the same geographical area. It also aimed to collect views on inter-authority working from individuals located in different parts of the public authority network.

The research was based on interviews with 70 individuals in 12 departments or units of the local authority and eighteen other public authorities serving the area. Interviews were semi-structured and the data collected qualitative.

Chapter 4 describes the environment in which intergovernmental relationships developed in Camden. It is divided into three parts. First there is a brief discussion of the geography of Camden and the Borough's social characteristics. Second, there is a description of Camden Council highlighting charac-teristics which previous studies have found to be associated with the development of interorganisational relationships - structure and culture. A political profile of Camden Council is also presented. The third part of the chapter describes features of the other authorities in the public authority network in Camden. As with the description of Camden Council the review

of other authorities concentrates upon features demonstrated to impact on interorganisational relationships namely, task, structure, coterminosity, finance and culture. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the typicality of Camden. Camden was unique, but every feature of the place, the local authority and the other public authorities serving it could be found elsewhere in London or other parts of the country.

Chapters 5 to 10 present the findings of the survey of those involved in the public authority network. **Chapter 5** examines the pattern of interdependence which existed between Camden Council and the other public authorities studied. Interdependence was found to be complex. Nine different types of interdependence based on vertical, horizontal and symbiotic relationships between authorities' tasks and goals were identified. The relationship between the local authority and any other authority was found to be multidimensional in many cases. Since different forms of interdependence gave rise to different types of linkages and fostered different forms of inter-authority behaviour, conflict and tension arose in some relationships. High levels of interdependence were identified between Camden Council and other public authorities serving the area.

Chapter 6 describes the linkages which existed between the local authority and other public authorities in Camden. The extent of linkages was far less than the extent of interdependence. Linkages between public authorities, excluding the local authority, formed a loosely joined network. At the level of the authority as a whole there were few formal linkages between Camden Council and other public authorities. There was limited interlocking of controlling board membership

and few formal authority-wide liaison structures. Formal linkages existed largely at the task level, for example through case conferences, joint committees and working parties or the designation of lead authorities, departments or individuals. Informal linkages played an important role. Links generally involved officers rather than members of authorities.

Chapter 7 brings together the findings of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It examines the socio-economic and organisational features of Camden which account for the mismatch between the extent of interdependence amongst public authorities and the linkages developed between them. The overwhelming number of features of the socio-economic context examined in Chapter 4 pointed to high levels of interdependence as described in Chapter 5. The organisational structure of local governance and the individual authorities, including Camden Council, which were part of the public authority network acted strongly to inhibit the development of relationships. Organisational features explain the pattern of patchy linkages described in Chapter 6.

The next three chapters present the research findings on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals working within the public authority network. **Chapter 8** looks at respondents' attitudes to interauthority working in general and with other types of organisations in particular. The great majority of respondents found working with other public authorities different from working with the private or voluntary sectors. Public authorities were seen to share a common cultures and experiences and to have obligations to each other. When asked specifically about. working with other public authorities respondents pointed to the importance they attached to

it on the one hand while highlighting the difficulties they encountered in doing it on the other. Members were seldom able or willing to overcome the problems encountered and left the task to officials. The organisational and political factors identified in Chapters 4 and 7 were at the heart of the frustrations respondents reported. These factors were seen to be changing in ways that made co-ordination more difficult at a time when the demand for closer relationships was increasing.

In **Chapter 9** respondents' views about the goals, strategies and tactics of inter-authority working are presented. A hierarchy of goals of inter-authority activity was identified. At the top level were goals of improving well-being within the community. Beneath this were goals directed at improved services, then goals of better service delivery, and at the lowest level, goals of creating a more positive climate for relationships. Goals were not generally determined jointly. Sustained activity depended on a process identified as mutual goal fulfilment rather then resource exchange as proposed in previous studies. Organisations were described as using a variety of approaches such as presentation, communications and planning to pursue goals. Camden Council was found to be pursuing a different and potentially disruptive set of goals aimed at changing the governmental system.

Chapter 10 summarises respondent's views on the effectiveness of the public authority network and the need for change. Ineffectiveness in tackling issues which crossed organisational boundaries was seen to characterise the network. Structural and environmental factors were identified as causing ineffectiveness, in particular structural differences between authorities, formal bureaucracy, resource problems and government

policy. Changes in all these factors as well as a greater commitment to co-ordination were seen by respondents as desirable.

The conclusions of the study are presented in **Chapter 11.** The conclusions fall into two parts. The first part draws together the themes identified in the previous chapters about the role of Camden Council in the public authority network and the pattern of relationships among public authorities serving Camden. The second part suggests more general conclusions about intergovernmental relations at the local level which can be drawn from the study. First it supports a view of local government which is much wider than the local authority and suggests the importance of the public authority network as an entity within a community. Second it supports a view of interdependence among public authorities which is much more varied and complex than previously identified. Third it supports a view of inter-authority activity based on mutual goal fulfilment rather than exchange. The study demonstrates the uniqueness of relationships among public authorities based on the presence of both elected and non-elected bodies. Relationships among public authorities cannot be fully explained by either theories of interorganisational behaviour or theories of intergovernmental relations. Fifth, the cart-wheel model of the local authority within the public authority network did not fit Camden, where the public authorities formed a distributed network. Sixth, the study cast doubt on the validity of assumptions made by policy makers, particularly within central government, about how the public authority network operates. Policy makers assume spontaneous co-ordination will occur at appropriate levels to ensure clients receive an optimum level of service in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. The public

authority network in Camden did not operate in this way. Finally the research cast doubt on the ability of some local authorities to perform an enabling role in the absence of political and structural change.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS

Horizontal IGR increases in importance as the fragmentation of government increases (Stewart, 1980). Fragmentation along geographical or functional lines is a feature of all but the very smallest systems of government. Geographical fragmentation is based on territory. The nation is divided into territorial units for certain purposes of government. The process of division may be accompanied by the location of elements of democratic control at the local level. Local government units may be large or small relative to the size of the nation and may divide urban and rural communities into separate units of government. **Geographical fragmentation** gives rise to multi-service units of government responsible for services at the local level. The internal structure of such units may nevertheless be highly functionally specialised.

Functional fragmentation refers to the establishment of specialised, single-service units of government. In order to function effectively they may adopt an area structure internally which involves a measure of delegation to sub-units serving particular localities. Formal democratic control of such services, however, remains at national level.

Fragmented systems of government need integrating mechanisms to counter the tendency for the different units of government to drift apart. Inter-governmental relationships are part of the structure

of integration. Differentiation and disintegration arise from, amongst other things, different interest groups exerting pressure on different parts of the governmental system. Fragmentation may be fostered by groups who are able to benefit from division and lack of co-ordination. If fragmentation reaches the point where it jeopardises the interests of those in control, other pressures build up for greater integration, and fragmentation is slowed or reversed. Over time a cyclical pattern of increasing and decreasing fragmentation could be expected to occur. It is not easy to measure the degree of fragmentation in a governmental system. Geographical fragmentation can be measured by population and area. Two broad indicators of functional fragmentation may be used. One is the number of separately constituted public authorities which deliver services to the citizen. The second is the number of authorities which are involved in complex problems and issues. The two forms of fragmentation may vary independently as shown on Figure 1.

Functional fragmentation can be observed in many other countries despite different constitutional and legal arrangements and is recognised as a consistent feature of modern Western nations (Dunleavy, 1984). In Britain the extent of functional fragmentation of government has often gone unrecognised, obscured by the large size of local authorities and the lack of a regional or provincial tier of government (Stewart, 1980).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRAGMENTATION AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL IN BRITAIN

Subnational government in Britain has evolved through alternating periods of fragmentation and consolida-

Figure 1 Functional and Geographical Fragmentation

	HIGH GEOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENTATION	LOW GEOGRAPHICAL FRAGMENTATION
HIGH FUNCTIONAL FRAGMENTATION	Plethora of small and specialised authorities e.g.Pre-modern system	Large local authorities and many functionally specialised authorities e.g. Present system
LOW FUNCTIONAL FRAGMENTATION	Many overall local authorities and few specialised authorities e.g.Early modern system	Large multi-purpose local authorities and few specialised authorities e.g. Redcliffe-Maud vision

tion (Vielba, 1986). At the end of the last century the highly fragmented system of parishes, counties, municipal corporations and special boards was drastically restructured (Keith-Lucas, 1980). The local authority was established as the prime unit of local government and public service provision in a locality. In the century over which the "modern" system of local government has operated, geographical fragmentation has been further reduced. Britain now has some of the largest units of local government in population terms to be found anywhere in Europe (Vielba, 1979). In the late eighties there was a small reversal in this trend with the abolition of the very large upper-tier metropolitan authorities.

Since the nineteenth century, public services have expanded consistently in cost, employment and scope of action and intervention. Government policy in the last few years has slowed the expansion but not driven the trend into reverse. It has been observed that the number of government organisations has declined in Western nations in the post-war period (Rose, 1984). However, the reduction in numbers caused by privatisation and reduced geographical fragmentation has concealed an increase in functional fragmentation.

The "loss" of local authority functions has been at the heart of increases in functional fragmentation (Robson, 1966). Functions have been transferred from local authorities to other public bodies, in some cases directly to central government but frequently to ad hoc agencies, special boards and the nationalised industries.

Losses have occurred through by-passing. Throughout the twentieth century local authority responsibilties expanded in land-use planning, social services and recreation. In other services, housing, education and public health, the involvement and workload of local authorities increased. Many new initiatives, however, by-passed local authorities. The new towns developed after the second world war were established under separate development agencies, a trend continued recently with the setting up of Urban Development Corporations. Economic planning at the local level was made the responsibility of special bodies, the Regional Economic Planning Councils. The boost given in recent years to work and training programmes for school-leavers and the unemployed became the responsibility of a single service board, the Manpower Services Commission, rather than the local

education authority.

Functional fragmentation was also fostered by the spread of two-tier local government. The abolition of the county boroughs in 1974 removed the only unitary local authorities. With the exception of the island authorities of Scotland the two-tier system of local government was adopted which gave both levels certain exclusive service responsibilities. When the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan County Councils were abolished in 1986 a single tier of local government was created in the capital and conurbations. However, far from consolidating all the existing local authority functions in one authority, a major part of the work of the upper tier authorities was passed to central government, existing specialised public authorities or newly created single-service joint boards and committees.

The dispersion of tasks and responsibilities in London following abolition is shown on Figure 2. Only a proportion of the upper tier's spending on services passed to the boroughs and districts. Bramley (1984) estimates that approximately half the budgeted expenditure of the GLC was transferred to the boroughs. The remainder went largely to non-elected bodies and joint boards with only a small proportion going to central government. However, the proportion of GRE transferred to the boroughs was greater. Stewart (1984) notes that in the Metropolitan counties, 70% of their expenditure was transferred to joint boards, leaving a much smaller transfer to local authorities.

Local government historians have seen a cyclical pattern in the consolidation and fragmentation of service provision at the local level which has taken

Figure 2 Destination of Main Services After Abolition of the GLC

services transferred to the boroughs	services transferred to central government	services transferred to joint boards	services transferred to other authorities
Planning and building control Housing Non-trunk roads Recreation and parks Refuse disposal* Trading Standards Sport Tourism Licensing Support for the arts	Trunk roads	Waste regulation Fire and civil defence	Support for the arts (Arts Council) Historic buildings (Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission) Buses and tubes (London Regional Transport) Education (Inner London Education Authority) Land drainage and flood protection (Thames Water)

Note: The dispersal of responsibilities from the GLC was infintely more complex than this table implies. The complexity of the new arrangements is discussed in Hebbert and Travers (eds) (1988)

*   Most boroughs have joined neighbouring authorities in waste disposal groups rather than undertake the function individually.

place. "Losses" from local authorities have occurred throughout the twentieth century, but the pattern appears to be one of acceleration through the 1930s, massive transfers in the period of reconstruction and nationalisation immediately after the second world war, and losses associated with reorganisation in the 1970s and 1980s. The trend is again gathering momentum as central government makes further moves to limit the role and the expenditure incurred by local authorities, and to require the contracting out of services. Contemporary urban government has been compared with the excessively divided institutional structures of the mid-nineteenth century. (Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978; Hebbert and Travers, 1988).

FRAGMENTATION AS AN ENDURING FEATURE OF BRITISH SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Lack of constitutional clarity

Writing at the turn of the century Redlich and Hirst (1903) concluded that the pattern of local government in Britain was not the outcome of any planned concept; instead it arose from the haphazard growth of earlier institutions. Later scholars have not demurred (Keith-Lucas and Richards (1978).

The flexible and unwritten character of the British constitution inhibits the emergence of a clear ideology of the role and purpose and therefore appropriate structure of government. One outcome is that it is possible to identify numerous idiosyncracies in the local government system such as the survival of the Corporation of the City of London whose boundaries and structures are the direct descendants of. its Medieval predecessors. It is also easy for institutions of government to multiply and

accumulate within the system without a clear pattern for rationalisation.

Governments have found the lack of constititutional prescription for the role of local government a convenient reason for preserving the status quo and contemplating only limited and ad hoc reform of subnational government. Robson (1954, p68) quotes a speech made by Aneurin Bevan (Minister of Health) in 1946 - a time when the welfare state was being set up and major organisational change was occurring in the public sector. Despite promising a greater role for local government in the future, he concluded that it was not a time to ask wider questions about local government saying, "we do not know what context local government is going to live in, it does not seem to me to be an appropriate time for an enquiry of that sort."

Many of those involved in considering reform have criticised the failure to consider subnational government as a whole. The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960) included the following comment,

> "The total effect on local government of all these transfers might almost be described as a resultant of blind forces... At no time was there any opportunity of giving thought to what would be the collective effect of all these transfers on local government institutions. In instance after instance, as we have already noticed, critics were told that they must not use this particular occasion for the purpose of re-organising local government."
> (para.686)

In the decade and a half following this enquiry, local government outside London, the National Health Service, public transport, and the water services

25

were all reorganised with very little reference of one to the other.

Ultra Vires

Another feature of British government which has attracted attention as an explanation of functional fragmentation is the fact that local authorities, like other public bodies, are restricted in their enterprises by the legal doctrine of ultra vires. This doctrine reinforced the laissez-faire attitudes of nineteenth century governments by shifting the burden of responsibility from what public authorities chose to do to what they were required to do. As a result it has been suggested that,

> "... we evolved a system of local government which is remarkably good in certain defined spheres of activity, but at the same time excessively narrow in scope and unimaginative in outlook."   (Robson, 1954, p258)

Such narrowness and unimaginativeness often provided the justification for establishing agencies outside local government to provide public services.

Both the Committee on the Management of Local Government (1967) and the Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969) argued against the restrictive effect of ultra vires and for equipping local authorities with a general competence and general spending powers. The Committee suggested that British local authorities compared unfavourably with their counterparts in Europe in responsiveness and initiative:

> "An English local authority is accustomed to carrying out exactly prescribed duties with its own staff ... joint action between authorities is not popular. It is often disliked and

consequently it is not always successful."
(para 43)

The Committee contrasted this position with America
and other European countries where not only did local
authorities enjoy less central regulation but they
also had general powers and competences.

> "Local authorities both in Europe and North
> America discharge many tasks by co-operation with
> outside agencies and make far freer use of
> voluntary associations." (para 44)

> "Perhaps even more important than actual
> extension of power is the different atmosphere in
> which a local authority enjoying several
> competences operates. The members think of the
> citizens' needs as a whole, and regard themselves
> as responsible for local well-being." (para 49)

The legal and psychological restrictiveness of the
doctrine of ultra vires was seen to lie at the heart
of the difference. Central government rejected the
demands for general competence for local authorities
when they were reorganised outside London in the
seventies. In recent times there have been few signs
from the courts or central government of its grip
being weakened. For example, the Fares Fair case
against the Greater London Council turned on whether
or not the local authority had the power to provide
subsidised as opposed to non-profit making transport
services. The alleged inappropriatenes of services
provided by some local authorities under Section 137
of the Local Government Act (1972) was cited by
central government as one of the reasons for
abolishing the Metropolitan and Greater London Council
(Department of the Environment, 1983).

Lack of an intermediate tier of government

British governments have favoured strong national

27

government and a unitary state and resisted the development of regional structures which might act as a focus for integration at the subnational level. The persistence of functional fragmentation has been seen as an outcome of the failure to develop intermediate regional or provincial organs of government and administration:

> "If regional councils were established there
> would be a practicable alternative to the
> transfer of functions from local authorities to
> central departments or special bodies. After all,
> the hospitals have been nationalised in order to
> be regionalised."
>
> (Robson, 1954, p67)

Britain had limited regional administration during the second world war in the form of the Regional Commissioners. In peace time they were fiercely opposed by the local authorities as smacking of tutelage.

The Labour Party has been broadly in favour of regionalisation but has never brought forward comprehensive proposals. The Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969) proposed a system of directly elected provincial councils. This suggestion found no favour with the government of the day. The last attempt to introduce an intermediate tier was stalled by the government's failure to secure agreement on devolution. Conservatives and Unionists have always resisted regionalisation.

Nationalisation

Functional fragmentation can also be understood as the organisational by-product, often unintended, of the pursuit of other national political objectives. For example, in bringing key industries into public

ownership in the past, governments chose nationalisation rather than municipalisation. In the early part of the twentieth century socialists such as the Webbs were urging the development of municipal trading. In _The Socialist Commonwealth_ the Webbs advocated local governmental involvement in a wide range of industries and services under the control of local authorities (Webb and Webb, 1920). Such municipalisation, however, never became a platform of Labour Party policy. Instead the preferred socialist strategy was nationalisation. Hence utilities such as gas and electricity were removed from local government to nationalised industries. The result at the local level was fragmentation as each industry separately tackled the problem of developing a structure for service delivery.

Privatisation

Fragmentation can also be used as a means of pursuing disengagement within the public sector. For example, water authorities were removed from local authorities in 1974 when the nine regional water authorities were set up in England. Privatisation was then rendered relatively easy by the separate character of the service and its organisation. The decision to pass certain services to separate agencies rather than to local authorities following the abolition of the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties could have been designed to leave the privatisation option open for the future. Whereas in the past functional fragmentation could be seen as a consequence of Labour governments' decisions to nationalise and centralise for social and political reasons, at the present time it can be seen as a consequence of a Conservative government's determination to reduce bureaucracy and limit collective intervention while simultaneously

maintaining strong central control.

The scale of modern government

Government is by far the biggest "business" in modern
Britain; its organisational needs are similar to
those of a very large company. A number of theories
about management suggest that any organisation which
becomes too big will be unresponsive and lose the
capacity to deal effectively with problems. An
excessively large organisation is unwieldy, remote
from those it serves and costly to administer
(Mintzberg, 1983). To overcome the inevitable loss of
performance which over-centralisation implies, some
fragmentation, either geographical or functional, is
required. In the modern world the latter has generally
been seen as more appropriate because it fits with
the application of specialist and professional
skills.

An ideal allocation of government functions could be
derived from a consideration of the costs and
advantages of providing services at different levels
or through different units of government. Discussions
of the appropriate allocation of responsibilities
using such criteria have figured prominently in the
reports of commissions and enquiries into the
organisation of local government and other public
services (Royal Commission on Local Government in
Greater London, 1960; Royal Commission on Local
Government in England, 1969). Such bodies have looked
deeply into the optimum size of units for the
delivery of particular services, their democratic
accountability and the inter-relatedness of particular
services. However, the search for an optimum pattern
has proved elusive and has seldom proved sufficiently
convincing to dictate patterns of service delivery

that run contrary to tradition or powerful vested
interests.

The role of special agencies

Functional fragmentation has been pursued as a means
of maintaining the basic efficiency and effectiveness
of subnational government but avoiding the
difficulties of local government reform. Functional
fragmentation has flourished because of a failure to
tackle geographical fragmentation quickly and
effectively. Despite the large units of contemporary
local government, historically local authorities have
been seen as too small in area, population and
financial resources, to be capable of providing
certain services. Special agencies have been set up
to deliver services in what was thought to be more
efficient and effective ways. The reform of the
geographical boundaries of local government came too
late because of the intransigence of vested interests
(Ashford, 1982).

Setting up a new and specialised agency is often
regarded as the appropriate political response by
central government to a newly arisen or newly
recognised problem. Such actions have both an
organisational and a political rationale.
Organisationally the new agency can make a fresh
start and concentrate upon the particular issue with
which it is concerned. Politically the setting up
of specialised agencies by central government to
tackle key problems provides visibility and allows
government to claim any successes for itself
(Stewart, 1980; Ashford 1984).

The role of the professions

The professions have had a very strong influence in British public administration, giving rise to what has been called the dominant functional image (Stewart, 1980). Greater importance is attached to integration within services than to integration of a range of services within a geographical area. The dominant role of the professions has grown stronger as geographical fragmentation has declined. Specialisation and professionalisation flourish with more autonomy within larger authorities than is possible within smaller units. The professions have seen their power and influence grow in public authorities outside direct political control. The professions have openly supported the continuation and extension of functional fragmentation. A number of groups have argued strongly for the independence of their work from political control. Keith-Lucas and Richards (1978) note that at various times in the sixties the police, social workers, college lecturers, planners and transport engineeers, all argued strongly in response to governmental enquiries, for the independence of their work from local government control. These arguments had triumphed two decades earlier when the medical profession demanded autonomy of the health service from local government as a price for entering the NHS.

Central government desire for power and control

Explanations of the continued functional fragmentation of local government must take into account the influence of central government's desire for control of local services. Central government and all the leading political parties over the years have used the rhetoric of a need for strong local government.

Strength, however, has largely beeen acceptable only in geographical size. The Treasury sees the task of controlling public expenditure as easier with fewer, larger authorities. Fewer and larger authorities are also seen to be more manageable and open to central government influence (although the Greater London Council proved large and very unmanageable for the Thatcher government). Nor has strength in local government been tolerated in practice; successive governments have weakened local government and enhanced central government's power. Limiting the role of local government, and functional fragmentation, have both contributed to this process.

Central government fear of local authorities becoming strong counter-vailing powers, capable of pursuing different public - policy strategies, influenced central government to press ahead with abolishing the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties. These authorities had become bases for wider political opposition (Flynn et al, 1985). The fear of strong local opposition movements has made the consolidation of a wider range of responsibilities and power in the hands of local authorities unattractive to central government. Functional fragmentation allows central government to maintain control of services more directly. Local authorities are the only directly elected units of government outside Westminster. Election gives them their own legitimacy and local political base of power. Other agencies responsible for services are organised in such a way as to be far more susceptible to central government intervention. The Secretary of State for Health is able to appoint and dismiss members of health authorities and maintains direct responsibility for the NHS. Most of the agencies responsible for services outside local authorities are responsive to national rather than

local preferences. None has the ability to pursue direct opposition to central government in the way some local authorities have done.

Why functional fragmentation persists

In summary, historically there seem to have been two contrasting attitudes towards fragmentation in Britain. A large degree of geographical fragmentation has generally been seen as a problem to which successive reforms have been directed. As a result, the thousands of local government territorial units of the past have been reduced to the few hundred present principal local authorities. Functional fragmentation, on the other hand, has been viewed as an imperfect but inevitable feature of local administration. In the past reformers of local government have often been content to increase functional fragmentation in the pursuit of other objectives such as nationalisation.

Two features of local government in Britain have created the potential for fragmentation to flourish. First, the lack of an agreed role for local government and, second, the restrictiveness of the doctrine of <u>ultra vires</u>. Fragmentation has flourished as a result of two characteristics of modern public administration. One is the prevalence of very complex and diffuse problems which must be broken down in some way to become amenable to action. The other is the growth dynamic of fragmentation itself: administrative change may take the form of waves of establishment, fragmentation and consolidation. Fragmentation may also become self-sustaining as new specialised bodies are created to connect the disintegrating fragments of the governmental system.

None of these features, however, is sufficient to create and sustain functional fragmentation in subnational government. For that to happen fragmentation must be an attractive strategy to those in a position to determine the shape and role of the governmental system. This proposition can be examined at various levels - for the interests of central government, for the interests of those employed within the public sector, and for broader class interests.

Central governments have been the instigators and executors of reform of the governmental system. Two strands of central governmental strategy are discernible. First, fragmentation has been a strategy, used by governments of all complexions, to maintain control over decentralised decision-making, public expenditure and service provision. A fragmented system has generally been incapable of throwing up powerful countervailing powers which central government would fear. Second, fragmentation has been seen as an inevitable and worthwhile consequence of pursuing other key strategies. Labour governments have accepted fragmentation as a part of pursuing equality, uniform national standards, planning and public ownership. Conservatives accept it currently as a means of facilitating privatisation. Governments of all colours have avoided radical reform and integration and been content to make exhortations and limited gestures towards improving co-ordination of programmes and services.

Reducing functional fragmentation has never been accorded priority in the reform of twentieth century local government. The pattern of functional fragmentation which has characterised subnational government has not been designed but has emerged

haphazardly as the accumulated result of decisions made with reference to other criteria. As a result, institutional structures have reinforced professional divisions in ways that have riven asunder connected parts of the public sector. Functional fragmentation has reduced government'scapacity to address particular problems, a phenomenon referred to by Hood (1976) as multi-organisational sub-optimism. Such structural defects carry a cos referred to paid for elsewhere within the governm sub-optimism, or in society at large.

Among those employed within the public sector, particularly the public services, the professions are the focus of organisation. A profession does not simply organise its membership; it structures the way problems are perceived and services developed. Functional fragmentation serves the needs of the profession directly. It allows many groups to be freed from direct political control and thus to dominate the development of a service. Groups such as doctors have resisted fiercely the idea of working for local authorities. Their example has inspired other groups to demand, though not necessarily to acquire, a separate existence for the services in which theyare most involved.

THE NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION

Fragmentation within a system of government gives rise to the need for integration. Self (1977) notes that governmental systems which contain a multiplicity of agencies reflecting multiple and conflicting interests are characterised by conflict and competition over services and policies. Conflict has costs in the form of wasted resources, inconsistencies, delays and deadlock. Fragmentation can

inhibit effective action to solve complex and diffuse problems and adds to the costs of public services by the resources absorbed by co-ordination. Such costs and disbenefits may outweigh the advantages of specialisation and organisational variety. Where co-ordination is ineffective the costs fall upon those groups most reliant on public services.

As functional fragmentation increases, the greater will be the need for processes and mechanisms to maintain the coherence of the system of government. The need for co-ordination of services was a central theme of many of the reports commissioned on subnational government in the sixties. The failure to recognise the links between services was cited by the Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969) as one of the main problems which needed to be addressed by reformers of the local government system.

> "Much of the evidence stressed the links between services, with their implications for the organisation of local government. Recognition was widespread that planning and transportation should be administered together; and witnesses who dealt with these subjects often considered that large-scale development, urban renewal and housing (or at least all very large housing projects) should also be in the same hands. Likewise, evidence from government departments, local authority associations, individual authorities and professional organisations pointed to the importance of the ties joining housing, health and welfare, child care and education..... In general, the evidence showed that there is a wide range of local government services which should be seen as a network of interwoven activities." (para 145-7)

Co-ordination can be achieved in government in many ways. It may be achieved spontaneously by agencies anxious to reduce the costs of fragmentation to themselves or their clients. Where co-ordination does

not occur spontaneously, attempts may be made to impose it artificially from above. During the sixties and seventies conventional wisdom favoured mechanisms of explicit co-ordination by governments. In the eighties and nineties central government has favoured reliance on spontaneity.

The need for co-ordination within the public sector has not diminished. The reports on a number of recent disasters such as the King's Cross and Bradford fires identified failures in co-ordination that led to inadequate public safety measures and inadequate responses to safety incidents. Two further examples of the continuing need for improved cross-authority working are community care and urban policy.

The policy of transferring patients from long-stay hospital care to accommodation within the community has been in place for a long time. Progress towards targets for transfer of patients has been slow and gaps in service provision have occurred (House of Commons Select Social Services Committee, 1985; Audit Commission, 1986). The Audit Commission (1985) summarised the problems as follows:

> "Responsibility for introducing and operating community-based services is fragmented between a number of different agencies with different priorities, styles, structures and budgets who must 'request' co-operation from each other. For community care to operate these agencies must work together. But there are many reasons why they do not, including the lack of positive incentives, bureaucratic barriers, perceived threats to jobs and professional standing, and the time required for interminable meetings (joint planning alone could easily be occupying the equivalent of 30 professional staff full-time in a large county)" (p3)

Furthermore, regional health authorities, which have a powerful planning role, are not matched

organisationally in local government. Hence the tendency for programmes of hospital closures to run faster than programmes building up community facilities.

For most of the last quarter of a century, inner-city problems have been on the political agenda in Britain. Studies of urban poverty have consistently stressed its multi-dimensional nature and identified failure to co-ordinate services as a key problem (Department of the Environment, 1977). The development of co-ordinating structures has been a common theme of inner city policies. Comprehensive Community Programmes (CCPs) were designed to tackle urban deprivation through comprehensive programme planning. Resources were a major problem for the initiative but so too were co-ordination and the ability to work across agency boundaries (Spencer, 1982).

CCPs were superceded by the concept of partnership (Secretary of State for the Environment, 1977). The White Paper stated that:

> 'The urban studies of recent years have shown
> that urban problems cannot be tackled effectively
> on a piecemeal basis. The problems interlock:
> education, for example, is affected by housing
> and by employment. The best results are likely
> to be achieved through a unified approach in
> which the different activities and services of
> government are brought together. Concerted
> action should have a greater impact. It should
> lead to a more efficient use of resources by
> avoiding duplication or conflicts of effort, and
> it ought to be more in departmental or agency
> terms.'
>
> (para 59)

New measures were announced which were on an area basis and involved special efforts of co-ordination and joint working which cut across established practices. The joint machinery of partnership was to involve both local and central government as well as

39

the health authorities, the police and the Manpower Services Commission.

Partnerships failed to develop a successful multi-agency approach to urban problems (White, 1985). More ostensibly successful intiatives such as GEAR (Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal) had limited success in developing cross-authority co-ordination. Booth and Money (1982) suggest that GEAR achieved results despite rather than because of its co-ordinative efforts, and dub it MANGO (a mutually non-effective group of organisations) which engages authorities in a cosmetic way. The approach to inner cities adopted since 1979 has relied less on imposed co-ordination and more on voluntary efforts. Studies of the Merseyside Task Force suggest that the initiative added to the pattern of organisational confusion by setting up new agencies rather than bringing existing bodies closer together (Morrison, 1987). The House of Commons Environment Committee (1983) concluded that,

> "The attitudes of those involved in the management of urban renewal in Merseyside fall far short of the joint working necessary for the effective co-ordination of effort." (pxxi)

An explicit attempt to circumvent the problems that arise when multiple authorities are responsible for a task was the introduction of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). The impetus for their development lay in government frustration with the slow progress made by the London Docklands Joint Committee which embraced a number of London Boroughs and the Greater London Council. Far from generating a wide-spectrum approach to urban problems, UDCs have been criticised for their narrow focus on land and property development and lack of interest in other social and economic problems. The structure of UDCs

and their renunciation of strategic planning have further fragmented policy within their geographical areas and increased the gaps and contradictions between the programmes run by different authorities (Brownhill, 1990).

THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY NETWORK

The British system of local government is based on local authorities which are directly elected and multi-functional. According to writers such as Stanyer (1976) they can be viewed as primary units of local government. Although local authorities discharge a specific set of responsibilities, most see themselves as having a general responsibility towards the communities they serve (Brooke, 1989). At the heart of this perspective is the concept of local authorities as a locus of government rather than administration. The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960) distinguished local government from local self-government. The former involved local administration of central government; the latter the "internal regulation of the affairs and services of some community such as a borough or parish" (Para. 222).

Over the last hundred years local authorities have been the only focus of democratic politics outside Westminster. The franchise for local authority elections was gradually widened from its ratepayer base to a universality matching that of national elections (Keith-Lucas, 1980). The process was completed in 1977 when the role of alderman, an indirectly elected member of a local authority was abolished. The controlling boards of all other public authorities are appointed, generally entirely by

central government, and are answerable only to Parliament through the relevant government Ministry.

The significance of the democratic control of local authorities has increased as the nature of local politics has changed. The direction of change has been towards increasing partisanship and the dominance of national political debate in local elections. For many years the number of independent local councillors fell and the majority of councillors are now identified with national political parties. The Widdicombe Report (Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business, 1986) quotes a figure of 15% of councillors elected as independents and a similar proportion of local authorities, mostly rural districts, controlled by independents. Estimates of the extent to which local issues account for voting behaviour at elections vary. Miller (1988) estimated that 20% of variation in voting bahaviour at local elections could be accounted for by local issues.

Partisan politics themselves have been a feature of British local authorities since the nineteenth century. However, as Gyford (1985) points out, until the post-war period local politics, although partisan, moved along rather separate paths from national politics. These paths converged in the post-war period. Hence the actions of local authorities have become not only clearly political but immediately identifiable with either central government or national oppositional policy. The strengthening of partisan politics at the local level can be seen as a swing of the pendulum against the growth throughout the twentieth century of pro-fessional and administrative power in local

authorities.

The broad thrust of central government actions over the twentieth century has been to increase central government control over local authorities. Since 1979 centralisation has accelerated despite a central government regime committed to minimising the role of government in society. Centralisation has had implications for the role of local authorities within the public authority network. It has acted to suppress local initiative in pursuit of its aim of breaking local monopolies and empowering customers. It has also concentrated power in the hands of a central government sceptical of the need for explicit co-ordination structures and reliant on spontaneous local initiatives. Were central government strongly committed to co-ordination, local authorities might be mandated to play a key co-ordinating role in their localities. Central government is itself functionally fragmented. The lack of corporateness at the centre deters government from seeing local authorities as corporate bodies trying to deal with complex inter-related problems (Central Policy Review Staff, 1977).

The co-ordinating roles assigned to local authorities

Over the last century local authorities have occupied different positions within the public authority network. From the creation of the modern system of local government until immediately before the second world war, local authorities, although numerous and small seem to have enjoyed relative freedom to act and were politically independent of central government (Gyford, 1985). Furthermore, whilst not responsible for all public services in an area, they dominated subnational government.

After the war it was no longer justifiable to see local authorities as synonomous with local government despite their greatly increased size and reduced numbers. The accelerating loss of functions from local authorities and the growing tasks of government posed the question of network leadership and the need for local authorities to play a co-ordinating role. However, while public management theorists focussed on the structures and processes needed to integrate the increasingly functionally fragmented subnational government, other changes were occurring which made local authority action problematic. The critical change was political. The nationalisation of local politics not only changed the public profile of local authorities but reinforced the long-established trend towards increased central control of local government. Subnational government more than ever mirrored the functional fragmentation of central government. While individual local authorities might have seen it in their interests to integrate the work of other public authorities with their own, they had effectively lost the autonomy and independence that would allow them to do so.

In the sixties, when local authorities were responsible for the provision of more services, it was possible for the Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969) to refer to the potential of local government to discharge "an all-round responsibility for the safety, health and well-being, both material and cultural, of people in different localities" (Para 27). The Commission favoured placing the remaining non-local authority health services under local authority control. Beyond this recommendation, little attention was paid to how local authorities would relate to other public authorities.

When central government decided to remove both health and water services from local authority control in the 1970s the role of the local authority within the public authority network became a more pressing organisational problem. After reorganisation in 1974 both health and local authorities had a duty laid upon them to co-operate. To facilitate co-operation the boundaries of area health authorities (the middle tier of the health service) and local authorities were made co-terminous. Each health authority and its related local authority had to establish a statutory joint consultative committee. Both authorities were given the power to supply each other with goods and services and from 1976 onwards cash was made available through health budgets for joint projects. The Royal Commission on the Health Service (1979) reported that arrangements were unsatisfactory and responsibilities unclear. Despite this finding, elements of the system of linkages between health and local authorities such as the area tier of health management were . subsequently dismantled.

The Study Group on Local Authority Management Structures (1972) was strongly critical of the fragmented departmentalisation which characterised the internal management of many local authorities. This report recommended that local authorities should adopt a more corporate approach to managing their affairs. It recommended a parallel approach to relationships within the public authority network with the initiatives coming from local authorities:

> "We have, throughout this report, urged local authorities to adopt a corporate approach to the management of their affairs. We believe that there is in many ways an equal need for what has been termed a 'community' approach to the problems and needs of areas. We are not, however, suggesting that there should be an attempt to organise all services or plan all projects

> according to some detailed formal plan; the need
> as we see it is for each authority to be aware
> of and take into account the interaction between
> the plans, policies and functions for which it is
> responsible and those of other authorities ... We
> believe that this concept of 'community' interest
> must involve not only the new local authorities,
> but also other voluntary and public agencies,
> including particularly the new area health boards
> and regional water authorities."
> (para 8.3-4)

The approach recommended by the Study Group was for a system of joint committees to be set up to link counties and districts but into which health and water authorities would also be linked. The Study group was very optimistic about the ease with which such relationships might be built:

> "Because of the contiguity of the boundaries of
> the [area health authorities] with those of local
> government it will be a simple matter
> structurally to involve the area health
> authorities in those services of mutual concern
> both in the day to day operation and in the
> forward planning and joint policy making of local
> authorities, particularly through the district
> joint committees to which we have referred
> earlier."   (para 8.19)

District joint committees were never developed into the strong co-ordinating mechanisms envisaged. Efforts were made to link the newly separated services to local authorities through joint membership and, in health, through statutory joint committees and a small financial allocation for joint projects. In general, however, it was left to individual authorities to take initiatives as best they could within the existing legal, financial and political framework.

In the eighties the tide turned against the approach promoted by the Study Group. New ideas about ways to improve the public sector focussed on breaking up

46

large units of government and privatising the provision of services. The public good was seen to be served by focussing on efficiency and effectiveness within individual services.Favoured innovations included opting out for schools and health facilities, competition, and the purchase rather than the provision of services. Relationships between public authorities would be purely voluntary in order to reduce the bureaucratic constraints on authorities' operations.

The concepts of service provision and public sector management being promoted at the time when the research reported here was undertaken, addressed the question of intergovernmental relations at the local level in an indirect fashion. There was strong emphasis on the need for marketing and the importance of the consumer (increasingly designated the customer) which focussed attention on the appropriateness of service outputs as perceived from outside the organisation. This way of looking at services should have drawn attention to the problems arising for the customer when authorities provided unco-ordinated or incompatible services.

Public authorities were being urged to adopt the values and practices of the "enterprise culture". The idea of enterprise focussed on innovation and inventiveness; it implied risk-taking by by-passing traditional bureaucratic processes. Such ways of working should have encouraged a search for new solutions to old problems, such as the need to make links across organisational boundaries.

By requiring authorities to put services out to competitive tender, central government attempted to shift the emphasis within local authorities from the

management of service-provision to the acquisition of services to meet local need. As a purchaser of services the local authority would become more skilled at working with other organisations and addressing problems to which it did not necessarily provide the total solution itself.

Other ideas about the provision of public services being promoted during the eighties were less favourable towards the establishment and development of intergovernmental relations at the local level. Since the beginning of the decade central government had been committed to the reduction of government at all levels. Part of the impact of such ideas was the reduction of resources available to public authorities, which inevitably jeopardised the financing of non-core activities such as collaborative structures. Furthermore it discouraged the development of new links which by definition constituted a growth in governmental activity.

A high value was placed by central government on competition. Competition was seen as an essential discipline which ensured both the efficiency and effectiveness of a service-providing organisation. Local authorities and other public authorities were obliged to introduce competitive tendering and to compete for their own services. The financial constraints imposed by central government emphasised the extent to which public authorities were in competition with each other for resources. The requirement to think and act competitively in many areas did not encourage the collaborative thinking and action inherent in the development of intergovernmental links.

Finally, the emphasis placed by central government on cost-reduction and overall reduction of public expenditure tended to promote a short-term perspective. Authorities were obliged to focus attention on balancing the budgets within each year against a background of financial uncertainty and falling government grant and subsidy. This financial regime generally discouraged long-term initiatives such as the development of relationships with other authorities.

The most recent attempt to describe a co-ordinating role for local authorities is the concept of the enabling authority (Brooke 1989, Stewart 1990). An enabling authority is one whose concern with public services is wider than the services it provides directly. Brooke (1989) identifies the origins of the enabling role in local authorities' historic commitment to promoting the broad interests of the areas and communities they serve. However, as Stewart (1990) points out, the concept of enablement has come of age in the nineties as a result of central government's commitment to privatisation and the ending of local government monopolies by the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering. The experience of discharging responsibilities successfully through contractors is seen as a basis upon which to build the pursuit of wider objectives through other public and volunteer agencies.

The difference between enabling and corporate management at the community-level lies not in the objectives of action but in the means employed. The aims of community level corporate management were the alignment of services provided by different authorities to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of service - provision. The aims of

enablement are similarly to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public authority network by imposing order and pursuing community welfare through increased choice (Brooke 1989).

Community-level corporate management focussed upon formal committees, planning and consultation. A coordinating superstructure was required to align authorities and pursue joint objectives. Enabling involves local authorities in reassessing their role and using existing relationships to exert their leadership within the public authority network. The role which the protagonists of enabling urge upon local authorities is that of provider of strategic management at the community level. The relationships which can be exploited strategically include membership of wider bodies, contractual and agency arrangements, purchasing, grant-giving, and regulation. (Brooke 1989). Where no such relationships exist the local authority must resort to influence. Stewart (1990) notes that to enable successfully a local authority must itself change in order to develop structures and equip members and officers with the skills needed to work across organisational boundaries.

Enabling is seen as a hope for the future of local authorities. As central government has acted to restrict local government activity, local authorities have been looking for new and satisfying roles to fill the void left by reduced direct service provision. Central government is open to voluntaristic local co-ordination which anticipates the criticism that central government action has left local government hopelessly fragmented and over-centralised.

So far the enabling authority is a prescriptive model. Both Brooke (1989) and Stewart (1990) point to examples of enabling behaviour but cannot identify an authority which operates strategically as an enabling authority. The research reported here was conceived and carried out before the concept of the enabling authority was enunciated. Intergovernmental relations at the local level are at the heart of the idea of enabling. The pattern of IGR within Camden and the role of Camden Council in the public authority network gives an indication of how near to or how far some local authorities may be from the model of an enabling authority.

CHAPTER 2 THE LITERATURE ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND HORIZONTAL IGR

LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR

POLICY STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY
OF HORIZONTAL IGR

Macro explanations of horizontal IGR
Pluralism and horizontal IGR
Elite theory and horizontal IGR
New right theories and horizontal IGR
Marxist theories and horizontal IGR

MIDDLE LEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF HORIZONTAL IGR

Interorganisational studies
Structural analysis
Intergovernmental relations

THE ENVIRONMENT

ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS

INTERDEPENDENCE

PROCESSES

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 2   THE   LITERATURE   ON   INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

There is no well-defined body of literature or theory of IGR at the local level. Academics and those directly involved in government have for some time been interested in IGR in Britain. However, the focus of this interest has been largely on vertical, or central-local, relations. Vertical IGR is now a relatively well researched area with a substantial body of academic writing and supporting theory (Jones, 1980; Rhodes, 1981; Goldsmith, 1986; Ranson et al, 1985). By comparison, horizontal IGR have received much less attention.

The predominantly vertical dimension of IGR research has been reflected in studies of accountability, power and control between levels of government. The original impetus to study central/local relations arose from political concern about the relationship between central government and local authorities (Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance, 1976). The subject has subsequently been widened to encompass other relationships. Rhodes (1988) argues that the relationship between central government and sub-central government must include relations with nationalised industries, public corporations and the local units of government departments.

This chapter begins by reviewing studies in operations research, local government studies and policy studies which included IGR at the local level. In the second part of the chapter the three-level model of theory is presented and a range of theories reviewed at the macro, meso and micro levels of explanation.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND HORIZONTAL IGR

In the late sixties and early seventies a number of influential works on horizontal IGR emerged from the Institute for Operational Research (IOR). IOR had been set up to remedy the tardy application of operational research techniques to public-sector problems. Stringer (1967) conceptualised the public sector as a 'multi-organisation' in which tasks were undertaken by parts of several organisations involving multiple decision-takers. The multi-organisational perspective was adopted in a major study of planning processes in Droitwich undertaken by IOR in the late sixties which typified studies of this genre.

The Droitwich study was published in 1974 (Friend et al). The authors build their model of horizontal IGR on interacting policy systems. A policy system is defined as the social context in which decisions are taken about a particular class of problems. Decisions are taken by actors who may belong to different organisations. Actors are inhibited in their decision-making by policy guidelines and by formal and informal relationships between them. Policy systems have many of the characteristics of policy networks (see below).

In the model developed by Friend et al horizontal IGR can be located both within policy systems (since actors are drawn from different organisations) and between systems. In a decision network, actors within a policy system may have the opportunity to seek solutions to problems jointly with actors in other policy systems.

By applying this model to the problems of planning overspill from the West Midlands conurbation, Friend et al reach a number of conclusions about the way the public authority network works. Planning involved multiple organisations and policy systems. The decisions to be taken were too complex to be resolved in a single set of moves. Actors therefore engaged in a bargaining process aimed at securing a satisfactory outcome and preserving maximum freedom of manoeuvre in subsequent negotiations. The critical factor in the functioning of the network was identified as the judgment skills of individuals. Changing issues militated against formal structures and emphasised organic ones. Limited resources required judgments to be made about the approaches made to others and the relationships developed. Interaction was seen invariably to have mutual benefits for those involved and to grow naturally as experience provided actors with further networking skills.

Friend et al have been criticised both on theoretical and methodological grounds (Martins, 1986). The nature of the planning issues involved in Droitwich led the authors to over-emphasise the mutual benfits of interaction and to place too much weight upon informal relationships and the judgment skills of individuals as a way of working across organisational boundaries. While these criticisms highlight weaknesses which limit the validity of the findings across the public sector as a whole, the model is nonetheless useful in understanding a case such as Camden where voluntary and informal relationships were common.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR

Local government studies is not a single discipline.

Like its parent subject, public administration is interdisciplinary, diverse and frequently atheoretical (Rhodes, 1991). Its focus is often pragmatic and institutional. Horizontal IGR has been researched by two different groups of scholars under the broad heading of local government studies. One group belongs to the political science tradition; the other uses a public administration and management perspective.

The study of local politics was advanced in the seventies by a number of classic studies of single authorities. Hampton (1970) and Newton (1976) both examined the politics of a county borough, Sheffield in the one case, Birmingham in the other. In Sheffield councillors' links with outside organisations were almost entirely with their political party or with voluntary organisations. In Birmingham the overwhelming point of contact of voluntary bodies with public bodies was with the City Council, either its officers or members. County boroughs were responsible for a far greater range of services than Camden Council is today, and the need for voluntary bodies to deal with other public authorities was less.

Dearlove (1973) focussed on the way public policy was made in one local authority, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The borough is portrayed as an organisation enjoying high levels of autonomy and relatively insulated from its electors, ratepayers and clients. The study looked at which sources of information and influence councillors paid attention to and those they ignored. Among those which members excluded were other governmental structures, including the GLC, the LBA and central government departments. These bodies were thought to lack local

interests and to pose a threat to local independence. They were also dominated by Labour (the borough was Conservative) and were on occasions a target for political defiance.

Saunders (1979) conceptualised local government as the lower-tier local authority. In a study of the London Borough of Croydon he identified the GLC and central government as part of the external environment in which the local authority operated. In particular he highlighted the hierarchical nature of their relationship with the borough and their role in curtailing Croydon's autonomy.

Relationships with other public bodies are peripheral in all these studies. Dearlove offers an explanation of this in the exclusion of certain groups and organisations by the local authority. Scholars have also held a highly local-authority centred view of local government which has excluded the relationships between the local authority and other public bodies from many studies of local politics. External relations have been seen as the vertical dimension of government or contacts as with business interests and the public and voluntary bodies.

Local government studies has a strong management dimension. The report of the Study Group on Local Authority Management Structure (1972) coincided with widespread interest in the management of local authorities. Research centres, such as the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), were the source of not only descriptive but also prescriptive works on local government management. The source of the management models proposed was the private sector. In the seventies management thinking in local government was dominated by the corporate management

model (Eddison, 1973; Stewart, 1971). This model
emphasised the importance of structures and processes
which co-ordinated and steered organisations and
prevented them from fragmenting along functional
lines.

Calls for the application of the corporate management
model not only within local authorities but across
the public authority network have been described
above (see Chapter 1). Studies of local government
revealed that the adoption of corporate management
had been less than wholehearted within local
authorities. Greenwood et al (1980) reported that by
the late seventies the commitment of local
authorities to the corporate approach was fading.
With respect to the wider development of corporate
management within IGR at the local level, very few of
the suggestions for formalising inter-authority
relationships were taken up.

Management research on horizozntal IGR in local
government has focussed attention largely on
bilateral relationships and particular kinds of
linking mechanisms. Studies of bilateral
relationships have concentrated on contexts where
formal links are statutorily required between the
local authority and another public authority.

By far the largest body of writing has been on the
links between local authorities and health
authorities (Glennerster et al, 1983; Wistow and
Fuller, 1983; Chant et al 1986; Challis et al 1988).
Wistow, (1988) notes that although a considerable
amount of collaborative machinery has been set up
between local authorities and health authorities, and
allocations of joint finance spent, a joint approach
to service provision has not emerged. While no longer

completely separatist, planning was seen to occur in parallel rather than jointly. Areas of problem-solving success tended to be ad hoc, and joint operational activity usually resulted from the efforts of particular individuals. The authors identified two sets of factors which explained the failure of joint arrangements to meet expectations. One was structural, for example, the over-reliance on formal methods, the instability caused by reorganisation in the health service and the strength of professional interests. The other set were environmental, in particular overall resource constraints under which both authorities were operating.

A number of studies have been undertaken of particular types of linkages between local authorities and other public authorities. The trigger for such studies has frequently been practitioners'concern about the efficacy of arrangements. For example, Elcock (1978) reports a study of health authority members and points to the distinctive attitudes held by councillors who are nominees on health authorities. Flynn and Leach (1984) in their study of joint boards and joint committees highlight the specific conditions under which such linkages are effective, noting the tendency for joint boards to become autonomous from the authorities they link and joint committees to become cumbersome. Leach et al (1987) studied the relationships between counties and districts. They found high levels of contact between the two tiers dominated by officials and informal relationships. The amount, type and quality of relationships varied greatly from place to place, between services and over time.

The literature on management in local government has shed considerable light upon the workings of particular forms of linking mechanisms and the relationship among particular pairs of authorities. Studies have demonstrated the conditions under which interauthority relationships develop. Environmental, organisational and attitudinal factors have been identified which determine the pattern of relationships. These factors generally match those identified by organisational-studies scholars who have examined the conditions under which organisations in general develop relationships (see Chapter 6).

POLICY STUDIES AND HORIZONTAL IGR

Studies of IGR reveal the complexity of relationships involved in particular issues or services. The fabric of government has been shown to be structured as policy communities and networks formed around distinct tasks or issues (Rhodes, 1988). These structures include both vertical and horizontal IGR as well as relationships with private and voluntary bodies.

Rhodes (1988) distinguishes six different types of network which can be involved in making public policy. None of the types corresponds to the network of public authorities serving a single local authority. Policy communities are vertically integrated and exclusive structures involving those who share responsibility for particular services. Territorial communities are associated with geographical areas built on strong provincial or regional identities. Professional networks, producer networks and intergovernmental networks based on the local authority associations share little in common with the Camden network. The final

type is based on Heclo (1978) and the idea of an issue network which is loosely structured, pluralistic and usually has a wide membership. In structural terms issue networks are closer to the Camden case but based on territory rather than one specific issue.

Policy studies reflect these different types of network. Rhodes (1988) quotes a large number of policy studies cases which demonstrate the operation of these network types. As discussed in Chapter 1, studies of topics such as community care and inner cities have demonstrated the extent to which poor horizontal IGR is responsible for policy failure. Because of the strong functional divisions within British government, policy studies have tended to marginalise questions about the relationships between policy networks at the local level. There have been no attempts to repeat Friend et al (1974) using policy studies theory and concepts which have been developed since.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF HORIZONTAL IGR

Theory has been used to explain patterns of IGR at three different levels of analysis (Houlihan, 1988). Such a framework can be applied equally successfully to vertical and horizontal IGR. The widest, or macro level, is that of social structure and seeks to demonstrate how relationships between public authorities are shaped and constrained by the distribution of power amongst different groups in society. At the middle level, explanations of IGR are provided by theories of structure and organisations. At the third, individual level, IGR patterns are explained by theories of political processes and the behaviour of professionals.

Macro explanations of horizontal IGR

Macro theories offer explanations of horizontal IGR by reference to the wider social system. In the course of theorising about the organisation of the state, macro theories contribute to an understanding of horizontal IGR. Most such theories offer an explanation of the fragmentation which is commonly found in modern liberal democracies. The patterns of power in society are shown to determine the degree and pattern of fragmentation of the machinery of government. Relationships among fragmented units may therefore be determined by interests which lie outside the organisations themselves, and outside the formal machinery of government. Macro theories also offer models of the processes by which the fragmented parts of the governmental system work together or side by side.

Pluralism and horizontal IGR

Pluralist theories give pre-eminence to the multiple sources of power in society and its diffusion amongst different interest groups and institutions. In a pluralist system governments respond to many separate demands of a differentiated society through a plethora of public bodies (Dahl, 1961). Fragmentation of the governmental system is seen as a direct reflection of the polyarchical nature of society.

Pluralists view the development of geographical and functional fragmentation rather differently. Geographical fragmentation is viewed positively because it creates more accessible governmental units through which demands can be expressed. Functional fragmentation on the other hand is viewed suspiciously. Specialised public authorities are seen

to be responsive to national pressures, to the interests of central government, and to sectional interests (Self, 1972).

Neo-pluralists modify the notions of pluralism to take account of the dominant role of business interests in Western democracies, and dwell on the internal processes of administration within modern government. All pluralists see advantages in multiple agencies defending the multiple interests involved in a complex issue or policy area. In this way the network as a whole has the ability to control the actions of any particular authority within it for the public good. Neo-pluralists emphasise the negative aspects of fragmentation:

> "Modern administration contains and requires a bewildering kaleidoscope of specialised experts, each claiming and receiving some title to professional authority... The multiplication of specialised professions supports the Balkanisation of public programmes and policies, unless the expert contributions are firmly harnessed to broader purposes." (Self, 1972, p293).

Pluralists differ about the extent to which governments play an active role in society and they differ too about the interests to which any such action responds. These differences are reflected in views about the way public authorities will relate to each other. Some pluralists see the state as passive, playing no role in developing co-ordination among public authorities; rather, co-ordination occurs through group adjustment (Miliband, 1969). Other pluralists propose an active state which plays a co-ordinating role either through formal co-ordinative mechanisms or through a shifting population of policy-based structures which reflect the issues of the day (Allison, 1971). Both viewpoints

would suggest a co-ordinative role for local authorities within their localities, although theorists differ about the degree to which local authorities are able to, or indeed should, impose co-ordination on the other authorities concerned with public services in an area.

According to classical pluralists the fragmented system of government is integrated by processes of interest group bargaining and negotiation known as partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom, 1965). Under such a system policy develops in an incremental fashion. Neo-pluralists focus on the policy networks which develop around particular issues. Within communities of interested organisations and groups networks develop that support not only bargaining but also rational decision making (Rhodes, 1988). Neo-pluralist theories suggest a less central co-ordinative role for local authorities within the public authority network than classical pluralist theories by stressing the importance of the network as a whole. Neo-pluralist theories also suggest that professional and informal channels of communication may be more important in co-ordinating the fragmented system than formal co-ordinating mechanisms.

Elite theory and horizontal IGR

Elite theory suggests that the tasks of government are in the hands of a small ruling group, the governing elite. Concentration of power is viewed positively because the ruling group is seen to emerge from those uniquely qualified for the task of governing and thus acts efficiently and effectively on behalf of the masses (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935). Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) note that such theories generally contain detailed accounts of the organisation and

structure of the governmental system including fragmentation at the subnational level.

Elite theories of government give prominence to the role of officials and to the development of a rational government bureaucracy (Weber, 1968). This gives rise to a dilemma. On the one hand, the need for control and co-ordination implies the desirability of a unified and centralised bureaucracy. On the other hand, the need to divide complex tasks into their component parts and to decentralise implies fragmentation and the development of partially autonomous units of subnational government (Nordlinger, 1981). These opposing forces pull the system of government first one way and then the other.

Elite theorists locate governmental power centrally but most see the governing elite responding to other elites and organised interests within society. In elite theory the relationship between the ruling group and these non-governmental forces is crucial in determining the form which fragmentation takes. Some theorists suggest that the pattern of fragmentation of the governmental system is a direct reflection of the activities and influence of other elites in society. They may be the elected politicians who have left their mark on the system of government through reorganisation and insitutional innovation. They may be powerful social or economic elites to which the ruling elite responds by organising the state apparatus to pursue their particular interests. Fragmentation may be a by-product of this process or a deliberate strategy to pursue certain economic or social objectives.

A particular group of elite theorists have developed the idea that the the ruling group and the

governmental bureaucracy act autonomously and respond only minimally to external pressures (Nordlinger, 1981). According to these theorists the fragmentation of the governmental system is fostered by those in power for their own ends.

Regardless of who controls the ruling elite, theorists have suggested three reasons why fragmentation may increase in parallel with centralisation (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). One reason is that the multiplicity of subnational governmental institutions is in itself no indication of decentralisation because they are excluded from key national decisions and act as an absorbent layer, insulating central government from those they govern. Another reason which has been advanced is that subnational government provides a means by which local and sectional elites can be tied into the governmental system and mobilised in support of the ruling group. A third reason is that through subnational government the governing elite can distance itself from difficult policy areas and through functional fragmentation, insulate areas from popular account.

New right theories and horizontal IGR

Theorists of the New Right focus upon the individual citizen and his rights. Such theorists see inherent tyranny in all forms of government. They suggest that the individual will only be able to exercise his rightful control over his existence if the activities of governments are minimised and those activities that are retained are tempered by forms of government which expose them to the equivalent of market forces (Scruton, 1981). The prescriptive theories of the New Right have been very influential with recent conservative governments.

However, within their generally critical view of governmental machinery, New Right theorists have focussed upon the notion of geographical fragmentation as offering citizens the possibility of good government. It is argued that the more numerous are the units of local government, the more opportunity there is for citizens to exercise an effective sanction over local politicians and bureaucrats by moving. It is assumed that citizens will behave as rational purchasers of local government services and move to areas which minimise their costs and maximise their returns. Small geographical authorities are more likely to be homogeneous and to exhibit distinctive characteristics. Many citizens do not experience total freedom of movement and numerous small authorities in a location allow choice to those tied to the general location by job or family demands (Tiebout, 1956). New Right theorists do not see any virtue in functional fragmentation per se although they favour federal or tiered systems of government as a way to check the actions of those in power by allowing further geographical fragmentation and by focussing more sharply the issues upon which voters are deciding at any particular election.

Public choice theories which have been strongly identified with those of the New Right postulate the need for two sorts of local government unit - those locally controlled and branches of central government services supplying services locally. Such a division with central government providing some developmental and most of the redistributive services and local government providing allocational and some developmental services is seen to follow from the rational pursuit of social welfare benefits (Dunleavy, 1984). However, there is nothing in the

67

model which suggests that the services controlled by central government should be fragmented across a number of public authorities. Such fragmentation would tend to detract from the economic efficiency obtained by an otherwise optimal distribution of responsibilities between different levels of government by necessitating co-ordinating machinery to counter duplication, gaps and conflicts.

Marxist theories and horizontal IGR

The central focus of Marxist theories is upon the class structure of society. They assert that class is based upon the relationship of groups of individuals to the means of production. A dominant class always emerges and controls the governmental system ultimately in its own interests. In modern Britain the dominant class is the capitalist class which owns the means of production.

Marxist theories differ in their view of the relationship between the class structure of society and the organs of government. Classical Marxism has generally viewed the system of government merely as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class, shaped and used to the benefit of that class. The structure of subnational government is seen in this model as a reflection of the interests of the capitalist class. Local government is not seen to reflect local interests but rather to represent at a local level the dominance of the national ruling class. Conflict may arise between this level of government and the state should local insitutions come under the sway of working-class interests. Such oppositional forces are never, though, able to withstand the power of the centre for more than a short period.

Some Marxist theories see the government in the role of arbiter (Poulantzas, 1978). Government is at arm's length from the dominant capitalist class but through its conscious neutrality always acts to favour the long-term interests of that class. Arbiter theories recognise the nearly evenly balanced strength of different classes in many nations and acknowledge that parts of the machinery of government must at any one time be under the influence of non-capitalist classes. The structure of the system of government, including fragmentation, can be used to keep potentially radical influences in check. For example the reduction of geographical fragmentation in Britain could be interpreted as a direct attempt to prevent Labour holding power at the local level. Labour support is more concentrated geographically than Conservative support. Large geographical authorities where the urban vote is diluted by suburban and rural votes favour the Conservatives. The exception has been in the main conurbations where there was sufficient concentration of Labour votes to dominate the former Metropolitan authorities. These were abolished in 1986 by a Conservative government in part as a reaction to their strong oppositional policies.

Events such as Abolition suggest that the history of class struggle may be read into the pattern of fragmentation currently displayed in the governmental system. Dunleavy (1984) suggests that the local government system which emerged during the nineteenth century was shaped by the conflicts between fractions of capital in the period of mass industrialisation. The nature of capitalism changed subsequently so that the close connections between local government and business were severed. Local authorities remained as

institutions which gave the state legitimacy as a
democratic structure but protected class interests by
their ineffective structure and organisation.
Functional fragmentation was positive in that it
protected the central state from proletarian
pressures by making it impossible for the working
class to capture and control the range of
governmental institutions upon which they depended
heavily. The governmental system can thus be seen to
maintain conservatism in the field of public
services. Obscure patterns of responsibility and
accountability make it difficult for clients to apply
effective pressure on the system. The near
impossibility of organising a sustained strategy
involving so many different agencies makes it unlikely
that effective action could be taken to tackle
problems posed by poverty and disadvantage.

A final variant of the basic Marxist theme is the dual
state thesis (Saunders, 1979). It suggests that
governments utilise resources in different types of
programmes in order to pursue order, capital
accumulation and legitimacy. Central government is
concerned primarily with capital accumulation and
leaves to local government the programmes which
contribute to order and legitimacy, either directly,
for example, through the police or indirectly, for
example, through housing programmes. Furthermore, it
is suggested that policy-making at the subnational
level will be fundamentally pluralist with pluralist
institutions to match. The reason advanced for this
pattern is the need for government to appear
responsive and to be seen to accommodate local and
sectional interests in order to maintain its long-term
control of the economy at the national level.

MIDDLE LEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF HORIZONTAL IGR

At the middle level there are two extensive bodies of theory which concern relationships among public authorities, - interorganisational studies and intergovernmental relations. Rhodes (1981) used both sets of theories to develop a framework for understanding central-local relations in Britain.

Interorganisational studies provide middle-level explanations of interorganisational relationships. Many use a contingency approach. Among recent developments of particular relevance to explaining horizontal IGR is structural analysis.

Intergovernmental relations utilise more micro-level explanations. The unit of analysis has been the individual post-holder and explanations of his/her behaviour have encompassed factors including attitudes, values, motivations and styles of management.

Interorganisational studies

Interorganisational studies grew out of organisational studies in the late fifties. Early writers on interorganisational relations point to the very large amount of sociological study of patterns of behaviour within organisations compared to the few studies of relations between them (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962). Interorganisational analysis developed using the same tools of functionalist sociological theory which dominated organisational studies. It has attracted similar criticism as its parent discipline (Sheets, 1981). More recent studies have adopted game approaches (Crozier and Thoenig, 1976) or a political economy view of

interorganisational relationships (Benson, 1975). Interorganisational studies have contributed significantly to an understanding of the environment in which organisations operate, the nature of networks, dependency among organisations and processes of interorganisational activity.

Structural analysis

Some interorganisational research has been carried out on commercial organisations (Assael, 1969). The majority of the classic studies have been American and have focussed on voluntary social service organisations (Levine and White, 1961; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Hall et al, 1977).

Structural analysis has grown out of main stream sociological research as a reaction to reductionism, structuralism and determinism. Structural analysis focusses on the relationships among social entities rather than on the entities themselves. Knoke (1990) uses network to compare political behaviour in a variety of settings including local governance. The contribution of structural analysis is in focussing analysis at the level of the network.

Intergovernmental relations

Intergovernmental relations as a topic of study developed out of an interest in federal systems (Rhodes, 1981). It focusses on the relationships between tiers of government, i.e. vertical IGR. Earlier studies of institutional, financial and constitutional arrangements have been complemented by studies of social structures and the processes by which policy is made within a complex tiered system of government. Many such studies have an application

only to vertical IGR and are also highly country specific. The potential for transferring the insights of many studies of federal systems to horizozntal IGR at the local level in Britain is therefore limited.

Later studies of intergovernmental relations have converged with interorganisational studies. Simeon (1972) and Wright (1978) studying intergovernmental relationships within Canada and America respectively identify the bargaining and negotiation processes whereby policy is made and the relationship between the centre and the states is handled. Compared to many interorganisational studies, intergovernmental relations research highlights the political dimension of relationships. This aspect makes it a useful tool in understanding the operation of relationships including those of horizontal IGR.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Environment has figured prominently in explanations of organisational structure and activity. Emery and Trist (1965) criticised the tendency to view organisations as closed sytems. They advocated the model of organisations as open systems located within an environment with which they interact. A variety of criticisms have been levelled against systems theory as a basis for studying interorganisational relationships (Karpik, 1978). However Rhodes (1981), in examining the contribution of interorganisational analysis to vertical IGR, demonstrated that it is possible to use the concept of an organisation's environment to explain the linkages it develops with other organisations provided that environment is carefully defined.

Rhodes (1981) used a narrow definition of environment in order to focus on a particular relationship, that between a central government department and local authority. For the purposes of this study a broader definition has been used which takes account of the many layers of context in which intergovernmental relationships are embedded. The literature on organisational studies suggests that there are four contextual layers which contribute to an explanation of the presence and development of inter-organisational relationships.

The first layer comprises the immediate context within which structure is developed and performance occurs. It corresponds to the idea of setting defined by Pugh et al (1969) as a mixture of organisational variables such as size, technology, resources, ownership and history. They demonstrated that such variables were correlated with structural variables such as task specialisation, control of work, and concentration of authority. Their contingency approach has been used in interorganiational studies to identify similar contextual variables which correlate with the presence and development of interorganisational linkages.

The survey of antecedent conditions affecting interorganisational relationships conducted by Halpert ,(1982) includes a number of factors which are an integral part of the organisational setting. These factors comprise an organisation's task, structure, culture and stability. Responsibility for providing a wide range of services, broadly defined statements of mission and heterogeneity of staff have all been shown to increase the likelihood of an organisation developing links with other organisations (Whetten and Aldrich (1979). Heterogeneity seems to make

organisations more aware of other services and more able to understand and build links with the agencies repsonsible for their delivery.

Organisations which do not have a clearly defined structure have been shown to face difficulties in developing interorganisational links (Gardiner and Snipe, 1970). Structure is necessary to provide the administrative support necessary for linkages to be effective. While a more defined organisation may be better placed to develop relationships, the particular form that an organisation's structure takes can have a profound effect on linkages. Successful interorganisational linkages seem to flourish between organisations which are characterised by good communications, closeness to their customers or clients and a strong framework of accountability and responsibility.

Three key indicators of an organisation's likely ability to develop and sustain interorganisational relationships have been identified: the extent to which it is centralised, bureaucratised and professionalised. In centralised organisations power is located too far from those who are aware of the need and potential for links with other service providers at the client level (Akinbode and Clark, 1976). Bureaucracy inhibits communications within an organisation and can make an organisation's response to others slow and inappropriate. A degree of professionalism in an organisation can contribute to the successful development of interorganisational linkages; however highly professionalised organisations may find it difficult to develop linkages with authorities whose staff have a different professional allegiance and outlook (Wright, 1977).

Culture as well as structure has been shown to affect the development and growth of interorganistional linkages. (Aiken and Hage, 1968) found innovativeness to be closely correlated with the development of organisational linkages. They interpreted this relationship to imply that innovativeness created a demand for new resources to be obtained by developing relationships with other service-providing organisations. It could alternatively be suggested that only those organisations accustomed to innovativeness are able to cope with the challenges that interorganisational relationships pose.

The stability of the organisational context has been identified as an explanatory factor in inter-organisational studies. Instability can arise from high staff turn-over (Widner, 1973) or from high rates of structural and policy change within an organisation. The effect of frequent change is uncertainty for other organisations, a phenomenon which interorganisational links seek to reduce.

The second layer comprises other organisations operating in the same functional or geographical area. This layer was identified by Thompson and McEwan (1958) in their study of the definition and pursuit of organisational goals. They observed that these processes must be undertaken in reaction to the actions of other organisations operating in the same field. This layer was further defined by Evan (1966) in the notion of an organisational set, a group of organisations with which a focal organisation interacts which affects the way that the central organisation behaves. The organisational set concept was further developed into the idea of organisational networks where the context of an organisation is provided by all the other organisations with which it

interacts directly or indirectly (Laumann and Pappi, 1976).

Studies have demonstrated that similarity of organisational structure facilitates interaction and, conversely, dissimilarity inhibits the development of interorganisational linkages (Redburn, 1977). Boundaries influence the development of links. Coterminosity implies that organisations serve a common public and are operating in a similar environment. Coterminous organisations can have not only a straightforward one-to-one relationship but also a basis of common interest and understanding. Where there is lack of coterminosity a multiplicity of links may be required to connect organisations providing two different services, and further structures may be needed to co-ordinate these interorganisational links (Hammond, 1976).

Internal structure also affects relationships. Halpert (1982) quotes studies demonstrating that differences in task, resourcing, priorities, goals, scale, culture and operating systems affect the establishment and development of relationships between organisations.

The third contextual layer is much broader and includes a wide range of socio-economic and political variables. Given the focus within interorganisational studies on the role of power and resources, examination of this layer of context has focussed largely on factors determining the availability and distribution of these two variables.

Benson (1975) defines this third aspect of the environment as the governmental system and public. The study of their influence on the public service

network and upon the availability of resources and distribution of power merges with macro studies of IGR described above.

The fourth layer corresponds to the all-encompassing notion of environment put forward by Emery and Trist (1969). They classified societal environments according to their degree of complexity and causal interconnectedness and hence uncertainty. As uncertainty rose, so they predicted would the need for interorganisational linkages that could increase certainty in the organisation's environment.

Emery and Trist (1965) identified three processes which led to turbulence: the impact of giant oligopolies, the role of governments in institutionalising the interdependence of social and economic factors and the role of research and development whose sole purpose is to induce change. The environment produced by such forces is characterised by uncertainty. Organisations operating in such environments must find a means of establishing stability among other things by developing links with other organisations. Terreberry (1968) notes that as turbulence increases, externally induced change increases at the expense of internally produced change so that other organisations become an increasingly important aspect of an organisation's environment.

Attempts to measure turbulence and its impact on organisations have been fraught with difficulties (Tosi et al, 1973). Galaskiewicz and Shatin (1981) found no relationship between turbulence defined in population terms and the predisposition of leaders of social agencies to co-operate. Organisational theorists have demonstrated the impact of changing

78

patterns of communications on organisational structures, for example, by replacing bureaucracies and hierarchies with networks (Handy 1989).

A further development by one of the original authors of the concept of environmental turbulence has been to focus on the nature of task. Trist (1983) identifies a class of issues called metaproblems which comprise complex sets of inter-related problems typical of turbulent environments. They are also typical of the problems to which the public sector must respond. The key characteristic of such problems is not their instability but their complexity and scale in relation to organisational capacity. Ackoff (1974) described the concept of "mess". A mess involves problems which inter-relate in such a way that the solution to one problem creates other problems. Because of this tendency the solution to a mess cannot normally be found by breaking it down into component parts. A mess or metaproblem can be tackled only by co-ordinated planning and action based on a systems approach. However Trist (1983) notes that the conflict and dissent inherent in turbulent environments prevent the development of consensus and interorganisational domains.

ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS

Studies of interorganisational relationships have been criticised for regarding the links between organisations as mere extensions of the organisations themselves. The organisational set model (Evan 1966) which has dominated interorganisational theory diminishes the importance of the linkages themselves (Rhodes 1981). By taking the focal organisation and the group or set of organisations with which it interacts as the basic unit of analysis, researchers

have often ignored the independent effect of linkages upon organisations (Knoke 1990). The advantage of conceptualising the local authority and other public authorities as a network is that it focusses attention on the linkages between the organisations studied.

The concept of a network of social relationships was developed by anthropologists and sociologists in the course of studying linkages among individuals (Mitchell, 1969). The analytical tools which were developed in order to study individuals were then borrowed and adapted by theorists wishing to explain organisational behaviour. Laumann and Pappi (1976) successfully applied the concept of a network to both individuals and organisations in their study of decision-making in a small German town.

There is no fully developed theory of the relationship between network variables and the behaviour of organisations, although some findings have been reported suggesting how the relationship may work. Hanf and Scharpf (1978) attribute the failure of modern governments to perform effectively, efficiently and responsively among other things to low network density. Christenson and Sachs (1980) demonstrate a negative relationship between public perceptions of service quality and the number of administrative units per capita which is an indicator of network size.

INTERDEPENDENCE

The assumption which underlies the great majority of writings on organisations is that the natural state of organisations is independence. A central question which is addressed, by studies of interorganisational

relationships is the nature of interdependence which exists among organisations. The dominant theory which has been used to explain the phenomenon of inter-organisational relationships has been resource dependence supporting the notion that the essence of interorganisational activity is exchange.

Levine and White (1961) in a study of community health organisations identified a number of resources, both human and physical, which were essential for such organisations to achieve their goals. Since these resources were always in limited supply, organisations had to take steps to procure them from other agencies to fill the deficit available in the external environment. Hence the need for resources gave rise to interaction with other organisations and interdependence among them.

Resource dependence and exchange have remained dominant concepts for understanding inter-organisational interdependence and activity although they have been considerably refined and reworked. The definition of resources has been widened to include intangible elements such as information. Benson (1975) singled out money and authority as the two basic types of resources sought and traded in interorganisational networks.

The need for resources is seen to be exacerbated by various environmental and organisational factors and thus to vary in intensity. Aiken and Hage (1968) found a relationship between an organisation's innovativeness and joint programmes. Aldrich (1975) also notes that the tendency for organisations to specialise in a society where the division of labour is strongly developed creates the need for relationships among organisations with related tasks.

Intergovernmental relations posits a different kind of interdependence between governmental units. This interdependence is based on the distribution of powers between levels of government. Wright (1978) suggests three models of IGR based on separated, inclusive and overlapping patterns of power distribution.

Leach and Moore (1979a identified hierachical and functional interdependence where powers are delegated or shared. In a study of relationships between counties and districts they describe three forms of structural inter-relationship: dependence on common resources; hierarchical dependency such as agency arrangements or delegation of powers; and functional interdependency where power is shared. They distinguish three types of function dependency - sequential (where one authority completes a task begun by another), pooled (where they both engage in the same task) and reciprocal (where tasks are passed back and forth between organisations). White et al (1975) also describe a model of interdependence among health organisations co-ordinating their goals and activities in a rational way in response to knowledge of client need. The authors point out that this model is largely a prescriptive one promoted by policy makers rather than a descriptive model of actual behaviour, unless actively promoted by central government or other external forces.

Edstrom et al (1984) in a study of linkages between Swedish manufacturing companies found that the growth of joint developments was encouraged both by a need for resources and the need to manage uncertainty in the environment. Neither explanation could fully account for the emergence of joint working which in many cases relied on individual or idiosyncratic factors.

PROCESSES

A number of theories have been advanced about the nature of the behaviour within interorganisational interaction. Four theories are reviewed briefly below: exchange, games, bargaining and negotiating, and partisan mutual adjustment. There is overlap between the last three but their roots are different.

Levine and White (1961) used exchange theory to explain the processes by which organisations obtained resources from each other. Exchange was entrenched in sociological theory as an explanation of interpersonal behaviour (Homans, 1958). Individuals expend effort in the pursuit of reward in their interaction with others. Like much sociological theory developed initially to explain individual actions, exchange theory was extended to collective behaviour and the actions of organisations (Blau, 1964).

Cook (1977) criticises the tendency of some interorganisational theorists to view exchange as synonymous with interaction. She argues that only those voluntary relationships where resources are transferred between organisations for mutual benefit should be considered exchange.

The transfer of resources to meet organisational needs implies the possibility of a market. In theory a perfect market could exist for the supply of needed resources to an organisation by other organisations. In practice markets are more likely to be monopolistic or oligopolistic. Organisations will therefore exhibit market-induced behaviours in attempting to secure essential resources.

Cook (1977) also points out that resources and power

are intimately connected. Any organisation upon which others depend for resources is able to wield power. A powerful organisation is able to alter the terms of trade in its own favour. In doing this it becomes dependent on others continuing to accept its terms. Two conclusions can be drawn. One, that organisations will direct their attention to managing dependence as much as to transferring resources. Second, although power will not be distributed equally long-term stability in the network will generally be achieved.

Benson(1975) takes exchange theory a stage further. Organisations seek money and authority. The political economy through which they are distributed defines the interorganisational network. The political economy operates at a fundamental level underpinning everyday activity directed towards the performance of tasks. Benson suggests that organisational decision-makers will pursue goals such as the fulfilment of programme requirements; the maintenance of a clear domain of high social importance; the maintenance of orderly, reliable patterns of resource flow, and the extended application and defence of the agency's paradigm. Organisations define the power which allows them to pursue these goals either from the wider society or by their position in the network and their ability to meet other organisations' need (i.e. exchange). In Benson's model goals are pursued by selecting appropriate strategies and tactics from a repertoire available to the organisations in question.

Within interorganisational studies a modified form of exchange theory is still dominant as a model of interorganisational processes. Its value in analysing voluntary relationships is to highlight the importance of rewards. Relationships are unlikely to prosper unless both sides find them rewarding and rewards

outweigh costs.

An alternative theory of the processes of interorganisational relationships is based on the notion of games. Crozier and Thoenig (1976) used game concepts to explain relationships within French local government. They identified a system which was fragmented, lacked co-operation and communication, was driven by rivalry and conflict and resisted attempts a formal co-ordination. The local governmental system was neither liberating nor efficient yet it was highly stable. The degree of stability in the system led them to postulate a substructure of bargaining, negotiating and game-playing which allowed individuals within the system to pursue their own objectives and manage their mutual dependence. The system was held together by a number of decision-makers who occupied key positions and mediated amongst others in the network. It was in the interest of everyone in the network to maintain the system because its substructural nature allowed individuals to have autonomy without public visibility or accountability.

Crozier and Thoenig add further insights on the nature of the game-playing process. First, games cannot be played independently by a few participants in that work. Games are always played collectively. Second, an individual is obliged to play several games simultaneously. Individuals play the game rationally, calculating the probability of gains and losses. However, multiple roles and imperfect knowledge imply that individuals will act irrationally much of the time.

Explanations based on games have not dominated interorganisational studies to the extent that exchange theory has done. One of the contributions of

85

game-based explanation is to offer a tool which can be used to uncover the complex informal relationships which exist in a fragmented and formally unco-ordinated system. The difficulty of the method is epistemological: when everyone is simultaneously playing multiple games how is it possible to derive an objective account of what is happening?

The concept of games has also played an important role in intergovernmental relations research. Wright (1978) in a study of IGR in the United States identified a model of overlapping relations of great complexity and diversity. Bargaining, negotiation and exchange were all observed within the system. The process tended to run along a number of well-worn paths and to follow certain rules. These rules or game strategies are learned by officials for use generally or in particular situations. Parts of the process are also ritualised into games by the officials and politicians who play them. The success with which such games are played is seen to be related to a player's structural position and personal skills.

Simeon (1972) in his study of IGR in Canada identifies a process of goal-directed behaviour by officials and politicians which encompasses bargaining and negotiation. He likens the process to international relations where there is conflict between the parties on many issues but agreement on certain overall goals, the need of compromise and co-operation and the means by which disputes are handled. The goals adopted by participants in the IGR process are shaped by environmental factors (socio-economic and structural); the institutional and cultural framework; and the demands and problems facing the system and the personal aspirations, style and role conceptions of those involved. In operating the

system decision-makers must adopt strategies and tactics which allow them to negotiate on several fronts simultaneously. To act in this way participants must make calculations about the behaviour of others. The complexity of the system in which they operate requires participants to simplify their calculations and assumptions. Simplification is achieved by making explicit rules and norms for behaviour in IGR, by taking certain goals as fixed and by concentrating on change at the margins. Simeon rejects the simple rules of operation identified by IGR studies of budgetary games such as Wright (1978), as inappropriate in a highly complex policy-based relationship among governmental units.

As IGR studies have moved from a constitutional and legal focus to one concerned with behaviour, they have identified in detail the political processes involved in relationships. The dominant processes in models of IGR are bargaining and negotiation undertaken by powerful individuals who pursue a mixture of personal and organisational goals. The pursuit of such goals can lead both to interaction and a lack of interaction between authorities. Unlike exchange theory, theories of interaction based on games, negotiation and bargaining suggest that lack of activity is as meaningful as activity.

Bargaining and negotiation are amongst the strategies which Lindblom (1965) identifies as partisan mutual adjustment. He constructs a model of decision making in which individual decision-makers pursue their own goals in the absence of centrally imposed co-ordination. Each decision-maker must adjust to others with whom he is interdependent. He may either adapt to the actions of others or attempt to force others to adapt to him. The process of adjustment is rational

and provides an efficient means of co-ordinating the actions of disparate decision-makers.

Conclusion

A wide range of empirical and theoretical works has been reviewed. There is no defined body of theory on horizontal IGR. It is necessary, therefore, to seek explanations of the relationships between public authorities, from a variety of disciplines.

In common with similar phenomena such as vertical IGR, explanations are available at three different levels. Among macro-theories of political phenomena aspects of pluralistic, elite and marxist theory are useful in understanding why the structures of governance are fragmented yet remain coherent. New-right theories help understand current central government attitudes towards the pattern of local public-service provision. Middle-level theories of interorganisational studies provide explanations of the nature of interdependence, the networks that exist among inter-related organisations and the processes which occur in intergovernmental relations. They also provide explanations of the role of the environment in shaping organisational and interorganisational behaviour. Intergovernmental theories and theories based on games provide explanations of the behaviour of decision-makers in relation to other authorities.

As with theories at the macro-level, there are a number of competing perspectives at the middle and micro levels. Previous studies have demonstrated the need for a synthesis of competing theories in understanding public service organisations which differ from both commercial organisations and pure government bodies (Knoke, 1990).

CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND METHODS USED IN THE STUDY

THE MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS USED IN DESIGNING THE STUDY

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

THE SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH LOCATION

THE SELECTION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES FOR INCLUSION IN THE STUDY

THE POSITION OF THE GLC

GAINING ACCESS TO THE SELECTED AUTHORITIES

THE SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

THE INTERVIEWS
The period over which the interviews were conducted

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

CHAPTER 3 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND METHODS USED IN THE STUDY

THE MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS USED IN DESIGNING THE STUDY

The starting point for this thesis was an earlier study financed by the ESRC on the relationships between counties and districts in urban areas of England undertaken by the researcher and various colleagues (Stewart et al, 1984; Leach et al, 1987). The main aim of that study was to explain variations in the quality of inter-tier relationships, in particular the incidence of conflict between counties and districts. It used a model which incorporated a set of factors derived from previous research in organisation studies (see Figure 3). Leach and Moore (1979) had developed a framework for explaining inter-authority relationships the land-use planning. The model used in the county-district relations study drew extensively on this earlier work. The latter framework is discussed in Hinings et al (1982). In the county-district study the classification of patterns of interdependence between authorities drew on the work of Thompson (1967), Williamson (1975) and Hall et al (1977). The game approach of Crozier and Thoenig (1976) and the political economy approach of Benson (1975) influenced the view taken of the use of strategies in intergovernmental relations. Young (1976) was a key source of ideas about officers' and members' values.

The work on county-district relationships was based on extensive semi-structured interviews with politicians and officials in thirteen authorities in London, the West Midlands and Lancashire. The conclusions of the study were that the model explained much of the

FIGURE 3

A Framework for the Study of County/District Relationships

```
    ┌──────────────────┐
    │ Linkages between │
    │   functions of   │
    │ County and District│
    │    A        B    │
    └──────────────────┘
         │        │
         ▼        ▼
┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
│Opportunities │  │ Obligation   │         ┌──────────┐│  Political   │
│for Interaction│  │ to Interact  │         │Territorial││  ideology   │
└──────────────┘  └──────────────┘         │ identity │└──────────────┘
    │        │         │                    └──────────┘      │
    ▼        ▼         ▼                          ▼           ▼
┌────────┐ ┌──────────────┐              ┌──────────────────┐
│  Not   │ │Perceived Areas│              │  Professional/   │
│Perceived│ │of Interdependence│          │   Political      │
└────────┘ └──────────────┘              │   Attitudes      │
              │    │    │                 └──────────────────┘
              ▼    ▼    ▼                   │            ▲  ▲
            (3)  (2)  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐ │  │
                      │    (1)       │  │Predispositions│ │  │
                      │  Perceived   │  │     to       │ │  │
                      │Potentialities│  │ Co-operation │ │  │
                      │for Co-operation│ │ Manipulation │ │  │
                      │ Manipulation │  │  Conflict    │ │  │
                      │  Conflict    │  └──────────────┘ │  │
                      └──────────────┘    │    ┌──────────┐┌──────────┐
                          │               ▼    │Professional││ Access  │
                          ▼                    │paradigms ││   to     │
                   ┌──────────────┐            └──────────┘│  Scarce  │
                   │Development of│                        │and valued│
                   │Strategies by A│                       │Resources │
                   │   and B      │                        └──────────┘
                   └──────────────┘
                          │
                          ▼
         ┌──────────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐
    ────▶│      Use of              │◀────  │Spillover from│
    ◀──── │    Strategies           │────▶ │deployment of │
         └──────────────────────────┘      │strategies in │
              │         │                   │other links of│
              │         ▼                   │relationship  │
              │  ┌──────────────┐           └──────────────┘
              └─▶│  Quality of  │◀──────────────┘
                 │ Relationship │
                 └──────────────┘
```

SOURCE: Hinings, et al (1982).

variation in quality observed in relationships between tiers of local government. Some modifications of the orginal model were needed, however, to increase its explanatory power. Figure 4 shows the redrawn model incorporating organisational and contextual factors ommitted from the original model.

The revised model developed in the work on county-district relationships was adopted in the research reported here on relationships between local authorities and other public authorities. Many respondents in the earlier study had described the other tier of local government as just another public authority they had to deal with and drew parallels and comparisons between relating to the upper or lower tier of local government and relating to the health authority or the water authority. In the model, relationships are determined by the interplay of professional and political attitudes and the opportunities and obligations which are set by the context in which they operate. This context comprises the constitutional and organisational structure of the authorities themselves, the issues and tasks emanating from particular communities, and the wider social, economic and political environment.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The size of the research team involved in the earlier research made it possible to look at ten different pairs of relationships across the full range of local government activity in three different parts of the country. The team had also been able to draw on the data collected in two national surveys of county-district relations to broaden the data base. Apart. from size there were other differences between the two studies. The main interest in the

FIGURE 4: Revised model of the Determinants of the
Quality of County-District Relationships

ISSUES &
TASKS

Constitutional &
Oranisational
Frameworks

* Local Government
  system
* Distribution of
  Powers
* Local Authority
  Organisation
* Inter-Organisa-
  tional Structures
* Party System

Professional and
Political Attidues

* Professional
  values
* Administrative
  Self-Interest
* Territorial
  Identity
* Political
  Ideology

External Constraints

* Resource Availability
* Central Government
  Policy
* Political Structure
* Technology
* Social Pathology

PREDISPOSITION TO
ACT

CHOICE AND USE OF
STRATEGIES

ACTION

county-district study had been in the extent to which
obligatory relationships about tasks for which
repsonsibility was divided betweeen the tiers were
co-operative or conflictual. In the wider network
there are few instances where responsibility for a
particular service is split between authorities and
few instances where the establishment of
relationships is obligatory.

The approach taken, therefore,in the research reported
here, was to use the model developed to explain the
quality of county/district relationships as a
framework with which to explore relationships between
local authorities and other public authorities. The
methodology employed in the Camden study was a
function of the implications of the design chosen and
the limits imposed by the capacity of a lone
researcher. The study was centred on the public
authority network in a particular geographical area.
It was a qualitative study based on semi-structured
interviews with a wide range of decision makers.

THE SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH LOCATION

The area chosen for research was the London Borough
of Camden. Camden fulfilled a number of pragmatic and
design requirements. It was within easy access of the
researcher's home and workplace. Good contacts
existed between the researcher's workplace and both
the local authority and other key public authorities
relevant to the study, which facilitated access.

It was felt important to select an area with higher
rather than lower levels of interdependence within the
public-authority network. Interdependence is the basis
upon which relationships develop. It was assumed that
the greater the levels of interdependence in the

network the more likely it was that intergovernmental relations would be a topic of concern to decision-makers. Respondents working in a highly interdependent network would be able to articulate views that shed light on the factors that shape the local authority's role in that network.

A number of features of the Camden area suggested that interdependence there would be relatively high. First,it was an inner London borough where the education service was provided by a separate authority, the Inner London Education Authority. Many relationships which elsewhere would be intra-authority, for example between education and leisure services, in Camden were inter-authority. Second, parts of the Borough were characterised by high levels of social need and intractable social problems of poverty, deprivation and unsocial behaviour beyond the scope of any one authority's actions. Third, Camden was a completely urbanised area within the dense urbanisation of the inner part of the conurbation. Public authorities operate in close proximity to each other and compete for land and labour and other resources. Levine and White (1961) argued that welfare organisations were obliged to enter forms of exchange in order to satisfy from each other their demands for resources and clients. Benson (1975) developed this notion further into the concept of a political economy operating between public authorities in which two scarce resources, money and autonomy, are traded.

Other features of Camden suggested it was an area where interdependence was likely to be an issue of concern to public-sector decision makers. The Borough was a Left-dominated authority characterised by high-spending and a set of radical policies aimed at

major social change. Such an authority might have been expected to take a greater than normal interest in the work of other public authorities and to be externally oriented. On the other hand it was recognised that the political complexion of the local authority might be a barrier to other public authorities wishing to develop relationships with the local council.

Second, resource scarcity may predispose organisations to collaborate. The notion of resource dependency which underpins much writing on inter-organisational networks suggests that both scarcity of material resources and desire for growth in a period of static resources can generate interaction. However, since the price of securing material resources from other organisations is an undesired loss of autonomy, authorities may be expected to compete fiercely for extra funding or squabble among themselves for existing resources. Gamm et al (1984) summarise the impact of falling resources on interorganisational structures. They suggest that joint approaches in adverse conditions are only possible where there is a history of prior positive linkages. Aiken and Hage (1968) have pointed out that inter-authority relationships carry costs for the participating authorities and are feasible only for organisations with spare capacity. Although Camden Council had a high rate base and a tradition of high spending it had also been under severe resource pressure from grant penalties and rate-capping. Other local public authorities, such as Bloomsbury Health Authority, had been under similar financial pressure.

THE SELECTION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES FOR INCLUSION IN THE STUDY

The main focus of the research was on the role of the local authority within the public authority network rather than on the network as a whole. An "organisational set" approach was therefore adopted to selecting authorities for inclusion in the study. The concept of an organisational set was developed by Evan (1966) from sociological concepts of role applied to organisations using a systems-analysis perspective. The local authority was designated as the focal organisation and the source of identifying the relevant organisational set. Initial contact was with the Chief Executive's department through which an approach was made to 12 departments and sections of the council. The list of departments and sections is shown in Figure 5. A positive response was eventually received from all departments approached.

FIGURE 5 Departments and sections of Camden Borough Council included in the Study

DEPARTMENTS
Baths and Recreation Chief Executive's Engineering Finance Housing Libraries and Arts Planning and Communications Social Services Works
DEPARTMENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE STUDY Architecture and Surveying Building Environmental Health
SPECIAL UNITS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY Civil Rights Unit Economic Development Unit Welfare Rights Unit

Interviewees were invited to list the public authorities to which the work of their department related, regardless of whether interaction existed. These lists were then combined to create a set of public authorities which might be included in the study. Voluntary bodies and private-sector organisations were excluded where they were mentioned. For example a number of respondents referred to the Citizens' Advice Bureau as a public authority. British Telecom, despite its recent privatisation, was also referred to as a public authority.

A large number of public authorities was mentioned including nationalised industries, single-purpose authorities such as health authorities, London Regional Transport and the police, QUANGOS and government departments. The list was too long and criteria had to be developed to select those authorities to be included in the study.

The first criterion used was that authorities had to operate within the London Borough of Camden. On this basis adjacent boroughs and other local authorities were excluded. Second, authorities whose relationship with the local authority was based on supervision rather than direct provision of services in a common geographical area were excluded. On this basis Government departments were excluded with the exception of the benefit side of the DHSS which has a network of local offices providing basic services to the public. Other organisations which did not provide a direct service to the public were also excluded. Under this criterion the local authority associations and some of the voluntary joint arrangements which succeeded the GLC were excluded. This reduction left a list comprising service-

providing public authorities operating within the geographical area of Camden.

The list was still very long. The next criterion to be applied was that similar organisations existed elsewhere. Under this criterion the British Museum was exluded as an organisation unique to that geographical area. The significance of the interdependence with the local authority was also considered. For example, the Countryside Commission which has very limited interdependence with the London Borough of Camden was excluded. The sample thus became focussed on service-providing authorities, similar to those that might be found in other parts of the country, which not only operated within the Camden area but had significant interdependence with the local authority.

THE POSITION OF THE GLC

When the research began in the autumn of 1985 the Greater London Council was still in existence. However, the authority was in the process of winding down in anticipation of its abolition on March 31st 1986. Contact was made with the authority but it did not prove possible to undertake any systematic interviewing of officers or members during this period. This loss was not to prove unduly serious for the study as the researcher was able to draw on a set of interviews conducted relatively recently at the GLC as part of the earlier study of two-tier relationships in local government. These interviews had been carried out in a wide range of departments of the Greater London Council, Tower Hamlets, Brent, Barnet and Harrow. The author did all the interviews personally in Brent and Barnet, and approxminately half the interviews in Harrow and the Greater London

Council. The main deficiency in these interviews was that they focussed on county-district relationships and did not look at relationships between the GLC and other public authorities.

The question then arose of which, if any, of the successor bodies should be included in the study. Two sorts of successsor bodies existed in London. The first may be termed the official bodies, proposed in the legislation. The second comprised unofficial, voluntary arrangements, primarily supported by groups of Labour Boroughs which attempted to preserve a number of roles developed by the GLC that central government did not recognise as legitimate (see Hebbert and Travers, 1988). The latter successor bodies were excluded. A distinction can also be made between joint boards which are freestanding bodies nominated by a number of local authorities and joint committees which are appendages of the authorities involved (Flynn and Leach, 1984). The former have been regarded as public authorities and included in the study; the latter have been regarded as co-ordinative mechanisms and extensions of the local authority.

The abolition of the GLC did not constitute a clean change in the public authority network. When the GLC ceased to exist many of its functions remained to be allocated and were lodged temporarily with the London Residuary Body. Some of the successor bodies proved difficult to establish. Instability in those parts of the network affected by the abolition of the GLC may have had an impact on the accuracy of some of the descriptions of linkages reported below, but it also introduced a dynamic variable into the study to be examined in its own right.

GAINING ACCESS TO THE SELECTED AUTHORITIES

The list of public authorities finally included in the study is shown in Figure 6.

Gaining access to the selected authorities proved to be relatively easy. Interviews were eventually arranged in all but three authorities. The reasons for failure varied: North Thames Gas, in its pre-privatisation phase replied that, "It is not the policy of British Gas North Thames to supply information for the type of research you request. In particular we   do not answer questions which in any

FIGURE 6 **Organisations included in the Study**

```
Arts Council*
Bloomsbury Health Authority
British Rail
British Waterways Board
Camden Council
Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee
Crown Estate
Department of Health and Social Security (Benefits
Section)
Hampstead Health Authority
Inner London Education Authority
Inner London Probation Service*
London Ambulance Service
London Electricity Board
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
London Regional Transport
London Residuary Body
Manpower Services Commission
Metropolitan Police
North Thames Gas*
Sports Council
Thames Water
Westminster City Council**
```

*   Organisations declining to take part in the study

**   included to check possible bias in selecting a
      single local authority.   Not included in the
      report.

way relate to politics." The Inner London Probabation Service sent a pro-forma requesting details of the research for internal vetting but never gave permission for interviews. Finally, Greater London Arts never responded to repeated attempts to make contact.

THE SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

The study looked at the problems and opportunities of interauthority collaboration through the eyes of senior management. They were not necessarily the operating level but were chosen as the place where strategic and policy decisions would be taken affecting the ability of those at the operating level to develop constructive relationships.

In the local authority approaches were made to chief officers and their deputies, certain departmental and sectional heads, and elected members. Advice was sought from the Chief Executive's Department on the most appropriate persons to approach, and the Chief Executive, in agreement with the Leader of the Council, gave the research the council's backing. There was no evidence that access to the authority was in any way constrained.

With the other public authorities an initial approach was generally made to the chief executive or the most senior regional or area manager responsible for the Camden area. Organisations frequently passed requests down to the appropriate level. The letter sent to public authorities indicated that interviews in the local authority had been at chief officer and member level, thus suggesting the sort of level that would be appropriate. The larger organisations generally suggested a number of people who should be contacted;

occasionally they offered to set up the interviews.
Again there was no evidence that access to the
organisations was anywhere being restricted although
it was obvious that some discussions were franker
than others.

The numbers of persons interviewed in each
organisation varied. The research was not designed to
compare organisations but rather to examine attitudes
and behaviour across the network of organisations
with which the local authority interacted. The
intention was to include a senior manager from each
main division of a public authority which might
interact with the local authority and, where
appropriate, other senior general managers and
authority/board members. The list of persons
interviewed, 73 in all, is to be found in Appendix 1.

Among officers of the local authority and other public
authorities the response to requests for interviews
was very high. Among elected and appointed members of
authorities the response was not so good. Some
refused outright, others never agreed appointments,
and some, having made appointments, failed to turn
up. Several leading councillors in Camden failed to
keep appointments on more than one occasion without
apology. Elected members are busy people but during
the period of the study many of the councillors in
Camden were unusually pressed. There were local
elections in May 1986; the council was very active in
opposing the abolition of the GLC and then in
developing voluntary arrangements with other Labour
Boroughs to continue various GLC roles; the council
was in conflict with central government over its
finances and had fallen foul of grant penalties and
rate-capping; many of its services such as housing
were under pressure and the council had adopted a

package of radical commitments to equal
opportunities, decentralisation and socialist
policies; the authority had attracted considerable
media attention for its supposed radicalism, alleged
poor management and defiance of central government
policies. Camden had its share of "scandals" such as
the report on elderly peoples' homes undertaken as
a response to health-service pressure which produced
headlines in the local press and professional
journals on the low levels of service that had been
discovered. Finally, political activity from inside
the majority party and supporting groups in the
community posed a continuing threat to the
established leadership. Members therefore had little
time to spare for interviews and were at times
embarrassed at their failings when their rhetoric had
promised much.

THE INTERVIEWS

The study was based on semi-structured interviews.
The interviews took the form of discussions on a
pre-set list of topics primarily derived from the
model described above. The main headings were as
follows:

    a.   closeness of relationships with other
       authorities

    b.   inter-authority linkages

    c.   roles of officers and members in interaction

    d.   attitudes to interaction

    e.   gains sought from relationships with other
       authorities

    f.   means by which gains are pursued

    g.   relationships with other types of
       organisations

    h.   effectiveness of the public authority
       network

    i.   changes in the public authority network

    j.   changes desired in the network

Examples of the interview schedules used in discussion with officers and members are to be found in Appendix 2.

When potential respondents were contacted they were sent a sheet outlining the research study, a copy of which is to be found in Appendix 3. Respondents were also asked if they would like to have in advance a list of the topics which the researcher wished to raise. Most respondents welcomed this list. They were able to give some thought to the issues raised before the discussions and also to obtain relevevant documents and data where they considered it appropriate. It also gave respondents the chance to query the assumptions behind the questions and to add items which they felt were relevant to the understanding of intergovernmental relations at the local level.

The majority of interviews lasted for between an hour and an hour and a half. A few were shorter; a few were substantially longer. Most discussions took place with individual respondents although in a few cases colleagues were interviewed together. Most respondents elected to work through the topics on the questionnaire more or less in order. Respondents were, however, encouraged to explore ideas as they emerged which often anticipated later topics as well as introducing new ones. Sometimes an important concept or idea emerged in an interview which was incorporated into subsequent discussions with other respondents. Partly as a result of this practice the emphasis of . interviews altered as the research progressed. Earlier interviews focussed more on

discovering the mechanics of interaction while later interviews involved checking such descriptions, allowing a greater amount of time for discussing potentially explanatory concepts.

Comprehensive notes were taken during the interviews. Respondents were assured that the discussions were confidential. The decision was taken not to tape-record interviews. It was felt that respondents would be inhibited from expressing frank opinions by the use of a recorder. Recordings also pose the problem of transcription adding a costly intermediate stage to data collection. The notes from interviews were either rewritten, if they were difficult to read, or tidied and annotated in their original form. Some respondents asked to be sent copies of the notes taken to check them for accuracy, which was duly done. It was felt that to ask all respondents to check notes would have been desirable but an unwarranted imposition on their time. Almost everyone offered to give further help and assistance in answering specific queries which had not been covered, and a number of such offers were taken up.

The period over which the interviews were conducted

It was intended to complete the interviews as quickly as possible to reduce the variation from changing circumstance and events. They took place over a period of just less than eighteen months. The first interview was on 4th November 1985 and the last on 7th April 1987. During this period the environment in which local councils and other public authorities were working was unstable and turbulent. There was also important organisational change in the network. Of particular significance were the abolition of the GLC, and the privatisation of British Gas.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The method of analysis chosen was in keeping with the notion of an exploratory and open-ended study. The essence of the method employed was to let the data speak for themselves. This approach is used in qualitative research which seeks to, "make the story readable without interpreting or changing the meaning of the subject's words" (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975, p 122). However, unlike the classic qualitative study the prime object of research was not the individual and his autobiography. It was concerned with a particular aspect of respondents' views and experience and explicitly sought their opinion on issues which might not have emerged spontaneously. On the other hand the interviews allowed respondents considerable room to introduce new topics and ideas within the overall context of intergovernmental and inter-organisational arrangements.

The analysis of the data involved scanning them in three different ways. First, using the primary headings from the interview schedule, the interviews from each organisation were scanned to build up a picture for the organisation as a whole. Second, the interviews were scanned heading by heading to build up a picture for each factor across the range of authorities studied. Finally the full set of interviews was scanned for statements from respondents about intergovernmental relations. These statements were used to generate new headings and to expand those used in the interviews.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

A common criticism made of the case study method is that it is not possible to generalise. Critics have

argued that the conclusions drawn from a single instance may as easily emphasise what is unique about the subject studied as what is common to other instances (Bennett, 1986; Sommer and Sommer, 1980). Others, however, have argued that generalisations can be made by logical inference from cases that have been analysed with appropriate theoretical frameworks. Logical inference about the relationships between variables does not depend upon representativeness of the sample studied but upon identifying a plausible process which can link the variables concerned (Mitchell, 1983). The requirement for logical inference in analysing data applies equally to sample and case study data. Thus while the case researcher may study a unique set of events analysis shifts the researcher's focus to processes which are widely distributed. For example, aspects of Camden's politics at the time of the research were both unusual and extreme. However, the political processes and behaviour associated with the local authority, elected members, and the local party apparatus could have been observed almost anywhere.

Eckstein (1970) suggests that cases can be used in a variety of ways both to develop and test theory. He identifies five different ways in which a case may relate to theory. The way that the research on Camden has been used comes closest to Eckstein's idea of a disciplined-configurative study which seeks primarily to describe. The nature of such studies is that:

> "The chain of enquiry in disciplined-
> configurative studies runs from comparatively
> tested theory to case interpretations and thence,
> perhaps, via ad hoc additions, newly discovered
> puzzles, and systematised prudence, to new
> candidate theories. Case study is thus tied to
> theoretical inquiry - but only partially, where
> theories apply or can be envisioned; passively,

> in the main, as a receptacle for putting theories
> to work; and fortuitously as a catalytic element
> in the unfolding of theoretical knowledge."
> (Eckstein, 1970, p 100).

The Camden study used the theoretical framework developed in the county-district study and the body of theory on inter-organisational and inter-govenmental relations upon which it drew in a new environment with the expectation of adding to and refining those theories. By using logical rather than statistical inference to analyse the data the inherent limitations of the case-study method were implicitly recognised.

Users of the case method have pointed to the importance of identifying the context in which the case is located in order to ascertain the extent to which parallels may be drawn with other cases. Many contextual variables were incorporated in the research design because of the very open nature of the system being studied. In addition respondents were asked to compare Camden with any other local authorities with which they had relationships. Because of the complex web of boundaries that criss-cross boroughs such as Camden, many public authorities were in a position to offer this comparison. Some said that relationships with Camden were different, primarily because of the complexion of Camden's politics; others said that Camden was just another local authority or organisation that they had to deal with. A further check was undertaken through a small group of interviews conducted in Westminster, an adjacent authority with politics well to the right of centre. These interviews did not suggest that the conclusions emerging from the main body of interviews were in anyway distorted.

Two further issues arise about the robustness of the

research design and methods. The first, which was apparent in the earlier county-district study, concerns the assumption of purposiveness in the behaviour of those involved in interauthority relationships. The research model assumes that actors recognise the context in which they are operating, consider the choices open to them and consciously choose particular lines of action. In intergovernmental relations at the local level the choice is frequently to do nothing. Inactivity could be interpreted as a form of non-decision making deliberately calculated to preserve the status quo and the autonomy of individual authorities (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). It could also be interpreted as the outcome of overwork, unclear strategic purpose, lack of imagination and apathy.

The second point concerns the reliance of the study upon interview data. The study did not attempt to observe directly the workings of relationships between the local authority and other public authorities either by sitting in on meetings or by tracing the history of particular mechanisms or issues. Such complementary methods were employed in the county-district research. Almost without exception the results of applying these complementary methods were to amplify rather than contradict the results of the interviews. Inevitably respondents' in different authorities and in different positions in the same authority hold different opinions about the nature and interpretation of events. Given the nature of the Camden research and the status of the researcher, however, there is no reason to think that respondents would set out deliberately to deceive. The researcher presented herself as a lecturer in public sector management carrying out academic research which might be published but would not name

respondents nor, without prior permission, authorities. Respondents might have wished to present a different version of events to a researcher working for central government or another organisation with a direct interest in the public authority network or if respondents' views were to have been attributed in publications.

Except for simple errors of fact through misremembering or lack of familiarity, respondents final statements on an issue were taken at face value and the different viewpoints these implied were noted and studied. It was seen as a matter of significance where a respondent was particularly ill-informed about issues or processes relating to his or her sphere of reponsibility. No importance however was attached to minor omissions which might be observed in the knowledge of any busy executive.

CHAPTER 4   THE CONTEXT IN WHICH INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPED

CAMDEN - THE PLACE

Urban geography
Population
Employment
Social characteritics

CAMDEN - THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

Organisational history
Organisational structure
Cultural characteristics
Political profile

THE OTHER AUTHORITIES SERVING CAMDEN

Tasks
Structure
Coterminosity
Finance
Culture

THE TYPICALITY OF CAMDEN

CHAPTER 4 THE CONTEXT IN WHICH INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPED

The aim of this chapter is to describe the background against which the intergovernmental relationships studied were developed. This description assists the reader to appreciate the character of the place and the organisations involved and to allow judgments to be made about the typicality and uniqueness of the setting in which the research was carried out. The description highlights features of the public authority network and of the communities it served which explain the pattern of intergovernmental relationships observed.

CAMDEN - THE PLACE

Urban Geography

Camden was an Inner London Borough situated on the northside of the river Thames (see Figure 7). Its area was just under 22 square kilometres, small by London standards: all but seven Boroughs were larger. The largest, Bromley, was seven times larger. The average for an Inner London Borough, excluding the City of London, was, however, much less at 30 square kilometres. Camden extended further in a north-south direction than it did east-west. As a result it included parts of both the central business district and the outer suburban ring (Walker and Land, 1983).

Most of the built-up area of Camden was developed by the beginning of the twentieth century. Remaining sites, with the exception of the public open spaces of Regent's Park and the land surrounding Hampstead Heath, were mostly infilled with development during the twentieth century. In the eighteenth century

FIGURE 7: MAP OF CAMDEN

there was open land between the urban area south of the present Euston Road, and villages such as Camden Town and Kentish Town. Hampstead and Highgate were independent settlements well away from London itself. The coalescence of these separate settlements did not result in a single dominant centre. The varying geography and social history of these settlements had, however, contributed to a modern Borough of contrasts and distinctive neighbourhoods (Gray, 1987; Tindall, 1977; Thompson,1974).

Current estimates of the distribution of land-uses showed that just over 20% of land in Camden was in industrial use. The greater part of this land was in service use with manufacturing industry a small and declining percentage. The balance of services was also changing with shops declining and offices increasing. More than a quarter of the land in industrial use was occupied by railways and other transport-related uses. Railway use had been declining but was still an unusually important category of land-use. One third of the Borough was used for housing; most of the remainder was either open space or roads.

The Euston Road divided the Borough into two contrasting areas. To the south was concentrated 80% of the Borough's office space, considerable concentrations of retailing and smaller concentrations of manufacturing. To the north of the Euston Road was to be found 90% of the domestic floorspace in the Borough and almost all Camden's public open space, the latter concentrated in the far north of the Borough. Shopping and commercial uses were concentrated round three centres, Camden Town/Kentish Town, Swiss Cottage and West Hampstead/Kilburn. Hampstead was a smaller, largely retail, centre. Residential areas varied greatly in

density. In the far north of the Borough densities
were less than 50 persons per hectare, with more than
three times this level found around Kentish Town and
Gospel Oak and the Eastern side of the Edgware Road.

Land prices in Camden were high and the Borough had
experienced   considerable pressure for development.
The age and changing demand for non-domestic land had
also created change in the Borough. Many major land
of holders were public authorities such as British
Rail and the National Health Service, both of whose
requirements had been changing. What was said to be
the biggest   redevelopment project in London was
currently being submitted for redundant railway land
around King's Cross.

The Borough of Camden bordered five other local
authorities. Many of the other public authorities had
boundaries which extended   into these neighbouring
authorities and beyond. Although Camden's boundaries
cut arbitrarily across neighbourhoods and commercial
centres, the overall character of the neighbouring
boroughs provided sharp contrasts with Camden. To
the south were Westminster and the City of London,
both of which were within the   central business
district, and contained   high concentrations of
commercial and public services.   To the north was
Barnet, a large and prosperous outer suburban Borough
dominated by residential development with a number of
local retail and commercial centres. To the East was
Islington, a densely populated Inner London Borough
with features of land use and economic development
similar to Camden. To the West was Brent, a large
suburban Borough, with significant areas of housing
and social stress in the south, as well as racial
tension.

Population

The estimated resident population of Camden in 1987 was 184,900 which put Camden on the small side for a London Borough. The average size of London Boroughs, excluding the City of London, was about 212,000. It was, however, closer to the average of 199,200 for an Inner London Borough. The long-term trend in Camden's population had been one of decline which had been almost continuous since the beginning of the century when the population was more than double its present level. However, from 1983 onwards the population increased each year so that by 1987 the resident population of the Borough was 3.2% greater than it had been in 1981.

The main reason for the growth in Camden's population was net migration, which was counter to the trend of net migration loss for London as a whole. Compared with other growth boroughs, Camden had a very low level of natural increase.

Camden's age structure had some unusual features for a London Borough. A higher percentage of Camden's population, both male and female, was in the (20-40 years) age group than for Greater London as a whole. The opposite pattern applied to the 5-20 years age bands. Two thirds of the population was of working age. Within this group there was a noticeable bulge in the younger age bands, that is those aged under 30, with the biggest bulge in the 20 to 25 years group: 13% of Camden's population fell in this band compared with 9% of the population of Greater London. It was estimated that fewer than half of the young adults in this age group worked; the remainder were students or unemployed.

One in six of Camden's residents was over retirement age. In line with national trends, a majority of this group were female and many formed single-person households. In size the retired group was falling, but this decline masked increasing numbers of the very elderly who made a heavy demand on public authorities for support services. At the other end of the age scale Camden had fewer children and teenagers than a typical London Borough. In part this skewness was because of the nature of the young adult population who were not looking to establish families and because of the tendency for families to move out of Camden once children were born. Two features of the population in this age-group were significant for local services. One is that there was a substantial and increasing number of single-parent families; second that the fertility of Camden women had increased resulting in an appreciable increase in under-fives.

Camden had a substantial population drawn from minority ethnic groups. At the 1981 census one in ten households was headed by someone from the New Commonwealth or Pakistan. Maternity statistics for 1985 show that 45% of the births in Camden were to women born outside the United Kingdom. The main origins of these women were Ireland and Bangladesh.

None of these population figures fully reflected two other groups which had a significant impact on local services. First, there was a very high turnover amongst young adults within which there were groups of highly mobile and transient individuals and the homeless. Second, the daytime population of Camden was two thirds as much again as the resident population, reflecting the large numbers of commuters drawn into the Borough. Furthermore, on average 5000

visitors stayed in the Borough each night. The figure
of 184,900 as the population to be served grossly
underestimated the demand for public services in
Camden.

Employment

Employment in Camden was on a scale far greater than
could be supported by the local population. In 1981
there were jobs for 213,000 employees, more than the
total population of the Borough. Fewer than a fifth
of these jobs were in production and construction.
More than a half were in business and personal
services, the remainder in office-based services. In
line with regional and national trends, there had
been a marked tendency for manufacturing employment
to decline and service-employment to increase.

The largest employers in Camden were almost entirely
in the public sector. They included London
University, the Post Office, Camden Council, British
Rail, the National Health Service, the Inner London
-Education Authority and Government Departments. In
contrast the private sector included large numbers of
small businesses and small employment locations of
larger businesses.

Camden had an economically active population of about
90,000, over 70% of those in the 16-60/65 age group.
The workforce was growing through in-migration and
increasing rates of female participation.
Unemployment, measured by benefit claims, was around
14% in the mid-80s, though estimated by Camden Council
to be nearer 17%. The overall figure concealed
differences between neighbourhoods. In the worst
area, King's Cross, male unemployment in mid-1987 was
36%. The overall trend in unemployment had been

downwards, mirroring regional and national trends. The numbers of long term unemployed had, however, been rising.

About half of Camden's residents in work were employed within the Borough. Fewer than one job in five in Camden was filled by a Camden resident and the trend had been downwards. The public sector employed higher proportions of local residents than the private sector. Local residents made up less than 5% of the workforce in offices situated in the central business district.

Three quarters of Camden residents in employment were in non-manual jobs. About a half of them were in management and professional jobs: the other half was split evenly between clerical and service jobs, such as cleaning, sales and catering. Camden was a relatively high-pay area. Earnings for both manual and non-manual employees were significantly above the national average and up to 5% greater than the average for Greater London (Walker, 1987).

Social Characteristics

Camden scored above the national average on most indicators of urban deprivation (Audit Commission, 1985). In relation to housing, Camden had problems of overcrowding and lack of amenities. The 1981 census showed nearly 6% of households living at a density of more than one person per room. Nearly 12% of households lacked exclusive use of a bath and indoor toilet. Camden had a significant homeless problem. At the end of 1986 there were 1800 homeless families for whom Camden had a statutory respon- sibility. The number of homeless families exceeded the number of vacant properties within the local authority

housing stock, and it was growing. In addition there were a large number of homeless people in the Borough for whom Camden did not have a statutory responsibility, for example, because of connections with other localities.

Social stress was evident in the Borough. Nearly 7% of households consisted of a single-parent family. Of even greater significance were the very large number, nearing one in six of all households, which contained a pensioner living alone. Other indicators of social and economic stress were the presence of significant numbers of families drawn from ethnic minorities, and the level of unemployment.

Some of Camden's social problems stemed from its metropolitan location. The main railway termini which brought so many of the commuters into the Brough also brought people, often young, who had left home to seek a new life in London. Vice was a problem in the south east of the Bcrough, around King's Cross, a centre for both prostitution and drugs.

Camden also had a different aspect. Parts of the Borough were unquestionably affluent. Some areas, such as Hampstead, had had a long tradition of high social status; others were newly gentrified, such as parts of Camden Town. Residents of these areas had high expectations of the services they were offered and at times were fiercely protectionist of their neighbourhoods.

> "Hampstead is 48% social classes 1 and 2 and has 82 resident M.P's. There is a very high proportion of very demanding articulate people."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority.)

CAMDEN - THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

Organisational History

Camden Council came into being in 1965 when local government in London was reorganised. Camden was formed by the amalgamation of three of the Metropolitan Boroughs (Wistrich, 1972), Hampstead, St.Pancras and Holborn. These authorities dated back to the London Government Act of 1899 which established the London County Council and the Metropolitan Boroughs. Although the three Boroughs had differed greatly, two decades after their demise their separate organisational and political identities had been subsumed by the new Borough ofCamden. Not one person referred to the pre-Camden system when discussing intergovernmental relationships.

In the intervening years since its establishment, a number of changes in the local government system have affected Camden. In 1974, when local government outside London was reorganised, responsibility for community health services was transferred to the newly established health authorities and local authority water responsibilities were transferred to the regional water authorities. Older staff in the local authority and the health and water authorities had experience of the transferred functions as local authority services.

The eighties was a period of flux in the public sector with reorganisation occurring within almost every policy. Some of these changes directly affected the local authority. Camden, like other London Boroughs, received new powers and responsibilties in planning, highways and recreation when the Greater London Council was dismantled in 1986. Other GLC

responsibilties were distributed elsewhere in the public-authority network. Camden, along with a number of other, mostly Labour, Boroughs formed new interauthority groupings to take on various discretionary activities which the GLC had pursued. Camden played a lead role both in establishing and running these interauthority groupings, and was an active member of the Association of London Authorities which represented Labour Boroughs.

Organisational Structure

Camden Council was by any measure a large organisation. In 1985/6 it had a revenue budget of over 323 million pounds and a capital budget of nearly 68 million pounds. It had the equivalent of 7,783 full-time staff and employed 8,223 people (London Borough of Camden, 1986).

The operations of the local authority were carried out by departments which were answerable to a system of committees of the Council. The departmental structure is shown on Figure 8. Departments varied in size: the largest, Social Services, was eighty times greater in staffing than the smallest, engineers. The dominance of Social Services was such that one in three Camden employees worked for the department. Another important feature of the overall structure was the large size of the Chief Executive's department.

Almost one in eight Camden employees worked in the Chief Executive's department. The size of the department reflected the inclusion within it of all central management and support services except finance. It also reflected the location of a number of special policy units - race, women, police,

Figure 8: DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CAMDEN COUNCIL

DEPARTMENT	% TOTAL EMPLOYEES (1984)*
Architecture and Surveying	3
Baths and Recreation	2
Building	8
Engineers	.5
Chief Executive	14
Environmental Health and Consumer Services	2
Finance	4
Housing	12
Libraries and Arts	5
Planning and Communications	2
Social Services	32
Works	16

*Source = London Borough of Camden (1984) Figures rounded.

economic development, decentralisation and co-ordination. However, sheer size of department is not necessarily reflective of power or influence. Camden was universally described as an authority with a weak centre where power was located at the departmental level.

"No strong centre is possible in Camden."

(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of Camden)

"There is no ethos that says the Chief Executive's Department should be taking a lead."

(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden)

The Chief Officers' Board was an advisory and consultative body with no real power. Lack of power in turn gave rise to a lack of coordination between different departments which at times pursued policies at odds with each other and with the council's overall priorities. Camden was seen to lack corporate identity because of the strength of departmentalism and to lack clear overall objectives.

"Camden needs more coordination in its approach and needs to be more sure of its aims."

(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

The Committee structure of Camden is shown on Figure 9. Two striking features of the structure are evident. First (not visible in the figure) is the number - over one hundred - of committees and other member groups, such as sub-committees, panels, working parties, liaison groups and steering committees. Second is the structural mismatch between the committee structure and the departmental

FIGURE 9   COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OF CAMDEN COUNCIL

COMMITTEE	% Total revenue Budget 1985/86	Main subcommittees	Departments reporting to Committee	Main areas of responsibility
Building, Works and Service	13.0	-	Building works Chief Executive (part) Environmental Health (part)	Highway maintenance, Markets, Cleansing, Street Lighting, Conveniences, Cemeteries, Mortuary, Coroners Court,Civil Defence, Catering, Vehicle Maintenance
Employment	1.0	-	Chief Executive (part) Environmental Health (part)	Economics Development Health and Safety, Pollution, Food Safety, Post Control, Infectious diseases
Housing Development Housing Management	42.0	Private sector sub-committee	Housing Environmental Health (part) Chief Executive (part), Architecture and Surveying (part)	House building, Housing maintenance and management, Housing Benefit, Mortgages
Leisure	6.0	-	Baths and Recreation, Libraries and Arts	Libraries, Arts, Play centres, Parks, Allotments, Swimming Pools, Sports Facilities.
Planning and Communications	2.0	Development Control	Planning and Communications	Local land use planning, Building control, traffic management and parking safety
Race and Community Relations	0.2	-	Chief Executive (part)	Race relations, monitoring of services for ethnic minorities

126

Committee	% total revenue Budget 1985/6	Main sub-committees	Departments Reporting to committee	Main areas of responsibility
Social Services	12.0	Health	Social Services	Residential Care, Field Social Work, Non-residential centres and facilities
staff and management	12.0	-	Architecture and surverying (part) Finance, Chief Executive (part)	Personnel, accommodation, office services, equipment, computing, legal services, committee services
Womens	0.3	-	Chief Executive (part)	Women, monitoring of services for women
Policy and Resources	11.0	Policy advisory police, grants, Kilburn sub-c, Kings cross sub-c, Camden sub-c	Chief Executive (part), Planning and Communications, Finance	Policy and Finance, Police monitoring, civic services, Registration, Redevlopment, Decentralisation, Grants to voluntary Bodies, Public Relations, Trading Standards

Source: London Borough Camden 1984; London Borough of Camden 1986.

127

structure. The most straightforward relationship was in Social Services. In some politically high profile areas full Council committees related to the work of individual sections of the Council, for example the Women's Committee and the Women's Unit. Other committees were responsible for the work of part or all of several departments.

Camden, in common with a number of other Labour-controlled London Boroughs, had committed itself in its 1982 manifesto to a policy of decentralisation. Fourteen neighbourhood units had been designated to which a range of services were to be decentralised. However, the proposals had run into considerable difficulties and at the time of the research little was in place. Area committees existed for three parts of the Borough, Camden Town, King's Cross and Kilburn. Formally, the area committees were sub-committees of the Planning and Communications Committee. The Camden Town and King's Cross schemes were primarily concerned with planning matters; the Kilburn scheme covered all council services. Designated officers supported the area committees' work.

Cultural Characteristics

The Borough Council's culture reflected characteristics common to most local authorities and other features particular to Camden. Several respondents referred to "the Camden culture".

> "Camden has its own culture which has not changed despite changes of political leadership."
>
> (Chair, Women's Committee London Borough of Camden)
>
> "There is a Camden Culture."

While there was little agreement about the nature of the culture there was a widespread belief that Camden displayed a distinctive set of cultural characteristics which affected the behaviour of those who were part of the organisation.

Camden, like all local authorities contained large numbers of employees who belonged to professional or quasi-professional groups. Respondents made various references to the ways in which professional allegiances affected the actions of council officers. These references stressed two things. One was the common bond of understanding and respect between members of the same profession, regardless of organisational boundaries.

> "There is a relationship of trust. For example the district surveyors do not bother to check calculations because they know Camden; but this can be worrying for Camden if they were to get things wrong."
>
> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

The other was the restrictive view of roles and the actions appropriate to them which was fostered among each profession.

> "Housing and Social Services workers are very busy and reluctant to become involved in welfare rights issues, but attention to clients' income in the short term can prevent longer term problems such as rent arrears or family difficulties. Our role is to persuade others that welfare rights considerations are an integral part of their work."

129

(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

The members of particular professions were concentrated in particular departments, for example social workers in social services, planners in the planning department. The weakness or absence of corporate structures and the ensuing strength of departmental ones helped to reinforce the strength of professionalism within Camden.

Local authorities are without exception bureaucratic structures. Bureaucracy in Camden was visible in the hierarchical structure of the organisation, in the division of tasks into specialised components assigned to specific grades of employee and in the prevalence of formal procedures.

The role of bureaucracy in defining the culture of Camden was complex. Bureaucracy was seen by many to contribute to a kind of malaise through the creation of delay and reactive management.

"Bureaucratic factors get in the way."

(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden)

"Decison making takes longer because of the committees' cycle. Contracts are slow and a longer time has to be allowed for finalising schemes."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)

Debate was muzzled.

"Camden doesn't encourage taking risks through openness and frank discussions."

(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)

"Nearly everything at Camden has to be done at arms length because of the bureaucracy."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

The impact of bureaucratic processes on the implementation of Council policy had been placed high on the political agenda. As a result much of the Council's creative energy had been turned inwards.

"Camden has seen a run of socialist policies such as equal opportunities which have forced managers to look back at the organisation rather than at what they are doing in service terms."

(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden)

"The Women's Unit can only tackle limited issues - it has little time to tackle issues involving outside agencies"

(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of Camden)

However, while some were working to reduce bureaucracy, others were working to strengthen it. The commitment to decentralise was intended to de-bureaucratise Camden by reducing the scale, specialisation and centralisation of its operations.

"The aim of decentralisation is sensitising bureaucracy to needs of the community which might engender wider thinking."

(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden)

Other initiatives taken in pursuit of policies such as equal opportunities or police monitoring were simultaneously strengthening bureaucratic processes.

"The achievement has been a local authority-run hostel financed by the health authority but with health authority people on the interview panels

for staff. To do this the health authority
staff had to take Camden's course for internal
interviewers. The whole process took three
years."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

"The police unit want to clear all contact and
for contact to be in writing."

(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
Camden)

Camden had very little of the managerial culture that
is associated with large formal hierarchies. Power
was distributed among departments in such a way that
a great deal of time had to be spent negotiating and
putting together deals with other managers in order
to make progress.

"In Camden you do not manage in the accepted
sense of the word. Camden is very democratic in
its operation. Trying to get 5-600 people
involved in a service to agree on something is
impossible. Where staff are spread across
departments this entails interaction and
negotiation as they do not all have the same
objectives."

(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)

Power was split between the officers, the members and
the unions. Members and unions were bound together
politically and would make strategic alliances
against officers for the benefit of either or both.

"Unions are very strong though strength varies
between departments according to the presence of
activists. Alliances are forged between unions
and members against officers."

(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)

Workerism was recognisable in some services:

> "The home help service is very good but very
> political. The workers are in control in Camden.
> There is workerism. NUPE is in control."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
> Authority)

Camden had for many years been known as a "money-bags"
council.

> "Camden thinks of itself as a money-bags council.
> If Camden thought something worth doing it would
> put money into it. Camden doesn't seek to gain
>
> things specifically. It can make generous grand
> gestures."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Staffing and expenditure levels were amongst the
highest for local authorities serving similar areas.
Service expenditure in 1984/5 was 467.4 pounds per
head compared with an average for a group of similar
authorities of 338.9 per head. In 1984 there were
39.44 full-time staff per 1000 population in Camden
compared with 28.87 for the group of similar
authorities (Audit Commission 1985). In particular
Camden spent very heavily on social services, housing
benefit administration, libraries and the provision
of discretionary services. A high level of subsidy
was provided from the rate fund to the Housing
Revenue Account and to other trading services.
However, this ability to spend had not always been
coupled with a concern for efficiency and
effectiveness.

> "Camden's solution to problems is to throw money
> at them. There is an overkill of provision and
> many services are seriously overmanned."

> (Director of Recreation, London Borough of Camden)

> "For eight years Camden has lost money and achieved nearly nothing. Little has been done since 1978. Camden has presided over an ageing/decaying housing stock and spent more time providing excuses for not meeting housing need."

> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

The culture in Camden placed little emphasis on performance. Some described the culture of Camden as "jungle-like" in which employees were encouraged to put their own interests before their commitment to their job.

> "Many officers put self before people. It is part of the Camden culture. The system militates against anyone being dedicated to their work."

> (Director of Recreation, London Borough of Camden)

Rate-capping, which was introduced in the financial year 1985/6, changed the environment in which Camden operated. Financial restraint and lack of resources were uppermost in the minds of every local authority respondent. However it had not at the time of the study changed the prevailing culture of the organisation. The imposition of rate limits was very recent and many officials saw restraint on rates and expenditure as inappropriate and even illegitimate. The initial impact of rate-capping had been to reinforce the inward-looking nature of the organisation.

> "Financial restraint and rate-capping requires local authorities to look inward at what they are doing."

134

It had reinforced the position of the departments as
the locus of operational activities and the point
where resources were expended rather than
strengthening the centre where more strategic
decisions might have been taken.

> "Wider problems are always neglected because of
> the pressures of day-to-day work, in part
> resulting from the financial situation."

Political Profile

Camden had been Labour controlled since 1971. The
1982 local elections produced a council of 33 Labour
members and 26 Conservatives. In 1986 Labour
strengthened its majority, gaining a total of 44
seats with the Conservatives holding 13 seats and the
Liberals taking 2.

The political tone of Camden owed a great deal to the
impact of younger and more radical Labour councillors
who came to power in Camden, as elsewhere, in the
elections of the late 70s and early 80s. As a group
they came from backgrounds and held views which were
in sharp contrast to those of the older, more
established Labour councillors they replaced.

The "new" Labour councillors included more women -
nearly half the Labour group was female. Fewer of
them than their predecessors had working-class
backgrounds and more were graduates and
professionals. A sizeable minority was not in
employment and around half a dozen Labour councillors

were full-time. In addition several more were dependent to a greater or less extent on members' allowances for income. Their attitudes and values had much in common with what has been labelled the "new urban Left" (Gyford, 1985).

> "Local authorities have changed: there are new kinds of politicians."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden)

As councillors they expected to be far more actively involved in Council affairs than had their predecessors. This expectation stemmed from the belief that everything must be viewed as political. They distrusted senior officials to implement their policies and wanted not only to become involved in administration but to work directly with officials, regardless of their position in the organisation.

An all-encompassing definition of what was political gave rise to a new set of policy interests. Camden's concerns were widened to include matters such as nuclear weapons, Northern Ireland, policing, employment, race relations and womens' issues. Two things followed: one was the adoption of a campaigning stance towards central government, public authorities and other organisations whose policies on issues on Camden's new agenda did not meet with the Labour Group's approval.

> "Local authorities have begun to take up as campaign issues those wider issues which relate to the community at large and impinge on Camden services."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden)

Campaigning led to outright conflict, particularly
with central government. The second outcome was the
demand for ever greater political scrutiny of what
was happening inside the council because of the
political requirement for the Council to conform to
newly-defined standards, particularly for equal
opportunities. Politics pervaded the whole authority
and contributed to the distinctive culture discussed
above.

The prevailing approach espoused by the new labour
councillors was interventionist. The outcome of this
approach was seen not only in high spending on all
programmes but also in the making of large amounts of
Council policy, much of which could not be
satisfactorily implemented.

> "Camden makes endless policy. An enormous effort
> is required to carry it through in its fullest
> detail which is often not understood. Members
> should be concerned about implementation."

> (Chair, Womens' Committee, London Borough of
> Camden)
> "It is very difficult to get members interested
> in a strategic policy agenda - they react to
> issues of the moment."

> (Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of
> Camden)

The combination of radicalism, interventionism and
involvement created pressures on Labour councillors
and soured and polarised relationships with the
Conservative minority. The agenda the Labour Group
had set for itself made huge demands on members' time
as exemplified by the large number of member bodies
which had been created. It contained inherent
contradictions and difficulties which carried high
political risks.

"Should a socialist council be assisting
capitalism? Rate payers' money is being invested
in firms but what control do they have?"

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
Camden)

The radicalism of the policies compared with the
Council's limited powers and resources led to outcomes
often falling short of objectives. Failure to fulfil
aims gave rise to disillusion by individual members
and local management committees.

"Camden is a white male-dominated council. It
pays much lip-service to women's issues but is
less enthusiastic about practical support"

(Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of
Camden)

"When the present administration came in, the
manifesto set out employment as a priority - it
is now being picked out as a priority again
because it is near election time. In between,
the authority hasn't really known what to do
because the issue is so wide and deep. Part of
the breakdown in communication with other
agencies is because members really don't know
what to do."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
Camden)

The radical stance of the Council took it to the
limits of legality, and its opposition to central
government spending controls had brought the threat of
personal surcharges. Such pressures led to high
turnover among councillors with many members
including eight Labour councillors standing down at
the 1986 election.

Relationships between the two main political parties
were strained and difficult. Both groups were
strongly partisan and had moved further apart over
policy. Publicly relationships were characterised by

slanging matches between leaders and senior members. The chair of the Women's Committee described the Conservative members of the committee as "stupid and vicious." Away from the public the majority Labour Group generally ignored the minority group and showed no interest in joint management of Council business. This approach led to further dissatisfaction and complaint by Conservative members.

The Labour Group maintained firm control of the political decision-making machinery in Camden. Group meetings could include not only councillors but also trade union and ward representatives. The Conservatives were represented on all the Council's committees but were by definition excluded from the supreme policy making body, the Labour Group. Committees normally followed lines set by the Labour Group. Officials did not play a significant role in committee meetings.

Both Labour and Conservative leaders were relatively new. The Council leader was an influential member of the Labour Group but did not have ultimate decision-making authority. His style of leadership had, therefore, to be open and consultative within his own party. The Labour leader had to cope with deep divisions among councillors over the party's policies and management of Camden. On occasions such divisions burst into the public arena.

In February 1987 the local press published details of a report from a Labour councillor to his general management committee which included the following comments,

> "The council's spending has increased by a third
> in real terms since 1982 - does anyone really
> believe that services have been improved by a
> third? Is it not the overwhelming view that

things have actually got worse?"

(Ham and High, 13.2.87)

He not only questionned the efficiency and effectiveness of council services but also the radical policy concerns of the council,

> "... as Councillors we find ourselves embroiled in all sorts of political arguments about subjects which are really tangential about Sinn Fein, the Lesbian/Gay Committee, travellers, the police, etc."

> (The Chronicle 13.2.87)

Camden consciously courted a high public profile. It engaged in widespread consultation and interaction with community groups, and co-opted members of client and interest groups onto a number of council committees. Such close links were seen to have both service and political advantages. On the one hand voluntary organisations were seen as a cheap and effective means of service delivery.

> "There is a clear policy to work with the voluntary sector."

> (Assistant Director Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

> "There is a growing sense of collaboration with the voluntary sector."

> (Member, London Borough of Camden)

> "Camden is very upfront on consultation and discussing issues with people."

> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

On the other hand Camden was concerned to raise consciousness within the community and thereby build long-term support for council policies.

> "The Police unit is a consciousness-raising unit."
>
> (Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of Camden)

> "Camden wants to push for a better social security system, Camden is trying to get different claimant groups to support the campaign to give it more force."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

Media attention was high compared with the low levels of interest in local government which characterised the regional and national media. Much of the wider attention focused on Camden's disputes with Central Government and its more innovative Left-wing policies. Camden was often portrayed as an example of a "Loony Left" local authority. However, unlike other similarly portrayed authorities, Camden's leaders were virtually unknown outside the locality.

Camden aspired to play a wider role in London's politics. As an authority it had long been active in the London Boroughs Association and had played a major role in inter-borough housing schemes. After abolition of the GLC, Camden not only continued this role but also volunteered its services to many of the unofficial successor bodies which Labour local authorities promoted such as London Boroughs Nuclear Policy Committee and London Boroughs Disability Unit. However, while the authority played a prominent role in the administration of such wider local government

bodies, it held few influential posts within them (Hebbert and Travers, 1988).

THE OTHER AUTHORITIES SERVING CAMDEN

The sixteen authorities were characterised by variety. Even the two health authorities differed from each other significantly over internal structure, culture and service priorities. Attention below, however, is focused on the similarities and differences between the local authority and the other public authorities in the network. Although, as discussed later in the thesis, there was a feeling of common experience and interest among all the organisations in the study by virtue of their location in the public sector, structural differences dominated the comparison between the local authority and the other public authorities serving Camden.

Tasks

The local authority was a multi-service organisation. In contrast, almost all the authorities in the study were focused on the delivery of a single service (see Figure 10). The two exceptions were the London Residuary Body and the DHSS. The former had been established to wind up the affairs of a previous multi-service authority, the Greater London Council, while the latter was a large central government conglomerate department subsequently split into its constituent functional parts. The dominance of a single-service perspective which characterised the other authorities in the network contrasted with the broad multi-service and community-focused viewpoint of the local authority.

FIGURE 10 SINGLE AND MULTI-SERVICE AUTHORITIES, PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITIES

SINGLE-SERVICE AUTHORITIES		MULTI-SERVICE AUTHORITIES	
Bloomsbury Health Authority	Health Care	DHSS	Personal Social Services
British Rail	Public Transport		Social Security
British Waterways Board	Navigation		Health
Camden and Islington FPC	Health Care		
Hampstead Health Authority	Health Care	London	Aspects of Housing,
Inner London Education Authority	Education	Residuary	Transport, Leisure, Technical and Management
London Ambulance Service	Medical Transport	Body	Services operated by former Greater London Council
London Electricity Board	Electricity Supply		
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	Protection		Housing, Highways, Personal Social Services, Land
London Regional Transport	Public Transport		Use Planning, Public Health, Leisure and
Manpower Services Commission	Labour Supply		Recreation, Libraries
Metropolitan Police	Protection	Camden	
Thames Water	Water Supply	Council	
Sports Council	Sport		

143

There were connections between the services provided by the local authority and the other public authorities in the network. All the authorities in the study were engaged in either community and welfare services or the provision of basic infrastructure. However, each organisation operated largely in its own distinct set of activities of provision. Task specialisation was associated with the location of specialised staff and particular professions in particular authorities.

Scale

Although the Borough of Camden was a large organisation, in comparison with most of the other public authorities providing services in the area it was in many respects relatively small. Figure 11. compares the total population served by the local authority and the other public authorities in the study. At the organisational level only two authorities served a smaller population. The picture does not change if Camden's daytime population is added in. Nor does the picture change substantially if areal divisions are compared with the local authority rather than whole organisations. Furthermore, for this comparison to be fair the figure used for the local authority should be that of the average population of the decentralised area structure that was being implemented. This figure was just over 13,000 people, smaller than the areal divisions used by any other authority. Camden ranked similarly in geographical area. The creation of overall sub-units within the local authority gave rise to logistical problems for much larger public authorities which had to multiply their liaison structures.

FIGURE   11

TOTAL POPULATION SERVED BY AUTHORITIES

1	Hampstead Health Authority	111,800
2	Bloomsbury Health Authority	129,700
3	**Camden Borough Council**	**184,900**
4	Camden & Islington Family Practitioner Committee	350,000
5	Inner London Education Authority	2,318,000
6	London Electricity	3,757,500
7	London Ambulance Service	6,770,275
	London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	6,770,275
	London Regional Transport	6,770,275
	London Residuary Borough	6,770,275
8	Metropolitan Police	7,111,500
9	Thames Water	11,500,000
10	British Rail	55,100,000
	British Waterways Board	55,100,000
	Department of Health & Social Security	55,100,000
	Manpower Services Commission	55,100,000
	· Sports Council	55,100,000

"Westminster has two social services areas
relating to Bloomsbury; Camden has five. For
example, three areas have case conferences at
4.00 today."

(Unit General Manager (Elderly), Bloomsbury
Health Authority)

Over expenditure the pattern is somewhat different.
Figure 12 shows the local authority fourth from the
bottom when organisations are ranked by their total
budgets/turnover. However, if organisations are
ranked by the element of their budget/turnover spent
in Camden, the local authority is clearly at the top
of the table (see Figure 13).

Structure

Apart from the local authority, the Inner London
Education Authority was the only organisation in the
study whose controlling body was directly elected.
Until Abolition the ILEA was a special committee of
the Greater London Council. Its membership consisted
of the GLC members for the ILEA area plus one member
nominated by each Borough in the area. The first
direct elections to ILEA were held in 1986.

The other public authorities fell into four
categories as shown on Figure 14. Two authorities had
no separate controlling body but were directly
responsible to government ministers. The largest
category of authorities had the structure more or
less of nationalised industries controlled by an
independent board appointed by central government and
responsible through a particular minister to
Parliament. For the third category of authorities,
including the health authorities, various interested
groups were able to nominate members of the
controlling boards. The fourth category contains only

FIGURE   12

TOTAL BUDGET/TURNOVER OF AUTHORITIES 1985/86

1	Sports Council	£3.7m
2	Camden and Islington Family Practitioner	£27.8m
3	London Ambulance	£48m **
4	Hampstead Health Authority	£60m
5	British Waterways	£60.5m
6	Bloomsbury Health Authority	£122.8m
7	London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	£171.2m
8	**London Borough of Camden**	**£391m**
9	Thames Water	£514m
10	London Residuary Body	£692m
11	Metropolitan Police	£871m
12	London Electricity Board	£927m
13	Inner London Education Authority	£1176m
14	London Regional Transport	£1301m
15	Manpower Services Commission	£3087m
16	British Rail	£3114m
17	Department of Health and Social Security	£42,932m *

*   Total Social Security Budget

**   This is a broad estimate based on contemporary
     figures because in moving offices detailed
     figures for previous years have been lost.

FIGURE 13

BUDGET/TURNOVER RELATED TO CAMDEN 1985/6

1	Sports Council	£0.13m
2	British Waterways Board	£0.2m
3	London Ambulance Service	£1.3m ***
4	London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	£4.7m
5	Thames Water	£8.2m
6	British Rail	£9.2m
7	Manpower Services Commission	£10.7m
8	Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	£14.7m
9	London Residuary Body	£18.9m
10	Metropolitan Police	£22.6m
11	London Regional Transport	£35.5m
12	London Electricity	£45.6m
13	Hampstead Health Authority	£60m
14	Bloomsbury Health Authority	£69m
15	Inner London Education Authority	£93m
16	Department of Health and Social Security	£152m
17	**London Borough of Camden**	**£391m**

NOTES

Calculation = $\dfrac{\text{total budget}}{\text{total pop. served}}$ x pop. of Camden

*   Calc on S.E. Budget because of uneven investment across the country as a whole.

**   Social Security Budget

*** Estimate. See footnote on FIGURE 12

FIGURE 14 MEANS OF CONTROL OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE STUDY

Direct Accountability to Parliament Via Minister DHSS Metropolitan Police
Board appointed by central government London Regional Transport London Residuary Body Thames Water Sports Council British Rail British Waterways Board London Electricity Board
Board Appointed by central government with nominations from key interest groups Manpower Service Commission Bloomsbury Health Authority Hampstead Health Authority Camden and Islington FPC London Ambulance Service*
Board comprising of elected members of constituent local authorities London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
Directly elected Camden Council Inner London Education Authority

one authority whose controlling board comprised members of the local authorities within the area which it served.

Where organisations were controlled by appointed boards these bodies in general played a much less active role on a day-to-day basis than the members of Camden Council, although examples of extreme centralisation were to be found elsewhere. The Director of Planning at London Regional Transport in a seminar with the Greater London Group at the London School of Economics in February 1988 quoted an example of a decision to use an alternative supplier for bus parts during a strike in the automotive industry during the 1970s having to go right up to the Board of London Transport.

Less involvement was because of the disparity in size between the boards and the organisations they controlled. Most non-executive board members had other extensive commitments and expected executive board members and senior management to dominate affairs in a way that contrasted with the interventionist political role of Camden members. As a result elected members in Camden felt they had no opposite numbers in the other public authorities with whom they could do business.

> "Members can feel very lost in unfamiliar
> inter-authority scenarios."

(Member, London Borough of Camden)

The internal structure of the other organisations was very varied. All had functional divisions although the extent to which these divisions were separate and independently accountable varied. At one end of the spectrum London Regional Transport had established

four separate businesses which were wholly owned
subsidiaries focused on different services:
underground trains, buses, engineering and London
Transport International, a consultancy business. Area
structures were established within the businesses for
marketing and operational reasons. A very different
structure was to be found in the Metropolitan Police
which had established a hierarchy of multi-functional
geographical areas and divisions complemented by a
range of specialised central functions.

The degree to which power and decision-making were
centralised within the other public authorities in
the study varied. Very little discretion was
delegated downwards in the DHSS over benefits (Flynn
et al).

> "The Euston office reacts to policy rather than
> creating it. Policy is a central concern.
> Officially much delegation has occurred in the
> last two years. Euston now has a budget for the
> building. There is an allocation of staff and
> grades but the local office does its own
> recruiting. But rates of benefit are centrally
> fixed. The Social Security Act made rates less
> discretionary."

(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

British Rail was also seen as highly centralised and
bureaucratic despite its geographically based
operating divisions.

> "Some statutory agencies have a measure of
> decentralisation, for example areas. British
> Rail however still works from the centre and
> there is a problem getting a response. For
> example, Camden has written to the Chairman of
> British Rail asking for cash towards a footpath
> project where a child was killed crossing the
> railway. It has been impossible to get a
> response after three months.

> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
> Camden)

While such centralisation was a source of frustration for the local authority, Camden Council in turn appeared centralised to other organisations. Officers in the health authorities felt that they had more discretion over services and greater budget freedom than their opposite numbers in the local authority.

> "Chief and senior health authority officers have more discretion to commit resources than their counterparts in Social Services. Even at the Assistant Director level in Social Services managers cannot commit resources. The health authority is able therefore to go much faster on proposals and has to slow down when dealing with local authorities."

> (Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community Services), Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Trends in centralisation and decentralisation were seen to be going in different directions in the local authority and other public authorities.

> "There is a problem with the increasing decentralisation of local authority work which contrasts with recent centralisation in the LEB where the previous ten divisions have been centralised into five areas and there has also been physical centralisation of locations. It is felt to be difficult to get a central answer from a decentralised local authority and felt also that each of the neighbourhood offices will gradually begin to behave differently and have different policies."

> (Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

An important difference between the local authority and all the other authorities in the study except ILEA was the means by which the organisation was made accountable to the public. Two different patterns were identified. One was for accountability to be seen to flow upwards through central government to the electorate at large. The other was for accountability to be seen to flow outwards through the nominees on controlling boards to interest groups, or through

local authority representatives, to communities. A
sizeable group of authorities complemented these
processes by consultative committees which were
intended to provide a forum for interested groups and
consumers to express opinions to the organisation
about its services and policies.

Coterminosity

The boundary of the local authority in Camden was set
by the London Government Act of 1963. The origins of
the boundary were, however, much older. The
principle behind the reorganisation which took place
in the mid-60s was to regroup existing local
authorities. The boundaries of the existing
Metropolitan Boroughs had been delimited by the
London Government Act of 1899 and in the majority of
cases followed parish and district boundaries (Royal
Commission on Local Government in Greater London,
1960).

The civil parishes had developed from the
ecclesiastical parishes of considerable antiquity
such as the parish of St Pancras which became part of
Camden and defined the north eastern boundary of the
modern local authority.

The use of historical boundaries, reflecting the
socio-economic and religious geography of London in
the nineteenth century and before, had created a
local authority area which cut across modern
geographical features. The boundary of Camden cut
across the two main open spaces in the vicinity and
divided local shopping centres which had grown up on
either side of main roads. In the northern part of
the Borough the boundary was generally recognisable
and ran mostly along main roads. In the south, the
boundary with Westminster ran along back streets

through Bloomsbury, Covent Garden and Holborn. Where the boundary separated Camden from the ancient City of London the boundary ceased to run along roads. Instead it criss-crossed streets and even bi-sected public buildings, (see Figure 15).

The geographical definition of the Borough of Camden neither reflected the spatial patterns of contemporary life nor encompassed a distinct community. This fact in itself might have made it an unattractive territory for other service-providing authorities to adopt. Its origins, though, meant that it was well established as a boundary. Compared with the local authority, the boundaries of the other public authorities in Camden had been defined more recently.

The geographical organisation of the authorities in the study is summarised in Figure 16. Local authority boundaries were used widely in the definition of areal units by other public authorities. However, the nature and extent of their influence depended upon their convenience for operational matters.

For example when, in 1980, the area level was removed from the National Health Service, the DHSS selected two priorities for determining district boundaries – links with local authorities and support for clinical teaching (Circular 80/8, 1980). In London neither criterion proved satisfactory. Borough boundaries did not approximate to the catchment areas of health facilities. Second, the major teaching hospitals were concentrated in inner London, sometimes straddling borough boundaries.

FIGURE 15   CAMDEN'S BOUNDARY WITH THE CITY OF LONDON

A: The Southern boundary

B: Detail of the eastern end of the southern boundary

FIGURE 16 GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANISATION OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN CAMDEN

ORGANISATION	MAIN AREAL DIVISIONS SERVING CAMDEN	BASIS OF BOUNDARY
Bloomsbury Health Authority	-	Pre-1982 health districts, partially defined by Borough boundaries
British Rail	SECTOR LEVEL:London and South East Sector REGIONAL LEVEL: London Midland Region; Eastern Region	Rail network and location of terminal
British Waterways Board	AREA LEVEL: London Area	Canal network and river systems
Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	-	Local Authority boundaries
Department of Health and Social Security	REGIONAL LEVEL: London North; London South	County boundaries and postal districts
Hampstead Health Authority	-	Pre-1982 health district defined by local authority boundary
Inner London Education Authority	DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Camden and Westminster	Local authority boundaries
London Ambulance Service	DIVISIONAL LEVEL: North West Division	Regional Health Authority boundaries and Hospital catchment areas
London Electriciity Board	DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Northern Division	Local Authority boundaries
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	AREA LEVEL: North Area	Local Authority boundaries
London Regional Transport	BUSES: DISTRICT LEVEL Abbey District	Location of garages and bus network
London Residuary Body	-	Bounday of Greater London Council
Manpower Services Commission	AREA LEVEL: London North Area	Local Authority boundaries
Metropolitan Police	AREA LEVEL: Number 7 Area DIVISIONAL LEVEL: Holborn; Kentish Town; Camden	Local Authority boundaries and location of police station
Thames Water	DIVISIONAL LEVEL:* * Within water supply, sewerage parts of the authority	Locational of plant and water/sewerage network. Residual influence of former Metropolitan Water Board boundary
Sports Council	REGIONAL LEVEL: Greater London and South East RegionLocal Authority boundaries	Local Authority boundaries

156

The boundaries of the public authorities studied fell
into two categories. On the one hand there were a
group of authorities whose boundaries were defined by
criteria unrelated to the Borough boundary. British
Rail and London Regional Transport used area
structures relevant for their transport network and
facilities. Thames Water and British Waterways
Board used boundaries relevant to drainage and water
networks. The DHSS Benefit service used postcodes to
organise areal divisions.

The second group of authorities operated areas based
on the local authority map of London. The majority
defined areal divisions as groups of Boroughs
modified here and there by operational considerations.
The number of Boroughs comprising an areal division
varied enormously. On the other hand, health
authority units were of similar size to or smaller
than the local authority. Operational boundaries had
therefore to be drawn within the local authorities
served by a health authority. Similarly, the
Metropolitan Police defined intra-Borough boundaries
for their smallest areal unit, the division.

The result of the boundary drawing exercises by the
individual authorities was that the public authority
network in Camden displayed an almost complete lack
of coterminosity. The boundaries of every public
authority differed from every other and from the
local authority.

Finance

The local authority had three sources of income -
central government grant, rates and charges. The
other public authorities in the study fell into three
groups over income. The first group, like the local

157

authority, raised income locally through a precept or levy. In each case the levy accounted, as with the local authority, for only a part of their income, the remainder coming in varying proportions from central government grant and charges. A second group of authorities relied upon central government grant for their prime source of income, supplemented only by any charges made for services. The third group operated as publicly owned businesses and relied principally on charges, modified by various degrees of public subsidy from central government.

However financed, all the authorities in the study were subject to financial controls imposed by central government. The strictest controls were over grants and rates, allowing central government to cash-limit authorities. Although concerned with the prices charged for publicly provided services, the government was not averse from seeing rises. The increase of financial freedom enjoyed in this way, however, was limited by the simultaneous reduction of public subsidies.

At the time of the research, and for a number of years previously, resources in relation to demand (both the demand for services and the costs of service provision) had been declining. This situation had arisen from a combination of economic recession and central government policy. The latter arose from the view that public expenditure was unproductive and a wasteful way of providing goods and services.

Many authorities in the study received financial aid from central government departments whose budgets were falling. Figure 17 shows the pattern of public expenditure in real terms from 1978/9 to 1988/9. The study was carried out when public expenditure was

FIGURE 17: GOVERNMENT PLANNING TOTALS IN CASH AND REAL TERMS

falling in real terms after a period of slow but continuous growth. During the two years following the study expenditure levelled out but did not regain 1984/5 levels.

Figure 18 analyses breaks this picture down by department. It shows the pattern of expenditure for the years immediately before the study and proposals for the forthcoming three years as they stood when the study began. Those authorities whose budgets had suffered the least were the Manpower Services Commission, the Metropolitan Police and those authorities funded by the DHSS. For the plan period the first two authorities could no longer expect unusually favourable treatment. Authorities dependent on the DHSS were able to plan for small increases. However, the position of the health authorities in the study was much less optimistic because RAWP(1) formulas transferred funds from London to other parts of the country and within London from central areas such as Bloomsbury to less well-provided areas.

Authorities found that resources were being squeezed not only through falling grant and subsidy but also through tightening controls on revenue raising. Trading authorities were encouraged to raise prices subject only to political acceptability. Government policy to reduce taxation levels implied a different

---

(1)   The Resources Allocation Working Party (RAWP) was set up by the DHSS in 1975. The Working Party developed formulae for allocating capital and revenue expenditure to regions in order to balance resources with needs. Under RAWP regions with the most generous ratio of resources to need progressively lost resources to poorer areas. Regions were required to apply similar principles in allocating resources between districts.

FIGURE 18   PUBLIC SPENDING IN REAL TERMS BY SELECTED GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Source: Treasury (1986) p13

	1983-1984 outturn	1984-1985 outturn	1985-1986 estimated outturn	1986-1987 plans	1987-1988 plans	1988-1989 plans	Difference 1983/4 1985/6	Difference 1986/7 1988/9
Energy (1)	1.2	2.6	1.0	0.1	-0.5	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3
Employment (2)	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.4	+0.2	-
Transport (3)	4.5	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.1	-0.1	-0.3
DOE - Housing (4)	3.2	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	-0.6	-
DOE - Other Environmenal Services (5)	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.3	3.1	3.0	-0.1	-0.3
Home Office (6)	4.7	5.0	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.9	+0.4	-0.2
Education and Science (7)	14.0	14.0	13.8	13.0	12.7	12.4	-0.2	-0.6
Arts and Libraries (8)	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	-	-0.1
DHSS - Health and Personal Social Services (9)	15.4	15.8	15.9	16.2	16.2	16.4	+0.5	+0.2
DHSS - Social Security (10)	36.7	38.1	39.3	39.1	39.1	39.2	+2.4	+0.1

161

Relationship between departments and authorities

(1) London Electricity Board
(2) Manpower Services Commission
(3) British Rail; British Waterways Board; London Regional Transport.
(4) Camden Council
(5) London Residuary Body; Thames Water; Sports Council; London Education Authority
(6) Metropolitan Police
(7) Inner London Education Authority
(8) Camden Council
(9) Bloomsbury Health Authority; Camden and Islington FPC; Hampstead Health Authority; London Ambulance Service
(10) DHSS Benefits Section

attitude to rates. To compensate for falling grant
many local authorities such as Camden and the Inner
London Education Authority through the GLC had raised
rates substantially. Rises were countered in the
early eighties by the imposition of grant penalties
by central government. Where authorities did not
reduce their expenditure, further rate increases
occurred. Camden Council, the Inner London Education
Authority and the London Fire and Civil Defence
Authority had all lost their entire block grant
through penalties. When central government moved to
limit rates further by introducing capping, all three
authorities had their rates limited in the first two
years of the system's operation (the period during
which the study was carried out). Central government
tightened controls on borrowing and realisation of
assets in a move simultaneously to squeeze capital
spending.

Culture

The local authority in Camden had a strong and
well-developed political culture. Three other
authorities in the study were controlled directly by
politicians. At the DHSS, Ministers were very far
removed from the level of the organisation providing
services in Camden. The Inner London Education
Authority and the London Fire and Civil Defence
Authority were both controlled by locally elected
politicians. Both had recently undergone major
structural changes and subsequent upheavals in their
political development. The LFCDA had changed from the
settled political environment of a generally low
profile committee of the greater London Council to a
finely balanced joint board whose members were keen to
pursue their own territorial interests. ILEA had
changed from an indirectly elected authority to a

directly elected one. The end to necessary dual membership had brought a number of new politicians. The new authority was heavily dominated by Labour members, many of whom were radical, active and interventionist. Direct elections to ILEA also brought in a new type of member such as the parent governor whose involvement in education policy preceded an allegiance to party. They were held together by a moderate and experienced leader who had been a senior politician in Camden.

The local authority service-delivery organisation was dominated by a bureaucratic professional culture. This culture was to be found in all the public authorities serving Camden. Two other different cultures were to be found in certain organisations. One was a quasi-military culture based on structures of command and discipline.

> "The London Fire Brigade is a uniformed and disciplined service."
>
> (Asst-Chief Fire Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
>
> "The police have little experience of committees because of the command structure with its military origins. For example, it is difficult to have a management team because of consciousness of rank."
>
> (Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

This culture was to be found in the authorities with uniformed services, the Metropolitan Police, LFCDA and the London Ambulance Service. It was also said to characterise the operational side of British rail.

> "Railways have a reactionary culture, almost military, because of the nature of the task. All parts of the system, including human ones, must perform reliably. The

culture involves much discipline and little
imagination. Railways are a strange
environment which produces a particular
culture similar to military culture all
over the world."

(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

The other culture found in some authorities was a
commercial/business culture akin to that of private
enterprise. Such a culture looked upon the activities
in which the authority was engaged as a business
which served people as customers rather than clients
or citizens. To achieve its goals it was more open to
the techniques of commercial management and the
disciplines of profit-generation. This culture was
being actively fostered in many authorities,
particularly those dependent on charges for their
income. It was most prevalent in the authority with
the longest history as a quasi-business, the LEB. In
many of the established bureaucracies such as LRT and
Thames Water, while the idea of a business and
enterprise culture was widely canvassed, it had not
taken root throughout the organisation.

THE TYPICALITY OF CAMDEN

Every local authority area is unique geographically,
politically and administratively. The uniqueness
lies not in any particular characteristic but in a
specific combination of features each of which can be
found elsewhere in a different context. Camden was
recognisably different from other London Boroughs but
when analysed along different dimensions could be
seen to have counterparts not only in London but in
other parts of the country.

Camden had sectors which belonged geographically to

the central business district, the inner and the outer suburban ring of London. The central business district was reflected in high land prices, high rateable value and extensive in-commuting. The inner suburban ring was reflected in above-average levels of deprivation, social problems, a large transient population and high levels of homelessness. The small but contrasting areas of outer suburban residential housing completed the heterogeneity of Camden's geography.

The administrative history of the local authority Camden reflected its position as an Inner London Borough, formed in 1965. The identities of its constituent boroughs had merged into an organisation which many claimed had a distinctive "Camden culture". The distinctiveness of such a culture was difficult to pin down and often seemed to be a reaction to particularly distinctive, though not unique, features of the organisation by those working within it.

Structurally the authority could be labelled "pre-Bains" (Gyford, et al 1984). It had strong professionl departments, a weak administrative centre, and a proliferation of political decision-making bodies. Politically Camden reflected the priorities of the Left in local politics (Gyford et al 1985). During the period of the research Camden was aligned with a group of London Labour Boroughs dominated by radical-left councillors who were committed to a platform of radical socialist policies. They were committed to a campaigning and confrontational style of politics which politicised a wide range of issues and polarised political attitudes. Within the council workerism was seen to characterise many service areas.

"There is an excessive concern with preserving
jobs rather than a concern with services."

(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Similar politics were to be found in other Boroughs
but Camden had differed in its superior ability to
fund its radical programme on the back of its very
high rate-base. Camden was not alone, however, among
London Boroughs or high-spending urban authorities to
face financial restraint through rate-capping.

The network of other authorities which provided
services in Camden differed only marginally from the
network serving adjacent Boroughs. The reason for
this similarity was the much larger geographical
areas covered by most of the authorities serving
Camden. The two organisations which were wholly
contained within Camden's boundary were the two
district health authorities. Each was built round a
distinctive set of facilities and had an individual
approach to organisation but was no more unusual in
its profile than neighbouring health authorities.
These conclusions were supported by respondents who
commented on the differences between Camden Council
and other local authorities with which they were
familiar. Socio-economic, political and adminis-
trative variables were cited as accounting for the
differences between and within groups of local
authorities.

"Boroughs are in rings. Inner (often Labour
Boroughs) are more interested in rail transport
than the outer Boroughs."

(London Regional Planning Manager, British Rail)

"Linkages at officer and member level may be
easier depending on the politics of the
authority.   For   example,   relations   with
Wandsworth are difficult because of a history of
animosity"

(Finance Officer, Camden & Islington Family
Practitioner Committee)

Such differences demanded a specially tailored
approach to intergovernmental relations to be
developed with each local authority.

"The two local authorities with whom Bloomsbury
works are different and Bloomsbury must develop
different strategies and operational plans to
match. Bloomsbury wants a comparable style
across its area."

(Divisional General Manager,(Local and Community
Services), Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Camden was not seen as any different, although its
character was recognisably distinctive.

"Camden is not peculiar or deviant."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

"Similar relationships to those with Camden are
found elsewhere... Relationships with
Conservative authorities take a similar form."

(Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher
Education) Inner London Education Authority)

"Camden is not unique. One is not conscious that
any London Borough is particularly skilful at
being assertive."

(Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of
Camden)

"Local authorities are structurally similar and
appear to be much of a muchness. There is no
real division among authorities: politics makes
no real difference."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
Commission)

CHAPTER 5

INTERDEPENDENCE

<u>Functional Interdependence</u>
     Completing Each Other's Tasks
     The Supply of Goods and Services
     Hierarchical Relationships
     Agency
     Regulating Others' Activities

<u>Task Environment Interdependence</u>
     Serving the Same Customers
     Forming Part of Each Other's Operational
     Environment

<u>Goal Environment Interdependence</u>
     Competing for Power, Resources and Influence
     Shared Aims and Objectives

<u>Conclusions</u>

CHAPTER 5

INTERDEPENDENCE

The public authority network in Camden included a wide
variety of organisations. The forms which inter-
dependence between them took were equally varied.
These forms overlapped so that the interdependence
between the local authority and a particular
authority was generally multi-dimensional. Such
overlapping meant that the overall pattern of
interdependence between Camden Council and the public
service network in the borough was complex.

Three basic forms of structural interdependence were
observed in Camden. They are discussed below under
the headings of functional, task environment and goal
environment interdependence. These categories
corresponded broadly to Pennings (1980) threefold
classification of vertical, symbiotic and horizontal
interdependence.

FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

Vertical interdependence exists among organisations
located in adjacent stages of production or service.
In Camden two types of relationship between the local
authority and other public authorities were observed
which were broadly similar to Pennings' vertical
category. One set of relationships arose from the
distribution of powers and responsibilities among the
public authorities studied. In some cases powers were
given in a monopoly fashion to one authority; in
other cases they were shared between the local
authority and another authority or given to both in
parallel. The second set of relationships arose from
the supply of goods and services among public

authorities necessary for the execution of their own particular responsibilties.

Completing Each Other's Tasks

The predominant pattern of public service provision in Camden was for individual organisations to be given a set of distinct, though often related, powers and responsibilities. Shared powers and responsibilties were unusual. In the period immediately before the research the pattern had been rather different. Shared powers had characterised the relationship between Camden Council and the former Greater London Council (Flynn et al, 1985). Land-use planning had involved reciprocal relations in which the upper tier had made the development plan and the lower tier constructed local plans within this framework. Planning applications were passed from one authority to the other in the course of approval. Waste collection had involved sequential relations with the upper tier disposing of the waste collected by the local tier. The two authorities also had parallel powers for housing and leisure services.

Functional interdependence which involved authorities completing each other's tasks was to be found in Camden. However, it was a relatively unusual form of interdependence. One example was the responsibility for providing housing benefit which was shared between the DHSS and Camden Council. Responsibilities were exercised sequentially: the DHSS assessed clients' eligibility and issued authority to Camden Council to pay the benefit until further notice.

Where there is an obligation to transfer a task between authorities part way through its completion, each party seeks not only an unproblematic transfer

but also a transfer which implies minimal disruption to the practices and procedures of each authority. Standardisation is important as a means of handling interdependence so that benefits are maximised and costs minimised to the organisations involved (Thompson, 1967). The flow of housing benefit tasks was described in interviews as simple and standardised and had been developed as such by the local authority which put a high priority on a satisfactory relationship.

> "Elsewhere it is a problematic relationship. However Camden's housing department is 'bang up-to-date' in its housing benefit section and puts pressure on Euston to speed up authorisations."
>
> (Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

> "There was a difficult time on housing benefit. When the government passed this on they washed their hands of it. The transfer was planned inadequately which produced enormous problems for Camden. Camden has organised to cope well, though this has had costs in Camden"
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Another more unusual example of authorities completing each other's tasks was the voluntary development of reciprocal relationships as over disposal of clinical waste. The disposal of such waste in ordinary dustbins by doctors had been identified as a problem by the Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee. While no one authority had the powers to solve the problem, a solution had been found by the health authority, providing bags and bins that were distributed by the local authority which then collected the waste and passed it back to the health authority for incineration. The service was financed by the Family Practitioner Committee which deducted

the cost from payments made by the local authority towards doctors' premises.

The Supply of Goods and Services

The local authority and other public authorities produced services which could be consumed by both individuals and organisations. Some of these services were traded, that is, purchased by consumers, on the basis of their preferences and ability to pay; others were non-traded, paid for by taxation or levy and available on the basis not only of preference but recognised need. Customer-supplier relationships were strongest where the supply of traded goods and services was involved.

Some of the public authorities in the Camden study such as London Regional Transport, British Railways and London Electricity Board operated within the traded public sector. The local authority operated in both the traded and non-traded sectors but was not a large supplier of services on a commercial basis to any of the other authorities in the network. Camden Council was a significant purchaser of goods and services, though electricity was the only major item purchased from trading public authorities.

The former GLC had a supplies department which undertook bulk purchasing of goods on behalf of Boroughs. With the demise of the GLC ILEA took over this function since most of the purchasing related to school equipment. The other main service supplied through this system was social services which purchased equipment and supplies for residential accommodation. The role of the supplies service was to negotiate discounts and act as a wholesaler. Boroughs were under no obligation to use the service

which was thus in competition with other direct and indirect suppliers. Some trading authorities, such as the transport operators, had no significant supplier relationships with the local authority.

Pennings (1980) identifies three features of commercial transactions which determine the direction and degree of interdependence that develops between customer and supplier. These features are the volume of business in relation to the total business of each organisation; the substitutability of the item traded; and its criticality to the business of the customer. Interdependence is also affected by market conditions, particularly where oligopolies and monopolies restrict the customers' or the suppliers' market.

In electricity supply the London Electricity Board had a monopoly. Electricity was essential to the local authority's operations, and the cost of the service was considerable. As a customer Camden Council was not particularly large compared with big industrial users. The only weapon it could employ was to delay payment of its bills as long as possible - a strategy deplored by London Electricity Board which retaliated by threatening to cut off supplies.

> "The relationship is not as good as it might
> be. Disconnection is a threat. It takes
> Camden time to process payments for bills
> because of the need for checking. The LEB
> wants fast payments therefore the
> relationship is soured and prickly."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of
> Camden)
>
> "One of the main things that the LEB would like
> is for the local authority to pay its bills
> promptly. Payment is often delayed because of
> bureaucracy and threats have been made to cut off
> town halls including Camden for late payment of

bills."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

In the supply of electrical services the market was
different. The local authority had a considerable
need for such services but the London Electricity
Board was only one of many organisations which could
have supplied the service. LEB for its part, however,
considered the local authority to be a particularly
desirable customer and was concerned to cultivate its
custom.

> "The LEB wants business in the form of electrical
> sub-contracting from Camden and other local
> authorities. Local authorities are seen as
> good, dependable customers."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

LEB used informal and social contacts fostered by the
local manager.

> "The LEB periodically holds social evenings to
> which both members and officers of the local
> authority are invited. It is part of my job to
> promote smooth relationships... This means
> encouraging a lot of contact at the ground level
> with the local authority staff, not just contact
> at the level of Chief Officer."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

It is frequently suggested that organisations seek to
manage their interdependence with other organisations
in ways which optimise their power and resources
(Benson, 1975). A supplier would want not only to
retain his important customers but also to understand
their pattern of demand; the customer would want to be
assured of his suppliers and to anticipate changes in
the market. With monopoly supplies the need for

management of the relationship is felt largely by the customer. The reverse is true where several suppliers compete for a single customer.

Pennings (1980), in his study of interlocking directorates, suggests that a high degree of vertical interdependence among organisations gives rise to concrete links between them. The nearer to a monopoly the more links are established. The sensitivity of commercial organisations to costs and prices, however, may be greater than that of a local authority. If so, the local authority's need to manage its dependence as a customer on certain monopoly suppliers would tend to diminish.

> "Chief Executives do not seem to be interested in making their organisations more customer responsive. Local authorities are not commercially responsible and therefore are not required to sell themselves to the people they deal with."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

Interdependence based on the supply of traded goods and services had been of diminishing importance as a feature of the public authority network, as privatisation reduced the traded sector. Gas and telecommunications had both been privatised but would have once been part of the public authority network at the local level. Both electricity and water were due for privatisation before the end of the decade. Neither the increasing use of charges nor the requirement to contract out services had increased the traded public sector. In general public authorities had not been able to compete for each other's business as a result of tendering arrangements. However, there was a trend towards splitting public authorities into 'businesses' which

traded with each other, sometimes in competition with the private sector. For example, London Regional Transport had been split into a number of such businesses such as LRT Bus Engineering, LT Builders and LT Caterers which charged each other for services in competition with private companies.

Interdependence based on trading relationships co-existed with other types of interdependence between the local authority and trading public authorities, and nowhere formed the sole basis of interdependence between Camden and another public authority in the network.

The non-traded services produced by the local authority and other public authorities could be consumed by organisations as well as individuals. The provision and consumption of non-traded services was widespread in the public authority network. Public authorities depended upon each other to provide public services which allowed them to deploy human capital in efficient ways (O'Connor, 1973). They required a healthy, educated well-housed and orderly workforce to deliver their own services. They also depended upon other public authorities for the physical infrastructure appropriate to modern service provision, such as transport.

As well as participating in the provision and consumption of collective services, the local authority and other public authorities supplied each other with specific non-traded services. Camden Council provided refuse collection services to public authority premises. The Manpower Services Commission advertised local authority job vacancies. The London Fire and Civil Defence Authority provided fire services at local authority buildings. Thames Water

provided water supply and sewerage to council premises.

Non-traded services were not provided free but gave rise to a complex pattern of financial flows based on rates and special payments. Some authorities, for example the Inner London Education Authority, paid rates on the normal basis. Where the Crown occupied property, for example a hospital, a payment was made through the health authority on the basis of a valuation made by the Treasury Valuer. A special formula was used to calculate payments in the form of rates by statutory undertakings. Some authorities made a mixture of payments: for example London Regional Transport paid rates on properties on non-operational land and special payments for those on operational land. The local authority paid itself rates on its property and paid its share of precepts and levies to bodies such as the Metropolitan Police, Thames Water and London Regional Transport.

Unlike the traded public sector, where a price was set for the supply of specific services, in the non-traded sector there was no direct relationship between services supplied and payment made. Payment occurred regardless of whether services were consumed or how much was consumed. It was difficult to value individually the benefits of collective consumption. Rates and special payments were regarded as taxes or enforced donations and gave rise to a different view of interdependence from that engendered by the supply of traded goods and services.

With rates public authorities were in the same position as private companies. They saw themselves as compelled to pay charges over which they exerted no control through the electoral system and felt that

they subsidised a range of public services from which they did not perceive themselves as deriving direct benefits.

None of the public authorities in the network took a public position about the level of rates and special payments. However, some were prepared to argue about the calculation of payments and the application of de-rating. For example the London Electricity Board which paid rates of over 3.5 million pounds to Camden in 1985/6 was actively pursuing this strategy.

> "There is an argument between the LEB and local authorities about rates which is reflected more widely than the LEB area concerning how much should be de-rated."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

Hierarchical Relationships

Hierarchical relationships, in which one authority can instruct another to act on its behalf without redress, are relatively rare in British subnational government. However, such relationships existed between several public authorities and the local authority in Camden over income collection. Camden Council was obliged to collect levies made by the Metropolitian Police and London Regional Transport alongside the Council's own rates and the rate set by the Greater London Council. After Abolition the council also collected the precepts of the Inner London Education Authority, the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority and the London Residuary Body. In addition "minor" precepts were collected on behlf of such authorities as the London Planning Advisory Committee and the North London Waste Authority.

Figure 19 shows that the sums involved were substantial compared to the rate set by Camden. The rates and levies of other authorities have an impact on the rate-setting of the local authority (Leach et al, 1987) It is, therefore, in the interests of the subordinate authority in a hierarchical relationship to establish good communications with the superior authority so that the latter is made aware of its impact on the former. As a high-spending authority believing in the implicit worth of public expenditure, Camden, in theory, should have been less sensitive than other local authorities to the level of precepts it was required to collect. This insensitivity appeared to be broadly the case with the exception of the precept set by the Metropolitan Police. Camden Council was generally suspicious of police activities and questioned the level and nature of police expenditure. It was reluctant to collect the precept. The Police had attempted to allay the fears of Camden and other boroughs by holding an annual consultation meeting about the precept between the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police (the chief financial officer) and the local authority associations in the Metropolitan Police area.

FIGURE 19 Rates, Precepts, Levies and Charges

1985/6

Camden Council	92.02
Inner London Education Authority	77.25
Greater London Council	34.25
Metropolitan Police	13.21
London Regional Transport	10.80
TOTAL	227.53

Non Camden rates, precepts, levies and charges as a %
of total charges   60%

1986/7

Camden Council	113.00
Inner London Education Authority	77.25
Metropolitan Police	14.83
London Regional Transport	9.79
London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	7.70
Thames Water Authority	2.05
North London Waste Authority	1.41
London Residuary Body	1.09
London Boroughs Grant Scheme	0.61
Lee Valley Regional Park Authority	0.10
London Waste Regulatory Authority	0.07
Joint Planning Advisory Committee	0.02
TOTAL	227.92

Non-Camden rates, levies, precepts and charges as
a % of total charges   50%

SOURCE: London Borough of Camden, 1986a

Agency

An agency arrangement is where one authority is able to subcontract the provision of certain services to another. The contracting authority retains control of the level and type of service provided and of costs. The contracting authority does not normally have a choice over which public authority can act as its agent. In some cases it may be able to choose whether or not to enter an agency arrangement; in others it may be required to grant an agency if it is requested. The authority acting as agent has the choice whether or not to agree to a contract and may have significiant influence over the terms of the agency. Agency arrangements involving local authorities are only possible where they are specifically permitted by legislation.

Camden Council acted as agent for a number of public authorities, mainly in the provision of engineering and construction services. The principal agency agreements were with the Greater London Council for works on Metropolitan roads and with Thames Water for work on the sewerage system. After Abolition metropolitan roads were either made the responsibility of the Boroughs or designated trunk roads and looked after by the Department of Transport. Camden, like other Boroughs, was able to carry out agency work for the DoT.

The local authority, as agent, provided a "total service" for minor capital works and maintenance. Camden proposed schemes, provided the necessary design and costing and, if agreed by the principal, carried out the proposals. Camden also had an agreement with British Waterways Board to provide

supervision and maintenance along the Regents Canal in return for public access.

The attraction of agency arrangements for the two parties was different. The agent was able to use the agreement as a means of supporting engineering and works departments which might otherwise be unacceptably small. It was also able to ensure that locally needed works were done. For the principal the attraction was the ability to draw on local expertise and, in some cases, to dispense with the need to maintain certain departments.

Relationships in an agency are particularly sensitive at two points. First is at the point where an agency agreement is drawn up and the general terms and scope of the agreeement are crucial for both parties. Second is at the point where decisions have to be made about the proposals put forward by the agent. At both points each party is constrained to negotiate the best possible deal from its own point of view. The principal is normally dealing with a multiplicity of agents and considerable dissatisfaction can arise from the allocation of available cash between the different agents.

The arrangements between the GLC and Camden were long-standing and generally unproblematic, although they involved considerable levels of administrative duplication. Sewerage agencies in London were frequently regarded as problematic, but the arrangements with Thames Water were deemed satisfactory by both sides.

> "Thames says Camden is the best agent because they don't go back to them for anything."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

The scale of agency work was limited by Camden's overall budget but very significant for the work of certain committees and departments. The size of the various agency agreements is shown in Figure 20.

FIGURE 20 Agency Agreements in Camden

Authority	Value of reimbursable work carried out by Camden Council
Greater London Council	2,433,012
Thames Water	594,035
TOTAL	3,027,047

Regulating Each Others' Activities

Regulation is one of the basic functions which governments perform (Fry, 1969; Baker, 1972). Powers to regulate are delegated to local authorities and other public authorities by Parliament. These powers can be applied both to the activities of the general public and to other organisations. Regulation is carried out through inspection, certification and permission-seeking procedures. Regulations are ultimately enforceable through the legal system.

Some of the authorities in the study area were involved in regulatory activity which affected other public authorities. The extent and significance of these activities varied, however, between authorities. The Metropolitan Police as enforcers of law and order were constantly involved in regulatory activity. Other authorities played a more limited regulatory role. For example, Thames Water was

responsible for enforcing regulations on effluent, and the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority dealt with fire regulations, both of which could have affected the activities of the local authority and other public authorities. Much of this regulatory activity went on "unseen", becoming visible only when there was a change in regulations or in enforcement procedures.

The local authority had a more varied regulatory role than any other public authority. The main areas of regulation were environmental health, building standards and land use. Land use regulation by the local authority gave rise to extensive interaction between Camden Council and other public authorities. The intensity of such interaction was increased by the high price of land in the area.

The nature of the regulatory role affects the relationships which develop between regulator and regulated. Authorities involved in regulation in the common interest are likely to adopt hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of management and to adopt an authoritative style towards their clientele (Webb, 1971). Such a style reflects the quasi-legal nature of the regulatory role and the importance accorded in government and public administration to maintaining fair and universal standards. Relationships between regulator and regulated would be expected to be routine, formal and standardised.

This model fitted some interauthority regulatory activity such as fire regulations and environmental health regulation, however, it did not fit land use planning. Baker (1972) offers a different view of the regulatory role. While agreeing that regulation is a "circumscribed, routinised activity", he notes that it

184

can be highly discretionary. It, too, needs to
involve consent:

> "When a Government's sphere of activity is
> extended very widely unless it is a very strong
> dictatorship, much of the regulation has in
> effect to be done by agreement and compromise,
> often with a multiplicity of interests... This
> second conciliating or compromising function of
> Government can never be completely distinguished
> from the first, that of regulating."   (p89)

Whereas the enforcement of regulations on something
such as building standards was handled almost
exclusively by officers and was very routine, land-
use planning was a highly politicised activity. In
order to carry out its role as land-use planning
authority, Camden had to balance a variety of
interests including those of residents, employers,
employees and other public authorities. It also
tended to a be a sporadic activity triggered by
individual planning applications. A number of
applications were being made by other public
authorities for substantial developments which were
not routine or standardised. A particular example of
interdependence-based or regulation which involved
delicate balancing of interests related to the
development of New End Hospital.

Camden adjoined the central business district and
commercial heart of London and contained areas of
very favoured residential property. Public
authorities were under pressure to divest themselves
of surplus land and property at their maximum
commercial value to relieve financial constraints.
These pressures existed over New End, an extremely
valuable site between Hampstead Heath and the main
centre of Hampstead. Hampstead Health Authority
proposed to close the hospital, which was used for

185

elderly patients, and sell the site for commercial development. The money obtained would have allowed development of a new hospital on a nearby site. The Inner London Education Authority was involved since it wanted part of the New End site to expand an adjacent school on a cramped location and to sell a block of nearby tenements to allow for school expansion. Some of the buildings involved were listed and there was resistence from the tenants who would have been displaced. A solution had to be found which balanced the interests of the tenants, allowed the Health Authority to redevelop, allowed the school to expand, proved an attractive deal to the developers, and preserved Camden's interest in a good environment, affordable housing and good public facilities. The proposals were the subject of considerable public debate, lobbying, negotiation and political activity, and illustrated regulation as balancing and the achievement of compromise.

British Rail was a major landowner in Camden and like the health authorities was seeking to divest itself of surplus land at a premium. One of the biggest development opportunities in London involved the development of land behind King's Cross Station. Land-use regulations were ultimately the tool used to decide upon the development proposal, although because of the scale of the development involved, the decision would almost certainly be shifted upwards in the system from the local authority to the Secretary of State.

Two factors reduced the amount of regulatory activity which might have existed between public authorities in Camden. In Britain there has been a tradition of exempting public authorities from the full range of public regulation. The reasoning behind exemption has

been that public authorities are responsible bodies which can be trusted to adhere to high standards without the formal procedures appropriate to other bodies. Exemption implies a mutuality of interest between regulator and regulated in the public sector that is absent elsewhere. Examples of such exemptions have included Crown immunity from public health inspection. Immunity from inspection by local environmental health officers was ended for the National Health Services premises in 1987 but still continues for other public services such as prisons.

Special procedures for public authority regulation have also been common, such as those for seeking planning permission by government bodies. There is an assumption that other public authorities should be treated differently and a presumption in favour of their proposals.

Exemptions have been criticised as fostering double standards. An example of the problem of standards arose in Camden in 1987 over residential care for the elderly. Local authorities have responsibility for registering and monitoring service standards in private residential homes. In Camden concern over standards in the authority's own homes was voiced by Hampstead Health Authority and as a result an independent inquiry was set up to investigate. In the subsequent report it was stated that,

> "In general we have been very disappointed with the standards of care offered in the residential homes and it is significant that if the homes were subject to the Registered Homes Act 1984 it is likely that only three out of 10 would be registered."

> (Halpern, 1987)

The general climate in recent years had been favourable to de-regulation, particularly where regulations were thought to affect business and enterprise. For example, various steps had been taken to relax land use planning controls which affected public landowners as much as private landowners. The White Paper, <u>Lifting The Burden</u> (Cabinet Office,1985) sets out the government's approach to regulation and lists a large number of deregulatory measures already taken and an equally extensive range of measures under review. They include services operated by local authorities, fire and transport authorities.

TASK ENVIRONMENT INTERDEPENDENCE

A central theme of the literature on inter-organisational studies is that organisations operating in connected fields should be viewed as part of each other's environment (Thompson & McEwan, 1958). In the public authority network in Camden the closely connected nature of many of the services provided meant that the different authorities were regularly operating in close proximity to each other. Interdependence arose from the way that their actions could affect each other's options and their need to take notice of the actions of others in developing their own strategies and plans.

The nature of the public services provided by the network studied in Camden resulted in task environment interdependence arising between the local authority and other public authorities in two different situations. In the first place, within Camden, they were all providing services to the same group of customers. Furthermore, given the basic nature of the services they provided, many customers consumed some of the services provided by several

authorities. Second, interdependence arose where the services they provided had a geographical dimension or were tied to particular situations or events.

Task environment interdependence is broadly similar to Pennings' (1980) category of symbiotic interdependence. He describes this relationship as one existing between organisations that provide complementary services to the same clients. Pennings suggests that compared with other forms of interdependence symbiotic interdependence has little strategic importance for the organisations concerned and is unlikely to give rise to lasting or significant interaction. In the public authority network in Camden task environment interdependence was a common form of interdependence and supported much of the interaction between the local authority and other service-providing authorities in the area.

Serving the Same Customers

There was considerable overlap in the customer/client bases of the organisations in the public authority network in Camden. The extent of the overlap was determined in part by the degree to which the boundaries of the authorities coincided (Flynn et al 1985). It was also determined by geographical qualifications placed by authorities on would-be consumers of their services. Some services were available for consumption by anyone who happened to find themselves within the authority's boundary. For some authorities, such as the transport operators, this pattern of consumption was normal; consumers were expected to have no link with the authority's geographical area other than to want to purchase or consume services there. For other authorities, links with geographically defined operating areas were

critical in defining access. In most cases residence was the key factor. There were, therefore, two groups which were potential customers/clients of both the local authority and other public authorities serving Camden. One group comprised those who lived in Camden, the other those who had reason to be in Camden for part of their time such as commuters, shoppers, students and visitors.

Among both groups were sub-groups of people who were dependent upon public authorities for a multiplicity of services. Prominent among these groups were the elderly, the physically and mentally handicapped, under-fives, those with low incomes, the homeless, children and women at risk and offenders, particularly juveniles. Many examples of groups to whom both the local authority and the other public authorities in the area provided services were cited by respondents. For example:

> "Benefit recipients are dependent on both the DHSS and Camden, on the latter for their housing benefit."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Social services and the police are involved with juveniles, drugs, domestic violence and homeless persons."
>
> (Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Interaction can also arise from the provision of health services to groups who are dependent upon the local authority and the education authority for the provision of special services. This includes provision of srvices to the elderly, the mentally ill and the mentally and physically handicapped."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

> "The police and the local authority are closely
> related but only on a practical level, for
> example they do work with the same families and
> in the same areas."

(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

Customers and clients are served better by authorities
whose services fit together and complement each other.

> "The public should be able to get information
> anywhere and each organisation should have an
> idea of what other public organisations do. The
> main aim in this is to help the public because
> people have multiple problems and it is important
> to sort out problems which prevent people getting
> jobs which are not necessarily job-related."

(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

However, the sub-groups mentioned above did not have
a strong consumer voice to demand such co-ordination.
For example, many consumers of multiple public
services were ineligible to vote or unregistered.
Consumer representation in the non-elected public
authorities was frequently weak.

Co-ordination of service provision was, however, also
in the interests of the authorities. Although
authorities provided distinct and separate services
they often addressed single parts of a complex
multi-dimensional problem. The effectiveness of one
authority's services would depend upon the
effectiveness of another authority's provision. One
respondent described the system of service provision
as a "jigsaw" where all the parts had to be made to
fit together in order to serve the public.

> "Both [the DHSS and the local authority] are
> working in different ways to the benefit of the
> public. Both are part of a jigsaw."

(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

> "The health authority and the local authority are reliant on each other to produce services."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "There is no joint input but different inputs to make a satisfactory service."
>
> (Administrator, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee)

Interdependence arose sometimes from the sequencing of services. For example, DHSS assessment of a client's eligibility for benefit not only unlocked the door to local authority housing benefit;

> "Clients should come to the DHSS first before they go to other agencies for help."
>
> (Assistant Director, Information, London South, DHSS)

but also opened up a range of other services such as assistance with the payment of fuel bills. Co-ordination was needed to ensure that clients moved through the system in the right order and received the full range of services to which they were entitled. Camden had set up its Welfare Rights Unit to tackle perceived bottlenecks in the benefit system.

> "The Welfare Rights Unit exists to sort out the breakdowns in the system."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

The DHSS for its part talked about a holistic approach to services:

> "A whole person concept exists to integrate our own benefits and to look at other aspects of benefit. The DHSS should be the main/lead

agency."

(Assistant Director, Information, London South, DHSS)

as well as the need for one authority, the DHSS to take a lead role in welfare services.

Public authorities in Camden were responsible for meeting different types of need among those dependent upon them for services. Some needs are arguably more basic than others (Maslow, 1954). For example ILEA provided education services in adult training centres. The effectiveness of education would have been impaired if the local authority and the health authority had not acted in such a way as to optimise the health and well-being of those attending the centres. Authorities recognised difficulties posed for them in providing for groups which required a multiplicity of services.

"Services which are particularly difficult to offer involve care for groups who need a wide range of services, for example the elderly and the physically handicapped."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

"Bloomsbury cannot provide a comprehensive public health service without links... The local authority cannot support local services without taking into account that of the health service."
(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority).

Co-ordination was seen to be necessary to overcome the difficulties and provide a coherent and complementary package of services.

"Removing duplication, developing complementary approaches so that the needs of the area are fully served by a variety of services are only possible by joint co-operative approaches."

193

> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

> "Under-5s - integration needs to take place with the health authority, social services and recreation services."

> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

> "Liaison groups have been set up on the elderly, mental handicap and disabilities, comprising members, consumers and officers."

> (Assistant Director Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

Interdependence also arose where one authority was responsible for alleviating the symptoms of a problem but the causes of the problem could be tackled only by another authority. For example, health problems could be partially caused by poor living conditions, and in turn partly caused by low incomes. For example, several authorities were involved in the problem of truancy. The police were involved in dealing with the symptoms while the education authority was closer to dealing with the cause. In some cases the education authority was dealing with a symptom of problems which could more appropriately be tackled by the local authority social services department. Co-ordination was seen to be necessary on a case basis by the parties involved and in the above example had been set up on a regular basis.

> "Non-attendance conferences are held fortnightly which are attended by ILEA, the Police and Social Services. They discuss truancy and lack of attendance on a case by case basis and information is pooled upon which decisions on action can be taken."

> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education. Authority)

A common problem with which most authorities had to deal was public ignorance of which authority supplied which service. Many thought that the local authority provided a much wider range of services than it actually did. In other cases clients sought help for immediate problems and did not seek help for other contributory problems. Authorities, therefore, often found themselves presented with problems which did not fall under their jurisdiction. Clients and customers had to be referred to more appropriate authorities. Interdependence arose between referring and receiving organisations. Referring authorities needed sufficient information about the responsibilities and structure of other authorities to be able to divest themselves successfully of clients they could not serve.

> "The main business is the proper payment of benefits. The office is not concerned with welfare except in terms of financial welfare. Where wider problems exist the role of the office is to refer. Staff are asked to keep an eye open for obvious non-financial problems and refer them accordingly."
>
> (Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown Estate)

Receiving agencies relied on an efficient inward referral process to reach their full client base.

Pennings' model of symbiotic relationships suggests that the interdependence arising from serving the same customers will give rise to predominantly ad hoc and informal relationships and will not be viewed as strategic by the authorities concerned. There was, as predicted, much contact between authorities on a case basis, and professionals handling such cases had built up a web of informal links to facilitate their work.

> "Informal links are developed by officers
> involved who have their own working
> relationships on a day-to-day basis."
>
> (Assistant Director Social Services, London
> Borough of Camden)

Where there was a continuous need for such liaison,
regular forums for the discussion of cases had been
established. However, cases also raised questions at
a strategic level.

> "There is a need to talk about specific problems
> and solutions in a strategic not a day-to-day
> environment."
>
> (Unit General Manager (Elderly), Bloomsbury
> Health Authority)

Tensions existed at a policy level about the
differing objectives of authorities in providing
services to groups of clients, which could be only
partially resolved at the case level.

> "The JCPT did a survey of organisations involved
> with the elderly and found that while they had
> the same objectives they differed at the
> implementation level. The same survey found that
> for mental handicap priorities differed."
>
> (Assistant Director Social Services, London
> Borough of Camden)

This area was very sensitive and was usually avoided
or approached very cautiously by authorities as it
impinged on the autonomy of the other authorities.
Where attempts were made to engage in strategic
debate about the nature of services provided to
particular groups of clients, it was often
unsuccessful.

> "At a policy level liaison meetings [between
> local authority and the DHSS] are problematic.

> DHSS says it cannot discuss policy changes because policy is given from above. It cannot discuss nitty gritty issues as policy because every case is different. Therefore there is frustration because neither policy nor cases can be dealt with."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

Forming Part of Each Other's Operating Environment

By definition all the public authorities in the study were providing services in the same geographical area. However, the nature of the tasks they performed brought certain authorities into even closer proximity. Authorities would not only share clients but also provide services at the same time and in the same place. In some cases the services provided by one authority or its service delivery patterns would impinge directly upon the services provided by another. The dense urban environment of Camden tended to increase the impact of authorities' activities upon each other. Failure by one authority to take account of the impact of its decisions on another caused conflict and soured relationships.

> "The Police are critical of the actions of certain committee chairpeople whose decisions have an impact on them. For example, squatters using an empty warehouse were granted a street closure and music and dancing licence by Camden for a party. 40 police were required to control the event which was eventually scaled down after protest. No reference whatsoever had been made to the police before the decisions were taken."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

Emergencies provided an example of where authorities including the local authority had to provide services together at a location dictated by circumstances.

Where several authorities were providing services simultaneously it was important there were clear definitions of their respective roles and a system for dealing with operational conflicts and issues affecting the task of more than one authority. Because emergencies were sudden and unpredictable, such relationships needed to be organised in advance. Organisation was achieved by planning and laying down procedures.

> "The aim is to bring order out of chaos. All
> large incidents are chaos. Simple plans
> help to bring order to chaos."
>
> (Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil
> Defence Authority)

However, plans had their limitations in what could be achieved at a major incident.

> "Plans work when an incident is straightforward"
>
> (Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil
> Defence Authority)

This point was well illustrated in Camden, shortly after the fieldwork for this study was completed, by the King's Cross fire. The subsequent report criticised among other things the adequacy of the co-ordination between London Underground and the emergency services despite the existence of "pre-laid plans for tube incidents."

Authorities may also share facilities and premises. The extent of such sharing was limited in Camden. For example, there was no dual use of schools agreed with ILEA. There were some examples in leisure services where Camden provided recreational facilities on land or in premises owned by other public authorities.

> "Camden delivers services within the area on other public agencies' land. It leases [canal] towpath for access and maintains it. It leases [railway] embankments for ecological reasons."
>
> (Director of Recreation, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Camden has its own boats such as the Tarpauley which provides day trips and five day trips."
>
> (Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board)

Hospital social work was an example of a service provided by the local authority not just on the premises of another authority but in close relationship with the services of the health authority. In Camden the provision of hospital social workers was a contentious matter because the large number of hospitals in the area meant that the local authority had a disproportionately large social work bill.

> "Hospital social work causes a lot of trouble. Camden has a lot of hospitals and therefore Camden has many more social workers. We have been trying to get this recognised so that other local authorities share the burden. For example, Great Ormond Street is a national and international institution but Camden pays. Similarly, University College Hospital and the Royal Free. Finally, we are getting the DHSS to act after threatening to charge the NHS for the service. The staff bill is two million pounds."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

The local authority leased property to both the health authorities and the family practitioner committee. The basis of all these relationships was that of landlord and tenant. Where rent or charges were involved each party had an interest in negotiating a fair and satisfactory level of reimbursement. Such relationships were governed by formal legal agreements

which set out the rights and duties of the parties
involved.

The services provided by some authorities had a direct
physical impact on the services provided by others,
as was clearly illustrated in highways and transport.
Service delivery by London Buses was particularly
sensitive to traffic conditions which were influenced
by, amongst other things,the local authority
responsible for the condition of many of the roads
and for traffic management.

> "Buses use public highways and their operation is
> highly sensitive to traffic conditions. Prior to
> Abolition the GLC was the leading authority for
> bus lanes and bus priorities as well as general
> traffic control measures such as traffic lights.
> Relationships on these matters will now be with
> the Boroughs and the Department of Transport."
>
> (District General Manager, London Buses)

The local authority was responsible for street
lighting and was obliged to liaise with British Rail
to ensure that lighting did not affect train
operations.

> "There is contact with British Rail on
> construction and bridge building and lighting
> near railways, so that it does not affect
> trains, as well as building over tunnels such as
> the new Hampstead Woods site."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
> Camden)

The close physical proximity of infrastructure
services and their ability to affect each other's
operations was recognised as requiring regular
interaction and an approach which prevented services
disrupting each other rather than one which focused on
repairing damage after it had occurred. An exception

to this pattern was the reinstatement of highways after works. The universal practice of laying pipes and cables under roads and pavements meant that public authorities had constantly to interfere with the surfaces maintained by the local authority.

> "Highways require regular contact with the utilities, for example, gas and water who dig up the road. They have to liaise with Camden and Camden reinstates the road although the utility pays. Complex legal problems of liability may occur if, for example, problems develop after reinstatement. 17,000 holes and trenches are opened up each year in the Borough."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

This relationship was a source of constant aggravation because of the requirement that the local authority reinstate the surface at the expense of the authority which disrupted the surface.

> "It is a big job getting them to pay for damage and reinstatement. The Water Board (Thames Water) is the worst, though they are not all as bad as each other."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Some of the problems stemmed from the unsatisfactory legal framework which did not oblige authorities to inform the local authority of their actions. Since the local authority had ultimately to deal with the problem and was the target of public complaints about the state of the roads and pavements, it was anxious to optimise relations with the relevant service authorities to improve communications. It was also campaigning along with other local authorities for a change in the legislative framework.

GOAL ENVIRONMENT INTERDEPENDENCE

Horizontal interdependence is found among competitors either for customers, as in the case of firms trading goods and services in the same market, or resources, such as the contributions or funds which voluntary bodies might vie for from the same public (Pennings, 1980). One organisation can affect the ability of another to achieve its goals by changes in factors such as products, purchasing or price.

The local authority and other public authorities in Camden were generally producing non-competing services and operated in distinct markets. However they did compete for resources and also for power and influence. Competition led to interdependence when the success or failure of one organisation to obtain scarce resources or power affected the ability of another organisation to fulfil its aims. Interdependence arose also, not from competition, but from common concerns about resources and powers which affected the ability of organisations to achieve their individual goals.

Competing for Power, Resources and Influence

Competition as a form of organisationsal dependence has received considerable attention among theorists of interorganisational relations. Many early studies were based on research among commercial enterprises (Thompson & McEwan, 1958; Assael, 1969) and voluntary associations (Levine and White, 1961; Aiken and Hage, 1968). Theories of interorganisational relationships were developed to fit behaviour among organisations which competed for customers, clients, market share or public funds. Studies of intergovernmental relations in federal systems have also focused on the

way different levels of government compete for power and resources through bargaining and negotiation.

All the authorities in the network in Camden were in competition with each other for a diminishing allocation of public funds. However, such competition took place at a far higher level than that of the organisational units serving Camden. Allocation of grant and subsidy between service sectors took place centrally with key decisions being made at Cabinet level.

Within service sectors, allocation was also centralised though the degree of centralisation varied. For example, allocation between local authorities occurred nationally while allocation between district health authorities took place at the regional level. Some funding was channelled through grant-giving authorities at the regional level such as the Sports Council for whose funds local authorities in an area competed.

As resources became scarcer competition became tougher, with two effects. First, authorities tended to focus attention more within their sector rather than on the wider picture. Second, it made authorities increasingly defensive. Neither attitude seemed particularly conducive to developing interauthority relationships.

> "The DHSS has generated fighting among health organisations. Districts fight region. Regions fight each other. In a situation of constraint and cut backs energy goes into in-fighting."
>
> (General Practitioner, Kentish Town Health Centre)

Legislation on competitive tendering forced authorities to compete with private contractors for

the provision of specified services. However, public authorities were prohibited from tendering for each other's business.

> "Camden must compete with outsiders but cannot take outside business itself, which is unfair "
>
> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

The nearest which authorities came to competitive bidding against each other was the annual round of bids to principals such as Thames Water and the Department of Transport for a share of the funds for agency work. Again this competition was intra-sector.

Authorities were anxious to see changes in the location of responsibility for a number of services. Some proposed changes were mutually agreeable; others were contentious. For example, both the local authority and the public utilities wanted a change of law on the reinstatement of services after works. The LFCDA wanted all aspects of fire prevention to be concentrated under its authority. In this case responsibility had been fragmented by the allocation of functions formerly discharged by the GLC.

Proposals to relocate other services were subject to considerable opposition. Unlike the previous examples which primarily affected London, they were national movements by authorities within a policy sector campaigning for changes in powers. For example, local authorities wanted to regain responsibility for local sewers, a proposal opposed by the water authorities. Camden, in common with a number of Labour local authorities, wanted to be given powers to determine local economic policy, which was fiercely opposed by central government.

"Camden is looking to draw in resources and to be given powers to intervene."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

The local authority had adopted a campaigning stance on a number of public policy issues that were outside the authority's direct line of responsibility. In many cases this bid was not for power but for influence. Camden's campaigning was directed at two levels of decision-making. At one level it was directed at the policies of individual public authorities providing services in the area; at another it was directed at central government.

Camden's efforts to influence other authorities and change their policies was overtly recognised.

"Camden wants to influence other bodies in how they operate and get them to start thinking in 'our terms'."

(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

The role of money in securing influence in a classical exchange process is further illustrated in the leisure area:

"Camden is seeking to encourage other authorities to manage their services better - generally they take kindly to it especially where they themselves have financial problems and Camden may be able to assist through a joint approach."

(Director of Recreation Services, London Borough of Camden)

Two examples of authorities on which Camden particularly targeted its efforts were the Metropolitan Police and the health authorities. Camden wanted to see changes in both the accountability and

the nature of policing. To this end it had set up its Police Unit and Police Committee to monitor and challenge police activity as well as to campaign for change at a wider level. Relations were largely confrontational but tempered by the police's general desire to be seen to be sensitive to the views of local communities about the way in which they were policed. The local authority had also set up a Health Sub-committee to shadow health policy. In health, however, the necessity for the local authority and the health authorities to work together on community care gave Camden Council the opportunity to bargain with the health authorities and exert influence over policy.

Camden was seen to espouse radical views on certain aspects of health care:

> "Camden takes a Left Wing Socialist view that you do not need medical care for geriatrics and psychiatric patients."

> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Camden's views were seen to have been influential in certain ways:

> "The Health Service cannot make progress on the closure [of Friern mental hospital] without a close dialogue with Camden. Camden as a result has been able to influence thinking within psychiatric services which were previously dominated by medical/institutional orientations."

> (Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

However, not all those involved in health organisations saw Camden's approach as legitimate.

> "Camden have produced a detailed document on
> Camden and its needs looking at health care and
> deprivation but no collaboration has occurred.
> The FPC thinks delivery of health is its remit."
>
> (Planning Officer, Camden and Islington
> Family Planning Committee)

Both those within the local authority and those in
other public authorities saw Camden's campaigning as
a strategy for challenging central government
policies.

> "Camden's ultimate aim is to change things on a
> national level."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
> Camden)
>
> "The main aim of much campaigning is to score
> points off government."
>
> (Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

Such a stance could have been interpreted as a
response to central government's critical views of
local authority policies and processes. Challenges to
local authority power and influence had in the main
been direct, although the competitive actions of the
Manpower Services Commission were seen to be part of
a central government strategy to gain authority in
training.

> "Quietly local authorities work with the MSC and
> fight off its take-over bids - because they see
> MSC as an agent of central government control."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Campaigning does not invariably produce confron-
tational relationships, although this outcome is
likely when campaigning is directed at issues close
to an organisation's core concerns or towards a third

party. Public authorities providing services in Camden were constrained by their own professionals as well as by central government from going native. Campaigning therefore led to a defensiveness in relationships.

> "Local authority officers cannot sit down and work together because they are constrained by policies they must work towards - they behave inflexibly, defending their autonomy and terms of reference rather than seeing what needs doing."

> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Shared Aims and Objectives

Amongst public authorities the success of one authority is not necessarily achieved at the expense of other authorities. Interdependence arose from the commonality of aims between the local authority and other public authorities providing services in Camden.

> "Relationships develop via common needs and common issues; having common duties imposed by central government."

> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London Borough of Camden)

Improved public services were at the heart of the commonality between authorities and, to a less extent, reduced umemployment. Common aims did not exclude differences about the appropriateness of particular policies and programmes but were seen as an essential ingredient for the development of effective inter-authority relationships.

> "The key factor for success is recognising that we are all trying to do the same thing"

> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

"It is necessary for structures to be sound and regular well-ordered communications to occur and be serviced properly. But this is not sufficient: there needs to be a common purpose - it can be political, or a common purpose can be seen in activity."

(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

"Employment is a very difficult area for local authorities and government - all want it but no one has a clue how to acheive it."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

"There is a day to day consensus with Abbey Buses especially on improvement measures. Both are working to improve public transport."

(Planning Officer (Transport) London Borough of Camden)

Some previous studies have suggested that inter-dependence may arise among organisations as a result of altruism (White et al 1975). Public authorities would be concerned to help other authorities because of a feeling of solidarity between them, not just in the expectation of themselves receiving assistance at some time in the future. Altruism is consistent with the values of public administration and service. It was not a widely expressed sentiment. As will be discussed later, relationships with public authorities were seen to differ from those established with the commercial or voluntary sectors. However, although relationships with other public authorities may have been easier, there was little to suggest that altruism was at the root of the difference.

"Relationships with local authorities are on the whole a little better they are generally more sympathetic to the LEB."

Sympathy was seen, however, to stem largely from familiarity and the common experience of working within the system of public accountability.

Organisations which compete with each other may also have common interests which affect their individual survival. The most important issue of common concern was falling central government grants and increased expenditure controls. Respondents in most organisations cited resource constraints as a problem for developing relationshps. Many others saw the need to find a way round such problems in order to pool resources and benefit from additionality. However, there was little suggestion that there should be common action to try and secure more resources. Individual authorities fought battles for their own budgets but only the local authority was prepared to campaign actively about public expenditure in general. No other authority was prepared to be publicly aligned with this campaign, and individual authorities were suspicious of Camden Councils's attempts to intervene on their behalf.

> "Bloomsbury feels bitter about Conservative health policy. How do you cope? By fighting for more money but doing the best with what you have. The Labour councillors [on the district health authority] especially are absolutely opposed to cuts and the discussion of cuts. They vote against proposals and put out press releases which are very unhelpful. It makes good discussion impossible."

(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Authorities' attitudes towards public expenditure typified attitudes towards other issues that appeared

to affect the interests of most, if not all, the
organisations in the public authority network.
Abolition of the GLC directly affected most
authorities and introduced uncertainty into the
environment, but only Camden Council became engaged
publicly in the issues.

CONCLUSIONS

Camden Council and the other public authorities
serving the Borough were connected by a great many
different types of interdependency. The Principal
forms of interdependence identified in Camden were:

a.   interdependence arising from the sharing of
     powers and responsibilities by different
     authorities;

b.   interdependence arising from the supply of goods
     and services by one authority to another;

c.   interdependence arising from one authority being
     given powers to instruct another authority to
     act on its behalf;

d.   interdependence arising from the ability of one
     authority to sub-contract part of its service
     provision to another authority;

e.   interdependence arising from the ability of one
     authority to regulate another authority's
     activities;

f.   interdependence arising from serving the same
     customer/client groups;

g.   interdependence arising from operating close to other   authorities and using each other's   land and premises;

h.   interdependence arising from competing with each other   for power, resources and influence;

i.   interdependence arising from pursuing shared aims and   objectives.

The   incidence   of   each   type   of   interdependency overlapped   so   that   most   public   authorities   were linked to the local authority in   several ways.   For example,   interdependence between Camden Council   and Thames   Water   arose   from   the   supply   of   water   and sewerage   services   by   Thames   Water,   Camden's   work   as an agent for Thames   Water for local sewers,   public health regulation by both   authorities,   the location of   water   and   sewerage   pipes,   and   the   mutual interests of the two authorities in land-use planning. On   the   other   hand,   interdependence   between   Camden Council   and   Bloomsbury   Health   Authority   arose principally from providing   closely connected services to the same group of clients,   particularly vulnerable and   dependent   people   within   the   community;   joint responsibility   for   developing   community   care projects; the provision of hospital social workers by Camden   Council;   competition   for   influence   over   the kind of health   services provided in the Borough and common aims of improving the   quality of life enjoyed by Camden people.   Overlapping was not   solely   a function of the fact that the local authority was a multi-service organisation, since patterns of multiple interdependencies were observed between other public authorities   in   the   network.   The   total   pattern   of interdependence in the   public authority network in Camden was complex.

Different types of interdependence gave rise to different patterns of behaviour and provided the basis for forming different types of relationships between the authorities. For example, relationships between Camden Council and the Metropolitan Police involved four main forms of interdependence; hierarchical relationships, serving the same clients and operating in the same physical environment and competition for influence over policing. Camden had an interest in the level of the precept it was asked to collect and the Metropolitan Police responded by consultation with local authorities before setting its annual rate. Camden and the police both had responsibilities towards offenders and for providing a safe and acceptable environment for local people. The authorities differed in their priorities and preferred actions in relation to both groups. Interdependence between the authorities had given rise to two different and conflicting patterns of behaviour. On the one hand, Camden adopted a campaigning stance towards the police aimed at winning influence over the way policing was carried out and ultimately at changing the structure of the police. At the same time, the Metropolitan Police was seeking to work more closely with other agencies including local authorities on a full range of policing problems. Beneath was a flow of day-to-day problems such as dealing with abandoned cars or traffic diversions in which each authority had a purely practical interest in handling the task effectively.

The example of the Metroplitan Police and Camden Council serves to illustrate how different forms of interdependence give rise to different interests and form the basis for different types of behaviour and relationships. It also illustrates how such interests

may conflict and give rise to behaviour and
relationships that conflict with each other and cause
tension between the authorities. Tension was rife
between the local authority and the police in Camden.
The police wanted closer relationships with the local
authority but only on certain terms and issues. The
local authority wanted to conduct a vigorous campaign
against police policy but also to deal with certain
law and order problems effectively by joint action.

The many different forms of interdependence identified
within the public authority network in Camden suggest
that the total amount of interdependence between the
local authority and the other public authorities
providing services may have been great. Among the
questions which respondents were asked to consider was
whether the work of their authority was closely
connected to that of other public authorities
operating in Camden. The great majority answering the
question directly saw their authority very closely
connected to other public authorities.

> "Absolutely inter-linked."
>
> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough
> of Camden)
>
> "The relationship is very close indeed"
>
> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
> Education Authority)
>
> "LEB is closely connected to every public
> authority."
>
> (Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
>
> "There is little to do that doesn't have a
> relationship to the local authority."
>
> (Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

However, respondents drew an interesting distinction
between what many called the theory and the practice.

They suggested that in objective terms the authorities were very closely linked together and interdependence was extensive but the concrete relationships to which this gave rise were much less extensive.

> "Yes in theory, it should be, but in practice not."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "In theory we should have a common goal of providing good order and a peaceful and enjoyable society."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
>
> "There should be pretty close links between the MSC and other public authorities."
>
> (Manpower. Wardour Street Job Centre)
>
> "Not as close as it should be"
>
> (District Planning Officer. Hamstead Health Authority)

This theme is explored further in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6   LINKAGES

The Network of Linkages among Public Authority

Formal Linkages at the organisational level

Interlocking Memberships

Formal Liaison Committees

Formal Linkages at the Task Level
      a. joint committees
      b. shadow committees
      c. joint officer groups
      d. joint appointments
      e. case conferences
      f. designation of lead authorities
      g. designation of lead departments
         or staff

Informal Linkages
      a. joint training
      b. staff flows
      c. social events
      d. political and professional networks

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 6

LINKAGES

If interdependence is to give rise to interaction
between organisations, structures and processes must
be developed through which communication, exchange
and other forms of organisational interaction can take
place. The structures and processes may be formal or
informal and may link together small parts or whole
organisations. In some cases the mechanisms for
interaction are spelled out in legislation and
circulars; in other cases they are developed locally.
Links between organisations may vary depending on the
kinds of personnel involved, the balance of
relationships and their quality and effectiveness.

There is no existing classification of linking
mechanisms which can be used to discuss the links
between Camden Council and the other public
authorities serving the area. The links observed in
Camden have been divided into three main groups. The
first group includes those formal mechanisms which
link together authorities as a whole. The second group
comprises formal mechanisms which link parts of
authorities, usually related to specific tasks or
policies. The distinction was generally clear,
although in health it was debatable whether the
formal linking mechanisms should have been seen as
operating at the organisational or the task level.
Informal mechanisms are in the third group. These
links centre on the contacts developed by individuals
with their opposite numbers in other authorities.
Such contacts can be actively encouraged, or
hindered, by structures and processes both within and
outside organisations.

This chapter focuses on the links that had been developed between Camden Council and other public. To begin with, a picture of the wider public authority network into which these linkages fitted is presented.

THE NETWORK OF LINKAGES AMONG PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Studies of interorganisational relationships have been criticised for regarding the links between organisations as mere extensions of the organisations. The "organisation set" model (Evan, 1966) which has dominated interorganisational theory frequently diminishes the importance of linkages (Rhodes, 1981). By taking the "focal organisation" and the group or "set" of organisations with which it interacts as the basic unit of analysis, researchers have often ignored the independent effect of linkages upon organisations. The advantage of conceptualising the local authority and other public authorities as a network is that it focuses attention on the linkages between the organisations studied.

Respondents reported a large number of links between the various public authorities whose links with the local authority were the focus of study. Previous research has shown that it is not straightforward to describe the network which such linkages create. The shape of the network identified is determined by the measure of linkages selected (Laumann & Pappi, 1974). The Camden study used multiple definitions of linkages including all regular or formalised interactions between authorities which respondents reported. This method should have produced a denser pattern of linkages among the authorities studied than the use of any single measure.

Studies of networks have encountered the problem of defining boundaries. By limiting the network under consideration, arbitrary criteria have to be imposed which can result in a misleading pattern being presented (Rhodes, 1981). The boundaries of the network examined in the Camden study resulted from the processes of selecting organisations described in Chapter 3.

Respondents were invited to name organisations located in the same policy community as themselves. The resulting network was then reduced by the imposition of a functional perspective which focused the study onto public authorities. This method produced a smaller network than either the organisational or complete public authority networks to which the authorities belonged.

Previous research has also developed a number of summary measures which can be used to describe networks (Harary et al 1965; White et al 1976). Mitchell (1969) proposed a number of characteristics which could be used to measure and compare their morphological characteristics: anchorage, density, reachability and range. Anchorage equates to the notion of a focal organisation. The anchorage point for the Camden network was the local authority. Reachability measures the preponderance of direct links and short indirect links among organisations. Density measures the extent to which the links which could exist in theory exist in practice. Range measures the number of direct links centred on the anchorage organisation.

Figure 21 shows the pattern of inter-authority relationships among the public authorities in the study excluding the local authority. Two features of

FIGURE 21

the way the network has been drawn should be noted.
First, relationships have been assumed to be
symmetrical. In reality they are not. For example,
respondents at the London Fire and Civil Defence
Authority made a number of points about links with
the London Ambulance Service but the respondent in
the latter organisation was preoccupied with
relationships with other parts of the health service
and never mentioned links with the other emergency
services.

> "Euston [DHSS Office] is usually on the receiving
> end of demands from other organisation for making
> particular payments to clients; less frequently
> Euston contacts other organisations for
> information."

(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS).

Flows of staff, resources and information may also be
one-way. Second, the links which consist of
contractual and trading arrangements or the discharge
of an organisation's normal duties such as regulation
have been excluded.

Authorities clustered together in recognisable policy
communities, such as health, transport, emergency
services, recreation and poverty. Three authorities
had a greater range, i.e. more linkages than any
other authority apart from Camden Council. They were
the Inner London Education Authority, the police and
the DHSS. Such pivotal authorities might have been
able to perform some of the co-ordinating functions
which it would have been expected that the local
authority would perform. Some public authorities were
poorly linked into the network, for example the
Manpower Services Commission and the nationalised
industries (British Rail and London Electricity
Board).

221

The density of the network was about 20%, i.e. one in five of the potential direct links between authorities actually existed. Given the multiple measures of linkages employed, this figure seems low, suggesting that within Camden the network was loosely joined. The reachability of the network was transformed by the presence of the local authority which meant that every authority was only one step away from every other and the different policy communities were thereby linked together. The role of the local authority in the network was tempered by the scale of the networks in which the other public authorities were enmeshed. Many of these authorities straddled the Borough boundaries and operated on a far larger geographical scale than Camden. Their networks included multiple local authorities, health authorities, and semi-autonomous divisions of large public authorities. The need to maintain large numbers of other relationships placed limits on the development of relationships with Camden Council.

The morphology of the public authority network studied in Camden had the following features. It was structured around a number of distinct policy communities which stretched beyond Camden and the public sector. The density of linkages was fairly low. Some authorities were only tenuously linked into the network. The shape of the network was a distinctive feature of the organisational environment in which the local authority operated in Camden. First, the local authority had the opportunity to play a unique role in linking public authorities which would otherwise have been only loosely and indirectly linked together. Second, the ability of the local authority to link those authorities together depended upon whether the links between public authorities reinforced or contradicted

relationships between those authorities and the local authority. The forms which linkages between authorities took were similar and as varied as their linkages with Camden council.

FORMAL LINKAGES AT THE ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL

There are three ways in which organisations may be linked together at the level of the whole authority. The first is by common ownership, which is widespread in the commercial sector and has parallels in the public sector. Public sector status could be thought of as common ownership; however, a better analogy would be reporting to the same government department and ministry. This linking structure was not recognisable in Camden since no one central government department was responsible for the work of the local authority. A second way in which organisations can be linked together as wholes is through inter-locking directorates. The third way is through formal liaison committees. Both these forms of linkages were observed in Camden.

Interlocking Memberships

Organisations can be linked at the highest level through individuals who serve as members of more than one controlling board or council. Interlocking in the private sector arises where corporations recognise a specific need for co-ordination with or control of other corporations. It may also arise where there is a perceived need for general economic and political information and solidarity with other members of the business community. (Burt 1980; Pennings, 1980; Palmer 1983)

Interlocking membership among public authorities may arise in a number of different ways. An individual may decide to stand for election to more than one body. An elected member of such an authority may be appointed to the board of another public authority in his or her own right. Likewise, an individual may be asked to sit on the board of more than one public authority. Such interlocking depends on the motivation of individuals to seek multiple seats and the preferences of those making appointments. A permanent way of interlocking authorities through membership is by nomination to a quota of places on a board or council. However, interlocking only occurs where the nominee is also a member of the nominating authority. An authority may be unable to persuade any of its members to take on the additional workload and have to nominate sympathetic non-members which weakens the interlock.

The significance of interlocking membership as a linking mechanism depends upon three things: first, the extent of interlocking and the numbers of nominees on a board; second, the role of members on the particular authority and the definition of their representative role; and third, the extent to which those who hold dual office are interested in and encouraged by their own organisations to develop a linking role.

Interlocking membership is not a strong feature of governmental institutions at the local level in Britain. Political careers in central and local government are sharply differentiated. Local politics is a full-time occupation for a minority and the burden of multiple offices is unattractive to many. Recruitment to local office differs between local government, where political and ideological

commitment is essential, and appointed boards where overt political affiliation can reduce chances of selection. A further factor serving to limit interlocking between local government and other public authorities has been the clear ministerial preference in recent years for appointees to have business rather than political or public-service expertise and interests.

Interlocking memberships were observed in the study of Camden but were not an exceptionally strong characteristic of the network.   The three main services involved were health, education and fire; opportunities for interlocking also existed in training and sport. Camden Council nominated two members to serve on the two health authorities within the Borough and two members to the Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee. The former were filled by Labour councillors; the   latter by Labour supporters, hence only limited interlocking occurred.

Until 1986 Camden nominated a member to serve on the Inner London Education Authority alongside the GLC members for the Borough. After April 1986 when ILEA became a free-standing authority and direct elections were held, the interlocking ceased as no Camden members stood for dual membership.

The only ILEA member for Camden after 1986 with close links with Camden Council had previously been a dual member and had held chairs in both authorities. On standing down as a Camden councillor he commented,

> "In some senses I am pleased because work on two
> authorities is very extensive. The load is
> almost impossible. The link function is very
> valuable to deal with inter-authority issues. I
> am used as a person who can sort things out.

> Therefore when my role disappears the loss of the
> link will be bad. It will be more a closing of
> communication."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA   nominee)

Interlocking was at the   same time established for
another service, fire, which passed, on Abolition, to
the LFCDA to which Camden nominated one member.

Local authority nominations were made for two other
bodies, the Manpower Services Commission Area Board
and the Regional Sports   Council. These nominations
were for local authority members to   represent a
number of local authorities. Camden members were not
involved, although some served on the local sports
council at Borough level.

A common feature of all these services, except for
sport, is that they have been relocated at some time
from local authorities to   specialised public
authorities. For instance, in the early 1970's
responsibility for many aspects of community health
passed from local government to the National Health
Service during a major   reorganisation of both
services. The need for a continuing   relationship
between the authorities was recognised in the way
both services were structured.   Circular HRC(73)22
(Department of Health and Social Security 1973)
specified that the local authority or authorities
could nominate four of the normally 15 members of the
Area Health Authorities and a similar level of
representation would apply to Regional Health
Authorities.   In 1974 a Labour Secretary of State
announced a policy of "democratisation" of the health
service by authorities to one third and making
parallel changes at the regional level.   This policy
was reversed by the succeeding Conservative government

which in Circular HC(80)8/LAC(80)3 <u>Department of Health and Social Security 1980</u> announced the reduction of local authority representation on the new district health authorities to four out of a normal membership of 17. Interlocking membership was also provided for when the Family Practitioner Committees became independent of their health authorities in 1985.

Interlocking was largely confined to where it was required by legislation. There was no identifiable pattern of voluntary interlocking either by members seeking dual office or by councillors being chosen for appointment to other bodies.

The local authority had powers to co-opt non-elected members onto council committees. This power was generally exercised in favour of voluntary bodies. Some members of the boards of public authorities serving Camden had local authority experience. However, only exceptionally were these links with Camden. For example, five of the twelve members of Thames Water in 1986 had experience of local government as members. Two of these were associated with London authorities, one with the Corporation of London and one with Redbridge.

In theory the link between the local authority and the health authority joined the organisations as wholes at the highest level. In practice the link was weaker. Nomination was a one-way linking structure. Further, the local authority nominees served on health authorities in their own right not as representatives of the local authority. As will be discussed later, this role was difficult for elected members to play. In the past few members had been interested in nomination and party supporters had been nominated

instead. More recently when Camden had adopted a
campaigning stance towards health policy, nomination
had attracted members who wanted to use health
authority membership as a platform for public debate
on health and public expenditure.

> "The local authority has given health authority
> membership less emphasis than it should have
> been given. The Local authority attitude is
> perceived to be that health authorities should
> be democratically elected and until then health
> is a second-rate activity to be involved in.
> Membership was for a long time composed of three
> old timers but this changed after the May
> elections. There are now three new members one
> of whom is a Parliamentary candidate and is seen
> to be intending to use membership as a political
> platform."

> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
> Authority)

> "At one time Camden could not get a majority
> party member to go on Bloomsbury Health
> Authority and they had to go outside to get a
> member of the Labour Party."

> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead
> Health Authority nominee)

Neither factor fostered a two-way flow of information
or influence.

Formal Liaison Committees

An alternative means of linking organisations which
have a broad set of interests in each others'
activities is through a liaison committee. Under
Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1985 a Police Consultative Committee was set up in
Camden. Membership of the Committee included local
councillors, police officers and representatives of
a wide range of other interested bodies. The
Consultative Committee had 42 members - 11

councillors, 6 police officers, 2 ILEA members and 2 MPs and the remainder drawn from 13 local groupings of community organisations.

Because it was at the Borough level it involved only middle-ranking officers from the police. The role of the Consultative Committee was to consult interested parties about policing rather than to provide a forum for both authorities to exchange views on their respective policies and programmes. The Commitee had no executive powers.

The first meeting of the Consultative Committee took place in January 1987 just as the research was finished. Strong views had already taken shape about its appropriateness and likely success. On the police side there was hope and expectation that the Committee would serve their interests and improve relationships with both the community and the local authority.

> "The hope is that the police Consultative Committee will be a forum where genuine common objectives can be identified and all seek to attain them. This must be an evolving process because incrementalism is best."

> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

Camden Council was both suspicious of the Committee and critical of its constitution.

> "The Police Consultative Committee will have no power or accountability but be a talking shop."

> (Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of Camden)

No other formal liaison committees were prescribed on a one-to-one basis between the local authority and other public authorities in the network. Some formal

liaison arrangements were prescribed with other public authorities but were based on much larger units than Boroughs. For example, Thames Water, British Waterways Board and the London Electricity Board had consumer consultative bodies upon which there was local authority representation.

The Water Act 1983 replaced direct local authority representation on the Boards of water authorities with representation on Consumer Consultative Committees. This completed the separation of the provision of water services from local government begun after the last war and culminating in the 1973 Water Act. The linkage between Thames Water and Camden Council had, therefore, moved from interlocking membership to a formal liaison committee.

Camden's interests were joined with those of all other local authorities in the public authority's area. The purpose of liaison committees with the Thames Water Consumer Consultative Committee was to provide a forum for discussion of Thames Water's plans and services by a wide range of organisations and consumer groups, not simply the local authorities.

Liaison committees between Camden Council and other public authorities were not repeated across the public authority network. An example of such a linking mechanism set up by the local authority was the quarterly meeting which took place between Camden Council and Abbey Buses, the local bus district of London Buses, part of London Regional Transport. It was a formal meeting chaired by Camden's chair of planning and serviced by Camden. Agendas were drawn up jointly and focused on policy issues. Matters of detail were dealt with by joint officer meetings

between the formal committees. Both organisations involved seemed to find the forum helpful.

Although these formal liaison committees involved councillors, none of these bodies had decision-making powers. All were advisory and served mainly to provide a forum for joint discussions.

> "Section 106 has been criticised for producing talking shops, but it is also felt to be a step along the road to greater accountability."
>
> (Superintendent (community liaison) No. 7 Area, Metropolitan Police)

Discussions were directed largely at the policies of the other public authorities rather than of the local authority and made these liaison committees asymmetrical.

FORMAL LINKAGES AT THE TASK LEVEL

Most of the formal links between Camden Council and the other public authorities serving the area were focused on particular tasks or policies. The forms which these links took were as varied as the work to which they related. Previous discussion has noted the variety of contractual arrangements which existed between public authorities. In this section discussion focuses on special structures and procedures established to link the local authority and other public authorities serving Camden. The mechanisms discussed here were formal, on-going means of linking authorities. The principal formal links observed in Camden were:

a. joint committees
b. shadow committees

c. joint officer groups

d. joint appointments

e. case conferences

f. designation of lead authorities

g. designation of lead departments/staff

Examples of each of these types of linkage and the contexts in which they were developed are discussed below.

a. Joint Committees

Under Section 22 of the National Health Act 1977, district health authorities and local authorities and, after 1984, Family Practitioner Committees were required to set up joint consultative committees (JCCs) to assist in the planning and operation of services of common concern.

It could be argued that the links between the local authority and the health authorities through the JCC and the JCPT were at organisational rather than task level because of the breadth of issues which they cover. The legislation required them to advise authorities on the performance of their duties and on the planning and operation of services in common (National Health Service Act 1977 Section 22). The latter requirement rather than the former dominated the work of the JCC; hence the linkages have been seen as task level rather than organisational level.

Their task was to review existing plans and then to develop joint strategies, development plans for major client groups and teams to implement their work. To assist the development of a joint approach, health authorities received a small allocation of money known as joint finance in their budgets.

The amounts involved were small. Hampstead Health Authority's budget in 1985 was 60 million pounds of which 6 million related to community care. 300,000 pounds was designated as joint finance.

A single JCC had been set up for Camden involving both Hampstead and Bloomsbury Health authorities. Representation was at member level. Voluntary associates were also represented on JCC. The Camden JCC met three times a year and much of its work was delegated to joint officer groups (see below). It was accountable to its constituent authorities from whom it needed agreement for its proposals. It was seen as the linchpin of relationships between the local authority and the health authorities, yet, like JCCs elsewhere, it came in for criticism because of its lack of power compared with the magnitude of the task of co-ordinating such different organisations (see Wistow and Brooks, 1988).

> "The JCC is an important means of liaison. Joint planning is very important. However, it is not capable of implementation because it cannot promote collaborative joint planning because of the structural difference between the authorities involved."

(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

The JCC was prescribed by legislation following the separation of health and social services in the 1970s. It was not a model adopted widely for relationships between public authorities. An example of one such committee which had been initiated by Camden Council was the Camden Liaison Committee. It focused on provision for the single homeless and involved Camden councillors, DHSS officials and relevant officers from social services and voluntary bodies. The Liaison Committee met twice a year. In

between times meetings took place with local DHSS offices.

b. Shadow Committees

Camden Council set up two committees to shadow the work of other public authorities: the Police Committee and the Health Sub-committee. Their aim was to give political prominence to policy areas where Camden wished to have greater influence. The Police Committee was a full committee of the council and was supported by the six-person strong Civil Rights Unit. Relationships with the police were distant and very formal.

> "The Civil Rights Unit is a unilateral action. The police are not involved. The police are willing to talk and want to set up consultation machinery. The CRU writes letters; they do not phone or visit"
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

The police view of the Committee was largely negative, seeing it as a threat and an attempt to interfere in their work.

The Health Sub-Committee was supported by the social services department. It was seen from outside as a body with limited powers.

> "The Health Sub-Committee has a low profile and contains junior politicians."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Members included councillors who were on the health authorities within Camden as well as the two District Medical Officers and representatives of voluntary groups. The role of District Medical Officer is intended to be pivotal in linking local authorities and health authorities. The holder is a medical adviser to the local authority.

The Sub-committee had developed from a liaison group which briefed nominees on health authorities into a campaigning body concerned generally with health and health policy. The health authorities viewed it negatively and felt themselves excluded by its mode of operation.

> "An implicit policy decision is seen by the health authority to have been taken to keep health authority officers from Hampstead and Bloomsbury out of the Sub-Committee."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "Bloomsbury representatives who have been sent have met with a barrage of criticisms and questions."
>
> (Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
>
> "The Health Sub-Committee is the least useful part of the mechanism because it is the campaigning body although it does look at some of the real issues."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

c. Joint Officer Groups

Member level committees are normally supported by joint officer groups which both prepare and implement proposals agreed at committee level. To support the work of JCCs local authorities and health authorities were required to set up Joint Care Planning Teams. A

single JCPT was set up for Camden involving the two health authorities. Representation on both sides was at senior management level. Much of the work of developing a joint approach to care was undertaken by multi-disciplinary local planning teams for groups such as the elderly or the mentally ill.

The main links between the local authority and the health authorities were at officer level. Contact was much more frequent than at member level. It was a more productive arena because it was task-oriented and, although officers were constrained by the viewpoints of their elected members, their freedom to explore alternative strategies was greater.

Officer working groups and liaison meetings were often the main level at which formal discussion took place between the local authority and other public authorities about issues of common concern. In some cases these were regular meetings, for example, the three times a year meetings between ILEA divisional officers and officers from social services, housing departments and the health authorities to discuss issues of common interest such as housing and social conditions. Often, formal meetings would be project or issue-related and have a life only as long as the project or issue.

d. Joint Appointments

Joint appointments were unusual in Camden. The only example observed was where Joint Finance funds had been used to finance an officer based in Camden whose role was to spearhead plans for care for the mentally ill following the rundown of Friern Hospital. A jointly managed and staffed hostel had also been planned to provide care for former Friern patients.

Both the health authority and the local authority had
resisted the proposals, and a compromise had been
arrived at whereby joint staff were avoided but the
health authority was involved in their appointment.
Both examples were from a policy area where there was
considerable joint machinery, and joint responsibility
for serving certain client groups was generally
recognised. The contribution of a joint appointee was
widely recognised. Nonetheless problems such as
incompatible salary scales made joint appointments
difficult.

e. Case Conferences

The focus of multi-service activity at the local level
was in some cases the individual client. The
mechanism frequently used to bring together the
different services required by the client was the
case conference. This device was used where one or
more of the public authorities providing services had
a statutory responsibility for the client's behaviour
or well-being. For example, regular conferences were
held on children at risk involving the police, the
health authority, ILEA and the social services.
Non-attendance (truancy) conferences were held
fortnightly, attended by the police, social services
and ILEA. Case conferences were part of the normal
pattern of action among the professions concerned,
and their establishment in Camden was routine.

f. Designation of Lead Authorities

Co-ordination of authorities involved in a single task
or policy area was in some cases tackled by
designating one of the authorities as a lead
authority. This role was performed by Camden Council

for a number of local authority tasks following the Abolition of the GLC.

Authorities for which Camden was the lead after Abolition included the London Area Mobility Scheme, the London Boroughs' Children's Regional Planning Committee, the London Boroughs' Disability Committee, the London Boroughs' Nuclear Policy Committee, the London Ecology Committee, the London Housing Unit Committee, the London Strategic Policy Unit, and the North London Waste Authority.

The principal examples of designating a lead authority as a linking mechanism came from health. Bloomsbury Health Authority took the role of lead authority for Camden in mental handicap and Hampstead the lead role for mental illness. This arrangement was practical because of the lack of co-terminosity of health and local authority boundaries.

g. Designation of Lead Departments or Staff

Where regular interaction with other public authorities was necessary, organisations often found it convenient to channel communications through a particular department or member of staff. The staff involved were able to build up knowledge and expertise about other organisations and provided a convenient point of contact from outside.

> "There is a problem of communication. British Waterway Board does not know who to contact and referral takes time. It is important to have one main line of communication to other authorities."
>
> (Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board)

For example the DHSS Euston Office had a special
section dealing with clients who had problems with
paying fuel and water bills to liaise with the
relevant utilities. The office also had two assistant
managers responsible for liaison with the local
authority, one with social services and one with
housing benefit. Camden planning department had
officers who were designated as key contacts for other
authorities such as London Buses or the Family
Practitioner Committee.

There were numerous other types of links which were
observed to take place in particular circumstances.
Although public authorities were obliged to consult
each other about many proposed actions, they chose to
consult each other on many more. Consultation was a
formal process usually carried out by correspondence,
although meetings and site visits could also be part
of the process. For instance, London Regional
Transport was required to consult the local authority
about any proposals to change services. Camden had
twenty eight days in which to make a formal response
to proposals. If the proposal was to move a bus stop
there was also need for a site meeting, involving not
only the local authority but also the police.

INFORMAL LINKAGES

Many of the linkages between the local authority and
other public authorities were instigated by
individuals. These informal linkages were seen to
play a vital part in co-ordinating the work of
different organisations and in dealing with day-to-day
issues.

Informal linkages avoided some of the rigidities
associated with formal relationships.

"Working in committee rooms can push people poles apart because they take up formal stances." (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority).

The weakness of informal linkages which respondents identified was their dependence upon benevolent individuals.

"Relationships need to be personality-proofed. There is also a need to avoid ad hoc communications in a crisis situation."

(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

"Relationships rely too much on goodwill and not enough on formality."

(Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher Education) Inner London Education Authority).

In order to develop such relationships, members and officers needed contacts in other organisations. Involvement in the formal linking mechanisms outlined above provided an environment in which contacts could be made. The discussion below focuses on some of the other means by which the development of contacts in other authorities was fostered. Three such enabling structures are considered:

       a. joint training
       b. staff flows
       c. social events

a. Joint Training

Joint training was recognised by respondents as a means by which contacts could be made that could subsequently be exploited to develop or improve relationships between authorities. Joint training provided a context in which people could get to know

their opposite numbers in other organisations and develop their understanding of each other's viewpoints.

> "The key is people in the same service knowing each other as people. This can be facilitated by joint training and other initiatives."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)
>
> "The biggest change which occurred in the relationship between officers in the mental health field was when they both went on a Kings Fund course and they discovered that they were both saying the same things."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Joint training also offered a means of increasing technical knowledge about each other's services which could foster new or improved operational links.

> "The police have invited fire people to watch their riot training. The fire service provides lecturers on police training courses."
>
> (Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority)

The extent of joint training appeared to be limited. The examples identified were of services where there was already a close operational relationship such as community care and the emergency services. Respondents noted that budget restraints meant that training levels were low anyway.

> "Cuts have affected health and social services more than usual. Neither is putting enough into training."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Lack of resources reduced the opportunity both for
joint training and for people to meet people from
other organisations at external training courses.

b. Staff Flows

Staff flows have been recognised in previous studies
as a means by which relationships between
organisations can be fostered.

First, they are a channel for information flow;
second, they are a means of generating innovation as
people enter new environments and, third, they lay the
foundations of a network of personal contacts between
organisations (Baty et al, 1971).

In Camden such flows seemed to contribute little to
the fostering of relationships. Among professional
staff, job moves tended to be intra-sector. At lower
levels movement between sectors was more common,
especially where salary scales differed.

> "Euston loses staff to local authorities because
> of any differentials and pressurised work. There
> is a big turnover, training is lost and staff
> levels are under-strength. Efforts are being
> made to combat this by being flexible on
> qualifications but pay is the key problem."

> (Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

Labour market conditions in many sectors such as
health and social security had led to very high rates
of turnover among staff so that continuing
relationships were difficult to develop.

> "Staff turnover at the local level causes a
> problem for consistent relations."

> (Director of Nursing Services (Community
> Services Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

242

> "There is a lack of stability in the health
> authority and the local authority at the senior
> level. The District Medical Officer is the only
> chief officer in the district from 1982. The
> District Planning Officer is the only adminis-
> trator from before 1982. There has been an
> enormous change in personnel and style. There is
> no institutional memory on either side to help
> collaboration."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
> Authority)

The only major staff movements which had taken place
were one-off movements of staff following transfers
of functions. Changes in the location of housing
benefit had involved a group of staff moving from the
DHSS to local authorities. The Abolition of the GLC
had entailed large numbers of staff moving with their
tasks to both local authorities and other public
authorities.

c. Social Events

Some authorities arranged social events to provide
officers and members with the opportunity to meet
informally and extend their contacts.

> "The LEB periodically holds social evenings to
> which both members and officers of the local
> authority are invited."
>
> (Ambulance Service Divisional Manager,
> London Electricity Board)
>
> "Abbey Buses gives receptions for people they
> have contact with: the police have similar
> receptions which build contacts."
>
> (District General Manager, London Buses)

The extent of such social events was unclear and it
was suggested that more opportunities for informal
social contacts were needed.

"We need to create at every level a meeting place, for example lunch meetings at patch level to include social workers, doctors and vicars."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Organised social events appeared to be a practice more prevalent in the trading public sector. Relationships between senior members of some authorities, on the other hand were seen to be so antagonistic as to rule out the possibility of social contact.

"The Leader of the Council and the Chairman of the Health Authority could never have dinner together."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

d. Political and Professional Networks

Research on urban areas has demonstrated the importance of networks of personal and professional contacts in developing and maintaining links between organisations (Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981). In Camden these networks were strong but did not easily link Camden Council and other public authorities. Party political links served particularly to link Camden with other local authorities. Professional networks tended to be intra-sector except where a particular profession, such as civil engineering, was to be found in more than one type of authority.

A different research project would have been needed to study the social, political and professional networks to which public authority decision-takers belonged.

CONCLUSIONS

The links that had been established between Camden Council and other public authorities serving the area took a great variety of forms. They could be divided into formal and informal. Informal links were at least as important as a means of maintaining relationships between authorities as formal links. Informal relationships were seen to be a direct and effective channel for communication and problem-solving which avoided the bureaucracy and public posturing which could affect formal relationships.

However, the functions which informal relationships could perform were inevitably limited. They relied heavily on the interest and receptiveness of the individuals concerned. Informal relationships could deal only with matters within the control of the individuals concerned, which severely limited their scope in most circumstances. Both the local authority and the other public authorities recognised the importance of informal links and were involved in activities which fostered them.

Formal links between Camden and other public authorities were numerous but not extensive. At the organisational level formal links were few. The Council was not interlocked greatly with the controlling boards of other public authorities through overlapping memberships. There were few liaison committees and those that had been set up were seen as being limited in scope and effectiveness. The majority of formal links were focused on particular tasks of common interest to the local authority and one or more other public authorities.

Such links could be formed in a great variety of ways. One widespread approach was to create a focal point for interaction, either named individuals or particular sections of the authorities concerned. Case conferences were relatively common. A third form of which there were a number was either a joint committee or working group.

Linkages between Camden Council and the other public authorities serving the area existed at all organisational levels from field staff to directors and members, and from day-to-day operations to strategic planning. However, the range of linkages observed was less comprehensive than this statement might at first sight imply. The levels at which authorities were linked were few because:

a. Member-level contact was limited and was primarily focused on interaction with the health authorities and ILEA and LFCDA;

b. Member involvement was not necessarily in a decision-making context. Except where members were nominated to other authorities, most high level inter-authority links were advisory;

c. Some member-level links were antagonistic and did little to support (if not undermine) links at other levels;

d. Most links appeared to have evolved in an ad hoc way in response to immediate needs of tasks and services, often at the level of particular divisions or functions within the authority, and were rarely assessed as a whole;

e.   The mismatch in scale and structure between the local authority and other public authorities often made it difficult to fix an appropriate level for interaction above those involved at the operational level.

Some interaction between the local authority and other public authorities was on an ad hoc basis. Other interaction was regular and cyclical. Ad hoc interaction triggered by operational needs was the commonest link between authorities. The frequency depended upon the nature of the issues involved. In some cases officers in the local authority would be in day-to-day contact with officers in other public authorities; in others contact might be needed only once or twice a year.

Formal meetings usually occurred on a regular basis. Some were relatively infrequent, annual, or quarterly; others such as case conferences needed to be frequent, and would be held monthly or fortnightly. The frequency and regularity of interaction were dictated by the nature of the tasks the linking mechanisms were required to handle.

The overall pattern of linkages between the local authority and other public authorities in Camden was patchy. Patchiness reflected the following features of the intergovernmental network at the local level:

a.   The extent to which linkages are required to be established by law was limited. Most links were established voluntarily by authorities in response to perceived operational needs;

b.   Linkages were generally at the operational rather than the policy level. Feedback from

implementation   to policy normally occurred
within the individual authorities rather than
through a joint mechanism;

c.   The number of formal linkages established between
the local authority and other public authorities
was   limited.   Informal linkages played a
significant role in maintaining   relationships
between the local authority and other public
authorities;

d.   The number of links operating on a regular basis
was limited. Most links were activated ad hoc as
issues arose;

e.   Some links involved both the local authority and
other public authorities to an equal extent. A
number of links, however,   such as the shadow
committees, appeared to involve only one of the
two authorities between whom the   relationship
existed to any great degree.

This pattern of patchiness was ameliorated to some
extent by the   direct linkages between the public
authorities within the local   network. However, the
density of this network was low and the pattern of
linkages was uneven.

Overall, therefore, the pattern of linkages between
the local   authority and other public authorities
serving Camden was less   extensive than would have
been expected from the extent and   nature of
interdependence described in the previous chapter. One
of the reasons lay in the factors described in
chapter 4, namely that while the socio-economic
character of Camden created forces   that demanded
the development of links   between authorities

providing services, organisational and political forces made the establishment of such relationships difficult.

CHAPTER 7 STRUCTURAL FACTORS FACILITATING AND INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-AUTHORITY LINKAGES IN CAMDEN

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTENT

> Environmental Turbulence
> High Levels of Demand for Services
> High profile, complex, multi-
>   dimensional problems
> Personnel Shortages
> Financial Resources
> Land Prices
> Heterogeneity

THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT

CHAPTER 7   STRUCTURAL FACTORS FACILITATING AND INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-AUTHORITY LINKAGES IN CAMDEN

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Previous studies have demonstrated that the socio-economic environment of organisations can affect the extent and the nature of linkages developed between them. Some of the factors which have been demonstrated elsewhere to facilitate the development of interorganisational links were present in the socioeconomic profile of Camden. So, too, were a number of features which have been associated with a failure to develop relationships.

The features of the socio-economic environment which seemed to encourage the development of inter-organisational links were: -

        a.   environmental turbulence
        b.   high levels of demand for services
        c.   high profile, complex, multi-dimensional
              problems
        d.   personnel shortages
        e.   financial resources

Features that seemed to discourage the development of links were: -

        a.   land prices
        b.   heterogeneity

Environmental Turbulence

Some sections of the population and sectors of the local economy displayed high levels of turnover and

instability producing an environment which conformed to the description of turbulent. Previous research has associated turbulent environments with the development of interorganisational linkages (Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968). Apart from high population turnover, particularly among young adults, Camden had sizeable groups of homeless and drifting persons, and large inflows of commuters and temporary residents, which made the demand for public services unpredictable and their delivery difficult. The urban environment displayed the complex dynamic forces arising from the interaction of organisational and non-organisational components typical of so-called turbulent fields. The closely inter-related nature of social and economic factors in a densely developed part of the metropolis, also resulted in actions by one authority being swiftly felt by others. The significance of uncertainty and the importance of reducing it were underlined by respondents who looked to information-sharing among authorities as a means of alleviating the problems of providing services to a shifting population.

> "Camden and Islington FPC has an inflation problem with 20% more on the Register than in the Registrar General's Population Estimates. The reason is uncertain but probably involves homelessness and drifters; immigrants; name and age confusion and high mobility."

> (Assistant Registar, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee)

CIFPC planned to tackle the inflation problem by developing information links with the health authorities and the local authorities.

> "Currently 400 children are out of school, twice the number for last year. Emergency measures have been taken. However, to do this quickly

is very difficult because of the problems of planning permission and funds. Such provision had to be achieved within three months; if ILEA had been warned in advance of the bulge of homeless families' children, action could have been taken to get classrooms ready in time for their arrival."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

"The LEB wants collaboration and co-operation to trace the movement of LEB customers, particularly tenants who move."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

High Levels of Demand for Services

Previous research has suggested that a shortage of clients will precipitate the development of links between social welfare agencies to ensure their mutual survival (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984). No such stimulus to interaction existed in Camden. All the public authorities in the Camden study experienced high levels of demand for their services; furthermore, in practically every case, demand was rising. Part of the increased demand was generated by population increase. Increasing numbers of the very dependent and the existence of significant levels of urban stress were increasing pressure on providers of personal and welfare-support services. Increased commuting into the area, coupled with the wider trend towards greater use of public transport, was increasing pressure on the transport operators. The providers of infrastructure and the utilities were under pressure to meet the demands of increased consumption and development/redevelopment within the Borough.

The problem faced by many authorities was therefore of managing excess demand, which was seen as a key

reason for establishing relationships which could control or reduce demand.

> "More and more the police are not acting alone but trying to act in concert with other agencies. They use a multi-agency approach and a more problem-solving approach because of limited resources... Previously the police tried to do everything themselves [in problem areas] which could have meant harassment, did their image harm, and moved the problem on rather than finding a long term solution."
>
> (Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

A much less co-operative outcome was for one overloaded organisation to attempt to "dump" its excess demand on another, for example by redefining problems or responsibilities.

> "The government in its desire to reduce its own spending puts an additional burden on Camden which has to pick up the bill for disadvantage. The government refuses to recognise the problem it has created for example in homelessness. Homeless people need assistance from somewhere."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden).

> "A man in the National Orthopaedic Hospital costs 1000 pounds a week. A local authority recently refused to pay 150 pounds a week necessary for the man to go home. Beds in hospital are being blocked. The elderly could go home if support were made available."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

High Profile, Complex, Multi-dimensional Problems

The socio-economic profile of Camden gave rise to complex multi-dimensional problems which demanded action by several authorities. Camden scored high on national indicators of urban deprivation. Parts of

the Borough had above-average levels of unemployment and poverty and contained above-average numbers of groups dependent upon public authorities for many basic services. Camden had problems such as vagrancy and large scale redevelopment that stemmed from its central metropolitan location. Some of these issues already had a high public profile, for example the redevelopment of Kings Cross and problems of vice in the Southern part of the Borough. Camden Council was endeavouring to raise the profile of other issues such as racism, unemployment and housing need, which it felt were politically important.

Respondents in authorities involved in tackling these complex and multi-dimensional problems cited the importance of the need for a concerted approach and effective links between authorities.

> "One body can't do the work [of economic development] well because of insufficient finance - there has to be a co-operative effort."
>
> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "[Camden] is trying to get an inter-agency response to [racial attacks] involving housing, social services, education and the police. For example, attacks often happen between home and school. Therefore a system is needed to alert other authorities when children are being absented from school because of fear of the journey."
>
> (Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Today's health problems are often behavioural or environmental. Their solution is very closely related to local authority work. For example, drugs, AIDS and alcohol abuse all require collaboration."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

A high   profile was seen to add to the impetus to
develop effective links   to solve   problems.

> "Issues which catch headlines in the press...
> such as child abuse, are done better."

> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
> Authority)

Personnel Shortages

Many public authorities had difficulty recruiting key
groups of staff despite the fact that one in seven
Camden workers was   unemployed. This problem was
accounted for by two factors. First, the mismatch in
skills and experience between the unemployed and
groups   in   short   supply,   such   as   computer
professionals,   nurses,   accountants   and   social
workers. Second, while wage and salary   levels were
above average nationally and for London, so too was
the cost of living. Public authorities were unable or
unused to paying premiums for their labour and lost
out to authorities in cheaper parts of the country or
to the private sector. In   particular the cost and
scarcity of housing in Camden and surrounding areas
made it difficult to attract workers into the   area.

Many previous studies have demonstrated that resource
scarcity   predisposes organisations to co-operate
(Gamm _et al_, 1984).   Personnel is an   essential
resource and authorities might have been expected to
look to joint action to solve shortages. However, it
did not appear that organisations were particularly
interested in establishing   relationships or acting
together for these particular reasons. For example,
Bloomsbury Health Authority noted in a   discussion
paper that,

"Constraints on changes in services include, staff recruitment and retention difficulties. For professional groups this problem is primarily attributed to national shortages and the high cost of living in the London area acting as a deterrent to recruitment. The latter is also applicable to clerical/secretarial and ancillary staff. However, it is considered that the principal reason for recruitment and retention difficulties with these groups is that wage rates are not competitive. It should be noted that those staff employed by the Local Authority in like work receive higher rates of pay."

(Bloomsbury Health Authority (1986))

Financial Resources

Either because of limited revenue-raising capacity or because of government restrictions on public expenditure, all the public authorities in the network were experiencing budget limits of greater or less severity. Resource scarcity has been widely demonstrated to predispose organisations to develop relationships. Many respondents confirmed this view, pointing to the need to pool resources in certain areas in order to be able to work effectively.

"The gain Camden seeks from interaction is to maximise resources."

(Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

However, as others pointed out, contracting resources had an opposite effect on organisations by reducing the money available for new initiatives and activities outside the one of mandatory service provision.

"As resources in London local authorities have been squeezed, the management thrust has been to concentrate on managing their own budget and therefore there has been little management time for other things and peripheral issues."

257

Resource levels are determined by both socio-economic
and   organisational   factors.   The   socio-economic
profile of Camden   affected the adequacy of public
authorities' budgets since budgets relied on local
resources. Two processes were   involved here.   First,
was the raising of local revenue through the   rates.
Camden had the second largest rate base in London
because the tranche of central London offices and
commercial   premises which fell within its boundaries
was capable of   producing a very large rate income.
The local authority had for   many years set a high
rate, but its ability to exploit its rate   base was
being progressively restricted by central government
financial controls.

Second, some elements of public authority budgets were
calculated   on the basis of needs among the community
to be served. Although on this measured need Camden
scored relatively highly with many   indicators, it
received limited grant in consideration of these
needs.   Because of its failure to meet government
spending targets Camden   Council had lost its Block
Grant from central government.   Health   service
budgets were also being held down in the Camden area
in   order to shift resources nationally and within the
London region   to areas of poorer provision.

Land Prices

Land and building prices in Camden were high because
of its   central and sought-after location. Housing
expense contributed to the   pattern of living outside
the Borough among many public sector   workers and
managers.   The lack of ties with the local community

inhibited the growth of informal social networks amongst key employees.

> "Senior staff cannot afford to live in Hampstead therefore they do not receive social and 'cocktail' criticism of their services."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Public authorities were substantial owners of land in Camden, and many owned sites which were being released for sale and redevelopment. Large profits could be made from such sales that were able to alleviate budget pressures. The same land market made it very expensive for public authorities to buy land for their development. In several instances land issues set the scene for conflict between public authorities which was inimical to the development of smooth inter-organisational relationships.

> "Property finances service improvement and authorities are looking to sell land and realise its full commercial value. The [New End] problem is financial pressure on the health authority. Camden has high land values and large areas of vacant land. The focus is on land ownership and cash rather than on co-operative aims and improving services."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

Heterogeneity

The heterogeneity of Camden, the sharp contrast between different neighbourhoods, the differences between the north and south of the Borough and the ethnic composition of the population, contributed to the variety of demands made upon public authorities serving the area. Where authorities covered a wider geographical area than Camden, the heterogeneity of

their constituency was increased further. Because of the location of Camden near the heart of a capital city, public authorities in the area experienced local, regional and national demands for their services. In many cases the demands were incompatible. For example, the health authorities were under pressure regionally and nationally to maintain specialised acute services, while the demand locally was for community services. Heterogeneity made it more difficult for authorities to establish common aims and objectives.

> "The work of Bloomsbury and other public authorities should be closely connected because the aim of public authorities is primarily to deliver local services to local people. But Bloomsbury is a large complex health authority which has supra-regional and national specialities within it. Health authorities are not elected and accountability is basically upwards unlike Camden where accountability is downwards towards the population. Therefore, there are problems, discrepancies and lack of co-operation."

(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

To summarise, the socio-economic environment in Camden generated pressures which implied that the development of closer links between public authorities would have been an appropriate strategy for service provision. Some elements of the socio-economic environment have been identified which engendered conflict between authorities but they were more than offset by the many pressures for co-operation between authorities. The appropriateness of developing linkages with other authorities in response to environmental pressures was widely recognised by respondents. However, as the next section will demonstrate, there were powerful counter-forces which affected the acceptance and

implementation of inter-organisational relationships within the public authority network.

THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT

The character of organisations as much as the environment in which they operate has been identified as a factor affecting the development of linkages with other organisations.   Previous studies have demonstrated the influence on relationships, not only of structural and cultural features of individual organisations, but also of the extent of difference between the organisations in a network.   (Redburn, 1977).

Camden Council, the local authority, had characteristics which have been associated with both the facilitation and inhibition of the development of easy relationships with other authorities. The main features of Camden which were identified as contributing to the ease of developing relationships were:

> a. Diversity of function, giving the organisation a wide range of interests and an understanding of many aspects of public service provision.

> b. High levels of professionalisation which fostered links across organisational boundaries among members of particular professions.

> c. A history of resource availability, allowing the costs of developing and maintaining relationships with other public authorities to be absorbed.

> d. An all-encompassing definition of political

interests and responsibilities which focused attention on the totality of public service provision in the Borough.

e. An interest in playing a wider role in London politics.

The main features of Camden Council which acted in the opposite direction, to inhibit the development of relationships with other public authorities, were,

f. Strong departmentalism, making it difficult for the authority to develop a common or wider viewpoint on issues and leading to a lack of experience in developing joint approaches between different functional areas.

g. Extensive bureaucracy, which was inimical to innovation and slowed response to initiatives by other public authorities.

h. Tighter financial controls set by central government, making it more difficult to finance non-essential services and relationships with other public authorities.

i. Decentralisation, which in many circumstances facilitates development of relationships, but which in Camden, because the local authority was already much smaller than most other public authorities, made interaction more complicated.

j. An overloaded committee system, which stretched members' ability to attend meetings and manage affairs and left little room for them

to develop new interests or dimensions to their work.

k. A strong inward-looking policy orientation among the new policy units set up by the council, which diverted attention away from external relationships.

l. A strong, interventionist left-wing policy stance, which looked to campaign against rather than compromise with other organisations espousing different viewpoints.

In Camden the differences between the local authority and the other public authorities in the network generally exceeded their similarities. The main points of difference were:

a. Each authority focused on providing a discrete set of services; none, other than the local authority, was a multi-service authority. Most authorities had a narrow perspective on service provision and had limited experiences of action in common with each other.

b. Authorities differed greatly in scale in area served, size of budget and the proportion of their budget spent in Camden. Interaction with the local authority could not be one of equal terms or symetrical.

c. Lack of co-terminosity. Authorities did not have the same territory of interest, and liaison arrangements became complex and burdensome.

d. Authorities differed structurally in their internal organisation, the degree to which they

263

were centralised, their methods of financing and
their accountability to central government and
the public. Relationships were difficult,
cumbersome and slow where structures were out of
alignment.

e. Authorities differed in their policy
preferences and viewpoints, partly reflecting
their different constituencies and stakeholders,
and partly reflecting the different professions
to which they were allied. Authorities did not
have common interests in or common viewpoints on
issues in which they were involved.

f. Authorities differed culturally making it
more difficult to establish common objectives
and joint working.

"The will exists to collaborate [with the health
authority] but there is a clash of cultures
therefore the will exists in spirit rather than
in practice."

(Member, London Borough of Camden)

The problems for co-operation and co-ordination
stemming from incompatible structures were commented
on widely by respondents in both the local authority
and other public authorities.

"Some authorities are more difficult to work with
because of their structure e.g. British Rail - a
very complex agency where the location of
responsibility and authority are unclear to
outsiders."

(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
of Camden)

"Social Services has a functional management
structure - day care, field work and residential
care. To liaise on ... [mental hospital due for
closure] requires three people plus someone from
housing. The newly appointed person dealing with

... is powerless within the structure. Camden is looking at the need to restructure and have appointed a mental health co-ordinator."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

"It is a nonsense that [within the Camden and Westminster Division of ILEA] there are four area health authorities, ten police areas and two Boroughs where such services should be provided on a co-terminal basis with joint funding and joint planning."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

Structural difficulties were made worse by the fact that all the public authorities were suffering resource constraints and were not only under pressure to retrench to their core tasks but were unable to contemplate initiatives which, though they might bring long-term benefits, would bring short-term costs.

In summary: while the socio-economic character of Camden created forces that might have been expected to lead to the development of links between authorities providing public services, other forces - stemming from the nature of the authorities themselves - were working in the opposite direction. The local authority had a number of organisational and political features which militated strongly against developing easy relationships with other public authorities. In addition, there was an almost complete lack of structural congruence between authorities in the public authority network in Camden, which made the establishment of good relationships a difficult task.

CHAPTER 8 PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS OF INTERAUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF INTERAUTHORITY WORKING

Camden Officials' Views of Interauthority
    Working

Camden Members' Views of Interauthority
    Working

Views of Respondents in other Public
    Authorities on Working with the
    Local Authority

PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAYS IN WHICH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAMDEN AND OTHER PUBLIC AUTHORITIES WERE CHANGING

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 8

PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS OF INTER-AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS

Previous research has shown that relationships between organisations are affected by the values, beliefs and attitudes of those involved in them (Schemerhorn 1975). The research in Camden focused on respondents' perceptions of inter-authority working within the public authority network. Three related areas were explored. First, respondents were asked to compare working with public-sector organisations and other organisations in the private and voluntary sectors. Second, they were asked to comment on how they and their fellow officers or members viewed working with either Camden Council or other public authorities serving Camden. Third, they were asked about the ways in which relationships among public authorities were changing.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

Respondents were asked whether they viewed working with public authorities any differently from working with other kinds of authorities. A minority felt that there was no difference between working with different types of organisation. A number of respondents pointed to both similarities and differences. Most replies, however, focused on differences between different kinds of organisations.

Those who felt that similarities outweighed the differences pointed to common organisational features that obscured distinctions between different types of organisations. Size was one such feature;

> "They are all big organisations and have to be approached similarly."
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No.7 Area, Metropolitan Police)

another was the pursuit of self-interest.

> "Public authorities are essentially similar to other independent agencies. Agencies have conflicting aims; each must defend its own corner."
>
> (Asssistant Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

Political elements were identified not only in the local authority but in private sector and voluntary organisations.

> "Many companies have their headquarters in London and all have their own internal politics in the same way as local authorities do."
>
> (Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)
>
> "Camden is very political and voluntary organisations in Camden have political elements."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No.7 Area, Metropolitan Police)

Those who gave pre-eminence to organisational similarities saw different types of organisations as equally straightforward or difficult to relate to and adopted a broadly similar approach to developing relationships whether they were with public, private or voluntary bodies.

Similar treatment, however, gave rise to discontent. Camden Council complained that it was treated like any other organisation by the Customs and Excise. The Customs and Excise was not part of the study but the quotation has been included to clarify the point. The

local authority felt that it should have enjoyed a greater measure of trust and more favourable treatment.

> "The local authority is exempt from VAT therefore it can claim VAT back. It is a very large sum, but a cumbersome procedure to get the money back. It is paid monthly on account. Customs and Excise should take the figures on trust more as one public authority to another public authority. Camden is treated like everyone else but shouldn't be."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Those who felt that differences rather than similarities dominated the comparison between types of organisations referred both to the commonality among public authorities that did not exist with other organisations and the features of public authorities that contrasted most sharply with those of commercial and voluntary bodies.

Commonality stemmed from three features: familiarity, environmental pressures and public-service values. Familiarity was stressed because many public authorities had more dealings with each other than with other types of organisations.

> "The Sports Council deals more with public authorities because their equal opportunities are better than commercial and voluntary organisations."
>
> (Director, Greater London and South East Regional Office, Sports Council)
>
> "Relationships are different in quantity because of the very considerable interplay with the local authority over sewers."
>
> (Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)

Familiarity also stemmed from a shared culture among public authorities and their employees.

> "A different rapport exists with the other public authorities because of cultural similarities."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
>
> "Public servants are all similar animals - they have public servant images and thought processes."
>
> (Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

As a result of familiarity, public authorities were seen to be easier to work with and relationships among them better. Familiarity resulted in comfortable relationships:

> "Relationships are cosier than with private enterprise."
>
> (London Regional Planning Manager, British Rail)

However one Camden member expressed a totally opposite view,

> "Local authorities find it difficult to get on with each other - private sector relations with local authorities are easier as they understand each other."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Public authorities shared a common working environment which promoted mutual understanding and made the development of relationships easier.

> "On the whole relationships are a little better because people in the local authority are working under the same pressures of public accountability which is different from working in a commercial organisation."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

As well as familiarity and common experiences, a number of respondents also identified values of public service management which implied that public authorities should treat each other differently from non-public authorities. These values were described by one respondent as an obligation on public authorities to collaborate and achieve better outcomes for the communities they jointly served.

> "An onus lies on Boroughs, LRT, government departments and other public agencies to work together and compromise their own interests in the interest of getting the right outcomes for London as a whole."

(Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

A respondent within the local authority described them as giving priority to relationships with other public authorities.

> "Camden always tries hard to reach agreement with other public agencies - tries harder than with the private sector."

(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

The application of such values led other respondents to note that among public authorities they were treated as equals, whilst amongst commercial organisations in the same field they were not.

> "The Crown Estate is not accepted by the property world as equal. It is seen as the public sector."

(Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown Estate)

A public authority was thought to be treated better by the local authority than a commercial one.

> "The local authority is generally felt to be more sympathetic to the LEB."

(Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

Three main features of public authorities set relationships with them apart from those developed with other types of organisations. The first feature related to the statutory framework within which public authorities operated. Public authorities were obliged to follow certain rules and procedures and were required to establish certain relationships.

> "Relationships with public authorities are different because they are statutory. Relationships with non-public bodies such as voluntary organisations are very different because they may be very co-operative but the relationship is not binding. Camden, on the other hand, is bound to relate but does not want to be bound."

(Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

They were also unable to exercise discretion over the tasks they performed.

> "They need to do all their work and cannot select. They have to do everything that they are given."

(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

These requirements were seen as constraints which produced more formal and less flexible relationships than could be achieved with other sectors.

"They are different because they are more formal."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

"Private/private interaction can work out an ad hoc system to get things done - not possible in the public sector because rules and procedures must be followed."

(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

Politics was a feature of local authorities which set them apart from other public authorities and made them different.

"The local authority is different because of politics and rates."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

The third feature which set public sector organisations in general apart was their bureaucratic nature. Relationships with them were seen to be more difficult. The causes of this difficulty were identified as bureaucracy, rule-bound behaviour and slow decision-making.

"There is also the problem of bureaucracy."

(Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

"Public authorities are still terribly bureaucratic. It is difficult to get hold of people."

(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

"Decision-making takes longer in local authorities because of the committee cycle. Contracts are slow and longer time has to be allowed for finding schemes."

Comparing relationships with public authorities and voluntary bodies, respondents generally stressed the voluntaristic, informal and flexible nature of relationships with the latter. From the local authority point of view in this sector collaboration was not only desired but achievable.

> "The voluntary sector - there is a growing sense of value of collaboration here. The private sector - there is considerable hostility to collaboration. The health authority - the will exists but there is a clash of cultures."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority)

In comparing relationships with the public and private sectors stress was again laid on the ability to achieve results quickly and flexibly. Examples were cited of easier and more fruitful negotiations with the private sector than the public sector for planning gain.

> "It's tougher dealing with public corporations than commercial ones because they are more hard headed. For example when Sainsburys was built Camden got all kinds of goodies from them in very constructive negotiations. The British Rail/National Freight Corporation Goods Yard was forced to a compulsory purchase order because Camden was getting nothing from them."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

However, respondents also pointed out that the private sector's concern with profit implied that co-operative relationships with the public sector were only likely to be established where they were profitable, not as with relationships with other

public sector bodies where they were in the public interest.

> "London Regional Transport has a greater involvement in the totality of affairs. Other businesses would not have such contacts and would regard getting 'market information' about plans as a cost."

(District General Manager, London Buses)

> "Private sector organisations only concentrate on profit at the end of the day. When the objectives of the private sector and the police meet the private sector is off the mark and have the resources; when they don't meet it is frustrating. For example in hotels there is much crime, particularly theft. Hotels could do more via security staff and maintenance but they do not because it costs money and the demand for rooms exists despite crime."

(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF INTERAUTHORITY WORKING

Respondents were asked about how they and their colleagues viewed working with other public authorities. The responses were varied and differed in emphasis between different groups of respondents. Officers of the local authority stressed the importance they attached to inter-authority working while elaborating on the practical difficulties of undertaking it. Local authority members described the problems they encountered in working with another public authority and indicated that inter-authority relationships were best left to officials. Respondents in other public authorities highlighted the impact of local politics on relationships between their organisations and Camden Council.

275

Camden Officials' Views of Inter-authority Working

Only one respondent indicated that inter-authority working was viewed entirely positively by officials of the department concerned.

> "There is a lot of enthusiasm because it is new. They welcome it."
>
> (Assistant Director Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

In part the attractiveness was the novelty of inter-authority working. The tone of other responses reflected views ranging from caution to hostility to working with other public authorities.

Local authority officials did not see working with other public authorities as unimportant. On the contrary, they considered it something that they should be engaged in, but generally hedged with provisos which implied that it was not central to Camden's priorities.

> "Officers see it very importantly."
>
> (Director Social Services, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Officers feel it is an important part of their role but in terms of liaison rather than working with other authorities."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "Relationships are often seen as important but long term. More time should be spent thinking about such issues but there is no time."
>
> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

The lack of enthusiasm for inter-authority working
expressed by officers in the local authority had its
roots in difficulties seen to surround such work. The
main problem concerned the time which working with
other authorities required. Officers were already busy
with their local authority work and were reluctant to
take on more commitments and could not devote the
time needed to developing relationships.

> "Housing and social services workers are very
> busy people and reluctant to become involved in
> welfare rights issues."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
> Camden)
>
> "There is a time problem. Camden has very
> generous conditions of service and staffing
> demands are high therefore they cannot always
> spare the time needed for developing relation-
> ships."
>
> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough
> of Camden)

Inter-authority working was seen as time-consuming and
because officers' time was limited, the time that a
task took could become the prime concern of
collaboration.

> "Most officers regard any work with public
> authorities as one where they hope to achieve
> the objects of the particular exercise as
> quickly as possible. The problems are time and
> bureaucracy, therefore the main objective is to
> minimise the time involved."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of
> Camden)

Time was not the only problem. Working with other
public authorities was described as "hard work"
because of a lack of knowledge about other
authorities, the complexity of some organisation's

structures and lack of perceived systems for communicating with them.

> "Officers consider working with other authorities
> very hard work. The system is lacking in clear
> channels of communications. People lack
> information about what agencies do and how they
> can help. When you make contact you get shunted
> around. Camden is similar; all public
> authorities are similar."

> (Director of Recreation, London Borough of
> Camden)

> "Some are more difficult to work with because of
> their structure e.g. British Rail - very complex
> agency where the location of responsibility and
> authority is unclear to outsiders."

> (Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
> of Camden)

For some officers, working with another authority was difficult because of the unfamiliarity of not being in charge.

> "Unless it is a Camden project and Camden is
> taking the lead, officers feel a bit powerless
> and feel work is a waste of time. They can feel
> positive when taking the lead."

> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
> Camden)

Activities when Camden officers were not in the lead were apt to be dismissed by such officials as a "waste of time". Another respondent pointed to the difficulties which older members of staff had with inter-authority working because of their traditional and narrow definition of the service they provided.

> "All staff see the benefits but some people find
> it difficult to do. Attitudes vary according to
> personalities. There are ones who enjoy it and
> therefore get something out of it. New staff
> find it easier. They see libraries no longer as
> a quiet place for bibliographical work. Older

staff find the interactive positive attitude
difficult."

(Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough
of Camden)

Officers also expressed views which coloured their
approach to particular agencies. Sometimes this
attitude was expressed by general comments about the
varying degrees of co-operativeness to be found among
public authorities.

"Some agencies are seen as sheer bloody-minded.
Some are seen as very helpful."

(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
of Camden)

Others expressed judgements on particular authori-
ties, (the point was made clearly by one respondent in
relation to two authorities not included in the
network).

"The Department of the Environment won't listen;
the GLC is monolithic."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
Camden)

There was no clear pattern to these judgments as they
depended upon the individual's experiences and their
points of contact with other authorities.

However, despite the problems surrounding inter-
authority working, officers regarded it as something
which, although difficult and unsatisfactory, had to
be attempted. One respondent summed up his and his
colleagues' views of inter-authority working as
follows:

"Officers regard working with other authorities philosophically. They do the job, as they see it, appropriately. It is in the public interest that authorities work together. However, officers are suspicious and do not always see eye to eye because they reflect the attitudes of the authorities they work for. But they have no option. They try to work together and do not work against each other. Relationships are not normally competitive, but very open."

(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Camden Members' Views of Interauthority Working

Members suggested that their involvement in inter-authority working was essential to its success, particularly in Camden where politicisation was widespread and members were active and assertive in decision-making.

"The member's role is crucial because of the kind of authority Camden is - the role of the member is more important. For example an injudicious remark by a member can undo weeks of work by officers."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority)

However, while councillors who understood the way that the public authority network operated were seen to be very effective, for most members this environment was a difficult one in which to operate.

"A councillor who knows his/her way round the system can secure great advantages."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

Members commented on a number of problems which faced them in working with other authorities. First, they

lacked   clear   equivalents   with   whom   to   build
relationships.

> "Members do not find appropriate opposites in
> other bodies they may have relationships with."
>
> (Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of
> Camden)

Even though other authorities had boards of members,
they were appointed members whose relationship with
their organisation was very different from that of
the elected member. Councillors found themselves in
unfamiliar organisational settings and unsure of
themselves without the party framework within which
they normally operated.

> "Members can feel very lost in unfamiliar, inter-
> authority scenarios."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead
> Health Authority nominee)
>
> "It is very different from working in one's own
> authority where one is under the same political
> grouping as those one is working with."
>
> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London
> Borough of Camden)

They also found that they lacked the status and
importance to which they were accustomed within their
own organisation.

> "Members who seem very large in their own
> authority seem diminished."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead
> Health Authority nominee)

Such problems were felt most keenly by those under-
taking dual roles. In addition, the representative
role of the dual member was particularly difficult.

In some situations it was unclear to those involved who or what organisation a member was representing, which caused difficulties all round.

> "I am on the North London Area Manpower Board via ILEA - but <u>not</u> as the Inner London Borough's representative which the MSC see me as."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Councillors were the only members of the health authorities with an electorate.

> "Joint membership is a difficult role as the only person on the Health Authority who has a constituency and representative status."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

They also found themselves in an environment where they were outnumbered by non-political appointees.

> "The health authority has token political membership. It is heavily weighted to appointed experts and the status quo. It can be used for raising issues rather than solving problems."
>
> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "The focus is on individual political issues. Few Camden councillors like to work this way"
>
> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London Borough of Camden)

They found themselves having to promote issues as individuals and unable to see the issue carried through to decision. Such difficulties led to relationships being evaluated as poor by councillors.

> "The local authority link to health authorities is totally unsatisfactory because of these weaknesses."

> (Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of
> Camden)

The slow and often painstaking progress of many collaborative efforts frustrated members who liked decisive action.

> "Members are under great pressure and want to be involved in decisions and active."
>
> (Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of Camden)

As a result, it was not easy to get members fully involved in inter-authority working. Members saw the value of developing relationships but did not have the time to carry them through.

> "It is easy to get members interested in health authorities but many are busy and there is pressure of time."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committe, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)
>
> "There is no dual membership with ILEA and not enough liaison because of lack of time."
>
> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London Borough of Camden)

Frustration had led to difficulties in filling vacancies on other authorities such as the health authorities.

> "Camden could not get a majority party member to go on Bloomsbury Health Authority - they had to go outside to get a member of the Labour Party."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

283

Some councillors were seen to regard inter-authority working as a side issue; those more interested in such work were often the longer-serving members of the Council whose services were widely in demand within Camden.

> "There are two sorts of councillors: those who get involved in external relations, typically those who have been on the Council a while, and those who see it as a diversion."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

Labour party attitudes created ambivalence about involvement by majority party members and the Council in inter-authority relationships in some areas. The party officially criticised the Manpower Services Commission, yet condoned involvement by local authorities at the local level.

> "Labour party policy and ideology says nothing very helpful. It lags behind reality and is based on a utopian approach. The policy is full of contradictions."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

> "Policy is Practical. It is very supportive to voluntary organisations but unclear in relation to statutory organisations and varies according to custom and practice."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committe, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)

Reflecting both the difficulties of member involvement and the existing balance of participation in interauthority working, members suggested that officers should play the key role in relationships.

> "There ought to be a better system. It shouldn't depend on members to get things together."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

284

Officers could also build relationships more easily because they were dealing with fellow professionals.

> "Officers may be able to build more constructive relationships and may be able to have useful discussion meetings."
>
> (Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of Camden)

However, in reality, members saw officers' roles limited by the political and organisational constraints imposed upon them.

> "Local authority officers cannot sit down and work together because they are constrained by policies they must work towards. They behave inflexibly, defending their autonomy and terms of reference rather than seeing what needs doing."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

The perceived opportunities and problems of inter-authority relationships were described by one councillor as follows:

> "Everyone will say collaboration is a good idea but joint working is not in the marrow. It doesn't actually exist in practice because of suspicions between organisations, political differences, the fact that health authorities are not accountable, political discordance and the way the two authorities fail to rub together. Collaboration is seen as a shorthand for financial transfer and little accountability."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

Views of Respondents in Other Public Authorities on Working with the Local Authority

Respondents noted that not only were most relationships with the local authority at officer

level but that such relationships were generally
satisfactory

> "The relationship with Council officers is very
> good."
>
> (Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)
>
> "Officers play a key role because members are too
> political."
>
> (Divisional General Manager (Local and Community
> Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

The reason for this positive evaluation was seen to
be the attitude of officers which was to fulfil the
obligations of their posts including, where appro-
priate, co-operating with the local authority.

> "Officers will always get along if it is part of
> their brief."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Further and Higher
> Education) Inner London Education Authority)

However, officer-level relationships also laboured
under some of the difficulties noted by respondents
within Camden. Among the most serious was seen to be
the political framework within which officials had to
operate.

> "Officers know the constraints the other person
> is operating under which lead to cynicism,
> frustration, abandonment and apathy. Potential
> developments do not get off the ground because
> the structure is wrong or because people do not
> understand the framework the other person is
> operating within."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools)
> Inner London Education Authority)

Members of other authorities, such as the health
authorities, encountered some of the same problems as
Camden members in inter-authority working. Time was
scarce and members' resources stretched.

> "FPC members are voluntary and have limited time,
> therefore they cannot stretch themselves via
> collaboration. Many FPC members are new and lack
> knowledge of procedures."
>
> (Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family
> Practitioner Committee)
>
> "Health authority members are very under-
> resourced; they have no staff, no members' room,
> secretariat or facilities."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

The difficulties of inter-authority working produced
frustration among members as it had among local
authority councillors.

> "The members of the health authority are very
> community conscious and very conscious of the
> lack of a relationship with the local authority.
> It hurts and it is counterproductive."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)

Again, the political nature of the local authority
was one of the main difficulties facing members of
other authorities in becoming involved in working with
Camden Council.

Many respondents saw working with senior officials and
working with members very similarly.

> "The officers are similar to the politicians."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "In Camden everyone is political."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

A number of reasons were put forward for this convergence. It was noted that a number of senior officials in Camden were councillors and were politically experienced.

> "The senior officers are themselves councillors elsewhere."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority).

Second, officials were bound to reflect the policies and expectations of members, and the more senior the officials the more they were under pressure to display politically oriented behaviour.

> "Interaction is usually with the Borough officials though this too can involve political posturing."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
>
> "Officers can forge tortuous links. Officers are very fearful of the political consequences of this. They are in an unreal world."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)

Finally it was pointed out that the large number of senior officials who had been replaced in recent years meant that in many areas members were of longer standing than their officials and were very firmly in the lead.

> "There is no 'yes minister' because members have been together longer than officers. This is true of both Camden and the health authority."

Most respondents saw working with members of the local authority as problematic. Problems stemmed from the impact of local politics in general upon relationships and from the particular effects of Camden's socialist politics. The special requirements and difficulties of working with a politically controlled body coloured most views of working with the local authority.

Camden councillors were seen by respondents as high quality individuals who were committed to their work.

> "Camden has intelligent and articulate councillors. Politics are difficult and care is needed."
>
> (General Practitioner, Kentish Town Health Centre)
>
> "The local authority joint members on the JCC seem to take their responsibility seriously."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

However, as local politicians, their approach was not always seen as compatible with that of the organisations they were dealing with. They were seen to have short-term horizons governed by the electoral system which did not always match the requirements for longer-term thinking in interauthority relationships.

> "Councillors look to the next election"
>
> (Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden)

Second, councillors were often primarily concerned

with local matters and seen to have a parochial outlook on issues.

> "In Islington MPs and local politicians have been involved where floodings have occurred from Hampstead Heath and have put pressure on Thames Water to take remedial action. As a result part of the relief section of drainage has been put in place in Islington without the sections at either end, at the top or the bottom, being done."
>
> (Planning Officer, Thames Water)

Politics as practised in Camden was seen to have a much wider impact on the development of interauthority relationships. Politics in Camden was seen to be pervasive and thus to be particularly important to the development of relationships with other authorities.

> "Labour authority members are more involved and influential, therefore there is greater concern to secure a greater involvement with members at ILEA, GLC and similarly Camden."
>
> (Director, Greater London and South East Regional Office, Sports Council)

Respondents felt that their organisations were regarded by Camden's members largely in ideological terms. The DHSS complained that councillors seemed incapable of regarding any action as non-partisan.

> "The DHSS feel that others cannot believe that they can be impartial and non-partisan."
>
> (Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

The Metropolitan Police complained that they were regarded as an instrument of class oppression.

> "Camden is seen to be unwilling to work with the police. They are seen to be promoting a dictatorship of the proletariat and to view the police as the remnants of an oppressive class which must be removed."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

Camden councillors were seen as partisan and partial in their outlook.

> "The police are seen to have a duty to the whole community but they see Camden as being accountable only to sections of the community which elected the majority party."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
>
> "Members are very much Camden spokesmen."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Their objectives in inter-authority relationships were seen as the pursuit of political gains.

> "[Camden councillors on Bloomsbury Health authority] are pursuing political careers."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
>
> "Local authority members seem to be out to score points off the health authority concerning how committed they are to promote good health and a good health service."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

These objectives were reflected in the issues which they were perceived to be concerned with. For example, respondents commented on the tendency of councillors to use inter-authority relations to pursue national issues.

> "The main aim of much campaigning activity is to score points off government. The main complaints and comments are aimed at government and

politicians. This is encouraged by a politicised
local authority. Campaigns to squeeze pennies out
of the DHSS are seen as being about showing the
local authority's attitudes to cuts and putting
pressure on the office to demonstrate the impact
cuts are having on their ability to spend."

(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

They were also seen to be engaged in a number of
struggles for power. One example given was
ideological, in which councillors were seen to be
trying to replace medical models of care with
non-medical ones.

"Camden takes a left-wing socialist view that you
do not need medical care for geriatrics and
psychiatric patients which are the main areas of
collaboration."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

Relationships between the Metropolitan Police and
Camden were seen to be dominated by a struggle for
power and control.

"At the higher level, the political level,
politicians and very senior officers see
everything in political terms and about
control."

(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

Councillors were seen to be critical and aggressive in
their dealings with the police.

The relationship is coloured; councillors are
critical and appear to give little support
because they are always making a case to take
over."

(Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

"Before the local elections a local councillor
wrote to the local free newspaper complaining

292

about police enforcement of parking restric-
tions. This was seen to be using the police as
whipping boys and police-bashing by the tone in
which it was written."

(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

The problems which the majority party faced in
involving members in inter-authority relations was
perceived by other organisations negatively rather
than sympathetically. Respondents in the health
authority thought that Camden gave relationships with
the organisation a low priority and were concerned
more with issues of accountability and control.

"The local authority has given health authority
membership less emphasis than it should have
been given. The local authority attitude is
perceived to be that health authorities should be
democratically elected and until then health is
a. second-rate activity to be involved in."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

Some respondents felt that councillors lacked
commitment to inter-authority working.

"Members are seen as passive if they are not too
political. They just go along to the JCCs,
presumably because they have to."

(Divisional General Manager (Local and Community
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

"To work, relationships need a large concerted
effort by members to be effective. Members would
not say anything against collaboration but would
not push it positively."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

However, the more active councillors who had been
appointed to the health authority after the 1986
local government elections were perceived even more

293

critically by the organisation because of their political activism.

> "Relationships have been worse since the last election. The left has strengthened its position. They are only interested in a political forum."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

> "Membership was for a long time composed of three old timers but this changed after the May 1986 elections. There are now three new members, one of whom is a Parliamentary candidate and is seen to be intending to use membership as a political platform."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

The only relationship with Camden which involved two sets of elected members was the local authority and ILEA. At the time of the research this relationship was very new. While in theory it should have been an easier relationship to establish, respondents commented on the difficulties caused by a lack of existing structures in establishing a pattern of meetings between the two sets of councillors.

> "Camden ILEA councillors have been trying to meet Camden councillors since they were elected - finally succeed at the third attempt. The party is not a linking forum; it has no facilities for this."
>
> (Member, Inner London Education Authority)

> "Contact is ad hoc. Local government is not well organised and depends on individual members. A member forum needs to be created."
>
> (Member, Inner London Education Authority)

Perceptions of the political dimension of Camden Council were tied to respondents' opinions about

working with the local authority. Relationships were described negatively.

> "At the member level there is a combative relationship."
>
> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "Camden is the most difficult local authority I have ever worked with because of its political complexion. The ruling Labour group is very difficult or impossible to work with."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)
>
> "Local authority representation on the health authority works very badly."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Politics was seen to create a barrier between the local authority and other public authorities, preventing dialogue developing or joint working.

> "The political dimension prevents the Borough from getting closer to the health authority. Because the local authority is politically led and the health authority is not, it is difficult to set joint priorities."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "There is little dialogue because of political differences."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

The contrasting left and right wing values of the chairs of the local authority and Hampstead health authority were cited as an example of the inability of the two organisations to establish the necessary personal contacts needed at the topmost level for successful relationships.

"The Health authority has a right-wing chairman, an estate agent. A Conservative appointment. He takes a business approach to the need for an acute facility and excellence in the hospital. He doesn't appreciate deprivation. He doesn't feel comfortable with political developments on Camden Council. There is great conflict at the personal level which is the beginning of problems with collaboration. The leader of the council and the chairman of the health authority could never have dinner together."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

"I haven't met the leader of the council. The Chairman has power under Griffiths(1) and needs a personal relationship with the chairman of the local authority to get things done. Elsewhere such relations are possible but they are not a possibility in Camden."

(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)

Politics was also blamed for the local authority being unable to deliver what was demanded from relationships by other authorities.

"Local authority officers and councillors have other constraints so that they cannot always deliver what the police want."

(Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area, Metropolitan Police)

Although senior level involvement in relationships was recognised as important, some respondents indicated that relationships were better when Camden councillors were not involved.

---

1. In 1983 Sir Roy Griffiths was appointed to examine management in the NHS. His subsequent report led to the apoointment of general managers in the Health Service and to strenthening of the role of the Chairman of the health authority.

"It works better when councillors are not there
because they introduce a political flavour.
They are not the right people to pursue points
with but local councillors take up cases."

(Regional Information Officer, London North,
DHSS)

"Relationships are easier when they are
non-political. Relationships with ILEA are
better because there is no member contact; all
officer. ILEA has a nominated representative but
not a member."

(Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)

As a result, authorities sought to side-step bodies
in which members were involved.

"People use public meetings to make political
speeches. Meetings go on for ever and get
nothing done. Members are now being by-passed by
the use of working groups."

(Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAYS IN WHICH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CAMDEN AND OTHER PUBLIC AUTHORITIES WERE CHANGING

Respondents were asked for their views on whether the
relationship between the local authority and other
public authorities was changing over time. None saw
the relationship as static, though one respondent saw
relationships as stable despite changes taking place
round about.

"Relationships are probably stable, at least
there is nothing visible and easily noted that
is changing."

(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

The respondent then went on to discuss the environ-

mental changes   resulting fom the Abolition of the
GLC.

There were many views on   the way in which
relationships were changing. Such relationships were
seen to be constantly changing and to reflect long-
term trends in the organisations concerned and their
environment.

> "The pattern always changes."
>
> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
> Camden)
>
> "There was a change in the early to mid-70s in
> traditional services. There was a change in the
> nature of the service to a willingness to link
> with related organisations in the community. Any
> change from now on is a development from this
> basic shift."
>
> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough
> of Camden)

However, some viewed the changes occurring recently as
different in order or nature from those occurring
previously.

> "Relationships have changed all the time over the
> last 20   years but there has been no clear
> direction until recently."
>
> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of
> Camden)

One respondent suggested that relationships changed
only when change was initiated deliberately by one of
the organisations involved.

> "Change does not occur unless Camden initiates
> it."

(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

However, the changes in relationships reported by most respondents were not so calculated. The sources of change mentioned were fourfold. Some features of the inter-authority network were seen themselves to promote change. Second, change stemmed from the issues public authorities had to deal with; third, from the organisations themselves and fourth, from the environment in which the network operated.

The dependence of relationships in the public authority network on individual personalities left relationships vulnerable to staff changes.

> "Relationships change not because of the agencies
> themselves but because of the changing
> personalities. It is not a rigid framework but
> all about people, therefore if people change
> relationships change."

> (Director of Recreation, London Borough of
> Camden)

Individuals determined not only the quality of relationships but also their content and development.

> "Much depends on the personalities of the
> officers involved. Changes in leadership can
> result in changes in relationships. For example,
> with Camden informal lunchtime meetings took
> place regularly with the previous director of
> social services; such meetings do not take place
> with the present director and the present
> director rarely comes to meetings with ILEA. In
> contrast, the reverse happened in Westminster
> where relationships have improved considerably
> since the present director took up his post. As
> a result more joint initiatives have taken place
> with Westminster and the fund of joint
> initiatives with Camden is beginning to dry up."

Relationships were also seen to go through cycles. Interaction would be built up and might enjoy a "honeymoon" period before coming up against more difficult problems and even stagnating.

> "Relationships are changing for the worse. Camden feels it gets less out of its contacts than previously. In the early days of liaison there was a novelty factor and certain pressures could be made to work; over time this wears off and the DHSS has hardened to such approaches. However, less satisfactory approaches will not go on for ever but are a stage."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

Inter-authority relationships were directly or indirectly linked to the provision of services. Changes in the demand for services requiring input from both the local authority and other public authorities gave rise to changes in their relationship. Increasing incidence of complex multi-dimensional problems could outstrip the capacity of agencies to tackle them in an ordered way and engender relationships based on crisis management.

> "The nature of needs and demand is changing; homelessness and drug abuse, unemployment, altered family structure and break up are increasing. As they become more critical, co-operation is built round crisis management, rather than forward planning, which was done in the mid to late 70s through integrated provision."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer, (Community Education & Careers) Inner London Education Authority)

In other cases it was not so much the issues which had changed but rather the ways in which they were perceived by the authorities concerned that affected relationships. Camden's decision to adopt a campaigning approach on certain issues brought it into a new relationship with other organisations.

Relationships between authorities changed in response to changes within the organisations concerned. Respondents cited a number of examples of such changes. In Bloomsbury Health Authority the creation of a division responsible for many of the services involving other authorities, together with a new management style, was seen to have led to closer relationships with the local authority.

> "Changes are occurring. Bloomsbury is becoming more proactive in relationships because the Local and Community Services Division did not exist before and there was no clear centre for such issues. There is more collaboration at lower levels because of new direction which is coming from the top. The key change is organisational; someone is now managing the service which was not the case before."
>
> (Divisional General Manager (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Relationships were also affected by the decision of an organisation to centralise or decentralise. Camden Council had pursued a policy of decentralisation; other organisations with which it had relationships a policy of centralisation. The resulting mismatch had required changes in the way the organisations related.

> "There is a mismatch between the increasing decentralisation of the local authority and recent centralisation in the LEB. It is difficult to get a central answer from a decentralised local authority; each of the

> neighbourhood offices will gradually begin to
> behave differently and have different policies"
>
> (Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
>
> "Internally at Thames there has been change, with
> centralisation at Reading."
>
> (Planning Officer, Thames Water)

Structural change was affecting relationships between
the local authority and the police in contrasting
ways. Camden's decision to set up its Civil Rights
Unit and Police Committee had altered the framework
within which relationships now had to take place. The
Police, on the other hand, had undergone considerable
internal changes affecting amongst other things the
profile of its staff and styles of working with other
authorities.

> "The police force is changing in composition. It
> is becoming more graduate, less working class
> and there are more women. The new staff bring
> their own attitude into the organisation.
> Policing is now more flexible and relaxed and it
> is recognised that there are often several
> options in any one situation."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area,
> Metropolitan Police).

Relationships also changed as attitudes within the
organistions involved changed. Respondents commented
on both changed attitudes within their own
organisations and changes they perceived in the
organisations with which they interacted. Camden's
attitude to the Manpower Services Commission which it
had opposed was seen to be softening and leading to
fuller and more constructive relationships.

> "Camden and the MSC never got to grips with the
> earlier training initiatives and there are few
> schemes. Camden is now thinking of a YTS scheme

though it is not saying so and it is still currently blocked."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

"On the YTS side there is more working together in Camden. This is possible because aims are more clearly defined. Both sides are more aware of the need to be cost effective and therefore become more interested in working together rather than running separate schemes."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)

Other attitude changes were less convergent. The police saw local authority attitudes towards them becoming increasingly aggressive.

"Things are changing in local authorities: there are more aggressive attitudes from local councils. At one point the police were told not to enter council buildings unless they were invited as if they were private buildings. Things are more aggressive and hostile than ever before."

(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

Changes in the wider environment were seen to have an important impact on relationships. Reorganisation had a direct impact on relationships. Political ties between Camden Council and ILEA had been weakened by the move to direct elections.

"Well developed member linkages in the past seem to have fallen away. As a result a number of local authorities have set up their own education officer, perhaps in a campaigning role and to improve communications."

(Assistant Education Officer, (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

"Borough council links with the new ILEA are less than previously. The real link is now not with the local authority but via the political parties."

303

The transformation of LTE to LRT had caused shifts of
power to occur in the public authority network: a
shift made more pronounced by the abolition of the
GLC.

The impact of the loss of the GLC was, however, seen
by most respondents to be limited and to affect
specific aspects of their work. Abolition had
affected the funding of voluntary bodies and the
complementary funding of some local authority
initiatives. It was also seen to have increased the
burden of work on councillors. Abolition was seen to
have had a direct impact on relationships within the
public authority network, though few of them involved
the local authority.

> "The result of the abolition of the GLC has been
> an improvement in relationships. Previously ILEA
> had to buy services such as supplies, legal
> advice, architecture, now they are able to
> provide for themselves. As a result ILEA has a
> greater say in such areas and can include them
> in its consultation with other authorities. For
> example, involving local authorities or communi-
> ties in the design of schools. Such direct links
> are felt to be more fruitful."
>
> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
> Education Authority)

The main impact on relationships involving local
authorities was to focus on the need for rela-
tionships with other local authorities.

> "There is a feeling that authorities should co-
> operate more with their neighbours when the GLC
> goes."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
Camden)

Changes in legislation and government policy were
identified as important sources of change in rela-
tionships. An example of the former was the Water Act
1983 which enhanced the ability of water authorities
to control those undertaking agency work, usually
local authorities. The relationship between the local
authority and the police had been changed by
legislation requiring the setting up of police
consultative committees. An example of the impact of
policy was community care which demanded close
working between the local authority and the health
authorities.

> "Relationships have changed as of neccessity, for
> example, relations between health and social
> sevices have changed and need to change further.
> The Health Service decision to close Friern
> Hospital, making community provision necessary
> means that they cannot progress closure without
> close dialogue with Camden."

> (Director, Social Services, London Borough of
> Camden)

The general policy framework provided by central
government was seen by many respondents to have made
relationships more difficult. The nature of policies
such as those being pursued in social security were
seen to make constructive relationships between the
local authority and the DHSS more difficult.

> "Most interaction concerns casework and during
> the next year pressure groups and welfare
> organisations will be testing out the new rules.
> The new social fund creates boundless
> possibilities for local monitoring."

> (Manager, Euston Benefit Office DHSS)

Frequent changes in government policy had also made relationships less stable.

> "Government changes the rules every year and others don't stand still e.g. NHS reorganisation and abolition."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Resource availability had declined and this decline had affected relationships. Rate-capping had left the local authority with fewer resources for tasks outside the core, and the pressure on public authorities to maximise their income had led to difficult relationships with the planning department over land.

> "Boroughs are rate-capped, making co-operation more difficult."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Community Education and Careers), Inner London Education Authority)
>
> "There is pressure on health authorities to make money. The environment of decision-making has changed. For example with the Property Services Agency there was the same amount of conflict under a previous government but the basis of conflict has changed from conflict about land."
>
> (Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden)

Privatisation, although in its early stages in the industries concerned, was also perceived to be affecting relationships.

> "The present government policy of privatisation is affecting relationships, for example Thames Water is trying to minimise expenditure on new services with a view to privatisation."
>
> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

"Privatisation is bringing closer relationships with the property companies. Relations with other public authorities are becoming more formal and distant."

(Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property, The Crown Estate)

Respondents identified changes in the political climate of Camden which had had an impact on interauthority relationships. Respondents pointed to a polarisation of political views which had taken place and to the increasingly difficult nature of London politics for the non-political organisation to deal with.

"It is a politically difficult time in central London; services must adapt and change their role."

(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority)

"Things are becoming more difficult because of the political pattern in London."

(Regional Information Offier, London North, DHSS)

Respondents differed in their assessment of the changing quality of relationships reflecting the particular linkages in which they were involved. Respondents suggested that relationships were increasing rather than decreasing.

"The quantity of dialogue has changed."

(Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

"Liaison didn't previously happen."

(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

Some saw relationships deteriorating in quality.

> "Since government circulars brought community care onto the scene there has been more conflict. Local authorities were seen to have latched onto this as a way to get additional funds. Health authorities, on the other hand, were suspicious of handing funds to organisations in which they had little confidence in their ability to provide care and who could stop the service. Cash causes conflicts."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Rather more of those who commented on the changing quality of relationships saw them improving as a result of closer working with other organisations and greater familiarity with the way they worked.

> "Relations with the Boroughs are improving slowly."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
>
> "Improving, but slowly. Since 1974 the authorities have been getting to know each other better."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)
>
> "Changes involve talking more to other organisations, getting to know them better and becoming more positive about their role."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area, Metropolitan Police)

CONCLUSIONS

Respondents identified much common ground between public-sector organisations which should have provided a more fertile environment for developing relationships than with other types of organisation. Familiarity, shared cultures and working environments

were all features which have been identified by other
researchers as contributing positively to the develop-
ment of inter-authority relationships (Schemerhorn,
1975). However, other features of public authorities
which set them apart from other organisations, such
as formality, bureaucracy and party politics, were
features that have been identified as inhibiting
successful cross-organisational linkages (Halpert,
1982). Hence relations with other public authorities
were seen to lack the informality and flexibility
possible with the voluntary sector or the
effectiveness of some links with the private sector.

The problems of working with other public authorities
stemming from their structure, culture and working
environment dominated the views of both officials and
members of inter-authority working in Camden.
Officials within the local authority generally found
inter-authority working to be time-consuming and
frustrating activity. Councillors found it
uncomfortable to operate outside their familiar party
and political frameworks and also lacked the time
necessary for developing interauthority relationships.
Those in other public authorities encountered similar
problems and found Camden Council's socialist politics
uncompromising to work with.

However, while structural factors were working against
the development of links between the local authority
and other public authorities in Camden, underlying
values of public administration were working for their
development. First, collaboration and co-operation
were seen as ideas in good currency within the public
sector network. Second, respondents articulated a
stronger view that there was an obligation for public
authorities to compromise with each other and pursue
collaborative aims in the interests of the public

they jointly served. Third, as public servants, officials were obliged to apply these values and engage in inter-authority working despite the difficulties and frustrations. There was, however, no strong ideological commitment to inter-authority working articulated by the members of the majority party in Camden.

Forces for change were seen by respondents to be pulling relationships within the public authority network in two different directions. The changing pattern of needs and demands for public services and government requirements for collaboration necessitated closer relationships between Camden Council and other public authorities. In addition there was a general view that over the long term relationships were increasing in quantity and improving in quality. On the other hand, the political and organisational environment in which relationships were developed was seen widely to be becoming more difficult.

The abolition of the GLC implied a major change in the public authority network serving Camden. Although the impact of its loss was noted for specific tasks and linkages, abolition was not perceived by respondents to have had a major effect on relationships between Camden Council and the remaining public authorities in the network.

CHAPTER 9 THE GOALS OF INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY AND THEIR ACHIEVEMENT

THE GOALS OF INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY

    Joint and Common Goals
    Corporate Goals
    Service Goals
    Service Delivery Goals
    Contributory Goals

THE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS EMPLOYED TO REALISE THE GOALS OF INTER-AUTHORITY ACTIVITY

    Orienting the organisation
    Interorganisational Processes

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 9

THE GOALS OF INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY AND THEIR ACHIEVEMENT

Respondents were asked about their views on the goals of inter-authority activities and the means by which such goals were being pursued. Their replies revealed that relationships between the local authority and other public authorities were being used to pursue a wide variety of goals by an equally varied set of strategies and tactics. Few of the goals or strategies were jointly determined. The majority were determined by individual organisations in pursuit of their own organisational goals. However, viable inter-authority relationships depended upon the development by the authorities concerned of mutually compatible goals and strategies.

THE GOALS OF INTERAUTHORITY ACTIVITY

The discussion of goals within inter-organisational studies has focused on the goals of organisations as wholes. Organisations are seen to be dependent upon each other for resources. The goals which they set determine the resources they need from other organisations and must be set in relation to the policies and preferences of those organisations upon which they are dependent. In this model of inter-organisational behaviour the exchange of scarce resources, is determined by goal setting at the top of the organisation (Rhodes, 1981).

Benson (1975) adopts a systems view in which organisational actors see their purpose as the acquisition of adequate resources to maintain and expand the existing organisation.

Critics of this model have pointed to the problems of reconciling behaviour with formal goals and the reification which accompanies the assumption that an organisation as a whole can determine and pursue goals (Rhodes 1981). In the discussion that follows these problems have been avoided by focusing on the goals of inter-authority activity as seen by those involved in that activity. The goals discussed here are those which respondents ascribe to inter-authority relationships and may not necessarily be shared by others or reflected in achievement.

A different critique of models which include the goals and strategies of organisational behaviour is that they are too purposive and ascribe purpose to behaviour which is routine or apathetic (Stewart et al, 1984). It might well be that when questioned about inter-authority activity respondents ascribed goals to it which in reality had no influence on behaviour. Although there may have been instances of ascription, three factors would have reduced the incidence of purposeless inter-authority behaviour. First, most of the interaction was voluntary rather than mandatory and therefore open to regular reassessment; second, inter-authority activity was generally described as problematic and unlikely, therefore, to be sustained without purpose; third, in the climate of financial stringency authorities were being pressed to examine the importance and effectiveness of all their activities, and purposeless activity could have been a prime candidate for removal.

The goals ascribed by respondents to inter-organisational behaviour in Camden related to a variety of levels of activity. At the most general level they referred to broad, mission-like statements of the authority as a whole such as the promotion of general

313

well-being. For example, respondents ascribed goals
relating to Camden Council's campaign for change in
the governmental system to inter-authority
relationships. At the second level were goals which
concerned the nature and quality of specific services
provided by the public authority network. Beneath was
a set of goals directed at changing and improving
systems of service-delivery. At the base level were
goals directed at improving the environment in which
authorities operated and increasing the opportunities
for constructive interaction with other authorities.

Joint and Common Goals

The goals of inter-authority relationships and
activity may be developed and held jointly or may be
an extension of the goals of individual authorities.
In Camden the latter type was more common than the
first. There was very limited machinery for joint
policy making between the local authority and the
other public authorities in the network which could
be used for joint goal-setting. Respondents referred
to common aims rather than joint aims. The goals of
inter-authority activity were seen as the development
of means by which those with aims in common could
work together.

> "On the adult training side MSC seeks
> co-operation with Camden. Both have the same
> aims."

> (Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
> Commission)

> "Our aims are the same but the means of getting
> there are different."

> (Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority)

It was also suggested that a goal of inter-authority

relationships was the creation of shared aims where
they did not exist.

> "The second stage in developing planning with the
> local authority after information exchange is
> developing strategies for shared aims. Finally
> comes developing operational proposals."
>
> (Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family
> Practitioner Committee)

However, the incompatibility of organisational goals
placed limits on such processes.

> "The priorities of the health authority are the
> teaching hospital and sorting out the mental
> illness problem. The Council's priorities are
> housing, racial equality and under-5s. Therefore
> in the discussion of priorities there is no
> meeting place."
>
> (District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health
> Authority)

Inter-authority relations were generally used by the
local authority and other public authorities to
pursue their own organisational goals. British
Waterways Board saw its agreements with Camden
Council and others as a means of fulfilling its duty
to provide and maintain the waterway and towpath of
the Regent's Canal. As a regulatory rather than a
proactive body in land-use planning Camden Council
could realise its development plans only through the
activities of other public and private organisations.
The Sports Council had only pump-priming funds
available and relied on developing partnerships with
other authorities to achieve its goals.

> "The Sports Council has to work through other
> agencies. It is not big enough to achieve things
> itself. It can only pump-prime and must
> influence the local authority to get its policies
> across. It aims to achieve its objectives for
> sport by working with local authorities,

315

voluntary bodies and commercial organisations."

(Director, Greater London and South East Regional
Office, Sports Council)

Goal fulfilment was often mutual: the incentive to
enter activities fulfilling another authority's goals
being the fulfilment of the first organisations's
goals.

"YTS and Camden are working to fulfil each
other's aims."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
Commission)

Corporate Goals

Respondents in both the local authority and the other
public authorities in Camden identified a number of
very broad goals which were being pursued through
inter-authority relationships. They fell into two
distinctive categories. The first group of goals was
directed towards the people and communities of Camden.
The second was directed towards the governmental
system.

Inter-authority relationships were viewed as being
used to promote the well-being of the community in
general. Goals to which inter-authority activity
could be directed included improvement in the quality
of life of Camden residents, greater public
satisfaction with public services in general and the
promotion of the interests of the area at large.

"Our goal is to improve the quality of life of
people in the Borough."

(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

"The ultimate objective is keeping the public

happy and keeping the complaints file down."

(Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

"Promoting the interests of the area."

(Director of Recreation, London Borough of Camden)

Goals of well-being were identified in both the local authority and other public authorities serving the area.

Inter-authority relationships were seen within Camden Council, but not within other authorities, as a means of changing the system of government. The public authority network at the local level was seen by Camden Council as a channel of communication and influence from local to central government. Within the local authority it was suggested that relationships with other public authorities were a means of seeking new powers, freedom from government restraint and changes in national policy.

"Looking to be given powers to intervene."

(Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

"In relation to government, freedom to do what Camden wants. Camden sees itself as an independently elected body, therefore it should be able to run services as it wants."

(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

"The ultimate aim is to change things on a national level."

(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

However, another authority, the DHSS, saw the same interaction with Camden Council differently. Rather than serving as a channel for influencing government, it saw the relationship purely as a means of allowing the expression of differing viewpoints.

> "The purpose of meetings is voicing a viewpoint; because of civil service rules the DHSS cannot get involved in policy discussions."
>
> (Regional Information Offier, London North DHSS)

Inter-authority activity was also seen as a means by which the way that the governmental network functioned could be changed. In particular it was seen as a means of increasing public accountability by the involvement of the democratically elected local authority in issues which were the responsibility of appointed public authorities.

Service Goals

Many of the goals pursued by authorities through inter-authority activity in Camden were phrased as improvements to service provision. Sometimes they were couched generally.

> "In the first place, a better service for patients."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

> "A better service to the public we both serve."
>
> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough of Camden)

A variety of specific changes in the nature of services were also being sought by both the local

authority and the other public authorities in the network.

In seeking better services authorities were addressing issues of both quality and effectiveness.

> "First, to improve the quality of education. Therefore, anything which enhances the quality of education is to the good of ILEA."
>
> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

> "Joint approaches can be more effective."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

They were pursued through a variety of goals. One goal was the use of links to create a comprehensive service,

> "Provision of a more comprehensive public health service than is possible without links."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Integration was also the theme of goals related to welfare provision and the treatment of clients requiring more than one service.

> "The whole-person concept, integrating DHSS benefit and looking at other aspects."
>
> (Assistant Director, Information, London South, DHSS)

Responsiveness was seen to make a contribution to improving service quality and effectiveness. The local authority was seen by larger authorities to be closer to the population of Camden and relationships with the local authority were seen as a means of

improving the tailoring of services to local needs.

> "Getting the right 'community feel' and
> responding locally."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools)
> Inner London Education Authority)

A final dimension of the search for better services
was access. Through the network of public
authorities, the clients of one authority were able
to obtain access to a wider range of services and
facilities.

> "Access to localities and groups of people via
> channels of other public services."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Community Education
> and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
>
> "To give the public easier access to vacancies
> and to information."
>
> (Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

This improved access was facilitated by referral and
interauthority agreements on the use of resources.

> "Job Centres also now provide more information
> for the public than they did in the past. This
> has been started under the 'gateway approach'
> whereby anybody can come into a job centre and
> ask any question which job centre staff may not
> be able to answer, but can provide a contact
> where answers can be obtained."
>
> (Regional Information Officer, London North,
> DHSS)

Service-Delivery Goals

Both the local authority and other public authorities
saw inter-authority activity as a means of improving
services by changing the ways in which services were

organised and delivered. Goals related to the improvement of services from both the client's (consumer) and the authorities'(producer) viewpoint. These twin concerns were reflected in goals which pursued both efficiency and effectiveness in the organisation and delivery of services.

Co-ordination was central to the goals of improved service delivery. Co-ordination included fostering complementarity between the services provided by different authorities.

> "Developing complementary approaches, so that the needs of the area are fully served by a variety of services is only possible by joint co-operative approaches."
>
> (Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

Complementarity implied relating and realigning services divided by organisational boundaries.

> "The benefits of being able to relate public education to other public services which in the view of the local resident should not be separated by bureaucratic lines."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Community Education and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)
>
> "Short-term, improvements, even minor ones, in the system on a day-to-day basis. Long-term, to influence other bodies in how they operate and get them to start thinking in 'our terms'."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "The aim is persuasion, to influence the activities of the local authority in the direction of the Sports Council remit."
>
> (Director, Greater London and South East Regional Office, Sports Council)

The pursuit of complementarity involved not only

persuading other authorities to change but was also aimed at recognising the way that different authorities' services impinged upon each other. Such recognition was the pre-requisite for negotiation and achieving a mutual adjustment of services and service provision.

> "LRT wants Boroughs to take account of public transport issues in planning and redevelopment e.g. putting offices over railway stations."

> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

A second set of goals related to the development of joint activities. The Metropolitan Police had developed a policy known as the "multi-agency approach" particularly over crime prevention, but not confined to that aspect of policing. The police saw relationships with the local authority as a means of extending that approach.

> "The Metropolitan Police are very much into the multi-agency approach to problems. With such issues it is seen to be fanciful to think that one organisation in isolation can solve the problem. It is necessary to seek the co-operation of other agencies and try to adopt a common policy."

> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

Law and order was not the only policy area where a joint approach was being sought: in the provision of health and social services goals identified by both the local authority and the health authorities included the development of joint service provision and joint management of services.

> "Combining in provision."

> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)

"Hampstead seeks genuine joint management, though
it realises that this is probably not achievable
in real terms."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health
Authority)

A third approach to improving service-delivery was
through planning. Respondents distinguished between
short-term adjustment of services and long-term
alignment and development. Inter-authority services
were being used to pursue the goal of better
planning. Planning could ensure that services
developed in a co-ordinated and complementary fashion
and that future problems of incompatibility of
services were forestalled.

"Working together with the statutory undertakings
ensures that services are installed in such a
way as to minimise future problems."

(Director of Engineering, London Borough of
Camden)

Both Camden Council and the other public authorities
in the network set goals for inter-authority activity
of achieving a better and more efficient use of
resources. A prime target was the removal of overlap
and duplication of services.

"Removing duplication."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
Education Authority)

"No duplication."

(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough
of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)

"Prevents duplication and overlap."

(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of
Camden)

Such goals were aimed at improvement of service-delivery from the producer's point of view without necessarily generating direct benefit for the consumer. It is usually argued that the consumer benefits from the financial savings made; however, in some cases the effect may be to remove choice or reduce access.

A fifth group of goals directed towards improved organisation and delivery of services concerned communications. Of particular concern was the desire to enhance referral. Public ignorance of service responsibilities and problems of access as well as the multi-faceted nature of client/customer needs meant that the authority contacted initially was not necessarily the most appropriate agency to meet some or all of those needs. A goal of interauthority activity was to ensure that clients/customers were passed efficiently to the right authority.

> "Camden employees can feel more competent and confident because they can pass people on via the network."

> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough of Camden)

> "To see that work which is properly the responsibility of other authorities is directed their way - the police are available 24 hours a day via 999, therefore they get many problems which are not their responsibility."

> (Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

Improving communications involved not simply increasing the amount of communication between authorities but also changing patterns of communication. In particular the need to foster multi-lateral as opposed to bi-lateral relations was singled out.

"Our aim is proper networking."

(Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family
Practitioner Committee)

A sixth goal of inter-authority activity directed at
improved organisation and delivery of services was
localisation. For example, Thames Water saw a goal of
relationships with local authorities as the
application of local knowledge and skills to the task
of providing water and sewerage services to a large
part of South East England.

"Maximum benefit from close contact with the
functions of local authorities and the benefits
of local knowledge and operations."

(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)

Contributory Goals

Much inter-authority activity was directed at
developing the climate in which service delivery
could be improved. Contributory goals were seen as
necessary to maintain existing levels of inter-
authority activity and as pre-requisites for
developing further links.

A primary goal of inter-authority activity was to
increase understanding at a number of different
levels. At one level people in one organisation
wanted to know more about the structure and operation
of other authorities.

"Getting an understanding of departments and the
way they operate."

(Regional Information Officer, London North,
DHSS)

At a deeper level authorities wanted not only to know how an authority operated but also to understand the organisation's policies and viewpoints.

> "A better understanding of other organisations' problems and more awareness."

> (Assistant Director, Information, London South, DHSS)

> "The Boroughs and LRT have to co-exist therefore LRT will try to learn their views on the needs of the area and seek to demonstrate how they are meeting those needs."

> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

This level of understanding was necessary in order to develop constructive relationships based on negotiation and compromise. The goals pursued were those of mutual understanding as it was as important to an organisation to be understood as to understand. The Metropolitan Police felt themselves to be a regular target of criticism by the local authority and wanted to achieve both understanding by and political support from the local authority to smooth the path of operational co-operation.

> "Co-operation at a basic level and support at a political level as well as criticism from the local authority especially from politicians. For example in housing, the police may want to use a flat to observe. This can be done quickly if relations are good."

> (Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station)

Interauthority action was also seen as a means of general development and broadening and a source of new ideas.

> "Broadening of our knowledge and experience by recognising that teaching and learning take place in all sorts of contexts."

(Director of Libraries and Arts, London)

An example of the effects of developing relationships with different sorts of organisations was also given:

> "All libraries need the informal approach of voluntary bodies which rubs off on the library service through relationships."
>
> (Director of Libraries and Arts, London Borough of Camden)

The impact of such learning on the further development of inter-authority linkages was by fostering an environment of innovativeness which has been shown elsewhere to correlate positively with relationships between organisations (Aiken and Hage, 1968).

Both Camden Council and the other public authorities used inter-authority relationships to acquire information relevant to their tasks. The information was of two main sorts. On the one hand information was sought about plans and proposals which might have a bearing on the activities of the first organisation.

> "The future: indications of what is planned."
>
> (District General Manager, London Buses)
>
> "Intelligence for the planning system."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

The second type of information concerned data and intelligence acquired by one organisation in the course of its normal activities which was of value to another organisation in planning and executing its tasks.

"To help in knowing where jobs are and where
specific recruitment difficulties exist, for
example hard-to-fill vacancies."

(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

"Camden provides useful information about local
firms which helps in giving grants to employers
to train."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services
Commission)

A third contributory goal was to acquire resources,
both monetary and non-monetary. As noted above, all
the authorities serving Camden were under financial
pressure to a greater or less extent. Studies of
interorganisational behaviour have stressed resource
acquisition as the prime motivation for establishing
relationships among organisations (Benson, 1975).
However, resource acquisition did not figure
prominently among the goals identified by respondents
within the Camden network. Resource acquisition was
identified more often as a goal by those within the
local authority than by respondents in other
authorities.

"The gain Camden seeks from interaction is to
maximise resources."

(Director, Social Services, London Borough of
Camden)

The most extensive comments on resource goals were
made by a member of the Economic Development Unit of
Camden Council. This unit had a high political
profile but limited funds which came largely from
Section 137 allocations(1); the funds were very

---

(1) Section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972
allowed local authorities to spend up to the
product of a 2p rate on items of benefit to local
residents.

limited compared with the scale of the task it
aspired to undertake.

> "Camden hasn't the resources to do things alone
> therefore it is involved in joint-funded and
> joint-run initiatives with both public and
> private sectors. Goals include looking to draw in
> resources and looking for co-operation in
> non-monetary resource terms e.g. expertise,
> assistance in managing projects and exchange of
> information."
>
> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of
> Camden)

Many authorities saw inter-authority activity as a
means of solving problems. Where the problem had
arisen between the local authority and another public
authority, relationships had to be used to agree a
settlement of the dispute.

> "Sorting out arguments."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough
> of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee)

Where a particular authority was experiencing a
problem of its own, in some cases inter-authority
relationships were seen as a means of acquiring help
to resolve them.

> "Here and now: can you help us, we've got a
> problem."
> (District General Manager, London Buses)

THE STRATEGIES AND TACTICS EMPLOYED TO REALISE THE GOALS OF INTER-AUTHORITY ACTIVITY

Previous studies of inter-organisational relationships
have looked upon strategies as a means by which
organisations cope with interdependence and by which
they can exert power over the exchange process and

change the network in their own favour.

Benson (1975) identified a number of strategic options for changing network relationships open to inter-dependent organisations, such as co-operation and disruption. Rhodes (1981) defines strategy in the context of central - local relations as:

> "the means employed by either a central department or a local authority for imposing upon the other level of government its preferences concerning the time of, the conditions for, and the extent of the exchange of resources." (p106)

Neither meaning is appropriate here. Respondents in the Camden study were asked to identify the strategies they were adopting to achieve the goals which they had ascribed to inter-authority activity.

The responses fell into three broad groups. The first group, which is not discussed further here, centred upon the continued use of inter-authority links to achieve the aims set for them. The second group focused on ways of orienting the organisation to foster goal achievement through inter-authority activity. The third group focused on inter-organisa-tional processes.

Orienting the Organisation

Presentation was seen to be important for achieving inter-authority goals. Visibility was seen as a way of maintaining relationships and keeping the organisation's goals and priorities to the fore.

> "Showing your face and waving the flag."
>
> (Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee)

The image of the authority as an effective provider of services with which other authorities might successfully collaborate was also seen as important.

> "Promoting of Bloomsbury's own high quality services and doing our side of the job."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)

A second approach was to search for opportunities to develop inter-authority relationships. Development could occur by finding ways to fit in with the work being done by other authorities.

> "The approach to local authorities is to look at what services they provide and see how they impact on the FPC and find room for collaboration in how the system works, how services are planned, their location and so on."
>
> (Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee)

Identifying problems amenable to a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency solution as well as adopting approaches which allowed other authorities to play a role in solving problems were also seen as means to pursue goals through inter-authority relations.

> "Trying to act in concert with other agencies trying to identify problems which can be solved in conjunction with other authorities at a local level."
>
> (Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

The strategies described above were essentially co-operation through consent and compromise. By contrast it was also suggested that to pursue goals through inter-authority relationships demanded the use of power to impose new and effective solutions. Such

strategies, however, were open only to large and powerful authorities.

> "Being a big, strong, dominant organisation gives the power to get things done and be experimental and take risks."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Community Education and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)

Finally, authorities recognised the need to change attitudes inside the organisation towards relationships outside the organisation. Change involved encouraging staff to engage in inter-authority activity and making that activity official and legitimate.

> "Encouraging contact with local authorities at all levels from operational staff to chief officers. The divisional manager sees it as part of his job to promote smooth relationships."
>
> (Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

It also involved education to equip staff with the skills and knowledge to work with other authorities.

> "Making all officers aware of the multi-agency and problems-solving approach."
>
> (Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

Inter-organisational Processes

It is difficult to separate goals and strategies. Many respondents in Camden identified as strategies for achieving the goals of inter-authority activity processes which in other authorities were the goals of inter-authority relationships. They were contributory or service delivery goals which in some authorities

were seen as means to achieving higher-order service and corporate goals.

Three processes were identified. The first was communications. Communications involved approaches such as exchanges and visits, attending meetings as a link person, building personal relationships, and developing institutional links.

> "Exchange visits and giving the local authority the internal phone book."
>
> (Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee)
>
> "Developing communications which are backed up by the corporate philosophy."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area Metropolitan Police)

Second, was the use of consultation, which involved inviting comment and making information available, often beyond the requirements of legislation.

> "LRT aims to get good consultation. Everything that is done in public is available to the Boroughs."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

Third, was planning.

> "Through the planning process."
>
> (Administrative Officer, London Ambulance Service)
>
> "Planning and consultation by and with the local authority on all planning matters."
>
> (Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)

CONCLUSIONS

Where formal links existed between the local authority and other public authorities, most respondents were able to identify goals which were being pursued through such links and particular strategies for achieving them. Often where links were informal, and at the task level, respondents did not identify particular goals and strategies but referred to the specific problems they wished to solve and the contacts they had made or others they were trying to influence.

The goals of inter-authority activity were many and varied. They could be seen to form a hierarchy. At the most general level authorities were pursuing goals directed at improving the general well-being of the community in Camden. At the lower level were goals directed towards improved services and beneath them, goals that focused on improving the organisation and delivery of services. At the lowest level were goals directed towards changing the environment in which authorities operated in order to foster the development of inter-authority links and the pursuit of higher-level goals. Because goals were at different levels of generality there was an overlap between the means and ends of inter-authority activity. For example, communications were in some circumstances seen as the goal of inter-authority activity. In others they were seen as a means by which goals such as the integration of services could be achieved. More inter-authority activity was identified with the pursuit of lower rather than higher-level goals.

The goals of inter-authority activity were generally extensions of the goals of the inter-acting authorities rather than jointly determined.

Interaction was sustained where mutual goal fulfilment was developed. Authorities were able to pursue different goals at different levels through inter-authority activity. Mutual goal fulfilment rather than resource exchange was the prime motivating force behind inter-authority relationships. This finding differs from the processes identified in most studies of intergovernmental relationships such as Rhodes (1981). Inter-authority relationships in both the local authority and other public authorities in the network were seen as a means of exploiting common and compatible goals.

Resources did not figure prominently among the goals of inter-authority activity. All the authorities serving Camden were facing financial restraints to a greater or less degree. All resources, monetary and non-monetary, were in short supply and their availability for deployment through inter-authority activity was limited. Second, many authorities faced legal or central government policy restraints on the expenditure of resources on activities outside their core organisational responsibilities.

Many inter-authority activities such as the liaison between Camden Council and the DHSS were funded from Section 137 monies which were limited. Many respondents in health commented on the relative tiny amounts of funding available as joint finance for health authority/local authority projects.

Camden Council was also pursuing a particular set of goals very different from any being pursued by other authorities in the network. These goals were directed towards changing the governmental system itself, its organisation, structure and priorities. They were the goals of campaigning which Camden sought to pursue through inter-authority activity. In this way Camden

was pursuing goals similar to the strategic options for changing network relationships described by Benson (1975).

Camden's campaigning stance did not match exactly any one of Benson's strategies. The nearest is the concept of a disruptive strategy which Benson sees as employing domain violations, fund diversion or programme circumvention. The local authority sought to influence factors under the control of the authority which was the target of the campaign. However, the local authority was not acting in a directly predatory fashion but was often seeking to influence a third party, central government. The responses of other authorities, which were the targets of such campaigning, were tempered by the notion that others, not themselves, were the true targets of the campaigns. While not welcoming Camden's attitudes, authorities such as the Metropolitan Police and the DHSS sought to emphasise the co-operative rather than the confrontational potential of relationships with the local authority.

The means by which authorities in the network sought to achieve their goals through inter-authority activity were many and varied. They focused on using the links which existed within the network to achieve their particular goals and orienting their organisations towards interauthority activity.

CHAPTER 10   THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY NETWORK IN HANDLING ISSUES THAT CROSSED ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES

CHANGES NEED IN THE NETWORK OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER   10

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY NETWORK IN
HANDLING ISSUES THAT CROSSED ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES**

Almost every respondent expressed a view on the
effectiveness of   the public authority network in
Camden   in   handling   issues   which   crossed
organisational boundaries. However, respondents also
pointed out it was difficult in many circumstances to
arrive   at judgments about the effectiveness of the
network in handling   the issues they were themselves
involved in. For example   respondents, all of whom
were senior   managers, were not always   aware of the
quality of relationships at the field level:

> "It is difficult to know how well established
> links are from the centre."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools)
> Inner London Education Authority)

Effectiveness was also a difficult concept for
respondents to   measure where they were not directly
involved in the provision of   services:

> "Effectiveness is difficult to judge if not a
> front line agency because aims are very broad."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
> Camden)

Despite such difficulties judgments were freely made
about the   effectiveness of the public authority
network. A minority focussed on its effectiveness and
a few judged the operation of the   network to be very
effective. Many respondents pointed to the   network's
mixed   record   of   effectiveness,   pointing   to
effectivenss   at one level or on a particular issue,
but   ineffectiveness in others. A large number of
respondents commented only on the ineffectiveness of

the public authority network, citing a wide range of reasons why it was poor at handling issues that crossed organisational boundaries.

Respondents were not offered a definition of effectiveness and their replies it should effectiveness was a varied concept. Two rather different notions of effectiveness seemed to be held by respondents. One idea was that in an effective system there was an absence of conflict and complaint; an ineffective network was thus one where there was dissent and overt disatisfaction.

> "Measurement of such relations tends to be in negative terms, i.e. the objective is that no one talks about you any more. Currently there are no pervasive or enduring comments about the transport system which is good."
>
> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)
>
> "Judged by the volume of complaints it is an average service."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

The other idea of effectiveness concerned problem solving capacity. An effective system provided a profile of services which met customer/client expectations, met objectives and solved or alleviated problems.

> "When you look at issues it doesn't do well at all. For example homelessness in the Southern part of the Borough. The approach is inadequate, piecemeal, patronising, awful, cheap. The advice agencies' work is totally inadequate. Various projects are useless to tackle the problem."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)
>
> "Relationships are primitive. Appallingly little progress has been made in creating a seamless service from the consumer's point of view."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

It was implied that an effective approach would be adequate, comprehensive, coordinated and client-centred.

The most enthusiastic view of the public authority network came from a manager within London Regional Transport:

"It handles issues very effectively; the success criteria are in the interests of the public. It works very successfully, more than it gets credit for."

(District General Manager, London Buses)

Others, though less fulsome in their praise, were satisfied with the network's operation:

"The system is currently effective for passing information and allowing action to be taken on local plans."

(Planning Officer, Thames Water)

"The local authority system works well for the MSC at the moment."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)

"It does work well, all authorities respect each other."

(Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority)

However, such responses were few. Respondents coupled their comments on effectiveness with comments on the ineffectiveness of other parts of the system. Many saw the operation of the public authority network as,

"Too diverse for a single judgment."

(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)

Effectiveness at one level was seen to be matched by
ineffectiveness at another level:

"It depends on the level. It is quite effective
at the ground level - incidents, people or
problems are where there is good cooperation. At
a higher level it doesn't work because of the
bureacracy involved."

(Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)

Two main reasons for variation were structure and
finance:

"It works well and it doesn't work well.
Effectiveness ultimately depends on the
organisational structure of the local authority
and on resources."

(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)

The structure of the links between authorities played
a role in determining the pattern of effectiveness:

"Some issues are handled reasonably. Where
mechanisms exist, issues can be resolved and a
way found out of situations of conflict. Where an
appeal procedure exists this is helpful. Where
there is no appeal, for example in relations with
London Regional Transport, the network works less
well."

(Director of Recreation, London Borough of
Camden)

Resources affected the willingness of authorities
within the network to cooperate effectively:

"It depends on the issue. Agencies are
obstructive if they feel they will be lumbered
with the costs."

(Acting Director of Wworks, London Borough of Camden)

Other pressures, such as publicity, could force authorities to put more effort into co-operation:

> "Effectiveness varies between issues. Issues which catch headlines in the press and require statutory liaison such as child abuse are done much better than issues that require voluntary joint planning such as services for the elderly."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

The view that the public authority network was ineffective in tackling issues that crossed organisational boundaries was expressed frequently and strongly. Some respondents put the point baldly:

> "There are no examples of success."
>
> (Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority)
>
> "It doesn't handle such issues at all - there is no system."
>
> (Economic Development Officer, London Borough of Camden)

The reasons respondents cited for the widely reported ineffectiveness of the public authority network fell into three categories. Ineffectiveness arose from the structure of the public authority network and the authorities within it; from the way the public authorities chose to behave and pursue their interests within the network; and from the environment in which the network operated at the time of the research.

A number of aspects of structure were seen to inhibit the effectiveness of the network. Respondents saw the

network of public authorities providing services in Camden as too complex to be fully effective:

> "The system is a plethora of different agencies and people funding it. It works as well as it can do."

> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

> "The broader network is very ineffective. The system is very complex."

> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

Complexity was seen to produce a sytem which was difficult for the public to understand and hence to use:

> "There is confusion about responsibilities in the public's mind with social services and housing."

> (Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

It was seen as fragmented, lacking coherence and direction.

> "It is a fragmented system. The best can only be got out of a transport system if is each element is allowed to do what it does best to the full. This cannot happen fully in a fragmented system."

> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

On some issues respondents reported a lack of a focal point or policy framework which could overcome the fragmented structure of organisational responsibilities:

> "The system handles some issues more effectively than others. On homelessness there is no central co-ordination or direction, no government policy and no clear local authority policy. There is much ad hocery."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London
Education Authority)

Fragmentation was seen to be reinforced by central
government's policy of privatisation which was seen
to reduce the coverage of the public authority
network and thereby contribute to its
ineffectiveness;

> "The system has changed in recent years by moves
> towards the privatisation of income maintenance,
> transferring responsibility away from public
> bodies. An example is homes for the elderly."
>
> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
> Camden)

The comment was made that the public authority network
could not by itself tackle many issues effectively:

> "The network is not effective by itself. It needs
> voluntary organisations to dovetail in."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Community Education
> and Careers) Inner London Education Authority)

Co-ordination was seen to be hampered by the lack of
a strategic authority in London:

> "It is not effective....London needs a strategic
> authority for policing, planning, transport and
> strategic housing supply. Bodies are missing."
>
> (Chair, Housing Management Committee, London
> Borough of Camden)

A second main theme in respondents' comments on the
ineffectivness of the public authority network was the
lack of formality within the system.

> "Relationships aren't effective. They rely too
> much on goodwill and not enough on form."

The network was seen to lack full effectivness because it operated in an ad hoc way. Many respondents commented on the dependence of the network on individuals. Dependence was seen as a weakness because it relied on personal commitment of the individuals, usually officers, and their ability to bring authorities together to solve cross organisation problems.

"The present system operates despite procedures and legislation and relies on the individual commitment of officers that are involved. In general the present system of public authorities handles cross organisational issues very poorly."

(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

"The effectivenss of the system comes down to the ability of officers to make it work. In general as a system it is not very effective."

(District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

Respondents noted that communications were poor within the system:

"While much is effective it is also piecemeal. There is a lack of information on families and their needs, children are often out of school for months at a time and it is difficult to anticipate changes in the homeless population."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

"There is a problem of communication. BWB does not know who to contact and referral takes time."

(Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board)

Lack of communication prevented the system acting effectively as a whole:

> "It doesn't handle issues. There is no interconnection or cross referencing."
>
> (Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)

Two other features of the public authority network were mentioned by respondents as contributing to its ineffectiveness. One was the structural mismatch between the authorities in the network which inhibited the development of effective linkages:

> "Structurally it makes it hard for the DHA's (appointed) and the Council (politically oriented, elected) to meet. There are different levels of accountability and management differences."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority)

The second was the lack of powers which particular authorities possessed in certain areas:

> "No, it is not effective. It does not provide a service to the homeless unless in certain guises for example the under 17's."
>
> (Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "The police do run up against difficulties. For example certain authorities only have certain powers to do certain things, they therefore have successes and failures."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area Metropolitan Police)

Ineffectiveness was seen to result not only from the structure of the public authority network but also from the way in which authorities chose to behave within it. In the first place, authorities were seen to be pursuing their own particular goals:

"Different bodies pursue different policy
objectives."

(Planning Officer (Transport) London Borough of
Camden)

"There is no community of interest. Each has its
own objectives."

(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)

The pursuit of self interest before common interests
led among other things to an inability to pursue
common standards:

"There are differences between Thames and the
Boroughs on the services provided and it is
difficult to operate a common standard."

(Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water)

"It is the system we have to work with. There is
no uniform approach."

(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

Ineffectiveness arose from the duplication of effort
which resulted from each organisation pursuing its
own interests.

"There can be potential confusion of mechanisms.
For example there are several working parties on
the elderly which cut across getting agreement.
The system has potential but requires good will,
support and similarity of objectives."

(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
of Camden)

Another theme which ran through respondents' comments
on the ineffectiveness of the public authority in
tackling cross-organisational issues was the lack of
commitment to interorganisational working on the part
of individual authorities. One respondent expressed
a conspiracy view of the difficulties of inter-
authority working:

> "There are problems with many groups. Some groups want to demonstrate that the system doesn't work. They want to make things difficult to demonstrate this."
>
> (Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

This view was idiosyncratic.

Working with other authorities was seen as a low priority:

> "There is inertia not outright hostility."
>
> (Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)

Lack of priority mainfested itself in many ways. Inter-authority working was often left to junior staff:

> "You have to have people responsible for collaboration at a high enough level to have the capacity and will to make good personal relationships. There is insufficient seniority."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

Inter-authority working was not defined as part of officers' core responsibilities and perhaps as a consequence tasks which crossed organisational boundaries were shuttled from one authority to another.

> "Relationships are tagged on responsibilities which are the first to go under pressure."
>
> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

> "The system does not handle issues very well. There is buck- passing in grey areas. This is typical of public concerns because they have too much work. Maybe it is caused by bureaucracy. There is a tendency to think of reasons why one shouldn't do something rather than get on with the task."

(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

It was suggested that inattention to cross-boundary
issues was built into the system by professional
training which reduced its capacity to act
effectively.

> "Social workers are not trained in income
> maintenance and do not look at problems as a
> whole. Therefore income maintenance is not seen
> as an integral part of dealing with other
> problems."

> (Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of
> Camden)

The low priority accorded to inter-authority
relationships was seen in the lack of objectives
defined for such work:

> "Relationships are averagely effective. They are
> very cumbersome and preoccupied with developing
> relationships as an end in themselves at the cost
> of developing the service. No rigorous
> time-tabled plannning has been developed."

> (Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead
> Health Authority nominee)

The environment in which the public authority network
operated was seen to be a cause of ineffectiveness in
handling issues which crossed organisational
boundaries. Resources played an important role in
allowing the network to function effectively:

> "It is not effective. Capital planning through
> the Department of the Environment is a joke."

> (Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
> of Camden)

> "Effectiveness varies. There are good examples of
> joint planning. However, much has been frozen in
> the last eighteen months."

(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools)
Inner London Education Authority)

Resources were particularly difficult where demand was
rising.

"It is not effective. The volume of demand is
great and resources are stretched."

(Director, Social Services, London Borough of
Camden)

Lack of resources made authorities act cautiously
towards each other within the network:

"Links are adequate for the resources available.
There is reluctance to set up elaborate
mechanisms if they can't deliver the goods."

(Administrator, Camden and Islington Family
Practitioner Committee)

Authorities were also seen to be operating under
constraints, some of them imposed by central
government, which inhibited effective
cross-organisational working.

"Relations with the NHS are not very effective
but getting better. Constraints on different
authorities make it difficult."

(Assistant Director of Planning, London Borough
of Camden)

"Current circulars on collaboration are fine
where they are coterminous authorities but they
are hopeless in central London. As a result,
authorities are running round like headless
chickens concerning reporting relationships.
Current government advice is trying to make
relationships too narrow. JCPTs on the other hand
are trying to break out in order to achieve
things."

(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community
Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

CHANGES NEEDED IN THE NETWORK OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Respondents were asked whether there were any changes they would have liked to have seen in the relationships among public authorities. None suggested that changes were unnecessary or undesirable, although some sounded notes of caution about making changes that went too deep too quickly. The changes respondents wanted were varied in nature and level. They ranged from a widespread desire to see more and better interaction between public authorities to specific changes in powers and procedures.

The most widely desired change was for closer working among public authorities.

> "Authorities should work closely together to create a service to people who cross over boundaries in a rational, concerted and positive way."
>
> (Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority))
>
> "The LEB would like to strengthen its links with local authorities"
>
> (Ambulance Service, Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)
>
> "One would like to see agencies talking and consulting with each other more, even though each one has a specific role to play in providing services."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area Metropolitan Police)

Respondents suggested a number of means by which better liaison could be achieved. Structural innovation was needed:

> "Links are needed to create a better service and prevent duplication and gaps."

(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority)

"One would like to see more links."

(Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

More and better communications were seen to be necessary:

"Improve information flows and communication flows where this is productive."

(Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)

"More information is needed to help staff in the front line."

(Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre)

A reform suggested by one respondent was staff exchanges.

"Staff exchanges would assist. For example library people would find it helpful to sit in on a CAB interview. Other local agencies have poor information systems and could benefit from seeing libraries at work."

(Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

Improved planning, both more joint working and new approaches, was seen as desirable.

"We need to plan parts of services together."

(Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority))

"Locality-type planning ideas would help. Planning is now fairly rigid, for example all-Camden, all-Bloomsbury."

(Director of Nursing Services (Community Services

Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

Common objectives and the adoption of common policies were seen as a means to attain closer relationships.

> "The hope is that the police consultative committee will be a forum where genuine common objectives can be identified and all seek to attain them."

> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

Respondents wanted to see a move towards greater joint working:

> "Unless people are very exceptional they find it difficult to work in isolation on theories of what needs to be done. The best they can do is respond to particular pressures."

> (Community Information Officer, London Borough of Camden)

For a number of respondents joint working implied taking steps towards shared control:

> "On health more joint control is needed. The health service is accountable to the District Health Authority; social services is accountable to the social services committee; the Joint Care Planning Team is accountable to both bodies which may have different priorities."

> (Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden)

> '"In the long run a London commuter railway is needed with all systems under the same policy and financial control allowed for in the 1984 Act. British Rail would act as operator/contractor for railways as in other metropolitan areas."

> (Director of Planning, London Regional Transport)

A second theme, apart from the need for more and better relations, was the desire to see changes in the attitudes adopted by authorities to each other.

For example, the Metropolitan Police wanted Camden Council to change its attitude towards the police:

> "A reduction of suspicion on the part of politicians."
>
> (Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)
>
> "There is a need to improve hugely on dialogue. Kentish Town is not reluctant to talk and has taken initiatives but the response from Camden is negative, equivocal or there is no reply at all."
>
> (Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

A similar concern was voiced by a health authority respondent.

> "Bloomsbury would like easier relationships with Camden and relationships which were as good as those with Westminster. Access to Westminster is easier because of the attitude of the Director of Social Services which does not occur in Camden. A more flexible and innovative approach by Camden to some of the suggestions made by Bloomsbury is also needed."
>
> (Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

The LEB on the other hand wanted to be considered in a privileged way by the local authority over land use planning.

> "The LEB would like to get special treatment and consultations with respect to local authority planning."
>
> (Ambulance Service, Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board)

In the DHSS scope for changed attitudes was recognised by both the Department and the Council. Respondents in the local authority wanted the DHSS to respond more positively to approaches from the Council:

"One would like the DHSS to take Camden more seriously. Would like the DHSS to be more imaginative. Camden is happy to feed ideas into the DHSS but wants them to respond more actively and take initiatives to get things changed. Currently the DHSS sees things as inevitable. A more positive attitude is needed."

(Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden)

"The DHSS should be more responsive. Letters are sent on a monthly basis but there are no replies, they are never acknowedged."

(Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden)

Respondents in the DHSS wanted more understanding by the local authority and other organisations of the limits within which the Department's response could be made:

"Little change needs to take place. But local authorities need to realise that chasing us every day isn't effective because it causes a logjam. A better understanding of DHSS work and roles is needed."

(Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

"Take-up campaigns are viewed positively if targetted properly but the DHSS wants them coordinated and wants an input."

(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

Respondents not only wanted other authorities to change their attitudes towards their own organisation and inter-authority working but also to make changes in their internal organisation. Respondents highlighted aspects of authorities' structures and procedures which seemed to inhibit the development of successful linkages. Local authority procedures were seen to be slow and in need of change by some respondents:

"The committee structure of local authaorities is

a nuisance because it takes a very long time."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)

Further delegation and decentralisation of decision making within the local authority was felt to be needed:

"It would be easier for the Manpower Services Commission if individual sections in Camden had more autonomy."

(Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)

Respondents recognised the need for change within their own organisations to facilitate the development of links.

"The divisional structure of Bloomsbury is also a problem."

(Director of Nursing Services (Community Services Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

"Administration is cumbersome because of the masses of files not computerised. The system is Dickensian."

(Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

However, for one respondent concern with the structures and processes involved in inter-authority working was pitching the need for change at the wrong level.

"There is a need to shift the preoccupation with interorganisational relations to relations based on what clients need. Organisational relations would take care of themselves. There should be a shift from process to discipline by focussing on purpose."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/Hampstead Health Authority nominee)

A third theme among the changes desired by respondents

was the need for more resources.

> "Yes, it would be nice to be given the resources to do the job."
>
> (Director of Nursing Services (Community Services Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority)
>
> "No money means no growth and no initiatives so organisations can't do joint schemes."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer (Primary Schools) Inner London Education Authority)
>
> "The DHSS is limited by resources in providing information therefore the local authority is taking the initiative. One would like to see a service-to-the-public initiative by the DHSS as well."
>
> (Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS)

Local authorities in particular wanted a reduction of restriction on spending in general and an increase in Section 137 budgets.

> "Camden has problems with Section 137 money because budgets are very tight."
>
> (Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission)
>
> "If the present administration see rate-capping as its role, why not give local authorities more discretion on how they spend their money. Section 137 is an anachronism. There should be a reversal of trends in grant-making. Rate-capping means authorities not only lack powers but also resources."
>
> (Community Information Officer, London Borough of Camden)

The fourth and final theme among respondents' concerns was structural change. New structures were needed to bring the authorities involved in particular policy areas together.

> "A more meaningful forum for employment is required."

(Community Information Officer, London Borough of Camden)

"Some structural change is needed to bring health and local authorities closer together. A possible model is that of Northern Ireland."

(District Medical Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

"There should be a more structured approach to inner city planning and more partnership and joint funding, for example for multi-ethnic needs, homelessness, under-fives and community centres jointly run and jointly funded. There should be a more formalised link between the separate agencies which would require an Act of Parliament. Authorities should be duty bound to provide a joint approach to some problems. Such a movement could be based upon community centres and joint management of them."

(Divisional Education Officer, Inner London Education Authority)

A number of respondents wanted to see a successor body to the Greater London Council exercising a co-ordinating and strategic planning role within London.

"There should be a strategic authority with wider powers, for example over planning and canals. It should not be a sports strategic authority."

(Director, Greater London and South East Regional Office, Sports Council)

A reunification of boroughs under a single local authority association was seen as desirable.

"One would like to see a revivial of a single local authority association for London which could provide the force for collaboration between Boroughs and joint bodies."

(Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)

Some respondents were anxious to see a rearrangement of responsibilities for service delivery and

transfers of powers between authorities in order to clarify and rationalise service provision.

> "One would like to see sewerage change and local sewers go to the Boroughs."
>
> (Acting Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

> "The system could be more effective if education moved to the Boroughs. It is bad because of separate political masters."
>
> (Assistant Education Officer(Further and Higher Education) Inner London Education Authority)

> "One would want to see wider powers in some areas, for example risk in properties outside the Fire Precautions Act. Many powers are currently split up."
>
> (Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority)

> "The Public Utilities Street Works Act (1964) needs sorting out - the utilities can dig up roads without the necessity to inform the highway authority. It should be mandatory to inform the local authority within 48 hours and write into this when the hole is likely to be filled and ready for inspection."
>
> (Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden)

Respondents expressed a desire to see new forms of accountability within parts of the public authority network.

> "The London Ambulance Service should be a special health authority with members from regional health authorities. The Regional Health Authority is a strategic planning/finance body. It is not easy to manage an operational service. Response is slow."
>
> (Administrative Officer, London Ambulance Service)

> "One would like to see greater accountability such as consultative groups with greater powers within the safeguard of the rule of law."

(Superintendent, Holborn Police Station)

"One would like to see a police authority for London similar to police committees elsewhere, excluding the absolute power of politicians."

(Chief Superintendent Hampstead Police Station)

Finally the comment was made that less central government intervention would be beneficial to the public authority network.

"Bloomsbury would like to be left alone by the DHSS and would welcome less control and less interference in relationships."

(Divisional General Manger, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority)

In making suggestions for change a number of respondents sounded notes of caution. Change that was too fast was considered unwise.

"Development, growing together is more appropriate than change."

(Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

"This must be an evolving process — incrementalism is best."

(Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station)

The implications of change which led to increased tasks and responsibilities was seen as a requirement for caution:

"One would like to see more links, but this means more work."

(Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)

"Yes, but changes involving getting closer together mean more meetings."

(Member, London Borough of Camden/ILEA nominee)

Caution was needed to handle politically-difficult issues and to prevent the incorporation of individual authorities into an amorphous public sector with the loss of valued specialisation and expertise.

> "There is a need to tread warily in such areas because of sensitivities."
>
> (Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "While advocating closer cooperation it is important to remember that each agency has a role to play and there is a danger of cooperation going too far because it is necessary for an organisation to maintain its own identity."
>
> (Superintendent (Community Liaison) No. 7 Area Metropolitan Police)

Caution gave way to doubt as respondents qualified their comments with statements about the feasibility of change.

> "A single local authority association for London is needed ...but this is unlikely to happen."
>
> (Assistant Director of Finance, London Borough of Camden)
>
> "One would like improved relationships but cannot be optimistic that this is possible."
>
> (District Planning Officer, Hampstead Health Authority)

CONCLUSIONS

Respondents saw an effective public authority network as possessing problem-solving capacity which crossed organisational boundaries and operated in a consensual manner. Although performance varied according to the particular parts of organisations involved in issues, it was judged overall by respondents to be poor. Ineffectiveness arose from the structure of the public

authority network, organisational attitudes towards inter-authority working and the environment in which the network operated.

The structural mismatch between authorities and their formal bureaucratic structures which inhibited the development of links between authorities was cited as prime causes of the ineffectiveness of the network. These difficulties were exacerbated on the one hand by resource problems and changing government policies and on the other hand low priority given to relationships with other public authorities. Relationships were developed on an ad hoc basis and relied much on the efforts of individuals that took an interest in them. Authorities were reluctant to commit resources where they did not retain full control.

The critical views expressed by the majority of respondents were matched by a desire for change in the public authority network. Changes were needed in four different aspects of the public-authority network. First, more and better inter-action was needed between public authorities. However respondents recognised that to achieve closer relationships, changes were needed elsewhere. Second, therefore, was the desire to see changes in the public authorities themselves. Internal structures and procedures needed to be adjusted to make them more compatible with those of other public authorities with whom interaction was required. For improved relationships to develop authorities needed to change their attitude towards each other focussing upon areas of common interest and displaying greater openness. A third change required was the easier availibility of resources to fund the costs of interauthority working and reserve the pattern of retreat to a core of mandatory services.

Fourth, structural change in the network as a whole was needed, including some reorganisation of responsibilities between authorities. Structures had to be created as a focus for leadership within the network for tasks which spanned several authorities.

CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS

THE CAMDEN CASE STUDY

Fragmented Service Provision

High Levels of Interdependence
among Authorities

Ad Hoc Linkages among Authorities

Leadership within the Network

Mutual Goal Fulfilment

Ineffectiveness

The Influence of the Environment

The Influence of Structure

The Influence of Attitudes and
Values

Change and Stability

DISCUSSION

A Network View of Local Service
Provision

The Nature of Interdependence
among Public Authorities

The Processes Involved in Inter-
authority Relationships

The Uniqueness of the Political
Dimension in Inter-
authority Relationships

Public Authorities as a Distributed
Network

The Assumptions Made about the Way
the Network Operates

A New Role for Local Athorities

CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS

Two kinds of conclusions can be drawn from the research undertaken in Camden. The first kind are about the role of Camden Council in the Borough's public – authority network and the nature and determinants of relationships between the Council and other public authorities. The second kind are more general inferences about inter-governmental relations at the local level. Because the research was based on a single case study, the latter conclusions are more tentative

The concluding sections at the ends of Chapters 4-10 have presented detailed summaries of the results of the research by topic. In the succeeding pages the separate strands of evidence are drawn together to give an overall picture of inter-governmental relations within Camden.

THE CAMDEN CASE STUDY

Fragmented Service Provision

The provision of public services in Camden was highly functionally fragmented. A large number of public authorities, twenty one of which were included in the study, were responsible for providing public services within the Borough. With the exception of the local authority, they were all single-purpose authorities. The local authority was characterised by strong departmentalism which added to the fragmented profile of service provision within Camden. Fragmentation created both the need and the opportunity for relationships between the local authority and other public authorities.

Structural changes were taking place within the local
government system which reinforced the pattern of
fragmentation. The abolition of the Greater London
Council meant that some services were transferred to
the Boroughs and other public authorities, in theory
at least, improving integration. However, not all the
former Greater London Council services were dis-
tributed in this way. A number of new, single-
purpose authorities were set up as well. Other
structural changes served to reinforce divisions
between authorities. For example, the political link
between the Borough and the Inner London Education
Authority was severed when the latter became directly
elected. Privatisation was reducing public
authorities' monopoly or domination of services, such
as public transport or care for the elderly,
increasing the number of service providers.

High Levels of Interdependence among Authorities

There were high levels of interdependence in general
between the authorities in the public authority
network and in particular between Camden Council and
other public authorities. Interdependence was often
complex and multi-dimensional. Interdependence arose
from the way responsibilities were distributed
amongst authorities, from the common environment in
which they operated and the objectives they chose to
pursue. Respondents recognised the extent of
interdependence and saw the local authority and other
authorities in the network as closely connected.

The nature of services provided gave rise to
interdependence. Fragmentation of the network arose
because each authority possessed a distinct set of
powers and responsibilties, while the location of
authorities in adjacent stages of the production

process gave rise to interdependence. For example, a process might be begun by one authority and completed by another. The basic nature of many public services, such as power supply, refuse collection, or fire fighting, meant that they were readily consumed directly or indirectly by other public authorities. Powers of regulation, exercised particularly by the local authority, were also applied to other public authorities in the network.

The nature of the services provided by the public authority network in Camden was also such that they could not be provided effectively or efficiently in isolation from each other. Camden Council and other public authorities shared a common customer/consumer base which generated complex problems and needs to which the public authority network had to respond. The particular services provided by each authority were often only a part of a much wider response required by individuals or occasioned by issues of public conern. Where a response was partial or unco-ordinated it was generally seen to be ineffective.

Interdependence also arose from authorities' organisational objectives. Seldom were authorities in competition with each other for the provision of services. However, they were in competition for resources, for powers to act and for influence within the public authority network. Interdependence also arose from the recognition of common causes amongst the authorities in the network, such as attempting to convince central government of the need for more resources.

Ad Hoc Linkages among Authorities

The relationships and linkages developed among

authorities in the network were limited when compared with the extent of interdependence. Formal links between Camden Council and other public authorities were not extensive. Relationships were more often dependent upon the informal links developed by individuals. Both formal and informal links concentrated at the level of officials with limited member involvement. Links generally focused on specific tasks and issues and rarely concerned the alignment of organisations as wholes. Links between Camden Council and the other public authorities had generally evolved in an ad hoc fashion in response to operational needs. The exception to this patttern were those areas where there was a statutory requirement to establish relationships such as JCCs. Mandatory relationships, however, were few.

Leadership within the Network

The overall density of the public authority network was low. Because of its multi-service nature, Camden Council had more links with other authorities than any other organisation in the network. However, the extent to which it played a leadership role within the network was questionable. The development of external relationships leading to co-operation through concrete linkages was not a priority for the local authority. Camden Council had adopted a campaigning stance which was directed both at the policies of a number of other public authorities serving the area, and, through them, at the policies of central government. Campaigning led to unease in the relations between the Council and other public authorities and occasionally to outright conflict.

Camden Council had developed its leadership role more extensively in relation to other local authorities in

the London area. The Council performed a servicing and co-ordinating role for some of the joint bodies which suceeded the Greater London Council and was similarly active in groupings of Labour authorities.

Mutual Goal Fulfilment

Relationships between Camden Council and other public authorities were being used to pursue a hierarchy of overlapping goals. At the most general level, relationships were seen as a means of increasing the general well-being of those living and working in Camden. Relationships were also seen to be a means of improving specific services. At the lowest level, relationships were seen to be a way of changing the operating environment of the organisations concerned. These goals were not jointly determined by the authorities but were extensions of their particular organisation's goals. The process of interaction was one of mutual goal fulfilment.

Ineffectiveness

Few of those involved in the public authority network thought it operated effectively in tackling issues which crossed organisational boundaries. Its record of success was seen to be patchy, and the ineffectiveness of the network was a common theme among those interviewed. The majority of those interviewed wanted to see changes in the relationship between the local authority and the other public authorities. The direction of desired change was towards more and better interaction, and factors that would facilitate interaction, such as more positive attitudes among those involved, more resources and improvements in the structural framework within which relationships were developed. However, a number of

respondents sounded notes of caution about the desirability of speedy or extensive changes.

The Influence of the Environment

The socio-economic profile of Camden gave rise to a high level of complex multi-dimensional demands and issues. Some of them concerned individuals and had a social welfare basis, such as care for the elderly or provision for the homeless. Some concerned the urban fabric. Transport issues were interactive. Social problems, such as crime, child abuse, and drug abuse required a response from many authorities.

The socio-economic environment of Camden was conducive to the development of linkages among the public authorities serving the area. Critical factors included the high levels of demand for services, high-profile and complex multi-dimensional problems, population instability, resource scarcity and shortages of personnel. Few socio-economic factors were working in the opposite direction to inhibit links, specifically the heterogeneity of the environment and high land prices.

A number of features of the wider environment, however, were not conducive to the development of linkages. Resource constraints, while making any savings which joint action could produce attractive, made the funding of new initiatives difficult and required authorities to concentrate upon their core activities. The policy framework provided by central government within which authorities operated was seen to be unhelpful in many areas, particularly where central government specified in detail the way links should be developed. The political climate, with its

sharp polarisation between Left and Right was seen to make relationships difficult to develop and sustain.

The Influence of Structure

Structural factors were generally not conducive to the development of linkages. The organisation and culture of the local authority constituted a factor that inhibited the development of links with other public authorities. Camden Council was a diversified organisation which held a very wide definition of its interests; it was also a professionalised body which until very recently had had ample resources with which to pursue its interests. However, while these features of the local authority encouraged the development of links with other authorities, many other characterstics worked in the opposite direction. Camden Council exhibited strong departmentalism and a well-entrenched bureacratic culture. The thrust of its strong Left-wing political stance was for the large part directed inwards, focusing on council structures and procedures, and where it was directed outwards, it focused upon campaigning for changes in wider government policy.

Those working within the network of public authorities identified factors which made working with each other easier than working with other kinds of organisations. These included familiarity, a shared public sector culture and a shared working environment. On the other hand characteristics such as bureaucracy, formality and party political sensitivities which were identified in the local authority were seen to imbue all public authorities and create difficulties for the development of linkages between them. However, within the limits of structural and cultural similarity which

371

characterised public authorities in general, on many
dimensions there were considerable differences between
the local   authority and the other organisations
within the network. These   differences in scale,
coverage, organisation, finance, culture and policy
preferences made the establishment of points of
contact and the agreement on areas of common interest
very difficult.

The Influence of Attitudes and Values

Values and attitudes among those involved in the
public — authority network reflected a mixture of
recognition of the desirability of working with other
authorities and establishing linkages and frustration
at the problems encountered in attempting to do so.
The work of Camden Council and of other public
authorities was widely seen to be closely connected,
and more extensive linkages than those in existence
were seen to be desirable. Public sector values were
seen by those working within the system to favour
collaboration between public authorities and to oblige
such authorities to regard each other co-operatively.
However, the   structure, culture and working
environment of the public sector were felt to
militate against building on such values. Both
officials and members experienced difficulties working
outside   their   normal   organisational
environment.Respondents in a number of authorities
experienced difficulty in working with Camden Council
because of its strong Left-wing political line and its
political style.

Change and Stability

The picture captured of inter-governmental relations
in Camden related to the period 1986/7. A major

change was occurring in the public authority network with the abolition of the Greater London Council. With the exception of one or two particular services, Abolition seemed to be having very little impact on relationships between Camden and other authorities. Other forces, however, were seen to be pulling authorities in two opposing directions. On the one hand demands for services which spanned organisational boundaries were increasing. On the other hand, changes in the political environment, in the structure of the system of governance and within the organisations themselves were seen to be making collaboration more difficult. There was a long-term optimism that relationships would improve and become more effective as the result of the efforts of those within the system. In the short term, however, the prospects for change in the quality or quantity of relationships between Camden Council and other public authorities were seen to be small.

DISCUSSION

The case study of Camden suggests that a number of revisions may need to be made in the accepted views of local government and administration. The case also suggests that some aspects of both interorganisational theory and intergovernmental relations theory may need modification in order to apply to public authorities. Thirdly, the case suggests that policy makers should review some of the assumptions upon which policies involving input from two or more public authorities are based.

A Network View of Local Service Provision

The Camden case study supports the view of local government which encompasses a multiplicity of service-

providing public authorities rather than just local authorities. An example of this wider view is to be found in Rhodes (1988) in which he replaces local authorities with sub-central government as the local focus of central-local relations. Such a view contrasts with the tendency noted in Chapter 3 for studies to focus within a particular sector of public service provision or to discuss a single policy area.

The case study emphasised the structural differences between the local authority and the other public authorities which have underlain the rationale for equating local authorities with local government in institutionally-focused studies. However, if attention is turned instead to the output of the public authority network (services and their collective consumption) the rationale for distinguishing between one authority and another on the basis of structure is much less.

The case study showed that although the local authority was the single largest provider of public services in money terms in the Borough, it accounted for less than half the money spent by public authorities operating within Camden. Secondly, although the links between the local authority and the other public authorities were only partially developed, the work of the local authority could not be isolated. It operated within a network that stretched beyond the Borough boundaries. Thirdly, those within the local authority and the other public authorities saw themselves as having much in common and subscribed to a set of values and beliefs which emphasised the connectedness and mutual obligations of public organisations providing services in a single geographical area.

The Nature of Interdependence among Public Authorities

The Camden study indicates that the pattern of interdependence among public authorities is more varied and complex than previous studies have suggested. Interdependence which is not mandatory has usually been generalised as resource dependence which fails to capture the very different relationships which link local authorities to other public authorities. In Camden, although most relationships were voluntary, there was little evidence of relationships built upon resource dependence.

The most useful characterisation of the interdependence found in the case study came from the commerical world (Pennings, 1980), based upon the location of organisations in the production process. However, whereas in the commercial world vertical interdependence (with customers and suppliers) and horizontal interdependence (with competitors) have the greatest strategic significance, symbiotic relationships (with others undertaking complementary activities) are particularly important for the public service network.

There has been little appreciation of the complexity of the relationships among organisations which are part commerical, part non-commerical, part voluntary and part mandatory. Brooke (1989) captures some of this complexity. He uses an eight-fold categorisation of relationships based largely on ownership and control. However, since Brooke's purpose is to discuss the means by which local authorities can use leverage over other authorities, he does not discuss in detail the ways in which interdependence arises from the task environment.

The Processes Involved in Interauthority Relationships

There was little evidence of exchange between the local authority and other public authorities in the case study. Where relationships were mandatory there was some evidence that relationships were played as a game and that decision-makers adopted strategies which took account of other decision-makers in a form of partisan mutual adjustment.

Where interaction was voluntary, the best description of it was mutual goal fulfilment. Authorities were prepared to involve themselves in relationships which they saw as contributory to one or more of their own organisational goals. Frequently a further prerequisite was that the activity would contribute to the personal goals of either the individual taking the initiative or the person required to put the effort into developing the relationship. Relationships seldom arose as an imperative from those at the top of authorities but generally at the instigation of officials directly concerned with tasks that were recognisably interdependent.

The Uniqueness of the Political Dimension in Interauthority Relationships

Inter-organisational studies have focused largely on relationships among voluntary and non-elected statutory bodies. The political dimension has been absent from such studies. Inter-governmental relations studies, on the other hand, have focused exclusively on the relationships among elected bodies and highlighted the goals and strategies of elected politicians and high-level officials. Neither body of theory by itself can explain the pattern of relationships found in the case study.

A key feature of the public authority network identified in the case study was the presence of both elected and non-elected bodies. In Camden the political dimension was crucial to understanding the relationship between the local authority and the other public authorities. The stance which the local authority adopted towards the other public authorities was highly ideological and influenced by electoral considerations. The position of those in control of the other public bodies ranged from the left of centre to the far right. The non-elected public authorities found a Left-wing campaigning authority particularly difficult to deal with. The public position adopted by most of them was neutral. Non-elected bodies rarely engaged in overt political activity.

Part of the difficulty experienced by those involved in inter-authority relationships were the different perspectives with which they approached the relationships. Some saw everything through political spectacles which led them to believe that they were engaging with others in a game of political strategy. Others saw the network through organisational spectacles which led them to believe that they were involved in a rational search for optimum service provision. No one was clear who was playing which game. For example, many local authority officials were thought to be playing the political strategy game simply because they worked for Camden. Many of these same officials probably underestimated the extent to which those at the top of some other public authorities were playing political games.

Public Authorities as a Distributed Network

The local authority is generally portrayed as the

central focus of relationships within the public
authority network. This cartwheel-like model can be
found in the analysis of local government in the
Redcliffe Maud report (Royal Commission on Local
Government in England, 1969) and in the prescription
of writers such as Stewart (1974) and Brooke (1989).

However, while acknowledging the different character
of the local authority, those within the public
authority do not regard it as having a central or
unique role to play in the network. In the case
study, the local council was not seen to have the
dominant share of the resources and skills necessary
for a central coordinating role. More importantly, it
was seen to have neither the legitimacy nor the will
to exercise such a role. The highly partisan position
adopted by the local authority was seen by others to
disqualify it from speaking and acting on behalf of
others. Furthermore, the leadership within Camden was
not particularly interested in playing such a role,
preferring to   pursue other political and
organisational goals.

Even if the local authority had been more interested
in a leadership role within the network, it is
doubtful whether the model of a cartwheel would have
fitted the network as well as the model of a
distributed network. In the distributed model there is
no central node, but a number of local nodes which
coincide with particular issues, inter-related tasks
or groups of clients and consumers. Several of these
nodes cluster near the local authority because of its
multi-service nature. Others only involve the local
authority tenuously.

The Assumptions Made about the Way the Network Operates

Central government policy makers make two assumptions about the way the public authority network operates which were not borne out by the case study. First authorities are thought to behave in a broadly co-operative way. Second, accountability is presumed to be achieved through service-specific organisations.

Current government policy is to encourage spontaneous rather than imposed co-ordination. The case study suggests that given the structural and political heterogeneity of the public authority network, what will result is a form of minimalist co-ordination. Authorities will generally adjust to accommodate each other and some ad-hoc initiatives will be taken to develop more substantial co-operation.

Minimalist co-operation allows each authority to undertake its task with minimal interference and constraint by other authorities. In this sense it is inherently good for the authority. However, minimalist co-operation is an inadequate basis for policy initiatives such as community care which assume active co-operation (Audit Commission 1986). As service provision becomes more fragmented and organisations become more heterogeneous through the enhancement of the commercial dimension of public authorities, the likelihood of more than minimalist co-operation being achieved spontaneously diminishes.

The second assumption that government makes is that by bearing heavily on individual authorities they will ensure effectiveness and efficiency on behalf of the client/consumer from the network as a whole. This outcome is not so because the pattern of service-

requirements does not match the structure of service-provision. The service requirements of a modern urban community are greater than the sum of its individual parts, therefore even if each individual authority operates effectively, the network as a whole may be very ineffective. Neither accountability nor control generally extends to the meeting of needs which rely on the active co-operation of two or more public authorities.

A New Role for Local Authorities

Local authorities never developed the wider corporate role which many prescribed for them in the seventies. Many reasons could be cited: structural differences, internal preoccupations, and lack of political will. As local authorities have seen their powers and roles trimmed, the nineties have seen the emergence of a new prescription for them, that of the enabling authority.

What light does the Camden case study shed on the feasibility of an enabling role? Camden may have been at the far end of a spectrum of relationships between the local authority and other public authorities providing public services in the same geographical area. The local council professed to care greatly about its citizens and the public services they received, yet it was at times practically at war with other service providers.

The concept of an enabling authority assumes the presence of three things which were missing in Camden. First, it assumes a political will in the local authority to pursue service goals before either ideology or short-term political advantage. Second, it assumes that the local authority has the means by which it can exercise sufficient leverage (through

resources, powers and skills) to impact on the network as a whole. Third, it assumes that the structural and political basis exists in the network as a whole for co-operation in those areas where the local authority does not have leverage.

Many authorities will fulfil these requirements to a greater extent than Camden. However, the case suggests there will be a large number of authorities which find the development of an enabling role as difficult and as unattractive as the wider corporate role was for many councils.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

Ackoff, R.R. (1974), <u>Redesigning the Future</u>, (N e w York: Wiley).

Aiken, M. and Hage, J. (1968) " Organizational Interdependence and Intra-Organizational Structure", <u>American Sociological Review</u>, 33, pp912-930.

Akinbode, I.A. and Clark, R. C. (1976), "A Framework for Analysing:Interorganisational Relationships", <u>Human Relations</u>, 30, pp879 - 930.

Aldrich, H.E. (1975), "An Organisation-Environment Perspective on Cooperation and Conflict Between Organizations in the Manpower Training System" in A.R. Negandhi (ed) <u>Interorganizational Theory</u>, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press).

Allison, G. (1971), <u>Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</u>, (Boston: Little Brown).

Ashford, D.(1982), <u>British Dogmatism and French Pragmatism: Central-Local Policymaking in the Welfare State</u> (London and Boston. Allen and Unwin)

Ashford, D. (1984), "The Structural Comparison of Social Policy and Intergovernmental Politics", in <u>Policy and Politics</u>, 12, pp369-389

Assael, H. (1989), "Constructive Role of Inter-Organizational Conflict", <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u>, 14. pp573-582

Audit Commission (1985), <u>Profile of Camden London Borough Council 1984/85</u> Audit Commission, London.

Audit Commission (1986), <u>Making a Reality of Community Care</u> (London:HMSO).

Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1970), <u>Power and Poverty</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Baker, R.J.S. (1972), <u>Administrative Theory and Public Administration</u> (London: Hutchinson).

Baty, G.B., Evan, W.M. and Rothermel, T.W. (1971) Personnel Flows as Interorganizational Relations. <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u> Vol. 16. pp430-442.

Bennett, R. (1986), "Meaning and Method in Management Research", <u>Graduate Management Research</u>. Winter 1986/87, pp2-55.

382

Benson, J.K. (1975), "The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy", Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, pp229-249.

Blau, P. M. (1964), Exchange and Power in Social Life, (New York: Wiley).

Bloomsbury Health Authority (1986) Local and Community Services Division: A framework for Strategic Planning.

Bogdan, R. and Taylor, S. J. (1975) Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods (New York: Wiley).

Booth, S.A.S. and Money, W.J. (1982) "Organisational Redundancy: a Critical Approach to the GEAR project", Public Administration, 60.2 pp56-72.

Bramley, G. (1984), "The Distributional Effects of Abolishing the Greater London Council", The London Journal, 10.1 pp46-54.

Brigdan, R. and Taylor, S.J. (1975), Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, (New York: Wiley).

Brooke, R. (1987), Managing the Enabling Authority (Harlow: Longman).

Brownhill, S. Redeveloping London's Docklands: Another Gerat Planning Disaster (London: Paul Chapman).

Burt, R.S. (1980), Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manufacturing, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 25, p557-582.

Cabinet Office (1985) Lifting the Burden Cmnd. 9571 (London: HMSO).

Central Policy Review Staff (1977), Relations Between Central Government and Local Authorities (London. HMSO)

Challis, L., Fuller S., Henwood, M., Klein, R., Plowden, W., Webb, A., Whittingham D, and Wistow,G. (1988), Joint Approaches to Social Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Chant, J. et al (1986), Health and Social Services:Collaboration or Conflict, (Policy Studies Institute).

Christenson, J.A. and Sachs, C.E. (1980), "The Impact of Government Size and Number of Administrative Units on the Quality of Public Services", Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, pp89-101.

Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services (1969), <u>Report</u> (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 3703)

Committee on the Management of Local Government (1967) <u>Management of Local Government Volume 1</u> (London: HMSO).

Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance (1976), <u>Report</u> (London: HMSO, Cmnd.6453).

Cook, K.S. (1977), "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interrorganizational Relations", <u>The Sociological Quarterly</u>, 18, pp62-82.

Crozier, M. and Thoenig, J.C. (1976), "The Regulation of Complex Organized Systems", <u>Administrative Science quarterly</u>, 21, pp547-570.

Dahl, R. (1961), <u>Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Dearlove, J. (1973), <u>The Politics of Policy in Local Government: The Making and Maintenance of Public Policy in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea,</u> (London: Cambridge University Press).

Department of the Environment (1983), <u>Streamlining the Cities</u> (London. HMSO. Cmnd. 9063).

Department of Health and Social Security (1973), <u>Circular HRC (73) 22</u> 94 (Membership and Procedures of Regional and Area Health Authorities) London HMSO.

Department of Health and Social Security (1980) <u>Circular HC (80) 8 LAC(80)3</u>.

Dunleavy, P. (1984), "The Limits to Local Government" in M. Boddy and C. Fudge (eds) <u>Local Socialism? Labour Councils and New Left Alternatives</u> (London: Macmillan).

Eckstein, H. (1970), "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), <u>The Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry</u> 7, (London: Addison-Wesley).

Eddison, P.A (1973), <u>Local Government: Management and Corporate Planning,</u> (London: Leonard Hill).

Edstrom, A., Hogberg, B. and Norback, L.E. (1984) "Alternative Explanations of Interrorganizational Cooperation: the Case of Joint Programmes and Joint Ventures in Sweden", Organization Studies, 5, pp147-168.

Elcock, H. (1978), "Regional Government in Action: A Study of the Members of Two Regional Health Authorities", Public Administration, 56, pp379-397.

Emery, F.E. and Trist, E.L. (1965), "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments", Human Relations 18, pp21-32.

Evan, W.M. (1966), "The Organisation-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations", in J.D. Thompson (ed) Approaches to Organizational Design, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).

Flynn, N. and Leach, S. (1984), Joint Boards ad Joint Committees: An Evaluation INLOVGOV (Birmingham: University of Birmingham).

Flynn, N.,Leach S. and Vielba C.(1985), Abolition or Reform? The GLC and the Metropolitan County Councils (London: Allen and Unwin).

Flynn, N., Likierman, A., Scrivens, E. and Vielba, C. (1989) Decentralisation of Public Expenditure Decisions. ESRC End of Grant Report.

Friend, J.K., Power, J.M. and Yewlett C.J.L. (1974), Public Planning: the Intercorporate Dimension, (London: Tavistock).

Fry, G.K. (1969) Statesmen in Disguise (London: Macmillan).

Galaskiewicz, J. and Shatin, D. (1981), "Leadership and Networking among Neighbourhood Human Service Organizations" Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, pp434-48.

Gamm, L., Spence, H.B and McCormick, T.M. (1984), "Interorganisational Decision-Making in Response to Cutbacks :A Case Study", Journal of Health and Human Resources, 6.4, pp476-497.

Gardiner, E.A. and Snipe J.N. (1970), "Toward the Coordination and Integration of Personal Health Service", American Journal of Public Health, 60, pp2068-78.

Glennister, H. with Korman, N. and Marsden-Wilson, F. (1983), Planning for Priority Groups (London: Martin Robertson).

Goldsmith, M. J. (1986), New Research in Central Local-Relations, (Aldershot, Hants: Gower).

Gray, R. (1987) A History of London (revised edition) (London: Hutchinson).

Greenwood, R., Walsh, K., Hinings, C.R. and Ranson, S. (1980), Patterns of Mangement in Local Government, (London: Martin Robertson).

Gyford, J. (1985), "The Politicization of Local Government" in M.Loughlin, M.D. Gelfand and K. Young (eds) Half a Century of Municipal Decline:1935-1985 (London: Allen and Unwin).

Gyford, J. (1985) The Politics of Local Socialism (London: Allen and Unwin).

Gyford, J,. Leach, S. and Game, C. (1989) The Changing Politics of Local Government Unwin Hyman London.

Hall, R., Clark, J.P., Giurdano, P., Johnson, P.V. and Van Roekel, M. (1977), "Patterns of Interorganizational Relationships", Administrative Science Quarterly, 22,pp457-474.

Halern, S. (1987) Home Truths on Camden Care, The Health Service Journal, 12.2.87, p178.

Halpert, B.P. (1982) "Antecedents" in D.L. Rogers and D.A. Whellen Interorganizational Coordination, (Ames Iowa: IowaState University Press).

Hammond, J.R. (1976), "Substate District, HSA and PSRO Area Designations", American Journal of Public Health, 66, pp788-790.

Hampton, W. (1970), Democracy and Community: A Study of Politics in Sheffield, (London: Oxford University Press).

Handy, C. (1989), The Age of Unreason, (London: Hutchinson).

Hanf, K. and Scharpf K.W. (eds) (1978), Interorganisational Policy Making, (London: Sage).

Harary, F., Norman, R.L. and Cartwright, D. (1965), Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs, (New York: John Wiley).

Hebbert, M. and Travers, T. (eds) (1988), The London Government Handbook (London: Cassell).

Heclo, H. (1978), "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in A. King (ed) The New American Political System, (Washington: American Enterprise Inc).

Hinings, C.R., Leach, S., Vielba, C.A. and Flynn, N. (1982), A framework for the Study of Inter-Authority Relations INLOGOV (Birmingham: University of Birmingham) mimeo.

Homans, G. (1958), "Social Behaviour as Exchange", The American Journal of Sociology, 63, pp5976 - 6000.

Hood, C.C. (1976),The Limits of Administration (London: Wiley).

Houlihan, B. (1988), Housing Policy and Central-Local Relations (Aldershot: Avebury).

House of Commons Environment Committee (1983), The Problems of Management of Urban Renewal (Appraisal of Recent Initiatives on Mersyside), (London: HMSO).

House of Commons Social Services Committee (1985), Community Care with Special Reference to Adult Mentally Ill and Mentally Handicapped People, Volume Second Report, Session 1984-5 HC 13 (London: HMSO).

Jones, G.W. (ed) (1980), Central-Local Relations in Britain (Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House).

Karpik, L. (ed) (1978), Organisation and Environment: Theory, Issues and Reality (London: Sage).

Keith-Lucas, B. and Richards, P.G. (1978), A History of Local Government in the Twentieth Century (London: Allen and Unwin).

Keith-Lucas, B. (1980), The Unreformed Local Government System (London: Croom Helm).

Knoke, D. (1990), Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Laumann, E.O. and Pappi, F.V. (1976), Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems, (New York: Academic Press).

Leach, S. and Moore, S. (1979), "County/District Relations in Shire ad Metropolitan Counties", Policy and Politics, 7.2, pp165-179.

Leach, S., Vielba, C. and Flynn, N. (1987), _Two Tier Relationships in British Government_, INGLOV (Birmingham: University of Birmingham).

Levine, S. and White, P.E. (1961), "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relations", _Administrative Science Quarterly_, 5, pp583-601

Lindblom, C.E. (1965), _The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment_, (New York: Free Press).

Litwak, E. and Hylton, L.F. (1962), "Interorganisational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies", _Administrative Science Quarterly_, 6, pp395 - 415.

London Borough of Camden (1984) _Annual Report 1983/4_

London Borough of Camden (1986) _Annual Report 1985/6_

London Borough of Camden (1986a) _Rates Leaflet_.

Martins, M.R. (1986), _An Organisational Approach to Regional Planning,_ (Aldershot, Hants: Gower).

May, R.J. (1969) _Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment_ London: Oxford University Press.

Maslow, A. (1954) _Motivation and Personality_ (New York: Harper and Row).

Miliband, R. (1969), _The State in Capitalist Society,_ (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson).

Miller, W. L. (1988) _Irrelevant Elections?_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Mintzberg, H. (1983), _Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations_ (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall).

Mitchell, J.C. (1969), "The Concept and Use of Social Networks" in J.C. Mitchell (ed), _Social Networks in Urban Situations_, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Mitchell, J.C. (1983), "Case and Situation Analysis", _The Sociological Review_, 31, pp187-211.

Morrison, H. (1987), _The Regeneration of Local Economics_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Mosca, G. (1939), The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill).

Newton, K. (1976), Second City Politics: Democratic Processes and Decision-Making in Birmingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Nordlinger, E. (1981), The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

O'Connor, J. (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of th State (New York: St. Martin's Press).

Palmer, D. (1983) Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate Coordination. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, p40-55.

Pareto, V. (1939), The Mind and Society, (London: Cape).

Pennings, J.M. (1980) Interlocking Directorates (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).

Poulantzas, N. (1978), State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books).

Pugh, D.S., Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C.R. and Turner, C. (1969), "The Context of Organization Structures", Administrative Science Quarterly, 14, pp91-114.

Ranson, L, Jones, G. W. and Walsh, K. (eds) (1985), Between Centre and Locality, (London: Allen and Unwin).

Redburn F. S. (1977) On Human Services Integration Public Administration Review 37 pp261-269.

Redlich, J. and Hirst, F.W. (1903) reprinted (1970), The History of Local Government in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan).

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1981), Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations, (Aldershot, Hants: Gower).

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1988), Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain, (London: Unwin Hyman).

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1991), "Theory and Methods in British Public Administration: the View from Political Science", Political Studies, 39, 3, pp533-554.

Robson W.A. (1954), The Development of Local Govenment Third Edition, (London: Allen and Unwin).

Robson, W.A. (1966), Local Government in Crisis Second Edition, (London: Allen and Unwin).

Rose, R. (1984) Understanding Big Government: the Programme Approach (London: Sage).

Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960) Report (London: HMSO) Cmnd 1164.

Royal Commission on the National Health Service (1979), Report (London: HMSO Cmnd. 7615)

Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960), Report (London: HMSO. Cmnd 1164).

Royal Commission on Local Government in England (1969), Report (London: HMSO. Cmnd 4040).

Saunders, P. (1979), Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, (London: Hutchinson).

Saunders, P. (1984), Rethinking Local Politics in M. Boddy and C. Fudge (eds) Local Socialism? Labour Councils and New Left Alternatives (London: Macmillan).

Schemerhorn, J.R. (1975), Determinants of Interorganisational Co-operation. Academy of Management Review. 18 pp846-856.

Scruton, R. (1981), The Meaning of Conservatism, (London: Macmillan).

Secretary of State for the Environment (1977), Policy for the Inner Cities (London: HMSO, Cmnd 6845).

Self, P. (1972), Administrative Theories and Politics: an Enquiry in to the Structure and Precesses of Modern Government (London: George Allen and Unwin).

Sheets, R.G. (1981), "Towards a Political Economy of State Social Service Organization: a Critique of Leading Trends in Interorganizational Theory and Research", in D. Dunkerley and G. Salaman (eds), The International Yearbook of Organizational Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Simeon, R. (1972), Federal - Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (T o r o n t o : University of Toronto Press).

Sommer, R. and Sommer, B.B. (1980), A Practical Guide to Behavioral Research: Tools and Techniques (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Spencer, K. (1982), "Comprehensive Community Programmes" in S. Leach and J. Stewart (eds), Approaches to Public Policy (London: Allen and Unwin).

Stanyer, J. (1976), Understanding Local Government (Glasgow; Fontana/Collins).

Stewart, J.D. (1971), Management in Local Government: A Viewpoint (London: Charles Knight).

Stewart, J.D., Leach, S., Vielba, C.A. and Flynn, N. (1984), County District Relations in Urban Areas of England, End of grant report. (London: ESRC).

Stewart, J.D. (1990), "The Enabling Authority", Management Education and Development, 21.5 pp359-366

Stewart, J.D. (1980), "The Governance of the Conurbations" in G.Cameron (ed), The Future of the British Conurbation (Harlow: Longmans).

Stewart, J.D. (1984), "The Conditions of Joint Action", The London Journal 10.1. pp59-65.

Stringer, J. (1967), "Operational Research for Multi-organizations", Operational Research Quarterly, 18.2, pp105-120.

Study Group on Local Authority Management Structures (1972), The New Local Authorities, Management and Structure (London: HMSO)

Terreberry, S. (1968), "The Evolution of Organizational Environments", Administrative Schience Quarterly, 12, pp590-613.

Thompson, F.M.L. (1974) Hampstead, Building a Borough 1650-1964 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Thompson, J.D. and McEwan, W.J. (1958), "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process" American Sociological Review, 23, pp23-31.

Thompson, J.D. (1987), Organisations in Action (New York: McGraw Hill).

Tiebout, C. (1956), "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", Journal of Political Economy, 6 4 , pp416-24.

Tindall, G. (1977) The Fields Beneath, the History of one London Village (London: Temple Smith).

Tosi, H., Aldag, R. and Storey, R. (1973), "On the Measurement of the Environment: An Assessment of the Lawrence and Lorsch Environmental Uncertainty Scale", Administrative Science Quarterly, 18, pp27-36.

Treasury (1986) The Government's Expenditure Plans 1986-7 to 1988-9 Cmnd 9702-1 (London: HMSO).

Trist, E. (1983), "Referent Organizations and the Development of Inter-Organizational Domains", Human Relations, 36, pp269-289.

Van de Ven, A. and Walker, G. (1984) The Dynamics of Interorganizational Co-ordination. Administrative Science Quarterly 29. pp598-621.

Vielba, C.A. (1986), Moving Apart: the Functional Fragmentation of British Local Government, London Business School Discussion Paper, General Series GS-07-86.

Vielba, C.A. (1979), "Area Management in England" in Planning and Administration 6, 1, pp47-55.

Walker, D. (1987) Population, Employment and the Economy (Document E update) London Borough of Camden Planning and Communication Notes PC8703.

Walker, D. (1989) Population Estimates and Projections 1987 London Borough of Camden Planning and Communication Notes PT8901X).

Walker, D. and Land, P. (1983) An Economic Profile of Camden London Borough of Camden Planning and Communication Notes PC8302.

Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1920), A Constitution for the Socialist Common-wealth of Great Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Webb. A. (1971) Social Service Administration: A Typology for Research, Public Administration, 49, pp321-39.

Weber, M. (1968), Economy and Society (Berkeley: University California).

Whetten, D.A. and Aldrich, H. (1979), "Organization Set and Size and Diversity: Links Between People-Processing Organizations and Their Environments", Administration and Society, 11, pp251-282.

White, C. (1985), Inter-organisational Relationships in Partnership adn Programme Authorities (DMS Dissertation, South Bank Polytechnic).

White, H.C., Boorman, S.A. and Breiger, R. L. (1976), Social Structure from Multiple Networks I Blockmodels of Roles and Positions, <u>American Journal of Sociology</u>, 81, Vol. pp730-80.

White, P.E., Levine, S. and Vlasak, G.J. (1975), "Exchange as a Conceptual Gramework for Understanding Interorganizational Relationships: Application to Nonprofit Organizations" in A.R. Neghandhi (ed), <u>Interorganizational Theory</u> (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press).

Widner, R.R. (1973), "Evaluating the Administration of the Appalachian Regional Development Programme", <u>Growth and Change</u>, 4, pp25-29.

Williamson, O. (1975), <u>Markets and Hierarchies</u> (New York: Free Press)

Wilson, G. and Fuller, S. (1983), <u>Joint Planning in Perspective</u>, National Association of Health Authorities and Centre for Research in Social Policy.

Wistow, G. and Brooks, T. (eds), (1988), <u>Joint Management and Joint Planning</u>, (London: Royal Institute of Public Administration).

Wistrich, E. (1972) <u>Local Government Reorganisation: The First Years of Camden</u>. (London: London Borough of Camden).

Wright, K.N. (1977), "An Exchange Strategy for the Interface of Community-Based connections into the Service System", <u>Human Relations</u>, 30, pp879-97.

Wright, D. (1978), <u>Understanding Intergovernmental Relations: Public policy and Participants' Perspective in Local, State and Natural Governments</u> (North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press).

Young, K. (1976), "Values in the Policy Process", <u>Policy and Politics</u>, 5, pp1-25.

APPENDIX 1

List of persons interviewed

This list omits individuals' names and shows the main capacity in which they were selected for interview. Many individuals hold other positions in the public authority network - a phenomenon discussed in the main text.

Bloomsbury Health Authority

Divisional General Manager, (Local and Community Services) Bloomsbury Health Authority.	15.7.86
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority	27.1.87
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority	20.2.87
Member, Bloomsbury Health Authority	20.3.87
Unit General Manager (Elderly), Bloomsbury Health Authority	26.3.87
Director of Nursing Services (Community Services Unit) Bloomsbury Health Authority	7.4.87
Vice-Provost (Medical) University College, London	3.3.87

British Rail

London Regional Planning Manager, British Rail	31.1.86

British Waterways Board

Area Leisure Officer, British Waterways Board	28.7.86

Camden & Islington Family Practitioner Committee

Administrator, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	14.5.86
Planning Officer, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	14.5.86
Assistant Registrar, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	14.5.86
Finance Officer, Camden and Islington Family Practitioner Committee	14.5.86

General Practitioner, Kentish Town   16.1.87
Health Centre

Crown Estate

Deputy Commissioner, Urban Property,   11.2.87
The Crown Estate

Department of Health & Social Security

Manager, Euston Benefit Office, DHSS   29.7.86

Deputy Manager, Euston Benefit   29.7.86
Office, DHSS

Regional Information Officer,   4.2.87
London North, DHSS

Assistant Director, Information,   13.3.87
London South, DHSS

Hampstead Health Authority

District Planning Officer, Hampstead   10.7.86
Health Authority

District Medical Officer, Hampstead   3.9.86
Health Authority

Chairman, Hampstead Health Authority   12.2.87

Inner London Education Authority

Divisional Education Officer, Inner   13.8.86
London Education Authority

Assistant Education Officer   11.2.87
(Community Education and Careers)
Inner London Education Authority

Assistant Education Officer   6.3.87
(Further and Higher Education)
Inner London Education Authority

Assistant Education Officer   17.3.87
(Primary Schools) Inner London
Education Authority

Member, Inner London Education   4.3.87
Authority. Hampstead

Member, Inner London Education   12.3.87
Authority. Hampstead

Minority Leader, Inner London Education Authority. Member, Westminster City Council	25.3.87

London Ambulance Service

Administrative Officer, London Ambulance Service	5.2.87

London Electricity Board

Divisional Manager, London Electricity Board	7.8.86

London Fire and Civil Defence Authority

Assistant Chief Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	25.3.87
Senior Divisional Officer, London Fire and Civil Defence Authority	25.3.87

London Regional Transport

Director of Planning, London Regional Transport	8.1.86
District General Manager, London Buses	21.1.86

London Residuary Body

Chairman, London Residuary Body	2.2.87

Manpower Services Commission

Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission	12.8.86
Adult Training Manager, Manpower Services Commission	12.8.86
YTS Manager, Manpower Services Commission	12.8.86
Manager, Wardour Street Job Centre	28.8.86

Metropolitan Police

Chief Inspector, Kentish Town Police Station	17.7.86
Superintendent, Holborn Police Station	7.1.87

Chief Superintendent, Hampstead Police Station	12.1.87
Superintendent (community liaison) No 7 Area, Metropolitan Police	21.1.87

Thames Water

Sewerage Liaison Officer, Thames Water	15.7.86
Planning Officer, Thames Water	7.10.86

Sports Council

Director, Greater London and South East Regional Office, Sports Council	14.8.86

London Borough of Camden

Welfare Rights Adviser, London Borough of Camden	4.11.86
Manager, Civil Rights Unit, London Borough of Camden	9.12.85
Director, Social Services, London Borough of Camden	19.11.85
Assistant Director of Works, London Borough of Camden	18.11.85
Acting Director of Works, London Borough of Camden	18.11.85
Director of Engineering, London Borough of Camden	15.11.85
Director of Libraries and Arts London Borough of Camden	15.11.85
Community Information Officer, London Borough of Camden	15.11.85
Employment Information Officer London Borough of Camden	15.11.85
Economic Development Officer London Borough of Camden	7.11.85
Director of Recreation, London Borough of Camden	5.11.85
Assistant Director of Planning London Borough of Camden	4.11.85

Assistant Director of Finance London Borough of Camden	26.11.85
Deputy Chief Executive, London Borough of Camden	22.1.86 14.10.86
Planning Officer (transport) London Borough of Camden	29.4.86
Assistant Director Social Services London Borough of Camden	2.3.87
Director of Housing, London Borough of Camden	16.2.87
Director of Planning, London Borough of Camden	16.3.87
Member, London Borough of Camden/ ILEA nominee, Sub-Committee Chair	19.11.85
Chair, Women's Committee, London Borough of Camden	7.1.86
Member, London Borough of Camden/ Hampstead Health Authority nominee	21.1.86
Chair, Social Services Committee, London Borough of Camden/Bloomsbury Health Authority nominee	22.1.87
Chair, Housing Management Committee London Borough of Camden	17.2.87

Westminster City Council

Deputy Director Social Services, Westminster City Council	11.3.87
Assistant Director, Planning and Transport, Westminster City Council	10.3.87
Director of Leisure, Westminster City Council	11.3.87

APPENDIX 2

Example of Questionnaire used with Officers

Discussion with ILEA

Questions Carol Vielba would like to raise

A   How closely related do you see the work of ILEA and other public authorities operating in the same geographical area?

B   What interaction, if any, is there between ILEA and other public authorities?

C   What role do officers play in the interaction between the ILEA and other public authorities?

D   How do members regard working with other public authorities?

E   What does ILEA seek to gain from relationships with other public authorities?

F   How does ILEA pursue these aims?

G   Are ILEA relationships with other public authorities any different from relationships with other organisations?

H   How effectively does the present system of public authorities handle issues which cross organisational boundaries?

I   Is the relationship between ILEA and other public authorities changing?

J   What changes would you like to see in the relationships between ILEA and other public authorities?

K   What else is important in understanding the relationship between public authorities?

NOTE

In A and B respondents were encouraged to discuss relationships with all other public authorities providing services in their area of territorial responsibility.

In C-K respondents in other public authorities were encouraged to concentrate upon relationships with the London Borough of Camden.

Example of Questionnaire used with Elected Members

Questions Carol Vielba would like to raise

1. How closely connected do you see the work of Camden and the work of other public agencies operating in the area?

2. What issues are of common concern to Camden and other public agencies at the present time?

3. How much of your time is taken up with such issues?

4. Do you, as a committee chairperson, play a particular role in relationships between Camden and other public agencies?

5. Are you, or have you been, a member of another public agency? How well do you think that the system of joint membership links public bodies?

6. How effectively do you feel that the network of public agencies operating in the Camden area handles issues which cut across agency boundaries?

7. What if anything does Camden seek to gain from relationships with other public agencies?

8. Does Labour Party policy and ideology have anything to say about relationships between local authorities and other public agencies?

9. Would you like to see any changes in the relationship between Camden and other public agencies?

10. Is the relationship between Camden and other Public agencies changing over time?

APPENDIX 3

Outline of the Research Given to Interviewees

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The aims of the research

1. To identify areas of common interest and activity among public agencies in an urban area.

2. To identify the way in which urban public agencies define their interests in relation to each other.

3. To identify the ways in which urban public agencies pursue their interests in relation to each other.

Areas of study

1. The division of responsibility for public services between agencies.

2. The issues which are of mutual concern to two or more agencies

3. Professional and political interest in issues which involve more than one agency.

4. Mechanisms which have been established for interaction between agencies.

5. The strategies and tactics employed by public agencies with respect to each other.

6. The results of interaction between agencies.

Method of study

The main tool of data collection will be informal interviews with officers and members in a range of public agencies operating in a particular urban area.

Interviewing is planned to fall into two phases:

Phase 1

(i)   Interviews with key officers in the centre and the main functional departments of agencies in order to identify issues, interests and strategies.

(ii)   Interviews with key members in order to identify members' views of interests and strategies.

Phase 2

(i)   Interviews with officers closely involved in collaborative arrangements.

(ii)   Interviews with members who are members of more than one agency.

(iii)   Second interviews with a limited number of key officers to ascertain the impact of abolition on inter-agency arrangements.