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**Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict:
exploring psychodynamic approaches and
some implications for dialogue and diapraxis**

Andrew Floyer-Acland

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements
for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict: exploring psychodynamic approaches and some implications for dialogue and diapraxis

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate religious hatred, seeking to understand its particular intensity from a psychodynamic point of view, and to identify some of the implications of this understanding for scholar-practitioners working in the field of conflict resolution.

The dissertation begins by establishing the parameters of the investigation and the methodologies used. Following a review of selected literatures of conflict resolution and transformation, psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology, highlighting in particular scholarship that pertains to religious hatred, the dissertation identifies and examines six dimensions of religion (identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control), looking for insights into how and why religious hatred may evolve into marginalisation, persecution and even genocide.

The dissertation argues that the intensity of religious hatred is caused as much by the psychological nature of religious belief as by its social, political or historical context. It argues that psychodynamic concepts such as personal and cultural complexes, narcissism, the divided self and the shadow provide important insights into religious hatred and explain the threat that such hatred poses to those who may be considered Other.

The dissertation concludes by exploring how dialogue and diapraxis can take account of psychodynamic insight and enable people in conflict to explore their beliefs, relationships and perceptions of Others, and to transform historic and present prejudices, stereotypes and misunderstandings.

Acknowledgement

This dissertation has benefitted hugely from the support, advice and guidance of Dr David Leech.

Many thanks.

Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: Andrew Floyer-Acland

DATE: 11 January 2021

**Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict:
exploring psychodynamic approaches and
some implications for dialogue and diapraxis**

Abstract	2
PART 1.....	7
Chapter 1: Introduction - overview, background, methods and language	7
Introduction	7
Overview	8
Background and context.....	11
Methodology	15
Language and format.....	24
Chapter 2: Reviewing the literature of conflict resolution, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology	26
Introduction	26
Conflict resolution and transformation	26
The psychology of religion.....	34
Psychodynamic psychology	39
Key texts on religious hatred.....	51
PART 2: UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS HATRED	54
Chapter 3: Cognitive approaches to religious hatred	54
Introduction	54
Conceptualisations of hatred.....	57
Evolutionary psychological approaches.....	63
Particulars of religious hatred	67
Hatred as addiction	72
Chapter 4: Psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred	75
Introduction	75
The idea of the complex	76
William James, the ‘healthy-mind’ and the ‘sick soul’	82
Complexes and religious traditions	84
Cultural complexes.....	86
The concept of the shadow	93
The circulation of affect.....	96
PART 3: RELIGIOUS HATRED AND THE DIMENSIONS OF RELIGION	99

Chapter 5: Highlighting six dimensions of religion	99
Introduction	99
Exploring possible frameworks	99
Using the literature	108
Religious hatred and the dimensions of religion	115
Chapter 6: The identity dimension	117
Introduction	117
Religion and identity	119
Conflicting religious identities and the idea of the ‘Other’	125
Identity and culture.....	130
The narcissism of small differences	131
The <i>persona</i> , the <i>shadow</i> and the <i>Other</i>	134
Chapter 7: Doctrine and Practice.....	138
Introduction	138
Religious practices.....	144
Characteristics of fundamentalism.....	147
Fundamentalism, hatred and violence	150
Psychodynamic approaches to fundamentalist doctrine and practice	151
Groups and group practices	155
Fundamentalism as a form of cultural complex.....	158
Chapter 8: The emotional and experiential dimension of religion.....	162
Introduction	162
Missing links	162
Definitions of religious experience	164
Religious experience and emotion.....	168
Effects of religious experience.....	171
Religious hatred and the divided Self.....	175
Healing the divided Self.....	178
Religious hatred as the failure to heal.....	181
Essentiality of religious experience and emotion.....	185
Chapter 9: The mythological dimension of religion	187
Introduction	187
Approaching mythology	188
Societal impacts of myth	191
Impacts of myth on individuals.....	193
Mythology and religious hatred	197
Modern myths and the importance of story-telling	198
Cosmic war: where myth bleeds into reality	201
When myth leads to martyrdom	205
The psychology of Armageddon	207
Mythmaking and scapegoating	210
Chapter 10: Sacred values	214
Introduction	214
The nature of sacred values.....	215
Sacred values and behavioural motivation	218

Valuing sacred values	220
Pseudo-sacred and fungible values	222
Broader perspectives on sacred values.....	225
Sacred values and religious hatred	228
Psychodynamic understanding of sacred values	230
Chapter 11: Power and Control	235
Introduction	235
The impetus to control	236
Constraints as control	238
Compensatory control	240
Terror Management Theory	243
From control to paranoia	245
Control through clericalism	248
Evolution of religious control.....	252
PART 4: DISCUSSION	256
Chapter 12: Implications for dialogue and diapraxis	256
Introduction	256
Dialogue and diapraxis	257
The implications: preparatory responses.....	260
Implications of religious hatred as a “psychospiritual” problem.....	265
Implications for dialogue and diapraxis identified in Chapters 1-5.....	268
Implications for dialogue and diapraxis in Chapters 6-11	272
<i>The identity dimension - restoring the Other</i>	<i>272</i>
<i>The doctrine and practice dimension - cultural complexes and the Golem Effect.</i>	<i>277</i>
<i>The emotional and experiential dimension – re-directing “energy flows”</i>	<i>281</i>
<i>The mythological dimension - the re-framing of myth</i>	<i>283</i>
<i>The sacred values dimension - exploring constellations of value and uncertainty</i>	<i>286</i>
<i>The power and control dimension – heresies of the heart.....</i>	<i>288</i>
Conflict transformation and the transcendent function.....	291
Conclusions.....	297
BIBLIOGRAPHY	302

Religious hatred and its contribution to human conflict: exploring psychodynamic approaches and some implications for dialogue and diapraxis

PART 1

Chapter 1: Introduction - overview, background, methods and language

Introduction

This chapter is ordered by the four parts into which this dissertation is divided. Part 1 provides an overview, setting out the purposes of the dissertation, the context in which it is written, and its potential contribution to the work of scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution and transformation, particularly for those intervening or planning to intervene in religious conflict or conflict which has religious dimensions.¹ It also introduces the approaches and methods used, emphasising the importance of the scholar-practitioner model of inquiry and how this translates research and theory into dialogue and diapraxis.² Part 1 also provides an overview of relevant literature in the fields of the psychology of religion, psychodynamic psychology, and conflict resolution and transformation. Part 2 introduces two subjects of central importance to the dissertation: the nature of religious hatred and the psychodynamic concepts which are pertinent to it. Part 3 focuses on religious hatred as it finds expression through six dimensions of religion which frequently provide a context, framework or justification for the expression of religious

¹ The use of these terms is discussed below.

² The term 'diapraxis' was first used by the Danish theologian Lissi Rasmussen in 'From Diapraxis to Dialogue' in the 1988 *Newsletter of the Office on Christian-Muslim Relations*: "I see dialogue as a living process, a way of living in co-existence and pro-existence. Therefore I want to introduce the term 'diapraxis'. While dialogue indicates a relationship in which talking together is central, diapraxis indicates a relationship in which a common praxis is essential. Thus by diapraxis I do not mean the actual application of dialogue but rather dialogue as action." (Rasmussen 1988). Diapraxis is discussed further in Chapter 12 of this dissertation.

hatred. Finally, Part 4 reviews the conclusions of the dissertation and its implications for intervention in conflicts where religious hatred is a factor.

Overview

This dissertation has two main themes. The first is to understand the phenomenon of religious hatred, the reasons for its particular intensity and to explore psychodynamic insights into religious hatred. The second is to identify the implications such insights may have for the conduct of processes intended to reduce or prevent religious hatred.

At this starting point it is also worth stating clearly what this dissertation does *not* aim to do. Most importantly, it does not attempt to analyse differences between expressions of hatred in different religions; in fact, it would perhaps be more accurate to say that it is about hatred linked to the psychological processes of *belief* rather than religion, but it is the psychological processes of *religious* belief which are its primary focus. This focus is also limited, for two reasons, to the processes of belief as they tend to be enacted and experienced within Western culture.³ The first reason is the constraints of time and space: there are some four thousand religions currently extant in the world, and some six billion adherents of the major world religions alone.⁴ To provide a comprehensive account of religious hatred, taking into consideration all the variables of character, community and culture, were it even possible, would be the work of several

³ It is notable, when the topic of this dissertation is discussed, how often it is assumed that it must centre on Islamic fundamentalism. This in itself may be regarded as a good reason for a focus closer to home.

⁴ Data from *Global Religious Futures*, Pew Research Centre 2010 <http://globalreligiousfutures.org> [viewed 18.10.19]. In addition “surveys of more than a million people living in 163 nations show that: 81% claim to belong to an organized religious faith....74% say religion is an important part of their daily lives. 50% report that they have attended a place of worship or religious service in the past seven days. 56% believe that “God is directly involved in things that happen in the world”. In very few nations do as many as 5% claim to be atheists...” (Stark 2015, p. 11).

lifetimes. The second reason is also methodological: as well as desk research this dissertation draws on the experience of a scholar-practitioner⁵ raised and working within mostly Western traditions and cultures that can be understood emotionally and intuitively as well as intellectually using the approach known as the sociotheological.⁶

Chapter 2 of Part 1 describes this dissertation's engagement with the literature and experience of scholars and practitioners in three areas of study and activity: the fields of conflict resolution and transformation, psychodynamic psychology, and, to a lesser extent, the psychology of religion. The literature in all three of these fields is very extensive and for this reason the literature review is selective, focusing on the work within the literature that is relevant either to religious hatred or to how it is expressed in the public domain. The starting point in each field is notably different. The literature of the conflict resolution field is relatively spare when it comes to considering in any depth the role of religion in conflict; this may be explained by the largely secular backgrounds of scholars in this field but it is still surprising given how frequently and popularly (albeit erroneously) religion is considered to be a source of conflict.⁷ The psychology of religion literature is included to provide context and background to psychodynamic literature. Although this has

⁵ The concept and roles of scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution and transformation - referring to those who both study conflict and practise as designers, mediators and facilitators of dialogue and diapraxis - are discussed later in this chapter. The scholar-practitioner approach combines a scholarly approach to theory-building within the subject matter with a practitioner's regard for the realities of praxis. This has to inform both the nature of the language to be used and the framework of the dissertation, acknowledging some inevitable tension between the demands of scholarship and practice which is informed to some extent by the empathetic and immersive methods of sociotheology.

⁶ For an account of the framework that sociotheology provides to enable the study of the social reality of religious activists see Juergensmeyer, M and Sheikh, M 2012, 'The Sociotheological Turn in the Study of Religion and Violence' in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (eds. Jerryson, M, Juergensmeyer, M and Kitts, M, Oxford University Press, Oxford. In essence sociotheology argues that the motivations of political actors who use religious language and ideas are both religious and secular: there is no distinction between defending a faith and struggling for a new socio-political order based on a religious vision. This means, for example, extending the traditional boundaries of international relations study to include accounting for religious thinking and rationality and so become better able to appreciate how social reality looks through the eyes of religious believers.

⁷ See Footnote 11 below.

historically been inclined to emphasise the more negative aspects of religion and reluctant to admit the positives, this has been changing in recent years. In particular this dissertation reviews the work of Carl Jung, a founder of the field, who has in recent years been viewed with disfavour in the academy. Whatever the past perceptions of Jung's deficiencies, the significance of his contributions to the understanding of religion and his value as a cultural critic as much as a psychotherapist are being newly appreciated.⁸ Concepts such as the cultural complex, the shadow and the transcendent function deserve wider exposure and will bring his insights, and those of his 'post-Jungian' successors, into both religion generally and into religious hatred, to a new generation.⁹

Part 2 of this dissertation then discusses, in the wake of the literature review, the natures of hatred in general and religious hatred in particular, possible approaches and methods that should be employed in turning evidence, particularly from psychodynamic literature, into an analysis of the causes, manifestations and motivations of religious hatred. Bearing these in mind, Chapter 4 explains the decision to concentrate on psychodynamic approaches, arguing that these deserve to be reconsidered in general, and outlining specific concepts that, this dissertation argues, are essential to an understanding of religious hatred. In particular it is argued the roots of religious hatred lie in a combination of personal and cultural complexes and other unconscious elements in the human psyche that can be triggered by external and internal events and experiences, and which only psychodynamic psychology, with its emphasis on the unconscious and apparently irrational, can explain, and into which aspects of Jung's analytical psychology in particular can provide insights.

⁸ See for example Hauke, C 2000, *Jung and the Postmodern*, Routledge, London; Brooke, R 2015, *Jung and Phenomenology*, Routledge, London; Barnaby, K and D'Acerno 1990 and 2017, *C.G. Jung and the Humanities: Toward a Hermeneutics of Culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Jung's approach to religion is discussed in detail on page 47.

⁹ Jung's contributions are considered in depth in Chapter 4.

Part 3 then examines in detail, in six chapters, each of six dimensions of religion and how they can provide the pressures and circumstances that may activate such complexes into the forms of hatred with which scholar-practitioners are familiar. The dimensions of religion considered are those of identity; doctrine and practice; emotion and experience; myth; sacred values; and power and control. While these are not claimed to be comprehensive, this theoretical framework is informed by practice and experience, and it is intended to provide a starting point for further research. This point is emphasised in Part 4 where some conclusions are drawn and the implications discussed for future intervention in religious conflict through dialogic and diapractic approaches.

Background and context

The genesis of this dissertation lies in both scholarship and praxis: years of seeking to understand the many dimensions of conflict that confront those who wish to intervene constructively in it, and as many years designing and conducting such interventions with people professing many types of ideological belief, both religious and secular. This work has fallen under a number of headings within the field generally known as ‘conflict resolution’.¹⁰ The majority of it is best described as ‘designing, facilitating and mediating dialogue processes’, with the majority of participants in these dialogue processes being individuals or organisations who have needed to understand each other better in order to resolve their differences or to enable future cooperation. The issues dividing them have ranged from the philosophical to the practical: from questions of human rights, inter-

¹⁰ The field of ‘conflict resolution’ is referred to throughout this dissertation because this is the term most widely used in both the literature and in popular parlance (Miall et al 2005, pp. 8-9). The term ‘conflict transformation’ is generally used in relation to intervention that aims at the more profound relational, structural and cultural changes (e.g. Lederach 2015) that will prevent and remove underlying reasons for conflict. It is arguable that to be properly effective intervention in conflicts with religious dimensions should always aspire to be transformative.

generational equity and environmental stewardship to the building of roads, reefs and runways - virtually always with political dimensions and participants vociferous in their advocacy in one direction or another.

On occasion this work has had specifically religious dimensions, involving conflict in the Middle East, Southern Africa and in the United Kingdom. This raises the question of what constitutes ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ (CRDs). This term is used to describe political and social situations that are shaped in part by the religious feelings, aspirations or frustrations of those involved in them. It is used in deliberate contrast to the term ‘religious conflict’ and its implication that a conflict is wholly about religion¹¹ or between people of different religious persuasions because very few conflicts – perhaps none at all in the modern age – are about religion alone or fuelled exclusively by religious hatred.¹² It is a given that all conflicts tend to have multiple causes ranging from the immediate and shallow to the long-festering and deeply-embedded, complicated by competing loyalties, adherences and identities, some of which are more obvious than others.¹³ In addition they are shaped by the economic, cultural and political contexts in which they occur, where poverty, ethnicity, governance, exclusion and democracy may also be issues. Amidst this complexity “Conflict analyses must capture these complexities,

¹¹ It is a popular trope that religion is often the cause of war but it is in fact the cause in only a very small minority. The Phillips and Axelrod *Encyclopedia of Wars* (Facts on File 2004) indicates that 123 out of 1,763 wars (7%) over the last five millennia can be described as religious in nature. In 35 armed conflicts since 2013 religion did not play any role at all in 14 or 40% (*Peace and Religion 2014*, Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney). Gordon Martel’s *The Encyclopedia of War* (Wiley-Blackwell 2012) suggests a similar figure while William Cavanaugh’s *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) deems the idea of ‘religious wars’ to be a largely modern Western invention, stating all wars have secular political or economic causes.

¹² The criteria and methodology for classifying conflict as ‘religious’, however, are controversial: see for example Barter, S and Zarkin-Osburn, I 2014, ‘Shrouded: Islam, war, and holy war in Southeast Asia’, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* vol. 53 no. 1, pp. 187–201 and subsequent responses.

¹³ This said, the term ‘religious conflict’ is not wholly redundant. When an individual or group expressly describe their conflict as ‘religious’, or define their grievances as exclusively religious, it would be otiose to forego the term in favour of ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ even if it is suspected that there are issues other than the religious that are fuelling the conflict. Within this dissertation the term ‘religious conflict’ is also used as shorthand for ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ on the grounds of concision.

taking account of theological narratives *and* socio-economic challenges. They must acknowledge that the causes of conflict are often non-religious, but that religious motives can still help determine conflict behaviour” (Shannahan and Payne 2016).¹⁴ The focus here, though, is less on conflict itself, or on specific conflicts, but rather on religion or belief-generated hatred as a phenomenon that can contribute to any situation of human conflict.

While the origins of this dissertation lie in the experience of intervention in conflict where people are divided by beliefs as much as by material realities, its precise focus is hatred, and more specifically religious hatred. While personal experience as a scholar-practitioner¹⁵ has always suggested that abstract or ideological differences are often expressed more forcefully than more practical or material ones, the experience of dialogue within the Church of England addressing the subject of human sexuality revealed how the intensity of feeling that can accompany religious differences in particular is not confined to war zones or other extreme situations.¹⁶ Sitting for many hours with people with conflicting views on how their faith should, or should not, accommodate people with differing sexualities provided some insight into how many aspects of religious difference could evolve into intense hostility. It was then not difficult to imagine how, in other circumstances and beyond the constraints deliberately imposed by the protocols of the Church of England’s *Shared Conversations* process, such intensity of feeling could develop into active hatred. This observation, together with past study of psychodynamic

¹⁴ The question of what constitute ‘religious motives’ may have been complicated in the United Kingdom by a recent tribunal ruling that ethical veganism is a philosophical belief and so a ‘protected characteristic’ under the Equality Act 2010 (BBC report, 3.1.20 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50981359>, viewed 14.1.20). See also Donaldson, B 2016, ‘From Ancient Vegetarianism to Contemporary Advocacy: when Religious Folks Decide that Animals Are No Longer Edible’, *Religious Studies and Theology*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 143-160.

¹⁵ The methodology shaping and informing this practice and experience is described on pages 16-20.

¹⁶ See <http://www.sharedconversations.org> [viewed 14.1.20]. The general methodology of such dialogue processes is discussed on pages 247-8.

literature and some experience of psychotherapeutic approaches, raised the possibility that this emotional intensity could not be entirely due to cognitive differences of opinion or doctrine. Reflection also recalled other situations rendered more severe by levels of intensity occasioned by differences of belief, whether religious, philosophical or ideological. In combination these situations suggested that the intensity of belief-based differences, religious or otherwise, might be triggered by unconscious psychological tensions, and that a psychodynamic approach to religious hatred would fill some important gaps in theoretical understandings of it and raise significant implications for how practitioners should respond to it.

Immersion in psychodynamic literature and reflection on these implications supports the argument underlying this dissertation that intervention in conflict with religious dimensions, whether by state-backed politicians or diplomats, international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ‘Track 2’ diplomats or other non-state mediators, requires, in addition to a knowledge of the basic premises and traditions of the religion with which they are concerned, an understanding of psychodynamic psychology as it pertains to the holding and expressing of beliefs.¹⁷ This is also why it is this general understanding of the processes and perspectives common to belief systems, rather than of any particular religion, that is the focus of this dissertation.¹⁸ This understanding can reasonably be expected, in turn, to inform the type of intervention deemed appropriate to any specific situation where religious beliefs inform or sustain the protagonists; it should even influence

¹⁷ The term ‘Track 2 diplomacy’ is commonly used to describe intervention by individuals or organisations without official standing. Examples from the United Kingdom are organisations such as International Alert (<https://www.international-alert.org>) and Conciliation Resources (<https://www.c-r.org>). Meanwhile ‘Track 1’ refers to official actors and non-state elites; ‘Track 3’ to grassroots actors.

¹⁸ In a significant proportion of dialogue work on environmental issues it is fair to say that the motivations of some of the participants are, if not ‘religious’ in the most normative sense, involve beliefs that are at least quasi-religious in terms of how they are held and expressed.

some details of process design when the finer points of intervention come to be considered.¹⁹

It should be made very clear, however, that this dissertation is not intended to be a handbook of process design, mediation or other forms of intervention: the focus is on theory-building and outlining key principles and broad avenues of approach to dialogue and diapraxis.

Methodology

This introductory chapter also describes two methods used in this dissertation. As so often with qualitative rather than quantitative studies, there is no single over-arching methodology that can underpin evidence which is, by its nature, exploratory and ruminative, but their combination provides a structure and discipline. The first is that of the scholar-practitioner which combines a phenomenological quest for understanding with the desire to turn understanding into praxis; the second is empathetic immersion: the narrative process of developing this understanding from the inside out because objective inquiry has its limitations with a subject such as religious hatred which, this scholar-practitioner argues, needs to be *felt* as well as *thought*.

One characteristic of the field of conflict resolution is that it has benefitted from individuals who combine the research, writing and teaching involved in conflict scholarship with an active role as mediators, facilitators and trainers, drawing on their

¹⁹ 'Process design' is the term used by mediators and facilitators to describe the process of decision-making involved in deciding how to intervene in conflict: it covers everything from who should be involved, what should be discussed and how, to the nature and amenities of the space in which they should meet.

experience to inform their scholarship, and vice-versa - hence their common designation as 'scholar-practitioners' (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 52).²⁰ While the training of scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution and transformation has yet to become as systematic as, for example, for those with clinical or legal responsibilities, the roles are not dissimilar in the sense of combining theoretical learning with hands on experience, usually through the medium of meetings and workshops that bring together parties in processes of dialogue. There is in addition the commitment to confidentiality, essential to praxis, that can complicate the reporting of experience and the sharing of learning.²¹ While theory has always informed praxis, it is perhaps less true that praxis has informed theory especially as intervention strategies, such as third party mediation, have come to be more widely used to resolve legal, commercial and public policy issues.²² Where praxis has informed theory it has tended to be more in the field of international and communal conflict resolution where the results are more publicly obvious and less bound by issues such as legal confidentiality. This is true in the case of this dissertation, where the quest for new theory is influenced in part by the experience of designing dialogue and intervention strategies which have often involved participants motivated by religious beliefs, ethical considerations or by intimations of the sacred as they affect public policy issues.²³

²⁰ The concept of the scholar-practitioner evolved out of the idea of the scientist-practitioner model, or Boulder Model, accepted by the American Psychological Association in 1949 for the training of clinical psychologists dealing with veterans returning from the World War II. The hallmark of the Boulder Model was a strong foundation in psychology and other applied sciences coupled with the learning of therapeutic principles, the skills required to treat patients and supervised field experience (Baker, Benjamin & Ludy 2000).

²¹ A number of footnote references in this dissertation are designated 'private communication' for this reason. The obligation of confidentiality remains, in some cases, in perpetuity for security purposes and can severely restrict both scholarship and the open attribution of learning.

²² Mediation, one of the most common forms of third-party intervention in conflict, has been an accepted adjunct to legal dispute resolution procedures in the United Kingdom since the launch of the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) in 1990.

²³ See for example Schwartz, S 1994, 'Are there universal aspects in the structure and content of human values?' *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 50, pp. 19-45 and Schultz, P, Shriver, C, Tabanico, J and Khazian, A 2004, 'Implicit connections with nature', *Journal of Environmental Psychology* vol. 24, pp. 31-42.

The scholar-practitioner role is also a third party role in that it means acting as a bridge between scholarship and praxis, absorbing the evidence and opinion of the former and translating it into a form which can ultimately be of value for the latter. This role grows more complex with the complexity of the issues considered, given the identification of vested interests, the differences among scholars, the rival intellectual histories, cultures and claims to be understood and interpreted, and the formulation of language that may find a way through such differences to a tentative reconciliation. However the field of conflict resolution develops, the scholar-practitioner will retain a role in cultivating the symbiotic relationship between praxis and scholarship, which “involves a continuing interaction between practice, on the one hand, and theory development and empirical research, on the other” (Kelman 2000). One of the purposes of this dissertation is to support this relationship not least by encouraging scholars within the conflict field to look more closely at how religion and religious hatred influence conflict, scholars in fields such as the study of religion to ensure their potential contributions to peace and reconciliation are better recognised, and practitioners to absorb and apply the resultant lessons.

The role and stance of the scholar-practitioner in relation to the situations in which he or she may be asked to intervene has also influenced the methodology underlying this dissertation. There are a number of issues that can arise in any situation, but the experience of intervening in conflict with religious dimensions highlights issues of particular importance and sensitivity. It is axiomatic, for example, that third parties must act impartially if they are to gain and retain the trust of the parties involved. This is rarely straightforward: the meaning of ‘impartial’, for example, may be different in a parish dispute than if a political interlocutor is suspected of past war crimes. It can be argued that true ‘impartiality’, let alone ‘neutrality’, is almost impossible for human beings with a

normal range of biases and prejudices, conscious and unconscious. The proper stance of scholar-practitioners in their approach to religion and religious hatred is affected by a further consideration: whether the presence or absence of religious conviction, or of some religious belief different from those in conflict, is preferable or should be avoided.

Another methodology used by this scholar-practitioner which also shapes this dissertation is that of the ‘empathetic immersion’ approach of sociotheology, described by Mark Juergensmeyer and Mona Kanwal Sheikh (2013, p. 631) as entering into a person’s culture and worldview, understanding what people intend to mean as well as what they say, and becoming completely immersed in their frames of reference.²⁴ There are alternative approaches: practitioners working in the world of legal and commercial conflict, for example, are more inclined to avoid close identification with the content of the situations in which they intervene (Roberts 2007, pp. 131-145) both to avoid any hint of partiality and because they are often lawyers or other commercial professionals trying to avoid any confusion between their roles as mediators and their roles as experts in their field. Intervening in religious situations poses different challenges: some scholar-practitioners, however skilled, may struggle to make headway with interlocutors for whom the absence of a shared belief on the part of the practitioner may render the building of trust difficult if not impossible.²⁵ The question of stance may become more acute the more extreme the nature of the belief or behaviour encountered.²⁶ In such circumstances another alternative

²⁴ While this resonates strongly with the conflict resolution exercises that most practitioners experience as part of their training, it can come as an apparent novelty to those whose positions and experience have not extended beyond their cause. Juergensmeyer and Sheikh provide the example of the documentary film *The Fog of War* in which Robert McNamara, the former US Secretary of Defense, advises policy makers to “empathize with the enemy”. He implies that had this been done during the Vietnam War it would have changed American attitudes to the North Vietnamese and enabled them to see it as a nationalist struggle against foreigners rather than, or at least as well as, a communist crusade (2013, p. 632).

²⁵ For example, a practitioner asked to intervene in a recent religious dispute decided that declaring herself ‘agnostic’ might reassure both sides as to her impartiality. This had an unintended effect: her absence of religious commitment was interpreted by both sides as an inability to understand the issues under discussion.

²⁶ A recent exercise in religious reconciliation was brought to a premature end when one key interlocutor declared that the mere fact of talking to others with different viewpoints was heretical (private

to empathetic immersion might be the deliberate detachment from the issues exemplified by an approach adopted in the relatively early days of conflict resolution: ‘controlled communication’. This method saw panels of academic experts listening to protagonists and then helping them work through the options for resolving their differences (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 49). While this detachment may have aided objective analysis of situations, the experience of this practitioner suggests that in conflicts with religious dimensions empathetic immersion is more likely to enable a scholar-practitioner to build the quality of relationship with protagonists that will subsequently enable difficult and sensitive issues to be discussed with some hope of progress. The reason for this is perhaps that people of faith in a largely secular culture have become used to being derided and even marginalised, so a practitioner who listens deeply and empathetically is more likely to be accepted and even welcomed than one who is perceived to be more intellectually and emotionally detached.

Empathetic immersion is particularly relevant, according to Juergensmeyer and Sheik (2013, p. 635), when it comes to understanding how the narrative structure of a storyline seeks to explain how religion can justify hatred and even violence, including where religion-related violence is set in the context of cosmic war where battle is done as much through symbols as weapons. They use the example of the jihadi narrative of cosmic warfare in the wake of the 9/11 tragedies and how these were affirmed by the responses and the language of the then US administration. The administration might have thought twice about using the word ‘crusade’ to describe its ‘war on terror’ if it had been better understood that this would be interpreted in the Middle East as a call to the ‘clash of civilisations’ and an evocation of the spirit of hate which had led Christian knights to

communication, November 2017). ‘Reconciliation’ for those with strong beliefs can depend on capitulation by those who do not share them.

repeated assaults on Jerusalem in centuries past.²⁷ Other examples illustrate the supreme importance of perceiving situations and contexts from the protagonists' points of view, especially when some protagonists are inclined to be categorized as 'Other'.²⁸

Practitioners are taught to recognise the importance of narrative as part of the process of intervention in conflict; John Winslade and Gerald Monk in *Narrative Mediation* (2001) state that it is "more useful to concentrate on viewing stories as constructing the world rather than viewing the world as independently known and then described through stories" (p. 3).²⁹ This process also delivers the mediation process from what Winslade and Monk call the "totalizing descriptions" that mean protagonists can become entrapped in dominant storylines that enshrine negative perceptions of each other.

The importance of empathetic immersion for this dissertation is that, like the narrative approach to conflict, it reduces the inadvertent exclusion of ideas or explanations that do not fit pre-conceived notions of relevance or significance. The problems caused by over dominance of a particular ideology or belief system or even approach are not confined to interventions where religious hatred is a factor. In any situation empathetic immersion is not without its challenges: it is always easier for protagonists to insist on working only within the parameters with which they feel comfortable.³⁰ One of the distinctive methods

²⁷ See Huntington, S 1993, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3.

²⁸ The concept of 'Others' and 'Otherness' recurs repeatedly in this dissertation. Where the words are capitalised this indicates that the meaning goes beyond the generic. These concepts are crucial to an understanding of religious hatred.

²⁹ Narrative mediation is an approach to conflict based in part on the development of narrative therapy, which was developed in the 1970s and 1980s as a means to help people identify and develop their own skills and knowledge so they could be brought to bear on the problems they faced. See for example White, M and Epston, D 1991 *Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends*, Norton, New York or Combs, G and Freedman, J 1996 *Narrative Therapy: The Social Construction of Preferred Realities*, Norton, London. Narrative mediation, like narrative therapy, has been criticised for its social constructionist approach.

³⁰ For example, during a dialogue process convened by the UK Sciencewise programme to discuss the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in agriculture and food production, it became apparent that scientists supporting GMOs viewed their use purely in scientific and food safety terms whereas opponents wanted to discuss the ethical, social, economic and environmental impacts on, for example, farmers in developing countries. Had the advocates of GMOs been willing to adopt a more empathetic and immersive approach to the subject instead of confining the dialogue to scientific issues, the dialogue process would have

that scholar-practitioners bring to conflict resolution processes has been reflected in the approach to the research that has informed this dissertation: rather than starting at Point A and moving steadily through Points B, C and D until the final point, the approach has been to start at Point A, have a look at Point B and then return to Point A to see if understanding of it has changed in the light of Point B. Then perhaps a look at Points B and C before again returning to Point A, or perhaps looking at Points C and D from Point B to see if that suggests a more creative option for reaching Point E, and so on. Underlying most conflict resolution strategies are methods that perceive conflict not as battles to be won but as problems best solved by protagonists working together to find mutually acceptable solutions, and this involves enhanced understandings of protagonists' needs and interests, values, fears and expectations best achieved through immersion in their points of view (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse 2005, p. 18; Carpenter & Kennedy 1988, pp. 128-9; Moore 1986, pp. 38-9; Acland 1990, pp. 147-156).

It is arguable that all scholarship by definition involves empathetic immersion in the research, arguments and evidence of other scholars, and this dissertation is no different. Immersion here, however, has gone beyond typical academic desk research in two ways. First, it has involved the study of para-academic texts, such as those produced by practitioners, and non-academic media produced by a wide variety of haters, homophobes, racists and other bigots of many different persuasions and degrees of coherence.³¹ Secondly, such expressions of ambition, grievance and frustration need to be analysed emotionally and intuitively as well as rationally: intellectual analysis alone is insufficient

been less likely to collapse before it could make any progress. For further information see <http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/food-the-use-of-genetic-modification-a-public-dialogue/> [viewed 20.12.17.] Sciencewise is a programme funded by the UK government's Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Its remit is to bring into dialogue scientists, policy-makers and members of the public to discuss the social and ethical dimensions of innovative science and technology.

³¹ It has not been felt necessary to reproduce or reference such material in this dissertation; its nature and extent has become an unfortunate accompaniment of everyday discourse.

to appreciate the shades and nuances of impact though the scholarly literature that responds to them provides a useful baseline. The importance of intense discourse analysis, first to identify any ‘negativity effect’³² and then to describe its consequences in terms of evaluating impressions of other individuals or groups, their moral stances or likely decisions, is well established among scholar-practitioners, the critical point being that negative evaluations tend to have more influence than positive evaluations (Coovert and Reeder 1990; Taylor 1991).³³ While not all expressions of religious hatred are necessarily as extreme as some of those studied, their potential to become so is evident in the language used, and the most chilling are sometimes the less extreme in that they demonstrate an understanding of how to infiltrate the minds of those who do not, at present, share their wilder beliefs. This distasteful research has reinforced the conviction that it is only the literature of psychodynamic psychology that can enter the minds of its authors and explain how religious hatred can arise and contribute to religious conflict. It is a bonus that in this respect empathetic immersion as a methodology is appropriate for both scholars and practitioners.

Thirdly, the research for this dissertation has also involved a systematic review of professional experience since 1985. This work has involved a wide range of people and organisations expressing strong beliefs and values. These have included religious believers, environmental campaigners, human rights activists and adherents to indigenous religious cultures. The review of this work has included reading case histories, post-intervention debriefs, independent analyses of lessons learned and insights gained, and reflections on how

³² The ‘negativity effect’ is extant when the negative impression conveyed by any communication outweighs any positive effects (Vonk 1993).

³³ The negative impacts of hate propaganda tend to increase intolerance of other people and their views and undermine the trust and interdependence that maintain political participation and social interdependence (Johnson and Johnson 2000).

this accumulated experience has been processed into professional training for bodies such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), law firms, academic and research institutions, government agencies and local government bodies. Training others has particular value in that it enforces the discipline of reviewing experience and distilling what has been learned into forms - written, summarised and illustrated - that can be assimilated by others; in this sense professional training of others can almost be considered a form of methodology for research.³⁴

While on the subject of research, questions have arisen about the accuracy, validity and applicability of some university-based academic psychological research. This has been prompted in part by the work of Joseph Henrich and Ara Norenzayan among others who argue that much research on human behaviour and psychology assumes that everyone shares most fundamental cognitive and affective processes, and that findings from one population apply to others. “A growing body of evidence suggests that this is not the case” (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). Among the reasons mentioned are variations in factors affecting research such as visual perception, analytic reasoning, fairness and cooperation: agreeing with anthropologists that people from Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic societies, and particularly American undergraduates on whom much psychological research relies, “are some of the most psychologically unusual people on earth” (ibid.).³⁵ Where this dissertation uses such research it should be assumed that it comes with appropriate caveats as to its reliability.

³⁴ The field of conflict resolution increasingly emphasises the importance of reflexivity as a means to distil important experience, to refine training methods and to build the habit of reflection amongst practitioners, and this in turn is influencing research methodology: see for example Attia, M and Edge, J 2017, ‘Be(com)ing a reflexive researcher: a developmental approach to research methodology’, *Open Review of Educational Research*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 33-45.

³⁵ The acronym WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic) is increasingly being used to remind researchers of the bias inherent in using subjects from this demographic.

Language and format

For the scholar-practitioner language is always an issue because using it badly can make difficult situations worse. Scholar-practitioners tend therefore to be measured in the language they use, wary of words that may challenge perceptions of their impartiality, and careful that what they say cannot be misinterpreted. Those who spend time designing and facilitating dialogue processes often emphasise structure and clarity in their use of language: the former to ensure that issues and are addressed in the way and sequence that optimizes the likelihood of a dialogue process working for all protagonists, the latter to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding contributing to what may already be a difficult situation. The mediator Kenneth Cloke goes further than this when he suggests that mediators develop a new language, allowing problems to be described as belonging to both parties, “that does not victimize or demonize, that empathizes and acknowledges emotions, that strengthens heart and spirit, that encourages responsibility for resolution and openness to transformation” (Cloke 2001, p. 149). Cloke is addressing practitioners in a field of third party intervention, the law, where language can be used as much to obscure and divide as to clarify and transform, but his admonitions are universal and some scholar-practitioners are focusing on deliberately developing language designed to avert conflict.³⁶

An academic dissertation focused on understanding religious hatred is removed from the exigencies of praxis, but the practitioner habit means that this dissertation uses language that, wherever possible, puts a premium on clarity. Similarly, it also tries to keep in mind the issues surrounding the use of examples and anecdotal evidence in illuminating a subject such as religious hatred. Detailed case studies in any field can enable the study of

³⁶ See for example Ramsbotham, O 2010, *Transforming Violent Conflict*, Routledge, London.

lived reality, the processes involved in causal relationships, the impact of the unexpected, and conceptual development drawn from multiple viewpoints, but experience as a scholar-practitioner and conflict resolution trainer suggests that there are also dangers and limitations in their use.³⁷ Chief among these is the difficulty of choosing case studies that are of universal value when every situation is individual, and the consequent danger of the lessons of one situation being assumed to be relevant in another. For this reason the approach preferred in this dissertation is to illustrate ideas and concepts through the use of examples that are specific and constrained rather than to rely on larger case studies where the key points may be lost amidst the detail.

There is a final point as regards the format of this dissertation. Eleven chapters out of its twelve are concerned primarily with the exploration of religious hatred designed to be of interest to scholars in the fields of religious studies, theology, the psychology of religion and conflict and conflict resolution. The twelfth chapter discusses some of the implications for dialogue and diapraxis raised by these ideas and is intended to be of value for theory-building among practitioners, including diplomats, politicians and conflict resolution specialists as well as scholars.

³⁷ See for example Hodkinson, H and Hodkinson, P 2001, 'The Strengths and Limitations of Case Study Research', Paper for the Learning and Skills Development Agency Conference, *Research, Making an Impact on Policy and Practice*, Cambridge.

Chapter 2: Reviewing the literature of conflict resolution, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology

Introduction

This literature review covers three fields of scholarship: conflict resolution and transformation, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology. Although the latter two of these became formally established at the beginning of the last century while the first is younger by about half a century, the literatures of each are extensive and reflect the significance of their subject matters. This review provides an overview of these three fields of scholarship as they pertain to the subject of religious hatred - though religious hatred is often more implicit than explicit in all three literatures and sometimes has to be extrapolated from milder expressions of religious anger or difference, or from situations of conflict where hatred may be more general than specific.³⁸

Conflict resolution and transformation

Conflict resolution, as a defined field of study, had its origins in the 1950s and 1960s (Miall, H, Ramsbotham, O and Woodhouse T 2005, p. 3) when superpower conflict threatened the use of nuclear weapons and the future of the planet. It was a multi-disciplinary field from the outset: small groups of pioneer researchers in Europe and North America began to see the potential of applying the literature of dealing with conflict learned from arenas as diverse as industrial relations, the civil rights movement and matrimonial dispute resolution to that of international relations. Progress was slow in that the diplomats, politicians and international relations scholars who had traditionally

³⁸ It becomes increasingly clear as this dissertation progresses that hatred is qualitatively different from anger; the nature of hatred, and religious hatred in particular, is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

documented the processes of dialogue among nation states saw little reason to admit scholars with ideas originating outside their experience or scholarship. Gradually, however, the value of fresh thinking began to be appreciated, institutions and scholarly journals were established and field experience began to feed into scholarship and vice-versa.³⁹ The field was also bolstered by the realisation among the United Nations Organisation, non-government organisations and humanitarian agencies that conflict resolution often needed to be a precursor to, or be congruent with, international development work (*ibid.*, p. 4). The end of the Cold War and its various proxy conflicts during the 1990s also opened up opportunities for conflict resolution scholarship as well as the re-heating of territorial ambitions that had been quiescent since 1945. Conflict resolution mechanisms began to be institutionalised within bodies such as the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union, AU), and many educational institutions, think-tanks and universities began their own scholar-practitioner study and training programmes. It is these bodies which have been largely responsible for the evolving literature of conflict resolution and for the literature which focuses most explicitly on the challenges to peace that have developed since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and have given fresh urgency to understanding the phenomenon of religious hatred.

Looking strategically at the literature of conflict resolution, it is apparent that there are, broadly speaking, four areas of scholarship. The first is concerned mainly with relations between states or major non-state actors and focused on improving the existing mechanisms for early warning of impending conflict, preventive diplomacy, hotlines and

³⁹ Among the first major areas where conflict resolution ideas made a tangible difference were the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s and the Centre for Intergroup Studies work on apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s.

confidence-building measures through bodies such as the United Nations. The second is focused on better understanding of the processes of negotiation and mediation,⁴⁰ building in particular on the work of bodies such as the Harvard Program on Negotiation, the Berghof Foundation,⁴¹ the Carter Center⁴² and in the United Kingdom the work of university departments such as that of the Division of Peace Studies and International Development at the University of Bradford,⁴³ the Conflict Analysis Research Centre at the University of Kent,⁴⁴ the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at the University of Coventry⁴⁵ and the University of Winchester's Centre for Religion, Reconciliation and Peace⁴⁶ to improve the practical functioning of human relationships when they are under pressure. The third area of scholarship is focused on better understanding of human needs and interests, especially those relating to identity and self-determination where the driving forces are movements, cultures and sub-groups within larger entities. The fourth area is a separate but parallel approach to the third and seeks to understand what it takes to *transform* rather than merely resolve conflict in any context (for example Vayrynen, ed. 1991; Jabri, 1996; Francis, 2002; Lederach, 2003). The subject of conflict transformation is particularly relevant to religious hatred: this dissertation argues that overcoming religious hatred depends ultimately on deep-seated changes of attitude made possible by processes akin to religious epiphanies facilitated through dialogue and diapraxis.

There is relatively little literature in either conflict resolution, the psychology of religion or psychodynamic psychology which is directly, specifically and exclusively

⁴⁰ www.pon.harvard.edu

⁴¹ www.berghof-foundation.org

⁴² www.cartercenter.org

⁴³ www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/psid/

⁴⁴ <https://research.kent.ac.uk/conflict-analysis/>

⁴⁵ <https://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/areas-of-research/trust-peace-social-relations/>

⁴⁶ <https://www.winchester.ac.uk/research/building-a-sustainable-and-responsible-future/centre-for-religion-reconciliation-and-peace/>

concerned with religious hatred. Searching the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (JCR) for ‘religious hatred’ produces just 69 ‘hits’, for example; the same exercise with the *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* about half that number, while the *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* produces a similar number but many are duplicates and, as with those produced by the JCR, most are about the fact of hatred rather than its anatomy. Searches in the ATLA Religion Database using various permutations of the search terms find a hundred or so entries, again mostly about incidents of religious hatred or legal and political discussion of it; there is little about what brings individuals to such strong feeling. This suggests that the power of religious emotion is under-estimated. In the fifty-five years between May 1935, when Josef Stalin famously asked how many divisions the Pope could muster, and the return of democracy to Poland in 1990 aided in part by the election of a Polish Pope, it appeared to many that religion had lost not only institutional power in the world, but perhaps more importantly its power to move people (Sahliyah 1990; Haynes 2007). The fallibility of this viewpoint was challenged first by the Iranian revolution in 1979, and has been proved repeatedly since then by the advent of polities rendered unstable by the pressures of faith (Atran 2010; McGrath 2004; Stark 2015). Religion wields emotional power, and when the emotion associated with such power is hatred then it is important to understand both its conscious and unconscious appeals (Moïsi 2009, pp. 76-8) and what this means for a contemporary world that is erroneously supposed to have turned its back on religion (Smith 2001, pp. 154-162).

In the absence of evidence it is reasonable to speculate why the literature of the conflict resolution field in particular does not consider religion in more depth.⁴⁷ First, it is

⁴⁷ It is not just the conflict resolution field: international relations theory, the mid-wife of conflict resolution, ignored religion for most of the 20th century. The reasons for this are discussed in Fox, J and Sandler, S

possible that those who write books and journal articles about conflict regard other issues as more salient than religion even though the history of recent years suggests that this would be an oversight. Secondly, religion may appear to be absent from the literature of conflict because it appears in other guises, for example as a dimension of culture and a marker of identity rather than a subject in its own right. Thirdly, religion is increasingly treated as a subset of ‘worldviews’, cognitive orientations to the world that articulate and summarise an individual’s or a society’s aims, beliefs and values (Naugle 2002). In this understanding ‘religion’ may be equated or conflated with secular worldviews such as Marxism, radical environmentalism or indeed any system of thought with influence on the way people and societies think. Finally, it should be observed that conflict resolution is a largely secular field but the neglect of religion is still surprising given how frequently religion is considered to be a source of conflict.⁴⁸

Often during the research for this dissertation answers to many questions have emerged from the grey areas between disciplines and where literatures overlap, and this is true of insights into religious hatred. The literature prompted by the growth of religious terrorism in the years since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the 11th September 2000 attacks in the United States, contains a wealth of social anthropology which also covers the nexus of religion and violence. While such texts do not, strictly

2005, ‘The Question of Religion and World Politics’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 293-303.

⁴⁸ “Overall, conflict scholars have tended to neglect religious dimensions of conflicts, and scholars of religion have tended not to incorporate the insights from conflict studies into their analysis” Svensson, I 2016, ‘Conceptualizing the Religious Dimensions of Armed Conflicts’, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 55, no. 1, pp.185–189. A similar issue is discussed by Professor Jeffrey Seul of Harvard Divinity School in ‘Religion in Cooperation and Conflict’ (in Honeyman, C and Kupfer Schneider, A (eds.) 2017, *The Negotiator’s Desk Reference Vol. 1*, DRI Press, Saint Paul, Minnesota). In a footnote Seul comments that much of the research discussed in his chapter was conducted by social scientists who are atheists, and quotes theologians Sarah Coakley and Martin Nowak “if it is simply assumed that ‘religion’ may be explained away in terms of something else, all attempts to clarify its workings will inevitably fall prey to the same reductive principles” (from Coakley, S and Nowak, M 2013, *Evolution, Games, and God: The Principle of Cooperation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.)

speaking, fall within what is usually considered the conflict resolution field, they can be said to build on Johan Galtung's half a century of extensive studies, well summarised in *Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work* (2004), of the structural relationships between conflict, violence and peace. Among the literature of value to those studying religious violence and hatred are Stern's *Terror in the Name of God* (2003); Fields' *Martyrdom: The Psychology, Theology, and Politics of Self-Sacrifice* (2004); Silberman's 'Religious violence, terrorism, and peace' in Paloutzian and Park's *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality* (2005); Atran's *Talking to the Enemy* (2010); Yanay's *The Ideology of Hatred: The Psychic Power of Discourse* (2013); *Nations under God: The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century* edited by Luke Herrington, Alasdair McKay and Jeffrey Haynes (2015) and Juergensmeyer's *Terror in the Mind of God* (2017).

The conflict resolution field is focused as much on methods of intervention as analysis, and this is of particular interest to scholar-practitioners. Numerous books have suggested methods of intervention, usually including case studies describing what has worked or not worked in different circumstances. The literature on intervention in religious conflict is relatively limited though in recent years a number of publications have begun to fill this gap. The work of Scott Appleby, including *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (1999) and *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (2011), is particularly notable in this regard, as is his editorship of the *Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding* (2015) which contains seminal essays by scholars and practitioners including Marc Gopin, John Paul Lederach, David Little, Atalia Omer and Lisa Schirch among others. Its companion volume, *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (2015), edited by Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts and Michael Jerryson, contains the work of similarly

distinguished scholars in the field. Recent years have also seen the publication of literature directed more towards practitioners, including, for example, the United States Institute for Peace's *Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding* (Frazer and Owen 2018), a systematic guide to analysing and understanding modes of intervention in religious conflict; Mark Owen and Anna King's 'Enhancing the Efficacy of Religious Peacebuilding Practice: An Exploratory Evidence-Based Framework for Assessing Dominant Risks in Religious Peacebuilding' (*Religions*, vol. 10, no. 12, p. 641); and the work of the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, for example *Approaching religion in conflict transformation: concepts, cases and practical implications* (Frazer and Friedli 2015). There is also a volume of literature of relevance to those interested in conflict resolution generally that documents the role of religious leaders and communities of faith as interveners in conflict.⁴⁹

The other approach to conflict in general, but which has a particular resonance for scholarship concerned with religious hatred, is the so-called 'transformative' approach. Conflict transformation, mentioned above as a development of conflict resolution, is different to conflict resolution in a number of regards. First, it starts from the presumption that the only way finally to resolve conflict is to address its roots by, for example, tackling the structural injustices that may feed it, or the differing frames of reference that sustain it. Notable examples of literature setting out this approach include Adam Curle's *Tools for Transformation* (1990) and John Paul Lederach's *Preparing for Peace: Conflict*

⁴⁹ See for example Johnston and Sampson's *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (1994) and *Conflict and Reconciliation: The Contribution of Religions* (2008), edited by the religious scholar John Bowker, followed by, among others, *The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding* (Mayall & Silvestri 2015) and *Faith-based Interventions in Peace, Conflict and Violence: A Scoping Study* (Shannahan & Payne 2016). While these publications document or advocate relatively formal interventions in religious conflict, they can sometimes overlook work done on the ground by religious groups such as the Quakers and Mennonites, both of whom have been convening and mediating peace talks for many years. The works of the Quaker Adam Curle and the Mennonite John Paul Lederach, are primary sources in this regard; Lederach's *The Moral Imagination* (2005) provides a philosophical underpinning for Mennonite work in the field.

Transformation Across Cultures (1995); more recently Oliver Ramsbotham's *Transforming Violent Conflict*, (2010) has focused attention on the vital importance of how language is used. Religion is one of the frames of reference where arguably differences cannot be resolved but must be transcended through the transformation of the relationships which may have given rise to strong emotions, such as hatred, that fuel conflict. In such situations scholar-practitioners have been exploring the use of methods that enable protagonists to express feelings that may be too sensitive or complex to be put into words, and to develop empathy across chasms of history, religion and experience. There has been growing interest in the use of the arts, for example, to bridge strong emotional divisions and there is an expanding literature in this area of conflict work.⁵⁰

Even a passing acquaintance with the literature of conflict resolution reveals the extent to which it is founded, in the broadest possible sense, on understandings of how human beings behave whether at the personal or global level: whether the focus of discussion is an international treaty, trying to help an aid convoy pass a roadblock manned by drunken militia, or an academic analysis of structural conflict in some corner of a war-torn country half a world away. So it is right that the other two literatures considered here

⁵⁰ For a useful overview see Bang, A 2016, 'The Restorative and Transformative Power of the Arts in Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Transformative Education*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 355–376. See also Michelle LeBaron's essay 'Creating Shifts: Using Arts in Conflicts with Religious Dimensions' in *Religion in Conflict Transformation* (Politorbis no. 52, pp. 53-8, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, 2011) and her work with Emily Beausoleil where the arts and neuroscience are brought together in the quest for radical transformation: Beausoleil, E & LeBaron, M 2013, 'What moves us: Dance and neuroscience implications for conflict approaches', *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 31, pp. 133–158; and also Acland, A, LeBaron, M & Macleod, C (eds.) *The Choreography of Resolution: Conflict, Movement and Neuroscience* (2013). Other literature that contributes to this aspect of the conflict resolution field includes Cynthia Cohen's essay 'Creative approaches to reconciliation' in Fitzduff, M and Stout, C Fitzduff, M and Stout, C, *The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts: Group and social factors*, Praeger, Westport, pp. 70-89; Coleman, P and Deutsch, M 2014, 'Some guidelines for developing a creative approach to conflict' in Coleman, P, Deutsch, M and Marcus, E, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 478-489; and Craig Zelizer's fascinating 2003 article 'The role of artistic processes in peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina', (*Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. 10, pp. 62-75) on the role of artistic processes in peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina which maps the possible range and scope of such interventions.

are first, that of the psychology of religion to provide some brief background and context, and then that of psychodynamic psychology to explore possible explanations of religious hatred beyond those currently provided by scholars of the other two.

The psychology of religion

It can be argued that the literature of conflict resolution is in many ways a psychological literature in that both conflict analysis and the study of methods for intervention rely to a great extent on an understanding of the psychology of conflict. Most scholar-practitioners in the conflict field have at least a lay appreciation of behavioural psychology – having some understanding of conflict behaviour is essential for praxis – but this counts for little when faced with the complexities of religion. Moreover, the first thing lay practitioners realise on approaching the psychology of religion, with perhaps the names of Freud and Jung at the head of their list, is that the contributions of the founders of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology are often not counted in the mainstream of psychology of religion scholarship (Stausberg 2013). While such omissions reflect divisions among scholars not only as to what is to be included in the canon of the psychology of religion, but also where the lines between the psychology, anthropology and sociology of religion, to name but a few of the possible sub-sets, should be drawn, some recent texts provide a foundational but not comprehensive grip on the subject. Among these are Hood, Hill and Spilka's *The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach* (2018); Paloutzian and Park's *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality* (2005 and 2013); Argyle's *Psychology and Religion: An Introduction* (2000); and Loewenthal's *The Psychology of Religion: An Introduction* (2000). These texts provide an introduction to the many subjects within the field, and also to the importance of recognising where the authors' interests lie, ranging from Argyle's broadly sympathetic

view of religion, through Paloutzian's emphasis on methodology and research to Loewenthal's determination to look beyond Christianity to Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism and new religious movements.

It becomes apparent that the study of the psychology of religion assumes some familiarity with both religion and psychology. For example, Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi's, *The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience* (1997) illuminates the relationships between what people believe and how they behave. Similarly, Seul's 1999 essay 'Ours Is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict' (*Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 553-569) provides useful insights into the relationship between group identity and religious conflict, and Teehan's *In the Name of God: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Ethics and Violence* (2010) puts sacred values into the context provided by evolutionary and cognitive psychology. John Teehan, Associate Professor of Religion at Hofstra University in New York, provides a concise starting point in saying that evolution has designed the human mind in such a way that it possesses a set of mental tools that shape religions and moralities. Moreover, and more specifically, he argues that religious traditions are cultural expressions of underlying cognitive and emotional pre-dispositions that are themselves the products of evolutionary processes (Teehan 2010, p. 4). One of the contentions that flows from this is particularly germane to the problem of religious hatred, namely that the same processes that generate the pro-social, constructive morality found in religion are also those that generate prejudice and violence. Following this argument, it is not then a question of whether religion, or any particular religion, is peace loving or violent; Teehan argues that they are all both, inherently.

The main thrust of the evolutionary psychology of religion is that religion developed

because it conveyed some sort of evolutionary advantage, probably by encouraging cooperation among individuals and communities, despite the costs associated with religious practices such as ritual, sacrifice and celibacy. The cognitive evolutionary approach also raises as many questions as it answers when it comes to the idea of religious consciousness, from Stephen Jay Gould's idea that religion is an exaptation or spandrel⁵¹ to Pascal Boyer's in *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought* (2001) that religion is essentially a mental capacity that has supported a number of human tendencies that are evolutionarily advantageous. Boyer's work, though important in its own right, arguably ignores most of the work done in the behavioural study of religion and to this extent is of limited value when it comes to a phenomenon such as religious hatred other than to see it as a mechanism for strengthening the resolve or the solidarity of one individual or one community against another.⁵² It does little to explain why modern and relatively sophisticated individuals can succumb to such a crude emotion, and inevitably, when its scope is exhausted, the temptation for the scholar is to revisit behavioural explanations.⁵³ Nevertheless, the work of scholars in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, anthropology and, to some extent, neurotheology has resulted in the development of a new cognitive science of religion which has, over the last twenty years or so complemented – some might say overtaken – the psychology of religion as it developed

⁵¹ Gould, SJ 1991, 'Exaptation: a crucial tool for an evolutionary psychology', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 4, pp. 43–65.

⁵² For a contemporary review of the cognitive science of religion see Martin, L and Wiebe, D (eds.) 2019, *Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-five Years*, Bloomsbury Academic, London.

⁵³ With regard to this Steven Reiss published, shortly before his death in 2016, *The 16 Strivings for God* (Mercer University Press, Macon) which claims to be the first comprehensive theory in the psychology of religion that has been peer-reviewed and scientifically verified. In it Reiss sets out the theory that people's religious beliefs and experiences are motivated by the need to satisfy certain particular personal needs that are deeply rooted in human nature. While some of these are predictable, such as acceptance (the desire for positive self-regard), power (the desire for influence or leadership) and tranquillity (the desire for safety), others are perhaps less obvious: such as order (the desire for structure), curiosity (the desire for understanding) and saving (the desire to collect) (Reiss 2016, pp. 17-8). While such a theory sounds prosaic compared with those of others in the field it may have the advantage of being more securely evidence-based, though it is still too soon to know the ultimate reception of Reiss's theories among scholars or whether his notions of religious motivation can also explain some aspects of religious hatred.

for most of the 20th century. The work of cognitive anthropologists such as Scott Atran's *In Gods We Trust* (2002) and Ara Norenzayan's *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict* (2015) argue that religion is either a cultural by-product of various evolutionary adaptations or a cognitive by-product of parts of the human mind that evolved for other purposes.

As a contemporary approach that prides itself on evidence-based analysis, the cognitive evolutionary approach may appeal to both scholars and practitioners in the conflict field who would otherwise have little interest in religion either because they underrate its significance despite the fact that 84% of the world's population is religiously affiliated,⁵⁴ or because they have little interest in theoretical accounts of religion if they are not evidence-based. Secondly, it provides a counterpoint to other approaches, highlighting how the same subject matter can be understood and interpreted from different directions. Thirdly, the cognitive evolutionary approach may develop in such a way that it commands intellectual respect further into the future, so appealing to future generations of scholars and practitioners. The question for this dissertation has been whether the current state of cognitive evolutionary research can provide reliable insights into religious hatred. The conclusion here, on balance, is that while it provides many insights into, especially, religious experience,⁵⁵ it does not at present contribute as much specifically to the subject of religious hatred as the psychodynamic approach.

While this more recent approach to the psychology of religion has provided some

⁵⁴ *The Changing Global Religious Landscape*, Pew Research Center 2017.

⁵⁵ As McNamara says, "Religious experiences are among the most powerful experiences that human beings can have. They can produce both awe-inspiring saintliness and horror inspiring maliciousness. They can elicit the most profound pouring out of the Self for others in some people and the most abject self-absorption in others. There are often life changing and are certainly life-sustaining for those who profess them" (2009, p. xiii).

immediate background and context for this dissertation, the pioneering literature in this field, such as Edwin Starbuck's *The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the Growth of Religious Consciousness*, (1899),⁵⁶ William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and James Leuba's *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion* (1909) have also provided some underpinning. James's approach, which can be regarded as primarily phenomenological, resonates with the spirit of this dissertation when, for example, it defines religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine" (James 1902, pp. 31–2), and in his insistence that the term 'divine' be interpreted very broadly and that it is futile to make the definitions of religion and divinity too precise. He was similarly critical of the clerical tendency to want to over-rationalize transcendent experience and to reduce the sense of presence, familiar from mystical literature, to abstractions. This contains an important reminder for scholars and practitioners: that rational argument provides little competition for religious experience and perception.⁵⁷ Beyond this, James's division of religion into that of the 'healthy-mind' and the 'sick soul' has possible relevance to the origins of religious hatred; this is considered in more depth in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

Overall, psychology of religion literature provides a useful context from which to consider religious hatred, and combined with the insights of religious studies scholars such

⁵⁶ Starbuck's book was the first to use the term "the psychology of religion" (Main 2008).

⁵⁷ Although William James is generally recognised as one of the most significant figures in the establishment of the psychology of religion Dittes (1973) comments that he "is revered in the first chapter of a textbook and then ignored in the substance of the book", adding that his "psychology is not employed by the field, and, far more importantly, his spirit does not inspire it". While it can be argued that James's research methods would not pass modern scrutiny, perhaps his chief importance lies in his willingness to describe personal religious experience without succumbing to the temptation to explore whether or not what people believe is true, his interest being in what and how they experience faith, the nature of its effect on their lives, and the wider consequences for them and those around them. His impact is also discernible, albeit perhaps less explicitly acknowledged, on the evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists who have brought new understandings of religion over the past twenty years.

as Ninian Smart (1969) and sociologists such as Linda Woodhead (2010), has helped to identify the structures and dimensions of religion which provide, in Part 3 of this dissertation, the framework within which to build theories of how and why religious hatred finds expression.⁵⁸

Psychodynamic psychology⁵⁹

This section begins with a brief definition of psychodynamic psychology and an explanation of why it has been chosen to explore this branch of psychology as a means of better understanding religious hatred. It would be perfectly reasonable to take a largely social psychological approach to hatred. Evan Harrington (2004), for example, provides a useful overview of how the subject of hatred has been studied by social psychology researchers investigating issues such as prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and aggressive behaviour.⁶⁰ Harrington concludes by saying that while hatred *per se* has not

⁵⁸ This summary of the psychology of religion excludes neurotheology: the attempt to explain religious experience and behaviour in neuroscientific terms. Advocates of neurotheological approaches to religion such as McNamara, P 2009, *The Neuroscience of Religious Experience*, (Cambridge University Press); Kisak, P (ed.) 2016, *Neurotheology*, (CreateSpace); Newburg, A 2010, *Principles of Neurotheology*, (Routledge, London); and Persinger, M 1987, *Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs*, (Praeger, New York), argue that there is a neurological as well as evolutionary basis for religious experience. The explanation and interrogation of neuroscientific approaches merits an entire dissertation in itself, though their current stances are still somewhat tentative and the evidence in support of them is arguably less than conclusive (see for example critiques such as Schjoedt, U 2011, 'The neural correlates of religious experience' in *Religion*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 91-5).

⁵⁹ 'Psychodynamic psychology' is used in this dissertation as shorthand to include descriptors such as 'depth psychological', 'humanistic', 'transpersonal', 'existential' and 'phenomenological' as well as 'psychoanalysis' and 'analytical psychology': i.e. an approach to psychology that explores the psychological forces, especially the unconscious ones, that are perceived to underlie human feelings and emotions and consequently behaviour.

⁶⁰ Harrington, E 2004, 'The Social Psychology of Hatred', *Journal of Hate Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 49-82. Harrington identifies at least three major independent approaches: the social-political attitudes perspective based on the seminal work of Adorno et al., (*The Authoritarian Personality* 1950) and more recently of Altemeyer (*Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-wing Authoritarianism* 1988 and *The Authoritarian Specter* 1998); the social influence perspective which looks at how the presence of others can change the behaviour of individuals and groups as exemplified in theories such as diffusion of responsibility (Latane, *The Unresponsive Bystander* 1970), obedience to authority (Milgram et al., 'Collective Behavior: Crowds and Social Movements' in *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (1968), the power of social roles (e.g. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the 'Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People are Transformed into Perpetrators' in *The Social Psychology of Good and Evil* 2004 edition; and the power of example (Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* 1989). The third

been a focus of research in social psychology, aspects of hate have been studied extensively by researchers in different branches of social psychology. It is also fair to say that such researchers, while largely secular in their focus, have paid some attention to religious hatred.⁶¹ It would also be reasonable to focus on and document religious hatred purely as a cognitive process, examining how, for example, anti-semitism has been used throughout history, or how more recently religious identity was deliberately used to whip up nationalist feeling in former Yugoslavia; there is no lack of evidence in connection with either.

The focus of this dissertation on religious hatred, however, concerns not how groups or even whole communities and nations can be lead, coerced or manipulated into religious hatred, but how and why individuals, and by extension communities, who profess a religious faith, can apparently abandon its tenets and accompanying values in their need, desire or willingness to indulge in an emotional intensity of hatred for others who espouse no faith, a different faith or even the same faith in a different way. This requires the more profound understanding of individuals that psychodynamic psychology provides. It can reach beyond the rational and the conscious, looking for reasons for hatred outside of current awareness. It can pursue phenomenological approaches to religious experience which examine the particulars of individuals' thinking and feeling. Psychodynamic psychology also has an appreciation of ultimacy that it shares with many forms of religion (Emmons 1999 and 2005; Schlauch 2006; Hoffman et al, 2015 and 2019), and it is perhaps

approach is the social cognition approach which has explored bias and preference within groups (e.g. Bettencourt et al, 2001, 'Status Differences and In-Group Bias' in *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 127, no. 4, pp. 520-542).

⁶¹ Obedience to authority, for example, has been studied as an aspect of hate in a number of religious groups, among them the Mormons (Sasse and Widder 1991), Hare Krishna (Hubner and Gruson 1988), Branch Davidians (Robbins and Post 1997) and Aum Shinrikyo (Juergensmeyer 2000). There is also evidence that obedience to authority plays a role in some Islamic religious factions where followers are willing to sacrifice themselves (Juergensmeyer 2000).

this which gives it a particular resonance for those perceiving some correspondence between ultimacy and religious hatred.⁶² There is one final and perhaps particularly significant reason for seeking to understand religious hatred through lenses that focus on interiority. Scholar-practitioners in the conflict field recognise that the strong feelings that accompany conflict often stem from unresolved *internal* conflict, and this applies whether a protagonist is an individual, a community, an organisation or sometimes even a nation: internal tensions spill over and find expression in external aggression. Intra-personal, intra-communal or intra-national tensions often need to be addressed, reduced or if possible resolved before progress can be made with the aggression and conflict that can be the consequences (Bowker 2008, p. 52). Where religious hatred grows out of such internal tensions it is essential that its origins, conscious and unconscious, are thoroughly understood. It is the contention of this dissertation that psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred provide a much-needed complement to social-psychological approaches.

Jarvis (2004, p. 2-3) identifies five characteristics of psychodynamic approaches to psychological phenomena: “the continuity between childhood and adult experience”; “the significance of early relationships”; “the primacy of *affect*” (original emphasis) in contrast to behavioural psychology’s focus on observable behaviour and cognitive psychology’s on thinking and reasoning; “the psychological significance of subjective experience”, including fantasy and sense of identity; and “the influence of the unconscious mind”. It is the latter three which are particularly relevant to a psychodynamic approach to religious hatred. While the insights provided into all these by psychodynamic psychology are likely

⁶² ‘Ultimacy’ in this dissertation implies the approach of Tillich (1957). For recent discussions of ultimacy in the philosophy of religion see for example Neville, R 2018, ‘Philosophy of religion and the big questions’, *Palgrave Communications*, vol. 4, no. 126 and Draper, P and Schellenberg, J (eds.) 2017, *Renewing Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

to be of value, the question has always arisen, not least among scholar-practitioners, about the reliability of such insights and the need for empirical evidence in support of them. This question is becoming less pertinent, however, with the gradual accumulation of empirical evidence that provides a testing of psychodynamic theory, exemplified by books such as Morris Eagle's *Core Concepts in Classical Psychoanalysis* and its companion volume *Core Concepts in Contemporary Psychoanalysis* (both 2018) and similarly rigorous publications such as Roth and Fonagy's *What Works for Whom?* (2005), and Fonagy et al's 'Theoretical and empirical foundations of contemporary psychodynamic approaches' in Luyten et al's *Handbook of psychodynamic approaches to psychopathology* (2015, pp. 3–26). This latter essay sets out to demonstrate “not only that psychoanalytic concepts can be tested empirically, but also that solid evidence supports many psychoanalytic assumptions” (ibid., p. 4), and cites the many studies that support this contention. This reflects the awareness within psychoanalytic circles of the need for such evidence, and also of two parallel and complementary cultures: one that is qualitative and interpretive, emphasising meaning and purpose in human behaviour based on traditional case study methods, and the other using methods from the natural and social sciences that seek explanations for cause and effect based on probabilistic data analysis models (ibid., p. 5). The evidence discussed in this essay provides support for a number of ideas used in this dissertation to explore religious hatred, such as the importance of unconscious motivation, defence mechanisms, the ubiquity of transference,⁶³ the complexity of psychological functioning and the need to focus on people's inner worlds.

While the original thinking of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Carl Jung (1875-1961) has been developed and in some aspects superseded by that of their followers, it is

⁶³ 'Transference' describes the process whereby “social interactions in any context.... are filtered through internalised schemas of past relationships” (Fonagy et al, 2015, p. 11).

still arguably Jung and Freud who provide the chief groundwork for attitudes to psychodynamic psychology and religion.⁶⁴ Freud provided psychodynamic perspectives on religion in five of his works ('Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907), *Totem and Taboo* (1913), *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), and *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), all of them relying on anthropological texts and an approach that "is decidedly interpretive rather than empirical" (Main 2008). Building on the work of James and Leuba, Freud applied his psychoanalytic methodology to the psychology of religion in a way that sealed the seriousness both of the subject and of a scientific method of studying it, meaning that he was bound to be listened to even when his conclusions were, for many, deeply shocking. Central to Freud's thesis is that civilization is built upon the rejection of instinctual behaviour, causing all manner of neuroses, and that religion is both a means to impose the behavioural norms that society demands and a means of compensating the human animal for the instinctual desire sacrificed in the process. While Freud acknowledged the importance of religion in human development as a way of overcoming aggression and helping human beings to come to terms with the internal pressures of our instinctive lives, he argued that this has been at the costs of guilt and neurosis and of living with an illusion that keeps us in a state of dependence. Despite the fact that Freud's psychology of religion has been widely criticised it remains influential in general culture, albeit not always in its specifics, and it does provide some insights into how, for example, unconscious psychological processes such as projection and sublimation may act. While Freud was personally atheistic, he was not, contrary to what many believe, entirely hostile to the idea of religion: he recognised its cultural importance and in his clinical writings he actively promoted a position of

⁶⁴ Though it was the French psychologist Pierre Janet (1859-1947) who 'discovered' the unconscious and who made particular studies of religion and religious phenomena, and the Swiss philosopher and psychologist Théodore Flournoy (1854-1920) who influenced both William James and Jung with his insistence that religion should be studied objectively and religious experience empathetically.

‘benevolent neutrality’ towards religious issues (Corveleyn 2000).⁶⁵ His followers were divided on the subject. Zilboorg, Erikson, Fromm and Loewald, for example, explicitly rejected Freud’s view that religion is “illusionary, delusionary, infantile and neurotic”⁶⁶ (Black 2006, p. 25), though this remained the dominant view until about the mid-1980s when the work of scholars such as Rizzuto’s *The Birth of the Living God* (1979), Eigen’s *The Psychoanalytic Mystic* (1998), Kakar’s *The Analyst and the Mystic* (1991), Spezzano and Gargiulko’s *Soul on the Couch* (1997), and Jones’s *Terror and Transformation* (2002) showed a new interest in the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion and more nuanced appreciations of Freud’s views on religion.

It is fair to say that Carl Jung’s relationship to religion was very much more positive, especially in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1933) and *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (1938), and he regarded the establishment of a ‘religious’ outlook on life as being fundamental to the achievement of what he called ‘individuation’: a person’s successful integration of the disparate conscious and unconscious elements of their life into a

⁶⁵ Numerous scholars have attempted to explain Freud’s antipathy to religion, with many blaming this on early failures of relationship with his parents, particularly his mother (for example Jones, 1955; Gedo, 1968; Harrison, 1979; Rizzuto, 1998). Ryan LaMothe (2004) argues that the presence of envy, caused by these failures depriving Freud of a capacity for ‘oceanic’ feelings, has been overlooked in Freud’s views on religion.

⁶⁶ Freud says of the psychic origin of religious ideas: “These...are not precipitates of experience or end-results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection -- for protection through love -- which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus, the benevolent rule of a divine providence allays our fears of the dangers of life.... And the prolongation of earthly existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework in which these wish-fulfilments shall take place” (Freud 1961, p. 30). Freud is careful to explain at this point the subtle difference between “illusion” and “delusion”, and this is something that scholar practitioners in conflict need to pay attention to. Whereas a delusion is based on fantasy and the flight from reality, illusion is the manifestation of desires so powerful that it overcomes individuals’ and societies’ need to create a transcendent reality: something that can so outrun the limitations of human conception that it is not subject to the ordinary demands of credibility. It is arguably the power and positive importance of illusion that has inspired generations of thinkers to create semantic constructions in defence of ideas that no amount of wordplay can render convincing to someone who does not share the need or desire for the illusion.

meaningful whole.⁶⁷ In fact, he went so far as to say that he had never encountered a patient in the second half of life whose problems were not, at base, their failure to achieve such a reconciliation (Jung 1933, p. 234).⁶⁸ Furthermore, his concept of the ‘collective unconscious’⁶⁹ as a means by which archetypal stories and their associations are transmitted across generations to nurture patterns of belief and behaviour that are then played out in real life can be seen as the forerunner of Kimbles’ and Singer’s idea of the cultural complex in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society* (2004) which, this dissertation argues, provides one of the most potent explanations of religious hatred. Jung’s concepts of the *complex*,⁷⁰ the *shadow*⁷¹ and the *transcendent function*⁷² are also particularly relevant in relation to religious hatred. All are

⁶⁷ While the term ‘individuation’ has been used similarly by people as diverse as Empedocles, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, it is commonly attributed to Jung and defined as the process of differentiation from the general collective psychology and the norms and the values of the society in which the individual is immersed (Jung, C.G. *Psychological Types*, CW6, para. 757). Jung saw the human psyche as divided by unconscious polarities such as light and dark, good and evil, and life and death, with a tendency to identify more with one pole than another, and to project the suppressed pole onto others. The antidote to this is the individuation process which makes us aware of such polarities and enables us to build a new archetype, the *self*, where these unconscious forces are balanced and reconciled to create a new wholeness.

⁶⁸ It was this which crystallised the differences between Freud and Jung. For the former religion was a symptom of psychological disease; for the latter, it was the absence of religion that underlay all adult psychological illnesses, including addictions, and his life’s work was the search for a psychology that would explain and treat the diseases of the human soul in a time when traditional religions could no longer play this role (White 1952, p. 47).

⁶⁹ Jung used comparative mythological and etymological material to analyse the psychological dynamics behind religious phenomena, arguing that the images contained in mythology and theology provided a psychic system which was inherited in the same way as physical characteristics.

⁷⁰ A *complex* is a collection of unconscious images and ideas accompanied by particular feelings which, when activated, affect behaviour. The idea of the complex became an increasingly important part of Jung’s psychology when he suggested that at the core of complexes are what he termed ‘archetypes’, inherited and universal patterns of experience that comprise what he called the ‘collective unconscious’ to distinguish it from the personal unconscious of Freudian thinking.

⁷¹ The *shadow* is the inferior being in every person, the Mr Hyde to every Dr Jekyll, the qualities and impulses that a person denies but can see clearly in other people. The shadow is the most powerful and dangerous of archetypes (primordial psychic patterns) not only in that it can enable activities that consciousness, and conscience, would not condone, but in that efforts to suppress it can also suppress creativity, spontaneity and the strong emotions that underlie character and personality, leaving people appearing and feeling shallow and spiritless (Jung 1964, pp. 168-170). Efforts to repress the shadow also encourage and strengthen it: Jung hypothesized that one of the reasons for the atrocities committed in the name of religion is that religion has a tendency to suppress the shadow, causing its dark propensities to intensify and strike back (ibid.).

⁷² The *transcendent function* is what enables the process of finding meaning, balance and wholeness beyond the divisions and limitations of everyday life, uniting the opposites of conscious and unconscious in ways that effect a psychological shift in attitude. It is called ‘transcendent’ because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible and brings the conscious and unconscious into a new relationship (Jung 1916, p. 279). This shift in attitude may result in changes in the personality, a new approach to life, a

discussed at length elsewhere in this dissertation, drawing on material from, for example, Dieckman's *Complexes: Diagnosis and Therapy in Analytical Psychology* (1991); *Meeting the Shadow* (1991), a collection of essays by, among others, Jung himself, Robert Bly, Joseph Campbell, James Hillman and Marie-Louise von Franz; and Jeffrey Miller's *The Transcendent Function*, (2004).

There are three reasons for putting Jung's work at the heart of psychodynamic discussion in this dissertation: his profound knowledge and understanding of religion as central to human experience; his willingness to explore the problem of evil as a human, eschatological and soteriological problem; and his identification of enantiodromia and "epiphany" (in the psychological sense) as crucial processes in the transcending of human hatreds.⁷³ The inclusion of Jung in any scholarly work, however, has in recent years been called into question and needs to be defended. There are five main grounds on which the academy has neglected and even shunned Jung. First, his reputation has been tainted by the nature of his relationships with some of his female patients; this is undoubtedly justified. Secondly, he has been accused of anti-Semitism and, thirdly, support for the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930s. The second is arguable (Samuels 1990); the third unjust and in fact the reverse of the truth (Samuels 1992; Bair 2004, pp. 213-23). The fourth accusation against Jung is that he was more mystic than scientist. Many of his followers would argue that this is because Jung understood religion from the inside rather than being an objective outsider.⁷⁴ Jung himself deplored what he saw as a caricature of

religious epiphany or even a new identity; this makes the transcendent function vital to resolving the deeper differences that underpin cultural or religious conflict.

⁷³ It is important to emphasise that "epiphany" as used in this dissertation refers to processes of sudden realisation which may or may not have a religious constituent, but whether positive or negative in character have a profound effect on an individual's thinking, feeling and way of life.

⁷⁴ Jung was the son of a Swiss Reformed pastor and used his Christian background to illuminate the psychological roots of all religions. Jung believed religion was a profound psychological response to the unknown - both the inner self and the outer worlds - and he understood Christianity as a meditation on the

his work and regularly protested, not least at the beginning of the Terry Lectures at Yale University upon which his *Psychology and Religion* (1938) was based, that “Notwithstanding the fact that I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist and adhere to the phenomenological standpoint” (ibid., p. 1). Nevertheless, the nature and opacity of some of Jung’s writings lends itself to the accusation of mysticism rather than science, and this accusation will remain until his work is more generally reassessed, as commentaries by prominent contemporary psychologists such as Andrew Samuels and Jean Knox demonstrate.^{75 76} The fifth objection to Jung being taken seriously in the academy may stem from the publication of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, first published in 1963 as his ‘autobiography’, and widely read and perceived as a definitive statement of his work. In fact Jung never saw nor approved the final manuscript, and the manuscripts he did see were considerably edited after his death (Shamdasani 2003, p. 23). In addition to these five main grounds there is a sixth: Jung’s most pervasive presence outside the therapeutic world, often unacknowledged, has been through the medium of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a psychometric test widely used in the business world and based supposedly on Jung’s *Psychological Types* (1921). Contemporary psychologists are inclined to regard MBTI as problematic at best and pseudo-science at worst (see for

meaning of the life of Jesus of Nazareth within the context of Hebrew spirituality and the Biblical worldview. Jung’s work is discussed further in Chapter 4.

⁷⁵ The accusation that Jung was a mystic deserves closer examination. Smyers (2002) argues that it has three possible meanings as regards Jung. First, if it means “a state of consciousness that surpasses ordinary experience through the union with a transcendent reality” (Dupre 1987, p. 246) then Jung can be regarded as a mystic though he himself defined mystical experience as an “experience of the archetypes” (Jung 1968, p. 110) rather than of some external ontological reality. Secondly, “mystic” is a pejorative term used by rationalists to describe what they are not and to label Jung, because of what he studied and how he did it, as Other to the world of science and rationality. Assigning this label has worked as a kind of taboo to prevent people reading Jung’s work and drawing their own conclusions. The third use of “mystic” to describe Jung is because his subject matter includes worldviews that can account for phenomena that cannot be explained by the mechanistic Newtonian worldview of contemporary Western intellectuals (though may be by recent discoveries in quantum physics). Jung’s investigations of religious phenomena persuaded him that there are powerful psychic forces that operate in humans which have been projected outwards as gods and spiritual beings. This reflects the contrast with Durkheim (1976) for whom God is a projection of the experience of society whereas for Jung God is the projection of an internal psychological experience.

⁷⁶ See for example Knox, J 2003, *Archetype, Attachment, Analysis: Jungian Psychology and the Emergent Mind*, Routledge, London; Samuels, S 2017, ‘The future of Jungian analysis: strengths, weaknesses opportunities, threats’, *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 636-649.

example Hunsley et al 2004); it has done nothing to increase Jung's reputation in the academy.

What might rehabilitate Jung? His exclusion from the academy has presumably meant that fewer scholars have become closely acquainted with the 20 volumes of his *Collected Works* or the same expanse of ancillary writings, nor perhaps with the development of contemporary post-Jungian thought (Abramovitch and Kirmayer 2003). Sonu Shamdasani and James Hillman argue in *Lament of the Dead: Psychology after Jung's Red Book* (2013) that the process of reassessment has already begun with the long-awaited publication, in 2012, of Jung's *Red Book*.⁷⁷ It has been asserted (Shamdasani 2003, p. 25) that this "foundational text" for analytical psychology will reduce some of the hostility to Jung and his thinking once it has been more widely read, understood and appreciated, though this probably overestimates the impact of what is by any measure an arcane and obscure text. It is more likely that Jung's work will be reassessed because of his influence in three arenas: his influence on contemporary religion particularly for people looking for a framework for understanding and the spiritual dimension of human experience (e.g. Palmer 2003; Tacey 2013); on cultural commentary more generally when secular humanism and rationalism fall short (e.g. Hauke 2000; Abramovitch and Kirmayer 2003); and, perhaps, on social and political activism where conventional politics is perceived as limited in its response to current social and political challenges such as climate change and social injustice (Kiehl, Saban and Samuels 2016).⁷⁸ Having said this,

⁷⁷ Jung's *Red Book* or *Liber Novus* is a calligraphic manuscript created by Jung between 1915 and 1930. It details Jung's experiments with his own psyche and since it first became available for study in 2009 is increasingly recognised as being central to the full understanding of his work. *The Black Books of C.G. Jung (1913-1932)*, also edited by Sonu Shamdasani and published in October 2020, sheds further light on Jung's methods and experience.

⁷⁸ It is also possible, although perhaps less likely, that his work on synchronicity with the physicist Wolfgang Pauli will eventually be vindicated as the quantum world gives up more of its secrets. See Jung, CG 1952, *Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle*, *Collected Works* Vol. 8; also Donati, M 2004, 'Beyond

and while valuing the elements of Jung's work used in this dissertation, it is unlikely there will be a wholesale acceptance of his legacy: parts of it, and his explanations of them, may be too inaccessible to many modern minds. There is also the question of whether Jung's analytical work stands up to scientific and empirical examination.⁷⁹ Jung himself was quite clear that it did, based as it was on his extensive clinical work, and analytical psychologists are prepared to argue that Jung's ideas, on dreaming for example, have stood the test of time far better than Freud's (Stevens 1993, p. 24). But it is also true that the foundations of analytical psychology were based on intuition, self-analysis and a limited patient demographic, allied with far-reaching explorations of esoteric, mythological, alchemical and metaphysical literatures.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, in the strict etymological sense an empiricist is "someone who relies on direct seeing and inner experience while rejecting all dogmatic theories" (Marciano 2019, pp. 235-256), and perhaps this is the sense in which Jung understood the empirical. More recently Peter Kingsley's *Catafalque* (2018) insists that Jung really should be treated as a Gnostic prophet, his understanding and interpretation of Jung differing markedly from that of most Jung scholars.⁸¹ While these differences do not affect the central but limited use of Jung's work in this dissertation, they reinforce the need for a review of his legacy both within the academy and beyond.

The reassessment of Jung's work, and recognition of his importance for the

synchronicity: the worldview of Carl Gustav Jung and Wolfgang Pauli', *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 49, pp. 707-728.

⁷⁹ As Karen Smyers argues (2002) "Whether or not Jung is seen as "scientific" depends on one's definition of science, but it is a fact that he constantly modified his models and terminology as his ideas changed based on evidence from his clinical practice and continuing study and travel, showing an empirical openness to evidence". Fordham (1960) and Fuller (1992) discuss Jung's claim to empiricism.

⁸⁰ Jung had more to say about metaphysics than might be expected from most empirical investigators, and readily acknowledged the function of philosophy in calling attention to his assumptions, saying that one of Freud's mistakes was to overlook the value of philosophical criticism. In fact Jung took a dim view of all philosophical and theological criticisms of his work on the grounds that only criticism from a scientific viewpoint was valid (Smith 1977).

⁸¹ For a review of *Catafalque* which highlights these differences (and opens up whole new vistas of Jung's work) see Marciano, M 2019, 'Revisiting Jung and Corbin: A Review of Peter Kingsley's *Catafalque*', *Dionysius*, vol. 37, pp. 235-256.

understanding of religion and its darker aspects in this dissertation, has been aided by the work of scholar-practitioners in the field of analytical psychology. An overview of post-Jungian psychology is provided by Andrew Samuels' *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (1985) and his views, and those of Freud, on religion by Michael Palmer's *Freud and Jung on Religion* (1997). The relationship between Jung and Freud, and their influence on each other, has also been increasingly scrutinised in recent years. Ernst Falzeder (2020), for example, is clear that Jung's theory was not "an offshoot from psychoanalysis" and that, on the contrary, Freud took more of his ideas from Jung than vice-versa. Analytical psychology as a field continues to offer insights into religion and violence, in for example *Terror, Violence and the Impulse to Destroy: Perspectives from Analytical Psychology*, papers from the North American Conference of Jungian Analysts and Candidates edited by John Beebe (2002). Lionel Corbett's *Psyche and the Sacred: Spirituality beyond Religion* (2012) links individual interiority with religion and spirituality. James Hillman, foremost among those who evolved the controversial school of archetypal psychology from Jung's work,⁸² provides what is perhaps one of the profoundest studies of the psychology of war and conflict in his *A Terrible Love of War* (2004).

The quest for psychodynamic insights into religious hatred has not been confined to Jungian literature and has involved re-visiting work by other psychologists who have fallen out of fashion. For example, while Abraham Maslow is best known for his *Hierarchy of Needs* (1943),⁸³ his work on human 'self-actualisation' and 'peak experiences' (Maslow

⁸² Since Jung's death in 1961 three main schools of post-Jungian thought and training have emerged: the *classical*, which mostly follows Jung's own thinking and reasoning; the *developmental* which blends ideas from Kleinian and other psychoanalytic theories of development; and the *archetypal* which follows a more postmodern, literary and semiotic model based on the pervasiveness of archetypal structures and the work of James Hillman (Abramovitch and Kirmayer 2003).

⁸³ Maslow, A 1943, 'A theory of human motivation', *Psychological Review*, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 370-396. Maslow has been criticised both for lack of scientific rigour, elitism and for bias towards Western cultures and values. This view is contested by some on the grounds that the pyramid frequently associated with Maslow's needs theory, and which has provoked particular criticism, was neither suggested nor supported by

1964)⁸⁴ provides some relevant background ideas.⁸⁵ Although his hierarchy of needs is now disregarded⁸⁶ by academic psychologists (Hoffman 1994), it does provide, for scholar-practitioners, an interesting albeit somewhat speculative link to human needs theory as articulated by scholars such as John Burton, one of the founders of the conflict resolution field whose work has also been subject to contemporary critique.⁸⁷ The mention of Maslow reflects the overall stance of this dissertation in relation to Jung and to other psychologists from earlier days, such as Joseph Campbell and William James, whose work is sometimes viewed within the academy as having been overtaken by that of later scholars. Psychodynamic psychology is always concerned with individual interiority, and it is arguably premature to reject ideas judged significant a hundred years ago because more recent ones have emerged, and rash to focus on refinements of theory rather than on original insights.

Key texts on religious hatred

The paucity of contemporary scholarly writing specifically on religious hatred by

Maslow himself, and that later developments of his theory are increasingly progressive and nuanced (e.g. Sosteric & Ratkovic 2020).

⁸⁴ Maslow, AH 1964, *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences*, Viking Penguin, New York.

⁸⁵ It is Maslow's work on what he called 'peak experiences' that may be significant for an understanding of some forms of religious hatred, though this needs further study. For example, if it can be shown that such experiences are fundamentally important, albeit unconsciously, to a psychologically satisfying religious life, the failure to have such experiences may drive some people to stronger and more divisive forms of religion to try to generate such feelings. Maslow's work on peak experiences may also be relevant to the work being done by scholar practitioners to explore the arts as media of intervention in conflict in the belief that they can influence human emotions in ways that more conventional forms of intervention may not.

⁸⁶ Yet it continues to resonate: see for example Rajasakran, T, Sinnappan, S & Sundara Raja, S 2014 'Purushartha: Maslow's Need Hierarchy Revisited', *The Anthropologist*, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 199-203, which links Western concepts of motivation and the Hindu principles of *purushartha* (a Sanskrit word that can be translated as the 'object of human pursuit' or 'goals of man'; the four purusharthas are *dharma* (moral duty), *artha* (economic prosperity), *kama* (love or pleasure) and *moksha* (spiritual liberation). Discussing how Maslow's hierarchy of needs and purusharta function as adaptive systems and exploring how spiritual connections and relatedness may improve understandings of motivation.

⁸⁷ See Burton, J (ed.) 1993, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, Macmillan, London and criticism in Park, L 2010, 'Opening the Black Box: Reconciling Needs Theory through Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-26.

psychologists (Sternberg and Sternberg 2008, p. vii)⁸⁸ has meant that research for this dissertation has involved exploration of many parallel subjects, case studies and sometimes texts which apparently have little immediate relevance in the quest for insights which can be developed and used as the grounds for further study. There are a number of texts that have provided such insights that can fit under all or none of the literatures detailed above. This final section enumerates some that have proved particularly useful.

The definition of hatred in general has generated a literature of its own over the centuries, and Robert Sternberg's *The Psychology of Hate* (2005) provides a useful account of this history. Putting this history into political and social context has been important: *Nations under God: The Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century* (2015), a collection of essays by some thirty scholars from across the globe features insights and empirical research on the role that religions play in contemporary world affairs including case studies of some of this century's most distressing convulsions. As a counterpoint to this Steven Pinker's *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (2012) provides a more optimistic view of current violence in the world based on a thousand pages of empirical evidence. Meanwhile John Bowker's edited collection *Conflict and Reconciliation* (2008) provides insights into religious hatred from scholars of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and Christianity.

On religious hatred itself, the scholar-practitioners of the psychotherapeutic world bring insights that combine the theoretical and practical. For example the cognitive therapist Aaron Beck's *Prisoners of Hate* (1999) provides valuable insights into the

⁸⁸ The Sternbergs say "psychology has offered up very few theories that deal explicitly with the subject of hate, which might result, in part, from the fact that there is no commonly accepted definition of hate" (Sternberg, R and Sternberg, K 2008, *The Nature of Hate*, Cambridge University Press, New York).

relationships between thinking processes and emotional and behavioural expressions of hatred, including domestic abuse, bigotry and genocide as well as many forms of political and religious conflict, including into the “collective narcissism” (p. 243) that can accompany many forms of religious observance and proselytising. Similarly, Coline Covington’s *Everyday Evils: A psychoanalytic view of evil and morality* (2017) looks at the evils committed by ‘ordinary’ people in a range of different contexts, using concepts such as group behaviour, dissociation and trauma to argue that hatred and evil have a range of causes and are highly contextual.⁸⁹ *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred* (1997) by Robert Robins and Jerrold Post provides further insight into such contexts. Psychiatrist William Gaylin covers similar territory in *Hatred: The Psychological Descent into Violence* (2004) though with a greater focus on religious hatred while Rush Dozier’s *Why We Hate* (2002) provides scientific accounts of how hatred arises in the human nervous system. These texts all serve as companions to Erich Fromm’s *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1977), Joseph Berke’s *The Tyranny of Malice* (1989) and Ervin Staub’s *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989) which all probe, illuminate and illustrate the darker sides of human character and culture.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ It is difficult, when exploring the subject of hatred, to avoid discussing concepts of evil which may give rise to it. In doing so it pays to be mindful of, if not agree with, the late Susan Sontag’s point that “We have a sense of evil” but we no longer have “the religious or philosophical language to talk intelligently about evil” (quoted in Waller, J 2002, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 12)

⁹⁰ As counterpoints to such texts, whether or not they address directly the subject of religious hatred, there are more positive psychodynamic explorations of human spirituality, for example Lionel Corbett’s *The Religious Function of the Psyche* (1996) and *Psyche and the Sacred* (2012); Murray Stein’s *Jung’s Map of the Soul* (1998) and Larry Culliford’s *The Psychology of Spirituality* (2011) all provide insights into what a healthy spirituality might mean in terms of humankind’s everyday interior functioning.

PART 2: UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS HATRED

Chapter 3: Cognitive approaches to religious hatred

Introduction

Part 2 of this dissertation examines two approaches to religious hatred. This first chapter looks at cognitive approaches to religious hatred: approaches that depend on an analysis of what is immediately apparent, using the scholarship of anthropologists, social scientists and cognitive and evolutionary psychologists to explore what has been written about hatred in general and to tease out how this may apply to religious hatred in particular. The following chapter looks at how psychodynamic psychology has understood religious hatred and how it may live in the unseen, unconscious areas of the human and cultural psyche.⁹¹

When Byron wrote in Canto XIII of *Don Juan* that “.... hatred is by far the longest pleasure/ Men love in haste but they detest at leisure” he highlighted two aspects of hatred. First, that hatred is a complex emotion and sometimes more than just an extreme manifestation or consequence of rage or anger, as it is sometimes portrayed. Secondly, that hatred is not generally something that can arise and subside quickly, again like anger: it is more often something planted in fertile psychic soil, nurtured and cultivated over time, and ripening when circumstances dictate or allow. If this is true of hatred generally, then it is perhaps true even more of hatred fermented in the timelessness of much religion. The

⁹¹ Choosing to focus on cognitive and psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred alone may be perceived as overly restrictive by those who believe that religious hatred amounts to a form of mental disorder. For this approach see for example Bolton & Gillet’s *The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease: New Philosophical and Scientific Developments* (2019, pp. 1-145) which weaves together biology, psychology and sociology.

purpose of this chapter is to explore the overt nature of religious hatred before, in the following chapter, looking at its underlying psychodynamic characteristics. Before doing this, however, it might be useful to provide a simple summary first, of the differences between anger and hatred, and secondly what this dissertation means by ‘religious hatred’.

Janne van Doorn (2018) suggests that the key difference between anger and hate is that the goal of anger is to restore or change a situation while the goal of hate is to hurt and eliminate the hated target. “Compared to anger,” he says, “feelings of hate often involve deep and *repeated* violations of one’s (sense of) justice”, adding that this might explain the shift of focus between anger and hatred, the former responding to an unjust *situation*, the latter to an unjust *nature* (referencing Otony, Clore and Collins 1988; original emphasis). A similar differentiation argues that anger is a natural reaction to almost any actual or perceived attack, hurt or threat and is therefore normal and appropriate and not psychologically harmful. Hatred, meanwhile, depends upon the cultivation of anger which in turn creates supporting cognitive structures which continue to produce anger and negative affect, causing psychological pathology. This *secondary anger* is really a response to the underlying hateful cognitive structures compared to *primary anger* which is created by actual threats (Vitz and Mango 1997). This differentiation between primary and secondary anger adds depth to a more everyday differentiation which might, for example, contrast anger’s short-lived and relatively spontaneous character, a relatively straightforward emotion substituting for more complex feelings of hurt or pain, fear or frustration, with hatred’s longer-term, deeper-rooted and sometimes more carefully nurtured and self-reinforcing character. Further depth again is added by Rina Lazar (2003) citing Akhtar (1995), reflecting on the range of feeling that can be involved in hatred of any kind. Akhtar (1995) makes a distinction between rage and hatred, marking the latter as being defensive. Rage, he maintains, is a reaction to frustration and acute whereas hatred is

chronic and, with its more complex psychic nature, may be with an internalised object. In addition hatred binds a person to the objective of hatred while rage tends to be freeing and, focused as it is in the moment, demands immediate expression. In comparison hatred is slow burning, becoming a constant background process enmeshed in the past and the future, and providing food for the identity and protection against “fear, guilt, dependent longing, repressed mourning, abandonment anxiety and the fear of psychotic disintegration, as well as from the need to be loved, passivity, helplessness and feelings of affection..... Hatred is very often preferred to emptiness or corroding anxiety. It provides the individual with an experience of continuity and a clear sense of identity” (Lazar 2003).

At the core of all forms of hatred is the focus on eliminating the hated person or group (Fischer et al, 2018), and it is arguably this existential element which defines religious hatred rather than the somewhat anodyne legal definitions which merely identify its target.⁹² In other words, in discussing *religious* hatred the focus needs to be on the *nature* of the hatred as well as at whom it is directed: the compulsion, whether realised or not, to want to destroy utterly another person or group because he, she or they are perceived to represent or symbolise something that is in some way blasphemous or sacrilegious. While the focus here is on the more extreme manifestations of hatred, as much as on the circumstances in which it can arise or the unfortunates at whom it is directed, it is important to place these within conceptualisations of hatred that are less extreme.

⁹² For example, Section 29A of the United Kingdom’s Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, adding a new Part 3A to the Public Order Act 1986, defines ‘religious hatred’ as meaning ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’.

Conceptualisations of hatred

The literature of psychology, sociology, anthropology and politics discussed in Chapter 2 suggests a number of ways that hatred generally can be conceptualised. The first is that the capacity for hatred is innate in the human species in the same way as aggression: in the words of the psychiatrist Anthony Storr, “if man were not aggressive, he would not be man at all” (Storr 1992, p. 10). Freud maintained that strong human feelings are natural and while they are normally constrained by the dictates of civilisation, there are forces, such as the death instinct and aggression, that are sufficiently powerful to overwhelm such defences and lead people to the extremities of behaviour especially in the name of self-preservation (Robins and Post 1997). Hate, for Freud, “always remains in an intimate relation with the self-preservative instincts” (Freud 1915, p. 139). Jung also saw aggression as an expression of psychic energy⁹³ and hate largely as a consequence of projection: the human tendency to project onto others the aspects of ourselves that we prefer to disown (Fromm 1973, p. 596).

More recently Staub (2003) has defined hatred as a strong negative feeling, with the hater seeing the object of his or her hatred as bad, immoral, dangerous or a combination of these, with acts of hatred intended to make such objects be damaged or destroyed. Professor Jose Navarro of the University of Cadiz says that hatred is built on a “complex mix of cognitions and emotions. The cognitive components are related to the devaluation of the other, the perception of them as a threat. The emotional part includes a set of feelings like anger, fear, distress and hostility” (Navarro 2013). So much is perhaps


⁹³ Freud and Jung’s early collaboration was terminated in part by their differences over the definition of *libido*. For Freud libido was largely and primarily a sexual energy while Jung used the term much more broadly to include any form or expression of psychic energy.

obvious, but Navarro adds that “another element related to hatred is a certain, sometimes crazy, sense that we are justified in acting against – or even eliminating – the object of our hate”. It is the combination of these two factors, argues Navarro, that lie at the root of hatred: the devaluation of the victim and the ideology of the hater which reduce empathy, because haters move increasingly away from the objects of their hatred. They remove obstacles that could limit hatred towards others by transforming any and all other feelings into hatred: “They not only change our ideas and feelings, but even the social norms that guide our behaviour towards the object of our hatred. The new behaviour ends up being accepted and normal; and institutions may even be created to promote and spread hatred” (ibid.). Navarro is here following the idea that hatred begins with “automatic thoughts” (Beck 1997, p. 94-7): cognitive distortions such as overgeneralisation which expands a particular instance of behaviour, for example, to become characteristic of an entire group; dichotomous thinking that polarises and ultimately demonises everyone into good guys and bad guys; tunnel thinking that discards anything that might contradict such reasoning; and catastrophic thinking which involves losing all perspective and encouraging over-reactions (Beck and Pretzer 2005, p. 70). A similar approach is taken by those who see the idea of ‘integrative complexity’ (IC) as providing indicators of those likely to be drawn into religious fundamentalism and extremism (Savage 2011). According to this approach low IC is characterized by rigid, black-and-white thinking, intolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, a desire for rapid closure, and the inability to recognise the validity of other viewpoints. Conversely, high IC is marked by flexible, broad thinking that recognizes multiple aspects and possible interpretations of an issue and sees connections and dynamic tensions between perspectives (Suedfeld 1985).⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Integrity complexity is defined as “the structure of information processing, independently of its content. It entails two aspects: differentiation and integration, where differentiation refers to the extent of perceiving a variety of dimensions and perspectives when considering an issue, whereas integration is a capacity to create conceptual connections among these different dimensions and perspectives” (Bekes and Suedfeld 2019).

Beyond these cognitive conceptualisations is the ‘duplex theory of hatred’ (Sternberg 2005, p. 69) that goes deeper than the purely cognitive. Hatred, says Sternberg, is psychologically related to love, and like love has its origins in personal stories that characterise our emotions, and is built on passion, commitment and the negation of intimacy. It is this latter, the distancing and detachment that comes with the lack of intimacy, that enables us to repudiate others because of their characteristics (race, religion) or actions (treachery, deceit), or to be influenced by propaganda that emphasises characteristics that enables us to imagine others as sub-human or inhuman. The passion element in hatred can arouse feelings of anger and fear especially in response to a threat, whether perceived or manufactured. The commitment element stems from the devaluation of the human characteristics of an individual or a group to the point where systematic action against them becomes not only possible, but required. Navarro suggests that these three elements – negation of intimacy, passion and commitment - can combine into different types of hatred. The Venn diagram below is based on Navarro’s interpretation of Sternberg’s theory.⁹⁵ The possible combinations, described in the white boxes, suggest certain consequences: negation of intimacy and commitment create the slow-burn, simmering hatred that may in time lead to pre-meditated, deliberate action against others; detachment and passion can cause sudden eruptions against others; passion and commitment combine to encourage systematic denigration such as changes in law that discriminate against certain groups. Where all three elements overlap the total annihilation as seen in the Holocaust or in Rwanda becomes possible (Szanto 2019).

⁹⁵ It is tempting to substitute a word like ‘detachment’ or ‘indifference’ for ‘negation of intimacy’ because it would reframe the concept into something more deliberate, but the use of ‘intimacy’ emphasises its value as a form of inoculation against hatred and the negation of it as something perhaps more systematic in psychic terms.



Developed from Navarro, JI 2013, 'The Psychology of Hatred', *The Open Criminology Journal*, vol. 6, pp. 10-17.

The summary above can make Navarro's model seem overly simplistic, but the details and qualifications he adds tend to suggest that this conceptualisation may be valid for hatred in many different contexts. Fanaticism, for example, "dilutes empathy, awareness of others' suffering, and feelings of guilt towards the object of our hatred" (ibid.). With personal frustration generating poor self-esteem a person "blames others for this accumulation of misfortunes and enters a moral vacuum.....In this context.....it is not uncommon to generate idealized expectations that violence and the "revolutionary" objective will solve existing personal problems". Peer group support means shared bonds, behaviours and ideals that make a person feel responsible and valued while at the same time limiting external influences ("contamination") and enabling actions that obtain the

approval of the group with few adverse consequences. All are compounded if the individual in question is emotionally immature.⁹⁶

A model such as Navarro's also arguably fits with past reflections on hatred. For example, one of Aristotle's first points in *Rhetoric* (ii.4)⁹⁷ is that while anger is always concerned with individuals, hatred is directed also against "classes" (which in this age can be interpreted as "groups"). Paraphrasing more of this passage, Aristotle goes on to say that anger aims at giving pain, whereas hatred is intended to cause harm; the angry people want their victims to feel, haters do not mind whether they feel or not; the angry may eventually feel pity, the hater never; the angry want their offenders to suffer, the haters "would have them cease to exist"; and anger can be cured by time, hatred not. For Aquinas, "hatred can be understood only in relation to love...". Just as everything that exists is characterized by natural love, so it is characterized by what Aquinas calls "natural hatred" (*odium naturale*), adding that everything in the universe is vulnerable to being harmed by its interactions with other things, and at its core hatred is the dissonance that we feel when we apprehend something that is potentially harmful to us (Gereboff et al 2009).⁹⁸ Aquinas also, and of particular relevance for this dissertation, identifies what we might call "religious hatred" when, speaking as a Christian, he encounters anything that threatens "his or her beatitude, the beatitude of others, and the glory of God" (ibid.), and might both be

⁹⁶ This echoes Scott Atran's assessment of the importance of group dynamics as a determinant of personal identity and behaviour: "small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behaviour in ordinary people" he argues in relation to the creation of religious terrorists and the importance of friendships and peer relations in maintaining their commitment right through to suicidal acts (Atran 2010, pp. 36, 310, 479).

⁹⁷ See Gereboff, J, Green, K, Fritz Cates, D and Heim, M 2009, 'The Nature of the Beast: Hatred in Cross-Traditional Religious and Philosophical Perspective', *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 175-2. Aristotle, Aquinas and Buddhaghosa are selected from the many examples this article provides to illustrate three particular philosophical and religious approaches to hatred.

⁹⁸ Gereboff et al note that Aquinas treats hatred formally in two brief articles of the *Summa theologiae* (ST I-II 29; and II-II 34), adding that to get the most out of his account, it needs to be interpreted in the light of his complete theory of emotion, which is set within the broader context of his theological ethic.

able to justify feeling that hatred and taking steps to change it. Gereboff et al use this point to explain, for example, the conduct of those at Westboro Baptist Church who demonstrate against homosexuality using signs such as, “God hates fags” and “AIDS kills fags dead”, arguing that the Westboro congregation are not simply disturbed on a sensory level by their images of gay people, but that their “interior disturbance is a way of registering a genuine threat to society” and thereby justify their calls for repentance.⁹⁹ As Gereboff et al point out, there is likely pleasure in their hatred of what they perceive as evil, and at this point “the most frightening dimension of hatred can appear: self-righteous delight in the suffering that one causes other human beings”.

Overall, Aquinas’s attitude seems to be that hatred is in some respects a natural human reaction to things, material or spiritual, that threaten a person’s or community’s wellbeing, and how it is responded to is of necessity a complex calculation involving interpretations of natural and divine law and the exercising of personal wisdom and discernment. Buddhaghosa, to use an example of thought from outside the Western canon, provides an interesting counterpoint to the relative ambivalence of both Aristotle and Aquinas.¹⁰⁰ Buddhaghosa is quite clear that hatred is pathological and a contagion, becoming “all-consuming and almost unstoppable when released into cycles of revenge” (ibid.); he describes a “hating temperament” that stems from previous lives where the person did vicious and violent things and altogether lacks the ability to be in sympathy

⁹⁹ Westboro Baptist Church has in recent years provided many examples of religious bigotry and intolerance. A recent non-scholarly account of this Christian assembly where hate is central to theology appears in Phelps-Roper, M 2019, *Unfollow: A Journey from Hatred to Hope: Leaving the Westboro Baptist Church*, Quercus, London.

¹⁰⁰ Buddhaghosa was a 5th-century Indian Theravada Buddhist commentator and scholar. His best-known work is the *Visuddhimagga* "Path of Purification", a comprehensive summary and analysis of the Theravada understanding of the Buddha's path to liberation. The interpretations provided by Buddhaghosa have generally constituted the orthodox understanding of Theravada scriptures since at least the 12th century CE. He is generally recognized by both Western scholars and Theravadins as the most important commentator of the Theravada (*Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*) encyclopediaofbuddhism.org/wiki/Buddhaghosa [viewed 14.2.20]

with others.¹⁰¹ Hatred is a danger because it becomes obsessional and all-pervasive: Buddhaghosa “finds no value whatsoever in hatred” and “nor can hatred bear some of the innocuous shades of meaning that it finds in the finely nuanced distinctions of Aquinas’s system” (ibid.).

Evolutionary psychological approaches

In addition to the cognitive approach to understanding hatred discussed above it is worth looking briefly at other understandings of hatred in general while also beginning to look in more detail at religious hatred. The evolutionary approach to hatred builds on the work of ethologists such as Nikolaus Tinbergen’s *Study of Instinct* (1951), Konrad Lorenz’s *On Aggression* (1966) and Desmond Morris’s *The Naked Ape* (1967) which lead to a re-thinking of B.F. Skinner’s work on environmental conditioning that had marginalised earlier thinking on the nature of human nature and in the middle years of the 20th century emphasised behaviourism.¹⁰² The evolutionary psychologist James Waller identifies “two foundational, innate, evolution-produced tendencies of human nature that are most relevant to our capacity for hate: ethnocentrism and xenophobia” (Waller 2004), arguing that studies worldwide show that these tendencies are universal, starting in infancy. Ethnocentrism can be summarised as the tendency to focus on one’s own group as the “right” one (Sumner 1906)¹⁰³; xenophobia as the tendency to fear outsiders or strangers. There is, as Waller comments, nothing very new in this: “Theologians beat evolutionary psychologists to the discovery of the “animal in humans” by several

¹⁰¹ *Visuddhimagga* in *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi (Wisdom Books, Boston 2000), p. 298 in Gereboff et al 2009.

¹⁰² For a concise history of thinking about hate and the approach of evolutionary psychology see Waller, J 2004, *Our Ancestral Shadow: Hate and Human Nature in Evolutionary Psychology*, paper presented at the Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, Spokane, WA, March 19, 2004.

¹⁰³ Defined by Sumner as “a differentiation that arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-group, out-groups”, quoted in Waller (2004).

centuries”, adding that it is a central element of the Christian view of human nature often captured in the doctrine of Original Sin.

If religion can be explained as an adaptation that carries evolutionary advantages by strengthening the solidarity of human groups, it can be argued that religious hatred is a mechanism that can amplify this in-group ethnocentrism and also, unfortunately, reinforce innate human xenophobia. Using evolutionary psychology as a total explanation of religious hatred, however, seems to overlook the forces of intellectual and cultural evolution that have in so many ways advanced human nature beyond its animal origins even if they linger in dark corners and can be summoned by the maleficent. It is hard to believe that the more refined forms of religious hatred, erupting for example among those who differ over matters of doctrine, the original *odium theologicum*,¹⁰⁴ are not as likely to stem from cultural, historical or individual psychodynamic differences as from the innate unconscious seeking of evolutionary advantage, or indeed from the circumstantial or environmental contexts in which hatred is a consequence of people’s responses to their situations. This latter conceptualisation of hatred emphasises the interaction between external factors and the intrinsic human capacity for violence, and the hate that may flow from, for example, the fight-flight reaction (Cannon 1963), frustration and grievance (Berkowitz 1989), or from the dark meanings that can be inferred, incorrectly or otherwise, from apparently innocent interactions (Bandura 1985). If the hatred of the oppressed for their oppressors illustrates one side of the coin (Hooks 1995), then the famous Milgram experiments on obedience and authority, bearing in mind some important caveats, illustrate

¹⁰⁴ “The bitter hatred of rival religionists. No wars so sanguinary as holy wars; no persecutions so relentless as religious persecutions, no hatred so bitter as theological hatred” (Room, A (ed.) 2001, *Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, (Millennium edition), Cassel & Co, London.

the other.¹⁰⁵ Though the history of the 20th century should have been witness enough, it is clear from recent conflict in the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Africa that, according to the psychiatrist Anthony Storr, “...the extremes of ‘brutal’ behaviour are confined to man; and there is no parallel in nature to our savage treatment of each other. The sombre fact is that we are the cruellest and most ruthless species that has ever walked the earth...” (Storr 1992, p. 9). Storr’s opinion is not shared by all. The Dutch biologist Frans de Waal calls this ‘veneer theory’, “the notion that civilisation is nothing more than a thin veneer that will crack at the merest provocation” (de Waal 2013, p. 43).¹⁰⁶ Historian and philosopher Rutger Bregman says that “In actuality, the opposite is true. It’s when crisis hits – when the bombs fall or the floodwaters rise – that we humans become our best selves” (Bregman 2020, p. 4). He blames the media for a picture that is consistently the opposite of reality and uses examples such as a real life *Lord of the Flies* story to illustrate his point (ibid., pp. 6 and 36),¹⁰⁷ while Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker uses empirical evidence to demonstrate that humankind is becoming less violent in *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (2011).

So although the overall state of humankind, in relation to the threat and use of violence, may be improving, given the behavioural tendencies noted by Storr and the evidence of most of human history - *pace* Pinker - it can be argued that religious hatred

¹⁰⁵ The Milgram experiments famously appeared to demonstrate, in summary, that an alarmingly high proportion of normally humane people can be induced to inflict pain on others if they are told to do so by someone in a position of authority. See Helm, C and Morelli, M, 1979, ‘Stanley Milgram and the Obedience Experiment: Authority, Legitimacy, and Human Action’, *Political Theory* vol. 7, pp. 321-46. More recently doubt has been cast on both the ethics and methodology of Milgram’s work (see for example Perry, G 2013, ‘Deception and Illusion in Milgram’s Accounts of the Obedience Experiments’, *Theoretical & Applied Ethics*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 79–92) to the extent that the results should be viewed with caution. Rutger Bregman goes further in *Humankind: A Hopeful History* (2020), “I know of no other study as cynical, as depressing and at the same time as famous as his experiments at the shock machine.....A man who misled and manipulated to get the results he wanted” (p. 164).

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in Bregman 2020, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ William Golding’s novel *Lord of the Flies* (1954) is arguably one of the most influential works of 20th century fiction, appearing regularly on the lists of school set texts. It features a group of British schoolboys who, stranded without adults on a remote island, rapidly revert to a state of lawless savagery.

provides another reason, or excuse, and sometimes active encouragement, for malignant human behaviour, with the precepts of religion providing little defence against it. Pinker and Bregman's more optimistic views offer hope that religion can be among the influences that swing behavioural choices in more positive directions: itself a good reason to understand better what influences such choices. But it is perhaps as well also to introduce at this point a concept that properly belongs in the following chapter on psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred: the notion of *enantiodromia*, the tendency of everything in nature sooner or later to switch the direction of its flow towards its opposite (Stevens 1990, pp. 140-1). Perhaps, when it comes to the light and dark sides of religion, what we witness are many different flows, some in one direction, others in the opposite, and it is as well to be prepared for both.

Perhaps also it is the very defiance of religious precepts which renders religious hatred qualitatively different from its secular equivalent, though it is doubtful whether victims of the latter would agree. While contemporary religious hatred seems as likely to grow out of social, historical or cultural circumstances as out of either innate capacity or evolutionary advantage, it may be that such situations trigger latent and primal inclinations both to prepare individuals for the conflict that is likely to flow from religious hatred, and to inculcate the will to win when it arises. For this reason it seems reasonable to conclude that all of these approaches to religious hatred contain something of relevance. In summary, if religion is innate, then it seems likely that so are the problems that it produces; if religion brings evolutionary advantages, then again it seems reasonable to suppose that aggression, and if necessary hatred perceived to be in defence of religion, are likely concomitants; and to the extent that religion always lives in relation to its social and historical circumstances, human responses to these are likely to include responses to the religion that is part of them. It can be argued, nonetheless, that religious hatred does have

characteristics that are particular to itself. In particular the concept of ‘religious hatred’ needs to be understood as echoing traditional notions of spiritual damnation: willing the total separation of person from any sense of themselves, any relation with others, and any inclusion in whatever ultimacy is perceived. Religious hatred involves the harming of others in a way beyond human reparation: it is the loss of *Nirvana*, divorce from the *Dao*, deprivation of any hope of *Moksha*, the loss of any sense of ultimacy – metaphysically, axiologically, soteriologically. It is in these terms that the full severity of religious hatred needs to be appreciated. Speed Leas, a scholar-practitioner who specialises in ecclesiastical conflict, provides a brutal summary of the purpose of religious hatred: “People’s goal is to destroy one another. They see themselves as part of an eternal cause, fighting for universal principles. They justify any means to achieve their all-important ends” (Leas 1985 quoted in McKay 2019, pp. 90-91). The consequences are communication that features outright condemnation of others coupled with extreme emotional volatility and the inability to disengage once battle has been joined.

Particulars of religious hatred

This brings us to a deeper focus on the cognitive approach to religious hatred as exemplified by Aaron Beck’s *Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility and Violence* (1999). Beck, one of the pioneers of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), provides detailed analysis of how innate, evolutionary or contextually-generated hatred, or indeed hatred driven by any other motivations, manifests itself in the actual behaviour of human beings. His starting point is the continuity running through the spectrum of behaviour from the personal to the genocidal, arguing that regardless of the external causes of antagonistic behaviour (“Anger is anger, whether provoked by a rebellious child or a rebellious colony; hate is hate, whether evoked by an abusive spouse or a ruthless

dictator”), the same internal or psychological mechanisms are generally involved in its arousal and expression (Beck 1999, p. 15). Beck applies this to the hatred of people and sets out the stages through which haters go in order to reach hatred in its extreme and deadly forms. The first characteristic of hatred is that is based on a distorted image of someone who then becomes characterised as ‘the enemy’. For hate to really take root this image has to become more extreme and, as Navarro (2013) has it, more detached from the reality it represents (for example the image of the Jew used by Hitler and the Nazis) so that it then becomes possible to project any deleterious characteristic onto this enemy, this Other. As part of this process the enemy then becomes homogenized and stereotyped: individuals lose their discrete identities, and thereby become interchangeable and disposable. In the next stage individuals become dehumanized and so devoid of value as people and undeserving of empathy. It becomes possible to kill them without feeling.¹⁰⁸ The final stage is demonization. The enemy becomes the embodiment of evil and therefore must be exterminated as a moral obligation for fear that others may be contaminated.

These stages are well recognised by organisations such as Genocide Watch as part of the process of preparing the ground for genocide (Stanton 1996). Religious factors appear in several of these stages: classification, where religion is used as an identifier of difference; symbolization, where specific symbols are associated with the vulnerable group; preparation, where victims are separated from the rest of the population so they can be more easily targeted; and finally in the stage of denial, when the perpetrators of genocide may defend themselves by asserting that their accusers are biased because of

¹⁰⁸ Propaganda in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide repeatedly referred to Tutsis as “cockroaches”. See Woolf, L and Hulsizer, M 2005, ‘Psychosocial roots of genocide: risk, prevention, and intervention’, *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 7, no.1, pp. 101-128.

their politics, ethnicity or religion.¹⁰⁹ The stages described above relate to the treatment of individuals. Observation from experience suggests that abstract ideas, beliefs and values can be denigrated in the same way with similar objectives: namely to discredit them, and those who hold them, so thoroughly that both can be discarded with ease. In dialogues with religious groups about human sexuality, for example, it is not unusual to hear homosexuality being distorted by being conflated with paedophilia, and of course it is relatively straightforward to demonise an enemy who can be presented as a paedophile (Herek 2000).

Similarly, the details, subtleties and nuances of ideas can become lost in the effort to homogenize and stereotype ideas: “Christianity is a vehicle for Bible-thumping rednecks”; “all Muslims are Islamic terrorists” and so on. Both the ideas, and the people who are perceived to represent them, become scapegoats and from then on every negative quality can be associated with them: this is presumably how religion has come to be blamed for so much conflict when, as Chapter 1 established, it is in fact very rarely a causal factor in any conflict.¹¹⁰ Once reduced to this semi-pariah status, as for example, arguably, religion has been by the increasing secularisation of the academy, it becomes harder for people to espouse certain ideas without both them and their ideas being marginalised and even ridiculed. Ideas can similarly become so diminished as to be unworthy of being taken seriously and deserving of immediate censorship; a university may even ban a Christian

¹⁰⁹ Steven Jacobs argues in ‘Genocidal Religion’, *Journal of Hate Studies*, vol. 9, pp. 221-235 (2011) that there are four precipitating factors for genocide: tribalism, religious exclusivism, privileged access to the divine and “a particularistic and parochial reading of sacred texts”. As genocide is arguably the ultimate expression of hatred, the idea that three out of the four precipitating factors are connected in some way to religion supports Jacobs’s contention (2011) that a religious dimension is a prerequisite for genocide.

¹¹⁰ Even the so-called ‘Wars of Religion’, roughly from 1559 until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and comprising at least twenty-five international wars and the same number of civil wars (Pinker 2011, p. 281) may have disrupted the Catholic order in Europe but religion, far from being the cause, is regarded by some historians as a proxy for territorial ambitions, the clash of financial interests and Great Power conflicts (see for example Cavanaugh, W 2009, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*, Oxford University Press, Oxford).

society.¹¹¹ This is bad not only for those being diminished but also for their persecutors: it feeds self-righteousness, egotism and narcissism, and in so doing allows the shadow side (Jung 1938, p. 131) of the persecutor to flourish as will be discussed in the following chapter. Quite apart from the negative impacts on individuals, the process also encourages the sort of over-generalisation and tunnel vision which are both destructive in themselves and sow the seeds for the further narrowing of understanding and intellect that integrative complexity identifies as fertile soil for extremism (Savage 2006). The final and most destructive stage is ideas being demonised lest they, and those who dare to utter them, influence others. The consequence is the no-platforming of speakers even in institutions, such as universities, which exist to explore and debate ideas (Smith 2016). This encourages the polarised and dichotomous thinking – the dividing of the world into the black and white, good and evil – that often accompanies religious hatred.¹¹² The link again to the concept of integrative complexity becomes apparent. The overall consequence of the process described by Aaron Beck and summarised above is one of transforming people and arguably even ideas into images of evil which appear, or can be made to appear, to threaten the vital interests or even the existence, physical or moral, of the aggressors. These reified concepts are projected onto the people or ideas that embody the threat, so while it is the projected images that are attacked, it is real people who become the victims. The remedy for this process, according to Beck, is modification of the belief system that predisposes the individual to overreact to supposed threats, and the development of strategies to

¹¹¹ “An Oxford College has banned the Christian Union from its freshers’ fair on the grounds that it would be “alienating” for students of other religions, and constitute a “micro-aggression”. The organiser of Balliol’s fair argued Christianity’s historic use as “an excuse for homophobia and certain forms of neo-colonialism” meant that students might feel “unwelcome” in their new college if the Christian Union had a stall” <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2017/10/10/oxford-college-bans-harmful-christian-union-freshers-fair/> [viewed 29.11.18].

¹¹²The contemporary accusation of promoting of ‘thoughtcrime’, vividly evoked by George Orwell in his dystopian novel *1984* (1949) is thrown both at liberals and conservatives (for example <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/06/anti-terrorism-plans-criticised-make-thoughtcrime-reality> [viewed 10.2.20].

interrupt the hostile sequence in its earliest stage so as to induce abandonment of violence as an acceptable weapon (Beck 1999, pp. 17-8).

This is very much the grounding of the process advocated by Genocide Watch for preventing genocide.¹¹³ Applying Beck's cognitive analysis to religious hatred also highlights what he calls the 'Moral Paradox' (Beck 1999, p. 21), though he describes it as a cognitive rather than a moral problem. The summary of the paradox is that while religions such as Christianity and Islam are ostensibly committed to love and peace, they have been invoked by individuals to justify acts as diverse as the Crusades, 9/11 and the murder of abortionists, furthermore "It is my strong contention that religion in both its institutional forms and its intellectual formulations has played a truly significant if unexplored role in *all* [sic] genocides, past and present...." (Jacobs 2011). Beck argues that the failure of religious values to reduce hostile behaviour, and in some cases the evocation of religious values to encourage it, reflects the power of the innate, evolutionary and environmental thinking and beliefs that drive them. When people perceive that either they or their values are threatened they can enter, or be induced or manipulated into entering, the cognitive processes described above, and the force of this may be more powerful than human qualities such as empathy or the behavioural norms encoded in religious teachings (ibid., p. 22).¹¹⁴

¹¹³ For example, Stanton advocates: "Vigorously protest use of dehumanizing words that refer to people as "filth," "vermin," animals or diseases; deny people using such words visas and freeze their foreign assets and contributions; prosecute hate crimes and incitements to commit genocide; jam or shut down hate radio and television stations where there is danger of genocide; provide programs for tolerance to radio, TV, and newspapers; enlist religious and political leaders to speak out and educate for tolerance; organize inter-ethnic, inter-faith and inter-racial groups to work against hate and genocide (Stanton 1996).

¹¹⁴ Beck himself identifies two remedies for this process. The first is to "deactivate" the hate mode when it is triggered by methods such as cooling-off periods, distraction, and the sort of dialogic methodologies used by mediators. The other, which Beck describes as a more enduring approach, is to intervene in the way that people perceive themselves, their values, and each other, insisting on rational judgments, developing objective criteria to help people evaluate more clearly, and encouraging greater awareness of how easily perceptions and categorisations can become biased and incomplete. These are, again, methods used by mediators to design and construct dialogue processes that can bridge limited thinking and defuse aggression. Beck also comments that while evolutionary psychology has contributed to our understanding of human

This suggests that, contrary to the arguments of modern atheists, the answer to the hatred unquestionably generated by religion and among religious people is not *less* religion but *more* religion. As the philosopher of religion John Schellenberg says in *Evolutionary Religion*, “Maybe religion needs to be born again” (Schellenberg 2013, p. 90), a reminder that in terms of the temporal landscape the world’s religions as we know them today are barely more than six thousand years old, and it is only within the last three thousand that they have mostly been codified and established. Schellenberg points out that human religion is still in its infancy and it is difficult to imagine how it may evolve over the millennia ahead. One starting point, in terms of reducing the scope for religious hatred, would perhaps be to discover forms of religion which change the balance between the devotional and the coalitional in favour of the former.¹¹⁵

Hatred as addiction

There is an additional aspect of religious hatred that deserves mention: its apparent addictiveness in that, like other forms of addiction, the addict can seem impervious to reason and evidence when presented with the negative consequences of the addiction. To appreciate this we need to look at the psychology of addiction and realise that anything can serve as the object of an addictive process including religions and their associated beliefs and promises (Maté 2018, p. 375).¹¹⁶ If those beliefs include ideas that can be considered

behaviour both in its negative and positive forms in terms of its contribution to human survival and reproduction, it had not, at the time of his writing, contributed as much on the evolution of cognitive patterns and especially primal thinking (Beck 1999, p. 23).

¹¹⁵ Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan (2009), studying the motivation for suicide attacks, divide religiosity into the *devotional* and the *coalitional*, suggesting there is a correlation between the latter and the motivations of suicide attackers, whereas the former seem less inclined to violence and self-sacrifice.

¹¹⁶ The use of the word ‘addiction’ in the pathological sense is relatively recent. Thomas de Quincey in *Confessions of an Opium Eater* (Penguin 2003), first published in 1821, for example, never refers to his narcotic devotions as addiction. The Romans, however, had a usage that prefigures our current one: an

pernicious, such as the superiority of some races over others, that homosexuality is a human malignancy, or that the followers of other religions are evil or deluded, for example, then presumably such beliefs can also be or become addictive, in which case it is important to understand the nature of addiction. A consensus of experts on drug addiction in 2001 declared that addiction is a “chronic neurobiological disease ... characterized by behaviors that include one or more of the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and craving” (Hall-Flavin and Hofman 2003). The question of whether addiction is really a form of disease will continue to be debated,¹¹⁷ but its characteristics less so: “compulsion, impaired control, persistence, irritability, relapse and craving - these are the hallmarks of addiction - any addiction” (Maté 2018, p. 131).¹¹⁸

It feels uncomfortable to conclude that some believers, perhaps especially those attracted to ‘strong’ religion, may display some of the characteristics of those addicted to drink or drugs, and that religious hatred is a destructive consequence akin to the

addictus was a person who was assigned to a creditor as a slave, which is where presumably the idea of addiction as a form of enslavement derives (Rosenthal, R & Faris, S 2019, ‘The etymology and early history of ‘addiction’, *Addiction Research & Theory*, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 437-449).

¹¹⁷ “As we delve into the scientific research, we need to avoid the trap of believing that addiction can be reduced to the actions of brain chemicals or nerve circuits or any other kind of neurobiological, psychological or sociological data. A multilevel exploration is necessary because it’s impossible to understand addiction fully from any one perspective, no matter how accurate. Addiction is a complex condition, a complex interaction between human beings and their environment. We need to view it simultaneously from many different angles—or, at least, while examining it from one angle, we need to keep the others in mind. Addiction has biological, chemical, neurological, psychological, medical, emotional, social, political, economic and spiritual underpinnings - and perhaps others I haven’t thought about” (Maté, G 2018, p. 402).

¹¹⁸ Although the term addiction has been controversial for quite some time (Shaffer 1986; Davies 1992), Brown (1993, p. 245) states that conceptually addiction ‘has fairly widespread agreement on the core phenomena’. Brown’s criteria have been compared with the DSM (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*) III and IV criteria for pathological gambling (Charlton 2002). Brown’s core criteria include: (a) Salience: when the activity (behavioural) and one’s thinking (cognitive) dominates the person’s life; (b) Euphoria: describes the ‘buzz’ or ‘high’ feeling gained from the activity; (c) Tolerance: the need to engage in the activity to a progressively greater extent to achieve the same ‘buzz’; (d) Relief: when a person repeats the behaviour to avoid an uncomfortable state; (e) Withdrawal: experiencing unpleasant emotions or physical effects when the activity is halted; (f) Conflict: when the activity leads to conflict with other people or self-conflict; (g) Relapse/ reinstatement: the activity is resumed with just as much vigour following attempts to abstain.

physiological and neurological consequences of narcotic addiction. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks in his book *Not in God's Name: Confronting Religious Violence*, names hate as a form of enslavement, “even of self-enslavement” (Sacks 2016, p. 238). So perhaps it is sometimes religious hatred, rather than religion itself, that is addictive, providing the intoxication that blurs and obliterates all other demands and responsibilities, increasingly holding sway over every facet of the life of the individual and overruling any rational consideration, amounting, in fact, to an ‘evil force’ (Schoen 2009, p. 4). It reinforces the argument in favour of some sort of transformative epiphany as the best answer to such a problem.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹If ‘strong’ religion (Almond et al 2003) can be addictive in the same way as other narcotics, then it raises the question of what might take the form of a curing conversion experience as advocated by groups like Alcoholics Anonymous: to what ‘Higher Power’ can de-radicalisation programmes, for example, advocate an appeal if the focus of the addiction is in fact a Higher Power or its associations?

Chapter 4: Psychodynamic approaches to religious hatred

Introduction

Chapter 3 explored cognitive and evolutionary psychological understandings of hatred and religious hatred; the focus of this chapter is to examine how psychodynamic psychology explains the capacity latent in some individuals and groups for religious hatred. The central argument is that individuals, groups and cultures can be possessed by largely unconscious psychological complexes,¹²⁰ rooted in personal or collective histories, that can cause or facilitate religious hatred. This chapter therefore begins with an exploration of what a complex is, how it arises, and how it performs within the conscious and unconscious life of individuals, and goes on to present the concept of the cultural complex which argues that such complexes can take on a more collective form for whole communities and even nations.

The approach here is to identify psychodynamic theories that are relevant, introduce them supported by evidence from scholarship, and build on these to the extent that the evidence allows. This approach is deliberately cautious because the relationship between psychodynamic psychology and natural science has been complicated since Freud's *Project for a scientific psychology* (1895). In recent years the tensions among psychodynamic psychology, cognitive behavioural psychology, neuroscience and neurobiology, to identify but a few of the fault lines, have complicated the search for

¹²⁰ It should be noted that the use of the term 'complex' is to some extent controversial in psychodynamic psychology. It is used here because the concept is fairly widely accepted even if the detailed language of its description and explanation continues to develop. For a full explanation of the concept and some of the arguments around it see Samuels, A 1985, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, Routledge, London, pp. 47-52; for an example of new thinking about the complex see Bovensiepen, G 2006, 'Attachment-Dissociation Network: Some Thoughts About a Modern Complex Theory', *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 451-466.

empirical evidence in support of the ‘talking cures’ and the theories on which they are based. The complexity of the subject matter, and the relative difficulty of using standard verification processes such as double-blind testing, means that even theories well-established through practice in clinical settings are treated with some caution by the more empirically-minded.¹²¹ The ideas taken from psychodynamic psychology are those judged likely to resonate both with the literature of religious hatred and with the field experience of scholar-practitioners.

The idea of the complex

A complex is, in essence, a collection of unconscious images and ideas accompanied by particular feelings (Kaplinsky 2008) which, when activated, affect behaviour. If such feelings are triggered by some conscious or unconscious event they will bring to the surface a variety of associations, memories, perceptions, desires, prejudices, likes or dislikes that were stored in the unconscious with the original feelings. The term complex was coined by the German psychiatrist Theodor Ziehen (1862-1950) who used the word-association test, invented by Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911)¹²² in 1879, to demonstrate that unconscious feelings would cause experimental subjects to display signs of emotion, hesitation, slips of the tongue and other oddities of behaviour in response to stimulus words. During these tests a researcher would read a list of 100 words to each subject who was asked to say as quickly as possible the first thing that came to mind in response to each

¹²¹ For a thorough introduction to this subject see Knox, J 2003, *Archetype, Attachment, Analysis: Jungian psychology and the emergent mind*, Routledge, London and Samuels, A 1985, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, Routledge, London.

¹²² Galton’s use of the galvanometer to test the speed of human reaction to a stimulus was designed to measure human intelligence, the assumption being that faster reactions equalled higher intelligence. Galton’s research into human ability lead eventually to the foundation of differential psychology (Jensen 2002) and also his now controversial work on the subject for which he coined the description - eugenics (Gilham 2001).

word, with his or her reaction time being measured in fifths of a second. Patterns detected in subjects' responses were perceived to be indications of unconscious beliefs and feelings.¹²³

The idea of the complex became an early component of psychodynamic psychology as it appeared to verify the influence of unconscious processes on personality and behaviour, but its use was developed in different directions, notably by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. Freud built much of his psychology around the Oedipus complex but did little to develop the concept further apart from some discussion of the equivalent Electra complex.¹²⁴ The reasons for this, according to Dieckmann (1991), was that for Freud, as a natural scientist of his time, the idea of the complex was too vague and too large; like others at the time he preferred a more reductive approach and this meant looking for the basic constituents which, in his case, were the drives which explained psychic functioning. Jung, on the other hand, regarded complexes as so central to his theories that he originally intended to call his whole approach “complex psychology” (Casement 2001, p. 13) on the basis of his experience at the Burghölzli Hospital, the psychiatric clinic of Zurich University, where he worked between 1900 and 1908. Jung developed his theories on the back of Galton's word association test but took them much further; indeed, his early reputation and his initial association with Freud was founded on the publication of a book

¹²³ For a full description of his use of the word-association test see Jung, CG 1904-7, *Studies in Word Association in Experimental Researches*, CW2 and also *Tavistock Lecture II* contained in his *Collected Works*, vol.18 paras. 97-106; also Cramer, P 1968, *Word Association*, Academic, New York.

¹²⁴ Freud introduced the Oedipus complex in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899). The positive Oedipus complex refers to a child's unconscious sexual desire for the opposite sex parent and hatred for the same sex parent, and the negative Oedipus complex vice-versa. The Electra complex was suggested by Jung in his 1912 Fordham Lecture *The Theory of Psychoanalysis* (subsequently published as *Psychology of the Unconscious* and revised in 1952 as *Symbols of Transformation*) as the equivalent complex for young girls; Freud rejected it, proposing instead that the Oedipus complex could apply to children of either sex but would be manifested as castration anxiety in boys and penis envy in girls. For a contemporary discussion of the Oedipus complex see Perelberg, RJ 2015, *Murdered Father, Dead Father: Revisiting the Oedipus Complex*, Routledge, London.

in 1906, edited with his mentor Eugen Bleuler,¹²⁵ summarising these experiments.¹²⁶ Jung described complexes in various ways, for example as an “autonomous groups of associations that have a tendency to move by themselves, to live their own life apart from our intentions” (Jung CW18, para. 151). He argued that both the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious consist of an indefinite and unknown number of complexes, and they can be identified because they are characterised by their “intense feeling-tone” (ibid., para. 148) and the physiological symptoms that accompany them, such as raised blood pressure, stomach cramps and changes in skin tone (ibid.).

It is important to note that Jung is proposing that complexes operate in autonomous or semi-autonomous ways, separately from conscious intention. This became an increasingly important part of his psychology when he came to suggest that at the core of complexes are what he termed ‘archetypes’,¹²⁷ inherited and universal patterns of experience¹²⁸ that comprise what he called the ‘collective unconscious’¹²⁹ to distinguish it from the personal unconscious of Freudian thinking. For this dissertation the significance

¹²⁵ Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) was Director of the Burghölzli Hospital from 1898 to 1927 and is remembered both for his early influence on Jung and for his seminal work in using the term ‘schizophrenia’ to replace the older ‘dementia praecox’.

¹²⁶ For a contemporary assessment of Jung and Bleuler’s word association tests, using fMRI scanning, see Escamilla, M, Sandoval, H, Calhoun V and Ramirez M 2018, ‘Brain activation patterns in response to complex triggers in the Word Association Test: results from a new study in the United States’, *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 484–509.

¹²⁷ Archetypes in the Jungian sense are generally understood in four ways: 1. As biological entities in genes providing the mental equivalent of DNA for the mind; 2. As organised but abstract mental frameworks without symbolic or representational content so incapable of being experienced directly; 3. As core meanings that contain representational content and therefore provide a central symbolic significance to our experience; 4. As metaphysical entities that are eternal and independent of the body (Knox 2003).

¹²⁸ Jung wanted to distance himself from Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), whose theory that evolution proceeded from the inheritance of characteristics acquired through subjective experience had been challenged by Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Jung wrote that the term archetype, “is not meant to denote an inherited idea, but rather an inherited mode of functioning, corresponding to the inborn way in which the chick emerges from the egg, the bird builds its nest, a certain kind of wasp stings the motor ganglion of the caterpillar, and eels find their way to the Bermudas. In other words, it is a ‘pattern of behaviour’”. This aspect of the archetype, the purely biological one, is the proper concern of scientific psychology” (Jung, *Collected Works* vol. 18, para. 1228.)

¹²⁹ The terms ‘autonomous psyche’ or ‘objective psyche’ are more commonly used today (Corbett 2012, p. 42).

of complexes, and the archetypes that drive them, lies in Jung's key description of their nature: "Everyone knows nowadays that 'people have complexes'. What is not so well known, though far more important theoretically, is that complexes can *have us* [original emphasis]" (Jung CW8, para. 200). The existence of complexes, according to Jung, throws serious doubt on the assumption that consciousness is unified and human will reigns supreme; in fact complexes can impede the intentions of the will and are sometimes responsible for actions that exceed conscious intention. An active complex, he continues, "puts us momentarily under a state of duress, of compulsive thinking and acting, for which under certain conditions the only appropriate term would be the judicial concept of diminished responsibility" (ibid.).

The import of this is hard to exaggerate: Jung is saying that there are aspects of human behaviour that are beyond our conscious control. This raises the question of whether and, if so, how, matters of religion, faith and belief, or something associated with them, can generate a complex that, whether or not intended, gives rise to religious hatred. To make the significance of this clear, imagine, simplistically, that a child is forced to take part in a religious ritual that involves, say, prostrating himself before a scarlet image while an attendant flogs him. It could be that forever after he associates both the religion and the colour scarlet with feelings of pain and humiliation. If, many years later, he sees a group of people wearing scarlet, or professing that same religion, might he again experience these feelings and, possibly, either take action to avoid them by running away, or perhaps attack them to avenge himself and symbolically, as well as maybe literally, destroy those unpleasant memories and feelings? This is to put, at its crudest, the case for how a complex might stimulate religious hatred in an individual even though there is no direct connection between either the past ritual, or its attendant colouring, and the current

incident. This is, obviously, an extreme example to set out the basic connection between an unconscious complex and subsequent behaviour, but it is not difficult to find instances in real life: for example, the middle-aged woman still paralysed by the sight of snow after a difficult childbirth twenty years earlier made more traumatic by her doctor's consequent failure to reach her¹³⁰; the elderly man still revolted by certain foods that conjure images from an emotionally deprived childhood.¹³¹ The clinical literature contains many more examples of how past experience, long buried in the unconscious, can give rise to current problems.¹³²

It must be emphasised that complexes *per se* are not unhealthy: in fact they are normal parts of the psyche which provide the individual the energy and qualities needed to pursue life in general (Dieckmann 1991, p. 5). But complexes can become pathological in one of two ways when they introduce a one-sided over-emphasis of a certain aspect of the psyche. First, they can consume excessive energy because they contain deeply rooted feelings of love or hate linked to equally deep fears and aggressive impulses. Secondly, they can become pathological if split off and isolated from the rest of the psyche as a consequence of these overpowering energies and the excessive accumulation of associations and amplifications they bring about. The consequence, says Dieckmann, is “like a dictator who arrogates all power to himself, the complex tends to suppress and repress everything that will not fit in its frame of reference, and this causes the conscious ego-complex to act again and again in self-damaging and overtaxing ways that would be avoided if it could reflect rationally” (ibid., p. 34). In considering the possibility that even

¹³⁰ Personal communication 2017.

¹³¹ Personal communication 2018.

¹³² For further examples see Dieckmann, D 2014, *Complexes: Diagnosis and Therapy in Analytical Psychology*, Chiron, New York.

a proportion of religious hatred stems from a complex turned pathological is to risk pathologising behaviour that may, in certain circumstances, be not unreasonable. If, for example, a village has just been razed and the inhabitants slaughtered by the fanatics of the Islamic State, to hate everything they stand for, including their religion, does not require a complex turned bad. Harboursing a constant, unflinching and behaviourally enacted hatred for the Anglican parson who prefers *Common Worship* to the *Book of Common Prayer* may seem excessive. Dieckmann appears to be making this distinction when he adds that complexes have three characteristics: “they tend 1) to be uncorrectable; 2) to operate automatically; and 3) to enrich themselves with archaic, mythological amplifications” (ibid.). The first reflects how very difficult it is to dissuade someone in the grip of such a complex from their point of view; the second the way that people sometimes sound as if they are on auto-pilot when expressing themselves; and the third the readiness with which ancient history is recruited to justify and legitimise a current perspective. These characteristics are unlikely to be apparent in the victim of Islamic State. On the other hand they were apparent, for example, during a dialogue process involving representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church justifying apartheid: the absolute conviction, the slightly robotic tone with which the usual arguments were produced, and the delving back into the mythology of Afrikanerdom for support (Acland 1990, p. 165). In the middle ground is the memory of discussing homosexuality with a group of those opposed to the ordination of gay clergy into the Church of England. There was certainly the absolute conviction of being correct, and the inclination to draw on and amplify Biblical texts to justify opposition, but there was no impression that they were on automatic pilot: they were passionate and very much engaged in the here and now.

William James, the ‘healthy-mind’ and the ‘sick soul’

Discussion of the possible pathology of religious hatred is a reminder of William James and his division of religion into that of the ‘healthy-mind’ and the ‘sick soul’ in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (James 1952, pp. 275 and 365).¹³³ James defines healthy-mindedness as “the tendency which looks on all things and sees that they are good” and describes such people as the ‘once-born’ because their optimism means they do not seek any form of re-birth or new awareness. Sick souls, he says, see the world as essentially evil, seek redemption and re-birth elsewhere and are ‘twice-born’. He argues in his discussion of the sick soul that those with troubled minds are naturally attracted to religion in a way that less troubled souls are not, and that the forms of regeneration advocated by “mind-curers”, such as relaxation, are “psychologically indistinguishable from the Lutheran justification by faith and the Wesleyan acceptance of free grace” and therefore available to people “who have no conviction of sin and care nothing for Lutheran theology” (James 1902, p. 128). Equally, James says, the optimism induced by religious faith can become “quasi-pathological” because for “the man actively happy.... evil simply cannot then and there be believed in. He must ignore it; and to the bystander he may then seem perversely to shut his eyes to it and to hush it up” (ibid. p. 35). This insight suggests that a phenomenon such as religious hatred may be a natural if overlooked accompaniment of religious faith, indeed “There are people for whom evil means only a maladjustment with things, a wrong correspondence of one’s life with the environment” (ibid., p. 51) which, he says, may easily be resolved.¹³⁴ He contrasts this with others for whom evil is “a

¹³³ Considerations of ‘health’ and healthy-mindedness are a constant concern for James, being mentioned over forty times in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

¹³⁴ The full quotation is as follows: “There are people for whom evil means only a maladjustment with things, a wrong correspondence of one’s life with the environment. Such evil as this is curable, in principle, at least, upon the natural plane, for merely by modifying either the self or the things, or both at once. ... But there are others for whom evil is no more relation of the subject to particular outer things, but something more radical and general, a wrongness or vice in his essential nature, which no alteration of the

wrongness or vice in his essential nature” which requires a supernatural remedy (ibid., p. 51).¹³⁵

While James’ work on religion has been criticised on a number of grounds, including its over-emphasis on the role of subjective feeling, its use of case studies of the pathological, its comparative lack of interest in the social, historical and theological, and a certain lack of sympathy for religious experience outside that of the Protestant hegemony in America at the time it was written (Hart 2008), it is fair to say that it remains a valuable resource for scholars of religious psychology and there are three particular contributions that James has made to the thinking in this dissertation. First “it would be hard to imagine the contemporary dialogue between psychology and religion without James’ contributions”, and James’ use of terms such as ‘sick soul’, ‘twice born’ and ‘healthy minded’ have shaped “cultural, religious, therapeutic, and academic discourse” even if they have not been consistently identified with him (ibid.).^{136 137} Secondly, James’ constant awareness of evil as a reality resonates with scholar-practitioners who have come face to face with phenomena which can only be so designated (Acland 1990, p. 110-111; Migliozzi 2016). While reflections on the possible pathologies of individuals as a source of religious hatred need to be considered, it is when individuals come together to form communities and cultures that the full consequences of religious hatred are most liable to

environment, or any superficial rearrangement of the inner self, can cure and which requires a supernatural remedy. ... But the deliverance must come in as strong a form as the complaint, if it is to take effect; and that seems a reason why the coarser religions, revivalist, orgiastic, with blood and miracles and supernatural operations, may possibly never be displaced. Some constitutions need them too much. ... There is no doubt that healthy-mindedness is inadequate as a philosophical doctrine, because the evil facts which it refuses positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality.....” ((James 1902, p. 51-2)

¹³⁵ Hence the perceived importance of some form of religious conversion to beat addiction as advocated by bodies such as Alcoholics Anonymous (Addenbrooke 2015).

¹³⁶ While there is no evidence that James influenced Freud (Myers 1990), there is considerable evidence that James had an enduring influence on Jung (Taylor 1980).

¹³⁷ See for example David Wulff in *Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary* (Wiley, New York 1996).

become evident.¹³⁸ Thirdly, James' writing on the phenomenon of religious conversion have contributed to this dissertation's thinking about how dialogue and diapraxis might induce similar epiphanies in those consumed by religious hatred.

Complexes and religious traditions

In *Psyche and the Sacred: Spirituality beyond Religion* (2012) the psychiatrist and Jungian analyst Lionel Corbett argues that religious traditions can be influenced by a set of complexes in the same way as individuals. Christianity, for example, bases its idea of sinfulness on the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, and this in turn has shaped subsequent doctrines such as Original Sin and Infant Baptism, and, Corbett avers, via writings such as Augustine's *Confessions* (400), these have formed "the complex of an entire religious tradition" (Corbett 2012, p. 90). In a similar way, and more controversially, Corbett suggests that the constant persecution of the Jews over the centuries, from the time of slavery in Egypt until the Romans' occupation of Palestine, lead to the development of a "collective victim complex" (ibid. p. 91), for which the explanation and antidote was the doctrine of the covenant that God is said to have made with Abraham.¹³⁹ This combination of a complex based on victimhood, persecution and exceptionalism is a parallel to the stories of children abused in childhood who grow up to abuse others, "a process known as identification with the aggressor" (ibid., p. 92). Corbett

¹³⁸ This subject is addressed in Chapter 11 with reference to clericalism.

¹³⁹ Corbett suggests that this covenant was the invention of scribes and priests in post-Exilic times who wrote a sacred history of the Israelites, portraying a golden past and the idea of the Jews being a chosen people, which they attributed to Moses. This was designed to rationalise the suffering of the Jewish people and explain that this suffering was because they had been insufficiently attentive to the laws of the Torah – which also encouraged a more zealous approach to the law and arguably an increasingly legalistic tradition (Corbett 2012, p. 91).

notes that many psychologists “see this process at work in some of Israel’s current behaviour” (ibid.).¹⁴⁰

Corbett concludes his reflections on the relationship between complex and doctrine by arguing that Christianity continued the theme of vicarious suffering which the prophet Isaiah had begun by giving the Israelites the idea that their suffering was something they were bearing for the sins of heathen nations. This enabled Christians to turn persecution into a form of victory and even psychological freedom guaranteed by the suffering and death of Jesus Christ. Even if it is suspected that Corbett may be over-stating his case – because this sequence of argument suggests a teleological coherence to events that may have been largely random – there is room for further research into the psychological effects of repetition of doctrine through readings, recitations and rituals. It may be that this process, designed as it is, at least to some extent, to open access to an adherent’s emotions, may also provide a route into his or her unconscious and therefore to the complexes residing there; this possibility is explored further in Chapter 7 below.¹⁴¹ This may be the process through which a religious complex can translate into human behaviour; there is research which does already tend to confirm this as a possibility though it is too limited to be regarded as definitive.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Corbett fails to provide supporting references for this claim and it should therefore be considered with some caution.

¹⁴¹ Chapter 7 explores the idea that repetition of a doctrine such as that of Original Sin may act as a nocebo and have what has been called the ‘Golem Effect’, encouraging behaviour that falls below the optimum. Research has established the ‘Pygmalion Effect’ in education: the discovery that high expectations of school students will result in improved academic results. The Golem Effect is its opposite (see for example Oz, S, & Eden, D 1994, ‘Restraining the Golem: Boosting performance by changing the interpretation of low scores’, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 79, no. 5, pp. 744–754; Reynolds, D 2007, ‘Restraining Golem and Harnessing Pygmalion in the Classroom: A Laboratory Study of Managerial Expectations and Task Design’, *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 475–483). Bregman (2020, pp. 257-9) suggests the Pygmalion and Golem Effects are “woven into the fabric of our world”.

¹⁴² See for example McClenon, J 2013, ‘Cognitive resource depletion and the ritual healing theory’ in *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, vol. 3, no.1, pp. 71-73.

Cultural complexes

Although the idea of cultural complexes is not new¹⁴³ it has been more thoroughly explored by Thomas Singer and Samuel Kimbles in *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society* (2004) which brings together the work of several distinguished depth psychologists including Murray Stein, John Beebe and Andrew Samuels as well as Joseph Henderson. As Singer and Kimbles point out in their introduction, this new application of Jung's theory of complexes "makes no special claim to having the answer to what causes – or might heal – group and cultural conflict, but they offer a point of view that may be useful..." (p. 1) and for this reason the idea of the cultural complex is explored here at some length, beginning by emphasising the authors' premise that "the psychology of cultural complexes operates both in the collective psychology of the group and in the individual members of the group" (p. 2). As they also point out, although Jung included the cultural level in his schema of the psyche, his theory of complexes has never been systematically applied to the life of groups, and Jung never took advantage of the original theory of complexes to understand "the psychopathology and emotional entanglements of groups, tribes, and nations" (ibid.). Yet some level of collective mentality is present in every individual's psyche and forms the common ground for social continuity as well as the background to everyday life (Alho 2006).

Had Jung pursued the idea of the cultural complex, he might have concluded that it is the active agent of the cultural unconscious in the same way that a personal complex is the active agent of the personal unconscious. It functions as the group version of a personal complex, anchored in the collective experience of the group's historical and cultural

¹⁴³ The term may have been first used by Joseph Henderson of the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco in an unpublished letter to Jung in December 1943 (Singer and Kaplinsky 2010, p. 22).

recollection. This is not to say that Jung made no contribution to collective psychology. His 1936 essay 'Wotan', for example, analyses how the German psyche was becoming possessed by primitive and archetypal urges,¹⁴⁴ and he highlights the dangers of "mass-mindedness".¹⁴⁵ The idea of mass-mindedness is worth exploring further because a cultural complex is, almost by definition, a creature of the collective. There can be little doubt that if the concept of the cultural complex had been developed in 1936 Jung would have embraced it wholeheartedly as it would have helped elucidate one of his major concerns at the time: the tension between the individual and the mass. This is relevant here because one of the perennial problems for scholar-practitioners is trying to discern whether a certain view belongs solely to an individual, whether it is also held by a group of which the individual is part and is repeated because by doing so the cohesion of the group is secured and the identity of the individual as a member of it is reinforced, or a mixture of the two. The value of further insight in this direction is not limited to the context of religious conflict: there are many situations where people are influenced by mass culture and group pressures apart from the religious or ideological.¹⁴⁶

Many of Jung's most powerful statements about the relations between the individual and society, and about the dangers of mass-mindedness, appear in 'The Undiscovered Self' (1957). The timing and context of this essay is important: Jung had lived through the rise of the dictatorships of Germany and Italy in the 1930s and their terrible consequences for

¹⁴⁴ It was this essay that gave rise to the accusations of anti-Semitism against Jung that persist to this day and have damaged his reputation (Samuels 1997) despite his repeated denials (e.g. Bauman 1949; Maidenbaum 2002, pp. 232-233). By focusing on the power of the Wotan myth and ignoring the social, cultural and political condition of Germany Jung gave the impression that he continued to support the spirit of neopagan *Volkstumsbewegung* that the Nazis had embraced in the 1920s and 30s.

¹⁴⁵ Throughout his writing Jung speaks of the dangers of identification with the collective psyche. For example in *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (1917, 1928) he observes how much our "so-called individual psychology is really collective" and "very special attention must be paid to this delicate plant 'individuality' if it is not to be completely smothered" (Jung CW7, para. 241).

¹⁴⁶ It should be noted that complexes can be used to explain many aspects of human behaviour; for the purposes of this dissertation they are used here solely to explain certain aspects of religious behaviour and hatred.

Europe, and now perceived something similar both in the rise of communism and, perhaps more significantly, in the rise of scientific knowledge “based in the main on statistical truths and abstract knowledge and therefore imparts an unrealistic, rational picture of the world, in which the individual, as a merely marginal phenomenon, plays no role” (Jung CW10, paras. 498-9). Jung argues that scientific assumptions result in individual people suffering a levelling down and a process of blurring that distorts the picture of reality into a conceptual average. There is some irony in this, given that Jung liked to insist on himself as a scientist and, some might argue, in his use of word association tests had employed the approach he is decrying here. In the twenty-first century, subject to the power of global corporations and the mass media, dangers more urgent than the rise of the over-mighty State may be apparent, but it is still possible to share Jung’s concerns about the one-sidedness that “is always compensated psychologically by unconscious subversive tendencies” (ibid., para. 500).¹⁴⁷ But would he now argue for ‘Religion as the Counterbalance to Mass-Mindedness’ (1957) as he did in his essay of that title? His argument was based on the idea of religion as a bulwark against the power of the State because “it is possible to have an attitude to the external conditions of life only when there is a point of reference outside them” (ibid., para. 506), and religion, he goes on to say, provides such a standpoint and also “another authority opposed to that of the ‘world’” (ibid., para. 507) which provides “the evidence of inner, transcendent experience which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass” (ibid., para. 511). These days people might be more inclined to see religious adherence more as a symptom of mass-mindedness than as a defence against it,

¹⁴⁷ The United Kingdom’s vote for Brexit in June 2016 may be regarded as ‘subversive’ in this way; see for example Ishkanian, A 2019, ‘Social Movements, Brexit and Social Policy’, *Social Policy and Society*, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press, no. 1, pp. 147–159.

which is a useful reminder that what pertains in one culture may not in another time and place, and that interpretation of ‘subversion’ depends on point of view.¹⁴⁸

Since the publication of *The Cultural Complex* Singer, Kimbles and other depth psychologists have developed their understanding of what a cultural complex is and how it functions. For example, Singer and Kaplinsky summarise the cultural complex as a large scale social complex that forms in the cultural unconscious of groups (2010, p. 23). The value of this theory is that it offers a new perspective for understanding the psyche of individuals who find themselves in conflict around their personal and group identity and the consequent internal and external pressures. It also provides, they argue, a unique perspective for understanding the structure and content of the group psyche and especially for elucidating the nature of conflicts and attitudes among groups towards one another (ibid.). In the same way as a complex in an individual is an emotionally charged group of ideas and images with an archetypal resonance, so the cultural complex similarly affects the psyche of individuals within collectives, whether those are groups, organisations, tribes or nation states. The concept of the cultural complex rests on the idea of a cultural unconscious which can be conceptualised, according to Singer, “as closer to the surface of ego-consciousness than the collective unconscious, from which we understand the archetypal patterns to originate” (ibid.). Singer goes on to say of the shared characteristics of personal and cultural complexes that:

1. They express themselves in powerful moods and repetitive behaviors. Highly charged emotional or affective reactivity is their calling card.
2. They resist our most heroic efforts to make them conscious and remain, for the most part, unconscious.
3. They accumulate experiences that validate their point of view and create a store-house of self-affirming ancestral memories.

¹⁴⁸ An example of this is the Church of England’s 1984 report *Faith in the City* which can be argued as a recent point when ‘the Conservative Party at prayer’ was accused by the then Conservative government of ‘Marxism’ (Dinham, A 2008, ‘Commentary: From Faith in the City to Faithful Cities: The ‘Third Way’, the Church of England and Urban Regeneration’, *Urban Studies*, vol. 45 no. 10, pp. 2163–2174).

4. Personal and cultural complexes function in an involuntary, autonomous fashion and tend to affirm a simplistic point of view that replaces everyday ambiguity and uncertainty with fixed, often self-righteous, attitudes to the world.
5. In addition, personal and cultural complexes both have archetypal cores; that is, they express typically human attitudes and are rooted in primordial ideas about what is meaningful, making them very hard to resist, reflect upon, and discriminate.

(*ibid.*, pp. 25-6)

These five points are probably recognisable to most scholar-practitioners as describing situations they have encountered.¹⁴⁹ The idea of the cultural complex, however, also needs to be approached with caution because while it may seem to fit a particular set of circumstances, extrapolating beyond this and claiming it can be applied to any situation is more problematic. As Kevin Lu cautions, “Too often, ‘applied psychoanalysis’ becomes ‘wild psychoanalysis’ when interventions ignore the respective epistemologies and methodologies of the disciplines onto which depth psychological theories are being applied” (Lu 2013, p. 386).¹⁵⁰ Moreover, as Singer and Kimbles make clear, the notion of cultural complexes is not the same as either cultural identity or national character but is easily confused with them (Singer and Kimbles 2004, p. 6), not least because cultural complexes, like personal complexes, can imbue those entrapped by them with a simplistic certainty about a group’s place in the world in the face of otherwise conflicting and ambiguous uncertainties (*ibid.*, p. 7). The importance of cultural complexes for Singer and Kimbles is that they can be activated and take hold of the collective psyche of the group and the psyches of individual members of the group: “cultural complexes can seize the

¹⁴⁹ For example, a meeting mediated in South Africa between black and Afrikaner church leaders included a “store-house of self-affirming ancestral memories”, a “simplistic point of view” and “often self-righteous attitudes to the world” to justify the then church-sanctioned doctrine of apartheid (Acland 1990, p. 165).

¹⁵⁰ This is something to be remembered when it comes to the question of whether Jung can help to explain conflict that stems from religious differences more generally. Dourley (2006) provides an introduction in his examination of the affinities between Samuel Huntington’s thinking in his seminal essay, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ (1993), and that of Jung, notably his identification of religion as key to the making of culture. Jung, argues Dourley, says religious conflict “represents the conflict between the archetypal powers bonding the conflicted communities” and “communities differentiated by their archetypal bonding, with the ever present danger of being rendered unconscious by such bonding...can readily find themselves compelled through the archetypal enmity such bonding generates to destroy the common human psyche that created them” (Dourley 2006, p. 38).

imagination, the behaviour and the emotions of the collective psyche and unleash tremendously irrational forces in the name of their logic” (ibid.).

This contention, and its application to religious communities, is illustrated in *The Cultural Complex* by Manisha Roy’s essay on how Puritanism in America turned a religious archetype into a cultural complex (ibid., pp. 64-77). Roy argues that the American cultural complex is the consequence of the tension between the Judaeo-Christian God-image of Yahweh as the embodiment of “perfection” and “righteousness” and the Christian image of Christ which, in Jung’s view, was an archetype more concerned with “wholeness”.¹⁵¹ Roy contends that the early Pilgrims to America, escaping persecution in England, brought with them their puritanical faith and imposed it on the New World despite the political, environmental and physical obstacles in their way, and it is this that lingers on behind the scenes in the form of a cultural complex (ibid., p. 74). She believes it is responsible for two of the most striking elements in American society: the tendency to strict judgment of others’ sexual and ethical morality, and “the absence of any awareness of one’s power shadow” (ibid.).¹⁵² She goes on to argue that this complex that enshrines the will to perfection also inclines the country’s leaders to self-righteousness and arrogance with no balancing input from the wholeness of the Christ-image. Roy admits that the ethnic and cultural mix in the United States is enormously complex, and that each cultural tradition brings its own creative energies and cultural archetypes to the melting pot; nevertheless, she argues, “the simple and painful psychological fact [is] that the more unconscious a complex is, the more energy it can hold and the more likely it is to have negative and destructive effects” (ibid., p. 75). If

¹⁵¹ In *Aion* (1951) Jung writes: “The Christ-image is as good as perfect (at least it is meant to be so), while the archetype (so far as is known) denotes completeness but is far from being perfect.... The individual may strive after perfection....but must suffer from the opposite of his intentions for the sake of completeness” (Jung CW9ii, para. 123). Much of Jung’s psychology is concerned with reconciling the opposites and fractures within individuals in the name of achieving a psychological and spiritual wholeness.

¹⁵² See below for discussion of the concept of the shadow in analytical psychology.

Roy is correct it might explain some of the social and political paradoxes that make a God-fearing nation also one of the most divided and violent: it is not the fact of a cultural complex rooted in a particular form of religion that is the problem – but its one-sidedness.¹⁵³

The Cultural Complex contains a number of other examples of what their authors consider can be regarded as cultural complexes: *malinchismo*, the tendency to reject one's own culture, in Mexico; corruption in Brazil; racism generally; and *ubuntu*, the spirit of fellowship, humanity, and compassion (Gade 2012), an example of how a cultural complex can be available for positive ends. The common thread in all these examples of cultural complexes is their ability to affect the fundamental feelings of those who experience them; the strength and depth of their lodging in the unconscious; their ability to accrue further experience that confirms their validity and resists dilution or variation; and, critically, their archetypal cores expressing primordial aspects of human experience. These examples also suggest a causal nexus between cultural values, collective identity and the personality traits that dominate in a particular culture (Alho 2006). While *The Cultural Complex* itself contains no explicitly religious examples other than that of Manisha Roy quoted above, it is not difficult to see how the hatred manifest in recent and current conflicts with religious dimensions could be increased by cultural complexes among protagonists. Moreover, in papers written before *The Cultural Complex* Singer and Kimbles do provide some thoughts on how group complexes can take over an entire community or nation with destructive consequences.¹⁵⁴ An essay of Singer's, for example, notes that "radical Muslim terrorism is

¹⁵³ To some extent this is reminiscent of Integrative Complexity (IC). Although a world away from Jung's psychology in terms of theory and methods, IC confirms that extremist ideologies of any kind feature heavily polarised positions and simplified, black-and-white thinking through a lens that rejects shades of grey, any degree of ambiguity or any acceptance of other points of view. See for example Suedfeld, P, Tetlock, P and Streufert, S 1992, "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity," in Smith, CP (ed.), *Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

¹⁵⁴ It can also be argued that in 2016 the issue of Brexit took on quasi-religious significance for both its supporters and decriers: the bitterness of the language being used and the polarisation of believers and non-

a demonic, archetypal defence designed to protect and relive a collective spirit wounded by the loss of its scientific, technological and materialistic initiative to the West".¹⁵⁵ If there is an Islamic complex it is presumably based on the idea, belief and memory that there was once a golden age of Islam before the West intervened through colonization and the imposition of secular states that compromised the purity of Islam within the Muslim world, the consequence being that some Muslims now feel oppressed by the secular and godless West (Savage and Liht 2009, p. 490).

The concept of the shadow

There is one common archetype, the shadow, associated with all complexes, both personal and cultural, that is likely to amplify any feeling of hatred already associated with a complex. The shadow is one of the archetypes which, Jung maintained, is an unconscious aspect of personality and the container of all of which an individual is either ignorant or reluctant to acknowledge. "Everyone carries a shadow," Jung wrote in *Psychology and Religion* "and the less it is embodied in the individual's conscious life, the blacker and denser it is" (Jung 1938, p. 93). One of the consequences of the shadow is the human tendency to project: to see in others the shadow aspects of oneself, and to react against those people because they embody what one does not wish to admit in oneself. These are the generalities of popular psychology and mentioned only as a reminder of what shadow and projection mean, very broadly, in the context of depth psychology. But this contrast of light and dark is hardly new: indeed, one of the primary purposes of religion

believers has all the hallmarks, using the Singer-Kimbles definitions, of cultural complexes being activated for both sides.

¹⁵⁵ Quoted from a review of Beebe, J (ed.) 2002, *Terror, Violence and the Impulse to Destroy: Perspectives from Analytical Psychology*, papers from the North American Conference of Jungian Analysts and Candidates, Einsiedeln, Switzerland in *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 2007, vol. 52, pp. 369–379.

has always been, arguably, to define the shadow side so that it may be avoided. The polarity is sometimes made explicit for religious believers: the prophet Isaiah in the Old Testament of the Christian Bible, for example, says “Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter....” (Isaiah 5:20, King James Version). In Chinese Taoism the yin-yang symbol shows us the alliance of opposites curled around each other and containing within each the pole of the opposite (Zweig and Abrams 1991, p.129), while the Sufi poet Rumi prefigures the idea of projection when he says “If thou hast not seen the devil, look at thine own self” (ibid.). In Hinduism and Buddhism these aspects of light and dark are personified by gods and demons, the *rakshasas*, spirits, that inhabit the human mind in the form of largely negative emotions such as greed, jealousy and envy.

Where there is a complex, there is a shadow, and the shadow is always involved in processes of change: “as in its collective, mythological form, so also the individual shadow contains within it the seed of an *enantiodromia*, of a conversion into its opposite” (Jung 1959, p. 272).¹⁵⁶ In the case of the cultural complex it contains the shadow aspects of the culture: prejudices, violence, indifference to social injustice (Corbett 2012, p. 164) and presumably, in parallel with the personal complex, the archetypes of enemies, treacherous

¹⁵⁶ Quoted in Collins, M, Hughes, W and Samuels, A 2010, ‘The Politics of Transformation in the Global Crisis: Are Spiritual Emergencies Reflecting an *Enantiodromia* in Modern Consciousness?’, *Psychotherapy and Politics International*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 162–176. The concept of *enantiodromia*, which Jung borrowed from Heraclitus (Jung 1923, pp. 541-542) embodies the principles of balance and compensation at the heart of analytical psychology: “The spirit is also a self-regulation system that maintains its own balance, as well as the body. If any process goes too far, it will immediately cause compensation. Without the compensation, there will be neither normal metabolism nor normal spirit. People can regard compensation theory as a rule of spiritual behavior. The absence of one party will result in an overdose of the other party (Stevens, A (trans. Yang, S) 2007, *A Brief Analysis of Jung*, Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, Beijing quoted in Yali, X 2015, ‘Study on the "Enantiodromia" in Analytical Psychology’, *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, vol. 329, Atlantis Press, Beijing.) It should be noted that the conscious and unconscious are separate and the one may be employed in balancing the other: in other words *enantiodromia* can be an internal process. Jung cites the example of St. Paul’s conversion as an example of this.

strangers, evil intruders (Stevens 1990, p. 45). When a cultural complex is activated, Singer argues, very primitive emotions – fear, hatred, and violent rage - are generated in individuals and groups of people, and with these come the shadow projections that explain the practice of scapegoating and demeaning society’s out-groups (Singer 2010). It is a propensity that can be manipulated by national leaders: for example Hitler’s repeated mention of *Untermenschen*, subhumans, by which he meant people of Jewish and Slavic origin. As Anthony Stevens describes, “By skilful use of the Nazi propaganda machine, he was able to induce a sizeable portion of the German population to project its shadow collectively onto these tragically unfortunate people” (ibid., p. 44). This was the consequence of the shadow expressed through the German cultural complex in the 1930s and, Jung would presumably argue, was the enantiodromia which balanced Germany’s long history at the apex of European culture. The importance of enantiodromia is something to which this dissertation will return in later chapters.

The same shadow process has been enacted through the dark sides of religion (Corbett 2012, p. 236). In some it is explicit: the Norse god Loki, for example, is the epitome of wickedness and dishonesty (Crossley-Holland 1980, pp. 162-172); the Egyptian pantheon contained the evil god Seth (or Set) (Velde 1977); and Manichaeism espoused the doctrine of two opposing principles, light and dark, in a constant cosmic battle.¹⁵⁷ Christianity is set apart, in Jungian thinking, by its insistence that God is entirely good even though the Old Testament indicates some genocidal tendencies and unbelievers in the

¹⁵⁷ Jung’s approach to Manichaeism was central to his thinking about Christianity: “Hence very early, in Clement of Rome, we meet with the conception of Christ as the right hand and the devil as the left hand of God, not to speak of the Judaeo-Christian view which recognized two sons of God, Satan the elder and Christ the younger. The figure of the devil then rose to such exalted metaphysical heights that he had to be forcibly depotentiated, under the threatening influence of Manichaeism. The depotentiation was effected this time by rationalistic reflection, by a regular tour de force of sophistry which defined evil as a *privatio boni*. But that did nothing to stop the belief from arising in many parts of Europe during the eleventh century, mainly under the influence of the Cathars, that it was not God but the devil who had created the world” (Jung, CW 11, para. 470).

New Testament's Book of Revelation are subject to angels bringing plagues (Chapters 15 and 16). Jung points out that if Christians wish to be truly monotheistic then both good and evil must be obtained in the single image of God (Jung CW11, para. 357).¹⁵⁸ The relevance of this to the generation of religious hatred is that when human beings are subject to circumstances that stimulate to action an unconscious religious complex, it is presumably as likely to activate the dark and shadow side of religion as it is to activate the light and love that religions prefer to emphasise. This highlights the difference between a traditional God-image, where God is only good, and lived experience where events which raise questions about the absence or complicity of God, make belief harder. As Lionel Corbett argues, "from a psychological point of view, our *experience* of God matters more than our *doctrine* of God..." (Corbett 2012, p. 166).¹⁵⁹

To summarise this argument from psychodynamic psychology, personal and cultural complexes that have their roots in any religious tradition are as likely to stimulate destructive as constructive behaviour because, whatever they may profess, all religions have dark sides. The next question is how the currency of destructive behaviour, which must include religious hatred, can spread so rapidly as to engulf entire populations.¹⁶⁰

The circulation of affect

¹⁵⁸ Jung famously (notoriously, for some) explored the dark side of God in *Answer to Job* (1952) which examines the psychological implications of the *Book of Job*. Jung has God realise, through his treatment of Job, that he is perhaps not wholly good after all, and this revelation pushes him into the process of self-transformation that leads to his incarnation as Jesus (Stein 1999, p. 285).

¹⁵⁹ It was this that led Jung to believe that the power of evil is more than simply human. While it could be argued that events such as the Holocaust or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima were purely the result of human behaviour, Jung felt that occurrences of such magnitude are far too terrible to be of purely human origin. Corbett says that some theologians acknowledge this, for example Jim Garrison in *The Darkness of God* (1982) argues that Hiroshima cannot be explained away as a purely human disaster and that God must have been involved.

¹⁶⁰ The concept of the shadow is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

The concept of the complex has found its way into popular speech – for example someone may be remonstrated with for teasing a child: “Don’t do that – it’ll give him a complex” – but, generally speaking, the idea of the complex is usually subsumed into talk about emotions. This is perfectly accurate even if only partially true, leaving out as it does the complex as a source of emotions, and therefore to understand the extent to which complexes are perceived in discussion of conflict attention must be paid to the emotions. This is not, at least as regards political and religious conflict, as ubiquitous as might be expected, perhaps because it is assumed that matters of high politics are immune from emotion and that politicians and diplomats move in circles exempt from the forces that shape human behaviour in most other contexts (Ross 2013, p. 152).¹⁶¹ This assumption cannot last beyond a moment’s reflection: whether the latest ructions in the world involve suicide bombing, financial crises, natural disasters or demonstrations against government policies, without exception they engage emotion as much as reason (ibid.). It would be untrue to say that emotion has been entirely overlooked in the study of international relations and conflict resolution: the role of fear in shaping defence procurement, for example, or the dangers of groupthink in decision-making have both been comprehensively studied, but there is still some tendency to treat emotions “as periodic aberrations from some baseline of “rational” competency. The result is an assumption that affective motivations can be set aside by standard models of rational action” (ibid., p.152).

¹⁶¹ Ross’s insight on this point deserves more extended exposure: “Scholars informed by political theory have identified the need to disentangle the presuppositions associated with secularism in the West before religious elements of political agency can be properly understood. We are unlikely to comprehend the complex politics of terrorist organizations without connecting up discussions in security studies and foreign policy with insights from these fields. Transnational religious movements employing violence are—like Western humanitarian organizations who instead pursue liberal forms of advocacy—at once political, cultural, and normative projects that cannot be understood without attention to the way fluid circulations of affect unite their members and connect them to even broader audiences. While scholars may hold disciplinary conventions in great esteem, emotions that migrate across social settings, actors, and political issues generally do not” (Ross 2013, p. 152).

Another element of emotions that is easy to overlook is that they are multidimensional. All emotions carry with them, for example, physiological consequences – how people look and move; their ability to interpret their proprioceptive sense (Acland et al 2013); the social, cultural and political impacts of their emotional state – whether they respond with arrogance or empathy, for example, towards those who may not share their preoccupations; and their cognitive abilities will likewise be affected by how they feel and the acuity of their intuitive capabilities. The cumulative effect of these is that social interactions must be regarded as the key medium of emotional exchange, and many important social interactions, particularly in situations of conflict, will be fleeting and often non-verbal. The result is socially transmitted blocks of emotion that the political scientist Andrew Ross calls “circulations of affect” (Ross 2013, p. 218).

It is not difficult to imagine how complicated becomes the task of the scholar-practitioner when, in addition to examining the normative structures of political conflict, for example, the practitioner must look also at how these circulations and re-circulations of affect have been formed, shaped and evolved into new forms that may be relatively transient. Add to these the need to understand the complexes that may also have determined their development, and it becomes apparent how much data the practitioner must theoretically assimilate before deciding on any course of action. Looking at the possible complexes, on the other hand, which may be driving the emotions, might be considered relatively straightforward given that both personal and cultural complexes usually have their roots in past experience which, certainly in the case of the latter, is usually a matter of public knowledge. The scholar practitioner might conclude that it is generally easier to predict the emotions that arise from a complex than it is to start with a multitude of emotions and try to deduce their origins.

PART 3: RELIGIOUS HATRED AND THE DIMENSIONS OF RELIGION

Chapter 5: Highlighting six dimensions of religion

Introduction

Part 3 of this dissertation examines religious hatred within the framework of six dimensions of religion. These dimensions, whose provenance is discussed below, provide a way to think systematically about religious hatred for both the scholar and the practitioner. They draw on the literatures of conflict resolution, psychology of religion and cognitive and psychodynamic psychology summarised in Chapters 3 and 4, and the aspects of hatred they highlight are reflected in the implications for dialogue and diapraxis set out in Chapter 12. While deciding which dimensions to use has not been straightforward, as the discussion below illustrates, it is arguable how significant the final decisions about dimensions are when they are ultimately no more than structural lenses through which to look at religious hatred: as will become apparent, the drivers of religious hatred become increasingly clear and pan-dimensional. The dimensional structure does, nevertheless, provide anchors for a subject that it is liable otherwise to become too fluid and diffuse to permit systematic thought.

Exploring possible frameworks

It is legitimate to ask from the outset about the nature and provenance of these ‘dimensions’ and how they relate to various taxonomies of religion, though it is a discussion difficult to separate from wider discourse about the nature of religion itself. The most obvious taxonomy of religion is that which divides religions into ‘world’ or

‘universalistic’ religions, often those with the numerically largest number of adherents (Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism). Alternatively they could be divided into the three divisions structuralists would call ‘degree-zero’: Religions of Antiquity, New Religions, and Religions of Traditional Peoples.¹⁶² But none of these describes the internal components of religion in a way that assists a scholar-practitioner understanding of how religious hatred might arise either generally or in the course of ‘conflict with religious dimensions’.

The challenges in doing this are reflected in the dissection of religion by Ninian Smart which was published with six dimensions in *The Religious Experience of Mankind* (1969), with a seventh and eighth added two decades later for *The World’s Religions* (1989) only to be removed for *Worldviews* (1995) though increased again, to nine, for *Dimensions of the Sacred* (1996). This process reflects the extent to which the content of Smart’s dimensions also evolved as he struggled with the attendant problem of definition: “if our seven-dimensional portrait of religions is adequate, then we do not need to worry greatly about further definition of religion” (1989, p. 21). He was particularly taxed, for example, as to whether Marxism should be included as a religion when it specifically proscribes “the invisible world” (1969, p. 21) which was crucial to his analysis on the grounds that personal religion “normally involves the hope of, or realization of, experience of that world” (ibid.). The challenge to this has been that if one judges that Marxism proclaims a future classless utopia as an invisible world, then Marxism should surely qualify as a religion (Rennie 1999). By 1995 Smart was including nationalism in addition to Marxism and humanism to what he calls “worldview analysis” while insisting that

¹⁶² Lévi-Strauss, C 1950, *Sociologie et anthropologie par Marcel Mauss*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris) quoted by Smith JZ 1996, ‘A Matter of Class: Taxonomies of religion’, *Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 89, no. 4, pp. 387-403.

secular worldviews are not religion but have “some of the same characteristics” (1995, p.45). Despite this he still analyses them as religious because they have a “distinctly religious-type function” (1989, p. 25) and eventually concludes that “[T]he washing away of a fundamental distinction between religion and secular worldviews enables us to ask more sensible questions about the functions of systems of belief” (1994, p. 604). By 1996, however, while the political and economic dimensions of religion have been included, albeit with little detail or explanation, Smart’s references to the invisible world have significantly declined despite his elevation of the Experiential and Emotional Dimension to its place at the head of his other dimensions. This sequence of development illustrates both the tension between taxonomy and definition, and the difficulties concealed in a phrase such as ‘conflict with religious dimensions’.¹⁶³

While Smart and his many predecessors are correct in seeing religiosity as multi-dimensional, the number and nature of these dimensions tends to depend on the purposes they are being called upon to serve, and when tested in the field the dimensions identified relate to the characteristics of those who are being sampled and to some extent the subjectivity of the interpreter. It can reasonably be argued, therefore, that there are precedents for creating a list of dimensions that will serve the analytical needs of the

¹⁶³ Smart was by no means the first scholar to attempt such an analysis. Looking briefly at past examples of such attempts, the theologian von Hügel in 1908 suggested that religion has three successive dimensions: the *traditional*, based largely on childhood experiences; the *rational*, which rests on the ability to think in abstract terms that comes with increasing maturity of reasoning; and the *intuitive* which grows out of the experiences of maturity. In a later example, in 1962 Glock divided religion into *ideological*, *ritualistic*, *intellectual*, *experiential* and *consequential* dimensions, while in 1998 Bailey in his documentation of Implicit Religion suggested it be defined in terms of *commitment*, *social integration* and *religious and secular interrelationships*. Such schemas have also been subjected to analysis in the field. For example, in 1966 Faulkener and DeJong tested Glock’s dimensions on a sample of students, revealing that, generally, while the experiential and consequential dimensions were quite distinctive, the others, particularly the ideological and intellectual, were more closely related even though the results, when interrogated further, revealed gender, denominational and inter-faith differences. Similarly, in 1982 Batson and Ventis conducted research into Allport’s concept of extrinsic and intrinsic religion (1959) which suggested a third orientation they called ‘quest’; this adds a dimension characterised by a willingness to be more open-minded and motivated by the search for personal growth (Hills P and Argyle M 2002, ‘A Psychological Dimension to Implicit Religion’ in *Implicit Religion*, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 69-79).

scholar-practitioner studying how religious hatred may be manifested in and through them. Beyond this there have also been attempts to grapple, as Smart also did, with what actually constitutes religion. Greil and Robins (1994) for example distinguish between quasi- and para-religions. The former are defined as forms of belief and behaviour that have a sacred dimension but lack formal organisation; environmentalism is an example.¹⁶⁴ Para-religions are movements that while having an essentially secular focus, in their approaches and methods use processes similar to those of evangelical religion; Alcoholics Anonymous is an example.¹⁶⁵ In addition to these, and perhaps inhabiting the world of both quasi- and para-religions, are the movements for self-development that have grown out of the popularisation of psychology, the development of holistic and alternative medicine and the evolution of New Age beliefs and other new religious movements (NRMs).

It becomes apparent that in exploring the concept of religious hatred as part of ‘conflict with religious dimensions’ the discussion inevitably moves onto what ‘religious’ means and from there to what constitutes ‘religion’. The concept of religion is likely to remain contentious despite many attempts to categorise different types of religion in the quest for consensus but, as has been pointed out, in this regard religion is no different from concepts such as ‘the economy’, ‘politics’ or ‘society’ (Woodhead 2010), where scholars proceed without final definitions. But, as Woodhead also points out, “the definition of

¹⁶⁴ Full discussion of the para-religious and psychodynamic dimensions of environmentalism are beyond the scope of this dissertation but might shed light on the nature and intensity of conflict over environmental issues. The mythological and religious traditions of many cultures include references to for example, ‘World Trees’ as the point of contact between the mundane and trans-mundane ((Eliade 1959, p. 256); ‘Sacred Groves’ have played a similar role (Hughes 1990). Williams (1990) argues that such spiritual experience of the natural world involves the projection of unconscious archetypes, and the ignorance or repression of such archetypes can mean they assume a negative form that can overwhelm the conscious ego if the objects of those projections are threatened by, for example, environmental damage or degradation (Schroeder 1992).

¹⁶⁵ Alcoholics Anonymous was founded in 1934 by William G. Wilson, as a consequence of a remark the analytical psychologist Carl Jung had made to a patient whom he was treating for chronic alcoholism: “His craving for alcohol was the equivalent on a low level of the spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness, expressed in medieval language: the union with God” (Jung et al 2015, p. 624).

religion is not the same as the concept of religion” (ibid.). The latter is criticised by all sides: by Christian theologians because ‘religion’ is a modern concept based on secular presuppositions that distort its reality; by secularists claiming it is too Christian; by postcolonial critiques who see ethnocentric imperialist biases forcing non-Western cultures into Western straightjackets; and by academics, including Woodhead, who observe that the “normativity of many sociological conceptions...in which a normal of ‘real’ religion (congregational, orderly, civic) has the effect of constructing alternative forms of religion as ‘fuzzy’, individualistic’, ‘eclectic’ and even ‘narcissistic’ ” (Woodhead 2011).

Woodhead’s answer is to offer a taxonomy of five major concepts of religion that embrace its inherently multi- and inter-disciplinary nature: religion as culture, identity, relationship, practice and power, with a number of sub-categories within each. Under the heading of culture, for example, Woodhead explores religion as belief and meaning, as meaning and cultural order, as values, as discourse, as ideology and mystification, and as tradition and memory. Similar sub-categories under each of her main divisions, with explanations of their logic, antecedents and derivation, provide a comprehensive approach that in many ways overlaps with Ninian Smart’s. Her taxonomy is compared with Smart’s below.

One exception is the concept of religion as power which, Woodhead argues, lies at the heart of religion but has been neglected in recent times largely because increasingly secular societies have tended to assume religion’s loss of social power.¹⁶⁶ But, as Woodhead points out, power has always lain at the heart of religion, whether it is the power that is drawn from relationship with higher powers, or the powers wielded by religious institutions and elites over their adherents and followers and through their wider

¹⁶⁶ The British Academy’s *The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding* (Sylvestri and Mayall, 2015) is notable among recent publications for its appreciation of power as a dimension of religion that can be overlooked in the contemporary world.

influence in society. The mention of power always catches the attention of scholar-practitioners in the conflict resolution field because of the significance of power relations in all forms of conflict, and it is worth examining Woodhead's dissertation more closely to appreciate whether this significance should be incorporated into an analytical framework designed to tease out how religious hatred contributes to religious conflict, given that hatred can have its roots in oppression by the powerful. She highlights, for example, the importance of religion as a 'compensator' for those denied worldly power (Stark and Bainbridge 1985) and Robert Putnam's idea of religion's ability to build 'social capital' (Putnam 2000). Woodhead mentions also the importance of ritual in cementing power through the coordination of individual actions and solidaristic emotions and bonds to the point that the need for intellectual debate and agreement can be bypassed, referencing Kertzer's naming of this as 'solidarity without consensus' (Kertzer 1988).¹⁶⁷ The analysis of religion as a form of power has, according to Woodhead, far-reaching implications, from the macro-level where religion influences through alliance with class, party and gender politics to the micro, as in "the practice of young Muslim women in Europe wearing *hijab* and *niqab*.... as an attempt to win recognition for a form of identity which is self-defined rather than imposed by the majority society" (Woodhead 2011).

This appreciation of power in relation to religion stems in part from greater awareness of the 'functional' as well as the 'substantive' conceptions of religion, the former focusing on how faith is articulated in practice through its impact on the thinking and behaviour of individuals and groups (Gellner 1992, p.3; Frazer and Friedli 2015, p. 31). Silvestri and Mayall (2016) conclude that Duffy (2004) and Thomas (2005) are

¹⁶⁷ This is a useful reminder that individuals and communities can be moved to action without intellectual assent to the reasons behind that action or, indeed, as has been argued about the 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union, without the reasons ever being clearly defined.

correct to say that “the experiential level (i.e. experiencing shared values and commitment) is as important, or perhaps even more important, than the intellectual and cognitive dimension of faith” (2015, p. 6). The theme is reinforced by the conclusions of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his definition of religion as

(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

(Geertz 1993, p.90)

Geertz’s subsequent words resonate with the stance of this dissertation when he says religion “tunes human actions to an envisaged cosmic order and projects images of cosmic order onto the plane of human experience” (ibid.).¹⁶⁸ It is this power of religion to inspire belief in a world and an order beyond the current temporal reality that can lead eschatology to “turn a disaffected teenager into a suicide bomber” (Johnston and Cox 2003, p. 14).¹⁶⁹

The attractions of combining the theoretical and the pragmatic is also exemplified by the approach to understanding the scope of religion articulated by George Lindbeck in *The Nature of Doctrine* (1984). He categorises alternative theories as the propositional, the experiential-expressive and the cultural-linguistic (Lindbeck 1984, pp. 31-41). The propositional describes religion as a set of propositional claims and organised beliefs about the world, handed down across time in the forms of sacred texts and stories, that place humankind in relation to a God or gods and provide guidance on the key questions that life throws at human beings. The experiential-expressive approach to religion places its emphasis, as the name suggests, on people’s internal emotions, feelings and spiritual

¹⁶⁸ Geertz’s conception of religion has been criticised for mistaking religion for ideology in a way that is itself ideological (see Steel, S 2002, ‘George Grant: A Critique of Geertz’s Analysis of Religion’, *Religious Studies and Theology*, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 23-36.) Notwithstanding this critique, Geertz’s appreciation of the nature of religious (or indeed, ideological) power remains useful in this context.

¹⁶⁹ It is this latter understanding of power, and the sense of control that may come in its wake, that is explored in Chapter 11 of this dissertation.

experiences of what Paul Tillich described as “ultimate concern” (Tillich 1957, p. 5); it also focuses on the transcendent, the eternal and the numinous, the ‘*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*’ (Otto 1917, p. 12). The cultural-linguistic theory also reflects the influence of cultural anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1993). Using this approach partly to criticise the expressive-experiential approach, Lindbeck sees religion as a force that shapes how people engage with the world: “...it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the description of realities, the attitudes, feelings and sentiments. Like a culture or language, it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities” (Lindbeck 1984, p. 33). While both the cultural-linguistic and expressive-experiential approaches are useful to provide a context within which to explore different understandings of religion, neither contribute particularly to explaining how and why religious hatred emerges in some social, political and cultural contexts, and in some individuals, but not others.

There is a point at which further discussion of the rightness or wrongness of conceptualizing typologies of religion ceases to have much value. As Cox (1998) argues, “The problem centers on the capacity of scholars to create broad generalizations for the purposes of comparison while still maintaining an accurate account of specific data on which the generalizations are based”; in the post-modern debate further doubt is raised about this capacity. At the heart of the postmodern critique is, argues Cox, a rejection of universals on the grounds, first, that unified knowledge about human societies and cultures is effectively impossible; secondly, that overarching interpretative theories of histories, cultures or societies are empirically unverifiable; and thirdly that any attempt to produce a comprehensive conceptual picture of cultures and societies ultimately flies in the face of what scholarship believes possible.

While any scholar-practitioner with experience of religious conflict will be aware of the dangers both of over-generalisation and of reducing religion into just another point of view, defining what exactly falls within the scope of ‘religion’ remains challenging, and this is a further reason for establishing a clear table of dimensions before discussing how religious hatred fits into an understanding of religion. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, both scholars at Bar-Ilan University, in *Religion in World Conflict* (2006), for example, describe the five social manifestations of religion “under which most of their understandings of religion can be placed” (p. 2). These are religion as identity, belief, doctrine, institution and religion as a source of legitimacy. A similar approach is taken in *Approaching religion in conflict transformation: concepts, cases and practical implications* (Frazer and Friedli 2015). This publication by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, a body which specialises in the mediation of religious conflict, is based on an appreciation of the understanding that active interveners in conflict, such as Swiss state-supported mediators, need to perform their roles. CSS admits challenges from the outset concerning what is meant by ‘religious belief’, what religions are, what roles they play and how to understand them, reflecting the lack of agreement on the definition of religion even in the field of religious studies, but equally recognises the need for practitioners to have definitions on which to base their work. Frazer and Friedli, for example, use ‘substantive’ and ‘functionalist’ (2015, p. 31), the former defining religion by identifying characteristics such as belief in a higher being, the latter by what religion can achieve, such as giving people a sense of meaning and purpose or contributing to the building of communities. Beyond this basic dichotomy Frazer and Friedli identify twenty-five different approaches to religion, gathering these under seven broad and overlapping groupings according to ‘family resemblances’ (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 31e): structural functionalist – societal cohesion; sociological organization; culture-constituting form; constructivist – response models for societal

needs; psychological dimension; perception of transcendence; and X-factor (Frazer and Friedli 2015, p. 32).

CSS summarises its approach into five ways of thinking about religion designed to “strengthen the analysis of the role of religion in conflict and thereby improve corresponding initiatives to transform conflict” (ibid, p. 6). These are religion as community, identifying the collective, community-forming aspects of religion where religion can underpin or enhance social cohesion, but may also create a dynamic that highlights boundaries between groups and contribute to identity-markers that can lead to religious hatred; religion as a set of teachings, characterizing religion as a set of inherited teachings on how things are and how they ought to be around which a society can unite, or which can also become a source of conflict where groups accept different teachings or teachings which challenge the status quo; religion as spirituality, focusing on personal experiences of the ultimate which can motivate people to conflict or reconciliation and emphasise either shared or different experience; religion as practice which focuses on the everyday life of customs, rituals and ceremonies which mark shared or diverse rites of passage or memory; and religion as discourse, understood as the words and language used to communicate which may also reveal whole ways of thinking about and interpreting the world, and in consequence areas of agreement and disagreement which may give rise to hatred. Each of these dimensions, as is apparent from the above, includes what CSS calls ‘dividers’ (sources of tension) and ‘connectors’ (capacities for peace).

Using the literature

At some point, and taking into account all the arguments outlined above, it has to be decided which are the dimensions of religion most likely to give rise to religious hatred

and through which religious hatred is most likely to be expressed and experienced. The four lists in the table below summarise the work of scholars and practitioners mentioned above: a scholar of religion (Smart 1989), a sociologist with a particular interest in religion (Woodhead 2011), two political scientists with a particular interest in religious conflict (Fox and Sandler 2006), and one practising mediator and a sociologist of comparative religion (Frazer and Friedli 2015). These four have been chosen for a number of reasons. First, those compiling them come from a range of backgrounds and they examine religious conflict from different angles: so the range of overlap suggests that such dimensions respond to some common cognitive recognitions. Secondly, they also, albeit perhaps not intentionally except in the case of Richard Friedli, reflect practitioners' need for structures that are readily comprehensible, because practitioners often have to make rapid process decisions under pressure and are unlikely to remember overly sophisticated formulations. Thirdly, they are immediately applicable: they provide practitioners with a framework within which fresh knowledge or new understanding can be safely lodged and recalled.

Smart	Woodhead	Fox & Sandler	Frazer & Friedli
Ritual Social and institutional Experiential and emotional Doctrinal and philosophical Narrative and Mythic Ethical and legal Material	Practice Identity Relationship Culture Power	Identity Belief Doctrinal/ideological Legitimacy Institutional	Practice Community Discourse Teachings Spirituality

Although reducing each of these lists to these headings does not spell out the detail under each, and nor does it quite compare like with like given the differences in the detail, it does allow a quick comparison of the broad areas of dimension that each identifies. Three, for example, agree that ritual and practice is one dimension of religion; the fourth may include it under 'doctrine' or 'institutional'. Similarly, Frazer and Friedli use the

umbrella term ‘teachings’, equating roughly with Smart and Fox and Sandler’s ‘doctrinal and philosophical’ and ‘doctrinal/ideological’, while Woodhead puts these under ‘culture’ as belief and meaning, cultural order, values, discourse, ideology and mystification, and as tradition and memory. The latter Smart includes under his ‘narrative and mythic’ heading and Frazer and Friedli under a blend of ‘community’ and ‘spirituality’, while Fox and Sandler see ‘legitimacy’ as the consequence of justification by religious observance. Similar observations can be made about other overlaps and combinations, though the teasing apart of the mythic, narrative and emotional and experiential dimensions of religion is particularly challenging. It again illustrates the difficulty of agreeing exactly what is meant by the ‘dimensions’ of religion: it depends where you are coming from and what purpose you envision for the compiling of such lists of dimensions.¹⁷⁰

The purpose of this list of ‘dimensions of religion’ is to create a framework within which it is possible to examine how the psychological movers of religious hatred may be manifested and thereby contribute to religious conflict and also, albeit more tentatively, to provide a framework within which to conceive of systematic responses to religious hatred. The following paragraphs identify the dimensions of religion which provide a coherent framework to suit all these purposes. Some historical examples are included to illustrate the type of circumstances they cover.

¹⁷⁰ The dimensions discussion could be much more extensive: Glock (1962) and Verbit (1970) distinguished between five or six dimensions; the sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger (1999) proposed that four major dimensions can be organized as the poles of two bipolar and orthogonal axes, the first axis contrasting emotions with what she calls “culture” (corresponding to beliefs and intellectual and symbolic heritage) with the second axis contrasting ethics with community. Tarakeshwar, Stanton, and Pargament (2003) suggested that five dimensions (very close to those described by Verbit) could be helpful for studying cultural variability on religion. Atran and Norenzayan (2004) advanced ideas from evolutionary psychology that are in favour of some ‘naturalness’ and universality of the major aspects of religion across religions and societies. Data from large international sociological studies suggest the usefulness of a model distinguishing between beliefs, practice (or behavior), and affiliation (or identification) (e.g. Voas, 2007). The concision of Saroglou, V 2011, ‘Believing, Bonding, Behaving, and Belonging: The Big Four Religious Dimensions and Cultural Variation’, *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* vol. 42, is also attractive.

The first dimension of religion to be considered is that of **identity**. It is interesting that Woodhead and Fox and Sandler separate out identity as a discrete dimension of religion, Frazer and Friedli subsuming it under a mix of community, discourse and spirituality, and Smart tending to see identity as part of the social and institutional dimension, though it would perhaps be fairer to say that for him identity seems to be more of a given vested in the totality of all the dimensions. Fox and Sandler are clear on the fundamental importance of identity, citing the many different ways in which conflict scholars use religious identity, from deciding which conflicts are religious to examining, for example, the extent to which the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir involves issues of religious identity (Fox and Sandler 2006, p. 3). It can similarly be argued that the withdrawal of support from the Dutch Reformed Church over 1986-9 contributed to the ending of apartheid because Afrikaner nationalism relied for a major part of its legitimacy on its identification with the Christian religion, the Black opposition similarly relying on religion in part to shape its legitimacy as a government in waiting.¹⁷¹ Identity is also perhaps the dimension of religion most closely associated with hatred in that hatred can so often be about destroying or even eliminating the personhood of others as Chapter 3 describes. Personal and cultural complexes also both have their roots in the sense of individual and communal identity, so the relationship with identity must be an essential element in any psychodynamic approach to religious hatred.

The **doctrine and practice** of religion can cause hatred and conflict because

¹⁷¹ For an insight into these parallel routes to identity see Engdahl, Hans 2012, 'Theology as politics in Afrikaner nationalism and Black consciousness', *Journal of Theology for South Africa*, no. 144, pp. 4-25.

people's practices differ (for example, how the sign of the cross should be made¹⁷²) or because the everyday expression of a religion cuts across the needs, interest or values of others (as an ancient example, the safety of pilgrimage routes¹⁷³) or because the practice of one person causes offence to another (for example, the eating of pork is offensive to Jews and Muslims). These differences may sometimes seem trivial to the outsider, but they are a reminder that what may seem insignificant to one person may be anything but to another. Differences of doctrine are illustrated all too easily by the tensions and occasional hatreds among Catholics and Protestants that have led to conflict ever since the Reformation and remain relevant to this day in contexts such as Northern Ireland. But the importance of doctrine differs from religion to religion, and from denomination to denomination within religions, and even between congregations (for example the differences of welcome afforded to gay Christians within different congregations of the Church of England). Practitioners need to have some understanding of doctrinal conflict and how it is perceived, interpreted and practised by individuals in specific situations and circumstances in order to understand how grounds for hatred may arise among some believers if individual or cultural complexes become activated in the course of its expression.¹⁷⁴

The **emotional and experiential** dimension of religion is important, particularly as a motivating factor, because arguably as many people *feel* as *think* their way to the beliefs

¹⁷² For instance 1652 the Patriarch Nikon introduced changes to Russian Orthodox ritual, including how many fingers should be used to make the sign of the cross, which resulted in widespread persecution of the so-called Old Believers (старовёры or старообрядцы). This was only revoked in 1971.

¹⁷³ Reynald de Chatillon's attacks on the Hajj pilgrim routes in 1181-2 raised politically useful questions about Saladin's dedication to Islam (Lee 2016).

¹⁷⁴ One observer of a recent intra-Anglican dispute comments that doctrine is so loosely conveyed within the Church of England that adherents may believe whatever their personal prejudices incline them to believe (private communication, October 2017). In contrast, others have no doubt where they stand: General William Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence under George W. Bush, has been quoted as saying that the United States would win the war against Islam because "our God" was bigger than "their God" (Wooldridge, A 2008, 'Rational Actors: Secular Fallacies', *World Affairs*, vol. 170, no. 4, pp. 47-57).

and sacrifices demanded by faith (James 1902, p. 39; Frijda, Manstead & Bem 2000, pp. 4-6; Frijda & Mesquita 2000, pp. 50-51). It is as well therefore to look beyond intellectual arguments in matters of religion and appreciate the extent to which it is often an expression of deeply felt emotion that may not otherwise find expression; hatred is among the emotions that religion can stimulate even where is not the additional impetus of an individual or cultural complex to add weight to its expression.

The **mythological** dimension that can bring to adherents a more transcendent sense of their role and place in the world and resonate with whatever individual or cultural complexes subsist unconsciously. One illustration is the contemporary show *Kynren* developed by an evangelical Christian to revitalize a depressed town in northern England; the partiality of the myth it portrays is doubtless an enduring part of its appeal (Bartie et al 2020, pp. 281-304). The mythological dimension of religion also contains adherents' sense of their religion in a more down-to-earth, narrative sense, in contrast to the more transcendent sense of the mythic, though in practice the effect may be the same. One example is the Voortrekker Monument on a hilltop south of Pretoria in South Africa, a reminder that people do not have to be 'religious' to value religion: both *Kynren* and the Voortrekker Monument are examples of this.¹⁷⁵ Such blending of the mythic and narrative contribute to the role of religion in building identity, creating in-groups and out-groups, and fomenting suspicion, distrust and hatred where there is fertile ground in the unconscious.

The dimension of a religion that reflects its **sacred values** is often what is most

¹⁷⁵ At one level the monument simply commemorates the Voortrekkers who left the Cape Colony between 1835 and 1854; its marble frieze illustrates the toils, struggles and religious life of the Voortrekkers. At another level the monument enshrines elements of Afrikaner mythology which equate the Voortrekkers with the Children of Israel in search of the Promised Land.

readily perceived from outside, especially as societies arguably become less willing to accept the impacts of religious teaching on personal lives. Conflict about sensitive issues such as abortion, genetic medicine and environmental stewardship are often underpinned by specific religious teachings, sometimes pointing in different directions, as well as by deep reverberations and unformulated intuitions within individual and collective psyches. The Church of England's Shared Conversations project, which used conflict resolution methodologies to facilitate discussions of human sexuality, provided resources setting out all points of view and using both doctrinal and sociological arguments to illustrate moral and ethical issues.¹⁷⁶ For some it is also a small step from claiming religious backing for a point of view to condemning others for not sharing it; in some cases even the discussion of a rival point of view, and the attempt to reconcile believers, has been condemned as sacrilegious in terms that amount to religious hatred.¹⁷⁷ Sacred values can also take on material forms. Mosques, churches, stupas, burial grounds and other sacred spaces are always more than just physical anchors of spiritual allegiances: they can embody, both consciously and unconsciously, the meaning and significance of adherents' beliefs, and attacks on them are experienced as more than just attacks on physical objects. Examples include the Islamic State group's attacks on ancient monuments in Iraq and Syria and the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhist statues at Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁷⁸

The final dimension of religion examined in this dissertation is that of **power and control** as described by Woodhead (2011). It is important because hatred can often grow out of the sense of existential threat to identity and even survival that power can represent.

¹⁷⁶ See for example *Grace and Disagreement: Writings to Resource Conversation and Grace and Dialogue: Shared Conversations on Difficult Issues* <http://www.sharedconversations.org/resources/> [viewed 30.11.17].

¹⁷⁷ Private communication, 2017.

¹⁷⁸ For an example of how a religious site can become a dimension of wider conflict see Jain, M 2017, *The Battle for Rama: Case of the Temple at Ayodhya*, Aryan Books International, Delhi.

The form such power takes will differ from situation to situation and comes in different types Acland (1990, p. 86). Religion can still wield military power, for example, albeit indirectly, as was apparent during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s when various churches assumed nationalist positions (Ivekovic 2002). In addition to such cases, as Woodhead argues, there is the power that is perceived to be drawn by religions from their relationships with whatever higher powers they acknowledge, and through their historical, cultural and social influence.¹⁷⁹ From a psychodynamic perspective the control that power enables is perhaps more significant than power itself.

Religious hatred and the dimensions of religion

Religion may have additional dimensions which are effectively sub-dimensions of these, or which include nuances not described above, but these provide a systematic framework within which Part 3 of this dissertation can consider the contexts in which the activation of unconscious psychodynamic movement can induce or increase religious hatred.¹⁸⁰ There is, however, another issue to be acknowledged and mentioned, although to consider it in the depth it deserves is outside the scope of this dissertation. It is the idea that the expression of hatred, religious or otherwise, and in speech or action, is in some circumstances the expression of evil. This rests on the idea, again beyond the scope of this dissertation, that religion is what stands between humankind and a collective surrender to the forces identified by Anthony Storr in *Human Destructiveness* (1972) and *Human Aggression* (1992). The argument is, in sum, that human beings without the moderating

¹⁷⁹ For a full appreciation of religion and power see Johnston, D and Sampson C 1994, *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, Oxford University Press, New York.

¹⁸⁰ For example, Frazer and Friedli's (2015) concept of religion as discourse, focused on the words and language used to communicate, can be considered to apply to all these dimensions. Each of them also has some role in the creation of (religious) community so arguably 'community' can be considered as a consequence of their accumulation rather than as a separate dimension.

influence of religion are prone to indulge their less attractive proclivities, and that religious hatred and conflict thrives on the failure of any or all of the dimensions of religion to fulfil their positive and benign purposes, both practical and psychological, and instead to allow spaces and vacuums in which the negative, malignant and easily manipulated processes described by Beck (1999) can begin to take root and in turn generate the deeper, psychodynamically rooted problems described in Chapter 4. It may also be that the failure of any single dimension constitutes system failure in this context, leading to the likely failure of the other dimensions. If this is correct, it suggests that it is the multi-dimensional nature of religion, and the possibility of *cumulative* system failure, which can make the failure of the positive aspects of religion so calamitous.¹⁸¹ Linking the failure of religion to the flourishing of religious hatred and thence to the expression of evil is a challenge to the doctrine of the *privatio boni*, that evil is merely the absence of good and in itself insubstantial.¹⁸² It can be argued that the failure to curtail religious hatred is more than just failure: it is in itself an evil act whose seriousness has perhaps not been appreciated to the extent that it should be. This is why religious hatred and hate speech should be regarded not simply as inevitable by-products or symptoms of religious, social or political differences, but as phenomena that religious and secular leaders, as well as scholar-practitioners in the conflict field, should address as a priority.

¹⁸¹ It should be acknowledged that the failure or absence of positive secular values can have the same effect. Every society develops sets of beliefs and values, some of them derived from religion, others more secular in character. A society where secularization marginalises religion will still have beliefs and values, but they may be implicit, unconscious and increasingly fragmented and perhaps because of this it may not be recognised when some or all of them become detached from the wellbeing of that society or its members. Over time the absence of values that are explicit and shared can create a vacuum in which toxic values can, unnoticed, begin to supersede more wholesome alternatives.

¹⁸² This doctrine is usually attributed to St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430ACE). See for example "Mali enim nulla natura est: sed amissio boni, mali nomen accepit" ("For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name "evil.") in *The City of God*, vol XI, ch. 9. For Jung this was a point of fundamental difference with the Christian Church. In *Answer to Job* (1952) and *Aion* (1959) Jung argues that evil is psychologically very real and very much more than the absence of good.

Chapter 6: The identity dimension

Introduction

The first dimension of religion in which the role of religious hatred is considered in this dissertation is that of identity, principally because it is arguably the aspect of religion most discussed since 11 September 2001 and its consequences, though in foreign policy and academic circles the subject has been argued over since Samuel Huntington wrote his seminal *Clash of Civilisations* article in 1993.¹⁸³ Analysis of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset suggests that until about 1980 religious and non-religious forms of ethnic nationalism caused approximately the same amount of conflict, but thereafter religious nationalist groups became increasingly involved in violence.¹⁸⁴ Taken at face value, events such as 9/11 and scholarship such as Huntington's appear less surprising: it shows that religion's influence on conflict, especially on the sort of intra-state conflict shaped by rival nationalisms of all kinds, has been broadly increasing for some time.¹⁸⁵ From this it is difficult to conclude other than that identity, as represented by various forms of ethnicity and nationalism, is certainly a dimension of conflict, and that religion can add both legitimation and the spark that ignites hatred.

This does not, however, tell us what 'identity' really means to those for whom it is worth fighting over. In conflict resolution circles it is common to understand religion primarily, if not wholly, as a signifier of identity and therefore to consider actual matters of faith largely as expressing historical, cultural or political perspectives in a specific social

¹⁸³ Huntington, S 1993, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3.

¹⁸⁴ The State Failure (SF) dataset shows a rise in religious violence beginning around 1965, though this may be attributed to the higher sensitivity of that dataset to changes in the level of violence.

¹⁸⁵ This tends to contradict modernization and secularization theory that for most of the 20th century predicted the demise of religion as a relevant political and social force in the modern era (Fox 2004).

context. Secondly, both personal and practitioner experience suggest that personal identity is fundamental to personal agency: what people do depends in large part on who they feel themselves to be. It could be argued that the first of these explains the second: so religious hatred and all its toxic consequences stem from the exaggerations, distortions and projections that accompany the assertion of religious identities.

The contention in this dissertation is that this approach is too simplistic. It does not explain why the relationship between religion and identity can become so toxic, nor why the moral and spiritual demands of a religious identity are not able to overcome the baser human instincts. While it is undoubtedly true, as Robert Winston argues, that “...cooperation creates a common identity and a sense of safety and fellowship” it is also true, as he adds, that “We constantly make the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’; we differentiate ourselves from the group in the next valley or in the next country, or from a group that practices a different religion” (Winston 2002, p. 245). The consequences of this ubiquitous human trait, Winston adds, “are brutal” as the history of the 20th century never fails to remind us. If scholar-practitioners are to understand religious hatred and intervene more effectively in religious conflict they need more positive insight into why the appeal of religion in general, and some of its more strident varieties in particular, continues to grow and the role that its identity dimension plays in this. As Mohammed Abu-Nimer argues, “It is clear that religious identity is an influential factor in the political, social, and economic realities as well as the values and cultural fabric of many communities in the world today” (Abu-Nimer 2012, p. 15).

It is tempting to see this as an issue mainly for parts of the world, or sections of nations, outside liberal and secular circles in Western Europe or both coasts of North America, but there needs to be greater understanding of how this relationship between

religion and identity continues to work even in increasingly secular societies and among people who no longer consider themselves religious or who may even be actively hostile to religion. In addition consideration needs to be given to the argument that identity in individuals is not fixed and static and may evolve over a lifetime (Erikson 1994), thereby making the psychodynamic approach to religion and identity particularly significant. This chapter therefore unpicks the psychodynamic meanings that identity can have and their relationship to religious hatred.

Religion and identity

The attention focused on ‘strong religion’ (Almond, Appleby & Sivan 2003) since the attacks on New York on 11 September 2001 has tended to obscure the fact that all the great religions have long histories of ‘enclave culture’ (ibid. pp. 23-89) that emphasise religiously-determined identity and demonise, to greater or lesser extents, those who live outside the enclave whether they are of the same faith, with less commitment, or more decisively ‘Other’.¹⁸⁶ It is a truism to say that the stronger and more extreme the belief, the greater the personal investment in it and therefore the more alignment there tends to be between adherence and identity, but this begs the question of those who are less extreme but no less invested in the sense of identity that religious adherence can bring: it is not only extremists whose personal identity is influenced if not shaped by their religion. One example of this is the pivotal role that Orthodoxy has played in Russia since the official Christianization of Kievan Rus in 998, and even during periods when it has been contested, such as during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) and during the years of the Soviet

¹⁸⁶ It is also the proponents of strong religion who tend to draw the flak of the ‘New Atheists’ such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens, probably because the stronger the religion the more appealing targets those propounding it make for convinced secularists.

Union following the Revolution of 1917. Orthodoxy has influenced everything from art, architecture and music to philosophy and political thought, to say nothing of its pervasive influence on everyday life and culture (Figs 2003, p. 301).¹⁸⁷ As Russia seeks to restore its sense of national identity in the wake of two revolutions within a century, both with arguably calamitous results for ordinary people, it is natural that they should turn to an institution that has survived both, albeit not without damage, as a rare representative of continuity in a time of multiple fractures.¹⁸⁸ The consecration in June 2020 of the new Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces (Главный храм Вооружённых сил России), celebrating the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union's defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russians call the Great Patriotic War, confirms these various threads as well as representing what is, in some respects, a profound *enantiodromia*.

What is it about religion that can provide this sense of identity, whether for individuals or nations? The answer may lie in the special claims that religious identities make. David McPherson (2016) argues that such claims come in four forms: convictions of conscience that involve demands of the sacred; the intrinsic goodness of religion as a distinctive human good; the instrumental goodness of religion for society; and the special vulnerability of religion to political abuse. The cumulative effect of these, McPherson maintains, is that a religious identity involves “a framework of ultimate meaning derived from a “transcendent” or greater than human source that shapes one’s practical life-orientation towards certain strong, categorical normative demands, which typically involve

¹⁸⁷ In Russian literature, in particular, the impact of Orthodox spirituality is most evident: it is difficult to imagine Dostoevsky, Tolstoy or Gogol without it, but equally writers of later and more perilous times, such as Bulgakov, Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, include a spiritual awareness that it is different to that of their contemporaries in other nations. This is sometimes attributed to a preference for discussing philosophical ideas in literature rather than, for example, in academic forums, “in keeping with the Orthodox view that the higher truths are to be perceived intuitively rather than purely rationally” (Clarke 2011).

¹⁸⁸ It also demonstrates that people can remain culturally religious even when prevented from practising their religion for decades.

a sense of the sacred”. The evidence he cites in support of this claim is the “widespread experience of existential malaise or flatness of a life lived without any sense of ultimate meaning, the sacred, or the transcendent”.¹⁸⁹ A similar point to this, but extended from the individual to the communal and national, is made in Rabbi David Rosen’s 2005 Templeton Lecture, *Religion, Identity, and Mideast Peace*.¹⁹⁰ It argues, echoing McPherson’s points above, that because religion seeks to give meaning and purpose to who we are, it is bound up with all the different components of human identity, from the most basic such as family, through communities, ethnic groups and nations, to the widest components of humanity and creation. He goes on to say that scholars studying the modern human condition have pointed out how much countercultures involving substance abuse, violence or adherence to cults and other movements are a search for identity by those who have lost traditional moral or communal orientations, concluding that “In the relationship between religion and identity, the components or circles within circles of our identity affirm who we are, but by definition at the same time they affirm who we are not!”, adding that “Whether the perception of distinction and difference is viewed positively or negatively depends upon the context in which we find or perceive ourselves (Rosen 2005).¹⁹¹

In summary, religion provides identity to communities and nations not only because of the obvious bonds and boundaries it creates, but because with it comes a sense of the transcendent which binds adherents to commitments beyond the familial, parochial or even

¹⁸⁹ McPherson quotes Taylor (2007) saying that our secular age suffers from the “malaise of immanence”. Nietzsche identified in his critique of the “last man,” who epitomizes modern, civilized culture. The “last man” is the person who is no longer able to “shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man,” and whose “soul” is “poverty and filth and wretched contentment” because he (or she) is concerned only with ordinary human satisfactions (Nietzsche 1883).

¹⁹⁰ Rabbi David Rosen was, at the time of this lecture, the Director of Interreligious Affairs for the American Jewish Committee in Jerusalem and Chairman of IJCIC, the International Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations.

¹⁹¹ Elsewhere in this lecture Rosen remarked on the absence of religious leaders representing their respective communities and faiths from the famous handshake on the White House lawn in September 1992. He attributes the failure of the Oslo peace process in part to this absence. Marc Gopin makes the same point in *Between Eden and Armageddon* (2000, p. 39).

national. So seeing the label of religion as being simply a form of tribal designation is overlooking a whole complex of other and more intense meanings. While this may be obvious to any student of religion, the import of it may be less apparent to the convinced secularist and it may accordingly be overlooked (Gopin 2000, p. 39). This may explain in part the lack of attention in depth paid to religion and religious adherence in much conflict resolution literature.

What, then, does identification with a religious grouping offer to those individuals who accept it? It offers a worldview that is utterly different from anything offered by any other sort of social group¹⁹²: a worldview that provides sacred meaning, purpose and clear guidelines on how to achieve them (Park 2007), membership of an eternal community (Ysseldyk et al 2010), a sense of control in an unpredictable world (Kay et al 2009), and a form of ultimate self-enhancement (Alicke and Sedikides 2009). In addition to these comforting cognitive anchors in a confused and confusing world, religious identification can also offer an immediate community of like-minded people willing to provide, at its best, the sort of social and personal support system that is so often lamented as lacking in the modern world (Putnam 2000). Moreover, to quote Rabbi Rosen again, it is the lack of such commitments that create the vacuums of morality and responsibility causing many personal and social evils.

This dissertation notes repeatedly the relative neglect of religion in conflict

¹⁹² While membership of political or environmental groups could be said to offer the hope of a lasting legacy, neither can promise the personal salvation that is common to many religions and is arguably one of the factors that distinguishes religions from other worldviews. Writing in May 2020, however, one is reminded of Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson saying that “The National Health Service is the closest thing the English have to a religion, with those who practise in it regarding themselves as a priesthood” (Lawson 1992, p. 613). Amidst the 2020-21 Covid-19 crisis for many it has offered a temporal form of personal salvation: the weekly applause for NHS staff, their privileged treatment in the community and the hailing of fallen heroes as martyrs has perhaps enhanced its quasi-religious status.

resolution literature. The same point is made by the prominent conflict resolution scholar-practitioner Mohammed Abu-Nimer, quoted above. Abu-Nimer's main focus is on efforts to involve religious leaders and communities more closely in peacebuilding initiatives where conflict has religious dimensions, and he discusses a number of reasons why this does not happen as much as it should. First, he says religion and peacebuilding are regarded as a subfield "that still operates on the fringes of the larger field of peace and conflict resolution, which is itself situated on the fringes of international relations, a field dominated by realpolitik or a hegemonic power paradigm, both in academia and politics" (Abu-Nimer, 2012). He also identifies "the secular cultural myth that religion and faith can and have to be kept outside of political and academic institutions", and the myth "that conflicts are only or primarily about material resources and never about religious identity or other ideational factors" (ibid.). This latter myth serves the needs of policy makers and religious: the former invested in power politics and interest-based diplomacy or negotiation, the latter refusing to accept the possible role of religious values, rituals, institutions, or doctrines in causing conflict or violence. It is also the case that while scholar-practitioners have developed methodologies for intervention in conflict, there has been little adaptation of these methodologies to the particular demands of religious conflict, and consequently the subject of religious hatred as either cause or consequence of conflict is largely absent from the literature.

Where scholars and practitioners have given thought to this subject, however, the scope for more such work becomes apparent. Landon Hancock, for example, suggests that a scarcity of acceptable identities may be a source of conflict that receives too little consideration, citing the case of Northern Ireland during the 1960s when people living in the province were limited to feeling and being British and Protestant-Unionist or Irish and Catholic-Nationalist (Hancock 2003). It may also be that the gradual growth of an

additional European identity, particularly in the Republic, began to erode the previous binary conceptions of identity (ibid).¹⁹³ This suggests that multiple identities may have advantages for those caught in conflict, but experience conversely suggests that one result of this can be the need to negotiate amongst identities and even *within* individuals before progress is possible. If there is a common approach to identity issues in religious conflict it rests largely on the role that identity competition plays in intergroup conflict. The purpose of such competition is to protect, satisfy or enhance basic human needs, including psychological needs (Seul 1999).¹⁹⁴ Religions are judged to satisfy such needs in ways that are more powerful and sustainable than other forms of added cultural meaning because they provide “cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and even self-actualization” (ibid.). Seul goes on to aver that “The peculiar ability of religion to serve the human identity impulse thus may partially explain why intergroup conflict so frequently occurs along religious fault lines” and the “peculiar ability of religion to support the development of individual and group identity is the hidden logic of the link between religion and intergroup conflict” (ibid.).

There is ample evidence to support Seul’s thesis as regards the composition of both communal and national identities: for example, to name but three, the confrontation between Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq; in Thailand, the notion of *kwam-pen-thai* (“Thai-ness”) is closely identified with Buddhism (Fleming 2014); and the growing power

¹⁹³ Hancock wonders about the dynamics by which people are forced into thinking of themselves, and being regarded by outsiders, solely as being members of one particular category from among the multiple (group) identities otherwise available to them (e.g. “Muslims”, as opposed to Gujeratis, Javanese, Sunnis or Alawites).

¹⁹⁴ The application of human needs theory to conflict resolution was pioneered by Australian diplomat and scholar John Burton (1915-2010), drawing on Maslow (1954).

of Hindu nationalism in India, which explicitly and sometimes violently invokes religion, and provokes religious hatred, in the name of nationhood. The corollary of such religious nationalism is the tension generated among minority religious groups feeling excluded by religiously exclusive notions of nationhood (Frazer and Friedli 2015) and its evolution into religion widening social fissures through exclusion and discrimination underpinned by claims of adherence to absolute truths. Ultimately the play of such differences can lead to violence both within societies and internationally to the point where it has been argued that religion becomes a source of ‘cultural violence’ (Galtung 1969) that is used to legitimize other forms of violence.¹⁹⁵ There is a risk, however, in attributing ‘cultural violence’ to religion in isolation: while it may define identity boundaries, it is more likely to be one among several factors that turn differences into divisions and then into hatred. Economic factors, for example, may underlie religious differences to produce horizontal inequalities among culturally different groups, and this can produce the resentments that can lead to conflict (Stewart 2008). This reinforces the conclusion that multicultural societies do not become conflicted simply because of the clash of multiple identities within them, but when these are combined with other factors (Fearon & Laitin 1996).

Conflicting religious identities and the idea of the ‘Other’

No exploration of religious hatred in the context of identity can overlook the problem of conflicting religious identities, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the conflict around homosexuality within the Christian churches. The experience of designing and mediating a series of conversations on the subject resulted in the key learning that how

¹⁹⁵ The relationship between religion and nationalism is an entire subject in itself. Kedourie (1961), for example, likened nationalism, which he saw as a Western export disastrous for the Middle East, to religion on account of its divisive potential.

such an issue is framed determines how it is discussed, and this makes the identity dimension particularly relevant. It is common, for example, for more orthodox religious groups to deny that there is such a thing as homosexual identity, preferring to see homosexuality as an aberration, a sin, even a disability. This is a stance which causes offence to those who claim that homosexuality is inborn rather being a ‘lifestyle choice’, and has resulted in a counter-argument that it is religion that is the adopted lifestyle (Ganzevoort et al, 2011); a recognition that making the argument one that turns on the politics of identity is a strategy often used by marginalised groups to highlight and challenge oppression by majority groups (Heyes 2008).¹⁹⁶ This can backfire: majority groups often relish self-defined enemies of the status quo as it can legitimise discrimination, and in the case of religious groups it can be claimed that such discrimination is a way of protecting their religious identity and it also distinguishes them from both more liberal believers and from the secular world.¹⁹⁷

There will be further discussion of the “Other” in a moment but it is useful to introduce it at this point by looking, as Ganzevoort, der Laan and Olsman do, at Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich’s theory of “selving and Othering” (2004) which addresses how such controversies are framed.¹⁹⁸ Baumann and Gingrich move beyond simplistic binary oppositions to look at a series of “grammars” to explain hatred and divisions more

¹⁹⁶ There is an argument that homosexuals began to replace communists as ‘the enemy’ of evangelical Christians after the Second World War and even more after the fall of the USSR in 1989 (Herman 1997) and thereby took their place in the cosmic battle between good and evil.

¹⁹⁷ In the case of homosexuality this is the continuing manifestation of a long-established phenomenon: “In a historical perspective, this is not exceptional, because homosexuality has often been associated with the stranger. In early twentieth century France, it was referred to as the German vice, whereas in Germany, it was called the French malady. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century it had been called the Italian vice, in the eighteenth French or English and in the nineteenth the “Arab way” (Tamagne 2004). Daniel Defoe wrote that it originated in Turkey, in Israel it is attributed to Arabs, in Algeria to the French, in sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, and so on (Greenberg, 1988). The missionaries called it pagan, and present-day evangelicals call it “the gay agenda”. Homosexuality, it seems, is consistently interpreted as “Other”, thereby demarcating it from the self” (Ganzevoort et al, 2011).

¹⁹⁸ It should be noted that this theory is built on a reinterpretation of the anthropological work of Edward Saïd, E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Louis Dumont.

deeply.¹⁹⁹ In the case of the homosexual-Christian divide the first grammar is “orientalising” in which Christians may attribute faithfulness to themselves and unfaithfulness or promiscuity to homosexuals while homosexuals may see themselves as tolerant, open and flexible while Christians are rigid, narrow-minded and repressed.²⁰⁰ On top of this, however, both may acknowledge some positive qualities in the Other, taking orientalising beyond crude binary stereotyping but orientalising still tends to be a barrier to meaningful dialogue.

The second grammar is “segmentation” which recognises that people may belong to many different groups at different levels in the hierarchy of significance as it affects the issues. For example, different homosexual subcultures may be quite separate from each other despite sharing the same heading, and likewise be in conflict with other minority cultures despite sharing their alienation from the majority culture. This second grammar enables groups to characterise their opponents by reference to other minorities with whom they may share some common interests, so, for example, homosexuals, paedophiles and terrorists may all be conjoined as posing a threat to society’s values. One of the segmentation shifts apparent in recent times is the relative fading of denominational differences, Catholics and Protestants for example, into new segmentations according to whether their perspectives are more liberal or conservative; liberal Catholics and Protestants now may make more common cause with each other than with more conservative members of their respective denominations. One of the most recent and

¹⁹⁹ Baumann and Gingrich define “grammars” as “a simple shorthand for certain simple classificatory structures or classificatory schemata that we argue can be recognized in a vast variety of processes concerned with defining identity and alterity” (Baumann and Gingrich 2004, p. ix).

²⁰⁰ “Many studies of homosexual behaviour give ample attention to the number of sex partners of homosexuals but fail to give corresponding numbers for heterosexuals, nor to explain a possibly high degree of promiscuity in light of the socio-cultural climate homosexuals live in or to differences between male and female homosexuality and the influence of gender differences. Without this kind of background, such studies contribute to the orientalising grammar” (Ganzevoort et al 2011).

perhaps most significant developments in segmentation is between those who espouse some form of religious affiliation and those who admit none. While this is superficially the religious versus the secular, it is as liable to conceal divisions as to heal them and to crumble under pressure and the disappointment that allies are not as similar as they may have appeared in contrast to obvious opponents.

The third grammar described by Baumann and Gingrich is “encompassment”. This is swift to acknowledge difference but anxious to seek and discover higher levels where similarities may lie. It is different from the segmentation grammar in that it is “defined by the characteristics of the self that are projected on the Other” (Ganzevoort et al 2011). This grammar is used particularly by dominant groups that want to incorporate minority groups first by allowing them their differences and then reinterpreting these to emphasise their similarities with the dominant group, which means the dominant group does not have to adjust its sense of self in relation to the Other. One example of this is demonstrating sympathy with a minority group and willingness to support it and research its origins or tendencies without subjecting itself to the same process; the result being that the minority group is still ‘Other’ and its Otherness effectively pathologized by the majority. This process is resisted by minority groups by the search for increasingly extreme ways, such as bizarre costumes, rituals or proclivities to demonstrate their difference and avoid being co-opted to support the narrative dictated by the majority.

All three of these grammars tend to be deployed by majorities who are determined to maintain their hegemony and undermine the legitimacy of their opponents while seeming to offer opportunities for minorities to share their dominance. Once these tactics have been identified, however, the result is usually mistrust and an increasing unwillingness to enter into any process that may endanger whatever identity a minority may have achieved. In

other words, attempts to deal with minorities' Otherness by either orientalising, segmenting or encompassing serve mainly to underline the significance of being 'Other'.

The idea of being 'Other' can take root in contexts ranging in scale from families to nations and continents. Marc Gopin's work *Between Eden and Armageddon* (2000) brings together the study of religion and the study and practice of conflict resolution, and central to this is how religions approach Others and the tension between the human needs for belonging and integration in parallel with equally powerful needs for uniqueness and individuation. He sees the former as consonant with the perpetual human need to search out new parts of the world around them, and to look for the underlying causes and origins of things which are typified in "numerous religious mythologies, as well as scientific enterprises" (ibid., p. 5). The latter, meanwhile, expresses itself through the myriad ways in which human beings try to make themselves different, through everything from fashion and eating habits to membership, ironically, of exclusive groups that actually submerge individual character in the quest for distinctive identity and defence "in the context of the mass of humanity and the indifferent character of the universe" (ibid.) It is this quest for meaning in the face of an apparently indifferent universe that can motivate both mystics and physicists. Gopin also draws attention to the modern tendency to see all religions as broadly similar and expressing universal values, a tendency he deplores on the grounds that such homogeneity is in defiance of the nature of religions, drawing as they do significant differences between believers and non-believers. He does not see this human tendency as inimical to peace and conflict resolution, though; rather it underlines the importance of negotiating boundaries and drawing on the "prosocial values of religious tradition" (ibid. p. 80).

Identity and culture

The final stopping place, in this review of identity as a dimension of religion and its relation to religious hatred as a cause of conflict, is culture. One of the later realisations of conflict resolution as a field, as gradually anthropologists joined its social psychologist originators, is that culture matters more than was appreciated by earlier scholars in the field. The debate continues about how much it matters, depending largely on which part of the field is being considered, but for anyone working on religious conflict it is difficult to see cultural difference as anything other than fundamental (LeBaron 2003, p. 4).²⁰¹ The challenge, given that there can never be a comprehensive or finite description of a culture, is making the subject encompassable, but the six dimensions of culture that the anthropologist Edward Hall identifies in *Beyond Culture* (1976) provide a good starting point.²⁰² Of these it is the second, individualism vs. communitarianism, that reinforces Gopin's point, above, about the human tension between wanting to be unique and wanting to be part of a collective. So if this tension lives within human individuals, and within human cultures, and within human religions, it is not difficult to see how its convergence or divergence in different contexts might well contribute to the other confusions and pressures that create individual or cultural complexes and lead some people to hate each other.

The evidence suggests that identity is an important, and perhaps the most important, contributor to hatred in the context of religious conflict. This is because religion can

²⁰¹ For a succinct account of the debate in the field see pp. 302-7 in Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse, T & Miall, H 2005, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (2nd ed.), Polity, Cambridge.

²⁰² The significance of Hall's six dimensions of cultural difference for conflict resolution are described in Pillay, V 2006, 'Culture: Exploring the River' in LeBaron, M and Pillay, V (eds.), *Conflict across Cultures*, Intercultural Press, London, pp. 32-48.

provide individuals, communities and other groups with a sense of meaning and purpose that transcends material needs, demands and ambitions. In addition it can help reinforce group bonds by drawing boundaries and denoting who should be regarded as Other. This much both the literature of religion and conflict tells us. What is less obvious, though, is why the sense of identity is so significant, and how the idea of the Other can, under certain circumstances, turn previously friendly neighbours into mutually hating enemies. The psychodynamic lens provides some possible answers to these questions and there are two in particular to explore: Freud's 'narcissism of small differences', and Jung's reflections on *persona*, *shadow* and the *Other*.

The narcissism of small differences

Having a common religious identity is no guarantee of a hate and conflict-free life. As Staub (2012, p. 829) notes, "Identities can be formed around small differences. Sometimes hostility against those who differ only slightly from one's own group is especially intense". There is no lack of examples of minor differences leading to major dissent, where the similarities among the protagonists, whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural and even physical appearance, are more striking than the differences; for example the Uzbek minority and the Kyrgyz majority in Kyrgyzstan; India and Pakistan; Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Iraq and Belgium. As Freud says, "It is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of hostility between them".²⁰³ It often seems to be religious and confessional differences that

²⁰³The idea of the narcissism of small differences first appeared in Freud's essay, 'The Taboo of Virginity' which appeared in *On Sexuality* (Penguin Freud Library, 1991, p. 272), although it may have based on the work of the anthropologist Ernest Crawley. It first appeared in relation to human aggression in *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1930) and is usually understood as referring to the role that harmless aggression can play in contributing to solidarity among members of a community. In the context of the hatred that can arise from religion, its two components, 'narcissism', and 'small differences', need to be considered separately; the starting point is Freud's essay *On Narcissism* (1914).

symbolize the narcissism and exacerbate the least discrepancies. These points have been made by a number of scholars including Kolstø (2002), Bjelić (2006) and Volkan (2006), all in relation to ethnic conflict. Religious difference where other forms of identity are similar introduces another layer of complexity. Andrade argues that religious hatred stems from “an otherwise surmounted suspicion that one’s beliefs are illusory, can be projected on to the other culture and eradicated” (2007, p. 1031), this being particularly true where similar beliefs are shared by rival cultures as they were, for example, by Orthodox Serbians and Catholic Croats in former Yugoslavia. Figlio (2018, p. 20) comments that “political accounts must be given full weight, but they don’t account for the unease that irrupts into violence fuelled by hatred”.

The idea that small differences can cause as much conflict as large ones is important, but in the context of religious hatred it is arguably much less important than understanding the narcissism that may accompany small differences. A chapter about identity is an appropriate context in which to introduce the subject of narcissism and examine the role it plays in religion. The first psychologist to use the word in a clinical context was probably Havelock Ellis (1898) who made a connection between Ovid’s myth²⁰⁴ and auto-eroticism (i.e. self as sexual object) in one of his patients; Freud also used the term in relation to sexuality in his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905). Ernest Jones (1913) seems to have been the first to put narcissism - what he called the “God-complex” - into a wider context as a personality trait, while Freud’s seminal essay *On Narcissism* (2014) put narcissism into a developmental perspective as a phenomenon that can only be understood

²⁰⁴ In Ovid’s myth, Narcissus is a handsome young hunter, son of the river god Cephissus and the nymph Liriope, who spurns the advances of the nymph Echo, so-named because she was cursed to only echo the sounds that others made. After Narcissus rejects Echo, making her fade away until all that remains is her voice, the gods punish him by making him fall in love with his own reflection in a pool. Finding that the object of his love cannot love him back, he pines away and dies. The story may have derived from the ancient Greek superstition that it was unlucky or even fatal to see one’s own reflection (www.britannica.com/topic/Narcissus-Greek-mythology [viewed 2.2.20]).

psychoanalytically.²⁰⁵ Discussion of narcissism evolved from psychoanalytical and clinical to more popular interest with the publication of Christopher Lasch's *Culture of Narcissism* (1979) in which he offers a historical and cultural analysis of narcissism as a social as well as personal trait. Although focused on the United States and now four decades old, this work retains a contemporary ring when it depicts what he sees as narcissism in society: "dependence on the vicarious warmth provided by others combined with a fear of dependence, a sense of inner emptiness, boundless repressed rage... pseudo self-insight, calculating seductiveness... intense fear of old age and death, altered sense of time, [and] fascination with celebrity" (p. 33, quoted in Konrath and Bonadonna, 2015).

There are several connections between narcissism and religious hatred. First, narcissism tends to be protected by hatred: it wards off shame by denigrating any person or fact which threatens to dent the ideal image that narcissism requires (Vitz and Mango 1997), and religious hatred presumably achieves this through the same mechanism in any context where a religious image of the self is threatened. Secondly, and following on from this, moral pride or any feeling of moral superiority to those who can be labelled as 'immoral' or 'sinful' can also be defended by hatred which can, furthermore, be reframed into something of virtue by being called 'religious', and from there it is a short step to defending the behaviour that can accompany religious hatred. This, at least, is the simplistic explanation, but there is another that is perhaps more disturbing and harder to

²⁰⁵ Narcissism was not included as a personality disorder until the third edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (DSM-III) (1980), perhaps reflecting a long debate as to whether narcissism was a normal and necessary stage of development (for example, Kohut 1966), inherently pathological (Kernberg, 1975), or a spectrum ranging from healthy self-esteem to overconfident self-importance involving fantasies of omnipotence and omniscience (Jones 1913). More recently it has been recognised that narcissistic personality traits divide into the 'grandiose' and the 'vulnerable', the latter involving passive-aggression, over-sensitivity and insecurity (Krizan, Z and Herlache, AD 2018, 'The Narcissism Spectrum Model: A Synthetic View of Narcissistic Personality', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 3–31; Campbell, WK 2020, *The New Science of Narcissism*, Sounds True, Boulder, pp. 54-9; see also Eagle 2018, p.p. 152-3).

address. The truth, argues Figlio (2018), is that while consciously we exclude those who are Other, especially Others who are different, unconsciously we hate sameness and avoid it by creating delusional differences. He quotes Freud on the example posed by the experience of the Jewish diaspora when he argues that unfortunately all the massacres of the Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure for their Christian fellows because “When once the Apostle Paul had posited universal love between men as the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became the inevitable consequence” (Freud, 1930a, p. 114). The implication here is that the Jews provided neighbours whom the host community could vilify and exclude, and occasionally annihilate, in order to retain a sense of its own coherence. The challenge is not, as scholar-practitioners faced with conflict are wont to argue, in managing difference, but in managing what Figlio calls the “endogenous unease in human society”. He himself admits that this is a challenging thought, the idea that we hate difference being so deeply engrained and there being so much evidence of aggression between ethnic groups. But he follows Volkan (1986, p. 187) in arguing that “we create minor differences, in order to strengthen the psychological gap between enemy and ourselves”. Difference, it seems, can support a defence against self-examination and the possible revelation of a hated similarity.

The persona, the shadow and the Other

The lens of Jung’s analytical psychology provides another view of identity. Jung, with a generally more sympathetic understanding of religion than many of those coming from more secular and humanistic standpoints, provides some particular insights into how identity is constructed and what can happen to it under pressure. It begins with his

depiction of what he called the *persona*.²⁰⁶ It is the part of a person that is presented to the world, and Jung takes pains to comment on the relationship between this outer face and what may be happening on the inside. He says, for example, that people who appear outwardly inflexible and unapproachable are often inwardly weak and malleable, “Their inner attitude, therefore, corresponds to a personality that is diametrically opposed to their outer personality” (Jung CW6, para. 802). He explains this by saying that people who overlook their unconscious processes are easily influenced: the inner flexibility acting as a compensation for the outer rigidity. This is a useful reminder that for Jung, and in fact from all psychodynamic perspectives, identity is never monolithic: there are always tensions between the outer and the inner, and between different elements of both. People are always more than their persona, and the pursuit of a good life for communities as well as mental health for individuals often consists in integrating the disparate and sometimes dissonant elements of identity. These tensions produce their own difficulties: one, for example, occurs when a person creates a persona that is too distant from their real nature and is unsustainable; another when a person identifies so strongly with a persona that other elements of their personality are sacrificed and their potential unrecognised and un-lived (Stevens 1990, p. 42). The result is people divided against themselves; and this is further complicated, Jung would say, by the emergence of the *shadow* as discussed in Chapter 4.

A few Jungian terms, such as *introvert* and *extravert* (Jung’s spelling), have crept into everyday usage with users often being unaware of their origins. The shadow as a term may be less familiar, but the idea behind it suffuses popular art and literature²⁰⁷ though its over-

²⁰⁶ Turn to *persona* in Jung’s “Definitions” (CW6, para. 672ff) and the reference is to *soul*. This is a useful reminder that when he uses this term Jung is not referring to the Roman term for a mask, a semi-detached, superficial everyday face that people wear to meet the world, but what he regards as an integral part of every individual. This is just one of the common misinterpretations of Jung’s work that has damaged his reputation in the academy.

²⁰⁷ For example, in concepts such as the ‘dark side’ in the *Star Wars* films and the character of the Joker in *Batman*.

simplification contributes to the modern tendency towards the binary that reduces the human capacity for nuance.²⁰⁸ With the shadow come semi-familiar concepts such the defence mechanisms that people use to protect themselves from awareness of their darker parts, and the projection of them onto others. The literature of identity is full of the many historical instances of enemies suffering the projection and scapegoating used to justify subsequent slaughter (Stevens 2002, pp. 271-2) and its regular appearance on the front pages of daily newspapers. As Robins and Post note (1997, p. 302), “We need our enemies. They provide a comforting explanation of what is wrong with ourselves”.

This is where the idea of the Other in psychodynamic psychology also needs to be considered. This concept extends beyond Jung’s use of the term, but the focus here is on its use in psychodynamic psychology.²⁰⁹ Renos Papadopoulos observes that during his professional life Jung “understood the Other in terms of complexes, which were intrapsychic structures that had a semi-independent and autonomous existence within one's personality” (Papadopoulos 2002, p. 170). In times of conflict these latent complexes become externalised and identified with actual or imagined enemies onto which the shadow is then projected. The consequence is that individuals, communities or entire races are imbued not only with responsibility for creating internal tensions, but with all the negative characteristics of which people are unconscious in themselves. If this sounds extreme and unlikely, it is useful to remember that “The distinction between what is “I” and what is “not-

²⁰⁸ It is sometimes overlooked that for Jung the shadow is not only a repository for the evil and darkness in people; it can also contain unrealised positive qualities. In his conclusion to *Aion* (1951), for example, Jung offers a balanced understanding of the shadow: “If it has been believed hitherto that the human shadow was the source of all evil, it can now be ascertained on closer investigation that the unconscious man, that is, his shadow, does not consist only of morally reprehensible tendencies, but also displays a number of good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses, etc.” (Jung CW9ii, para. 423).

²⁰⁹ The origin of Other, in philosophical usage, lies with Hegel who argued that the concept of the Self requires the existence of the Other (Berenson 1982). In psychological usage Jacques Lacan pioneered the term for similar reasons (Thibierge and Morin 2010).

I” is not so easily made as most people assume” (Harding 1965, p. 16). Jung believed that the Christian churches, well aware of these dimensions of human life, were active in the suppression of it in order to maintain their control of the human psyche and because they recognised the psychic and social dangers that could be unleashed by the expression of these latent powers in the form of religious hatred. If one of the characteristics of religious hatred is a disproportionate response to difference, it is reasonable to believe that the causes are likely to be to some extent unconscious. In such situations it is not unlikely that some of the disproportionality is caused or augmented by acute awareness of the Other, compounded in whole or part by shadow projection.

Chapter 7: Doctrine and Practice

Introduction

Every dimension of religion has some overlay with others, and nowhere is this truer than where a person's everyday practice of a faith - the prayers, worship, rituals, behaviours, celebrations of events, the use of symbols which demonstrate or illustrate the faith (Smart 1996, p. 72) - overlaps with the sense of religious identity which he or she draws from it. These are the elements of religion through which religious identity is often most visibly and potently expressed because, unlike doctrine, hermeneutics, ethics or the other important but relatively abstract or disembodied elements of religion, they have a materiality and tangibility which bring them alive to believers and non-believers alike. Whether it is the abstinence from alcohol, the veneration of an icon, the requirement for pilgrimage or the everyday conduct of life, these are the signs of religion apparent to all. This chapter examines in particular contemporary religious fundamentalism because it is this practice of religion which is most associated with religious hatred and religious conflict, and because it affects the needs, interests and values of others, whether believers or non-believers. This chapter examines how fundamentalism is manifested and secondly the psychology of the fundamentalist mindset that motivates its practice and its consequences.

Before addressing fundamentalism as a way of practising religion that can generate hatred and cause conflict, however, this dissertation looks briefly at how doctrine may have a similar psychological effect, albeit unintended.

Religious doctrine and the “Golem Effect”

It is important to state as an introduction to the argument that follows that it is not going to discuss in any depth the history, credibility or theology of any religious doctrines but treats them rather as they might be regarded by a follower who accepts them as part of his or her upbringing and culture: a backdrop to everyday life, perhaps not very deeply considered but nonetheless absorbed, valued and respected. The question to be asked is what unconscious effect might even such lightly worn religious beliefs have on someone? There is little scholarly literature on this subject, and what there is tends to focus on extreme situations and be distracted by the influence of factors other than belief.²¹⁰ Even in *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (2010), a scholarly book whose stated purpose is to survey “the intersection between religion and state-organised murder” (p. 1), there are few mentions of specific doctrines which may have contributed to such killings.²¹¹ There is clearly scope for further psychological research, beyond the reach of this dissertation, that looks deeply into how the specifics of doctrine influence behaviour. One point worth highlighting, however, is the ease with which any eschatological doctrine can be twisted to become a justification for extreme behaviour. As Steven Pinker observes (2011, p. 395) any utopian

²¹⁰ For example, *In God's Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (Berghahn 2010), is a collection of essays that looks at the Armenian, Jewish, Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. These case studies review the use of religion to legitimise and motivate genocide as well as the potential of religious faith to resist mass murder and the role of religion in coming to terms with the legacies of atrocity. The first point noted in an overview of these cases is that the victims of these genocides were murdered because they were Jews or Armenians or Bosnian Muslims regardless of whether they or their killers actually believed in any religious precepts (Bartov and Mack 2001, p. 2). Ronald Suny argues in the case of the Armenian genocide in 1915 that “these mass killings were not primarily driven by religious distinctions or convictions. Membership in a religious community (*millet*) was an important marker of difference, and religion closely corresponded to ethnicity, even in many cases to class. But the motivations for murder were not spontaneously generated from religion or even ethnicity but were driven by a cascade of influences—decades of hostile perceptions of the “other” exacerbated by a sense of loss of status, insecurity in the face of perceived dangers, and the positive support and encouragement of state authorities for the most lawless and inhumane behaviour” (Bartov and Mack 2010, p. 24).

²¹¹ Most mentions of theology concern issues such as, for example, the theology of obedience which it is argued by some paved the way for Christian complicity in the Rwandan genocide (*ibid.*, p. 147).

ideology is liable to lead to genocide for two reasons. First, if the point of utopia is to make people safe, happy and contented forever and always, its moral value is infinite, and therefore any sacrifices along the way, however great they may be, can be perceived and justified as less than the ultimate value of the utopia when it is achieved. Secondly, any utopia, however conceived, has to conform to a blueprint, and those who get in the way of it have to be removed for the sake of the vision and the majority.²¹² Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley (quoted in Pinker 2011, p. 397) argue that communist eschatology mimicked Christian doctrine, beginning with perfection in the Garden of Eden, the arrival of the prophet Marx bearing truth in the form of science, and calling for a revolution that will lead to the triumph of the working class and the end of history because things will again be perfect.²¹³

The Golem Effect was mentioned briefly above in relation to psychological complexes and the idea of the cultural complex. This section of this chapter explores this idea in more detail because if the theory could be empirically demonstrated to be correct then it could be argued that the implications for both religious doctrine and practice would be far-reaching.²¹⁴ The essence of the idea of the Golem is the bringing to life of a

²¹² Pinker also notes how often utopias hark back to Golden Ages, usually based on agrarian paradises, citing Mao's agrarian communes, Pol Pot's expulsion of Cambodian city-dwellers to rural areas (and the killing fields); even Hitler's obsessive loathing of Jewry, which he associated with commerce and cities, was in part motivated by his desire to settle Germans in rural Eastern Europe (Pinker 2011, p. 396). There have been hints of similar attitudes in some of the political plans put forward by campaigning environmental groups ever since the back-to-the-land arcadian idealism of the flower-power era.

²¹³ Chirot and McCauley go on to say that Hitler's promise of the Thousand Year Reich was no accident but a deliberate mimicking of the perfect foretold in the Biblical book of Revelation. Bartov and Mack also argue that the Nazis in effect adopted the traditional Jewish concept of the Chosen People (stretching the definition of eschatology a little), "translating it into a doctrine of racial superiority and a collective mission to transform the world" (2010, p. 3).

²¹⁴ By way of background it should be explained that the Golem was originally in Jewish mythology a roughly formed clay figure, most famously brought to life by Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, traditionally known as the Maharal, in order to protect the local Jewish community from the threat of expulsion by the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (Kieval 1997). Over a period of time, it is said, the Golem became increasingly corrupt and violent to the point where it had to be destroyed. It should be noted that there are many versions of this legend and the Golem appeared in many times and places and continues to do so: the character of Gollum in Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings*, for example, is said to be based on the Golem (Glinert 2001).

previously lifeless, inert material such as a lump of clay, to act as a perfect servant because it obeys any commands given by its creator, but which cannot be trusted because it will become destructive if left to its own devices.²¹⁵ In modern management and educational literature, the Golem Effect is used to describe the debilitating effect of low expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies on performance (Babad, Inbar and Rosenthal, 1982; Eden 1990), being the counterpart of the Pygmalion and Galatea Effects used to describe the effect of positive expectations on, and self-expectations of, children or employees (Reynolds 2017).²¹⁶

The Golem Effect is much harder to research than the Pygmalion Effect within established ethical guidelines for social and psychological research because it would involve subjecting people to negative expectations.²¹⁷ According to Rutger Bregman (2020, p. 258), the Golem Effect is a kind of nocebo that causes poor pupils to fall further behind, the homeless to lose hope and isolated teenagers to radicalise. “It’s one of the insidious mechanisms behind racism, because when you’re subjected to low expectations, you won’t perform at your best, which further diminishes others’ expectations and thus further undermines your performance”. The Golem Effect is also now well recognised in business and banking circles, its consequences manifestly apparent, for example, during

²¹⁵ The myths and stories associated with the Golem, together with exploration of their significance and relevance in a variety of settings are extensively discussed in Kieval, H 1997, ‘Pursuing the Golem of Prague: Jewish Culture and the Invention of a Tradition’, *Modern Judaism*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 1-23 and Glinert, L 2001, ‘Golem! The Making of a Modern Myth’, *Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures*, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 78-94.

²¹⁶ The Pygmalion Effect was named first, in 1963, by Dr Bob Rosenthal who conducted an experiment in San Francisco to investigate the effect of telling random schoolchildren, and their teachers, that they were particularly clever. The effects were remarkable, leading to high increases in IQ and attainment (Bregman 2020, p. 255-258). Since then the Pygmalion Effect has been tested in many different contexts and while it remains controversial (see for example Jussim and Harber 2005) it seems to have some validity although the role of self-fulfilling prophecies and the capacity of erroneous beliefs to create social realities remains a subject of research. In management education, the Galatea Effect refers to the idea that raising the self-expectations of subordinates regarding their own performance will raise its level. (Eden, 1990).

²¹⁷ One notorious experiment to demonstrate the Golem Effect left a group of orphans with lifelong speech impediments (Silverman, F 1988, ‘The “Monster” Study’, *Journal of Fluency Disorders*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 225-231, quoted in Bregman 2020, p. 258).

the 2008 financial crisis when people's perceptions that a financial institution might be about to fail lead to a rush to withdraw cash which did indeed cause it to fail (Edwards, McKinley and Moon 2002).

The argument of this dissertation is that some religious doctrines can have a Golem Effect, inadvertently causing religious hatred by activating beliefs and attitudes that result in harm to others. The doctrine of Original Sin in Christianity, to offer a simplistic example, might be argued to have a Golem Effect: if we are mired in sin from birth anyway before we have even done anything wrong, then everything is hopeless and the addition of a few more sins will not make much difference. Similarly, it can be argued that the concept of reincarnation, which should encourage adherents to seek merit in their current life in the hope of advancement in the next, could cause people to do less than they might to obtain that advancement on the grounds that there will be other opportunities in the future. Moreover, if these doctrines are shared so that everybody believes in Original Sin, for example, then presumably the Golem Effect is magnified: everybody is sinful so everybody can be expected to behave badly and even if they do not in the present then it can safely be assumed that they will sometime in the future. Could the cumulative effect be a community or a society in which the population expects the worst rather than the best of each other? Meanwhile a doctrine of eternal life can persuade followers that what happens in the present is less important than what may happen in the future: so death by torture can be a route to salvation and part of the divine plan – hence the gruesome relish with which Christian martyrologies depict the demise of the saints and doubtless encouraged others, both torturers and victims alike, to follow their example (Pinker 2011, p. 17). Similarly doctrines that promote the possibility of immortality as a reward for allegiance are also liable to create grounds for hatred. If you are a committed Moslem, for example, then the advance of secularism is a threat and hating it sufficiently to don a

suicide vest and become a *shahid* in pursuit of paradise becomes a logical choice (Cave 2012, p. 279). The more the focus is on an eternal afterlife, it seems, the less inclination there is to tackle injustice and deprivation in this: the great movements for social reform such as the emancipation of slaves and equality between the sexes arose only when the preoccupation with the next world began to lose the long grip that had inured medieval society to the trauma of the everyday by creating hope in the life to come (ibid.). Cave argues that most immortality narratives foster a profound selfishness in that they focus on the survival of the individual personality and the actions necessary for personal salvation rather than cultivate virtues such as empathy and compassion (ibid., p. 280). Similarly, if faith of whatever kind claims exceptionalism, whether of individual, community or nation, then a possible result is a dangerous narcissism that may have destructive political, social or religious consequences; this too can be argued to be a species of Golem Effect.

These arguments are speculative, however, in that it has proved impossible to find any scholarly literature or any record of experiment that discusses the Golem Effect directly in relation to any religious doctrine, despite the volumes of literature that analyses healthy and unhealthy ways of being religious such as that of William James (1902) already discussed.²¹⁸ It seems intuitively likely that if some religious doctrines can have a Pygmalion or Galatea Effect and thereby encourage positive aspirations and moral rectitude, then others may have a Golem Effect and do the opposite: it is therefore

²¹⁸ They are not far, however, from what is known in psychology as ‘pluralistic ignorance’: the situation in which people individually may reject a norm but go along with it because they assume that most others accept it even if in reality they do not. It has been blamed for many social ills, from the support for racial segregation (O’Gorman, H 1975), for example, to climate change denial (Geiger and Swim 2017). Bregman (2020, p. 261) wonders if negative ideas about human nature are a form of pluralistic ignorance, asking whether human fears that most people are out to maximize their own gain at the expense of others is not born of the assumption that this what most others think when in fact the majority would prefer a life based more on kindness and human solidarity.

reasonable to consider the possibility that some religious hatred may be a consequence, albeit unintended, of religious doctrine.

Religious practices

It is the practice of religion perhaps far more than its doctrines, though, that is arguably the common metric by which outsiders measure its merits or otherwise, not least because the behaviour of adherents often provides the only visible manifestations of their faith. It has been argued (Haidt 2012, p. 250) that a focus on religious practices is a more reliable guide to the nature of religion than religious beliefs.²¹⁹ It raises the question of which practices should properly be the focus of a dissertation on religious hatred, with some obviously less associated with the darker sides of religion than others. If George Orwell's evocation of "old maids hiking [*biking* in some versions] to Holy Communion through the mists of the autumn morning" (Orwell 1941)²²⁰ depicts one form of religious practice, then it could be argued the atrocities of Islamic State in recent years depict another, yet they are worlds apart both in terms of their impact on those immediately involved and upon popular understanding of the nature of religion. The purpose of this chapter, however, is to identify how religious practice as a dimension of religion contributes to religious hatred. The aspect of religious practice that has most obviously been associated with conflict in recent years is fundamentalism, and it should be made clear at the outset that this focus is not on Islamic fundamentalism or indeed on any specific model of fundamentalism, but on what has been called the "fundamentalist

²¹⁹ Haidt also argues that the New Atheists' positions on religion are undermined by a model of religion that tends to begin and end with belief: "...trying to understand the persistence and passion of religion by studying beliefs about God is like trying to understand the persistence and passion of college football by studying the movements of the ball. You've got to broaden the inquiry. You've got to look at the way that religious beliefs work with religious practices to create a religious community" (Haidt, 2012, p. 250).

²²⁰ The image clearly has some archetypal resonance for believers in a vision of a bucolic England beyond Orwell's generation: it was famously (mis)quoted by Prime Minister John Major in his speech to the Conservative Group for Europe, 22 April 1993.

mindset” (Strozier et al 2010) on the grounds that “[F]undamentalism is not a religion *but a way of being religious*” (ibid., p. 216, emphasis added). While this can be interpreted as meaning that fundamentalism is about practice more than doctrine, it is perhaps too reductionist to be conclusive and could lead the more iconoclastic towards the conclusion that the executioners of Islamic State and the conservative evangelicals of Anglicanism have something of the same mindset. This would clearly be a gross exaggeration. In popular parlance, though, ‘fundamentalism’ has come to be discussed as if it is a genus separate from more moderate religious practices.²²¹ The argument here is that religion has always been practised along a spectrum of intensity from lip service at one end, through the social conformism of conventional piety, to the radical and evangelical at the other.²²²

Definitions of fundamentalism

The history and definition of what has come to be known as fundamentalism used here is that adopted by the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences which generated five volumes of evidence about fundamentalism in many contexts between 1987 and 1995. This project, aware that no definition of fundamentalism would be greeted with wholesale approval, decided that what was required was a definition that would reflect the findings of case studies that would enable structured comparisons of movements and groups. The definition finally agreed was

²²¹ The word ‘fundamentalism’ tends to be associated with Islam, especially since 11 September 2001, but it was first used in a 1920 editorial in the Northern Baptist *Watchman-Examiner* to describe the commitment of a group of conservative evangelical Protestants to preserve the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith from evolutionists and other critics of biblical literalism (Almond et al., 2003, p. 2). There is some debate (Ruthven 2007, p. 4) about whether it is even appropriate to use the word ‘fundamentalism’ outside this original pre-millennialist Protestant context because, for example, one can argue that all believing Muslims should accept the inerrancy of the Qur’an as the unmediated word of God, and therefore by definition all faithful Muslims are fundamentalists.

²²² Such a spectrum of practice is nothing new: Gibbon notes in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, “The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful” (Gibbon 1776, 1.1).

“Fundamentalism”.... refers to a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled “true believers” attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors”.

(Almond et al 2003, p. 17)

While a detailed analysis of the results of this project is outside the scope of this chapter, the results are nevertheless interesting to review twenty-three years after the project ended, not least for their continuing relevance in a world that, as regards the impacts of fundamentalism, has changed markedly in this time.²²³ Summarising the key findings of this project is not easy and risks the over-simplification and stereotyping that the project was at pains to avoid (Marty 1996) as well as overlooking the careful qualifications that surround its conclusions, but some seem to capture points relevant to any study of religious hatred.

First, the project was careful, using its definition, to set out which movements within which religions it deemed fundamentalist. It identified three particular categories of fundamentalist movement (Almond et al. 2003, pp. 23-89): the ‘enclave’ cultures within the Abrahamic faiths which may have additional ethnonationalist goals but whose primary base is in religion; Hindu and Buddhist movements that are syncretic and based as much on ethnonationalism as on religion; and a variety of other movements “that have been identified as fundamentalist by the media because of their religious trappings, militance and visibility” (ibid., p. 90) but which did not meet the project’s definition “because they do not originate in reaction to secularization and the marginalization of religion, and they do not strive to create a religious alternative to secular structures and institutions” (ibid.) These quotations are included for two reasons. First, they demonstrate that what falls

²²³ Indeed, the fact that this major study was concluded before 9/11 makes its results perhaps more objective than might otherwise have been the case.

within and outside definitions of fundamentalism has a somewhat arbitrary edge to it; and secondly, as the study of history demonstrates, religious movements can wax and wane within relatively short time periods. So while the Fundamentalism Project has undoubtedly provided some useful markers, its conclusions, two decades on, should be treated with some caution. Bearing this in mind it is still useful to look at the nine characteristics of fundamentalism – five ideological and four organisational – that the project distinguished in its study of enclave cultures.

Characteristics of fundamentalism

First among the ideological characteristics is that fundamentalist movements are a reaction to the processes and consequences of secularization and modernisation affecting all religious communities, in particular the erosion of religion and its role in society. Fundamentalist movements may be assertive in pursuit of this: for example the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India seeking to suppress Muslims²²⁴; or defensive as in the case of Palestinian Muslims versus Israelis. This ideological strain of fundamentalism manifests itself in four other ways. It tends to be highly selective, focusing on arguments that support its case while preferring to ignore those that do not: fundamentalists within Christian Churches, for example, are arguably selective when they use Old Testament texts to condemn homosexuality while ignoring modern scholarship that provides alternative interpretations of the same texts. They are also willing to accept the tools and technologies of modernity, such as the Internet and social media that help to spread their message, while simultaneously advocating the social mores of the late Iron Age. It is Manichaeic in the

²²⁴ In a recent example of this a local BJP government in India omitted (or was rumoured to have omitted, which in terms of religious provocation comes to the same thing) mention of the Taj Mahal from its promotional literature on the grounds that it is a Muslim construction (private communication March 2018).

sense that there are no shades of grey: the fundamentalist approach is right, good and evidence of light in the world, with the certainty of purity and freedom from contamination of the unsaved outside; all else is dark and doomed. There may be degrees of contamination, however: for Shi'ite Muslims the darkness includes first secularized Shi'ites, then Sunni Muslims, and then the world of the *kuffar*, the unbelievers (ibid. p. 96). This Manichaeian approach is supported by two other considerations: first, that the relevant holy books are of divine origin, true in every particular, and secondly there is belief in a final consummation of the world in which good will triumph over evil and history will come to an end with the arrival of the Messiah or the Hidden Imam who will rescue believers from the horrors of the end times.²²⁵ Both these can be argued to influence the practice of religion in that they shape the atmosphere and the context in which ritual and worship are conducted.

Organisationally all fundamentalisms again tend to have similar elements, particularly an elect membership and clear boundaries between the elect and the rest. These boundaries are in some cases physical: for example ultra-Orthodox Jews are required to live within walking distance of a synagogue.²²⁶ This emphasis on boundedness tends also to be reflected in the behavioural requirements of fundamentalisms such as certain forms of dress, conduct and diet. Thus private issues tend generally to become public affairs, whether matters of worldview, sexuality, identity or gender differentiation. Relationships are often tightly controlled, reflecting the idea that the resources of the

²²⁵ The Abrahamic religions' cosmologies are relatively clear about the end times compared with those of the eastern religions. Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist deliverances are more from alien invasion and overthrow though concepts such as the Khalistan of the Sikhs have a millennial air about them (Almond et al 2003, p. 97).

²²⁶ This exclusivity is also reflected, presumably, in the preference for closed communities among sects such as that of the Branch Davidians raided and destroyed in Waco, Texas, in 1993 (Docherty 2001) though it should be noted that the Fundamentalism Project resisted labelling the Branch Davidians as 'fundamentalist' on the grounds that members' loyalty was to their leader, David Koresh, rather than to a religious tradition (ibid., p. 91).

group, including breeding potential, are the property of all rather than individual members. The Fundamentalism Project scholars noted that the failure to understand that fundamentalists “project their readings of private and personal concerns onto the largest possible political canvas leads to many misreadings of fundamentalisms” (ibid.). This explains in part, they contend, why fundamentalisms are uniformly patriarchal,²²⁷ and so concerned with apparently trivial symbolic issues such as (in the American context) prayer in state schools and the display of religious symbols on public property. This is less about faith or imposing a certain morality, they argue, and more about whether it is “we” or “they” who are claiming the culture: the overlap with the identity dimension of religion is apparent. With all this goes a typically authoritarian hierarchy with a charismatic leader, though interestingly it has also been observed (ibid. p. 98) that “membership is voluntary and orthodox insiders are presumed to be equal”. This is not the outside impression of organisations such as Islamic State, but it may be that fundamentalist organisations in war zones, which were perhaps less prominent during the time of the Fundamentalism Project, are necessarily less equal than others in more stable settings.²²⁸ It is a reminder that the findings of the Project may need up-dating.²²⁹

It may be argued that the characteristics above, while core to any description of fundamentalism, do not fully reflect the range of philosophies that many scholars include within broader categorizations of fundamentalism. Ruthven (2003), for example, includes the Nazi idea of a Thousand Year Reich, and cites both that and modern communism as

²²⁷ It may be that in this regard the Fundamentalism Project’s conclusions may become dated: a number of progressive movements on issues such as women’s rights and the environment, which have some characteristics of fundamentalisms, also have more matriarchal forms of leadership. This has also been true of religious movements outside the mainstream; see Wessinger, C (ed.) 1993, *Women’s Leadership in Marginal Religions*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago.

²²⁸ This point is speculative: it has not proved possible to find any research to confirm or refute it.

²²⁹ And why the word ‘tend’ is used here so frequently: it needs to be appreciated that while all fundamentalisms have similarities, each needs to be understood on its own terms.

secularized versions of Judaeo-Christian eschatology. It may be argued that such movements also rely on inerrant texts such as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (1924) and Chairman Mao's *Thoughts* (1964). Ruthven also quotes the arguments of historians Christopher Hill and Norman Cohn that revolutionary movements in pre-modern times, such as the Fifth Monarchy Men,²³⁰ and the Anabaptists of Münster,²³¹ driven as they were by "chiliastic expectations and end-of-the-world scenarios", can be accurately described as fundamentalist. Equally, he suggests that the doctrine of papal infallibility adopted at Vatican 1 (1869-70) corresponds to Biblical inerrancy, and that some New Age cults and new religious movements are also designed to provide similar sources of authority and certainty in an uncertain world. It would be a mistake, however, to think that fundamentalism is confined to fringe cults. Even parts of the mild, moderate and largely middle class gentility of the Church of England are subject to flurries of fundamentalism over issues such as homosexuality (Brown and Woodhead 2016, p. 62).

Fundamentalism, hatred and violence

This is an appropriate point to discuss the subject of fundamentalism, hatred and violence. Does it follow that fundamentalism, as a contributor to religious hatred, leads inevitably to terrorism and violence? Mark Juergensmeyer in *Terror in the Mind of God* (2017) takes the view that "politics and human ambition are behind most acts of violence

²³⁰ The Fifth Monarchists were a group of Christians at the time of the English Civil war who believed that the prophetic dream of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 2 indicated that four empires (the Babylonian, Persian, Grecian and Roman) had already fallen and the fall of the fifth, the English Monarchy, would presage the Second Coming. One of the Fifth Monarchists' most prominent supporters was the regicide Thomas Harrison who was hanged, drawn and quartered for treason after the Restoration (Capp 2012).

²³¹ A group of radical Anabaptists established a sectarian government in the German city of Münster between February 1534 and June 1535. This rebellion started with a Lutheran perspective but rapidly gained a political edge when it called for the absolute equality of all people in all things, including the distribution of wealth. The increasing iconoclasm of those involved included the proclamation of royal powers in this new Zion and the legalization of polygamy. The city was besieged by its expelled Bishop and when he triumphed the Anabaptist leaders were publicly tortured and executed, their bodies exhibited in cages hung from the steeple of St Lambert's Church; the cages remain (Arthur 2011).

in public life, including those tarred with the rhetoric and symbols of religion” (p. 268) and that much of what is said about religious terrorism may be applied to other forms of political violence that are what Juergensmeyer calls ‘performance violence’ (p. 269). The difference, he continues, is that terrorism associated with religion is “almost exclusively symbolic..... consistent with legendary images of grand encounters between existential foes” and “accompanied by striking claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism, characterized by the intensity of the religious activists’ commitment and the transhistorical scope of their goals” (Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 270). Juergensmeyer’s approach, “epistemic worldview analysis” (p. 12), like Freud’s, seems to start from the assumption that religious belief is always a proxy for other motivations.²³² The weakness of this approach is that, unlike Jung’s, it precludes the possibility of intrinsic motivation, that religious adherence in pursuit of meaning and purpose to life found through relationship with some form of ultimacy is a goal in and of itself. It can be argued that the absolutism described above by Juergensmeyer, and the cosmic dimension of such violence, suggest that the brands of religion most associated with such violence tend to be fundamentalist, and this applies as much to acts by individuals acting once and alone (such as the Norwegian Anders Breivik) as organisations and networks dedicated to long-term campaigns.²³³

Psychodynamic approaches to fundamentalist doctrine and practice

²³² For an explanation of epistemic worldview analysis and its relevance here see Juergensmeyer, M and Sheikh, M 2012, ‘The Sociotheological Turn in the Study of Religion and Violence’ in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence* (eds. Jerryson, M, Juergensmeyer, M and Kitts, M), Oxford University Press, Oxford. It is built in part on Michel Foucault’s idea of the ‘episteme’ which he described by as a paradigm of thinking that “defines the conditions of all knowledge” (Foucault, M 1973, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences*, Vintage, New York, p. 168).

²³³ It is important to state that the vast majority of believers do not condone violence enacted in the supposed name of their faith. For example, the Pew Research Center reported in 2015 that 95% of Muslims regarded Islamic State as non-Muslim (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/> viewed 30.4.2018). However, it is also argued that “ISIS and other jihadist groups legitimise themselves through a repertoire of ideas that have broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations” (Hamid 2014).

Fundamentalisms, in and of themselves, are, to repeat the words of James Jones (Strozier et al. 2010, p. 216) just ways of being religious: it is how they are enacted by human beings on the ground that determines their impact. This is true, of course, of any set of ideas, whether social, religious, political or indeed of any abstraction that can be played out in the real world with real world impacts. So it makes sense to look not only at the characteristics of fundamentalist doctrine and practice, but at those of their adherents. As might be expected, there is a wide spectrum of evidence and opinion in the psychodynamic literature on the subject of fundamentalists. Conclusions at the two extremes of this spectrum provide an idea of the range of views along it and are worth quoting. At one end are those who regard the fundamentalist mindset as evidence of a dangerous psychopathology composed of distinct characteristics, including dualistic thinking; paranoia and rage; an apocalyptic orientation that incorporates distinct perspectives on time, death, and violence; a subjugation to charismatic leadership; and the consequences of a conversion experience. Added to these are “psychological themes of shame and humiliation, the need for simplified meanings, and most of all for the absolutist and totalized way things get structured in the fundamentalist mindset” (Strozier et al 2010, p. 11). At the other end of the spectrum the fundamentalist mindset is regarded, in *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* (Hood et al., 2005), as little more than a rigorous form of commitment to living with and from sacred texts, creating a way for them to interpret the world, as well as themselves in relation to the world, and to persevere in an inhospitable culture. “This meaning system encompasses all of life and is strongly felt, for it deals with issues of eternal importance. It also provides a framework for motivation, and in the process helps meet several personal needs for meaning, such as purpose, value, efficacy and self-worth” (Hood et al 2005, p. 5).

This latter approach explicitly rejects the idea that fundamentalists have psychopathologies out of the ordinary, arguing that empirical psychology has failed to find any such traits such as a link with authoritarianism (ibid. p. 4), and that research claiming such links is an example of the social sciences' prejudice against fundamentalists. It also argues that the term 'fundamentalism' is widely misused as a synonym for bigotry, fanaticism, or anti-intellectualism. The problem is, argues Carpenter (1997, p. 4) that 'fundamentalist', like 'puritan', has become a word of wide usage and immense symbolic power. "It has been spoken with derisive loathing and, no doubt, some fear in intellectual circles, for *fundamentalist* evokes images – such as the Scopes "monkey" trial in Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925 or, more recently, the widespread demonstrations against abortion – that represent deep and long-standing cultural conflicts in modern America" [emphasis in original].

Instead the authors argue that fundamentalism is a logical possibility for any religion,²³⁴ and that it is the form religion takes when threatened by the philosophic, moral and scientific claims of modernity. The controversy around different psychological approaches to fundamentalism is reflected in responses to *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*. For example, Sara Savage in *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* described it as a "breakthrough in the study of religious fundamentalism" that "knocks prevailing stereotypes on the head" (Savage 2006). In contrast, David Wulff in the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* described the book

²³⁴ While the epithet 'fundamentalist' tends to be applied mostly to Christianity and Islam, there are fundamentalists in non-Abrahamic traditions, such as the Buddhist or Hindu. Their adherence, however, tends to be less to inerrant scripture and more to people or ideas derived from an idealized past; the ethnonationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India is an example (Anderson, E and Longkumer, A 2018 'Neo-Hindutva': evolving forms, spaces, and expressions of Hindu nationalism, *Contemporary South Asia*, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 371-377).

as “as frank an apologia for fundamentalism as one is likely to find authored by contemporary social scientists” which “would greatly benefit from a more strictly phenomenological turn, one that combines bracketing of their apologetic stance, immersion into a broader range of fundamentalist thinking, and sufficient critical distance to facilitate a penetrating analysis that would take us beyond what the fundamentalists can tell us themselves” (Wulff 2006). This snapshot of two polarised views also provides the opportunity to make a number of important points to be held in mind when considering psychological commentary on fundamentalism and fundamentalists.

First, much of the scholarly attention paid to fundamentalism, certainly pre-11 September 2001, comes from North America and is predicated upon the American experience of fundamentalism – as is evident from the Carpenter quotation above. Secondly, the more recent literature has been influenced by the atrocities of Islamic State, the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups in the wake of the post 9/11 actions against Afghanistan and Iraq and during the ongoing horrors of Syria. The widespread fear of fundamentalism is no longer confined, as Carpenter wrote in 1997, to intellectual circles but has become pervasive, and it is difficult to believe that this has not, to some extent, influenced psychodynamic scholarship as well as the popular presses. Thirdly, and consequent to the above, the words ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘terrorist’ have become almost synonymous, psychologically, and this has a number of unfortunate consequences, the main one being that the more moderate forms of fundamentalism, which can be found in any religion, can be treated as extremist and dangerous.²³⁵

²³⁵ A dramatic example of this was reported in *The Daily Telegraph* on Tuesday 8 November 2016: “Government officials know so little about religion that they cannot see the difference between Muslim extremists and traditionalist Anglicans – and so just assume both are a bit “bonkers” according to the Archbishop of Canterbury”.

Groups and group practices

The issue is further complicated when the dynamics of group psychology are taken into account. This is dangerous as well as important ground: the pitfalls of applying psychoanalytic theory to groups without sufficient awareness of the differences between individuals and groups is well appreciated (Marcus 1994),²³⁶ and likewise it is problematic, as touched on above, to use psychoanalytic approaches to individuals to explain why they may become more extreme in their practices, and yet many of these practices are, almost by definition, group practices (Victoroff 2005). Psychoanalytic thinking about groups dates back to Freud's first speculations in 1921 when he hypothesised that groups are formed and bound when the ego ideals of individuals are subsumed into those of their leaders and, how catastrophically we know to our cost, releases them from the constraints of personal conscience (Freud 1955). Freud likened the relationship between a member of the group and the leader to a patient and a hypnotist: "just as the patient gives up his own judgment and especially his own moral and ethical standards and limitations and unquestioningly allows the hypnotists to be his guide, so the member of the group may give up his own morals and can be led to do what he would never do as an autonomous person" (quoted in Terman 2010, p. 18).

There was extensive research into the psychology of groups and into the relationships between groups and leaders after the Second World War, not least in the

²³⁶ Marcus argues that the group does not have a psychological structure, nor does it have the instinctual nature of the individual. Similarly Kurt Lewin argued that "the organization of the group is not the same as the organization of the individuals of which it is composed" and "The properties of a social group, such as its organization, its stability, its goals, are something different from the organization, the stability, and the goals of the individual" (Lewin 1943).

effort to understand how ordinarily moral individuals could be persuaded or induced to act in the ways they had done during the war years and in the years since (Klein 1948; Grinberg et al, 1977; Anzieu 1975). Among the results of this work the conclusions by Wilfred Bion are particularly relevant to “the fundamentalist mindset [is] situated in a group psychological context” (Terman 2010, p. 27). If a group is given no guidance or no specific task, Bion postulated on the basis of his research with groups, the group becomes organised by three basic assumptions that reflect primitive developmental anxieties and conflicts among the individuals of the group. He labelled these assumptions ‘dependency’, ‘fight-flight’ and ‘pairing’ (Bion 1961). The dependency assumption is that the group leader will magically provide for the group; the fight-flight assumption stimulates the group to organise around the need to resist or escape some external enemy; and the pairing assumption is that a couple in the group will provide some sort of messianic certainty of a way forward. This latter assumption, it can be reasoned, must be an invitation to anyone with a messianic streak to take advantage of their position in a group.

Before leaving the subject of fundamentalism in the context of groups there are two additional scholars to be heard, one secular, one religious. The secular is Eric Hoffer (1902-83), a stevedore on the San Francisco docks who wrote philosophical treatises in his spare time while living in railroad yards. The first and most famous of his books is *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (1951)²³⁷ which is concerned mainly with political movements but contains much that can equally be applied to religious fundamentalists. Hoffer makes a number of points worth remembering. First, he describes the relationship between religion and guilt, saying that there is an unavoidable contrast between “loftiness of profession and imperfection of practice”. The consequent feeling of

²³⁷ After leaving the docks in 1964 Hoffer became an adjunct professor at the University of California and endowed the Laconic Essay Prize.

guilt promotes hate so that “the more sublime the faith the more virulent the hatred it breeds” (Hoffer 1951, p. 96). Hoffer does not define what he means by a ‘sublime’ religion, but the point is that the aspiration to goodness is no protection against negative consequences; in fact it may exacerbate them.²³⁸ A second useful point is that “fanatics of all kinds... hate each other with the hatred of brothers” (ibid., p. 86) and it is the fanatic and the moderate “who are poles apart and never meet”. Hoffer’s point is borne out by experience on the ground: for example the divide between moderate and extremist Protestants in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s was sufficient to complicate peace-making across the supposedly larger divide between Protestants and Catholics (MacIver 1989). This also reflects the experience of scholar-practitioners who have tried to ameliorate issues by talking to those who are on the moderate side of fundamentalism as a more reasonable route to the fanatics: it rarely works because the moderates tend to be seen as traitors to the greater cause. Hoffer adds that “The opposite of the religious fanatic is not the fanatical atheist but the gentle cynic who cares not whether there is a God or not” (ibid.). A third point concerns the psychology of proselytising. Hoffer suggests that “The missionary zeal seems rather an expression of some deep misgiving, some pressing feeling of insufficiency at the center. Proselytising is more a passionate search for something not yet found than a desire to bestow upon the world something we already have” (ibid., p. 110). This argument is absent from some of the more scholarly reflections on the subject of fundamentalism and the psychology of fundamentalists: that the anger and the certainty of rightness and the rejection of the Other may conceal personal insecurities and vulnerabilities.

²³⁸ C.f. Blaise Pascal: “Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction” (Pensées 894, 1669).

This latter point is reflected in a further analysis of the fundamentalist mindset. Jung saw fanaticism of any kind as “overcompensated doubt” (Jung CW6, p. 41) while the depth psychologist Lionel Corbett sees narcissism as something similar: “when dogma about eternal verities is used to buttress areas of personal fragility, either because it would be intolerable to face the experience of the numinosum, even modified by ritual or symbol, or because dogma is used to defend against problems within the personality” (Corbett 1996, p. 33-4). Corbett provides the example of pathological grandiosity, needed to maintain a fragile self-structure, being used to depreciate the religious values of other people, or using the anti-sexual or misogynistic bias of dogma to avoid dealing with personal inhibitions. Similarly, religious practice may be used by narcissistic personalities to create charismatic leadership styles that lead to them being idealised by their followers, and their followers being infantilised into submission. The result of such individual pathologies can be a collective complex which “mobilizes in the group’s behaviour, emotion and life a defensive self-care system” (Singer and Kimbles 2002, p. 22) to protect the collective spirit.²³⁹

Fundamentalism as a form of cultural complex

In Chapter 4 the idea of the cultural complex (Singer and Kimbles 2004) was explored as a possible explanation of how religious hatred can grip an entire society. The hypothesis here is that fundamentalism can, in certain circumstances, be a variety of cultural complex comprising a particular type of human mindset, and the behaviour associated with it, that finds its fullest expression in fundamentalisms of many sorts -

²³⁹ Singer and Kimbles contrast this with Donald Kalsched’s 1996 account of how the individual psyche responds to trauma in defence of the self in *The Inner World of Trauma: Archetypal Defenses of the Personal Spirit* (Routledge, London).

religious, political, environmental, even psychological. It is these, combined with certain combustible social and political circumstances that, borrowing Juergensmeyer's metaphor, can provide the spark that leads to conflagration. If an organisation, community or a society is gripped by ideological rigidity, resistance to change or intolerance of any person or body who represents what it conceives to be Other, then it provides a home and a banner for individuals with a mindset that values those characteristics, and thereby generate or contribute to the hatreds that can accompany them.

Once such a cultural complex becomes established, then it could be argued that religious fundamentalism has little to do with religion and in this collective situation the accusation of psychopathology, denied when applied to individuals, may make sense, though this it be more evident in those leading and influencing the cultural complex than in the footsoldiers who sacrifice themselves in its name. There is evidence for this in Hartz and Everett (1989) reporting the work of Fundamentalists Anonymous²⁴⁰ and in the more recent work of those studying fundamentalist terrorism, for example, Schneider (2002); Atran (2006); Volkan and Kayatekin (2008); Strozier et al (2010); Unterrainer et al (2016). In the context of a cultural complex, statements such as "Fundamentalism is more a state of mind than a form of religion, more a psychological than a spiritual matter. As a psychological state of mind, it is always pathological. Wherever it appears and in whatever form or context, it is psychopathology" (Ellens 2014, p. 221) begin to make more sense if it is accepted that it is the organism as a whole, rather than individuals within it, which maintains the complex. This seems a way to explain how fundamentalism can provide a vehicle, opportunity and legitimacy for extreme beliefs and behaviour without implying

²⁴⁰ An organisation established in 1985, modelled on Alcoholics Anonymous, to help those addicted to fundamentalist religions (Luce, J 1986).

that all who espouse strong religion are mentally deranged as this is clearly not the case (Almond et al 2003).

In *The Cultural Complex: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives on Psyche and Society* (2004), Singer and Kimbles argue that Jung left a major gap in analytical psychology when he eschewed his original theory of complexes and instead went to the archetypal level of the psyche (p. 2).²⁴¹ This was probably because he had a lifelong fear of the individual being subsumed in the collective having experienced the nullification of his father by collective religion and his early vision of Europe being bathed in blood and horror as a result of its surrender to the collective forces of militarism and empire (Jung 1925, pp. 41-2). Singer and Kimbles believe that their elucidation of the cultural complex is filling this gap by reclaiming the psychodynamics of the collective for analytical psychology, and in their observations of the ways that contemporary groups relate to each other and to the wider world they provide evidence that supports this claim. They describe the intense collective emotion, the hallmark of an activated cultural complex, that accompanies expressions of group identity particularly as claims of victimhood form the nexus of group identities: “Mostly these group complexes have to do with trauma, discrimination, feelings of oppression and inferiority at the hands of another offending group”. In case such complexes are viewed as occasional and of little importance Singer and Kimbles argue that such group complexes “litter the psychic landscape and are as easily detonated as the literal land mines that scatter the globe and threaten life – especially young life – everywhere” (ibid. p. 7). Any questioning of such claims of victimhood provokes “the full fury of that group’s psychic defenses” while the “inner sociology” of

²⁴¹ As mentioned above, it was by doing this and focusing on the primitive and mythical in his essay ‘Wotan’ (1936), avoiding the social, political and economic realities of Weimar Germany, that Jung laid himself open to accusations of anti-Semitism and fascination with Nazi mythopoesis.

such cultural complexes can “seize the imagination, the behaviour and the emotions of the collective psyche and unleash tremendously irrational forces in the name of their “logic” ” (ibid.). With again the reservation that psychodynamic interpretation has to be cautious, this description of the activation of cultural complexes in groups provides explanations of psychological phenomena that are intuitively more convincing than their banishment under the heading of ‘psychopathology’. Singer and Kimbles are both rehabilitating Jung and building on his legacy to provide new understandings and explanations of religious behaviour.

Chapter 8: The emotional and experiential dimension of religion

Introduction

The emotional and experiential dimension of religion looks at religious hatred in the context of what Ninian Smart describes in *The Religious Experience of Mankind* (1969) as the “invisible world”, the “divine world” or the “sacred world”: visions and miracles, the intuition or appearance of celestial figures, ethereal music, the sense of being bathed in light and love, healing, conversion and the other intimations of powers and presences outside the normal. These are the aspects of religion for which the cognitive scientists and the neurotheologians may have evolutionary and neuroscientific explanations, while for believers they constitute an inherent part of what constitutes religion (Rennie 1999).²⁴² This chapter looks both at the inward exploration of what religion means to individuals seeking meaning, purpose and community in their lives – and how even this can contribute to religious hatred and conflict with others.

Missing links

These are subjects barely covered in the contemporary literature of conflict resolution. This is not surprising: as has already been noted, while conflict literature covers the role of religion most frequently in terms of identity and/or cultural conflict, it rarely looks beneath the surface at what constitutes ‘religion’, let alone at what secular humanists might regard as the even less accessible phenomena of the numinous. Stark’s explanation, originally aimed at social scientists but probably fitting conflict scholars as

²⁴² It was the lack of this dimension that originally, for Smart, differentiated religions from secular ideologies such as Marxism even if the latter may include a future utopia that is currently invisible. He later found this distinction impossible to maintain.

well, suggests that the reason for this theoretical neglect has been that those who claim to have received revelations or to have communicated with the supernatural “are either crazy or crooked, and sometimes both”. He continues by saying even many social scientists who assume the rationality of more mundane religious phenomenon, “find it quite impossible to accept that *normal* people can *sincerely believe* they have communicated with the divine” and “even the most unbiased social scientists typically have been unwilling to go further than to grant that the recipients of revelations have made honest *mistakes*, that they have *misinterpreted* an experience as having involved contact with the divine” (Stark 1999, p. 287, original emphasis). Stark concludes that all this is taken as self-evident as any scientist ‘knows’ [sic] that real revelations are quite impossible. Indeed, at first glance it is difficult to imagine why someone wrestling with the realities and consequences of religious hatred and conflict might have the time or inclination to explore aspects of religion that seem remote from the more obvious manifestations of religion in the form of group identity and culture.²⁴³ It is also arguably the dimension of religion where the insights of depth psychology are potentially both most helpful and most liable to be misleading because of the subtlety and ineffability of the subject matter and the complexity of interpreting what may be tenuous evidence. Nevertheless, if, as Stark suggests, social scientists are inclined to dismiss accounts of the numinous, one is left with few options other than to turn to forms of psychology which are prepared to entertain what human experience, if not social science, has always taken seriously.

The argument as to whether depth psychology should be accepted to have the respectability of a science is particularly pertinent when it comes to these more fragile

²⁴³ Gopin argues “there is much evidence that prosocial emotions are key to a stable non-violent society” and therefore “conflict resolution practice should have a much more constructive approach to, and even embrace of, emotions and intuitions, spiritual or secular, as critical to peacemaking and reconciliation” (2000, p. 49).

dimensions of religion. The conclusion reached by the philosopher Michael Lacewing in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry* (2013) that psychoanalysis is gradually overcoming its historical limitations, particularly in regard to its empirical methodology, and is in the process of becoming a science, is worth emphasising.²⁴⁴ If this is the case, and proceeding with all necessary caution, it would seem curious not to give at least some consideration to what depth psychologies have made of numinous experience. It should at the same time be admitted that while recent research and scholarship²⁴⁵ in the field of neuroscience may have rendered the study of religious and numinous experience less subjective, it has also drawn ever more complicated lines among fantasy, imagination, neural stimulation, forms of mental illness such as temporal lobe epilepsy²⁴⁶, and what William James, writing a century ago, might have recorded as genuine encounters with the numinous. While neuroscience continues to evolve it should be accepted, certainly for the deliberately cautious purposes of this dissertation, that for all its progress and fascination, neuroscience has added little of either moral or metaphysical significance to human understanding of the numinous in general or manifestations of religious hatred in particular except inasmuch as it may shed light on the psychopathologies of some individuals.

Definitions of religious experience

Ninian Smart's sense of the experiential dimension of religion brings with it a discussion of what makes all religions so important to their adherents and so inexplicable -

²⁴⁴ Lacewing, M 2013, 'Could Psychoanalysis be a Science?' in Fulford, K, Davies, M, Gipps, R, Graham, G, Sadler, J, Stanghellini, G and Thornton, T (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry*, Oxford Handbooks Online [viewed 12.2.20].

²⁴⁵ See for example McNamara, P 2009, *The Neuroscience of Religious Experience*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

²⁴⁶ See for example Koenig HG 2009, 'Research on religion, spirituality, and mental health: a review', *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 54, pp.283-91; Devinsky, O 2003, 'Religious experiences and epilepsy', *Epilepsy Behavior* vol. 4, pp.76-7.

alien, even – to practitioners in fields such as diplomacy, international relations and conflict resolution where, if religious collisions are not understood or responded to with sufficient insight and sensitivity, disaster can ensue. In *Dimensions of the Sacred* (1996) Smart gives consideration to the visionary, meditative and inspirational forms of religious experience such as *dhyana* (purified consciousness) and *bhakti* (which Smart refers to as “the experience of the numinous Other”).²⁴⁷ Smart continually wrestled with what constitutes religious experience. In *Worldviews* (1995) for example, he describes Otto’s ‘*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*’ (1917, p. 12) as one type of religious experience and then says mystical experience “does not seem to have the qualities Otto ascribes to the numinous” because it is “quiet”, “empty of images” and “does not give rise to worship or reverence, in so far as there is nothing ‘Other’ to worship or revere” (1995, p. 61). These notes are included to make clear one point from the outset of this discussion: that pinning down what scholars, mystics or indeed ‘ordinary people’ mean by, and describe as, religious experience is not straightforward and perhaps explains some of the resistance of psychologists and social scientists to what is least subject to empirical investigation.

One place to start is with the work of the Religious Experience Research Centre (RERC) founded by Sir Alister Hardy at Manchester College, Oxford, in 1969, and now based at the University of Wales.²⁴⁸ Hardy, who had been a distinguished biologist, was convinced that religious experiences had biological roots and deserved systematic

²⁴⁷ The Sanskrit is usually translated as attachment or devotion accompanied by deep affection. In the *Bhagavad Gita* the term is used to designate a religious path, and the idea also informed the Bhakti Movement that inspired many religious movements throughout India and extended its influence to Sufism, Jainism and even Christianity. See Flood, G 2003, *The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford and Neill, S 2002, *A History of Christianity in India, 1707–1858*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

²⁴⁸ The Centre holds in its archives some 6,500 accounts of religious and spiritual experiences delivered in response to what became known as the ‘Hardy question’: “Have you ever been aware of or influenced by a presence or power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?” (Hardy, 1979, p. 20; Franklin, 2014, pp. 7-8).

empirical study, claiming that such experiences are veridical and ‘real’ in the same sense as other observations of experience.²⁴⁹ As Walter Stace has said more recently, mystical experience is "a psychological fact of which there is abundant evidence" (Stace 1960). Some observers have been religious and interpreted their experiences within religious frames of reference; but there are also people of no religious persuasion who describe experiences “which they cannot but interpret as religious” (Rankin 2005). Many of the accounts collected by RERC putatively reflect an awareness of “a greater reality underlying the physical world of the senses” (ibid.) For many, while such experiences come unexpectedly and are often kept secret for fear of ridicule, they can be the most important event in their lives and provide a sense of meaning, direction and comfort that remains with them. The RERC archive has enabled systematic study and classification of such experiences, and has contributed to the evolution of a vocabulary to describe them.²⁵⁰ This work has been complemented by the work of, for example, the Exceptional Human Experience Network (EHEN) in the United States.²⁵¹ One result of the RERC’s research has been some insight into the proportion of the population who claim to have had experiences that relate to the Hardy question. Research published in 1997 found that between 31% and 49% of British people claimed to have had direct personal awareness of “a power or presence different from everyday life” (Argyle 1997), while later research has suggested that up to 76% of the British population “claim an awareness of a transcendent reality” (Hay and Heald 1998 quoted in Rankin 2005). Research in 2013 by the think tank Theos, which describes itself as “a Christian think tank, committed to the belief that

²⁴⁹ Hardy’s approach was rigorously phenomenological.

²⁵⁰ For example, the psychologist Abraham Maslow refers to ‘peak experiences’; Andrew Greeley to ‘limit experience’ to indicate that these experiences suggest a limit or horizon of life beyond which there may be more; Marghanita Laski writes of ‘ecstasy’; R.M. Bucke prefers ‘cosmic consciousness’ (Rankin 2005).

²⁵¹ Both RERC and EHEN include the ‘out of the body experience’ (OBE) and ‘near death experience’ (NDE) which arguably belong in a slightly different category to those described as ‘religious’ both because of their nature and usual circumstances, and because there are now neurological as well as psychological explanations for these phenomena (see for example Blackmore, S 2017, *Seeing Myself: The new science of out-of-body experiences*, Robinson, London).

religion in general and Christianity in particular has much to offer for the common good”,²⁵² found that 59% of people believe in “some kind of spiritual being or essence”, though unfortunately the methodology did not discover what exactly was meant by this. Belief in something does not, of course, equate to direct experience of it, but this mélange of figures suggests that a fairly large proportion of people in what is supposedly an increasingly secular country²⁵³ are still, in some way or other, open to the idea of spiritual experience and value the idea of some adherence to the non-material while being freed from association with any particular doctrines or institutions (Badham 2005) or, one might add, the constraints that accompany any formal allegiance to them.²⁵⁴

If these figures seem high, it is perhaps worth reflecting on the extent of the bookshelves devoted to ‘spiritual’ matters in every bookshop, the plethora of festivals in which ‘spiritual’ studies or treatments are offered, and the popularity of everything from yoga to mindfulness retreats.²⁵⁵ The commercial value of such offerings suggests a substantial number of customers actively seeking experiences which the material world, despite its contemporary wealth, is unable to provide. It may also be that the availability of such products is causing a rise in their consumption, and that they offer something not available through mainstream religion.

²⁵² Website www.theosthinktank.co.uk viewed 6.6.18.

²⁵³ Numbers of people responding ‘none’ to the question of what religious beliefs they hold: 1983 – 31%; 1993 – 37%; 2003 – 44%; 2013 – 51%; 2017 – 53%. Research also reveals that despite these figures ‘belief in a soul’ is 70%, belief in an afterlife 50%, and both figures appear to be increasing (Linda Woodhead, Anne Spencer Memorial Lecture, University of Bristol, 15 March 2018).

²⁵⁴ There are also increasing numbers of people who designate themselves ‘spiritual but not religious’; see for example Erlandson, S 2000, *Spiritual but Not Religious: A Call to Religious Revolution in America*, iUniverse, Bloomington; Heelas, P and Woodhead, L 2005, *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality*, Blackwell, Malden.

²⁵⁵ When and whether to put ‘spiritual’ in inverted commas is a constant conundrum. In this dissertation they are used where the claim to spirituality seems questionable: see for example Warrington, R 2017, *Material Girl, Mystical World: The Now-Age Guide for Chic Seekers and Modern Mystics*, HarperElixir, San Francisco, which appears to argue that some forms of shopping can be ‘spiritual’.

Religious experience and emotion

Before the relationship between religious experience and religious hatred is examined some of what is called religious or spiritual experience, and that for which Rudolf Otto coined the term ‘numinous’, should be investigated more deeply.²⁵⁶ One starting point for this is the body and how the embodiment of sacred experience provides evidence that such experience is ‘real’. There is something of this in William James when he writes of the “convincingness of these feelings of reality” that are “genuine perceptions of truth” (James 1902, p. 57), arguing that the physical symptoms of such experience, such as the shiver down the spine or the butterflies in the stomach, can be more significant purveyors of wisdom than theological formulae (ibid., p. 58). More recently Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams commented that “I don’t think any one of us can begin to discover again what religion might mean unless we are prepared to expose ourselves to new ways of being in our bodies” (Williams 2014). The popularity of yoga retreats and other forms of embodied experience as spiritual activities echo these points, likewise the wilderness retreats that aim to reconnect people with the natural world in a manner reminiscent of the pantheism of Bruno, Spinoza, Emerson or Vyasa, author of the *Mahabharata*.²⁵⁷ Religious traditionalists might object that such moments cannot provide a proper experience of a divine that is above and beyond nature, though St. Francis of Assisi, patron saint of environmentalists, might have disagreed. The key point is that human bodies, and the feelings they express, are not to be regarded as inferior to the processes of the mind. As the neuroscientist Guy Claxton puts it,

²⁵⁶ The root of the word ‘numinous’ is the Latin *numen*, meaning “a deity or spirit presiding over a thing or place (Collins English Dictionary 7th ed. 2005), so ‘numinous’ describes the presence or power of a divinity. It is important to note that it is etymologically unrelated to Kant’s *noumenon*, a Greek word describing the unknowable.

²⁵⁷ Hinduism is arguably at least as pantheistic as it is theistic; see Kvastad, N 1975, ‘Pantheism and Mysticism’, *Sophia*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.1-15.

Feelings are not a nuisance. They are not – as Plato thought, and many still do – wayward and primitive urgings that continually threaten to undermine the fragile structures built by dispassionate reason.... Feelings are somatic events that embody our values and concerns. They signal what we care about: what gives our lives meaning and direction.

(Claxton 2015, p. 5)

The reason for emphasising embodied experience is that it is a powerful counter-argument to all those who, engaged in conflict with others, are inclined to disregard their opponents' concerns as 'emotional' and therefore unworthy of serious consideration, or those for whom 'religious experience' is by definition something not of this world, detached from ordinary human concerns and therefore not to be taken seriously. Religious experience and emotion may be foreign to the worlds of the diplomat or the technocrat but, unaddressed, have a way of turning into actions that are all too real and relevant to their concerns. As Dominic Moïsi points out in *The Geopolitics of Emotion* (2009), if the relationship between Christianity and Islam is based on what is experienced as systematic humiliation of the latter by the former, then it should not be surprising when steps are taken to reverse it. Equally, if people more often *feel* than *think* their way to the beliefs and sacrifices demanded by faith (James 1902, p. 39; Frijda, Manstead & Bem 2010, pp. 4-6; Frijda & Mesquita 2010, pp. 50-51), then it is likely that those feelings find bodily expression, and possibly expression in acts of hatred or violence. The intensity of religious feeling that enables self-sacrifice may be the same for the suicide bomber as it was for Father Damien when he laboured in the leprosy settlement on Molokai: this is why religious experience needs to be understood.

It is useful to list the combination of emotional and somatic responses to religious experience to set out how wide-ranging and powerful they can be. William James reported some of these in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), since when others have described more, some of them as the result of experimentation with hallucinogens such as

LSD. Walter Pahnke, for example, in 1967 listed nine properties derived from the study of mystical experiences in “almost all cultures and religions” in an attempt to describe the “universal psychological characteristics” which appeared to be common to spontaneous mystical and experimental psychedelic experiences:

1. *Unity* is a sense of cosmic oneness achieved through positive ego-transcendence....[...] the person becomes very much aware of being part of a dimension much vaster and greater than himself.....
2. *Transcendence of time and space* means that the subject feels beyond past, present and future and beyond ordinary three-dimensional space in a realm of eternity or infinity.
3. *Deeply felt positive mood* contains the elements of joy, blessedness, peace and love to an overwhelming degree of intensity, often accompanied by tears.
4. *Sense of sacredness* is a non-rational, intuitive, hushed, palpitant response of awe and wonder in the presence of inspiring realities.....
5. *The noetic quality*, a feeling of insight or illumination that is felt on an intuitive, non-rational level and has a tremendous force of certainty and reality.... a gain of insight about such things as philosophy of life or sense of values.
6. *Paradoxicality*.... A person may realize that he is experiencing, for example, an "identity of opposites".²⁵⁸
7. *Alleged ineffability*... the experience is felt to be beyond words, non-verbal, impossible to describe.....
8. *Transiency* means that the psychedelic peak does not last in its full intensity, but instead passes into an afterglow and remains as a memory.
9. *Persisting* positive changes in attitudes and behaviour are toward self, Others, life and the experience itself.

(Pahnke 1967)

In addition to these nine the neuroscientist Patrick McNamara (2009) identifies a further eight based on more recent analyses:

10. an enhanced sense of personal power or even that one has been specially blessed by God;
11. enhanced “theory of mind” capacities (these are capacities to accurately guess their mental states and emotions of Others);
12. changes in sexual behaviours (these can be enhanced or dramatically diminished);
13. changes in reading/writing behaviours.....most often these manifest as an enhanced interest in writing (in pathological cases, this becomes a form of hypergraphia²⁵⁹);
14. enhanced awareness and appreciation of music [...]

²⁵⁸ McNamara (2009, p. 15) describes this as “the ability to respectfully hold opposing points of view”. The ability to empathise with, if not to hold, opposing points of view is a quality demanded of effective third parties in the conflict field and there is of course literature on religion as a form of mediation: for a recent example see Meyer, B 2020, ‘Religion as Mediation’, *Religion, Media and Materiality*, vol. 11, no. 3.

²⁵⁹ Hypergraphia is defined as “the tendency towards extensive and, in some cases, compulsive writing in temporal lobe epilepsy”. The writing is often concerned with moral or religious issues (Waxman, S and Geschwind, N 1974, ‘Hypergraphia in temporal lobe epilepsy’, *Neurology* vol. 24, no. 7, p. 629.

15. complex visual and metaphoric imagery (These complex visual metaphors are usually related to the sense of noetic insight that accompanies intense religious experiences. The religious ideas are felt as so meaningful that only complex symbolic visual imagery could capture them);
16. ritualization (This is the propensity to perform ritual actions when religious experiences are heightened); and
17. encounter with God or spirit beings.

(McNamara 2009, pp. 15-6)

McNamara points out that not every religious experience will contain all seventeen of these properties, and relatively mundane experiences may contain few beyond positivity and determination to change behaviour towards others (ibid. p. 16). Equally, not all such experiences may result in the transformation of personality and behaviour any more than the experience of being ‘born again’, in Christian nomenclature, can be guaranteed to last once the intensity of the original experience has dissipated. For some the purpose of mystical experience is the elevation of the human spirit, though whether the form this takes in different religions, for example the state the Sufis describe as *al-insan al-kamil*, the ‘perfected human’ (Geels & Belzen, 2003, p. 10), what the Buddhists describe as ‘perfect mind’ (Kakar, 2003, p. 109), or the ecstasies of Christian mystics are in any way equivalent depends on descriptions of experiences that are notoriously difficult to compare (Claxton 2014).

Effects of religious experience

It may be objected that a line should be drawn between mystic states, whether induced by religious ecstasy or hallucinogenic chemicals, and the more everyday religious experiences induced, for example, by attending a religious celebration. The question here is whether situations of confrontation and conflict, which draw believers into the need to defend their beliefs or sense of religious identity, may also induce more emotional (rather than cognitive) appreciations of their faith which might explain to some extent the passion

with which religious issues are argued and fought. Perhaps the quest for religious experience is both stronger and less conscious than is customarily appreciated, and is in part the quest for stronger experience *per se*. If this need for strong experience is met, then maybe its first effect is to *intensify* everything else that people associate with their religion, including the need to justify it to others and themselves in terms as vigorous as the feelings it induces.

Leaving aside the more mystical dimensions of religious experience, it has to be asked how the more everyday forms of religious experience, such as those concomitant with attending celebrations, festivals, rituals or forms of worship, may contribute to religious hatred. In this there seems to be some convergence in the scholarship of neuroscientists and depth psychologists (Lacewing 2013). Both are concerned with how religious experience affects the human sense of Self, the first relying on data and empirical research, the latter more on the knowledge that flows from professional experience and intuition. Patrick McNamara bases his model of the Self on two theories supported by recent empirical psychological literature: that of the Self as a collection of schemas (Markus and Wurf, 1987) and the Self as a story (Bruner, 1990).²⁶⁰ The former rests on work on representational and information-processing properties of the self-concept, the latter rooted in the tradition of narrative psychology. These meta-theories contribute to two sub-theories of the Self: the theory of self-regulation and the theory of possible Selves – including the ‘ideal Self’ (McNamara 2009, p. 24) - that people hope or expect to become, or fear to become, in the future. The narratives of these possible future Selves are designed to evolve the present Self, through the resolution of its internal conflicts, into a

²⁶⁰ While drawing on McNamara’s 2009 book *The Neuroscience of Religious Experience* for guidance on the interface between religion and brain science, it should be noted that McNamara himself is acutely aware that this science, and especially the science of neurotheology, is still in its infancy, and therefore any conclusions based on it must still be regarded as tentative. Précising his complex arguments also risks distorting them.

more complete Self. “We evaluate our current and past Selves”, says McNamara, “with reference to possible Selves” (ibid., p. 25).²⁶¹ Possible Selves are relevant because of the role they play in self-regulation, particularly through events such as regular attendance at religious rituals, for example, which activate other possible Selves including the ‘ideal Self’ mentioned above. This ideal Self then provides a standard against which the current Self can be measured in terms of progress towards its ultimate goal, including the resolution of internal conflicts between the current and the desired (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry and Hart-Johnson 2004 quoted in McNamara 2009). The highest standard of all is the God to which the religious process is oriented and towards which believers are directed through prayer and ritual in the attempt to become possessed by the spirit of God, however conceived. The parallels with Jung’s concept of the psychological journey of individuation, explored in further detail below, are apparent even if Jung insisted that a vision of the *mysterium tremendum* is not the goal (Stein 2006, p. 48). In fact, argued Jung, becoming marooned in the land of the *numen* would constitute a state of possession and inflation which is generally destructive for individuals and groups (ibid.).

The language of religion is suffused with this notion of an ideal Self whose apotheosis is union with ultimacy of some kind. The Christian Bible provides an example: “I in them and you in me, that they may become perfectly one.....” (John 17:23). This very high standard of an ideal Self leads also to the idea of the ‘divided Self’ which religion promises to heal (McNamara 2009, p. 26).²⁶² This is an idea which will draw a nod of recognition from any scholar-practitioner in the field of conflict resolution: those

²⁶¹ C.f. Markus, H and Nurius, P 1986, ‘Possible selves’, *American Psychologist*, 41, pp. 954-969.

²⁶² In pursuing this strand of thought it is important to concede that the idea of the Self is not universally accepted. Dennett (1991) for example argues that there is no single Self responsible for all our actions, but rather a centre of “narrative gravity” (p. 410) which creates drafts of experience and the illusion of single-mindedness. McNamara rejects this argument on the grounds that individuals, even children are “are designed by nature as strategic agents” (McNamara 2009, p. 27).

who cope with their internal doubts and divisions by projecting them onto those they perceive as enemies or just Other are all too familiar; once someone or some party or group is so categorised it becomes easier to marginalise or demonise them and to justify consequent behaviour based on such assessments. McNamara reasons that a divided consciousness has its advantages, such as being able to deceive ourselves, and being able to believe two contradictory points of view simultaneously as the alternative to the cognitive dissonance that human beings find uncomfortable.²⁶³ McNamara also argues that creating a unified sense of Self is difficult and costly in terms of the effort involved in suppressing the goals, habits and desires that contradict the values of a unified and perhaps ideal Self, and therefore that in some circumstances, from an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense to live with a divided rather than unified Self. Again, there seems little in McNamara's arguments with which a depth psychologist would disagree.

Ideas about the unified Self and the divided Self are relevant to this dissertation for two reasons. First, McNamara argues that a unified Self makes for a strong agent, and strong agents are essential to promote and manage the within-group cooperation that has always been vital for human survival. He adds that such cooperation is not always benign in that one of the most powerful forms of coalitional cooperation is warfare, and religion appears to have been crucial for development of individuals who could wage effective warfare. He dismisses the idea that religion is merely about producing nice little boys and girls: "it is also about producing real, mature, autonomous, and free adults, adults who could wage effective war when necessary" (McNamara 2009, p. 32). Whether or not one is prepared to go quite this far, it does suggest that experience such as collaborative ritual or individualistic prayer and meditation enhance the possibility of a unified Self which can

²⁶³ This 'compartmentalization' (Brewer 2011) may explain how some people with a modern scientific education can also be Creationists.

both reinforce group loyalty against outsiders and provide powerful agency in support of survival. With this perspective it is little wonder that states have long co-opted even supposedly pacifist religious movements into supporting their ambitions. It goes some way to explain the sometimes contentious bonds between established religions and secular states: the unified Self becomes the unified nation. Secondly, the idea of the divided Self is central to understanding how emotional and religious experience is relevant to understanding religious hatred; the rest of this chapter is devoted to exploring and explaining this relevance.

Religious hatred and the divided Self

This argument begins with William James and Lecture VIII, ‘The Divided Self, and the Process of its Unification’ in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. James argued that a divided consciousness was part of the inheritance of humankind and one of the purposes of religion was to bridge and heal this division (James 1902, pp. 129-30). In the hundred years since James it has also become possible to confirm, to some extent, his speculation that internal human divisions are the consequence of inheritance: as he put it, “Heterogeneous personality has been explained as the result of inheritance - the traits of character of incompatible and antagonistic ancestors are supposed to be preserved alongside of each other” (James 1902, p. 129).²⁶⁴ The existence of the divided Self has arguably provided as strong an internal motivation for people to take religion seriously as has the utility of the unified Self for aiding external human cooperation. But a divided Self is no more a recipe for a tranquil life than a divided state: if it is not to overwhelm the

²⁶⁴ For further explanation of the genetics of divided consciousness see Haig, D 2006, ‘Intrapersonal conflict’ in Jones, M and Fabian, A (eds.), *Conflict*, Darwin College Lectures, pp. 8-22, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

individual's mental stability it must be managed. McNamara calls this management process to reduce the tensions between the current Self and the ideal Self 'decentering' (McNamara 2009, p. 44), and it is this process, he argues, that religion aims to procure.

Decentering [staying with the American spelling] does this by temporarily decoupling the executive Self, the current Self that controls cognitive and motor functions, from its position of control so that it is open to emotion and experience. In other words, it allows the busy, everyday Self to take a step back and take a look beyond its immediate cognitive environment in order to harness greater and different resources and thereby build a "new identity... larger and more complex than the older Self..." (ibid. p. 47). This paraphrasing of McNamara's account of the decentering process hardly does justice to a sequence of complex arguments and descriptions of cognitive and non-cognitive processes, and yet these are no more than the empirical confirmations of long-held truths. McNamara himself acknowledges that "Many scholars (e.g. Freud, Propp, Jung, Campbell, Eliade) have noticed that the experience of growth into a better or ideal Self is accomplished via integration of the old into the new or better story" (ibid., p. 51).²⁶⁵ The end result of this integration of old and new, especially in the context of religious experience, is some sense of elevation, less attachment to old desires and grudges and a consequent sense of freedom and expansiveness as well as what McNamara calls the "quiet dignity so characteristic of genuinely religious individuals" (ibid., p. 55). In extreme cases the result may be the religious ecstasy that acts as a bridge

that connects the adept to the very absolute, divine, and transcendent entity, realm, or state taught in the religious doctrine.....(as in Hindu *darshana*, Sufi *hal* or *wajd*, or Catholic *visio beatifico*), immersion (as in Vedantic *brahman* or Christian *unico mystica*), release of 'self' from the body (as in some yogic practices, or the vanishing notions of 'self' to open up the space of a blissful emptiness (as in some Buddhist meditation practices).

(Malinar and Basu, 2008, p. 246)

²⁶⁵ C.f. the convergence among neuroscientists and depth psychologists mentioned above.

How, though, can this apparently benevolent centering process contribute to the fomenting of religious hostility and hatred if its fruits can be seemingly so positive?

The short answer, according to McNamara, is that it can sometimes go wrong.

Decentering, he explains, occurs in four stages, paraphrased as follows:

- Stage 1. The sense of agency of the current Self is inhibited;
- Stage 2. The current Self becomes open to new possibilities and a new Self;
- Stage 3. A process of searching for ways to reconcile the old and new Selves begins, looking for ways to create a new version of the Self that can encompass deeper and better solutions to internal conflicts; and
- Stage 4. The new Self, closer to the ideal Self, binds and integrates the old Self, creating a new identity that is larger, more complex and more unified than the previous Self.

(Adapted from McNamara 2009, p. 47)

Problems arise if, in Stage 3 of this process, the search process fails because it is prevented from starting or finishing, for example because the openness to non-cognitive influences is inhibited by the discomfort of fellow members of a religious community, or because the pressures of material circumstances leave it incomplete, and then in Stage 4 the binding process still takes place.²⁶⁶ This means that the old Self binds *with itself* because no new or ideal Self has emerged during the search process, and therefore the old identity is actively reinforced. If this happens existing convictions will be continually reconfirmed and held with ever greater force and certainty; the more it occurs, whether through self-agency or at the behest of others, the more bound to itself the old Self becomes, and the harder it is for the individual to accept new ideas or indeed any which challenge the increasingly bounded sense of Self. The end result is the narcissism and fanaticism evident

²⁶⁶ Remembering that one of the possible (and contested) etymological origins of the word 'religion' is the Latin *ligare*, to bind (Partridge, E 1958, *Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*, Routledge, London.)

in any form of religious extremism.²⁶⁷ So religious experience, instead of being the great liberator and expander of the Self through exposure to non-cognitive sources of knowledge, intuition and inspiration instead faces an impregnable attachment to the old and the limited (Vonk and Visser 2020).

This is, as mentioned above, a much paraphrased and simplified version of McNamara's complex arguments based on empirical research. It resonates, however, with much that has been written by depth psychologists before the advent of modern neuroscience.

Healing the divided Self

Depth psychology can provide similar insights to neuroscience when it comes to exploring how the religious process can go wrong, and this is particularly pertinent when it comes to understanding fundamentalist and extremist religious movements that have an irrational core inaccessible to argument and resistant to reasonable compromise (Main 2006). Main argues that "Depth psychology, as the discipline par excellence for exploring and theorising about the irrational, may be able to provide insights that enable this irrationality to be more effectively engaged" (ibid.).²⁶⁸ In fact, the differences in style and approach among neuroscientists and depth psychologists may occlude similarities of conclusion uncomfortable to both as has been noted in this chapter. Jung, long derided as

²⁶⁷ The focus here is on religion but the same process could, presumably, operate in relation to any system of beliefs or values which aims to deepen, consciously or not, the sense of meaning and purpose an individual seeks through it.

²⁶⁸ It is arguable that approaches which take religion seriously, including its non-rational and experiential elements, are better placed to inform those trying to establish dialogue with fundamentalists, for example, than those based on secular approaches which see fundamentalism in largely social, political, historical or ideological terms. This also perhaps explains the plethora of books by depth psychologists published since 9/11 (for example, Hillman 2004; Jones 2002; Stevens 2004; Covington et al 2002; Beebe 2003).

a mystic and religion-obsessed eccentric by his academic critics, described what he called the individuation process in terms little different from what McNamara describes as the goal of healing through religion:

Individuation means becoming an ‘individual’ and, in so far as ‘individuality’ embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one’s own self. We could therefore translate individuation as ‘coming to selfhood’ or ‘self-realization.’”

(Jung 1953, p. 173)

Similarly, the mechanism of McNamara’s decentering process bears a resemblance to what Jung called the ‘transcendent function’, the mechanism by which conscious and unconscious tendencies are integrated: “The function is called ‘transcendent’ because it allows an individual to transcend his or her attitude and arrive at a new one; it potentiates psychological growth” (Miller 2004, p. 14). The development of the transcendent function, as the final chapter of this dissertation makes clear, is an important response to the problem of religious hatred.

If psychological growth is the chief aim of modern psychotherapists, and if the argument that contemporary psychotherapy, like religion, is also trying to deal with the human feeling of incompleteness (Corbett 2012, p. 113) is accepted, then the forms of salvation offered by priest and therapist have to this extent begun to converge. Jung made the same claim in two essays written some 90 years ago, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls’ (1928) and ‘Psychotherapists or the Clergy’ (1932). In these Jung refers to healing as a “religious problem” and says modern man wants to know “how he is to reconcile himself with his own nature – how he is to love the enemy in his own heart and call the wolf his brother” (Jung CW11, p. 341).²⁶⁹ The same issues are raised by William James (1902, p. 172) when he describes St. Augustine’s “psychological genius” in recognising

²⁶⁹ Quoted in Spiegelman, J 1984, ‘Psychotherapists and the Clergy: Fifty Years Later’, *Journal of Religion and Health*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 19-32.

the “the trouble of having a divided self”. This is again pointing, like McNamara, to the problem of religious hatred being parallel to the problem of self-hatred among people whose internal life is divided. This argument is also not, as might be thought by those critical of him, peculiar to Jung. The psychoanalyst Melanie Klein describes hatred as a kind of primal rage, the innate hatred of the death instinct of life itself as though it recognizes the moral superiority of the life instinct (Vitz and Mango 1997). Perhaps positive religious experience and the intense affirmation it brings is a natural antidote, a vaccination against this death instinct, and the lack of such experience enables the death instinct and hatred to remain.²⁷⁰

Religious experience is supposed to be the process that heals these divisions and negativities, but if the inward process fails it is easier, less painful, to project them outward onto others – the unbelievers, the backsliders, the unclean – all forms of the great and dangerous Other. Similarly Corbett warns that all religious experience risks triggering a shadow side: ways of emphasising one’s own importance, using compassion to impress others; even using meditation as a means of feeling superior to others who do not meditate (Corbett 2012, p. 211; Vonk and Visser 2020). Investment in any creed can, ironically, says Corbett, “impede the discovering of spiritual truth by reinforcing the ego” (ibid.) and inviting comparisons with those on a different path.

²⁷⁰ Melanie Klein (1882-1960) also popularized the concept of ‘splitting’, originally developed by the psychiatrist Ronald Fairbairn (1889-1964) as part of object relations theory. In psychoanalytic theory splitting is regarded as a defence mechanism that operates by polarising everything into the extremes of good or bad. There may be some correlation with the idea of the divided Self as described by McNamara and again we see a pre-figuring of the convergence of psychodynamic psychology proposed by Michael Lacey (2013). For the sake of completeness another convergence should also be acknowledged here: “The emergence of depth psychology was historically paralleled by the translation and widespread dissemination of the texts of yoga... for the depth psychologies sought to liberate themselves from the stultifying limitations of Western thought to develop maps of inner experience grounded in the transformative potential of therapeutic practices” Shamdasani, S (ed.) 1996, *The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1932 by C.G. Jung*, Princeton University Press Princeton, p. xvi.

Religious hatred as the failure to heal

All of the above suggests that religious hatred may be a consequence arising from *failures* of religious experience. This is not intended to mean that the individual who fails to achieve mountaintop enlightenment becomes frustrated and resentful of those who have, nor that the resolution of spiritual emergencies involves a retreat into the blaming of others, but rather that the frustration that grows out of the failure to develop a meaningful religious life of some kind could turn into a hatred of the self and perhaps a resentment of others as a means to deflect its self-destructiveness. This idea grows out of reflection on what may be meant by “a meaningful religious life”, and it reflects a point made earlier: that the core problem of religious hatred may not be too much religion but too little of the sort that nourishes a person’s internal life and inoculates it against surges of religious emotion which can turn destructive. What Jung called the individuation process has been mentioned above and it is worth describing this in more detail to illustrate how it relates to the idea of a religious life that provides some immunity against religious hatred.

There is, as ever, a danger on drawing too much on the work of a single individual, especially one as controversial as Jung, but in the sixty years since his death others have continued to develop his ideas. One dimension of his work about which this is true is lifespan theory in developmental psychology (Stein 1998, p. 172), though Jung’s role in its origin is not always recognised (see for example Baltes et al 2006; Hill and Allemand 2020). One significance of lifespan psychology is that it contradicts the work of those who attribute most of psychological and character development to infancy and early childhood. Jung saw development as something that continues throughout life to its very end, and

religion as having an important role in this. In *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1933) he says:

I have treated many hundreds of patients. Among those in the second half of life - that is to say, over 35 - there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given their followers, and none of them has really been healed who did not regain his religious outlook.

(Jung 1933, p. 234)²⁷¹

This needs to be understood in the context of the five stages of consciousness development that Jung perceived (Jung CW13, pp. 199-201). The first stage is described as *participation mystique*,²⁷² referring to unconscious unity between the observer and the observed, a characteristic of small children before they can distinguish between their own presence and that of others. In the second stage a sense of separateness develops and with it projection becomes more discrete and discerning though parents remain major carriers of projection including of the omniscience and omnipotence attributed to them by their offspring. This lasts until the teenage years when suddenly parents know nothing and projection shifts to individuals and institutions, from celebrities, sports and music stars to political parties and religious bodies, which gradually replace personal opinions with collective opinions, views and values (Stein 1998, p. 181). This process of projection continues through partnering and parenting, and in fact, says Stein, the development of consciousness stops here with individuals continuing “to project positive and negative features of the psyche into the world around and to respond to the psyche’s images and powers as though they were located in external objects and persons” (ibid.). If conscious development does continue into a third stage, it involves abandoning and often de-

²⁷¹ This statement may explain, among other reasons, why Jung is treated so warily by more secularly inclined psychologists.

²⁷² Jung borrowed the term from the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. For a critique both of Lévy-Bruhl’s work and Jung’s use of it see Segal, R 2007, ‘Jung and Lévy-Bruhl’, *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 52, pp. 635-658.

idealising projections, with the projected psychic contents becoming more abstract and manifesting as symbols and ideologies. This is the point at which philosophy and theology become possible for the individual, with the power of projection allowing ideas and entities such as gods, and law, and concepts such as truth and beauty to take on the numinous power once granted to parents and pop stars. At this stage of development subjective projection is replaced by more objective evaluations of the world and the development of principles that can be applied to it: “In place of unconscious empathy based on participation mystique or projection, one has rules that dictate duty” (ibid. p. 182). This is the beginning “of finding a religious outlook on life” of which Jung speaks above, and while in a contemporary and largely secular society it is liable to be quite unconventional it can have the advantage of bringing stability and a degree of maturity especially to a disordered psyche or a chaotic life.²⁷³

The next stage of development is different in kind: what Stein calls “the radical extinction of projections” and the creation of an “empty center” which he equates with “modern man in search of his soul” (ibid., p. 183). He sees this as the time when human beings lose their sense of being anything more than parts of a socio-economic machine, where they count for little, and whatever grander sense of meaning and purpose they might have had is replaced by moments of pleasure and largely utilitarian values. Jung himself describes as being at this stage people “who believe in ego consciousness and in what we call reality.....”. Jung believed that European ego consciousness was inclined to bury or at least suppress the unconscious, with the result that it then tends to turn against us and become a cause of neurosis (Jung, CW9i, para. 221). This, supposedly, is the modern human: secular, atheist, humanist, perhaps, though in the context of everything being

²⁷³ Hence the references in 12-Step Processes to a “Greater Power” to whom some control must be ceded.

relative and without any sense of the certain. In reality, however, Jung says that the ego has taken on the projections previously attached to the external world, and in particular becomes inflated with a God-like sense of its own importance: an ominous development in that such inflation makes it hard for a person to respond to their environment, to make wise decisions or to express empathy with others. It is, in short, the road not only to megalomania, but to the social and political horrors that beckon when people are immune to social or moral restraints. Stein also argues (*ibid.*, p. 185) that fear of this stage of development is one of the reasons the fundamentalists of the world become trapped in the earlier stages of development. Despite these dangers, he also argues that the removal of projections and the taking of personal responsibility are real psychological achievements which pave the way for the fifth and final stage of development.

This involves recognition of the limitations of the ego, awareness of the unconscious and its powers, and a willingness to interact directly with the psyche and its archetypal relationships (*ibid.*, p. 186). In one sense this fifth stage of development comes full circle back to *participation mystique* and a world that respects the myths and divinities of the ages and an appreciation that, in psychic terms, such things are as ‘real’ as the material world embraced in the fourth stage of development. While the overall purpose of individuation is not religious, being the forging of psychological wholeness, the reconciliation of internal opposites and the integration of conscious and unconscious, the process could not take place without a development of religious consciousness.²⁷⁴ As will

²⁷⁴ While Jung stopped at Stage 5, as described, there are indications that he envisioned further stages. For example, in ‘The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga’ (1932) he discusses the attainment of states of consciousness in the East that surpass what was then known in the West. He was sceptical about the possibility of Westerners achieving them, but suggested that Stage 6 would involve some sort of ecological relation between the individual psyche and the natural world. This led him to investigate physics and cosmology with physicists such as Wolfgang Pauli (1900-1958), with whom he wrote *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (1952) which contains his paper ‘Synchronicity – An Acausal Connecting Principle’ (Main 2000).

become clear in Chapter 12, individuation through what is called in this dissertation ‘epiphanic intervention’ and the activity of the transcendent function is also, it is suggested, central to the transformation of religious hatred.

Essentiality of religious experience and emotion

This chapter has looked at two causes of hatred that can spring from the emotional and experiential dimension of religion. One is internal division, the other is the failure of a development of consciousness that takes people beyond forms of religion that seek to emphasise Otherness and more rigid forms of belief. Can the particular toxicity of religious hatred be put down to the frustration and disappointment, to say nothing of the sacrifices, privations and self-denials, caused by failed investments in religious experience or the inability to appreciate religious emotion? It is certainly easy to argue that hatred is a human phenomenon that casts a greater shadow in the context of a process that is supposed to be healing, and it is also worth noting that hatred is a discrete phenomenon and to understand that for individuals it can have positive as well as destructive consequences. Some people find that by focusing on their hatred they no longer feel hopelessness or despair: it becomes a source of strength, meaning, power, energy and even of identity as in Northern Ireland or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Corbett 2012, p. 154).²⁷⁵ By this token hatred can also strengthen the sense of Self, indeed it can become an ideal Self in its own right, so that whatever increases hatred increases the Self, and any attempt to decrease hatred may be experienced as an attempt to weaken the Self. “.....This is why hatred is so

²⁷⁵ Schwartz (1997) argues that the basic tenet of the religion of the Hebrew Bible is that “one God establishes one people under God.” This, in turn, she says, means that “monotheism is a myth that grounds particular identity in universal transcendence. And monotheism is a myth that forges identity antithetically—against the Other” (quoted in Countryman 1999). Countryman argues “The problem may, indeed, be endemic to monotheism and unavoidable since monotheism can imply a degree of unity in all experience that makes the division between “us” and “them” far more emphatic and decisive than it might otherwise have been.”

difficult to get rid of, and also why preaching against hate is often ineffective. When evil behaviour is being used to maintain emotional balance, no amount of moral teaching will change the behaviour” (ibid., p. 155).

Religious experience, whether of the mystical or more mundane variety, can be positive or negative in effect. At its best, it inspires people to act with greater compassion and humanity, encouraging them to think and experience more broadly, making them more tolerant of difference and more understanding of human frailty. At its worst, when it goes wrong, it can reinforce existing prejudices, blind people to obvious inequities, and even contradict the demands of the faith which has supposedly framed it.

Chapter 9: The mythological dimension of religion

Introduction

Scholars have wrestled with the place and meaning of myth since before Sir James Frazer published his monumental survey, *The Golden Bough*, in 1922, but that remarkable publication, for all its deficits, brought home how enormous and inexhaustibly complex any venture into the subject of myth quickly becomes even before rival psychodynamic approaches and interpretations are taken into account.²⁷⁶ The approach taken here therefore is to look for specific insights into what Ninian Smart calls the mythological dimension of religion (Smart 1969, p. 18) and for the light they may cast on the origins and reasons for religious hatred.²⁷⁷ The chapter begins by looking at mythology through the eyes of three scholars, Ninian Smart, Mircea Eliade and Joseph Campbell, who, though now controversial figures in the field, can be said to have laid its foundations. Their distinctive approaches, while complementary, also provide a sense of the contrasting ways the subject has been treated and provide a background for using William Doty's encyclopaedic *Mythography* (1986/2000) to understand how myths and rituals need to be studied and understood, David Leeming's thematic anthology *The World of Myth* (1990) and Tim Read's *Walking Shadows* (2019) for a contemporary psychiatrist's insights into myth and archetypal crises. Also considered is the Hero's Journey, what Campbell called the 'monomyth', that appears in cultures across the world, and the implications of this for individuals influenced by it. These discussions provide the background for exploration of the idea of 'cosmic war' which, this dissertation argues, shapes much modern mythology

²⁷⁶ For an account of Freud and Jung's approach to mythology see Segal, R 2003, 'Jung's very twentieth-century view of myth', *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 48, pp. 593-617.

²⁷⁷ As previously noted, Smart renamed and renumbered his 'dimensions of religion' periodically throughout his life. For this chapter the 1969 definition of the 'mythological dimension' is used.

and provides both conscious and unconscious contributions to religious hatred.

Approaching mythology

Smart describes a myth as “a moving picture of the sacred” (Smart 1973a, pp. 79-80), whose forms, while having much in common with the depiction of fairy tales, legends and historical narratives, are distinguished by the presence of sacred beings, whether good or evil, that provide an illustration of the relationships between the sacred, transcendental or supernatural and the everyday world.²⁷⁸ Smart is also clear that terms such as ‘myth’ and ‘mythological’ are not used to imply, as in common usage, that the content of these stories is false; he sees them as neutral terms that simply report what has been said, written or believed. This approach contrasts with that of Philip Wheelwright, for example, who says “The very essence of myth....[is] that haunting awareness of transcendental forces peering through the cracks of the visible universe”.²⁷⁹ While Wheelwright’s point is made from a theistic perspective, he catches something of the tensions between the visible and the invisible that underlie all descriptions and explanations of myth, and in his “haunting awareness” also the fascination that myth has always exerted for anthropologists and scientists as much as for historians, philosophers and theologians.²⁸⁰

The density of scholarship about the critical difference between myths and other stories makes arriving at a final perception challenging but there does seem some

²⁷⁸ Smart includes in his studies of mythology not just stories directly about God (as in the Book of Genesis) or the gods (as in Homer’s *Iliad*) but also of the historical events that are significant in a religious tradition, such as the Passover ritual in Judaism that re-enacts the children of Israel’s delivery from bondage in Egypt, arguing that historical events of this kind effectively function as myths (Smart 1969, p. 18).

²⁷⁹ Quoted in Schorer, M 1959, ‘The Necessity of Myth’, *Daedalus*, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 359-362.

²⁸⁰ This is a term that Smart alternatively used and shied away from in successive editions of *The Religious Experience of Mankind*. The final edition, published in 1996 as *The Religious Experience*, includes references to ‘the invisible world’.

consensus that the purpose of the former is not entertainment, though they may have that value, but that myths are vehicles for ritual and symbolic events that enshrine moral and psychological lessons. Myths tell us how to live, how to act, especially how to navigate the differences between order and chaos when faced with the inevitable moral and social dilemmas that accompany human life. One of the first points of departure for those studying the significance as opposed to just the description or provenance of mythology has long been the work of Joseph Campbell (1904-87). Where Frazer documents the world of myth, Campbell seeks to understand, explain and make myth relevant, even normative, for contemporary readers. He elucidates what he sees as the four functions that myth serves: the first three being the mystical function that “opens the world to the dimension of mystery, to the realization of the mystery that underlies all forms”; the cosmological dimension “showing you what the shape of the universe is”; and the sociological function “supporting and validating a certain social order”. It is the fourth function, though, that really persuades him of the importance of myth: “the pedagogical function, of how to live a human lifetime under any circumstances” and, he adds, “Myths are clues to the spiritual potentialities of the human life” (ibid.). It is the second and fourth of these functions that are most relevant to this dissertation: the latter because, like anything pedagogical, the teaching can be for good or ill; and the former, cosmological dimension, because within it are found the stories that, for some, provide evidence of ongoing cosmic wars in which human beings should take sides.²⁸¹

Both of these are reflected in the work of Mircea Eliade (1907-86).²⁸² Eliade shares

²⁸¹ For examples of such evidence see Juergensmeyer 2017, pp. 182-203.

²⁸² Since Eliade’s death his anti-Semitic views and his involvement with Romanian fascism have tainted his reputation (see Berger, A 1994, ‘Mircea Eliade: Romanian Fascism and the History of Religions in the United States’ in *Tainted Heroes: Antisemitism and Cultural Heroes*, Harrowitz, N (ed.), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, pp. 51-74).

Smart's perceptions of myth while taking them a step further in that he sees the purpose of myths as telling the story of human origins and establishing the pattern for all significant events in human life (Eliade 1996, p. 430). For Eliade, myths tell of the original homogeneity of time and space and how these are interrupted by hierophanies, manifestations of the sacred, which create order for the human occupants of a chaotic world. So myths are primarily cosmogonic, providing a sense of the roots of the world and ritual that people can re-enact and thereby anchor themselves in an era constantly beset by change. For Eliade myths and rituals are rooted in sacred space and sacred time, and result from manifestations of the sacred into profane space and time.²⁸³ These hierophanies create fixed points around which religious communities can frame their existence and perform rituals which take them back to the origins of divine creation. This is important because religious people desire to live in "a sacred world, because it is only in such a world" that they possess what he calls a "real existence" and the chance of expressing "an unquenchable ontological thirst" (ibid., p. 64). Reaching this point Eliade also defines the differences between 'religious' and 'non-religious man' [sic], a polarisation which he implies is greater than we customarily realise. Religious man, says Eliade, "lives in two kinds of time, of which the more important, sacred time...[is] a sort of eternal mythical present that is periodically reintegrated by means of rites" (ibid., p. 70). Non-religious man also experiences the ebb and flow of time and the celebrations that punctuate it; the essential difference being that non-religious man does not experience intervals of sacred time, nor the mystery that accompanies them or the "man's deepest existential dimension",

²⁸³ In *The Sacred and the Profane* Eliade uses the example of a church: "For a believer, the church shares in a different space from the street in which it stands. The door that opens on the interior of the church actually signifies a solution of continuity. The threshold that separates the two spaces also indicates the distance between two modes of being, the profane and the religious. The threshold is the limit, the boundary, the frontier that distinguishes and opposes two worlds - and at the same time the paradoxical place where those worlds communicate, where passage from the profane to the sacred world becomes possible" (Eliade 1956, p. 25).

the link to his own life and death (ibid., p. 71). If this gulf between the religious and non-religious is as extensive as Eliade believes, it may explain the tendency of believers to feel unconsciously superior with their insight into the infinite, and non-believers resentful of that superiority and motivated to diminish it. This combination of narcissism on the part of the former, and resentment among the latter, can provide the grounds for both anti-clericalism, which is discussed in Chapter 11, and for wider motivations to hate.

Societal impacts of myth

This polarisation also raises questions about the significance of religious myths for different sectors of the population. A similar point is raised by Campbell when he distinguishes between local and universal manifestations of myth and its relationship to ritual (Cox 2010, p. 95). Campbell says myths and rituals work together by “disengaging [the believer] from his local, historical conditions and leading him toward some kind of ineffable experience” (Campbell 1970, p. 462). While local myths may convey local meanings for a community, when they feed into rituals they bring an experience of the universal which can transform the community’s understanding of itself. For example, the memory of a boy who lost his life in the Great War grows from half-forgotten history to something much greater when he is remembered as part of national Remembrance Day celebrations: sad and local loss is transformed into national self-sacrifice in the struggle for a greater good.²⁸⁴

Taken together, Smart, Campbell and Eliade are saying that myths provide a picture

²⁸⁴ This may also, at the same time, change that community’s sense of who ‘belongs’ as part of it, leading to the ‘them and us’ that can become the grounds for segregation and ultimately genocide. The local myths which can bless people with ‘ineffable experience’ may also lead, inadvertently, to experiences of a much less healthy kind as is explored below through the work of René Girard.

of the sacred and of divinity which can bridge the chasm between the transcendent and the everyday, thereby bringing a sense of (divine) order. This may be so, but in the everyday world myth may legitimate the bringing of the order desired by one group against the interests of another. The scholarly vision of myth as invariably beneficent is not always replicated on the ground. Furthermore, the rituals by which myth is made flesh - metaphorically (or literally, for some) in the case, for example, of the Last Supper - can also become as much a source of division as of sanctity and unity depending on the context in which they are performed and who determines who may participate. The logic of religious ritual is that the repetitive enactment of words and movement induces a certain inner state of mind, such as humility, or awe, or respect, or worship, in those participating. It is also true that things outward can excite things inward, and this is probably closer to most people's experience than the more abstract processes described by Smart, Eliade and Campbell. Take the example of the Voortrekker Monument on a hilltop just south of Pretoria in South Africa. As previously mentioned, the monument commemorates the Voortrekkers who left the Cape Colony between 1835 and 1854, its marble frieze illustrating the everyday struggles and religious life of the Voortrekkers. Beyond this simplistic level the monument enshrines elements of Afrikaner mythology that equate the Voortrekkers with the Children of Israel in search of the Promised Land.²⁸⁵ The contribution of such monuments to a people's perception of their history and identity should not be under-estimated (Everett 2003). Until relatively recently representatives of the DRC and the apartheid government told the story of South Africa in terms that more clearly reflected the mythology told through the Voortrekker Monument than through a

²⁸⁵ This mythological element arguably made a significant contribution to Afrikaner Nationalism and to the acceptance of apartheid as a form of quasi-religious doctrine, institutionalised religious hatred in all but name, by the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) even until the late 1980s. The symbolic significance of the monument is arguably recognisable in recent efforts, not all of them successful, to play down its former social and cultural value for Afrikaners and re-brand it as a symbol of reconciliation and nation building (van Vollenhoven 2017).

more objective history of the country.²⁸⁶

This difference between the abstract and academic analyses of myth, and the impacts of myth on the ground, has been pointed out by David Lewis-Williams's criticism of the moral philosopher Mary Midgely when she said "Myths are.... imaginative patterns, networks of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world" (Midgely 2007, p. 28). Lewis-Williams (2010, p. 276) argues that while this is how myth may be perceived within the academy, it is not how myths tend to have been perceived and held in much of human history and still are in some places. He illustrates this by suggesting that to say Muhammed was not bodily raised into heaven could put one at serious risk in some parts of the world: the difference between imaginative patterns, networks of symbols and divine revelation can be a matter of life and death. As Kautsky (1965) says, quoting from Merton (1957, p. 421), "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences". The point worth emphasising, even if it is a truism about myth, is that stories which cannot be literally true may still have serious meaning for those who tell them.²⁸⁷

Impacts of myth on individuals

²⁸⁶ One extravagant version of the Afrikaner myth, told by a very senior DRC churchman, was that South Africa was a land empty of human inhabitants when his ancestors discovered it (private communication 1986). A similar myth, widely believed to this day, is that the Australian government classified its Aboriginal people among the fauna and flora until the 1967 constitutional referendum (<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-20/fact-check-flora-and-fauna-1967-referendum/9550650>).

²⁸⁷ Vamic Volkan uses the term *chosen glories* to describe the narratives of a mythical and heroic past which often demonizes other groups and is available for political leaders to call on in their efforts to mobilise support for nationalist agendas. He also uses *chosen traumas* to describe grievances which have benefitted from myth-making for political ends (Volkan, V 1999, 'Psychoanalysis and diplomacy: Part I. Individual and large group identity', *Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies*, vol. 1, pp. 29 –55).

The aspect of mythology that must now be considered is its impact on individuals, recalling what Campbell calls “the pedagogical function, of how to live a human lifetime under any circumstances” (Campbell 1991, p. 34), starting from creation myths designed to ground the individual with a vision of how things have come to be, proceeding through the disordering inevitable in the life of the individual as much as the world, and then setting out how this disorder can be redeemed through the actions of the individual. This is the basis for Campbell’s concept of the ‘monomyth’ which he uses in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (1949) to describe the Hero’s Journey, supposedly the archetypal pattern taken by many myths and stories in which “A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man” (Campbell 1949, p. 23).²⁸⁸ The significance of the Hero’s Journey as an archetypal myth is, for those who are willing to accept the insights of archetypal psychology, that it reflects innate human tendencies, hard-wired in the mind and dating back to humankind’s earliest days.

A good example of this monomyth is the *Enûma Eliš*, the Babylonian myth.²⁸⁹ It begins with how the universe and the important things in life arrived, moves on to an event which disrupts the established order and introduces the concept of suffering, and concludes with the resumption of the original order as a consequence of the heroic actions of an

²⁸⁸ In recent years the idea of the monomyth, and some aspects of Campbell’s scholarship, have been questioned in, for example, Ellwood, R 1999, *The Politics of Myth: a Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell*, SUNY, New York) and Northup, L 2006, ‘Myth-Placed Priorities: Religion and the Study of Myth’, *Religious Studies Review*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 5–10. The thrust of Ellwood’s criticism is of Campbell’s “oversimplification of historical matters and tendency to make myth mean whatever he wanted it to mean”.

²⁸⁹ The *Enûma Eliš* was discovered in 1849 in the ruined library at Ashurbanipal in Mosul, Iraq, the ancient city of Nineveh. Its one thousand lines were written in Old Babylonian in cuneiform script on seven clay tablets dating from the 7th century BCE, though some elements of the myth may pre-date this by a millennium or so (Heidel, A 1942, *The Babylonian Genesis*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago).

individual “primal man”, the Hero being the god Marduk in the case of the *Enûma Eliš* (Wink 2001, p. 261). A similar example is that of the Grail story and the hero Parsifal, one of the knights of the Round Table, perhaps more resonant for European and North American audiences in view of its Christian setting, and one that has been repeatedly told and interpreted through psychodynamic and particularly Jungian lenses not least by Emma Jung and Marie-Louise von Franz in *The Grail Legend* (1960).

This tripartite structure is common to many myths though the values highlighted, both negative and positive, within each may vary according to the needs and preferences within each tradition, as may the fifteen or so stages of the story which Campbell identified within this central structure. The essential structure of departure, initiation and return can be seen in any number of monomyths from those of the ancient world, through those of the great religions, to the epic stories of our current age often translated into cinema, such as *The Lord of the Rings*, *Star Wars*, and *His Dark Materials*. The central thrust of all such stories is the journey from blindness, unconsciousness or naivety towards wisdom, maturity, moral awareness and self-sufficiency. Whether or not this structure is as universal as mythologists such as Campbell claim, more significant is the effect on those exposed to such stories through the process of ‘mythical incorporation’ (Dillon 2010). Such a process, which in the past and still in some contexts would be expected to be undergone as part of mythic ritual and ceremony at certain times during a lifespan, usually after some prior initiation ritual (Eliade 1958), is understood to involve the incorporation of the participant into the person of the primal man and consequently his or her experience of the power, healing and identification with the qualities of the primal man, the Hero. The purpose of this is to enable the participant, now also Marduk, Jesus, Mohammed or Gautama Buddha,

to live the life of this primal man in addition to his or her own life²⁹⁰ and thereby find the psycho-spiritual healing and grounding they may hitherto have lacked.²⁹¹

In addition to this, says Dillon (2010), myths reveal two types of hero, the *affirmative* and the *transcendent*. The former acts to affirm the original order of the universe following whatever event disordered it, so Marduk in the *Enûma Eliš* acts to reverse the suffering and chaos caused by his parents, and Jesus acts to redeem humanity in the wake of Adam's disobedience in the Garden of Eden. The transcendent hero, meanwhile, ushers in an entirely new order that takes him or her beyond the original vision of the world, and beyond its mythical and symbolic order. Furthermore Dillon (2010), supported by Bloom (1993), argues that in some ways much modern religion is already Gnostic in nature in that "the Gnostic hero... seeks to transcend the limitations and binaries of the mythical and symbolic order in order to attain 'direct knowledge' (i.e. *gnosis*) of the Godhead".²⁹² This suggests that believers who emphasise personal relationships with the divine effectively transform heroes such as Jesus into Gnostic heroes while at the same time giving Lucifer his traditional role as "the adversary in this Christian variant of the ancient Near Eastern combat narrative" (Forsyth 1987, p. 7). This would go some way to explain the way that

²⁹⁰ A young person today, initiated into contemporary culture by the trappings of an expedition to the cinema, might find in Frodo Baggins, Luke Skywalker or Lyra Belacqua a similarly primal hero. Indeed, in the 1990s the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution sponsored an exhibit called *Star Wars: The Magic of Myth* which discussed the ways in which Joseph Campbell's work shaped the *Star Wars* films (Kripal 2008, p. 189).

²⁹¹ It was realisation of the healing potential of myth and ritual that caused psychotherapists such as James Hillman (1983) to argue for their use in therapeutic processes.

²⁹² The 2nd-century Roman Catholic bishop Marcion, generally regarded as one of the first Gnostics, perceived a battle between the true and loving God of the New Testament and Yahweh of the Old Testament, referred to as the "Demiurge", who was false and evil (Dillon 2010). The literature of some independent pentecostalist churches, such as Hillsong (<https://hillsong.com>, viewed 6 August 2018), seems to demonstrate some of the characteristics of a modern Gnosticism in the quest for the "small spark of the true God trapped within the human body" (ibid.).

the devil is personalised in evangelical churches and the intensity of the hatred generated among such congregations for any satanic associations.²⁹³

Mythology and religious hatred

Psychodynamic psychology emphasises the importance of myths, albeit assimilated unconsciously, for making sense of the everyday world. In *The Cry for Myth* (1991), for example, the psychotherapist Rollo May argues that every individual seeks – “indeed *must* [original emphasis] seek if he or she is to remain sane - to bring some order and coherence into the stream of sensations, emotions, and ideas entering his or her consciousness....” According to May, each one of us is forced to deliver for oneself what in previous ages was done by family, custom, church, and state, namely, form the myths through which we can make some sense of experience (May 1991, p. 29). The absence of such a sense of order and coherence in any life is a recipe for anger at oneself and the consequent projection of negative qualities onto others as a means of disowning them – both of which, in some circumstances, can evolve into hatred.²⁹⁴ Secondly, disagreement within any organisation or community which draws identity and legitimacy from a mythology, can be perceived as the process of rejecting a primal myth, potentially resulting in a fractured state where incoherence may reign. Thirdly, this would require the arrival of a hero to do the mending, and whose task would begin, in classical mythical style, with the slaughtering of opposition.²⁹⁵

²⁹³ Satan deserves more space in this dissertation than the constraints of space allow. See Neil Forsyth’s *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton University Press 1987) for a comprehensive treatment.

²⁹⁴ For a brief para-scholarly exploration of projection resonant with the work of Jung and Campbell see Johnson, R, 2016, *Inner gold: Understanding psychological projection*, Chiron Publications, Asheville.

²⁹⁵ Which is what seems to have happened in Bosnia in 1992-5. “Before a town was “purified” of its non-Christians, religious leaders would often hold formal religious services for Bosnian Serbian troops” (Van Gorder 2014, p. 129).

One might argue that every political manifesto is in some sense trying to answer May's cry for myth, although modern political parties tend to be wary of the overtly mythologized shows of, for example, the Nazi Party in the 1930s (Jackson 2006). If the monomyth is as perennial and as ingrown in the human psyche as mythologists such as Campbell argue, then it is its absence that needs to be feared because, as Anne Campbell implies in the title of her review of James Waller's *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (2007), "Human Nature Abhors a Vacuum" (Campbell 2009). Without a positive path to follow, some individual human beings, as Waller demonstrates, will default to the negative. Where there is the absence of a positive mythology provided by credible and respected institutions there is always the danger of it being filled by anti-hero mythology. 'Drill' music, which idolises the hero who leaves normal life to be initiated into something different but, crucially, either does not return or returns with powers dedicated to breaking down rather than building up, is suggested as an example of this (Stuart 2020).²⁹⁶ In summary, both myth and its absence can provide opportunities for hatred rooted in the unconscious need for it or the equally unconscious awareness that there is a vacuum to be filled.

Modern myths and the importance of story-telling

With the contemporary weakening of the traditional forms of religion which provide sustaining mythologies, does it follow that the overtly religious monomyth is a thing of the past outside the churches which preserve the resonant and intuitively true stories that for

²⁹⁶ See for example 'Drill, the 'demonic' music linked to rise in youth murders', (www.thetimes.co.uk/article/drill-the-demonic-music-linked-to-rise-in-youth-murders-0bkbh3csk, viewed 10 August 2018), and Stuart, F 2020, *Ballad of the Bullet: Gangs, Drill Music, and the Power of Online Infamy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. One should be aware of moral panics though: jazz, after all, was once known as "the devil's music".

example Kastrup (2016) values? A more recent answer to the cry for positive monomyth, conscious or unconscious, is *Kynren*, a sound and light show established by an evangelical Christian that is contributing to the restoration of a northern English community devastated by industrial recession over the past thirty years.²⁹⁷ While *Kynren* is not ostensibly ‘religious’, it draws heavily on religious history, symbolism and metaphor, as well as on a romantic nationalism, to promote a para-Christian identity for what is a largely secular community. *Kynren* is an example of monomyth, intended or not, which incorporates the journey of a young hero called Arthur (of course) as he witnesses the challenges and triumphs of English history before returning renewed to the 21st century. While *Kynren* is also in the great tradition of historical pageant (Bartie et al., 2018 and 2020), a sceptic might be tempted to call it a propagandized history excluding the more inconvenient and less attractive elements of the national story. Even if *Kynren* is, for the more sophisticated, a distinctly bowdlerized and even manipulative version of British history, its use of up to 1700 volunteers per evening presumably encourages a renewed sense of meaning and community in Bishop Auckland and its people, to say nothing of its effect on the many thousands of spectators who have seen it over the past few years. If *Kynren* is an example of how powerful the monomyth can be, then it is also a cautionary example of how easily such a performance could be perverted.

Given the importance of myths and their role in shaping both communal and national histories, as well as personal beliefs, it is curious that their role does not receive more detailed scrutiny in conflict resolution literature. One context in which conflict resolution scholar-practitioners have looked at myths is that of cultural conflict. Michelle LeBaron,

²⁹⁷A glance at the promotional videos on the *Kynren: an epic tale of England* website (www.kynren.com viewed 8 August 2018) provide a sense of the spectacular nature and scale of this event as well as its purpose: “the name *Kynren* echoes the Anglo Saxon word 'cynren', meaning generation, kin, or family and *Kynren*'s aim is to show how our forebears lived, over the course of 90 thrilling minutes.”

for example, argues that uncovering myths is a way to reveal embedded values and different ways of perceiving the world, especially in situations where historically some voices have been ignored or marginalised (LeBaron 2003, p. 280). LeBaron's approach to myths reflects the concerns of the scholar-practitioner and contrasts with those whose main interest is analysis rather than the possible utilisation of myths for third party intervention that may help to create understanding and motivation for change for those involved in conflict.²⁹⁸ LeBaron's sensitivity to the importance of myth stems in part from her appreciation that the narratives, the stories, that people tell each other have power, shaping communities' and nations' understandings of the past and expectations of the future, which makes them important when it comes to understanding the causes of conflict and the possibilities for peace (Kautsky 1965; Casebeer 2008 quoted in Huffman 2016; Gopin 2000, p. 15).²⁹⁹

Depth psychologists tend to see myths as positive in nature: they reveal the structures of psychic life, they provide access to the numinous, and they give human beings life lessons to help them make sense of a chaotic and uncertain world. They also have their negative sides: the Voortrekker Monument and the mythology of the Great Trek helped lay

²⁹⁸ LeBaron also sees the exploration of myths as fruitful for the misconceptions they can reveal about people's own groups and who they see themselves to be. She uses the example of Disneyland where the myth of the American West is communicated through 'Frontierland', a constructed environment which embodies the theme of "rugged individualism" and "individual initiative" (LeBaron 2003, p. 280) as exemplified by the archetypal figure of the Lone Ranger. As LeBaron comments, "these interpretations are not necessarily faithful to the views of history held by indigenous people, contemporary scholars, or the early settlers themselves, yet around them has grown an aura of truth....Contemporary historians suggest that the American West was settled as a result of a "large scale federal presence in the form of troops, infrastructural improvements (roads), and economic incentives such as land grants" (Francaviglia, R 1999, "Walt Disney's Frontierland as an Allegorical Map of the American West", *Western Historical Quarterly*, vol. 30, no.2 pp. 181-2, quoted in Slatta, R, 2001 "Taking our Myths Seriously: The Western Forum", *Journal of the West*, vol. 40, no. 3).

²⁹⁹ LeBaron is apparently rare in recognising the importance of appreciating myth in conflict resolution. A search of CR literature and journals produces some mentions of myth as a substitute for truth, and occasional recognition that myth can be important as a motivator of conflict (describing, for example, the rationale for Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka as 'mythological' (Svensson 2007), but otherwise there seems no practitioner recognition of the importance of working actively with myth.

the foundations for apartheid in South Africa by strengthening the self-identity of Afrikaners and reinforcing their sense of exclusivity in the same way as English nationalists might take heart from the myth of England as depicted in *Kynren*. These are common examples of where the blurring of myth and history can be used for political, religious and social effect, and while some of that effect might be to foment hostility between different identity and cultural groupings, and possibly such hostility could have a religious aspect to it as part of the identity-making, it would be an exaggeration to say that either is likely directly to cause the type of religious hatred with which this dissertation is concerned. The role of myth, as a dimension of religion, in causing such hatred, is central neither to the literature of the psychology of religion nor to that of conflict resolution. Bringing the two literatures together, however, and joining them with understanding and experience of how hatred and conflict can arise, it becomes apparent that there are aspects of religious mythology that can have a role in shaping the thinking of some individuals and perhaps communities. As Campbell says, “The individual has to find an aspect of myth that relates to his own life” (Campbell 1991, p. 33).

Cosmic war: where myth bleeds into reality

One aspect of mythology discussed above is the prevalence in the world’s religions of creation myths, most of which have common elements developed in the pre-scientific past to explain how and why the world has come to be as it is. Myths such as the Garden of Eden in the Christian Bible also explain the advent of evil and suffering in the world as a result of Adam’s consumption of the fatal apple (Genesis 3: 5-7). In parallel with these beginning times there is also for some Christians the myth of the end times: of the ‘Rapture’ and the millennial kingdom following the final cosmic battle between good and

evil in the place called Armageddon.³⁰⁰ All three monotheisms of the Middle East include vivid, sadistic and arguably pathological fantasies about how the end will come and the horrors awaiting the infidels, or the enemies of the Lord, according to which tradition is followed. Internet forums warning that the end times are imminent are striking not only because of the certainty with which they predict the future, but the relish with which they imagine the fate of those who disagree with them.³⁰¹ These are prophets of violence and retribution and they take their cue from scripture. While one may not wholly agree with Marc Gopin that “This is an important clue to why and when Western religions, in particular, turn to solutions of extreme violence to resolve the problems and tragedies of life” (Gopin 2000, p. 10), in that it ignores many other reasons why this may be, the general tone of the Book of Revelation, for example, does not provide any great impetus to reconciliation and is inconsistent with the “love your enemies” approach emphasised earlier in the Christian New Testament. There is a psychodynamic pattern common to all ideologies that emphasise this cosmic dimension of religion, for example the ideology of the radical Sikh:

1. *The cosmic struggle is played out in history* [all italics original]. In order to commit violence, the devout must believe that the cosmic struggle can be realized in human terms. The struggle between good and evil as depicted in the great Hindu epics has continued in historical time. The contemporary adversary is identified with the legendary demonized foe.
2. *Believers identify personally with the struggle*. Under the guidance of their spiritual leaders, the devout feel personally responsible for the moral decadence in the world. A battle between good and evil is taking place within the soul, but by joining forces with others, the true believer can externalize the battle field.
3. *The cosmic struggle continues in the present*. Despite the appearance of calm and tranquility, under the surface the battle between the forces of good and evil still rages.
4. *The struggle is at a point of crisis*. Apocalyptic rhetoric is used to promote a sense of urgency to join in the momentous battle.
5. *Acts of violence have a cosmic meaning*. To act in the service of one’s faith is to demonstrate great valor and piety. Not to so act is a sin.....

³⁰⁰ The Rapture is an eschatological idea popular with some evangelical sects, mainly North American. For example, the *Left Behind* books depict the Rapture and the attendant sufferings of those not raptured in grisly detail. They have been accompanied by similar books for younger people, films and video games.

³⁰¹ The regular announcements of imminent Rapture have created a mythology of their own, coupled with all the elements of modern conspiracy theory; see for example Frykholm, A 2004, *Rapture Culture: Left Behind in Evangelical America*, Oxford University Press, New York.

The problem is that images that could be of such end times have become a staple of the international news cycle. As Dale Stolz says, “All of this parched ground of global problems provides a fertile field for the eruption of collective psychic energy and images. Long-forgotten, unconscious mythic images reappear when there is trouble in the land. In Freud’s parlance, it is the return of the repressed” (2011).³⁰² The more that the evening news resembles the visions of Armageddon, the more encouragement there is for people to believe not only that it may happen for real, but that it may actually be desirable as an alternative, because coupled with the myth of Armageddon and cosmic conflict is the myth of a return to a Golden Age in which one or other (ultimately benevolent) God will usher in a world of peace and plenty. In fact the urge to create such a world may be as much a reason for religious terrorism as the urge to destruction; Jessica Stern’s interviews with religious terrorists around the world reveal a longing for such a world where things are simpler and clearer: “It is about purifying the world” (2003, p. xi).³⁰³

The argument here is that myths such as that of Armageddon can be directly responsible for religious hatred in that they encourage the abandonment of hope and reason in preference for revenge and retribution: in many ways they embody the Golem Effect discussed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. They are particularly dangerous for those prone to delusion or to paranoid or schizophrenic states where internal disorder can be

³⁰² Stolz also reminds us of what Joseph Campbell writes about the power of mythic thinking: “...mythology is no toy for children...For its symbols...touch and release the deepest centers of motivation, moving literate and illiterate alike, moving mobs, moving civilizations.... The world is now far too small and our stake in sanity too great for any more of those old games of Chosen Folk (whether of Jehovah, Allah, Wotan, Manu, or the Devil) by which tribesmen were sustained against their enemies in the days when the serpent still could talk” (Campbell 1959, p. 12).

³⁰³ Stolz also quotes from a tape sent by Osama bin Laden to Al Jazeera TV on February 11, 2003 in which he said: “We also stress to honest Muslims that they should move, incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation.....so as to liberate themselves.... to establish the rule of God on earth” (Stolz 2011).

projected onto the external world (Read 2014, p. 101). They also encourage what Campbell called ‘mythic inflation’, “the exaltation of the ego in the posture of a god” (Campbell 1959, p. 80).³⁰⁴ This image is reflected in the story of the emperor’s new clothes³⁰⁵ which resonates with those wary of the effects of rank, wealth or power on those who are unable to resist the inflated sense of importance and entitlement that can accompany them.³⁰⁶ The same can apply to priests, imams and other gurus, especially in the context of religious ritual where the costumes and the general theatricality of religious events can encourage both inflation and narcissism amongst those who claim to act as intermediaries between gods and people: “Individuals take upon themselves the powers and attributes that, they believe, belong to a deity, even to the extent of believing the deity is incarnated in their own persons or that they are enacting the will of the deity” (Baring and Cashford 1991, p. 171).³⁰⁷ It is one of the reasons why some religious groups choose to adopt more austere approaches to dress and ritual: to avoid the dangers of the priestly caste taking on the mantle of divinity. Mythic inflation and narcissism can also contribute to fundamentalist attitudes: dogma can be used to disguise religious doubts, to avoid dealing with personal fragilities around subjects such as sex, and can also be used to avoid

³⁰⁴ Carl Jung also identified inflation as a peril particularly for Westerners who attempted Eastern yoga (Jung 1917, CW7, para. 243) because he suspected that attempts at detachment were “mere liberation from moral considerations” (ibid., CW11, paras. 825-6) but his concerns about psychological inflation were much wider: “An inflated consciousness is always egocentric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of drawing right conclusions about the future. It is hypnotized by itself and therefore cannot be argued with. It inevitably dooms itself to calamities that must strike it dead” (ibid., CW12, para. 563). Joseph Campbell amplified his idea of mythic inflation in relation to Jung’s concern about yoga: “...not *mythic identification*, ego absorbed and lost in God, but its opposite, *mythic inflation*, the god absorbed and lost in ego” (Campbell 1959, p. 80).

³⁰⁵ The enduring power of Hans Christian Andersen’s tale of a vain and gullible ruler is reflected in the fact that the phrase “the emperor’s new clothes” generates 82,600 references to titles in Google Scholar (viewed 20.5.20).

³⁰⁶ The story that the Romans supposedly recognised the dangers of inflation by having a slave whisper “Remember you are mortal” in the ears of a victorious general during his Triumph has been largely discredited, however; see for example Beard, M 2007, *The Roman Triumph*, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

³⁰⁷ The issue of clerical narcissism is discussed in Chapter 11.

the affective power of ritual or symbol that may involve disconcerting contact with the numinous (Corbett 1996, p. 34).

When myth leads to martyrdom

If the idea of Armageddon is dangerous because it encourages despair, and inflation and narcissism are a risk for those whose mythology gives them a place in pageants of faith, perhaps most threatening to all are those who claim that they are engaged in the reality, rather than the mythology, of cosmic war, and are prepared to sacrifice their lives, and the lives of others, in this role. Mark Juergensmeyer comments that “...the concept of sacrifice makes sense only within the context of cosmic war” (2017, p. 211) and there is nothing new about martyrdom: a minority of people throughout history have sought martyrdom in the name of their faith in addition to the countless others upon whom it has been forced.³⁰⁸ While our contemporary experience of voluntary martyrs in the form of suicide bombers is not exceptional, it colours the way that religion is perceived more widely in secular societies already impatient with many aspects of religion.

Juergensmeyer’s extensive scholarship on the subject of cosmic war sets out how prevalent, and how potentially dangerous, the mythology of such a war is in many parts of the world, and it provides a link between the mythology of cosmic war and the generation of religious hatred. The background to cosmic war is both mythological and transcendental, drawing on legends of the past such as the expulsion of Lucifer from heaven, and on metaphysical conflicts between good and evil. Juergensmeyer summarises the relationship between cosmic and everyday conflict as follows:

³⁰⁸ Though it has recently been argued that the number of Christian martyrs has always been exaggerated; see Moss, C 2013, *The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented a Dangerous Legacy*, HarperOne, San Francisco.

What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have placed such religious images of divine struggle – cosmic war – in the service of worldly political battles. For this reason, acts of religious terror serve not only as tactics in a political strategy but also as evocations of a much larger spiritual confrontation.

(Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 184)

The extent and influence of the gospel of cosmic war is now, according to Juergensmeyer, global in character: it lies behind Islamic State and Al-Qaeda; militant Sikhs and Hindus in India; Aum Shinrikyo in Japan; the Kach party in Israel; Ashin Wirathu's militant Buddhists in Myanmar; the slaughter perpetrated by Anders Breivik in Norway; and parts of the violent campaign against abortion clinics in the United States. While it is tempting to marginalise people such as Breivik or Timothy McVeigh, the Christian militiaman who bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, as unhinged extremists, it is harder so to characterise entire movements. Juergensmeyer describes the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation through the eyes of activists on both sides who see the confrontation as “the absolutism of cosmic war that makes compromise unlikely” (ibid., p. 193) with those suggesting compromise lambasted as traitors and as much the enemy as the other side, and both preferring war over peace. He also explains that while such overtly religious conflicts such as the Crusades and the Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century have usually been described as “wars in the name of religion” rather than “wars conducted in a religious way”, it may be that there is an explanation for the extremes of violence and hatred that are often witnessed during such conflicts.³⁰⁹ When all these things come together with the need to assert a threatened identity or dignity, the

³⁰⁹ Juergensmeyer quotes the historian Natalie Zemon Davis who has uncovered what she describes as “rites of violence” in her study of religious riots in sixteenth century France which constituted “a repertory of actions, derived from the Bible, from the liturgy, from the action of political authority, or from the traditions of popular folk practices, intended to purge the religious community and humiliate the enemy and thus make him less harmful” (Davis 1973). Davis observes that the extreme ways of defiling corpses and desecrating religious objects had “perverse connections” with religious concepts of pollution and purification, heresy, and blasphemy” (ibid.). Juergensmeyer comments that such events are, in their own way, “religious”, and that one of the “main businesses of religion” is to create a vicarious experience of the warfare that is usually imagined as being conducted on a spiritual plane (Juergensmeyer 2017, p. 196).

depersonalization of enemies that enables them to be hated as less than human, and the impossibility of compromise or surrender, it begins to be possible to see how believing in the notion of a cosmic war can lead directly to terrible enactments of human hatred.

The psychology of Armageddon

Reading Juergensmeyer and wondering how his work integrates with the theoreticians of myth discussed above raises the question of whether there is a distinctive psychology of apocalypse and Armageddon which might explain the relationship between mythology and religious hatred. One angle on this investigation is the attitudes of people when faced with the real life possibility of Armageddon. Public opinion research in the early years of the Cold War, for example, revealed what was referred to as an ‘Armageddon Complex’. Nearly half of those polled expressed the desire for the forces of good (in this case the United States) to engage in what were regarded as the forces of evil (the Soviet Union) in a final battle even if it resulted in catastrophe for both countries.³¹⁰ The author of the commentary on these results, Maurice Farber, who was at the time a professor of psychology at the University of Connecticut, puts forward two hypotheses to explain them. The first is that personal frustrations are reflected in aggressive political opinions; the second “that feelings at any particular moment are powerfully influenced not so much by the immediate situation as the *psychological future time perspective* i.e. the outlook for the future” (Farber 1951; original emphasis). Further analysis revealed that the poorer a person’s outlook, the greater the desire for this ultimate confrontation. In the seventy years since this work was carried out polling and interpretation methods have evolved enormously so these results need to be regarded with some caution; Farber himself

³¹⁰ See Farber, M 1951, ‘The Armageddon Complex: Dynamics of Opinion’, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 217-224.

admits that whether future outlook, as a phenomenological variable, determines mood, or vice-versa, remains open because “variables on this level have hardly been explored” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the idea of some correlation between personal outlook and desire for cosmic catastrophe is intriguing. It seems intuitively possible that if a person has little to lose then a catastrophe which consumes all may feel like the ultimate revenge on an indifferent world.

Another approach is to consider in greater depth a modern myth of the end times, the *Left Behind* books and films created by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins.³¹¹ This modern version of the Book of Revelation has been a publishing phenomenon albeit less in Europe than in North America and other parts of the world; at the time of LaHaye’s death in 2016 the sixteen books had sold some 80 million copies and spawned four full length films and a video game. This follows in the footsteps of other equally popular dispensational literature and films such as Hal Lindsey’s *The Late, Great Planet Earth* (1970) in establishing so-called ‘rapture’ fiction as a sub-genre of Christian literature (Guest 2016). It is the popularity of such literature that commands the attention of anyone seeking to understand fantasies of total annihilation: is it just delivering a vicarious thrill similar to that of the horror movie, or is it responding to something more profound in the human psyche that explains this cosmic dimension of religious hatred? The subject has been thoroughly explored by Richard Fenn in *Dreams of Glory: The Sources of Apocalyptic Terror* (2005). Fenn observes that one of the purposes of apocalyptic vision is to train its receivers to expect more of life, and of themselves, before it is achieved. He quotes O’Leary (1994) on how this premillennialist thinking requires believers to improve the world before the longed-for consummation which places heavy psychological demands upon believers, enjoining

³¹¹ LaHaye, T and Jenkins, J 1995, *Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days*, Tyndale, Colorado Springs.

them to practice self-purification in anticipation of the final Judgment, “they had to consistently hold their intense anticipation in check and turn their attention to organizing their everyday lives by planning for a future that most believed was unlikely at best” (O’Leary 1994, pp 136-7).

Being a believer in the rapture or the coming apocalypse is not cost-free: it requires motivation and investment to anticipate the calamity that will befall others but not oneself. Fenn explores a number of reasons why, psychologically, a person might be prepared to make such an investment. For example, Fen (2005, p. 107) says that while many individuals live reasonably happy and successful lives, they also wonder if they have somehow missed the boat, reaching a point in their lives when they wonder what they might have done or who they might have become had they only taken another course earlier in their lives: “the apocalyptic vision may appeal to those who feel they have a debt of unsatisfied love or animosity or with an unfulfilled potential” (Fenn 2005, p. 107). For those who cannot be described as even ‘reasonably happy’ but are instead enduring failure at work, living in a declining family or community, losing social standing or experiencing any form of rejection or isolation, or in any way “mourning the loss of themselves” (ibid., p. 110) there is again a motivation for everything to end. Fenn points out that in both cases what is really at stake is the loss of time to do other things, or the burdensome passing of time in hand with the knowledge that nothing can change until death at last ends the suspense: fear of death being another motivation for belief in rapture and apocalypse according to (Weber 1979, p. 229). In these motivations are reflected the observation of the historian Norman Cohn in *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (1957, p. 14)³¹² that

³¹² It is interesting to note that the original edition of Cohn's *Pursuit of the Millennium* (1957) offers a detailed application of psychoanalytic theory to apocalypticism. Cohn argues that those seeking an explanation of millennial movements “cannot afford to ignore the psychic content of the phantasies which have inspired them. All these phantasies are precisely such as are commonly found in individual cases of

apocalyptic thinking has tended to emerge in regions where rapid social and economic change is taking place and at times when displays of wealth are highly visible but unavailable to the majority of the population. Seen in this light, Armageddon looks not only like the end of the world but revenge especially against the rich and secular; it certainly qualifies as a potential source of religious hatred.

Mythmaking and scapegoating

There is another side to apocalyptic thinking that adds to this: the division into the saved and unsaved – in the Christian tradition those raptured go straight to heaven and those left endure the years of tribulation before the Second Coming.³¹³ This is a form of ultimacy that generates religious hatred because apocalyptic beliefs, apparently or actually legitimised by religious authority, provide fertile ground to breed incipient paranoia. While sometimes danger will seem to come from alien Others, from infidels and their more fanatic followers, at other times it will seem to come from within, from people who look familiar, but who are in fact agents for an enemy. As Fenn (2005, p. 72) has it, “The arch-typical enemy in apocalyptic visions is therefore someone like the Devil or the Antichrist, who wears disguises to make him seem familiar, safe, and benign, but who poses the ultimate danger to all who come under his spell”. So the usual suspects in the apocalyptic nightmare are not only other super-human forces, but “suspicious strangers of

paranoia. The megalomaniac view of oneself as the elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted yet assured of ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human existence, such as transience, dissension, conflict, fallibility whether intellectual or moral; the obsession with inerrable prophecies— these attitudes are symptoms which together constitute the unmistakable syndrome of paranoia. But a paranoid delusion does not cease to be so because it is shared by so many individuals, nor yet because those individuals have real and ample grounds for regarding themselves as victims of oppression." (p. 309) in the revised edition of *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (1980) Cohn reduces the emphasis on psychoanalytic interpretation.

³¹³ It should be remembered that apocalyptic thinking is not confined to Christianity: “In the *major* religious traditions the cosmic-historical awareness there present has resulted in a proliferation of eschatological forms.....the presence of scenarios of dramatic world-endings and their ensuring results for man” (King, W 2011, ‘Eschatology: Christian and Buddhist’, *Religion*, vol. 16, pp. 169-185; original emphasis).

all kinds who have become domesticated”. The relationship between apocalyptic myth and this demonization of whatever Other is available is confirmed in René Girard’s *Violence and the Sacred* (1972). Girard emphasises two basic characteristics of human violence: that it is more difficult to quell an impulse towards violence than to rouse it, but once roused the urge towards violence “lingers on” and “must find an outlet” (Girard 1972, p. 2). There is a reminder here of the nature of hatred: neither hatred nor violence erupt and decline in moments, and both need an object on which they must be vented before they will subside. This latter point is central to Girard’s approach: if human violence cannot be used against whatever originally inspired it, then it will find a surrogate victim based on vulnerability and availability (Golsan 2002, p. 30).³¹⁴ In this way the apocalyptic vision can play into the hands of those who need a surrogate victim who can become a focus for the animosities or vengeance of a group so that the consequences can be relatively confined and divisions within that group can be focused outwards. This enables social harmony to be restored and, Girard argues, enables the development of culture and civilisation. He calls this the “sacrificial crisis” because it requires the sacrifice or at least expulsion from the group of a surrogate victim or scapegoat (Girard 1972, pp. 39-67).³¹⁵ Girard emphasises in *Violence and the Sacred* (1972) and *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* (1978), and later works such as *The Scapegoat* (1982) and *Job, the Victim of his People* (1987), that scapegoats are not necessarily drawn from the marginalised as modern use of the word tends to suggest. In *The Scapegoat* Girard observes that members of royal families frequently make good scapegoats, citing the

³¹⁴ Girard cites the example of Medea from Euripides’ tragedy who slaughters her own children as substitutes for her faithless husband Jason. Girard’s argument is that however horrible such conclusions, they do provide a means of escape from the traps and dilemmas posed by human violence.

³¹⁵ This process also, Girard argues, triggers the “mimetic desire” that is the other cornerstone of his contention: that violence among human beings rests on one desiring something that another has, and that in this process they begin to resemble or mimic each other. This aspect of Girard’s work has been criticised on the grounds that his claims for mimetic desire as an explanation of every aspect of human nature are too sweeping, overlook alternate explanations, and are derived from the reading of fiction rather than from empirical research (Palaver 2010; see Golsan 2002, p. 116 for an overview).

example of Marie Antoinette whose position as both queen and foreigner made her distinctive and ideal for the projection of revolutionary France's problems.³¹⁶ This visibility accounts for the use of religious and ethnic minorities as scapegoats, thinking of historical anti-Semitism and current moves against Moslems in India; Girard calls these "reservoirs of scapegoats" (Girard 1982, p. 18) to be called upon when the larger community is looking for a common enemy. One common feature of such scapegoating is accusing those targeted of the most reprehensible of crimes, such as rape, incest and bestiality, hence the 'blood libel', the historical accusations against Jews of child murder (Dundes 1991).³¹⁷ Girard remarks that such crimes "seem fundamental. They attack the very foundation of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences without which there would be no social order" (ibid., p. 15); the purpose of such accusations being to "bridge the gap between the insignificance of the individual and the enormity of [the] social body" (ibid).

Following the sacrifice of the scapegoated individual or community there is then a strange reversal of fortunes. As Golsan says, as a result of the mimetic process, the scapegoat can come to be universally perceived as a saviour. Originally blamed for the onslaught of violence contaminating the community, after the sacrifice the victim is revered for removing it. "Once damned as the source of chaos, the victim is now venerated as the wellspring of social harmony. In essence, the scapegoat becomes an oxymoron: both a blessing and a curse" (Golsan 2002, p. 36). Girard's explanation is that this allows the

³¹⁶ Girard also uses Job as an example of a scapegoat, providing an interesting contrast with Jung's use of the same figure.

³¹⁷ Modern anti-Semitism continues the tradition of hostility towards and suspicion of Jews since very early times until the present, exemplified and perhaps institutionalised by the notorious forgeries called *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (Cohn 1967) and now finding new life in the 'adrenochrome' and Covid-19 conspiracy theories of the QAnon movement in the United States (see for example Ackerman, G, & Peterson, H 2020, 'Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential Impacts', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 59-73).

majority to avoid responsibility for its own violence by attributing this to a source outside itself, thereby establishing a distinction between two different types of violence: the “bad” and “impure” for which the scapegoat is responsible, which “corrupts, divides, disintegrates and undifferentiates” (Girard 1991, p. 214) and for which the scapegoat is blamed having introduced the original contagion, and the sacrificial violence directed against the scapegoat which is “good” and “pure”, which “heals, unites and reconciles” (ibid.), and which is justified and even sanctified by divine precept.

Scapegoating is perhaps the most immediate and apparent form that the intrusion of mythology as an active if largely unconscious component of human functioning can take. But it would be a mistake, this dissertation argues, to discount the more obscure roles that myth can play in fomenting visions of what it means to be human that can, inadvertently or otherwise, contribute to religious hatred. Myth is by its nature an aspect of ultimacy, and if the concept of ultimacy contained within it includes forces of division, whether human or cosmic, then hatred will never be far behind even if it lurks in their shadows.

Chapter 10: Sacred values

Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of sacred values, which figure extensively in contemporary scholarship that examines the psychology of religious hatred, especially where extremist or fundamentalist religion is involved.³¹⁸ In earlier scholarship of religion this concept seems to have been assumed to be part of the moral and ethical dimensions of religion, subsumed under the study of ritual and sacrifice, or sometimes taken to be so much at the heart of all religion that it requires no further discussion.³¹⁹ Conflict resolution literature tends to address the concept of sacred values rather more explicitly, perhaps because in the early days of the field there was a tendency to divide all conflict, perhaps somewhat simplistically, into ‘conflicts of interest’ and ‘conflicts of value (Aubert 1963, pp. 26-42). The former were defined as conflicts largely over material interests such as land, money and resources, and the latter over more abstract issues such as identity, tradition, national pride - and religion. It is also perhaps true to say, as has been observed already, that the conflict scholars of half a century ago were largely secular humanists for whom the decline of religion was a given and therefore difficult to conceive of as still a serious source of conflict. Despite geopolitically seismic events such as the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, both to some extent inspired by religious pressures, this attitude tended to prevail until the equally seismic events of 11 September 2000 when finally it became apparent that religion was not, after

³¹⁸ See for example Jones, J 2002, *Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic Perspective*, Brunner-Routledge, Hove; Atran, S 2010, *Talking to the Enemy: Violent Extremism, Sacred Values and What it Means to be Human*, Penguin, London.

³¹⁹ Ninian Smart, for example, has as one of his dimensions the “Ethical and Legal”. He acknowledges in his description of this dimension that “we must distinguish between the ethical teachings of a faith.....and the actual sociological effects and circumstances of a religion” (Smart 1969, p. 20).

all, an aspect of human and political life that could safely be overlooked. As the philosopher Mark Taylor says, “You cannot understand the world today if you do not understand religion. Never before has religion been so powerful and so dangerous” (Taylor 2007, p. xiii). The first half of this chapter examines sacred values in some depth as a prelude to considering how they contribute to religious hatred.

The nature of sacred values

Sacred values have been defined as “any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values” (Tetlock et al. 2000). While such a definition is not accepted in its entirety by all scholars for a number of reasons to be discussed in due course, and which are of extreme importance in the context of initiatives to resolve conflict,³²⁰ the phrase “possessing infinite or transcendental significance” does capture the essence of what is generally meant by sacred values.³²¹ Contained within it are also a number of implications about sacred values that are worth noting as a prelude to discussing their significance in the context of religious hatred.

It is important to be clear about what is meant by ‘the sacred’. Traced back to the Latin *sacer*, *sacrum*, *sanctus*, for the Romans *sacrum* means a consecrated thing, anything that belonged to the gods and could be encountered inside a temple while what was outside

³²⁰ The phrase “precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values” is particularly significant as shall be seen when discussing below experiments to test the durability of sacred values in the face of inducements to trade them.

³²¹ It should be noted however, that “Humans sacralise countless things, including water, wine, cows, dung, trees, books, buildings, and rocks. The types of item that humans sacralise appear unbounded, but possibly the most recurrent thing that humans have sacralised throughout history is land” (Sosis 2011).

the temple was *pro* – in front of, outside of – the *fanum*, temple, and therefore *profanus* – profane, unholy (Kripal 2014, p. 94). This distinction is significant because it helps anchor the tension between sacred and profane, and the difficulty of understanding one except in relation to the other. It also illustrates the extent to which the idea of ‘the sacred’ exists on a spectrum, extending from the holiest of holy at the one end to the taboo and even demonic at the other. It does not follow from this, however, that what is sacred is inevitably good: it should once again be remembered that Rudolf Otto defined the sacred or holy as the human experience of the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* (Otto 1917), both terrifying and alluring, and is often more about its power and potential (Riesebrodt 2010, pp. 74-5) than what is morally good. It is also important, particularly in the context of conflict, to realise that there is nothing that is universally sacred: almost anything, Kripal argues (2014, p. 95) can become sacred within a particular social and historical context.³²²

If the definition of what is sacred is fluid, its reach is determined more by its inherent power than by any rectitude it may possess. This idea of the sacred being defined by its power rather than its holiness, where holiness is aligned with righteousness, casts a whole new light on what sacred values can mean. Kripal illustrates the idea of the sacred being powerful by reference to the Biblical story of the Ark of the Covenant and what happens during its transportation by King David and his priests in 2 Samuel 6, 1-7. The unfortunate Uzzah reaches out his hand to steady the Ark against its shaking by the oxen moving it,

³²² An extreme example of this, described recently by a religious education teacher, is ‘Pastafarianism’ whose deity is the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM). The Church of the FSM was originally created in 2005 as a lighthearted means for opponents of religion to combat the teaching of Creationism and Intelligent Design and is in effect a modern version of Russell’s teapot, the analogy formulated by the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) to demonstrate that the philosophic burden of proof lies on the person making claims rather than on those trying to disprove them (Garvey 2010). While the whole idea of the FSM is of course preposterous, a visit to its official website (www.venganza.org viewed 22.8.20) is thought-provoking as well as amusing, and it also demonstrates that something even bogusly sacred can still be powerful.

and is immediately struck dead by God. The story makes the point that the Ark carries real power and should only be touched by someone qualified to do so. The Ark is akin to a nuclear reactor (in Kripal's image) and while its immense power is of service to the community, it is a power that, unless it is handled with care, also presents an awesome danger.

This latter aspect of the sacred is perhaps less immediately apparent in most sacred objects. Pre-revolutionary Russia's miracle-working icons, for example, never seem to have posed any direct risk to worshippers, though their power was sometimes perceived as an indirect threat to ecclesiastical tranquility by church authorities (Shevzov 1999). The power they possessed, in addition to that of healing, was of convening the faithful in multitudes, reinforcing the faith of the already faithful, and bringing comfort and reassurance to an enslaved population in a way that the 'official' church could not.³²³ No less sacred to some contemporary neo-Druids, Wiccans and followers of the 'New Age' are the stones of Stonehenge, though again the power of them comes in diffuse forms. Philip Shallcross, for example, says "The past is a potent source of inspiration . . . the past is the realm of our ancestors, and for the Druid, our ancestors are our companions and teachers in this life" (Shallcross 2000, p. 7).³²⁴ The power, again, may be indirect and contextual as when Brian Fagan argues that architectural structures like Stonehenge provide "the setting, a powerful form of nonverbal communication that kept the messages

³²³ The Russian Orthodox Church seems not to have had clearly established rules by which particular icons would become specially venerated. Several terms were used to describe such icons ('miracle-working' – *chudotvornaia*, 'specially venerated' – *osobochtimaia* and 'locally venerated' – *mestnochtimaia*) but the criteria for using one term over another were not clearly defined. Technically, it appears that icons could be referred to as *chudotvornye* only if so recognized by the Holy Synod. Yet laity frequently used that term in reference to icons not officially recognized as such (Shevzov 1999).

³²⁴ If the sacred can also be defined by the willingness of people to go to war over it, then the "Battle of the Beanfield" of 1985 during which some five hundred solar festivalers were arrested by police after they were denied access to Stonehenge (Chippindale 1986) provides some evidence of the contemporary sacredness of the site.

of ritual, and of the mythic world, in people's minds" (Fagan 1998, p. 8). This is despite the association of Stonehenge with Druidry being spurious (Cusack 2012): whatever the reality, the association has become part of folklore and folk memory and has enabled modern Druids' claim to an indigenous form of British spirituality (Shallcross 2000).³²⁵

Sacred values and behavioural motivation

The significance of all values, sacred or otherwise, is that they often provide the motivation for human beings to engage in behaviour which may carry risks as well as rewards. For this reason scholar-practitioners find it essential to understand the values in contention and their meaning, in terms of aims and goals, for those in conflict. So much is obvious: but the actuality of values also provides other indicators of significance. First, the operation of values indicates that those involved have goals in mind, even though they may be, at the point of intervention, poorly conceived or expressed. Those goals, in turn, exhibit the aspirations of the individual (Karlovy 1993, p. 274) and also about who this person wishes to become in terms of their identity because goals are highly personal and reveal much about a person's previous experience, current commitments and personal values (Emmons 2005). Whether goals determine values, or values goals, is a moot point: Reker and Wong (1988), for example, are clear that they are self-reinforcing in that both goals and values provide guidelines for living and orient people towards what is valuable, meaningful, and purposeful. At the same time people draw psychological benefits from affirming some solidarity with societal values and the collective rituals through which these are expressed (Durkheim 1976).

³²⁵ The experience of managing dialogue among the various claimants to authority over the future of Stonehenge attests to the passion with which such claims, however doubtful in fact and archaeology, are pursued (private communication 2018).

Why and how do some values become sacred? To paraphrase Durkheim, the lack of sacred values poses risks to both individuals and societies in that without them, and the rituals that accompany them, humankind can lose the qualities that provide significance for otherwise meaningless lives. This point of view sees human beings as always drawn to moral frameworks and reluctant to see matters of principle sacrificed on the altar of expediency. As Tetlock et al put it, “Homo sociologicus will not surrender without a fight to homo economicus” (Tetlock et al, 2017).³²⁶ It is reasonable to argue that values - or indeed anything from a particular place to a particular object - become sacred when they are perceived with “respect and veneration” and are thereby provided “with the ability to function as a particular source of significance in people’s lives” (Silberman 2005).

Scholar-practitioner Donna Hicks has taken this further in focusing on the core concept of dignity as an essential prelude to appreciating the significance of sacred values. Hicks argues that the human longing for dignity, which she defines as the “feeling of inherent value and worth” (Hicks 2011, p. 6) provides those in conflict with the sense of safety which is essential if they are to risk, for example, negotiating with an enemy. She argues also that there is an evolutionary basis for the importance of respecting the dignity of others: it lays a foundation for the relationships that underpin human community and survival (ibid.). Hicks’s arguments are underwritten by researchers in cognitive-evolutionary science (see for example Eisenberger and Lieberman 2004)³²⁷ who emphasise

³²⁶ When the history of Brexit comes to be written there will be questions over whether the Remain campaign erred in basing its arguments on economic projects rather than engaging with the value-based campaign of Leave. Homo sociologus, it may be decided, did indeed prevail over homo economicus.

³²⁷ Eisenberger and Lieberman point out (Eisenberger, N and Lieberman, M 2004, ‘Why rejection hurts: a common neural alarm system for physical and social pain’, *Trends in Cognitive Science* vol. 8, no. 7, pp. 294-300) that while many psychologists assume that high self-esteem is associated with psychological well-being and low self-esteem with depression, anxiety and other psychological problems, it may not be ‘self-esteem’ *per se* that contributes to psychological well-being, but rather the state of social connectedness that underlies

the absolute significance of individuals being accepted by their communities both for their own and their community's collective health.³²⁸ It is also useful to look at the reverse: at what happens when people are afforded no dignity or, worse still, when dignity is absent and replaced by shame, particularly unacknowledged shame. Sheff and Retzinger's *Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts* (2001), a study of how violence is triggered in many settings from the domestic to the international, cites evidence that violence frequently arises from the denial of shame and consequent alienation in relationships. This is particularly significant for young people: the evidence points to social alienation making young people more inclined to radical values and prepared to use violence in asserting them (Pretus et al, 2018). To have shame, however, there must first be values, and values significant enough, should they be denied, suppressed or contravened, to trigger those feelings of shame. Sacred values are a two-edged sword when it comes to human motivation. Positive values can lead people to noble, heroic and self-sacrificial action in pursuit of a cause; yet those same values can render people vulnerable should they be challenged, frustrated or denied by others. It is this duality which makes sacred values of critical significance in how religious hatred is approached and treated and which also gives them their power as unconscious motivators of human behaviour.

Valuing sacred values

this construct. This supports arguments that note religion's value both in building individual well-being and social coherence.

³²⁸ There is also research that indicates that if people experience severe social rejection then their judgment may also be affected as they try to be re-included in their group either by over-conforming to group norms or deliberately indulging in behaviour that seeks the attention of the group as a precursor to re-inclusion (Zadro and Williams 2003, p. 325). The consequences of such behaviour in a situation of group conflict or insecurity can be imagined.

The power of the sacred to lead, oppose, persuade and pursue is not in doubt, though it is a power that can be indirect, oblique and ancillary to other forms of influence. When sacredness is attached to values, however, it can gain a hard-edged quality that it may lack in other contexts. The definition of sacred values adopted by Tetlock, Peterson and Lerner (1996), and quoted above,³²⁹ illustrates the unwillingness to compromise them as a key characteristic, and reflects the experimental work done by Philip Tetlock and Jeremy Ginges in Israel. This work has been widely quoted in conflict resolution literature to demonstrate the difficulties which adherence to sacred values poses for those mediating and negotiating in contexts such as the Middle East. This work begins with the fact that for religious Zionists the Land of Israel is sacred territory and its surrender, even in return for political and financial benefits, is as much unthinkable as unacceptable. The strength of the opposition to the idea of “land for peace” was brought home in 1995 by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a religious Zionist, because Rabin was close to agreeing to cede parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to an interim Palestinian government in return for numerous benefits to Israel (Clark 2014, p. 141). For Amir and other religious Zionists this was beyond the authority of any Israeli government given that this meant giving up territory that had been granted to the Jews by God in the Abrahamic covenant (Stern 2003, pp. 90-2). In 2007 Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran and others conducted a field study to examine under what circumstances some might be prepared to trade a sacred value for a tangible benefit. One of the main findings of this research was that the ‘rational actor’ model of negotiating behaviour has its limitations.³³⁰ Those participants holding to a sacred value (who regarded Muslim control of East

³²⁹ “.....those values that a moral community treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs or indeed any mingling with secular values”.

³³⁰ The ‘rational actor’ model in negotiation theory is based on rational choice theory which holds that individuals, faced with a number of options, will take account of all the necessary information available to distinguish among those options, and will then act consistently to make the best self-determined choice of action. Even within economics, the field where rational choice theory originated, its limitations are increasingly recognised (e.g. Foley 2003; Bourdieu 2005).

Jerusalem as a sacred right) were not only less likely to accept a trade-off that had added ‘sweeteners’ (Israel paying each Palestinian family \$1,000 a year for ten years), but were gravely insulted by the thought that they might give up a sacred value for a financial incentive (Ginges et al 2007).³³¹ This is an example of what Norenzayan calls the “backfire effect” (Norenzayan 2013, p. 168): not only are some people unwilling to sacrifice what they see as sacred truths or commitments even in the name of peace, the suggestion that they might do so indicates, as they perceive it, a contempt for those values and therefore for them personally.

Pseudo-sacred and fungible values

While the definition of what is sacred may be relatively static, it does not follow that the values attached to it will remain constant, nor does it mean that a belief or value that is said to be ‘non-negotiable’ can never change (Francis 2016). In practice sacred values can and do evolve in response to changing circumstances.³³² In the light of this there is a line of argument that denies the inflexibility of sacred values. Thompson (1998), for example, argues that truly sacred values cannot exist because of their function as a utility, and the critical factor is not how much it takes to compensate someone for a sacred issue, but what factors allow trade-offs to occur on sacred issues: “The term “sacred” describes people’s preferences on issues on which they view themselves as uncompromising” (Thompson

³³¹ One possible explanation for this is the neural evidence “that when individuals naturally process statements about sacred values, they use neural systems associated with evaluating rights and wrongs (TPJ) and semantic rule retrieval (VLPFC) but not systems associated with utility. The involvement of the TPJ is consistent with the conjecture that moral sentiments exist as context-independent knowledge in the temporal cortex” (Berns GS, Bell E, Capra M, Prietula M, Moore S, Anderson B, Ginges J, and Atran S 2012, ‘The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values’, *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* [viewed 11.2.19].

³³² Even thirty years ago, for example, the idea of women priests in the Church of England was considered by many to be deontologically inconceivable, yet in 2017 30% of Church of England clergy were female; also in that year just over 50% of ordinands were women (*Statistics for Mission 2017*, Church of England). Thirty years may seem a long time, of course, for those with a frustrated vocation.

1998, p. 266). The problem is, however, that labeling an issue as sacred may be, or may be perceived, as a negotiating ploy rather than a reflection of a heartfelt value, though the genuine anointing of certain issues as sacred can remove them from bargaining consideration and increase the likelihood of a favorable settlement.

While it seems that not everything has its price, it is also important to mention what have been called “pseudo-sacred” values (Clarke 2014, p. 142). These are values that are declared to be sacred for as long as those advancing them feel themselves to be in a strong position but are reduced or abandoned when that position becomes weaker (Bazerman et al 2008; Tenbrunsel et al 2009). Clarke (2014, p. 142) relates the example of the Lacandon Mayans in Mexico who appear to regard trees as sacred because, should a tree be cut down, a star will fall from the sky; they are consequently reluctant to agree to any logging in their forests. They have agreed some tree harvesting, however, on the grounds that their negotiating position was weak and some selective logging would be preferable to no agreement and indiscriminate logging that would pose a greater threat to the stars. The experience of mediating dialogue over issues that are supposedly non-negotiable on the grounds of sacred values replicates the Lacandon story: as time moves on and the full picture becomes clearer, some concessions begin to appear preferable to no agreement and uncertain outcomes.

In addition to this it can be argued that sacred values are also subject to what psychologists call the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (Ross 1977; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Ross and Nisbett 1991). Put at its simplest, this is the human tendency to explain human actions with too much emphasis on a person’s character and too little on the situation in which they find themselves (Goldie 2002, p. 161). The result of this is the presumption that character trait differences are the most relevant predictors of future action when there

may in fact be other considerations that weigh as heavily on those making the decisions (Ross and Nisbett 1991). Something similar seems to happen when it appears that sacred values are being violated: their nature is considered immutable, like character traits, rather than being responses to a situation which may change when the situation is perceived to change, as the example of the Lacondon Mayans demonstrates. One consequence of this is conflict caused by different interpretations of what constitutes a sacred value and when it should be regarded as fungible.³³³

To complete this summary of why even supposedly sacred and non-negotiable values tend in practice to be more flexible than their adherents care to admit there are three further examples worth noting from literature relating to values and relevant as the background to understanding how they may contribute to religious hatred. First, Fiske & Tetlock (1997) distinguish three kinds of trade-off when it comes to sacred values: *routine* trade-offs are those where typically one item is traded for another within a single relational model; *taboo* trade-offs are those where a sacred value is traded against something with no such value (as in the cash for values example above) and *tragic* trade-offs are those where sacred values are traded against each other.³³⁴ The art of politics, Tetlock points out (quoted in Pinker 2011), is in large part about reframing taboo trade-offs as tragic trade-offs, so “keeping troops in Afghanistan is reframed from ‘putting the lives of our soldiers in danger’ to ‘guaranteeing our nation’s commitment to freedom or ‘winning the war on terror’”. Pinker comments that “the reframing of sacred values.... may be an overlooked

³³³ A vivid illustration of this at the time of writing (May 2020) is the situation of the Prime Minister’s special adviser who interpreted coronavirus pandemic lockdown rules to legitimise a journey that others regarded as contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the rules. His situation is complicated by the fact that the lockdown rules seem to have acquired a sacral status that in public perception places them beyond interpretation.

³³⁴ Steven Pinker (2011) quotes the novel *Sophie’s Choice* (Styron 1979) as presenting the ultimate tragic trade-off, when a mother is faced with having to choose which of her children should be spared death in Auschwitz.

tactic in the psychology of peacemaking” (Pinker 2011, p. 763). Secondly, an understanding of how values may be fungible has been developed to aid understanding of judicial decision-making (MacDougal and Lasswell 1992). Rather than looking at possible trade-offs as described above, this jurisprudential approach looks at how different jurists may order values in different hierarchies, thereby reaching different judicial decisions despite being faced with the same facts and evidence.³³⁵ Thirdly, beyond the scope of this dissertation there is a burgeoning literature on value hierarchies that supposedly reflect competing social frameworks and paradigms.³³⁶

Broader perspectives on sacred values

It might be thought that situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian are extreme and that the reluctance to compromise sacred values is a specifically religious phenomenon but this is not the case. Clarke (2014), for example, cites the case of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the United States, quoting its “notorious slogan “from my cold dead hands”” (p. 141-2) and the words of its former president, Charlton Heston (cited in Marietta 2008, p. 767, fn.1): “...we know that there is sacred stuff in that wooden stock and blued steel”. It can be argued that as members of the NRA tend to be strongly Christian and patriotic their relationship to their weapons goes beyond the entirely secular. While the weapons are sacred for the NRA, the earth and its ecosystem are sacred for many more, and this second example of the sacred, arguably semi-detached from the religious, is perhaps more telling. The recently deceased John Cairns captured the spirit of this in his essay ‘Sustainability

³³⁵ For example, judicial decisions in relation to sentencing offenders take into account a number of factors such as public safety, need for punishment and the likelihood of rehabilitation, all of which compete for emphasis when the sentencing decision is made and are influenced by each decision-maker’s values and priorities (personal communication 22.8.20).

³³⁶ See for example papers given at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy collected at <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/MainValu.htm> [viewed 27.5.20].

and Sacred Values' (2002)³³⁷ where the notable convergence of the scientific and the sacred looks beyond the long-established science versus religion debate.³³⁸ Cairns describes his shock following the statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists in 1992, when over 1600 scientists from 71 countries, including over half of all living recipients of the Nobel Prize, declared:

As scientists, many of us have had profound experiences of awe and reverence before the universe. We understand that what is regarded as sacred is more likely to be treated with care and respect. Our planetary home should be so regarded. Efforts to safeguard and cherish the environment need to be infused with a vision of the sacred.

(UCS 1992)

Cairns' shock was not that his scientific colleagues would put their names to such a statement, but that this statement attracted so little attention given how remarkable it was. Since then it has become commonplace for environmental literature to advocate a relationship with our home planet in which sacred values inform scientific and technological approaches to conservation and sustainability.³³⁹ It is also becoming more common for religious leaders to swing the resources of their congregations behind renewed efforts to improve human stewardship of the earth.^{340 341}

³³⁷ Cairns, J 2002, 'Sustainability and sacred values', *Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics*, vol. 2, pp. 15-27.

³³⁸ The conflict model of science vs. religion seems to have begun in the mid-19th century. John William Draper's *History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science* (1874) established this as the default to think about the historical relations between science and religion. It was translated into 20 languages (notably becoming a bestseller in the late Ottoman empire where it probably influenced Atatürk's belief that progress meant science superseding religion). A little later Andrew Dickson White's *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (1896) referred to a 'conflict between two epochs in the evolution of human thought – the theological and the scientific'.

³³⁹ See for example publications such as *Resurgence* which embraces "a vision where spiritual fulfilment and material wellbeing are in balance and science is in constant conversation with wisdom (<https://www.resurgence.org/about/vision-statement.html>) [viewed 8.2.19].

³⁴⁰ See for example the Pope's 2015 encyclical *Laudato Si*.

³⁴¹ The belief that the perception of the natural environment as sacred may help to protect it, however, may be misplaced. Sonya Sachdeva argues (Sachdeva, S 2016, 'The Influence of Sacred Beliefs in Environmental Risk Perception and Attitudes', *Environment and Behavior*, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 583–600) that the very fact of seeing somewhere as sacred may result in it being perceived as the "epitome of purity" and thereby protected from pollutants and other environmental risks; this may, however, be a minority view.

The argument for regarding nature as sacred is rooted in the belief that the conceptual barrier between humankind and the natural world has done much to enable our destruction of it, and that sacralising, or re-sacralising, nature would provide a counter to this (Milton 1999). This conceptual barrier is more apparent in western industrialised culture, based on the Biblical injunction that humankind should have dominion over the world (Genesis 1: 26-8), than it is in non-western traditions. Sponsel and Natadecha-Sponsel (1993, quoted in Milton 1999) point out that the Buddhist worldview situates humankind within nature, while Posey (1998) sees the “sacred balance” expressed in some indigenous cultures as providing the requisite guidance. Milton (1999) argues, however, that in some contexts the sacredness of nature depends on it being seen as separate from humankind.³⁴² Regardless of the relationship between nature and humankind, it has been suggested that environmentalism is characterized by four kinds of ‘ecological piety’ (Szerszynski 1997, p. 50). Monastic piety applies to environmentalists who retire from the world to be as self-sufficient and ‘green’ as possible; sectarian piety is directed at social change rather than renunciation but requires the same degree of personal commitment; churchly piety covers those who express their commitment through organisations espousing the requisite values; and folk piety through green consumerism with environmental awareness expressed through the choices in everyday living. The significance of this, according to Szerszynski, is that it reflects that contemporary piety is inspired not so much by the thought of divine beings as by action grounded in environmental values. Such responses to environmental values are essentially religious, he argues, and therefore address the sacredness of nature.³⁴³

³⁴² Whether humankind should be considered part of ‘nature’ remains a controversial point. Ellen and Fukui (1996) provides an interesting overview of this issue.

³⁴³ This approach to nature is underpinned by Goodin’s theory of green value (Goodin 1992, p. 19ff, quoted in Milton 1999). Goodin argues that people can find a larger context, and some meaning, purpose and pattern in their lives, through their relationship with the natural world in the same way as they do through more traditional religious beliefs.

This brief overview of some environmental approaches to sacred values suggests that in the near future, in an age of putative environmental catastrophe, that the process of re-ordering of values from the consumerist to the ecological will take on similar characteristics to the process of re-ordering religious values in past centuries.³⁴⁴ Advocacy by organisations such as Earth First!, Greenpeace, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and, most recently, Extinction Rebellion, is increasingly reminiscent of old-fashioned, Salvationist evangelising complete with eschatological threats.³⁴⁵ It is not difficult to imagine a future in which sacred values, based on the growing reality of earth in the form of Gaia as avenging angel, motivate significant numbers of people to defy political complacency and take to crusading in the name of justice and equity just as their forebears did in earlier campaigns against unheeding governments.³⁴⁶

Sacred values and religious hatred

If the purpose of religious hatred is to eradicate a person or a community by severing the internal bonds that provide integrity, the bonds that ensure relationships, and the bonds of faith that provide salvation, and thereby eradicate the individual or the collective, then we need to explore how the existence, use or abuse of sacred values can enable this. The first way is simply by being unaware of them, often illustrated by reference to the destruction of sacred land or burial sites in first nations territories such as in Canada and Australia (Carmichael et al 1994), and consequently failing to pay it sufficient respect.

³⁴⁴ The publication of *This is a Crisis: Facing up to the Age of Environmental Breakdown* by the Institute for Public Policy Research in February 2019 (while the first draft of this chapter was being prepared) alerts policymakers to the seriousness of the situation.

³⁴⁵ WWF's current campaign film, *Not making a choice is a choice* (online at www.wwf.org.uk) is an apocalyptic presentation that posits personal responsibility in a similar manner to eschatological preaching [viewed 26.5.20].

³⁴⁶ See Lovelock, J 2006, *The Revenge of Gaia*, Penguin, London.

The second is more complex: the conflation of the sacred and the secular. An interesting example of this is the conflict that broke out following publication of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* (1988). In February 1989 the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then supreme leader of Iran, issued a *fatwā* calling for the death of Rushdie and of anyone associated with the publication of the work on the grounds of blasphemy. Rushdie himself later argued in his essay 'Is Nothing Sacred?' (1990) that literature is the one place in any society where, within the secrecy of our own heads, we can hear voices talking about everything in every possible way", reflecting his belief in literature as a "privileged arena" for exploring the bounds of the sacred. For the Ayatollah, and for many Muslims, there are no such bounds and therefore everything must be treated as sacred: a concept that both confuses and affronts some Western secular sensibilities (Husain and Rosenbaum 2004). This raises questions about Eliade's concept of the sacred and the profane (1957): if there is no such boundary does it follow that the sacred must always be presumed for fear of transgressing others' sense of the sacred? The answer to this lies, according to Daniel Shapiro (2016, p. 108) in learning to speak the language of the sacred and looking for what can be held in common as sacred.

There is a final aspect of sacred values in relation to religious hatred: meaning. Dozier points out that meaning is "uniquely significant" to human beings because "the vast majority of our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors are shaped by meaning systems of our own creation" (2002, p. 10). He argues that meaning rather than instinct is so important to our species that our limbic system has evolved "a powerful tendency to blindly interpret any meaning system that we deeply believe in as substantially enhancing our survival and reproduction" and it is this which causes us to experience "strong primal feelings of joy

and well-being coupled with an exciting new sense of purpose” (ibid., p. 11).³⁴⁷ It is this feature of the human brain that is also capable of decoupling our behaviour from its survival impulse, which enables us to be committed to a belief system and a set of sacred values even if it includes beliefs or values that are objectively self-destructive. The emotional and non-rational commitment to such systems that provide us with our personal senses of meaning and purpose also leaves us vulnerable to interpreting differences of meaning as threats to our survival. This is why when any form of religious hatred or discrimination is tolerated, let alone encouraged, there may be few rational limits to the actions that may be legitimised or the damage that they may do. In other words, using Dozier’s arguments, religious hatred invariably involves an attack on the very systems that give people meaning and purpose in their lives: it is always more profound than it may appear. The significance of this, when it comes to understanding why religious hatred is more than just a question of disliking what someone else believes, can hardly be exaggerated.

Psychodynamic understanding of sacred values

The final section of this chapter explores the relationship between sacred values and religious hatred. The link between these, in scholar-practitioner experience, is uncertainty and the vacuum it creates (Friend and Hickling 2005, p. 8; Acland 2008). The argument, in its simplest form, is that sacred values provide people with anchors to a sense of security and stability. When these anchors are loosened, whether by the erosion of societal bonds, by the thinning of religious or ideological commitments, or the pressures of economic hardship or indeed anything else that makes people feel less secure in their homes,

³⁴⁷ One cannot but be reminded of the conversion experiences described by for example Rankin (2005) and Luhrmann (2012).

relationships and identities, uncertainty turns from being a mild inconvenience to a disquieting dislocation. The resultant fear and anxiety provokes the instinct to fight by seeking new certainties in stronger ideology, religion or identity, or to flight into some form of extremism, either of which may carry hatred as the new price of belonging and the appearance of certainty. Both fight and flight usually result in more conflict, more dislocation and thus more uncertainty.

The link between uncertainty and all types of extremism was recognised in the September 2013 special issue of the *Journal of Social Issues*.³⁴⁸ The introductory essay by Michael Hogg, Arie Kruglanski and Kees van den Bos begins by recognising that the psychological relationship between uncertainty and extremism is complex and its nature rests on what is meant by uncertainty, how uncertainty relates to neighbouring constructs, what the focus of uncertainty is, what we mean by “extremism,” what aspects of extremism we focus on, and what the psychological processes are that may translate uncertainty into extremism. Scholar-practitioners are often advised to look particularly for three types of uncertainty (Hickling and Friend 2005, p. 8). The first is relevant elements of the immediate environment: for example the data on which decisions may be based, such as the reliability or otherwise of estimates and predictions. The second concerns relationships: whether others will do as they say, and what decisions may be made by others which have an effect on an immediate albeit unrelated situation. The third is guiding values, whether political, religious or cultural, implicit or assumed, which set directions and guide operating principles. The influence of uncertainty on any situation of conflict should never be under-estimated and interventions to reduce uncertainty are often

³⁴⁸ The essays in this edition were selected from a group of papers presented at a conference on uncertainty and extremism organized at Claremont Graduate University in November 2009. The meeting was sponsored by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and the European Association of Social Psychology.

fundamental to securing assent to more far-reaching interventions to reduce conflict.³⁴⁹

The form of extremism of interest here is religious hatred and its possible manifestations, noting that there is some correlation between periods of societal instability and sociopolitical and ideological extremism that includes religious extremism, citing events as far removed and apart as the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Great Depression of the 1930s which lead to the slide into fascism, communism and nationalism, and the current upsurges of religious extremism in parts of the Muslim world (Lane 2011; Staub 1989). Common to all such situations is people feeling uncertain about the accuracy of their perceptions, beliefs and attitudes and hence seeking out others who are similar to themselves, partly to check and look for confirmation of their own positions, but also to reaffirm the cohesiveness of their bonds with like-minded people (Swann, Rentfrow and Guinn 2003). This can have the effect of cementing the social influence of those who promise the most certainty, whether they are political demagogues, represent extremist belief systems or even financial fraudsters who benefit from uncertainty in times of fiscal crisis by promising spurious guarantees of wealth and security (Altmeyer 2003). This reflects how broad manifestations of uncertainty can be: people can feel uncertain about all sorts of things, from their perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, values and relationships to their careers, their future and their place in the world; and even more crucially about their sense of self and identity especially in the context of the multiple uncertainties of the

³⁴⁹ US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was vilified for his statement on 12 February 2002 in which he said “Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones (Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States Department of Defense (viewed 1.9.20). In fact Rumsfeld was doing no more than stating a basic process of risk and uncertainty analysis.

contemporary world. “Uncertainty can be weak or strong, transitory or enduring, and important or trivial.... Uncertainty is multifaceted and thus how people respond to uncertainty is also multifaceted” (Hogg et al, 2013).

Finding a community of people who share one’s beliefs, attitudes and prejudices and insulate one from the views of those who might challenge those makes perfect sense, whether that community is a political party, a newspaper, a church or an online social media group. In addition it becomes self-serving to label those who disagree as heretics and deviants who are not only wrong but also morally suspect – because only the morally suspect would consider undermining what is obviously the consensus. Equally obviously it makes sense to follow those, whether in person or in publications, who harbour no doubts as to the rightness of the cause and are energetic in condemning those who do. This can even lead people to accepting an existing social structure if it provides the desired stability and certainty even if it puts its adherents at a disadvantage (Jost and Hunyadi 2003).³⁵⁰ It can also lead people to investing in the most egregious conspiracy theories.

The links between uncertainty, extremism and religious hatred are well explained through the social psychology-based arguments set out above, but the link back to sacred values is less apparent; it might appear more logical to discuss uncertainty in relation to power and control, the subject of the chapter following this. Psychodynamic psychology can provide this link by following David Tacey’s contention that “We have to go outside conventional boundaries....and descend into the unconscious, to where sacred values fall

³⁵⁰ This is what is known as System Justification Theory (SJT), the idea within social psychology that beliefs which justify the existing system are psychologically comforting. It is based on people having a range of needs, material, relational and existential, that can be met by the status quo even when this disadvantages specific individuals. It can also explain psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance (see Jost, J and Andrews, R 2011, ‘System Justification Theory’ in Christie, D (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, pp. 1092-3.).

when they are no longer upheld by culture” (2013, p. 64).³⁵¹ Culture for Tacey, in this context, means the social stability that religious and political certainties can bring, and it is the ending of these certainties that mean sacred values retreat into areas of the psyche where they remain latent. Tacey sees the forces of what he calls ‘fanatical religion’ replacing these sacred values and quotes Jung from ‘The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man’: “I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that modern man has suffered an almost fatal shock, psychologically speaking, and as a result has fallen into profound uncertainty” (Jung CW10, para. 155). Later in that essay Jung warns that “No psychic value can disappear without being replaced by another of equivalent intensity” (Jung CW10, para. 159). It is the contention of this dissertation that in some circumstances it is the medium of uncertainty which has enabled the replacement of gentler sacred values by religious hatred.

³⁵¹ When faced with uncertainty the human tendency is to estimate what certainty might mean or, if that is not possible, proceed by making assumptions. Both estimates and assumptions will, in the absence of any firmer data, be value-based (Friend and Hickling 2005, p. 332).

Chapter 11: Power and Control

Introduction

The final dimension of religion this dissertation considers in relation to religious hatred is that of power and control, exercised through a mixture of agency and influence (Woodhead 2011). The forms power takes differ from situation to situation, but in most situations, Acland (1990) argues, in addition to the ‘hard’ power inherent in military materiel, money or resources, there are also those now often described as ‘soft’ power, such as education, culture, the dissemination of information and moral and religious influence.³⁵² In addition to such cases, as Woodhead argues, there is the power that is perceived to be drawn by religions from their relationships with whatever higher powers they acknowledge, and through their historical, cultural and social influence. The focus on power, however, can be misleading because power alone does not inevitably prevail.³⁵³ This illustrates the importance of differentiating not only between hard power and soft power, but between power and capability to control which is the purpose of all power: “Power is one’s ability to affect the behavior of others to get what one wants. There are three basic ways to do this: coercion, payment, and attraction. Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction” (Nye 2008). Hard power can be quantified at source; capability needs to be

³⁵² These may also wield forms of hard power, directly or indirectly, as was apparent during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s when various churches assumed nationalist positions (Perica 2002).

³⁵³ A potent example of this confusion was the general assumption in Western foreign and military policy circles in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 that the Afghan mujahideen opposing the massively powerful and technologically superior Soviet forces would be rapidly defeated. In fact the Soviet-Afghan War lasted until 1989 when the Soviet Union finally withdrew. One of the key reasons, among many, was that the Soviet Army was equipped and trained to fight a war on the flat plains of Central Europe against forces similarly armed and deployed; it was marginally effective, notwithstanding the appalling brutality which accompanied its operations, against small groups of lightly armed guerrillas moving rapidly through mountainous territory and supported by a civilian population (Fremont-Barnes 2012). This confusion of power with capability prevailed despite the US experience in Vietnam a decade earlier, and arguably continued with the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

assessed at its point of impact in terms of the ability it provides to control people and circumstances. Soft power, meanwhile, is best measured by its results and usually over the longer term. Education, for example, may be an invitation to learn through attraction and thereby to achieve influence; foreign aid may be an expression of goodwill and genuine benevolence, but it can also be hard payment to buy what cannot be coerced or attracted. These are the basics of power and control: the question is where religion, and religious hatred, find a place in this wider context.

The impetus to control

It might be thought that the contemporary influence of most religion falls mainly under the heading of soft power compared with the past realities of armed crusades or seeking divine intervention in aid of a cause or a country but there are exceptions, for example efforts in the United States to oppose state funding for contraception and abortion (Haynes 2012, p. 137). Lurking in the background of all exercises of soft power are efforts to influence and, more subtly still, and even if not consciously intended, to control the way others think, feel and act. The focus in this chapter therefore is more on the narrower issue of control than on the wide open spaces of power which are too broad to be encompassed here.

If religion is in part about giving meaning, purpose and structure to life through relationships with higher and larger powers, then in the wake of these comes a sense of control both for those providing and serving the religion through its institutions and the use of scriptures, rituals and homilies, and for those accepting its benefits for person and communal life and the strictures and constraints which accompany them. Control as the enactment of power has long been identified as central to human motivation (Kelley 1971);

Adler deems it “an intrinsic ‘necessity of life’” (Wolman 1981, p. 289) and Hood et al (2018) quote Reid (1969) describing power as “one of the basic human desires”. They add that “although the ideal is *actual* control, the need to perceive personal mastery is often so great that the *illusion* of control will suffice” (ibid., p. 22; original emphasis). The significance of this is that religion is one of the means by which human beings seek control, particularly over the aspects of life and the worst of circumstances where some sense of control can counter the uncertainties and provide the meaning that may otherwise be lost. The ability to pray while chaos reigns can provide this sense of control; the unchanging timelessness of religious ritual can provide a sense of stability in an unstable life;³⁵⁴ and it seems that the appeal to supernaturalism, whether the conventional forms as offered by the main religions, the more esoteric offered by magic or that practised by the spiritual-but-not-religious, increases when the efforts of secular control systems appear to be failing (Gibbs 2018, pp. 79-83).

Beyond these, there is no lack of research demonstrating that a sense of control is an important contributor to people’s senses of physical and mental well-being (Jackson and Bergenman 2011; Wink, Dillon, and Prettyman 2007). It complements and reflects other indicators of mental health, such as the sense of agency in the world and the corresponding internal locus of control³⁵⁵ (Schieman 2008) with their attendant mental health benefits such as lower tendency to depression (Jang et al. 2006). The question of whether religious belief affects one’s sense of personal control has given rise to two hypotheses, ‘relinquished control’ and ‘personal empowerment’ (Schiemann 2008). To summarise

³⁵⁴ Which is perhaps why changes to ritual are so bitterly fought.

³⁵⁵ ‘Locus of control’ is defined as the degree to which people feel they, rather than external forces, control the events of their lives. The concept is significant in the psychology of religion where research demonstrates that intrinsic religious orientation correlates with internal locus of control (Kahoe, R 1974, ‘Personality and achievement correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 812–818).

these, the former predicts that people who believe in divine control over their lives will report a lower sense of control than those who do not³⁵⁶; the latter asserts that “beliefs about God's omnipotent power provide a sense of coherence and meaning to life that helps people reconcile life's uncertainties and adversities” (ibid.). The personal empowerment hypothesis is complicated, and perhaps contradicted, by the fact that many who believe in a powerful god believe in their collaboration with this power, thereby enhancing their own potency, and there is research to suggest that some people come to rely on such an external source of power to achieve a sense of internal control.³⁵⁷ Notwithstanding the cautions about such research, and these two contrasting hypotheses, perhaps the most important aspect of this research for this dissertation is the establishment of the relationship between belief and control because, as previous chapters have illustrated, loss of the sense of control and agency is one of the foundations for religious hatred.

Constraints as control

In addition to offering believers a sense of control, whether through collaboration with a greater power or through trusting in the surrender to it, religions also involve accepting constraints on what might otherwise be natural desires³⁵⁸ which sometimes means putting wider social interests ahead of self-interest and self-gratification.³⁵⁹ Indeed,

³⁵⁶ In the words of William James, "There is a state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God" (James 1902, p. 54).

³⁵⁷ The results of this research need to be viewed with extreme caution: they were based on American adults from mainly monotheistic faiths and with no apparent controls for cultural bias. Personal experience suggests that people of other faiths can be more fatalistic regardless of locus of control.

³⁵⁸ What James Strachey describes as "the irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization" in his introduction to Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents* (Strachey, J 1962, 'Editors' Introduction', in Freud, S *Civilization and its Discontents*, Norton, New York, pp. 11–12).

³⁵⁹ The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has arguably demonstrated both a majority willingness to put collective interests ahead of self-interest, as Bregman (2020) would aver, and a tendency to condemn those who are unwilling to do this. It will be interesting to see in the years ahead whether this represents a wholesale shift from the emphasis on personal self-interest to collective self-interest, or whether it is a temporary phenomenon in response to specific circumstances.

the failure to operate self-control has always been regarded by most religions as an impediment to spiritual progress. Even acknowledging that definitions of morality and goodness are as controversial as those of amorality and immorality, the people who adhere to religions generally have a fairly straightforward understanding of what constitute the former whether they flow from the Eightfold Path or the Ten Commandments, foremost among them being the willingness to follow divine commands and the Golden Rule.³⁶⁰ In the opposite corner are, for example in the Western Christian tradition, the Seven Deadly Sins which constitute failures of self-control: “More precisely, virtues seem based on the positive exercise of self-control, whereas sin and vice often revolve around failures of self-control. Insofar as it is fair to regard vice and sin as the opposite of virtue, the centrality of self-control to both is an impressively consistent theme. We submit that it is fair to consider self-control the master virtue” (Baumeister and Exline 1999).³⁶¹ Baumeister and Exline go on to describe virtuous self-control as “The Moral Muscle” (ibid.), explaining that like any muscle it grows stronger with exercise and helps people to feel secure not only in their virtue, but in their control over themselves and their circumstances. The loss of this control carries with it the fear of being overwhelmed by powerful emotions, either one’s own or that of others, and especially of the uncontrolled aggression of others including the possibility of annihilation (Robins and Post 1997, p. 80).

³⁶⁰ Leaving aside the fundamental flaw in the Golden Rule as pointed out by George Bernard Shaw in *Man and Superman*: the assumption that others *want* to be treated as you do (Shaw 1903, p. 227).

³⁶¹ The exception is possibly Pride which today tends to be celebrated as self-esteem: a contrast to the historical avoidance of pride lest, in pagan mythology, it invited hubris or in Christian traditions the comparison of mere mortals with God. The social significance of this change may be under-estimated: “Throughout most of history and most of the world, morality has existed as a major counter-force to self, and virtue has represented the internal overcoming of self-interested behavioural tendencies. Now, however, these seemingly eternal opponents appear to have joined forces. This change is arguably the most radical moral realignment in Western history, at least from a psychological standpoint” (Baumeister and Exline 1999).

The mention of the fear of annihilation signals that this is beginning to move into the territory, considered below, where loss of control begins to blend into paranoia. Most of the time healthy individuals avoid this slippery slope because they employ a variety of defence mechanisms to cope with stresses such as the threat of or actual loss of control (ibid.), defence mechanisms being among the processes described by depth psychology and supported by increasing neurological evidence (Berlin 2011; Eagle 2011). But the individual who has not developed healthy defence mechanisms may fall back on more primitive ones: denial, distortion and delusion, especially delusional projection where hatred and annihilation of others is the alternative to being controlled by them. Robins and Post (1997, p. 80) quote the Kleinian psychoanalyst James Grotstein, who characterised human beings as “meaning-obsessed”, comparing the inner turbulence caused by this fear of annihilation to the black holes described by astronomers which swallow everything, including light. So overwhelming is this dread of meaninglessness that it creates an imperative to find or if necessary invent meaning (Grotstein 1990). If the moral or religious constraints that people feel imposed upon them by their faith begin to threaten their sense of control, then the alternative can be to create an alternative world in which they determine what is right and wrong and, more significantly for this dissertation, *who* is right and wrong.

Compensatory control

Before the shift from control to paranoia is explored further the concept of ‘compensatory control’ deserves mention. Using the theory of compensatory control, it can be argued that religious beliefs can act as defence mechanisms when other sources of control are lacking. There is evidence (Kay et al, 2008 & 2010; Laurin et al, 2008) that religious faith or commitment to secular institutions or ideologies can operate as forms of

control that compensate for loss of control in other areas.³⁶² More extreme religious ideologies are likely to be adopted by people who live in sociocultural contexts that limit both personal control and confidence in the power and accountability of government. From a CCT (Compensatory Control Theory) perspective this may cause people to invest their need for control in religious beliefs that provide a sense of control. This effect is not just apparent in more economically and politically unstable nations. Individuals living within wealthy countries, especially those in lower socioeconomic status communities, may feel constrained in their access to resources or limited in personal control of their own lives (Pargament 1997; Kay and Eibach 2013).³⁶³

Kay and Eibach argue that Compensatory Control Theory provides unique insights into the importance of control motivations, and how religious and secular ideologies can satisfy these motivations, to the extent of being able to predict extreme adherence to different ideologies. They qualify this, however, by stating that compensatory control processes do not necessarily or inevitably result in active extremism: but this is more likely to happen when people perceive threats to their sense of control in parallel with economic and sociocultural factors that lead individuals “to channel all of their compensatory control strings into a single outlet” (ibid.). Kay and Eibach go on to argue that by highlighting the common theme of control in otherwise diverse, social, political and religious ideologies, CCT makes an important contribution toward understanding the psychological functions of

³⁶² It has been demonstrated experimentally that in addition to “believing in an interventionist God” there are two other sources of compensatory control: “perceiving patterns in noise” [randomness] or “adhering to superstitions and conspiracies”, and “defending the legitimacy of the socio-political institutions that offer control” (Kay, A, Gaucher, D, Galinsky, A and Whitson, J 2009, ‘Compensatory Control: Achieving Order Through the Mind, Our Institutions, and the Heavens’, *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 264–268).

³⁶³ The relationships between low economic status and religiosity are examined in Brandt, M and Henry, P 2012, ‘Psychological Defensiveness as a Mechanism Explaining the Relationship Between Low Socioeconomic Status and Religiosity’, *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, vol. 22, pp. 321-332.

ideological extremism. The theory proposes, and the research evidence supports, “that when people experience random, threatening events they defensively embrace ideologies that restore their faith in internal or external sources of control in their lives, and these sources of control are substitutable” (ibid.).

While CCT can arguably be applied to all ideologies, it should be noted that ideologies that include supernatural beliefs are particularly effective in helping people cope with the anxieties provoked by randomness and unpredictability in life events. Kay and Eibach cite Malinowski (1954) in support of this contention, maintaining that established rituals help to cultivate a spiritual imagination that enables people to perceive manifestations of the supernatural in everyday events and circumstances.³⁶⁴ Ara Norenzayan’s *Big Gods* (2013) also confirms that many aspects of human behaviour are affected by the idea of watchful deities or supernatural entities having the power to intervene in the mundane. An interesting and suggestive parallel to findings about the relationship between the need for control and acceptance of supernatural presence is the correlation between the need for control, belief in the paranormal and narcissism. Individuals with a tendency to narcissism are prone to fantasies of success, wealth and beauty, and in particular to having control over others. Research suggests that there may be an indirect link between narcissism and paranormal belief through proneness to fantasy (Irwin 1990; Roe and Morgan 2002), and it is a short step from there to the link between narcissism and religious belief described in Figlio (2018), Herman and Fuller (2018) and Vonk and Visser (2020).

³⁶⁴ Though the accessibility and value of supernatural control beliefs are likely to vary according to the religious traditions adhered to. For example, Luhmann (2012) describes how evangelical Christians emphasise learning what they perceive to be the voice of God during prayer and throughout their lives. Such practices would presumably make religious compensatory control more effective; Kay and Eibach cite Ault (2004) as describing a similar process among Baptists. They do not, however, mention equivalent practices among non-Christian believers so the universal applicability of their conclusions should be treated with caution.

Terror Management Theory

While Terror Management Theory (TMT) has its origins in anthropologist Ernest Becker's *The Denial of Death* (1973), it is possible to see it as an extreme form of compensatory control – death is, after all, the ultimate annihilation for those who cannot accept the safety net of an afterlife. Becker argues that much of human action is designed to distract us from the inevitability of our own death, and this horror of annihilation drives us as individuals and as social beings to create everything from personal reward systems through systems of meaning such as laws, constitutions and religions, to assertions of power and control to defend ourselves against the fear and anxiety that the idea of death brings with it. He argues that “The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else; it is a mainspring of human activity - activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny for man” (Becker 1973, p. ix). The idea is explained more fully by Pascal Boyer in *Religion Explained* (2001):

Some social psychologists speculate that our attachment to social identity, to the feeling that we are members of a group with shared norms, may in fact be a consequence of the terror induced by mortality. In this "terror-management" account the principal source of motivation for human beings as for other animals is the evolutionary imperative to survive. Many cultural institutions—shared symbols, shared values, a sense of group membership—are seen as buffers against this natural anxiety.

(Boyer 2001, p. 205)

TMT is supported by some evolutionists (for example Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon, 1986) arguing that fears about anything that threatens human survival have an adaptive value because they help to avoid such threats and thereby facilitate genetic survival, while being opposed by some evolutionary psychologists (for example Kirkpatrick and Navarrateb, 2006) on the grounds that such forms of generalised anxiety

are not adaptive and do little to ensure survival.³⁶⁵ This may be so, but even those who profess not to be religious may think more about ultimacy in the face of death, and given the emphasis in many religions on some form of survival after death, it seems reasonable that religion is one means by which human beings try to cope with the idea of mortality. As Atran remarks, “Believing in God and the afterlife is a way to make sense of the brevity of our time on earth, to give meaning to this short existence” (2010, p. 445).

Why, though, should this fear of death lead to religious hatred? The first question is whether, if religious hatred intends the obliteration of others, then its expression is not in some senses an assertion of the will to life, if necessary at the expense of others?³⁶⁶ In this respect the purveyor of religious hatred is playing the ultimate zero sum game (Axelrod 1984, p. 121).³⁶⁷ Secondly, if religious belief is a way of denying the finality of death, could it be that religious hatred of others, wishing their utter obliteration, is a form of unconscious and symbolic power-play: ‘by hating you we are denying your power to survive’? These are posed as questions for lack of evidence that they have previously been asked or answered. Looking at this ultimate power of religion – the power of life over death, however conceived – is coming full circle to look again at the preservation of identity in the face of the power of others to eradicate it. If people are prepared to fight for their beliefs and values, abstractions in comparison to identity as a signifier of continued

³⁶⁵ Both these positions overlook the possibility that human beings survive death and that there is, as many religions have always argued, a transmundane world. In this case Boyer, Becker and these evolutionists would be profoundly wrong. This is a possibility of which scholar-practitioners need to be mindful when working with people for whom the transmundane world is a reality.

³⁶⁶ This is finding a parallel between religious hatred and the evil that comes with a state of mind associated with the death drive that fuels the destruction of emotional meaning, *joie de vivre*, the envy of life and vitality (Migliozzi 2016).

³⁶⁷ The concept of the ‘zero-sum game’ is much studied by scholar-practitioners in the conflict resolution field who need to persuade their interlocutors that ‘win-win’ games are possible. One of the situations where win-win games are less likely and zero-sum outcomes the default are where one or other of those involved needs to assert their agency at all costs – hence its relevance to questions of survival.

existence, it should be less surprising that they are prepared to fight for the power to assert and defend their identity to death and beyond (Ysseldyk et al, 2011).

In summary, people as individuals and as communities or nations find their survival and ongoing identity anchored in part through religious allegiance, and when circumstances require them, in their perception, to defend, protect or assert the powers that protect their identity, then religious hatred can become both a means to rally brothers in arms and an end in itself as an expression of that determination to survive. There are no “atheists in foxholes”³⁶⁸ in part because religion is used to stave off the threat of death as the ultimate dissolution of control, but also because religion can legitimise and even add a sacred edge to whatever battles have to be fought to maintain control.

From control to paranoia

There is a point at which fear of losing control, whether by direct means or through some form of compensatory mechanism, can begin to shade into paranoia (Shapiro 1967, pp. 73-80), and one of the forms through which this may be expressed is religious hatred. One of the characteristics of religious hatred, like paranoia, judging from both research and personal experience, is that it seems often to spring from the obsession with a single idea, whether it be the ordination of women, the acceptance of homosexuality or the Hindu

³⁶⁸ There seem to be no certain origins of this aphorism. Nathan Heflick and Jamie Goldenberg predicted in 2011 that “atheists would be buffered from mortality concerns if their atheistic worldview – no life after death – was challenged, but not if it was supported. Results confirmed the hypothesis and were also found for theists and agnostics. These findings support TMT’s claim that literal immortality is of paramount importance in ameliorating death concerns” (Heflick, N and Goldenberg, J 2012, ‘No atheists in foxholes: Arguments for (but not against) afterlives buffer mortality salience effects for atheists’, *British Journal of Social Psychology* vol. 51, pp. 385–392).

demonization of Muslims.³⁶⁹ Robins and Post (1997, p. 174) argue that the hallmark of the paranoid mindset is the overvaluation of a single idea, the domination by one over-riding concept. Regardless of whether this idea has merit the paranoid grossly and obsessively exaggerates its importance, subordinating every other value to it and willing to commit any act to fulfil it: “The complete dominance of this idea means that paranoid fanatics live within a closed ideational system, a sealed castle of invincible ignorance immune to competing consideration”.

The significance of the relationship between paranoia as a consequence of feeling the loss of control and religious hatred needs to be treated with some caution, but the evidence does suggest that it should be regarded as a serious possibility. One of the likely oppositions to such an idea is that paranoia is indicative of a dangerous and relatively rare mental health condition. This would be mistaken: “the paranoid outlook is associated with a wide range of pathologies, from entirely normal to severely psychopathological” (ibid., p. 3); it is possible for people to be ‘paranoid’ without being seriously psychologically disturbed.³⁷⁰ Freeman et al (2005) discovered that “suspicious thoughts” are a “weekly occurrence” for 30-40% of people, with 10-30% having “persecutory thoughts”. While only 5% went so far to as to believe in more improbable threats such as conspiracies against them, one of the symptoms of relatively serious paranoia, if extrapolated to the entire population of the United States (approximately 330 million) or the United Kingdom

³⁶⁹ Mezey, J 2006, ‘Neocolonial Narcissism And Postcolonial Paranoia: Midnight's Children and the ‘Psychoanalysis’ of the State’, *Intervention: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2 pp. 178-192.

³⁷⁰ Some of this evidence is drawn from *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred* (Robins, R and Post, J 1997). At the time of publication of this book Robert S. Robins was professor of political science at Tulane University having served several presidential administrations as an intelligence officer and consultant in political psychology and been a visiting scientist at the Tavistock Clinic in London. Jerrold M. Post was professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs at George Washington University having founded and run the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (later the Political Psychology Division) which specialises in the psychobiography of world leaders.

(approximately 67 million) this would suggest that respectively some 16 million American and 3 million British people may fear some loss of control over their lives to unspecified ‘Others’ as well as perhaps being more vulnerable than the majority to the conspiracy theories that circulate freely in the age of the Internet. Even taking into account the acknowledged limitations of this research,³⁷¹ this does suggest a large number of people who may be psychologically inclined towards the acceptance that unspecified Others may pose a threat to their autonomy: “[...] a central psychological motivation for conspiratorial thinking is to serve as an antidote for the poisonous feeling of powerlessness” (Robins and Post 1997, p. 57).

So paranoid thinking is more common than might be supposed, and likewise some openness to conspiracy theories.³⁷² It does not, of course, follow from this that all religious hatred is evidence of paranoia, or all those that feel religious hatred towards others are suffering from some form of psychosis: such conclusions would be an unwarranted medicalising of what is, as other chapters have shown, more usually the consequence of social and psychological pressures. It is, however, suggested here that religious hatred rooted in paranoia and conspiratorial thinking may in some circumstances, for some individuals and some communities, be one of the antidotes to feelings of loss of control or impaired autonomy: perhaps an extreme form of compensatory control (Stojanov and Halberstadt 2019). This may be particularly so for those for whom religion is ontologically important; it may even be that “religion, rather than enabling persons to gain emotional distance from their paranoid thoughts and feelings, actually increases the

³⁷¹ Freeman et al note the limitations of their research including “an epidemiologically representative sample” and the sample mainly comprising “young adults who may have higher rates of suspiciousness”.

³⁷² The documentary film *The Social Dilemma* (2020), too recently published at the time of writing to have received scholarly appraisal, describes in apocalyptic terms how social media is inducing paranoid beliefs in people who might previously have been immune to them (<https://www.thesocialdilemma.com>, viewed 22.9.20).

emotional intensity of them by giving them divine justification” (Carlin 2010). If that religion feels marginalised, in some way threatened or even just subjected to pressure to change its form or expression, amplifying resentment into hatred, or inspiring the same emotion in family, community or fellow adherents, may reduce a sense of powerlessness and provide some sense of control. While initially such a course of action might be rational as a form of defence, the danger is that such feelings can escalate, bolster self-belief even if it is based on delusional thinking, and perhaps provide reasons for perceiving new conspiracies especially if these reasons and beliefs make others responsible and “will divert the sufferer from dealing with genuine problems and will lead him to tilt at the imaginary windmills of conspiracy” (Robins and Post, 1997, p. 62).

The next stage of this process is familiar from previous chapters of this dissertation: the projecting of uncomfortable internal feelings on to an external enemy with the resultant prejudice, scapegoating and ultimately genocide. Robins and Post argue that just as the paranoid find comfort in creating a pseudo-community of enemies, they can also find comfort in belonging to a group united against common enemies. This transition from individual to group paranoia is critical to understanding how large movements and nations can be convinced to go to war, sometimes against their better judgment (*ibid.*, p. 83). The ultimate threat to control, after all, is annihilation, whether of the nation, the culture or the individual through the medium of conquest, suppression or death.

Control through clericalism

Over the last twenty years or so one of the issues that has come to the fore and done immense damage to religious institutions is child sexual abuse. The link to religious hatred is apparent mostly in the hatred for institutions that this issue has engendered among both

believers and non-believers, but it is initially difficult to see any wider links to religious hatred. Indeed, the subject is most often viewed in terms of sexual perversion and criminality, the connection with religion being only that membership of a religious institution has in the past provided opportunities for such abuse. A scholar-practitioner with direct experience of the issue, however, describes child abuse as “rape of the soul” which resonates with definitions of religious hatred that equate hatred with the annihilation of personhood.³⁷³ Reading reports of such abuse in religious institutions, for example that of the *Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse* (Commonwealth of Australia 2017), makes such a direct link between abuse and clericalism and ecclesiolatry as to warrant some research into clericalism to explore the extent to which it might give rise to other forms of religious hatred. While clericalism is historically most associated with the Christian churches and particularly with the Roman Catholic Church, from a psychological point of view it can become entrenched in any institution or organisation that begins to value itself, its own members and its reputation more than those whom it is intended to serve. As the Royal Commission makes clear, clericalism has been identified as a contributing factor that has enabled child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church (RC 2017, p. 612 and extensive fn. 169).³⁷⁴ For the purposes of this dissertation, however, clericalism is treated as potentially a problem for all religions, and it must be emphasised that the purpose here is not to pillory the Catholic or any other Christian church, but to explore why and how it can happen, and the consequences in terms of its possible contribution to generating an environment in which religious hatred may take root.

³⁷³ Personal communication 1.9.20.

³⁷⁴ In his *Address to the Synod Fathers at Opening of Synod 2018 on Young People* Pope Francis said: “Clericalism arises from an elitist and exclusivist vision of vocation, that interprets the ministry received as a power to be exercised rather than as a free and generous service to be given. This leads us to believe that we belong to a group that has all the answers and no longer needs to listen or learn anything. Clericalism is a perversion and is the root of many evils in the Church: we must humbly ask forgiveness for this and above all create the conditions so that it is not repeated” (viewed 2.9.20).

One frequently cited definition of clericalism is that included in a 1983 report by the United States Conference of Major Superiors of Men, *In solidarity and service: Reflections on the problem of clericalism in the Church*.³⁷⁵ The report summarised it as “The conscious or unconscious concern to promote the particular interests of the clergy and to protect the privileges and power that have traditionally been conceded to those in the clerical state”, adding that there are attitudinal, behavioural and institutional dimensions to the phenomenon of clericalism. The report goes on to say that clericalism arises “from both personal and social dynamics, is expressed in various cultural forms, and often is reinforced by institutional structures”, describing the symptoms of clericalism as “an authoritarian style of ministerial leadership, a rigidly hierarchical worldview, and a virtual identification of the holiness and grace of the church with the clerical state and, thereby, with the cleric himself” (CMSM 1983). This description provides a number of indications that would point to problems for any organisation. Among them are the restriction to members of only one gender, inhibiting the diversity of viewpoints; the reservation of critical powers (in this case the administration of the sacrament) to an elite; a hierarchical model of leadership that can inadvertently exclude an understanding of problems lower down in the organisation; and perhaps most potentially dangerous of all, the inculcation of a sense of superiority towards those outside the organisation. The Irish clinical psychologist Maureen Gaffney is quoted in a commentary on the Australian Royal Commission report (but it could be a commentary on any organisation with the characteristics mentioned above) as saying the Roman Catholic Church in Australia has all

³⁷⁵ The organisation’s website says “CMSM is both the common voice for major superiors and the primary common resource serving leaders of male religious in the United States. Our members are major superiors and councilors of more than 200 monastic communities and provinces that include 16,000+ Catholic religious-order priests and brothers” (viewed 2.9.20).

the characteristics of the worst kind of such an institution: “rigid in social structure; preoccupied by power; ruthless in suppressing internal dissent; in thrall to status, titles and insignia, with an accompanying culture of narcissism and entitlement; and at great psychological distance from human intimacy and suffering” (O’Hanlon 2010).

Another aspect of power and control noted by the Royal Commission as a contributor to clericalism is the role played by sex (or rather, in the case of the Catholic Church, that played by celibacy). The report comments that throughout the history of the Church, power associated with sex has had symbolic meaning because power was accrued by those who overcame sex. Although sex was banished to the person’s unconscious, it was not so much controlled as denied, and the men who attained this mastery of themselves were acknowledged as spiritual masters because it could be managed only by especially estimable people who were all the more admirable because they were exceptional. This established the link between celibacy and purity, not least in the eyes of their followers, ensuring the position of superiority for those who achieved it while also enabling the church to reinforce its own power through a system of strict behavioural control. “In a system of this kind, the setting apart of the priest based on the rule of celibacy was the sign of power exercised over a laity treated as less significant... the priest’s identity becomes equated with his role”, and as a consequence, the personhood of the priest becomes invested with the wielding of this (RC 2017, p. 619). This explains how sex can be significant as a factor in the power and control exercised by a religion.

A similar factor derives from the notion that ordination into a priesthood brings ontological change: “The priesthood is not just the deputing of an individual to take on a particular role. It is more than a function; it is a radical reorienting of the whole reality of the person. He is changed at the level of his being ...” (ibid., p. 620). The danger is, as

some commentators on the Royal Commission report make clear, and the evidence supports, that for some individuals such a sense of change can result in feelings of superiority and entitlement that enable some abusers to justify their conduct to themselves and to feel that they are protected by their status and the compliance of their victims because of that status. This can turn clericalism into “a close relative of pathological narcissism” (Frawley-O’Dea 2007, pp. 151). It can also, to use the language of depth psychology, result in inflation and what Jung called development of the ‘mana personality’ (Jung CW7, paras. 387-390).

Evolution of religious control

The mana personality is one of many Jungian concepts that is less than straightforward and often overlooked.³⁷⁶ It is allotted very little space in Jung’s *Collected Works* and in fact is only described in detail in ‘The relations between the ego and the unconscious’ (1928), but it is crucial to an understanding of both power and control as a dimension of religion and how these have evolved beyond the traditional bounds of religion. In psychodynamic terms the mana personality represents the stage of the individuation process that involves a person’s ego embodying the contents of the collective unconscious, with the danger of the person becoming identified with those and thereby risking a major inflation followed by deflation rather than moving forward to a development of the individuated Self and a more complete personality (Sorge 2020, part 1). Translating this from psychodynamic language, what it means is that people can

³⁷⁶ The term ‘mana’ is originally a Melanesian-Polynesian expression that describes the sacral power emanating from holy people and places. It may be used to describe either a divine power, a magical shamanism or a universal force of some kind and has been recognised by anthropologists and ethnologists in many belief systems around the world. Its nearest equivalent in the Judeo-Christian tradition is the concept of the charisma, the endowment of a gift given by the Holy Spirit.

become possessed by the sense of sacral power conveyed by sacred office and either believe themselves to be a mixture of hero, magician, medicine man and a demi-god to lesser mortals, or be overwhelmed and drowned by exposure to the depth and complexity of the unconscious. Jung says this produces in some patients “an unmistakable and often unpleasant increase of self-confidence and conceit”, encouraging them to think they know everything, and, more significantly, the depths of their own minds. Others, meanwhile, can feel themselves crushed by the contents of their unconscious, losing their self-confidence and abandoning themselves “with dull resignation to all extraordinary things that the unconscious produces” (Jung 1928, para. 221). The relevance to those who aspire to be ministers, priests and gurus is very obvious: the process of ontological change described in the Royal Commission Report as presenting the danger of clericalism is psychodynamically very real.

What is the link between the mana personality problem and religious hatred? There are two answers. One is that if the inflated wins over the crushed, to use Jung’s image above, the result can be a saviour complex. The guru or minister or priest believes he or she has been placed on earth to redeem others and may wield whatever powers he or she can accumulate to do so, including demonising Others: it is not unusual for dictators to believe they are playing a role ordained by divine providence which justifies any means to achieve their ends (Robins and Post 1997, pp. 113-140). The other answer is that it is also not unusual to find others willing to project such a calling onto those who put themselves forward as such. Jung saw this in Germany and Italy during the 1930s: the longing for such a saviour to rescue those nations from their travails. He himself even made the mistake of, briefly, seeing Fascism and Nazism, and their leaders, as quasi-religious movements erupting from the unconscious, the saviour complex being an archetypal image of the collective unconscious which naturally becomes activated in troubled times (Jung

1935a, para. 369).³⁷⁷ Such phenomena have also become more common in contemporary times: the rise of populist political leaders and movements; the claims of campaigners to be saviours opposing what they see as apocalyptic tendencies; even the ubiquity of superheroes in popular culture. All these can be seen as mana personalities, real or invented, vying for religious or quasi-religious hegemony over those who respond to their sacral power or missionary call: “the saviour complex as mass psychology” (ibid.), or perhaps the saviour complex finding its home in the cultural complex.

There is one further aspect of the mana personality in relation to religion, hatred and control that should not go unmentioned: its role in the establishment and cultivation of cults, both free standing and as movements within established religions. It will be clear from the references to personal inflation, saviour complexes and populism above that the same descriptors can be applied to the people who create and perpetuate cultic forms of belief and leadership. The delinquencies of such leaders are well rehearsed and there is no need to reproduce them here, but sometimes overlooked is the fine line between mainstream religious institutions and the movements within them which, while adhering to the main precepts of whichever faith they espouse, cultivate an exclusivity which, overtly or more covertly, claim to represent a more perfect truth and usually one that the institution has neglected or compromised in its desire to be more widely acceptable. There is nothing new about such movements: every mainstream faith has experienced sects and breakaways claiming a greater authenticity and commanding the loyalty of its particular followers. The problem comes when either the breakaway movement or the affronted mainstream seeks to denigrate the other, and does so by making their followers Other and therefore, at the

³⁷⁷ Jung rapidly realised his error and by 1937 had become highly critical of the regimes in Italy and Germany.

extreme, objects of hatred. In such situations the confrontation of mana personalities across the divide, the “unintentional influence on the unconscious of others” (Jung CW10, p. 76), will often determine whether it is the mainstream or the breakaway that prevails.

PART 4: DISCUSSION

Chapter 12: Implications for dialogue and diapraxis

Introduction

This dissertation has explored one central theme, the intensity and persistence of religious hatred, and has used the literatures of conflict resolution, the psychology of religion and cognitive and psychodynamic psychology to investigate possible explanations. One of the clearest impressions is that in none of these is the topic of religious hatred addressed as specifically, systematically or as comprehensively as the subject deserves, and therefore the process of exploration has involved a combination of wide reading in each field of study, extrapolations from research into similar subjects, and to a certain extent extemporising from over thirty years' experience of working with groups of people divided, sometimes violently, by matters of belief and value.

In this final chapter the focus shifts to considering the implications of this research for dialogue and diapraxis, approaches employed by practitioners tasked with trying to bring together people whose relationships are sometimes coloured by religious hatred. It must be emphasised that these implications are tentative and directed as much towards theory-building as praxis, albeit influenced wherever possible by the experience of practitioners. The chapter begins with a discussion of dialogue and diapraxis to put the subsequent discussion into context. It then reflects on the chapters covering the six dimensions of religion and the implications for praxis before advancing some conclusions about how dialogue and diapraxis need to be conceived in the context of addressing religious hatred.

Dialogue and diapraxis

The term ‘dialogue’ is commonly used by practitioners in the conflict resolution field to describe the process of interaction among protagonists brought together to review and to try to resolve their differences. Such conversations tend to be carefully designed by practitioners to provide participants with the best opportunity for identifying areas of common ground, tackling differences and building at least sufficient relationship to enable them to discuss difficult issues despite the internal pressures of interest and emotion and the external demands of constituencies. Because of these pressures it is usual for practitioners to act as impartial mediators and facilitators, helping participants to understand each other, to clarify areas of difference and language, to create a structure within which issues can be discussed systematically. They also contribute to the containing of the high emotions that often accompany such conversations through enabling strong feelings to be expressed while creating safe spaces within which they can be heard. Such a process puts a premium on what is known as process design. This involves taking account of context and history (what has happened in the past, how the situation has arisen, previous efforts to resolve the situation); clarifying purposes and products³⁷⁸ (what the process is intended to achieve, what the participants need to have at the end of the process); identifying and recruiting participation (who are the people involved, whom they represent, the roles they take, the expertise available); selecting process methods (and deciding the order in which to use them); and resources (the time and money available to support the process).³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ ‘Purposes’ include what will be different at the end; ‘products’ can be divided into the ‘visible’ (treaties, agreements, contracts) and ‘invisible’ (trust, relationships); see Friend, J and Hickling, A 2005 (third edition), *Planning Under Pressure*, Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford.

³⁷⁹ For examples of detailed process design in the context of complex conflicts see LeBaron, M and Carstarphen, N 1997, ‘Negotiating Intractable Conflict: The Common Ground Dialogue Process and Abortion’, *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 341-361; Fitzduff, M, 2002, *Beyond violence: Conflict resolution process in Northern Ireland* (vol. 7), United Nations Publications; Ury, WL, Brett, JM and

The mechanisms through which such dialogue is managed may include shuttle mediation; ‘caucus’ meetings³⁸⁰; analytical workshops; core groups of key ‘stakeholders’³⁸¹; representative groups to preserve relations between leaders and their constituencies; process management groups to ensure efficiency and accountability in the way an intervention process is conducted; and numerous methodologies to keep protagonists focused both on solving problems and building relationships with each other.³⁸² The practitioner role can thus require the ability to assimilate and utilise a great deal of specialised knowledge particular to each situation while at the same time managing the dynamics of group processes, the drafting of sensitive documents and the moment-to-moment handling of complex and sometimes heated interactions for which there is no script. The multiplicity of tasks calls for both physical and emotional stamina and often some speed and ingenuity in responding to unfolding circumstances.³⁸³

‘Diapraxis’, meanwhile, was first used by the Danish theologian Lissi Rasmussen in ‘From Diapraxis to Dialogue’ in the 1988 *Newsletter of the Office on Christian-Muslim Relations*.³⁸⁴ Rasmussen conceives of diapraxis as “dialogue as action” (original emphasis), in which a common praxis is essential, contrasting this with dialogue in which

Goldberg, SB, 1988, *Getting disputes resolved: Designing systems to cut the costs of conflict*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco; Jeong, HW, 2005, *Peacebuilding in postconflict societies: Strategy and process*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder; Moore, CW, 2014, *The mediation process: Practical strategies for resolving conflict*, John Wiley & Sons, London; Carpenter, S and Kennedy, W 1988, *Managing Public Disputes*, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.

³⁸⁰ A term used mostly in legal and commercial mediation and dispute resolution, it describes private and confidential meetings between third parties and protagonists.

³⁸¹ Defined as, literally, those with a stake in the issues.

³⁸² There are numerous guides to forms of intervention. One of the most enduring is Christopher Moore’s *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco), currently in its fourth edition and a comprehensive primer on the subject.

³⁸³ For an overview of how scholar-practitioners work see Roberts, M 2007, *Developing the Craft of Mediation: Reflections on Theory and Practice*, Jessica Kingsley, London.

³⁸⁴ At the time of writing Rev. Dr. Lissi Rasmussen was chairwoman of the board of the Danish Islamic-Christian Study Center for Co-existence. The Center was established in May 1996 by a group of Christians and Muslims to build positive relations between citizens with Christian and Muslim backgrounds.

talking is central. She argues that “We need a more anthropological contextual approach to dialogue where we see diapraxis as a meeting between people who try to reveal and transform the reality they share. From there theological questions can be asked and dealt with. Out of a diapraxis may emerge a deeper meeting, a dialogue” (Rasmussen 1988). Rasmussen’s reasoning is that ‘dialogue’ is too focused on communication and not enough on wider forms of interaction that would see human beings working, experiencing and living together. This would foster a dialectical relationship between theory and practice based on the practical aspects of religion such as the equality, reciprocity and collective ownership she saw while working in Africa. She argues that while in Western Europe conflict among religions is less overt than elsewhere, it still persists in people’s minds and perceptions despite the increasing intermingling of cultures and religions. The problem is no longer, she believes, so much about relating to people who are different, but managing the encounters between and within human beings. The only way to counter the pressures of this is to enable people to work and strive together for common goals, both getting to know each other as individuals and building a shared ownership of their activities whether these involve the everyday tasks inherent in living together or working together to produce works of art, literature or shared understanding.³⁸⁵

Rasmussen does not see diapraxis as a process relevant only to situations of religious conflict (she shares this dissertation’s perception that religion is never the root cause of conflict but is not infrequently used to incite hatreds between different communities) but

³⁸⁵ For recent examples of diapraxis in action see Bitter, J-N and von Blarer, D 2011, ‘Tajikistan: Diapraxis between the Secular Government and Political Islamic Actors’ in *Religion in Conflict Transformation*, Politorbis no. 52, Center for Security Studies, Zurich, pp. 85-87; Puoskari, E and Rossi, A 2019, ‘Bridging faiths and worldviews through dialogue’ in Gruener, S, Smith, S and Hald, M (eds.), *Dialogue in Peacebuilding: Understanding Different Perspectives*, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, pp. 196-207; Karam, A 2019, ‘From Dialogue to Diapraxis in International Development’, *International Journal on Human Rights*, vol. 16, no. 29, pp. 33-39; Tjelle, E 2020, ‘Towards a green diapraxis: Experiences and reflections from an interfaith journey’, *Consensus*, vol. 41, no.1 , art. 11.

one that builds on religion as a motivator to shared values and mutual cooperation that are equally important to secularists (ibid.). Rasmussen is also clear that diapraxis means questioning the status quo, taking into account power differences among participants, and a willingness to be open and to accept mutual critiques: all as a precursor and a foundation for dialogue. In many respects her concept of diapraxis contains echoes of conflict *transformation* rather than resolution: a determination to seek out and change the roots of difference rather than simply negotiate the surface symptoms. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, if it is conflict transformation that is required as a response to religious hatred, then diapraxis makes sense as a process that goes beyond dialogue.

The implications: preparatory responses

This section sets out some reflections on the necessary preparations that practitioners should make when approaching any conflict with religious dimensions. The first point is to appreciate that any conflict in which religious hatred plays a part is inevitably and always multidimensional because religion itself is multidimensional. This dissertation has looked in some depth at six dimensions - identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control – based on the dimensions of religion discussed with most frequency in the literature. These should be regarded as a minimum: in particular situations there may be others which fall outside these six, or which are subsets of one or more of them. However they are defined and identified, different dimensions of religion need to be recognised, analysed and understood as a precursor to whatever interventions may be designed because the intensity of religious hatred arises from the combination and accumulation of multifarious sources, and from the likelihood that their origins may be negatively reinforced by their presence in the protagonists' personal or cultural unconscious.

Secondly, as psychodynamic psychology makes clear, the influence of what is outside consciousness can wield a disproportionate power, and so it is with the components of religious hatred: what is *not* apparent is sometimes at least as important as what *is*. The focus needs to be not only on the headline-grabbing actions of religious extremists but also on the more everyday predilections and prejudices of those whose behaviour contrasts with their purported beliefs. The eruptions of discord over the re-ordering of pews in a village church, for example, can be as revealing psychologically as a symbol of other religious hatreds as anything written about rival beliefs.³⁸⁶ So, thirdly, the religious psychology of individuals is as important as that of groups and communities because while in some instances the cumulative effect of individual behaviours both influences group behaviour and creates the overall culture and climate within which certain patterns of behaviour can survive and prosper, the reverse can also be true. The cultural complex can result in a cycle of cause and consequence in both directions, escalating the chances of individuals being excluded and communities becoming less tolerant and more prone to conflict as a consequence of religious hatred.

Next, it should be noted that religious hatred's primary contribution to conflict is to erect psychological and behavioural obstacles which cannot easily be circumnavigated, set aside or reframed by using the normal methods available through dialogue or other forms of intervention. It is possible, for example, to overcome differences of interest or ambition by looking for new avenues of advantage for both parties, or to resolve interpersonal

³⁸⁶ Such issues, and their accompanying symbolism, should always be analysed psychodynamically because symbolism is the language of the psyche (Jung 1964, p. 232). The pews in one church, for example, symbolised the desire for order, the submission of congregants to minister, and the social hierarchy within the community. The removal of some pews to create more social space was experienced by some congregants as the casual and thoughtless rejection of long-established values.

differences through a frank conversation that untangles the consequences of poor communication or sheds new light on distorted perceptions. Hatred, trailing as it often does the suspicion that all initiatives are designed to mislead and undermine, requires interventions that go beyond the cognitive rearrangements of interests, values and fears. It corrupts the very processes of thought that make reinterpretations of established positions possible; it poisons the common humanity that can enable even sworn enemies to put aside their differences in the name of greater goals. In short, religious hatred is a form of psychic bondage that renders normal human intercourse and relationship impossible, and adds further dimensions, often unconscious, that deepen and widen the gulfs between people. In the language of conflict resolution such conflict is often described as ‘intractable’³⁸⁷: the inability to disengage; it leaves people feeling trapped and without hope of escape from their predicament. This is where the more profound processes of diapraxis, investing in bringing people to live and work together, may offer a way forward that a dialogue process alone cannot.

The next preparatory points arise from the general points made at the outset of this dissertation and need to be held in mind by any practitioner, or an institution supporting her or him, contemplating any form of intervention in a conflict where religious hatred is apparent. It must be appreciated that most contemporary politicians, diplomats, academics and conflict resolution practitioners, certainly from Western countries, tend to be educated into mindsets that are more secular than religious even if their origins might have inculcated some religious belief, if only culturally. Because of this they tend to treat religion as a mixture of identity marker and cultural inheritance comprising a set of non-

³⁸⁷ See for example LeBaron, M and Carstarphen, N 1997, ‘Negotiating Intractable Conflict: The Common Ground Dialogue Process and Abortion’, *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 341-361.

rational beliefs and values that impede progress. As Mohammed Abu-Nimer says, when the officers and managers of most organisations operating within secular or non-religious governance frameworks design their programmes, they tend to build partnerships with secular civil society groups and professionals who share with them the same secular ideological assumptions of promoting diversity, human rights and sustainable development. In parallel with this he identifies among policy and development practitioners a basic resistance towards engaging religious leaders, believing that religion and religious institutions should be confined to their primary function of providing theological and spiritual services to communities. Additionally there is sometimes an anxiety that any engagement beyond these parameters might constitute a violation of the principle of separation of church and state. “What is missing in such approaches.....is an authentic read of the local context, including major players and power relations, which would reveal that religion and [faith-based organisations] are relevant beyond mere theological issues” (Abu Nimer 2018, p. 7).

Practitioners need to educate themselves, their colleagues, their sponsoring institutions and possibly some protagonists in the situations in which they work into a more nuanced understanding of religion to ensure that the adherents of any religion, and their beliefs, are respected, taken seriously and engaged empathetically. Another trap for secular thinkers when confronted with religious hatred, or indeed with any form of religion, is to retreat to generalities and simple binary answers: the religion is true or untrue; it is the cause of all conflict or a universal force for good; adherents are rational or irrational; their faith is good or evil. The reality is always more complex: religions are always a mixture of history, myth, belief, culture and custom, and their adherents bring a mixture of reason, intuition, emotion and experience to their apprehensions of the divine and the numinous. They are also a cross-section of any human populace: good, bad,

reasonable, extreme, and the consequences of faith are as varied as the consequences of any other human activity: a blend of the benevolent, the indeterminate and the corrupt. Binaries and generalities have to be resisted in the name of uncomfortable reality and its many shades of grey.

Following on from this, it should be appreciated that religious hatred generally has a number of causes, including those clearly rooted in history, social issues, political beliefs, peer pressure and occasionally personal psychopathologies, and those whose origins can be less exactly attributed but may include emotional and spiritual perspectives and choices that appear in some ways non-rational to outsiders or more secular observers. While the former can be subject to intellectual analysis, because naturally the context, environment and history of any situation in which religious hatred arises are always going to be relevant, and so also are the material motivations of those involved, the failure to speak also the languages of the heart and soul as well as that of the mind and body, will limit what any intervention can achieve. The emotional and spiritual dimensions of religious hatred cannot be addressed by cognitive and rational means alone: interventions in response to them also need to explore avenues that are relational and symbolic, these being the languages of emotion and spirit (LeBaron 2002, p. 17). To put this into popular parlance, changing minds often means changing hearts first – which is why the idea of epiphany and epiphanic intervention becomes important.

The suggestion of psychopathology among the causes of religious hatred listed above needs to come with its own caution. Practitioners need to be aware of what is known as the “Fundamental Attribution Error” (Ross 1977; Tetlock 1985): the tendency to attribute to internal attitudes behaviour which is actually the consequence of external circumstances. It can be tempting to try to explain away socially aberrant behaviour by focusing on the

mentality of the individual rather than pausing to consider what may have been other motivating factors. It is useful for practitioners to remember that, when faced with someone they believe is behaving ‘irrationally’, they need to question whether they understand them well enough. It is as well to believe that human beings never act irrationally: there is usually some reason and logic, however fleeting or contorted, behind even the most apparently irrational behaviour. There is also danger in labelling such behaviour too swiftly: what appears to be hatred can be a substitute emotion that people resort to because it is more accessible, and perhaps more satisfying to express, than emotions that may be more accurate but also more complex and perhaps more distressing. For example, as Dozier says, “A sense of being trapped is a common precursor to the development of a hate reaction” (Dozier 2002, p. 21).

Implications of religious hatred as a “psychospiritual” problem

The “psychospiritual”³⁸⁸ generally falls outside the remit of practitioners in conflict resolution but when looking at the implications for addressing religious hatred it cannot be avoided, and for this reason it seems inevitable that practitioners faced with religious conflict should have some basic familiarity with recent psychodynamic literature. In recent years interest in the spiritual dimensions of psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy has grown tremendously; in *Spirit and Psyche* (2003) the scholar and psychotherapist Victor Schermer identifies what he calls a new paradigm for addressing

³⁸⁸ ‘Psychospiritual’ has become familiar in psychological and religious scholarship as a term loosely used to describe the integration of the psychological and the spiritual, and is commonly used to describe therapeutic systems, including secular and quasi-secular systems, that see a spiritual dimension to the human as being essential to psychic health and full human development. Included in such systems is Jungian psychology, Roberto Assagioli’s ‘Psychosynthesis’, the archetypal psychology of James Hillman and the transpersonal psychologies of, for example, Ken Wilber, Stanislav Grof and Abraham Maslow (Gleig, A 2010, ‘Psychospiritual’ in Leeming DA, Madden, K and Marlan, S (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion*, Springer, Boston).

the “psychospiritual self” in the light of empirical evidence that spirituality is linked to human development. Ursula King argues that whether this new paradigm is “experienced as a dark night of the soul or as transforming illumination of the spirit” (2008, p. 120) it is rooted in human development and not to be dismissed with the “spiritual skepticism” shaped by “predominantly Freudian views based on instinctual biology” (ibid., p. 119).³⁸⁹ In other words, practitioners need to take spiritual issues seriously – not least because, logically, negative conditions of the spirit, such as hatred, should be considered and evaluated through the same lenses as more positive spiritual directions. If the way to develop spiritual health is through practices such as prayer and meditation, then it may be argued that part of the answer to religious hatred as a spiritual condition may be through processes or practices designed to address it and to develop spirituality as a form of intelligence (Emmons 2000).

The work of Victor Schermer is also relevant to another aspect of religious hatred. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation the addictive quality of hatred was mentioned, and this deserves further discussion. To provide some context, consider a group of people who have been brought together to discuss some issue of mutual concern that is obviously so deeply felt by some members of the group that they find it difficult to have any constructive dialogue with those with whom they disagree. The reluctance to enter such a process, even if it is to discuss something relatively trivial, is usually born of fear, disrespect and disdain, and these are gateways to hatred. If this group does meet it is likely that these embers could easily be fanned into personal hatreds with all their possible

³⁸⁹ King (2008) argues that this is reflected in three areas of research on human development: infant development occurring within a living-systems, relational perspective; research on higher states of consciousness including dreaming states, the brainwaves of meditators and left/right brain functions; and on the increased capacity for healing, altruism, concentration and other characteristics developed through spiritual practices.

consequences. This embryonic, latent hatred can be regarded as similar to a form of addiction - not unlike addiction to alcohol or drugs in that exposed to certain temptations, inducements or circumstances, it is easily kindled into stronger life. As every practitioner will attest, in most communities there are individuals, sometimes coalesced into groups, who seem particularly sensitive to imagined slights and prone to inflating molehills into mountains, who are generally inclined to become disproportionately involved in conflict, and who on occasions even seem to relish the toxicity which follows in such situations. While it is difficult to know whether it is the conflict that attracts them, the opportunity to express certain aspects of their personality or the chance to attack others, the element of repetition in their involvement suggests something akin to a form of addiction.

This raises the question of what can replace such addiction. The first answer is derived in part from Victor Schermer's observations in the 30th S.H. Foulkes Annual Lecture, published in the *Journal of Group Analysis* in 2006.³⁹⁰ Schermer, trained in the psychoanalytic traditions of object relations theory, became interested in what he was to call the 'psychospiritual' paradigm when he took up an appointment as a clinician in a substance abuse rehabilitation unit. Schermer's interest in the application of spirituality to psychotherapy was stimulated by his surprise at the improvements and self-transformations he witnessed, which his patients "attributed to spiritual awareness and awakening" (Schermer 2006, pp. 446-7). The interest that this aroused led Schermer to realise that earlier clinicians, among them William James and Carl Jung, had made similar observations, and that Alcoholics Anonymous, with its quasi-religious approach to addiction, had its origins in the Oxford Movement. Schermer also discovered that

³⁹⁰ S.H. Foulkes was the originator of group psychotherapy in the 1940s. Foulkes reasoned that since human beings are fundamentally social beings and most of our difficulties arise in our relationships with each other, it makes sense to explore, understand and try to change our behaviour in a group context.

mainstream psychoanalysts such as Bion (1970), Rizzuto (1998), Eigen (1998) and Grotstein (2000) had discussed psychospiritual approaches to therapeutic intervention and the achievement of the “transcendent position” (Grotstein 2000, pp. 300-302, quoted in Schermer 2006) that “allows the person to live with a higher degree of resilience, creativity and integration”. This approach, coupled with the experience of AA, suggests that addiction can be transcended.

The second answer lies in the work of the Canadian scholar-practitioner Michelle LeBaron who has written and practised extensively using relational, symbolic and creative means of addressing deep-rooted and intractable differences of worldview and relationship among diverse peoples (LeBaron 2002, 2003, 2004, 2013, 2016). LeBaron brings a particular awareness that conflict work that does not aim to transform its subjects as well as resolve their problems is doing no more than suppress symptoms rather than address causes. It seems possible that some combination of psychodynamic and psychospiritual approaches, coupled with relational and creative approaches to religious conflict, including for example use of the performing arts such as music, dance and storytelling, integrated into forms of dialogue and diapraxis could enable both substantive issues and an addiction to hatred to be addressed.³⁹¹

Implications for dialogue and diapraxis identified in Chapters 1-5

Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation established its purposes and reviewed the literature of conflict resolution, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology.

³⁹¹ The recent proliferation of conferences, events and scholarly publications linking the arts and conflict is evidence that this thinking is beginning to spread; for an overview see Bang, A 2016, ‘The Restorative and Transformative Power of the Arts in Conflict Resolution, *Journal of Transformative Education*, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 355-376.

The role of the practitioner, and whether he or she should have a personal religious faith or practice, was one of the first issues raised. From the sections above the conclusion is that whether or not practitioners have a faith of their own, they should be knowledgeable about the faith of others and not just about the facts of faith but have an inside knowledge and understanding of what it *means* to be a believer. The question of whether they should have a personal faith remains open: in some situations it will be an advantage; in others having no faith may be worse than having the ‘wrong’ faith.

A similar dilemma attends the question of whether practitioners should have some familiarity with psychodynamic literature and be able to act, to some extent, as psychotherapists. This is a question that is regularly discussed by conflict resolution practitioners who work in marital mediation, and whose clients are often as much in need of therapy as they are of resolution of their specific problems. While it is an idea that makes practitioners uneasy (Roberts 2007, pp. 85-6; Bush and Folger 1994, pp. 97-8) because of the danger of confusing two very different roles, the fact that religious hatred has internal as well as external causes, as this dissertation has demonstrated, means that some psychological understanding would seem essential for practitioners. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 gives some indications of what should be on their reading list, and Chapters 3 and 4 discuss some critical concepts in cognitive and psychodynamic psychology that should be familiar.

The role of the shadow, for example, is in psychodynamic literature central to an understanding of religious hatred, and there is an implication that consideration should be given to adapting the processes of identification and integration designed for individuals, through dialogue and diapraxis, to work in larger settings. The analytical psychologist

Marie-Louise von Franz, proposes the following (paraphrased) process for identifying and integrating the shadow:

1. Identify the projection;
2. Differentiate between object and projection;
3. Evaluate the moral issue which the shadow presents;
4. Illuminate the reality beyond the projection; and
5. Reflect “on how such an overpowering, extremely real, and awesome experience could suddenly become nothing but self-deception”.

(Von Franz, 1980, p. 10)

Wolfgang Giegerich proposed helping patients to work through a number of stages in a similar process:

1. The enemy or crusade stage, characterised by fear, in which the enemy is definitely outside and different from us;
2. The heretic or witch-hunt stage, associated with condemnation, in which the projection has receded to the point that the enemy is among us;
3. The turncoat or subversive stage, associated with cynicism, in which the shadow is deliberately used to justify social or political ends;
4. The *mea culpa* stage, characterised by guilt, in which we fully acknowledge the shadow within our self; and
5. The hospitality or the accomplished integration stage which creates identity at a higher level.

(Giegerich 1991, pp. 86-106)

It is not difficult to imagine how a competent process designer could translate processes such as these into a form that would work with groups, and it seems reasonable to believe that where the interests of groups or even nations are at stake, and conflict is caused or augmented in whole or part by shadow projection, either or both of these would be logical processes to work through especially in settings, such as conflict with religious identity dimensions, where shadow projection is a factor in generating religious hatred (Storr 1972, pp. 124-137).³⁹²

³⁹² Such a process occurred with a group of Israeli and Palestinian academics and diplomats over the course of a week-long conference. The first two stages were accompanied by both fear and condemnation. The third stage was characterised more by weary resignation than cynicism, and in the fourth the guilt was acknowledged in admissions that both sides had some responsibility for their situation. It would have been unreasonable in the circumstances to expect a full integration in the final stage, but if ‘hospitality’ includes a senior Israeli diplomat dancing with an equally senior Palestinian activist, then that was achieved. These stages did seem to take the participants beyond the usual rituals of mutual denial and projection (personal communication, 10.12.18).

As important as having some insight into the psychology of religion and the religious is having an equal insight into the structure of faiths and the risk factors involved should they be present in a situation of conflict. The sociotheological approach, for example, takes the logic of theology and the religious reasoning of protagonists and relates it to their social setting, thus providing a way into the epistemic worldviews of others that counters simplistic images and stereotypes (Juergensmeyer and Sheikh 2012). Mark Owen and Anna King's identification of eight prominent risk factors in religion and peacebuilding also provides a theoretical framework enabling a systematic approach to the conceptualisation and design stages of peacebuilding projects (Owen and King 2019). Straightforward frameworks such as these need to be extracted from the pages of specialist journals and transported to the desks of politicians and diplomats as well as conflict resolution practitioners.³⁹³

Dialogue and diapraxis have been discussed at some length above. The conclusion here is that diapraxis is more likely than dialogue alone to enable the strength of epiphany that can overcome some of the causes of religious hatred, but it is not always possible for protagonists to live and work alongside each other for the sort of periods necessary for Rasmussen's vision of transformative change to take root. There is some evidence, however, that dialogue processes in combination with LeBaron's relational and creative approaches to conflict can have transformative effects. For example the chapters by Toni Shapiro-Phim, John Burt and Carrie Herbert in *The Choreography of Resolution: Conflict, Movement and Neuroscience* (2013), the results of a LeBaron-inspired project to look at

³⁹³ During ten years as political negotiation trainer for the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office the author of this dissertation never met any diplomat who had ever been exposed to the most basic conflict or negotiation literature.

the role of the performing arts in conflict resolution, describe projects in Cambodia and Liberia where non-verbal diapraxis has crossed boundaries where dialogue alone would have stalled.

Implications for dialogue and diapraxis in Chapters 6-11

The identity dimension - restoring the Other

These following sections reflect on the six chapters considering the six dimensions of religion identified in Chapter 5, looking particularly for implications that can contribute to theory-building for praxis, beginning with identity. The first point to note is that while identity is crucial, it is rarely as straightforward as it appears. It usually has a number of layers to it, each of which has a different meaning for both its holders and beholders. Directly challenging a proclaimed identity is never wise, but accepting it without further exploration can be misleading for all. In addition identity is fluid in that different manifestations of identity may appear, or be proclaimed, at different times and in different circumstances. Religious identity seems to be particularly prone to adaptation, not least because religion itself is multidimensional. When it comes to the relationship between religion, identity and religious hatred, and particularly the problems posed by religiously-based hate groups, there are no simple answers beyond the need for leaders of the religious mainstreams to promote tolerance and understanding at every opportunity. This nebulous note can, however, be supplemented by something more specific: positive efforts to meet the needs that such groups provide to their adherents and particularly to the younger people they recruit. Religious hatred does not take root in a vacuum: if people are seeking and finding a sense of identity through such groups then dialogue and diapraxis need to help them expand it so that it is less likely to exclude those they have considered 'Other'.

Much of the emphasis in the literature of religious hatred is on the significance of ‘the Other’, the process of ‘Othering’, the dangers of stereotyping and scapegoating, the ease with which human beings project their own internal fears and grievances onto Others and in the process demonise and dehumanize them, paving the way to the ghetto and the concentration camp. There is nothing new in this: as Ursula King says, “At all times and in all places people have dealt with Others; they have accepted or rebuked, loved or hated, oppressed or liberated Others” (King 2008, p. 53). As she goes on to point out, though, an encounter with ‘the Other’ can also be a source of “surprise, enrichment and joy” (ibid.) and it seems likely that the experience and views and perceptions of many Others will be required if humankind is to surmount the local and global challenges to be faced in the future. She does not, however, suggest *how* we deal with the inevitable differences that arise when Others come together. This first focus area for any group process is therefore in some ways fundamental to all the others: if it proves impossible to go beyond ‘Othering’ then it is doubtful whether addressing any of the other dimensions can succeed.

Psychological processes such as stereotyping and projection are familiar to all practitioners in the conflict field: they are two of the ways in which human beings deal with the uncomfortable reality that finding ways to blame others for our predicaments is the easiest way to evade the responsibility for managing differences more constructively. Both stereotyping and projection rely on the tendency for people to generalise, particularly when they feel angry, and part of the process of withdrawal from projection and stereotyping is to facilitate a shift from the general to the specific. With such a shift the Muslim person is no longer a representative of a group of Others but a specific individual with whom it is possible to discover things in common, to have a relationship, to discover the ways in which this individual is different from the generalised image of what it

previously meant to be Muslim. Projection is more complicated because it involves first acknowledging that what is being projected has its origins within oneself, and that the process of seeing Otherness in Others in part springs from the reluctance to own everything in oneself. Projection begins with fear of ourselves, not fear of the Other, and this can be the hardest for people to accept.³⁹⁴

One of the usual recommendations for reducing hatred of others who are different is to cultivate the gift of empathy: the ability and willingness to stand in the shoes of the Other, to experience what they experience and to understand it in the way that they do, and by so doing to become part of a new collective. The problem with empathy is enshrined in the French proverb “tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner” – the danger is that a request for empathy for others can be perceived as the first step in being asked to abandon one’s own values and standards. So asking people to invest time and effort in understanding other cultural traditions, for example, has to be crafted in a way that leads to them being able to stand back from all such traditions in order to trace their history and origins and how they have developed over time: the process of opening a dialogue rather than driving people to shelter in their familiar trenches. Identity-level conflicts are recognised in the conflict resolution field as being notoriously difficult to resolve, to the point of intractability (LeBaron and Carstarphen 1997; Rothman and Olson 2011).³⁹⁵ It should not be assumed, however, that religious conflicts where identity is a significant contributor to conflict arise because of religious dissimilarity. The empirical evidence, based on data from intra-state armed conflicts between 1989 and 2003 using the Uppsala Conflict Data

³⁹⁴ As a simple illustration, working with Christians opposed to homosexual behaviour it is *sometimes* apparent that those who are most fervently homophobic have homosexual tendencies: it is easier to keep denying aspects of oneself that feel shameful and be over-alert to them in others.

³⁹⁵ In May 2001 the *Journal of Peace Research* produced a Special Issue on *Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes*.

Programme is that conflicts where protagonists belong to different religious traditions are no harder to resolve than those where they belong to the same religious tradition (Svensson 2007).³⁹⁶ One of the conclusions of research on resolving religious conflict is that efforts should be made to prevent conflicting parties from developing their demands in religious terms, given that negotiated settlements are more likely if religious claims are not involved (Mayal & Silvestri 2015). But this ignores the point that conflict around identities is not about claims: it is more existential in that identities exist, even if only marginally different, and if identity is the dimension of religion aiding or abetting the expression of religious hatred or the causes of conflict, then it has to be addressed.

One approach advocated by the scholar-practitioner Jay Rothman is the ARIA approach, ARIA being the acronym for four categories of conflict intervention that align with different conflict types: Antagonism, Resonance, Invention and Action (Rothman 1997). It is the first category of intervention, Antagonism, that Rothman advocates as the approach to conflicts rooted either in the past or in identity-based conflict because it is the “hurts and indignities of the past” (ibid.) which contribute to antagonisms and hatreds. He sees the gradual surfacing of these antagonisms through designed processes of dialogue and mediated empowerment and confrontation as the way forward in such situations. While respecting Rothman’s scholarship, expertise and ongoing engagement with conflict in many parts of the world, it can be argued that his approach is not sufficiently reflective of the particular demands of intervention in conflict where religion is an active ingredient and is at odds with that of Marc Gopin, equally prominent and active as a scholar-

³⁹⁶ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University in Sweden is the world’s main provider of data on organized violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war, with a history of almost 40 years. Its definition of armed conflict has become the global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied.

practitioner. Gopin starts from the contention that any form of preset or formulaic method of intervention is unlikely to be effective in identity-based conflict because “the tight relationship between identity, personal legitimacy, and the drive to create religiously unique cultural expression is high” (Gopin 2000, p. 63), especially when religious identity is being used to mark one identity in opposition to another, which Gopin calls “negative identity” (ibid.). He calls instead for intervention that takes the form of “a hermeneutically reworked sense of religious identity” using indigenous approaches to change that result in the protagonists undergoing a shift in mentality that results also in changes in behaviour based on the appeal to a new hermeneutic.³⁹⁷ Gopin contends that his experience suggests that “a slow and steady process of exposing [religious advocates] to the humanity of their enemies combined carefully with exploring alternative hermeneutic religious paths often creates a quiet revolution in religious thinking” (ibid.)³⁹⁸ He adds that with more moderate sections of the religious community it might be possible to raise universal human commitments, such as human rights, as the basis for a multi-cultural and multi-religious society, but for many of the most extreme religious people such human commitments can only come about when deeply perceived threats to identity and existence have abated.³⁹⁹ Gopin’s approach draws heavily on the work of John-Paul Lederach, a Mennonite scholar-

³⁹⁷ The ‘shift in mentality’ may be more significant than the ‘new hermeneutic’. This may be achieved, according to Beck, through “the clarification and modification of the belief system that predisposes the individual to overreact to supposed threats, the development of strategies to catch the hostile sequence in its earliest stage, and the abandonment of violence as an acceptable weapon” (Beck 1999, pp.17-8). This is also the process advocated by Genocide Watch for preventing genocide. For example, Stanton advocates: “Vigorously protest use of dehumanizing words that refer to people as “filth,” “vermin,” animals or diseases; deny people using such words visas and freeze their foreign assets and contributions; prosecute hate crimes and incitements to commit genocide; jam or shut down hate radio and television stations where there is danger of genocide; provide programs for tolerance to radio, TV, and newspapers; enlist religious and political leaders to speak out and educate for tolerance; organize inter-ethnic, inter-faith and inter-racial groups to work against hate and genocide” (Stanton 1996).

³⁹⁸ It is interesting that a similar process is used in the opposite direction. “.....radicalisation develops when people are, first, confused about their identities and, second, search for a meaning for their role within society or in a community” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). “Isis are able to use a powerful marketing brand that transcends all boundaries and has created a central identity with which many.... young people have identified” (Awan, Imran 2017, ‘Religion, Identity and Radicalisation’ in *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, 6, 1-21.)

³⁹⁹ There is an urgent need for more research into the circumstances in which such hermeneutic re-working can or cannot work.

practitioner who has always emphasised the importance of exploring indigenous methods of conflict resolution rather than calling on outside models of intervention (Lederach 1994). The Gopin-Lederach method of using and building on existing thinking to create new attitudes to Others, coupled with Baumann and Gingrich's concept of grammars (2004), seems to constitute a logical approach to the reducing the problem of the Other as a source of religious hatred.

The doctrine and practice dimension - cultural complexes and the Golem Effect

This section looks at three aspects of doctrine and practice. The first, following on from the section above on identity, considers the implications of shared and different doctrines and practices for group identity. In the wake of this the significance of cultural complexes is considered and also the Golem Effect and the implications of this for those who lead religious organisations.

Hate groups value signs, symbols and the rituals of show and parade because they embody meaning and identity in the same way as religions use the same means to create in tangible form the ideas they embrace. As much or more than this, symbols and rituals provide vehicles to express the power and solidarity of group activity, which in turn brings peer group validation, a feeling of the power of being part of a larger whole and having a unified purpose. Equally, those whose ideas or practices are different may not only threaten this sense of unity but introduce the possibility of the cause becoming in some way contaminated and this contagion undermining not only the individuals pursuing the common cause, but the very cause itself. The more extreme the cause and the more committed its supporters, as with many forms of fundamentalism, the more vulnerable they may feel to such sources of contamination. It is worth noting that the proponents of more

extreme doctrines often seem to feel more vulnerable than those whose beliefs are more mainstream, hence the fissiparous nature of minority sects, whether religious or political.⁴⁰⁰

If divergences among believers in the same creed can be dogmatic and even provoke violence, as is the case between Sunni and Shia in Islam, for example, then the divergences between religions themselves are even greater despite the wishful thinking of religious pluralists and perennialists:

On matters of cosmology (the order and meaning of the universe), theodicy (divine governance), soteriology (theory of human redemption), and theological anthropology (the status of human nature and freedom in relation to the sacred), to mention only a few basic doctrines, religions display profound and abiding differences that no amount of translation and clarification will fully resolve.
(Appleby 2000, p. 151)

Even broad ideas and concepts that might be expected to have some resonance across cultures, adds Appleby, carry different nuances of meaning that have to be acknowledged and negotiated, so any attempt at cross-cultural dialogue in pursuit of interreligious cooperation needs to find or work out a “second order religious language” (ibid.) that provides a common vocabulary while remaining true to the theological claims of each religious community involved. This is a crucial point for those mediating interreligious dialogue to appreciate: the desire and willingness of those involved to avoid confrontation by agreeing to common propositions which, when put to the test, may prove to be so generalised as to be worthless in terms of real progress towards reconciliation.⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰⁰ It is hardly scholarly but one of the most eloquent expressions of this characteristic is often held to be the scene in *Monty Python's Life of Brian* which displays rival factions in opposition to the Roman occupation of Judaea (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iS-0Az7dgRY> [viewed 26.4.19]).

⁴⁰¹ Following in detail the progress of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), established in 1969 to advance ecumenical progress in relations between the two churches, reveals the extent to which mutual professions of goodwill and serious intent based on many areas of common belief can be insufficient to overcome issues of real difference such as the ordination of women or attitudes towards homosexuality and same-sex relations.

Another danger of syncretism is that it can mask real differences that, like all suppressed conflict, eventually return to haunt even those with the best intentions. It is always possible to find overlaps in doctrine, such as regarding concepts of mercy, reconciliation or love, but such overlaps can achieve little unless they are matched by material actions on the ground. A shared belief in the importance of human loving, for example, may not extend to a shared endorsement of same-sex marriage. Similarly, shared principles, particularly ones expressed in general language, are easy to agree: the oil executive and the environmental campaigner have no difficulty in affirming the importance of the natural world and the dangers of climate change, but they still find it hard to agree on whether fossil fuels should be left in the ground.⁴⁰² This desire to agree, even at the price of platitudes, may form part of a religious cultural complex that can include, for the Church of England for example, the vague liberal niceness that so infuriates those who favour stronger religion (Brown and Woodhead 2016, p. 19). Teasing out the nature of cultural complexes through the process of dialogue would in some situations form a useful precursor to more substantive discussions because it would enable protagonists to understand better the significance of the substance.

Practitioners do well to remember that those whose faiths are very different may regard each other more sympathetically than those whose beliefs are more closely aligned. In the conflict resolution world this is sometimes characterised as the phenomenon of the

⁴⁰² This is not to decry to the process of agreeing the language of shared principles, however, because these may bring other benefits. A private meeting among Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) and Anglican leaders in South Africa in 1986, for example, to explore areas of common ground and shared principles made limited progress during the meeting but lead indirectly some months later to the DRC renouncing the doctrine of apartheid – a move which helped to undermine the legitimacy of the apartheid government. It is possible that it was the recognition of a common humanity, rather than the shared principles, that made the difference. (Private correspondence with participant, December 2018).

‘loyal enemy’ and the ‘disloyal enemy’.⁴⁰³ The former are those with whom one’s differences are obvious; the latter, being putative allies, are far more dangerous: in common parlance they deliver the knife in the back rather than the chest. The importance for practitioners lies in identifying where real enmity and hatred may lie: the likelihood is that it will be among those whose differences are less pronounced. Such hatred, stimulated by Freud’s “narcissism of small differences” (Freud 1929, p. 305), leads to hypersensitivity about differences, a proneness to aggression in pursuit of their maintenance and the need to identify and even exaggerate differences to preserve and inculcate feelings of separateness and selfhood (Gabbard 1993). Faced with this situation practitioners are well advised to invest time and effort in establishing their recognition of differences, and of those rival selfhoods, in order to build relationships with protagonists through their confidence of those recognitions. This runs against the natural inclinations of practitioners to emphasise what is common among protagonists as a prelude to building upon it.

Finally, Chapter 7 raises the question of the Golem Effect, questioning the psychological effect of doctrines such as original sin, reincarnation and eternal life. There is an abundance of research on the relationship between religion and physical and mental health which tends to contradict the generally negative assumptions of earlier psychodynamic literature though there seems to be little agreement about the specific mechanisms involved. The Golem Effect of religious doctrine has not, so far as it has been possible to discover, been researched to date. If it could be demonstrated that doctrines such as Original Sin can contribute, albeit unconsciously, to religious hatred by encouraging believers to think of themselves as sinners and behave as such, then religious

⁴⁰³ While it has proved impossible to discover the origin of these terms, there is a hint of Victorian colonialism about them. One might speculate that they originated with the Indian rebellion of 1857 as a way to differentiate between Indian troops who remained loyal to the British Raj and those who did not.

leaders whose organisations propagate such doctrines would be faced with those implications. Whether or not such research is conducted, and regardless of the results, it makes sense for adherents to any doctrine to explain how it contributes to their thought and action to ensure that others appreciate what matters to them and, *pace* Appleby above, where there may be common ground and difference.

The emotional and experiential dimension – re-directing “energy flows”

The emotional and experiential dimensions of religion are perhaps the most difficult for those who cannot share the feelings associated with sincere belief in part because it is those feelings that bring the psychic energy to a room.⁴⁰⁴ Practitioners often refer to working with “the energy in the room” but experience suggests that this tends to be based on intuition rather than on any concept of the nature and flow of psychic energy. Jung’s concept of psychic energy stems from his contention that everything in the psyche has an opposite, that the flow of libido between these opposites shapes human behaviour, and that the greater the difference between the opposites, the greater the libido - the psychic energy - involved. Praxis involves intervening in this perception of opposites and consequent tensions among people: the more profound the differences between them, the greater the energy generated by the resultant conflict and the more strenuous the practitioner has to be to contain and channel it in constructive directions. Just as with the psychic life of an individual, if the flow of energy is too much in one direction, or if it is blocked, then the tendency will be for protagonists to feel their interests or ambitions are being neglected and to develop, as a consequence, feelings of frustration and impotence.

⁴⁰⁴ Although both Freud and Jung recognised the idea of ‘psychic energy’ the term has suffered in recent years from its association with vague New Age theories and needs rehabilitation through the work of, for example, Jones (2016) and Laughlin (2018).

The challenge to practitioners is to maintain a balance of communication and commitment, of homeostasis, among the participants in processes of dialogue and diapraxis. The answer lies in part in Jung's concept of compensation: that a weakness or a failing or too great a strength in one area needs to be compensated for by an adjustment in another. If a participant's energetic direction is thwarted in some way, for example when it becomes apparent that he or she cannot achieve what was originally desired or expected, the progression of libido may stop and energy regress into the unconscious where it activates complexes and causes a divide between ego-consciousness and the unconscious, resulting in internal conflict and either the lack of motivation or the inability to move forward. Until the participant can deal with this new internal situation progress becomes difficult, but in time the libido stimulates neglected functions, the ego is challenged to use new thoughts and emotions that come into consciousness, and the person matures to the point that they can deal anew both with conscious and unconscious needs (Stein 1998, pp. 79-80). If progress appears to be thwarted by the reluctance of participants to accept a blockage to the direction of their energies, time needs to be invested in a way that stimulates unconscious activity; in many contexts providing the time and space for people to tell their stories, exploring the emotional and experiential dimensions of their beliefs, for example, will answer this need. In this context religious hatred needs to be seen as a source of psychic energy that can be re-directed in more positive directions.

The importance of story-telling as a vehicle for such energies should never be underestimated (Abu-Nimer 2001). Conflict is one of the contexts in which people test out who they are and discover who they can be, and the telling of their stories is one of the ways they construct coherent emotional identities to cope with the pressures of conflict and to heal what may have become divided within them. In this situation the role of the

practitioner can be seen as being an exemplar of this process, inclining individuals towards greater knowledge of themselves so that the result of conflict and of emotions such as religious hatred is not denial and projection but growth and integration through the emergence of what Jung calls the ‘transcendent function’ (Jung 1957).⁴⁰⁵ Its significance in relation to the emotional and experiential dimension is that it assists individuals, as the term suggests, to transcend the thinking and feeling that has brought them to their predicament and replace it with a fuller awareness of their choices by bringing together the conscious and unconscious elements within them. It is perhaps useful for practitioners, working as facilitators or mediators, to think of themselves as living embodiments of the transcendent function especially when it comes to managing the emotional and experiential expressions of their clientele, and it is for this reason that it is helpful if practitioners can empathise with the issues that arouse strong emotion.

The mythological dimension - the re-framing of myth

The psychotherapist James Hillman confesses in *A Terrible Love of War* (2004) that he was unable to explain his own behaviour, let alone his patients’ (p. 7), until he discovered the work of the Neapolitan Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), whose *Scienza Nuova* (1725) set out to explain the historical cycles that underlie the rise and fall of all societies. Causal reasoning is a latecomer, says Vico according to Hillman, the basic layer of the mind being poetic and mythic, providing the recurring themes and ubiquitous patterns and forces that play through human lives and societies and which Hillman interprets as archetypal (Hillman 2004, p. 7-8). These archetypal patterns embrace both rational and irrational events, including religion, sexual love, violence and war – all “timeless themes of human existence given meaning by myths. Or, to put it otherwise:

⁴⁰⁵ The role and value of the transcendent function will be explored more fully in a later section of this chapter.

myths are the norms of the unreasonable” (ibid., p. 9). Hillman goes on to explore the extent to which the unreasonable and the imaginal are responsible for so much of the human inclination to conflict: “imagination is the driving force, especially when imagination has been preconditioned by the media, education, and religion, and fed with aggressive boosterism and pathetic pieties by the state’s need for enemies” (ibid., p. 25).

While Hillman provides a polemic rich in insights into the nature and experience of war and how the mythologies of different ages have encouraged and sustained it, he also teases out a response to it using those same mythological processes underpinned by psychological reasoning. He provides as an example a sequence of responses to the Homeric *Hymn to Ares*, the god of war, building on the method of classical therapy that sees the cure for a problem in the problem itself: *similis similibus curantur*: cure by means of similars (ibid., p. 202).⁴⁰⁶ So, the principle goes, if Ares (Mars) gives us war, then Ares should be asked for help to respond to it. His responses include appreciating the virtues of the martial spirit, being robust and honest in understanding the frailties of civilization, uncovering the deceptions and delusions that support the rush to war, and having the courage to be restrained in the face of provocation. It is only a small move to imagine how similar steps could be taken in response to the mythological dimensions of religious hatred. A dialogic process could appreciate the strengths of feeling that lie behind religious hatred; acknowledge how it falls short of the beliefs and norms of whatever religion is professed; explore how it has arisen and what factors support it; examine how these might be tamed and constrained; search for alternatives that will respect the original feelings but channel them into new hopes and opportunities. This is known as re-framing in dialogue parlance: framing religious hatred in terms that respect its mythological dynamics could add new

⁴⁰⁶ The principle behind medical vaccinations and homeopathy.

impetus to proven method.

This approach, however, only addresses the mythological dimension of religion at an objective level: it is limited in its ability to reach the archetypal level, where for example the myths of Armageddon and Rapture dwell, that Hillman regards as the essence of the mythological. To reach this level the mythological and the personal need to be brought together through symbols and metaphors to enable a more profound appreciation of how images and their associated emotions are formed. LeBaron (2003) balances the need to work at this level with a practitioner's concern for introducing structure and process in a way that brings together the immediate and the mythic. She sees three levels at which exploring myths is useful when cultural stories have evolved around long-unquestioned assumptions: at the personal level where family myths have helped to create identity; at the interpersonal level where myths about relationships and roles, reflecting cultural understandings, can be uncovered; and at the intergroup level where myths about cultural groups can be examined for what they reveal and also what they hide (LeBaron 2003, p. 281). Translating these three levels into praxis could mean inviting protagonists to begin by identifying myths that have shaped their own stories: thinking, for example, about the influence of elders on their own lives, remembering physical objects from their childhood which symbolised, for better or worse, the values they imbibed when the foundations of their current personalities were being laid, or exploring how myths of the end times have shaped their present experience. When this way of reflection has been established protagonists can begin to reflect similarly on personal relationships with peers, colleagues and others, and perhaps parallels found in religious history or mythology to illustrate the nature of these relationships together with, again, ideas or artefacts that may symbolise them. Finally larger relationships and parallels can be explored and more probing questions asked about how different groups are imagined and symbolised, drawing on

image and metaphor where words are insufficient to realise the depths of identity. Such a process can create habits of thought that replace old assumptions with new understandings and shared cultural meaning (Clark 2002, p. 5).

The sacred values dimension - exploring constellations of value and uncertainty

Practitioners are tempted to place emphasis on sacred values that are shared in the belief that these can provide firm foundations for moving forward to material and operational issues. This, again, is something that is not as straightforward as it appears because in the context of all conflict, and perhaps religious conflict in particular, the relationships between values and emotions is usually complex. While values may carry emotional as well as moral meaning, emotions may reflect much more than abstract articulations of a religion's norms or mores: religious hatred, for example, may be generated either by what is or is not of value (Dozier 2002, p. 284). The significance of emotional meaning is that it can carry more weight than cognitive meaning, and it may explain the willingness to go to war in the name of a religion which values peace: the emotional value of defending the homeland taking precedent over the cognitive concept of peace as an abstract value. It may also explain the willingness of suicide bombers, for example, to carry out acts in the name of religion which appear to contradict the sacred values of the cause they profess to support.

This issue is complicated by the tendency of those who preach religious extremism to be ambiguous about their support for violence in its name. As Appleby notes (2000, p. 94), "the constant use of metaphor and veiled allusion, apocalyptic imagery and heated rhetoric" are not always intended to be taken literally: while they are useful to fan the flames, they can also be disavowed as a set of instructions to be followed. Appleby gives

the example of Sayyid Qutb, the leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood whose inflammatory language in *Ma'alim fi-I-Tariq (Milestones)* appeared to legitimise the use of violence against Islam's enemies and was used by his disciples to justify the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Qutb himself, however, denied that he intended Islamists to attack individuals, only institutions (ibid.). It is useful for practitioners, therefore, to ensure that the expression of sacred values is heard metaphorically and understood eschatologically as well as literally. In fact, sacred values should never be taken in isolation but appreciated as part of a pattern and hierarchy of values that govern both an individual's or a community's everyday life and the meanings which either or both give to the wider sweeps of historical movement. So, for example, being pro-abortion means upholding both an individual woman's right to determine her own destiny and at the same time upholding women's right to choose as part of the larger issue of women's rights as they have evolved over the past half century or so; equally, being anti-abortion is targeted not only at an individual woman making that choice but at the idea that a woman's right to choose is less sacred than the life of the child she carries. It is equally true, however, that in some circumstances, such as pregnancy caused by sexual assault, some anti-abortionists put the rights of a woman above those of her unborn child (Manninen 2014, p. 174). While it is unpopular in some absolutist circles to say it, values are rarely so sacred that in no circumstances are they ever relative to other competing values. Having said this, when faced with someone expressing absolute values, the wise practitioner listens very carefully before asking, rather gently, the sort of questions that encourage people to examine the sense in which a value is so sacred that it is never open to interpretation, comparison or qualification.

The challenge for praxis is how to turn values from the abstract to the more concrete so that their emotional force, and their relationships with each other, can be felt as well as

thought; at the same time the hierarchies, ambiguities and uncertainties of values need to be acknowledged. One way to do this is perhaps to adapt the process of ‘constellations’ which has in recent years become a method used by practitioners in the conflict field. Originating in the field of family therapy, constellations is a diapractic way to model the past and present relationships of people living within a dysfunctional family system. It involves placing non-speaking individuals, representing key figures, into spatial relationship with each other and with the problem-holder with the help of the problem-holder and a family therapist/facilitator (Cohen 2006).⁴⁰⁷ The method is now used beyond the field of family therapy to help people involved in, or studying, situations of conflict to understand the perspectives of all involved so that the systemic relationships among them become clearer. Although there is no scholarly record of such a method being used in situations where different value systems are operating, experience in several political contexts suggests that it would be effective in helping protagonists to understand respective values, how they inter-relate, and areas of convergence and divergence. It could also elicit the uncertainties associated with each value: their relative significance, how they might be reduced or managed, contingency plans if neither is possible, and the consequences of each value applied to its full extent.

The power and control dimension – heresies of the heart

This final section looking at the implications for dialogue and diapraxis of religions’ propensities for seeking power and control over their adherents and in the wider world

⁴⁰⁷ Family constellations work was pioneered by the German psychoanalyst Bert Hellinger who observed during sixteen years as a missionary in Zululand the importance of Zulu reverence for past generations of ancestors and their continuing influence: “Family Constellations are grounded in the epistemology of existential-phenomenology and the Zulu-influenced ontology of trans-generational connectedness. The clinical methodology originated with the family systems therapy of Virginia Satir and Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy” (Cohen 2006). See for example Boszormenyi-Nagy & Spark (1973); Satir (1987); Hellinger (2002a); Franke (2003). For a non-academic description of constellations use outside family therapy see Whittington, J 2020, *Systemic Coaching and Constellations: The Principles, Practices and application for individuals, teams and groups*, Kogan Page, London.

focuses on what Ryan LaMothe calls “heresies of the heart” (LaMothe 2010). By heresies of the heart he means the human proclivity to absolutize the relative and contingent and by so doing to embrace the totalitarian tendency to believe in the superiority of one’s own beliefs and the inferiority of the Other and his/her beliefs. This conceiving of the Other as inferior results in a narrowing of the capacity for emotional intelligence. The type of faith manifested in heresies of the heart, vis-à-vis the Other, “involves the distortion of the theological principle of *imago dei* and a corresponding distortion of trust, loyalty, and hope wherein the Other is either treated as an object-person to be assimilated or excluded”. In his fury at this treatment of the Other, LaMothe seems torn between ascribing it to idolatry, the heresy of the heart which tempts human beings to “rely on the idea of Truth to alienate, depersonalize, and coerce other human beings” (ibid.) or to “a lack of emotional intelligence and an eclipse of the capacity for emotional wisdom” (ibid.). Dietrich Bonhoeffer also identifies human folly as a heresy of the heart in his *Letters and papers from prison* (1953, p. 8) and advises against trying to reason with a fool on the grounds that it is both useless and dangerous as it does not take much to make a fool aggressive: “Neither protests nor force are of any avail against it, and it is never amenable to reason. If facts contradict personal prejudices, there is no need to believe them, and if they are undeniable, they can simply be pushed aside as exceptions”.

The power and control dimension of religion, and the implications of compensatory control mechanisms, Terror Management Theory and clericalism, are left until last because in many ways they provide the apotheosis for this entire dissertation. It can be argued that religious hatred is the ultimate form of control: if hatred is strong enough it shapes identity; it defends faith and doctrine; it determines emotion and experience; it asserts certain values at the expense of others; it even decides which are the dependable myths around which to build in-groups and out-groups. If faith is such that it enables an act of self-martyrdom as

part of it then in effect it provides control even of mortality (Huffman 2016). In sum, putting the need or desire to control at the heart of religious hatred complements the argument that religion has always been about maintaining control, of self and others, in the face of social or political enemies or of an indifferent universe (Geyer and Baumeister 2005). It can also be argued that religious hatred provides a form of control in the face of the uncertainty discussed in Chapter 10. In relation to this, Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog's *Engineers of Jihad* (Princeton University Press 2016) reveals a number of intriguing facts about the composition of jihadist groups, among them the fact that engineers are fourteen times more likely to be found among Islamist militants than in the general population, and four times more likely to be part of a militant group than graduates with other degrees (p. 162).⁴⁰⁸ Gambetta and Hertog's explanation is that engineering is a field that attracts individuals with a need for cognitive closure, clear-cut answers, a sense of order, hierarchy and a dislike of ambiguity.⁴⁰⁹ Such characteristics are not limited to those who espouse Islamic radicalism: similar traits have been identified among those who follow other traditions (Pratt 2010).⁴¹⁰

The implications of this need for certainty and control potentially pose a challenge for scholar-practitioners interested in designing processes of dialogue and diapraxis that have at their heart a willingness to surrender some control and to live with some ambiguity in order to develop more finely nuanced understandings of Others and of their different

⁴⁰⁸ Gambetta and Hertog's research also reveals that university graduates in general are over-represented, proving that "the core of the Islamist movement emerged from would-be elites, not from the poor and dispossessed" they argue that graduates and engineers in particular are frustrated by the lack of opportunities and social mobility in the Islamic world (Gambetta and Hertog 2016, p. 33).

⁴⁰⁹ For a summary of the arguments and evidence marshalled in the book see an earlier article: Gambetta, D and Hertog, S 2009, 'Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 201-230.

⁴¹⁰ There is also anecdotal evidence. For example, after interviewing a young Christian priest who believed in the literal truth of the Creation as described in the Book of Genesis this author was surprised to discover he was an engineer and had had a modern scientific education. It reinforces the idea that sometimes personal needs or character traits are more significant in forming personal beliefs than more objective considerations.

needs and beliefs. For all the talk of careful design and controlling the process of communication and exchange, such processes are intrinsically liable to take whatever forms their participants determine: mediators and facilitators can shape and channel and sometimes divert if they become too difficult, but they need a certain latitude if they are to be creative in terms of helping to develop new ideas and attitudes. To corral them too closely would be to fashion new ‘heresies of the heart’. Nevertheless, this dissertation argues that the theoretical starting point for dialogue and diapraxis should be that they are intended as, and designed to be, processes of transformation and epiphany, because nothing short of these is adequate to counter religious hatred or powerful enough to overcome the desire for certainty and control that shapes the mindsets that most need to be reworked. For this reason the rest of this chapter goes beyond the reductionism involved in looking at the implications of each dimension of religion and focuses on this need for building a theory of conflict transformation and epiphany for those consumed with religious hatred.

Conflict transformation and the transcendent function

As the discussion of the literature of conflict resolution and transformation in Chapter 2 (p. 33) made clear, the transformative approach is based on the need to address the root causes of conflict by eliminating the structural injustices or distorted frames of reference that feed it. Where religious hatred is a cause of conflict, or even a contributory factor in sparking or prolonging conflict, then scholar-practitioners need to have a strategy for replacing it with at least neutral feelings towards those who are its objects, and preferably a more sympathetic understanding of them and their beliefs and values which takes into account the possibilities, uncertainties and implications explored in previous chapters of this dissertation. The challenge lies in enabling this within the normal constraints of dialogue and diapraxis, such as time, money, the willingness to engage and

the need to keep participants safe from others and sometimes themselves. The final section of this dissertation will focus, however, purely on how dialogue and diapraxis might in theory bring about the sort of psychological transformation that would nullify or reverse among participants any tendencies to religious hatred. In building this theory attention has been paid to the extensive literature on the nature of “epiphanies” among both the religiously inclined and the purely secular in the effort to identify the circumstances and processes that cause people to undergo sometimes radical changes of heart and mind. Research into this has started with William James’s illustrations of these in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* and drawn on more recent literature such as Lofland and Skonovd (1981), White (2002), Snook et al (2018) and McDonald (2008). It has also drawn on Jung’s concept of the ‘transcendent function’ mentioned already in Chapters 2 and 8 and discussed at further length below.

McDonald provides a starting point in his description of narrative research to identify the nature and circumstances of epiphanic experience as it affected the lives of his research subjects. These could be considered factors to be taken into account when determining the nature of dialogue and diapraxis processes designed to trigger transformative changes. He summarises these as follows:

<i>Concept</i>	<i>Description of Concept</i> ⁴¹¹
Antecedent state	Epiphanies are preceded by periods of anxiety, depression, and inner turmoil
Suddenness	Epiphanies are sudden and abrupt
Personal transformation	Epiphanies are an experience of profound change and transformation in self-identity
Illumination/insight	Epiphanies are an acute awareness of something new, something that the individual had previously been blind to
Meaning making	Epiphanies are profound insights because they are deemed significant to the individual’s life

⁴¹¹ Each description is fully referenced in McDonald, M 2008, ‘The Nature of Epiphanic Experience’, *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 89-115.

Enduring nature

Although the actual epiphany is a momentary experience, the personal transformation that results is permanent and lasting

(McDonald 2008)

It is likely that many scholar-practitioners have observed such shifts during their work. It is quite normal, for example, for participants in conflict resolution processes to exhibit signs of anxiety in advance of such processes; equally, sudden breakthroughs and new insights are not unusual, and participants' relief at such changes can profoundly affect their behaviour and sense of self in the long as well as the short term.⁴¹² It is important to note, though, that negative epiphanies can be as constructive as the positive; mediators are often described as agents of reality when they confront those in conflict with the consequences of their actions. Whether it is the possibility of losing a war or an expensive battle in a law court, the process of being forced to face up to realities can remove the scales from one's eyes.⁴¹³

So establishing such epiphanies as the deliberate purpose of dialogue and diapraxis processes intended to address religious hatreds is in principle quite encompassable: the challenge is to do it effectively and in a way that avoids the resistance that many participants might feel if they were to perceive some degree of manipulation in the process. This is where an appreciation of the transcendent function, and that fact that the transcendent function "mediates between a person and the possibility of change by providing, not an *answer*, but a *choice*" (Samuels 1985, p. 59, original emphasis), might

⁴¹² Sudden breakthroughs of this type are not confined to actual interventions in conflict. It is likely that most conflict resolution teachers and trainers have experienced students, sometimes senior practitioners in other disciplines, who have reached new and unexpected realisations about previous or current situations and relationships. This perhaps indicates the extent to which conflict is under-addressed even in professional circles.

⁴¹³ A phrase that seems to have its origins in the story of St Paul regaining his sight after his epiphany on the road to Damascus (Acts 9: 1-22).

assist in the development of a theory of epiphanic intervention that involves not manipulation but opportunity.⁴¹⁴

The significance of an enhanced awareness of the transcendent function for dialogue and praxis is that it would put a decisive emphasis on the need for transformation, for a discernible shift in consciousness responding to Einstein's famous dictum that "No problem can be solved at the same level of consciousness that created it".⁴¹⁵ The role and function of the transcendent function can be summarised fairly simply: "The function which mediates opposites..... it facilitates a transition from one psychological attitude or condition to another" (Samuels et al 2010, p. 150). In this definition the transcendent function also "represents a linkage between real and imaginary, or rational and irrational data, thus bridging the gulf between consciousness and the unconscious" (ibid.). Anthony Stevens offers a different insight in *Archetype Revisited* (2002). Focusing on developments in neurology he suggests that the aim of Jungian psychotherapy is "to reduce the left hemisphere's inhibition of the right hemisphere and to promote increased communication in both directions across the corpus callosum" (Stevens 2002, p. 315). This would then correspond, he continues, to what Jung called the transcendent function.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁴ As Dehing (1993) points out, Jung used the term transcendent function surprisingly infrequently given its significance. He used it first in 1916 in a paper that was not published for some forty years, 'The transcendent function' (CW8, 1957), and subsequently in *Psychological Types* (CW 6, 1921); 'The relations between the ego and the unconscious' (CW 7, 1928); 'Psychological commentaries on "The Tibetan Book Great Liberation"' (CW11, 1939); 'On the psychology of the unconscious' (CW7, 1943); *Symbols of Transformation* (CW 5, 1952); *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (CW14, 1955-6) and 'A psychological view of conscience' (CW10, 1958) as well as in three seminars and four letters.

⁴¹⁵ Research has failed to find a definitive source for this much-quoted remark. Einstein seems to have said a number of things along these lines, referring mainly to the need for new thinking in the nuclear age. The fact that it has become a popular (mis)quotation suggests that it carries some resonance.

⁴¹⁶ Stevens also draws attention to the speculations of Rossi (1977) that religious practices such as prayer, ritual, the use of mantras and mandalas have the effect of promoting bilateral hemispheric integration, an idea supported by research (Gluck and Stroebel 1975) that EEG records "show greater synchrony between both sides of the brain in subjects practising transcendental meditation" (Stevens 2002, p. 315). This bringing of both hemispheres into greater harmony "offers a plausible neurological basis for the 'higher consciousness' which Jung described as the primary consequences of the transcendent function" (ibid.). It is as well to note that neuroscience has proceeded a long way in the time since Stevens was writing and doubtless has much further to go, so conclusions on this point should be appropriately cautious.

One of the fullest examinations of the concept to date is Jeffrey Miller's *The Transcendent Function* (2004), sub-titled *Jung's model of psychological growth through dialogue with the unconscious* which captures its importance for this dissertation: that if there is an ultimate answer to the problem of religious hatred then it lies in the 'haters', through the process of examining in depth the reasons for their hating, learning how to transcend the unconscious forces as well as the cognitive reasons that compel it. But Miller argues that this is not just a task for the haters: a willingness to explore such unconscious forces, and how to respond to them, is something that needs to be woven into the entire culture. "We [depth psychologists] bemoan the fact that the culture is in denial about its shadow... but we do nothing outside the analytic situation to remedy that" (Miller 2004, p. 134). He calls for "philosophers, teachers, clergy people, ethicists and others who focus on values" to become more involved in public discourse to ensure "the cultural application of the transcendent function can be profitably used particularly with social issues that manifest highly divisive positions since those positions probably evidence affect indicative of a deeper, denied field" (ibid., pp. 134-135). As Miller describes situations that merit the application of the transcendent function, such as abortion and tension between the genders and generations, and how it operates in everyday life, it becomes apparent that much of what happens in dialogue and diapraxis is already, albeit unknowingly, acting to initiate the transcendent function. For example, Miller says that "animating the transcendent function is as much a perspective as it is an act" (ibid., p. 137): the perspective that rejects the either/or in favour of the both/and approach is something that mediators and facilitators constantly encourage to move people away from divisive dichotomies. Similarly Miller sets out the need to look beneath the surface, to discern what is happening not just in the observable cognitive field but buried deeper and indicated by the dissonance, for example, in relational interactions. Again, one of the skills emphasised in training third parties is the ability to ask questions that promote inward reflection and a wider awareness of others'

needs and values. In such situations the transcendent function is an enhanced awareness that sensitises both third parties and participants to the undercurrents influencing an interactive process.⁴¹⁷

As regards the activities that “when incorporated into our normal lives, serve to increase or spark the transcendent function” (ibid., p. 140), among these Miller identifies meditation, artwork, music, yoga, poetry, dance, theatre and creative writing because they “allow the mind to quiet down and thereby naturally come into closer contact with hidden, unknown, or unconscious material” (ibid., p. 141). This is the logic that has stimulated interest in the use of the creative arts to add new dimensions to conflict resolution; as the neuroscientist Emily Beausoleil says of dance, for example, “When creative movement elicits imagination, the hold of habitual patterns and perceptions is loosened and parties can begin to experiment with “rechoreographing” in conceptual, emotional and behavioral terms” (Beausoleil 2013). As she indicates by the inverted commas around “rechoreographing”, dance can be metaphorical as well as literal: it is not suggested that suave politicians or hard-bitten insurgent leaders are encouraged to dance together, but the use of elaborate metaphors or mind maps to describe or help visualise complex thinking, for example, are already well-established methods among practitioners particularly for use in situations where participants may be reluctant or unable to establish or continue dialogue processes using purely cognitive means. Whatever the actual methods employed,

⁴¹⁷ A further point, which may be particularly relevant to situations involving religious conflict or religious hatred, is that the idea of the transcendent function undoubtedly has metaphysical and spiritual overtones. Although Jung emphasised his credentials as a scientist and was always anxious not to be seen as a metaphysician, as has been discussed previously, Miller says “Some believe there is a clear reflection of the Divine in the transcendent function despite Jung’s protestations to the contrary” (ibid., p. 115). In support of this contention Miller quotes the psychotherapist Ann Ulanov arguing that this is really what Jung means by the word transcendent because “it is precisely through the workings of the transcendent function that we receive evidence of the Transcendent in the metaphysical sense operating within us, much like religious tradition describes the Spirit of God moving us to pray” (1996, p. 194), adding that the solutions that arise out of the activity of the transcendent function have a numinous quality that reflect a transpersonal presence responding to inner conflict.

the point is to engage the non-cognitive dimensions of emotion and experience and thereby, according to Iain McGilchrist, also enhance awareness of the Other that right hemisphere brain activity enables (McGilchrist 2009, p. 93).⁴¹⁸ The use of the creative arts in bringing a new consciousness to dialogue and diapraxis is no longer a novelty among scholar-practitioners but an explanation of their value, based on the combination of depth psychology and neuroscience, adds legitimacy to approaches that are still regarded as experimental in much of the conflict resolution field.

Conclusions

The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine religious hatred, particularly through a psychodynamic lens, and to explore some of the implications for scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution tasked with responding to situations of conflict fuelled by religious or para-religious beliefs. It begins by exploring the literatures of conflict resolution and transformation, the psychology of religion and psychodynamic psychology focusing on scholarship relevant to religious hatred. Using this background it identifies six dimensions of religion (identity, doctrine and practice, emotion and experience, mythology, sacred values and power and control) to use as a minimum theoretical framework within which to look more closely at how religious hatred manifests itself and the consequences that can result. The final chapter summarises and reflects on some of the implications for praxis arising from religious hatred within each of these dimensions and considers how processes of dialogue and diapraxis might in theory be conceived and designed to respond to participants divided by such hatreds.

⁴¹⁸ Iain McGilchrist's *The Master and his Emissary* (2009) is a controversial work of neurophilosophy that argues how the divided brain has influenced the development of music, language, politics and art.

The dissertation reaches three major conclusions within which are others, more tentative, where the need for further research is indicated. First among these is that a divergence is arising between scholars and practitioners in the secular West and those in parts of the West and in other parts of the world where religious adherence is growing and increasing in its influence on social, political and international affairs. This divergence stems in part from ignorance of traditional religion among those who consider themselves non-religious, and in part from living in cultures where religion is often considered to be of marginal significance. The resultant lack of empathy for the religious is a disadvantage for politicians and diplomats at the national and international levels; for leaders of diverse communities; and for scholar-practitioners in the conflict resolution field. All need to remember that a religion does not have to be objectively 'true' to be powerful or meaningful for its adherents. In particular scholar-practitioners would be assisted by a better appreciation of psychodynamic as well as social and political approaches to the problem of religious conflict, especially those which provide insights into the role of religion in personal and cultural development particularly in relation to cultural complexes. An appreciation of the concept of the shadow, and the psychological tendency to balance an extreme in one area of affect with morbidity in another, is also useful.

The second major conclusion is the importance of understanding the multidimensionality of religion, the value of a holistic approach to recognising how, in any situation, religion may be expressed through a number of its many dimensions, and how religious hatred may have its roots in any or all of these dimensions. One likely explanation for the intensity of religious hatred is the cumulative effect of hatred felt through multiple dimensions. While the identity dimension is critical in generating senses of what constitutes Other, this may be as often rooted in a reference to a mythological past as to the present: it is wise to investigate all aspects of the past, whether factual or putatively counterfactual,

before concluding that current circumstances weigh more heavily. Fundamentalist religion, or religion aimed at supporting non-religious causes such as ethnic nationalism, can acquire the characteristics of a cultural complex rooted in past experience which may include religious hatred and can in some circumstances cause adherents to marginalise and even demonise those considered Other. Equally, while sacred values may in some senses be shared, they do not in and of themselves provide sufficient common ground to eclipse partisan issues; and while they may be more fungible than at first appears, attempts to trade issues of material value against those of sacred value can be interpreted as insulting to the latter. There is also some evidence that the experiential dimension of strong religion can have an addictive quality, and where this type of religion inculcates the hatred of others or their beliefs or values, that too can become addictive. It is often argued, especially by secularists, that religion has historically provided a medium of popular control for the more politically or socially powerful – the ‘opium of the people’ in Karl Marx’s famous phrase⁴¹⁹ – but a psychodynamic approach suggests that the power commanded by religion is as often personal and related to fear of the uncontrollable in terms of death and the desire for some relationship to ultimacy as demonstrated in clericalism. The dissertation also suggests that certain types of religious doctrine can have a Golem Effect resulting in unintended psychological consequences for adherents and implications for those who may be considered Other. This conclusion is very tentative, however, and needs further research.

The third overarching conclusion is that processes of dialogue and diapraxis addressing religious hatred need to consider, as one of their prime purposes, what is called here ‘epiphanic intervention’: the deliberate intention to induce some sort of psychological

⁴¹⁹ The full quote is "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people"; it was published in the Introduction to Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843).

epiphany as the best or only effective way to respond to hatred as a condition of mind. This conclusion is intended as a hypothesis requiring further testing because while there is anecdotal evidence from scholar-practitioners that such epiphanies are possible and realisable, and there is evidence that epiphanic intervention can address other forms of addiction, there is insufficient evidence to indicate the circumstances or processes within which such reversals of attitude and behaviour, enantiodromia, may be triggered and achieved with addiction to religious hatred, nor whether certain types of process can be expected to be more effective in some situations or with some types of participant. This conclusion is based on the determination that religious hatred is at its heart a psychospiritual problem which is unlikely to be addressed by interventions based on purely material considerations. This suggests that processes to address religious hatred need to involve activities, reflections and the cultivations of relationships specifically designed to reduce perceptions of the Other and broaden participants' appreciation of their own psychic biases and the origins of the hatreds they may feel.

If there is an additional, more general conclusion, it is that in recent years there has been a dearth of original theory-building in the conflict resolution field, the exception being the efforts devoted to developing creative and arts-based approaches to conflict generally and belief and value-based conflict in particular. It may be that this is to a certain degree inevitable in a field that is coming to maturity, especially where it is doing so within the established structures of law or diplomacy, for example, but nevertheless the need for sound theory and innovative practice becomes ever more pressing in the face of an increasingly complex world. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way that religion, for long assumed to be a depleted force, is again in the ascendant beyond the Western secular academy, and as such demands to be met with knowledge, empathy and creativity.

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