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Jean Monnet Chair Papers

European Security Cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance

Helga Haftendorn




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Haftendorn, *European Security Cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance*

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European Security Cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance

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European Security Cooperation and the Atlantic Alliance*

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I. The Changing European Security Context

At the beginning of the 1990's, major elements of the post-World War II European security system are in a process of rapid transition. It started with a Soviet-American rapprochement, which led to a reactivation of the dormant arms control process. The December 1987 INF "Double-Zero" Agreement removed all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometres. With the Soviet leadership firmly anchored on detente, both the CSCE process and the search for a reduction of conventional forces in Europe received a new impetus. The CFE negotiations promise not only significantly lower force levels as their result, but also a predominantly defensive military structure in East and West. Military stability will be enhanced to the extent that both the risk of inadvertent military confrontation and the temptation to use military means for political ends are minimized.

Well into 1989, however, the Iron Curtain looked as solid as ever before in its post-war history, backed up by a struggle, though a mellowing one, of power and of ideology between two contending political systems. It started to fall in the summer of that year: first went the barbed wire at the Hungarian-Austrian frontier, then the divide became permeable to fugitives from communist oppression and economic mismanagement in East Germany, and on November 9 the Wall in Berlin crumbled. At the same time, Eastern Europe was experiencing a peaceful revolution, with the slogan "We are the people" its population claimed the civil rights it had been deprived of for forty years. Within a few weeks, the Eastern European countries (with the exception, at least until now, of Albania) were following Gorbachev's line on Perestroika and on the road towards

* This monograph is an edited version of the author's Jean Monnet Lectures at the European University Institute, Italy, held from October 17-26, 1989.

In a time of rapid political change, it should be noted that the author did neither wish to change the overall thrust of her argument nor add completely new material, though she has in the process of editing taken account of some political changes, most notably concerning the German Question.

democratization. It might be too early to tell where this road will eventually lead, but it is self-evident that major changes are underway that will significantly alter the political structure of Europe.

The basic results of World War II had been the division of Europe, and the political as well as military presence of both the Soviet Union and the United States on the continent. Today, both this division and the military presence of the superpowers in Europe seem to be open to question. The East-West conflict has been both deideologized and demilitarized. The dramatic changes we are witnessing in the East open up a prospect for both the disintegration of the once solid "Soviet Bloc", and for close co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The "German Question", once laid firmly to rest by anchoring the two German states to opposing military alliances, is back in the headlines.

Significant changes are also taking place in the West. The United States is reappraising its global role and burden, and is asking whether and how this burden can be either better shared with its allies, or devolved over time. This reappraisal of the Atlantic connection is to some extent due to a sense of overcommitment, of overextension of its resources; it is also a consequence of the increased self-assertiveness of the United States' West European allies.

Within NATO, a major problem of the past 40 years has been the unequal distribution of power and influence between the United States and its allies, contrary to the professed equal status of all members. Over time, the differences in position have been somewhat leveled, but the dominance of the North American nuclear superpower, as well as the weakness of the nuclear have-nots, has remained.

With increased economic and political weight, and with more internal unity, Western Europe leads a more assertive policy and will also demand a greater voice in international affairs. The United States does support the process of West European integration.¹ So far, however, it is not clear whether the implementation of the Single European Act, adopted in 1987, will also lead to a common European security policy.

If Gorbachev is moderately successful in reforming the political and economic system of the Soviet Union, and the arms control negotiations yield the expected results, we might be entering a period of increased military stability in Europe. At the same time, however, political stability might be reduced due to ethnic and social unrest in the former Soviet empire and the re-emergence of the German Question. Past policy in the West has been based on the assumption that military stability ran in parallel with political stability² – interpreted as territorial stability and politi-

¹ See Address by Secretary of State Baker before the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, *US Policy-Information and Texts*, No. 154, December 13, 1989, pp. 35-44.

² This has been the basic assumption of the "Harmel Doctrine", and German *Ostpolitik*. See "The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council. Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting, December 1967", *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, Brussels 1984, pp. 289-291.

cal status quo. This has changed. A major problem in the future will be how to manage change while maintaining political stability.

In the minds of many, the greatest uncertainty is the evolution of the German Question. With the recent events in the GDR, and a generally responsive West German leadership and public, the question of the future of the two German states, and their reunification is back on the international agenda. Any new European security structure will have to cope with the concerns raised by this prospect.

With it comes a changed perspective on the function of the Atlantic Alliance. To some extent, this is a consequence of the dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the amelioration of the East-West conflict and, as a result, a reduced perception of a military threat, and the re-emergence of the German Question.

The Atlantic Alliance, in the words of Lord Ismay, its first Secretary General, had a threefold political function: "To keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." The end of the Cold War has deprived it of its containment function; with a reorientation of US foreign policy toward a greater degree of unilateralism and less entanglement, its coupling function is under strain; while its control function is no longer accepted by a Federal Republic which has been an exemplary democratic state for 40 years and which expects to be treated on a par with the other members of the alliance.

NATO's military function has been to deter an attack on any member of the alliance, and, if deterrence should fail, defend all alliance partners against any aggression, especially those on the Central (European) front. The strategy of flexible response served as an instrument for coupling the defense of Western Europe to that of the United States, as it also controlled the risk that the United States would become involved in a nuclear conflict against its will. With the strategy of flexible response losing in credibility, and nuclear deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union increasingly being transformed into a security partnership, NATO loses its military function.

Instead, the non-military elements of security gain in importance:

- economic security (incl. jobs, resources, markets) and cooperation;
- civil rights (especially the right of self-determination) and human rights and their world-wide rule;
- human environment, and how to combine economy and ecology.

Finally, the alliance was built on the assumption of political equality. In reality, however, due to its preponderant military power the United States has played a dominant role within the alliance and has controlled NATO policies. In cases of disagreement, the influence of the other alliance members was limited to a veto power, or the ultimate choice of leaving NATO integration altogether. Increasingly, the West European members have strengthened their internal cooperation and demand a greater role in NATO affairs.

To take account of the various changes, to adapt the alliance system to the challenges of the future, and to give the European partners a greater role, three different conceptual approaches have been discussed:

1. An Atlantic approach: a West European pillar in NATO;
2. A West European approach: a West European defense community (WEU, EPC or other), reinforced after 1992 by a significantly strengthened European Community, with NATO reduced to a traditional military alliance without integrated military forces;
3. An all-European approach: a European system of collective security, a European order of peace, or a common European home.

Without completely rejecting any one approach, the West Europeans have in the past limited their initiatives to a number of pragmatic steps designed to strengthen their role within the Alliance, rather than testing any "grand design":

- The 1981 Genscher-Colombo initiative for a political union, and the 1983 Stuttgart "Solemn Declaration on a European Union";³ building on the fairly successful activities of European Political Cooperation (EPC);
- The Single European Act which came into force on July 1, 1987, where the twelve reconfirm their goal to complete the Common Market by the end of 1992, and to create a Political Union extending also to the political and economic aspects of security;⁴
- The French proposal to reactivate the dormant WEU, leading to the 1986 Rome Declaration in which the seven Foreign and Defense Ministers confirmed their intent to make better use of the WEU framework, and the European Security Platform of 1987 in which they developed a set of common policy principles;⁵
- The institutionalization of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), giving it a secretariat, and agreement on an ambitious work program;⁶

³ See "Draft European Act submitted by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic," November 4, 1981, *Bulletin of the European Parliament*, No. 50/81; and "Stuttgart Declaration on European Union," June 19, 1983, *EC Bulletin*, No. 6/83.

⁴ See "Single European Act" ("Einheitliche Europäische Akte, unterzeichnet von den Außenministern der EG-Mitgliedstaaten in Luxemburg im Februar 1986") *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 163-183.

⁵ See "Rome Declaration", October 27, 1986, in Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO. Building a European Defense Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity*. London et al: Brassey's 1989 (Atlantic Commentaries No. 2), pp. 83-90; and "Platform on European Security Interests," *ibid.*, pp. 91-96.

⁶ The members of the IEPG are the European NATO partners, except Ireland and Luxembourg. It was created in the early 1980s to provide for a European forum to coordinate arms production and procurement which included France; it closely cooperates with the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD). However, on French insistence, it is separate from NATO.

– Continuation and intensification of the CSCE process and of East-West arms control negotiations, with good prospects for an speedy agreement on deep cuts as a result of the CFE talks.⁷

Until quite recently, the defense and security policy of most West European countries (with the partial exception of France) has been based on a set of rather conservative assumptions:

– military defense is an alliance matter; and NATO provides adequate arrangements, though it will have to deal with new challenges and problems;

– at present, there is no viable, separate Western European security option nor is a legitimate purpose for separate defense cooperation perceivable. The WEU has at best a complementary and reserve function;

– defense policy is complemented and increasingly transformed by a process of East-West detente on various levels, with special emphasis on the CSCE and arms control negotiations;

– any intensification of West European security cooperation should neither endanger the cohesion of NATO nor the coupling of the United States to the defense of Western Europe;

– significant changes of the European security system will take time to mature; an All-European security system might be a long-term goal, but not an immediate perspective;

– the primary goal is the economic integration and political union of Western Europe, to be realized in the EC framework.

European thinking has thus focused less on alternative security structures than on adapting and complementing the existing European and Atlantic organizations. In this context, a reinvigorated Western European Union could best serve as a European security caucus in NATO, fulfilling the following tasks:

– providing reassurance in case of an attack by reliance on an automatic security guarantee;

– serving for intra-European policy coordination in defense and security affairs, e.g. in burden-sharing, in arms control, or in responding to US initiatives;

– providing for coordination of industrial and technological policies as well as for joint arms production, and paving the way for a two-way street in arms procurement across the Atlantic;

– tying Great Britain to the defense of the European continent;

– constituting a political framework for rapprochement between the two German states;

– assisting in building a European political identity, encompassing security and defense, and by providing for a greater degree of self-assurance.

⁷ The CSCE process started 1973 with the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, its result being the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, see Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki – Geneva – Helsinki 1972-1975*. Leiden: Sijthoff 1979; so far there have been review conferences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. The Vienna meeting gave a mandate to a conference on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), charged with negotiating reductions of the conventional forces in Europe.

The West Europeans still face enormous problems if they wish to increase the scope and intensity of their security cooperation.

One problem is to avoid the duplication of policy coordination within the WEU on the one hand, and NATO and its EUROGROUP on the other. A separate European security cooperation framework would, in the words of a recent British observer, "offer a rich potential for duplication, redundancy, and institutional displacement."⁸

There is also the fundamental dilemma that the French are very reluctant to get involved in any type of joint defense planning that would bring them back into NATO while the British, on the other hand, resist any separate military coordination outside the alliance which might weaken the NATO link.

Further, there are the inherent institutional problems of the Western European Union:

The issue of a common seat for its branches has not yet been settled: should it be in Brussels, to allow for close coordination with the other European institutions and NATO, or in Paris, as the French would like to have it?

Another open issue is its membership. Though there is a consensus that the WEU should not become a club of the "big boys", the question of enlargement is charged with difficulties: how to get the Danes and the Norwegians in, and how to keep the Turks out – by insisting that member states have to renounce the use of force in settling territorial disputes?

So far, the selection of the members of the WEU Assembly is unsatisfactory. Should they represent national Parliaments as is the case with the present mode, in which the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also sit in the WEU Assembly; or should they have a democratic legitimacy of their own, which they would gain if they would be delegated from the directly elected European Parliament? And what will be their relationship with their national governments?

Another question to be tackled will be the preservation of the essential security link with the United States – the coupling of the defense of Western Europe to that of the United States (the nuclear umbrella) – and how to maintain a constructive political relationship with the US in view of increasing pressure for "a fairer share of the burden", for devolution, or even disengagement?

So far, all US Administrations have supported the idea of closer European integration, including defense cooperation. Some observers, however, have been concerned that increased defense responsibility on the part of the Europeans would ultimately mean a diminution of US influ-

⁸ William Wallace, "Relaunching the Western European Union: Variable Geometry, Institutional Duplication Or Policy Drift?" In Panos Tsakaloyannis, Ed., *The Reactivation of the Western European Union: the Effects on the EEC and its Institutions*. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration 1985, p. 40.

ence, and also of US ability to protect its own interests.⁹ The West Europeans will therefore have to take account of American sensibilities:

- recognize US leadership in defining the structure of the East-West relationship, and provide for adequate burden- and risk-sharing;
- retain the NATO framework, especially the political, military, and economic ties between Europe and North America;
- avoid the “European pillar” becoming a “Fortress Europe”, e.g. by closing the European markets to American products;
- respect American interests in the future European order (e.g. by maintaining a symbolic troop presence, and encouraging Washington to play an active role in the CSCE process).¹⁰

Western interests will best be served by maintaining the Atlantic Alliance, but adapting it to the challenges of the time. Giving the Europeans a larger voice in this process, a “European Pillar” in NATO – in the sense of a “European Caucus” – could contribute to more effective policy coordination among the West Europeans.

The development of a Western European Defense Community, reducing NATO to a classical military alliance, or the dissolution of military alliances altogether and the establishment of a European order of peace, will be long-term perspectives – for the year 2000 – but are not on the agenda of today.

II. NATO in a Period of Transition

In a changing international environment, NATO will change, too. But what is NATO?

NATO was founded in 1949 as a classical defense pact. In the following years (1950-1952) it developed into an integrated military alliance, with military forces permanently assigned to it. Not only have the United States and Britain committed themselves to deploy troops on the European continent as long as is necessary or appropriate,¹¹ but NATO also relies on nuclear weapons under the command and control of the US President. The crucial importance of the United States for defense and

⁹ See Paul E. Gallis, “European Roles and Responsibilities,” in NATO at 40, *CRS Review*, April-May 1989, pp. 18-20.

¹⁰ See “The Agenda of US–Soviet Relations,” Address by President Reagan at the US Military Academy at West Point, October 28, 1987, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* Vol. 23, Nr. 43, November 2, 1987, p.1237; “Blueprint for a New Era in Europe,” Address by Secretary of State Baker before the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, *US Policy – Information and Texts*, No. 154, December 13, 1989, pp. 35-44.

¹¹ After the communist aggression in Korea, President Truman in September 1950 dispatched four additional divisions to Europe. This decision was approved by Congress in 1951 with S. Res. 99, and reaffirmed by the US Government at the London Conference in October 1954, together with a British pledge also to station troops on the European continent, see Phil Williams, *The Senate and US Troops in Europe*, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan 1985.

deterrence is symbolized by the fact that SACEUR has always been an American.

The *raison d'être* of NATO has been to share the risks and responsibilities of common defense; reality, however, has seen the Europeans perched beneath the American nuclear umbrella.

NATO's strategic and policy framework is based on three elements:

1. a joint assessment of the threat;
2. a military strategy of flexible response;
3. an overall policy of deterrence, defense, and detente as resolved in the Harmel Report of 1967, and reaffirmed by NATO as recently as May 30, 1989.¹² The Harmel Doctrine acknowledges that NATO is not only prepared to deter a Warsaw pact attack and to defeat one should deterrence fail, but also to expand East/West cooperation in ways that will reduce the potential for war.

The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task...

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary.¹³

The military doctrine of flexible response, also agreed upon by the alliance in 1967, maintained that NATO was prepared to meet any level of aggression with comparable force, conventional or nuclear, and declared that NATO would increase the level of force, if necessary, to terminate the conflict.

Over time, there have been numerous changes in both dimension of alliance doctrine, and the compromise on which NATO's consensus is based has been challenged time and again.

The most dramatic challenge was by Henry Kissinger, who in 1979, at a seminar commemorating the 30th anniversary of the alliance, shocked the NATO faithful with his exclamation: "Extended deterrence is dead!"¹⁴

Today's reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance is in large measure due to the changing international environment and the less imminent danger of military aggression. The policies of Mr Gorbachev and the budget squeeze in the United States, along with progress in the current arms

¹² For the Harmel Report, see above, fn 2; the May 30, 1989, NATO Communique has been reprinted in *Survival*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July/August 1989), pp. 376-377.

¹³ Harmel Report, *op. cit.* fn. 2, p. 289.

¹⁴ See Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO", in *NATO: The Next Thirty Years*, ed. by Kenneth A. Myers. Boulder, CO: Westview 1980, pp. 3-19.

control negotiations, have done much to reduce the military function of NATO to a deterrent and reassurance role.

There are also many expressions of increased self-assertiveness on the part of the United States' West European allies. A major problem of the past 40 years of alliance history has been the unequal distribution of power and influence within the alliance between the United States and the other states, contrary to the professed equal status of all members. Over time, the differences in position have somewhat leveled off, but the dominance of the North American nuclear superpower, as well as the weakness of the nuclear have-nots, have remained.

Accordingly, there have been repeated efforts to change the structure of the alliance, to provide for a more equal distribution of power, and, above all, to give the European members a greater role and responsibility:

– In 1958 the French President, Charles de Gaulle, proposed the establishment of a three-power directorate in which the United States would share its control of the alliance with Great Britain and France.¹⁵

– In 1962 and 1963 President John F. Kennedy, in addresses at Philadelphia and in Frankfurt (Paulskirche speech), called for a “Grand Design” of Atlantic partnership, a “two pillar” or “dumbbell” architecture for the alliance.¹⁶

– In the 1960's, the United States tried to give the non-nuclear members of the alliance a greater role in nuclear affairs. A first effort was the Multilateral Force (MLF), which turned into a diplomatic disaster because of the parallel move for an American-Soviet agreement on nonproliferation. The second try, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, turned out rather successful, though so far it has not really been tested.

– In 1966 de Gaulle announced France's intention of withdrawing from the integrated military structure of the Alliance, and the consequent need to transfer Allied facilities out of France by April 1, 1967.

– As a reaction to American calls for a better burden-sharing, British Defense Minister Healey proposed the formation of a European Caucus within NATO. The EUROGROUP had its first meeting in November 1968. France does not participate in EUROGROUP activities.

– In 1973, after the traumatic experiences of Vietnam and the mutual irritations by Ostpolitik and Detente, US National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, proposed an agreement on a new “Atlantic Charter”.

¹⁵ See Charles de Gaulle, *Memoiren der Hoffnung. Die Wiedergeburt 1958-1962*. Wien, München et al. 1971, pp. 245-323.

¹⁶ For President Kennedy's addresses see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (cit. *Public Papers*), John F. Kennedy: 1962, Washington: GPO 1963, pp. 537-539; and *ibid.*: 1963, Washington: GPO 1964, pp. 516-521.

In a related speech, Kissinger stated that the US has global responsibilities, which the Europeans have only regional interests.¹⁷ This patronizing attitude, as well as the Arabs under the threat of the oil embargo, challenged the Europeans to agree first on a "Declaration on European Identity" and, only a year later, on a watered-down "Declaration on Atlantic Relations" with the North Americans.¹⁸

– Under the threat of US troop withdrawals, as called for by Senators Mansfield and Nunn (the latter with the intention not of weakening European forces, but to strengthening its conventional fighting power), and by heavy pressure from subsequent administrations for a fairer burden-sharing, the Europeans got on their feet and arranged for the establishment of European coordinating bodies (Eurogroup, Independent European Program Group) and for a number of European support programs (EDIP, LTDP, CDI).¹⁹

The European quest for a greater role acquired a new urgency under the impact of the double crisis of the early 1980's. On the one hand, the West was faced with an international crisis on the future of East-West relationships (i.e. how to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and how to prevent a similar Soviet move in Poland); on the other with an intra-alliance crisis of confidence (given the wide-spread disagreement on the Western reaction to these crises, and the violent domestic opposition to the NATO decision to deploy new INF in Western Europe). Additional irritations were provided by President Reagan's SDI initiative, the outcome of the Reykjavik summit, especially the understanding between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev to abolish all land-based missiles, and the Soviet-American double-zero INF agreement of December 1987 to scrap all land-based missiles between the range of 500-5000 km. Disagreements on nuclear strategy (as evidenced in the "Discriminate Deterrence" report and the 1989 Wintex exercises) further troubled American-European relations. The idea gained support that the Europeans would do better to look after their own security, and decrease their dependence on the United States.

¹⁷ For Kissinger's "Year of Europe" proposal see his address at the annual AP dinner in New York on April 23, 1973, *Department of State Bulletin*, May 14, 1973, Vol. 68, pp. 593-598, see also his London Pilgrim's speech, *ibid.*, December 31, 1973, Vol. 69, pp. 777-782.

¹⁸ "Declaration on European Identity", resolved by a Conference of Heads of State and of EC Governments at Copenhagen on December 14, 1973, *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 50-53; "Declaration on Atlantic Relations", approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on June 19, 1974, and signed by Heads of NATO Governments in Brussels on June 26, 1974, in *NATO Final Communiqués 1949-1974*, pp. 318-321.

¹⁹ With the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) in 1970, certain European nations agreed to provide for additional infrastructure programs; the Long-term Defense Program (LTDP) of 1978 was an action program consisting of a wide range of measures designed to help to adapt the NATO defense posture to the challenges of the 1980s; the 1985 Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative (CDI), on SACEUR's prodding, was designed to strengthen the conventional leg of the NATO triad.

Where are we now, and where do we go from here? What are some of the most pressing challenges NATO is facing and how should, and could, it adapt to cope with them? The consensus on how to deal with the Soviet Union has become shaky. Should the West help Gorbachev to restructure the Soviet system and economy, should it let him stew in his own soup, or should it bail him out? There is a strong current in the United States that sees the main task as “managing the decline of the Soviet Empire”, and at most to engage in a “damage limitation” exercise. Not many share the benign view of the present Chief of Staff, General Powell, that the Soviet Union is at present “a bear with a Smokey hat and a shovel in his hand putting out regional fires,” but rather that it is still a formidable bear in the European den, which needs to be checked by the American eagle. In Europe, especially in Germany, the opinion prevails that the West should help Gorbachev to succeed in reforming the Soviet Union, and at the same time provide for peaceful change in Eastern Europe.

The developments in Eastern Europe, in the GDR particularly, give rise to the concern that German reunification will take place quickly. In the past, all alliance members have reaffirmed the right of self-determination and have – most on a verbal level, some, however, in treaty form²⁰ – supported the wish of the German people for eventual reunification. With black-red-gold in the stress of Leipzig, however, and huge crowds calling for a common German state, with all West German parties clarifying their position on the German Question and Chancellor Kohl’s 10 points gaining wide acceptance in the Federal Republic, its allies have become uneasy and are calling for caution and restraint.²¹

There is also wide disagreement on the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy. While the United States is trying to increase the number of options available to avoid or delay escalation to the strategic nuclear level in case of military conflict, the Europeans would prefer to rely on automatic escalators to prevent any significant military actions over their territory, whether they be conventional or nuclear. There is wide-spread reluctance on the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons, most explicitly in West Germany, which resents its “singular” exposure to the risk from systems primarily deployed and targeted on German territory. The Germans, therefore, emphasize the coupling of the defense of Western Europe with that of the United States. On the whole, however, nuclear weapons lose political importance as their military usefulness diminishes. There are some indications that we are approaching a post-nuclear era,²² without being quite ready for it.

²⁰ The United States, Great Britain and France in the Paris and Bonn Treaties of 1954/55, see *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. 6, Part 4 and Part 5 (1955), Washington: GPO 1956, Doc. Nos. 3426 and 3427.

²¹ A good example is Secretary Baker’s address in Berlin, see fn. 1.

²² See Edward N. Luttwak, “An emerging post-nuclear era?” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 211, Winter 1988, pp. 5-15.

There is further disagreement among the alliance partners on the sharing of risks and burdens. When President Bush offered the Federal Republic political partnership in his Mayence speech while visiting Germany, and called for "creative responsibility sharing", he didn't spell out what such a partnership might look like.²³ It should be more than burden-sharing and the old numbers game; but is the United States prepared to share leadership? And are its partners ready to shoulder larger political and military responsibilities?

The question of out-of-area commitments is also at issue. While the United States expects its partners to join in its efforts at world-wide crisis control, the allies have in the past been reluctant to involve themselves in contingencies outside the NATO area. They have never done so as an alliance, though members have joined forces with the US either individually (as in the Lebanon in 1984) or in a coordinated move as WEU partners (as in the Gulf 1987). The Federal Republic is in a special situation since its Basic Law is interpreted as prohibiting any deployment of the Bundeswehr outside the NATO system.

With the sharply decreasing sense of a Soviet threat on the one hand, and limited financial and manpower resources available in most alliance countries on the other, domestic support for both defense and the alliance is decreasing. Is the alliance faced with a crisis of acceptability, or of legitimacy? How can support for NATO be bolstered? The Harmel Formula in itself might not be enough, though it should be made clear that the alliance does not prevent detente, but rather facilitates it by providing for political stability. It could also be useful for setting up an arms control and verification regime.

How can the allies keep trade, economic concerns, and burden-sharing frictions from undermining the alliance? European-American relations have in the past been plagued by "chicken wars", "soy bean crises", "steel conflicts", and Gas-pipeline embargoes. The EC's Common Agricultural Policy has been a bone of contention as have the COCOM rules to restrict trade with the communist bloc. A fair amount of energy had to be spent to solve all these mini-crises and crises, and to prevent them from impinging on security relations. What should be done to ensure that after 1992 the European Community produces net gains for NATO as a whole, instead of additional irritations?

There is a consensus among Western policy elites that NATO continues to be a vital element in the Atlantic security system. As has been mentioned, there is a need for structural reform to adapt it to the changing distribution of weight within the alliance. Could a "European Pillar" take account of this trend and reform the present structure? What should it look like? Will the Europeans be able to muster the necessary community of interests to speak with a single voice? How could a "European Pillar"

²³ See Address of President George Bush in Mayence, *US Policy Information and Texts*, No. 70, June 1, 1989, pp. 1-7.

function without weakening the cohesion of the alliance, and preventing a disengagement of the United States?

There have also been various American plans for the reorganization of NATO. In 1984 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed giving the Europeans a greater role in alliance affairs, while also charging them with a heavier burden, e.g. by appointing a European as Saceur.²⁴ More recently, however, former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and SAIS professor, David P. Calleo have called for a devolution of the American commitment, leaving it to the Europeans to sort out their role.²⁵ This latter perspective has not yet been taken seriously by the Europeans.

For them, a basis goal is to preserve the essential security link with the United States – the coupling of the defense of Western Europe to that of the United States (the nuclear umbrella) – as well as maintaining a constructive political relationship in spite of increasing US pressure for “a fairer sharing of the burden”, for devolution, or even disengagement.

III. Burden-sharing in NATO

After this year’s NATO Summit Meeting, Secretary of State James Baker called for “creative responsibility sharing” with the US’ allies²⁶ what did he mean by it, was it just new clothes for the old issue of burden-sharing? He defined it as

really a broader concept than burden-sharing. It embraces issues such as how we define threats to our security, how we divide up responsibilities, and who we engage in responsibility sharing. It applies to a broad range of issues on the international agenda.²⁷

Has there really been a change of concepts, or paradigms, in American political thinking? To answer this question it might be useful to look at past paradigms of burden-sharing:

²⁴ See Henry A. Kissinger, “A Plan to Reshape NATO,” *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, 1984, No. 1.

²⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Choosing where to put our forces,” *Washington Times*, June 2, 1987; David P. Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony. The Future of the Western Alliance*, New York: Basic Books 1987.

²⁶ “After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the West in a Changing World.” Address by Secretary Baker before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1989, US State Department, *Current Policy*, No. 1181, p. 3.

²⁷ Baker, fn. 1.

1949/1959: Priority of economic recovery

In the immediate post-war period, emphasis had been on the economic recovery of Europe. According to the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the size of European forces should not interfere with their countries' economic recovery. Occupied Germany paid occupation costs, but also received substantial economic aid from the United States, mostly under GARIOA and ERP programs.²⁸

With the end of the occupation regime in 1955, Germany stopped paying occupation costs; a few payments, however, continued until 1958. There had been an understanding that the Federal Republic would spend the same amount on rearmament and the equipment of the Bundeswehr. (Allied Forces in Berlin are still funded from the German Federal Budget, the level of expenditures being negotiated between the FRG and the US and then appropriated by the German Bundestag). The FRG, as well as most of the other European NATO countries, received US Military Assistance (MAP).

1960/61-1968/76: Offsetting the "Dollar drain"

Between 1960 and 1976, a series of off-set agreements were concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, totaling about 10 billion US dollars, to compensate for US military expenditure in Western Europe (the "dollar drain") through the purchase of military equipment in the U.S., and since 1968, also by the purchase of US treasury bonds, and by a German commitment not to exchange dollars for gold, thus stabilizing the dollar on international currency markets (and financially supporting the U.S. during the Vietnam War). Later on the FRG agreed to supply services for US troops in Germany (repair of barracks etc.). Some West European NATO countries filled in for the United States in giving increased military assistance and training to the poorer NATO countries like Greece, Portugal and Turkey, as well as to some other US allies like Iran, Pakistan and Ethiopia.

1969-1974: How to deal with "Overcommitment"?

In Guam in 1969 President Richard Nixon called on the allies to take better care of their own security, while the US would in the future limit its support to military aid but refrain from direct military involvement. This "Nixon Doctrine" was complemented by the resolve of Congress to end American overcommitment. Senator Mike Mansfield and some of his colleagues called in a number of resolutions for unilateral troop with-

²⁸ Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) was fund to support the administration and to provide for economic aid in the former enemy territories; the European Recovery Program (ERP) was the so-called Marshall Plan Aid. Under both programs Germany between 1946-1952 received about 3 bill. US Dollars.

drawals from Western Europe (and other places), and for circumscription of the war-making powers of the US President. Though none of these resolutions came into force, they were a powerful political signal. They were further diffused by the promise of mutual troop reductions as a result of the MBFR talks.

There had also been economic overstretch, which became evident in the various currency crises of 1968-1974. In response, the US closed the gold window" in 1970; speculation on the international currency markets forced it to agree to a realignment of the Dollar (to some extent forced upon the United States by Germany and France after these countries let their currencies float against the dollar. The Smithsonian Agreement of 1971 provided only temporary relief, as did the "Snake-in-the-tunnel", an agreement to limit the floating range of the combined European currencies against the dollar. After more speculation, the international financial markets returned to a free-floating monetary system on the eve of the OPEC-induced oil crisis.

1976-1986: "Atlanticist paradigm" – Improvement of conventional forces

In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of members of the US Senate, most notably Senators Henry "Scoop" Jackson and Sam Nunn, undertook various initiatives to improve NATO conventional forces, especially its C³I capabilities, survivability, sustainability, firepower, and ability to use E.T.'s, etc.

- The 1974 Jackson-Nunn amendment was to improve the "teeth-to-tail" ratio of US forces.²⁹
- The 1975 Nunn-Culver amendment urged the Secretary of Defense to improve NATO standardization, and required US procurements to be consistent with the standardization of NATO forces.³⁰
- In 1977 the NATO Heads of State and of Government pledged to increase their defense spending by 3% (in real terms) annually ("Three-Percent-Solution").³¹

²⁹ See P. L. 93-155, *Defense Authorization Act, 1974*, cited in *US Military Commitments to Europe*. Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee to the H. R. Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, April 4, 1974. See also *Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance*. Report by Senator Nunn to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, April 2, 1974.

³⁰ See P. L. 94-106, Section 814.

³¹ In May 1978, the NATO Ministers pledged their countries to increase their defense expenditures in real terms by 3% above inflation annually. See also *The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future of NATO*. By the Staff of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute 1981.

– One year later, in 1978, NATO agreed on a Long-term Defense Program (LTDP), with emphasis on conventional force improvements.³²

– In 1980, the Levin Amendment required the Secretary of Defense to report on allied defense efforts, especially whether the allies were meeting the 3 percent spending objective, and to describe cost sharing arrangements within NATO and with Japan. Starting in March 1981, the Administration annually transmits to Congress an “Allied Commitments Report.” Congress also expressed its feeling that the President should seek increased support from host nations for the costs of stationing US forces there.³³

– Following up on the congressional mandate, the US Government, in the December 1980 Stoessel Demarche, demanded additional services and contributions from the Federal Republic of Germany. Bonn declined agreement on a Master Restationing Plan (MRP), but the Federal Republic and the United States concluded a War-time Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS) in 1982 under which Bonn agreed to assign ready reserves to provide support and logistics for American reinforcements in case of an emergency.³⁴

– In a display of continued displeasure over European attitudes toward the Soviet Union, and about their lagging defense commitments, the Alaska Senator Stevens in 1982 sought a cut of approximately 20,000 in the number of troops deployed in Western Europe, and wanted to put a cap on the remaining forces. In a compromise worked out between Senators Stevens and Nunn, a ceiling of 315,000 was established, together with the provision that the President could waive the ceiling for national security reasons.³⁵

– The 1984 Nunn/Roth resolution, modified by the Cohen compromise, established a permanent ceiling on US forces in Western Europe at 326,414 men; to be reduced by 30,000 in each of the following three years if the allies did not meet the 3% spending increase or specified output goals (munitions supply, shelters for aircraft, sustainability of troops).

This line of argument was in accordance with the strategy of flexible response, and was to reinforce previous arguments for less reliance on

³² See fn. 19.

³³ See *P. L. 96-342*, Section 1006.

³⁴ For details see my “Die Zukunft der amerikanischen militärischen Präsenz in Europa,” *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 38, No. 20, pp. 639-648; also my “Lastenteilung im Atlantischen Bündnis. Die Zukunft der amerikanischen militärischen Präsenz in Europa,” *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 40, No. 16, pp. 497-506.

³⁵ For the Stevens Amendment see *Senate Resolution S 2951*, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, September 30, 1982, p. S 2951, see also *P. L. 96-377*, 1983 *Omnibus Defense Authorization Act*.

nuclear weapons as well as for less exposure of the United States to the nuclear dangers inherent in extended deterrence.³⁶

– The 1985 Nunn/Roth/Warner amendment was devoid of any coercive clause. It targeted US funds for cooperative weapons research and development, to improve interoperability, and to work toward a American-European two-way street in weapons procurement.³⁷

– The 1987 Conrad amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act called on the allies to negotiate a schedule for increases in their defense spending.³⁸

– The 1989 Nunn-Warner amendment mandated cuts in US defense expenditures earmarked for NATO if there was a negative change in the “baseline ratio” between US and Allied troops in Europe.³⁹

1988-1990: “Fundamentalist paradigm” – A Call for a devolution of the US commitment to Europe

With the withering away of the Soviet threat, the risks inherent in the United States’ military presence in Western Europe were reduced; but so also was the rationale for having these forces there. The diminishing threat thus gave rise to a competing paradigm.

The “fundamentalist paradigm” was not entirely new, and it came in two variations:

– One was a call for world-wide power projection by the United States – and for a devolution of the traditional US commitment to Europe. Its proponents argued that it was not in the US interest to have 60% of its military expenditures tied up in the NATO area. Former Secretary of the Navy, John Lehmann, planned a 600-ship navy, while former National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued for a small intervention capability, to be deployed in international crises, be they in South West Asia or Central America.⁴⁰

³⁶ See *P. L. 98-525, 1985 Omnibus Defense Authorization Act*; for the Nunn/Roth amendment see Amendment 3266, “Improvements to NATO conventional capability,” for the Cohen compromise see Amendment 3267, *Congressional Record, Senate*, June 20, 1984, pp. S. 7721 and 7741.

³⁷ See Amendment 187, “To improve cooperation in research, development, and production of military equipment among NATO nations,” *Congressional Record, Senate*, May 22, 1985, pp. S 6756-6766. See also *P. L. 99-661, 1987 Defense Authorization Act*.

³⁸ *P. L. 100-204, Section 1254, 1988/1989 Foreign Relations Authorization Act*, Section 812, “Sense of Congress Relating to Support of Mutual Defense Alliances.” The Secretaries of State and of Defense submitted the requested report “Sharing the Roles, Risks and Responsibilities for the Common Defense” in December 1988.

³⁹ See Amendment 527, “To provide for a reduction in the relative amount of the cost of maintaining United States forces in Europe that is to be borne by the United States,” *Congressional Record, Senate*, July 31, 1989, pp. S 9156 and 9307.

⁴⁰ See fn. 25

– The other strand has been represented by House Member Pat Schroeder, who in the Mansfield tradition called for burden-shedding, not burden-sharing. A “Defense Burden-sharing Panel”, chaired by the Congresswoman, has judged in an interim report, that US commitments have extended beyond its capabilities. In the Panel’s view,.

US economic strength vis-à-vis the rest of the world has declined significantly. In 1988, concerns about the Federal deficit, the trade imbalance, high Federal spending generally and high defense spending specifically have ignited a national debate about our future defense needs and a reassessment of US global military commitments.⁴¹

As a consequence, according to the report,

Many Americans feels that we are competing 100 percent militarily with the Soviets and 100 percent economically with our defense allies. Some have said that the United States has incurred all the burdens of empire and few, if any, of the benefits.⁴²

In the view of the panel, the United States cannot sustain this relationship any longer. It warns that change is essential:

The Panel states in the strongest possible terms that Europeans had better be prepared to defend their own territory without a large-scale US ground commitment, because that commitment cannot be guaranteed for-ever.⁴³

Pat Schroeder is generally considered a representative of the more liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Much of the report reflects the critique of those in the Democratic Party who have traditionally argued that US federal spending should be reoriented toward domestic social programs. But the report also draws heavily on testimony provided by political conservatives, including former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. They argued that the United States needs to reduce its efforts in NATO because US forces will in the future need more flexibility in order to deal with projected military challenges to Western interests in the Third World.⁴⁴

At present the two last paradigms, the “Atlantic” and the “fundamentalist”, compete with each other in American Congressional and public opinion.

In the past, the Europeans have tried to meet American expectations by a number of multilateral and bilateral programs. Most were ad hoc pro-

⁴¹ *Report of the Defense Burden-Sharing Panel*. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, August 1988, p. 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp.2-3

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 8

⁴⁴ See Stanley R. Sloan, “The United States and NATO: Commitment in Balance. A Case Study of US Policy prepared for the Atlantic Council of the Change”, October 1988 (manuscript), p. 19.

grams, few ran on a continuing basis. One of the latter has been the NATO Infrastructure Program, in which most members pay a certain amount into a common fund according to their economic ability. The biggest contributors are the United States with 27% and the Federal Republic with 26.44%. However, the FRG is also one of the countries getting most out of the program. From this fund the logistics structure of NATO – air strips, oil pipelines, communications systems, airplane shelters and other projects for the common use – are financed. Also, the relocation of NATO Headquarters from Fontainebleau to Brussels was paid out of infrastructure fund, as was the rebasing of the US F-16 squadron from Terrejon to Comiso in Italy. Other principal joint funding programs include the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO), the Airborne Early Warning System (AWACS), the NATO Multi-role Combat Aircraft Development, Production and In-Service Support Management Agency (NAMMA), the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) and the NATO European Fighter Management Organization (NEFMO).

Ad hoc programs have been: The Long-term Defense Program (LTDP), the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS), joint R&D programs for weapons procurement according to the Nunn Initiative, and others, such as military assistance programs to Greece and Turkey.

Bilateral German-American programs have been the POMCUS (Pre-positioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets), the WHNS (War-time Host Nation Support) and the Roland-Patriot Program. Pre-positioning was initiated with the 1967 trilateral agreement to withdraw some of the ready forces from West Germany, but keep them earmarked for NATO missions and bring them back for regular exercises (REFORGER). In the 1982 WHNS agreement the Federal Republic has agreed to provide 93,000 reserves to support US forces redeployed to Germany in a crisis situation; with the 1984 Roland-Patriot deal the FRG provides the personnel to man US Anti-aircraft batteries equipped with Patriot missiles on loan from the United States.

German-French defense cooperation figures prominently in intra-European Cooperation. Both countries regularly consult each other, and have anchored these processes in a number of joint institutions such as a Franco-German Defense Council and a joint army brigade deployed in South-West Germany. There is also a good deal of bilateral German-British and British-French defense cooperation.⁴⁵

Various European countries have formed multinational consortia for joint arms production. The German-French Alpha Jet and Roland Missile,

⁴⁵ See Karl Kaiser/Pierre Lellouche, Eds., *Le couple franco-allemand et la défense de l'Europe*. Paris: Masson 1986; Karl Kaiser/John Roper, Eds., *British-German Defense Cooperation. Partners within the Alliance*. London: Jane's Publishing Co. 1987; Yves Boyer/Pierre Lellouche/John Roper, Eds., *Pour une nouvelle entente cordiale: la relance de l'alliance franco-britannique en matière de sécurité*. Paris: Masson 1988.

as well as the British-German-Italian Tornado, have been technical though not commercial successes. National specifications have added to the production costs, while different export policies have contributed to political frictions. As a by-product of the Nunn initiative to stimulate American-European joint arms projects, the number of new European joint ventures has decreased.⁴⁶

So far there has been little intra-European burden-sharing, though some took place when Germany supplied military equipment and gave military assistance to Turkey, to which the U. S. had committed substantial defense assistance in exchange for Turkish membership of NATO.

The most recent debate on burden-sharing between the United States and its NATO allies has to be seen in the context of another debate on US hegemony, and on US leadership during, and became particularly important after, the Vietnam War as a debate on US "overcommitment". According to the "Nixon Doctrine"⁴⁷ it was to be solved, in some part at least, by off-set arrangements and burden-sharing with America's allies and friends. It was conceptually fuelled by books such as Robert Keohane's "After Hegemony" and Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers".⁴⁸ There has been as long tradition in American thinking on how to make interests and commitments meet power and resources.⁴⁹

There has always been some ambivalence in American Political thinking on the role of power. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleberger, in a recent lecture at Georgetown University, reaffirmed that

the shift in the balance of power among the leading Western countries does not mean that the United States must abandon its leadership role. On the contrary, the United States will remain for long into the next century the only power able – or at least willing – to think in global terms and to fashion policies in the overall political, economic and security interests of the West. We have not always done this well, nor have we necessarily done so for selfless reasons, but the fact remains that none of our Western partners has the global reach or the disposition to take the lead in safeguarding the institutional mechanisms which are vital to the preservation of international political and economic stability. Our capacity to play this role may have been diminished, but the need for us to do so has not.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ See David Buchan, "The West European defense industry: A vision, of an entente militaire," *Financial Times*, May 18, 1987.

⁴⁷ See President Richard M. Nixon's remarks with newsmen, in Guam, *Public Papers*, Richard M. Nixon: 1969, Washington: GPO 1970, pp. 544-556.

⁴⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House 1987.

⁴⁹ For a classical treatment see Walter Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little & Brown 1943; for the application of this principle to the post-World War II experience see Robert E. Osgood, "American Grand Strategy: Patterns, Problems, and Prescriptions," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1983, pp. 5-17.

⁵⁰ US Information Service, *Wireless Bulletin*, No. 116, p. 3.

Limitations on available resources, especially the “budget squeeze” (the deficit in the US Federal Budget and the commitment of the Bush Administration to balance the budget without raising taxes), have contributed to increasing demands from both the Administration and Congress in the United States that its partners should carry “their fair share” of the “Transatlantic Bargain”.

What has the “Transatlantic Bargain” been all about? It has been, at its core

- an Atlantic security guarantee, essential for the security and well-being of the United States itself, and for Western Europe as its strategic and political “glacis”;
- a fundamental geopolitical calculation that the United States can not be indifferent to the balance of power in Europe;
- an important device for containing the Soviet Union;
- a means of access to markets and resources (and a correlate to the Marshall Plan).

The United States commitment was in exchange for the promise of a substantial European contribution towards European defense.

With its “Troops-to-Europe Decision” (Sen. Res. 99) in 1951 Congress endorsed the “Transatlantic Bargain”, but already at this time it had qualified its consent to President Truman’s decision to send an additional four divisions to Europe. It had stated that it was “the feeling of the Senate” that, among other things, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify that the European allies were making a realistic effort on behalf of European defense. The Senators felt that the European partners should make the major contribution to Allied general forces, and that provision should be made to utilize the military resources of Italy, West Germany, and Spain. They reserved for themselves the right to agree to any increase of these forces above the six divisions committed to Europe in 1950/51.⁵¹

The bargain was maintained intact into the late 1960’s, and again into the early 1980’s, but further circumscribed:

- In a 1967 Trilateral Agreement the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic agreed to return some troops to their country of origin, but keep them assigned to NATO duty, with their equipment pre-positioned (POMCUS), and have them transferred to Western Europe regularly for exercises (REFORGER);
- The 1982 Stevens amendment put a cap (of 315,000 men) on the number of US troops deployed in Europe. The following year the number was slightly raised, using a Presidential waiver, in order to deploy personnel for manning the new Pershing II and Cruise missile units.
- The 1984 Nunn/Roth amendment and Cohen substitute served as a signal that the continued US military presence was contingent on increased

⁵¹ Senate Resolution 99, Conally/Russel Resolution with McCellan Amendment, 82nd US Congress, 1st Session, April 4, 1951, p. S 3282; see also Wesley Byron Truitt, *The Troops to Europe Decision: The Process, Politics, and Diplomacy of a Strategic Commitment*. 1968 Columbia Ph.D. Dissertation (microfilm).

European defense spending in the range of 3%, or as a substitute, the provision of an adequate munitions' supply, increased numbers of aircraft shelters, and improved sustainability of conventional forces. Otherwise, in each of the next three years the US forces were mandated to be cut by 30,000 men.

– With the Nunn/Warner amendment to the Defense Authorization Act (S. 1352) of 1989/90 the Senate tied the level of US troops to the then existing ration of allied troops, and mandated corresponding cuts if those were reduced.⁵²

The call for a “fairer share of the burden” is as old as the alliance, but how does one measure a “fair share”? The public debate has focused on military spending, as it is easier to measure financial input than military output. For analytic purposes, and in terms of military relevance, “resources” and “output” are more relevant.

Any comparison of US and West European defense expenditures will be to the disadvantage of the West Europeans if one looks at the aggregated input figures. However, in the US defense budget there is no distinction between expenditures for the NATO theatre, and those for other contingencies. Traditional wisdom has it that about 60% of all defense-related expenditures are for NATO-related purposes.

⁵² See Stanley R. Sloan, *Defense Burden-sharing: US Relations with NATO Allies and Japan*. June 24, 1988 (CRS Report for Congress, 88-449 F), pp. 17-26. For the Nunn/Warner amendment see fn. 39.

Table 1a: Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries

Current prices and exchange rates										
Country	Currency unit (million)	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989e	
Belgium	Belgium francs	37388	70899	115754	144183	152079	155422	150647	155164	
Canada	Canada \$	1999	3360	5787	10331	10970	11715	12335	12611	
Denmark	Danish Kroner	2967	5355	9117	13343	13333	14647	15620	15813	
France	French francs	32672	55872	111672	186715	197080	209525	215073	223868	
Germany *	Deutsche mark	22573	37589	48518	58649	60130	61354	61638	63269	
Greece	Drachmae	14208	45936	96975	321981	338465	393052	479236	521209	
Italy	1000 Lire	1562	3104	8203	18584	20071	23788	26590	—	
Luxembourg	Lux. francs	415	636	1534	2265	2390	2730	3163	3142	
Netherlands	Dutch guilder	3909	7119	10476	12901	13110	13254	13300	13583	
Norway	Norw. Kroner	2774	4771	8242	15446	16033	18551	18865	21117	
Portugal	Escudos	12538	19898	43440	11375	139972	159288	193864	207738	
Spain	Pesetas	—	—	350423	674893	715306	852767	835353	912173	
Turkey	Turkish liras	6399	32833	203172	1234547	1867990	2476869	3788920	6104534	
United Kingdom	Pounds sterling	2607	5571	11542	18352	18639	19269	19495	21239	
United-States	US dollars	79846	88400	138191	258165	281105	288157	293093	300325	
NATO Europe	US dollars	—	—	112791	92711	120787	148358	157014	—	
North America	US dollars	81754	91704	143141	265731	269000	296992	303116	310810	
NATO total	US dollars	—	—	255932	358442	409787	445350	460130	—	

* In addition to defense expenditures (NATO definition), the German authorities are obliged to incur large expenditures for Berlin owing to the exceptional situation of this city and the need in the interest of the free world to ensure its viability. These expenditures, which are not included in the figures given above since they do not come within the NATO definition are forecast to be 17234.6 million DM in 1989.

Table 1b: Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries

1980 prices and exchange rates

Country	Currency unit (million)	1970	1975	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989e
Belgium	Belgium francs	73305	95529	115754	114788	120475	122428	118100	118906
Canada	Canada \$	5336	5227	5787	7708	7931	8104	8189	8012
Denmark	Danish kroner	8409	8226	9117	9197	9166	9373	9643	9454
France	French francs	83537	91618	111672	120263	120665	124430	123647	125071
Germany *	Deutsche mark	37866	45932	48518	50191	49912	49908	49388	49679
Greece	Drachmae	51337	94420	96975	127521	114304	116217	123806	117333
Italy	1000 Lire	6484	7236	8203	9134	9228	9766	10202	10398
Luxembourg	Lux. francs	797	1130	1534	1710	1771	2008	2313	2242
Netherlands	Dutch guilder	9426	9788	10476	11604	12045	12251	12227	12398
Norway	Norw. kroner	7145	7230	8242	10069	9888	10844	10453	11305
Portugal	Escudos	49184	50485	43440	41421	43218	43795	47890	46274
Spain	Pesetas	—	—	350423	394029	376619	423790	392764	404598
Turkey	Turkish liras	74001	161276	203172	221393	250179	247004	255302	262999
United Kingdom	Pounds sterling	11627	11462	11542	12940	12529	12265	11740	12123
United-States	US dollars	174994	130923	138191	188074	200162	199517	196676	194647
NATO Europe	US dollars	—	—	112791	122529	121861	123847	122419	124369
North America	US dollars	179558	135393	143141	194666	206945	206449	203680	201499
NATO total	US dollars	—	—	255932	317195	328806	330296	326100	325868

* In addition to defense expenditures (NATO definition), the German authorities are obliged to incur large expenditures for Berlin owing to the exceptional situation of this city and the need in the interest of the free world to ensure its viability. These expenditures, which are not included in the figures given above since they do not come within the NATO definition are forecast to be 17234.6 million DM in 1989.

Table 2a: Defense Expenditures as % of Gross Domestic Product based on current prices⁵³

Country	Average 1970-1974	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989e
Belgium	2.9	3.2	3.3	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.7
Denmark	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1
France	3.9	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.7
Germany *	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.9
Greece	4.7	6.7	6.6	6.4	7.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.0
Italy	2.3	2.1	2.2	-	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	-
Luxembourg	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2
Netherlands	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.0	2.9
Norway	3.3	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.3
Portugal	6.9	3.9	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.0
Spain	-	-	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.1
Turkey	4.4	5.7	4.9	4.3	4.5	4.8	4.3	4.1	3.9
Unit.-Kingdom	5.1	4.9	5.2	4.6	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.2	4.2
NATO Europe	-	-	3.6	-	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.2	-
Canada	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0
United-States	6.5	5.1	5.8	6.3	6.1	6.7	6.4	6.1	5.8
North America	6.1	4.8	5.5	5.9	6.2	6.3	6.1	5.7	5.4
NATO total	-	-	4.7	-	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.5	-

* These percentages have been calculated without taking into account the expenditures (see note table 1).

⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense, Press Release, M-DPC-2 (87) 48, 1st December 1987, pp. 3-4; and Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. A Report to the United States Congress*, April 1988, pp. 13-14 (tables II-2 and II-3).

Table 2b: Defense Expenditures as % of Gross Domestic Product based on constant prices

Country	Average 1970-1974	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989e
Belgium	2.9	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.0
Denmark	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1
France	3.9	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.7
Germany *	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.9
Greece	4.7	6.7	6.6	6.4	7.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.0
Italy	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2
Luxembourg	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
Netherlands	3.5	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
Norway	3.6	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.0
Portugal	6.4	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.0
Spain	-	-	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.1
Turkey	2.8	4.5	4.4	3.9	4.1	4.2	3.9	3.8	3.7
Unit-Kingdom	5.7	5.0	5.2	4.5	5.1	4.8	4.5	4.1	4.1
NATO Europe	-	-	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.2
Canada	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0
United-States	6.8	5.1	5.6	5.9	6.1	6.3	6.0	5.7	5.6
North America	6.4	4.9	5.3	5.6	5.7	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.2
NATO total	-	-	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.3	4.2

* These percentages have been calculated without taking into account the expenditures (see note table 1); if these expenditures were included, the percentages (based on constant prices) would be as follows:
1970: 3.3 1980: 4.1 1986: 3.9 1988: 3.7
1975: 4.4 1985: 4.0 1987: 3.9 1989: 3.7

Table 3: Selected Indicators of Contribution to NATO Defense (including Spain)										
Rank	Defense Spending Share %	Defense Spending Change 71 vs 87	Active Defense Manpower-Share (%)	Active Defense Manpower (% Change 71 vs 87)	Active & Reserve Defense Manpower-Share (%)	Ground Forces DEF Share (%)	Tac Air Combat Act Share (%)	Naval Tonnage (All Ships Less SSBN) Share (%)		
1	US 61.33	TU 177.99	US 41.39	TU 44.73	US 37.45	US 42.22	US 45.67	US R9.71		
2	FR 7.41	LU 148.23	TU 11.40	LU 13.93	GE 11.27	GE 11.74	FR 9.46	UK 13.48		
3	GE 7.27	JA 140.32	FR 8.47	GR 13.39	FR 9.69	TU 9.97	UK 9.06	FR 6.10		
4	UK 6.72	GR 108.22	GE 8.16	TU 9.61	TU 9.61	FR 6.00	GE 6.64	JA 4.24		
5	JA 5.19	SP 73.62	IT 7.10	NO 4.65	IT 6.17	GR 5.16	TU 5.40	GE 2.79		
6	IT 3.91	BE 60.04	UK 6.13	GE 4.43	SP 5.98	IT 4.55	TU 5.00	TU 2.73		
7	CA 1.89	NO 52.79	JA 4.34	JA 3.26	UK 5.05	UK 4.30	JA 3.85	IT 2.11		
8	SP 1.47	FR 52.43	JA 3.24	BE 0.76	GR 3.61	JA 3.61	GR 3.37	SP 2.10		
9	NE 1.39	CA 42.96	GR 2.78	FR -0.83	JA 2.20	SP 3.24	NE 2.18	GR 1.67		
10	BE 0.89	IT 37.30	NE 1.62	CA -1.73	NE 2.16	NE 3.06	SP 2.08	CA 1.62		
11	GR 0.62	NE 28.00	CA 1.52	IT -2.26	BE 1.81	BE 1.75	BE 2.08	NE 1.30		
12	TU 0.61	GE 26.14	PO 1.39	NE -5.95	NO 1.81	NO 1.41	CA 2.03	NO 2.03		
13	NO 0.59	US 24.66	BE 1.39	US -10.77	PO 1.22	DE 1.35	PO 1.34	PO 0.67		
14	DE 0.46	DE 11.99	NO 0.60	DE -29.22	CA 1.13	CA 0.96	NO 1.04	DE 0.42		
15	PO 0.24	UK 4.98	DE 0.46	UK -29.53	DE 0.82	PO 0.68	DE 0.89	BE 0.31		
16	LU 0.02	PO -21.42	LU 0.02	PO -53.79	LU 0.01	LU 0.01	LU 0.00	LU 0.00		
Non-US NATO	33.47	32.30	55.38	* 0.99	60.34	54.17	50.48	36.05		
Non-US NATO + Japan	38.67	40.80	58.61	* 0.75	62.55	57.78	54.33	40.29		
Total NATO	94.81	27.26	96.76	* 5.62	97.80	96.39	96.15	95.76		
Total NATO + Japan	100.00	30.44	100.00	* 5.35	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		

* = excludes Spain

Rank	Ratio: Def. Spend. Share/GDP Share	Ratio: Active Def. Manpower/Pop. Share	Ratio: Active & Res. Def. Manpower- Pop. Share	Ratio: DEF Share/ GDP Share	Ratio: Acft Share/ GDP Share	Ratio: Naval Tonnage Share/GDP Share
1	US 1.61	GR 2.19	NO 3.33	TU 17.83	TU 9.65	TU 4.88
2	GR 1.52	TU 1.86	GR 2.77	GR 12.71	GR 8.06	GR 4.11
3	UK 1.17	US 1.30	TU 1.42	PO 2.19	PO 4.28	UK 2.35
4	TU 1.10	FR 1.17	GE 1.42	NO 1.98	BE 1.75	PO 2.14
5	FR 0.98	NO 1.09	BE 1.41	NE 1.66	UK 1.58	US 1.56
6	NO 0.83	BE 1.09	FR 1.34	DE 1.54	NO 1.46	NO 1.08
7	PO 0.77	PO 1.04	DE 1.23	BE 1.47	FR 1.25	SP 0.85
8	GE 0.76	GE 1.02	SP 1.18	SP 1.31	US 1.20	FR 0.81
9	NE 0.75	IT 0.95	US 1.18	GE 1.22	NE 1.18	NE 0.70
10	BE 0.74	SP 0.86	NE 1.13	US 1.11	DE 1.02	DE 0.48
11	IT 0.60	NE 0.85	PO 0.91	FR 0.79	SP 0.84	CA 0.45
12	SP 0.59	UK 0.83	IT 0.83	UK 0.75	IT 0.77	IT 0.33
13	CA 0.53	DE 0.69	UK 0.68	IT 0.70	GE 0.69	GE 0.29
14	DE 0.52	CA 0.45	CA 0.34	CA 0.27	CA 0.57	BE 0.26
15	LU 0.30	LU 0.35	LU 0.21	LU 0.19	JA 0.19	JA 0.21
16	JA 0.25	JA 0.02	JA 0.14	JA 0.18	LU 0.00	LU 0.00
Non-US NATO	0.81	1.06	1.15	1.31	1.22	0.87
Non-US NATO + Japan	0.63	0.86	0.92	0.93	0.88	0.65
Total NATO	1.19	1.15	1.16	1,211.06	1.21	1.20
Total NATO + Japan	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.86	1.00	1.00

There are very obvious limits to the “numbers game”. If the output is measured one arrives at somewhat different figures:

Table 5: Country Performance in Selected Burdensharing and Force Improvement Areas⁵⁴

	BE	CA	DE	FR	GE	GR	IT	LU	NL	NO	PO	SP	TU	UK	US	JA
% GDP for Defense	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕
Active Duty Military and Civilian as % of Population	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	●	⊕
Military, Civilians, and Reserves as % of Population	●	⊕	●	●	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊕
Ground Combat Capability DEF/GDP	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	●	●	●	●	⊕	⊕
Air Force Combat Aircraft/GDP	●	⊕	●	●	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	●	⊕
Naval Tonnage/GDP	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	●	⊕
Nuclear Contributions	●	*	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	⊕	⊕	*	*	●	●	●	*
Force Goal Performance	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	*	⊕	●	●	*
CDI Force Goals	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	●	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	*	●	●	●	*
Munitions Sustainability	⊕	●	⊕	*	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	⊕	●	●	*
Host Nation Support	●	*	⊕	*	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	⊕	⊕	*	●
Military Assistance to LDDI	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	●	*	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	*	*	⊕	⊕	⊕	*
Development Assistance as a % of GDP	●	●	●	●	●	*	●	*	●	●	*	*	*	⊕	⊕	●
Out-of-Area Contributions (Persian Gulf Support)	●	⊕	⊕	●	●	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	*	⊕	⊕	●	●	⊕
Level of Performance and/or Contribution: ● High ⊕ Medium ⊕ Low ● High/Medium ⊕ Medium/Low * Not available or not applicable																
Note: No set of selected indicators can fully convey the full range of nation's defense efforts and burdensharing contributions. Readers are, therefore, urged to review this chart in conjunction with the detailed discussions and data elsewhere in the report.																

⁵⁴ 1989 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (Allied Commitments Report), Report by the Secretary of Defense to the US Congress, Washington, DC., April 1989, pp. 14, 15 and 9; see also EUROGROUP, *Western Defense: The European Role in NATO*, Brussels 1988, pp. 10-11.

With the Nunn/Roth amendment of 1984, the United States recognized that output categories are more important than unrelated input figures, and that there is an output equivalent to the spending goals. However, there are still other elements of the contribution which are even more difficult to measure and compare:

- effectiveness, training, and readiness of troops;
 - lower costs of draft armies vs. voluntary forces;
 - investment in modern weapons systems vs. high operating costs;
- Further limits to any "numbers game" are the non-material costs and services the Europeans are carrying, such as:
- provision of ground and buildings for stationed and indigenous troops;
 - opportunity costs for military services;
 - heavy exposure to military manoeuvres, low-flying exercises etc.;
 - domestic opposition to military burden because of low threat perception, disagreement with national priorities, opposition to US leadership;
 - singularly sharing the nuclear risk.

The Federal Republic also argues that its substantial support for Berlin is part of its contribution to the common defense.

Over time, the arguments for a "fairer share of the burden" have changed, and they will continue to do so in the future. A helpful experience has been the NATO Burden-sharing Exercise, which presented its report in December 1988.⁵⁵ It has somewhat alleviated the problem but not put it to rest. If detente continues, very likely burden-sharing will no longer refer to who should be doing more, but who will be permitted to do less. Burden-sharing might become a competition in burden-shedding. This will be the case if the CFE talks yield a substantial arms control agreement.

A soft spot has been the American suggestion that NATO partners should cooperate more closely in responding to out-of-area contingencies. After some hesitation, in 1987 they cooperated with the United States in the security of the Gulf shipping lanes, either by sending naval units, otherwise supporting these activities by relieving members of other duties (Germany), or contributing financially (Luxembourg). Interestingly enough, these activities have been coordinated in the WEU Council of Ministers.

In the past, American demands for more burden-sharing have contributed to European-American irritations and frustrations; but they have also challenged the Europeans to strengthen their defense cooperation and to develop concepts for a European Pillar, or security caucus, in order to make Western Europe less dependent on American politics.

An important function for a West European security caucus could be the development of solutions for multilateral burden-sharing with the United States. In the long-term, a European Pillar could contribute to a

⁵⁵ See *Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance. A Report by NATO's Defense Planning Committee*, Brussels: December 1988.

better sharing of risks, of burdens, and of responsibility with the United States. But this is not a very likely short-term perspective given the different power relationships, global and geopolitical roles of the United States and the West European countries.

IV. Prospects and Problems of West European Security Cooperation

As we have seen, the greatest need is to provide for European policy coordination in those cases where the West Europeans are challenged to provide a common response. In the past, various institutions have been used for this purpose:

- the EPC in 1973-76, to coordinate policies regarding both the CSCE process and the European-Arab dialogue;
- the Western European Union during the Iran-Iraq Gulf War, to work out a European contribution in the Persian Gulf;
- the EUROGROUP in some limited way, to deal the American demand for better burden-sharing;
- The Independent European Program Group (alongside with the NATO CNADs) to coordinate and consult on joint armaments programs.

However, there exists little organization and therefore little continuity for agreeing on a common position, e.g. on burden-sharing vis-à-vis the United States. Available mechanisms are highly specialized, and often on an *ad hoc* basis deal with a specific project or contingency. Also, membership is quite selective, e.g. the French do not participate in EUROGROUP activities, and the WEU leaves out most of the smaller European countries.

So there are many gaps and, at the same time, there is some overlap. In past years we have witnessed, however, a steady process toward closer European cooperation on issues of security. This process is encouraging, and nourishes the hope that one day a European security network or caucus will emerge.

Some of the most promising developments have been:

- the reactivation of the WEU, after the watering-down of the Genscher-Colombo initiative and the Single European Act;
- the October 1986 Rome declaration on increased cooperation in security policy, and the October 1987 decision on a European Security Platform;
- and a general consensus that work on West European security cooperation neither should nor would endanger the cohesion of NATO nor the coupling of the United States to the defense of Western Europe.

In the 1987 "Security Platform", the then seven WEU countries stated their common understanding:

... as far as we can foresee there is no alternative to the Western strategy for the prevention of war... To be credible and effective the strategy of deterrence and defense must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

The substantial presence of US conventional and nuclear forces... embody the American commitment to the defense of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the US strategic deterrent ...

We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defense and make a more effective contribution to the common defense of the West. To this end we shall: ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements, ... concert our policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect our security interests.⁵⁶

Emphasis is at present on the parallelism of the Atlantic Alliance in military and security affairs, and the European Community in economic and political affairs. Given their different tasks, their membership and structure vary accordingly. Blurring the differences, e.g. charging the Community with security cooperation, would endanger the usefulness of either one. Conceptually, however, it is difficult to conceive of a European Political Union without some responsibility for the common defense of Western Europe.

There is much evidence for the argument that European security cooperation will receive its input and its dynamic from the process of European integration, and not from security considerations. If it does, however, it will have to use the provisions of Art. 30 of the Single European Act to extend its policy reach to security affairs proper, not just the political and economic dimensions of it.

A major problem will be to enlist the support of those countries which still hesitate to subordinate their defense policies to a supranational authority, like France and Britain, or who, because of their neutral status, like Ireland, or because of domestic opposition, like Denmark, Spain and Greece, have in the past been careful not to align themselves too closely with the NATO military alliance.

It is, however, conceivable that one day the WEU might be integrated into the EC framework, especially if NATO loses some of its functions and of its usefulness for the defense of Western Europe. Either the European Council could also meet as WEU Council, or the latter might be transformed into a select committee on security cooperation, with a special member of the Commission charged with security affairs; the WEU Assembly meanwhile would transfer its functions to the European Parliament. On its road to political union the EC might well wish to further differentiate functions and membership. The result would be a variable

⁵⁶ "Platform on European Security Interests," in Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO* (see fn 5).

structure by which some members join in specific tasks while others abstain (“variable geometry”).

In the meantime, the nexus between the EC on the one hand, and the WEU and NATO on the other needs to be strengthened. In practice, the EC will have to show how it interprets Art. 30,6 of the Single European Act:

(a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European Security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.

(b) The High contracting Parties are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at a national level, and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.

(c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain High contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.⁵⁷

Although the result of concern on part of some member states – notably Ireland, Denmark and Greece⁵⁸ – that the Community was on the way toward a European defense organization, the Act does indeed give the Community the authority to coordinate various aspects of security. Its industrial policy will of necessity also have to deal with military R&D and production. The reference to the “technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security” gives the EC another handle to coordinate arms production, as well as to support the activities of the IEPG.

Given that the major challenges to the security of Western Europe are not caused by military threats, but rather are indicative of far-reaching changes in political, social and economic values, they will require economic, social, ecological and other responses – policies well within the realm of the Community. Emphasis on these aspects of security will increase with a diminishing perception of an external military threat.

In the short-term, a preferred option to a merger of the two institutions and functions might be a reactivation of the “reserve potential” of the Western European Union, and its use as a “European Defense Caucus”, kept separate from the Community network.

An advantage of using the WEU would be that its membership is limited to those countries with a strong interest in common defense, and its institutional framework, though weak, is separate from both NATO and

⁵⁷ “Single European Act of 1987,” The European Communities: Official Documents, Brussels: EC 1988, p. 1049.

⁵⁸ See Panos Tsakaloyannis, Ed., *The Reactivation of the Western European Union: The Effects on the EC and its Institutions*. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration 1985.

the EC. If the necessary care is taken it is flexible enough to be compatible with a still-existing NATO. Also, the WEU could operate alongside a European Community moving forward toward political union.

The speed and the direction of a reactivation of the Western European Union⁵⁹ will depend on whether there is still the perception of a military threat from the Communist bloc, or whether the latter has more or less faded into oblivion, or been dissolved, with Soviet military power significantly reduced. It will also need the positive spill-over of a dynamic process of European integration, as it might also gain from an American disengagement. In a changed security pattern, the WEU might be useful in a number of ways:

– If the military threat continues, WEU could build on its security guarantee; it would need adequate forces of its own, especially if the West Europeans could no longer rely on North American reinforcements, though they would have to take care not to violate any arms control agreements. The core of WEU forces could consist of the already existing German-French elements of defense cooperation. The remaining difficulties however should not be overlooked.

– If the Communist threat has faded, and a balance of power been achieved, it would still be prudent (though difficult) to preserve the WEU as a system of reassurance, in case the detente process breaks down, or violence erupts in a decaying Communist bloc.

– With the Cold War overcome, and NATO and the Pact dissolved, a new and very different role for a West European security system seems conceivable: it could be transformed into an all-European system of collective security. Then, the Western European Union could either be used to securely anchor the Federal Republic to the West, alongside the ties of the European Community, or, in case of a German confederation, to control Germany and to circumscribe its political ambitions.

There will be no stable political situation in Europe if Germany acts as a halfway house, or as a freewheeling entity, between East and West. I therefore think that the recreation of a strong and active “Mitteleuropa” is not very likely, rather I foresee increasing tendencies to contain the center of Europe, and to anchor both parts securely in integrative frameworks. Care should be taken, however, not to discriminate against Germany, but to integrate it on the basis of equality and mutuality.

The CSCE process is reserved for the emerging East-West detente relationship in Europe. If the CFE talks yield, as expected, substantial agreement for cutting conventional forces in Europe by half, this process will receive added momentum. From regulating relations among states with different political and social systems, and belonging to opposing

⁵⁹ See Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO. op. cit.*; Willem F. van Eekelen, *Future European Defense Co-operation: The Role of WEU*. An ESG Occasional Paper, September 1989; Reinhardt Rummel, “Modernizing Transatlantic Relations: West European Security Cooperation and the Reaction in the United States”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 83-92; Tsakaloyannis, *The Reactivation of the Western European Union, op. cit.*

military alliances, it might gradually transform the present European system into a more cooperative European order of peace.

The revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe in the winter of 1989 have reminded us that any policy assumptions may change rather quickly. There are four possible scenarios to think about:

1. NATO could, over time, lose its function as a coherent and credible military alliance, either due to
 - deep cuts in arms control, which would fundamentally change the overall security pattern in general, and the existing NATO alliance framework in particular;
 - a withdrawal of US (and British) troops from the European continent as a result of an East-West agreement, because of domestic pressure in America, or due to vocal opposition in Germany;
 - continued European (German?)-American frictions, in the first instance over economic issues (given increased economic competition after 1992), but spreading to political issues and leading to a high degree of mutual frustration;
 - or a dissolution of NATO, together with the Warsaw Pact, in the course of continued East-West detente.

2. The process of European integration could significantly change. Close policy coordination and political union could come to a halt, either because of British obstruction; as a consequence of a nationalist government in France; or as a result of political deadlock after the 1990 elections in Germany, or the formation of a shaky red-green coalition in Bonn.

It would be highly doubtful whether there could be an ersatz for a process of European integration run aground. Cooperation among the WEU members has not yet been sufficiently developed to serve as a holding operation. The same problems stalling European union would also prevent closer cooperation among the nine WEU countries. However, the process of European integration might be sufficiently advanced that, even in the case of serious political problems, it could not be completely reversed.

And what happens if the European Community is more successful than many expect today, and within a few years develops into a real Political Union? It would then acquire a security competence of its own. But how will it coordinate the emerging European defense consensus with a still existing Atlantic alliance? What kind of bargain has to be struck with North America? How will relations evolve with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? Or with Japan?

3. Another possible, and no longer completely unlikely, development would be a significant change in the European balance of power, with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, or, even more likely, of the COMECON, with the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland joining the European Community.

A dissolution of the Pact would not change significantly the existing European security structures since its members are closely tied to the Soviet Union by a network of bilateral treaties of cooperation. However, with the outposts of the CPSU in the East European capitals, the local communist parties, being forced to renounce their leadership role by internal opposition, Soviet party control will weaken and might lead to a reinterpretation, or even a renegotiation, of the existing treaties.

The transformation of the East European economic system would have a formidable impact on the European Community. Any enlargement of the EC involving more neutral countries (Austria has also applied for association with the EC) or former COMECON members, would change the Community significantly. It will either water down its political cohesiveness or strengthen the trend to a variable geometry.

4. Elections in the German Democratic Republic would result in a solid majority for a German Federation or Union, once again placing the German Question at the head of the international agenda. To a large measure, political reactions will depend on whether the existing institutions are capable of providing stability and structure in the face of radical political change.

Special responsibility will rest with the European Community, as one of the big attractions for the people in the GDR will be the prospect of participating as quickly and as fully as possible in the economic prosperity of Western Europe. NATO will be faced with the task of developing European security arrangements that neither undermine the credibility of the alliance vis-à-vis the West nor are threatening to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Four Power mechanism still existing will also come into play though care should be taken that the post-war system of Four Power control over Germany is not resurrected.

The biggest responsibility will rest, however, with West Germany. It will be expected to act as a responsible midwife of German unification, as a stabilizer of a rapidly desintegrating East Germany, as well as a guarantor of continued integration of Germany into the community of the West. The Federal Republic might, however, become fairly absorbed with this task, with little energy and resources to spend on strengthening European security cooperation.

In a time of change, the West will need cooperative structures to manage these changes. New challenges will have to be met:

1. How to implement and verify the East-West arms control regime which might result from successful CFE-negotiations?

The two alliances could be mandated to develop a mutual inspection system; a joint agency could be established to provide for verification of an all-European agreement on arms control and confidence measures. Also, the WEU, with its obvious capability to monitor arms and arms control, could be used in this respect.

2. How to formulate common European policies, not just vis-a-vis the United States, but also the other powers and states?

Probably there will be more than one forum to deal with this task: the European Council or EPC on general political and economic matters; EUROGROUP (with, hopefully, France back into the fold) for military cooperation; a revitalized WEU or a new European caucus within NATO for security policy in general. Pragmatic solutions will be more suitable than formal ones, and only experience will show which ones are adequate to meet the task.

3. How to provide stability for a process of rapid change in Eastern Europe, and how to control the dynamic of the unfolding German question?

A strong European Community cooperating closely in both economic and political affairs, would be best suited for this task. It would develop a new "Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe" to beef up the decaying economies and stabilize the crumbling political systems of the East European countries, while at the same time encouraging domestic liberalization and democratization. The GDR might either find its place in a reformed East European system, establish a net-work of treaty relations (*Vertrags-gemeinschaft*) with the Federal Republic, or achieve, in a controlled process, union with the Federal Republic.

4. How to cope with Third World contingencies or threats?

Coordination of policies on Third World contingencies has in the past been most difficult given the different historical traditions of the European states. While France and Great Britain still honor some of their previous colonial commitments, the Federal Republic has shied away from any "out-of-area" military commitment, and limited its involvement to economic support and a few activities in the United Nations framework. Though the German position has recently undergone some changes, a long road has yet to be travelled before a common European position could emerge.

5. How to cope with the new dimensions of security: environment, the atmosphere, water, resources et al., or those problems where the old and the new dimensions of security overlap, e.g. economic security or an international environmental regime?

A whole new spectrum of issues is unfolding, which will change international relations as soon as nations realize that these challenges can only be met jointly, and not on a national basis. Given an increasing global interdependence, a European framework for their solution might be too limited. This is a reminder that any European network has to be closely tied to the global setting, be it in the old or new dimensions of security.

It is very difficult to speculate on the direction European security cooperation will take in the future.⁶⁰ The most likely development is a slow process toward increasing West European political cooperation, extending to security affairs with pragmatic, partly *ad hoc*, and somewhat messy (but in general adequate) structures being developed. With the diffusing of the East/West conflict the creation of new All-European structures will receive a strong push. At the same time, new challenges will arise in the Third World, and the non-military dimensions of security will gain in importance.

⁶⁰ Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, Eds., *Europe in the Western Alliance. Towards A European Defense Entity?* London: Macmillan Press 1988 (Studies in International Security: 26).



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