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*“Global Governance De-Politicised:
Knowledge Networks, Scientisation and Anti-Policy”*

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1. *Introduction.*

‘Global Governance’ is a concept in constant construction and conception with alternate or overlapping terms such as ‘global social governance’ (Kaasch and Martens, 2015), ‘global administrative law’ (Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005) and ‘global policy’ (Stone and Ladi, 2015). From early discussions of the concept in the journal *Global Governance*, scholars have noted with frustration the ambiguity of the term (Finkelstein, 1995). Ambiguity is also an opportunity as it allows scholars to capture the fluid and rapidly evolving multi-actor character of global governance. Yet, ambiguity and lack of societal awareness of the processes and practices of global governance also contribute to its de-politicisation.

In this chapter, global governance is defined through a four-fold dispersion of power and authority: first, a horizontal inter-governmental policy cooperation between officials and political leaders of nation-states whereby sovereignty remains a core value; second, a vertical trans-governmental collaboration of national officials with international organisations and international civil servants; third a diagonal cooperation across the public sector in collaboration with private actors in global civil society, business, the professions and knowledge industries; and fourth, unilateral private initiatives to build global governance.

This four-part typology of the eco-system of global governance imposes an order that does not exist in a disordered reality of institutional initiatives and network innovations. Even so, the fragmented governance ecosystems that emerge do so both by design and by accident. The veritable diversity of policy instruments, practices and structures outlined in part 3 is reflective of creative collaborations to contain or control cross-border problems.

Yet, there is also a dual dynamic of de-politicisation. As discussed in part 4, civil society and publics can both ameliorate and contribute this dynamic. De-politicisation arises from lack of public comprehension of a bewildering array of disconnected governance architectures on the one hand, and from technocratic distancing tactics on the other practiced by international civil servants, government officials and various experts. The discussion of de-politicisation adheres to the following definition:

Depoliticisation is a process inextricably bound up with the practice of government and the management of populations; it is an act which is central to the functioning of contemporary governmental rationality and one which has become an important tool for the operation of new forms of power and regulation (Foster, Kerr and Byrne, 2014: 226).

At face value, many private modalities of global governance where government is not involved or is very much in the background are excluded from this definition. On the other hand, the quote opens analysis to new forms of globalised power and transnational regulation that abound in transnational spaces of global policy making. Hence, global governance offers new terrain for the analysis of de-politicisation.

In the next section, the chapter utilises the ‘principles, tactics and tools’ taxonomy of de-politicisation (Flinders and Buller, 2006). However, this chapter deviates from this approach in two respects. First, it enrolls an additional consideration – *scientisation* – in section 5. Second, it does not start inside the

Westphalian nation-state or put ‘politicians’ at the centre of de-politicisation tactics as has been the case with much of literature analysing national dynamics. Rather it puts politicians alongside equally powerful and decisive actors such as international civil servants, NGO executives and senior leadership of other non-state actors in business, philanthropy and academia who collaborate to “move to an indirect governing relationship” (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296)..

Finally, rather than ‘anti-politics’, the phrase ‘anti-policy’ is adopted. This reflects the analytical focus on the meso-level of global governance rather than the ‘high politics’ of summitry and diplomacy pursued by governments and international organisation. The discussion in section 6 also links anti-policy to ideas of technocracy and growing ranks of ‘experts’ who reconfigure their power in novel manner via transnational networks, global policy programs and trans-governmentalism (Legrand, 2015). The chapter concludes by recognising that the scientisation of global governance abets de-politicisation, but also recognises the dual dynamic of criticism, innovation and alternative (scientific) explanation and interpretation that comes through knowledge networks.

2. *De-politicisation*

As the Editors to this volume argue, new ‘fuzzy’ forms of governance obscure the explicitly political nature of decisions, thus making them appear more technocratic. Citizens become less engaged with public debate over those decisions. In global governance citizens and citizenship are anomalous categories. There is no category of ‘global citizen’ with rights and responsibilities in relation to ‘global government’. Instead, the *fragmentation* of global policy responsibilities via a proliferation of tools, instruments, ‘soft law’, standard-setting with sector specific regulation and partnerships cultivates disinterest among citizens and communities. This is compounded by the paucity of societal mechanisms for everyday citizens to map, monitor and measure the impacts on governance outcomes and processes. The ordinary citizen is at considerable cognitive distance from transnational policy making dynamics and faces high barriers in accessing the institutions of regional and global governance.

New political and policy elites have consolidated in the ecosystem of global governance and interact regularly with national political elites. These actors may often share the principle of de-politicisation – governing at a remove – but the mix of tactics and actors involved are composed differently. The *tactics* of de-politicisation are (i) institutional; (ii) rule-based; and (iii) preference-shaping

Institutional de-politicisation involves tactics of distancing and delegation of authority and implementation to other bodies by international organisations and governments. At the national level this has usually meant removing or restricting direct political involvement of politicians to so-called ‘arms-length bodies’; institutional tools such as quangos, non-departmental public bodies and agencies. At global and regional levels the mechanisms and instruments of de-politicisation for international organisations and governments, are new innovations of indirect governance such as ‘global public private partnerships’ (GPPPs) and transnational networks as well as informal international organisations like the Group of 20 (G20). These policy-making structures provide some operational flexibility, especially for quasi-public (or semi-private) bodies like GAVI (formerly known as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation) in financing and delivery of services.

Rule based de-politicisation builds in explicit rules into decision making that are as “neutral and universal as possible” for rules that discriminate in favour or against some states are likely to generate non-compliance with treaties or other multilateral agreements. In the case of global governance, it is less the case of legal and regulatory constraints that are ‘hard’ and often involve sanctions, and more the case of ‘soft law’. That is, voluntary standards, benchmarks, ‘best practice’ and other kinds of targets (Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte, 2012). For instance, the standard-setting roles of ISO (International Organisation of Standardisation) or the peer review processes of the OECD that both promote, through different tools, harmonisation and convergence. Likewise, the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) are a set of calculative practices that function as a ‘mentality of rule’ connecting populations and spaces to particular global social programmes aimed at transforming them (Ilcan and Phillips, 2010: 845).

De-politicisation through preference-shaping and agenda-setting in transnational policy venues speaks to the establishment of a ‘dominant rationality’ and non-decision-making dynamics that systematically delete certain problems or issues from public debate and policy consideration. Expertise is deployed to entrench a certain way of ‘seeing’ and defining problems, and the development of models and methodologies to ‘manage’ such problems. Additionally, the theories and concepts not only provide ‘cause-and-effect’ explanations of problems and their solutions for decision-makers but also deliver legitimation for the choice of tools such as GPPPs, networks and soft law. Adopted and broadcast by leading international organisations, the theory of ‘Global Public Goods’ is represented as a neutral and rational economic analysis of global public ‘bads’ (and thus made distinct from ‘ideological’ accounts of the evils of capitalism or neo-liberalism). This theory, amongst others, has provided intellectual ammunition for the mandate creep of international organisations into new fields of policy action. It also supports preference shaping for authorising their central role in global governance, as reflected in the manner in which they are now immediately recognisable by their acronyms – IMF, WHO, OECD, ISO, G20, etc (for a discussion see Brousseau, *et al*, 2012) .

Where these tactics might be directed centrally by politicians within the nation-state, in global governance there is far less synchronisation. Instead, the *fragmentation* of policy responsibilities among a plethora of global actors and institutions compounds de-politicisation. There is no sovereign order. Routes for transparency and accountability are split and truncated due in large part to the multiplicity of global and regional policy initiatives. The extensiveness of this fragmentation of transnational policy-making polities is important to keep in analytical sight as this is a chapter concerning de-politicised ‘global governance’ in its entire ambit. It is not a chapter about de-politicised global energy policy, or other global policy issues concerning health, environment, tobacco or transport.

‘*Scientisation*’ can be considered a fourth tactic of de-politicisation (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 313). Due to technological and scientific advances, most fields of governance have become highly complex requiring regular input and monitoring by highly trained professionals and scientific advisors. Reliance on expert consultation, evidence construction and technocratic deliberation in global and regional governance creates new cadres of transnational administrators, and institutes ‘knowledge’ organisations and their networks as governance institutions. Knowledge networks do not simply intersect GPPPs, international organisations and other structures of global governance to provide expertise. KNETs also constitute power. Rather than arguing that this fourth tactic of de-politicisation is an inherently ‘apolitical’ dynamic, or ‘post-political’ in the sense of completely foreclosing dissent (Flinders and Buller, 2008: 313; Darling, 2014), epistemic power is in constant contest. That is, there are challenges to dominant knowledge groups from competing epistemic communities as well as from norm based groups and networks in civil society providing alternative visions of policy and re-politicisation of neutral economic theory or policy orthodoxy.

3. Problems and Processes of Global Governance

Global governance has emerged with the complex interdependence of economies and societies as well as the attempts of states to cooperate to contain cross-border or transboundary policy problems. But both state and global actors are equally important in developing new tactics and tools to de-politicise global governance. De-politicisation in global governance involves ‘arena-shifting’ and delegation from the institutions of nation-state representative democracy (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 296). This is reflective of the birth of new ‘arenas’ of power, authority and decision-making beyond the nation-states. Yet, it is also symptomatic of a de-politicisation discourse that “seeks to portray certain issues as beyond the control of national politicians” (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 299). Many contemporary policy problems are transnational whereas governments – local and national – are bound by norms of Westphalian sovereignty and cartographic borders. Such state-bound notions of policy making give *national* political elites recourse to disown or deflect policy responsibilities that are global or regional.

The global governance literature is extensive and today it has diversified into sub-fields (such a global health governance or global environmental governance) and penetrates most social science disciplines. However, it emerged from the study of International Relations, and in particular, from growing scholarly dissatisfaction of viewing international organisations as the mere tools of state interests. A landmark publication – *Governing Without Government* (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) – not only highlighted the independent institutional agendas and policy powers of international organisations but also brought into consideration the neglected global governance roles of non-state actors such as in the ‘diagonal’ and ‘unilateral’ categories developed below.

‘Global governance’ has become a key term in the lexicon of international organisations. One established yet ‘depoliticised’ definition comes from the World Health Organization (WHO) which casts this process as “the way in which global affairs are managed (and as) there is no global government, global governance typically involves a range of actors including states, as well as regional and international organizations”.¹ The WHO is not exceptional. Similar neutral sounding definitions can be found on the web-sites of other international organisations. With the stress on ‘management’ of global problems, matters of power and authority as well as representation or accountability are often de-emphasised. Nevertheless, there is relatively broad agreement around this definition that this mode of governance, or management, includes a multiplicity of actors from business, civil society, expert communities alongside official actors as shared public-private governance and transnational administration.

De-politicisation of global governance is both an un-directed trend and a deliberate tactic of international organisations, governments and non-state actors. The de-politicisation comes with four-fold dispersion of policy making that distinguishes global governance from national modalities of governance that oscillates around core government departments and agencies. The first two are primarily tactics of institutional de-politicisation led by politicians and civil servants. The second set of tactics present a much greater role for non-state actors and for a gradual partial privatisation of policy:

Horizontal dispersion, through movement of policy issues and coordination to inter-governmental networks between government officials at the same level: that is, networks of legislators, judges and regulators who have cross-national counterparts. The Financial Stability Board of Finance Ministers attached to the G20 processes is a well-known case. Other examples include the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – an official network of financial regulators with responsibilities for money laundering, or the annual Four Countries Conference of chief executives of electoral agencies from Australia, NZ, Canada and the UK (Legrand, 2015). This is mostly an inter-governmental dynamic of information sharing that recognises the sovereign authority of state officials.

Vertical decentralisation, through trans-governmental networks of public sector officials or international civil servants where there is collaboration and attempts at multi-level policy coordination. CGIAR (the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) is possibly the oldest known GPPP and in which the World Bank has taken a central convening role and coordinates with donor governments as well as a world-wide network of scientific laboratories. There is a multiplication of such networks at the regional level. Within the European Union (EU) there is considerable density of regulatory networks in areas such as telecommunications, energy and data privacy (Eberlein and Newman, 2008). Within Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers, comprising representatives from each members’ labour department, has been tasked with negotiating a regional migrant workers’ rights framework and implementing this at the national level.

Diagonal delegation across the public-private divide, whereby government officials and international civil servants build partnerships with private sector actors. This can be global public private partnerships such as GAVI (previously known as the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation) bankrolled by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency

¹ <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story038/en/>

Initiative) and the Global Water Partnership. These ‘global public policy networks’ (sometimes called GPPPs) are quasi-public or semi-private. While PPPs and policy networks are very evident within national contexts, in global governance the de-politicisation is more extenuated in the absence of a central pole of (nation-state) power and clear lines of accountability.

Unilateral initiatives from the private sector and civil society. Partnerships of transnational administration can be contrasted with private regimes. For instance, the credit-rating agencies such as Moody’s and Fitch but also the ISO are different types of private actors that perform global roles of accreditation and co-ordination, respectively. Business sometimes acts unilaterally to deliver public goods and services. Private rule making – such as in global forestry stewardship – is well recognised (Chan and Pattberg, 2008). Business groups and other non-state actors often seek to shape and inform global policy agendas through preference shaping initiatives like those undertaken at the World Economic Forum in Davos or through other dialogue processes.

The quasi-public transnational policy communities that revolve around these four strategies of global governance constitute a global public sector or a discernible “global administrative space”, in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has broken down (Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005).² Yet, this ‘public sphere’ or ‘administrative space’ has a qualitatively different character to assumptions that prevail concerning sovereign states on matters of public authority and legitimate exercise of power. These de-politicised spaces are ‘distributed’ and ‘dispersed’ (Darling, 2014); that is, separated into functionally autonomous issue-specific sectors often with their own professional language and administrative rationalities.

Formal public actors in global governance – that is, international organisations and states – remain very important actors but in terms of financing, regulation and delivery of public goods and services they are inextricably reliant on private and civil society actors. The vast diversity of partnership arrangements have led another set of observers to describe the trend of private engagement in policy combined with some regulatory authority as ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). It has also meant that non-state actors can engage in the framing, definition, implementation and enforcement of these norms and rules (Brütsch and Lehmkuhl, 2007). It is a process of constant tinkering and adjustment of rules or standards. This tinkering creates opportunities for engagement in the ‘global administrative space’ for various expert and stakeholder groups.

However, global standards and best practices that may be adopted in bureaucratically mature OECD countries are less likely to be smoothly implemented in poor developing countries, or states in conflict, experiencing hampered policy capacity. Consequently, the pattern of implementation across countries is also highly uneven and contingent. Moreover, such states may be ‘rule-takers’ rather than ‘rule-makers’ or key contributors to debates about international best practice and global standards.

At the same time, there may be on-going shifts in the balance of power between different international organisations, and continual contests and ‘forum switching’ of global issues and responsibilities. For instance, global health issues are addressed by the WHO but increasingly also in a number of World Bank initiatives or via public-private partnerships like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In this mix of ‘official’ policy actors, the influential role of a private actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in shaping global health agendas cannot be ignored. Nor can it be overlooked the manner “in which first-world universities and their global health departments control the flow of resources for tropical disease control programs” (Harper and Parker, 2014: 202).

Examples from the global health field are indicative of de-politicisation in the gradual moves to indirect forms of governing mediated through private actors or autonomous institutions; that is, “of delegating responsibilities, (which) centre in particular on replacing – at least in part – politicians with experts, redefining political processes in technical terms and transferring tasks and responsibilities to

² See the program on ‘global administrative law’ at New York University School of Law: <http://www.iilj.org/gal/GALworkingdefinition.asp>

non-state actors, for example through the multiple forms of privatisation...” (my insertion, Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 277).

In other words, de-politicisation has been conceptualised as the passing of responsibility and accountability away from government (Burnham, 2001; Kuzemko, 2015). This is the case in global governance via four routes: First, when decision making and administrative authority is delegated to the public-private partnerships and private regimes of the global governance tools outlined above. Second, when market principles are introduced, or designed into, the administrative conduct of these entities. Third, when technocracy takes hold – scientisation – as discussed below. Fourth, when the deliberative space is shrunk as a consequence of high cost access for participation in multiple and usually remote policy forums.

4. *Global Civil Society*

De-politicised global governance is by no means an inevitable process. The empirical reality is that new and innovative governance arrangements have emerged to ameliorate transnational policy problems. These governance innovations and experiments may well presage new spheres of public action. These spaces are also public spheres where alter-globalisation resistances, subaltern governance contestation and unanticipated enactments of policy occur. For instance, the elite government-corporate dialogue of the World Economic Forum convened in Davos is corresponded by the so-called ‘other Davos’ of Porte Alegre and the World Social Forum. Accordingly, it is necessary to “view politicisation and depoliticisation as ‘multilevel’ concepts” (Wood, 2015: 1). Closure at one level may also entail a myriad of new opportunities and policy experimentation elsewhere.

In addition to the deliberative space being shrunk, it is also being comprehensively disaggregated. There is a considerable degree of fragmentation in the experimentation with global and regional governance instruments. This diversity is bewildering in itself. It is difficult for national citizenries and local communities to see a coherent and connected apparatus of governance, in large part, because there is no coherent apparatus or centre of power and authority. Transnational policy responsibilities are not only partly privatised but also delegated to sector specific transnational policy communities each with their own distinct policy languages, procedures and participants. In the absence of world government or sovereign authority and oversight, it “expands the sphere of market-like interactions and promotes individual and private choice including self-monitoring alongside or in place of public solutions and responsibilities” (Hansen, 2011: 255).

Global civil society has often been credited as a force working to (re-)politicize certain issues considered objects of technical regulation or monitoring by states or international institutions. Social movements provide alternative visions and critiques of the prevailing order, notably the ‘Occupy Movement’ regarding social and economic inequality. Crowd-sourcing has been a new technique – albeit an ‘ad hoc’ one – for resourcing resistances. The analytical discourse on ‘global public goods’ is an influential reformist paradigm for re-introducing ideas of public responsibility and international cooperation on shared policy problems.

NGOs, social movements, faith based organisations, and others are usually deemed to be located *outside* the “official” political system of governance providing alternatives “from below.” This entails several assumptions about the benign, progressive, critical or emancipatory character of global civil society. Anti-globalisation or alter-globalisation groups are an important source of counter-hegemonic discourses (deSousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). Yet, in certain circumstances, civil society actors can contribute to de-politicization when incorporated into UN processes or the activities of other international organisations or policy regimes, helping “to remove issues from fundamental political contention through participation in and functional contributions to global governance” (Jaeger, 2007: 258). ‘Observer status’ or consultative arrangements in many international fora can have a quietening effect, disciplining NGOs into more professional and less disruptive behaviours (Bracking, 2014). It also allows power holders to govern ‘through’ civil society. That is, “the role of nonstate actors in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions is not an instance

of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors but rather an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government” (Sending and Neumann, 2006: 651).

Global governance is thus performed through autonomous subjects such as philanthropic foundations, transnational networks of NGOs, expert communities and business associations being enrolled into the dominant rationality of partnership in global governance. This has been observed with regard to international financing of HIV-AIDS programs:

The considerable HIV/AIDS funding that Africa has received has been channelled to non-state actors, in effect placing much of the service delivery in the hands of transnational networks of private voluntary organisations rather than the African state. Local NGOs become drawn into these anti-politics webs of development as they implement the programmes of Western donors.” (Burkhardt *et al.*, 2013: 176).

The networked public-private global governance that works on cooperative relationships with ‘stakeholders’, NGOs and others puts ‘global civil society’ in a prime position for the de-politicization of global governance. Well-known elite and professionalised international NGOs such as Transparency International, Medecins Sans Frontieres or Oxfam or philanthropic bodies like Ford Foundation and the Open Societies Foundation network have cooperated and collaborated with both governments and international organisations (see *inter alia*, Roloefs, 2015; Stone, 2013). The involvement of key civil society groups “has political functions, such as signalling consent and ensuring the governability of the global population” (Jaeger, 2007: 259).

Likewise, scientists, specialist advisors and policy researchers can be enrolled in support of the prevailing order providing scholarly or scientific legitimation. Deferring to scientific expertise, or bureaucratic recognition of the need for independent technical and professional advice or oversight in the financing, delivery or evaluation of global and regional policy, is another tactic of de-politicisation. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the role of experts in de-politicisation of global governance but with a concern for their interplay in the re-politicisation of global governance where science is contested and scholarly authority often in competition.

5. *Knowledge Networks and Scientisation of Global Rule*

In his book, *The Anti Politics Machine*, James Ferguson develops a critique of the concept of ‘development’ which he viewed through the lens of failed attempts, of ‘development agencies’ aiding the so-called ‘Third World’ and in particular the World Bank development programs for Lesotho. He points to the consistent failure of these agencies to bring about economic stability, poverty alleviation and growth. Instead, the anti-politics machine uncompromisingly reduces poverty to a technical problem.

By the same token, ‘global governance’ can be understood as a set of discourses that generate particular forms of knowledge and causal definitions of global problems around which policy solutions and interventions are organised. It is in this context that experts play a critical role: ‘science’ or ‘causal knowledge’ is deployed to reduce conditions of ‘uncertainty’. That is, ‘wicked problems’ like climate change, poverty and pandemics. Uncertainty impinges on policymaking at both the level of ‘objective’ knowledge of problems as well as the interpretative nature of decision-makers’ cognition of that ‘knowledge-base. In an uncertain world of countless cross border problems, reassurance is sometimes found in ‘science’.

A dominant discourse of the past 20 years concerns the need to ‘bridge research and policy’ and utilise K4D (Knowledge for Development) as well as to measure, evaluate and report on the impacts of development interventions (Hout, 2012: 408). For example, in the terrain of global health, the Evidence to Policy initiative (E2Pi) aims to help narrow the gap between evidence synthesis and practical policymaking and is one among many other initiatives supporting the MDGs (Yamey and Feachem, 2011). This discourse is symptomatic of the wider evidence-based policy movement that

emerged in the OECD political economies towards the turn of the century. The lament of disconnect between evidence and policymaking has been recently reinvented in a new manifestation or policy discourse around ‘science diplomacy’. Common to each manifestation is a desire for improved knowledge utilisation in governance in order to generate better policy processes and outcomes.

There is now a substantial body of literature on the manner in which ‘experts’, and various forms of expertise, are argued to be central players in de-politicisation strategies in energy policy (Kuzemko, 2015), global health policy (Burkhardt *et al*, 2013); the Kyoto climate change regime (Huggins, 2015) or the calculative practices of the MDGs (Ilcan and Phillips, 2010). These are issue areas that (attempt to) displace deliberation from generalist political actors and the citizenry who are deemed to lack the capacity to make fully informed decisions due to the highly technical, complex or science-based character of the policy issue.

“Underlying depoliticisation strategies is, then, an inherent anti-politics, which seeks to preclude conflict and plurality. Politics is framed as inefficient and bureaucratic and de/politicisation as a panacea for it: ‘Politics is a pathogen; depoliticisation an antidote’” (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 277 quoting Hay, 2007).

And the antidote is concocted by scientists and administered by expert practitioners. Calls for K4D and evidence-based policy privilege experts and elevates policy deliberation to technocrats. The constraints on wider participation and deliberation are more pronounced in the ecosystem of global governance.

Experts enter, or are co-opted into, policy deliberations equipped with information and evidence, models and measures, theories and methodologies. Their tactical input to governance is legitimised by their professional accreditations, high-level educational qualifications or scientific recognition. However, rather than simply observing – monitoring and mapping problems and other phenomena – experts also enact and shape that reality. They are not simply tools to be used by international organisations, governments or GPPPs but exercise professional agency in their own right.

This is also a view of expert agency as “performance” where “expertise does not serve exclusively to *legitimize* practices, but may translate into material everyday practices through its embedding in socio-technical landscapes or networks” (Henriksen, 2013: 408). That is, models and metrics (such as the MDGs, or the Basle 4 proposed standard on capital reserves for banks, or ISO guidelines on how countries quantify their greenhouse gas emissions) become devices that structure individual and organisational behaviours as well as that of nation-states.

Central to expert power in global governance are knowledge networks (KNETs see Ilcan and Phillips, 2010; Stein, 2001; Stone, 2015). There are different conceptual labels for these networks – *inter alia*, epistemic communities, interpretative communities, discourse coalitions – yet, all these concepts share the idea that knowledge can have an independent force in policy-making. Not only do transnational KNETs create and transfer knowledge that is both ‘scientific’ and policy relevant, they are apparatus for “the necessary hardware and finances to support knowledge acquisition and implementation (Stein, 2001: 6–7). KNETs take varying forms. For example, the scholarly ‘networks of excellence’ funded by the European Commission differ on criteria of legal status, membership, degree of institutionalisation and issue focus when compared to more permanent global scientific entities like the Global Forum for Health Research or CGIAR which have long term funding and explicit policy missions.

As instruments of global governance, KNETs incorporate professional bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities that organise around a special subject matter or issue. Individual or institutional inclusion in such networks is based upon professional or official recognition of expertise such as commitment to certain journals, conferences or other gatherings and organs that help bestow scholarly and scientific credibility. KNETs are essential for the international spread of research results, scientific practice and what is deemed international ‘best practice’ on matters as varied as banking standards, immunisation schemes, sustainable fisheries or corporate social responsibility.

International organisations and other multilateral initiatives require policy analysis and research to support problem definition, outline policy solutions, monitor and evaluate existing policy as well as to provide scholarly legitimacy for policy development. In other words, knowledge is a key resource, and constitutive element, in global policy development.

Consequently, KNETs can be seen as a type of ‘governmentality’: “technologies of government are not simply mechanical devices; they are assemblages of forms of practical knowledge, with practices of calculation and types of authority and judgements... (Ilcan and Phillips, 2008: 713; see also Hansen and Tang Jensen, 2015: 370). One micro-example comes from an announcement on EBPDN – the Evidence Based Policy and Development Network – where member institutes and think tanks share experience regarding their policy initiatives and partnerships:

The Policy Lab® is pleased to be working on a project jointly run by the World Health Organization’s Knowledge Management and Sharing section and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), towards the end of using “evidence-based design” as an innovative method to better move knowledge to action in public health policymaking.

By no means unique, the Policy Lab is symptomatic of the specificities of collaborative problem solving processes in global governance. Other global governance ‘assemblages’ of socio-technical networks of private and public actors (or ‘policy sectors’ and ‘policy communities’ in the old-speak of policy studies) include the anti-corruption assemblage (Hansen and Teng-Jensen, 2015; also Hout, 2012) or the anti-drug policy community (Alimi, 2015) or senior economists working as consultants for development agencies and international organisations (see the essays in Mackenzie *et al*, 2007).

From this theoretical vantage, governance is regarded as a wider societal phenomenon that envelopes different kinds of expert communities. Governance is not contained within the architecture of the state (Walters, 2012: 11) or only within international organisations. In other words, practical knowledge is mobilised to govern a domain (such as banking or energy policy), but is also linked to theories, programmes and expertise that supply it with policy objectives and which can thus be viewed as an apparatus of rule. Recognising the tactics and techniques by which knowledge organisations seek to shape their own conduct (such as via peer review, rigorous methodologies and international rankings), or that of other groups or organisations, provides insight into the ‘forms of reason’ and ‘regimes of truth’ that operate within institutions and at specific historical junctures (Walters, 2012: 11).

Knowledge production is not divorced from the social and political worlds of the policy process. Whilst this point may be obvious, the social practices within KNETs give their product – policy plans, publications, analysis – a patina of scientific objectivity and technocratic neutrality. Sophisticated computer modelling, positive economic theories or scientific papers published in refereed professional journals create ‘communication codes’ that construct some knowledge as more persuasive or reliable. These codes are not only expensive to reproduce but difficult to access for the everyday citizen, becoming part of the mechanics of de-politicisation. For example, developing competence in the intricacies of Basle 3 concerning the global, voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing, and market liquidity risk requires significant personal investment in comprehending financial and economic theories of macroprudential regulation.

KNETs are one important manifestation of the ‘technologies’ of global governance, or instruments that centralise non-state actors in the problematization, management and monitoring of global issues. Anti-policies are a further set of tools of de-politicisation that help shape the preferences of political elites in states and international organisations, networks and GPPPs. Other tools and approaches could have been discussed – for instance, financial intermediation funds and other global architectures of public finance management (see Bracking, 2014) – but space constraints preclude an investigation in this chapter.

6. *Anti-Policy and De-Politicised Transnational Administration.*

The idea of anti-policy entails the “repression of ‘bad things’” (Hansen, 2011: 252; Walters, 2008: 267). That is, the ubiquity of discourses, measures and policies whose stated objectives is to combat or prevent bad things’ – ‘global public bads’ such as pollution, species annihilation, or volatility in financial markets. Uncertainty and ambiguity (which are not necessarily ‘bad’ but nonetheless a challenging reality) are to be ameliorated through robustness and resilience in the creation, management and enforcement of rules, better communication and brokerage of ‘sound’ evidence for policy, and the development of indices, scales and other professional measures to evaluate and manage ‘the problem’ and engage in surveillance and reporting. Policy design, public administration and policy evaluation is de-centered and situated outside politics as a neutral modality of governance.

As a concept, ‘anti-policy’ is not yet fixed. It is cognate to the macro-level ‘anti-politics’ concept but, when used, is generally applied at the meso-level of a specific policy sector or issue. It describes the proliferation of governmental policies that are against or opposed to a specific societal problem (Nyers, 2008: 333). Examples from the policy lexicon include anti-corruption, anti-terrorism, anti-poverty, anti-drug use, anti-crime, amongst other anti-policies that control populations. In short, ‘anti-policy’ can be considered one of the tactics of de-politicisation at meso-levels of global governance.

It focuses on the policies and strategies that name themselves explicitly as ‘anti-’, the kinds of legitimacy these might enjoy, the forms of resistance they might face and, not least, the productive processes such anti-policies can entail in terms of spurring socio-technical networks of people and objects around the problem to be governed. Anti-policies can mobilize particular professions, refine knowledge and provide the occasion for creating new institutions and technologies to address the undesirable things (Hansen and Tang-Jenson, 2015: 369).

Anti-policy is useful for lowering analytical gaze to the meso-level governance of specific global policy sectors in which GPPPs, KNETs and private regimes circulate to control a given policy problem. The idea of anti-policies also captures the degree of plurality and fragmentation in global governance. Yet, there continues to be a binary distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conduct or ‘efficient and effective’ policy versus perverse or politicised policy or ‘wicked problems’ that are irresolvable or intractable (for instance, poverty or addiction). Anti-policies draw lines that determine identities of subjects they are designed to govern and control as they “aim to separate and differentiate the population in the name of protecting it” (Nyers, 2008: 335).

Yet, between the ends of the spectrum there are a wide range of interpretative practices, deviations and adjustments that do not fit conveniently into categories of good or bad governance. Professional ecologies and scientific communities are not homogenous entities but are diverse in their approaches, theoretical inspirations and methods of inquiry. Consensus is often lacking. Anti-policy scholars have shown a propensity to focus on experts supporting or reinforcing neo-liberal governmentalities. Yet, questioning and contention is also the norm of knowledge communities, where debate and scientific dispute is of value and productive.

‘Anti-policy involves a will to technologise and transform an otherwise controversial subject into a domain of numbers and facts’ (Walters, 2008: 280) where scenario planning, foresight, regular review, planning, and manpower training prevail and help make decision makers and administrators ‘feel’ more assured or more in control. Anti-policy is a tactic – that can be rule based, institutional and/or scientised – of ‘placing at one remove the political character of decisionmaking’ (Burnham, 2001: 136). The desire is for a more ‘rational’ or ‘evidence-based’ or ‘targeted’ process of policy making where policy goals lead to projected policy outcomes. It is based on instruments such as rankings, benchmarking and league tables as well as other calculative devices.

Nonetheless, global anti-policies do not necessarily lead to de-politicisation. These policies can be approaches to create transparency and regularity so as to stabilise interpretation of the dimensions of transnational policy problems. There is a dual dynamic.

De-politicisation “is often characterised, misleadingly, as producing a contraction of both government and space within which politics is played out” (Foster and Kerr, 2014: 226) As suggested earlier, however, the multifarious modes of global governance are forging new policy spaces, a plurality of them, often with attendant public spheres drawn from different elements of national and global civil society. There are counter-processes of *politicisation*. For example, the ‘war on drugs’ regarding the trade in illegal substances and criminalisation of drug users has been contested by the alternative ‘harm reduction’ paradigm of policy thinking through the privately initiated Global Commission on Drugs (Alimi, 2015). In other words, there are “movements of issues between an arena of fate and necessity (the non-political), where nothing can be done (depoliticisation), to one of deliberation and contingency (the political), where action and change are possible (politicisation)” (for a full explanation see Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 278).

On the one hand, global governance represents a closure of spaces for substantive deliberation and the exclusion of participation given the elite venues where much global policy making takes place (Jaegar, 2007). On the other hand, the growth of global civil society, the promises of social media, the oppositional tendencies and sources of resistance to a uniformly neo-liberal globalisation depict conditions of choice and voice for various citizenries and communities. Through eco-labelling and the certification processes of bodies like the Forestry Stewardship Council, consumers can exercise some choice (Chan and Pattberg, 2008). That is, “global norms can be challenged and rendered contingent” (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 275). Or as noted elsewhere, “the question of resistance at the global level is not necessarily one of rejecting global frames of action, but of how to promote alternative frames of action that compete with market ones” (Henriksen, 2013: 409).

Alternatives are not only generated from outside transnational administrative spaces but also from inside. It is important not to forget that contestation can also come from inside decision making circles (Boswell and Corbett, 2015: 1402). The proliferation of GPPPs has involved ingenuity and innovation on the part of international civil servants, private donors and state officials in constructing these new institutions but also in seeking legitimacy via a discourse that they deliver ‘global public goods’. Experimentalist governance involves policy creativity in response to dissatisfaction with existing institutional arrangements.

But partnerships also generate problems. The multi-stakeholder character of GPPPs and their shared execution and financing responsibilities does not create a coherent edifice of bureaucratic efficiency. Instead, partnerships and networks are as often characterised by miscommunication and conflict. For example, the original vision of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was to become a simple financial instrument. However, the proliferation of partners required to sustain the Global Fund led to increasing bureaucratization and an undermining of the Fund’s own intentions. Today the Fund faces criticism that it has actually impeded resource distribution and grant-giving (Taylor and Harper, 2014).

Within scientific communities and KNETs there also are conflicting sources of analysis and discordant interpretations of global policy problems. No better example of this can be seen in the contestation that surrounds the expert deliberations of the IPCC and continuous re-politicisation of climate change issues. Likewise, there can also be situations of deliberately constructed uncertainty. For example, the manner in which conservative interests – such as lobbyists, conservative foundations (like the Koch or ExxonMobile Foundations) or right wing think tanks – fuel the climate denial movement and recalibrate problem definition towards increased uncertainty allowing for policy resistances or reversals. In other words, political interests use uncertainty, and amplify it, to re-politicise issues and pursue their own ends.

Without a doubt, KNETS are a scientisation tactic of global governance. They cross-cut and intersect with international organisations and trans-governmental networks, as well as GPPPs and private regimes. But they are composed of diverse sets of unruly and relatively autonomous actors who operate with their own interpretations of global realities and explanations of global uncertainties.

While de-politicisation of global governance may be reliant on scientisation, it is nevertheless multi-pronged. Turning a particular social practice like corruption, or environmental phenomena like pandemics and climate change, into a problem is hinged to socio-cultural perceptions of what counts as good or bad practices is not only created by theories like ‘global public goods/bads’, expert modelling or various scientific explanations. Tactics and specific institutional or regulatory tool – in the global governance case technologies like horizontal intergovernmental networks like the anti-money laundering regime of FATF; or the trans-governmental networks like the peer-review processes and best-practice guidelines convened by the OECD – operationalize the theories and interpretations.

De-politicisation cannot be conceptualised as “a stable endpoint, but an effect or outcome of policies or political strategies which can be challenged and reversed” (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014: 277). Just as it is valuable to side step away from the stark binaries of ‘global governance’ and ‘anti-globalization’ to recognise the pluralities of ‘alter-globalisations’, it is also worthwhile to step down to the meso-level of policy-making to make visible the professional negotiations and theoretical disputes within KNETs and GPPPs. As relatively new governance innovations, these network or partnership tools have also been vulnerable to funding fluctuations, fads and fashions in international institutions, and have been disbanded, merged or withered. Not all flourish. Their (potential) impermanency and informality in institutional design may well be another feature of de-politicisation.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to redirect attention from the macro-level of de-politicised global governance – where there is nonetheless considerable evidence of re-politicisation via cross-national resistances to austerity politics found in Occupy or the critical writing of Thomas Piketty as well as social movements like those that surround environmental activists and radical thinking of the anthropocene – to focus on meso-level anti-policy tools such as global public-private partnerships and knowledge networks. A future avenue for research and empirical work is to focus on the micro-level to uncover the effects of control technologies deployed by professionals based within the organisational settings of global programs, and to unravel their models, vocabularies and categories that determine the particular shape of financial allocations, reporting procedures and service delivery mechanisms.

In the diverse ecosystem of global governance, this chapter has focused on networks and partnerships as depoliticising tactics of global governance. GPPPs and KNETs emerged with dissatisfaction with the policy capacities of traditional institutions – states, inter-governmental organisations and multi-lateral agreements. As new governance institutions they are not only tools of de-politicisation that take the management of global problems to distant and technocratic administrative realms. As experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012), these networks also represent venues of creativity and innovation on the global governance landscape.

GPPPs and KNETS also represent new spheres of public activity, ripe for re-politicisation. These are not non-political spaces but are subject to a variety of disruptions from within as policies are performed or implemented in unexpected ways. These structures are also subject to occasional criticism from different logics of perception (Darling, 2015) manifest in local oppositions, global civil society resistances, or critiques from alternative professional and scientific networks. KNETs in particular, are not stable as ‘scientisation’ tools given the value of questioning, critical analysis and debate in scholarly and scientific communities.

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