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THE "GREENS" AND THE "NEW POLITICS"
GOODBYE TO THE THREE-PARTY SYSTEM?

by

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Introduction and statement of the problem

Opinion research and politics are having equal difficulties in conceptually grasping the Greens' latest election success. What for some represents the result of a long-term change in values is for others merely spontaneous protest against a political system alleged to have become inflexible. There is similar variety in the presumed consequences of the party political formation of Green voter potential. Are these the first signs of a basic realignment between social groups and the party system, or will the "protest potential" be absorbed by the established party system? A cursory glance at the distribution of opinion in the population makes the second alternative look unlikely. Large parts of the population welcome the foundation of an environment party and would even vote for it in some circumstances. Estimates vary as to the level of voter potential from which the Greens could win votes¹. However, the trend is plain: from an originally rather amorphous group of spontaneous sympathizers, a hard core of voters that can be counted towards the voter potential of an environment party is clearly crystalizing out. In early summer 1980, on our estimate, the upper limit of this potential was some 15% of those entitled to vote.

It would be unrealistic to assume, on the strength of both the results of elections to date and of our own

election simulations and forecasts, that the Greens will be able to exploit this voter potential to any great extent at present. On the other hand, a number of individual results in the latest Landtag and especially municipal elections indicate that the share of voters accessible to the Greens is in particular conditions well above that in the 1980 Bundestag elections. For instance, where threats to the environment arise, or have already occurred, large movements away from the established parties towards the Greens are unleashed. An intuitive interpretation of the election results, namely to see this pattern as a causal connection, is tempting. However, this is insufficient. It can be shown -- as is the aim of this paper -- that the connection between the perceived deterioration in the performance of the party and government system (for instance in the form of unsolved environment problems) and voting for the Greens can essentially be explained indirectly: acute political conflicts about differing strategies for solving environment problems will lead to voting for an environment party (or another "new" party) when they impinge on politically weakly-mediated interests. In this view, the quality of the ties that potential "Green" voters have to the existing parties and to the system of established social groups takes central importance.

There have been various approaches towards explaining the causal connections of decreasing ties, and they are rather hard to distinguish analytically. Firstly, the social structure approach has recourse to the pattern of social stratification, its development in the context of social change and the consequences for changes in political views. Secondly, the value shift hypothesis, while starting essentially from the same situation, stresses primarily the effect of changed value priorities, the New Politics, as a cause of weakened ties to the political system. Finally, the protest thesis singles out disturbed relationships between "elite" and "masses" as a cause of the declining loyalty of social groups. One of the results of this analysis is that while each of these approaches makes its own contribution towards explaining the causes of weakening ties to the political system, it is only by combining all the proposed explanations that the dimensions of the new conflict can be adequately illuminated. A reduction of the problem to the alternative of value shift or protest does not seem indicated. Instead, the development described can be seen as a "three-stage process": change in social structure → change in political value concepts → change in electoral behaviour ("protest voting").

Data

The present analysis is based on a series of population surveys carried out by Rudolf Wildenmann, of Mannheim University and the European University Institute, Florence, in collaboration with W.E. Wright, Silke Wollweber and the author between 1976 and 1980. The surveys are representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and were carried out in early summer of 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980. The field work was done by Infratest, Munich. The data sets will soon be available through the Central Archives in Cologne. For the analysis of the shift towards the "New Politics", here given only very briefly, it was possible to refer back to the Cologne/Mannheim election studies of 1961, 1969 and 1972; these data are available from the Central Archives as part of the "German Electoral Data Project".

Social differentiation and decreasing social control

The development of modern industrial states into welfare states of the post-industrial type (Bell 1963, Huntington 1974), the rise of new forms of political participation (Barnes/Kaase et al 1979), and the process of the formation of social vehicles for new political ideas -- such as the Greens or other alternative parties -- can be seen as closely connected.

Social modernization, with its manifold accompaniments such as urbanization, industrialization, the decline of traditional value orientations, social democratization, educational expansion and increasing spatial and social mobility (Huntington 1974: 32, Flanagan 1979) lays, as it were, the foundation on which a rearrangement between party systems and social structure can be built.

In this process considerable, if not decisive, importance is ascribed to the state of development of the social mode of production (cf. Kornhauser 1959, Janowitz 1970, 1976). Modern industrial societies are societies with a high degree of division of labour. This fine-grain division of labour has led and is leading to a many-layered social differentiation and, through the rising degree of organization of socio-economic interests, to progressive differentiation of the social stratification structure. In this process, old class contradictions are increasingly broken down, while the differentiation within social strata by sectoral and regional subdivision increases further. At the same time, the heightened spatial and social mobility of many members of society promotes the formation of heterogeneous social environments (Daalder 1967, Giddens 1975). In the course of this development both the imprinting power of life experiences that are

made homogeneous by the social structure, and the relevance of belonging to associations and social groups through which value and attitude patterns are structured, diminish.

Decreasing social control over individual political decisions through strong social-structural ties makes room for heterogeneous influence through differing and fluctuating social relationships and interests (Janowitz 1976: 85ff, Kornhauser 1959). For the political sphere, this concatenation is connected with declining party loyalties, stronger issue orientation by voters and decreasing class voting behaviour (Pappi 1973, Klingemann 1973, Lipset 1981).

Hand in hand with the progressive differentiation of the social division of labour goes the decreasing importance of traditional legitimation contexts in modern welfare states and the considerably increased level of education and information of broad areas of the population.

In the social sphere, this "educational revolution" (Allardt 1968: 73) leads to a situation where the difference between the intellectual capacities and political sophistication of on the one hand an increasing

part of the younger population and on the other of the ruling political and social elite becomes less and less. At the same time, with the increasing complexity of political decisions, the distance between the two groups as regards the chances of real influence over the political process increases. This situation favours politicization as a symbol of social problems that in the broadest sense have to do with increasing the chances of political participation. The continued non-fulfilment of these demands can in the end lead to the establishment of new social conflict, in consequence of which attitudes towards political authority -- towards politicians and the institutionally anchored standards that regulate entry to ruling positions in society -- change radically.

For the chances specifically for an environment party to become a relevant factor in the political system, given this background, two further accompaniments of the socio-economic development of modern industrial society are of importance -- the level of prosperity and its costs to the public (Lehner 1979b).

Prosperity and its costs

According to Ronald Inglehart's much-discussed theory (1971, 1977) the raising of material prosperity steadily loses importance in highly industrialized, or

post-industrial, societies in favour of the satisfaction of non-material interests. In his view the shift in priority of needs results above all from the high prosperity of these societies, which has led to the large-scale satisfaction of the material needs of many members of society. To the extent that material needs are individually satisfied and the marginal benefit from any further rise in the level of provision becomes less, the satisfaction of non-material needs gains in importance: there is a shift in individual hierarchies of needs from material to non-material interests.

Without distinguishing here whether this is a case of a lastingly stable socialization process of post-materialist value structures or rather of merely temporary and reversible shifts², we can state that such a shift in priorities in favour of non-material interests increases the chances of parties with a corresponding programme.

The election results in the "strongholds" of the Greens indicate that the explanatory power of this approach increases when not only the prosperity of western industrial societies and its consequence for the population's material welfare are taken into account, but

also the costs of this prosperity and its effect on individual need priorities (Lehner 1979b). The nature and extent of these costs of prosperity, that arise as a "by-product" of an economy devoted to growth, are perceived by many citizens as steadily on the increase. To the extent that these costs of prosperity -- from environment pollution to the fear of radiation from nuclear power stations -- rise in relation to the individually reached level of prosperity, the need to reduce these costs increases. Demands to correct these developments are increasingly articulated and -- if the logic of competitive democracy is followed -- aggregated via the party system³. This form of conflict resolution functions as long as the demands for corrections do not touch the fundamental structures of the social mode of production. At that point the established parties can no longer resolve the conflict structurally, since they themselves, via the traditional legitimation pattern of "growth as a basis for rising individual prosperity" (Murphy et al. 1979: 157) become protagonists in the conflict. At the same time, these demands are hard to implement in the context of large interest groups with a primarily economic orientation -- from employers' associations to trade unions -- because of their low capacity for organization and for conflict (Lehner 1979a: 71ff). For en-

vironmentalists and the materially saturated population groups not mediated in the "old" class conflict dimensions, this means that yet another non-material need is no longer being adequately met, namely their participation whether actual or psychologically mediated through party links, in political decisions. Theoretically there then opens up before these groups a new dimension of political conflict, structured by political problems that can no longer be defined through the mainly materially based industrial class conflict -- the "old" politics -- but stand outside this conflict and the groups that mediate it. From the point of view of ideas this means that differing standpoints on the political problems are no longer, as assumed by Downs (1957), reflected in a change in the individual position on a one-dimensional political scale -- let us say left-right or liberal-conservative -- but lead to the development of a "new" political dimension perpendicular thereto.

The "New Politics": Establishment v. Anti-Establishment

The hypothesis that a party system constitutes in a voter's perception a multidimensional structure of decision alternatives is not new. It was presented as a reformulation of Down's model by Stokes (1966), Converse (1966), Pappi (1973), and most recently by

Barnes/Kaase et al. (1979). What is new is the view that the party systems of post-industrial societies can best be seen as a two-dimensional space constituted by an old and a new politics dimension (Barnes/Kaase 1979, Hildebrandt/Dalton 1977, Dalton 1978).

The new conflict dimension has in common with the old "left-right" dichotomy the fact that, in both, political forces oriented towards change are set against a conservative political camp. In this original sense, the new conflict situation could certainly be understood as left-right conflict. On the other hand, the two dimensions are distinguished by the different relationship to the opposition in the conflict. While the old left-right dimension separates the "haves" from the "have-nots", and the conflict relates to the extent of political intervention in social development, the new political dimension sets the forces that insist on conventional mediation of interest, the establishment, against the groups not yet incorporated in the system who favour unconventional strategies for acquiring social power. In this sense the two axes of the party system can be treated as the value dimension and standards dimension of social conflicts (Klingemann/Pappi 1972:3), with the value axis distinguishing the value communities linked to the traditional conflict structure, (from "conservative-traditionalist

goal orientation") and the standards axis distinguishing groups with differing strengths of social ties and consequent differing acceptance levels of traditional forms of participation. The characterization of the two camps as "establishment" and "anti-establishment" should in substance be seen in this sense. The ideally typical "new left" position, as located in this party space, differs in this account from the old left position not necessarily in terms of programmatic goals, but rather in terms of those goals' organisational mediation, which had been previously brought about conventionally through the interest groups appropriate to the reideologized class conflict. Without venturing further into the range of problems raised by this, we might, in this classification, characterize the political camp of the "new right" as that which combines conservative and traditionalist goal orientation with low social bonding and preference for unconventional forms of participation.

(FIGURE 1)

If these theoretical deductions have validity for the German party system, empirical analysis should reveal three things. Firstly, that in voters' perception there is a New Politics dimension that can be distin-

guished analytically from the traditional conflict structure. Secondly, that the established parties can offer no, or only inadequate, policy options along this dimension. Finally, that the political left in the Federal Republic sees itself as split into two camps, with the old left tending towards the SPD and the new left more towards the alternative, Green camp. These connections will be discussed below.

The New Politics dimension

In recent political science literature there has been a number of approaches and methods for operationally encompassing the existence of a New Politics dimension. Miller and Levitin (1976) define their "New politics groups" through individual attitudes towards political protest, law and order, the social counter-culture and the governmental control apparatus. Hildebrandt and Dalton (1977) operationalized their "new politics dimension", as Inglehardt (1971, 1977) did his post-materialism index, through the personal importance of political problems. Finally, Kaase and Klingemann (1979) and Barnes/Kaase et al. (1979) calculate their protest, or establishment/anti-establishment, dimension on the basis of sympathy ratings of various social groups and political parties. The factor

common to these concepts is that they attempt to understand party systems not as a purely interpretative quantity, but as a space model, which constitutes as faithful a representation as possible of the voter's psychological closeness to the parties and of the distances between those parties deduced therefrom.

In the analysis presented here, the "Old v. New Politics" dimension is developed on the basis of sympathy ratings of only four parties -- the CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens. The restriction to these parties ensures that the resulting "New Politics dimension" is defined only on the basis of support for the Greens in relation to the established parties⁵. If despite this restriction the term "New Politics dimension" is nevertheless used, this is because the following analysis and the comparison with the data of the Political Action Study 1980 tend to support the substance of this interpretation (cf. Dalton 1981, also Kaase/Klingemann 1979).

(TABLE 1)

The low rating of the Greens is noteworthy; not only did an above average number of those surveyed find themselves unable to make any judgement of the Greens (7.8%), but in addition, the most frequent evaluation was at the zero point: neither "like" nor "dislike".

(FIGURE 2)

To determine the parties' position vis-à-vis one another, a principal components analysis was carried out on the basis of the sympathy ratings, having sifted the individual answer patterns⁶. This analysis, as expected, separated the Old Politics factor (eigenvalue 1.99) from an analytically clearly profiled New Politics factor (1.33) and a third factor determined mainly by the position of the FDP, which because of the small eigenvalue (0.68) will not be included in further analysis. The variance share of the factors expressed in the eigenvalue (50 and 33%) expresses first of all the still dominant explanatory power of the polarization between old blocs of power and influence, in which the dispute along the traditional lines of conflict is reflected. Besides this the second factor, running perpendicularly to the first, points to the existence of a marked potential basis for a political re-orientation of the German party system. Figure 3 shows diagrammatically the 1980 model of the German party system as deduced from this analysis. A notable feature is the rather indifferent position of the Greens as regards the Old Politics dimension: in the voters' view they have, indeed, a slightly conservative goal orientation.

(FIGURE 3)

From the position in this space of the voter groups defined by older conflicts of status and religion, it becomes clear how small the explanatory value of traditional conflict and stratification patterns is for the New Politics dimension⁷. On the Old Politics dimension, as against this, the trend to a further diminution of religion and class conflict can, comparing the configuration with say the findings of the analysis by Pappi (1973) or Dalton (1981), be seen to be continuing. Nevertheless -- leaving aside the small group of landowners -- the Old Politics dimension remains the most important conflict dimension for the groups defined by affiliation to traditionally mediated social-structure relationships. This finding is fully in line with expectations, since after all the historical process of political transformation of the central conflict positions has made the party political embodiment of these core groups of the social structure a dominant characteristic of party systems, not only in Germany. The continuing politicization, i.e. political interpretation, of these conflicts by the parties themselves (Daalder 1966, Sartori 1968, Pappi 1988), as well as the reinforcement of these conflict constellations by the major social groups, contributes, des-

pite the far-reaching opening up of the major parties -- the trend towards the "people's party" -- to the maintenance of this pattern. However, for reasons given above, there is doubt that one can deduce from this the persistence of the party system suspected by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). To the extent that the voters separate their party preference from their social-structure ties and take their voting decisions instead on the basis of perceived issue competence, candidate preferences or their ideologically structured world-view, the success of social-structure transformation processes on the Old Politics deminsion will decline. At the same time there will be an increase in the political room for manoeuvre of processes of rearrangement between social structure and party system, in a manner similar to the emergence of the new lines of social conflict sketched out above.

From the theoretical deduction of the causes of weakening links to the political system, it may be concluded that, apart from the general rise in the level of education, it is above all membership in different generational units that constitutes the relativization of the mapping between social structure and politics. This presumption of a generational effect is founded on the theoretically based assumption, uni-

versally accepted in research on political socialization, that primary political socialization takes place at the age of between 14 and 18. The political phenomena and social contexts with which young people are confronted at that age take on dominant importance, on this view, for the formation of their general and political concepts of values and standards. To determine the influences that generation effects have on political orientation, it is not enough to bring together several birth years into age cohorts at roughly equal time intervals, or even to take age as a continuous variable. Instead, criteria must be worked out that constitute a connected generation in the sense of the constancy of a "historical social space" (Lepsius 1973: 298ff, following Karl Mannheim's concept of a connected generation). According to the breadth with which one sees the concept of constancy of historical social space, one can arrive at a figure of 6 to 10 generations for the Federal Republic (ibid.). According to the approach chosen here, three great age groups with broadly similar collective life experience will be distinguishable from each other analytically:

- the generation type that went through either the last or both World Wars and the Nazi dictatorship, and made the essential contribution to the reconstruction of the Federal Republic in the post-war period. For

them, this democratic order is seen as fundamentally positive, against the background of the dictatorship system of the Third Reich and political and economic collapse that they experienced in their lives. This group, now over 50, occupies the political and economic elite positions and therefore also has this interest as a reason to defend the existing system. One can distinguish from this generation:

- the first post-war generation, not decisively involved in reconstruction, with middle positions among the social elite positions: while they tend on the whole to take a positive attitude towards the democratic system, they do not see themselves responsible for its legitimation;
- the third generation type is formed of those age groups that went through their first socialization experiences after reconstruction in an economically and politically comparatively stable phase. For them, dictatorship, war and economic collapse do not constitute relevant experiences; they evaluate the existing order without having experienced in their lives these criteria for comparison, and instead orient themselves by democratic demands and the extent to which experienced democratic reality corresponds with them. This comparison must be particular-

ly drastic for third-generation representatives that have not yet managed to move up into social elite positions; they have therefore a tendency towards greater readiness to change the institutional system, in which they do not see themselves adequately mediated. For these age cohorts, the old lines of conflict are increasingly losing significance: the trend towards the "old centre" with simultaneous withdrawal movements along the anti-establishment/New Politics dimension is clearly recognizable.

(FIGURE 4)

At the same time these groups clearly stand out from their inherited stratum position: they have less in common with the interests of their own social stratum than with those of their age cohort. It is the sons and daughters of the old middle class that are least mediated in the traditional conflict structure. They come out of their position in the political "old right camp" of businessmen and professionals, without, however, passing over into the "old left camp"; for them, the old conflict structure offers no alternative possibility of political orientation. But the corresponding groups in the new middle class and the working class because they are relatively removed from the old

conflict dimension, are likewise open to party political mediation of their specific interests. If now the position of a young "old middle class" and a young "new middle class" is compared with the corresponding generation types in the party space, then one can, on the basis of the well-known higher level of education in the middle class⁸, deduce the existence of an additional education effect. The suspicion that a status group is being formed here which is of above average qualifications by degree of education and political interest, and "frees itself from its coalition with the petty bourgeoisie and becomes independent" (Lepsius 1973: 310ff) because of its position of indifference as regards interests vis-à-vis the working class and the entrepreneurs, is clearly illustrated here. The New Politics dimension has its greatest importance -- and here, I feel, the voting potential of the FDP and that of the Greens becomes separated -- for that part of the younger generation which, while having the necessary prerequisites, has not (yet) managed to rise into social elite positions: the younger, well-educated generation, Kornhauser's "unattached intellectuals" (1959: 183ff)⁹.

(FIGURE 5)

This interpretation leans strongly on individual life cycle effects to explain the preference for New Politics options. Specifically, this would mean that each rising generation is initially open to New Politics approaches, and with increasing age and therefore growing professional and family responsibilities becomes more conservative, i.e. becomes integrated into the Old Politics. On this interpretation the conflict described will be characterized less by an opposition between an "old class" and a "new class" that is a permanent entity with distinct post-materialistic values (Inglehart 1981, Bruce-Briggs 1979), but more accurately as the problem already described in Pareto and Mosca of accommodating rising social elites. In fact both effects are linked with each other, to the extent that the consequences of social modernization sharpen the problem of elite circulation both qualitatively and quantitatively.

In order to arrive at forecasts of the further course of this conflict dimension, it is necessary to investigate individual life cycle effects in different generations, thereby separating the two effects. This problem does not look soluble at present, both from the methodological point of view and for reasons of inavailability of long-period individual data series

(Gleen 1977, Allerbeck/Hoog 1981). We are therefore compelled to deduce hypotheses as to the direction and strength of these effects on the basis of separate, individual states of affairs.

Earlier work on value shifts in post-industrial societies have -- including for the case of the Federal Republic -- stressed the existence of strong generational effects (Inglehart 1971, Hildebrandt/Dalton 1977). According to this, younger generations show an increasingly strong interest for the New Politics, while the war and post-war generations continue to stick to the Old Politics. The development of these trends for the Federal Republic can be seen in Table 2, which shows the mean values for the New Politics dimension for a given generation at different points in time.

(TABLE 2)

Both the differences of the mean values and the eta coefficients of the variance analysis show the development towards increasing importance of the generation effect for the New Politics dimension. These findings do not however allow any conclusions to be drawn as to the numerical change in the New Politics camp in any generation over time. This would, however, be essential

for an even approximate determination of life cycle effects, such as Allerbeck and Hoog (1981) attempted. They managed to show that while the generation effect seems to be the best explanation for the shift in political attitudes, changes in individual life cycle -- predominantly at the age of around 30 -- also seem to be bound up with a change in political attitudes; however, a general connection between the process of ageing and a development towards conservatism has hitherto not been established.

On this background, the results in Fig. 5 could be interpreted either as a problem of elite circulation or as a conflict between "old" and "new" class.

In this situation the political system's capacity for integration, i.e. the ability of the political parties to tie in these new groups and their demands, takes on central importance. To the extent that integrative capacity declines, the chance increases that competing, new elites can on the basis of the social mobilization process appeal to various parts of the population with alternative programmes of solutions.

Voting Green as a reaction to a deterioration in system performance: the institutional analysis

In the foregoing section we have discussed the causes for the change in social structural stratification

patterns resulting from the development towards post-industrial forms of society, and the consequences of these for the capacity of the political system or of the parties oriented round the old conflicts to take account of new or highly differentiated interests. In this we have found that the integrative capacity of the German party system, its ability to integrate specific interests satisfactorily, is felt to be less than adequate in the estimation of certain population groups.

With this definition of the integrative capacity of a political system, starting from the individual's perception of its efficiency, the further institutional analysis is delineated: it is not the formal structures of political institutions, and their system property designated as "value-considering potential", that is to be analysed here, but the capacity that the individual ascribes to political institutions for representing his own interests. It is only in this way that it becomes possible to explain the evident difference in the integrative capacity of the formally and institutionally unchanged German party system between 1972 and 1980. These differences indicate that alongside the structural immobilism sketched out at the beginning in giving consideration to new values, there is a decisive function for the mode of conflict mediation by the political

elite, the "translation handling" (Sartori 1968: 19).

On this viewpoint, the decreasing importance of class conflict could be explained by the fact that the political elite interprets this conflict politically with decreasing intensity. The increased weight given to the New Politics by the younger generations would then be explainable as a reaction to the development of the CDU and SPD into mass parties of the "people's party" type. While in the traditional setup the programmatically left camp, working for changes in the status quo, is symbolically integrated into the left class party via the interpretation of this conflict of interest as class conflict, with decreasing politicization of this conflict the ideological integrative capacity of the former class party declines. Old left positions must be organized and legitimized at an increasing remove from the traditional conflict structure.

Transferring this type of explanation to the development of the German party system, we may draw the conclusion that the old left which was socialized until, say, the time of the SPD's Godesberg programme (1959-tr.) ought to differ from the up-and-coming left on both the Old and the New Politics dimensions. To test this hypothesis, the position of groups distinguished by time of

socialization was calculated separately according to individual self-assessment on a left-right scale along both dimensions. The results, in Figure 6, confirm our hypothesis.

For the generations that had their primary socialization before 1945 and immediately after the end of the Second World War, the political position on the left-right continuum agrees almost perfectly with the traditionally embodied conflict structure^{9a}. They define their political position through the ordering criteria derived from class conflict, i.e. from the Old Politics.

(FIGURE 6)

With different political socialization experiences, this pattern increasingly breaks up, especially on the left of the spectrum. Those who had their first political experiences at the time when the SPD began to open into a people's party connect their left-wing positions increasingly with an "anti-establishment" pattern of interpretation separated from traditional class conflicts. Finally, for the youngest age cohorts of those now between 18 and 24, the old conflict has largely lost its imprinting power to structure the ideo-

logical "world-view" seen by the majority as left-wing. A key position in this interpretation is taken up by the age cohort that experienced its primary political socialization between 1966 and 1970 in the reideologization phase of German politics. For this group, the traditional class conflict has almost as great importance as for the oldest generation. At the same time, however, those on the left of this age cohort see themselves as just as far removed from the establishment as those on the left of the youngest group. It is here that there arises a political camp that is open to appeals for a reformist politics opposed to the establishment: the New Left.

From the fact that the New Politics does not always separate the whole generation equally, but that this conflict leads mainly to a separation between Old and New left, it can in accordance with our central thesis be concluded that the decline in ideological ties to the system of established conflict structures constitutes a major cause for the development of the New Politics dimension¹⁰.

Irrespective of whether the increased New Politics orientation of the younger generation is explained by their changing value priorities on the basis of

greater individual or social welfare, or, as attempted here, as a function of the mode of political interpretation of social conflicts by the political élite, both causes bring about in the first place a deterioration in the integrative capacity of the political system.

Without strictly maintaining in the analysis below the differentiation outlined above of the causes of declining integrative capacity, let us briefly go into the theoretical connection between the migratory movement of some population groups out of the party system and the perceived effectiveness of the parties.

The question of the reaction of the members of an organization to its deteriorating performance was taken by Albert O. Hirschman as the subject of his book Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970). For any member of an organization -- and the "psychological membership" in parties mediated through party Loyalties can be included here -- there are, according to Hirschman, two contradictory reactions to a decline in the organization's performance: exit or voice. Transferred to party systems, this means voting for another party or articulating unsatisfied interests with the goal of changing the state of affairs (1970: 30). Decisions on

exit or voice, though, especially in the context of organizations with voluntary membership and political parties, are not taken abruptly, but on the basis of existing loyalties, i.e. positive ties, to those organizations. The greater the loyalty, the more likely will a person be to react to a deterioration in performance by voice rather than exit. Strong loyalties, not only to individual parties but also to groups in the social structure or to communities, increase voice because they make exit more difficult.

The conditions for the success of a -- green or alternative -- new party are thereby adequately described. It has good chances with all voters who because of slight social or ideological ties to the existing social and political system have only slight loyalties to party and social systems and therefore have a rather low exit threshold. This threshold is lowest for people who have hitherto not developed any very strong positive attitude to any party. Should these groups in addition have no social position at stake, or should they evaluate the economic and social risks of alternative policy programmes with no basis of personal experience of economic collapse, then they are still more easily reachable by alternative or environment

parties. But even in a voter group that either has other party loyalties and/or has already risen into established social positions, voting for an environment party is conceivable on the logic of exit or voice. Among the possibilities are firstly, because the deterioration in performance, for instance through environmental pollution, has reached such a pitch that material interests take second place by comparison. Such situations, where threats to the environment become relatively dominant, arise where people are directly affected by the cost to prosperity of environment pollution. Secondly, people might vote Green despite existing loyalties on the basis of a calculation that voting Green would stimulate or accelerate changes of course within the party. This drastic form of opposition by temporary exit becomes especially likely where the party previously voted for does not treat interest articulation within the party sufficiently flexibly, or else gives the impression that voice will not lead to any successful change of course. Temporary exit in this circumstance is easier where the risk for the party, to which a loyalty, however weak, persists, remains calculable, or the consequences of a lost election would have no immediately negative results for the personal situation. Such a calculation might explain why the Greens clearly do worse in Bundestag elections, which are the most important ones at least in

the perception of the voters, than in Landtag or municipal elections. Finally, a third medium-term development might be that the Greens, through their participation in parliament, successfully minimize the perceived risk for established voter groups and therefore become votable on the basis of politically inadequately represented but socio-economically relevant interests.

Nevertheless all these movements towards exit are founded on the same basic pattern: the reduced capacity of the political system to mediate political conflicts arising either from divergent political interest priorities or open conflict over adequate programmes to solve pressing environment problems.

To determine these effects and their interactions analytically, a path analysis was carried out with the variables generation, education, materialist or non-materialist interest orientation, attitude to the expansion of nuclear energy, the establishment/anties-establishment dimension as operationalization of ties to the political system, voting intentions and the actual (simulated) election of an environment party¹¹. The results can be seen in figure 7; they represent a summary of the arguments presented so far:

(FIGURE 7)

The basis for the emergence of Green or alternative voter potential is changes in the social stratification structure as mediated through a general rise in levels of education and a differentiation on that basis of socially organized interests. In the processes of traditional interest mediation, the group of the better-educated younger generation is least involved. Their specific interests come up against a party system which is structurally less and less able adequately to reflect these interests. In particular, the younger generation's higher interest in non-material values, such as participation in democratic decision-making processes, as well as the resistance mediated through the new interests against the growth-oriented consumer society -- and here opposition to nuclear energy is an exemplary case -- lead to a situation where these parts of the population feel themselves increasingly far removed from the system of social and political interest mediation organized primarily according to old interest positions. The exit movement on the anti-establishment dimension is best explained by these two factors, and less simply by the effect of belonging to the younger generation; and these rejection movements in turn best explain Green

voting intention. The "crossing" of the threshold out of the system of the established political parties, expressed in an actual vote for the Greens, comes about by the addition of the intervening variables; mere membership in the younger generation or in the group of persons with higher education contributes nothing towards raising the voting tendency. The connection does not become visible until the interaction effect between high education and membership in the younger generation is included in the regression estimate. This shows what was already visible in Figure 5: the tendency to vote for an environment party rises exponentially in the young, better educated age cohort; the highly-educated welfare generation is leaving the established party system. The direct age and education effects of the other population groups on voting decisions for the Greens disappear completely here. This means that the voting intentions of these groups can essentially be explained by their low integration into the political system. The clearest effects here result from the described disassociation movement on the anti-establishment dimension, a directly and indirectly mediated anti-nuclear attitude and a non-material interest position. It is, finally, noteworthy that the education effects essentially act indirectly on the voting decision, by leading to a rise in non-material interest

priorities -- and it is only through the unsatisfactory mediation of these interests in the political system that the educationally conditioned exit moment is set going.

Prospects

On the basis of the connections outlined, the integrative imagination of the established parties is stimulated: either they show their adaptability by developing new ways to take account of even unorganized interests and potentials for opposition, or they are overwhelmed by an exit wave that can lead to a perceptible rearrangement of the relations between social groups and party systems. Certainly, any dramatization of the "deficitary party representation" described (Guggenberger 1980: 14) would be out of place here: the exit potentials are still so small that the established parties cannot be sufficiently weakened that they can no longer recover.

In looking for a forecast of the Greens' future chances on the basis of the above analysis, several scenarios offer themselves, which can be distinguished according to the cause supposed for the emergence of the New Politics camp.

- If the New Politics represents merely a problem of accommodating up-and-coming elites, then the conflict, which would be seen as exaggerated from an ideological point of view, could be solved as before with the establishment of the successive new elites. This scenario is, however, not very likely on the basis of our analysis.
- If the New Politics is a consequence of rising social or individual prosperity, then we can count -- on the assumption of stable or at least not drastically deteriorating economic conditions -- on a further, constant increase in this conflict potential. The established parties have on this view paradoxically contributed to this development through their efficiency, and are, qua mass integration parties, almost helpless in face of it. They would have to respond with a far-reaching "democratization" of politics.
- Finally, it may be hypothesized that the trend towards the "People's Party" is the cause of the shift towards the New Politics. This development would then primarily affect the SPD, since in the perception of voters and in its own claims, both in the "class struggle phase" in opposition and in the re-ideologization phase in government, it stood for a

policy of change, of social reform. This zeal for reform has flagged in the meantime, and the New Left -- and not only they -- have moreover lost in the transition from Brandt to Schmidt their charismatic leadership personality. Perhaps the shift to the New Politics should be seen much more than hitherto -- and this should be taken as an indication of a possible fourth scenario -- as a political problem of "leadership and change" (Miller/Levitin 1976).

Footnotes

- 1) Cf. on this the widely varied forecasts collected by F. Müller, in: Murphy et al. (1979); likewise R.-O. Schultze (1980).

- 2) A discussion of these theoretical assumptions can be found in Lehner (1979b). He points out that Inglehart's theory is confronted with a consistency problem that has its cause in the fact that it is based on two mutually independent approaches -- Maslow's conception of a hierarchy of needs and a socialization thesis -- and that from the two approaches contradictory hypotheses regarding the individual value shift can be deduced. This consistency problem seems especially problematic where the need priorities dependent on the individual level of material welfare are interpreted as value priorities on the assumption of long-term socialization processes.

- 3) The connection between level of prosperity, costs of prosperity and the articulation of environmental interests can, however, not be interpreted mono-causally and linearly. It should instead be assumed that this causal chain is closed only on particular

conditions. First, for instance, the various analyses of the environmental protection movement indicate that there are clear interaction effects between university or big-city ambience and the articulation of protest. Objective detriment to the environment becomes relevant for political action only once it is interpreted politically by organized groups in the environment area. See on this also Pappi (1977) and Kaase/Klingemann (1979).

- 4) On this arrangement of the opposing camps see most recently Dalton (1981). I too should like to use the term "new left" here, though without however overlooking the problems that arise from the fact that in the German context this term is loaded with the connotations of the 60's New Left.
- 5) It might be objected to the restriction chosen that it means that in terms of statistical procedures the dimensionality of the party system is inadequately grasped by it. On the other hand, various studies, e.g. Norpoth (1979), indicate that the individual rank order of the smaller parties in the German party system leads to very unstable and logically inconsistent preference orders, and furthermore that these rank orders are very strongly influenced by the party leaderships' coalition behaviour. From

this aspect it would even seem defensible to leave the FDP too out of the analysis, since its sympathy values are unambiguously determined by the coalition with the SPD.

- 6) To sift the individual answer patterns -- arising from the fact that many of those questioned use only part of the scales to rate all the parties -- the individual average over all (4) ratings is calculated and subtracted from each rating. On this cf. Pappi (1973) and Barnes/Kaase (1979).

- 7) This possibility of calculating the principal component values for each individual questioned is the main reason for choosing a factor analytic solution to the problem, despite ordinal scale quality. To determine the position of the groups in figures 4-6, in each case the group mean values were calculated on both dimensions and then transferred into the coordinate system. To delimit the stratum divisions, the head of household's occupation was used. On this cf. Pappi (1973: 193ff.).

- 8) In fact, in the group division made here too, the proportions of people with higher education in the middle class are above average. Of the twelve

persons in the young "old middle class" in our random sample, eight of those questioned were indeed still students; this also explains the "runaway" appearance of the group mean value.

- 9) In this connection cf. also the international comparative analysis by Kaase and Klingemann (1979). The authors use a similar group sub-division, but in addition distinguish according to the extent of church ties of these groups and can therefore demonstrate a further "unattachment" effect in the sense of the theory presented here.
- 10) In favour of this interpretation there is also the fact found by Inglehart (1977) that on a European comparison the New Left is below average in strength in British politics, which is strongly characterized by class conflict. In these aspects one should expect French politics to show a drastic reduction in the voting share of the *écologistes* on the background of the wave of reforms set going by Mitterand.
- 11) An exhaustive description of the individual variables can be found in the appendix. Figure 7 shows the network of interactions between the variables arranged causally in the direction of each arrow. Nonsignificant effects have not been entered. The strength of the significant effects is expressed by the standardized regression coefficients (beta weightings) assigned to the arrows.

Variables

Generation

Dichotomized for the regression analysis into the youngest post-war generation 18-29 years (1), 30 years and older (0)

Education

Dichotomized for the regression analysis into Abitur (approx A levels) and above (1), and below (0)

Postmaterialist Interest Position

Rank ordering of the 4 Inglehart items:

- maintenance of law and order in this country
- more influence of citizens on governmental decisions
- fight against rising prices
- protection of the right to freedom of speech

Dichotomization: second and fourth items mentioned in first and second places = postmaterialist ideal type (1), other combinations (0)

Establishment/Anti-Establishment

Factor score on the basis of sympathy ratings of the political parties CDU, SPD, FDP and Greens, with individual answering patterns sifted

Green Voting Intentions

Could you imagine that you would vote for this party (previous question: reference to

environment party) in a Bundestag election, or do you not think so? Dichotomy: yes (1), no (0)

Elections of Greens

Here is a ballot paper giving the names of parties. Please put one cross secretly against the party that you would now vote for in a Bundestag election. Dichotomy: Greens (1), other (0)

Anti-nuclear

Nuclear energy should be further developed to meet our future energy needs. Dichotomy: Agree (0), disagree (1)

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FIGURE 1

Old and New Conflict Dimension and Political Camp




TABLE 1

Sympathy ratings of political parties, 1980

	\bar{x}	s	Don't know %	No indication %
SPD	2.42	2.58	1.9	0.6
CDU	1.72	2.33	2.1	0.6
FDP	1.52	2.16	2.6	0.6
GREENS	-0.93	2.62	6.1	1.7

Note: \bar{x} = mean value; s = standard deviation -- on scale from -5 through 0 to +5.

Source: Population survey 1980, by Rudolf Wildenmann




FIGURE 2

Sympathy Ratings of Political Parties, 1980




ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT

FIGURE 3

The position of social groups in the party system, 1980. Results of the principal components analysis.

- PL: Protestant Landowners
- KL: Catholic Landowners
- PNM: Protestant New Middle Class
- KNM: Catholic New Middle Class
- PA: Protestant Working Class
- KA: Catholic Working Class
- KAM: Catholic Old Middle Class
- PAM: Protestant Old Middle Class



Legend.


Age	Class*	N	Key
18-29	A	104	⊙
	NM	132	⊕
	AM	12	⊗
30-50	A	254	□
	NM	370	▨
	AM	59	▩
51+	A	263	△
	NM	315	▴
	AM	73	▾

* A: working class
 NM: new middle class
 AM: old middle class

SOCIAL REFORMING/
 EGALITARIAN
 GOAL ORIENTATION

CONSERVATIVE-TRA-
 DITIONALIST GOAL
 ORIENTATION


FIGURE 4
 The position of combined age and stratum groups in the party system, 1980. Results of principal components analysis (without landowners)



ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT

FIGURE 5

The position of combined age and education groups in the party system, 1980. Results of the principal components analysis (without landowners).



Legend

Age	Education	n	Symbol
18-29	low	120	⊙
	middle	68	⊕
	high	104	⊗
30-50	low	421	□
	middle	150	⊞
	high	176	⊠
51 +	low	470	△
	middle	137	⊡
	high	125	⊢

CONSERVATIVE-TRADITIONALIST GOAL ORIENTATION

SOCIAL REFORMING/EGALITARIAN GOAL ORIENTATION

x
CDU

x
SPD

x
FDP

TABLE 2

The New Politics in connection with generations, 1961-1980⁺

Generation (period of socialization)	1961	1969	1972	1976	1980
<u>Welfare Generation</u> (1966-1980)	--	--	--	-.47	-.46
<u>2nd Postwar Generation</u> (1956-1965)	--	-.23	-.30	-.19	-.35
<u>1st Postwar Generation</u> (1945-1955)	-.17	-.06	-.19	-.10	-.12
<u>Third Reich</u> (1933-1944)	-.05	-.09	-.01	.04	.22
<u>Weimar</u> (1918-1932)	.02	.15	.24	.40	.53
<u>German Empire</u> (pre 1917)	.21	.22	.28	.58	.63
Eta	.11	.13	.21	.29	.38
(N)	(1366)	(724)	(1853)	(1918)	(1830)

⁺ Entries are group mean values for each age cohort, the mean value for the whole random sample being in each case zero; negative values mean a New Politics orientation. The values for 1961, 1969 and 1972 are taken from Table 6.4 in BDH (1981:..). The data for calculating the values for 1976 and 1980 derive from the population survey by Rudolf Wildenmann. For the method of calculation see the above-mentioned source.

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FIGURE 6
 Position of those on political right and left socialized at different times, 1980





FIGURE 7

Path-analysis model determining voting for Greens



R = .45; R² = .21

Data source: Population survey 1980, by Rudolf Wildenmann

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