THE IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL BACKLASH ON THE RISE OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL POPULISM:

The fear of ethnic disappearance

Cross-Country Study of Austria and Hungary

Master Thesis

Governance, Leadership and Democracy Studies

Lisbon, March 2021

Lara Maria Marques Cardoso (104518002)

Supervisor: Professor João Pereira Coutinho

The Catholic University of Portugal - Institute of Political Studies

In memory of my godfather.

Abstract

National Populists are winning seats around Europe and liberal democracy finds itself increasingly undermined. According to the report *Democracy in Crisis* (2020)[1], the number of countries that have suffered democratic setbacks surpasses the number having achieved gains in this realm. This dissertation for the MA Program in Governance, Leadership and Democracy Studies will reflect on how the cultural backlash is fueling white identity resentments through the fear of ethnic change. According to Kaufmann (2018), in order to understand the phenomenon of national populism, the issue of migration "is central and ethnic change is the story." (Kaufmann 2018,11).

According to Goodwin and Eatwell (2018) the national populist phenomenon reflects deep-rooted fears about immigration and hyper ethnic change (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,132). People feel instinctively negative about how immigration could threaten their national identity, and consequently lead to the destruction of the wider group identity, calling into question the future of the white majority (Taub 2016; Kaufmann 2018; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).

Keywords: national populism; hyper ethnic change; immigration; Whiteshift; demographic anxiety.

Word Count Dissertation (excluding footnotes): 25 251
Word Count Dissertation (including footnotes): 27 197
Word Count Abstract: 155

---

[1] Information retrieved from Freedom House's annual reports on Freedom in the World.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The increasing surge of national populist figures and parties throughout the past two decades is undermining liberal democracies around the world (Norris and Inglehart 2016; Fukuyama 2018; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018). According to the report *Democracy in Crisis* (2020)[2] the number of countries that have suffered democratic setbacks surpasses the number having achieved gains in this realm. Thinkers like Margaret Canovan (1995,1999, 2002) have shown how populism is an alternative form of democratic politics that will be with us for a long period of time. But what motivates people to support populist authoritarian movements?

There are two main competing explanations that try to theorize the emergence of this phenomenon: the cultural approach (Ignazi 1992, 2003; Inglehart; Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2019; Norris 2916, 2017) on one side, and the economic factors (Rodrik 2017, 2020; Guiso et al 2017; Autor et al 2016; Sandbu 2020; Klein and Pettis 2020) on the other. The economic approach explains populism as being a response to growing inequality and social exclusion, mobilized by the dispossessed. But how can we explain the rise of authoritarian leaders using an economic approach if national populism emerged long before the financial crisis of 2008? (Norris and Inglehart 2019)[3]

Therefore, to understand the rise of national populism, this study focused on tracing the deep roots of this phenomenon. The purpose of this thesis is to understand to what extent white identity politics is fueled by demographic anxiety, contributing to the rise of the right-wing populism in Europe.

---

[2] Information retrieved from Freedom House's annual reports on Freedom in the World.

[3] One study of seventeen democracies in Europe found that national populism experienced the majority of its growth before the financial crisis. Furthermore, it enjoyed its largest gains in countries that had escaped the worst effects of the crisis of 2008 (Stockemer 2016).

In fact, the major cause of the populist vote is the anxiety generated by the idea that pervasive cultural changes erode the cultural norms of one's nation.

According to Goodwin and Eatwell (2018,132) the national populist phenomenon reflects deep-rooted fears about immigration and hyper ethnic change. People feel instinctively negative about how immigration could threaten their national identity, and consequently lead to the destruction of the wider group identity, calling into question the future of the white majority (Taub 2016; Kaufmann 2018; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).

Research Question

Departing from the assumption that migration is a central issue to understand the rise of European national populism, not as an economic matter, but a cultural one, this work will analyze the trigger of immigration to comprehend how demographic anxiety is fueling the rise of right-wing populism, leading us to the following research question:

To what extent is white identity politics, fueled by demographic anxiety, contributing to the rise of European national populism?

Methodology

The present study is structured in two main parts: one descriptive and one analytical. After considering the existing literature that supports hypothesis (figure 1), we will further proceed with a content analysis (Berg 2012,338). This analysis will be based on a cross-country-study with micro level data on individual's opinions, aiming to qualitatively analyze the weight of ethnic and cultural motivations, through people's perceptions of immigrants (Krastev and Holmes 2019).

The work will take the cases of Hungary and Austria to sustain how the issue of immigration has more to do with people's fears of cultural destruction and demographic anxieties (Kaufmann 2019,343) rather than displeasure with lived reality (Mounk 2018,174).

The data used to conduct this study is gathered through the analysis of secondary sources[4]. As far as data on people's perception about immigration is concerned, this study uses data collected from Eurobarometer, European Social Survey (ESS), Worldometers, World bank and UN reports.

| H1	→	Concerns related with hyper ethnic change are at the forefront of the national populist surge
H2	→	The perceived threat of immigration as a result of Whiteshift's anxiety
H3	→	The ultimate goal of national populism is ethnocracy

Figure (1). Hypothesis

---

[4] Such as journal articles, textbooks, dissertations or critical reviews.

Figure (2). Conceptual Model

Choice of Countries

Considering the purpose of the present investigation, we strongly believe that it would be much more relevant to the study to perform a cross-country analysis. This study aims to specifically focus on the issue of immigration to validate the veracity of the submitted hypothesis (figure 1). This work aims to fully comprehend and examine the reality of countries where migration currently depicts a major issue on the social and economic scenes. According to information retrieved from Eurobarometer[5] (figure 3), in Europe, migration is perceived as one of the most compelling issues by at least 30% of the population of eleven European countries[6]. As an outcome, we selected the cases of Hungary and Austria (figure 4) to verify our hypothesis.

There are two main reasons that fundament our choice over these countries. Firstly, due to the Austro-Hungarian past.

---

[5] Note: Data from 2018. Source: Eurobarometer.

[6] Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, German, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Secondly, in virtue of our deep belief that it is incredibly much more fruitful and challenging to establish a comparison with a country such as Hungary, characterized by a strong anti-immigrant sentiment on the cultural level, yet presenting low levels of immigration, reflecting an opposite reality of the Austrian. Owing to this, it seems more enriching to include in the cross-country study a country like Hungary, rather than more common alternatives, like Sweden.

One may argue that comparing countries such as Austria and Hungary is not suitable due to the Hungarian past communist background. However, Hungary represents a unique case regarding the importance of migration. More than Austria, even with the absence of immigration, the anti-immigration sentiment is very strong and highly exploited by the populist radical right (Duncan 2010,350).

In the European case, and among much of the literature (Krastev 2019; Kaufmann 2018, Brubaker 2017), it has been common to argue that national populism differs in the East and in the West. However, research (Hjerm 2003) has shown that, despite the differences that both east and western countries hold, the classic distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism[7] should be reconsidered. The aim of this work is not to verify if the West is civic and the East is ethnic, but to what extent ethnicity issues are present in explaining national populist support.

---

[7] It is often claimed that there are two different types of nationalism in Europe – in the West and in the East. This distinction is to be found in Kohn's work (1945) which considered that Western nationalism was a by-product of the democratic creation of the modern-state, while the nationalism in the East was better explained as a struggle for cultural hegemony. Kohn's work was taken by Smith (1986,1991) with his classical division of civic and ethnic national identities and nationalism (Kaufmann 2019,4).

What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment? (MAX. 2 ANSWERS)
(11/2018)

Figure (3). Percentage of people considering immigration on the two most compelling issues among European Citizens

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[8]

What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment? (MAX. 2 ANSWERS) (11/2018)

Figure (4). Percentage of people in Hungary and Austria that consider immigration one of the two most compelling issues among European Citizens. Austria (light blue), Hungary (dark blue)

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[9]

1. National Populism

According to Krastev (2011,11), we now live in the "age of populism". In fact, throughout the past two decades the world has been witnessing an increasing surge of populist figures. This phenomenon has captured the attention of a wide range of social and political scientists, who seem to be concerned with its pace and spread. From Europe to the United States, to Latin America and Brazil, liberal democracies seem to be facing a huge challenge. This said, despite genuine concerns and efforts to acknowledge this subject, there seems to lack a coherent criterion to describe when and how political actors become populists (Bonikowsji and Gidron 2014,1603)[10].

To begin with, it is important to consider that populism can cover all the positions of the political spectrum and for this reason it is essential to be objective when specifying the notion of populism that is under consideration. This work will reflect on the notion of national populism, which is typically situated on the right side of the political spectrum. Furthermore, as populism can be understood as a political ideology (Mudde 2004), a discursive style (Hawkins 2009, 2010; Kazin 1995; Bonikowski and Gidron 2014) or as a political strategy (Acemogl and Egorov and Sonin 2011; Madrid 2008; Bonikowski and Gidron 2014), it appears to be relevant to begin by clarifying that this paper does not discuss the long debate on the nature of national populism as a political strategy or a discursive style.

---

[10] "There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?" (Ionescu and Gellner 1969, 1)

Despite not denying the scientific credibility of any other theories, for practical reasons, it intends to work with Cas Mudde's widely-known definition (2004,544). Defining populism has been a challenging task for scholars since, despite common evidence in this field; many authors find it increasingly difficult to agree on one fixed definition of populism. Most social and political scientists agree that national populism appeals to the people, but beyond this, there is little consensus. Furthermore, all politicians aim to call for the support of the people, but if it is true that there cannot be populism without speaking in name of the "whole", it is also true that this rhetoric is not enough to form solid conclusions. Also, common people, or citizens, find it truly hard to define the term and usually fall into misleading definitions that confuse right-wing populism with extreme right parties. The study of national populism has long been conducted by the normal pathology approach (Mudde 2010,1167-1186).

The normal pathology thesis refers to the belief that national populism is part of the anatomy of contemporary western democracies, and that it only gathers support under extreme conditions/circumstances. Cas Mudde (2010) considers this thesis unhelpful since the normal pathology thesis has many limitations due to only being focused on the demand-side. Hence, the author claims that national populism should not be considered a normal pathology but rather a pathology normalcy. That is, it is connected to mainstream parties and ideas and much in line with broadly shared mass attitudes and policy positions (Mudde 2010,1168). In fact, contrary to the views held by the normal pathology thesis, Mudde maintains that the main features of the national populist ideology – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – are not so distant from the mainstream ideologies and mass attitudes (Mudde 2010,1173-1175). Simply put, the pathological normalcy thesis does not entertain the idea that national populist parties are part of the mainstream contemporary democratic societies.

Instead, it argues that national populism is about the radicalization of mainstream views (Betz 2003,74-93; Minkenberg 2001,1-21). National populists do not hold a new ideology. They are, as Lucardie (2000,182) puts it, "purifiers" of what they consider to be an ideology that betrayed the masses and promoted elites' interests in detriment to normal people's welfares. Their political struggle is not about positions, but rather about issues (Mudde 2010,1179). Therefore, voters do not need to move to a new issue position, but instead their attention is drawn to a new issue, such as immigration. Moreover, a significant part of the population had already been sharing national populist positions, especially in relation to immigration, but mainstream political parties did not provide them with a channel to voice their concerns. The central point is that, traditionally, the issues that characterize national populism rhetoric - security, corruption, and immigration - have not been prominent in the political struggle (Mudde 2010,1179). Populist radical right parties do not focus primarily on socio-economic issues, as most traditional parties do, but rather on socio-cultural issues (Norris 2005; Mudde 2010, Goodwin and Eatwell 2018, Inglehart and Norris 2018).

1.1.   Defining Concepts

a) Defining National Populism

Regarding the notion of national populism, many authors agree on several features – the anti-elitism and the worship of the general will. For Cas Mudde (2010) populism is characterized by a set of ideas that divide two groups - the people and the corrupt elites. In his words it is a "thin-centered ideology" that considers society to be "ultimately separated in two homogenous and antagonist groups – the pure people vs the corrupt elite – and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, 543-545). By "thin-centered ideologies" he understands ideologies that do not deliver answers to all the key socio-political questions.

They can, therefore, be compatible with other developed political systems, such as liberalism or socialism. Another point is that, although populism can arise in other political systems, its features depend upon the socio-political context where the populist actor emerges (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012,9). Likewise, Krastev (2011) agrees in this conceptualization of national populism as a thin-centered ideology. He proceeds to argue that politics are the expression of the general will of the people and that social change is only possible through a radical change of the elite (2011,5-15). In line with Mudde's definition, Taguieff's (1995) proposes a different but complementary definition. To him, the polarized opposition between two groups – "us" and "them", in two different dimensions – vertical and horizontal, defines national populism. In the vertical dimension the antagonism is between "the people" and "the elite". On the other hand, in the horizontal dimension, he considers the opposition between insiders and outsiders. Insiders are understood as being "people like us", who were born in the country, share the way of life and cultural costumes, whereas outsiders are people (e.g., Muslim community) or institutions (e.g., European Union) that are threatening the way of life and the cultural customs (Taguieff 1995, 9-43).

For Müller (2016), on the other hand, in order to conceptualize the definition of populism, three features must be traced. Firstly, attempts to hijack the state apparatus; secondly, the rhetoric of corruption and mass clientelism; and finally, systemic efforts to suppress civil society (Müller 2016, 19-24). To Eatwell and Goodwin (2018,54-56) populism is an ideology based upon very deep and long-term currents that are characterized by three main features – 1. The prominence of the popular will; 2. The defense of the interests of plain and ordinary people; 3. The desire to replace corrupt elites.

Considering National Populism as a serious ideology, the authors argue - as does Cas Mudde (2004) - that national populism is a thin ideology based on the previously identified core values (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018,78-80). Likewise, Francis Fukuyama defines national populism through three main features. First of all, radical right parties usually pursue policies that are popular in the short term, but unsustainable in the long term. Secondly, their definition of "the people" does not include all the people, since they invoke only an ethnic or racial group that they consider to be the "real people". Finally, the third feature of national populism according to the author has to do with the cult of personality that leaders make around themselves, claiming that they alone represent the people (Fukuyama 2017).[11]

b) Populism and Nationalism

Regarding the relation between nationalism and populism, many authors agree that nationalism and populism are not necessarily the same but that they do often coincide. Half a century ago, populism was considered a "kind of nationalism" (Ionescu and Gellner 1969, 4). Moreover, the Latin American literature (Germani 1978), characterizes nationalism as representing an integral part of populism. However, this relationship is contested by some authors (Bonikowski and others 2018; De Cleen 2017; Stavrakakis 2017) that consider nationalism and populism to be independent phenomena. According to Ernest Gellner (1983, 1), nationalism is essentially a political principle that holds that "national unity and political unity must be congruent."

---

[11] Retrieved fom: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/09/the-populist-surge/ (last accessed September 2020).

He understands nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy that requires that ethnic boundaries do not cross political boundaries and that ethnic boundaries within the same state do not separate those in power from the rest of the population. Ernest Gellner argues that culture is main characteristic on which the formation of nationalism is based. To the author, culture is understood as a homogeneous element of a national community (Gellner 1983,11). He argues that culture traces the representation of a system of ideas, modes of behavior, and communication (Gellner 1983,50-51). Bonikowski (2018) argues that despite the two elements being distinct, they are both components of the radical right (Bonikowski 2018,5-7). Moreover, Goodwin and Eatwell (2018) also argue that despite being different, national populism often puts an emphasis on nationalism. Nationalism, as the authors claim, refers to the belief that one is part of a group that shares a common sense of history and identity. While national populism might put an emphasis on nationalism, there are substantial differences between the two. For instance, national populist leaders do not do try to isolate their country from the rest of the world and accept various forms of international links and obligations (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,67-80). Likewise, De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) contest that although both claim for "the people", they do it in very different ways: populism invokes the people as an underdog, nationalism invokes the people as the nation. Therefore, for the authors, they are different phenomenon despite the fact that they can complement each other (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 301-319). Kaufmann (2019,1), on the other hand, understands right-wing populist movements not in terms of nationalism, but instead as ethno-traditional nationalism. Meinecke (1908), Kohn (1944), and later Smith (1991) developed the definition of ethnic-nationalism. However, according to these authors, ethno-nationalism is understood within civic typology. Ethnic-Civic Nationalism defines national membership in terms of the territory and the rights and duties of citizenship.

They essentially argue that the circumstances of a nation's birth mark it for the rest of life; for example, nations that seceded from states, or nations that were unified smaller units in a larger state, had to define themselves in ethnic terms, not in institutional ones (Kaufmann 2019, 4-6). Kaufmann (2019) defends ethno-traditional nationalism, that is, when nationhood consists of the existence of a particular configuration of ethnic groups, commonly including an ethnic majority. The majority, is a central component of ethno-traditional nationalism. The ethnic majority orient themselves towards traditional symbolic elements, such as religion, language, and physical appearance (Kaufmann 2018,5). Although this work does not intend to deny the credits of other theoretical approaches, it will treat national populism as a matter of ethno-traditional nationalism. According to Eatwell and Goodwin (2018), this might be better explained through nativism. The latter is an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of a native group, and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening the homogeneous nation-state (Mudde 2019,24). In fact, populist ideas are often linked with an emphasis on values dating back to classical Greek democracy and based on Judeo-Christian tradition (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018, 132). Cas Mudde (2019) also considers this point. To him, one of the key features of right-wing populism is nativism – the combination between nationalism and xenophobia. This ideology posits that states, or in this case, the nation, should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group. Nativism promotes the interests of the native born over the interests of the others, i.e., the minority groups (Mudde 2019,193; Norris and Inglehart 2018,182). According to Cas Mudde even security has a nativist component, as foreigners are always perceived to be the central source of natives' insecurity. Security, for national populist leaders refers not only to individuals but also to collectives, namely the nation and the ethnic-majority group (Mudde 2019,33).

The issue of security, for populist right-wing leaders, is not just perceived as a matter of physical security. In fact, it is the coming together of many components such as culture and economics.

c) National Populism and Liberal Democracy

Liberal Democracy is a political system that combines popular sovereignty and majority rule with minority rights, rule of law, and separation of powers (Mudde 2019,193).

After the collapse of the Berlin Wall (1989) liberal democracies flourished in the world. It was thought that, by the time communism fell apart, the triumph of liberal democracy would be guaranteed. Thus, authors such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) considered that history as we knew it, had come to an end since the biggest opponent of liberal democracies dominance had collapsed.

However, time has shown not just Fukuyama, but all those whose visions were too optimistic, that new challenges for liberal democracies never cease to exist. The present conjuncture and the rise of national populism is one precise example of that. This said, despite the fact that academic debate entertains the idea that national populism threatens liberal democracy, there is as yet no clear consensus regarding the anti-democratic nature of this phenomenon. Some authors consider it anti-democratic, while others disagree with this assumption, presenting a different approach. Some social scientists believe that national populism can contribute as a corrective to the failures of liberal democracy, whilst others go even further to say that it represents a different form of more direct democracy, more akin to the ancient Greek notions of democracy. Pappas (2016,29-32) considers that populism is both illiberal (that is, anti-pluralist) and democratic. As Canovan (1995,6-8) puts it, populism is compatible with democracy in that it supports the expression of the general will.

What populism cannot be compatible with is the liberal face of democracy. Consequently, populism is both considered democratic and hostile to liberal democracy as it challenges our understanding of democracy.

Likewise, Goodwin and Eatwell (2018,25-29) do not consider national populism to be anti-democratic. According to them, populist leaders are looking for more direct forms of democracy in order to give more power to people and less to the established elites. Canovan (1999,2-16) goes further by defending that populism is an alternative form of democracy. According to the author, populism is an attempt to avoid, or at least to reduce the tensions that are intrinsic to liberal democracies. To Canovan (2002,38; 1995,8-14), populism emerges as a response to the fragility of democracy. She claims that national populism is not a result of the tensions that exist between liberalism and democracy, but between the two contrasting faces of democracy, which she nominates as "redemptive" and a "pragmatic"[12]. The author notices that, "redemptively" democracy promised to give people a voice and a road to participation, but "pragmatically" gave more voice to elites, whose values are somehow different from many of those they govern. Liberal democracy is thus considered an elitist system of institutions.[13] Therefore, the tensions between these two faces of democracy provide the impetus to the populist mobilization (Canovan 1999, 8-14).

---

[12] "The notion of popular power lies at the heart of the redemptive vision: the people are the only source of legitimate authority, and salvation is promised as and when they take charge of their own lives. But from a pragmatic point of view democracy is simply a form of government, a way of running what is always one particular polity amongst others in a complex world" (Canovan 1999,9).

[13] Canovan's theorical framework (1999) draws on the work of Oakeshott (1996). The latter author, used to claim that European politics had been marked, in the last five hundred years, by a tension between two contrasting approaches – "politics of faith" and "politics of skepticism". Canovan (1999) placed democracy within Oakeshott framework of two styles of politics – a "redemptive face" and a "pragmatic face" of democracy.

This relationship between right-wing populism and liberal democracy has also been discussed by Müller (2016,10) who enhances the debate about the conceptualization of national populism by considering it misleading to comprehend national populism as a corrective form of democracy. To him, one of the main features of national populism is precisely that fact that it is anti-pluralist. In the national populist rhetoric, citizens that do not support populist parties might not be considered as belonging to the people.

On the contrary, for Krastev[14] (2007) the new populism does not represent a challenge to democracy, in the sense that it threatens neither free elections nor majority rule. The rise of national populism, as argued by Krastev, is itself a by-product of the last wave of democratization. Therefore, populists should not be portrayed as anti-democratic. To him it would be a mistake to consider the rise of national populism as a victory for anti-democratic appeals. He does not consider that populists plan to introduce dictatorships, they only seem to be opposed to the representative nature of liberal democracies. Bonikowski, Kaufmann and Rooduijn (2018,5-9) argue that populism is not always a harmful force. In fact, Kaufmann (2018,8) argues that populism might have a role to play in revitalizing democracy. While Müller (2016,103) considers it misleading to think of national populism as a corrective form of democracy, Rooduijn (2018,9) considers precisely the opposite: that populism could offer a corrective to liberal democracy, as it has the potential to bring issues to the table, that might have been ignored by mainstream political parties. On the other hand, Halikiopoulou (2012, 2013; Bonikowski and others 2018:7) considers populism toxic for democracy. He suggests that the persistence on the general will of the people and the urgency they suggest in implementing their ideas are reminiscent of a number of dictatorial regimes (Bonikowski and others 2018,7).

---

[14] Retrieved from: https://www.eurozine.com/the-populist-moment/ (last accessed October 2020).

In fact, Mounk (2018,98) makes a point when he considers that a system where the will of people seems to overlap with the courts or bureaucrats can easily seem democratic in the short term. That said, in the long term, it could also pave the way for an autocrat to weaken democracy.

1.2.   Two contrasting approaches

The academic debate over the causes behind the increasing success of the radical right involves various discussions. Discussions regarding the nature of the drivers of national populism are usually tackled according to two competing approaches: the economic and the cultural.

The economic approach explains the rise of the radical right as a result of growing inequality and social exclusion. On the other hand, the cultural approach analyzes the support for national populist parties in light of the centrality of cultural diversity and value changes. Both theories have one element in common, the root cause of the phenomenon: globalization (Mudde 2019,101).

a) The economic approach

Rodrik (2017, 2019) argues that populism has emerged in the context of economic anxieties and distribution struggles that have been exacerbated by globalization. Basing his evidence on economic history and economic theory, the author believes that the advanced stages of globalization are at the forefront of the populist backlash. To him, the main problem advanced by globalization is the alleged unfairness of economic openness to the detriment of national citizens. Populist leaders usually exploit the fear of losing jobs by blaming external factors, such as immigrants. Rodrik (2017, 2019) argues that populism can only be defeated by financial de-liberation.

This means that the focus of globalization should be relocated where the net gains are likely to be more substantial, and the international community should rebalance the competences of global and national governance in favor of the latter. From the author's perspective, deglobalization is considered a prerequisite for long-term functioning of liberal democracies. While Rodrik (2017, 2019) considers that the globalization shocks are responsible for the demand of populism, Guiso and others (2017) consider that they alone cannot fully explain the European populist outbreak. They consider that the combination of external threats from globalization, including migration and the automatization or global market competition, is fueling the distrust of free market believers. This distrust in turn motivates people to consider both left and right mainstream parties ineffective, allowing for an abstention-based space in which populist agendas can act. Only the combination of multiple elements is able to produce sound explanations for the increasing populist vote.

Likewise, Yan Algan (2017,8) and others defend that rising unemployment and decreasing real income are strongly associated with an increase in anti-establishment voting. Moreover, the author's research shows evidence that decreasing real income was associated with an above-average effect on political participation in Southern and Eastern Europe. Guiso et al. (2017,40) affirm that "populism does not have a cultural cause, but rather an economic insecurity cause, with an important and traceable cultural channel" Contrary to Rodrik (2017; 2020) and Guiso and others (2017,7), Sandbu (2020,2-4) affirms that globalization is typically used as a scapegoat when attempting to explain the populist backlash, but that it is in fact technological changes and domestic economic policy choices, rather than economic openness that can account for this surge. In fact, large numbers of people in the West, who could previously expect decent earning and secure jobs, instead only have access to precarious employment.

Hence, this contributes to the rise of economic insecurity, and as Inglehart (2018) notices in his article "The Age of Insecurity", democracy only works as long as people feel their existence is safe. At the same time, economy provides other groups with more prosperity and richer opportunities than ever. Therefore, it is natural that those who are excluded from opportunities of prosperity, feel resentment and vote for populist parties. Sandbu (2020,2-4) considers populism to be a response to an economy and politics that benefit some people while blocking others from attaining prosperity.

Populists usually capture this discontent by invoking the idea that social and political liberalism has failed. There is a vast number of economists who have developed studies linking political support for populists to economic shocks. Autor and others (2016) carried out a study correlating Trump support with China trade shocks. According to the authors, china trade shocks might possibly be related with Trump's victory in 2016. Additionally, other empirical studies have correlated a higher penetration of China imports with the support for Brexit in the United Kingdom and the increase of far-right nationalist parties in continental Europe (Rodrik 2019). On the contrary, Matthew Klein and Michael Petties (2020) claim that there is no such thing as a global conflict between states, namely with EUA and China. What exists, indeed, is a global conflict between economic classes within countries.

In an essay[15] Inglehart (2018) reflects on how the problem is not the lack of the economic growth but rather its distribution. In America, the incomes of educated people such as professors, doctors and lawyer's flatlined, while CEO incomes rose sharply. Facchini and Mayda (2008), analyze the drivers of populism through a different but complementary perspective.

---

[15] Inglehart, R. (2018). The Age of Insecurity. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-04-16/age-insecurity (last accessed October 2020).

The authors explore individual attitudes towards populism-related issues, such as immigration. In this sense, they argue that economic drivers are the most important factors influencing citizen opinions towards immigration. To the authors, the main determinants of individual negative attitudes towards migrants are the effects that their arrival can produce on the economic conditions of the country, and namely on the job market (Facchini and Mayda 2008,4). While it might be true that economic factors play a part in the increasing rise of national populist parties, their relevance cannot explain why some Britons share the opinion that despite being conscious of the economic consequences their exit would produce; they would prefer it in order to defend their national identity.

b) The cultural approach

Authoritarian populist movements have been with us for 20 years, in times of both good and bad economic conditions. This is why political sociology that explores the evolution of conflicts on cultural values and identities, offers the most promising direction in which to theorize populist successes (Inglehart 1995,2-4).

John Inglehart (1977; 1990) was one of the first authors to notice that a deep-rooted process of value change was occurring, which was gradually transforming citizens' relationship with government. Over time, the debates that had traditionally dominated the political sphere, such as economic redistribution, jobs and taxation, began to change. As the West entered the last decades of the twentieth century, as well as the first decades of the 21st century, new concerns - which Inglehart (1990, 276) refers to as "New Politics" - were included in the agenda.

Inglehart's theory suggests that the lack of international wars and the growing economic prosperity, generated a move from materialist to postmaterialist values in the next generations, namely within the higher income classes (Inglehart 1990, 276-279).

According to Lipset (2001, 25), the western world had embraced a new political era with the emergence of the post-materialistic issues. That is, the prevailing importance of issues related to the environment, women's right, gender equality, equal status for minorities, greater democratization, etc. The rise of the new, prosperous and college-educated middle class pushed new values and priorities to the forefront of politics[16]. Baby Boomers were less worried about their basic economic and physical security and therefore were far more likely to adopt a different set of "post-material" values. This value change is what Inglehart calls the "Silent Revolution". This cultural shift in advanced industrial societies created a dividing line between those who held post-materialistic values and the older generations, who traditionally held materialistic values. The silent revolution soon produced a backlash among those who didn't share the same values. Therefore, this value-shift fueled the sudden rise of national populist leaders such as Jean Marie Le Pen. Those were already symptoms of an emerging divide in values between people. In fact, according to Piero Ignazi (1992, 25; 2003, 201), the 1980s and 1990s wave of radical right success was a by-product of the "Silent Counter-Revolution", that is, a cultural backlash against social value change and demographic shifts. Radical movements have been, since the 1960s, mostly about cultural politics. For Hofstadter (1964) cultural politics is about groups that want their cultural commitments to be prevalent, or mostly dominant. To this end, and for cultural practices to be accurately valued, social life has to be organized in a certain way.

---

[16] Many of these were new middle-class people that were born after the Second World War and therefore were raised in a completely different atmosphere than the older generations who were born and raised amid the Great Depression and the war.

According to Bonikowski (2017,205), the presence of a high variety of social changes produced a sense of collective anxiety, fueled by fear, among national ethnocultural majorities.

These threats lead people to feel resentment toward elites, immigrants, and ethnic, racial and religious minorities thereby producing latent attitudes and increasing the legitimacy of radical political campaigns that promise to return power and status to their supporters. This socio-cultural divide restructured political competition in Europe. Thus, the populist resurgence, it is argued here, points to deep-rooted cultural conflicts on collective identity and societal values within society. According to Norris and Inglehart (2016; 2019,9), the rise of national populism is consequently a reaction against a society that moved from class-based divide, to value-based divide. For this reason, the authors agree that authoritarian populism is better explained through a cultural backlash, acknowledging it as a by-product of the "Silent Revolution". Considering the given prominence of cultural motivations, Norris and Inglehart have been striving to show how economic factors are surprisingly weak predictors of populist support. In fact, according to one study carried out with data from 32 countries (ESS)[17], the strongest populist support comes from small proprietors, not from poorly paid workers. Furthermore, when considering economic variables, studies have shown that only 1 in 5 was a significant predictor of populist support. On the other hand, when considering cultural variables, tests have shown that 5 in 5 factors, such as anti-immigration attitude and authoritarian values, predicted support for these parties. [18]

---

[17] Source: European Social Survey. Cited in Norris and Inglehart.2016. Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. HKS Working Paper.

[18] When considering economic variables, studies have shown that only 1 in 5 was a significant predictor of populist support. On the other hand, when considering cultural variables, tests have shown that 5 in 5 factors, such as anti-immigration attitude and authoritarian values, predicted support for these parties (Norris 2016). Retrieved from:

Cultural motivations might explain why many Brexit voters wanted to leave the EU even though they were conscious of the fact that leaving would likely cause job loss and economic setbacks, or why Trump voters remain loyal even when the Trump administration threatens to cut social benefits that they themselves depend on. In fact, income has become a much weaker predictor of the public's political preferences, since the electorate shifted from a class-based polarization towards a value-based polarization (Norris and Inglehart 2019,182). Furthermore, for Fukuyama (2018, 21-29), questions of identity – language, ethnicity, religion and historical tradition – have increasingly displaced economic class as the defining characteristic of contemporary politics. The author argues that people's support for national populism might tend to expose economic demands, but these demands are interpreted in terms of a cultural loss. Likewise, according to Francesco Gottardi (2018,1) individuals are primarily concerned about the cultural impacts in one's life due to immigration, rather than because of economic means. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2018,132) similarly argue that national populism partly reflects deep-rooted fears about how a new era of immigration and hyper ethnic change could lead to the destruction of the wider group and way of life. Kaufmann (2018,216) claims that age, education, national identity and ethnicity are far more important than income or occupation. [19]

Taub (2016), likewise, comprehends the rise of national populist not only in the light of the cultural approach, but also as a white cultural backlash. The actual majority is expected to become part of a minority in 2050 (Kaufmann 2018,20).

---

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/ (last accessed October 2020).

[19] One comprehensive review of 100 studies looked at how people across the West think about immigrants and concluded that, while arguments focused on economic self-interest failed, people were far more anxious about the impacts of immigration on their nation's culture (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018).

It is expected that states that were ethnic and cultural homogenous in the past, will become more heterogenous states instead. For this reason, Kaufmann (2018) and Taub (2016), call for the primacy of cultural motivations when analyzing the rise of radical right. The fear of being outnumbered is deeply rooted in the National Populist surge.

1.3. Limitations of unilateral approaches

Some authors consider the academic debate over the hierarchy of populism drivers to be harmful. As Cas Mudde (2019, 101) notes, decades of academic research have been successful in delivering evidence that cultural motivations are much more important than economic explanations. In fact, there are few far right voters who are motivated only by economic issues, while there are many who are only expressing cultural motivations. However, in the light of what De Vries (2018) argues, the two approaches are much more complementary when they interact. She defends that the rise of national populist support is a consequence of a backlash against globalization, and for that reason, it combines both cultural and economic approaches. According to De Vries and Rodrik, globalization is a complex phenomenon that embraces various realms: economic, political, social and cultural. All these realms bring tensions, as Rodrik (2017) notices "globalization brings a trilemma for societies". Likewise, Fukuyama (2018, 5) claims that the socio-cultural translation of socio-economic concerns explains most of the support for radical right policies. According to Fukuyama in human behavior, economic motivations are linked to cultural motivations. In his words, "to be poor is to be invisible in the eyes of our fellows, and thus the indignity of invisibility is worse than the lack of resources" (Fukuyama 2018,103). That is why Goodwin and Eatwell (2018, 36-39) argue that these approaches should be analyzed together and not as competing approaches.

They argue that the binary debate is unhelpful when trying to understand the rise of national populism because it suggests that this phenomenon is not as complex as it actually is. Therefore, the authors suggest a more complete approach, which joins all realms of societal life: economic, political, social, cultural and demographic. They consider that national populism is driven by four deep-rooted societal changes, where, despite giving prominence to cultural issues, they do not refuse to accept that deprivation takes a part in explaining the greater picture. Therefore, although this dissertation will mainly be focusing on cultural issues, it would be misleading to ignore the credibility of economic events as a part of this phenomenon.

1.4.   National Populism and Hyper Ethnic Change

According to the previous referred literature (2.1;2.2;2.3), the New Politics (Inglehart 1990,276) opened an era of new concerns, but also uncovered resentments and deep-rooted fears. The phenomenon of national populism can, in fact, be explained by several factors and various conditions – either External, in case of the mass flow of immigration; or Internal in the case of economic crisis, distrust of politicians, etc. However, cultural motivations can to a large extent account for these feelings of resentment. As was noted above, national populism reflects deep-rooted fears about how a new era of immigration and hyper ethnic change could lead to the destruction of the wider group. As far as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt can tell, there is no example in history of a successful multi-racial democracy where the majority group has become a minority (2018,170). These changes are fruit of several societal and demographic changes that have produced completely different values of living. Meanwhile, both citizens and governments are wrestling to come to the terms with this new era of mass immigration and ethnic change.

It is unsettling traditional norms, values and ways of life and is stoking a backlash from citizens who see it as a demographic and cultural risk. When Noah Yuval Harari (2011,180) wrote that nationalism was losing ground, because people are increasingly more likely to believe that all of humankind is the actual legitimate source of political authority, he missed a point. Despite tolerant youth replacing old and less tolerant citizens, many people still feel committed to their nation state. According to Goodwin and Eatwell (2018) there are good reasons to believe that citizens' attachment to the nation state will remain strong in the coming years. What people feel instinctively negative about, is how their nations are changing not only culturally but also demographically. This challenges the approach that, in order to overcome resentments and, as a consequence, national populism itself, all governments need to do is to create jobs (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,9-16). Taub (2016) links the national populist surge with the crisis of the whiteness, or, as Kaufmann (2018, 10-11) puts it, the whiteshift. Whiteness as they define it is the sense of membership in an ethnonational majority. According to Taub (2016), "Whiteness is the privilege of not being defined as the 'other'". It means being part of a group whereas the traditions and values, often based on the Judeo-Christian tradition, are the norm. Also, for Taub (2016), the support for populist leaders and anti-immigration policies might be explained not by the amount of racial or ethnic diversity in a community, but rather by the pace of change. As Krastev (2020,68) noted, the hyper ethnic change will strengthen the idea of ethnic disappearance, which might become a major force of the future, and populist parties promise to stop it. National Populists tend to view their national community from a more restricted perspective highlighting the importance of ethnic ancestry. That is, shared customs and values which can be forged in "melting pots". The preservation of these customs is only possible as long as those communities still exist.

Therefore, the fear of being outnumbered, as Krastev (2020, 67) puts it, is deeply rooted in politics. This fear is particularly relevant in democratic systems, because it means being outvoted. What matters the most is to be the majority or part of it, and the actual majority is expected to become part of the minority in 2050. That is why Bryan Turner (2019,1-8) argues that populism and the crisis of democracy cannot be understood without an examination of the demographic transformation of modern societies. Kaufmann (2018,20) argues that anxiety not only about immigration, but also about population implosion, is at the heart of right-wing populism. National populists, by fearing ethnic groups to be dying, place the blame on liberal culture. The preservation of the ethnic state is, therefore, at the center of illiberal policies. Consequently, there is a correlative relationship between hyper ethnic change and the emergence of populism, which exacerbates the need to approach demography as an important issue in the study of national populism.

2. Demographic Anxiety[20]

Many societies - e.g., Britain, Germany, Hungary, Poland, etc. - are now facing a demographic crisis. It is argued in this work that these crises have strong repercussions on the health of liberal democracies (Turner 2019) and on the rise of right-wing populist parties (Turner 2019). This chapter aims to present the complex picture of the interactions between liberal democracy, demographic change and national populism. For Kaufmann and Monica Toft (2012,3) demography must be considered one of the major drivers of politics.

---

[20] "If demography matters for war, it matters just as much in shaping politics in peace" (Kaufmann and Toft 2012,1).

These authors argue that political scientists cannot afford to use demographic evidence in misleading ways when they are seeking to comprehend patterns of political identities and change. Jack Goldstone (2012,10) claims that the next four decades will bring about tremendous shifts in the long-term demographic trends and therefore, political effects might arise from growing demographic disparities.[21] In fact, shifts in population composition can affect who wins and who loses in political battles, leading to party realignments (Krastev 2020,67). Demography is not a new subject for political theorists, what is new are the terms in which this relation is now characterized and thought.

Weiner (2001,11-12) understands political demography as the field devoted to studying the population size, composition, and distribution in relation to politics. The focus of this field are the political consequences of population change and namely, the effects of those changes in demands upon governments. Political demography is therefore concerned with population indicators – such as fertility, mortality, and migration rates – but also with the comprehensive study of the attitudes that people, and also governments, have towards population issues. According to Weiner (2001,11-12), in political demography the core population characteristics can play an essential part in helping to analyze themes like elections, economic convergence, social security, political development, etc. There are key elements of population change that are straightforward. That is, people enter or leave populations by three ways: births, deaths and net migrants (immigrants minus emigrants) (Goldstone 2012,12-14). Demography has always been discussed in Malthusian terms[22], but today, demography is not understood in these terms.

---

[21] Each form of demographic disparity is associated with distinct political dilemmas: different ethno-religion populations, for instance, may set the stage for ethnic, religious and nationalist violence, value conflict or challenge the unity of states (Coleman 2012, Orgad 2015).

[22] That is, the idea that the population growth was exponential, while the growth of resources and food supply was linear, leading to chaos, war and socio-political instability (Malthus 1798).

In fact, the picture is dramatically different (Coleman 2012; Kaufmann 2018, 2020; Krastev 2020). David Coleman proposes the emergence of a third demographic transition characterized by the reconfiguration of the culture, identity and power of a state/nation, due to differences between demographically native populations and youthful immigrants (Kaufmann, Coleman and Toft 2012, 176) The author suggests that nowadays Europe's ethno-demographic changes are raising questions around identity. As Orgad (2015,24) notices, low fertility rates among citizens with European ancestry and huge flows of mass migration, are creating huge demographic changes across the western world. In the European Union, projections suggest that over a quarter of the population in many member-states will have non-European ancestry by 2051 (Kaufmann 2019; Krastev 2020)[23].

According to Krastev (2020,67-68), numbers are unpredictably relevant in demography, because "when numbers change, power changes hands". Considering the logic of liberal democracy, power changes hands when people change their vote intention. But power can also shift when population itself changes (Krastev 2002,67; Coleman 2012,176-194). Inglehart (1977) explains this change with a value-change theory, Norris and Inglehart (2018) explain this change with the new electorate – young and liberal citizens. But this shift might also be explained by demographic population changes (Kaufmann 2018; Kaufmann 2019; Krastev 2020). In fact, demographic changes have been one of the most important vehicles of social change. Krastev (2020) claims that the fear of being outnumbered is deeply rooted in politics and, consequently in political behavior.

---

[23] Current ethnic majorities in Austria, Belgium and Germany are predicted to have become minorities by the middle of the 21st century (Orgad 2015).

In democratic societies this is quite relevant, because "being outnumbered can also mean being outvoted" (Krastev 2020,67). Kaufmann (2018) sees the future of white majority as an important issue when explaining today's political trends. According to estimated numbers (Coleman 2012; Orgad 2015; Kaufmann 2018; Krastev 2020), white majorities might face a significant reconfiguration in the future years, threatening to become part of the minority. The future of European liberal democracies might thus be defined by the way in which those ethno-cultural majorities will try to preserve their identity in the face of population decline. Although Orgad (2015,51-52) admits that the western population is in decline, he also argues that many of the assumptions over demographic decline, especially those coming from public opinion, are exaggerated. In fact, according to the author, some fears related with ethnic and religious immigrant groups have weak ties with reality. Likewise, Kaufmann (2018,17) argues that majority groups still hold increasing fears about non-European immigrant groups, which they consider likely to be part of the majority in the future. Demographic trends are difficult to predict in a precise manner, and to add to the complexity, there is also the possibility of an immigration trade-off. In other words, just as immigration can continue to increase, it can also go down in response to governmental restrictive measures. Moreover, there is also the case for a European demographic recovery. Despite the latter possibilities, indicators and studies estimate that the scenario most likely to occur is the continued increase of immigration flows and the continued decrease of fertility rates (UN 2000; Coleman 2012; Kaufmann 2019; Krastev 2020).

2.1 Defining Concept

a) Demographic Anxiety

Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1994) defines demographic anxiety as "demographic bulimia". With this definition the author refers to the increasing adherence of two opposing ideas about population: on one side, the consideration that the world is hugely full; on the other, the assumption that there are not enough Europeans. In other words, Europeans see their share of global population dropping, while non-Europeans have arrived to Europe in large numbers. Enzensberger characterizes this phenomenon as a hidden panic triggered by the fear that too few of us and too many of them could simultaneously exist in the same territory (Enzensberger 1994,117). While European life expectancies continue to increase, fertility rates remain below replacement levels. Furthermore, for Krastev (2020), demographic anxiety is explained by the fear felt by a majority-group at the thought of becoming part of the minority. Kaufmann (2018) conceptualizes this fear with a different term but a similar approach. According to him, the demographic anxiety is a by-productct of the Whiteshift (Kaufmann 2018,15). This term is related with two interconnected topics: white ethnic majorities and white tradition of national identity (Kaufmann 2018, 6). It conceptualizes the decline of the white-share of population in western countries. Being white, speaking the nation's language without a foreign accent, and being Christian or Judeo-Christian are the marks that define white majorities to the detriment of minorities (Kaufmann 2018; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018). The decline in numbers of white people that share a language and Judeo-Christian values is, therefore, what the term Whiteshift aims to explore. For Kaufmann (2018;2019) the reason behind demographic anxieties also lies in rapid ethnic change. Hyper ethnic change (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,132) is a by-product of the increasing flow of immigrants who have been arriving in Europe.

The mass inflow of migrants combined with European low-fertility rates fuels the changes in the ethnic composition of European societies. Likewise, Taub (2016) also relates fears and anxieties about demography with the white majority decline – whiteness. Whiteness is more than a defining skin color; it concerns the membership of the ethno-national majority. In other words, it means being part of a group that shares traditions, appearance, values and ways of life. All in all, it is about being a person who is part of "us" - the majority -and not part of "them" - the minority. It is the privilege of not being defined as a stranger. Moreover, Liav Orgad (2015,28) defines this fear of being outnumbered as "demographobia". Regarding the issue of demographic anxiety, the author considers six different sorts of anxiety[24]. As argued in his book[25] the causes of demographic anxiety are often multiple, rather than just a single one. Regarding the author's notion about anxieties related to culture, he argues that majorities might seek to keep out migrants which are seen as a threat to the liberal culture - liberal values and institutions, national culture, such as language, national symbols - or the popular culture, such as social mores. Orgad (2015,52) considers that in many cases demographic anxieties are a by-product of a misleading reality and a sort of public hysteria that does not correspond to the reality. However, when analyzing the case of Europe, the author suggests that, despite some exaggerated descriptions and false conclusions, Europe's cultural challenge is not a myth.

---

[24] Firstly, related to national security, where majorities might feel that migrants constitute a security risk; Secondly, concerning economy, where migrants may be regarded to overload the welfare system; Thirdly, related to community cohesion and civic participation, where migrants are likely to be seen as a negative contribute to the healthy functioning of democratic society. The last two sorts of anxiety are concerned with population density and culture:majorities may feel that migrants are likely to constitute a risk due to their natural population growth, threatening, therefore, the national culture of the country.

[25] The Cultural Defense of Nations (2015).

The European populations are in decline and western lifestyle and values are being transformed. In almost all western countries, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), that is, the number of children that a woman has during her lifetime - has dropped below the replacement rate of 2.1, which is the rate required for demographic stability. At the same time, this demographic decline is accompanied by a change in values and lifestyles, which are now much more liberal and secular than they were before (Inglehart 1977; Norris 2015; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2018; Orgad 2015). Particularly in Europe, migrants and native Europeans usually embrace contrasting lifestyles and values (Orgad 2015,69).

b) White Identity [26]

Identity is defined by academics as falling into two main categories: "achieved" – derived from personal effort, and "ascribed" – derived from inborn categories (Taub 2016). People tend to associate themselves with the category that offers most social privileges[27]. But as many scholarly articles show (Sanbu 2020; Klein and Petties 2020), the gap between those who are offered opportunities and the ones that seem to have been shut off from prosperity is greatly growing, and as a result more and more people are gaining self-esteem from a communal identity, such as ethnicity, rather than an achieved identity. Ethnic groups are communities that believe they are descended from the same ancestors and distinguish themselves from others through cultural markers (Taub 2016).

---

[26] "An identity is questioned only when it is menaced, as when the mighty begin to fall, or when the wretched begin to rise, or when the stranger enters the gates, never, thereafter, to be a stranger: the stranger's presence making you the stranger, less to the stranger than to yourself" (Baldwin 1976, 61).

[27] For instance, a successful CEO tends to identify himself, primarily through his career, rather than his ethnic-group.

When we consider the term identity, we are looking at the psychological sense of attachment to a group. This sense can provide a relevant cognitive structure through which individuals interact and participate in the political and social world (Jardina 2014,26). Nowadays, the anxiety felt by whites to protect the values and interests of their groups plays an important role in explaining the present political and social issues. Therefore, comprehending white identity politics seems to be extremely helpful in understanding how white identity politics can actually influence political phenomena such as national populism. Membership and identification with socio-demographic groups influence citizen's political beliefs (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). As Jardina argues, the sense of group deprivation in detriment to others, can strongly influence political behavior (Jardina 2019,39). Likewise, Breznau's (2017) research work shows that the intensification of group boundaries is a defense mechanism built on the belief that a group will only prosper if other groups are relegated.

Erick Knowles and Linda Tropp (2016) claim that ethnic change tends to emphasize people's sense of white identity. One of the arguments of this work is that Whites feel that their existence, as a majority-group, is being threatened due to, on one hand, the demographic decline, and, on the other hand, mass inflows of migrants. Therefore, this anxiety is rooted in the desire of restoring their dominance, as a group. Without being exhaustive, we will summarize the main approaches of inter-groups relations that seem to conceptualize how groups react and interact with one another. Despite a wide range of conceptual frameworks and theories, there are two main approaches that can be adopted when explaining inter-groups relations. Firstly, there is the intergroups hostility, that can be oriented by individual attitudes.

Those attitudes are learnt or adopted through socialization. Out-group hostility is therefore a by-product of individual-level attitudes[28]. The second approach refers precisely to the opposite. In fact, group categories, interests, and identities might also explain intergroup relations. In this case, attitudes are determined by individuals that automatically categorize themselves and others into groups[29].

One of the foundational theories under this approach is the social identity theory (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979), which claims that individuals often base their perceptions on their membership in groups. In other words, when individuals feel that their group is not only distinct, but also positively distinct from other groups, their self-image as a group member sharpens. Whites, as the group majority, feel that their dominance is threatened (Kaufmann 2018, Krastev 2020) and there is strong evidence that a perceived threat to group status might promote collective action among the group. The framework of intergroups theories has not paid much attention to the behavior of dominant groups (Jardina 2019,35).

In fact, dominant groups are often taken for granted or ignored (Doane 1997,391). This is probably because Whites have always been seen as the dominant group; until recently there were no empirical studies about this group's behavior. Indeed, identities become relevant when the dominant group feels threatened and acts to defend its position – culturally, politically, or ideologically (Jardina 2019,5).

Fears felt by a group faced with the loss of their dominance can, therefore, make them salient and strengthen their identity.

---

[28] This approach does not agree that individual behaviors are driven by group identities, interests or status.

[29] This means that people immediately assign individuals to social groups, based on characteristics such as age, gender, race, and so on.

In fact, as Jardina (2014,67) shows across many surveys, the share of Whites who defend that White identity is "very" or "moderately" important almost doubled from the 1990s to the 2010s. In fact, as ethnic majorities seem to decline in the West, White identities seem likely to become more salient.

As Cas Mudde argues, the radical right rhetoric "us" versus "them", can change over time. That is, just as in the post 9/11 Turks and Moroccans in German were reduced to being Muslims, radical right parties also redefined "us" more in terms of white ethnic-majorities or in terms of Judeo-Christian Civilization[30] (Mudde 2019,78-80).

As described above, academic debates about majority-groups and white-majorities are a very recent upgrade. The same is true for the political and public debate.

Until very recently political leaders did not seem to express much concern about the future of white-majorities, but national populist do express these concerns. For Whites, challenges to their dominance might appear in diverse forms. Demographic changes in the composition of the nation and the large flux of immigrants who do not assimilate and import new customs and cultures are potentially felt as a threat to the white-majority. These fears, either real or exaggerated (Orgad 2015,7) orient individuals towards political solutions that address their anxieties, having, therefore, an impact on their voting behavior (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2016; Kaufmann 2018; Krastev 2020). As Jardina (2019,57) claims, a threat can politicize a group's identity. Likewise, Amanda Taub (2016) argues that White identity politics have been left without a vocabulary. Their *language* only existed in the context of white supremacy, but since it became censured by the politically correct rhetoric, white identity politics had little to say.

---

[30] For instance, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) appeared in 1950s as a Greater German Party, rejecting the emergence of the Austrian nation and claiming that was part of the German nation. But in the 1980s, in an attempt to adapt to the context of the moment, the FPO redefined itself as the party for Austrian patriots (Mudde 2019).

There is therefore no acceptable way to expose what Whites perceive as a crisis without being considered racist (Taub 2016; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,101).

2.2. The role of immigration

When immigrants arrive in a country, they not only bring human capital. They also bring their moral codes, values and traditions (Collier 2012,76). Right-wing populist parties vary from country to country, but they all share hostility towards immigration, as well as nativist appeals and cultural protectionism. As Ivarsflaten (2005,32) notices, among all the populist parties, the most successful were the ones who supported and voiced the immigration issue. Likewise, Betz (1994,81) argued that "the emergence and rise of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe coincided with the growing tide of immigrants (…) This has made it relatively easy for the radical populist Right to evoke pre-existing xenophobic sentiments for political gain." Among the European Union countries, public concerns about immigration used to be lower than worries about other issues, such as unemployment. However, the importance of the immigration issue rose increasingly in Europe, matching levels of concern about unemployment (fig. 5).

European Union

Figure (5). Public Concern about Unemployment and immigration, EU 2007-2017

Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer[31]

Authors studying immigration agree that the issue has proven to be the perfect scapegoat for national populist parties to capture voter discontentment and socio-cultural anxieties (Betz, Immerfall 1998) (fig.5). Regarding the relationship between immigration and the appeal to vote for the radical right, the literature holds three main theories: the ethnic competition theory (Rydgren 2007), the contact theory (Husbands 2002; Allport 1954; Byman 1998/1999; Brown and Lopez 2001) and the defended neighborhood theory (Green and others 1998,374).

The ethnic competition theory predicts that individuals will vote for radical right-wing parties when the percentage of immigrants is higher in a certain geographic area (Rydgren 2007). In light of this theory, the supporters of radical right-wing parties base their motivations on ethnic group competition for issues such as cultural hegemony and public resources or social welfare (Rydgren 2007,10).

---

[31] Retrieved from: Norris and Inglehart. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press, p.184; European Comission, Eurobarometer:
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/42/groupKy/208
(last accessed October 2020).

On the other hand, the contact theory (Husbands 2002; Allport 1954; Byman 1998/1999; Brown and Lopez 2001) predicts that more immigrants in a geographical unit, would signify a decrease in the radical-right vote. This theory bases its arguments on the premise that as long as individuals begin interacting, mutual stereotypes are likely to erode, leading to integration and better relations between natives and immigrants. This theory could serve to explain the high anti-immigration sentiment in countries with low-immigration. The third theory suggests that the increasing share of the populist vote is a result, not of the changes in the proportion of immigrants, but of the speed at which these shifts occur. In other words, the rapid influx of ethnically different migrants in a homogenous region would be likely to increase the national populist vote intention (Green and others 1998,376). However, as the proportion of foreigners increases in the population, so does the contact between the foreigners and the natives, leading thus to a decline in hostility. Despite the evidence given by the latter theoretical work, these assumptions would probably work if citizens were actually aware of objective data. Instead, literature (Stockemer 2017) also suggests that what counts are voter's perceptions towards immigrants, rather than the structural data.

According to Abraham Maslow (1943,12), the human being acts according to a hierarchy of needs. At the most basic level, they desire primary resources, which are imperative for the survival of human beings– i.e., access to food, basic health services and so on. When these necessities are granted, people deliver more time to other necessities – such as self-esteem. Therefore, they look for what Maslow (1943,12) calls "auto-actualization." Inglehart (1977) assumed that this tendency for auto-actualization (Maslow 1943), as a result of an increasing share of postmaterialist values, would continue indefinitely. But soon those postmaterialist values gave seat to a backlash, namely within the White population.

People began to focus once more on the lowest tiers of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. As a result, Whites are becoming more and more wary about the weight of migrants and ethnic minorities in their societies (Mounk 2018, 176). Among many other common features, the issue of immigration rarely fails to be part of the national populist rhetoric. When asked, individuals rarely fail to mention this issue when explaining their vote intention, or their major concerns.[32]

Paul Collier (2013,87) entertains the possibility that immigration itself matters, but more important than that, is the scale and the speed at which the flow of immigration occurs (Fig. 6), as well as the period it takes for immigrants to adjust to the host society norms and moral codes. Although American immigrants absorb the national identity quite quickly, this is not the case in Europe. Indeed, evidence shows that children of immigrants in Europe show more resistance towards adopting the national culture than their parents did (Collier 2012,78). Demographic fears have come to occupy a central place in the populist political discourse, and also among people's most rated concerns (Kaufmann 2018, 2019). The literature provides considerable support for the cultural grievance thesis.

Several recent studies have found that support for the Leave outcome in the Brexit referendum was strongly associated with the discontentment with foreigners, measured by right-wing authoritarianism (Zavala, Guerra, and Simao 2017).

The relationship between the migrant crisis in 2015 and the rise of the AfD party in Germany is another case in point (Kaufmann 2018, 225). (fig. 6).

---

[32] According to a study carried out by Podobnik and others (2017), when the percentage of immigration reaches around 22%, the percentage of populist vote increases, exceeding 50 percent in some cases.

Figure (6). Monthly arrivals and AfD support, 2013-17.

Source: Dennison et al., 'The Dutch aren't turning against immigration'[33]

The Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENL), nowadays named Identity and Democracy[34], is an accurate example reflecting the reality of right-wing populist in Europe.[35] with their website messages.

---

[33] Retrieved from: Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift. Penguin books, p. 106

[34] Right-Wing political group, which coordinates many European right-wing parties – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Czech Republic - in the European Parliament. (https://www.id-party.eu/)

[35] *Our European cultures, our values and freedoms are under attack (…) They are threatened by mass immigration.* Retrieved from: https://www.id-party.eu/ (last accessed November 2020)

The political scientist Nate Breznau finds that within 17 countries in the European Western Countries, the increase in the foreign-born share strongly predicts populist right-wing voting (fig 9). The foreign-born population concerns all those who have migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence (OCDE 2020).

The United Nations estimates that in 2015, 248 million migrants lived outside their country of birth. This figure has doubled since 1960 and continues to rise. Many migrants move to high-income European societies, which now contain 74 million or around 30 percent of the world's migrants. Europe now hosts more migrants than any other region (fig 7).


Figure (7). Net migration in the 5 years prior to 2020.

Source: Migration Data Portal [36]

---

[36]Retrieved from: www.migrationdataportal.org/?i=netnumbermig&t=2020&m=1 (last accessed December 2020).

The vote-share for right-wing populist parties and the percentage of foreign-born citizens from 1962-2017 seem to show a correlation. The data collected shows that in each country, the number of foreign-born citizens explains the increase in the vote share for anti-immigrant parties (fig. 8). Therefore, immigration seems to be an important component when explaining the rise of the national populist vote. (fig.8) Even in the countries that reveal a low percentage of immigrants or foreign-born population this explanation can be plausible. Why? According to Breznau's research (2017), the narratives of right-wing populist parties are shared among media and social networks and consequently shape public perceptions over the issue. Perceptions on immigration contribute to the social and political imaginary of the right-wing populism. The native population might feel threatened by immigrants who challenge both group and national identities.

Figure (8). Foreign-born share and support for anti-immigration parties in Western Europe.

Source: Breznau 2017[37]

[37]https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/12/14/europes-ageing-societies-require-immigration-to-survive-and-that-means-anti-immigration-politics-is-here-to-stay/.

But still to be clarified are the factors driving this fear. What accounts for people's perceptions of immigrants? Perceived fears or data-based evidence of value-changes and demographic decline?

Literature to support both sides. On the one hand, Krastev (2007, 2017, 2020), Kaufmann (2016; 2017; 2018) and Coleman (2006;2012) suggest that in a recent future, white majorities will struggle to maintain their dominance. On the other hand, Orgad (2015,94), despite assuming that Europe's demography is faced with a difficult task, believes that most of the public anxiety over immigration is based on an exaggerated public hysteria.

a) A third demographic transition?

Demographic changes have been one of the most relevant paths of social change since the end of World War II (Kaufmann and others 2012). Since the 17th century up to post-World War II, many European countries were countries of emigration. However, since the 1950s there was a regression in this trend[38]. These demographic changes were a result of demographic transitions[39]. For demographers, the first demographic transition occurred when mortality and birth rates fell from the traditionally high levels. The second demographic transition began in the 1970s, and describes a fall in the fertility rate, which might be explained by the societal changes, namely sexual behavior, since women improved their societal position (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004, 9).

Since then, the fertility rate has been in decline, reaching now a level that is not sufficient to guarantee the replacement level of populations.

---

[38] Intra-European migration deaccelerated and European countries began to experience inflows of people from non-European countries (Coleman 2005). Although intra-European migration was barely noticed, non-European immigration began to be much more apparent due to distinctive differences in the culture, language and values – i.e., religion.

[39] That is, the fall in death rates due to improvements in welfare, environment and medical treatment (Coleman 2012).

In Europe the case is particularly striking, as the European ethnic majority population has been declining in absolute terms since 2000s (Coleman 2012; Orgad 2015; Kaufmann 2018; Jardina 2019; Krastev 2020). The relative size of the white population is shrinking (Krastev 2020; Jardina 2019) as a result of differences in birth rates across different racial and ethnic groups. These trends, combined with the increasing flows of immigration might end up leading to what Coleman believes to be the third demographic transition.[40] Fertility rates in all European countries are below replacement level, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe. At the same time, migration has become the driving force behind demographic change in many European countries.

The third demographic transition, that Coleman (2012,401) suggests to be on progress, refers to a change in the composition of the population, in his own words "the universalization of ethnic diversity" (Coleman 2012,425) leading to a possible replacement of the original population by ethnic-minorities through immigration and differential fertility. In fact, foreign-origin populations are expected to cover between 15 and 30 percent of the total population in Western Europe in 2050 (Coleman 2015; Krastev 2020; Kaufmann 2018). The United Nations estimates a large growth of immigrant population from 2000 to 2050 (UN 2000). This scenario would particularly benefit the European Union, whose demographic decline is contributing to an increasing percentage of older population. A net immigration of 1.4 fertility population would preserve the working age of European population (UN 2000).

But at the same time as this scenario can be understood as a beneficial solution, it also raises anxieties and fears among national citizens.

---

[40] The perpetual ethnic transformation of developed societies (Coleman 2006).

As noted above, there are not many ways of leaving and entering a society, in this case, there are just two paths to preserving the size of European population: through births, and through net migration. According to Kaufmann (2018), the latter solution will bring a huge amount of ethnic diversity and that might significantly benefit national populist parties. Moreover, as soon as foreign communities begin to increase, their collective weight also improves, meaning that they are less likely to have to adopt to social norms, and are more likely to preserve their own (Coleman 2012,224).

The United Nations presented a comprehensive set of illustrations showing the effects of migration (UN 2000) and the potential for large-scale growth in the immigrant population from 2000 to 2050. This trend would preserve the size of the ageing population. They (UN 2000) suggest that in the next 50 years, the populations of all countries of Europe will face population decline and population ageing. In fact, the population of the European Union, which in 1995 was larger than the United States by 105 million, is predicted to become smaller by eighteen million in 2050. The long-lasting below-replacement fertility and the continued immigration to respond to this issue will eventually lead to an increase of the foreign population and will therefore cause a change in the composition of the host countries (UN 2000).[41] If the pace of this transformation persists, it is likely to lead today's societies towards a huge shift - a completely different ethnic-composition and consequently a decline of the white-majority[42].

---

[41] Taking the example of Germany - one of the countries selected in the UN report on replacement migration (2000) - if the flow of immigration continues at the level of the 1990s, the foreign population in Germany is projected to be 21 per cent of the total population.

[42] As well as the Judeo-Christian values.

This scenario, will, of course, depend both on the path and speed of this transformation, and on the way foreign-born population will adapt to local norms. Kaufmann (2018,6), for instance, argues that this level of change can be adjusted if intermarriage increases in the long-term. Likewise, Coleman (2006;2012) argues that this transformation might depend on the pace of immigration and the assimilation rates (who accepts whose cultural norms). However, if the latter suggestions are true, it is also true that assimilation is difficult to verify in the short-term.

Figure (9). Countries and areas where population is projected to decrease by at least one percent between 2019 and 2050.

Source: United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division - World population prospects 2019[43]

For that reason, national populism is expected to last as long as people's fears persist. The World Population Prospects (UN 2019) shows how the decline in European countries population is evident, when compared side-by-side with the rest of the world (fig. 9).

b) Exaggerated public hysteria?

The popular argument of an ageing Europe, whose survival needs immigrants, reinforces a growing sense of existential melancholy (Mounk 2018,173). A significant part of the revolt against immigration is fueled by the fear of an imagined future, rather than an actual discontentment with lived reality. As Mounk (2018,170) observes, when immigration rates increase, the daily experience also changes, leading to a change in the social imagination. Because of this, the political imagination of the radical-right assumes a special relevance, as it feeds the social imaginary with the idea that the white-majority might be in danger. What is striking about this evidence, and also brings more complexity to the equation, are the cases of countries where apparently there is little cause to be concerned about social and demographic transformations because immigration barely exists. The case of Eastern Europe supports this trend. In Hungary, for instance, even with the absence of immigration, fears of a foreign invasion persist to be a very vivid element in the political context. Cas Mudde (2019,121) claims that more than an issue position, what matters is the issue salience, that is, how relevant people think an issue is. Within this logic, people's perceptions on immigration play a special role. Orgad (2015,79) argues that some of the resistance and hostility against immigration is not based on daily experiences or on actual numbers. It is in fact misleading ideas resulting from people's perceptions that account for their fear and anxiety. In fact, individuals' feelings over immigrants are unrelated to the actual numbers of foreign-born individuals.

A research produced by Stockemer[44] (2015) finds that perceptions alone drive the support for populist parties. Furthermore, a study produced by Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz (2005) suggests that individual opinions over immigration are more likely to lie in perceptions rather than in actual data. Therefore, an exaggeration of the minority-group size results in a sense of threat among the majority-group (Gallagher 2003,385). In fact, in Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz's (2005) research work, the answers given by respondents show a problem of innumeracy, that is, respondents cannot translate their perceptions into numbers.[45] Moreover, their research suggests that a large number of Americans have highly misleading perceptions regarding the ethnic composition of the USA, which influence their attitudes towards immigration. Furthermore, when asked about the size of the white-population, respondents also showed a lack of numerical knowledge. Answers show that whites perceived their group as representing a much smaller part of the population than they actually do. The misleading perception over the size of the minority-group, combined with the misleading thought that the white population is smaller, corroborates Orgad's (2015,79) considerations over an exaggerated public hysteria.

2.3. Demographic Anxiety and National Populism

Many authors suggest that demography has a role to play when considering possible explanations for the national populist surge (Kaufmann 2018; Kaufmann 2019; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Kastev 2020). A study on European populist right parties suggests that rising ethnic diversity increases support for populist voting (Breznau 2017).

---

[44] on "What Accounts for the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Europe: Structural Data or Immigration Perceptions?"

[45] For instance, in the United States of America, the more non-Hispanic whites believe minority groups have increased in numbers; the bigger is their willingness to restrict immigration.

In a meta-analysis work of 171 articles that gathered over 500 coefficients and 4 million data, Kaufmann and Goodwin (2016,44) suggest that ethno-diversity increases anti-immigration attitudes among native-born whites and support for national populist parties. The two contrasting frameworks of liberal and illiberal democracy in Europe are also two contrasting ideas of "the people": liberalism is a claim for inclusive politics and a more diverse form of political representation while illiberalism, on the contrary, is a claim to preserve the ethnic character of national democracies (Krastev 2020,3).

According to Kaufmann (2018,16), immigration, ethnic change and demography are, thereby, essential elements when attempting to comprehend the rise of national populism. To him, the white majority concerns over immigration are the main cause of right-wing populism. The demographic composition of many European countries has been dramatically changing since the end of the II World War, and these shifts are creating existential insecurities among white majorities. Also, people's perceptions on these changes, instrumentalized by national populist rhetoric, contribute to the increasing support for these parties.

The ageing of populations is producing societies such as Spain, where 40% of the population will be over sixty by 2050 (UN 2000). The UN's projections (UN 2000, UN 2005) estimate that by 2050 there will be two Africans for every western citizen; and by 2100 there will be four Africans per western citizen (Coleman 2012). These projections are particularly striking when compared with the year 1950, when there were 3.5 Europeans and North Americans for every African. Although the UN (UN 2005) assumes that the European fertility rate will recover to the replacement level (2.1), the actual numbers for Europe have sharpened the concerns about declining ethnic majorities (Kaufmann 2018,18).

David Coleman suggests that, over time, a white-majority sharing an identity and values might cease to be sustainable (2012,4). This is because the ancestry of some national populations, namely in Europe, is being radically transformed due to high levels of immigration of people with different ethnic and racial ancestry. As a matter of fact, if the demographic decline of Europe's population, combined with the inflows of immigrants continues to accelerate, nations, as they are known today, might potentially lose their viability (Miller 2016,19). As previously mentioned in this work, the lack of an acceptable manner for white people to expose their fears, or, as Taub (2016) puts it, a lack of vocabulary to express white identity politics, has made people feel close to issues that relate to their concerns, such as controlling borders, the fear of Islamic terrorism, crime, etc.

National populists capture these concerns and politicize them in their agendas, getting, thereby, increasingly closer to the fears of the white majority. Immigration and ethnic change, raises, in people's minds, the possible scenario of the once-dominant group being transformed into a minority as nations continue to become far more ethnically and culturally diverse. This public anxiety fuels national populists that blame immigrants, mainstream parties and increasing secular agendas. At the same time, mainstream parties fail to respond effectively to these worries, partially due to the fact that most of those in decision-making seats and the media, accept and celebrate these shifts. This general failure to address people's concerns has given national populist leaders the space needed to make their promises more attractive.

The white resentment is not just motivated by the amount of ethnic diversity, but also by the pace of change (Taub 2016; Kaufmann and Harris 2015; Kaufmann and Goodwin 2016), which exalts public anxieties over a hyper-ethnic change[46]. When Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris (2015) analyzed white British responses to ethnic change, they found that white Britons, who lived in areas that went through rapid ethnic change, became more likely to vote for the right-wing British National Party.

As Kaufmann argues, ethno-cultural protectionism is one of the major drivers of the national populist vote today (Kaufmann 2018,29). The ineffectiveness of mainstream parties to capture concerns related to demographic change has contributed to the growth and salience of the problem, as well as the public anxiety (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,225). Moreover, as soon as foreign communities begin to increase in number, so does the possibility of normalizing their social norms and moral codes in detriment to those of the native population.

Kaufmann (2015) conducted a survey[47] in an attempt to understand how different scenarios produced different attitudes towards migration and, consequently, the support for right-wing populism. Therefore, when British respondents were confronted, among many other scenarios, with the possibility of the current high rates of immigration producing a highpoint decline in White British share by 2060, support for immigration fell thirty points (Kaufmann 2015,13). The survey results lead Kaufmann to defend the centrality of the effects of demographic decline, which predict anxiety over immigration, in explaining right-wing populism.

---

[46] Taking the example of Britain, between 2004 and 2014 the country saw an increase of 66% percent of the foreign-born population (Kaufmann and Harris 2015).

[47] Eric Kaufmann and Gareth Harris. 2015. Changing Mapping the white British response to ethnic change.

2.4. National Populism and Ethnocracy

The literature entertains possibilities regarding the role of ethno-cultural changes – characterized by the high influx of people with different moral codes, languages, appearance and customs – in explaining the support for national populism. Indeed, many people feel that their traditional values are being eroded due to the hyper ethnic change (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,132), a feeling that is likely to be reinforced by growing ethnic diversity. According to Cas Mudde (2019) and Goodwin and Eatwell (2018,156), nativism is one of the most prominent features of national populism. It is an ideology, which defends that native citizens should inhabit states and that foreign-born citizens are dangerous elements since they threaten the homogeneity of the nation (Mudde 2019,193). Despite the fact that many populist leaders try to emphasize nativism in softer terms, such as ethnopluralism – the idea that even though people are divided into different groups they are equal, but still segregated (Mudde 2019, 192) - the reality is that the national populist discursive approach always implies that one culture (the native) overlaps the other (foreign-born) in terms of superiority. Therefore, for Cas Mudde (2019) the major aim of national populist agendas is to (re)create a state in which cultural differences are barely felt, that is, a monocultural nation. To that end, immigrants who resist assimilation must see their entrance barred. Therefore, national populists should not be portrayed as defenders of an ethno-pluralistic nation. On the contrary, the ultimate goal of national populist leaders is, according to Cas Mudde (2019), ethnocracy. By ethnocracy, the author understands a supposed democratic regime in which the dominance of one ethnic group is guaranteed (Mudde 2018,192).[48]

---

[48] In other words, ethnocracy is translated into a democracy where the citizenship is based on ethnicity.

Research has consistently shown that support for national populism is predicted by analyzing attitudes towards immigration, which are largely linked with cultural motivations, namely ethnic nationalism (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Heath and Tilley, 2005; Kaufmann 2016; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018). Likewise, Kaufmann (2018; 2019) has dedicated a considerable amount of his work to explaining why the new nationalist trends are surging in so many democracies[49]. He describes national populism in terms of ethno-traditional nationalism. This definition is quite new in the field of nationalist and ethnic-nationalist studies. In fact, ethnic nationalism theories were developed when immigration played little part in explaining nationalism. Ethnic nationalism theories (Kohn 194; Brubaker 1992) have been developed to explain movements that took place during a different time period than the one that this work aims to analyze. Nowadays, political considerations cannot be considered the main cause in new nationalism explanations. On the contrary, according to Kaufmann (2018; 2019) it is cultural considerations that can explain the resurgence of the new nationalism[50].

The problems that are arising nowadays were not much taken into consideration at a time when definitions of ethnic and civic nationhood were being formulated. In 1990 immigrants made up around one to two percent of European nations' populations (Kaufmann 2019, 6). In addition to this, most of the ethnic majorities at the time were native minorities, such as Jews (Baycroft and Hewitson 2006,53). This might elucidate why, according to Kaufmann (2019,7), ethno-nationalism cannot explain contemporary national populism.

---

[49] Especially the ones you were considered consolidated.

[50] Ethnic nationalism movements are not about legitimizing territorial and political claims, as in the contemporary world there is no territorial revisionism.

Furthermore, as Jardina (2014; 2019) claims, concerns relating to majority-groups are a recent field of research, with most of the literature focusing on the issues relating to minority-groups. It was only when ethnic majorities demographically declined that research studies about white identities began to emerge. Orgad (2015,35) highlights this matter when considering that ethnic majorities have no standing in international law, which only applies to minority groups or nation states. As matter of the fact, Kaufmann (2019,13) is of the opinion that in order to comprehend national populist leaders and their voters, there is an essential distinction that should be made between ethnic nationalism and ethnic traditional nationalism. The origins of ethnic and civic nationalism can be found in Hans Kohn's (1944) work. Kohn (1944) distinguished civic nationalism as a rational and liberal way of considering nationhood, which is founded on human rights and personal freedoms. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, considers nationhood in a moral ethnocentric way.

Kaufmann (2019,2) understands that these are not adequate definitions to explain right-wing populism. To him, a definition better suited to contemporary national populism is the ethno-traditional nationalism - a type of nationalism that seeks to protect the traditional preponderance of ethnic majorities through slower immigration and increased assimilation. Ethno-traditional nationalism comprises the existence of a particular configuration of ethnic groups, which includes an ethnic majority (Kaufmann 2019,6). As Vanhanen (1999,19) claims, eighty percent of the world's nations have one ethnic majority and that is a central feature of ethno-traditional nationalism in many world regions – North Africa and East Asia and Europe, for instance. Majorities are important because of their "ethnosymbolism" (Smith 1998,170), that is, they hold traditional symbols of the nation, such as language or physical appearance (fig 11).

But despite holding the claim for the prominence of the ethnic-majority groups, national populists and its voters, do not seek to stop immigration, they would rather defend a way of slowing the pace of change (fig 10). Contrary to the ethnic nationalism theory, the ethno-traditional nationalism does not defend a membership determined by the circumstances of birth. As Cas Mudde (2019,124) notes, national populist leaders and voters are not against immigrants who assimilate, they are against the ones who live according to a different set of values, distinct from the ones held by the majority-group. Ethnic nationalism, on the contrary, aims to put a stop to migration. The membership is thereby defined in terms of territory, under the circumstances of birth.

Figure (10). Percentage of people who agrees that:

Source: Ipsos Mori 2017[51]

---

[51] Retrieved from Goodwin and Eatwell. (2018). National Populism: The revolt against Liberal Democracy. Penguin Books.

Being able to speak the national
language is important

97%

92%

88%

Sharing national customs and
traditions is important

86%

84%

90%

Being born in the country
is important

58%

55%

43%

Europe
United States
Canada

52

Figure (11). Percentage of People who believe that language, customs and ancestry are important.

Source: Bruce Stokes 2017

Contrary to the ethnic nationalism theory, the ethno-traditional nationalism does not defend a membership determined by the circumstances of birth. As Cas Mudde (2019,129) notes, national populist leaders and voters are not against immigrants who assimilate, they are against the ones who live according to a different set of values, distinct from the ones held by the majority-group. Ethnic nationalism, on the contrary, aims to put a stop to migration. The membership is thereby defined in terms of territory, under the circumstances of birth.

---

[52] Retrieved from Goodwin and Eatwell. (2018). National Populism: The revolt against Liberal Democracy. Penguin Books.

Hence, those who are in favor of stopping immigration and oppose interracial marriage (one of the best indicators of assimilation), take an ethnic view of national membership. Therefore, according to Kaufmann (2018; 2019) and Cas Mudde (2019), national populism cannot be seen through the lens of this theory. Despite some national populist leaders entertaining ethnic nationalist views, their approach and their voters do not fit into the exclusive ethnic nationalism theory (Kaufmann 2019,4).

Kaufmann's work (2018; 2019) entertains the possibility of reverting people's anxiety and fears over immigration, through increasing foreign-born assimilation rates. This possibility would be vital in two ways: first, it would prove that national populism could be better explained by applying the ethno-traditional theory. Secondly, it would prove that populist voters are driven by the willingness to defend ethno-traditions, rather than by irrational hatred. The results of a survey[53] conducted by Kaufmann (2017) point in this direction. When the author examined the support for right-wing populism in Britain, results showed that when people are presented with the likelihood of immigrant assimilation, their hostility towards immigrants, and consequently, their support for right-wing populism, decreases. These findings suggest that changing the way immigrants are perceived in relation to majority-groups is important when addressing the anxieties of white voters that support right-wing populism (Kaufmann 2017,38). The changes in the demographic composition of nations challenges what Kaufmann (2019) considers to be the ethno-traditions of nationhood.

The assumed possibility of the white majority losing its cultural dominance over foreign-born people has given rise to an increasing support for national populist parties. Immigration rates have been transforming the ethnic face of Europe.

---

[53] Can Narratives of White Identity Reduce Opposition to Immigration and Support for Hard Brexit? A Survey Experiment.

The foreigners speak different languages, hold different social codes and different lifestyles. This distinctiveness reinforces the impression that traditional norms and values are rapidly disappearing (Norris and Inglehart 2018). National populist leaders aim to protect those supposedly undermined ethno-traditions, and since demographic trends seem to suggest a demographic decline, namely in Europe (fig. 12) (Kaufmann 2018; Krastev 2020; Coleman 2012; UN 2000) the only way of protecting the "ethnosymbolism" (Smith 1998,170) of one's nation is slowing the pace of change, that is, immigration.

54

Figure (12). Estimated and projected fertility by SDG region, 1950-2100, according to the medium- variant projection.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Decline (2019)

---

[54] Retrieved from: https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Highlights.pdf (last accessed November 2020).

3. The evaluation: To what extent is ethnic disappearance at the forefront of national populism?

Immigration is the perfect scapegoat for national populist leaders. Many authors (Kaufmann 2018; Kaufmann 2019; Krastev 2020) advance the possibility that people develop anti-immigration attitudes due to the fear of being outnumbered (Krastev 2020), since high inflows of migrants combined with a low fertility rate fuel population change. This work chose the case of Austria and Hungary to verify what is behind immigration that makes it such a good predictor of the national populist vote.

The present chapter aims to clarify the differences between the political situation in Austria and Hungary and to observe how immigration could be better understood, when combined with each country's demographic trends.

3.1. Hungary

a) National Populism in Hungary

When in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, the countries that were controlled by the Soviet Union, were finally able to draw their own paths. Hungary held its first free elections in 1990, and by that time, Viktor Órban was already recognized for his willingness to give Hungary the freedom to pursuit freedom and democracy.

The current national populist party, FIDESZ[55] was founded in 1988 as an anti-communist party. At the time, the aim of the party was to pursue the development of a market economy and, therefore, the necessity to take part in European integration was vital.

---

[55] Federation of Young Democrats- Hungarian Civic Alliance.

However, today this position has changed. Órban opposes the European project and addresses severe criticism to EU members (Becker 2010,31; Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2018).

Fidesz saw its first success in 1990 when the party gained 22 seats in the elections for the National Assembly. In 1998, Fidesz won the elections and formed a coalition with two other parties, with Órban as the prime minister (Becker 2010,33).

What is striking about this is not the description of the party's path until recent years, but rather the approach pursued by Órban to become prime minister. In fact, when the current Hungarian prime minister won elections in 1998, he worked to integrate Hungary as a member of the European Union, which subsequently took place with the enlargement in 2004. In 2002, Fidesz, which campaigned with MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum)[56] in a single list, lost elections for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), successor of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's party, which held onto power until 2010 (fig 13).

	2002	2006	2010
MSZP	42.0 %	43.2 %	20.9 %
FIDESZ	41.1 %	42.0 %	52.9 %
SZDSZ	5.6 %	6.5 %	-
MDF	*	5.0 %	2.2 %
Jobbik		2.2 %	15.9 %
LMP	-	-	6.8 %
Turnout	71.5 %	68.0 %	64.0 %

Figure (13). Results of Parliamentary Elections 2002, 2006, 2010.

Source: Becker 2010[57]

---

[56] Extinctic since 2011.

[57] Retrieved from Becker, J. (2010). The Rise of Right-Wing populism in Hungary. SEER Journal of Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe. P.24-40.

Figure (14). Comparative results of Parliamentary Elections 2010 and 2014

Source: Mudde 2014[58]

Figure (15). Comparing parliamentary seats between 2010 election and 2014 election.

Source: Mudde 2014[59]

---

[58] Retrieved   from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-majority/
(Last accessed November 2020).

[59] Retrieved   from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-majority/

By that year, Órban's party agenda had changed dramatically. With the corruption scandals in the socialist government and consequently the divisions it produced among Hungarian society, Viktor Órban returned to power with a comfortable victory (Becker 2010,33) (fig.14 and fig.15). The prime-minister that once endorsed liberal and democratic principles, the development of a market economy and the membership of the European Union, redrew his principles and policies to embrace reforms characteristic of what, in 1997, Zakaria named an illiberal democracy (Mudde 2014).

With a constitutional majority, Órban implemented a program that transformed Hungarian democracy (Mudde 2014). After taking power, the Hungarian prime minister used the constitutional majority to reform constituency boundaries in favor of his own party (Novak and Kingsley 2018). In consequence, referendums proposed by the opposition are often rejected (Freedom House 2019).

The annual reports of Freedom House (2018, 2019) show how Hungarian democracy is in retreat. Last year's report considered Hungary as partly free in 2019, ranking 70 over 100. In fact, Órban has been assaulting rights and civil liberties since he was elected. Fidesz reduced the Hungarian parliament, limited the court's and other non-majoritarian institutions' power, and suppressed media and civil society freedoms[60]. The rule of law is a special concern among those who observe what is happening in Hungary (Freedom House 2019; Novak and Kingsley 2018). Elections are held without election observation in the polling stations and in 2018 many local election commissions supervised polls without an opposition or nonpartisan presence (OSCE 2018). When in 2012 Hungary implemented the National Law, it designed a new constitution for the country and a new face for Hungarian democracy (Mudde 2014).

---

[60] For instance, today, all Hungarian media is under Fidesz control. Since the government acquired critical media and investors allied to the government bought other communication channels, freedom of expression barely exists (Becker 2010).

The National Law was accepted without a referendum and constitutionalized a very particular image of the country and its people. The "partisan constitution" (Müller 2004,65), redrew the powers and structure of the constitutional court and limited the age of the judges, in order to remove the professionals that were not in line with Órban's office. Furthermore, the "exclusive constitution" (Müller 2004,102) was able to exclude opposition parties, as they did not take part in its development. Órban pursued a strategy aimed at removing power from and silencing the party's opposition in many different ways such as writing a new constitution where opposition parties' opinions were not included and removing parliamentary seats (Müller 2016,66). In parallel with the New Constitution (2012), Fidesz also worked to reform the court's administrative system in 2018. According to this reform, the ministry of justice could appoint and promote judges (Freedom House 2019). The new administrative system also allowed members of the constitutional court to have a seat in the supreme court, the ultimate judicial arbiter. In fact, between 2010 and 2014, Fidesz chose the 11 judges to make up the Constitutional Court (Mudde 2014). This control only ceased temporarily when Fidesz's majority declined, and an opposition party was able to be included into the nomination process for four judges, which took place in 2016 (Freedom House 2019).

The way in which Fidesz controls the checks and balances of his country reveals how Hungarian democracy is struggling to survive. According to the Freedom in the World Report (Freedom House 2019), it is not only the media and justice that are being victimized by the regime, but also academic freedom, freedom of assembly and individual freedoms that are under assault.[61]

---

[61] Among civil liberties, Hungary ranks 43/60, and among political rights the county scores 27/40 (Freedom House 2019).

In his third-mandate Órban has completely changed Hungary into a political system that emanates from his own power and from his party's will.

Órban's party agenda displays all the features that were discussed in the chapter about National Populism and it corresponds to Cas Mudde's definition of National Populism (2004). This said, it raises questions to those authors (Canovan 2005; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Krastev 2018; Mudde 2019; Bonikowski, Kaufmann and Rooduijn 2018) who hold that national populism is an alternative form of democracy, or that it does not have negative impacts on the quality of democracy. In Hungary, Fidesz not only eroded liberal values, but also democratic ones.

The party instrumentalized the classic and most prominent rhetoric of national populist leaders – us versus them. In the new constitution (2012) there is a clear evocation of the pure Hungarians – "We, the members of the Hungarian Nation" (Fundamental Law 2012, preamble[62]; Mendelski 2019,14).

Also, in his speeches, Órban rarely fails to emphasize this by clearly distinguishing the pure Hungarians, from other ethnic, religious minorities.[63] Moreover, the antagonism between us and them is also drawn between the Hungarian People and the left-liberal corrupt elites, especially scapegoated in the image of Brussels and the European Union.[64]

---

[62] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf (Last accessed December 2020)

[63] "Masses arriving from other continents and cultures endanger our way of life, our culture, our customs and our Christian traditions." (Órban speech 2017) – retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjoe2GjgLRA&t=9s (Last accessed December 2020)

[64] "The main danger to Europe's future, does not come from those who want to come here, but from Brussels fanatic internationalism." (Órban speech 2017) – retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjoe2GjgLRA&t=9s (Last accessed December 2020)

The corrupt elites are not only those who oppose his party, but also the European Union's liberal elites, that want to pursue policies that, according to the Hungarian Prime Minister threaten Hungarian religious values, borders and the country's national identity (Bruno Mendelski 2019,6). The idea that his party alone represents "the people" is better illustrated by the Hungarian New Constitution (2012) where the single constitutionalism Will is very present (Müller 2016,76).

The new constitution helps to perpetuate national populists' power, even if they lost an election. In fact, it was designed to disable pluralism and to set up the conditions to perpetuate power, based on the idea that Fidesz alone can represent the will of the people. Another prominent feature of national populist leaders and parties is nativism (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Mudde 2019,193). In other words, the combination of nationalism with xenophobia is rarely missing from the national populist agenda. European nativism is commonly associated with Judeo-Christian values (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,65). In Hungary, the recognition of the role of Christianity (Ádám and Bózóki 2016,113) in preserving nationhood is very strong, taking part in their nativist view. The role of Christian values is therefore present in the New Constitution (2012). The rhetoric of a foreign invasion might also be related with this nativist and religious vision of the Hungarian people, since, as soon as masses of migrants arrive, they are portrayed as "endangering the Hungarian way of life, culture, customs and Christian traditions; Gaining territory for them is losing territory for us" (Órban speech 2017)[65].

---

[65] Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjoe2GjgLRA&t=9s (Last accessed December 2020).

The role of cultural values is central in understanding Hungarian national populism. In fact, Órban does not seem to reject immigration as long as people assimilate the dominant culture. What the Hungarian prime minister seems to reject is the introduction of different cultures as well as different ways of life in the Hungarian society.[66]

Therefore, Hungarian national populism can be portrayed according to what Kaufmann (2020) considers to be an ethno-traditional nationalism. The Fidesz party is against change; its agenda is about preserving values, religious customs, and traditions.

For Müller (2004,62) the notion of national populism is hostile to the mechanisms and values that are often associated with constitutionalism, but the case of Hungary paints a different picture. National populist leaders such as Órban, seem to be comfortable with constitutionalism and institutions, as long as they are their institutions.

Canovan (1999, 2002) claims that national populism is not anti-democratic by nature, yet the case of Hungary would suggest otherwise. The Hungarian rule of law is under assault, the media are not free to criticize, nor are they independent from the governmental power.

The fundamental Law of 2012 was designed to restrict the voices of the opposition and to give the former government long-lasting powers (Müller 2016). The new constitution is a perfect example of a framework that used to be democratic and then became a partisan instrument.

In contrast to what many authors may argue (Canovan 2002,2005; Goodwin and Eatwell; Mudde 2019; Krastev 2020; Bonikowski, and Rooduijn and Kaufmann 2018), national populism can erode not only liberal principles, but also democratic ones.

---

[66] "Those, who have sought to come here as new family members, have been let in to make a new home for themselves. But Those who have come here with the intention of changing our country, shaping our nation image, have always been met with resistance" (Órban Speech 2017).

There are many *would-be* illiberal democracies in Europe, for instance in Austria and in Sweden. But there are only two that were able to reach and consolidate power – Law and Justice (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary). Both parties have worked to destroy independent institutions, to restrict freedoms and to silence any opposition (Applebaum 2020,13). The Órban regime bases its rhetoric on references to Christianity, and especially on the "Christian-national" idea (Ádám and Bozóki 2016,108-111). These references are well established in the preamble of the new constitution that "recognizes the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood" (Fundamental Law 2012).

This said, Órban's Christianity is not a sign of religious belief; on the contrary, it is a marker of identity (Ádám and Bozóki 2016,108; Brubaker 2017,1208). The political rhetoric of the *self*[67] and the others is not just nationalist but also civilizationist. As Europe becomes more secular in values, Órban's populist rethoric is increasingly represented in terms of Judeo-Christian ancestry, in opposition to Islam. The emphasis on Christian values is a way of belonging (Mendelski 2019,12)[68].

Jardina (2014,2019) argues that the sense of group deprivation in detriment to others, can strongly influence political behavior. In the period of the post-communist transition, the Hungarian nationalism was reinforced between the "self" and the "other" dichotomy. In fact, those who held liberal ideas were considered part of an anti-national project (Brubaker 2017,1208). Especially since the refugee crisis in 2015, the claims over European ancestry and cultural identity have been increasingly about civilizationism.

---

[67] Pure Hungarians.

[68] *Therefore, if "they" are Muslim, then "we" must, in some sense, be Christian* (Brubaker 2017,1199).

That is, over the defense of the group's identity, over the defense of the symbols of nation that in the view of its leaders could cease to exist if people were not willing to defend European Christian values.

Therefore, for Órban the reconstruction of policies based on Christian values is vital to saving Europe from "being transformed into something unrecognizable" and to guarantee the survival of the ethnic and cultural composition of Hungary (Brubaker 2017,1209). When hundreds of thousands were trying to flee from Syria, they passed through East Central Europe, providing an opportunity for national populists, such as Órban, to instrumentalize the refugee crisis, fueling public fears and anxieties over a "foreign invasion" (Mendelski 2019,13). Órban took advantage of the context and built a fence along Hungary's southern border with Serbia and Croatia, blaming Brussels for putting Europe's Christian identity at risk. Despite the existence of many would-be illiberal democracies (Applebaum 2020,13) in Europe, the reason why Hungarian national populism succeeds in the absence of a high unemployment rate (fig. 16) and a low migration rate seems to lack satisfactory explanations. The anti-immigration sentiment and also the concerns over this issue captures many voter's attention, but statistics on immigration do not legitimize these fears.

The rise of national populism in Hungary is a rather unique case. In the absence of a high unemployment rate (fig. 16) the economic motivations – triggered by income - fail to explain why Fidesz continues to be appealing to so many voters. In fact, in 2014, Hungary had one of the lowest unemployment rates since 1999. But even with the lack of economic explanations, Órban managed to continue in office.

Figure (16). Unemployment rate in Hungary (1999-2020).

Data source: Statistica 1990-2020[69]

Moreover, when comparing the GDP per capita growth between 2014 and 2019 (fig.17), Hungary presents a more favorable position than Estonia or Czech Republic, where national populist appeal was lower.

---

[69] Retrieved from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/339859/unemployment-rate-in-hungary/ (Last accessed December 2020).

Figure (17). Comparing GDP per capita growth in six Eastern European Countries.

Source: World Bank 2010-2019[70]

Therefore, the explanations that highlight the economic motivations for national populist vote seem to lack applicability to the case of Hungarian national populism.

Furthermore, the research produced by Francesco Gottardi (2018) on the drivers of national populism, entertains the possibility that Hungarian anti-immigration attitudes, that potentially measure national populism (Immerfall and Betz 1998) are better explained by cultural motivations. The demand to restrict the number of immigrants coming into the country is linked to cultural motivations, rather than the fear of being economically endangered (Gottardi 2018,21). Among the other European Countries, Hungary has one of the most hostile attitudes towards immigrants as shown by Messing and Ságvári's work (2020).

---

[70] Retrieved from:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2019&locations=HU-HR-EE-CZ-SK-PL&start=2010
(Last accessed December 2020).

Among the 27 countries analyzed in figure 18, Hungary presents a higher percentage of rejection towards migrants, whereas Germany, which has a much higher percentage of immigrants, had an unarguably lower percentage of rejection.

	Rejection Index (RI)	Perception Index (PI)
AUSTRIA	21	48
BELGIUM	8	55
BULGARIA	40	40
SWITZERLAND	5	60
CYPRUS	16	43
CZECHIA	42	39
GERMANY	5	58
ESTONIA	25	48
SPAIN	8	60
FINLAND	7	61
FRANCE	12	53
UNITED KINGDOM	10	59
CROATIA	10	50
HUNGARY	57	38
IRELAND	10	62
ITALY	16	45
LITHUANIA	17	52
LATVIA	31	55
MONTENEGRO	23	46
NETHERLANDS	10	58
NORWAY	2	60
POLAND	20	56
PORTUGAL	4	61
SERBIA	28	44
SWEDEN	3	64
SLOVENIA	14	45
SLOVAKIA	37	38

Figure (18). Rejection and Perception Indexes on immigration by country.
Source: Messing and Ságvári 2020[71]

If these attitudes are not justified by low income and lack of economic growth – two important indicators of economic discontentment - then what drives this phenomenon? Much of the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Mudde 2018; Gottardi 2018) considers the possibility that cultural motivations better serve to explain the rise of national populism.

---

[71] Retrieved from: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/15322-20190505.pdf
(Last accessed December 2020).

Despite the absence of high numbers of immigration, the issue has proven to be the perfect scapegoat not only for Órban (Hárs 2009,58), but also for his voters.

When asked about their feelings concerning an increase of immigrants from outside of Europe (Eurobarometer 2018), almost 50% per cent of participants considered it very negative (fig.19). This outcome is not surprising, but the answers given to a similar question add some complexity to the equation. The same survey asked people to speak about what they thought of immigration within Europe. In this case, almost 50% considered it fairly positive (fig. 20).

**Figure (19).** Immigration of people from outside the EU (Hungary)

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[72]

Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you.
Immigration of people
from other EU Member States
(11/2018)

Figure (20). Immigration from people inside of EU.

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[73]

The contradictory answers to different but similar questions lead us to another question: are Hungarian people against immigrants or are Hungarian people against change? Kaufmann (2019), Mudde (2019) and Krastev (2020) consider that the new nationalism (Kaufmann 2019) is better understood through the fear of ethnic change.

Authors that agree on the prominence of economic motivations (Rodrik 2017, 2020; Guiso and others 2017) regarding the rise of national populism fail to account for this. If people were actually concerned with the economy (more than with threats to their culture), a similar or higher opposition to immigration within Europe would be expected as in fact, European's qualifications are expected to be higher compared to the qualifications of migrants from poorer countries outside of Europe.

---

[73] Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/59/groupKy/278
(Last accessed December 2020).

If people's fears were related with the increase of competition over jobs, Hungarians would be much more likely to reject immigration from European countries, rather than from other non-European countries.

In 2016 the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted a survey in which Hungarian people were asked how they felt about immigration of people from the same ethnic group as the majority (fig 21). While the percentage of people opposing same-ethnic immigration was not low, it was surpassed by the combined percentages of people who would opt to allow *few, some* and *many*.

Figure (21). Question: Allow some/few immigrants from the same ethnic group as majority? (Hungary)

Source: ESS 2016

On the other hand, when Hungarians were asked if they would allow *many* or *few* immigrants of a different ethnic group, the answers were aligned with Kaufmann (2019), Mudde (2019) and Krastev's (2020) arguments (fig. 22).


Figure (22). Allow many/few immigrants from a different ethnic group as majority (Hungary)

Source: ESS 2018

This time, the number of people willing to allow *many* or *some* immigrants from a different ethnic majority into Hungary, clearly declined. Contrary to what was observed in the previous graph (fig. 21), the majority was no longer willing to permit many immigrants, and the percentage of people that would allow *none* exponentially increased. The fact that Hungarians are against the immigration of people that hold different ancestries and roots supports the research hypothesis of this work. People's reactions to immigration are fuelled by a fear of change, rather than by economic considerations or racial hatred (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Kaufmann 2018, 2019).

The role of cultural and national identity – customs, traditions, and values - seems to better predict national populism, as the literature claims (Norris and Inglehart 2018). In a survey conducted by ESS in 2018, Hungarian people were asked if cultural life was enriched or undermined by immigration. The majority of people pointed to the latter hypothesis.

While a strong majority of the respondents had a moderate response (five over ten), only a minority agreed that immigration could enrich cultural life.


Figure (23). Cultural life enriched or undermined by immigration.

Hungary

Source: ESS 2018

In addition to this, when asked about the importance of following traditions and customs, the majority of the respondents agreed that sharing the same customs and traditions was an important factor (fig.24). Kaufmann's (2018,241; 2019) argument holds that national populist leaders, as well as their voters, do not want to halt immigration, they want to defend what they consider to be under threat – their national identity.

Figure (24). Importance of following traditions and customs.

Hungary

Source: ESS 2018

The traditional symbols of the nation[74] are important because they make up the national identity of the state. This argument could explain why so many Hungarians are opposed to immigration from outside the EU, while they do not oppose immigration from inside the EU. People seek to defend their values and traditions, because those characterize their ethnic majority (Kaufmann 2019,145). Traditions do not define people's membership to a nation but they account for the national identity of the state (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,132). Órban has been successful in capturing these fears, holding a conservative view of Hungarian national identity.

---

[74] Such as, language or customs.

Indeed, many people feel that their traditional values are being eroded due to the hyper ethnic change (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,114), a feeling that is likely to be reinforced by growing ethnic diversity.

Major demographic changes[75] have inflamed authoritarian appeals and hidden fears among citizens (Applebaum 2020,38). In Hungary, the percentage of immigrants is barely existent. However, Fidesz's political agenda never fails to invoke immigration as a central issue. Hungarian people have one of the most hostile attitudes towards migration, but the truth is that they barely have any contact with immigrants. The literature has already shown that people's opinion over immigration is usually based on their perceptions rather than on empirical data (Stockemer 2017). In fact, people lack reliable information about demography (population size, growth, composition), but they also lack information about their nation's real problems. This lack of data has led to the instrumentalization of issues such as immigration as a cover for the underlying issue, which is of concern to many Hungarian people: the population decline and the fear that their ethnic majority will soon become a minority. Krastev (2020,71) considers that the presence of demographic anxiety, in the form of ethnic disappearance, is not a surprise in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, Eastern Europe has lived through traumatic incidents in the past, which have contributed to fueling the scenario of cultural disappearance.[76] Despite the lack of data to support the idea that Hungarians fear the disappearance of their nation, surveys have shown that voters believe that their cultural identity is in danger of extinction. Events such as the refugee crisis of 2015 have helped Órban, and other national populist leaders, to capitalize on these fears, leading to misperceptions and public hysteria (Orgad 2015,79).

---

[75] Resulting from immigration and demographic trends.

[76] Take the case of Czech Republic as an example; in the 19th century, they feared they would end up speaking only German and lose their native language.

Immigration, especially in the case of asylum seekers, is the more recent example of a public driven concern with population change (Kulcsár and Brown 2009, 25).

An essay on the public perceptions of population changes in Hungary (Kulcsár, and Brown 2009) shows that Hungarians have an accurate level of knowledge concerning their nation's population dynamics. However, when it comes to immigration, they tend to overestimate the numbers. This thesis entertains the possibility that immigration is the only realistic way of addressing population decline. An article (Kirs 2017) based on interviews conducted with representatives of Hungarian civil society organizations shares explanatory opinions over the issue of immigration and the Hungarian attitudes towards immigrants. According to the article, one of the major factors driving hostility towards immigrants is fear. András Léderer[77] (Kirs 2017,33) claims there is an existential fear related to ethnic disappearance. That is, due to population changes, fueled by immigration, the community of Christians and the Hungarian culture, fear they might become a minority in the future. Furthermore, Kováts[78] (Kirs 2017,29) noticed that the fear of losing cultural identity is present among the fears related to migrants. He shared his experienced about ethnic ghettos in Brussels and suggested that, in Budapest, the fear related with the appearance of ethnic ghettos is bigger than in Brussels, or in Stockholm. The main fears among local habitants are related to differences in cultural features such as customs and language. Léderer considers that this fear, as Krastev (2020) also mentioned, might be explained by Hungary's history of conflicts (Kirs 2017,29).

As Gyulai mentioned in his interview, the change of one's society is not entirely impossible. It can happen under certain conditions (Kirs 2017,29).

---

[77] A staff member of the Refugee Programme.

[78] The Director of the Menedék Association for Migrants.

The following section will briefly analyze Hungarian demographic trends to understand whether these fears are well founded (Coleman 2012; Kaufmann 2019; Krastev 2020), or whether they are merely a by-product of public hysteria (Orgad 2015).

b) Demographic Profile

In the early 20th century, the Kingdom of Hungary - the Habsburg Empire - was a multi-ethnic country. But, differently from Austria, the Hungarian half, despite being ethnically heterogeneous, was politically unitary, ruled by a centralized and nationalistic Magyar[79] government (Brubaker 1995,195).

However, when the I World War ended (1918), the Habsburg empire collapsed and the territory of Hungary was officially separated from Austria, giving rise to two sovereign countries. This disintegration led to huge transformations within the Hungarian society and within its demographic composition. The 1920 Treaty of Trianon stripped Hungary of land and population (Brubaker 1995,197). Hungary saw its population reduced from 20.8 million to 7 million and its land area decreased by 72% (Hárs 2009,7).

The numerical changes in the composition of the population and the territory led to changes within the ethnic composition of the nation. If at one time a multi-ethnic population made up the country, this ceased to be true when the composition of the country changed.

This decrease in size and composition resulted in a change in the ethnic configuration of the nation. It shifted the country from a multi-ethnic to a much more homogenous demographic structure.

---

[79] A member of the predominant Hungarian ethnic group. Magyars were originated in the Uruals, but migrated and settled in the territory of Hungary.

This ethnic homogeneity of the Hungarian society persists up to this day. Despite 70% of the lost population being non-Magyar, over three million Magyars suddenly became national minorities in neighbor nation-states. Ethnic Hungarian communities are concentrated in the states adjoining Hungary and are especially significant in Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia; territories that once belonged to Hungary but ceased to be part of the Hungarian empire at the end of the First World War (Rothschild 1974).

According to Hárs (2009,7), this ethnic configuration had consequences on the migration patterns and policies of Hungary. Therefore, the patterns of immigration in Hungary give special salience to ethnicity (Brubaker 1998,1056). Unsurprisingly, the majority of immigrants that enter Hungary are from the ethnic Hungarian communities that live in the neighboring countries; Romania, Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia and Ukraine (Brubaker 1998,1054; Hárs 2009,16).

The issue of immigration received special attention when a study produced by the United Nations (UN) entertained the possibility that Europe would have to open borders to 159 million immigrants in order to achieve sustainable demographic trends (UN 2000; Hárs 2009). The report (UN 2000) gave special relevance to the issue of an ageing Europe and emphasized the importance of immigration in order to balance the unsustainable demographic trends, characterized by a fertility rate above the replacement level (2.6).

The UN report (2000) fuelled a public debate over immigration. However, the Hungarian government by no means considered the idea of indiscriminately opening the country's borders. The solution was in the ethnic Hungarian workers living in neighboring countries (Hárs 2009,9; Brubaker 1995,196).

As Brubaker argues, ethnicity plays a key role in defining the patterns of immigration (Brubaker 1998,1049).

As a matter of a fact, the centrality of ethnicity was well demonstrated when in the early 1990s, the draft Citizenship Act proposed to reduce the waiting period for ethnic Hungarian immigrants to acquire citizenship, while on the other hand non-Hungarian immigrants became subject to very strict rules including a waiting period of three years and the passing of an exam on Constitutional affairs (Hárs 2009,57). However, the fact that ethnic-Hungarians have preferential treatment when entering and remaining in the country, does not mean that their ethnicity gives them the immediate right to Citizenship, as is the case in Germany (Brubaker 1995,203).

Ethnicity functions as a migration-facilitator in a country that is highly hostile to inflows of foreign people. Therefore, despite ethnicity playing an important part in the acceptance of immigrants, ethnic Hungarians do not simply assimilate to Hungarian Hungarians once they migrate to Hungary. "Official" ethnicity is not automatically converted into citizenship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hungary once again experienced dramatic changes in the dynamics of its population.[80]

The current total population of the country is estimated to be around 9,66 million (Worldmeters 2020). Only 4,1% percent of the total population are foreign-born citizens. According to data gathered from OCDE, 17% of the foreign-born citizens have arrived recently – in the last five years – and 30% comes from a high-income OECD country.

Compared with other European countries, like Austria, where 17% of its total population are foreign-born citizens, Hungary is one of the European countries with the lowest percentage of foreign-born citizens.

---

[80] These changes are divided in three different categories: 1. Long-term population decline; 2. Population aging and 3. population deconcentration.

In 2019, the structure of the Hungarian society was characterized by a total fertility rate of 1.5, a life expectancy (at birth) rate estimated to be between 76 and 77 years old and the majority of the population was estimated to be between 25 and 64 years old (fig 25). The low total fertility rate (fig. 27) combined with the increasingly aging population (concerning the low fertility rate and the high expectancy rate) and the barely existent number of immigrants reinforced the tendency for population decline that has already been observed. In 2019, the annual rate of population change was -0,2 (UN 2019).[81]

Thus, this signifies that the total percentage of the Hungarian population decreased between 2018 and 2019, when the tendency towards a decrease in population could already be observed. In fact, the Hungarian population has been declining since 1985 (fig. 28). The World Population Prospects (2019) estimates a huge change in the composition of the population between 2019 and 2100 (fig. 25 and fig 26.) that drastically reduces the size of the Hungarian society. In 2100 the pyramid is expected to see a reduction in all the age groups, the maintenance of a fertility rate above the replacement level translated into a decrease of births and a higher life expectancy given the medical and scientific advances (UN 2019).

---

[81] Annex A.

Figure (25). Population in 2019 – Hungary

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects[82]

Figure (26). Projected population in 2100.

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

---

[82] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2019. World Population Prospects.Volume II: Demographic Profiles.

Within Europe and more particularly, Eastern Europe, Hungary has the lowest fertility rate, and it is expected to continue decreasing (fig. 27). In addition to this, the average annual rate of population change (fig. 29) also shows that Hungary has a lower position when compared with the average of the European countries or particularly with the average of the Eastern European Countries.

Figure (27). Total Fertility in Hungary

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects[83]

---

[83] Medium variant projections are illustrated in thin coloured lines and uncertainty is shown in lighter shades for 95 per cent prediction intervals.

**Figure (28).** Projected total population in Hungary (1950-2100)

Source: UN 2019, World population prospects

Figure (29). Average annual rate of population change.

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

Briefly speaking, concerning demographic trends, Hungary has a very hard task at hand. With an extremely hostile position towards immigration and with all the demographic indicators and projections pointing in the direction of population decline (fig.28), the Hungarian situation will hardly be sustainable without an increase in immigration (Coleman 2012, UN 2000). The most interesting part about demographic considerations is the way in which the public perceives them. According to a study about public perceptions about population changes in Hungary, Kulcsár and Brown (2009,30) concluded that Hungarian citizens have very accurate perceptions about demographic dynamics. However, when analyzing figure 30, we understand that, despite Hungarians having an accurate sense of the population size, fertility and mortality, when it comes to immigration, they tend to overestimate the volumes of migration and immigrants. The authors, as well as Kirs (2017) entertain the possibility that some sort of nostalgia (Krastev 2017,56) related to the drastic changes in the Hungarian society, is hidden behind the issue of immigration, that seems to be the only realistic way of addressing population decline.

Demographic dynamics	Increased			No change			Decreased		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Population size*	5	5	6	7	5	10	86	89	84
Fertility	4	4	4	6	5	7	89	91	89
Mortality	75	76	80	19	22	17	2	2	3
Internal migration	45	50	48	44	47	48	3	4	3
Emigration	60	65	63	28	30	31	5	4	7
Immigration**	71	76	73	21	22	21	3	2	6
Immigration of marriages	5	6	5	14	14	14	77	80	81

Figure (30). Public Perception of demographic dynamics.

Source: Kulcsár and Brown 2009[84]

Population literacy is especially central at times when certain population trends create significant concerns for a large number of people. Immigration, especially unauthorized immigration, is a more recent example of a public concern driven by population change and demographic anxiety.

3.2. Austria

a) National Populism in Austria

The success of national populism in Austria is one of the most curious cases regarding the emergence of the radical right in western Europe (Ellinas 2010).

Founded in 1956, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) descended from the libertarian and nationalist waves of the 19th century and defended a cultural and political unification with Germany (Gruber 2019,39; Ellinas 2010,44). The party used to make strong opposition to the he Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)[85] and to the Christian conservative Party (ÖVP). When the party was founded it was not considered a radical-right party and during three decades its position was considerably marginalized (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019).

Today, and according to the outcomes of the last legislative elections (2019), the FPÖ is the third political force among the five political parties within the Austrian political system. The party only shifted its position within the political spectrum to the radical right when Haider took place in 1986. By that time, the political agenda of the FPÖ moved towards anti-immigration and identity issues.

Its biggest political victory remounts to 1999, when the party won 26.9% of the vote in legislative elections.

[85] This opposition remains until today, contrary to ÖVP.

With its charismatic leader, Jörg Haider, the entry of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria's national government in 2000, marked the beginning of the success of the radical right in Western Europe (Ellinas 2010,45). After thirteen years with a governing coalition between the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian's people party (ÖVP), the ÖVP made a coalition with the national populist party (FPÖ). The FPÖ's main proposal was to reduce the presence of foreigners in the country. However, even under the big coalition, in the last of year of the government the country registered 298,000 foreign workers (Recent Austrian Migration Research 2004).

The Freedom Party (FPÖ) well-suits Canovan's (2002; 2005) definition of populism as a way of political mobilization that constantly references the common people. As Mudde (2019,46-48) notices, all radical right ideologies are characterized by an "us" versus "them" dichotomy, but both "us" and "them" are likely to change over time. The FPÖ is one of the best examples of this shift. In fact, when the part was founded it called for the defence of a German ideology. But over time, the core ideology of the party embraced a defence of Austrian patriotism – "Austrian patriots" (Mudde 2019,84).

Just as Órban, who used to defend the Hungarian integration into the European project, the FPÖ's agenda shifted to maximize popular appeals, and found the perfect scapegoat in immigration. Hence, over time, the party began to embrace radical claims based on cultural and ethnic identity, giving prominent emphasis to the cultural, ethnic and racial inequality of human beings. The rise of national populism in Austria captures special attention among political scientists. More than in the Hungarian case, economic motivations are very weak predictors in explaining this phenomenon. First and foremost, the FPÖ first appeared in office before the financial crisis of 2008, an event that represents one of the most eligible reasons why many authors emphasize the role of economic motivations (Rodrik 2017).

Moreover, when we observe the rate of unemployment in Austria (fig.31) we perceive that the country enjoys a low rate of unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate in Austria is lower than in other European countries. Even after the economic crisis in 2008, it increased minimally compared to the patterns seen in other European countries (fig. 31). According to a report produced by the European Economic and Social Committee (2013), after 2008 the employment growth in Austria was higher than the average of the euro zone. In 2012, Austria had the lowest unemployment rate in the EU. Therefore, the "income explanations" are not be able to explain why people voting for the national populist party.

**Figure (31).** Unempoyment rate in Austria (1999-2020).

Source: Statistica 1999-2020[86]

Francesco Gottardi (2018) produced a work in which he analyses the weight of cultural and economic motivations explaining national populist appeals.

---

[86] Retrieved from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/262695/unemployment-rate-in-austria/
(Last accessed December 2020).

The results of his analysis were particularly relevant since they showed that economic motivations were not able to explain the rise of national populism in Austria. By studying variables related with "Income" and "Unemployment", the research results have shown that these indicators are never significant (Gottardi 2018). On the contrary, the variables related with cultural issues, such as attitudes towards immigrants, that according to several authors (Betz, Immerfall 1998; Kaufmanm 2018) have a positive causal relationship with national populism, have appeared to be better predictors for the presence of national populism (Gottardi 2018).

Additionally, when observing the GDP per capita annual growth - from 1999 to 2019 – in Austria (Worldbank 1999-2019), one might also confirm that the countries' economy, despite some decreasing periods in the following years, is not able to justify the rise of national populism (fig. 32).

Figure (32). GDP per capita annual growth (1999-2019) in Austria and Hungary.

Source: World bank 1999-2019[87]

The economic explanations are unsatisfactory in elucidating the reasons behind the rise of national populism in Austria. Although socioeconomic explanations are necessarily needed to analyze this issue, they cannot account for the pace of the electoral change. As Norris and Inglehart (2018,132) argue, cultural motivations are much stronger indicators in predicting the national-populist vote.

The issue of immigration has been particularly central in all national populist party's agendas. The FPÖ was no exception. In 1999, the main concerns for Jörg Haider were the refugees from the former Yugoslavia, independent of whether they were Christian or Muslim (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019).

In fact, in the early 1960s, and due to the need for labor force, the government introduced the "guest-worker" regime. As a result, a considerable number of people from former Yugoslavia and Turkey arrived in Austria to work, but they were expected to leave after a few years, according to a rotation procedure. However, the majority decided to stay and bring their families. Today, the great majority of foreign workers have indeed become permanent residents - are naturalized and considered an integral part of the Austrian population (Migration Council for Austria 2016).

The number of foreign residents increased sharply after the fall of the iron curtain and during the period of the cold war. The "guest-worker" structure was replaced by a yearly quota system for residents, that reduced the net immigration into Austria. Also, the different legal status of foreign workers made Austrian immigration shift from a guest worker program to one of immigration proper (Wischenbart 1994,79).

From that time, the influx of immigrants into Austria was made up of people from different origins: EU-internal migration, third country immigration from eastern to southern Europe in the sequence of the Yugoslav war, and in the 2000s, refugees from Asia and Africa (Migration Council for Austria 2016). As a result, between 1989 and 2015, the share of foreign nationals increased from four to thirteen (Gruber 2019,36).

This dramatic change in the composition of the Austrian nation had political implications due to immigration. As Kaufmann argues (2018), the changes that result from immigration are a fertile soil for national populist leaders to politicize the issue and gain seats. The increasing evolution of the patterns of immigration led, therefore, to an evolution regarding public opinion over the issue.

According to Gruber (2019,36), even long before the refugee crisis of 2015, Austria was one of the most immigration-skeptic in the EU. The data available in the European Social Survey shows that, since 2000, when Austrians are asked whether immigration makes the country a better or worse place to live, the answers are more negative than the European average (Gruber 2019,3).

In 2003, Statistics Austria noticed a record in the naturalization of foreign-born individuals in the country with more than 40,000 foreign nationals being considered an integral part of Austrian society. From a demographic point of view, Austria is an immigration country. In 2019, the total number of people with foreign background (first- and second-generation migrants) was 2.070,1 (Statistics Austria 2019).

Not only the numbers, but also the composition of the inflows become an issue of concern. Despite not holding such hostile attitudes towards immigrants as Hungarians do, when Austrian citizens were asked (Eurobarometer 2018) what they felt regarding immigration from outside the EU, 30% of the respondents felt "fairly negative" and more than 20% felt "very negative" (fig. 33).

The number of respondents who said they would consider it "fairly positive" was considerably similar to the number of people who felt fairly negative, but only 10% of the respondents considering it "very positive".

Compared to Hungarian data on immigration, Austrians are less hostile to non-European immigration. However, a pattern can be seen when comparing the answers concerning immigration from outside EU and with the ones regarding immigration inside EU.

Figure (33). Immigration of people outside the EU – Austria.

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[88]

Despite not showing an ostensible hostility towards immigrants, when comparing the answers given in figure 33 with the answers given in fig.34, one might conclude that the number of people who respond negatively is not significant compared with the number of people who felt "fairly positive" and "very positive" regarding immigration inside the EU.

---

[88] Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/59/groupKy/278
(Last accessed December 2020).

According to Gruber (2019,44) immigration from other EU countries is perceived in economic terms. On the contrary, immigration from third countries is understood more in cultural terms, namely with narratives regarding the cultural differences between European Christians and Muslim population. The fact that intra-European immigration does not pose higher hostile attitudes, can once again entertain the possibility of the higher weight of cultural motivations which in turn might explain radical right populism (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Gottardi 2018; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018).

Figure (34). Immigration from other EU member states – Austria

Source: Eurobarometer 2018[89]

Furthermore, a study produced by Goodwin and Raine (2017) investigated attitudes and perceptions over Islamic immigrants. Chatham House carried out a survey in which it gathered the countries' position over the issue. All countries reveal a similar position, but given the focus of this work, we will only consider two of them – Austria and Hungary.

---

[89] Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/59/groupKy/278 (Last accessed December 2020).

Hand in hand with Hungary, Austria's overall opinion is that all Muslim immigration should be halted (fig. 35).

Figure (35). What do Europeans think about Muslim immigration?'
Source: Chatham House 2017; In, Matthew Goodwin and Thomas Raines 2017

The Austrian national populist party's concerns over immigration, only moved towards an anti-Muslim attitude in 2005, when FPÖ had a new leader, Heinz- Christian Strache (Kaufmann 2018, 9-192).

Until then, Jörg Haider promoted identity politics based on the exclusion of the "other" in ethnic terms (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019). In the 1990s, the FPÖ used to focus on immigrants from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Africa with Muslims barely being mentioned in his discourse. It was only when Haider left the FPÖ to found a new populist party – the Alliance for the future of Austria (BZÖ) - that the FPÖ, with its new leader, began to embrace an anti-Islamic rhetoric (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019).

This position boosted the FPÖ vote share, which saw its votes increased by six-point five percent compared with the previous elections - eleven percent of vote share (Gruber 2019; Kaufmann 2018). There is, indeed, one special feature in the case of the Austrian national populism that deserves some attention.

Historically, the FPÖ was anticlerical, given that the church ideas challenged the pan-germanic ideas of the party (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019). Contrary to Fidesz, the party never claimed to be Christian, nor did it defend the Catholic tradition. But, as Jardina (2019,57) claims, a threat can politicize a group identity. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the party began to claim to be a defender of the Christian West. In 1997, its new party program emphasized the role of Christianity in defending the Austrians values (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019).

As Erick Knowles and Linda Tropp (2016) claim, ethnic change tends to emphasize people's sense of white identity. In fact, the intensification of a group's boundaries can be seen as a defense mechanism[90].

The introduction of the Christian element as a way of drawing cultural differences between the "us" and "them" increased the vote share of the party (Brubaker 2017,4). In 1999, fifteen percent of Austrian citizens claimed that they did not want to live near a Muslim. With the shift in the FPÖ position towards an anti-Muslim attitude, in 2008 the number of people who were concerned about the possibility of living next to a Muslim increased to twenty eight percent (Hafez, Heinisch and Miklin 2019).

At that time, Austria had never suffered a Muslim terrorist attack, but the fact that a large number of the non-European immigrants were Muslim increased the hostility towards them.

---

[90] As Baldwin (1976,61) mentioned "an identity is questioned only when it is menaced, as when the mighty begin to fall".

Kaufmann argues that national populism is a response to immigration-led ethnic change (2018, 2019,4). Likewise, Goodwin and Eatwell (2018,132) entertain the possibility that a rapid change in the composition of one's society might drive fears and anxieties that are at the root of national populist vote behavior.

In 1998, a survey on "Migration and Xenophobia" was undertaken by the Ministry of Science and Transportation. This survey was expected to measure facts, opinions and attitudes of Austrians towards immigration and foreign population. While 31% of the citizens saw foreigners as a vehicle to enrich Austrian culture, 40% claimed that they felt as if they were foreigners in their own country (European Migration Network 2004). The survey concluded that, despite the negative attitudes towards immigrants and foreign culture, between 1991 and 2000 the country began experiencing a decrease in hostility (European Migration Network 2004,30).

Data collected in 2002 (ESS 2002) regarding the issue of immigration showed that Austrian citizens were less hostile towards immigration if foreign people were willing to live according to Austrian traditions and culture (fig. 36).

Figure (36). Qualification for immigration: committed to the way of life in the country

Source: ESS 2002

According to the responses gathered (fig. 36), the commitment with the way of life and with the ethnosymbolism of the nation – traditions, values, culture – was considered to be extremely important among the overall respondents (Smith 1998,170; Kaufmann 2019).

Figure 37 shows that regarding immigration from countries with different cultures and ancestries, it is important to Austrians for immigrants to follow the culture and values of the majority.

Figure (37). Importance of following traditions and customs (Austria)

Source: ESS 2004

Furthermore, data on public attitudes towards immigration show that those hostilities did not cease to exist. The outcomes of a survey conducted by European Social Survey in 2018 showed that Austrian people still seemed to reveal some skepticism over the role of foreigners regarding the possible positive contribution to their culture (fig. 38).

Figure (38). Cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants.

Source: ESS 2018

Many authors agree that hostility towards immigration is linked with the national populist vote (Norris and Inglehart 2018; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Kaufmann 2018; 2019; Krastev 2020). As a matter of the fact, Gruber's work (2019) produced a comparative analysis of attitudes towards immigrants and voting preferences, where both economic and cultural motivations are measured.

Figure 39 shows that none of the voters, even those who are aligned with Greens and SPÖ scored the maximum positive position over the issue, however, the two parties' electorates show a much more moderate opinion towards immigration.

Regarding the FPÖ and the ÖVP voters, results show to be in agreement with existing literature over the linking relation between national populism vote and concerns over immigration.

Figure (39). Attitudes towards immigrants compared among Austria voters.

Source: Gruber 2019[91]

As many academic works (Gottardi 2018; Kaufmann 2018; 2019; Goodwin and Eatwell 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2018) argues, cultural motivations are, overall, the best predictors to account for the rise of national populism in Austria.

Austria's national populist party did not increase in popularity in a context of economic crisis. The observed indicators - employment, income and GDP per capita growth – show that the country's economy was not struggling. Moreover, Austria's democracy was one of the most stable, with a comprehensive welfare state (Ellinas 2010,19).

According to Maslow's hierarchy (1943), human beings act according to their needs. At the most basic level they seek primary sources, but when those sources are granted, they enter into what Maslow claims to be a process of "auto-actualization". For Inglehart (1997) this process is translated into a shift from materialist to post-materialist values.

---

[91] Retrieved from:
https://homepage.univie.ac.at/oliver.gruber/Gruber_2019_Swimming%20upstream.pdf (Last accessed December 2020).

Probably because of its stability, Austria soon entered in a post-materialist society where strong changes, especially due to globalization (Mounk 2018) – for instance, Austria's integration in the European project (1995) - began to take place. But as Ignazi (1992,25) noticed, people began to speak out against those changes that were opportunistically addressed by the FPÖ.

Paul Collier (2013,87) claims that immigration matters, but more important than that, is the scale and speed at which those inflows of migrants enter into the country. The refugee crisis of 2015 was the cherry on the top of the cake for the national populist party that was able to mobilize public opinion and to sow the seeds of discord both among mainstream parties and among citizens. In fact, due to the events of 2015 and 2016, the total number of foreign nationals rose to 15% at the beginning of 2017 (Gruber 2019,39). In addition to that, a survey carried out by Eurobarometer (2015) showed that in 2015, the degree of attachment to the country increased sharply; 70% of the respondents felt very attached and 25% of the respondents claimed to feel fairly attached. The number of people who responded in a negative manner was never significant. Compared to the previous and following years, the data from 2015 reached the highest value when considering the degree of attachment to the country (fig.40).

Demographic changes in the composition of the nation and the large influx of immigrants who do not assimilate and import new customs and cultures are potentially felt as a threat to the white majority (Kaufmann 2018,495; 2019).

Figure (40). How much do you feel attached to your country? (Austria)

Source: Eurobarometer 2015[92]

These fears, either real or exaggerated (Orgad 2015) orient individuals towards political solutions that appease their anxieties, having, therefore, an impact on their voting behavior (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2016; Kaufmann 2018; Krastev 2020). Demographic trends in Europe show that the continent is facing a serious demographic crisis (Orgad 2015; Coleman 2012; Kaufmann 2018). The increasingly aging population accompanied by a low fertility rate and increasing flows of immigration, threatens public perceptions over the possibility of today's majority ceasing to exist. In this context of demographic crisis, immigration represents an important element. In fact, Coleman's work (2012, 2015) has shown how countries would suffer drastic decreases in population number if immigration would cease to occur.

Kaufmann (2018,11) argues that in order to understand contemporary national populism, immigration is central and "ethnic change is the story."

---

[92] Retrieved from:
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/26/groupKy/158
(Last accessed December 2020).

Likewise, Rydgren (2008,18) notices that in light of the ethnic competition theory, the higher the percentage of immigrants, the higher the vote for the radical right is. However, this theory cannot explain why Hungarian national populism is so much higher, considering the low percentage of foreign nationals. According to the ethnic competition theory (Rydgren 2008; 2011) Austria should score a much stronger hostile attitude and much higher percentage of national populism than Hungary. But contrary to what should be expected, in Hungary national populism is much more consolidated than in Austria. The concerns over immigration are therefore at the center of the study, but they cannot be dismissed with demographic trends. The following section will briefly observe how Austrian demographic indicators, combined with other factors, can account for the differences between the two countries and account for the controversial results.

b) Demographic Profile

Like other countries in the region, Austria has been shaped by its history, namely by the cross-pressures of Germanic and other cultural influences from the Habsburg empire. As a result, the country has complex cultural and regional cleavages. The country of Austria's population has never experienced a high degree of homogeneity.

When the Habsburg empire fell apart, the country saw its territory sharply reduced. The foundation of a small and independent republic was followed by a Nazi occupation and therefore, Austria's status remained unclear for a decade. After the end of the II WW, Austria had finally experienced independence. These events that the country went through moulded not only its history and culture but also its population composition.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was multi-ethnic, but differently from Hungary, when Austria achieved its independence, the country's population was not built on homogeneity. In fact, this could be explained, among many other reasons, by the mass inflows of immigrants that soon appeared to be needed for seasonal work (IOM Vienna 2004).

In 2017, 1.675 million foreign people lived in Austria. This number corresponds to 19% of the total population. Currently, Austria registers a ratio of foreign-born population of around 35% (Statistics Austria 2019). Already in 2002, Austria had scored a high percentage of foreign-born population compared to other European states (fig. 41).

The country presents, not only, the tendency to maintain an increasing percentage of foreign-born people, but also to increase it (UN 2019).

Figure (41). Percentage of foreign-born, by country, in Europe (2002)

Source: Eurostat 2002[93]

---

[93] Retrieved from: Kaufmann. (2018) Whiteshift. Penguin Books, p.96.

According to UN projections (2019), the share of foreign population is expected to increase by 2.06 million by 2030. In fact, in 2040 the country is expected to reach more than 41% in terms of the number of foreign-born people. Contrary to the average of Europe and of the Western countries, Austria in particular demonstrates a higher and increasing annual rate of population change. This means that Austria, contrary to the European demographic trends, is not yet in a situation of population decline (fig. 42). However, from 2025 onwards, the country is expected to begin experiencing a decline in its rate of population change, and between 2045 and 2050 projections (UN 2019) point to the possibility of the country starting to experience a negative rate of annual change, that is translated into a non-replacement of the deaths by new births.

As the report on World Population prospects (2019) shows, between the years 2045 and 2050, the number of births is expected to be 406, whereas the number of deaths is estimated to be 560. [94]

Figure (42). Average annual rate of population change.

---

[94] Table in the Annex B.

In fact, the report on World Population Prospects (UN 2019) shows that the structure of the population will have dramatically changed by the year 2100.

In 2019 the total populations were 9.0 million, whereas in 2100 it is expected to be 8.677 million. In addition to this, figure 43 shows that in 2019, 55.7% of the population was made up of people aged between 25-64 years old, whereas in 2100 (fig. 44) this number is expected to decline to 44.7%. This is particularly relevant because this age group makes up the active labor force and therefore a decrease in their numbers will translate into a greater dependence of the country on foreign workers. The estimated decline is illustrated in figure 45.

Figure (43). Population Projection in 2019.

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

---

[95] Medium variant projections are illustrated in thin coloured lines and uncertainty is shown in lighter shades for 95 per cent prediction intervals.

Figure (44). Projected Population in 2100.

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

Figure (45). Total Population (1950-2100).

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

Moreover, in 2019 the percentage of people aged 15 or under, was 14.4%, whereas in 2100 it is expected to be 14.2%. The major difference between the two pyramids is related to the age group of 25-64 years old. This decline might be explained by the low fertility rate observed in the country. It is expected to increase from 1.53(2019) to 1.74(2100) (UN 2019), this said it will still not create the conditions necessary to reach the replacement level (2.6). Therefore, presenting a negative indicator regarding the TFR - (fig. 46) (World Population Prospects, UN 2019).

Figure (46). Total fertility – Austria 1950-2100.

Source: UN 2019, World Population Prospects

The fact that even though Austria has a low fertility rate, it has a positive annual rate of population change, might be explained by migration and the increasing share of foreign-born-population.

There are only two ways for population to grow: through births or through immigration. Since the low fertility rate is not able to guarantee population replacement, the only way to justify the positive development in the number of inhabitants in Austria is through increased immigration.

4. Conclusion: Cross-Country Evidences[96]

Figure (1). Hypothesis

Starting from the question - *to what extent is white identity politics, fueled by demographic anxiety, contributing to the rise of European national populism?* – the present work aimed to analyze how the white population's cultural backlash, fueled by hyper-ethnic change and, consequently, by the demographic anxiety it produced, have contributed to the rise of European national populism.

The topic of ethno-demographic change is becoming increasingly present in public debate (Kaufmann 2018).

---

[96] "If the twentieth-century was the century of unmixing, the twenty-first century is one of remixing" (Krastev 2020,70).

Mass migration is changing the European fundamental essence and ancestry and as Samuel Huntington (1996,32) argued[97] people's cultural identities are likely to be the new form of conflict in the post-Cold War era[98].

This is precisely what the contemporary world has been witnessing in recent years with the new radical right highlighting ethno-national themes. Its identitarianism favors a halt of inflows of people and seeks to protect their countries from rapid changes (Kaufmann 2018,7; 2019,2). As Krastev (2020) suggests, the contemporary European nationalism has been defined by ethnicism, fueled by demographic anxieties over Europe's changing salience and culture. Europeans see their share of global population dropping, while non-Europeans have arrived in Europe in large numbers. This frightens people with the likelihood that "too few of us and too many of them" could simultaneously exist in the same territory (Enzensberger 1994,120). Population change is a central issue in this thesis. Immerfal and Betz (1998) as well as Kaufmann (2018;2019) argue that immigration has an intimate causal relationship with the national populist vote. Despite Europeans still being numerically predominant in Europe, they are beginning to imagine a future in which they have become part of the minority (Coleman 2012; Krastev 2020; Kaufmann 2018). There is ample evidence that throughout the world people lack consistent information about the size, growth and/or composition of their population. But beyond that, people have perceptions on population problems that are incompatible with the reality[99] (Kirs 2017,11).

---

[97] In, The Clash of Civilizations (1996).

[98] In his work, the author reflected on the divisions that would be created regarding people's different religion, history, language and tradition.

[99] The concerns over immigration are one possible way of addressing concerns over population decline in the future.

After analysing the two different cases, it would seem that Austrian national populism and Hungarian national populism have resulted in two particularly different political situations[100]. Austria on the one hand, has a higher percentage of immigration inflows but does not have a consolidated national populist government. Hungary, on the contrary, has a low percentage of immigration but nonetheless a stronger presence of national populism in public office.

The nature of both cases well suits Canovan (2002; 2005) and Mudde's (2004) notion of national populism. Both parties use anti-establishment rhetoric and both instrumentalize the group identity (Jardina 2014, 26; 2019,47) and topics of concern to the public[101]. Whilst not meaning to undermine the importance of the economic perspective, the contexts in which both national populist cases emerged satisfy the debate over the prominence of the cultural motivations in detriment to the economic ones[102].

In the data collected both countries have shown to give significant importance to the preservation of the ethnosymbolism of the nation (Smith 1998,170; Kaufmann 2019)[103] as well as both countries present a high percentage of attachment to their country (fig.47), but for some reason both express those sentiments in different ways.

---

[100] According to the Freedom House Annual Report (2019) Hungary is considered partly-free, while Austria is considered free, ranking 93 out of 100.

[101] For instance, when the FPÖ addressed anti-Muslim rhetoric, the party saw its electoral support increase.

[102] The advantages gained by FPÖ with the introduction of anti-Muslim rhetoric and the introduction of the defence of Christian values are an example on how cultural related-issues have a much stronger impact on people's voting preferences, than economic ones do.

[103] Measured by the importance of following traditions and culture, for instance.

Figure (47). How emotionally attached to your country? (Austria and Hungary)

Source: ESS 2018

By comparing the cases of Austria and Hungary, one might conclude that the Hungarian case suits all the three hypotheses. The Hungarian case partly differs from the Austrian case. In fact, national populism has produced much more damage to the Hungarian liberal democracy, where Órban's supermajority in parliament has put him the perfect position to assault the country's individual freedoms as well as the institutional checks and balances. In Austria, the national populist party never reached a majority, and was, from the very beginning, confronted with mass opposition (from both inside and outside the country – EU sanctions). The literature supports the hypothesis that gives prominence to hyper-ethnic changes (Goodwin and Eatwell 2018,132) as an important driver of national populism in both countries.

But regarding the hypothesis that considers the perceived threat of immigration as a result of white anxiety, only Hungary reveals strong predictors, not only according to the literature, but also according to collected data on the topic.

Austria does not show enough evidence to affirm that the perceptions over immigration are a by-product of white anxiety, in the sense that it would permit to affirm that Austrians fear ethnic disappearance. They show, however, a certain pattern of hostility towards immigration, and especially, towards anti-Muslim immigration. The absence of data regarding people's perception of population changes and the lack of literature considering the fear felt by Austrians at the possibility of being outnumbered is probably justified by the positive rate of annual population change (UN 2002). The Austrian case, unlike the Hungarian one, does not verify the hypothesis related with demographic anxiety. This might be explained by the Austrian demographic situation, that among the majority of the European countries, it is one of the most positive cases. In fact, one of the main differences the two countries hold is related to their demographic situation. While Hungary has been observing population decline since 1990, Austria is only expected to register negative rates of population change between the years 2045 and 2050 (UN 2019). Moreover, this decrease (-0,1) will continue to be lower compared to the projected decrease for Hungary in the same time period (2045-2050): -0.5. Therefore, Hungary has a much more concerning situation regarding its demographic composition. The country is now expecting to see its population reduce to 6.857 million by 2100 (UN 2019). At present, young people represent a small cohort of Hungary's population. Also, the low birth rate and the high emigration rate exacerbate this trend even further (Kaufmann 2018). In addition to this, while Austria still presents a positive rate of annual population change, Hungary has demonstrated a negative rate of population change since 1990.

These values combined with the low fertility rate of 1.5[104] contribute to the increasing concerns among the Hungarians over the ethnic disappearance of its nation (fig.48).

Figure (48). Fertility Rate Hungary and Austria.

Source: World bank (1995-2020)[105]

Given this situation, the possibility of allowing immigration becomes even more frightening. The high hostility over immigrants in Hungary[106] is both a by-product of public hysteria (Orgad 2015) and a reaction to the knowledge concerning the demographic situation of the country.

---

[104] Below the replacement level (UN2019).

[105]

Retrieved from:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2018&locations=AT-HU&start=1995
(Last accessed December 2020).

[106] Messing and Ságvári (2018) worked on a report to map perceptions on the issue of immigration and found Hungary to be among one of the countries with the highest percentage of rejection towards immigrants, more than in Poland, for instance, where the national populist appeal is also very strong.

Despite the overestimations regarding the number of immigrants in the country[107] Hungarians have a very accurate idea of their country's situation.

A report[108] on the most extreme positions over the issue of immigration shows that between 2016/2017 (fig. 49) Hungary ranked second in terms of the most extreme perceptions over immigration, whereas Austria ranked fourth, in a year where inflows of migrants were very high. Italy and Hungary are the two countries with most hostile positions towards immigration. Regarding Italy, it is not difficult to explain this position, since the country was one of the most overwhelmed destinations from people who were fleeing from wars in Syria, Afghanistan, etc. But more interestingly, Italy is the country with the oldest population in Europe (PORDATA 2018).[109]

Figure (49). Extreme perception on immigration.

Source: Messing and Ságvári 2018[110]

---

[107] Which might be explained by the government's manipulation of information.

[108] Behind the Culture of fear (Messing and Ságvári 2018).

[109] Information available: https://www.pordata.pt/Europa/%C3%8Dndice+de+envelhecimento-1609 (Last accessed December 2020).

[110] Retrieved from: https://cps.ceu.edu/sites/cps.ceu.edu/files/attachment/article/3014/messing-sagvari-fes-study-march-2018.pdf
(Last accessed December 2020).

Regarding the notion of ethnocracy as the ultimate goal of national populist leaders, in both countries they aim to be founded in a society where cultural differences are barely felt. Especially due to the fear of population decline, mostly felt in Hungary, the reduction of ethnic difference is a sign that their population is still culturally predominant, even if it is decreasing in absolute numbers.

Despite the differences that result from national populism in the two countries, Austrian populism shares with the Hungarian populism the centrality of identity politics in their rhetoric and their agendas. In both cases, the populist mobilizations emanate from the claim that national identity is under assault by foreigners and that ethnic and cultural identities have to be protected. The motto "Hungary for Hungarians" is similar to slogans used by Austrians such as "Vienna for Viennese" or "Austria First" (Mudde 2019, 84). Literature argues that the nationalist sentiments that prevail in Eastern and Western Europe produce different kinds of nationalism (Brubaker 1998,2017; Kohn 1945; Smith 1986; 1991). Brubaker (2017,4) sustains that these differences might be explained by the nature of the concerns held by both. Concerns over immigration are undeniably important in both cases, but the questions they raise in each country might be particularly different. In Austria, the national populist party holds a liberal view, that is, the fear related with the inflow of people from the third-world or nondemocratic countries lies in the anxiety they hold about the erosion of the democratic civic culture of host countries. The cultural question is therefore the key: "How can liberal democracies integrate newcomers without triggering majoritarian political backlash?" (Krastev 2020, 73)

In Hungary, on the other hand, the national populist leader holds a conservative vision, and therefore, the anxiety related with immigrants from different cultures and ancestries is related to the possibility of foreigners destroying the national identity of the country by turning the majority into a minority (Krastev 2020,73).

For Kohn (1945) the rising nationalism in the West is to be found in the democratic creation of the modern nation-state, while the rise of Eastern European nationalism is to be found in the struggle for cultural hegemony. For the author these differences are translated into different kinds of nationalism: a civic and an ethnic nationalism[111].

According to Hjerm (2003,3) the divisions of civic West and ethnic East fail to be relevant if explanations do not take into account the presence of ethnicity within the institutions and as a part of the countries' nationalism.

The aim of this work is not verifying if the West is civic and the East ethnic, but to what extent ethnicity issues are present in explaining national populist support.

Nowadays, the white population's anxiety to protect the values and interests of their groups plays an important role in explaining the present political and social issues. If this is true in the Austrian case, then the theory that would better fit in the national populist explanations is the ethno-traditional nationalism.

Despite Hungarian national populism being better suited to Kaufmann's ethno-traditional nationalist theory, Austrian national populism should also be analyzed using this theory, due to the prominence of the questions related with identity (Hjerm 2003,12)[112].

Therefore, national populism is likely to remain strong in the coming years, especially in countries where population decline is more evident, and if there is another influx of refugees as in 2015.

---

[111] Civic West and Ethnic East.

[112] The introduction of the Christian element as a
an identity issue in the FPÖ discourse, is one example of this.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. (2011). A Political Theory of Populism, NBER Working Papers 17306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Ádám, Zoltán, and András Bozóki. 2016. "State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary." Intersections 2 (1): 98–122.

Affairs, Vol. 53. No. 3), pp. 407–25.

Aghekyan, E. et al. (2018). "Democracy in Crisis", Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (last accessed September 2020).

Alba, R., Rumbaut, R. G., & Marotz, K. (2005). A Distorted Nation: Perceptions of Racial/Ethnic Group Sizes and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Other Minorities. Social Forces, 84(2), 901–919. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0002).

Allport, G.W. (1954) The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books).

Algan, Yann, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou, and Evgenia Passari. (2017). The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall.

Applebaum, Anne. (2020). The Twilight of Democracy: the seductive lure of authoritarianism. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. (2016). Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure, NBER Working Paper No. 22637.

"Austria". 2018.Freedom in the World: Austria. Freedom House. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2018 (last accessed November 2020).

"Austria".2019. Fredoom in the World:Austria.Freedom House. Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2019 (last accessed November 2020).

Baldwin, James. (1976). The Devil Finds Work. New York: Vintage International.

Baycroft, T. and Hewitson, M. (2006). What is a Nation? Europe: 1789–1914, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Becker, J. (2010). The rise of right-wing populism in Hungary. SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 13(1), 29-40. Retrieved December 7, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43293344.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. (1954). Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berg, Howard. (2012). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Pearson. Vol. 8.

Betz, H.-G. (2001). Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. International Journal, 56(3), 393. doi:10.2307/40203575.

Betz, H.G. (1994). Radical Right- Wing Populism in Western Europe. Macmillan.

Betz, H.G. and Immerfall, S. (1998). The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, London: Macmillan Press.

Betz, Hans-Georg. (2003). The Growing Threat of the Radical Right, in Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass, 74–93.

Bonikowski, B. (2017). Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment. The British Journal of Sociology 68 (S1): 181-213.

Bonikowski. B. et al. (2018). Populism and nationalism in comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange: Nations and Nationalism, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12480.

Bozóki, A. (2015). Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism. In The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy, edited by Peter Krasztev and Jon Van Til, 3–36. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Breznau, Nate. (2017). "Europe's Ageing Societies Require Immigration To Survive – And That Means Anti-Immigration Politics Is Here To Stay". EUROPP. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/12/14/europes-ageing-societies-require-immigration-to-survive-and-that-means-anti-immigration-politics-is-here-to-stay/. (Last accessed November 2020)

Brown, L.M. and Lopez, G.E. (2001). 'Political Contacts: Analyzing the Role of Similarity in Theories of Prejudice. Political Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 279–92.

Brubaker, R. (1995). Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: Historical and comparative perspectives. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 18(2), 189–218. doi:10.1080/01419870.1995.9993861

Brubaker, R. (1998). Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the "New Europe." International Migration Review, 32(4), 1047. doi:10.2307/2547671

Brubaker, R. (2017). "Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective". Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

Brubaker, R. (2019). Populism and nationalism. Nations and Nationalism. doi:10.1111/nana.12522.

Byman, D.L. (1998/1999) 'Review: Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact C. Caldwell. 2009. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West, New York: Doubleday.

Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy, Political Studies 47, 1: 2–16.

Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: populism as the ideology of democracy, in Y. Mény, Y. Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK: 25–44.

Canovan, M. Taking politics to the people: populism as the ideology of democracy. (1995). In: Mény Y., Surel Y. (eds) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403920072_2.

Citrin J and Sides J. (2008). Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States. Political Studies 56: 33–56.

Coleman, David, and Rowthorn, Robert. (2011). "Who's Afraid of Population Decline? A Critical Examination of Its Consequences." Population and Development Review 37: 217-48. Doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41762406.

Coleman, David. (2006). Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition. Population and Development Review 32, no. 3: 401-46. Accessed November 15, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20058898.

Collier, Paul. (2013). How Migration is Changing our World, Oxford University Press

Collier, P. (2013). Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World. New York: Oxford University Press.

De Cleen, B. (2017). Populism and nationalism. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ostiguy, & P. Ochoa Espejo (Eds.), Handbook of populism (pp. 342-362). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

De Cleen, B. and, Y. Stavrakakis. (2017). Distinctions and articulations: a discourse

  theoretical framework for the study of populism and nationalism, Javnost - The

  Public 24, 4: 301–319.

De Vries, Catherine. (2018). The Globalization Backlash: it's both culture and th

  economics, stupid. Social Europe.

Doane, Ashley W., Jr. (1997). "Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States: The

  Role of 'Hidden' Ethnicity in Intergroup Relations." Sociological Quarterly 38(3):

375–97.

Duncan, F. (2010) Immigration and integration policy and the Austrian radical right in

  office: the FPÖ/BZÖ, 2000–2006, Contemporary Politics, 16:4, 337-

354, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2010.523935.

Eatwell, R. & Goodwin, M. (2018). "National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal

  Democracy". Penguin Books.

Ellinas, A. (2010). Party and Media Politics in Austria: The Rise of the FPÖ. In, The

  media an the far right in western Europe: playing the nationalist card, Cambridge

University Press, DOI: 10-1017/CBO9780511676017.003.

Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. (1994). Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia, trans. Piers

  Spence and Martin Chalmers, New York: New Press.

European Social Survey. (2002). Qualification for immigration: committed to the way of life. (Austria).

European Social Survey. (2004). Importance of following traditions. (Austria).

European Social Survey. (2016). Cultural life enriched or undermined by immigrants. (Austria).

European Social Survey. (2018). Cultural life enriched or undermined by immigrants (Hungary).

European Social Survey. (2018) How emotionally attached to your country? (Austria and Hungary).

European Social Survey. (2018). Importance of following traditions (Hungary).

European Social Survey. (2018). Allow many/few immigrants from a different ethnic majority (Hungary).

European Social Survey. (2016). Allow few/some immigrants from the same ethnic group as majority (Hungary).

European Commission. Euro-barometers. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/ publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/42/groupKy/208 (Last accessed October 2020).

European Migration Network and National Contact Point Austria. 2004. The Impact of immigration in Austria's society. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/illegally-resident/at-1st_study_en.pdf (last accessed January 2021).

Facchini, G. and A. M. Mayda (2008). From Individual Attitudes Toward Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence. Economic Policy, Vol. 23, No. 56, pp. 651-713.

Foa, S. Robert and Yascha, Mounk. (2016). The danger of deconsolidation: the democratic disconnect. Project MUSE, vol. 27, issue 3.

Freedom in the World report - Austria. (2020). Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/austria.

Fukuyama, F. (2017). "The populist surge". The American Interest.

Fukuyama, F. (2018). "Identities: The demand for dignity and politics of resentment", D.Quixote.

Fukuyama, F. 1992. The end of History and the Last Men. Free Press.

Gallagher, C. A. (2003). Miscounting Race: Explaining Whites' Misperceptions of Racial Group Size. Sociological Perspectives, 46(3), 381–396. doi:10.1525/sop.2003.46.3.381

Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Germani, G. (1978). Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Gidron N, Bart Bonikowski. (2013). Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda, in Weatherhead Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004.

Goldstone, Jack A., Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds. (2012). Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics. Paradigm Publishers.

Goodhart, Richard. (2020). Head, hand and heart, Allen Lane.

Goodwin, M. and Raines, T. (2017). What do Europeans think about Muslim immigration? Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/02/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration (Last acessed November 2020).

Gottardi, Francesco. (2018). Drivers of Populism: economic insecurity or cultural

   backlash? From individual attitudes towards migration to the dynamics of political

   competition. Leiden University.

Green, D.P., Strolovitch, D.Z. and Wong, J.S. (1998) 'Defended Neighborhoods,

   Integration, and Racist Politics in Western Europe'. In Schain, M., Zolberg, A.

and Hossay, P.

Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. (1998). Macropartisanship: A

   Replication and Critique. The American Political Science Review 92(4): 883.

Grubber, O. (2019) Swimming upstream? Attitudes towards immigration in Austria and

   the electoral implications for progressive politics. Retrieved from:

https://homepage.univie.ac.at/oliver.gruber/Gruber_2019_Swimming%20upstream.pdf

Guiso et al. (2020). (PDF) DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF POPULISM.

   Available   at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325472986_DEMAND_AND_SUPPLY_OF_

POPULISM (Last accessed October 2020).

Guiso, Luigi, H. Herrera, M. Morelli, and T. Sonno. (2020)."Economic Insecurity and

   The   Demand   For   Populism   In   Europe". Heliosherrera.Com.

https://www.heliosherrera.com/populism.pdf. (Last accessed October 2020).

Guiso, L., H. Herrera, M. Morelli and T. Sonno. (2017). Populism: Demand and Supply.

      IGIER   and   CEPR,   Working   Paper,   retrieved   from:

http://www.heliosherrera.com/populism.pdf (Last accessed October 2020).

Hafez, F., Heinisch, R. and Miklin, E. (2019). The new right: Austria's Freedom Party

      and   changing   perceptions   of   Islam.   Brookings.   Retrieved   from:

https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-right-austrias-freedom-party-and-

changing-perceptions-of-islam/

Hainmueller J and Hopkins DJ. (2014). Public Attitudes toward Immigration.

      Annual Review of Political Science 17: 225–249.

Halikiopoulou, Daphne & Bart Bonikowski & Eric Kaufmann & Matthijs Rooduijn.

      (2018). Populism and Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective: A Scholarly

Exchange. Nations and Nationalism. 25. 10.1111/nana.12480.

Halikiopoulou, D., Mock, S. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2013). 'The civic zeitgeist:

      nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right', Nations and

Nationalism 19, 1: 107–127.

Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). 'The paradox of nationalism:

      the common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism',

European Journal of Political Research 51, 4: 504–539.

Hans-Georg Betz. (1994). Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St Martin's Press, p. 81.

Harari, N. Y. (2011). Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Vintage Publishing, London.

Hárs, Ágnes. (2009). Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe The Case of Hungary. Idea Working Papers, No.12.

Hawkins, Kirk A. (2009). Is Chavez Populist?: Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42.

Hawkins, Kirk A. (2010). Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heath AF and Tilley JR. (2005). National Identity and Attitudes towards Migrants: Findings from the ISSP. International Journal on Multicultural Societies 7 (2): 119–132.

Hjerm, M. (2003). National Sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe. Nationalities Papers, 31(4), 413–429. doi:10.1080/0090599032000152933.

Hofstadter, Richard. (1964). The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. New York: Vintage Books.

Howard, B. (2012). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Pearson. Vol.
8.

Hungarian Constitution: Fundamental Law of Hungary. (2012). Retrieved from:
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf (last accessed
November 2020).

"Hungary". (2018). Freedom in the Worrld: Hungary. FreedomHouse. Retrieved from:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2018. (last accessed
November 2020).

"Hungay". (2019). Freedom in the World:Hungary. FreedomHouse. Retrieved from:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2019 (last accessed
November 2020).

Huntington, S.P. (1996). The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order,
SIMON & SCHUSTER, New York.

Husbands, C.T. (2002) 'How to Tame the Dragon, or What Goes Around Comes Around:
Hypothesis by H.D. Forbes'. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 4, pp. 720–
30.

Ignazi, P. (2003). Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ignazi, Piero. (1992). The silent counter-revolution: hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe, European Journal of Political Research 22:3–34.

Inglehart, R. (2018). The Age of Insecurity, Foreign Affairs, vol. 97 issue 3.

Inglehart, R. and Paul Abramson. (1995). Economic Security and Value Change. The American Political Science Review,Vol. 88, issue 2, doi:10.2307/1962290.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). "Modernization, cultural change, and democracy." New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash, Harvard Kennedy School RWP 16-026.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Pressdoi:10.2307/j.ctt13x18ck.

Ionescu, G. and Ernest Gellner (eds.). (1969). Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Ivarsflaten, Elizabeth. (2005). 'Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to Western Europeans.' Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 15(1): 21–45.

Jardina, Ashley. (2019). White Identity Politics. Cambridge Studies in Public opinion and political psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jardina, Ashley. (2014). Demise of group dominance: Group Threat and the New Relevance of White Identity for American Politics. PhD(Political Science), University of Michigan.

Kaltwasser, R. Cristóbal and Paul Taggart, Pauline Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds). (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaufmann, E. (2018). Whiteshift: populism, immigration and the future of the white majority. Abrams Books.

Kaufmann, E. (2016). 'Trump and Brexit: why it's again NOT the economy, stupid', LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

Kaufmann, E. (2017). Can Narratives of White Identity Reduce Opposition to Immigration and Support for Hard Brexit? A Survey Experiment. Political Studies, 003232171774048. doi:10.1177/0032321717740489.

Kaufmann, E. (2019), Ethno-traditional nationalism and the challenge of immigration. Nations and Nationalism, vol. 25, issue 2.

Kaufmann, E., & Goodwin, M. J. (2018). The diversity Wave: A meta-analysis of the native-born white response to ethnic diversity. Social Science Research. Doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.07.008

Kaufmann, Eric, and Gareth Harris. (2015). "'White Flight' or Positive Contact? Local Diversity and Attitudes to Immigration in Britain." Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 12,1563–90. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015581684.

Kazin, Michal. (1995). The Populist Persuasion: An American History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kirs, Eszter. (2017). Fears about migration in Hungary in the view of representatives of civil society organizations. COJOURN 2:4. Doi: 10.14267/cojourn.2017v2n4a4

Klein, Matthew and Michael, Petties. (2020). Trade Wars are Class wars, Yale University Press.

Knowles, E. D. and L. R. Tropp. (2016). Donald Trump and the rise of white identity in politics.The Conversation.

Kohn, H. (1944). The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background, New York: Macmillan.

Krastev, I. (2011). The Age of Populism: Reflections on the Self-enmity of Democracy. European View, 10(1), 11–16. doi:10.1007/s12290-011-0152-8

Krastev, I. (2020). The Fear of Shrinking Numbers. Journal of Democracy, 31(1), 66–74. doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0005

Krastev, I. & Holmes, S. (2019). The light that failed. Penguin Books.

Krastev, I. (2007). The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? Journal of Democracy.

Kulcsár, L., & Brown, D. (2009). Public Perceptions of Population Changes in Hungary. Eastern European Countryside, 15(1), 23–36. doi:10.2478/v10130-009-0002-8

Lazarsfeld, P., B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet.(1948). The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. (Second Edition.) Pp. Xxxiii, 178. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. (1944). The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia University Press.

Levitsky, S. & Ziblatt, D. (2018). "How democracies die". Penguin Books.

Lipset, Martin. (2001). The breakdown of class politics: the debate on post-industrial stratification. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C

Lucardie, Paul.(2000). Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties, Party Politics, 6:2, 175–85

Macartney, C.A. (1937). Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-1937, London: Oxford University Press.

Mackenzie, W.J.M. (1978). "Political Identity". New York: St. Martin's Press.

Madrid, R. L. (2008). The rise of ethnopopulism in Latin America, World Politics, Vol. 60(3), pp. 475–508.

Maslow, Abraham H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review 50, n4.

Meinecke, F. (1908). Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Princeton, N. J: Princeton
University Press.

Mendelski, B. (2019). The rethoric of Hungarian Premier Victor Órban: Inside X Outside in
the Context of Immigration Crisis: In: Ratuva S. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of
Ethnicity. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https: ://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0242-
8_155-1 perceptions of Isla

Messing, V. and Ságvári, B. (2019) Still divided but more open. Mapping European
attitudes towards migration before and after the migration crisis. Budapest,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Retrieved from: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/budapest/15322-20190505.pdf (Last accessed December 2020).

Messing, Vera and Ságvár, Bence. (2018). Looking behind the culture of fear: cross-
national analysis of attitudes towards migration. Friedrich Ebert Stifung.

Migration Council for Austria. (2016). Understanding migration – managing migration.
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior Herrengasse 7, A-1010 Vienna.

Miller, D. (1995). "Nationalism". London: Oxford University Press.

Miller, David. (2016). Strangers in Our Midst. The Political Philosophy of Immigration.
Harvard University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9z4w (Last accessed
November 2020).

Minkenberg, M. (2017). "The Radical Right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under Siege?" Palgrave Macmillan.

Minkenberg, Michael. (2001). The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-Setting and Policy Effects, West European Politics, 24:4, 1–21.

Mouffe, C. (2018). "For a left populism." Verso Books.

Mounk, Y. (2018). "The People VS Democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it". Harvard University Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction". In Populism: A Very Short Introduction.

Mudde, Cas and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser.(2017). Populism. Oxford University Press, Oxford UK.

Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.). (2012). Populism in Europe and the Americas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, Cas. (2014). The 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections, or how to craft a constitutional majority. The Washington Post. Retrieved from:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-

hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-majority/ (Last accessed November 2020).

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 542–563. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. (2017). The populist radical right: A Reader. Routledge.

Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? European Journal of Political Research, 52(1), 1–19.

Mudde, C. (2019). "The Far Right Today". Polity Press.

Mudde, Cas. (2010). The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. West European Politics, 33: 6, 1167 — 1186.

Müller, J.W. (2017). What is Populism? Penguin Books.

Norris, Pippa. (2016). It's not just Trump. Authoritarian Populism is rising across the West. Here's why. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/ (Last accessed September 2020)

Norris, P. (2017). "Is Western democracy backsliding? Diagnosing the risks". Journal of Democracy.

Norris, Pippa. (2005). Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–183.

Novak, B. and Kingsley. (2018). Hungary creates new court system cementing leader's control of judiciary. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/world/europe/hungary-courts.html (Last accessed December 2020).

Oakeshott, Michael. 1996. The Politics of faith and the politics of skepticism. Yale University Press.

OECD (2020), Foreign-born population (indicator). doi: 10.1787/5a368e1b-en (Accessed on 29 November 2020).

Orgad, Liav. (2015). The Cultural Defense of Nations: A Liberal Theory of Majority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pappas, T. S. (2016). 'The spectre haunting Europe: distinguishing liberal democracy's challengers', Journal of Democracy 27, 4: 22–36 pp. 241–61.

Putnam, R. (2000). "Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community", New York, Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, R. D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137–174. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x

Radelet, S. (2015). The Great Surge: The Assent of the Developing world. New York, Simon and Schusterm.

Rodrik, D. (2017). Populism and the economics of globalization. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), DP12119.

Rodrik, Dani. (2010). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the future of world economy. Oxford University Press.

Rodrik, Dani. (2019). What is driving populism? Project Syndicate Magazine. Retrieved from: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-and-cultural-explanations-of-right-wing-populism-by-dani-rodrik-2019-07?barrier=accesspaylog (Last accessed October 2020).

Rothschild, Joseph. (1974). East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Roy, Olivier. (2016). "Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts, the Churches and the Concept of a Christian Europe." In Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, edited by Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, 185–201. London: Hurst.

Rydgren, J. (2007) 'The Sociology of the Radical Right'. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. European Journal of Political Research, 47(6), 737–765. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x

Rydgren, J. (ed.). (2012). Class Politics and the Radical Right. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.

Rydgren, J. and Ruth, P. (2011) 'Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Support in support in Sweden: a multilevel analysis.

Sandbu, Martin. (2020). The economics of belonging: a radical plan to win back the left behind and achieve prosperity for all. Princeton University Press.

Skolkay, A. (2000). Populism in Central Eastern Europe. Thinking Fundamentals Vol. 9.

Smith, A. D. (1991). "National Identity". Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A. D. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories
of Nations and Nationalism. London. New York: Routledge.

Smith, A. D. (2010). Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smith, A.D. (1986). The ethnic origins of nation. B.Blackwell.

Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). Anti-populism may be the real threat to democracy. Blog post.
http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/07/24/is-populism-really-a-threat-to-
democracy/#Three

Stockemer, D. (2015). Structural Data on Immigration or Immigration Perceptions? What
Accounts for the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Europe? JCMS: Journal
of Common Market Studies, 54(4), 999–1016. doi:10.1111/jcms.12341

Suransky, P. S. (2017). "Go Back to where you came from: The Backlash against
Immigration and the fate of Western Democracy". C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Surkyn, J and Ron Lesthaeghe. 2004. Value Orientations and the second demographic
transition (SDT) in Nothern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update.
Demographic Research, 3: 45-86.

Szabós, Jakub. 2020. First as a tragedy, then as a farce: a comparative study of right-wing populism in Hungary and Poland. Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, no.2

Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Taguieff, P. A. 1995. Political science confronts populism: from a conceptual mirage to a real problem, Telos 103: 9–43

Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1978). Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations. Academic Press.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Monterrey: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 33–47.

Tajfel, Henri. (1978). Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison. In Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel. London: Academic Press, Inc., 61–76.

Taub, A. (2016). "Behind 2016's Turmoil, a crisis of white identity". The New York Times.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2018). Fidesz. Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Fidesz (Last accessed December 2020).

"Three Paradoxes Fuel the Drift Toward Populism in Europe, Krastev Says | Central
European University". (2020). Ceu.Edu. https://www.ceu.edu/article/2017-03-
15/three-paradoxes-fuel-drift-toward-populism-europe-krastev-says.

TNS Opinion & Political. (2018). Special Eurobarometer 469 Integration of immigrants
in the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2837/918822

Turner, S. Bryan. (2019). Democracy, Demography and right-wing populism. In: G. Fitzi,
J.Mackert and B.Turner (ed.) Populism and the crisis of democracy, vol.3:
migration, gender and religion in the United Kingdom. Taylor & Francis.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
(2019). World Population Prospects 2019. Volume II: Demographic Profiles
(ST/ESA/SER.A/427).

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2019.
World Population Prospects. Volume II: Demographic Profiles.

United Nations. (2000). Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing
Populations? New York:United Nations.

United Nations. (2004). World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. Volume 1, Comprehensive Tables. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

United Nations. (2005). World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Volume 1, Comprehensive Tables. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

Vanhanen, Tatu. (1999). Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis. Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 1 (1999): 55-73.

Viktor Órban Annual Ceremonious Speech for Hungary National Holiday. 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tjoe2GjgLRA&t=9s (last accessed December 2020).

Weiner, Myron, and Michael S. Teitelbaum. 2001. Political Demography, Demographic Engineering. New York: Berghahn.

Weiner, Myron. (1971). Political Demography: An Inquiry into the Consequences of Population Change. In Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications. Prepared by a Study Committee of the Office of the Foreign Secretary: National Academy of the Sciences. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971.

Wike, R. & POUSHTER, J, &,FETTEROLF, J.& SCHUMACHER, S.(2020). Classifying European Political Parties. Pew Research Centre. Retrieved from: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/us-image-2019-appendix-classifying-european-political-parties/

Wischenbart, R. (1994). National identity and immigration in Austria - historical framework and political dispute. West European Politics, 17(2), 72–90. doi:10.1080/01402389408425015

Wodak, R. (2015). "The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourse Mean." Sage.

Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22. doi:10.2307/20048274

Zakaria, F.(1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, issue 22. doi:10.2307/20048274

Zavala, Agnieszka, Rita Guerra, and Claudia Simao. (2017). The relationship between the Brexit Vote and individual predictors of prejudice: Collective narcissism, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation. Frontiers In Psychology 8. https://doi.org/10.3389/ fpsyg.2017.02023).

Zoltán, A. and A. Bozóki. (2016). State and Faith: Right-Wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary. Intersections 2(1).

Annexes

Annex A

Hungarian Demographic Profile

United Nations. (2019). World Population Prospects: Demographic Profiles, Vol.II

Hungary

	1950	1970	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2030	2050	2075	2100
Population												
Total population (thousands)	9 338	10 366	10 377	10 221	10 086	9 927	9 778	9 660	9 338	8 470	7 472	6 857
Median age (years) (a)	30.1	34.2	36.4	38.5	39.1	40.1	41.7	43.3	45.9	48.0	47.6	47.7
Population under age 15 (thousands)	2 328	2 158	2 118	1 720	1 565	1 475	1 413	1 392	1 336	1 175	1 072	989
Population aged 15-24 (thousands)	1 542	1 715	1 460	1 519	1 303	1 230	1 142	1 004	942	853	769	697
Population aged 25-64 (thousands)	4 738	5 292	5 402	5 438	5 643	5 624	5 515	5 317	5 007	4 071	3 466	3 132
Population aged 65+ (thousands)	729	1 201	1 396	1 543	1 575	1 598	1 708	1 948	2 053	2 371	2 164	2 039
Percentage of population under age 15	24.9	20.8	20.4	16.8	15.5	14.9	14.5	14.4	14.3	13.9	14.4	14.4
Percentage of population aged 15-24	16.5	16.5	14.1	14.9	12.9	12.4	11.7	10.4	10.1	10.1	10.3	10.2
Percentage of population aged 25-64	50.7	51.1	52.1	53.2	56.0	56.7	56.4	55.0	53.6	48.1	46.4	45.7
Percentage of population aged 65+	7.8	11.6	13.5	15.1	15.6	16.1	17.5	20.2	22.0	28.0	29.0	29.7
Dependency ratios (per 100)												
Total dependency ratio (b)	97.1	95.9	92.1	87.9	78.7	76.5	77.3	81.7	86.5	108.1	115.6	119.0
Child dependency ratio (c)	81.7	73.2	66.2	59.6	50.8	48.1	46.3	45.1	45.5	49.8	53.1	53.9
Potential support ratio (d)	6.5	4.4	3.9	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.2	2.7	2.4	1.7	1.6	1.5

	1950-1955	1965-1970	1985-1990	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2025-2030	2045-2050	2070-2075	2095-2100
Rates of population change												
Annual rate of population change (percentage)	1.0	0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5	-0.5	-0.3
Population doubling time (years) (e)	68	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mortality												
Crude death rate per 1,000 population	11.3	10.9	13.9	13.8	13.2	13.2	12.7	12.5	13.5	14.6	14.9	12.8
Infant mortality rate (1q0) per 1,000 live births	72	37	17	10	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	1
Under-five mortality (5q0) per 1,000 live births	83	41	19	11	9	7	6	5	4	2	1	1
Life expectancy at birth (years)	64.0	69.5	69.4	70.9	72.5	73.7	75.3	76.6	78.0	80.8	84.2	86.9
Male life expectancy at birth (years)	61.9	66.8	65.4	66.5	68.3	69.6	71.6	73.0	74.6	78.1	82.1	84.9
Female life expectancy at birth (years)	66.1	72.0	73.6	75.4	76.7	77.8	78.7	80.1	81.3	83.5	86.2	88.9
Life expectancy at age 65 (years)	12.6	13.4	13.8	14.6	15.3	15.9	16.5	17.2	18.1	19.9	22.2	24.2
Fertility												
Crude birth rate per 1,000 population	21.0	14.5	12.0	9.7	9.4	9.5	9.1	9.5	9.1	9.0	9.2	9.3
Total fertility (live births per woman)	2.69	1.98	1.82	1.38	1.29	1.33	1.33	1.49	1.58	1.67	1.73	1.75
Sex ratio at birth (males per 100 females)	106	106	106	106	106	105	105	106	106	106	106	106
Mean age of childbearing (years)	27.2	25.5	25.4	26.8	27.9	28.9	29.4	29.6	30.3	31.5	31.9	31.9
Births and deaths												
Number of births (thousands)	1 006	742	630	500	476	477	447	461	428	384	347	322
Number of deaths (thousands)	540	561	728	707	672	661	627	609	634	626	565	443
Births minus deaths (thousands)	466	181	- 98	- 207	- 196	- 184	- 179	- 148	- 206	- 242	- 218	- 121
International migration												
Net number of migrants (thousands)	25	16	- 92	79	62	25	30	30	30	30	30	30
Net migration rate (per 1,000)	0.5	0.3	-1.8	1.5	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9

a   Age that divides the population in two parts of equal size, that is, there are as many persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median.
b   The total dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 0-24 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 25-64. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (25-64).
c   The child dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 0-24 to the population aged 25-64. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (25-64).
d   The potential support ratio is the ratio of the population aged 25-64 to the population aged 65 years or over. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of age 65 years or over.
e   The population doubling time corresponds to the number of years required for the total population to double in size if the annual rate of population change would remain constant. Doubling time is computed only for fast growing populations with growth rates exceeding 0.5 per cent.

4

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
World Population Prospects 2019, Volume II: Demographic Profiles

156

Annex B

Austrian Demographic Profile

United Nations. (2019). World Population Prospects:Demographic Profiles, Vol.II

Austria

	1950	1970	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2030	2050	2075	2100
Population												
Total population (thousands)	6 936	7 516	7 724	8 069	8 254	8 410	8 679	9 006	9 176	9 131	8 788	8 677
Median age (years) (a)	35.7	33.6	36.5	38.2	40.0	41.9	43.2	43.5	45.5	49.3	48.7	48.5
Population under age 15 (thousands)	1 579	1 848	1 308	1 358	1 318	1 238	1 225	1 298	1 350	1 225	1 231	1 235
Population aged 15-24 (thousands)	950	997	1 151	950	1 013	1 023	1 008	961	879	899	880	848
Population aged 25-64 (thousands)	3 685	3 622	4 113	4 520	4 585	4 652	4 810	5 018	4 772	4 323	3 974	3 874
Population aged 65+ (thousands)	722	1 050	1 153	1 242	1 337	1 497	1 635	1 730	2 174	2 684	2 703	2 720
Percentage of population under age 15	22.8	24.6	16.9	16.8	16.0	14.7	14.1	14.4	14.7	13.4	14.0	14.2
Percentage of population aged 15-24	13.7	13.3	14.9	11.8	12.3	12.2	11.6	10.7	9.6	9.8	10.0	9.8
Percentage of population aged 25-64	53.1	48.2	53.3	56.0	55.6	55.3	55.4	55.7	52.0	47.4	45.2	44.7
Percentage of population aged 65+	10.4	14.0	14.9	15.4	16.2	17.8	18.8	19.2	23.7	29.4	30.8	31.4
Dependency ratios (per 100)												
Total dependency ratio (b)	88.2	107.5	87.8	78.5	80.0	80.8	80.4	79.5	92.3	111.2	121.1	124.0
Child dependency ratio (c)	68.6	78.5	59.8	51.1	50.9	48.6	46.4	45.0	46.7	49.1	53.1	53.8
Potential support ratio (d)	5.1	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.4

	1950-1955	1965-1970	1985-1990	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2025-2030	2045-2050	2070-2075	2095-2100
Rates of population change												
Annual rate of population change (percentage)	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.1
Population doubling time (years) (e)	—	122	—	—	—	—	111	94	—	—	—	—
Mortality												
Crude death rate per 1,000 population	12.3	12.9	11.3	10.0	9.4	9.2	9.4	9.9	10.2	12.2	12.6	11.1
Infant mortality rate (1q0) per 1,000 live births	53	26	9	5	4	4	3	3	2	1	1	1
Under-five mortality (5q0) per 1,000 live births	61	30	11	6	5	5	4	4	2	2	1	1
Life expectancy at birth (years)	66.5	70.1	75.0	77.5	78.9	80.1	81.0	81.4	82.9	85.5	88.3	91.0
Male life expectancy at birth (years)	63.8	66.7	71.5	74.2	75.9	77.3	78.4	78.9	80.9	83.7	86.6	89.3
Female life expectancy at birth (years)	69.1	73.3	78.2	80.6	81.7	82.8	83.5	83.8	84.8	87.3	90.1	92.9
Life expectancy at age 65 (years)	13.1	13.6	16.1	17.5	18.4	19.2	19.8	19.8	20.9	22.8	25.0	27.1
Fertility												
Crude birth rate per 1,000 population	15.0	17.2	11.2	10.4	9.6	9.3	9.5	9.9	9.6	8.9	9.0	9.3
Total fertility (live births per woman)	2.10	2.57	1.45	1.39	1.38	1.40	1.45	1.53	1.60	1.68	1.73	1.74
Sex ratio at birth (males per 100 females)	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	106
Mean age of childbearing (years)	27.9	26.9	26.9	28.0	28.7	29.5	30.2	30.6	31.6	32.6	32.7	32.7
Births and deaths												
Number of births (thousands)	522	639	430	417	392	387	404	439	437	406	397	403
Number of deaths (thousands)	427	478	432	403	385	384	402	437	466	560	555	481
Births minus deaths (thousands)	95	161	-2	14	6	3	2	3	-29	-153	-157	-78
International migration												
Net number of migrants (thousands)	-78	50	111	65	178	154	267	325	100	100	100	100
Net migration rate (per 1,000)	-2.3	1.4	2.9	1.6	4.4	3.7	6.3	7.4	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3

a   Age that divides the population in two parts of equal size, that is, there are as many persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median.
b   The total dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 0-24 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 25-64. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (25-64).
c   The child dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 0-24 to the population aged 25-64. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of working age (25-64).
d   The potential support ratio is the ratio of the population aged 25-64 to the population aged 65 years or over. They are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of age 65 years or over.
e   The population doubling time corresponds to the number of years required for the total population to double in size if the annual rate of population change would remain constant. Doubling time is computed only for fast growing populations with growth rates exceeding 0.5 per cent.

4

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
World Population Prospects 2019, Volume II: Demographic Profiles

158