

National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy

A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of Economics for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2013

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Abstract

Arguments that a national identity could create a sense of social unity, solidarity and cohesion in a national group have a long tradition in social and political theory. J. S. Mill, for instance, argued that “the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities” because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are “artificially tied together” (2001, 288). In Britain in the 2000s these arguments resurfaced in public and political discourse through a distancing from multiculturalism, which was increasingly seen as divisive, and a new emphasis on national unity and social cohesion through the promotion of British identity. There is, however, a lack of empirical research in Britain on what the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might actually be, and the strength of the relationship as compared with other issues that might also be important for social cohesion. This mixed-methods thesis attempts to address the research gap both through analysis of the Citizenship Survey covering England and Wales, and through semi-structured interviews with respondents of Black-African and Black-Caribbean ethnicity in an area of London. I argue first that the type of national identity in question is of crucial importance; a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic national identity is helpful, and evidence suggests the latter form may in fact be detrimental to some aspects of social cohesion. Second, I argue that social cohesion might be better broken up into two separate concepts – one referring to a commitment to certain of the state’s institutions (termed ‘institutional cohesion’), and the other to associational types of behaviour (termed ‘associational cohesion’) – since the correlates of each of the two concepts are rather different and their separation would resolve many of the confusions in academic and public discussions of social cohesion. Third, I find evidence to suggest that British identity may be of more relevance for the associational type of cohesion than the institutional type, but overall both British and English identity are of marginal relevance for social cohesion as compared to education, deprivation, and perceptions of discrimination. This suggests that attempts to use British identity as a tool to create unity and cohesion in the context of increasing diversity may not work or even be counterproductive; issues of inequality and discrimination may be much more important to address. Fourth, I reflect on the extent to which issues of unity and cohesion at the level of the nation-state are still relevant in the context of identity politics on the one hand, and processes of globalisation on the other. I argue that nation-states, for the time being, remain important sites of redistribution and reference points for perceptions of equality; to the extent that these issues are important for social cohesion, nation-states are therefore important too.

Acknowledgements

There are many people and organisations that deserve thanks for their support during the writing of this thesis. First and foremost, however, I am extremely grateful to Helen Moore for all of the time she gave up to help, and for her continued generosity and enthusiasm for the study. Her support was invaluable. I would also like to thank my supervisors Hartley Dean and Tania Burchardt for their constructive and detailed guidance, and particularly for their support in the more difficult and stressful times of the PhD process. I have been very fortunate to have been part of the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, and am grateful to everyone there for providing a stimulating environment in which to work. I am also very grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for their generous funding for this project. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. I am grateful to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) for permission to use data from the 2007-08 and 2008-09 Citizenship Surveys, and to the UK Data Archive at the University of Essex for making it available. Neither the DCLG nor the Data Archive, however, bears any responsibility for the analysis presented here. Each of the participants in the qualitative component of this study deserve a special mention for the selfless way in which they gave up their time, and for their insightful and illuminating discussions. Last of all, I would not have been able to submit this thesis without the unwavering support of my friends and family, and am extremely grateful to all of them.

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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

Arguments for the importance of national identities for national unity, cohesion and solidarity have a long history in social and political theory. J.S. Mill, for instance, argued that “the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities” because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are “artificially tied together” (Mill 2001, 288). Jean-Jacques Rousseau also wrote of the importance of patriotism for national unity, claiming “that the greatest miracles of virtue have been produced by patriotism” (Rousseau 1973, 130), and that “a careful and well-intentioned government, vigilant incessantly to maintain or restore patriotism ... provides beforehand against the evils which sooner or later result from the indifference of the citizens to the fate of the Republic” (*ibid.*, 137). In the 20th and early 21st centuries such arguments were adopted by other political philosophers, who have argued that national identities can be important for national unity and solidarity for a variety of reasons. These include: a liberal concern with “the creation and maintenance of the conditions under which liberal democratic institutions will survive” (Barry 2001, 79); a socialist or social democratic concern with the implementation of policies designed to ensure redistribution or social justice (e.g. Miller 1995); a communitarian concern with supporting a national culture that provides the necessary cultural conditions for human flourishing (Luban 1980); and a conservative concern with the maintenance of national customs or traditions, which is seen as an important end in itself (e.g. Scruton 2006). What this diverse set of arguments has in common is, for varying reasons, an emphasis on the importance of national identities for a sense of national unity, solidarity and cohesion.

Since the early 2000s government policy and public discourse in the UK has emphasised the importance of national unity and cohesion, and arguments about the importance of national identity for national unity and cohesion have found their way into this policy and public discourse. ‘Race relations’ policy has seen a shift away from multiculturalism – the favoured policy prior to 2001 – and towards an emphasis on ‘community cohesion’ (Worley 2005). In the wake of the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, a view was expressed in government reports of ‘communities’ excluding themselves from the ‘mainstream’ by living ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle 2001), and “in national policy, respect for diversity has been de-emphasised or de-prioritised in favour of emphasising shared values and promoting cohesion” (Lewis & Craig 2013, 2). There was a new perception that multiculturalism could be divisive and detrimental to national unity, and a focus emerged of immigrants (and possibly their descendants) integrating into a ‘mainstream’ British culture.

This shift in government policy towards a new focus on community cohesion, with its emphasis on the importance of national identity, has taken place despite a lack of academic research into what the nature of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might actually be in Britain, and despite a lack of conceptual clarity on how the relationship might be dependent on the precise meaning given to both 'national identity' and 'social' or 'community' cohesion. The research that *does* exist highlights a number of things of importance. On the one hand, evidence from the US in particular suggests that ethnic diversity may be associated with negative outcomes for some types of cohesion: lower interpersonal trust, social capital and support for redistributive policies (Putnam 2007; Alesina & Glaeser 2004). Other evidence suggests belonging and attachment to Britain may be associated with "social trust, civic duty ... and by increased support for the political order" (Heath & Roberts 2008, 2). On the other hand, different research suggests that, at least in contexts outside the US, "immigration, multiculturalism policies and redistribution can represent a stable political equilibrium" (Banting 2005, 98); and that there may be crucial differences in the roles of 'ethnic' and 'civic' national identities for cohesion, since 'ethnic' identities may exclude certain groups (Heath & Roberts 2008). In addition it may be the case that, contrary to suggestions that minority communities should feel a greater sense of 'Britishness' to bring themselves into the British 'mainstream', many members of ethnic minority groups *already* feel British, and instead a bigger issue may be to do with the non-acceptance of their identity claims by the white majority (Modood *et al.* 1994).

This study investigates, therefore, whether or not national identity in Britain *can* be important for increased social cohesion outcomes. If so, it asks in what contexts: what type of national identity; and what precisely is meant by the social cohesion it might be important for? If not, then what else might be important instead: as Banting (2005) and Letki (2008) suggest, are structural issues more important? Does the relationship vary by ethnic group? And what are the roles of non-acceptance and discrimination?

This thesis investigates these questions by using a mixed methods approach. The reasons for using mixed methods to investigate the research question were primarily based on what Bryman refers to as *completeness* – that is because "a more complete answer to a research question or set of research questions can be achieved by including both quantitative and qualitative methods" (2012, 637) – and also *explanation*, in the sense of using the qualitative component to "explain relationships between variables" found in the quantitative component (2012, 641). The quantitative component of the thesis analyses the Home Office's Citizenship Survey covering England and Wales. It first uses Principal Components Analysis to produce

measures of social cohesion, second constructs regression models to investigate whether there are associations between British and English identities and the measures of social cohesion and whether these associations vary by ethnic group, and third asks whether any of the control variables included in the model – measuring, for instance, ‘structural’ issues such as deprivation, socio-economic group, and educational qualifications – might also be important for social cohesion. The qualitative component consists of semi-structured interviews with twenty two respondents of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity living in an ethnically diverse area of London. Respondents expressed their feelings of their national and ethnic identities, and any links they might see between these identities and aspects of social cohesion. The objective of the qualitative component was to identify a range of narratives surrounding national and ethnic identities and possible links, or otherwise, to social cohesion.

The thesis makes four main arguments. First, it suggests that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question. It is argued that the distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity (e.g. Kymlicka 1995) is helpful, and that British identity – which is at least to some extent a civic national identity – may be more relevant for social cohesion than English national identity, which is largely an ethnic national identity. Indeed, English identity may, in some cases, be associated with decreased social cohesion, perhaps because of its exclusive nature, with its links to being ‘Anglo-Saxon’. Second, the thesis argues that the vague, ambiguous and contested concept of social cohesion might be better broken up into two different types of cohesion, since its relationship with national identity differs depending on the type in question. These types are given the working titles of ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’: the former refers to the ability to influence and access public institutions, such as public services; and the latter refers to associational relationships between individuals – such as social and civic activities – and to feelings of spatial belonging. It is suggested that British identity may have some importance for associational cohesion, but may have little relevance for institutional cohesion. Third, the thesis argues that certain types of equality may have much more important relationships with social cohesion than does national identity. For associational cohesion, structural equality – with a particular focus on area-level deprivation and educational qualifications – may be much more important than national identity; and for institutional cohesion, perceptions of discrimination – particularly with regard to equal access to public services – may be especially important. Fourth, the thesis reflects on the role of the nation-state as the appropriate ‘level’ at which to focus on issues of social cohesion and suggests that, to the extent that states are important for implementing progressive social policies, and are important frames of reference

for perceptions of equality, the fact that equality was found to be important for social cohesion means that states are, for the time being, important too.

Why is all this important for British social policy? To answer this question, the next section introduces the policy context in Britain, particularly since the early 2000s; it discusses the shift in race relations policy from multiculturalism to 'community cohesion'; and it illustrates the importance of evidence on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in this policy context.

1.1 National identity and social cohesion in British public discourse and policy

Since the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, UK 'race relations' policy has seen a shift from previous policies focusing on multiculturalism, to a new policy focus on social cohesion (Worley 2005). After the 2001 disturbances several reports were published. The Cattle Report (Cattle 2001) used the definition of social cohesion given by Forrest & Kearns (2001), a definition that will also provide the starting point of this thesis, but simply replaced the word 'social' with 'community' in order to discuss 'community cohesion'. The Cattle Report built partly on Parekh's (2000) idea of Britain being a 'community of communities', but claimed that different communities were living 'parallel lives'; the task of community cohesion was then to bring together, in some sense, this diverse set of communities, but the discourse around community cohesion had "a strong assimilationist tendency" (Platt 2007a, 2), particularly in that there was an implication of ethnic minority communities, rather than communities in general, being the problem.

The new focus on social and community cohesion implied a move away from multiculturalism, which was increasingly seen as detrimental to national unity (O'Donnell 2007). Multiculturalism had been criticised prior to the advent of the social cohesion discourse, including on the grounds that concerns for preserving cultural differences could lead to the overlooking of discrimination within groups (Okin 1998); that institutionalising difference 'freezes' cultural differences, making them less available to reform (A. Phillips 2007); and that multiculturalism trivialises difference by providing only a superficial 'celebration' of it (Gilroy 1992). What was different about the new critique of multiculturalism that accompanied the social cohesion discourse, however, was its emphasis on the former's alleged role in undermining national unity. The new critique included accusations that multiculturalism had a role to play in "licensing ethnically based 'ghetto mentalities' and disunity" (McLaughlin 2010, 97), and sustaining 'difference' rather than promoting integration (Percival 2007).

There are many examples of this shift, including in speeches and statements of politicians, the media, and policy. A perception that "diversity threatens national stability" (Burnett 2007, 353) has appeared in statements such as Gordon Brown's assertion that:

"Continually failing to emphasise what bound us together as a country, multiculturalism became an excuse for justifying separateness and then separateness

became a tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity” (Telegraph 2007).

As leader of the opposition, David Cameron expressed similar views, stating that:

“[t]he doctrine of multiculturalism has undermined our nation’s sense of cohesiveness because it emphasises what divides us rather than what brings us together” (Burnett 2007, 353).

The Denham Report (Denham 2001, 11) – another influential report published after the 2001 disturbances – argued for a civic national identity as a key component in the community cohesion strategy:

“We have drawn on the detailed descriptions and analysis contained in the reports of Cattle, Clarke, Ouseley and Ritchie ... in setting out the following brief overview of the key issues. There is a large measure of agreement on the following being the most important factors;

- the lack of a strong civic identity or shared social values to unite diverse communities”.

This idea of using a civic notion of Britishness as a unifying tool has been a key theme in the social cohesion agenda since 2001: “The issue of Britishness and what it represents, whether it is an identity that can continue to act as social glue, is resonant in all discussions about cohesion in the UK” (Hickman *et al.* 2012, 49). This has been a major part of the agenda despite Parkeh’s (2000, 38) warning just a year earlier that “Britishness as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations”. Measures to promote the new social cohesion agenda included the introduction of new Citizenship Test requirements for immigrants wishing to gain citizenship (Burnett 2007) and citizenship became more prominent in policy with, for example, its link with access to benefits, such as the differential treatment of asylum seekers in providing welfare in the form of vouchers (Alexander, Edwards *et al.* 2007).

There has been extensive academic criticism of the social cohesion discourse. One of the main strands has focused on the relative emphasis placed on social and cultural explanations, in particular of the 2001 disturbances, in preference to socio-economic explanations. For example, McGhee (2003, 392) criticises government reports following the 2001 disturbances for their “overwhelming emphasis on the failure of inter-community communication [which] de-emphasises contributory factors such as poverty, exclusion from the workforce, exclusion from consumption”. Similarly, Amin (2003, 460) criticises the “culture of unashamed

questioning of the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims”, instead citing the long history of deprivation as a key factor in the 2001 disturbances.

More recently government reports, such as the Home Office’s (2005a) *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society*, have addressed this criticism to a certain extent, showing greater emphasis on inequality between ethnic groups alongside the perceived importance of British identity (C. Phillips 2009). Nevertheless, much media discourse still focuses on relations between communities, in contrast to most academic literature which emphasises the need to tackle both issues: “We need to consider how people relate to each other as well as addressing fundamental issues of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. Discussing how people get on together without dealing with inequalities will not work” (Hickman, Crowley *et al.* 2008).

In this policy context, therefore, providing evidence on the nature of any relationship between national identity and social cohesion, and other issues that may influence this relationship, is of fundamental importance, especially given the strong emphasis placed on the potential benefits of a civic notion of Britishness for community cohesion. It is hoped that this thesis can, in however small a way, contribute to the current policy debate in Britain.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature relevant to a discussion of national identity and social cohesion. It discusses the meaning of the contested and ambiguous concept of social cohesion, and presents the most rigorous definition of the concept to date – that of Forrest and Kearns (2001). It then discusses the concept of national identity, including presenting a brief history of nationalism, and goes on to discuss race and ethnicity. Links to the concepts of nationalism and national identity are highlighted and, following this, theoretical arguments regarding the importance of national identity for social cohesion are outlined. Chapter 2 next goes on to review existing research that is relevant for an investigation into the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. In particular, there is a substantial body of research into links between ethnic heterogeneity and some indicators of social cohesion such as social capital, interpersonal trust, and support for redistributive policies; and there is a limited amount of research investigating the relationship between national identity and social cohesion directly. Chapter 2 finishes by drawing out the specific research questions arising from this review of the literature, and provides a theoretical framework that will guide the methodology used in the empirical part of the thesis.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology for the empirical investigation of this thesis, although greater details of more specific aspects of the methodology are provided in Chapters 4 and 5, which report on the results of the quantitative and qualitative components respectively. Chapter 3 shows the reasoning behind the choice of the Citizenship Survey for quantitative analysis, presents the relevant questions available, and outlines the way in which the theoretical framework will guide the analysis. It then goes on to outline the approach to the qualitative component, which comprises a set of semi-structured interviews with people of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity in an ethnically diverse area of London. Purposive sampling was used to recruit interviewees, which ensured a range of different people were interviewed across three potentially important categories: employment status, gender, and age.

Chapter 4 gives a detailed report on the quantitative component of the thesis. Its first task is to use Principal Components Analysis to produce measures of the multifaceted concept of social cohesion, and it shows that, using the variables available in the Citizenship Survey, social cohesion can be broken down into ten different 'elements'. Second, it produces regression models to look for associations between measures of national identity and social cohesion. The

main focus is on British national identity, but a measure of English identity is also created. Results are broken down by ethnic group, and comparisons are drawn between the magnitudes of the effects of British and English identity with the magnitudes of the effects of key control variables.

Chapter 5 gives a detailed report of the qualitative component of the thesis. The data presented are drawn from twenty two semi-structured interviews with respondents of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity residing in an area of London. Chapter 5 presents a range of narratives around four issues: first, respondents' expressions of their national identities; second, respondents' expressions of their ethnic identities and any links they may see between their ethnic and national identities; third, the ways in which respondents described the links they may or may not see between their national identities and social cohesion; and fourth, groups of narratives that were commonly expressed together. The aim is to establish as wide a range of narratives as possible regarding ways in which respondents expressed their feelings of identity, and in terms of links between their identities and social cohesion.

Chapter 6 draws together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 with some theoretical considerations on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain since, in addition to the empirical analysis, this study also involves some important theoretical work. Chapter 6 introduces some new theoretical material, and provides a synthesis of this theoretical material together with the insights found from Chapters 4 and 5. It identifies four different theoretical arguments about the ways in which national identity might be important for social cohesion that correspond to four different political positions. In the light of the findings from Chapters 4 and 5, the nature of the concepts of national identity and social cohesion are each explored, and links are drawn between different conceptions of each, and the four theoretical arguments regarding the importance of national identity for social cohesion. Reflections are then given upon the importance of national identity for national social cohesion in the context of arguments for multicultural solidarities on the one hand, and global solidarities on the other.

Chapter 7 concludes. After summarising the thesis, including the argument of each chapter and key findings, it presents the four main arguments of the thesis. These are first that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question; and second that social cohesion might be better broken into two different concepts corresponding to two different types of cohesion, since the relationship with national identity depends on the concept in question. Third, it is argued that indicators of equality – in particular area-level deprivation, education and perceptions of

discrimination – may have a much more important relationship with social cohesion than national identity. Fourth, reflections are given on the role of the nation-state as the appropriate ‘level’ at which cohesion should be maintained, and it is suggested that, given the importance of states for redistribution and as a frame of reference for perceptions of equality, together with the finding that equality may be of particular importance for social cohesion, then nation-states remain for the time being an important ‘level’ for cohesion. Last, Chapter 7 draws on the government policy context in Britain to outline some policy implications and areas for future research.

Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter first explores the central concepts under investigation by discussing the meaning of social cohesion, and exploring literature on national identity. Issues of 'race', ethnicity and religion are also relevant to the discussion of national identity and social cohesion, so they are explored next. The chapter goes on to discuss existing research on national identity and social cohesion, with a particular focus on the evidence that exists on possible links between ethnic diversity and indicators of social cohesion such as trust and support for redistributive policies. The chapter finishes by stating the research questions in detail, and providing a theoretical framework that will guide the way in which the questions are investigated in this thesis.

2.1 Meanings of social cohesion

Although in much public and policy discourse the meaning of 'social cohesion' is taken to be relatively unproblematic, it has been used in multiple, often contradictory ways, and remains very much a vague and contested concept. As Kearns & Forrest (2000, 966) put it:

“What is meant by the term 'social cohesion'? Typically, it is used in such a way that its meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that everyone knows what is being referred to. The usual premise is that social cohesion is a good thing, so it is conveniently assumed that further elaboration is unnecessary.”

Pahl (1991, 350) hints that excessive social cohesion in certain situations may create negative outcomes: “Excessive local or personal loyalty or cohesion may be the essential basis for certain types of crime”. In addition, there may be conflicts between the levels at which social cohesion is supposed to occur such that, for instance, the cohesiveness of a small region, with desires such as self-governance, may create problems for the cohesiveness of the country as a whole. Despite these conceptual issues, “politicians, Eurocrats and atheoretical specialists in social policy argue for social cohesion and social consensus as if these were self-evidently good” (Pahl 1991, 358).

Following criticisms of the vague nature of the concept, there have been academic attempts to define it more precisely. Definitions vary, but often reference is made to 'social glue' (Rajulton, Ravanera *et al.* 2007), or “the need to find unifying common ground which will inspire assent across the board” (Wetherell 2007, 5).

The most rigorous attempt at an academic definition is provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) (see Table 1), whereby social cohesion is broken down into the following five dimensions: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and place attachment and identity. In public and policy discourse, the Cattle Report (Cattle 2001) used these five dimensions, although replaced the term 'social cohesion' with 'community cohesion', the reasoning behind which was that, as noted above, it is possible for internally 'socially cohesive' communities to exhibit tensions externally with other communities. The Cattle Report therefore distinguished between 'social cohesion' as referring to the presence of cohesion in an unspecified (but potentially very small) area, including for example a cohesive community within a divided city; and 'community cohesion' as referring to cohesion within and between different communities (Robinson 2005).

As already hinted at, the concept is multi-level in the sense that an individual's identification with, and relationships within, a group can be at, for example, the national level, the community level, or the neighbourhood level. Although a property of a group, indicators of social cohesion can be found at the individual level, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Given the fact that the definition provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) is the most rigorous attempt to date at defining social cohesion, this formulation seems a reasonable starting point to use in investigating the role of national identity for social cohesion. However, the concept will be used critically and its contested nature will be kept in mind.

Table 1: The dimensions of social cohesion	
Domain	Description
Common values and a civic culture	Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in politics
Social order and social control	Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for difference; intergroup co-operation
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities	Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others
Social networks and social capital	High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action problems
Place attachment and identity	Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity

Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001, 2129)

2.2 National identity

There have been academic arguments for the importance of national identity for social solidarity and cohesion. One such argument asserts the importance of national identity and nation-building in liberal democracies (e.g. Tamir 1993; Miller 1995). Miller (1995, 10) argues that “it may properly be part of someone’s identity that they belong to this or that national grouping”, and that national identity can be important for replicating at the national level the solidarities found in small communities. This can in turn be important for sustaining support at the national level for such things as the political order and the welfare state. Miller (1995) also argues that national identity has more significance in advanced liberal societies than many would admit. Although people may be “repelled by the raucous form that nationalism often takes in countries that are less developed and less liberal”, there are moments when people “see their own well-being as closely bound up with that of the [national] community” (*ibid.*, 15). Canovan (1996) also sees national identity as important, and uses the metaphor of national identity as a ‘battery’ that makes states operate, with citizens motivated to work for common goals.

There have, in addition, been arguments about the potential benefits of national identity at the local level. Putnam (2007, 164), for example, argues that the benefits of immigration are often felt at the national level, whilst the short-term costs are “often concentrated at the local level”, and it may be possible to reduce the impact of these costs by encouraging shared identities. Hirschman (2005) also emphasises what he sees as the long-term benefits to local-level American society and culture of fostering a national identity and allowing immigrants to become more ‘American’.

In the context of these arguments for the potential benefits of national identity for solidarity and cohesion, this section will explore the concept of national identity, and its implications for an analysis of the role of national identity for social cohesion.

History of nationalism and national identity

Miles & Brown (2003) argue that the 19th century saw nationalism become much more widespread in Europe, whereby a sense of ‘imagined community’ that was seen as necessary to sustain a capitalist economy was created to consolidate the system. There were significant links between racism and nationalism, with proponents of the latter drawing upon ‘scientific’ racism in an attempt to demonstrate the distinctness of each nation, and contend that there was a “historical inevitability” to the separateness of the nation (Miles and Brown 2003, 145).

The idea that there were biological differences between national 'races' was a particularly useful argument in creating and sustaining national myths.

Towards the end of the 19th century and during the start of the 20th century, nationalism also influenced policy in Britain. Faced with a challenge to Britain's industrial supremacy, a declining birth rate, evidence of the poor health of British soldiers during the Boer War, and a new activism amongst the working class, the ruling classes sought to "subordinate class interests to those of nation and empire" by arguing that social reforms were the fruits of imperialism, and justifying this on the grounds of the supremacy of the British race (Williams 1989, 156). Williams argues that the state created an impression of an interdependence between welfare reform and imperialism, such that trade unions came to believe that welfare reforms were necessary for 'national efficiency', upon which imperialist power depended, which created "an apparent material as well as ideological basis for the working class to believe in imperialism and racial supremacy" (*ibid.*).

Since the advent of genetics, 'scientific' racism has become thoroughly discredited (Pilkington 2003). In particular, the idea that features such as skin colour are necessarily congruent with other characteristics, such as intellectual capacity, has been shown to be incorrect (Ballard 2002). In addition, the political and economic climate altered significantly in the 20th century such that "the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the nation state is becoming increasingly contradictory" (Miles and Brown 2003, 147). Economic and political interdependence between nations, accompanied by increased migration across borders, have challenged traditional national identities and led to a "fragmentation and erosion of collective social identity" (Hall 2000, 146).

Nevertheless, national identities remain widespread: in England, Scotland and Wales the majority of residents identify with Britain, at least as part of their identity (Heath and Roberts 2008). However, many meanings can be attached to national identity, and it is important to be clear about precisely what type one is discussing. Although nationalism can be linked to racist ideology, this is not necessarily the case: "Nationalism is a broad-spectrum ideology ranging from fascism to a moderate identification with a given country with no necessary negative assumptions about other nations" (O'Donnell 2007, 250). Despite its widespread racist use in the 19th century, there can be a wide range of meanings attached to national identities. Some key distinctions will be explored in the following section.

Civic belonging and national identity

Castles & Miller (2009) make an important distinction between civic belonging and national identity in their comparison of state development and national identity in, amongst other countries, Britain, France and Germany. In Germany, which was unified relatively late in 1871, an idea of nation and corresponding national identity existed before the formation of the state; this was an ethnic, racially-based identity. In Britain and France, by contrast, the state was created without a corresponding pre-existing national identity: in France such an identity was created after the French Revolution; whilst in Britain it was accepted that citizens could identify with England, Wales or Scotland as long as they showed political allegiance to Britain.

This comparison demonstrates the differing nature of national identity in Britain, France and Germany in the 19th century, with France requiring its citizens to abandon group identities in favour of a unitary French identity, Britain permitting citizens to maintain group identities as long as they showed political allegiance, and Germany requiring having (and being accepted by others to have) German national identity as “a precondition for belonging as a citizen” (Castles and Miller 2009, 146). This comparison highlights the important distinction between civic belonging and national identity, with national identity and civic belonging being tied together in France and Germany, but allowed to remain separate in Britain.¹

These distinctions between types of national identities, some with the accompaniment of a racist ideology but some without, highlight just how important it is to be clear about the sort of national identity one is talking about, especially if it is something one is looking to promote. It may also have important implications for how national identity may relate to social cohesion and solidarity. A civic conception of national identity is seen as ‘thinner’ and more abstract than an ethnic conception; this makes civic identity more inclusive to other ethnic groups than an ethnic conception, but has raised questions about the ability of ‘thinner’ identities to sustain solidarities between citizens in the same way that a ‘thicker’ conception could (Kymlicka 2008).

¹ In addition, Mirel (2002) describes the way in which immigrants to the US in the early 20th century were initially required to give up their ethnic identities entirely in order to assimilate. By 1950, however, this policy had changed considerably, with American identity being redefined in terms of civic ideals such as respecting diversity. In this way, immigrants were able to simultaneously keep elements of their ethnic identity whilst also adopting elements of an American civic identity. This distinction has similarities to that between civic and ethnic conceptions of British national identity in a recent UK-based study (Heath and Roberts 2008). Ethnic conceptions of national identity place emphasis on “ancestry and ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at birth”; whilst civic conceptions place emphasis on acquired characteristics, such as support for a particular type of politics (Heath and Roberts 2008, 24).

2.3 Race, ethnicity and religion

Of central importance to arguments that national identity is important for solidarity and cohesion are issues of race, ethnicity and religion. Academic literature emphasises the importance of ethnic identity in the understanding of national identity (Maxwell 2006; Castles and Miller 2009) and of aspects of social cohesion (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Putnam 2007); and ethnicity is also “a possible source of new national identities” (Miller 1995, 20). Religious identities may also be important since some religious groups may “give religion rather than national origins a greater saliency in self-concepts” (Modood and Ahmad 2007, 187). It is possible that the relationships between national identity and social cohesion may differ depending on ethnic or religious identity, and so these key concepts will be explored in this section.

Ethnic and racial identity

Two points of particular relevance for how national identity may relate to social cohesion come out of this literature. The first is the importance of identity claims being accepted by others; and the second is the changing, complex and often hybrid nature of identities that defies reduction into specific categories. Each of these issues will now be discussed in turn.

After the period of significant immigration to Britain following the Second World War, a politics of identity emerged in response to the racism directed at recent immigrants. This politics of identity constructed a notion of ‘Black’; one that highlighted the commonalities in experience of those discriminated against due to their country of origin. “Blocked out of any access to an English or British identity”, people could simultaneously use ‘Black’ identity as an alternative identity source, whilst also showing their solidarity with people who, despite often having a different skin colour and heritage, shared their plight (Hall 2000, 148). Political ‘Blackness’ became an identity one could learn from experience, not something that necessarily described one’s heritage or culture. Hall (2000) highlights his experience of adopting a new identity as a ‘Black’ person, something that happened only after leaving Jamaica and living in the UK.

It is interesting to note the way in which Hall describes ‘Black’ identity as compensating for being excluded from English or British identity. This is consistent with the emphasis placed by several commentators, for example McCrone & Bechhofer (2008), on the importance of identity claims being accepted by others, and it highlights the need for examination of the role identity supposedly plays in the choice, or otherwise, of members of ethnic minority

communities to exclude themselves. For example, a study by Modood *et al.* (1994) highlights the willingness of many of the participants of Caribbean heritage to identify with Britain, but also their feeling of exclusion from this identity by the (white) majority, because of their skin colour. The political identity of 'Black' may be particularly important to the qualitative component of this study since it is of particular relevance to those of Black African and Black Caribbean heritage – the groups that were targeted for interview.

Although it had advantages for uniting otherwise diverse groups of people to fight against the common experience of racism, there were problems inherent in the political identity 'Black', such as that it suggested non-white groups had something in common other than how others treated them (Modood 1994), and it was rejected by some Asian groups in order to highlight the distinct nature of discrimination against them. This contributed towards the creation of what many commentators have termed 'new ethnicities', in which people took new, complex and sometimes hybrid identities. According to Solomos (2003, 211), "[p]erhaps the most important symbol of this change was the assertion that it was possible to be both black and British". This led to a desire, for example, for third generation Black people to identify simultaneously with their Caribbean heritage, a 'Black' identity, and a British identity: "They want to speak from all three identities" (Hall 2000, 152). This point is echoed by Amin's (2003, 462) reading of the 2001 disturbances in northern England, in which those involved were "young people who have grown up routinely mixing 'eastern' and 'western' markers of identity, through language, bodily expression, music and consumer habits, and who are not confused about their identities and values as cultural 'hybrids'".²

These issues highlight first the importance of identity claims being accepted by others, whereby the identity of 'Black' can be seen partly as a response to exclusion from British identity, suggesting care will need to be taken in interpreting the national identities of minority ethnic groups: it may be that a lack of British identity does not indicate an unwillingness to adopt such an identity, but instead a feeling of exclusion from it. Second, the description of emerging 'new ethnicities' illustrates the complexity, fluidity and hybridity of identities,

² There are many disadvantages to how the political identity of 'Black' came to be used. First, by emphasising the common experiences of racism of recent immigrants, it hid other differences, such as class and gender, which could potentially highlight important similarities such as the economic position of working class whites and some migrants; and also suggested a "false essentialism, namely, that all non-white groups have something in common other than how others treat them" (Modood 1994, 866). Second, it silenced the specific experiences, cultural pride, and identity of Asian people. As Modood (1994) argues, 'Blackness' had become a symbol of the discrimination against African and Caribbean people, one that focused in particular on skin colour, and also became associated with African and Caribbean heritage and cultural pride. Whilst many people of African and Caribbean heritage would also object to being categorised as 'Black', this problem applied in particular to Asian people, many of whom viewed the discrimination against them as based around culture and religion rather than skin colour.

demonstrating that it is difficult to place them firmly in fixed categories. The analysis of relationships between national identity and social cohesion will need to demonstrate awareness of this complex and multiple aspect of people's identities; for example there will need to be awareness of the possibility that people identify strongly with both their heritage and host countries simultaneously.³

This last point is particularly important with regard to the way in which ethnicity is categorised in census or survey questions, since fixed categories are used with which respondents are asked to self-identify, but these fixed categories may not respond to the way in which respondents understand their own identities, which may be complex, hybrid, and dependent on context:

“Expressed or chosen identity is often not captured in sources of information about minority ethnic groups: questions are not left open and the options offered indicate that in seeking information on ethnic origin surveys and censuses are attempting to capture something about the ‘non-White’ population of the UK aggregated to reflect a number of common aspects of ‘identity’ such as immigration history, forebears’ nationality, region of origin, religion and so on”.

(Platt 2007a, 18)

The ethnic categories that are used in censuses and surveys attempt to combine the aim of producing categories which are seen as useful for the purposes of analysis of different groups with the aim of producing categories that people able to meaningfully self-identify with. For instance, Howard (2006, 120) highlights the way in which categories are decided upon on a politicised basis rather than reflecting an understanding of “sociological reality”. The extent to which the ethnic categories used in this study correspond to the actual ethnic groups with which people identify, therefore, is clearly a crucial issue with regard to the conclusions that can be drawn from the way in which relationships between national identity and social cohesion might differ by ethnic group.

³ A related and important distinction is that between identity as a ‘mode of oppression’, and identity as a ‘mode of being’ (Modood 1994). An identity as a ‘mode of oppression’ is an identity based on the characteristics of a group that are the focus of discrimination; the original form of ‘Black’ identity falls into this category. Such an identity is negative since it is determined by the oppressing group and does not necessarily correspond to how the oppressed group would wish to define their own identities. Identity as a ‘mode of being’, by contrast, has much more to do with positive aspects of a person's identity, such as pride in their heritage, which Modood sees as necessary for active participation in society. There is a danger that by imposing identity categories upon minorities, this creates “group identities exclusively from the point of view of the dominant whites”, and fails to recognise minorities’ “mode of being ... which defies such reduction” (Modood 1994, 869).

Religious identity

Religious identity may also be an important source of identity, particularly for some ethnic groups – indeed for some commentators it may be the most important source of personal identity (Platt 2007a) – and there may also be overlaps between religious and ethnic identity. Modood (1994) highlights the importance of the struggle against cultural and religious discrimination for some Asian groups, whilst these issues have become even more prominent in the last decade, with Amin (2003, 460) describing a “culture of unashamed questioning of the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims”. Modood & Ahmad (2007, 187) argue that “South Asians, especially Muslims, give religion rather than national origins a greater saliency in self-concepts”.

There may also be relationships between religious identity and various socio-economic issues. Lindley (2002, 427) finds that religious identities reveal important differences in earnings and employment within conventional ethnic categories: for example, “notable differences exist between Indian Sikhs and Hindus”. There is, in addition, evidence of a “pure Islamic penalty”, after controlling for other characteristics, for employment and earnings. Despite such findings, Maxwell (2006) finds Muslims to be almost as likely as those of a White British ethnicity to identify with Britain. Such research highlights first that ethnic and religious identities may overlap, and second that religious identity, in addition to ethnic identity, may be related to aspects of social cohesion. Including religious identity in the analysis of the role of national identity for social cohesion is thus essential, since the relationship may be different for different religious groups. This will be particularly important in the quantitative component of this study (see Chapter 4) since the analysis will cover all religious groups. Religion may, perhaps, play less of a role in the qualitative component since the ethnic groups under investigation are those of Black African and Black Caribbean heritage. Religion may be more important for Muslims and South Asians than for these groups (Modood and Ahmad 2007).

2.4 Existing research

2.4.1: Ethnic diversity and social cohesion

Before focusing directly on existing research on national identity and social cohesion, it is informative to discuss the large literature that exists on the relationships between ethnic diversity and aspects of social cohesion. This related research will help provide a background for a discussion of the research on national identity and social cohesion, since part of the argument for the importance of national identity is that it is needed to overcome potentially divisive identities, such as those based on ethnicity.

There is a body of evidence, much of it from the US, that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, social capital, and support for redistributive policies. For example, Putnam (2007) provides evidence that, in the US, ethnic diversity is associated with a reduction in generalised trust, towards those both outside and within one's own ethnic group. Alesina & Ferrara (2002) find, again using data from the US, that living in a heterogeneous area and being a member of a historically subjugated group both decrease trust at the individual level.

There is, in addition, some cross-national evidence to support the finding that heterogeneity decreases trust outside the US: for example Delhey & Newton (2005) find the same pattern across 55 countries, although it is most marked amongst the Nordic nations. Alesina & Glaeser (2004, 218) conclude that the "importance of ethnic fractionalization cannot be over-emphasized" in their explanation of the more generous social spending found in Europe in comparison with the US, suggesting that support for redistribution, too, is related to ethnic homogeneity. Noting the lower levels of ethnic diversity in Europe, the overall picture from much of this US-based research predicts a decline in trust, social capital, and support for social spending as Europe becomes more diverse. This creates a pessimistic picture for policymakers in Europe, suggesting that the adoption of progressive social policies will become increasingly difficult and social problems, such as a lack of trust, will increase alongside an increase in ethnic diversity.

There is, however, also a significant body of contradictory evidence. Banting (2005) fails to find cross-national evidence of systematically lower social spending in countries with large foreign-born populations. Moreover, Canada exhibits quite different patterns as compared with the US: "immigration, multiculturalism policies and redistribution can represent a stable political

equilibrium” (*ibid.*, 98). Letki (2008), in a study of ethnic diversity in British neighbourhoods, finds low socio-economic status to be more important than heterogeneity for explaining social capital. Hooghe *et al.* (2009, 218) find that “the full-blown negative relationship between ethnic diversity and generalised trust does not hold across Europe”. Gesthuizen *et al.* (2009) find that economic inequality and a national history of continuous democracy are more important for explaining cross-national differences in social capital in Europe. Evans (2006, 152) studies British evidence for the argument that there is a “trade-off between the extension of multiculturalist policies and public commitment to a universalistic welfare state”, but finds little or no evidence for such predictions. In sum, the pessimistic predictions made based on mostly US-focused research do not seem to consistently hold in Europe; there may be “no necessary tension between diversity and solidarity” (Burchardt & Craig 2008, 11).

What explains these contradictory findings? It seems clear that a systematic negative relationship between ethnic diversity and aspects of social cohesion does not hold. As Pilkington (2008, 4.8) puts it: “[the] claim that there may be a tension between diversity and solidarity is incontrovertible. [The] further claim, however, that these principles are in fact in conflict is more debatable”. But what mediates the potential tensions between diversity and solidarity?

One suggestion put forward by many authors, including Miller (1995), Tamir (1993), Canovan (1996), Goodhart (2007), Putnam (2007) and Hirschman (2005), and one that features prominently in the social cohesion public discourse, is national identity. However, more research is needed to establish whether, across a range of different cases, there are relationships between national identity and solidarity, since “[this] can help identify the potential room for creating new approaches that generate solidarity while accommodating diversity” (Kymlicka 2008, 73). Wetherell (2007, 13) argues that “we need more empirical work on who is grabbed by these new identity possibilities, in what contexts, and with what effects”. Stone & Muir (2007, 26) argue that “Britain’s ongoing national identity crisis looks set to continue and the implications for community cohesion remain unclear”.

2.42: National identity and social cohesion

There are two questions of particular importance for an analysis of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. First, what is already known about British identification for minority ethnic groups? Second, what direct evidence is there that national identity influences social cohesion? These questions will be discussed in turn.

British and minority ethnic identification

Heath & Roberts (2008) find that the majority of British residents have dual identities, including ethnic minority residents. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Hall (2000) and Modood *et al.* (1994) that young Black men and women ‘speak’ from several identities simultaneously. In addition, Heath & Rethon (2010) fail to find evidence of an inverse correlation between attachment to one’s community and wider society, and find that in fact most members of minority groups do identify strongly both with their group and with Britain. The common presence of dual identities among ethnic minority groups suggests that if ethnic identities accompanied by a lack of British identity are problematic for social cohesion, this phenomenon is not likely to be systematic or widespread amongst minority groups, but may be more isolated.

Generation may also be important for the national identities of minority groups, since “[a]cross groups we can observe a generational shift towards more majority-orientated identities” (Platt 2013, 26). When referring to minority ethnic groups, however, ‘generation’ can mean at least two different things: it can refer to whether or not someone is a first, second or third generation immigrant; or it can refer more broadly to the generation of a family a person belongs to. The two meanings overlap to a certain extent when one is discussing, for instance, a family that has three generations currently living in the UK, whereby the grandparents are foreign-born but came to settle in the UK, and their children and grandchildren are UK-born. For recent immigrants – those having no UK-born children – the term mainly has relevance with regard to the generation of their family they belong to. Generational differences – in the sense of whether a member of a family belongs to an older or younger generation – may be important to this study in terms of looking at how identities change over time. However, it is the sense of the term that refers to generation of immigrant – that is whether a person is foreign-born themselves, or the child or grandchild of someone foreign-born – that may be the most important distinction for the meanings attached

to ethnic and national identities. The main focus of generational issues in this study, therefore, refers to generation as understood as 'generation of immigrant'.

There is some evidence of factors that may influence a feeling of belonging to Britain. Maxwell (2006) finds perceived discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups to make them less likely to identify with Britain. This finding is consistent with that of Modood *et al.* (1994), who find that some members of ethnic minority groups feel they are not accepted as British. In addition, the distinction already discussed between civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity is important here, since a civic conception may be considerably more open to members of ethnic minority groups than an ethnic conception. The predominant conception amongst members of the British public, however, includes an ethnic component (Heath & Roberts 2008).

Identity and 'social cohesion'

As already shown, there are several theoretical arguments about the importance of national identity for solidarity and the legitimacy of the state. Such arguments support the contention that increasing British identity may be beneficial for solidarity and social cohesion. But what empirical evidence is there to support such a contention in the British context?

There is limited evidence in the British context, but a study that does analyse some of these links is authored by Heath & Roberts (2008, 2), who find belonging and attachment to Britain to be associated with "social trust, civic duty ... and by increased support for the political order". However, Heath & Roberts (2008) do not analyse whether the links between British identity and outcomes such as trust and support for the political order differ depending on the ethnic or religious identity of the respondent, or whether neighbourhood-level characteristics such as socio-economic deprivation and ethnic diversity are important for social cohesion. Also, there has been no research on whether perceived discrimination which, as discussed above, has been shown to be important for British identification (Maxwell 2006), influences the relationships between British identity and social cohesion. Overall, there is relatively little evidence of relationships between national identities and social cohesion, despite the theoretical arguments for the importance of national identity for solidarity and cohesion in the academic literature, and the importance of such relationships to the arguments of the social cohesion public discourse.⁴

⁴ Qualitative evidence on identity and social cohesion highlights the importance of perceived fairness in resource allocation for reducing racial tensions (Dench *et al.* 2006; Hudson *et al.* 2007). In addition, Hickman *et al.* (2008) ask respondents about their understandings of the meanings of social cohesion,

Despite the lack of evidence in a British context there is, however, some evidence elsewhere. Putnam (2007) argues that one is more likely to trust another person if there is a shared element of identity such that the other person is not perceived as 'socially distant'. There is evidence from the social psychology literature that when group identification is made along ethnic lines, "ethnic identity is related to out-group prejudice" (Smith *et al.* 2003), and that super-ordinate identities such as national identity may be beneficial to intergroup relations by creating a 'thin' identity transcending previously differentiated groups, and thus creating a new sense of 'we' (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).⁵

These findings point to several areas in need of further research. The perception that strengthening British identity may lead to increased social cohesion appears to be oversimplistic, since many members of ethnic minority groups already identify strongly with Britain. Given this, which factors influence this relationship? Are discrimination and socio-economic deprivation and inequality important for this relationship? Is the predominant conception of Britain – one that includes an ethnic component – problematic for social cohesion, or would encouraging a civic conception make no difference? Would the 'thinning' of British identity to be as inclusive as possible to ethnic minority groups influence its potential for increasing social cohesion or, as Kymlicka (2008, 72) argues, are 'thinner' "national identities still capable of sustaining ... solidarity"? In addition, little is known about the perceptions of minority groups of the way in which national identification is developed, and how this may relate to "racial community conflict" (Percival 2007, 164).

and about their understandings of belonging to Britain, and identify two narratives with regard to how recent immigrants are perceived when moving to a local area. 'From here' is a narrative in which the local area is seen as being comprised of settled residents who are 'like us'. Where this narrative is dominant, new immigrants are seen negatively, and are seen to be responsible for restoring the 'social cohesion' they have disturbed. By contrast, 'from here and elsewhere' is a narrative whereby the diversity of the area and history of immigration are acknowledged, and responsibility for maintaining 'social cohesion' is seen as shared between existing residents and new immigrants. These studies do not, however, ask respondents about the relationships they see between identity and social cohesion.

⁵ In addition, Crisp & Hewstone (1999) find evidence that identities based on one main cleavage, such as ethnicity, may lead to intergroup conflict. Miguel (2004) argues that the success of Tanzania relative to Kenya in bridging social divisions and producing effective local public services is due to nation-building policies in Tanzania.

2.5 Research questions and theoretical framework

There is a tension in the academic literature between arguments suggesting that national identity can be beneficial for aspects of social cohesion (Miller 1995; Goodhart 2007; Putnam 2007), or that it may “lead ultimately to social inclusion or exclusion” (McCrone and Bechhofer 2008, 1245); and arguments suggesting that national identity may have a more complex relationship with social cohesion, and one that differs depending on various other factors such as ethnic identity, religious identity, and socio-economic variables (Maxwell 2006; Hickman, Crowley *et al.* 2008). Although there are theoretical arguments for the importance of national identity for solidarity and cohesion, and large literatures both on ethnic and religious identities and on relationships between diversity and aspects of social cohesion, there is limited empirical evidence directly focusing on a relationship between national identity and social cohesion in the British context, and no research that investigates the relationship systematically.

Main Research Question: What is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain?

There is a sense in which the main research question of this study occupies a middle ground between, on the one hand, the academic literature and, on the other, the public and policy discourse. In the academic literature there are arguments for national identity being broadly important for social solidarity, and also arguments that national identities can be important for aspects of social cohesion, such as trust and support for redistribution. Perhaps since the concept of social cohesion itself is vague and contested, there have been no attempts to explore systematically the influence national identity may have on it. Yet in public and policy discourse the term is used, as highlighted previously, as if it were relatively unproblematic and as if there were a consensus both over its meaning and also over the effect that national identity is argued to have upon it.

The relationship of this study to the academic literature is thus complicated, but the connections can be seen in two ways. First, the investigation of the role of national identity for social cohesion can be seen as a search for empirical evidence for a specific aspect of the broader arguments for national identity being important for solidarity at the national level (e.g. Miller 1995), and for national identity being important for specific indicators of social cohesion, such as trust and social capital (e.g. Putnam 2007). Second, this study can be seen as the filling of an academic research gap for a question posed partly by public and policy

discourse. The public and policy discourse makes claims for which, at present, there is little or no academic evidence. There is academic research, however, into related issues, such as the nature of ethnic identities and their relationship with national identities, and on other issues which may influence aspects of social cohesion, and the insights from this literature are used to provide a theoretical framework for the present study.

Based on the key themes identified in the literature, Figure 1 represents a summary of the issues that may, potentially, affect the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. These relationships may be very complex, and it is accepted that Figure 1 is likely to be an oversimplification. However, since it is based on the key themes currently in the literature, it should provide a reasonable conceptual tool. The objective of the theoretical framework is to specify precisely how the main research question of this study will be investigated. In what follows, each relationship in Figure 1 is briefly described.


First, however, it is necessary to discuss what is clearly an important issue with regard to the fact that social cohesion is an area-level concept, and the other concepts in Figure 1 can be treated as individual-level. There is a conceptual difficulty with the research question itself, since national identity is something belonging to individuals (clearly 'nation' is an area-level concept but it is individuals that identify with the nation), whereas social cohesion is the property of an area. Arguments for the importance of national identities for social cohesion are similarly about *individuals* identifying more strongly with the nation, but about this implying that an *area* might become more socially cohesive.

An approach to investigating the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, therefore, could either try to investigate both concepts, in some sense, at the area level, or investigate both concepts at the individual level. Investigating both at the area level might involve taking aggregate measures of national identity, and seeing if there was a relationship between the aggregate national identity and social cohesion of different areas. Investigating both at the individual level could involve looking at individuals' national identity, and for individual-level indicators of an area's social cohesiveness.

It was decided to investigate the relationship between both concepts at the individual level, because treating national identity in terms of an aggregate would not allow for the complexities and nuances that may shape people's national identities to be revealed – something that may be very important in fully answering the research question, and which is a particular focus of the qualitative component. Investigating 'social cohesion' at the individual level, therefore, implies a particular understanding of the concept. Under investigation are

both indicators of individuals' *perceptions* of area-level cohesion, and indicators of the likelihood an individual might *contribute* to social cohesion. The latter type of indicator would suggest that if many people adopted a particular trait then an area could be considered to be socially cohesive. If one is, for instance, interested to know whether an area might be considered as socially cohesive in the sense of having a high level of civic engagement, then one might look for a large number of individuals engaging civically as an individual-level indicator of social cohesion in this sense. It is important, however, to flag this conceptual difficulty with the way in which I am treating social cohesion.

Figure 1: Theoretical framework



R1. The relationship between national identity and social cohesion

This is the key relationship under investigation. The literature predominantly focuses on the way in which national identity may influence social solidarity and cohesion (e.g. Canovan 1996); therefore the direction of this relationship points from national identity towards social cohesion. Possibilities that the relationship may be two-way are explored in the qualitative component, however. The concept of national identity can be broken down into various types, including ethnic or civic (Heath and Roberts 2008), British or non-British, and also of different strengths. National identity itself may be directly affected by various factors (R2), which in turn may indirectly affect social cohesion. Social cohesion itself may be directly affected by factors other than national identity (R3). In addition, there may be factors that affect the relationship between national identity and social cohesion itself (R4, R5 and R6). These factors affecting the relationship itself are operationalised as interaction effects (for example between national identity and ethnic identity) in the quantitative component of this study.

R2. Which issues directly affect national identity?

This relationship describes factors that directly affect national identity and which may, in turn, indirectly affect social cohesion. The literature identifies several salient factors that may affect national identity: perceived discrimination, which may reduce the likelihood that a member of an ethnic minority group identifies with Britain (Maxwell 2006); acceptance of identity claims by others, such that members of minority groups may attempt to identify with Britain but never be fully accepted by the majority (Modood *et al.* 1994; Hall 2000); ethnic identity, in that there may be a difficulty in simultaneously identifying with one's ethnic heritage and the national identity of the host country (Alba and Nee 2003); and socio-economic attainment, which may affect the likelihood of strong national identification (*ibid.*).

R3. Issues affecting social cohesion directly

There may be factors other than national identity that affect social cohesion directly. Hickman *et al.* (2008) identify both structural and relational issues that may affect social cohesion. Structural issues include individual-level factors - quality of housing, level of poverty, and employment status (*ibid.*); and also area-level factors - ethnic diversity, and area-level deprivation (Putnam 2007; Letki 2008; Dench *et al.* 2006).

In terms of relational issues that may affect social cohesion, Hickman *et al.* (2008) identify two key narratives that may directly influence social cohesion, particularly with regard to how new immigrants to an area may be perceived: 'from here' and 'from elsewhere'. 'From here' is a

narrative in which the local area is seen as being comprised of settled residents who are 'like us'. Where this narrative is dominant, new immigrants are seen negatively, and are seen to be responsible for restoring the social cohesion they have disturbed. By contrast, 'from here and elsewhere' is a narrative whereby the diversity of the area and history of immigration are acknowledged, and responsibility for maintaining social cohesion is seen as shared between existing residents and new immigrants.

R4. The way in which ethnic identity affects the relationship between national identity and social cohesion

The literature emphasises the importance of ethnic identity in the understanding of national identity (Maxwell 2006; Castles and Miller 2009) and aspects of social cohesion (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Putnam 2007). The academic literature suggests that the relationship between ethnic identity and national identity may be varied, with some people having both a strong ethnic and national identity, but others not. It is therefore important to include it as an interaction effect in the quantitative component since the relationship between national identity and social cohesion may be different for people with different ethnic identities. For example, there is evidence that suggests people identifying with a Black Caribbean ethnicity may be, in some cases, considerably less likely to identify themselves as British (Heath and Roberts 2008); whilst people identifying with a South Asian identity may be almost as likely as those of a White British origin to identify themselves as British (Maxwell 2006). In addition, the generation an immigrant belongs to may also be important (Modood *et al.* 1994). The relationship between national identity and social cohesion may therefore be different for people of a different immigrant generation, so this factor is included in R4a, and operationalised in the quantitative component as an interaction effect.

R5. The way in which religious identity affects the relationship between national identity and social cohesion

In addition to ethnic identity, religious identity may affect the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. Modood & Ahmad (2007, 187) argue that "South Asians, especially Muslims, give religion rather than national origins a greater saliency in self-concepts". There may also be relationships between religious identity and employment and earnings (Lindley 2002), and religious differences in national identification: Maxwell (2006) finds Muslims to be almost as likely as those of a White British ethnicity to identify with Britain. Such research highlights that religious identity, in addition to ethnic identity, may influence the relationship between national identity and social cohesion.

Religious and ethnic identity may also overlap, so this relationship is represented by R5a. Lindley (2002, 427) finds that religious identities reveal important differences in earnings and employment within conventional ethnic categories: for example, “notable differences exist between Indian Sikhs and Hindus”.

R6. Other issues affecting the relationship between national identity and social cohesion

There is evidence to suggest that feelings of belonging to Britain are strongly influenced by age (Heath and Roberts 2008), and also level of education (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010) and employment status (Maxwell 2006). There is also evidence to suggest that access to education and paid employment for some ethnic minority groups differ markedly depending on gender (Dale 2002). There is also evidence that social cohesion is influenced by education and employment (Hickman, Crowley *et al.* 2008), and that indicators of social cohesion such as trust and political participation are associated with age. Since both national identity and social cohesion may be associated with education, employment, and age, it is therefore plausible that these characteristics could influence the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. Heath & Roberts (2008) find that age and socio-economic status do in fact explain a portion of the association they find between strength of belonging to Britain and trust and political participation. The characteristics that form R6, therefore, are: age, gender, employment status, and education level.

2.6 Conclusions

The academic literature features arguments that national identities can be beneficial for national solidarity and cohesion (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Canovan 1996), and for local-level aspects of social cohesion such as trust and social capital, whereby national identity is seen as important for mitigating problems perceived to stem from ethnic diversity or tensions (Hirschman 2005; Putnam 2007). There is, however, little evidence to support such arguments in the British context, and contradictory evidence internationally. These issues are highly relevant to public and policy discourses, where an association has been made between strong British identities and social cohesion without a corresponding body of academic evidence. It is also not clear that the concept of social cohesion itself is appropriate for dealing with these issues.

This research therefore critically investigates, in the British context, the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, and with a particular focus on the implications of ethnic differences for this relationship. There are large literatures exploring the nature of national identities, of ethnic and religious identities, and also other factors that may directly influence aspects of social cohesion. It is possible to draw upon these literatures to construct a theoretical framework of the potential issues that may influence the role of national identity for social cohesion; these relationships are shown in Figure 1 above.

These issues are of great importance for policymakers. The emphasis in policy discourse on the importance of social cohesion has not been accompanied by research showing a clear understanding of what is meant by the concept, or whether this is the best way to resolve ethnic tensions. In addition, the implication that increasing British identity amongst members of minority ethnic groups will be beneficial for social cohesion contradicts research suggesting that members of such groups already identify strongly with Britain (e.g. Heath and Roberts 2008); that discrimination greatly reduces the likelihood of British identification for minority groups (e.g. Maxwell 2006); and that members of minority groups are able to make sense of their hybrid ethnic and British identities (Modood *et al.* 1994; Hall 2000). Greater understanding of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain, and the salience of any factors influencing the relationship, such as ethnic identities, would greatly enhance the ability of politicians to make appropriate policy decisions.

Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY

Although it remains a contested distinction, many researchers differentiate between quantitative and qualitative research methods. One difference relates to epistemology, whereby quantitative methods are often linked with positivist principles and qualitative methods are often linked with interpretivist principles (Bryman 2008). Another relates to ontology, whereby quantitative methods are linked to a view of the world in which researchers can go out and investigate an independent and 'objective' reality; whereas qualitative methods are linked to a view of the world as socially constructed, and to which the researcher cannot be independent (*ibid.*). Viewing national identity and social cohesion, and the relationship between them, as existing in an 'objective' reality to which the researcher is independent would therefore be more consistent with a quantitative approach to answering the research question; whereas viewing the concepts and the relationship between them as entirely socially constructed, as dependent on the interpretations of different social actors, and as objects of study to which the researcher can never be independent, would therefore be more consistent with a qualitative approach to answering the research question.

The choice of research strategy in this study was influenced both by the nature of the research question and by the extent to which there already exists a body of theory and evidence with regard to the question. Quantitative research is often linked with the *testing* of theories, in contrast to qualitative research being linked with the *generation* of theories (Bryman 2012), so clearly the extent to which there is a well-defined theoretical model to test is a crucial consideration. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are clear arguments suggesting that national identity may be beneficial for social cohesion; Forrest & Kearns (2001) provide a detailed theoretical definition of social cohesion; and there are substantial literatures on other concepts that might influence the relationship. Given that the research question is about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain, it may therefore be informative to use the theory that does exist to investigate the question in Britain as a whole, which suggests using a nationally-representative dataset – that is using quantitative methods – may be a good strategy.

On the other hand, the concepts of national identity and social cohesion are contested and problematic. Pahl (1991, 359) warns of the dangers for those that "refer to social cohesion unproblematically". National identity in Britain may have extremely complex interactions with generation, ethnicity and religion: "groups are moving at different rates; and the patterns for religious identity, British identity and minority ethnic identity do not all assume consistent

trajectories” (Platt 2013, 26). The concept of ethnic identity is also problematic in terms of the way it is operationalised in survey research, particularly given the way in which a predefined list is presented to respondents “with relatively crude fixed categories” (Burton *et al.* 2010, 1332). Indeed, several of the interviewees in this study did in fact refer to their selections for ethnic identity in survey categories as being determined by their perceptions of what ‘society’ viewed them to be, rather than their own perceptions of their identities. It may, therefore, be important to follow a research strategy that gives opportunities for theory *generation*, and is able to understand the social constructions of national and ethnic identity and social cohesion and the ways in which the concepts are interpreted differently by different social actors – that is to follow a qualitative strategy.

In sum, then, given the desire to answer the research question by focusing on Britain as a whole – that is by understanding broad patterns of association between concepts at the national level – it was felt that a quantitative component to the study was appropriate. However, given the contested nature of the concept of social cohesion, and the complexities inherent in the concepts of national identity and ethnic identity, it was felt that including a qualitative component in the study was also appropriate. For these reasons, a mixed methods approach to answering the research question is followed, in which nationally representative patterns in relationships between national identity and social cohesion can be investigated in the quantitative component, and different understandings of each of the key concepts and their relation to ethnicity can be investigated in the qualitative component. In addition, because of the contested nature of the concept of social cohesion in particular, Chapter 6 delves into some theoretical considerations about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in more detail and, in the light of the empirical findings of Chapters 4 and 5, presents a synthesis of theory together with insights from both the quantitative and qualitative components.

Based on the distinctions made by Bryman (2012) between different rationales for conducting mixed methods research, the two approaches that were drawn upon in particular were those of *completeness* and of *explanation*. According to Bryman (2012, 637): “Completeness indicates that a more complete answer to a research question or set of research questions can be achieved by including both quantitative and qualitative methods”. As already mentioned, given the research question is about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain, clearly some data that can be taken to be representative of Britain as a whole would be advantageous (or, in the case of the Citizenship Survey, England and Wales, which contain a large proportion of the population of Britain), so quantitative analysis of a

national dataset is informative. However, the contested nature of social cohesion in particular, and the relevance of ethnicity to the research combined with the challenges involved with constructing or using ethnic categories in survey research (Burton *et al.* 2010), mean that something more nuanced might be said about the research question by using a more open-ended method. In addition, finding a dataset with satisfactory questions on respondents' identity was difficult. In the case of the Citizenship Survey, it was not possible to 'get at' several aspects of national identification deemed important by other studies and significant bodies of literature, not least the idea of 'non-acceptance' of the national identities of members of minority groups by the majority, and its potential impact on the national identifications of members of minority groups (Hall 2000). In addition, with regard to the contested concept of social cohesion, the quantitative component follows the definition provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001), but the qualitative component is able to explore the concept more freely by allowing respondents to describe things in their own terms. In sum, qualitative data alone would be insufficient to capture broad nationally representative patterns regarding the relationship between national identity and social cohesion (and possible important ethnic differences), and quantitative data alone would be insufficient to capture fully the complex nature of the concepts of national identity, social cohesion and ethnic identity, so a more complete understanding of the research question can potentially be achieved by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. In this way, it is possible that "complex objects of social scientific analysis like this require a variety of research tools to arrive at a comprehensive understanding" (Bryman 2012, 637).

The other key rationale for using mixed methods in this study relates to what Bryman refers to as *explanation*: "One of the problems that frequently confronts quantitative researchers is how to explain relationships between variables" (2012, 641). The quantitative component can look for broad patterns of association between variables, and one knows that they are nationally representative, but not why these associations might have been found. Adding a qualitative component allows for different understandings of the ways in which associated variables might be related to be expanded upon in detail, and potential mechanisms explaining the relationships can be uncovered. As will be seen later, there are clear instances of the quantitative and qualitative component in fact combining in this way. For example, the quantitative component found that whether or not a respondent was born in the UK crucially affected associations between British identity and social cohesion. A potential explanation for this finding was given by the qualitative component, in terms of the very different accounts of what British identity meant to first- and later-generation immigrants, and in terms of how these different meanings might affect the relationship to social cohesion. There are also key

differences in the findings of the quantitative component depending on whether the national identity under investigation was English or British identity, and these findings were explained by the ‘fleshing out’ of the concepts in the qualitative component through an exploration of the different meanings English and British identity had to respondents.

In addition, uncovering descriptions of possible mechanisms underlying the associations between variables found in the quantitative component can perhaps give suggestions as to the causality at work. Causality is notoriously difficult to establish, but Pawson & Tilley (1997) identify two perspectives that can be contrasted in terms of strategies to attempt to identify it. A ‘successionist’ theory of causation broadly follows a Humean approach to causality, whereby causality is inferred when two events are seen to be ‘constantly conjoined’; if one can isolate all possible confounding factors then it is possible to conclude that one event is (probably) causing the other. This approach informs quantitative strategies for establishing causation, and in particular experimental designs, in which an experimental group and a control group differ only in their exposure “to the information, experience or event whose impact is to be tested” (Hakim 1987, 101). The disadvantage to this strategy, however, is that it does not say much about *why* the causal relationship might have been found. Pawson & Tilley (1997) contrast this approach with a ‘generative’ theory of causation, in which the strategy is to search for the underlying mechanism and to understand the contexts in which it may or may not have effects. The qualitative component can, perhaps, shed some light on potential mechanisms – the aim is not to establish causality conclusively, but simply to uncover some potential mechanisms that might explain the associations found in the quantitative component and to guide future research.

In the following two sections, an overview of the methodology used in both the quantitative and qualitative components to this study is outlined, although further details about more specific aspects of the methodologies are given in Chapters 4 and 5. The quantitative component consists of secondary analysis of the Citizenship Survey to investigate the relationship between national identity and social cohesion; whilst the qualitative component explores narratives of national and ethnic identity and social cohesion as expressed by interviewees in an ethnically diverse ward. Both components are guided by the theoretical framework outlined in Figure 1.

3.1 Quantitative component

The quantitative component investigates the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, with a particular focus on ethnic differences, by first using Principal Components Analysis to create measures of the multifaceted concept of social cohesion, and second by constructing regression models based on the theoretical framework in Figure 1. The concept of social cohesion was operationalised according to the five dimensions as defined by Forrest & Kearns (2001), although alternative meanings are explored in the qualitative component; variables were selected from the Citizenship Survey that could potentially represent each dimension of social cohesion (see Table 3 below), and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used as a data reduction technique to break the large number of variables down into a smaller number of components. Composite variables were created from each of the components, representing measures of each of the 'elements' of social cohesion.

Regression models were then created based on the theoretical framework shown in Figure 1. Each of the composite variables from the PCA was used as a dependent variable in a separate regression model. The relationship R1 (see Figure 1), therefore, represents the main relationship under investigation, but variables representing R3 to R6 were also included in the regression models in order to ascertain whether these relationships also have an influence on the relationship R1. It is accepted that the regression models do not incorporate relationship R2 – which refers to things that may affect national identity directly – since national identity itself is taken as a given. Separate regression analysis could explore factors that affect national identity (R2), but this is not the focus of the quantitative component; instead issues directly influencing national identity are investigated by the qualitative component, since the methods are better placed to uncover the detail and nuance of respondents' feelings about their national identities, and is an important reason for using mixed methods. It is also accepted that the regression models will not be able to establish whether the relationships are *causal*, since they only show associations. However, the qualitative component seeks to uncover potential mechanisms that could give clues about causality.

In choosing the methods for the quantitative component, consideration was given to the potential advantages of using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Given the complexity of the relationships illustrated in Figure 1, including the possibility of two-way relationships and many interactions between variables, the way in which SEM allows for the testing of interactions between variables may have been useful, as would the ability to treat certain variables as dependent and independent simultaneously. However, given that SEM is a

confirmatory method, and given the contested nature of the ambiguous and multifaceted concept of social cohesion, it was felt that there was not a sufficiently well-defined theoretical model to employ SEM to test the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, since “it is crucial for researchers using SEM to test models that have strong theoretical or empirical foundations” (Bowen & Guo 2012, 7). Instead, an exploratory method was needed to measure social cohesion, and so PCA was used (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the choice of PCA over exploratory factor analysis). Also, cross sectional rather than longitudinal data was used because the research question does not refer to changes in social cohesion or national identity over time, although an analysis of the relationships over time would certainly make an interesting topic of future research.

Choice of dataset

The Home Office’s Citizenship Survey was chosen as the most appropriate dataset to use for this study. In choosing an appropriate dataset, two key criteria were considered: first, richness of questions on identity, due to an absence of such questions in many datasets; and second, given the potential for ethnic identity to play an important role in the relationship under investigation, the presence of a sample suitable for investigating ethnic differences, such as an ethnic minority boost sample, which would increase the likelihood of finding statistically significant results and reduce the size of the standard errors.

The following table shows a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of several UK surveys that were considered based on the two key criteria for this research; a more detailed analysis and references are shown in the Appendix, Part A.

Table 2: Summary of potentially useful datasets		
	Sampling	Questions on identity
BHPS	No boost sample	Limited
Labour Force Survey	No boost, but larger sample of 60,000 used	Limited
BSA	No boost sample	Good
Citizenship Survey	Ethnic minority boost sample	Good

The table shows the Citizenship Survey to be the most appropriate for the purposes of this research, since it has several advantages over other UK-based surveys. It is relatively rich in questions on identity, and provides both attitudinal and behavioural measures of social cohesion on several dimensions. Just as importantly, however, it includes an ethnic minority boost sample (Agur *et al.* 2010). The boost sample features an over-representation of minority ethnic respondents, which potentially makes it possible to reveal statistically significant differences between ethnic groups in the relationships between national identity and social cohesion that would not be revealed without the boost sample. This will be particularly important for establishing whether R4 and R4a (see Figure 1) are important for the central research question.

The fact that the Citizenship Survey provides data on individuals, whereas the concept of social cohesion is an area-level concept, is an important issue. The Citizenship Survey can provide individual-level indicators of social cohesion. However, as shown in Table 3 below, there are aspects of the concept of social cohesion on which it will not, in principle, be possible to create an analysis at the individual level. Table 3 shows the aspects that can or cannot in principle be properties of an individual. For example, it is not possible that an individual exhibits 'common aims and objectives' since this property is a property of a group. By contrast, an individual can exhibit 'support for political institutions and participation in politics'. This will mean that only part of each dimension of social cohesion can be analysed using the Citizenship Survey and is, unfortunately, a limitation of this study.

Table 4 below shows the structure of the initial regression models used, including control variables corresponding to the concepts identified in Figure 1. Figure 1 identifies a number of issues that could potentially interact with each other in their relationship with social cohesion, so these were operationalised as interaction effects in the regression models. However, as will become clear in Chapter 4, not all the interaction effects were used in the final models due to the fact that some of them consistently did not produce statistically significant results, and so were dropped from the model to aid parsimony.

Initially, analysis was conducted using the 2008-9 Citizenship Survey – the most recent dataset available when the analysis took place. However, after the initial analysis was finished it was felt that in order to check the robustness of the results, and also to have the benefit of a larger sample size, the 2007-8 survey could be combined with the 2008-9 survey. Encouragingly, the results using the combined sample were very similar to the initial results.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the way in which ethnicity is categorised in survey questions is problematic (Burton *et al.* 2010). There have been extensive debates about the nature of a question asking respondents' ethnic group that was originally included in the 1991 census. It is important to be aware of the difference between the way the categorisation is set out in survey questions, as compared with the way in which respondents may wish to express their own ethnicity. Commentators have emphasised the way in which the construction of ethnic categories is likely to be politicised, and there are important power differences between those deciding upon the categories and the respondents choosing the category in a survey question. It is, therefore, important to be aware that the way in which the quantitative component of this study 'captures' ethnic difference is likely not to correspond neatly to the way in which individuals may personally express their ethnicity. Whilst this is certainly a limitation of the quantitative component, investigating ethnic differences may, nevertheless, reveal something important about group differences relating to immigration history, place of origin, and perhaps the nature of disadvantage or discrimination faced by different groups: "there are still many who would maintain that the existence of inequalities across subgroups of the population is worthy of attention, even if those concerned do not directly identify with the categories to which they are being allocated" (Platt 2011, 18).

As will be seen below the distinction between survey categorisation and self-identification is also, to an extent, an issue with the qualitative component, in that the qualitative component specifically targets those who categorise themselves as 'Black African' or 'Black Caribbean' when asked to identify their ethnicity from a list of ethnic groups taken from the Citizenship Survey. However, since the qualitative component allows respondents to freely express their ethnicity as part of the interview, it is also possible to gain further insights into respondents' genuine self-identification, and this is one of the reasons for using mixed methods in this study.

Table 3: Social cohesion variables available in Citizenship Survey

The dimensions of 'social cohesion': what variables are available in the Citizenship Survey (CS)?			
Domain	Description	Individual level?*	What variables available in CS?
Common values and a civic culture	Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour; support for political institutions and participation in politics	No No Yes	PAffLoc, PAffGB (p20, agree you can influence decisions affecting local area, Britain?); PActUK, Prally (p18, have you contacted councillor etc in last 12 months, attended rally); PTParl,PTCncl (p23, do you trust parliament/local council); Civact1,2,often (p34, in last 12 months have you been local councillor, sch. governor, member of group making decisions on local health etc)
Social order and social control	Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for difference; intergroup co-operation	No No No Yes Yes No	ReWork, RePub, ReShop, ReHeal (p54, are you treated with respect at work/on public transport etc); Reldis (p40, have any of these organisations ever discriminated against you because of your religion); RIntr1 (p35, is there more/less racial prejudice than 5 years ago, who against?); SRespect (p12, do people in local area respect ethnic differences?); SRace (p8, what proportion of your friends are of same ethnic group?);
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities	Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others	No No Yes Yes	RDis01 ... RDis16 (p37-39, would local services/work treat you worse/better/the same as other races/religions?); VALS8 (p52, should individuals take responsibility for helping others?);

Social networks and social capital	High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action problems	Yes Yes No	SFriends (p8, do you have close friends); Freth (p8, which ethnic groups friends from); SInc, SRace (p7-8, how many friends from same ethnic group/similar incomes?); MxOftr1 ... MxOftr7 (p46-48, in last year have you mixed socially with different ethnic/religious group at home, work, club, shops etc); MxLoc (p49, do you think people from different ethnic/religious groups mix enough, should more/less in local area); Fgroup ... Findgp (p24-26, have you volunteered in any of the following in last 12 months); MxFVol (p26, have you mixed with people from other ethnic/religious groups when giving unpaid help); Trust (p23, how much do you trust police, parliament, council, generalised trust); PActUK, Prally (p18-19, have you contacted councillor etc, attended rally, signed petition, public meeting);
Place attachment and identity**	Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity	Yes Yes	SIntro2 etc (p9, how strongly do you feel you belong to neighbourhood, local area, Britain); FeConf (p57, ever feel there is a conflict between national identity and religion?); FeBrit (p7, to what extent do you personally feel part of British society); SProud (p12, are you overall proud of local area?)

Adapted from Forrest & Kearns (2001, 2129)

Page references in the right-hand column refer to UKDA (2007)

* The 'individual level' column indicates whether or not, in principle, this concept could be assessed at the individual level. It asks: can this trait be a property of an individual? For those concepts that can be assessed at the individual level, the available variables in the Citizenship Survey are shown in the column to the right.

** An analysis of the relationships between national identity and place attachment and identity could become somewhat nebulous when some of these variables are used (such as asking the effect of strength of British identity on attachment to Britain). However, other variables are not nebulous and may yield interesting results, such as the effect of British identity on attachment to the neighbourhood, local area, and so on. Care will be taken to avoid the analysis becoming tautological, particularly when studying this dimension.

Table 4: Regression equation and explanatory variables available

Equation to be used in the multiple regression analysis	
SC =	$f\{NI, RI, EI, NI, EI, NI, RI, EI, NI, EI, GNR, NI, EI, Male, NI, Age, NI, Emp, NI, Educ, NI, Male, NI, Pov, Hsg, Emp, Nar, Dvrs\}$
Summary of variables and corresponding questions available in the Citizenship Survey (CS):	
Variable Name & Description	Potential CS questions
SC (social cohesion)	See Table 3
NI (national identity)	NatIdE, NatIdW (what do you consider your national identity to be); FeBrit (personally feel part of British society); SBegB (how strongly belong to Britain); Molmpt (relative strength of parts of identity) ; XnatiDu (whether any British and a non -British national identity)
EI (ethnic identity)	Ethnic (which category best describes your ethnic group); EthnicO (how would you describe your ethnic group); ImpEth (how important is your ethnic/racial background); Molmpt (relative strength of parts of identity)
Accept* (acceptance of identity)	NO QUESTIONS
Socio (socio-econ. Indicators)	Rincome (respondent's income); PIncome (re spondent's partner's income); Rnssec17 (socio-econ. class); Rhhldr (owns/rents accommodation); DimD, WDepD (index of deprivation, deciles)
RI (religious identity)	Relig (what is your religion, even if not practising); Relact (are you practising); RelLiv, RelWrk, RelFri, RelSch (does religion affect aspects of your life)

Male (whether male or female)	Gender may influence the relationship between nat. id. and social cohesion directly, or also as an interaction with ethnic identity. This will be included as a binary variable.	Sex (gender of respondent)
Age (age of respondent)	Age may influence the relationship directly. This will be included as a continuous variable representing age in years.	Birth (what is your date of birth); Age1f (what was your age last birthday)
GNR (generation of immigrant)	This may interact with ethnic identity to affect the relationship. This will be included as a binary variable representing either 1 st generation immigrant status or British born. It will be included as an interaction effect with ethnic and religious identity.	HcobaA (in which country were you born); Cameyr (which year did you arrive in this country); BrnMom, BrnDad (which countries were your mother/father born)
Emp (employment status)	Employment may influence the relationship between national identity and social cohesion directly.	RILO3a, RILO4a (employed/unemployed/inactive/family worker); Rnssec17 (socio-econ. class)
Educ (level of education)	Education may influence the relationship between national identity and social cohesion directly.	Zquals, Zquals1, Zquals2 (highest qualification)
Pov (level of poverty)	Poverty may influence social cohesion directly, so need not be included as an interaction effect.	Rincome8, Pincome (respondent's & partner's income); Rnssec17 (respondent's socio-economic class)
Hsg (type of housing)	Housing may influence social cohesion directly, so need not be included as an interaction effect.	Hhhlldr (whether rents or owns accommodation)
Dvrs (diversity of area)	This variable measures the percentage of minority ethnic households in the ward in which the respondent lives (in deciles). This may interact with socio-economic variables to influence social cohesion directly.	Pethdec (percentage of minority ethnic households in ward, deciles)
Nar (narratives of place)	This variable measures whether a respondent exhibits a 'from here' or 'from here and elsewhere' narrative (Hickman et al. 2008). It may not be possible to capture the narratives Hickman et al. identify precisely, but some of the attitudes these authors mention have relevant corresponding questions in the Citizenship Survey. This may influence social cohesion directly.	VALS2 (respect culture/religious beliefs of others even when these oppose own values); VALS3 (ethnic/religious groups should adapt and blend into larger society); VALS4 (ethnic/religious groups should maintain customs/traditions); VALS8 (take responsibility for helping others in community); Duallid (possible to belong to Britain & maintain separate cultural/religious identity?)

All references to variable names from UKDA (2007)

* There are, unfortunately, no variables in the Citizenship Survey that may provide indicators of whether a respondent feels their identity claims are accepted. Despite this issue being prominent in the academic literature, it will not be possible to include it in the regression model. This is a limitation of the quantitative component of the study, but questions on this issue will be asked in the qualitative component.

3.2 Qualitative component

Three key criteria were considered in choosing an area in which to conduct the interviews for the qualitative component. The first criterion was the demographic make-up of the area. Particular minority ethnic groups were targeted for interview – for reasons discussed below – so an area with a high concentration of people from those ethnic groups was an important consideration, in order to facilitate easier access to interviewees. Clearly this criterion narrows down the number of areas that could be targeted for interviewees, but there are a large number of areas in Britain with a high concentration of particular minority ethnic groups. The second criterion was personal familiarity with the local area. This was considered important in particular because it makes the recruitment of interviewees much easier than in an area about which the researcher knows very little. Following on from this, the third criterion was the presence of a number of contacts in the area that could facilitate access to different types of interviewees, both to increase the size of the sample, and to ensure that the sample was as diverse as possible. As explained below, recruiting interviewees through a variety of sources increases the likelihood that the sample will be diverse, and reduces the risk of biases in the selection of participants.

Minority ethnic groups rather than members of the majority group were chosen to target for interview for several reasons. First, as mentioned in the literature review, the ways in which minority groups understand identity and its links in particular with “racial community conflict” are under-researched (Percival 2007, 164). Second, there are likely to be more complex links between ethnic and national identities than for members of the majority group. Third, as already discussed, the focus of the social cohesion discourse has primarily been on the identities of ethnic minority groups rather than the majority group, and so it is hoped that targeting minority groups for interview will make the study more relevant to current public and policy debates. This does not imply, however, that interviewing the majority group would not produce informative and interesting data, but it is beyond the scope of this study. A focus on Black African, Black Caribbean or South Asian ethnic groups was considered most appropriate to the research question since a substantial part of the post-war immigration to the UK was from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia (Craig 2012). As discussed in more detail below, members of these ethnic groups are relatively likely to have been settled in Britain for some time, and also may contain first, second and third generation immigrants, allowing for the possibility to investigate whether these differences have a relationship with differences in feelings of national identity.

Based on these considerations, two local areas were shortlisted. One – in London – has a high proportion of Black Caribbean and Black African residents, and is familiar to the researcher. The researcher also has a number of contacts in this area that can make recruitment easier. The second – in Birmingham – has a high proportion of South Asian residents, particularly of Bangladeshi ethnicity. Again, the presence of contacts in the area was considered an important advantage.

At the Major Review stage of the thesis, the candidate proposed to include both shortlisted local areas in the qualitative component of the research which, in addition to ensuring that Black Caribbean, Black African and South Asian ethnic groups were represented in the study, would have had the advantage of enabling a comparison between the two areas. Unfortunately the Major Review examiners deemed the inclusion of two areas too ambitious, particularly bearing in mind the strict deadlines in place for the submission of the thesis. It was a requirement of passing Major Review that the candidate restricted the qualitative component to one local area only. For this reason, and also the fact that the researcher's familiarity with and contacts within the area in London were significantly better than for the local area in Birmingham, it was decided at the Major Review stage to include the London local area only. If time had allowed, however, including two areas would have been desirable, and could be an important focus of future research into national identity and social cohesion.

The objective of the qualitative component is to identify key narratives about national identity and social cohesion from the perspective of the interviewees, to explore the understandings they have of these concepts, and understand the nature of any links they see between them. The data derived from the interviews are not representative, but the objective of the interviews is to identify as many different narratives as possible.

Since the qualitative component involves what could be considered to be vulnerable groups, research ethics approval was sought and received before fieldwork was undertaken. In addition, full informed consent was sought from participants prior to starting the interview, including permission to use audio recording, and a commitment was given to strict confidentiality and anonymity. Data protection, in the form of security of interview recordings and transcripts, was ensured by either keeping data in a locked cupboard or on a password-protected computer. No record of any identifying information was kept: names were not included in the transcripts, and after transcription each interviewee was given a pseudonym to aid analysis.

Demographics of the local area

Although the local area in question had boundaries that did not fit exactly with an administrative area, a large proportion of the local area studied was in one particular ward. In a relatively central area of London, this ward is very ethnically diverse, with only 37% of the population being categorised as 'White British', in comparison to the London average of approximately 45%, and the average for England of around 80% (ONS 2011). Around 8% of the population is categorised as Asian, which is similar to the average for England, although unusually (compared to the English average) most of Asian origin are categorised as Chinese or 'Other Asian'. Around 30% of the population is ethnically Black, more than twice the London average and nearly 9 times the English average, with around 14% of the population categorised as Black African, 11% Black Caribbean, and 5% 'Other Black'. A further 8% are of mixed ethnicity, and 11% are categorised as 'Other White' (*ibid.*).

In terms of socio-economic characteristics, the ward has a relatively similar proportion of economically active people compared to the average for England, but has a relatively low proportion of retired people (less than 6%, compared to over 13% for England on average), and a slightly higher proportion of unemployed people (6% compared to 4.4% for England). Its population is relatively young, with a median age of 31, compared to 33 for London and 39 for England (*ibid.*).

There is also evidence of active local community and political activity. The ward's society recently campaigned for the renovation of a local park; there are several local arts festivals; and a local farmers' market. In addition, schooling is an important local issue: a recent campaign against the closure of a secondary school failed; whilst another local secondary school is the most over-subscribed state school in the country. It is, however, unclear whether there are ethnic differences in community participation. The area is interesting for its relatively high levels of ethnic diversity, particularly those of Black African and Black Caribbean origin, accompanied by an active local community.

Methods

There were three stages to the methodology: first, snowball sampling was conducted to access appropriate interviewees; second semi-structured interviews were conducted; and third data were collated and analysed using thematic analysis (Robson 2002). A summary of the methods is shown in the table below.

Table 5: Summary of qualitative methods

Sampling method	Snowball
Interview method	Semi-structured
Target number of interviews	20 - 24
Data analysis	Thematic analysis

Sampling design

The construction of the sample for the qualitative component of the study followed a purposive sampling approach, based on three key categories that were considered to be of particular importance: gender, age and employment status. These categories were considered to be particularly important because of findings in the literature that age can be very important for both national identity and social cohesion (Heath and Roberts 2008); and that gender (Dale 2002) and employment status (Hickman, Crowley *et al.* 2008) may also be very important. The way in which respondents expressed narratives about their identities and social cohesion, therefore, may vary depending on these three key categories. Clearly, in an ideal world it would be possible to include many more categories, but due to practical limitations such as time constraints it was felt that three would have to suffice. Individuals of a Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity were targeted for interview, and there was a target of between 20 and 24 interviews, meaning the intention was to have one or two interviewees in each category.

There are many different ethnic groups that would be interesting to target for interview in a way that is relevant to the research question. However, it was felt that the interviews should be restricted in some way because people with different histories and experiences may have markedly different understandings of their national and ethnic identities, which may be influenced by very different experiences of disadvantage and discrimination. For instance, Modood (1994) highlights the way in which some Asian groups rejected the identity of 'Black' to emphasise the distinct discrimination they faced, based more on religion and culture than skin colour. The experiences that different groups may have faced in terms of the non-acceptance of their national identities by the white majority may similarly be quite different and related to the nature of discrimination against them. In addition, because of the policy debate over community cohesion in Britain being focused not only on recent immigrants, "but also longstanding minority ethnic groups" (Platt 2007a, 2), and because of the possibilities for insights to be found looking at generational differences in national and ethnic identification (Hall 2000), it was felt that focusing on interviewees that could potentially be from a settled

community (potentially including different generations) would be especially informative for the research question.

In terms of the history of immigration into the UK, there was a substantial post-war period of “immigration from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia [that] was stimulated most of all by the need for labour” (Craig 2012, 54). During this period, immigration was largely from India, Pakistan, the ‘West Indies’, the ‘Far East’, and West Africa, as shown by substantial increases in the estimates of the populations of each of these groups in the UK between 1951 and 1961 (*ibid.*, 55). Given the personal familiarity with several contacts in an area of London with a substantial Black African and Black Caribbean population; given that the nature of discrimination for these two groups was likely to be relatively similar, being focused on skin colour rather than culture or religion; *and* given that these two groups may include people that are relatively settled in Britain, opening possibilities for interviewing people from several generations, it was felt that it would be reasonable to target these two groups for interview.

It is, however, important to note first that there are some key differences between these two groups, particularly the much higher levels of educational qualifications found in the Black African group (Platt 2011); and second to reiterate the importance of the problematic nature of identifying respondents based on a pre-defined list of ethnic categories. It is also worth noting at this point the procedure used to establish the ethnic group of interviewees. Interviewees were asked to fill in a preliminary short questionnaire, which included standard survey categories on ethnic groupings (taken from the Citizenship Survey). Interviewees were asked to indicate which category they felt most applied to them, although they could also give their own description of their ethnic group. Respondents were, therefore, purposively sampled based on their self-identification as Black-African or Black-Caribbean. Interestingly, following the purposive sampling, two of the interviewees in fact described their ethnic identities as mixed when asked to elaborate further as part of the interview, which highlights the importance of the distinction between self-identification and identification from a pre-defined list (although admittedly a ‘mixed’ category was present on the list).

As mentioned, based on the academic literature it is anticipated that issues of religious identity may not be as salient for individuals of a Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity as they might be for Muslims or individuals of a South Asian origin (Modood and Ahmad 2007). Nevertheless, questions on religious identity are included in the Interview Schedule, but may not be as important as they would have been for Muslims or South Asian groups. By contrast, the identity of ‘Black’ may be important for these groups, and it may also be related to national identity. For example, Hall (2000) describes the way in which ‘Black’ identity may

partially be a response to exclusion from British identity. The interview schedule contains open-ended questions on ethnic and national identity such that it should be possible for the identity of 'Black' to be explored.

The sample construction utilised several methods of recruiting interviewees. Several contacts in the area were used, as was door-to-door leafleting, spending time at a local market, talking to people in local betting shops, and making announcements in several local churches. All of these methods resulted in the recruitment of interviewees. One of the contacts in the local area also kindly assisted in conducting some of the interviews. It is accepted that this, to some extent, may increase inconsistency in the results of the qualitative component, particularly given that the interviews were semi-structured and so were somewhat open-ended, but two interviews were conducted jointly, in part to check for consistency. Also, given the author of this study is a white male, having a second interviewer – and the interviewees were often asked if they had a preference as to their interviewer – had the potential to reduce issues of 'respondent bias' (Lincoln & Guba 1985), whereby a respondent may feel the researcher is a threat and could withhold information or simply say what they feel would be socially desirable. Given that the second interviewer was female, albeit also white, this could potentially be especially beneficial when interviewing women.

Twenty-two interviews were conducted. Table 6 below shows the composition of the qualitative sample in terms of the number of interviews conducted with respondents falling into each group. Although the target was to have between one and two interviewees in each group, there were two groups that unfortunately were not represented – these were females aged 35 to 50, out of employment; and males aged over 50, out of employment. The aim of the purposive sample was to generate a reasonable spread of interviewees across the three categories, and it was felt that this was achieved, although it is accepted that it would have been advantageous to conduct more interviews to ensure that all categories were fully represented. In total, ten interviews were conducted by the second interviewer, ten by the author, and two were conducted jointly. For the avoidance of doubt, the second interviewer did not have a role in transcription, analysis, or indeed any other part of this study. The second interviewer was also given ethics clearance and gave formal assurances of strict confidentiality before the start of fieldwork.

Table 6: Composition of the qualitative sample (numbers of interviewees)

	Age: < 35	Age: 35 - 50	Age: > 50
In employment; Female	4	3	2
In employment; Male	3	1	2
Out of employment; Female	1	0	1
Out of employment; Male	2	3	0

Interview methodology

The interview schedule (see the Appendix, Part B) was intended to ask respondents what they consider their national, ethnic, and religious identities to be, and to ask them whether or not they consider there to be any links between national identity and social cohesion. In this way, it was intended that narratives surrounding the relationships between identity and social cohesion could be uncovered. The open-ended nature of the questions could also, perhaps, reveal whether or not respondents see the concept of social cohesion to be appropriate for describing these relationships. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were undertaken for several reasons. As compared to structured interviews, they offer the flexibility to discuss delicate issues surrounding identity whilst importantly also placing emphasis on the interviewee's point of view rather than the interviewer's specific concerns (Bryman 2001, 313). Interviews of about an hour were aimed for, but in practice the interviews varied a fair amount in length, often depending on how much time the interviewee could spare. The shortest was around 15 minutes, with the longest being around two and a half hours, although the majority were between 45 minutes and an hour.

A further problem that was anticipated was the presence of language barriers, although it was thought this may be less of an issue for the Black Caribbean group in particular, and also to an extent the Black African group, as compared with some Asian groups, for instance, and was one of the reasons for the choice of these groups to interview. Nevertheless, to overcome potential problems, it was decided to focus only upon those with a reasonably good level of English; the reasoning behind this is as follows. Two approaches to the problem of language barriers are possible: the first is to use translators such that interviewees can speak in their preferred language; and the second is to limit the sample to those with reasonably good levels of English. The first approach involves many difficulties, including finding appropriate translators with fluency in both English and the interviewee's preferred language, and creates

additional biases in the data through translation. For reasons such as these, it was felt that the second approach is more appropriate, although it does have the disadvantage that it was not possible to discover whether the discourse around national identity and social cohesion, and links between these concepts, are different for those with limited or no English. Nevertheless, it was felt that the discourses that do emerge will still be of interest, in particular since the focus of much of the social cohesion agenda has tended to be on relatively young British-born people belonging to ethnic minority groups. It may even be the case that second-generation members of minority groups may be more conscious of and sensitive to issues surrounding identity, as is evidenced by Modood *et al.*'s (1994, 100) observation that the second-generation participants in their study were, "much more than the first generation, conscious of the difficulties" of retaining identity based on their heritage in addition to their British identity. It is, however, necessary to note this as a limitation of the study.

Chapter 4: QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT

This chapter gives a detailed report of the results of the quantitative component of this study. The chapter is designed in particular to give an answer to the questions: what is the relationship between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by ethnic group? In order to answer these questions, data from the Citizenship Survey were used to first produce measures of social cohesion, and second to investigate the relationship between British identity and each measure of social cohesion. Close attention was given to ethnic differences in social cohesion, and to whether the relationship between British identity and social cohesion differs by ethnic group.

The broad findings discussed in this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the multifaceted concept of social cohesion, as measured using variables available in the Citizenship Survey, can be considered to break down into ten different 'elements' which are as follows: equal treatment by public service providers (general); equal treatment by health service providers; trust in and equal treatment by the police; satisfaction with one's place of residence; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain; social interaction with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering; ability to influence decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public.

Second, these ten elements can be broken down into three broad groups in terms of the extent to which each regression model provides a satisfactory explanation of the social cohesion measure. The first group has a high level of explanatory power; the second group a moderate level; and the third a poor level of explanatory power. For those elements that were poorly explained, further exploration was undertaken to find control variables that were relevant and increased the R squared values; this further exploration produced some success for some of the elements, but only limited success for others.

Third, the relationship between British identity and social cohesion differs depending on the element of social cohesion in question: it appears to be associated with moderately increased social cohesion for some elements, but have no impact on others. In addition, these associations differ markedly depending on the ethnic group in question.

Fourth, some variables used as control variables appear to be strongly associated with the measures of social cohesion, and the effect is significantly stronger than that of British identity for some of the elements. High levels of education and reduced area deprivation, in particular, are associated with positive social cohesion measures. A discussion is given towards the end of

the chapter, relating these findings to debates over whether identity, or ‘objective conditions’ such as deprivation and levels of education, are most relevant for social cohesion.

An additional striking finding is that, for non-White ethnic groups, generation – in the sense of being UK- or foreign-born – appears to be of fundamental importance to whether or not British identity is associated with social cohesion. Nearly all of the positive associations between British identity and social cohesion that were found for non-White groups *only* apply to those not born in the UK.

Parts of the chapter contain detailed technical explanations of the statistical techniques used. However, in order to allow the narrative to flow more freely and in a manner that can be more easily read, much of the technical information is given in separate boxes and tables, in footnotes, and in some cases in the Appendix.

Summary of methods

The methodology of the quantitative component of this study can be split into two parts. The first part considers each of the variables in the Home Office’s Citizenship Survey that were taken to be theoretically plausible measures of social cohesion, as detailed in Chapter 3. As detailed in the literature review, social cohesion is a complex and multifaceted concept, and there are a large number of variables that could be considered to represent it. Because of this, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used as a ‘data reduction’ technique in order to break the large number of variables down into a smaller number of components, with each representing a separate element of social cohesion. Care was taken to check that each component has a substantive meaning, and those variables that did not ‘fit’ either statistically or substantively were eventually dropped, after all possible combinations of variables were considered. Following this, PCA was again used to create composite variables for each ‘element’ of social cohesion. PCA, rather than factor analysis, is preferable for the creation of composite variables (Blunch 2008, 71), which is why this technique was preferred for this purpose. Part 4.1 of this chapter details this part of the methodology and corresponding results.

The second part of the methodology used each composite variable as the dependent variable in a linear regression model. A measure of the strength of a respondent’s British identity was created and used as a key explanatory variable. Control variables included each of the issues identified theoretically as potentially affecting social cohesion, as detailed in the literature review, and as illustrated in the ‘theoretical framework’ (Figure 1). Particular attention was given to ethnic differences in social cohesion, and to differences in the relationship between

British identities and social cohesion for different ethnic groups; variables representing differences in ethnic groups were therefore used as key interaction effects with the identity variables. The regression models thus enable one to ask: holding other factors constant, what is the relationship between British identity and each of the social cohesion measures, and how does this impact vary by ethnic group? Part 4.2 of this chapter gives a description of the methodology used when constructing the regression models; and Part 4.3 shows the results of each of the models. Part 4.4 gives some analysis of the results, and Part 4.5 concludes. Table 7 below shows the structure of the methodology used in this chapter, and the corresponding results.

Before going any further, it is important to outline briefly some details of the design of the Citizenship Survey. The survey “is designed to contribute to the evidence base across a range of important policy areas including cohesion, community empowerment, race equality, volunteering and charitable giving”, and uses a representative sample of around 10,000 adults (the ‘core’ sample), and in addition an ethnic minority (defined as non-white ethnic groups) ‘boost sample’ of around 5,000 adults (Agur *et al.* 2010, 1). The survey covers England and Wales. Data from the 2007-08 and 2008-09 surveys are used in this study, the combination of which was not hugely problematic because the “sample design for 2008-09 is effectively that of the 2007-08 survey, with some minor changes to the number of issued wards” (*ibid.*, 3). The sample design uses two phases, in which wards⁶ were randomly selected in the first phase, and households randomly selected in the second phase, which has the practical advantage of geographically concentrating the households to be targeted for interview, but the disadvantage of reducing statistical efficiency (compared to sampling all households nationally). Households were sampled, but *one* eligible adult was selected at random from each household, where eligible adult means being aged 16 or over for the core sample, or “being 16 or over *and* from an ethnic minority group for the boost sample” (*ibid.*, 10).

For the core sample, there was a response rate of 56% for the 2008-9 survey and 57% for the 2007-8 survey. The actual number of interviews conducted for the core sample for both the 2007-8 *and* 2008-9 surveys was 9335 in each year (Agur *et al.* 2010; Agur *et al.* 2009).

The design of the ethnic minority boost sample is complex. Two techniques were used to target ethnic minority interviewees: direct screening and focused enumeration screening. Direct screening was used for wards in which 18% or more of the population were categorised

⁶ Primary sampling units (PSUs) were in fact sampled, which are identical to wards aside from the fact that if a ward has fewer than 500 addresses it is grouped with a neighbouring ward to create a PSU (Agur *et al.* 2010).

as belonging to an ethnic minority group (defined as a non-white ethnic group according to the 2001 census). This means that a random sample of these wards (with 18% or more ethnic minority population) was taken, and a random sample of households was taken within each selected ward. It was established whether or not each selected household had an ethnic minority (i.e. non-white ethnic group) resident, and if so, they were asked to be interviewed. 63% (2008-9 survey) and 62% (2007-8 survey) of such addresses were ineligible since they did not contain anyone from an ethnic minority group. For the remainder of households, the response rate was 55% for the 2008-9 survey and 49% for the 2007-8 survey (Agur *et al.* 2010; Agur *et al.* 2009).

Focused enumeration screening was used for wards in which 1% or more, but less than 18%, of the population was from an ethnic minority group. Focused enumeration is a technique in which respondents from the core sample (residing in these wards) were asked whether the four addresses adjacent to them ('adjacent' defined as the two addresses preceding and the two following the interviewee's address on the Postcode Address File) had anyone belonging to an ethnic minority group living there. In 97% of such cases in both years of the survey, it was thought no-one belonging to an ethnic minority group lived there (or the address was classified as 'deadwood', such as a commercial property). The remaining 3% were then targeted for direct screening, in which 67% (2008-9 survey) and 63% (2007-8 survey) were in fact found to have at least one eligible adult (i.e. an adult categorised as belonging to a non-white ethnic group). Of these people, the response rate was 55% for the 2008-9 survey and 59% for the 2007-8 survey (Agur *et al.* 2010; Agur *et al.* 2009).

In total (in terms of a combination of the direct screening and focused enumeration methods) the boost sample led to 5582 interviews in 2008-9 and 4762 Interviews in 2007-8 (Agur *et al.* 2009). For both the Principal Components Analysis and the regression analysis, it was necessary to use weights to "correct for biases caused by unequal selection probabilities and non-response" (Agur *et al.* 2010, 33). The weight variable used was 'WtFlnds', which is the appropriate weight for using the combined core and boost sample. The boost sample, as was discussed, was used because of the importance of 'capturing' ethnic differences in results. The statistical software package Stata was used for analysis, and for the regression analysis, Stata provides additional functions allowing for the adjustment of standard errors due to the survey design. This was not necessary for the Principal Components Analysis because it is a descriptive technique and therefore does not provide statistical significance tests. Section 4.22 details additional information about these additional functions for the regression analysis.

Table 7: Quantitative Component – Structure

1. Measuring Social Cohesion	
A	Identification of theoretically plausible variables in Citizenship Survey
B	PCA Stage 1: Inclusion and exclusion of variables identified in (A)
C	PCA Stage 2: Creating composite variables for each group
D	Presentation of each measure of social cohesion
2. Relationship between British Identity and Social Cohesion	
A	Construction of the regression model
B	Results of regression models with a high level of explanatory power
C	Results of regression models with a moderate level of explanatory power
D	Results of regression models with a poor level of explanatory power
E	Analysis

4.1 Measuring social cohesion

The first stage in the measurement of social cohesion was to establish which variables in the Citizenship Survey could be considered to be potential indicators of social cohesion. The multifaceted and often vague nature of the concept make this a particularly difficult task, but initial guidance can be found from the definition of social cohesion provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001). All questions that were in the Home Office's Citizenship Survey, for the years 2007-8 and 2008-9 (NatCen 2010) were considered, and those deemed to potentially be able to represent a particular aspect of social cohesion were listed, as described in Chapter 3. Table 3 (in Chapter 3) shows the definition of social cohesion given by Forrest & Kearns (2001) together with those questions that could theoretically be considered to measure each part of the concept.

4.11: Methodology

The overall objective in the measurement of social cohesion using data from the Citizenship Survey was to be able to use the large number of variables identified theoretically as being potential indicators of social cohesion, and create from them a much smaller number of composite variables that could be considered as representing a particular element of social cohesion. Since the list of variables identified that could potentially measure social cohesion is large, it is necessary to employ a data reduction technique to make the measures of social cohesion less unwieldy. Additionally, data reduction techniques offer the possibility of analysing the structure of the relationships between variables, such that it is possible to gain an insight into how many different elements of social cohesion might be represented by the variables in the Citizenship Survey. It is then possible to use the Citizenship Survey variables to create one or more composite variables that can be considered to measure a particular aspect of the concept.

There are two main data reduction techniques that could both analyse the structure of the relationships between variables and create a more parsimonious set of composite variables based on the number of components identified. The first is Principal Components Analysis (PCA), which explains a proportion of the variance in a set of variables in terms of a smaller number of 'principal components' (Bartholomew 2008). It is a descriptive technique, and therefore does not provide information such as statistical significance tests. The second

technique is factor analysis, which assumes that a proportion of the variance in the set of variables to be analysed can be explained in terms of a number of latent variables, or factors. It is a model-based technique, and therefore provides information such as significance tests, and tests of model fit. The two techniques become very similar when the variance of the error terms in factor analysis can be assumed to be equal. However, Principal Components Analysis was chosen for the purposes of this study, since the objective is to create a set of composite variables, and PCA is more reliable than factor analysis at generating scores for the creation of composite variables (Blunch 2008, 71).

PCA is a technique that transforms a set of variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated components, whilst retaining as much of the variance in the variables as possible. The variance of a variable can be considered as equating to the amount of information contained in that variable (Blunch 2008). So, if a variable has a variance of zero – that is if all of its values are the same – then it is of no interest since it contains no information. For example, if a test is devised such that the only results are either to pass or to fail, but every person taking the test passes, then this tells one nothing that could be used to discriminate between those taking the test. By contrast, a test with marks ranging between 1 and 100, and where those taking the test had a wide range of scores across the entire scale, could be used to give one a lot of information about the relative abilities of those taking the test.

PCA is useful in determining how to measure social cohesion because it can reduce the large and unwieldy number of variables identified as potential indicators of social cohesion into a smaller and more manageable number of components, and this can be done in such a way that as much of the information as possible in the original variables is retained.

A second key consideration in the measurement of social cohesion centred on whether the variables to be used were continuous, binary, ordinal or categorical. Nearly all the variables identified as potential indicators of social cohesion (as shown in Table 3) are either binary or ordinal variables. In order to conduct the PCA it is necessary to adopt a technique that is appropriate for the analysis of binary and ordinal variables, since standard PCA assumes that all variables are continuous (Bartholomew 2008).

At this point it is necessary to note a few technical issues with using the Citizenship Survey data. First, some of the questions in the Citizenship Survey were changed in quarter 4 of 2008-9 in order to make space in the survey for questions on, amongst other things, violent extremism (NatCen 2011, personal communication). This affects several questions on treatment by public service providers, along with some questions on respect, mixing and

values. Including quarter 4 in the analysis therefore resulted in a very large number of missing values for some of the variables identified as potentially measuring social cohesion, so it was decided it was necessary to exclude quarter 4 from the analysis and concentrate only on quarters 1, 2 and 3. Doing this drastically reduced the number of missing values.

Second, although the initial analysis was conducted using only quarters 1, 2 and 3 from the 2008-9 survey, it was decided a second analysis would be undertaken that combined these three quarters with all four quarters from the 2007-8 survey. The reasons for this were to increase the sample size, in order to check both whether any statistically insignificant findings became significant when the sample size increased, and also to increase the possibilities for searching for interaction effects. The sample was thereby increased from 11251 to 25346. The second reason was as a robustness check: the findings produced using only the sample from 2008-9 were replicated using the expanded dataset to check whether or not they changed. Most findings did in fact stay very similar to those produced only using the 2008-9 dataset: the ten components uncovered using the PCA had very similar loadings and almost identical interpretations; and nearly all the statistically significant associations found using the regression analysis held with the larger sample, with some additional significant associations uncovered.

Third, the number of respondents answering 'don't know' to some of the questions created a separate issue with respect to missing values. Due in part to the fact that questions were drawn from many different parts of the survey questionnaire for inclusion in the PCA, there were many different people answering 'don't know' to at least one question. If 'don't know' answers are excluded listwise from the PCA, this results in almost 40% of the sample being excluded – an unacceptably large proportion. It was decided to include the 'don't know' answers in the analysis to reduce the missing values drastically, but in order to do this it was necessary to recode the ordinal variables as binary, which unfortunately involves losing some information. On balance it was felt that losing this information was better than having missing values of around 40%.⁷

⁷ If one decides not to exclude the 'don't know' answers from the analysis, it is not at all clear how to code them when the variable in question is ordinal. If, for instance, the possible answers are 'strongly agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', and 'strongly disagree', it does not seem justifiable that a 'don't know' answer would indicate the respondent disagrees even more strongly than had they answered 'strongly disagree'. One might perhaps make an argument that a 'don't know' answer might indicate ambivalence or a lack of opinion, so 'don't know' could be coded in the middle – that is in between 'tend to agree' and 'tend to disagree', but it was felt that this is a rather strong assumption as a 'don't know' answer does not really fit on the ordinal scale at all.

If one considers a 'don't know' answer in the context of binary variables, the situation is slightly different. Consider, for instance, a question whereby a respondent is asked whether or not they feel they belong to their local area, and

Following the recoding of variables into the binary format, the technique that was chosen for the PCA is to compute polychoric correlations between the variables, and to run a standard PCA on the resultant correlation matrix. Polychoric correlations are specifically designed for binary and ordinal variables and so are appropriate for this task, and although tetrachoric correlations are also designed for binary variables, they do not support sampling weights, which are needed for this analysis; more detailed technical information can be found in Figure 2.

The use of PCA to create composite variables followed two stages. First, all of the variables identified as potential indicators of social cohesion (see Table 3 above) were included in an initial PCA. Statistical and substantive criteria were used to decide upon those variables that should be kept for a subsequent PCA, and those that should be dropped. All combinations of variables were tried systematically. Second, a final PCA was run using the remaining variables in order to generate composite variables representing each aspect of social cohesion.

they can either answer 'yes' or 'no', but instead they answer 'don't know'. Whilst answering 'don't know' is not equivalent to answering 'no', it nevertheless seems a reasonable assumption that we should consider a respondent answering 'yes' to belong more strongly to their local area than a respondent answering 'don't know'. One can then keep the don't know responses in the analysis, instead of excluding them, by coding all 'yes' responses as 1 and all 'no' and 'don't know' responses as 0 in a binary variable. Whilst this solution is not ideal, it does at least seem more justifiable than coding 'don't know' arbitrarily in an ordinal variable.

For this reason it was decided to recode all ordinal variables as binary variables such that all 'don't know' responses could be included in the analysis. This drastically reduces the number of missing values, although it does have the significant disadvantage of losing some of the information contained in the ordinal variables. A four category ordinal variable (e.g. 'strongly disagree'; 'tend to agree'; 'tend to disagree'; 'strongly disagree') therefore, was recoded such that 'strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' were set as value 1, and 'tend to disagree' and 'strongly disagree', together with any 'don't know' answers, were coded as 0. Although doing this does involve loss of information, it was in fact found that the interpretation of the PCA components generated in this way was very similar to a PCA utilising the full ordinal variables.

Figure 2: PCA and Factor Analysis with Binary and Ordinal Variables

As is common in social scientific survey data, nearly all the Citizenship Survey variables considered as measures of social cohesion are either binary or ordinal. Many are measured on a scale whereby the respondent answers 'strongly agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to disagree', or 'strongly disagree'. Standard principal components analysis (PCA) and factor analysis techniques assume variables to be continuous, and so these standard techniques are inappropriate for this study. Some authors using PCA or factor analysis simply use ordinal variables as if they were continuous, despite the fact that this violates the assumptions. Whilst this approach is somewhat more justifiable when the number of ordinal categories is large (more than ten, for instance), with a smaller number of categories (many of the Citizenship Survey variables have four or five) the possibility of obtaining inaccurate results is substantial (Bartholomew 2008).

An approach used to achieve data reduction for a set of binary variables is termed the 'underlying variable' approach (Bartholomew 2008). Purely out of convenience, it assumes that ordinal variables are an incomplete representation of a continuous latent variable. So, for instance, a variable with four possible responses ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' is assumed to be an incomplete representation of a continuous latent variable that captures precisely how much a respondent agrees with the question. This incorporates the fact that all that is known from the ordinal variable is that if a person answers 'strongly agree' to one question and 'tend to agree' to a second, one would presume they agree more strongly with the first question than the second; but one would not, however, know *how much* more strongly they agree. The underlying variable approach, therefore, assumes the distinction between 'strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' to represent *some* point on the underlying continuous variable, but one does not know precisely where this point is, only in what order the four categories are.

Standard PCA and factor analysis techniques essentially analyse correlations between continuous variables. Using the underlying variable approach, it is possible to analyse the correlations between binary and ordinal variables by creating types of correlation specifically designed for these types of variables. One such type of correlation is the polychoric correlation (Uebersax 2011). Polychoric correlations can be computed in Stata, and this makes it possible, when analysing binary and ordinal variables, to use standard PCA and factor analysis on the correlation matrices computed based on polychoric correlations.

The variables analysed in the measurement of social cohesion are all binary. The quantitative component of this study, therefore, uses Stata to run standard principal components analyses on the correlation matrices of polychoric correlations. This ensures that the assumptions of standard PCA and factor analysis are not violated.

Each of the variables potentially measuring social cohesion, as listed in Table 3, were included in an initial PCA. Variables were then considered for inclusion or exclusion in a further PCA. Several criteria were considered when deciding whether to retain a particular variable: the first set of criteria was based on statistical guidelines; and the second on substantive and theoretical guidelines.

The objective of a PCA is to explain as much of the variance in a set of variables as is possible in a (preferably much) smaller number of principal components. One of the statistical criteria was therefore to account for as much of the variance as possible; a conventional rule of thumb is to aim for around 70% of variance (Bartholomew 2008). This should be attained whilst ensuring that eigenvalues are generally over 1, and by identifying an 'elbow' in the scree plot showing where the proportion of variance explained by each further component begins to decrease dramatically. Variables with a large proportion of variance that remains unexplained by the PCA, therefore, are good candidates for exclusion.

Substantive and theoretical criteria for deciding whether or not to exclude a particular variable focused around whether a particular component had an intuitive interpretation. Each component can be interpreted based on those variables for which it has high loadings. If a component exhibited high loadings on five variables, for instance, and one of the variables appeared intuitively to correspond to a different concept, then this indicates that one may need to investigate whether there may be a spurious correlation due to, perhaps, the wording of the survey question or a bias in missing values. In considering whether a set of variables might represent a particular element of social cohesion, therefore, not only is it important that each variable has a high loading on the same component, but also that each variable has something substantive in common with the other variables.

An additional objective of the PCA was to attain a solution approaching 'simple structure'. Simple structure is a property of a solution that is relatively easy to interpret since the loading of each variable is near zero on all of the components but one. The component can then be interpreted as being a representation of a particular set of variables. Each component, therefore, can be interpreted in terms of something that is common to those corresponding variables with high loadings on that component and loadings near zero on each of the other components. Another criterion when deciding upon those variables to exclude from the PCA, then, was whether or not that variable had a high loading on only one component and loadings of near zero on each of the others. Variables not exhibiting this property were good candidates for exclusion.

Based on both these statistical and substantive criteria, Figure 3 gives a summary of the methodology used to decide upon which variables to exclude from the PCA and which to retain.

Figure 3: Excluding variables from PCA

The methodology for deciding upon which variables to exclude from the PCA and which variables to keep was as follows:

1. Run a PCA with an unlimited number of components, on the correlation matrix of all variables
2. Establish where the 'elbow' in the scree chart might be, and how many components have eigenvalues of over 1, in order to decide the number of components to keep
3. Run the PCA again, this time only keeping the specified number of components
4. Note the proportion of the variance that has been explained; if it is less than around 70% it may be beneficial to drop at least one variable
5. Those variables with a large proportion of variance left unexplained by the PCA are good candidates for exclusion
6. Identify which variables have high loadings on which of the components; each component can be interpreted in terms of the variables with high loadings on that component. For each component, any variable with a substantively different interpretation from the others with high loadings is a good candidate for exclusion
7. Identify those variables exhibiting 'simple structure' and those that have high loadings on more than one component. Variables not exhibiting 'simple structure' are good candidates for exclusion
8. Exclude variables systematically based on the criteria in (5), (6) and (7) above. Run the PCA again – if the proportion of variance explained (as described in step (4)) increases, it may be advisable to permanently drop this variable

Figure 5: Component loadings of 11-component PCA with varimax rotation

Rotated components

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6	Comp7	Comp8	Comp9	Comp10	Comp11
paflfocc	-0.0046	0.0454	-0.0228	0.0344	0.0398	-0.0154	0.0680	0.6403	-0.0461	0.0057	-0.0138
paflfbc	-0.0004	-0.0004	0.0059	-0.0363	0.0046	-0.0058	-0.0455	0.6598	0.0217	-0.0037	-0.0457
ptpofcc	0.1310	-0.0002	-0.1505	0.0657	-0.1146	0.0801	0.0578	0.0042	0.1150	0.4193	0.0924
sbeneighc	0.0160	-0.0109	-0.0225	-0.0021	0.3738	-0.0137	0.0243	0.0450	0.0317	-0.0100	0.0459
sbeiocc	-0.0079	-0.0314	0.0349	-0.0707	0.5443	0.0286	0.0284	0.0035	0.1002	0.0133	0.0518
sbeigbc	-0.0147	-0.0254	0.0176	-0.0364	0.0624	-0.0599	-0.0254	0.0133	0.6455	0.0004	-0.0087
febrifcc	0.0122	0.0208	-0.0154	0.0041	0.0116	0.0362	0.0181	-0.0340	0.6392	-0.0019	-0.0360
sracec	0.0191	-0.0486	-0.0313	-0.1376	-0.0244	0.4502	0.0094	0.1024	-0.0268	-0.2150	0.1424
xmofcc	0.0029	0.0144	-0.0250	-0.0563	-0.0816	0.4913	0.1308	0.0641	0.0002	-0.1043	-0.0113
zinfvoic	0.0185	-0.0086	0.0061	-0.0410	0.0289	0.0366	0.5072	0.0164	-0.0265	-0.0332	-0.0071
zforvoic	-0.0031	0.0143	-0.0034	0.0245	-0.0050	-0.0024	0.5388	0.0036	0.0865	-0.0240	0.0370
zcivparc	-0.0025	0.0224	-0.0325	0.0568	0.0205	-0.0748	0.4634	0.0710	-0.1138	-0.0075	-0.0228
rdis01c	0.0056	0.5201	0.0220	-0.0028	0.0071	0.0309	0.0283	0.0193	-0.0304	-0.0063	-0.0252
rdis02c	0.0111	0.5117	0.0309	0.0003	-0.0338	0.0269	-0.0002	0.0260	0.0074	-0.0335	0.0188
rdis03c	-0.0089	0.4771	0.0836	-0.0416	-0.0182	0.0157	-0.0086	0.0453	0.0027	0.0361	0.0112
rdis04c	-0.0223	0.1301	0.3928	0.0392	0.0327	0.0272	0.0670	-0.0666	0.0916	-0.1223	-0.0611
rdis05c	-0.0011	0.1254	0.3960	-0.0215	0.0479	0.0325	0.0191	-0.0456	0.0795	-0.0921	-0.0424
rdis06c	-0.0253	-0.0134	0.4811	-0.0090	-0.0318	-0.0561	-0.0480	0.0278	-0.0475	0.1025	0.1051
rdis07c	0.0130	0.0568	0.3943	0.0253	-0.0417	-0.0370	0.0277	0.0001	-0.0289	0.1373	0.0317
rdis08c	0.1704	-0.0808	0.2811	-0.0853	0.0658	0.0684	-0.0685	-0.0207	-0.1339	-0.0052	0.0133
rdis09c	0.3594	0.0168	0.0171	0.0642	-0.0531	-0.0412	0.0461	0.0063	0.0917	-0.0783	-0.0252
rdis10c	0.3721	-0.0004	0.0202	0.0735	-0.0534	-0.0461	0.0425	0.0036	0.0909	-0.0885	-0.0210
rdis12c	0.3987	0.0958	-0.1516	-0.1130	0.0650	0.0426	-0.0253	-0.0291	-0.0604	0.1968	-0.0006
rdis13c	0.3915	0.1018	-0.1622	-0.1181	0.0694	0.0587	-0.0095	-0.0411	-0.0418	0.2202	-0.0220
rdis14c	0.3169	-0.0961	0.1185	-0.0216	0.0424	-0.0098	-0.0651	0.0430	-0.0414	-0.0394	0.0628
rdis15c	0.3711	-0.0760	0.1044	0.0595	-0.0138	-0.0314	-0.0067	0.0079	-0.0263	-0.1010	-0.0235
rdis16c	0.3510	-0.0776	0.1295	0.0884	-0.0394	-0.0425	0.0232	0.0163	-0.0012	-0.1311	-0.0276
strustc	-0.0146	0.0535	-0.0478	0.4359	0.0947	-0.0229	0.0374	-0.0132	-0.0380	0.0468	-0.0067
stogethc	-0.0173	0.0331	0.0345	0.1936	0.1541	0.3633	-0.0853	-0.0721	0.0048	0.1222	-0.0486
ssaefcc	0.0099	-0.0295	0.0229	0.5062	-0.0533	0.0486	-0.0437	0.0279	-0.0510	-0.1565	0.0125
senjoyc	0.0074	-0.0198	-0.0398	0.2609	0.3345	-0.0243	-0.0353	0.0251	-0.0243	0.0228	0.0193
repubc	-0.0182	0.0813	0.0769	-0.6015	0.0380	0.0098	0.0030	0.0215	-0.0517	-0.0888	0.7136
rhealcc	0.0111	0.1494	-0.0939	0.0059	0.0122	-0.0454	0.0050	-0.0374	0.0326	0.0019	0.6051
srespectc	-0.0161	0.0497	0.0053	0.0791	0.0384	0.5578	-0.0762	-0.1080	-0.0241	0.1254	-0.0857
svaluec	0.0013	0.0132	0.0107	0.3375	0.2382	-0.0041	-0.0256	0.0392	-0.0523	0.0067	-0.0584
sinc	0.0732	-0.0421	-0.0877	0.1097	-0.1326	0.1577	0.0389	0.0457	0.1440	-0.4621	0.1526
ptcncic	-0.0048	-0.0741	0.0889	0.0593	-0.0716	0.0684	-0.0390	0.2030	0.0521	0.3345	0.0950
ptparic	-0.0307	-0.1547	0.1665	0.0358	-0.1493	0.1197	-0.0575	0.1736	0.1536	0.3150	0.0624
ptrustc	-0.0138	-0.0447	0.0148	0.4319	-0.2394	-0.0129	0.0912	-0.0614	0.0427	0.1310	0.0232
reldis13c	0.0356	0.2777	-0.1637	0.1516	-0.0826	-0.1337	-0.1339	0.0173	0.0629	0.0291	0.0960
sfriendsc	-0.0206	-0.0445	0.0616	-0.0333	0.0253	0.0280	0.3664	-0.1281	-0.0177	0.2810	-0.0024

Based on the statistical and substantive criteria outlined, it was then necessary to decide which variables to exclude from further analysis. Four of the variables (sfriends, reldis13, sinc and zcivpar) have a particularly high unexplained variance - of over 50% - and so are good candidates for exclusion. Several more of the variables have relatively high loadings on several components and so, given the target of attaining simple structure and achieving an intuitive interpretation, these are also good candidates for exclusion. In addition, ptrust has an interpretation that does not fit comfortably with the other variables that have high loadings on component 4. Ptrust asks a respondent about generalised trust, whereas all the other variables refer to place – either the respondent’s local area or neighbourhood – which makes this variable a candidate for exclusion. Table 8 shows a table of those variables considered for exclusion.

Table 8: Variables considered for exclusion from PCA		
Variable	Question	Reason considered for exclusion
Ptcncl	To what extent do you trust your local council?	Fairly high loadings on several components, and no particularly high loading on any
Ptparl	To what extent do you trust parliament?	Fairly high loadings on several components, and no particularly high loading on any
Ptrust	Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	Interpretation does not fit with the other variables with high loadings for that component
Sfriends	How many close friends do you have?	Has a large proportion of unexplained variance
Sinc	How many of your friends have similar incomes to you?	Has a large proportion of unexplained variance
Reldis13	Have you experienced religious discrimination by any public services?	Fairly high loadings on several components, and no particularly high loading on any; also has a relatively high proportion of unexplained variance
Zcivpar	Have you taken part in any civic engagement in the last year?	Has a large proportion of unexplained variance

Source: UKDA (2007)

Each of the above variables were systematically excluded from the PCA in turn, such that all possible combinations were explored, whereby one or all of the 7 variables were dropped. The outcome of the analysis was that all variables aside from Zcivpar were dropped. When these variables were dropped from the PCA, the proportion of variance explained improved and the

interpretation of the components became much more intuitive. Without the other six variables, the proportion of unexplained variance for zcivpar fell, so it was possible to keep it.

Table 9 shows the 35 variables that were retained for the final PCA, along with their meanings and possible answers. Also shown in brackets are the values that each variable was given when recoded into a binary variable: it is intended that values of 1 represent higher levels of social cohesion, and values of 0 lower levels.

Table 9: List of variables chosen as indicators of social cohesion		
Variable name	Survey Question	Possible Answers
Paffloc	Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your local area? (15-20 minutes walk)	1. Definitely agree (1) 2. Tend to agree (1) 3. Tend to disagree (0) 4. Definitely disagree (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Paffgb	Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting Britain?	1. Definitely agree (1) 2. Tend to agree (1) 3. Tend to disagree (0) 4. Definitely disagree (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Ptpolc	To what extent do you trust the police?	1. A lot (1) 2. A fair amount (1) 3. Not very much (0) 4. Not at all (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Sbeneigh	How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?	1. Very strongly (1) 2. Fairly strongly (1) 3. Not very strongly (0) 4. Not at all strongly (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Sbeloc	How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? (15-20 minute walk)	1. Very strongly (1) 2. Fairly strongly (1) 3. Not very strongly (0) 4. Not at all strongly (0) 5. Don't know (0)

Sbegb	How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?	1. Very strongly (1) 2. Fairly strongly (1) 3. Not very strongly (0) 4. Not at all strongly (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Febrit	To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?	1. Very strongly (1) 2. Fairly strongly (1) 3. Not very strongly (0) 4. Not at all strongly (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Srace	What proportion of your friends are of the same ethnic group as you?	1. All the same (0) 2. More than a half (0) 3. About a half (1) 4. Less than a half (1) 5. Don't know (0)
Xmxoft	In the last year, have you mixed [in some way] with people from a different ethnic group at least once a month?* [derived variable]	0. No (0) 1. Yes (1) (derived variable: don't know coded as 0)
Zcivpar	In the last year, have you taken part in [any listed] civic engagement activities?*** [derived variable]	0. No (0) 1. Yes (1) (derived variable: don't know coded as 0)
Zinvol	Have you given any informal voluntary help in the last 12 months? [derived variable]	0. No (0) 1. Yes (1) (derived variable: don't know coded as 0)
Zforvol	Have you given any formal voluntary help in the last 12 months? [derived variable]	0. No (0) 1. Yes (1) (derived variable: don't know coded as 0)
	Compared to people of other races, how would ... treat you?	1. I would be treated worse than other races (0) 2. I would be treated better

		<p>than other races (0)</p> <p>3. I would be treated the same as other races (1)</p> <p>4. Don't know/no opinion (0)</p>
Rdis01	Your local doctors' surgery	
Rdis02	Your local hospital	
Rdis03	The health service generally	
Rdis04	A local school	
Rdis05	The education system generally	
Rdis06	A council housing department or housing association	
Rdis07	A local council (apart from a housing department)	
Rdis08	A private landlord	
Rdis09	The courts – that is, Magistrates and Crown Courts	
Rdis10	The Crown Prosecution Service	
Rdis12	Your local police	
Rdis13	The police in general	
Rdis14	The immigration authorities	
Rdis15	The Prison Service	
Rdis16	The Probation Service	
Srespect	Would you agree or disagree that this local area (15-20 minutes walking distance) is a place where residents respect ethnic differences between people?	<p>1. Definitely agree (1)</p> <p>2. Tend to agree (1)</p> <p>3. Tend to disagree (0)</p> <p>4. Definitely disagree (0)</p>

		5. Don't know (0)
Strust	In your neighbourhood, to what extent can people be trusted?	1. Many of the people can be trusted (1) 2. Some can be trusted (1) 3. A few can be trusted (0) 4. None can be trusted (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Svalue	To what extent do you agree or disagree that people in this neighbourhood share the same values?	1. Strongly agree (1) 2. Agree (1) 3. Disagree (0) 4. Strongly disagree (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Stogeth	To what extent do you agree or disagree that this local area (within 15-20 minutes walking distance), is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together?	1. Definitely agree (1) 2. Tend to agree (1) 3. Tend to disagree (0) 4. Definitely disagree (0) 5. Don't know (0)
Ssafe	How safe would you feel walking alone in this neighbourhood after dark?	1. Very safe (1) 2. Fairly safe (1) 3. A bit unsafe (0) 4. Very unsafe (0) 5. Never walks alone after dark (0) 6. Don't know (0)
Senjoy	Would you say that this is a neighbourhood you enjoy living in?	1. Yes, definitely (1) 2. Yes, to some extent (0) 3. No (0) 4. Don't know (0)
Repub	Would you say you are treated with respect when using public transport?	1. All of the time (1) 2. Most of the time (1) 3. Some of the time (0) 4. Rarely (0) 5. Never (0) 6. Don't know (0)

Reheal	Would you say you are treated with respect when using health services?	1. All of the time (1) 2. Most of the time (1) 3. Some of the time (0) 4. Rarely (0) 5. Never (0) 6. Don't know (0)
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Source: UKDA (2007)

The next objective of the PCA was to use the final set of variables and run a PCA in order to establish composite variables for each component, with each component representing a separate element of social cohesion.

Figures 6 and 7 show the results of a PCA on the final set of variables retained. Ten components have eigenvalues of at least one, so these ten components are included, and together the PCA explains 70.67% of the variance in the variables, which just exceeds the target of 70%. As shown in the right-hand column of Figure 7, the PCA explains at least half of the variance in each variable.

Each of the ten components can be interpreted in terms of those variables for which it has high loadings, since component loadings are the correlations between a component and a particular variable (Blunch 2008). Each component can then be interpreted as being a representation of a particular set of variables. The black boxes around some of the loadings shown in Figure 7 highlight those variables with relatively high loadings on that component; most other variables have loadings relatively close to zero. As one can see, the PCA does not exhibit perfect 'simple structure', since some of the variables outside the black boxes have loadings closer to zero than others. Nonetheless, the black boxes capture to a reasonable extent those variables that have high loadings. Each of the ten components, therefore, can be interpreted in terms of something that is common to those corresponding variables inside each of the black boxes.

Figure 6: Final PCA for the measurement of social cohesion

```

. pcamat r(R). n(25346) factors(10) names(pafflocc paffgbc ptpo1cc sbeneighc sbe1occc sbegbc febr1tc sracc ec xmoftc zinfv01c zforv01c
> zcivparc rdis01c rdis02c rdis03c rdis04c rdis05c rdis06c rdis07c rdis08c rdis09c rdis10c rdis12c rdis13c rdis14c rdis15c rdis16c
> strustc stogethc ssaefec senjoyc repubc rehealc srespectc svaluec)
Principal components/correlation          Number of obs   =   25346
                                          Number of comp. =    10
                                          Trace           =    35
Rotation: (unrotated = principal)       Rho             =   0.7067

```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	8.69559	4.59029	0.2484	0.2484
Comp2	4.1053	1.84028	0.1173	0.3657
Comp3	2.26503	.36837	0.0647	0.4305
Comp4	1.89666	-.126008	0.0542	0.4846
Comp5	1.77065	-.263318	0.0506	0.5352
Comp6	1.50733	-.249205	0.0431	0.5783
Comp7	1.25812	-.102386	0.0359	0.6142
Comp8	1.15574	.0861463	0.0330	0.6473
Comp9	1.06959	-.0592418	0.0306	0.6778
Comp10	1.01035	.067351	0.0289	0.7067
Comp11	.943	-.0841534	0.0269	0.7336
Comp12	.858846	-.0647778	0.0245	0.7582
Comp13	.794069	-.0647846	0.0227	0.7809
Comp14	.729284	-.0639889	0.0208	0.8017
Comp15	.665295	-.0525567	0.0190	0.8207
Comp16	.612738	-.0311623	0.0175	0.8382
Comp17	.581576	-.046512	0.0166	0.8548
Comp18	.535064	-.026753	0.0153	0.8701
Comp19	.508311	.00931877	0.0145	0.8846
Comp20	.498992	-.0279499	0.0143	0.8989
Comp21	.471042	-.0176142	0.0135	0.9124
Comp22	.453428	-.0369385	0.0130	0.9253
Comp23	.41649	-.0424588	0.0119	0.9372
Comp24	.374031	-.040918	0.0107	0.9479
Comp25	.333113	.0247053	0.0095	0.9574

—more—

Figure 7: Final PCA with varimax rotation

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6	Comp7	Comp8	Comp9	Comp10	Unexplained
pafflocc	-0.0133	0.0238	0.0037	0.0472	0.0153	-0.0247	-0.0038	0.0624	0.6663	-0.0063	.1607
paffgbc	0.0107	-0.0144	-0.0023	-0.0264	-0.0180	0.0342	0.0076	-0.0552	0.6953	-0.0347	.1485
ptpo1cc	-0.1678	0.0163	0.3577	0.0964	-0.1144	0.2106	0.0536	0.0239	0.0935	0.1633	.4774
sbeneighc	-0.0123	-0.0013	0.0365	0.0228	0.6210	-0.0175	-0.0287	0.0290	0.0069	-0.0079	.1483
sbe1occc	0.0208	-0.0161	-0.0045	-0.0734	0.6248	0.0620	0.0263	0.0146	-0.0143	0.0082	.2064
sbegbc	0.0124	-0.0399	-0.0267	-0.0555	0.0609	0.6508	-0.0483	-0.0275	0.0385	-0.0027	.2027
febr1tc	-0.0041	0.0013	0.0154	0.0105	-0.0204	0.6475	0.0413	0.0332	-0.0251	-0.0276	.2055
sracc ec	0.0300	-0.0468	-0.0148	-0.2370	0.0757	-0.1109	0.4768	0.0725	0.0724	0.0672	.4286
xmoftc	0.0159	-0.0075	-0.0217	-0.0622	-0.0831	-0.0163	0.5228	0.1524	0.0491	-0.0276	.3592
zinfv01c	0.0303	-0.0224	-0.0199	-0.0215	0.0182	-0.0142	0.0542	0.5370	-0.0270	-0.0072	.4499
zforv01c	0.0026	0.0059	-0.0255	0.0088	0.0047	0.0976	0.0166	0.5757	-0.0191	0.0453	.3378
zcivparc	-0.0390	0.0277	0.0146	0.0245	0.0489	-0.1133	-0.0679	0.5069	0.0573	-0.0096	.4992
rdis01c	-0.0136	0.5331	0.0445	0.0205	-0.0005	-0.0488	0.0055	0.0272	-0.0152	-0.0428	.1523
rdis02c	0.0006	0.5297	0.0372	0.0046	-0.0307	-0.0215	0.0022	0.0034	-0.0043	-0.0068	.1179
rdis03c	0.0058	0.5158	0.0329	-0.0380	-0.0026	-0.0061	-0.0090	-0.0274	0.0433	0.0070	.1424
rdis04c	0.3195	0.1763	-0.2424	0.0447	0.0282	0.0950	0.0421	0.0622	-0.0834	-0.0476	.3056
rdis05c	0.3229	0.1769	-0.2079	-0.0089	0.0461	0.0858	0.0448	-0.0021	-0.0525	-0.0303	.3616
rdis06c	0.3233	0.0650	-0.1808	-0.0613	0.0305	0.0245	-0.0374	-0.1082	0.1270	-0.1879	.3073
rdis07c	0.2641	0.1214	-0.0946	-0.0022	-0.0054	0.0525	-0.0286	-0.0218	0.0857	0.1158	.4244
rdis08c	0.3210	-0.0518	0.0071	-0.0812	0.0826	-0.1192	0.0805	-0.1039	0.0048	0.0295	.4546
rdis09c	0.2464	-0.0186	0.2328	0.0721	-0.0885	0.0723	-0.0449	0.0872	-0.0216	-0.0442	.2382
rdis10c	0.2633	-0.0399	0.2315	0.0804	-0.0895	0.0695	-0.0475	0.0868	-0.0276	-0.0419	.2075
rdis12c	0.0389	0.0750	0.4999	-0.0715	0.0608	-0.0460	0.0109	-0.0412	-0.0111	-0.0101	.1794
rdis13c	0.0215	0.0812	0.5076	-0.0749	0.0686	-0.0224	0.0265	-0.0282	-0.0218	-0.0283	.1985
rdis14c	0.2909	-0.1080	0.1785	-0.0218	0.0405	-0.0535	-0.0054	-0.0482	0.0413	0.0579	.3436
rdis15c	0.3409	-0.1042	0.1787	0.0550	-0.0246	-0.0506	-0.0258	0.0253	-0.0166	-0.0440	.1858
rdis16c	0.3585	-0.1074	0.1345	0.0804	-0.0589	-0.0225	-0.0325	0.0630	-0.0110	-0.0428	.1864
strustc	-0.0735	0.0649	0.0284	0.4524	0.0460	-0.0169	-0.0422	0.0563	0.0108	0.0218	.3783
stogethc	-0.0056	0.0116	0.0197	0.2647	0.0809	0.0823	0.3663	-0.1168	-0.0332	0.0182	.4146
ssaefec	0.0725	-0.0502	-0.0993	0.5532	-0.1776	-0.0569	0.0482	0.0076	0.0134	0.0295	.4087
senjoyc	-0.0317	-0.0246	0.0259	0.3119	0.2961	-0.0279	-0.0386	-0.0242	0.0155	0.0176	.3808
repubc	0.0470	-0.0844	-0.0419	0.0043	0.0110	-0.0368	0.0254	0.0013	-0.0074	0.7300	.2235
rehealc	-0.0830	0.1210	0.0809	0.0117	-0.0177	0.0294	-0.0504	0.0277	-0.0531	0.6000	.2784
srespectc	-0.0332	0.0324	0.0491	0.1360	-0.0108	0.0461	0.5657	-0.1134	-0.0650	-0.0283	.341
svaluec	-0.0026	0.0151	-0.0036	0.4172	0.1442	-0.0313	-0.0243	-0.0212	0.0389	-0.0392	.4108

In order to interpret Figures 6 and 7 substantively, it is necessary to consult Table 10 below, which shows a list of each of the variables, together with the questions the variables correspond to in the Citizenship Survey. The task in the interpretation of each component, then, is to understand what might be common to each of the variables exhibiting high loadings on that component. Table 10 shows a list of each of the ten components together with the variables for which the component has high loadings, and the interpretations of the variables.

Table 10: Groupings of variables by component		
COMPONENT	HIGHEST LOADINGS ON	MEANING
1	Rdis04 Rdis05 Rdis06 Rdis07 Rdis08 Rdis09 Rdis10 Rdis14 Rdis15 Rdis16	Compared to people of other races, how would ... treat you? Your local school The education system generally A council housing department / housing association Your local council A private landlord The courts The crown prosecution service The immigration authorities The prison service The probation service
2	Rdis01 Rdis02 Rdis03	Compared to people of other races, how would ... treat you? Your local doctor Your local hospital The health service generally
3	Ptpolc Rdis12 Rdis13	Do you trust the police? How would your local police treat you compared to other races? How would the police in general treat you compared to other races?
4	Strust Svalue Ssafe	How much can people be trusted in your local area? Do people in your neighbourhood share the same values? How safe do you feel after dark in your local area?

	Senjoy	Do you enjoy living in your neighbourhood?
5	Sbeneigh Sbeloc	How strongly do you belong to your neighbourhood? How strongly do you belong to your local area?
6	Sbegb Febrit	How strongly do you belong to Britain? To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?
7	Srace Xmxoft Stogeth Srespect	What proportion of your friends are of the same ethnic group as you? Have you mixed [in some way] with people from a different ethnic group at least once a month? Do people from different backgrounds get on well in your local area? Do people respect ethnic differences in your local area?
8	Zinvol Zforvol Zcivpar	Have you done any informal volunteering in the last 12 mnths? Have you done any formal volunteering in the last 12 mnths? Have you taken part in any civic engagement in the last 12 mnths?
9	Paffloc Paffgb	Can you influence decisions affecting local area? Can you influence decisions affecting Britain?
10	Repub Reheal	Are you treated with respect when using public transport? Are you treated with respect when using health services?

Source: UKDA (2007)


Based on the meanings of each of the questions in the right hand column, it is possible to get a sense of the themes common to each component. Each component could be interpreted as follows:

1. Equal treatment by public service providers, compared to other races (but NOT health services or the police)
2. Equal treatment by health services, as compared to other races
3. Trust in and equal treatment by the police
4. Satisfaction with, and harmony of, neighbourhood and local area

5. Belonging to neighbourhood / local area
6. Belonging to Britain
7. Social interaction and getting on with people of different backgrounds
8. Civic engagement and volunteering
9. Ability to influence decisions of public institutions
10. Being treated with respect when in public / using public services

Figure 8 below represents graphically the ways in which the variables split into components according to the results of the PCA, and composite variables were created based on these PCA results such that each of the ten composite variables can be considered to represent a different element of social cohesion. The text in the coloured area explains the interpretation of each element, whilst the labels outside the circle identify the key themes and concepts exemplified by the element, some of which are common to more than one element.

Figure 8: Elements of social cohesion



It is worth reflecting briefly on the ways in which the variables in the PCA ‘group’ together. It may be the case, for instance, that certain variables are correlated with one another because the questions are worded in a similar manner, or perhaps that they are taken from the same part of the survey (and so a respondent may, perhaps, have answered the question in a particular way because he or she gave the same answer to the question that preceded it). The components relating to ‘access to public services’ and ‘belonging to place’, however, show that the PCA is revealing more about the structure of the data than simply ‘picking up’ on the question wordings. Despite coming from similar parts of the survey, the PCA shows that belonging to Britain and to one’s local area are markedly different from one another; as are attitudes to the police and health services, and compared with one another and with attitudes towards public services in general.

There are some similarities between the way in which the elements of social cohesion divide up and some of the concepts in the sociological literature. Scholz (2008, 21), for instance, identifies three types of solidarity. Social solidarity measures “the interdependence among individuals within a group” and “the cohesion of a small community” and is probably most similar to satisfaction with one’s place of residence, since this element focuses on sharing of

values, trust, pulling together to improve the neighbourhood, on so on in a (spatially defined) community. A similar concept is Crow's (2001) idea of 'community solidarity' in which a common interest allows solidarity to cut across other lines of differentiation. The element of satisfaction with one's place of residence, therefore, fits under the theme of social/community solidarity.


The second type of solidarity identified by Scholz (2008) is civic solidarity, which describes the obligations of the state to its citizens, particularly in redistributing wealth. To the extent that equal access to public services can be seen as a form of wealth redistribution, the elements of social cohesion that refer to access to services have most in common with this form of solidarity. Being treated with respect when using public services is also included here. The third type of solidarity identified by Scholz (2008) is political solidarity, in which people with common interests support each other in a battle for common goals and are able to have political influence to obtain those goals. This form of solidarity has most in common with the ability to influence public institutions.

Amongst the ten elements of social cohesion there is also a strong spatial theme, both in terms of belonging to one's local area and Britain, but also in the element of satisfaction with one's place of residence, which refers strongly to neighbourhood and local area.

The elements under civic activity and social activity have similarities to ideas of civil society: the ideas of association with people of different spheres (i.e. meaningful interaction with those of different backgrounds) has similarities with Aristotle's idea of civil society as "founded on respect for different spheres and multiple associations in which life is lived" (Ehrenberg 1999).

Figure 9 shows a modified version of the diagram representing the elements of social cohesion, together with the theory relevant to each of the elements.

Figure 9: Elements of social cohesion with theoretical categories



4.2 Construction of regression models

Part 4.1 of this chapter showed how Principal Components Analysis can break the large number of variables potentially measuring social cohesion into a smaller number of components, whereby each component represents an 'element' of social cohesion. Composite variables were created from each component, so that ten composite variables are able to represent the ten elements. This section – part 4.2 – explains how each of the composite variables was used as a dependent variable in a regression model, such that it is possible to search for associations between measures of British identity and each of the elements of social cohesion, controlling for other potential confounding variables. A discussion is given of how the regression model is constructed, including the measurement of British identity and the inclusion of control variables, and second it is shown how the ten elements of social cohesion divide into three groups. The first group is relatively well-explained by the model, the second moderately well-explained, whilst the elements in the third group are not well-explained.

4.2.1: Building the model

The main measure of national identity used in the regression models in this chapter is of a respondent's British identity. This is derived from the variables *natid5* and *impnat*. *Natid* asks the respondent to list any national identities they may have, and *natid5* is coded as 1 if they mentioned British identity, whilst *impnat* asks the respondent about the importance of their national identity to their sense of who they are. The derived measure of British identity is a binary variable with a score of 1 when a respondent mentions British identity as their national identity, and also considers their national identity to be either 'very important' or 'quite important' to their sense of who they are. Sensitivity analysis will also be conducted at appropriate points in the analysis to consider whether changing this measure of British identity – by focusing only on those considering their national identity to be very important, or looking at English as opposed to British identity, for instance – has an impact on the results.

Once the key independent variable – British identity – has been constructed, it is necessary to include control variables in the model. The literature review identifies several factors that could potentially affect both British identity and social cohesion, so it is necessary to include variables representing these factors in the model to prevent, as much as is possible, reporting spurious associations between British identity and social cohesion that are in fact driven by a

third factor. By including control variables in the model it is possible to establish whether or not associations remain between British identity and each of the measures of social cohesion whilst holding these third factors constant.

In addition, the literature review identifies several factors that could influence the relationship between British identity and social cohesion itself. These factors will need to be included as interaction effects with British identity. Last of all, several variables will be included that are hypothesised in the literature to have an impact on social cohesion but not British identity in order to compare the relative magnitudes of the associations between each of the independent variables and the measures of social cohesion.

There are many factors identified in the literature that may affect social cohesion, or both social cohesion and British identity. The theoretical framework illustrated in Figure 1 (see Chapter 2) provides a guide to the construction of the regression models, including those variables that are to be used as interaction effects. Variables – and interaction effects – that were consistently found to be statistically insignificant were dropped from the final model. Table 11 shows the concepts identified in the literature review as being particularly salient, and the variables in the Citizenship Survey that are available for measuring each of these concepts.

Table 11: Control variables available in Citizenship Survey		
Concept	Variable	Description
Quality of housing	Hhhldr	Rents/owns accommodation – a somewhat crude indicator for quality of housing
Level of poverty	Pincome	Respondent's income
Employment status	Rnssec7	Socio-economic group, split into 7 categories, including whether or not in work
Ethnic diversity of area	Pethdec	The proportion of minority ethnic residents in the respondent's ward
Area deprivation	Dimd7	Index of area deprivation
Religion	Relprac	Whether practicing a religion
Age	Dvage	The respondent's age, in years

Education	Zquals	The respondent's highest qualification
Ethnicity	Ethnic5	The respondent's ethnic group, split into 5 categories
Gender	Sexmale	Binary coding of the respondent's gender
Generation of immigrant	Rcob2	Whether respondent born in UK
Length of time in place of residence	Slive5	The number of years the respondent has lived in their local area

The following issues are good candidates for being included in the model as interaction effects with British identity:

- Ethnicity
- Generation of immigrant / length of time in UK
- Religion

Some of the variables did not work well in the model and so had to be removed. For instance, the Citizenship Survey does not measure income very well – a respondent's personal level of income turned out not to have a significant effect in many of the models – so this variable was removed. It is still possible to measure poverty indirectly, however, via socio-economic classification and area deprivation. Additionally, the indicator for quality of housing (rent/own accommodation) turned out not to be significant, so was also removed. An additional control variable that was included was a dummy variable representing the year of the survey – either 2007-8 or 2008-9 – to pick up whether or not there are systematic differences in results depending on the survey year. This variable was not significant at the 5% level for all models except two: the models for ability to influence decisions, and being treated with respect. The explanatory variables included in the regression model were also analysed to check for multicollinearity – see the Appendix, Part C for a discussion of this.

4.22: Differences between regression models

Each of the ten composite indicators of social cohesion was used as the dependent variable in a linear regression model. Linear regression is appropriate since the ten indicators of social cohesion are derived from 35 binary variables; when the number of variables from which a variable is derived is as large as this, it can be interpreted as continuous; and linear regression is appropriate when the dependent variable can be interpreted as continuous (Bartholomew 2008).

There are a few technical issues to note at this point, relating to the complex design of the Citizenship Survey, which contains a core and boost sample, and a multi-stage stratified random sample design. The regression models were computed using Stata, which contains a set of commands that can be used to take account of the sampling design in the calculation of output. The following code was used in order for Stata to modify the standard errors to compensate for the complex design:

```
Svysset psu_scr [pweight=wtfndtot], strata(strata_scr) vce(linearized) singleunit(certainty)
```

The `psu_scr` part of the command specifies the sampling unit variable used in the Citizenship Survey, whilst the `strata(strata_scr)` part specifies the sampling unit variable. The `pweight=wtfndtot` part specifies the weights used. The `wtfndtot` variable is derived from a weight for the combined sample for quarters 1, 2 and 3 of the 2008-9 survey (NatCen 2011, personal communication), and the `wtfnds` variable from the 2007-8 survey, which is the weight for the combined sample for all four quarters.

There are two options that could appropriately be used for the calculation of variance estimation in the Citizenship Survey – variance estimation is specified by the command ‘`vce`’ – and these are ‘`linearized`’ and ‘`jackknife`’. Linearized variance estimation is most commonly used, but can have poor results when the number of sampling units is small (Stata 2009). An alternative is to use a jackknife method. The results in this chapter use a linearized method as the default, but sensitivity analysis is conducted on key analyses with the results briefly reported in the main text, and details in the Appendix.

Broadly speaking, the ten models can be split into three groups. The first group has relatively high R squared values, and clear patterns that indicate the model can provide a meaningful insight into the social cohesion indicators. The second group has moderately satisfactory R squared values and patterns emerging that can be meaningfully interpreted. The third group,


by contrast, has low R squared values, indicating the model to be a poor predictor of the social cohesion variables. Although some patterns can be ascertained from the regression results, care should be taken in reading too much into them, since there may be important confounding factors not included in the model. Table 12 shows a summary of the R squared values for each of the ten elements of social cohesion.

Table 12: Summary of R squared values for each of the 10 models		
Element	R squared value	Explanatory power of model
Satisfaction with place of residence	0.193	High
Civic engagement & volunteering	0.158	High
Socialising with people of different backgrounds	0.189	High
Belonging to local area	0.106	Moderate
Belonging to Britain	0.055	Moderate
Equal treatment by service providers (general)	0.031	Poor
Equal treatment by health services	0.018	Poor
Equal treatment by police services	0.021	Poor
Ability to influence & confidence in public institutions	0.039	Poor
Respectful treatment	0.022	Poor

As can be seen from Table 12, the ten indicators of social cohesion can be split roughly into three groups. The models for satisfaction with one's place of residence, civic engagement and volunteering, and socialising with people of different backgrounds, have relatively high R squared values, indicating that the models explain the variation in the social cohesion indicators relatively well. The models for the second group, consisting of belonging to one's local area and to Britain, have moderate R squared values, indicating that the models do

explain the composite variables reasonably well (less so in the case of belonging to Britain), but that a fair amount of the variation in the social cohesion indicators remains unexplained, so one should be careful in making overly bold assertions based on these two models. The third group, consisting of the three service provision indicators along with one's perceived ability to influence public institutions, and whether or not one is treated with respect in public, have low R squared values indicating that the models do not explain the variation in the social cohesion variables very well. For this last group, further exploration will be undertaken to search for other variables that may be important. Figure 10 shows an updated version of the diagram of the ten elements of social cohesion, but this time splitting the elements into three groups according to the explanatory power of their corresponding regression model.

Figure 10: The elements of social cohesion by group



In addition, and before directly discussing any of the regression models, it is informative to present summary statistics of each of the ten measures of social cohesion. Table 13 presents the number of observations, the means, standard deviations, and the maximum and minimum for each of the ten cohesion measures. Statistics are shown first for the overall sample, and then for each of the ethnic groups considered separately.

Table 13: Summary statistics of each measure of social cohesion

Social cohesion measure		Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
1: Equal treatment by public service providers	Overall	25287	1.688	0.965	-0.411	3.266
	White UK born	13970	1.700	0.946	-0.398	3.229
	White non UK	924	1.690	0.961	-0.316	3.216
	Asian	5181	1.682	0.997	-0.411	3.260
	Black	3081	1.607	0.978	-0.377	3.266
	Mixed	922	1.825	0.969	-0.308	3.208
	Other	1196	1.665	0.991	-0.312	3.191
2: Equal treatment by health service providers	Overall	25287	1.767	0.434	-0.363	2.480
	White UK born	13970	1.780	0.408	-0.282	2.431
	White non UK	924	1.719	0.482	-0.285	2.422
	Asian	5181	1.782	0.447	-0.363	2.480
	Black	3081	1.723	0.479	-0.256	2.439
	Mixed	922	1.747	0.449	-0.281	2.428
	Other	1196	1.724	0.471	-0.260	2.438
3: Equal treatment and trust in the police	Overall	25287	1.177	0.691	-0.810	2.593
	White UK born	13970	1.261	0.642	-0.647	2.593
	White non UK	924	1.231	0.669	-0.629	2.486
	Asian	5181	1.125	0.703	-0.810	2.572
	Black	3081	0.918	0.774	-0.785	2.549
	Mixed	922	1.022	0.770	-0.721	2.435
	Other	1196	1.173	0.699	-0.676	2.497
4: Satisfaction with place of residence	Overall	25287	1.389	0.634	-0.570	2.585
	White UK born	13970	1.520	0.594	-0.480	2.585
	White non UK	924	1.371	0.634	-0.424	2.410
	Asian	5181	1.298	0.633	-0.568	2.450
	Black	3081	1.138	0.637	-0.520	2.376
	Mixed	922	1.071	0.663	-0.561	2.337
	Other	1196	1.157	0.651	-0.570	2.300
5: Belonging to one's local area	Overall	25287	1.121	0.585	-0.553	2.147
	White UK born	13970	1.125	0.580	-0.553	2.060
	White non UK	924	1.000	0.644	-0.392	1.997
	Asian	5181	1.205	0.545	-0.453	2.147
	Black	3081	1.058	0.602	-0.459	2.092
	Mixed	922	1.063	0.602	-0.429	1.985
	Other	1196	1.002	0.632	-0.414	2.124

Social cohesion measure		Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
6: Belonging to Britain	Overall	25287	1.312	0.422	-0.552	2.039
	White UK born	13970	1.330	0.425	-0.418	2.039
	White non UK	924	1.277	0.437	-0.552	1.884
	Asian	5181	1.354	0.367	-0.332	1.994
	Black	3081	1.248	0.443	-0.403	2.026
	Mixed	922	1.250	0.424	-0.287	1.950
	Other	1196	1.169	0.471	-0.383	2.011
7: Social interaction with people from different backgrounds	Overall	25287	1.152	0.543	-0.374	2.245
	White UK born	13970	0.940	0.520	-0.374	2.190
	White non UK	924	1.218	0.500	-0.300	2.226
	Asian	5181	1.414	0.426	-0.205	2.245
	Black	3081	1.433	0.441	-0.215	2.235
	Mixed	922	1.501	0.457	-0.035	2.208
	Other	1196	1.440	0.478	-0.293	2.201
8: Civic engagement and volunteering	Overall	25287	0.826	0.607	-0.452	2.265
	White UK born	13970	0.921	0.602	-0.452	2.261
	White non UK	924	0.813	0.608	-0.321	2.233
	Asian	5181	0.643	0.587	-0.450	2.249
	Black	3081	0.757	0.589	-0.388	2.265
	Mixed	922	0.877	0.589	-0.391	2.120
	Other	1196	0.659	0.581	-0.452	2.120
9: Influencing the decisions of public institutions	Overall	25287	0.494	0.560	-0.370	1.836
	White UK born	13970	0.423	0.527	-0.370	1.795
	White non UK	924	0.473	0.533	-0.307	1.738
	Asian	5181	0.587	0.593	-0.278	1.788
	Black	3081	0.621	0.594	-0.323	1.836
	Mixed	922	0.597	0.580	-0.313	1.732
	Other	1196	0.520	0.568	-0.277	1.769
10: Being treated with respect when in public	Overall	25287	1.206	0.445	-0.391	1.897
	White UK born	13970	1.175	0.442	-0.391	1.863
	White non UK	924	1.250	0.429	-0.289	1.877
	Asian	5181	1.279	0.418	-0.296	1.897
	Black	3081	1.190	0.485	-0.292	1.870
	Mixed	922	1.198	0.470	-0.267	1.858
	Other	1196	1.259	0.441	-0.257	1.888

4.3 What is the relationship between British identity and social cohesion?

According to several commentators (e.g. Goodhart 2007), British identity is important for positive social cohesion outcomes. Based on these arguments, one should expect to find British identity to be positively associated with at least some elements of social cohesion. Is this argument supported by the findings of this chapter? The answer to this question depends on the element of social cohesion one is discussing.

First, one needs to establish whether British identity is associated with the composite variable representing the element of social cohesion in question, since if British identity has an impact on social cohesion one should at least find an association between the two. Second, as discussed above, ethnicity may be important. An interaction effect between British identity and ethnicity will therefore be included in order to determine whether any association between British identity and social cohesion differs by ethnic group. Third, the length of time a respondent has been in the UK may be important, so a variable representing this will also be included as an interaction effect. Last, if there are associations, it is necessary to consider how strong the magnitude is as compared with other variables in the model in order to place the effect of British identity in context. Comparisons of the magnitude of the effects of British identity as compared with control variables will therefore be given.

Part 4.31 below focuses on the models producing a high level of explanatory power, and makes several arguments. First, there are associations between British identity and two of the three measures of social cohesion – satisfaction with one's place of residence, and civic engagement and volunteering – even after controlling for all other factors, but not for socialising with people of different backgrounds. When broken down by ethnic group, British identity is associated with civic engagement and volunteering for all three of the White, Asian, and Black groups, but only with satisfaction with one's place of residence for the White group. When broken down in such a way, a positive association between British identity and socialising with people of other backgrounds is also found for the Asian group.

Second, although there do appear to be positive associations between British identity and social cohesion outcomes, at least for satisfaction with one's place of residence and civic engagement and volunteering, these associations are relatively modest when compared with some of the control variables. When compared with the effect of qualifications and area deprivation, the magnitude of the effects of British identity look rather small indeed: it is

argued that 'structural' variables have a larger effect on social cohesion than British identity for these elements.

Part 4.32 looks at the two models with a moderate level of explanatory power: belonging to Britain and belonging to one's local area. For the model for belonging to Britain, British identity is (perhaps unsurprisingly) more strongly associated with social cohesion as compared with the control variables, although for belonging to one's local area area-level deprivation is particularly important.

Parts 4.31 and 4.32 make an additional argument. When one takes into account whether or not the respondent was born in the UK, for the non-White ethnic groups, nearly all associations between British identity and social cohesion are no longer found for those born in the UK, but *are* found for those not born in the UK. This suggests that the generation a member of an ethnic minority group belongs to may be of fundamental importance with regard to whether British identity has an impact on social cohesion.

Part 4.33 looks at the group of measures that are poorly explained by the model, and investigates whether adding further independent variables can increase the R squared values. Some success (albeit limited for some of the models) is attained by doing so, although one must be careful in interpreting the results of these models, since the R squared values are still not particularly large and there may be other variables, perhaps not included in the survey, that might be more strongly associated with these elements of social cohesion than British identity, education, or deprivation. It may also be the case that broad national-level indicators such as level of qualifications, socio-economic group, and so on, are good predictors of *some* of the elements of social cohesion but not others or, perhaps, that these composite variables are not particularly good measures of the concepts they are intended to represent.

4.31: Models with a high level of explanatory power

Turning first to the group of models with a high level of explanatory power, Tables 14, 15 and 16 below show the full results of the regression output for the dependent variables representing ‘satisfaction with one’s place of residence’, ‘civic engagement and volunteering’, and ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’.

Table 14: Regression output for 'Satisfaction with Place of Residence'					
Summary statistics:					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
compm4	25287	1.388678	0.6341965	-0.5704478	2.585028

Survey: Linear regression	
Number of strata	= 623
Number of PSUs	= 2203

Number of obs	=	20400
		20631.56
Population size	=	3
Design df	=	1580
F(42, 1539)	=	78.31
Prob > F	=	0
R-squared	=	0.1929
Linearized		

compm4	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Important British ID	0.043	0.010	4.11	0.000	0.022 0.063	
Ethnic group (ref=white)						
2: Asian	0.027	0.027	0.98	0.327	-0.027 0.080	
3: Black	-0.063	0.028	-2.29	0.022	-0.118 -0.009	
4: Mixed	-0.180	0.031	-5.9	0.000	-0.240 -0.120	
5: Chinese / Other	-0.117	0.032	-3.69	0.000	-0.179 -0.055	
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.028	0.016	-1.74	0.083	-0.059 0.004	
3: Lower supervisory	-0.056	0.017	-3.35	0.001	-0.089 -0.023	
4: Routine	-0.080	0.021	-3.75	0.000	-0.121 -0.038	
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.061	0.032	-1.93	0.054	-0.123 0.001	
6: Students	0.007	0.032	0.22	0.827	-0.056 0.070	
7: Not stated	0.039	0.059	0.66	0.512	-0.077 0.155	
Age (years)	0.002	0.000	3.7	0.000	0.001 0.003	

Sex: female		-0.127	0.011	-11.77	0.000	-0.149	-0.106
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)							
2: A levels or equiv.		-0.061	0.017	-3.54	0.000	-0.095	-0.027
3: GCSEs or equiv.		-0.089	0.015	-5.84	0.000	-0.119	-0.059
4: Foreign or other		-0.177	0.040	-4.42	0.000	-0.256	-0.099
5: No quals		-0.142	0.018	-7.78	0.000	-0.178	-0.106
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)							
	2	-0.060	0.021	-2.8	0.005	-0.102	-0.018
	3	-0.065	0.021	-3.03	0.002	-0.107	-0.023
	4	-0.111	0.022	-5.06	0.000	-0.154	-0.068
	5	-0.156	0.023	-6.82	0.000	-0.201	-0.111
	6	-0.178	0.024	-7.32	0.000	-0.225	-0.130
	7	-0.278	0.025	-11.15	0.000	-0.327	-0.229
	8	-0.376	0.026	-14.47	0.000	-0.427	-0.325
	9	-0.455	0.026	-17.79	0.000	-0.505	-0.405
	10	-0.558	0.027	-20.98	0.000	-0.610	-0.506
Born in UK		0.009	0.021	0.44	0.659	-0.032	0.051
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)							
2: 1-4 years		0.129	0.025	5.08	0.000	0.079	0.179
3: 5-9 years		0.188	0.026	7.16	0.000	0.137	0.239
4: 10-29 years		0.201	0.025	8.04	0.000	0.152	0.250
5: 30 or more years		0.229	0.028	8.26	0.000	0.175	0.283
Practising a religion		0.018	0.013	1.4	0.160	-0.007	0.043
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)							
	2	-0.016	0.025	-0.65	0.519	-0.064	0.032
	3	-0.035	0.025	-1.39	0.166	-0.085	0.015
	4	-0.072	0.025	-2.88	0.004	-0.121	-0.023
	5	-0.086	0.024	-3.59	0.000	-0.133	-0.039
	6	-0.152	0.025	-5.98	0.000	-0.202	-0.102
	7	-0.119	0.027	-4.33	0.000	-0.173	-0.065
	8	-0.183	0.030	-6.14	0.000	-0.241	-0.124
	9	-0.210	0.028	-7.43	0.000	-0.265	-0.154
	10	-0.247	0.033	-7.51	0.000	-0.311	-0.182
Survey is year 2008-9		0.007	0.012	0.57	0.567	-0.016	0.030
_cons		1.734	0.043	39.94	0.000	1.649	1.819

Table 15: Regression output for 'Civic Engagement and Volunteering'

Summary statistics:					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
compm8	25287	0.8263267	0.607474	-0.4521634	2.264861

Survey: Linear regression	
Number of strata	
=	623
Number of PSUs	
=	2203

Number of obs	=	20400
Population size	=	20631.563
Design df	=	1580
F(42, 1539)	=	64.49
Prob > F	=	0
R-squared	=	0.1577
Linearized		

compm8	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Important British ID	0.038	0.011	3.42	0.001	0.016 0.059	
Ethnic group (ref=white)						
2: Asian	-0.157	0.022	-7.08	0.000	-0.200 -0.113	
3: Black	-0.050	0.022	-2.29	0.022	-0.093 -0.007	
4: Mixed	0.052	0.026	2.02	0.043	0.002 0.103	
5: Chinese / Other	-0.118	0.028	-4.18	0.000	-0.174 -0.063	
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.062	0.016	-3.92	0.000	-0.092 -0.031	
3: Lower supervisory	-0.120	0.015	-7.78	0.000	-0.150 -0.090	
4: Routine	-0.177	0.020	-8.63	0.000	-0.217 -0.136	
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.196	0.031	-6.42	0.000	-0.256 -0.136	
6: Students	-0.032	0.033	-0.98	0.327	-0.096 0.032	
7: Not stated	-0.061	0.060	-1.02	0.307	-0.178 0.056	
Age (years)	0.001	0.000	2.6	0.009	0.000 0.002	
Sex: female	0.056	0.011	5.1	0.000	0.035 0.078	
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.068	0.017	-3.89	0.000	-0.102 -0.033	
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.208	0.015	-13.83	0.000	-0.237 -0.178	
4: Foreign or other	-0.233	0.033	-7.12	0.000	-0.297 -0.169	
5: No quals	-0.403	0.018	-22.41	0.000	-0.439 -0.368	
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.044	0.025	1.78	0.076	-0.005 0.093	

	3	0.019	0.024	0.8	0.425	-0.028	0.066
	4	0.005	0.025	0.2	0.841	-0.044	0.054
	5	0.017	0.026	0.68	0.497	-0.033	0.068
	6	0.004	0.025	0.18	0.861	-0.044	0.053
	7	-0.009	0.026	-0.36	0.716	-0.060	0.041
	8	-0.020	0.025	-0.8	0.421	-0.070	0.029
	9	-0.035	0.025	-1.39	0.164	-0.085	0.014
	10	-0.063	0.025	-2.51	0.012	-0.112	-0.014
Born in UK		0.152	0.019	8.06	0.000	0.115	0.189
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)							
	2: 1-4 years	0.069	0.023	3.03	0.003	0.024	0.114
	3: 5-9 years	0.149	0.024	6.3	0.000	0.103	0.195
	4: 10-29 years	0.134	0.022	5.99	0.000	0.090	0.178
	5: 30 or more years	0.128	0.026	4.99	0.000	0.078	0.178
Practising a religion		0.158	0.012	12.96	0.000	0.134	0.182
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)							
	2	0.016	0.027	0.6	0.546	-0.036	0.069
	3	-0.013	0.028	-0.46	0.646	-0.068	0.042
	4	-0.004	0.028	-0.16	0.873	-0.059	0.050
	5	0.001	0.027	0.02	0.981	-0.053	0.054
	6	-0.025	0.027	-0.91	0.361	-0.077	0.028
	7	-0.011	0.028	-0.38	0.702	-0.065	0.044
	8	-0.034	0.029	-1.19	0.232	-0.090	0.022
	9	-0.038	0.029	-1.33	0.185	-0.095	0.018
	10	-0.098	0.029	-3.31	0.001	-0.155	-0.040
Survey is year 2008-9		-0.020	0.012	-1.71	0.087	-0.043	0.003
_cons		0.839	0.041	20.69	0.000	0.759	0.918

Table 16: Regression output for 'Socialising with People of Different Backgrounds'

Summary statistics:					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
compm7	25287	1.151939	0.5428537	-0.3744145	2.244632

Survey: Linear regression	
Number of strata	
=	623
Number of PSUs	
=	2203

Number of obs	=	20400
Population size	=	20631.563
Design df	=	1580
F(42, 1539)	=	95.53
Prob > F	=	0
R-squared	=	0.1885
Linearized		

compm7	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Important British ID	0.014	0.009	1.58	0.115	-0.003 0.032	
Ethnic group (ref=white)						
2: Asian	0.111	0.017	6.5	0.000	0.078 0.145	
3: Black	0.163	0.017	9.57	0.000	0.130 0.196	
4: Mixed	0.257	0.024	10.82	0.000	0.210 0.304	
5: Chinese / Other	0.176	0.022	7.99	0.000	0.133 0.219	
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.030	0.013	-2.33	0.020	-0.055 -0.005	
3: Lower supervisory	-0.028	0.013	-2.15	0.032	-0.053 -0.002	
4: Routine	-0.017	0.018	-0.97	0.335	-0.053 0.018	
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.080	0.024	-3.32	0.001	-0.128 -0.033	
6: Students	0.009	0.026	0.34	0.731	-0.041 0.059	
7: Not stated	-0.012	0.051	-0.24	0.807	-0.112 0.087	
Age (years)	-0.006	0.000	-15.15	0.000	-0.007 -0.005	
Sex: female	-0.034	0.009	-3.7	0.000	-0.051 -0.016	
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.025	0.014	-1.72	0.085	-0.053 0.003	
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.036	0.013	-2.88	0.004	-0.061 -0.012	
4: Foreign or other	-0.054	0.028	-1.95	0.051	-0.108 0.000	
5: No quals	-0.105	0.015	-6.82	0.000	-0.135 -0.075	
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.012	0.022	-0.55	0.582	-0.055 0.031	

	3	-0.036	0.021	-1.7	0.090	-0.077	0.006
	4	-0.028	0.022	-1.3	0.193	-0.071	0.014
	5	-0.018	0.022	-0.81	0.415	-0.061	0.025
	6	-0.045	0.022	-2.07	0.039	-0.087	-0.002
	7	-0.048	0.021	-2.26	0.024	-0.090	-0.006
	8	-0.095	0.022	-4.33	0.000	-0.137	-0.052
	9	-0.099	0.022	-4.51	0.000	-0.142	-0.056
	10	-0.155	0.023	-6.66	0.000	-0.200	-0.109
Born in UK		-0.113	0.015	-7.38	0.000	-0.143	-0.083
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)							
2: 1-4 years		0.003	0.017	0.19	0.853	-0.031	0.037
3: 5-9 years		-0.002	0.018	-0.09	0.930	-0.036	0.033
4: 10-29 years		0.031	0.017	1.82	0.069	-0.002	0.065
5: 30 or more years		0.025	0.020	1.22	0.224	-0.015	0.065
Practising a religion		0.024	0.011	2.19	0.029	0.002	0.045
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)							
	2	0.118	0.028	4.28	0.000	0.064	0.172
	3	0.143	0.027	5.29	0.000	0.090	0.196
	4	0.167	0.027	6.28	0.000	0.115	0.219
	5	0.245	0.027	9.11	0.000	0.192	0.297
	6	0.257	0.026	9.84	0.000	0.206	0.309
	7	0.355	0.027	13.24	0.000	0.302	0.407
	8	0.398	0.026	15.5	0.000	0.347	0.448
	9	0.460	0.026	17.63	0.000	0.409	0.511
	10	0.483	0.026	18.81	0.000	0.433	0.533
Survey is year 2008-9		0.003	0.011	0.28	0.777	-0.018	0.024
_cons		1.249	0.037	33.67	0.000	1.176	1.321

Table 17 below summarises the results of these models in terms of the effects of British identity. Having a British identity is associated with an increased satisfaction with one's place of residence, and with increased civic engagement and volunteering, but there is no significant effect on socialising with people of different backgrounds, at the 5% level. Alternative calculations using jackknife variance estimation yielded almost exactly the same results, with the only difference being that the p value for socialising with people of different backgrounds was modified to 0.116 - full details of the alternative jackknife variance estimations are shown in the 'Sensitivity Analysis' section of the Appendix (Part D).

Table 17: Associations between British identity and social cohesion (positive values = increased social cohesion)			
	Satisfaction with place of residence	Civic engagement and volunteering	Socialising with people of different backgrounds
Effect of British identity	0.043	0.038	0.014
P value	0.000	0.001	0.115
R squared	0.193	0.158	0.189

It is possible that the associations between British identity and social cohesion differ by ethnic group. To determine whether this is the case, additional regression models were run for each ethnic group separately, by restricting the sample in each case to the ethnic group under consideration. This allows for the possibility of determining whether or not British identity has an association with the social cohesion measures for each ethnic group separately. Six ethnic categories were used: White UK born, White non-UK born, Asian, Black, Mixed, and Chinese/Other. The question one is asking, therefore, is: compared to a Black person with no British identity, what is the effect of being Black and having a British identity? Similarly for a different ethnic group: compared to an Asian person with no British identity, what is the effect of being Asian and having a British identity? The same question can be asked of all six ethnic groups. Tables 18 to 23 below show the results. Results that are significant at the 5% level are shown in bold.

Table 18: Regression output for the White UK-born group

Regression output for the White UK-born group												
	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds			R squared		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t			
										0.188		0.141
Important British ID	0.044	0.012	0.000	0.031	0.012	0.014	0.019	0.010	0.060			
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)												
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.027	0.017	0.122	-0.052	0.017	0.003	-0.023	0.014	0.095			
3: Lower supervisory	-0.050	0.018	0.005	-0.109	0.017	0.000	-0.024	0.014	0.086			
4: Routine	-0.082	0.023	0.001	-0.157	0.022	0.000	-0.019	0.019	0.329			
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.109	0.040	0.006	-0.205	0.039	0.000	-0.067	0.032	0.035			
6: Students	0.018	0.041	0.656	-0.040	0.041	0.331	0.022	0.033	0.506			
7: Not stated	0.053	0.069	0.441	-0.080	0.069	0.244	-0.002	0.059	0.976			
Age (years)	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.045	-0.006	0.000	0.000			
Sex: female	-0.123	0.012	0.000	0.061	0.013	0.000	-0.033	0.010	0.001			
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)												
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.063	0.018	0.001	-0.076	0.019	0.000	-0.021	0.016	0.185			
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.097	0.017	0.000	-0.222	0.017	0.000	-0.030	0.014	0.033			
4: Foreign or other	-0.194	0.057	0.001	-0.205	0.051	0.000	-0.024	0.044	0.590			
5: No quals	-0.160	0.021	0.000	-0.418	0.020	0.000	-0.097	0.017	0.000			

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)										
2	-0.060	0.021	0.005	0.045	0.025	0.079	-0.014	0.024	0.557	
3	-0.078	0.022	0.001	0.019	0.026	0.458	-0.038	0.022	0.090	
4	-0.119	0.023	0.000	0.010	0.026	0.690	-0.020	0.023	0.390	
5	-0.158	0.024	0.000	0.025	0.027	0.357	-0.018	0.024	0.438	
6	-0.177	0.026	0.000	0.014	0.027	0.610	-0.051	0.024	0.031	
7	-0.280	0.027	0.000	-0.010	0.028	0.733	-0.055	0.023	0.018	
8	-0.402	0.029	0.000	-0.009	0.029	0.747	-0.098	0.024	0.000	
9	-0.463	0.029	0.000	-0.044	0.029	0.126	-0.102	0.024	0.000	
10	-0.597	0.031	0.000	-0.066	0.028	0.021	-0.160	0.026	0.000	
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)										
2: 1-4 years	0.130	0.031	0.000	0.035	0.027	0.196	0.000	0.021	0.984	
3: 5-9 years	0.182	0.032	0.000	0.113	0.028	0.000	-0.006	0.021	0.788	
4: 10-29 years	0.193	0.030	0.000	0.093	0.026	0.000	0.028	0.021	0.182	
5: 30 or more years	0.225	0.032	0.000	0.092	0.030	0.002	0.020	0.023	0.390	
Practising a religion	0.012	0.014	0.390	0.177	0.014	0.000	0.034	0.013	0.006	
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)										
2	-0.011	0.025	0.650	0.019	0.027	0.494	0.119	0.028	0.000	
3	-0.034	0.025	0.179	-0.018	0.029	0.545	0.143	0.027	0.000	
4	-0.074	0.026	0.004	-0.009	0.028	0.752	0.174	0.027	0.000	
5	-0.081	0.024	0.001	-0.003	0.028	0.925	0.250	0.027	0.000	
6	-0.151	0.026	0.000	-0.029	0.028	0.293	0.245	0.026	0.000	
7	-0.108	0.028	0.000	-0.009	0.029	0.762	0.355	0.027	0.000	
8	-0.177	0.030	0.000	-0.039	0.030	0.187	0.404	0.026	0.000	
9	-0.216	0.032	0.000	-0.015	0.032	0.633	0.470	0.027	0.000	
10	-0.253	0.043	0.000	-0.086	0.037	0.020	0.531	0.029	0.000	
Survey is year 2008-9	0.004	0.013	0.731	-0.019	0.013	0.146	0.003	0.012	0.793	
_cons	1.760	0.045	0.000	1.027	0.042	0.000	1.129	0.037	0.000	

Table 18 shows the regression output for the White UK-born group. The results are quite similar to the results for the sample as a whole – although this is perhaps unsurprising, given the fact that this group makes up a large proportion of the overall sample. The R squared values are all fairly similar. British identity is significantly and positively associated with the social cohesion measures for the ‘satisfaction with place of residence’ and ‘civic engagement and volunteering’ models. For ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’ the coefficient is positive and is now almost significant at the 5% level, with a P value of 0.06.

The control variables also exhibit a similar pattern to the models for the whole sample, with higher educational qualifications being associated with increased cohesion, particularly for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’ models, and lower scores on the Index of Multiple Deprivation being associated with much lower scores for ‘satisfaction with place of residence’. The percentage of minority ethnic residents in the ward has a negative association with ‘satisfaction’, but a very strong positive association with ‘socialising with people of other backgrounds’.

Table 19 below shows the regression results for the White non-UK born group. The R squared values are a little higher than for the other ethnic groups, aside for the ‘socialising’ model, for which the R squared value is a little lower. The most striking differences, however, relate to the effect of British identity for this group. The positive associations for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’ models – found for the White group born in the UK – are lost and, for the ‘socialising’ model, rather than there being a positive effect that is only just insignificant, British identity is *negatively* associated with socialising with people of different backgrounds. This suggests that British identity may have a more negative relationship with these social cohesion measures for the White non-UK born group.

For the ‘satisfaction’ model, the control variables exhibit patterns that are similar to the UK-born model, although the negative effects of deprivation and the percentage of minority ethnic residents are concentrated towards the most deprived and most diverse areas, rather than there being a general pattern across all areas. For the ‘socialising’ model, the negative association with area deprivation is lost, although much of the positive association with the percentage of minority ethnic residents is retained.

Table 19: Regression output for the White non-UK born group

Regression output for the White non UK-born group											
	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds				
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t		
R squared	0.278			0.221			0.148				
Important British ID	0.023	0.048	0.629	0.043	0.046	0.355	-0.080	0.033	0.017		
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)											
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.018	0.047	0.707	-0.076	0.046	0.099	-0.082	0.042	0.053		
3: Lower supervisory	-0.132	0.062	0.035	-0.147	0.057	0.011	-0.047	0.050	0.348		
4: Routine	-0.021	0.075	0.775	-0.272	0.062	0.000	0.080	0.064	0.212		
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.031	0.135	0.819	-0.249	0.127	0.052	-0.087	0.081	0.286		
6: Students	0.057	0.123	0.642	0.031	0.118	0.792	-0.051	0.076	0.504		
7: Not stated	0.084	0.066	0.209	0.157	0.176	0.374	0.057	0.169	0.735		
Age (years)	0.001	0.002	0.468	0.001	0.002	0.405	-0.006	0.002	0.000		
Sex: female	-0.130	0.039	0.001	0.047	0.040	0.250	-0.053	0.032	0.101		
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)											
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.178	0.092	0.055	-0.049	0.068	0.472	-0.121	0.053	0.024		
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.145	0.054	0.008	-0.189	0.062	0.003	-0.080	0.051	0.115		
4: Foreign or other	-0.255	0.077	0.001	-0.154	0.064	0.018	-0.147	0.047	0.002		
5: No quals	-0.131	0.068	0.054	-0.354	0.070	0.000	-0.072	0.057	0.204		

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)										
2	-0.076	0.098	0.439	0.162	0.079	0.043	0.042	0.066	0.523	
3	0.088	0.070	0.212	0.071	0.085	0.405	0.092	0.054	0.090	
4	0.065	0.072	0.368	-0.012	0.083	0.887	-0.109	0.074	0.142	
5	-0.020	0.086	0.818	-0.065	0.090	0.470	0.080	0.073	0.273	
6	-0.051	0.082	0.540	-0.013	0.075	0.863	0.064	0.070	0.362	
7	-0.169	0.091	0.064	0.087	0.082	0.287	0.040	0.065	0.541	
8	-0.053	0.083	0.523	-0.071	0.079	0.371	0.001	0.074	0.985	
9	-0.422	0.092	0.000	0.012	0.089	0.889	0.016	0.078	0.836	
10	-0.436	0.092	0.000	-0.073	0.080	0.364	-0.069	0.073	0.343	
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)										
2: 1-4 years	0.051	0.065	0.433	0.201	0.048	0.000	-0.005	0.044	0.902	
3: 5-9 years	0.154	0.061	0.012	0.279	0.058	0.000	-0.021	0.046	0.644	
4: 10-29 years	0.220	0.072	0.002	0.384	0.064	0.000	0.025	0.056	0.660	
5: 30 or more years	0.260	0.094	0.006	0.214	0.089	0.017	0.051	0.081	0.528	
Practising a religion	-0.030	0.047	0.526	0.115	0.038	0.003	0.024	0.036	0.499	
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)										
2	-0.149	0.085	0.081	0.025	0.101	0.801	0.069	0.087	0.430	
3	0.047	0.087	0.591	0.094	0.105	0.376	0.007	0.083	0.934	
4	0.079	0.072	0.272	0.103	0.100	0.303	-0.044	0.084	0.606	
5	-0.077	0.090	0.394	0.119	0.089	0.182	-0.009	0.104	0.933	
6	-0.164	0.089	0.068	0.106	0.094	0.264	0.279	0.093	0.003	
7	-0.125	0.102	0.223	-0.072	0.089	0.415	0.192	0.082	0.020	
8	-0.180	0.079	0.024	0.016	0.093	0.860	0.169	0.080	0.037	
9	-0.265	0.086	0.002	-0.088	0.084	0.297	0.210	0.080	0.009	
10	-0.364	0.091	0.000	-0.082	0.083	0.326	0.288	0.081	0.000	
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.010	0.041	0.806	-0.013	0.039	0.743	0.009	0.031	0.770	
cons	1.726	0.114	0.000	0.677	0.114	0.000	1.448	0.104	0.000	

Table 20: Regression output for the Asian group

Regression output for the Asian group												
	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds					
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
R squared	0.073			0.178			0.080					
Important British ID	0.026	0.021	0.204	0.052	0.021	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.270	0.016	0.018	0.365
Born in UK	-0.093	0.026	0.000	0.162	0.025	0.000	-0.016	0.018				
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)												
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.043	0.030	0.156	-0.156	0.030	0.000	-0.024	0.023	0.289			
3: Lower supervisory	-0.032	0.031	0.311	-0.196	0.029	0.000	-0.017	0.020	0.411			
4: Routine	-0.078	0.044	0.079	-0.260	0.035	0.000	-0.071	0.027	0.010			
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.016	0.038	0.680	-0.206	0.034	0.000	-0.113	0.025	0.000			
6: Students	-0.064	0.046	0.157	-0.067	0.045	0.137	0.015	0.029	0.598			
7: Not stated	-0.240	0.093	0.010	-0.124	0.099	0.213	-0.187	0.060	0.002			
Age (years)	-0.004	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.574	-0.002	0.001	0.000			
Sex: female	-0.159	0.021	0.000	-0.005	0.019	0.805	0.000	0.014	0.989			
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)												
2: A levels or equiv.	0.013	0.035	0.702	0.034	0.034	0.315	0.040	0.023	0.079			
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.033	0.029	0.262	-0.044	0.031	0.154	-0.052	0.021	0.012			
4: Foreign or other	0.045	0.043	0.299	-0.200	0.041	0.000	-0.016	0.030	0.602			
5: No quals	0.038	0.030	0.198	-0.275	0.028	0.000	-0.123	0.021	0.000			

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)									
2	-0.020	0.063	0.756	-0.146	0.072	0.045	-0.058	0.043	0.174
3	-0.024	0.065	0.715	-0.033	0.064	0.610	-0.079	0.049	0.106
4	-0.175	0.070	0.012	-0.064	0.061	0.292	-0.109	0.049	0.027
5	-0.168	0.061	0.006	-0.041	0.062	0.511	-0.100	0.042	0.018
6	-0.213	0.061	0.001	-0.141	0.057	0.013	-0.087	0.039	0.026
7	-0.226	0.058	0.000	-0.095	0.059	0.105	-0.079	0.039	0.046
8	-0.306	0.058	0.000	-0.122	0.054	0.024	-0.114	0.038	0.003
9	-0.329	0.060	0.000	-0.093	0.053	0.084	-0.153	0.038	0.000
10	-0.347	0.057	0.000	-0.103	0.054	0.055	-0.193	0.038	0.000
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)									
2: 1-4 years	0.243	0.046	0.000	0.075	0.035	0.035	0.051	0.025	0.038
3: 5-9 years	0.337	0.047	0.000	0.184	0.040	0.000	0.063	0.026	0.016
4: 10-29 years	0.335	0.045	0.000	0.171	0.039	0.000	0.080	0.026	0.002
5: 30 or more years	0.415	0.055	0.000	0.237	0.048	0.000	0.124	0.033	0.000
Practising a religion	0.047	0.025	0.065	0.015	0.022	0.486	-0.032	0.016	0.051
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)									
2	0.071	0.321	0.824	-0.941	0.121	0.000	0.047	0.261	0.857
3	-0.077	0.306	0.801	-0.915	0.095	0.000	0.172	0.262	0.511
4	-0.618	0.324	0.057	-0.769	0.140	0.000	-0.079	0.275	0.775
5	-0.103	0.304	0.734	-0.851	0.091	0.000	0.019	0.270	0.943
6	-0.052	0.306	0.865	-0.982	0.087	0.000	0.126	0.261	0.628
7	-0.001	0.300	0.997	-0.769	0.103	0.000	0.052	0.259	0.841
8	-0.145	0.298	0.627	-0.918	0.083	0.000	0.034	0.259	0.895
9	-0.025	0.294	0.933	-0.976	0.072	0.000	0.107	0.258	0.679
10	-0.108	0.296	0.715	-1.032	0.071	0.000	0.069	0.257	0.789
Survey is year 2008-9	0.023	0.021	0.276	-0.022	0.022	0.314	0.004	0.015	0.789
_cons	1.556	0.306	0.000	1.763	0.106	0.000	1.597	0.263	0.000

Table 20 above shows the regression output for the Asian ethnic group. The R squared value for the 'civic engagement' model is fairly similar to that of the model for the full sample, but for the 'satisfaction' and 'socialising' models the R squared values are lower. The positive association between British identity and 'civic engagement' that was found in the model for the full sample is retained, but there are no associations between British identity and both the 'satisfaction' and 'socialising' cohesion measures.

The patterns exhibited by the control variables are fairly similar to the model for the full sample. However, for the 'satisfaction' model, for the Asian group being older is associated with lower satisfaction with one's place of residence – as opposed to higher scores for the full model. In addition, a respondent's qualifications, and the percentage of minority ethnic residents, are no longer significant for the Asian group as compared to the full sample. For the 'civic engagement' model, the control variables of the Asian model are fairly similar to those for the full sample, with the main difference being that having a higher density of minority ethnic residents is associated with a lower score. For the 'socialising' model, the main difference as compared with the full sample is that having a greater density of minority ethnic residents in one's area is no longer significantly associated.

Table 21 below shows the regression output for the Black group. The R squared values are again lower than for the models using the full sample. There are no associations between British identity and both 'satisfaction with place of residence' and 'socialising with people of different backgrounds', but there is a positive and significant association between British identity and 'civic engagement and volunteering'.

The control variables exhibit similar patterns to the models for the full sample. For the 'satisfaction' model, lower educational qualifications and living in a deprived area are negatively associated, whilst living for a long time in the neighbourhood is positively associated. The main difference for this model is that living in an area with a higher percentage of minority ethnic residents is positively associated. For both the 'civic engagement' and 'socialising' models, the patterns are again similar, except that living in an area with a high percentage of minority ethnic residents is negatively associated with both civic engagement and socialising with people of different backgrounds for the Black group, whereas for the overall sample the results are broadly insignificant, and broadly positive, respectively.

Table 21: Regression output for the Black group

Regression output for the Black group	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
R squared		0.099			0.128			0.076	
Important British ID	-0.042	0.028	0.126	0.124	0.029	0.000	-0.029	0.017	0.103
Born in UK	-0.042	0.030	0.160	0.073	0.032	0.023	-0.038	0.021	0.067
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)									
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.043	0.044	0.335	-0.102	0.038	0.007	-0.034	0.027	0.215
3: Lower supervisory	-0.035	0.039	0.362	-0.134	0.036	0.000	-0.048	0.027	0.073
4: Routine	0.017	0.057	0.766	-0.155	0.055	0.005	0.031	0.037	0.410
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.059	0.057	0.301	-0.174	0.051	0.001	-0.080	0.035	0.022
6: Students	0.018	0.052	0.731	-0.048	0.049	0.331	0.048	0.034	0.155
7: Not stated	0.018	0.131	0.894	-0.083	0.161	0.605	-0.168	0.086	0.051
Age (years)	0.002	0.001	0.149	-0.002	0.001	0.074	-0.004	0.001	0.000
Sex: female	-0.216	0.029	0.000	0.036	0.025	0.152	-0.045	0.018	0.011
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)									
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.124	0.044	0.005	-0.078	0.038	0.041	0.071	0.029	0.015
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.072	0.036	0.043	-0.116	0.038	0.002	-0.019	0.028	0.490
4: Foreign or other	-0.049	0.074	0.515	-0.187	0.055	0.001	-0.017	0.043	0.704
5: No quals	-0.188	0.042	0.000	-0.317	0.050	0.000	-0.066	0.027	0.015

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)										
2	0.096	0.105	0.358	-0.060	0.127	0.636	-0.190	0.110	0.084	
3	0.145	0.086	0.091	-0.124	0.092	0.179	0.020	0.070	0.772	
4	-0.125	0.097	0.198	-0.160	0.087	0.066	0.027	0.078	0.727	
5	-0.084	0.100	0.401	-0.096	0.093	0.302	-0.158	0.075	0.037	
6	-0.113	0.090	0.213	-0.247	0.088	0.005	-0.075	0.072	0.300	
7	-0.157	0.082	0.056	-0.207	0.083	0.013	-0.137	0.070	0.050	
8	-0.238	0.082	0.004	-0.174	0.075	0.020	-0.169	0.066	0.010	
9	-0.224	0.080	0.005	-0.145	0.071	0.041	-0.171	0.068	0.013	
10	-0.265	0.079	0.001	-0.149	0.072	0.039	-0.203	0.067	0.003	
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)										
2: 1-4 years	0.159	0.045	0.000	0.046	0.044	0.295	0.062	0.035	0.078	
3: 5-9 years	0.212	0.050	0.000	0.123	0.051	0.017	0.058	0.040	0.140	
4: 10-29 years	0.249	0.052	0.000	0.134	0.049	0.006	0.090	0.038	0.019	
5: 30 or more years	0.381	0.070	0.000	0.114	0.065	0.079	0.142	0.049	0.004	
Practising a religion	0.069	0.028	0.015	0.123	0.029	0.000	0.003	0.020	0.879	
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)										
2	0.755	0.060	0.000	-0.236	0.123	0.055	-0.289	0.037	0.000	
3	0.451	0.089	0.000	-0.194	0.075	0.010	-0.544	0.096	0.000	
4	0.555	0.158	0.000	-0.293	0.109	0.008	-0.785	0.095	0.000	
5	0.437	0.101	0.000	-0.238	0.078	0.002	-0.729	0.061	0.000	
6	0.629	0.091	0.000	-0.182	0.080	0.023	-0.751	0.073	0.000	
7	0.586	0.087	0.000	-0.283	0.084	0.001	-0.577	0.046	0.000	
8	0.501	0.072	0.000	-0.234	0.067	0.001	-0.711	0.048	0.000	
9	0.645	0.063	0.000	-0.300	0.053	0.000	-0.634	0.037	0.000	
10	0.554	0.060	0.000	-0.316	0.052	0.000	-0.633	0.037	0.000	
Survey is year 2008-9	0.005	0.027	0.857	-0.054	0.025	0.032	0.019	0.018	0.277	
_cons	0.710	0.120	0.000	1.294	0.104	0.000	2.395	0.090	0.000	

Table 22: Regression output for the Mixed group

Regression output for the Mixed group												
	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds					
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
R squared	0.211			0.208			0.132					
Important British ID	-0.027	0.042	0.518	0.031	0.036	0.386	0.018	0.033	0.577			
Born in UK	0.036	0.050	0.472	0.214	0.040	0.000	0.018	0.034	0.593			
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)												
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.014	0.055	0.801	-0.222	0.055	0.000	-0.142	0.043	0.001			
3: Lower supervisory	-0.124	0.051	0.015	-0.233	0.047	0.000	-0.050	0.043	0.249			
4: Routine	-0.160	0.081	0.051	-0.247	0.065	0.000	-0.014	0.054	0.797			
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.084	0.093	0.368	-0.254	0.074	0.001	-0.086	0.061	0.163			
6: Students	-0.293	0.078	0.000	-0.118	0.072	0.104	-0.143	0.067	0.035			
7: Not stated	-0.362	0.145	0.013	0.168	0.201	0.404	-0.147	0.117	0.211			
Age (years)	0.005	0.002	0.008	-0.002	0.002	0.277	-0.004	0.002	0.019			
Sex: female	-0.257	0.041	0.000	0.027	0.034	0.425	-0.055	0.033	0.103			
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)												
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.112	0.059	0.059	-0.105	0.053	0.047	-0.073	0.047	0.124			
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.146	0.060	0.015	-0.171	0.047	0.000	-0.008	0.036	0.832			
4: Foreign or other	0.280	0.112	0.013	-0.231	0.115	0.046	-0.081	0.102	0.426			
5: No quals	-0.020	0.071	0.784	-0.328	0.055	0.000	-0.215	0.062	0.001			

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)										
	2	0.236	0.097	0.016	0.095	0.117	0.415	-0.030	0.080	0.707
	3	0.129	0.094	0.175	0.248	0.111	0.026	-0.130	0.120	0.283
	4	-0.195	0.110	0.077	0.133	0.124	0.288	-0.118	0.079	0.140
	5	-0.192	0.094	0.042	0.259	0.108	0.017	-0.071	0.087	0.415
	6	-0.217	0.120	0.073	0.143	0.128	0.267	-0.126	0.089	0.157
	7	-0.202	0.095	0.035	0.213	0.111	0.056	-0.149	0.070	0.035
	8	-0.264	0.085	0.002	0.054	0.106	0.609	-0.199	0.083	0.017
	9	-0.366	0.092	0.000	0.129	0.106	0.225	-0.211	0.074	0.005
	10	-0.408	0.098	0.000	0.137	0.108	0.207	-0.254	0.075	0.001
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)										
	2: 1-4 years	0.218	0.074	0.004	-0.034	0.072	0.641	0.179	0.070	0.012
	3: 5-9 years	0.188	0.076	0.014	0.172	0.070	0.015	0.176	0.070	0.013
	4: 10-29 years	0.212	0.079	0.008	0.082	0.069	0.236	0.216	0.079	0.007
	5: 30 or more years	0.141	0.100	0.158	0.150	0.095	0.118	0.098	0.080	0.223
	Practising a religion	0.035	0.042	0.409	0.125	0.037	0.001	-0.011	0.033	0.738
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)										
	2	0.140	0.139	0.315	0.203	0.126	0.110	0.094	0.085	0.269
	3	0.004	0.163	0.979	-0.087	0.175	0.619	0.202	0.108	0.063
	4	-0.059	0.117	0.614	0.193	0.133	0.149	0.004	0.147	0.976
	5	-0.031	0.093	0.738	0.186	0.128	0.149	0.142	0.096	0.141
	6	0.030	0.126	0.813	0.150	0.145	0.303	0.150	0.133	0.259
	7	-0.392	0.106	0.000	0.204	0.124	0.101	0.061	0.086	0.479
	8	0.045	0.090	0.620	0.104	0.117	0.379	0.286	0.079	0.000
	9	-0.068	0.073	0.356	0.097	0.114	0.396	0.322	0.060	0.000
	10	-0.065	0.080	0.412	-0.012	0.108	0.908	0.262	0.061	0.000
	Survey is year 2008-9	0.009	0.037	0.806	-0.081	0.036	0.027	0.035	0.033	0.292
	_cons	1.319	0.134	0.000	0.838	0.173	0.000	1.515	0.120	0.000

Table 22 above shows the results of the regression output for the Mixed ethnic group. The R squared values are a little higher than for the models using the overall sample for 'satisfaction' and 'civic engagement', but a little lower for 'socialising with people of different backgrounds'. British identity is not significantly associated with any of the three models.

The control variables for each of the three models are fairly similar to the models for the overall sample, except the negative association for the percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward for the 'satisfaction' model, found for the overall sample, is not found consistently for the Mixed group.

Table 23 below shows the results of the regression output for the Chinese or Other group. The R squared value is a little lower for the 'satisfaction' model, a little higher for the 'civic engagement' model, and about the same for the 'socialising model', as compared with those for the overall sample. There are no significant associations between British identity and any of the social cohesion measures.

For the 'satisfaction' model, educational qualifications are not as clearly negatively associated – aside from the effect of foreign qualifications – as compared to the overall sample; living longer in one's neighbourhood is not as consistently positively associated; and practising a religion becomes positively and significantly associated for the Other group. The control variables for the 'civic engagement' and 'socialising' models exhibit fairly similar patterns to those for the overall sample.

These findings are, of course, only associations, and it is not clear in which direction any causation may go. It may be the case, for instance, that for some ethnic groups, civic engagement and volunteering cause increased British identification, rather than British identification causing increased civic engagement and volunteering. It may also be the case that there is some element of two-way causation, whereby to some extent British identity is causing civic engagement and volunteering, but also civic engagement and volunteering is causing increased British identity. It is unfortunately not possible to determine which is the case from this analysis on its own; more work into potential mechanisms underlying these associations is needed. Last of all, it may be the case that both British identification and one or more of the social cohesion outcomes are being caused by a third concept that is not controlled for in the model. Care has been taken to control for as many of the concepts that could theoretically be relevant for both British identity and social cohesion as is possible but, unfortunately, this last possibility cannot be ruled out entirely.

Table 23: Regression output for the Other group

Regression output for the Other group											
	Satisfaction with place of residence			Civic engagement and volunteering			Socialising with people of different backgrounds				
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t		
R squared	0.131			0.176			0.180				
Important British ID	0.017	0.042	0.685	0.042	0.044	0.341	0.024	0.023	0.305		
Born in UK	-0.051	0.053	0.332	0.130	0.046	0.005	-0.073	0.036	0.040		
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)											
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.023	0.051	0.659	-0.096	0.048	0.044	-0.087	0.039	0.025		
3: Lower supervisory	-0.065	0.055	0.239	-0.096	0.048	0.047	-0.040	0.038	0.293		
4: Routine	-0.088	0.067	0.188	-0.133	0.055	0.017	-0.132	0.048	0.007		
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.021	0.074	0.774	-0.117	0.070	0.095	-0.084	0.061	0.168		
6: Students	-0.075	0.067	0.263	-0.125	0.058	0.033	0.010	0.043	0.810		
7: Not stated	-0.303	0.141	0.033	0.018	0.115	0.874	-0.071	0.065	0.279		
Age (years)	0.003	0.002	0.067	0.001	0.001	0.457	-0.002	0.001	0.104		
Sex: female	-0.139	0.032	0.000	0.033	0.030	0.267	-0.074	0.025	0.003		
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)											
2: A levels or equiv.	0.004	0.062	0.955	0.009	0.058	0.878	0.020	0.043	0.646		
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.060	0.067	0.372	-0.114	0.054	0.036	-0.107	0.041	0.010		
4: Foreign or other	-0.172	0.051	0.001	-0.227	0.052	0.000	-0.047	0.038	0.212		
5: No quals	-0.090	0.049	0.069	-0.361	0.041	0.000	-0.103	0.042	0.014		

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)										
2	-0.051	0.076	0.506	0.222	0.097	0.023	-0.080	0.073	0.278	
3	-0.070	0.076	0.359	-0.007	0.103	0.949	-0.246	0.065	0.000	
4	-0.153	0.091	0.093	0.146	0.105	0.166	-0.101	0.069	0.145	
5	-0.130	0.079	0.100	0.059	0.090	0.510	-0.262	0.073	0.000	
6	-0.223	0.073	0.002	-0.028	0.074	0.703	-0.087	0.068	0.200	
7	-0.278	0.087	0.001	-0.045	0.081	0.578	-0.080	0.071	0.258	
8	-0.359	0.079	0.000	0.028	0.074	0.704	-0.222	0.064	0.001	
9	-0.359	0.078	0.000	0.037	0.077	0.625	-0.214	0.061	0.001	
10	-0.410	0.075	0.000	0.009	0.072	0.898	-0.205	0.064	0.001	
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)										
2: 1-4 years	0.115	0.050	0.022	0.076	0.054	0.157	0.139	0.037	0.000	
3: 5-9 years	0.098	0.065	0.132	0.182	0.062	0.004	0.064	0.048	0.182	
4: 10-29 years	0.094	0.065	0.150	0.050	0.067	0.456	0.147	0.044	0.001	
5: 30 or more years	-0.047	0.102	0.643	0.324	0.114	0.005	-0.177	0.082	0.032	
Practising a religion	0.112	0.041	0.006	0.049	0.032	0.124	0.001	0.031	0.985	
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)										
2	0.083	0.147	0.570	-0.060	0.154	0.697	0.170	0.185	0.361	
3	-0.355	0.131	0.007	-0.369	0.126	0.004	0.383	0.208	0.067	
4	-0.302	0.135	0.026	-0.092	0.163	0.573	0.335	0.197	0.090	
5	-0.449	0.148	0.003	-0.243	0.130	0.062	0.524	0.197	0.008	
6	-0.188	0.133	0.160	-0.367	0.119	0.002	0.558	0.197	0.005	
7	-0.233	0.128	0.070	-0.142	0.130	0.274	0.514	0.193	0.008	
8	-0.111	0.126	0.380	-0.225	0.121	0.063	0.673	0.195	0.001	
9	-0.234	0.127	0.067	-0.221	0.118	0.063	0.669	0.198	0.001	
10	-0.352	0.125	0.005	-0.322	0.114	0.005	0.582	0.196	0.003	
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.010	0.034	0.759	0.042	0.036	0.248	-0.017	0.025	0.508	
_cons	1.638	0.148	0.000	0.907	0.146	0.000	1.180	0.213	0.000	

Another important factor hypothesised in the literature as potentially affecting the relationship between British identity and social cohesion is the generation a member of a minority groups belongs to. For ethnic minority groups, whether or not the respondent was born in the UK may be of particular importance. A binary variable representing whether the respondent was born in the UK (with a value of 1 when born in the UK, and 0 when not) was therefore included as an interaction effect with British identity for each of the models for the different ethnic groups.

The main coefficient of interest is the main effect of British identity in each interaction model, as this allows one to ask, for instance: is an Asian person born in the UK and with a British identity more likely to have positive social cohesion outcomes as compared with an Asian person born in the UK but without a British identity?

The same question can then be asked for an Asian person not born in the UK, by changing the reference category of the interaction model, such that one is comparing to an Asian person born outside the UK but without a British identity, with an Asian person born outside the UK *with* a British identity. The same process can then be followed for each of the ethnic groups, except for the White groups, which are already split between those born and not born in the UK.

In addition, the interaction effect between British identity and being born in the UK shows whether there is an *additional* effect of being *both* born in the UK *and* having a British identity, as compared to being born outside the UK with no British identity. When the reference category is changed, this effect becomes the additional effect of being both born *outside* the UK and having a British identity.

Table 24 shows the results of the regression models with interaction effects for the Asian group. P values are not shown, but associations that are significant at the 5 per cent level are shown in bold. If one looks at the main effect of British identity, it is clear that British identity is only positively associated with the social cohesion measures for those *not* born in the UK. Indeed, there is a *negative* association between British identity and 'satisfaction with place of residence' for Asian respondents born in the UK. This pattern is also captured in the interaction effects for the 'satisfaction' model: there is an *additional* positive effect of being both born outside the UK *and* having a British identity. No significant effects were found for the 'socialising' interaction model, however.

Table 24: Interaction models for the Asian group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
R squared	0.076		0.179		0.080	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.074	0.023	0.070	0.023	0.011	0.017
Main: Born in UK	0.012	0.043	0.203	0.041	-0.026	0.029
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.158	0.047	-0.061	0.047	0.015	0.034
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	-0.084	0.042	0.009	0.043	0.026	0.029
Main: Not born in UK	-0.012	0.043	-0.203	0.041	0.026	0.029
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.158	0.047	0.061	0.047	-0.015	0.034

Table 25 below shows the results of the regression models with interaction effects for the Black group. If one looks at the main effect of British identity, it is again clear that the positive association between British identity and ‘civic engagement’ only holds for those respondents *not* born in the UK. For those born in the UK there is no such association for British identity, and for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ models, no significant effects were found.

Table 25: Interaction models for the Black group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
R squared	0.099		0.129		0.076	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	-0.028	0.034	0.157	0.034	-0.029	0.022
Main: Born in UK	-0.017	0.042	0.129	0.042	-0.040	0.030
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.043	0.055	-0.100	0.054	0.002	0.042
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	-0.072	0.044	0.057	0.045	-0.027	0.034
Main: Not born in UK	0.017	0.042	-0.129	0.042	0.040	0.030
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.043	0.055	0.100	0.054	-0.002	0.042

Table 26, however, shows that the pattern for the Mixed group is a little different. In contrast to the Asian and Black groups, where British identity was associated with positive social cohesion outcomes, but only for those not born in the UK, for the Mixed group it is associated with *decreased* social cohesion for those not born in the UK for both the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ models. This suggests that the relationship between British identity and social cohesion may differ for those of Mixed ethnicity, as compared to those of Asian or Black ethnicity. Finally, Table 27 shows the results of the interaction models for the Chinese or Other group, for which there were no significant associations for British identity.

Table 26: Interaction models for the Mixed group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
R squared	0.215		0.209		0.140	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	-0.163	0.072	-0.028	0.058	-0.124	0.042
Main: Born in UK	-0.030	0.059	0.185	0.051	-0.052	0.041
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	0.191	0.085	0.083	0.071	0.201	0.063
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.028	0.051	0.055	0.043	0.077	0.045
Main: Not born in UK	0.030	0.059	-0.185	0.051	0.052	0.041
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	-0.191	0.085	-0.083	0.071	-0.201	0.063

Table 27: Interaction models for the Other group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
R squared	0.133		0.177		0.182	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	-0.021	0.048	0.065	0.053	0.002	0.026
Main: Born in UK	-0.113	0.069	0.168	0.054	-0.109	0.054
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	0.152	0.090	-0.093	0.086	0.088	0.069
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK						
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.131	0.076	-0.028	0.070	0.091	0.061
Main: Not born in UK	0.113	0.069	-0.168	0.054	0.109	0.054
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	-0.152	0.090	0.093	0.086	-0.088	0.069

Alternative measures of national identity

It is worth asking at this point whether the results presented above remain the same when one makes small adjustments to the key variables – that is, do the results hold consistently, or are they the product of a specific calculation of each of the key variables? For instance, it is worth looking more closely at the variable representing British identity. The existing measure is a binary variable coded as 1 when a respondent mentions British identity as their national identity and also considers their national identity to either be ‘very important’ or ‘quite important’ to their sense of who they are. One could equally plausibly change the variable such that it is only coded as 1 when a respondent considers their national identity to be ‘very important’. The results above (such as in Table 17) show that British identity is associated with increased satisfaction with one’s place of residence, and with increased civic engagement and volunteering. It is worth asking whether these results hold when different measures of British identity are used.

First, one might ask if the results hold when simply comparing those that mention British identity as their national identity with those that do not (rather than including a measure of the strength of national identity). The pattern is in fact very similar, as shown by Table 28 below, as compared with Table 17 above.

Table 28: Associations for alternative measure of British identity			
(positive values = increased social cohesion)			
	Satisfaction with place of residence	Civic engagement and volunteering	Socialising with people of different backgrounds
Effect of British identity	0.028	0.061	0.013
P value	0.008	0.000	0.151
R squared	0.193	0.158	0.189

Second, one might ask whether looking at the importance of respondents’ national identity to their sense of who they are exhibits similar patterns when broken down further. For those people mentioning British identity as their national identity, and compared to those

considering their national identity to be ‘not at all important’ to them, the following associations can be found:

Table 29: Different strengths of British identity (positive values = increased social cohesion; reference = ‘not at all important’)			
	Satisfaction with place of residence	Civic engagement and volunteering	Socialising with people of different backgrounds
‘Not very important’	0.106	0.050	0.044
P value	0.010	0.274	0.234
‘Quite important’	0.156	-0.088	0.061
P value	0.000	0.035	0.069
‘Very important’	0.132	-0.072	0.025
P value	0.000	0.089	0.466
R squared	0.195	0.161	0.190

The pattern shown by Table 29 is interesting: for satisfaction with one’s place of residence, a stronger British identity on the whole increases satisfaction; whereas for civic engagement and volunteering strength of identity seems to make little difference (and in fact possibly decreases the association); and for socialising with people of different backgrounds, British identity appears to have no association at all.

Third, one might ask whether British identity has markedly different relationships to these three elements of social cohesion compared to identification with the nations that make up Britain. When one looks at respondents mentioning English identity as the national identity, the results are striking, as shown in Table 30:

Table 30: Associations between English identity and social cohesion (positive values = increased social cohesion)			
	Satisfaction with place of residence	Civic engagement and volunteering	Socialising with people of different backgrounds
Effect of English identity	-0.003	-0.016	-0.033
P value	0.751	0.168	0.001
R squared	0.192	0.157	0.189

When British identity is replaced by English identity, the positive effects on satisfaction with one's place of residence and civic engagement and volunteering disappear. What is more, having an English identity is associated with *decreased* socialising with people of different backgrounds. Such results are consistent with other research that considers English identity to be an ethnically-based, non-inclusive identity, as compared to British identity which can be 'civic' and more inclusive (e.g. Heath & Roberts 2008). To investigate this further, Tables 31 to 36 show associations between English identity and each of the three elements when broken down by ethnic group. These associations were found in the same way as before, by restricting the sample to each ethnic group in turn. To save space only the coefficients and standard errors are shown; any associations that are significant at the 5 per cent level are shown in bold.

As can be seen from Table 31, the pattern for the overall sample – whereby English identity is not significantly associated with 'satisfaction' and 'civic engagement', yet there is a *negative* association between English identity and 'socialising with people of different backgrounds' – is retained for the White UK-born group. The R squared values for this group are also fairly similar, albeit with a somewhat lower R squared value for the 'socialising' model.

From Table 32 one can see that, for the White non-UK born group, there is a positive association between English identity and 'satisfaction'. However, as with the UK-born group, there is again a negative association for 'socialising with people of different backgrounds, and for this group the association is quite strong – it is greater in magnitude than any of the other variables in the model, aside from those measuring the percentage of minority ethnic

residents in the ward. The R squared values for this group are higher than for the overall sample, with the exception of the 'socialising' model, for which they are slightly lower.

Table 33 shows that, for the Asian group, English identity is significantly and positively related to 'civic engagement and volunteering', but not significantly associated with the other two indicators of cohesion. The R squared values are substantially lower than those for the overall sample for the 'satisfaction' and 'socialising' models, but slightly higher for the 'civic engagement' model.

From Table 34 one can see that, for the Black group, there are positive associations between English identity and 'satisfaction' and 'civic engagement', but no significant associations for the 'socialising' measure. The R squared values for the Black group are all somewhat lower than those for the overall sample.

Table 35 shows the results for the Mixed group. One can see that, for the 'civic engagement' model, there is a significant and negative association with English identity. For the other two models the results are not significant. The R squared values are a little higher for the 'satisfaction' and 'civic engagement' models, but a little lower for the 'socialising' model, as compared to the full sample.

Last of all, Table 36 shows the results for the Chinese or Other group. There are no significant associations between English identity and the 'satisfaction' and 'socialising' measures of cohesion, but a positive association between English identity and the 'civic engagement' measure. The R squared values are fairly similar as compared to the full sample, although the R squared value for the 'satisfaction' model is slightly lower.

Table 31. English identity: regression output for the White UK-born group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
R squared	0.186		0.144		0.142	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	0.013	0.012	-0.016	0.012	-0.025	0.010
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.025	0.017	-0.050	0.017	-0.021	0.014
3: Lower supervisory	-0.054	0.018	-0.108	0.017	-0.023	0.014
4: Routine	-0.083	0.023	-0.155	0.022	-0.017	0.019
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.109	0.041	-0.197	0.039	-0.062	0.032
6: Students	0.013	0.041	-0.042	0.042	0.025	0.033
7: Not stated	0.052	0.069	-0.080	0.069	-0.001	0.059
Age (years)	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.006	0.000
Sex: female	-0.120	0.012	0.064	0.013	-0.035	0.010
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.063	0.019	-0.075	0.019	-0.019	0.016
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.102	0.017	-0.223	0.017	-0.027	0.014
4: Foreign or other	-0.207	0.058	-0.218	0.050	-0.013	0.045
5: No quals	-0.165	0.021	-0.417	0.020	-0.097	0.017
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.060	0.021	0.043	0.025	-0.014	0.024
3	-0.078	0.022	0.018	0.025	-0.039	0.022
4	-0.123	0.023	0.013	0.026	-0.021	0.023
5	-0.159	0.024	0.023	0.028	-0.021	0.024
6	-0.179	0.026	0.012	0.027	-0.053	0.024
7	-0.276	0.027	-0.012	0.028	-0.058	0.023
8	-0.403	0.029	-0.013	0.028	-0.100	0.024
9	-0.465	0.030	-0.047	0.029	-0.104	0.024
10	-0.599	0.031	-0.069	0.029	-0.163	0.026
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.130	0.030	0.037	0.027	0.001	0.021
3: 5-9 years	0.184	0.032	0.115	0.028	-0.003	0.021
4: 10-29 years	0.193	0.030	0.095	0.026	0.028	0.021
5: 30 or more years	0.222	0.032	0.095	0.030	0.023	0.023
Practising a religion	0.014	0.014	0.176	0.014	0.037	0.013
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.011	0.025	0.021	0.027	0.119	0.028
3	-0.035	0.026	-0.017	0.029	0.141	0.027
4	-0.073	0.026	-0.009	0.028	0.177	0.026
5	-0.079	0.024	0.002	0.028	0.251	0.027
6	-0.151	0.026	-0.028	0.028	0.248	0.026
7	-0.109	0.028	-0.008	0.030	0.357	0.027
8	-0.174	0.030	-0.037	0.030	0.404	0.026
9	-0.212	0.031	-0.012	0.032	0.475	0.027
10	-0.250	0.043	-0.083	0.037	0.534	0.029
Survey is year 2008-9	0.005	0.013	-0.018	0.013	0.003	0.012
_cons	1.770	0.045	1.042	0.042	1.143	0.037

Table 32. English identity: regression output for the White non-UK born group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different	
R squared	0.281		0.221		0.159	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	0.113	0.057	0.061	0.053	-0.164	0.039
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.019	0.047	-0.076	0.046	-0.076	0.042
3: Lower supervisory	-0.134	0.062	-0.145	0.057	-0.044	0.050
4: Routine	-0.021	0.075	-0.270	0.061	0.085	0.063
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.030	0.137	-0.245	0.125	-0.084	0.082
6: Students	0.069	0.125	0.038	0.116	-0.077	0.077
7: Not stated	0.113	0.060	0.039	0.159	-0.146	0.130
Age (years)	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.007	0.002
Sex: female	-0.129	0.040	0.044	0.040	-0.055	0.032
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.184	0.091	-0.050	0.067	-0.121	0.053
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.156	0.054	-0.197	0.062	-0.066	0.052
4: Foreign or other	-0.248	0.077	-0.155	0.065	-0.158	0.047
5: No quals	-0.125	0.068	-0.362	0.070	-0.096	0.057
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.065	0.098	0.167	0.079	0.026	0.066
3	0.095	0.069	0.077	0.084	0.084	0.052
4	0.067	0.072	-0.011	0.082	-0.111	0.070
5	-0.017	0.084	-0.072	0.090	0.069	0.072
6	-0.056	0.080	-0.014	0.073	0.067	0.071
7	-0.181	0.089	0.079	0.082	0.060	0.065
8	-0.061	0.082	-0.074	0.079	0.022	0.071
9	-0.420	0.090	0.009	0.089	0.018	0.077
10	-0.429	0.091	-0.068	0.079	-0.080	0.072
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.048	0.065	0.202	0.048	-0.002	0.044
3: 5-9 years	0.144	0.060	0.281	0.059	-0.011	0.046
4: 10-29 years	0.207	0.072	0.382	0.063	0.036	0.056
5: 30 or more years	0.251	0.093	0.221	0.089	0.060	0.085
Practising a religion	-0.030	0.047	0.115	0.038	0.027	0.035
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.155	0.086	0.012	0.101	0.085	0.087
3	0.032	0.089	0.081	0.106	0.030	0.086
4	0.074	0.073	0.079	0.100	-0.047	0.086
5	-0.087	0.091	0.104	0.088	0.016	0.104
6	-0.170	0.090	0.097	0.095	0.296	0.095
7	-0.129	0.104	-0.075	0.088	0.206	0.085
8	-0.185	0.081	0.006	0.093	0.185	0.083
9	-0.270	0.086	-0.101	0.083	0.225	0.082
10	-0.362	0.092	-0.087	0.084	0.285	0.083
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.010	0.041	-0.012	0.039	0.013	0.031
_cons	1.720	0.116	0.687	0.115	1.454	0.107

Table 33. English identity: regression output for the Asian group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different	
R squared	0.074		0.178		0.080	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	0.066	0.036	0.095	0.038	0.028	0.024
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.041	0.030	-0.153	0.030	-0.023	0.023
3: Lower supervisory	-0.033	0.032	-0.198	0.029	-0.017	0.020
4: Routine	-0.079	0.045	-0.263	0.035	-0.072	0.027
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.011	0.039	-0.212	0.034	-0.115	0.025
6: Students	-0.070	0.046	-0.077	0.045	0.013	0.029
7: Not stated	-0.243	0.093	-0.131	0.099	-0.189	0.059
Age (years)	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.001
Sex: female	-0.157	0.021	0.001	0.019	0.001	0.014
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.017	0.035	0.040	0.033	0.042	0.023
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.035	0.029	-0.039	0.030	-0.051	0.021
4: Foreign or other	0.047	0.043	-0.197	0.040	-0.015	0.030
5: No quals	0.040	0.030	-0.270	0.027	-0.123	0.021
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.022	0.063	-0.150	0.074	-0.059	0.043
3	-0.021	0.065	-0.028	0.064	-0.077	0.048
4	-0.173	0.070	-0.060	0.061	-0.108	0.049
5	-0.164	0.061	-0.034	0.062	-0.098	0.042
6	-0.215	0.061	-0.144	0.057	-0.088	0.039
7	-0.224	0.058	-0.092	0.059	-0.077	0.039
8	-0.310	0.059	-0.126	0.055	-0.115	0.038
9	-0.329	0.060	-0.093	0.054	-0.153	0.038
10	-0.345	0.057	-0.102	0.055	-0.192	0.038
Born in UK	-0.094	0.026	0.163	0.024	-0.015	0.018
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.245	0.046	0.079	0.036	0.052	0.025
3: 5-9 years	0.343	0.046	0.197	0.040	0.067	0.026
4: 10-29 years	0.339	0.045	0.181	0.039	0.083	0.026
5: 30 or more years	0.414	0.055	0.245	0.048	0.124	0.033
Practising a religion	0.050	0.025	0.020	0.022	-0.031	0.016
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.049	0.326	-0.980	0.116	0.036	0.262
3	-0.084	0.310	-0.931	0.092	0.168	0.264
4	-0.623	0.327	-0.779	0.141	-0.081	0.277
5	-0.122	0.308	-0.882	0.086	0.010	0.271
6	-0.064	0.310	-1.003	0.084	0.121	0.263
7	-0.010	0.303	-0.787	0.099	0.047	0.261
8	-0.148	0.302	-0.925	0.080	0.033	0.260
9	-0.028	0.298	-0.984	0.068	0.105	0.260
10	-0.111	0.299	-1.039	0.066	0.067	0.259
Survey is year 2008-9	0.025	0.021	-0.021	0.022	0.005	0.015
_cons	1.554	0.310	1.765	0.103	1.596	0.264

Table 34. English identity: regression output for the Black group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different	
R squared	0.101		0.118		0.075	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	0.115	0.036	0.071	0.036	-0.005	0.026
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.040	0.045	-0.107	0.038	-0.032	0.027
3: Lower supervisory	-0.035	0.039	-0.144	0.036	-0.046	0.027
4: Routine	0.012	0.057	-0.162	0.055	0.032	0.038
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.063	0.057	-0.178	0.052	-0.077	0.035
6: Students	0.018	0.052	-0.052	0.050	0.049	0.034
7: Not stated	0.008	0.131	-0.062	0.168	-0.173	0.087
Age (years)	0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.004	0.001
Sex: female	-0.214	0.029	0.045	0.025	-0.047	0.018
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.130	0.043	-0.079	0.039	0.071	0.029
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.080	0.036	-0.108	0.038	-0.021	0.027
4: Foreign or other	-0.048	0.075	-0.193	0.054	-0.015	0.044
5: No quals	-0.193	0.043	-0.314	0.052	-0.067	0.027
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.088	0.117	-0.044	0.128	-0.194	0.110
3	0.150	0.089	-0.089	0.098	0.013	0.070
4	-0.124	0.099	-0.147	0.089	0.025	0.079
5	-0.074	0.103	-0.076	0.095	-0.161	0.076
6	-0.105	0.094	-0.223	0.089	-0.079	0.072
7	-0.150	0.086	-0.195	0.087	-0.139	0.070
8	-0.236	0.087	-0.161	0.077	-0.172	0.066
9	-0.225	0.084	-0.134	0.073	-0.174	0.069
10	-0.259	0.084	-0.142	0.073	-0.204	0.068
Born in UK	-0.066	0.031	0.083	0.031	-0.043	0.022
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.160	0.045	0.055	0.045	0.061	0.035
3: 5-9 years	0.202	0.050	0.144	0.053	0.054	0.040
4: 10-29 years	0.235	0.051	0.160	0.050	0.084	0.038
5: 30 or more years	0.368	0.070	0.138	0.066	0.137	0.049
Practising a religion	0.065	0.029	0.135	0.028	0.000	0.019
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.803	0.064	-0.169	0.114	-0.298	0.039
3	0.548	0.090	-0.108	0.086	-0.554	0.101
4	0.661	0.162	-0.196	0.117	-0.797	0.101
5	0.527	0.108	-0.129	0.081	-0.744	0.066
6	0.717	0.096	-0.075	0.079	-0.767	0.076
7	0.685	0.095	-0.174	0.092	-0.591	0.050
8	0.598	0.077	-0.115	0.077	-0.727	0.059
9	0.744	0.070	-0.191	0.059	-0.648	0.044
10	0.654	0.068	-0.198	0.058	-0.649	0.045
Survey is year 2008-9	0.003	0.027	-0.052	0.025	0.018	0.018
_cons	0.596	0.132	1.162	0.112	2.414	0.096

Table 35. English identity: regression output for the Mixed group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different	
R squared	0.211		0.213		0.132	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	-0.034	0.045	-0.090	0.044	-0.023	0.042
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.013	0.056	-0.218	0.054	-0.142	0.043
3: Lower supervisory	-0.119	0.051	-0.228	0.047	-0.049	0.043
4: Routine	-0.152	0.082	-0.240	0.065	-0.014	0.055
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.082	0.093	-0.242	0.074	-0.082	0.061
6: Students	-0.293	0.078	-0.112	0.072	-0.141	0.069
7: Not stated	-0.338	0.149	0.223	0.193	-0.134	0.121
Age (years)	0.005	0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.002
Sex: female	-0.263	0.042	0.026	0.034	-0.054	0.033
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.112	0.059	-0.096	0.051	-0.070	0.047
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.148	0.060	-0.162	0.047	-0.004	0.037
4: Foreign or other	0.285	0.112	-0.238	0.115	-0.085	0.102
5: No quals	-0.015	0.070	-0.321	0.056	-0.214	0.061
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.244	0.096	0.082	0.112	-0.037	0.079
3	0.128	0.096	0.238	0.108	-0.133	0.120
4	-0.192	0.111	0.112	0.120	-0.126	0.081
5	-0.194	0.094	0.252	0.108	-0.073	0.087
6	-0.208	0.121	0.164	0.125	-0.123	0.090
7	-0.198	0.095	0.210	0.109	-0.151	0.070
8	-0.262	0.086	0.042	0.103	-0.204	0.083
9	-0.363	0.092	0.120	0.104	-0.215	0.074
10	-0.402	0.097	0.134	0.107	-0.257	0.075
Born in UK	0.041	0.052	0.243	0.040	0.027	0.037
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.228	0.075	-0.021	0.072	0.181	0.070
3: 5-9 years	0.196	0.077	0.192	0.071	0.180	0.070
4: 10-29 years	0.218	0.080	0.092	0.068	0.218	0.078
5: 30 or more years	0.157	0.101	0.173	0.096	0.102	0.079
Practising a religion	0.037	0.042	0.133	0.037	-0.010	0.034
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.121	0.141	0.208	0.120	0.102	0.089
3	-0.006	0.164	-0.055	0.176	0.217	0.109
4	-0.069	0.120	0.212	0.124	0.014	0.151
5	-0.044	0.089	0.199	0.124	0.150	0.099
6	0.021	0.118	0.173	0.138	0.161	0.130
7	-0.397	0.104	0.221	0.118	0.068	0.088
8	0.033	0.090	0.116	0.114	0.293	0.082
9	-0.079	0.070	0.115	0.108	0.330	0.063
10	-0.079	0.075	0.001	0.102	0.270	0.063
Survey is year 2008-9	0.009	0.037	-0.076	0.036	0.036	0.032
_cons	1.324	0.134	0.826	0.171	1.510	0.121

Table 36. English identity: regression output for the Other group

	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different	
R squared	0.130		0.184		0.181	
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Important English ID	0.055	0.059	0.226	0.059	-0.084	0.047
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.022	0.052	-0.099	0.048	-0.086	0.038
3: Lower supervisory	-0.066	0.056	-0.099	0.049	-0.038	0.038
4: Routine	-0.089	0.067	-0.131	0.057	-0.135	0.048
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.019	0.074	-0.120	0.070	-0.088	0.060
6: Students	-0.076	0.066	-0.131	0.057	0.006	0.043
7: Not stated	-0.297	0.140	0.034	0.116	-0.070	0.064
Age (years)	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.001
Sex: female	-0.137	0.032	0.039	0.029	-0.076	0.024
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.001	0.062	0.001	0.058	0.023	0.043
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.058	0.067	-0.123	0.055	-0.103	0.041
4: Foreign or other	-0.174	0.050	-0.231	0.050	-0.052	0.038
5: No quals	-0.087	0.049	-0.356	0.042	-0.105	0.042
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.049	0.075	0.214	0.095	-0.065	0.073
3	-0.067	0.075	-0.003	0.103	-0.241	0.063
4	-0.157	0.090	0.123	0.103	-0.092	0.068
5	-0.129	0.079	0.061	0.091	-0.260	0.072
6	-0.220	0.073	-0.023	0.073	-0.087	0.067
7	-0.277	0.086	-0.047	0.081	-0.078	0.069
8	-0.360	0.079	0.020	0.074	-0.219	0.063
9	-0.360	0.077	0.029	0.076	-0.210	0.060
10	-0.409	0.076	-0.003	0.073	-0.198	0.063
Born in UK	-0.056	0.055	0.097	0.046	-0.048	0.034
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.112	0.050	0.068	0.054	0.137	0.037
3: 5-9 years	0.097	0.064	0.180	0.059	0.065	0.048
4: 10-29 years	0.093	0.064	0.051	0.063	0.148	0.045
5: 30 or more years	-0.066	0.105	0.267	0.114	-0.167	0.084
Practising a religion	0.114	0.041	0.054	0.031	0.003	0.030
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.080	0.147	-0.078	0.154	0.181	0.185
3	-0.350	0.133	-0.400	0.130	0.416	0.211
4	-0.314	0.138	-0.149	0.173	0.360	0.198
5	-0.451	0.147	-0.266	0.134	0.547	0.197
6	-0.188	0.133	-0.381	0.121	0.577	0.197
7	-0.244	0.130	-0.199	0.133	0.545	0.193
8	-0.117	0.126	-0.263	0.124	0.696	0.195
9	-0.233	0.128	-0.235	0.121	0.693	0.198
10	-0.352	0.126	-0.339	0.118	0.604	0.196
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.010	0.033	0.044	0.035	-0.016	0.025
_cons	1.642	0.149	0.949	0.147	1.155	0.212

Religion

Religion was also identified as something that could potentially affect the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. A respondent's religion was therefore included in the model to test whether this fundamentally changed the results. In addition, an interaction effect between British identity and religion was included, in order to investigate the main effect of British identity in each interaction model. This enables one to ask: compared to someone of a particular religion, and without a British identity, what is the effect of being of that religion and having a British identity? First of all, a simple interaction between whether or not a respondent actively practices a religion and whether or not the respondent had a British identity that was important to them was included. The results of the main effects of British identity from the interaction model is shown in Table 37 below, with the effects of both non-practising and practising religious respondents being found by changing the reference category as appropriate.

Table 37: Effect of British identity for those that are practising and non-practising (the effect of British identity; positive values = increased social cohesion)			
	Satisfaction with place of residence	Civic engagement and volunteering	Socialising with people of different backgrounds
Non-practising	0.047	0.036	0.009
P value	0.000	0.008	0.436
Practising	0.028	0.033	0.031
P value	0.133	0.072	0.049
R squared	0.194	0.159	0.189

Next, interaction models were produced between British identity and different religions. By changing the reference category and looking at the main effect of British identity, this allowed one to ask: compared to a practising Christian with no strong British identity, what is the effect of being a practising Christian and have a strong British identity? The same question can be

repeated for each of the other religions with categories available in the Citizenship Survey. Table 38 below shows the results, along with those for non-practising people and those who have no religion.

Table 38: Effect of having a British identity for different religious groups							
	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement & volunteering		Socialising with different backgrounds		
	Coeff.	p	Coeff.	p	Coeff.	p	n
Christian	0.022	0.31	0.04	0.067	0.044	0.021	7383
Buddhist	-0.154	0.371	-0.248	0.089	-0.118	0.301	160
Hindu	-0.049	0.294	0.091	0.047	0.055	0.111	1214
Jew	-0.181	0.534	0.175	0.488	-0.056	0.748	53
Muslim	0.075	0.055	0.08	0.026	-0.014	0.606	3196
Sikh	-0.039	0.631	-0.044	0.497	0.038	0.501	492
Other relig.	0.131	0.22	-0.038	0.677	0.035	0.66	463
Not practice	0.049	0.001	0.036	0.019	0.009	0.463	12401
No religion	-0.036	0.176	0.037	0.178	0.005	0.834	3553
R squared	0.1967		0.1593		0.1894		

As one can see, there is no particularly clear pattern here. The most obvious finding is that for those that are *not* practicing, there is a positive association between British identity and social cohesion on two of the indicators. In addition, one positive effect is found for Christian, Hindu and Muslim groups.

Control variables

For these three models many of the control variables are also statistically significant, so it is informative to analyse these control variables both in terms of other factors that may be associated with social cohesion, and by way of comparison with the magnitudes of the effects of British identity.

Area deprivation

By far the strongest and most consistent predictor of satisfaction with one's place of residence is the control variable representing area deprivation, derived from the ODPM Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) for England and IMD for Wales from the year 2005 for the 2007-8 dataset, and 2007 for the 2008-9 dataset (UKDA 2009).⁸ This variable is split into deciles, and compared to a respondent living in the decile representing an area of least deprivation, living in a more deprived area is consistently associated with lower social cohesion outcomes in terms of satisfaction with one's place of residence. What is more, the magnitude of this effect is stronger for each consecutive decile, and all effects bar one are significant at the 1% level, with the remaining effect being significant at the 5% level. These results make intuitive sense: respondents are more likely to be satisfied with their place of residence if it is less materially deprived. However, this measure of social cohesion also contains variables referring to trust, respect for difference, whether people pull together to improve the neighbourhood, and feeling safe after dark, indicating that material deprivation also has a strong association with these issues. In addition, the magnitude and consistency of the results is striking, despite the fact that one cannot say simply from these associations that material deprivation causes lower social cohesion on this measure.

This association is not, however, found as consistently for the other two measures. Area deprivation is not significantly associated with civic engagement and volunteering, except for the most deprived decile, whilst for socialising with people of other backgrounds the pattern is stronger, but not as strong as for satisfaction with one's place of residence.

⁸ Care has been taken to check that there is no significant overlap between the IMD and other variables included in the model. The IMD is a weighted average of 7 domains of deprivation: income, employment, health & disability, education, skills & training, housing & services, living environment deprivation, and crime (DCLG 2008). There are 38 indicators 'feeding into' the 7 domains. There should be no problem with overlap with other variables in the model because the IMD variables are derived from area-level data – from Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs), which contain an average of around 1,500 people – whereas all other variables used in the model are individual-level. For instance, the education domain of the IMD is derived from indicators such as average GCSE scores at the LSOA level, and the proportion of people going into higher education. These indicators should not be correlated to a large degree with the variable in the model representing an individual respondent's highest level of education.

Table 39 shows the associations between area deprivation and each of the measures of social cohesion, with the reference category being the least deprived decile. Negative values indicate decreased social cohesion outcomes. Alternative calculations using jackknife variance estimation yielded very similar results, with no substantive changes in terms of significant or insignificant effects – full details can be found in the Appendix Part D.

Table 39: The effect of area deprivation, deciles						
(reference = least deprived; 10 = most deprived)						
	Satisfaction with one's place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
	Coefficient	P value	Coefficient	P value	Coefficient	P value
2	-0.060	0.005	0.044	0.076	-0.012	0.582
3	-0.065	0.002	0.019	0.425	-0.036	0.090
4	-0.111	0.000	0.005	0.841	-0.028	0.193
5	-0.156	0.000	0.017	0.497	-0.018	0.415
6	-0.178	0.000	0.004	0.861	-0.045	0.039
7	-0.278	0.000	-0.009	0.716	-0.048	0.024
8	-0.376	0.000	-0.020	0.421	-0.095	0.000
9	-0.455	0.000	-0.035	0.164	-0.099	0.000
10	-0.558	0.000	-0.063	0.012	-0.155	0.000

Level of qualifications

Another control variable with strong associations with some of the three measures is the variable representing the level of a respondent's qualifications. The results are particularly striking for civic engagement and volunteering: for instance, compared to having a degree-level qualification, having no qualifications is strongly associated with negative civic engagement and volunteering outcomes, and the qualification associations are the strongest of any of the variables in the model. Higher outcomes in terms of satisfaction with one's place of residence, and socialising with people of other backgrounds, are also fairly consistently and strongly associated with a higher level of qualifications.

Table 40 shows the associations between level of qualifications and each of the three measures of social cohesion. In each case it is asked: compared to a respondent with a degree or equivalent, what is the effect of having the stated (lower) level of qualifications?

Table 40: The effect of level of qualifications on social cohesion						
(reference = higher education)						
	Satisfaction with one's place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
	Coeff.	P value	Coeff.	P value	Coeff.	P value
A level or equivalent	-0.061	0.000	-0.068	0.000	-0.025	0.085
GCSE or equivalent	-0.089	0.000	-0.208	0.000	-0.036	0.004
Foreign or other qualifications	-0.177	0.000	-0.233	0.000	-0.054	0.051
No qualifications	-0.142	0.000	-0.403	0.000	-0.105	0.000

Comparison of magnitude of effects

To understand the relative size of the associations between British identity and each of the three social cohesion measures it is informative to compare the magnitude of each effect with those of the control variables. What one finds is that the effect of at least one of qualifications or area deprivation dwarfs the effect of British identity. Figures 11 and 12 below show the effects of British identity, together with the effect of having a higher education qualification as compared to no qualifications, and living in one of the least deprived areas as compared to one of the most, for the 'satisfaction' and 'civic engagement' models for the whole sample (not broken down by ethnic group). Given that a significant effect of British identity was not found for the overall sample for the 'socialising' model, the White non-UK born model is shown for illustrative purposes. Positive values indicate positive social cohesion outcomes.

It is clear from these charts that area deprivation is of great importance to whether or not someone is satisfied with their place of residence, qualifications of great importance to whether someone is involved with civic activities and volunteering, whilst both are of considerable importance to socialising with people of other backgrounds (for the White UK-born group). For this last model, British identity is negatively associated with cohesion, but the positive effect of reduced deprivation is still twice as large in magnitude.

Figure 11: Size of effects – satisfaction with place of residence




Figure 12: Size of effects - civic engagement & volunteering





Figure 13: Size of effects - socialising with people of different backgrounds



4.32: Models with a moderate level of explanatory power

Turning now to the group of models with a moderate level of explanatory power, Table 41 below shows the results of regression models for ‘belonging to Britain’ and ‘belonging to one’s local area’. Having a British identity is associated with increased belonging to both Britain and one’s local area, and this effect is significant at both the 5% and 1% levels. Female respondents exhibit higher scores on each of the belonging measures; and both area deprivation and having a high percentage of minority ethnic respondents in one’s ward are in general negatively associated with belonging, particularly for belonging to one’s local area.

Table 41: Regression output for belonging cohesion measures

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.104	0.008	0.000	0.047	0.012	0.000
Ethnic group (ref=White)						
2: Asian	0.045	0.019	0.016	0.240	0.026	0.000
3: Black	-0.033	0.019	0.087	0.141	0.028	0.000
4: Mixed	-0.037	0.021	0.078	0.139	0.030	0.000
5: Chinese / Other	-0.091	0.025	0.000	0.111	0.033	0.001
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.030	0.012	0.016	0.007	0.017	0.656
3: Lower supervisory	-0.065	0.013	0.000	0.009	0.017	0.571
4: Routine	-0.075	0.018	0.000	0.027	0.024	0.270
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.028	0.021	0.185	0.028	0.032	0.378
6: Students	-0.001	0.025	0.977	0.001	0.037	0.978
7: Not stated	-0.071	0.042	0.093	0.090	0.053	0.092
Age (years)	0.000	0.000	0.987	0.002	0.000	0.000
Sex: female	0.042	0.008	0.000	0.071	0.011	0.000
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.036	0.013	0.006	0.003	0.019	0.881
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.071	0.012	0.000	0.020	0.017	0.230
4: Foreign or other	-0.128	0.032	0.000	0.009	0.038	0.819
5: No quals	-0.089	0.014	0.000	0.053	0.019	0.006

Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.012	0.018	0.497	-0.014	0.024	0.549
3	-0.003	0.017	0.854	-0.009	0.024	0.704
4	-0.047	0.018	0.009	-0.028	0.024	0.246
5	-0.020	0.018	0.255	-0.056	0.025	0.024
6	-0.025	0.018	0.167	-0.079	0.026	0.003
7	-0.077	0.020	0.000	-0.116	0.026	0.000
8	-0.059	0.020	0.003	-0.171	0.026	0.000
9	-0.067	0.020	0.001	-0.206	0.026	0.000
10	-0.063	0.019	0.001	-0.208	0.028	0.000
Born in UK	0.045	0.016	0.004	-0.027	0.022	0.221
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.017	0.021	0.417	0.120	0.027	0.000
3: 5-9 years	0.034	0.022	0.122	0.249	0.027	0.000
4: 10-29 years	0.048	0.020	0.019	0.327	0.026	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.061	0.022	0.006	0.440	0.028	0.000
Practising a religion	0.027	0.010	0.006	0.064	0.013	0.000
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.024	0.018	0.175	0.008	0.030	0.793
3	-0.031	0.017	0.076	-0.044	0.032	0.162
4	-0.060	0.018	0.001	-0.044	0.030	0.144
5	-0.029	0.017	0.088	-0.042	0.030	0.161
6	-0.057	0.017	0.001	-0.117	0.032	0.000
7	-0.069	0.019	0.000	-0.106	0.032	0.001
8	-0.095	0.018	0.000	-0.151	0.032	0.000
9	-0.074	0.020	0.000	-0.155	0.035	0.000
10	-0.057	0.022	0.009	-0.168	0.035	0.000
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.009	0.008	0.274	0.018	0.012	0.149
_cons	1.348	0.036	0.000	0.806	0.049	0.000
R squared	0.055		0.106			

If one again breaks the sample down by ethnic group, regression output can be shown for each group separately, as before. The question one is asking is: compared to a member of the specified ethnic group without a British identity, is having a British identity associated with increased or decreased belonging for that ethnic group? Tables 42 to 47 show the regression output for each ethnic group separately, and significant associations (at the 5% level) are shown in bold.

The tables below show that British identity is positively and significantly associated with both belonging to Britain and to one's local area for the White UK-born group and the Asian group. For the White non-UK born, Black, Mixed, and Chinese or Other groups, British identity is significantly and positively associated with belonging to Britain, but not to one's local area. The

R squared values for several of the belonging regression models are higher for certain ethnic groups: notably the White non-UK born, Mixed, and Chinese or Other groups.

Table 42: Regression output for belonging models - White UK born

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.091	0.009	0.000	0.042	0.013	0.001
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.036	0.014	0.010	0.012	0.018	0.523
3: Lower supervisory	-0.064	0.014	0.000	0.008	0.018	0.657
4: Routine	-0.067	0.019	0.001	0.037	0.025	0.149
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.045	0.027	0.100	0.009	0.041	0.831
6: Students	0.016	0.031	0.612	-0.009	0.046	0.845
7: Not stated	-0.047	0.046	0.304	0.111	0.062	0.076
Age (years)	0.000	0.000	0.181	0.002	0.001	0.004
Sex: female	0.053	0.009	0.000	0.082	0.013	0.000
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	-0.054	0.014	0.000	0.003	0.020	0.892
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.088	0.013	0.000	0.017	0.018	0.360
4: Foreign or other	-0.123	0.045	0.007	0.108	0.047	0.021
5: No quals	-0.111	0.016	0.000	0.050	0.022	0.020
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.020	0.020	0.298	-0.026	0.025	0.298
3	-0.010	0.018	0.590	-0.023	0.025	0.362
4	-0.055	0.019	0.005	-0.044	0.025	0.080
5	-0.020	0.019	0.285	-0.050	0.027	0.058
6	-0.031	0.019	0.108	-0.086	0.028	0.002
7	-0.086	0.022	0.000	-0.128	0.028	0.000
8	-0.072	0.023	0.002	-0.195	0.029	0.000
9	-0.072	0.023	0.002	-0.213	0.029	0.000
10	-0.082	0.022	0.000	-0.223	0.032	0.000
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	-0.019	0.023	0.411	0.115	0.033	0.000
3: 5-9 years	-0.022	0.024	0.361	0.232	0.033	0.000
4: 10-29 years	-0.005	0.022	0.836	0.308	0.031	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.021	0.024	0.374	0.427	0.032	0.000
Practising a religion	0.028	0.011	0.008	0.058	0.015	0.000
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.029	0.018	0.119	0.008	0.031	0.802
3	-0.034	0.018	0.057	-0.046	0.032	0.145
4	-0.064	0.018	0.000	-0.044	0.031	0.152
5	-0.032	0.018	0.073	-0.043	0.030	0.156
6	-0.064	0.018	0.000	-0.120	0.032	0.000
7	-0.072	0.020	0.000	-0.106	0.032	0.001
8	-0.103	0.019	0.000	-0.139	0.033	0.000
9	-0.077	0.022	0.000	-0.167	0.039	0.000
10	-0.062	0.026	0.019	-0.189	0.044	0.000
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.014	0.009	0.124	0.019	0.013	0.165
_cons	1.484	0.036	0.000	0.809	0.050	0.000
R squared	0.054			0.101		

Table 43: Regression output for belonging models - White non UK born

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.145	0.029	0.000	0.050	0.054	0.357
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	0.034	0.041	0.405	-0.084	0.053	0.114
3: Lower supervisory	-0.098	0.052	0.062	0.010	0.068	0.884
4: Routine	-0.196	0.073	0.008	-0.115	0.092	0.213
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.088	0.078	0.262	0.244	0.101	0.016
6: Students	-0.001	0.116	0.993	0.010	0.135	0.939
7: Not stated	-0.313	0.094	0.001	0.225	0.154	0.146
Age (years)	0.003	0.001	0.015	0.002	0.002	0.226
Sex: female	-0.019	0.036	0.594	0.052	0.045	0.250
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.038	0.067	0.569	-0.021	0.093	0.823
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.033	0.063	0.602	0.013	0.078	0.873
4: Foreign or other	-0.043	0.062	0.488	-0.080	0.066	0.226
5: No quals	-0.024	0.051	0.634	0.108	0.072	0.138
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.142	0.054	0.009	0.141	0.094	0.134
3	0.125	0.060	0.039	0.109	0.077	0.157
4	0.082	0.062	0.189	0.173	0.081	0.034
5	0.017	0.057	0.773	-0.076	0.088	0.386
6	0.055	0.056	0.325	-0.036	0.084	0.666
7	0.046	0.075	0.537	0.035	0.079	0.656
8	0.030	0.067	0.657	-0.067	0.090	0.459
9	-0.041	0.074	0.582	-0.234	0.094	0.014
10	0.138	0.071	0.052	-0.192	0.093	0.040
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.072	0.060	0.231	-0.056	0.068	0.412
3: 5-9 years	0.205	0.055	0.000	0.211	0.074	0.005
4: 10-29 years	0.223	0.057	0.000	0.319	0.073	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.187	0.068	0.006	0.483	0.092	0.000
Practising a religion	-0.006	0.038	0.876	0.087	0.049	0.079
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.125	0.074	0.091	0.065	0.083	0.433
3	0.053	0.081	0.513	0.017	0.090	0.854
4	0.069	0.075	0.358	0.028	0.091	0.755
5	0.066	0.082	0.418	0.098	0.103	0.338
6	0.086	0.074	0.246	-0.021	0.098	0.828
7	0.024	0.081	0.766	-0.011	0.113	0.926
8	0.053	0.075	0.480	-0.206	0.096	0.033
9	0.008	0.071	0.907	-0.084	0.091	0.360
10	0.029	0.073	0.692	-0.126	0.087	0.148
Survey is year 2008-9	0.040	0.033	0.230	0.031	0.041	0.452
_cons	0.889	0.104	0.000	0.752	0.132	0.000
R squared	0.167			0.219		

Table 44: Regression output for belonging models - Asian

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.116	0.013	0.000	0.072	0.019	0.000
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	0.010	0.019	0.595	0.021	0.027	0.429
3: Lower supervisory	-0.004	0.021	0.865	0.028	0.026	0.282
4: Routine	0.003	0.029	0.912	-0.021	0.036	0.561
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.042	0.024	0.086	0.033	0.033	0.317
6: Students	-0.015	0.034	0.651	-0.002	0.041	0.964
7: Not stated	-0.117	0.079	0.137	-0.266	0.130	0.041
Age (years)	0.002	0.001	0.009	-0.001	0.001	0.453
Sex: female	0.024	0.013	0.075	-0.021	0.019	0.281
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.061	0.022	0.006	0.049	0.029	0.098
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.044	0.019	0.023	0.049	0.029	0.086
4: Foreign or other	-0.047	0.035	0.183	0.055	0.042	0.192
5: No quals	0.027	0.022	0.215	0.061	0.027	0.023
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.043	0.048	0.365	-0.037	0.066	0.572
3	-0.037	0.039	0.348	0.043	0.070	0.543
4	-0.074	0.041	0.072	-0.027	0.078	0.728
5	-0.022	0.037	0.548	-0.072	0.068	0.290
6	-0.029	0.040	0.470	-0.063	0.063	0.319
7	-0.064	0.037	0.087	-0.080	0.063	0.202
8	-0.034	0.037	0.363	-0.033	0.060	0.589
9	-0.021	0.037	0.566	-0.086	0.061	0.158
10	-0.060	0.037	0.102	-0.074	0.061	0.224
Born in UK	-0.015	0.016	0.344	-0.109	0.024	0.000
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.096	0.035	0.006	0.293	0.045	0.000
3: 5-9 years	0.176	0.032	0.000	0.421	0.046	0.000
4: 10-29 years	0.168	0.032	0.000	0.488	0.042	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.143	0.039	0.000	0.505	0.048	0.000
Practising a religion	-0.003	0.015	0.835	0.057	0.023	0.012
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.062	0.120	0.603	0.421	0.609	0.490
3	0.099	0.099	0.317	0.427	0.603	0.480
4	-0.039	0.135	0.776	0.299	0.610	0.624
5	0.083	0.112	0.458	0.420	0.605	0.488
6	0.198	0.084	0.019	0.570	0.602	0.344
7	0.147	0.090	0.103	0.487	0.600	0.417
8	0.112	0.083	0.180	0.499	0.599	0.405
9	0.179	0.079	0.024	0.547	0.597	0.360
10	0.156	0.079	0.047	0.516	0.598	0.388
Survey is year 2008-9	0.006	0.014	0.663	-0.018	0.018	0.321
_cons	0.956	0.097	0.000	0.295	0.603	0.625
R squared	0.084			0.099		

Table 45: Regression output for belonging models - Black

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.106	0.019	0.000	0.036	0.027	0.184
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	-0.026	0.031	0.408	0.063	0.040	0.122
3: Lower supervisory	-0.004	0.028	0.884	0.006	0.038	0.876
4: Routine	0.015	0.035	0.669	0.016	0.052	0.763
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.028	0.049	0.564	0.035	0.048	0.468
6: Students	-0.063	0.043	0.140	0.004	0.052	0.943
7: Not stated	0.026	0.109	0.809	0.073	0.107	0.494
Age (years)	0.000	0.001	0.818	0.001	0.001	0.646
Sex: female	-0.012	0.020	0.544	-0.037	0.027	0.162
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.013	0.033	0.700	-0.010	0.043	0.823
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.042	0.027	0.114	0.025	0.042	0.554
4: Foreign or other	0.015	0.045	0.741	0.068	0.050	0.171
5: No quals	0.010	0.032	0.747	0.028	0.043	0.518
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	-0.050	0.090	0.580	-0.095	0.126	0.451
3	0.049	0.078	0.533	0.384	0.085	0.000
4	0.119	0.066	0.073	0.033	0.118	0.778
5	-0.031	0.070	0.660	-0.072	0.113	0.526
6	0.030	0.052	0.557	0.067	0.097	0.490
7	0.003	0.053	0.959	-0.017	0.097	0.857
8	0.053	0.049	0.286	-0.001	0.092	0.992
9	0.031	0.050	0.542	-0.054	0.090	0.547
10	0.014	0.051	0.777	-0.029	0.088	0.738
Born in UK	-0.055	0.022	0.015	-0.059	0.030	0.050
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	-0.006	0.040	0.881	0.252	0.059	0.000
3: 5-9 years	0.064	0.042	0.129	0.340	0.057	0.000
4: 10-29 years	0.100	0.042	0.017	0.408	0.062	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.120	0.050	0.016	0.542	0.072	0.000
Practising a religion	0.113	0.021	0.000	0.088	0.028	0.002
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	-0.102	0.043	0.018	-0.447	0.159	0.005
3	-0.491	0.214	0.022	-0.098	0.112	0.383
4	-0.502	0.130	0.000	-0.635	0.138	0.000
5	-0.385	0.087	0.000	-0.652	0.154	0.000
6	-0.338	0.053	0.000	-0.500	0.097	0.000
7	-0.262	0.051	0.000	-0.545	0.100	0.000
8	-0.429	0.057	0.000	-0.625	0.085	0.000
9	-0.425	0.044	0.000	-0.526	0.057	0.000
10	-0.400	0.042	0.000	-0.515	0.057	0.000
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.026	0.017	0.143	0.016	0.029	0.574
_cons	1.494	0.086	0.000	1.175	0.123	0.000
R squared	0.060			0.076		

Table 46: Regression output for belonging models - Mixed

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.104	0.024	0.000	-0.001	0.034	0.986
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	0.025	0.038	0.513	0.015	0.046	0.740
3: Lower supervisory	-0.041	0.035	0.238	-0.088	0.048	0.070
4: Routine	0.057	0.052	0.275	0.025	0.081	0.752
5: Never worked/unemp.	0.019	0.071	0.790	0.042	0.086	0.624
6: Students	0.025	0.048	0.602	-0.140	0.067	0.039
7: Not stated	-0.354	0.103	0.001	-0.675	0.208	0.001
Age (years)	0.000	0.001	0.965	-0.001	0.002	0.396
Sex: female	-0.037	0.026	0.165	-0.036	0.035	0.306
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.036	0.041	0.382	-0.064	0.051	0.206
3: GCSEs or equiv.	0.012	0.042	0.770	0.022	0.050	0.669
4: Foreign or other	-0.037	0.091	0.687	0.117	0.133	0.381
5: No quals	-0.039	0.055	0.478	0.104	0.064	0.106
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.041	0.067	0.544	0.344	0.107	0.002
3	0.071	0.058	0.220	0.199	0.111	0.074
4	0.136	0.056	0.017	0.441	0.109	0.000
5	0.121	0.048	0.013	0.251	0.091	0.006
6	0.048	0.070	0.495	0.204	0.098	0.039
7	0.074	0.052	0.157	0.168	0.094	0.075
8	0.029	0.056	0.605	0.131	0.096	0.174
9	-0.036	0.059	0.547	0.055	0.100	0.581
10	0.053	0.054	0.323	-0.021	0.098	0.826
Born in UK	-0.005	0.033	0.892	0.018	0.042	0.670
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.167	0.058	0.004	0.497	0.075	0.000
3: 5-9 years	0.165	0.058	0.005	0.536	0.072	0.000
4: 10-29 years	0.167	0.059	0.005	0.628	0.072	0.000
5: 30 or more years	0.144	0.069	0.038	0.854	0.093	0.000
Practising a religion	0.069	0.027	0.012	0.100	0.039	0.010
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.404	0.067	0.000	0.321	0.216	0.138
3	0.349	0.099	0.001	0.266	0.226	0.241
4	0.408	0.081	0.000	0.178	0.224	0.428
5	0.474	0.064	0.000	0.203	0.218	0.354
6	0.544	0.076	0.000	0.316	0.219	0.151
7	0.361	0.076	0.000	-0.092	0.221	0.679
8	0.387	0.064	0.000	0.108	0.215	0.615
9	0.460	0.061	0.000	0.310	0.208	0.138
10	0.403	0.064	0.000	0.262	0.211	0.215
Survey is year 2008-9	0.017	0.023	0.444	-0.047	0.035	0.177
_cons	0.598	0.096	0.000	0.232	0.242	0.339
R squared	0.090			0.181		

Table 47: Regression output for belonging models - Chinese/Other

	Belonging to Britain			Belonging to Local Area		
	Coef	Std Err	P>t	Coef	Std Err	P>t
Important British ID	0.258	0.026	0.000	0.039	0.033	0.239
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)						
2: Intermediate occup.	0.046	0.037	0.215	0.029	0.054	0.595
3: Lower supervisory	-0.004	0.045	0.927	0.032	0.054	0.546
4: Routine	0.045	0.047	0.339	0.103	0.069	0.132
5: Never worked/unemp.	-0.012	0.056	0.833	-0.017	0.071	0.810
6: Students	0.040	0.050	0.418	0.063	0.068	0.352
7: Not stated	-0.056	0.121	0.644	0.153	0.181	0.398
Age (years)	0.004	0.001	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.013
Sex: female	-0.009	0.025	0.722	-0.057	0.036	0.115
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)						
2: A levels or equiv.	0.032	0.046	0.489	0.026	0.064	0.690
3: GCSEs or equiv.	-0.061	0.050	0.222	0.074	0.062	0.238
4: Foreign or other	-0.020	0.044	0.654	-0.020	0.060	0.738
5: No quals	0.062	0.036	0.083	0.036	0.050	0.468
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)						
2	0.206	0.088	0.020	0.030	0.130	0.821
3	0.100	0.090	0.269	-0.118	0.126	0.351
4	0.218	0.098	0.027	-0.064	0.116	0.583
5	0.143	0.093	0.123	-0.197	0.130	0.131
6	0.168	0.092	0.070	-0.041	0.119	0.730
7	0.248	0.091	0.007	-0.097	0.120	0.421
8	0.160	0.089	0.073	0.000	0.118	1.000
9	0.128	0.091	0.158	-0.252	0.121	0.038
10	0.210	0.084	0.013	-0.183	0.112	0.102
Born in UK	0.042	0.033	0.212	-0.099	0.053	0.063
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)						
2: 1-4 years	0.099	0.039	0.012	0.306	0.048	0.000
3: 5-9 years	0.095	0.047	0.046	0.291	0.069	0.000
4: 10-29 years	0.132	0.050	0.009	0.435	0.062	0.000
5: 30 or more years	-0.200	0.117	0.087	0.363	0.110	0.001
Practising a religion	0.056	0.027	0.043	0.096	0.037	0.011
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)						
2	0.238	0.268	0.375	-0.198	0.139	0.158
3	0.114	0.253	0.652	-0.109	0.120	0.367
4	0.007	0.246	0.978	-0.397	0.110	0.000
5	0.214	0.246	0.386	-0.295	0.131	0.025
6	0.140	0.250	0.577	-0.403	0.104	0.000
7	0.180	0.244	0.460	-0.459	0.105	0.000
8	0.211	0.245	0.391	-0.221	0.092	0.017
9	0.195	0.242	0.422	-0.206	0.082	0.013
10	0.107	0.241	0.658	-0.336	0.083	0.000
Survey is year 2008-9	-0.023	0.026	0.386	0.057	0.031	0.067
_cons	0.525	0.258	0.043	0.880	0.176	0.000
R squared	0.136			0.135		

For the ethnic groups not already split between those born in or outside the UK, it is again informative to include an interaction effect between British identity and being born in the UK, to investigate whether the patterns seen for the other measures of cohesion – whereby for the Black and Asian groups, positive associations were found between British identity and cohesion for those *not* born in the UK, but for the Mixed group this association was negative – are also found for the two ‘belonging’ measures of cohesion.

Table 48: Belonging interaction models for the Asian group

	Belonging to Britain		Belonging to local area	
R squared	0.088		0.100	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.148	0.015	0.101	0.021
Main: Born in UK	0.055	0.028	-0.044	0.039
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.106	0.031	-0.098	0.042
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.043	0.026	0.004	0.037
Main: Not born in UK	-0.055	0.028	0.044	0.039
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.106	0.031	0.098	0.042

Table 48 shows the results of the interaction models for the Asian group. One can see from the main effect of British identity that the pattern found before is again found for the two belonging models – British identity is positively associated with social cohesion, but only for those *not* born in the UK. The interaction effect between being not born in the UK and having a British identity also highlights this pattern: there is an additional positive effect of being *both* born outside the UK *and* having a British identity for both belonging models.

Table 49 shows the results of the interaction models for the Black group. The pattern seen for the Asian group is not found – instead whether or not a respondent is born in the UK appears to make very little difference. British identity is positively associated with the ‘belonging to Britain’ model for both those born in and outside the UK, but no significant effects were found for the ‘belonging to the local area’ model.

Table 49: Belonging interaction models for the Black group

	Belonging to Britain		Belonging to local area	
R squared	0.061		0.077	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.116	0.022	0.054	0.032
Main: Born in UK	-0.039	0.034	-0.028	0.040
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.028	0.042	-0.055	0.049
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.087	0.036	-0.001	0.042
Main: Not born in UK	0.039	0.034	0.028	0.040
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.028	0.042	0.055	0.049

Table 50: Belonging interaction models for the Mixed group

	Belonging to Britain		Belonging to local area	
R squared	0.093		0.184	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.175	0.049	-0.122	0.063
Main: Born in UK	0.030	0.043	-0.041	0.053
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.100	0.060	0.171	0.077
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.074	0.029	0.049	0.041
Main: Not born in UK	-0.030	0.043	0.041	0.053
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.100	0.060	-0.171	0.077

Table 50 shows the results of the interaction models for the Mixed group. For the ‘belonging to Britain’ model, the results are similar to those for the Black group, in that it makes no difference whether or not a respondent is born in the UK – positive associations with British identity were found regardless. For the ‘belonging to the local area’ model, the results are similar to those for the Mixed group in the previous regression models – positive associations appear to be coming from those born in the UK, as shown by the interaction effect between *both* being born in the UK *and* having a British identity.

Last of all, Table 51 shows the results of the interaction models for the Chinese or Other group. There are again positive associations between British identity and ‘belonging to Britain’ for

both those born in and outside the UK, but there are no significant associations for the 'belonging to the local area' model.

Table 51: Belonging interaction models for the Other group

	Belonging to Britain		Belonging to local area	
R squared	0.136		0.135	
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.262	0.028	0.051	0.040
Main: Born in UK	0.047	0.046	-0.080	0.068
Int: Born in UK * Br ID	-0.013	0.058	-0.047	0.074
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK				
	Coef	Std Err	Coef	Std Err
Main: British ID	0.249	0.053	0.004	0.062
Main: Not born in UK	-0.047	0.046	0.080	0.068
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID	0.013	0.058	0.047	0.074

Comparison of magnitude of effects

Figures 14 and 15 compare the magnitude of the effect of having a British identity with the effects of having qualifications, and of living in one of the least deprived areas, for belonging to Britain and belonging to one's local area respectively.

Figure 14 shows that having a degree-level qualification as opposed to having no qualifications increases the likelihood a respondent will feel they belong to Britain, and living in one of the 10% least deprived areas as compared to one of the 10% most also increases the likelihood a respondent will feel they belong to Britain. Both of these effects are significant at the 1% level. However, having a British identity is of substantial importance for belonging to Britain as compared with area deprivation or qualifications, perhaps unsurprisingly given the similarity of the concepts.

Figure 15 shows that having a degree-level qualification as opposed to having no qualifications decreases the likelihood a respondent will feel they belong to their local area, although living in one of the 10% least deprived areas drastically increases the likelihood they will feel they belong. For this element, the pattern found for the other three models described above is repeated: area deprivation and level of qualifications have markedly stronger effects than British identity, with deprivation having an effect over four times the magnitude of British identity.

Figure 14: Size of effects - belonging to Britain





Figure 15: Size of effects - belonging to local area



4.33: Models with a poor level of explanatory power

Turning last of all to the group of models that have a poor level of explanatory power, one can ask: what is the impact of British identity on social cohesion?

Five of the regression models are poor predictors of the social cohesion indicators, and have very low R squared values – the highest is that of the model for ability to influence decisions, which explains 3.9% of the variation. The elements of social cohesion this applies to are:

1. Element 1: Equal treatment by service providers (NOT health services or the police)
2. Element 2: Equal treatment by service providers (ESPECIALLY health services)
3. Element 3: Trust in and treatment by the police
4. Element 9: Ability to influence decisions of public institutions
5. Element 10: Being treated with respect when in public / using public services

Table 52 shows the impact of British identity on each of the measures of social cohesion. As was the case in four of the five other models discussed in sections 4.31 and 4.32, British identity has a positive and significant effect on several of the elements, but for two no significant effect was found.

Table 52: Associations between British identity and social cohesion (positive values = increased social cohesion)					
	Equal treatment - general services	Equal treatment – health services	Trust in & treatment by the police	Ability to influence decisions	Treated with respect
Effect of British identity	0.063	0.019	0.019	0.061	0.013
P value	0.001	0.017	0.152	0.000	0.173
R squared	0.031	0.018	0.021	0.039	0.022

In terms of the control variables, the three models looking at services do not have quite such clear patterns as the other models with high or moderate explanatory power. For ability to influence decisions and, to a lesser extent, being treated with respect, however, education appears to be a fairly important predictor: with the model for ability to influence decisions, having no qualifications as compared with a higher education qualification decreases the score by a coefficient of 0.108, and for being treated with respect by a coefficient of 0.036, with both effects being significant at the 5% level.

To a certain extent the patterns seen with these models are similar to the patterns for the other five models, discussed in the preceding sections. British identity, at least for three of the models, has a small but positive effect on social cohesion outcomes, and for two of the models educational qualifications have a fairly important effect. Given how low the R squared values are for these models, however, it is difficult to draw any particularly firm conclusions, since there may be other variables that are not controlled for that have large and confounding effects.

So, is it possible to add additional control variables to the models in an attempt to raise the R squared values and attain more reliable results? For instance, it may be the case that attitudes towards services are affected more by whether or not a person has used them recently than by things such as British identity, education, or deprivation. There are quite a few variables available in the Citizenship Survey that could capture concepts that may be related to public services, influencing decisions, or being treated with respect. Although there are limited questions regarding public services generally, Table 53 shows potential control variables for the four following concepts:

Table 53: Additional control variables available in the Citizenship Survey

Health:

- GHealth: How good is respondent's health in general
- Dill: Respondent has a disability or long-standing illness
- Rcare: Respondent's family member has a disability or long-standing illness
- Rorg: Respondent has had direct contact with health services recently

Police:

- Rorg9: respondent has had direct contact with police recently
- Rorgcourts [derived]: respondent has had direct contact with courts, probation or prison services recently
- Reldis9: police have discriminated against respondent because of religion

Influencing decisions:

- Pinfl: how important is it to the respondent that can influence local decisions
- Pcsat: would respondent like to be more involved with local decisions

Being treated with respect:

- Reldis13: Respondent has experienced discrimination because of religion
- Rdispro: Respondent has been discriminated against when going for work promotion

Source: UKDA (2007)

Each of these variables was included in a regression model for all five of the elements for which the R squared values were low. All were included since there is a certain amount of overlap both in the interpretation of the elements, and in the control variables listed – although reldis9 (police religious discrimination) and reldis13 (general religious discrimination) were not used in the same model because they overlap. In addition, regressions were run both with and without 'rdispro', since there were a considerable number of missing values (due to the question being inapplicable to those who are not in work).

The results, broadly, were that the R squared values improved, but only modestly. It is of course possible to increase the R squared values simply by adding as many variables as possible, but there were in fact some interesting patterns that emerged by adding the extra control variables. Perceived discrimination had a significant, negative and relatively strong effect for each of the five models, indicating that perceived religious discrimination, or perceived discrimination in the workplace, is negatively associated with attitudes to public services, attitudes towards the ability to influence decisions of institutions, and feelings of being treated with respect. Interestingly, self-reported bad health, or the presence of a disability or long-standing illness, were not significantly associated with the health service composite variable, but were negatively associated with feelings of being treated with respect when in public or using public services (i.e. bad health is associated with worse social cohesion outcomes for this element). Having had contact with public service providers recently was not associated with the general equal treatment element. However, somewhat encouragingly, having had recent contact with the health services was associated with more positive scores on the health services element, and having had contact with the police had no effect on the scores on this element, although contact with the courts, probation or prison services did, perhaps unsurprisingly, have a negative association with scores for the police element.

Table 54 shows associations between British identity and each of the five elements, together with the control variable (amongst those just added) with the strongest effect for that model. For each model, only the additional variables (as listed in Table 53) that were statistically significant were kept so as to avoid artificially increasing the R squared values.

It is clear that a positive and significant effect of British identity remains for three of the elements, although it is also apparent that the effect is relatively small. The same pattern appears as for most of the models discussed in previous sections, whereby the magnitude of the effects of some of the control variables is much larger than the effect of British identity. Perceived discrimination, in particular, appears to be very important for attitudes towards public services, and for a feeling of being treated with respect. For ability to influence decisions, respondents' attitudes towards whether influencing the decisions of public institutions is important to them has a large effect.

Table 54: Associations between British identity and social cohesion, and key control variables					
	Equal treatment - general services	Equal treatment – health services	Trust in & treatment by the police	Ability to influence decisions	Treated with respect
Effect of British identity	0.060	0.018	0.007	0.048	0.013
P value	0.001	0.027	0.650	0.000	0.242
Control with strongest effect	General religious discrimination	General religious discrimination	Police religious discrimination	Influencing decisions unimportant	Workplace discrimination
Co-efficient	-0.325	-0.277	-0.648	-0.429	-0.137
P value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R squared	0.043	0.038	0.040	0.094	0.057

The R squared values are now a little higher, although are still quite low (aside from the model for ability to influence decisions, which has improved a fair amount), so it is worth being cautious about concluding too much from these models. Nevertheless, it is now possible to say a little more about these five models: there is a sense that perceived discrimination could be particularly important to respect and attitudes to public services; and that its importance greatly outweighs that of British identity.

It is worth asking why it might be the case that, for these five elements of social cohesion, the independent variables used fail to produce a model with a high level of explanatory power. One answer could be that there are concepts not adequately ‘captured’ by the Citizenship Survey variables that could explain these elements – the fact that the Citizenship Survey income variable is problematic and not included in the regression models in this chapter is a possibility. Another answer could be that the composite variables measuring each of these elements are not particularly good measures of the concepts for which they are intended. A

third possible answer is provided by Fuller (2011), who highlights the difficulties that can be encountered when broad and national-level concepts are used to measure and explain social cohesion. In particular, Fuller focuses on how using such concepts can mask local complexities. This critique is certainly relevant to the methods followed in this chapter, since the objective has been to look for broad national-level (i.e. England and Wales) patterns in terms of indicators of social cohesion, and concepts that are associated with such indicators.

With this critique in mind it is perhaps unsurprising that national-level patterns based on broad concepts such as socio-economic group, ethnic group and level of education cannot be consistently identified as predictors of several of the social cohesion indicators. One can speculate that the factors driving whether or not someone considers service providers to treat them equally, whether or not someone feels they can influence the decisions of public institutions, or whether someone trusts the police may be locally specific or more complex than broad categories allow for, although the possibility of exploring such issues was part of the reason for including a qualitative component in this study. However, it is difficult to say for sure which of these three possibilities accounts for the failure to bring the R squared values any higher.

4.4 Analysis

One of the main findings of this chapter is that the social cohesion measures can be split into ten separate elements, and that these elements can be split into three groups in terms of the extent that the measure is explained by the regression models. The first group, consisting of satisfaction with one's place of residence, civic engagement and volunteering, and social interaction with people of different backgrounds, is relatively well-explained by the model, since the R squared values are relatively satisfactory. The second group, consisting of belonging to Britain and belonging to one's local area, is moderately well-explained by the model. The R squared values are a little low, but there are nonetheless some patterns and significant associations. The third group, consisting of treatment by service providers (a general measure, a measure focusing primarily on health services, and a measure focusing on policing), the ability to influence institutions, and being treated with respect in public, is by contrast poorly explained by the model. The R squared values for this group are very low, but including alternative control variables in the models can nevertheless modestly increase the R squared values.

There are fairly consistent significant and moderately strong associations between British identity and many of the elements of social cohesion. This finding, to some extent, supports the contention that British identity is important for solidarity and cohesion (Goodhart 2007; T. Phillips 2010). However, several important caveats are necessary.

First, the findings presented here are associations, and it is not clear which direction, if any, causality might go. There is a danger, for instance, of misinterpreting the finding that, for the Asian group, British identity is associated with belonging to Britain and one's local area, and with civic engagement and volunteering, and socialising with people of different backgrounds. Given a recent tendency of negative sentiment towards Muslims (Amin 2003), there might be a temptation to interpret this finding as implying that Asians, or perhaps more specifically Muslims, should identify more with Britain in order to improve social cohesion. This, however, does not necessarily follow, since this association does not imply causality and it is perhaps more plausible that the relationship between British identity and social cohesion is complex and two-way.

There is, in addition, evidence to suggest that members of minority groups may wish to identify with Britain but feel excluded from this identity. Modood *et al.* (1994) highlight the willingness of participants of Caribbean heritage to identify with Britain, but also their feelings

of exclusion from this identity because of their skin colour. It is perhaps prudent, therefore, not to advocate policies aimed at increasing British identity amongst members of Asian and Black groups due to a perceived link to an increase in some elements of social cohesion, but instead to recognise that, in some cases, British identity and social cohesion may go together, so one needs to establish ways to foster both.

A second important finding of this chapter is that, for the Asian and Black groups, British identity is only positively associated with any of the elements of social cohesion for those not born in the UK. There are positive associations between British identity and many of the elements of social cohesion for the Asian and Black groups, but only for those not born in the UK. For the Mixed group, however, the pattern is slightly different, with British identity being associated with increased cohesion most often for those born *in* the UK. It is possible that this pattern reflects something to do with the immigration history of these groups, perhaps with British identity meaning something different to first-generation Black and Asian immigrants, as compared to second- or third-generations, and also as compared to the Mixed group, who may have more complex or hybrid identities. It is not clear simply from this finding why this might be the case, but it may be relevant to what Hall (2000) and Solomos (2003) term 'new ethnicities' in which, for third generation Black British people, for instance, new identity possibilities were established whereby "it was possible to be both Black and British" simultaneously (Solomos 2003, 211).

What is certainly clear from this finding is the need to treat different generations – in the sense of immigrant generation – of ethnic minority groups separately when considering a relationship between British identity and social cohesion. It is crucial, given the emphasis in public and political discourse on British identity as a potential positive influence on national unity (O'Donnell 2007), and as a partial solution to the idea that "diversity threatens national stability" (Burnett 2007, 353), that it is recognised that the generation a member of an ethnic minority group belongs to may be of fundamental importance to whether or not British identity has any relevance to social cohesion at all. This issue is ignored by, for example, Goodhart (2007, 278) in his assertion that "we need to create, bottom up as much as top down, a post-ethnic sense of national solidarity that is open to citizens who do not belong to the ethnic majority but, equally, does not set itself against the feelings, symbols and solidarities of that majority". David Blunkett's assertion that "it was necessary to combine a strong sense of identity with knowledge of the English language and cultural norms if social cohesion [is] to be maintained" (Solomos 2003, 220) similarly ignores the issue of generation.

Third, the comparison between British and English identities is interesting. Despite the finding that there are positive associations between British identity and many of the elements of social cohesion, there is a *negative* association between English identity and socialising with people of other backgrounds, for the White groups – both those born in and outside the UK. It is impossible to say using the evidence in this chapter whether English identity is *causing* a reduction in relationships with people of other backgrounds, and it may also be the case that there are confounding factors not controlled for that are driving both. Nevertheless, the finding may be linked to the findings of other work, for instance Heath & Roberts (2008), in which the differences between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions of national identity are found to be very important. English identity is, perhaps, an ‘ethnic’ identity, whereas British identity can, at least in principle, be a more inclusive ‘civic’ identity. It would also be interesting to investigate further the relevance of this distinction for the White non-UK born group.

Last, but perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to compare the magnitudes of the effects of British identity with those of the other independent variables. Aside from the results showing – perhaps unsurprisingly given how similar the concepts are – that British identity has a relatively large effect on belonging to Britain, compared to the control variables British identity consistently has a relatively small effect on the social cohesion measures. It is necessary, therefore, not to overemphasise the relevance of British identity for social cohesion. For the models looking at attitudes to public services and respect, one (tentatively, given the R squared values) finds perceived discrimination to be very important, and certainly more so than British identity. For many of the other elements, area deprivation and qualifications are far more important than British identity. This, to a certain extent, supports the contention of Hickman *et al.* (2008) that “[we] need to consider how people relate to each other as well as addressing fundamental issues of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. Discussing how people get on together without dealing with inequalities will not work.” Similarly, it may support, to an extent, McGhee’s (2003, 392) criticism of the lack of emphasis in the social cohesion agenda on “factors such as poverty, exclusion from the workforce, exclusion from consumption”. It is worth reflecting, therefore, on the implications of this tentative finding for arguments over the relative importance of national identity and objective conditions for solidarity and cohesion.

National identity and objective conditions

Various academics have argued for the importance of national identity in creating or sustaining solidarity and cohesion. J. S. Mill (2001, 284), for instance, claimed that political stability required the adoption of a common identity to ensure people “co-operate with each other

more willingly than with other people". More recently, Miller (2000, 31-2), argued "that nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction". Such solidarity enables "people [to] feel themselves to be members of an overarching community, and to have social duties to act for the common good of that community, [and] to help out other members when they are in need" (*ibid.*). For Barry (2001, 83), nationality is important because it provides "the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities". Barry, however, questions whether British identity in particular is in fact rich or 'thick' enough for such purposes, suggesting that "British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion" (Barry 2001, 84). These identities can allow for a sense of belonging to 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) in which members of such communities will never meet or know most of their fellow members. The fundamental argument underlying such claims is that some kind of meaningful common identity is needed to generate and sustain a sense of solidarity between people that are unlikely to generate such solidarity by other means, such as through face-to-face interaction. This solidarity in turn can help the stability of public institutions and the proper functioning of a democracy. Insofar as many such institutions and democratic politics happen to occur at the national level, a national identity is important in generating the required solidarity.

On the other hand, many arguments have also been made for the importance of certain objective conditions in the creation and maintenance of cohesion and solidarity. Often these arguments come through concerns about social justice: an example is Fraser's separation of redistribution and recognition as dimensions of justice, whereby an emphasis is placed on the importance of economic disparities as part of the redistributive dimension (Fraser *et al.* 2003). Economic inequalities are not only potentially problematic from a social justice perspective, but may also imply that people are in unequal positions to participate in society, thereby having implications for integration, cohesion and solidarity. There is also a certain amount of empirical work that focuses on how objective conditions might impact upon social cohesion and solidarity in Britain. Letki (2008) finds that an area's level of socio-economic deprivation explains a large proportion of differences in a sense of community, trust and social interactions – concepts that are often regarded as important indicators of social cohesion and solidarity; whilst Hickman *et al.* (2008) find that poor housing, worklessness and poverty can all damage cohesion.

Social cohesion is clearly a problematic concept, and can be broken down into many diverse elements – to the point that it is not clear that including so many diverse elements in one concept is particularly helpful. However, to the extent that the operationalisation of social cohesion used here can be considered to be sufficiently similar to the related concept of ‘solidarity’, these findings tentatively suggest that, for many of the elements, objective conditions matter more for cohesion and solidarity than British identity. For civic engagement and volunteering, having been through higher education has an association nearly three times stronger than that of having a British identity for people of a Black ethnicity, and more than five times stronger for the Asian group. For satisfaction with one’s place of residence, the association between British identity for the White UK-born group is over ten times smaller than that of area-level deprivation. For feelings of belonging to one’s local area, area-level deprivation is four times as important. Having said all this, a strong British identity does appear to have a small but fairly consistent association with positive outcomes, at least for some ethnic groups; although exceptions include a negative association between British identity and socialising with people of different backgrounds for the White non-UK born group.

However, the relationships between national identity, objective conditions, and cohesion and solidarity may be more complicated than this. Miller, for instance, argues that one of the most important things about national identity is that it creates a sense of solidarity that can help sustain support for things such as redistribution. If this argument is correct, national identity may increase solidarity, which in turn creates support for redistribution which, when put into practice in the form of increased living standards for the less well off, in turn may increase solidarity (assuming that the increase in solidarity created by an improvement of living conditions for the less well-off is not cancelled out by a decrease in solidarity amongst those from whom money is redistributed).

The findings presented in this chapter cannot disentangle the intricate relationships between national identity, objective conditions and solidarity. It is a tentative finding, however, that all three are associated with each other: positive social cohesion outcomes are strongly associated with positive objective conditions, particularly in the form of high levels of education and living in a less deprived area, and moderately associated with a strong British identity. Holding British identity constant, education and living in a less deprived area are strongly associated with positive social cohesion outcomes on several of the ‘elements’ of cohesion; and holding these objective conditions constant, a strong British identity is moderately associated with positive social cohesion outcomes on several of the ‘elements’ of social cohesion.

Another interesting question that is raised, rather than answered by, these findings is whether it is absolute or relative objective conditions that are associated with increased social cohesion outcomes. Many arguments have been made for the idea that substantive equality is positively related to cohesion and solidarity, and that in some circumstances equality may be more important than absolute objective conditions for a wide range of positive outcomes. Barry (2001, 79), for instance, argues that a “sense of solidarity is fostered by common institutions and a spread of incomes narrow enough to prevent people from believing – and with some reason – that they can escape from the common lot by buying their way out of the system of education, health care, policing and other public services that their less fortunate fellow citizens are forced to depend upon”. It is possible to point to some empirical findings in support of such an argument, some of which (e.g. Veenhoven 1991) suggest that, after a country’s GDP exceeds a certain point, further increases are not associated with increased well-being. However it is difficult to provide answers to this question from the findings presented in this chapter. The two variables that are particularly consistently associated with increased social cohesion represent a respondent’s level of education *relative* to others, and the deprivation of a respondent’s area of residence *relative* to that of others. It would certainly be interesting to know whether, for instance, raising the overall standard of education, but with the relative distribution of qualifications remaining the same, has the effect of increased scores on the relevant measures of social cohesion, or whether cohesion and solidarity are more a matter of inequality, as Barry (2001) suggests.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter gave a report of the methodology and results of the quantitative component of this study. It was intended in particular to answer the questions: what is the relationship between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by ethnic group? Data from the Home Office's Citizenship Survey were utilised first to produce composite variables, with each representing a separate element of social cohesion, and second to create regression models whereby British identity, along with the relevant control variables, were included in a model with the social cohesion measures as the dependent variables.

Social cohesion, as represented by the variables available in the Citizenship Survey, was found to break down into ten elements: equal treatment by public service providers (general); equal treatment by health service providers; trust in and equal treatment by the police; satisfaction with one's place of residence; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain; social interaction with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering; ability to influence decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public.

The ten elements were found to break down into three broad groups in terms of the extent to which the regression model provided a satisfactory explanation of social cohesion indicator. The first group was relatively well explained by the model; the second moderately well explained; and the third poorly explained. For the models that explained social cohesion well or moderately well, British identity was found to be positively associated with social cohesion for the White, Asian and Black groups in particular. For the White group, however, there is a *negative* association between *English* identity and socialising with people from other backgrounds. The magnitudes of the effects of British identity were also striking: the size of the effects are much smaller than those of area deprivation and qualifications, and (tentatively given the low R squared values) also perceived discrimination, for some of the elements.

An additional finding of this chapter is that, for the Black and Asian groups, British identity is only positively associated with social cohesion on any of the measures for those *not* born in the UK, suggesting the possibility that immigrant generation may be of fundamental importance with regard to whether British identity has any relevance for social cohesion.

There are several issues identified in this chapter that shed light on particular issues to be investigated in the qualitative component. First, it will be investigated whether generation may be important for the relationship between British identity and social cohesion. Second, it will be investigated whether interviewees consider British identity as an 'ethnic' or 'civic'

conception of national identity: this may be particularly relevant to the finding of a negative association between English identity and socialising with those of different backgrounds. Last, there will be an attempt to uncover reasons behind the associations found in this chapter. In particular it would be interesting to know interviewees' views on whether British identity can cause social cohesion, whether social cohesion may cause increases in British identification, or whether a third factor may be driving increases in both British identity and social cohesion for some of the elements.

Chapter 5: QUALITATIVE COMPONENT

The quantitative component addressed the question of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion by looking at broad, nationally-representative associations. The qualitative component, by contrast, addresses the question in a much narrower way, but one that should uncover much more nuance and detail than is possible using secondary analysis of a government dataset.

The data for the qualitative component of this study consists of transcriptions from semi-structured interviews with a sample of 22 respondents of Black African or Black Caribbean origin, living in an ethnically diverse area of south London. The objective of the interviews was to investigate: the ways in which interviewees talked about aspects of social cohesion (as defined by the 'elements' theorised in the quantitative component of this study, together with theoretical accounts by, for example, Forrest & Kearns (2001)); the ways in which they talked about aspects of their identities (in particular national and ethnic identities); and any links they may have seen between these concepts. It is hoped that the analysis of this data will give more detailed and nuanced insights into the presence, or not, of links between respondents' national and ethnic identities and social cohesion than was possible with the analysis of data in the quantitative component.

It is important to bear in mind that whilst the results from the qualitative component may be detailed, they do represent a much narrower answering of the research question than that provided in the quantitative component. The responses given in the interviews are all specifically from people belonging to two (admittedly broad) ethnic groups, so it is highly plausible that the responses given by members of other ethnic groups could be very different. Nevertheless, given the limitations of time on the number of interviews it was possible to conduct, it was felt that it was important to achieve a good representation of these two specific ethnic groups, rather than a sparse representation of many different ethnic groups. In addition, given the increased likelihood of respondents having complex and multiple national and ethnic identities compared to people of a White British ethnicity, it was felt that it would be more relevant to the research questions of this study to hear from people belonging to the Black African and Black Caribbean groups.

Another aspect of the methodology which has the consequence of giving results that offer a narrower answer to the research question is that all respondents were currently living in a particular area of South London, and so responses may, to an extent, be locally specific,

although this is also a strength, especially given the possibility (as discussed in section 4.33) of some aspects of social cohesion being locally specific, and therefore being difficult to ‘capture’ with broad, nationally representative surveys. This is one of the reasons for including a qualitative component in the research design, although *comparisons* between areas will not be possible, since only one area was included in the study.

These aspects of the methodology have implications in terms of the external validity of the findings. Fairly obviously, it will not be possible for the results to be taken as nationally representative, as they are taken from two ethnic groups in one local area of London. Even within those groups and that local area, they are not representative, as random sampling was not used. However, the intention was to find a wide range of possible views on each of the issues discussed in the interview, and for this reason, purposive sampling was used to maximise the diversity of the sample.

So, how will this chapter contribute to the answering of the main research question? First, it will investigate the ways in which people understand their national and ethnic identities, and the interactions between the two. If, as some commentators claim (e.g. Goodhart 2007), overly strong ethnic identities have become problematic and divisive in Britain, then one might expect some respondents to privilege their ethnic identities and not identify with Britain at all. If some respondents do feel this, then what are their reasons? Do any respondents, as other commentators suggest (e.g. Solomos 2003), mix ethnic and national identities unproblematically, and feel both strongly at the same time? Why is it that the quantitative component found that generation was so important? Do respondents see marked differences in the identities of first, second and third generation immigrants, as some literature might suggest (e.g. Modood *et al.* 1994)? Section 5.2 investigates these questions by exploring the range of narratives by which respondents express their national identities. It finds that three key themes are repeatedly used when respondents express their national identifications: colonialism; generation; and the difference between British and English identities.

Second, this chapter will investigate what respondents think about the impact of their national and ethnic identities on social cohesion outcomes. Do they feel, for instance, that if they felt more British it would allow them to belong to their neighbourhood more, or would engaging in civic activities or volunteering, perhaps, strengthen their British identity? Section 5.3 explores these questions, and finds three narratives in which British identity and social cohesion might be linked: by British identity being a ‘signifier’ of connectedness with society; by ‘Britishness’ being represented in social expectations of language, accent and etiquette, and by these expectations impacting upon social cohesion; and by British identity as knowledge of the

British political and social system impacting upon social cohesion outcomes. Section 5.3 also finds two narratives by which British identity does *not* matter for social cohesion outcomes, but other concepts do instead: these are individual preferences and personal responsibility; and other identities, such as Black identity, religious identity, a 'global' identity as a human, and a local London identity.

Third, one might ask whether there is any way in which the narratives identified in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are linked. Are there groups of respondents that are more likely to use certain combinations of narratives than others? How do these respondents feel about their national identities? Section 5.4 identifies three broad groups of respondents: those discussing *both* colonialism *and* British identity as a 'signifier' of connectedness with society; those combining negativity about British identity with the narrative about language, accent and etiquette; and those combining a moderate, or perhaps 'civic' notion of British identity with the narrative about personal choice and responsibility. First of all, however, Section 5.1 turns to a discussion of the methodology used in the qualitative component.

5.1 Methodology

Semi-structured interviews of around one hour were conducted with a group of interviewees chosen through purposive sampling from a small (around ward size) area in London. The objective of the interviews was to investigate: the ways in which interviewees talked about aspects of social cohesion (as defined by the ‘elements’ theorised in the quantitative component of this study, together with theoretical accounts by, for example, Forrest & Kearns [2001], although also allowing for other interpretations the respondents may express); the ways in which they talked about aspects of their identities (in particular national and ethnic identities); and any links they may have seen between these concepts.

In constructing the sample the intention was to include twelve categories of participant, defined through an analytically constructed matrix. Attitudes to identity may vary by gender, and gender is likely to be more important for some ethnic identities than others (Dale 2002), so an attempt was made to interview equal numbers of men and women. For minority ethnic groups, the generation a person belongs to may be important for their understanding of their ethnic and national identities (Modood *et al.* 1994) so the sample was split into three age groups to increase the likelihood that different generations (i.e. first- or second-generation immigrants) were included. In addition, there is also evidence that social cohesion is influenced by employment (Hickman *et al.* 2008) so the sample was split between those in and out of employment. The twelve categories, therefore, consisted of six for men and six for women, six for people in employment and six for people out of employment, and four of each of the three age groups. Table 55 gives an illustration of the construction of the twelve categories.

Table 55: Categories of participant included in the sample				
		AGE		
		<35	35 – 50	>50
FEMALE	In employment	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
	Out of employment	Category 4	Category 5	Category 6
MALE	In employment	Category 7	Category 8	Category 9
	Out of employment	Category 10	Category 11	Category 12

In total, 22 interviews were conducted, as explained in Chapter 3, section 3.2. There are two groups unfilled – a woman out of work in the middle age category, and a man out of work in the older age category, although the sample contained a reasonable spread of interviewees across the twelve categories (Table 6, Chapter 3, section 3.2 gives an exact breakdown). All of the interviewees self-identified as Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity when filling in an initial screening questionnaire, when presented with ethnic categories from the Citizenship Survey.

A range of methods were undertaken to recruit interviewees, with the hope that finding people from different sources would diversify the sample as much as is possible. These methods included addressing a church congregation, speaking to people asking for money at a local market and working on local market stalls, conducting interviews in local betting shops, speaking to people at a local supermarket, and using several contacts in the local area.

Although there was not a formal process of interview piloting, the informal process involved some initial ‘practice’ interviews, which were conducted with participants the researcher knew well. These interviews were used to develop and refine the interview schedule (see the Appendix, Part B for the final version). The recordings of these were listened to and reflected upon, one of the interviews was transcribed in full, and the interviewees were consulted as to how they found the interview. This process had three main benefits: to give the researcher some initial experience in framing questions around the sensitive issues of a person’s identities; to give the researcher some practice in helping the interview flow; and to reflect upon whether the interview schedule could be improved. There was some concern over the repetitive nature of the latter part of the interview schedule, where ten topics were being discussed in turn; in response to this, the ten topics were condensed into eight in order to reduce repetition. In addition, there was concern over some of the phrasing in the interview schedule being overly academic or formal, and so more informal or colloquial descriptions of certain concepts were decided upon. For instance, ‘support for redistribution’ was changed to ‘feeling willing to contribute towards the support of people in need (such as through taxes)’. Following this process a second, appropriately modified, version of the interview schedule was produced.

After the informal piloting stage, the first two interviews conducted with participants forming part of the sample – one by the researcher and one by the second interviewer – were analysed to establish the effectiveness of the interview schedule. These two interviews were transcribed, reflected upon, and sent to the candidate’s supervisor. Several things were learnt from the first two interviews. In particular, there was a considerable amount of repetition in

the interview, particularly in the 'linking identity and social cohesion' section, whereby the same questions were repeated for each of the eight topics, making the process tiring and uninspiring for the participants by the time the questions had been asked for the fourth or fifth time. It was therefore decided to produce 'show-cards' for each of the eight topics,⁹ and to ask the interviewees which topic they would like to talk about most. The interview then became more fluid, whereby the participants could switch between the topics on the show-cards as they pleased, and it became less necessary to repeat the questions to such an extent. It was also felt that this allowed the participants greater control over discussing the issues that they wanted to raise, rather than being frequently prompted by rigid questioning. After this stage, the interview schedule was changed to incorporate these show-cards, and remained the same for the remainder of the interviews.

The analysis of the interviews was designed to answer specific research questions, rather than allowing the research questions to emerge from the data, so an entirely open-ended or exploratory method of analysis would not be appropriate (this is also reflected in the semi-structured nature of the interviews). Having said this, the analysis was intended to be more open-ended than that conducted in the quantitative component, since the idea was to look for narratives around the concepts under study, and the meanings each interviewee attributes to them.

It was decided that an approach in the thematic analysis tradition was to be followed. A contrast can be made between inductive and theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006), or similarly an inductive approach as compared to a 'template' approach (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 2006). An inductive approach (e.g. Boyatzis 1998) allows codes to be developed such that they are a way of organising the observations made from readings of the data, meaning that the coding is data-driven rather than based on previous research or a specific hypothesis. A theoretical approach (e.g. Crabtree & Miller 1992) draws on previous research and literature to develop an *a priori* set of codes that are then applied to the data, and so the development of a 'codebook' is based more on theory and previous research than the dataset itself. An inductive approach can be advantageous when one wishes to develop a research question from the data, whilst a theoretical approach can be advantageous when one wishes to answer a relatively narrow research question by analysing a particular aspect of the data (Braun & Clarke 2006). Because the analysis in this study was designed to answer a specific set of research questions, initially a theoretical approach was taken to coding, whereby an initial 'codebook' was developed *a priori* from the relevant literature. This

⁹ See Show-Card 5 in the Interview Schedule, Appendix, Part B.

theoretical approach is also consistent with the design of the interview schedule, the structure of which was led partly by the ten 'elements' of social cohesion theorised in the quantitative component of this study. After the creation of the initial codebook, however, a more inductive approach was followed, such that the codes could be adapted and added to if those developed *a priori* did not 'fit' the data. An element of the inductive approach was therefore followed in the sense that any patterns or frequent observations across interviews that fell outside the initial codebook were included in a later version of the codebook. This combination of theoretical and inductive approaches is similar to that used by Fereday & Muir-Cochrane (2006).

5.11: Developing a codebook

The codebook was developed in five stages: the first two *a priori*, and the last three on an inductive basis. The first stage was guided by the research question, and attempted to establish both the range of different meanings respondents attributed to their national and ethnic identities, and the range of different narratives by which respondents thought British identity might, or might not, impact upon social cohesion outcomes. Three codes were therefore developed for this stage: 'nation', which referred to any instance in which respondents discussed their identification (or lack of it) with Britain or any other nation; 'ethnic', which referred to any instance in which respondents discussed their ethnic identity; and 'impact', which referred to any instance in which respondents explored ways in which their national or ethnic identities might impact upon social cohesion outcomes. Coding was conducted first by running a word search using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software, and then by reading through the interviews multiple times to check for consistency, and any relevant coding not identified by the word search.

The second stage involved identifying key issues discussed in the relevant literature as potentially affecting national or ethnic identities, or social cohesion outcomes. The interview data were coded when respondents discussed any of these issues in any form, which involved a certain amount of judgement and interpretation, but the data were read on multiple occasions to check for consistency. The issues identified, with their respective codes in square brackets, were:

- a distinction can be made between ethnic and civic types of national identity (Heath & Roberts 2008) [civic]
- perceived discrimination may reduce the likelihood that a member of an ethnic minority group identifies with Britain (Maxwell 2006) [discrimination]
- national identity may be affected by the acceptance of identity claims by others, such that members of minority groups may attempt to identify with Britain but never be fully accepted by the majority (Modood *et al.* 1994; Hall 2000) [acceptance]
- ethnic identity may be important, in that there may be a difficulty in simultaneously identifying with one's ethnic heritage and the national identity of the host country (Alba and Nee 2003) [dual]
- quality of housing, level of poverty, and employment status may affect social cohesion (Hickman *et al.* 2008) [socio-econ]

- social cohesion may be affected by ethnic diversity and area-level deprivation (Putnam 2007; Letki 2008) [diversity] [socio-econ]
- ethnic diversity combined with scarce resources has also been identified as problematic for racial tensions (Dench *et al.* 2006) [scarce resources]
- the generation an immigrant belongs to may also be important for national identity (Modood *et al.* 1994) [generation]
- religious identity may affect the relationship between national identity and 'social cohesion' (Modood & Ahmad 2007) [religion]
- there is evidence to suggest that education can influence both feelings of belonging to Britain (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010) and social cohesion (Hickman *et al.* 2008) [education]

After the first two *a priori* stages of coding had been completed, therefore, the codebook consisted of the following codes:

Table 56: Qualitative methods – a priori codebook	
CODE	MEANING
Nation	Respondents describe their feelings about (their own or other people's) British or any other national identity
Ethnic	Respondents describe their feelings about their own or other people's ethnic identities
Impact	Respondents directly discuss the impact of British identity on any social cohesion outcome
Civic	Respondents discuss a civic / ethnic distinction, or describe a national identity as ethnic or civic
Discrimination	Respondents discuss perceived or actual discrimination or prejudice against themselves or anyone else
Acceptance	Respondents discuss identity claims being accepted, or not, by others
Dual	Respondents express two or more identities at the same time
Socio-econ	Respondents discuss any socio-economic issues, including employment,

	poverty, housing, deprivation
Scarce resources	Respondents discuss any effects of a lack of resources combined with ethnic diversity
Generation	Respondents discuss differences in age or generation in national or ethnic identification
Religion	Respondents mention their own or anyone else's religion
Education	Respondents discuss education

The third stage of coding involved looking at the different ways in which respondents described their national identities, whereby the intention was to pick up inductively on themes or narratives that were expressed by several respondents. This was done by reading through any sections of text coded as 'nation', along with the surrounding text to maintain an appreciation of context. If at least two respondents explored a particular narrative surrounding the meanings they attributed to their national identity, this theme was coded, and themes were checked and re-checked for consistency. Respondents frequently mentioned issues focusing on generation and dual identities, which were both codes created in the *a priori* stage, but two new themes were identified by this process: colonialism, which was seen as central to some respondents' understandings of their British identities; and the differences between English identity and British identity, which were quite frequently contrasted. These themes are explored in Section 5.2 of this chapter.

The fourth stage of coding involved looking at the range of different narratives by which respondents thought British identity might or might not impact upon social cohesion outcomes. During this stage all sections of text coded 'impact', along with the surrounding text, were explored, and any narratives that were expressed repeatedly were coded. Two narratives that were in the *a priori* codebook were found here: religion was described as important for social cohesion by several respondents; as was an ethnic (or Black) identity. However several other codes were created inductively, based on other narratives that appeared: British identity as a signifier of connectedness to society (coded 'connect'); British identity as language, accent and etiquette (coded 'LAE'); knowledge of the British system as being important (coded 'knowledge'); the importance of individual choice and personal responsibility for social cohesion (coded 'individual'); and identities as either a human or a

local Londoner as being important (coded 'global' and 'local' respectively). These themes are explored in Section 5.3 of this chapter.

The fifth stage of coding involved looking for patterns in terms of particular respondents using particular combinations of narratives. The approach to the methodology here was slightly different from the other coding stages. A spreadsheet was created in which each of the 22 respondents were listed in rows, along with an indication of which of all the *a priori* and inductive codes had been expressed at any point during their interview. An indication of how they felt about their British and English identities was also given – these were coded as 'strong', 'moderate' and 'weak / rejection' as appropriate. The idea was to find patterns in terms of those respondents expressing a particular set of narratives by showing which respondents exhibited which codes. Although not all respondents fell neatly into a group, there were broadly three different groups of respondents; these groups, and disconfirming instances, are discussed in Section 5.4 of this chapter.

Before directly discussing the views of the respondents, it is informative to give each of the 22 respondents a pseudonym, to ensure respondents' anonymity but at the same time give a sense of who each respondent is. Table 57 below gives a list of pseudonyms and key characteristics for each of the respondents in the study.

Table 57: Pseudonyms and key characteristics for each respondent

Name	Gender	Age	Employment	African or Caribbean
Tania	Female	18-24	In employment	African
Anna	Female	25-34	In employment	Caribbean
Tracy	Female	25-34	In employment	Mixed
Abigail	Female	25-34	In employment	African
Julie	Female	35-49	In employment	Caribbean
Mary	Female	35-49	In employment	Caribbean
Sophie	Female	35-49	In employment	Caribbean
Helen	Female	50-64	In employment	African
Cheryl	Female	50-64	In employment	African
Leila	Female	18-24	Out of employment	African
Ellie	Female	50-64	Out of employment	Caribbean
John	Male	18-24	In employment	Caribbean
Alan	Male	25-34	In employment	Mixed
Graham	Male	25-34	In employment	African
Bruce	Male	35-49	In employment	Caribbean
Brian	Male	50-64	In employment	Caribbean
Terry	Male	50-64	In employment	Caribbean
Adam	Male	18-34	Out of employment	African
Lyndon	Male	25-34	Out of employment	African
Nigel	Male	35-49	Out of employment	Caribbean
James	Male	35-49	Out of employment	African
David	Male	35-49	Out of employment	Caribbean

5.2 National identity

This section will ask: how do respondents feel about their national identities? In particular, how do respondents feel about their British identities?

The approach to answering these questions is as described as 'stage 3' in the methodology section, whereby all text coded as 'nation' was analysed. The aim is to uncover the range of narratives by which respondents described their national identities. There was considerable variety in the way in which respondents expressed their identification, or not, with Britain, but several key themes emerged, around which respondents based their discussions. These were:

- Colonialism
- Issues surrounding generation
- The difference between British identity and English identity

Section 5.21 will give a general discussion of respondents' descriptions of their feelings of British identity, and the three following sections will discuss each of these three themes in turn.

5.21: Respondents' descriptions of their feelings of British identity

Of the 22 respondents in the sample, 13 expressed some form of British identity when asked, 4 said they did not have a British identity, 3 said they only felt English but not British, and 2 were rather indifferent when asked how they felt about their British identity. With one respondent – Cheryl – this indifference was expressed in terms of wanting to feel British, but not being fully accepted as British because of her skin colour: "Yes to an extent, but not completely ... I feel I should be British but I live here, and um, but sometimes people make you think oh, you're not from here" (50-64 year old, in employment). When asked whether she felt British, Leila – the second of the two respondents – expressed her preference for her Nigerian identity: "Um, in some way I guess, but the thing that, my parents have always spoken to me in their native language ... I guess the only way how I really feel British is that we live here, my education is from here, yeah that" (18-24 year old, not in employment).

Of those that said they did not have a British identity, Adam (18-34 year old, not employed) said "I'm not very patriotic, to be honest"; John (18-24, in employment) said he identifies with

London but with Britain "there's just been a betrayal somewhere"; Tania (18-34, in employment) remarked that she would just "say human"; and Sophie (35-49, in employment) thought that "as far as feeling British I can't say it's something I've ever given any thought to".

Of those identifying with Britain, it was fairly common to mention their ethnicity at the same time:

"as someone from, as Black Caribbean, I do feel I identify as being British, but it might be different to someone else" (Anna, 25-34, in employment).

"I would say I'm British anyway ... I put the Caribbean, but that's where I'm from" (David, 35-49, out of employment).

"I just like to keep the identity as an African as well, so obviously British, doesn't bother me" (Helen, 50-64, in employment).

In the social cohesion public discourse it is sometimes argued that British society has become increasingly divided along ethnic or religious lines, and that a stronger British identity would be a positive unifying influence. Other commentators dispute such claims, however: for instance (Hall 2000, 152) argues that young Black people can identify simultaneously with their Caribbean heritage, a 'Black' identity, and a British identity; and Amin's (2003) reading of the 2001 disturbances in northern England described young people as unproblematically adopting hybrid identities. It is worth describing, therefore, the ways in which respondents expressed their views about their ability, or otherwise, to identify both with their ethnic background and with their country of residence.

All the respondents in the sample were able to express their feelings about their national and ethnic identities, and there was an overwhelming sense that, for those respondents that had either a British or an English identity, the dual or multiple identities were described unproblematically. Bruce – a 35-49 year old – described his identity as "Afro-Caribbean-British-Black" and explained, "because my forefathers are from Africa, my parents are from the Caribbean, I was born in Britain, and I'm Black". Ellie (50-64, out of employment) also described how her son was comfortable with his multiple identifications, saying that "I wouldn't want him to grow up with a complex [due to multiple identities], that's the thing but he doesn't seem to have that". Nigel, a 35-49 year old man who was out of employment, expressed his multiple identities, and the importance of passing on this understanding to his children:

“I was born here, but my family’s from South America. So it’s very important for me to maintain that, you know, history, because I’m... I’ve got a lot of children, and they need to know where their father’s come from. So it’s very important that they know that I’m a Black man, born in this country, my family’s from South America, and it’s very important for them to know their history, very important for them to know their history.”

These views, therefore, are very much consistent with Amin’s (2003) argument that many people have hybrid identities unproblematically, and the fact that the majority of respondents were comfortable with both a British or English identity *and* their ethnic identities calls into question the idea that ethnic identities are in general divisive.

5.22: Colonialism

For some of the respondents, colonialism played a role in how they described their British identities. Five of the 22 respondents discussed colonialism, even though it was not mentioned as a question in the interview schedule. For several respondents, the fact their country of ethnic origin was previously a British colony featured in the way they made sense of their British identity and the duality of their nationality, and in some cases discussion of the identity of a parent went along similar lines. For instance, Terry (50-64, in employment) described his dual British and Dominican identity in the following way:

“I’m proud of that, of being part of the United Kingdom, yes... I think they can live side by side, because as I said we have a colonial history, Dominica is a colony of Britain, and you have good things which, unlike the Portuguese, which Britain left us ... there’s a connection between the United Kingdom and other countries”.

Similarly, Mary (35-49, in employment) described her mother’s identity as “Grenadian and British ... [because] my mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony and so ... most people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the same time”.

Julie – a 35-49 year old woman, also in employment – expressed more negative views of Britain’s colonial past: “Some people might not be happy about being British, I suppose because of the past, some people, um, for example colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes them feel alienated from being British”. However, for Julie, this did not stop her from feeling

British: “I mean the past is very important but I don’t think past problems or past shames will stop me from feeling British, but there are some people for whom it would, it would be very important”. She went on to say that “there’s a lot of people from for example India or Pakistan who because they’re like me they’ve been born here, and they know this culture, would identify themselves with being British, irrespective of how Britain behaved in India, sort of thing, they would still believe that their British identity was important”.

A theme of the interaction between Britain’s colonial past and generation was unpacked in some detail by Mary, who described three different types of identity:

“You’ve got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were, that came here as being part of the colonialism, like my parents’ generation. And then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of parents that were immigrants. Then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us who are, who have migrated in the current world, like, and so they’ve come here recently and have sought British identity, and we see things very differently from one another ... we might not relate to each other very well at all because our experiences are so vastly different, and so how we perceive our Britishness is going to be quite different. I might perceive myself as being more patriotic, more British than somebody else who’s not born and brought up here. They might say ok, I’m British, but they might not feel the strange sense of belonging that maybe I might feel from, you know, the experiences I’ve had from being part of the fabric of it all.”

5.23: Generation

For many of the respondents generation – in the sense of ‘generation of immigrant’ – played a key role in how British identities were expressed. Of the 8 people that directly discussed the differences in national identification between older and younger generations of Black people living in Britain, there was an overwhelming consensus that younger people identified more with Britain (or sometimes England) than older people. Examples of such views include (with the interviewer’s speech in italics):

“And what about your children? What do they feel, do you think? Oh, they feel they’re British. They’re British and they spend more of their time in England ... The younger

ones normally tend to identify directly with Britain, because that's all they know" (Terry, 50-64, in employment).

"I think the younger generation identify themselves very much with Britain ... I find young people on the whole, people in their 30s and under, I think they have a very strong sense of belonging to Britain in most aspects of the culture ... I think the young generation very much associate themselves with Britain and where they live, and which parts of Britain they're from" (Julie, 35-49, in employment).

"How does your son feel about feeling English or British? He says he's 'English but half Black' [laughs]. Does he feel slightly 'Jamaican' in any way? Does he feel 'Jamaican'? I don't know, he's so 'English!' [laughs]" (Ellie, 50-64, not in employment).

"[Do] you think your children have a different identity to you, or do you? Absolutely, absolutely. Um, my daughter, my big daughter is probably more attached to this country ... I think as a younger person growing up now, she probably feels more British" (Nigel, 35-49, out of employment).

"Ooh, I think my son thinks of himself as British. I do, yeah" (Sophie, 35-49, in employment).

In addition to older and younger generations, the other related themes that were often mentioned that determined how people felt about their national identities were place of birth, where someone grew up, and the length of time they had spent in a particular place. For instance, David, a 35-49 year old man born in the Caribbean, expressed such views:

"well I can say I'm British, but I'm still from the Caribbean. It's a bit like you, if you were growing up in Australia or something, but you'd still recognise yourself as from here. It depends how long you were in Australia for. If you were a little kid you could grasp that sort of culture easier, and quicker I suppose."

Views that younger people identified strongly with Britain or England contrasted with descriptions of older people's feelings of national identity, which were in general seen as more weakly identifying with Britain, and also more split between Britain (or England) and their country of origin. Sophie said of her mother, "how she takes on board living in England I don't know but I would say she feels St. Lucian". Leila – a younger respondent, born in the UK – expressed the view about her parents that "obviously they're less British ... it's just that some of what their norms and their values, are kind of different to the British values that we're brought up with today".

However the view that, in terms of their national identity, younger people identified mainly or only with Britain or England was also seen as problematic, particularly because these younger people may not be treated or accepted in the same way as white people of the same age. These views are related to arguments by Hall (2000) and Modood *et al.* (1994) regarding the importance of identity claims being accepted by others, and were coded as 'non-acceptance' during the coding stage:

"There's a big generational thing. You know. As we move nearer obviously to the third generation, who don't see themselves as Caribbean or African, they just see themselves as English, except that they can't be called English, I think that's where a lot of resentment is coming in because they don't feel that they're always seen the same way" (Bruce, 35-49, in employment).

A very similar view was expressed by another respondent (Julie, aged 35-49):

"Um... It think it's... I think it is different with age, because um, younger people, younger people expect to be treated in the same way as um, as um Caucasian, and they find it harder because they associate themselves more with Britain, whereas um, people of my age and older, they remember what it was like to be treated as though they were different, and they more accept that, um, there are differences and that there are problems, and that there might be problems because of their ethnicity, whereas um, younger people they don't expect that - they expect to be treated in exactly the same way as someone who is Caucasian and they find it an awful lot harder to cope with. So I think age is important, yeah."

The important narratives by which generation could affect national identity, then, were: the feeling that younger people identified more with Britain than older people; the idea that place of birth, place of growing up, and the length of time spent in a place were related determinants; and the idea that younger people, despite often identifying more strongly than Britain or England than older people, were not having their identity claims accepted because of their skin colour or 'race'.

5.24: The difference between British identity and English identity

The other important narrative around which respondents frequently based the discussion of the national identities was the difference between British and English identities. Differences between British and English identities have relevance to the debate about differences between 'civic' and 'ethnic' national identities (e.g. Heath & Roberts 2008). Feeling English is sometimes portrayed as an ethnically based identity, where some kind of ancestry, along with 'white' physical characteristics are supposed to be prerequisites for adopting an English identity. Feeling British, by contrast, is sometimes portrayed as a (potentially) more inclusive civic identity, open to citizens regardless of ethnic background or physical characteristics.

Respondents offered a variety of views with regard to the difference between English and British identities, although in 10 of the interviews the distinction was not discussed explicitly. Some respondents identified more with a British identity than an English one – "I'm not English. I would say I'm British but not English" – whereby the difference was seen as British being "a nationality" as opposed to English identity being "a real personal, a real who you are" (Graham, 25-34 year old man, in employment). Similarly, when asked whether he felt English or British, Nigel (35-49, out of employment) replied: "I've got an affinity towards where my family are, in South America, but I'm British. You know, I'm British. Clearly British.". The view was also expressed that English identity was seen as an ethnically-based identity: "Well clearly I believe that I cannot be considered as English, unfortunately because I'm not Anglo-Saxon" (Bruce, 35-49, in employment).

Other respondents expressed a greater English identity when asked whether they preferred British or English:

"England really, because I was born and raised in England and I don't really know Scotland and Wales and um, Northern Ireland very well, so I suppose I identify myself really with England." (Julie, 35-49, in employment).

On several occasions the view was expressed that feeling 'British' was often synonymous with feeling 'Black British', which was a signifier of difference rather than the signifier of similarity that came with an English identity:

"Well, I like 'Black British' because it obviously recognises that I'm Black and I was second generation Blacks of this country but now I'm kind of almost the idea of 'English', yeah... It's more in terms of me internalising it, so I don't feel like I'm always

the victim, if that makes sense? Because then when you categorise yourself, you're 'Black British', that kind of gives you like you're separate from everything." (Ellie, 50-64, out of employment).

It is noteworthy that the two young mixed-ethnicity respondents in the sample identified strongly with being English rather than British, with Alan (25-34) saying: "I'm English and that's the way I see it. I don't really understand the British tag"; and Tracy (25-34) saying "British is, just seems quite patriotic, and like, it's like dominating, in my mind it's like 'I want to be all of it'... I couldn't say I'm British, but rather English, because I know that bit a little bit more."

In sum, then, there was a wide range of views on respondents' preferences for English or British identities, and their reasons for such a preference. English identity was equated with a 'white' ethnic identity by some respondents; others challenged this view by trying to assert their similarity to other English people, such as by rejecting the 'Black British' label; and others expressed the view that they were English in a fairly uncontroversial way.

5.3 The relationship between British identity and social cohesion

Section 5.2 explored the range of narratives expressed when respondents discussed their national identities. This section explores the range of narratives expressed when respondents discussed whether or not British identity has an impact on social cohesion outcomes. It draws on the coding described in stage 4 of the methodology section (5.1).

When asked questions directly about the impact of British identity on any of the elements of social cohesion, or when discussing these relationships more generally, respondents had very different ideas about how British identity might, or might not, impact upon social cohesion outcomes. Some narratives described British identity as potentially important, whilst others did not. In the narratives in which British identity was important, respondents often expressed different understandings of British identity.

Figure 16 represents the narratives in which respondents considered to be important for social cohesion - some focus on British identity as being important for social cohesion, whilst others do not. There are three narratives by which British identity could be important. The first was where British identity is a signifier of connectedness to society, whereby identity and connectedness go 'hand in hand'. This narrative was very ambiguous in terms of any causation between British identity and connectedness, as the two were represented as going together instead of one implying the other. If one is connected with society, one often will also identify with Britain; and if one identifies with Britain one is more likely to be connected. Conversely, if one is not connected it is likely that one does not identify with Britain; and if one does not identify, it may be difficult to feel connected.

The second narrative focused on an understanding of British identity in terms of social expectations of language, culture and etiquette. According to this narrative, Britishness is about a particular way of speaking, a particular accent, or a certain set of 'manners'. For those that meet these social expectations, positive social cohesion outcomes often follow, for instance because one might ask the right question in the right way, or be understood better by others because of one's accent and manner of speaking.

The third narrative focused on an understanding of British identity as being about knowledge of the British system. Identifying with Britain means that one knows how to negotiate and engage with the social and political system, and this will lead to positive social cohesion outcomes such as feeling one is able to contact an MP, or knowing how to negotiate complex public services.


There were two narratives in which respondents expressed the view that British identity did not have anything to do with social cohesion outcomes, but that other things were important instead. The first narrative, expressed by a majority of respondents, was that positive outcomes were created by individual choice and personal responsibility rather than any aspects of identity. According to this narrative volunteering, engaging civically, being involved with a political group, or contacting a local MP were all things that were driven by an individual's choices and motivations rather than anything else.

The second narrative in which respondents expressed the view that British identity was not important for social cohesion was by emphasising the importance of other identities instead. According to this narrative, social cohesion is driven by religious identities, a 'global' identity as a human being, local identities, or ethnic or 'Black' identities, but not British identity.

These narratives often appeared in overlapping and contradictory ways in which respondents expressed several in the same interview, considering British identity to be both important and not important for social cohesion at the same time. There were, however, patterns in terms of which respondents expressed which of the narratives: these patterns will be explored in Section 5.4, but the focus of this section is on introducing each of the narratives in turn.

For brevity when quoting respondents' views, parentheses will be used to indicate whether the respondent is employed or unemployed (E or U), and which of the three age categories they belong to (1 indicates 18-34 years; 2 indicates 34-49 years; and 3 indicates 50 years or over). Parentheses indicating E1, for instance, show that the respondent is an employed person aged 18-34 years.

Figure 16: Narratives of British identity and social cohesion



5.31: Narratives by which British identity affects social cohesion

(i) *British identity as a signifier of connectedness with society*

Several respondents expressed the view that British identity could be a signifier of connectedness with society. Often a contrast was made between those that had both British identity and a connection with society, and those that had neither.

Mary, for instance, described how “if you don’t identify with Britain then you are probably feeling quite disconnected in terms of your sense of belonging. I think there’s got to be some sense of identity within that, within the fabric of British culture for you to even want to effect any change” (E2). Tania thought something similar, saying “I think if you feel like you’re not part of the country or if you’re not seen as part of the country people aren’t going to listen to you” (E1). John expressed similar views:

“you have to [identify with Britain] on some level or why would you go to a public meeting if you hate Britain that much, you wouldn’t go to a public meeting ... but that’s self-explanatory surely because if you’re that anti-Britain, we’re in Britain, of course it’s going to be difficult for you to get by” (E1).

Julie thought a similar problem may apply to motivations for being involved with a pressure group, whereby if someone “had less of an identity they might think ‘oh what’s the point, nobody is going to listen anyway’” (E2).

The ambiguity in how this process might work, in the sense that both a lack of British identity and a lack of connectedness might each cause the other, was summed up by Anna, who described how people without a British identity “might not feel valued, or they might feel belittled by their environment, so they wouldn’t feel that they want to help it, so they’ll feel like they’re outsiders, so they wouldn’t feel they want to help” (E1). Not wanting to help might make one feel like an outsider, but feeling like an outsider might make one not want to help.

An association between alienation from feeling British and local belonging was made by Julie, who thought that:

“Some people might not be happy about being British, I suppose because of the past, some people, um, for example colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes them feel

alienated from being British, and then they don't have as strong sense of belonging to wherever it is they live in London as someone who doesn't think that" (E2).

John likened British identity to 'playing the game', saying it is necessary to "buy into it" to get what one wants:

"You need a British passport, on some level you need to buy into it and if you don't, you're stuffed ... like I said, I feel betrayed and when it comes down to it, it's like playing the game but at the same time it's, ultimately I don't believe in it but I know if I want to be able to do what I want to do and live the kind of life I want to live, I need to just accept it on some level and go along with it. It's having a balanced opinion, knowing when to pick a fight and when to just ..." (E1).

(ii) *British identity as language, accent and etiquette*

The second narrative in which British identity could be importance for social cohesion focused around Britishness in terms of language, accent and etiquette. It was often perceived that the ability to speak English well could lead to positive outcomes, and that an English accent was also beneficial. Knowledge of things perceived to be typically 'British' in terms of etiquette was also perceived to be linked to positive outcomes, for example because it could mean one might be more able to 'negotiate' complicated public services more effectively, or one might know how to ask the right question in the right way.

The ability to speak English well was deemed important by many respondents. This narrative arose, for instance, when discussing access to public services, where a perception was expressed that people might be treated unfairly if their English language skills are not good. Sophie described her experiences as follows (E2):

"In school there is a woman, I think she's from Sri Lanka, and because of the language, I find in school she would go up to the women in the office because she might have some disagreement or something going on and they wouldn't pay much attention to her or shoo her off. Yes, I can understand it's hard to understand somebody who doesn't speak English well, but I don't like to see that because I think give her a chance, don't try to shoo her off before you've even given her a chance to express what the matter is. And I think maybe for her at times she's voiced to me that she sometimes a bit well what's the point of me going and asking I don't know, to a lawyer

or citizen's advice, because she feels like they will, you know, not listen to her or give her a chance, but I'm somebody on the whole, I'm like you have just as much right as anybody.... Because in school only last week actually I had to go in with her, into the headmaster because she had some disputes that were going on with her son, where I'm like come for support and I will get them to sit down and listen, they will have to stop and yes it might be difficult, but if you give her time and are actually patient you will get what she's trying to say to you rather than shooing her off, so I think that for some people depending on the language and where they're from, yes at times it's very difficult for them."

In addition, having an English accent was deemed an advantage by several respondents, although none of the respondents that did not have typically 'English' accents complained about mistreatment because of the way they spoke. Differences between accents in other English regions, or in the other countries of the UK, were not discussed. Tracy explained that "I think it's an advantage that I have an English accent ... I like the fact that I've got an English accent and I don't look English, because I like the juxtaposition of that, it gives a kind of advantage somehow, so I think it's quite a positive thing" (E1). Speaking about being treated with respect in public, and about access to public services, Leila said (U1):

"I'm thinking like if you have an African accent, or a type of accent, and I dunno if you're trying to communicate with someone they can just get frustrated more easily. Like any accent, I guess that would kind of, I dunno how to explain. I guess with an English accent I think everything is just easier done, you get things like easier, and people will tend to listen to you more."

In addition to seeing language and accent as central to both British identity and some aspects of social cohesion, some respondents perceived knowledge of typically 'British' or 'English' etiquette to be important for achieving positive outcomes. Tracy explained that if "you're English yourself, you have a certain etiquette" (E1), and that this etiquette affects how one might communicate and so how one may be treated by others, for instance when using public services:

"I think English people are respected more in England, in a lot of... and I think it's a subconscious thing. I think it's just easier for people in public services to deal with people that they think are English. I think there's a sense that if they are English they just kind of know what's going on" (E1).

Alan explained how this bias based on whether someone is perceived as English can lead to unfair treatment or discrimination:

“if someone English who was white and grumbled about things that were going in Britain, or services, it would just be a political thing but somehow someone is from somewhere else... I mean someone who’s white and English and compares it to France or something it’s okay but if someone is from somewhere else with an accent or because of ethnicity we’re complaining that somehow it’s not okay” (E1).

(iii) British identity as knowledge of the British system

The third narrative in which British identity was important for social cohesion centred around the idea that British identity entailed knowing about Britain, and in particular the British political and social system. This in turn makes it easier for one to negotiate the system in order to get what one wants – for instance when using public services, contacting an MP, and so on. This view of British identity leads, in some cases, to an almost tautological answer to the question ‘what is the impact of British identity on social cohesion’, since if British identity is synonymous with being able to engage with the British political system successfully, yet one aspect of social cohesion is the ability to engage with the British political system, this implies anyone with a British identity will also have ‘greater’ social cohesion in this sense.

Anna expressed how British identity could be an advantage in this sense:

“That’s a very good question. Probably because I am comfortable as being a British person I wouldn’t have a problem with contacting my MP. I suppose someone who doesn’t know how the workings of this country work, wouldn’t go for that, but I wouldn’t have a problem, no. *Ok, ok, so you think that because you do identify with Britain it makes these things easier? Yes. So you think if you didn’t identify with Britain you’d be less likely to do the volunteering work you’d done? Yes.* Probably because I know what my local environment needs, so I’d find out what I could provide, and I’d want to do that because I know it affects everyone” (E1).

However, Mary was more unsure about whether it was British identity itself that was driving these positive outcomes –instead it may be the complex nature of services, and the idea that they are not geared towards helping all people equally:

“Not necessarily. I don’t necessarily think that services, public services, are geared towards supporting a variety of people, it’s geared towards supporting people who are equipped to be able to deal with those services because their services are very complicated. And so if you struggle to negotiate how complicated those services are, and whether you identify with Britain or not, you may find that you’re on the outside of those services. And it suits the government for that to happen, because then there’s a whole range of people who are just... who just kind of drop off the edge who they don’t have to look after or pay attention to, or care about really, because they’re not in the statistics” (E2).

5.32: Narratives in which British identity is not important for social cohesion

In contrast to the three narratives outlined above, many respondents expressed views whereby British identity was not important for social cohesion, but that other factors would be. This section will explore these narratives.

(i) Individual choice and personal responsibility

Many respondents disagreed with the idea that broad traits such as British identity could have an impact on social cohesion outcomes, and instead preferred to talk about the importance of the individual, with personal choice and personal responsibility seen as of primary importance. This narrative, in various forms, was widely discussed, and was expressed by a majority of the respondents – 13 of the 22 in the sample. The narrative was also expressed by at least some of the respondents when discussing each of the elements of social cohesion, rather than it being a narrative focusing mainly on one or other of the elements.

An emphasis on the choices and preferences of the individual was an important narrative with regard to the motivations to why respondents might feel they belong in their local area, whether they choose to volunteer or engage civically, and whether people might treat others with respect. When expressing this narrative respondents often viewed individual choices and preferences as much more important than feelings of identification with Britain.

When discussing whether British identity might be important for whether or not people are treated with respect, David (U2) said that “it depends what type of people you’re talking to” and, on a personal level, the way he treated others with respect was “just my own thinking”. A similar opinion was expressed by Helen (E3), who thought that “people are different, some people treat others with respect, and others don’t. And they have their reasons, and their prejudices, and that.” Tania (E1) said that “I don’t think so, I think it might be just individual upbringing or generational upbringing, the way that this generation has been brought up.”

The emphasis on personal preferences was again strongly present when discussing motivations for volunteering or engaging civically. James (U2) stated that “No, no that’s just me, I just want to help”, whilst Tracy (E1) dismissed British identity as being important for volunteering and civic engagement, saying “why would it matter because it’s about individual passions”.

Asked whether they felt identifying with Britain had an impact on a feeling of local belonging and satisfaction with where one lives, Leila thought that “I don’t think it makes much difference, I think it’s just really up to what the person wants and needs around them that makes the difference” (U1). Similarly, when asked whether he thought identifying with Britain had an impact on accessing public services, Graham answered “I’m just who I am, I just live my daily life, I just go with my aspirations and challenges, which you always face” (E1).

Taking personal responsibility for what happens in one’s life was also repeatedly discussed. Although similar, this narrative contrasts to the idea that individual choices and preferences were important for determining social cohesion outcomes by emphasising how individuals feel they can change their own outcomes by their own willpower or behaviour (and also sometimes that others should do likewise). Anna expressed the view that if one is not satisfied with where one lives, it is important to do something about it and, if that proves impossible, move to an area when one can feel satisfied, saying “well, you have a choice of living where you want to live really, so you can live in an environment you are comfortable in, or if not you can move” (E1); whilst Brian expressed a very similar view, saying that “for people to be in a place where they’re uncomfortable well maybe they can do something, or maybe they can’t do nothing in that neighbourhood and they need to move themselves to a place where they are able to integrate or be part of” (E3).

Graham also expressed the view that if one is not satisfied with public service provision, it is important to do something about it – for instance by moving area to have access to a different school (E1):

“you can find another way of improving the service that you want to get for yourself. So even if the state provide something that is not up to your taste, then maybe you can work more harder to provide a service that you want. So they, probably if the educational service is not too good, and you probably just, I just use a case where you want to send your son or your kid to a school, a better school, then that means you will have to work more harder, in order to send your kid to a better school ... You don’t have to depend too much on the provision of the state, if that makes sense, it is what it is, but I wouldn’t live my life depending on the system of provision. If it’s not too good, I’ll have to make a provision for myself, to better my own life and probably the people around me. And hopefully at some people the state will get it and improve.”

Other respondents discussed instances where they had personally created a solution to potential barriers to positive outcomes. For instance, when asked whether he thought that

British identity affected belonging to his local area, Bruce answered: "I think for me it doesn't make much difference because I think I've learnt how to relate to my neighbours" (E2). This idea was also expressed in a more negative sense, in terms of creating 'coping strategies' to deal with barriers to positive social cohesion outcomes, often created by perceived discrimination. Nigel expressed his views on how satisfied he was with where he lives in the following terms (U2):

"I'm not satisfied here at all. At all. But I adapt to my conditions. I'm not satisfied here at all, but I adapt to my conditions. You know, what they say is what it is, and you know you have to really have to live with what you get, what you get is what you get. No, I'm not happy, I'm not happy with where I am at the moment, but it is what it is."

(ii) Other identities

The second narrative that was often discussed when respondents disagreed that British identity is important for social cohesion focused on other identities. The main types of identities discussed were: identity as a human or identifying with the world; identifying with London; Black identity; and religion.

Several respondents mentioned a 'global' identity of identifying with the world, or as a human, as being more important for social cohesion outcomes than British identity. Tracy put it in the following way: "I feel that I don't belong [to Britain], and that the world is possibly my home, so that the fact that I feel like there's a bigger picture if you like, there's a whole planet out there, and I don't need to feel like I'm necessarily stuck in one place" (E1). Discussing social interaction with others, Brian said:

"it doesn't really matter where you are, you do as another human to another human, you interact, you've got to otherwise you just may as well lock your door and don't go out ... I don't see why the question's asking the affinity to Britain. Why does it have to be affinity, it's just human relationships" (E3).

For Alan, being part of London was important: "in London, you're part of this world city. Outside of London people don't feel that connected to London and here there are people from all over the place. I don't think it's just about ethnicity" (E1).

Many respondents thought that their Black identity was important, for instance in terms of the type of political issues one might get involved with, or in terms of the type of volunteering one might do. Bruce thought that “if there were an issue affecting Blacks, yeah I would definitely march” (E2), whilst Sophie also made a distinction between Black and other issues, saying “I think for a lot of Black people maybe they don’t, they’re quite channelled in the sense of themselves and their family, not even necessarily helping other Black projects in the community, and for me it’s not necessarily like I do only Black projects, I do whatever is needed” (E2). Nigel thought being Black was a crucial disadvantage in terms of one’s ability to have a say in political decisions and being treated fairly:

“I mean you don’t need to talk about because I mean, how many MPs are Black, how many ... you know there’s not say for Black people in this country, or in America, the only person’s the President in America ... of course it is important for them to feel British, but they don’t feel British, they feel that they’re Black, they feel that they’re living in someone else’s country” (U2).

For some of the respondents, religion was also an important influence on some of the social cohesion elements, particularly with regard to whether one might do any volunteering, or which people one might want to help. For instance, Helen thought that “some people, because of their religion, they help old people, or children in need, anyway” (E3), whilst Alan expressed similar views, saying that religion may affect volunteering:

“mainly along the lines of the groups that they then volunteer with. So obviously there are Jewish groups in the area, there are Muslim groups in the area, there are Christian ones so I think it’s more just in terms of which group they decide to volunteer with rather than whether they’ll do it, or not” (E1).

For Julie, religion had far-reaching implications for many of the elements of social cohesion, affecting belonging, social networks, and alienation from British society:

“I think religion plays a great part in feeling, and in developing a sense of belonging, and um, people who don’t have the church, that can sometimes help them feel alienated as well, not having a social network around them, can help them to feel that they are a little bit alienated from the British society” (E2).

Julie went on to explain that her religion affected both her decisions to volunteer, and helped her retain a sense of self-worth:

“I think that’s down to being a Christian. Because I’ve been, you know, good to my faith, I’ve been accepted by God, so then I suppose I’ve got to be useful in society. And I think without my belief, then I’d be, um, then I’d feel, I’d have less self-worth without it, so then I don’t think I probably wouldn’t have had the courage to go out and do volunteering, or feel of use, whereas because of my faith that’s part of my faith to be of use to other people, because I don’t think Black people are always respected, I don’t think they are always respected by the police, to be quite honest, they’re not always respected by the police or treated as though they’re of any value. Whereas that’s of less importance to me because of my faith, regardless of whether I’m valued, yes or no, it’s up to me to be of value, and to help others, so, and my faith is instrumental in that” (E2).

5.4 Links between narratives

Section 5.2 explored the range of narratives by which respondents understood their British identities; and Section 5.3 explored the range of narratives by which respondents thought that British identity might, or might not, be important for social cohesion. This section attempts to identify links between some of the narratives: although many respondents used different narratives in overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways, there are patterns in the sense that certain narratives were more likely to be combined than others. At the risk of doing a great disservice to the complex and multifaceted views of the respondents in this study, in a very crude sense many, but not all, respondents fall into one of three groups – although disconfirming instances will be discussed later in this section. These three groups are intended to represent vastly over-simplified types, and will of course be very much reductive with regard to the respondents' full views but, it is hoped, should nonetheless be interesting and informative with regard to how the narratives identified in this chapter are linked.

The first group is made up of respondents who expressed views on British colonialism – either positive, negative, or a mixture of the two – and also expressed the view that British identity, at least sometimes, can go hand-in-hand with positive social cohesion outcomes, often as a signifier that a person is connected with British society. In this way, the colonialism discourse discussed in Section 5.2 is linked with the discourse on British identity as a signifier of connectedness discussed in Section 5.3.


The second group is made up of respondents who viewed British identity as important for social cohesion in the sense that the former is very much associated with language, accent and etiquette: that is, they expressed the narrative described in Section 5.31(ii). These respondents also tended not to themselves identify strongly with Britain, and in many cases reject the identity. In this way, a rejection of British identity is linked with the view (found in section 5.31) that British identity, as represented in norms of language, etiquette and culture, can impact upon social cohesion outcomes.

The third group comprises those respondents not expressing any narrative by which British identity might matter for social cohesion, but instead expressing the view that individual choice and personal responsibility are important for social cohesion outcomes. The respondents in this group all had some kind of British identity, but were fairly unenthusiastic about it, with some saying British identification was not central to their life. For these

respondents, British identification was largely accepted, but not especially important either on a personal level or in influencing social cohesion outcomes.

Figure 17 represents the ways in which many of the respondents in the sample form these three very broad groups with respect to the narratives they express, on the dimensions of having a strong or weak British identity, and whether or not respondents think British identity is related to social cohesion outcomes. Group 1 is rather mixed with respect to the strength of respondents' British identities, with some expressing a strong identity but others being uncomfortable identifying themselves as British. The respondents in Group 1 also discuss issues relating to how colonialism is important for the formation of British identities, and generally also discuss how British identity can be a symbol of connectedness with or inclusion in society. Group 2 is made up of respondents who either reject or have a weak British identity, but who discuss how British identity can be linked to expectations and norms of social behaviour, which can in turn affect social cohesion outcomes. Respondents' attitudes to these processes are often negative. Group 3 is made up of respondents that often have a moderate British identity, or who are rather indifferent, and who think that British identity does not have an impact on social cohesion outcomes, but instead express the view that individual choice and personal responsibility are far more important. In the following sections each group will be discussed in turn.

Figure 17: Links between narratives



5.41: Group one: colonialism and British identity as a signifier of connectedness

Of the five respondents expressing the narrative that British identity might be a signifier of a person's connectedness to society, four also expressed an awareness of how colonialism might be important for the meanings attached to a person's British identity. Why might this be the case, particularly given the fact that questions on colonialism were absent from the interview schedule? Is there anything that can be drawn from the literature on colonial and postcolonial British identities that can give an insight into the narratives expressed by these respondents? This section will attempt to answer these questions, first by drawing on a selection of literature to consider the meanings of colonial and postcolonial British identity, and second by linking this literature to the views expressed by these respondents and considering instances whereby the views are both consistent and inconsistent with the literature.

Rush (2011) explores British identification amongst Black residents in the 20th century Caribbean, noting how people either viewing themselves as middle class, or with the goal to become middle class, frequently adopted some sort of British identity, and in doing so "participated actively in the shaping and transmission of a Caribbean Britishness" (Rush 2011, 10). Under colonial rule, those people having professional jobs or having more regular contact with schools, many of which were run by British Christian missionaries or the colonial administration, were under increased pressure to adopt British cultural norms; and more affluent people had better access to (often British-run) media, leading to increased exposure to British propaganda. Many Caribbean immigrants to Britain, both before and after the Second World War, therefore identified as British, at least as some part of their identity, before arriving in Britain.

There are several aspects of this that are important for the present discussion. First, the idea that British identity can extend beyond the national boundaries of Britain is potentially important. For Miller (2000), one of the things that differentiates national identities from other sorts of identity is that national identity "connects a group of people to a particular geographical place" (Miller 2000, 29). This, however, is only partially true in the case of colonial Caribbean Britishness, which connected a group of people to two different places. It is true, as Miller asserts should be the case, that this national identity had a geographically bounded 'homeland'. But, given the fact that some commentators (e.g. Habermas 2001) argue for a post-national world in which nationalism and national identities are no longer as relevant as they once were, it is curious that British identity, at least to some 19th or 20th century residents of British colonies, was already an identity that transcended national boundaries –

whereby the term 'Britain' referred to a "supranational" entity (Rush 2011, 7). If this is true, it makes Miller's assertion that it "is this territorial element that makes nations uniquely suited to serve as the basis of states, since a state by definition must exercise its authority over a geographical area" somewhat contentious (Miller 2000, 30). As Yuval-Davis (2011, 88) argues, "citizenship in a state is virtually never the one exhaustive way of national belonging".

Second, colonial British identity was viewed by some as a symbol of middle-class status, since it was associated with a professional job, or an aspiration to get a professional job: many "members of the working classes were unlikely to adopt a British identity and British culture, while the growing numbers of white-collar West Indians increasingly participated actively in the shaping and transmission of a Caribbean Britishness" (Rush 2011, 9). In some sense, then, British identity could be viewed as a signifier of being connected with (colonial British) society, or of 'getting ahead' in society.

With regard to the first point, it is certainly true that the respondents discussing colonialism recognised that many people born in former British colonies would identify themselves as British before they arrived in Britain, and that for them, there was no contradiction in having a dual identity. Terry explained that "my parents were born overseas, but I see that there is a direct link between Dominica and, as part of the empire. Because, Dominica used to be a colony of Britain, and I think there are good things been had of this country ... I'm proud of that, of being part of the United Kingdom ... You can still can be British and your country of origin, you can still identify with your country of origin". Similarly, speaking of her mother, Mary said: "my mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony, and so ... most people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the ... same time". This is an important point and perhaps one that deserves more recognition when arguments are made for the importance of generating or sustaining a sense of national identity in order to increase social cohesion (e.g. Goodhart 2007; Putnam 2007), or when national identity as a potential positive influence on social cohesion is discussed in public discourse (such as in some of David Blunkett's speeches), with the implication that members of ethnic minority groups sometimes do not identify with Britain enough.

Also worth noting are the experiences of some people of an ethnic minority origin, who found themselves "[blocked] out of any access to an English or British identity" due to a lack of acceptance of their identity claims (Hall 2000, 148). In the context of colonial British identities, Rush (2011, 5) describes how "black colonial subjects' claims to Britishness have seldom been taken seriously", and how many colonial immigrants to Britain were taken aback by the fact that, despite already identifying strongly with Britain, they were not seen as British upon

arrival in the British 'homeland'. These ideas are echoed by many of the respondents in the sample. For instance, Cheryl expressed the view that "I'm Nigerian. I feel I should be British but I live here, and um, but sometimes people make you think oh, you're not from here. They try to remind you with their actions and stuff like that." Julie expressed a similar view, saying: "I'm not sure whether, the thing is I'm not sure whether um, it's sort of always accepted that a Caribbean who was born here would identify themselves with Britain, it's sometimes it's sometimes in the media it's almost as if it's not really valued, but that's I don't think that worries me too much, I still would continue to feel English and British."

With regard to the second point, the five respondents in this group all express the narrative viewing British identity as a signifier of connectedness to society, but exhibit a variety of different views with regard to colonialism. Two of the respondents discuss colonialism without expressing any value judgements, two discuss colonialism in a negative sense, whilst the fifth respondent does not discuss colonialism at all. Mary – one of the two respondents not expressing a value judgement – discusses her understanding of her connection to Grenada, her mother's place of birth, and also that "if you don't identify with Britain then you are probably feeling quite disconnected".

Julie and John discuss colonialism in a negative sense. Julie says that "some people might not be happy about being British, I suppose because of the past, some people, um, for example colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes them feel alienated from being British, and then they don't have as strong sense of belonging to wherever it is they live in London as someone who doesn't think that". Julie, however, is able to reconcile her British identity with such negative views regarding Britain's colonial past, saying that "I mean the past is very important but I don't think past problems or past shames will stop me from feeling British". John has more difficulty reconciling Britain's past with his feelings of Britishness. He describes his ambivalence about Britain by saying "Well, study your history, man, they're all just a bunch of pirates going around the world nicking land", but at the same time sees some good sides of the modern state: "there is a degree of satisfaction that you're not going to get locked up for certain things, for example, like in other countries. It's a tolerant, open society so that obviously brings satisfaction for obvious reasons". At the same time, he views identifying with Britain as a signifier of inclusion to some extent: "You have to on some level or why would you go to a public meeting if you hate Britain that much, you wouldn't go to a public meeting." John seems able to reconcile his identity as a British citizen with Britain's past to a certain extent, and when asked how he felt that for some people it was important for them to identify with Britain, said:

“I think that’s fine, as long as that makes them feel good about themselves, great, but I think they have to ultimately realise, we all have to ultimately realise that all these things are just silly little games and count for nothing ... I ain’t got nothing against someone being happy, if that’s what you want to do, cool. But I just think it’s really important to have that underlying understanding that it is just a flag and beyond what I give it, it carries no meaning ... But I think people haven’t learned that before they start waving the flag. Every person should at some point realise the truth and that is that we’re all from the earth and we’ve all got a common history and a common culture beyond that.”

For some respondents, then, an awareness of how colonialism can impact on the formation of a British identity appears to be linked with a view that British identity is a signifier of connectedness to and inclusion in society, and therefore a signifier of positive social cohesion outcomes. This link remains across respondents that are positive or negative about colonialism (with John, quoted above, being the most negative about colonialism).

5.42: Group two: Britishness and language, accent, culture and etiquette

Five of the respondents in the sample expressed the narrative whereby British identity is associated with expectations and norms of language, accent, culture and etiquette, and whether or not these norms or expectations are met may affect social cohesion outcomes. It is notable that these five respondents also did not have a strong British identity, and often rejected British identity. There was a commonality between these respondents of negativity towards British identity, and also negativity towards the ways in which certain social expectations could shape outcomes. These five respondents often interpreted questions asking them about whether British identity could impact on social cohesion outcomes in a particular way – by viewing British identity as being about norms of language, accent, culture and etiquette, rather than something more internal (or as one respondent put it, “a real who you are”).

Why might it be the case that some of the respondents with the most negative attitudes towards British identities are also those discussing ways in which British identities are associated with social expectations and norms, and these expectations and norms, in the form of language, accent, culture and etiquette, can impact on social cohesion outcomes? This section will explore this question by first giving a brief discussion of the literature on ‘manners’, cultural etiquette, and the ‘civilising process’. Second, the five respondents expressing this narrative will be introduced, and an illustration will be given that they all exhibit the pattern of a rejection of or distancing from British identity, together with a generally negative view of the way in which social norms might affect social cohesion outcomes. Third, some parallels between some of the views of the respondents and the literature will be explored.

There is a wide literature on the ways in which social norms and expectations can be produced. Elias (1994) documents the ways in which the nobility in Europe developed an ever more complex system of ‘manners’, propagated by expectations of behaviour in the courtroom, to maintain an authority over a newly moneyed bourgeoisie. In time, this code of conduct found its way into expectations of the behaviour of ‘lower’ classes in Europe, whereby the adoption of these systems of ‘manners’ was thereby associated with higher status and privilege. Codes of social manners were also a technique by which European imperial powers could export ‘civilised’ behaviour, in contrast to barbarism, around the world, such as the appearance of Spanish ‘etiquette books’ in Latin America (Moore *et al.* 2007). Furthermore, this ‘civilising’ process outside Europe, by which colonial subjects were taught norms of British

and Christian culture, could be used by native British missionaries to enhance their status in British society (Rush 2011).

The five respondents discussing this narrative certainly show an awareness of how expectations of social 'manners' can affect other people's perceptions, which in turn can affect outcomes. These respondents also often describe this process in a negative way, although this is not always the case, and very often this negativity is tied up with a rejection of or distancing from British identity. Leila – a young female respondent – describes how “the only way how I really feel British is that we live here, my education is from here”, and that “if you have an African accent ... someone can just get frustrated more easily, I guess with an English accent ... you get things like easier, and people will tend to listen to you more”. Tracy explained how she rejects British identity because “British is, just seems quite patriotic, and like, it's like dominating, in my mind it's like 'I want to be all of it' ... I couldn't say I'm British”; and yet also expressed the view that “English people are respected more in England ... and I think it's a subconscious thing”.

Expectations over social norms can also extend to appearances, and norms of appearance can interact with other expectations. Alan describes a conversation at his workplace in the following terms:

“[A colleague said that] ‘Oh I was really surprised there was this Black guy on the tube with a baseball cap and all this sort of stuff and reading Voltaire.’ I was like, ‘I know lots of people who wear baseball caps who went to university,’ but if they were white and doing that I don't know, I don't know what the assumption was. Is it the baseball cap or is it the ethnicity and why did he feel the necessity to mention that the guy was Black.”

In terms of expectations about his own appearance, Alan also describes the following conversation:

“It does sometimes feel like maybe if I haven't shaved for a couple of days there's an assumption about who I am maybe when I do certain things as opposed to my white friends who haven't shaved for a couple of days and wear a beanie or whatever they're just seen as student-types ... and people have openly said it to me in my work in the past. They said, ‘It was only once you opened your mouth it was okay’ because I've got a middle-class voice, or accent, I don't know.”

John described the obstacles he had to overcome to start a community organisation in a way that is very much in keeping with Elias' ideas of the courtroom being used to sustain superiority through codes of conduct, by explicitly linking the challenge of reading legal documents to culture and the maintenance of a status hierarchy:

“I can imagine how most people are scared away, scared off of doing it [starting an organisation or company] because I basically had to read through legal documents and liaise with a lawyer and dealing with the language of it. It was linked to the culture, the linguistics of it and the system of it, almost like a hierarchy in the way it works with lawyers and whatnot and then you've got the law and you've got to register with this ... But it's going through that process of understanding the language because it's the legal system, you've got these Latin words and the way the lawyers write and the rules and the rules of Articles and Association and whatnot, it's dense stuff. If you can break it down and digest it ... it's off-putting, it's not necessarily an encouraging process but you've got to get through that to get to the good stuff. Back to the point of culture, maybe it is linked a bit to ethnicity and culture, seeing that as a daunting thing, difficult.”

The respondents in this group, then, are characterised by having a weak British identity, or by rejecting British identity outright, and by expressing negative views on ways in which social norms and expectations can affect social cohesion outcomes. Similarities can be drawn between these narratives and the literature on the 'civilising process' and the way in which 'manners' and etiquette are constructed.

5.43: Group three: moderate or indifferent British identity and personal choice and responsibility

Group three is made up of respondents who are both fairly indifferent about their British identities, either downplaying their importance or having only a moderately strong identity, and who also express the narrative, outlined in Section 5.3, that it is individual choice and personal responsibility, rather than issues surrounding identity, that matter for social cohesion outcomes.

From the interview data there are numerous examples of the combination of these two narratives. David downplayed the importance of his British identity by saying “I would say being British, I don’t know if that calls for anything that significant”, whilst at the same time, when asked whether feeling British had any impact on “whether you get involved with the council” replied: “No, no. It’s got nothing to do with that, it’s just my own choice.” Similarly, Leila was fairly unenthusiastic about her British identity, saying of her religious, ethnic and British identities that “I guess that British would be last”, and that the impact of British identity on local belonging was not particularly important:

“I don’t think it makes much difference. I think that, I don’t think it makes much difference. I think it’s just really up to what the person wants and needs around them that makes the difference, not the fact that you feel more British or not.”

In total, seven of the respondents in the sample expressed the view that individual choice and personal responsibility were important for social cohesion outcomes, and also did not express any narrative by which British identity could impact upon social cohesion. These seven respondents also either had a moderate British identity, whereby they identified with Britain but it was not central to their life, or were fairly indifferent about their British identity.

It is possible to view the narratives expressed by this group in terms of two alternative interpretations. On the one hand, these respondents feel mildly British in the sense that they are happy enough with the country in which they live, but it is not something that is particularly important to them and it certainly has very little to do with their motivations for achieving positive ‘social cohesion’ outcomes such as volunteering, or political participation. These motivations instead stem from personal choices, and these respondents are expressing a rejection of the whole idea that people’s behaviour is somehow determined by certain factors, such as British identity. On the other hand, it is possible to see a connection between these views and concepts such as a civic notion of citizenship, or a civic nationality, whereby

citizens take their responsibilities to society seriously and have a duty to participate in many activities, such as participating politically or engaging civically.

Most definitions of citizenship include not only the rights of the citizen, but also their duties and responsibilities (Yuval-Davis 2011). In order for democracies to function effectively and produce just outcomes, citizens must have a certain attitude towards their fellow citizens, and be prepared to participate in certain activities. Kymlicka (1995, 175) argues that “the health and stability of a modern democracy depends ... [in part] on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: e.g. ... their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; ... and their sense of justice and commitment to a fair distribution of resources”. Barry (2001, 80) argues for what he describes as a ‘civic nationality’ which involves, amongst other things, “making sacrifices for the common good”, and being prepared to give up such things as money and leisure time for one’s fellow citizens, whilst Miller (2000, 131) suggests that a civic nationalism “does not imply a common history, language, culture, etc. but merely recognition of the authority of a constitutional or political framework”.¹⁰ Kymlicka also acknowledges the idea of ‘civic nationality’ as a version of citizenship based on ideology and shared commitment, but claims that a non-cultural notion of citizenship is mistaken since citizenship also implies the learning of certain cultural and historical features of a society, such as a common language.

Leaving aside for a moment the debate over the feasibility in practice of a non-cultural notion of citizenship, it is possible that by downplaying the personal importance of their British identities, and in particular by both rejecting the significance of British identity for social cohesion outcomes and emphasising the significance of personal choice and responsibility, the respondents in this group are expressing a narrative that is similar to these concepts of civic nationality or civic citizenship. British identity is perhaps seen as something that is ‘thick’ with cultural and historical connotations, whereas by emphasising one’s personal responsibilities as important drivers of social cohesion outcomes, the narrative suggests that it is the fulfilment of the civic duties or sacrifices for other citizens that produce positive outcomes.

Several of the respondents display this combination of narratives, whereby a moderate British identity is combined with a sense of personal responsibility to society, which in turn is seen as affecting social cohesion outcomes. Bruce, for instance, described his identity as Black British,

¹⁰ It is worth noting that Miller doubts that many examples of civic nationalism actually exist, since most include cultural and historical aspects, but the concept is useful in the abstract as one end of a spectrum, with ethnic nationalism at the other.

but when asked how important this identity was to him, said it was “something that probably matters more to society rather than me”. When asked about whether his British identity affects his local belonging, Bruce says “for me it doesn’t make much difference”, and instead describes how the choices he has made to get involved with the local tenants’ association have led him to become accepted more in the local area: “I sit on the local tenants’ association, you know I’m quite active in what I do, you know, I feel because of that I’m accepted a lot more than probably had I sat, you know, been on benefits and, not doing anything.” When asked whether he thought his British identity affects his volunteering or civic engagement he gave a similar answer, saying “Well not for me ... You know, and I wouldn’t have thought it would matter”; and instead emphasised the responsibility he felt to be involved with issues affecting many people in society, saying if there was an issue “which probably affects everyone, or if they want to march for something else, you know I mean the civil service march coming up you bet your bottom dollar I’ll be walking on that unless they’ve made a decision today to sort out our pensions”.

Helen also had a moderate British identity, but one that wasn’t central to her life, saying “I just like to keep the identity as an African as well, so obviously British... Doesn’t bother me”. She also emphasised how she thought that it was important to give something to society:

“I enjoy you know, one on one, support and I believe that everybody should actually do something for the society they live in, and that’s why I did it, it wasn’t because I’m a Christian, I think I would have done that regardless.”

When asked “*how about your Britishness, do you think the fact you feel British has anything to do with it, or do you think...*” she replied: “No, not really. I, I mean it’s individuals how they think and what they wanna do”.

In sum, then, there could be two interpretations for the combination of narratives for many of the respondents in this group. On the one hand, the respondents could be seen as saying that no factors external to their own individual choice have got anything to do with social cohesion; or alternatively the combination of narratives could be viewed as a rejection of British identity as an influence on social cohesion, but an endorsement of the idea that a civic sense of citizenship, or a ‘civic nationality’ (Barry 2001) are important for social cohesion outcomes, by emphasising personal responsibility.

5.44: Disconfirming instances

These three groups, however, do not fit neatly with the narratives expressed by *all* respondents in the sample. Although most respondents discussing colonialism also use the 'signifier' narrative, there is one respondent that does not.

Terry is a male over 50 years old, in employment. His ethnic heritage is from a former British colony, and both his ethnic heritage and his British identity are very important for him. There is a strong sense that he is comfortable with this duality of his identity:

"I think they can live side by side, because as I said we have a colonial history, Dominica is a colony of Britain, and you have good things which, unlike the Portuguese, which Britain left us, for example schools, they left us hospitals ... You can still can be British and your country of origin, you can still identify with your country of origin."

Terry is positive about Britain, and Britain's colonial past, but consistently does not think that British identity has anything to do with social cohesion outcomes, frequently answering such questions by saying things like "It doesn't make any difference".

For him, what is important for positive social cohesion outcomes has more to do with specific aspects of local and government policy. Two issues he repeatedly discusses are support for cultural organisations linking Britain with other cultures; and policies focusing on issues such as equality of opportunity. Of cultural or charity organisations, Terry said:

"[I have] established an organisation, a charity organisation already, at the moment we're looking to expand ... to keep in touch with one another as well as trying to see how we can help our community back home, as well as people in England, not only Dominicans, but other people, from other different countries as well ... In fact the organisation has been helping all over the world, people from all over the world. I find it is important that we keep our identity culturally because we need to, the kids who are growing up here they need to know more about Dominica, and where we are and where we're going."

He also thought that equal opportunities policies were important for social cohesion outcomes, saying:

“Because there is something, equal opportunities policy, and a lot of people, they could quote the equal opportunities policy from the front book to the back book, to the end of the book. But my problem with this is you not only have to talk about equal opportunities, you have to be implementing equal opportunities. Not only implementing, take only one section, but you need to implement it in totality. In the workplace you find that some people, although they say they’re implementing equal opportunities policy, in truth or in fact, they tend to forget certain things, without implementing the whole thing. You should not just be talking about equal opportunities ... you should also be talking about ethnicity, respect your ethnicity, your cultural background, your language and so on. If you cannot do this totally, it’s just a farce.”

Terry therefore does not fit ‘neatly’ with the other respondents discussing colonialism, in group one. For him, an awareness of Britain’s colonial past does not lead him to think that British identity and connectedness with society go together; instead positive outcomes can be achieved by properly implementing specific policies designed to promote equality, or recognising cultural links between Britain and other countries.

Similarly, although most respondents *either* express the ‘signifier’ narrative (and are in group one) *or* the ‘language, accent and etiquette’ narrative (and are in group two), there is one respondent expressing both. John is an employed male, under the age of 35, was born in Britain, but is rather negative about British identity. The signifier narrative is expressed in comments such as his response that British identity is important for some social cohesion outcomes: “I’d say yes but that’s self explanatory surely because if you’re that anti Britain, we’re in Britain, of course it’s going to be difficult for you to get by”; and yet he also views language as potentially important for positive outcomes, saying that “When I did my Level One training to teach, there were these two guys who both had really bad English ... you have to fill out all these questionnaires in English and do all your course work in English and they were both struggling, having to get lots of help to get through it.” There in a sense in which these views combined are somewhat contradictory since, for him, British identity is both a signifier of connectedness with society, and so the two always go together; and also British identity only implies positive social cohesion outcomes when social expectations of language, accent and etiquette are met. John, then, also does not fit ‘neatly’ with the separation of the three groups outlined in this section.

5.45: Analysis

What can the presence of these three groups of respondents tell one about any potential relationship between British identity and social cohesion? Regarding the first group, the similarity between colonial British and modern British societies is, perhaps, that in both cases British identity and connectedness with society in fact go together, whether one likes it or not. In colonial British society, middle-class status and professional jobs were seen as belonging to those that considered themselves to be, or aspired to be, British. In modern British society, British identity and connectedness also go together, and can be contrasted with a lack of identity and a lack of connectedness. Yet not all groups have equal access to such an identity or such connectedness. In colonial society the identity of 'native' Britons was contrasted with the (ostensibly lesser) identity of colonial subjects, and those with darker skin had more difficulty in being seen as British at all (Rush 2011). In modern society some groups are 'blocked out' of access to British identity (Hall 2000) and, by implication, connectedness with society. British identity is, then, a signifier of connectedness whether one likes it or not, and both British identity and connectedness are not accessible to all groups on an equal basis. The emphasis here, then, is one where British identity and connectedness are seen as being attained by status or heritage.

For the second group, etiquette and manners are important for social cohesion. In contrast to the first group, where British identity (and therefore connectedness with society) is something one either has or not, possibly because of one's status or heritage, for the second group etiquette and manners can be learned. In this sense the narrative is more positive or inclusive than for the first group since members of minority groups could potentially 'learn' the manners necessary for social cohesion. In another sense, however, the message is quite a negative one, since all of the respondents in the group are negative about British identity and the processes involved in the relationship between 'manners' and social cohesion. In theory, at least, members of ethnic minority groups can 'learn' to have the right accent, language, or manners, to ensure positive social cohesion outcomes. Yet there is a sense of injustice about why it *should* be the case that it is necessary to conform to such social expectations to achieve positive outcomes.

In contrast to the first two groups, where British identity is 'thick' with cultural connotations (heritage or status for the first group, and etiquette and manners for the second group) and this 'thick' British identity matters for social cohesion outcomes, for the third group what matters for social cohesion is a much 'thinner' sense of citizenship. A distinction between

'thick' and 'thin' cultures and moralities is explored by Walzer (1994), and has been adopted by various academics to differentiate between 'thick' culture-laden national identities, and a 'thinner' citizenship. Walzer distinguishes between 'thick' or maximalist moralities and 'thin' or minimalist moralities. A moral argument always originates from within a 'thick' or maximalist morality – that is it is always 'laden' with culture and can never be made on an objective basis. Minimalist 'thin' moral arguments, however, can occur when something is abstracted from a thick moral argument such that someone from a different maximalist thick morality is able to agree with it. This other person will interpret the thin argument in terms of their own thick culture and morality, but what unites the two thick cultures is the "mutual recognition" of the thin claims: minimalism "consists in principles and rules that are reiterated in different times and places, and that are seen to be similar even though they are expressed in different idioms and reflect different histories and different versions of the world" (Walzer 1994, 17).

One might distinguish between 'thick' and 'thin' national identities, therefore, in a similar way. A thick national identity is, perhaps, one that is rooted in a particular culture, with its own detailed description of what is right and wrong, socially acceptable practices, and so on. A thin national identity might then be an abstract notion that members of several different maximal or thick cultures mutually recognise. It will have less cultural 'content' than the thick version and, following Walzer's distinction, will be interpreted differently depending on the culture of the person doing the interpreting, but has the potential to be more inclusive than a culturally thick version.¹¹

If this argument is right, then, for the third group there is a recognition of their belonging to a maximalist culture in the sense that they all have some kind of British or English identity. However, this identity is not considered to be important for positive social cohesion outcomes: what is important instead is emphasising the 'thinner' ideas that most people in society can recognise as positive in the abstract: 'helping other people', 'taking responsibility', or 'giving something back' to society; rather than a 'thick' code of expectations of language or etiquette.

So what does all this tell one about how British identity might, or might not, matter for social cohesion? When arguments are made in support of national identity, they are usually on the

¹¹ The view that British identity will be interpreted differently by people of different backgrounds was in fact expressed by a number of respondents. For instance, Mary said: "Do you know what, there's... there's two things, there's... you've got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were... that came here as being part of the colonialism, like my parents' generation. And then there's the Caribbean identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of parents that were immigrants. Then there's the Caribbean identity of those of us who are... who have migrated in the current world, like... and so they've come here recently and have sought British identity, and we see things very differently from one another."

basis that it can provide some sense of solidarity between citizens, the vast majority of which are unlikely to ever meet each other to engage in face-to-face interaction, and that this solidarity is essential for such things as the functioning of democratic institutions, redistribution to support equality and social justice, and so on. This argument is made in particular in the face of increasing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in modern democracies (although such diversity has always been present to some degree, the argument is that it makes such solidarity harder to achieve), economic globalisation (which has increased inequality, so solidarity is needed to support redistribution), and as a counterweight to the new, allegedly divisive identities emphasised by the 'politics of recognition'. If British identity is to serve such a purpose, this chapter suggests three possibilities, each with different implications for overcoming any problems created by increasing diversity, economic globalisation, and the 'politics of recognition'.

The first possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised whilst retaining its culturally 'thick' links to status and heritage. British identity and connectedness to society go together in that one either has them or does not, but having them is a matter of status and/or heritage. Emphasising British identity in this way, however, is unlikely to combat any potential problems of increasing ethnic, cultural or religious diversity, since one attains it by virtue of the fact that one is a member of the dominant 'British' culture in the first place. For similar reasons, an emphasis on the importance of status and heritage is unlikely to provide a balanced counterweight to other identity claims, since many of the identity claims are a result of the injustices created by status and heritage. It is also unlikely to provide the support for redistribution necessary to combat increasing inequality, since British identity (and therefore connectedness) are attained by status in the first place. According to this possibility, then, British identity is not an inclusive identity, and is unlikely to provide the basis for solidarity needed to achieve any of these three goals.

The second possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised in a culturally 'thick' way, but one that is open to anyone *if* they are prepared to conform to certain social expectations. In the context of the integration of diverse ethnic, cultural or religious groups into society, this can be achieved *if* they are prepared to assimilate. It is unlikely, however, to provide an appropriate counterweight to any 'divisive' claims of groups through the 'politics of recognition', since assimilation requires the adoption by everyone of a pre-defined set of culturally 'thick' norms, and so there would be no room for other identity claims. The solidarity necessary for redistribution, in order to combat rising inequality, would

only be achieved to the extent that all (or at least most) members of society were prepared to assimilate in this way.

The third possibility is that British identity in its culturally 'thick' sense is de-emphasised and that, instead, what matters for solidarity is the mutual recognition by all (or at least many) members of society of some more abstract, culturally 'thin' set of ideas that many people agree is important: 'helping others; 'giving something back'; or 'taking responsibility' being a few examples given by respondents in the sample. In Walzer's sense, these are abstract commonalities that are generally agreed upon, but the details will be interpreted differently by members of particular ethnic, cultural or religious groups. A 'thinner' or 'civic' version of national identity has been endorsed by various academics (e.g. Barry 2001; Miller 2000). The respondents in the sample, however, preferred to describe these ideas not in terms of national identity, but more in terms of personal or individual responsibilities, or as common commitments to society (Sophie, for instance, said that "I live here I like Britain, I follow the laws, I, you know, I think I have a loyalty to Britain, but as far as feeling British I can't say it's something I've ever given any thought to 'cause it doesn't seem that important to me").

This third sense of national identity (or common commitment to society) is open to all, regardless of status, heritage, or membership of an ethnic, cultural or religious group. But would this third possibility create the solidarity necessary for overcoming any problems stemming from diversity, the 'politics of recognition', and rising economic inequality? Questions similar to this are often asked: Barry (2001, 83-4), for instance, asks whether the problem for British identity might be that "the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities" and argues that there is a "sense that British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion". Kymlicka (2008, 72), however, is more positive about the potential for 'thin' national identities to sustain solidarity: "In the last 40 years, we have seen a dramatic 'thinning' of national identities, as they have been stretched to accommodate demands for inclusion by a range of historically disadvantaged groups ... At each step of this process, commentators have feared that the thinning of national identity to make it more inclusive would undermine its power to create meaningful solidarities. And yet it seems clear that thin national identities are still capable of sustaining the sort of solidarity that enables societies to adopt progressive social policies".

A related point, and one that is raised in particular given the fact that the respondents discussing narratives on the third possibility do not frame this 'common commitment' in terms

of a British identity at all, is why it should be the case that a *national* identity, or *national* civic commitment, is the appropriate level at which a sense of solidarity should be generated. It is in some sense a historical accident that many of the institutions for which a sense of solidarity or commitment is allegedly necessary are at the national level. One also has local institutions, local democratic politics, and so on, that would by the same argument require a sense of solidarity and commitment and yet still be too large for many of the members to meet face-to-face. Perhaps a national identity would generate sufficient solidarity for local issues, too. But institutions and (to some extent) democratic politics also exist at the European level; as does an (admittedly relatively small) amount of redistribution. From this perspective an exclusive emphasis on the importance of national identities seems somewhat arbitrary. One wonders, when, for instance, Miller (2000, 32) argues for national identity because it is “*de facto* the main source of such solidarity”, whether this is currently true today, and certainly whether it will continue to be true in the future in the face of both globalisation on the one hand, and other competing sources of identity on the other.

A point along similar lines is argued for by Barry in his criticism of ‘national romanticism’: rather than the nation-state being the fundamental unit of culture and morality (as for Miller and Walzer); or sub-state nations (as for Kymlicka); for Barry boundaries are “better the more conducive they are to the creation and maintenance of a liberal political order within them. Whether that requires units that are large or small, heterogeneous or homogeneous, is a pragmatic question. There is not going to be any generally applicable answer” (Barry 2001, 137).

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter provided an analysis of the narratives expressed by 22 respondents of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity when asked questions about their ethnic and national identities, and any relationships they might see between them and social cohesion. Arguments for the importance of national identities and cohesion and solidarity often stem from the former's potential role in generating solidarity amidst diversity, so to an extent it is important to hear the view of members of two minority ethnic groups. These views should not, obviously, be taken as representative of the general population, or even of these ethnic groups – instead the aim was to identify a wide range of narratives by which respondents understood their national identities, any relationships to social cohesion, and any links between the narratives.

Section 5.2 provided a description of the narratives expressed when respondents' discussed their national identities. A majority had a British identity, and three key themes emerged around which respondents based their discussions: colonialism; generation; and the differences between British and English identities.

Section 5.3 provided a picture of ambiguity with regard to whether or not respondents thought British identity might be important for social cohesion. There were three narratives by which British identity was deemed to be important: British identity is important because it is a signifier of connectedness with society; British identity is important because it entails social expectations in terms of language, accent, and etiquette or 'manners', and these in turn can affect social cohesion outcomes; and British identity is important because it entails a knowledge of the British social system, which in turn can affect social cohesion outcomes. There were also two narratives by which British identity was deemed unimportant: because individual choices and personal responsibility were important instead; and because identities other than British identity were important. The other identities mentioned were a human or global identity, an identification with London, a religious identity, and a Black or ethnic identity.

Section 5.4 linked certain narratives together in the sense that there were patterns in terms of the respondents expressing them. Respondents broadly could be put into three groups. For the first group, there was a link between the importance of colonialism for understanding British identity, and the narrative suggesting that British identity could be a signifier of connectedness with society. In colonial British society, British identity was related to middle-class status, and was not available equally to all ethnic or socio-economic groups. In this way,

an understanding of British identity as inherently linked to status and heritage can be related to a view of British identity and connectedness with society going together: one either has both or neither. For the second group, there was a link between negativity about British identity and an appreciation of the ways in which Britishness could be represented in social expectations of culture, accent, etiquette and 'manners', and how these expectations can shape social cohesion outcomes. Although in theory this implies that such social expectations could be learned, respondents were quite negative about these processes, and there was a sense of injustice regarding how it was necessary to adopt pre-existing cultural practices in order to achieve positive outcomes. For the third group, there was a link between a moderate or indifferent British identity and the view that personal responsibilities and choices were particularly important for social cohesion. Although the respondents in this group did not reject British identity, its significance was de-emphasised, and commitments to such ideas as 'helping others' and 'giving something back to society' were emphasised instead.

Chapter 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

This chapter has two main aims. Having presented the results from the quantitative and qualitative components in detail in the previous two chapters, it is important to return to some of the theoretical material detailed in the literature review. The first aim, therefore, is to expand upon the theoretical discussions of the nature of the concepts of national identity and social cohesion, and relationships postulated between the two, and the second aim is to synthesise the evidence from both the quantitative and the qualitative components of this study and give a discussion of it in the light of the expanded theoretical discussions.

The first section of the chapter extends the discussion of arguments that national identity might be important for social cohesion found in the literature review. The suggestion made is that there are, broadly speaking, different types of argument corresponding to different political positions. Four main arguments about the importance of national identity for social cohesion are identified: first, a liberal concern with national identity being important because it generates the social cohesion that is necessary for the functioning of a nation's liberal democratic institutions; second, a social democratic concern with national identity being important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies; third, a communitarian concern with national identity being important for generating the social cohesion necessary for a civic culture that is able to provide citizens' lives with context and meaning; and fourth, a conservative concern with national identity implying identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society, the cohesion of which is an important end in itself.

The second section of the chapter examines the central concepts under investigation: national identity and social cohesion. The ways in which different meanings of each concept correspond to different political positions is made explicit. The evidence this study provides about the way in which the concepts have different meanings, and the way in which the relationship between them varies depending on the meaning in question, is then discussed and linked to the political positions previously outlined.

The third section discusses the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in the context of the potential importance of different types of equality for social cohesion. Suggestions that equality is important for cohesion feature in academic literature (e.g. O'Donnell 2007) and in responses to the government's community cohesion discourse of the

early 2000s (e.g. McGhee 2003); and this study provides evidence that also suggests certain types of equality may be particularly important for social cohesion.

Last, the chapter reflects on whether the 'level' of the nation-state is the appropriate 'level' at which to focus on social cohesion. It discusses multicultural arguments for sub-state level cultures being important, and also arguments that, particularly in the context of processes of globalisation that create common concerns across national boundaries, cohesion at a broader level may also be important, such as the regional level (in particular the European Union) or the global level.

6.1 Arguments for national identity: left, right and centre

This section explores liberal, social democratic and conservative arguments on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. Since the concepts of 'national identity' and 'social cohesion' are often used in such ambiguous ways, and with widely differing (but often unspecified) meanings depending on the nature of the discussion, it is informative to explore the motivations upon which a relationship between national identity and social cohesion might be postulated since this goes some way to uncover the meanings of each concept. It is argued that, although the traditions of liberalism, social democracy, and conservatism are very broad, there are generally speaking different senses of each of the concepts of national identity and social cohesion, and correspondingly of the relationship between the two, that can be linked to each of the traditions.

I shall begin with a discussion of liberalism. The historical development of liberalism can be loosely split between classical and modern liberal periods, with the ideas of the former developing in the 18th and early 19th centuries, and the ideas of the latter from later in the 19th century (Kukathas & Pettit 1990). Both kinds of liberalism emphasised the individual's right to individual liberty or autonomy, but what distinguishes modern from classical liberals is that the former added rights of protection from poverty, ill-health, and to the provision of education, to the more minimal classical idea of liberty understood in "just the negative sense of freedom from interference" (*ibid.*, 74). Classical liberals have much in common with modern libertarians – a position that will be outlined later – but for now the focus will be on the ideas of modern liberalism.

For liberals, the maintenance of a society's liberal institutions, through which liberal principles can operate, is usually a very high priority. Usually the 'society' in question has been that of the state, and often there is an implicit assumption in liberal writing that the relationship being explored is that "between the individual and the state" without any particular justification of why this relationship is the most appropriate (Van Dyke 1995, 31). Liberals have held a variety of views on the relationship between nationality and the liberal state, but generally the concern is with a sense of social unity that is sufficient for the maintenance of liberal institutions: J.S. Mill, for instance, thought that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities" because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are "artificially tied together", which may present an obstacle to the creation or maintenance of 'free' institutions (Mill 2001, 288). In addition to stressing the importance of a sense of social

unity for the maintenance of liberal institutions, Mill expresses a concern for an absence of public order created by national differences within a state: “An army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than devotion to the flag. Such armies have been the executioners of liberty through the whole duration of modern history.” (*ibid.*, 287).

Other more recent liberals have expressed similar reasons for valuing nationality or national identity, again emphasising the way in which social unity and order are necessary conditions for the survival of liberal institutions. Barry (2001, 79) argues that “the creation and maintenance of the conditions under which liberal democratic institutions will survive must be a very high priority for an egalitarian liberal”, and that “we cannot expect the outcomes of democratic politics to be just in a society that contains large numbers of people who feel no sense of empathy with their fellow citizens and do not have any identification with their lot”.

The liberal argument on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, then, is characterised first and foremost by a concern for the maintenance of liberal (often democratic) institutions, without which liberal principles cannot be put into practice, and the autonomy or toleration of diversity that liberals value cannot be realised by all citizens. Since liberals “are presumably, first and foremost, people who want to see liberal institutions thrive” (Barry 1999, 57), the kind of social cohesion being discussed is often one stressing social unity or public order, which are seen as necessary conditions for the maintenance of liberal institutions. A shared national identity, in certain forms, may help generate this sense of social unity and empathy with other citizens.

Perspectives different from the liberal one, however, might emphasise the importance of different values. A social democratic approach, for instance, might first-and-foremost emphasise the importance of equality rather than liberty or autonomy. For Miller (1998, 48), “the values underlying the political projects of the left ... are of course disputed, but among them we must surely count *democracy* and *social justice*”, where social justice refers to measures taken to reduce “the huge resource inequalities generated by capitalist markets”. ‘Social democracy’ has been used in many different ways and can mean different things but one way is as an extension of liberalism, but one in which material equality is given more prominence. This argument would stress that “individuals can exercise control over their own lives only when excessive concentrations of power, wealth, and advantage are replaced by the widest possible equality, but an equality which makes possible, rather than prevents, diversity and unpredictability” (Barker 2008, no page number).

There are some clear similarities between social democratic approaches and modern liberal approaches. Many liberals are not only concerned with the maintenance of liberal institutions, but also share with social democrats the importance of a sense of egalitarian social justice. Rawls' (1999, 53) two principles of justice, for instance, are a good example of this:

“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.

Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”

Rawls' first principle is a classic statement of the liberal argument for the concept of liberty, but the second has more in common with the social democratic concern for egalitarian social justice. Where some social democrats would disagree with Rawls, however, is with regard to Rawls' treatment of distributive justice as a political or contractual issue, rather than one that depends crucially upon affective social ties. Whilst all members of society agreeing to a political notion of fairness is a nice idea, so the argument might go, for members of a democratic society to be genuinely willing to make the sacrifices necessary for socio-economic inequalities to be reduced to an acceptable level, appropriate social relationships or ties must exist between members of that society:

“Rawls advances a distributive principle - the difference principle - which gives people a claim on what others have produced by exercising their talents and skills, but says nothing about the communitarian relationships which, in practice, would be needed to underpin this principle ... We can only expect them to consent to institutions that enforce the preferred distribution if they regard themselves as bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more egalitarian the distribution can be”.

Miller (1989a, 59)

Another way of thinking about these differences between the liberal and social democratic concerns for autonomy and equality is Sen's (1992) idea of debates over the 'base' of equality. For liberals, the most fundamentally important type of equality is that all members of society are equally able to enjoy autonomy – that is equality of autonomy represents the 'base'. Any other types of inequalities that arise could then be justified on the grounds that at least there was equality at the 'base' – for instance financial inequalities between two otherwise similar

people could be justified on the grounds that each had equality of autonomy, and one simply chose to take a less lucrative career path. Social democrats, by contrast, might emphasise the importance of material equalities as their 'base', even if this means some restrictions on certain freedoms. From this perspective:

“the argument should not be about inequality or equality in themselves, but about where (at what level) we demand that there should be equality and where we consider it to be peripheral or inequality to be tolerable. The difference of opinion between those who tolerate distributional inequality and those who do not becomes, therefore, one not about whether equality or inequality is a good thing but about where we insist that equality should be enacted and where we are happy to restrict it”.¹²

(Platt 2011, 10)

When translated into differences in arguments about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, these differences between liberal and social democratic perspectives reveal an importance difference in what might be meant by national identity. One is a fairly 'thin' conception of national identity, whereby members of society have a simple commitment to that society's institutions (potentially including institutions ensuring 'fair' redistribution). What Miller refers to, however, goes beyond this conception in that there is a *cultural* component to national identity: for him, things such as trust are “much more likely to exist among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping cultural values” (1998, 48). The argument such theorists would make against the 'thinner' Rawlsian commitment, is that something more than an ideological commitment is needed for the proper functioning of a democracy, as suggested by Abizadeh's claim that “[t]his is in fact his [Miller's] substantive thesis: that democracy presupposes a shared nationality understood in cultural terms” (Abizadeh 2002, 498).

¹² This view is illustrated by Brian Barry's description of differences between himself and Iris Marion Young. Barry considers the issue of the under-representation of women in 'top corporate positions', and argues that unequal outcomes such as these are potentially fair if they happen within the framework of just (by which he means liberal) institutions and there is an absence of discrimination. For Barry (2001, 93): “Whatever outcomes occur as a result of free choices made within just institutions are the outcomes that should occur”. He describes Young's position, by contrast, as emphasising that the unequal outcome is *in itself* unfair:

“I would not for a moment wish to deny the great plausibility of a claim that the lack of women in 'top corporate positions' strongly suggests the existence of discrimination. But that is not Young's claim: according to her, the fact that fewer than half of all 'top corporate positions' are filled by women actually *constitutes* discrimination” (Barry 2001, 93).

What appears, then, are two competing conceptions of what is meant by national identity and, I would like to suggest, two correspondingly different conceptions of social cohesion. According to the ‘thinnest’ conception, advocated by some liberals, social cohesion is required in order to ensure the effective functioning of liberal democratic institutions in society. To the extent that national identity is hoped to support social cohesion, this national identity will have a fairly ‘thin’ character – perhaps something like the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’, to be discussed in Section 6.2 below. A ‘thicker’ conception of both national identity and social cohesion might be advocated by social democrats, by contrast, since the function of social cohesion is not simply to ensure the functioning of liberal institutions, but in addition to ensure that conditions of substantive equality can be realised. To the extent that national identity has a role in supporting this type of social cohesion, it may need to be of a ‘thicker’ variety than that of constitutional patriotism, since members of a society need to be “bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more egalitarian the distribution can be” (Miller 1989a, 59).

There are, of course, many overlaps between liberals and social democrats with respect to these conceptions of national identity and social cohesion, since many liberals also stress the importance of a strong egalitarianism. Brian Barry is one such egalitarian liberal. Barry’s view of British identity is that it “seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant affective, cognitive or behavioural connotations”. This leads him to worry that, because of the lack of this ‘thicker’ aspect, “British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion” (2001, 83-4). As is often the case when social cohesion is discussed both academically and in public discourse, a precise definition is not offered. However one might infer from Barry’s egalitarian values the type of cohesion he is discussing: that is, something that both provides the social order required for the simple maintenance of liberal democratic institutions, and also allows for meaningful redistribution for the realisation of egalitarian social justice. As Barry explains, the problem with British identity is “that the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability *and justice* of liberal democratic polities” (2001, 83, emphasis added).¹³

David Goodhart makes a similar distinction. For Goodhart (2013, 287), a “national identity has both a very particular aspect rooted in the customs, language, texture and reference points of

¹³ Of course, the social democratic concern with equality of outcome might be contrasted with the concerns of liberals such as Barry: “the former stressing greater material equality and equality of cultural access and the latter greater equality of opportunity” (O’Donnell 2007, 250).

everyday life, and a more universal 'citizenship' aspect derived from the political rules and procedures of liberal democracy. The two are normally mixed up together in most people's ideas of national identity, though it is the first that carries most of the emotional charge." The key issues here, according to Goodhart, are that "while 'constitutional patriotism' and the democratic rules of the road can help us live together despite growing diversity they are not enough to create a sense of mutual attachment" (*ibid.*, 287); and crucially that this sense of mutual attachment is necessary for progressive politics.

Thus far the discussion in this section has concentrated on differing conceptions of national identity, and the corresponding conceptions of social cohesion, that might be advocated by some liberals and social democrats. There is significant overlap in these respects between liberalism and social democracy, but where some liberals might advocate a 'thin' conception of national identity similar to that of constitutional patriotism, and a correspondingly 'thin' conception of social cohesion, social democrats or strongly egalitarian (particularly in the sense of equality of outcome) liberals might prefer a 'thicker' conception of national identity that is thought to support a conception of social cohesion that provides for the maintenance of liberal institutions but also is functional for redistribution and egalitarian justice.

However, in addition to ideas that a certain level of cohesion may be necessary for the maintenance of liberal institutions, and for the adoption of progressive social policies, some communitarians put forward additional arguments regarding its importance. In particular, arguments have been put forward that the sharing of a common culture, and also of a common language, are fundamentally important in giving people's lives context and meaning and can create the conditions for human flourishing. Miller, for instance, describes Charles Taylor's position as suggesting that:

"individualist liberals fail to understand the preconditions for autonomy. They see it as unproblematically given and needing only protection against external constraints, whereas in fact it requires a certain kind of cultural background. People can only make authentic choices about their own lives against the background of a civilization in which, for example, moral questions are debated in public, certain aesthetic experiences are available, and so forth. Community makes its appearance here in the guise of a common culture, participation in which is a necessary condition of liberal aspirations to autonomy".

Miller (1989a, 62-3)

With regard to types of social cohesion that may be important, arguments such as these imply that value needs to be placed on the cohesion of a common culture and language. Cohesion at the *national* level could be especially important, it might be argued, because “the promotion of individuality and the development of human personality is intimately tied up with membership in one’s national group, in part because of the role of language and culture in enabling choice” (Kymlicka 1995, 51). According to Abizadeh (2002, 496), partly for these type of reasons: “The specifically communitarian claim is that the social relations must constitute a community in a strong sense (e.g., not reducible to a contractarian scheme of social cooperation)”. Social cohesion in this sense, then, refers to cohesion of the community in terms of a thriving culture (and perhaps also common language), and *not* simply a contractual arrangement that may be sufficient to provide for the maintenance of liberal democratic institutions.

It is necessary now, however, to look into conceptions of national identity and social cohesion from the political right, since the relationship postulated between the two concepts will again be different. The political right can be split between two schools of thought that are in many respects in fact rather different: libertarianism and conservatism. As mentioned earlier in this section, libertarianism can be understood as a modern version of classical liberalism (Kukathas & Pettit 1990). Libertarians tend to desire minimal government; often the only role of government is to monopolise the use of force and to ensure public order. Nozick (1974), for instance, preferred the idea of no state at all, but concludes that a minimal state is needed as it would be chosen by people to ensure enforcement of their liberties (see Kukathas & Pettit 1990, 31). From the perspective of libertarianism, therefore, social cohesion is not a particularly important concern, aside from in the minimal sense of cohesion as public order. The issues egalitarian liberals or social democrats might be worried about – “social rights, rights to housing, education, health care and so forth – have no standing on libertarian principles” (Miller 2000, 51), and so the relationship between the citizen and the state is simply a contractual arrangement whereby the citizen acknowledges the hegemony of the state on the minimal set of roles ascribed to it. The national identity required for the maintenance of such an arrangement would be rather ‘thin’, perhaps something similar to, or even thinner than, the ‘constitutional patriotism’ of liberalism.

The conservative position differs from the libertarian one in that the ideal of a minimal state is retained, but there is much more of a concern for social unity. Miller (2000, 42) suggests that, for conservatives:

“the individualism associated with the free market is not a sufficient basis on which to hold a society together ... What is needed ... is a reassertion of moral values and social responsibility, and the citizen is portrayed as a person who sticks to the rules of the economic game while at the same time performing acts of public service such as charitable work in his or her local community”.

The conservative emphasis on subscribing to common moral values is demonstrated by Conservative minister Matthew Hancock’s recent assertion that, despite the fact it is not a legal requirement, “Companies have a “social duty” to hire British workers before immigrants [since] while British firms were not legally obliged to prioritise local workers ... they [have] a responsibility to support local employment” (BBC 2013).

The conservative right would be critical of the liberal conception of national identity on the grounds that a purely ideological attachment to the state and its institutions is insufficient for social unity; what is instead required is an emotive sense of belonging, which would in turn dictate the nature of the state’s institutions, rather than the other way around: according to this view “[w]e have to feel that we belong together in a common society before we can address the question of the political institutions that will govern us” (Miller 2000, 104). This criticism is consistent with the conservative criticism of liberalism as imposing abstract *a priori* notions of justice upon a society, rather than allowing the customs and traditions of a society to dictate its institutions and sense of justice, for example as argued by Roger Scruton (2006, 3): “The wise policy is to accept the arrangements, however imperfect, that have evolved through custom and inheritance, to improve them by small adjustments”.

The key issues to take from this discussion are first that national identity and social cohesion can be used in various different ways; second that certain meanings of national identity tend to be used in conjunction with particular meanings of social cohesion; and third that each pair of meanings can loosely be associated with a political position. One can therefore identify something of a continuum, starting with libertarianism, then with liberalism, liberal egalitarianism, social democracy, and conservatism coming next in turn. Libertarianism and, to a lesser extent, liberalism, have both a very ‘thin’ idea of what social cohesion might mean – for the libertarian simply law and order in a minimal sense – and a correspondingly ‘thin’ notion of national identity (perhaps a ‘constitutional patriotism’) that, it is argued, can support the required cohesion. Social democracy implies a more demanding sense of social cohesion in which not only law and order, but egalitarian redistribution, are priorities, and so social democrats worry that a very ‘thin’ sense of national identity is insufficient to generate the type of solidarity required for progressive politics – what might be needed instead is an identity

based on 'affective ties'. Conservatism becomes more demanding still, in emphasising descent, history and tradition, and adding cultural or descent-based criteria for membership of a society. Both the social cohesion required, and the national identity that is supposedly needed to underpin it, are 'thick' with cultural or ethnic content. The next section will explore in detail the different meanings of both national identity and social cohesion, the implications for the relationship between the two concepts, together with insights drawn from the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this thesis.

Why does all this matter? This section has tried to outline the different meanings that can be attributed to national identity and social cohesion, and to suggest that understanding the motivations and political standpoint underlying arguments about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion can give insight into those meanings. It will become clear in Chapter 7, which gives a discussion of policy implications, how very often the vague nature of both the concept of national identity, and particularly the concept of social cohesion, can be exploited to generate arguments that can be somewhat misleading. Seemingly contradictory statements in public discourse, whereby one commentator might argue that social cohesion has been undermined by immigration and so a stronger national identity is required to compensate, but another might argue that society's level of cohesion is doing just fine, are better interpreted in the light of the political views of those expressing the arguments. If the meanings of the terms are the same then both statements cannot be true at once; but if one interprets each commentator to have different understandings of what is meant by both 'national identity' and 'social cohesion', then it becomes clearer what each commentator might be getting at.

Whilst being in danger of oversimplification, I wish to highlight the following four arguments postulating a link between national identity and social cohesion that can be drawn from this discussion of the political and social theory literature:

A1. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the effective functioning of a nation's liberal democratic institutions.

A2. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at ensuring social justice.

A3. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the maintenance of a civic culture – partly inherited and partly negotiated –

which is an important good in itself because it provides citizens' lives with context and meaning.

A4. National identity is important because it implies identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society, the maintenance and cohesion of which is an important end in itself.

6.2 Meanings of national identity and social cohesion

6.21: Meanings of national identity

As was discussed in Section 6.1, there are different theoretical arguments that can be made about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, and these different arguments imply somewhat different meanings of national identity and social cohesion, and can be linked to different political positions. This section gives a discussion of the range of possible meanings of national identity that can be linked to these theoretical arguments. It argues that a three-way distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity is helpful when discussing the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in order to provide clarity about what precisely is meant by 'national identity'.

Constitutional patriotism is a concept that was originally developed by Dolf Sternberger, but is more commonly associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas (e.g. 1998; 2001). For Habermas it could provide “a functional equivalent to conventional notions of national belonging” (Fine 2007, 146), in a way that emphasises a non-emotive commitment to the state and its institutions, and de-emphasises traditional notions of belonging such as those based on history, culture or descent. Instead, a commitment to a state’s institutions, and the way in which they embody certain (democratic) principles, is emphasised.

As Kymlicka points out, being committed to certain principles does not explain why people should be committed to any *particular* state (as opposed to *all* liberal democratic states):

“In terms of their political values, the Danes, Germans, French, and British have probably never been as similar as they are now. But this has not had any appreciable impact on the desire of these majority nations to retain their national independence.”

(Kymlicka 1995, 188)

Habermas’ solution to this is to make a distinction between universalistic principles themselves and a specific *political culture* in which they are embodied: “The universalism of legal principles manifests itself in a procedural consensus, which must be embedded through a kind of constitutional patriotism in the context of a historically specific political culture” (Habermas 1998, 226). Citizens can, therefore, agree with universalistic principles but be committed to the historically specific formulation of them in terms of the institutions of a particular state.

Constitutional patriotism, then, can be seen as an attempt to combine or reconcile the universal with the particular. Fine (2007, 42) describes this as follows:

“On the one hand, constitutional patriotism refers to a shared attachment towards universalistic principles implicit in the idea of constitutional democracy. On the other hand, popular attachment to the idea of a constitution entails the sense of attachment citizens feel towards the particular ways in which abstract principles are interpreted and applied through national institutions.”

Constitutional patriotism can be contrasted with a ‘civic’ sense of national identity. Whereas constitutional patriotism “seeks to bracket off questions about shared history and common culture and to claim that the basis on which citizens associate can be purely political”, ‘civic nationalism’ embraces a national culture, although it can also adapt “the inherited culture to make room for minority communities” (Miller 1995, 189). Constitutional patriotism refers to a political commitment to a state and its institutions, but is devoid of cultural content: for proponents of constitutional patriotism, the “level of the shared political culture must be uncoupled from the level of subcultures and their prepolitical identities” (Habermas 1998, 118). Civic national identity, by contrast, is a form of national identity that is inclusive in the sense that any human being may (in theory at least) adopt it, but that has at least some cultural content, where culture is understood as referring to such things as a shared language or history, rather than a ‘political culture’ in Habermas’ (1998) sense. This can be contrasted with ethnic national identity, which includes both a commitment to the state’s institutions and legal system, and some cultural content, but the criteria for membership (or the recognition of membership) are based on descent or ethnicity.

Sometimes the concept of a ‘civic’ national identity is used in such a way as to appear to mean something similar to the concept of constitutional patriotism, whereby it is devoid of cultural content and citizens have a mutual attachment only in that “each acknowledges the authority of a common set of laws and political institutions” (Miller 1995, 189). Kymlicka, however, argues that this usage has led to mistaken conclusions, such as in thinking that the ideological element to American national identity means that American ‘civic’ national identity is devoid of cultural content:

“At the time of the Revolution, the overwhelming majority of Americans shared the same language, literature, and religion as the English ... In order to develop a sense of distinctive nationhood, Americans emphasized certain political principles – liberty, equality, democracy – principles which had justified their rebellion. Some people

conclude from this that American nationalism is ideological *rather than* cultural ... But that is a mistake. The Americans, as much as the English, conceived of national membership in terms of participation in a common culture ... Ideology shaped, but did not replace, the cultural component of national identity.”

Kymlicka (1995, 200)

It may be more helpful, therefore, to distinguish between three concepts: constitutional patriotism; civic national identity; and ethnic national identity. “What distinguishes ‘civic’ nations from ‘ethnic’ nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour” (Kymlicka 1995, 24). With regard to ethnic national identity, Abizadeh (2002, 497) notes that “*ethnic nationalists* appeal to the nation understood as a community of shared culture but also of common *descent*”. The three-way distinction is also illuminating with regard to arguments A1 to A4, as already hinted at in section 6.1. A ‘thinner’ national identity – in particular constitutional patriotism – might have more to do with arguments A1 and A2, where the emphasis is on the cohesion necessary to support the maintenance of liberal democratic institutions or institutions of redistribution; but a ‘thicker’ national identity such as a cultural civic identity or an ethnic identity might be more consistent with arguments A3 and A4, where the emphasis is on the maintenance of a civic culture, or on the inherited customs and traditions of national society.

This three-way distinction was also, to an extent, supported by the narratives on national identity presented in the qualitative component, although respondents did not always express it in the same terms. For instance, a distinction was made between a national identity itself and a commitment to ‘following the laws’ or a ‘loyalty to Britain’, as indicated by the following respondent:

“I live here I like Britain, I follow the laws, I, you know, I think I have a loyalty to Britain, but as far as feeling British I can’t say it’s something I’ve ever given any thought to ‘cause it doesn’t seem that important to me”.

This respondent’s views have some similarities with the notion of constitutional patriotism in the sense of following laws and of a distancing from conventional notions of national identity, but there is also a semantic ambiguity in that a ‘loyalty’ or a ‘like’ of Britain can also have an emotive component, so to some extent the respondent may be implying a sense of ‘love’ for Britain in addition to the ‘commitment’ of a constitutional patriotism. Nevertheless, there was

a clear distinction made between this respondent's sense of 'loyalty' to Britain and a British identity.

Respondents in the qualitative component generally saw British identity itself as implying at least some cultural content, in a way that is consistent with the understanding of a 'civic' national identity discussed above. One of the narratives around which British identity was seen as being connected with social cohesion focused on language, accent and etiquette, which are clearly cultural traits, rather than a non-cultural constitutional patriotism. English identity, by contrast, was clearly seen as an ethnic identity, with some respondents describing their exclusion from it due to not being (or being seen as) 'Anglo-Saxon'. However, the possibilities for British identity to be exclusionary were also often discussed, suggesting that, at least for the respondents in this study, British identity has not yet become what Trevor Phillips (2009) describes as a purely civic, inclusive identity that is open to all.

There is a debate, the implications of which will be expanded upon in the next section, about the extent to which 'thinner' versions of national identity are sufficient for the social unity and cohesion that states are alleged to require. Habermas argues that constitutional patriotism is sufficient for the functioning of a liberal state: "If some kind of national consciousness is required from the point of view of inculcating a willingness on the part of citizens to do what is required of them for the common good, such as the maintenance of public services through taxation or the acceptance of democratic decisions as legitimate, it is according to Habermas constitutional patriotism that can perform these integrative functions" (Fine 2007, 41-2). Others, however, argue that "Habermas's 'patriotism of the constitution' is too thin ... It is useless to imagine that particularistic loyalties can be attenuated unless there is some wider focus of loyalty that can be charged with some emotional force" (Barry 1999, 55). Miller similarly suggests that members of a society need to be "bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community" (1989a, 59). What is argued is that some kind of *emotional* attachments between citizens are needed; "a shared affective identity that inspires ... members' loyalty" (Abizadeh 2002, 496) rather than simply a commitment to a contractual arrangement. What I will argue is that the extent to which this is a problem is at least partly explained by what is meant by social unity and cohesion and the reasons why cohesion is desired. Being clear about both the type of national identity and the type of social cohesion under discussion, therefore, can go some way to resolving seemingly contradictory claims.

It is now, however, important to explore, in the context of the distinction between these three concepts of national identity, what the significance of all this is for the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. The first issue is related to policy implications, and refers

to the ambiguity in the usage of the term 'civic' identity. If it is used in the way Miller (2000, 131) uses it, then civic identity refers to a non-cultural identity, or something akin to what I am calling 'constitutional patriotism'. But as both Kymlicka (1995) and Miller (1995) suggest, most alleged examples of this non-cultural type of national identity are in fact mistaken, and such national identities do in fact have a cultural component to their meanings: "Immigrants to the United States must not only pledge allegiance to democratic principles, they must also learn the language and history of their new society" (Kymlicka 1995, 24). This is important because, when government reports (e.g. Denham 2001) suggest the need for a civic identity, if this means civic in the sense I am using it here, then this identity can be open to all groups regardless of descent (i.e. it is not an ethnic national identity), *but* adopting such an identity does involve *some* amount of cultural assimilation. My claim is simply that it is important to be clear about that fact, rather than using the ambiguity of the notion of 'civic identity' to suggest that no assimilation need take place.

The second, and related, issue regards the cultural status of *language*. Given there has been a major emphasis on English language use in recent British policy on immigration and cohesion, it is important to understand whether enforcing English language use is a purely *functional* requirement or whether it should be understood as a part of the assimilation into British culture. It seems plausible that all languages, at least to some extent, have some cultural and historical connotations (e.g. Kymlicka 1995), and so requirements to learn English might be thought of at least in part as assimilation into the existing dominant culture. But one could, alternatively, adopt an argument such as that given by Brian Barry in order to downplay the significance of language as a cultural trait:

"Where language is concerned, a state cannot adopt a neutral stance: it must provide its services in one or more languages, decide if a linguistic test for employment is to count as illegal discrimination, and so on. At the same time, however, it can be said of language as of no other cultural trait that it is a matter of convention. No doubt every language has its own peculiar excellences, but any language will do as the medium of communication in a society as long as everybody speaks it. This is one case involving cultural attributes in which 'This is how we do things here' – the appeal to local convention – is a self-sufficient response to pleas for the public recognition of diversity."

(Barry 2001, 107)

Whilst the idea that the English language has cultural and historical connotations is surely beyond dispute, it may be true that there can be functional reasons for learning English for many people, especially given its status as a major international language. The point here is only that this duality of reasons for emphasising English language use for social cohesion – both for culture and for getting on in British life – might be pointed out, and the priority between the two made explicit, when encouraging English language use.

6.22: Meanings of social cohesion

This section provides a synthesis of the data from the quantitative and qualitative components, together with the theoretical considerations explored in this chapter up until now, to present an argument that the contested concept of social cohesion might be meaningfully split into two different concepts, which may be particularly advantageous when one is discussing the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. These two concepts are termed ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’. It is further argued that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion may depend on which of the two concepts one is discussing. Table 58 gives a comparison of the two concepts with regard to the evidence relating to each concept in both the quantitative and qualitative components of this study, and with regard to the theoretical considerations explored in this chapter up until now, including the four different arguments outlined in Section 6.1.

Institutional cohesion refers to relationships between individuals and public institutions, particularly with regard to the ways in which individuals have a say in influencing these institutions, and the ways in which individuals can gain access to the services they provide. A ‘cohesive society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society in which individuals feel public institutions are legitimate and can represent them, and where all individuals are able to access the services these institutions provide on an equal basis. This type of cohesion refers more to a contractual relationship between the individual and society’s institutions than any particular cultural traits.

Associational cohesion, by contrast, refers to relationships *between* individuals in a society and to the ways in which individuals feel a sense of belonging as part of that society. A ‘cohesive society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society where individuals interact with each other, are engaged in civic activities with other members, feel strong senses of belonging to the society and their locality, and feel they have much in common with other members. This type of cohesion refers to cultural traits and cultural similarities between individuals.


Table 58: A comparison of Institutional Cohesion and Associational Cohesion

	Institutional Cohesion	Associational Cohesion
Description	Refers to contractual relationships between individuals and public institutions.	Refers to relations between individuals – in particular interactions with others and associational behaviour – and to spatial belonging, and emphasises cultural similarity.
Quantitative evidence	Operationalised as being able to influence and access public institutions. Not strongly associated with British or English identity; perceived discrimination associated strongly.	Operationalised as engaging in civic and social activity and spatial belonging and satisfaction. Associated with British identity to some extent; education and deprivation are associated more strongly.
Qualitative evidence	Linked with national identity through knowledge of the British political system; feeling of responsibility to society leads to a commitment to constitutional framework.	Linked with national identity through national identity being a signifier of positive outcomes; the non-acceptance of colonial British identities could lead to negative social outcomes.
Theoretical issues	Emphasises a commitment to liberal democratic institutions; ‘sameness’ refers to equal access to institutions.	Emphasises the sameness of values, culture and identities themselves, and has assimilatory implications.
Consistent with political positions	Liberalism, social democracy (arguments A1 and A2)	Communitarianism, conservatism (arguments A3 and A4)

Quantitative evidence

The quantitative component provides a body of evidence to support the distinction between institutional and associational cohesion. The quantitative component, let us recall, found that social cohesion breaks into ten different 'elements'. Figure 18 below shows each of the elements, together with an indication of how they group into the two types of cohesion. From the evidence provided in the quantitative component, there are important differences between the two types in terms of the variables with which they have large and significant associations. The top half of Figure 18 represents 'institutional cohesion'; whilst the bottom half represents 'associational cohesion'. Institutional cohesion is represented by the 'elements' that measure the ability to influence public institutions, being treated with respect using public services, and perceptions of equal access to public services. Associational cohesion, by contrast, is represented by the 'elements' that measure social interactions with people of different backgrounds, civic engagement and volunteering, being satisfied with one's place of residence including feeling that neighbours share values and can be trusted, and belonging to one's local area and Britain.

Figure 18: Two types of cohesion – links with quantitative analysis



The reasoning behind the splitting of the ten elements of social cohesion into these two groups, with one group representing institutional cohesion and the other associational

cohesion, is as follows. The quantitative component found that the regression models for each of the ten elements of social cohesion broke up into three categories in terms of the proportion of variance explained by the model (i.e. the R squared values). The five models with a high or moderate level of explained variance were those that had variables representing associational cohesion as the dependent variable; and the five models with poor levels of explained variance were those that had variables representing institutional cohesion as the dependent variable.

For the models representing associational cohesion, national identity was of some relevance: there were positive associations between British identity and each of the five elements for many of the ethnic groups, and these findings held up fairly robustly when subjected to sensitivity analysis, although educational qualifications and area deprivation were associated more strongly. For English identity the findings were more mixed: there were positive associations between English identity and civic and social activity for some non-white ethnic groups, but for the white group English identity was *negatively* associated with social activity with people of different backgrounds. The exclusive ethnic connotations of English identity, as discussed in the qualitative component, are a possible explanation for this finding. The fact that the R squared values for the models representing associational cohesion were reasonably satisfactory is important, because it suggests that the findings were less likely to be spurious associations driven by another factor that was not controlled for. These findings, in any case, suggest that for associational cohesion national identity may be of some relevance. However, whether or not the relationships between national identity and each of the measures of associational cohesion are causal and, if so, the direction of causality, are issues that it is clearly not possible to establish with these regression models.

By contrast, the models with poor levels of explained variance were those that had dependent variables representing what I am calling institutional cohesion. Although for three of the five models there were again positive associations between British identity and the measure of social cohesion, it is difficult to conclude, on this evidence, that British identity has much relevance for the models representing institutional cohesion, for two reasons. First, the low R squared value increases the chance that a third factor that is not controlled for may be driving the positive association, which would mean that the associations that were found in these models are spurious. Second, the low R squared values mean that British identity cannot be doing much explanatory 'work' with these models. Since R squared values can be thought of as the reduction in the level of prediction errors as a proportion of the total variation, the R squared value of 0.018 found for the model for the 'health services' element shows that the

model does not predict the values of the social cohesion measure much better than simply using the mean. The fact that the magnitudes of the associations between British identity and each of the measures of institutional cohesion were small compared to some of the control variables in the model increases the sense even further that British identity had only a weak relationship with these measures of cohesion.

Attempts were made, however, to increase the R squared values of the models measuring what I am calling institutional cohesion by adding additional control variables to the models that might theoretically be regarded as important for these types of cohesion. Measures of perceived discrimination, in particular, were added, and were found to have moderate success in increasing the R squared values in that they increased in some models, but not especially in others. However, a key finding was that indicators of perceived discrimination had effect magnitudes that were *much* greater than those of British identity (and only three of the models found significant effects for British identity). This suggests that British identity is not especially important for these measures of institutional cohesion, but that perceptions of discrimination *are* particularly important.¹⁴

Overall, then, the differences between associational and institutional cohesion in the quantitative component can be summarised as follows. British identity may have some relevance for associational cohesion in that there are fairly consistent, positive and significant associations between British identity and each of the associational cohesion measures for several ethnic groups, *and* the R squared values are generally large enough for it to be less

¹⁴ For linear regression models with only one independent variable, the interpretation of R squared values in terms of the explanatory 'work' done by the independent variable is fairly clear. Since the R squared value measures the decrease in prediction errors when using the model as compared with the sample mean, the one independent variable is reducing the prediction error by precisely the amount indicated by the R squared value. For linear regression models with more than one independent variable, however, interpreting the explanatory 'work' done by any one *particular* independent variable is less clear-cut, since the *overall* reduction in prediction errors can be attributed to the combination of *all* explanatory variables. In general, however, assuming multicollinearity is not a great problem (see the Appendix, Part C for a discussion), it could be said that a greater amount of explanatory work is done by variables with relatively large coefficients. For models with large R squared values, therefore, it is likely that a greater amount of explanatory work can be attributed to a particular variable, as compared to the same variable with the same relative coefficient size in an identical model but with a lower R squared value. For these reasons, I am concluding that it is plausible to argue that, for the models representing institutional cohesion, the combination of very small relative coefficient magnitudes for British identity *and* low R squared values mean that British identity is not doing much explanatory 'work'. For the models representing associational cohesion, by contrast, the combination of relatively small coefficient magnitudes for British identity and larger R squared values may mean that British identity is doing more explanatory 'work' in these models. In addition, many of the relative coefficient magnitudes for British identity are larger in the associational cohesion models than the institutional cohesion models. For instance, religious discrimination has an effect magnitude over 15 times greater than British identity for the model measuring equal treatment by health service providers (an indicator of institutional cohesion), but educational qualifications has an effect size of 10 times greater than British identity for civic engagement and volunteering (an indicator of associational cohesion).

likely that the associations are spurious. However, the associations are small compared with the effect magnitudes of some of the other variables – most notably area deprivation and educational level. For institutional cohesion, by contrast, British identity may have much less relevance. The R squared values of the models were initially very low and the positive and significant associations that do exist between British identity and cohesion for three of the five models are very small. When other control variables were added to the models in an attempt to increase the R squared values, measures of discrimination in particular were found to have effect sizes much larger in magnitude than those of British identity, *and* the R squared values remained fairly low in some cases. This combination of low R squared values and comparatively very small effect sizes for British identity suggests it is not doing much explanatory ‘work’ in these models, so may not have much relevance for institutional cohesion, at least in the way it is operationalised in this study. This finding, however, must be treated with caution because of the possibility that the relatively low R squared values are due to another factor that has not been included in the models (and that may change the coefficient sizes if included), *or* that these models do not ‘capture’ the concepts of what I am calling institutional cohesion particularly well. Nevertheless, the *tentative* findings regarding differences between institutional and associational cohesion are that perceptions of discrimination may have much more relevance than national identity for institutional cohesion; whereas for associational cohesion British identity may be *moderately* associated but education and deprivation may have much more important relationships to associational cohesion.

Qualitative evidence

The qualitative component presented evidence on narratives by which national identity and social cohesion might, or might not, be linked, and the narratives imply somewhat different understandings of what is meant by social cohesion. The differences in these narratives can also support the distinction between institutional and associational cohesion and, in addition, illustrate ways in which the processes underlying the relationships between national identity and each of the two types of cohesion might work.

With regard to institutional cohesion, Chapter 5, section 5.31 explores a narrative whereby British identity and social cohesion are linked through knowledge of the British political and social system. The emphasis with this narrative is on an ability to access public institutions, such as ways of negotiating complex systems of public services, or ways in which it might be possible to contact a local MP. These ideas clearly have resonances with the understanding of institutional cohesion as being about the ability to access – as in the case of public services – or

influence – as in the case of contacting an MP to express one’s views – public institutions. In terms of the processes by which these examples of institutional cohesion might come about, one respondent discussed the complex nature of public services and the way in which services might not be “geared towards supporting a variety of people”. As with the quantitative evidence, in which perceptions of discrimination were linked to institutional cohesion outcomes, this respondent emphasises the importance of accessibility to public services for “a variety of people” in society, suggesting that ensuring equal access across different groups might be especially important.

In addition, Chapter 5, section 5.43 discusses the respondents in ‘group three’. These respondents express a combination of two different narratives: they generally have moderate British identities, but downplay their importance, and they also emphasise the ways in which personal choice and individual responsibility might be important for social cohesion outcomes. The examples of types of social cohesion given by these respondents include being part of a local tenants’ association, and participating in a demonstration about pensions, which clearly have links to the idea of being able to influence public institutions. These respondents tended not to think their British identities had a role to play in social cohesion outcomes, and one possible explanation for the way in which these narratives are grouped is that respondents thought that their own sense of their responsibilities to society were important for determining social cohesion outcomes, rather than their British identities, where cohesion was understood as a commitment to a “constitutional or political framework” (Miller 2000, 131). If this interpretation is right, it supports the finding of the quantitative component that British identity does not have much relevance for institutional cohesion.

With regard to associational cohesion, Chapter 5, section 5.31 explores a narrative whereby British identity can be a signifier of positive social cohesion outcomes; British identity and a sense of connectedness with society often went together, whilst an absence of British identity was often accompanied by a lack of connectedness. This narrative often used understandings of what I am referring to as ‘associational’ cohesion. British identity was linked with a sense of belonging, both to Britain and to a locality; and British identity was also linked with an idea of being ‘listened to’ in social situations. Both British identity, and its link to cohesion, were understood in cultural terms, particularly with regard to Britain’s history and descriptions of colonialism. One understanding was that negative connotations with regard to Britain’s colonial past could lead to a distancing from British identity, which could lead to an absence of belonging. Also, a colonial sense of Britishness was associated with middle-class status and the adoption of ‘British’ cultural traits. The issue of non-acceptance was also important, whereby

colonial British subjects would arrive in Britain already with a strong British identity, but would feel rejected from that identity by the white majority because of their skin colour. This in turn could lead to negative consequences in social situations where immigrants felt they were not considered as 'from here'.

The narrative about British identity and social cohesion being linked through language, accent and etiquette (see section 5.31), however, sits somewhat in the middle of the distinction between institutional and associational cohesion. In one sense, this understanding of the link between British identity and social cohesion is much more culturally 'laden' than the narrative focusing on knowledge of the British political system. The ability to speak English well, having a middle class English accent, and having an understanding of things perceived to be typically 'British' in terms of etiquette were all linked to positive outcomes; whilst lacking these traits were linked to negative outcomes. There is clearly an idea that Britishness, understood in terms of subscribing to a dominant culture, was linked (sometimes unfairly) to positive outcomes. The cultural focus of these narratives fits more with what I am describing as 'associational cohesion'. On the other hand, many of these narratives used an understanding of cohesion described in terms of access to public services in particular, which fits more with what I am describing as 'institutional cohesion'. This suggests – contrary to the quantitative evidence suggesting British identity has little to do with institutional cohesion – that cultural notions of British identity may indeed be important; but from another perspective could also emphasise the quantitative findings that non-discrimination is very important for accessing public services. Respondents in the qualitative component were often negative about the ways in which a lack of these cultural traits of language, accent and etiquette could be a problem, which may suggest that there is much work to do in ensuring equality of public service provision regardless of issues such as language proficiency. Indeed, Craig (1999, 197) highlights the way in which minority ethnic groups “are structurally disadvantaged in their treatment by the social security system”, not least because of failures to provide sufficient translation services.

Theoretical issues

In addition, there are some important *theoretical* differences between the two types of cohesion. Institutional cohesion – referring to relationships between individuals and public institutions, including public services – has more in common with the concerns of some liberals and social democrats in terms of support for liberal democratic institutions and for the institutions of redistribution. Associational cohesion – referring to the ways in which people interact with each other and to belonging to place – has more to do with communitarian concerns with community, culture and language providing important conditions for human flourishing, or conservative concerns with the maintenance of national traditions and customs. Institutional cohesion might therefore have more relevance for arguments A1 and A2, as outlined in section 6.1 of this chapter, whereas associational cohesion might have more relevance for arguments A3 and A4.

In this way, having a state that is institutionally cohesive might be thought of as an essentially liberal idea whereby citizens put aside their prepolitical attachments and show a commitment to a particular set of institutions and democratic processes, and a commitment to the ability for all to access them on an equal basis. The ‘cohesion’ refers to the *same* commitment and the *same* access to these institutions and processes of all citizens. After this point, there is a common framework of institutions and democratic processes through which difference – of culture, values or identity – can be contested.

Associational cohesion, by contrast, may be seen to imply a quite different type of ‘sameness’ upon which cohesion is based. It does not simply imply a commitment to an essentially liberal framework, but actually of sameness of values, culture or identities themselves. Some of the questions in the Citizenship Survey that form part of what I am calling associational cohesion are of this type: for instance, respondents were asked to what extent they agree that their local area is a place where people share values. Thought about in this way, for an area to be institutionally cohesive it is not necessary that people share values (aside from universal democratic liberal ones); but for an area to have associational cohesion it may well be necessary. This issue of whether the sameness of values is constitutive of the meaning of social cohesion has resonances with the findings of Hickman *et al.* (2012, 12-3) that:

“there is a strong suggestion in our interviews that many people have an understanding that pluralism necessarily entails conflict and that the goal sought is agreed means of resolving conflict rather than a mythical harmony based on common

values. Social cohesion, in other words, is not about avoiding conflict; it is about resolving conflict.”

The issue about what is meant by ‘shared values’ is an important one, since policy is “driven by the attempt to commit and bind newcomers to the *particular* society that is receiving them, notionally making them familiar with the ‘British’ ... values and ways of doing things” (Joppke 2004, 253). Yet many of the specific values espoused by, for instance, the Cattle Report were simply universal liberal values: “Instead of being ‘British’, this was the universal, nationally anonymous creed of the liberal state” (*ibid.*). In other aspects of policy on community cohesion and immigration, however, the tone is rather different, and focuses on the perceived failure of minority communities “to ‘integrate’, and their desire to lead increasingly separate lives, both geographically and culturally, at odds with ‘traditional’ values of white Britishness” (Craig 2008, 237), and implies ethnic minorities should assimilate into the majority culture.

Rather than talking about shared values in the abstract, therefore, it is important to be clear about whether one is actually discussing universalistic liberal values or more specific values. When discussing the importance of shared values in our understanding of social cohesion, from the perspective of my distinction between institutional and associational cohesion, universalistic shared values might have more to do with institutional cohesion, but more specific shared values might have more to do with associational cohesion. The strong ambiguity over the type of values ‘Britishness’ is supposed to imply is illustrated by the list drawn up in a recent study (Ethnos 2005, 6):

“These included upholding human rights and freedoms, respect for the rule of law, fairness, tolerance and respect for others, reserve and pride (generally valued by white English participants and criticised by white Scottish and white Welsh participants, as well as those from ethnic minority backgrounds), a strong work ethic, community spirit, mutual help, stoicism and compassion, and drunkenness, hooliganism and yobbishness.”

Many of these values are clearly universal liberal values, but others are not. One would (presumably) not wish to argue that a cohesive society can be built around drunkenness, hooliganism and yobbishness, but perhaps one might argue that one could be built around ‘reserve’ and ‘pride’. Yet if one wishes to emphasise ‘reserve’ and ‘pride’ rather than ‘upholding human rights’ and ‘respect for the rule of law’, then this is going to imply assimilation to white English cultural values, which may evoke negativity from minority groups,

as shown in the Ethnos study. If one wishes to emphasise universal liberal values then it is, as has been discussed already, difficult to see what is specifically *British* about them.

This neatly illustrates the duality of the discourse around social cohesion and shared values, whereby sometimes shared values are discussed in terms of universal liberal values which can emphasise such things as tolerance of diversity, but then the discussion can quickly shift to specifically white English cultural traits and can have strongly assimilationist connotations. It is extremely important to be clear as to exactly what an emphasis on cohesion and shared values is supposed to entail: is it important for all members of society to subscribe to the principles of living in a liberal democracy, but not necessarily important that people adopt the same cultural attachments beyond this; or is it important for all members of society to share at least some of the same cultural traits? Distinguishing between ‘institutional’ and ‘associational’ types of cohesion is one way to move away from such ambiguities and their very different implications, and could prevent the ambiguity from being used to shift without justification from a discussion of liberal values to one of English cultural assimilation. Distinguishing between the two types of cohesion could similarly help prevent contradictions such as the Home Office’s promotion of “assimilationist policies underpinning community cohesion (which ignores the continuing racism characterising British life)” (Craig 2008, 238) whilst at the same time suggesting that “to be British does not mean assimilation into a common culture so that original identities are lost” (Home Office 2005b, 15).

These issues are, therefore, going to be crucially important for policy. In the context of the community cohesion agenda, more progress has been made specifying the type of national identity than being more specific about social cohesion, since a civic notion of Britishness has been promoted rather than the concept of English identity with its strong ethnic connotations. Whilst community cohesion has been defined in government reports (e.g. Cattle 2001; LGA 2002), it is such a broad concept that simply defining it and its dimensions in a report, then going on to discuss it as a unified concept, can be problematic. If what I am suggesting in this chapter is sound, then there are going to be fundamental differences in the implications of policies promoting institutional cohesion as compared to associational cohesion, since the former may focus on issues of equal access to the state’s institutions and democratic processes, including understanding the reasons behind issues of accessibility for different groups, possible issues of discrimination and interactions between discrimination and group difference; whereas the latter may focus on encouraging a sense of sameness in values, identities and culture as a route to state-level national unity, and is going to have far more to do with assimilation into the majority culture.

6.3 Equality and social cohesion

This section puts arguments over the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain in context by asking what else might also be important for cohesion and solidarity. A major alternative to the debate surrounding identity in much academic literature is a discussion of the relationship between social cohesion and structural equality. Given that a major finding from Chapter 4 is also that inequality – in particular education and area deprivation – may be particularly relevant for social cohesion, it is pertinent to explore the potential relationship: that is the aim of this section.

To begin with it is important to explore the theoretical arguments put forward for the relationship between equality and social cohesion. One can find two main arguments here. The first is discussed in section 6.1 as Argument A2: national identity is important because it can provide the social cohesion that is necessary for the enactment of progressive social policies, which in turn can help ensure equality. The direction of causation implied is from national identity to social cohesion, and then from social cohesion to the enactment of progressive social policies; in terms of the relationship between equality and social cohesion, therefore, the argument postulates social cohesion has the potential to cause increased equality. This is the kind of argument endorsed by Miller (e.g. 1995; 2000), in which he argues that strong ties of community can increase support for redistribution. A hypothesis which implies a similar direction of causality can be found in Kymlicka (2008, 62): “ethnic/racial diversity as such makes it more difficult to sustain redistributive policies, since it is difficult to generate a common sense of national identity and feelings of national solidarity across ethnic/racial lines”. This argument again implies that national solidarities enable the maintenance of redistributive policies.

The second argument, however, reverses the postulated direction of causality. It suggests that a cohesive society is only possible (or is at least much more likely) under conditions of substantive equality. A number of notable theorists have argued along these lines. Rousseau (1973, 238), for instance, considered the distribution of rights and resources to both be important for the stability of states: “People the territory evenly, extend everywhere the same rights, bear to every place in it abundance and life: by these means will the State become at once as strong and as well governed as possible”. In addition, Durkheim considered material equality to be important: “While Durkheim accepted class hierarchy he was a radical meritocrat, arguing that organic solidarity could not function ‘normally’ without genuine

equality of opportunity ... This led him to advocate a number of egalitarian positions, including opposition to inherited wealth” O’Donnell (2007, 252).

A suggestion put forward for the *mechanism* that might drive this section argument is in the design of a state’s institutions, and in particular the welfare state. Titmuss (1971, 225), for instance, argued that “the ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions – and particularly its health and welfare systems – can ... foster integration or alienation”. If this second type of argument is correct, then states could create social cohesion not by bolstering national identity, but by carefully designing institutions such that, in particular, equality is increased.

What the debate between the two arguments essentially comes down to is whether social cohesion is dependent on a prepolitical community of people that wish to live together and share the same political system and institutions, or whether social cohesion can be engineered by certain projects such as the design of these institutions themselves. Perhaps Kymlicka’s (2008, 61) suggestion that causation goes both ways is correct: “the welfare state has both presupposed and perpetuated an ideology of nationhood”. Yet, on the evidence from this study, to the extent that a national identity – either British or English – can be considered an indicator of a prepolitical sense of community, then inequality – in the sense of indicators of educational qualifications and area deprivation – appears to be much more important for social cohesion than a prepolitical sense of community. Of course, these are associations, and do not imply causality, but if national identity was to cause strongly increased social cohesion, then one should at least expect to find the two to be strongly and consistently associated. It may also be that British or English identity, as operationalised in the Citizenship Survey, do not ‘capture’ the concept of prepolitical community, but in the way the concepts were measured here, indicators of equality were much more important.

6.4 Conceptual issues: multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism

Many discussions of national identity and social cohesion, particularly ones closely related to public discourse in Britain, begin with a discussion of multiculturalism and ostensibly multiculturalism's opposition to national identity and national social cohesion (McLaughlin 2010; Percival 2007). I have decided not to pursue this approach in this chapter, and instead to focus on broader arguments for links postulated between national identity and social cohesion found in political and social theory, because I believe the approach is somewhat misleading, and for two reasons. First, it reduces the debate on issues that may potentially be important for generating or sustaining social cohesion to a very narrow subset of the possible options, namely by focusing on group identities; and second reduces the debate even further by choosing two particular types of group identity – some sub-state cultural identities and (presumably state-level) national identities – and presenting them as binary oppositions to one another, rather than (as I wish to suggest) simply two examples of a type of group identity. From my perspective, there are a range of different things that could be important for generating or sustaining social cohesion, of which group identities are one possibility. Even within the subcategory of group identities, state-level national identities and the sub-state cultural identities that some multicultural theorists frequently refer to are but two examples. It is more helpful to see emphases on multicultural and national identities as two types of a similar argument rather than the binary oppositions that they are sometimes made out to be. Mike O'Donnell (2007, 249) makes a similar point in arguing that the “underlying issue is social solidarity and how to foster it. Focusing on national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism is merely one approach and could be counterproductive if pursued insensitively”.

Nevertheless, given the prominence in some of the social cohesion literature of a critique of multiculturalism, it is important to consider the arguments. This section will first consider arguments for the importance of supporting national identity and criticising multiculturalism on the grounds of sustaining social cohesion; and second put this debate in context by considering a critique of nationalism with reference to globalisation and theories of cosmopolitanism. A key theme throughout is of different ‘levels’ of group identity, whether it be at a sub-state level as advocated by some multiculturalists, a state level as advocated by some types of nationalists, a regional level as advocated by, for instance, some European Union enthusiasts, or a global level as advocated by universalists. An additional theme is a dual

challenge to the importance of national identities: a multicultural challenge from 'below'; and a universalist challenge from 'above'.

6.41: Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism can refer either to a state of affairs – that is a description of multiple cultures existing within a single polity – or to a set of social policies generally aimed at attributing groups with particular rights on the basis of cultural differences. It is the latter meaning that is of interest here, given that the debate around the alleged divisiveness of multiculturalism tends to focus on multicultural *policies* rather than the existence of cultural diversity in itself. In its latter meaning, multiculturalism “can be seen as an attempt to remedy the longstanding patterns of injustice that have characterised state-minority relations in the era of nation-building states” (Kymlicka 2008, 61). To the extent that liberalism has been influential for state-minority relations in this era, multiculturalism can also be seen as an attempt to remedy some of the perceived injustices of liberalism, such as supporting the dominant groups in society under the pretence of cultural neutrality.

Justifications for multiculturalism can point in particular to the pretence of cultural neutrality upon which some liberal arguments depend, and suggest that such cultural neutrality is not practically possible. A state will necessarily need to make *some* cultural decisions, so the criticism goes, not least on the key issue of the language or languages to use in education, public sector employment, and the courts. The state is then not culturally neutral and, crucially, will often tend to favour the cultural preferences of the society’s dominant group or groups. The issue then becomes that a liberal claim of cultural neutrality is in fact a cover-up for the normalisation and imposition of the dominant group’s cultural values. As Young (1990, 116) argues:

“The standpoint of the privileged, their particular experience and standards, is constructed as normal and neutral. If some groups’ experience differs from this neutral experience, or they do not measure up to those standards, their difference is constructed as deviance and inferiority. Not only are the experience and values of the oppressed thereby ignored and silenced, but they become disadvantaged by their situated identities.”

Multiculturalism, when used to refer to a set of public policies, can denote a very broad range of measures ostensibly taken to offset a bias towards the cultural values of a society’s dominant group, and to ensure that members of non-dominant groups have (at least roughly) the same opportunities for cultural fulfilment as members of the dominant group. Will Kymlicka, for instance, focuses in particular on sub-state level national groups and argues for

the adoption of policies designed to protect the language or culture of these groups on the grounds that without such deliberate protections, in “a democracy, public institutions are likely to be shaped by the culture of the dominant group” (2008, 53). This bias towards the culture of the dominant group may, in some situations, justify measures that emphasise the cultural traits of a non-dominant group. One example is in language policy: in Canada residents of Quebec are entitled to represent themselves in court in French, for instance, rather than being obligated to use English, as they would be required to do in the UK or United States.

However, multiculturalism can be criticised on the grounds that institutionalising differences between groups can be divisive. Cultural differences between groups that otherwise might have been fluid and rapidly changing are instead ‘frozen’ due to the set of policies prescribing what those group differences are. In much of the Western world in the 2000s, this has led to a political counter-movement in opposition to multiculturalism, whereby the values of (state-level) national identity and state unity are emphasised, and therefore setting the representation of multiculturalism as being something divisive as the direct opposite of national identity as a unifying force. This argument was made in political discourse by, for instance, Ted Cantle’s (2001) much-quoted report suggesting that communities in the English north were living ‘parallel lives’. David Goodhart uses a strand of this argument by criticising what he describes as “the multicultural invitation to newcomers – ‘You can remain unchanged and still fit in’ – [which] waves away the problem of integration but does not solve it” (2013, 170).

It is important to interpret these arguments for the importance of national identity and unity at the detriment of multiculturalism in the context of both the different political positions outlined in section 6.1 and the different meanings of national identity and social cohesion outlined in section 6.2. First of all, given that the debate focuses on the importance of culture, it is of more relevance for arguments A3 and A4 than A1 or A2. Clearly what the debate is about is an argument over the importance of emphasising group identity and the cohesion of the group at different levels – sub-state cultures (such as, for instance, Kymlicka’s emphasis on sub-state nationalities) and state-level national identities. Argument A3 focuses on the importance of access to a state-level national culture in providing context and meaning in people’s lives, but from a multicultural perspective a very similar argument could be made that instead focuses on sub-state level cultures. Nation-states, the argument goes, “are good for their members by providing them with the indispensable conditions of flourishing. The fundamental idea here ... is that human beings require immersion in a language and culture in order to thrive” (Barry 1999, 20). Multicultural arguments can take a similar form:

multicultural policies may be needed to offset a bias towards the dominant culture in a society and allow subscribers to minority cultures the same opportunities for human flourishing as members of the dominant group.

So, what insights into the debate between multiculturalism and national identity can be derived from the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5? From Chapter 5, there was an overwhelming sense in which the picture painted by critics of multiculturalism was not especially accurate. This picture suggests that at least some of the respondents spoken to might be living 'parallel lives', immersed in a culture separate to the British 'mainstream'. This justifies, so the argument goes, the adopting of policies emphasising 'what unites us' – one common culture, a common national identity, a common language. Yet nearly all the respondents simply gave the impression that life is just more 'messy' than these representations, and were much more consistent with the idea of 'new ethnicities' whereby people have complex, hybrid identities, and adopt such identities unproblematically (Solomos 2003), as well as with Amin's (2003, 462) argument that many of the people involved in the 2001 disturbances in northern England were "not confused about their identities and values as cultural 'hybrids'". The respondents neither drew mainly from 'their' sub-state culture (as argued by multiculturalists that they should be allowed to on social justice grounds, and portrayed as problematic by critics of multiculturalism); nor did they have any particular problem in describing their identification with Britain, how this interacted with their other identities, and the fact that having multiple identities was simply not a problem. From the data presented in Chapter 5, there is no particular evidence of anything like unified sub-state cultures of the kind described by multicultural theorists, and also no evidence to suggest there is something like a 'mainstream' British culture from which the respondents may supposedly be detached.

One 35-49 year old man, for instance, described his identity as "Afro-Caribbean-British-Black" since "my forefathers are from Africa, my parents are from the Caribbean, I was born in Britain, and I'm Black". A woman aged 50-64 made similar comments about her son's multiple identifications, saying "I wouldn't want him to grow up with a complex, that's the thing but he doesn't seem to have that". Another man again expressed similar sentiments about how clearly his multiple identities were felt, and about the importance of his children sharing this understanding: "it's very important for them [his children] to know that I'm a Black man, born in this country, my family's from South America, and it's very important for them to know their history".

Admittedly the external validity of the findings from Chapter 5 is necessarily limited. The findings cannot possibly hope to represent even the area in which the study was conducted, or the ethnic groups in question, let alone all ethnic minority groups across Britain. The sample was composed of two (broad) ethnic groups in a very specific area of London. It is quite plausible that stories of 'parallel lives' might be told by members of different ethnic groups, from different areas of Britain. It is also plausible that the social positioning of the interviewees may have affected both the nature of the interviewees found, and their willingness to talk freely about these issues. Yet given the aim was to identify the range of narratives surrounding how people's national identities might be related to social cohesion, it is striking that the story told by the critics of multiculturalism was not present. One might at least expect the meanings and connections postulated by these critics to be found meaningful by at least some of the respondents: but not one of them expressed such views, and a great many expressed scepticism with these arguments.

6.42: Cosmopolitanism

If sub-state cultural identities and state-level national identities can be seen as simply two types of group identity, rather than the binary oppositions that the debate between multiculturalism and social cohesion takes them to be, then one might wonder why an emphasis could not be placed on the importance of groups identities at other 'levels'. Many commentators have argued for the importance of identities and solidarities at levels 'higher' than that of the state: for instance the regional level, in particular referring to the European Union (e.g. Habermas 1992); or the global level (e.g. Fine 2007). Viewed from this perspective, multicultural theorists and the critics of multiculturalism do not seem to be on directly opposing sides. Both are arguing for the importance of group identities and group solidarities (for various different reasons); as are some proponents of regional or global solidarities. The disagreement is simply about the 'level' at which the group of most importance is claimed to exist.

Cosmopolitanism can mean many things but at its most basic level simply means to be "a citizen of the world" (Barry 1999, 35). It is not a new idea, existing "long before that of nationalism", dating back to ancient Greece, and being used more recently by Kant and Hegel (Fine 2007, ix). By contrast, the origins of nationalism are much newer – "in its modern and basically political sense the concept *nation* is historically very young ... the old meaning of the word envisaged mainly the ethnic unit, but recent usage rather stressed 'the notion of political unity and independence'" (Hobsbawm 1992, 18).¹⁵ This is true despite attempts by nationalists, particularly on the right (as discussed in Section 6.1), to emphasise history in their arguments, and despite suggestions that cosmopolitanism is a radically new idea that is out of touch with the reality of well-established and historically formed nation-states. Some contemporary cosmopolitans have embraced recent ideas of globalisation, arguing that there have been increases in international migration, global capital flows, economic and environmental interdependence between states, and technological changes that have revolutionised global communication, and suggesting that the salience of states is in many senses decreasing. Critics have argued that, far from nationalism and national identities becoming irrelevant in modern times, if anything national sentiments are increasing: "There is presently no sign that national identities are on the wane. Insofar as there is any movement, it appears to be in the direction of smaller, more intense forms of nationality rather than towards cosmopolitanism" (Miller 1989b, 238). This leads to criticisms of cosmopolitanism as

¹⁵ Hobsbawm is quoting from the *Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. VIII (Oxford 1933), p.30.

being an ideal that is detached from reality. For Robert Fine, however, the difference of contemporary cosmopolitanism is that: “What makes modern cosmopolitanism *modern*, however, is not so much that it stands for a universal human community over and above local loyalties, but rather that it seeks to *reconcile* the idea of universal species-wide human solidarity with particular solidarities that are smaller and more specific than the human species” (2007, 15). If this is correct, then cosmopolitanism may be able to accommodate the “human need for solidarities smaller than the species” – including national ones – whilst at the same time embracing universalism (Hollinger 2001, 238).

An important difference between, on the one hand, both multiculturalism and nationalism and, on the other, cosmopolitanism, is the relative emphasis on the importance of a *single* culture in people’s lives. Nationalists would tend to emphasise national culture; and multiculturalists sub-state cultures; but for cosmopolitans the emphasis is that a multiplicity of cultures might be important for any one person. Jeremy Waldron (1995), for instance, uses Salman Rushdie as his inspiration for a critique of communitarianism in which, he argues, Rushdie’s life can represent the complexity and multiplicity of sources of culture, meaning and identity that many people experience. Rushdie’s life as a migrant, with hybrid identities and cultural influences, is contrasted with “views that locate the coherence and meaning of human life in each person’s immersion in the culture and ethnicity of a particular community” (Waldron 1995, 94). It is certainly the case that many multiculturalists, and indeed many moderate nationalists, would agree with the idea that people have multiple sources of identity, providing their lives with multiple sources of context and meaning. Yet there can, in practice, be a tendency to overlook the importance of this fact, and to instead discuss the importance of a particular culture in people’s lives. Thus, Margalit and Raz argue that “[f]amiliarity with *a* culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable” (1995, 86, emphasis added). Yael Tamir similarly takes to speaking of the importance of a singular culture, by claiming that: “The right to culture is meant to allow individuals to live within *the* culture of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create *the* culture of *the* community they belong to, and to redefine *its* borders” (1993, 8, emphasis added).

From this perspective, rather than multiculturalism and nationalism being opposed, they both place excessive emphasis on one particular culture as being unique in providing meaning to people’s lives. Luban’s (1980, 393) idea of the “Romance of the Nation-State” is taken up by Brian Barry in his critique of both nationalism and multiculturalism: the nationalist “idea that people can flourish only within their ancestral culture” (Barry 2001, 263) is in fact very similar to the multicultural argument advanced by Kymlicka, who is “equally spellbound by sub-state

nationalities, and invests them in the same romantic spirit with a unique capacity to bring meaning to the lives of their members" (*ibid.*, 137).

I wish to suggest that the views expressed by the interview respondents in this study, as presented in Chapter 5, fit much more comfortably with a cosmopolitan outlook than with either a multicultural one or one that emphasises the importance of national unity. There are two aspects to this claim. The first is related to the discussion of multiculturalism in the preceding section, and to the opposition of, on the one hand, multiculturalism and nationalism as emphasising the importance of *one* culture in providing meaning to people's lives and, on the other, cosmopolitanism as emphasising the multiplicity of sources of meaning and identity. I wish to suggest that the views of the respondents in this study are much closer to the latter view, as I hope is shown by the examples given in the preceding section from the interview data in Chapter 5. The second aspect of my claim is related to a criticism of cosmopolitanism: that the view of the world it presents is a very nice idea in theory, but it is simply out of touch with the reality of a world in which local and national loyalties are simply not going to go away. Whilst it is clearly important for cosmopolitans to respond effectively to such a challenge, since it is surely true that, although the importance of national loyalties in people's lives may sometimes be exaggerated, they are not simply about to die out in the very near future, I also wish to illustrate some respondents' views in which they clearly found meaning in the idea of global loyalties, identity as a human, and global citizenship.

With regard to this latter claim, several respondents mentioned a 'global' identity of identifying with the world, or as a human, as being more important for social cohesion outcomes than British identity. One female said: "I feel that I don't belong [to Britain], and that the world is possibly my home, so that the fact that I feel like there's a bigger picture if you like, there's a whole planet out there, and I don't need to feel like I'm necessarily stuck in one place". Similarly, a male respondent said:

"it doesn't really matter where you are, you do as another human to another human, you interact, you've got to otherwise you just may as well lock your door and don't go out ... I don't see why the question's asking the affinity to Britain. Why does it have to be affinity, it's just human relationships."

For another male respondent, this global identity was connected to being a part of London: "in London, you're part of this world city. Outside of London people don't feel that connected to London and here there are people from all over the place. I don't think it's just about ethnicity".

So what does this discussion mean for the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in general, and for the relationship between British identity and social cohesion in particular? The first point is that it may be all be very well that the cosmopolitan vision ‘fits’ better with the views of the respondents in this study than either the nationalist or the multiculturalist visions, but the importance of national identity for social cohesion, as we saw in Section 6.1, is supposed to be that it strengthens state-level cohesion and solidarity which can, in turn, be useful for various things, depending on one’s political viewpoint – the maintenance of liberal institutions, or egalitarian redistribution, perhaps. Although this study shows no evidence of the ‘parallel lives’ described by Cantle (2001), the fact of these complex, hybrid identities may be problematic in itself, since it may, the argument might go, be beneficial to social cohesion if the respondents in the sample had all unequivocally adopted a British national identity that superseded, or at least was now more salient than, all other identities.

I wish to object to this line of argument, and for several reasons. The first is that there appears to be a major contradiction between this argument and a key claim commonly made by moderate defenders of national identity. This is that one must work with identities that actually exist, rather than proposing some kind of utopian system to which people do not, in reality, actually relate. Moderate nationalists might thereby criticise cosmopolitans on the grounds that national identities are in fact important to people, whereas ideas of global identities and solidarities are utopian fantasy. Miller, for instance, explains his starting-point as:

“In moral and political philosophy, in particular, we build upon existing sentiments and judgements, correcting them only when they are inconsistent or plainly flawed in some other way. We don’t aspire to some universal and rational foundation such as Kant tried to provide with the categorical imperative ... There can be no question of trying to give rationally compelling reasons for people to have national attachments and allegiances. What we can do is to start from the premise that people generally do exhibit such attachments and allegiances, and then try to build a political philosophy which incorporates them.”

Miller (2000, 25)

The point is simply that, if one wishes to follow through the ideas about the importance of *existing* sentiments consistently, then the fact of respondents’ complex and hybrid identities is a significant one. A global identity was meaningful to many of them; there are many potential

identifications that could be useful in building solidarities with others. These findings are hardly inconsistent with other studies, such as those using the concept of 'new ethnicities'. Solomos (2003), for instance, highlights the importance of the possibility of being both Black and British at the same time; Hall (2000) describes how third generation Black people can identify with the Caribbean heritage, a 'Black' identity and a British identity simultaneously; and Amin (2003) describes the hybrid identities of young Britons. Such ideas make Miller's insistence that the solidarities of importance must be at the national level rather difficult to sustain.

And, of course, conservatives seeing intrinsic value in the preservation of a supposedly historic and unique national culture may not be especially sympathetic towards the realities of the hybrid identities of relatively recent immigrants and their descendants. Their response may be to tell such people: this is *our* country, either fully assimilate to this pre-existing national culture, or leave. Yet there is clearly a problem here. If one wishes to increase social cohesion in Britain, socialists, liberals and moderate conservatives would all agree that one must increase social cohesion amongst those people actually residing in Britain – some form of ethnic cleansing is ruled out – and Britain is a diverse place. But, as we have seen in Chapter 4, identification with exclusive national identities such as English identity are actually *damaging* to some forms of social cohesion. The data from Chapter 5 strongly support the idea that minority ethnic adoption of English identity is seriously problematic, since it is constructed on an exclusive ethnic basis. Only British identity – less exclusive than English identity – was found to be correlated with positive social cohesion outcomes.

But there is a further problem here: generation is of crucial importance.¹⁶ British identity was only found to be correlated with social cohesion for those *not* born in the UK. For those of minority ethnicity but born in Britain, British identity was not correlated with any of the social cohesion measures. If the interview data in this study is anything to go by, and it is consistent in this respect with other studies (e.g. Heath and Roberts 2008), then most of minority ethnicity born in this country feel British in some form anyway, whether mildly or more strongly. And there is no evidence from this study that getting them to feel more strongly British, however that might be done, would have any positive impact on social cohesion at all.

The discussion of the possibility of solidarities based upon a global identity leads neatly to an exploration of the rather peculiar nature of British identity itself, and in particular the relationship between colonialism and British identity that emerged from the interview data of Chapter 5. For those respondents that emigrated from a former British colony, the way in

¹⁶ Or at least my proxy of it is, which is whether or not a respondent was born in the UK.

which many of them described how they already identified with Britain upon arrival was one of the clearest narratives to appear from the interview data. A 50-64 year old man expressed his colonial connections with Britain by saying “I’m proud of that, of being part of the United Kingdom, yes ... because as I said we have a colonial history, Dominica is a colony of Britain ... there’s a connection between the United Kingdom and other countries”. A 35-49 year old woman expanded in more detail on how colonialism affected British identification:

“My mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony and so ... most people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the same time ... You’ve got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were, that came here as being part of the colonialism, like my parents’ generation. And then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of parents that were immigrants. Then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us who are, who have migrated in the current world, like, and so they’ve come here recently and have sought British identity, and we see things very differently from one another ... we might not relate to each other very well at all because our experiences are so vastly different, and so how we perceive our Britishness is going to be quite different.”

These issues also give a potential explanation as to why the interaction of British identity with those born in the UK had such an important effect on predicting social cohesion outcomes in Chapter 4: British identity was associated with positive social cohesion outcomes for those *not* born in the UK, but for those that were it made no difference. It is perhaps the case that this interaction – of those born outside the UK *and* with a British identity – ‘captured’ something these respondents had in common and this may, possibly, have something to do with a shared experience of those emigrating from a former British colony. Regrettably, the Citizenship Survey does not provide sufficient data to investigate further those respondents originating from former British colonies, although this would make a fascinating topic for further research.

That West Indian immigrants to Britain commonly viewed themselves as British before arrival is well-documented. Glazer (1995, 135) argues that “West Indian immigrants to Britain viewed themselves and, I believe, still view themselves as Black Britons, wanting nothing more than full acceptance, the same rights in all spheres that all other citizens hold”. In the context of the discussion of cosmopolitanism, and in particularly when set in opposition to the way in which identification with Britain is supposedly the solution to the fragmentation of society, the absence of which has been leading to declining cohesion and solidarity, the comparison of a colonial British identity felt by those emigrating to Britain with the recent insistence that immigrants identify more strongly is striking. Stuart Hall illustrates this dichotomy perfectly by

describing his experience in a recent interview: “I came as a colonial, I came bearing a British passport, a British subject, etc., it was only after that that I had to apply for one, or for permission to stay” (BBC 2011).

6.5 Conclusions

Chapter 6 attempted to draw together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, and to provide an extended theoretical discussion of the implications for the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. Section 6.1 explored the theoretical arguments for the potential importance of national identity for social cohesion found in social and political theory and identified four different arguments corresponding to four different political positions. Each of the four arguments also used somewhat different concepts of both national identity and social cohesion.

Section 6.2 drew out these different meanings of first national identity, and then social cohesion, and discussed their relationships to the different theoretical arguments found in section 6.1 and the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to national identity, it was suggested a distinction between constitutional patriotism and a 'thin' version of civic national identity might have more to do with theoretical arguments A1 and A2; and a 'thicker' version of civic identity and ethnic national identity might have more to do with theoretical arguments A3 and A4.

Section 6.2 then discussed the relationships between the theoretical arguments, the way in which social cohesion was found to break up into ten 'elements' in Chapter 4, and differences in meanings of social cohesion found in Chapter 5. It was argued that social cohesion might be better broken up into two different concepts: 'institutional cohesion' and 'associational cohesion'. Arguments A1 and A2 might have more to do with institutional cohesion; whilst arguments A3 and A4 might have more to do with associational cohesion.

Section 6.3 discussed the findings in Chapter 4 in particular that indicators of equality may be much more strongly associated with social cohesion than national identity. It drew on the distinction between institutional and associational cohesion to show how perceptions of discrimination might be especially important for institutional cohesion, whilst education and deprivation might be especially important for associational cohesion.

Section 6.4 explored the idea of different 'levels' at which cohesion and solidarity could exist. It argued that the debate in much recent public discourse, which focuses on the alleged opposites of multiculturalism and national unity, may be misleading. Instead it is suggested that multiculturalism and national unity are not the binary opposites they are suggested to be: instead they are two examples of arguments that identities (at a particular level) could be important to sustain solidarities (at the corresponding level). Alternative 'levels' at which

solidarities could be sustained are explored. Next, a discussion is given of the way in which both proponents of multiculturalism and national cohesion tend to focus on the importance of *one* particular level. Against this, a discussion of cosmopolitanism is given, which emphasises the importance of a multiplicity of different levels – with corresponding solidarities and cultures – at the same time. It is suggested that respondents' views in Chapter 5 'fit' better with a 'cosmopolitan outlook' (Fine 2007, 15) than an emphasis on one particular level and corresponding culture. This suggests that discussions on social cohesion in Britain should move away from an approach that emphasises national unity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism; instead, possibilities for multiple identities, solidarities, and cultures that might be important to people, could be explored.

Yet if – as section 6.3 suggests – equality is important for social cohesion, then to an extent the level of the nation-state may also be indirectly important for social cohesion. The nation-state is currently of central importance for redistribution, which can help reduce inequalities, and in terms of a frame of reference for people's perceptions of equalities (McKnight & Nolan 2012). Chapter 7 goes on to reflect, in the light of the discussion of section 6.4 on different levels of cohesion, on the role of the nation-state in sustaining social cohesion.

Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

This thesis has investigated the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain. Arguments that national identity can potentially help sustain national solidarities have a long tradition in social and political theory, and have been revisited recently in British public and political discourse and social policy. In the early 2000s, the prior emphasis on multiculturalism began to be questioned and started to be seen as divisive and detrimental to national unity; in its place an agenda focusing on social cohesion was formed, with a particular emphasis on the importance of British identity. These debates and changes in social policy took place against the backdrop of political claims that diversity itself may undermine national solidarity and cohesion, and academic studies arguing that ethnic diversity may be associated with reduced trust (e.g. Putnam 2007) or reduced support for redistributive policies (e.g. Alesina & Glaeser 2004). This, along with the perception that multiculturalism could be divisive, gave the new emphasis on social cohesion a racial or ethnic dimension, in the sense that there was a new focus on immigrants (and possibly their descendants) integrating into a 'mainstream' British culture. This thesis aims, I hope, to contribute *both* some kind of insight into whether or not British identity could indeed be beneficial to British social cohesion in the way suggested in public and policy discourse, *and* have something to say in relation to the more abstract theoretical debate on the importance or otherwise of a national identity for social cohesion and solidarity, albeit using evidence in the British context.

This chapter asks: what is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain? I argue first that the type of national identity in question is of crucial importance; a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic national identity is helpful, and evidence suggests the latter form may in fact be detrimental to some aspects of social cohesion. Second, I argue that social cohesion might be better broken up into two separate concepts – one referring to support for certain of the state's institutions, and the other to associational types of behaviour – since the correlates of each of the two concepts are rather different and their separation would resolve many of the confusions in academic and public discussions of social cohesion. Third, I find evidence to suggest that British identity may be of more relevance for the associational type of cohesion than the commitment type, but overall both British and English identity are of marginal relevance for social cohesion as compared to education, deprivation, and perceptions of discrimination. This suggests that attempts to use British identity as a tool to create unity and cohesion in the context of increasing diversity may not work or even be counterproductive; issues of inequality and

discrimination may be much more important to address. Last, I reflect on the extent to which issues of unity and cohesion at the level of the nation-state are still relevant in the context of identity politics on the one hand, and processes of globalisation on the other. I argue that nation-states, for the time being, remain important sites of redistribution and reference points for perceptions of equality; to the extent that these issues are important for social cohesion, nation-states are therefore important too.

This chapter begins with a summary of the thesis thus far, providing an outline of the structure and a statement of each chapter's key arguments and findings. It next goes on to synthesise the arguments from each of the chapters to answer the main research question directly: what is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain? It next reflects theoretically on why it should be the nation-state that is the appropriate level at which cohesion is desired. Last, a discussion is given of the policy implications arising from this thesis in the British context, and some thoughts are given on important areas for future research.

7.1 Summary of thesis

Chapter 1 introduced the thesis by discussing the ways in which issues of national identity and social cohesion have become prominent in public and political discourse in the last ten or fifteen years. It described how the debate around the importance of social cohesion arose in Britain in particular as a response to the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, in that it attempted both to explain and provide a solution to the disturbances (Robinson 2005). Ted Cantle's (2001, 9) influential report on the disturbances, for instance, described communities living 'parallel lives': "Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges". In the context of concerns over the alleged divisiveness of multicultural policies, increasing politicisation of debates over immigration, and further events such as the London bombings of 2005 which led to the questioning of Muslim allegiances to Britain, a new approach that focused on unity, British identity, and cohesion, was promoted by many commentators. David Goodhart (2013, xxiii), in a recent book, sums up this new approach:

"To combine diversity with solidarity, to improve integration and racial justice, it is no good just preaching tolerance, you need *a politics that promotes a common in-group identity* ... [it is important to] focus on integration and national identity and to question a form of multiculturalism that was too often indifferent to both".

Chapter 2 detailed the theoretical background to the question of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain. It explored the postulated relationships between national identity and social cohesion in the context of a discussion of the history of nationalism, links between nationalism and national identity, and the significance of race, ethnicity and religion. The few rigorous academic attempts to define the slippery concept of social cohesion were then explored, with a particular emphasis on the work of Forrest and Kearns (2001). As Kearns and Forrest (2000, 966) argue, social cohesion is typically "used in such a way that its meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that everyone knows what is being referred to. The usual premise is that social cohesion is a good thing, so it is conveniently assumed that further elaboration is unnecessary". It is important to note, however, that although social cohesion is often thought of as an area-level concept, in the sense that cohesion is a property of an area, the way the concept is investigated in this thesis is at the individual-level, since *individuals* were interviewed in the qualitative

component, and the quantitative dataset was at the individual level. Although social cohesion is an area-level concept, *indicators* of cohesion can be found at the individual level. For instance, a borough of London being a place where common values are shared might be thought of as a type of social cohesion, but an individual believing that those in their borough of residence share values can be an individual-level indicator of cohesion.

Having reviewed the postulated theoretical relationships and relevant theoretical background to the question of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, Chapter 2 then looked at existing empirical research into the nature of the relationship in Britain. Despite the prominence of arguments for the importance of national identity for social cohesion in political and social theory (e.g. Miller 1995; Barry 2001; Tamir 1993; Goodhart 2013), and the centrality of national identity in the UK government's distancing from multiculturalism and emphasis on social cohesion since the early 2000s (e.g. Denham Report 2001), there is a lack of rigorous and detailed empirical research over the nature of this relationship (Kymlicka 2008), not least in Britain.

Despite this lack of research, there are substantial bodies of evidence on related issues. Chapter 2 detailed some recent work on a possible link between ethnic diversity and social cohesion, including Putnam's (2007) hypothesis that ethnic diversity is associated with reduced trust, and Alesina & Glaeser's (2004) argument that ethnic diversity is associated with decreased support for redistributive policies. These arguments have not gone unchallenged, however, with evidence to the contrary provided by several commentators, who argue that ethnic diversity in itself does not necessarily undermine social cohesion (e.g. Banting 2005; Letki 2008). Next, literature on national identification in Britain, particularly amongst minority ethnic groups, was reviewed, and then the limited empirical work that does exist linking national identity with social cohesion in Britain was discussed.

The next section of Chapter 2 drew on the reviewed literature to state the research question in more detail and context. A theoretical framework was produced that informs the design of the quantitative work discussed in Chapter 4, and that also guides to some extent the qualitative work discussed in Chapter 5, although the qualitative work is somewhat more open-ended. The theoretical framework in particular used areas of literature suggesting that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might depend on various issues such as ethnic identity and religious identity, and 'structural' issues such as socio-economic level, education and deprivation. This framework guided the construction of regression models, and in particular the inclusion of control variables, in the quantitative component, and in the qualitative component it guided the construction of the interview schedule.

Chapter 3 gave an overview of the methodology used in the empirical components of the thesis. With regard to the quantitative component, it introduced the principles behind the choice of the Citizenship Survey, the way in the concept of social cohesion would be measured, and the ways in which the theoretical framework from Chapter 2 guides the construction of the regression models. With regard to the qualitative component, it introduced the area in which the interviewees all reside, and discussed the principles behind the choice of purposive sampling methods, and some limitations of the methodology. Although more detailed discussions on methods were presented in each of the empirical chapters themselves, Chapter 3 gave an overview for the strategy for answering the research question empirically, and therefore linked the literature review with the two empirical chapters that come next.

Chapter 4 gave a detailed report of the quantitative component of this study, with both the methodology and results discussed in depth. The first task of the chapter was to undertake the measurement of the slippery concept of social cohesion using data from the Citizenship Survey. The measurement was based theoretically around Forrest & Kearns' (2001) definition of the concept: the strategy was to consider which variables available in the Citizenship Survey could potentially measure the parts of the concept identified by Forrest & Kearns; and then to conduct Principal Components Analysis in order to break all the variables considered as potential measures into a smaller number of components, with each component representing a particular 'element' of social cohesion. One of the key findings here was that social cohesion, as operationalised in this way using data from the Citizenship Survey, was a very fragmented concept. It was found to break down into ten different elements, representing rather different ideas: such as access to public service provision; feelings of belonging to locality and nation; political engagement and participation; or meaningful social interaction, civic participation and volunteering. Composite variables were created representing each 'element'.

Following the creation of variables representing the elements of social cohesion, Chapter 4 provided data from regression models measuring associations between British identity and the social cohesion variables, with a host of control variables included. Ten regression models were created, with each one corresponding to a particular element of social cohesion, as identified by the Principal Components Analysis. The selection of control variables was guided by the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, which was based on the review of relevant literature. The broad findings were that for many of the 'elements' of social cohesion, British identity had a positive and significant effect on the social cohesion measure, but that the magnitude of the effect was very small in comparison with some of the control variables. Three control variables were found to be particularly important, and much more so than

British identity: a measure of the respondent's educational qualifications; a measure of the relative deprivation of the area in which a respondent lives; and the respondent's perception of being discriminated against, which was especially important in the models measuring access to public services. Although the many nuances in the data cannot be described in detail in this brief summary of the thesis, a tentative finding was that deprivation, education and discrimination may be much more important for social cohesion outcomes than British identity. However, the highly fragmented nature of the concept, as demonstrated by the Principal Components Analysis, makes broad statements about the relationship between British identity and social cohesion in general rather difficult without breaking the concept of social cohesion down further.

There were two important additional findings of Chapter 4. The first was that when measures of British identity were replaced by measures of English identity, in most cases any positive associations were lost, and in some cases there were *negative* associations between English identity and social cohesion. The negative association between English identity and meaningful interaction with people of different backgrounds was particularly striking. This suggests that, rather than being potentially beneficial for social cohesion, English identity may in some cases be detrimental to social cohesion. The magnitudes of the effects, however, were again rather small, suggesting that any negative effect of English identity is small compared with education, deprivation or discrimination; and of course these are only *associations* and do not imply that English identity is *causing* reduced social cohesion.

The second finding was that, for non-white ethnic groups, British identity was nearly always only associated with any of the measures of social cohesion for those *not* born in the UK, suggesting that generation may be of crucial importance to explaining the relationship between British identity and social cohesion. For non-white immigrant groups, British identity and social cohesion may be related to one another, but for the descendants of non-white immigrants, there is no evidence to suggest that British identity has any relevance for social cohesion at all. This finding has important implications for policy, particularly given the emphasis in government policy on promoting British identity amongst immigrants *and their UK-born descendants* alleged to be part of communities living 'parallel lives'.

Chapter 5 attempted to answer the question of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in a rather different way to Chapter 4. The data were transcriptions of interviews with twenty-two respondents of Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity, living in an ethnically diverse area of south London. Rather than attempting to get a representative overview of whether or not British identity is associated with various measures of social

cohesion, the qualitative component of the study, as presented in Chapter 5, took a narrower (in the sense that the sample was relatively restricted) but more open-ended approach. Interviewees were able to express their feelings of their own identities, and any connections they may or may not see between them and various aspects of social cohesion, in their own way, and the aim was to identify a range of possible narratives which, it was hoped, would be as diverse as possible. A focus on interviewees of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity allowed for an exploration of how people described both their ethnic and national identities, and the links between them, which was especially relevant to the research question because of the centrality of ethnicity and race to discussions of national identity, and because of the emphasis on the alleged lack of British identity amongst ethnic minority groups featuring prominently in the government's 'social cohesion agenda' and related discourse. In presenting this data, Chapter 5 had three main tasks: first to present the range of narratives about respondents' feelings of their national identities; second to present the range of narratives about ways in which British identity may, or may not, be connected with social cohesion; and third to identify links between the narratives.

With regard to the first task, there were a variety of narratives on how strongly respondents felt British: some felt strongly British; some not at all; and some were rather indifferent. However, three main narratives emerged around which many respondents based their discussions of their national identities: colonialism, the importance of generation, and differences between British and English identity. Many respondents considered English identity to be an ethnically-defined identity, and felt excluded from it because of their skin colour, whereas British identity was in general seen as more inclusive to those that were not seen as 'Anglo-Saxon'. In distinguishing between English and British identity there were certainly resonances of the commonly used distinction between ethnic and civic national identities (e.g. Miller 1995). Some respondents, however, fought against the perception that they were excluded from an English identity and firmly adopted it regardless, with one person explaining that she did not always want to appear the 'victim'. Generation was also seen as key to the meaning given to national identity by many of the respondents, in that there were clear differences between the feelings towards Britain, or England, that first generation immigrants might have as compared to those that were brought up in Britain. The interaction between generation and colonialism was particularly interesting, and not something that was anticipated to arise from the interviews. The feeling that many first generation immigrants arriving from what was a British colony would feel strongly British before arrival, and were sometimes surprised by the non-acceptance of this identity by the existing population, was a clearly expressed theme by several respondents, and was very much consistent with Stuart

Hall's account of his own experiences as a 'post-colonial subject' (e.g. Hall & Chen 1996; BBC 2011).

The second task of Chapter 5 was to present the range of narratives about ways in which British identity may, or may not, be connected with social cohesion, although respondents often displayed several narratives in the same interview. These narratives were inevitably oversimplifications of the respondents' views, and perhaps 'fit' with some respondents' views more than others, but it was necessary to simplify the interview data in this way in order to draw out similarities between the interviews. There were three narratives by which British identity was perceived to potentially have a connection with social cohesion. First, British identity was seen to be a signifier of connectedness with society, whereby British identity and connectedness went 'hand in hand'. A contrast was made between the idea of people that have both a British identity and a connection with society, and people that have neither, although the causation implied was ambiguous – some respondents suggested both that having a British identity might lead to a greater connection with society, and that being connected with society could lead one to identify more as British. Second, British identity was understood as being about social expectations of language, accent and etiquette; identifying as British implied meeting these social expectations, which could then lead to more positive social outcomes. In particular, there was a perception that the ability to speak English well could lead to positive outcomes, particularly if one used a 'typically English' accent, but that an absence of 'good' English or an English accent could be problematic. Third, British identity was seen as entailing knowing about the British political and social system, which in turn could make it easier to get what one wants, particularly with regard to understanding how to access public services successfully or influencing political decisions.

There were, however, two narratives by which British identity and social cohesion were not perceived to be connected at all; for these narratives, respondents expressed views that things other than national identity were important for social cohesion. The first narrative focused around the importance of individual choice and personal responsibility, rather than national identity, for positive social cohesion outcomes. This narrative was widely expressed by many of the respondents, and about many different aspects of social cohesion: individual choice and responsibility was seen to influence belonging, volunteering, civic engagement, influencing political decisions, accessing public services, and socialising with others. The importance of individuals using their own willpower to change outcomes for the better was often discussed. The second narrative focused on other identities: national identity was not considered important for social cohesion, but other identities were. The identities discussed in particular

were religion (often Christianity, but also a 'spiritual' identity not based around organised religion), an identification with London, an identification with humanity or the world, and a 'Black' identity. For instance, when discussing the importance of identity for belonging, several respondents discussed how their identification as a human gave them a sense that the world was their home, and others discussed how London, rather than Britain, was more important to their identities. A view was also expressed that Black identity and religion were important, sometimes because a Black identity meant that particular 'Black' political issues were deemed important to campaign for, or because religious values meant that certain types of volunteering or help for others were very important.

The third task of Chapter 5 was to identify links between narratives. The idea was to identify those narratives that commonly were expressed together by some of the respondents, in order to attempt to establish connections between narratives. Although many narratives were used in overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways, there were underlying patterns in the sense that some narratives were more likely to be combined. There were three groups of narratives. The first group linked the narrative on British colonialism – upon which there were positive and negative views – with a narrative that British identity was a signifier of positive social cohesion outcomes. Some of the respondents expressing this narrative felt strongly British and saw their British identity as a way of connecting to British society, and also felt the links between Britain and its former colonies were important. Others, however, expressed frustration at the ways in which their skin colour led to a non-acceptance of their national identity by others.

The second group linked a narrative whereby British identity was felt only weakly, or was rejected outright, with the narrative that British identity was understood in terms of social expectations of language, accent, culture and etiquette. The significance of this was that there was a sense of frustration or injustice with the fact that the fulfilment of social expectations that were perceived to come with British identity were associated with positive social cohesion outcomes. The frustration or injustice stemmed from the sense that it was only by the fulfilment of predefined social norms (having a particular accent, adopting a particular etiquette) that positive outcomes could be attained. If one has a particular accent, or behaves with a certain etiquette, then positive outcomes would follow; but if one has the 'wrong' accent or etiquette, then negative outcomes would follow.

The third group linked a narrative whereby indifference towards British identity was expressed with the narrative that individual choice and responsibility, rather than anything to do with identity, affected social cohesion outcomes. The sense here was of respondents accepting that

they felt (at least moderately) British, but suggesting that it had very little to do with social cohesion.

Chapter 6 had three main aims. It started by expanding upon the discussion of theoretical links between national identity and social cohesion found in the literature review, by providing an analysis of the nature of the relationships postulated by political and social theorists, and established four broadly different types of argument that correspond to four different political positions. In particular these arguments focused on the ways in which national identity was deemed to be important for social cohesion, and imply somewhat different meanings of both national identity and social cohesion. The four arguments are:

A1. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the effective functioning of a nation's liberal democratic institutions

A2. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at ensuring social justice

A3. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the maintenance of a civic culture – partly inherited and partly negotiated – which is an important good in itself because it provides citizens' lives with context and meaning

A4. National identity is important because it implies identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society, the maintenance and cohesion of which is an important end in itself

The second aim was to expand upon the discussions of the concepts of national identity and social cohesion found in Chapter 2, in the light of the findings and insights from Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to the concept of national identity, it built upon the discussion of civic and ethnic types of national identity found in Chapter 2 to make a three-way distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic national identity. Constitutional patriotism is best known through the work of Jürgen Habermas (e.g. 1998), for whom it was “a functional equivalent to conventional notions of national belonging” (Fine 2007, 146). A civic national identity is one in which emphasis is placed upon acquired characteristics and so can be open to people of all ethnic groups; whereas an ethnic national identity is one in which emphasis is placed on “ancestry and ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at birth” (Heath and Roberts 2008, 24). This three-way distinction was, to a reasonable extent, supported by the distinctions drawn by interviewees in the qualitative component, whereby a

loyalty to, rather than an identification with, Britain could be seen as a kind of constitutional patriotism; British identity was largely but not exclusively a civic national identity; and English identity was largely but not exclusively an ethnic national identity. Some respondents did, however, describe ways in which they were not always accepted as British because of their 'race', so British identity was not seen as an 'ethnically neutral' identity for all respondents; and other respondents described ways in which they adopted an English identity despite its ethnic connotations.

Chapter 6 went on to combine this theoretical discussion with the findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to present a synthesis of theory and evidence with regard to the concept of social cohesion. The fragmented nature of the concept was explored, and it was argued that it may be beneficial to separate social cohesion into two different concepts: one referring to a commitment towards and equal access to the state's institutions, including institutions of redistribution such as public services; and the other referring to associational types of behaviour, such as volunteering, meaningful interaction with people of different backgrounds, and civic engagement. These two types of social cohesion were termed the 'institutional' type and the 'associational' type, respectively. It was argued that, based on the data from Chapter 4, the correlates of social cohesion depend on whether one is discussing the institutional or associational type, and data from Chapter 5 were used to illustrate the different meanings that can be attributed to the two concepts. The institutional type of social cohesion was found to be particularly associated with perceptions of discrimination, especially in terms of perceptions of equal access to public services; whereas the associational type of social cohesion was found to be particularly associated with area-level deprivation and educational level, although British identity may also be associated with the associational type of cohesion in some cases, albeit much more weakly than deprivation and education. It was suggested that British identity may have some kind of role to play for the associational type of cohesion; but for the institutional type of social cohesion there was very little evidence to suggest either English or British identity were of much relevance at all.

Chapter 6 argued that links can be drawn between particular conceptions of constitutional patriotism and national identity, particular types of social cohesion, and different political positions. Broadly, it was argued that liberalism is more compatible with a 'thinner' type of national allegiance such as constitutional patriotism, and liberals are generally more concerned with the institutional type of social cohesion than the associational type. Social democrats might also be concerned with the institutional type of social cohesion, and in particular its implications for egalitarian redistribution; some may also worry that

constitutional patriotism is too 'thin' an allegiance to rely on for strongly egalitarian policies to be followed, so a 'thicker' civic national identity may be more compatible. Communitarians and conservatives might also be concerned with maintaining an associational type of social cohesion, since for communitarians a rich associational life can provide the conditions for human flourishing, and conservatives may be concerned about the maintenance of a national culture, which is seen as important in its own right. Communitarians might therefore support a culturally 'thick' kind of civic national identity, and conservatives might either support a culturally 'thick' civic national identity, or a national identity with ethnic connotations.

The third aim of Chapter 6 was to reflect upon arguments for the importance of national identity for national social cohesion in the context of arguments for multicultural solidarities on the one hand and for global solidarities on the other. The 'level' at which solidarities are argued to be of importance was a key theme. In the context of debates in Britain portraying multiculturalism and national unity as opposites, it was argued that they instead represent two types of a similar argument about the importance of solidarity at a particular level. A distinction is drawn between different levels at which solidarities may exist: multiculturalism often refers to solidarities at the sub-state level; the discourse around the importance of social cohesion generally referred to the importance of solidarity at the national (usually British) level; arguments have also been made for solidarities at a regional level, and in particular with reference to the EU; and universalists would argue for the importance of global solidarities. Reasons given for why these solidarities are deemed important vary widely, but what such arguments have in common is the privileging of *one* particular level. Chapter 6 argued against this, and suggested that life is simply more complex than the account given by any one of these positions. People have multiple and complicated identifications at many different, potentially overlapping, levels, and any one of them can potentially form the basis for some kind of solidarity. Different solidarities are going to have varying importance for different people, and there can be no single answer to the question of the 'right' level for solidarities to be emphasised. It was argued that looking at the problem from a 'new cosmopolitan outlook' (Fine 2007) is more in tune with the complexities of people's multiple identifications than a stubborn emphasis on solidarity and cohesion at, for instance, the level of the nation-state.

7.2 What is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain?

Having summarised the thesis up until now, it is time to directly answer the main research question of this study: what is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion? I will make four main points: the first regarding the concept of national identity; the second regarding the concept of social cohesion; the third regarding the importance of equality; and the fourth reflecting on the role of the nation-state in ensuring equality.

1. The relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question.

The type of national identity in question is of crucial importance in the sense that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion may be different depending on the type of national identity under discussion. I have suggested that it is helpful to draw upon a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity made by various academics (e.g. Kymlicka 1995), since the relationship of each to social cohesion may be rather different. Constitutional patriotism, in Habermas' (1998) sense, refers to a functional equivalent to a national identity; that is a feeling of commitment to a polity that does not rely on notions of nationhood, with their historical, cultural and ethnic connotations. By contrast, civic national identity embraces a national culture, and ethnic national identity would also have an element based on common descent: "What distinguishes 'civic' nations from 'ethnic' nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour" (Kymlicka 1995, 24).

The distinction between these three types of national identity was broadly supported by respondents in the qualitative component of this study, although they did not always express the distinction in these terms. A concept similar to constitutional patriotism was sometimes described as a 'loyalty to Britain', in which British laws and procedures were respected, but was different to an identity, which was described as 'a real who you are'. This 'loyalty to Britain' was therefore not seen as a national identity as such, but clearly is related to concepts of national identity since respondents discussed it as part of their discussions of feelings of national identity. There is, however, a semantic ambiguity in this description since, although a commitment to following the state's laws was emphasised, a 'loyalty' to Britain could also

imply an emotive attachment as well as a commitment to a contractual arrangement. By contrast, English identity was clearly seen as an ethnic national identity, with many respondents expressing their feelings of exclusion from it on the grounds that they were not 'Anglo-Saxon'. British identity, by contrast, sat somewhere in between: respondents were in general more open to adopting a British identity, and some were less likely to express perceptions of exclusion from it on the grounds of ethnicity. British identity was repeatedly given historical and cultural connotations by many respondents and, for some, these connotations led to feelings of exclusion from it, based sometimes on 'race' or ethnicity, and sometimes on things such as English language usage, accent or cultural traits.

For some respondents, British identity itself could mean very different things to different people and, potentially, this could lead to different relationships between British identity and social cohesion. In particular, this manifested itself through discussions of British colonialism and the differing British identities of 'post-colonial' immigrants to Britain as compared to those coming from countries that were not formerly British colonies. The story told by many respondents coming from former British colonies, or by their children of the parents' feelings, was one whereby immigrants felt strongly British even before arrival in Britain; many had been through British colonial schooling, for instance. Upon arrival, these feelings of British identification were challenged by others on a racialised basis. These experiences have much in common with Stuart Hall's descriptions of his own experiences of arriving in Britain (Hall & Chen 1996), and highlight the potential exclusionary aspects of British identity. According to the views of at least some respondents in this study, then, British identity has not (at least yet) been transformed into a 'post-ethnic' or purely civic and inclusive national identity, contrary to claims by, among others, Trevor Phillips (2009). To the extent that British and English identities are exclusionary of certain groups of people, they represent a problem for British social cohesion in that if such identities are emphasised to ostensibly bolster cohesion, they can (conceptually at least) only produce cohesion between those that feel themselves to have fully adopted that identity, and be fully accepted by others as having that identity.

Although the boundaries of a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity are blurred, I wish to suggest it is helpful both to make such a distinction, and to describe English identity as a largely ethnic identity, British identity as a largely civic identity (albeit with some historical, cultural and ethnic connotations), and what respondents described as a 'loyalty to Britain' – in the sense of following British laws – as a kind of constitutional patriotism, albeit one with semantic ambiguities due to the emotive connotations of the word 'loyalty'. The relationship between national identity and social

cohesion then depends on the type one is discussing. Although it was not possible to operationalise the concept of constitutional patriotism in the quantitative component of this study – and, in any case, it was not seen by respondents in the qualitative component to be a national identity as such – the quantitative component did produce striking evidence on differences in the relationship between British identity and social cohesion as compared to that between English identity and social cohesion. Whilst British identity was positively and significantly associated with many of the social cohesion measures, almost all of the positive associations were not found for English identity. In addition, English identity was found to be *negatively* associated with one type of social cohesion – that measuring meaningful interactions with people of different backgrounds. This is consistent with the discussion above of the dangers of the exclusionary nature of national identities with ethnic connotations, and suggests not only that English identity is inappropriate as a tool to bolster social cohesion, but also that the exclusionary elements of British identity may need to be addressed.

In summary, then, the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question. A ‘loyalty to Britain’ might be said to be a kind of constitutional patriotism; British identity might be described as a largely (but not exclusively) civic national identity; and English identity might be described as an ethnic national identity. It may be important to address the exclusionary aspects of national identities – in particular those based on ethnicity or cultural markers – in order to make them more compatible with positive social cohesion outcomes. British identity may be associated with some positive social cohesion outcomes, but English identity may not and, potentially, may actually be damaging to some types of social cohesion.

2. Social cohesion might be better broken up into two different types of cohesion, since its relationship with national identity differs depending upon the type in question.

In addition to the relationship between national identity and social cohesion depending on the type of national identity in question, it may also depend on the type of social cohesion under discussion. Social cohesion is a notoriously ambiguous concept, often to the point where “its meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that everyone knows what is being referred to” (Kearns & Forrest 2000, 966). According to the definition provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001), social cohesion can refer to: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and place attachment and identity. I wish to suggest that, at least for the purposes of discussing its relationship with national identity, it might be better broken up into two separate types: one referring to an ability to influence and access public institutions; and the other referring to associational types of behaviour and spatial belonging.

From the quantitative component of this study (see Chapter 4), I found that social cohesion can break up into ten different ‘elements’, based on the way in which it was operationalised using the Citizenship Survey. These ten elements can be summarised conceptually in terms of four different groups, which are:

- The ability to influence public institutions;
- The ability to access public institutions, and in particular public services;
- Civic and social activity; and
- Spatial belonging and satisfaction.

What I wish to suggest is that civic and social activity and spatial belonging and satisfaction differ somewhat from influencing and being able to access public institutions in their relationship with national identity, since the variables found to be associated with each of the two types (as shown in Chapter 4) are somewhat different. British identity was in general more consistently associated with the associational type of cohesion than with the institutional type of cohesion, as shown in Table 59 below.

These two types of social cohesion are also conceptually rather different, with the first referring to relations between individuals and public institutions; and the second referring to feelings of spatial belonging and relations amongst individuals, in terms of interactions with others and associational behaviour. The concept of social cohesion might be made less

ambiguous and multifaceted by breaking it up into these two types. Based on the evidence provided in this study, British identity may have more to do with associational cohesion than institutional cohesion, and English identity may not be particularly related to either.

Type of social cohesion	Description	Associated with
Institutional cohesion	Contractual relationships between individuals and public institutions, including ability to access and influence institutions	British and English identity not strongly associated; perceived discrimination is associated more strongly
Associational cohesion	Relations between individuals and spatial belonging; emphasises cultural similarity	British identity is associated to some extent; education and deprivation are associated more strongly

From the qualitative component (see Chapter 5) there are also examples of how the *processes* underlying the relationships between national identity and each type of social cohesion might work. There were several narratives by which respondents expressed how they had problems in accessing public institutions – sometimes based on the complex way in which institutions were set up, and sometimes based on barriers of language or accent – and these problems were frequently seen as cases of discrimination. For the other type of social cohesion – the associational type – there are narratives of how feeling British might make one feel a greater sense of belonging, or how it might encourage one to volunteer, for instance; and how an absence of a British identity might be linked to a feeling of disconnectedness from society, which might lead to a lack of involvement in society (see, for instance, the narrative of ‘British identity as a signifier of connectedness with society’ in Chapter 5, section 5.31).

The two types of social cohesion can also be linked to the different theoretical arguments for the ways in which national identity might be important for social cohesion, as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1. The institutional type of cohesion corresponds more to what liberals and some social democrats might be concerned with regarding social cohesion – the maintenance of a state’s liberal democratic institutions, and support for institutions that deliver egalitarian social justice, including public services. The argument here is that national identity can be important because it either generates the social cohesion necessary for the effective functioning of a nation’s liberal democratic institutions; or because it generates the

social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at ensuring social justice.¹⁷ The associational type of cohesion corresponds more to what conservatives and communitarians might be concerned with – a rich associational life and civic culture that provide the social conditions for human flourishing. The argument here is that national identity can be important because it either generates the social cohesion necessary for the maintenance of a civic culture that provides citizens’ lives with context and meaning; or because it implies identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society.¹⁸ Based on the quantitative evidence in this study, British identity is not especially related to the first type of social cohesion, but may be to some extent related to the second type. The differences between these two types of cohesion surely highlight the importance when designing policy intended to influence social cohesion of being more specific about what one is discussing. There is the potential for simply ‘talking past’ one another if not.

3. Equality may have a much more important relationship with social cohesion than does national identity.

As has already been hinted at, the associations that were found between national identity and social cohesion in the quantitative component are relatively very small in magnitude as compared to some of the control variables in the models. Perceived discrimination appears to be particularly strongly associated with the institutional type of social cohesion, at least when one considers equal access to public services; and education and deprivation are particularly strongly associated with the associational and belonging type of cohesion. In short, it seems that indicators of equality might be much more strongly related to social cohesion than is national identity; that is *either* equality in the sense of non-discrimination, *or* structural indicators of equality such as education and deprivation.

Given that these are *associations*, not causal relationships, what is the significance of these findings? One can find two competing explanations in the academic literature in terms of the possible causality at work here. The first has been discussed in terms of argument A2 (see Chapter 6, section 6.1), and suggests that a national identity can provide the conditions for social cohesion, which in turn makes progressive social policies, such as a strong welfare state, possible. The sense of causality implied is fairly linear: national identity causes social cohesion,

¹⁷ See arguments A1 and A2, discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1.

¹⁸ See arguments A3 and A4, discussed in Chapter 6 section 6.1.

which in turn allows for the maintenance of egalitarian institutions, which can implement redistribution. This is essentially the argument endorsed by, for instance, Miller (1995).

The second explanation suggests the reverse direction of causality: a cohesive society is only possible within the context of structural equality and equality of access to public institutions. Barry, for instance, claims that a “sense of solidarity is fostered by common institutions and a spread of incomes narrow enough to prevent people from believing – and with some reason – that they can escape from the common lot” (2001, 79). O’Donnell (2007, 258) argues along similar lines: “It matters less what people believe than that they care about the society they live in. People are more likely to care if their rights are secure and they have a decent standard of living.” Furthermore, the “adoption of egalitarian policies could significantly contribute to the strengthening of social solidarity in Britain and, for that matter, globally” (*ibid.*, 263).

In terms of this second explanation, one suggestion of the *mechanism* by which cohesion is created is in the design of public institutions, and in particular the welfare state. Richard Titmuss, for instance, argued that “the ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions – and particularly its health and welfare systems – can ... foster integration or alienation” (1971, 225). What the debate essentially comes down to is whether one views cohesion as the result of some kind of pre-political community, which in turn makes the maintenance of democratic institutions and the adoption of progressive social policies possible, or whether cohesion can be generated by the design of institutions such that citizens feel they have something in common to share. This latter view, for example, is expressed by Brian Barry (1999, 59):

“If I ask why I am obliged to contribute to the old-age pensions of somebody I have never met and have no particular interest in who lives in Rotherham, but not to the pension of somebody equally distant to me who lives in Rennes, the answer is that I belong to the same scheme of social insurance as the first but not the second.”

Will Kymlicka (2008, 61), by contrast, considers the relationship to work both ways at once:

“On the one hand, politicians appealed to ideas of common nationhood and national solidarity to legitimise the welfare state. Citizens were told that they should be willing to support the welfare state because its beneficiaries are co-nationals to whom we have special obligations: they are ‘one of us’. On the other hand, the welfare state also served to spread ideas of nationhood. Access to common national educational and healthcare systems, and to other social rights, gave concrete substance to ideas of common nationhood. Participating in the institutions of a national welfare state

provided a source of common experiences and loyalties that helped bind together the disparate populations of Western countries.”¹⁹

Given that the findings from the quantitative component of this study are associations, it is not possible to give *conclusive* evidence either way on this debate. However, if a common sense of nationhood was a major factor in the creation of social cohesion, one would expect national identity to be strongly associated with social cohesion; yet such a strong association was not found. From this perspective, the second view – in which cohesion can be engineered or generated by rights such as equal access to the state’s institutions – appears more plausible. National identities were not strongly associated with the institutional type of cohesion at all; instead of perceptions of the absence of discrimination in terms of equal access to public services were much more important. For the associational type of cohesion, education and deprivation were much more strongly associated with cohesion than British identity.

What is clear from these findings is the need for further research into all the possible drivers of increased cohesion – not just a focus on national identity – the directions of causation, and the potential underlying mechanisms. The possibility that carefully designed, inclusive institutions may be important for social cohesion is, perhaps, a particularly important future research agenda. As Mike O’Donnell (2007, 249) argues, the “underlying issue is social solidarity and how to foster it. Focusing on national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism is merely one approach and could be counterproductive if pursued insensitively”.

¹⁹ Or, as Kymlicka (2008, 61) summarises: “In short, the welfare state both presupposed and perpetuated an ideology of nationhood”.

4. The 'level' of the nation-state is only one of a number of different 'levels' at which identities might be emphasised to support cohesion; but to the extent that the nation-state is important for equality, nation-states may be important for cohesion too.

Chapter 6 argued that the UK policy shift in the early 2000s from multiculturalism to social cohesion, in which multiculturalism and social cohesion were seen as binary opposites and national cohesion was seen as a counterbalance to multiculturalism, might be better seen from the perspective of *many* different levels at which identities might be emphasised to support cohesion. Many different identities are important to people. Within Britain the most obvious alternatives to British identity are English, Welsh and Scottish identities. Even British identity itself is one that can transcend British borders, as was evidenced by discussions of colonialism by some of the respondents in this study. Government policy documents frequently use the concept of 'community' as if Britain could be neatly split into clearly defined and fixed parts; yet many other identities based on religion, class, sexuality, gender, ideology, individual preferences, and so on, may also be important to people and could also form the basis for solidarities. If one is concerned with creating the kind of cohesion that might be linked to access to culture and conditions for human flourishing, then there are many possibilities.

In addition, processes of globalisation present additional challenges that require cooperation beyond the borders of states, such as an increasingly interdependent economic and financial system. If one is concerned about ecological issues, economic stability, or redistributive justice between states, then state-level solidarities are not the only ones of importance – regional or global solidarities may also be important too. Indeed, a world or human identity was indeed a clearly expressed narrative by some of the respondents in this study, and these possibilities for solidarities may be important in addition to state-level solidarities. Emphasising state-level national identities as a tool to create cohesion has the very real potential to de-emphasise the importance of cohesion at a wider level.

This complexity and multiplicity of identity is well understood – e.g. Modood *et al.* (1994); Hall & Chen (1996); Hall (2000) – yet the complexity and multiplicity of possibilities for different solidarities and access to cultures is often overlooked. Margalit and Raz argue, for instance, that “[f]amiliarity with *a* culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable” (1995, 86, emphasis added); and Tamir claims that the “right to culture is meant to allow individuals to live within *the* culture of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create *the* culture of *the* community they belong to, and to redefine *its* borders” (1993, 8, emphasis

added). Chapter 6 argued, therefore, that there may be a need in discourse both on multiculturalism *and* social cohesion to move away from an idea in which *one* particular identity and corresponding level of cohesion is emphasised, and towards one in which the complexity of people's identities and cultural affiliations is recognised. These multiple and overlapping identities and affiliations may, perhaps, have the potential to be less divisive than an overemphasis on *one* particular identity and corresponding solidarity. It is suggested, therefore, that a 'new cosmopolitan outlook', in the sense used by Fine (2007, 15), would allow *both* desires for local belonging and identity to be taken seriously, but also to reconcile them with "the idea of universal species-wide human solidarity". The nation-state, then, is just one of a number of possibilities for belonging, identity and solidarity.

However, if equality is important for social cohesion, it is obviously significant for equality - and therefore indirectly for social cohesion - that much redistribution and other progressive politics occurs at the level of the state. As O'Donnell (2007, 263) notes: "The practical pursuit of equality has occurred mainly within the context of emerging nation states". If one puts aside debates over the appropriate level at which equality *should* be ensured, it is undeniably true that states currently are fundamentally important in terms of redistribution *within* their borders. The European Union's budget, for instance, is only 2% of the size of the government spending of its member states (Economist 2013). To the extent that equality is important for social cohesion, states are important for (state-level) social cohesion too. Miller's (1995) claim that the state is *de facto* significant for social cohesion is, to some extent, therefore an important one.

However, Miller's further claim – that the nation-state is in a more principled sense the right level for progressive politics – is more disputable. This issue links to the arguments put forward in the previous section. If one views a nation-state as being fundamentally based on some kind of prepolitical community, then nation-states might indeed be argued to be the right 'level' for redistribution to take place. If, however, carefully designed institutions can produce the solidarity required for redistribution then cohesion can, at least to some extent, be engineered, and the currently existing state borders can be seen as largely arbitrary.

Miller clearly subscribes to the first view. In saying that one "can only expect [people] to consent to institutions that enforce the preferred distribution if they regard themselves as bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more egalitarian the distribution can be", Miller (1989a, 59) appears to be arguing for a fairly linear idea of causation. Emotive loyalties and attachments, some constructed and some pre-existing, create a sense of solidarity, which in turn allows for the enactment of progressive

social policies, which in turn enables the fulfilment of his socialist sense of social justice. Perhaps with something like Titmuss' (1971) idea of the welfare state itself reinforcing commitments to redistribution in mind, Miller goes on to argue that it "is not an adequate answer to this line of thought to say that a distributive practice can, of itself, create the necessary ties. No doubt there is a process of reinforcement such that implementing a practice of distributive justice appropriate to a particular community will tend to buttress the sense of community that already exists" (*ibid.*). But, by implication, the pre-existing sense of community is a necessary condition for the implementation of the practice of distributive justice in the first place.

Barry, however, gives the opposite view, arguing that "elevating ... the "interests of the nation" normally goes along with the suggestion that it is at best irrelevant and at worst disloyal to divide the nation by making demands on behalf of one economic group over another ... Redistribution has never come about in the way fantasized by Walzer and Miller, the general recognition that shared values require it. Rather, it has invariably required the creation of a political party that has deliberately sought to divide the electorate on socioeconomic lines" (Barry 1999, 50). An additional issue is that plainly many states do not coincide neatly with a single nation. Even if Miller's argument that progressive politics requires prepolitical national ties holds for nations, then the absence of a fit between nations and states is problematic for the further claim that existing states are the right level for redistribution to take place. Britain – especially with the impending referendum on Scottish independence – is a case in point. Even if it is true that a special kind of solidarity is fostered amongst those sharing a national identity, this does not help redistribution in Britain very much. Most white Britons feel English rather than British – in fact, according to the 2008-9 Citizenship Survey, fewer than half of those of white ethnicity living in England and Wales stated British as their national identity (they could pick more than one) – so it is debateable whether Britishness actually constitutes the kind of national identity that is allegedly needed at all.

McKnight & Nolan (2012, 35) studied "the determinants of preferences for redistribution in a pool of 33 European countries", and found "that (at least in Europe) growing income inequality leads to more individual support for redistribution". They also found "that the actual level of redistribution implemented in the country reduces support for more redistribution" (*ibid.*) suggesting that, at least to some extent, the design of public institutions – namely the extent to which they redistribute income – has an impact on people's support for redistribution, as Barry (1999) and Titmuss (1971) claim.

It is surely the case that states are *currently* extremely important sites for redistribution and perceptions of equality. Given that discrimination and structural equality – in the form of education and area deprivation – were found to be particularly strongly associated with indicators of social cohesion, to the extent that states are influential sites of redistribution, and can be important for attempts to tackle discrimination, they may therefore be important for social cohesion too. In addition, states may be important for *perceptions* of equality. McKnight & Nolan (2012, 35-6) point out that an “important issue related to social cohesion within the EU is the extent to which people frame their assessments of their own well-being with reference to their fellow country-men and women or with a broader span including those in other EU countries”, and conclude that their “findings highlight the continuing importance of national reference groups in EU countries”. Whilst states remain important sites for perceptions of equality and possibilities for redistribution, therefore, they may also be important sites for sustaining social cohesion.

However, given the multiplicity of different sources of identity and their possibilities for sustaining different solidarities, and given the possibilities for different sites to be important in terms of frames of reference for perceptions of equality, particularly in the context of processes of globalisation, then the possibilities for multiple and overlapping levels – from the local to the global – at which both institutional and associational cohesion might be important in the future should not be overlooked. If equality – both in a structural sense and in the sense of an absence of discrimination – is particularly important for cohesion, then the different ‘levels’ at which these inequalities are framed will be important for the way in which future debates over cohesion and solidarity are contested.

7.3 The social policy context in Britain

Since the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, UK race relations policy has seen a shift from previous policies focusing on multiculturalism, to a new policy focus on social cohesion or, more precisely, *community* cohesion (Worley 2005). In the wake of the disturbances several reports were published, of which the Cattle Report (2001) was arguably the most influential. The Cattle Report used the definition of social cohesion provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) – the definition that also formed the starting point of this study – but simply replaced the word ‘social’ with ‘community’ to produce a definition of community cohesion. The Cattle Report built partly on Parekh’s (2000) idea of Britain being a ‘community of communities’, but claimed that different communities were living ‘parallel lives’; the task of community cohesion was then to bring together, in some sense, this diverse set of communities.

The Denham Report (2001, 11), published around the same time as the Cattle Report, identified a civic national identity as a key component in the community cohesion strategy:

“We have drawn on the detailed descriptions and analysis contained in the reports of Cattle, Clarke, Ouseley and Ritchie ... in setting out the following brief overview of the key issues. There is a large measure of agreement on the following being the most important factors;

- the lack of a strong civic identity or shared social values to unite diverse communities”.

Indeed, the Denham report argued that the communities that had most successfully overcome the possible tensions resulting from diversity had done so because they had “succeeded in uniting diverse groups through a shared sense of belonging to, and pride in, a common civic identity” (Denham Report 2011, 11). The emphasis on using a civic version of British identity as a ‘social glue’ has been a highly prominent theme since 2001: “The issue of Britishness and what it represents, whether it is an identity that can continue to act as social glue, is resonant in all discussions about cohesion in the UK” (Hickman *et al.* 2012, 49). The promotion of British identity as a potential positive influence on cohesion has taken place despite Parekh’s (2000, 38) much-criticised claim that “Britishness as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations”, to the point where Trevor Phillips, the former chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, has suggested that Britishness “offers us an

overarching common identity, available to anyone who chooses to live here” (T. Phillips 2009, 248).

Following on from the definition of community cohesion provided in the Cattle Report, the Local Government Association’s *Guidance on Community Cohesion* proposed the following ‘working definition’ of a cohesive community:

- “there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities;
- the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued;
- those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and
- strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.”

LGA (2002, 6)

This new focus on community cohesion was criticised extensively, and in particular on the grounds that it over-emphasised social or cultural explanations for failures of cohesion and did not address the extent to which structural inequalities, poverty or exclusion might be important for cohesion as well (McGhee 2003; Amin 2003; Hickman *et al.* 2008). In particular, there was a criticism that the lack of emphasis on structural factors in this discourse implied that minority communities had chosen to self-segregate themselves, which underplayed “the impact of socioeconomic disadvantage, racial discrimination, and segregation resulting from external constraints on settlement rather than choice decisions” (C. Phillips 2009, 196).

Platt’s (2002, 143) comparison of Lord Scarman’s report on the Brixton disturbances in 1981 with the Cattle Report highlights this issue:

“Scarman’s object of attention was disadvantage, specifically racial disadvantage: deal with disadvantage, he suggested, and ‘race relations’ will look after themselves. By contrast, Cattle focuses on the communities and on getting pre-supposed ‘communities’ to speak to each other. Scarman could be criticised on the grounds of promoting an integrationist view of society, which was not sufficiently sensitive to cultural difference. On the other hand, Cattle’s acceptance of difference as self-evident and having apparently fixed and permanent boundaries could be seen to detract from the very important issues of structural disadvantage facing both white and minority group ‘communities’.”

To an extent, the failure to emphasise structural explanations of the 2001 disturbances, and in the community cohesion policy discourse, was later addressed in the *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* report (Home Office 2005a). This report offered “a greater balance between the expressed need for a common British identity and sense of belonging *and* the eradication of social and economic inequality between ethnic groups” (C. Phillips 2009, 197).

The London bombings of July 2005 were also significant for the community cohesion discourse. The discourse had already been influenced by the ‘war on terror’ following the attacks on the US in September 2001, since these events had already unfolded when the 2001 reports by Cattle, Denham and others were published. The fact that British-born Muslim men carried out the attacks intensified the “culture of unashamed questioning of the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims” that already existed (Amin 2003, 460). This, combined with the focus on problematised communities, allowed the discourse to focus on the assimilation of self-segregated communities into the ‘mainstream’ rather than on problems inherent in the *whole* of society. By problematising certain communities such as those in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, and certain groups such as Muslims, attention could be detracted away from society as a whole. There are resonances here with concepts such as an ‘underclass’, or the ‘social exclusion’ of particular groups or individuals, which are based upon a distinction between the normal and the problematic ‘other’.

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) was set up in July 2006 as a response to the London bombings. The CIC’s report in 2007 departed somewhat from the Cattle Report in that “cohesion policy was relevant to every locality and not just those that had been the recipient of immigration and exhibited the characteristics of fractured communities” (Hickman *et al.* 2012, 39). However, in other respects the CIC continued in the tradition of the Cattle Report, such as by questioning the value of multiculturalism.

Further riots in England, in August 2011, led to the ‘Riots Communities and Victims Panel’ being set up to “explore the causes of the riots and how communities can be made more socially and economically resilient, in order to prevent future disorder” (DCLG 2013, 4). The Panel’s final report (RCVP 2012, 12) emphasised failures in relationships within communities, such as problems of poor parenting, feelings of being unable to “intervene in each other’s lives”, and not feeling “neighbours treated each other with respect”, as undermining social cohesion. However, the report also discussed the feelings of many residents that public service providers were not listening to them or involving them in decision making. This issue was seen as an additional problem for cohesion.

Both individual and structural issues were identified as causes of the riots. Youth unemployment, sometimes resulting from failures in the education system, were prominent issues, but proposals for tackling issues of wealth inequality to combat a perception of “a growing gap between rich and poor” in certain areas, and as a route to preventing future riots, were confined to suggestions that “society must continue to support sustainable growth and promote business expansion” and that “businesses have a clear role [in] giving[ing] something back to society and making progressive steps to sharing wealth and providing opportunities for individuals to achieve a stake in business” (RCVP 2012, 9). Indeed, the central proposal to combat wealth inequality was to promote the “Government’s responsible capitalism work to make shareholder participation a priority and support businesses that take this approach to business planning” (*ibid.* 10). Individuals, on the other hand, were criticised for their lack of ‘personal resilience’ and ‘character’: “Young people who develop character will be best placed to make the most of their lives ... Evidence also tells us that employers want to see character in potential recruits” (*ibid.*, 7).

The issue of policing – and perceptions of unfair treatment including racial discrimination – that rioters themselves described as a highly significant factor in the riots (Lewis *et al.* 2011) was also mentioned in the Panel’s final report but, whilst noting that “Black and minority ethnic happiness following contact with the police is significantly worse than it is for white people”, meekly recommended only “that police forces proactively engage with communities about issues that impact on the perceptions of their integrity” (RCVP 2012, 11); a stark contrast with both the rioters’ own perceptions of the issues at hand, and with the Macpherson Report’s (1999) description of the police as ‘institutionally racist’ over a decade earlier. The government’s response to the report (DCLG 2013) emphasised that the government is “committed to building stronger relationships between the police and public” (*ibid.*, 28), and acknowledged that “the benefits of stop and search need to be carefully weighed against the potential negative impact on community confidence in the police, and the confidence and trust of those from Black Minority Ethnic backgrounds in particular” (*ibid.*, 29). However, in the policing section of the government’s response to the report, not a single reference was made to differential treatment of ethnic groups, or racial discrimination by the police.

7.4 Implications for social policy and future research

In this UK government policy context, what, then, are the implications of this study for policy and future research? The government's usage of the term 'community cohesion', as it appears in various reports, is extremely broad and ambiguous, and can be used to refer to many different concepts simultaneously. In *Guidance on Community Cohesion* (LGA 2002, 6), community cohesion is described as a concept that "incorporates and goes beyond the concept of race equality and social inclusion". Given that the concepts of social inclusion and exclusion themselves are broad, contested and ambiguous (e.g. Barry 1998), 'going beyond' such concepts is an ambitious task. I wish to suggest that it is questionable whether social cohesion, or the related concept of community cohesion used in government reports, is particularly helpful in its unified form. Evidence from this study suggests that the correlates of different aspects of cohesion are rather different and it may be helpful to divide social cohesion up into at least two different concepts which, as working titles, I have termed 'institutional cohesion' and 'associational cohesion'. Institutional cohesion, as operationalised in the quantitative component of this study, refers to the ability to influence and gain equal access to public institutions. Associational cohesion, by contrast, refers to associational types of behaviour – that is ways in which people interact or relate to other another – and to belongings to place. With reference to the 'working definition' of community cohesion given by the LGA (2002, 6), associational cohesion might have something in common with "a common vision and sense of belonging", the appreciation of "the diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances", and the "strong and positive relationships ... developed between people from different backgrounds"; whilst institutional cohesion might have something in common with the "similar life opportunities" of people from different backgrounds, particularly when this refers to their equal access to public institutions such as public services.

British identity, upon which there has been much focus in policy discourse on community cohesion, was found to have little to do with institutional cohesion but may be somewhat more important for associational cohesion. Given that "social cohesion is the currently favoured shorthand to address the complex and often disjunctive set of policy challenges" relating to "similar phrases such as community cohesion, social inclusion and integration, and antonyms such as social exclusion" (Zetter *et al.* 2006, 4), being more specific about the type of cohesion under discussion might go some way to resolve disputes whereby some claim that there is a crisis of social cohesion, whilst others claim instead that discourse around

community cohesion is one way of drawing upon earlier discourses of assimilation but in an apparently deracialised manner (Worley 2005). Additionally, arguments about national identity being important for institutional as compared with associational cohesion may be associated with different political positions: a liberal or social democratic position, or a communitarian or conservative position, respectively (see Chapter 6 for a discussion). It is crucial in any discussion of policy to be clear as to which type one is referring to, since this would not only go some way in reducing the ambiguities currently inherent in the concept of social cohesion, but would also allow any assumptions being made on the basis of political persuasion to be made more explicit.

Rather than having a general emphasis on the importance of a civic notion of British identity in all policy discussions of cohesion (Hickman *et al.* 2012), policy discussion could then focus on the issues of most importance corresponding to the type of cohesion in question. If one is interested in designing policy to promote *institutional* cohesion, the evidence from this study suggests that British identity may be of little relevance. Instead, the most important issue may be perceived fairness, on the one hand, or discrimination, on the other, in terms of access to public institutions such as public services. In terms of institutional cohesion, there is little evidence here to suggest that a policy of trying to make minority groups feel more British is going to be effective in increasing cohesion. That institutional cohesion – which in particular focuses on equal access to public services – appears to be strongly related to perceptions of discrimination should not be surprising. Craig (2008, 242) identifies a large body of evidence suggesting that “access to welfare provision is highly unequal, on a basis that is highly racialised”. If one is concerned with designing policy such as to foster institutional cohesion, therefore, it may be particularly important to address these issues of unequal access.

Given that perceptions of discrimination appear to be important for institutional cohesion, there is a serious concern that the community cohesion agenda, with its emphasis on national unity and the questioning of the allegiances of immigrant groups and their descendants (Amin 2003), and its links to immigration policy with its “political rhetoric about security and the so-called ‘war on terror’” (Craig 2007, 616), may in fact be undermining cohesion rather than bolstering it. The Race Relations Amendment Act in 2000 “increased the onus on public sector organisations to *demonstrate* that they were operating in a non-discriminatory fashion” (Platt 2002, 13). Yet some policy implemented under the ‘war on terror’ has gone in precisely the opposite direction: the stop and search legislation has, “the Home Office admits ... disproportionately disadvantage[d] people ‘of Muslim appearance’”, to the point where a senior Asian police officer claimed that “a new offence, of ‘travelling whilst Asian’, had been

covertly introduced by police” (Craig 2008, 240). This is despite the fact that, in more than 100,000 searches under terrorism legislation, no arrests relating to terrorism were made (Guardian 2010). From this perspective, the modification of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights is a welcome development; as is the (partial) acknowledgement of the problems with stop and search in the government’s response to the 2011 riots (DCLG 2013), although the discriminatory nature of stop and search is not fully recognised. A recent report found that “Enforcement of drug laws is unfairly focused on Black and Asian communities, despite their rates of drug use being lower than the white majority”, with Black people being 6.3 times more likely to be searched than white people (Eastwood *et al.* 2013, 11). Minority ethnic groups may “also have greatest difficulty in accessing appropriate health provision, often because of the failure of health services to respond to specific cultural needs such as for interpretation” (Craig 2008, 242). Descriptions of discrimination by the police, and barriers in access to public service provision due to language, accent or complex institutional design were clearly expressed by many of the respondents in the qualitative component of this study. If one is interested in designing policy to benefit what I am calling ‘institutional cohesion’, therefore, it might be much better to address these issues of discrimination and unequal access rather than the ‘one size fits all’ solution of focusing on boosting British identity.

If, however, one is interested in designing policy to influence what I am terming ‘associational cohesion’ then British identity may have somewhat more relevance. Associational cohesion refers to relationships between individuals – ways that people interact and engage with each other – and also to belonging to place, whether that is the local area or Britain. Many government reports, at least until the increased emphasis on structural factors in the Home Office’s (2005a) *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society*, focus strongly on this type of cohesion; the Cattle Report, for instance, problematised people living in communities where their lives “do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges” (2001, 9). Some associations were found in the quantitative component of this study between British identity and indicators of this type of cohesion; and narratives were found in the qualitative component that could describe mechanisms of the ways in which a relationship might work. The focus of government reports and policy has been on a civic notion of British, rather than English, Scottish or Welsh identity, and the evidence presented here suggests the choice is the right one: British identity is more inclusive and has a greater potential to be a civic identity. However, several crucial caveats must be made about the relationship between British identity and associational cohesion.

The first concerns the notion of British identity itself. Many of the government reports refer to the importance of a notion of civic identity, such as the Denham Report's (2001, 12) reference to a "civic identity which serves to unite people and which expresses common goals and aspirations". Yet the evidence from the qualitative component of this study suggests that British identity may, at least not yet, be considered to be a truly civic identity that is open to all. Some respondents described ways in which they felt blocked out of access to a British identity, or ways in which it was associated with particular expectations in terms of language, accent and etiquette. British identity may, as Parekh noted, still have "systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations" (2000, 38). The experiences of 'post-colonial' respondents, many of whom arrived in Britain with a strong sense of British identity only to find their identity was not accepted because of their skin colour, is particularly striking. As Hickman *et al.* (2012, 50) suggest: "One of the problems for those determined on the functionality of Britishness as a social glue is Englishness, the latter is highly significant in prescribing the possibilities and impossibilities of Britishness". Another key issue with regard to promoting Britishness as a tool to increase social cohesion is the fact that there is evidence to suggest that the adoption of a British identity amongst white English people is less commonplace than one might expect from the community cohesion discourse, and may be less commonplace than for many non-white groups, such as Hickman *et al.*'s assessment that:

"It is also important to bear in mind that the group of people for whom Britishness may have least resonance now, because of the unraveling of the two nation building projects, is the White British majority ethnic group in England, many of whom would far rather the category 'English' featured on the Census ethnic origin question as opposed to British (their wish was granted in 2011)."

(Hickman *et al.* 2012, 51-52)

Similarly, a study by Ethnos (2005, 7) found that "the participants who identified most strongly with Britishness were those from ethnic minority backgrounds resident in England", rather than white people. With regard to government reports and policy, particularly at issue here is the emphasis in early reports on community cohesion on certain problematised communities, with minority ethnic communities' failure to integrate and adopt a British identity being the implied root of the issue. From this perspective, the change of emphasis in the CIC report (CIC 2007) on cohesion being something *all* communities should strive for is a welcome modification. If one is to use a civic notion of British identity as a tool to increase social cohesion, therefore, it may be at least as important to promote it amongst white 'English' people than amongst members of ethnic minority groups.

Of course, that British identity is not *currently* a purely civic identity does not mean that it does not have the potential to be a purely civic, inclusive identity. A critic of this study might point out that the failure to find meaningfully large associations between British identity and the institutional type of cohesion may be because British identity does not yet have the character required of it. Some suggestions have indeed been focused on a need to reconstruct British identity. If it was possible to characterise people's understandings of British identity over time (its exclusionary or inclusionary nature, how close to a civic identity it might be, and so on), *and* combine this with a longitudinal study of how British identity and social cohesion were associated, *then* one might get some idea of the relationship *if* British identity were to become truly civic. This, perhaps, would be an important topic of future research.

The second caveat regarding the relationship between British identity and associational cohesion concerns the British identities of members of minority ethnic groups, since there may be crucial differences between those born in Britain and those that were not. From the quantitative component of this study, there is very little evidence to suggest that, for those identifying with an ethnic minority group and born in Britain, British identity has any impact on social cohesion of either type – nearly all of the associations that were found were amongst those *not* born in Britain. This distinction was not clearly made in, for instance, the Cattle Report (2001); the references were instead to supposedly clearly-defined communities that (presumably) grouped together first, second and third generation immigrants. If one combines this evidence with the evidence from the qualitative component, and elsewhere (e.g. Modood *et al.* 1994), that suggests British-born people of ethnic minority origin may encounter barriers of access to English and British identities, it may invoke feelings of exclusion or frustration if the policy to increase cohesion emphasises their need to identify more strongly as British.

Amongst those *not* born in Britain, a distinction may also need to be made between those emigrating from former British colonies and those that emigrated from elsewhere, since many 'post-colonial' first-generation immigrants to Britain *already* felt British upon arrival, and may have, and have had, different experiences and understandings of British identity. Further research into whether the associations found between British identity and associational cohesion for those not born in the UK are because of differences in 'post-colonial' experiences would be beneficial to understand fully the importance, or otherwise, of this distinction.

The third caveat refers to the finding in the quantitative component that issues of structural equality – most notably education and deprivation – may be *much* more important than national identity for associational cohesion. This raises the possibility that reducing structural inequalities – and also in paying attention to the distribution of structural inequalities across

different ethnic groups – may be a much more beneficial policy focus for associational cohesion than a focus on British identity. For this reason, the slight shift in the Home Office’s (2005a) *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* report towards emphasising inequalities between ethnic groups, in addition to British identity, is to be welcomed but perhaps does not go far enough. From the evidence presented here, the primary focus may need to be on inequalities, and British identity should come second. What is certainly clear is that more research into the relationships between inequalities and cohesion, their interactions with ethnic difference, and the mechanisms underlying such relationships, is needed. There is, for instance, evidence to suggest that the effects of educational qualifications on social mobility vary markedly by ethnic group. Platt (2007b, 487) argues that “minority group members are well aware of the importance of education as a necessary (if not sufficient) route to success” but that some ethnic groups were able to use education to achieve more positive social mobility outcomes than others. It is certainly plausible that similar differences could exist with regard to social cohesion. The understanding of ethnic differences in the effects of education on a variety of social outcomes, and the mechanisms underlying them, is therefore an important topic for future research.

There are specific policy implications in particular arising from the fact that area-level deprivation was found to be strongly associated with associational cohesion in the quantitative component. Obviously the findings were associations, so it is unclear whether there are causal relationships between deprivation and cohesion – or, for that matter, between education and cohesion. Nevertheless these relationships, and whether or not social cohesion policy should be targeted at addressing inequalities in deprivation and education, are important topics for future research and the potential policy implications are important to discuss.

Policies that target particular areas have a long history in the UK, and were enthusiastically adopted by the Labour government since 1997 (Platt 2002). The initial focus of the community cohesion reports on the ‘problem communities’ in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham could be seen as one example, albeit one that overemphasised ‘how people get on together’ rather than structural deprivation. However, the areas measured by the deprivation variable in the quantitative component are Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs), which contain an average of around 1,500 people, so it is not clear whether they correspond to the type of communities that the Cattle Report refers to.²⁰ The Labour government, nevertheless, also implemented the New Deal for Communities, and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal which, given the apparent importance of area-level deprivation for associational

²⁰ See Chapter 4, section 4.31 for a discussion.

cohesion may seem like an appropriate strategy for increasing cohesion. Given that ethnic minorities are over-represented in deprived areas this strategy might appear, on the face of it, to also have the effect of improving equality between ethnic groups.

There are some problems with a policy approach that targets specific deprived areas, however. With reference to the evidence from the quantitative component of this study, there is a possibility that the variable measuring deprivation is actually 'picking up' on other issues of structural inequality. This is particularly the case given that a measure of *income* was not included as a control variable in the final regression models – for reasons discussed in Chapter 4 – although an individual's socio-economic group, including being out of work, was included. It may, therefore, be the case that structural inequalities other than area-level deprivation, including ones that focus on the individual, are also important for social cohesion. In addition, Platt (2002) highlights a number of difficulties for the strategy of targeting deprived areas. First, resources targeted at specific areas may not go to the most deprived people in those areas and, in particular, "there is evidence that minority ethnic groups have gained less from targeted neighbourhood funds than their presence warrants" (Platt 2002, 157). It is possible, therefore, that the adoption or continuation of policies aimed at deprived areas may not have the effect of increasing cohesion because the resources are going to the 'wrong' people. Second, "the perception of targeted resources and their ('undeserving') recipients in a context of scarce resources can create tension and heighten incipient resentments and divisions" (*ibid.*), which may be problematic for cohesion. It may be advisable, therefore, to focus policy not only on deprived areas, but also to implement some less targeted and more universal policies to reduce structural inequalities. What is certainly the case is that more research is needed into the relationships between *both* individual poverty *and* area-level deprivation, and social cohesion, and this may be particularly important at a time when cuts to public services may widen some inequalities in the coming years, and their impacts on different ethnic groups may vary markedly.

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Appendix: PART A – CHOICE OF DATASET

Choice of Dataset for Quantitative Component

Two key criteria in choosing an appropriate dataset for the quantitative component of this research were: the presence of appropriate questions on identity; and the presence of a sample suitable for investigating ethnic differences. With respect to the first criterion, of particular importance was the presence of questions on ethnic and religious identity, since such questions are uncommon in most UK surveys, along with extensive questions on national identity. With respect to the second criterion, the key elements that were sought after were either a relatively large sample size, or the presence of an ethnic minority boost sample and appropriate weightings. A larger sample, or an ethnic minority boost, would increase the number of respondents falling into each ethnic category, thus increasing the chances of finding statistically significant differences between ethnic groups. In what follows, some of the main datasets containing desirable elements for the purposes of this research are described, in order to explain and justify the choice of the Citizenship Survey as the most appropriate. Weaknesses of the Citizenship Survey are also noted.

The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a longitudinal survey, which would potentially be advantageous for investigating the temporal ordering of relationships between identity and cohesion. Unfortunately, however, the survey contains limited questions on identity (BHPS 2008). Additionally, the sample is too small to be appropriate for investigating ethnic differences, since the initial sample in wave one consisted of only 8167 households, and there is no ethnic minority boost sample (Taylor, Brice *et al.* 2009).

The Labour Force Survey (LFS), by contrast, has a larger sample of approximately 60000 households (ONS 2007), which would make it more appropriate than surveys with smaller sample sizes for investigating ethnic differences. The advantages of this larger sample for the purposes of investigating ethnic differences are demonstrated in a recent report using the LFS, researching ethnic differences in women's demographics and economic activity (Lindley, Dale *et al.* 2004). However, it shares a weakness with the BHPS in that it contains only limited questions on identity (LFS 2007), and for these reasons is unsuited to this research on the relationships between identity and cohesion.

The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey contains a relatively good set of questions on identity, including questions on national identity, religious identity, attitudes towards immigration and threats to national identity, and also regarding which aspects of a respondent's identity are

most important to them (UKDA 2008). However, the BSA survey unfortunately has a relatively small sample of 4468 cases and has no ethnic minority boost sample (BSA 2008), making it, like the BHPS, unsuitable for investigating ethnic differences.

The Citizenship Survey, by contrast, includes an ethnic minority boost of approximately 5000 in addition to its core sample of approximately 9600 (UKDA 2010). This potentially makes it possible to reveal statistically significant differences between ethnic groups in the relationships between identity and social cohesion that would not be revealed without the boost sample. The Citizenship Survey is also relatively rich in questions on identity, and provides both attitudinal and behavioural measures of 'social cohesion' on several dimensions.

It was felt that, on balance, the Citizenship Survey was the most appropriate survey to use for this research. This is in particular due to the fact that no other datasets contain the combination of an appropriate sample for investigating ethnic differences, together with relevant questions on identity.

Appendix: PART B – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

Thank you for being willing to take part in this interview. The interview should take around an hour, and if you feel uncomfortable with the questions at any time please feel free to say so and we can either stop, or move onto a different question. If you would like to stop at any time and for any reason please be assured you can do so without any problems.

The interview is part of my research for a PhD at the London School of Economics. I am looking into the relationships between national identity (such as whether people feel they belong to a particular country), and social cohesion (which includes the ways in which people trust each other, form friendships, what they think about their rights and responsibilities, the respect they have for each other and for the law, and whether they share values with the people around them). I think that, in this country, we don't know enough about these things, and I hope that, in some small way, this research will help provide information and ideas to people in power so that they can make better decisions.

Can I also assure you that this interview is strictly confidential and you will remain completely anonymous. Your name will not be on any record of this interview and will not appear in anything that I write. Finally, can I please ask for your permission to record this interview, and for you to confirm whether you are happy to start? I'm the only person who will listen to this and, once I've typed it up, I shall delete the recording.

INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

Perhaps we could start by you telling me a little bit about yourself?

[If needed, probe with the following questions, or if not, fill in the blanks.]

How old are you?

[Show showcard 1 with bands]

Are you currently in employment?

[Show showcard 2. Probe: Who else, if anyone, in your household is in employment?]

Do you have any educational qualifications?

[Also: code gender]

Do you think you can identify your household's estimated income from this list of income bands? (But don't feel you have to if you don't know or don't wish to say.)

[show showcard 3]

How many people are there in your household?

[probe: is there anyone under 18; are there any dependants?]

IDENTITY: Ethnic Identity

I would now like to ask you a few questions about your identity. By identity, I mean 'who do you think you are?'

To what extent, if at all, would you say you identify with any of the following ethnic groups?

[show showcard 4]

If you feel that none of these apply how, if at all, would you define your ethnicity?

Which country or countries were your parents from?

Is your identification with your ethnic group especially important to you? Is this central to your life or something that matters to you "in the background"?

IDENTITY: Religious Identity

Would you say you are religious, or not?

[Probe: What is your religion? Do you count yourself as an observant ... (Christian, Muslim, etc.)...?]

Is this especially important to you? Is it central to your life or something that matters to you "in the background"?

[Probe: Do you feel it is more or less important than your ethnic identity, or are they of similar importance to you? Are the two things, so far as you're concerned, in a sense connected?]

IDENTITY: National Identity

I would now like to ask you questions such as whether, or not, you think of yourself as belonging a particular country or nation.

If you feel you identify with a particular country or nation, what do you feel your national identity to be?

[Probe: Do you feel this identity is split between [country of origin] and [Britain/England]?

Do you mainly feel English or British?

[if identifies with [country of origin]:

In what ways would you say you are still connected to [country of origin]?

Is your national identity especially important to you? Is it central to your life or something that matters to you "in the background"?

[Probe: How does this compare with other aspects of your identity?

Are you able to describe why you feel you have that national identity?

[Probe: What do you feel it is that you have in common with other people that also have that national identity?]

Do you mind me confirming - what is your formal/legal nationality (e.g. what does it say on your passport(s))?

Do you think it is important that people feel able to both maintain their ethnic identity and identify with a national group or country, or do you feel this is something that is not important?

Have you ever felt discriminated against because of any aspects of your identity, or is this not something that you've ever experienced?

Can I ask whether you are able to rank each aspect of your various identities in terms of how important you feel each is to you? Which is the most important and which is the least important and in which order would you place the ones in between?

[show piece of paper on which I have written each aspect of identity a person has mentioned]

Is this how you've always felt or do you think you might have answered that question differently earlier in the course of your life?

Do you think your parents/Children would answer that question the same as you or differently?

Do you think your friends that are the same age as you would have answered that question the same or differently?

LINKING IDENTITY & SOCIAL COHESION

The following card shows some of the themes that are sometimes talked about when people discuss social cohesion. I would like to talk about each theme in turn.

SHOW-CARD 5

Feeling able to use public services (such as health services or education services, for example)

Feeling of belonging to your local area or neighbourhood

Feeling satisfied with the place that you live (such as getting on well with other people, trusting other people, sharing values with other people, feeling safe)

Having opportunities for volunteering and civic engagement (by which I mean things such as attending local meetings, contacting a local councillor, contacting an MP, and so on)

Socialising with other people and forming friendships

Being treated with respect when in public

Feeling that you are able to influence the decisions of public institutions (such as your local council, parliament, or the police)

Feeling willing to contribute towards the support of people in need (such as through taxes)

[show card, then take each theme in turn, starting with the relevant introductory question and then moving on to the main questions]

LINKING IDENTITY & COHESION: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

Public services

Do you feel that you are able to use public services as you would like, or not?

[probe: - this could mean education services, health services, or public transport, for example - and services that your family/children use as well as services you use (or have used) yourself

do you think you are treated equally compared to other people?

which people in particular are you thinking of?]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Belonging

To what extent, if at all, do you feel you belong to your neighbourhood and local area?

[probe: - how strongly do you feel you belong?

is there a difference between how you feel about your neighbourhood and how you feel about your local area?]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Satisfaction with the place you live

To what extent, if at all, would you say you are satisfied with the place in which you live?

[probe: - would you say the place you live is somewhere where people share values, or not?

how well would you say people get on together?

do you feel safe where you live, or not?

Do you trust other people, or not?]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Volunteering & civic engagement

To what extent, if at all, have you been involved recently (over the past year) in any volunteering?

To what extent, if at all, have you been involved recently (over the past year) in any civic engagement activities (such as contacting your local councillor or MP, attending a local meeting, or something similar)?

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Social interaction & friendships

Would you say you have people you would call your friends, or not?

[probe: - how often, if at all, do you have contact with them?]

To what extent, if at all, would you say you socialise with people of other backgrounds to you?

[probe: - these different backgrounds could be people of a different ethnicity, religion, income level, or social class for example]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Being treated with respect

To what extent, if at all, would you say you are treated with respect when in public?

[probe: - in what situations would you say you are or are not treated with respect?]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Influencing decisions

To what extent, if at all, would you say you are able to influence the decisions of public institutions?

[probe: - this could mean influencing your local council, MP, or parliament, for example]

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

Willingness to contribute

To what extent, if at all, would you say you are willing to contribute towards the support of people in need (e.g. through taxes)?

< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS >

LINKING IDENTITY & COHESION: MAIN QUESTIONS

Do you feel that the way in which you do or do not identify with Britain affects [this theme], or do you think it makes little or no difference?

[probe: - (IF APPLICABLE) is there any way in which your other national identities affect this, or do you think they make little or no difference?

is there any way in which your ethnic identity affects this, or do you think it makes little or no difference?

Is there any way your religious identity affects this, or do you think it makes little or no difference?]

Thinking now about people other than yourself, do you think the way in which they do or do not identify with Britain affects [this theme], or do you think it makes little or no difference?

[probe: - if, for instance, you think about someone of an older or younger generation, would you answer this question differently, or not?

if you think about someone of a different ethnic group, would you answer this question differently, or not?

if you think about someone of a different religion, would you answer this question differently, or not?]

I've heard it said that [this theme] might be affected by many different things, such as inequality, poverty, people's education, ethnic diversity, job opportunities, discrimination, and so on. Do you think that anything else might affect [this theme], or do you think other things make little or no difference?

[probe: - do you think [factor being mentioned] is of more, less, or the same importance for [this theme] than a person's British identity?

and how about for you personally?]

Is there anything else that occurs to you that you'd like to tell me?

Thank you very much indeed for taking the time and trouble to talk to me

Show-card 1: AGE

18 - 24

25 - 34

35 - 49

50 - 64

65 - 74

75 +

Show-card 2: EMPLOYMENT²¹

- 1 Self employed
- 2 In paid employment (full or part-time)
- 3 Unemployed
- 4 Retired from paid work altogether
- 5 On maternity leave
- 6 Looking after family or home
- 7 Full-time student / at school
- 8 Long term sick or disabled
- 9 On a government training scheme
- 10 Something else (please give details)

²¹ These categories are taken from the Citizenship Survey questionnaire (UKDA 2007).

Show-card 3: INCOME

No income

Under £2,500

£2,500 - £4,999

£5,000 - £9,999

£10,000 - £14,999

£15,000 - £19,999

£20,000 - £24,999

£25,000 - £29,999

£30,000 - £34,999

£35,000 - £39,999

£40,000 - £44,999

£45,000 - £49,000

£50,000 - £74,999

£75,000 - £99,999

£100,000 or higher

Show-card 4: ETHNIC GROUP²²

White

- 1 British
- 2 Any other white background (please give details)

Mixed

- 3 White and Black Caribbean
- 4 White and Black African
- 5 White and Asian
- 6 Any other mixed background (please give details)

Asian or Asian British

- 7 Indian
- 8 Pakistani
- 9 Bangladeshi
- 10 Any other Asian background (please give details)

Black or Black British

- 11 Caribbean
- 12 African
- 13 Any other Black background (please give details)

Chinese or other ethnic group

- 14 Chinese
- 15 Any other ethnic group (please give details)

²² These categories are taken from the Citizenship Survey questionnaire (UKDA 2007).

Appendix: PART C – MULTICOLLINEARITY

The table below shows correlations between each of the explanatory variables used in the regression models, in order to check for multicollinearity. That the explanatory variables are correlated is normal; indeed, if this were not the case then there would be no need to include them as control variables. However, when correlations between them are too high, this can create problems since including two highly correlated explanatory variables in the model can result in both being shown as statistically insignificant when including only one may show statistical significance. Generally, good practice is to ensure there are no correlations over around 0.7. As can be seen from the table below, there largest correlation is 0.515 – between a respondent’s ethnic group and whether are not born in the UK. It makes intuitive sense that these variables would be correlated, and the fact that there are no higher correlations suggests that multicollinearity should not be a substantial problem.

Table C1: Multicollinearity of explanatory variables													
MEANING	NAME	impridc	ethnic5	rnssec7c	dvage	rsex	zquals6c	dimdc2	rcobc	slive5c	relprac	pethdec	year0809
British identity	impridc	1.000											
Ethnic group	ethnic5	0.053	1.000										
Socio-econ. group	rnssec7c	-0.021	0.149	1.000									
Age (years)	dvage	0.025	-0.193	-0.213	1.000								
Sex	rsex	0.049	0.007	0.049	-0.014	1.000							
Qualifications	zquals6c	-0.021	-0.009	0.399	0.171	0.035	1.000						
Area deprivation	dimdc2	0.039	0.310	0.280	-0.183	0.014	0.213	1.000					
Born in UK	rcobc	-0.033	-0.515	-0.154	0.047	0.024	-0.063	-0.268	1.000				
Time lived locally	slive5c	0.083	-0.188	-0.033	0.408	0.013	0.151	-0.051	0.227	1.000			
Practising religion	relprac	0.127	0.263	0.099	0.015	0.083	0.031	0.178	-0.392	-0.039	1.000		
Ethnic min. in local area	pethdec	0.123	0.523	0.158	-0.209	-0.018	0.013	0.410	-0.500	-0.131	0.328	1.000	
Dummy survey year var.	year0809	0.019	0.037	0.026	0.010	-0.017	-0.003	0.030	-0.024	-0.001	0.024	0.027	1.000

Appendix: PART D – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Alternative jackknife calculations for variance estimation for Tables 14, 15 and 16.

Table D1: The impact of British identity on social cohesion (jackknife variance estimation in parentheses)						
	Satisfaction with place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
Effect of British identity	0.043		0.038		0.014	
P value	0.000 (0.000)		0.001 (0.001)		0.115 (0.116)	
R squared	0.193		0.158		0.189	
Table D2: The effect of area deprivation, deciles (jackknife variance estimation in parentheses)						
(reference = least deprived; 10 = most deprived)						
	Satisfaction with one's place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
	Coefficient	P value	Coefficient	P value	Coefficient	P value
2	-0.060	0.005 (0.006)	0.044	0.076 (0.78)	-0.012	0.582 (0.585)
3	-0.065	0.002 (0.003)	0.019	0.425 (0.428)	-0.036	0.090 (0.092)
4	-0.111	0.000 (0.000)	0.005	0.841 (0.842)	-0.028	0.193 (0.196)
5	-0.156	0.000 (0.000)	0.017	0.497 (0.500)	-0.018	0.415 (0.418)
6	-0.178	0.000 (0.000)	0.004	0.861 (0.862)	-0.045	0.039 (0.040)
7	-0.278	0.000 (0.000)	-0.009	0.716 (0.718)	-0.048	0.024 (0.025)

8	-0.376	0.000 (0.000)	-0.020	0.421 (0.424)	-0.095	0.000 (0.000)
9	-0.455	0.000 (0.000)	-0.035	0.164 (0.166)	-0.099	0.000 (0.000)
10	-0.558	0.000 (0.000)	-0.063	0.012 (0.013)	-0.155	0.000 (0.000)

Table D3: The effect of level of qualifications on social cohesion (jackknife variance estimation in parentheses)

(reference = higher education)

	Satisfaction with one's place of residence		Civic engagement and volunteering		Socialising with people of different backgrounds	
	Coeff.	P value	Coeff.	P value	Coeff.	P value
A level or equivalent	-0.061	0.000 (0.000)	-0.068	0.000 (0.000)	-0.025	0.085 (0.086)
GCSE or equivalent	-0.089	0.000 (0.000)	-0.208	0.000 (0.000)	-0.036	0.004 (0.004)
Foreign or other qualifications	-0.177	0.000 (0.000)	-0.233	0.000 (0.000)	-0.054	0.051 (0.053)
No qualifications	-0.142	0.000 (0.000)	-0.403	0.000 (0.000)	-0.105	0.000 (0.00)

Satisfaction with place of residence (jackknife variance estimation):

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	623	Number of obs	=	20400
Number of PSUs	=	2203	Population size	=	20631.563
			Replications	=	2203
			Design df	=	1580
			F(42, 1539)	=	77.45
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1929

compm4	Coef.	Jackknife Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
impbridc	.0427955	.0104513	4.09	0.000	.0222956	.0632954
ethnic5						
2	.026636	.0273475	0.97	0.330	-.0270052	.0802773
3	-.0633263	.027786	-2.28	0.023	-.1178275	-.008825
4	-.1803266	.0306826	-5.88	0.000	-.2405095	-.1201436
5	-.1172182	.0319364	-3.67	0.000	-.1798603	-.0545761
rnssec7c						
2	-.0278283	.0160995	-1.73	0.084	-.0594069	.0037504
3	-.0558358	.0167306	-3.34	0.001	-.0886523	-.0230192
4	-.0796393	.0213198	-3.74	0.000	-.1214573	-.0378212
5	-.0611777	.0318171	-1.92	0.055	-.1235859	.0012305
6	.0070441	.0324252	0.22	0.828	-.0565567	.070645
7	.0387819	.0599397	0.65	0.518	-.0787877	.1563516
dvage	.0016963	.0004603	3.68	0.000	.0007934	.0025992
2.rsex	-.1273231	.010866	-11.72	0.000	-.1486363	-.1060098
zqual56c						
2	-.0610705	.0173162	-3.53	0.000	-.0950356	-.0271053
3	-.0887201	.0152619	-5.81	0.000	-.1186557	-.0587844
4	-.1771497	.040381	-4.39	0.000	-.2563556	-.0979438
5	-.1418024	.0183055	-7.75	0.000	-.1777081	-.1058968
dimdc2						
2	-.0599583	.0215972	-2.78	0.006	-.1023205	-.0175961
3	-.0651747	.0216385	-3.01	0.003	-.107618	-.0227315
4	-.1111356	.0221321	-5.02	0.000	-.154547	-.0677242
5	-.1564399	.0230796	-6.78	0.000	-.2017097	-.11117
6	-.177715	.0244396	-7.27	0.000	-.2256526	-.1297775
7	-.278473	.0251359	-11.08	0.000	-.3277762	-.2291698
8	-.3763926	.0262034	-14.36	0.000	-.4277897	-.3249955
9	-.4550116	.025741	-17.68	0.000	-.5055017	-.4045215
10	-.557699	.0267607	-20.84	0.000	-.6101892	-.5052087
1.rcobc	.0093676	.0213946	0.44	0.662	-.0325973	.0513325
slive5c						
2	.1290303	.025554	5.05	0.000	.0789071	.1791535
3	.1879844	.0263934	7.12	0.000	.1362147	.2397541
4	.2007963	.0251335	7.99	0.000	.1514977	.2500949
5	.228934	.0278668	8.22	0.000	.1742742	.2835938
relprac	.0177576	.0127023	1.40	0.162	-.0071575	.0426727
pethdec						
2	-.0158808	.0248234	-0.64	0.522	-.064571	.0328095
3	-.0351356	.025548	-1.38	0.169	-.085247	.0149759
4	-.0722186	.025333	-2.85	0.004	-.1219084	-.0225288
5	-.0858216	.0241054	-3.56	0.000	-.1331036	-.0385397
6	-.1523723	.0257306	-5.92	0.000	-.202842	-.1019027
7	-.1187964	.0277029	-4.29	0.000	-.1731347	-.064458
8	-.1827446	.0300324	-6.08	0.000	-.2416523	-.123837
9	-.2095326	.0284676	-7.36	0.000	-.2653708	-.1536944
10	-.2466178	.033113	-7.45	0.000	-.311568	-.1816677
year0809	.0067444	.0118738	0.57	0.570	-.0165457	.0300345
_cons	1.733848	.043709	39.67	0.000	1.648115	1.819582

Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.

Civic engagement and volunteering (jackknife variance estimation):

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	623	Number of obs	=	20400
Number of PSUs	=	2203	Population size	=	20631.563
			Replications	=	2203
			Design df	=	1580
			F(42, 1539)	=	64.00
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1577

compm8	Coef.	Jackknife Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
impbrdc	.0377186	.0110668	3.41	0.001	.0160115	.0594258
ethnic5						
2	-.1565865	.0222101	-7.05	0.000	-.2001509	-.1130222
3	-.0500625	.0219816	-2.28	0.023	-.0931787	-.0069463
4	.052197	.0258835	2.02	0.044	.0014273	.1029667
5	-.1182188	.0283882	-4.16	0.000	-.1739013	-.0625362
rnssec7c						
2	-.0616269	.0157476	-3.91	0.000	-.0925154	-.0307385
3	-.1198879	.0154631	-7.75	0.000	-.1502183	-.0895575
4	-.1766382	.0205456	-8.60	0.000	-.2169377	-.1363388
5	-.1961537	.0307115	-6.39	0.000	-.2563932	-.1359142
6	-.0319344	.0327927	-0.97	0.330	-.0962562	.0323874
7	-.0609011	.0603468	-1.01	0.313	-.1792693	.0574672
dvage	.0011273	.0004353	2.59	0.010	.0002734	.0019812
2.rsex	.0564832	.0111196	5.08	0.000	.0346726	.0782939
zquals6c						
2	-.06756	.0174495	-3.87	0.000	-.1017867	-.0333333
3	-.2078252	.0150729	-13.79	0.000	-.2373901	-.1782602
4	-.2327743	.0328837	-7.08	0.000	-.2972747	-.168274
5	-.40331	.0180632	-22.33	0.000	-.4387404	-.3678796
dimdc2						
2	.0439811	.0249186	1.76	0.078	-.0048958	.0928581
3	.0191351	.0241489	0.79	0.428	-.0282321	.0665023
4	.0049913	.0250921	0.20	0.842	-.044226	.0542087
5	.017488	.0258968	0.68	0.500	-.0333078	.0682837
6	.004334	.0248598	0.17	0.862	-.0444277	.0530957
7	-.0093571	.025878	-0.36	0.718	-.0601159	.0414017
8	-.0204296	.0255503	-0.80	0.424	-.0705456	.0296865
9	-.0352035	.0254301	-1.38	0.166	-.0850839	.0146768
10	-.0630552	.0253289	-2.49	0.013	-.112737	-.0133734
1.rcobc	.1520771	.0189534	8.02	0.000	.1149005	.1892536
slive5c						
2	.0690362	.0229148	3.01	0.003	.0240896	.1139828
3	.1490304	.0237884	6.26	0.000	.1023702	.1956906
4	.1339616	.0224882	5.96	0.000	.0898517	.1780714
5	.1276476	.0256796	4.97	0.000	.0772779	.1780173
relprac	.1582179	.0122513	12.91	0.000	.1341875	.1822484
pethdec						
2	.0161396	.0268925	0.60	0.548	-.036609	.0688883
3	-.0129651	.0284549	-0.46	0.649	-.0687784	.0428481
4	-.0044332	.0279826	-0.16	0.874	-.0593201	.0504537
5	.0006593	.0273441	0.02	0.981	-.0529752	.0542938
6	-.0245723	.0270904	-0.91	0.365	-.0777092	.0285646
7	-.0106692	.0280625	-0.38	0.704	-.0657128	.0443743
8	-.0341701	.0288319	-1.19	0.236	-.0907229	.0223826
9	-.0381908	.0289946	-1.32	0.188	-.0950627	.0186811
10	-.0975211	.0296237	-3.29	0.001	-.155627	-.0394152
year0809	-.0198516	.0116765	-1.70	0.089	-.0427546	.0030513
_cons	.8385469	.0407369	20.58	0.000	.7586429	.918451

Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.

Socialising with people of other backgrounds (jackknife variance estimation):

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	623	Number of obs	=	20400
Number of PSUs	=	2203	Population size	=	20631.563
			Replications	=	2203
			Design df	=	1580
			F(42, 1539)	=	94.57
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1885

compm7	Coef.	Jackknife Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
impbridc	.0140738	.0089464	1.57	0.116	-.0034743	.0316218
ethnic5						
2	.1112538	.0172211	6.46	0.000	.0774752	.1450325
3	.162912	.0171205	9.52	0.000	.1293308	.1964933
4	.2570257	.0238323	10.78	0.000	.2102795	.3037719
5	.1756708	.0221222	7.94	0.000	.1322788	.2190628
rnssec7c						
2	-.0297133	.0127953	-2.32	0.020	-.0548108	-.0046158
3	-.0275531	.0128816	-2.14	0.033	-.0528199	-.0022863
4	-.0174101	.0181147	-0.96	0.337	-.0529415	.0181213
5	-.080492	.0243725	-3.30	0.001	-.1282979	-.0326861
6	.0087754	.0256517	0.34	0.732	-.0415396	.0590904
7	-.0123385	.0512478	-0.24	0.810	-.1128594	.0881825
dvage	-.005949	.0003943	-15.09	0.000	-.0067223	-.0051756
2.rsex	-.0335296	.0090953	-3.69	0.000	-.0513698	-.0156894
zquals6c						
2	-.0246778	.0143696	-1.72	0.086	-.0528632	.0035077
3	-.0363799	.0126882	-2.87	0.004	-.0612674	-.0114925
4	-.0539	.0278329	-1.94	0.053	-.1084932	.0006933
5	-.1046399	.0154156	-6.79	0.000	-.134877	-.0744028
dimdc2						
2	-.0120853	.0220979	-0.55	0.585	-.0554295	.0312589
3	-.0355597	.0211122	-1.68	0.092	-.0769705	.0058512
4	-.0284255	.0219786	-1.29	0.196	-.0715358	.0146848
5	-.0177927	.0219807	-0.81	0.418	-.0609072	.0253218
6	-.0447226	.0217953	-2.05	0.040	-.0874733	-.0019719
7	-.0482032	.0215113	-2.24	0.025	-.0903968	-.0060095
8	-.0946208	.0220161	-4.30	0.000	-.1378047	-.051437
9	-.0986412	.0220087	-4.48	0.000	-.1418106	-.0554718
10	-.1546108	.0233744	-6.61	0.000	-.2004589	-.1087627
1.rcobc	-.1131286	.015412	-7.34	0.000	-.1433588	-.0828985
slive5c						
2	.0032005	.0173666	0.18	0.854	-.0308635	.0372646
3	-.0015559	.0178793	-0.09	0.931	-.0366254	.0335137
4	.0312569	.0172333	1.81	0.070	-.0025456	.0650593
5	.0247711	.0204721	1.21	0.226	-.0153843	.0649265
relprac	.0237942	.0109154	2.18	0.029	.002384	.0452045
pethdec						
2	.1182571	.0278795	4.24	0.000	.0635725	.1729417
3	.1428814	.0272355	5.25	0.000	.08946	.1963029
4	.1668024	.0267627	6.23	0.000	.1143082	.2192966
5	.2445425	.0270642	9.04	0.000	.1914569	.2976281
6	.2572286	.0263657	9.76	0.000	.2055131	.3089441
7	.3546424	.0270071	13.13	0.000	.3016689	.4076159
8	.3977484	.0258908	15.36	0.000	.3469644	.4485324
9	.4602081	.0263278	17.48	0.000	.4085669	.5118492
10	.4829605	.0258772	18.66	0.000	.4322032	.5337178
year0809	.0030489	.0108323	0.28	0.778	-.0181983	.024296
_cons	1.248611	.0373194	33.46	0.000	1.17541	1.321812

Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.