

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R N o . 3 3

BOUNDARIES AND INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
BETWEEN ELITES: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS FROM
CIVIL-MILITARY ELITES IN ISRAEL

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NOVEMBER 1982

Workshop on Empirical Elite Research, European University
Institute, Florence, October 4 - 8, 1982. *

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Printed in Italy in November 1982

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A. Introduction



The subject of this paper is the nature of the boundaries between the defense establishment and the civilian sector in Israel, seen from the point of view of institutional linkages and formal networks.

One of the reasons for our choice of this particular research subject was that, despite its centrality in the context of the relationship between elites in general and civilian and military elites in particular, the society and the military, institutional linkages and networks have not been comprehensively dealt with on either a theoretical or an empirical level. The question of boundaries between institutional frameworks is of fundamental interest and importance in the social sciences.¹ Both sociologists and political scientists like to describe the social history of societies as a history of structural and functional differentiation. Processes of differentiation usually produce changes in the location and nature of inter-institutional boundaries. The pace of change of the inter-institutional boundaries depends, of course, on the force of the pressures acting on them and their ability to resist them. Even the professional armed forces, their notorious conservatism notwithstanding, had to respond to these external and internal pressures by re-defining and re-locating the boundaries between the military and the civilian establishments

and the institutional linkages between them.

The examples by which we shall illustrate our conceptual analysis will be drawn from the case of Israel. Israel is unique in many respects including the existing relations between society and the military. However, Israel's case is not exceptional. This allows its conclusions to be generalized to and compared with those in other countries, and especially those in Western democracies.

From the War of Independence onward there has been a fundamental ideological consensus in Israel which has covered almost the whole range of the political spectrum. This consensus concerns the boundaries between the defense and civilian establishments, in general and elites in particular, even though the application of the fundamental principles of this consensus has occasionally given rise to acute controversies. This fundamental consensus has been aided by ideological-normative linkages between the military establishment and the mainstream of socio-political trends of the Israeli society. We can support this proposition by a few examples from the spheres of the political-military doctrine and the social ethos.

Since the War of Independence, including the period following the political change of 1977, direct and indirect evidence indicates that there has been a high degree of consensus between the majority view of the general staff, especially the decisive view of the Chief of Staff himself, and the main trends within the coalition. One expression of this consensus was the similarity of interpretation of the international and middle-eastern scene. Disagreements within both the general staff and the successive governments notwithstanding, it was the "realpolitik" that has been guiding both elites up to this day. Moreover, there has been both fundamental and operative consensus between the two elites with regard to the substance of the desirably political culture, viz., self-identification as a democratic society, whether its liberal variant which is

prevailing today, or the social-democratic variety which was dominant before 1977.²

The situation in the sphere of social ethos resembles that in the political field. There have always been mutual influences in such matters as status symbols, nature of discipline, attitudes toward ceremonies, patterns of entertainment, style of dress etc. in spite of the well-known tendency of military establishments to foster their own particular codes of behavior.³ Nevertheless, even in this respect, the gap between the two sectors in Israel seems to be among the narrowest known in the Western democratic societies, let alone most of the non-democratic ones. To the extent that changes in the social ethos of the IDF did occur, they have followed in the wake of general change in the civilian society, and have been perceived as negative both by the IDF commanders and by the political and social leadership.⁴

These convergent processes have no doubt been aided, at least until now, by the existence of numerous and varied institutional linkages. Especially noteworthy in this context are the social and professional networks which developed due to the existence of an extensive and active reserves system. Other relevant factors are the sources of officer recruitment and the early retirement of the senior commanding staff. Data on officer recruitment sources indicate that - at least up to the seventies - the manpower pool which supplied IDF officers has matched almost exactly, at each level of the hierarchy, the manpower pool from which the younger generation of politicians, public administrators, academicians, artists etc. came⁵. These sources of officer and other elite recruitment can be described, albeit with some over-simplification as mainly veteran and Ashkenazi, urban or kibbutz and moshav based. Though this similarity of background is not sufficient by itself to ensure homogeneity of views and attitudes, it seems nevertheless a necessary condition. The early retirement age prevents crystallization of a particularistic social and political

ethos, which might be conducive to cultivation of a strategy of well-defined boundaries of divergence, distance and separation from the civilian sector.

B. The Conceptual Framework

Survey of literature in search of a comprehensive conceptual base for the treatment of the question of boundaries has yielded rather modest results. A substantive contribution has been made by Karl Deutsch, who analysed inter-institutional boundaries in terms of (a) internal and external communication, and (b) memory facilities. (Deutsch, 1956; Deutsch, 1966: 205-209). A systematic treatment of this subject can be found in Easton. Though dealing with boundaries almost exclusively in the context of political systems, he does suggest some more generally applicable indicators, which, in contrast to Deutsch's approach, are of structural-organizational nature. (Easton, 1965: 69; Almond, 1965). Luckham offers a typology and describes the characteristics of boundaries pertaining directly to the relationship between the military and the political systems (Luckham, 1971). In fact, his is the only practical typology, as far as this subject is concerned, to be found today in the literature of military sociology.

It may be remembered that Luckham distinguishes between integral, permeable and fragmental boundaries. (Luckham, 1971: 17-18). He suggests the following indices which should help to discriminate between the different boundary types: (Luckham, 1971: 17-18).

- (a) the extent to which the military establishment exercises control over interaction of its personnel at various levels with its non-military environment;
- (b) the extent to which there is a fusion of the goals and organizations of the military and the civilian sectors.

It follows that a military establishment with integral boundaries is

one in which "the extent to which the interchange between persons holding roles at various levels of the military hierarchy and the environment are under the control of those with responsibility for setting the operational goals of the armed forces that is the higher command is optimal".

A permeable boundary, in contrast to this, is one in which "there is a complete fusion both in respect of goals and of organization between the possessors of the means of violence and other social groups."

A fragmental boundary is one in which the military establishment - although distinctive in its goal and organizations - does not effectively control the interaction of its personnel with holders of civilian roles, thus impairing "the capacity of the holders of military roles to interact with the political and social environment as a single entity in a consistent manner."

Like any typology, whatever its degree of clarity, this one also raises some questions that need further clarification. Although this is not the place for a systematic treatment of the subject, we would like to make a few comments in this context.

First, in his discussion of conditions leading to, or, conversely, impairing the formation of different boundary types, Luckham indicates several important variables affecting these conditions:

- the structural differentiation between the two sectors;
- the nature of the functions of the military;
- the degree of cohesiveness of the armed forces. (Luckham, 1971: 18-20).

It seems, however, that these "conditions" are rather symptoms of more basic processes, ignored by Luckham, viz., those of convergence and of divergence between the military sector on the one hand and

the various civilian sectors on the other.

The convergence process means that the two sectors, which are rather different from each other in terms of internal structure, management, mode of operation and social norms, begin to converge by adoption of attributes similar or identical to those characteristic to the other sectors.⁶

However, this process of attribute development alone does not suffice to indicate the nature of the boundaries, i.e. their integrality, fragmentality or permeability. It is thus possible to formulate different hypotheses concerning the possible association between convergent processes and boundary types. Thus, e.g. we may hypothesize that, as a result of adoption of some 'civilian' function by the armed forces (such as research and development, production, education, etc.) convergent processes reinforce structural isolation of the military establishment and thereby protect the integrity of the boundary. As opposed to this, those convergent processes in which civilian norms are adopted in the area of economic incentives,⁷ or in the area of style, cultural patterns or discipline, should blur the distinctiveness of the military establishment and make the boundary permeable - at least in its above mentioned sections - to mutual penetration of ideas and rules of action.

It is possible then to postulate that the evaluation of a common market, in which the military and the civilian establishments compete, will eventuate in a decrease in the integrality of the boundaries. The degree of decrease in integrality of these boundaries will be determined by the extent of competition for manpower resources and social and political legitimacy between the two sectors.

Second, Luckham's typology lacks elaboration concerning the means of control over interaction between the military and its environment. Thus the treatment of such questions as the policies and

strategies of boundary maintenance in partly permeable sections is impaired. This includes the extent of the use of coercion, of visual and other symbols, of promotion of the awareness of distinctiveness by fostering social distance, of the formation of distinctive ideologies, etc.

Finally, the central weakness in Luckham's typology seems to be its neglect of the question of types of institutional linkages between the defense establishment and various sections of the civilian sector. Except for esoteric contacts, traffic across institutional boundaries inevitably implies contacts between people from both sides of the boundary. Most meetings, especially those involving army personnel subordinate to military authority and control, take place under some type of institutionalized circumstances. The control discussed by Luckham is essential not only on the boundaries themselves but also, maybe even more so, with regard to the linkages.

It should be noted that for as long as the defense establishment is acting in coordination and cooperation with various representatives of the civilian sector, institutional linkages will persist regardless of the attempt of those responsible for maintaining the boundaries to optimize their integrality. In fact, because the boundary lines are cutting across institutional linkages they remain discernible. In other words, boundaries between the two sectors are interspersed with institutional linkages and the absence of such linkages from a given section of a boundary is an indicator of a high level of integrality of that section.

In view of the importance which we attach to institutional linkages in the context of a discussion of boundaries between the military establishment and the civilian sector we shall now attempt to present some dimensions of what we see as expedient treatment of the issue concerned.

Several questions pose themselves in the context of classifications of the institutional linkages discussed in this paper:

The first question concerns the composition of the parties to the linkage, especially the personal and, even more importantly, the functional-institutional identity of the civilians. The military personnel can have a variety of civilian partners in institutional linkages such as elected politicians; officials of national and local executive authorities (ministries of education, labor, treasury, transport, etc.); representatives of public institutions other than state administration (academies, research organizations, professional associations, economic organizations) etc.

The second question concerns the degree of institutionalization of the institutional linkage. By this criterion we can distinguish various types of linkages such as permanent, mainly task-oriented frameworks, some of which are statutory or decree-based; temporary frameworks, such as incumbence in political or diplomatic posts by military personnel, director-general's committees for specific projects, adoption of army units by civilian groups and vice versa, ect.; and various ad hoc inquiry committees comprising both military personnel and civilians.

The third question is that of the respective status of the parties to the linkage. In this context it is important to know whether it is the military or the civilian party that has the formal and the informal veto rights and the decisive vote. This is especially relevant to state frameworks, ministerial, or parliamentary committees. Although in many cases decision making authority is statutory and unambiguous, there are many others in which formal authority does not match the de-facto held power. Moreover, it is plausible to assume existence of institutional linkages in which there is no a priori definition of authority relations between partners.

The fourth question, linked to the last one, is that of the rules of the game characteristic of different institutional linkages. Depending on circumstances these rules can be competitive or conflictive, (e.g. the need to compete for economic or manpower resources, or conflicts over conceptual differences concerning those questions of strategy and power to which both sectors are sensitive). An alternative possibility is that the rules of the game are by definition conducive to consensus and cooperation (e.g. various state rituals and ceremonies). Various ad hoc committees set up to solve specific acute problems, e.g. those concerning the welfare of soldiers or para-military organizations, are also characteristic of these types of linkages.

The fifth question is that of the control exercised by each sector over its representatives. Here too variation is considerable, especially if degrees of control are distinguished and ranked. In general terms we may assume that in some linkages both sides tend toward strict supervision of their representatives as illustrated by contacts in the political sphere. A different situation arises when only one of the parties is interested in strict control over the interaction. This occurs, for example, in the situation of contact between representatives of the military and those of the mass media, or between the military and trade unions.

The sixth question concerns the domain or the territory to which a given institutional linkage belongs. Due to frequent ambiguities in the definition of the division of labor between the defense and the civilian establishments, the scope of authority and responsibility of each may vary at different times and in different societies. For example, matters of manpower recruitment, armament purchase and military jurisdiction are usually the domain of the defense ministry. However, there are some par excellence civilian domains, such as production for the civilian market. Apart from these two possibilities, there may be other activity areas, not clearly identified, as

belonging to either party, or areas which both parties aspire to adopt as their own. In such cases the rules of the game will tend to be competitive or conflictive.

The use of this preliminary typology, the validity and reliability of which is still to be proven by extensive testing, must not be based on the assumption of stability of the institutional linkages over time. These linkages tend to assume different characters and be differently located along each of the above dimensions. Among the many possible reasons for such variation, mention must be made of changes in the conception of the desirable boundaries between the two sectors held by different elites.

Finally, it should be noted that the criteria suggested above seem to be relevant mainly with regard to concrete linkages and less applicable to what may be designated as abstract (i.e. mental or ideological) linkages. Therefore, we shall refrain from discussing the latter in the present context and relate to them rather as components of policies and strategies of system boundary maintenance. Thus, e.g. cultivation of a characteristic style of life, or typical attitudes vis-a-vis social and political issues by the armed forces do constitute a de-facto strategy for reinforcement of the integral nature of boundaries, or at least some important portions thereof. On the other hand, deliberate blurring of distinctions between the mentality and the life style of the military sector and that of the mainstream of the civilian sector would indicate an opposite strategy. To what extent are the above mentioned indicators applicable to the Israeli case?

C. Institutional Linkages between the Defense Establishment and Civilian Sectors in Israel

We shall inquire into the nature of the boundaries between the

defense establishment and the civilian sector in Israel through analysis of typical linkages in some specific domains.⁸ Within this framework a large number of institutionalized linkages can be discerned.⁹ However, in the interest of brevity, the presentation will have to be rather schematic.

The Political Domain

Some institutional linkages typical for the political domain are the Prime Minister's bureau, the cabinet, the Knesset committees (i.e. the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security; the Committee for State Control, and the Joint Subcommittee of the Finance and Foreign Affairs and Security Committees); the military government in the West Bank and various political party forums. What are the attributes of these linkages, formed primarily with a view to serve civilian national frameworks?

First, despite the fact that the main client is the civilian sector, the domain with which we are dealing here is usually that of security. Thus, e.g. the reason for the contact may be discussion of professional-military matters (such as response to enemy's action), or political-military matters (such as intelligence evaluations). Discussion of these issues belongs to the joint domain of the defense establishment and political leadership. These linkages evidence many symptoms indicating a certain degree of fusion between the defense and the civilian-political establishments. It finds expression, for instance, in the systematic inclusion of senior army officers in government meetings; in the monopoly held, de-facto, by the military intelligence on analysis and evaluation of national security situation; in the high ratio of regular army officers serving in what amounts to diplomatic posts connected with negotiations with neighboring countries¹⁰, as well as in the recruitment of politicians who are senior reserve officers.¹¹

Second, in most of these linkages, it is the representative of the political sector who is, as far as the formal status is concerned, the senior partner. This is certainly so with regard to the Prime Minister and his ministers. In some other linkages (e.g. joint committees comprising representatives of IDF and of the Foreign Office, or joint committees of the Defense Ministry with representatives of settlement movements) seniority of status is neither a priori defined nor laid down by law.

Third, linkages between representatives of the military and representatives of elected functionaries of the political establishment involve bilateral control and supervision. However, it seems that, especially in the last few years, there has been a tendency for the control to become more pronounced in the defense sector. This may be due to the greater freedom of expression and lower commitment to those at the top of the hierarchy in the civilian sector. The representatives of the military in most linkages in the domain of politics, reflect, above all, the positions of the IDF and the Chief of Staff. In comparison, the variation in the views and opinions of the civilian representatives is significantly greater, particularly so due to the pluralistic and coalition nature of the political establishment in Israel.

Fourth, inquiry into the degree of institutionalization of linkages in the political domain brings up an interesting finding: there seem to be two polar types: (a) linkages characterized by low institutionalization, such as sporadic meetings, organized in connection with special events of public interest which call for response by the political leadership. Such linkages are, e.g. the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, or party assemblies in which it has been customary, especially in the past, for army officers to appear and present their points of view: (b) linkages which show a considerable degree of institutionalization. A typical example is the Prime Minister's bureau, to which members of the defense establishment

are permanently attached as liaison between the latter and the PM and his cabinet. Another institutionalized linkage is the military government that once functioned in Israel proper and is functioning today in the administered territories.

Fifth, the overt rules of the game incumbent on participants in political domains are usually cooperative and solidary. Yet we must not overlook the fact that the behavior of a significant number of people is also guided by the rules of competition and even of severe conflict. Both in the past and at present this has been conspicuous in Knesset committees, especially those dealing with defense budgets, or when representatives of the defense establishment are called upon to respond to public criticism.

The Economic Domain

Due to the considerable weight carried by the defense establishment in Israel's economy, institutional linkages characteristic of the economic domain are numerous and varied. The share of the defense establishment in the economy finds expression primarily in the defense budget¹² and in the size of the manpower employed directly or indirectly by the various agencies of the defense establishment¹³. The representatives of the defense establishment in the economic networks are mainly officials of the defense ministry, though in some cases they include IDF officers, especially from technical branches such as air force or ordinance corps. The typical linkages in this area are associated with the Israeli military industrial complex, which, relative to population size, national budget and the GNP, is among the biggest and most sophisticated in the world.¹⁴

The production system of armaments and other equipment required by the IDF is organized in plants of varying legal and financial links

with the defense establishment. Some are integral parts of the defense ministry or the IDF, others are legally separate corporations, even though the defense establishment exercises considerable influence over the appointment of their directors and members of directorates.¹⁵ Still others are in private ownership or partnerships with the defense ministry and serve as sub-contractors of the defense ministry-owned enterprises. It should be noted that it has been the government's policy in the last few years to encourage a shift from government ownership to civilian ownership of the defense industry. This has been done through the conversion of military industrial enterprises into legally and economically autonomous government corporations. A tendency has developed to transfer an even greater part of production to enterprises in the private sector, while aiding them through credit and technical advice.¹⁶

Apart from the defense ministry's production system, whose extensive relations with the civilian sector are almost "symbiotic" (Zusman and Tolkovsky, 1973: 29-34) a mention should also be made of "Shekem". This economic venture, which serves the defense and police personnel and their families, has grown in the last few years into notably the biggest Israeli retail chain selling everything from food to electric appliances and furniture. This calls for an extensive network of relations with civilian industrial and marketing firms. Another noteworthy framework is the "emergency economy command", which may be considered, in some respects, the focus of supervision and control over those segments of economy and manpower which remain unmobilized during a war.

What, then, are the attributes of these various linkages?

First, we should note that these networks serve the defense establishment as well as various state agencies, and individual citizens in the capacity as members of the Israeli labor force. Since we are dealing

here with economic enterprises or regulation of production processes intended to meet the interests of all parties concerned, the domain is not purely military but rather common to the military and the civilian sectors (state, public and private).

Second, the fact that these linkages are in a common domain adds another dimension to the question of formal and informal status seniority between the two parties: whereas on the political level the civilian partner is manifestly senior, the overall status profile here is rather blurred since some of the networks show a clear status advantage of the military partner (e.g. those concerned with ordering from civilian suppliers or marketing defense industry's products on civilian markets). In other networks it is the civilian partner who carries more authority, e.g. in the commercial relations system between Shekem and its civilian suppliers, or in civilian projects aided by the army.¹⁷ In many situations no clear definition of authority relations between the partners in a linkage has yet been crystallized, e.g. in the framework of "emergency economy command" or in various committees of director-generals dealing with national projects.¹⁸

Third, despite the absence of a clear hierarchy of authority, the control over contacts of defense personnel with their civilian partners is usually exercised more strictly by the defense establishment than by its civilian partners. The defense establishment's control over the quality items purchased from private suppliers is an example of this. However, in many other cases both sides exercise similar degrees of control over contacts of their representatives with the other side. This bilateral, more or less, balanced type of control, is exemplified by the economic networks concerned with marketing of the defense industry products on civilian markets, or with joint defense and other ministries' committees (such as those that dealt in the past with settlement planning in the Galilee, the Negev or the Sinai).

Forth, the nature of the business contracted in the economic networks usually requires a high degree of institutionalization of the linkages. Indeed, over the years, the institutionalized frameworks which became established employ permanent staffs to deal with economic transactions between the defense establishment on the one hand and development projects, economic-financial sectors, and civilian projects of the other. These transactions are almost equally advantageous for the defense establishment (defense industries, aircraft, industry); state frameworks (e.g. in the case of urban development in strategically sensitive locations, aid to civilian projects, etc.); as well as for individual citizens, who have business dealings with the defense establishment.

Fifth, although we are dealing here with economic transactions, conflictive rules of the game seem to be only infrequently employed, while the competitive rules are, no doubt, the more frequent. These rules are employed by the civilians in their quest to secure orders from the defense establishment, or by the defense industry, which competes with other producers in civilian markets.¹⁹ Thus the various economic networks constitute - no less than the political networks - a particular domain as far as the hierarchy of authority and prestige among the partners, the nature of controls, degree of institutionalization, and above all, where the typical rules of the game are concerned.

The Educational and Cultural Domain

The educational-cultural activities of the defense establishment in general and the IDF in particular can be classified into two major groups which are distinct from one another.²⁰ The first type includes routine and special educational programs. For example, vocational training and recreational services which are provided either for all soldiers in the conscript and standing armed forces or for particular

groups within these categories. The objective in this case is to raise the educational and cultural standards and to develop vocational skills of servicemen and officers on active duty or in the reserves. For this purpose the military uses a staff of officers and non-commissioned officers as well as civilian professionals. The second type includes a system of pre-recruitment educational, recreational and vocational training services for special groups. Typical examples are 'Gadna' (para-military youth battalions), and military workshops for youth aged 16-18. These activities of the second type call for a high degree of institutionalization of linkages between the defense establishment and civilian educational frameworks. What are then the attributes of these numerous and diversified networks?

First, the identity of the client-consumer is different here from that of the other networks discussed above. State networks do not directly enter the picture as clients. The direct consumers are either individuals (adult or youth), or the defense establishment, especially its military division, i.e. the IDF.

Second, even though the direct client of these services is the defense establishment, especially the IDF, the domain is primarily civilian or common to the defense and the civilian sectors. Only combat training can be seen as belonging to an exclusively military domain.

Third, despite the fact that par excellence military matters are rather rare in these linkages, the military partner often enjoys a formal status senior to that of the civilian partner. This is so in all matters connected with the educational and cultural services provided by the IDF for special populations, such as the culturally deprived youth. It also holds with regard to the status of the IDF representatives in charge of the Military Broadcasting Service (Galei Zahal), as well as the IDF and Defense Ministry-published press, distributed among the civilian public.

Seniority of the civilian partner characterizes those networks in which services such as vocational training are provided by entirely civilian schools. Such services, though operated in coordination with the defense forces, are not intended to serve exclusively the IDF.

Fourth, the seniority of the military partner in a considerable proportion of these networks accounts for the fact that the control of the contents of interaction is primarily in the hands of the IDF, except in those frameworks which provide services for soldiers in the field of general education, e.g. preparatory courses for matriculation. Even in such cases, however, it is the IDF authorities who select those entitled to enroll in such courses and can thus control the volume of the population served by them.

Fifth, we are dealing here with educational frameworks which are generally well institutionalized, such as schools, seminars, universities, etc.

Sixth, the rules of the game guiding the activity in these linkages are solidary and cooperative, with only one exception, viz., the competition between Galei Zahal (the Military Broadcasting Service) and Shidurei Israel (the Israel Broadcasting Service). Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Galei Zahal seems to have a lead, especially among the young listeners.

The Professional Domain

In this context professional networks mean those situations in which personnel of the defense establishment (officers and civilians) meet either within the defense establishment or outside of it, with their civilian professional and occupational counterparts. Typical examples are: unit headquarters, in which officers from the standing army,

airforce, etc. function along with reserves officers called up for active service; cooperation between the Defense Ministry's research division and civilian research institutions; all professional contacts among the military personnel (engineers, doctors, psychologists, sociologists, etc.) with their civilian colleagues.

The attributes of these linkages are, generally, clear and unambiguous. First, the professional dimension indicates that the domain is common to both sides, and that both sides derive utility from these meetings. Yet, the subjects dealt with on the occasions of such meetings are more often than not military rather than civilian, especially in the case of reservists working in unit headquarters when called up for active service, or in the case of military frameworks employing civilian research workers.

Second, it follows from the above that with regard to both status and exercise of control, the military partner is in most cases the senior one. It is also he who carries the responsibility for the maintenance of permanent linkages and their institutionalization. The exceptions here are sporadic meetings between social scientists serving in the army and their civilian counterparts.

Third, the typical rules of the game in these networks are solidary and cooperative, though we must not ignore the element of personal and institutional competition which generally characterizes contacts between professionals in both theoretical and applied areas.

The Domain of Social Networks

Almost all types of networks discussed so far constitute a potential base for the formation of intensive social relations transcending the specific interests which had originally brought the two parties

together. There are some networks, however, whose very purpose is social relations per se. Typical examples are social gatherings for the middle and upper classes in Israel, where officers almost routinely meet artists, university people, senior government officials and politicians. The composition of such meetings is variable and one may assume that each set is the result of the personal selection of the hosts. Parallel to such rather elitist meetings, the frequent and prolonged reserve duty generates, in addition to its declared purpose, a base for the formation of networks of social relations on every level, outside the military framework. Mention should also be made here of such popular customs as the adoption of army units by civilian settlements and vice versa. Though informal, these linkages serve a par excellence solidary social function. The same holds true with regard to the Soldiers' Welfare Association, which along with instrumental services for individual soldiers and military units, contributes, albeit indirectly, to the formation of social networks linking civilians with defense personnel.

Since we are dealing here with extremely diversified social networks, many of which display primary group features, their overall attribute profile is necessarily somewhat blurred. There is usually no a priori institutional definition of each side's position in the hierarchy of their relation system. The status of the individual in these networks is rather a matter of personal esteem, although military rank or official position do affect its evaluation to some extent. Social networks formed between reservists and the standing army personnel in the framework of reserve service are usually those among equal ranks, however even if there is a rank difference, neither partner is, a priori, destined to be the senior partner. These networks are characterized by rather loose, usually bilateral control over the behavior of partners in the linkage. The extent of institutionalization is not uniform. Most social meetings are only very slightly institutionalized but events like adoption of a military unit or the activities of the

Soldier's Welfare Association are both institutionalized and of an enduring nature. The rules of the game are in all cases solidary and cooperative.

Communicative Networks

The networks in this domain bring together representatives of the IDF and public opinion makers from the mass communication media. The civilian partners in these meetings are: military correspondents of the press, the radio and the TV, and journalists specializing in foreign affairs and security. To this we should add a body of special importance in this context, viz., the daily papers' editors' committee. This committee is periodically meeting senior representatives of the defense establishment (usually the Chief of Staff or the Defense Minister) on various issues, and the explicit purpose of these meetings is to convey the message of the defense establishment to the general public.

The military partners in these networks are the personnel of the IDF's speaker's unit, the department of public relations of the Defense Ministry, intelligence branch officers, etc. The clients are both the citizens in their capacity as consumers of communication in general, and the defense establishment. Obviously then, the domain is common to both sides. As to the participants' status, whereas the defense establishment seems to have the unquestionable advantage due to its power to control the channels and the contents of the communication, this power does not become converted into formal institutional terms a priori defining the hierarchy among the parties. As in every democratic society, where the press sees its legitimate mission not only in transmission of information, but also in revealing shortcomings and failures, the Israeli press representatives have been increasingly disinclined to accept an a priori definition of their status in this interaction as inferior, with the result of making control of these networks increasingly more bilateral and symmetrical. The matter of

this control is especially poignant in institutionalized communicative networks such as the editors' committee or meetings with military correspondents. It follows that the rules of the game include competitive and conflictive elements, the pattern of which continues to be particularly strong in Israel.²¹

The Domain of Symbolic Networks

National revival, collective identity, and patriotism are a few of the implicit symbolic meanings that could be attached to the networks that have been discussed so far. These symbolic meanings are especially applicable to the political and cultural domains.

However, some linkages between the defense establishment and civilians have clear and manifest symbolic significance as reinforcers of identification with the fundamental norms of the society, an objective which is the precise and explicit purpose of the linkage. Such linkages are e.g. state celebrations of independence days, national memorial days, state funerals, etc. On a more modest level, such is also the purpose of ceremonies marking army unit's adoption, or even of inviting parents into military camps on such occasions as completion of training series, officers' courses, etc.

The emphasis on the common heritage considerably blunts the edge of the control over mutual relations in these linkages, at least as far as the military is concerned. At the same time, the representatives of the civilian sector are - as in political networks - of unambiguously senior status, particularly in the case of national ceremonies in which the active role of the military is limited to contributing the visual contents (parades, etc.) of these institutionalized frameworks.

Following this schematic description of major networks which bring together major and minor elite groups, we would like to devote a few

words to those types of linkages which are conspicuous by their absence from the Israeli scene.

On the political level there is the striking absence of a formal institutional framework with a function similar to that of the National Security Council of the US or other countries.²² Furthermore, soldiers and officers on active service cannot be elected to public and political bodies such as local authorities or parliament.²³ Political participation of army personnel is limited in Israel to voting rights and the right of passive participation in political assemblies.²⁴ Another linkage connected with both the political and the economic domain, which is totally absent in Israel, though quite popular today in several Western countries, are trade unions of soldiers and officers. Their absence is especially striking in view of the enormous political and economic power of Israeli trade unions, which in some respects, are among the most powerful in the world. The ban on trade unions does not, of course, apply to civilian employees of the defense establishment, including those employed by the IDF and the military industrial complex.

Among the professional networks, the one conspicuously missing in Israel is an elaborate linkage between the civilian and the military judiciary systems. Their contact is very limited and expressed mainly in the enactment by the Knesset of the Law of Military Jurisdiction and the appointment by the President of the State - (at the defense minister's recommendation) - of the president of the supreme military court of appeal. This appointment has been so far held by senior military men. Apart from this, the military judiciary system is fully autonomous both with regard to appointments as well as procedure. Also noteworthy is the absence of institutionalized and legally enacted communication channels between servicemen and officers on the one hand and representatives of the public on the other in matters of personal grievances. In contrast to this, the defense establishment

and the IDF have developed an effective autonomous system dealing with both military personnel and civilian's complaints. The fact that the complaint officer of IDF (IDF's ombudsman), is a former Chief of General Staff is a measure of the importance attached to this function by the defense forces. The defense establishment sees this framework as adequate to meet the existing needs and forbids uncensored application by army personnel to outsiders, including Knesset members.

D. Some Concluding Remarks

The attributes of the institutional linkages described above enable us to present at least a tentative picture of the degree of integrity, fragmentality or permeability of various sections of these boundaries. We assume that, with the exception of a few cases which we shall list below, there are no really integral boundaries between the defense and the civilian sectors in Israel. However, it is possible to discern a high degree of integrality in those cases in which: (a) the domain of the institutionalized linkage is either exclusively that of defense or exclusively civilian; (b) there is a clear superiority of one partner's status; (c) the control over the interaction is strict and continual, and (d) the rules of the game are competitive or conflictive.

At the other extreme will be the permeable boundaries which are characteristic of those cases in which: (a) the domain is common to both parties; (b) there is no clear definition of status hierarchy; (c) the control over the interaction is minimal; (d) the degree of institutionalization is low and (e) the linkage is based on social and national solidarity and cooperation.

The range of fragmentary boundaries includes all those cases in which linkage attributes are so diversified as to make their profile rather

blurred. In some cases the domain is exclusive and in other cases the domain is common to both parties. In either case, when linkage attributes are diversified the location of partners in the status hierarchy varies, there is bilateral and rather loose control of the interaction, institutionalization is partial rather than comprehensive and the rules of the game are mixed. The rules are sometimes competitive and conflictive, sometimes cooperative and solidary, and in some cases a combination of all four.

It is hardly possible at this stage of our investigation to classify with any accuracy - using the above distinctions - all the sections of the inter-sectorial boundaries. Our classification at this stage can only be tentative and rather impressionistic. The picture is clearer with regard to those few boundary sections between the defense establishment and some specific population groups, which evince a high degree of integrality. One such group is the non-Jewish population of Israel, with the exception of the Druze, who are subject to the military service law, and the volunteers from the Bedouin and the Chercassian community. (Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974: 265-267). This population, despite full Israeli citizenship rights, is exempt from recruitment into the IDF. The arrangement was made immediately upon the declaration of independence and the establishment of the IDF. Contact between the Moslem and Christian Arab population and the defense establishment is extremely limited,²⁵ and the boundaries are closed and integral. A similar phenomenon, though produced by different causes, exists also within the Jewish population. It concerns the ultra-orthodox Yeshiva students, who are exempted de facto from army service and women who declare themselves to be orthodox, thus by law being exempt. The analogy is qualified not only because the former group is Arab and the latter Jewish but also because of the rather paradoxical fact that orthodox Jews are not only represented in the Knesset (this is also true of the Arabs), but because they sometimes participate in government coalitions.²⁶ In addition there are some

other groups apart from those mentioned above whose recruitment into the IDF is limited and selective.²⁷

Since, apart from those groups which for political, ideological or psychological reasons are not interested in contact with the defense establishment, the overwhelming majority of the population is subject to recruitment into the IDF, the boundaries between this population and the defense establishment are by definition non-integral. Yet, even here there exist, as might be remembered from the presentation of institutional linkages, several options, including integral boundary symptoms.

Though schematic and illustrated by only a few selective examples, our description of institutional linkages should suffice to indicate the diversified nature of the inter-institutional boundaries in Israel. Moreover, we hope that one may be able to use the variables employed here for a more comprehensive comparative study of institutional linkages between elites.

Let me thus summarize the potential advantage of such an approach to the understanding of patterns of interaction and confrontation between elite groups in general. (This is, of course, in addition to other approaches and methodologies).

- a) Knowledge about the scope (quantitatively speaking) of linkages (or meeting points) and the quality of the participants in terms of status, prestige, etc. may give us some illuminating insights about the potential chances for interaction between elites or, vice-versa, the extent of institutional segregation between the various elites.
- b) Mapping institutional linkages may help to locate the most prominent frameworks and inform us about the type of linkage where most

of the encounters take place. In other words, we may get an idea about the multidimensionality of the linkages and the variety of participants.

- c) Information about the rules of the game that regulate these frameworks may shed light on the normative climate that characterizes these frameworks. We refer here mainly to the cultural climate that encourages consensus or, alternatively, dissidence and conflicts.
- d) Institutional and formal linkages may be compared to the informal and less institutionalized linkages, namely the intention is to compare the two networks in order to examine the extent of convergence or divergence.
- e) The comparison of the two networks may help us to clarify channels of mobility and career patterns of the various elites. Moreover, it may give an answer to the extent of role expansion of elites beyond their institutional boundaries (for example, academicians who are engaged in politics, or politicians who are active members of cultural institutions).



NOTES

- x First version of this paper was prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Conference, Chicago, October 23-25, 1980.
1. For a comprehensive survey of research in this field see Strassoldo, 1977.
 2. We might add here that, following their discharge from active service, some senior I.D.F. officers have expressed dissent from the consensual views of the defense establishment, hence possibly also from the norms of the Israeli political culture. An outstanding example of this is the former Commander of the Airforce, General Benjamin Peled.
 3. Such as courage, tenacity of purpose, rigorous discipline, rank as a symbol of social distance, groomed appearance, etc. (Horowitz, 1979: 11.13; Horowitz, 1977: 62-63).
 4. These changes find expression in the intensification of symptoms of what Moskos calls occupational (vs. institutional) orientation (Moskos 1977). Other expressions are instances of economic corruption by some of the people who, by virtue of their position in the defense establishment were in close contact with civilians involved in business with the defense establishment.
 5. There are some exceptions here, e.g. the orthodox section has contributed less to the officer's corps than to other areas of public life in Israel.
 6. For a more systematic discussion see Lissak, 1978: 8-11, 28-31.
 7. Moskos would probably call this process a change from "Occupation to Institution" (Moskos, 1977). See also Janowitz's criticism (Janowitz, 1977).
 8. The institutional linkages may be classified into seven major domains. Each domain comprises a varying number of networks, sometimes homogenous and sometimes diverse with regard to their characteristic attributes.

The seven domains are: the political, economic, educational and cultural, professional, social, communication and symbolic networks.

9. In addition to linkages occurring within the defense establishment between military personnel and civilian employees or other security forces personnel such as police or civil guard.
10. See further elaboration of this subject by Horowitz (1979). The strength of these tendencies varied in different periods.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject on the background of the 1973 election campaign see Ben-Dor, 1975: 131-138.
12. The defense budget is about 40% of the 1979/80 national budget and 25% - 30% of the GNP.
13. In recent years about 25% of the labour force has been employed directly and indirectly by the different extensions of the defense establishment.
14. No detailed and up-to-date data on the proportion of industrial products purchased locally by the defense establishment are available. For partial data see Kochav and Lifschitz, 1973: 263-270.
15. An outstanding example of this is the aircraft industry. Though originally a branch of the Defense Ministry from 1968 the legal status has been changed. It became a public corporation - Israel's Aircraft Industry.
16. One should not forget that in Israel part of the defense industry output is intended for the civilian market. The demand for such products comes mainly from the civilian metal, chemicals and electronics industries.
17. Such as afforestation, bridge building, etc.
18. e.g. new settlements in the administered territories.
19. This is rare since the defense industries are trying - with considerable success - to channel their surplus productive capacity into fields in which there is no civilian competition. The exception is Shekani which

competes with other retail chains by reducing its prices, which it can afford to do, due to its superior organization and huge turnover.

20. Two additional types are: combat training for soldiers on active and reserve service, and pre-recruitment paramilitary training for youngsters, combined with educational activities (Lissak, 1970: 327-334).
21. For a more systematic treatment of the interactions between the defense establishment and the mass media in Israel, see Lissak, 1981.
22. Although recommendations to set up such a forum have been repeatedly made, they have so far not been accepted by any Israeli government. The latest such recommendation was made by the Agranat Commission (Agranat Commission, 1975) 27-33.
23. This is the case for example in Germany, Denmark (Janowitz, 1972: 156; Harris, 1975: 36)
24. In the matter of participation in political assemblies there were some irregularities in the fifties and sixties. Thus, e.g., a certain political forum within the Mapai party served as an arena for political activities of member of I.D.F. personnel. Another example is the protest movement following the Yom Kippur War (1973) in which members of the armed forces participated.
25. Except for contacts with the military government which in the past administered some areas in Israel, where the Arab population is concentrated.
26. The exemption of Yeshiva students and Orthodox women is itself the result of a coalition agreement, ratified and expanded by the Likud government.
27. e.g. culturally deprived youth and/or those with criminal records (Kimmerling, 1979: 28-29).

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