

**The London School of Economics and
Political Science**

*When Knowledge Meets Practice: Learning
Communities and the EU's Common Security
and Defence Policy*

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis explores the role of learning communities in the evolution of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It engages the academic debate on institutional learning and the "practice turn" in IR to shed light on the factors leading the EU to learn by policy failure, as well as by ten years of practice in crisis management. Specifically, the work investigates the role of the knowledge and practice-based communities that shaped the consensus towards the comprehensive approach, with a strong emphasis on civilian means.

Ideational factors, as opposed to material ones, are critical in understanding why the EU has developed a "soft" provider of security, in spite of the St Malo commitment to develop hard security capabilities. In the absence of a direct threat, EU member states' preferences towards CSDP were driven by a set of new ideas, which in turn resulted from an emerging international agenda advocating the development of non-military crisis management approaches and tools. Through a critical appraisal of the "practice turn" and its application to the study of EU security and defence, the thesis sheds additional light on the overlap between knowledge and practice, which bears relevance for the research agenda on learning communities and norm diffusion.

The empirical analysis makes an evidence-based reconstruction of the rise and evolution of civilian crisis management (CCM) and security sector reform (SSR). The comparison between the two case studies assesses the extent to which, at critical junctures, ideational factors influenced security policies. CCM and SSR, in fact, shared a similar learning process, yet the former had a much deeper impact on the shape and activities of the CSDP than the latter. To account for such variation in outcomes, it is argued that the emergence of "learning by doing" shaped CCM evolution. On the contrary, the introduction of SSR by knowledge-based communities failed to produce a common practice. Therefore, when policy innovation is supported by the re-elaboration of practices, the ideas diffused by learning communities are more persuasive and impactful on policy-making.

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This thesis is dedicated
to my parents, who taught me how to live;
to my wife, who taught me how to love;
to my supervisor, who taught me how to work.

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List of Abbreviations

ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
ASSET	Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training
ASSN	African Security Sector Network
AU	African Union
BASIC	British American Security Information Council
CA	Comprehensive Approach (EU)
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management (EU)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (UK)
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal (EU)
CLMA	Civilian Lessons Management Application (EU)
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (EU)
CMB	Crisis Management Board (EU)
CMC	Crisis Management Center
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (EU)
COREU	Correspondence Européenne Network (EU)
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU)
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (EU)
CPDC	Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation Network (OECD)
CRCT	Crisis Response Coordination Team (EU)
CRT	Civilian Response Team (EU)
CSDG	Conflict, Security and Development Group

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
CoP	Community of Practice
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEVCO	European Commission's Directorate-General for Development Cooperation - EuropeAid
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
DOS	Department of State (US)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service (EU)
EGT	European Group on Training (EU)
ELMA	European Lessons Management Application (EU)
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union (EU)
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy (EU)
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (EU)
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPLO	European Peace-building Liaison Office
ESDC	European Security and Defence College (EU)
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP	European Union Capacity-building Mission

EUFOR	European Union Force
EU ISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPM / EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representatives
EUSSR	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
HQ	Headquarter
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (EU)
IGC	Inter-governmental Conference (EU)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD)
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MS	Member States (EU)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OMIK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OPCEN	Operation Centre (EU)
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PMG	Politico Military Group (EU)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
RELEX	European Commission's Directorate General for External Relations
RFSI	Swedish Council for Peace and Security Initiative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWG	Security Working Group (EU)
TEU	Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

WEU

Western European Union

ZIF

Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze
(*Center for International Peace Operations*)

Chapter 1

Introduction

The study of the European Union (EU), and namely of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has until now failed to spot the processes through which new ideas affect policy evolution. It is well known that ideas change the world. In more academic words, they produce new patterns of cooperation among states, impinging on the formal and informal institutions that were created to foster such cooperation. What is most problematic is to determine how ideational factors bear impact on actors' decisions, particularly those leading to the adoption of common policy frameworks. What is also unclear is how these frameworks then result in observable policy outcomes.

Drawing from the academic debate on institutional learning (Etheredge, 1985; Nye, 1987; Haas E.B., 1990; Haas P.M., 1990; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Hall, 1993; Levy, 1994; Zito, 2009; Radaelli, 2009), policy evolution (Adler and Haas, 1992) and the recent "practice turn" in IR (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, 2011b), this research specifies the conditions under which international organisations learn, and how security policies evolve as a consequence of these lessons learned. It is argued that specific ideas had impact on EU security policies because new knowledge was bound up in the execution of the security practices. Conversely, the thesis shows that a purely epistemic enterprise not

associated with performance did not generate policy transformation, as intersubjective, consensual knowledge struggled to expand. Therefore, the objective of this work is to test the avenues of learning affecting CSDP and its “learning by doing” evolution. Under what conditions does learning matter and what is the relationship between knowledge, practice and power? Can the comprehensive approach to CSDP, and in particular the development of non-military crisis management tools be explained from a practice perspective, or does evolution stem from the role of expertise or knowledge-based networks, as other authors have suggested (Cross, 2011)?

The empirical findings demonstrate that institutional learning has policy impact when the consensus on the lessons learned from the past is underpinned by a common set of normative and principled beliefs - which fits the definition of *episteme* in accordance with Haas’ theory of institutional change; at the same time, it shows that policy impact turns into observable policy evolution and shapes broader socio-political processes (e.g. the design of CSDP as a “civilian” or “soft” provider of security) when the knowledge is embedded in communities of practice that structure experience and define the way actors socialise and learn.

In the case of the CSDP, common practices defined the way EU actors learned. The nexus between new knowledge and practice is what made CSDP learning by doing possible. My contribution demonstrates the academic advantage of analysing the CSDP as an environment in which transnational learning, promoted by knowledge and practice-based communities, drives policy-

making. Investigating the role of “learning communities” in CSDP also help detecting which one of the several communities discussed by the IR literature (Adler, 2008: 199; Cohendet et al., 2011: 306) is more suitable, in analytical terms, to account for security cooperation within the EU framework. In fact, there is a strong need in IR theory “to clarify the main characteristics of diverse communities” (Créplet et al., 2003: 44), how they contribute to knowledge creation and what are the implications in policy terms.

In this regard, it is important to observe that the CSDP environment includes sectors where practice – and learning by doing – struggled to emerge, despite the evidence of knowledge-based policy innovation. Reappraising the concept of epistemic communities helps us assessing the exact extent to which impactful learning depends on the overlap between knowledge and practice, something that the academic literature has not clarified. As long as EU security and defence is a new policy field in which outside-in diffusion processes have repeatedly occurred, it can be argued that there can be new knowledge without a common practice, but a fully-fledged process of institutional learning cannot be achieved without common practice.

This approach is also applied in an empirical field – security – traditionally considered as a hard case for the role of ideas and identities in shaping decisions. In this regard, this work suggests that interests are present across the whole trajectory of norm diffusion. The conceptual bases of learning communities point out the notions of “joint enterprise”, shared beliefs (Haas P.M., 1990) and repertoire (Wenger, 1998). These communities are linked to

the emergence of a dominant view of a social reality across different backgrounds, as in the case of epistemic communities (Haas P.M., 1992); or the existence of like-mindedness as the condition for the development, sharing and maintenance of common practices leading to collective learning (Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bicchi, 2011).

Dominance is power-based. The presence of interest-based constituencies (e.g., support from one or more member states) backing the formation of consensual views determines the ability of the communities to gain access to and influence politics. Accordingly, I seek to demonstrate through my empirical analysis that the creation of a policy consensus (McNamara, 1998) on new forms of security cooperation leads to policy change when ideas are supported by interests and can rely on pre-existing practices.

These factors can largely account for the variation in impact of new norms or security prescriptions. Not all ideas, in fact, are equally successful in influencing policy-making. Some of them lead to the creation of new institutions, bureaucracies, or entail profound changes in actors' behaviour. Other may be diffused, but are discarded or do not manage to persist (Risse-Kappen, 1994). Some norms shaped the activities, perceptions and the institutional design of the CSDP in the first ten years of existence (1999-2009). Others had a much more limited impact. Accounting for such variation is a main theoretical goal of this thesis.

1.1 The argument

Learning has obviously to do with change. What is less obvious is the definition of what type of change occurs as an international organisation learns, whether it is simple adaptation or more complex belief change (Zito, 2009). This thesis defines learning as “the process by which consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the results affect the content of public policy” (Haas P.M., 1990: 23). This approach proves particularly useful for the institutionalisation of security and defence cooperation within the EU over the past fifteen years.

In fact, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has been marked by unprecedented developments in the field of security and defence. Prompted by the December 1998 Franco-British St Malo Declaration, the CSDP was officially launched at the Cologne European Council on June 1999. In the wake of the Yugoslav Wars, the initiative was to provide the European Union with the military *force the frappe* to support the critical mass of the until then inconclusive CFSP. It was also a response to major changes in the structure of the post-Cold War international system, which urged European states to enhance their power projection capability and decrease their reliance vis-à-vis the United States (Jones, 2007; Howorth, 2007).

The evolution “by doing” (Grevi et al., 2009) of the CSDP in the past decade affected activities, institutional structures and procedures. It can be understood as a wide process involving three fundamental dimensions. First, the building

up of institutions and the consequent process of institutional reform, leading to the implementation of existing structures, and the creation of new pivotal ones. Second, the emergence of a European strategic debate, resulting in the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy (updated in 2008). Third, the operational experience gained by CSDP missions from 2003 onward (Grevi et al., 2009). In March 2003, in fact, the EU launched its first military operation (EUFOR Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) using NATO assets under the “Berlin Plus agreement”, while the first autonomous CSDP military deployment came about only a few months later, in May 2003, with the launch of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC). Since then, the EU engaged in more than 27 operations, thus becoming a significant actor in crisis management in many regions of the world (Western Balkans, Africa, Middle East, Caucasus, Asia).

Such evolution of the CSDP by practice has led some analysts to qualify the evolutionary process as learning “by doing” (Juncos, 2006; Grevi et al., 2009). The research interest of this thesis, as well as the empirical contribution to the debate, does not lie in the rise and development of the CSDP *per se*, nor in its impressive institutional growth alone. My puzzle centres on the specific design the CSDP has evolved into, through the acquisition of new knowledge and its application it “by doing”.

Seen from an institutionalist perspective, the shaping of the CSDP appears as a history of endogenous institutional change producing unintended consequences (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010; Pierson, 1996). As a matter of fact, whereas the

nature of past errors (e.g. policy failure in the Balkans) and the lessons learned concerned the absence of military means, the solution has rather gone in the opposite direction. In empirical, operational terms the CSDP has developed mostly on the civilian side of the crisis management spectrum (Drent, 2011). The comprehensive approach (CA) and civil-military coordination have dominated the political, strategic and institutional dynamics. Concerned with clearing up why the EU had started engaging in crisis management, where and with what implications on the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery, the academic literature has failed to explain why something that was supposed to have a military outlook and outreach, ended up being overwhelmingly civilian or civil-military. Alternative explanations of the EU security architecture, as the next chapter will show, are indefinite as to why actors learned and socialised in a specific manner, and how their common understanding of the CSDP as non-military was constructed.

By engaging the debate, the theoretical starting point of this work lies in the institutionalist approach quoted above. CSDP institutions evolved as a result of endogenous change impacting on states' cooperative attitude. At the same time, my research challenges institutionalism on two grounds: the processes and the outcomes of institutional change. Concerning processes, my work reframes the study of socialisation within CSDP (Meyer, 2006; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Cross, 2010) so as to focus on the conditions for persuasiveness defining how socialising forces matter. By doing so, it identifies learning communities as the “carriers of change”, mediating between structure

and agency, as well as between interests and ideas, and ultimately leading to learning. The EU has become a comprehensive security provider because transnational expertise and practice-based communities pushed forward a new security thinking changing the traditional – military – understanding of crisis management. Curiously enough, the academic literature has overlooked the nexus between the profound re-conceptualisation of security resulting from the changing nature of post-Cold War crises, on the one hand, and the new activities developed by international organisations, including the EU, on the other. The impact of the paradigmatic shift in security on new norms influencing the security agenda, and hence on the content of cooperation through CSDP, has hardly been inquired into. Nonetheless, a link exists between the generation of new security norms at the international level and the development of the EU comprehensive approach, including all the sub-policies that fall under this label. CSDP's adaptation to systemic pressures was then characterised by an emerging consensus on the importance of non-military crisis management and on the value of civilian and integrated capabilities. These ideas diffused and trickled down the EU decision-making by means of social interaction. They ultimately affected the way states preferences are shaped and gained salience in the CSDP setting because practice helped constructing and consolidating social interaction.

This thesis shows how the practice of security enabled the EU to learn and evolve. In that respect, it fills a lacuna in the institutionalist literature, which tends to focus on the creation or reshaping of institutions rather than their

effect (Menon, 2011; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). A convergence on a comprehensive vision of the CSDP, in fact, does not automatically translate into the CSDP implementing comprehensive policies. My work follows the causal chain of events to reconstruct how specific concepts within the EU comprehensive approach framework turned into policies, and why specific ideas produced policy evolution by means of experiential learning while others did not. The framework develops four pathways of influence, which describe the conditions under which ideas turn into policies. These include the presence of a power constituency supporting the diffusion and institutionalisation of the new ideas; the formation of cohesiveness and a “sense of belonging” among practitioners, facilitated by a common identity; a shared epistemic enterprise aimed at producing policy innovation; and the emulation of a successful model of cooperation or policy implementation.

1.2 The research design

The hypotheses are tested on two case studies: security sector reform (SSR) and civilian crisis management (CCM). The choice of these two case studies was based on the following criteria.

Cases should, first of all, represent new or emerging policy fields in CSDP. They should also be relevant for the EU comprehensive approach, in terms of civilian or holistic contribution to crisis management concepts/procedures. Concerning the institutionalisation within the CSDP, each case should have a

clearly defined policy framework with at least one CSDP operation carried out between 2003 and 2009 (SSR and CCM missions). Finally, selection was influenced by the degree of comparability between the processes of norm diffusion, variation in policy outcomes/evolution and availability of sources. Both SSR and CCM provide sound empirical evidence of the presence of the communities of practice and/or experts promoting the diffusion of new norms that originate in the post-Cold War security environment. These communities act within a dense networked governance system (Mérand et al., 2010) composed of a variety of units: bureaucratic actors, national desks officers, NGOs, diplomats, military staff etc. In each one of the two case studies, a questionnaire inspired from social network analysis was used to structure interview questions. Namely, it helped locating the relevant communities and their membership, so as to facilitate the task of detecting the inner working processes, practices and knowledge flows. Despite the relatively poor academic attention to the EU SSR and CCM developments, these two policy areas occupy a central position in the EU's comprehensive provision of crisis management. Both are key examples of policy innovation, hence useful cases to explain how policy consensus emerges, diffuses, gets institutionalised and evolves. At the same time, differences in policy outcomes – especially institutional developments and operational outreach – make a comparative analysis between SSR and CCM suitable for testing the conditions under which some norms lead to policy evolution, while others do not.

Besides exploring the genesis of the comprehensive approach as a process of learning, my work seeks to answer the following questions: why did CCM have more impact in shaping the CSDP in terms of policy outcomes? Was a policy consensus on SSR more difficult to muster, or to turn into implementation, and if so, why? Starting from similar conditions of policy failure, followed by policy innovation, the relative success of CCM and poor evolution of SSR tell us that even if they are “grabbed” by policy-makers and enter the institutional arena, norms may still fail or struggle to survive in practice. Even the presence of national constituencies (e.g. backing from the United Kingdom, in the case of SSR) are alone not sufficient to cope with the intricacies of multilateral cooperation. The connection between ideas and interests needs to be complemented by the one between knowledge and practice.

Finally, the choice of SSR and CCM was functional to the feasibility of this research. Whereas the notion of comprehensiveness would have been too broad to analyse, SSR and CCM fit the empirical targets of this study, as they allow a narrow focus and an in-depth inquiry into specific policy areas at the heart of the paradigmatic shift in security.

The comparison between SSR and CCM builds on Mill’s method of difference and a qualitative, semi-structured interviews-based research design in order to test the hypotheses that cohesiveness and overlapping practices/epistemes are key determinants of variation. Therefore, the same research methods have been

used to gather empirical evidence, although structured questions have been slightly adjusted to the different contexts.

To facilitate comparison between empirical findings (cf. chapter 8), the case study chapters have symmetrical structures. In both cases, research findings are presented according to three dimensions: (1) the types of learning communities, namely their composition and cohesiveness, which define the cognitive architecture of the policy area under study; (2) the diffusion process of ideas, according to an assessment of the pathways of influence and intervening factors; (3) the analysis of policy outcomes, and whether evolution as learning by doing has occurred or not.

1.3 Significance

Kenneth Waltz wrote “elegance in social science theories means that explanation and prediction will be general” (Waltz, 1979). Although this study aims at achieving as much elegance as my academic experience allow, the undertaking may prove to be vain as studies on the European Union are in general difficult to generalise. This is mostly due to the *sui generis* nature of the EU integration process, including in the “less than supranational but more than intergovernmental” security and defence policy (Howorth, 2011).

The theoretical scope of this work might therefore be somewhat narrower, but nonetheless worth the effort to address the CSDP’s continuous process of institutional adaptation. My theoretical framework seeks to overcome the

realist emphasis on exogenous processes of change, but also engages the current “inward looking” analyses of institutional dynamics and social rules within the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery (*aka* Brusselsisation) that has been gaining ground since the mid-2000s. The thesis merges elements of sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989; Christiansen et al., 1999; Checkel, 2005), networked governance (Mérand et al., 2011) and epistemic/communitarian approaches to International Relations (Ruggie, 1975; Haas E.B., 1990; Haas P.M., 1990; Verdun, 1999; Cross, 2011; Adler, 2005), including the most recent “practice turn” (Adler, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Lachmann, 2010). The sociological source of inspiration resides in the works of Foucault (1970) and Bourdieu (1990) and their conceptualisation of epistemes and background knowledge. The concept of learning communities (Adler, 2008), seeks to bring ideas back into the debate on European security cooperation, while at the same time making clear that ideational forces and socialisation matter but do not operate independently from power.

The empirical scope on the CSDP has three focal points: the structure of learning communities interacting in the CSDP environment; the ensuing dynamics of norm diffusion; and the impact in terms of policy outcomes.

Concerning structural aspects and the problem of “cohesiveness”, the original contribution of this research is to visualise learning communities beyond formal institutional structures or committees, and to picture them as “islands of knowledge and practice”, transcending states and international organisations’ boundaries. Therefore, the argument (Cross, 2011: 26) that epistemic

communities' internal cohesiveness explains external persuasiveness is reformulated so as to include a more nuanced definition of the content (what is agreed or not agreed upon), the domestic setting (culture, institutional barriers to the formation of consensus) and, most importantly, the linkage with professionalism and practice.

Another innovative feature of this analysis is that it explores the extent to which previous experiences in a given policy field (e.g. civilian police) and the existence of networks of practitioners support the formation of new knowledge, and hence boost learning. In terms of norm diffusion, the empirical case studies test the applicability of the policy evolution model (Adler and Haas, 1992; McNamara, 1998) to security policies. By going through the steps of failure, innovation and norm diffusion, important indications can be derived in order to understand how international organisations dealing with security and crisis management adapt their policy objectives and institutional setting to face changing circumstances.

Concerning the outcomes, the value added for studies on the CSDP is to put learning by doing (Juncos, 2006), previously looked at as an isolated concept, into the broader context of institutional learning. According to my model, in fact, policy evolution should produce learning by doing, understood as the refinement of new policy tools out of the first waves of operational experiences leading to feedback loops. The absence of lessons learned is, in this regard, a symptom that a convergence on the policy consensus has struggled to turn into convergence in outcomes and implementation.

All in all, while being careful on the “elegance”, the nub of my argument is to follow the norm, rather than the money or the institutional structures, and connect it with the relevant pre-existing or emerging practices.

1.4 The structure of the thesis

The remaining chapters of this thesis identify the emerging consensus on non-military and civil-military approaches to crisis management as the foremost achievement of the CSDP since its creation in the late-1990s. The consensus came out as an adaptive response to changing international conditions leading states to no longer view purely military interventions as viable means to solve conflicts and to design security cooperation within the EU accordingly. This consensus, supported by key constituencies of member states, allowed the CSDP to find its “niche” in the European security landscape by investing in the comprehensive dimension of crisis management and hence differentiating itself from other international organisations dealing with security (e.g. NATO). The learning process, however, resulted in some norms being more influential than other and, as a consequence, in different patterns of policy evolutions across areas of cooperation. The limit of learning is that the policy consensus does not necessarily turn into a good practice, or effective cooperative outcomes.

The CSDP empirical record demonstrates that ideational factors can drive cooperation, but also that such cooperation does not automatically turn into successful and impactful provision of security. This narrow experience of the

comprehensive approach, by SSR and CCM means, can therefore illuminate integrative efforts in other sectors. Namely, it can shed light on the interaction between material and ideational factors, as well as on the link between rhetoric and practice of cooperation.

In chapter 2, the argument of the thesis is developed. I start from a review the literature on the rise of European security cooperation. I argue that the academic debate has acknowledged the importance of transnational communities as driver of learning and institutionalisation (Cross, 2011) but failed to account for the permanence of some practices and the fading of others. Furthermore, the formative interactions leading to the formation of knowledge have not been sufficiently studied. Therefore, the chapter discusses the way my analytical framework fills this gap in the literature, and how the concepts of epistemic communities and communities of practice are operationalised to explain the current shape of the CSDP. I hypothesize that policy evolution occurs if practice and knowledge overlap, and elaborate on the pathways of influence and intervening factors through which new ideas turn into policies. The methodology section discusses how the learning process is assessed and expounds the qualitative methods used to trace learning communities. In particular, it specifies how the triangulation between semi-structured interviews, process-tracing and document analysis made it possible to detect the attributes and types of communities, the process of knowledge formation, its subsequent integration into the CSDP framework and the emergence of learning by doing.

Chapter 1 – *Introduction*

Chapter 3 and 4 pave the way for the empirical analysis. They introduce the paradigmatic shift in security that occurred since the end of the Cold War, as well as the structures, actors and networks that construct the CSDP, with an emphasis on their “comprehensive” nature. Overall, these are two complementary chapters, whose principal aim is to introduce the “comprehensive approach” the EU’s crisis management tools are embedded into.

Chapter 3 does that by focusing on the origins of comprehensiveness. It connects the re-conceptualisation of the definition of security resulting from the new nature of crisis management to international responses – namely human security and peacebuilding. By doing so, it explains how the idea of comprehensiveness and its implementation through the EU comprehensive approach are rooted in a broader paradigmatic shift affecting the global security agenda. Therefore, the chapter seeks to link global norm generation to the rise of the EU’s specificity in comprehensive crisis management.

Chapter 4 examines how the comprehensive approach shaped the CSDP institutional design. Special emphasis is placed on the “culture of coordination” and the institutional interface connecting military and non-military, civilian structures. It is argued that the governance process is made of three dimensions: structures, actors and networks. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to provide an exhaustive explanation of the CSDP system by examining the interplay between the three dimensions. Conclusions show that the CSDP system is characterised by the presence of different type of networks and

communities that structure relationships between actors and structures. Moreover, they show that those networks are manifold and multi-level, thus extending beyond the formal institutional setting where intergovernmental negotiations occur: network's configurations vary depending on the sector analysed.

Moving on to the analysis of the case studies, chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute the empirical bulk of the thesis. The framework for learning and policy evolution is applied to the emergence of SSR and CCM within the EU security architecture.

Chapter 5 introduces the two policy frameworks and makes clear how they fit into the CSDP, particularly as regards their contribution to shaping an integrated or comprehensive vision of security cooperation. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to help the reader understanding the levels of the analysis and gathering background information on the case studies before embarking upon the empirical investigation. Accordingly, it contains both an overview of the relevant academic literature as well as a state-of-the-art description of the scope, structures, procedures and practices related to the implementation of SSR and CCM.

Chapter 6 investigates the case of SSR. It addresses the questions of why and how SSR principles were institutionalised by EU member states, what influenced EU policy-makers' choices and, finally, what have been the outcomes of the policy consensus on the EU approach to SSR. Through a thorough investigation of the role of learning communities and by tracing back

the dynamics of norm diffusion, this first case study concludes that convergence was driven by a confluence of ideational factors and state interests. Empirical evidence shows the role of national constituencies (the United Kingdom in particular) in supporting the diffusion of SSR's knowledge. At the same time, conclusions highlight the failure of SSR framework to turn into a real convergence in policy outcomes and evolution. As a result, SSR's overall impact on the shape and activities of CSDP has been limited.

Chapter 7 analyses the development of CCM in the EU through the lenses of conceptual evolution, and the resulting diffusion of ideas and practices across EU member states. By asking similar questions to the ones raised in the case of SSR, and with similar starting conditions (experience of policy failure and policy innovation), the chapter illustrates a different picture of learning. Knowledge is, in the CCM case, rooted in shared practices, born out of EU member states' previous experiences in civilian missions (e.g. police) with other international organisations. The genesis of a CCM policy framework and the so-called "EU way to civilian crisis management" (Nowak, 2006) are hence practice-driven, and strongly supported by the constituency of Nordic EU member states - Sweden and Finland in particular. Conclusions to this chapter emphasise, in stark contrast with the previous case study, the much stronger impact of CCM in defining the CSDP, and the greater amount of policy evolution through learning by doing.

Chapter 8 explains such variation and uncovers the causal link between learning communities and policy evolution, in light of the evidence emerged

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from the case studies. It summarises and compares the empirical, then discusses the theoretical implications. By linking the case studies findings to the broader thesis' argument, this chapter answers the question of why some ideas turn into policy evolution while others do not.

The thesis concludes with chapter 9, where the theoretical and policy relevance of this work, as well as some recommendations for future research are mused on.

Chapter 2

The theoretical framework

Introduction: *explanans and explanandum*

This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that the soft or civilian focus of the CSDP results from the lack of a consensus among member states on the degree of military integration in the EU (Santopinto and Price, 2013). Quite the contrary, the development of an overwhelmingly civilian CSDP is the end product of a growing transnational consensus on non-military approaches to crisis management. This explanation shows the limits of IR theories emphasising inter-state bargains and balancing/bandwagoing behaviour, and stresses the importance of ideational factors in shaping security policy-making. New ideas can affect security policies, but different channels for diffusion may lead to different outcomes in policy terms. The channels under study are transnational communities of experts and practitioners, who act as carriers of knowledge into policy-making structures. Understanding how ideas turn into policies through these channels may help explaining the reason why some ideas produce change while others do not; and, as a result, what type of cooperation stems from what ideational factors and under what conditions. Questions about how actors learn, what lessons they draw, how knowledge produces change in international organisations, have been salient in political

science and IR debates over the past thirty years. These questions have also been relevant for the study of the European Union (Zito, 2001, 2009; Zito and Schout, 2009; Radaelli, 1995, 2009). As the other policy areas studied in the literature, learning also took place in EU security and defence, an area of cooperation that was created in the late-1990s and has grown substantially ever since. Therefore, the theoretical question worth asking is whether the transnational communities performing the learning process matter in EU security policy-making, which ones do, and how?

By way of introduction, let us briefly consider the historical and international context first. Since the end of the Cold War, security has become a complex and multidimensional concept, owing to the decline of traditional inter-state wars and the rise of new challenges such as intra-state conflicts, asymmetric and unconventional warfare, terrorism, civil wars, or threats related to failing or failed states. The international provision of security and multilateral defence cooperation, have evolved accordingly. Multilateral institutions have become increasingly absorbed in the management of security crises. Despite operational distress and budgetary constraints, *crisis management* has become a term of art in the post-1989 security discourse, and translated into a diffused international practice. Collective security organisations started to engage in complex peacekeeping, crisis management or nation-building tasks whose nature was not essentially military. Responding to momentous changes in polarity as well as in the nature of armed conflicts, comprehensive forms of intervention have therefore emerged, entailing profound changes in the way

actors decide upon and implement their responses to crises. These “new trajectories” for crisis management involved the conceptualisation of different and longer phases of action, joining short-term combat responses with broad conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction long-term programmes.

The most immediate implication of these transformations for security and defence cooperation has been the increased value of civilians and civilian capabilities in what was previously considered a *domaine réservé* for the military. New scenarios opened up in the field of international security, with experts and practitioners gradually moving towards a consensus on the critical importance of civilian, and “civilian-military” work to the success of crisis management operations (Chivvis, 2010: 1).

Both states and international organisations refined their crisis management goals, means, and instruments according to new systemic priorities. However, the way these actors responded to structural stimuli varies from case to case. There is no universal doctrine or model for civil-military crisis management, since each actor develops different instruments, sets out different goals, or uses different terms according to contextual or historical considerations (Wendling, 2010: 10). As a result, understanding “how” single actors respond to structural pressures is crucial in explaining “why” change takes place in the international security environment.

The “how” question is a theoretical one, and implies the presence of some intervening factors between agency and structure, which alter the way these two interact. These factors are *social* and *ideational*. Actors do not just adapt to

structural constraints, such as changes in the distribution of natural resources or an alteration of the balance of power, in order to guarantee their self-preservation in an anarchic international system. States, and international organisations alike, learn by diffusing and assimilating new knowledge: endogenous factors, such as ideas, identity, expertise or the social interaction with other actors, affect the way preferences are shaped. From a theoretical standpoint, asserting that international organisations learn entails embracing a pragmatic approach merging some elements of social constructivism and institutionalism. To what extent does this pragmatic approach apply to the evolutionary dynamics of the EU's CSDP? The new approaches to global security and crisis management that originated in the post-Cold War international system have affected the EU and other security institutions (UN, NATO, OSCE) in a similar way, but with different outcomes.

What generated change in CSDP is the overarching question of this research. From a theoretical standpoint, the evolution of the CSDP into the comprehensive approach, with a critical focus on civilian means, constitutes the *explanandum*. The outcomes that this thesis seeks to explain are the institutional structures sustaining CSDP; the operational outreach; the means at its disposal; the holistic procedures for crisis response. The analysis of the determinant – that is, the *explanans* – is framed as the combination between the

practice, knowledge and power, which generally define the process of *learning* and, in the case of the CSDP, was operationalised as *learning by doing*.¹

The claim that the EU has learned to be a security actor “by doing” suggests the importance of an international practices approach to understand the determinants of the learning process (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 16). This thesis tests such claim by assessing the extent to which evolution in CSDP could not be, instead, explained through the lenses of other learning approaches. The theoretical framework considers different pathways by which ideas turn into policy. While elaborating on the pathways, I deemed it necessary not to limit my ontological choice to the concept of communities of practice, but to include, as useful competing explanations, knowledge-based, epistemic communities (Haas E.B., 1990) as well. Hence the question arises as to whether practice-based communities, as opposed to other communities, played a determinant role in producing evolution.

The hypotheses presented in this chapter suggest that, in European security, learning by doing has occurred in those sector areas in which practitioners have endowed their joint enterprise with political validity, epistemic ground for action, and intersubjective meaning. In other words, practices helped constructing, or reconstructing from past experiences, the common knowledge as well as a common understanding of a political reality. By contrast, in other sector areas, common practices have struggled to emerge, although new

¹ In the words of the EU Institute for Security Studies’ former Director Alvaro de Vasconcelos, who quoted the Spanish poet Antonio Machado, “walking is how you learn to walk” (Grevi et al., 2009: 12).

epistemes (ideas and cognitive content) have nonetheless had an effect on policies and decision-making events.

Acknowledging the importance of international practices and their contribution to the understanding of world politics, this research tests the applicability of a learning framework to the understanding of CSDP evolution. The research design looks at two sectors of EU security cooperation that display variation in the outcomes of policy evolution. One is CCM, which has expanded and significantly impacted on the CSDP activities. The other is SSR, which, on the contrary, has failed to become a fully-fledged practice and occupies a marginal role in the EU security framework. The presence of a community of practice in the case of CCM, and its absence in the epistemic-driven emergence of SSR, explain the failure of the latter, the successful evolution of the former and its impact on the overall strategic posture of the CSDP.

2.1 The rise and evolution of European security cooperation

The academic debate on European security cooperation has largely ignored these factors. Namely, it has failed to account for the EU response to the changing nature of international security. Scholarship on European security has not produced a comprehensive framework that could explain – theoretically – the rearrangement of EU security policies, structures and capabilities (institutional reform) or the creation of new institutions from scratch, as well as the resulting process of policy change.

This section briefly reviews the alternative explanations for the emergence of CSDP, in order to show the original contribution of this thesis. It is divided in two parts: genesis and evolution. The first part focuses on the explanations for the “rise” of the CSDP, while the second addresses its advancement through institutional and operational development.

2.1.1 CSDP genesis: exogenous and endogenous drivers

The academic debate on CSDP has its origins in the causes and remedies to the EU’s diplomatic *échec* in the Balkans (Pond, 1999; Forster and Wallace, 2000).² It pertained to the redefinition of the European security architecture according to the transformations in the post-1989 international system, namely vis-à-vis the US and NATO (Kupchan, 2003). In this regard, the EU’s inaction in the Yugoslav tragedy not only reflected a fundamental split in the interests of the three larger member states (France, Germany and the UK), but was also the logical consequence of the lack of a military underpinning characterising a European diplomacy “without teeth” (Jopp and Diedrichs, 2009: 100). In his formulation of the “capabilities-expectations gap”, Hill (1993) pioneered the conceptualisation of European foreign and security policy, based on the notions of *actorness* and *presence* (Hill, 1993: 308), which showed the gap between what the EU was talked up to and what was able to deliver (Hill, 1993: 306).

² As Fraser Cameron put it, “the lessons of the Yugoslav conflict were never far from the minds of the negotiators at the 1996 IGC preparing improvements in the CFSP” (Cameron, 1999: 32).

The first attempts to account for the launch of the CSDP at the December 1998 St Malo Summit, and its official establishment six months later at the Cologne Summit, described the initiative mainly as a reaction to exogenous stimuli affecting European security (Pond, 2002; Duke, 1999; Cornish and Edwards, 2005).

Accordingly, structural realist perspectives have explained the evolution of CSDP as a European attempt to balance against the United States (Posen, 2009). The main problem with this approach is that the “hard balancing” thesis – a robust military build up to rebalance the transatlantic relationship – has failed to materialise. Instead, the EU’s crisis management machinery has been soft-security intensive. Variants of realism have sought to address this point. The idea of “soft balancing”, developed by Pape (2005), contends that Europeans are instead more likely to balance the United States through “international institutions, economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of neutrality” (Pape, 2005: 17).

Engaging realist scholars, Howorth (2007) contends that structural change is not the only factor that spurred European security cooperation. Two sets of combined explanatory variables (exogenous and endogenous factors) account for the EU’s move towards a global security commitment. He identifies four underlying drivers behind CSDP: *a)* exogenous forces deriving from the end of the Cold War, most notably the lessening strategic importance of Europe for the United States; *b)* new tasks and concept entered the IR lexicon in the post-Westphalian “new world order”, such as crisis management, that meshed easily

with the multilateral internationalism of most of the EU's activities; *c*) the reappearance of military conflict in the European continent (Western Balkans); *d*) the development of a European defence industry (Howorth, 2007: 52).

Andrew Moravcsik (1998) also stresses the importance of endogenous sources such as the convergence of member states interests and interstate bargains or the pressure from domestic groups having an interest in areas such as the production of weapons, economic sanctions and the creation of joint military forces. Without denying the primary role of power and interest in shaping interstate relations, Moravcsik's neoliberal theory of European cooperation maintains that the preferences of domestic actors and political processes in the domestic policy shape an institutional setting whose inner functioning abides by the rules of intergovernmentalism.

More recently, Gross and Juncos (2011) have studied the relationship between changes in the international security environment and EU operational approaches. They focused on the impact of EU crisis management capabilities on the EU's role and self-perception as a security actor.

None of these accounts of the genesis of the CSDP, however, answer the underlying question of this thesis as to why some security concepts (and not others) become embedded in discourse and practice (Koenig, 2012: 131), and what has driven a specific shape of the CSDP in its formative process.

2.1.2 CSDP evolution

Works on CSDP implementation have been manifold and largely dominated the “second wave of CSDP theorising” (Kurowska and Breuer, 2012: 2). As a result of the first of operational experiences (2003-2009), studies on the evaluation of EU missions (Merlingen and Otruskaite, 2008; Emerson and Gross, 2007; Grevi et al., 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009) and related institutional learning (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Ioannides, 2006; Adebahr, 2009) emerged in the literature. Academic writings have been particularly concerned with the functioning of Brussels-based institutions and the process of Brusselsisation (Duke, 2005). Scholars belonging to this strand see CSDP as an institutional context within which “actors’ identities and interests develop and change through interaction” (Checkel, 1999: 550). Theories on socialisation and organisational learning have provided some additional insight on the process of identity construction and rearticulating of interests as significant change-inducing factors in an institutionalised and socialisation-prone setting (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Adebahr, 2009). However, a question remains open as to what extent CSDP has created dynamics of path-dependency (Kay, 2005), constraining member states behaviour (Pierson, 1996) and letting security cooperation enter a path of unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

CSDP’s influence on states behaviour has been looked at through the lenses of Europeanisation. Through a comparative analysis, Giegerich (2006) discovered

patterns of adaptation of national cultures to the emerging EU strategic culture. Meyer (2006) compared the evolution of public and élite opinion in selected countries to find areas of shared consensus and norm compatibility fostering the convergence of national interests. Gross (2009) analysed British, French and German policies with respect to CFSP/CSDP in two specific crises (FYROM and Afghanistan) in order to determine whether Europeanisation of national foreign security policies occurred or whether other considerations (such as the influence of the transatlantic alliance) were more pertinent to explain national preferences.

Several authors have also emphasised fierce tensions among member states as determinants of CSDP (Menon, 1994, 2006; Howorth, 2007, 2011). According to Menon (2011) cleavages that have emerged across several dimensions (civilian *vs* military instruments; Atlanticists *vs* Europeanists; territorial defence *vs* force projection)³ exerted pressure on institutional structures, producing incremental institutional change.

More recently, academic research has moved to a collegial outlook over the social networks (Mérand et al., 2011) and the role of expertise as “epistemic” shaper of policy change (Cross, 2011). Mérand has looked at processes of socialisation within institutional settings. The CSDP is a “social field”, comprised of policy-makers seeking to make sense of the world which in turn leaves them “open to new ways (rules, power structures, and symbolic representations) of structuring” the CSDP (Mérand, 2010: 372). All in all, the

³ See also Giegerich (2006).

analysis of networks and epistemic communities marked a rapprochement of sociological institutionalism to power, as it became clear that socialisation and ideational forces matter but could not float or operate freely (Risse-Kappen, 1994). It is at this specific juncture, at this critical moment of research on the dynamics of EU security cooperation, that my thesis engages the academic debate.

2.2 Learning and CSDP: conceptual and ontological choices

According to Jopp and Diedrichs, the EU is an organisation involved in a kind of “lifelong institutional learning”, trying to incrementally improve its own set of procedures and instruments for better coping with external crises and problems (Jopp and Diedrichs, 2009: 106). Ginsberg, too, acknowledges the importance of institutional learning in EU foreign and security policy developments in the early twenty-first century (Ginsberg, 2007: 43).

This thesis re-frames the role of learning as a driving force behind the evolution of CSDP. Namely, it looks at the CSDP as a social field, characterised by the presence of a multitude learning communities. These communities produce change by mediating between structure and agency, and between exogenous and endogenous factors. Communities do not simply exchange knowledge, as networks do. They construct and diffuse cognitive content to achieve a specific policy enterprise.

On that account, the present thesis seeks to fill a theoretical gap in the literature. What drove the specific orientation of CSDP towards the soft provision of security (Drent, 2011), with an institutional and operational emphasis on the comprehensive approach, which largely rests on civilian means?

It is argued that new norms, ideas and shared beliefs, arising from policy failure and gradually turning into “consensual knowledge”, have shaped the rise and evolution of non-military CSDP by activating processes of policy and institutional evolution as learning. Accordingly, my work investigates the policy consensus that produced EU cooperation in crisis management, thus shedding light on the causal force of ideas in driving CSDP. It aims to go down the causal chain to reconstruct how specific concepts turned into policies, why other were discarded and what crucial factors influenced the emergence and diffusion of consensual knowledge. Finally, it accounts for the lag between policy change and policy outcomes, hence explaining why specific ideas produced evolution as experiential learning and others did not.

This section presents the conceptual choices of the thesis and defines learning in relation to the actors, or communities, performing it. Drawing from the academic literature on learning, it appraises the evolution from the notion of epistemic communities (epicoms) to the practice turn in IR and the growing use of communities of practice (CoPs) as the conceptual focus of research. Assessing the distinction between epicoms and CoPs is important. In fact, while the former have been previously used by scholars to account for the role

of expertise in shaping EU decisions (Cross, 2011), the latter have gained ground to conceptualise the EU as a set of practices (Bicchi, 2011) that constitute, and not result from, knowledge. Clarifying whether the carriers of learning are expertise or practice-based is hence crucial to determine who are the agents of the learning process and under what conditions the latter results in policy evolution.

2.2.1 What does “an international organisation learns” mean?

The notion of learning is, to use Jack Levy’s famous expression, a “conceptual minefield (...) difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically” (Levy, 1994: 280).⁴

A fundamental distinction is between *individual* (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; Argyris and Schon, 1978) and *collective* learning (March and Olsen, 1988; Etheredge, 1985; Downie, 1998; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Haas E.B., 1990; Nye, 1987). Levy gives a basic definition of *individual* learning as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (Levy, 1994: 286). On the contrary, *collective* learning implies the possibility that a group of individuals (a government, an

⁴ Each one of the major paradigms in IR Theory has coped with the problem posed by learning lessons to achieve change. While for neorealist scholars learning takes a “deceptively simple meaning” (Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991: 24 as mechanical adaptation to structural pressures (Waltz, 1979), neoliberals maintain that regimes may foster organisational learning by creating or reinforcing institutional memory (Nye, 1987). Social constructivism found a particular interest in collective, shared learning and socialisation (Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 1996).

organisation, an institution) could learn in much the same way as single individuals do, thus having their distinctive (but shared) goals, beliefs, and memories. Collective learning is commonly classified into two similar, but not identical categories: organisational learning and institutional learning.⁵

The literature also distinguishes between two levels of learning, determined by the degree of complexity and the effects of learning on the actors' behaviour. The distinction is between simple *adaptation*, involving simple instrumental change, and complex *learning*, involving belief change (Zito, 2009; Argyris and Schon, 1996; Haas E.B., 1990), although the same notions have been given different labels by scholars.⁶ Haas defines *adaptation* as the process by which “behaviour changes as actors add new activities (or drop old ones), thus altering the means of actions, but not the ends of the organisation”. Instead, *learning* occurs when “the ultimate purpose of the organisation is redefined as means as well as ends are questioned and new ends are devised on the basis of consensual knowledge that has become available” (Haas E.B., 1990: 3). As a result, “true” learning involves a reassessment of fundamental beliefs and values. It entails a reconsidering of how policy-makers approach a major problem, hence referring to a situation in which the policy-makers' comprehension moves towards a more complex and integrated understanding of an issue accompanied by a new formulation of the problem-solving.

⁵ Organisational learning is commonly used in sociology, whereas political scientists give preference to the term “institutional learning” so as to encompass the broader definition of “institutions” covering organisations, rules, norms and regimes. That being said, the two terms have been often used interchangeably.

⁶ *Adaptation* is also known as single-loop (Argyris and Schon, 1978) structural adjustment (Levy, 1994) or “simple” learning. *Learning* is also labelled double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) or “complex” learning.

Chapter 2 – *Theoretical framework*

Since the 1990s, mainstream research on learning in IR has gone in three directions. A first strand of studies has analysed processes of policy change (foreign policy in particular), building on both collective and individual approaches to learning (Etheredge, 1985; Hemmer, 2000; Farkas, 1998; Stein, 1994; Levy, 1994). A second strand has focused on the broader question of international cooperation and how learning between two or more states could lead to some form of progress in IR (Haas E.B., 1980, 1990, 1997; Adler and Crawford, 1991). Finally, the most recent social constructivist literature has emphasised processes of collective learning leading to the diffusion of norms (Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 1996).

2.2.2 Learning communities: clearing the conceptual confusion

Learning communities are defined as those transnational communities within the IR literature that create the “social fabric of learning” (Adler, 2008: 199): they are the social and epistemological enablers of institutional learning. The academic literature identifies the following types of learning communities: 1) communities of practice (Wenger, 1998; Adler, 2008); 2) epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Adler, 1992); 3) security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler, 2008); 4) critical communities (Rochon, 1998). It is worth exploring the relationship between these different types of communities and the difference with transgovernmental networks.

To begin with, communities *are* a type of network. The research focus on one or the other concept diverge in terms of the depth of relationships between actors and the purpose of their interaction: while communities cluster around the construction and codification of a common/consensual knowledge, the rationale for the formation of networks is the exchange of knowledge or information among equal actors. Networks are used to depict sets of social interactions (Mérand et al., 2010: 126). The focus on communities instead allows scholars to spot the common causal models and set of political values within the ties (interactions) of the network, hence paying attention to what factors undergird the simple “representation of the social structure” (Knoke, 1990: 8). Learning communities are cognitive: they rest on a common learning objective that determines the degree of members’ involvement in the collective thrive of the community.⁷

Let us now turn to the commonalities and differences among communities. From a “practice” perspective, as Adler noted, all the communities listed above “can be seen as subsets of communities of practice, as long as the focus of the analysis is on the practices that undergird the communities” (Adler, 2008: 199). Despite being subsumed under the practice paradigm, however, these concepts display some noteworthy differences, which help in clarifying their features as well as their contribution to specific research agendas. Critical communities, for instance, rest on ideas that are fundamentally critical. In that regard, they diverge from epistemic communities insofar as their perspectives are critical of

⁷ The value of communities on networks is that a community is not just a set of relationships; it is “about something” (Wenger et al., 2002: 43).

the policy establishment rather than being oriented toward helping it to function better (Schurman and Munro, 2010: 54). Security communities' inner features entail the process of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957) and shared identities and values within a region (Adler and Barnett, 1998).

This thesis identifies as units of analysis epistemic communities and communities of practice. I chose to focus on these two types for two main reasons. The first reason has to do with academic relevance, since there is a wider body of literature in International Relations, and also European Studies, devoted to these two specific ones. Secondly, these communities are comparatively knowledge-intensive, in the sense that they are the units where knowledge creation occurs on a regular basis. Both influence political actors' decisions by developing, sharing and maintaining common causal beliefs through socialisation and persuasion. At the same time, they arise from two slightly different versions of institutional learning – one emphasizing the epistemic and “dominant” constitution of consensual knowledge (Foucault, 1970; Ruggie, 1975; Haas, 1990), and the other reflecting the evolution of background knowledge as a result of reiteration of shared practices (Wenger, 1998; Adler, 2008; Bourdieu, 1990; Adler and Pouliot, 2011a). Let us briefly overview how the two streams developed.

2.2.3 The “epistemic communities approach” to learning...

What is “expertise” and why should it matter in IR? Ruggie introduced the concept of epistemic communities in a special issue of *International*

Organization (1975) co-edited with Ernst Haas (Ruggie, 1975). According to Ruggie, processes of institutionalisation involve not only the grid through which behaviour is acted out, but also “the epistemes through which political relationships are visualised” (Ruggie, 1975: 569). Ruggie borrowed the term epistemes from Foucault (1970), and defined epistemic communities as “a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention” (Ruggie, 1975: 570). Haas later articulated the idea of epistemic communities as “professionals who share a commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values” (Haas E.B., 1990: 41). A more precise conceptualisation was finally given by Peter Haas as follows:

*An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. They have (1) a **shared set of normative and principled beliefs**, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) **shared causal beliefs**, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which they serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) **shared notions of validity** – that is, inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a **common policy enterprise** – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.⁸*

(Haas P.M., 1992: 3)

⁸ Bold added for emphasis.

The emergence of epistemic communities is therefore related to the increasingly complex and technical nature of the issues decision-makers need to address. Accordingly, complexity and uncertainty push decision-makers to seek technical advice, which then contributes to the way interests are formulated and decisions are taken.

Epistemic communities have provided an important stimulus to research aimed at explaining how policies are crafted according to knowledge flows wielded by transnational networks. In fact, they allow researchers to identify the missing link between political objectives, technical knowledge and the formation of interests. This has profound consequences for the study of IR. In the current international society, characterised by globalisation and interdependence, knowledge and ideas must spread across state boundaries in order to be recognised by the wider international community. As a consequence, networks of experts cannot be conceived as belonging to single national communities separated one from each other. Epistemic communities are transnational because their expertise and “vision” are carried over from the national levels into the international arena.

Rejecting simple notions of causality, in *When Knowledge is Power* (1990) Ernst Haas maintains that international organisations (IOs) are created to solve problems that require collaborative action among states for solution; therefore, “the knowledge available about the problem at issue influences the way decision-makers define the interests at stake in the solution to the problem; (...)

when knowledge become consensual, we ought to expect politicians to use it in helping them to define their interests” (Haas E.B., 1990: 9-12).

Consensual knowledge refers to “generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society” (Haas E.B., 1990: 21). An important characteristic of the Haas’ definition is that consensual knowledge is socially constructed and it is constantly tested and examined through adversary procedures. For instance, as Haas himself put it, consensual knowledge differs from ideology because it must constantly prove itself against rival formulas claiming to solve problems better (Haas E.B., 1990: 21).

2.2.4 ...and Communities of Practice (CoPs)

The understanding of how knowledge is formed and affects learning has been revisited by the agenda on international practices, which has gained momentum in social theory (Schatzki et al, 2001) and IR theory in the mid-2000s (Adler, 2005, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, 2011b; Pouliot, 2008, 2010; Bicchi, 2011; Katzenstein, 2010; Wiener, 2008). This agenda comprises a vast array of analytical frameworks that see practices as the key entry point to the study of world politics. Practices are competent performances, that is, socially meaningful patterns of action, which “embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 4). Here, knowledge is therefore understood as “practical”, since

intersubjectivity is bound up in performance and can only be expressed as such (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 8). In other words, social activities embedded in communities, routines and organizations structure experience, which in turn constitutes knowledge.

Against this backdrop, the notion of communities of practice defines the transnational, like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice (Adler, 2008: 196).⁹ As in the case of epistemic communities, CoPs develop, share and maintain new cognitive content (originating in new causal beliefs), agree on a joint enterprise and have mutual expectations and predictability of intention. Therefore, as in the case of technical expertise carried through by epistemics, CoPs generate transformation, via what literature describes as the “practice’s lifecycle” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) involving the generation, diffusion, institutionalisation and fading of a specific practice. Practices can also interact with one another or overlap, through constellations (assemblages) of practices (Wenger, 1998), or communities operating at different levels (Hansen, 2011).

CoPs expand inter-subjective knowledge and establish it as social structures by means of institutionalisation processes.

⁹ Cf. Also Wenger (1998).

2.2.5 Epicoms and CoPs: competing or compatible?

Since the practice turn, the academic literature has discarded epistemic communities as the unit of analysis to explain EU foreign and security policy.

This thesis seeks to reconcile the two apparently competing conceptual tools.

It is important to highlight the differences between the two. Professionalism or like-mindedness is a first key difference, as it implies that individuals belonging to a given community hold culture, values and interests, and therefore identities, which are intrinsic to their practice. CoPs are, in this sense, professional networks of people sharing the same background, whereas epicoms are networks of professionals who do share a practice, but come from a variety of backgrounds. It follows that what brings a CoP together is the set of shared expectations, routines and intentions rooted in professionalism (but not in uniformity¹⁰): self-consciousness develops around the activities commonly understood and continually renegotiated by its members, by a process taking the shape of “war stories” (Brown and Duguid, 1998) which includes a common jargon (Cohendet et al., 2001).

Epicoms instead cluster around a common causal model or epistemic interpretation of reality. Identity is weaker than in CoPs. What holds the community together is a “procedural authority” to attain progress towards a cognitive goal set by the community. Individuals are creative, they gather

¹⁰ Cf. Adler and Bernstein (2005: 296). As Adler noted, “boundaries of CoPs are determined by people’s knowledge and identity and by the discourse associated with a specific practice” and hence are not necessarily “congruent with the reified structures or institutional affiliations, divisions and boundaries. (...) boundaries form in and around practice” (Adler, 2008: 200).

knowledge not just as a result of the reiteration of know-how, or by interaction with other members resulting from common experiences, but also in function of *their own* experience outside the community. Agency is heterogeneous. Last, but not least, epistemic communities emerge in an uncertain context calling for the creation of a new paradigm, which is not necessarily the case for communities of practice (Whiteneck, 1996).

Another difference has to do with the distinction between consensual/causal knowledge (episteme) and background knowledge (habitus), which can be simplistically redirected to the sociological divide between Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Background knowledge originates in habitus, defined by Bourdieu as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions that constitute people’s thoughts and practices” (Bourdieu, 1990: 53). From a CoP perspective, learning entails the evolution of background knowledge (Adler 2005: 20), a change of habitus. Consensual knowledge has a slightly a different rationale. Ernst Haas then defines learning as the process by which “consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the content of public policy” (Haas E.B., 1990: 23). Consensual knowledge refers to “cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society, provided only that the finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous testing and examination”. (Haas E.B., 1990: 21).

The table below summarises the differences between knowledge-based networks, epistemic communities and communities of practice. Although

epicoms can be seen as a subset of a community of practice if one looks at the common practice that undergirds them, their features actually diverge as regards membership, objectives, selection criteria, identity and function.¹¹

Table 2.1: Differences between knowledge-based networks, epistemic communities and communities of practice¹²

Group	Membership	Practice	Objective	Selection	Identity	Function
<i>K-B Networks</i>	Heterogeneous	Coordination (no common practice)	Knowledge exchange	Members have equal rights	No common identity	Access to knowledge
<i>Epicoms</i>	Heterogeneous	Common practice	Construction / Codification of consensual knowledge	Authority and reputation: Members are self-selected	Linked to the objective, but no strong sense of belonging as agents come from different background	External Advancement of a set of knowledge, "change the world"
<i>CoPs</i>	Homogeneous	Common practice	Accumulation of background knowledge	Professionalism ("by peers")	Strong	Achievement of internal shared learning

2.3 The CSDP has learned - by doing?

This thesis investigates the dynamics of the EU's learning by doing. Did practices play a leading role in explaining the learning process? Communities of practice expand because like-minded groups of practitioners are bound by a shared interest in learning and the application of a common practice. This only partially depicts the evolutionary process of the CSDP. What about those sector

¹¹ On the differences between epistemic communities and other groups involved in policy coordination, such as interest groups and social movements, see Haas P.M. (1992: 18).

¹² The categorisation draws from Cohendet et al. (2001: 309-310).

areas in which a common practice (and the relevant communities) did not exist? To test the argument that practices matter in achieving learning and policy evolution, this thesis uses both the concepts of epistemic communities and communities of practice. In a similar way as Adler's analysis of the role of communities of practices in the successful expansion of the North Atlantic security community (Adler, 2008), this work investigates the overlap between the epistemic act of knowledge creation and the (presence or absence of) underlying practices, to assess the effective role of the latter in explaining CSDP. The framework of analysis is designed to answer two underlying questions:

- 1. Why has the CSDP developed a soft or civilian crisis manager, if Europeans drew military lessons from the failure to deal with crises in the Western Balkans in the 1990s?*
- 2. Why have some ideas been impactful in shaping CSDP policies, while others have not? Why has security cooperation deepened in some areas and not in others?*

A critical focus on international practices can help address the puzzle of European security. What ideas generated practices, and how? Is the concept of communities of practice the most appropriate tool to conduct investigation or would expertise alone suffice to that purpose?

Generative relationships (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 24-25), meaning those episodes of formative interactions that facilitate the emergence of a new practice, have not been sufficiently investigated by the academic literature. Nor were the dynamics of formation linked to the expansion and diffusion of practices, whereby intersubjective knowledge becomes established as social structures. Similarly, cases of “non-practice” in which practices fail to emerge and to meet the last phase of a “practice’s lifecycle” have been overlooked by the literature, hence missing an important step in the genealogy of practice development.¹³

With those considerations in mind, the following explanations to the research questions are hypothesized:

H1: The EU learned to become a soft crisis manager. The emergence of new approaches to the international provision of security influenced the way policy-makers conceived the EU’s role in crisis management and, as a result, the institutionalisation of CSDP. It follows that learning is more likely to occur when a consensus develops internationally and results in the formation of transnational communities.

It is expected that the creation of a policy consensus on non-military crisis management, promoted within the EU security architecture by expert and practice-based communities, has been the source from which the current design of the CSDP stems from. EU policy-makers learned the importance of security

¹³ On the genealogy of practice development, and its more general role in explaining strategic interaction from a practice perspective, cf. Adler and Pouliot (2011a: 24).

provision through civilian means, as a result of a process of diffusion of new ideas. It is argued therefore that epistemic innovation, supported by unfolding practices, has affected the first ten years of CSDP institution building, operational experience and strategic choices.

This hypothesis challenges alternative explanations for the rise of civilian and civil-military crisis management. Dwan (2002) emphasises the convergence of interest between small, neutral and anti-federalist EU member states, willing to counterbalance the attempt to create a military CSDP. Other authors (Quille et al., 2006; Chivvis, 2010) account for the CSDP “soft” identity as the result of an ongoing struggle between Atlanticists and Integrationists and the troublesome relationship between NATO and the CSDP. Gross (2008) and Tardy (2011) focus instead on the reshuffle of the security architecture after the end of the Cold War, and the EU’s efforts to put into practice the comprehensive approach to meet the growing demand for civil-military planning. According to Santopinto and Price (2013), the lack of strategic coherence and divergence among EU member states’ interests (Kagan, 2004; Menon et al, 2004; Gray, 2007). Finally, Dijkstra (2013) stressed endogenous-driven institutionalisation, and the influence of the Brussels-based bureaucracy on the creation of CSDP institutions. This approach, however, does not fully capture the diffusion of ideas outside the Brussels bureaucracy and the role of external (national, transnational) actors.


A learning approach to CSDP brings new light to the debate as it goes through the processes of social interactions, not limited to the EU’s bureaucratic arena,

as a result of which a new understanding of CSDP was constructed. It stresses the role of agency, by investigating the way actors respond to systemic changes or experience of failure (e.g. the Balkan crises) so as to change the underlying goals of an institution. One thing is to adapt military means to changing warfare; another thing is to speak about a “civilian power EU” and implementing a soft vision of European security. Furthermore, the hypothesis posits that ideas are not confined to bureaucratic walls. They are transnational, and trickle down the EU’s policy-making environment by processes of norm diffusion, which this work analyses by taking learning communities as the unit of analysis.

H2: The EU also learned by doing. Innovation has better chances to shape EU security policies if a community of practitioners existed in the sector area under consideration, and actors already share a common understanding and experiences of the issue at stake.

This second hypothesis suggests that generative efforts to create a common knowledge (e.g. innovation from policy failure) between actors are more likely to be successful and impact on policy evolution if a common practice already exists – and a community of practice too as a result. Figure 2.2 (below) elucidates the expansion of a practice:

Figure 2.2: Practice-based learning



Cognitive evolution is not just mediated by practice (Adler, 2008: 202). Cognitive evolution has more chances to succeed if it is generated into a pre-existing practice, which facilitate social learning (Checkel, 1999: 549). This hypothesis switches the analytical focus from governance and network analyses (Mérand et al., 2011) to the investigation of the formative actions that explain the genealogy of ideas by mapping the communities committed to its institutionalisation. It also engages the debate on European strategic cultures (Biehl et al., 2013; Meyer, 2006; Giegerich, 2006) by placing the emphasis on practice-based strategic interactions and patterns of learning by experience in shaping the development of CSDP. From these considerations, a third hypothesis follows:

H3: Conversely, when learning is knowledge-based, but does not rely on a shared practice (as in the case of a new area of cooperation or a new approach bridging previously separated sectors), influence on policy evolution is slower and change more difficult to achieve.

Despite favourable conditions and supportive agency facilitating innovation and diffusion, some ideas may struggle to have policy impact and produce change. If ideas are not bound up to pre-existing or present practices (and hence if a community of practice is absent), they are less likely to fulfil the institutionalisation process and struggle to generate evolution. This third hypothesis is tested against the competing explanations that epistemic communities and networks have shaped European security and defence (Cross, 2011; Howorth, 2004), and hence that the simple intersection between power and ideas (Risse-Kappen, 1994) can lead to change.


2.4 Pathways of influence and impact of learning

This section explains how the framework of analysis is applied to the case European security and the hypotheses tested. The literature describes the necessary steps for an idea to become a norm or a practice. These include generation, diffusion, institutionalisation and fading (Adler, 1991; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Adler and Haas elaborated a model explaining the role of epistemic communities in a five-step process involving policy innovation, diffusion, selection, persistence and evolution¹⁴ (Adler and Haas, 1992: 375-

¹⁴ According to the model, communities act first as policy *innovators*, by identifying the nature of the issue-area and framing the context in which new ideas are interpreted. Second, communities *diffuse* their policy recommendations transnationally, through communication and socialisation processes. New knowledge is shared and exchanged across research groups, national governments and international organisations through different channels (conferences, meetings, research networks), so that innovation becomes consensual. Policy *selection* mechanisms intervene to select certain advices and discard others. Policy *persistence* refers to the continuation of consensual and background knowledge about an issue within the members

387). Between generation and diffusion there is a “tipping point”, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

Figure 2.3: Policy evolution (Adler and Haas, 1992)



The learning dynamic leading to policy evolution can take essentially two forms: (1) intentional, when the policy outcomes reflect the new ideas diffused throughout the learning process; (2) unintentional, when the policy outcomes are different from the ideas diffused throughout the learning process.

Unintentional learning does not necessarily mean that an institution has failed to learn. It can mean, however, that policy evolution through learning by doing has not led to the desired policy outcomes, hence resulting in an incomplete learning process (this may include a “non practice” scenario).

Based on this typology and drawing from previous works on ideas and norm diffusion by McNamara (1998), Adler and Haas (1992), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Risse-Kappen (1994), the following table 2.4 maps out the possible interactions related to the pathways of influence through which

of an epistemic community, to determine how long it will remain influential. Finally, learning communities stimulate policy *evolution* as learning. Cf. Adler and Haas (1992: 375-387).

learning communities turn ideas into policy. The table identifies four main pathways. For each one of them, it outlines the underlying logic of action, the processes and actors involved, the impact on the learning process and, ultimately, the way it affects policy outcomes. The expectation is that for each one of the case studies under investigation, empirical findings will fall within one, some or all these pathways.

Table 2.4: Pathways of influence: how ideas turn into policy outcomes

<i>Logics of action</i>	Pathways	<i>Ideational processes and actors</i>	<i>Intervening factors</i>	<i>Impact on learning</i>	<i>Expected policy outcomes (cf. Legro's criteria)</i>
Interest-based	Sponsorship	Political and financial capital provided by key constituencies or "winning coalitions" in support of ideas	Timing, domestic structures	Relevance and dominance of new ideas as a result of the link with key political stakeholders.	Durability
Identity-based	Socialization	Interactive process of identity formation through socialization and cross-fertilization among actors, which creates a sense of "belonging".	Institutional-bureaucratic	Cohesiveness of the learning actors and development of a logic of appropriateness forging shared learning.	Concordance
Epistemic	Innovation	Shared understanding of the link between policy failure and policy innovation that creates the rationale for action.	Institutional and cultural	Authority and cohesiveness of the learning process as learning actors agree on a joint enterprise.	Concordance, Specificity
Isomorphic	Emulation	Presence of successful models that provides ground for action via their imitation.	Cultural	Transnational diffusion of ideas. Outside-in process of diffusion.	Durability, Specificity

Ideas turn into policy outcomes if the following four conditions are met:

1. the presence of a power constituency supporting the diffusion and institutionalisation of the new ideas;
2. the formation of cohesiveness and a “sense of belonging” among practitioners, facilitated by a common identity;
3. a shared epistemic enterprise aimed at producing policy innovation;
4. the emulation of a successful model of cooperation or policy implementation.

As Cross noted (2011), the cohesiveness of a community is a key parameter to define its persuasiveness and impact on policy. Among the factors influencing cohesiveness, the creation of a sense of belonging and a common rationale for action through socialisation is crucial, as it defines the identity boundaries of a learning community. Whether the result of organisational routines and experiences (CoPs) or the agreement on a common causal belief and joint policy enterprise (epicoms), identity formation is a main element of the set of generative interactions that allow a community to form.

Constituencies denote the presence of domestic coalitions or government networks that advocate and support, by means of resources or political action, the diffusion of new ideas. These actors can be individual member states, an institution (i.e., the European Council) or even an external organisation, provided that it is able and capable of exerting an influence on the target institution through advocacy action. Constituencies are often related to policy

networks. To achieve institutional learning, experts and practitioners need channels into the institutional system and institutional partners (decision-makers) to build up winning coalitions (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Hecló, 1974). Policy networks are therefore all important to ensure that ideas are injected into the institutional arena.

Learning is also a process of acquisition of new cognitive content, or paradigm innovation. An experience of policy failure is a necessary condition for shared beliefs to be developed and diffused. Widespread perception and common interpretation among stakeholders of an unsuccessful policy experience is the key factor paving the way for the rise of an alternative paradigm. This creates both the “cognitive authority (Adler, 2008: 203; Antoniadés, 2003: 29) or symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977) to offer previously unavailable understanding of a cause-effect linkage.

Policy failure concurs to define the boundaries of a learning community. The fiascos of the UN-led peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, as well as the failure of EU member states to effectively tackle conflict in the Western Balkans, pushed EU decision-makers and security experts, particularly in neutral and Nordic member states, to reconsider security policies. Similarly, the growing scepticism surrounding development aid in eradicating poverty convinced major aid donors (such as the UK, The Netherlands or the Nordic countries) to reframe the link between development, security and good governance, in order to ensure a more effective allocation of funds. In the case of security sector reform, the need for a transparent and democratically

accountable security sector gained salience in the wake of the EU and NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe. Public awareness in the UK, a country whose contribution was all-important to make SSR politically salient, was raised out of policy failure in Sierra Leone.

Emulation results from the information gathered about the experiences of other international actors. It includes processes of institutional isomorphism¹⁵ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5) as well as the exchange of best practices both at the operational and decision-making levels. Sociological institutionalism and the English school approach associate policy emulation to the expansion of Western cultural values shaping the formation of the “international society”.¹⁶ The concept stems from a “common perspective or international policy culture” (Ikenberry, 1990: 89), embedding rules and values that shape agency and behaviour and constitutes a precondition for emulation to occur.

What allows international actors to reproduce institutions by imitation is then a common social structure, making participation in a growing multilateral network culturally “necessary and appropriate” (Finnemore, 1996; March and Olsen, 1989). Social structures constructs what actors want - think about member states participation in the EU or the EU relations with NATO and the UN – but the relation between structure and agency is mutually constitutive.

¹⁵ Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing as the processes by which “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344).


¹⁶ On the English School approach, see Bull (1977); Bull and Watson (1984); Gong (1984); Buzan, (1993).

Therefore, inter-subjective learning dynamics and socialisation occurring at the micro-level between agents, do affect social structures too.

This co-constitutive relationship between structure and agency creates the room for learning communities to influence policy by an emulation path. The presence of successful model can provide learning communities with ground for action via imitation. An example to be replicated facilitates the impact of new ideas into policy.

On that account, figure 2.5 presents the framework and core argument of the thesis:

Figure 2.5: The core argument of the thesis



2.4.1 Intervening variables

Learning interactions are linked to the environment in which they operate. This includes domestic, institutional and cultural factors as well as time. As intervening variables, these factors facilitate a better understanding of the relationship between ideas and policy outcomes.


Organisational cultures shape organisations' (or units therein) self-perception, hence their behaviours and calculations. When different cultures coexist in the same institutional space, it is likely that each of them will try to defend its autonomy, protect its environment and possibly dominate over the other, especially in those situations where cooperation and close coordination is required. As a result, if the institution is not able to manage conflict between different cultures, competition patterns across overlapping communities may occur, leading to confrontation, miscommunication and competing compartmentalised processes. This outcome is the opposite process of learning: instead of producing shared solutions to complex problems, it encourages separate habit-driven behaviours.

Institutional factors also affect learning. Homogeneous or multi-level structures of governance can facilitate or hamper information sharing and the institutionalisation of new knowledge into the decision-making. It also affects the persistence – duration of lessons learned.

Domestic conditions refer to the degree of openness of a political culture to the diffusion of ideas and, as a result, to their institutionalisation. Some political

élites are more prone than others to seek the advice of formal or informal epistemic communities, or to facilitate the expansion of a practice.

Figure 2.6: Intervening factors



Finally, timing matters. I define timing as a point in time when a problem gets political salience, hence becoming *problematized*. According to Rose and Miller (1992), problems involving public policy choice can first arise through a process of *problematization* which can begin when existing practices are criticised as not ‘ideal’. These practices may, as a result, be made to appear deficient in some way or ways, leading to the identification of a “problem” for which an appropriate solution is required. Timing as problematization is an important intervening factor to create the awareness of policy failure that help new ideas moving towards the tipping point.


2.5 Causality, case selection and methodology

The thesis applies the learning communities framework to explain EU cooperation in the field of security and defence, and the soft or civilian design of the CSDP. The explanatory analysis of the role of learning communities relies on a constructivist approach, involving a mix of process tracing and content analysis. Before discussing the methodology, the question of how learning communities influence policies requires some clarification about causality and the nexus between dependent and independent variable.

The academic literature is ambiguous as to what is actually being explained in analyses involving knowledge and practice-based communities. Some authors (Haas P.M., 1997) locate the dependent variable in the general outcome of international policy coordination. Others (Dunlop, 2014) are sceptical about the standards against which an epistemic community's influence is judged and prefer to speak about different levels of influence.

Since the purpose of this work is to make sense of the CSDP as it currently stands, the dependent variable can be defined as a “policy outcome” involving goals, means or instruments-related institutional change (figure 2.7). Goals refer to the ultimate purpose of the institution, its ends, values or strategic prescriptions underlying the institution's means of action. Means refer to the organisational structures, programmes and policies that are set out to achieve the institution's goals. Finally, instruments are material and non-material resources (capabilities) available to achieve the institution's goals through its means.

Figure 2.7: Criteria for measuring institutional change




As for the independent variable, and linked to it the notion of causality, this thesis embraces a constructivist approach. It focuses on the role of ideas and knowledge in politics, stressing the role of collectively held or intersubjective understandings of social life. Ideational factors are shared, and construct the interests and identities of actors. Understanding how those social facts (Searle, 1995) construct reality is the primary objective of this work. Accordingly, the framework is not elaborated along causal “Big-T” claims (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998), but in such a way as to emphasize constitutive explanations with some limited causal properties (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Understanding how knowledge diffuses, and assessing the role practice, allows us to hypothesize about the conditions that make learning in European security cooperation possible. Learning communities, in this regards, are neither a

proper independent variable, nor simple transmissions belts: they are part of the constitution process.

The methodology used to test the hypotheses empirically is designed to capture the intersubjectivity at the core of this approach. To assess the relationship between ideas and policy outcomes, it is useful to refer to Legro’s definition of the “robustness” of a norm. Legro defines norms as “collective understandings of the proper behaviour of actors” (Legro, 1997: 33). Their robustness, defined as the influence on actors regardless of their identities, interests and individual behaviour, is determined by three criteria: specificity, durability and concordance (cf. figure 2.8). Specificity refers to how well the guidelines embedded in the norm are understood by actors. Durability is about how long the rules have been legitimately in effect and what factors questioned such legitimacy. Finally, concordance concerns the acceptance of the rules across formal and informal settings, that is the degree of inter-subjective agreement among actors (Legro, 1997: 34-35).¹⁷

Figure 2.8: Norm robustness (Legro, 1997)



¹⁷ See also Keohane (1989) and Young (1989).

In order to understand how learning communities have shaped EU security cooperation, this thesis tracks down the actions and processes through which ideas turned into policy. Ultimately, causality must reveal the impact of ideational factors in influencing concrete decisions, as well as their operational outcomes.

The selection of case studies reflects the concern of accounting for variation in the way ideas influence policies. Civilian crisis management (CCM) and security sector reform (SSR) are part of the CSDP toolbox for crisis management. They can be defined as two concepts, or new forms of activity in international security¹⁸ that have been incorporated into the European Union's functions in the late 1990s and early-2000s, became fully integrated in the CSDP through policy frameworks and started being implemented as part of the EU's operational efforts to prevent conflicts and maintain peace and stability. As such, they lie at the same level of analysis. EU documents present them as CSDP "tools" in support of international peace and security.¹⁹ Although some degree of overlap between SSR and CCM missions occurs in the field, the borders between the two concepts are clear in terms of the activities covered, instruments,²⁰ training and personnel.²¹

¹⁸ Cf. Finnish Government (2008: 5) and Meharg et al. (2010: 1, 14).

¹⁹ Cf. ENTRi (2013: 81) and European Union (2008: 2).

²⁰ The activities (and instruments) covered by CCM correspond to the four priority areas of civilian action defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection. The activities (and instruments) covered by SSR are defined in line with the 2004 OECD guidelines for the implementation SSR. For a detailed list, see chapter 5. For a discussion on the fuzziness of the SSR concept, and the confusion among EU policy-makers, see chapter 6.

²¹ For instance, as Bloching notes, Civilian Response Teams (CRT) for CCM and the SSR Pool of experts belong to separate domains and do not relate to the same expertise nor mode of

Therefore, my case selection has targeted two examples of policy innovation. I singled out the analysis of concepts designed to respond to increasingly challenging and complicated operating environments that required comprehensive approach and capabilities. Both cases have concurred to the definition of the framework for the EU comprehensive approach, which the European Commission defines as the “strategically coherent use of the EU tools and instruments for external action”.²² Both can be also understood as emerging practices in EU security.

However, despite having a similar genesis, CCM and SSR resulted in very different evolutionary patterns. Civilian crisis management has undergone a learning curve, with lessons learned growing exponentially with experience and leading to evolution and impact of the concept on the activities and institutional design of the CSDP. SSR implementation has been poor and learning almost absent.

To account for such variation, the thesis compares the two cases following Mill's method of difference, according to which everything between the two cases is constant except for the explanation (dependent variable) and the outcome (policy and institutional evolution). My analysis certainly leaves aside other potentially relevant cases of evolution. I deemed it necessary to limit my analysis to two cases belonging to the category of soft security provision and whose differences in outcomes were so wide as to make a good test for the hypotheses presented in the analytical framework. CCM and SSR are examples

deployment, although they operate within the framework of EU crisis management (Bloching, 2011: 23).

²² Cf. European Commission and HR/VP (2013: 1).

of epistemic innovation on which the determinant role of practices can be nicely tested. They are also traceable, as access to information and ability to understand the processes of diffusion do not pose any particular problem – this is not the case with all subfields of security and defence cooperation.

Having clarified the criteria for case selection and the causality, the methodology of this thesis aims at identifying the processes by which consensual knowledge was crafted, diffused and impacted on security policies. It uncovers the social and epistemological structure of the CSDP, therefore reconciling traditional institutional and networked governance approaches (Smith, 2004; Mérand, 2009) with and knowledge and practice-based learning accounts (Haas, 1990; Cross, 2011; Adler, 2008).

To this purpose, a combination of semi-structured experts and élites interviews, process tracing and document analysis was used. Interviews were structured in a survey,²³ whose questions were inspired by social network analysis (SNA). The resulting map of learning communities frames and describes the distinct structure of epicoms and CoPs in each one of the two case studies: their composition, individual and institutional members, selection and socialisation processes, and evolution over time.

The survey was hence designed to spot social relations among policy actors and experts. It allowed identifying the type, membership and boundaries of the learning communities in the two case study areas. In particular, it has been

²³ Cf. annexes 2 and 3.

used to detect the presence of a common practice binding the actors involved in those communities during the formative interaction and diffusion processes.

As Hafner-Burton et al. put it, network analysis offers “a method for measuring the sources of socialisation and diffusion of norms based on the strength of ties between states, collective state identities such as security communities, and the importance of individual states” (Hafner-Burton, 2008: 569). Material and social relationships create structures among actors through dynamic processes, which define, enable or constrain agency, therefore affecting collective action (i.e. international cooperation and governance). Network analysis concerns relations (ties) between nodes (or agents). Networks are defined as any set or sets of ties between any set or sets of nodes. It is grounded in three principles:

- (a) nodes and their behaviours are mutually dependent, not autonomous;
- (b) ties between nodes can be channels for transmission of both material and non-material products (i.e., information, beliefs and norms);
- (c) persistent patterns of association among nodes create structures that can define, enable or restrict the behaviour of nodes.

(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 560-561)

The population is defined by using Kriesi and Jegen's (2001) criteria for delineating the boundaries of the network:

- 1) *positional criterion*: scanning and identification of all actors interested in security policy in a given area of analysis (i.e. Europe);

- 2) *participative criterion*: in-depth study of conferences, seminars and summits in order to extract actors who took a stand on the issue at stake, independently or on behalf of their organisation;
- 3) *reputational criterion*: submission of the list drafted on the basis of the previous two criteria to a small group of experts who would add the names of other experts that were mission or would subtract those who they would consider as playing a marginal role in the debate.

These three criteria are a fairly good starting point to draw a list of the actors involved in one learning community, in that they can show that its members are:

- 1) actively involved in the network-building phase, either by attending meetings and conferences or by publishing papers or getting involved in projects related to the issue;
- 2) recognised as members of the community by other individuals or organisations; or that they hold as many shared contacts as possible and as less grades of separation as possible with other members, hence corroborating their affiliation with the community.

More than 25 semi-structured élites and expert interviews have been arranged for each of the two case studies, for a total of 50+ interviews.²⁴ Interviewed

²⁴ Cf. list of interviewees, annex 1.

people were EU and national officers (civilian and military staff), experts, scholars, professionals from lobby and advocacy groups involved in European security. All of them were asked a mix of structured questions and non-structured ones.

From each interviewee’s transcripts, I extracted the main relationships the individuals had with colleagues and acquaintances, to draw the overall network of communications and interactions. Drawing from Créplet et al. (2003: 49), I distinguished two types of relationships: groups whose members develop close working relationship, with similar or complementary practices (a CoP); and groups whose aim was the advancement of specific knowledge, for instance by promoting a new thinking (an epistemic community). The distinction (cf. table 2.9) represented a way for to distinguish the two kinds of communities.

Table 2.9: Attributes of CoPs and epicoms

	Community of practice	Epistemic community
Relationship with other agents	<i>Close working experience, similar or complementary practice</i>	<i>Advancement of specific knowledge or new thinking</i>
Expectation - case study	<i>CCM</i>	<i>SSR</i>

The questionnaire included standardized questions related to the interviewee’s background (current and past affiliations, sector, type of organisations he/she collaborated with); the understanding of the issue areas under study (definition

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of the concepts of CCM/SSR, identification of main challenges to implementation, lessons drawn; language and technical jargon used); the engagement in the policy areas (professional output, sources of funding, self-perception of influence vis-à-vis policy-making, type of expert advice requested and frequency, list of people or organisations consulted, meetings or conferences attended); the relationship with other influential stakeholders (reputation, type of relationship).

To ensure a rigorous data collection and analysis, I triangulated different sources of observation. The mapping methodology presented above was then complemented by process tracing and content analysis, to assess the impact of the communities in shaping decisions at key points in time and find a correspondence of their ideas into the new policy frameworks created.

Process tracing “traces the operation of the causal mechanism at work in a given situation” (Checkel, 2008: 116). According to George and Bennett (2005: 210-211), the basic version of process tracing delineates the narrative or description of how events occur, and then links the events to the analytical framework. Process tracing was hence used in this thesis to identify the critical junctures and reconstruct the events leading to policy evolution in the selected case studies.

Qualitative document analysis was finally used to assess whether the ideas and knowledge diffused by the communities reflect in the content of EU official documents; what conceptualisation emerged as a result of the process of learning; or whether emulation patterns were detected by the comparison with

official documents of other international actors. Specific criteria were adopted for documents selection, verification and analysis. EU and member states' official strategies, guidelines, policy frameworks and communications were considered, together with other relevant written documents that were issued by organisations recognised as influent in the policy debate according to the results of the survey (for instance, definitions provided by think-tanks and organisations that have shaped the debate according to more than one interviewee). The publication date was considered to track the progress of knowledge diffusion over time; acknowledgments have also been useful to cross-check whether contributors to one influent publication were likely to form a community or had links with governments / policy networks. Documents were collected from the public domain; in some cases, confidential sources were used. For each document, the meaning, the relevance, the terminology used, the ideas expressed (objectives, aims, values), context as regards the two policy areas considered were assessed and related to other publications of the same time or by the same authors to reconstruct the diffusion process.

Based on the aforementioned methodology, the analysis of the case studies started on background knowledge acquired through an intense review of the secondary literature available. Interviews were arranged in Brussels, Geneva, Stockholm, Rome, Pisa, London and Washington DC with multiple stakeholders, carried out between March 2011 and April 2012. Almost all interviews were face-to-face, in exceptional cases Skype and phone calls were

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arranged. The list of interviewees was expanded through referral method – recommendation of suitable interviewees by initial contacts – after a preliminary phase of the fieldwork. Data gathered from interviews were typed one day (at the latest) after the interview and cross-checked with previous findings and results from document analysis and literature review to test their reliability and validity. Internet tools – in particular social networks as LinkedIn, Academia.edu, organisations' databases, Alumni networks – were widely used to verify the professional links between individual actors, joint publications, common experiences. I am grateful to those interviewees who have accepted to submit their resumes and share personal information to facilitate this research. Interviews were never recorded to facilitate a relation of trust with the interviewee. In some cases, group interviews with up to three experts were arranged.

While this is by no means a research work without limits, this methodology has allowed me to get an in-depth understanding of the actors who have promoted SSR/CCM ideas in Europe, their belonging to specific learning communities and the way their enterprise translated into observable policy outcomes. The extent to which the conclusions can be generalised beyond the boundaries of European security will be discussed in the concluding chapters.

Chapter 3

A paradigmatic shift in security: CSDP and the EU's comprehensive approach

Introduction

A Joint Communication by the High Representative and the European Commission, released in December 2013, defines the EU comprehensive approach (CA) as the “strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments” (European Commission, 2013: 1) for external action in crisis or conflict situations.²⁵ As tools for crisis management, security sector reform and civilian crisis management are embedded in the EU's CA at three levels. Conceptually, coordinated cooperation and coherent measures resulting from a comprehensive or integrated approach are essential preconditions for an effective use of the crisis management tools. Institutionally, CA offers the organisational basis for cooperation, encouraging the creation of structures and the division of labour/distribution of resources. Finally, at the planning and operational level, the coordination between actors enables the definition of the common objectives, of the instruments to be used as well as the criteria for appropriate and timely action (SWP/ZIF, 2012: 25). Therefore, CA provides

²⁵ Cf. European Commission and HR/VP (2013).

the basis for the crisis management tools to be effectively operated within the CSDP.

On that account, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it illustrates the conceptual origins of the EU's comprehensive approach and the new global security agenda since the end of the Cold War. The EU has in fact developed its crisis management structures and capabilities at a time of profound change and re-conceptualisation of the definition of security. The changing nature of security threats compelled international actors to adapt their responses, therefore altering the character of crisis management. Chapter 4 will outline the impact of this new multi-dimensional understanding of security provision on the actors, structures and networks involved in European security cooperation.

Second, this chapter is a starting point to explain the civilianisation of CSDP (Drent, 2011). It addresses the normative transformations that underpin the rise of "comprehensiveness", which, combined with experiences of policy failure (e.g. the Balkan crises in the 1990s), drove the evolution of the CSDP. By doing so, it paves the way for the empirical analysis, which investigates why some tools for crisis management within the comprehensive approach have been more impactful than others in shaping CSDP activities.

Comprehensiveness refers to the need for multi-faceted, rapid response capabilities, and a complementary long-term strategy, to address all possible aspects of a particular crisis in a coherent manner (Barry, 2012: 2). It embraces a holistic approach in resolving crisis situations and moves away from purely military responses that dominated the security discourse during the Cold War.

There is no single or common definition of comprehensive approach in the international community. States and international organisations understand and implement comprehensiveness in slightly different ways, in most cases using different models, strategies and terminology (Wendling, 2010: 10). The European Union translated the idea of comprehensiveness into a framework for coordination among the different EU actors. CA acquires hence a very specific meaning in the EU jargon, although the same term may be present in member states' national doctrines or other international organisations' policies.²⁶

Accordingly, this chapter locates the EU CA within the broader emergence and evolution of “comprehensiveness”. This overview is necessary in order to understand the environment in which two elements of the comprehensive approach, SSR and CCM, developed. The deepening of security cooperation in Europe through the CSDP and the paradigmatic shift in security are in fact part of the same package and cannot really be analysed as two free-standing processes. Notwithstanding the military orientation of the St Malo declaration (1998),²⁷ this paradigmatic shift heavily influenced the CSDP, as shown by the institutional consolidation of the CA with the Lisbon Treaty as well as by the importance of civil-military coordination and cooperation for CSDP missions.

Therefore, it is important to link broader norm generation and diffusion at the international level (new concepts and security paradigms), to the narrower

²⁶ For instance, NATO's Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Cf. the definition of the comprehensive approach on NATO's website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (Accessed 7 February 2014).

²⁷ As a matter of fact, the British-French joint declaration does not contain any reference to the development of civil-military, civilian or comprehensive crisis management capacity for the EU.

development of the Union's CA, in order to pave the way for the two in-depth case studies analysed in chapters 6 and 7. My empirical analysis will then show to what extent the civilian side has prevailed in shaping the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management, and why.

Building on the literature available and on interviews with security experts and practitioners, this chapter identifies human security and peacebuilding as the intellectual and paradigmatic ground upon which the foundations of comprehensiveness were laid. In the following sections, I explore the conceptualisation of these two key paradigms in order to explain how the EU has responded to the need for a more integrated understanding of crisis management by developing its own concept of CA. Doing so, the chapter pays special attention to analytical and conceptual challenges rather than operational ones, although transformations were in part triggered by the need to revise missions' character and design.

In line with previous works on the subject, my analysis acknowledges that contemporary crisis management has essentially changed in three dimensions: (1) an expansion of the spectrum of tasks beyond traditional military peacekeeping; (2) a dilation of the timeline of intervention (from short to long-term conflict prevention interventions); (3) as a result of the previous two, the rise and diversification of the actors involved (Major and Molling, 2009: 21). These changes created the international awareness for new appropriate responses on three levels: a broader level where new global norms are generated, leading to the peacebuilding international agenda; a theoretical one,

prompting the human security approach; and the narrower, implementation level of the CA.

3.1 Concepts and practices of peacebuilding in international politics

The term “peacebuilding” (PB) officially entered the international politics lexicon in 1992, with the report *An Agenda for Peace* released by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (United Nations, 1992). However, it is widely recognised that the conceptual origins of the term date back to the mid-1970s, thanks to the work by Johan Galtung *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding* (Galtung, 1976). Galtung posited that “structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars may occur” (Galtung, 1976: 298). His observations provided the intellectual cradle for the subsequent evolution of the peacebuilding concept during the 1980s/1990s and its integration in the peace studies academic debate. Along a social and holistic vision of the resolution of conflict, a consensus progressively developed within the academic and intellectual community on peacebuilding as tool for conflict transformation (Lederach, 1997): a comprehensive concept encompassing “the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 1997: 20).

As it is often the case, major structural transformations – the end of the Cold War – and subsequent changes in the morphology of conflicts created a

window of opportunity for new principles to be officially adopted by international actors. The window of opportunity was further opened by a sharp increase in unsolved, protracted and complex conflicts across the globe – Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Afghanistan – and relevant dramatic episodes such as the Rwandan genocide - that highlighted the fiasco of international responses and the need for more appropriate instruments for intervention. Both in global (e.g. the UN's failure to deal with fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa) and regional policy arenas (e.g. Western European states facing instability in their immediate neighbourhood), all conditions were met for the peacebuilding principles to become mainstream, and for conflict prevention and development assistance tools to be integrated. Institutional change occurred through the creation of new policy and planning methodologies (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001: 8). In many cases, these processes overcame bureaucratic resistance to maintain conventional aid and post-conflict assistance (Menkhaus, 2004). The new approaches also coped with the general reluctance of international agencies to intensify mutual dialogue and to deepen coordination as required by the integrated approach.

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined the principles of post-conflict peacebuilding as regrouping “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people”, and based on the belief that “only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable

foundation” (United Nations, 1992: VI). Initially linked to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, the UN’s work on peacebuilding continued steadily throughout the 1990s, nailing down the conceptual links between previously disconnected fields of interventions (security, development, governance etc.). The table 3.1 lists the different initiatives and publications contributing to a deepened shared understanding and implementation of peacebuilding within the UN system.

Table 3.1: Institutionalisation of peacebuilding (UN)

UN Document	Year	Contribution to PB
An Agenda for Peace	1992	<i>PB officially enters the UN language. Definition of PB.</i>
An Agenda for Development; UNDP Report on Human Security; An Agenda for Democratization.	1994 1994 1996	<i>Conceptual work on the links between security, development, democratization and human rights feeding the debate on PB.</i>
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace	1995	<i>Expansion of the PB concept to address all conflict phases. PB aim: institutionalization of peace.</i>
An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities	1996	<i>Identification of PB activities to be undertaken by UN agencies.</i>
Brahimi Report	2000	<i>Re-definition of PB: "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war".</i>
Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations	2003	<i>Call for an action plan to identify ways in which different actors within the UN system may devise joint, country specific PB strategies.</i>
A More Secure World	2004	<i>Recommendation for the establishment of a PB Commission and Support Office.</i>
In Larger Freedom	2005	<i>Further elaboration of PB Commission plan.</i>
Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office (UNSC and UNGA)	2005	<i>Creation of permanent institutional structures to address PB needs.</i>

In the UN context, the new PB structures became operational by the mid-2006. They succeeded in breaking new ground in the organisation’s security agenda, although in stark contrast with poor operational achievements in theatres such

as East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. Criticism over PB practices was also expressed by some analysts and scholars (Betts, 1996; Rieff, 2002; Le Sage, 1998), who highlighted the gap between the neoliberal international consensus²⁸ on PB and the inadequacy of interventionary commitment (Richmond, 2004).

Despite such growing criticism of the effectiveness of UN peace operations, the institutionalisation of peacebuilding within the UN system contributed to raise international awareness concerning the need for multidimensional and comprehensive missions to consolidate peace and preventing the recurrence of conflicts. States, international organisations and non-state actors (NGOs and civil society organisations in particular) jumped on the bandwagon (Barnett et al., 2007). It was not just a consequence of the UN's legitimising power in the international arena, nor a mechanical cascade effect originating in structural changes affecting conflicts. According to Mankhouse (2004), think-tanks and advocacy groups on conflict prevention and peacebuilding sprang up in the mid-1990s, producing fieldwork-based research and intense lobbying aimed at convincing donors and multilateral agencies that narrow sectoral strategies were ineffective in complex post-conflict environments (Mankhouse, 2004: 3). This advocacy strategy eventually paid off in mainstreaming PB. Certainly, the UN cover was essential to give credibility and legitimacy to those voices, and so certainly was the adherence to a specific epistemic – Western, liberal – vision of PB (Paris, 2002). Tschirgi (2003) describes a “gradual elaboration of

²⁸ On the “liberal bias” of peacebuilding, see Paris (2002).

an expanded normative framework” (p. 3) for international affairs under the UN umbrella, with a series of international conferences in the early part of the 1990s seeking to generate an agenda with the concept of peacebuilding at its core.

Swift normative diffusion through bandwagoning produced a general overhaul of structures and policies to respond to the security challenges under the new paradigm. Institutional revisions affected individual governments and IOs alike, through the establishment of conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding units (e.g. CHAD in DFID, the Post-Conflict Unit at the World Bank etc.) or networks (the OECD’s CPDC, now INCAF). Many governments attempted to align their programs in the foreign, security and development policy fields (Tschirgi, 2003). However, these efforts did not produce substantial results in terms of overall coherence of peacebuilding objectives. A major side effect of the swift diffusion was therefore the proliferation of definitions and approaches to PB, many of which went far beyond the principles established at the UN level in an uncoordinated manner.

Terminological confusion and inconsistency between different organisations’ PB objectives undermined multilateral cooperation, and affected implementation and impact assessment matters, with obvious implications on learning infrastructures.²⁹ As Barnett et al. (2007) put it, actors comply with notions of peacebuilding that are consistent with their own mandates,

²⁹ On organisational learning and peacebuilding, see Benner et al. (2007).

worldviews, and organisational interests (p. 53); consequently, the idea of building peace is operationalised with considerable differences.

The table 3.2 provides an overview of the different international actors involved in PB, and the different concepts and practices developed within each one of them.

Table 3.2: Definitions of peacebuilding

Agency	Concept	Definition
UN DPA	Post-conflict peacebuilding	<i>All external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, including all activities and programs designed to support and strengthen these transitions.</i>
UNDP	Conflict prevention and peacebuilding	<i>Activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations.</i>
World Bank	Post-conflict reconstruction	<i>Activities that support the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society</i>
European Commission	Conflict prevention and crisis management	<i>Activities aiming not only at easing a situation where an outbreak of violence is imminent (conflict prevention in a narrow sense) but also at preventing the occurrence of such a situation (conflict prevention in a wider sense)</i>
US Department of state	Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization	<i>Activities to help post- conflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development.</i>
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Post-conflict reconstruction	<i>An umbrella term covering a range of activities required in the immediate aftermath of a conflict</i>
UK Ministry of Defence	Peacebuilding	<i>Activities relating to the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people require a commitment to a long-term process</i>
UK Department for International Development	Conflict reduction and post-conflict peacebuilding	<i>Conflict reduction includes conflict management (activities to prevent the spread of existing conflict); conflict prevention (short term activities to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict); conflict resolution (short term activities to end violent conflict); and peacebuilding (medium and long term actions to address the factors underlying violent conflicts). Essential post-conflict peacebuilding measures include disarmament, demobilization and</i>

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		<i>reintegration programs, and building the public institutions that provide security, transitional justice and reconciliation and basic social services.</i>
German Federal Foreign Office	Civilian crisis prevention	<i>The concept of civilian crisis prevention encompasses conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding and is understood through a number of strategic leverage points, such as the establishment of stable state structures (rule of law, democracy, human rights and security) and the creation of the potential for peace within civil society, the media, cultural affairs and education.</i>
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	Peacebuilding	<i>Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the development of the structural conditions, attitudes, and modes for political behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social and economic development. As conceptualized in the joint Utstein study, peacebuilding activities fall under four many headings: security, socioeconomic foundations, political framework for long term peace, and reconciliation.</i>
French Ministry of Defence	Peace consolidation	<i>Activities in support of peace consolidation include monitoring compliance with arms embargoes, deployment of peacekeeping troops, DDR and deployment of police and gendarmerie in support of the rule of law.</i>
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Crisis management	<i>Policy primarily pursued through multilateral organizations: peacekeeping, political and constitutional processes, democratization, administrative state capacity, technical assistance for public finance and tax policy, and support for independent media.</i>
Canadian International Development Agency	Peacebuilding	<i>Efforts to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict in order to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence</i>
Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces	Peacebuilding	<i>Actions to support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability, which include mechanisms to identify and support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of confidence and well-being, and support for economic growth.</i>

Against this backdrop, it is worth stressing that the EU is a distinctive actor in peacebuilding. From a normative standpoint, the EU was, since the beginning, conceived as a peace project. Many of the notions underlying PB (sustainable peace, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, effective

multilateralism, democracy promotion and human rights) are part of the EU's DNA and figure in the Lisbon Treaty and other EU official documents.

The significance of the EU as the most ambitious elaboration of the link between a durable form of peace and factors such as democracy, the rule of law, security and prosperity has been studied both in terms of historical legacy (Anastasiou, 2007) and normative vision for a value-based foreign policy (Tocci, 2008). Politically, the EU is also the world's biggest donor and a key provider of security in its neighbourhood. Finally, the EU can be seen as the incubator of evolving, puzzle-like communities of peacebuilding practices, built on a habitus that has pioneered new forms of internal post-sovereign politics (Björkdahl et al., 2009) together with an integrationist, humanitarian and multilateral outward focus.

Because of these features, which outline a very peculiar relation between outward "vision" (normative power Europe) and inward "practice" of peace resulting from historical and political legacies, the EU has been described as a PB actor distinct from the others. This peculiarity is also due to the way the Union has internalised PB. On the one hand, the EU consensus on PB emanates from the international consensus on liberal PB and follows closely on the UN PB agenda, adding the focus on regional frameworks of integration and association (Björkdahl et al., 2009: 8); on the other hand, however, EU institutions and member states have developed different strategies and methodologies, thus generating additional confusion and overlap to an already complex concept.

The on-going institutional reform launched by the Lisbon Treaty so far has not introduced a coherent model. Despite the creation of a specifically dedicated division on “Conflict prevention, peacebuilding and mediation instruments” within the EEAS, fragmentation persists.³⁰ The complexities of the EU’s PB practice are due not just to the different notions or operational approaches. Part of the problem is also the multi-dimensional nature of the concept, which entails, in some cases, a conflict of responsibilities among institutions. PB areas are manifold³¹ and the distinction between Commission’s long-term or CFSP’s short-term interventions tends to be fuzzy.

3.2 Human security: theory, narrative and praxis

Peacebuilding and human security (HS) are two interrelated concepts. Both have dominated the post-Cold War conflict transformation, and challenged the traditional security paradigm based on state power and military force, which no longer seemed well-equipped to meet challenges facing weak and fragile states. HS and PB were boosted by the same factors: intra-state conflicts outnumbering interstate ones, underdevelopment as a source of increased violent upheavals (security-development nexus), relationship between conflicts and social development.

³⁰ For a detailed description of the roles of the EU institutions in peacebuilding following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see EPLO (2011).

³¹ For a list of PB areas and activities, and their definitions, cf. Appendix 1 in Barnett et al. (2007: 56-57).

The fundamental difference between the two concepts is epistemological. PB is an international, multidimensional agenda redefining actors' engagement in promoting sustainable peace and providing the practical guidelines to achieve such goal. HS is a new paradigm that ensues from a paradigmatic shift, meaning a profound change in the basic models of thinking explaining a social reality. This revolution aimed at changing the way academics and professionals view and talk about security. Therefore, in addition to the normative thinking on the root causes of conflicts, a broader and more theoretical debate opened up in the early-mid 1990s on the subjective nature of security, leading to the fundamental question: "whose view of security should count?" (United Nations, 2009: 6).

Proponents of HS demand a deepening and widening of the notion of security, traditionally understood as defence of a sovereign state or territory from a military threat. Human security refers to the welfare of individuals and communities, expressed in its security and development dimensions as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" respectively (Kaldor et al., 2007: 273). Officially launched through the UNDP report in 1994, HS was endorsed by a group of states and NGOs led by the governments of Canada and Norway, which took the organisational shape of the Human Security Network³² (Paris, 2001: 87). HS principles had already entered the security discourse during the 1970s-1980s, although at that time they were not part of a compact theoretical framework, and not labelled as "human security": for instance, the

³² The network originally included also Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand (Paris, 2001: 87).

pioneering 1982 Report of the Palm Commission used the term “Common Security”.³³

Progressively, from the late-1990s onward, the paradigm made its way through academia (Richmond, 2001; Stoett, 1999; Suhrke, 1999), while actors began to adopt more or less similar conceptual templates to institutionalise the concept.³⁴ Degree and research programmes on human security proliferated in the early-2000s and a new body of literature emerged to engage, expand or even attack the paradigm (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 2012). Since the HS suffered from the a lack of consensus, disagreement over common parameters, purposes and contexts, international debates on broad/narrow formulation and institutionalisation across different organisations blossomed (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). As in the case of PB, actors and authors offer competing definitions, according to different visions of HS (Liotta and Owen 2006; MacFarlane and Khong 2006; King and Murray, 2001).

The 1994 UNDP’s Human Development Report is generally considered as the standard and most diffused reference for HS, although detractors point out that such definition fails to introduce criteria facilitating implementation. The key dimensions identified by the UNDP report are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24-25). The table below (3.3) displays the main definitions of human security.

³³ The *Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues* (aka the “Palm Commission”) was formed to examine international security problems. Available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/36555/andrew-j-pierre/common-security-a-blueprint-for-survival> (Accessed 9 August 2012).

³⁴ Criticism has been raised, however, about how states have customised their definition of human security to suit their own foreign policy or strategic needs. Cf. Paris (2001: 90).

Table 3.3: Definitions of human security

International Actors (Organisations/States/Individuals)	Definition / Components of HS*
UNDP	<p><i>Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.</i></p> <p>(UNDP, 1994: 23)</p>
Human Security Network	<p><i>A humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from poverty and despair, is still a dream for many and should be enjoyed by all. In such a world, every individual would be guaranteed freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to fully develop their human potential. Building human security is essential to achieving this goal. In essence, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives</i></p> <p>(Human Security Network's official website)</p>
Japan	<p><i>Japan emphasizes "Human Security" from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel land mines, and has taken various initiatives in this context. To ensure "Human freedom and potential," a range of issues needs to be addressed from the perspective of "Human Security" focused on the individual, requiring cooperation among the various actors in the international community, including governments, international organizations and civil society.</i></p> <p>(Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Bluebook 1999, Chapter 2, Section 3)</p>
Canada	<p><i>For Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives."... "Canada has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>1. Protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict.</i> <i>2. Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions.</i> <i>3. Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence.</i>

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	<p>4. <i>Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights.</i></p> <p>5 . <i>Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime</i></p> <p>(Foreign Ministry's official website)</p>
<p>Kofi Annan</p>	<p><i>In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of security is evolving. Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence. The need for a more human-centred approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used</i></p> <p>(United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Millenium Report, Chapter 3, p.43-44)</p>
<p>Astri Suhrke</p>	<p><i>Whether the threat is economic or physical violence, immediate protective measures are necessary if longer-term investments to improve conditions can be relevant at all. It follows that the core of human insecurity can be seen as extreme vulnerability. The central task of a policy inspired by human security concerns would therefore be to protect those who are most vulnerable. ...The philosophers do not tell us precisely who the vulnerable are, but it is self-evident that those exposed to immediate physical threats to life or deprivation of life-sustaining resources are extremely vulnerable. ...Other persons can be placed in equally life-threatening positions for reasons of deep poverty or natural disasters. This gives us three categories of extremely vulnerable persons:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>victims of war and internal conflict;</i> • <i>those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and</i> • <i>victims of natural disasters.</i> <p><i>In this schema, the condition of abject poverty or powerlessness is not qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict. Indeed, it recalls the concept of 'structural violence' developed in the 1970s by Johan Galtung.</i></p> <p>(Suhrke, 1999)</p>
<p>Gary King and Christopher Murray</p>	<p><i>"...the number of years of future life spend outside a state of "generalized poverty"</i></p> <p><i>"...our suggestion for a parsimonious set of domains for measuring human security would be income, health, education and political freedom and democracy"</i></p> <p>(King and Murray, 2001)</p>

<p>David T. Graham and Nana K. Poku</p>	<p><i>Rather than viewing security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua citizens’ (that is, toward their states), our approach view security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua persons’ (Krause and Williams 1997). Implicit then, in this conjunction of issues with ideas of human security and liberation is the notion of the ethical and moral. As an approach that focuses upon the importance of the insecurities facing people rather than governments or institutional agencies, human security is concerned with transcending the dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy that views critical concerns of migration – recognitions (i.e. citizenship), basic needs (i.e. sustenance, protection (i.e. refugee status), or human rights (i.e. legal standing) – as problems of interstate politics and consequently beyond the realm of the ethical and moral.</i></p> <p>(Graham and Pok, 2000: 17)</p>
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*Source: Global Development Research Center (GDRC) website, “Definitions of Human Security”³⁵

As the dimensions of human security encompass, as the UNDP definition admits, a complex net of tasks and categories, their practical use for policy-makers and analytical feasibility for scholars has been questioned (Paris, 2001). An interesting illustration of this problem has to do with the linkage between the theoretical precepts of HS and the operationalisation of peacebuilding missions in fragile contexts. According to Cockell (2000), conducting peacebuilding following a human security approach implies the selection of four basic parameters: focus on root causes of conflict, attention to differences in local conditions when launching new operations, target of sustainable and durable results, and mobilisation of local actors and resources in support of peace. This narrows down the applicability of HS to a necessary “arbitrary understanding” of its prescriptions.

³⁵ Available from: <http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf> (Accessed 1 October 2012).

Since HS means practically anything, then it effectively means nothing (Paris, 2001: 93) unless actors single out a specific operational orientation to avoid problems of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970). It follows that when it comes to conceptual confusion, HS and PB show similar shortfalls, although at different levels of analysis. How is this confusion reflected in the EU approach to human security policies?

Studying the importance of HS as a new strategic narrative for the EU, Kaldor et al. (2007) distinguish between *lexis* – what is written about HS – and *praxis* – HS-based actions, policies and tactics on the ground (p. 273). They argue that HS is in essence European. It is deep rooted in the EU security discourse. What the CSDP does in three areas – *crisis management*, *civil-military co-ordination* and *conflict prevention* – already is a HS approach, only it is not called that way (Kaldor et al., 2007: 274). The main contribution of HS to European security is to bring greater coherence to the formulation of EU policies by offering a set of principles applying to the ends and means of CSDP, namely (1) the respect for human rights, (2) the establishment of legitimate political authority through limitations in the use of military force and (3) effective multilateralism (Kaldor et al., 2007).

But why should the EU adopt a new paradigm, if this is already done in the current praxis? Why should the EU embark upon a human security template? Glasius and Kaldor (2005) argue that the motivation is threefold: morality (e.g. moral commitment to provide security where this is lacking), legality (e.g. obligations coming from the EU legal framework) and self-interest (e.g.

Europeans cannot be safe as long as other states and people live in insecurity), underpinned by the outcomes of globalisation impacting on traditional state security (Sira and Grans, 2010). Furthermore, when translating into policy practice, the terminological and conceptual fragmentation into multiple policy labels (Kaldor et al., 2007) ineluctably adds up to cumbersome inter-institutional dynamics and the lack of a clear definition of tasks and objectives of EU foreign policy. Advocates of HS claim that the only way to bring clarity to the plethora of concepts, norms and labels is to reframe the definition of “security” from the theoretical/paradigmatic levels, which would allow to put in place customised policies “to the complex needs of contemporary global security” (Kaldor et al., 2007: 288).

3.3 The EU’s comprehensive approach to security

3.3.1 Genesis of the EU’s CA

The previous sections help us grasping the external normative context in which the notion of comprehensive approach, and the CSDP framework for it, developed. The present section, and the next one review respectively the genesis of the CA and its implementation within the CSDP.

Notwithstanding the tendency to conceive PB and HS as “catch-all labels”, the difference between them can be framed in these terms: HS has to do with a shared understanding of *the why*, whereas PB relates to *the how*

comprehensiveness in security is implemented through integrated policies.³⁶ Against this backdrop, it is important to note, for the sake of analytical clarity, that comprehensiveness and the comprehensive approach implemented by the EU are not the same thing. Comprehensiveness denotes a general understanding in the international community that responses to security threats cannot be strictly military and, therefore, links with other dimensions or different types/methodologies of interventions are necessary alongside the use of force. Governments and international organisations have gradually adapted their strategic doctrines and procedures so as to take into account greater comprehensiveness, with many overlapping terms such as “whole of government” (used by the British government), “multi-dimensionality” or “integrated mission” (United Nations), 3D approach (Defence, Development and Diplomacy, in Canada and the Netherlands).³⁷

The EU’s comprehensive approach is the process of institutional change within the Union aimed at instilling a “culture of co-ordination” among the different actors involved in crisis management and as part of a broader holistic framework for intervention by means of the Petersberg tasks. Accordingly, CA can be described as *the operationalisation of “the why” and “the how” within the EU institutional setting*.

The history of the EU CA is linked to the circumstances leading to the launch of the CSDP in the late-1990s. As some authors have argued, while widespread

³⁶ This differentiation takes inspiration from Drent (2011): “Key to comprehensive approaches to security is the shared understanding of *the why* (human security), but also of *the how* (with integrated policies)” (Drent, 2011: 4).

³⁷ Cf. Drent (2011: 4).

agreement emerged over the nature of past errors (e.g. policy failure in the Western Balkans) and justified the design of new instruments to deal with crises, consensus on the errors was more evident than the agreement on the institutional means to fix them (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010).³⁸ Squabbles pertained to the relationship with NATO (Howorth and Menon, 2009) and the appropriate level of military build-up, but also to the neutral and Nordic states' emphasis on conflict prevention in the new policy design, given their tradition in this area (Ojanen, 2000; Olsen and Pilegaard, 2005). The reasons why this led to the “civilianisation” of the CSDP (Drent, 2011) will be discussed more extensively in the next chapters.

CA essentially relies on two components: civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)³⁹ at the tactical level and civil-military coordination (CMCO)⁴⁰ at the political/strategic/institutional levels.

The CIMIC doctrine is a military development, introduced in NATO member states since the mid-1990s as a result of a set of lessons learned on the ground, namely in the Western Balkans. The EU officially adopted the CIMIC concept in 2002, upon recommendation of the EU Military Committee and based on a Council's decision (Council of the European Union, 2002a).⁴¹

³⁸ According to Menon and Sedelmeier, the tension between the military solution foreseen by the early initiatives on CSDP (Saint Malo and Cologne) and the shaping of a civilian CSDP lies at the basis of EU security cooperation: “the subsequent history of ESDP reveals the way in which the unintended consequences of the introduction of new instruments can profoundly shape outcomes” (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010: 83).

³⁹ Cf. Council of the European Union (2009a).

⁴⁰ Cf. Council of the European Union (2003; 2006a).

⁴¹ On the origins of CIMIC in the EU and on the distinction between CIMIC and CMCO, cf. Khol (2006: 122).

CMCO serves a more internal function of coordination of the planning and implementation phases of the EU's crisis response, therefore addressing "the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis" (Council of the European Union, 2003). Furthermore, CMCO is a concept that was developed in the EU context only, given the *sui generis* nature of EU decision-making and has no homologue in other organisations.

Understanding the genesis of CMCO implies grasping the contextual nuances of the EU multi-level governance and the divide between the European Commission, the Council and member states in handling an expanding security agenda. The conceptual initiation of CMCO comes at a crucial point in time, where debates intensify over the future trajectories of the CSDP and a growing consensus arises on the need to equip crisis management policies with non-military, conflict prevention and integrated civil-military means. In particular, this resulted in the European Commission (through Development Cooperation, Humanitarian aid etc.) potentially exerting influence in the security dimension of European integration and, as a result, in the urgency to establish mechanisms for effective coordination to avoid a deadlock. Accordingly, while CIMIC is the integration of a doctrine within the EU crisis response machinery to satisfy operational needs, CMCO has both an external (building up a more holistic crisis response capacity) and an internal (avoid turf wars between new and previously existent institutions dealing with overlapping agendas rooted in PB and HS) rationale.

The establishment of a “culture of coordination” can be seen as one of the most important examples of institutional learning in EU security. From the beginning in 2001, the implementation of CMCO built on the awareness of previous policy failures to create and revise CSDP institutions. Specifically, it concentrated on the following aspects: the sharing of knowledge and experiences between relevant actors (e.g. the European Commission and the Council Secretariat)⁴² to create synergies and enforce coordination, especially during the routine phases of crisis management planning (Mostl, 2011: 32; Khol, 2006); the accumulation of experiences through EU missions, leading to implementation of a structured operational evaluation process and drawing from shared comprehensive assessments of CMCO operationalisation⁴³ (Perruche, 2006; Erhart, 2007; Khol, 2006).

All this was complemented by a strong national backing, as three consecutive presidencies of the EU (the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland)⁴⁴ made CA and CMCO the centrepiece of their agendas (Drent, 2011: 8). In sum, the creation of a “culture of coordination” can be described as getting practices closer to each other, sharing previously existing knowledge and gathering new experiences under the same roof.

⁴² As Mostl notes (2011: 32), “the first conceptual work on CMCO took up the issue of inter-institutional coordination in 2001, when the European Commission and the Council of the EU shared their relevant experiences”.

⁴³ For instance through the *EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning* (GAERC, 2005). Cf. also Juncos (2006).

⁴⁴ See, for instance, the non-paper on CMCO produced by the three member states in 2005, addressing the issue in terms of five parameters: analysis, planning, management of operations, methodology of measuring progress, and management of capabilities (Perruche, 2006). Cf. Non-paper by the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland (2005).

On a conceptual level, through the institutionalisation of CIMIC and CMCO, the EU has fully taken on board the concept of CA. A shared understanding developed among member states and institutions on the use of comprehensive tools and procedures for all phases (planning, conduct, as well as routine procedures) leading to concrete operations. Institutional, structural and tactical problems remain, notwithstanding the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent reform of the pillar structure: do coordination problems really lie in practice, as it has been argued (Ehrhart, 2007: 10)?

3.3.2 The implementation of the comprehensive approach

The academic literature has extensively focused on the creation of the EU's comprehensive actorness in the field of crisis management, including the operational developments. Pirozzi and Sandawi (2009) identify the following main features: *a)* the progressive expansion of the operational area and spectrum, that is the operative readiness to intervene in traditional (i.e. Balkans) and new (i.e. Central Asia) scenarios and the broadening of the security-related range of tasks; *b)* the low-escalation spectrum of military operations, which eventually casts doubts about the capacity of the EU to act autonomously and efficiently in high-intensity conflicts; *c)* an increasing integration of civilian-military components of crisis management and the inclination towards a comprehensive approach to crisis management, which however has not led (yet) to a genuine civil-military coordination at the

planning level; *d*) a growing intertwining of the first (Commission) and second (Council) pillars; *e*) an increasing importance of the EU Special Representatives, considered as playing a big role in the field in terms of managing coordination between the different parts involved in the theatre of operations; *f*) a truly multinational character and a high degree of participation by non EU states; *g*) an increase of financial requirements for CSDP operations⁴⁵ (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009: 9-12).

The integration of civilian and military instruments of crisis management can be considered as vital for the operational success of CSDP, due to the emphasis put by European policy-makers and by the former High Representative, Javier Solana, on the capacity of the EU to effectively apply a comprehensive approach to crisis management⁴⁶, as opposed to other institutions that are ill-designed for such coordination (i.e. NATO).

The debate has also highlighted the initial problems for CSDP missions in assuring an effective coordination of its military and civilian operations and instruments.⁴⁷ Ladzik (2009) and Juncos (2006) point out the example of Bosnia, where the military operation (EUFOR Althea) clashed in many areas with the work of the police mission (EUPM). As a result, the police mission (whose mandate was too weak to deal with a precarious situation in the theatre) suffered in terms of reputation and motivation for not having the power to fulfil those tasks for which the mission was deployed. The military, instead, were

⁴⁵ On this point, see Scannell (2004) and Menon (2009: 238-239).

⁴⁶ The literature on the civil-military co-operation and integration is abundant. For a good introduction into the topic, see Weiss (1999).

⁴⁷ For an introduction of decision-making procedures and the resources of crisis management operations, see Gourlay (2004).

entrusted with the police tasks, thus leading to a general confusion about relative commitments (Gross, 2007). At the same time, Ladzik observes that in the most recent operations (such as Aceh Monitoring Mission, EUFOR RD Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa) the EU has succeeded in improving civil-military coordination, partly thanks to the creation of the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff in 2005 (Ladzik, 2009; Pullinger, 2006).

The problems arising from the implementation of civilian-military crisis management, as well as from the predominance of civilian over military missions (Keukeleire, 2010), are reflected in the confusion generated at the level of inter-institutional coordination between the European Commission and the Council. Problems of consistency and coordination mainly stem from the overlapping between the CSDP civilian capabilities and the civilian crisis management instruments of the first pillar, which gave rise to turf battles between Council actors and the European Commission, leading to an inefficient use of resources (Keukeleire, 2010).

There are many aspects that can be analysed when raising the question of inter-institutional coherence. Police missions, for instance, fall within the category of CCM, but rely on the comprehensive approach as they involve a highly complex cross-pillar coordination, which may include also instruments from the III pillar for the combat against crime and border management (Gross, 2007).⁴⁸ The literature has stressed, in particular, the inter-institutional problems encountered by EU missions in Bosnia (EUPM), RDC (EUPOL

⁴⁸ On the governance aspects of EU crisis management and inter-institutional coordination, see Ursula Schroeder, *Governance of EU Crisis Management*, 2007 (in Emerson and Gross); For a more detailed account of civilian crisis management, cf. Nowak (2006).

Kinshasa, EUFOR, EUSEC) and Macedonia (PROXIMA). In the latter case, fierce battles took place over competence between the Head of the Mission, the Special Representative and the European Commission delegation, with no effective division of labour between existing development efforts and CSDP activities (Ladzik, 2009; Ioannides, 2007).

Ursula Schroeder has analysed the inter-institutional issues by using the theoretical framework of “negative coordination”, according to which institutions act on the basis that any new initiative from another conflicting body will not undermine its status or interests. Schroeder’s findings show an expansionary strategy of the Council, giving itself mandates to enter fields such as rule of law and civil protection, and a defensive reaction by the Commission, which resulted in the emergence of a large grey area of competences and an enduring institutional tension in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management (Emerson and Gross, 2007). Gross points out that lately the two institutions have “learned” to work more smoothly (Gross, 2007): the creation of the Civil-Military Cell is a good example of how a certain degree of inter-institutional coordination was achieved, since in this body experts of the European Commission are associated to the Council staff.

In line with these conclusions, Juncos argued that, resulting from a process of learning by doing in the implementation of EU missions Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM and EUFOR Althea), new institutional arrangements (such as the Civil-Military Cell and the CMCO) have been established both at the decision-making level and on the ground to guarantee a better coordination

of military and civilian crisis management instruments (Juncos, 2006). The implications and limits of experiential learning in the sub-fields of SSR and CCM will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

3.4 Conclusion

These operational complexities presented in the previous section show that conceptualising the broader CA framework is essential to narrow down the analysis to the EU tools for crisis management, such as SSR and CCM. Comprehensive approach is in fact the attempt to reach a coherent division of labour between the Brussels bureaucracy and member states, and link it to operational effectiveness in crisis management. SSR and CCM activities are not separated from the comprehensive approach: they are embedded in it.

This chapter has explained the link between global norm generation in response to structural changes and the rise of the comprehensive approach to crisis management within the European Union. The analysis has explored the way a new, multi-dimensional understanding of security translated into a paradigmatic shift, which in turn has impacted on the way international actors define their commitment to security provision through peacebuilding and human security. The EU internalised and operationalised these norms within the CSDP through the integration of civilian and military tools and the creation of an internal culture of coordination.

Conclusions point to several directions and pave the way for the empirical analysis offered in the next chapters. First, the chapter offers a thus far missing investigation into how the EU CA integrates and relates to the wider debate on human security and peacebuilding. Addressing a veritable conceptual labyrinth, the chapters provided a clear account of the relationship between “the why” (HS), “the how” (PB) and the operational (CA) aspects of the complex paradigm innovation process aimed at introducing comprehensiveness and holism in peace and conflict studies and practices. The CA concept is too often taken as granted by the literature, which does not go deep enough into its genesis, thus leaving the impression that the integration of civilian and military instruments arises, somewhat inexplicably, out of the blue in the early-mid 2000s. This chapter (and my next one on CSDP structures) explicitly links CA to a broader normative evolution occurring at the global stage and shaping EU policy-makers beliefs.

Second, the analysis also explains the relevance of national and transnational networks and communities for norm generation and diffusion. As the three cases of PB, HS and CA have shown, activities aimed at sharing knowledge and practices and the creation of communities in support of the new agendas contributed to mainstreaming new norms by means of “bandwagon effect”, lobbying and advocacy, complemented by states support and under the legitimacy of key international bodies (e.g. the UN). At the same time, the chapter has demonstrated that a high degree of fragmentation over the definitions and the scope of human security and peacebuilding exists,

hampering the effective use of multilateral instruments when translating policies into practices. Shared beliefs produced only limited international policy consensus, and mostly tied to a liberal or Western conception of interventionism. It therefore failed to translate into “global networked governance” in the field of security.

Third, by investigating the rise of the CA in the EU, this chapter has not only clarified the circumstances leading to the adoption of the new integrative approach, but has also shed light on its limits. The latter essentially result from the persisting gap between the member states’ agreement over past failures (e.g. Western Balkans) and the more fragile consensus on how to operationalise shared ideas about comprehensiveness into institutional reform.

To sum up, this chapter stressed the importance of understanding the causes and effects of the paradigmatic shift in security in order to explain how consensual and influential knowledge shaped the current institutional design and policy objectives of the CSDP, as they go beyond military peacekeeping.

Chapter 4

The Common Security and Defence Policy: structures, actors, networks

Introduction

This chapter outlines the main features of the EU security architecture, by reviewing the roles and responsibilities of the CSDP institutional structures, before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It also identifies the key actors involved in security and defence matters and the relations among them (networks). The CSDP decision-making environment is in fact characterised by networked governance. Different types of networks and communities interact and, in some cases, overlap. By structuring the relationships and balance of power among actors, this system of interactions determines the institutional configurations and the policy outcomes of the CSDP. Understanding how networked governance is applied to CSDP is then crucial to come to grips with norm diffusion and policy evolution. The emergence of new dimensions of security and the paradigmatic shift of the post-Cold War system left its mark on the institutional design of EU security cooperation. Therefore, before investigating the way norm diffusion shaped institutionalisation in the two empirical case studies, it is important to provide a

more general overview of the CSDP construction and highlight its consonance with the unfolding of the multidimensional understanding of security.

In line with the mainstream academic literature on the subject (Khol, 2006; Quille et al., 2006; Gross, 2008; Emerson and Gross, 2007; Grevi, 2007; Ehrhart, 2007), this chapter places emphasis on the comprehensiveness of CSDP structures, or the attempt to improve institutional coordination between the civilian and military instruments of crisis management. Therefore, whereas the previous chapter has shown the theoretical and conceptual levels at the origins of the comprehensive approach, this one deals with the institutional interface connecting traditional military structures with non-military, civilian ones in the broader sense of the term. Analytically, it is argued that each one of the three dimensions (structures, actors and networks) contains three levels of analysis: 1) governance processes (supranational, intergovernmental, transgovernmental); 2) actorness (state and non-state actors); 3) field (military, civilian, civ-mil, industrial, political). Each section will be structured so as to examine the interplay between these dimensions, with the overall target to provide an exhaustive explanation of the CSDP system. The European Union is often depicted as the actor with the greatest ability and experience to operationalise the comprehensive approach (Major and Molling, 2009), and also one that has made significant efforts to adapt its institutions in accordance with the demand for greater internal coordination.

Broadly speaking, the comprehensive approach “enhances the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes in the political, diplomatic, security,

economic, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions of international engagements in pursuit of a common goal both within and beyond the EU” (Wendling, 2010: 27). In a narrower sense, it allows to locate the CSDP perspective on civil-military co-ordination, understood as the “effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Council of the European Union, 2003). This chapter focuses mostly on the latter, although the wider framework must be taken into account too.

The next three sections analyse, respectively, structures, actors and networks that compose the CSDP system and their evolution. The purpose is to show that such system reflects changes in the definition and understanding of security that have permeated EU decision-making. From a methodological standpoint, the analysis relies on secondary sources available and it is complemented by interviews with EEAS officials.

4.1 An overview of CSDP structures: the institutionalisation of “comprehensiveness”

CSDP falls under the authority of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. Its key feature, in terms of decision-making and compared to other fields or policies of the EU, is the requirement for unanimity, which makes the CSDP governance fully intergovernmental.⁴⁹ That being said, the

⁴⁹ Cf. Rehl and Weisserth (2010: 38).

bureaucratic structures also reveal a mix of supranational (e.g. the Council Secretariat's structures), intergovernmental (e.g. the PSC) and national (e.g. Foreign or Defence Ministries) bureaucratic actors.

Until the mid-2000s, the literature on CSDP institution building has been surprisingly poor. Accounts for the institutionalisation of security cooperation in Europe were first derived indirectly from studies focusing on the broader CFSP dynamics (Smith M.E., 2004). It was not until very recently that the academic community started regarding bureaucratic developments in the EU as a research focus, mostly under institutionalist lenses⁵⁰ - this seems almost commonsensical given that changes have taken place in less than a decade since 2000 (Vanhoonacker et al., 2010: 13).

Mainstream academic thinking on security co-operation has evolved around the works of Christopher Hill (1993) and Jolyon Howorth (2000, 2007, 2011), followed up by debate on CFSP institutionalisation (Smith M.E., 2004; Moravcsik, 1998), on strategic cultures (Meyer, 2005; Giegerich, 2006) and on socialisation affecting identities and preferences (Checkel, 2003). Towards the end of the 2000s, the “governance turn” brought a revival of public administration and organisational theories applied to EU security, together with the growing interest on the actors and the communities affecting policy-making

⁵⁰ *Bureaucratisation* means the process by which the establishment of international organisations (like the EU) entails the creation of professional and permanent bureaucracies to manage current affairs and facilitate intergovernmental policy-making (Weber, 1978; Rosenau, 1992; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Olsen, 2006). By contrast, *institutionalisation* is a broader process involving the creation of formal and informal institutions, and shared norms and rules within those institutions (Breuer, 2012; Smith, 2004; Meyer, 2004), to support international cooperation. The creation and evolution of bureaucracies can be analysed under institutionalist theoretical lenses.

(Cross, 2010; Howorth, 2004; Dijkstra, 2008, 2010), hence bringing CSDP to the forefront of European Studies.

The dynamics of defence cooperation within the 2nd pillar attracted scholars' attention, particularly as regards the themes of (inter)institutional coherence/coordination and the impact of organisational structures on policy outcomes. Works explored issues of institutional coordination and coherence (Blockmans, 2008) between civilian and military dimensions (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Gross, 2008; Wendling, 2010), across external and internal EU policies (Duke and Ojanen, 2006; Keohane, 2008; Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009) and between the EU and other international actors (Tardy, 2005; Duke, 2008; Wouters and Ruys, 2008; Hofmann, 2009); division of tasks and competences allocation within and among CSDP institutions or fields such as civilian crisis management (Duke, 2005; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006; Dijkstra, 2009); analyses of the relationship between bureaucratic entities and civil servants in shaping policy and institutional outcomes, particularly as a process of learning or institutional isomorphism (Cross, 2010; Howorth, 2011; Juncos and Pomorska, 2010). More recently, the principal-agent theories seemed to open new venues for research on the relation between political preferences, institutional design and policy outcomes.

As the nature of this literature shows, the creation of Brussels-based bureaucracies characterises much of the initial efforts by EU member states in the wake of St Malo (1998) and Cologne (1999) (Grevi et al., 2009). Permanent structures are established since the Helsinki Council (1999) to run

the CSDP according to the objectives outlined in Council documents and, subsequently (2003), to the strategic guidelines provided by the European Security Strategy. Although member states' intentions to centre on comprehensive and civil-military integrated structures dates back to the very beginning of CSDP (cf. creation of Civcom in 2000 stemming from recommendation by the PSC or establishment of the CivMil Cell in 2003), the Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a landmark development.

The treaty provisions, in fact, place the comprehensive approach to crisis management and a holistic view of intervention in crisis situations at the cornerstone of capacity-building and institutional reform processes. Accordingly, the Treaty envisages a major reconfiguration of EU institutions in the CFSP and CSDP fields to achieve better internal coordination, management, efficiency and coherence among crisis management structures (Barry, 2012: 3). Changes include the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Since its official opening (1 January 2011), the EEAS has integrated permanent civilian and military crisis management bodies as well as intergovernmental committees. The former include the new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD),⁵¹ the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). According to the division of tasks among these three permanently-based structures, the

⁵¹ On the creation of the CMPD, cf. Gebhard (2009).

CMPD deals with strategic planning for CSDP missions and operations and is tasked with creating synergies between their civilian and military aspects; the CPCC covers operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian missions; the EUMS carries out early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for CSDP activities; finally, the EU Operation Center (OPCEN) becomes also part of the permanent structures, although it was activated for the first time in March 2012 to support the EU's operations in the Horn of Africa.⁵²

Intergovernmental committees, bringing together representatives from member states (diplomats, seconded experts and military representatives – chiefs of defence) inside the EEAS include Civcom, the EU Military Committee and the PSC, as well as the EU Special Representatives, the EU Delegations in third countries and the Politico Military Group (PMG).

The institutional landscape is completed by the EEAS' geographical and thematic desks as well as by the Commissions DGs (e.g. DEVCO, ECHO, Justice and Home Affairs) and European Parliament Committees and Council bodies (e.g. COREPER) associated with security. The HR/VP and the Crisis Management Board (CMB), chaired by the HR/VP herself or by the EEAS Executive Secretary, is in charge of discussing organisational and coordination aspects of crisis response, crisis management and conflict prevention to ensure coherence in the EU external action.⁵³

⁵² A summary of the main features of the OPCEN and details on its activation can be found in the OPCEN factsheet issued by the EU: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1634515/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2012).

⁵³ Details on organisation and membership of the CMB can be found on the EEAS website: http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm (Accessed 21 October 2012).

As this overview has shown, despite huge operational challenges and problems in implementation-effectiveness-efficiency, the institutional make up introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has made the EU the “home” of the comprehensive approach (Barry, 2012). It also reveals two inner peculiarities of the institutionalisation of EU security cooperation within CSDP.

First, the shape of the CSDP in the post-Lisbon era results from the internalisation of a new set of collective norms falling under the umbrella of comprehensiveness. Institutions, through the diffusion of norms, did shape states’ interests and triggered further institutionalisation. States have not ceded interests to a supranational cause, but have reconstituted them in terms of European norms rather than just national ones (Smith M.E., 2004).

Second, Brusselsisation (Nuttall, 2000; Allen, 2004) shows that, through the institutional nexus constituted by the vast number of committees, institutions did also play a role in shaping security identities (March and Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) towards new collective scopes for action – in our case, the call for a comprehensive understanding of EU security and defence policy.

The Brussels-based institutions created since 1999 facilitated the adoption of a comprehensive approach by the actors involved in the CSDP. As both the governance and institutionalist literature contend, institutions act as socialising agents, and not just arenas for coordinated action. This last claim, however, requires us to sketch out the actors and ties (networks) among them that form

the CSDP institutional environment, so as to provide a “morphology” of CSDP and visualise the environment in which normative processes operate.

Figure 4.1: Institutional structures in CFSP/CSDP (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2010: 39)





Figure 4.2: Bureaucratic actors in the CSDP and levels of governance (Vanhoonacker et al., 2010: 12)



4.2 Comprehensiveness and actorness: the proliferation of security actors and its implications for the CSDP

A major implication of the rise of a comprehensive approach is that a multitude of public and private actors have called into question the role of states as the only security providers. Security actors have proliferated so as to include judges, police officers, private contractors or development agencies due to the new multi-dimensional understanding of security as going beyond pure military interventions.

The EU decision-making has evolved not just in terms of bureaucratic structures, but also as far as the actors who interact within institutions (and produce policy outcomes) are concerned. Specifically, the objective of integrating long-term conflict prevention with short-term crisis management policies, resources and capabilities has reduced the number of tasks carried out exclusively by states. Within the CSDP institutional set-up, a number of non-state actors offer advice or influence (formally or informally) security decisions, particularly in those contexts where member states lack sufficient information or expertise.

Accordingly, a typology of CSDP actors can be built across several dividing lines. One is between state and non-state actors. State actors include all member states bodies, representations, ministries and assets in Brussels, capitals and on the ground, but is not limited to defence and foreign ministries. When it comes to crisis management, in fact, ministries of interior, finance,

justice also play a role, raising important questions in terms of functional needs and coordination mechanisms (Vanhonacker and Jacobs, 2010).

Non-state actors constitute a complex galaxy. On the one hand, it is composed of permanently or temporary established supranational EU institutions and relevant units (Council of the EU, European Commission, European Parliament and EU agencies) and CSDP agencies (e.g. the European Defence Agency, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the EU Satellite Centre). On the other hand, NGOs, think-tanks, research institutes and consultancies involved in the multi-level, transnational social network that characterises the CSDP “field” and the private sector (defence industry, private security and military companies) are also part of it.

The academic literature is divided over the real impact of the non-state actors on the CSDP policy-making. Some authors believe that supranational elements are indeed creeping into the second pillar intergovernmental logic (Allen, 1998; Cross, 2008; Ojanen, 2006). Others contend that, despite the existence of clear elements of transgovernmental and transnational cooperation alongside narrow intergovernmental relations (Mérand et al., 2010), non-state actors in the CSDP remain in practice fairly marginal: in the end, a handful of state actors are really decisive and exert influence by reconstituting power at the supranational level (Mérand et al., 2010).

The truth seems to be somewhere in a middle ground between these two view points. Recent studies, particularly in the fields of governance and network analysis, have in fact provided enough evidence that the CSDP has become a

highly networked policy area. Therein, a variety of actors influence the agenda and have to be taken into account when analysing the factors affecting policy outcomes. At the same time, it seems clear that the “supranational intergovernmentalist” vision of EU security (Howorth, 2007, 2011) gets constrained, at all levels of policy-making, by the definition of a strategic vision for the CSDP. The latter remains a prerogative of member states.

A second cleavage concerns military *vs* civilian actors. This cleavage stems from the traditional tension between civil and military cultures deep rooted in member states and uploaded at the EU level. Since uniformed officers entered the Council’s building in the early 2000s, professional and cultural barriers with civil servants have appeared. Problems of communication and coordination between civilians and the military have then become a distinctive feature of a CSDP viewed as “flawed by design” (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). Furthermore, the process set off since 2003 to enhance coordination in the EU’s civil-military interface, after the “cultural revolution” initiated by the CMCO concept, is largely a result of the dialectic between civilian and military actors. This process can be seen as a struggle to find a balance of power for new structural and procedural arrangements. Under this perspective, the framework for crisis management structures and procedures should be viewed not only as the result of compromises between member states “more or less” influenced by non-state actors; but also, and perhaps most importantly, as a struggle between civilian and military inputs on how to structure strategic

planning and ensure effective civil-military organisation. In this struggle, the military has certainly been more influential than the civilians (Khol, 2006).

In addition to the two cleavages introduced above, a comprehensive mapping exercise cannot overlook the fact that the CSDP system is not segregated from the rest of the world. Although bureaucracies tend to delimit and defend their “territories”, and abide by their own organisational rules (Downs, 1967; Allison, 1971), CSDP institutions are part of a broader policy environment and are entrenched in a complex net of inter-institutional relations and flows of influence. Third players (NATO, the UN, the US) intervene in the policy debate and their influence cannot be overlooked. For instance, the EU has established with the UN a mutually-influencing networks, which regularly engage in cooperative and supportive initiatives. The networks have shown a fair level of convergence on issues relating to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Inter-institutional cooperation⁵⁴ between the two organisations resulted in the creation of the EU-UN Steering Committee. The relationship is even tighter with NATO, going well beyond the Berlin Plus capacity framework to include expanding security communities (Adler, 2008) and institutional isomorphism (Koops, 2012).

There is, finally, the problem of leadership. Leaders are a precious – yet scarce – resource. EU security makes no exception, especially if one considers the tension between legitimacy (consensus and equality underlying decisions) and effectiveness a times when external and internal pressures are significant

⁵⁴ On inter-institutional cooperation, cf. Tardy (2005), Hofmann (2009), Wouters and Ruys (2008), Duke (2008).

(Giegerich and Gross, 2006). Although the literature identifies the heart of the matter in the presence of *directoires* and their role in assuming control over planning and initiation of missions, individual leaders also count, as demonstrated by the patterns of co-operation and integration during the Solana (1999-2009) and Ashton (1999-present) mandates. This is particularly relevant in the EU, where the interactions between different levels of governance and the ensuing dispersion of authority/accountability can go to the detriment of efficiency and result in bad, or ill-timed policies. Furthermore, it is useful to recall that, in a social network, power is situational: it depends on one's position in the social structure, which grants the ability to control the flow of information or cooperation (brokerage). If the structure is "social", then individual brokers (who are located at the very basis of the social structure) can be as influent as organisational units.

Actors interact within institutional structures by means of transgovernmental and transnational networks. The next section introduces the concept of networked governance and tracks the networks existing in the CSDP field.

4.3 Connecting the dots: CSDP networks and communities

The actors and structures of the CSDP have been widely debated in the academic literature. Nonetheless, a comprehensive analysis linking these two analytical tools is still missing.

Between the micro-perspective (actors and structures shaping policies) and the macro-one (CSDP as a “system” producing a set of policy output) lies a meso-level where interactions and processes take place. In this level, characterised by networked governance, the decision-making environment is influenced by the presence of different types of networks and communities that structure the relationships, links and the balance of power between actors, and consequently, structures.

Networked governance constitutes a step forward vis-à-vis traditional governance approaches. The latter stress the existence of entry points allowing policy entrepreneurs to intervene in decision-making (Mérand et al. 2010: 123). In European security studies, they put emphasis on the multiple patterns of cooperation among a variety of state and non-state security actors, authorities and formal and informal arrangements that define institutional configurations (Krahmann, 2005: 16; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007) and policy outcomes (Webber et al., 2004: 4).

Networked governance introduces the configuration of ties between actors and EU structures, leading to the assertion that a policy area is embedded in a set of social – hence dynamic and evolutionary – relations. Ideas, knowledge, interests and preferences are contained in this fluid, enclosed and inclusive environment surrounding the CSDP institutional nucleus, like molecules in the cytoplasm.

Within this environment, socialisation processes induct actors into the norms and rules of the communities they belong to (Checkel, 2005; Bauer, 2012).

Socialisation is a widely used approach in the recent IR literature, with a soaring number of studies addressing the role of institutions as sites of socialisation for individuals, and their consequences as regards the formation of preferences and policy decisions. Checkel (2011) identifies regular interaction between members of a particular group and learning and persuasion processes as the two key mechanisms leading to socialisation.

In this regard, my contribution to the debate is to clear up the mechanisms through which norms, through socialisation, are internalised by actors and reflect in the compliance to specific institutional and policy arrangements. According this perspective, rules and norms are seen as essential to maintain social order (Kratochwil, 1989), and the dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world become determinant of human action (Adler, 1997).

It is important to differentiate analytically between networks and other knowledge and practice-based communities (Bicchi, 2011). Networks are constituted by actors who are formally equals (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 797), whereas communities are studied on the basis of the practices and knowledge underpinning them (Bicchi, 2011: 1119). In other words, whereas the core constituent of a network is the relationships (their depth and thickness) between nodes having equal rights, communities arise out of a shared activity that is narrowly associated with the exercise of power.

What networks and communities are hence relevant in the CSDP field? According, to Smith, national actors are primarily involved and, although they

act mainly as national agents, they find themselves mediating between national capitals and the Brussels-based centres of foreign policy-making (Smith M.E., 2004: 118). Some institutions, such as the Council Secretariat DG-E, facilitate socialisation as they instil a feeling of ownership in national civil servants seconded to CSDP bureaucracies of the Council. Once socialised, many of these agents import that spirit back to capitals. According to Breuer (2012), PSC Ambassadors adapt national positions according to what they deem appropriate as a result of the knowledge and interactions they had in the Brussels CSDP networks.⁵⁵ Duration of appointment might reinforce the impact of socialisation as those who has served for longer time in Brussels may feel closer to PSC colleagues than other diplomats in national ministries (Breuer, 2012).

The study by Mérand et al. (2010) points out that the CSDP network is quite dense with links between bureaucratic actors in Brussels and national desks, although state actors occupy a prominent position – namely through PSC ambassadors. Their empirical findings suggest that states reconstitute power at the supranational level rather than ceding it (Mérand et al., 2010).

Another way to detect networks active in the CSDP realm is to pick up specific cases of intergovernmental agencies or transnational committees, such as the EUMC and Civcom (Cross, 2010, 2011), the PSC (Howorth, 2011; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007), COREPER (Cross, 2007, 2011), the Council Secretariat Working Groups (Juncos & Pomorska 2006; Beyers 2007) and the COREU

⁵⁵ On the PSC, cf. also Duke (2005) and Howorth (2007, 2011).

(Bicchi, 2011). The advantage of this kind of analyses is that institutional boundaries simplify the task of detecting inner working processes, practices and knowledge flows. The downside, however, is that single institutions or groupings of professionals (e.g. the Committee of Permanent Representatives, aka COREPER) may say little about the causal force of ideas, except in those cases where a specific bureaucratic unit holds the monopoly of norm entrepreneurship and diffusion.

Networks and communities operate *across*, not *within* institutions. Analyses that take structures as isolated from one another fail to focus on how social relationships are constructed (Hoffmann et al., 2005: 5). The result is that network constellations that are not institutionalised, or not part of a given structure, fall outside the radar.

Hoffman et al. (2005) contend that actors and their collocation (centrality, or importance) within the network depends upon four variables: (1) presence in Brussels, with Brussels-based actors being more central than capitals-based ones; (2) professionalism (e.g. diplomats and military officers); (3) participation in transgovernmental groups (e.g. Franco-German group); (4) involvement in operations, as operational actors are more central than policy makers as their activity forges stronger common practices.

My reading is somewhat different. The results of the mapping exercise of CSDP communities question both the four determinants of network's centrality and the identification of a practice with a single, specific institutional body.

To start with, interviewees' answers to structured questions confirm that that EU policy-makers judge as very influential for their work the advice coming from organisations and individuals who are *not*, or *not necessarily* Brussels-based.⁵⁶

Secondly, professionalism is of course considered as important, but the circle of practice is wider and stretches well beyond a specific group. As a matter of fact, many diplomats and civilian officers working in CSDP confirmed that they are regularly in touch with professionals from other backgrounds or countries (e.g. the US) and that cross-fertilisation and knowledge-sharing (for instance, during international conferences) influenced their perceptions and their position towards policy agendas.⁵⁷ Evidence from interviews also suggest that the participation to field missions reinforced individual actors' beliefs and views on CSDP, for instance as far as more emphasis on the comprehensive approach and integrated civilian/military crisis management tools are concerned.⁵⁸

As a result, my research fieldwork confirms that the networks and communities within the CSDP field are manifold and extend beyond the CSDP nucleus where formal institutional structures are located.

Moreover, networks seem to have different configurations depending on the sector concerned. As the two cases of seemingly overlapping policy agendas (SSR and CCM) will show, norm diffusion might follow similar patterns or

⁵⁶ Interviews of the author with policy-makers and practitioners in Brussels, Spring 2012.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Interviews of the author with policy-makers and practitioners in Brussels, Stockholm, London and Rome, Spring-Winter 2012.

originate in the same paradigmatic shift, but the communities as well as the actors affiliated to them are not quite the same. Analyses of the main agencies acting in the CSDP field (Cross, 2010) do tell us how socialisation (Checkel, 2007) affects decision-shaping and decision-taking. Nonetheless, they completely overlook how (and why) agencies are crafted in the first place; what (state, non state) actors drove the institutionalisation of EU cooperation in specific security areas (civilian, military, integration of both); and, most importantly, who or what shaped the views of these actors.

Therefore, any attempt to chart the network and communities in the CSDP environment should start from a comprehensive listing of the relevant *actors* involved. It should also take into account context and norm-specific factors to spot the communities within which practices and knowledge are contained and carried. The table 4.3 below provides a useful template to locate the actors involved in the CSDP:

Table 4.3: CSDP levels of actorness

Entity/Field	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>CIV-MIL</u>	<u>INDUSTRIAL</u>	<u>POLITICAL</u>	Field/Governance
<u>STATE</u>	<i>E.g. MS Military Staff; Ministries of Defence; National Defence Colleges</i>	<i>E.g. MS National Police; Ministry of Interior/Justice;</i>	<i>Folke Bernadotte Academy; National Defence Colleges</i>	<i>E.g. BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, Airbus Military; EADS; Dassault Aviation</i>	<i>E.g. Ministries of Foreign Affairs; PM Cabintes; Parliaments' Committees; Political Parties</i>	<u>INTERGVT</u>
<u>NON- STATE</u>	<i>E.g. EDA; EUMS; EUMC;</i>	<i>E.g. CPCC; Civcom;</i>	<i>E.g. CMPD; ESDC; EU ISS; DCAF</i>	<i>E.g. EDA;</i>	<i>PSC; COREPER;</i>	<u>SUPRA/TRANS -national</u>
<u>THIRD PARTIES</u>	<i>NATO;</i>	<i>OSCE, UN, OECD, World Bank;</i>	<i>OSCE, UN;</i>	<i>Boeing;</i>	<i>US Government</i>	-

Building on this template, CSDP networks develop – and can hence be detected - across the norms or policy areas they engage with. Accordingly, since the actors dealing with police missions under the civilian crisis management framework and counter-piracy & naval strategies are not the same, there cannot logically be a perfect overlap as far as their relationships and grouping into knowledge or practice-based communities are concerned.

4.4 Conclusion

As this section sought to show, structures, actors and networks within the CSDP need a more careful scrutiny. Previous academic works have failed to provide an exhaustive overview of the net of formal and informal relationships between institutions and other relevant stakeholder. The governance turn in EU studies certainly raised awareness about the multi-level nature of decision-making in the hard case of security co-operation. However, it fell through extending the same logic to the multi-dimensional and multi-faceted shape of the environment surrounding governance dynamics.

The rise of comprehensiveness and the push towards a more holistic approach in EU security policies, particularly after the Lisbon Treaty, have multiplied the actors influencing security decisions. As a consequence, networks and communities have proliferated beyond formal institutional structures or committees. With these considerations in mind, chapters 5, 6 and 7 look into the CSDP's cognitive architecture and the diffusion of SSR and CCM. The two case studies show that, as a result of the broadening security landscape, new actors, networks and communities emerged besides traditional ones and influenced, with different outcomes, the institutionalisation of security cooperation.

Chapter 5

Introduction to the case studies: the EU frameworks for Security Sector Reform and Civilian Crisis Management

Introduction

This chapter introduces the two case studies, which test my argument that ideational factors, through practice and expert-based communities, have driven the evolution of the CSDP. There are a few reasons why security sector reform and civilian crisis management – and not other CSDP thematic areas of cooperation – were chosen.

As discussed in chapter 1 and 2, in selecting my cases I wished to single out two examples of innovative concepts that have shaped the EU's development as a crisis manager. According to the 2013 ENTRi's handbook on EU's crisis management, SSR is “based on the concept of human security, has formed part of the toolbox in international crisis management”, and it is both “an operational as well as a normative concept” (ENTRi, 2013: 81). Activities falling under SSR are cross-sectoral⁵⁹ and encompass the reform of institutional structures, the improvement of capabilities, the establishment of civilian offices for the supervision of security forces (ENTRi, 2013: 82). As the

⁵⁹ They include military, police and intelligence agencies, ministries, parliament, civil society organisations, judicial and criminal prosecution bodies, paramilitary groups. Cf. ENTRi (2013: 81).

next sections will discuss, the EU’s involvement in SSR follows the guidelines for implementation elaborated by the OECD-DAC (OECD, 2005, 2007).

CCM is also considered by EU documents as “an important tool under the CSDP in support for international peace and security” (European Union, 2008: 2). CCM activities cover the four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council (2000): police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection. As innovative concepts providing new tools for the CSDP, SSR and CCM operate at the same level of analysis (cf. table 5.1).

Table 5:1: Levels of analysis in EU crisis management

EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT		
Guiding principle	COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH	
Tools	CCM	SSR
Activities	<p>Four priority areas (Feira 2000):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Police - Rule of Law - Civilian Administration - Civil Protection 	<p>Cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary activities. Holisitic approach aimed at reforming the security system of a country, including institutional structures and operational capabilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defence and armed forces reform - Security forces and services reform - Judicial reform - Police reform - Prison reform - Establishment of civilian authorities for the control of the security sector

These two thematic cases are also highly relevant to illustrate the learning framework. In both cases, ideas emerging in the post-Cold War setting have shaped the EU security discourse, leading to the adoption, and subsequent implementation, of new policy frameworks. SSR and CCM are deeply entrenched in the new understanding of security and crisis management involving the development of non-military approaches and tools for intervention.

Second, these two cases were singled out because they display slightly different empirical manifestations of policy evolution. While CCM had a huge institutional and operational impact on the CSDP, the SSR framework has been far away from ensuring effective implementation and a coherent management of the mechanisms at disposal. EU-led SSR missions have been few and low scale, with uneven or disappointing results in the field. In institutional terms, SSR impact has been hardly detectable when compared to CCM. Therefore, by applying the same methodology to the analysis of these two cases, I intend to account for difference in outcomes and further specify the hypotheses set out in the theoretical framework.

Finally, availability of empirical material and comparability between the cases also influenced my choice. SSR and CCM documents are not subject to significant restrictions, hence making it possible to configure a comparative research design. In sum, when thinking about what case studies should be selected, I took into account the three key criteria of relevance, contribution to

illustrate/refine my theoretical argument and feasibility. Against this backdrop, the empirical part of this thesis is structured as follows.

This chapter introduces SSR and CCM. In each one of the two areas, the chapter overviews the academic literature available. It then illustrates the main characteristics of the policy frameworks, as well as all other relevant aspects such as structures, procedures, practices as they have developed from the late-1990s onward. The purpose is to provide a reader with a clear understanding of the empirical universe, before embarking upon the analysis and hypotheses-testing in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 will then summarise the conclusions on the basis of the comparative findings.

5.1 Introducing Security Sector Reform

Although SSR is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, its place in the EU security architecture is validated by two concept documents issued by the Council Secretariat (Council of the European Union, 2005d) and the Commission (European Commission, 2006), as well as by the *Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy*⁶⁰ (2008). Lately, the development of SSR approaches to conflict resolution in general (Law, 2006; Peake et al., 2006; Brozka, 2006), and the EU's engagement in particular

⁶⁰ As regards SSR, the *Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy* (2008: 8) states “Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction (...)”.

(Sheriff, 2007; Spence and Fluri, 2008; Law and Myshlovska, 2008; Ekengren and Simons, 2010) have attracted scholars' attention, particularly as far as the practices and challenges arising from the implementation of SSR policies are concerned (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012). The literature, however, is mostly based on policy analysis and a case-by-case or comparative methodology, typically focused on assessment and evaluation matters as well as the problems of coordination and cooperation among multilateral actors. Theory development, aimed at accounting for the processes and outcomes of SSR, has thus far lagged behind: the current knowledge about EU SSR needs further exploration to uncover processes of institution building, policy evolution and the factors shaping different actors or organisations' perspectives.

5.1.1 The literature on SSR

As a few academics have noted (Brzoska, 2000; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012), accumulation of knowledge about security sector reform has only begun recently and the debate has been marked by general recommendations on the wider goals of the new policy framework, and some quite rare more detailed analytical suggestions for improvement, based on specific case studies in post-conflict situations. The literature shows, in other words, a rich policy-related and empirical orientation, but overlooks completely rigorous academic focus on the causes and implications of norm

evolution. As a result, the debate on the emergence of SSR tends to be fenced off: studies emphasise the importance of development concerns (i.e. major donors)⁶¹ or changes in the security/strategic environment (i.e., NATO or the OSCE)⁶² in shaping SSR inception depending on the writer's affiliation. This is due to a congenital incoherence within the SSR debate and agenda, originating in the difficult (re)conciliation between security and development, which resulted in an incoherent academic debate. As Chuter put it, SSR is the “bastard child of civil-military relations and development studies” (Chuter, 2006: 3). A key consequence is that SSR studies show such a significant variation as regards SSR definitions, objectives, processes, recipients, implementing institutions and methodologies that it appears almost impossible, if not useless, to bring them under the same roof.

In spite of these complexities, one shall not deduce that tracking down the evolution of SSR is an impossible enterprise, for two reasons. First, the existence of different perspectives does not imply the absence of unbiased processes of systemic change across the end of the Cold War, as a result of which important challenges such as the causes of conflicts and the impact of aid policies begun to be seen under a different light. As Hendrickson put it, dramatic social and political upheaval in many of the lesser developed countries (including in the former Soviet space) at the end of the Cold War

⁶¹ See, for instance, the bulk of the academic literature in the UK, which emphasises the role of DFID as the godfather of SSR and the central focus of this policy in poverty alleviation, hence upholding the view that development incorporated security concerns (and not vice-versa).

⁶² Cf. Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005), Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder (2004). Cf. also the documents produced by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

brought forth a real change in thinking (Hendrickson, 1999), reducing the deep split that had previously existed between development and security communities.⁶³ The next section will deal with these processes and put SSR into historical perspective.

Secondly, the analysis presented in this chapter does not drift uncontrolled across the broader international community, but is contextually bounded to its institutionalisation in the EU. This provides the researcher with the theoretical coordinates to engage the debate on SSR conceptual origins and evolution with a fair degree of objectivity.

Against this backdrop, a first, quite striking feature of SSR lies in the fact that the EU, namely the European Commission and some member states, have been engaged for a long time in what can be defined as SSR policies *ante-litteram*. Even before the label “SSR” was created and the concept mainstreamed at the international level, the EU was involved in reconstruction and institutional reform policies, as part of its external action tools, that today fall under the conceptual umbrella of SSR. Several interviewed experts confirmed that different bits of SSR policies were in fact operational well before the SSR concept was created.⁶⁴ In particular, the European Commission and member states were exposed to aspects of security sector reform through their membership in other international organisations active in the areas of human

⁶³ On this point, see Hendrickson (1999: 15-16).

⁶⁴ Interview of the author with experts in Brussels and Geneva, Summer/Winter 2011.

rights, conflict prevention, post-crisis reconstruction and rehabilitation and governance, such as the OSCE⁶⁵ or the UN (Law and Myshlovska, 2008: 10).

Despite these examples of sectoral cooperation, security and development actors, including those inside the EU policy-making, hardly appreciated the importance of a comprehensive SSR framework. Doelle and Gouzée de Harven (2008) note that the nature of international relations during the Cold War was not conducive to the acknowledgment of this framework. Ideological enmity between the superpowers fuelled proxy wars and hence the re-emergence of conflicts between developing countries. Furthermore, donors' dogmatic view of aid policies was limited to economic growth, with no recognition of the mutual influences of security and good governance on development. Only with the end of the Cold War's structural constraints could a window of opportunity open up for the international community adopt the paradigm of human security and pave the way for the emergence of SSR (Doelle and Gouzée de Harven, 2008: 39).

Touching on the link between human security and security sector governance/reform, Hanggi and Tanner observe that what shaped the international security agenda in the 1990s towards a human security approach was a whole new set of previously existing phenomena, from small arms and light weapons to food, health and environmental security. These became

⁶⁵ The Commission was among the signatories of the OSCE 1999 Charter for European Security and during the 1990s EU officials met regularly (both at the ministerial and lower levels) with OSCE colleagues to discuss common areas of action such as enlargement, stabilisation and association processes, ENP, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus etc. Similarly, the EU and its member states have traditionally provided support to UN agencies and programmes in fields that are now embedded in the SSR template.

“securitised”, meaning characterised and treated as security concerns (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005: 12). The problem was that, before the mid-1990s, development agencies and security institutions (including the EU), despite the progressive acknowledgment that security had a crucial role in sustainable development, only focused on narrow sections of SSR (e.g. demobilisation or police reform) but did not look at the wider context through a long-term strategy connecting them (Hendrickson, 1999: 18). From the mid-1990s, key international organisations (the OECD, UNDP, the World Bank) started profiling SSR, setting norm standards and promoting norm transfer (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005). This process was driven by the emerging consensus that an unreformed security sector represented an obstacle to the promotion of sustainable peace, democracy and development, but was also thwarted by the challenges arising from the conceptualisation of SSR (a contested concept) and its implementation (due to the scarcity of SSR practices and lessons learned).

Before focusing on the genesis and evolution of SSR in the EU, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the existing definitions of SSR according to the context, implementing actors, operating principles and activities.

To start with, it is useful to point up that the notion of SSR is associated with security sector governance, According to DCAF:

*Security Sector Governance (SSG) refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation.*⁶⁶

⁶⁶ DCAF (2009: 1).

*Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to enhance SSG through the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control. SSR offers a framework for conceptualising which actors and factors are relevant to security in a given environment as well as a methodology for optimising the use of available security resources. By emphasising the need to take a comprehensive approach to the security sector, SSR can also help integrate a broad variety of actors and processes.*⁶⁷

The standard definitions of “security sector” and “security sector reform” are provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and are today commonly used by international actors to formulate their SSR policies. According to the DAC, the key actors in the security sector are “the security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them”. Security sector reform involves “transforming the way the security sector is managed and monitored to ensure that the security organisations are accountable to democratic civil authorities and that sound principles of public sector management are applied to the security sector” (Ball, 2002: 8). But what does security sector mean exactly, in other words what types of institutions and activities are covered when we use the term “SSR”?

The terminology note to the *OECD Handbook on Security System Reform* (OECD, 2007: 5), which is based on the *OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance* (OECD, 2005), defines the security system as:

(...) including core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs,

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).

The note adds that:

(...) this definition has become established internationally and so in the handbook, “security system”, “security system reform” and “SSR” all refer to that broad range of security and justice institutions. The terms also denote activities sometimes referred to by international actors as “security sector reform”, “security and justice sector reform” and “rule of law”.

With respect to this last point, it is important to stress that although the OECD guidelines allow the use of SSR for both security “system” and “sector” governance and reform, the gap between systemic and sectoral approach triggered an intense debate in the expert communities on how to conduct SSR, with serious policy implications.

In fact, the OECD’s “systemic” recommendations have not been automatically followed by all the actors involved in SSR implementation. Some institutions continued to have a narrow understanding of SSR, limited to activities in the security sector. The systemic approach, instead, entails a fuller developmental and holistic viewpoint. The *DAC Guidelines on Helping Preventing Violent Conflict* (OECD, 2001) clarify this point by saying that:

security system include the traditional security forces but indicates a broader approach: security system reform is understood as the transformation of security systems so that they are managed by, and

operate in manner more consistent with, democratic norms, rule of law – which includes well functioning and just judicial and penal systems and sound principles of good governance. Therefore, the term security system reform no longer refers only to the reform of the armed forces, which is only one aspect or sector of security. The idea is to reform the entire security system.

(OECD, 2001).

For instance, a joint paper by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State and the Department of Defense from 2009, fully takes on the systemic definition of SSR and defines it as:


the set of policies, plans, programs and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence.⁶⁸

Hanggi and Tanner’s influential work on security sector governance in the EU’s neighbourhood (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005) acknowledges the holistic approach to the provision of security along the OECD lines, in its “double sense”. First, by integrating all those partial reforms (such as defence reform, police reform, intelligence reform), which in the past were generally seen and

⁶⁸ USAID, DOS, DOD (2009: 5).

conducted as separate efforts. Second, by putting the security sector and its components under democratic governance, given its normative commitment to the consolidation of democracy, promotion of human rights and implementation of the principles of good governance (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005: 17). The EU, as the next section will show, has fully adopted this approach at the declaratory level. On that account, the figure 5.2 summarises the categories of actors influencing security sector/system governance and reform:

Figure 5.2: Main actors in SSR and SSG (Ball et al., 2002: 4)



Despite the existence of a standardised template for SSR, based on the systemic approach and codified by the OECD work, in practical terms SSR varies substantially according to factors such as the specific reform context, the implementing organisations, and has been shaped by several policy experiences and practices.

The SSR approach is holistic: whereas some generic features are considered as common to any type of involvement in SSR, many different sub-approaches have arisen and been developed by the several external actors engaged in SSR. These include state and non-state actors, NGOs and civil society organisations. In the last ten years, intergovernmental organisations have tended to play a leading role in conceptualising and implementing the SSR agenda (DCAF, 2009). IOs tend to approach SSR from either a development (i.e., World Bank), security (i.e., OSCE, NATO, EU) or democratic perspective (i.e. Council of Europe); have a global (i.e., UN, EU, OSCE), regional (i.e., African Union, Council of Europe) or sub-regional focus (i.e., ECOWAS); maybe active in field activities, such as capacity building and technical assistance (i.e., Council of Europe), norm development (i.e., OECD) or both (i.e., EU, OSCE); can operate in different country contexts, such as post-conflict (i.e., EU, NATO, OSCE), transition countries (i.e., Council of Europe) or developing countries (i.e., OECD, ECOWAS, World Bank). Although the overarching principle and framework of SSR remains the same, each IO has experienced SSR programmes in different ways, depending on its specific concerns (problem-solving), capabilities or geographical scope.

5.1.2 A policy framework for EU SSR

In light of the importance of international organisations and their practices in shaping the SSR concept, this section introduces the distinct features of the EU as an actor in this field.

Since the early 2000s, the EU has constantly increased its focus on SSR as part of its external action. Like other fields, this policy innovation process is part of the evolving goals and means for the EU security, resulting from its growing fields of competences and the changes occurring in its security environment. The EU has progressively internalised the SSR discourse and practice as part of the security-good governance-development paradigm. However, the rise of SSR did not come about from scratch. As a major provider of external assistance, the European Commission has been engaged in over 70 countries around the world in support of a wide spectrum of sub-sectoral SSR activities, several years before SSR entered the EU debate (Buxton, 2008: 29). Activities included justice reform, capacity building of interior and justice ministers, prison services, legal aid, human rights commissions and ombudsman functions, border guards and custom institutions and in some cases also the reform of armed forces).⁶⁹

⁶⁹ These figures are drawn from a survey conducted by the Commission in the summer 2005, to map the past and current EC's activities in support of SSR related programmes in the period 2000-2005. The results are annexed to the EC Communication on Security Sector Reform of June 2006 (European Commission, 2006).

Similarly, both the CSDP and its predecessor, the Western European Union (WEU),⁷⁰ have been engaged in missions falling under the SSR template, particularly police ones (van Eekelen, 2008: 117). This spectrum of activities rapidly became a key element justifying EU interventions and CSDP operations (Sabiote 2010). As of September 2011, two EU missions fall explicitly under the SSR field (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, EUSEC Democratic Republic of Congo) while other 14 missions out of 27 are partially related or fully cover SSR aspects such as rule of law, police and judicial assistance.⁷¹ In this regard, what the new SSR paradigm added to the pre-existing framework was not a simple “relabeling”, but the more complex transformation of ad-hoc, sub-sectoral intervention scattered across a broad range of activities under different EU instruments to an holistic, coherent approach based on the “whole-of-government” and involving enhanced coordination between EU institutions as well as a comprehensive framework for action. Accordingly, the peculiarity of the EU’s involvement in SSR and understanding of the security-development nexus arises from the fact that it affects all EU institutions (Sheriff, 2007). This is due to the cross-cutting nature of the concept and the presence of several interlocking agendas, from development cooperation to enlargement, from conflict prevention to human rights.

⁷⁰ The literature tends to downplay the WEU’s engagement non-military missions before the transfer of its crisis management functions to the EU, particularly since, as noted by van Eekelen (2008) the WEU task of elaborating decisions concerning defence issues was, in its practical dimension, more often police-oriented than military. In this regard, it is worth reminding that, until 1995, Germany could not constitutionally contribute with military units to out-of-area operations: providing police, border-guards and custom officers was to a number of operations was then seen as a way to circumvent the problem (van Eekelen, 2008: 117).

⁷¹ Figures taken from CSDP MAP.

Although the EU cannot be depicted as a “leader” in SSR (Dursun-Ozkanka and Vandemoortele, 2012: 140), it is true that EU-led initiatives have gained momentum after the creation of the Union’s SSR policy framework in 2005-2006. The DCAF’s report on *Intergovernmental Approaches to SSR* identifies the EU as “potentially the most important resource provider for SSR programmes” (DCAF, 2006: 9).

The European Security Strategy (2003) underlines the importance of the security-development nexus (p. 2) and contains a brief but noteworthy reference to SSR as a means to “increase capabilities in different areas (...) in terms of a wider spectrum of mission” and as “part of broader institution building” in third countries (p. 12-13). Two years later, in November 2005, the *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform* was adopted (Council of the European Union, 2005d) bringing into being the effective integration of the concept.⁷²

Making explicit reference to the core objectives of the European Security Strategy, the document underlines the role of EU SSR in “...putting fragile states back on their feet...enhancing good governance, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability”, placing special emphasis on local ownership and inter-institutional coherence with other areas of EU external action. In many respects, the concept adheres to the OECD DAC guidelines. For instance, the definition of security sector replicates the categories listed in the OECD DAC document, although it is stated that the guidelines do not

⁷² The draft concept document was produced by the Council Secretariat on the basis of a paper titled “Initial elements for an EU security sector reform concept” discussed by the Political and Security Committee (van Eekelen, 2008: 113).

“reflect the specificities of the EU, nor those security aspects that fall under the CSDP” (Council of the European Union, 2005d: 5).

Six months after the Council’s concept, in May 2006, the Commission issued its own framework document through a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament titled *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* (European Commission, 2006), accompanied by annexes on previous areas of European Community support to SSR and international standards relevant for SSR activities. The document stated that “SSR is an important part of conflict prevention, peace-building and democratisation...SSR concerns reform of both the bodies which provide security to citizens and the state institutions responsible for management and oversight of those bodies”. From a content analysis of the Communication it emerges that the Commission, taking also the OECD DAC guidelines as its conceptual basis, intended to stress more forcefully the “security system” (as opposed to “security sector”) approach to SSR, underlining that reform should be understood as part of a governance reform policy and public sector strategy going beyond the security sector (van Eekelen, 2008: 115). Therefore, the Commission and the Council have articulated their approaches in slightly different ways, with the latter pursuing a narrower agenda based on security and crisis management, and the former relying on a broader one associated with good governance and conflict prevention.

Despite the scarce attention given by the Council Secretariat and the PSC to the Commission communication and differences between the two documents in

terms of conceptual nuances, operational focuses and implementing bodies, a Council of Ministers' decision of 12 June 2006 resulted in the release of the *EU Policy framework for Security Sector Reform* (Council of the European Union, 2006c). This third document pulled together the Commission's related activities and doctrines with the military route available to execute and support SSR through the common security and defence policy (Ekengren and Simons 2011).

On that account, the Commission and the Council have indeed become active players in SSR. As far as the latter are concerned, the CSDP missions and the Community's Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the Instrument for Stability have contributed to this rapid development by complementing the adoption of an overarching holistic and coordinated framework. However, as some authors have pointed out (Sheriff, 2007), challenges for SSR implementation in the EU arise precisely from an erroneous use of policy and operational instruments. On the one hand, although developed with reference to the OECD model pledging effective cross-pillar mechanisms, the EU SSR policy framework has suffered from the EU institutional fragmentation and the presence of too many levels of governance (and hence too many bureaucratic structures snooping into decision-making about SSR). On the other hand, and partly as a result of institutional framework, the EU has lacked common operational guidelines (Sheriff, 2007: 98) to evaluate and assess SSR activities in order to improve conceptual, planning and implementation tasks.

5.2 Introducing Civilian Crisis Management

The development of civilian crisis management in the EU is commonly seen as a process of capacity-building, aimed at equipping the Union with the instruments to carry out successful non-military peace-building and crisis response within the framework of the “Petersberg tasks” defined by the Article 17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Nowak (2006), stresses such instrumental nature, defining CCM as “the civilian-operational capacities of the EU member states that have been developed since 1999 in parallel with the military aspects of crisis management under ESDP” (Nowak, 2006: 17). No study, however, has approached the rise of CCM through the lenses of its conceptual evolution, and the resulting diffusion of norms and practices across EU member states. Whereas the operational and institutional aspects related to CCM implementation have produced an intense debate, its genesis has been largely neglected or superficially regarded as a way to avoid the militarisation of the CSDP and draw the line between NATO and the EU’s roles in global security. Although these factors have undoubtedly paved the way for the evolution of European security cooperation towards a non-military or civil-military approach, there is still no clear understanding of the drivers that have influenced EU member states’ decision to move into this direction. This is a rather paradoxical situation given the prominence of civilian missions over military operations in CSDP⁷³ (as of March 2012, 22 out of 28 missions

⁷³ Such prominence reveals a striking (and unaccounted for) changing conception of CSDP, as at the time of policy creation member states intended to establish a European military

launched by the EU since 2003 are civilian). Previous works have mentioned, usually through a few introductory lines, the origins of EU CCM at the 1999 Cologne Council, propelled by policy failure over the Western Balkans and, in particular, by the troubles encountered by UN (UNMIK), NATO (KFOR) and OSCE (OMIK) missions to ensure peacebuilding in Kosovo. However, the processes through which policy failure turned into policy evolution, and hence the way non-military crisis management was adopted by EU policy-makers, lacks of details and systematic explanation.

5.2.1 The literature on EU CCM

This section briefly reviews the main competing explanations for the EU's early engagement in CCM. The literature on this aspect of CSDP is surprisingly poor and displays an inexplicable gap between, on the one hand, the fuss about the EU's incapacity to become a fully-fledged military power or a muscular crisis manager and, on the other, a very simple question that has not generated explanatory writings: how do we explain the rise of EU civilian crisis management within CSDP, the policy convergence towards the establishment of institutional structures and the consequent operational outreach?

The starting point everyone seems to agree upon is change in the post-Cold War international system. Contextual factors and changes in the global security

capability in crisis management that would allow the Union to act independently from NATO. This eventually changed as the value added of CSDP turned out to be "civilian" (Gross, 2008: 314).

environment generated a momentum for non-military crisis management to become accepted as a key issue in the security policies of EU member states. The awareness that peacekeeping should go beyond the borders of military intervention spread rather fast. By the mid-1990s, an international policy consensus and convergence appeared on the need for more comprehensive, coordinated civil-military planning and intervention in crisis situations (Duke and Courtier, 2010). It is worth reminding that the *Charter of Paris* (OSCE, 1990) can be considered as the key document showing for the first time the relationship between the end of the Cold War and the implications for the future course of global security.

However, systemic pressure would not have been enough to create the urgency for EU's involvement in civilian crisis management to arise in the early 2000s. In the scant literature on CCM, a few factors are deemed as crucial in explaining the creation of EU CCM. Focusing on cooperation between the EU and the UN, Thierry Tardy (2011) argues that a fundamental reshuffle of the international security architecture, security governance actors and methods after the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of regionalisation – that is, international organisations that aspire to play a role in the security realm at a regional level. As a response to UN's inappropriateness or ineffectiveness in maintaining international peace (cf. policy failure in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Timor Este during the 1990s) the transformation of the EU into a regional peacekeeper was initiated by member states as a way to overcome the rising distrust vis-à-vis UN crisis management (Tardy, 2011: 13). In addition to the

EC's involvement in areas such as post conflict recovery and humanitarian aid, the CSDP increasingly engaged in peacebuilding and, in particular, CCM (Tardy, 2011: 16).

Other authors (Dwan, 2002) identify the internal politics of EU and its member states as heavily shaping the EU's move towards civilian crisis management. Dwan notes that the swift creation of a military rapid reaction force caused the consternation of three overlapping constituencies: the neutral states (Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden), concerned about the prospects of military alignment that could follow the commitment to an EU military capacity; the smaller member states, fearing that a military *directoire* of bigger powers (Britain, France, Germany) would control the fate of the EU security and defence policy; and the anti-federalists (Denmark, the UK) willing to counterbalance the push towards military integration. As far as the latter is concerned, a similar viewpoint is offered by Quille et al. (2006), who account for the creation of the Civilian Military Cell – and its contribution to developing EU civil-military coordination – as an identity-driven struggle between Atlanticists and Integrationists over the EU's autonomy in defence planning and conduct (the autonomous operational HQ), particularly following the April 2003 initiative in Tervuren.

The CSDP's "civilian" identity can therefore be understood as a by-product of the controversy surrounding EU-NATO relationship and the degree of autonomy / complementarity of the newly created EU military identity. Combining civilian and military power in crisis management, however, cannot

be seen as the sheer result of a package deal between member states' diverging national interests and visions of EU defence. Chivvis (2010: 5) notes that the driving ideas behind civilian CSDP were rooted in the belief that the EU was better equipped than NATO to handle post conflict reconstruction, namely in the Western Balkans.

Certainly, the strategic debate on the nature of EU power had a prominent role too. Focusing on the broader notion of comprehensive approach, Gross (2008: 9) argues that its formulation and implementation is grounded on the formulation of the EU strategic goals through the European Security Strategy (2003) in response to the changing security framework. According to Gross, the EU's comprehensive set of military, political and economic tools justifies the effort to put into practice the link between security and development and combine civilian and military instruments to meet the growing demand of civil-military planning.

In sum, the literature concurs with the view expressed by Duke (2008: 90) that the development of civilian aspects of crisis management in CFSP was heavily reactive in nature. The term "reactive" can be interpreted in three ways. First, as observed by Duke, reactive refers to the need to respond to existing crisis situations, such as Kosovo. Second, reactive also implies that inter-institutional forces (cf. EU-UN and EU-NATO relations) have been at play and shaped the way the EU built its identity in relationship to other international organisations and, as Tardy (2011: 35) put it at the junction between institutional and inter-governmental dynamics. Third, reactive may refer to the linkage between the

internal politics (and cultures) of member states and the search for a common “vision” for CSDP, which ultimately resulted into enhanced civilian and civil-military structures and instruments for the conduct of crisis management.

5.2.2 The rise of EU as a civilian crisis manager: framework, institutions and capabilities

Having reviewed the main accounts for the emergence of CCM, let us now turn to its practical development through the establishment of EU CCM conceptual framework, institutions and capabilities. This section illustrates the trends on which the EU has become a civilian crisis manager, drawing on the literature on the topic and on primary sources available. It looks at how institutions and capability building were launched following the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. It also analyses further conceptual, institutional and capacity development as a result of learning by doing from the early CSDP missions.

Since the beginning of its security and defence policy, the EU has been involved in the development of a civilian crisis management concept under the legal framework of Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU): *“Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”*.

The Lisbon Treaty has amended Article 17 TEU and the new formulation is now included in the Articles 28 A [42] and B [43] (cf. table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Extract from Art. 28 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the “Petersberg tasks”

<p><i>“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter (...)”</i> {Art. 28 A [42(1)]}</p> <p><i>“Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council”</i> {Art. 28 A [42(3)]}</p> <p><i>“The tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) [42(1)], in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (...)”</i> {Art. 28 B [43(1)]}</p>

The EU involvement in civilian crisis management is distinctive and different from any other international organisation in the field of security, as the literature has already shown (Nowak, 2006; Duke, 2008). First, the EU activities in crisis management and peacebuilding are divided into first-pillar Community actions and second-pillar civilian and military crisis management, with different actors, budget procedures and policies. Accordingly, although this research tackles the CSDP dimension of CCM only, it is important to reiterate that the structures and resources for CCM are physically located both within the Community and the Council Secretariat. Therefore, they do not conform to the purely intergovernmental method of military crisis management.

Second, and unlike NATO or the OSCE, the EU has clearly declared its ambition to develop both military and civilian capabilities to support a comprehensive approach. Therefore, besides the adoption of a Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) concept to ensure coordination with external actors (IGOs and NGOs) in EU-led operations, the Civil-Military Coordination concept (CMCO)⁷⁴ was produced to ensure effective internal coordination “of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis”⁷⁵ (Khol, 2008). When accounting for the institutional genesis and evolution of CCM,⁷⁶ it is therefore important to take these complexities into account and, in particular, to bear in mind the broader civil-military developments, which are closely related to and often overlap with the question of purely “civilian” capacity building.

Against this backdrop, the rise of CCM was characterised initially by three elements: under-thematisation, conceptual looseness and rapidity. First, the EU CCM was neither a policy priority, nor was it in the limelight of academic and media debates. In fact, while the Saint Malo Declaration and the proposed creation of rapid reaction corps for autonomous EU capacity in crisis management received media attention, the significance and potential development of non-military crisis response tools passed almost unnoticed.

⁷⁴ For a definition of CIMIC and CMCO, and the difference between the two concepts, see Khol (2006: 124).

⁷⁵ Cf. Council of the European Union (2003).

⁷⁶ When using the acronym CCM (whether preceded or not by EU) I refer to the civilian crisis management *framework* developed and used by the European Union only. When referring to the broader *concept* of civilian crisis management, also adopted by other international organisations, I will use the formulation “civilian crisis management”, without acronym.

Second, civilian crisis management has been for a long time an ambiguous and not clearly defined concept, which has led to a significant amount of conceptual confusion in international peacekeeping. According to previous works (Nowak, 2006; Ioannides, 2010), the first definition was provided in March 2002 by a special report of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), defining civilian crisis management as: “the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution” (Lindborg, 2002: 4).

Third, institutionalisation of crisis management (including its civilian facet) in the EU has been remarkably fast. Such rapidity was made possible by a number of facilitating factors (lessons from the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Anglo-French Saint Malo declaration), among which the institutional precedent – the WEU - provided the new crisis management structures with consolidated practices and experiences (Duke, 2008: 76).

Contrary to what is commonly reported, the inception of the EU’s CCM was not the Cologne Summit (June 1999), but, two years earlier, the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty (signed on October 1997), as a result of the Swedish-Finnish initiative during the intergovernmental conference in 1996-1997. The initiative, which led to the adoption of the Article 17.2 TEU, was aimed at providing the Union with the tools to carry out peace support operations, out of the realisation that the EU could not stand

powerlessly in the event of situations like the violent conflicts that erupted in the Balkans.

At the Cologne Summit, one month after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council decided to mandate the upcoming Finnish Presidency to address non-military crisis management, besides the work undergoing on the military side. A “Security Working Group” (SWG) was tasked to deal with this question and produced a list of the existing instruments at the Union level, in cooperation with the Council Secretariat, the Commission and member states.⁷⁷ The result of this was an inventory of non-military crisis response instruments available in EU member states forwarded to Delegations on November 24, 1999.⁷⁸ As an example, the table 5.4 shows the list of pre-existing structures, instruments and expertise of civil police in some of the EU member states:

Table 5.4: Non-military crisis management tools available in EU member states in the field of civilian police (1999)⁷⁹

EU member state	Tools and resources available (CIVIL POLICE)
DK	<i>Denmark participates in civilian police missions implemented by the UN, OSCE, WEU, as well as other multilateral and bilateral operations. Denmark at present participates in international missions with approximately 80 police officers (of whom 68 are deployed in various missions in the Balkans - IPTF, UNIP, ECMM, PMG, and MAPE). 50 of these officers are permanently at the disposal for international operations and are registered with the UN Stand-by arrangement system</i>
ES	<i>At present, 42 members of the Spanish national police and 188 members of Guardia Civil are serving in missions under NNUU, NATO, OSCE, and WEU. Tasks involve monitoring of human rights violations, local police forces, refugee/displaced persons movements, as well as control and police tasks of refugee camps, borders and embargoes</i>

⁷⁷ Cf. Council of the European Union (1999a: 2).

⁷⁸ Cf. Council of the European Union (1999b).

⁷⁹ Source: Council of the European Union (1999b: 3-4).

Chapter 5 – Introduction to the case studies: SSR and CCM

IR	<i>Irish police have a long tradition of service as civpols in UN missions and have participated in a number of OSCE and EU missions. Coreu DUB109 sets out the position regarding the training of police officers in Ireland for such missions</i>
IT	<i>Italy has a territorial police, a state police and a custom police, which are autonomous forces that can and have been employed in crisis management. A school of advanced police studies offers two "stages" yearly to form around 70 international police trainers. This facility is at the disposal of international organisations (i.a. the EU)</i>
NL	<i>A total of around 70 military police officers from the Netherlands are currently deployed in various crisis regions, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina in IPTF, and some in Albania (MAPE). - A group of civil police officers has been deployed on an ad hoc basis in crisis regions (e.g. forensic experts assisting the Rwanda Tribunal or the ICTY). - The Government is currently looking into ways to enhance its capacity to deploy civil police in crisis regions to assist in the establishment of structures for democratic policing as an integral part of peace building</i>
AUS	<i>Long-standing experience for forces for international (especially UN) missions; for training: see coreu VIE 350/99</i>
P	<i>National civil police force (Policia de Segurança Pública - PSP - depending on the Ministry of Internal Affairs) has been participating in international police missions (monitoring human rights and local police forces, refugee/displaced movements) humanitarian assistance to refugees, local police training, police counselling and consulting, voters registration and election monitoring</i>
FIN	<i>A rostrum of trained civilian police (CIVPOL) available. 110 trained experts in reserve. 16 civilian police at the moment in field operations (UN, OSCE, and WEU)</i>
SW	<i>Currently about 180 Swedish police in international missions: 148 in UN, OSCE or WEU missions (IPTF, UNMIK, UNAMET, PMG, and MAPE). Before departure, training at the Swedish Armed Forces International Command (SWEDINT). Also bilateral missions (e.g. support for legal sector in Central and Eastern Europe). - Responsibility currently shared between National Police Force and Swedish Armed Forces. Government proposal forthcoming that National Police Board takes a collective responsibility for all international police activity and creates a Foreign Force within the Police Force</i>

These inventories served as the basis for the *Action Plan for non military crisis management* of the EU subsequently adopted by the December 1999 Helsinki European Council,⁸⁰ and designed to indicate the steps the Union should undertake to develop a rapid reaction capacity in the field of non-military crisis management. The Action Plan identifies three objectives for the Union's approach to CCM:

⁸⁰ Cf. Helsinki European Council (1999: 6).

- *Strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and improve performance (...);*
- *Enhancing and facilitating the EU's contribution to, and activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous action;*
- *Ensuring inter-pillar coherence.*⁸¹

To that purpose, three tools are foreseen:

- An inventory of national and collective resources, to give an overview of resources that could be marshalled within a rapid reaction framework (...). In this process Member States and the EU institutions could, if they wish, highlight sectors in which they find that they have acknowledged expertise;
- A database to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management;
- A study taking into account lessons learned, to define concrete targets for EU Member States' collective non-military responses to international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 6.

for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a contribution to civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours).⁸²

The purpose of these three tools was to identify areas of relative strength and weakness to improve training standards, sharing of experience and best practices, as well as bilateral or multilateral projects between Member States.⁸³

The *Action Plan*, in turn, paved the way for the work undertaken by the Portuguese Presidency on the development of the CSDP civilian capabilities.

In accordance with the recommendations contained in the Helsinki Presidency Report, the work of the Portuguese Presidency largely relied on the study that drew on “experience from recent and current crises, on the expertise of the Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis management in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000”, and “carried out to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management.”⁸⁴ The study concluded that four priority areas should constitute the bulk of EU civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. It gave priority to the development of rapid reaction response capabilities “fully taking into account, and building upon, existing experiences, instruments and resources”.⁸⁵

The rationale for choosing these areas reflected a concern to pay particular attention to the fields where “the international community so far has demonstrated weaknesses”, which hence would “provide "added value" as it

⁸² *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁸⁴ Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000). Cf. also Nowak (2006: 19).

⁸⁵ Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000).

would improve the Union's capacity to react as well as the Union's capability to meet the requests of the other lead organisations: they would be able to count – on a more systematic basis – on a sizeable quantitative and qualitative contribution which could represent the nucleus of some of their missions. This would, in turn, increase the Union's visibility".⁸⁶

Therefore, capacity building relied on the expertise made available by member states. Civilian police and, to a lesser extent, rule of law assumed a leading role in improving EU crisis response capabilities. The targets for the police were set by the Santa Maria da Feira European Council (June 2000) set the targets for the police: 5.000 police officers available for international police missions, with 1.000 of them deployable within 30 days.

The Gothenburg Council (June 2001) later adopted a *Police Action Plan* to further develop the planning capacity of police operations at the strategic level. The presence in some of the member states of specialised police forces ready to be deployed⁸⁷ facilitated the task of capacity building. In addition, the Gothenburg Council set up the targets in the area of the rule of law, with a commitment to 200 experts to train, advice and in some cases carry out executive tasks when local structures are failing or inexistent. Targets and guidelines for civilian administration and civil protection were also set, although in a less precise and sustained way compared to the other two priority areas. Member states committed to provide a pool of experts for quick

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Gendarmerie-type forces were already present in France (*Gendarmerie Nationale*), Italy (*Arma dei Carabinieri*), Spain (*Guardia Civil*), The Netherlands (*Marechaussee*) and Portugal (*Guarda Nacional Republicana*).

deployment in civilian administration missions across a variety of functions, with emphasis on the promotion of a swift transition to local ownership. Targets for civil protection included intervention teams of 2,000 personnel and assessment teams to support humanitarian assistance (handled by the Commission).

From this inception phase (1999 – 2001) onward, conceptual, institutional and operational aspects of CCM make significant progress, sustained by those member states that were already disposing of expertise in the civilian aspects of crisis management. Institution building went in parallel with the creation of military structures. By Swedish initiative, in May 2000, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom), composed of officials from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, mid-ranking national diplomats and a number of police experts (Cross, 2012: 187) was formally established by a Council decision (it met for the first time on June 16, 2000). Civcom was to advise the PSC and other Council's bodies on civilian crisis management matters, therefore in parallel with the work of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) for military affairs.

These improvements need to be understood in relation to the efforts to implement more coherent civilian military co-ordination as well as to an evolutionary path characterised by intense learning by doing.⁸⁸ It began with the planning of the first civilian mission, the EU Police Mission on Bosnia and

⁸⁸ See chapter 7.

Herzegovina (EUPM) in early 2002⁸⁹ (EUPM was launched on 1 January 2003, taking over from the UN International Police Task Force).

5.2.3 Civilian crisis management after Lisbon

The last wave of institutional change occurred with the Treaty of Lisbon, as a result of two growing trends affecting the development of EU crisis management. The first trend is the continuing dissolution of the border between civilian and military intervention, which requires a consolidation of the hybrid structures and procedures to implement the comprehensive approach. The second one is the demand for more sophisticated expertise and specialisation in the conduct of crisis management tasks.

In an attempt to complement the restructuring of the EU external action through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Lisbon Treaty tried to further enhance civil-military co-ordination by integrating the former DG VIII (military) and DG IX (civilian) into a single new directorate, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). The CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS are now placed under the same roof (the EEAS) and the authority of the High Representative. The restructuring was supposed to enhance a culture of integration, in theory at least.

As this chapter has shown, between 1999 and 2011, civilian crisis management has become a central part of the CSDP, in institutional, conceptual, strategic

⁸⁹ The decision to deploy an EU police mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina was taken by the General Affairs Council on 18-19 February 2002.

and operational terms. Because of the expanding geographical and thematic reach, number of personnel deployed, growing complexity and scale of missions and institutional/conceptual innovation, CCM can be defined as the “ugly duckling” of CSDP: neglected at its origins and often overshadowed by the military debate, it constitutes nonetheless the bulk of the EU’s role as a global security provider. At the same time, as the academic literature has pointed out, a number of challenges and shortfalls prevent the EU from becoming an effective crisis management in the civilian field. For instance, Jakobsen (2006) argues that the expectations-capability gap is much harder in the civilian domain than it is in the military one. This could severely damage the EU’s reputation as a global leader in civilian crisis management. Korski and Gowan (2009) contend instead that different commitments of member states loose support from Brussels are the main factors responsible for poor training and wobbly capability building.

5.3 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has presented the EU frameworks on SSR and CCM. By doing so, it challenged the conventional wisdom on the two issue areas on two grounds. First, concerning SSR, the chapter has shown that the creation of an EU policy framework was more than a simple “relabeling” of previous European Commission activities in post conflict environments; as a matter of fact, framing SSR has meant putting a wide range of sectoral and sub-sectoral

activities under the same roof, with a specific emphasis on the holistic approach. Second, as regards CCM, the chapter has underlined the existence of expertise and know-how, provided by member states, alongside the process of capacity-building that has caught the attention of scholars. It also elucidates the relation between the conceptual efforts aimed at producing a CCM framework, and the expansion of structures and activities over time.

On that account, the following chapters explore the extent to which learning communities shaped the evolution of SSR and CCM from the conceptual framework to institutionalised practice.

Chapter 6

Learning communities and the CSDP: Security Sector Reform

Brian: "Excuse me. Are you the Judean People's Front?"
Reg: "F... ff! We're the People's Front of Judea"
(Monty Python's *The Life of Brian*)

Introduction

This case study-chapter tests the hypothesis that the emergence of the EU's approach to security sector reform has been driven by learning communities, which introduced new ideas into the EU's decision-making process. This chapter analyses the extent to which the EU has *learned* to adopt and implement SSR, in order to enhance its conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction capabilities as well as to better address changing security threats. The learning process was ideational in nature and driven by transnational communities, who acted as agents of institutionalisation of the SSR principles into the EU policy arena. Individuals belonging to these communities carried their expertise into the EU decision-making system and mainstreamed a new security thinking based on the post-Cold War paradigm of "human security" and on the integration between security, development and

good governance. EU SSR is hence understood as a policy innovation process to enhance the Union's commitment as a security provider, by stressing the need for a holistic approach to security aimed at ensuring effective crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

Against this backdrop, the obvious questions arise as to why (and how) member states decided to institutionalise and operationalise the SSR guidelines, what influenced EU policy-makers choices and, finally, how a consensus on the EU approach to SSR emerged and turned into a policy framework? The less obvious and trickier question has to do with the outcomes of this diffusion process. Contrary to civilian crisis management and in spite of the growing recognition of the EU as a SSR provider, European SSR programmes have been very far from ensuring effective implementation and a coherent management of the available mechanisms. The policy-practice gap and the challenge of coherence (Bryden, 2011) are particularly relevant in the case of the EU. Detractors point out, quite rightly, that “pure” EU-led SSR missions have been few and low scale, with uneven or disappointing results in the field. In institutional terms, SSR seems to suffer from a “firefly complex”: whereas EU officials acknowledge its presence, the actual impact on institutional structures and procedures is hardly detectable when compared to other policies.

This chapter addresses the first, general question and the second, comparative one, by exploring the pathways of influence triggering the dynamics of policy failure, policy paradigm innovation, emulation and learning (McNamara, 1998;

Adler and Haas, 1992) with respect to SSR. It explains why the SSR framework did not generate learning by doing through systematic practice. For comparative purposes, the structure of this chapter replicates the other case study on CCM. Accordingly, the next section goes through the process of SSR formation and its diffusion in the EU, outlining the structure of learning communities and assessing SSR persistence. Section 6.2 discusses the EU's operational experience in the field of SSR. It shows that the lack of a fully developed SSR practice resulted in shortfalls in the learning process. The conclusion summarises the key challenges for the evolution of EU SSR in light of the empirical findings.

Unpacking the construction of the EU approach to SSR bears two important normative implications. First, a deeper understanding of the genesis of SSR would allow us to better capture the distinct features of the EU's involvement, and achieve a more rigorous assessment of its SSR practices. This can positively contribute to identifying useful lessons to improve the coordination among EU external action instruments and procedures. Second, this exercise also sheds light on the complexities of the SSR concept and, potentially, clears up the confusion that obstructs effective international cooperation in this field. In fact, it is worth reminding that SSR activities take place in different contexts (transition and developing countries, post-conflict situation but also developed countries) and encompass a wide array of dimensions (defence, justice, development, governance etc.), making the delimitation of their conceptual and

operational borders, and hence division of tasks among international actors, difficult at best.

The study is based on a content analysis of official documents and reports on SSR as well as on interviews with more than 25 élites from the Council Secretariat, the European Commission and member states as well as experts from leading European think-tanks and NGOs carried out between March and December 2011 in Brussels, Geneva, Paris and London.

6.1 Learning communities and EU SSR: between knowledge and power

The emergence of SSR coincides with, and hence must be understood in the context of the rapid expansion of the EU's crisis management structures and activities (Grevi et al., 2009). Taking such contextual factor into account, this section casts light on the driving causal forces that underlie the emergence of the EU SSR framework. It shows that SSR originates in policy failure and in an effort to merge different perspectives into a single *episteme*, prompting a holistic understanding of security, development and good governance. The whole SSR conceptualisation's enterprise can therefore be seen as an attempt to gather different sub-communities in order to form, through socialisation and knowledge sharing, a new epistemic community of SSR. The EU case shows that this venture has been only partly successful. The creation of the SSR policy framework displays a significant degree of institutionalisation of the concept in the EU security architecture. However, the glass can be also seen as

half-empty, due to the limited record of policy experience (CSDP missions have been few, and low-scale) and further institutional reform to make the EU SSR practice more effective. In other words, compared to CCM, the process of SSR norm diffusion resulted in a much less robust outcome and a lower impact of the norm on EU security policies.

To account for this variation as well as for the genesis of SSR as a process of learning, this section is structured in three parts:

- (1) the attempt to form an SSR epistemic community, bridging previously separated communities and building a new cognitive architecture;
- (2) the influence of the SSR concept on the CSDP, through the analysis of the four pathways of influence and intervening factors;
- (3) SSR policy outcomes, addressing whether the diffusion of ideas has led to policy evolution as learning by doing.

6.1.1 The learning communities of SSR

The conceptualisation and consolidation of security sector governance and reform have been influenced by three factors: first, a structural change in the nature and scale of conflicts characterising the post-Cold War period; second, the emergence of human security as a new thinking linking security to development and good governance; and third, the consequences of the traumatic experience of the conflicts in the Western Balkans, which eventually

reinforced the need for a more coherent and integrated approach to security including civilian and military aspects.

Linked to these major systemic events, three epistemic communities flourished in the 1990s: the security policy community, the development cooperation community and, with a lesser degree of engagement, the one dealing with the promotion of democracy, good governance and justice. Although the three communities had varied discourses and slightly different focuses and causal beliefs, their policy enterprise was based on the common assumption that a well governed and transparent security sector and/or system is a key factor to ensure socio-economic development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The genesis of SSR is deep-rooted into the interaction between these three communities. Security sector governance and reform are in fact bridging concepts joining distinct fields of expertise and, as a consequence, experts who are not used to talking to each other. Therefore, when the need for a holistic approach to crisis management and conflict prevention begun making headway at the international stage, the idea of integrating security/development/good governance into a single policy framework was advocated by untied networks of individuals, who did not necessarily share the same view on the terms of this integrative process. As a result, much of the efforts that underlie the promotion of SSR were aimed at addressing the cleavages between independent epistemic communities, by having people sit around the table in view of setting up expert consensus around the new norms.

6.1.1.1 The security/defence community

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has widened and deepened. Systemic factors have led to the proliferation of failing states and intrastate wars, entailing the progressive blurring of the boundaries between external and internal security. Declining military expenditures and downsizing state armies (SIPRI, 2006) also played an important role in opening a window of opportunity for a change to the old notion of security. In practical terms, this meant understanding peacekeeping as going beyond military intervention, and led to a blossoming debate on civil-military relations and, at a later stage, on governance issues as well. As non-military security issues (i.e. political, economic, judicial and societal aspects) were adopted by the global security agenda, the practices of IOs switched towards a comprehensive approach tackling a wide range of activities within the broader security sector (Hänggi and Tanner, 2005). The endorsement of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) notion of “human security”, encompassing the broader and non-military nature of security concerns (UNDP, 1994), spurred the affirmation of the “security-development nexus” (Williams, 2002; Chandler, 2007) as the absolute protagonist of the peacebuilding discourse.

As a result, a “new thinking” regarding security emerged during the 1990s (Barbé, 1995) and can be divided into three major strands. First, the call for democratic control of armed forces as well as oversight of the defence sector and, to a broader extent, of the whole spectrum of security forces emerged.

These norms were first adopted by the OSCE in the 1994 *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, followed by the *Charter for European Security* agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. A second major strand was connected with NATO's emphasis on civil-military relations during the enlargement process to the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The promotion of defence and security sector reform was one of NATO's central goals in the post-Soviet, new NATO candidate countries. Therefore, NATO became the first and most active provider of external assistance in SSR (though with a different label) under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework launched in 1994. A third strand of the debate, very much connected to the previous two but less transnational in focus, centred on the "new defence diplomacy" implemented by Western governments to ensure conflict prevention and stable relationships with other countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements, in order to make armed forces democratic and accountable. Members of the security/defence policy community are military and civilian staff from the Ministries of Defence, diplomats and officers seconded to security organisations (mostly NATO and OSCE) and the network of strategic studies institutes (academia and think-tanks) dealing with defence matters.

6.1.1.2 The development cooperation community

A new paradigm also developed in the development discourse, stressing that security and stability, including the transformation of ineffective, inefficient and corrupt security forces, would become a necessary pre-requisite for development and aid delivery (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). The security-development nexus stimulated multilateral and bilateral donors to embrace SSR as an instrument to improve the effectiveness of development assistance. Development experts and practitioners acknowledged that the foundation for sustainable development is in the capacity to address the root causes of conflict, hence integrating development aid with a new hybrid sphere of intervention called “post-conflict peacebuilding”.

In May 1997, OECD countries’ Development Ministers issued the *Policy Statement on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*, stressing that the “development co-operation efforts should strive for an environment of ‘structural stability’ as a basis for sustainable development (...), embracing mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social and economic development” (OECD, 1997: 2).

This first policy statement initiated the process leading to the adoption of the OECD guidelines, which set the standards for SSR implementation and mainstreamed the security-development nexus into the development discourse (see the next section). European donor states headed by the United Kingdom

and operating under the institutional umbrella of the EU, were the first to embrace the concept, concerned about the effectiveness of their development policies in post-conflict situations and with significant impact on their policy preferences (Sabiote, 2010). Much of the debate initially revolved around military spending: that is, on the way governments would be expected to control and administer the security sector and the difficulties in managing the accountability of institutions. The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic institutions as well as the “baptism by fire” (Ginsberg, 2001) for the EU in the Western Balkans dramatically accelerated the development and diffusion of the security-development nexus. The EU and NATO’s support to the transition from authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe empirically demonstrated that good governance in the rule of law and defence sectors were crucial for sustainable economic and social development. The central link between development and security became mainstream in the Balkans as well (Spence and Fluri, 2007). The EU’s South-eastern neighbourhood, pretty much like the Eastern, was composed of states having serious deficits in security, development and democracy, with regime types ranging from new but weak democracies to regimes with authoritarian features and limited political participation (Hänggi and Tanner, 2005). The challenge for European donors was to prevent conflicts in the Balkans from undermining their own security, and to ensure the effectiveness of the stabilisation mechanisms (i.e. the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).

6.1.1.3 The genesis of SSR

Against this backdrop, the conceptual roots of SSR are twofold. First, they arise from what was described as a “developmentalisation” of donor countries’ security discourse.⁹⁰ The increasing influence of the development community in security affairs was aimed at emphasising transparency, comprehensiveness and a system-wide approach to the establishment of good governance starting from the security sector. Second, a “securitisation” of the development assistance also came about.⁹¹ This process aimed at making aid and state building more effective in the long-term, by integrating the conflict-peace-development agenda and reduce the security threats associated with state failures.

Mainstreaming the security-development nexus and achieving a whole-of-government approach to SSR is therefore to be understood as a complex process of knowledge formation, whereby security and development experts came to talk to each other intensively, in order to strengthen linkages between the two communities and produce consensus over the trajectories of policy change. It is correct to describe this as an attempt to merge what would previously be different epistemic communities by instilling a culture of integration.

The “bicephalous” structure of SSR communities is reflected in their *shape* and *extension*. The *shape* is simple and narrow: although no institutionalised body

⁹⁰ Interview of the author with an expert (via Skype), January 2012.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

was tasked with advancing the SSR agenda transnationally, SSR actors are easily identifiable and in many cases received strong financial and political support from Governments. SSR experts are very likely to be affiliated or associated, if not employed in, a relatively small batch of organisations. Secondly, as regards the *extension*, expertise does not overlap with practice: in the SSR case (as opposed to CCM, cf. next chapter), empirical findings show that there are no pre-existing, shared experiences within the same or contiguous organisational unit (a network of professionals) that generated a change of habitus. Most of the interviewees deny having been involved in a working relationship with SSR professionals before the term “SSR” was created. Differences in their backgrounds, jargon used and professional output confirm these statements.⁹² Those who did share a working routine either belonged to the development community or to the defence community, with very few people brokering in between. Therefore, not only an SSR community of practice did not exist when the concept began making headway in the international community and, subsequently, in the EU, but professional had very different perspectives on crisis management.

The SSR genesis is therefore associated with a new vision of a specific social reality (conflict and fragility), namely the idea that the security sector or system is crucial to improve donors and security providers’ operational outreach. Interviewees describe the relationship with other SSR experts as the explicit attempt to forge a new understanding of things, beyond the simple

⁹² Answer to semi-structured questions during interviews and via telephone. See questions in the SSR questionnaire annexed.

sharing of knowledge. People’s participation in conferences was associated with the objective of promoting a mutual understanding, aimed to the achievement of a common policy goal. Table 6.1 shows the participants’ list to four selected conferences on SSR that took place between 2005 and 2007. The sample draws from the interviewees’ answer to the question on their participation to conferences they considered most important for the formation of their expertise on SSR.⁹³ The table shows the attempt to gather experts and officials with different backgrounds (security and development). It also gives an idea of some of the organisations that are systematically represented at these knowledge-sharing events.

Table 6.1: SSR Conferences 2005-2007

The EU and Security Sector Reform (3-4 May 2007, Stockholm)	Security Sector Governance and Reform: A Challenge for the European Union (30 September 2005, Brussels)	Coordination or confusion? The integration of security and development in EU policy (29 November 2005, Brussels)	Security sector reform in peacebuilding: towards an EU-UN partnership (28 June 2006, Brussels)
Organiser: DCAF Venue: Swedish National Defence College	Organiser: DCAF Venue: CEPS	Organisers: Egmont Institute (Brussels), International Peace Information Service (IPIS, Antwerp) and DCAF Venue: Chateau de Val Duchesse, Brussels	Organisers: DCAF, EPC, King Badouin Foundation Venue: Residence Palace, Brussels
Expert Defence (DCAF) Scholar Security/Defence (Bristol University) EU Official (European Commission) Expert Security (EPC) Diplomat (SNDC)	Expert Defence (DCAF) Diplomat (EU PSC) Expert Defence (DCAF) Expert Defence (DCAF) Expert Security (GCSP)	Expert Defence (Egmont) Expert Defence (IPIS) Scholar Development (Oxford) Expert Development (German Development Institute) Expert Development	Expert Security (EPC) Expert Defence (DCAF) EU Official (UN DPKO) EU Official (EUSR) Expert Defence (DCAF) EU Official (Council

⁹³ Cf. questionnaire in annex.

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UN Official (UN, Disarmament Affairs) Expert Defence (Defence Academy of the UK, Conflict Studies Res. Centre) EU Official (Deputy Director General for Political and Military Affairs, Council EU) Former Minister Defence (The Netherlands)	Expert Defence (EU ISS) NATO Official (NATO PA) Expert Security (CEPS)	(Sussex IDS) Expert Security/Defence (DCAF) EU Official (DG RELEX, European Commission) EU Official (EUMS)	EU)
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On that account, the criteria of position, participation and reputation were used during my interviews to map the population of SSR communities. I cross-checked the data gathered from the interviews with the analysis of reports/documents/publications of relevant individuals and organisations on SSR, as well as with research on open sources (institutions websites and available contact lists).

Table 6.2 provides a list of the institutions that form the epistemic communities of SSR, divided into five areas: (1) Education/Research (University departments, think-tanks, research institutes); (2) Government (Ministries, Agencies, national defence colleges); (3) Training centres; (4) NGOs; (5) IOs (and related bodies).

The results of the empirical research indicate that intense collaboration took place from the early-2000s among the individuals belonging to the organisations in all the five areas listed in the table. The organisations marked with the green colour are those that were more frequently referred to according to the reputation criteria. Individuals met frequently during conferences,

seminars and knowledge-sharing initiatives organised or co-organised by these institutions. Through a scrutiny of the “acknowledgments page” of major SSR publications (for instance, the OECD Guidelines), I found that those experts who contributed more substantially to the definition of the SSR concept had already collaborated in previous occasions (mostly to produce joint publications or attending conferences). Furthermore, the professional background of the people listed (accessed through open source, such as LinkedIn or resumes available on Google or, in some cases, shared confidentially by the individual) shows that the vast majority of the contributors was affiliated or had been affiliated with one of the institutions that figure in the table below.

At the same time, major differences in terms of objectives of the SSR process, jargon used and personal views of the operational challenges for SSR missions were detected across the military *vs* development/civilian divide. The learning communities of SSR appeared fragmented, with no or very poor sense of belonging among individuals committed to advance SSR principles. Experts working for DFID had a radically different view of the subject matter than those working for EPLO. Similarly, their account of the origins of SSR as more security or defence-focused differs substantially. In a few cases, interviewees would speak about a “wall” that has yet to be torn down between the vision of SSR as strictly relating to the defence sector and a more systemic

understanding, which should take into account development as well as good governance challenges and closer inter-institutional cooperation.⁹⁴

Table 6.2: SSR epistemic communities

Institution	Sector	Country	Staff	Function	Website
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna	1, 3	Italy		Training	http://www.sssup.it/
Netherlands Institute of International Relations - Clingendael	1	The Netherlands		Research, Consultancy, Training	http://www.clingendael.nl/
European Union Institute for Security Studies	5	-		Research	www.iss.europa.eu
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office	4	-		Advocacy network	www.eplo.org
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	1	Austria		Research, Training	http://www.aspr.ac.at/aspr/
Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management – National Defence Academy	2	Austria		Research, Training, Political Advice	http://www.bundesheer.at/organisation/beitraege/lvak/eifk/eifk.shtml
UK Department for International Development (DFID)	2	UK		Government	www.dfid.gov.uk/
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform	1	UK		Research, Advocacy, Knowledge sharing	http://www.ssrnetwork.net/
Conflict, Security and Development Group – King's College London	1	UK		Knowledge sharing, Research	http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	1, 5	Switzerland		Training, Research, Advocacy, Knowledge Sharing	www.dcaf.ch
International Security Sector Advisory Team	1,3	Switzerland		Training, Mentoring, Networking	www.issat.dcaf.ch
Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training	1, 3	Switzerland		Training, Capacity Building, Networking	http://asset-ssr.org
Geneva Centre for Security Policy	1	Switzerland		Research, Training	www.gcsp.ch
OECD – International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), previously Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC)	5	-		Advisory, Networking, Decision-making	http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/theinternationalnetworkonconflictandfragility.htm
Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze	3	Germany		Training	http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/
German Institute for International and Security Affairs	1	Germany		Research	http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/start-en.html

⁹⁴ Interviews of the author with experts, Brussels, December 2011.

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Folke Bernadotte Academy	3	Sweden		Training	http://www.folkebernadotteacademy.se/
Crisis Management Centre	3	Finland		Training	http://www.cmcfi.nland.fi/
Swedish National Defence College	2	Sweden		Research and Development	www.fhs.se
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University	1	Sweden		Research, Education	http://www.pcr.uu.se/
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2	Sweden		Government – Development co-operation	www.sida.se
Forum Syd	4	Sweden		International Development cooperation, research and advocacy	https://www.forumsyd.org/DefaultForumSyd_C.aspx?id=12337
Saferworld	4	UK		Research, Consultancy, Advocacy	www.saferworld.org.uk
EU – Council Secretariat EEAS, EUSRs, EUMS, EUMC, CMPD, CPCC, CIVCOM, PMG, PSC	5	EU		International Organisation	http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm
European Security and Defence College	3	EU wide		Training	http://esdc.mil-edu.be/
EU – Member States Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defence, DGs Development Co-operation, Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Interior	2	Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Austria		Government	N/A
European Centre for Development Policy Management	1	Netherlands, Belgium		International Development Think and Do Tank.	http://www.ecdpm.org/
Overseas Development Institute	1	UK		Research	www.odi.org.uk
NATO	5	-		International Organisation	www.nato.int
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe	5	-		International Organisation	
Crisis Management Initiative	4	Finland		Advocacy	
International Alert	4	UK		NGO, Advocacy	http://www.international-alert.org/
International Crisis Group	4	-		NGO, Research, Advocacy	http://www.crisisgroup.org/
Council Secretariat DG-E External	5	-		IGO	
High Representative's Office	5	-		IGO	
DG RELEX	2	-		EU - Policy-making	
Downing Street	2	UK		Government	
UK Foreign Secretary's Cabinet	2	UK		Government	

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<i>Foreign Office's Security Branch</i>	2	UK		<i>Government</i>	
<i>UK PR (PSC Ambassador)</i>	2	UK		<i>Government</i>	
<i>UK Foreign Office's CFSP Unit</i>	2	UK		<i>Government</i>	
<i>UK Defence Ministry's Policy Staff</i>	2	UK		<i>Government - Military</i>	
<i>UK Defence Ministry's EU/NATO Division</i>	2	UK		<i>Government - Military</i>	

6.1.2 The dynamics of SSR diffusion: does knowledge matter?

This section analyses the process of SSR diffusion, and therefore constitutes the bulk of my empirical analysis. It explains how the EU elaborated its approach to SSR in the mid-2000s, showing that a set of constituencies (the UK and other member states; the OECD) backed it up, and that the creation of a policy consensus emerged from policy failure, emulation and innovation.

The rise of SSR in the EU was expert-driven. Specifically, it relied on the *DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance* (OECD, 2005), and on the *Handbook on Security System Reform* (OECD, 2007), which served as a vehicle for the “multilateralisation” of the EU variant of SSR (Albrecht, Setepputat and Andersen, 2010). It is therefore crucial to understand how the OECD guidelines were developed and framed and what were the flows of influence and networks involved in different phases of policy innovation, diffusion, selection, persistence and evolution. SSR conceptual foundations are rooted in the attempt to forge a Europe-wide policy consensus that, as the previous section has shown, emerged gradually among national think-tankers,

political actors, pressure groups, research centres and NGOs belonging to the security and development communities.

6.1.2.1 Policy innovation, selection, diffusion and emulation

Learning from policy failure, national epistemic communities from major aid donors provided the boost for policy innovation. The UK communities were in the frontline of this development, supported by the British government.⁹⁵ Actually, British policy-makers did not reinvent the wheel when launching the SSR agenda in 1998/1999. Tony Blair's – and the Labour Party's – internationalist agenda relabelled and reformulated concepts that had already been introduced in the policy arena (including the EU and the European Commission) but lacked a comprehensive policy framework and, most importantly, could get enough drive to spread transnationally. It is therefore important not to overemphasise the role of the UK as the pioneer of SSR, but to stress the fact that specific ideas and norms already circulating in the international system were picked up and reframed as part of a broader agenda heavily sustained by national resources and means. The UK advanced the SSR agenda first at the national level, then through the OECD DAC forum before SSR norms reached the EU, at a crucial stage where comprehensive and civilian crisis management principles were gaining ground.

⁹⁵ I thank Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball for their comments on the development SSR in the UK.

The vision of SSR as a new instrument for the foreign/security policy of donor countries was laid out by Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, through a policy statement in March 1999. Short's understanding of future SSR activities reflected an emerging government-wide consensus on a new rationale for increasing foreign-security-development policies coordination, as a result of recent experiences in developing countries such as Cambodia or Sierra Leone.

The Department for International Development (DFID) got that vision off the ground (Hendrickson, 2000). The UK's role as a promoter of SSR relied on a tight network of expert communities, who were tasked with assisting the wider overhaul of DFID's humanitarian policies, procedures and organisational structures. This process started with the creation, in April 1998, of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD). CHAD replaced the Emergency Aid Department and its action was aimed at monitoring and providing advice to DFID on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, human rights, migration, as well as to "liaise with government departments and conflict departments of other governments, NGOs and academic groups" (Gibbons, 1998). It was within CHAD's institutional framework that SSR policies started to be addressed as a tool to increase effective implementation of the security-development nexus. Shortly after the creation of CHAD, DFID commissioned a number of research projects to further develop the SSR agenda. Among these projects, a highly influential paper written by Nicole Ball for *Saferworld* and funded by DFID, titled *Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform:*

Policy Options for the British Government (Ball, 1998) was published in March 1998 and hugely impacted on the definition of an UK approach to SSR. Another important step towards concept-building was the establishment of the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King's College London in 1999, supported by a three-year grant awarded by DFID. The rationale for the establishment of the CSDG was to examine policy challenges associated with the linkage between security-development and good governance, and to provide support to the UK's government policy development in the field of SSR and conflict prevention. Neither DFID, nor the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had in fact sufficient capacity/expertise to deal with the emerging SSR/good governance agenda and thus needed to rely on external advice to set up a coherent policy framework.

In February 2000, a DFID-sponsored symposium on security sector reform and military expenditure constituted the first attempt to mainstream SSR across the development and security communities. It served also as an opportunity for Claire Short to announce the DFID-CSDG joint initiative to create an information network, in order to enhance the sharing of information and analysis (Short, 2000).

As a result, in the first semester of 2000, DFID commissioned CSDG to produce a set of security-sector assistance guidelines identifying the ways in which development assistance could help countries strengthen their security sector governance and pointing out the ways in which DFID itself, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MoD could find synergies

(Hendrickson, 2000). By allocating considerable funds in networks such as the GSDG, DFID promoted knowledge-sharing and gathered expertise on SSR that subsequently fed back into DFID structures and triggered policy development. The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) was another DFID-funded initiative. Initially hosted by Cranfield University and subsequently managed by the University of Birmingham, the GFN occupied a prominent position in promoting SSR conceptualisation. The epistemic mission of the GFN is stated in the network's principal aims: to "promote a better understanding of security and justice sector reform through the provision of information, advice and expertise to practitioners, academics and policy-makers through the world". The FCO also defined the objective of the network as "to provide knowledge management and network facilitation services to an international network of SSR practitioners".

As part of the broader question of the constraining conditions facilitating or hampering the emergence of epistemic communities, the role of the DFID in SSR confirms that the formation of consensual knowledge to be diffused transnationally depends upon national backup. As suggested by Sugden, there is an overwhelming agreement that the UK is a leader in the field of SSR, and in this regard the DFID is described as the "Godfather of SSR", exerting a significant influence on *fora* such as the OECD DAC and the UNDP (Sugden, 2006).

Other member states jumped on the bandwagon. The Netherlands became involved in the development of SSR to enhance civil-military cooperation. In

the early 2000s, close cooperation between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Clingendael Institute produced an intense exchange of information allowing decision-makers to understand how to take up and implement SSR-related policies. In 2004 an SSR team located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and composed of one expert from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one from the Ministry of Defence was established. The team was tasked with identifying specific SSR activities Ministries could be involved in, such as training, policy support and the provision of material/infrastructures (Ball and Hendrickson, 2009). In January 2005, a development advisor was seconded to the Ministry of Defence after a pool of some 30 military SSR specialists was created within the same Ministry. The pool also included highly qualified staff in the field of policy, judicial issues, finance, logistics etc. Germany also started promoting a holistic approach to SSR, although more focused on internal security structures (Albrecht et al., 2010).

In parallel with the creation of the Western-based networks, an African effort to conceptualise SSR according to the developing countries' perspectives and needs cropped up, leading to the creation of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), initially supported by South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria. The institutionalisation of a regional network on the recipients' side promoted the debate among African parliamentarians, military officers, and policy analysts leading to SSR norm development and feeding back into the reflexion taking place at the donors' level.

How did these norms convey into the EU security architecture? SSR policy diffusion and persistence within the EU institutional framework (CSDP/Commission) see IOs-related networks come into play in addition to existing national constituencies, through emulation processes. The OECD-DAC, and in particular its Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC)⁹⁶ constituted a leading cross-national forum for epistemic communities to sit around the table and share their views on SSR. As a matter of fact, the UK (and DFID in particular), following the conclusion to the February 2000 symposium on security sector reform, increased its contribution to the DAC in order to shape the international agenda and influence other member states. So did the Netherlands and other interested donors. This resulted in the expansion of the CPDC's mandate and in the recruitment of new consultants.

Chaired by the DFID Senior SSR adviser, the CPDC's *modus operandi* was designed for forging a common, transnational understanding of the security-development nexus through the adoption of standardised guidelines (OECD, 2005). It led the coordination of a team of consultants (by and large including members involved in CSDG and GFN activities) that produced a conceptual framework for the OECD's initial engagement with SSR (2001), a global survey on SSR covering 110 developing and transition countries (2004) and a policy report on SSR and Governance (edited by Nicole Ball and Dylan

⁹⁶ Now the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).

Hendrickson) that served as the basis for the OECD-DAC 2004 Guidelines.⁹⁷

The CPDC's mission was not only to achieve a clearer understanding of SSR and provide guidelines for policy implementations, but also to coordinate and bring together the SSR experts from different backgrounds and organisations.

Nonetheless, mainstreaming SSR cannot be defined as a one-way flow from norm setters (the UK and the OECD) to norms takers (other states and IOs, including the EU). It was, instead, a complex and multidimensional process, characterised by intense socialisation and multiple flows of influence. Although some countries soundly promoted norm creation by investing financial resources, it would be misleading to conclude that the EU were just passively delivered norms. On the one hand, empirical findings show that representatives of EU member states and Commission/Council officials seconded to the OECD were socialised as a result of their participation in CPDC meetings.⁹⁸ Evidence of this influence is reflected in the European Commission's 2004 annual report on development aid and external assistance, which promotes an "holistic approach to governance, peace, security and development according to the OECD guidelines" (European Commission, 2004). This greatly promoted the creation and diffusion of human security-related norms within the EU.

On the other hand though, evidence from interviews also suggests that fifteen EU member states and the Commission actively contributed to the same

⁹⁷ Interview of the author with an expert, London, September 2011. Cf. also the acknowledgment page of the *OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance* (2004: 5). See also OECD (2001).

⁹⁸ Interview of the author with an expert, London, September 2011.

debates leading to the adoption of the OECD 2004 Guidelines: that is, the very document the EU policy framework on SSR was modelled on.

The conclusion to be drawn is that in the phase of policy innovation, selection and diffusion, the EU was both a norm taker and a norm maker. Another important implication is that the question of “who the SSR norm setter is” does not really lead anywhere, since multiple influences have arisen across different communities (security, development, democracy promotion) shaping the debate at different stages. What seems to matter is rather the construction of networks around centres of expertise and the consequential processes of social networking and knowledge-sharing that sought to achieve the creation of consensual knowledge. A big part of the game was to raise awareness by “setting up useful meetings at useful times”, as an interviewed EU official put it.⁹⁹

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was also in the frontline of this development and was outsourced by the EU the task of spurring on the conceptualisation of SSR.¹⁰⁰ The term “outsourcing” implies the existence of a convergence between the EU’s need to develop a policy framework from scratch and other actors (such as DCAF) with the goal, mandate and capacity to fill such gap providing the right input at the right time.¹⁰¹ Evidence from the interviews in Brussels and Geneva confirms that the policy-makers who drafted the *Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*, adopted by the Council of the EU in November 2005, drew

⁹⁹ Interview of the author with an EU official, Brussels, March 2011.

¹⁰⁰ Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.

¹⁰¹ See previous note.

substantially on the policy recommendations advanced in the *Chaillot Paper no. 80* published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and DCAF in July 2005 and co-edited by Hänggi and Tanner.¹⁰² Further conceptual development of SSR was also fostered by experts communities through networking and training activities between 2006 and 2009, promoted by the “pool” of member states favourable to the new approach and exploiting the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU to shape the security agenda. Austria and Finland, who held the Council presidency in the first and second semester 2006, provide a good example of this. Both states, traditionally committed to non-military crisis management, took advantage of the six months presidency to shape the SSR concept.¹⁰³

This policy enterprise contributed to change the perceptions and behaviour of some member states, who had been reluctant to implement a comprehensive vision of security. The Europeanisation of France’s attitude towards SSR is an interesting case, since it demonstrates the power of knowledge to shape the security agenda of a big member state. The French government were initially very sceptical about an approach that implied bridging the “unbridgeable” gap between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (namely *l’Aide au développement et gouvernance démocratique*) and the Military. The French involvement in SSR came directly as a result the influence of OECD DAC experts on French

¹⁰² The paper can be downloaded from the EU ISS website: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/promoting-security-sector-governance-in-the-eus-neighbourhood/> (Accessed 23 June 2011).

¹⁰³ Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.

policy-makers.¹⁰⁴ The French policy framework on SSR followed the OECD DAC guidelines and was released in August 2008, to “board the train before it leaves” as reported by a French official.¹⁰⁵

The persistence of SSR norms in the EU was made possible by two factors. First, the constant networking and cross-fertilisation activities operated by the emerging epistemic community of SSR, divided into different sub-communities. Second, by the “presidency factor”, which allowed some EU member states to push forwards the SSR agenda.

In the period between 2002 and 2006, favourable circumstances encouraged a prioritisation of the EU SSR agenda, as the rotating presidency was held by major donors such as Denmark (second semester 2002), The Netherlands (second semester 2004), the UK (second semester 2005) or by countries supporting the development of non-military crisis management tools such as Ireland (first semester 2004), Austria (first semester 2006) and Finland (second semester 2006). A conference on SSR in the Western Balkans held in Vienna and organised by the Austrian presidency of the EU (in association with DCAF and the EU Institute for Security Studies) on February 2006 took forward the work done by the previous British presidency to further mainstream the SSR conceptual basis, coherence and coordination among different institutional, governmental and non-governmental actors (Batt, 2006).

¹⁰⁴ Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.

Table 6.3: Timeline for SSR conceptual development

<i>Date</i>	<i>Main SSR-related initiatives / documents</i>	<i>Actors concerned</i>
January 1994	Partnership for peace (PfP) launched	NATO
December 1994	Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security	OSCE
May 1997	Policy statement: conflict, peace and development co-operation on the threshold of the 21 st century	OECD
March 1998	Publication “Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government” (by Nicole Ball)	Saferworld
April 1998	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) established at UK Department for International Development (DFID)	United Kingdom
March 1999	Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) established at King’s College London	United Kingdom
March 1999	Speech by Clare Short, UK Secretary for Development, at King’s College London: “Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty”	United Kingdom
June 1999	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe launched	EU
February 2000	DFID-sponsored symposium on security sector reform and military expenditure	United Kingdom

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October 2002	Publication “Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP” (Paper prepared by Nicole Ball)	UN
2003	Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) created	United Kingdom
2003	African Security Sector Network (ASSN) created	Africa
2003	European Security Strategy: “A Secure Europe in a Better World” released	EU
2005	DAC guidelines on security system reform published	OECD
July 2005	Chaillot Paper n. 80 “Promoting security sector governance in the EU’s neighbourhood” (by H. Hanggi and F. Tanner) published	EU ISS
July (→ Dec) 2005	UK Presidency of the EU begins	EU
October 2005	EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) released	EU / Council of the European Union
January 2006 (→ June)	Austrian Presidency of the EU begins	EU
February 2006	EU Presidency seminar on security sector reform in the Western Balkans (Vienna, Austria)	EU / Presidency
May 2006	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “A Concept for	EU / European Commission

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	European Community Support for Security Sector Reform” issued	
June 2006	Council conclusions on a policy framework for security sector reform released	EU
2007	DAC handbook on security system reform published	OECD
2008	UN Secretary-General's report on "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” released	UN
2008	International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) created within DCAF	DCAF
2008	Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training (ASSET) created	Global
June 2008 / September 2010	EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau launched/completed	EU / CSDP
August 2008	French policy framework on SSR released	France
October 2008	First pilot training session for practitioners on SSR in CSDP missions organized at European Security and Defence College (ESDC) by France and the Netherlands	EU / ESDC
2009	EU member states’ decision to create a permanent pool of SSR experts	EU
December 2010	Selection process for the EU SSR Pool completed	EU

January 2011	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management established	Europe
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6.2 SSR in practice

SSR policy evolution as learning by doing presents a puzzle. The EU SSR practice has in fact displayed a gap between what is stated in the policy frameworks (that is, the rhetorical level of conceptualisation) and what is actually being achieved on the ground. Accordingly, evolution as learning appears as the most problematic aspect of the EU's involvement in SSR policies. SSR seems to remain in the mind of the EU policy-makers a fuzzy concept, difficult to implement and assess, with disappointing operational results at best and no systematic lessons learned exercise to underpin policy evolution. Therefore, the question arises as to why did the EU adopt SSR, but fail to implement it? The next section discusses the operational experience of the CSDP as far as SSR missions are concerned. As operations represent the learning environment in which the learning by doing process should occur, it is important to analyse how the EU has practically implemented SSR.

6.2.1 Operational experience

Missions constitute the most visible output when it comes to the provision of security. As some authors have pointed out, the EU has positioned itself as a

key actor in the promotion of SSR activities within the framework of its crisis management operations (Sedra, 2006; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2013). However, it has also been noted that the EU SSR strategy underlines a fragmentation of competences within the EU and, in operational terms, a cultural gap between a development-oriented and a security-oriented community (Weiler, 2009: 27). The empirical findings of this thesis confirm that the conceptual confusion and the gap existing between different perspectives (e.g. systemic vs sectoral, development vs security, civilian vs military) and responsibilities (e.g. Council Secretariat vs Commission) have affected the EU's performance on SSR. As a consequence, learning has been poor essentially because the EU struggled to perform SSR.

Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele (2013: 145) distinguish three aspects of the EU SSR policies: (1) the rebranding under SSR of a number of existing policies; (2) the integration of other policies to bring them in line with SSR principles; (3) the creation of new instruments and actions emerging from the SSR agenda. The authors also note that, despite some clear progress, the EU has not completely redone the scope of its activities in post-conflict reconstruction under the SSR guidelines.

Against this backdrop, two types of EU SSR missions can be identified. The first type includes civilian CSDP missions addressing the transformation of one or more parts of the security sector, such as police reform, training and capacity-building in relation to police forces, border guards, and security forces, or development of the culture and institutions of the rule of law

(Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2013: 140). Among the EU missions and operations launched between 2003 and 2011, six involve aspects of SSR, namely: EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), EUPOL Afghanistan, EUTM Somalia, EUJUST-LEX Iraq, EUPOL DRC (Bloching, 2011: 2; Gross and Jacob, 2013: 14).

The second type includes, instead, missions that are explicitly labelled as SSR-support activities and build on a comprehensive and holistic approach in the provision of advice and assistance to the reform of the security sector in a given country (Derks and More, 2009: 20). There have been only two missions that were launched with the explicit objective to reform all the major state security institutions, in line with the “holistic” understanding of SSR: EUSEC RD Congo and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Derks and More, 2009: 20).

A “knowledge-practice” gap explains the predominance of the first type of missions, targeting an individual agency or institution, over those implementing a multifaceted and integrated approach to SSR. The emergence of SSR in the international conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda has pushed the EU to integrate the SSR knowledge into its system. However, the implementation has been predominantly sectoral, in spite of the fact that the EU policy framework defines SSR as systemic in line with the OECD-DAC guidelines.

When operationalising SSR, EU officials have been confronted with a new, complex policy area, requiring the integration of different crisis management tools, without a track record of collaboration on this matter. A common

repertoire on SSR programme design, planning and delivery was missing in the Council Secretariat, and the majority of staff lacked expertise or training.¹⁰⁶ In the first five years of SSR implementation (2005-2010), the Council Secretariat has had only three full-time SSR officials within DG E VIII and DG E IX and some rule of law experts (Derks and More, 2009: 20). The design of CSDP missions covering SSR has overlooked the core “holistic” component because of the lack of SSR expertise, aggravated by the high turnover of the Council Secretariat staff. Even when created, expertise struggled to be retained in EU bureaucratic units (Derks and More, 2009: 21). This has also affected evaluation and assessment works, which often misconstrue the SSR objectives in what are, in reality, civilian missions. These problems have been worsened by an absence of comprehensiveness in the way EU institutions deals with planning aspects of SSR missions. In the case of the SSR mission in DRC, attempts to merge the Council and Commission strategies for SSR were unsuccessful. Similarly, there has not been a framework bringing together First and Second pillar approaches to SSR in Guinea Bissau.

Troubles in planning, resulting from bad conceptualisation, had consequences on the implementation of the EU SSR-support activities. Bloching points out that the neither EUSEC DRC, nor EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, have lived up to their ambitious agenda, as they focused almost exclusively on the security side of the security-development nexus (Bloching, 2011: 4). As a result, learning by doing in SSR fell short of a correct, holistic implementation on the ground, and

¹⁰⁶ Skype conversation with an expert, Brussels, 22 February 2014.

was hence hampered by the EU's failure to set up a sufficient number of missions of the second type described above.

That being said, it is worth reviewing the assessments on holistic CSDP SSR missions and the challenges associated with them. The latter have to do, in particular, with coordination, management, financial, leadership, staffing and training.

6.2.1.1 EUSEC DRC

EUSEC DRC was the first, groundbreaking EU mission addressing security sector reform in a post-conflict environment, through the adoption of comprehensive, coordinated and multilateral response. Launched in 2005, it was the first mission of its kind and reflected the growing importance of army reform in the EU's approach to peacebuilding. Originally aimed at providing advice in support of army integration, compatibly with the principles of human right, good governance, international humanitarian law, transparency and the rule of law, the mandate evolved over time, according to the inclusion of other strands of activity in line with the evolving EU objectives in SSR (Clément, 2009a: 245). As of August 2013, EUSEC was made of 21 military and 23 civilian staff, not counting the 17 police officers deployed under the EUPOL mission.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Source: International and German Personnel in Peace Operations 2013-14, Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations, p. 4.

EUSEC's main achievement has to do with the mission's advice role on army reform, in cooperation with the United Nations, resulting in the adoption by President Kabila of the "Revised Plan of Army Reform" in May 2009 (Clément, 2009b: 97). The mission also addressed the problem of the Congolese soldiers' low pay – to prevent widespread corruption in the army – and achieved a several small initiatives in the fields of human rights training, IT network, and flanking measures designed to improve the life of the military (Bausback, 2010: 158).

Five big challenges were associated with the mission: the EU's internal organisation, the missions' ability to engage non-military actors, the coordination with non-EU donors, and difficulties in implementing SSR when security forces were fighting a protracted conflict (Clément, 2009a: 247). The unclear division of labour among EU actors has certainly been a major one and has affected the mission from the early stage. Three separate budget lines were created and two different missions were set up: military activities were part of the EUSEC mandate, while police activities fell under the responsibility of EUPOL; finally, REJUSCO, under the Commission's Directorate General for Development, addressed the programme for justice reform (Froitzheim and Soderbaum, 2013: 175). Unclear division of labour resulted in the Commission and the Council squabbling over their respective responsibilities, which ultimately has undermined the credibility of the EU vis-à-vis local authorities (More and Price, 2011: vii). Poor division of labour also occurred between the EU and external actors, in particular coordination with MONUC was difficult

as competition developed between the two missions, because of a fundamental disagreement over who and how should take a lead in promoting SSR in the DRC (Clément, 2009a: 251). The lack of political expertise was another important setback. Mission's members were hired for their technical / military skills, with little consideration of their political ability to engage Congolese actors in devising the Strategic Plan for SSR (More and Price, 2011: 20).

Overall, a limited amount of lessons have been learned from EUSEC. The gap between the EU's ambitions in SSR and the modest means (financial, capabilities) available has probably been the most evident one. Internally, it was noted (Clément, 2009a: 253) that as the mission represented the first EU attempt to implement SSR under the OECD-DAC rules, it allowed member states with less operational involvement in the region to attract new SSR players, such as Germany and Italy, in addition to the early supporters (Benelux, France, the UK and Sweden). However, evaluations of the mission describe the overall EU coherence as "suboptimal". More and Price observe that, beyond the general principles enunciated in the EU SSR policy frameworks, there has been no guiding framework or common EU objectives that were feasible in the Congolese context (More and Price, 2011: 23).¹⁰⁸ According to Bausback, tensions between member states further fragmented the EU's approach to SSR. The launch of two separate missions – EUPOL and EUSEC - results in part from the reluctance of some member states to be

¹⁰⁸ In their study, More and Price (2011: 23) note that a 2006 classified document entitled "A Comprehensive Approach to SSR in DRC" and a 2010 "Roadmap on EU Engagement in DRC" actually existed, but only a handful of headquarters staff were aware of them. Field staff were not familiar with these documents and acted on the absence of an overarching framework and without evidence-based strategic direction on SSR support.

engaged in defence reform (Bausback, 2010: 159), which came at the expenses of an integrated approach. Furthermore, little or bad coordination existed between CSFP actors and the Commission, among different EU missions (EUPOL, EUSEC) in the field, as well as between the headquarters and the field.

With the launch of EUSEC, expectations for the implementation of other comprehensive SSR initiatives were relatively higher, as the EU seemed able to carve out a niche role (Law, 2007) in stabilizing fragile post-conflict states through an emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance of the security sector. Those expectations were in fact disappointed by the lack of coherence and the implementation of EU SSR in Congo. Most importantly, the learning curve slowed down dramatically after EUSEC, as most of CSDP SSR missions continued focusing on specific sectors, rather than a comprehensive approach, with the exception of SSR Guinea-Bissau.

6.2.1.2 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau provided another example of the challenges of SSR in conflict-affected contexts. It has been one of the smallest CSDP operations, with 21 advisors deployed and a budget of less than €6 million. The mission had a relatively ambitious mandate. It was to assist the local authorities in developing implementation plans on the basis of the national SSR strategy; prepare donors' engagement on capacity building, training and equipment for the

security sector; and, to achieve these two objectives, it relied on a comprehensive SSR approach linking with regional and international donors and partners (e.g. UN agencies), as well as with several long-term EC instruments (Helly, 2009: 371).

Internal weakness significantly affected the mission. Staff recruitment proved extremely difficult due to member states' reluctance to send civilians in a country with poor strategic importance and language requirements in a Portuguese-speaking country (Helly, 2009: 371). As a result, EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau ended up understaffed and overstretched, hampering the ability of EU officers and advisers to take the lead on key issues (Bloching, 2010). Growing instability in the country and political violence (Helly, 2009: 375) also undermined the missions' ability to carry through its mandate and effectively liaising with local authorities. It also made harder for EU advisers to grasp the specificities of Guinea-Bissau's state fragility and to foster local ownership.

Coordination within the EU and with other international organisations proved loose, and envisaged synergies with EC-funded long-term programmes (European Development Fund and the Instruments for Stability) failed to take off (Bahnson, 2010: 270), although the logistical and political support provided by the EC delegation proved crucial to ensure the deployment and implementation phase.

Several lessons learned have been identified. Matching mission's mandate with adequate capabilities and human resources was widely seen as a prerequisite

for future SSR missions, based on the shortfalls experienced in Guinea-Bissau (Bahnson, 2010; Helly, 2009). This, in turn, is a function of the political will of Member States to supply the mission with appropriate staffing and equipment (Bloching, 2010). A sustainable basis for long term SSR assistance would have also been required – also because member states showed no willingness to deploy another CSDP mission in the country. Some authors have noted that the military mutiny of April 1, 2010, which triggered the EU's decision to terminate the mission at the end of September, provided member states with a good opportunity to exit Guinea-Bissau without losing face (Bloching, 2010: 8).

To conclude, the table 6.4, based on the report by Gross and Jacob (2013), overviews the common lessons learned and challenges for SSR implementation. The table shows that failure to implement the holistic, long-term approach to SSR, confusion or lack of expertise among staff, and persisting differences among organisational cultures (civilian, military) as well as EU bureaucratic actors (EEAS, Commission) heavily influenced operational performance and constituted an obstacle to lessons drawing.

Table 6.4: SSR operational experience, main lessons and challenges¹⁰⁹

<p>LESSONS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A holistic and comprehensive approach to SSR is needed to engage with institution-building in the long-term; - mission planning revolves around the identification of appropriate mission mandates and civil-military coordination where both aspects of crisis management are present; - staffing should be improved in selection aspects as well as training standards, especially in the pre-deployment phase; - common training standards should also facilitate the dissemination of a common understanding of SSR activities (currently missing); - civil-military coordination structures have been insufficient and underutilized; planning and oversight mechanisms continue to function separately (CPCC vs EUMS) also after the creation of CMPD; - civilian and military planners should share lessons learned and the contacts between them should be intensified. - cooperation with partner (UN, NATO) should go beyond framework agreements and involve strategic discussions on the entire conflict cycle to develop joint guidance;
<p>KEY HINDERING FACTORS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - inter-institutional competition between EU actors with SSR-related competences has negatively affected the implementation; - budgetary procedures and financial instruments are insufficient and inflexible, which explains delays in the implementation of missions or the achievement of their mandates; - working approaches and culture remain distinct as coordination between EEAS and Commission (entailing diverging planning and funding cycles) is problematic.

6.2.2 Why has the EU failed to implement holistic SSR?

To summarise, three factors explain the EU’s poor performance in SSR and consequent lack of learning by doing: 1) the absence of a consensus among expert communities scattered across the development cooperation and the security areas; 2) the complexity of the EU bureaucratic politics and the

¹⁰⁹ Source: Gross and Jacob (2013: 23-26).

cleavage between supranational and intergovernmental governance, involving confrontation between the Commission and the Council Secretariat and member states, which has not been solved by the creation of the European External Action Service; 3) shortfalls in terms of capacity building, training and recruitment. These three aspects are intertwined.

The failure to create an overarching epistemic community, who would mingle the security and development discourses, is paramount. SSR is by its nature a bridging concept: the success of diffusion, persistence and evolution of holistic norms hinges on the degree of consensus among experts on how concepts shall be interpreted and implemented. Challenges arising from SSR implementation relate to the failure to forge a single community, despite some stimuli in this direction. As experts hold different meanings, values and beliefs about SSR, according to the lenses they use, a strong normative force could not fully drive forward. The most notable division arises across systemic and sectoral approaches to SSR. But language also matters in restricting access to the community, namely as far as the gap between English speaking and non-English-speaking individuals is concerned. As a result, expertise has been translated into policy framework, but failed overall – the EU is a case in point – to be turned into something governments and organisations can use at the practical, operational level.

The intricacy of EU decision-making, characterised by multi-level governance and the confrontation between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, did not help. Although it provided epistemic communities with

multiple access points to influence decision-making, EU bureaucratic politics has overall proceeded to the detriment of SSR policy implementation. This triggered further conceptual confusion, as well as coordination and organisational problems arising between the Commission and the CSDP-led activities. It also exacerbated critical cultural gaps, such as divergent national approaches towards areas of intervention (i.e. police reform), not to mention the broader issue of civilian vs. military structures and expertise within the Council Secretariat.

Finally, the training-recruitment-deployment gap has been a substantial practical problem. Challenges can be divided into four categories: finance, procurement, staffing and training.¹¹⁰ Lack of sufficient financial support to SSR-related missions has been a major hindrance for effective implementation, together with the shortage of or the inadequacy of the equipment for civilian personnel. Procurement has thus far been cumbersome, slow and ineffective, for both regulatory and financial reasons, hence reducing freedom of movement, operational flexibility and increasing reliance on external actors (UN, NATO) for protection in dangerous places such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Understaffing and a general lack of training and knowledge of the areas of intervention are other important shortcomings. Despite the launch of initiatives aimed at developing international SSR training standards¹¹¹, EU member states

¹¹⁰ For a more detailed account of operational and implementation challenges to EU SSR, cf. Bloching (2011).

¹¹¹ Organisations such as the Geneva-based International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) and the Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training (ASSET), established in 2008 within DCAF, were in the frontline in promoting training, education and

have struggled to recruit or second deployable personnel and, when they managed to, officers were not sufficiently prepared for the task or do not have a cultural understanding of the context in which the mission takes place (Bloching, 2011).

To fill these gaps, recent initiatives have attempted to enhance strategic training, pre-deployment specialisation and permanent expertise for EU SSR civilian and defence missions. The establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the launch of Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI) and the setting up of the permanent pool of SSR experts (or Deployable European Expert Teams) are three significant examples. These initiatives are expected to promote shared expertise and contribute to the reflection on the development of SSR theory and related matters within the EU, by submitting analyses and reports to the Council and Commission.

6.2.3 Appraising SSR’s robustness

Let us finally turn to the robustness of SSR, on the basis of Legro’s (1997) criteria of *specificity*, *durability* and *concordance*.

First, how well are SSR guidelines grasped by EU actors? A major lesson learned from the institutionalisation of SSR into the EU is that mainstreaming does not necessarily mean “understanding”. And even if there is understanding,

networking activities to foster a transnational understanding of the issue and facilitate coordination among different actors on the ground.

it does not necessarily mean “being able to do”. Although SSR has been mainstreamed in the EU through the creation of three policy frameworks, the process has been anonymous and bureaucratic, with no specific institutions or individual that can be recognised as truly responsible and accountable. When the EU approach to SSR was carved out in 2005, under the UK Presidency’s push, the questions of who in Europe was to deal with SSR, how and with what instruments was left open. EU policy-makers were not in the position to do much about it due to their lack of expertise in this area. More than five years after the adoption of the EU concept, interviews still reveal a deficit of understanding, worsened by the fact that governments and institutions prefer to hire external consultants to outsource studies and evaluations for SSR activities. Outsourcing obstacles the development of “in house” expertise and know-how. An exception in this regard is the *Swedish guidance document for Security Sector Reform (2007)*, outlining the overall approach and assessment framework for Swedish actors’ engagement in SSR processes. The document was produced by the Contact Group of the national SSR Steering Committee composed of representatives from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the National Defence College, The National Police, the Armed Forces and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Unfortunately, this best practice developed at the national level to create synergies and convergence among agencies has not yet been replicated at the EU level.

Second, is the legitimacy of SSR long-standing? The young age and the confusion over its exact meaning, coupled with the fact that many policy-

makers see it as a slogan rather than a credible – and implementable – policy agenda have an obvious effect on the durability of SSR. Many interviewees raised serious doubts about the development of the EU as an actor in SSR in the near future. Missing opportunities – such as the post-conflict Libya – seem to confirm these feelings. Poor durability results from the fact that the EU is far away from a true implementation of SSR as a whole of government approach. Poor durability essentially originates in low concordance. SSR ideas in the EU could flow within a limited time frame (2005-2009), after which information exchange and constructive debate stopped, blocking further conceptualisation (and consequently, evolution as learning) of SSR: a normative downturn occurred. All in all, the norm development behind the EU SSR framework fails to meet the Legro's criteria of robustness.

6.3 Conclusion

It can be concluded that EU and national decision-makers sought the support of experts to develop a framework for SSR. At the same time, the presence of multiple flows of influence and the multi-dimensional nature of SSR rule out the existence of a single norm setter: norms were set and diffused out of a complex interplay between knowledge and power nested in epistemic communities. This chapter outlines a co-constitutive relation between ideational factors and state interests in accounting for the choices made by the EU and its member states in the security domain. Policy convergence and

European cooperation in the field of SSR was driven by epistemic communities conveying new ideas and operating in the grey area between changing structural conditions of the post-Cold War era and domestic/EU political processes. Support from national constituencies (the UK in particular) and the presence of a guiding model or template for implementation (the OECD handbook) contributed the persuasiveness of epistemic communities.

However, policy consensus on the SSR framework failed to turn into a real convergence in the outcomes and into policy evolution. SSR remained embroiled in conceptualisation: confusion among experts created confusion among policy-makers, ultimately resulting in confusion in policy. Different lenses, through which SSR policies are visualised, persist as *epistemes* are neither coherent, nor truly dominant and consensual. As a result, notwithstanding strong backing from constituencies (the “interest” factor), wobbly cognitive cohesion hampered effective persistence and policy evolution. This reinforces the view that ideas, interests and power are deeply inter-related in a co-constitutive relationship when it comes to shaping security policies.

The question hence arises as to why the SSR community lacked cohesiveness, especially since, as it was argued in the previous chapter, learning communities tend to be congenitally heterogeneous. A first explanation has to do with inconsistencies in the SSR debate itself. Neither the expert communities nor the policy communities have made enough efforts to sort out the disagreement between different approaches over security. The divide between sectoral and

systemic SSR is a case in point. EU bureaucratic politics has triggered further confusion, for instance by exacerbating critical cultural divides. Shortfalls in capacity and standardised training could only make the situation worse by clogging up implementation and assessment. Obvious as it may seem, ideas are powerful yet fragile drivers of change: like interests, their impact on the social reality heavily relies on context, timing and, most importantly, on the actors' ability to consolidate consensus underlying action. The institutionalisation of SSR diffusion shows that the EU policy environment is open for norm entrepreneurship – in fact, the EU did grab SSR shortly after the OECD guidelines came out. However, it also indicates that implementation can become problematic if concepts are not pinned down in clear targets compatible with states' capabilities and interests.

Chapter 7

Learning communities and the CSDP: Civilian Crisis Management

*I never fully understood why we had to drive a Citroën.
My father's ideological position on the matter was that Citroëns
were the most technologically advanced cars on the road.
In retrospect, I wonder whether my father's insistence upon buying Citroëns (...) had something to do with his early life. He was, after all, an immigrant – born in Belgium, raised there and in Ireland – who only arrived in England in 1935. In time he learned to speak impeccable English, but underneath he remained a continental.
I like to think that there was some subliminal ethnic motive at work. German cars were of course out of the question.
The reputation of Italian cars (at any rate those we could afford) was at its lowest point:
Italians, it was widely felt, could design anything – they just couldn't build it. Renault was disgraced by its founders' active collaboration with the Nazis. Peugeot was a respectable outfit but better known in those years for their bikes (...). And, perhaps the decisive if undeclared consideration, the eponymous founder of the Citroën dynasty had been a Jew.*

(Tony Judt, The Memory Chalet)

Introduction

This chapter grapples with two questions. The first one arises as to how a policy consensus on CCM emerged, which factors influenced the choices made by policy-makers, and how this understanding about the conduct of crisis management operations turned into established institutional structures, policies, procedures and capabilities. The second, comparative question concerns policy evolution. Contrary to security sector reform, CCM missions have led to a

significant amount of policy evolution through *learning by doing*. As noted by several scholars, the number of CCM missions made paramount the implementation of a lessons-learned process to improve capacity development and human resources, which had suffered from the absence of systematic procedures (Emerson and Gross, 2007: 14). This is especially true in the Western Balkans, where the EU experience with crisis management, catalysed by the policy failure in the 1990s, produced a sort of “laboratory for learning” (Gross, 2008: 311). The literature describes *learning by doing* as instrumental to advance the EU’s engagement in CCM, for instance in terms of command and control structures (cf. through the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) or internal/external coherence and coordination with the military through the implementation of civil-military coordination and cooperation (CIMIC-CMCO). Therefore, by showing a clear evolutionary pattern, norm diffusion in the case of CCM has led to very different outcomes in comparison with SSR. Why has this policy area persisted and evolved?

This chapter challenges current explanations of the EU as a civilian crisis manager by investigating the role of transnational expertise (epicoms) and practice-based (CoPs) communities in pushing forward a new security thinking, which changed the traditional understanding of crisis management. I argue that processes of policy failure, policy paradigm innovation, emulation and evolution as learning by doing (McNamara, 1998; Adler and Haas, 1992) changed EU policy-makers’ understanding of security in the post-Cold War international system and shaped their interests and preferences at the domestic

(member states) and international (CSDP institutional setting) levels. The chapter tests the argument that such policy consensus lays at the core of the institutionalisation of CCM in the EU, and produced profound implications on the EU role as a global security provider during the first decade of the 2000s. This chapter also tries to clear up the conceptual confusion over learning communities, by showing the extent to which practice is located behind and within knowledge. It does so through the mapping of the universe of experts and practitioners involved in CCM.

The empirical analysis is based on experts and élites interviews carried out between March 2011 and April 2012, with officers from the Council Secretariat, the European Commission, and member states as well as experts from leading European think tanks and NGOs and at the UN.

7.1 Bridging practice, knowledge and power: learning communities and the EU way to civilian crisis management

Is there such a thing as a “learning community” that boosted the institutionalisation of CCM in the EU? If so, what are its boundaries, who are the key players or actors involved in it and how can their influence be traced? To what extent were learning *from others* (by emulation) and *from experience* (by doing) facilitated by transnational networks of experts and practitioners? Finally, how did ideas translate into institution-building, leading to the

establishment of new civilian and civil-military structures such as Civcom or the CPCC?

By providing an answer to these questions, this section draws on the empirical research – more than 25 semi-structured interviews and the consultation of primary/secondary sources – carried out between March 2011 and May 2012 in Brussels and Stockholm. Mirroring the structure of the previous chapter to facilitate the comparative analysis, it investigates how learning communities shaped CSDP civilian outcomes by looking at three factors:

- (1) the type of CCM communities, namely their structure, boundaries and cohesiveness, and the overall cognitive architecture of CCM;
- (2) the diffusion of CCM in the CSDP;
- (3) the policy outcomes and the expansion of CCM practices by experiential learning;

The analysis of CCM diffusion focuses, in particular, on the contribution of the Nordic countries, and namely Sweden and Finland, in shaping the crisis management agenda. It argues that the “Nordic constituency” allowed transnational communities to become persuasive and influence the EU policy-making. Out of Nordic initiative, ideas spread across the EU decision-making, facilitated by multiple points of access within the EU institutional structure and by the presence of networks of practitioners, who had experienced the

importance of a new approach to crisis management during previous field operations.

The conclusion accounts for the structure and outreach of learning communities in civilian crisis management, with special emphasis on the mechanisms of policy evolution by learning and the impact of EU policies in conflict and post-conflict situations.

7.1.1 Learning communities civilian crisis management

What are the building blocks and who exactly partakes in the learning community of CCM? The EU's move towards developing a civilian crisis management capacity has been heavily shaped by member states' domestic politics (Dwan 2002: 2), with the CCM agenda being supported by three overlapping constituencies: neutral, small and anti-federalist states. Major donor countries (the Nordics, The Netherlands and the UK) can be considered another constituency in support of CCM, motivated by their need to reframe aid strategies in a changing international system.

Springing from the international debate on the new dimensions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (cf. chapter 3), national and transnational communities of practitioners and experts, supported by these four constituencies, started prioritising CCM in the debate on the future of European security, bolstered by the Cologne European Council's decision (June 1999) to mandate the Finnish Presidency to address non-military crisis management.

The rotating presidency of the European Council between 1999 and 2003 was particularly favourable to CCM conceptual development (cf. table 7.1), allowing expert in national capitals to become key players in the debate.

Table 7.1: List of member states holding the rotating Presidency of the European Council (1999-2003)

YEAR	PRESIDENCY
1999	Germany ----- --- Finland*
2000	Portugal ----- --- France
2001	Sweden ----- --- Belgium
2002	Spain ----- --- Denmark
2003	Greece ----- --- Italy

*In bold: member states openly supportive of CCM development

Locating the boundaries of learning communities, however, is not an easy task, because of two peculiarities of the CCM communities: their *shape* and *extension*.

First, contrary to previous studies (Verdun, 1999; Kriesi and Jegen, 2001), there is not a single and formal institutional structure or body whose shape or boundaries coincide with the learning community of CCM. On the one hand, no single group or committee of experts was formally appointed and tasked with advancing the agenda on behalf or support of policy-making. Similarly, the community of practice cannot be visualised as a well-defined organisational structure (i.e., the PSC) due to the blended nature of peace operations and the secondment of member states diplomats or officials to international organisations other than the EU during the 1990s. Civcom, for instance, could certainly be defined as a community of practice. However, not all the individuals who were deployed in NATO and UN operations in the Western Balkans and who have influenced CCM conceptual development became part of that Committee. In other words, the logic of *habitus* characterising communities of practice must be conceived as scattered across different institutions, governments or NGOs. What matters is not the institutional body (for instance, the PSC, Civcom or the CMPD), but the nature of the linkages and the flow of influence enabling new ideas or knowledge to become policy relevant. What defines the shape of learning communities is not an institutional affiliation, but their members' "exposure" to multiple flows of influence making the congregation of knowledge fluid and evolutionary.

Another important aspect of the learning communities of CCM has to do with their *extension*. The relationship between expertise and practice overlaps across institutions and takes place mostly through private channels out of the radar screen of formal decision-making. While some individuals are identified as experts only – e.g. think-tankers loosely connected to EU institutions but somewhat influent vis-à-vis national governments through their research output – with no affiliation to a community of practice, others act as practitioners whose set of beliefs progress in time throughout professionalism. However, several actors, individuals and institutions alike, fall in-between as they career path slid across or amid the two types of learning communities.

To reduce such complexity, we shall again clear up the distinction between the epicoms and the CoPs that moulded the EU approach to civilian crisis management. Following Peter Haas' (1992) definition, epicoms are knowledge-based networks of individual and institutions clustering around the idea (or the goal) of the importance of non-military crisis management as a mean to conduct of peace operations and support the EU foreign and security policy activities. Regardless of the association to a specific group (i.e. a particular committee in the Council Secretariat) or discipline (police or military officials, judges), what brings these individuals together is a set of shared principled normative and causal beliefs. By contrast, CoPs are composed of those individuals and institutions sharing a set of experiences, within the same or contiguous organisational structures (i.e. the EU institutional setting, or bodies within the EU-UN inter-institutional complex, such as the EU-UN

steering committee), which ultimately are responsible for shaping their beliefs and understanding of crisis management in the sense of a non-military development. Both communities serve as the “layers” where norm diffusion and exchange processes take place, thus creating a pattern of influence that significantly affects security decisions taken by governments. Epicoms and CoPs provide a decisive interpretation of facts that contribute to the way policy-makers formulate their interests.

On that account, the population of CSDP expertise and practice-based communities can be identified on the basis of the three criteria already used by Mérand et al. (2011: 126) to delineate the boundaries of the CSDP networks: *position*, *participation* and *reputation*. The first criterion (*position*) permits to scan government departments, decision-making units or interest groups having a stake in security policies and CSDP issues, namely those who are related to civilian crisis management; the second criterion (*participation*) pinpoints the actors who took a major stand on CCM issues on the basis of their attendance to conferences, seminars or summits; finally, through the third criterion (*reputation*) members of the learning communities were invited to cross-check the list of key CCM actors and add/subtract other individuals or institutions they considered important/marginal in the CSDP debate.

Based on the data gathered from standardised questions asked during interviews and a careful scrutiny of secondary sources, the table 7.2 provides a list of actors divided into five areas: (1) Education/Research (University departments, think-tanks, research institutes); (2) Government (Ministries,

Agencies, national defence colleges); (3) Training centers; (4) NGOs; (5) International Organisations (and related bodies).

To operationalise the three criteria, interviewees were asked to list at least five individuals and organisations that they considered as being most influential in shaping the CCM agenda (*reputation*); to list the main CCM-related conferences, workshops and meetings they had attended since 2000 (*participation*); and to define their role and influence in policy and decision-making (supported by concrete examples) in the field of CCM, complemented by a description (where possible) of the sources of funding and the type of professional output (*position*).¹¹² The interviewees were also asked to provide definitions and answer content-related questions (for instance, how they would define CCM and what they thought were the main challenges to implementation in the EU framework), in order to evaluate their understanding and knowledge of the subject, and also the extent to which their ideas fit into the community's shared beliefs. In some cases, further evidence in support of the answers was provided, such as resumes, working papers and non-classified documents. To respect as much as possible the privacy of the interviewees, I have decided not to include a list of their names in the form of a list or table. As a result, table 7.2 figures relevant institutions and organisations only. However, the membership of the CCM community and some of the individuals who are part of it can be extrapolated by cross-checking the institutions listed in the table, with their affiliates, as well as the list of the interviewees in annex.

¹¹² See questionnaire in Annex.

Table 7.2: Learning Communities (expertise and practice-based) of EU CCM, overview of the main national and transnational actors involved (1999-2002)*

Institution	Sector	Country	Function	Website
Istituto Affari Internazionali	1	Italy	Research, Consultancy	www.iai.it
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna	1, 3	Italy	Training	http://www.sssup.it/
Netherlands Institute of International Relations - Clingendael	1	The Netherlands	Research, Consultancy, Training	http://www.clingendael.nl/
European Union Institute for Security Studies	5	-	Research	www.iss.europa.eu
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office	4	-	Advocacy network	www.eplo.org
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	1	Austria	Research, Training	http://www.aspra.at/aspra/
Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management – National Defence Academy	2	Austria	Research, Training, Political Advice	http://www.bundesheer.at/organisation/beitraege/ivak/eifk/eifk.shtml
British American Security Information Council	1	UK/USA	Research, Advocacy	http://www.basicint.org/
UK Department for International Development (DFID)	2	UK	Government	www.dfid.gov.uk/
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform	1	UK	Research, Advocacy, Knowledge sharing	http://www.ssrnetwork.net/
Conflict, Security and Development Group – King's College London	1	UK	Knowledge sharing, Research	http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	1, 5	Switzerland	Training, Research, Advocacy, Knowledge Sharing,	www.dcaf.ch
International Security Sector Advisory Team	1,3	Switzerland	Training, Mentoring, Networking	www.issat.dcaf.ch
Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training	1, 3	Switzerland	Training, Capacity Building, Networking	http://asset-ssr.org
Geneva Centre for Security Policy	1	Switzerland	Research, Training	www.gcsp.ch
OECD – International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), previously Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC)	5	-	Advisory, Networking, Decision-making	http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/theinternationalnetworkonconflictandfragility.htm
Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze	3	Germany	Training	http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/
German Institute for International and Security Affairs	1	Germany	Research	http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/start-en.html
Folke Bernadotte Academy	3	Sweden	Training	http://www.folke

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				bernadotteacademy.se/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	1	Sweden	Research	www.sipri.org
Swedish Institute of International Affairs	1	Sweden	Research	http://www.ui.se/
Crisis Management Centre	3	Finland	Training	http://www.cmcfinland.fi/
Finnish Institute of International Affairs	1	Finland	Research	http://www.fiia.fi/en/home/#tab1
Institut français de relations internationales	1	France	Research	www.ifri.org
Swedish National Defence College	2	Sweden	Research and Development	www.fhs.se
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University	1	Sweden	Research, Education	http://www.pcr.uu.se/
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	2	Sweden	Government – Development co-operation	www.sida.se
Forum Syd	4	Sweden	International Development cooperation, research and advocacy	https://www.forumsyd.org/DefaultForumSyd_C.aspx?id=12337
Royal United Services Institute	1	UK	Think-Tank, Research	www.rusi.org
Centre for European Reform	1	UK	Think-Tank, Research	www.cer.org.uk
Saferworld	4	UK	Research, Consultancy, Advocacy	www.saferworld.org.uk
EU – Council Secretariat EEAS, EURS, EUMS, EUMC, CMPD, CPCC, CIVCOM, PMG, PSC	5	EU	International Organisation	http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm
European Security and Defence College	3	EU wide	Training	http://esdc.mil-edu.be/
EU – Member States Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defence, DGs Development Co-operation, Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Interior	2	Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Austria	Government	N/A
European Centre for Development Policy Management	1	Netherlands, Belgium	International Development Think and Do Tank.	http://www.ecdp.m.org/
Overseas Development Institute	1	UK	Research	www.odi.org.uk
Egmont Institute, Royal Institute for International Relations	1	Belgium	Research, Think Tank	www.egmontinstitute.be
Security & Defence Agenda	1	Belgium	Think-Tank	www.securityand

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				defenceagenda.org
European Policy Centre	1	Belgium	Think Tank	www.epc.eu
Centre for European Policy Studies	1	Belgium	Think Tank	www.ceps.eu
International Relations and Security Network - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich	1	Switzerland	Research, Think-Tank	http://www.isn.ethz.ch/
RAND Europe	1	UK	Consultancy	http://www.rand.org/randeurope.html
NATO	5	-	International Organisation	www.nato.int
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe	5	-	International Organisation	
Crisis Management Initiative	4	Finland	Advocacy	
International Alert	4	UK	NGO, Advocacy	http://www.international-alert.org/
International Crisis Group	4	-	NGO, Research, Advocacy	http://www.crisisgroup.org/
<i>Council Secretariat DG-E External</i>	5	-	IGO	
<i>High Representative's Office</i>	5	-	IGO	
<i>European Defence Agency</i>	5		IGO	
<i>German PR (PSC Ambassador)</i>	2	Germany	Diplomacy	
<i>DG RELEX</i>	2	-	EU - Policy-making	
<i>Downing Street</i>	2	UK	Government	
<i>UK Foreign Secretary's Cabinet</i>	2	UK	Government	
<i>French Defence Ministry DAS</i>	2	France	Government - Military	
<i>German Chancellery</i>	2	Germany	Government	
<i>German Defence Ministry</i>	2	Germany	Government - Military	
<i>German Foreign Ministry's Policy Staff</i>	2	Germany	Government	
<i>European Parliament SEDE</i>	5	-	EU	
<i>Foreign Office's Security Branch</i>	2	UK	Government	
<i>French PR (PSC Ambassador)</i>	2	France	Government	
<i>UK PR (PSC Ambassador)</i>	2	UK	Government	
<i>German PerRep NATO</i>	2	Germany	Government	
<i>French Defence Minister's Cabinet</i>	2	France	Government - Military	
<i>French Defence Staff's Euroatlantic Division</i>	2	France	Government - Military	
<i>UK Foreign Office's CFSP Unit</i>	2	UK	Government	
<i>UK Defence Ministry's Policy Staff</i>	2	UK	Government - Military	
<i>German Defence Ministry's</i>	2	Germany	Government -	

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<i>Policy Staff</i>			<i>Military</i>	
<i>German Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate</i>	2	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Government</i>	
<i>French Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate</i>	2	<i>France</i>	<i>Government</i>	
<i>French Defence Staff</i>	2	<i>France</i>	<i>Government - Military</i>	
<i>UK Defence Ministry's EU /NATO Division</i>	2	<i>UK</i>	<i>Government - Military</i>	
<i>NATO Secretary General</i>	5	-	<i>IGO</i>	
<i>NATO International Staff</i>	5	-	<i>IGO</i>	
<i>German Foreign Ministry's EU Correspondent</i>	2	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Government</i>	
<i>German Foreign Minister's Cabinet</i>	2	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Government</i>	

* In *Italic*: actors in the CSDP network according to the list produced by the “ESDP network project” (Mérand, et al., 2011: 130). The table shows that the “traditional” CSDP actors and the communities of CCM do not fully correspond.

Interviews revealed that the universe of CCM learning communities appeared, at its early stage (late-1990s, early-2000s) heterogeneous and somewhat mutable. Relations between experts, practitioners and decision-makers mostly occurred through private or informal channels and were dominated by a few key, influential individuals closely connected to governments or international institutions. A large, cohesive transnational community of civilian crisis management was hence missing and it would be more correct to speak about a patchy and evolutionary morphology, or “islands” of knowledge and practices loosely linked (but nonetheless interconnected) to each other.¹¹³

There are two possible explanations for this specific configuration. First, in a similar way to the lag that exists between policy actions and policy outcomes, as a result of which agreed policies take time to pay off (McNamara, 1998: 63),

¹¹³ Assessment based on the interpretation of the empirical data gathered from semi-structured interviews (cf. survey in annex), 2011-2012.

another time lag exists between systemic change and paradigmatic shift, that is between the transformations brought forth by the end of the Cold War and the change of mindset (and the international awareness of it) underlying the formation of the new security thinking. In other words, at the macro-level, collective systems of beliefs (epistemes) and practices (habitus) react relatively slowly to changed structural conditions. Second, and consequently, terminological confusion and inflation, through the blossoming of several new, ill-defined terms (Blockmans, 2008: 8), characterised the re-conceptualisation of security and defence in the new international system.¹¹⁴

At the same time, an analysis of the empirical evidence collected through the survey shows that previous collaborations in non-military crisis management occurred and individuals had a record of working relationship with colleagues from other ministries, or international organisations.¹¹⁵ In the table 7.2, individuals belonging to the institutions coloured in blue are those who can be defined as forming an embryonic community of practice, by a match of the position and participation criteria. They did not perform collaborative work within the same office or unit, but reported to be frequently confronted with the same operational challenges and to collaborate during multi-national missions in the field (e.g. United Nations peacekeeping missions). As the next section will show, it was the expansion of these practices that led to the formation of a fully-fledged CoP of civilian crisis management.

¹¹⁴ See chapter 3.

¹¹⁵ Source: answers to standardised questions during fieldwork research in Brussels, Stockholm, New York and Rome, 2011-2012.

On that basis, the next section discusses the processes of CCM diffusion according to the four pathways of influence. It presents the bulk of the empirical analysis and makes the case of the Nordic countries' (Sweden and Finland) role in sustaining the conceptual development (norm diffusion) of civilian crisis management, in much similar way the United Kingdom acted as the “godfather” of security sector reform. However, drawing from McNamara (1998), it contends that the creation of a policy consensus was inspired by three ideational sources: policy failure, policy paradigm innovation and emulation. The following section also identifies the communities of practice that have been more influential in shaping the CCM agenda.

7.1.2 *The dynamics of CCM diffusion*

By analysing the mechanisms and flows of norm diffusion, this section argues that knowledge rooted in practice, backed by a strong support provided by the Nordic member states, prompted capability generation and institution-building for EU civilian crisis management, since its inception at Cologne in 1999. It also demonstrates that the linkage between *episteme* and *habitus* propped up policy evolution, facilitating patterns of learning from experience and from emulation. As a result, the evolution of consensual and background knowledge on crisis management fostered what the literature erroneously conceived as a sole matter of capabilities. Quite the contrary, the very act of instilling non-military tools, resources and procedures in the EU crisis management

mechanisms denotes a deeper process of conceptual evolution and policy consensus aimed at changing the EU and its member states' role as providers of regional and global security. The process arose in response to changed structural conditions that tailed off the effectiveness of pure military interventions. It involved the creation of a Europe-wide consensus based on intense knowledge sharing and socialisation, both inside and outside the EU institutional setting.

7.1.2.1 Policy failure, innovation, diffusion, selection

The rapid build-up of the CFSP/CSDP, the envisaged use of civilian means in the conduct of the Petersberg tasks, as well as the new posture of European security institutions (EU, NATO, OSCE), all these initiatives originate in a systemic fracture - the end of the Cold War – as a result of which Europe was confronted with a number of important political developments (De Zwaan, 2008: 23): the fall of the Berlin wall and the unification of Germany; the demise of the Soviet Union; the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of new fully independent states; finally, a high-risk and unstable area in its south-eastern neighbourhood (the Balkans). Other factors gradually contributed to transform the international security discourse towards a rising role of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks beyond classic defence and security doctrines (cf. chapter 3).

Civilian crisis management is, against this backdrop, a tricky concept. On the one hand, the implementation of a “CCM” doctrine is an exclusively EU

prerogative, as no other international organisation has formally adopted a similar concept (with the exception of the UN's executive policing). On the other hand, however, its genesis is closely linked to the debate arising in the 1990s at the international level on the future of military expenditures; on how to improve civil-military operations on the ground; and the increasingly relevant linkage between governance, development and security in a developing world whose political and economic destiny was unshackled from the constraining forces of a bipolar system. At the time, the EU could be visualised as yet another international organisation engaged in soul-searching in a transforming world. Furthermore, security and defence issues were addressed in a very modest manner by the article J.4 TEU, stating that CFSP included "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence". The security landscape was still dominated by NATO, with the Western European Union (WEU) and the OSCE as important players. This is to say that policy innovation for civilian crisis management eventually came about in a period when EU security institutions, procedures and policies were not yet in place.

Accordingly, policy innovation processes stem out of the need by member states to address two fundamental questions: a broader one concerning the future trajectories of global security and the looming need to integrate civilian and military means of intervention; and a narrower one concerned with the shape and the room for manoeuvre of the security/defence dimension of the

CFSP. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), a consensus developed between the three constituencies composed of neutral, small and anti-federalist on the fact that civilian crisis management could yield a weighty value-added for the EU. Transnational communities of experts and practitioners played a pivotal role in forging this consensus.

A significant amount of work have accounted for the role of Nordic countries (in particular, Sweden and Finland) in influencing the development of CSDP towards a civilian crisis manager (Rieker, 2004; Bailes, 2006; Jorgensen, 1999). It is true that a number of factors justify the active stance of the Nordic countries' in this domain. For instance, Sweden's commitment to the civilian dimension of EU crisis management can be justified on the ground of at least six explanations: 1) the peculiarities of Swedish society, that is an inclination to look at conflict through "civilian" lenses rooted in the fact that the country has not been at war for more than 200 years; 2) political and ideological proximity of the ruling social democratic government with a non-military (or not just military) development of EU security cooperation; 3) the imperative to demonstrate, domestically, that EU was well suited to fulfil civilian tasks and was hence different from NATO; 4) the élites' awareness of new patterns of conflicts that arose at the end of the cold war; 5) the Ministry of foreign Affairs' conflict prevention agenda driving the debate on Sweden's international role, particularly considering Sweden's allegiance to the UN; 6) most, importantly, the strong concern that CSDP could lead to a mutual

defence agreement (unacceptable for a non-aligned country) and that CSDP development could go to the detriment of NATO's role in Europe's defence.

Finland shared many of these points. All the way through the Cold War, the idea of neutrality was deep rooted in the Finnish strategic culture, a characteristic labelled as "Finlandisation". Finland's decision-makers were also aware that with the end of the Cold War and the new emphasis on the comprehensive approach to security which gradually spread in the 1990s would entail a reformulation of the country's strategic posture, pretty much as any other Western nation. This triggered a momentous change of mindset that Ojanen correctly describes as the switch from a broad notion of neutrality to a narrow notion of military non-alignment (Ojanen, 2008: 56). The end of the Cold War and the accession to the EU have pushed Finnish decision-makers to adopt a more "flexible" strategic doctrine, adapt to "constantly re-assessing its military non alliance and the functioning of crisis management and security cooperation in Europe, taking into consideration changes in the regional security environment and developments in the European Union".¹¹⁶ Ideology, leadership and party politics counted. Martti Ahtisaari, previously a diplomat and UN mediator, was elected President of Finland in March 1994, remaining in office until March 2000. His personal engagement with crisis management, mediation and human rights undoubtedly contributed to shape Finland's security policy preferences.

¹¹⁶ Council of State, 2001. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001, Report to parliament 13 June 2001. Helsinki: Edita, p. 7, 39. Aka the White Book (2001). Cf. also Ojanen (2002: 162).

Against this backdrop, the paradigmatic shift in security turned into policy consensus quite easily and in a relatively short period of time in Sweden and Finland compared to other states. Two factors facilitated the emergence of this policy consensus. First, previous experience with crisis management arising from Swedish and Finnish involvement in UN peacekeeping, which contained a “civilian” element although it could not be labelled as CCM; second, a strong presence of non state actors, knowledge-based community in these two countries, exerting a substantial influence in policy-making through institutional and informal channels. The former constitutes a community of practice; the latter is an epistemic community, clustered around the idea that addressing the roots of conflict should involve the use and development of civilian instruments. Overlapping communities of practice and epistemic communities shaped the Swedish and Finnish approach to crisis management. These, in turn, impacted on the conceptualisation and capacity-building at the EU level.

The resulting policy innovation and diffusion were accompanied by patterns of Europeanisation, causing the Nordics to move away from the strategic Cold War thinking. In the Nordic region, as in other states, the 1990s came as an opportunity to rethink their strategic choices and posture, in particular the choice of “neutrality” (Bailes, 2006). From a theoretical standpoint, the influence of Europeanisation processes is perfectly compatible with transnational learning communities, which are understood as flexible entities that produce institutional change, and do not oppose it. While the wind of

change was blowing from outside the EU (the demise of the Soviet Union led to a reconsideration of the “Nordic balance” and opened a new course in defence policy), the accession to the EU and the progress towards a common security policy in the late 1990s accelerated these transformations, out of the necessity to adapt security policies in view of EU membership.

In Finland, due to geopolitical (e.g. the proximity with Russia) and historical considerations, the traditional need to maintain a strong territorial defence capacity merged with an increased commitment to international crisis management (Ojanen, 2008). From the late 1990s, civilian crisis management and civilian military integration and coordination enter the security discourse. The debate involved Ministers and Government officials, but most importantly relied on communities of experts as well as practitioners that had been previously involved in the UN system and in peace operations. The White Book on Finnish national defence (2001) has an entire section on the issue of civilian crisis management, as opposed to the previous documents of 1995 and 1997. Phone interviews with high-rank officials and experts reveal that before and during the drafting phase of the White Book, multiple flows of influence were at play, spurred by key individuals (e.g. the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen and Erkki Tuomioja) as well as external institutions (e.g. the Finnish Institute for International Affairs). In the years preceding the adoption of the White Book, open seminars and regular meetings were held between representative of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

“knowledge” community of experts in the security and strategic field.¹¹⁷

Finland’s previous engagement within the UN in support of the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi report was beneficial to forge this consensus.

In Sweden, the modernisation of the national defence forces begun in 1992, although more concrete steps were taken in 1995 through the establishment of a permanent Defence Commission (*Forsvarsberedningen*). The Commission’s proposals gave high priority to an increased role of Sweden in international crisis management, which would entail changing the country’s strategic doctrine from territorial defence to flexible forces well equipped to be deployed in multilateral operations (Rieker, 2004). The Swedish Parliament ratified these measures on March 2000.

In substance, the debate set off in 1995 had mostly to do with enhancing the comprehensive approach to conflict through new training facilities for peacekeepers, taking care of those aspects such as logistics, division of tasks, effective recruitment etc. As noted by a Swedish Ambassador, it became clear very soon that a crucial aspect of civilian crisis management has to do with “individuals”, a “pretty rare and pricey resource” in this field.¹¹⁸ Accordingly, the key lesson ensuing from the debate was that effective civilian crisis management missions would depend on the states and international organisations’ capacity to recruit, train and raise funds for deployment.¹¹⁹ In parallel with the reorientation of Swedish defence forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was also developing a doctrine for conflict prevention

¹¹⁷ Interview of the author with Finnish expert, March 2012.

¹¹⁸ Interview of the author with a Swedish Ambassador, March 2012.

¹¹⁹ Interview of the author with a Swedish Ambassador, March 2012.

in the attempt to increase the commitment to civilian police within UN missions, therefore with a strong emphasis on non military crisis management. To this purpose, the Council for Peace and Security Initiatives (RFSI) was created within the MFA and remained operational between 1995 and 2002. This body was composed of individuals from several backgrounds, including national and transnational NGOs and think-tanks, scholars, and representatives of the Swedish MFA, MoD, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The Council was tasked with three aims: 1) informing the Government about crisis management, sharing knowledge and fostering cross-fertilisation; 2) from a Government perspective, it was also a way to inform (and get feedback from) non-governmental actors on a wide range of policies regarding security; 3) the body also gathered and produced a significant amount of policy recommendations, acting as an informal think-tank¹²⁰. It led to the publication of a number of papers on the subject of the new dimensions of security and crisis management, ultimately resulting in the Government's White Paper for defence reform in 2004. The latter document stresses the importance of Sweden's role in civilian crisis management, as a way to support international security. It also points out how national capability will greatly benefit from participation in international civilian crisis management, particularly at the EU and UN levels (Wedin, 2008). According to several diplomats and scholars involved, members of the Council were exposed to a significant amount of internal and external influences, through

¹²⁰ Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.

interactions with key experts and practitioners who influenced the way conflict prevention was conceptualized and, as a consequence, would be institutionalised.¹²¹

The creation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the first international centre dedicated to training aspects of crisis management provides another good example of the role of learning communities in shaping institution-building and the conceptualisation of crisis management at the national, then international level. Mandated by the Swedish MFA and the MoD, a training coordinator for international missions was appointed in 1997 with the aim of conducting an inquiry and developing an integrated civilian and military training system for international conflict management.¹²² The task involved both civilian and military aspects of training for humanitarian or peace support mission, which corroborates the centrality of expertise and “human resources” in the civilian crisis management capacity building. The inquiry was explicitly set to be “open both to broad international participation and the NGO community”.¹²³ The report’s conclusion point out that the training platform for civilian and military crisis management shall be a reference point where all the actors in international conflict management can meet, whether they be military and police officers, representatives of humanitarian agencies, diplomats etc.¹²⁴

Integrated and multidisciplinary approach, dialogue between different sectors

¹²¹ Interview of the author with Swedish experts and practitioners, March 2012.

¹²² Statens offentliga utredningar, 1999. *Internationell konflikthantering – att förbereda sig tillsammans*, Stockholm: SOU, p. 15 (Summary in English). This document contains the final report of the commission of inquiry.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

and close contacts with international and regional actors were set as key items of the Institute agenda. The design of the new institution was explicitly inspired by the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia. An interview with the training coordinator who drafted the study revealed a number of institutions and individuals external to the Swedish government were consulted to produce the report (and hence, the design of the new institution). The last section of this chapter will discuss more in depth the question of training and its impact on policy evolution.

The launch of the FBA, as well as the process leading to its creation, also affected the definition of crisis management and Sweden's policy preferences in this domain. At the time (1997-1999) there was in fact no "finished" notion of what civilian crisis management meant. Here lies the importance of learning communities as opposed to competing explanations of the rise of civilian crisis management. Although it is true that some factors – Nordic's concern about NATO's role after the creation of the CSDP and potential militarization of the latter, last but not least their concern of becoming "second-class powers" in the security domain – stimulated Sweden's quest for non-military evolution of CSDP, the way experts, practitioners and policy-makers responded to changing structural conditions are at the basis of the evolving policy consensus on civilian crisis management. Using a famous expression by Antonio Machado, "by walking one makes the road": this is what really drove the rise of civilian crisis management.

Evidence from interviews in Brussels and Stockholm shows that a quite intense lobbying activity was done by Swedish diplomats and officials between 1997 and 2003, supported by the diffusion of a number of reports and working papers produced by experts and academics affiliated to research centres. The table below (7.3) lists the institutions in Sweden:

Table 7.3: CCM, the knowledge community in Sweden

Institute	Sector	Country
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	Governmental	SE
University of Lund	Academia	SE
Uppsala University – Department of Peace and Conflict Research	Academia	SE
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)	Think Tank	SE
Forum Syd	NGO	SE
Swedish Red Cross	NGO	SE
Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR)	NGO	SE
National Defence College (FHS)	Military (Civilian management)	SE
Folke Bernadotte Academy	Training	SE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Governmental	SE
Ministry of Defence	Governmental	SE
Swedish Armed Forces iNternational Center (SWEDINT)	Military	SE
Swedish EOD and Demining Center (SWEDEC)	Military/Civilian	SE
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen)	Governmental	SE
Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)	Think Tank	SE

Lobbying and exchange of knowledge was also facilitated by the fact that many of these practitioners shared the same field experiences – and failures – in the Balkans (Kosovo, Bosnia, Timor Este) in the framework of UN or NATO missions. According to one interviewed diplomat, a “loose and informal network” composed of officials previously seconded to multilateral missions

helped diffusion of ideas and proposals.¹²⁵ Back from the field, those officials would keep in touch and meet up in Brussels, when working for EU institutions or for their respective MFAs.¹²⁶ Bonds of friendship and acquaintances, developed through shared practices, mattered a great deal in assessing policy failure (what lessons to be drawn?), set paradigm innovation (how to design/change institutions resolved to deal with crisis management?) and influence decision-making.¹²⁷

In this regard, and despite divergent views stemming from different institutional perspectives, members of the CCM learning community agreed on two fundamental priorities for the EU agenda: first, that more than the policy or strategic aspects, recruitment could be seen as the main challenge to future CCM initiatives; second, that implementing the comprehensive approach was functional to reduce the gap between different organisational cultures and improve inter-institutional collaboration.

Policy selection was positively influenced by three factors: timing, national cultures and EU governance structures, all compatible with a high degree of persuasiveness of learning communities. Undoubtedly, the support provided by shared practices to the development of a consensual knowledge (that is, the overlapping of epistemic communities and communities of practice) made it possible to crystallise ideas and turn them into institutions. So did the backing of countries such as Sweden and Finland, in terms of political and financial

¹²⁵ Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.

¹²⁶ Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.

¹²⁷ Conclusions based on diplomats' and EU officials' answers to semi-structured questions based on survey (annex 2).

investment. At the same time, ideas were heard and promoted because they arose in a period of momentous international change and reconfiguration of European security cooperation. Activists and NGOs have been championing greater civil-military cooperation for at least a decade in the late-1970s to late-1980s, without producing any significant change in policy cooperation. Conversely, a stronger demand for a new paradigm existed in the mid to late 1990s.

National cultures and the some institutional practices of the Nordic countries political systems were also conducive to letting ideas circulate freely. In Sweden, for instance, consultation between governmental agencies, research centres and other actors is an institutionalised practice, partly because of the reduced size of the Ministries. External ideas can therefore easily shape policy-making. *Gemensam beredning* or “joint drafting procedure/joint preparation” is a system of inter-governmental coordination that occurs “when a government matter impinges on another ministry’s area of responsibility or involves another minister within the same ministry, the matter is dealt with in consultation with the other ministers concerned”.¹²⁸ Interestingly, a similar openness to the circulation of ideas exists in the EU multi-level governance structure. In the EU decision-making, in fact, the presence of multiple access point due to the intergovernmental/supranational divide and the multi-level governance seemed to “magnify” the impact of expert communities and communities of practice. The EU’s “field”, in the Bourdieu’s understanding of

¹²⁸ Cf. Swedish Government, Glossary of Government’s terms: http://www.svet.lu.se/links/Svenska_sidor/ord/wordlistgov.pdf (Accessed 13 March 2012).

the term, prompts learning since ideas, particularly those ones that are not or less politicised, are allowed to blossom and influence policy-making. The presence of the Commission as a supranational architect in shaping policies¹²⁹ has been decisive in mitigating the impact of the intergovernmental method of negotiation, which tends to be constrained by member states politics.

7.1.2.2. Policy emulation

A key factor paving the way for norm persistence and evolution was the presence of successful models and experiences, which smoothed the delivery of a blueprint for the organisational, conceptual and procedural aspects of the newborn civilian crisis management. Emulation from EU military crisis management, as well as from other international organisations (UN, OSCE) and NGOs fulfilled this important task.

The military certainly occupied a prominent position. By looking at how EU military structures and procedures worked, civilians tried to learn from and, in some cases, effectively replicated what they considered as a successful organisational model. Indirectly, this meant copying from NATO: EU military crisis management, in fact, largely reproduced NATO's structures¹³⁰ and procedures to set up its configuration, through institutional isomorphism.¹³¹

Accordingly, the decision-making procedures (planning, implementation and

¹²⁹ On this point, cf. Rhinard (2010) and Lavallée (2011).

¹³⁰ Previous studies have shown that EU member states took NATO's decision-making structures into account when creating a politico-military body at the ambassadorial level (PSC), assisted by a military committee composed by the representatives of the Chief of Defence (EUMC) and supported by a military staff (EUMS). Cf. Koops (2012: 68) and Juncos (2010).

¹³¹ Institutional isomorphism posits that organisations within the same field tend to look alike. Cf. Powell and DiMaggio (1983).

evaluation) to launch civilian missions were designed on the basis of the Crisis Management Procedures for military crisis management, which in turn were modelled on NATO's ones (Juncos, 2010: 88). The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 followed the same planning methodology used under the Military Headline Goal 2010, based on virtual planning scenarios (the “illustrative scenarios”), listing of available personnel required for mission deployments and comparison between member states' indications and capabilities required to achieve operational preparedness (Schuyer, 2008: 136). As far as institutional structures are concerned, the CPCC reproduced substantially the organisational logic and template of the EUMS (adapted to its civilian tasks); similarly, the creation of Civcom arose in the course of the negotiations for the establishment of new military CSDP structures (early 2000), namely the EUMC, and out of the need to find similar institutional solutions for the civilian track (Rieker, 2004). From a procedural standpoint, the debate about the establishment of a formal lessons-learned management process, particularly within the CPCC, followed a similar emulation pattern. The current conceptual framework aimed at setting the standards for knowledge management and lessons learned procedures¹³² builds on existing practices for military operations of the EUMS (European Parliament, 2012: 20), such as the Lessons Learned Cell. Although the CPCC has currently no official repository for the lessons learned that are gathered from missions. However, the Civilian Lessons Management Application (CiLMA) is being developed following the model of

¹³² The *Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions* (Council of the European Union, 2008b) and the document *Towards an architecture for evaluation of civilian ESDP missions* (Council of the European Union, 2008a).

the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA), the database for military lessons learned created within the EUMS. It is worth reminding that these EUMS tools were established in emulation of the NATO practice Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (Council of the European Union, 2007c). However, it has been noted that the standard military approaches, which assume strictly separated crisis management phases, failed to reflect the more long-term ambitions of civilian interventions (Bossong, 2011). Therefore, the EU drew on other examples of civilian intervention or administration to consolidate its framework for CCM. The UN and OSCE's experiences with international civilian administration, particularly those ones in the Balkans such as UNMIK, served as a reference for the first wave of civilian missions.¹³³

The Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) were inspired by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination capacity (UNDAC) (Schuyer, 2008: 138).

Finally, cooperation with NGOs proved to be a useful exchange to enhance capacity building based on the experiences of these actors on the ground. The role of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in advising EU policy-makers on sustainable peacebuilding policies during the formulation of the CHG 2008 can be cited as example in this regard.

The table 7.4 displays some examples of policy emulation that helped designing EU civilian crisis management. It also highlights the nexus between the EU civilian/military structures and the organisations that provided the

¹³³ Cf. Council of the European Union (2008a).

model inspiring EU structures, procedures and frameworks, namely the emulation curve of NATO - EU (military) – EU (civilian).

Table 7.4: EU civilian crisis management, learning from others

ORGANISATION	STRUCTURE / PROCEDURE / FRAMEWORK	EU (military)	EU (civilian)
NATO	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center	European Lessons Management Application (ELMA)	Civilian Lessons Management Application (CiLMA)
NATO	NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) / NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS)	EU Crisis Management Procedure	EU Crisis Management Procedure
NATO	Military Committee (MC)	EUMC	CIVCOM
NATO	International Military Staff	EUMS	CPCC
UN	UNDAC	-	CRTs
UN	UNMIK	-	EULEX

7.2 CCM in practice

This section discusses the operational experience of CCM and the ensuing process of learning by doing. It shows the extent to which implementation through operations lead to lessons gathering, and lessons gathering to further

policy expansion. For the purpose of this research, I decided not to review all the civilian missions, but to identify key areas within the experiential learning process that demonstrate the evolution of the CCM practice.¹³⁴ This choice does not mean that “big” lessons deserve more analytical consideration than small ones. To avoid going off topic, I zoomed in on the lessons, which I considered as most relevant to link the theoretical ambitions and the empirical outcomes of this work. Therefore, the main contribution of this section is to show that a considerable amount of CCM missions have been launched since 2003, covering a wide range of activities in several operational theatres. Contrary to SSR, those operational environments generated a learning dynamic, which included an expansion of the professionals and experts within EU institutions; a progressive standardisation and formalisation of the learning process; and the implementation of the lessons, creating evolution in areas such as capabilities and training. The section concludes by appraising the robustness of CCM in light of its evolution in and within practice.

7.2.1 Professionalism and the policy consensus on CCM

An important side effect resulting from the creation of a policy consensus and subsequent institutionalisation of civilian crisis management was the expansion of the learning communities of EU CCM, particularly the practice-based ones.

¹³⁴ There is a growing body of secondary literature dealing with the nitty-gritty of individual CCM missions, both in terms of evaluation and lessons learned. A comprehensive review is provided by the European Parliament’s report on CSDP missions and operations (European Parliament, 2012: 34-101).

The emerging policy framework, in fact, created the need for new experts to join newly created crisis management structures, both in national capitals and in Brussels, to sustain the extended set of security policies – which had been built from scratch – and contribute to their improvement through providing input for experiential learning.

Therefore, as a result of the process of institution building (from 2001/2002 onward), new seconded and contracted officers, experts and consultants joined the Directorate for civilian crisis management (DG E IX) of the General Secretariat of the Council as well as other new born structures such as CIVCOM or the CivMil Cell.¹³⁵ This wave of recruitment was magnified by the consequences of the 2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The enlargement made new expertise available. The latter was welcomed in Brussels as new member states that had direct experience of the Post-Cold war systemic shift. Their experts offered the know-how acquired during a decade-long period of institutional reform covering critical aspects of CCM such as the reform of the police sector, the rule of law and the transition towards transparent and accountable armed forces. New expertise also mushroomed in non-institutional settings, as the new policy area magnetised the attention of Brussels and member states-based think-tankers, academics, NGOs etc. Accordingly, policy persistence was characterised by an attempt to enlarge the communities through new recruitment inside and outside EU institutions.

¹³⁵ The creation of the Civilian Response Teams (CRT) as a “pool of experts” rapidly deployable to conduct a wide range of missions is a particularly interesting development in this respect.

The unclear scope of civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding at the international level (Nowak, 2006: 16) did not affect the emerging consensus on the definition of civilian crisis management within the EU. Evidence from the interviews confirms that, despite some degree of terminological confusion, a broad convergence exists between experts and practitioners on the definition and purposes of the EU way to CCM.¹³⁶ Nowak herself (p. 17) reckons that the Security Working Group established after Cologne settled on the broad definition of EU CCM as all non-military instruments and policies of the EU dedicated to Crisis Management. The identification of the four priority areas agreed upon at Feira (2000) allowed to narrow down further the definition. Specifically, it provided the Union with a sort of “niche” differentiating the EU’s activities in the four areas from other international actors. At the same time, the EU also acquired its own way to design and operationalise crisis management missions, placing the emphasis on the cooperation (CIMIC) and coordination (CMCO) between civilian and military aspects also known as comprehensive approach. This too contributed to consolidate a common view of CCM.

In sum, the analysis of learning communities in this field displays a reasonable degree of cohesiveness. Civilian crisis management in the EU is consensually understood as: 1) non-military crisis management activities, instruments, resources and policies; 2) covering the four priority areas established at Feira;

¹³⁶ Asked about how they would define CCM, and what they saw as the main challenges of implementation, interviewees’ answers revealed a shared understanding of the subject matter, detectable from the language and example used, and references to the same keywords – namely in terms of policy documents, frameworks and initiatives (Feira, CHG, main missions such as EULEX Kosovo). Shared lessons also emerged – cf. section 7.2.2.

3) complying with the logic of a comprehensive approach to security provision integrating civilian and military means; and 4) firmly entrenched in the process of institutional reform (e.g. the creation of integrated institutional structures such as the EEAS or the CMPD) and the build-up of capabilities.

7.2.2 Main lessons from operational experience

The consensus on the four aforementioned points laid the foundations of policy evolution and learning by doing. It allowed EU policy-makers to identify common lessons, adopt new procedures to manage the feedback flowing from the missions and improve the effectiveness of the crisis management machinery.

As of the Summer 2012, out of 28 CSDP missions, 22 have been civilian ones. CCM operational activities encompassed monitoring, substitution, mentoring, training and assistance in the following areas: policing, rule of law, human rights, gender, civil administration, mediation and border support (Blair and Gya, 2010: 118). These field operations have provided the Union with a large amount of lessons learned, to improve its institutional structures, procedures and capacities. To date, police missions have been the largest deployment. Police advisers deployed outnumber any other type of personnel.¹³⁷ The initial orientation was towards executive policing, defined as missions that “include the responsibilities for law enforcement in unstable situations” (Dwan, 2002:

¹³⁷ Cf. CSDP missions’ personnel breakdown (updated 1/2012) on the CSDP MAP website: <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel> (Accessed 3 May 2012).

9). Subsequently, the focus of EU police missions has moved to include training and advisory tasks. The EU has helped host nations to improve the quality and professionalism of their forces, fighting organised crime, develop confidence building between clashing ethnic groups. The key geographical focus has been in the Balkans (Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo), but major missions were deployed also in Afghanistan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the rule of law field, the EU missions in Iraq, Georgia and Kosovo has focused on training for judicial and prison officials, support to the democratisation processes.

As a result of the early assessments, specific recommendations were made to improve strategies and capacities for civilian and civilian – military crisis management. Bossong (2012) distinguishes between four phases of learning: (1) learning from others (2000-2002), when officials and international experts developed a first wave of planning documents for civilian missions following previous examples of civilian administrations under the UN and OSCE (Bossong, 2012: 14); (2) early learning by doing (2003-2004), resulting from the police missions in Bosnia and Macedonia and characterised by experimentation and improvisation, at least if compared with the long-standing templates for planning, conduct and assessment of the military staff; (3) proliferation of missions (2005-2005), with operational (i.e. lack of human resources), bureaucratic (i.e. turf wars between the Council and the Commission) and political (lack of agreement on the creation of an EU operational headquarters) shortfalls hampering learning; (4) build-up of

infrastructures and processes for regular organisational learning (2007-2009), which followed the formal lessons-learned process established by the EUMS and was characterised by the establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), operational since 2008.¹³⁸

The lessons learned matrix below (table 7.5) provides a list of the main lessons that have been identified over a decade of operational experience, based on content analysis of official documents, reports, policy briefs and other secondary sources produced by institutions and individuals working on CCM matters.

Table 7.5: Overview of the main lessons learned in civilian crisis management

LESSONS	TYPE	DETAILS	MISSIONS AFFECTED*
Inter-pillar Coherence and institutional coordination	O/P	Institutional disconnect between First and Second Pillar, hampering effectiveness on the ground (e.g. difficult transition between short and long term programmes).	EUPM BiH, EUPAT-EUPOL PROXIMA, EUSEC-EUPOL RD Congo, EUBAM Moldova, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia
International coordination	O/P	Lack of “effective multilateralism”: challenges of coordination with international partners, namely IOs (UN, OSCE, NATO), affecting the implementation of the comprehensive approach.	EUSEC-EUPOL RD Congo, AMM Aceh, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUMM Georgia, EUTM Somalia
Capability: Training and Deployment	O/P	Deficiencies in mission leadership and in the delivery of adequate or standardized training to seconded staff during the pre-deployment phase.	EUPM BiH, EUPAT-EUPOL PROXIMA, EUSEC-EUPOL RD Congo, AMM Aceh, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia
Capability: Recruitment and Staffing	O/P	Reluctance of MS to meet promised personnel contributions. Deficiencies of seconded civilian experts, judicial staff and	EUPM BiH, EUPAT-EUPOL PROXIMA, EUSEC-EUPOL RD Congo, AMM Aceh, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL

¹³⁸ Cf. Bossong (2012).

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		police officers. EU positions often not attractive to qualified national staff.	Afghanistan, EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia
Budget and Finance	O/P	Need to increase the speed and flexibility of finance mechanisms (e.g. ATHENA) ¹³⁹ for crisis management missions.	AMM Aceh, EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, EULEX Kosovo,
Mandate, Planning, Command and Control	O/P	Insufficient planning and conceptualisation of missions, lack of proper command and control structures resulting in missions' design not being appropriate for the task, both at the operational and political level.	EUPM BiH, EUSEC-EUPOL RD Congo, EUJUS-LEX Iraq, AMM Aceh, EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUTM Somalia
Comprehensive approach CIV-MIL	S/P	Absence of predefined procedures to harmonise CIV and MIL planning. Gaps in planning capabilities, with overly complicated procedures scattered over different political and military actors not willing to cooperate intensively. Insufficient national efforts to increase coordination.	EUTM Somalia
Scale	S/P	Small scale of operations with limited impact on country context.	All missions except EULEX Kosovo and EUPM BiH
Strategic Vision	S/P	Lack of an overarching strategy and common vision as to what missions should achieve. De-link with European Security Strategy.	All missions

O/P = Operational and procedural lessons

S/P = Strategic and political lessons

* Source: Lessons Overview Matrix (European Parliament, 2012: 113-114).

¹³⁹ It is worthwhile noting that ATHENA has itself an internal lessons learning cycle. Because of the small size of the mechanism (10 staff), the learning process is considered fairly agile, informal and direct (European Parliament, 2012: 25).

7.2.3 Formal and informal mechanisms for lessons drawing

The CPCC structure was conceived as an upgraded version of the Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell). The latter was created in 2005¹⁴⁰ within the EUMS. It served as a planning body to enhance the capacity to deliver early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, with particular emphasis on management of the civilian/military interface.¹⁴¹ With a 70+ civilian experts staffed structure, the CPCC was to serve as a formal chain of command (a headquarters) for EU civilian mission by providing planning and operational support (Chivvis, 2010).

Further institutionalisation of the lessons learned process for civilian crisis management was possible thanks to the creation of new structures and procedures, such as the IT-based system “Crisis Management GOALKEEPER”¹⁴² to ensure more effective knowledge and resource management; or the institution of best practice units across missions and the revision of the methodology for lessons learned reports so as to make recommendations less mission than thematic-specific (Bossong, 2012: 24).

¹⁴⁰ Before the Civil-Military Cell was launched, two concepts had been instated to deal with coordination during the actual crisis management: an ad hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRTC) responsible for a draft of the crisis management concept at the political-strategic level and a Crisis Action Team within the EUMS (operational-tactical level).

¹⁴¹ A reference document on the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell is the Italian Presidency Paper “European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning, operations” (2003).

¹⁴² The Goalkeeper system is composed of the “Governor” and “Schoolmaster” databases and it is available online at: <https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu/StartApp.aspx> (Accessed 11 September 2012).

Since 2009, in line with the recommendations of the 2008 Guidelines on lessons learned (Council of the European Union: 2008b), a comprehensive annual report is produced to review ongoing CSDP missions and identify the key lessons. Although the report is still classified, it appears in secondary sources available that the first edition (2009) focused mostly on the strategic and operational planning levels, namely on the type of mission (with a special emphasis on rapid deployment), mandates (police, rule of law, monitoring) and mission support issues (European Parliament, 2012: 20). The report also highlighted the need to pay more attention to identifying and implementing lessons in the following areas: chain of command, co-operation between actors, training, rapid deployment, operational planning phase, conduct, finance and procurement, training and recruitment, press and public information, logistics and communication, and security (European Parliament, 2012: 21). The second annual report (2010) shifted instead its attention towards broadening and improving the system of learning, through the introduction of benchmarking at the operational level and the conduct of impact assessment for each mission (European Parliament, 2012: 21).

In addition to the establishment of formal and standardised processes, the literature on the CSDP lessons management and procedures (Bossong, 2012; Smith, 2011; Raemmler, 2010; Bloching, 2011; Keohane, 2011) has shown that informal practices (including personal relationships, corridor talks) have been a pragmatic if not essential way to disseminate and integrate new knowledge into the system. This is due to the wide use, confirmed by interviewees, of informal

mechanisms – such as information sharing through personal or professional networks and knowledge exchange with external experts – to capture and report lessons (European Parliament, 2012: 21). Through informal channels, communities of knowledge and practice have helped conveying lessons to foster policy evolution.

The process aimed at strengthening CMCO in EU crisis management occurred ad hoc, before systematic structures for learning were established. As Ioannides noted, much of the EU operational lessons in the first deployments was based on the cross-fertilisation of expertise of individual officials and the rotation of key experts from one EU missions to the next. These individual initiatives have lead to institutional learning at the operational level (Ioannides, 2010: 45). Examples of lessons gathered through those ad hoc mechanisms include the need to strengthen evaluation mechanisms (EULEX Kosovo); the problem of the apolitical character of missions, hampering the development of long-term strategies linking CSDP operational results to CFSP goals (also EULEX Kosovo); the importance of engaging the entire spectrum of the rule of law – including police, justice and customs – rather than individual components (EUPOL Proxima, EUPAT Macedonia, EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina). In particular, the operational experience in Bosnia¹⁴³ (EUPM, EUFOR) revealed the need for increased internal coordination between the civilian and military aspects of CSDP. Building on the work of the Danish (2002) and Greek (2003) EU presidencies, the comprehensive approach of all EU actors in the planning

¹⁴³ Here, in fact, a police mission (EUPM) and a military operation (EUFOR) were operating simultaneously.

of crisis management missions was adopted¹⁴⁴, and the concept of CMCO created, thus leading to a new template for the EU Crisis Management Concept¹⁴⁵. The CMCO's culture of coordination "built into the EU's response to a crisis at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the operation", relying on "continued co-operation and shared political objectives" as well as on "detailed preparations at working level involving relevant Council General Secretariat/Commission services".¹⁴⁶

Further operational experience, particularly in Bosnia, was critical to consolidate CMCO. In line with the CHG 2008¹⁴⁷, the UK, Austria and Finland produced a non-paper on enhancing the EU CMCO, based on the conclusions of a seminar organised by the UK Presidency on the 17th of October 2005. The non-paper stressed the need to improve comprehensive planning and management of capabilities, with special emphasis on three key issues: comprehensive analysis (shared understanding of the causes of a crisis); comprehensive planning (to refocus the Civ/Mil Cell on new procedures and methods, in order to ensure the participation of all relevant EU actors in the mission planning phase, and encourage a joined-up vision of strategic aims); joint review and lessons learned process (to provide continuous evaluation of individual missions according to the strategic objectives of the EU).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Council of the European Union (2002b).

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Council of the European Union (2002c).

¹⁴⁶ Council of the European Union (2003: 2-3).

¹⁴⁷ CHG 2008 envisages CCM missions deployed either jointly or in close cooperation and coordination with military operations throughout all phases of the operation (Khol, 2006: 137).

¹⁴⁸ See Khol (2006: 137).

7.2.4 Improving civilian capabilities and human resources

The analysis of documents and reports produced within the CCM practice and knowledge communities (Ioannides, 2010; Blair and Gya, 2010; Chivvis, 2010; Bossong, 2012; Grevi et al., 2009) shows two major shortfalls arising from the early civilian missions deployed under the CSDP from 2003 onwards: the absence of adequate training and, as a consequence, severe shortfalls in recruitment.

The Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), elaborated in December 2004, built on “what was achieved in civilian crisis management since 1999”¹⁴⁹ and out of the awareness that EU’s ambitions in global security lay on enhanced civilian capacities. Official EU documents also underline that, in developing the CHG, “the Lessons Learned from EU-led operations and exercises should be taken into account”.¹⁵⁰ Key aspects of the CHG included the development of integrated civilian crisis management packages; the ability to conduct concurrent civilian missions, to deploy at short notice and to work with military missions; as well as the issue of inter-pillar coherence between CSDP actions and long term EC programmes (Gross, 2008: 16). A new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 was approved by the Civilian Capability Improvement Conference on 2007, building on the results of the Headline Goal 2008 and on the growing body of CSDP crisis management experience.¹⁵¹ As highlighted by the Headline Goal process itself and by several reports from field missions,

¹⁴⁹ Council of the European Union (2004: 2).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 7.

¹⁵¹ Council of the European Union (2007b: 2).

challenges to CCM capacity building pertained to the lack of personnel and expertise available for CCM missions: costs of recruitment, bureaucratic hurdles, training, replacement and domestic shortage.

In 2005 the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept was launched, tasked with creating a pool of civilian experts (pre-selected by member states) ready for deployment within five days and up to three months. The CRTs objectives include assessment and fact-finding missions, logistical support, early presence following the adoption of a Joint Action and assisting the EUSR function (Gross, 2008: 17).

Availability of technical expertise and staff deployability largely depends on training. Lessons from CCM missions revealed considerable differences between Member States in training standards for civilian personnel, which jeopardises an effective and coordinated pre-deployment strategy (Bloching, 2011; Korski and Gowan, 2009).

To patch up this aspect of the crisis management machinery, a Commission's funded pilot project, called the *Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management*, was launched in October 2001. From November 2002, due to the positive assessment, it eventually evolved into a more structured initiative, the European Group on Training (EGT).¹⁵² This open and informal network of training experts and centres was given the responsibility to develop proposals for a common approach and harmonised training programmes across EU member states. Its activities expanded quite swiftly so as to become a reference

¹⁵² EGT is the phase II of the project, launched in November 2002 after the enlargement of the core group (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) to additional EU member states (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland and the UK).

for the identification of joint standard and requirements for both civilian and civilian military training, including the implementation course for the Civilian Response Team (CRT), the EU civilian stand-by force also created as the operational solution to the staffing problems in individual crisis missions (Gross, 2008). All through its 9 years of activity, activated courses focused on the rule of law, civilian administration and civilian crisis management, with over 1,200 member states experts getting trained by the members of the network. Three centres had been more actively involved in the development of the network since its inception: the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (Italy), the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR, Austria) and the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF, Germany). The Crisis Management Center (Finland) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) joined this core group shortly after the creation of the network.

Despite a promising start, insufficient link between training, recruitment and deployment as well as the lack of institutionalisation of arrangements among the members constituted a heavy burden for the EGT'S mission (Bloching, 2011). As a result of these flaws, a new network, the Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi), was created and coordinated by ZIF. As the successor of the EGT, ENTRi was explicitly designed to address previous gaps, namely by intensifying pre-deployment and specialisation courses for civilian experts and issuing standardized certificates for training courses to improve the quality of formation. In 2005, another attempt to deepen and increase the know-how and expertise for CCM missions

led to the establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). A Brussels-based virtual network college comprising civilian and military academies, universities and colleges, the ESDC was mandated with the task of fostering a European security culture within CSDP and disseminating a common understanding of CSDP activities, including the civilian aspect of crisis management.

Notwithstanding these efforts and the intense network-building, however, staffing and training still constitute, even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the main obstacles to the delivery of effective civilian crisis management in the framework of CSDP operations. In light of the present dissertation on norm diffusion in civilian crisis management, the persistence of these problems can be accounted for as follows.

To start with, it is worth reminding that a convergence in policy actions does not necessarily lead to a convergence or effectiveness in policy outcomes (McNamara, 1998). Consensus building and cohesiveness of the members of learning communities are unquestionably factors that stimulate the institutionalisation of new norms. However, policy change may take longer to occur and the lag between intentions and deeds can be substantial. Furthermore, policy evolution as learning is a much more expensive and time-consuming step than previous ones steps of the norm/practice evolution models, especially in terms of resources for training and coordination to achieve the desired operational results and improve the efficiency of institutional structures and procedures. In fact, member states' civilian cultures

vary greatly and, although CCM became institutionalised relatively easily, a proper culture of coordination involving civilian and military tools is much harder to instil as civilian and military structures are subject to centrifugal forces and tend to remain “separate worlds” (Drent, 2011). Finally, one should not forget that civilian crisis management structures, despite drawing from models through policy emulation and institutional isomorphism, have been built from scratch, as opposed to a much longer history of military cultures and organisation – including as regards international security cooperation (cf. NATO-EU relations).

7.2.4 CCM's robustness

Let us conclude by assessing the institutionalisation of CCM according to the criteria of norm's specificity, durability and concordance (Legro, 1997). The evidence is collected from the answers to the interviews as well as from an analysis of relevant secondary sources published since 1999 by European institutions and individuals.

According to Legro, *specificity* refers to how well the guidelines for restraint and use are defined and understood: do countries argue about what the norm entails in terms of behaviour or implementation? Are guidelines simple and clear enough to be correctly understood by actors?

Although conflicts exist between the Council and the Commission on the division of tasks for civilian missions and inter-pillar coherence¹⁵³ (Hoffmeister, 2008), and member states maintain different strategic cultures¹⁵⁴, organisational structures and procedures for deployment (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011; Howorth, 2002; Meyer, 2005; Baun, 2005), civilian crisis management has found its own niche in the EU institutional structure, associated with the development of non-military crisis response capabilities. The EU specificity and specialisation as a civilian crisis manager is well known and acknowledged both inside and outside the EU institutional setting¹⁵⁵. Furthermore, in comparative terms, one could go as far as to claim that the objectives and instruments of civilian CSDP are much better defined than those of military CSDP, given the enormous divergence among key member states as regards a common vision of European defence – for instance, the political barriers to the creation of a common defence market.¹⁵⁶

The second criterion is *durability*, which denotes how long the rules have been in effect and how long-standing is their legitimacy. In this regard, civilian crisis management has, since its inception, produced an ever-growing amount of

¹⁵³ In several instances, in fact, the EU deploys several civilian crisis management tools at the same time and under different frameworks: in general, it has been noted (Hoffmeister, 2008) that when CSDP civilian crisis management operations (defined as short term actions in response to acute crises) intrude on institution building and long-term conflict prevention, serious questions of delimitation of competences between the Community method and intergovernmentalism arise.

¹⁵⁴ According to Howorth (2002), as many as six types of divergences can be identified across EU member states national security cultures: allied/neutral, Atlanticists/Europeanists, professional power projection/conscript-based territorial defence, nuclear/non nuclear, military/civilian instruments, large/small states and weapons providers/consumers. Cf. also Biava, Drent and Herd (2011: 1231).

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Jacobs (2011).

¹⁵⁶ On such divergence, cf. Bono (2002), Faleg and Giovannini (2012).

missions and, over ten years, left a strong mark on the operational contours of the CSDP. Despite the shortcomings outlined in the previous section, the CSDP over the past ten years has unquestionably gone civilian, carving out an international reputation as a provider of non-military security services. It is worth repeating that one of the key characteristics of the institutionalisation of crisis management within CSDP has been the rapidity with which it has blossomed, boosted by previous (learning from others) and new (learning by doing) experiences as well as from the competence and know how provided by those practitioners who operated in national and international (NATO, OSCE, UN) contexts (Duke, 2008). At the same time, it seems evident that the civilian and civil-military aspect of the institutionalisation of EU security cooperation is not complete and remains, by and large, a story to be written, particularly taking into account the quest for a clear strategic vision for the future of CSDP (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010).

Finally, *concordance* is the degree of intersubjective agreement, which denotes how widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic debates, treaties, formal and informal settings. My empirical findings show that a consensus has emerged on a common definition of what the EU's involvement in civilian crisis management amounts to, based on the guidelines set up at Feira. This is partly the consequence of the fact that CCM has become part of the EU jargon, with no equivalent in the lexicon and practices of other IOs. During my fieldwork interviews in New York, Brussels, Vienna and Stockholm, I realised that a former Austrian-national OSCE official and a German-national UN official

strongly disagree over the basic definition of “civilian” crisis management. But also that a Swedish diplomat seconded to the EU, a former Finnish representative to the PSC and a Czech practitioner working in the EEAS had a much clearer idea of the EU’s involvement in this field, with no substantial dissimilarity between their views. Similarly, think-tankers working on EU matters seemed to have little problems locating the conceptual boundaries of EU CCM, whereas complexity would arise when experts were asked to comment on civilian crisis management outside the EU setting.¹⁵⁷

Legro’s expectation is that the clearer, more durable and widely endorsed a prescription is, the greater will be its impact. Consistently with this vision, we can therefore conclude that norm robustness and the progressive creation, driven by learning communities, of an EU specific way to civilian crisis management, account for the significant impact of CCM on the current shape of the CSDP. The policy and expert consensus underlying the robustness – and hence the impact – of CCM did not spring up overnight, but progressed as part of an evolutionary process through which knowledge and practices became shared, consensual and dominant, thus influential within the EU decision-making.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews of the author with experts and practitioners, Spring 2012.

7.3 Conclusion

In light of the evidence presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that learning communities operated in accordance with the criteria set out in the theoretical framework and decisively influenced the creation of a civilian crisis management capacity within the CSDP. EU decision-makers and member states' governments sought the support of a body of experts and practitioners to develop a policy consensus in support of their security choices towards a non-military understanding of the EU's role as a security provider.

Through an in-depth analysis of the learning communities of CCM, this chapter has answered some crucial questions about 1) the relationship between state interests and ideational factors in accounting for EU security cooperation; 2) the factors that influenced the overall impact and policy evolution of civilian crisis management in comparison with other new, post-Cold War security policies (such as SSR); 3) the conceptual and empirical link between knowledge and practice.

With regards to the first question, the analysis suggests that cognitive and ideational forces conveyed by learning communities stand neither above nor below interstate bargaining and power struggles between nation-states.¹⁵⁸ Instead, they are to be located at the same level of policy-making, as they provide domestic political élites and decision-makers in Brussels with an essential normative underpinning, without which the creation of policy

¹⁵⁸ A similar point is made by Verdun (1999: 323).

convergence and hence cooperation could not occur. Learning communities intervene in the grey area between structural factors (i.e. the end of the Cold War) and domestic political processes (at the EU or member states levels) to influence decision-makers perceptions and value-based judgements about the necessity and/or the type of policy responses envisaged.

This co-constitutive relation between state interests and ideational factors also accounts for the pivotal role of national constituencies – in particular, Nordic EU member states – in supporting the process of norm diffusion. As the chapter has shown, the degree of influence and persuasiveness of CCM learning communities heavily depended upon the resources and political backing provided by those constituencies. Indeed, ideas and knowledge do not float freely (Risse-Kappen, 1994). In the case of the EU CSDP, the demand for non-military instruments championed by some member states as well as the opening window of opportunity to provide the Union with an added value in the global security arena facilitated the progress towards CCM and the Feira decision to develop a specific range of civilian tools.

The chapter has then shown the main institutional and bureaucratic factors hampering policy evolution as learning by doing. Accordingly, the role of learning communities appear of the utmost importance for the added value of CCM as a “know-how asset” aggregating knowledge, experience and lessons learned that are lacking in other international organisations (Chivvis, 2010: 46). Finally, a more nuanced delimitation of the action areas of epicoms and CoPs proved useful to emphasise the conditions under which ideas are persuasive.

The presence of a practice in the formative stages of knowledge, and its expansion through communities, positively influences norm diffusion. The narrower the disconnect between habitus and episteme, or between professionalism and expertise, the more likely the possibility that norms will be impactful on decision-making and generate a convergence in policy objectives. In other words, ideas have better chances to become dominant and consensual if they are rooted in overlapping practices *and* beliefs.

Chapter 8

Learning between knowledge, practice and power

Victoria Concordia Crescit

(Arsenal Football Club's Motto)

Introduction

By the mid-2000s, the EU successfully established the institutional and policy means to become a “modern” crisis manager. Multilateral security co-operation within the EU quickly adapted to a changed security demand of the post-Cold War international system, requiring the development of non-military and integrated crisis response capacities to better address complex security environments. Since the early 1990s, as pre-existing peacekeeping norms started to be challenged, new agendas and approaches to interventions aimed at achieving sustainable peace arose and diffused in global *fora* (e.g. the UN). This policy consensus, resulting in multiple processes of norm generation and diffusion (involving concepts such as democratisation, good governance, human rights, the security-development nexus etc.) is ultimately responsible for the current design of EU security institutions and policies.

Claiming that actors' responses to structural changes hugely impact on policy evolution, and that such responses are, in turn, the product of community-

clustered, socially constructed (hence dynamic) epistemes and practices, the previous chapters 6 and 7 have tested the applicability of a learning community model to the EU SSR and CCM frameworks. The two cases are particularly relevant for the post-Cold War security agenda based on comprehensiveness, and substantially contributed to making the EU a “civilian and normative” power.

SSR and CCM are big slices of the comprehensive approach the CSDP was designed on the basis of. As my comparative analysis has shown, CCM provided a significant drive for institutional reform, shaping the policies governing EU operations towards the four priority areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) and producing impact on the ground. The outcome of SSR institutionalisation has instead been far less notable. EU member states agreed on a new way to cooperate in security involving the diffusion of a set of norms; however, CCM was more impactful on the shape and the outcomes of CSDP than SSR. Why?

By summarising the key findings of my empirical analysis, this chapter answers this question and engages the debate on what makes learning communities persuasive, and what factors make certain ideas more influential than others. A key implication of this claim is that a policy consensus (McNamara, 1998) is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to redefine cooperation between states. Consensus, driven by the emergence of new, shared beliefs emerging from innovation or failure, is certainly fundamental to redefine states and actors’ interest in new forms of cooperation. However, it

does not automatically result into successful policy outcomes or institution building. For that to occur, knowledge need to be solidly and coherently secured to a power system, and anchored in practice. These two characteristics define the dominance of a certain type of knowledge over others. As this chapter will show, CCM found a secure harbour in the EU power system as well as in the pre-existing shared practices of non-military crisis response developed by other international actors. SSR, instead, continued to suffer from a thorny attempt to bridge divergent interests, perspectives and organisational cultures.

The first section of this chapter presents the summary of empirical findings for the two case studies. The second section engages the debate (Cross, 2011) on the persuasiveness, cohesiveness and impact of learning communities on policy structures. It also explains what the overall contribution of the present thesis is in that respect. Finally, the last section assesses the relative significance of this approach vis-à-vis the alternative explanations of EU security cooperation, which I referred to in chapter 2. Accordingly, this chapter paves the way for the conclusion of my thesis, where broader questions of the model's general explanatory power, the normative/practical implications and lessons for future research trajectories will be presented.

8.1 Summary of findings

This section presents the summary of empirical findings, which emerge from the comparative analysis of SSR and CCM institutionalisation. In line with the structure of the case study chapters, it is organised according to three criteria: (1) the type of learning communities; (2) the dynamics leading to the diffusion of ideas; (3) outcomes (policy change).

8.1.1 Learning communities and formative interactions

Despite some degree of overlap as regards the transnational actors involved (cf. tables 6.2 and 7.2), different types of learning communities can be identified in the cases of SSR and CCM. This is a first, important consideration, as it calls into question current approaches to learning. In fact, it paves the way for a new research agenda, inquiring into the relationship between the cognitive content and the structure of social relationship underlying its formation.

In both the cases studied, knowledge generation and community formation ran almost in parallel, as transnational communities advocating paradigm innovation were missing. Formal communities such as the Delors Committee (Verdun, 1999) were absent in the early development of SSR and CCM. The role of the Delors Committee as the epistemic community behind the creation of the EMU relied on an explicit mandate by the European Council. The Committee was formally tasked with addressing monetary issues, in view of creating a consensus and achieving a targeted policy result. The constitution of

the EMU epistemic community preceded the policy action associated with it. Conversely, the two processes were informal in the cases of CCM and SSR, and could not be spotted by simply looking at the institutional bodies in place. For this reason, in my previous CCM chapter, I have pointed out the peculiar morphology of the “islands of knowledge and practices”. Those islands define social and cognitive ties loosely linked, but nonetheless interconnected to each other emerging at the earliest stages of CCM conceptualisation.

A main point of differentiation has to do with the relationship between the notions of episteme and practice. My study on the genesis of CCM provides evidence of the existence of common practices, albeit informally diffused and not structured. Those practices, arising in member states’ involvement in field operations with other international organisations (e.g. UN missions) supported the formation of a new episteme and the work carried out by expert.

On the contrary, the conceptualisation of SSR was not associated to a specific *habitus* or background knowledge provided by the actors involved. Knowledge sharing and socialisation were functional to the purpose of bridging different approaches into the new SSR vision. However, individuals who influenced the debate on SSR, although exposed to practitioners, were not part of the same community of practice. Development and security professionals did not share field experiences. They did not have a sense of common routine that would facilitate their interaction. EU SSR remains today an innovative crisis management tool that lacks a backup empirical basis. Furthermore, SSR is a “chapeau”, integrationist concept, which includes very different types of

activities and an intense coordination of efforts, in order to provide long-term systemic reform. This made it easier for persisting and competing organisational cultures/behaviour to resist the merger. The case of SSR displays, in this regard, a particularly strong divide between the security/defence community and the development community, which I defined as the bicephalous structure of SSR communities. Interviews with experts and practitioners belonging to both groups reveal substantial differences in the terminology used as well as over definitions and means to achieve policy ends. Experts working for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) do not share the same concept of SSR than colleagues from Development agencies such as the ODI or DFID. Their sense of belonging to an SSR community reflect different visions of what SSR should achieve, or how it should be operationalised in the field. Because SSR is the “bastard child” of the security-development nexus, its norm entrepreneurs have struggled a lot to set up expert consensus around the new norm, which explains much of the fuzziness resulting in vague policy objectives and lack of awareness between policy-makers.

This assessment of the empirical findings does not mean that the SSR practice is doomed to remain in the shade. The relationship between SSR professionals (consultants, academics, practitioners) based on their CVs and work experiences after 2006 – that is, once SSR had been mainstreamed - shows that the hint of a community of practitioners is slowly emerging. Many of the individuals who have acquired experience in SSR now share similar working

experiences and acknowledge the need to overcome their cultural, organisational and epistemic divide. Several interviewees have pointed out that the SSR experts involved in consultations and collaborative projects, for instance the one leading to the publication of the OECD Handbook (OECD, 2007: 4), regularly provide consultancy advice to the same organisations, or participate in professional networks facilitating contacts and career development.¹⁵⁹ Generally, when asking interviewees “who the most influential individuals shaping the SSR agenda are” and “who do you interact more often with” for issues regarding SSR, the list of individuals and organisations was not subject to much variation – the usual suspects came up systematically.

Research on civilian crisis management produced a different picture. Involvement in previous experiences shaped actors’ perceptions and reinforced the move towards a new episteme. For instance, actor socialised by meeting regularly during peacekeeping missions, or contributing to conceptual preparatory works, such as the Agenda for Peace or the Brahimi Report. While the presence of a structured community of practice *strictu sensu* can be hardly detected, shared practices of crisis management have led to traceable personal and informal relations. Back to their capitals after a mission in the field, national diplomats and civil servants maintained professional links with colleagues with whom they had shared a working routine or an occasional task.¹⁶⁰ These experiences contributed to construct a background knowledge. As a result, CCM was not built from scratch, and could be framed also looking

¹⁵⁹ Interviews with SSR experts, various locations, Spring 2011.

¹⁶⁰ Interviews with CCM experts and practitioners, various locations, Spring 2011.

at the conceptual and operational work being done in other international *fora*, hence drawing from the UN's integrated missions, from the OSCE's civilian administration, or at the level of member states.

The relationship between habitus and episteme, therefore, heavily influenced the diffusion of ideas at the national and transnational level in the latter case analysed here. The learning communities in Sweden and Finland, which have been presented in chapter 7, were composed of both practitioners with extensive field expertise on the civilian aspects of crisis management, and experts sharing new principled beliefs relating to the multi-dimensional nature of interventions in response to crises.

Conversely, conceptual work to create a policy framework on SSR, in the UK and The Netherlands, was less rooted in shared practices and more focused on the epistemic attempt to bridge distinct policy fields.

8.1.2 Pathways of influence and the diffusion of ideas

The present section compares the empirical findings vis-à-vis the process of learning, through the four pathways of influence (innovation, sponsorship, emulation, socialisation). Each one of these elements reveals an interesting degree of comparability between SSR and CCM.

To start with, both generated in the recognition of policy *failure* emerging throughout the 1990s, which spurred innovation. In particular, the consensus on failure was facilitated by ineffectiveness in UN peacekeeping missions as

well as by growing instability in the EU's South-eastern neighbourhood, which European member states had been unable to come to terms with. It soon became an international *acquis* that, in many fragile regions of the world, multilateral crisis management had failed.

Both CCM and SSR hence stemmed from a process of paradigm *innovation*, whereby “start-up” communities initiated the conceptual work with a shared enterprise of updating the security discourse – and policies.

Some empirical differences appear at this point though. SSR innovation was channelled through the growing debate on the future of governments' military spending and, in parallel, through the one on the need to redesign aid policies to address interrelated problems of conflict and fragility more efficiently and avoid a waste or bad allocation of resources. Pioneers of SSR found fertile ground in traditional security providers (e.g. states having a significant military apparatus) and major donors. CCM entrepreneurs intersected the debate on European - and, in particular, Nordic countries' post-Cold War strategic posture, and hitched their ideas to the future of major international organisations in a transformed international system: the UN, in quest of legitimacy as peacebuilder; and NATO, engaged in the overhaul of European security institutions – meaning, essentially, the need to avoid duplications with the newborn EU security policy. Furthermore, as the previous chapters have shown, while innovation came from expertise in both cases, overlapping practices were present in CCM only.

The way a constituency of interested state actors supported the *diffusion* of the two concepts through sponsorship is very much alike. The sponsorship factor was arguably a prominent booster of diffusion in both CCM and SSR. While the configuration of EU institutions (by the multi-level governance, providing norm entrepreneurs with multiple access points to influence decision-making) provided a comfortable arena for internalisation of ideas, support from national actors and governments proved crucial, with the UK in SSR and the Nordic countries in CCM acting as “godfathers” of the new approaches.

In terms of contribution to the institutionalist debate, my research clearly shows that learning communities define the boundaries of the space in which states reconstitute behaviours and interests as EU norms, and not just national ones (Smith M.E., 2004a). What enables institutions to shape interests, and identities, is the formation of a set of consensual and dominant norms emanating from a shared background (practices) or episteme (value-based judgment) clustered in communities. Learning communities are therefore pivotal insofar as they are within the state (they are tightly connected with state interests) and, at the same time, they carry ideational content inside national, intergovernmental and supranational bureaucracies. For this reason, they can be considered as a “thermostat of power”, regulating the balance between actors’ material interests and cognitive/ideational inputs. As a matter of fact, both CCM and SSR were selected not just for the scientific value of their prescriptions, but also for their relevance vis-à-vis EU member states’ preferences.

At the constituency level, intense advocacy through workshops, conferences, studies, publications (white and non-papers, editorials) and other activities aimed at fostering socialisation and networking occurred and characterised the emergence of ideational relations between actors, in some cases leading to the creation of ad hoc institutional structures tasked with dealing with the emerging paradigms. The Swedish' Council for Peace and Security Initiative (RFSI) for CCM and the UK's Stabilisation Unit (FCO, MoD, DFID) for SSR are good examples.

The policy selection process, which coincides with the “tipping point”, was influenced by intervening factors. Timing, national cultures and EU governance structure facilitated the emergence of new ideas, although with some differences between the two cases. As regards the cultural factor, it is interesting to note that both CCM and SSR diffused first in those countries (UK and Nordic states) where a culture of “openness” was present; where the political system was particularly conducive to letting ideas circulate; where consultation with non-governmental bodies (academia, think-tanks, agencies, NGOs) as well as across the institutional spectrum was part of the country's political culture. Ideology and the presence of party-based “policy networks” played a role in both cases. Although security norms tend to produce a bipartisan consensus within the political spectrum, the presence of progressive, social democratic governments in both Sweden and the UK when the CCM and SSR agenda were presented gave a substantial impetus to the debate. In the first case, the Swedish and Finnish Social Democratic parties (and influential

individuals, such as Ministers of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh and Tarja Halonen) were keen on showing their electorate that the newborn CSDP would not open a season of militarisation of security co-operation in the EU (hence duplicating NATO), but conflict prevention and non-military crisis management tools would be included in the “basket”. Similarly, in a way, the UK Labour Party had a stake in enhancing Britain’s outreach and a more efficient planning and conduct of overseas international development policies.

Emulation, as intervening factor facilitating the institutionalisation of CCM/SSR through persistence and evolution, shows instead two different patterns. EU CCM was modelled on a reliable set of successful experiences and practices, providing a blueprint for the organisational conceptual and procedural aspects of the new policy realm. Cooperation with other actors (OSCE, UN), NGOs and institutional isomorphism – replication of EU military structures, procedures and capability generation for crisis management – enormously facilitated the implementation of the CCM agenda. In terms of operational experiences, although a strong and successful model was lacking, experiences of UN and OSCE with civilian administration in the Balkans are an example of references upon which EU CCM was moulded. Empirical findings also show the (not negligible) extent to which emulation of military lessons learned procedures contributed to create a conceptual framework for knowledge management and lessons learned gathering on the civilian side.

For SSR, emulation acquires a different meaning. Mainstreaming and institutionalising SSR in the EU was not inspired by a model, as no other actor

was previously involved in comprehensive SSR activities and, most importantly, was labelling its efforts in the security-development-good governance nexus as “SSR”. Emulation came in terms of guidelines for adapting SSR to individual actors’ need, with the OECD DAC acting as “agent of standardisation”. SSR norm diffusion proceeded by emulation in the sense that almost all international actors involved in this field have adhered to the OECD guidelines on security system reform, although in reality policy documents display a degree of variation: jargon, objectives and means for SSR policies vary substantially across organisations and European policy-makers seldom agree on what SSR implies as they are asked to go into detail, beyond the OECD principles.

Finally, SSR and CCM differ strikingly in terms of *evolution* as learning by doing. Despite some common challenges, such as the training-recruitment-deployment gap and the “practical” inadequacies of financial, logistical and regulatory support for SSR and CCM missions, one can hardly argue that the two norms faced the same destiny when turning into real policies. The EU commitment to CCM is vast, whereas pure SSR missions can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Asked about what the EU CCM approach amounts to, practitioners in Brussels respond quickly and precisely, making explicit references to the Feira priorities or to the experience in the field.¹⁶¹ Instead, discussions on the notion (and application) of SSR generally end up in stammer. Similarly, the EU as a civilian power consolidated over the past ten

¹⁶¹ Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, Spring 2011.

years, whereas SSR security provision is criticised as lacking impact on the ground and sufficient coordination or even attention in Brussels, in spite of the relevance of the norm for current crises in the southern neighbourhood (e.g. Libya). Lessons learned are abundant on the CCM side - although procedures to collect and elaborate lessons learned are far from being faultless; they are scattered and ineffective on the SSR side.

8.1.3 Outcomes: explaining policy change and variation

One of the most fascinating aspects of academic research is the possibility to explain variation in outcomes. When I started engaging the CSDP literature in search of a strong research design, I was mostly concerned with why – and how – the cooperation on security and defence within the European Union evolved the way it did. It was only much later, during my fieldwork research in Brussels, that I came across what appears as a more subtle, theoretically-relevant and largely under-researched question: how come that certain norms, or ideas, become policies while others fade away? Current and previous studies on the CSDP take for granted the fact that the EU has gone civilian, and that some policies (e.g. police, rule of law) had a more successful and committed implementation record than others (e.g. SSR, DDR). They just don't explain why this was the case. In providing an answer to this question, my empirical findings point at several directions, but identify the relationship between interests and ideas as crucial.

Let us start with the consideration that the clearer, more durable and widely endorsed a norm is, the greater will be its impact (Legro, 1997). My empirical research suggests that this expectation is correct, as CCM evolution corresponds to a relatively robust norm, as opposed to a relatively weak one in the SSR case. Therefore, a first account for variation is that the latter did not meet Legro's criteria for robustness in terms of specificity, durability and concordance.

Another explanation can be deduced from the comparison of the two processes of diffusion through the pathways of influence. If we cross-check the steps of the Adler and Haas (1992) model of policy evolution (diffusion, selection, persistence, evolution) with the elements of the pathways that define how learning occurs (innovation, socialisation, emulation, sponsorship), one can conclude that CCM and SSR share all but three (emulation, persistence, evolution). Since evolution is the outcome we want to explain, according to Mill's method of difference (Hancke, 2010), it can be argued that the *emulation* and *persistence* factors account for the variation. The application of Mill's method to my two case studies can be represented by the table 8.1.

Table 8.1: Mill's method of difference: comparison between CCM and SSR norm diffusion

Process / Norm Evolution	CCM	SSR	Pathways
Failure	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>Innovation</i>
Diffusion	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>Socialisation</i>
Selection	<i>V</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>Sponsorship</i>
Emulation	<i>V</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Emulation</i>
Persistence	<i>V</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Experience</i>
Evolution	<i>V</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Learning by doing</i>

Emulation and persistence are directly linked. As I already discussed in the previous section, the persuasive example of the potential merits of an idea gives a strong impetus to forge consensus and maintain it across time. Economic theory also suggests that once a policy is introduced, it is likely to persist and it proves hard to be removed (Coate and Morris, 1999). As a matter of fact, SSR has not entirely disappeared, hence a certain level of persistence can be acknowledged. It has not, however, produced enough persuasive power to influence the design of EU institutions or the nature of missions.

Explanations can be manifold. According to Fullan, “terms travel easily...but the meaning of the underlying concepts do not” (Fullan, 2005: 67). An interviewed SSR expert stated “mainstreaming (SSR) does not necessarily mean understanding; and if there is understanding, it does not necessarily mean

being able to deliver. Perhaps SSR has been mainstreamed too early”.¹⁶² Theoretical, conceptual and analytical embedding for SSR did not lead to the creation of appropriate means to implement SSR programmes. Timing has certainly played a role as a heavy intervening factor. As chapter 3, 6 and 7 have shown, crisis management practices were criticised as “not ideal” since the early 1990s, producing different solutions. In that respect, SSR and CCM were problematised (Rose and Miller, 1992) differently. Only CCM got political salience, thanks to states’ interest in avoiding the militarisation of CSDP and maintain NATO’s primacy as Europe’s defence organisation. Shortly before the development of the CCM framework, the St Malo process created a unique window of opportunity for some countries to mitigate the push towards a “common army” or “mutual defence agreement” vision of the CSDP, and to keep the United States involved in European defence by not duplicating or downgrading NATO.¹⁶³ SSR was not subject to the same process of problematisation. It was less “attractive” than CCM, given the latter’s contribution to differentiating CSDP from other security organisations, such as NATO or the UN.

Furthermore, conceptual work for the EU approach to CCM followed a pragmatic approach, which started from the inventory on resources already available within member states and subsequently aimed at addressing the issues of how to develop (cf. headline goal process), apply (cf. learning by doing

¹⁶² Interview of the author with an expert, Brussels, March 2011.

¹⁶³ Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.

2003-onward) and coordinate (cf. institutional build up and reform since 2001) them, on the template of parallel developments on the military side.

SSR posed more serious conceptual challenges, and demanded profound institutional change at different levels. First, in the methodology of decision-making, since SSR entailed unprecedented cooperation and exchange of information between institutions, up to the need to create a “collegial” collaboration between competing bureaucracies. Second, in the practices on the ground, for instance through the implementation of a systemic – as opposed to sectoral – approach, or by stressing the importance of local ownership. Third, in the troublesome partnership between technical, academic and policy/practice expertise.

With regard to the last point, it is worth recalling that EU policy-makers knew little about SSR at the time it was introduced: SSR networks did not exist beforehand. On the contrary, CCM was supported by “shared stand-by practices”, and its conceptualisation came largely as a result of pre-existing informal networks between ministries and organisations “streamlining countries’ positions and preferences”, as a Swedish policy-maker observed.¹⁶⁴

It follows from this assessment that the structure and the persuasiveness of the learning communities are key to understanding the different trajectories of policy change between SSR and CCM, as they shaped the formation, as well as the success, of the two concepts.

¹⁶⁴ Interview of the author with a Swedish policy-maker, March 2012.

8.2 Persuasiveness and impact of learning communities: theoretical implications

If learning communities are of any use to explain cooperation is because the concepts they advocate have an impact. Academic research has logically addressed the issue of persuasiveness and influence, in order to establish when and under what conditions epistemic communities, or CoPs are more likely to be persuasive. A number of alternative explanations have been offered: access to key decision-makers (Haas E.B., 1990; Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992), the compatibility of policy goals with institutional norms (Sabatier, 1998), policy-makers' dissatisfaction with past policies (Hall, 1993), political salience of the issue requiring expert advice (Radaelli, 1995), and, last but not least, the sharing of a high level of professional norms and status (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Communities of practice expand when they cross the cognitive threshold known as the "tipping point" (Gladwell, 2002), which include the socially constructed definitions of novelty and the success of the practice, which in turn depend on individuals' expectations vis-à-vis their collective background knowledge (Adler, 2008: 203). Cross looks at (1) the importance of professionalism at the heart of cohesiveness within epistemic communities and (2) the understanding that epistemic communities do not simply exist, but can be strong or weak and hence level of cohesion during socialisation processes and their ability to reach a consensus are crucial in explaining their success or failure in persuading policymakers (Cross, 2011).

I overall agree that cohesiveness is critical for a community to be persuasive, that communities can be of different types (nascent, fully fledged) and hence that internal cohesiveness explain external persuasiveness (Cross, 2011: 26). However, my research findings suggest that the factors affecting cohesiveness go beyond the internal variables identified by Cross (selection and training, frequency and quality of meetings, shared professional norms, common culture).

What does this analysis of CSDP add then to the existing literature on learning communities, namely vis-à-vis cohesiveness? From the role of communities in shaping cooperation in CSDP it can be concluded that:

- a. A shared practice facilitates the emergence of a policy consensus, which constitutes the necessary basis to achieve progress towards a new policy orientation of security cooperation. New cognitive content is more easily learned if it comes as an expansion of a practice, as opposed to the attempt to bridge previously separated episteme. The capacity of institutions to learn “by doing” also depends on the presence of a fully-fledged CoP, since routines and a shared sense of belonging facilitates communication and understanding between actors on the benchmarks, the outcomes and the types of lessons to be learned – and how to learn them. Conversely, a policy framework not supported by an existing shared practice makes it difficult to overcome institutional and cultural barriers, hence jeopardising policy evolution.

As a result, this thesis demonstrates that the CSDP has learning by doing in areas where a common understanding on the “doing” was already present. Conversely, CSDP actors failed to improve their performance through experiential learning when trying to bridge previously compartmentalised sectors.

A corollary of the previous argument is that the presence of consensus does not automatically lead to the existence of a single dominant vision of what should be achieved. Empirical chapters show that learning communities may also co-exist at different levels of analysis. They are, in other words, like “Matryoshka dolls”: consensus can be reached at a broader and abstract level (e.g. on human security as a new paradigmatic approach, or on the necessity to introduce elements of peace-building in security cooperation), but it does not become dominant unless sub-communities agree on common standards, definitions, measures to achieve policy change. In the case of SSR, the emerging consensus on failure, innovation and diffusion was counterbalanced by disagreement across bureaucracies (defence, development), institutions as well as divergent national interests and perspectives over the policy instruments needed to sustain the new policy framework. Therefore, *consensus* is necessary to *persuade* decision-makers, but *impact* on institutional change (involving goals, means and instruments) fundamentally depends on *dominance*. The relationship between consensual and dominant knowledge is what

influences robustness of learning communities and, as a result, robustness of norms (Legro, 1997). In this respect, the empirical chapters show that practice-based communities lead to more effective policy and institutional evolution, whereas knowledge not supported by a shared practice may result in fragmented communities and, in turn, in dysfunctional policy outcomes. The comparison of SSR and CCM also demonstrates that the narrower and more technical policy consensus gets (e.g. how to operationalise CCM approaches and use scarce resources / develop new ones to this purpose), the higher the chances that a dominant vision emerges. Although it is difficult to set general rules to determine what conditions foster the emergence of *dominance* out of *consensus*, this study allows to draw some interesting conclusions concerning the following factors: the type and structure of learning communities at the moment paradigm or norm innovation kicks off; the domestic setting (meaning the political, cultural and leadership conditions creating the environment where consensus develops and potentially leads to dominance); finally, some exogenous conditions creating the window of opportunity for change – that is, salience.

- b. Sponsorship, and hence power matter. The case studies show that backing from a political constituency is critical, although it may not lead to policy evolution and learning. Besides providing communities

with financial and political backing, capitals can mobilise and steer them in order to match their interests. As Verdun observed, in her analysis of epistemic communities and the EMU, epistemic communities do not stand “above” the political struggle between nation states” (Verdun, 1999: 323), but they are in a way part of it: they are given responsibility and power to shape decision because lack of cooperation in a technical field would go against states interests and members of the communities possess the exclusive access to information or knowledge needed to advance such cooperation.

Intervening factors help explaining the relationship between ideas and policy outcomes, as well as evaluating the contribution of this work, vis-à-vis alternative theories. National cultures and a certain permeability of EU institutional structures facilitated policy diffusion, although they were not, as argued by other scholars (Cross, 2011: 28)¹⁶⁵ indispensable drivers. While it might be argued that Nordic countries communities do share a common culture, the overlapping constituencies supporting CCM (neutral, small and anti-federalist states, and donors) can be hardly included in the same cultural family, yet they forged a solid consensus on the need to conceptualise an EU approach to non-military crisis management. Furthermore, network ties

¹⁶⁵ According to Cross, “common culture is an encompassing concept that is typically a key part of the identity, heritage, symbolism and sense of purpose shared by a group of individuals. It includes esprit de corps – a sense of camaraderie, and devotion to the goals of the group – but is also more. Some transnational networks, bureaucratic committees or nascent epistemic communities rest only on esprit de corps, but a strong epistemic community is also characterized by a shared culture” (2011: 28-29).

between practitioners rooted in practices and experience with previous organisations in the field (e.g. UN policing) arose from a common sense of engagement and not from a similar cultural background. Finally, a “culture of openness” was instrumental to achieve policy selection. Tight relations between experts and practitioners existed in the key constituencies supporting CCM (Sweden and Finland). In other contexts, the emergence of learning communities was facilitated by other elements, such as the reduced size of the countries (e.g. Ireland, or other small member states).

Similarly, while the EU’s permissive decision-making structure facilitated learning, it cannot be considered a sufficient condition for ideas to become consensual, dominant leading to policy evolution. In this respect, the EU governance seemed to amplify the influence of communities on decision-makers with regards preferences that are not politically sensitive (both CCM and SSR can be considered as less sensitive from a political standpoint compared to, for instance, military crisis management) and which are hence easily crystallised. However, once they are mainstreamed or institutionalised, the destiny of ideas gets indeterminate: CCM and SSR are, as we have seen, two different stories in terms of practical impact.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ I would like to thank Mark Rhinard for his precious comments on this point.

- c. The “cognitive architecture” of the policy area under study influences the learning dynamics and, as a result, the outcomes of institutional change. What seems to matter the most in the creation of a *consensual* and *dominant* vision underlying norm diffusion is the cognitive architecture, defined as the type and structures of communities at the moment norm entrepreneurship starts. Explaining why and to what extent learning communities matter requires examination and thoroughly understanding not just their specific internal dynamics, but also and foremost their place in the broader EU social context or networked environment; the boundaries between knowledge and practice, defining where an epistemic community ends and a community of practice begins; in other words, better outlining what networks are we talking about before even investigating how they work.

In this respect, I found a striking amount of conceptual confusion in the literature concerning the relationship between practice (*habitus*) and knowledge (*episteme*). To start with, many analyses proceed with the investigation of one community (e.g. a single Committee). However, multiple communities often co-exist and overlap, due to variation in expertise, cultures or professional norms. For this reason, I accounted for CSDP as an environment in which practices and expertise are arranged in multiplex social and cognitive ties, which I locate within the broader concept of learning communities. My empirical analysis

suggests that neither CCM, nor SSR diffusion have shown the presence of a “single” epicoms or CoP, but showed a heterogeneous morphology tightly connected though not perfectly amalgamated (CCM) or even competing (SSR) communities. A new research agenda on learning communities could elaborate more on the morphology of learning communities. This analytical target is in fact evolutionary and dynamic, and very rarely limited to a single committee because of the multiple flows of influence and socialisation across institutional borders.

Finally, the argument that shared professional norms *enable* the development of shared causal beliefs and foster agreement on appropriate policy goals (Cross, 2011) fails to specify how knowledge interfaces with practice. The empirical findings of this thesis indicate that a consensual understanding about new, shared causal beliefs emerged both in CCM and SSR, even though the latter was not underpinned by shared practices. However, pre-existing shared practices determined the agreement over a *dominant* vision of appropriate policy goals. Dominance emerged in the CCM case only. Here, pre-existing networks of practitioners, having a common understanding of routines on the ground or in headquarters, reinforced the overall persuasiveness and impact of learning communities. When practice interfaces with knowledge, a dominating view or some kind of prioritisation within the means-ends relationship is more likely to emerge, thus reinforcing the long-term impact of the norm.

In the case of SSR, the creation of a policy framework at member states (the UK, The Netherlands) and EU levels occurred before the first attempt to introduce shared protocol, procedures and professional routines leading to an “SSR practice” that was absent beforehand. On the contrary, the CCM framework came both as a result of the validation of new knowledge benefiting from networks of practitioners’ endeavour to “practice change”. It come pretty straightforward that a common episteme, or information base on human interpretation of facts, is stronger and more dominant if it is supported by the practical routines and background knowledge arising from CoPs.

To conclude, evidence on CSDP missions presented in the empirical chapters confirms that the cognitive architecture of knowledge influences learning “by doing”. The way knowledge and practice overlap impacts on the way knowledge is produced, stored, exchanged, transmitted and retrieved. The “walking is how you learn to walk” (de Vasconcelos, 2009) proved more effective as practitioners shared a sense of belonging, a common repertoire and a mutual engagement towards a clear set of CCM objectives and activities.

8.3 Conclusion

To sum up, a main theoretical contribution of the present thesis is to draw from the current debate on the “practice turn” and communitarian international relations (Adler, 2005) to reappraise the conceptual and analytical relationship between *episteme* and *practice*. The two are mutually reinforcing, as the latter enables ideas to become dominant and expand to new practices.

This thesis also leads to the conclusion that *dominance* is achieved when ideas are rooted in a net which includes practices and power sources. Dominance arises when paradigm innovation is embedded in a consensual understanding of the causal beliefs, when this embeddedness is complemented by a shared notion of the “field” resulting in formal or informal network ties between professionals, and when a powerful champion of change provides interest-based support for the new policy enterprise.

I have argued and demonstrated empirically that knowledge, practices and power are interlinked and mutually reinforcing drivers of the diffusion of ideas, and that learning communities are more likely to be persuasive (towards decision-makers) and impactful (towards institutions) when epistemic communities and communities of practice overlap, or, to be more precise, the latter support the formation of the former as this positively affects the overall robustness of learning communities. For instance, institutional isomorphism (Reynolds, 2007), or *emulation*, is generally reinforced by the presence of a community of practice as demonstrated by NATO-CSDP relations (Lachmann,

2010). Similarly, experiential learning “by doing”, as the comparative evolution of CCM and SSR has shown, is facilitated by cognitive proximity, shared tacit knowledge, shared repertoire, sustained mutual engagement and working routines, in other words the features that form a community of practice (Cohendet et al., 2001: 14).

Chapter 9

Conclusion

So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
(The Great Gatsby)

Current theories on social and institutional learning, including the practice turn, do not fully account for what happened within CSDP. They failed to acknowledge the complex cognitive architecture from which learning stems. This is particularly relevant in a decade of intense evolution of the European security discourse, during which new crisis management tools have been introduced and tested in the field. Conceiving the CSDP as a field in which knowledge and practice-based learning communities operate and foster evolution brings forward a renewed understanding of how organisations change, driven by new cognitive and ideational stimuli.

As I embarked upon this research enterprise, back in 2009, my ambition was to contribute to the academic debate on institutional change. Change has to do with the ways in which the interpretation or re-interpretation of past events designs the future, as the link between policy failure and policy innovation shows. The act of interpreting denotes the emergence of a *consensual* and

dominant view between actors of a changing social reality in which old responses are adapted to new needs.

The linkage between epistemic knowledge formation and practices, and their overlap producing *dominance*, clarifies the relationship between two different, though mutually supportive types of ideational forces underpinning learning. First, the epistemic act of norm/paradigm innovation, whereby new shared causal and principled beliefs and notions of validity are fashioned and embedded into a common policy enterprise: this is what characterises epistemic communities. Second, the daily re-elaboration of the shared sense of the past across the changing morphology of the field in which the actors' background knowledge has blossomed, leading to the reiteration and, where necessary, the renovation of practices: this is what communities of practice are founded on. Understanding – and further conceptualising – learning as a product of evolving knowledge and practices bears significant potential for social sciences, since, as Bourdieu observed, “the progress of knowledge presupposes progress in our knowledge of the conditions of knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1980: 1).

This thesis demonstrates that the sense of the past, understood as *habits* and not to be confused with historical path-dependency, has been fundamental in shaping CSDP. One could go as far as to argue that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is perhaps even more influential on the current design and activities of the CSDP than the St Malo Declaration itself, as the latter does not contain any reference to comprehensiveness or the development of joint civilian-military

tools for crisis management and conflict prevention. In the same way a new episteme is generated out of a critical appraisal of previous knowledge, or following a technological upgrade, an evolving habitus draws from a set of elements that constitute a heritage in people's mindset and organisations' codes of conduct: the notions of national interest, strategic cultures (Giegerich, 2006) but also education and early work experiences shaping people professionalism are certainly some of these elements.

The communities that are responsible for learning shall not be associated to geographical or political limitedness: the OECD's International Network on Conflict and Fragility, where much of the thinking on SSR and on other issues relevant for CSDP was done, cannot be detected by researchers' analytical radars if these are set on the "Brusselsisation" or "Franco-British-engine" modes.

Against this backdrop, my work has critically tested the validity of IR learning theories, especially in light of the recent "practice turn", in accounting for policy evolution in European security. My claim that the EU has learned to become a security actor implies that CSDP's institutional format and activities come as the result of learning from policy failure, which produced policy innovation, as well as learning by doing, which generated evolution. In particular, I argued that, when epistemic policy innovation is rooted in the re-elaboration of past practices, and hence when a community of practice sustains the learning process, the ideas diffused by transnational communities are likely to be more persuasive and impactful on decision-making. On the contrary,

nascent epistemic communities that are not bound to a common practice struggle to become dominant, although some degree of consensus can still be reached. The reason is that, when the first scenario occurs, new ideas feed back into pre-existing consensual knowledge and are reinforced by shared practices; when the second scenario occurs, instead, an emerging consensual knowledge hits bureaucratic or cultural barriers, which are hard to overcome if none or loose network-ties between actors, organisations or policy fields are present.

On the basis of these preliminary considerations, my concluding remarks are structured as follows. The next section outlines the explanatory power of this thesis vis-à-vis the alternative explanations presented in chapter 2 and in light of the empirical findings. It summarises the contribution of a learning communities approach, based on the articulation of practice and episteme, to the academic debate. The third section presents the normative implications and their relevance for the future of EU security cooperation in times of deep changes caused by austerity cuts. Finally, the last section suggests future trajectories of research on EU and international security and the role of learning theories and sociological institutionalism.

9.1 Explanatory power

In his preface to *The Order of Things* (1970), Michel Foucault refers to the tension between the “exotic charm of another system of thought and “the limitation of our own”.

To the extent that they stem from systems of thought, epistemes – and, as a result, the communities that that ensue from them – are by definition prone to epistemic closure. Such fragmentation is due to cultural, ideological, political divide. The knowledge of things proceeds from a fundamental arrangements of knowledge, which lies at the crossroad between the encoded, culturally-rooted understanding of the empirical order and the scientific explanations of it. As Foucault put it, “between the already encoded eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region which liberates order itself” (Foucault, 1970: xxi).

That “arrangement of knowledge” paves the way for the “authoritative claim” the learning enterprise is built upon. It stems from the recognition of the consensus surrounding knowledge and the dominance emanating from it. Against this backdrop, the explanatory power of the theoretical approach used in this study finds in this “middle region” its biggest strength and, at the same time, its main source of weakness.

By addressing the blind spots between the epistemic notion of learning, theorised by Ernst Haas and Emanuel Adler, and its evolution down through the “practice turn” by Adler himself, my thesis has sought to elucidate the dynamics and overlap between expertise-based and practice communities, and the way the mutually supportive relationship between habitus and episteme reinforces the diffusion and impact of ideas and, as a result, the prospects for international (European) security cooperation. As a matter of fact, Bourdieu himself stated, the habitus “a product of history, produces individual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with the scheme generated

by history” (Bourdieu, 1980: 54). It is this system of dispositions that, according to Bourdieu, allows the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to account for it, and ensures the active presence of past experiences which guarantee the “correctness” of practices and their constancy over time (p. 55).

In this respect, the “creative act” of producing new principled beliefs pertaining to epistemic communities is naturally reinforced if it is lodged into the set of dispositions, habits of mind and regularities that form a community of practice, by means of which the authoritative claim leading to a new arrangement of knowledge is more likely to overcome cultural and structural barriers.

This theorisation, I believe, bears deep implications for IR Theory and the study of international cooperation – in particular, integration processes, which can be summarised in the following three points.

9.1.1 Follow ideas, track practices

A first, general theoretical lesson from my research concerns the object of sociological institutionalist analyses. Empirical investigations of European security over the past five years have overemphasised the role of bureaucratic structures as agents of socialisation. This approach presents some advantages in operational terms, particularly since bureaucracies tend to have clear boundaries and mandates, making them fit for research. However, as I have repeatedly pointed out in the previous chapters, learning communities are

seldom confined to a single entity. Decision-makers are not locked in their offices and do not talk exclusively with colleagues from their unit, like in the New Yorker's 1969 Cartoon (cf. Annex 4). People have at least three good reasons not to do so: first one, they would probably go insane. Second, their career prospects would be severely undermined, especially in a job market where networking matters. Third, they most likely could not be locked inside their offices anyway because of the EU's multi-level governance system, which essentially means that influential Council, member states and Commission officers know each other.

The process leading to the institutionalisation of a norm, to the creation of a policy framework and, finally, to its implementation is a highly complex one. It entails intense consultation between bureaucratic units, institutions, states and other relevant international organisations. An analysis of the EUMC as an epistemic community (Cross, 2011), or the COREU network as a community of practice (Bicchi, 2011), provides interesting findings in terms of how these structures influence agenda-setting. However, they are incomplete: it would be like investigating the diffusion and impact of the "tiki-taka" style of play in football by looking at the Spanish national team only, hence failing to consider how this thinking emerged in the first place as an evolution of "Total Football" in Barcelona, The Netherlands and other European contexts.¹⁶⁷ To understand how concepts develop, it is therefore necessary to follow ideas, from the moment they are generated down to the processes of diffusion and

¹⁶⁷ I thank Roberto Rocca for his comments on the limits of a bureaucratic approach to learning communities, as well as for his feedback on the evolution of "Total Football" as an example of norm diffusion.

institutionalisation, hence looking at how cognitive content flows and evolves across (not within) institutional structures.

My thesis shows that the expansion of a pre-existing practice (CCM) has more power, in terms of persuasiveness and influence, than the epistemic attempt to bridge separated areas of security cooperation into a single framework (SSR). This work has hence explored the different social structures (communities) coexisting within a policy area (CSDP). Different communities resulted in different learning processes. In one case, the rationale behind the formulation of CCM rested on the enhancement of a “know-how asset”, shared by a community of practitioners, which was expected to provide CSDP with a niche role in international security. In the other case, instead, the SSR enterprise was linked to the generation of new avenues of knowledge, which openly called into question the existing practices of security. It can hence be concluded that, in order to follow the ideas that successfully influenced the construction of European security, the practices associated with it must be tracked down.

9.1.2 Limitations and lex parsimoniae

This work presents several limitations. First of all, the empirical study only deals with two cases. It thus makes it difficult to draw robust implications regarding the typology of learning communities, their interactions and the extent to which this learning approach can be replicated to other environments – for instance, security cooperation in other institutional or regional contexts.

There is clearly a need for further empirical research on a broader scale, and in particular in comparative perspective across different international organisations, as discussed in the last section of this chapter. Moreover, the analysis does not sufficiently explore the possibility that a form of community may evolve into another, for instance how an epistemic community may succeed in becoming a community of practice. Transformative interactions between communities are also a promising research avenue in this respect.

Other limitations of this research relate to the mapping technique used and the snapshot of learning communities. The choice to apply a qualitative research design was motivated by the need to concentrate on the dynamic flow of knowledge. This choice, however, goes to the detriment of the quantitative assessment of network relationships, in other words the structures upon which social interactions occur. The use of a set of criteria drawn from social network analysis, in order to detect relations among actors, could only partially address the problem. Furthermore, some “filters” through which membership of the communities is selected could not be covered by the framework: for instance, my methodology did not bring into focus other pertinent indicators such as education and cultures, which concur in the definition of the predominant system of thought in a given sector of cooperation (think about the liberal notion of peacebuilding, or the Western vs “others” understanding of the Responsibility to Protect; cf. also a deeper investigation of the role of language); individual leadership and the way it affects the diffusion of some ideas over others was also missing: in some cases, individuals can play a

decisive role in shaping policy change (for instance, the Ruggie's agenda on business and human rights). The truth is: following the norm and singling out what drivers mattered, and amongst those which ones can be identified as critical, independent variables is already a complex process tracing enterprise. The path an idea follows from its inception to the applicability on the ground may in some cases stretch forth through centuries, disappear at some points and reappear to surface again at specific historical circumstances. Learning communities are also complex entities: their configuration is not linear, their shape and size irregular, their representation follows the "Matryoshka doll" illustration, whereby different degrees of consensus at a higher, abstract level include different "arrangements" at the lower, technical or contextual level.

After four years of PhD research, I can claim with sufficient confidence that institutional learning tests a researcher's ability to abide by the law of parsimony. At the same time, it helps reminding you that few, well-structured although not entirely exhaustive hypotheses are the best way to reduce, and hence explain complexity. In this work, I therefore singled out what I think are the most critical drivers of learning, and these essentially have to do with (1) the actors who carry the cognitive content producing learning; (2) the cognitive architecture within which they operate; (3) the power-based enablers (the constituencies) who elevate ideas from being a small boat in the great sea to the domain of political relevance. A second implication is that, no matter what the theoretical or methodological approach used is, that basic principle of simplicity known as the "Occam's razor" shall never be forgotten.

9.1.3 The making of CSDP and its relevance for IR Theory

The present study also addresses the agency-structure debate that has haunted IR Theory for decades. Following the “turn to ideas” (Schmidt, 2010) and the basic logics of constructivist sociological institutionalism outlined by Adler, I have argued that human actions and the world’s reality are mutually constitutive and depend on “dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997: 322).

My cases show pretty clearly the extent to which interactions, socialisation and learning influence and constitute the identity of actors as well as their interests, but has also stressed the role of power in terms of creating the conditions for ideas to become authoritative – or dominant. Learning communities complement sociological perspectives on CSDP and push forward the research agenda in the wider fields of international security and international relations in many respects.

First, they mediate between the internalisation of norms through socialisation, understood as the shaper of agents’ preferences, and the presence of power within institutions, which sways socialisation processes. The latter become a mutualisation of influence: views are intrinsically linked to the interests of those who “view” and their desire to influence the mindset of their interlocutors.

Second, learning communities move the analytical focus into human agency, as they emphasise the capacity of actors to shape responses to changed structural circumstances. In this respect, my work avoids the return of structuralist institutional account (Menon, 2011), and rejects explanations based on predictability and path-dependency orienting decision-makers' actions. But it also contrasts the growing literature on principal-agent rational-choice theories, which take all consequences as intended and pre-determined.

Third, a learning communities approach shows that paramount to the making of international cooperation, in this case of the CSDP, is the agents' interpretation or reinterpretation of consensual knowledge (episteme) and of the schemes of perceptions and actions that are derived from interaction within a social field over a long period (habitus) (Mérand, 2012). This act delivers a new know-how, making what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical (Pouliot, 2008). The making of the CSDP in its formative years is a creative, concerted, isomorphic, multi-layered and evolutionary act. Structural and agential elements are therein combined: actors build on their expertise and/or on practical background knowledge they accumulated which in the end result in institutional constructions. While Mérand (2012) conceives this process as *bricolage*, I prefer to compare it to the practice of building construction, which entails a collective effort between a real estate developer, who secures funds (the EU or other international organisations); investors, who provide the funding (states); construction managers, who coordinate the efforts of different groups of participants (formal networks such as INCAF or DCAF); the

architects, who provide the building design (epistemic communities); and the engineers (communities of practice), who ensure the link between planning and implementation thanks to their know-how rooted in practical experience. This finally leads to the establishment of CSDP's comprehensive and civilian structures for mission planning and implementation.

9.2 Normative implications: a comprehensive CSDP?

In light of the present conclusions, a broader, empirical overview of the most recent developments affecting CSDP is necessary to beef up my study with some normative, policy-relevant recommendations. The question arises as to how my contribution can provide some practical guidelines for a more coherent and integrated European cooperation in security and defence.

In ten years of operational existence of the CSDP, the EU has become a global crisis manager and strengthened its role as a regional security actor, by serving as a partner of the United Nations and finding a relatively stable coexistence with NATO. Recently, however, since 2008 (launch of Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa) and up till the Summer 2012, the CSDP entered a period of stagnation, marked by an “existential crisis”. The core problems can be identified in the lack of political will and low commitment on the part of member states to provide EU institutions with coherent strategic guidelines. Operational requirements have meanwhile become more onerous as the demand for security provision increased, due to upheaval in the neighbourhood

(cf. the Arab Spring), transformations to global security in a multi-polar world and defence budget restrictions caused by austerity. In response to these changes, only one crisis management mission – the small-scale EUTM training mission in Somalia – was launched in more than four years, a crisis that was worsened by the EU lack of action on Libya.

This trend has been broken, very recently, by two signs of revival. The first one has to do with the debate on pooling & sharing of military capabilities, boosted by the NATO smart defence agenda in the wake of the Chicago Summit in May 2012. Originating in the Ghent initiative (Autumn 2010) and strongly promoted by the European Defence Agency, pooling and sharing seeks to operationalise the EU and member states' attempt to meet new security challenges while at the same time coping with scarce capabilities due to the budget cuts imposed by austerity measures (Faleg and Giovannini, 2012; Biscop and Coelmont, 2012). The second sign is a renewed engagement in crisis management, taking the form of the launch of new missions (cf. EUCAP Nestor and EUCAP Niger) specifically designed to “turn the comprehensive approach into comprehensive action” (Ashton, 2012) and let the EU assume its global responsibilities in high-risk theatres (Faleg and Blockmans, 2012). These initiatives constitute important and concrete steps to tackle insecurity in a comprehensive manner, following the strategic roadmap defined by the regional strategies for the Sahel (EEAS, 2012) and the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union, 2011).¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, the institutional structures, such

¹⁶⁸ Cf. also European Parliament (2012).

as the EEAS, and procedures, such as early warning capacity, created by the Lisbon Treaty badly need a new set of learning experiences to consolidate the integrated, comprehensive approach. The CSDP is still, in a sense, a young security institution compared to other organisations and the post-Lisbon institutional format has not been tested on several fronts, from the internal coordination to interoperability on the ground.

This overview points directly to the great dilemma surrounding the future of EU security cooperation. Acknowledging ten years of progressive institutionalisation and development of shared practices, the Lisbon Treaty has formalised structures and procedures to reinforce the comprehensive approach, hence integrating military with civilian tools for long and short term crisis response capacity. However, this new arrangement is characterised by scarce resources (worsened in the wake of the Eurozone crisis), lukewarm political underpinning (due to differences in member states preferences resulting in political sensitivities and stumbling blocks, such as the issue of a permanent operational headquarter), and loose strategic direction. How could this stalemate be overcome?

The answer to that is neither in the withdraw of the state to the benefit of right-minded Brussels-based civil servants controlling policy-making due to their positional power (Dijkstra, 2012), nor in the *directoire* of a core group of member states (e.g. the Franco-British entente) providing the authority for legitimacy and ignition, while at the same time retaining the control over the red button.

The recipe lies somewhere in the middle. It resides in the formation and consolidation of an empowered community of like-minded agenda-setters belonging to different backgrounds (Commission officers, military officials, Brussels-based diplomats, seconded national experts), but sharing a common sense of practice reinforcing their conviction that a comprehensive approach to security represents the future of crisis management and conflict prevention. The normative vision and practical aspects of the EU's crisis response should become mutually reinforcing and feed into the strategic discourse. In an integrated approach, existing *esprits de corps* must necessarily become integrative, breaking the walls between competing cultures and previously separated organisational routines. This process can work only if a series of conditions apply: the presence of constituencies agreeing on the need to provide a strong political and financial backing to this cause – for instance, the German-Swedish initiative to intensify military pooling and sharing in Europe through the implementation of the “Ghent Framework”,¹⁶⁹ a rationale for action justifying the greater push towards deeper integration and greater comprehensiveness - e.g. the austerity measures imposing to “do more with less”; the search of complementarities between NATO's and the EU's pooling and sharing agendas; an empirical validation of the policy enterprise - e.g. emulation of successful operational models and best practices, such as the EU comprehensive efforts in the Horn of Africa, where multi-dimensional and

¹⁶⁹ Cf. “Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative”, Food for Thought Document, Berlin and Stockholm, November 2010. Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative/_sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf [Accessed 7 February 2014].

inter-operating missions co-existed; finally, the emergence of a consensual/dominant understanding of the strategic way forward, fostered by stronger and accountable leadership.

The bottom line is that the learning communities approach to CSDP reinforces the claim that the power-based representation of technical knowledge and experiential know-how concur in explaining the design and activities of the CSDP as we see it today. As a consequence, these factors are crucial to estimate the trajectories of security cooperation as they will unfold tomorrow. Arguably, the construction of a comprehensive CSDP is based on a consensual and dominant vision of the changing nature of security affairs among European stakeholders. Such vision is imposed by exogenous factors, such as a changing security environment. It is also rooted in practice, through learning by doing, and supported by a sizeable group of member states, who perceive the integrated approach as a common denominator. If theory must serve the practical purpose of making predictions about future scenarios, I would therefore argue that while the first decade of the 2000s was marked by the “civilian” aspects of CSDP, reflected in the civilian deployments outnumbering military ones, the second decade will be focused to construct a “comprehensive” vision of CSDP out of the design sketched over the past ten years, possibly leading integrated structures, missions and capabilities. The CSDP has already started its transformation from a civilian to a comprehensive actor. As a UK diplomat pointed out, a generational shift is needed to produce a cultural shift, as individuals need to live through and experience new

policies.¹⁷⁰ The underlying idea of the comprehensive approach (that things are done better if done together) was implausible ten years ago and still finds some resistance in certain environments. What makes the difference now is that integrated policies implemented in the Balkans or in the Horn of Africa, through learning by doing and the constitution of nascent professional networks, will plausibly create the practices that will, in turn, back up paradigm innovation.¹⁷¹

9.3 Future trajectories of research

Not all ideas can mold international cooperation. Influential ideas certainly do. As the very final act of my work I deem necessary to identify some concrete research avenues with respect to 1) the contribution of a learning community approach vis-à-vis institutional learning, sociological institutionalism and the research agenda on practice/knowledge-based communities; 2) security cooperation in Europe.

9.3.1 Learning communities and IR Theory

Let us start from the extremely broad area of IR Theory. Let us also acknowledge that whereas academic works on institutions and ideas have

¹⁷⁰ Interview of the author with a UK diplomat, London, December 2012.

¹⁷¹ I thank Mary Martin for her input on the broader relation between theory development and empirical back-up.

multiplied in the past 20-30 years,¹⁷² works on learning and communities can be counted on one hand.¹⁷³ My contribution has to do with the cognitive dimension of ideas - such as causal beliefs or knowledge, i.e. collectively shared validity claims with regard to cause- and effect-relationships and states of the world. Essentially, I conceive the diffusion of ideas as learning.

A first, key “lesson” to be learned for future research is that institutional bodies and transnational bureaucracies cannot be investigated in isolation from one another. The circumstances under which socialisation takes place, and norms are internalised by actors should lead to a renewed, comprehensive research programme, devoted to explain which norms matter in international cooperation, why, what are the communities involved in their diffusion and the impact on institutional outcomes.

The research agenda on norm diffusion could be refined so as to stress that (1) sources of change are both within and outside the institutional arena as norms transcend institutional borders, and (2) unexpected consequences are part of institutional development,¹⁷⁴ and policies evolve through multiple, non-linear stages. This justifies a deeper understanding of the praxis and epistemological origins of social interactions determining the way actors mobilise ideas and use them to foster policy change. A future research agenda could therefore explain

¹⁷² On the vast, incredibly vast literature on the diffusion of ideas as a central theme of IR literature, cf. the Grant Proposal “The Transformative Power of Europe: the European Union and the diffusion of ideas”, available from: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/forschung/Trafo_Europ_short.pdf (Accessed 12 September 2012).

¹⁷³ That being said, a revival has occurred as a result of the rise of communitarian IR and the practice turn. The Canadian scholarship has been in the avant-garde, overtaking research in Europe and the United States.

¹⁷⁴ Policy outcomes might be different from what is expected, as shown by the development of a civilian, as opposed to military, CSDP.

how changes in the international system impact on agencies and what accounts for policy-makers' agreement over a certain type of cooperation pattern; and also what explains the emergence of policy consensus (or the lack thereof) at critical junctures, especially when experiences of policy failure are no longer considered as acceptable. In this regard, a recommendation coming out this work is that research should privilege the analysis of macro-structures (e.g. an international organisation, such as the EU or the IMF) and their interactions (e.g. EU-NATO or EU-UN relations), in addition to micro-bureaucratic units (e.g. EUMC, COREU). For instance, comparative research could look at how specific norms, such as state-building, develop across institutions (e.g. OECD and EU approaches to state-building) and explain possible variation in outcomes or patterns of inter-institutional co-operation. In the sample case above, interaction between EU, OECD and respective member states' representatives through formal (INCAF) and informal networks would deserve exploration.

Furthermore, research shall acknowledge that in the same way an episteme can be weak or strong, practices can be tight or loose: in this sense, it would be extremely beneficial to our understanding of international affairs if future research agendas clear up the conditions under which a practice becomes stronger or weaker, hence more or less influential, and whether specific types of institutional design (e.g. the EU multi-level governance) facilitate or hamper the emergence of practices. It shall also be explained what is the relative weight of cultural factors in explaining experts or practitioners' consensus.

This bears particular relevance as the international systems moves towards multi-polarity and emerging powers exert a political and cultural counterweight to the West. In a global order in which Western liberal values are increasingly called into questions, because of the relative decline in Western hegemony, the question arises as to how the framework of learning communities can be applied to explain multi-polar/multi-lateral patterns of cooperation. The dominance of the liberal peace agenda in the global discourse and practice of peace making depends, in fact, on the material (Waltz, 1979), ideational (Nye, 2004) and discursive (Foucault, 1970) power of the “Global North” (Peterson et al., 2012). With the transition towards multi-polarity, these power balances worldwide are shifting as old and new powers are (re)emerging. These changes take different shapes across different policy and geographical areas. The influence of emerging powers on dominant peace norms has not been explored. Peacebuilding and the notion of the R2P (Kuperman, 2008; Bellamy, 2011; Weiss, 2011) are important cases in point. Research efforts should then be directed towards understanding how ideas become consensual and dominant in a multi-polar system. How can emerging epistemes or connecting habits be affected by multiple cultural gaps? In other words, what factors can be considered as more relevant to explain resistance to knowledge formation and practice expansion as the balance of power is reconfigured – and new security dynamics emerge?

9.3.2 Learning communities and EU security studies

Updating the research agenda on security cooperation in Europe is perhaps a more challenging and, to a certain extent, ambitious task. CSDP is a very recent research field and scholars, likewise policy-makers, are “learning by writing”. Since Christopher Hill’s capability-expectations gap (1993), the intensification of studies having EU foreign *and security* as the object of analysis have reduced the “theoretical deficit” that was considered relatively high in the mid 2000s (Howorth, 2001; Bono, 2002; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004). Theoretical applications of CFSP/CSDP may still be uncoordinated (Jorgensen, 2004), but competing mainstream explanations have emerged (e.g. rationalist approaches and institutionalist ones). An evolutionary pattern within each one of these explanations also unfolded, as shown by the evolution from a trans-governmental agenda to the focus on Brussels-based bureaucracies.

I guess the most important implications of my research for future studies concerns the development of a social epistemology of the CSDP and, to a wider extent, for European integration. Over the past decade, research has mostly gone in the direction of ontological (what constitutes EU security identity) and normative (how does the EU CSDP relates to external challenges, actors, threats). More recently, as I already discussed in the literature review, sociological accounts were brought to the fore of academic debate. What has been neglected is, using Bourdieu’s formulation, the “knowledge of the knowledge”: a systematic and thorough focus on the types of knowledge

acquired by the EU security system and their effects. In a highly interdependent world characterised by technological and social change proceeding at unprecedented pace, academic research should be able to explain what type of knowledge makes headway into decision-making, what are the cognitive beliefs rooted in expertise and practices that shape discussions about security and defence, and what factors facilitate/hamper cooperative outcomes. If we start conceiving EU institutions as maximising the cognitive impact of knowledge and practice-driven learning, future research should then show how the construction of principled and causal beliefs is structured in the first place. Accordingly, it would be interesting to see how other security frameworks have evolved, and how the EU relates to other international organisations with which it shares the same or a contiguous practice field (e.g. NATO, the OECD, the UN). The emerging debate on military pooling and sharing provides a good case, because it raises highly relevant theoretical questions: what motivated states to move from previous forms of armaments cooperation (within NATO and outside, e.g. EDA or OCCAR), to forge new ones? How robust is the emerging consensus on pooling & sharing and what are its policy implications, namely the impact on security governance? Prior analyses of armaments cooperation across Europe and the US (Jones, 2007; Guay, 1998; De Vore, 2013), overlook the formation of policy innovation and fail to specify how policy issues were re-framed and influenced decision-making (McNamara, 1999; Adler, 2008; Batora, 2009), in response to structural changes in global security – namely, the transition towards a multi-polar world, transformations

in the defence industry, US pivot to East, austerity measures imposing substantial defence budget cuts.

Moving on from the practice turn, a research agenda on learning communities could explore other empirical case studies (e.g. cyber security) in which different types of communities may co-exist and produce a complex cognitive architecture. This may eventually lead to a more robust analytical framework for addressing the major issues surrounding the future of security governance, possibly drawing from the education literature (Feger and Arruda, 2008).

Security and defence cooperation in Europe is producing a highly technical, innovative and, from an institutional standpoint, increasingly sophisticated policy field. It is by understanding how ideas, in the form of technical knowledge and practical know-how, are interpreted and channelled into the decision-making that it will be possible to explain the identity and determine the causes of CSDP. The notion of learning communities, which I elaborated in this thesis, defines the multiple processes and overlapping episteme/practices by which actors come together to achieve learning goals in a specific field. By further exploring the explanatory potential of this concept in IR Theory, and by applying it to other policy areas, the gap between the generation of knowledge and the related praxis may finally be bridged.

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Annex 1: List of interviewees

(in alphabetical order)

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Head of Unit CFSP/CSDP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

Aemal Bahadur

Integration, Partnerships and Cooperation Directorate, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO

Conrad Bailey

Head of Conflict Department, Multilateral Policy Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

Nicole Ball

Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy, Washington DC

Guy Banim

Mediation Support Team, Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Mediation Division, European External Action Service

Luiza Bara

Fragility and Crisis Management, EuropeAid, European Commission

Anders Björner

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Steven Blockmans

Head of Foreign and Security Policy Unit, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Alan Bryden

Deputy Head of Research, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Helen Campbell

Head of the Policy Coordination Unit, European External Action Service

Francesca Cook

Independent Consultant

Nils Daag

Annex 1 – List of interviewees

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Guy de Haynin

Major General, Former Director of the Analysis, Assessment and Production Division, Directorate of Military Intelligence, France

Andrea de Guttry

Full Professor and Director of the International Training Programme for Conflict Management, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna

Dirk Dubois

Head of Security Sector Reform Training, European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

Renata Dwan

Senior Project Officer, Civilian Capacities Project, United Nations

Stig Elvemar

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Michael Emerson

Senior Associate Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies

Salvatore Farina

General, Head of Military Policy and Planning, *Stato Maggiore Difesa*, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Philipp Fluri

Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Michaela Friberg-Storey

Head of the Security Sector Reform Unit, Folke Bernadotte Academy

Luca Giansanti

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

Fernando Andresen Guimaraes

Advisor, European External Action Service

Bernard Harborne

Lead Conflict Adviser, Fragile States and Conflicts, African Region, World Bank

Dylan Hendrickson

Annex 1 – *List of interviewees*

Senior Research Fellow, Conflict Security and Development Group, King's College London

Isabelle Ioannides
Outreach Team, Bureau of European Policy Advisors (BEPA)

Pedrag Jurekovic
Austrian National Defence Academy

Antti Kaski
Counsellor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland

Radek Khol
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), European External Action Service

David Law
Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Giorgio Lazio
Admiral, Head of Military Policy Unit, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Gustav Lindstrom
Head of Emerging Security Challenges Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Birgit Loeser
Head of Planning and Methodology, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), European External Action Service

Kathleen McNamara
Director, Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University

Alessandro Minuto Rizzo
Senior Consultant, ENEL and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO

Antonio Missiroli
Director, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS)

Frédéric Mérand
Professor of Political Science, University of Montreal

Christoph Meyer
Professor of European and International Politics, King's College London

Annex 1 – *List of interviewees*

Carlo Musso
Head of Research Department, Finmeccanica

Michele Nones
Head of Security and Defence Unit, Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI)

David Prodger
Deputy Head, European Security, Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

Mark Rhinard
Senior Research Fellow, Swedish Institute for International Affairs

Patrick Simonnet
Deputy Head of Unit, Fragility and Crisis Management, EuropeAid, European Commission

Thierry Tardy
Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Oliver Ulich
Head, Partnerships Team, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Luc van de Goor
Head of the Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael

Petra van Oijen
Project Officer, International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)

Erwin Van Veen
Policy Analyst on Peace and Security, International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Catharina Wale Grunditz
Horizontal Issues, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), European External Action Service

Victoria Walker
Senior Security Sector Reform Advisor, International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)

Erik Widman

Annex 1 – *List of interviewees*

Head of Europe Division, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Catherine Woollard
Director, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

Richard Wright
Director of Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Security Policy, European External Action Service

Roland Zinzius
Head of Unit, Pan-African Issues & Institutions, Governance, Migration, EuropeAid, European Commission

Annex 2: Questionnaire SSR

Introduction

The aim of this questionnaire is to map the universe of the expertise-based networks that have shaped the debate on Security Sector Reform, with specific focus on the European Union's approach. This mapping exercise constitutes a methodological tool for my Ph.D. thesis on the role of learning communities in fostering policy and institutional change in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Accordingly, the results of this study will be used for scientific purposes and information provided will be treated with the utmost confidentiality so as to guarantee the privacy of your data.

Although I understand you have a very busy schedule, I kindly ask you to be as precise as possible in your answers: the questionnaire has a total of 20 questions and it is designed in a way to require **less than 25 minutes** to fill out.

Comments, questions or attachments in support of your answers (i.e. working papers, resumes, official documents) are of course welcome and can be addressed via email to: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk .

Thank you very much for your time.

1. Personal information

Name:

Nationality:

Age:

Gender:

Native language:

2. Background information [4 questions]

(2.1) Which organization or institution you currently work for or are affiliated to?

INSTITUTION	WEBSITE

(2.2) What type of organization is it? (underline the correct answer)

- *governmental*
- *international organization*
- *NGO*
- *business*
- *academia*
- *interest group*
- *lobby*
- *think-tank*
- *military*
- *other* _____

(2.3) Which of the following sectors do you focus on? (underline the correct answers)

- *development*
- *security/defence*
- *human rights*
- *good governance*
- *democracy promotion*
- *post-conflict reconstruction*
- *peace-building*
- *migration*
- *civilian crisis management*
- *humanitarian aid*
- *SSR/DDR*
- *mediation*
- *gender*
- *civil society*
- *training*
- *other* _____

(2.4) If different from the present one, what organization(s) or institution(s) were you working for / affiliated to between 1999 and 2006?

YEAR	FUNCTION	ORGANIZATION

3. Your views on SSR [2 questions]

(3.1) How would you define SSR? (please include references unless this is your original definition or viewpoint)

(3.2) What do you think are, in general, the main problems related to SSR conceptualization and implementation?

4. Your engagement with SSR [11 questions]

(4.1) What type of professional output best characterizes your work in relation to SSR?

- *direct involvement in policy-making*
- *providing expertise*
- *opinion-making*
- *lobbying*
- *legislative activity*
- *diplomacy*
- *military/defence matters*
- *advocacy*
- *other:* _____

(4.2) What are or have been your main sources of funding for SSR-related projects?

- *government budget (please specify below which ministries or agencies):*
- _____
- *corporate funding*
- *political funding*
- *parliamentary funding*
- *donations*
- *NGOs*
- *research schemes*
- *EU budget*
- *UN budget*
- *World Bank budget*
- *OECD budget*
- *other* *IOs*
- *budget:* _____
-

(4.3) In your field of expertise, do you perceive yourself as influential vis-à-vis policy and decision-making? If yes, please specify why/ provide evidence.

(4.4) Do you rely on external or expert advice or make use of sources produced by other individual or organizations? Please provide one or two examples of interaction with experts that have significantly shaped your ideas or knowledge about SSR.

(4.5) How often do you seek or have you sought expert advice for SSR matters (underline the correct answer)?

- *often*
- *regularly*
- *seldom*
- *never*

(4.6) When looking for expertise to carry out a work assignment on SSR, you tend to consult (underline the correct answers, multiple choice possible):

- *advisors or colleagues within my organizational unit or institution*
 - *people of my same ethnicity or nationality who I can speak to in my native language*
 - *people recommended by mutual friends or acquaintances*
 - *individuals met at thematic conferences, workshops etc.*
 - *random google search*
 - *my organization/institution takes care of providing the useful contacts at the right time*
 - *experts or professionals working in influential organizations/institutions, especially those that are linked to my employer*
 - *I seldom need expert advice: I know almost everything one needs to know and I use to provide, rather than seek expertise*
 - *policy-makers who have direct experience with the subject-matter*
 - *people with field experience*
 - *other*
-

(4.7) How many individuals you can reasonably define “experts” in the field of SSR are you regularly in touch with? Please provide up to 10 names and function.

NAME	FUNCTION	EMAIL

(4.8) Please list five individuals and organizations you consider as being most influential in shaping the SSR agenda, regardless of your interaction with them.

a) Individuals

NAME	FUNCTION	EMAIL

b) Organizations

NAME	COUNTRY (if applicable)

(4.9) Please list the main SSR-related conferences, workshops and meetings you have attended since 2000 (if possible indicate a minimum of three)

CONF. TITLE	ORGANIZER	LOCATION	YEAR

(4.10) Would you consider these conferences useful? If yes, why? (underline the right answer)

- *No*
- *Yes, because of:*
 - *networking opportunities*
 - *knowing more about SSR*
 - *exchange views with other colleagues*
 - *eat a lot, get to see new places*
 - *other:* _____

(3.11) Has fieldwork experience been instrumental to shape your views on SSR? If yes, please provide one or two examples.

5. A few more questions on SSR and the EU [3 questions]

(5.1) Which EU member states were, in your opinion, more actively and effectively involved in pushing forward the SSR agenda?

(5.2) What is your position vis-à-vis the EU approach to SSR?

- *what approach?*
- *favorable: The EU is becoming a major player in SSR*
- *against: the EU's approach to SSR stops at the declaratory level: implementation lags behind*
- *there is no "EU approach", only the Council and the Commission's engagement*
- *other: _____*

(5.3) What do you think is the main obstacle to the implementation of the EU approach to SSR?

END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

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Feedback is welcome: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk

Annex 3: Questionnaire CCM

Introduction

The aim of this questionnaire is to map the universe of the expertise and practice-based networks that have shaped the debate on Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), with specific focus on the European Union's approach. This mapping exercise constitutes a methodological tool for my Ph.D. thesis on the role of learning communities in fostering policy and institutional change in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Accordingly, the results of this study will be used for scientific purposes and information provided will be treated with the utmost confidentiality so as to guarantee the privacy of your data.

Although I understand you have a very busy schedule, I kindly ask you to be as precise as possible in your answers: the questionnaire has a total of 19 questions and it is designed in a way to require **less than 20 minutes** to fill out.

Comments, questions or attachments in support of your answers (i.e. working papers, resumes, official documents) are of course welcome and can be addressed via email to: giovanni.faleg@ceps.eu

Thank you very much for your time.

6. Personal information

Name:

Nationality:

Age:

Gender:

Native language:

7. Background information [4 questions]

(2.1) Which organization or institution you currently work for or are affiliated to?

INSTITUTION	WEBSITE
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(2.2) What type of organization is it? (underline the correct answer)

- *governmental*
- *international organization*
- *NGO*
- *business*
- *academia*
- *interest group*
- *lobby*
- *think-tank*
- *military*
- *other* _____

(2.3) Which of the following areas do you focus on? (underline the correct answers)

- *development*
- *security/defence*
- *human rights*
- *good governance*
- *democracy promotion*
- *post-conflict reconstruction*
- *peace-building*
- *migration*
- *police*
- *rule of law*
- *civilian administration*
- *civil protection*
- *monitoring*
- *humanitarian aid*
- *SSR/DDR*
- *mediation*
- *gender*
- *civil society*
- *training*
- *other* _____

(2.4) If different from the present one, what organization(s) or institution(s) were you working for / affiliated to between 1999 and 2006?

YEAR	FUNCTION	ORGANIZATION

8. Your views on CCM [2 questions]

(3.1) How would you define CCM?

(3.2) What do you think are, in general, the main problems related to CCM implementation?

9. Your engagement with CCM [10 questions]

(4.1) What type of professional output best characterizes your work in relation to CCM? (underline the correct answer)

- *direct involvement in policy-making*
- *operational (missions)*
- *consultancy*
- *research*
- *lobbying*
- *legislative activity*
- *diplomacy*
- *advocacy*
- *other:* _____

(4.2) What are or have been your main sources of funding for CCM-related projects? (underline the right answers. If not applicable, skip to question 4.3)

- *government budget (please specify below which ministries or agencies):*
- _____
- *corporate funding*
- *political funding*
- *parliamentary funding*
- *donations*
- *NGOs*
- *research schemes*
- *EU budget*
- *UN budget*
- *World Bank budget*
- *OECD budget*
- *other* *IOs*
- *budget:* _____
-

(4.3) How would you describe your role and influence in policy and decision-making in the field of CCM? Please feel free to provide examples and evidence of this.

(4.4) Please provide one or two examples of interaction with experts or practitioners that have significantly shaped your ideas or knowledge about CCM.

(4.5) When looking for expertise to carry out a work assignment on CCM, you tend to consult (underline the correct answers):

- *advisors or colleagues within my organizational unit or institution*
 - *people of my same ethnicity or nationality who I can speak to in my native language*
 - *people recommended by mutual friends or acquaintances*
 - *individuals met at thematic conferences, workshops etc.*
 - *random google search*
 - *my organization/institution takes care of providing the useful contacts at the right time*
 - *experts or professionals working in influential organizations/institutions, especially those that are linked to my employer*
 - *I seldom need expert advice: I know almost everything one needs to know and I use to provide, rather than seek expertise*
 - *policy-makers who have direct experience with the subject-matter*
 - *people with field experience*
 - *other*
-

(4.6) How many individuals you can reasonably define “experts” in the field of CCM are you regularly in touch with? Please provide up to 10 names and function.

NAME	FUNCTION	EMAIL

--	--	--

(4.7) Please list five individuals and organizations you consider as being most influential in shaping the CCM agenda, regardless of your interaction with them.

c) *Individuals*

NAME	FUNCTION	EMAIL

d) *Organizations*

NAME	COUNTRY (if applicable)

(4.8) Please list the main CCM-related conferences, workshops and meetings you have attended since 2000 (if possible indicate a minimum of three)

CONF. TITLE	ORGANIZER	LOCATION	YEAR

(4.9) Would you consider these conferences useful? If yes, why? (underline the right answer)

- No
- Yes, because of:
 - o networking opportunities
 - o knowing more about CCM
 - o exchange views with other colleagues
 - o eat a lot, get to see new places
 - o other: _____

(4.10) Has fieldwork experience been instrumental to shape your views on CCM? If yes, please provide one or two examples.

10. A few more questions on CCM and the EU [3 questions]

(5.1) Which EU member states were, in your opinion, more actively and effectively involved in pushing forward the CCM agenda?

(5.2) What is your position vis-à-vis the EU approach to CCM? (underline the right answer)

- *what approach?*
- *favorable: the EU is a major player in CCM*
- *against: the EU's approach to CCM stops at the declaratory level: implementation lags behind and fail to have a real impact on the ground*
- *other:* _____

(5.3) What do you think is the main obstacle to the effective implementation of the EU approach to CCM?

END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

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Feedback is welcome: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk

Annex 4: Cartoon



Cartoon from The New Yorker, Published April 19, 1969, "Poor things!"