

THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP: THE EU's CHANGING POLICY
TOWARDS AFRICAN IRREGULAR MIGRATION

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Contents

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	6
1.0 Background	6
1.2 Mapping hypothesis	10
1.3 Framing irregular migration and the root causes	13
1.4 Defining variables	15
1.5 The relevance of the study	16
1.6 The structure of the study.....	17
CHAPTER TWO: THE EU MIGRATION POLICY CHANGE.....	23
2.0 Introduction.....	23
2.1 Development of the EU Asylum and Migration Control Policy (1990-2015).....	25
2.2 The Common European Asylum Policy (CEAP).....	29
2.3 European Approach for Migration (EAM)	33
2.4 Development of border control policies.....	36
2.5 External control: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).....	38
2.6 A normative turn: Addressing the Root Causes of irregular migration	40
2.7 Mapping of the EU’s migration policy change	41
2.8 Summary of the EU migration policy change.....	41
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	44
3.0 Introduction.....	44
3.1 Policy venue shopping for fortress Europe	45
3.2 A race to the bottom.....	48
3.3 Migration Control through co-operation with non-EU member states	51
3.4 The EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration control	55
3.5 African countries’ resistance to cooperating in irregular migration control	57
3.6 Subverting the EU’s influence	66
3.7 A recap and highlights of the literature gap	67
3.8 Towards decolonization: The root cause of African irregular migration as an emerging issue of contention	70
CHAPTER FOUR: RHETORICAL ACTION THEORY	77
4.0 Introduction.....	77
4.1 Rhetorical action and adaptation.....	79
4.2 Rhetorical entrapment	82
4.3 Formation of rhetoric in rhetorical action	84
4.4 Rhetorical action and Persuasion	88
4.5 rhetorical action and the EU policy-shaping.....	93

4.6 The EU-Africa Partnership as a platform of social engagement.....	96
4.7 Operationalization of variables: rhetorical action and entrapment	97
4.7.1 Independent variable: Rhetorical action.....	98
4.7.2 Intermediate variable: The 2015 migration crisis - a catalyst for the rhetorical action.....	106
4.8 Conceptual Diagram	108
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	110
5.0 Introduction to rhetorical analysis.....	110
5.1 Analyzing rhetorical situation and rhetorical action	112
5.2 Digital data and data sources.....	114
5.3 Data and data sources.....	117
5.4 The process of rhetorical analysis	117
5.4.1 Preparation for research (gathering background information).....	118
5.4.2 Data collection and sorting.....	119
5.4.3 Data analysis	121
5.4.4 Presentation of research findings and discussion.....	124
5.5 Validity and reliability	125
5.6 Limitation in rhetorical analysis.....	126
CHAPTER SIX: STUDY ANALYSIS	128
6. 1 Introduction.....	128
6.2 Africa’s rhetoric of coloniality.....	130
6.3 The rhetoric of colonialism in irregular migration control	130
6.4 Rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration.....	134
6.4.1 Africa’s critique of neo-colonialism	135
6.4.2 Rhetoric of the root causes of African irregular migration	138
6.5 European rhetoric on irregular migration before the Valletta Summit	142
6.6 The Africa-EU Valletta Summit	144
6.6.1 European rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (the rhetoric of migration control).....	146
6.6.2 African rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (critique rhetoric of neo-colonialism).....	152
6.6.3 Demystifying root causes: A critic of the EU’s domination and lack of impartiality	158
6.6.4 From rhetorical action to rhetorical entrapment in the Valletta Summit	164
6.7 The EU rhetorical adaptation in Parliament.....	169
6.9. Summary of the findings chapter	180
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION	183
7.1 Introduction.....	183
7.2 Persuasion through the rhetoric of colonialism – a strategy of blackmailing	186
7.3 Formation and expression of neo-colonial rhetoric and root causes of African migration ..	189

7.4 The 2015 Valletta Summit: a space for social recognition and validation of the rhetoric of root causes of irregular migration	191
7.5 Rhetorical entrapment: a learning experience for the European partners	193
7.6 The EU policy change.....	196
7.7 Advancing knowledge: ‘the postcolonial others’ influencing the normative power Europe	198
7.8 Summary of the discussion chapter.....	199
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	203
8.1 Conclusion	203
8.2 Recommendation	206
References.....	208

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“It is important for us to be meeting now because we are currently at a critical turning-point, in so far as the European Union finds itself compelled to redefine its policy for border management with regard to receiving migrants and refugees, while remaining faithful to the values of the Union which define us as the European Union. Europe wants to remain open and faithful to its values” **(the Prime Minister of Luxembourg and the then head of Luxembourg presidency in the European Council, Xavier Bettel, during the 2015 Valletta Summit)¹.**

“I believe that the time when we had the illusion of managing migration flows only through border management is gone. We have now finally understood, not only that we need to act as Europeans, all together, but also that we need to act on what we all usually define as the root causes: poverty, climate change, lack of democratic spaces, violations of human rights, opportunities for life.” **(High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, 2017).**

1.0 Background

The EU is changing its course of African irregular migration management from control measures to ‘addressing the root causes.’ In 2015, during the EU-Africa Valetta Summit on irregular migration control, the EU took an unprecedented migration management course: it established the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETFFA), with a specific aim to address the root causes of migration in Africa. The move signified a reenergized effort by both the African and European partners to reconstruct and redefine African irregular migration (Castillejo, 2016, 2017; McKeon, 2018; Parshotam, 2017). First, the EU-Africa partnership agreement signed at the Valletta summit acknowledged the root causes of irregular migration in African countries.

¹ European Commission (2015g);Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg (2015).

Secondly, it recognized that the right approach to managing African irregular migration flows is addressing those root causes (European Commission, 2015f; European Commission, 2020). Such a policy shift appears to run against the conventional knowledge in migration studies, that since the 1990s, when the process of integrating migration and asylum issues at the EU level began, the EU had always capitalized on border protection and migration control measures (Celata and Coletti, 2016; Chou, 2012; Guiraudon, 2000; Guild, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Guild and Bigo, 2010; Lavenex, 2001; Parkes, 2017; Van Criekinge, 2008). It hence remains puzzling as to why and how the EU took such an unprecedented policy shift to tackle the root causes of African irregular migration.

Even though the EU had always engaged African countries in irregular migration management, the concept of the root causes (and the need for addressing the root causes) remained entirely absent in the EU policy documents in the 2000s. Throughout this period, there lacked a concrete policy on irregular migration management that could be connected to addressing the root causes (Castles and Van Hear, 2011; Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Moreover, during this time, “migration policy-making was packaged into the ‘technocratic’ language of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘adaptation’ to existing norms, specifically in the area of human rights and humanitarian migration” (Weinar et al., 2018:2). Unlike in the scholarship in the 2000s, in recent years, and most significantly since the 2015 Valletta Summit, there has been an invigorated focus on addressing the root causes of African irregular migration (see Castillejo, 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2017; Fulvio, 2016; McKeon, 2018; Trauner, 2016; Parshotam, 2017; Vătăman, 2016). Even then, a few scholars, such as Guiraudon (2018) and Scipioni (2017), suggest there was no major turning point in EU policy development in 2015. While these scholars criticize the EU's actions of empowering external border control in maintaining fortress Europe, they remain silent on the unprecedented policy shift that resulted from the 2015 Valletta Summit.

However, Carling (2017) terms the move to address root causes of African irregular migration as intuitive but problematic and misleading.

Some studies have suggested that the 2015 migration crisis triggered the EU policy change (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019; Falkner, 2016; Paul and Roos, 2019). They hold this argument since the EU-Africa Valletta Summit (where the EU policy migration change was initialized) was held when the European migration crisis peaked. However, I argue contrary to what these studies suggest: that the 2015 migration crisis on its own was not a trigger for the EU policy change. First, the crisis did not offer a policy direction. The EU had the option to empower its existing structures of irregular migration control or would have taken any other alternative rather than taking a new policy shift. As explained by Nohrstedt and Weible, “even if many crises are followed by struggles over the dominant interpretation of causes and implications, the proximity of crises in relation to policy subsystems (in terms of policy and geographical distance) remains critical in order to clarify the nature, involvement, and effects on policy debates” (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010:3; see also, Weible et al., 2012). I advance my argument that the process of influencing the EU actors to refocus on addressing the root causes of African irregular migration started as early as 2008, but the policy shift was actualized through the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit. The 2015 migration crisis, therefore, can only be understood as a catalyst for policy change (*see the conceptual framework and operationalization of variables in the theory chapter for a detailed analysis*).

The concept of the root causes of African irregular migration was not new and did not emerge with the 2015 migration crisis. It was first mentioned in the 1999 Tampere Convention but ever since, it was not embraced into the EU migration policy (Boswell, 2002, Lindstrøm, 2005). “By the 2000s, the root-causes doctrine had become engrained in European policy thinking about migration and development. It has partly been a dormant idea, however, and re-emerged in an unprecedented way with the establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in

2015” (Carling and Talleraas, 2016:6; Carling 2017:20). The intensification of the need to address the root causes of migration originated from the debates between the European and the African partners that, first, the causes of African irregular migration ought to be understood from a historical perspective (Andersson, 2015; Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; Eskinazi, 2011; De Haas, 2014; Ogu, 2017; McKeon, 2018). Secondly, the root causes were structural and systematic (Boswell, 2002; Crush, 2015; Carling and Talleraas, 2016; Docquier et al., 2014; McKeon, 2018; Mwangi & Cirella, 2020). In these international debates, particularly within the EU-Africa partnership, Africa was viewed as an actor in a continuous struggle for decolonization and one which advocated for a change of norms of engagement with the EU actors (Staeger, 2016).

This idea of root causes did not only pull attention to the role of ‘norms as structures’ but also the behavior of both the African and European partners in irregular migration governance. “Exploring the construction and change of norms within their socio-cultural contexts conveys one part of the story, while studying the role of norms as causing rule-following behavior conveys the other” (Wiener, 2007:51, see also Wiener, 2004). The persistent tension in irregular migration management between European and African partners indicated conflicting interests and partners’ attempts to reposition themselves to pursue their preferences by framing and counter-framing irregular migration management norms. The struggle over the norms of irregular migration management provided a platform where interventions and investigations met. As a result, the EU-Africa partnership almost drastically established a new form of legitimacy relating to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration. As Bano argues, “as new norms emerge through competition, decisions taken at the point of contention may appear to contradict or deviate from the prevailing interests and the previous known normative framework” (Bano, 2015:9). I, therefore, argue that interaction between European

and African partners was a manifestation of a new norm formation process that established the 2015 migration policy shift.

Emerging migration studies suggest that the EU migration policy shift to address the root causes of African migration was influenced by African partner countries (Andersson, 2016; Fulvio, 2016). “Further, the export of a security model [*by the EU actors*] has given more powerful ‘partner’ states a perfect bargaining chip” in irregular migration control (Andersson, 2016: 1063; see also Andersson, 2014:274ff). Additionally, it is suggested that African partner countries were the ‘exogenous agents’, and the root causes of irregular migration were the ‘exogenous issue’ that influenced the EU to change its irregular migration management approach (Fulvio, 2016). But how?

It is on this background that this study presents the question; how did the African partner countries participate in influencing the EU’s change of migration approach from purely control mechanisms to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration?

1.2 Mapping hypothesis

The labels ‘refugees’ and ‘irregular migrants’ have been re-conceptualized and redefined by political actors, in both historical and present contexts, to become a powerful discursive force for political mobilization in different spaces (Godin and Doná, 2016). Witteborn explains how actors make irrelevant issues become relevant in policymaking in migration. He defines such ‘becoming relevant’ as “a process through which people shift between different moments and ways of being and relating while responding to historical, socio-political and economic realities, and moving towards new ways of experiencing and acting in the world” (Witteborn, 2015:364). The politics of post-coloniality and that of Eurocentrism continue to dominate the EU-Africa relations on irregular migration control. As scholars assert, the Africa-Europe colonial engagement continues to shape how Africa and European partners view each other

within the irregular migration control partnership. This indicates a heightened consciousness of coloniality and the ethical imperative of managing irregular migration (Adepoju, 2006; Staeger, 2016; Woolley, 2017; Philipps, 2018). To Andersson (2016), African partner countries have used irregular migrants as a tool of persuasion to redirect the EU's external actions towards the historicity of coloniality. The root causes of irregular migration have been argued to link to the historical past and, in particular, colonialism (Baldwin-Edwards, 2009; De Haas, 2014; Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013).

The emergence and growth of the concept of root causes of irregular migration apparently has been part of Africa's decolonization process. Staeger, for instance, argues that "Pan-African decolonization is an unfinished, normative project that will reshape Africa-EU relations toward a more equal, actual partnership of voluntary engagement.[..] As such post-colonial studies have gradually shifted from pure resistance to European colonialism to a re-problematization of post-colonial itself" (Staeger, 2016: 982, see also Kotsopoulos and Mattheis, 2018). Other scholars argue that African countries have always made an effort to reconstruct history which has primarily been written from a Eurocentric point of view and where Europe exerts unparalleled hegemony in constructing ideas around the African irregular migration (Garrido et al., 2019: 2-8).

Irregular migration control is one of the areas where the 'post-colonial others' have equated the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and that of Eurocentrism. "A postcolonial perspective on NPE explains why an EU foreign policy based on Eurocentric norms struggles to free itself of paternalistic discourse about Africa" (Staeger, 2016:981; see also Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). While acknowledging the increasing literature on Africa's effort to decolonize (Gikandi, 2010; Woolley, 2014; Gallien, 2017; 2018), this research study offers a yet unexplored perspective of the EU migration policy shift. It begins by presenting a

hypothesis that African partner countries constructed a linkage between the root causes of African irregular migration and coloniality. In this regard, the construction of the root causes was both instrumental and norm-based in influencing the EU change of policy towards African irregular migration. This hypothesis presents an emerging perspective of the EU-Africa engagement in international affairs. The study aimed to fill a puzzling analytical gap - how did the African partners (African Union, regional blocs, and African countries) use coloniality to construct the root causes of African irregular migration to influence the traditionally dominant EU actors.

In their study 'Migrating towards minority status: Shifting European policy towards Roma,' Guglielmo and Waters (2005) demonstrate that the EU migration policy change was influenced through a rhetorical action. This study brings the Africa-Europe colonial engagement at the center stage to examine how [de]coloniality and the framing of the African irregular migration reinforce each other to form a strong enough rhetoric to influence the EU's shift of irregular migration management approach. As an argument, African countries generated persuasion towards the EU's policy shift through rhetorical action. They constructed rhetoric that the European partners (the EU and the EU member states) were directly or indirectly part of the root causes of African irregular migration and therefore were obliged to take responsibility. In this respect, rhetorical action was the strategy of influencing the EU policy shift. From Andersson's view, the effectiveness of generating influence depended on how African partner countries constructed irregular migrants and how successful that construction impacted the EU actors (Andersson, 2016). As such, the construction of irregular migrants and the root causes presented a progression of decolonization by African countries. In other words, the study offers a perspective of how African countries within the EU-Africa partnership used colonial rhetoric through rhetorical action to influence the EU migration policy shift.

1.3 Framing irregular migration and the root causes

The concept of root causes of irregular migration is dependent on how irregular migration itself is conceptualized. Hence, the root cause is a problematic, unclear and sometimes contradictory concept. It is also a term that is undergoing constructions and experiences political contestation and analytical uncertainty, making it even more complex (Düvell, 2009; Vollmer, 2011; Chadwick, 2017). The categorization of migrants as refugees, economic migrants, invaders, legal/regular or illegal/irregular is deeply embedded in both policy and social sciences, thus enabling the reconstructions of the social world in which root causes occur (Bakewell 2008a; 2008b; Crawley et al., 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2017). This categorization creates an opportunity for strategic use of constructions where “they offer a window into the migratory ecology of survival, whereby a morally ambiguous of ‘gray zone’ allows for the victim to become the victimizer and where, in fact, any clear-cut distinction between perpetrator and victim is often blurred and indiscernible” (Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013:6; see also Morrice, 2017). Critical scholarship has presented the framing of knowledge in irregular migration studies as Eurocentric. Different concepts such as ‘Abyssal lines’ (de Santos, 2016: 118ff; 2016b; Morrice, 2019) or ‘Departheid’ (Kalir, 2019) have been put forth to explain how the western line of thinking controls how ‘the others’ view migration and irregular migrants. “In the same way, in spite of the fact that political colonialism has been eliminated, the relationship between the European – also called ‘Western’ – culture, and the others, continues to be one of colonial domination” (Quijano, 2007:168). In the Western publics, the concept of irregular migrants appears to be well constructed as threats to national security and social systems (Balzacq, 2005; Huysmans 2006, 2006b:1ff; Bobba and Roncarolo, 2018), African exodus or catastrophic invasion (De Haas, 2008a; Collier, 2013).

This study holds the ambiguity of the root causes of African irregular migration at its center of analysis. Within the EU-Africa partnership scholarship, it remains unclear how African partner countries politically construct the concept of root causes of African irregular migration and express it to their European counterparts. As argued by Triulzi and McKenzie, the analysis of the framing of African irregular migration needs to be understood from a historical perspective instead of a narrow and presentists' version.

“The link between irregular migration and historical past appears to be poorly perceived among the new generations of African migrants. It is depicted as unemployed urbanized youths who appear to escape from the present ‘regimes of violent’ rather than from their nebulous colonial past” (Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013:6).

The study uses the term irregular migration according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) definition - “the movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (IOM, 2011). Based on this definition, irregular migration is a generic term that consists of both asylum seekers and economic migrants. The study incorporates Africa’s historical past (colonialism) in examining Africa’s framing of the root causes of irregular migration. The meaning of colonialism, in this case, goes beyond the 1884 Berlin conference on the scramble, demarcation and occupation of the African continent. Instead, the term colonialism is borrowed from Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who defines it as “a system of naturalizing differences in such a way that the hierarchies that justify domination, oppression, and so on are considered the product of the inferiority of certain peoples and not the cause of their so-called inferiority. Their inferiority is ‘natural’, and because it is natural, they ‘have’ to be treated accordingly; that is, they have to be dominated” (de Santos, 2016b:18, see also Panico, 2019; Distretti, 2019).

As a claim, the construction of irregular migrants as victims of colonialism and neo-colonialism by African partner countries needs to be understood as part of the postcolonial discourse (Triulzi and McKenzie, 2013: 6). The dominant postcolonial critique is that the underlining power imbalance of the EU-Africa relationship in irregular migration management takes the form of neo-colonialism. “Postcolonialism claims that colonial discourses, domination and oppression continue beyond the end of historical colonialism and that there is an ongoing legacy of colonial relations of inequality and Western privilege” (Morrice, 2019:21-22). Other than the colonial rhetoric, the EU was heavily criticized for taking the fortress approach during the migration crisis (Del Sarto, 2016; Menéndez, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Vătăman, 2016).

Although the strategic use of colonial rhetoric in framing African irregular migration was a robust persuasion tool, its effectiveness was enhanced by a strong critique of the EU’s inconsistency in its ‘normative *actorness*’ in irregular migration control. In other words, the EU policy shift was a readjustment of its external *actorness* relative to the African partners’ influence to take responsibility in addressing the root causes.

1.4 Defining variables

The construction of colonialism and neo-colonialism as the root causes of African irregular migration by African partner countries influenced the EU migration policy shift from control approaches to addressing the root causes. However, to make the rhetoric of the root causes of irregular migration more influential, African partner countries critiqued the EU actors by highlighting the inconsistency within its ‘normative’ external actions. Besides, due to the 2015 migration crisis, the EU urgently required a working solution. The migration crisis, in this case, acted to catalyze the EU’s acceptance of the African rhetoric of addressing the root causes of irregular migration.

In this study, rhetorical action and entrapment enable understanding the policy learning process, which led to the EU migration policy change. A policy change requires both knowing and deciding and takes different forms depending on the conceptual contexts and across different collective settings within policy processes (Birkland, 2006: 2-5; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013; Klindt, 2011; Radaelli, 2009). “By focusing on how issues are defined, one can explore how leaders – who are themselves politically motivated -actively adopt strategies to justify reforms” (Lin and Katada, 2020:5; see also Marmor et al., 2015). The EU policy change was an outcome of policy learning resulting from a successful rhetorical entrapment. As put forward by Heikkila and Gerlak, “in defining learning, we first draw out the connection between learning processes and learning products, both cognitive and behavioral” (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013:484). The EU paradigm shift in African irregular migration management and the establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa are conceptualized as the cognitive and behavioral products of rhetorical action. However, while these learning products are quite clear, the study focuses on the process of rhetorical action that resulted in policy change (*see section 7.6.2 in the discussion chapter for more detail*).

1.5 The relevance of the study

By studying how the African partner countries constructed and expressed the construction of irregular migrants and the root cause of irregular migration, and the EU’s response to this rhetoric, it becomes possible to understand the degree and dimension of influence on policy shift. It also enables a proper understanding of each partner’s interests in irregular migration management and the underpinning sustainability of the EU-Africa partnership. In the analysis of international relations, this study sheds light on the increasing proactiveness of the ‘post-colonial others,’ particularly Africa, against the normative power Europe. From the lens of social constructivism, the study informs how the predominantly lesser persuasive actors can use the colonial rhetoric to generate influence towards the EU foreign policy change. The study

also offers insights into how the seemingly dying politics of coloniality has been brought into a living debate within the EU-Africa irregular migration framework.

1.6 The structure of the study

Chapter Two: the EU migration policy change – focuses on the development and the dimensions of the EU asylum and migration policy change. The first section examines policy development from the early 1990s to 2015. This section is divided into two broad categories of policy development: first, policies that focus on irregular migration control within the EU (by the EU institutions) and, secondly, policies that aim at deterring irregular migration from outside the EU external borders. The chapter demonstrates the policy change in two dimensions: 1) EU's actions in irregular migration control have continuously been expanding beyond the EU external borders, and 2) there is increasing involvement of non-EU actors in irregular migration management. In either case, migration control and border protection mechanisms remain the predominant approach. However, an unprecedented shift in the migration management approach took place in 2015. The EU took a different policy course – that of addressing the root causes of irregular migration. The policy goes against the EU's tradition of migration control and indicates a change in the 'core' of the migration policy framework that I term as a normative change.

Chapter three: literature review examines the scholarship of the EU's asylum and migration policy change or failure to change. It discusses different scholarly arguments, including the 'policy venue shopping' argument that explains the communitarization of asylum and migration policy. 'The race to the bottom' argument explains the establishment of the Common European Asylum Policy. The chapter further examines the African partners' resistance to cooperate in the EU-Africa partnership and brings out the tension between the two partners in migration control. It also discusses the emergence of the concept of addressing the root causes

of irregular migration in the EU policy. Lastly, the chapter reviews the literature on the root causes of African irregular migration within the EU-Africa partnership framework and how scholars have linked root causes to coloniality politics.

Chapter Four: the theory chapter is based on constructivism. The study is informed by rhetorical action, which explains the hypothesis that ‘African partner countries constructed colonialism as the root causes of irregular migration and irregular migrants as the victims of colonialism to influence the EU policy migration change.’ For this study, rhetorical action involved a combination of rhetorical practices, including system narrative, issue narrative and identity narrative, to form mega rhetoric. System narratives criticized the Africa-EU neocolonial-like relationship. Issue narratives comprised the root causes of African irregular migration while identity narrative criticized the EU as a normative power.

While emphasizing the power of speech, the chapter explains how powerful rhetoric generates persuasion against an opponent. It further explains how rhetorical action by some actors results in rhetorical entrapment of the opponent, hence influencing it to adjust its behavior accordingly. The credibility of rhetoric to the extent that the opponent cannot oppose the accusations or defend himself without demonstrating inconsistency and double-standards is referred to as rhetorical entrapment. Rhetorical action helps explain African and European partners' engagement and influence on the EU policy change.

Chapter five: the methodology - discusses rhetorical analysis as the analytical framework of the study. Rhetorical analysis is founded on rhetorical action and involves speech and text analysis. The methodology provides an analytical framework that brings speeches together to understand the process of framing and counter-framing of irregular migration and how rhetoric generates persuasion. The study used both official/diplomatic, and unofficial rhetoric from both African and European partners. Two hundred thirty-six video clips (speeches) captured during

the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit were analyzed. The analysis used speeches from other online platforms to show the changing attitude both before and after the Valletta Summit. This is notwithstanding further text analysis to demonstrate the changing policy text in the EU policy documents.

Chapter six: empirical chapter – analysis rhetoric by both African and European leaders before, during and after the 2015 Valletta Summit. The rhetorical artifacts of the three periods are sequenced to show persuasion through rhetorical action. The study finds that by incorporating colonial rhetoric in African irregular migration management in around 2009, there was a successful rhetorical action and entrapment against Italy. Gaddafi demanded Italy pay for colonial injustice first so that Libya could participate in joint-irregular migration control. This was despite the fact that colonialism itself appeared irrelevant in the irregular migration control agenda. Italy compensated Libya for colonial injustices in return for cooperation on African irregular migration control. However, this rhetorical action was based on blackmail.

Even then, Libya's rhetorical entrapment became the starting point to link colonial rhetoric to irregular migration control. During the 2015 Valletta summit, African partners embarked on neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration. Both African and European partners had different agendas. On the one side, the European partners, being under pressure to manage the migration crisis, were urgently searching for a workable solution. They also framed irregular migration as a threat to security in Europe. On the other side, the African partners were pro-active in articulating the rhetoric of the root causes. To make the rhetoric more persuasive, African partner countries strongly highlighted the inconsistency between the EU normative principles and external practices. As a result, the EU found itself entrapped: it could neither deny the validity of accusation nor defend itself. In other words, it was left without

other alternative other than to accept the African rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration.

Chapter seven: discussion chapter – discusses rhetorical action, a strategy that African partners used to influence the EU policy change. African partners influenced the EU migration policy shift by constructing rhetoric of coloniality as the root cause of African irregular migration. Scholars consider the EU a normative power and an actor in a continuous process of reconstructing self and changing ‘the others.’ One gap left by the existing NPE scholarship is whether ‘the other’ can influence the EU in the event where its internal processes fail to yield normative power. This study contributes to filling this knowledge gap. Based on the evidence provided, and in the context of irregular migration control, ‘the post-colonial others’ have influenced the EU to reposition its normative actions. However, this evidence cannot be generalized to other social, economic and political spheres.

Chapter eight: conclusion and recommendation - The EU’s inability to decline the delegitimization of NPE by African partners or defend its inconsistency and double standards in upholding the shared norms and values is what this study refers to as rhetorical entrapment. Any EU’s attempt to oppose would have put the EU in a worse state of self-contradiction. According to Africa’s anti-neo-colonial rhetoric, the primary root causes of irregular migration included the exploitation of natural resources in Africa, the negative effect of climate change and the imbalance in the Africa-EU trade agenda. These are development areas where African partner countries felt disempowered and where the EU partners demonstrated dishonesty in their relations with Africa for not incorporating them in the irregular migration management. The Africa-EU partnership, therefore, needs to redesign the economic agreement based on a true collaboration featured with shared responsibility, non-domination and non-partisanship. To achieve this, the study recommends that the EU work with Africa as equal development partners instead of imposing ‘what it thinks is necessary for African development.’ The

consideration of Africa's development priorities would enhance joint cooperation towards irregular migration management. This ultimately improves the sustainability of EU-funded projects in Africa, especially those addressing irregular migration.

CHAPTER TWO: THE EU MIGRATION POLICY CHANGE

2.0 Introduction

EU migration and asylum policy is seemingly changing, as shown by many policy developments and recasts. However, from the early 1990s until 2015, very little had changed. During this time, the migration policy only changed what Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993:31ff) refer to as secondary facets of a system. The EU migration policy core has maintained a high degree of steadiness. The EU has ever since maintained migration control approaches (Ripoll and Trauner, 2014). This chapter systematically traces changes or status quo within the EU migration policy development up to 2015 when the EU took the unprecedented policy change. The chapter also demonstrates that before 2015, the EU's governance structure was changing through different treaties, but the irregular migration management approach did not change. The establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa to address the root causes of African irregular migration in 2015 signified a change beyond just engaging the non-EU member states or managing the irregular migration outside the European borders. It was a shift in the EU migration policy.

The current EU migration policy has a long history. Although migration and asylum had been mentioned in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the issue was primarily managed at the state level until the 1999 Amsterdam treaty (Lavenex, 2001, 2006). But even after the asylum and migration issue was taken to the EU level, it remained predominantly controlled by the Council. The Amsterdam Treaty, however, somehow checked the role of the European Council in handling the asylum matters by shifting the asylum issues to the EU's first pillar. Such a move was an apparent advancement in the integration of the asylum since the first pillar matters relate to Areas of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), where member states adhere to the principles of justice, definite abidingness. After the Amsterdam Treaty, the European asylum policy can

be considered to have shifted from being purely a national level issue to an intergovernmental issue, and to date, it remains ‘a community’ issue (Guild and Harlow, 2001; Noll, 2000:210 ff; 2003).

Despite the communitarization of migration and asylum issues, the EU did not experience smooth policy development in these areas (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014). One explanation of the slow process of asylum harmonization among the member states is their reluctance to surrender power on the border-asylum issues to the supranational institutions, namely the Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Another reason for the diverse commitment towards the integration of asylum is the member states’ reluctance to lose their freedom to their own external frontier controls (Geddes and Scholten, 2016: 218-219; Givens and Luedtke, 2004). Before the Amsterdam treaty, the intergovernmental cooperation remained unaccountable to other supranational institutions and hence enjoyed freedom from restrictions of asylum laws. The policymakers were neither accountable to their judicial institutions and parliaments at the national level nor the European community institutions. Nolls points out that, during this time, there lacked transparency and accountability as well as judicial control in the EU’s intergovernmental organ relating to asylum management (Nolls, 2003). This power imbalance resulted in a ‘democratic deficit’ in migration and asylum (Guiraudon 2000; Lahav, 2006).

The imbalance of power within the EU during this time provided an environment for developing the controversial extraterritorial asylum policies. This was mainly due to the high ambiguity of the moral and judicial legitimacy of EU’s compliance with asylum law as a whole. Nonetheless, the significant development in the governance structure of the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice changed the EU policy-making dynamics. These supranational institutions could function to impose new constraints in migration governance

(Guiraudon, 2000; Betts, 2003). Besides, this later came to be partially reaffirmed through the Treaty of Nice (as outlined under the Title IV TEC) together with the European Council Directive 3004/927/EC, which shifted the Council decisions from ‘unanimity agreement’ to ‘qualified majority voting’ in all communitarized Justices and Home Affairs. All member states (apart from the UK, which was exempted from Title IV) were to abide by the decisions of the EU supranational institutions; hence, no member state could independently pursue policies such as extra-territorial asylum policies irrespective of their perceived effectiveness (Monar, 2005). As the EU governance changed over time, the ‘Community approach’ got strengthened in the area of asylum and migration policy.

2.1 Development of the EU Asylum and Migration Control Policy (1990-2015)

The EU integration process on asylum can be traced back to the 1985 Schengen agreement, when asylum issues became at the center of the intergovernmental debate as the internal borders became less important. The introduction of the Single European Act in 1987 saw the concern of migration and asylum take the central foci, a phenomenon which was necessitated more by its potential practical realization than a political will (Noll, 2003). Simultaneously, more focus was given to the external border control and the member states’ cooperation on migration and asylum from within the EU territory.

The EU’s preparedness to manage cases of a mass influx of irregular migrants who required international protection can be traced to the 1990s. The first asylum policy instrument was established on 15th June 1990 during the Dublin Convention, which aimed to harmonize member states’ responsibilities in irregular migration management. In particular, Article 3(5) forms the foundation of the current Dublin system. The signing of the convention was purely intergovernmental and occurred without the involvement of the European Commission. Initially, the cooperation on asylum and migration was, in essence, executed outside the

European Community framework. The EU later sought to formalize it and make it a European Community law partly through the Maastricht treaty in 1991. During this time, the 1991 forced displacement caused by the former Yugoslavia conflict led to a mass influx. This mass migration caught the EU off-guard - having no concrete policy instrument to respond. In later conventions - in London in December 1992 and Copenhagen in June 1993 - the member states and the EU institutions expressed their concerns about asylum management to enhance refugee protection.

Based on the Maastricht Treaty, the unbinding cooperation among member states on refugees was adopted into the EU's institutional framework. The Council was mandated to work with the Commission and the Parliament, but the European Court of Justice remained without powers over asylum issues. On 25th September 1995, the European Council adopted the resolution on burden-sharing regarding reception and protection of people in need of international protection (European Council, 1995). Later, on 4th March 1996, the Council adopted Directive 96/198/JHA regarding the readiness and emergency procedure for the burden-sharing to enhance temporary protection of displaced persons (European Council, 1996). The directive was again strengthened by the Action Plan of the Council in December 1998. The Commission laid the procedures for the prompt adoption of the plan following the Treaty of Amsterdam and minimum standards for temporary protection adopted later in 2001 (Barents, 1997; European Council, 2001; Hatton, 2004; Van Selm-Thorburn, 1998).

In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty conferred new powers among the EU institutions to establish a mechanism for legislation of asylum matters. The conferment involved a transitional period of five years, during which both the member states and the Commission had shared rights to initiate an agenda, and a unanimous decision by the Parliament and the Council was a requirement. The Amsterdam Treaty also gave the Court of Justice some powers on refugee

matters in specific cases (Levy, 1999; Kuijper, 2000). The treaty allowed the Council to follow the standard co-decision procedure and arrive at the final decisions through a qualified majority. Indeed, the Council adopted the co-decision procedure and has been operational since 2005. Within five years of the transitional period, the treaty hoped to see the Council work on criteria and approaches of determining which member states should consider and process asylum applications on behalf of the EU. The Council was also expected to set the minimum standard concerning procedures, refugees' status, and reception.

When the Tampere Programme was adopted in October 1999, the Council resolved to implement the standard European system in two stages. The first phase was a short-term strategy to set the minimum standards for establishing a uniform procedure and a common status for those granted a valid and long-term asylum within the EU. This phase took place between 1999 and 2004 and led to the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Among the significant achievements in this phase included the establishment of Eurodac database to store and compare fingerprint data; delineation of minimum standards for members to follow in admitting the asylum-seekers; qualification for international protection as well as the granted type; procedures for issuing and revoking asylum status; and enactment of policies for temporary protection in case of an influx of immigrants (European Council, 1999; Lenaerts, 2010).

At the end of 2004, the second phase took off following the EU's effort, through the Hague Programme, to have the measures and policy instruments implemented by December 2010. These instruments and procedures aimed to establish a single asylum procedure with standard guarantees for refugees' protection. The Commission made efforts to have the second phase of CEAS implemented by crafting proposals and presenting them to the Parliament and the Council. However, the negotiations for policy change progressed slowly until the Lisbon

Treaty came into force in December 2009. The central EU's objective was to develop minimum standards to establish a common European system with uniform procedures and status of asylum, uniform subsidiary protection status, and a uniform temporary protection system. It also involved common standard procedures for issuing and revoking asylum or subsidiary protection and rules guiding reception conditions. Besides, it provided procedures and guidelines on partnerships with third countries. Following the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the TFEU Article 80 explicitly outlined mechanisms for solidarity and fair responsibility sharing principles among member states, which included the financial consequences (Takle, 2018).

The Lisbon Treaty also changed the decision-making process and introduced co-decision as a standard procedure for all asylum-related decisions. It introduced a code of qualified majority voting on legal migration issues and led to the creation of new legal bases for integration measures. The Council and the Parliament were to co-decide on immigration policies affecting both regular and illegal migrants. Nonetheless, in the vent of the asylum crisis, the Council adopted provisional measures and was a superior decision-maker. For other cases, the Council had to consult with the Parliament as per Article 78(3). Further, as per Article 79(5), the Lisbon Treaty explicitly noted that the EU and members were to share asylum management competence. Above and beyond, the treaty significantly improved the oversight roles of the Court of Justice, which saw the development of a vast body of case laws on refugee matters. Phase two further got a boost when the Council adopted the Stockholm Programme from 2010 through 2014. In addition to establishing a common system, the program emphasized the need for solidarity with members experiencing migration pressures. It also outlined the tasks to be executed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (European Council, 2009). In short, the advancement of the EU governance structures presented new complexities in developing the asylum policy.

2.2 The Common European Asylum Policy (CEAP)

The development of the EU governance, right from the Maastricht Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaty, resulted in the intensification of the Europeanization of asylum. The 1999 Tampere Convention marked the beginning of the current Common European Asylum Policy (CEAP), also known as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). CEAS consists of four Council directives: Directive in the event of mass influx, Reception Conditions Directive, Procedure Directive, and Qualification Directive. The development of all the council directives and their recasts were founded on full respect to the 1951 Geneva Convention. The EU claimed to honor the fundamental rights outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It also asserted full respect for human dignity in asylum management.

The CEAP acknowledged that fair recognition, assessment and the granting of refugee status, and the subsidiary protection status were crucial for limiting the asylum seeker's secondary movements from one member state to another. This movement was commonly understood to be motivated by the differences in legal frameworks across the member states. Member states were obliged to operate within the confinements of international law that they were party to and which outlawed discrimination. The CEAS came with high ambitions for efficient and effective irregular migration management strategies that defined the EU as a normative actor in refugee protection. However, with time, the consequent difficulties in managing the migration control and asylum protection undoubtedly indicated how far the objectives of CEAS remained unattainable (Meyerstein, 2005; Takle, 2012). As put forward by Roos and Orsini (2015), in practice, the EU experience was a de facto collapse of its Dublin system and the CEAS.

The Dublin regulations required the member state through which asylum seekers entered the EU to be responsible for the reception and assessment of asylum applications. The goal of

CEAS, including the newest version of Dublin (III) that was enacted in 2013, was to raise efficiency and effectiveness in the promotion of refugee protection among all EU member states and to equitably distribute the asylum burden between the members (Moreno, 2008; European Commission, 2016b). In contrast, the strategy of sharing responsibilities between member states resulted in such a conspicuous imbalance in asylum burden that the highly burdened frontline countries abandoned these rules to their fullest extent. The disparity in the EU member state's reception capacity vis-a-vis the actual number of refugees received demonstrated how the failure of the Dublin system was evident. Although most asylum seekers entered inner Europe through Greece and Italy, their asylum applications were not lodged in those countries. The frontline countries just acted like open gates, contrary to the Dublin system's obligation. The crash of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) led to the introduction of temporary border controls in different countries, which according to Thielemann and El-Enany (2010), posed a threat to the Schengen system – one of the most successful EU projects.

The failure of the EU asylum policy did not only demonstrate how undesirable the Dublin system was but also, in the context to control measures, it raised concern about its viability. The major aspect of undesirability in the Dublin system was that its burden-sharing strategy was founded on a random geographical point of entry and the possibilities of migration flows (Koeppinghoff, 2018). Its inability to manage irregular migrants was a critical factor contributing to the low acceptance and legitimacy of the overall CEAP. Yet, the expectation that the EU could execute the Dublin system by merely exerting more pressure on the member states was unrealistic. The system was likely never to be successful since it stood contrary to the politics of migration control. While some member states refused to take in asylum seekers, others used their domestic policies to process asylum applications. As a result, the nature of reception conditions in some countries worsened. The differences in the treatment of asylum

seekers contrary to the reception conditions Directive and the asylum procedures Directive further resulted in increased secondary movement by the asylum seekers, making it harder for the Dublin system to function.

Even in the Dublin III system, the main criterion for allocating the responsibilities for asylum claims was the proximity to the 'points of entry' into the EU territory. The states in which the applications were lodged were supposed to host asylum seekers until asylum processing was completed so that they could either be deported upon the rejection of the status or transferred to another member state if granted status. Reliance on this strategy was based on one fundamental assumption - that the allocated asylum responsibilities would be reinforced by protecting the EU external border by the member states. Owing to how slow the process of assessing and granting status in EU member states typically was, the Dublin III system served as an instrument of creating refugee burden and later shifting that burden to southern member states (Thielemann and El-Enany, 2010; Thielemann, 2017). This explained the reason for the abandonment of the EU asylum policies by the member states. Contrary to the expectation, the harmonization in the asylum procedure and granting status was not possible in practice. There was a massive discrepancy between different EU member states in recognizing asylum seekers from the same country of origin (Angeloni, 2019; Sebastian and Seibel, 2019).

At the same time, the Commission claimed that irregular migrants had mastered the functionality of the Dublin System. They made every effort to avoid submitting their identity, and the refusal was increasing with the migrant influx. They also refused to conform with other Dublin System requirements with the hope of advancing to the member states of their wish to apply for asylum from there. As a remedy, the EU introduced the Eurodac system (European Commission, 2016).

Eurodac was an instrument to empower the Dublin system by capturing irregular migrants' data at the EU southern borders. Eurodac system had a broad scope since it captured fingerprints beyond asylum. Alongside Eurodac, the Commission re-energized the harmonization of asylum systems by reducing undue pull factors for secondary irregular migration across the member states to bring the CEAS into reality. To achieve this, the Commission's idea was to combine the three fundamental Council directives (the Reception Conditions Directive, the Procedure directive, and the Qualification Directive) into a single common asylum procedure through which the member states were supposed to apply in managing secondary movement. However, some policy instruments have remained inactive since their establishment. For instance, although the EU had effected the 2001 Directive on minimum requirements for granting temporary protection during migrant influx, the directive largely remained unapplied. This was partly due to the ambiguity of the directive's terms, which created tension among the member states, especially regarding burden-sharing criteria.

In 2010, the Commission allocated the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) a new mandate of supporting the implementation of the newly introduced migration control policies. EASO's main task was to provide finances and facilitate technical operations. The support office was also tasked with the implementation of additional recasts on legislative acts, including the Qualification Directive (which became effective in January 2012), the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Dublin III Regulation, the Eurodac Regulation, and the Reception Conditions Directive (all of which became operational in July 2013). Building on the achievements of the Stockholm Programme, the Council focused on Article 68 of the TFEU to develop guidelines for legislative and strategic planning in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ). These guidelines emphasized prioritizing and effectively implementing the CEAS while still ensuring people's free movement. It also aimed to provide a high level of protection to citizens (European Parliament, 2016; European Commission, 2016d). The policy

further involved managing the EU's external borders and police cooperation towards criminal matters such as migrant smuggling and trafficking.

2.3 European Approach for Migration (EAM)

In 2015, the migration pressure saw the Commission issue the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015c). The EAM was proposed by the Commission and subsequently adopted by the Council after consultation with Parliament. In the spirit of implementing article 80 of the TFEU, the main aim of EAM was to facilitate the emergency relocation of individuals who needed international protection from frontline countries, especially Italy and Greece. The policy involved several actions in managing migration pressure, including the establishment of hotspots to trace the movement of irregular migrants and implement EU-wide relocation and resettlement programs. The EU achieved this by establishing multi-agency coordination between European Border, Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, and EASO. These institutions worked to register and fingerprint all irregular migrants.

The European Approach for Migration had short-term and long-term goals. In the short term, it focused on implementing proposed immediate actions to address the Mediterranean crisis. In the long-term, the EAM had four main policy themes. The themes included securing borders and saving lives, reducing motivation for secondary irregular migration, establishing an effective uniform asylum policy, developing new legal migration measures, and modernizing the blue card system. It also set new priorities for refugee integration to enhance migration benefits for asylum seekers and their countries.

Indeed, the EAM aimed at establishing legislative mechanisms for improving the CEAS, where instead of Council directives, it would create a basis for directly applicable rules. The objective was to simplify and reduce refugee procedures, enhance uniform guarantees for refugees, and ensure stringent measures to prevent abuse. In a way, EAM advanced the directives that

outlined which applicant qualifies for international protection. To make CEAS workable, the EU needed a plan to harmonize the refugee recognition rates and asylum protection and implement more strict measures to prevent secondary migration. The EAM highlighted the reception conditions Directive, which contained the most disputatious issues, to address the time challenge in asylum processing. It was to reduce the waiting period for accessing the labor market and ultimately prevent asylum seekers from traveling from one member state to another (European Commission, 2015c).

Even under the EAM framework, there was an effort to change the Dublin Regulation. Moreover, EAM saw the Eurodac database reform with an aim to extend its coverage of data of immigrants who never applied for international protection but still were residing in the EU member states. Some measures included fingerprinting of the above six-year-old children to track and reunite them with their families. The policy permitted law enforcers to access the database (European Commission, 2015c). The Commission further made reforms whereby the EASO ceased to be an EU supporting entity and became a fully operational EU Agency for Asylum management. EASO was also mandated by aiding the operations of CEAS, such as monitoring the EU operational laws and ensuring uniformity in verifying applications across all member States (European Parliament, 2018).

Some reforms in the EAM framework appeared redundant and overlapping. For example, the EU developed, adopted, and revised several directives on immigration without implementing them. The Council Directive 2002/90/EC outlined what constituted a crime of facilitating illegal entry, transit and residence while the framework Decision 2002/946/JHA defined the criminal liabilities for such actions (European Commission, 2002). The Directive 2011/36/EU offered guidelines on combating and preventing human trafficking as well as protecting the victims. These directives were further connected to Council Directive 2004/81/EC, which

highlighted measures against granting the smuggled or trafficked people residence permit (European Commission, 2004). Later, the Commission developed a 2015-2020 EU Action Plan intending to combat migrant smuggling. In line with this plan, the Commission performed a fitness check on the implementation of the then legal framework. It established that there lacked enough evidence on the prosecution of people engaged in humanitarian assistance. Eventually, it concluded that a legal framework to address human smuggling was crucial for irregular migration management.

The Commission further revised the Directive on Procedures to establish EU-wide common standards and procedures for deporting illegal immigrants. The initial recast was outlined in the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC), whose implementation report was first issued in March 2014. Later in September 2015, under the council's direction, the Commission issued an Action Plan on return. The main objective of the Action Plan was to enhance the return of irregular migrants. Within the same plan, the Commission established the European Return Programme, which had both short and long-term goals of returning the irregular migrants with a rejected asylum application. The short-term goal was to harmonize the disparity between the national return schemes, while the long-term goal was to empower joint reintegration programs (European Commission, 2008; European Commission, 2015e). Again, this move appeared like going back to the previous policy proposals that had initially failed.

Within the European Agenda for Migration, the EU had established trust funds to support its external management of irregular migration. The Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), established under the EU Action Plan, was the chief funding source for implementing EAM. Overall, there was a significant increase in funding allocation for AMIF in the period 2014-2020. Other funding instruments included the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), and the European Social

Fund (ESF). However, since funds allocated to these programs were not explicitly provided for in the budget, the actual execution of the EU Action Plan remained unclear (European Parliament, 2018).

2.4 Development of border control policies

Most border-based migration controls were established through the Amsterdam Treaty and integrated into the EU legal framework. First, the Schengen Borders Code set out rules on external crossings and the conditions guiding the reintroduction of temporary internal border checks. Secondly, there was a burden-sharing mechanism. The EU recognized that not all members had external borders to control irregular migrants, and hence members were unequally affected by border traffic flows. It, therefore, reallocated funds to facilitate external borders-related activities. For the 2010-2014 period, the Commission developed the Internal Security Fund- Borders and Visa (ISFBV) as the burden-sharing mechanism. The third control policy related to developing a centralized database for irregular migration and border control purposes, including the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen Information System (SIS), and Eurodac. The EU also developed the Facilitators Package, which aimed to deter and penalize illegal entry, residence, and transit. Chiefly, the EU aimed at enhancing the operationalization of border management policies through Frontex, which played a critical role in offering European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) at all border points. Besides, Frontex engaged in joint operations with third nations bordering any member state to ensure that irregular migration flows were effectively managed (European Commission, 2017; 2018c).

According to the provisions of the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) practices, both external and internal aspects of the Union's border surveillance had become intertwined. The integration of the two levels of migration control manifested through the defense forces' inputs towards the development of EIBM. They also engaged in operational interventions such

as assisting the third countries in training security forces and monitoring migration (European Commission, 2017). For instance, in the spirit of implementing EIBM, the member states' navies had the EUNAVFOR MED and Operation Sophia as a core item of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Initially, the military joined forces to fight smugglers. Later, their mission was broadened to include integrated border management activities such as information exchanges among law enforcement agencies. They worked in partnership with Europol and European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in executing search and rescue, and surveillance activities. The EU further created Migration Management Support Teams (MMST) to support the implementation of border surveillance monitoring hotspots. This alliance worked to identify, check, book, and plan return operations for asylum seekers entering the EU (European Commission, 2017).

The EU's response to the securitization of refugee and migrants' influx led to the Europeanisation of the management of borders. An amendment to the Schengen Borders Code was also adopted to address the potential terror threats. The proposal demanded all citizens leaving or entering the Schengen area be screened (European Commission, 2016d). In 2015, Italy initiated Mare Nostrum, a search and rescue mission for the stranded migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. Later the Mare Nostrum was replaced with a more restricted EU search and rescue program called Joint Operation Triton.

Another notable policy change around the border policies was the introduction of the 'Smart Borders' package. The Commission proposed the package to modernize border management through border checks automation and collecting any crucial data omitted by the Visa Information System, the Schengen Information System and Eurodac. The previous system could not systematically support the monitoring of irregular migrants from third countries. It experienced difficulties in earmarking asylum seekers in the case they mutilated their

identification documents after getting admission to the Schengen Area. Smart Borders package aimed to address the challenge wholesomely by reducing illegal migration, overstays and detect other serious crimes. It also aimed to solve other challenges, such as addressing the slow pace of joint border control activities (European Commission, 2016b; European Parliament, 2016c).

Before the massive migrant influx that led to the 2015 migration crisis, only Spain, Greece, and Bulgaria had completed external borders fencing in 2009, 2012, and 2014 respectively, to deter irregular migrants. This was in contradiction to the Schengen Borders Code that prohibited such deterrence without good reasons. Since then, more member states started the political agenda to construct walls to prevent asylum seekers from reaching their borders indiscriminately. Other barriers were built in Slovenia and Austria, and Hungary. The construction of border fences such as the Spain-Morocco fence was made possible by the lack of explicit EU guidelines (Benedicto and Brunet, 2018).

2.5 External control: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)

Since 2006, within the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU and the member states approached the African states and other non-EU member states for joint irregular migration control. However, this partnership achieved minimal success. Later, in 2011, the Commission adopted the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). GAMM was the central EU's policy framework in managing asylum and irregular migration with third countries. It defined how the EU was to execute its policy dialogues and partnerships with non-EU countries on migration issues. The policy worked to better reorganize legal migration and discourage illegal migration to promote international protection and maximize the development effect of migration. Through the GAMM, the EU and the member states aimed to be at the forefront to support the global-level talks regarding refugees and other migrants (European Commission, 2011). The GAMM had four thematic priorities: "better organizing legal migration and

fostering well-managed mobility; preventing and combating irregular migration and eradicating trafficking of human beings; maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility; promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum. The protection of human rights is a cross-cutting priority” (European Commission, 2015b: 5).

Under GAMM, the EU acknowledged that a properly managed migration was one that ensured fair treatment of third-country citizens legally residing in any member state. It thus strengthened efforts to prevent irregular migration and promoted partnerships with non-EU countries. Besides, the EU strived to develop standard obligations for both its citizens and regular immigrants. It used the ‘more for more’ approach (more cooperation on implementing migration control measures for more development aid) to persuade third countries to accept collaboration in irregular migration control.

One Council Directives related to GAMM included Directive 2009/52/EC. It outlined measures and sanctions to be taken against employers of illegal asylums in member states. The directive implementation report was first issued in May 2014, where the EU showed the engagement of the third countries in negotiating and implementing readmission agreements. In this regard, the GAMM was mostly concerned with the fight against human smuggling and trafficking and returning irregular migrants. The Joint Readmissions Committees managed this exercise to supplement this Action Plan, and the Commission issued a communication on a more seamless return policy and a recommendation on enhancing returns (European Parliament, 2018). The intensification of irregular migration control activities along the EU southern border and the Mediterranean region led to a significant increase in the funding allocation to the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). During the 2015 migration crisis, the EU established two major trust funds. One was the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis. This trust fund aimed to strengthen control measures by supporting the Syrian neighborhood,

including Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, which were the main host countries for Syrian refugees. By enabling these countries to host refugees, the EU would have prevented migrants move to Europe for asylum. The projects under this trust fund also aimed to empower the refugees and host communities (European Commission, 2018b).

Overall, these policy instruments indicate an outward move - a shift from the EU internal decision-making to engaging the non-EU actors. Nonetheless, restrictive migration control remained the primary approach to irregular migration management (see Strik, 2017).

2.6 A normative turn: Addressing the Root Causes of irregular migration

As mentioned elsewhere, the concept of addressing the root causes of irregular migration did not begin with the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit. In coordination with External Relations, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) constituted a High-Level Working Group on Immigration and Asylum that came up with a proposal to address the root causes of irregular migration. Later during the 1999 Tampere Convention, the EU indicated the necessity to take up the action plan to manage migration and asylum issues. However, instead of implementing the action plan to tackle the root causes, the EU embarked on reinforcing border control, combating tracking and smuggling of migrants and implementing readmission agreements (Boswell, 2002). The EU did not make further efforts to integrate the idea of root causes into the EU migration policy (Lindstrøm, 2005) (*see section 3.10 in the literature review for further discussion*).

A normative EU migration policy shift, which relates to tackling the root causes, indeed, occurred in 2015. On 11 and 12 November 2015, the EU partners (European Union, the EU member countries) and African partners (the African Union and the African countries) held a summit in Valletta, Malta. From the African side, the summit involved 26 countries. These countries were categorized into three regions: the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) window, the North Africa (NoA) window and the Horn of Africa (HoA) window. As a result of the summit,

the EU established the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The EUTF was initially designed to run for five years (2015-2020). Unlike the objectives of the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis, which focused on migration control, the main goal of the EU Trust fund for Africa was to address the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration in Africa. In particular, the EUTF aimed to promote resilience, create economic opportunities, enhance security and development, and address human rights abuses (article 2 of the EUTF constitutive agreement, European Commission, 2015d).

2.7 Mapping of the EU’s migration policy change




Fig 2.0: Author’s summative analysis of the EU’s policy change based on the above literature review

2.8 Summary of the EU migration policy change

The figure above demonstrates that although the EU’s migration policy appeared to have undergone reform, until 2015, the EU maintained a status quo. The apparent changes before 2015 revolved around different mechanisms of irregular migration control - internal control,

control along the external borders, and control through partnerships with third countries. However, one of the most significant shifts was establishing the EU Trust Fund for Africa, whose main aim was to address the root cause of African irregular migration. The change of the migration approach corresponds with the argument by Crawley and Skleparis.

“It is clear therefore that there is nothing ‘natural’ or ‘fixed’ about the legal and policy categories associated with international migration: rather these categories are in a constant state of change, renegotiation and redefinition. The categories ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ do not simply exist but rather are made. Choosing to label – or equally not to label – someone as a ‘refugee’ is a powerful, and deeply political process, one by which policy agendas are established and which position people as objects of policy in a particular way” (Crawley and Skleparis, 2017:52).

The above elaboration of different policy instruments requires a scholarly understanding of the EU’s motivation to change or failure to change its migration policy. The following chapter (literature review) explores the scholarship of the EU migration policy change, including what Sabatier and Weible (2007) would call the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) or what Crawley and Skleparis (2017) terms as policy renegotiation and redefinition within the EU-Africa partnership.

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0 Introduction

The contemporary EU migration governance has been viewed differently by scholars and has been an area of contestation in academic debates explaining the EU migration policy change or failure to change. This literature review chapter discusses scholarly work on why the EU's migration policies have either changed and the dimension of change or failed to change. The chapter further explores the EU's motive to reach out to African partner countries to form migration control partnerships.

Migration is a policy-oriented field, and diverse views of the EU policies emerge from the different approaches scholars use to evaluate policy moves. Even though analyzed from different schools of thought, in general, one academic challenge is that many migration studies “often suffer from either too much theory that has not been tested empirically or too many empirics with weak theoretical foundations” (Bonjour et al., 2018: 414). Researchers also use different levels of analysis and implicit assumptions in explaining the EU migration policy change.

The chapter is structured in three major sections:

- Section one explores the EU's internal migration policy developments. Here, I show that policy venue shopping can best explain the initial EU migration policy change. I explain the second policy move (i.e., the development of Common European Asylum Systems (CEAS)) as a race to the bottom.
- Section two (the core of the literature review) explores the EU-Africa partnership. In this part, I demonstrate resistance by African partner countries to cooperate with the European partners in irregular control projects. However, I argue that African countries'

resistance to cooperating should not be understood as a policy proposal. The resistance does not explain the EU policy shift. Therefore, I show the need for more evidence that demonstrates the 2015 policy shift.

- The last section acknowledges that the concept of addressing the root causes of irregular migration was mentioned in the 1999 Tampere convention. Nevertheless, it remained dormant in the EU migration policy until the 2015 Valletta Summit. I further review the emerging literature that links colonialism and neo-colonialism to the root causes of African irregular migration. In this section, I identify some literature gaps that the study aims to fill.

3.1 Policy venue shopping for fortress Europe

In the early 1990s, the EU initiated the process to integrate migration from exclusively intergovernmental levels to the European community level - the so-called communitarization process. The process started as soft-laws that were later formalized in 1991 through the Maastricht Treaty. At this time, the migration and asylum issues were placed in the third pillar of policymaking. The move was commonly associated with intergovernmentalists' ideologies (Moravcsik, 1993).

The integration of migration and asylum issues in the EU formed a two-level game, i.e., the national-level governance and international-level governance. The EU member states were able to take advantage of one level of control when the other one was not favorable for some policy moves. This meant that the member states had greater flexibility than previously when migration and asylum were purely managed by domestic actors. The member states' attempt to search for a policy-making venue and circumvent domestic limitations to best boost their interests of migration control was what Guiraudon (2000) and Lavenex (2001) referred to as 'policy venue shopping.' Policy-venue shopping is understood as an attempt by the member

states to circumvent different actors involved in the EU migration governance, particularly the Court, the Parliament and the Commission, to achieve restrictive migration policies. To the proponents of the policy venue shopping, the Europeanization of migration policies enabled member states to avoid responsibilities that limited them from achieving their desired goals in migration control. One of the significant challenges was judicial constraints that emerged from upholding asylum rights, which tended to limit the jurisdiction of the governments' actions of migration control. Another perceived challenge was the opposition by other state organs such as ministries and parliamentarians, and pro-migrants lobby groups that advocated for more liberal measures in migration management (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Lavenex, 2001; Bonjour et al., 2018; Daviter, 2018).

There have been methodological challenges in examining the preference formation between the EU institutions, particularly the Council. The Council was viewed as the most difficult institution and in which policy-formulation reflects member states' domestic policymaking process (Bonjour et al., 2018). Hence, policy venue shopping analysis starts from liberal inter-governmentalism where the scrutiny of preference formation at the state level. At this level, preferences were considered to be shaped by national dynamics such as interest groups and political party competitions (Boswell, 2007; Eising et al., 2017). The governments of the member states acted as proxies to resist the unfavorable policies in the Council. The situation became even more complex because policy-making at the EU level did not go through the same process as at the domestic level (Huysmans, 2006b). Member states pursued interests with diverse sensitivity, and therefore, political issues were differently politicized. The issues of security, for instance, could be more preferential than those of human rights. As a result, the Council could have more or less liberal irregular migration policies than some member states.

In the migration and asylum, the member states' representatives at the Council pushed for policies similar to those of their government to reduce adaptation costs in implementing policy change. In such a scenario, according to Börzel, there emerged a struggle in any move to introduce a policy change (Börzel, 2002). Migration scholars, therefore, conclude that national policymakers in the Council were influenced by the state's preferences and tended to resist or initiate change relative to the existing domestic policies (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Zaun, 2016; Bonjour et al., 2018).

A similar process took place within the EU institutions, where the policy-making involved different actors with diverse interests, shifting preferences (Kaunert et al., 2013). The shifting of preference formation occurred through problem framing. A way of understanding policy formulation at the EU level, according to Daviter, was through the analysis of how the framing of policy problems contributes to policy change. In other words, the shift in policy depended on how migration and asylum issues were constructed, categorized and prioritized as policy problems (Daviter, 2018; 2015). This is why Kohler-Koch explains the need for researchers to examine how shifting problem framings reinforce each other to either promote or resist a policy change within a dynamic political environment that involves supranational actors (Kohler-Koch et al., 2017).

Throughout the 1990s, there was a minimal migration policy change. The EU's institutional framework had the member states having the maximum influence in the decision-making process. Other supranational institutions were granted almost insignificant decision-making power. Researchers view the member states to be in a continuous process to keep off irregular migrants by developing restrictive asylum and migration policies (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Bonjour et al., 2018). In this regard, scholars commonly viewed EU integration as cooperation aimed at closing down the external borders to build a 'fortress Europe.'

In the 2000s, there was minimal EU policy change. The treaty of Amsterdam was important in the European communitarization process. It gave supranational institutions minimal competence in migration and asylum. Yet, these areas largely remained intergovernmental. In 2009, through the Lisbon treaty, the distribution of power within the EU institutions changed. Although the Council still retained the highest decision-making power, the parliament gained influence in the legislative process. The court also got involved in a broader range of affairs, including partial judicial control over migration and asylum issues. The Commission remained with the role of proposing legislation and overseeing the implementation. Considering that the member states had partially surrendered power to supranational institutions, this redistribution of power within the EU institutions presented a thesis against policy venue shopping. Scholars argue that governments of the member states lacked the overwhelming dominance at the EU level, and hence policy venue shopping did not perfectly apply (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Block and Bonjour, 2013).

The critique of policy venue shopping, nevertheless, did not apply to all the EU policy areas. In migration and asylum, the Council still dominated power leaving the other EU institutions with limited jurisdiction. Scholars have thus not given much attention to the role of supranational institutions, namely the Commission, due to its perceived insignificant role in the decision-making process. Instead, in the case of migration and asylum, the Council was described as more restrictive while the Parliament and Court were seen to be more liberal. The restrictive nature of the Council was derived from the member states where the interests of interior ministers were to restrict irregular migration (Bonjour et al., 2018).

3.2 A race to the bottom

In 1999, the European Council adopted the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) through the Tampere Convention. The CEAS included the Procedure Directive (2003), the

Reception Condition Directive (2003), and the Qualification Directive (2004). During this time, the asylum was conceptualized as a collective problem that required the Europeanization of the asylum system (Guiraudon, 2000; Lavenex, 2001; Guild, 2006). The effort to Europeanize asylum processes led to establishing common but minimum asylum management standards across the member states (Boswell and Geddes, 2011:51ff). The common standards were more restrictive and more confined than the asylum protection standards already held by some member states. The principal reasoning for such low asylum standards was to at least achieve some level of convergence among all the member states. It was further argued that those countries whose standards were above the average-level would reduce their policies relative to other member states to the minimum level to avoid attracting irregular migrants. Toshkov and de Haan (2013) explain that although every member state would have preferred a high asylum standard, individually, they made an effort to joy-ride by shirking responsibility to other member states. Motivated by the need to reduce irregular migration within the EU, scholars argue that the member states would relegate their migration and asylum policies to the harmonized minimum level. This move was commonly referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’ (Guiraudon, 2000; Hatton, 2005; 2009; Des Places and Deffains, 2004; Czaika, 2009; Monheim-Helstroffer and Obidzinski, 2010).

Initially, the CEAS was not legally binding among the member states since every state used its domestic structures of managing migration and asylum and therefore would not entirely solve the problem of neglecting responsibilities. The CEAS was commonly measured by the outcome of asylum processing, including the rejection and acceptance rates of asylum applications. Even then, based on these outcomes, the CEAS did not yield any significant harmonization of asylum management among the member states (Caminada et al., 2010; Neumayer, 2005; Toshkov and de Haan, 2013). Although there was no doubt that member states would have preferred more restrictive policies, the degree of the race to the bottom was not expected to be the same. While

some EU member states such as the Netherlands were seen to be reluctant to relegate their migration and asylum policies (Bonjour and Vink, 2013, see also, Monheim-Helstroffer and Obidzinski, 2010), others such as Austria, as argued by Benedek (2016), were quick to introduce more restrictive policies that could be interpreted as a race to the bottom.

In analyzing the racing to the bottom, the stance of the supranational institutions in the pursuance of liberal policies remains debatable. One argument was that the commission supported the member states in establishing restrictive policies. Others argued that the commission's role always followed the wind direction; it changed from supporting more or less restrictive migration policies (Lahav and Luedtke, 2013). The most popular scholarly observation was that establishing the common (minimum) standards signified the increasing role of the supranational institutions, namely the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The parliament was also considered to have a more liberal position since it gained full legislative powers (Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Block and Bonjour, 2013; Bonjour et al., 2018). Even after the Amsterdam Treaty and Lisbon Treaty, migration policy largely remained the same was mainly described using 'a race to the bottom.' In either way, the member states maintained a 'fortress Europe' through restrictive migration control measures. In other words, the EU held a status quo within a policy change.

Dublin System was a refugee burden-sharing mechanism established as an intervention to distribute asylum seekers from the EU's front line countries. It was established through the 1990 Dublin Convention. Like other CEAS Council Directives, the Dublin system indicated the racing to the bottom (Thielemann, 2004; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006). Scholars have criticized the Dublin System and CEAS, citing inconsistencies between the EU normative *actorness* and lack of willingness among the EU institutions to execute it (Lavenex, 2018; Scipioni, 2017; McNally, 2017; Da Lomba, 2019).

In the study of ‘policy venue shopping’ and ‘the race to the bottom,’ however, there is a difference in the empirical studies of the policy change itself. Bonjour et al. (2018) question the measure of restrictiveness or liberalization of the EU migration policy. On the one hand, the analysis of policy venue shopping involved comparing domestic and international migration policy venues, each with different actors and policy-making processes. On the other hand, the race to the bottom compares the communalized migration policies (CEAS) with those held by member states. Scholars, therefore, differ significantly in examining the resultant policy outcome and the primary motivation towards a policy change. Either way, the idea narrows down to the EU effort to maintain a restrictive migration policy. Failure to initiate a policy change within the EU was influenced mainly by the Council’s power relative to other EU actors.

3.3 Migration Control through co-operation with non-EU member states

The conceptualization of the idea to reach out to the non-member states on irregular migration control was initialized through the 1999 Tampere Convention by the European Council. The convention highlighted the need to establish a partnership with third countries - both migrants’ home and transit countries (European Council, 1999). Yet, the policy move remained dormant as the EU explored the internal migration control mechanisms. The failure to manage irregular migration from within led the EU to increase its effort to establish cooperation with its neighboring countries. In the case of EU-Africa relations, the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 was the first instance to bring on board the agenda of African irregular migration to Europe. However, the agreement remained non-binding. The solidification of the linkage between irregular migration control policies and external cooperation started taking shape around 2005.

The motivation to establish partnerships with non-EU members took a different dimension from the EU's internal policy-making mechanisms. First, the EU member states and the Council,

which were more associated with restrictive migration policies, had their powers checked by the relatively increasing powers of supranational institutions, namely the parliament and the Court. The EU, therefore, ceased to be a favorable policy venue for restrictive migration policies. As an alternative, they established cooperation with the third countries. By so doing, as argued by Celata and Coletti (2016) in their work *'Beyond fortress Europe'*, the member states were able to circumvent the limitation poised by their opponents within the EU to pursue their interests beyond Europe. As such, the Court and the parliament had no jurisdiction in the affairs relating to establishing EU-Africa or even Turkey-EU migration control partnership.

Secondly, the EU reached out to African countries due to its inability to manage irregular migration from within. Even if there were no internal limitations by the court and the parliament, managing irregular migration from within the EU was not viable. Moreover, considering the high number of asylum rejections, the cost of deporting migrants was equally rising and becoming unbearable. Controlling migration from outside the EU was thus a cheaper and more effective option. Besides, as noted by Strange and Oliveira, the EU's move to reach out to African countries was an attempt to escape condemnation associated with the violation of human rights during the migrants' deportation process (Strange and Oliveira, 2019).

Within the EU-Africa framework, the irregular migration management policies were framed as either security or development issues. As explained by Lavenex and Kunz, within the EU-non-EU partnership, "the policy change involved in realizing this nexus requires an instance of 'frame-shifting,' i.e., a major reorientation of the ways in which the migration problem is defined and dealt with in the EU policy" (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008:442). Such a view presented a major reorientation of how the irregular migration problem was defined and reconstructed within the partnership framework. The process was not only characterized by the involvement of new actors (non-EU countries), but it also involved two completely new policy agenda - 'the

migration-development nexus' (Sørensen et al., 2002a; Sørensen et al., 2002b; Chou, 2006; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008) and 'migration-security nexus' (Geddes, 2000; Geddes, 2001; Lavenex, 2001; Huysmans, 2006). The dualism between the concepts of migration-development and migration-security was brought together through the idea of human security, which was seen mainly as securitization of the development process.

Under the migration-security discourse, the EU developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and engaged the African countries. The ENP was founded on what Lavenex and Kurz call policy frame. They define policy frame as "the ideational core of a particular policy field, which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social problem and expresses guideposts for action" (Lavenex and Kurz, 2008: 442). Migration policy frames contained factual information about the empirical relationship between irregular migration and the normative value of policy action. In the EU's external actions in migration control, the normative value was underpinned to 'shared security.' On the one side, this policy framing of shared security favored the EU member states since its main objective was irregular migration control (Vorrath and Zoppei, 2017). On the other side, the securitization of migration policies gave African partner countries more bargaining power. They variably used irregular migration as a bargaining chip against their European partners in driving out what was in their interest (Andersson, 2014:274).

In the first phase of cooperation with African countries, the EU prioritized both border control and immigrants' readmission. This was still within the conceptions of shared security and within the European Neighborhood Policy framework. The power relation was in favor of the EU migration and security agenda. The EU was the principal convener of the agenda, financier of the intervention actions and the leading player in the implementation process. The third countries were to protect their borders to prevent irregular migration from reaching Europe

(Chou, 2012; 2008b; Guild and Bigo, 2010; Andersson, 2014). At the same time, African states were to forcefully return their nationals transiting in their territories illegally and accept back their nationals deported by the EU member states. Nonetheless, convincing African countries was difficult since they were also aware that the entire policy action was meant to serve the EU interest (Chou, 2009; 2011; Chou and Gibert, 2012).

In 2004, the EU introduced Aeneas Program, scheduled to run from 2004-2008. The program aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the EU and the African countries towards migration control. It also offered assistance to the third countries in implementing migrants' returns and readmissions. Favored by the power imbalance, the EU and the member states changed the cooperation terms of the agreement and placed conditionalities on the African countries (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). For instance, during the 2002 Seville European Council meeting, there was a suggestion that development aid ought to be conditional on the third countries' co-operation in migration control. Eventually, the presidency's conclusions passed the conditionality as policy. Based on the Seville Council meeting, an unjustified lack of cooperation in joint irregular migration management could lead to restrictions in developing relations with the third countries (Cassarino, 2006). The EU and the member states had since influenced the partnership with the third countries in migration control through their development aid tools (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006; Del Sarto, 2010; Kunz and Maisenbacher, 2013; Tittel-Mosser, 2018; Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019). It achieved this by making cooperation on migration control a precondition for development aid.

Secondly, the securitization of irregular migrants was growing. The increased influx of African migrants was seen as a cause of insecurity in Europe, giving the EU and the member states a more substantial reason to engage African partners. Balzacq refers to such policy framing as a self-referential practice (Balzacq, 2005, see also Bigo, 2002), where the EU acted to defend

itself from securitized migrants. As put forward by Brachet, the aim of the European politicians and technocrats was to extend the EU's southern migration frontier from the shores of the Mediterranean to beyond the Sahara desert. "Seeking to control population movements further and further "downstream", the southern migration frontier of the EU has been progressively externalized, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Sahara: Europe attempts not only to control entries in its territory but also movements within the African continent" (Brachet, 2016: 276).

3.4 The EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration control

Unlike the well-established analytical frameworks of the EU internal policy-making, i.e., 'policy venue shopping' and 'the race to the bottom,' migration scholars view the EU-African relations through migration-development nexus and migration-security nexus. At the initial stages of the EU-Africa partnership, African countries were passive in participating in joint migration control, prompting the EU actors to undertake significant policy developments and implementation (see Chou, 2012). As the EU and the member states pushed for migration control strategies, African countries resisted through go-slows and non-cooperation in those programs. Instead, they showed more interest in the migration-development nexus as opposed to the EU's migration-security nexus. De Haas views African partner countries in a race to position themselves as 'victims of irregular immigration' to be included as beneficiaries of the migration-related programs. They did so by establishing their relevance as migrants' countries of origin or transit countries strategically positioned to manage migration effectively (De Haas, 2008a; 2008b: 4ff; Collett and Ahad, 2017; Parkes, 2017). The major migrant transit countries included Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Morocco, and Libya and exploited their geopolitical strategy in engaging the EU actors. Other countries such as Nigeria, Gambia, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Somalia and Eritrea were largely considered migrant's countries of origin (De

Haas, 2008b: 4ff; Bradford and Clark, 2014). The transit countries gained more relevance due to their additional significance as key migrants' countries of origin (Adam and Trauner, 2019).

To the EU actors, the relevance of transit countries as strategic partners was not only based on the partner's capacity to control irregular migration but also on the number of migrants transiting through a route (Chou, 2012). However, migratory routes are very fluid. There would be no much effectiveness in migration control if one country cooperated in establishing deterrence measures and others failed. Deterring migration in one country created a transit opportunity in the other. For instance, "in October 2006, boats were leaving the Gambian beach of Tanjeh after Senegalese and Mauritanian beaches were patrolled" (Cross, 2009:179). The more significant and established a migratory route traversed a country, the more that country appeared relevant for the EU actors to invest in control-based projects. During the negotiation process, countries like Libya and Morocco had established their position as transit countries. They saw themselves as the most significant EU partners in deterring illegal migration through the central and western migratory routes. As a result, they created a geostrategic agenda to enhance their citizens' legal mobility to Europe (Parkes, 2017). After analyzing Moroccan engagement with the EU, Parkes suggests that Morocco used irregular migrants as a bargaining chip for its citizens' access to the European labor market (Parkes, 2017; see also, Andersson, 2015).

One of the significant and conspicuous EU's weaknesses in forming partnerships was its inability to solely implement migration control activities. The actual control tasks such as border protection were left for the African partner countries (Chou, 2009; 2012). Many African states preferred to engage in bilateral negotiations (state-to-state diplomacy) instead of multilateral engagement with the EU institutions. Bilateral negotiations were rapid, efficient and easy to tailor resolutions to the national contexts. Moreover, some EU member states

offered attractive funding packages in migration management compared to the EU as a polity (Castillejo, 2016, 2017; Mohamed and del Salto, 2015).

3.5 African countries' resistance to cooperating in irregular migration control

Other than halting the irregular migration influx, the second primary EU's objective in the partnership was to return and re-admit African migrants. However, the deportation faced strong resistance from migrants' home countries. In many African countries, cooperation to enhance forced return migration was seen as conspiracy and detrimental to their own development process (Mouthann, 2019). The EU's use of development aid as a conditionality of 'less for less' (i.e., 'less cooperation in migrants deportation, for less development support') did not seem to leverage African partners' contribution to irregular migration control.

There was either little or complete lack of genuine interest among African partners to control migration. From the economics of labor perspective, irregular migration served vital political and economic interests and constituted a potential development resource to the African partner countries (De Haas, 2008a). Emigration in this context appeared to benefit African states by relieving pressure on domestic labor markets. Another perspective suggested by Leonhard den Hertog was that non-compliance in migration control among the African states was due to the EU's renaming, reallocation, recycling, and eventually double-counting foreign aid to inflate what it claimed to offer to African states as development aid. They also perceived EU funding as a reallocation of funds from mainstream development to irregular migration control projects (den Hertog, 2016).

Other scholars argue that the African countries' resistance to cooperate in the repatriation of migrants was motivated by remittances. The volume of remittances received from the diaspora by far surpassed the development aid that the EU actors offered to Africa (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). There was less rationality in accepting repatriation of migrants in return for a little more

development spending (De Haas, 2005; 2014; Amuedo-Dorantes, and De la Rica, 2007; Fokkema and De Haas, 2011; Parkes, 2017). Cooperating on repatriation, hence, posited a retrogressive impact on the development process among African partners. It increased pressure in the local labor markets and was against their development vision. In other cases, there was skepticism among African states' on the viability of legal circular labor migration as a motivation to accept repatriation (Parkes, 2017). The politicization of return migration was an attempt to secure the labor market for irregular migrants in Europe and remittances sent home. In countries with high restrictions to travel to Europe, the back door was the only option for irregular migrants (De Haas, 2008a; De Haas, 2010a). In this context, irregular migration was motivated by restrictive policies, continued absorption of migrants in the European labor markets and the role of remittances in the migrants' home countries (De Haas, 2010b; Dickinson, 2017; Kunz, 2008; Singer, 2010; Knoll, 2017; Chou and Gibert, 2012).

Scholars tend to combine the government's official stance on irregular migration control and the general public conceptualization of irregular migrants to analyze the struggles between the African and European partners (Munck, 2008; Chou, 2009, 2012; Vives, 2017b). In many African partner countries, forced repatriation was seen as a potential source of political instability. Using the Malian and Ethiopian cases, Parkes suggested that governments feared the spread of anti-regime ideas that migrants could be incubating when in the diaspora. They, therefore, feared co-operating to forcefully return them home (Parkes, 2017). The potential political instability related to repatriation, in this case, was founded on the public view that such the governments' actions would be cutting down remittances. As noted by Castillejo, "it seems that Ethiopia is stalling on this issue [*migration control and deportation of migrants*] because it does not want to alienate its diaspora, because of the importance of remittances, because of the political sensitivity of and public hostility to forced returns, and because it does not want to be dictated to by the EU" (Castillejo, 2017:28).

African states had consistently resisted accepting repatriated migrants. Instead, they promoted the development agenda in the EU-Africa negotiations. Correspondingly, the redirection of development aid from the mainstream development to migration control projects by the EU actors was met with unofficial non-compliance by the African partners. They deliberately stalled migration control and reintegration projects. For instance, in its diplomatic negotiations with the EU, Ethiopia was one of the countries that seemingly accepted the agreement on the return and readmission of its nationals within the Mobility Partnership Framework (Castillejo, 2017). Yet, practically Ethiopia blocked the entire return and readmission process. All through, Ethiopian authorities cited both legal and technical challenges in executing the return process. It dragged the process of verifying its nationals and issuance of travel documents to make the EU's project unsuccessful. Eventually, the repatriation pilot project of Ethiopian migrants proposed by the EU never materialized, and no migrants were returned. Instead, Ethiopia blamed the EU for losing potential returnees (Collett and Ahad, 2017).

Tunisia had continuously resisted any agreement on migration control and the repatriation of irregular migrants with rejected asylum applications. This was a way of avoiding the potential public upheavals through protests against the signing of such agreements (Mohamed and Del Sarto, 2015). The case was similar to Morocco, where for a long time, it resisted any form of agreement with the EU on the deportation of irregular migrants. A major negotiation held in 2010 failed after other 15 rounds of failed negotiations. As a result, the EU's attempt to reestablish readmission negotiations with Morocco was termed as wholly stalled. Similarly, no sooner had the readmission negotiations with Nigeria started than they immediately stalled. While the EU was busy engaging Nigeria on irregular migrant repatriation, the Nigerian governments did not support deportation and knew that the negotiations were heading nowhere (Castillejo, 2017; Parkes, 2017). It was known to the African countries that the EU's objective was to prevent African migration to Europe without adding value to their development.

The Senegalese government was another partner that linked the migration agenda to its development process. The EU's need for a migration management partner created Senegal's opportunity to drive forward its development agenda (Van Criekinge, 2010). The EU sent its first diplomatic mission on irregular migration control to Senegal in 2005. The delegation framed irregular migration as an emergency that required urgent intervention. As a remedy, it recommended a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The EU had committed to provide Senegal with long-term funding for the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) program. It procured funding and launched it, intending to establish a long-term instrument. Almost immediately after the mission, the EU, led by France, Portugal, and Italy, deployed the FRONTEX mission in Senegalese waters under the framework of RRM (ibid). In less than half a year, the migration management operated on an emergency mode that necessitated high cooperation of Senegalese authorities and IOM in deterring irregular migration (Chou, 2012; Gaibazzi et al., 2016:222ff; Mouthaan, 2019). Within the partnership framework, the push and pull persisted as Senegal appeared to have diverse interests. As the EU saw Senegal as an uninterested partner, Senegal saw the EU as imposing its own agendas without adequately considering its development interests. However, when the program started, it was faulted for having lacked government ownership. For Senegal, the RRM project was good for nothing. It was an EU's unilateral program that did not contain incentives significant enough for Senegal to engage.

Although the EU-Senegal partnership agreement mainly outlined comprehensive management of irregular migration, most projects only focused on deterrence measures, including strengthening naval forces and training and equipping them to prevent departures. The partnership also aimed to enhance the repatriation of Senegalese irregular migrants. Other activities involved research assistance on legislation to improve migration management, assist involuntary return and integration into local societies, and protection of unaccompanied

minors. Nonetheless, due to the EU's overemphasis on control measures and less concern for Senegal's development needs as outlined by the 'comprehensive migration management' agreement, Senegal withdrew its engagement and the projects stalled (Panizzon, 2008; Van Criekinge, 2010). Senegal did not appreciate the little development aid offered by the EU. As viewed by Vives, the funding allocation was tiny for any constructive management of Senegalese migration-related challenges (Vives, 2017a, 2017b).

Despite apparent fruitful cooperation between IOM and the Senegalese government in the initial stages, there was still little progress in irregular migration control. The EU's two major concerns in the migration control agenda were: first, to establish a common stance in executing control measures and border management. Second, to strike an agreement in readmission of migrants. In either case, the country's development agenda was not the top priority. In Senegal, while the migration control projects started immediately, i.e., barely a few months after the 2005 EU's delegation, other development-related projects took kicked off years later (Van Criekinge, 2010). In 2007, Senegal and the EU made an unprecedented step by releasing a joint declaration - 'comprehensive migration management'. The declaration indicated a shift away from the previous dialogues (featured by irregular migration control) and established a development-migration nexus (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008; Sinatti, 2015). In 2008, the European Commission initiated an incentive-based mobility partnership based on a 'more for more' approach. The EU was keen not to apply the negative framing of the statement (less for less), which would have appeared a threat to the partners, thus provoking total non-cooperation (Chou, 2012; Funk et al., 2017; Parkes, 2017). The then 'new agreement' contained two elements: the political aspect and the programmatic aspect. The political components outlined the mutual interest in the cooperation. They included a list of migration-related issues such as enhanced circular migration mechanisms and reduced bureaucracies to enter and exit the EU Member states for Senegalese citizens. The programmatic component of the initiative

contained a practical approach to control irregular migration (Chou and Gibert, 2012; Van Criekinge, 2008). This shift in the dialogue process led to additional funding for the mainstream development process.

Further EU-Senegal engagements were characterized by difficult negotiations on how to bring out the best from the project (Reslow, 2012; Funk et al., 2017). Regarding the deportation of migrants, Senegal was conscious of not engaging non-Senegalese nationals, especially from other West African countries and avoided deporting them. It saw the EU's objective to control migration within the African territories as detrimental to people's free movement within the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Senegal feared that other ECOWAS member states would retaliate by expelling its citizens back (Collyer, 2009; Chou, 2012; Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016; Panizzon, 2008). Since the initial dialogue and the resultant unilateral policy action by the EU, Senegal successfully tamed the EU's influence. It was also able to divert the dialogue to its interest and policy agendas (Kunz et al., 2011:194).

The EU's inefficiency in engaging African partner countries was evident due to its internal challenges in coordinating strategic actions on irregular migration management. There was an apparent pull and push between the commission, the Council and the Member states. Some scholars such as Van Criekinge (2010) viewed the EU member states-African states bilateral negotiation as an alternative due to inefficiency at the EU level, where member states differed on migration management strategies. For instance, the EU delegation to Senegal highlighted that one of the limiting factors was the lack of approval of the action plan from the Council. The fact that the commission could not operate autonomously resulted in little or no progress at all. This prompted the individual member states to be more pro-active in engaging in bilateral dialogues with African countries (Mouthaan, 2019; Sinatti, 2015).

Other scholars such as Van Crieking (2008) and Chou (2009, 2009b, 2012) suggest that the bilateral negotiations with individual EU member states were EU's tactical change of plan to a more strategic one. The shift in strategy was an EU's attempt to find a better grip of the African partners in achieving the same goal – irregular migration control. Although bilateral negotiations with individual member states appeared to be a newer strategy, the EU member states had engaged the African states through development agreements long before. Some agreements linked migration and development; however, they led to nothing tangible in irregular migration control.

As the EU struggled to shift development aid from the general poverty reduction domains to migration control, Senegal saw it as a weak strategy. Senegal's unwillingness to cooperate in the joint-migration control missions saw them come to a halt. The EU could not influence the Senegalese government even in implementing the seemingly comprehensive migration management projects. The continuously evolving EU's actions were negatively perceived and interpreted as scheming. Despite the struggles among the EU actors about the right approach to engage Senegal, the Senegalese government did not interpret it as a sincere difficulty of integrating migration into the development agenda (Van Crieking, 2010). Instead, Senegal saw it as the EU's strategic attempt to address its interest without considering the country's development problems (Sinatti, 2015).

Whether the bilateral negotiations were part of the EU's deliberate strategy to reach Senegal or not, in either way, the Senegalese government found an opportunity in them. It was easier to shift the agenda to consider its development interests initially despised by the EU delegation in the RRM, resulting in the government disowning them (Van Crieking, 2010). Even during the engagement with individual member states, the Senegalese government mainly indicated resistance in the dialogues as well as non-compliance in the implementation of whatever did not align with its interests. For example, in 2007, the negotiation on migrant readmission also

came to a halt soon after starting. Senegal was against readmission of non-Senegalese until additional funds were guaranteed (Panizzon, 2008; Van Crielinge, 2010; 2008; Roig and Huddleston, 2007). However, it did not despise the negotiation in totality.

At a particular point, all the negotiations stalled due to a lack of a working agreement. The EU, through the Commission, approached Senegal again to resume the talks while focusing on readmissions. This time, the EU shifted its stance closer to that of Senegal. Yet, Senegal was still not satisfied with what the EU offered in return for its cooperation in migration control and temporarily halted the further negotiations. Further negotiations could only continue upon the EU's commitment to more development aid and additional labor market access to Senegalese migrants (Chou, 2009; Chou and Gibert, 2012). The Senegalese government had expressed a similar stance to individual EU member states, especially France and Spain, that were the most pro-active in bilateral negotiations. Besides, Senegal avoided the negotiations with the commission and some individual EU member states that appeared to prioritize migration control agenda. Instead, the country engaged those EU member countries that aligned with the comprehensive approach to irregular migration management. France and Spain took the lead role in redesigning new schemes that would consider Senegal's demands omitted in the earlier RRM policy tool (Kabbanji, 2013).

Mali was another EU's strategic partner in African irregular migration control. Although there was a high number of Malian irregular migrants in Europe, Mali was a relevant partner due to many non-Malian irregular migrants transiting through the country (Dünnwald, 2011; Sylla and Schultz, 2020). Like Senegal's case, France and Spain were the lead EU member states in engaging Mali to find a strategy to readmit Malian irregular migrants in Europe. From the Malian perspective, there was less concern to meet the EU's irregular migration control demands. The Malian government understood that complying with the EU's requisite to control

its nationals' mobility challenged its authority and existence. After experiencing difficulties in returning irregular migrants to Mali, the EU established tailored cooperation at least to ease the situation. The Netherlands, for instance, worked to strengthen the partnership that would enable the deportation of Malian migrants in exchange for development projects in Mali. In Europe, the agreement was praised as it would hasten the process by providing the necessary documents for returning migrants to their home countries (Colleta and Ahad, 2017). It was seen as a solution to the long-term migration management challenge with Mali.

Contrastingly, as the Mali-Netherlands agreement was applauded in Europe and seen as a successful case of a renewed partnership, the situation was the opposite in Mali. The deal was met with ridicule, protests and seen as a betrayal of Mali nationals by its government. The logic to refer to the agreement as a betrayal emerged from comparing the amount of foreign aid offered with the remittances to Mali (Colleta and Ahad, 2017). A few days after the deal, the Malian government denied signing an agreement with the EU on the deportation of Malian migrants. The Dutch Minister Koenders, who had signed the agreement on behalf of the EU High Representative Vice President (Federica Mogherini), was compelled by the Malian authorities to issue a formal confirmation that the agreement did not include readmission of Malians (The government of Netherlands, 2016). Later the confirmation revealed that what was agreed was a rather general 'Joint Roadmap' on priority actions that outlined 'joint work to tackle root causes of migration'.

Through the foreign minister Abdoulaye Diop, the Malian authorities issued an official government's position regarding the agreement. Diop denied signing any document that would enable the repatriation of Malian migrants living in Europe illegally. The Malian government quickly made a U-turn to avoid losing the grip of the people. Abdoulaye Diop claimed that Mali "does not intend to put a price on its dignity even if the EU is a development partner" (MG, 2016). A few irregular migrants already deported from France were sent back in less than

a month after the deal. The Malian government explained that the migrants lacked formal Malian passports and had traveled using the European Travel permits. The Malian government officials further indicated that it would only accept people if they were well verified to be its nationals and not just be assumed to be Malians. The French government remained silent and temporarily stopped the deportation of Mali nationals (Colleta and Ahad, 2017).

3.6 Subverting the EU's influence

Most African partner countries were pro-active and pragmatic on which migration issues to own or to reject. They focused more on advancing their development issues instead of just accepting the EU's unilateral control approach. For instance, in Senegal's case, every attempt to cooperate was accompanied by explicit gains in the context of migration and development and domestic capacity building (Lavenex and Kurz, 2008). The leveraging occurred in two ways: the countries showed their relevance as major migrant countries of origin and/or revealed their strategic geographical position as transit countries. Their threats to non-cooperation in migration control or repatriation meant creating a suitable environment for favorable agendas and prioritization of their development process (Parkes, 2017). Moreover, they always kept the EU actors nearby. The cost of their non-cooperation in migration control was high enough to make the EU concede to their demands for development-related migration management projects. Most transit countries expressed their relevance in holding or letting African irregular migrants transiting to Europe. The more the EU showed a high need to control migration, the more the African partner countries found an opportunity to articulate its interest (Reslow and Vink, 2015; Van Criekinge, 2008).

Moreover, African countries like Senegal, Ethiopia and Mali expressed a strong perception of the EU's incapability to manage irregular migration alone. Through negotiations, Tunisia, Morocco and Senegal were able to convince the EU of its ineffectiveness in the migration

control in their territorial waters without their cooperation. In the negotiation process, they saw the EU as unwilling to deploy adequate resources in the EU-Africa cooperation on irregular migration control (Mouthaan, 2019). Overall, to leverage negotiating for increased EU investment, African countries did not completely pull out of the partnership agreements. As explained by Parkes, a country like “Ghana was still unlikely to pull lucrative migrant workers out of Europe in order to secure ODA which it anyway knows is subject to a sunset clause” (Parkes, 2017; 88: see also, Munck, 2008).

3.7 A recap and highlights of the literature gap

The literature review above highlights the key explanations of why the EU developed policies towards specific dimensions. To start with, the member states' decision to take the migration and asylum issue to the EU level has been argued as policy venue shopping - to make policies favorable to their interests. At the EU level, they initiated the race to the bottom by developing CEAS. But this did not solve the challenge of irregular migration. The inability to control migration from within its territory led to reaching out to African partner countries.

The EU-Africa partnership was characterized by tension where African partner countries struggled to overcome economic and political domination by the EU actors. However, this body of literature experiences one challenge. It only showed how African partner countries, within the partnership framework, resisted the EU's influence in irregular migration control. As such, I argue that although African countries had always engaged in decolonization to address the structures that reproduced global inequalities (Ferrero, 2017), their resistance to the EU's migration control approach did not present any policy recommendation. Guided by the research question, *‘how did African partner countries influence the EU's policy change from control measures to addressing the root causes of irregular migration?’*, I advance the literature review by exploring the scholarly work on the root causes of African irregular

migration. This is with the acknowledgment that migration scholars need to avoid being entangled in what De Genova (2014) terms as one-dimension thinking in migration studies. Often, researchers look at people's migration without considering the whole context and historicity of irregular migration. (see De Genova, 2018; Tazzioli and Walters, 2016).

The scholarship of the root causes of African irregular migration offers a different explanation of the EU-Africa engagement. Paoletti argued that a way of understanding the dynamics of policy change within the EU-Africa partnership is to examine the African partner countries' rhetorical demands. He further contends that the tension between European and African partners in the irregular migration control framework was a struggle for African countries to challenge the EU's political and social dominance. In other words, they aimed at addressing the apparent neo-colonialism in migration control. "A rise in North-South tension over the issue of irregular migration would lead poorer states to demand more equitable economic and political arrangements within the new international order" (Paoletti, 2010:4).

There has been a growing politics of decolonization by Africa countries in international affairs (Veracini, 2010). Although there was a general understanding between European and African partners that there exist root causes (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007), there was a significant difference in how each partner pursued its interests. From Africa, irregular migration to Europe was a consequence of colonialism that left the global south prone to economic and political meddling (Matunhu, 2011; Rodney, 2018:1ff; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010; 2016). Gatrell presents a critic that the construction of the refugee crisis in Europe failed to consider the long history of the refugees' home countries.

"To write the history of refugees is to engage critically with a category of concern which has to be problematized and historicized, to understand how refugees have in Ian Hacking's words, become 'moving targets (Hacking, 2006).' This calls for

something more akin to a total history that integrates ‘history from below’ with other domains, including the history of geopolitics, law, and humanitarian assistance. Such an approach acknowledges but does not privilege the exercise of external power over refugees” (Gatrell, 2016:184).

The proponents of the two accounts of historical establishments (colonialism and neo-colonialism) criticize the early halting of investigations of the root causes at the presentist level, failing to consider how the historical past could shapes structures with the potential to reproduce disadvantages to the current refugee home countries. The shallow investigations subdue the concerns of the primary (vulnerable) agents. As well, ending the quest too soon produces narrowly focused results and incomprehensible policy proposals. Paoletti further argues that

“Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this research is that the North’s exclusionary border management practices provide the South with a greater degree of bargaining power across a number of different issues. Said practices of border control and more specifically, of externalization affect the way in which North-South bargaining is conducted, and provide Southern countries with tools for leverage in other matters that are on the negotiating table” (Paoletti, 2010:6).

To this end, I argue that the resistance of the African partner countries to cooperate in joint irregular migration control missions was a manifestation of decolonization. African countries were conscious of colonialism and neo-colonialism. They therefore generated the right bargaining tools to leverage the EU’s migration policy shift to a dimension that reflects a decolonized state.

3.8 Towards decolonization: The root cause of African irregular migration as an emerging issue of contention

Before the 2015 Valletta summit, there was an acknowledgment within the EU migration policies that the most sustainable approach was to address the root causes of irregular migration. The 1999 Tampere convention was the first instance when the EU mentioned the relevance of addressing the root causes but since this time, ‘tackling root causes’ remained an abstract idea (Boswell, 2002, Lindstrøm, 2005). “As yet, the EU cannot, as of now, be said to have devised a root causes strategy in which policies that impact on asylum and migration pressures are coordinated to ensure the maximum impact is achieved” (Lindstrøm, 2005: 600, see also Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Initially, the EU referenced the root causes of irregular migration from East and Central Europe and not outside Europe. By this time, migration from outside Europe was not a major issue.

Boswell further argues that the EU stood a more politically neutral actor compared to some of the former colonial EU member states in engaging African countries in irregular migration management (Boswell, 2002). Although addressing the root causes appeared to offer a long-term solution, the EU saw a quick option in implementing deterrence and migrant readmission policies. Moreover, instead of addressing the root causes, the EU diverted its effort to the Common European and Asylum System (CEAS) (Lindstrøm, 2005). In short, other than the one-time mentioning of the need to address the root causes of irregular migration (in the 1999 Tampere Convention), the concept remained absent within the EU migration policy.

In recent times, migration scholars have revived a critical debate on addressing the root causes of African migration. Different from the argument that African’s resistance to cooperate in the EU’s migration control was motivated by the value of migrants’ remittances or development aid, another newer argument is related to the historical past (Hurts, 2010; Hansen and Jonsson, 2011; Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Ogu, 2017). The former argument is essential in explaining

African partner countries' dissatisfaction with irregular migration control. However, the partner's resistance to a particular policy can lead to a policy change but does not by itself offer a direction of change. Informed by the hypothesis of the study, the African partner countries did not only resist the EU's influence but also articulated the issue of the root cause of irregular migration. The analysis here links the root causes of African irregular migration to the colonial era and the aftermath structures that explain Africa's dependence on Europe. Scholars suggest that the African countries demanded Europe to take responsibility by addressing the effects of neocolonialism. By doing so, the EU would have tackled the root causes of irregular migration. As such, African partner countries' attempt to utilize their relevance in irregular migration control was a form of repositioning to use migrants as a 'bargaining chip' (Andrijasevic, 2010; Klepp, 2010; Paoletti, 2010:6).

The idea to revisit the historical past to properly understand the current African irregular migration can be explained using Marks's thoughts in her work '*root causes and human rights*'. To Marks, it requires the examination of real social engagement to understand history. "It would take us beyond 'pragmatism' and 'practicality' to praxis, beyond distributional consequences to the organization of productive processes, and beyond 'fantastic' possibilities to real, historically created ones" (Marks, 2011: 77). Marks further explains that the role of discourse ought to take precedence in understanding the root causes. The mainstream thoughts tend to assume that history is given and somehow fixed – that the African state of underdevelopment is a phenomenon that naturally existed rather than created. And so is the understanding of the cause of irregular migration in Europe. The strong resistance to cooperate in joint migration control missions by African partners can be referred to as Africa's resistance to accepting false necessity. "False necessity brings into focus the 'fatalistic myths' which the historicity of existing arrangements and prevent us from grasping their contingency, provisionality and hence, most importantly, their mutability" (Marks, 2011:74). It is deducible

that vast migration literature is based on the idea that the history of underdevelopment is fixed and natural. Marks takes a more radical argument that human rights abuse and its root causes should not just be highlighted but rather explained. She reorients the concept of root causes as planned misery, which manifests through human insecurity, such as extreme poverty caused by economic exploitation, conflict and violence, environmental degradation and global inequality created through human actions. “So, where abuses are currently explained with reference to bad policies, laws and interpretations, the concept of planned misery would urge inquiry into the material context of such harmful thinking” (Marks, 2011:76).

The understanding of root causes and planned misery concurs with Unger’s concept of ‘false contingency’. False contingency is a critic of the doctrine of fatalism that argues that events and phenomena are fixed, accidental and inevitable, and human beings are powerless to change them (Unger, 2004: XViiiff). Challenging determinism and achieving a real alternative to history starts with rejecting the inevitability of certain outcomes. It is then followed by proposing a thought-provoking but accepted argumentation; if the problems are systemic, then the solutions must equally be systemic.

To Hansen and Jonsson, the EU-Africa partnership on migration control reveals a striking parallel between the present and past. The policies of the 1920s onwards (through the colonial era) have greatly shaped the African human geography and the current migration projections. These scholars criticize the mainstream literature for failing to engage the historical past in studying the current EU-Africa partnership on migration control. Scholars need to engage a more crucial colonial history in the examination of the existing power asymmetries. The failure to do so obfuscates the comprehensive understanding of the forces behind African partners’ actions and reactions (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011). In the study of African irregular migration to Europe, as suggested by Ogu, the historical past ought to take center stage. He holds a strong

perception of the current African irregular migration as a re-enactment of the transatlantic slave trade. He backdates the genesis of examining the African partners' reaction in the current partnership framework to the pre-colonial period (Ogu, 2017).

“At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European colonial effort in Africa. This historical dimension is precisely what is lacking in existing scholarly analyses of European migration, which are usually governed by a ‘presentist’ perspective. In previous scholarship, there is of course much awareness of colonialism’s impact on the current, path-dependent migration regimes of individual EU member states, but the equally significant colonial impact of European integration’s approach to the nexus of Africa and migration has gone largely unnoticed. [...] Only by bringing this by now largely forgotten past into the picture can we begin to understand the motivating forces behind current EU-Africa relations, in general, and the EU’s migration policy towards Africa, in particular” (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 263).

Further, as put forward by Ogu while explaining the root causes of African irregular migration, imperialism and colonialism were instrumental in Africa's instability and economic underdevelopment (Ogu, 2017). Other scholars present the idea that links the colonial era and the current structures of economic dependence known as neo-colonialism (Andersson, 2016; Stewart, 2013: 20). Further, these scholars suggest that the high demand for development aid by African partners as a prerequisite to cooperate irregular in migration control aimed to compel the EU member states to take responsibility for the misery established by the former European governments through colonialism. Using Senegal's case, Chou and Gibert explain that the African partners' refusal to cooperate due to lack of an explicit value-added aspect of the partnership (Chou, and Gibert, 2012; Kunz *et al.*, 2011: 171ff).

Besides, the EU's external actions to control irregular migration in Africa were viewed as an attempt to enlarge its sovereign state control area. This created a strong consciousness among African countries that the colonial and neo-colonial periods were connected to wealth accumulation, resource extraction, and control by European states (Fregonise, 2020; Chou, 2009b). Marks' observation of historicity and coloniality is better explained by interrogating who gains - and who loses in maintaining certain perspectives of historical truths of the root causes (Marks, 2011).

There is a general agreement among scholars that migration is a path-dependent process (Castles and Miller, 2009:6-10; de Haas, 2010a; Massey et al., 1999:169). Andersson has presented the same view, that “outsourced controls – by constituting a boom for collaborating states and a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Europe; by undermining regional mobility even when ‘successful’; and by creating security path dependency in bilateral cooperation – have become self-perpetuating” (Andersson, 2016: 1065). “The history of European-African relations and the wide power asymmetry between the EU and African political actors means that the extra-territoriality of EU migration governance in Africa has been subject to criticism that it is a form of neo-colonialism” (Strange and Oliveira, 2019:236, see also, Woolley, 2014). The interconnection between postcolonialism and the need to address the root causes of irregular migration is increasingly taking shape. As Gallien (2018) explained, postcolonialism refers to a philosophy of activism that does not only contests against the colonial-founded system of inequality but also seeks new anti-colonial ways to challenge the power structure (see, Young, 2003; Gikandi, 2010: 113).

The above highlighted Africa's resistance to joint irregular migration control is a postcolonial approach to seek an alternative power structure within the EU-Africa partnership. As well, there was high consciousness of the continuation of dominance and colonial legacy among

African countries. Stephen Hurts, in his work, 'Understanding the EU development policy: history, global context, and self-interest' notes that "more recent enlargements of the EU do present an opportunity to shift development policy away from just being a continuation of Europe's colonial past" (Hurts, 2010:162). Although overcoming the colonial-based EU-Africa relationship ought to have occurred long ago, there still lacks evidence of how and to what extent African states have struggled to tackle colonial dominance. To understand the influence in the shift of the EU migration policy, one ought to view the European partners' actions and reactions contingent on the problem framings by the African partners (Squire, 2015; Bilgiç, 2016).

Chapter six of this study brings new understandings of how African partner countries articulated the colonial and neo-colonial as the root causes of African irregular migration to their European counterparts. The argument is that African partner countries developed and expressed a successful rhetorical action to influence the EU's policy change.

CHAPTER FOUR: RHETORICAL ACTION THEORY

4.0 Introduction

In the world of constructivism, international relations scholars have developed the idea of rhetorical entrapment to demonstrate that actors can strategically use community norms to shape actors' behavior. Ideational forces, shared learning and knowledge, normative and institutional structures are crucial in influencing states' behavior. In a social-setting, when actors internalize and accept norms, they are obliged to comply. Those norms generate legitimate pressure for the actors to conform. In the case of non-conformity, actors become subject to actions of naming and shaming, which influences them to change their behavior accordingly (Glanville, 2018). Actors, therefore, might find themselves trapped by their own rhetoric of normative commitment. Such pressure to comply with community norms has also been referred to as 'community trap' or 'rhetorical entrapment' (Schimmelfennig, 2001), 'rhetorical trap' (Kaplan, 2017), or 'ethical trap' (Lebow and Frost, 2019). Awareness of regional identity and a sense of belonging to a regional community by actors are critical in rhetorical entrapment. Additionally, interests and identities are reconstructed through interaction between actors.

Rhetorical action is a strategy of political legitimization and delegitimization of states' actions. It is one of the explanations that advance the understanding of states' reception and reaction to rhetoric. The scholarship of rhetorical influence on foreign policy outcomes is increasing (see Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Morin and Gold, 2010; Park, 2017). This chapter deploys a rhetorical action to explain the research variables in answering how African partner countries, within the Africa-EU partnership framework, contributed to influencing the EU's policy change towards African irregular migration.

In international relations, actors construct ideas that structure expectations about appropriate norms and behavior in a community setting (McDonald, 2018). The framing then shapes the actors' identities and hence defines the characterization of social engagement between them. An actor use norms to validate a particular stance to influence others. But the use of the norms can also be strategic (see Schimmelfennig, 2003). Rhetorical action is particularly concerned with justification, argumentation, and persuasion using community norms. It is best suited to explain strategic moves through rhetoric where speech functions to create effects upon an intended audience. It further expounds on how actors rely on archetypal rhetorical strategies founded on different values and underlying interests and assumptions in a socialized setting (Heracleous, 2006). Strategizing combines a discourse and social practice and "comprises those actions, interactions and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated practices that they draw upon in accomplishing that activity" (Balogun et al., 2014: 176). In explaining the process of persuasion through rhetoric, Schimmelfennig presents a combination of norms, interests to establish a rhetorical action. Precisely, he refers to rhetorical action as "the strategic use and exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environment of the proponents and intended to persuade the audience and the opponents to accept the proponents' claims and act accordingly" (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 199). He even simplifies rhetorical action as the strategic use of norm-based argument (Schemmelfenig, 2001; 2003).

Initially, due to the strategic combination of norms and interests, Schimmelfennig argued rhetorical action as a form of bridge-building between rationalists and constructivists (Schimmelfennig, 2001). However, in his later work, he concedes that the framework belongs to the social constructivism school of thought (Schimmelfennig, 2006; see also Kratochvíl et al., 2006; Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). Viewing rhetorical action through a social constructivism lens, one can explain it as a strategy that connects cultures, values and norms to define the actors' engagement in community relations. This brings to focus the social

embeddedness of language in the behavior of individual actors. Language is not only viewed as just a reflection of reality but also as a tool through which reality is constructed and reconstructed (Balogun et al., 2014; Diez, 1997; Kratochvíl et al., 2006). It thus requires a proper understanding of the language to understand the dynamics of social actions and international engagements among actors. Language, in this context, expresses both instrumental rationalities and shared norms.

In rhetorical action, the establishment of norms and compliance with those norms is crucial. Actors strategically use rhetoric to pressure other actors to accept a particular normative position where a conceivable social behavior is already determined. It also involves qualitative process-tracing case studies analyzed from a specific methodological starting point (Dixon, 2017). As suggested by most scholars, shaming and pressure to comply with international obligations emerge from the export of norms from the western power to ‘the others’. A rhetorical action is thereby a form of resisting influence and exerting pressure on the ‘normative powers’ (Hansen, 2006).

4.1 Rhetorical action and adaptation

Rhetorical action has various possible outcomes, each of which depends on the reaction of the targeted actor. The actor may eventually adapt to the admired normative position and become rhetorically entrapped or may resist. Hence, connected to rhetorical action is the concept of rhetorical adaptation. Rhetorical adaptation enables understanding of complex and uncertain ways to respond to pressure to comply with shared norms. In rhetorical adaptation, an actor is deemed inconsistent or not compliant with social norms when it does not shift its behavior to adapt to the normative expectations. In agreement with Schimmelfennig definition, Dixon views rhetorical adaptation as “drawing on a norm’s content in order to craft arguments that could diffuse pressures to comply with a norm or minimize perceptions that certain actions are

in violation of a norm” (Dixon, 2017:85). Hence, rhetorical adaptation refers to an actor’s behavioral adjustment relative to the rhetoric that asserts pressure to change. There are four types of actor’s reactions/adaptations to rhetorical actions:

- The first form of reaction is norm disregard. It involves an actor ignoring a norm that is connected to a given action. Despite being fully aware of the norm, an actor deliberately chooses not to reference it. Actors use such a strategy when the norm involved is weak, or there exists a little consensus on the logic of appropriateness of the opponent’s idea. Actors can avoid being entrapped through norm disregard when the norm is not socially institutionalized or in the absence of severe consequences in case of norm violation (Ben-Josef and Dixon, 2019). When a norm is widely accepted and acknowledged as appropriate, it becomes difficult for an actor to ignore it. In this case, the strategy of norm disregard is less likely to succeed. In a situation of a highly established norm, actors try to avoid the cost of violation of the norm.

- The second form of reaction to rhetorical action is norm avoidance. The strategy starts by acknowledging the validity of the norm. However, an actor might argue that its motivations and actions are not within the scope of the norm under concern and therefore denies any norm violation. Such denial is termed by Cohen (2001, chapter 2) as ‘interpretative denial,’ which involves admitting raw facts without placing those facts in specific contexts (see also Bruna, 2010; Martin, 2015).

- The third type of response to a rhetorical action is norm re-interpretation. This arises when one or more understanding of a norm is contested. Such a strategic response aims to narrow the scope within which a norm is interpreted in an attempt to delink any action that might appear to contradict the norm. Moreover, this defensive strategy is associated with the re-interpretation of the norm’s prescription and the context under which a norm applies.

Unlike norm avoidance, where an actor refrains from the norm, re-interpretation tends to redefine the norm (Dixon, 2017).

- The fourth form of reaction in rhetorical action is rhetorical entrapment. Park defines rhetorical entrapment as “a process of social influence that alters the range of possible future actions by eliminating or exaggerating the political cost of, specific – including previously used – policy options” (Park, 2017:490). Entrapment involves a situation where an actor cannot reject the validity of the understanding of a norm, and any attempt to do so generates inconsistency and double standards. As a form of rhetorical adaptation, rhetorical entrapment takes place in two ways. Rhetorical entrapment starts with norm signaling - that Dixon refers to as ‘talking the talk.’ Actors start to rhetorically acknowledge the need for change towards the proposed normative stance. Later there is ‘walking the walk’ – adjusting the behavior to resonate with the implied normative direction (Dixon, 2017; Hansen, 2006). At this point, the rhetorical action is viewed to have achieved a successful entrapment, which leads to the other actor’s behavioral change.

Nevertheless, when all the actors engaged in rhetorical action do not share a normative commitment and depend on just the procedural norm of consensus-seeking, they are likely to find themselves in a never-ending argument, unable to persuade each other or be persuaded. When the interlocutor does not accept norm-avoidance, norm disregard and norm re-interpretation, actors end up with an unworking relationship. Morin and Gold clarify that in rhetorical action, “actors unwilling to suffer reputational costs by having behaviors inconsistent with their previous discourse and unwilling to build trust with their interlocutors by ignoring their previous behaviors, can close their debate by adopting an unworking agreement” (Morin and Gold, 2010: 566). In this case, actors do not mind behaving contrary to their own claim of commitment to normative practice. In other cases, they are prepared to suffer reputation costs. Scholars explain that the EU’s decision to initiate talks on turkey’s

accession was due to Turkey's attempt to entrap the EU. However, Turkey's efforts to rhetorically trap the EU were not successful. Turkey did not have sufficient materials to entrap the Turkey-skeptic EU member states: its European identity was controversial (Bürgin, 2010; Saatcioglu, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2011). But when the actors claim to be committed to the shared norms, rhetorical entrapment occurs.

4.2 Rhetorical entrapment

Rhetorical entrapment is established in a strategic process when players are cognizant of the inequality in the interaction and are unwilling to change their stances. Indeed, Kaplan (2017) refers to rhetorical entrapment as a plan for the weak - the apparent weaker actors become tactical. They use their opponents' public commitment to the shared norm in the process of framing arguments. Understanding how interlocutors strategically act within a social setting to 'locking in' the opponent is vital in rhetorical entrapment. First, locking in involves a situation where the rhetor is expected to argue within socially accepted principles to the extent that any attempt to argue against those principles results in self-contradiction, inconsistency and double standards - hence losing credibility. When the opponent chooses to remain consistent with the norms to maintain integrity, they do not need to counter-argue. This is what Schimmelfennig refers to as silencing of the interlocutor. The actors under social pressure (usually) do not change their interests; they only refrain from illegitimate behavior. Successful rhetorical action silences the opponent without bringing about a substantive consensus on the norm-conforming policy (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Interlocutors achieve this by hiding their own interests behind rhetoric that asserts values to which all parties present feels obliged to give lip service (Schimmelfennig, 2003:197).

A rhetorical argument, however, goes beyond the intersubjectively shared norms and the prevalence of an argument itself. Trust or distrust is not necessarily a factor. To establish an

effective rhetorical action, interlocutors must frame their interests into a language that articulates the shared norms and values so that when rhetoric is communicated, it leaves an impact on the speaker. Morin and Gold refer to this as a civilized force of hypocrisy. “Speakers cannot return to a pure bargaining process and openly reveal inconsistencies between their discourse and their instrumental objectives without risking the loss of credibility” (ibid; 2010:577). In other words, persuasive rhetoric is non-reversible. It shifts strategists from the world of rational choice to the world of construction through arguing. Nonetheless, even the actors engaged in rhetoric may as well find themselves entrapped between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness.

Rhetorical entrapment is founded on the interaction between normative identity and behavior. Hence, it has the highest impact when the normative standards are well established and the social engagement between actors is substantial (Aoun, 2012). As Krebs and Jackson (2007) argue, rhetorical entrapment is a political strategy that involves arms twisting through twisting tongue. During times of crisis, the actor’s identity comprises the potential to encounter the subjectivity of self, thereby allowing the rhetor to force the target to adapt to rhetoric formally established (Mattern, 2005:139ff; Schimmelfennig, 2003:42-47). The subjectivity of self has also been referred to as a meta-power that defines how actors' socialization leads to constructing and reconstructing interests and identities at the international level.

As explained by Abdallah et al. (2011), a particular rhetorical practice can be reinforced by a strongly related non-rhetorical approach. The two eventually form what Bednarek et al. (2017) refer to as rhetorical transcendence. Besides, specific rhetorical practices can be joined together to establish a discourse. And a rhetorical approach might constitute overarching discourses. These multiple rhetorical practices interconnect to generate a form of ‘synergy rhetoric,’ making it possible to bridge opposite sides (Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010). Based on the notion of synergy rhetoric, it is possible to have multiple key activities

that demonstrate consistency between rhetoric and rhetorical situation, such as the historical context of socialization. By analyzing this meta-powered rhetoric, we are able to understand the pursuance, by an actor, to multiple objectives within that particular community setting (Bednarek et al., 2017).

4.3 Formation of rhetoric in rhetorical action

Rhetoric, according to Hauser “is concerned with the use of [verbal] symbols to induce social action” (Hauser, 2002:3). It is aimed at a specific audience for a particular action. In constructivism, rhetoric is based on social facts expressed through speech. Both rhetoric and narratives are features of discourse but are not always the same, but speeches and texts that makeup rhetoric are the same building blocks of a narrative. In rhetorical discourse, narratives become rhetoric when their application is strategic. “While they are rarely complete narratives or completely narrative, rhetorical discourses often use narrative elements as means to their argumentative, convincing or otherwise motivational ends” (Iversen, 2014). When a narrative contains rhetoric, i.e., entails argumentation with the potential to persuade, it becomes a rhetorical narrative (Herman et al., 2012: 4-7). In this situation, Phelan terms narratives as rhetoric where a narrative is not just a story but also an action (Phelan, 1996:8-10).

Miskimmon et al. differentiate a mere narrative and a rhetorical narrative by referring to the latter as strategic narratives. They define strategic narratives as “instruments for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations and change the discursive environments in which they operate” (Miskimmon et al., 2014:2). In other words, when a narrative is framed, it becomes rhetoric or a strategic narrative. As explained by Kirkwood (1992:30), “rhetors may tell stories of deeds which reflect characters’ states of mind, or they may enable or challenge people to perform such acts themselves, with striking consequences for their own life stories. Often, however, performances disclose specific states of mind only when rhetors make them

revealing through commentary or the careful stipulation of narrative details”. The interplay between rhetoric and narratives in rhetorical action has two implications: first, actors can generate rhetoric by combining framed narratives, and narratives can contain a whole argument that connects to the targeted audience.

Narratives hence are part of rhetorical discourses, and through framings, they create rhetoric. Due to the strategic use of norms in rhetorical action, rhetors combine different narratives (e.g., identity narratives, issue narratives and system narratives) to generate a persuasive effect. An actor can generate and project a narrative relative to the existing discourse and relevant to their situation. In this regard, narratives form a structuring effect on rhetorical action, i.e., based on a particular discourse, the strategic framing of narratives generates a rhetorical action. Actors reflexively operate within discourses to strategically construct narratives with a very instrumental aim to influence others to behave in a particular manner (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2019:12ff; Baynham & De Fina, 2016). In short, framings and narratives are components of rhetorical action.

Irrespective of the discourse, rhetoric is shaped by one or more different features, including history, metaphors, symbols, analogies and images). Likewise, framing refers to “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Miskimmon et al., 2014:7, see also Entman, 2009). Framing involves a joining-up account of the matter and throwing out or taking both possible perspectives of a narrative (Ankeny, 2011). As such, rhetoric links to the concept of constructivism, which Diez (1997) refers to as ‘sense-making’. Diving deeper into their functions, narratives express the root causes of a phenomenon and define the effects or conditions as problematic. Moreover, they convey moral judgment and highlight remedial actions.

In practice, framing is commonly undertaken by political leaders and other elites in shaping political thoughts. For instance, political speech relating to the foreign policy domain can well connect to the country's development or public policy change. A good example is Hansen's methodological framework of identity constructions in foreign policy (Hansen, 2013:10ff). A root cause of a domestic issue can be framed to emanate from within or outside the country. The nature of framings enables examining how narratives become rhetoric (De Fina and Georgakopoulou, 2019:10-14). In this case, discourse is understood as a platform for exercising framing, generative, performative functions (Carta and Morin, 2016:1). It is not only conceived as heavily reproducing structural dynamics of the social interaction but also acts as both the only access point to the real world and constitutive of the reality as discovered. Rhetorical action directs to articulating strategic narratives to generate conceptualization of the norms as structures, i.e., what we believe as the reality of convergence and divergence of various fragments that constitute the whole. In political realms, articulation is the approach of establishing the structure and the exercise of power. This articulation of rhetorical artifacts defines the relations of domination and subordination within knowledge perspectives and the social relations of power (Graham, 2018). The analysis of rhetorical action involves the whole process of combining, through framings and narratives of norms and interests.

Rhetoric is based on events and issues as well as social settings. It is also implicit to the time factor, i.e., historical - beginning, middle or present. Social relations consist of actors with long-term engagement and, therefore, long-standing narratives about the perception of themselves and other actors, about historical-present issues and about the structure of the international system. These relations may be based on short-lived events such as crisis, summits and conventions that later become rhetorical artifacts. ÓTuathail (2002) terms the connection of these events as "storyline". These storylines are sense-making tools that generate a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative to influence a policy change. They also involve actors that

form them. “While actors actively form ‘positions,’ they are also entangled within the webs of meaning that dominant storylines permit and are ‘positioned’ by the images, metaphors, analogies and reasoning that these narratives allow” (ÓTuathail (2002:607).

As building pillars of rhetoric, narratives are necessary for informing the emergence, sustainability, transformation of structure-agency relations over time. Roberts (2006) explains three forms of narratives to understand actors’ engagement at the international level - identity narrative, system narrative and issue narrative. The identity narratives are concerned with actors' identities (both states and polities) in international engagement with others, e.g., normative power. As highlighted in the later section of this chapter, identity narratives lack any definite analytical framework. They usually present a constant process of negotiation and contestation. Secondly, there are system narratives - they involve the nature and the structure of a system of interaction such as the Africa-EU partnership. Finally, are issue narratives - they apply strategic sense-making out of issues to shape the nature of social engagement and policy direction.

These three forms of narratives are reinforcing components of rhetorical action. Their convergence occurs primarily when the construction of a narrative works to express a gap in evidence that requires a solution through the search for further evidence. “Other-times, the stitching together of the narrative offers the scientist a process to figure out where and why the different explanatory devices and situational elements fit together, knowing that they need to be aligned to make any kind of joined-up account of the matter” (Morgan & Wise, 2017:4, see also De Fina, 2016). For simplicity, within discourses, narratives are framed to form rhetorical action, i.e., a joined-up account of the matter.

Social actors are situated in social practice; a situation is thus a vital force that constitutes a discourse in rhetorical action. Consequently, rhetoric will always be embedded in a context -

rhetorical situation where a speech must respond to the essentials of the occasion. The rhetorical situation is different from the rhetor or the persuasive intent. It guides the understanding of rhetoric. “The rhetorical situation ‘dictates the significant physical and verbal responses,’ it ‘constrains the words which are uttered,’ and it ‘prescribes its fitting response’” (Benoit, 2000:179, see also Herrick and Education, 2004). The rhetorical situation connects the speech to the inner truth and external values. Such a scenario is also viewed as situated social relations and combines political rhetoric and the context. This is notwithstanding that rhetoric does not only interact with the context but also changes it (Martin, 2015). “Situations control rhetoric, as questions control answers, and situations are only rhetorical if they require modification through rhetorical means” (Turnbull, 2017:117). When interlocutors in a rhetorical action are situated, then they must be understood in the right context.

4.4 Rhetorical action and Persuasion

In rhetorical action, language matters: through language, strategic narratives become instruments of rhetorical action and persuasion. Rhetorical action underpins a form of persuasion that combines both the logic of consequences and appropriateness (Petrova, 2016; Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2004; Risse and Kleine, 2010). From the definition, persuasion captures the critical elements of the two paradigms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 914) define persuasion as “the mission of norm entrepreneurs: they [*actors*] seek to change the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitments. Persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes intersubjective”. In this regard, the objective is to reach a reasoned consensus with the right process of reasoning (Risse and Kleine, 2010).

Within a social engagement, actors use language to express diverse perceptions and ideologies in rhetoric. Instead of being just a medium of information transformation from an autonomous

reality, language enables social relations through discourse claims to form reality. A conceptualization is made possible by language as a network of words or signs juxtaposed to derive the desired meaning whose significance is constructed relative to other objects. These collocations establish links with either positive or negative meaning when put together through contestation. The understanding of rhetorical action aids the investigation of how actors socially construct or express beliefs, ideas, and meanings to influence other actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Besides, rhetorical action takes intersubjectiveness normative positions as prominent features in the real world. For instance, the concept of refugees is a framed social fact and is reliant on the agreement among actors about asylum. Thus, refugees will always exist as long as the agreement remains (Betts and Loescher, 2011:89; Haddad, 2008:7). As long as a state is a party to asylum law, the international community will always compel it to comply with asylum norms and standards.

Rhetorical action is dependent on how an actor frames a social phenomenon in relation to the other. For instance, irregular migration control inhibits asylum rights in the sense that states are perceived to deter human movement to safe-havens. It is, however, essential to note that these systems of juxtapositions are unfixed and are in a continuous struggle of developing certain understandings in which they should be fulfilled since there will always be diverse potential meanings (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:28-36). The constructs of rhetoric must resonate with the norms of social engagements. Rhetors do so with an intention to create a purposeful meaning to the political past, present or future (Miskimmon et al., 2014: 12-14). Rhetorical action acknowledges this struggle by placing social norms and actors' interests together to strategically conceptualize a specific phenomenon and create influence within those social norms to maximize interests.

There has been an attempt to distinguish “being a narrative” from “possessing narrativity” in the persuasion process (Ryan, 2005). The nature of engagement between actors is defined by

different narrativity, which cannot be put into one perspective since each narrative is determined by the speaker and the audience's interpretation. Some events of international socialization may not be narratives by themselves but can later be recognized to possess a narrative. For instance, there was no formal end to the Cold War. Yet, the interpretation of events using the narrative's semantic features by activists and political leaders led to the development of an understanding of a transition from the historical period to an unknown new beginning (Miskimmon et al., 2014:12-14). The main purpose of differentiating 'being a narrative' and 'possessing narrativity' in rhetorical action is to comprehend the nature of rhetoric and how actors intend to maximize gains, legitimize an action or defend themselves against other actors' persuasion.

Depending on the context, rhetorical action involves actors with persuasive strategies for a particular problem and use speech to convince other actors. By analyzing communication dynamics between socialized settings, researchers deduce that actors use language to get others into their envisioned position by strategically maneuvering and rhetorically sharing their perspectives. This is why Rumelt (2011) explained that rhetorical action is an application of strength against weakness in social interaction.

Rhetorical action and entrapment involve the language performing a critical role. The process places rhetorical practices at the core of persuasion. For example, for this study, the rhetorical analysis starts from a normative power perspective - inconsistency within the EU foreign actions. It then perceives the African partner countries as restraints of the EU actors. A relational concept of power can both be productive and repressive. Through power and relations, activities are made to happen or not: or the extent of their achievement (Carta and Morin, 2016:5-7). By placing an entity with respect to other entities, a subject position is constructed through the rhetorical process. As a form of persuasion, rhetorical action uses conceptualization of the structures as what we believe to be the reality of convergence and

divergence of various fragments that constitute the whole. In other words, the identity narratives, system narratives and issue narratives are joined together to generate mega rhetoric as a persuasion tool. This articulation generates the influence to reconstruct social engagement among actors.

As a strategy of influence, rhetorical action acknowledges the power imbalance between actors, thereby emerges to offer an alternative way out among the seemingly disadvantaged actors (Bednarek et al., 2017; Miskimmon et al., 2014:10). Mega rhetoric is an instrument of power that constitutes and redefines the norms and practices in shaping the actor's identity and the meaning of a social system. Unlike other persuasion strategies, rhetorical action offers tactical means of power relations that create an opportunity to free the lesser influential actors from domination by major actors dominating power using dominant discourses.

The seemingly weaker actors, such as small states, aware of their less material power, act strategically to establish persuasiveness. When the actors adopt a strategic rather than truth-seeking orientation, the outcome will reflect a compromise instead of reasoned consensus (Morin and Gold, 2010; Petrova, 2016). Thus, rhetorical action involves no change in the actor's preferences. Instead, it relates more closely to the rationalists' conceptualization of 'information updating' but with the recognition that socialization leads to the change in the actor's behavior. Morin and Gold argue that while an actor's primary objective in rhetorical action is gain-maximizing, in communicative action, the key intention is truth-seeking. In rhetorical action, the consensus is a procedural norm, and the outcome is a result of an unworking agreement (Morin and Gold, 2010). While communicative action occurs between actors in symmetrical social relations, rhetorical action arises in asymmetrical social settings where the subaltern has to be strategic in applying normative aspects to generate influence. In explaining the untapped potential of rhetorical actions, Huspek notes that "the idea of rhetorical

action points beyond Habermas' normatively grounded technics for advancing validity claims" (Huspek, 2007:362).

The main requirement in examining persuasion in rhetorical action is identifying the critical norms shared through the actors' socialization and the framing of those norms within the rhetorical situation. Subsequently, the concern is whether the objectives of the rhetorical action are achieved at the behavioral level without necessarily exploring the actor's internal motives for the change. As a persuasion strategy, a key feature of rhetorical analysis is the interrogation of "whether the behavioral change was a consequence of changing preferences, or just a tactical reaction to a successful rhetorical attack" (Kratochvil et al., 2006: 499).

Actors develop persuasion by hiding the pursuit of self-interest and embark on norm-based arguments. The rhetorical action continues until the opponents cease arguing against the issue and act accordingly, irrespective of whether they have been convinced or not. In the case of non-compliance by the opponent, the interlocutor questions the validity claims on the truthfulness while pointing out inconsistencies between the opponent's real stance and what ought to be the stance (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). Argumentation, thus, does not necessarily lead to trust. The breach of trust in the previous engagements could as well have an impact on the capability of the argumentation to build trust. Based on such knowledge, interlocutors construct a set of beliefs about the real impetuses and goals of the other. These beliefs may alter the interpretation of the speech act of others. Such peaceful but strategic rhetoric becomes a trap. It becomes easy for the accused to confirm the interlocutor's rhetoric and quite challenging to disapprove it. This is best brought out by Morin and Gold, who define rhetorical entrapment as "the inability to pursue a preferred option that violates a prior rhetorical statement while refusing to comply with normative standards because it would undermine material interests" (Morin and Gold, 2010: 577).

The construction of high power rhetoric mainly depends on domestic-international contexts, the goal of political leadership and communication environments. In the context of the research hypothesis, the rhetorical action by the African partner countries was presumed to have successfully entrapped the EU actors. The EU's establishment of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to address the root causes of irregular migration signified both rhetorical entrapment and practical adaptation ('talk the talk' to 'walk the walk'). The study does not distinguish 'talk the talk' and 'walk the walk.' The two steps of rhetorical entrapment form a continuous process of policy change.

4.5 rhetorical action and the EU policy-shaping

The EU has been the principal focus of rhetorical entrapment due to its growing identity as a normative actor whose actions are based on globally acknowledged norms and values. Due to the well-established concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), the analysis of persuasion mechanisms, mostly between the EU and the EU potential member, has its starting point as the causal effects of norms. The non-EU countries accept the EU's normative identity but try to manipulate EU norms to their advantage. In these accounts, the EU has sometimes been presented not as an actor but rather as a normative context in which rational actors are situated using the EU norms to increase their own benefits (Aoun, 2012; Kratochvíl and Tulmets, 2010). Using the logic of obligatory action where norms guide actors' behavior, the EU's engagement and 'the others' leads to states sharing a belief system of the EU (Petrova, 2016). Within this socialization, the arguments by the non-EU's partners - pushing their self-interests - are capable of compelling the EU to conform with its own normative positions. The idiosyncratic interlocutors are hence able to frame norm-based arguments and disband any socially sustainable counterarguments to compel the EU to act accordingly.

The debates on migration policies revolve around international norms of asylum protection and the EU's role as a global leader in upholding those norms. Rhetorical action leads to a policy change by first invoking knowledge claims about the causes of an issue and even its effects. Knowledge claims shape policy proposals and are determined by the actor's understanding of policy problems and appropriate interventions. Salmivaara and Kibler (2020) term such policy proposal as policy rhetoric; this is a policy recommendation that emerges from different argumentations, beliefs and underpinning rhetoric. Boswell et al. (2011) refer them to as policy narratives - "the factual beliefs espoused by policy-makers and others engaged in political debates about the causes and dynamics of the problems they are seeking to address, and about how policy could impact these dynamics" (Boswell et al., 2011:4, see also, Boswell, 2011). As causes of policy change, policy rhetoric possesses the most influence when they are cognitively plausible, morally compelling, and contains perceived interest. Besides, they are more persuasive when they keep coherence, consistency and plausibility.

When policy rhetoric is quite prevalent, they attract expert knowledge and place the policy debates at the center of analysis, stressing the role of ideas in policy formulation. Policy changes that emerge from political decision-making are partly influenced by public debates and tend to depart from the state's policy preferences (guided by rational interest) or objective 'facts.' This happens when political actors gather the ideas from the outside to construct a policy problem and the most appropriate solution (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011). Although conventional political thoughts shape rhetorical practices, they are also motivated by rival actors in an attempt to win a situation to their advantage (Bleich 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Boswell, 2011). For a knowledge claim to be competitive vis-a-vis others, it needs to be understandable to the knowledge experts and persuasive to the general public.

There exist no specific approach to the formation of policy claim. Commonly, different groups come together, gather scattered rhetoric and form a complete policy knowledge. Policy

knowledge typically acquires a particular pattern, especially in situations that are hard to define or have no straightforward solution, such as crises. During crises, decision-makers make their decision heavily influenced by an existing rhetoric, i.e., the next course of action, who is responsible for what, how, and why. Policymakers usually work to align their policy proposals with the existing wave of opinion, which they use to explore and define an issue in addressing a policy dilemma (Boswell, 2011; Krebs and Jackson, 2007).

EU policy changes have been influenced through rhetorical practices, which express policy knowledge (Aoun, 2012; Boswell, 2011; Carta and Morin, 2016:68; Vertovec, 2011). Rhetorical action has been used to influence a shift in the EU migration policy change (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005). Policy rhetoric in the migration domain is based on ideologies that range from left-right. In the case of irregular migration control, left-wing politics have ideologies that promote less restrictive migration policies. On the contrary, right-wing politics tend to promote policies founded on their school of thought, i.e., securitization of migrants and criminalization of asylum seekers (see Boswell et al., 2011). It is deducible that policy rhetoric is constructed and diffused based on the actors' interests. Balch and Geddes found that rhetorical practices related to human trafficking impacted the UK's migration control system during the 2006 migration crisis (Balch and Geddes, 2011). Carling and Hernández-Carretero examined the effect of rhetorical practices in Spain about the West Africa irregular migration to the Canary Islands. They examined the effect of high-risk irregular migration narratives and those related to security threats to immigrants and how those narratives influenced migrant-protection policy changes. They found that political narratives at the national level triggered governments' efforts to reach out to the African countries to establish migration management partnerships (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011; Hernández-Carretero and Carling, 2012). In every level of policy articulation, knowledge claims by various actors are involved, including politicians, practitioners, technocrats, researchers and media. Policy rhetoric is

perceived as knowledge claims and becomes a shared role between politicians and technocrats. The move to bring together the political rhetoric and the knowledge claims within the EU is a changing role of expert knowledge.

4.6 The EU-Africa Partnership as a platform of social engagement

Researchers tend to use both the official (diplomatic) and unofficial discourses to study the EU-Africa partnership on migration control. The official discourse involves studying what is diplomatically expressed by partners within the formal EU-Africa events such as summits and official agreements. It is also the dominant discourse in the literature of the EU-African partnership on irregular migration control (see, Panizzon, 2008; Chou and Gibert, 2012; Reslow, 2012). The study of diplomatic negotiations examines the official bargaining process and highlights the official reasons for compliance or non-compliance in joint irregular migration control. But again, the official discourse experiences limitations. It does not tell it all; it fails to seek adequate depth in studying the construction of irregular migration and the root causes - thereby missing out on some critical elements. For instance, it is difficult to explain the gap between the rhetorical acceptance to comply and the practical non-compliance among some African partner countries in irregular migration control (see Collett and Ahad, 2017).

To de Haas, the use of unofficial discourse in explaining the engagement between the EU and the African partners is more appropriate and comprehensive in understanding each partner's motives.

‘What remains largely unspoken behind official discourses proclaiming they will ‘combat illegal immigration’ is that European and African states, or at least some powerful interest groups within them, have little genuine interest in stopping migration, because the economies of receiving and sending countries have become increasingly dependent on migrant labour and remittances, respectively’ (De Haas, 2008a: 1315).

Like de Haas (2008a, 2008b), who prefers the study of the EU-Africa partnership using unofficial rhetoric, Sillince et al. (2012) find the analysis of rhetorical action more appropriate in a free social environment. Whether in an official or unofficial setting, the key motive in rhetorical action is the connection of rhetoric to the targeted audiences, both the physical audience or implied audience. As Collett and Ahad (2017) applied in the study of the EU engagement with non-member states in irregular migration, the unofficial discourse consists of political rhetoric expressed in public.

The official and non-official discourses are, however, not exclusive of each other. Speakers can engage various audiences to articulate specific meanings of actions, goals and values. They achieve this by aligning their interests with the norms and values held by the audience. Rhetorical action necessitates going beyond examining what partners say during diplomatic negotiations to include the broader societal understanding and reactions to the issue being contested. The use of both official and unofficial rhetorical settings brings together a wide range of societal actors.

4.7 Operationalization of variables: rhetorical action and entrapment

This study used rhetorical action to explain the role of the African partners, within the EU-Africa partnership on migration control, in influencing the change of the EU migration policy. Rhetoric is strategic when it is based on community norms and is perceived to be consequential by the dominating actors. Sillince et al. (2012) view dominating actors as those holding responsibility and power to determine the survival and direction of engagement. For the repressed actors, the strategy involves persuading the target audiences (i.e., the dominating actors) to act according to social norms. Rhetorical action is contextualized as follows:

4.7.1 Independent variable: Rhetorical action

The study expresses three [*strategic*] narratives that constitute rhetorical artifacts of rhetorical action based on the Africa-EU partnership.

- The rhetoric of root causes of African irregular migration (*issue narrative*)
- The rhetoric of long-standing EU's dominance over the African partner countries in irregular migration management, i.e., the colonial and neocolonial-based structures that define European and African partners (*system narrative*), and
- The critical rhetoric of the EU's identity of normative power, i.e., the inconsistency in normative '*actorness*' in irregular migration management (*identity narrative*)

The rhetoric of root causes

Rhetorical action includes a wide range of rhetorical practices (see Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007; Sillince, 2005). Within the EU-Africa mobility framework, the unworking relationship, featured by resistance to cooperate by African partner countries, went hand in hand with rhetorical practices by African leaders of what constituted the root causes of irregular migration management. Moreover, as suggested by studies, there seemed to exist multiple rhetorics of coloniality in Africa. Ogu (2017) suggests that European colonial action in Africa was the root cause of vulnerability, forced displacement and irregular migration. On the other hand, other scholars (Andersson, 2015; Kohnert, 2007) view the consequent structures of dependence and the imbalanced Africa-EU relations (commonly known as neo-colonialism) as the root causes of irregular migration. Although these discourses of root causes of African irregular migration appear to vary in a way, the related rhetoric shows some resonance. They suggest intervention policies different from migration control and border protection approaches.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, rhetorics can be combined to form 'synergy rhetoric'. The rhetoric of the root causes of irregular migration and that of the EU-Africa structures of

engagement (colonial-based relationship) connect to generate more persuasion. Such broadening of the concept shows how the processes of rhetorical actions are entangled and how they unfold in resonance with non-rhetorical practices (e.g., non-compliance with the migration control agreement by African countries) to construct high-powered rhetoric to entrap the EU actors.

Rhetorical entrapment requires actors to declared their overall support to the legitimacy of the shared norms at the early stages of engagement. Then, they point out the inconsistency within the EU's normative power (Sillince et al., 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2003:192ff). This happens based on either honest belief of rightfulness or strategic reasoning. Later during the engagement, actors (non-EU members) prefer to depart from the normative standard since it contradicts their interests. They expose the inconsistency between the community's normative declarations and the (EU's) behavior through rhetorical action. Regarding the Africa-EU partnership on migration control, this is contextualized in the following steps:

- Acknowledging the EU as a normative power.
- Highlighting inconsistencies within the normative power Europe (NPE) regarding irregular migration control measures, i.e., a critic of fortress Europe.
- Framing the EU as part and parcel of the root causes of African irregular migration

The EU's identity as a normative power: Normative Power Europe (NPE) is a theorization of the EU's identity - what the EU is and what it does. Manners describes normative power Europe as the ability to shape conceptions of the 'normal'; the EU is presumed to shape the norms, standards, and prescriptions of world politics. As such, the EU's actions to influence 'the others' are generally accepted as universally applicable (Manners, 2002; 2008). The concept NPE is characterized by five central core norms that include: peace, liberty, human right and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. Moreover, there are four minor norms:

social solidarity, anti-discrimination sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2002). These normative principles originate from the EU's political and legal foundations (its treaty-based nature), its hybrid polity (a post-Westphalian polity - with intergovernmental and supranational institutions), and its historical context (Manners, 2002; Birchfield, 2013).

The concept of NPE has gained popularity, especially when analyzing the EU's normative actorness against its normative foundation. These two perspectives can also be seen as the EU 'being' a normative power and the EU 'acting' as a normative power (Manners, 2002; Diez 2005). At times, these two perspectives align, while in other cases, they contradict. For instance, in his study of the militarization of the EU *vis-a-vis* the normative power Europe, Manners argues that even military intervention has been legitimized by the concept of human security, which builds EU normative *actorness*. "The focus of all human security concerns has been people-centered freedom from fear and want, which is precisely what the normative principle of sustainable peace has sought to address" (Manners, 2006: 192).

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) acknowledges non-state actors as key security threats. It also recognizes human security as an approach to address these threats. The ESS (later, Common Foreign and Security Policy) highlighted the discursive practices, norms, and values that the EU stands for (Pace, 2007). In the document 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,' the EU made some effort to consolidate the concept of human security as its security approach and a guide to its external actions. At the same time, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), whose content resonated with the seven principles of the Barcelona Report. The two documents (ESS and the Barcelona report) became the foundation of the current European Neighborhood Policy (Albrecht et al., 2004; Glasius & Kaldor, 2006: 6-8; Kaldor et al., 2007; Martin & Kaldor, 2009:1-5). The ENP sets out the platform for, among other issues, the EU's engagement with African states on immigration control.

The legitimacy of a normative power becomes more attractive and convincing when the principles being promoted are more justifiable, coherent and legitimate. The coherence of the normative power emerges from solid and non-contradicting principles. The consistency is maintained by ensuring the same level of performance both within and outside the promoting agent (Manners 2008; 2009; 2009b). As put forward by Cruz-Rubio from post-positivist lenses, legitimacy is a product rooted in ‘the belief’ of legitimate power relations, while the legitimization of power is presented as the process of building and sustaining legitimacy. Public policies are instruments for legitimizing and products of legitimization on the larger political system (Cruz-Rubio, 2013; Clark, 2005:33ff).

Although scholars of NPE do not doubt the foundational principles as normative, critics fault the EU implementation of those principles (i.e., EU’s external actions) or their negative impacts - either expected or non-intended consequences. As some cases, such as the abolition of the death penalty, show a strong consistency between the normativity and the EU’s actions (Manners, 2002), in irregular migration control, researchers indicate a contradiction between the EU’s normative stance and its external *actorness*.

Inconsistency within NPE: The extension of the debate on the EU’s *being* and *acting* normatively has attracted another dichotomy between the EU’s norms and interests. Scholars advance the concept of NPE while acknowledging that norms and interests are strongly interlinked and not easily separated (Diez, 2005; Diez and Pace, 2011; Pace, 2007). But again, norms and interests do not easily co-exist, and choices are inevitable (see Aggestam, 2009; Manners, 2009b). However, some studies present a contrary view that the EU is a realist power that only uses normative power in disguise while perusing its interests (Hyde-Price, 2006; Seeberg, 2009; Ruffa, 2011; Del Sarto, 2016). Other studies examining the EU’s role, particularly in the asylum-migration control nexus, show a strong disconnection between the normative principles and interest (Stewart, 2011). Since the establishment of the European

Neighborhood Policy in 2004, the EU's strategy on irregular migration control, as noted by Cardwell, has deviated from the core normative principles. The control of asylum-seeking is one of the areas that Cardwell explains how "EU non-Member States participate in the pursuit of 'internal' EU policy goals whilst remaining as 'outsiders'" (Cardwell, 2011:220).

The fact that there is no other polity with an established identity as a normative power gives the EU a unique role in legitimizing its policies and practices. Despite the apparent contradiction between the normative principles and actions, the EU has attempted to legitimize its actions while still protecting its interests within the neighborhood. As put forth by Pace, "EU actors thus engage in getting the EU's strategy right: when to offer carrots, when to impose sticks, when to use conditionality" (Pace, 2007: 1046, see also, Diez and Pace, 2011). The EU achieve its mission through complex policy application using diverse legal instruments, institutional setup and strategies (Cardwell, 2011). The conceptualization of normative power involves analysis-linking of ideational and non-material justification of normative principles, actions and outcomes.

Scholars deconstruct the EU as a normative power by analyzing its external actions. They argue that its actions in the field of asylum and migration have a detrimental impact on its normative identity (Carrera, 2012; Lavenex and Stucky, 2011; Pawlak, 2009; Martin, 2011; Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Tocci and Cassarino, 2011). The contradiction of the EU's normative principles and interests manifests in its actions, "is already obvious in the EU's external actions such as energy, security and migration" (Aggestam, 2009: 33). Menéndez strongly asserts that "the commitment to an asylum by the EU has ever been ambivalent, the actual normative force has heavily been dependent on the prudential value of asylum policy" (Menéndez, 2016: 390). The EU partnership agreements with the developing countries on migration control have shown a big gap between the EU's self-proclaimed normative actor, and the EU's view by 'the others'. Based on this inconsistency, Elgström radically terms the EU as an actor dominated by hidden

agenda and driven by self-interest (Elgström, 2008). The absence of specific legal acts to guide the EU's external actions in irregular migration control establishes an environment for the EU member states' avoidance of national and European laws (Menéndez, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018).

Even some of the staunch proponents of the NPE highlight inconsistency in the field of migration. Diez, for instance, argues that "another criticism of the EU as a normative power concerns its consistency, both in terms of not discriminating between different external actors, and not undermining norms from inside. Thus, there have been charges of bias and arbitrariness related to the EU's application of human rights. Also, since 9/11, the EU and its member states have taken part in the drive towards the securitization of migration" (Diez, 2005: 624; see also Diez, 2013). Other scholars have expressed similar arguments. Having securitized migration internally, the EU has opted to address the vulnerabilities that originate from the third countries by externalizing its governance (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Lavenex, 2004; Lavenex, 2006; Balzacq, 2005; Boswell, 2007).

In other cases, some scholars have looked at the EU's external action in migration control from a crisis management point of view. The EU actors are seen to frame the asylum issues as 'crises' - thereby legitimizing urgent measures (Boin et al., 2013:100ff; Menéndez, 2016; Trauner, 2016). Inconsistencies related to normative power are constructed as the EU's unpreparedness to act or application of temporary measures to manage crisis awaiting for comprehensive intervention actions (Vătăman, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Inconsistencies are also framed as human rights violations within the EU member states. UNHCR quoted that the asylum system in some parts of Europe was becoming continually fragile; difficulties in accessing territories, asylum procedures, and breach of the principle of *non-refoulement* were evident (UNHCR, 2014). The gap between the EU asylum framework and the actual member states'

practices was continually widening, compelling the EU actors to engage in a policy reform process (Trauner, 2016).

In the effort of disentangling the widely expressed EU's inconsistencies between the normative principles and its actions in migration control, different implications have been posited. Diez argues that "the EU 'humanitarian' interventions in Africa seem to depend on the geostrategic interests of the EU Member States" (Diez, 2013:197, see also Gegout, 2009). However, Birchfield responds that "many criticize the normative power Europe approach when they find empirical evidence of the EU's hypocrisy or double standards or sheer lack of influence in international arenas, without recognizing that it is the holistic, ethically grounded concepts that are being tested against real-world examples in the first place, whereas most other approaches are not even concerned with such questions" (Birchfield, 2013: 916). Although Birchfield claims that most of the instances of inconsistency are a manifestation of unintended policy failure and not deficiencies of the policy framework, he fails to offer how the EU legitimizes its actions to distinguish (an unintended) policy failure from strategic use of policies to achieve self-interests.

As noted elsewhere, African leaders described the EU's foreign aid as an instrument to curtail asylum rights by financing border surveillance projects. The migration partnerships between the EU and countries like Libya and Mali, where slavery of irregular migrants heading Europe for asylum-seeking was documented (IOM, 2017), were highly criticized from all corners. Such a migration control approach destroyed the EU's normative image and deduced its influence on asylum standards to 'the others' (Collett, 2016; Rankin, 2017; Toaldo, 2017; Guillem and Cvetkovic, 2018). "If our research findings were taken seriously, European leaders would not be building walls and telling people to stay away. They would be working together to ensure that traumatized people are protected and to ensure that the EU lives up to its reputation as an

upholder of human rights and international protection” (Squire and Perkowski, 2016 see also, Finlay, 2018; Tocci, 2017; Sjurson, 2017).

The EU, as part of the root causes. Scholars suggest there is increased effort by ‘the other’ to challenge the prevailing order of EU dominance.

“As a result, and somewhat paradoxically, the EU and its Member States are asked by the rest of the world both to acknowledge their position at the periphery of the emerging multipolar system and to assume global responsibilities commensurate with historical weight and contemporary economic wherewithal. It suffers too from what is often perceived as ‘neo-colonial’ behavior, whether in the context of Euro–African trade agreements, World Trade Organization negotiations or the International Criminal Court” (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 285).

Other studies portray the EU as reluctant to rise to the challenge and consider the voice of ‘the others’. The concept of normative power Europe which sometimes is contended to be similar to the Eurocentric international order, is seen to be too strong for the periphery to overcome (Bickerton, 2010; Nicolaïdis, 2010; Staeger, 2016).

The critique of normative power Europe is highly visible in the politics of Pan-Africanism. Africa’s efforts to attain full decolonization, in this case, perceive the normative power Europe as Eurocentric agenda. A similar argument has been presented by scholars of international relations who claim that Western democracies participate in creating the conditions for people to migrate from their countries irregularly. “By engaging in wars abroad, participating in the destruction of entire regions and societies, exploiting cheap labor and natural resources, and supporting autocratic and authoritarian regimes, these democracies create the very refugees that they then reject” (Gallien, 2018: 736, see also Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007). The African rhetoric of neo-colonialism has been a strong critique of the EU’s moral and political

contradictions. On the one hand, is the EU's self-presentation a normative power, a human right defender and hospitable to those in need of protection. On the other, 'the post-colonial others' view of the EU's political influence aimed to create conditions for people to flee from their homes while yet reject them from reaching its fortress Europe (Grosfoguel, 2016; Palladino and Woolley, 2018).

4.7.2 Intermediate variable: The 2015 migration crisis - a catalyst for the rhetorical action

The 2015 Valletta summit, in which the concept of root causes was formally incorporated in the EU policy, was held when Europe experienced a 'migration crisis'. As defined by Nohrstedt and Weible, crises refer to "periods of disorder in the seemingly normal development of a system and widespread questioning or discrediting of established policies, practices, and institutions" (ibid, 2010:5). Studies have suggested that the 2015 migration crisis might have triggered the EU migration policy shift (Baldwin-Edwards et al., 2019; Falkner, 2016). Others suggest that the 2015 Valletta Summit was the origin of the EU's policy change (Fulvio, 2016; Pace, 2016; Parshotam, 2017; Vătăman, 2016). Even then, the studies that start the analysis of the EU policy shift from 2015 hint that the 2015 migration crisis triggered the EU migration policy shift. These studies are founded on the notion that crises are causal drivers for significant policy change (Boin et al., 2009; Grossman, 2019; Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017; Nohrstedt, 2008; Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Nevertheless, scholars point out that post-crisis policy outcomes can range from comprehensive policy change to either small change or even continued stagnation (Boin and Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2009). "What explains these different outcomes? Most scholars writing about the nexus between crises, disasters and public policy note their potential agenda-setting effects, but have not developed explanations for their contingent nature and their variable impacts" (Boin et al., 2009: 82). Here, I argue that as triggers for policy change, crises do not offer a policy direction. Therefore, the existence of the 2015

migration crisis alone does not offer a convincing explanation as to why the EU shifted its migration policy specifically from ‘control measures’ to ‘addressing the root causes.’

On the flip side, a crisis can be a catalyst for policy change (Niemann and Speyer, 2018; Pautz, 2018; Schader, 2020; Zimmermann, 2020). A policy outcome is understood as an end product of ‘frame contests’ between different actors, already with competing interests, who seek to take advantage of a crisis-induced opportunity. A crisis catalyses the contestation between frames and counter-frames regarding the nature, magnitude, and causes of the crisis itself (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; t Hart and Tindall, 2009: 9). Further, as a catalyst, a crisis enables the politicization of the responsibility of the occurrence or escalation of the issue (De Vries, 2004). During a crisis, “contestants manipulate, strategize and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative” (Boin et al., 2009: 82). Hence, a crisis becomes a phenomenon that needs to be explained, including its origin (Ansell et al., 2016).

While acknowledging that the idea of addressing the root causes of irregular migrants had existed prior to the 2015 crisis, the role of the migration crisis as a catalyst for the policy change was well established (see Bedea and Osei Kwadwo, 2020; Troncotă and Loy, 2018; Buonanno, 2017:100). The 2015 migration crisis was not a trigger for the EU’s policy change per se since the influence for a policy shift had already begun. It was rather a ‘catalyst for change’.

4.8 Conceptual Diagram




Fig 1.0: Conceptual diagram: rhetorical action, rhetorical entrapment and policy change

Rhetorical action involved the combination of the issue narrative (root causes of African irregular migration), the system narrative (a critique of neo-colonialism) and the identity narrative (a critique of normative power Europe). Rhetorical entrapment resulted from rhetorical action and compelled the EU to shift its migration policy. The 2015 migration crisis catalyzed the process of rhetorical action and entrapment, and policy change.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.0 Introduction to rhetorical analysis

Rhetorical analysis is a methodology that analyses people's rhetoric, opinions, appraisals, and evaluations of phenomena such as events, people, politics, international affairs, debates, and their attributes to persuade others to act accordingly. The methodology further involves examining the persuasive force of rhetoric. It consists of qualitative analysis, including the collection of rhetorical evidence and subjectivity analysis.

Informed by political rhetorical action, the rhetorical analysis examines persuasion through the actor's rhetorical expression of shared norms and interests to compel the other (mostly the state) to act accordingly. It brings together the meaning analysis and the relation between meanings to generate a relational meaning analysis (see Berger, 2018: 109ff). The relational meaning analysis enables the examination of meaning while considering the nature of socialization between actors (the presentation of self and others) in an attempt to influence others. It is generalizable that rhetorical analysis is a methodology of inquiry to analyze both the rhetorical act of persuasion by an actor and the persuasive power of discourse (Leach, 2000).

As mentioned elsewhere, rhetoric comprises framing, i.e., combining narratives or framing strategic narratives. Foreign policy researchers have used rhetorical analysis to identify the presence and the use of a particular way of framing rhetorical artifacts in political speeches (Miller, 2007: 56-58, 212). Frames are analytical units that generally lack causal features within discourses (Miskimmon et al., 2014: 7). The understanding of framing enables us to examine why and how strategic narratives become rhetoric. Various rhetorical artifacts must be framed in a particular and convincing way so that the structure of persuasion of rhetoric can be visible.

The influence of rhetoric depends upon the strategy of the rhetor, the credibility of a message and the audience. The expression of rhetoric presents the pursuance of interests in a social engagement; shared norms hence play a critical role. To understand the power of rhetorical action, a researcher should be interested in how the rhetor forms a linkage between various elements of texts or speech in explaining how each or part of the component impacts the persuasion. Most rhetorical artifacts function dramatically, whereby a rhetor might use fantasies, dramas, and myths to express popular rhetoric (Berger, 2018: 100ff). Rhetorical action is therefore characterized by unique features that might not necessarily be seen unless juxtaposed with other rhetorical artifacts. These rhetoric features may not be striking or readily visible until a researcher brings them together (Selzer, 2003). A researcher's principal task in studying an issue through rhetorical analysis is to combine the common denominator(s) of rhetors to develop unique characteristics of different pieces of rhetorical evidence and compare them. In other situations, a speech might not have readily available rhetorical artifacts to illustrate or construct the envisioned meaning. This is demonstrated by the speaker's argumentative structure that includes repetitions to create persuasion. Thus, the researcher might opt to go beyond the strict confinement of rhetorical comparisons to illuminate the purposed construction (Leach, 2000). The comparison between rhetoric by different speakers enables generalizations of the whole influence process.

As a scientific inquiry process, rhetorical analysis functions to study how interlocutors map their perspectives and truthful appeals to the targeted audiences. It incorporates the shared norms (in the form of ethos, logos and pathos), including the speaker's credibility, trustworthiness, and dynamism (Charteris-Black, 2018: 8-16; Leach, 2000). Issues such as loyalty, friendship, hatred, and reverence are also part of what a researcher examines in the analysis of rhetorical action. These rhetorical features are identified through the speaker's ideas in a speech. As such, the researcher's main task is to relate them analyze the force of influence.

5.1 Analyzing rhetorical situation and rhetorical action

First, rhetorical action emerges from a situation of shared norms. Therefore, one external feature of rhetorical analysis is the examination of the rhetorical situation. This analytical characteristic enables the incorporation of audience, contingencies and exigencies to create an opportunity to understand a rhetorical action and reaction in their appropriate context. A rhetorical situation is characterized by the nature of socialization in which the rhetor, the (contentious) issue and the target audience are involved. In such a case, the rhetorical situation analysis involves examining the existing cooperation or misunderstandings between the involved parties. The speaker and the target audience are expected to communicate within certain shared social norms, which should be evident in their rhetorical expressions. The context ought to be apparent in the language used (Dixon, 2017). Timing and place are critical factors in understanding the framing of a rhetorical situation. For example, a rhetorical analysis of Europe and Africa's present interaction could be based on historical socialization. These historically fixed or changing values, thoughts, fantasy, attitudes and realities being constructed ought to be factored in when analyzing a rhetorical situation.

Secondly, rhetorical entrapment is concerned with the examination of the effect of rhetorical action. A strategy is derived from how actors use speech to impact the actual or targeted audience (Sillince et al., 2012). A key feature in rhetorical action is the persuasive art, where argumentation takes advantage of ambiguity, contradiction or even inconsistency in normative practices. The prevalence of a particular rhetorical practice (Sillince et al., 2012) and the importance of the issue itself (i.e., the nature of rhetoric) (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Bednarek et al., 2017; Erkama and Vaara, 2010) are vital in generating rhetorical persuasion. The speech is presumed to have a 'constructive potential' to shape actors' engagement within

a social environment. Depending on a scenario, rhetorical action becomes instrumental in shaping the actors' decisions, thereby altering their behavior.

The analysis of rhetorical entrapment focuses on the targeted audience that is presumed to be persuaded. The audience's analysis is critical because politicians, government leaders, and activists direct their rhetoric to a specific audience and not just the general physical audience. Because of this reason, the audience is classified into two major categories: the particular/targeted audience and the universal audience. Irrespective of the type of audience, for rhetorical entrapment to occur, there requires a shared reference(s), i.e., understanding the context between the speaker and the audience. The speaker's intended purpose of rhetoric determines the audience. On the one hand, the targeted audiences are the speakers' premeditated audience as opposed to merely the physical and tangible public (Perelman, 1979; Goodwin, 2017). The particular audience is finite and involves people or agencies closely inclined to the speaker. On the other hand, the universal audience is usually broad and involves all the relevant actors. However, a speaker can address both categories of the audience at the same time. There is a scenario where a speaker can target a particular audience by choosing rhetoric that appeals to the universal audience, such as the international community.

Social facts and truth in rhetorical action are phenomena that both the universal and particular audiences need to agree with. This is especially in socialization settings where actors have different preferences; homogeneous and heterogamous values exist concurrently. A speaker can start by connecting to the audience by establishing what the audience believes in or the absence of what it believes in. Hence, rhetorical argumentation exists in two forms: the associative (connective) techniques and the dissociative (separative) techniques (Wiethoff, 2018). In the rhetoric of association, the speaker sets up a connection at the beginning of the broader contentious issue. Such framing is aimed at creating a more persuasive argument (Scul, 2009).

In dissociative rhetoric, the speaker tends to ground his stance away from the argument's starting point. For effectiveness, the speaker can split the idea into different parts to establish a disassociation with undesirable elements of the broader rhetoric. The associative and dissociative argumentations are opposite processes but not mutually exclusive. They are, instead, complementary and strategically applicable co-currently (Goodwin, 2017). Additionally, ambiguity is a crucial element of rhetorical action since excessive clarity might exclude some targeted audiences. A speaker might avoid some extreme opinions or explicit statements in an attempt to appeal more to the shared values and to enable the audience to connect the meanings to the rhetoric that aligns with their own specific values. The way in which speakers construct connections (of different framings) in relation to the values and norms of the targeted audience enables the understanding of how the audience is connected to the speaker's world. A critical task in rhetorical action is to link the implied audience even when it is not co-present in the speech (see Heracleous, 2006; Sillince et al., 2012).

5.2 Digital data and data sources

Social scientists are increasingly turning to digital data and so do rhetorical analysts. A study by Cesare et al. (2018) shows that digital techniques have dramatically made social research cheaper and faster and have created new research possibilities for researchers and policymakers (see, Salganik, 2018:99-105; Porter, 2009). In this digital age, researchers have an opportunity to study actors' characteristics such as interests, rhetorical behavior and establish a connection between these elements in ways that were impossible in the past. This vast, rapidly increasing, and diverse digital information is known as 'Big Data'. With the advancement in communication technologies and their application in international relations studies, researchers do not just think of going online, but also everywhere (Handa, 2013:2-7). Rhetorical analysis involves studying argumentation about an issue by people speaking from different locations. It is thus more comfortable to use digital research methodologies. One advantage of rhetorical

analysis using digital data is that it creates an opportunity to study rhetoric within the speaker's real environment and examine the audience's response, such as jeering or applauding.

The application of advanced digital techniques has a long history, but until 2000 little had been done about rhetoric (Yue et al., 2018). Although initially, it was a computer science subject, it has heavily spread to social science. First, the advancement in communication technologies has enhanced the demand for feedback in almost every socio-economic and political sphere. Political communication is one area that involves the examination of feedback, especially with the proliferation of digital means of inquiry. Likewise, the emergence and development of mainstream media and social media have offered an enormous volume of opinionated data, essential in research studies in political science and international affairs. As viewed by researchers, social media development correlates with the application of rhetorical analysis as a research methodology in social research (Yue et al., 2018; Deacon, 2007).

When institutions require public opinions, they use focus groups, surveys or opinion polls. The rapid growth of websites and social media, for instance, has enabled public opinion analysis such as reviews, blogs, Tweets and postings on social network sites (Neuendorf & Kumar, 2016; Flaounas et al., 2013; Hogenboom et al., 2013). The result has been the emergence of more and new forms of data. This data has increasingly been used to inform policymaking and political moves. In addition, people use product reviews consisting of previous opinions to examine how the world perceives them. Therefore, states and polities have reduced the necessity to conduct focus groups and surveys to gather public opinions due to the high volume of publicly available information.

The transition from analog to digital methodologies did not happen all at once. It is ongoing, but so far, researchers have found entirely satisfactory opportunities to make the rhetorical analysis more effective. A speaker can express his rhetoric online or speak offline to the

physical audience, but then the address is posted online. Whether online or offline, rhetorical expressions are commonly presumed to represent the true position of the speakers. Nevertheless, the review of new data sources is continuously progressive. Social-constructivists continue to search for new ways of making sense of the social world with this massive digital data development (see Alburez-Gutierrez et al., 2019; Handa, 2013:85ff; Kang et al., 2018; Mullen, 2006). Bar-Haim et al. (2011) conducted an expert investors' rhetorical analysis in microblogs in studying capital market performance. Speech and text analysis of blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and mainstream news have also been used to study different phenomena such as trade (Zhang and Skiena, 2010), prediction of the stock market (Bollen et al., 2011), and prediction of election results (Tumasjan et al., 2010). In most non-political domains, such analysis has been referred to as sentiment analysis.

In the current international affairs, the rhetoric (in the form of opinionated postings) in social media has aided reshape political activities and has profoundly impacted socio-political policies and systems. In other cases, researchers have found that rhetorical persuasion has mobilized the masses for political changes, like in the case of the 2011 Arab Spring (Breuer and Groshek, 2014; Karolak, 2018) or the 2010 UK election prediction (Franch, 2013). The rhetorical action is effective with external data such as opinionated documents and internal data such as analyzed voluntary feedback regarding a political issue.

The common sources of digital data used in this study were institutional websites, Youtube, mainstream media. These sources, especially social media, have been used to study issues where respondents were entirely out of reach (Alburez-Gutierrez et al., 2019; Swarts, 2012). In many digital platforms, researchers can query data about the users who have agreed to share their opinions about specific issues. These digital technologies are standard in the study of digital rhetoric, i.e., internet-based communications (see Eyman, 2015:12ff; Gries, 2015; Porter, 2009) and migration flows (Zagheni et al., 2014). Most of what is posted on social

media is considered already opinionated (Kursuncu et al., 2019). The opinion extraction is thus not necessary for data gained from social media. For this study, the opinion holders were the speakers or authors of online postings. The information about data, e.g., the posting date, was captured and used in all cases.

5.3 Data and data sources

The study acquired digital data from various internet platforms, including online sources like personal Youtube channels, TV interviews, and institutional press releases. Principally, all the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta summit proceedings were accessed from the EU website. The information was not necessarily uploaded for research purposes, but the researcher found it relevant for the study. When such information is used for research, it is referred to as unstructured data. The process of collecting/gathering it from various online platforms is referred to as data mining (Salvo, 2012).

The study acknowledged that the two widely spoken languages in Africa are English and French. Where the original data was in French, translation was done. In some official events, such as the 2015 Valletta summit, the summit's official translation was considered. When there was no official translation, the researcher translated using extensive tools, such as automated translations. In these cases, the researcher sought assistance from a French-English speaker to confirm the translation.

5.4 The process of rhetorical analysis

Research design is about connecting research question(s) and answers. The following sections outline various rhetorical analysis steps used for this study.

5.4.1 Preparation for research (gathering background information)

The use of unstructured digital data necessitated me to familiarize myself with the available data before the actual data collection. I started by exploring the possible materials necessary for the research question. My main task in the preparation was to seek ways to understand the analytical constructs of the subject being investigated. Analytical construct is the process of operationalizing a content-context relationship to analyze rhetorical change (Krippendorff, 2009:105; Koliba & Gajda, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2012; Krippendorff, 2018). To establish valid analytical constructs, I developed a relationship between texts and speeches and sought the right context in which they existed. By so doing, I validated the speakers' intentions and developed a clear picture of the rhetorical effects. Once the key features of the contextual-textual relationship were established, I conducted an inter-contextual correlation. This enabled me to know in advance the context and the network of correlations that formed the background of texts and speakers. Another focus of the analytical construct was situating concepts in their appropriate contexts, rather than merely counting the number of concepts. Here, my main concern was gathering information about the rhetorical artifacts and the context in which they occurred. I achieved this through an in-depth investigation of the entire speaking situation. The exploration included studying the speaker, the issue, and the reaction of the target audience.

Another form of preparation involved listening to audio and video versions of speeches available online. I further referred to how analysts and experts interpreted these rhetorical artifacts. In this case, I used the expert's analysis of relevant rhetoric to expound my own analysis. This understanding provided me with a more relevant scope of research. It also enabled the development of expectations within the reasonable range and the means to judge data. Moreover, I conducted a more in-depth examination of the speaker's previous rhetoric to properly understand a speaker's background, e.g., concerning his/her position on irregular

migration management. This helped in generating a proper understanding of the rhetorical situation. The prior examination of the rhetorical situation involved analyzing the strategy employed by a speaker to generate the intended persuasion. For example, some speakers preferred an indirect way of linking the historical past of the Europe-Africa engagement to the current irregular migration, while others preferred a radical approach. This information provided more clarity and trust that the rhetoric collected, indeed reflected reality and contributed to the research agenda. Some of the background information included,

- the date of the occasion where the speech was spoken
- the circumstance in which the speech was given, i.e., an event in Africa that involved the EU delegates, the nature of the immediate audience
- the differentiation between the overt and covert goals of the rhetor
- the repetition of rhetoric by a single rhetor, i.e., affirmation, reaffirmation or subversion
- the different sources where the text, audio, or visual speech was found.
- Whether the person spoke on his behalf or when represented an institution, i.e., on behalf of the country, the African Union (AU) or European Union (EU)

All this background information enabled me to get the right rhetorical artifacts. There were possibilities where the rhetor would represent a group of rhetors - for example, 'we' to refer to African leaders or both African and European leaders. In other cases, a speaker spoke on his own opinion.

5.4.2 Data collection and sorting

The study retrieved the unstructured data by performing a two-stage process. First, I classified the texts and speeches based on their typical relevance. Where the computer-aided application did not yield the expected results, I used the manual search. Rhetoric retrieval involved an advanced search using primary words and concepts such as African irregular migrants,

European Union-Africa partnership, colonialism, neo-colonialism, the root causes of irregular migration, and other relevant phrases. Then, I did a second-level ranking of data whereby the sorting was based on the strength and relevance of rhetoric.

I considered a document or a speech relevant if it contained at least an argument that contributed to answering the research question. This meant that for a rhetorical artifact to qualify for classification per the query issue, the relevance of opinionated wording would matter. Liu explains that “the totality of the opinionated sentences and their strengths in a document together with the document’s similarity with the query is used to rank the document” (Liu, 2012:120; see also, Karimi and Shakery, 2017). Essentially, rhetoric was established based on the study's theme - irregular migration management - but not limited to positive and negative classifications.

The Valletta summit was explicitly between the European and the African partners on African irregular migration management. Since the conversation was direct, the speakers and the audience were straightforward. The physical audience was still the target audience. Although the researcher, at times, deployed interpretive and reflexive speech analysis, by and large, the literal meaning of rhetoric was dominant. The context (i.e., time, place, and situation) of the speaker was considered to play a minimal role since the summit's objective was well defined. The speech was interactive rather than a unilateral communicative situation. It was possible to have a response to a specific argument within the same gathering.

There were a total of 236 video clips about the 2015 EU-Africa Valletta Summit on the EU website. However, I did not use some video clips for different reasons; several did not contain speech, some were duplicated, and others contained general remarks, such as welcome remarks or vote of thanks and did not qualify to be rhetoric. Some video clips, nonetheless, were lengthy and captured speeches by different speakers. Speakers ranged from heads of state or heads of country delegation, EU and AU leaders. The speeches by representatives of international

organizations, including Interpol, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), were considered. Political analysts' voices were also captured. Altogether, 67 pieces of speech and text were included in the study. Many speakers just gave general support to their affiliated side without expressing concrete rhetoric independently. In some instances, some speeches were not available, but they had been quoted in written documents.

5.4.3 Data analysis

Data mining/collection was followed by data analysis. The analysis was beyond a mere word count in examining the nature of rhetorical persuasion contained. The fundamental purpose was to bring out how rhetorical action was a persuasion strategy in the EU migration policy change. I captured the generic styles of speech in all the relevant video clips. I incorporated time and space in the rhetorical analysis to examine the act of persuasion – the speakers' attempt to reorient audiences to a particular situation. A speaker could speak at different times to convey different but related arguments. Also, a speaker could repeat an argument several times in different places. Because of this reason, the main analytical task was the examination of the reflection of speech in particular situations, audiences, and purposes.

To maintain consistency of analysis based on the thematic areas, the researcher must be willing to compromise by dropping and connecting parts of information (Krippendorff, 2018). First, I ensured that thematic content analysis preserved the originality of textual interpretation. I maintained this by clarifying the target audiences to remain sensible in achieving the research objective. This categorization was done to all forms of rhetorical artifacts used in the study. The data that fell far from the scope was dropped and not included in the study.

I began the analysis by scanning through each classified video clip from the beginning to the end. Then I carefully reread all transcripts, highlighting the critical use of ethos, pathos and logos in a speech or text. Keywords and phrases that captured these key features in every video transcript were highlighted and categorized accordingly. I then established a smooth connection between rhetoric. At this stage, some texts and speech transcripts were split into subcategories, while others were combined. Even after splitting and combining arguments, I revisited the data that did not directly fit into the primary categorization but was still relevant and analyzed it distinctively. Lastly, all the categories were organized into a hierarchical structure according to the thematic rhetorical action areas.

The study used the three primary interpretation approaches: the literal approach, an interpretive approach and a reflexive approach. The literal approach mainly focuses on the exact use of a particular language and semantics. The interpretive approach is concerned with making sense or constructing participants' accounts. In other words, the interpretive approach involves interpolating meanings. In a reflexive approach, the researcher gets more engaged in reflecting a speaker's intention by conducting a situational analysis (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Hsiu-Fang and Shannon, 2005; Welsh, 2002). Depending on the necessity, I deployed all three approaches in conducting a rhetorical analysis – analyzing the characteristics of a language as a persuasion tool. The concurrent use of literal, interpretive and reflexive forms of analysis enabled the integration of the content and context of speech and text to examine the subjectiveness of rhetoric.

Another significant task in video analysis was the re-figuration of the context to bring out the persuasiveness of rhetoric. I examined whether speakers spoke only about the prevailing situation of migration, i.e., framing irregular migration as a crisis, or linked the current EU-Africa relations to coloniality. At this level, it was possible to observe how each partner sought to shape their circumstances through rhetoric so that their point of view would appear

appropriate to their opponent. Another analytical task was examining rhetorical entrapment - political behavior of when and how the EU felt entrapped. For this task, I categorized my analysis relative to the thematic areas of rhetorical action (such as the rhetoric of colonialism, neo-colonialism by African partner countries) and the European partners' rhetorical entrapment.

In both rhetorical action and rhetorical entrapment, I focused on the nature of rhetoric, i.e., whether rhetoric was an action or a reaction. Such an analysis brought out the subjectivity of rhetoric. However, a single expression could have an objective or/and subjective rhetoric. Objective statements express factual information, while subjective statements express subjective views. However, at times, the sentence-level analysis failed to precisely capture the speakers' attitude towards the direction of migration management. As an alternative, the analysis involved the clauses and contexts of the speech. I used feature-level analysis by concentrating on the features of rhetoric. The feature-level analysis is an aspect-based rhetoric summarization (Liu, 2012:11). Rather than examining the construction of the language in use through the analysis of sentences or clauses and phrases, the feature-level analysis is concerned with the overall opinion. A feature-level study is founded on the assumption that an opinion consists of rhetoric and a target audience; hence an opinion without a target did not have any use and was thus not considered as rhetoric. The ability to capture the targets of the opinions enabled a proper understanding of the purpose of rhetoric. In a nutshell, the feature-level analysis enabled the production of a structured summary of arguments about the subject of the study. Under every theme, I checked if data was enough to construct strong rhetoric, generalizable and supportive of the larger context of the rhetorical action.

One form of analysis is data extrapolation. Extrapolation involves inferences of unobserved rhetorical instances in the periods between or beyond the observed data points (Krippendorff,

2018: 47-8). Rhetorical action is presumed to analyze a general case of a policy change system featured by complex variables, e.g., rhetorical action, rhetorical reaction and policy change. For instance, I examined the entire policy influence system - how African partner countries framed the root causes of irregular migration and how a rhetorical entrapment by the European partners occurred. Some components of the system (rhetorical action and entrapment) were not readily available. Thus, I used extrapolations to manage the situation. Some extrapolation involved establishing a relationship based on time, while others were based on the content. Content inferences addressed the limitation of the unavailability of some arguments presented by both African and European partners, especially during the 2015 Valletta summit. The established analytical constructs ensured that rhetoric was processed in line with what they purposed to achieve.

Lastly, I analyzed how the rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration was incorporated in the EU's wider policy discussions. Although the central space of rhetoric was the EU parliament, I also engaged the rhetorical evidence from political discussions across Europe.

5.4.4 Presentation of research findings and discussion

The findings chapter was meant to describe the large bodies of rhetoric as behaving (i.e., evolving and changing). It also aimed at describing relationships between rhetoric by different partners and the principles of interaction between those rhetorical elements. The rhetors' persuasiveness was described using the already identified rhetorical artifacts and presented according to the study's thematic areas.

The analytical approach captured the complexity of rhetorical action as a mechanism of persuasion. The analysis was presented through what Krippendorff refers to as 'filtering methodology' rather than purely time-series analysis. Rhetoric was arranged as it occurred

(based on time) and based on how it was linked to other thematic areas to complete a thematic area within the larger rhetorical action process. However, both forms of analysis (the filtering methodology and the time-series analysis) operate within a framework that enables analysts to interpolate between data points and extrapolate its ups and downs into the future (Krippendorff, 2018: 50; Volkens et al., 2009). Lastly, in the discussion chapter, I discussed the evidence within the rhetorical action framework.

5.5 Validity and reliability

In qualitative research, researchers tend to use terms such as ‘rigorousness,’ ‘soundness,’ and ‘trustworthiness’ to refer to the validity and reliability of data (Cohen et al., 2013: 295ff; Leung, 2015; Sarma, 2015). In rhetorical analysis, validity refers to the “question of whether the researcher sees what he or she thinks he or she sees so that there is evidence in the data for the way in which data are interpreted” (Welsh, 2002; see also Woods et al., 2016). Validity ensures that data present evidence in a way that reflects the interpretation of that data. Rhetorical analysis and the associated qualitative content analysis have been regarded as akin to ‘impression analysis’ because of the lack of scrutiny on how the analytical process is conducted. However, the use of software has added value to qualitative research. To ensure validity and reliability, first, I ensured a comprehensive online search to facilitate data interrogation. This is important, primarily when ‘attributes’ are used to search for data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Bazeley & Jackson, 2013: 130-132). Secondly, in the 2015 Valletta Summit speeches, all the recorded video clips were available on the EU website in their original form. It was possible to revisit them for clarity. I studied all the speeches and comments recorded at the summit without sampling. I also defined the different bits of research themes for data to fit well and to increase reliability.

5.6 Limitation in rhetorical analysis

The use of digital data is not without limitations. Most of these limitations are related to data access, representativity and ethics. Digital sources are non-representative samples of a large population (Zagheni and Weber, 2015). The non-representation model, however, did not affect the rhetorical analysis since the analysis was not dependent on the number of individuals constructing rhetoric. Instead, the concern was how strong rhetoric contains persuasion.

The attempt to trace rhetoric from online platforms presented two significant challenges. First, identifying the appropriate online location of the rhetorical artifacts was a cumbersome task. The task involved tracking the opinion sites on the internet and sorting the information contained. Due to the high rate of online postings, most of the information posted before 2015 was not readily available. In rhetorical analysis, data availability depends on the speakers', the audiences' or analysts' willingness to upload it on the internet. Because of the high proliferation of different online sites, some striking speeches have been reproduced hence easily accessible.

In as much as the advanced online search was commendably solving the problems of rhetoric mining, it was still insufficient. The use of synonymous words gave reasonably similar results. For instance, the term 'colonialism' and 'neo-colonialism' are closely related and sometimes perceived as synonyms. Both words are shared - only a prefix of three letters differentiates them. All applications captured the two terms as almost the same. Besides, many such aspects of expressions describing rhetoric are multi-word phrases, which is difficult for embedded dictionaries to handle. In other cases, some 'aspect expressions' such as neo-colonialism to describe a particular entity, e.g., imbalanced terms of trade, might not necessarily be the domain-specific synonyms of that entity. To manage these challenges, I treated the first-level searches as relevant hints, out of which an extra and more in-depth online search was done.

Some video clips on the 2015 Valletta Summit were also uploaded on the EU's website under the same names, making it difficult to distinguish them. There was an assumption that the 236 video clips on the EU website captured all the critical events of the 2015 Valletta Summit. For the successful use of digital data in studying rhetorical analysis, there was a need for advanced data and computational skills. I upgraded my computation skills in digital data analysis.

CHAPTER SIX: STUDY ANALYSIS

6. 1 Introduction

This chapter provides evidence about how the African partner contributed to influencing the EU's policy change from 'border control measures' to 'addressing the root causes' of African irregular migration. The analysis of findings is based on 'rhetorical political analysis' as used by James Martin in his work *Situating Speech: A rhetorical Approach to Political Strategy*. I examine how rhetoric as a medium of speech is used to influence actors' change of behavior. As a strategy of influence, "rhetorical analysis underscores the *situated* nature of ideas, that is, their presence in speech and argument delivered at, and in response to, specific times and places" (Martin, 2015: 25; see also Schimmelfennig, 2003). Actors frame ideas out of certain controversies and express them rhetorically. Rhetorical action, in this case, involved changing symbols and their meaning to influence the target audience. Rhetorical analysis hence examines the force created by the contents of arguments (Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 2005:117-125; Finlayson, 2007; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Martin, 2015). The analytical task involved identifying premises of speech, i.e., figurative elements or generic style of speech. Another analytical task included inventive re-figuration of the context to bring out the persuasiveness of discourse. The chapter further incorporated time and space factors into the argument to demonstrate how actors persuaded audiences by redirecting them to their desired situations and how audiences changed over time.

Since 2006, there were apparent differences between the European and African partners, and struggles within joint irregular migration control programs were visible. As mentioned elsewhere, I argue that the resistance by African partners to cooperate in the EU-Africa joint migration control missions was not a policy proposal. It only indicated policy rejection and not a recommendation for any particular policy direction. The chapter, therefore, deviates from

non-rhetorical struggles such as African partners' resistance to take part in joint migration control missions; instead, it focuses on examining the influence through the act of speech - rhetorical action.

A noticeable similarity between the European and African partners was that both used formal and informal rhetoric. The informal rhetoric, in this case, refers to the public rhetorics that emerged either before or after a formal/diplomatic engagement like a summit. Informal rhetoric also includes the speech spoken during a TV interview, press conferences, political forums, or expressed out of personal motivation. On the other hand, formal rhetorics are those expressed in summits and parliaments or other official engagements. However, there existed a vast correspondence between official/formal and unofficial/informal rhetoric. A person could speak about an issue formally and informally, depending on the place and the purpose. The repetition of rhetoric also occurred on different platforms or places. The study analysis, therefore, did not distinguish between formal and informal rhetoric. Rather, the focus was on the purpose of the rhetoric itself.

Unlike colonialism, which was conducted overtly, neo-colonialism operates as an unequal influence within relations where the former colonizers pursue their economic and political interests resulting in retrogressive effects on the formally colonized. The African countries consistently constructed irregular migrants to Europe as the victims of neo-colonialism. Since 2008, elements of persuasion were evidenced by the continually growing colonial rhetoric on different political platforms by African partners. Contrastingly, it was apparent that the EU and member states showed reluctance to acknowledge the colonial or neo-colonial rhetoric during the early years. Although the rhetoric of root causes was on the rise across Africa, during the EU-Africa 2015 Valletta Summit, African partners successfully constructed a link between the root cause of African irregular migration to neocolonialism. As a result, the EU finally found itself rhetorically entrapped - it was in a position where it could not reject the new rhetoric.

6.2 Africa's rhetoric of coloniality

This section is divided into two. The first part analyses the link between the rhetoric of colonialism and African irregular migration. The second bit is concerned with the rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of irregular migration.

6.3 The rhetoric of colonialism in irregular migration control

As early as 2006, the EU had intensified irregular migration control beyond its territory. The EU reached out to African countries to develop a partnership towards irregular migration control. Besides, it was around this period that some African countries started linking colonialism to African irregular migration. During Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Libya became an EU's strategic partner in African irregular migration control through the central Mediterranean route that was the main migratory route to Europe. Being a direct receiver of African irregular migrants and Libya's neighboring country, Italy had a more active role in acting on behalf of the EU in developing a partnership. In 2008, Italy initiated diplomatic negotiation with Libya on establishing a partnership on African irregular migration control. In this negotiation, Gaddafi brought from nowhere the rhetoric of Italy's colonial rule in Libya and the need for compensation. Rather than framing Italy's financial input as development funds like in the other African countries, Gaddafi was particular - he claimed that Libya was only interested in compensation for the colonial rule in the early 20th century as a precondition to co-operate in irregular migration control. Speaking at a ceremony in Rome during his three-day visit, and while standing next to the then Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, Gaddafi said,

“Europe will 'turn black' unless the EU pays Libya £4 billion a year, as compensation for colonial injustice. Libya will not participate in the control of illegal immigrants from Africa. Unless my request for money is met, Europe

will otherwise become another Africa. Tomorrow Europe might no longer be European because there are millions of African immigrants who want to come in. We don't know if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent or if it will be destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions”.^{2 3}

From a rationalist perspective, there was no direct correlation between the rhetoric of compensation for early 20th-century colonial injustice and co-operation towards African irregular migration control. Nevertheless, Ghaddafi was well aware that Libya was the most strategic migrants’ transit route to Europe. He emphasized his unequivocal relevance in assisting Europe to manage African irregular migration. By so doing, he magnified the consequences of the EU’s failure to manage African irregular migration by saying, “tomorrow Europe might no longer be for Europeans as there are millions of blacks who want to come in”. Gaddafi further used irregular migrants to negotiate his high demands through outward blackmail. He capitalized on the differences between African irregular migrants and Europeans when he said,

“We don't know what will happen; what will be the reaction of the white and Christian Europeans faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans”.⁴

Again, he created a problematic situation for Italy to oppose his demands: first, he wanted Italy to acknowledge that there existed an unsorted issue of colonial injustice. Secondly, he demanded Italy take responsibility for colonial actions by offering compensation. Most significantly, he framed African irregular migrants as a security threat to European culture to construct irregular migration control a priority to the EU actors. In response to Gaddafi’s demands, the former Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, had several options:

² The Telegraph (2010).

³ BBC News (2010).

⁴ BBC News (2010).

- First, Berlusconi could have disregarded Libya's role in irregular migration control and therefore dismiss Gaddafi's demands. This then would have necessitated Italy and the EU to seek for an alternative strategy without Libya. Italy would then avoid being entrapped by embarking on what Dixon (2017) refers to as norm disregard. However, Libya being the major migratory route to Europe, the cost of losing the Italy-Libya partnership was unbearable to the EU.
- Secondly, Italy could have disregarded colonial injustice and claim that the context was irrelevant and, if it was relevant, only to an insignificant level. By so doing, Italy would have pushed for irregular migration control agenda without incorporating the Libya-Italy colonial engagement. Ben-Josef and Dixon (2019) refer to such a reaction as norm avoidance – Italy would have avoided colonial rhetoric by directly funding irregular migration control and therefore avoid being entrapped. Even then, Italy would have acknowledged Libya as a vital partner in irregular migration control. Yet, the risk would have been high for Italy since there would be no motivation for Libya to participate in migration control.
- The third option would have been a re-interpretation of the colonial rhetoric to its advantage by accepting the logic of colonialism but giving more attention to irregular migration. Such a move would have downplayed Libya's colonial demands and capitalized on Italy's interest - irregular migration control. However, Libya would have questioned the partnership as ingenuine and one that only served the EU's interests.
- Due to strong socialization between Libya and Italy, and the EU's need for strategic irregular migration control partners, and the validity of colonial rhetoric, the process of rhetorical action led to an entrapment. Berlusconi could not reject the validity of the colonial injustice committed by Italy. He had minimal chances for a valid counter-argument, and as a result, there was rhetorical entrapment.

Eventually, Berlusconi signed an Italy-Libya agreement in 2008. According to the agreement, Italy pledged to compensate Libya 5 billion Euros over the next 25 years for colonial injustice, and in return, Libya was to cooperate in irregular migration control⁵. Berlusconi acknowledged that the money that Italy committed to compensate Libya was purposely meant to address the adverse effects of colonialism as opposed to the common expectation - contribution towards migration control mechanisms. He categorically stated that,

“As head of the government and in the name of the Italian people, I feel it is my duty to apologize and express my sorrow for what happened many years ago and left a scar on many of your [Libya’s] families. The money paid is a material and emotional recognition of the mistakes that our country has done to yours during the colonial era”.^{6 7}

Provocative and controversial as Gaddafi’s remarks were, they revealed a feeling of entitlement for compensation of colonial injustice that Africa still holds. As a result of this attitude of entitlement, it remained apparent that African leaders lived to wait for good opportunities to address the atrocities and injustices related to the colonial era. For instance, Gaddafi responded to Berlusconi’s remarks that,

"In this historic document, Italy apologizes for its killing, destruction and repression against Libyans during the colonial rule."⁸

Gaddafi’s demanding tone, as exemplified by his diction, was not of an aid beggar. The EU's need for African irregular migration control gave him a perfect opportunity to address colonial injustice. Even in the absence of a significant crisis, through blackmail (the securitization of

⁵ Financial Times (2016).

⁶ The New York Times (2008).

⁷ Fetouri, (2019).

⁸ The New York Times (2008).

African migration), Gaddafi created a compelling reason for Italy to pledge compensation for colonial injustice.

Gaddafi's strategic action to drag the colonial rhetoric into irregular migration control partnerships did not end with the Libya-Italy agreement. Instead, it became the beginning of new rhetorical action (i.e., framing neo-colonialism as the root causes of African irregular migration) by African countries against the EU actors. As mentioned in the later section of this chapter, having sorted out the colonial issues with Libya, after the Valletta Summit, Italy became the most vocal EU member, urging other EU members to stop colonizing Africa as that was the root cause of African irregular migration.

6.4 Rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration

Neocolonialism has been described as “the deliberate and continued survival of the colonial system in independent African states, by turning these states into victims of political, mental, economic, social, military and technical forms of domination carried out through indirect and subtle means that did not include direct violence.”⁹ Neocolonialism is, therefore, a generic term that combines policies or actions that shape the nature of the relationship between the former colonizers and formally colonized and which indirectly serve to enhance continuity of the colonial era.¹⁰ By 2015, all European countries that colonized Africa were EU members and participated in the Valletta Summit. Thus, African partners' critical rhetoric regarding Europe's historical (colonial) past in the Valletta Summit was considered a critique of neo-colonialism. This was regardless of the reference to the term neo-colonialism itself. Instead, neo-colonialism was constructed by framing the EU's political, economic, military and other forms of domination on African states, as part of the root causes of African irregular migration.

⁹ Oseni (2020).

¹⁰ Sartre (1964:30ff).

6.4.1 Africa's critique of neo-colonialism

As African irregular migration increased, the EU intensified its effort to form a partnership with African countries on migration control. The EU was also the sole financier (either through multilateral or bilateral mechanisms) of irregular migration control projects. Despite development aid, African countries still resisted co-operating. There was a growing concern that the migration management agenda was increasingly shifting the EU's aid from mainstream development to border control programs. Also, the EU was the sole decision-maker for projects it funded. African governments saw the EU's development aid as a neo-colonial tool to serve its interests rather than the African countries' development priorities. When the African countries refused to co-operate, the EU introduced a 'more for more approach'. This meant more cooperation on irregular migration control for more development aid. Many African countries did not like the strategy as they interpreted it as 'less cooperation in migration control for less aid' (*see section 3.5 of chapter 3*).

In July 2009, the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame - during an interview with CNN about the development of Africa - termed foreign aid from Global North as dead aid. He further emphasized that colonialism should not be ignored as one of the major factors for African underdevelopment.

"What we want is to be self-reliant and get zero aid. In our case, we do not want anybody to control us [*using aid*]. Nobody owns us. But we should be free to transact in business. And what we are talking about here is the principles of the process of getting rid of aid. During my term in office, I have to make sure that the process is on, and is effectively done so that whoever comes after me may finish the job. I wish I could do it sooner. Aid must do those things that will eventually see people wean off foreign aid. [...] I think there has been a bad start for Africa for

many reasons, some of them colonialism. I agree with what President Obama said while in Ghana `that African people should not always talk of colonialism as the failure of their continent', but that has to be factored as part of it".¹¹

The connection between the 'inefficiency of foreign aid' and colonialism clearly showed that Kagame's speech targeted Europe. Also, by mentioning that "it is about the principles of the process", Kagame highlighted his determination to move away from the EU's foreign aid and hold former colonizers accountable for the effects of colonialism in Africa. By dead aid, he meant that most of the time, aid to Africa did not free people out of poverty; instead, it created more dependence on aid. Kagame used pathos by connecting his logic to Obama's comments on Africa's colonial rhetoric in explaining the necessity for decolonization. In other words, Kagame argued that the EU's influence to shape the colonial rhetoric was instrumental and aimed to hinder Africa's process of decolonization. To Kagame, colonialism should be considered part of the root cause of some of Africa's current problems. He viewed Europe's attempt to ignore the historical reality as a deliberate move to avoid condemnation.

Kagame's rhetoric that Europe gives "development aid" to Africa with an intent to reap economic benefit was not far-fetched. According to the African Union (2015), the continued failure of African political leaders to defy outside pressures from their former colonial masters was one of the factors likely to speed up the current migration in the sense that it undermines the likelihood of forging an effective and progressive African position on migration.

Kagame tried to challenge the target audiences: 'the modern-colonizers' and 'the non-modern colonized,' linked together by development aid¹². He saw the minimal reference to the colonial

¹¹ CNN (2009).

¹² see the use of 'modern-colonizers' and the 'non-modern colonized' by Nicolaïdis et al. (2014:19ff).

history by the EU actors as guided by the presentist's version of procedures, policies and laws, which confine policymakers in irregular migration to an irresistible course with inevitable outcomes. For a long time, the EU embarked on a relatively fixed migration control approach of border protection. To African countries, this presented a false notion that control measures were necessary and unavoidable. They further saw the underdevelopment of the continent as not natural but rather human-caused.

The African countries further criticized the EU for shifting Africa's development aid from mainstream development projects to migration control. Although the EU saw 'the more for more approach' as an incentive and conditionality for African countries to co-operate in irregular migration control, African partners termed the strategy as an ill-advised policy. In 2014, during the Umushyikirano (Rwanda's annual national dialogue) in Kigali, Rwanda, Kagame critiqued the EU's aid, saying that it was always accompanied by lies and double standards and hypocrisy – for which African states should not apologize. Through the lens of neo-colonialism, Kagame saw aid as an instrument of control when he said that,

“But all they [*Europe*] do is politics. They belittle people. We are not people to be belittled at all. They feel they are all better than anybody. We shall never ever be apologetic for standing up for our rights, and there are no better people than us in our own country and in our affairs [*applause*]. . . . It is a tradition, of course, there are people who say ‘well we give you our money so we must tell you what to do and what to be. Well, there comes a point where I say ok, between my rights and what I want to be, and, your money, then you can remain with your money. But of course, that also tells you the truth: their hypocrisy, their double standards, and lies. People tell you that they can give you their money because they are interested in your well-being, but I cannot have my well-being without

having my rights. I cannot have my well-being when you dictate to me every day what I should do and what I should be. You can remain with your money, and I will have my freedom too [*applause*]. And I will manage my problems, and I will also manage the ones that you caused me. There is no problem, but there is a line you cannot cross”.¹³

Like in 2009, Kagame repeated the rhetoric of the EU actors' control using foreign aid. Such a repetition indicated that even before the 2015 Valletta summit, the neo-colonial discourse was building. Around 2014, the critical issue around African irregular migration management involved the EU's financing border surveillance and migration control project instead of addressing the origin of those causes. Kagame termed the conditionalities that accompanied the aid as insincere. Critically as he framed it, the development aid was a tool for manipulation that African leaders ought to resist. “...It is a tradition, of course, there are people who say well we give you our money, so we must tell you what to do and what to be.” Kagame was not only concerned about Africa having the freedom to manage its issues, but he also acknowledged that some of the problems had been caused by those offering strategic aid, i.e., “ I will manage my problems, and I will manage the ones that you caused me”. He linked colonialism (as part of the root cause of the problem) with neo-colonialism – control through foreign aid. Worthwhile noting, as highlighted in the later section (*in section 6.7*), the EU president, Juncker, in his 2018 State of the Union speech to the European Parliament, responded to Kagame in particular on the issue of EU's development aid to Africa.

6.4.2 Rhetoric of the root causes of African irregular migration

Even when the EU pursued African countries for a partnership towards migration control, there was already ongoing critical rhetoric of what consisted of the root causes of irregular migration.

¹³ 2nacheki (2019). [the original event took place in 2014]

Overall, African irregular migration to Europe was constructed as people's response to unlimited and unfair resources flow out of the continent to Europe. This rhetoric by African leaders, activists, and other influential people highlighted trade as one of the root causes of irregular migration. The negative terms of trade were perceived to cause impoverishment in the continent.

Aminata Traoré, a former Malian minister of culture and an activist, explained the nexus between European exploitation (neo-colonialism) and African irregular migration. She presented a question to the EU that,

“now that you (*the EU actors*) have devastated the ecosystems, dulled the people's mind and humiliated them, as a result, they have turned into complete conformists, how can you dare to tell these people they should stay at home, while at the same time you take everything from them, what they needed to live a dignified life in their countries: How? If you don't want someone to come to your countries, give him the opportunity to manage his wealth himself. Don't take from him that what he needs to live dignifiedly at his home, while simultaneously locking your doors twice. He will necessarily search for what you have taken from him. Yet, are the free countries of Europe capable to understand this?”¹⁴

As a Pan-Africanist, Aminata Traoré framed the EU actor as part of the root cause of African irregular migration. She constructed the root causes as the devastation of the ecosystem and the exploitation of resources by Europe. She then connected the EU's contribution to the root causes, with the inconsistency of the EU's 'actorness' in two ways. First, she used 'while simultaneously locking your doors twice' to describe fortress Europe. Secondly, she critiqued

¹⁴ Estifanos (2016).

normative power Europe by presenting a question, ‘Yet, are the free countries of Europe capable to understand this?’ The persuasiveness of Traoré’s rhetoric was not only based on her conceptualization of the EU’s role in causing irregular migration but also the EU’s inconsistency in its normative power.

Europe had been argued to be one of the key contributors to global warming and climatic change, which adversely affected the livelihoods of the global south. Yordanos Estifanos, a pan-Africanist and an activist, argued that irregular migration was not only a result of unfair and exploitative relations between Europe and Africa but also as a result of climate change. To Estifanos,

“Of the major constraints that preclude African countries from realizing a potential demographic dividend, climate change and resource exploitation stand on top. Although these factors have intensified in recent decades, they have always been present, embedded in historical and structural relations, which can be traced back to the era of the industrial revolution and colonization. Being confronted with increasing climate change hazards (some of which are climate-change induced) and growing competition for African resources, mainly by countries in the Global North, the youth from different African countries are responding in different ways. Migration, both internal and international, is one of these responses to climate change and resource exploitation as well as skewed historical and prevailing twisted economic, political and power relations. Migration being inherently age selective, youth migration is particularly prominent. Consequently, many African youths question the actions and inactions of international actors as well as the unfairness of global economic inequalities through migration. The conventional narrative regarding African

migrants who are heading to countries in the Global North, however, is that they are irregular (another way of saying illegal) migrants”.¹⁵

Estifanos’ argument was seemingly an extension of Traoré’s rhetoric. His argument was based on the increased awareness of economic exploitation climate change had caused displacement and forced migration. As Estifanos explained, a significant concern was how the developed world had contributed to climate change, which disproportionately affected the developing world, thereby causing irregular migrants. He further viewed both neo-colonialism and colonialism as the origin of this vulnerability ‘...these factors have always been present, embedded in historical and structural relations which can be traced back to the era of the industrial revolution and colonization’. The picture Estifanos created was that colonialism was the root cause of African irregular migration and had been sustained by neo-colonial structures. He concluded by urging the EU to take responsibility for contributing to the root causes of African irregular migration.

“It shows that it is rather the direct responsibility of countries in the Global North to welcome African migrants as long as the former directly or indirectly contribute to migration, i.e., through climate change and resource exploitations. [...] Welcoming African migrants into Europe is not a moral question only [...]. It rather is a responsibility for the harm and disruption caused by undesirable consequences of climate change and resource exploitations that are embedded in skewed economic, political and power relations”¹⁶.

Although Estifano’s argument appeared to address the universal audience using the term Global North, his target audience was Europe (the EU) that was the ultimate destination for irregular African migrants. He used the terms like ‘former directly and indirectly contributors’

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ Estifanos (2016).

of migration to denote colonialism and neo-colonialism, respectively. Besides, he saw the EU actors obliged to receive African irregular migrants for being part of what he terms as the root cause – neo-colonialism, i.e., ‘..it rather is a responsibility for the harm and disruption caused by undesirable consequences of climate change and resource exploitations that are embedded in skewed economic, political and power relations.’ Alongside faulting the EU for being part of the root causes of African irregular migration, like Aminata Traoré, Estifano criticized normative power Europe for its fortress approach.

“Juxtaposed against these are the governments in countries of the global north which are building more and more high-tech fortresses through adopting draconian anti-immigration laws as well as intervening in the politics of periphery countries under the pretext of national security and, at times, under the guise of establishing democracy”.¹⁷

In summary, African partners' rhetoric always linked root causes of irregular migration to colonial and neo-colonial agendas. The rhetoric was further lauded by the critic of the EU's normative *actorness* in irregular migration control.

6.5 European rhetoric on irregular migration before the Valletta Summit

Although there was critical rhetoric in Africa about the EU's external actions, the EU actors (the EU and member states) had always pushed for border protection and the fight against human trafficking to manage migration. When the African irregular migration intensified (just before reaching its peak in 2015), European leaders were under pressure to find a more effective solution. For instance, Baroness Anelay, the then UK's Minister of State for the Foreign Office, in a written statement, expressed that the European stance was not to support further search and rescue missions to save African irregular migrants entering Europe by unworthy boats, as

¹⁷ Estifanos (2016).

it encouraged more people to migrate. The blame was placed on migrants for putting their lives in danger and, therefore, ought to be responsible for their own risks.

“Ministers across Europe have expressed concerns that search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean have acted as a pull factor for illegal migration, encouraging people to make dangerous crossings in the expectation of rescue. This has led to more deaths as traffickers have exploited the situation using boats that are unfit to make the crossing.”^{18 19}

By 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had reported more than 3000 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea.²⁰ Anelay’s remarks came into the limelight when she submitted a proposal to the EU to stop search and rescue operations in the Sea. This came a time when the EU had plans to initiate its search and rescue mission (Operation Triton) to replace Italy’s led rescue operation (Mare Nostrum). The EU’s Triton mission was far much underfunded compared to Italy’s Mare Nostrum. It was suggested by some agencies such as IOM that reducing funding for search and rescue missions would increase the number of migrants drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. Yet, the EU introduced a lesser funded Triton mission. Fabrice Leggeri, the head of the EU border protection agency (FRONTEX), was clear that the EU's mandate was not to save stranded migrants at sea but to prevent them from crossing the Mediterranean Sea.

“Triton cannot be a search and rescue operation. I mean, in our operational plan, we cannot have provisions for proactive search and rescue action. This is not in FRONTEX’s mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union”²¹ [*words were spoken five months before the Valletta Summit*].

¹⁸ Euractive (2014).

¹⁹ BBC News (2014).

²⁰ IOM (2015).

²¹ The Irish Times (2015).

Within Europe, the fight against human traffickers and migrant smugglers was the dominant rhetoric that defined the EU's actions in irregular migration management²². By reducing the scope of search and rescue of operation Triton, much attention shifted to the prevention of departures from Libyan shores²³. The rescued migrants eventually ended arriving in Europe; hence the search and rescue strategy did not work for the EU's objective to prevent irregular migrants. This explained why Leggeri was clear that the proactive search and rescue "was not in FRONTEX's mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union." Contrastingly, the EU's move to reduce search and rescue was heavily criticized. Maurice Wren, the then chief executive of the Refugee Council, expressed

"The only outcome of withdrawing search and rescue help will be to witness more people needlessly and shamefully dying on Europe's doorstep."^{24 25}

6.6 The Africa-EU Valletta Summit

The Africa-EU summit was held in Valletta, Malta, in November 2015. The summit involved heads of state from both the EU member countries and African partner countries. Top officials in the African Union and European Union also took part in the summit. For proper analysis, the speeches by different speakers were connected to form concrete rhetoric from each partner. In the beginning, the Maltese Prime minister Joseph Muscat expressed that African and European partners were expected to be honest in the discussion. As the host of the summit, he expressed that,

²² Andersson (2015); Brachet (2018); Guiraudon (2018)

²³ Cusumano (2019)

²⁴ BBC News (2014).

²⁵ Euractive (2014).

“..This is the first time that we see the two continents meet together to speak honestly.. I hope honestly.. about this phenomenon [*African irregular migration*]”.²⁶

Based on Muscat’s comments, all that was spoken by each partner was assumed to be an honest stance of each partner. The speeches were also presumed to contain what partners stood for and believed to be true. Right from the onset of the Valletta Summit, it was clear that both the African and the European partners had their list of agenda priorities. This was mentioned by the president of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, before the first European partners’ premeeting session.

This is a summit, with our African partners, about very early recognition of the root causes of irregular migration, about development cooperation, which should also be linked to the rule of law, and to the fundamental rights. It is also about sustainable cooperation in the fight against human trafficking. For us [the European partners], it is also about readmission agreements. So, there is a list of challenges from both sides.²⁷

Based on Schulz’s words, each side had its well-planned issues related to African irregular migration. As well, each partner knew the agenda of the other. For this reason, and for clarity of analysis, the rhetoric of each partner was discussed separately. The first section focuses on the European partners’ perspective – the rhetoric of migration control and border surveillance. The following part consists of rhetoric by the African partners.

²⁶ European Commission (2015ad).

²⁷ European Commission (2015ad).

6.6.1 European rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (the rhetoric of migration control)

After the first round of negotiations with African partners, the European partners held a side meeting. Afterward, the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, gave a speech that expressed the EU stance.

“The purpose of our informal meeting, which took place right after the summit with our African partners, was to speed up the implementation of the decisions taken so far by the European Council. Every week, decisions are taken in Europe. This testifies how grave the situation is: the reintroduction of border controls or “technical barriers” at the borders. It is a clear demonstration that we need to regain control of our external border. Clearly, not as the only action but as the first and most important action; as a precondition for European migration policy. In this connection, I welcome the declaration made by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary today of committing 225 officials to reinforce FRONTEX and EASO. This is good news. It is indeed urgent to fill this gap in implementation”.²⁸

From Tusk’s speech, it was clear that the EU pushed for migration control mechanisms. It aimed to address technical barriers related to border protection measures by empowering FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Contrary to the expectations of the African countries, Tusk highlighted that the Valletta Summit “was to speed up the implementation of the decisions taken so far by the European Council.” In reality, the understanding was that the summit was of equal partners as opposed to African partners being there to implement the decisions of the European Council. Besides, he welcomed “the declaration made by Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary today of committing 225 officials to reinforce FRONTEX and EASO”. Such declaration indicated the EU’s firm stance in support of border control strategy. While FRONTEX was mainly concerned with preventing

²⁸ European Commission (2015h).

irregular migrants from reaching Europe through the Mediterranean Sea, EASO facilitated migrant control within the EU. Most significantly, the urgency to manage the migration crisis appeared frequently in his speech. For instance, Tusk said, “This testifies how grave the situation is..” and “it is indeed urgent to fill this gap in implementation.” In the same speech, Tusk further argued for migration control and border protection by saying that,

“Securing our borders also requires that our rules and laws be applied. The European Union will stick to its international obligation in terms of asylum rights, but it must be clear that without registration, there will be no rights. If a migrant does not cooperate, there must be consequences. It is also clear that asylum seekers cannot decide where they will be granted asylum within the European Union. These are issues for the Commission and our Interior Ministers. They will need to turn these principles into operational reality now. Again, if we do not progress, this Schengen will be at stake..”.²⁹

By referencing the interior ministers across the EU, the focus was to establish internal migration control mechanisms, chiefly implemented by the police. He also suggested that the migrants' non-compliance with the Dublin System would lead to revocation of asylum rights, deportation being the only option. According to the president of the EU Council and the president of the EU Commission, it was notable that the EU operated in an urgent mode to manage the ‘migration crisis.’ To European partners, time was a critical factor. Success meant achieving anything that could effectively control the migrant influx. Tusk again expressed the urgency by saying,

²⁹ European Commission (2015h).

“To conclude, let me repeat: The clock is ticking. We are under pressure. We need to act fast as a Union and in cooperation with our partners, including Turkey, and that also will have to move fast...”.³⁰

From the European rhetoric, it was clearly visible that the EU expected African partners to support its border control agenda. This was evident in a speech by Tusk, who said,

“We need to find a new form of cooperation, but today the most important thing is to find partners as far away as possible from Schengen. I do not doubt that we have to do something much more effective to reestablish our external border. Our cooperation with Turkey and African partners can be easier when we have Balkan states as alternative partners in migrant control”.³¹

The EU’s effort *to find partners as far away as possible from Schengen* meant using the southern borders of African transit countries as a virtual EU’s external border to keep off the irregular migrants. Other European leaders, including Louis Grech, Maltese Minister of European Affairs³², Muscat, Maltese Prime Minister³³ and Simonetta Sommaruga, President of Switzerland,³⁴ expressed border protection and the control of irregular migration as the central focus for the EU. The Swedish Prime minister Stefan Löfven also expressed that alongside the concerns about Africa’s development agenda, Europe’s agenda of irregular migration control needed to be considered. Although he acknowledged African partners pushed for a development agenda, he highlighted the EU’s main aim was irregular migration control.

“We can find a balance between, on the one hand, cooperating with the African countries to enhance development, but of course, we need to discuss illegal migration³⁵. We must respect the rules we have in the European Union. We do this

³⁰ European Commission (2015h).

³¹ European Commission (2015m).

³² European Commission (2015r).

³³ European Commission (2015am).

³⁴ European Commission (2015x).

³⁵ European Commission (2015q).

because, when our authorities question us that we cannot guarantee the security and the control of our borders, we need to listen. That is why we are taking that decision [pushing for migration control]”.³⁶

From Prime minister Löfven's comments, it was apparent that he suggested that there was a direct link between the migration crisis and the security threat in Europe. Theresa May, the then Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Women and Equalities of the United Kingdom, expressed the need for the EU to enforce control measures more vigorously. From Theresa's perspective, the EU's guiding post in the Valletta Summit was migration control through border protection and the fight against human traffickers.

“What we are doing in Europe and in the UK as well is ensuring that we smash the criminal gangs (human traffickers) that are making money out irregular migration and cause human misery.”³⁷

Although Norway is not an EU member state, it was actively involved in the discussions as one of the European partners. Like other EU member states, it supported the EU's agenda of migration control. In the summit, Erna Solberg, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway, supported the EU's migration control agenda when she said that

“I hope that the action plan gives us a little bit more control of migrants. This is the concern for all the European countries right now”.³⁸

In this summit, the EU's main objective was to manage the perceived 'migration crisis.' The EU used FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) to implement irregular migration control and surveillance of the southern borderline. To ensure effectiveness, the EU invited Interpol (International Police) to reinforce irregular migration control in the

³⁶ European Commission (2015w).

³⁷ European Commission (2015u).

³⁸ European Commission (2015p).

Mediterranean Sea. Since 2011, the two agencies have joined efforts in border protection.³⁹ On this basis, Interpol was one of the European partners and a proxy in the Valletta Summit. Although there was high irregular migration across Africa, Interpol did not attempt to hinder asylum-seeking. Contrastingly, it fiercely came in to prevent African irregular migration to Europe. The Secretary-General of Interpol, Jürgen Stock, without reference to any asylum law, indicated strong support for the EU's agenda in migration control. In his words,

“One of the dimensions of the crisis we are discussing here in Valletta is organized crime. Organized crime groups are organizing huge profits from desperate people trying to leave their countries and looking for a better life. These organized crime groups are also involved in other criminal activities such as drug trafficking, wildlife crime, and money laundering. The international community has to find a strong response, and this summit is about taking action. Interpol has come in strongly to counter migrant smuggling and assist in coordinating police activities”.

40

From his speech, Helmut's main concern was establishing a quick and actionable EU-Africa plan to stop irregular migration to Europe, which was framed as migrant smuggling and trafficking. ‘..The international community has to find a strong response and this summit is about taking action’. Coordination of Police activities was crucial in border protection both within Europe and alongside the southern border.

Seemingly, the European partners were not fully prepared to handle the African rhetoric of the root causes. There was a division among the European partners – some members did not the EU border control agenda. This difference was also noted by Schulz, the president of the European Parliament, who specified that,

³⁹ Interpol (2011).

⁴⁰ European Commission (2015ah).

“The meeting is featured by two phenomena. On the one hand, the EU member states are divided about the migration policy within the EU, and now the African countries are into partnership with the European Union on the basis of the action plan”.⁴¹

Unlike the vast majority of European leaders, a few, such as the Estonian Prime Minister, Taavi Rõivas, expressed the need to address the root causes of African migration, including enhancing trade⁴² (an agenda that African partners firmly pushed forward, *see in the later part*). Germany, under Angela Merkel, had accepted the most migrants in Europe and had an open-border policy. The country was not operating within the Dublin system, which had proved inefficient in managing the EU-wide asylum management.⁴³ Other small EU member states such as Luxembourg and Lithuania had a similar course. The president of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, was quoted critiquing the establishment of border fences by some EU member states.

“Some amendments proposed are difficult because they involve changing the EU’s treaty... Border fences are not the best solution for Europe and fences are not the best symbolism”.⁴⁴

The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, and the head of Luxembourg Presidency in the EU Council, Xavier Bettel, also acknowledged that his country was among the very few EU member states willing to invest in people instead of borders.

“As the EU member states, we have to find mid-term and long-term solutions to African irregular migration. Luxembourg is one of the few.. few countries in Europe

⁴¹ European Commission (2015z)

⁴² European Commission (2015ai).

⁴³ European Commission (2015an).

⁴⁴ European Commission (2015aj).

that prefer to spend and invest money in people rather than investing in defense policies”.⁴⁵

The extra emphasis by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg that only very few countries were willing to invest in people and root causes of African migration indicated how the EU at large firmly aimed to achieve the sole objective of empowering border protection and migration control measures. Besides, contrary to African partners, the European partners saw the Euro 1.8 billion offered to the EU Trust Fund for Africa as a considerable achievement. The amount was praised by many European leaders, including the president of the EU Parliament.^{46 47} At the end of the Valletta Summit, there were critical voices in Europe about the proposed action plan to address the root causes. They pointed out that it was unclear what really constituted ‘the root causes’ of irregular migration.

6.6.2 African rhetoric in the Valletta Summit (critique rhetoric of neo-colonialism)

As part of the opening speeches, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, President of the African Union Commission, was on an entirely different tone from that of the European leaders and the president of the EU Council - Tusk. The rhetoric of coloniality and the EU’s double standards was evident in her speech. She expressed questions about why Europe framed African irregular migration as a crisis. Yet, larger numbers of Europeans came to Africa during and before colonization, and the situation was not labeled the ‘European migration crisis’ in Africa. Zuma started her analogy of migration between Africa and Europe from pre-colonial times.

“Historically, Africa has been receptive to European migration even before colonialization. As well, during and after the second world war, Europeans flocked to Africa to as far as the most southern part of Africa for commercial and settlement

⁴⁵ European Commission (2015aq). (see also European Commission, 2015t; European Commission, 2015ak)

⁴⁶ European Commission (2015ab).

⁴⁷ European Commission (2015af); European Commission (2015ap);

purposes. They were welcomed, and at that time, there was no crisis of European migration in Africa. The challenge of African migration cannot be fixed with quick fixes. It needs sustainable solutions”.⁴⁸

A striking difference between Zuma’s rhetoric and that of European partners was the context situation. As the European partners spoke the language of the migration crisis, Zuma and other African representatives spoke the historical past and, in particular, the Europe-Africa colonial engagement. Secondly, as the European partners sought support from the African partners to implement mechanisms to prevent people from reaching Europe, Zuma had an opposite view. She faulted Europe for not honoring the principle of reciprocity. “Historically, Africa has been receptive to European migration even before colonialization... They were welcomed and at that time, there was no crisis of European migration in Africa”. Her tone suggested that, because of the Africa-Europe colonial engagement, Europe needed to be more friendly to irregular migrants rather than making a huge investment in border protection to stop them from reaching Europe.

Zuma’s speech was a deconstruction of the EU’s rhetoric that African irregular migration was indeed a crisis “...and at that time there was no crisis of European migration in Africa”. Her point was that if Europeans went to Africa and the situation was not labeled a crisis, it should not have been a crisis when African irregular migrants went to Europe. Moreover, she outrightly opposed the president of the European Council, Tusk. Tusk had claimed that “..this testifies how grave the situation is: the reintroduction of border controls, or “technical barriers” at the borders. It is a clear demonstration that we need to regain control of our external border”. In response, Zuma declared that “..the challenge of African migration cannot be fixed with quick fixes. It needs sustainable solutions.”

⁴⁸ European Commission (2015ae).

Such strong opposition by the chair of the African Union Commission showed contradicting motivations for each partner, i.e., the need to manage migration crisis vis-a-vis the need to address the root causes.

The Senegalese president and then the chairperson of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Macky Sall, further referred to Africa-Europe colonial engagement. Sall represented not only his country but also the broader West African countries. Unlike the European partners who started their speech by framing African irregular migration as a crisis, Sall, just like Zuma, started his speech by highlighting the Africa-Europe historical engagement.

“We are here in the spirit of dialogue and openness. [...] we are here, and the relationship is based on solidarity. Dialogue and migration go back to the beginning of time. The problem of migration is not easy. What we need to have is a global sustainable approach. It is only then we will be able to resolve this complex matter together. [...] Between African and Europe, we have a long history. We have seen very many shared sacrifices.. twice in one generation. We have long cooperation between Europe and Africa. We are very close. We are interlinked. We have cultural ties and linguistic ties..”⁴⁹ [Translated from French]

The critical point in Sall’s initial part of his speech was how colonialism interlinked Europe and Africa. He suggested that the current happenings (both challenge and solution to African irregular migration) required an understanding of Africa-Europe historical engagement, which led to both “*cultural ties and linguistic ties.*” The observable differences of both speakers’ opening remarks in a speech between the European and

⁴⁹ European Commission (2015ar).

African partners showed a diverse conceptualization of the problem of irregular migration.

African partners were also critical about the measures taken by the EU in migration control. Zuma expressed her concerns regarding the European partners' overemphasis on border protection. She accused the EU member states of taking a fortress Europe.

“Part of the problem we are facing today is in part because some countries in Europe have taken a fortress approach. There is no part of the world that can be a fortress. African Union is not in support of and cannot endorse the establishment of the so-called processing centers in Africa. The processing centers or whatever they may be called will become de facto detention centers that will constitute a serious violation of human rights and re-victimization of migrants”.^{50 51}

As the representative of the African Union, Zuma, strongly opposed the EU's proposal for extra-territorialization of migration control as had been mentioned by Tusk, i.e., “..to find partners as far away as possible from Schengen...” Zuma was clear that ‘African Union is not in support of and cannot endorse the establishment of the so-called processing centers in Africa’. She was categorical that African did not support anything of such kind, ‘...or whatever they may be called’. Her critique of the EU's fortress approach was taken was also endorsed by the President of Senegal, Sall, who mentioned.

“We should avoid policies that involve building new barriers. That is not the way forward. Let us engage in a partnership that creates prosperity for both partners”.⁵²

Sall did not only reject the EU's proposal for empowering control measures by asserting that building new barriers ‘*is not the way forward*’ but also redirected the EU to a notion of shared

⁵⁰ European Commission (2015ae).

⁵¹ European Commission (2015ag).

⁵² European Commission (2015ar).

prosperity. Sameh Shukry, the head of the delegation of Egypt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was critical to the EU's violation of human rights through the unlawful deportation of African irregular migrants. He saw unlawful deportation of migrants as an attempt by the EU to engage in the partnership in a coercive manner. He expressed that,

“The solution to irregular migration is to address the challenges in a human manner on the bases of cooperation and partnership and shunning any coercive migrant return policies”.⁵³

Shukry's comments seem to be addressed to Tusk, who had earlier stated that ‘*the European Union will stick to its international obligation in terms of asylum rights, but it must be clear that without registration [in the Dublin System], there will be no rights. If a migrant does not cooperate, there must be consequences...*’. As the EU Council president suggested, the deportation of irregular migrants would result from failure to comply with the EU's Dublin System. This prompted Shukry to recommend ‘*..shunning any coercive migrant return policies*’. It is worth noting that even before the 2015 Valletta summit, the African countries had resisted deportation (*see chapter three*).

African leaders were certain right from the onset of the Valletta Summit. They knew they were coming to discuss the root causes of irregular migration. The representative of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia, was asked by journalists about the African expectation from the summit. He responded,

“We came here specifically to identify what causes [*African irregular*] migration.”⁵⁴

Similar rhetoric came from Barnaba Marial Benjamin, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister of the Republic of South Sudan, who commented that

⁵³ European Commission (2015k)

⁵⁴ European Commission (2015j).

“I think more commitment from Europe [*to address the root causes*] is important; with such commitment, African countries will be ready to manage migration.”⁵⁵

Alongside the South Sudan minister was his Sudanese counterpart, who gave a supporting argument. Ibrahim Ghandour, Foreign Minister of Sudan responded to a question,

“...But there are root causes including poverty eradication, fair trade agreements, climate change, and conflicts. So, we need to address the root causes in order to not discourage but to make everyone not think of leaving their home. [...] (*On the question of how the EU did repatriation of irregular migrants*). This is against human rights. European countries keep telling us about human rights, and repatriation of people is one of these issues. So, we better deal with it on the basis of that... It has to be voluntary and in accordance with the international law”.⁵⁶

Ghandour’s gist of his comments was the need to address the root causes of irregular migration. However, to generate persuasion, he delegitimized the EU normative actorness by highlighting the inconsistency between what the EU said and what it did regarding irregular migration control and deportation of migrants. ‘...European countries keep telling us about human rights, and repatriation of people is one of the issues. So, we better deal with it on the basis of that. It has to be voluntary and in accordance with the international law’. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Egyptian delegation, Shukry, further reinforced the need for addressing the root causes of African irregular migration.

“.. more importantly, the EU’s restrictive measures that rely mainly on security measures, interception and border control do not only expose irregular migrants to violence, discrimination, and exploitation but also fail to reduce the number of irregular migrants. What is needed is to address the

⁵⁵ European Commission (2015l).

⁵⁶ European Commission (2015s).

root causes of irregular migration, economic empowerment, poverty alleviation, trade and investment. Moreover, to address the root causes of irregular migratory movements, a range of strategies will be required: Economic development, poverty alleviation, trade and investment”.⁵⁷

In summary, contrary to the European partners who gave the presentist version of African irregular migration, African partners were more concerned with the historical past. As Europe drove the migration control agenda, Africa pushed forward the agenda of addressing the root causes of irregular migration. Besides, African partners delegitimized the EU’s migration control approach, terming it an effort to establish a fortress Europe.

6.6.3 Demystifying root causes: A critic of the EU’s domination and lack of impartiality

African partners did not only highlight the need to address the root causes of irregular migration but also clarified what those root causes entailed. Generally, root causes included a wide range of issues as unfair terms of trade, resource flow, climate change and external economic and political influence that fall under the broader meaning of neo-colonialism as highlighted elsewhere in this study. The construction of the African partners' root causes portrayed the EU actors as one of the key contributors to irregular migration.

The trade between Africa and Europe was heavily seen to be founded on structures of colonial engagement. African partners argued that resources are located in Africa, while industries are located in Europe. Europe would, therefore, remain a dominant partner - dictating the terms of engagement, some of which were detrimental to the African development process. The chair of the African Union, Zuma, explained what African

⁵⁷ European Commission (2015k).

countries termed root causes of irregular migration by referring to trade and industrialization.

“Africa and Europe should be discussing beyond the raw materials and beyond trade but industrialization. This is what will create jobs. We have to industrialize and modernize our continent; otherwise, young people will continue to go elsewhere. [...] climate change is another issue. It is a shared responsibility. Africa contributes the least and suffers most”.⁵⁸

She termed climate change as a root cause of African irregular migration and framed the EU to be part of the root causes, i.e., ‘...*Africa contributes the least and suffers most*’. In other words, part of the root causes of African irregular migration was pollution by the EU member states.

Her attempt to link Africa’s low industrialization and modernization to irregular migration management was a well-calculated strategy of diverting attention from the border protection mechanisms heavily embarked by the EU. She aimed to introduce a different agenda of unbalanced trade and economic relations between the two continents⁵⁹. The use of phrases like ‘*We have to..*’ indicated a shared role between Europe and Africa. Zuma supported the prevailing rhetoric of neo-colonialism and twisted economic relations and faulted the EU’s *actorness* in irregular migration control. To generate persuasiveness of her rhetoric, she combined the critic of the EU normative identity and Africa's industrialization proposal. In this case, she viewed African irregular migrants as a phenomenon predestined to remain when she said that (i.e., ‘...*otherwise young people will continue to go elsewhere*’) unless the continent is industrialized.

⁵⁸ CGTN (2015).

⁵⁹ European Commission (2015ae).

The president of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, gave a speech highlighting an intervention strategy in solving the root causes of African irregular migration. Like Zuma, he saw African irregular migrants as people who follow the direction of resources from Africa to Europe. He said,

“The issue of irregular migration can be resolved through development; harmonious development of Africa. Resources are in the north. In the south, there is nothing. It seems to me that it is impossible to put an end to this [*irregular migration*] overnight”.⁶⁰

Itno’s view that resources were in Europe while nothing was left in Africa resonated with Africa's dominant rhetoric that Europe had contributed to Africa’s underdevelopment through neo-colonialism, which set structures for the uncontrolled flow of resources. Besides, the rhetoric by the Chadian president aligned with a vast critical scholarship on the negative impact of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Africa.⁶¹

In his speech, Sally, the president of Senegal and ECOWAS, presented neo-colonial rhetoric more profoundly by elaborating on the flow of natural resources from Africa to Europe. Sally was principally focused on the impact of the Africa-EU trade and the benefits of natural resources in Africa.

“One of the causes of poverty in Africa, and a cause of irregular migration is trade. Until we have a fair pay for our natural resources in Africa, we will continue to be dependent and irregular migration will continue. We have to ensure that there is a fair payment not just for our natural resources but also, most importantly, processing of these commodities on our continent would provide a greater added value than merely exporting raw materials. Local processing would create jobs on African soil. This is the agenda we have been fighting for everywhere, including

⁶⁰ AFP News Agency (2018).

⁶¹ Czubala et al., (2009); Fritz, (2011); Boysen et al., (2016); Bureau & Swinnen, (2018).

from the G7, G20, to the United Nations. We also raised the same issue in this Summit, saying that it is not only about fair pay, but we also have to combat tax evasion because many different multinationals try using different ways to avoid taxes. In Africa, we have a lot of huge lost revenue, the fraudulent flow of money from Africa to Europe, which is estimated at \$ 60 billion a year”.⁶² [Translated from French]

Sall’s key point was the unfair terms of engagement between Africa and Europe. He addressed neo-colonialism in various ways. First, he criticized Western multinationals for not only paying peanuts for natural resources but also transporting those resources to Europe for processing, therefore, failing to create job opportunities in Africa. Besides, a more critical issue was tax evasion and the illicit flow of money from Africa. Such framing of rhetoric portrayed Europe to be in a continuous state of looting resources from Africa through multinational corporations. He repeatedly emphasized on the uncontrolled flow of resources from Africa to Europe, urging that Africa can do well even without (EU’s) foreign aid if the resource flow issue was adequately addressed.

“If we were to cut tax evasion and repatriate those resources back in Africa, it would enable us to avoid reliance on foreign aid. It would also enable us to reimburse our external debts. These are issues that have to be addressed together with other security issues such as terrorism.”⁶³ [Translated from French].

From his speech, Sall brought in another perspective of neo-colonialism: Africa’s reliance on foreign assistance rather than its own resources. This resonated with rhetoric presented by Kagame, the President of Rwanda, in 2014 (as highlighted in the earlier section) that “what we want is to be self-reliant and get zero aid. In our case, we do not want anybody

⁶² European Commission (2015n).

⁶³ European Commission (2015n); European Commission (2015y).

to control us [using aid]..” Here, Sall suggested that if the EU-Africa partnership was to manage the problem of African irregular migration sustainably, then it must work to manage resource flow to Europe and reduce Africa’s overreliance on EU’s development aid. It would also enable clearance of the huge external debt that African countries possess. As mentioned in chapter three, Senegal was one of the African countries that withdrew their input in joint migration control with the EU. One of the reasons why African countries did not comply was the belief that the EU relocated funds from mainstream development to migration control projects, including border surveillance in the transit regions. The rhetoric by Zuma as the chair of the African Commission and the president of Senegal, and the then chair of ECOWAS was applauded by other African leaders, including Kadré Dérisé Ouedraogo, the Secretary-General of ECOWAS⁶⁴ and Salaheddine Mezouar, Head of the delegation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco⁶⁵.

One issue that remained unmentioned by the European partners and that Zuma termed as a root cause of African migration was the unlawful military intervention by Western countries in Africa. According to the proponents of decolonization, unwarranted military intervention is another element of neo-colonialism. Zuma highlighted that,

“The African Union expresses its concern about the militarization of its shore and its airspace and a tendency to resolve to military actions as a solution to the problem we are facing without international authority and the consent of the neutral agencies.”⁶⁶

By bringing into the scene the agenda of militarization, Zuma referred to the military intervention partly by the EU members in Libya that caused destabilization of the country and

⁶⁴ European Commission (2015al).

⁶⁵ European Commission (2015ao)

⁶⁶ European Commission (2015ae).

produced irregular migrants. Her rhetoric was as well a critic of the EU's 'normative power', portraying military intervention in that case as not a force for good. Surprisingly, as the European leaders questioned the concept of 'addressing the root causes' of irregular migration, the African leaders maintained that there existed a link between the causes of African irregular migration to imbalanced relations. Further, they created an unfavorable situation for the European partners to pursue the border protection agenda by questioning the EU's compliance with international law, thereby exposing its double-standards and inconsistency in its external actions.

Eventually, both partners signed the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Unlike the European partners who praised the signing of Euros 1.8 billion and termed it a huge achievement, African partners saw it as far less than enough to make any significant change. For instance, Samura Kamara, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister of Sierra Leone saw the pledged amount as insufficient for any tangible development.

"The money offered is not enough... There is a need to add more.. It is not enough because the problems are big".^{67 68}

At the end of the Valletta Summit, Barnaba, Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister of the Republic of South Sudan commented that

"Of course, the fund offered is not enough.. What is one billion Euro? More commitment from Europe is important."⁶⁹

Based on how the African partners constructed the root causes of irregular migration, i.e., poverty and underdevelopment, the expectation was higher. The rhetorical question by Barnaba Marial, '*What is one billion Euro?*' showed how much more commitment African leaders expected from the EU actors. However, it is important to note that the EU took note

⁶⁷ European Commission (2015aa).

⁶⁸ European Commission (2015ar).

⁶⁹ European Commission (2015l).

of these critical voices regarding the funding. Although the EU-Africa partnership initially signed the Valletta Action Plan with the EU pledging 1.8 billion Euros, later, the EU increased the amount to 4.7 billion Euros⁷⁰.

In summary, African partners were able to present their interests, i.e., the agenda of addressing the root causes and opposed that migration control. Even then, African leaders doubted how the fund would be put into use. After the signing of the agreement, the main concern was implementation. For instance, Abdoulie Jobe, Minister for Trade in the Gambia, also said that,

“EU Trust fund for Africa is just a tool that should be assessed through the projects implemented. [...] The challenge is the aspect of implementation. We hope the implementation will be swift”.⁷¹

The same comments were echoed by William Lacy Swing, the Director-general, International Organization for Migration (IOM)⁷² and Jan Eliasson, the UN Deputy Secretary-General.⁷³ They saw the summit as the beginning of a new engagement between Africa and Europe.

6.6.4 From rhetorical action to rhetorical entrapment in the Valletta Summit

In rhetorical action, a researcher should demonstrate the ‘constructive potential’ of rhetoric to shape the opponent's behavior. A crucial point of the analysis is bringing out precisely how rhetorical action led to entrapment. The analytics entails assessing how the rhetoric of root causes by African partners during the Valletta Summit resulted in entrapment and hence the EU policy change. In such a case, the focus of analysis shifts from the persuasiveness of the speakers’ rhetoric to ‘the assessment of being persuaded,’ i.e., the reception of African rhetoric

⁷⁰ European Commission (2020).

⁷¹ European Commission (2015ac).

⁷² European Commission (2015v).

⁷³ European Commission (2015o).

by the European partners. A key feature in rhetorical entrapment is understanding how the opponent frames community norms concerning his own normative identity and behavior⁷⁴.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, rhetorical action does not always lead to entrapment. As well, rhetorical action becomes a form of learning when entrapment occurs. The notable differences between the interlocutors do not solely reveal rhetorical entrapment. Therefore, the framing of the concept of addressing the root causes by the African partners and highlighting the inconsistencies within the EU's normative *actorness* in migration management was not by itself enough to prove rhetorical entrapment. It required the analysis of the understanding of how the EU felt compelled to accept the persuasion. Looking at rhetorical entrapment from a different angle, the concern was whether there was a strong enough commitment to the community norms (i.e., those of the EU-Africa partnership) for the EU to feel persuaded to change its migration policy. Another factor was the EU's need to realign its external actions to retain its identity as a normative actor. The combination of these two rhetorical elements demonstrates rhetorical entrapment.

Like had been observed by the European Parliament president, experts of the EU-Africa relations noted the differences in the partners' interests and expectations during the summit. As the EU made an effort to re-energize the co-operation with African partners on migration control measures, the African countries were determined on non-control measures. Denis Tull, an expert of EU-Africa relations, once commented that,

“We should not pretend there is a common interest here. What is being called ‘co-operation’ by the EU is seen very differently by African countries”.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Kratochvil et al., (2006); Splidsboel-Hansen, (2006)

⁷⁵ Financial Times (2016).

Denis Tull, was a researcher of African politics at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin

As a learning phase, the European partners had been confronted with a new policy alternative. In his speech, Bettel, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg and the then head of the Luxembourg Presidency in the European Council, expressed an observation that the EU felt compelled by the African states to shift its migration policies.

“Europe is experiencing its greatest migration crisis since the second world war. It is important for us to be meeting now because we [*the European Union*] are currently at a critical turning point. The European Union finds itself compelled to redefine its policy for border management, with regard to receiving migrants and refugees, while remaining faithful to the values of the Union and which define us as the European Union. Europe wants to remain open and faithful to its values”.^{76 77}

Although Bettel expressed the EU’s urgent need to manage the migration crisis, he also noted a strong persuasion from the African partners. The rhetorical action was achieving entrapment: the EU could neither deny the accusations of human rights violations in migration control and migrants’ deportation nor deny that addressing the root causes was a more sustainable solution. Nevertheless, the European partners knew that framing the concept of the root causes wholesomely served African partners’ interests. Bettel noted that ‘*We (the European Union) are currently at a critical turning point.*’ In this critical turning point, the EU could not defend itself against the accusations or reject the rhetoric of the root causes. Throughout the Valletta summit, the European partners did not oppose the allegation of human rights violations for taking what African partners considered a fortress approach. The EU leaders also did not oppose the logic of African rhetoric of addressing the root causes. The EU was left with no option other than changing its policy, or else it would have demonstrated more double standards between its normative principles and its actions.

⁷⁶ Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (2015).

⁷⁷ European Commission (2015g).

The entrapment was evident in Bettel's words when he pointed out that, '*the European Union finds itself compelled to redefine its policy for border management...*' this statement placed the EU as the target of rhetorical action. The statement, '*the European Union finds itself compelled to...*' by Bettel cannot be understood as '*the African partners compel the EU to redefine its policy for border management.*' In comparison, the latter statement translates to rhetorical action while the former indicates rhetorical entrapment. As the head of the Luxembourg Presidency in the European council, his expression of the EU's feeling of entrapment represented that of the broader EU.

Another evidence of rhetorical entrapment was the EU's need to stick to its normative values and principles. Bettel further indicated that '*the European Union finds [...] while remaining faithful to the values of the Union and which define us as the European Union. Europe wants to remain open and faithful to its values*'. The over-emphasis on the term '*the EU want to remain faithful to its values*' showed both the EU's need to align its normative identity with its actions within the EU-Africa partnership framework and comply with the international norms and values of migration management.

There were other voices that expressed a sense of the EU entrapment. Speaking to the press at the end of the 2015 Valletta Summit on migration, the spokesperson of the European Commission said:

"The EU is constantly analyzing these issues with its African partners. Based on the results of these different work strands [*development projects to address the root causes of African irregular migration*], it will be decided in what form this joint analysis will be ultimately presented".⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Chadwick (2017).

The idea of addressing the root causes had emerged out of a controversy. As noted by the spokesperson of the European Commission, the agenda that was conceived rhetorically became the agenda of the following EU-Africa summit in Abidjan.

Due to the unceasing influence, the EU surrendered to the rhetoric that irregular migration was a shared responsibility. When the Summit ended, more voices from Europe accentuated that the key issue in the African irregular migration management was strengthening cooperation by addressing everyone's interests. The Italian undersecretary of foreign affairs, Benedetto Della Vedova, noted

“the sense of this summit is to take the discussion to a political level and to show that we are aware that there is a mutual interest and we (*the EU*) are ready to intervene”.⁷⁹

It was at the political level where the reflection of speech character, as the medium of ideas, happened. Rhetorical action was acknowledged - the summit had taken the discussion to a political level rather than the conventional technocratic approach. The managing director of the European External Action Services and the EU's diplomatic service, Lotte Knudsen, also highlighted that

“there is a recognition of collective responsibility. It is not just an EU problem or an African problem”.⁸⁰

Within the context of the root causes, Knudsen's rhetoric indicated shifting perspective by the EU to take responsibility on its part as opposed to solely migration control that it had firmly pushed forward. Similar rhetoric came from Paolo Magri,⁸¹ one of the participants in the summit. Magri noted

⁷⁹ Financial Times (2016).

⁸⁰ *ibid*

⁸¹ Paolo Magri is a member of the Europe Policy Group del World Economic Forum; He is also the Executive Vice President and Director of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI); Secretary of the

“after years of debate about migration, we are finally going beyond the tip of the iceberg, which is the emergency of rescuing [*African*] people in the sea, and we are looking at its deep roots, such as underdevelopment and economic disparity.”⁸²

As a member of the Europe Policy Group, del World Economic Forum and the Strategic Committee of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rhetoric by Magri’s as well as other European leaders such as Bettel and Knudsen, indicated the EU’s readiness to a new intervention approach of addressing what African countries referred to as root causes of irregular migration.

6.7 The EU rhetorical adaptation in Parliament

Rhetorical entrapment leads to adaptation. After the Valletta summit, the EU took note of the African partners' critical rhetoric about its inconsistency in its normative *actorness*. In her speech on the EU-Africa irregular migration partnership to the European Parliament, the EU's High Representative and vice president, Mogherini, highlighted that the EU’s needed to consider the facts and the running rhetoric on African irregular migration.

“I believe we have a serious responsibility as Europeans to look at the facts. Many times, in particular, when electoral debates get heated or when political confrontations turn even more heated than electoral debates, we have the tendency to say a lot, without necessarily looking at the facts”.⁸³

Mogherini acknowledged that much of what was said about irregular migration within the EU was based on political propaganda to advance different actors' political mirage. She highlighted

Italian Group of the Trilateral Commission; member of the Strategic Committee of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁸² Financial Times (2016).

⁸³ Mogherini (2017).

two facts about the management of African migration control. The first fact she highlighted was that

“there are no shortcuts when we deal with the issue of migration. [...] There are no shortcuts, there is a complexity that needs to be faced as it is”.⁸⁴

The shortcut, in this case, was the border protection approach that the EU actors had embarked on. The second fact was the stories about irregular migration that the EU had finally accepted to consider, that is, the narrative behind the numbers entering the EU irregularly.

“The second fact is that the measures we have finally, finally, started to put in place are starting to show the first results. I believe we must never forget the starting point, the fundamentals, and go back to basics, which is the human dimension of the phenomenon.”⁸⁵

As the first fact highlighted the need for the EU to face reality and the complexity of African irregular migration without taking shortcuts such as border protection, the second fact showed that the right path to migration management rested upon addressing the root causes. More importantly, by overemphasizing that ‘*the measures we have finally, finally, started to put in place,*’ showed that the EU already initiated the new policy of addressing the root causes of irregular migration, and African partners were cooperating as expected. She further echoed the critic by the African partners concerning the detrimental effects of the EU’s migration control actions,

“I have heard myself - and I believe many of you have done the same - stories from detention camps in Libya. When we speak to migrants or aid workers in Lampedusa, you hear things no one should hear. I have seen myself the images of men and women marked like animals by the human smugglers. We have to realize that this

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

is a new form of slavery and we are facing with this a tragedy that none of us can underplay or ignore”.⁸⁶

Her emphasis on listening to what was happening in Africa and acting on it indicated that, whether political or non-political, rhetoric relating to the African irregular migration had always reached the relevant policymakers in the EU. A lot of rhetoric were critical to the EU’s external actions in migration management in Africa. Some rhetoric (*as indicated in the earlier sections*) questioned the EU’s role in creating the root causes through colonialism. Others faulted the perpetual and unfair economic and political dominance of EU actors (neo-colonialism), while others related to the violation of human rights in immigration control. Mogherini connected these rhetorical narratives and saw the EU’s necessity to change its actions to protect its normative identity.

“We have internal contradictions in the European Union, and I am sure you will hear more from President [*of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker*]...We need consistency and coherence. We need the Member States to invest in this approach, consistently and with coherence. I was glad to see that many of them [*the EU members states*] are realizing now how important it is to invest in these partnerships...”⁸⁷

Her rhetoric showed acknowledgment of critical rhetoric against the EU’s identity as a normative power. She demonstrated an already rhetorically entrapped need to adapt to the new norms when she termed the EU’s external *actorness* on irregular migration control to lack consistency and coherence as a global normative actor. Although she acknowledged that many member states had already realized the necessity to invest in the renewed partnership, it was apparent that a few were still yet. To promote the EU’s identity as a normative power, she

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid.

recommended a shift from the conventional migration control mechanisms to addressing the root causes.

“I believe that the time when we had the illusion of managing migration flows only through border management is gone. We have now finally understood not only that we need to act as Europeans, all together, but also that we need to act on what we all usually define as the root causes: poverty, climate change, lack of democratic spaces, violations of human rights, opportunities for life”.⁸⁸

Surprisingly, the EU had considered the views and the priorities of its African partner countries and the critical rhetoric that persuaded the EU to address those causes. By mentioning that ‘we (the EU) have now finally understood’, *it* clearly exhibited that the idea of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration did not originate from the EU. Indeed, it was out of struggle that the EU actors made to understand African interests. A policy briefing released by the European parliament in 2016 showed the EU having successfully conceded to the influence of African partner countries.

“[*Irregular*] migration has always been closely related to economic and social development, but has only recently become part of mainstream development thinking and international policy. The political stakes are high in the quest to adapt to new levels of migratory pressure, not only in the EU but also on the global agenda, which recently saw a rise in migration-related issues”.⁸⁹

In this case, the EU saw irregular migration as not just a conventional security issue but also an issue that could be addressed through promoting mainstream development. In 2016, the EU

⁸⁸ Mogherini (2017).

⁸⁹ European Parliament (2019:2).

accepted that the repositioning of the irregular migration agenda was motivated by political forces from outside. The EU had already started adapting by shifting its migration policy.

“The EU and its member States have reshaped their external policies, including development cooperation, to place more focus on migration-related issues. Widely used in this context, political rhetoric on 'addressing root causes of migration' has been questioned by academics as creating unrealistic expectations”.⁹⁰

The EU further showed acknowledgment of rhetoric of root causes by shifting the language of development aid. This was after considering the African partner countries' critic of the EU's use of aid and the associated conditionalities to manage African irregular migration. The European Parliament was keen not to use the concept of helping African partner countries to manage irregular migration using aid.

“A complex interaction between aid and migration also exists, which is far from a simple one-way causality.[...] A more global approach to cooperation with third countries, such as the EU's already well-established assistance focusing on good governance, infrastructure, rural development and strengthening resilience, as well as going beyond development assistance to include trade and investment, appears promising in terms of deterring migration”.⁹¹

The EU's acceptance that there was a need to go beyond traditional development to trade and investment in irregular migration management was evidence of a changing policy. It strongly correlated with the African partner countries' rhetoric of trade and neo-colonialism. As stated in the earlier section, the African rhetoric held that trade manifested as a one-direction flow of

⁹⁰ European Parliament (2019:1).

⁹¹ European Parliament (2019:1).

wealth, and irregular migrants were the people who followed wealth to Europe. Talking about the establishment of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Mogherini held that:

“One year ago, or two years ago, it was all about the European crisis on migration. I think that today we have managed - again, finally we are starting to see the results - managed to put in place some elements of an intelligent policy based on a partnership that our African partners recognize as useful, that our international partners starting from IOM, UNHCR and the UN system, recognize as right”.⁹²

Mogherini’s remarks, in this case, indicated the EU’s full adaptation to the rhetoric of addressing the root causes and compliance to the international norms, and complete acceptance by the African partner countries to co-operate in irregular migration management. More practically, such harmonized synergy renewed partnership was successful due to the EU’s consideration of what African partners recognized as useful. Further, Mogherini restated the need for the EU to shift from the notion of giving Africa aid to taking part in shared responsibility establishing. This was a precondition for realizing the concept of a genuine partnership.

“We definitely need to use this money [*the EU Trust fund for Africa*] in a sense of partnership with our African friends and I believe the next EU-African Union Summit in Abidjan, at the end of November, will be exactly this: moving from the concept of aid to the concept of partnership, working together, facing together common challenges and taking advantage together of common opportunities. And also working together on common issues we have close to

⁹² Mogherini (2017).

our heart: multilateralism, a certain way to understand security and peace, climate change, the multilateral agenda.”⁹³

A year after the Valletta Summit, in November 2016, the 5th African Union – European Union Summit on investing in youths for a sustainable future was held in Abidjan. The summit convened leaders from 55 African countries and 28 European countries. A press release by the European Commission emphasized the outcome of the 2015 Valletta Summit that:

“European and African leaders reaffirmed their strong political commitment to address the root causes of irregular migration in a spirit of genuine partnership and shared responsibility during the Valletta Summit, and in full respect of international laws and human rights, as well as creating legal pathways for migration.”⁹⁴

Unlike the language of helping, which was mainly used by the European partners before the Valletta Summit, there was a gradual change to using the language of shared responsibility.

The idea of shifting from the concept of ‘development aid to Africa’ or ‘helping Africa’ to the concept of ‘genuine partnership’ was not just a random choice of words by Mogherini. Rather, it signified an EU’s ideological shift in the future relationship with Africa. This ideological shift was restated by the president of the European Commission, Juncker, during his 2018 State of the Union speech to the European Parliament. He said,

“To speak of the future, one must speak of Africa – Europe's twin continent. We need to invest more in our relationship with the nations of this great and noble continent. And we have to stop seeing this relationship through the sole prism of development aid. Such an approach is beyond inadequate, humiliatingly so.

⁹³ Mogherini (2017).

⁹⁴ European Commission (2017b).

Africa does not need charity; it needs true and fair partnerships. And Europe needs this partnership just as much. In preparing my speech today, I spoke to my African friends, notably Paul Kagame, the Chairperson of the African Union. We agreed that donor-recipient relations are a thing of the past. We agreed that reciprocal commitments are the way forward. We want to build a new partnership with Africa. Today, we are proposing a new Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs between Europe and Africa.[..] We want to create a framework that brings more private investment to Africa. [...] Trade between Africa and Europe is not insignificant 36% of Africa's trade is with the European Union. This compares to 16% for China and 6% for the United States. But this is not enough. I believe we should develop the numerous European-African trade agreements into a continent-to-continent free trade agreement, as an economic partnership between equals”.⁹⁵

In this speech, Juncker gave a strong emphasis on the newly reconstructed EU-Africa relations. He expressed the commitment to address unequal partnership, including through trade that had affected African negatively. Like Mogherini, Juncker urged the European parliamentarians and the member states to stop the traditional form of relations founded on ‘giving development aid.’ By reaffirming the rhetoric of African leaders on foreign aid and explicitly mentioning the Rwandan President (then as AU chairman), Kagame, Juncker wanted to convince African Partners that the EU had reformed. Kagame was mentioned because of his critical stance on the EU’s control of African Partners through aid.

The formal introduction of the new rhetoric by the African partner countries was also accentuated by the European Parliament communication to the Council that,

⁹⁵ Juncker (2018:12).

“The new rhetoric, with 'root causes of migration' at its core, was fully deployed in 2015 in the joint Valletta action plan, which also emphasizes the development benefits of migration. The plan was accompanied by the launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, based on resources coming mainly from EU development instruments, the European Development Fund in particular, providing €3.7 billion from a total €4.1 billion”.⁹⁶

As an internal communication that aimed to address the EU parliament, it could be understood that the rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African migration did not emerge from the EU institutions. As demonstrated elsewhere, the rhetoric of the root causes of irregular migration among African countries started as early as 2008 and had been growing. Still, within the EU, it was termed as *the new rhetoric* that emerged from the 2015 Valletta Summit. Correspondingly, it was a significant achievement for the African partners that the European Council acknowledged the root causes of African irregular migration were a shared responsibility between African and European partners. The European Council posted on its website that,

“The summit recognized that migration is a shared responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination. The EU and Africa worked in a spirit of partnership to find common solutions to challenges of mutual interest”.⁹⁷

A similar argument was put forward in the EU parliament by Udo Bullmann. In November 2018, Bullmann, when addressing the European Parliament in response to a question on what precise measures should Europe take to control Africa irregular migration, said:

⁹⁶ European Parliament (2019:9).

⁹⁷ European Council (2015).

“When factors such as poverty, social inequalities, lack of education and environmental degradation exist, irregular migration becomes inevitable.[...] The only way forward is to tackle the root causes that push people to risk their lives in the Sahel region and the Mediterranean Sea. [...] We have, however, to stop seeing the Africa-EU relationship from the sole prism of development aid, which remains crucial for the poorest people and countries. Africa needs a true and balanced partnership based on ownership and responsibility. This is what we expect from the new External Investment Plan for Africa and neighbourhood countries adopted by EU in 2016, which call to promote sustainable investments in Africa. We should stop exploiting the African natural resources without investing in capacity building in areas such as education, skill development, infrastructures and democracy”.⁹⁸

Bullmann’s remarks were not isolated random thoughts. It signified the EU’s changing policy dimension. In his State of the Union speech, Juncker, the European Commission President, addressed the European Parliament and explained the EU’s intentions in irregular migration management. The EU was committed to establishing lasting stability creating employment opportunities in local communities⁹⁹. The European Parliament highlighted in one of the policy briefs that one of the root causes of African irregular migration include,

“Geographical and historical factors: this set of explanatory variables relates to the geographic distance between sending and receiving countries, common language, or colonial past.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ EURACTIV (2018).

⁹⁹ Juncker (2018).

¹⁰⁰ European Parliament (2019:4).

The attempt to link, among other issues, the colonial past and the irregular migration was a big stride in adapting to the dominant African rhetoric that colonial-related issues were part of the root cause of the vulnerability and irregular migration.

The critical rhetoric of neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration later broadened to political forums in Europe. Italy, having had an agreement to compensate Libya over the colonial injustice, aided in magnifying the rhetoric of colonialism and African irregular migration. In 2017, Italy accused EU actors of continuing neo-colonialism. The Italian Deputy Prime Minister, Luigi Di Maio, while on a visit to the Abruzzo region in central Italy, accused France and other EU member states of prolonging African colonization leaving African people with no option other than to migrate to Europe irregularly. In his words:

"The EU should sanction France and all countries like France that impoverish Africa and make these people leave because Africans should be in Africa, not at the bottom of the Mediterranean. If people are leaving today, it's because of European countries, France above all has never stopped colonizing dozens of African countries."¹⁰¹

Di Maio's remarks resulted from Italy's frustration due to the overwhelming influx of African irregular migrants landing on its shores each passing day. These remarks showed that part of the EU community acknowledged the rhetoric of injustices of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa despite the spirited refutation by the majority. Having accepted Ghaddafi's demands to compensate Libya (its only colony) for colonial injustice in return for co-operation towards migration control, Italy stood to have satisfactorily cleared itself from a possible implication by the colonial rhetoric. In any case, Africa's rhetoric of colonialism could only place Italy in an advantageous position against its rivals within the EU.

¹⁰¹ BBC News, (2019); see also EURACTIV (2019), TelesurTV.net. (2019),

6.9. Summary of the findings chapter

Based on the above evidence, it was apparent that within Africa, there was no clear-cut approach to challenge what they considered as ‘Eurocentric normative power Europe’. Few African countries (transit countries) like Libya used irregular migration to generate blackmail against the former colonizers. In the 2015 Valletta Summit, the vast majority of African states used some rationality that neo-colonialism was part of the root causes of African irregular migration. The two mechanisms of linking the rhetoric of coloniality to African irregular migration created persuasion against the EU partners. The two elements of rhetorical action can be summarized as:

- Rhetorical issues
- Spaces of rhetoric

Rhetorical issues: (colonialism and neo-colonialism)

African partner countries used the rhetoric of colonialism and neo-colonialism to influence the EU’s migration policy change. In comparison, the rhetoric of neo-colonialism (the unfair economic and political influence) was more influential in the EU’s policy change than that of colonialism for two major reasons. First, issues such as trade and climate change that fall under neo-colonialism made logic to all the EU actors. Secondly, these issues were connected to other global issues such as human rights and sustainable development. The persistent calls to address the injustices of neo-colonialism by African leaders had subsequently shaped public opinion of the larger EU-Africa society. In addition, the anti-neo-colonial rhetoric had become a popular discourse in African, thereby mobilizing a strong influence to compel the EU actors. As in the case of Libya, despite colonialism having no connection to irregular migration, it still generated a persuasive power enough to entrap Italy.

Spaces of rhetoric

Prior to the 2015 Valletta Summit, the effectiveness of the formation of colonial rhetoric underpinned African leaders' use of different spaces. Such a strategy aimed to establish what Nyers and Rygiel describe as new ways of being political and new versions of politics.¹⁰² One form of space was 'the venues of interaction between the African and European partners' - the most critical was the Valletta Summit. However, the place of rhetoric did not affect the content of rhetoric. Despite different physical audiences and rhetorical situations, the target audience was always the same.

¹⁰² Nyers and Rygiel, (2012: 9ff); see also, Godin and Doná, (2016).

CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

7.1 Introduction

The chapter discusses the findings of the research question: *how did African partner countries participate in influencing the EU's migration policy change to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration?* Guided by rhetorical action, the chapter discusses how the rhetoric of root causes was turned into a powerful normative persuasion to influence the EU policy change. Within specific social settings, commitment and harmonized interests to maintain community norms and values generate collective identity. Following Schimmelfennig's rhetorical action framework, actors who can link their interests with community norms and standards of legitimacy are well-positioned to shame their opponents by highlighting non-conformant behavior. Through rhetorical action, they alter the direction of engagement, which would not have been possible within the pre-existing power arrangements.

The EU-Africa partnership was presumed to be guided by the norm of mutual interests. It also provided a good institutional environment through which both European and African partners, as members, expressed the legitimacy of their preferences. Since 2006, African partners saw the EU-funded migration control projects as an EU's mission to serve only its interest. However, being aware that the African partner countries did not possess adequate material bargaining power to divert the EU's actions, they founded their rhetorical claims about:

- The historical past of the Africa-Europe engagement, i.e., the rhetoric of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
- The inconsistencies and double standards within the EU's normative *actorness* in the irregular migration control, i.e., the critical rhetoric of the EU's normative identity.
- The constitutive norms and values of the partnership framework, i.e., the rhetoric of mutual interest and reciprocity.

Rhetorical entrapment occurred when the EU could neither defend its inconsistencies in the light of its identity as a normative power nor openly oppose the African partners' rhetoric without losing its credibility within the partnership framework. It enlightens why scholars suggest that the EU's migration policy change was influenced by exogenous actors using exogenous issues (see Andersson, 2016; Fulvio, 2016). Rhetorical action and the opponent's adaptation or failure to adapt is an interactive process. As a normative critique, rhetorical action starts by exposing the actor's lack of interest in upholding the community values. When actors go rhetorically strategic, they bring exogenous issues into the scene and problematize the identities and interests of the EU (see, Schimmelfennig, 2003:69).

In an environment of shared history, the normative meaning goes beyond the literal definition of the norm to include the historical and socialization context (Van Leeuwen, 2018; 2017). The rhetoric of colonialism and neo-colonialism by the African countries started long before the 2015 Valletta Summit. As early as 2008, they started disregarding partnership norms by implicitly refusing to participate in joint irregular migration control. At the same time, they questioned the EU's contribution to the causes of migration. By so doing, they established the concept of root causes of irregular migration.

African partners unanimously lauded the construction of root causes based on colonial historicity. They demonstrated dissatisfaction in the EU's irregular control programs by embarking on the rhetoric that historical and systematic causes outside the migration domain constituted the root causes of irregular migration. The historicization of the root causes heightened the differences in the migration management approaches between African and European partners in the Valletta Summit. First, African partners delegitimized the migration control measures as unlawful. Secondly, by capitalizing on root causes, they partially placed blame on the EU actors. The struggle between the two partners created an appropriate environment for subjecting the moral 'truth' of the EU's foreign actions. The African rhetoric

of neo-colonialism as the root causes of irregular migration was a powerful tool to influence the EU since it was applied unilaterally by all African partners at the continental and national levels. It combined both the policy proposal and a critique of the EU's actions and inactions in migration control. Simultaneously, African partners underrated incompetences related to governance in their own countries and how they constituted the root causes of African irregular migration. This indicated that the construction of root causes was not neutral but strategic. African partners were aware that the EU had a well-established identity as a 'normative power' and would be unwilling to suffer reputation costs by demonstrating a stance inconsistent with its identity as a force for good.

The EU actors, on the other hand, were aware that most African countries were unhappy with the approach to border surveillance and migration control (Chou, 2012; Chou and Gibert, 2012; Parkes, 2017; Van Crieking, 2008). Indeed, the EU experienced difficulties establishing migration control agreements with the African partners. Both multilateral and bilateral negotiations on irregular migration control were featured by strong resistance from the African partners. Even when the EU managed to enter into agreements with African partner countries, most of them stalled without significant achievement (Parkes, 2017). At other times, some African partner countries made them deliberately fail through direct non-compliance.

In the following sections, the discussion is based on the argument that the EU did not change its migration policy to tackle the root causes due to the unworking relationship in irregular migration control. Instead, the policy shift resulted from rhetorical action by African countries. Nonetheless, the unworking agreements between the European and African partners significantly aided the construction of the root causes of African irregular migration and helped amplify the persuasion of the neo-colonial rhetoric.

7.2 Persuasion through the rhetoric of colonialism – a strategy of blackmailing

In rhetorical action, a key strategy to win the target audiences is to connect with their world of reality (Wiethoff, 2018). Libya was the first African country to strategically use African irregular migrants to persuade the EU actors to meet Libya's demands. Essentially, Gaddafi referenced issues outside the values and norms of partnership. For example, he highlighted the racial and cultural differences between African irregular migrants heading Europe and the Europeans. He knew well that irregular migrants had been highly securitized in Europe and that Italy's main objective was to keep off migrants. Being aware of this Italy's perception of irregular migrants, his reference of African irregular migrants as black, Muslim, dangerous and uncivilized aligned with security discourse in Europe. Indeed, this strategy worked to make his colonial rhetoric more appealing to European audiences. When judged using the EU's normative principles (as well as the norms of the Libya-Italy partnership), Gaddafi's effort to link African irregular migration to the colonial agenda was a form of *blackmail*. His rhetorical strategy generated persuasion through racial prejudice by presenting irregular migrants as an unbearable risk to the future of the EU.

The foundation of any action applied in the Libya-Italy partnership was supposed to connect to the global norms. Prejudice and bias against irregular migrants are against the universally accepted norms. Correspondingly, such racial comments were against the norms and values of the EU-Africa partnership on migration control. Gaddafi's rhetoric did not align with universal principles, or the Libya-Italy shared values or even the agenda of irregular migration control. To the universal audience, Gaddafi's rhetoric was unfounded. Gaddafi's rhetoric on the securitization of irregular migrants, however, was contextually valid since it connected to the real motive of his target audience. Irrespective of being biased, Gaddafi's rhetoric addressed

the real Italy's motivation for irregular migration control. In this case, what can be interpreted as blackmail, had the potential, and indeed it generated a strong persuasive power against Italy.

Most notably, blackmail was Gaddafi's strategy to bring Italy closer to the discussion of colonialism. In rhetorical action, argumentation is different from formal logic. Rhetoric takes a discursive approach in that it brings an agent to adhere to others, whereas logic is a mere calculation as per the values and norms previously set forth. Logical reasoning is impersonal, while rhetorical action is based on the hierarchies of socialized norms and much attention is given to the agent (Sillince, 2002; 2005). The persuasion of Gaddafi's rhetoric was derived from the convergence between argumentation and the logic that the EU already perceived irregular migrants as a threat to national and social security in Europe. No matter how irrelevant colonial history was in the context of irregular migration management, Italy could not refute Gaddafi's argumentation about the logic of colonial injustices.

Even though Libya managed to justify its political goal based on blackmail, it was able to drive the idea of unsorted injustice related to colonality to gain legitimacy. The incontestable argument of Italy's colonial injustice served as a warrant for the validity of Libya's claim for compensation within the partnership framework. Since Italy's interest was irregular migration control, based on the principle of mutual interests, Libya's interest was as well, in accordance with broader community norms. As put forward by Miskimmon et al., "a less powerful speaker can stimulate a powerful actor by asking a targeted audience to justify the disconnection between its narrative and understanding of self-identity and the seemingly contradictory actions or inactions" (Miskimmon et al., 2014:10, see also, Roselle et al., 2014; Crilley, 2015). In particular, the EU and Italy had less influence to forge a workable relationship with Libya without meeting Gaddafi's demands. Additionally, since it was a time of crisis that required an actionable partnership, Italy could not dare Gaddafi justify the link between compensation for colonial injustices and cooperation towards irregular migration control.

Gaddafi's reference to the colonial rhetoric can best be explained as 'possessing a narrative' rather than 'being a narrative.' In international affairs, the understanding of events is contextually constructed and depends on the audience's interpretation (Ryan, 2005). It was clear to both Italy and Libya that the colonial agenda was far separate from the theme of partnership – irregular migration control. Libya did not frame colonialism as the root cause of either the migration of Libyans or other African migrants. Instead, Gaddafi possessed the grievances of colonial injustice irrespective of whether Italy needed a migration control partnership or not. It was notable indeed that Gaddafi arrived in Italy for 'negotiation of irregular migration control' wearing the emblem of Omar Al-Mukhtar, one of Libya's famous anti-colonialist. He was also accompanied by Al-Mukhtar's son (Fetouri, 2019). In this case, rhetorical action using a 'possessed narrative' constituted high persuasiveness to redirect the Italy-Libya negotiation's top agenda from irregular migration control to compensation for colonial injustices.

Any attempt by Italy to reject Libya's colonial rhetoric would have had implications. It would have openly denied that colonialism did not occur or Italy's colonial actions were not harmful. Either way, it would have demonstrated inconsistency based on the universal understanding of colonialism and violation of human rights, thereby losing credibility. Italy would not have a legitimate argument to defend itself from compensating Libya and would have demonstrated double standards for accepting that colonialism led to a loss of life and property but was not willing to pay. Italy got rhetorically entrapped. Even when it was clear that Libya was driving its egoistic preferences, Italy could not defend itself or generate a credible counterargument within the partnership.

Rhetorical entrapment is said to have occurred when a rhetorical strategy emerges successful, i.e., when the interlocutor has been cornered and compelled to claim a stance that otherwise, they would not have supported. Italy could not have declined the accusation or reversed its

stance to form a true partnership with Libya. Due to Italy's inability to denounce partnership norms and values, Gaddafi was able to constitute and reconstitute Libya's identity as a victim of colonization to establish the Italy-Libya partnership that would maximumly serve his interests.

Even after the removal of Gaddafi from power in 2010, the unrecognized Libyan government had presented a similar threat to the EU: that Europe would turn black due to African irregular migration unless the EU offered more resources and political recognition (Andersson, 2016). Another case was that of the Spain-Morocco partnership. Spain feared that if migrants managed to cross to Europe through Morocco, it was because the Moroccan government wanted them to pass by selectively opening and closing its borders. Mauritania was as well a key EU's partner in the African migration control that ever used its relevance in migration control to threaten the EU to meet its political recognition demands. After the 2006 military coup d'état, the migration crisis intensified, and the EU was eventually compelled to start negotiations with the unelected Mauritanian government (Frowd, 2014; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart, 2010). Although blackmail was not the dominant rhetorical approach that resulted in the EU migration policy change in 2015, still, it contributed to setting up the political rhetoric of colonialism in the EU-Africa mobility framework.

7.3 Formation and expression of neo-colonial rhetoric and root causes of African migration

Unlike the Libya-Italy partnership or other EU-North Africa countries, whose persuasion was featured by blackmail, a newer form of rhetorical action occurred later. The second form of rhetoric involved neocolonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration. The rhetoric was led by pan-Africanists and state leaders who claimed that the causes of Africa's irregular migration, including imbalanced trade and climate change, were rooted in colonialism.

Unlike rhetorical action through blackmailing, which was spontaneous, the rhetoric of neocolonialism developed over time. African partner countries started gradually developing rhetoric and eventually incorporated rhetoric in the migration control partnership framework. For instance, the pathos in Kagame's critical rhetoric concerning neo-colonial-based Africa-EU relations lured the EU actors to reconsider their contribution to under-development in Africa. Although the colonial rhetoric was not based on statistical facts, the argument was critically catchy and connected to the EU normative principles. Such a rhetorical persuasion makes the audience get into deep thinking, searching the speaker's main point. "But lacking self-evidence that can be imposed on everyone, a hypothesis, to be accepted, must be supported by good reasons, recognized as such by other people, members of the same community. The status of knowledge thus ceases to be impersonal because every scientific thought becomes a human one, i.e., fallible, situated in and subjected to controversy" (Boger, 2005:196).

African leaders were aware that the EU actors had prioritized migration control projects, which at times ran counter to Africa's development agenda. Strong rhetoric against the EU-funded migration control projects showed the EU's aid to Africa was not perceived as genuine but rather instrumental. Interestingly, contrary to the mainstream studies, which suggested that African countries were more interested in migrants reaching European labor markets, rhetoric by African partners, including during the Valletta Summit, did not frame African irregular migrants as a labor force in Europe. Within the partnership, it would have been assumed that partners would comply with the shared norms to maintain a positive reputation as genuine partners. However, this being a social engagement, open conditionalities could not apply; instead, social influence became the means of persuasion. African partners were chiefly concerned with the EU's need to acknowledge the root causes of irregular migration and contribute to addressing them. The neo-colonial rhetoric described the Africa-EU partnership as a parasitic relationship. African partners created a strong rhetorical impact against their

European counterparts - that the EU actors accepted an unlimited flow of material resources from Africa, while at the same time, they restricted irregular migrants from reaching their territory.

Africa's neo-colonial rhetoric maintained that African irregular migrants were victims of unfair global political and economic structures. From a Marxist perspective, such rhetoric established a critic that any attempt to examine colonialism as the root cause, alone, considering its long-term consequences, would hinder understanding the broader context within which those conditions for irregular migration were systematically reproduced. While the African leaders placed neo-colonialism at the center stage in constructing irregular migrants, they also suggested remedial action: the EU needed to take part in the responsibility and act accordingly. The logic was that tackling the root causes involved replacing inappropriate economic structures, rules and procedures with the right ones. In rhetorical action, although rhetors try not to offer specific details of the proposed policies, they must narrow their audience's range of choices to redirect them to a specific policy direction. By capitalizing on the rhetoric of root causes, African partners eliminated a wide range of migration control options that the EU would have otherwise opted for.

7.4 The 2015 Valletta Summit: a space for social recognition and validation of the rhetoric of root causes of irregular migration

The 2015 Valletta Summit provided a platform for EU-Africa diplomatic interaction and was featured by contestation of migration management approach between the African and European partners. The fluid meaning of the root causes put forth by African partners opened the floor for rhetorical contestation. As noted in the earlier section, the meaning of the root causes included historical issues directly or indirectly linked to the present manifestation of irregular migration. The African partners strongly supported the rhetoric of unbalanced economic structures established through colonialism. This rhetoric addressed the systems of dependency

of the African countries, commonly known as neo-colonialism. African leaders argued that irregular migration could only be solved by re-designing economic structures that would eventually enhance Africa's industrialization. Instead of examining the conditions through which joint migration control was to be achieved, African partners delegitimized the EU migration control actions in the partnership framework. As a result, there was a re-conceptualization of irregular migration management norms through social recognition of mutual interest and shared responsibility.

African partners gathered influence by connecting the rhetoric of root causes to a critic of the EU's identity as a normative actor. By doing so, they delegitimized the EU actions by establishing the subjectivity of self (the EU's) within the partnership framework. The fact that the summit was held during a migration crisis was not a concern to African partners. Unlike the EU partners, who expected some level of deliberations on control measures at least to manage the crisis, African partners operated in post-crisis mode – not constrained by the urgency to control irregular migration. Despite the critic that the EU actors had contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa, there was no counterargument from the EU partners. Eventually, rhetorical entrapment led to validating a new norm of addressing the root causes of irregular migration.

To understand the EU's migration policy change, it is essential to clarify how rhetorical action during the 2015 Valletta Summit led to the validation of the root cause of irregular migration. Depending on how the rhetorical action is conducted, it can culminate in either mutual recognition based on the principles and structures of socialization or create more conflict (Sillince et al., 2012). In rhetorical action, social validation consists of validity claiming generated through political engagement. The degree of integration between the actors involved determines the level of social recognition, i.e., the higher the level of integration, the greater

the possibilities of social recognition of a norm (ibid). Social recognition translates to a negotiated validity claim, such as referencing a particular norm, to justify an intervention approach (Fierke, 2010). The validation of the African rhetoric by the EU actors occurred through social recognition, without any reference to the universal laws.

7.5 Rhetorical entrapment: a learning experience for the European partners

The recognition of the root causes of irregular migration started right at the Valletta meeting and signified a process of social learning for the EU partners. In rhetorical action, social learning differs from the conventional cognitive approach of learning that aims to fill a knowledge vacuum. Social learning is a process of gaining transformative knowledge through which the learning agent reconstructs and redefines concepts and approaches (see, Nedergaard, 2005; Klindt, 2011). The persuasiveness of African rhetoric increased the shared understanding of addressing the root causes of irregular migration to the extent that the EU actors initiated a self-reflection process, including situating themselves as part of the root causes. In this regard, policy learning led to a policy change.

Identifying the impact of rhetoric on the target audiences, be they elites or the general public, requires examining opinions, attitudes and behavior before and after rhetoric reaches them. One way of understanding the effects of rhetoric is by analyzing the sensitivity of cultural and political contexts that compels the rhetors to drive audiences towards certain understandings of rhetorical dimensions (Miskimmon et al., 2014:9ff). Another dimension is understanding how audiences consume political information and attribute credibility to rhetoric. This is achieved by examining the nature of discussions within the target audience's political and non-political spaces, such as legislative spaces and media (see Lees-Marshment, 2009: Chapter 2). Once these processes have been taken into account, the researcher can identify the diffusion of rhetoric and the end impact.

Based on the Valletta Summit and the period after, I argue that the European partners were not merely passive recipients of neocolonial rhetoric. They soberly understood the critical message and internalized it. The internalization of neocolonial rhetoric took place in both political spaces such as political debates/forums within Europe and non-political (legislative) spaces such as the EU parliament. Other spaces of re-affirming the migration policy shift included the EU-Africa summits in the following years. These venues were some of the spaces where the EU actors expressed new engagement norms with African partners. Learning (i.e., resulted from rhetorical entrapment) was also evidenced in contemporary debates on the EU foreign actions in irregular migration control.

The issues, referred to by African partners as neo-colonialism, were later decently articulated in the EU parliament. The EU leadership spearheaded rhetoric of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration while highlighting the existing inadequacies within the international system that produced Africa's marginalization, forcing people to migrate irregularly. The mentioning of the root causes of irregular migration in the EU parliament was a genuine expression by the EU actors of re-constructed values and norms of engagement within the EU-Africa mobility framework. The learning process was partly catalyzed by increased securitization of irregular migrants, where irregular migration was labeled as an invasion or African exodus. Besides, the 2015 migration crisis increased the EU's attention to rhetoric by African partners expressing the classical questions about the EU-Africa relations' impartiality and the root causes of African irregular migration. The rhetoric of root causes got adequate attention in the European political spaces. However, Italy took the colonial rhetoric outside of the EU parliament in a radical approach. It accused the EU actors at large and some member states of being the root cause of African irregular migration through proliferating colonialism.

Political actors have varying abilities to construct rhetoric, sometimes even those that can work against them. Moreover, political actors have many identities and can apply them based on the context (Miskimmon et al., 2014:5). In the European political spaces, Salvini (the Italian prime minister) and Luigi De Maio (the deputy prime minister) condemned France and other former colonizers for maintaining colonialism – which they termed the root cause of African irregular migration. I thus argue that unlike in the seemingly orderly rhetoric in the EU parliament, Italy's fierce colonial rhetoric was instrumental. As mentioned elsewhere, Italy had already agreed to compensate Libya for colonial injustices. Matteo Salvini aimed to promote Italy's identity as a moral actor for agreeing to compensate Libya for colonial injustices. They aimed to demonstrate what other EU members needed to do. Italy colonized only one African country - Libya. Already having established an agreement to compensate for colonial injustice, no European country could have accused Italy of being part of the root causes of African migration, which Italy condemned. Interestingly, France had colonized most of the countries in west and central Africa that were major home countries of African irregular migrants.

The construction of a high-power rhetoric by Italy originated from two sources. First, Italy was the EU's migration gate. According to the Dublin system, irregular migrants were to be returned to the country of entrance for asylum processing, where many ended up being returned to Italy. Italy's political leadership saw the African rhetoric of managing the root causes of irregular migration as a sustainable way of getting rid of the migration pressure. The failure of the Dublin System led to other EU member states refuse to share the refugee burden leaving Italy overburdened with irregular migrants. Secondly, the European migration crisis created a favorable domestic and international political environment for quick policy learning. Italy was strategic to use political debates to articulate the colonial rhetoric. In other words, the political contestation about the refugee crisis made the colonial rhetoric more pronounced and influential to the target audience.

Italy's rhetoric that the EU member states were part of the root cause of African irregular migration through neo-colonialism had such a powerful effect that France considered the rhetoric inappropriate and summoned the Italian ambassador in France. While in Burkina Faso, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, reassured that the French mission in Africa was not to propagate colonialism or neo-colonialism. But, when anti-French colonial and neo-colonialism rhetoric intensified in Francophone countries, France threatened to withdraw its military from the peacekeeping mission in West Africa.

7.6 The EU policy change

Rhetorical action is discursive and observable through the language-in-use and social recognition. As a form of social engagement, rhetorical action is meant to yield social change. African partners' main achievement was the EU's social recognition that the root causes were a shared responsibility and the consequent shift in policy instruments. After the Valletta Summit, there was a crucial positive correspondence from the European partners. Rather than seeing competing rhetoric during the Valletta Summit, which could have created continued antagonism and struggle between the African and European partners, the EU realigned its migration policy accordingly.

Understanding the dynamics of a policy continuity or a change requires demonstrating how the target audience responds to political rhetoric. The EU's adaptation occurred in two ways: first, through positive rhetorical response. It accepted that the root causes of African irregular migration were a shared problem and a shared responsibility. In her speech on the EU-Africa migration partnership to the European Parliament, the EU's High Representative and vice president, Mogherini, retaliated the rhetoric of root causes. Mogherini used what Leach (2000) refers to as epideictic rhetoric - a form of rhetoric that focuses on whether an action deserves praise or discernment by examining it through the community values and norms. The primary

reason she opted to emphasize the EU's need to examine facts was to distinguish fallacies (which are commonly considered meaningless in an argument) from rhetoric that reflected reality.

The second form of adaptation was non-rhetorical transformation, i.e., the EU established the EU Trust Fund for Africa, whose primary objective was addressing the root causes of African irregular migration. Policies are integral to rhetorical narratives (Boswell, 2011). As argued by Nicoll and Edwards (2004), a rhetor persuades a particular audience to take a specific policy action because there would otherwise be many policy dimensions at their disposal to address a policy challenge under concern. One way of examining the effect of rhetorical persuasion is by identifying adherence among the audience to establish an action that aligns with the admired position (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Perelman, 1979, 1971). As the Vice president of the EU Commission, Mogherini understood that her arguments were not only required to be adequate in clarifying the new EU's policy shift as featured by the EU Trust Fund for Africa but also to bring the EU parliamentarians to that particular position. Mogherini used normative power jargon, such as consistency and coherence, to express the EU's reformed role in irregular migration control. She also chose to apply the rhetorical scheme of association by connecting the EU's identity with normative actions. Mogherini's address aimed to re-affirm the African partners that the EU policymaking had considered what Africa considered to be valuable in their development process. The re-affirmation of the EU's acceptance of the newly reconstructed reality of tackling the root causes was even louder in a speech by Juncker, the EU Commission president. In other words, she used non-political language and within regulated disputation to highlight the EU's renewed consistency in its foreign actions.

A policy shift is ultimately evident in policy documents and media releases. In rhetorical action, policy texts operate simultaneously as text and discourses. As such, rhetorical action perceive text within a policy as a textual intervention and indicate a change in discourse. Text

systematically generates the objects that actors speak about (Klindt, 2011; Winton, 2013). Text of the EU press release showed a shift in the discourse of the EU-Africa partnership on migration management. By viewing changed policy text as both rhetoric and discourse, the rhetorical correspondence by the European partners was not a mere talk. The EU's migration policy confirmed a strong willingness to work with African partners in implementing irregular migration management-projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

7.7 Advancing knowledge: 'the postcolonial others' influencing the normative power Europe

In world politics, the EU is referred to as a normative power and is considered an actor that 'shapes the conceptions of the normal.' Most studies portray the EU as a norm shaper or a force for good (Manners 2002; Pace, 2011). In his work, 'Constructing the self and changing others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe,' Diez presents several ways the EU constructs the duality of 'self' and 'the other' in international affairs. One way of othering is through the representation of others as inferior. Secondly, by representing them as violating the universal principles (Diez, 2005). Based on this study, African partners rhetorically expressed that the EU partners looked down upon them despite being partners. They saw the EU's attempt to off-load all human rights violations to African countries as a way of labeling them as inferior.

The rhetoric by African partners described the EU-Africa partnership on migration management as not of equals. Morrice put forward that irregular migration is a key area where "global inequalities and colonial relations of domination become reproduced and cemented in the process" (Morrice, 2019:25). African Partners' rhetoric indicated an effort to overcome this domination. Such resistance by the post-colonial others and rhetorical action against the EU actors corresponds with Staeger's critic of NPE that

“NPE is not the post-imperial, non-colonial normative discourse it pretends to be. Its intellectual origins and false claims of universality have detrimental effects on the African decolonial project. Within Africa–EU relations, NPE intervenes to capitalize on EU–AU institutional similarities to reinforce European normativity” (Staege, 2016: 981-2).

In this regard, the scholarship of NPE experiences one significant weakness. Scholars concede that the EU is still not a perfect global actor but one in the process of self-construction (Diez, 2013). Such understanding leaves an open question: if the internal systems of self-construction fail, can ‘post-colonial others’ influence the EU to comply with the global norms? This study has filled the knowledge gap by presenting a case of irregular migration management where the EU internal mechanisms did not deliver normative *actorness*. A perspective answer is *yes* - *‘the post-colonial other’ can influence the EU to comply with international norms*. This is also the answer to the research question: *African partners indeed contributed significantly to influence the EU’s migration policy shift. They did so through rhetorical action*. It is generalizable that ‘the post-colonial other’ can resist the EU’s influence and, in turn, influence the EU for a positive change. However, such generalization is limited to irregular migration management. However, the EU's effort to reposition its action to match its normative principles is not a weakness. It is progress towards establishing itself as a legitimate normative power to ‘the others’.

7.8 Summary of the discussion chapter

While most rhetorical action cases are concerned about the EU and the potential members, this study aimed at explaining the 2015 EU migration policy shift and how African partner countries acted as agents of change. The African partners used rhetorical action as a political strategy to articulate their interests by highlighting the root causes of irregular migration and the EU’s non-conformance with the Africa-EU partnership norms.

As early as 2008, soon after the EU initiated the effort to reach out to African countries for irregular migration control, African leaders started linking colonialism and neo-colonialism to irregular migration management. Italy's need for a migration control partnership with Libya gave Libya a perfect opportunity to revisit the colonial agenda. After rhetorically entrapping Italy, Libya persuaded Italy to commit to compensating for colonial injustice. Later, after 2016, Italy was the most vocal EU member to echo the African countries' rhetoric that colonialism was the root cause of African irregular migration. The second rhetoric connected neo-colonialism and the root cause of irregular migration while it criticized the EU actions. The rhetoric was amplified through unworking migration control agreements between African partner countries and the EU actors.

During the 2015 Valletta Summit, it was clear that the African and European partners were pushing for different issues. On the one hand, the European partners made an effort to revisit the migration control mechanisms and sought support from Africa countries to manage borders. The EU leadership framed the situation as a crisis that required an urgent solution. On the other hand, rhetoric by the African partners had two perspectives. First, it re-directed the Summit's agenda to historical issues using colonial rhetoric. African partners claimed that the economic relationship with Europe was exploitative and was the root cause of African irregular migration. The strategy of influence by the African partners explained the relations between two distinct and reinforcing processes. They voiced out what constituted the root causes of African irregular migration and rejected that the 2015 migration issue was indeed a crisis.

Secondly, African partners delegitimized the EU's external actions in irregular migration control and criticized the EU's identity as a normative power. As a normative power, the EU's identity came into the spotlight for the fortress approach to migration management I had taken. African leaders criticized the EU for many deaths of migrants on its doors and the asylum seekers trapped in human trafficking networks in North Africa. Another critic of the EU

member states was its failure to process asylum applications and unlawful deportation of migrants. Nonetheless, the EU's framing of the 2015 influx as a migration crisis enhanced the effectiveness of the African rhetoric of addressing the root causes.

It is necessary to understand that the target audiences were not always readily waiting for any rhetoric directed to them. To generate a strong, convincing and credible persuasion, African leaders chose a combination of pathos, ethos and logos to bring together the rhetoric of neo-colonial structures, the root causes of irregular migration and delegitimization of the EU actions in irregular migration control. Finally, having no other alternative, the EU agreed to take an abstract proposal of addressing the root causes of African irregular migration and established the European Trust Fund for Africa.

In specific contexts, such as in irregular migration management, 'the post-colonial others' are seemingly determined to decolonize by instrumentally pursuing material self-interests in the cases where the EU actions contradict the community norms and values. Although 'the post-colonial other' have had a collective identity with the EU actors through partnership agreements, it would not be expected that any actor's preferences would change. The EU's acceptance of root causes as a shared responsibility was an attempt to rejuvenate the legitimacy of its foreign actions to 'the postcolonial others.'

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1 Conclusion

This study informs on the EU-Africa relation in irregular migration management. It viewed the EU from a normative position and the African partners as resisters or recipients of the EU norms. It examined how African partner countries contributed to influencing the EU's migration policy change. It did so by examining the role of 'ideational' factors comprised of rational utility (self-interests) and community norms and values. The study drew upon rhetorical action and rhetorical analysis to study the persuasive power of African partners. The rhetorical analysis enabled examining how African partners, within the EU-Africa migration control partnership, assembled powerful colonial rhetoric to influence the EU policy change. African partners generated persuasiveness by linking rhetoric of coloniality and root causes of African irregular migration. In all the cases, the persuasive power of rhetoric was contained in the premises and figures of speech, including ethos, pathos and logos. Another gist of persuasion was the rhetorical situation, which functioned expressively by involving the audience in the broader public environment.

The study concludes that the EU migration policy shift from 'control measures' to 'addressing the root causes of African migration' did not emerge from the EU's internal decision-making processes. Rather, the EU was highly influenced by African partner countries through rhetorical action. In this case, Rhetorical action involved a combination of rhetorical narratives, including system narrative, issue narrative and identity narrative, to form mega rhetoric.

The study traced Africa's effort to influence the EU's change of its external *actorness* in migration control since 2008 when the EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration control took shape. However, this persuasion process remained somehow unnoticed in the migration studies, especially by scholars who view the 2015 Africa-EU summit as the origin of the EU's

migration policy shift. The persuasiveness among African partner countries can be put into two categories. The first form involved blackmail and was demonstrated by the Italy-Libya partnership on irregular migration control. Libya demanded Italy to compensate it for colonial injustice as a prerequisite to forming a partnership on irregular migration control. Although compensation for colonialism had no connection with any migration control requirements, Libya successfully used it to persuade Italy to the extent that Italy could not avoid the logic of compensation for colonialism without demonstrating double standards. Italy thus became rhetorically entrapped and shifted its terms of engagement to align with Libya's demands. Essentially, Gaddafi brought in issues such as racial and religious differences that fell outside the values and norms of partnership to influence Italy. The study has termed such possession of a narrative as *blackmail* against Italy. However, even blackmail-based rhetorical practices contained some degree of rationality concerning colonial rhetoric, credible enough to generate a powerful persuasion against Italy.

The second form of persuasion went beyond blackmailing and framed neo-colonialism as the root cause of African irregular migration. This was the dominant rhetoric among African partner countries. African statesmen and heads of government claimed the existence of colonial-based structures which sustained the unrestrained flow of wealth from Africa to Europe, leaving the continent impoverished and people vulnerable. They, therefore, constructed African irregular migrants to Europe as victims of neo-colonialism and people who follow wealth. Such construction implied that the EU actors (and especially the former colonizers) were part and parcel of the root causes of irregular migration. In 2015, when the migration crisis was at its peak, the neo-colonial rhetoric became more prevalent in political forums.

The 2015 Valletta Summit was a venue where African and European partners met with different expectations and where a new policy shift was declared. The policy shift was

attributed to the persuasiveness of the successfully constructed colonial rhetoric. Secondly, the Valletta Summit coincided with the time when the EU was heavily criticized for violating asylum protection and migrants' rights. As a result, the EU's identity as a normative power was delegitimized. The EU actors could not reject that there existed neo-colonialism - dominance and economic imbalance that was disadvantageous to the African partner countries and had a potentially harmful effect on the African people. Moreover, they could not deny that migration control approaches, such as border surveillance and protection of violated asylum law.

The EU's inability to decline the delegitimization of NPE or defend its apparent inconsistency and double standards in upholding the shared norms is what this study refers to as rhetorical entrapment. Indeed, any EU's attempt to counter-argue would have put it in a worse state of self-contradiction. At the end of the Valletta Summit, the EU announced a policy shift from control measures to addressing the root causes of African irregular migration. Even after the Valletta Summit, there was a strong voice from the EU top leadership that the EU had considered the rhetoric from Africa partner countries and was willing to align its external *actorness* in irregular migration management with Africa's development priorities. This explains why the main objective of the EU Africa Trust Fund was to address the root causes of African irregular migration.

Scholars of international relations see the EU's ability to influence 'the post-colonial others' to emerge from the internal coherence of its ideas. From the normative power Europe perspective, the role of 'the others' is marginally considered, or they are depicted as 'passively influenced'. However, this study has offered a different perspective: that in irregular migration management, an area where the EU experiences deficiency in normative practices, 'the post-colonial others' have successfully influenced the EU to change its external actions.

8.2 Recommendation

The future of the Africa-EU partnership on migration management depends on how both partners can establish structures of sustainability. The failures in the past joint migration control projects resulted from African partner countries' belief that the EU pushed its interest to keep off the irregular migrants without considering their development priorities hence withdrew their input. Eventually, much of the EU's 'foreign aid' to Africa was spent on control measures and did not establish an effective long-term solution to manage African irregular migration. As shown in this study, African partners expressed their development priorities that relate to the root causes. The EU, being conscious of the emerging principle of shared migration problem and shared responsibility, ought to shift development aid from pursuing its geo-strategic interests in Africa, especially that run counter with the development agendas of the African countries and focus more on mutual interests of the partnership.

According to Africa's decolonization rhetoric, the primary root causes of irregular migration included the exploitation of natural resources in Africa, the negative effect of climate change and the imbalance in the Africa-EU trade. These are development areas where African partner countries felt disempowered and where the EU partners are seen to demonstrate unfairness in their relations with Africa. Europe and Africa, therefore, need to redesign the economic agreement to reflect a true partnership featured with shared responsibility, non-domination and non-partisanship. To achieve this, the study recommends that the EU requires to work with Africa as equal development partners instead of imposing 'what it thinks is necessary for African development.' In the long-term, this move would build the legitimacy of the EU external actions in Africa, including those related to irregular migration management. It also builds ownership of the EU-funded development projects by the African countries. Further, a partnership of equals eliminates the possibility of African countries using the EU's foreign aid

simply because it is available and has to be used. Since the root causes are a shared responsibility, each partner needs to play its role.

The EU has strongly proclaimed itself as a normative power and human rights defender. Considering the high number of irregular migrants dying at the Mediterranean Sea while seeking asylum in Europe, the EU's identity as a normative power has become a point of ridicule by 'the others'. While the EU focuses on the fortress Europe approach, it erodes its normative power to influence 'the other' regarding human rights in other domains. The EU needs to improve its internal migration and asylum management systems to enhance compliance with the asylum law and its normative principles to maintain its identity as a force for good.

The scope of this study was limited to the EU-Africa partnership on irregular migration management. There is a need for further research on how and to what extent the 'post-colonial others' can leverage the EU in other social-economic and political domains. The study also did not examine how the projects funded through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, in reality, addressed the root causes of African irregular migration. There is a need for further research on how the EU Trust Fund for Africa was used to manage the root causes of African irregular migration.

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