

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

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Part I

& Part II

THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN

FOR A EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY 1947-1950

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PART I-II

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THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN
FOR A EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY 1947-1950

by Alan Hick.

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FOREWORD

"Just as the revolution of 1848 was preceded by a 'campaign of banquets', so a hundred years later, the European revolution was announced by a 'campaign of congresses' spread over the years 1947-1949. These congresses expressed the state of mind and stimulated the major trends of a heterogeneous and many sided movement - a movement curiously inefficient in its tactics, and in its direct strategy, but to which the Council of Europe owes its existence, and because of which the Community of the Six has been able to take shape and win the acceptance of public opinion."

These opening words to the article 'The campaign of the European congresses', written by Denis de Rougemont in 1967¹, provided the original impulse to this present dissertation. For, as de Rougemont has so aptly reminded us, the history of the European Community does not start in May 1950, but during the crucial transitional years just after the Second World War, which itself gave the impetus to the post-war 'European Idea'.² It is for this reason that the story of the 'campaign of the European congresses' during the late 1940's is both interesting and instructive. It is also relevant to the present-day debate over Europe. Indeed, at a time when we are re-assessing more and more the socio-economic, and above all, the political dimensions of the European Community, it is surely of value, and perhaps enlightening, to look back to what de Rougemont has described as the "certain creative freshness inspiring the whole undertaking" these thirty years ago. In doing so, we can discover and reflect upon the important corresponding debates, arguments and dilemmas which are beginning to appear in the new directly elected European Parliament. Moreover, had it not been for the hard preparatory work and essential psychological progress achieved during these transitional years after the war, underpinned by Western Europe's vital economic recovery, the idea of a European Parliament might not have materialised in the practical, if still stunted form, which we are now starting to witness.

1. DENIS DE ROUGEMONT, 'The campaign of the European congresses', Government and Opposition, vol. 2, No. 3, April-July 1967, pp. 329-334.

2. See W. LIPGENS, Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbevegungen 1940-45, (München, 1962).

Emerging out of a cold war context and in sequence with OEEC, the corner stone and main reference point of this immediate post-war European campaign was the "historic", though sadly forgotten, 'Congress of Europe', held at The Hague in May 1948, and around which the major part of this study is centred. The Hague Congress, within a space of only three days, indeed, not only captured the fiery European mood of the period in question, it also condensed, rationalised, synthesised and transformed the 1940's debate about transition within a European framework into an active and practical campaign for real change. It was, in the words of Carol Webb, "a startling occasion, bringing together many European political leaders and parties, but somehow going beyond this to indicate the emergence of a new political current. It was certainly the peak of the European Movements' attempt to capture widespread public interest in the European Idea."^I The Hague Congress, in short, was the most grandiose, the most emotionally charged, and the most convincing mass demonstration in the post-war era of Europe's will and determination to unite.

The "strange driving passion", which, de Rougemont informs us, "inspired the militants of Europeanism" these thirty years ago, failed nevertheless to actually unite Europe in real and immediate terms. The Hague Congress, and the subsequent campaign of the European Movement, it is true, led directly to the creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949, including an official and representative European Assembly; but the latter body was devoid of real political teeth, lacking in sustained impact, and unable in the final event to muster any real influence or popular support. From an immediate and specific point of view, there was no real European "revolution" - there was no effective transfer of national political sovereignty to a supra-national European Political Authority.

So what went wrong? Was it a lack of pragmatism or realism? Jean Monnet, for his part, seemed to think so, and characterised the Hague Congress, the birth of the European Movement, and the./.

I. Carol Webb, 'Europeanism and the European Movements', in Social and Political Movements in Western Europe, p.316.

./political campaign which it sponsored as "voluntaristic", "confused", and "dreamy".¹ This dismissal of a political approach, of a political lead and appeal to catch the enthusiasm of peoples, parliaments and governments alike for the European Idea, led in turn to a technocratic, "functional" approach, designed by Monnet, and with the aim of filling the supra-national gap in Europe by a series of "backdoor" manoeuvres which would transfer limited national powers in specific economic areas to an a-political and mainly bureaucratic High European Authority. As Robert Schuman bluntly explained in his famous press declaration of May 9, 1950:

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."²

Concrete achievements - there have been many: the "spill over" effects and "feedback" aspirations of Monnet's functional approach have indeed resulted in a certain "expansive logic" of "sector integration", and by side-stepping the questions of "high politics", have also enabled a limited transfer of power from the nation-state apparatus to a High European Authority - be this the European Commission or the Council of Ministers. Yet, because the former authority is a bureaucracy and has, therefore, no legitimate popular-political base; and because the latter is still, more than ever, essentially intergovernmental, in which national interests are the most vented and best protected, the real influence of such High European Authorities is clearly limited, and in the final event, unable to side-step problems arising from national politics. In short, the so-called "functional" integration of Europe has much to its credit, but its continual evasion of the central dilemma in European ./.

1. JEAN MONNET, Mémoires, (Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976), p.323.

2. SCHUMAN DECLARATION, 9.5.50., plus Plan, see Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol.7, 1948-50, p.10701.

./union - that of political sovereignty - has resulted in a bureaucratic alienation in the integrating machinery, and a separation between the proposers of coordinated actions and the legitimate holders of political power. In the words of Walter Scheel:

"Europe has grown beyond the blind belief that political unity would automatically and inevitably follow communal institutions in the economic field. This conception has shown itself to be false. The impulses which will bring Europe together, in the economic field too, must come from politics."¹

The wheel has therefore turned full circle. Indeed, the gradual attention and importance now being attached to the future role and purpose of the directly elected European Parliament is indicative that a political stimulant, along with greater democratic control of Europe's institutions, is seen again as the more acceptable strategy for a workable and legitimate European union, as opposed to the increasing "spill around" tendencies of functionalism. That is why, to repeat the point made earlier, the deliberations at the Hague Congress of May 1948, and the political campaign for a European Assembly which they spurned, are relevant and worth studying.

It must be stressed, of course, that the European campaign launched at The Hague was not of a purely political nature alone. In fact, the European Movement was also extremely active in economic, social, and cultural spheres. It is not within the scope of this study, however, to go into the details of these complex and varying activities, since this would take another three volumes to describe! The following work will instead concentrate on the political campaign of the European Movement, which, after all, was the central pillar and primary activity of the campaign as a whole. In analysing chiefly these political aspects, it must, on the other hand, also be emphasised that the text makes no pretence at giving a qualified account of the views and policies pertaining to the governments and parliaments.

1. WALTER SCHEEL, opening address to the Free Democratic Party Congress, 12. 11. 73., from R. J. Harrison, Europe in Question (Allen & Unwin 1974)

involved or the intergovernmental European institutions, about which much has already been written. The main theme of this book is rather to describe the important and fascinating political struggle pursued by the European Movement behind the official scenes, which subsequently overflowed into the realm of official decision-making during the period in question. After a brief survey of the formal post-war setting, we must, therefore, return our attention to the emergence of individual pre-European groups during the war, and in turn, look at the basic ideas and purposes of the European pressure groups which sprang up after the war, and their decision, in the summer of 1947, to form a liaison committee and sponsor a mass 'Congress of Europe'. The decisive preparatory stages to, and the actual launching of, the Hague Congress itself, in May 1948, can then be described in full context. - This much will comprise the first part of the study. In turn, the second part of the book will go on to describe the official launching of the European Movement, in October 1948, and the political campaign pursued for the creation of a European Assembly, leading directly to the setting up of the Council of Europe in May 1949. Finally, the conclusion will briefly examine the initial political work and lost opportunities of the Council of Europe, in conjunction with the strong, but then declining campaign conducted behind the scenes at Strasbourg by the European Movement. The text will finish at the point of the federalist-functional split in the Movement, in 1950, and the eclipse of the overt political initiative with the launching of the Schuman Plan.

The break up of the European Movement in 1950 indeed marked the rapid decline of the political campaign for a supranational Europe which had emerged so strongly in the late 1940's. In the end, there were no "miracles", and a crucial and opportune time for "making Europe" faded away in the bureaucratic haze of functionalism. But the passing of time can never fully destroy the appeal and significance of views and ideas./.

./which have been so forcefully and passionately expressed. - In the light perhaps of the re-emergence of a European political initiative, it will be left to the reader to decide whether these views of the recent past have real meaning for today.

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
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INTRODUCTION

THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN



CHAPTER 1

THE POST-WAR SETTING

I) 'Shattered Peace'

"The four-century-old state system that was centered in Europe, and which had been weakened in the First World War, collapsed in the course of the Second. A new system would have to emerge. There was much uncertainty about the shape it would take, and about the two countries that were sure to dominate it."¹

The meeting of Russian and American troops on the Elbe in the late morning of 25 April 1945 epitomised both the emergence, out of the wreckage of the Second World War, of the two new world 'superpowers', and the eclipse of the old Europe and the international system it hitherto represented. The momentous war-time rise of the Soviet Union and America, together with the destruction of Germany, the crippling of France and her neighbours, and the impoverishment of Great Britain, resulted in a new bi-polar balance of power between the two emergent giants, both of whom before the war had been politically detached from the prevailing international order - the United States due to strong isolationist currents at home, the Soviet Union due to the isolation to which she had been subjected abroad, as illustrated at Versailles and later at Munich. Now, it was up to these two great powers, thrown to the international fore, to shape the post-war world and the destiny of Europe.

The far-reaching ramifications of the new international order in embryo would impose crucial conditions and limitations upon the European integration process and European unity campaign which came into being, and which in part it fostered. The central international development by which co-existence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. gave way to a global antagonism on a bloc basis was especially significant, since it not only provided a new impulse and a new sense of urgency to the European Idea, but also a ./.

¹ Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Pelican 1980), p.7.

./..new geo-political definition to the whole undertaking. In the words of Walter Laqueur:

"The cold war created a far greater degree of European unity than had been thought possible, and it also brought about lasting American involvement in European affairs."¹

As 'Western Union' became the official order of the day, so too did the European Union campaign tailor its aims to meet the needs of the moment and the official opening provided. When the process unfolded, however, differences in nuance and of objectives became more pronounced, not only among the various unofficial pressure groups which comprised the European Movement - the subject of this study, but also among the main governments concerned. The central pivotal role of Britain, seeking primarily an Atlantic alliance and only a co-operative Europe, clashed in the final event with the supra-national European initiative sought by France. For each, it was chiefly a question of security - the former having to readjust to her reduced power capability, the latter to the reality of a renascent industrial Germany. What set in motion the initial complementary unity process, nonetheless, was the overall perceived threat posed by Soviet imperialism and impending Western European economic collapse. This was also what chiefly motivated U.S. intervention, subsequently giving form to the post-war international order which ensured the splitting of Europe into two differently united halves. The next few pages will attempt, briefly, to describe this crucial development.

. . .

Although the European unity movement emerged essentially out of the traumas and idealism spurned by the Second World War,² proposals for European regional action had played little part in official war-time planning for the new order, while at the ./.

1. Walter Laqueur, Europe Since Hitler, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 89.

2. *CP*, pp. 38-43.

./same time perceptions of the immediate post-war international situation did not necessarily imply any rigid bi-polar division of world responsibility between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Indeed, to all appearances, Great Britain, backed by an Empire and Commonwealth of some three-quarters of a billion persons, also emerged from the war as one of the major triumphant powers, and had throughout the conflict been one of the 'Big Three' responsible for drawing up the new European map at the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Summits. France too had managed to retain 'big power' status, joining the other 'Three' in the post-war Council of Foreign Ministers and in the occupying German Control Commission, as well as in the permanent Security Council of the newly-founded United Nations Organisation. Together, Britain and France had initially given some impetus to the European unity idea, recorded in Churchill's dramatic offer of 15 June 1940 to establish an Anglo-French Union,¹ and in Churchill's sponsorship in 1943 of the 'Council of Europe' idea also supported by de Gaulle.² In turn, however, this sort of heady European enthusiasm gave way to a reassertion of a more national 'realpolitik' view. As Churchill so brutally informed de Gaulle in January 1944, "...each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I must choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt."³ From this position, stemmed Churchill's "three circles" concept of Britain's post-war world role, whereby unity with the Empire and Commonwealth came first, followed by unity across the Atlantic and finally with Europe.⁴

The Roosevelt Administration, on the other hand, strongly influenced by the 'Wilsonian' liberal view of foreign affairs, ./.

1. For the 'inside' story, see Jean Monnet Memoirs, op.cit., pp.137-141.

2. Cf. pp. 52.

3. Quoted in D.P. Calleo, Europe's Future: The Grand Alternatives (New York, 1965) p.124.

4. See R.J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups (Un. of California, 1970) pp.17-18.

./..had a more 'global' perspective of the post-war order, summed up in the term 'Grand Design', denoting an international approach which would not strive to install simply another 'balance of power' or new political 'spheres of influence' but attempt instead to remove conflict, anarchy and crude 'power politics' from international relations altogether.¹ Having deliberated and in turn rejected the idea of future European unity, on the grounds that it would jeopardise the new global strategy envisaged as well as threaten American trade,² the U.S. policy makers looked instead to the setting up of the United Nations Organisation in the political field, and the Bretton Woods reconstruction, development and monetary agencies in the economic field. Coupled with this was the public pressure in America towards the end of the war to withdraw from Europe after the conflict. The net result was that the U.S. Administration was neither favourable towards European unity nor willing to become permanently entangled in European affairs, let alone prepared to assume any post-war 'camp' responsibility. Throughout most of the war, in fact, Roosevelt had regarded his role more as that of a "mediator between Russian Communism and Churchillian imperialism".³ Now, towards the end of the war, he in turn promised Stalin at Yalta that there would be no more U.S. troops stationed in Europe within two years of Hitler's pending defeat.⁴

The Soviet Union, however, having borne the brunt of the fight against Hitler, and having lost twelve million of her population and one-third of her economic resources in the process of doing so, did not share America's abstract view of international relations nor America's eagerness to pull out of Europe at the./.

1. See D. Yergin, op.cit., pp.8-9.

2. See the interesting account of the US State Dept. Subcommittee on European Organisation (1943-4) in Hans A. Schmitt, The Path to European Union: The Marshall Plan to the Common Market (Louisiana State University, 1962), pp.13-15.

3. Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Unity (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p.45.

4. Roger Morgan, Western European Politics since 1945: the shaping of the European Community (London 1972), p.16.

./first opportunity, though this was certainly not due to any support for European union. Soviet designs - like those of France after the First World War¹- were essentially about status, security and reparations. The peace settlement which emerged from the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in 1945 seemed to provide this. In exchange for giving credibility to Roosevelt's idealistic United Nations project and for contributing to the final war effort in the Far East against Japan, as well as having earlier agreed not to interfere in sensitive Mediterranean areas such as Greece, Turkey and Italy², Stalin secured a vast extension of the USSR's frontiers westwards from the Baltic to the Black Sea (especially in Poland), plus a free hand in a range of buffer-states comprising not only ex-Nazi allies such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania but also Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. (While having reluctantly ceded to these Soviet security demands in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill managed to extract at Yalta, nonetheless, a Soviet guarantee to uphold democracy and political freedom in the region). In addition, although Germany was to be divided into four occupation zones, the USSR would be able to extract reparations by removals of capital equipment not only from her own zone, but also 10% of that deemed "unnecessary for the German peace economy" from the other zones.

The immediate post-war settlement was in turn defended as an extension of Roosevelt's 'Grand Design', based upon a 'realistic' policy of co-operation and co-security along with confidence in the exemplary potential of the United Nations. Despite his suspicions of Soviet policy, plus some added tension at the Potsdam conference itself, President Truman pursued the liberal 'Yalta axiom' of co-existence bequeathed by his predecessor. Moreover, having to bow to public pressure in America for withdrawal from Europe, he also swiftly demobilised the huge U.S. armed forces, ./.

1. See R. Morgan, op.cit., pp.10-14.

2. See, for example, Winston Churchill's account in The Second World War (Cassell) Vol. XI, pp.187-8, 200, 203.

./though this did not stem the growing U.S. isolationist tide which - as in 1918 - returned a Republican majority in the Congressional Elections of November 1946 committed to domestic budgetary priorities and to a vast reduction in foreign aid and military expenditure abroad. American reluctance to be drawn into Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet presence in turn led to the development of a dangerous power vacuum in Western Europe, accompanied by a fear of exposure and insecurity. This fear was exacerbated by the prospect of economic collapse and by Moscow's blatant disregard for the international tenets implicit in the Yalta understanding, and was finally brought to a head by the mounting urgency of the unresolved German problem and by Britain's imminent failure to exercise world power responsibility. It was in response to this fast deteriorating situation that an eventual reassessment of U.S. policy took place, leading to intervention in Europe and thereby calling into question the tenuous 'Grand Design' axiom left over from the war.

- The post-war European economic crisis, which was to provide the tangible motivation for America's ultimate intervention, arose mainly from the fact that the war, in simple terms, had "cost more than the combined total of all European wars since the Middle Ages."¹ The apparent return to political normality throughout most of Western Europe could not really conceal that total war had left in its wake almost total ruin and chaos.² Of the four main Western European nations, moreover, Britain had now acquired a staggering external debt of £3,000s, while France, Italy and Germany had suffered drastic reductions in resources and now had to face impossible expenditure levels simply to keep alive. Initially relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction were generated by short-term American loans³ and by limited UNRAA⁴ aid. Within a year of the end of the war there was even some mis-placed optimism as to the rapidity of Europe's ./.

1. Richard Mayne, op.cit., p.32.

2. For a vivid description of the post-war European "waste land" see Richard Mayne, ibid., pp.26-37.

3. Ibid., p.72.

4. 'United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration'

././apparent recovery.¹ However, behind the immediate paupery and visible destruction which was first tackled lay the invisible sub-structural devastation brought on by the war. Capital equipment was obsolete and worn out. The work force had been brutally uprooted and was now exhausted, undernourished and disorganised. Technical skills had been lost. Essential foreign markets had either disappeared or had been taken over. Food and fuel production now dropped to dangerous levels. In short, by the Autumn of 1946, the "hidden damages" of the war began to emerge with a vengeance. "Europe stopped, caught her breath, and suddenly collapsed from delayed shock."² To this was added the "dollar gap", resulting from the massive U.S. export surplus to Europe in the face of the latter's fast disappearing foreign assets and dwindling credits. By the Spring of 1947, not only had Western Europe manifestly failed to recover as hoped, but was confronted by perilous shortages, exhaustion and inflation at home, and by the prospect of no longer being able to buy from abroad. A crisis of unforeseen magnitude loomed ahead, while in America, where industrial production as well as gold reserves had more than doubled during the war, the public had only just opted for further isolationism. This prompted the British Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, to complain that, "the Americans have half of the total income of the world, but won't either spend it in buying other people's goods or lending it or giving it away on a sufficient scale."³

To this post-war European economic crisis was added a new ideological twist, provoked by aggressive Soviet political speeches and by uncompromising use of the right of veto by USSR delegates to the U.N. Security Council, and above all by Soviet action in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the sheer speed, ruthlessness and thoroughness with which this region fell into the absolute political grip of Soviet Communism not only broke the Yalta guarantee, it also called into question the whole 'Yalta axiom' about co-operation and ././

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1. See Richard Mayne, op.cit., pp.83-4, plus the section on Will Clayton (US Under Secretary of State) by Hans A. Schmitt, op.cit., p.17.
 2. Hans A. Schmitt, ibid., pp.17-18.
 3. Quoted by Daniel Yergin, op.cit., pp.306-7.

./ co-existence, and revived the fear of antagonistic ideological bloc confrontation. By the Summer of 1947, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland, as well as the Russian-occupied zone of Eastern Germany had all become absorbed by intimidation and brute force into Soviet puppet dictatorships. Czechoslovakia was next on the list. What guarantee was there now of Western Europe in its isolation and economic chaos not going the same way, especially in view of the Communist armed struggle in Greece, Soviet territorial demands on Turkey, and the strengthened position of Communist Parties in both France and Italy where they commanded a quarter of the popular vote? Any such take-over perhaps had not been Stalin's immediate post war intention, but as Attlee, the British Premier, put it, "to leave nothingness might tempt the Soviet Union to strike out for domination over the whole of Europe."¹

The most sensitive power vacuum of all, in this sense, remained Germany, whose destiny would also determine that of Europe as a whole, and whose unsettled status after the war made her the test case for the new international order to be forged. In the final event, as Roger Morgan has argued, the "problem of Germany" would be the "supreme cause of East West friction."² Yet, throughout the first year of peace, it was not the USSR but France which was regarded by US officials as the major obstacle to a permanent settlement of the German question.³ Under De Gaulle and in turn Bidault, it was the French Government which initially led the opposition to German political or economic unification, and which stressed just as much as the USSR the importance of reparations and security against the threat of renewed German aggression. By the Summer of 1946, however, a new perspective emerged. The ./.

1. See E. Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe 1945 - 1970, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 54.

2. R. Morgan, op. cit., p. 17.

3. J.L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, (Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 526-7.

./Western authorities now became increasingly aware of the general economic "impasse" resulting from a strict application of the measures formerly agreed in the wake of the celebrated Morgenthau Plan to place severe limits on the level of German industrial output.¹ The British in particular resented having to pay some £80m in order merely to keep Germany at subsistence level, while the Russians not only refused to co-operate in this, but also continued to pillage at will in their own closed-in zone, while still demanding reparations subsidised by the Western zones.² In reaction the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was finally provoked to complain that the USSR was "determined to loot Germany at our expense."³ The Soviet Union meanwhile also refused to allow Germany to export in order to pay for much-needed food imports, despite the fact that Germany had previously played a central role in European trade. (Before the war, in fact, the three Western zones alone had been the source of one-fifth of all industrial production in Europe, whereas in the immediate post-war era production there reached barely a third of this pre-war level.)⁴ At the same time, moreover, Molotov decided to push Soviet demands for a centralised government in Germany. In view of the rigid one-party state system already enforced in the Soviet zone by April 1946 (and which the USSR had in turn attempted to foist upon the free Western zones of Berlin), plus the vindictive and highly disruptive effect of Soviet "looting", this initiative appeared near to a take-over bid. In short, by the Autumn of 1946, Germany was fast developing into a major source of mutual distrust, dispute, over-reaction and conflict.

1. Jacques Freymond, Western Europe Since the War: A Short Political History, (Praeger, 1964), pp. 31-2.

2. See C.M. Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War, (Hutchinson, 1961), pp. 17-18.

3. See E. Barker, op. cit., pp. 57-8.

4. D. Yergin, op. cit., p. 306.

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The impending crisis over Germany, together with the threatened collapse of the Western European economy and the political submission of Eastern Europe to absolute Soviet power and ideology, all profoundly disturbed the political and civil order of Western Europe, severely shaking its confidence in its capacity to survive. In the initial absence of an American lead, it fell upon Britain to voice an opinion on this deteriorating situation. Indeed, in his first major speech as Foreign Secretary, Bevin declared in the House of Commons that in Eastern Europe one kind of totalitarianism was being replaced by another.¹ The 'silent transfer of power' and the real if masked decline of Britain as a 'Great Power' after the war², however, placed considerable limits on her ability to respond adequately to the precarious European condition.

Over one-quarter of the nation's wealth had, in fact, been expended on the war effort, while overseas investments had been liquidated and one-quarter of merchant shipping lost. Burdened with a massive national debt, and unable to pay out of current earnings for more than one-third of imports of food and raw materials (running at some £2,000k a year) the post-war British Government was soon "deeply conscious of the debilitating effect" all this would have upon foreign policy.³ To this was added an expensive list of strategic responsibilities and overseas burdens, at a time of Empire discontent and transition, and of violent nationalist or communist inspired stirrings. The brute reality of the situation was that Britain's resources were simply over-stretched, while her economic potential did not match the world leadership role which she was meant to exercise on a par with the US and USSR. Bevin, a life-long practitioner of power-./.

1. Speech of 20.8.45., quoted by E. Barker, op.cit., p.45.

2. See G. Lichtheim, The New Europe: Today and Tomorrow, (Praeger, 1963), pp.12-16.

3. J. Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973, (OUP, 1975), pp. 162-6.

./politics,quietly concluded that Britain could not stand up to Soviet power in Europe without the United States.¹

This reassessment of British power capability and of US responsibility(to be analysed in more detail later)was not immediately appreciated by American policy-makers. Influenced by isolationist pressures,they in fact weakened British resources further by impulsively cutting off Lend Lease aid in August 1945,only to replace it later by a loan stipulating sterling convertibility with the dollar,which in turn resulted in a flight of capital from London,a rapid exhaustion of the loan and,by the Summer of 1947,a drain on British reserves to the tune of \$237m a week.² The general impact of the 40% increase in the US wholesale price index in the second half of 1946, moreover,accompanied by the grossly distorted trading effects of the dollar gap and US exports,in turn hampered the expansion of multilateral trade and production,and slowed down to an alarming degree the course of post-war European recovery.³ The final blow came when Europe's crucial fuel shortage was aggravated,particularly in Britain,by the disastrous Winter of 1946-7,encapsulating the mood and fear of vulnerability and insecurity which events since the war had nurtured.

Time was clearly running out. The holding operation which Bevin and Attlee had striven to maintain at the international level,in anticipation of the US eventually being brought in as a counter-weight to Soviet power in Europe,began seriously to ~~sh~~ter. As the US Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs,Will Clayton, came to acknowledge,The reins of world leadership are fast./.

1. E. Barker,op.cit.,pp.54-5.

2. R. Mayne,op.cit.,p.87.

3. See Inverchapel Memorandum to US State Dept.,18.6.47., summarising Britain and Europe's post-war economic crisis, Foreign Relations of the United States,1947,Vol.III,

'The British Commonwealth & Europe',pp.17-23.

./slipping from Britain's competent but now very weak hands.

These reins will be picked up either by the United States or Russia." But America could not assume this leadership "unless the people of the United States are shocked into doing so."¹

The crucial event which was used by Bevin to administer this "shock" took place in February 1947 when, in the wake of the winter fuel crisis which had forced half of British industry to come to a halt,² the Foreign Office abruptly informed the State Department that Britain had to withdraw from protecting Greece and Turkey, and that the United States "would have to undertake the task" of defending the Eastern Mediterranean from the apparent Soviet threat.³ At the same time, Attlee informed the House of Commons that Britain would shortly be pulling out of India. This was done by the middle of August 1947. In the words of Richard Mayne:

"..within the span of a few months and by a few crucial decisions, the British Government tacitly acknowledged the closing of an epoch. Pax Britannica was coming to an end. Harried by economic necessity, Britain was embarking on a long, painful and halting process of readjustment: very gradually, she was becoming one European country among many, each no longer strong enough to play a decisive world role by herself."⁴

Bevin's timely appeal for US intervention did not go unheeded. Truman and the State Department were eager to seize the opportunity, regain the political initiative vis-a-vis the new, isolationist Republican-dominated Congress, and assert America's newly realized world role. On March 12, the 'Truman Doctrine' was announced, in which the US President not only asked for funds, but promised that his commitment to./.

1. Quoted by D. Yergin, op. cit., p. 308, (March 1947).

2. See Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, (London, 1967), p. 113.

3. See FRUS, 1947, Vol. V., pp. 35-37.

4. R. Mayne, op. cit., p. 88.

./protect Greece and Turkey was part of a broader commitment to "support free peoples of the world" against the threat of totalitarianism.¹ As Louis J. Halle has explained:

"The consequences of Mr. Truman's Message of March 12 did not stop with aid to Greece and Turkey. They continued with the European Recovery Programme and the policy of actively containing the Russian empire from Elbe to Korea. They continued with the measures of opposition to further Russian expansion which finally inaugurated the Cold War. All this was implicit in the President's Message of March 12, which thereby represents a turning point in history."²

The official US abandonment of isolationism and of the 'Yalta axiom' in favour of a tougher 'Riga' conception of US - Soviet relations was a fundamental development of crucial significance to Western Europe and the unity process which it helped establish. For the policy switch essentially acknowledged not only Britain's decline but also Western Europe's inability to fend off the perceived Soviet threat without US aid organised at a multilateral level.³ Despite the dramatic circumstances which finally propelled the President to make his pronouncement, it was no rushed decision. The first major step towards this policy re-evaluation had been set in motion one year previously when, on 22 February 1946, the US Ambassador in Moscow, George Kennan, sent his celebrated "long telegram" on Soviet affairs to President Truman, in which a strictly ideological and world-revolutionary picture was presented of Soviet intentions.⁴ Commenting, a few days later, on the worsening German problem, Kennan stressed that the centralised German agencies favoured by Moscow could fall under Russian control and thereby ensure Soviet domination of all of Germany. In these circumstances, he bluntly stated that there were only two courses of action: ./.

1. See J. Freymond, op. cit., p. 39.

2. Louis J. Halle, op. cit., p. 123.

3. See, for example, the note exchanged between the US State and War Departments, 5.3.47., on this subject, FRUS 1947, Vol. III, op. cit. pp. 197-9., plus background to Marshall Plan, pp. 197-249.

4. See J.L. Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 316, 318-322, 327.

- ./.
- "(1) to leave the remainder of Germany nominally united but extensively vulnerable to Soviet political penetration and influence or (2) to carry to its logical conclusion the process of partition which was begun in the east and to endeavour to rescue the western zones of Germany by walling them off against eastern penetration and integrating them into the international pattern of western Europe rather than into a united Germany." 1

That Kennan's "get tough" policy, with its crucial implications for Germany and European integration, seems to have struck a chord can be judged by the fact that he was very soon appointed as the Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department. In the meantime, moreover, Truman put up a strong fight at an international level to remove Soviet troops still occupying Iran², while a more specific reorientation of policy was affirmed when the US Secretary of State, James Byrnes, announced at Stuttgart on 6 September 1946 America's intention to promote, if necessary, West German unification, as well as safeguard Western Europe as a whole from Soviet influence. This was followed a few weeks later by the announcement of an Anglo-American economic bi-zone in Germany coming into operation from January 1, 1947, viewed by the Soviet Union as the start of the Cold War.³ American public opinion took more time to accept this policy change towards containment and involvement. Churchill's famous 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946, for example, received a mainly hostile response, while in November of the same year, it needs to be remembered, a Republican majority was elected to Congress on an isolationist ticket. Fortunately for Truman, however, while the Republican isolationists led by Robert A. Taft concentrated on domestic-budgetary affairs, their main foreign policy spokesmen, namely John Foster Dulles and the influential chairman of the ./.

1. Quoted by J.L. Gaddis, op. cit., p. 328.

2. Ibid, p. 316; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York, 1970), pp. 196-8.

3. C.H. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 18.; Gaddis, op. cit., p. 331.

4. See W. Knapp, Unity and Nationalism in Europe Since 1945, (Pergamon press, 1969), pp. 16-17; W. Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

./.Senate Foreign Relations Committee,Arthur Vandenberg,came to appreciate the administration's perception of the international situation. Dulles,in fact,clearly stated in January 1947,in a major speech approved by Vandenberg,that Germany should be united within the framework of a federated Europe,while on March 22 resolutions introduced to Congress favouring a "United States of Europe" were well supported.¹ The influential publicist,Walter Lipmann,in turn argued the case for US aid in order to promote European economic union.² - The appointment in January of the same year of General Marshall as the new US Secretary of State helped to set the seal for such an initiative and together with his Under-Secretary,Dean Acheson,and President Truman the decision to "scare the pants off Congress" by portraying the Greek and Turkish troubles as part of a global Soviet revolutionary policy, to be resisted especially in Europe,was put into operation.³

Thus,the announcement of the 'Truman Doctrine' in March 1947,while certainly an historic turning point no doubt jolted by the stunning British strategic disclosures sent off by Bevin, was nonetheless part of a policy response set in motion some time earlier to the overall crisis in Western Europe,highlighted by Soviet moves in the East,Britain's demise,and Germany's crucial but uncertain pivotal role in the new post-war order. Implicit in the launching of the 'Doctrine',however,was an exaggeration of the specific point at issue. The domino theory of Soviet penetration and the threatened collapse of Western Europe,which so gripped official policy perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic,overlooked the case that Soviet demands on Turkey were not followed up by action,while Stalin actually ordered the ./.

1. See Max Beloff,The United States and the Unity of Europe, (Faber & Faber,1963),p.14.

2. Ibid.

3. See R. Morgan,op.cit.,P.20; D. Acheson,op.cit.,p.219.

./Greek Communists' uprising to be wound up, despite Yugoslav protests!¹

The vulnerability of Western Europe, and Germany especially, to Soviet Communism was, on the other hand, very real, as became tacitly clear at the unsuccessful Four Power Conference held in Moscow between March 10 and April 24, in the immediate wake of Truman's declaration. Indeed, upon his return, Marshall stated in a radio address to the American people that Russia appeared determined to obstruct or delay the settlement of matters essential to the recovery of Europe. He then concluded:

"The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion... Whatever action is possible... must be taken without delay."²

The full significance of the Truman Doctrine, as a pledge by the US not to allow Western Europe to become a depressed area at the mercy of Communist advance³, whether intended or not, now took tangible form.

On May 8, Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, delivered what was in effect a prologue to the Marshall Plan, calling for world political and economic stability and freedom, and declaring that a "coordinated European economy" remained the "fundamental objective" of US foreign policy.⁴ The Policy Planning Staff under Kennan in turn drew up two important and detailed reports in favour of a US-sponsored programme of economic aid for Europe.⁵ With the initial aim of "halting the economic disintegration of Western Europe" and of "restoring hope and confidence" to the area, the long-term objective envisaged was above all political, namely "to encourage and contribute to./.

1. See K. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London 1962) pp 164-5.

2. FRUS 1947, Vol. III, op. cit. p. 219; L. J. Halle, op. cit., p. 127.

3. Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 265.

4. FRUS 1947, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 219; K. Beloff, op. cit. pp. 18-19.

5. FRUS ibid., pp. 220-230., Memo. 16.5.47., Recommendation 23.5.47.

./..some form of regional political association of western European states." Implicit in this proposed political strategy was the de facto recognition of Europe being divided between East and West, and the urgent need for the Western zones of Germany to "make the maximum contribution to economic restoration in western Europe in general." America's interests in the enterprise were presented as follows:

"The Planning Staff recognizes that the communists are exploiting the European crisis and that further communist successes would create serious danger to American security. It considers, however, that American effort in aid to Europe should be directed not to the combatting of communism as such but to the restoration of the economic health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in other words, to combat not communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which Russian communism is now exploiting."

In short, the ambitious US programme of economic assistance to Europe now under serious consideration, though no doubt motivated by "a genuine sense of community with the peoples of Europe"² and perhaps also by American economic interests and outlets relying to a certain extent upon European recovery, was nonetheless essentially a matter of US political and strategic security against potential Russian communist advance. It was a continuation of the Truman Doctrine, stripped of any naked negative anti-communism, but conceived all-the-same within the foreign policy framework of 'containment'.

Events now moved quickly. On May 22, both Parties in Congress authorised aid for Greece and Turkey, and thereafter pursued a bipartisan foreign policy upholding the basic tenets implicit in the Truman Doctrine. At the same time, in anticipation of America's major entry into European affairs, the French and Italian Premiers abruptly expelled Communists from government. On May 29, the US and British authorities set up an Economic Council in their biosphere, with German membership. (Eventually, the French zone, too, cooperated). - It was in this setting that on June 5, at Harvard./.

1. FRUS, op. cit., p. 225.

2. W. Knapp, op. cit., p. 20.

./.. University, Marshall sketched the picture of European collapse; called for a US-sponsored programme of European reconstruction, not "piecemeal" relief; and issued an open invitation asking the European nations themselves to take the initiative in drawing up such a recovery programme.¹ It was an historic opening in post-war US foreign relations, inaugurating America's active assumption of world leadership and European commitment, without, nonetheless, thereby appearing to force the "American way" on Europe.² The 'open' invitation, implying that Russia and the Eastern European states could participate, was in this sense a skilful diplomatic ploy.³ It was safe to assume, Kennan had argued, that the Soviet Union would refuse to collaborate in what was meant to be, as Marshall himself stipulated, "a joint programme, to be agreed by a number, if not all, European nations" at an independent trans-national level. It was best, therefore, to "play it straight" and force the Soviet Union to come clean in assuming responsibility for the division of Europe.⁴ This point was subtly implied by Marshall when he declared:

"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist... Any government which is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation.. on the part of the United States Government. Any government which manuevres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States."

Marshall's bluff worked. For, the implicit if not explicit condition of Eastern European participation was the renunciation by Moscow of the absolute tutelage which it had imposed in that area since the war, plus, in effect, the tacit acceptance of ./..

1. For Marshall Plan text, see FRUS, op. cit., pp. 237-9.

2. Clayton had stressed the importance of this tactic, FRUS, p. 235

3. See D. Yergin, op. cit., pp. 314-5.

4. See Hans A. Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

5. FRUS, op. cit., pp. 238-9.

./German economic revival as part of an integrated European recovery. Thus, while Britain and also France eagerly accepted the continental basis of Marshall's offer and swiftly organised a preparatory meeting with the USSR to discuss the matter, the Soviet authorities insisted that the Marshall Plan, as it stood, was an American take-over bid in Europe and an infringement upon national sovereignty, and that each participating country should, instead, separately administer the available funds. In turn, therefore, the USSR refused to participate in the full-scale follow up planning conference arranged in Paris, ensuring that all the Soviet satellite states, despite Poland and Czechoslovakia's initial interest in the Plan, had to follow suit. By mid-July, the 'Paris Treaty', setting up the Committee for European Economic Co-operation, was signed by the 16 Western European nations outside of the Soviet orbit, with the task of drawing up a comprehensive and supposedly trans-national four-year 'European Recovery Plan'. On April 16, 1948, two weeks after Congress had provided an initial \$5 billion appropriation (out of a total \$17 billion), the Western European recipients signed the Convention for European Economic Co-operation and set up the corresponding administrative organisation, 'OEEC'. The first official step towards Western European economic consolidation and unity had been taken. "The Marshall Plan thus became a Western European plan, and the Communists were out-maneuvred, appearing to be ranged on the side of 'hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos'."¹ At the same time, the tighter Soviet measures enforced in the Eastern half of Europe, together with the setting up of the counter-unity COMINFORM, in September 1947, made up of Eastern European Communist Parties plus those of France and Italy, cemented the division of Europe into two, and confirmed Russia's intentions to violently resist ERP, as witnessed by./.

1. S. Rees, The Age of Containment: the cold war (Macmillan, 1967) p. 23.

./the Communist-led strikes in France and Italy in November and December of the same year. In turn, the effects of these strikes in stiffening the resolve of the new French Premier, Robert Schuman, together with the failure of the Four Power London Conference of November 1947 in resolving the German question, persuaded the French authorities finally to endorse the Anglo-American case for reviving Western Germany within the developing OEEC framework. On March 7, 1948, the British, French, American and Benelux nations issued a communiqué favouring the establishment of a Federal Government for Western Germany, (France being further assured by the formal agreement authorising her economic absorption of the Saar). Hence, the division of Europe and the division of Germany into two separate halves now became an established fact, against a background of fierce ideological bloc confrontation and mounting political tension. The seeds of Western European unity had been sown, but so too would they reap the Berlin blockade crisis of June 1948 and the crystallisation of the 'Cold War'.¹

The international framework of Western Europe's development in the early post-war years was thus set by a confrontation between the two super powers.² The momentous issues at stake arising from the 'shattered peace', together with the strategic and political implications of this development, were of crucial importance in determining the new face of Europe and of the post war European unity campaign. Indeed, the impact of the new balance of power not only helped consolidate Western Europe, but also brought to a head the fundamental conceptual differences concerning the pace and ultimate character of the unity project.

1. Cf. pp. 266-7.

2. R. Morgan, op.cit., pp. 20-1.

2) Western or European Union?

Although Marshall Aid was granted on the understanding that the recipient nations would attempt to formulate a joint economic plan of action, America's chief strategical concern was Western Europe's political stability and unity in response to perceived communist advance. The immediate need to tackle the region's economic vulnerability by supplying US funds in order to boost greater trans-national trade and to cushion closer monetary cooperation was essentially meant, as the influential US Congressmen Kersten and Fullbright put it, "to encourage the political unification of Europe."¹ The implications of this policy, while indeed offering hope to those who envisaged an eventual full-scale US-Western European partnership, also allowed for the pre-emptive option of America being able to secure Western Europe's continued political and economic allegiance without being liable for any organic entanglement in the area. - The US, in other words, could quite simply protect its essential strategic and market interests without being drawn into more burdensome structural links and responsibilities across the Atlantic. It is worth noting in this context that the US Foreign Assistance Bill debate on Marshall Aid, emphasizing the need to fortify the political and economic stability of Western Europe, also articulated the view held in some quarters that aid should be conditional on the recipient countries forming a defensive alliance among themselves, while the final Act itself assured America's direct interests by insisting that the funds be the subject of bilateral agreements.²

The role of Germany in all this was of crucial significance, insomuch that Western European economic recovery as well as East-West strategic considerations in America relied heavily upon./.

1. See A. Baloff, op.cit., p.27.

2. Ibid., pp.25-28.

./West Germany's reconstruction and alignment in the US-OEEC camp.

Implicit in the Marshall Plan, therefore, was an unconcealed US political attempt to force the pace towards a rehabilitation of West Germany within a uniting Europe. As D. Yergin has argued:

"It reduced the tension over German recovery by placing that nation at the centre of a Continent-wide effort. Without Germany, it was argued, Europe could never recover, and the Americans made it clear to jittery Europeans that success in the Marshall Plan depended upon an economically vital Germany. Aid from the United States would compensate the Western Europeans for the reparations they would not be getting from Germany. Meanwhile, economic recovery would keep most of Germany looking to the West, and so integrated into a Western system. Here, then, were the central and double aims of the Marshall Plan - economic recovery and economic containment. Here, also, was a solution to the German Question."

Moreover, the very fact that only a part of Germany (admittedly the major part), just as only part of Europe, could effectively operate within the Plan was itself a key element in enabling the US-sponsored unity process in Western Europe to take off.

In the words of David P. Calleo:

"Unification was made easier, not only by the division of Europe as a whole, but in particular by the division of Germany. It can be argued that almost all the postwar progress towards unity has depended on Germany's partition, for it is hardly conceivable that the Western communities could ever have achieved such a degree of integration if Germany had been at her full size. Germany united is too large, too populous, and too powerful to be fitted peacefully within the European framework." ²

The Marshall Plan, in this connection, remained in considerable part a double-edged US policy commitment, expressly identifying on the one hand West Germany as a central and integral stimulating force for Western European recovery as a whole, while failing on the other hand to clarify the extent to which America herself was prepared to become intrinsically linked to the European unity initiative. The mixed stringency and ambiguity of ./.

1. D. Yergin, op.cit., p. 320.

2. David P. Calleo, Europe's Future, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), p. 39.

./the scheme in this ultimate sense propelled France to consider, primarily, the 'European' way of containing (West) Germany, whereas in Britain it stiffened Bevin's resolve to secure his main objective to see, in the words of Max Beloff, "that the United States maintained its footing in Europe."¹ Consequently, in spite of the initial consensual basis and historic momentum provided by the Marshall Plan in favour of some sort of urgent Western European consolidation, the longterm political implications and linkage variables for the unity process arising from the scheme heightened what eventually proved to be divergent political-strategic planning priorities in France and Britain with regard to European union.

On the one side, France, reluctantly accepting the case for West Germany's economic revival within the Marshall Aid framework (funds being distributed through OEEC from mid-1948 onwards) and conceding in turn West Germany's political rehabilitation with the formation of the Bonn Government in September 1949, came round to the view that renascent German might would best be harnessed within a supra-national and inter-dependent West European structure.

Initial French fears about Germany's revival, leading to what became perhaps an over-dependence on British collaboration and good-will and to an increasingly precarious insistence by France on maintaining some control of the industrial Ruhr area through the International Ruhr Authority created in April 1949, thus gradually gave way to the more visionary Schuman Plan of May 1950 (secretly prepared by Jean Monnet) proposing the pooling both of French and German coal and steel production (along with that of other interested European states) under a Common European Authority, as a "first step" in the federation of Western Europe.² This sectoral or 'neo-functional' supra-national project launched by the French Government in 1950, and which subsequently gave birth to the European Coal and Steel/.

1. M. Beloff, op.cit., p.26.

2. Cf. pp. 44-5.

./Community - the 'Europe of the Six' - was itself, moreover, preceded by a more overtly political European campaign, described in later chapters, which, though no doubt provoked in large part by concern over West Germany's post-war role, was also part of a broader emotional response to the war-time experience which had instilled in some political quarters both in France and in other areas of occupied Europe a new supra-national conceptual breakthrough regarding European reconstruction after the war.¹ Indeed, it was no coincidence that the postwar constitutions of both France and Italy, for example, envisaged the limitation of national sovereignty within a broad, peace-keeping new order.² In the same context, it is worth observing that notably in France but also in Italy, Belgium and Holland a poll conducted in 1946 by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his associates revealed that over half of all MP's were favourable to the idea of European Federation.³

In Britain, however, a rather different view prevailed. In the initial post-war phase this could be explained by the fact that the country had appeared to emerge, along with America and Russia, as one of the three major victorious powers, having, in striking contrast to the Continental states, neither suffered a complete débacle nor occupation. Despite some fraying at the ends, her political and economic structures seemed largely intact, while the country's social cohesion never seemed stronger. Indeed, under Churchill's patriotic leadership, British society had mobilised to the hilt, and in turn, at the end of the war there resulted a deep re-newed national awareness and a popular determination to turn military victory into a new civic mobilisation for a vast national programme of social and economic./.

1. Cf. pp. 43-4.

2. Preamble and Article 11 respectively of the French and Italian post-war constitutions. The West German federal constitution of 1949 also made the same explicit sovereign provision. See R. Mayne, op.cit., p.165; R. Morgan, op.cit., p.5.

3. See Arnold J. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958, (New York University Press 1958), pp.19-20.

./ reform. The landslide Labour victory of 1945 subsequently mandated the post-war Attlee administration to carry out such a programme, in which socialist measures in the national context were given top priority. The sum significance of the situation was explained by the leading federalist, Altiero Spinelli, as follows:

"All this meant...a strengthening of nationalism - British nationalism to be sure, better mannered than that of other countries, alien to exaggeration, but nationalism nonetheless, strengthening the persuasion that outside of national unity, there is nothing that has the right to interfere with it."

In short, contrary to the continental experience, the model and appeal of the nation-state, as an instrument of protection and reform, was now even more valid in Britain than before the war. Added to this was the political, economic and emotional link with the Empire and Commonwealth which had rallied to the flag in Britain's "darkest hour", while proverbial British aloofness from the European continent in times of peace, together with the ruling Labour Party's reluctance to abandon any part of its newly won governmental authority to suspicious 'Conservative' elements in Europe, plus the discouraging prospect offered by the continent's prostrate economic condition and shaky political roots, all presented a rather negative list of reasons, as Attlee later put it, "not to enter into engagements to the full extent possible to the Continental Powers."² In turn, the rapid realisation by the Attlee administration of Britain's own precarious condition and effective war-time eclipse by the two new world super-powers, described in an earlier section, led not to an integralist but to a strictly practical, 'step by step', intergovernmental approach to the fundamental trans-national questions and principles arising out of the official European unity programme. Above all else, it led to a realistic./.

1. A. Spinelli, "The growth of the European Movement since World War II", European Integration, ed. C.G. Haines, (John Hopkins, 1957), p.42.
2. C.R. Attlee, As it happened, (W. Heinemann, 1954), p.173.

./assessment by Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers in favour of securing an American commitment for the defence of Britain and her neighbours as a top foreign policy priority. As Wilfred Knapp has argued:

"Ernest Bevin was well aware that western Europe could not be defended against the Soviet Union without the support of United States . In his mind, therefore, the essential requirement was to keep a bridgehead for the United States in Europe rather than to unify Europe in such a way that the United States might be tempted to leave Europe to look after itself."

Post-war British foreign policy, accordingly, became 'Atlantic' rather than 'Europe' oriented. 'Western Union' rather than European Federation became the order of the day. Though to a very large degree both concepts were complementary, in the final event Bevin gave priority to the former. His strategy, in this sense, was not so much geared against closer European unity as conscious of the risk of becoming prematurely over-committed to the European mainland at the price, perhaps, of strengthening the US isolationist lobby. Despite his former espousal of the European Union idea² as well as his rousing lead in activating European support for the Marshall Aid initiative, his grasp of world power politics led him to reject both a Euro-centric or 'third force' policy option.³ In this respect, therefore, he could not pursue a dynamic policy of 'European leadership' on an organic plane. Nor, on the other hand, could he attempt to seek an effective American commitment in the absence of some sort of British-sponsored effort in the European arena. He thus embarked upon a central but limited policy of 'co-operation' with Britain's European neighbours, stimulating their hopes for European Union but falling well short of the supra-national commitment of which they began to conceive. To a, perhaps, exaggerated extent he never lost sight of his cherished US ./.

1. W. Knapp, op.cit., p.32.
2. As early as 1927, at the TUC, Bevin had advocated a trans-national European 'economic entity'. See F. Williams, Ernest Bevin, portrait of a great Englishman, (Hutchinson, 1952), pp.140-151.
3. See ibid., pp.262-3.

./partnership objective. The result was a startling success in bridging the Atlantic gap, but a lost opportunity in Europe itself. - As Roy Jenkins later commented: "He played weak cards with great force..(but)he began the mishandling of our relations with Europe. ..His roles in the creation of NATO and in the spurning of the Schuman Plan were symbolic." ¹

The final parting of ways between Britain and France over European union(though France too remained a loyal adherent of the wider 'Western Union')was an historic but far from clear cut process. Indeed,between 1947 and 1950 much of the initial progress towards consolidation and unity was based around an Anglo-French entente,inaugurated by the bi-lateral mutual assistance treaty signed at Dunkirk in March 1947. This itself brought about the multi-lateral Brussels Treaty defence pact,while OEEC and,later,the Council of Europe were also spearheaded by the entente. It was not a balanced partnership,however,insomuch that up until the Schuman Plan break-out France depended on British participation within the European unity project in order to cancel out Germany's ultimate admission. For a full three years,in fact,the French Government avoided stepping over the parapet in its dealings with Britain over Europe. The British Government was clearly aware of this tactical advantage and exploited it by insisting each time on a "step-by-step" intergovernmental European policy in line with its strategic and world interests. Attlee,himself,recorded in this respect:

"Germany is potentially a great Power, but France is unlikely ever to occupy again the position she once held. A realisation of this has created a demand for some form of federation, but there is a general recognition that without Britain such a grouping would not be strong enough to hold its own. On the other hand, Britain has never regarded itself as just a ./.

1. Roy Jenkins , "Ernest Bevin", Nine Men of Power(Hamish Hamilton, 1974),p.80.

./ . European power. Her interests are world-wide." ¹

In consequence, for three years Britain managed to thwart all attempts supported by France at creating a more organic form of European union. The issue arose in acute form over the proposal to create the Council of Europe as a move towards federation. The arguments and wheeler-dealing which took place regarding this proposition, in which the campaign of the European Movement was of crucial significance, are a central theme in the chapters which follow. Suffice at this stage to outline the differences of view which already surfaced in the immediate wake of the Marshall Plan concerning the first two official Western European initiatives, namely the Brussels Pact and OEEC.

While the latter organisation, directly associated to Marshall Aid, was still in embryo, the rapid deterioration in East-West relations which accompanied the preparatory arrangements leading to the OEEC Treaty of April 1948 prompted more urgent action in the Western Europe defence sphere, resulting in the Five-Power Brussels Pact signed by Britain, France and Benelux on 17 March 1948.² Officially described as a 'Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence', the Pact, so far as Britain was concerned, essentially centred on the latter aspect. It was in fact, to quote Richard Mayne, "the first post-war Treaty to recognise the potential danger from Soviet military power."³ Conceived by Bevin, and proposed jointly by the British and French Governments, the Pact clearly appeared as an extension of the mutual defence agreement signed earlier at Dunkirk, placed now, however, within a cold war setting. Profoundly disturbed by the perceived Soviet menace, and finally provoked by the break down of the Four Power London Conference in November 1947, Bevin, indeed, clearly indicated the ./ .

1. Attlee, op. cit., p. 172.

2. Cf. pp.

3. R. Mayne, The Community of Europe, (Gollancz, 1962), p. 72.

./essential military nature of the pact he had in mind in a secret memorandum which he despatched to the US Secretary of State at the beginning of the new year. Despite token support for "some form of union in Western Europe", the British Foreign Secretary tacitly emphasised the more immediate need for a mobilisation of Western Europe defence, with the backing of America and the Dominions, in order to halt the Russian threat.¹ Using Western Europe as a springboard, what Bevin was suggesting, in the words of the US Under Secretary of State, "would in fact mean consideration of a military alliance between the United States and Great Britain."² The concept of a wider 'Atlantic Alliance' was certainly not opposed by Bevin's colleagues in Europe. Bidault, for example, was "more than willing" to enter into a "concrete" Western alliance with America³, while the Belgian Premier, Paul-Henri Spaak also stressed early in the preparatory stages leading to the Brussels Pact that any defence arrangements which did not include the US were "without practical value".⁴ However, where France and Belgium differed with Britain was that in Europe itself they wanted to go beyond a Western Union defence arrangement, envisaging the proposed Five Power Treaty as a tight basis for pursuing a deeper regional organisation of Western Europe with a full economic and customs union as the goal.⁵ In Washington an even more forthright position was adopted, Kennan stressing, as Policy Planning Director, the primary need for a "real federal (European) authority" rather than "just another framework of military alliances."⁶ Bevin, in turn, tried to broaden his appeal in this respect, calling for a more sweeping "consolidation of Western Europe" in his historic speech to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948.⁷ Shortly afterwards, the following message./.

1. FMUS 1948, Vol. III, "Western Europe", pp. 4-6.

2. Ibid. p. 13. 3. Ibid., p. 29. 4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. Ibid., pp. 26-30. 6. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 7. Cf. pp. 96-7.

./was sent to the US State Department concerning American hesitation over Bevin's 'Western Union' policy:

"Mr. Bevin quite understands the preoccupations of the United States Government. At the same time he is conscious of a risk of getting into a vicious circle. Without assurance of security which can only be given with some degree of American participation, the British Government are unlikely to be successful in making the Western Union a going concern."¹

The Soviet-organised coup in Prague, in February 1948, forced the pace of events, leading to the signing of the Brussels Treaty one month later and to an official "firm commitment" by the US of military support.² By June, in response to the West German currency reform crisis and the Berlin blockade, this US commitment was given a decisive boost in the form of the Senate-backed Vandenberg Resolution heralding a full-scale American defence association with Western Europe. Ten months later the scheme was complete, and on 4 April 1949 Bevin went to Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty which united for defence purposes the US and Canada with the Brussels Treaty Powers plus, by this time, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.³ 'Western Union' had been achieved, Bevin's impact in all this having been immense.

Integration in the European sphere itself, meanwhile, had been held in check. As a Chatham House Study Group later pointed out in this connection:

"From the beginning British foreign policy aimed at the inclusion of the United States and Canada in a European security system. This concept permeated British official thinking throughout the whole period... Its corollary was that British Continental commitments should move pari passu with American ones and on no account in advance of them."⁴

The Brussels Treaty remained essentially a military one. The provisions on "economic, social and cultural collaboration" were vague, and progress on these matters "notably slow".⁵ In keeping with Article 7 of the Treaty, it is true that an inter-

1. FRUS, op.cit., p.19. 2. Ibid, Policy Planning Report, 23.3.48., pp.61-4.

3. Cf. pp.

4. See S. Ball, NATO and the European union movement. (London, 1959),

5. Hans A. Schmitt, op.cit., p.35.

./ . governmental Consultative Council of Foreign Ministers was set up, along with a secretariat and a number of committees¹, but this still fell short of the type of institutional arrangement envisaged by Bidault and Spaak, who in turn tried to persuade the Council to support the European Movement's proposition for a more sweeping supra-national European Assembly, as described in later chapters. Economic questions, in the meantime, together with continental efforts to set up a customs union, quickly disappeared from the Brussels Treaty agenda, being consigned, more appropriately, to the OEEC.

The immediate *raison d'être* of the OEEC, however, as a joint co-operative effort by the 16 Western European nations², plus the allied-controlled zones of West Germany, to close the dollar gap and "restore a strong and prosperous European economy" through "effective use of American aid" and a certain liberalisation of European trade, was a fairly consensual but limited basis for an official European unity initiative at an operative trans-national level. The immediate, practical tasks at hand were too pressing to permit any rash or radical institutional development. In its initial scope, nonetheless, the results achieved by OEEC were startling by anyone's standards. Indeed, within a remarkably short period the OEEC countries managed, through the cushioning effects of US funds, to restore production to near pre-war levels. Total output of goods and services between 1947 and 1950 rose by 25%, and in certain key industries the advance was even more striking: steel production increased by 70%, cement by 80%, vehicles by 150% and refined oil products by 200%.³ At the same time, quantitative trade restrictions were dismantled and, ./ .

1. For Brussels Treaty Text, see R. Vaughn, Post-War Integration in Europe (E. Arnold 1974) pp. 24-30; A. & F. Boyd, Western Union, (Hutchinson, 1948), appendix E.
2. OEEC Convention, 16.4.48., signatories: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. For text, see R. Vaughn, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-35.
3. See A. Laaqueur, *op. cit.*, p 138.

./by 1950, a multilateral clearing system for monetary transfers was created through the European Payments Union. The end result was a doubling of intra-European trade within six years and a general increase in exports of 91% within half that time.¹ "By the end of the four years (1948-52) which the Marshall Plan had originally been designed to cover, European recovery had been achieved and the OEEC had played a notable part in that recovery."²

There can be no doubt that OEEC was a tremendous success, without which European unification plans would have remained a pipe-dream. At the same time, nonetheless, OEEC was severely limited both in scope and in actual structure, and was incapable in itself of providing the necessary momentum for a deeper form of union.

The restrictions in scope derived essentially from Britain's reluctance to give up the right of independent action on trading matters, explained initially by the fact that only 25% of UK trade was with Europe whereas some 50% was with the Commonwealth nations, backed up by preferential tariff agreements.³ French efforts at freeing not only trade quotas but also key sectorial tariffs, in turn proposed at a more detailed level by the Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker, thus received short shrift from the British, fearful of mounting pressures for an eventual European Customs Union, while conscious of their dependence on the revival of world trade in general. Similarly, with post-war sterling being grossly overvalued, Britain held out as long as possible for bilateral monetary clearing arrangements, Attlee's Labour administration tending to regard fiscal autonomy and an unimpaired Sterling area as essential to its national economic planning measures.⁴ In the final event, despite the developing Benelux./.

1. W. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 138-9.

2. M. Camps, Britain and the European Community 1953-1963, (Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 8.

3. See "Les Anglais en face de l'Union européenne", Revue de l'Action Populaire, March 1949, pp. 200-1.

4. On British reluctance, see M. Camps, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-9; N. Beloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

./ tariff union initiative¹, OEEC's economic programme shelved the idea of a full European Customs Union, insisted upon national economic planning rights (albeit within a co-operative programme), and, lastly, distributed US funds to each member state separately. Economic co-operation, not economic unification remained the order of the day.²

These limits in the scope of OEEC were also reflected in its formal structure. During the preparatory period leading to the signing of the Convention in April 1948, the French had, in fact, tried to introduce a supra-national element to the organisation by proposing the setting up of a strong executive board working full time, voting by majority, backed up by an adequate international secretariat, and led by a Secretary General with power to take important initiatives. The British once again, however, refused to go along with this bold political step, and insisted on a council of ministers operating by unanimity with most of the work being done by different committees of government appointed experts, as stipulated in the final OEEC text.³ - In the words of the leading British federalist of the time, R.W.G. Mackay:

"..this organisation was a co-operative one; all decisions were to be made by governments; and any resolutions of the executive committee had to be unanimous. The most, in effect, that OEEC could do was to make recommendations which the individual governments carried out; there was no transfer of sovereignty, or integration in any sense, ..It was, in short, a purely intergovernmental organisation."⁴

A more balanced critique of OEEC was later offered by Jean Monnet who, also discounting the overt political campaign led by the European Movement, succinctly commented:

"Nor would the pragmatic methods of OEEC bring unity, because there it was laid down that anyone could be exempted from decisions which he found difficult. It was the opposite of the Community spirit. Still, provided that the limits of co-operation were recognised for what they were, OEEC could./.

1. First conceived in 1943, and initiated by the Customs Convention of 1944, the full Benelux union was put into official effect in January 1948. A similar, though abortive attempt was made by France and Italy.

2. See articles 5-7, OEEC Convention, R. Vaughn, op.cit., pp. 0-5.

3. Ibid., arts. 14 & 15. 4. R.W.G. Mackay, Towards a United States of Europe (Harmondsworth 1961), p. 98.

- ./.
- certainly help the European economy, which in the past had been too compartmentalised... It would be a mistake to ask more than that of a system which entailed no delegation of sovereignty. Very soon, OEEC had become simply technical machinery... I realised that neither this organisation... nor the parliamentary meetings in Strasbourg that resulted from the Hague Congress, would ever give concrete expression to European unity." ¹

3) The European Campaign

The setting up of OEEC together with the launching of Western Union on the basis of the Brussels Pact and later through NATO, though no doubt essential steps in achieving Western European stability and security, nonetheless failed to satisfy accompanying demands for a more organic form of European integration. Such demands were at first difficult to quantify, since indeed official European action in the wake of the Marshall Plan momentarily boosted hopes and aroused enthusiasm among most (though not all) pro-European groups who only later, in view of the still orthodox framework of Western Europe's co-operative institutions, argued that the measures taken scarcely seemed proportionate to the "new start" envisaged. Veteran European federalist, Altiero Spinelli, for example, later claimed in this respect that the Marshall Plan had not been maximised, primarily due to the continent's failure to stand up to Britain. He went on to argue:

"If the American government had seen through the false European spirit of the British, and had granted the aids contingent on the creation of political federal institutions on the continent, we would now have European union, since no serious opposition could have been given by the forces favouring maintenance of sovereignty except, of course, Great Britain." ²

It was a tempting but, at this stage, shallow analysis of the situation. The first effective impetus to Western European unity had been taken up and translated into "practical politics" by Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. Without his "shock" ./.

¹. Jean Monnet, op.cit., p.273.

². Altiero Spinelli, quoted by Hans A. Schmitt, op.cit., p.24.

./tactics and determination to secure America's commitment in West Europe's survival the Marshall Plan as well as the 'Atlantic Alliance' might not have materialised at all. Without the economic recovery and military security which derived from this official initiative, Western Europe would not have been in the position to pursue further integration measures. At the same time, moreover, France and the European continent in general could by no means afford or desire to ditch Britain in the way Spinelli suggested. For, in the immediate Marshall Plan era, looming economic collapse and vulnerability to Soviet Communism was the main concern in Europe's capitals, not European "constitution mongering" with all the pit-falls Bevin rightly feared in this context. The long-term implications arising out of the Marshall Plan, however, particularly the role of West Germany and the need to sustain joint economic recovery and expansion once US funds were curtailed, did indeed demand a more lasting institutional edifice and political understanding. The growing concern, in this connection, that the British Government seemed to regard European regional action as a temporary expedient destined to take second place to national economic planning powers and to a broader 'Atlantic' unity concept opened a policy rift which, in time, the European political campaign both tried to bridge and exploit. Put another way, European regional action dealing with immediate reconstruction problems and cold war security needs did not hold out the germ of further integral development. OEEC, notably, "got things done" and perhaps helped to pave the way towards the European 'Common Market' initiative in the decade that followed; but the decisive trans-national gap which prevented a direct passage from European intergovernmental co-operation to supra-national union remained to be filled.

It will be argued in the course of this book that the political campaign of the European Movement leading to the ./.

./..creation of the Council of Europe and the European Consultative
✓ Assembly played a crucial part in filling this supra-national gap,
even if, in the final event the campaign faltered and was eclipsed
✓ by Monnet's more judicious neo-functional approach. In comparison
to Bevin's step-by-step policy based upon a cautious though
sharp analysis of urgent requirements and actual conditions, the
idealistic tone adopted by the European Movement may seem naive.
It no doubt was; and the eventual demise of the campaign in the
wake of the technocratic-oriented Schuman Plan may be cited as
proof of this. Nonetheless, except if one takes an entrenched
deterministic view of history, naivety and idealism can at times be a
potent force. A rich assortment of political leaders were attracted
to the European Movement campaign, ranging from Paul-Henri Spaak
to Konrad Adenauer, from André Philip to Ugo La Malfa, from
François Mitterrand to Michel Debré, etc. Were they all naive?
Perhaps so, but they should not be dismissed out of hand. Some
were in government, more were not; but their campaign, spearheaded
by a determined executive team led by Duncan Sandys, Joseph Retin-
ger and Henry Brugmans (among others) did, for a short period of
time at least, have an impact. In France, Bidault and Schuman took
a special interest in promoting the Movement's proposals. The
international press and parliamentary groups (both barometers of
public opinion) also showed a positive disposition towards the
Movement as it gathered pace. More of this later. Suffice for
the moment to stress that the political campaign of the European
movement, well ahead of the relatively immobile official co-ope-
rative institutions, helped boost and keep the supra-national Euro-
pean idea alive, creating the popular-political climate without
which the European Community might not have come to birth. - As
Paul-Henri Spaak declared in this respect:

"..whilst recognising the primary responsibility for the
creation of a United Europe rests with the Governments./.."

./ . themselves, we should remember that without our movement they can achieve nothing. Behind them, and indeed ahead of them, there must be a surge of public opinion, and it is we in the European Movement, who form the core of that opinion." ¹

- Set against a sombre, bi-polar, cold war background and an official unity policy generated by the exigencies arising out of Europe's exhausted economic condition and precarious political-strategical situation, the birth and idealistic-political campaign of the European Movement during the vital formative years which spread from the Marshall to the Schuman Plan can now be examined more fully.

1. Paul-Henri Spaak, foreword to the European Movement and the Council of Europe (Hutchinson 1949), p.13.

CHAPTER 2

A NEW START?

1) European Idealism and the Second World War

Although it was the cold war and the implications arising out of it which gave practical effect to the process of Western European consolidation, the vital impetus to the post-war European unity ideal stemmed directly from the traumatic experiences of the Second World War. The 'European Idea' as such, of course, already had a long catalogue of conceptual precedents stretching from the era of Charlemagne, and later the Crusades and the post-medieval plans for European pacification presented by Henry de Navarre and the Duke de Sully, to the rational arguments of Rousseau, Montesquieu and Saint Simon, and in turn to the romantic urgings of Victor Hugo and the cosmopolitan plans of Mazzini, and so on. But, in order to get to grips with the essential underlying hope and conviction which transformed the previously detached diplomatic or theoretical efforts for European unity into a passionate movement for effective change, it is to the Second World War - as an extension of the First World War - which we must look for a tangible contextual reference point. In particular, we must try to understand the vital psychological breakthrough in European idealism and supra-national thought wrought by the re-newed lead-up to war in 1939, by the voluntaristic supra-national commitment that was born in reaction to fascism, and by the emotional war-time process which led to what became known as the 'European Resistance'.

In this connection, it needs to be recalled that the First World War had been fought in the name of 'national self-determination'. The League of Nations set up in 1920 in order, theoretically, to uphold the peace was consequently fashioned on a very loose interstate basis which, in the final analysis, was incapable of exercising any real international authority over its members. When war broke out again in 1939 the League had long passed into the periphery./.

./of political endeavour. The evident failings and incapacity of the League, however, had given spark to other initiatives aimed at putting an end to the "international anarchy" of the "balcanised" European States' system, the most famous of which was the Briand Plan of 1929, sponsored by the Pan-Europa movement under Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. The Plan¹, proposing a form of European Confederation, received support from diplomatic and political circles, but could not stem the growing nationalist-dictatorial tide which swept much of Europe. In the discouraging years of the 1930's, the 'Personalist' movement in France² also fought in vain against new mass totalitarianism and the slide back into total war. Finally, in Britain, in the wake of the Munich Crisis of 1938, a restricted but influential body of opinion known as 'Federal Union' came up with a set of proposals profoundly more supra-national than contemplated hitherto. Arguing that the failure of the League of Nations, the nurturing of aggressive nationalist dictatorships and the re-newed danger of a European "civil war" had been caused by the lack of a real and democratic international authority endowed with sovereign powers over and above those of the nation-states, they proposed the urgent creation of a free European Federation, with British participation, as a bulwark against further nazi aggrandisement. With the final outbreak of war, followed by the so-called 'Phoney War' in Western Europe, 'Federal Union' reached the zenith of its activities and attracted a rich following to the cause, including Lord Beveridge, Barbara Wootton, Lionel Robbins, Kingsley Martin, Harold Wilson, Prof. Hayek, R.W.G. Mackay and Miss F.L. Josephy. The movement's influence in Britain rapidly dwindled, however, after the French and Dutch débacle of 1940 and in the subsequent re-birth of British national pride and sense of purpose in the lone fight against nazi tyranny which followed. Nevertheless, the idea that a new type of European ✓

1. For Briand Memorandum text, see R. Vaughn, op.cit., pp.11-12.

2. Cf. pp. 45-6.

3. on 'Federal Union', see A. & F. Boyd, op.cit., plus a documentary chapter compiled by John Pinder to be published in a SUI series.

./order needed to be established after the war had at least been launched. By now, however, the real theatre of thought in favour of some sort of supra-national commitment had passed to the anti-fascist and resistance groups in occupied Europe.

It is indeed an important point that the European idea, in its full supra-national form, was inspired to a very great extent as an idealistic rallying call in opposition to nazi-fascist oppression. It was, in fact, no mere coincidence that the first organised anti-fascist movement, founded in Italy as early as 1923 under the radical-socialist leadership of Gaetano Salvemini, Carlo Rosselli and Ernesto Rossi, and known as 'Non Mollare' ('Don't Yield'), developed into perhaps the most vocal and active pro-European anti-nationalist group of the pre-war and war-time period, giving birth to the 'Justice and Liberty' movement under Rosselli, and later to the resistance 'Action Party' and European Federalist Movement in Italy. The vital and original conceptional breakthrough in European thought to which these anti-fascist leaders became committed was the idea of supra-national government as a principle in itself. In other words, as a reaction to the pernicious and violent tenets of fascism, and in opposition to fascism's blatant mass manipulation of national-patriotic feeling and to its blinded rejection of moral-democratic norms, they developed a credo in which a tolerant supra-national outlook and corresponding political organisation would be the central pillars of a democratic, free-thinking and freedom-loving European society of the future. This is why the anti-fascist resistance pact of 1930 was committed to a "new humanity" in a "free" and "just" "United States of Europe",¹ and why Carlo Rosselli, before being murdered by the fascist militia, went on to call for a "Young Europe" movement and for a "European Party".² It is also why Ernesto Rossi, along with militant anti-fascist Altiero Spinelli and ./.

1. "Il Patto d'Unione della Concentrazione", Avanti!, Sept. 1930.
2. C. Rosselli, speech, 31.5.33., quoted in L'idea dell'unificazione europea dalla prima alla seconda guerra mondiale (Einaudi, 1974), chapter by D. . Francesco on Italian resistance.

Eugenio Colomni, jointly declared in a clandestine manifesto issued in 1941 from the penal island of Ventotene that an end had to be made to the "reactionary..selfish..militaristic-imperialistic" grip of nationalism in Europe and that after the war a new "human" and progressive European Federation was imperative. The text further stressed:

"The problem which must be solved in the first place, and without which there will be no real progress, is the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national sovereign states...

The minds of the people are already much better disposed than in the past towards a federal reorganisation of Europe. All responsible men must now recognise that it is impossible to maintain a balance between independent European states... the main aim(is) the creation of a solid international state. This is a time for a new task and it is also the time for the new men of the MOVEMENT FOR A FREE AND UNITED EUROPE." 1

The 'Ventotene Manifesto' was subsequently circulated in clandestine circles, strongly influencing the Action Party programme of 1943 which called for a post-war European Federation with executive, legislative and judiciary organs², and, in turn, providing the basis of the 'Movimento Federalista Europeo' launched in the same year.³ At a wider level, the MFE and Ventotene proposals, according to Dutch resistance leader Henry Brugmans, represented the most "reflective" and "concrete" programme of action to emerge from the European-minded resistance groups, the "clarity" and "vigour" of which was borne out in the final joint programme of these groups. That such a like-minded European resistance network came into being was a consequence of the trans-national solidarity which Nazi-fascist occupation provoked. The supra-national view which emerged was further aided by the complete collapse of the existing pre-war nation-state orders throughout the European continent and by what Steven Hawes as described as the "existential freedom" to opt for radically new allegiances in choosing to./.

1. Ventotene manifesto, full text in Piccola antologia federalista (Europa edition, Rome 1956), pp. 9-15. Also see R. Vaughn, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

2. P. d. A programme, printed in Italia Libera, 27.7.43., MFE TURIN

3. MFE Programme, printed in first edition of L'Unità Europea, May 1943; see also A. Spinelli, L'Europa non cade dal cielo, (Milino 1960), pp. 17-22.

./.resist the new prevailing national order! In short, the individual decision to resist the effective national authority - be this the long-established fascist order in the cases of Italy and Germany, or an apparently "legal" puppet regime as in the case of Vichy France - led many partisans, hounded as "traitors", to conceive of a higher morality than that of pure national-patriotism. The psychological anguish and mental breakthrough in making such a decision has been summarised by Spinelli as follows:

"The rejection of the principle 'my country right or wrong', the decision to support what was 'right' even against one's own country, amounted to defeatism, when confined to words, but became high treason if translated into deeds. Some of the enemies of tyranny more deeply imbued with national traditions suffered soul-searching agonies before taking this stand. Others of a more radical temperament broke the taboo of national loyalty to their own state without difficulty and without remorse." 2

The result was that a variety of resistance personalities neither fully enamoured with alternative nationalist-oriented or communist-controlled³ power groups, became actively involved in the struggle for a supra-national post-war European federal order. Important political prisoners, such as Léon Blum, avowedly espoused the cause. Leading resistance fighters throughout Europe began to formulate federation plans and proposals.⁴ In December 1943, Henry Prenay, commander of the famous 'Combat' resistance network, in turn made a dramatic appeal for a trans-national 'European Resistance' union. Four decisive meetings were subsequently organised in Geneva between representatives of various resistance movements from Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Germany. There resulted, in July 1944, the joint formulation of the 'European Resistance Manifesto', signed by ./.

1. See S. Hawes' chapter "The individual and the resistance community in France", Resistance in Europe 1939-1945, ed. Hawes and White, (Pelican 1976).
2. A. Spinelli, European Union in the Resistance, Government and Opposition, vol. 2, No. 3, April-July 1967, pp. 321-329.
3. The Communist international resistance cannot be fully compared inasmuch as its basic allegiance remained Moscow-oriented.
4. See W. Lipgens, Europa-Federationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-45, (Munich, 1968); chapter by Lipgens in European Integration ed. F.R. Willis (New York 1975).

./all, the principal part of which stated the urgent post-war need to set up a supra-national European Government responsible directly to the people rather than to national administrations, along with a European Federal Constitution and a Supreme European Court. - The full anti-fascist and war-time evolution of the supra-national European idea had found its international spokesmen.¹ Limited in number and overall influence, they had nonetheless given expression to the federal and democratic European ideal with a vigour and emotion unknown before², and which would in turn fire the immediate post-war European campaign. For, as Spinelli has so aptly reminded us:

"When we recall today the emergence of this (European) federal idea during the war, not as a distant ideal, but as the cornerstone of the new democratic post-war world, we may fail to do justice to the originality and vigour of this vision, if we do not also remember that those who dreamed of it were exiles on penal islands, or in concentration camps or members of the Resistance." 3

2) The Growth of European Movements after the War

The 'European Resistance' call for a new federal order, R. Vaughn has argued, "was not just the dream of a few wise men; it probably represented the aspirations of many."⁴ It has already been pointed out in this respect that a majority of parliamentarians in France, Italy, Belgium and Holland after the war were favourable to the idea, as was further expressed in concrete form in the post-war constitutions of the former two countries.⁵ In addition, a public opinion poll held in France in the immediate aftermath of the ./.

1. For a more detailed description of this development leading to the 'European Resistance Manifesto', see Lipgens, op. cit.; opening chapters by A. Chiti-Batelli in Storia del Federalismo Europeo (E.R.I., Turin, 1973); Henry Bruggmans, L'Idée Européenne 1920-1970 (College d'Europe, Brugge, Tempel, 1970), pp. 81-104; A. Spinelli, "European Union in the Resistance", op. cit.; Jean-Pierre Gouzy, Les Pionniers de l'Europe Communautaire (European Research Centre, Lausanne, 1968), pp. 19-24; J. Freymond, op. cit. pp. 9-11.

2. See R. White, op. cit., p. 22.

3. A. Spinelli, op. cit.

4. R. Vaughn, op. cit., p. 11.

5. Cf. p. 24.

./war in Europe, in July 1945, recorded that 75% of those questioned were in favour of the recreation of Europe as a federation of states with "all matters of common interest under the control of a democratically elected federal government."¹ The situation after the war, nonetheless, was such that European plans and projects were pushed mainly into the background. The vigorous lead taken by the 'European Resistance' was quickly eclipsed by the return to power of traditional political parties whose policies, though not necessarily unfavourable to the European federal idea, were conditioned by the practical exigencies and immediate needs of the nation, and smothered in turn by the ~~some~~ slide of 'big-power' diplomacy into cold war. The Marshall Aid initiative, it is true, finally gave new life to the post-war European campaign, but it was also part of a bi-polar development which had fundamentally shattered the conceptual framework envisaged by the 'European Resistance'. Looking back on the failure of the hopes of Ventotene and Geneva, Spinelli commented:

"In the first elaboration of a plan of action, there was the belief... that Europe would continue to be the centre, and an autonomous centre, of the political life of the world. America would return across the ocean..., Russia behind its borders... The reality of 1945 and of the following years was instead completely different. Europe became merely a passive object of American power and Russian power that had divided it and were occupying it." ²

The 'European Revolution' which leading resistance groups had envisaged simply failed to occur, and the influence of these groups rapidly declined.

Initial efforts in keeping the movement and its aims alive, nevertheless, were made. Indeed, immediately after the liberation of France, the left-wing resistance group 'Franc-Tireur' constituted the 'French Committee for European Federation'³, in which Albert Camus and Robert Verdier played a leading role. Together with the Spinelli MFE group, they organised the first European Federalist./.

1. R. Vaughn, op.cit., p.11.

2. A. Spinelli, quoted P.M. Willis Italy Chooses Europe (OUP, 1971) p.6.

3. See Gouzy, op.cit., p.25.

./Conference, held at Paris in March 1945, repeating the supra-national European message of July 1944.¹ New federalist organisations emerged; and more meetings with such groups were subsequently held: first at Geneva (May 1945), then at Hertenstein (August 1946), and finally at Luxembourg (October 1946), where the European Union of Federalists was officially constituted. There followed important meetings at Bale (November 1946), at Paris (December 1946), and eventually at Amsterdam (April 1947), where it was decided to organise a major international EUF-sponsored congress at Montreux for the Summer.²

By mid-1947 the EUF claimed a membership of over 150,000 in France, Italy, Holland and Belgium, with new recruits from the rest of Europe too. Arnold J. Zurcher enthusiastically declared later that "this group approached the dimensions of a mass organisation with truly multinational support."³ Be this as it may, the movement remained of only marginal interest to the real political establishment in Europe, having no solid base in the traditional party structures and governmental elites where decision-making counted. Moreover, right from the start, it was plagued by labyrinth divisions over theory and policy. This had much to do with the rise of the "new" current of thought which, by 1947, dominated the EUF, under the title "integral federalism", denoting a corporatist and internal-oriented brand of federalism as opposed to a "fusionist" approach extending political sovereignty on an international scale. Drawn in part from the libertarian-Proudhonien ranks of the pre-war 'personalist' school and war-time resistance circles jointly associated with Denis de Rougemont, Alexandre Marc, Marcel-Claude Hytte and Henry Brugmans, who rejected essentially the monolithic aspects of the "Jacobin" state,⁴ the integral federalist current became increasingly absorbed by the more reactionary leading movement "La Fédération", which had its./.

1. See A. Spinelli, "European Union in the Resistance", op.cit.

2. For a detailed study of this process, see W. Lipgens Die Anfänge der Europäischen Einigungs politik 1945-7, (Klett, Stuttgart 1977).

3. A.J. Zurcher, op.cit., p.22.

4. See Brugmans, op.cit., pp.73-8; F. Kinsky Fédéralisme et personalisme (Presses d'Europe, 1976).

./roots,not in the Resistance,but in the pre-war anti-parliamentary leagues and in the corporatist networks of Vichy France. Promoters of this latter group were,above all,followers of the Maurrassien tradition. Indeed,André Voisin,as General Secretary of "La Fédération", together with Max Richard,as chief editor of publications,and Louis Salleron,as the main "cultural" spokesman,had all been involved with Action Française before the war,whereas Bertrand de Jouvenel,a founder leader,had openly espoused fascism as one of Doriot's staunchest supporters in the 'Parti Populaire Français'.¹ Their policies could not have contrasted more with the political,juridical and constitutional views of the former supra-national resistance current led by Spinelli and the MFE. For,indeed,they essentially rejected the liberal and modern parliamentary tradition;they rejected political and constitutional models of representative organisation;they in fact rejected the whole concept of "political" sovereignty and therefore the notion of a popular and collective supra-national European sovereignty expressed through representative "political" institutions. The long-fought for principle of equal political rights and of accountable access to political power,best summed up in the term "one man one vote",was meaningless to them. Instead, they wanted to distribute powers along corporate lines to what was called the "living forces" - a vague term meaning extra-parliamentary working groups of patronat,trade unionists,technicians,vocational associations,local and ethnic groupings,youth and church organisations,etc. How the proportional role and strength of these separate interest groups was to be equitably calculated,and who,furthermore, was to take responsibility for this,was a fundamental democratic problem evaded by the meaningless term "proportional to their social role". In conclusion,unlike the Spinelli-MFE rump in the EUP,they./.

1. See A. Greilsammer,Les Mouvements Fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974 (Presses d'Europe, 1975), pp. 41, 52, 117; E. Weber, Action Française (Stock, 1962), pp. 328, 380, 447, 466, 555n, 558, 562-3, 559; D. Dioudonnat, Je Suis Partout 1930-1944: les maurrassiens devant la tentation fasciste (Table Ronde 1973), pp. 9, 194-212, 245; J. Plumeyne & L. Assiéra, Les Fascismes Français: 1923-1961 (Seuil, 1963) pp. 91-3, 130-1.

./identified the European unity campaign not as a political ideal in order to extend the parliamentary-state model to a supra-national constitutional base, but rather as a functional-oriented process by which a "revolutionary" European Estates General of the extra-parliamentary "living forces" would emerge and somehow force the hand of the political establishment to cede powers to corporate and regional groups.

At the Montreux Congress, held on 27-31 August 1947, these fundamental differences of view emerged more clearly. Indeed, as Spinelli recorded, the Congress was split into two main factions, upholding "diverse conceptions" about the federal idea, the stronger group gravitating around the French "Fédération" circle, the weaker group around the Italian MPE¹. Lately weakened by internal disputes and by the temporary departure of Spinelli who, as General Secretary of the Action Party, had tried to keep the federation issue alive in the Italian constitutional battle², the MPE, with Spinelli once more at the helm, fought hard at Montreux for the restitution of the main points in the original resistance programme, stressing the need to constitute a "European Government" and a "European Parliament" with supra-national sovereign powers, along with a "European Court" for the protection of individual rights. On the other side, the French integral federalists criticised the MPE's preoccupation solely with "constitutional" and "institutional" changes purely at the European level and in the political sphere. As Spinelli went on to record:

"The Italian (federalist) movement was anti-ideological, the French one was profoundly ideological. The Italian movement was fixed upon the creation of European institutions with the view to developing a new European political framework which would profoundly revolutionise the whole of national and political life. The French movement regarded European institutions as being a simple element of coordination, incapable in itself of providing change, and for this reason supported a multiform programme of action which concerned all the parts of existing society." ³

1. A. Spinelli, Storia e prospettiva del MPE, L'Europa nel Mondo, (MPE publication, 1953), pp. 156-160.
2. See Chiti-Battelli, *op.cit.*, pp. 196-7. 3. Spinelli, *op.cit.*

./. Henry Brugmans gave a similar version of the Montreux debate:

"In fact, on one side, the Italians of the 'Movimento Federalista Europeo', Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi and their friends, insisted exclusively on the necessity of a European POLITICAL union. And for such a union to be viable, it needed a supra-national power, which, in turn, could only be defined through a federal constitution. This being the case, the movement, in their opinion, needed to apply itself to one objective only: the convocation of a European Constituent Assembly...

On the other side, the French movement 'La Fédération', animated by the tireless André Voisin, defended very different positions... No doubt, European union was indispensable, but its institutions, instead of slavishly copying national parliamentarianism, should reflect pre-existing social realities: political federalism needed to correspond rather to a European society made up of autonomous groups and unions."

These fundamental differences which, Brugmans explained, "continually divided" the EUP between the hard-core exponents of integral federalism and the so-called "maximalists" in the MFE seriously hampered the image and inner cohesion of the movement. Indeed, in reference to the former predominant grouping, the influential European campaigner René Courtin complained that "the society of which the federalists dream is unpleasantly close to the French ancien régime and to the Portugal of Salazar."² Spinelli's "maximalist" views, on the other hand, appeared impractical. The MFE, Brugmans argued, "wants to prematurely force the hand of history", adding, "and gives too much emphasis to the centralising character of European federal authorities... The fear of a European 'super-State', which is so familiar to French, Swiss and Benelux circles, rarely appears in Italy."³ Montreux did not settle this argument; it in fact exacerbated it. In contrast to Ernesto Rossi's earlier call for a "true supra-national State with its own sovereignty and a central government directly responsible to and elected by the citizens"⁴, the General Policy Resolution approved by the Congress advocated instead an "organic solidarity" accompanied by "functional decentralisation and self government." It is true that a "federal ✓

1. Brugmans, op. cit., pp. 23-4. See also Gouzy, op. cit., p. 11.

2. René Courtin, "French views on European union", article in International Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Jan. 1949, p. 17.

3. Brugmans, "Positions fédéralistes européennes", La Fédération, July 1949, CEC GE. EVA.; La Pensée Politique du Fédéralisme (Siffert 1969) p. 24

4. E. Rossi, Federazione Europea (Nuova Italia, 1948), pp. 78-83 - first printed in 1944 as L'Europa di domani, L.F.E. TORINO.

./authority" at a European level was also proposed, but it was meant to include a "government" fashioned according to the corporate groups of the "living forces". Moreover, despite the efforts of the Spinelli-Rossi wing, there was not one phrase in the Montreux Resolutions referring to a projected European Assembly, Parliament or Federal Constitution. The integral federalist side, in short, carried the Congress, aided by eloquent interventions by Denis de Rougemont and Brugmans. Not one phrase explaining the MFE position was printed in the Official Report of the Congress. The sole dissenting voice recorded was that of British Federal Union veteran Miss F.L. Josephy, who declared that she was "lost in the subtleties of integral federalism."¹ Similarly, the composition of the EUP Central Committee, decided at the Congress, was, in Brugmans' view, "provisionally" dominated by the integral federalists², despite the inclusion of Rossi, though not Spinelli. The three senior positions in the Executive Bureau - President, Institutional Director and Secretary General - were assigned respectively to integral federalists Brugmans, Marc and Raymond Silva. In the meantime, Marcel Rytte had been put in charge of the political debate at the Congress, while André Voisin, as General Secretary of the 'French Coordination Committee of Federalist Movements' and as a leading Central Committee member, remained in a strong strategic position. The sum significance of the situation, despite the subsequent moderate and bridge-building efforts of Brugmans and Silva, was described by Spinelli as follows:

"The integral federalist wing gained a complete victory at the Montreux Congress... The EUP thus became a centre for attracting movements who wanted an integral transformation of the whole of society in the federalist sense. The Italians remained practically isolated in an attitude of opposition, deprived of almost any effective influence upon the new international organisation and its policy... The negative results of this situation were not long in being felt... the French federalist movement... proved incapable of formulating a clear./.

1. Official Report - 'Rapport du Premier Congrès Annuel de l'EUF. p. 31. B. 47, CEC GENEVA. Also see A & F Boyd, op.cit., appendix F, for the full English version of the policy Resolution.
2. Brugmans, 'Idée Européenne, op.cit., pp. 22-3.

./.. European federalist policy and remained identified essentially with their programme of internal federalism." ¹

As the first major European pressure group to emerge after the war, the EUP's preoccupation by the Summer of 1947 with internal federalist theories was indeed remarkably out of step with the deadly serious pattern of international events and bi-polar power pressures which had by now given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Other European movements which meanwhile had been formed, to be described shortly, appeared much more linked to cold war developments. The impact of the Marshall Plan upon European unity politics, nonetheless, was certainly appreciated by Brugmans who was never fully converted to hard-line integral federalist dogma and who, as EUP Executive Chairman, strove to present on behalf of the movement a "third force" European policy, accepting Marshall Aid but "refusing" somewhat hopefully bloc confrontation and Europe's forced division into East and West ideological spheres. Europe, he maintained, should neither be capitalist nor communist, but "social".² This "third force" concept was echoed in centre-left French political circles and even more so among a key section of the British Labour left.³ At a distinct trans-national level it was also the central motivating theme which gave impulse to a new libertarian-socialist European grouping.

-Launched just a few weeks prior to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine at an international conference held in London on 22-23 February 1947 under the auspices of the militant though miniscule 'Independent Labour Party', the Movement for a United Socialist State of Europe indeed led the "third force" field in claiming that only an independent socialist Europe would prevent inter-bloc warfare. Electing Marcel Pivert (leading SFIO militant) and Bob Edwards (ILP Chairman and General Secretary of the Chemical Workers Union) respectively as Chairman and Vice-Chairman, plus the exiled Spanish Socialist leader Enrique Gironella as head of the Executive Bureau, the MUSE went on to ./..

1. Spinelli, op.cit., pp.158-9.

2. See, for example, Brugmans, Vingt Ans d'Europe 1946-1966, (College of Europe, De Tempel, Brugge, 1966), pp.40-45.

3. Cf. pp.101-2.

./pronounce at the larger follow-up conference at Montrouge-Paris on 21-22 June, held in the immediate wake of the Marshall Aid speech, that a regenerated Europe could "only be conceived and realised by the Europeans themselves", and that one of the "essential" steps in this was the "transfer of national sovereignties to a federal organism." The far-left character of the movement and the rich revolutionary flavour of its first meetings, however, plus its apparently dogmatic stand in favour of only a socialist united Europe and its sponsorship by the outcast ILP, all initially restricted the MUSSE's appeal, despite attempts to enlist rank and file socialist support. Left-wing federalists, such as Brugmans, Marc, Henry Frenay and later Spinelli and Ignazio Silone, nonetheless did become involved, as did eventually senior members from especially the French and Dutch Socialist Parties, considerably increasing its international standing, though changing its orientation towards a more pluralistic conception of European unity.¹

By contrast, the British United Europe Movement, founded principally by Winston Churchill and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys in May 1947, and fired by the former's historic "Europe Arise" speech at Zurich in September 1946 and by the Soviet threat to Western Europe's security, had no time for "third force" solutions or for federalist bravado. Firmly committed to the idea of a Western Alliance and linked closely to establishment circles, it had practically no dealings with the MUSSE and only a tenuous rapport with the EUF. Under Sandys' lead, the UEM concentrated instead on practical action for European unity within closely-knit influential circles, with the view to establishing an Anglo-French spearhead movement. Certainly in its initial stages, however, the movement was seen as a Churchill propaganda vehicle.

-When Churchill declared at Zurich his prestigious support for the creation of "a kind of United States of Europe"², he had, as Paul-Henri Spaak put it, "caused a considerable stir"³ and "galvanized all those who believed in the need for a new Europe", thereby becoming./.

1. See Boyd, op. cit. pp. 81-2; USSE, ILP pamphlet, Feb. 1947, C.A.S. BRUGGE
2. For full Zurich speech text, see Boyd, op. cit., Appendix B.
3. Spaak, The Continuing Battle: memoirs of a European 1956-1966 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1971), p. 200.

./."one of the leading pioneers of European unity."¹ Be this as it may - even federalist leaders Brugmans and Spinelli were enthused by Churchill's European lead - his Zurich speech nevertheless contained, as Spaak also stated, "an ambiguity which no one noticed at the time" but which would "become the root cause of a grave misunderstanding."¹ This concerned the precise geographical vision which Churchill had of a united Europe, and whether he seriously contemplated Britain as being a part of the scheme or not. Churchill, as mentioned in an earlier section, had in fact a long-standing record in favour of European union, but had never been too clear or consistent about Britain's position in this respect. In 1929, he had supported the Briand Plan, but had also indicated that it was suitable only for continental Europe and not for Britain, whose role was at the centre of the Empire and Commonwealth. This message was repeated in 1930, when he confided:

"But we have our dreams and our own task. We are linked but not comprised. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed."²

During the war, on the other hand, Churchill publicly espoused the idea of a future 'Council of Europe' in which Britain would, it seemed, take the lead.³ But he subsequently dropped the idea in favour of a "three circles" concept uniting Britain primarily with the Empire and Commonwealth, and with America, and only then with Europe.⁴ Finally, at the end of the war, he developed a model of a future "world order" based upon separate co-operative regional pillars such as America, Asia, Europe and, in turn, Britain again with the Empire and Commonwealth. The Zurich speech, in essence, was a qualified extension of the latter two models, stressing the over-all peace-keeping framework of the United Nations Organisation, while also stating that Britain should help forge a united Europe but not be included as a full member of this regional group. Indeed./.

¹. Spaak, op.cit., p.200.

². Churchill, article in the 'Saturday Evening Post', 15.2.30., quoted by Brugmans, L'Idée Européenne, op.cit.

³. See Boyd, op.cit., p.73; European Movement and the Council of Europe, op.cit., p.31.

⁴. CF. p.3.

./he plainly emphasised:

"The first step in the creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany..The first step is to form a Council of Europe..In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia..must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine."

- As Spaak explained in this respect:

"The united Europe which Churchill advocated was a continental Europe, of which France and Germany were to be the joint leaders. ..Churchill wanted Britain to promote the creation of a united Europe, but he did not want Britain to be a part of it. For a number of years after his Zurich speech nobody asked exactly what was on his mind when he made it. People were only too glad of his backing for a great cause. The ambivalence of his speech suited everyone... However, he was perhaps wrong not to have clarified his position when the time was right and to have allowed people to believe that there was a powerful movement in Britain ready to press for that country's integration within continental Europe."

Churchill, in all probability, had a split mind on the issue, at times being influenced by his pro-European colleagues, notably Sandys, Harold MacMillan and perhaps Robert Boothby, all who saw Britain's integral role within Europe as complimentary to her overseas links, while in later times being pressed by High Tories such as L.S. Amery and Anthony Eden, who continually stressed Britain's prior commitment to the Empire and Commonwealth, though approving of continental moves towards European unity. The setting up, in January 1947, of the British 'United Europe Committee' under Churchill's chairmanship and with Sandys as the main Secretary was in this sense a victory for the pro-European lobby, as was the first official policy statement declaring that despite Britain's "special obligations and spiritual ties" with the Commonwealth she was nevertheless a "part of Europe and must be prepared to make her full contribution to European unity".³ This gain was repeated when, at the official launching of the UEM at the Albert Hall in May 1947, the principal policy resolution recognised that "Britain must play her full part" in the united Europe campaign.⁴ In turn, Sandys was able to give full vent to this view./.

1. Churchill's Zurich speech, Boyd, op.cit., appendix B.

2. Spaak, op.cit., pp.200-1.

3. See Boyd, op.cit., pp.74-5. 4. Ibid.

./when, as the main UEM delegate to the UEF Montreux Congress, he declared in a key speech, contrary to Churchill's ambivalent Zurich message, not only that the European unity project depended on a Franco-German partnership, but also that

"France must be assured that there will be in the European Union another large power upon whose friendship and good faith she can implicitly rely. There is, of course, only one such power, and that is Great Britain. Unless Britain can convince France that she means to play her part as a full and effective member of the European family, the whole project will come to nought."

The "dilemma" of "divorcing the Commonwealth to marry Europe", he optimistically concluded, would not arise in practice.¹

While this point was subsequently borne out so far as the attitude of the Commonwealth nations themselves were concerned (as shall be seen in later chapters), a very major "dilemma" did eventually arise, however, within the Conservative Party and in the UEM over this loyalty issue. Although Sandys initially succeeded in persuading Churchill to support and in turn preside over the Hague Congress project, despite all the political pit-falls and federalist connotations which were attached, and where Churchill, in fact, publicly declared that Britain's place was within a united Europe,² in the long-term, as Party pressures grew and the return of a Conservative administration drew nearer, Churchill sided with the more imperial-minded Amery and Eden lobby and most of the Party members who, as Spaak put it, "though ready to follow their leader..were not prepared to go beyond expressing a measure of sympathy for the idea of a united continent of Europe of which Great Britain would not be part."³ Likewise in the UEM, where Tory spokesmen such as Amery (a Vice Chairman), Eden and Leslie Hore-Belisha carried considerable political weight, difficulties and doubts regarding a real European commitment arose. The token presence of a few Labour and Socialist members, such as Gordon Lang K.P. and Victor Gollancz, plus representatives of the weaker Liberal Party including Lord./.

1. Sandys, speech at Montreux Congress, Aug. 1947, Official Report, op. cit., pp. 102-5.
2. Cf. pp. 186-7. 3. Spaak, op. cit., p201.

./Layton (treasurer), Lady Violet Bonham Carter and Lady Rhys-Williams, as well as other leading representatives of industrial, military, cultural and religious spheres, could not fundamentally challenge this Conservative political predominance over the movement. Moreover, among the ranks of the committed Europeans, ambitious politicians such as MacMillan certainly had problems in following their opinions yet avoiding Party scorn and possible ridicule regarding any open plans of a federal nature. The result was the espousal of a confederal approach, which initially became labelled as "unionist" and eventually as "functionalist"². Boothby, though hardly ambitious by this stage, also fell into the same camp, since it appeared the only way of securing Britain's commitment both to Europe and her overseas territories. The position and strategy adopted by Sandys, however, was more acute and is of central importance to this dissertation.

While sharing the view advocated by MacMillan that Britain could, at the outset, be committed within Europe upon a mainly confederal basis, Sandys wanted to equip this initial structure with a potentially expansionary capacity, based not around a rigid but a flexible political framework, which would not require a severe jolt but would itself provide the motor for progress towards a deeper form of union. Indeed, one of the principal themes throughout the following chapters will be to show how Sandys, as effective leader of the European campaign, was consistently and firmly in favour of Britain's commitment to a real united Europe with an eventual European Government and Parliament on a supra-national scale. He was not, on the other hand, a theoretical federalist, but was rather a sharp and committed realist, seeking practical methods and sensible formulae for achieving his goal. Above all, the crucial difference between Sandys and the more open supporters of European political federation was a question of method rather than of./.

1. DEB. Council List, SANDYS PAPERS.

2. Functionalism in the pre-Schuman Plan sense, i.e. incorporating a political framework.

./direction, though this method would, in the final event, determine a slight difference in destination. For, on the one hand, the "maximalists" were drawn essentially from a juridical-constitutional tradition of change, wanting to translate common values and goals into precise institutional form through direct judicial-political methods. - European unification needed to be defined, from the start, in the specific sense of a projected European Federation, to be achieved by a straight-forward constitutional approach which would finally transfer, "at a stroke" precise sovereign powers to a European political authority, forthwith to be constituted. Sandys, on the other hand, was more accustomed to British political practice whereby sovereign parliamentary powers and rights were not simply produced by specific constitutional acts, but evolved gradually in a less rigid framework of precedents and conventions, arrived at through experience, general consent and without the problematic need for a binding agreement signed at one moment in time. In this sense, he did not favour a "Federal Pact" approach, but rather the gradual creation of a European authority through a drawn-out series of agreements and conventions, evolving almost "imperceptibly" into an effective federal framework without having to secure a prior commitment to such a project from the national governments and parliaments involved. - This much he tried to explain at the Montreux Congress, when he said:

"Whether in the economic or political sphere, complete unity will not in any case be achieved overnight. At first it may only be possible to adopt quite modest measures of co-operation among a restricted number of nations. But the important thing is to make a start. An attitude of co-operation, once initiated, becomes a habit, and the scope rapidly expands. A group of nations working in harmony with one another by their example attract others to them, and the area of confidence progressively widens."

It will be argued in the following chapters that, in the context of the time, the strategy advocated by Sandys was the most progressive and realistic mixture possible, in so much as that up until May 1950 official circles on the European continent ./.
1. Sandys speech, Official Report, op. cit.

./could not envisage European union without Britain, and that Britain would certainly not join any binding constitutional European project as evoked by the "maximalist" federalists. On the other hand, it will also be argued that, in the final event, the views of the latter group to draw up a "pact" even without Britain if necessary, were partially vindicated in view of the previously unforeseen rigidity of Britain's negative attitude towards European Union.

For the time-being, in any case, the combination of Churchill's apparent European initiative, Soviet aggrandizement, the Marshall Plan and lingering war-time idealism for the supra-national pacification of Europe together prompted the founding of the trans-national European Parliamentary Union, under Coudenhove-Kalergi's initiative. Launched at an international conference held at Gstaad in September 1947, the EPU could only initially muster 114 "active parliamentarians" to the cause, representing Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.¹ The French and Italian delegations, moreover, comprised nearly three-quarters of the total attendance.² Nevertheless, despite these representative shortcomings, the EPU, with Coudenhove at the head, regarded itself as a "preliminary European Parliament", whose role was to "help organise in every Parliament non-partisan groups favouring (European) federation", and to "call as soon as possible a CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY for Europe", to be elected either by national parliaments or directly by the people.³ A more specific set of proposals would be presented at the follow-up conference planned for 1948. Some important names were attached to this ambitious movement, including Paul Reynaud, Edouard Bonnefous, François de Menthon, Paul Pflimlin and André Noël, but the organizing Council of 15 members were mostly political "unknowns", with the exception of Georges Bohy (EPU chairman and ./.

1. See Boyd, op. cit., p. 84; Lipgens, Die Anfänge der Europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1947, op. cit., pp. 554-561.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

./..leader of the Socialist Group in the Belgian Parliament)and René Coty(a future French President). The EPU's value,above all,was in the subsequent organisation of All-Party Groups throughout the Parliaments of Europe,notably in France,Italy and Britain. The latter Group,as we shall see in following chapters,would be of particular interest,in view of the special importance attached to the British Government's European policy. Its founding chairman, Labour M.P. RWG Mackay,would indeed be one of the most zealous and ardently committed leaders of the European campaign,and,despite his weak standing within his own Party's hierarchy,he would occupy a vital pivotal position in his federalist critique of the Churchill-UEM "monopoly" of the united Europe idea in Britain.¹

European pressure groups had also emerged in other spheres. Post-war Christian Democratic Parties on the European continent, for example,combined in June 1947 under a loose umbrella organisation known as 'Nouvelles Equipes Internationales',under the pro-federal leadership of MRP deputy Robert Bichet,and later attracting Schuman,Bidsault and Adenauer to the cause,though its programme initially remained rather vague.² Of more immediate interest,perhaps was the Independent League for Economic Co-operation,founded in Brussels in June 1946 under the distinguished chairmanship of the past and future Belgian Premier,Paul Van Zeeland,and supported by leading political and economic personalities including Paul-Henri Spaak,Roger Motz,François Poncet,Michel Debré,Etienne Giscard d'Estaing,Pieter Kerstens,Ugo La Malfa,plus UEM members such as Macmillan,Lord Layton,Peter Thorneycroft and Edward Beedington-Bearens. Perhaps the two most committed and interesting leaders of the movement,however,were Damiel Serruys(former chairman of the pre-war 'Union Economique Douanière')and the fascinating./.

1. See RWG Mackay,You Can't Turn the Clock Back(London 1945)pp. 266-7,plus his main work,Federal Europe,(London 1940).

2. For its more detailed proposals,see NEI Conference pamphlet (1949),CAEM BRUGGE.

./former aide to war-time Polish General Sikoraki and post-war 'Eminence Grise' of pro-European political circles, Joseph Retinger - the initial organiser of ILEC.¹ The basic aim of the movement was, in the words of Retinger, "to revive the concept of unity of Europe by applying it first to the economic field."² Its main proposals, as outlined by Serruys at the Montreux Congress, included: the gradual establishment of a European customs union; a common production plan; complete free trade, to be achieved through progressive reduction of tariffs; the convertibility of European currencies; and more joint European co-operation over the regulation of agricultural and energy problems.³ The ILEC, moreover, was one of the first groups immediately to seize upon the Marshall Aid announcement in June 1947, drafting straight away a set of concrete proposals for the British, French and US Governments, outlining how the aid could best be channelled along constructive lines.⁴

By mid-1947, a proliferation of European pressure groups had thus come into being - some, such as the UEP, MUSSE and in part the NEI, inspired initially by post-war idealism and a mainly Eurocentric federal vision not fully in keeping with the bi-polar international development which was now forcing the pace of official decision making, others, notably the UEM, ILEC and in part the EPU, taking cue from conditions and events leading to a western bloc consolidation, though the latter group had a distinct European federal policy too, while ILEC was in many ways a forerunner to future Common Market European functionalism. To a large extent, however, just as official European policy projects such as OEEC hinged upon an Anglo-French axis, so too did the emerging European campaign need to consolidate its activities in these two countries.

-Despite the existence of various populist though mainly./.

1. See Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise, ed. J. Pomian, (Sussex University Press, 1972), especially pp.209-213.

2. Ibid.

3. Serruys speech at Montreux, see Official Report, op.cit. pp58-69.

4. Retinger Memoirs, op.cit., pp.212-3.

./fringe federalist movements in France, there was no umbrella organisation comprising a more balanced and influential grouping of European activists. This lack of organisation was of considerable concern to Duncan Sandys who, despite the political imbalance in his own movement on account of Labour's hostility to Churchill¹, nonetheless regarded the UEM as a future launching pad for coordinated action with France especially and with similar movements on the European continent as a whole. Indeed, already in December 1946, he confided to Coudenhove: "It is difficult to make any progress at the moment in France, the reason being French fear of a revived Germany."² Efforts were nevertheless initiated mainly through the former resistance leader and actual co-director of 'Le Monde', René Courtin, who looked to a united Europe as an independent "third force" analogous to the Socialist-MRP-Radical alliance in France while offering at the same time an international solution to the "German problem".³ Though initially greeted by doubts and hesitation among French Socialists, who were sympathetic to Courtin's unity project but deterred by its links with Churchill,⁴ the scale of international events and Western European momentum helped out. By 10 July, 1947, Courtin was able to send Sandys an impressive list of 26 leading political and cultural figures, including Socialists, who were willing to form a French Committee.⁵ On 16 July, the Committee was officially inaugurated with the veteran Radical leader, Edouard Herriot, as its Honorary President. The other main members included: Paul Bastid (Radical), Paul Reynaud (Independent), Pierre-Henri Teitgen (MRP) and subsequently Paul Ramadier (Socialist) as vice-presidents; plus René Mayer (Radical); Paul Coste-Floret, François de Lanthon, Edmond Michelet (MRP); Robert Lacoste, François Leenhardt, André le./.

1. Cf. pp. 80-1.

2. See Lipgens, op. cit., pp. 570-2

3. See Courtin article in International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

4. Lipgens, op. cit.

5. Courtin, letter to Sandys, 10.7.47., CAE: BRUGGE.

Troquer and M. Monjoz (SFIO) and the senior academic André Siegfried. Courtin, for his part, acted as General Secretary of the Committee, formally called 'Le Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie', soon to be aided by André Noel (MRP) and by the former French Minister, Raoul Dautry (Independent) who became Chairman. - As Sandys remarked, with obvious satisfaction, the French Committee was "influential and highly representative."¹ The Committee, however, was rather more pro-federal than perhaps anticipated, Courtin clearly setting down their objective as a "European Federation".² Ramadier, Dautry and Noel, on the other hand, proved to be a little more cautious in this respect, and in practice, moreover, Courtin himself was forced to modify his position due to pressure from his British UEM colleagues. This British pressure became only too evident as the campaign to co-ordinate activities started to gather pace.

3) Beginnings of Coordination

By mid-1947 it had in fact become clear that the multiplicity of European pressure groups which had emerged since the war and in response to developments leading to the cold war ran the risk of causing confusion and potential discouragement both among public opinion and within the groups concerned. Though in some cases duplication of membership occurred, the need for closer overall liaison was imperative. Coudenhove-Kalergi, in this connection, initially saw it as his task to lead an umbrella movement for European unity and, already in November 1946, had proposed a merger between the projected UEM and a revived version of his Pan-Europa under the title 'United Europe', of which he would be Secretary General, Churchill (Honorary) President and Sandys Assistant Secretary General.³ Neither Sandys nor Churchill seemed to have shown any marked enthusiasm for the project, though./.

1. See Lipgens, op. cit., p. 611.

2. CFNU 'Provisional Manifesto', 24.1.47., CAEM BRUGGE.

3. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 'United Europe: memorandum on the planned merger of the British Committee for a United States of Europe and the Pan-European Union', Gstaad, 1.11.46., CAEM BRUGGE.

./this did not dissuade Coudenhove from greeting the formation of the 'United Europe Committee', in January 1947, as a "new sister organization" to his dissipated Pan European Union,¹ nor from proposing the idea of inviting Churchill to be Honorary President of the projected EPU.² Churchill's failure to show up at the EPU-Gstaad inaugural congress, in turn, was hardly an auspicious starting point for Sandys in his own attempt to lead an umbrella grouping with EPU support. - As Retinger acidly commented concerning Coudenhove's co-operation along such lines:

"He had every right to be considered as a pioneer of European Unity, and not withstanding other circumstances he wanted to be treated as such."

Co-operation between the UEM and EUP, though rather difficult at first, resulted in a more substantial alliance. The initiative in taking up contact seems actually to have come from the federalists' side when, in February 1947, Brugmans, Marc and H.R. Nord went to London on behalf of the EUP in order to start discussions with the newly formed United Europe Committee and to outline their own "objectives and working methods." Stressing the international composition of the EUP, as opposed to the national character of the apparently junior UEC, and pronouncing the conviction that a United Europe needed to be based upon the surrender of certain elements of national sovereignty together with the need for economic planning and inner federalism and the rejection of a purely "Western bloc" policy aimed against Russia, they subsequently sought the UEC position, concluding rather naively:

"If the United Europe Committee could share our views..it would seem that nothing would stand in the way of the UEC adhering to the EUP, on the same conditions and with the same rights and duties as the other federalist movements." 4

The point which the EUP delegation failed to grasp, however, was that the UEC, despite the inclusion among its ranks of some Federal Unions/.

1. See Coudenhove telegram to Churchill, 18.1.47., CAEM BRUGGE

2. Letter to Sandys, 17.6.47., CAEM BRUGGE.

3. Retinger op.cit.p.214
4. Note to UEC members signed by Brugmans, Marc and Nord, and sent to Sandys from London on 3.2.47., CAEM BRUGGE.

./members,¹ had not been founded in order to become affiliated to any European federalist organisation, but rather to give an Anglo-French lead to the developing European movement as a whole.² Sandys, nonetheless, answered the EUP questionnaire with considerable tact, stressing:

"It is clear that no United Europe could be created unless the member states were to agree in some measure to surrender elements of their sovereignty."

He in turn explained, however, that any such partial relinquishment of sovereignty could only develop out of a broader gradual campaign:

"We have not attempted at this stage to define what these elements should be or to define the precise constitutional solution which will commend itself to the nations of Europe. We are confining ourselves to the limited aim of obtaining sufficient support for the general conception of European unity to enable a representative conference of leading Europeans to be convened. It would be for such a conference, after full discussion, to consider the next steps to be taken."³

Sandys' compact reply, also assuring the EUP that the UBC/UEM recognised the need both for common political and economic action in Europe plus the ultimate need to "unite all the peoples of Europe", hopefully with the "co-operation of Russia", actually summed up the strategy which he adopted up to the convening of the Hague Congress over one year later.- The European sovereignty issue, though by no means rejected, was not to be allowed to stand in the way of prior practical progress of the European campaign in its initial take-off stage. For was the campaign to be overtly aimed at uniting the Western half of Europe alone, though this was the initial implicit assumption. Above all, the idea of launching a "representative conference of leading Europeans" had been aired. - It soon proved to be the central uniting theme in the joint campaign which followed, though at the cost of considerable federalist discord and misunderstanding.

The federalists' position in relation to the new British movement was indeed essentially one of bluff and naivety. The need for serious British support and involvement in the European campaign was evident to all but the most adventurous of "maximalistes" in the./.

1. ie. Gordon Lang A.F., P.L. Josephy, Lord Beveridge, etc.

2. See, for example, Sandys letter to Coudenhove, 4.12.46., CAEM. BRUGGE.

3. Sandys, 'answer to questions', attached to EUP Note, op.cit.

./..context of the time. Spurned by Labour¹ and unable to muster much impact now through 'Federal Union', the EUP leadership had to face the fact that the emerging Churchill group, despite its ambiguity, would have an international standing which would overshadow the relatively unknown, though numerically superior, theorists in their own trans-national movement. Sandys, nonetheless, valued the international links of the EUP, while at the same time he hastened the formal launching of the Anglo-French United Europe groups. Both aspects combined when, after having been officially represented at the UEM inauguration at the Albert Hall in May 1947, the leading EUP spokesman in France, André Voisin, issued an invitation through Gordon Lang requesting a joint meeting in Paris between British and French delegates of the European unity and federalists movements. On July 17, only one day after the Conseil Français was officially set up, Sandys arrived in Paris as part of what was supposed to be a mixed team of leading British UEM and federalist personalities, including Gordon Lang, Robert Boothby, L.S. Amery, Lealie Hore-Belisha, Lord Beveridge, Miss Josephy and led, in theory, by UEM treasurer Lord Layton.² At the various meetings held throughout the course of the visit it soon transpired that it was more than a purely Anglo-French affair and that Sandys was taking the lead in order to force the pace towards a more ambitious coordination project. Having secured major status through the UEM and CFEW being identified as "sister movements", on July 20 he chaired a crucial exploratory meeting attended not only by Lang, Courtin and Noel representing the "United Europe Movement and associated movements" together with Brugmans, Marc and Silva for the EUP, but joined also by Joseph Retinger and Daniel Serruys representing the ILEC, plus Léon Kaccas as a vice-president of the EPU. Opening the proceedings, Sandys came quickly to the point - in view of the "large measure of common agreement" existing between the movements, he was proposing the ./..

1. Information given to the writer by Henri Brugmans.

2. See EUP Lettre Circulaire, No. 13, 22.7.47., CEC GENEVA; Federal News, No. 149, August 1947, article "Diversity & Unity", RETINGER PAPERS; Lipgens, op. cit., pp. 612-4.

./formation of a European Liaison Committee, in which each participating movement would retain its independence while accepting that the new movement as a whole would have to draw up some "broad division of responsibilities" and allocate to each organisation some "more or less defined sphere of activity." There resulted the following agreement: The participating movements to the new Committee would seek "as far as possible" to adopt a "common line of action" and to "endeavour in all important matters to act in consultation and agreement with each other", though retaining their ultimate "freedom of action." It was also agreed that the ILEC would concentrate on the economic aspects of the campaign, and the KFU on gaining parliamentary support for the European cause, while the EUP would act as a trans-national mass propaganda movement, leaving the UEM/CFEU to concentrate on gaining the support of "prominent public figures" with the view to organising "large public meetings of an international character." ¹

The draft agreement to set up the 'European Liaison Committee' was speedily approved by the UEM, the ILEC and by the CFEU, fears in the latter group concerning British Conservative caution over the supra-national sovereignty issue being overridden by the realisation that the European unity campaign "depended" on an Anglo-French agreement. ² Problems soon arose, however, both with the EUP and KFU. In the first case, the EUP Montreux Congress in August 1947 marked a notable difference of view between the EUP theologians and the invited UEM delegation, leading to a public clash on radio over the "revolutionary" federalist views of de Rougemont and the "realistic" unionist tactics defended by Smys. ³ At the subsequent EUP Central Committee meeting on August 31, both Rytte and Marc also complained about the dangers of being associated too much with "parliamentarians", who threatened to submerge the federalist movement in an apparent attempt to regain the influence which they had lost. It was only with considerable difficulty, ✓

1. 'European Liaison Committee' meeting, 20.7.47. official minutes, RETINGER PAPERS.

2. See Courtin, 'Après les réunions fédéralistes franco-anglaises', Le Monde, 23.7.47.

3. De Rougemont, article in Government & Opposition, op.cit., pp332-3.

./therefore,that Brugmans managed to extract a formal ratification of the liaison pact,¹ notifying Sandys of the fact on September 2. The EPU ratification,on the other hand,failed to materialise. There can be little doubt that Coudenhove was to blame. Having been snubbed by Churchill and Sandys in his own liaison attempts,and publicly embarrassed by Brugmans' outspoken "third force" statements,the final straw was Churchill's disinterest in and Sandys' downgrading of the projected EPU-Gstaad conference. In the final event,despite having tentatively agreed to the July liaison pact,Coudenhove persuaded a meeting of the provisional EPU Council,held only one day before the Gstaad conference in September,to withdraw from membership of the European Liaison Committee. The conference was not even informed of this decision and in consequence did not discuss it. Moreover,the decision to leave the Committee was communicated some two weeks after the Gstaad conference without any reference to the newly elected Council. The fundamental problem was that Coudenhove expected a privileged share out of liaison responsibilities for himself and his movement. Sandys,already making his weight felt,together with Retinger held that such special treatment was untenable. The longterm result,as Retinger put it,was that Coudenhove "accepted several times to participate in the Co-ordinating Committee,but each time after a few weeks or even a few days,he retracted."²

Initial coordination had at least been achieved between the four remaining movements,while some interest was also expressed with regard to the developing Catholic-NEI initiative,though on the condition that European unity did not become solely a "Party issue"³ In the same context,Sandys warned his French committee colleagues that in any talks with the USSE,they should argue that insistence on./.

1. EUP CC meeting,Montreux,31.8.47.,official minutes,CEC GENEVA.
2. See Retinger,op.cit.,p.214; Coudenhove-Sandys correspondence 21.6.47. & 25.8.47.,letter from Sandys to Noel 6.8.47.,Memo on relations with EPU,CAEM BRUGGE; plus Lipgens,op.cit.,pp.617-8.
3. Sandys letter to Noel 6.8.47.,op.cit.

./a purely 'socialist' Europe "would bring us nearer to real unity in Europe", adding "the aim should be unite all Europeans, all parties and all nationalities."¹ The stress which Sandys placed on avoiding party divisions over Europe was intrinsically linked to his strategy of convening an international assembly of "prominent public figures" who would publicly acclaim the cause of European unity and in turn propel the campaign into the realms of governmental attention. The July liaison pact had in effect assured Sandys of responsibility for such a campaign. The idea took root more firmly when at Montreux both he and Retinger discussed the project at considerable length, and found, as Retinger recorded, "from the outset we were in complete agreement."² The federalists for their part, however, launched at Montreux the idea of an alternative corporatist-oriented mass international congress on the lines of an "Estates General of Europe", composed of delegates from the so-called "living forces" who would present their "cahiers de revendications" to vast deliberative assemblies and permanent committees which would somehow persuade national authorities to relinquish powers to a new European authority which, in turn, would have fixed responsibilities to coordinate and give full expression to the various autonomous institutions and groupings initially called into action.³ Such a programme was presented by Brugmans at the subsequent European Liaison Committee meeting held at Paris, in Sandys' absence, on October 15.⁴ The very evident doctrinal void which separated the EUP "militants" from the Sandys-Retinger axis both as regards the nature of power and the purpose of politics was now also threatening to disrupt their initial plans and objectives for the European campaign.

Matters moved towards a partial conclusion at the next meeting of the European Liaison Committee, held in Paris on November 10-11, where Sandys, as a priority, tightened his tactical grip and numerical./.

1. Letter by TB Martin on behalf of Sandys to M. Debré, 17.9.47., CABE
2. Retinger, op.cit., p.215. 3. See de Brugmont, op.cit., p.336. BRUGME
4. European Liaison Committee meeting, Paris, 15.10.47., official minutes, CABE: BRUGME.

./..advantage in terms of organisation, securing the meeting's agreement to increase representation in a new Co-ordination Committee to a maximum of four delegates for each member movement, while at the same time set up an Executive Committee including a Chairman and General Secretary appointed on a yearly basis and backed up by a secretariat based in Paris and London. An annexed Protocol to the provisional agreement, moreover, also defined the UEM and CPEU as two distinct member groups both entitled to their full quota of votes. The net result of this agreement was that the Sandys-Retinger axis was assured a permanent majority in the new Co-ordination and Executive Committees inasmuch that the separately recognised CPEU under Courtin would not challenge their British co-founders in the UEM, while the ILEC was both sympathetic to Sandys' realistic approach and, in any case, comprised many UEM members. In addition, the three-to-one monopoly in Sandys' favour was extended even more in the projected Executive Committee where Sandys and Retinger were guaranteed the two additional places of Chairman and Secretary. Not surprisingly, therefore, was the ultimate decision concerning the scale and character of the planned "European Conference" postponed until the next meeting of the restricted Committee, though already Sandys defended his own invitation policy restricting the Congress to about 300 important personalities, as opposed to the federalists' view of a mass gathering of at least 1000 popular representatives. Already at this stage, in fact, the ascendancy of the Sandys-Retinger axis with regard to the planning of the immediate campaign was quite evident, the location of the "Conference" being decided, on Sandys' initiative, as The Hague and the date being provisionally fixed for May 1946. This choice of venue arose from the fact that Sandys, relying on his friend Prince Bernard of the Netherlands, could secure substantial financial backing for the proposed Hague project from the Dutch-based Philips Group, and had already arranged for the leading Dutch political supporter of European Union, Senator Kerstens, to coordinate this fund raising.

/.task. This illustrative point, that the financing of the project was already under way, made it clear to the hard-pressed federalist representatives in the Committee that the campaign policy would ultimately be decided by those who held the purse strings. The EUP, in this respect was not a well financed organisation, whereas the UEM, assisted by ICI Chairman Lord McGowan, succeeded in raising generous funds from the leaders of British industry. For all its naive enthusiasm in favour of a pseudo-revolutionary campaign of the "living forces", the EUP was simply unable to finance by itself any project for a mass "Estates General". As an organisation it could not match the crucial financial pull of its counter-parts in the Liaison Committee. These hard economic facts, together with Sandys' impressive organisational flair and the political reality that a European movement ostensibly backed by Churchill would outshine an organisation of mainly unknown federalist theorists at an international level, would indeed weigh heavily in the EUP's official decision whether or not to accept the provisional agreement of November 11. ¹

Presenting his report to the EUP Central Committee on November 15 Brugmans had little hope to offer. The EUP was confronted by a "dramatic situation", having to take "great risks" whatever it decided to do. "Alone against three" in the Liaison Committee, the EUP's idea of "summoning Europe" in a vast popular campaign of the "living forces", leading to a mass "Estates General" had been superseded in the Committee by Sandys' idea of a conference of outstanding European personalities, which would in turn provide the basis for a more protracted political campaign. Moreover, Brugmans warned, despite Labour's official opposition to the "Churchill movement" and the USSE's detachment from the coordinated campaign, the Hague Conference project stood a good chance of succeeding as a politically representative./.

1. European Liaison Committee meeting, Paris, 10-11.11.47., official minutes, CAEM BRUGSE. On UEM finances see E. Beddington-Behrens, Look Back - Look Forward (Macmillan, 1963), ch. 13, 'The European Movement'. On EUP finances see newsletter appeals of the period, CEC GENEVA.

./..ffair. The federalists, he went on to argue, should have no illusions as to the influence they would have at such a congress:

"We have at once sensed the danger for us in this spectacular gathering; it could crush us, or at the very least, create confusion in the public at large. However, if we refuse, what will happen? It seems difficult to call the Estates General against the congress of The Hague. The others will have ample cover on the left..and we shall soon have to face serious financial difficulties. Very probably this would soon paralyse our action in the immediate future, and it is the immediate future which counts. ..Our own movements will disintegrate if we do not give them a clear goal. We would run the risk of becoming a sect. And in the meantime the others would act. The right is enjoying an unexpected revival, the communists have deliberately isolated themselves and the 'third force' will either withdraw to its tent or join the 'great names' of a 'united Europe'... We could, doubtless, to a certain extent prevent the others from winning a complete victory at The Hague, but we could not succeed either, and we should have paralysed each other mutually."

It was evident in his presentation that Brugmans had undergone a strong dose of realism through his brief association with the more politically experienced members of the Liaison Committee. His fears of the EUP becoming an isolated "sect" had also been given a severe jolt when, in attempting to reduce the anti-federalist majority in the Committee by appealing for French socialist support and USSE involvement, the SFIO leader Léon Elum mockingly turned him down, accusing the federalists of being a "bag of crabs".² Brugmans, as a result started to have serious misgivings about the over doctrinaire aspects of hard-line integral federalism, and thereafter attempted to steer the EUP along a more moderate and adaptable "possibiliste" approach in the European unity campaign. He ardently proposed, therefore, that the November 11 agreement be ratified by the EUP, but on the condition that three provisos be respected: (1) that Eastern European countries be invited to the congress; (2) that "permanent organs" be set up at The Hague; (3) and that delegates to the congress be chosen by national committees without the Joint Committee having the right of veto. In this way, he hoped to retain some "third force" aspect to the affair, secure some loose sort of "Estates General" apparatus ./.

1. EUP CC meeting, 15.11.47., quoted by de Rougemont, op.cit. p.337.

2. See Lippens, op.cit., pp.626-7.

...and, at the crucial initial stage, reduce Sandys' monopoly of authority wielded at a singular committee level by charging a broader alternative organisation with responsibility for the Hague Congress invitation policy. Not everyone at the EUP Central Committee meeting was convinced by his arguments or by his compromise approach. - As de Rougemont informs us:

"In the discussion which followed, one could feel that each of the 18 members of the Central Committee who spoke (out of the 20 present) had the same fears and contradictory desires, however unequally divided: breaking with the party of leading personalities which held the purse strings and the press, meant, on the one hand, to run the risk of courting destruction or of becoming a sect, as Brugmans said... and, on the other hand, to condemn the Hague to be simply a trompe l'oeil congress, without any European future.

But to go to The Hague under the auspices of a union vaguely outlined by Churchill instead of calling the Estates General - did this not involve running the risk of losing not only the benefit of numbers... but also the creative and revolutionary dynamism which the federalist doctrine brought with it?

Should we survive and risk losing the very reason for our existence?.. Or should we run the risk of isolation and dislocation and thus jeopardise the only chance perhaps for our federalist revolution to succeed?"

In the final event, the more realistic views of Brugmans prevailed and the November 11 agreement was ratified. It was a difficult and important decision both for the EUP and for the future campaign, fraught with risks and the seeds of growing internal dissension. As de Rougemont again put it:

"The EUP chose that day to take the risk of collaborating. It did so seemingly without enthusiasm, even with a certain pessimism among many, as if the decision implied more than a concession."

There was now one month left between this crucial EUP decision and the next meeting of the Liaison Committee, during which the EUP made one more effort to enlist the support and involvement of the USSE and EPU in order to reduce, indeed overturn, the anti-federalist majority with regard to the Hague preparations. On December 10, Marc made an impassioned appeal to the USSE Chairman, Marcel Pivert, in which he insisted:

"A very important game will be played at the Hague reunion, a reunion which we are firmly intent upon transforming into an Estates General of Europe. But, in fact, this game will not."/.

1. de Rougemont, op.cit., pp. 337-C. 2. Ibid, p. 33.

- ././ only be played at The Hague, it is already now being played, and the result of the battle will depend to a large extent on the preparations in hand." 1

The appeal was made in vain: The French USSE leaders, especially Henry Frenay, tried but failed, to persuade their British colleagues - John MacNair, Fenner Brockway, Walter Padley, etc. - to moderate their stand and participate in the Hague preparations. As Frenay confided to Marc, "one has just to mention the name Churchill and it is like waving a red flag in front of a bull."² In the final event, the USSE Executive Committee narrowly rejected a motion to participate in the joint Hague campaign, though Frenay, Pivert and later Bob Edwards indicated their personal sympathy for the project and the possibility of participating in an unofficial individual capacity.³ The EPU, likewise, decided to "maintain its independence" in order to concentrate its campaign at the "purely parliamentary level."⁴

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the compromises which would have to be made in the joint campaign, Brugmans and Silva attempted to move the EUP towards a more practical "possibiliste" centre-ground policy position. Key support for this strategy was given by leading Dutch Central Committee member H.R. Nord who, in early December, presented Brugmans with a compromise federalist plan which struck a balance between the corporatist extremes of the integral-federalist Fédération tendency on the one side, and the strict constitutional approach of the Spinelli-Rossi maximaliste MFE alliance on the other side. The plan, somewhat ambiguously called "Thoughts about a European Constitution", basically proposed that, instead of pursuing an unrealistic "Estates General" approach or an impractical "juridical" approach, the EUP ought instead to adopt a pragmatic "factual approach" in the European unity campaign, concentrating on attainable European institutions and working on from there. ././

1. Marc, letter to Marceau Pivert, 10.12.47., BRUGMANS PAPERS

2. Frenay letter to Marc, 12.12.47. UEP PARIS.

3. Ibid, plus Pivert letter to Brugmans, 19.12.47. BRUGMANS PAPERS

4. Lipgens, op.cit., pp.633-4.

./The initial goal, he went on to suggest, should be a "European political council (a kind of 'Politburo'), containing influential politicians and capable of exercising considerable authority." In turn, a "draft text" outlining proposals for a "European Bill of Rights" and the setting up of "regional sub-federations" and autonomous "European functional agencies" could be presented to this authority as the most suitable official agency at the European level.¹ Nord, in short, was proposing that the Hague Congress should attempt to stimulate the official setting up of a Council of Europe, rather than actually regard itself as a representative transitional European instrument of change. This coincided with Brugmans' own developing thoughts on the issue and the need to campaign for an intergovernmental pact setting up a European authority of some sort, the sectoral, functional and integrating mechanisms of which would develop and coordinate a web of multiple and regional autonomous groupings. Nord's plan, in fact, would be reflected in large part later in the EUP's official draft resolutions for the Hague Congress.² In the meantime, it provided a stimulating reference point for Brugmans as he entered into the crucial Liaison Committee discussions of December 13.

It was, in fact, at this meeting, held in Paris and spread over two days, that the Committee assumed the new official title of the "Joint International Committee of the Movements for European Unity". Attended at various stages by R. Dautry, P. Bastid, R. Courtin, E. Vermeil, and A. Noel (CFEU); Paul van Zeeland, P. Kerstena, D. Serruys, Beddington-Behrens and J. Delattre (ILEC); Brugmans, Silva and Volsin (EUP); and by Lord Layton and Sandys (UEK), the meeting speedily elected Sandys and Retinger as Chairman and General Secretary respectively of the new Executive Committee, joined for the moment by Brugmans, Serruys and Dautry.³ The main business of the meeting - the preliminary organisation of the Hague Congress - was less straightforward. Having already./.

1. H. R. Nord, Thoughts about a European Constitution, c. 12.47.
BRUGMANS PAPERS.

2. Cf. pp. 116-129.

3. Joint International Committee meeting, 13-14.12.47., official minutes,
CAB. BRUGGE.

./..examined Brugmans' three conditions for continued involvement in the project - that Eastern European countries be invited, that "permanent organs" be set up at the Congress and that the delegates be selected by national committees - Sandys had confidently replied as "Provisional Executive Chairman" in a circular issued two days before the meeting that the "immediate purposes" of the Congress were to "demonstrate in striking fashion" existing support for the European idea and to forthwith launch a strong campaign in all countries. Stressing, as he had on previous occasions, that the aim of the campaign was to bring about the "effective unification of all Europe" and that "care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the aim of the Conference was the creation of a Western bloc", he nonetheless went on to argue that, in view of the "ideological opposition" of Russia and her satellite states to the European idea and the restrictions which would prevent a free selection of delegates from such countries, a small number of "observers" should instead be selected by the Joint Committee for representative purposes. The formula, he emphasised, would apply both to Eastern Europe and to Spain. It was hardly a policy which corresponded to Brugmans' lingering "third force" aspirations, nor did Sandys' vague references to a post-Hague campaign fully satisfy his more specific structural demands. Even so, despite the distinct hardening of attitude with regard to Soviet intentions, no doubt boosted by the collapse of Four Power London talks in November,² Sandys had gone some way towards accommodating Brugmans on the "Western bloc" issue, (though Bevin, it is true, had as yet to pronounce in full his Western consolidation policies).³ With regard to the essential invitation policy, however, Sandys left little room for compromise. His argument, of vital importance for understanding the preparatory stages to the Hague Congress, was as follows:./.

1. Sandys, 'Organisational Arrangements for the Conference', note, 11.12.47., RETINGER PAPERS.

2. Cf. p. 20.

3. Cf. pp. 96-7.

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"The question as to whether or not the Conference is, in fact, fully representative of Europe, will be decided by the impression formed by the press, and, through them, the general public of the world. That impression will depend entirely upon the actual composition of the assembly, and not upon the methods adopted to issue the invitations.

If the composition of the delegations is inadequately balanced or inferior in personal standing, the press reaction will certainly be unfavourable, and the fact that we might be able to say that delegations had been selected by impeccable constituted committees in each country will not make the slightest difference.

Numerous consultations will, of course, have to take place and advice will have to be sought from the individuals, organisations and groups in the various countries. IF, HOWEVER, THE EUROPEAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE, IT MUST ITSELF RETAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SELECTION OF DELEGATES, AND CANNOT AFFORD TO DELEGATE THIS VITAL FUNCTION TO ANY OUTSIDE BODIES." 1

Sandys was clearly determined not to allow the federalists to reverse their minority status in the Joint Committee by transferring the invitation decision-making to a loose international network spread out beyond the immediate grip of the "unionists" and open to mass federalist agitation. Above all, he was adamant upon preventing the Congress itself from being attended by delegates of "inferior personal standing", meaning unknown federalist enthusiasts lacking in impact and ill-equipped to carry out a practical programme of action. Already in a strong strategical position, he managed to persuade Brugmans to accept a joint "compromise" set of proposals, in due course approved by the Committee meeting on December 14. It was agreed, therefore, that the Hague Conference was to be entitled "Congress of Europe", the purpose of which was:

1. to demonstrate in striking fashion the powerful and wide-spread support which already exists for the European idea;
2. to produce material for discussion, propaganda and technical studies;
3. to provide a strong new impetus to the campaign in all countries."

With regard to the Eastern European question, it was further stated:

"in countries from which it proves impossible to obtain representation delegations should (with the exception of Russia) be represented by small numbers of observers chosen by the Coordinating Committee."

Finally, as to the actual responsibility for selecting delegates, ./.

1. Sandys, op.cit. (His italics)

./the agreed text patently emphasised:

"European movements, where they existed, should be fully consulted, but the final decision and responsibility must rest with the International Committee."

In short, the International Committee continued to support, while Brugmans also succumbed to, the arguments and strategy put forward by Sandys and Retinger in favour of holding a spectacular gathering, limited in scope by the tight organisational control of the Committee, and designed to win influential support for the general cause of European unity. In the words of Walter Lipgens:

"These limited objectives, amounting essentially to a demonstration for the purposes of influencing political parties, fell far short of the federalist idea of an assembly of 'living forces' demanding their rights from the nation states and laying the foundations of a federal policy."²

Brugmans, nonetheless, was satisfied that in actual circumstances he could do no better, and that at least the Hague project might indeed provide a "strong new impetus" to the future campaign. His conditions had not been met, but events were now moving too fast to permit him, recklessly, to pull out of the joint project.

Yet there were further humiliations to come. Having agreed the place and venue of the Hague Congress, the Committee, in fact, went on to decide that "Mr. Churchill would be the most fitting person to preside over the Conference", while a "group of prominent European patrons", including van Zeeland, Blum, Count Sforza and Hugh Dalton of all people, should be approached by the Committee actually to deliver this and other important invitations.³ Furthermore, Sandys' determination to control the initial selection procedure was aided when a draft guide which he had prepared for the British case, giving prime place to political and establishment circles, was approved by the Committee for general application, as was Sandys' proposed estimate that countries such as Britain should be represented by at least./.

1. Official minutes, op. cit.

2. Lipgens, op. cit., p. 636.

3. Official minutes, op. cit.

./100 leading personalities out of a now projected total of 750 for the whole Congress.¹ Finally, in yet another rebuff to the EUP's official standing, the Joint Committee, under Sandys' influence, allotted preparatory responsibilities for the three main committees which would constitute the Congress on the following basis:-(1) the UEM and the CFEU, only in "collaboration with Dr. Brugmans", would draft a report for the political committee; (2) the ILEC alone would prepare a similar text for the economic and social committee; (3) the General Secretary, Retinger, would take responsibility for preparing a report for the cultural committee, again in collaboration with de Rougemont.² It was clear that the EUP, as such, had a tough battle ahead in securing proper recognition of its contributions and aims.

The first official meeting of the 'Joint International Committee of the Movements for European Unity' was subsequently drawn to a close, after having initiated, as Sandys put it, "an effective instrument for joint action" which would, he hoped, "strengthen our appeal to the public and lend greater weight to our efforts."² Whether the Committee would actually manage to create an impression in the practical political spheres of official decision making depended to a major extent on how seriously the projected 'Congress of Europe' would be viewed by the political and economic leaders of Western Europe, towards whom Sandys and Retinger, above all, now had to direct their energy and persuasive skills. The project at this stage was still fraught with risks and dilemmas. This was especially the case with regard to the attitude of the British Labour Government which, while having initiated the OEEC process and in the months to follow would launch the 'Western Union' campaign, nonetheless ended up keeping the former movement in check and the latter policy on a decidedly Atlantic rather than European conceptual basis. Moreover, it remained openly hostile to the "Churchill-inspired" ./.

1. Annex to official minutes, op.cit. - The final British number swelled to 152, out of a total 800 delegates.

2. Official minutes, op.cit.; Lipgens, op.cit., p.638.

✓ ./movement in Britain, and was hardly likely to be enthused about a 'Congress of Europe' organised under Churchill's auspices. The Joint Committee hoped to surmount such hostility by attracting influential personalities to the cause representative of the whole democratic political spectrum. But the Committee itself did not yet constitute an effective united front as an international European movement, despite Sandys' optimism, inasmuch as the EPU still retained a sulkily hostile attitude towards it, while the USSE for the most part regarded the movement as an instrument for only a 'capitalist' Europe. The NEI had not yet fully emerged. Above all, however, the seriousness of the movement, and the realistic gradual approach to European unity which it stood for, could only be appreciated by the more cautious leaders of Europe's political and economic establishment if the scope and character of the Hague project was of a similar serious grain. Any naive talk about a "revolutionary" Estates General and the like could throw the whole project out of balance and out of the realm of serious political consideration. This was why Sandys wanted to retain a tight grip of the planning and preparatory stages to the Congress, and to keep the federalists as much out of the limelight as possible. Brugmans and the "possibiliste" centre in the EUP appear to have accepted the point, on the grounds that they otherwise risked becoming a "sect". There were others who did not. De Rougemont, for example, concluded:

"One can see here the difference in level between the federalist ambitions and the unionist objectives. Can one say that the Joint Committee was nearer to the 'possible', to what political parties and their leaders would allow? This would amount to the admission that the federalists had at the same time given up trying to CREATE the possible, which is the essential act of every revolution, political or spiritual. I think rather that the EUP still hoped, to make the Hague Congress something more than a congress."

-The preparatory stages to the Hague Congress would only partially vindicate de Rougemont's analysis.


1. De Rougemont, op.cit., p. 339.

PART I

THE HAGUE CONGRESS MAY 1948

A. PREPARATORY STAGES

B. THE CONGRESS



A. PREPARATORY STAGES

CHAPTER 3. INITIAL PREPARATIONS: DECEMBER 1947-MARCH 1948

1) The Invitation Policy

"The preparation of the Congress of Europe was very difficult. We wanted to have a monster international gathering independent of any government and of any political party, and to get the most European minded, the most famous and the most representative participants. But rivalries were hard to avoid and, moreover, it was naturally difficult to gather seven hundred and fifty people - the number we had in mind - willing to spend a week of their time on work which, although we thought it most important, did not in some cases seem so to them."

This brief survey by Retinger¹ of the significance, difficulties and issues at stake in the Hague Congress invitation policy neatly summed up the two central aspects involved: how to attract the support of influential personalities, and how to prevent in-fighting among the various groups sponsoring the Congress, particularly in view of the fact that some EUP members still regarded the Congress as yet another launch meeting of "living force" militants. An additional problem was that the movement as yet had few national branches, while Sandys was intent on laying down a central guideline for the issue of invitations, as well as ensuring that the International Executive Committee which he dominated had ultimate responsibility for the final invitation list. Addressing himself to these problems, Sandys had already argued, in the lead up to the joint meeting of December 13-14, that in order to be both representative and authoritative the Congress needed to be composed of "heads or leading figures" from each major profession, organization and political party, etc.² As described earlier, the meeting in turn had initially decided to issue invitations in each democratic Western European country through a well known "Committee of Patrons", but at the subsequent Executive Committee meeting in Paris, held on January 30, the idea was dropped in view of the "political difficulties" this entailed. In its place there would be a "list of prominent ./.

1. Retinger, op.cit., pp.215-6.

2. Sandys' conference note, 11.12.47., op.cit.

./.people who had accepted to attend the Congress." ¹

What this change in fact signified was that Sandys remained unable to secure a politically-balanced match of party leaders in Britain willing to act as Patrons. Retinger had tried but failed to convince his old colleague Hugh Dalton to represent Labour, whereas his earlier success in gaining Sir Stafford Cripps' support had also foundered.² The reason was quite simple - Labour would not share a platform with Churchill. There were no doubt some valid political reasons for this, inasmuch that Churchill, as Honorary President of the Congress, would, along with the Conservative Party in general, derive a great satisfaction from leading from on high his Labour opponents in such a European setting. Sandys' contention, on the other hand, that the whole point of the Hague Congress was that it was above partisan domestic politics was sincere and plausible. From the very start of the invitation arrangements he had striven to be politically objective, stressing that the national Parliamentary list be drawn up "in proportion to party strength (and) to be nominated by the (newly constituted) All Party Parliamentary Group" for Europe.³ In contrast to all appearances, moreover, persuading Churchill to sponsor the Hague project in such a senior capacity, despite the possible risks and potential embarrassments which all too easily might occur, was a coup in itself. Put another way, it was not only the Labour leaders who risked losing face by supporting the Congress; whereas the possibility of enhancing their own standing and taking the wind out of Churchill's sails also existed. This double-edged political dilemma at the centre of the Hague Congress invitation policy, to which more attention will be given in later chapters, was well summed up by Harold MacMillan - sufficient for an initial understanding - in the following way:

"As regards our Parliamentary representation.. Churchill was in a somewhat delicate position. He enjoyed of course an unrivalled position as the war leader who had helped to save Europe. But./.

1. Joint International Executive Committee meeting, 30.1.48., official minutes, CAEM BRUGGE.
2. Retinger, op. cit., p. 218; letter to Dalton, 22.12.47., CAEM BRUGGE.
3. Sandys, op. cit.

./ he was also a party politician, an active and somewhat truculent leader of an opposition anxious to weaken and as soon as possible take the place of the existing Government. As a party leader he could not fail to recognise that a considerable portion of the Conservative Party were doubtful and even anxious about this new movement. They feared, and not unnaturally, that in one way or another, both on the political and economic side, Britain's position as head of the Empire and Commonwealth might be prejudiced. These doubts were to remain, and it was not until many years later that they could be substantially removed. The Liberal Party was small, and on this matter united. But the weight that they could give either in Parliament or outside was limited. The Labour Party, or at least its chiefs, was undoubtedly suspicious if not opposed to the whole affair. They were not unnaturally jealous of Churchill's unique position, which they believed him to be exploiting."

Re-structuring their plans towards achieving a more attainable representative list of prominent persons, if not actual party leaders, from political, professional and organisational circles, Sandys and Retinger proceeded to operate mainly through their own personal contacts² and through trusted colleagues in the Joint International Committee network itself. In France, Courtin was given responsibility to compile the invitation list, "in consultation with Voisin." The Dutch and Belgian members of the Committee were also given the go-ahead to arrange their own draft lists. Leading (though moderate) federalists were instead given charge of less important draft national lists, Silva checking the Swiss situation (though Sandys also had private talks with the Swiss Foreign Minister), while Brugmans was asked to find out how far it was possible to obtain non-fascist elements from Spain and Portugal. Sandys also despatched Dautry, as a safe and moderate colleague, to go to Scandinavia, a region whose pragmatic approach to European unity would help in furnishing delegates favourable to a realistic approach at the the Hague Congress.³ - In addition to the sensitive situation in Britain, where Sandys relied to an increasing extent on the All-Party Parliamentary Group to ensure a representative political delegation, there remained the two trouble spots of Germany and Italy. In both cases Sandys appears./.

1. Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune 1945-1955, (Macmillan, London, 1969), p. 159.

2. See Retinger, op. cit., pp. 215-6.

3. Sandys, confidential report on invitation process, ICP6; plus information in letters to Dautry and Paris Bureau, 21. & 22. 12. 47., CAB. BRUGSE.

./to have exercised personal control over the invitation process, operating through the British and American authorities in the two main Western zones of Germany - Konrad Adenauer, beginning to make his weight felt in NEI circles, was one of the leading delegates to come forward on this basis¹ - while, with regard to Italy, Sandys decided to pass over the maximalist MFE and entered into direct talks with the Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, and the Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, as well as with the Pope. As a result of these latter conversations, it was decided to constitute what was described as a "representative Italian Committee" which would act with the blessing of the current political and catholic establishment.² Though it is true that Spinelli and Rossi above all showed little sympathy for the "Churchill-inspired" Hague project in the first place, this rather blunt dismissal which they received from Sandys, and later from Rettinger would be a source of grave bitterness and discontent, even if in the final event the new Italian Committee had, in fact, to operate to a considerable extent through the well established MFE network.

The fundamental point at issue in this whole process was that Sandys sought the backing of influential personalities for the Hague campaign, whereas the entrenched federalist side wanted the Congress to comprise solely "militants" already fully converted to the European cause, in the MFE case, or somehow representative of the "living forces," in the integral federalist case. According to Sandys' strategy, the Congress, though hopefully representative in the general political sense, would be tilted towards moderate "unionist" methods of change rather than to pseudo-revolutionary formulae. The more radical federalists did not appreciate that such a moderate tendency would, in fact, be the inevitable result of the Congress being broadly representative. This was where the conflict of strategy occurred in its simplest form: whereas the political oriented MFE maximalists, as ./

1. See Morgan, op. cit., p. 56; Adenauer Memoirs 1945-1957, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), pp. 109-111, 166.

2. Sandys, report on Rome trip, ICP5, January 1946, CAB. DRUGGE.

./well as the more doctrinaire integral federalists were impatient to provide a radical impulse and lead, Sandys and Retinger (supported by the majority of the Joint Committee) wanted to have at least a margin of political consensus behind the movement before embarking on a more adventurous programme of change. The overall control which the latter two exercised in the choice of delegates was confirmed at the Joint Committee meeting of January 30, at which it was decided to set up a Selection Sub-Committee, composed of Sandys, Dautry and Serruys, along with Voisin for the minority EUP, which would be responsible for scrutinising draft lists presented, whereas Retinger himself would be responsible for submitting invitation proposals in the case of countries where no reliable organisation existed.¹ - As Retinger later commented in this respect:

"...so far as France Belgium and Holland were concerned, our friends in these countries were of the greatest help, but when it came to other countries we generally had to use our own judgments and make arrangements ourselves. All this entailed not only an extremely extensive correspondence.. but also personal visits by myself and Duncan Sandys to several hundred people. As time went by we found it more and more difficult to refuse invitations to persons whose names had been put forward but whom we did not consider suitable. After we had arrived at The Hague it fell to me to refuse admittance to some would-be delegates." 2

2) Initial Organisation of the Political Report

The main organisational framework for the Hague Congress, it will be recalled, was to be divided into three main working committees, dealing with political issues, economic and social problems, and cultural and moral questions. The drawing up and selection of the reports, and in turn the draft resolutions, to be submitted to these committees was, therefore, of crucial influence as regards the choice of issues to be discussed (or not discussed) at The Hague, and would thus determine to a considerable extent the shape and area of the final text to be approved by the Congress. The importance of these draft texts was./.

1. Official minutes, op.cit.

2. Retinger, op.cit., pp.215-6.

./clearly appreciated by Sandys. With his past ministerial experience and acute political skill, he was well aware that a major international conference lasting for only a few days could be fixed in considerable part beforehand, providing the documentary preparation was sufficiently clear in form and suitably vague in contents so as to warrant general approval for plans which could be later defined in a more intricate and perhaps more compelling manner than initially indicated. In this sense, while content to leave the experts in the ILBC to draft their own report and to allow de Rougemont and the more radical federalist theorists to continue theorising (under Retinger's ultimate supervision) in the drafting of the cultural report, Sandys, as described earlier, had made sure that responsibility for drawing up the essential political report remained in the 'safe' hand of the Anglo-French United Europe Movement, "in collaboration with Dr. Brugmans". Losing no time in formulating and circulating his own proposed scheme, which he sent to Dautry in the form of a memorandum on December 21, he again drew attention to Brugmans' seemingly individual junior role, stressing:

"I hope that this memorandum will provide a sufficient skeleton to enable the two Committees to start work without delay. I am at the same time asking Dr. Brugmans to set out any proposals he may wish to make for discussion by our two Committees. I hope that by the middle of January your Committee and ours will have been able to produce the first draft of the text of the political report. These documents could then be exchanged and after further consideration, we might, towards the end of January, have a joint meeting between representatives of the French Committee, the British Committee and Dr. Brugmans."

The draft memorandum itself² strongly indicated Sandys' pre-occupation with the need not to harass the Hague Congress delegates with unwieldy proposals for which it would be difficult to reach approval by consensus. The first section of the report, he stressed, "should point to the ultimate goal of European unity, and should explain in extremely general terms the various forms which this unity might take, and the political advantages which might be expected to./.

1. Sandys, letter to Dautry, 21.12.47., CAE: BRUGGE.

2. Sandys, memorandum by the Chairman of the Executive Committee (IC P4), 21.12.47., CAE: BRUGGE.

./..flow from it." It should end, he added, with a resolution "urging Governments to make a joint declaration to the effect that they accept European unity as one of the vital aims of their national policy and..engage themselves to take no action which might obstruct or render more difficult the eventual attainment of this objective." Though this strategy was later attacked by pro-federalist historians as being weak and dilatory, and virtually subservient to official British foreign policy in failing to "point the way ahead",¹ it must be understood that Sandys wanted to indicate the "ultimate goal" without laying down any doctrinaire conditions as to the precise form and juridical requirements of the future union, which, at this stage, would be of theoretical rather than of practical value to the as yet unofficial campaign. The European movement had to prod, perhaps even goad, but not try to dictate to democratically elected governments - Hence also the need for some vague official recognition of the unity campaign. But as Sandys went on to specify later in the text with regard to current inter-governmental action leading to OEEC, "no far reaching measures of economic integration are possible without some corresponding unification in the political and military spheres." This point was further developed in the second section of his memorandum when, dealing with "immediate steps" for which the movement should campaign, he proposed the official setting up of a "European Council" based upon a regular system of inter-ministerial conferences aiming to achieve a common European policy on current economic, political, defence and cultural problems, and backed up by a permanent international secretariat. Again, though this indeed sounded all too similar to the actual debate taking place regarding the scope of the projected OEEC, as well as foreshadowing the Brussels Pact initiative, Sandys nonetheless couched his proposal in terms prescribing a more organic evolution, arguing in this respect:

"The goal of a United Europe will, obviously, not be reached overnight. Barriers of suspicion must first be worn down and./.

1. See, for example, Lipgens, op.cit., p. 57.

- ././ a common European outlook built up. This will be brought about only by developing among the Governments of Europe the habit of regular consultation and joint action upon matters of common concern."

It was a theme to which he would return, and about which he would be more explicit, during the course of the campaign.

At this early stage, it is probable that Sandys did not have a clear picture himself of how the evolution from an inter-governmental to a supra-national European structure would actually take place. He was clear, however, in maintaining that a gradualist strategy was called for if the European movement was not to fall at the first hurdle. This did not mean, as Spinelli would later insinuate, that there was absolutely "no talk of federation, transfer of sovereignty, supra-national institutions, or...of creating a real European political framework."¹ Indeed, Sandys did express his personal views on these important matters already at this date. Two days before the Joint Committee meeting of January 30, he in fact issued a press statement which threw considerable light on his draft outline of December 21. The text, giving a good insight into the pragmatic strategy which he pursued during the Hague campaign and after, is quoted almost in full below:

"...the European nations...cannot be effectively or lastingly united without some pooling, to a greater or lesser degree, of their separate national sovereignties. My own view is that the more the rights of sovereignty can be merged and shared the greater will be the prospect of peace and prosperity.

But at the same time, we must face the fact that the nations are not, and rightly, prepared straight away to entrust their safety and stability to new and untried international institutions. The first pre-condition of any union of nations is mutual confidence and a common outlook. These cannot be created, they must grow. The first stage in this process is to foster the habit of regular consultation between Governments on inter-European and international problems. These include trade, finance, defence, foreign affairs, culture and education. For this purpose, it is urgently necessary that formal inter-governmental consultative machinery should be set up. Out of this process of consultation there will emerge, I believe quite quickly, a sense of European solidarity and common purpose.

When a firm basis of confidence and joint experience has been laid, it would be reasonable to ask the nations of Europe to abate at any rate some part of their separate sovereignties"/.

1. Spinelli, "Why Europe", Willis, European Integration, op.cit., pp58-9.

././Agreeing with pro-federal sympathies of "justifiable impatience",

Sandys went on to argue:

"..However, to skip the essential preparatory stages would be to ignore the very real psychological and practical difficulties which exist, and would destroy all hope of bringing this great project to fruition. If, on the other hand, without immediately pressing for the irrevocable surrender of national rights, we first create an atmosphere of mutual trust and a realisation by the European peoples of their common interests, I am convinced that it will thereafter be possible to bring about some effective and far-reaching form of organic union. Moreover, it may well be that all this will be accomplished within a space of time which will surprise even the most optimistic supporters of the cause of a United Europe." 1

Though Sandys did not go into such detail when presenting his memorandum on the initial organisation of the political report for the Hague Congress, it is likely that some of his more astute colleagues at the joint meeting of January 30, held in the immediate wake of Bevin's dramatic speech in favour of a "consolidation" of Western Europe, were confident that the Hague project entailed more than a mere moral boost to the intergovernmental initiatives now in train. The Executive Committee, in fact, purposely added to the previous three objectives of the Hague Congress outlined in December that it should also "help bring into being European organisations to further the work of unification."² Moreover, it was further agreed that the EUP as a whole, rather than just Brugmans in his individual capacity were to have a formal role and authority in the drafting and final consideration of the political report. Such partial recognition of the federal case, however, was not enough to hold off the mounting opposition to Sandys' leadership in more sensitive EUP circles.

3) Tension among the Federalists

There can be little doubt that the rather brusque way in which Sandys initially set about organising the Congress arrangements created considerable tension and anger within the EUP, whose./.

1. Sandys, Streatham News, 28.1.48., SANDYS PAPERS. (He was prospective Conservative candidate for Streatham). On French radio, 26.1.48., Sandys actually spoke in favour of an eventual European "Federation", Perspectives Politiques de 1944, copy, CAEN BRUGGE.

2. Officer Summary, p. 23.

./o. negotiating position and status within the Joint Committee had been rather drastically deflated since the heyday of the Montreux Congress. Doubts and criticisms had of course been expressed prior to the official launching of the Committee on December 14. The tactical out-manoeuving of the EUP which followed, however, gave way to a storm of protest. Already, on December 31, the EUP Secretary, Raymond Silva, angrily complained to Retinger about the way that Sandys was going about referring to himself as the Chairman of the Joint Committee, when in fact he had only been designated the post of Chairman of the Executive Committee, the movement as a whole having "no formal Chairman".¹ This was only the tip of the iceberg. At the subsequent EUP Central Committee meeting of January 15-17,² a whole deluge of critical charges was heaped against the "unionist" orientated Committee and the effective control Sandys exercised over the preparations for the Hague Congress. - Attempting to pre-empt any outright rebellion, Brugmans was the first to declare openly that there was a "tactical" struggle going on in the Joint Committee and that his task was not made easier by other members who had "every difficulty in the world to play the game in a correct manner". He therefore proposed that the EUP had two options: either to withdraw from the Committee, or to try again to re-enforce the federalist representation within it. Ruling out the first option, on the ground that it would appear to the public simply as a damaging "quarrel between federalists", he suggested instead that the EUP should once more approach the more federal inclined EPU and USSE to join the Committee. Though most members regarded collaboration with EPU as being an eventual possibility, considerable doubts were still cast concerning the USSE, which would not support a Congress presided over by Churchill. Hytte was one of the most outspoken critics at this point, saying that the EUP should insist that the Congress be held under several presidencies. Brugmans' position differed: It was an "incontestable historic fact", he said, "that when one ./o

1. SILVA letter to Retinger 31.12.47., RETINGER PAPERS.

2. EUP Central Committee meeting 15-17.1.48., official minutes,
CEC GENEVA.

./. evokes the idea of European unity, Churchill's name comes to mind. Marc in turn intervened to say that, in his opinion, the Hague Congress should be a "revolutionary act", producing a "psychological shock" sufficient to initiate some transfer of authority to new organs born out of the Congress. He therefore opposed the idea of having Churchill as the sole President at the Hague, warning that, if the EUP did not react against this, it would find itself trapped in a "psychological and institutional framework" in which it would have no significant role. The strongest challenge to Brugmans' moderate approach in the Joint Committee as regards the Hague Congress came, however, from the minority Italian MFE wing in the EUP Central Committee. Altiero Spinelli (acting in place of his colleague Rossi) led this opposition, declaring his objection both to the integral federalist notion of a European Congress of the "living forces", and to the possibiliste strategy of compromise with the "unionist" camp. The EUP, he strongly argued, should "insist" within the Joint Committee that the Hague Congress be only a "federalist Congress"; otherwise he would vote against continuing collaboration. Miss Josephy, in reply, clearly stated that if the EUP did not participate at The Hague it would not be "federalist at all". It was preferable, she therefore suggested, to work within the Joint Committee with the aim of gaining the maximum "federalist nuance" possible at the Congress. In this sense Brugmans had already outlined his plans to increase the federalist viewpoint in the Political Report, declaring the need for a preamble to the report which would clearly indicate that the federalist goal was not "utopian". The French federalist, Francis Gérard, also lent his support on this point, and summed up the possibiliste position by warning that the EUP should not forget that the Movement which they were attempting to create at The Hague would surpass the scope of the federalist movements. If the EUP stuck to an inflexible federalist formula the Congress would be split wide open. If, on the other hand, room for agreement could be found with those not yet of a federalist opinion, there would still remain the possibility

./ of convincing them at a later stage, whereas a split would simply cut short all rapport between the two camps.

The turbulent meeting ended on this note, and in turn the Joint Executive meeting of January 30 went on to give the EUP greater official representation in the formulation of the Political Report, as already noted, as well as deciding to appoint official Rapporteurs for each of the three Congress Committees, thus placating to a limited extent requests for a broader chairmanship of the Congress.¹ In addition, the Executive Committee also decided to try once more to enlarge the composition of the Joint International Committee as a whole, Courtin, Voisin, Noel and Rebattet (French Secretary), undertaking to approach the USSR and the NEI, while Retinger would again try his best with the EPU.² An effort was thus made to appease the federalist position. However, so far as the fundamental aspects of the Congress were concerned, the more doctrinaire posture of both the integral federalists and of the MFE maximalistes was effectively pushed aside.

This was particularly the case for the former. Indeed, prior to the meeting of January 30, Marc naively stirred up the integral federalists' hopes by publicly stating that the Hague Congress would in fact prove to be a revolutionary "Estates General of Europe":

"No, not all is lost yet", he declared, "... Europe's voice will at last make itself heard. The representatives of all the living forces of our continent are going to be convoked at The Hague".³

In swift reaction, the subsequent meeting of the Joint Executive Committee severely rebuked such wild and unauthorised public pronouncements, the minutes for the meeting of January 30 reading:

"in order to avoid possible confusion, no oral or written statements regarding the Congress should be made by members of the Committee or the organisations they represent, without prior consultation with the General Secretariat..."⁴

The Executive, under Sandys continuing influence, further stipulated:

1. Minutes 30.1.48., op.cit. 2. Ibid. Retinger had in fact already contacted Bohy in this respect on 23.12.47., letter to Bohy, RETINGER PAPERS. 3. MARC "Les Etats Generaux de la Have", LA FEDERATION, no 36, Jan. 1948 4. Minutes op.cit.

./ "for the sake of clarity, in any references they might make to the Hague Congress in their publications, the organisations represented on the International Committee should adhere to the agreed title, namely, I - Congress of Europe - and should employ no other designation".

This clear indication of the strength of feeling with which Sandys, Retinger and the majority of the organising committee objected to federalist slogan-mongering with regard to the Hague Congress did not, however, reduce all hope within the possibilist EUP leadership that some federalist progress could be salvaged from the gathering, now definitely scheduled to open on Friday May 7². The EUP General Secretary, Raymond Silva, even urged that the federalist movement should "re-double its efforts", and that the "federalist idea would be victorious at The Hague."³

The maximalist leaders of the MFE remained unconvinced on this point. Indeed, already in November 1947 Rossi privately confided to Spinelli that he was very sceptical about holding a congress under Churchill's auspices. The idea of an "Estates General", moreover, appeared incomprehensible to him, as he scoffed at the naive efforts of Marc, Silva and others in the EUP who, he said, simply wanted to lay their hands on the funds available through the Churchill group.⁴ By the time the Second National Congress of the MFE was held at Milan, on February 15-17 1948, Rossi was even more adamant and outspoken in his opposition to the Hague Congress. Stressing the EUP's minority position in the organising Committee and Sandys' snubbing of the MFE in favour of high-ranking Italian personalities of "nationalist" and even former "fascist" background, he insisted that the Churchillian brand of Europeanism had nothing in common with that of the MFE. "Churchill", he stated, "has always been the symbol of English imperialism"⁵; his views about a united Europe did not./.

1. Official minutes, 30.I.48., op-cit. 2. Ibid.

3. EUP Lettre Circulaire no. XVII CEC GENEVA

4. E. ROSSI, letter to Spinelli, 9.II.47., MFE TURIN

5. E. ROSSI, speech at II° MFE National Congress, Milan, 15-17.2.48.,

"On the participation of the Italian EUP delegation to the Hague"
MFE TURIN



./ compare in depth and significance to the federation plans of the MFE. Rossi also warned, moreover, that Churchill's presidency of the Congress would prevent the involvement of prominent British and European Socialists, and would thus ensure that the publicity concerning the project would centre above all on Churchill himself. There was no use, he pleaded, to assume that, because the federalist case was "intellectually and morally" superior to that of Churchill, the press would give it suitable coverage. Brugmans' stature, he continued to argue, was "tiny" compared to the "world-wide" fame and importance of Britain's war-time leader. Churchill had only to pronounce one speech and it would be given full coverage by the world press. He therefore concluded that to participate in the Hague project at this moment in time would be a serious "mistake", and that while there remained no "guarantees" concerning the list of delegates to be invited, and while the federalists could not find political support from someone of Churchill's calibre, then the MFE should refuse to attend the Congress.¹

Not everyone agreed with Rossi on this point. MFE delegate Palumbo, for example, argued that the federalists should not refute "a priori" the possible openings which The Hague might constitute.² Similarly the veteran Mino di Villagrazia thought that the federalist position should be expressed at The Hague and that, even if Brugmans' "historical stature" was smaller than that of Churchill, "his voice would be heard the same".³ Spinelli, for his part, agreed fully with Rossi's argument, but not with his conclusion. The EUP, he warned his MFE colleagues, would in any case be sending a small delegation to The Hague, if only to oppose the unionist monopoly there. The absence of Italian federalist delegates would be seen as a sign of division. For the sake of "federalist solidarity" it was therefore preferable to send some MFE representatives who would only attend as "observers".⁴

1. ROSSI, MFE Congress, *ibid.*

2. PALUMBO, speech, *ibid.*

3. MINO DI VILLAGRAZIA, speech, *ibid.*

4. SPINELLI, speech, *ibid.*

After considerable debate, Spinelli's slightly more conciliatory formula was accepted by both Rossi and di Villagrazia, who jointly presented a motion to the Congress declaring:

"in consideration that no representative of left-wing opinion will want to participate at the Hague Congress, and that it will be a Churchillian demonstration in favour of a western bloc, the MFE will delegate representatives only in the form of observers to participate at the Hague Congress"¹

Following a passionate speech by Brugmans, however, who appealed for a more "cooperative spirit" and for a "general international plan" in favour of a united Europe, rather than a "crystallisation" between the unionist and federalist forces, the MFE narrowly rejected Rossi's motion, in the hope that the British Labour Party would assume its "responsibility" towards Europe and not dogmatically prevent a Socialist voice being heard at The Hague.² At the same time, the MFE conference explicitly re-affirmed its support for the "fundamental principle" of creating a European "supra-national Government directly and freely elected by each citizen of the federated states, and directly responsible to them".³ To this the MFE added that they would "participate more actively in the EUP and in all initiatives of a European character", upon the condition, however, that these initiatives were "directed to promote the idea of European federation and not to mislead popular aspirations behind false objectives".⁴

Despite the fierce and outspoken lack of trust which the MFE leaders felt towards Sandys and the "Churchill-dominated" Hague project, the movement as a whole had decided not to boycott the Congress, though the final MFE motion of February 17 showed the risk and reluctance involved in this decision. Brugmans, moreover, who had been severely harassed up until the meeting by his./.

1. Motion presented by Rossi, di Villagrazia, Monti - MFE Congress, *ibid*.

2. BRUGMANS, speech, plus compte rendu, *ibid*.

3. List of Resolutions adopted by II^o MFE Congress - Political Motion, printed in L'UNITA EUROPEA Feb. 1948, MFE TURIN

4. *ibid*.

./.. maximaliste critics, had scored what proved to be only a hollow personal victory against the Spinelli-Rossi wing. For a while, it is true, he could continue unabated upon his possibiliste strategy within the Joint International Committee, where his standing and prestige now increased to a considerable extent. His powers of persuasion, however, had only bought time; they had not fundamentally altered the growing scepticism which existed within the MFE ranks concerning collaboration with the unionist camp, while among the more militant integral federalists there lay hidden a latent powder-keg of discontent over their cherished objective of a European Estates General. The latter group, in fact, would erupt at The Hague, upon the discovery that it did not constitute anything quite so "revolutionary" as they had hoped. In doing so, they split the federalist camp wide open and precipitated Brugmans into making a "disastrous"^I intervention during the long debate over the European Assembly. The Italian MFE delegates, for the most part, retained a low profile both prior to, and at the Hague Congress. Rossi, for example did not even attend, while Spinelli (for once) made no intervention. After the rather abortive performance of the EUF at The Hague, however, they vented their wrath with full vengeance and a clear conscience, leading to Spinelli's full take-over of the MFE and radical alliance with Frenay in the EUF, which in turn culminated in dislodging Brugmans and his possibiliste colleagues from the central EUF reins of power. This much will be explained later ; suffice for the moment to pinpoint one of the main set-backs which Brugmans had hoped to avoid in his plan for a "general" international gathering at The Hague, and without which the Churchill-unionist position would not have been quite so dominant - the failure to persuade British Labour, and in turn the European Socialist Parties, to officially support and attend the Congress.

I. Brugmans' own personal description expressed to the writer concerning his intervention during this debate. Cf. pp. 231-2.

4) Labour's Hostility

.. "the attitude of the British Labour Government to the Congress of Europe.. created by far the biggest political problem its organisers had to face. While the attitude of most Western Governments was sympathetic and at worse lukewarm, in Britain it was openly and actively hostile. This unfortunate decision was to set the Labour Government on an anti-European course which it kept as long as it was in power. Britain lost the unique opportunity it had of assuming the leadership of Europe to which victory in the War gave it the title and the means."

Though the above statement by Retinger's biographer, John Pomian¹, is indisputably correct concerning the Hague Congress, the broader conclusions arrived at need considerable revision. To dismiss the Labour Government's record as being "anti-European" on account of its failure to support the Hague Congress and the campaign which followed, is indeed a blinkered under-estimation of Britain's official role in initiating OEEC and the Brussels Pact, both of vital practical significance in the immediate context of that time. To accuse the Labour administration of not assuming the "leadership of Europe" needs to be tempered by these facts. To claim, moreover, that the war had actually given Britain the "title" and "means" to lead Europe should also be seen in the light that the indisputed "title" had been achieved at the cost of subsequent economic and military exhaustion so far as the "means" were concerned. The result was summed up by Christopher Mayhew who, as former Under Secretary of State under Bevin at the Foreign Office, clearly argued:

"In the early stage it was our economic weakness resulting from the war, spilling over into the field of defence, which seemed a particularly impelling factor. The close association ² with the United States was a pleasure, but also a necessity."

-The economic and strategic reasons which pushed the Labour Government towards the espousal of a primarily "Atlantic" rather than Euro-centric oriented foreign policy after the war have already been outlined earlier.³ What needs stressing again at this point./.

1. See Retinger memoirs, op. cit., p. 217.

2. C. Mayhew, "British Foreign Policy since 1945", International Affairs, vol. XXVI, no. 4, October 1950, p. 477.

3. CF., ch. 1.

./is that Bevin's "Western Union" policy by no means cancelled out closer moves towards European unity, but on the condition that this did not impair the overriding Atlantic commitment sought or weaken Britain's faltering international trading relations. As Mayhew warned, "it was of the utmost importance not to act hastily." The attitude of the British Government had to be tempered "inevitably" by the "universality of Britain's ties and commitments in the Western world." No other country had "a foot in so many camps" and was consequently liable "to fall between so many stools." The simple option of concentrating primarily on European union, or adopting a European "third force" policy was, therefore, totally discounted:

"It has, I think, always been recognised by the British Government that such a combination, even if it could be brought about, which is very doubtful, could not be strong enough, from either the economic or defence point of view, to be sure of deterring Soviet aggression, or of remaining neutral if such aggression took place. It always seemed of the utmost importance from many points of view that Europe and the United States should go ahead together, and that no encouragement should be given to isolationist elements in the United States by any appearance of cold-shouldering from Europe. Then, as now, the planning of Europe's defence, trade and economic development, seemed to make little sense without active United States participation."

The British Government's two-tier "Western Union" policy of actively forging greater Western European coordination at a non-organic co-operative level, while pursuing at the same time the principal objective of an all-embracing Atlantic Alliance, reached its high point when, on January 22, 1948, Bevin declared to a packed House of Commons that the "free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together..I believe the time is ripe for the consolidation of Western Europe."² While going on to qualify the "union" he had in mind as a loose "spiritual" and "ethical" understanding, based on a treaty but not a "rigid thesis" or "directive", and backed by the United States, Bevin, nonetheless, had spoken out, as Spaak put it, "as a great European" and had launched the "beginning of a new./.

1. Mayhew, op.cit., p. 443.

2. Bevin, House of Commons debate on foreign affairs, Hansard, 22.-23.1.48.

./."European policy" as well as a "future Atlantic policy".¹ Though Spaak also described how, under the probable pressure of his Foreign Office advisers, Bevin was "a little overcome by his own boldness" and subsequently "tried to minimise the significance of his speech", the initiative of January 22 led directly to the signing of the Brussels Treaty Pact on March 17, 1948, between the British, French and Benelux Governments. The military orientation and institutional limits of the inter-governmental Consultative Council established under the Treaty, briefly described in an earlier section,² still constituted a form of European Council, even if it was meant to be a stepping stone towards the formation of an Atlantic Alliance system. Bevin, in this respect, stole a lot of the thunder contained in the initial Hague Congress draft political reports proposing a "Council of Europe".³ In short, he felt that the official steps he had already taken, highlighted further by the formal inauguration of OEEC on April 16, sufficiently justified both his European standing and the Labour Government's lack of interest towards the Hague Congress, which, after all, was a purely unofficial and as yet rather ambiguous affair. There was, however, another underlying reason for his negative attitude towards the project, as recalled in the following account by Retinger:

"Prior to the Congress of Europe..I had a long talk with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ernest Bevin, whose foreign policy at that time still had Churchill's complete support. I tried to persuade him to induce the Labour Party to give us their backing, but during the two hour conversation the only argument he put forward against joining the movement was the fact that Churchill was its official leader in Great Britain. Churchill was a political opponent, and the Labour Party could not support its political opponent. Mr. Bevin said, among other things, that naturally the personality of Winston would dominate the Hague Congress, and when I suggested that Sir Stafford Cripps was willing to take part (as he was willing to do), in order to counter-act Churchill's influence, Bevin pooch-pooched the idea. I then suggested that he himself should go to The Hague, ./."

1. Spaak, op. cit., pp. 142-144.

2. Cf. pp. 30-31.

3. Cf. pp. 116-152.

././ but he confessed frankly that he was not of sufficient stature in Europe to be a counter-balance to the immense popularity of Winston Churchill." 1

Though it was perfectly understandable on Bevin's part not to want, in effect, to lend support to a political opponent, his apparent timid reluctance not to be shown up in public by Churchill was a political misjudgement. For, as Spaak had indeed pointed out, Bevin's international prestige as a "great European" had, at this time, been well secured by his "historic" speech of January 22 together with the rapid establishment of the Brussels Pact plus OEEC. By seizing the initiative with such resolve and leadership, Bevin had effectively pulled the European mat from under Churchill's feet. His reputation and stature were not endangered by attending the Congress, at which he could have spoken as the leading government statesman in Europe, and as the architect of the Brussels Treaty, whereas Churchill's fame did not compensate the latter's actual removal from real political power. Nor was Bevin's "Western Union" strategy at risk, since his European standing could have been enhanced in America's eyes without having to take any firm Euro-centric commitment. By being absent at The Hague, however, which had by May 1948 progressed from being an unofficial to an influential public gathering of considerable interest, Bevin not only assured Churchill of the European gauntlet once more, but was also placed on a defensive position in order to push his pro-Atlantic policy through. It is true that Churchill's presidency of the Congress posed a serious political problem; but Bevin could have turned this against Churchill and the Conservative Party by showing good-will and uncalled-for modesty in attending the conference, and thereby gaining a much more sympathetic hearing than Churchill whose presidency would have appeared vain and inconsiderate. Indeed, had Bevin agreed to go to The Hague, it was not he, but Churchill, who, in the final analysis, would have been placed in an embarrassing political position. The./.

1. Retinger, op.cit., p.220.

./latter had, up until then, always shown a keen political cuteness not openly to usurp Bevin's official standing on the European issue, for a fear of the back-lash accusation of "sour grapes"; it is likely that he would have been forced to do so again. Moreover, Bevin would have found himself in good Socialist company at The Hague - the Belgian Premier, Paul-Henri Spaak had already agreed to go, while the prestigious leader of the French Socialists, Léon Blum, had even indicated that he would preside, if so requested at one of the Committees.¹ It was a formidable team and, along with Bevin, would have out-matched anything Churchill could muster. Bevin, furthermore, could have followed Blum's example and offered to preside over the deliberations of the Political Committee, which would have been an ideal platform for advancing the British Government's European policy, and one which would have captured the attention both of the official observers and of the press much more than the eloquent expressions of intent put forward by Churchill. - To sum up, by failing to attend the Hague Congress, Bevin lost a valuable opportunity to reap the political benefits of the pragmatic European lead which he had already given, and which he could have used as a powerful and impressive counter-force to Churchill's more vacuous rhetoric and fading past glory as Britain's rejected war-time leader. There were certainly political problems for Bevin to go to The Hague. But these difficulties would have re-bounded and blown in the face of the Tory leader had Bevin decided to use all the trappings and influence of his office in order to assume the political leadership of the Congress of Europe, with the support of Spaak, Blum, and other leading Socialist statesmen from the European continent. By not going, he allowed Churchill to "steal the show", while his European colleagues for the most part lurked on the side-lines. In all this, he had mistakenly assumed that the Congress would pass by almost unnoticed compared to the real governmental initiatives in Europe. This was to misjudge the depth./.

¹ Information contained in an NEC paper on the Hague Congress, written by Morgan Phillips for the NEC meeting of 28.1.48., LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

./..of feeling on the European continent in favour of a speedier European unification process, which inevitably spilled over into the emotional wave of the Hague Congress. Paul-Henri Spaak indeed judged the Congress to be an "historic landmark in the annals of Europe."¹ Bevin, in contrast, regarded the whole project as having nuisance value only. It proved to have much more than this.

The net result of all this was that the Labour Government decided to ignore the whole Hague project, and concentrate on "practical" initiatives of its own. In his parliamentary address of January 22 Bevin in fact tacitly declared:

"It is easy to draw up a blue-print for a united Western Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political organisations, I must say it is a much slower, harder job to carry out a practical programme which takes into account the practical problems which face it. I am afraid it will have to be done a step at a time."²

Likewise, Attlee, in the same debate, completely washed his hands of the whole question, stating:

"I have already said that we welcome the fullest support for the United Europe idea. As regards any particular organisation, it would not be right of the Government to pronounce a ruling on it, but we have always welcomed and supported it. This is a voluntary organisation for the propaganda of ideas."³

Pressed further by Churchill as to the Labour Government's attitude towards the ALL-Party Group for a united Europe, the British Premier conceded that the Government was not involved, though it was "free for anybody to join the organisation."⁴ Despite the official assistance given to the project in other European countries⁵, the British Government thus chose to remain aloof, passing on responsibility concerning the Hague Congress to the Labour Party machine itself, and to the ideological hard-liners in the Labour National Executive Committee, who would have to pronounce the final decision.

1. Spaak, op.cit., p.201.

2. Bevin, Foreign Affairs, 22-23.1.48., op.cit.

3. Attlee, 23.1.48., ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. See MacMillan, op.cit., p.161.

The Labour Party, as an organisation, had, in actual fact, as yet to fall fully into line with the "Western Union" policy evoked by Bevin and the Labour administration. In the early post-war period there had been much hope among the party rank and file that some sort of understanding might indeed be achieved with Soviet Russia. Even by the Spring of 1947, while accepting that Britain would have to rely on some sort of broad Atlantic arrangement and that initial limited co-operation in Western Europe was necessary, the party's foreign policy statement published by Transport House and entitled "Cards on the Table"¹, still looked to a "one world" post-war order, rejecting at the same time a "third force" European formula on the grounds that it would provoke rather than prevent a permanent "crystallisation" of Europe into rigid bi-polar bloc spheres of influence.² This was not the view, however, of a key section of the Labour Left. Indeed, in May 1947, as members of the so-called 'Keep Left' group, Richard Crossman, Ian Mikardo and Michael Foot, together with other Labour MP's including R.W.G. Mackay and Leslie Hale, lucidly declared in opposition both to the party's reluctance to formulate new plans and to Bevin's apparent subservience to American rather than European conceptual dictates that "We are Europeans now!", adding:

"A Socialist Britain cannot prosper so long as Europe is divided. The goal we should work for is a federation which bonds together the nations now under Eastern domination with the peoples of Western Europe." ³

Subscribing to the view that an independent and democratic socialist Europe would act as a progressive force against East-West polarisation, their aspirations rapidly dwindled in the wake of the Prague coup, the Berlin crisis and the formation of NATO. By May 1949, Mikardo was fighting a lone battle in claiming that the "third force", as a "peaceful solution of Europe's problems", still "made sense"⁴, and by ./.

1. Cards on the Table, Transport House, Spring 1947, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES

2. Ibid, p.17.

3. Keep Left, paper published for the Labour Party Conference, May 1947, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

4. Ian Mikardo, "Why I Disagree", Tribune, 20.5.49.

./early 1950 he finally came round to the view that the "European Revolution" would have to be limited initially to the creation of a "Western European Federation".¹ Meanwhile the importance of the 'Keep Left' group was that its leading personalities - especially Crossman and Mackay - had acted as an important Labour vanguard in establishing, along with other Labour Left-wingers such as Barbara Castle and Christopher Shawcross, the Parliamentary Labour Party 'Europe Group' and in turn the 'All Party Group' for a united Europe.² In short, they had established a non-partisan rapport with those circles sponsoring the Hague Congress.

The party machine did not approve. This was particularly stressed by Hugh Dalton as head of the NEC International Committee, who, while having shown no effective sympathy for Keep Left, or for the USSE for that matter, was steadfastly opposed to any European unity campaign which was not strictly socialist in character. Right from the setting up of the UEM under Churchill's presidency he had indeed criticised participating Labour members, such as Gordon Lang, as showing "collaborationist tendencies",³ while the NEC General Secretary, Morgan Philips, had advised members of the party to "withdraw" their support on the grounds that the future of Europe depended on "the success of the United Nations and on the strengthening of friendly collaboration between Russia, America and Britain."⁴ Sandys, in turn, had concluded that, at this rather difficult juncture in time, Labour had been caught off balance, but that Labour rank and file support would soon follow.⁵ Despite Retinger's efforts, this proved not to be the case. Thereafter, in fact, in the wake of the Marshall Plan and in a final desperate attempt to prevent a definite East-West polarisation, the Labour Party tried to revive the Second International, in the vain./.

1. Ian Fikardo, The European Revolution, Strasbourg Papers campaign, GT/E2/13, MACKAY PAPERS. 2. Cf. pp. 127-136

3. Hugh Dalton, speech at 46th Labour Conference, Lurgate 26-30.5.47., Official Report, pp. 106-107, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

4. Morgan Philips, letter of 22.1.47., quoted in full by Dalton, *ibid.*

5. Sandys, letter to Coudenhove, 25.1.47., CAE. BRU. E.

./hope of at least salvaging some East-West Socialist dialogue in Europe. In turn, at the 'International Socialist Conference', held at Antwerp between November 28 and December 1, 1947, and attended by delegates of 18 Socialist Parties principally from Western and Eastern Europe, the Marshall Plan was only given qualified support (ie. that it should remain non-political), while at the same time the Moscow Cominform was indirectly attacked.¹ (The issue of a European "third force" was left aside). By the time the Committee of the International Socialist Conference met on January 10, 1948, however, the deadlock of the London talks with Russia weighed heavily in the decision of the British Labour Party and French Socialist Party to jointly sponsor a European Socialist Conference at London, in March, to which only the Marshall Aid countries (including the Western zones of Germany) would be invited to send delegations.² In the wake of the Prague coup, in February, the Eastern European Socialist Parties had either been expelled or had withdrawn from the International Socialist Conference altogether.³ - It was at this very crisis wrought moment in time, with its global strategy of East-West détente eclipsed by events and its European-Socialist policy in tatters, that the Labour Party machinery was in turn tossed into the political fray concerning the projected 'Congress of Europe', to be held under the auspices of the Opposition Tory leader. The response was far from positive.

The attitude of the Party Executive to the Hague Congress was first discussed in detail at the NEC meeting of January 28, where, upon the advice of Morgan Philips, it was agreed that a public statement on the issue, so soon after Bevin's speech of January 22, was "undesirable".⁴ Instead, a "private communication" was conveyed to Labour members who had already indicated their support in order to "discourage" them from participating in the proposed Congress, and./.

1. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. 7, 1948-50, p. 9112.

2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., p. 9215.

4. NEC meeting, 28.1.48., official minutes, plus accompanying note on the Hague Congress by Morgan Philips, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

./to emphasise the Labour Party's own initiative in sponsoring the conference of Western European Socialist Parties to be held in March. Word of the NEC decision subsequently circulated, and in turn prompted Churchill to write to Attlee on February 1 in order to state that a wide measure of political support for the Hague conference had already been obtained on the Continent, and that prominent Socialists in other countries had accepted invitations to attend. Attlee, in reply, again washed his hands of the affair, saying that it was not up to the Labour Government but to the NEC to decide upon official party policy towards the Congress. Churchill then wrote to Shinwell, who, as NEC Chairman, abruptly replied that the Executive had reaffirmed the decision to "discourage" Party members from taking part in the Congress, on the grounds that "the subject of European unity is much too important to be entrusted to unrepresentative interests."¹ Shinwell's specific objection concerning the "number of private individuals selected by unknown process (who) rob the congress of any real representative character" was, however, based upon incorrect information supplied to him by Morgan Philips, giving little emphasis to parliamentary delegations and too much to individual groups.² This matter was subsequently cleared up by Retinger who, after a long discussion with Morgan Philips on March 2³, in turn stressed in writing that the composition of the British delegation had only been officially decided at a joint meeting held on February 24 between the UBI, Federal Union, the All Party Group, and the British sections of the ILEC and USSE, at which it was agreed that out of a British delegation of 100, 20 Labour MP's, 8 Trade Unionists, 4 members of the Co-operative Movement and 5 members of the USSE would be invited to attend the Congress.⁴ Moreover, in the final event, this number went up to include some 40 Labour MP's, 27 Conservative MP's, 5 Liberals, . . .

1. Correspondence between Churchill, Attlee & Shinwell, Feb. 1946, Lesinga Contemporary Archives, op.cit., p.9111; CAB: BRUGGE.

2. Note to NEC meeting, 28.1.46., op.cit.

3. Mentioned in Retinger letter to Philips, 10.3.46. CAB: BRUGGE.

4. Ibid.

./MP's, and 4 Independents out of a total delegation of 150.¹ Despite this clarification as to the balanced representative planning of the Congress, plus a vain attempt by Retinger to invite the 'International Socialist Committee (ie. the organising committee of the Western European Socialist Conference in March) to become an "official sponsor" of the Hague Congress,² with all the executive rights and political representation this entailed, the Labour Executive refused to budge in its rigid opposition to the whole scheme.

The repercussions were soon felt. - It has already been noted how Labour's position hung over the MPE conference in February; so too among the British federalists was their both anger and disappointment. Miss Josephy indeed declared that "great harm" had been done by the Labour Party announcement, which would "inevitably have a highly prejudicial effect upon the Continental Socialists who will find themselves in an extremely difficult position." She in turn argued, rather simplistically, that Labour had not appreciated the "true" EUP origins of the Hague Congress in the welter of UEM publicity surrounding the whole affair in Britain. "We are convinced", she added, "that had the EUP's name been published as one of the sponsors the reaction of the Labour Party in this country would have been very different."³ Brugmans, hard-pressed and bitter over Labour's reaction, proffered a different argument in a EUP policy document circulated towards the end of February. The EUP, he stated, had "found much understanding but little organised support in British Labour."⁴ Rather than blame Sandys and the UEM for the "Churchill problem", he instead put the onus of responsibility upon the Labour Party itself, his argument being stated in full below:

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1. "List of British delegates to the Congress of Europe at The Hague" 20.4.48., CAB: BRUGGE.
 2. Retinger, letter to Philips, 20.3.48., CAB: BRUGGE.
 3. Josephy, official EUP Executive document, Congress of Europe, 5.2.48. UEM PARIS (Miss Josephy was chairman of Federal Union).
 4. "Notes by Dr. Brugmans", February 1948, CAB: BRUGGE.

"The following are the relevant facts regarding the Congress of Europe at The Hague, organised by

✓ The European Union of Federalists (grouping 40 movements) ✓

The United Europe Movement

The Independent League for European Cooperation

Le Comité pour l'Europe Unie (Ed. Harriot) :-

1. The Congress will be held, whatever Labour may decide to do.
2. The response will be considerable, since continental opinion is extremely favourable to European Unity.
3. Labour's abstention would not be understood on the Continent, especially after Mr. Bevin's speech. It would not be interpreted as a demonstration of strength, but as a lack of sense of responsibility towards Europe. On the Continent it would certainly strengthen Mr. Churchill's prestige, if not the case for European Federation.
4. Some Labour people and Socialists will certainly participate, even if the Labour Party boycotts the Congress; it will not be strong enough to prevent a Churchillian victory, but it will cover the organisers on their left flank.
5. Mr. Sandys has obtained serious support from the Vatican. As the future of the Continental democracies depends largely on collaboration between Socialists and Christian Democrats, it might be dangerous to boycott a congress in which H.H. the Pope is personally interested.
6. The European Union of Federalists (principally composed of Socialists, Catholics and progressive independents) has always tried to counter-balance Mr. Churchill's position as a champion of European unity. In its efforts it has found much understanding but little organised support in British Labour circles. On the Continent it has built up a strong popular and progressive movement, especially in Holland, France, Germany and Italy.
7. The European Parliamentary Union (Chairman: Georges Bohy, Belgian Socialist) and "United Socialist States of Europe" are ready to become co-organisers of the Congress in order to make it a really representative demonstration. All they are waiting for is a favourable Labour decision.

February 1948.

The final point made by Brugmans was well supported by the recent developments in the two movements to which he referred. The joint meeting of February 24, for example,¹ at which the composition of the British delegation was agreed upon, had been attended by British USSE delegates and by Mackay for the EPU. Moreover, as the founding chairman of the USSE, Bob Edwards was pressing for the full involvement of his movement in the Hague preparations. As Sandys privately confided to Mackay:-

"Our negotiations with the USSE were progressing well and they undoubtedly would have joined us but for the Labour Executive's decision (even so the proposal to join our Committee was only turned down by the USSE Executive by a majority of two)".²

The EPU Council was also warming to the Hague Committee, while the British All-Party Parliamentary Group, under Mackay, had "asked" the EPU as a whole to be the "organisation responsible for issuing (parliamentary) invitations to the Congress".³ The All-Party Group in the French Parliament was in turn contemplating a similar step.⁴ The stumbling block was again the hostility shown by Labour with regard to the Congress, which the sulking EPU Secretary General, Coudenhove-Kalergi, was only too glad to use as an excuse not to collaborate. "It is more important", he wrote to Mackay in reference to the Labour administration, "for us to collaborate closely with the Government initiative for European Federation than to participate at the Hague Conference".⁵

Brugmans' main point in his EUP Executive note had stressed, however, that it would be in Labour's own interests (as well as in the interests of a European Socialist strategy) to become fully involved in the Hague Congress. He repeated his argument in a strongly-worded letter printed in the Labour weekly "Tribune" on February 20:

1. Cf. p. 103

2. SANDYS, letter to Mackay 9.3.48. MACKAY PAPERS.

3. Recorded in the Joint International Committee meeting, 5.3.48., official minutes (IC/M/4), CAEM BRUGGE.

4. Ibid.

5. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, letter to Mackay 28.2.48. MACKAY PAPERS.

"There is nothing to be said against party politics in this matter (he remarked) But we, on the Continent, fear that European Federation may be judged by the Labour Party as a point of purely internal policy, a question of being more or less strongly against Mr Churchill.

I am very much surprised to see that in Great Britain the Congress of Europe is regarded as the initiative of the United Europe Movement. On the Continent it is just the opposite. We have daily to make it clear that the Congress will not be a purely federalist manifestation (ie. of the EUF)..

Emphasising the strong Socialist orientation of the EUF, Brugmans continued to argue:

"There certainly are essential differences between our conceptions of European Federation and those of a reactionary. But don't you think it would be politically relevant if they could be openly confronted, especially since Mr Bevin's recent speech did not make it quite clear what was the specific Socialist point of view? What Europe and the world are waiting for is neither negativism nor a Labour secession, but the clear-cut, progressive solution for problems which will arise while Europe unites. The Hague would be an excellent platform for every partisan of European unity to make his own contribution. Can responsible Socialists stay aloof when this discussion is taking place?

"The conference can be really representative, if Labour lifts the ban. Otherwise, a good occasion of common will and frank discussion will be missed".¹

In all this, Brugmans was extremely conscious of the latent tension within his own movement over participation at The Hague, and of the pledge which he had in effect given to the MFE that Labour would in the final event assume its "responsibility" to Europe by attending the Congress.² This in turn accounted for his passionate concern about Labour's negative response and for his incessant appeals during this period towards his Labour comrades. On the eve of the International Socialist Conference, in March, he made a final plea to Morgan Philips. Writing as EUF Executive Chairman and as "a member of the Dutch Labour Party for 21 years", he again stressed the mainly Socialist and radical composition of the EUF, adding in respect of the Congress itself:

1. BRUGMANS, letter in Tribune 20.2.46.

2. Cf. p. 93.

"The Congress at The Hague will take place anyway and will strike public opinion as people on the Continent are very keen on the idea of European unity. Some Socialists will participate for certain and the texts of the proposed resolutions could be satisfactory and it would then be impossible to maintain that this Congress was reactionary. It all depends on one problem, will the Socialist and progressive forces at The Hague be in the position of free lances or official representatives...

If in Great Britain the 'Churchill problem' exists, it does exist on a much smaller scale on the Continent. On the other hand, we are pretty sure to be able to obtain good representative delegations from practically all European countries in the West if the Labour Party ban is lifted".¹

Similarly, Retinger had also made a direct appeal to Shinwell, stating:

"A number of leading continental Socialists have already indicated their intention to attend the Conference. In the circumstances the decision to discourage members of the British Labour Party from participating will not be understood in other European countries, especially after Mr Bevin's speech advocating Western Union".²

The appeals to Labour were all made in vain and, as a result, the Continental Socialists who had already agreed to attend the Congress were indeed placed in an extremely difficult position. Foremost among these, of course, there figured both Paul-Henri Spaak and Léon Blum, who, in making their tentative decision, had also hoped to receive Labour Party support.³ The Labour Party "discouragement" severely dashed their aspirations. The more pugnacious Spaak at first came out fighting, and informed Retinger soon after the Labour decision that he would strongly urge Blum and other Continental Socialists to go together to The Hague "whatever the attitude of the British Labour Party may be".⁴ He further added that, in his opinion, "no European Congress could be in any way representative without the presence of Churchill, the chief artisan of Victory and recognised as such by most Continentals".⁵ Blum./.

1. BRUGHMANS, letter to M. Philips 19.3.48. BRUGHMANS PAPERS

2. RETINGER, letter to Shinwell 12.2.48. CAEM BRUGGE

3. Information contained in the M. Philips NEC note 26.1.48. op cit

4. Recorded by Retinger in a letter to Sandys 1.3.48, after talks with Spaak on 14.2.48., CAEM BRUGGE

5. Ibid.

./, and the French Socialist Party Executive Committee, under the strong pro-Labour influence of its Director, Guy Mollet, were less certain about causing a split among Socialist ranks. At a crucial meeting on February 19 they decided instead to attempt at persuading Labour to change its policy with regard to the Congress, in order to ensure a "total and organised Socialist representation" at The Hague. Guy Mollet was in turn charged with carrying out negotiations on this point with Labour representatives at the forthcoming International Socialist Conference. As Marceau Pivert informed Marc, however, the SFIO did not hold out much hope in this quest to influence Labour, the NEC decision to "discourage" participation at The Hague having come as a "heavy blow" to the French Socialists. Nevertheless, the SFIO Executive Committee had not as yet ruled out their official support of the Congress, and, in addition to re-affirming their policy in favour of European Federation, they were still prepared to take part in the invitation policy.¹

In the meantime, the European activists within the Labour Party itself, led by Mackay and Leslie Hale (both members of "Keep Left"), decided to resist the NEC decision to "discourage" Labour members from attending the Hague Congress. They indeed regarded the NEC policy as meaning "not encourage", which in no way constituted an official ban upon Labour participation. The Labour Executive and Cabinet, plus the official whip, all in fact played along in the game, and were consulted at each stage of the preparations.² Indeed Mackay grew so confident that no real obstacle would be placed by the Labour Party machine upon participation at The Hague, that he even entered into a bet with Sandys that at least 25 Labour M.P.s would attend the Congress!³ By April, 41 Labour MPs had actually accepted to go as a delegation, including leading ./.

1. Information described at length in a letter from Pivert to Marc 19.2.48., BRUGHANS PAPERS

2. Events clearly recorded by L. Hale in a letter to Morgan Philips 22.4.48., MACKAY PAPERS

3. Mackay letter to Sandys, 14.5.48., records this interesting anecdote! MACKAY PAPERS

./o. members of the "Keep Left" group such as Richard Crossman, Mackay and Hale, along with other prominent Europeanists such as Gordon Lang, Christopher Shawcross, Hugh Delargy, J.B. Hynd and Ivor Thomas, (the latter two being former Ministers)¹. In the meantime, however, the International Socialist Conference, held privately at Selsdon, Surrey, on March 21-22, put a damper on much of the general Socialist enthusiasm for the Hague Congress.

Meeting under the hard-line chairmanship of Hugh Dalton, the conference in fact rejected French appeals to participate at The Hague, in a blunt decision stating that the Socialist Parties should "take no part" in the forthcoming Congress. The memorandum submitted by the British Labour delegation went still further, and declared with regard to the Congress:

"the concept of European unity may be corrupted in the hands of reaction. Socialists everywhere must guard against the prostitution of this great constructive ideal into the vulgar instrument of anti-Soviet propaganda, by discredited politicians who hope to rebuild their shattered fortunes under the protection of its popular appeal."²

Moreover, despite the fact that the Labour delegation also defended itself by proposing that the Socialists themselves should take the "initiative in promoting the (European) ideal on the plain of constructive realism", when pressed specifically by the French to organise a major propaganda campaign and a conference of European Socialist Parties, trade unions and progressives before the Hague Congress, as well as to set up a permanent organisation for the promotion of European unity, they objected and fell back to propose the convening of a more limited conference of Socialist parties, in order to discuss co-ordination methods.³ The preparatory conference in question was in turn scheduled for April 25. - It would be the scene of a final French appeal to Labour with regard to participation at The Hague.

1. "List of British Delegates..", op.cit. Also see Guardian article 'Delegates to conference on European Union', 17.4.48.
2. "European Co-operation within the Framework of the Recovery Programme" - Labour Party memorandum to Selsdon meeting, 21-22.3.48. LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES
3. Keatings Contemporary Archives, op.cit., p.9215.

CHAPTER 4. RE-APPRAISAL OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN; MARCH 1948

I) General Position: Joint Committee Meeting March 5

At the same time as the hard-line ideologues in the Labour Executive were busy undercutting international Socialist support for the Hague Congress on the grounds of it being "reactionary" and "unrepresentative", the organising Committee itself had in fact clearly demonstrated the falsity of this accusation by securing in Britain the active support and collaboration of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for European Unity. It has already been noted how representatives of the latter group had participated in the joint meeting of February 24, at which the method for selecting the British delegation to the Hague was decided.¹ Similarly, on Friday March 5, at the first full Joint International Committee meeting of the new year, the All-Party Group sent Mackay, Boothby, Sir Peter MacDonald and P.G. Roberts as "observers" to the re-union. The member organisations in the Committee were represented by Layton, Rhys Williams, Retinger and Delattre (ILEC); Brumans, Josephy and Nord (EUF); Vermeil, Courtin, Jacquet and Noel (CFEU); and finally Sandys, Lang, Gollancz and Lindsay (UEM).²

The meeting was mainly preoccupied with the effects which Labour's open hostility to the Hague Congress would have upon the composition and general appeal of the conference. Indeed, as a further illustration of their efforts to be representative, both sections of the Anglo-French movement ensured the inclusion of Socialists in their Committee groups, Lang and Gollancz for the UEM, and Jacquet (a member of the French Socialist Central Committee) for the CFEU. The initial part of the meeting, moreover, was dominated by Labour's outspoken European militant, R.W.G. Mackay, who, despite his "observer" status, gave a discourse on the political situation./.

1. Cf. p.103.

2. Joint International Committee meeting 5.3.48., Official Minutes (IC/M/4), CAEM BRUGGE.

./ in Britain arising from Labour's hostility to the Congress, and stressed that the Labour, Trade Unionist, and Co-operative members who comprised the socialist part of the British delegation would go to The Hague "even if the Labour Party did not reconsider its attitude". Prugmans, for his part, drew attention to Spaak's strong support on this matter, and suggested that the Belgian Socialist Premier should be proposed as Honorary President at The Hague, along-side Churchill. The meeting decided to "study" the idea, while, in the meantime, Jacquet was charged with enlisting Paul Ramadier, the former French Socialist Premier, as Chairman of the Political Committee at The Hague. (Blum's reluctance to break ranks with Labour had evidently been appreciated). As regards the other two Committees, Paul Van Zeeland, as President of the ILEC and a former Belgian Christian-Democrat Premier, had already accepted to chair the Economic debate, this decision being confirmed by the meeting, whereas nobody had as yet been designated the chairmanship of the Cultural debate. The main point to be stressed was that a clear effort had once more been made to ensure that the running of the conference would not be monopolised by any one political group. Indeed, by deliberately choosing a distinguished Socialist as Chairman of the Political Committee, which was regarded as the most prestigious and important focal point of the Congress, the Joint Executive Committee undermined Labour's argument that the conference was controlled by the "hands of reaction".

The actual invitation lists for the Congress had, in the meantime, been completed as regards Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, though it was noted that the Labour Party policy might ultimately cause some alterations. The Committee also took note, with considerable satisfaction, that the Dutch Labour Party had decided upon "an absolutely favourable attitude" towards the Congress, while the USSE was actively collaborating in the preparations, despite having rejected any formal commitment to the project itself. The NEI, moreover, had added its support./.

./ in favour of participation at The Hague, and would give a "formal" confirmation of this agreement at its next Executive meeting, on March II. The EPU, for its part, still had some "reservations" about becoming involved, though the lead which the British and French All-Party Groups were already giving in relation to the preparatory Committee was indicative that Coudenhove was losing ground in his personal opposition to the Sandys-dominated co-ordination movement. On this point, the meeting was informed that Retinger had written to the EPU Chairman, Georges Bohy, and that "a result may be expected within a short time".

On a lighter note, the Committee also discussed the type of flag which could be used for the Congress and for the ensuing international campaign. Sandys proudly presented his own design, which was basically a broadly-spread red letter "E" (for Europe), drawn on the back of an envelope. The meeting in turn accepted this great work of art as their official emblem, not realising that it would later become the subject of an amusing, indeed ridiculous, quarrel with Coudenhove.

In addition to the outstanding problems still remaining with regard to the as yet incomplete invitation lists for the Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries in particular, the status of the Eastern European delegations and of the USA was also brought into question towards the end of the meeting. After thoughtful debate, it was finally confirmed that both the Eastern European and Spanish delegations, instead of being selected on an "official" representative basis, would be constituted under a limited "observer" status and be drawn from among the most famous personalities living in exile, such as Salvador de Madariaga (leader of the Liberal International) for Spain, and Gregory Gafenco (former Socialist Rumanian Foreign Minister) for Eastern Europe. Retinger would be mainly responsible in this area. The invitation policy in respect of the USA was described in the official minutes of the meeting as follows:

"The advantages and disadvantages regarding American representation were discussed: it is of the utmost importance to convince the United States of the realism of the Congress; on the other hand, the presence of the US delegates, even as observers, might tend to lessen the political significance of the Congress unless other non-European nations are given an equal representation. It is proposed to invite persons from the USA to attend the Congress as guests".¹

Despite the "guest" status which was thus attributed to the USA, it was clear that the Congress organisers wanted to impress upon the US political establishment that serious efforts were actually being carried out, in addition to the as yet limited diplomatic initiatives, for the furtherance of Western European unification, and for the eventual 'liberation' of the Soviet-dominated Eastern European regimes. The invitation to the conference proffered to the United States was, in fact, the first step in a protracted series of co-ordination measures leading to the official launching of the 'US Committee on a United Europe', and to the subsequent tarnishing of the European Movement by CIA under-cover agencies, which would reach a peak during the 1950's.²

The status of the overseas territories was also a problem for the organising committee. Though the Belgian and Dutch were partially involved in this question, it remained chiefly a concern to the British and French representatives, and required careful handling. While, on the one hand, the Joint International Committee did not want to appear hostile or detached to the overseas ties, they did not want, on the other hand, to stamp the 'Congress of Europe' as an overt and up-dated imperial affair. However, within the broader ranks of the affiliated groups, especially the UEM and CFEU, there existed strong lobbies in favour of a continuing association between a united Europe and the overseas ties of her member-states. The Committee consequently decided to invite various "observers" from the Dominions, though not the Commonwealth in general, to attend the Congress. (The main discussion concerning the overseas territories took place the next day, when the Executive Committee went into the details of the draft Political Report).

1. Official minutes 5.3.46., op.cit. 2. Cf. pp.259-263.

2) Draft Political Report: Executive Committee Meeting March 6

The eventual Political Resolution which emerged from the Hague Congress on May 10, 1948, and which became the central tenet of the subsequent campaign of the European Movement, leading to the official creation of the Council of Europe in May 1949, had its real genesis at the crucial Joint Executive Committee meeting of March 6, at which the draft reports of the main member movements were submitted and discussed in considerable detail. The representatives present at this meeting, held in the home of Duncan Sandys, included: Layton, Retinger and Delattre (ILEC); Brugmans, Joseph, and Nord (EUF); Vermeil Courtin, Jacquet and Hoel (CPEU); Boothby, as an "observer" for the British All-Party Group; Kebattet and Martin (General Secretariat); and finally Sandys himself, representing the UEM, and acting as Chairman.¹ The draft political texts submitted clearly bore the imprint of the latter's guiding influence and determination behind the scenes in persuading his colleagues of the need to pitch their reports at a realistic level, while managing to retain a thinly-veiled commitment to the eventual supranational integration of Europe. In short, all the reports corresponded basically to the format originally issued by Sandys in December, in which he had proposed that the "ultimate" form of European unity envisaged should only be indicated in general terms, while the "immediate" specific measures to be proposed should fall within the scope of inter-governmental co-operation.² In the meantime, however, the Soviet take-over of Czechoslovakia in February had shaken the European campaigners into a new sense of urgency, while their actual ideas with regard to the setting up of some sort of European Council had also been pre-empted by the pending agreement of the Five Brussels Powers for the creation of an official, though more limited, Consultative Council.³ In other words, the inter-governmental initiative, which./

1. Joint Executive Committee meeting, 6.3.48., Official Minutes, (IC/M/6), CAEM BRUGGE.

2. Cf. pp. 82-88.

3. Cf. pp. 96-7.

./ Sandys had originally seen as the major prerequisite to the more protracted campaign for a real and effective political integration of Europe, was now an official-political reality, despite the limits in membership and terms of reference. The proposals drafted in the various reports in question evidently took note of this fact, and as a result, went one step further than initially suggested, by including an essential link-up stage between the "ultimate goal" and "immediate steps":

As regards the "ultimate goal", each of the draft texts submitted spoke of an eventual political Federation of Europe, the sole exception on this point being the report issued by the EUP of all groups. The latter report¹ in fact stressed, above all, the need to avoid creating a "centralised" European "super-state". European unity should instead be based upon the principle of "self-government" and the maximum "decentralisation" possible in favour of "regional" and "functional" "community-based" democracy. In this respect, there was no clear mention of a supranational political structure, but rather a united Europe formed around "federal bodies" (d'organismes fédéraux) which would be vested with limited sovereign powers passed on by the nations participating in the scheme. The draft report submitted by the French Council,² on the other hand, called for a "true Federation", based upon an effective "political and economic solidarity". Indeed, though mention was made of the need to "safeguard" the autonomous and diverse elements within the eventual Federation, it was clear that the latter group envisaged a political fusion as opposed to a co-ordinated regional and functional decentralisation of the European states. In complete counter-position to the EUP report, they therefore suggested that the ultimate goal was a "Federal State" which could promote a unified political approach capable of removing the "national egoisms" that cause war. Similarly, ./.

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1. EUP "Rapport sur la Politique Générale" (IC/P/I3), CAEM BRUGGE.
 2. CFEU "Projet Français de RAPPORT POLITIQUE" (IC/P/I4), CAEM BRUGGE.

./ the British report^I proposed a longterm policy for the creation of a "democratic Federation of Western Europe" based on the principles of "common citizenship, political freedom, representative and responsible government, with a Parliament directly elected by the people". Even the official "note" submitted by the General Secretariat² called for an eventual "political Federation" and stressed the view that no effective economic integration of Europe would be possible without a parallel "political" strategy involving "some surrender...or joint exercise of sovereign powers".

Turning to the "immediate steps", all the draft reports, including that of the EUP, repeated Sandys' original proposal for the creation of an intergovernmental European Council. The EUP, of course, did not use precisely the same wording, though the sense was identical. In addition to expressing support for the officially-existing co-operative "European economic organisations", and for the need to extend "inter-consular" coordination services, the latter report went on to call for the inter-governmental creation of a "permanent official Committee" to meet at regular intervals in order to formulate European foreign and economic policy and to bring "the family of European states" more closely together. Additional steps advocated in the report were mainly of a functional nature, including the creation of a special European fund and study committee in order to facilitate the official effort towards European integration, especially at the legislative-fiscal level; the creation of permanent committees to look into the problem of the colonies; the creation of a "European Atomic Authority", in order to coordinate scientific progress in this field and to submit the industrial results to public scrutiny; the creation of a "European Academy"; the creation of a "supra-national Commission" for the protection of human rights, etc.

1. British Report (IC/P/15), CAEM BRUGGE, plus MACKAY PAPERS.

2. "Points for inclusion in Political Report" Note by General Secretariat (IC/P/12), CAEM BRUGGE.

Despite the undoubted quality of this EUP programme, it must be stressed once again that there was no mention of any supra-national political European institution.¹ It is true however that, in addition to the above proposals, the EUP also advocated the formation of a "European Army Force", but this was envisaged as part of a world force (i.e. probably within the scope of the UN), and thus not having to undergo the direct supervision of any supra-national political European authority. Indeed the only part of the report which might have dealt with such a scheme rather vaguely skated over any specific proposal and instead merely called for an "internationalisation of the parliamentary spirit" and for the formation of a "European parliamentary tradition". No precision was offered in any way as to how or when this should come about, still less under what specific form. There was certainly no mention of a tentative European political Assembly whether of a deliberative, consultative or constitutional nature. In fact, the EUP report firmly steered clear of any hint to merge sovereignty at a political supra-national European level. This was in direct contrast to all the other reports: The Conseil Français, for example, clearly stated that in addition to the immediate necessity for a European intergovernmental organisation, equipped with an international secretariat and a regular conference system, the "essential task" of this body would be to promote a "federal" European political structure in which national sovereignty would be restricted while a "central European government", with an adequate parliamentary assembly, would come into operation.² The inter-link method for achieving this work would be based upon a "conjunction" of the efforts among the European Parliamentary groups active within the EPU.³

1. Even the proposal for a "supra-national" European commission on human rights was regarded as being the Cultural Committee's sphere of action rather than that of the Political Committee.
2. This point was again stressed in the draft resolution for the Hague Congress presented in the CPEU's report.
3. This point should not be underestimated in view of the joint Anglo-French parliamentary initiative of March 18-19, 1948, for a European Constituent Assembly. Cf. pp. 128-136.

The British report went even further in this respect. First, as regards "emergency policy", it suggested the immediate setting up of a "Council of Western Europe consisting of the representatives of the Governments of the sixteen participating countries, and Western Germany, to lay down the broad lines of common action in the political, economic, and strategic fields". As a vital inter-link stage between this intergovernmental political structure and the eventual "democratic Federation of Western Europe" mentioned earlier, the report above all went on to declare:

"To achieve this objective H.M. Government, in co-operation with the other States of Western Europe, should take steps to convene within six months a constituent assembly of Western Europe, composed of representatives chosen by the Parliaments of the participating States, to frame a constitution for such a Federation".

It was the most lucid statement from among all the reports in favour of a direct political strategy for the ultimate attainment of a supra-national European Federation. The "note" presented by the General Secretariat, in turn, also called for an "Emergency Council of Europe", equipped with a permanent European secretariat to deal with economic, military and political affairs; but when it came to linking this body to the ultimate "political Federation" envisaged, it more cautiously proposed the setting up of a "European Deliberative Assembly", arguing its case in the following gradualistic terms:

"The success of these measures will depend upon making the different parliaments and the general public European-minded. The best way of achieving this would be to create immediately some form of European deliberative body through which views could be exchanged and a common European opinion expressed on the major problems of the day. Whilst it could have no constitutional powers, this European Deliberative Assembly would be able to give most effective support to the European Council. The quickest and most practical way of bringing such an assembly into being would be for each parliament to nominate the necessary representatives".

The latter report in turn stressed that it would really be upto the "Emergency Council of Europe", once it had dealt with "immediate dangers", to consider "mere far-reaching and permanent plans for European integration", including:- a customs union, a unified currency, the "functional" integration of continental services and resources, a combined European Defence Force, a common citizenship and, "ultimately", a political Federation.

To sum up, it should be strongly emphasised that, despite later federalist accusations that the so-called "unionist" member groups of the Joint International Committee had deliberately sabotaged and diluted in advance the contents of the Political debate at the Hague Congress, the least forthright draft political report presented at this crucial Executive Committee meeting of March 6 was that of the EUP itself. Indeed, if any member group can be singled out at this stage of the proceedings for demonstrating a lack of commitment both to long term political unification plans and to a short-term supra-national political strategy, it is the EUP. Nowhere in their report can there be found a mention of ultimate supra-national political Federation, still less, any immediate European parliamentary assembly. Instead, the EUP document was impregnated with an abundance of anti-state and pre-"functional" pronouncements, along with the need for internal decentralisation. Their proposals for power-wielding "federal bodies" (d'organismes fédéraux) should indeed be seen within this light, that is, as technical and "functional" co-ordinating bodies of the "living forces", unaccountable in the traditional political sense. Clearly, despite Brugman's over-all responsibility for the document, which probably accounted for its "possibilist" moderate tone, the anti-political corporatist views of Voisin, Marc and Hytte, etc. had exercised a certain influence. The fusionist political-juridical Massini school of thought represented by the Rossi-Spinelli MPE axis had been totally ignored.

By contrast, the draft British report was certainly the most forthright and radical document presented in terms of a direct./.

./.. political strategy for European Federation. The outspoken tone of the report was explained by the fact that its authors were the two leading parliamentary supporters of the British All-Party Group for European unity, namely R.W.G. Mackay and Robert Boothby. The former was indeed clearly responsible for the proposal to set up a European Constituent Assembly, and would actually move a debate on a practically identical motion twelve days later, in the House of Commons.¹ Boothby, for his part, was responsible for the longer section in the report dealing with the more functional intergovernmental measures which the European Council should soon put into operation, especially as regards currency stabilisation, the execution of ERP, a comprehensive European production Plan, Colonial developments, etc.²

The over-all importance and most striking feature of the report was, however, the way it inserted and specifically highlighted the need for a direct political-parliamentary initiative as the crucial inter-link between actual intergovernmental co-operation and the projected ultimate political Federation. This approach was keenly backed by the French report,³ though evaded by the EUP. The note submitted by the General Secretariat, on the other hand, influenced by Retinger and Sandys, stressed the need for a more gradual and indirect political strategy, though the goal of an "ultimate political Federation" remained the same. In other words, rather than place the constitutional responsibility for such a plan upon a newly-created European parliamentary assembly, the Retinger-Sandys axis clearly preferred to leave the initial official action to be taken jointly by the actual governments concerned. This did not mean, as federalist writers would later claim, that./.

1. Cf. pp.124-132.

2. Boothby had in fact already drawn up a very similar document, (without the call for a Constituent Assembly) for the UEM General Purposes Committee: "Memorandum on Europe" (GP P 8) CAEM BRUGGE.

3. At a second meeting of the Joint Executive Committee held on the same day, dealing with the draft Economic Report, the French Council chairman, Courtin, clearly called out for a "bold" approach and "to push the Governments" rather than "lag behind them" IC/M/5, March 6, 1948 CAEM BRUGGE.

Retinger and Sandys remained strictly "intergovernmentalist" in approach and had no supra-national aspirations concerning European unity. On the contrary, they conceived that the only realistic method for the initial progress from an intergovernmental political structure towards an eventual supra-national and effective European Federation was to actively persuade Governments themselves to take such measures. This could not be achieved overnight. To call, therefore, for the immediate convening of a European Constituent Assembly appeared to them to be nothing more than an idealistic pipe-dream. On the other hand, the much more reasonable request for a supra-national European Deliberative Assembly, with no formal powers, but with a potential capacity to create the right popular climate and European political impetus for a subsequent series of far-reaching political initiatives, seemed to be the most serious option available at that time. When such a psychological stage was reached, two years later, Sandys did in turn proceed to promote a clear strategy in favour of a "Supra-national European Political Authority".^I For the moment however, both he and Retinger pitched their plans at a less ambitious level. The EUP, on the other hand, were in no position to complain subsequently of "unionist" moderation and over-cautiousness on this matter, since they avoided any reference at all to the need for a European political Assembly in their own draft political report. In the discussions which ensued during the next few weeks it was not, in fact, the EUP report which caused any friction or difficulties, but rather the difference of view which existed between Mackay's proposal for a European Constituent Assembly, and the General Secretariat's call for an initial European Deliberative Assembly. Before proceeding to examine the final outcome and synthesis of views on this vital point, however, a brief analysis of the proposals put forward in the original draft political reports as regards foreign and military policy, plus the colonial question, is called for.

I. Cf. pp. 444-449.

In the wake of the Soviet-backed Communist coup d'Etat in Czechoslovakia on February 22, followed by the resignation of President Benes on February 25 and by the mysterious "suicide" of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk on March 10, the Joint Executive meeting of March 6 was hardly predisposed to take a "soft line" as regards Europe's policy towards the USSR. This was especially the case of the British draft political report in which Boothby^I urgently warned:

"To a point which, a year ago, it seemed reasonable to hope might be avoided, the campaign for European unity has become the campaign against Communism, in its present totalitarian manifestation. If we are honest with ourselves, we must face the fact that this is a world-wide conspiracy for the capture of monopolistic power; and that, behind the Stettin-Trieste line, where Russian power is absolute, the values of Western democratic civilization are being systematically destroyed."

In addition to advocating a united Western European effort to achieve economic stability and industrial growth through some joint "deliberate planning of production" (including the rationalization and co-ordination of the heavy industries of the Ruhr, Belgium, Luxembourg and Lorraine under the "supreme direction of a supra-national Authority"), he therefore also pointed to the need for "effective strategic co-operation". Such steps, he claimed, in view of the pending Brussels Pact, "can be achieved overnight - and should be". The note issued by the General Secretariat also called for some urgent cohesion on these matters, stressing the "political as well as economic dangers of totalitarian Communism", and openly stating that "our ultimate aim must continue to be the unity and liberty of all Europe, and we shall not at any time disinterest ourselves in the fate of the peoples of Eastern Europe". The EUP, on the other hand, though certainly opposed to Communism, and just as surely wanting to work for the unity of all Europe, did not want to be ever-identified as being part of a hostile western alliance. The report presented by Brugmans thus stressed instead the continuing need for some sort of third force Europe, with an./.

I. BOOTHBY was a close friend of Masaryk and had urged him not to return to Czechoslovakia during U.N. talks in New York.

./o. "independent" foreign policy and a position of "neutrality" as regards the two blocs, in the hope of bringing about "mediation" or "compromise" between the two. This thought was echoed less strongly in the French report, though much more space was devoted to the "German problem" than to that of Communism. After two wars within the space of one generation, the French delegates were indeed very aware of the need to integrate the newly-industrialized "German giant" within a European economic and political organization capable of preventing any future "imbalance" and potential "hegemony". The solution put forward therefore, especially in immediate terms, was the setting up of a joint "European coal co-operative", composed chiefly of France, Germany and Belgium. (This idea received more detailed attention within the work of the Economic Committee). It should be noted, however, that steel was not mentioned, in so much as France at that time was desperately short of coal, whereas steel production in Lorraine was not yet in a position to be challenged by German production.

As described earlier, another pressing problem for France, and even more so for Britain, was the question of the territories overseas. Boothby, in a statement probably in line with the personal thoughts of Sandys and MacMillan, though not with the larger traditional imperial lobby in the Conservative Party as a whole, tackled the problem as follows:

"To the question 'Can Britain enter a Western European Federation and simultaneously maintain out ties with the Empire?', the answer must be an emphatic 'Yes'. The two policies are, in essence, complimentary. For the Empire must have the markets of Europe, and Europe must have the markets of the Empire, if either are to regain a permanent and well-founded prosperity. The task, not an easy one, is to graft the preference system of the one upon the other... The truth of the matter is that, by herself, Britain can no longer play the role towards the Dominions that she played in the nineteenth century either as a provider of immigrants and capital goods, or as a market, or as a protector. Although the Dominions are too tactful to say so, we have become, for them, a liability rather than an asset. The only way in which we can become, once again, a central bastion for their security and ./o.

./provide them,once again,with an outlet for their primary products,is by union with Western Europe.

The argument becomes even stronger when applied to the Colonial Empire...The conclusion is inescapable. The most effective Imperial policy for Britain or any other European State in the modern world is to do everything in their power to bring about the unification of Western Europe".

The note submitted by the General Secretariat similarly stated:

"A United Europe must of course include Europe's colonial dependencies...and must be closely associated with the British Dominions and the self-governing overseas partners of other European powers".

Even the EUP,in a clarification of its position,declared that Britain must be an "integral part" of the future European Federation,and that therefore a policy of "very strict collaboration" and "solidarity" between Europe and the Commonwealth was necessary. The French report in turn drew attention to the sacrifices made by Britain's overseas territories during the war,and to the need to "affirm" that Britain's membership of Europe would also involve her Dominions and Empire.

To conclude,this first major exchange on the draft political reports indicated,in broad terms,that there was more accord than division between the member groups of the Joint International Committee . On the most important foreign policy and military issues the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist position of each delegation was clear,though the EUP naively stuck to its European third-force formula,along with the French representatives. Within a few months,both succumbed to the pattern of world events and were reluctantly drawn into fully supporting a Western democratic bloc. The cold war rhetoric employed chiefly by Boothby soon became common currency in the international movement as a whole,and was one of the striking features of the debate at the Hague Congress.Though the activities of the Soviet Union clearly gave just cause to the movement's overt anti-communism,the more sceptical opponents of the European cause,especially within British Labour ranks,now had a useful weapon in claiming that the movement,with Churchill appearing to be at the head of it,was nothing./.

./.. more than the tool of European war-mongering reactionary forces. The strong support given to Boothby's view, that a united Europe represented "the most effective Imperial policy for Britain", enforced the impression that the movement was merely the instrument of the right-wing European establishment. This was a false picture. Indeed, with the exception of Britain, the movement solidly represented all democratic political parties and each section of social-economic life. The idea, however, that to some members a united Europe represented the only life-line for a continuance of the actual political and economic status quo, as well as a means of supporting an anachronistic imperial commitment abroad, was all too evident. Europe, to the more Conservative grouping, clearly offered the hope of "pouring old wine into a new bottle". To be fair to Boothby and his colleagues, however, they in fact represented the more forward looking section of the British Conservative Party and establishment class in so much as they identified a united Europe as being in the real interest of the overseas territories, as well as constituting a vital commitment so far as Britain should be concerned. The more traditional imperial lobby, represented by Amery and Eden, was much less progressive in this sense, and was prepared to tolerate, at times even support in Amery's case, the concept of European unity, so long as it did not take primary importance over Britain's imperial ties and continued leadership of the Commonwealth. This, in blunt terms, meant that no organic form of union should take place with Britain's involvement, whereas the more progressive group, supported by the other movements for European unity, were working towards precisely this goal. The proposal put forward by Boothby and the other member groups in favour of some sort of "supra-national" industrial planning authority in Europe was important in this respect, and should be recognised to have been quite a radical departure from previous national planning concepts, or from plain old-fashioned laissez-faire policies, with which the traditional Conservative-Liberal establishment was best identified. The rather more./.

./ radical proposition , advocated by Labour M.P. R.W.G Mackay, in favour of officially convening a European Constituent Assembly "within six months" was another indication that the movement did not simply comprise old Tory "die-hards" and imperialist-orientated members of the European establishment. Similarly, the General Secretariat's suggestion of a European Deliberative Assembly was also a radical political departure, within the context of the time, from the traditional rigid inter-state norms of political co-operation, though it appeared to be less so afterwards. The internal debate over these two proposals gathered pace and impetus throughout the weeks following the crucial executive meeting of March 6. The resulting formula would clearly affect the outcome of the Hague Congress, held two months later. In the meantime, Mackay experienced the first official reaction to his proposal when, in conjunction with a similar initiative taken by his EPU colleagues in the French Parliament, he presented his case for a European Constituent Assembly to the House of Commons on March 18.

3) The Parliamentary Initiative for a European Constituent Assembly, March 18-19, 1948

It must be stressed, in view of the Labour Executive's harsh opposition to participation at the Hague Congress of 1948 (and present-day opposition to European union in general), that the first major parliamentary initiative in Britain in favour of an organic, supra-national European political structure was primarily organised by the Labour Left, with R.W.G. Mackay and Richard Crossman as the main motivating forces. Indeed at the inaugural meeting of Labour's "Europe Group", on December 2, 1947, organised by Mackay, Christopher Showcross and Sydney Silverman, and supported by Labour's leading left-wingers Crossman, Ian Mikardo, Michael Foot and Leslie Hale, the main objective in./

./ their initial campaign was defined as "to find whether a positive British Socialist Foreign policy may be constructed on the principle of European Union."¹ Within two weeks, at the subsequent meeting of December 16, the group agreed that both a "practical functional" method, and a "blue-print"(constitutional) formula for the promotion of European integration would have to be employed together, since "European Union would not come either by natural growth or by artificial construction alone."² In turn, on January 9, 1948, Crossman, Mackay, Mikardo and others sent an urgent letter to Bevin, demanding a "firm declaration" from him in support of European unity, and against "jealously guarding national sovereignty."³ Finally, at the next meeting of the group, on January 20, Crossman took the lead in gaining the meeting's agreement that, in view of the crucial Foreign Affairs debate planned for January 22, "it would be deplorable if proposals for European Unity were to be put forward by the Opposition Leaders and not from the Government Front Bench."⁴ On January 22, Bevin in turn made his famous speech in favour of a "consolidation of Western Europe."⁵ Pressing still further, the 'Europe Group' meeting of February 10, now attended by other left-wingers including Barbara Castle and Jenny Lee, considered various drafts on European Union, especially Mackay's proposed "Federalist approach, and Crossman's "Economic approach".⁶ By Thursday March 11, five days after the crucial Executive meeting of March 6, a final draft had been agreed upon, comprising Crossman's urgent consideration of immediate economic measures to be taken, and Mackay's long term plan for full European Federation, along with his inter-link proposal in favour of a European Constituent Assembly.⁷ The document in turn received the ./.

1. Meeting of 2.12.47, official minutes, MACKAY PAPERS.

2. "Europe Group", meeting 16.12.47., official minutes, MACKAY PAPERS

3. "Europe Group", letter to Bevin, 9.1.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

4. "Europe Group", meeting 20.1.48., official minutes, MACKAY PAPERS

5. Cf. pp.102-104.

6. "Europe Group", meeting 10.2.48., official minutes, MACKAY PAPERS

7. Draft presented to "All Party British Committee of the European Parliamentary Union", 11.3.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

./ support of the All Party Parliamentary Group and was formally introduced, as a Back-Bench motion on European Union, in the House of Commons the same day. By March 18, the motion stood in the name of 120 MP's from all sides of the House (in large part from the Labour Left) and was finally discussed, though only briefly. The motion, introduced by Mackay, proposed that urgent steps should be taken in consultation with the British Commonwealth to create a Western European "political union"¹. For this purpose, the motion went on to stress, "there should be an emergency policy designed to secure immediate and effective co-operation between the countries of Western Europe, and a long-term policy designed to bring into being a federation of Europe". In other words, a two-phase policy similar to the strategy originally proposed by Sandys was put forward, laying stress on specific immediate measures to be put into effect, without losing sight of the over-all goal at the end. The immediate plan was explained as follows:

"That the emergency policy should establish forthwith a Council of Western Europe consisting of representatives of the governments of the sixteen participating countries in the European Recovery Plan, and Western Germany, to lay down the broad lines of common action; that the Council should have power to set up permanent international staffs to co-ordinate social, economic and defence policies; that the first and most important task of the economic staff would be to frame concrete proposals for the stabilisation of the currencies of Western Europe, for the development of trade, for the execution of the European Recovery Plan, for a comprehensive production plan, including agriculture and the heavy industries, and for Colonial development; that the necessary staffs should act under the direction, and by the authority, of the Council of Western Europe, and should be continuous in session."

In turn, the motion briefly outlined the eventual organic political structure envisaged, declaring:

"That the long-term policy should be to create a democratic federation of Europe, with a constitution based on the principles of common citizenship, political freedom, and representative government, including a charter of human rights; ./.

1. Hansard 18.3.48. ,pp.2302-2304.

./.. that such a federation should have defined powers with respect to such matters as external affairs, defence, currency, customs, and the planning of production, trade, power and transport..."

Finally, the crucial inter-link stage which Mackay had pressed for at the International Executive Committee meeting of March 6 was presented, though in a slightly modified form:

"..that to this (Federation) objective, the governments of the states of Western Europe should take steps to convene, as soon as practicable, a constituent assembly composed of representatives chosen by the Parliaments of the participating states, to frame a constitution for such a federation".

Up until this moment Mackay perhaps had every right to feel confident. He had, after all, managed not only to activate considerable Back-Bench support for his motion (indeed by mid-April nearly 200 M.P.'s had officially put their names to his proposition). In addition, he had actually secured a majority of Labour MP's among his supporters, thus stealing Churchill's thunder, and avoiding any charge by Labour sceptics in the NEC of his being a Tory stooge. Churchill in fact was hard pressed, not to say embarrassed, by Mackay's mobilisation of backbench Labour support for what he had regarded as his own pet-subject. Moreover, the motion's clear call for an eventual Federation and for the convening of a European Constituent Assembly, "as soon as practicable", constituted a much more radical step towards European unity than envisaged as yet by the leader of the Opposition. As a result, Churchill gave only tepid support to Mackay's plan, stating "we on this side of the House, while not committing ourselves to every detail of the phrasing of the Motion, or even to some of the points which it contains, nevertheless feel this is a matter which should be ventilated and discussed in the House".^I In contrast, Independent MP Kenneth Lindsay, an active member of the All Party Group, declared ./..

I. CHURCHILL, Hansard 16.3.48. op cit.

./ with considerably more enthusiasm that this was "one of the most important Motions which has been signed by Members of all parties and put before the Government for many years."¹ The Government front-bench however remained unmoved, Herbert Morrison refusing to provide official debating time to the Motion. Clearly the Brussels Treaty, signed by Bevin the day before, represented the limit of the Government's current commitment.

It is not certain whether Mackay actually expected such a blunt rebuff to his well-prepared motion, though his correspondence with Coudenhove Kalergi during this period would suggest that he did not.² It was clear that the Government was not going to be persuaded over-night to adopt the radical and perhaps premature programme put forward by Mackay. But in view of the considerable back-bench support which he had managed to mobilise for his motion, Mackay almost certainly hoped for some sort of debate on the matter, in which both front-benches would have been pressed to clarify their position concerning the fundamental political aspects of European Union. Moreover, Mackay had deliberately modified his proposal for a European Constituent Assembly, no longer suggesting that this body should be set up "within six months" - as he had at the International Executive Committee meeting twelve days earlier, but instead, as soon soon as it would be "practicable". In any case, despite this initial setback, Mackay had not lost all hope or enthusiasm in his project; indeed, he gained more back-bench support for it, and came back fighting in the important Foreign Affairs debate held on May 5, the eve of the Hague Congress³

In the meantime, a parallel motion to that presented by Mackay on March 18 to the House of Commons was actually put forward, on March 19, to the French National Assembly by Édouard Bonnefous (the influential head of the French Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee), Paul Rivet (chairman of the parliamentary federalist group), Édouard de Manthon (EPU vice-president) and André Noël (leading member of the CFEU). The motion, supported by 140 French./

1. LINDSAY, Hansard 18.3.48., op cit. 2. MACKAY PAPERS
3. Cf. pp. 176-7.

./MP's from most parties, and deliberately planned in conjunction with the British parliamentary initiative, repeated the specific call for a "European Constituent Assembly", to be arranged by the Parliamentary representatives of each nation willing to become associated in a "European Federation".^I The selection process and date proposed regarding the meeting of this Assembly were, however, slightly less clear than in the corresponding British Motion. The French text in fact called for a "rapid" creation of such an assembly, and invited the French Government to take up the initiative "urgently" with other governments, in order to reach an agreement on the composition and eventual meeting date of the proposed Constituent Assembly. In other words, unlike the British proposition, which plainly indicated that the Constituent Assembly should be composed of "representatives chosen by the Parliaments of the participating states", the French proposal left all options open on this important matter, though it did stress that parliamentarians should be technically responsible for setting up ("constituée") the Assembly. It was not clear therefore, whether the French project intended that the Assembly be composed of Government or Parliamentary-led delegations, or perhaps even be directly elected by universal suffrage. This was a very important point, which led to considerable misunderstanding and a vicious quarrel between Mackay and Bonnefous at the Hague Congress itself. Moreover, it should also be noted that despite the strong and radical stand which Paul Reynaud would take at The Hague on the subject of a European Assembly, he was not one of the signatories to the motion presented to the French National Assembly on March 19. On the other hand, former French Socialist Premier, Paul Ramadier, did put his name to the motion in question, though ironically, as chairman of the Political Debate at The Hague, he tried to cast a moderating ./.

./influence in counter position to both Reynaud and Bonnefous. Other signatories to the French motion of March 19 included Edgar Faure, P.O. Lapie, André Philip, Henri Teitgen, Yvon Delbos, Maurice Schumann, André Le Troquer, Bonnaet, etc. - With such distinguished backing the motion was not officially ignored, as was the case in Britain, but sent to the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee under Bonnefous for further elaboration. The positive results of the Committee's work would subsequently come to light at a crucial time in the European campaign, shortly after the Hague Congress.¹

The point that needs to be emphasised at this stage is that, despite the coordination between the EPU sponsored groups in the French and British Parliaments with regard to the timing of their resolutions for the convocation of a European Constituent Assembly, there remained the lack of a real understanding between the two parliamentary groups concerning the fundamental question of how the proposed assembly was to be composed. Furthermore, during the crucial period between the joint parliamentary initiative of March 18-19, and the actual opening of the Hague Congress itself on May 7, the leaders of the two groups made no real attempt to communicate or reach a common view-point on the matter in preparation for the Congress.² This led to a disastrous split in the important Political Committee debate of May 8-9, re-enforced by the complete disarray and confusion among the participating federalist groups led by Brugmans. The result was that the better-prepared and more moderate strategy of the Sandys-Retinger axis eventually won the day.

On the other hand, the political and psychological importance of this joint parliamentary initiative of March 18-19 should not be under-estimated, since it did convincingly cut across national political boundaries and actually illustrated the spirit of./.

1. Cf. p. 283.

2. Information given to the writer by EDOUARD BONNEFOUS, interview July 1977, Paris.

./parliamentary trans-nationalism which was at the heart of the proposed European Constituent Assembly.¹ Moreover, the numerical backing which the joint initiative received in both countries from sober and - especially in the French case - influential parliamentarians could only help to boost the growing emotional wave of "Europeanism" which the preparations leading to the Hague Congress had partly sparked off. The fact that experienced political leaders such as Ramadier, Philip and De Menthon were ready to put their names to such a proposal also indicated that in France at least the idea of forging a direct strategy leading to political Federation was viewed with considerably less scepticism than in Britain. In this sense, though Mackay's proposal both in the International Executive Committee and in the House of Commons was too far ahead of official British opinion, the political establishment on the European continent was more sympathetic to his case, though also wary of British Governmental caution and the Labour Executive's opposition. The EPU Secretary General, Condembove Kalergi, was also aware of this dilemma, and used it as an excuse to cover his personal objections to playing "second fiddle" to Sandys in the Joint Committee. Thus, despite the pending impact of the Anglo-French parliamentary initiative, he was still not prepared to commit his movement formally to supporting the Hague Congress. In fact, on March 15, in the light of the Brussels Treaty negotiations, he brusquely informed Sandys:

"Since the British Labour Government has taken the Pan-European initiative on the Government level, we will do nothing that would antagonise the British Government. Our final attitude will therefore be determined by the degree of Labour co-operation".²

The subsequent lack of Labour co-operation, however, eventually forced Condembove to swallow his pride and follow the lead ./.

1. An article in Le Monde, for example, noted this "spirit" behind the joint initiative as part of a larger European and federalist action. See "Le Gouvernement invité à préparer la convocation d'une Constituante européenne" 20.3.48.

2. COUDEMBOVE KALERGI, letter to Sandys 15.3.48. SANDYS PAPERS

./, already given by Mackay and other EPU members in supporting the work of the Joint International Committee.

4) Political Report: Final Synthesis

At the same time as Mackay and Bonnefous were about to present their motions to the British and French Parliaments, the International Executive Committee intensified its efforts in achieving a closer synthesis of views with regard to the Political Report and the question of the European Assembly in particular. To this end, an important inner-meeting was held in Paris, on March 12-13, at which Professor Vermeil of the French Council presented yet another draft paper covering all aspects brought up at the meeting of March 6, though laying particular stress on the 'German problem'.¹

The subsequent Draft Political Report, drawn up as a result of this last round of discussions, did not appear to be drastically different in form to the previous report submitted by the General Secretariat.³ There were, however, some subtle alterations in the contents. The preamble, for example, comprised some of Boothby's most pertinent thoughts and reflections on the necessity for European unity. Of more importance was the accommodation of Mackay's allusion to an eventual European Parliament, in the conclusion. An additional clause dealing with the "Spiritual Values" of European Union was also included in the report, as an attempt to reconcile the more philosophical and idealistic currents of thought represented among the French and EUP groupings. On the specific structural issues in question the report nonetheless repeated the call for the setting up of an

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1. E. VERMEIL, 'Congres de l'Europe - Avant Propos', March 1948, CAEM BRUGGE.
2. 'Draft Political Report, embodying the results of the discussion at the meeting of the Joint International Committee in London on March 6 and subsequent exchanges of views in Paris on March 12' (IC/P/16), CAEM BRUGGE.
3. Cf. (IC/P/12), pp. 118-126.

./."Emergency Council of Europe", stressing that this would be an "inter-governmental body at the ministerial level". Similarly, there was no change in its proposal for the creation of a "European Deliberative Assembly", though, in contrast to the previous General Secretariat's report, which had specifically drawn attention to the fact that the Assembly would have "no constitutional powers", the present text evaded the question, while adding, with some ambiguity, that "whilst it could at this stage have no legislative powers, this European Deliberative Assembly would be able to give powerful support and encouragement to the European Council". In other words, the strict and categorical limits which the previous note had implied as regards the role of the proposed Assembly were now open to a broader interpretation, in which a gradual evolution in the Assembly's powers, from one "stage" to another, was marked out. This indication of a joint evolutionary process between the European Assembly and the Council, along with the clear reference to a future "elected European Parliament with legislative powers", and finally, a "complete federation" in the "subsequent stages", all amounted to a rather more radical long-term strategy than might have at first been appreciated. Thus, even if Mackay's proposal for a Constituent Assembly had not been accepted, the ultimate goal of a supra-national European political structure had been stressed all the same. Moreover, the additions made in the new report, with regard to the safeguard of human rights, complimented the over-all message of "supra-nationalism". The report now in fact went much further than the original EUP call for a European Commission on human rights, proposing instead that, among the "immediate steps" to be taken by the governments willing to participate in the Union, there should be a joint "Declaration of Rights", accompanied by the setting up of a "European Court" and actual provisions for armed intervention by a "mixed European armed force" in the event of any "flagrant or persistent ./.

./infringement" of the provisions in the Declaration, such as the prevention of free elections.¹ This rather strongly-worded section of the new text had clearly been influenced by the events in Czechoslovakia at that time, though the fact that the EUP had originally identified this issue as somehow being the responsibility of the Cultural Report, for which Denis de Rougemont was now taking an active preparatory part,² may also have persuaded Sandys and Retinger to ensure that the Political Report and Debate, over which they had more influence, covered the topic fully.

The final Political Report,³ agreed upon shortly after, and eventually submitted to the Hague Congress by the International Committee, repeated all the above points, with only minor - though sometimes interesting - alterations. The introduction notably repeated Beethby's previous anti-Communist warnings that the sixteen nations of Western Europe, while "enfeebled by internal division", faced the prospect of "moral and material ruin" and the "destruction of their free way of life". But where there was "peril" in division, there was also "opportunity" in "unity" from the political, economic, and even the cultural standpoint.

The first main section of the Report, entitled Principles and Objectives, went on to explain this message. While stressing that the "lasting basis" for European unity would depend upon "moral" and "spiritual" forces - "our common belief in the dignity of man, our common heritage of civilisation, our common pride in the contribution which Europe has made in the past to the progress of humanity", etc. , the Report concentrated essentially upon the factual case for "Political Union", putting forward the following argument:

1. It must of course be pointed out that a Declaration of human rights and the need for a European Court had long been crucial tenets in the official EUP programme, but they did not figure in any sharp form in their Draft Political Report IC/P/13.
2. Cf. pp. 152-153.
3. "Congress of Europe The Hague-May, 1948 POLITICAL REPORT submitted to the Congress by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity" CAEN BRUGGE , see ANNEXE I

"It is impossible to keep problems of economic collaboration and defence separate from those of general political policy. Economic and defence plans having been made, political power is required to implement them. The process of industrial and military integration, even in the early stages, inevitably give rise to conflicts of national interests. These difficulties can only be resolved and the necessary compromises accepted when the problem is viewed in the light of wider political considerations. If therefore the policy of mutual aid, adopted by the Governments of the Sixteen Nations, is to bear any substantial fruit, it must be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer political union. Sooner or later this must involve the renunciation or, to be more accurate, the joint exercise of certain sovereign powers".

This key part of the final text presented on May 7 had evidently been obliged to take into account the signing, on April 16, of the Convention for European Economic Co-operation by the 16 Western European governments in the U.S. sponsored Recovery Programme, setting up a mere national organisation to administer the millions of American dollars given to boost Europe's productive capacity. Indeed, to an even greater extent than before, the final Political Report now clearly stressed that economic and industrial co-ordination by itself would not be sufficient to set Europe upon a real course towards Union, and that the crucial remaining problems arising out of "conflicts of national interests" could only be properly solved within a new political framework equipped with eventual supra-national, rather than inter-governmental, powers. Neither the Brussels Treaty alliance nor the O.E.E.C. were thus seen as constituting the real political means for Union, since neither took into account the eventual transfer of some national sovereign powers to a supra-national political authority.¹ The actual terms used in the Report regarding such a transfer of sovereign powers, however, were not fully federalist in scope and meaning. Indeed, by deliberately correcting the notion of "renunciation" to actually mean "the joint exercise" of certain sovereign powers, the Report allowed for the possibility of an ./.

1. This point was later taken up by Mackay, who complained that the OEEC catered for "no transfer of sovereignty, or integration in any sense... It was, in short, a purely intergovernmental organisation". R.W.G. MACKAY Towards a United States of Europe (Hutchinson, 1961) p. 98.

./effective, but not necessarily permanently binding, transfer of sovereign powers to a supra-national European political authority. In other words, it allowed for the democratic and accountable exercise of political powers at a supra-national level, but without stipulating any full technical abandonment of the national sovereign base from which that political right derived. It was a delicate and most ambiguous balancing act, and one which, in the final event, was at methodological odds with the clear juridical-constitutional school of thought of the maximalist MPE, plus other radical supporters of binding constitutional Federation plans such as Mackay and Bonnafous. On the other hand, the more corporatist inclined integral-federalists who objected to the notion of "indivisible sovereignty", plus the more cautious unionists in Britain who, in any case, preferred a loose confederal to a fully-fledged Federal Union of Europe, could find some comfort in this less fusionist phraseology, while Sandys and Retinger clearly regarded an evolutionary, "step by step" policy towards supra-national Union as by far the most realistic policy option. The struggle between the various groups and personalities over the precise meaning of "joint exercise" of certain sovereign powers, however, did not finish with the publication of the Political Report. Indeed, the notion of directly "merging" sovereignty at a supra-national level was re-introduced by Mackay in the drafting of the Political Resolutions on the eve of the Hague Congress, while at the conference itself this idea was again challenged by the more conservative members of the British unionist camp.^I

The remaining part of the section on "Principles and Objectives" dealt with the geographical scope and character of the proposed European Union. The text carefully stated, on this rather difficult subject, that the basic requirement for the admission of a nation to the Union was "its acceptance of democratic principles and its assurance to its citizens of the fundamental rights of the individual". Thus, although the ./.

./."unity of all Europe" was envisaged as the ultimate goal, the text clearly stressed "for immediate practical purposes, all that is left of Europe are the Sixteen(OEEC) Nations and it is upon them that we must for the present found our plans". Any of the initial EUP hopes for a "neutral" Third Force Europe, comprising both the Eastern and Western areas had therefore rescinded in the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia, along with the official launching of the OEEC. In an attempt to shield the campaign from being identified more than necessary with a Western bloc strategy, the Report also, however, considered its plan for a United Europe as constituting the type of "Regional Group" expressly provided for in the Charter of the U.N.O.

The two remaining problems with regard to the European Union's scope concerned Germany and the overseas ties of the member states.

As regards the so-called "German Problem", which, as already noted, was of primary concern to France, the Report clearly warned:

" One of the most crucial problems is to restore the economic life of Germany, without thereby exposing her neighbours to the danger of renewed aggression. This risk will inevitably recur if the formidable war potential of the Ruhr and Rhineland is allowed to revert to the exclusive control of a German State".

The "only solution" to this "dual problem", the Report went on to suggest, was the "integration of Germany into a European Union", which would not only allow German resources to become freely available again to the rest of Europe, as well as enable the period of military occupation to be reduced. It would also allow Germany herself to gain full access to the resources and raw materials in the possession of the other European nations. It was not absolutely clear in the report, however, if the proposed solution was meant to apply only to the Western-controlled zones or to the whole of Germany, though with the subsequent dramatic Berlin crisis in the summer of 1948 it became clear that the plan could comprise Western Germany alone.

The problem of overseas ties was subsequently covered. This subject was evidently of primary concern to Britain, and accordingly, the Report drew upon the strong consensus of opinion in the International Executive Committee in order to stress both the crucial role which Britain should have within a united Europe, and the need therefore to give clear reassurances to the more doubtful elements inside the British unionist camp, as well as to British and Commonwealth opinion in general, about the joint benefits of such a commitment. Two substantial clauses in the Report were given to explaining the matter, under the sub-title "Britain and the Commonwealth". The first clause made it clear that Britain was counted upon to be an active member of the proposed Union, stating:

"No scheme for European Union would have any practical value without the effective participation of Great Britain. The United Kingdom is an integral part of Europe."

Adding that, at the same time, Britain was also "the centre of a world-wide commonwealth", the report continued to emphasise that this "dual position need raise no insurmountable difficulties". This was explained in the second clause, which drew upon a mixture of Beothby's thoughts and the views of the French Council expressed in their reciprocal draft reports of March 6:

"Economically, both Europe and the Commonwealth would be greatly strengthened by being closely associated with one another. Politically, the Dominions have as much to gain as the peoples of Europe. Twice in a generation they have had to send their young men to die in wars which originated in Europe; and they will certainly wish to help remove the causes of conflict at their source".

In an additional paragraph, under the sub-title "Overseas territories", the idea that a European Union must include in its "orbit" the "extensions, dependencies and associated territories" of the European member states was stressed yet further, though the subsequent phrase, explaining that this meant preserving the "existing constitutional ties which unite them", was a clear reference to France's preoccupation with retaining her metropolitan ties, especially in Africa.

To sum up, this first section of the Political Report, dealing with the "Principles and Objectives" of European Union, alluded to a mixture of national interests, Western European fears of Soviet imperialism, and to a certain continuing element of post-war European idealism. This latter factor should not be regarded as a piece of propaganda packaging. Indeed, despite a limited tendency - mainly confined to the unionist camp - to perceive a future European Union as the only means of maintaining the political and economic status quo, there was still at this early stage of the campaign an overriding enthusiasm for the "European Idea", that is to say, for the creation of a supra-national European society which would be based on democratic, tolerant and humanitarian principles, and which, by its supra-national nature, would be an effective safeguard against a renewal of nationalism and the international anarchy which had led to two world wars. This was the essential meaning behind the phrase quoted above - "to help remove the causes of conflict at their source". The Hague Congress, in this sense, would be the first major trans-national conference of its sort to be convened in Europe after the war, and the opening stages of the Congress did indeed capture and illustrate an emotional appeal for future comradeship and peaceful harmony between the European states, which only three years previously had been at war with each other. On the other hand, the Congress was not only conceived to incite a strong psychological boost to the more pragmatic inter-governmental efforts towards European co-ordination. It was also meant to constitute an influential platform in favour of creating new, specific European institutions which would provide the basis for subsequent progress towards a truly supra-national political framework. The next two sections of the Political Report thus went on to deal with the steps which were necessary to take in this direction.

The "Immediate Measures" proposed in section II of the Political Report were in large part a repetition of the suggestions put forward in the final draft text written after the Paris meeting of March 12.¹ Thus, as a first step, the creation of an "Emergency Council of Europe" was again proposed, though, in view of the actual signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, the Report now also specified that the participating governments of the pact - France, Britain and Benelux - had indeed "laid the foundations for this Council" and should therefore invite all the other free countries of Europe to accede. The role of this enlarged Council of Europe was meant to cover not only the problems of military defence and economic recovery (which the Brussels Treaty and the OEEC reciprocally dealt with at an inter-governmental level); it was also meant to deal with "the task of planning the subsequent stages of the political and economic integration of Europe". The text further pointed out:

"The Council will, of course, only be effective if Governments are prepared in practice to implement its decisions, even though these should involve sacrifices of national or sectional interests".

Hence, the report did not openly adopt a counter position to the official inter-governmental measures so far taken to unite Europe, but tried instead to expand upon them. This strategy may have been to the distaste of some of the more radical federalists, but it should also be stressed that the text, evidently influenced by Sandys and Retinger in approach, also pointed out that inter-governmental measures alone would not be sufficient to unite Europe effectively, and that a supra-national attitude would have to evolve for such a purpose. This was what they meant in pointing the way to "sacrifices of national or sectional interests" in the Council which, it should be noted, was no longer referred to in the purely "intergovernmental" and "ministerial" terms that were used in the previous draft.² In short, Sandys and Retinger./.

1. Cf. pp. 136-8 (IC/P/16)

2. Cf. p. 197

./cleverly emulated Bevin's "step by step" policy towards European unity, while, at the same time, they remained a long step ahead, proposing to build upon existing inter-governmental foundations, and to conceive them in a broader and more evolutionary light than had the British Foreign Minister. Their original strategy had, of course, been loosely formulated before Bevin had actually pronounced a specific European unity policy; but they now conveniently adapted even more to his tone, if not to his over-all outlook. The first point that was therefore stressed right at the beginning of the Report's proposed "Immediate Measures" was that the "full unification of Europe can only be achieved progressively". In turn, when it came to describing the type of "administrative and planning staff" required for the independent functioning of the proposed Council of Europe, the text not only looked to the setting up of rather pallid Defence and Colonial Sections, but also to an intensive Economic Section, which should "formulate longer range proposals for the permanent unification of the European economy", and above all, to a Political Section, in order to "develop a common European policy; to secure combined action to uphold and strengthen the democratic way of life; and to examine the constitutional problem of bringing about the organic unity of Europe". To this was added the call for a European "Declaration of Rights" and a "European Court", along with the provisions for armed intervention described in the previous draft.¹ Finally, the Political Report also put forward the proposal for the creation of a "European Deliberative Assembly", described in the same ambiguous tone of the former draft². Moreover, the text now went so far as to suggest that although the "quickest" method for establishing such an Assembly would be "for each parliament to nominate the necessary representatives", an additional phrase was inserted suggesting that "later, a system of popular election should be instituted". This again clearly implied that the./

1. Cf. pp. 137-8

2. Cf. p. 137

./initial European political framework suggested in the report, within the context of "immediate measures" to be taken, was not supposed to remain rigidly stable, but was meant instead to evolve towards the deeper form of "organic unity" explicitly foreseen.

The final section of the Political Report, dealing with the "Subsequent Stages" in the European unity process, repeated yet again that, in addition to the "provisional" urgent measures proposed, "plans must be prepared for the permanent and organic unification of Europe". These plans included:

- " (a) The grant of Common Citizenship, without loss of original nationality;
- (b) The creation of a single European Defence Force;
- (c) The development of a unified economic system; and finally
- (d) The conclusion of a complete Federation with an elected European Parliament."

The text further contended, in what was an evident illustration of Sandys' diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis Bevin, that a clearer official lead was required:

"Under the pressure of circumstances, the nations of Western Europe are taking concerted action to meet immediate difficulties and dangers. But it cannot end there. There can be no turning back from the road which must lead us on step by step to complete union. The rate of progress will be greatly quickened and the dangers reduced if, instead of waiting for events to compel us, we recognise not only the unavoidable necessity of the first steps, but the eminent desirability of the ultimate destination".

The Report in turn concluded:

"Let governments and peoples boldly proclaim that their aim is nothing less than the full and permanent unity of Europe and dedicate themselves to work unremittingly for its realisation".

- It is indeed difficult to claim that this final Political Report presented to the Hague Congress was the work of over-cautious members of the unionist camp, as has been implied ./.

./by Federalist writers¹. Indeed, the third section of the text clearly stated that a full Federation of Europe was envisaged as the final goal of the campaign, while the first two sections attempted to provide both a realistic and adaptable set of proposals as regards the political base from out of which this final Federation should evolve. If anything, the Report was probably more explicit than either Sandys or Retinger had originally envisaged, should we judge from the first memorandum sent out on the subject in December 1947.² This notable radical shift, however, had little to do with any federalist pressure from the EUP; indeed, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the official EUP proposals were somewhat evasive concerning the sovereign-political aspects of European unification.³ It was instead the actual course of political events, such as the setting up of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and OEEC, plus the pressures stemming from the joint parliamentary initiative for a European Constituent Assembly in which Mackay was actively involved, which pushed the organisers of the Political Report towards adopting a more progressive tone.⁴ Sandys' political strategy in the campaign was, after all, to remain always one step ahead of officially-espoused policy in Britain in her relationship towards Europe, while, at the same time, he badly needed the support of the European parliamentary groups in order to provide the Congress of Europe with a sufficiently influential and representative political standing, in view of Coudenhove-Kalergi's stubborn reluctance to involve the EPU as an official sponsor of the Congress.

Despite the considerable progress achieved in the drafting of the final report, there nevertheless remained important areas of uncertainty. This was especially the case with regard to the./.

1. See, for example, BRUGMANS L'idée Européenne op. cit. p.132.

2. Cf. IC/P/4 pp.83-6

3. Cf. pp.II7-8, I21-2

4. Mackay, for his part, also showed a willingness to compromise and moderate his position towards a less direct strategy.

Cf. pp.I36-8.

./specific methods envisaged for the evolution of the immediate inter-governmental stage, first towards the deliberative-organic political framework proposed, and later, towards the "complete Federation with an elected European Parliament" which was conceived as the "ultimate destination". In contrast to the direct juridical approach, favoured by Mackay, Bonnefous, and especially the MPE, Sandys based his hopes upon an indirect political strategy which required a gradual change in the political climate in favour of successive steps towards full supra-national unity. He believed, in other words, that effective institutional changes could only come about providing a consensus of political opinion already approved such measures. To reverse the process, and actually attempt to push through a programme for which there was yet no overriding support, would, he thought, lead only to a flat rebuff by the political establishment, and risk blighting the long-term prospects for a successful campaign. On the other hand, he was not, as would be claimed by radical EUP leaders, of the opinion that the Movement should give no political lead whatsoever. Indeed, as already pointed out, his strategy was always based on keeping "one step ahead" of officially-espoused policy, but not to place himself and the immediate campaign on another planet altogether, even though it was necessary to offer a general view of the final goal. This meant, in turn, that a certain methodological vagueness was implicit within his strategy, along with an over-reliance on somehev "muddling through", in the best sense of British political and constitutional practice. This was not always to the liking of his continental colleagues in the campaign. Nevertheless, before embarking on this rather hazardous European venture, the initial equipment - if not the precise route - was thoroughly prepared and well thought out. Hence, the apparently "moderate" initial proposal for a European Deliberative Assembly was couched in terms alluding to a gradually increasing co-ordination role vis-à-vis the Council, which itself was relied upon./.

./to practice in time a supra-national outlook¹. How this should actually come about was not technically illustrated as yet, though Sandys would later do so². It was clear, however, that the process would only succeed if the Deliberative Assembly could create the right psychological climate and political impetus needed for such an evolution. It was of crucial importance, therefore, to ensure that the initial roles of both institutions should be seen, as the Political Report put it, within a "provisional" light, and as a starting point for future "organic" unification measures. In other words, they had to comprise an in-built expansionary capacity, and be generally regarded from the beginning as being only the "first stage" of a more complicated structure. The foundations, in turn, had therefore to be secure but not rigidly limited in scope. This was indeed the first important step at the start of the campaign, and one for which the Executive Committee could already, realistically, find broad political support, providing a sufficiently popular and influential boost could be given to the actual take-off of the project. At the same time, however, it had to be made clear to the more cautious political elements that they were not technically bound to any fundamental organic transformation, prior at least to a convincing display of political maturity and consensus in the Assembly, as well as in the Council itself. This was the way in which the "historic" Congress of Europe was essentially conceived by the majority of the organising Executive Committee - not as a mere sounding board for over-cautious members of the unionist camp, nor as a platform for a starry-eyed pseudo gathering of the so-called "living forces", pretending to be a "European Estates General", but rather as a convincing major demonstration of illustrious and influential European personalities who were prepared to publicly state their support for immediate steps to set in motion the longer process and ideal of full European unification.

1. Cf. p.144

2. Cf. pp.444-5.

Not all the participants saw the Hague Congress in this light. Some came deliberately in order to water down the delicate balance of opinion and strategy laid out in the Reports submitted. Others came expressly to radicalise the proposed programme, or direct it towards drastically different currents of thought. The subsequent scenes of heated confusion and of occasional manipulation were of minor importance, however, to the sound overall mixture of realism and of idealism for the European cause presented in the Political Report at The Hague, (though admittedly the actual Draft Political Resolution drawn up did give rise to ambiguity). On the other hand, the Report was steered to a position of realism as befitted the British rather than the Continental case, and Sandys to a large extent was responsible for this emphasis, alluding to Bevin's gradualistic policy. Yet it must be equally stressed that, at this moment in time, despite a more progressive yearning among continental political circles for quicker fundamental measures in the unification of Europe, it was also readily conceded that a United Europe would be inconceivable without the participation of Britain. This continuing dilemma would be the cause of considerable friction during the forthcoming European campaign, and would, in the final event, lead to a rupture with the gradualistic strategy still advocated by Sandys when all the evidence pointed to the fact that Britain, whether led by a Labour or Conservative administration, was quite unprepared to really contemplate a commitment to the eventual goal, laid down in the Political Report to the Hague Congress, of a "permanent and organic unification of Europe".

There was no such disenchantment at the campaign's outset. Indeed, the initial strategy advocated in the Political Report, and the subsequent astonishing success of the Hague Congress and of the European Movement in attaining the official creation of the Council of Europe and a Deliberative European Assembly

./., in May 1949, proved to be a decisive victory for the realistic current of thought represented by the Sandys-Retinger axis, and supported by the overwhelming majority of the International Executive Committee in the Spring of 1948. Not everybody in the Movement as a whole, however, was totally convinced, on the eve of the Hague Congress, that this was the best strategy: The more radical members of the marxist MEE wing of the EUP were openly cynical, and were saving their counter-attack against the possibiliste EUP leadership for a more opportune date. In the meantime, just before the Congress was held, the integral-federalists, with Denis de Rougemont appearing at the head, made one last attempt to render the Congress more attune to the ideas launched by the latter at Montreux for a European "Estates General" of the so-called living forces. The efforts which ensued represented the last integral-federalist stand.

CHAPTER **5.** TOWARDS THE HAGUE CONGRESS MARCH-MAY 1948

1) A "European Manifesto"? The last Federalist Hope

"It is not to reveal a State secret", Brugmans ironically wrote, concerning the famous "Message to the Europeans" which Denis de Rougemont delivered to the final session of the Hague Congress, "that this text had raised some fears and some considerable doubts .. among the unionists".¹ This was a direct reference to the tense saga, so colourfully described by de Rougemont himself, regarding the "battle" for the soul of the Hague Congress between his own federalist circle and the more sober-inclined International Executive Committee, dominated by Sandys and Retinger.² Confronted by the fact that the Political Report, coupled with the actual Political Debate at The Hague, was fairly well contained by the Sandys-Retinger axis, while the planning of the Economic Debate was similarly dominated by the rather pragmatic experts among the ILEC leadership, the only area where a federalist 'last stand' might be taken was in the sphere of the Cultural Debate. It has already been noted how, in this sense, the draft political report presented by the EUP representatives on March 6 attempted to enlarge the scope of the Cultural Committee's institutional agenda, by directing the crucial subject of human rights and a proposed European Commission to the latter's sphere of competence,³ and how, in turn, the final political draft countered this rather obvious encroachment.⁴ In a more intriguing though apparently "innocent" way, de Rougemont attempted a similar exercise, with the help of some integral federalist colleagues.

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the drafting of the Cultural Report had been entrusted by Retinger to de Rougemont already at the beginning of the year. This decision was ./.

1. BRUGMANS L'Idée Européenne op.cit., p.132

2. DE ROUGEMONT "The Campaign of the Congresses" op cit.

3. Cf. pp. II f, II n 4. Cf. pp. 137-8, 145

./taken essentially in order to placate the federalists, by giving them responsibility in a field to which they, though not Sandys, attached considerable importance.¹ This was not quite the way de Rougemont actually saw things:

"When Duncan Sandys, in January, then Joseph Retinger, on 25 February 1948 came to see me ... I knew nothing of what had passed since Montreux in the inner circles of the committees...

At Montreux, I had formulated the most radical federalist theses, but it was not my friends from the UEP who came to seek me out in my Voltairian retreat - it was precisely the men from London whom the federalists (rightly or wrongly) mistrusted the most: my innocence spared me the crisis of conscience which they had just gone through".²

Even so, de Rougemont was either sufficiently aware of the stakes involved, or so impulsively confident about his role in the Cultural preparations, as to put forward, "very clearly", three rather imposing, and perhaps mis-placed, "conditions" for his agreement to take charge of the cultural aspects of the Hague Congress, namely:

- "(1) The Cultural Commission, far from being a simple ornamental adjunct to the serious commissions (political and economic) must assume the decisive role in defining the purpose of the whole undertaking and its hoped for consequences.
- (2) In order to prove that it shared this view, the Joint Committee should entrust to the Cultural Commission the drawing up of the Preamble defining the long-term and short-term aims of the congress and of the movement.
- (3) Since this Preamble should contribute also to the codification of the terminology of the resolutions, its contents, drawn up by the cultural section, should be debated before the Congress by the leaders of the political and economic sections."³

In other words, de Rougemont was actually proposing as a condition for his collaboration that the immensely complex efforts, entrusted chiefly to the leaders of the International Executive Committee, in achieving a balanced and realistic Political Report, outlining the principles, objectives and long and short-term measures of the campaign, and which in turn would be submitted to the scrutiny of Europe's most distinguished public./.

./personalities, should in fact take second place to, and be substituted for, his own Preamble and his own proposed definition of what the campaign was all about! Furthermore, he was also insisting that the Cultural Commission should somehow replace the collective expertise of the other two Commissions, and actually "assume the decisive role" in laying down the main reference points for the subsequent debates of the above bodies. - And all this, we remember, was being put as a condition by someone who, in his own words, "knew nothing of what had passed since Montreux" in the working and executive committees of the Movement. In view of the intense and delicate work required for the Political Report alone, the complexity and difficulty of which was illustrated in the preceding chapter, de Rougemont's attitude towards the actual leaders of the movement was, to say the least, a little naive.

Retinger nevertheless played along with de Rougemont, despite the obvious political complications which the latter's attitude presented the International Committee. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Secretary General seriously entertained the thought of handing over the Congress' soul to de Rougemont in the way demanded. More likely, he intended to channel the latter's enthusiasm and federalist eloquence to a more isolated though harmlessly spectacular plane. Thus, it appears that Retinger actually obtained, "with some difficulties" the agreement of the organisers allowing de Rougemont to deliver his Preamble immediately after Churchill's inaugural speech at The Hague (though the writer has found little clear material related to this point). "Retinger had supported me very skilfully", de Rougemont recalled, quoting from a letter sent to him from the Secretary General on March 29, of which the following is an extract:

"I consider that this declaration ought to form the starting point of our joint work and after the Congress, it must become a manifesto of the whole international./.

./European movement. Just like the peace pledge in England a few years before the war was covered with some 13 millions signatures - in the same way we must endeavour to have this manifesto supported by millions of signatures of Europeans, thus creating a very strong popular movement as each signatory would not fail to remember his signature and his pledge. It cannot fail also to produce an additional pressure on timid and recalcitrant governments.

The launching of such a manifesto ought to constitute one of the principal and immediate objects of the Congress and of our movement. It ought, by the work of collecting signatures, to keep our ideas constantly alive among the masses. Every meeting organized by our affiliated bodies must end in collecting these signatures (and eventually ¹ a few pence from each signatory to keep the work going).

Though Basinger was clearly excited by the prospect of such a European pledge, it was equally evident, if one reads between the lines, that the precise conditions which de Rougemont had originally issued regarding the actual running of the Hague Congress itself had not been met. The campaign for a popular European manifesto was certainly important and constituted the type of appeal to the "masses" which the EUP militants would thrive upon, but it was a campaign which would be affectively modelled after the Congress, leaving the more intricate details proposed for the Political and Economic Debates in tact at The Hague. In short, by the very fact that such a European pledge, in order to be attractive and intelligible at a mass popular level, needed to be concise, and to indicate in broad terms the principles and objectives of the European campaign, meant that de Rougemont's writing skills, rather than any deeper philosophical thoughts should be most called upon. He did not exactly see it this way however. Already by the end of February he had enlisted the help of some 50 European philosophers, writers, and academics. Soon after, in March and April, numerous working committee meetings took place in Paris, Geneva and London, at which de Rougemont's federalist-'personaliste' colleagues, such as Alexandre Marc and Robert Aron, took a leading part in formulating ./.

./the Report and draft of Resolutions for the Cultural Debate, as well as the text of the Preamble for the Congress as a whole, which was far from brief or general.

However, at the Joint Committee meeting of April 8, in Paris it was suddenly decided that the text, now entitled "Preamble", would constitute a "Message to the Europeans", to be approved by acclamation, and therefore delivered only at the closing session. Moreover, the new format was to be restricted to two pages in length, of which only the last ten lines would actually describe the pledge. Furthermore, representatives of all three sections would examine the text prior to the Congress, "to ensure the necessary homogeneity of the reports of the three Commissions".¹ As if this was not enough, on April 26, in London, de Rougemont was also informed by the Congress organisers that there existed two other Cultural Reports, whereas his project as a whole was "too long" and "spoke of federalism", a stand which was not supported by all. Consequently, it was decided to circulate all three texts plus a shortened version, written by de Rougemont, incorporating the substance of all the reports.

- As the latter recalled, with some bitterness, ..

"I felt that over the head of my report, they were aiming at the 'Message', they were trying to break the federalist point of the congress".²

The fact which de Rougemont did not seem to appreciate, however, is that the Hague Congress was not planned as a purely "federalist" gathering, still less the internal-orientated, philosophical brand of "integral-federalism" to which de Rougemont and his closer colleagues adhered. The "Congress of Europe", as described in the preceding chapter, was conceived by the clear majority of the International Executive Committee as a spectacular "historic gathering" of leading European personalities, who would publicly declare their influential support for the supra-national "European Idea", and for immediate practical./.

1. Joint International Committee meeting, 8.4.48., official minutes (IC/M/II), p.4., CAEM BRUGGE.

2. DE ROUGEMONT, op.cit., p.341.

./measures to initiate,where realistically possible,the European unification process. There was simply no possibility, so far as the organisers were concerned,to subject the many important personalities attending the conference to the ivory-tower passions of federalist theorists. The idea of the latter group,that the Hague Congress should constitute a "European Estates General" of the "living forces",had clearly been repudiated early in the year¹,if not right at the start of the whole co-ordination effort. Indeed,there was nothing to stop the integral-federalist militants from organising their own pseudo "Estates General",on a glorified Montreux basis. They chose not to,because they realised,in effect,that the Congress of Europe,organised by such a well-connected international body,with such influential spokesmen,and with the towering personality of Churchill apparently at the head,would easily out-match a gathering of mostly unknown theorists. But having accepted(he matter how reluctantly)that this was the position,it was surely unfair for people like de Rougemont, and Marc in an even more aggressive manner,to later assert that they had somehow been duped by the whole affair. The policy and tactics employed by Sandys and Retinger.were certainly open to more than a touch of machiavellianism,but on the other hand,it was surely unrealistic,indeed absurd,of de Rougemont to think that he could monopolise the sense of the whole Congress according to his own thoughts and federalist objectives. He had not,in any case,totally given up the struggle. - As he concluded,after the series of official rebuffs received towards the end of the preparatory stages to the Congress: "We were all nervous on the eve of battle".²

1. Cf. pp. 40

2. DE ROUGEMONT,op cit. p.341

2) Labour boycotts The Hague:repercussions

The biggest political problem still facing the organisers of the Hague Congress, right to the eve of the conference itself, remained the hostile attitude of the British Labour Party. The reasons for this negative response to the Congress by the Party machine, if not the Parliamentary Party as a whole, and the dangers it presented in undercutting international Socialist support, have been outlined in an earlier chapter, which concluded describing the hostile decision of the International Socialist Conference held at Seltsden Park on March 21-22 regarding the Hague Congress.¹ Up to this point, the much more enthusiastic French Socialist Party had made appeals, but had not clearly criticised the attitude of the Labour Executive on the issue. This would no doubt have remained the position had Guy Mollet continued weakly to present the SFIO case to Labour. After the disastrous March meeting, however, Léon Blum was convinced that much more pressure should be applied, and now opened a bitter campaign against the Labour Party's narrow minded European policy. The British Labour Executive, he tacitly charged, were encouraging a dangerous partisanship that could well destroy the unity movement in its infancy, and in fact negate the very idea of European unification. Furthermore he pointed out that his Labour colleagues had failed to present any positive programme for the attainment of a Socialist Europe, whereas the campaign for a representative European Assembly now held the key to an eventual federation. It was therefore necessary, he firmly concluded, for the European Socialist parties to co-operate with the International Committee responsible for the Hague Congress.²

Despite his strong criticism of Labour policy, Blum was nevertheless careful not to split ranks on the issue, at least not at this stage. In a leading article printed./.

I. CP. pp. 95-114. 2. BLUM Le Populaire 25.3.48. ,see
also F.F. RITSCH The French Left and the European Idea,
1947-1948 (Paquet Press, New York, 1966), pp.165-7.

./..in the French Socialist daily, 'Le Populaire', he in fact partly blamed Churchill's personality, as the honorary leader of the United Europe Movement, for Labour's subsequent relapse into partisan politics over European unity:

"Mr. Churchill has a character too original and too powerful for him not to leave his mark on everything he touches...He continues to play a part of the first importance in the internal politics of his country and in international politics.

The stamp of his approval brought with it the danger that the European Federation would have a character too narrowly Churchillian. This is explained the embarrassment, circumspection and hesitation of the Labour Party, and in consequence, of international Socialism. The Federalist movement would have great difficulty in emerging from the shadow of a too illustrious name".¹

Churchill in turn responded in an open letter to Blum by firmly rejecting the notion that his initiative should have actually prejudiced the cause of European unity:

"When at Zurich in September 1946 I revived the ancient and glorious conception of a United Europe..which I had supported for many years, I had no idea it would become a Party question. I thought it would become a movement and an inspiration on a level far above Party politics in any country. Indeed if we cannot rise above Party differences in a common cause on which we all agreed, how can we hope to bridge the fearful gulfs of reciprocal injuries between nations great and small, and thus repair the ruin of Europe? This was I believe your view too, until you became aware of the adverse decision of Mr. Shinwell and the Executive of the British Socialist Party. It would be a disaster to a supreme and vital cause if ordinary Party politics in Britain were to obstruct this great international movement".

The Conservative leader in turn argued:

"Nothing could be more wrong and foolish than for the Socialist Parties of Europe to try to create and maintain a monopoly of a cause and policy which belongs not to local Parties, but to whole States and nations...The idea that Europe could be united on a one-Party Socialist basis...is of course absurd. You will need all the help you can get and we shall need all the comradeship of which we are worthy, if we are to win this great prize for all the peoples, for all the Parties 'for all the men in all the lands'." ²

1. BLUM, Le Populaire 26.3.48.

2. CHURCHILL, letter to Blum 7.4.48., CAEM BRUGGE

It should be stressed at this point that neither Blum nor Churchill really intended to rebuke the other. This public exchange of letters was meant perhaps more for the attention of the Labour leadership. Blum, on the one hand, did not want to fall victim to any collaborationist allegations, nor directly confront the pre-Labour Guy Mollet faction at the head of the SFIO. Thus, by appearing to question Churchill's European credentials, but bringing in reality the partisan attitude of Labour more into light, the veteran French Socialist leader effectively increased the pressure on Labour to show greater European magnanimity. Churchill, for his part, publicly illustrated the difficulties which Labour's singular approach to Europe had placed upon the continental Socialist leaders, and he indeed took the opportunity to conclude his letter to Blum with the following eloquent plea for a united campaign:

"The British Socialist Party have not threatened with disciplinary measures or victimisation any of their members who may come to The Hague as individuals, and I trust that the French Socialist Party will allow full freedom to its own members; for I am sure that all who fell out of the line in these grave and melancholy times will expose themselves to the reproach of history. I hope therefore for all our sakes that the position may be made plain in a manner conducive to the dignity and independence of all Parties and to the causes and principles which Parties exist to serve.

I address this letter publicly to you, my dear Monsieur Blum, because of our association in the struggles of the past and I hope that our closing years may see us united in the march to what is noble and true."¹

Blum's campaign to induce a non-partisan approach to the European campaign appeared to bear fruit.--In a well-received speech on April 9, he thoroughly committed himself to the idea of a Western European Third Force, in which socialism would play a leading role in co-operation with other forward-looking Parties: "The Third Force", he stated, "is that means by which democracy at the national level will be transported to the international level, and for this, socialism must serve as a guide."²

1. CHURCHILL, op. cit. 2. "Discours de Stresa" 9.4.48., see L'Ouvre de Léon Blum 1947-50, (Paris, 1963), p.189

His forceful approach apparently won over Mollet¹ and other Party leaders, and in the second week of April the SFIO requested a special session at the forthcoming International Socialist Conference in Paris to discuss yet again Socialist participation at the Hague Congress.² The British Labour Executive also appeared to be open-minded about the subject, having effectively appreciated Blum's earlier letter to Churchill.³ Indeed, just a few days before the conference, planned for April 24-5, Blum and his staff at 'Le Populaire' were "immediately optimistic". Robert Verdier was especially convinced that the Labour delegates were going to "soften their position and that socialism would now construct a realistic programme for achieving federation through co-operation with the International Committee".⁴ The preparatory meeting to the conference, on April 18, gave rise to further enthusiasm, and the positive hope that socialism would become the "animator of European federation."⁵ Blum, as one of the leading French delegates to the special session dealing with the Hague Congress, was now ready for his most crucial battle in the European campaign.

The reality of feeling in the British Labour camp, however, had not changed. On April 20, only four days before the conference, the Labour International Committee of the N.E.C. agreed that "the position adopted at Selsdon Park should be maintained", though - as a rather pallid attempt to placate the French Socialists - it was also agreed to "encourage the establishment of a more powerful and permanent Socialist organisation in Europe."⁶ An additional working paper, entitled "Notes on European Unity",⁷ and which dealt only with economic co-operational measures, would also be used as a basis for discussions. In short, the Labour delegation to the Paris conference, led by Dalton, Morgan Philips and Denis Healey, was intent upon stubbornly./.

1. Retinger had also appealed to Mollet for support in a letter, dated 19.4.48., stressing non-partisan politics, RETINGER PAPERS

2. See F.F. Ritch op.cit.p.167. 3. See Times 24,26.4.48.

4. F.F. Ritch op.cit, from Verdier in Le Populaire, 15.4.48.

5. Ibid, from Le Populaire, 18.4.48.

6. I.C. meeting, 20.4.48., official minutes, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES

7. Ibid.

./resisting any French pleas for co-operation with the International Committee organising the Hague Congress, as well as any attempts to push through proposals for a supra-national political unification of Europe. Despite all the French enthusiasm which preceded the conference, the omens for a happy outcome were not good.

In the meantime, in the wake of the joint parliamentary initiative for a European Constituent Assembly, described earlier¹, the Labour Parliamentary Party members of the "Europe Group", led by Mackay and Crossman, had not lost hope of a successful Labour turn-out at The Hague, despite the National Executive's official discouragement, plus the set-back at the Selsdon Park meeting. Crossman's faith in a strong Labour lead in the growing European campaign was emphasised further in an important leading article written for the March edition of the French 'Revue Socialiste', calling for closer Franco-British socialist co-operation for the European ideal.² By the beginning of April, Mackay, for his part, was so confident about the growing support for the European campaign that he wrote to Coudenhove-Kalergi declaring:

"I cannot at the moment say that Bevin will back the Hague Congress but there is every indication that he will".³

Even Sandys, who was not often inclined to make rash political judgements, despatched a message to his organization team that "representation of the British Labour Party at the Congress is absolutely certain", adding that this information could be used privately to "reassure" the other continental Socialist delegates.⁴

1. Cf. pp. 128-136.

2. F.F. Ritch, op. cit., p. 162

3. MACKAY, letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi, II.4.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

4. SANDYS, telegram sent to Bogholm, Rodd, Silva, Tombacopoulos, Kerstens, Delattre plus Van Zeeland, 26.3.48., CAEM BRUGGE.

As a result of this growing confidence in a strong Labour turn-out, plus the increasing prestige which the Hague project in general was acquiring, Coudenhove-Kalergi, in turn, bowed to the pressure with which Mackay persuaded a crucial meeting of the EPU Council, held on April 9, to commit the parliamentary movement to supporting the Congress on a formal basis. In consequence, the EPU also appointed official representatives to the Joint International Committee.¹ Though substantial parliamentary representation had been secured beforehand, this important decision by the EPU now meant that, technically speaking, the EPU itself would be responsible for issuing invitations for the actual Congress to European members of Parliament. Socialist parliamentarians could therefore attend the Congress without appearing to have been invited by a Churchill-led movement, as the Labour Executive had previously chosen to interpret. This point was immediately taken up by the 'Keep Left' European activist Leslie Hale M.P., who, in an urgent letter to Dalton, claimed that "a fundamental change" had now taken place, and that there was no longer any reason for the National Executive to discourage individual Labour MP's from attending the Hague Congress.² At the subsequent NEC International Committee meeting of April 20, however, the Labour Executive's attitude hardened still further, and it was agreed that any action by Labour MP's to actually attend the Hague Congress would be "strongly disapproved of by the Party."³ The Labour General Secretary, Morgan Philips, in turn personally informed Hale that there had been "some misunderstanding as to the real attitude of the National Executive Committee to the Hague Congress."⁴ The official NEC policy was subsequently clarified in a stern letter sent by Philips on April 21 to each of the 42 Labour MP's who still to this date intended to go to The Hague. The letter stated, in the coldest of terms, that./.

1. Information officially sent by Mackay to Retinger in a letter dated 13.4.48.; MACKAY PAPERS

2. HALE, letter to Dalton. 13.4.48. , MACKAY PAPERS

3. I.C. meeting, 20.4.48., official minutes, op.cit.

4. Philips, letter to Hale, 21.4.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

./the Labour Executive's attitude toward participation at the Congress had been "misrepresented" by those members who still thought that they were free to attend as individuals, despite official discouragement. The Labour General Secretary therefore reminded these members:

"that the National Executive Committee strongly disapproves of members taking part in the Hague Congress, whether as individuals or as representatives of organisations."

He then went on to warn:

"The National Executive Committee is unconditionally opposed to any action which might appear to associate the prestige of the governing majority in Great Britain, however indirectly, with an organisation calculated to serve the interests of the British Conservative Party." I

He no longer was the Party Executive simply advising Labour MP's not to support the Hague Congress, it was now clearly threatening them not even to attend in an individual capacity, since this would be a breach of Party policy! At a time when the Executive was already carrying out a witch-hunt against Labour MP's who had shown their sympathy for the pro-Communist ~~Nonni~~ Socialist Party in the Italian elections of April 18, leading to the expulsion of J. Platts-Mills M.P. from the Labour Party,² the dangers entailed by confronting such an official threat were apparent to all. Hale for one, however, was not deterred and wrote an equally stern letter to Morgan Philips rightly indicating that for some time the Labour MP's intending to go to The Hague had acted, with the tacit involvement of the Labour leadership and Party whip, on the assumption that they could attend the Congress as individuals, despite the lack of encouragement from the Executive. He then added:

"In all these circumstances I am very deeply concerned that an action which must have been known to the Executive for many weeks should now be the subject of what appears to approach very near to an official ban.."

1. Official letter by Morgan Philips sent to the 42 Labour MP's intending to go to The Hague, 21.4.48., MACKEY PAPERS

2.

3. HALE, letter to M. Philips, 22.4.48., MACKEY PAPERS

Proceeding to defend his position on the grounds that the Hague Congress was effectively regarded as an all-party conference, and that it would be much wiser "to try to capture the Conference for the socialists" than to let Churchill steal the show, he forcefully concluded on the following point:

"I am writing only for myself, but the 40 odd members who have made all arrangements to go to the Hague represent the most loyal and most active supporters of the Government.

If I myself am confronted with the decision that I have either got to go to my constituency and say that I have abandoned the decision I publicly announced, and which I announced as what I considered to be a great step for world peace, and if we are to leave Mr. Churchill to go to The Hague and point to two and three hundred empty chairs, and that although the socialists of Europe have publicly announced their intention to co-operate, they have abandoned their idealism in response to the Whip, I should regard it indeed as a major political disaster, ... I do not think it is a decision I could possibly take. Certainly I would prefer to resign my seat, and to continue as a loyal member of the Labour Party outside the House." ¹

Not all among the 42 Labour MP's who had agreed to go to the Hague Congress displayed the same courage and tenacity as Leslie Hale. Already, on April 26, the influential Labour spokesman on Germany, John Hynd M.P., appeared to be backing out, on the grounds that individual Labour representation at the Congress would now "have very unfortunate interpretations placed on it". ² Hale tried to pre-empt such hesitation among his colleagues by privately gaining an assurance from Morgan Philips that the NEC had not actually placed a ban on members going to The Hague; they had simply felt obliged "to reiterate their strong view". ³ Mackay and Cressman readily took up this news, ⁴ and along with other members of their group, addressed/.

1. HALE, letter to Philips, 22.4.48., op. cit.

2. J. HYND, letter to Mackay, 26.4.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

3. "Memorandum on an interview between Mr Morgan Philips and Mr Leslie Hale on April 22nd, 1948", MACKAY PAPERS.

4. IBID.

./the following points to Morgan Philips the day before the crucial Labour Executive meeting of April 28:

"..The position we are placed in is an exceedingly unfortunate one. We count ourselves amongst the most loyal members of the party, and are deeply disturbed at the suggestion which is constantly being made in the press that this is a defiance of a Party decision, or something in the nature of a rebellion. Throughout these very long arrangements we have kept the Party in every way informed as to our activities...

We felt at the commencement that it would be a tragedy if, at the Hague conference, which will inevitably be described as a representative conference, we were allowed to go forward with the case (European unity) on the basis of Mr. Churchill's speeches, which we felt were based on a fundamental misunderstanding and misconception of the real needs of the situation and we felt it right to seek an opportunity of asserting the Socialist faith in this matter at this important meeting. But the second purpose of the Hague Conference, and the purpose we seek to achieve, is the federation of all the organisations which have been adumbrating proposals for Western Union. If this is to be done, we must have on the controlling committee of the federated organisation substantial Socialist representation. This we hope to achieve...

Furthermore, we are informed that many other Socialist Parties in Europe will be represented, on the basis of our announcement that we propose to attend".¹

As in the past, however, the NEC meeting of April 28, under Shinwell's hard-line chairmanship, remained totally unmoved, and reaffirmed that it would be "undesirable for members of the Labour Party to attend the Hague Conference", and that it would also be "inconsistent with the Labour Party's international policy" should they become members of any permanent organisation set up at The Hague.² Morgan Philips in turn informed Leslie Hale of the decision, adding in conclusion:

"In the view of the National Executive Committee, the objects which we all have in view can best be promoted by ensuring the successful development of.. Socialist instruments, rather than by dispersing the energies and interests of members of the Party over a large number of organisations some of which are dominated by political elements hostile to the British Labour Party and to European Socialism." ³

1. Joint letter sent to Morgan Philips on 27.4.48. MCKAY PAPERS
2. NEC meeting, 28.4.48., official minutes, op. cit.
3. PHILLIPS, letter to Hale, 28.4.48., MCKAY PAPERS.

From the point of view of European Socialism, however, the Labour Executive's behaviour at the International Socialist Conference at Paris, on April 24-5, was hardly exemplary! Hugh Dalton and his team arrived with the firm conviction of not budging an inch in their opposition to Socialist participation at the Hague Congress, and despite strong pressure from the other Italian, Belgian, Dutch and French delegations, they forced their intransigent views upon the reluctant conference. Léon Blum, who made himself the chief spokesman for those who favoured a non-partisan approach toward European unification, and who wanted to support openly the Hague Congress, was indignant and deeply disillusioned by Labour's inflexibility. "For two days, the elder statesman of French socialism ardently championed his beliefs, while the Labourites stood firm. Unable to shake the British, Blum, frustrated, charged the Labourites with faithlessness toward Socialist ideals; was it not, asked Blum, a traditional policy of socialism to support all democratic efforts at internationalism; were, then, the Labourites true Socialists?"² The parties represented at The Hague, he went on to contend, were all democratic, even if some were non-Socialist, and a Socialist-orientated Federal Europe could never be achieved without working in co-operation with other parties.³ Pressed by Dalton's unwavering resistance, however, the conference decided ultimately to maintain the British policy of non-participation at The Hague, and non-co-operation with the International Committee, though in the final resolution some vague references were made to an eventual "supra-national" European federal structure, along with the more immediate need to set up an ephemeral European Socialist Information Centre.⁴

1. In a tough speech to a mass meeting organised by the SFIO on the eve of the conference, for example, Dalton clearly warned against mixing the European ideal with the "corruption" of "reactionary politicians". Speech 23.4.48., DALTON PAPERS
2. F.F. Ritsch, op cit. p.168.
3. KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 1948 p.9272. See also articles in Manchester Guardian and Times, plus Le Monde 25-6.4.48 and particularly "Socialisme et Fédéralisme" Le Monde 27.4.48.
4. Official Résolution of Paris Conference 25.4.48. DALTON PAPERS

On April 27, the National Council of the SFIO, acting on the instructions of the International Socialist Conference, made non-participation at the Hague Congress the official party policy.¹ It was a decision taken with considerable reluctance and much bitterness toward the Labour Executive. Guy Mollet, who had been so cautious in the past, was now openly sceptical about Labour's European policy, while Léon Blum finally decided to break ranks with Labour and remain loyal to his long-founded Socialist international principles, even if this meant having to transcend party policies and prejudices. On May 7, the tired and frail veteran leader of the French Socialist Party, the tormented and lonely figure-head of democratic humanitarian socialism, who had fought off the ruthless bolshevikisation of his Party in 1920, who had resisted the proto-fascist attacks on French democracy in 1934 and inaugurated the most compelling series of social reforms in French history in 1936, who had courageously overturned the trial by his Vichy accusers in 1941 and went on to survive the Nazi concentration camps, now, at the end of his years, stood up to Labour scorn and Party timidity and attended the opening session of the historic Congress of Europe, accompanied by fellow Socialist, Paul Ramadier.

The Congress, moreover, was attended by numerous other Socialist MP's from all over Europe, though none with Blum's experience and standing. Even Paul-Henri Spaak, in the final event, failed to turn up through deference to Labour. Yet, in a way, Labour was also unofficially represented. Despite the threats and accusations of the Labour Executive, 23 Labour MP's, including Mackay, Hare, Shawcross and Bynd did actually take part at the Hague Congress, and were subsequently castigated for doing so at the Labour Party Annual Conference in May.²

1. F.F. Ritsch op cit. p.169.

2. Cf. p.264.

Mackay would subsequently write to Sandys "I always felt guilty about our bet, so I am enclosing a cheque for £5 to square it up. The bet was for 25 MP's and in the long run only 23 went" (ie to The Hague)!, MACKAY PAPERS

Three days before the opening of the Hague Congress, however, 14 among the 42 Labour MP's who had originally intended to go to the Congress timidly backed down, and on the eve of the Congress itself they were joined by another 5 members of the delegation, including Richard Crossman,^I who subsequently had very little to do with the 'Europe Group', and who would eventually conform to the Labour establishment's European policy despite the rebellious courage he showed on other international questions.

All in all, the Labour Party's record over the Congress of Europe was a dismal and small-minded one. Despite Churchill's inevitable presence, this Congress was, after all, the first mass post-war European rally of its kind, and in its own historic way, paved the psychological path for European integration in the future. It was a Congress upon which great statesmen such as Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer staked their subsequent political career, while veteran Socialist leaders like Léon Blum had the magnanimity and vision to dedicate their historic reputation to its success. The British Labour Party, however, - the most powerful and respected Socialist Party in Europe, with a Government the most capable and most looked to for a European lead - threw away much of its international prestige and admiration for narrow and short-sighted political reasons, and has subsequently done little in the European field to restore its immediate post-war reputation. In immediate terms, Shinwell and his colleagues in the Labour Executive had complained that the Hague Congress would not be "representative"; by refusing to participate, and by attempting to force the other European Socialist Parties to do likewise, they themselves deprived the Congress of this very possibility.

I. For Labour Party representation at the Hague Congress, see the official final list of delegates, CAEM BRUGGE, plus the following articles: Manchester Guardian, 'Delegates to conference on European Union', 17.4.48.; Sunday Dispatch, 'Socialists and the Hague Congress', 9.5.48.

3) Conclusion to the Preparatory Stages

Despite Labour's boycott of the Hague Congress, and the pressure put on other Socialist Parties to follow suit, the energetic efforts of the Joint International Committee, and especially Sandys and Metinger, ensured that the ever-all composition of the Congress was both impressive and representative in the general sense. Indeed, the efforts of the campaign organisers seem, if anything, to have redoubled in face of Labour's attempted sabotage.¹ In this, they were substantially helped by the EPU's official decision, on April 9, to sponsor the Congress,² along with the formal entry of the NEI, under Robert Bichet, to the International Committee, on April 8.³ The USSE, also accorded considerable private help, especially in France and Britain, and would be classed as an unofficial sponsor of the Congress. As a result of such co-operation, the organising committee could indeed claim that the preparatory stages to the Congress had been successful. The official publication of the European Movement, printed one year later, described the outcome as follows:

"The Congress succeeded beyond all expectations. It proved to be the most remarkable and representative gathering of prominent international personalities that has ever been assembled to discuss the fate of Europe. It was attended by some 800 persons of almost every European nationality. The delegations included well-known statesmen, among them several former prime ministers and a number of ministers in office; Members of Parliament of all shades of democratic opinion; bishops and prominent churchmen of all denominations; leading industrialists and trade-unionists; eminent lawyers, economists, university professors, scientists, artists, poets and authors; and members of a wide variety of women's, youth and other organisations. Whilst all were invited in their individual capacity they could, as a whole, claim to represent with authority every important aspect in the life and opinions of Europe."⁴

1. The International Committee meeting, 8.4.48., official minutes (IC/M/II), plus the subsequent invitation report prepared by Sandys (IC/P/16) indicate an acceleration of effort on this matter. CAM BRUGGE.
2. Cf. p.163
3. IC/M/II, 8.4.48., op. cit.
4. European Movement and the Council of Europe, op. cit., p.36

It was no empty statement. Among the official list of delegates to the Hague Congress¹, there figured the names of famous past, present and future European prime ministers, including:- Churchill, Eden and MacMillan for Britain; Herriot, Daladier, Reynaud, Ramadier, E. Paure and Chaban-Delmas for France (plus the initial presence of Léon Blum); Van Zeeland for Belgium; Adenauer for Germany; De Gasperi for Italy, and so on. Other famous political personalities and ministers who attended, in addition to those already active in the Joint International Committee, included:- François Mitterrand, François de Menthon, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, M. Schumann, André François-Poncet, Ugo La Malfa, Peter Thorneycroft, Sir Maxwell-Fyfe; Sir Arthur Salter, plus active Socialists such as Georges Bohy, Paul Rivet, Victor Collins, Hugh Delargy, Gordon Lang, Carlo Schmidt, Ignazio Silone, Aldo Garosci, etc. (the latter being the leading anti-fascist comrade of the murdered Rosselli brothers). The list of economists, trade union leaders, industrial and cultural figures is too long to describe; suffice to mention names such as Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, Lord McGowan, Bob Edwards, Paul Finet, Salvador Madariaga, Bertrand Russell, etc. The religious side was equally well represented, the Congress receiving the support of both the Anglican and Catholic hierarchy. In short, it certainly was a most spectacular European gathering, Labour's hostility notwithstanding. In the sober assessment of Harold MacMillan, "it was indeed one of the most remarkable and representative collections of famous European personalities ever brought together"², while Paul-Henri Spaak, despite his reluctant absence, later stated that the Hague Congress was to become "an historic landmark in the annals of Europe."³ Léon Blum, for his part, declared at the end of the Congress that "a new phase in the history of the world" had been launched⁴.

1. See Annexes

2. H. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op cit. p. 158

3. P.H. SPAAK, The Continuing Battle, op. cit. p. 201

4. LEON BLUM, Le Populaire, editorial on The Hague, 12.5.48.

The final run-up to the Hague Congress did, of course, pose a considerable amount of organisational work at the location of the conference itself, where Senator Kerstens took charge. Last minute problems also occurred at the international level. The official boycott policy of the International Socialist Conference was obviously the most important set-back, even if the decision was not carried out by most Socialist Parties with any firmness. Another pressing problem, however, resulted from the crucial Italian elections of April 18, and the subsequent political re-organisation in that country, which in turn diverted the attention of many Italian politicians who otherwise would have attended the Congress, though de Gasperi did actually turn up. The Italian delegation to The Hague was consequently reduced to almost half, with a total turn out of only 57 representatives. This was an important point, since the majority of the Italian Parliament was favourable to European Federation and, had the delegation been numerically stronger, the Political Debate at The Hague would probably have been more orientated toward radical proposals for European unity. Instead, despite Count Carandini's formal commitment to European Federation, as Italy's main spokesman and as the effective mouthpiece of the MFE, the Italian delegation as a whole maintained a low-key presence at the Congress, just as Spinelli had suggested at the MFE conference in February^I, and as he, for once, now acted upon. On the other hand, the more gradualistic inclined British and French delegations to The Hague were increased to a significant extent, accounting for about one hundred and fifty persons each, thus amounting to not much under half of the eventual representation at the Congress. This considerable Anglo-French weighting to the affair was indicative of how Sandys' initial conception of working through a British and French based United Europe Movement had actually affected the make-up of this historic Congress of Europe. The low Italian turn out, plus the relatively high number of cautious Scandinavian delegates (32 per-/-

./.(Denmark, 12 for Norway, 19 for Sweden), provided a further weighting of opinion favourable to Sandys' realistic European unity approach.

To this was added the fact that the British delegation to the Hague Congress was extremely well organised in advance as a coherent working group under the nominative chairmanship of Mackay, and perhaps more importantly, under the actual chairmanship of Boothby for the Political Committee, Layton for the Economic Committee, and Lindsay for the Cultural Committee - the former two personalities remaining in liaison with Sandys. In addition, Sandys' close assistant, T.B. Martin, would act as Secretary to the whole group, thus ensuring the Executive Chairman's partial supervision of the team. Furthermore, at the International Executive meeting in The Hague, on May 3, attended by Sandys, Kerstens, Retinger, Brugmans, Mackay, Silva and Moel, the primary Steering Committee for the running of the Congress as a whole was chosen, and again ensured that the realistic current of opinion, identified with the Sandys-Retinger axis, would be dominant over that of the Federalists. Out of the main personalities in this Committee Brugmans was in fact the only EUP voice, the other members being Sandys, Kerstens, van Zeeland, Mackay, Courtin, Retinger and Rebattet.¹ At the last Executive Committee meeting, held on the eve of the Congress itself, Sandys secured a final safeguard against any over-radical statements of intent which Denis de Rougemont might have wanted to make for the federalists, by gaining the Committee's agreement to approve the letter's 'Message to the Europeans' only when "certain passages" had been re-drafted.² Moreover, the "broad lines of the organisational arrangements for the campaign to be conducted after the Congress" were to be explained in the closing session by Sandys himself.³

1. I.C. meeting, 3.5.48., official minutes (IC/M/I2) CAEM BRUGGE

2. I.C. meeting, 5-6.5.48., official minutes (IC/M/I3) CAEM

3. Ibid. BRUGGE.

Despite these tactical moves by Sandys in the actual organisational framework of the Congress, it was surely only reasonable that he, as the executive chairman of the Congress and of the international movement which had made it possible, should have at least a word over the orientation of the campaign to follow. He would, in any case, be limited to "incorporate the views" expressed at the final Executive Committee meeting.¹ Sandys, more than any other person involved, bore the brunt of responsibility for the success or failure of the Congress. It would therefore have been naive to expect him to release the reins of power, after nearly a year of hard preparation, to federalist spokesmen such as de Rougemont, whose views neither expressed the feelings of the overwhelming majority in the preparatory committee, nor the bulk of opinion among the delegates to the Congress in question. On the other hand, the EUP was also clearly an important international organisation involved in the project, even if most of its adherents were relatively unknown. Its members and leaders certainly had a right to make their opinions known, but not to monopolise or take over the Congress as some would have wished.² When this fact finally dawned upon some of the more radical federalists towards the end of the Congress, they tried to wreck the whole enterprise, while Spinelli would later claim that the organisers prevented them from being heard.³ That there was some manipulation during the course of the debates at The Hague is not in doubt. This manipulation, as we shall see, was not, in fact, wholly activated by Sandys (despite appearances), but by rather more sceptical Conservative members of the British unionist camp. If, however, there was one major reason why

1. Official minutes (IC/M/I3), op. cit.

2. Paul-Henri Spaak, in this sense, would note two years later that the "decisive" merit of the Hague Congress, in contrast to previous federalist gatherings, was the fact that it re-united famous political personalities "of the first order" rather than unknown "idealists" of earlier times. See ORGANIZZAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE, speech on "European Unity" 6.5.50. P.H. SPAAK

3. SPINELLI, 'Storia e Prospettive del MFE', op. cit. pp. 163-4.

./the federal European point of view was not dominant at The Hague, it was, above all, because of the doctrinal and irresponsible divisions which existed between the various federalist groups themselves at the Congress. The utter lack of solid preparation within the EUP led to squabbles and misunderstandings between its various integral-federalist, possibiliste, and fusionist wings, while its MFE members, for the most part, sulked in the background. On a broader scale, parliamentary political personalities, such as Mackay and Bonnefous, found themselves at odds over the question of the European Assembly, whereas Reynaud appears to have been misunderstood by his own partner, Bonnefous, on the very same question! To top all this confusion, the veteran EPU Secretary General, Coudenhove-Kalergi, would create panic and apprehension throughout the whole debating chamber by talking about the "revolutionary" changes the project would bring about. Yet all these parliamentary personalities were fundamentally in agreement with each other about the main steps to be initiated for the eventual creation of a European political federation. Had they devoted a little time to seeking a joint presentation and position, the Congress would have been spared some of the long and hostile intra-federalist battles,¹ though it is doubtful whether the EPU members could have reached any compromise with the integral-federalists in the EUP, since the former were working toward fusion, while the latter were working toward diffusion, of political power in Europe.

In this connection, before going on to describe the Political Debate at the Hague Congress, it is first necessary to appreciate the slight change of attitude and strategy which Mackay, as a central figure in the debate, adopted in the immediate course of events which preceded the opening of the Congress.

¹. The earlier chapter dealing with the joint-parliamentary initiative for a European Constituent Assembly, Cf. pp. 135-43, described these common points between Mackay and Bonnefous, as well as their lack of a common understanding before the actual convening of the Hague Congress.

It should be recalled that in the first official British Draft Political Report, presented on March 6 to the International Executive Committee, Mackay had called for the creation of a European Constituent Assembly, to be composed of parliamentary delegated representatives and to be convened "within six months".¹ This suggestion was confronted with the General Secretariat's more moderate proposal for the convening of a European Deliberative Assembly.² In the subsequent House of Commons motion of March 18, Mackay unsuccessfully requested an official debate on his proposal, backed by about 120 M.P.s, for a European Constituent Assembly to be convened "as soon as practicable".³ In the subsequent Foreign Affairs debate, on May 5, Mackay again drew attention to his motion, now backed by 190 MP's, but deliberately moderated the tone of his approach by describing the type of Assembly in question as "a constituent assembly of some kind" which, he went on to reassure more sceptical members, was "not to settle a form of constitution like that which the Americans or Russians have, but so that an opportunity can be given to people to discuss the form of political organisation to be devised in the future for the proper working of the Federation of Europe and the United States of Europe".⁴ In other words, his proposal was no longer that of creating a European Constituent Assembly in the full direct-political sense, but rather an Assembly perilously similar to the European Deliberative Assembly called for in the final Political Report submitted to the Hague Congress, which would have a much vaguer political-constitutional competence.⁵ This much was indicated in Mackay's speech of May 5, when he stressed that this "European Assembly" (excluding the term Constituent) would be composed of MP's from Europe who could "sit together for two or three months to work out a method or way in which there might be some kind of union between the European Powers."⁶ He then added, in terms similar to the thoughts./.

1. Cf. p. 120 2. Cf. p. 120 3. Cf. p. 131 4. HANSARD 5.5.48.
5. Cf. pp. 145, plus 137. 6. HANSARD ibid P. 1282-3
P. 1284

./expressed in the Political Report, that "there would be nothing binding" in the work to be done by this European Assembly, "it would have to come back to the Parliaments for ratification. "Is not", he in turn concluded, "the time arriving for something like that to be done?"¹

Thus, despite the fact that Mackay was still doggedly pressing the Government "to transfer the sovereignty of this country to another authority...to face the problems of union which means merging into a wider sovereignty"², he had toned down his previous direct constitutional strategy to a considerable extent, relying upon a much looser and more ambiguous political phraseology in order indirectly to achieve the same ends. Though his position was still, in the final event, a juridical one, he had learned quite enough from the March 18 episode, plus the subsequent direct opposition of the Labour establishment to political Federation plans, to realise that the softer and more slippery approach adopted by the Sandys-Retinger axis had some merit to it. This shift of emphasis in Mackay's strategy was in turn of crucial significance in the context of the Political Debate at the Hague Congress. Indeed, at the International Executive Committee meeting at The Hague on May 3, Mackay, plus Brugmans and André Noel were given responsibility for drafting the Political Resolution which, upon the approval of the International Committee, would be presented to the Congress for debate.³ This draft Resolution was, of course, meant to be based upon the proposals listed in the Political Report, about which there had been so much discussion. - Nevertheless, it was also obvious that to draw up a crisp and succinct format for the./.

1. MACKAY, HANSARD op cit p.1284 Cf. also pp.139-40

2. Ibid p.1283.

In the course of the same debate, Mackay received valuable support from A. Salter M.P., who called for a "new conception of sovereignty" and to "pool some degree of authority", while Boothby also added that "the supreme object of our policy (was)..the creation of a United States of Western Europe", based upon "a series of organic acts of union". HANSARD

3. Official minutes of meeting (IC/4/12), op. cit.

./actual two-day debate of the Political Committee was a most important responsibility, and one for which Sandys must have had sufficient confidence in Mackay, as well as Brugmans for that matter, to carry out according to the well-defined guidelines already arrived at. This confidence was well-placed, and in the final draft Resolution submitted to the Political Committee the key clause referred only to a "European Deliberative Assembly", while in his actual presentation of the Resolution, Mackay, who along with Courtin was designated Rapporteur to the Committee, stressed the need "to avoid getting into such phrases as 'constituent assemblies'", preferring instead to refer simply to "an Assembly that can do something."^I The point to stress at this stage, in any case, is that, by the time the Hague Congress was actually held, Mackay's approach to the problem of convening a European Constituent Assembly had considerably changed, though unfortunately neither Bonnefous nor Reynaud had been sufficiently warned about this new guise.

The draft Reports and Resolutions had now been prepared. Nearly 800 important European personalities were due to arrive at The Hague, where the crowds were busy anticipating above all the arrival of their war-time hero Winston Churchill. The world press corps and mass-media was already present. The member-movements of the organising committee were nervous and agitated. Leading Socialist politicians were either sulkingly looking from afar, or actually drawing upon their sometimes frail resources to show up, courageously, despite Labour wrath and Party apprehension. - In short, the scene was now set for the most exciting and surely most extraordinary post-war European Congress. Yet there remained one outstanding problem, which indeed was only finally settled on the eve of the Congress itself: the question about which flag to use! ...

I. The draft Resolution and the presentation of views on the question of the European Assembly will be analysed in the next chapter.

At the International Committee meeting of March 5, it will be recalled, Sandys had proudly presented his own design for the Congress - a broad red 'E' for Europe. However, once the EPU had officially decided to sponsor the Congress, in April, Coudenhove-Kalergi at once became very agitated about this artistic creation by his rival, and actually pleaded with Churchill to change the proposed flag, arguing that 'E' would be seen as representing 'England':

"I am sure that you will understand my feelings: for me this is as if someone would suggest to you to replace the Union Jack with the letter 'B'!"

Defending his own Pan-Europa flag, he continued to argue:

"As a matter of fact, the red Cross has been Europe's flag for nine centuries, since it has been the banner of the Pan European armies of the Crusaders. Its background, the golden sun, represents European civilisation enlightening the world." I

As if this lurid description was not enough, Coudenhove went so far as to claim that his flag was actually "burning in the hearts of millions of Europeans as a promise of a brighter future"! Churchill, however, does not appear to have shown much interest in the matter, despite Coudenhove's assertion that "symbols are even more important than programmes." Sandys remained rigid on the issue, explaining that his emblem was not a European flag but simply a symbol for the Congress, whereas Coudenhove's flag was too controversial. Rubbing salt into Coudenhove's wounds, he went on to state flatly that the latter's artistic design was in fact "a lousy flag - almost entirely dark blue, relieved only by a yellow ball with a small red cross on it"²! The red 'E' thus remained the flag for the Hague Congress, and would later be used as a symbol of the European Movement, though the colour was changed to a more sober green. - It was not a personal defeat which Coudenhove took well, and amid the array of blowing 'E's at The Hague, and one year later at Strasbourg, there could be seen the more colourful individual signs of Coudenhove's resistance.

1. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, letter to Churchill I4.4.48. CAEM BRUGGE
2. SANDYS, letter to Mackay, CAEM BRUGGE.

With this final problem out of the way, everything was now ready for the opening of the Congress- at least nearly everything since there would also be some amusing incidents at the Congress itself caused by minor organisational slip-ups. This lighter side of the story apart, the Congress was indeed a tremendous success. In the words of Joseph Retinger:

"Never in my long experience of public life have I seen such an imposing gathering. Important people volunteered to come and spend their time working out practical proposals for implementing this new (European) idea. They did not know what the reaction of the public would be; many of them did not know what would be the reaction of their governments or of their respective parties. Many of them realized that because of the positions they held they were taking on an enormous responsibility. They could derive no special glory from it since they were too many for any one of them to claim much credit, and they therefore had to work more or less anonymously."I

This description by Retinger of the difficulties and anonymity facing participants to the Hague Congress was for the most part true. Not everyone who turned up at the Riddersaal Palace on May 7, however, came with the idea of shunning publicity, as we shall see.

I. RETINGER, memoirs op.cit., pp. 220-221.

B. THE CONGRESS

CHAPTER

6

THE HAGUE CONGRESS MAY 7 - 10, 1948

1) THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION, MAY 7

"People called us Utopians and starry-eyed idealists, but today the first step towards European Union has been taken. ... Europe is uniting, but unless we make sure that the Union is a federal one it may not help us very much. Economic Union must be accompanied by political union. We need a European Parliament elected by us, the peoples of Europe, to control the European planning so that it does not become a European Big Business monopoly... We must control the controllers... Our Union must be based on a Charter of Human Rights...

We, the people, have got to show our governments this is the only sort of Union we are interested in, and we must make our governments agree to create this sort of Union - not a mere Alliance... but a real Union with common citizenship and a common government for our common affairs; an open Union which the other peoples of Europe can join."¹

-This eloquent plea, delivered on radio by Miss Josephy just a few days before the start of the Hague Congress, in many ways summed up the deeper longterm issues involved in this unique European conference. The novelty of the gathering was not simply the influential array of European "Notables", as Paul Reynaud described them, who actually attended the Congress, but the effective transnational popular appeal which the whole project was attempting to conjure and subsequently channel behind the growing European campaign for organic political unity. Not everyone who attended the Congress, it is true, felt as strongly about the longterm integration measures in the same way as Miss Josephy and her federalist friends, but there was nevertheless a broad desire among most delegates to push the European governments a step further than the interstate co-operative measures taken hitherto in the unification of Europe. The Hague Congress was also, in a rather more dramatic sense, a kind of irresistible ceremony, creating new bonds between the European peoples, and exorcising the past national spirits of hatred and of conflict which had led to so much suffering and destruction. As befitted such a ceremony, the initial setting and./.

1. MISS JOSEPHY, text of an address on Radio Luxembourg 2.5.48.
CAEM BKUGGE

- ./ opening celebration at The Hague created the right psychological mood. Denie de Rougemont described this almost artificial atmosphere in the following way:

"Presidents and rapporteurs, we had crossed the hall in procession, Churchill and his wife leading the way up to the tribunal where Juliana and Prince Bernhard were already seated. There were flowers everywhere and fanfares in the courtyard of the palace. 'It might be a wedding' whispered Lord Layton."¹

The Opening Plenary Session, held on the Friday afternoon of May 7 in the 'Ridderzaal' Palace at The Hague, set the tone for this historic "Congress of Europe". It was, above all else, a spectacle, a significant and symbolic demonstration, showing the vitality and sense of common purpose which the ideal and objective of European unity could summon among people whose nations only three years earlier had been torturing, murdering and tearing each other apart in the most barbarous and hideous, nationalist inspired war in their history. In this immediate and compelling sense, the Hague Congress was certainly an exemplary success in terms of displaying European humanism and a joint endeavour to exert peaceful and fraternal solutions and goals upon the existing problems and future dangers facing Europe and the world at that time. The staging of the Hague Congress indeed defied the rigid national barriers and ethnic divisions which had so often and so recently submerged the European continent into a calamitous blood-bath. It brought to the attention of public opinion the humane possibilities and decisive relevance of the European Idea, setting the pitch and generating further the enthusiasm for the practical action and official policies of the years to come. - As V.D Clark commented in a leading article for 'The Observer':

"The meeting was in fact not a Congress but a political demonstration - the most impressive and authoritative demonstration that has been held for years or even centuries."²

1. DE ROUGEMONT, "Campaign of European Congresses" op. cit., p. 342
2. V.D. CLARK, "Hopes at The Hague", 'Observer', 16.5.48.

- However, he also remarked:

"..but nevertheless only a demonstration. If this meeting and all that may flow from it is understood to be part of a political campaign - an agitation, spontaneous, determined and purposeful - then it may well produce results - even great results.

But these meetings must not mistake their own character, or conceal the real limits of their powers. The delegates are not elected, they have no mandate, and their deliberations can enlighten but not direct the peoples of Europe."¹

This blunt statement of the factual limits of the Hague Congress, as well as its crucial role and duty, illustrated the dilemma, felt by many of the delegates, between the idealistic urge to rush towards the attainment of full European unity, and the sense of realism with which the means for achieving this goal had to be tempered. In the words of Harold MacMillan, "The extravagances of some of the younger enthusiasts had naturally to be restrained by the efforts of the more experienced and prudent members."² But such prudence did not suit everybody, the result being that the main debate mixed the "admirable" with the "grotesque", though it did at least have the advantage of "forcing the partisans of a united Europe to define their position."³

The first main speaker to do so was the Honorary President of the Congress, Winston Churchill. Mounting the rostrum, after the initial welcoming speeches by the Bourgmester of The Hague and by the Chairman of the Dutch organisation Committee, the former British war-time leader proceeded to make his famous "Grand Design" speech which, in terms of actual commitment and oratory, outshone even his Zurich speech in favour of European unity. It was, furthermore, the only major speech which Churchill delivered to The Hague Congress, thus deflating Labour's accusation about his wilfully dominating the whole project.

1. CLARK, *ibid.*

2. H. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., pp. 161-2.

3. Western Europe Since the War, op. cit., p. 47.

4. W. CHURCHILL, speech delivered at the Opening Plenary Session of the Hague Congress. 7.5.48. - Plenary Verbatim Report #5-4
CASH BRUGES.

Referring initially to the historical background of the European "Grand Design", dating to Henry of Navarre and his "great Minister Sully", Churchill drew attention to his own Zurich speech of 1946, and was adamant in stressing that the European Idea was above the petty party squabbles with which Labour appeared to identify the issue:

"This is not a movement of parties but a movement of peoples. There is no room for jealousies. If there is rivalry of parties, let it be to see which one will distinguish itself most for the common cause. No one can suppose that Europe can be united on any party or sectional basis, any more than any one nation can assert an overweening predominance. It must be all for all. Europe can only be united by the heart-felt wish and vehement expression of the great majority of all the peoples in all the parties in all the freedom-loving countries, no matter where they dwell or how they vote."

Paying tribute, in fact, to the work done by Bevin, as well as by Spaak and Bidault in this field, Churchill went on to claim that the Congress, by bringing together such a rich and varied grouping of representatives, effectively constituted the "voice of Europe" - that is, of a free and tolerant Europe, liberated from tyranny and war-time hatreds, and joyful in its vast cultural inheritance. He in turn attempted to give definition to the latter ideals which the movement should aim for:

"The movement for European Unity, as our draft Report declares, must be a positive force, deriving its strength from our sense of common spiritual values. It is a dynamic expression of democratic faith based upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. In the centre of our movement stands a charter of human rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law. It is impossible to separate economics and defence from general political structure. Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defence must inevitably be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer political unity."

He then added:

"It is said with truth that this involves some sacrifice or merger of national sovereignty. I prefer to regard it./.

./..as the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions all of which under totalitarian systems, whether Nazi, Fascist, or Communist, would certainly be blotted out forever."

Thus, by pitching his definition of the movement's broader aims and conceptions so closely to the official draft Report, Churchill clearly intended to remain within the centre-ground of opinion at The Hague, neither identifying himself with any strict co-operative current, nor with any platonic visionary view of full-scale federalism. In adopting this middle-course, he was almost certainly influenced by Sandys. Hence, while accepting the general need for some sort of "larger sovereignty" for European affairs, he also made it clear that in his opinion this did not necessarily entail any drastic sacrifice at one particular moment, of national sovereign rights and standing; rather, just as his son-in-law had consistently preached, it was a matter of gradual change and development in this direction, in accordance with outside circumstances and internal consensus. The external threat of Soviet expansion, and the need therefore to rebuild Europe upon a Franco-German reconciliation, was also evident in his speech. Thus, repeating his Zurich message, Churchill boldly stated:

"Europe requires all that Frenchmen, all that Germans and all that every one of us can give. I therefore welcome here the German delegation, whom we have invited into our midst. For us the German problem is to restore the economic life of Germany and revive the ancient fame of the German race without thereby exposing their neighbours and ourselves to any rebuilding or reassertion of their military power. United Europe provides the only solution to this two-sided problem and it is also a solution which can be implemented without delay."

He in turn declared:

"..We seek nothing less than all Europe. Distinguished exiles from Czechoslovakia, almost all Eastern Europe nations, and also from Spain, are present among us. We aim at the eventual participation of all European peoples whose society and way of life are not in disaccord with a charter of human rights and the sincere expression of free democracy. We ./..

./welcome any country where the people own the Governments,
and not the Government the people."

Later in the speech, his criticism of the Soviet bloc was even clearer:

"Why should they (the Eastern European nations) now be regimented... by variously labelled forms of totalitarian tyranny, all fomented by wicked men, building their own predominance upon the misery and subjugation of their fellow human beings? Shall so many millions of humble homes in Europe, aye, and much of its enlightenment and culture, sit quaking in dread of the policeman's knock?"

(...)

"That is the question we have to answer here. That is the question which perhaps we have the power to answer here. After all, Europe has only to arise and stand in her own majesty, faithfulness and virtue, to confront all forms of tyranny, ancient or modern, Nazi or Communist, with forces which are unconquerable, and which if asserted in good time, may never be challenged again."

The rest of Churchill's speech was mainly devoted to the more specific requirements which the initial steps towards European unity should take. In this, he drew attention to his war-time call for a Council of Europe as a necessary part of the future world organisation, and in partnership with the "vast Soviet Union" on the one hand, and the "United States and her sister republics in the Western Hemisphere" on the other. The present attitude of the Soviet Union towards European unity, however, meant that such a partnership could only be initially reached in the West. Of major interest in this speech was Churchill's commitment to include Britain within the proposed European project. Thus, while stressing the need to "move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth", Churchill clearly stated that he envisaged "the Council of Europe including Great Britain linked with her Empire and Commonwealth." In explaining the type of institutional machinery required in order to establish such a European Council, the British Opposition leader urged the Conference to be valiant but not to overestimate its actual role and competence:

"I take a proud view of this Congress. We cannot rest upon benevolent platitudes and generalities. Our powers may be limited, but we know and we must affirm what we mean and what we want. On the other hand it would not be wise in this critical time to be drawn into laboured attempts to draw rigid structures of constitutions. That is a later stage, and it is one in which the leadership must be taken by the ruling Governments in response no doubt to our impulse, and in many cases to their own conceptions. We are here to lay the foundations upon which the statesmen of the Western Democracies may stand, and to create an atmosphere favourable to the decisions to which they may be led. It is not for us to wield the authority of Governments to confront each other or the world with sharply-cut formulas or detailed arrangements. There are many different points of view which have to find their focus."

He in turn described where such a synthesis of views might be reached in an official European capacity:

"The task before us at this Congress is not only to raise the voice of Europe as a united whole during these few days. We must here and now resolve that in one form or another a European Assembly shall be constituted which will enable that voice to make itself continuously heard and we trust with ever-growing acceptance through all the free countries of this Continent."

It was clear therefore that in Churchill's view the Congress should not attempt to put forward precise proposals for a European Constituent Assembly, still less for an immediate demand upon governments to establish a European Federation according to a plan issued from this unofficial gathering at The Hague. As he perhaps rightly implied, if the project was not to be rejected outright, the complications and sensitive views surrounding the issue necessitated a patient and realistic strategy. Just as Sandys had continuously advocated, a broad official and popular consensus was first required before proceeding towards a deeper form of organic union. Thus the role of the Congress was first to "raise the voice of Europe" in the general sense, and secondly, to call for the official creation of what Churchill evidently intended to be a Deliberative European Assembly, in order to achieve agreement at a more important level. The./.

./ essential weakness and ambiguity in his presentation, however, was his failure to indicate whether the Assembly in question was actually meant to formulate "the sharply-cut formulas or detailed arrangements" which were outside of the scope of the Congress itself. The text of his speech instead only referred to the rather general role which the Assembly should have in upholding the case for European unity, but not necessarily any specific programme of action. Was this the limit of Churchill's commitment? - He did imply that a "stage" would later be reached when "structures of constitutions" might be drawn up, but this was to be within the competence of the European Governments, "in response no doubt" to the impulse of the Assembly and European campaign as a whole. The precise nature of this "impulse" nevertheless remained in doubt, unlike the more explanatory evolutionary steps proposed in the Political Report drawn up under Sandys' chairmanship.¹ Churchill's evasiveness on this crucial issue would be challenged by R.W.G. Mackay, the next day, in his presentation of the Draft Political Resolution.²

For the moment, Churchill concluded his historic opening speech at The Hague stressing the "high and solemn responsibility" which rested upon the Congress not "to cast away forever" the opportunity which it presented for a united Europe. - His discourse was received with intense and sustained applause. The Dutch evening press reports were also full of praise for his stately address, calling it "a masterful definition of the necessity for a United Europe", or presenting it under the headline "Welcome".³ Within the next few days his speech received positive front-page coverage throughout the international press as a whole, with only the Communist and Labour-orientated journals seeking to diminish its contents and importance.⁴

1. Cf. pp. 137, 144-146. 2. Cf. pp. 203-16. Het Binnenhof & Nieuwe Courant reciprocally 7.8.48. - Evening press reports compiled in SANDYS papers.

4. International press collection CAEM BRUGGE.

After a dignified interval following Churchill's opening speech, the Chairman of the Plenary Session and former French Premier, Paul Ramadier, addressed the Congress in a rather low-key discourse illuminated only by his praise of Churchill's past actions for a united Europe and present realism about how to work towards it through established governments and national institutions. This moderate and pragmatic approach which Ramadier supported was rather a contrast to his previous position apparently in favour of a European Constituent Assembly¹. He now in fact publicly stated that "Europe would not be constituted by a type of coup d'Etat", nor would it be created by "a sort of federalist revolution, which would weaken the Governments without strengthening the collectivity." Instead, he appealed for a campaign which would promote the "internal evolution" of the official Brussels Treaty Organisation rather than launch a "destructive shock" against it. Only a gradual approach, he concluded, could succeed, while the alternative would offer no salvation.²

In contradiction to his eminent French colleague, Coudenhove-Kalergi, who now mounted the rostrum, openly declared in a rather emotional speech punctuated by a mixture of French and English, that the creation of a United States of Europe "surpassed the mandates of our Governments", and that a Constituent arrangement was the "immediate and radical solution" to the European question. He then pointed to the efforts already taken in this field by his European Parliamentary Union which, he claimed, "represented the peoples of Europe and not their Governments", and as such constituted the European "avant-garde". The rest of his speech dealt mainly with the support given to the European campaign by the United States, and he quoted particularly from a personal letter given by the Head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, fully supporting ✓

1. Cf. p. 133.

2. P. RAMADIER, Opening Plenary Session Verbatim Report 7.8.48., op. cit. pp. 10-11.

./ the Congress and its aims. He then finished his address by pointing out that the creation of a united Europe must be based upon the two "noblest foundations" of its past, "Greek individualism" and "Christian socialism", and perhaps above all on the "dignity of the human person." Its aims should be to assure a permanent European peace, a good standard of living and the freedom of its citizens.¹

Despite the visible and overriding agreement on the need to construct a united Europe as a living symbol of freedom and of individualism, in contrast to the totalitarian regimes in the Eastern European bloc, the two distinct currents of thought which would characterize the debate at the Hague Congress were already clear. On the one side, there was the pragmatic evolutionary approach to European Union put forward by Churchill and supported by Ramadier. On the other side, Coudenhove-Kalergi dismissed his earlier pro-governmental prudence², rejected the cautious advice of Europe's elder statesmen, and rode the populist hobby-horse of 'Federation now!' His radical enthusiasm for "immediate solutions" would be even more noticeable in a later stage of the Political Debate. Up until this moment, however, there had been no real federalist speaker. This was soon rectified by the next two delegates to address the Conference, Count Carandini, as leader of the Italian delegation and the only effective mouthpiece for the maximalist MFE, and Henry Brugmans, as head of the EUP, and proponent still of a rather moderate brand of integral-federalism:

Carandini, after having drawn attention to Italy's particular economic and demographic plight, lost no time in arguing that diplomatic or economic pacts alone were of no lasting value in the European campaign. Instead, the crucial issue of European sovereignty had to be clearly tackled.

1. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, Opening Plenary Session, V.R., 7.5.48.
op. cit. pp. 11-14.

2. Cf. p. 135.

This could only be done, he said, by having a "guarantee of a collective and disciplined supra-national political accord" as an essential precondition for the setting up of a "uniform system" of union. He went on to explain that the success of an economic unification of Europe depended upon "a true and disciplined political federation of the European states."¹

The initial part of Brugmans' important opening speech, later published by the EUP under the title "La Question Préable"², appeared to support fully Carandini's maximaliste political stand: "Never", the EUP Executive Chairman declared, "would a gathering of sovereign States save us from nationalism." The intergovernmental and interministerial meetings of the OEEC and of the Brussels Treaty powers would inevitably represent only the "reasons of state". Nothing would really be achieved until the "sacred dogma of national sovereignty" was overturned. The "immediate" and "realizable" goal of the Congress, he therefore urged, was to "federate Europe" and "envisage" the setting up of "a Government and European Parliament." However, Brugmans also clearly declared, in staunch defence of integral-federalism, that "European federalism is not uniquely a political order. It is at the same time functional." Indeed, he went on to stress the accompanying need for the "organisation of things", for the setting up of common "specialist bodies, autonomous and linked at the same time". In other words, despite his personal inclination for some sort of ultimate democratic-political control, Brugmans felt obliged to support what he considered to be the more fundamental integral-federalist cause of devolving powers to the autonomous "living forces". This was in contrast to Carandini's call for a "uniform" and "collective" political Federation at a supra-national "disciplined" level, prior to any localised devolution outside the realms of political accountability. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that Brugmans./.

1. CARANDINI, Opening Plenary Session V.R. 7.5.48. op cit, pp. I4-17.

2. Pamphlet edited by EUP Geneva, see CEC GENEVA.

./o did at least put forward a less dogmatic and less anti-political case for integral federalism than was supported by his more doctrinaire colleagues. The pressures on him, however, to state more clearly the precedence of the so-called "living forces" over the traditional type of political representative institutions came to light in his "disastrous"¹ intervention later in the Political Debate. For the moment, however, he concluded this first speech with the following eloquent plea:

"Et si nous saisissons cette dernière chance, nos petits-fils diront de nous:

Ils se sont ressaisis en pleine misère. Ils ont su dominer leurs servitudes et leurs faiblesses. Ils ont démontré que rien ne brise l'élan des peuples libres. Ils furent justes, ils furent forts et pacifiques. Ils ont bien mérité du genre humain."²

The next speaker, Gregoire Gafencu (former Romanian Foreign Minister), drew attention to the desperate situation in the Eastern half of Europe, dominated by Soviet totalitarianism. The word "Europe", he stated with deep feeling, provoked the strongest and most emotional reverberation among the Eastern European nations, who regarded the initiation of unity in the Western half of the continent as a "promise of peace" and eventually a "promise of liberation." He further added that the complementary economic potential of both halves of Europe made it indispensable to visualise an eventual re-establishment of links between the two. He also insisted that if Western Europe did not take a strong stand now, Soviet aggression would expand even further. The conclusion he therefore reached was that a "positive and courageous" policy had to be adopted; there was no better option than that of the "federative principle."³

1. Brugmans' own description of his later intervention. - Interview, Brugge, July 1977.

2. BRUGMANS, Opening Plenary Session V.R. 7.5.48. Op. cit. pp. 17-21.

3. GAFENCU, *ibid.* pp. 21-25.

The illustrious former and future Premier of Belgium, Paul van Zeeland, responded to Gafencu's passionate appeal for the unity and liberty of all Europe by proposing at the end of what was otherwise a slightly dull and cautious speech the following special Resolution:

At the start of the deliberations, the Congress affirms that its object can only be fully realised when the whole of Europe is united and organised. Therefore, sixteen nations having up to the present decided to co-operate, they emphasise that their gathering does not constitute a closed community and send fraternal greetings to all Peoples.¹

The Resolution was adopted unanimously to warm applause, and this first Session of the Hague Congress came to a dignified end.

It was indeed a successful Opening Plenary Session, full of enthusiasm yet tempered by a sense of responsibility. On the one hand, there were 'revolutionary' calls to break down national barriers and build a united Europe based on universal moral principles of freedom, democracy and social justice. On the other hand, there was the rather 'grandfatherly' guiding spirit, associated with Churchill, Ramadier and van Zeeland, advising caution and restraint. The Congress was clearly united in its horror and abjuration of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe, yet apparently confident that a West European Union would somehow eventually alleviate the plight of their fellow Europeans on the other side of the 'iron curtain'. The Congress, above all, had a certain dignity which appeared at times to be almost stage-managed. Differences of opinion could already be discerned, but there was as yet no bitterness or petty squabbling. These differences were nevertheless highlighted by various press reports. 'Le Monde', for example, drew attention to the contrast between Churchill's and Brugmans' position, and actually appealed for some "conciliation" between the two.²

1. VAN ZEELAND, Opening Plenary Session V.R. 7.5.48. Op. cit. pp.25-7.
2. Le Monde, in depth report 8.5.48.

The pro-federalist journal 'Combat', however, maintained that the Congress, as the effective "voice of Europe", had the right to put forward its views with "force and precision."¹ In the French Communist organ, 'Humanité', on the other hand, there was no attempt to understand or portray the various divisions and issues at stake at The Hague. The Congress was instead described as a "masquerade" and as an attempt to unify "America's Western European colonies" for a future war against the East.² The British Labour weekly 'Tribune' merely remarked that "the Congress of Europe was a great occasion for Mr. Churchill."³

The Opening Plenary Session of the Hague Congress had, without doubt, been a success. The disciplined and well-organized presentation of views would soon be shattered, however, by the subsequent antics and procedural chaos which ensued during the two-day debate which commenced the next morning, on Saturday May 8, when the Congress split into three working committees - political, economic and cultural. This study will be mainly concerned with the work of the Political Committee.

2) THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE DEBATE AND RESOLUTIONS: MAY 8-10

The meetings of the Political Committee were held in the dining room of the Hague Botanical Gardens and Zoo. There were times when this particular location seemed to be a rather apt setting for the debate which followed. Indeed, with regard to the contrast between the previous day's stately inaugural ceremony and the actual amateurish scenes in the first session of the Political Debate, a press report from the Manchester Guardian commented:

1. Combat, article on the Hague Congress by federalist Bernard Voyenne, 8.5.48.
2. Humanité, article by Pierre Courtade, 8.5.48.
3. Tribune, "Whats Happening" - article "The Hague Labours" 14.5.48.

"The session ...was...deplorable. Several hundred delegates and observers gathered...and sat at small tables as though for a smoking concert. The chairman, M. Ramadier, and his committee had a platform too low to give them command of the meeting. The speakers were on the floor level and could not be seen from the back. Places had not been marked out, and the delegations were split up according to the time the delegates arrived. There were no tellers appointed and there were no steering committees. Waiters clattered about with cups of coffee, young men distributed packs of cigarettes, and almost half the delegates were strolling about and talking during both speeches and translations. Somebody had tiptoed into the tulips at the side of the platform and a workman slowly mopped up the pools. If one had seen 'Mon Eddy Gray' quietly juggling in one corner it would not have seemed incongruous."¹

Harold MacMillan, who was one of the key participants in the Political Debate, gave a similar though less drastic account of the scene:

"The conference, like all bodies of this size, proved somewhat unwieldy. Three committees were formed... presided over by suitable figures of distinction, each aided by its managing 'bureau' and attended regularly by a solid core of devotees. Others of us wandered about, like students at a university, from one classroom to another, attracted by some notable speaker or by some specially keen debate."²

- Despite the interest aroused among delegates by the important Economic and Cultural Committee deliberations, it was clear that the Political Debate attracted the chief attention of the participants and observers alike, as well as the international press. The original draft Political Report, it will be recalled, had been summarised into a more suitable draft Political Resolution, drawn up by Mackay, Brugmans and Noel, and approved by the Executive Committee on the eve of the Congress.³ The full contents of this crucial text are printed below:⁴-

1. Manchester Guardian, article, "Congress of Europe goes Warily", 10.5.48.
2. H. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit. p. 161.
3. Cf. p. 177.
4. Draft Resolution (Political Section), delivered to the Hague Congress 8.5.48. both in French (T 28) and in English (T 29), CAEM BRUGGE.

DRAFT RESOLUTION
(POLITICAL SECTION)

T 29

PRINCIPLE

The ravages wrought by six years of war and by the Occupation, the diminution of world food production, the destruction of industrial capacity, the creation of huge debts, the maintenance of military expenditure out of all proportion to the resources of the people, the shifting of economic power, the rancours left by war the progressive evils of nationalism and the absence, despite the work of UNO, of any effective international authority to provide law and order, constitute an unprecedented menace to the well-being and the security of the peoples of Europe and threaten them with ruin.

In accordance with the principles, ^{and} objectives ~~and measures~~ set out in the Political Report submitted by the International Committee ,

The Congress.

1. Recognises that the nations of Europe are unable any longer to survive as isolated economic and political units and are incapable of assuring security and social progress to their peoples.
2. Notes with approval recent steps which have been taken

by some European Governments in the direction of economic and political cooperation, but believes that in the present emergency the organisations created are inadequate to provide any lasting remedy.

3. Declares that the time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources.
4. Demands the convening as soon as practicable of a European Deliberative Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations, from among their members and others, designed
 - a) to stimulate and give expression to European Public opinion;
 - b) to advise upon immediate practical measures designed progressively to bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe;
 - c) to examine the juridical and constitutional implications arising out of the creation of such a union or federation and their economic and social consequences;
 - d) to prepare the necessary plans

Such an assembly must have full right of access to all sources of information and must be adequately staffed for carrying out of all its functions.

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- 5 European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights.
6. Is convinced that in the interest of human values and human liberty, the Deliberative Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of courts of justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter.
7. Declares its conviction that the only ultimate solution to the economic and political problems of Germany is its integration in a federated Europe.
8. Considers that any federation of Europe should be designed to protect the security of its constituent peoples, should be free from outside control, and should not be directed against any other nation.
9. Declares that the Union must have as one of its objectives the improvement of economic, political, and social standards in dependent or associated territories, and should preserve treaties which now bind its constituent parts to other countries beyond the seas.
10. Declares that the creation of a United Europe is an essential element in the creation of a united world.

In view of the laborious process involved in the preparation and drafting of the Political Report, the final draft Political Resolution distributed to the meeting was quite short and at times rather vague, perhaps even a slight anti-climax to the whole affair. The most sensitive points were nevertheless included either in written word or in between the lines: Clause I, for example, was clearly a reference to the Soviet threat. Similarly, the "German problem", and the necessity to allow the full re-emergence of that country within a European as well as a national setting, was advocated in clause 7, as were the important safeguards with regard to overseas territories in clause 9. The free and democratic nature of a European Union was clearly stipulated in clauses 5 and 6, stressing the need for a European Court and Charter of Human Rights. In the same vein, the Preamble, plus clauses 8 and 10, emphasized the peace-loving nature of the projected Union. Without doubt, however, the most interesting proposals with regard to the precise political-institutional framework of the proposed Union were put forward in clauses 2, 3, and 4. Most of the debating time in the Committee would be taken up by these draft proposals. - Clause 2 warmly applauded the recent inter-governmental initiatives towards European unity which the setting up of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and OEEC represented, but was equally firm in stressing that the cooperative rapport set up was wholly insufficient. Clause 3, in turn, appealed for effective European supra-national links, proposing not only a transfer but indeed a merger of some portion of national sovereignty. This term, to "merge" some sovereign rights was most important, and was almost certainly inserted by Mackay, for it implied a permanently binding fusion of sovereignty rather than the less federal-orientated term used in the original Political Report, which referred "more accurately" to the "joint exercise of certain sovereign powers".¹ It was a clause ./.

1. Cf. pp. 139-40.

./which would soon stir up considerable controversy and ill-feeling in the debating session. Similarly, clause 4 would in turn monopolise the attention of all those involved in the Congress, and was certainly the most publicised debating point taken up by the press and later by the European Movement itself. The first phrase in the clause distinctly called for the quick setting up of a "European Deliberative Assembly". Yet the subsequent four sub-clauses implied a whole range of duties for the Assembly far out-stretching the original qualification given. Indeed, only sub-clause (a) referred to the deliberative role of the Assembly; sub-clause (b) implied that it should have some sort of consultative role; sub-clause (c) actually aspired to some sort of pre-Constituent Assembly and, in combination with sub-clause (d), effectively meant a real Constituent Assembly! Clearly, despite the perhaps moderate call for a mere Deliberative Assembly, there was plenty of scope within clause 4 to discuss a whole variety of choices. But this was probably not the intention of the drafters either of the original Political Report, or of the draft Resolution. More likely, they preferred a relatively neutral title for the proposed Assembly so as not to sound over-radical in their demands. At the same time, they did not want to restrict rigidly the scope or potential role of the proposed Assembly - at least not at this stage, hence the need for ambiguity. This point would come across in the subsequent presentation of the draft Political Resolution by the two rapporteurs to the Committee - Courtin, and more specially, Mackay.

After Paul Ramadier, as chairman of the Political Committee, formally opened the session, René Courtin was the first to speak: Stressing the representative character of the Political Report and equally the heavy responsibility which Sandys had assumed in the presentation of the final synthesis, Courtin strongly appealed to the delegates to retain a sense of reality. The European Idea, he bluntly stated, had not yet acquired a mass./.

./ following; still less had it penetrated the traditional institutions of national power and of established interests. He therefore warned the meeting not to alienate public and Governmental opinion by rushing the cause which the Congress represented. "We know perfectly", he admitted in regard to the draft political text, "that, as a consequence, it lacks vigour and bite, that its points have been softened and it is up to you to see if you want to re-intensify it. We were determined to establish a minimum text, it is for you to see if you can go further along the way to the realisation of Europe." That much said, he drew attention to the open character of the European Union sought, in which both Germany and eventually Eastern Europe should be included. In turn, he stated the emotion he felt as a former representative of the Resistance in holding such a Congress. He subsequently expressed the organising committee's approval of the recent inter-governmental measures taken to unite Europe, but reminded the audience of the "catastrophic" failure of the co-operational pre-war League of Nations and the actual "paralysis" of the United Nations. Thus, despite his continued call for prudence in the European campaign, he did stress that there was one "revolutionary" point which they should not fear in making: the need to rise above national sovereignty. In the same light, he pointed to the proposal for a European Court capable of protecting individuals from totalitarian Governments. He then went on to explain the need to set up a Council of Europe which would be less vague in character than the actual OEEC or Brussels Treaty committees and in which, he proposed, an "ad hoc Minister of European Affairs" from each participating country should participate. (It should be noticed at this stage that the actual draft Political Resolution made no precise mention of the proposed Council, presumably because it was accepted throughout the Political Report as a body inter-linked to the more exciting European Assembly, which was the main focal point of the debate). Finally, Courtin raised the crucial question of the proposed./.

./ European Assembly:

Without doubt, he said, from among all the various proposals, it was the European Deliberative Assembly idea which was held "particularly close to heart" and which was a "very great novelty". "This Assembly", he went on to declare, "should very rapidly become the conscience and mind of Europe before then becoming its animator and organisor." However, stressing again the potential opposition of Governments and Parliaments, he urged the meeting to adopt a gradual strategy, favouring, first, the establishment of a "Consultative Assembly" whose members would be selected essentially by national Parliaments, and secondly, the replacement of this body, "within the shortest delay", by a European "Deliberative Assembly" directly "elected by universal suffrage", which would thus become the "mouth-piece" of the European people in general. This latter Assembly, he yet again emphasised, would not at first have any formal legislative powers, though he was apparently confident that it would gradually gain such powers through the growing recognition of its sovereign role.^I

It was certainly a skilful and stimulating presentation to the debate. Unfortunately however, Courtin did not really explain how, throughout this gradual process towards an effective European Parliament, the more cynical or negative Governments would be persuaded not to take protective measures against an encroachment upon their formal powers. Presumably Courtin was confident that a controlled and realistic evolution in the European Assembly towards political maturity and accountable respectability would be sufficient to alleviate the main doubts and criticisms of national Governments and Parliaments alike. This was a notion which had all the hallmarks of Sandys' perception of the campaign, and was not to the liking of the more juridically-inclined supporters of full federation in attendance at the Congress.

I. R. COURTIN, opening presentation, Political Committee V.R.

R.W.G. Mackay, speaking as the second rapporteur to the Political Committee, was considerably more forthright and vigorous in his reasoning. European Union, he argued, could not simply be achieved by the co-operation and good-will of Governments. This was the "illusion" which during the inter-war period had wrecked the Briand Plan and ruined the League of Nations. What was needed at the outset instead was the clear conception that a united Europe was effectively about real "power" and about "Government". By looking back and by drawing lessons from the past, the Congress should not be afraid in its conviction that it was actually trying to "interfere" with the states of Europe. He therefore went on to declare, in apparent contrast to Courtin's earlier cautiousness:

"..this congress is going to succeed or fail according to whether the resolution we are passing is going to have teeth in it, is going to be a strong resolution and is going to really produce something different to the conceptions of European organisations than have been produced before."

Referring in turn to Churchill's statement the previous day, and the latter's apparent preference for a united Europe which did not imply a "sacrifice of national sovereignty" but rather a "gradual assumption of a larger sovereignty", Mackay went on to challenge the Conservative Party leader, pointing to the deeper issues at stake behind these words:

"..I don't think it greatly matters whether you talk of a surrender of sovereignty, of a merger of sovereignty, or an enlargement of sovereignty so long as it is quite clear at all times that the individual states of Europe are giving up some of their rights to exercise powers which they cannot exercise without interfering with the other states of Western Europe."

He then emphatically announced:

"M. le President, I think that this is really the most fundamental issue we must face today. It may be a matter finally of drafting, but the point we have got to decide is that if we mean to unite Europe, if we mean that there is to be a Government of Europe of some kind, if there is to be a political authority which can exercise power over problems which are common to all the European states, ./.

./..then that must involve of necessity that giving up of the exercise of those powers by the individual parliaments of the existing European states."

Many advocates of European unity plans, Mackay went on to say in a guarded swipe at Churchill and some of the more sceptical "unionists" in his entourage, "used the phrase without conveying any of the ideas". There was too much "loose language" about European Federation, some of which "may mean nothing". It was therefore necessary, in Mackay's view, to form concrete projects:

"..if the Union of Europe is to mean anything, it must mean a political organisation which has power; which has power in respective matters such as external affairs, defence, currency, probably customs and the planning of trade and the development of production within the trading area. It must have specific powers of that kind which it can exercise itself and which cannot be exercised in conflict with it."

There could be no doubt to Mackay's resolute supra-national view and fusionist interpretation of the united Europe to work for. However, he was also careful to mention that his own Government regarded it as an "ideal" which might be difficult to construct in practice. As a result, Mackay's conception of the proposed European Assembly was a mixture of juridical boldness and cautious ambiguity: On the one hand he stressed:

"..we must have at the earliest possible moment, or the earliest practicable moment, an Assembly of people chosen by the different Parliaments of the different States of Europe to work out the full, the new political organisation of Europe."

He then added however:

"I am trying to avoid getting into such phrases as 'constituent Assemblies'; that seems to be a waste of time. What we want is an Assembly that can do something, and therefore let us just call it an Assembly."

Nevertheless, it was clear from the rest of his speech that Mackay intended that the Assembly in question should have some direct official role in drafting constitutional plans for the unification of Europe. He thus stressed that the Congress must be "determined to get an Assembly, constituent, or otherwise an Assembly for the specific purpose of filling in the details."

./.,of working out the plans,of facing the problems.." The campaign launched at The Hague,he therefore concluded,had to concentrate on getting Governmental approval for the convening of such an Assembly.(The remaining part of his speech concentrated on the German problem,Britain's inclusion within Europe,plus her overseas ties).^I

The Political Debate was launched,but within minutes it was marred by din and confusion about the wording and translation of the draft Resolution,as well as by difficulties over voting arrangements in this rather fluid and noisy gathering. There followed some comical inovations in procedure,with members being asked to indicate their voting preferences by either standing or sitting. Finally,irritated by this sudden babbling lapse of the meeting,and by Ramadier's hesitant and ineffective chairmanship,Mackay interrupted to suggest that a steering committee be constituted so as to arrange in order the list of amendments and speakers. The proposal was accepted and,while the steering committee got to work,a stream of general speeches were made by leading delegates.

Paul Reynaud,the former French Premier,chose this moment to mount the rostrum and take the Congress by surprise in advocating a much more exciting plan as regards the proposed Assembly than had been heard until now. Expressing his support of clause 2 in the draft Resolution,that the existing inter-governmental European institutions were "inadequate" in meeting the emergencies of the time,he clearly looked to a future European Assembly as the only fundamental remedy,and noted the historic importance of the Hague Congress in this respect. However,he then warned against "deceptions" as regards the creation of such an Assembly along the lines indicated in clause 4 of the draft text. A European Assembly nominated by national Parliaments,he argued,meant that its members would./.

I. R.W.G. MACKAY,opening presentation,Political Committee VR.

8-9.5.48.,pp.6-II. CAEM BRUGGE.

./ be qualified and conditioned by a "purely and exclusively national mandate." The result would not really be a European Assembly, but rather a "club of national MPs." The popular impact of such an arrangement would be nil. While this elite, national-appointed European clique would effectively enjoy the fruits of political tourism, the national Ministers would simply continue to dominate European affairs and defend only their own national interests. All this, he claimed, would be a loss of precious time and, as far as Reynaud was concerned, Europe was already living on borrowed time. - The danger of war. The mounting tension in security and the arms race. The pressing and urgent economic problems confronting the European nations as a whole. The insufficiency of American aid in overcoming the dollar deficit in the Western European balance of payments, plus the fact that this aid would not last for ever and was partially dependent on an American market surplus, and above all, on the annual approval of funds by the U.S. Congress which had granted the existing sum on the understanding that effective European integration measures would follow. - All this, in Reynaud's opinion, rendered the problem of organic European unity and reconstruction absolutely imperative. The best way to proceed, he therefore advocated, was by creating a truly European Assembly which would be capable of capturing popular opinion and stirring public support for European Union at an effective supra-national level and thereby circumvent petty national interests, and overcome general national egoism by appealing to a new European sovereign source as opposed to the divisions of national mandates. In short, the famous ex-Premier of France proposed the creation of a European Assembly which would be directly elected by universal suffrage. - In his own words, written after the event:

"At the Hague Congress I pointed out how difficult it would be to make the interest of Europe prevail over the self-interests of each nation, and declared that the only chance of success was to shock public opinion in all countries. I said that we must therefore appeal to the peoples./.

./through the democratic mechanism of elections. I proposed that the Assembly should be elected by universal suffrage, with one deputy for each million inhabitants voting not as Englishmen, Frenchmen or Italians but as Europeans." I

It should be stressed, however, that contrary to what his joint-sponsor in this project, Edouard Bonnefous, has later written on the famous episode, Reynaud categorically stated at The Hague that he was not proposing to create "straight away" an actual "European Parliament". Indeed, he emphasised that he wanted to "keep an equal distance" of "dangers" both of this sort and of creating "powerless" European institutions. The actual motion which Reynaud and Bonnefous presented to the Political Committee, reading as an amendment to the draft Resolution, in fact suggested the following formula:

1. That there shall be established a European Consultative Assembly charged with formulating solutions to the problems of European revival and with advising on the best distribution of American aid;
2. that those members of the Congress who belong to parliaments in those countries which are receiving American aid shall bring in and support a Bill to elect the members of this Assembly before the end of the year;
3. election being by universal suffrage and according to the electoral regulations in each country, on the basis of one representative for every million of population or any fraction of a million greater than half."³

He concluded his address with an impassioned plea for such a direct and clear political initiative in order to render Western Europe a new independence and control over its own destiny. "Magnificent speeches", he said, were not enough; the Congress should above all come to a "firm decision."⁴

Reynaud's speech was in fact warmly received and loudly applauded by the meeting. Similarly, the international press was pleased not only with the news-worthy story Reynaud had./.

1. P. REYNAUD, "The Unifying Force for Europe", FOREIGN AFFAIRS Vol. 28, January 1950, pp. 255-264.

2. Bonnefous, mistakenly recorded that he and Reynaud demanded the "immediate convocation of a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage" see L'Europe, en Face de Son Destin p. 100 (Presses Universitaires de France).

3. Doc. E 791 902-Hague Congress C.A.M. BRUGES 4. REYNAUD, V. E. op. cit. pp. 20-24.

./so innocently provided, but also by the excellent and lively performance with which he had delivered his "bomb-shell". As the 'Manchester Guardian' commented,

"He is now well over seventy, but is still the trim lively little man that he was eight years ago when it looked as though he would rally France."¹

There was indeed little doubt that the former French Prime Minister had in effect "stolen the show" at The Hague. A leading article in 'Le Figaro' in fact stressed that, amid considerable confusion and timidity, Reynaud's proposal was the "only concrete proposition of the day."²

Nevertheless, his efforts to rally Europe on a popular radical note were not met with unanimous approval. Harold MacMillan, for example, was the first to stress the slightly "ungenerous" mood which seemed to prevail vis-à-vis the actual inter-governmental European machinery set up so far, adding that he broadly supported the draft Resolution as it stood. He therefore appealed to the meeting to retain a sense of enthusiasm but also of responsibility. "Let us not shrink back", he declared, but "let us not be led into making proposals that are not practical." Scandinavian delegates Kristensen and Smitt Ingebretsen also stressed their reluctance to move too quickly, the latter pointing out that the Congress, however important it may have been, had "a remarkable lack of authority," and that it should be "cautious not to spoil the possibilities to transfer the (European) ideal into political realities." Duncan Sandys, for his part, vainly attempted to intervene and direct the attention of the Congress to the less divisive policy topic regarding the situation in Eastern Europe. Reynaud's timely contribution to the debate had, however, lit a fuse which would not burn out so easily.³

Yet it should be emphasised again that the former French Premier, at this stage of the proceedings, was far from ./.

1. Manchester Guardian article 10.5.48. Op.cit.

2. Le Figaro, article by M. Chatelain 9-10.5.48.

3. MACMILLAN, KRISTENSEN, INGEBRETSEN, SANDYS V.R. Op.cit. pp.24-27.

./..advocating an unpopular cause. Despite grumbles and diversions from the "unionist" benches, plus some opposition from among the integral-federalists which would come to light later on in the debate, Reynaud indeed appears to have temporarily caught the idealistic mood of the meeting. As the Manchester Guardian again commented, in view of MacMillan's bid for a more cautious approach - "This did not seem to make much impression on an audience of this character."¹ Moreover, it should also be noted that the official draft Political Report presented to the Congress had alluded to an eventual elected European Parliament², while René Courtin, as an official rapporteur to the Political Committee, had actually suggested that a directly elected European Deliberative Assembly should be constituted "within the shortest delay" after the initial creation of his proposed indirectly selected Consultative Assembly.³ Mackay, for his part, had not been over-concerned with the representative quality of the Assembly, so long as it retained some official formulating powers. Reynaud's proposal was not so much out of context as out of step with these previous suggestions. He was not demanding a directly elected European Constituent Assembly, as Bonnefous would later carelessly seem to indicate,⁴ still less an immediate directly elected European Parliament. Instead, he was simply advocating that the type of advisory European Assembly which the Congress was apparently contemplating - be this a Deliberative or Consultative Assembly - should be directly representative in a European sense rather than in an indirect national-mandated sense. It was certainly an exciting project, but hardly one which would throw official decision making bodies and institutions into real turmoil. In the context of the time, it was perhaps an unrealistic first step in the direction of full European Union, but not one which was really revolutionary or necessarily impractical. Reynaud's notion indeed was essentially radical only in the way it ./..

1. Manchester Guardian, article 10.5.48. Op. cit.

2. Cf. pp.137,146. 3. Cf. p.202. 4.Cf. p. 220-I.

./attempted to arouse a popular European frame of mind almost at a stroke. It was a psychological "shock" which Reynaud wanted to administer, but towards public opinion and not as yet with regard to the real official decision-making framework throughout Western Europe. Transformation in this area would, he conceded, only become possible once that the popular mood had itself adapted to a supra-national way of thinking. His mistake, however, was surely in the idea that direct elections by universal suffrage would somehow submerge national mandates and national egoisms. The reverse situation was rather more likely, at least during the initial stage of change, and especially in view of the fact that there was no effective trans-national Party organisation at that time which could appeal above national interests. This notwithstanding, Reynaud's appeal was hardly a commencement to any drastic convulsions in the European political economy.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's sudden conversion to a direct strategy, and the strong support which he now promptly gave to Reynaud's motion was, however, the equivalent of giving it the kiss of death. Blatantly unperturbed by any outside political-governmental feeling, the E.P.U. Secretary General chose this moment to upstage the actual contents of Reynaud's proposal, and delivered his own fatal address on the subject. Describing the proposed amendment, repeatedly, as being "revolutionary" and the formulation needed for all those delegates who favoured an "immediate solution to the European question", Coudenhove indeed unwittingly stamped the motion with a much more radical and unrealistic label than it actually comprised. The type of Assembly proposed, he proclaimed, would, despite its nominative Deliberative or Consultative title, actually constitute the "biggest authority which would exist in Europe and no Government would dare oppose it." ^I

- It was precisely the type of support which Reynaud least needed, though unfortunately even his own joint-sponsor, Edouard Bonnefous, would also qualify the original motion in a similar revolutionary light. For the moment, however, this interesting interlude to the official course of the debate was brought to an end by Ramadier, who, in resuming the chair, read out the ordered list of amendments, which had by now been compiled by the steering committee and were ready for examination.

The sub-committee at first appeared to have done its work well, and the various amendments to clauses I and 2 of the draft Resolution, dealing with the general need for a European approach to actual problems and the first steps taken in this direction by Governments, were streamlined, made to sound a little less dramatic and were passed without difficulty. However, when it came to clause 3 and the crucial reference it had originally made to "transfer and merge" sovereign rights within Europe, the steering committee, under Manningham Buller's sceptical "unionist" influence as chairman,¹ had managed to introduce an undeclared amendment of its own, cutting out the reference to "merge" sovereignty, and thus leaving the more pallid phrase preferred by Churchill and the Conservative-"unionist" group about some "joint exercise" of sovereign rights. As if this already weak phrase was not enough, the Dutch delegate, M. Tendeloo, wanted to undermine the whole significance of the clause by adding as a further qualification: "on a basis of equality", by which she meant similar powers between the smaller and bigger nations in the proposed union, thus rendering a confederal rather than federal structure.² Miss Josephy, however, was one of the few delegates both to see the underlying meaning of this latter amendment, as well as the manipulative tactics adopted by Manningham Buller's personal amendment process. She first questioned Manningham Buller's effective cutting of the original text:

1. Manningham Buller was a leading member of the "unionist" camp and a Conservative M.P.

2. M. TENDELOO, V.R. Op. cit. pp. 29-30.

"...I want to resist both amendments that have been moved to this clause of the resolution. It seems to me that the whole guts, if I may use a very British word, of the resolution are in this clause. Either we mean what we say, or we don't. If we mean what we say there is no use just talking about joint exercise of sovereignty, we've got to admit that we have to transfer and merge some of our sovereignty in a common authority." (Applause)

Anybody can talk about joint exercise and sovereignty. If a governmental body wants to give some powers temporarily to a joint organisation, they can do so. And that is a joint exercise of sovereignty. What we want, is that every country that joins the European Union, or Federation as I prefer to call it, shall legally transfer some of the rights that it now exercises by itself to a common democratically elected authority which shall represent both it and its partners in the Union. And that is what this clause wants as it stands. (ie in original draft form) And the first thing I'm asking you is to reject the (Manningham Buller) amendment on the ground that it does not, - not, I repeat, - give us the common exercise of sovereignty that is only possible if people transfer part of their present rights to a common organisation."

She then went on to oppose Miss Tendeloo's amendment:

"...I think she doesn't realise what Federation means. If you have an elected European authority, it does not represent the states, it represents the peoples. Now we in Britain have a saying, that what we want is: one man one vote... (she put it more simply) one bloody man one bloody vote... The thing we must have is a representation of people as people, and that is where you get your equality in your Federation. Not through trying to give equality to a small State in relation to a large State. It is every person as a person that we say has rights. And that is why we want to see this idea of federal government depending on the peoples, and not on the States..."

In conclusion, Miss Josephy therefore urged the meeting to reject both amendments to clause 3 and leave the original draft in tact.^I

This would not be the last time at the Hague Congress that Miss Josephy, as a veteran leader of Federal Union, would make a crucial interjection in order to clarify the real issues at stake. Her position was essentially that of the fusionist-Federation school of thought which, stemming from pre-war Britain, had been the original impulse to Federation plans./.

./taken up by the continental European Resistance, whose supra-national thoughts had been most receptive to precise political formulations for the merging of sovereignty at a European level. This, of course, had been especially the case in Italian resistance circles, and it came as no surprise that now at The Hague Miss Josephy's argument ran very similar to the collective-juridical and political thoughts of the MFE wing in the UEP. Not all federalists, however, were convinced about the merits of a democratic supra-national Federation based upon a unified political conception of equal sovereignty, summarised in Miss Josephy's amalgamated term: "one man one vote". One of the leading French supporters of integral-federalism, Van Vassenhove, was the first in effect to directly challenge Miss Josephy's notion of European Federation. Rather than concentrate on a merging of sovereignty, he instead attempted to inject safeguards emphasising a radical dismemberment of state sovereignty throughout the proposed Federation on an internal non-political scale, giving sovereign and administrative autonomy to the diverse "ethnic, cultural and linguistic" groups involved.^I Ramadier in turn only complicated matters further by attempting to link Vassenhove's amendment to Tendeloo's amendment, while actually not appearing to realise that Mannigham Buller had effectively changed the original draft clause itself! Mackay, for his part, did not seem to think that Vassenhove's amendment was even relevant to clause 3 or whether it had actually been vetted by the steering committee. On a similar note, Leslie Hale angrily denounced Manningham Buller's apparent manipulation of the draft text, while other delegates now started to connect clause 3, on sovereignty, with clauses 4 and 5, dealing with the proposed Assembly and European Court. By the time that the actual issue was thus put to a vote, nobody quite realised for what they were voting. On the first count

I. VAN VASSENHOVE, V.R Op. cit. pp.31-32.

./the amendments polled 60 votes for and 60 votes against. It soon became apparent, however, that many delegates had voted in error and that some who had no right to vote had been counted. On a second vote, this time only for or against the original draft clause itself, hardly anyone was discovered to be in opposition to it! There had been no continuation of the debate between the vote on the amendments and the vote on the original clause, but a great many people had somehow changed their minds on this crucial subject within the space of a few minutes. This switch, however, had also resulted from the alarm felt among the Conservatives in the British delegation when Leslie Hale and his fellow Labour MPs had threatened to go home if the rather bland attempts to frustrate and manipulate their efforts at finding serious proposals for real European unity continued.

In this climactic way, the vital clause 3 of the draft Political Resolution remained in tact, and the Hague Congress was to go down as having clearly adopted the supra-national cause of European unity. Indeed, at the final plenary session dealing with the Political Resolution, the ambiguous phrase referring to the "exercise" of some sovereign rights in common was actually dropped altogether from the text, which now clearly declared that the European nations must "transfer and merge" part of their sovereignty together. It was an important victory for the international federalist camp, but a paper victory all the same. The practical measures needed in support of this fine-sounding theoretical stand were to be found in the more pallid proposals for a European Assembly listed in clause 4 of the draft Resolution, to which the meeting now returned its attention. However, the clause in question was not, in fact, debated in this rather demanding Saturday afternoon sitting of the Political Committee. This was again due mainly to the attempts of *Manningham Buller*, as head of the steering committee, to manipulate the debate unfairly, going so far as ./

./.to omit the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment from the existing agenda on the ground that it was impracticable!

Harassed and confused, President Ramadier agreed to these ridiculous technical objections, his ruling being received with justifiable outbursts from Reynaud and his supporters, pounding on their desks in protest and shouting vehement charges of unfairness. In the end, the steering committee was urged to think again and straighten out properly this time the list of amendments for the evening session. The first sitting of the Political Committee came to an end on this uproarious note.

The afternoon session opened in a somewhat milder and more amicable atmosphere, and the Political Committee soon got to work on the less controversial clauses in the draft Resolution, while Ramadier promised that the crucial clause 4 would be discussed at length later in the evening when all the amendments would be ready.

The meeting hence turned its attention to clauses 5 and 6, dealing reciprocally with proposals for a European Charter of Human Rights and a for the establishment, upon the proposition of the European Deliberative Assembly, of European courts of justice. The first clause in question was broadly supported, apart from slight grumbings by Paul Bastid that the U.N. was already in the process of drawing up a similar charter and that it was better to support the application of this charter for the purposes of Europe. J.M. Drapier however, a close colleague of Paul-Henri Spaak, preferred some immediate specific action and therefore proposed the setting up of a European Commission which could straight away consider and prepare a draft charter dealing both with Human Rights and Democracy, which should be produced within three months. The amendment was accepted and the meeting moved on to consider clause 6.

At this point, Drapier again spoke up to complain about the discrepancy between the draft French text and the rather./.

./loosely phrased English version. He therefore proposed an important amendment in which it was clearly indicated that the Congress was actually proposing one European Court only and that its duty would be to uphold the rights expressly laid out in the proposed charter. The amendment was passed by 31 votes to 12. The French delegate, Mme. de Sazannet, in turn stressed, in a highly emotional speech alluding to the recent war-time oppression, how it should also be tacitly understood that every individual European citizen would have access to the proposed European Court. Her point was strongly supported and the final text subsequently emphasised this right of individual redress before the court.

These two important proposals for the establishment of a European Charter of Human Rights and a European Court above state control were indeed among the most tangible clauses in favour of a free and democratic supra-national Europe to be put forward by the Hague Congress. Moreover, in the context of the time, the issues involved were so fundamental that both the Political Committee and the Cultural Committee felt obliged to take up the proposals. The stimulus given to the subsequent European campaign by these pronouncements proved to be of crucial significance both in demonstrating the humanitarian and democratic vision of the proposed union, as well as directly aiding the immediate attempts after the Hague Congress to set up a European Consultative Assembly. The most outstanding result of this initiative taken at The Hague, however, was in the official signing by the Western European nations at Rome, in November 1950, of the European Convention of Human Rights, followed later by the constitution of a European Court. - The Hague Congress, at least on this point, was a practical success.

The Political Committee, at a later stage of the proceedings, also commended itself to the general public in its straightforward recommendations stressing the independent, peaceful./.

./and open nature of the Union envisaged, indicated by the largely unamended draft clauses 8 and 10, while the acceptance of Europe's continued ties with the overseas territories, advocated in draft clause 9, plus the insertion of an additional clause indicating a democratisation and economic enrichment of these countries in question, pleased both the Empire and Commonwealth orientated Conservative-"unionist" delegates, as well as the more socially-minded progressive thinkers who attended the Congress. Perhaps of much more psychological importance, however, was the emotional though stately way in which the vast majority of the meeting addressed itself, at its final Sunday night session on May 9, to the so-called "German problem".

The draft clause concerned with this sensitive question had clearly stated that the "only ultimate solution to the economic and political problems of Germany is its integration in a federated Europe."¹ The overwhelming mood of the conference was in agreement with this radical notion, and there followed a long row of speeches approving it. A British delegate, Miss Gowan, for example, spoke not only of the obvious economic asset which Germany's re-integration held out for Europe, but how there would also be established a secure basis for future peace and reconciliation. Lionel Curtis in turn stressed the need to provide Germany with new hope and the possibility of future inclusion within a united European defence force. Dr. Braun, as a representative for the Saar, spoke of his own region as an economic meeting-point for a new Franco-German reconciliation within a European framework, while Dr. Kramer spoke of the German people's strong appreciation of the initiative taken at The Hague, in which for the first time since the war his country was officially represented at such an important international gathering. He in turn appealed to the moral supra-national spirit which had guided the European Resistance to serve as an example for the basis upon which European./.

./ Federation and Germany's re-integration should be constructed. This thought was also echoed by Swiss delegate, H.G. Ritzel, who, having once been condemned to death by the Hitler regime, now pleaded that the new Germany should be given hope and a legal basis upon which to build and expand the rights and liberty of her people.

The draft clause in question was thereafter put to the vote and accepted unanimously, accompanied by a prolonged applause and evident signs of relief. As Ramadier pointed out, no amendments had been presented. To everyone's delight, it had been a dignified, symbolic and significant act, bringing Germany back into the European fold without any recriminations or upsets. If indeed there was a moment when The Hague Congress in effect exorcised the past tragedies of war, then this was it. The fraternal dignity with which this clause 7 was passed, however, did not prevent a subsequent proposal by France's leading delegate on German affairs, François Poncet, pointing out that a future European Federation was not, unfortunately, the "magic key" to the current industrial and political problems of that country, and that a special commission should be set up by the International Committee to analyse Germany's difficulties in relation to Europe. He was supported in this by A. Hynd M.P., British parliamentary expert on German affairs. Miss Josephy, in counter position, argued that it was not up to the organising committee but the proposed European Assembly itself to look into this matter. The two rapporteurs, Mackay and Courtin were split on this procedural issue, and the atmosphere in the hall once again became highly charged with numerous delegates shouting "au vote", while Duper and Swiss delegate, M. Stellan, pleaded for a compromise by which a separate clause in the Resolution would stress the need for a co-ordinated review of the German situation by the sponsoring movements involved. After more confusion, the compromise was finally accepted and this part of the debate came to an end. I

The main climax to the Political Debate at The Hague had taken place the previous evening of May 8-9, when the crucial clause 4 dealing with the proposed European Assembly had finally been discussed and argued in full.

The debate had in fact opened on a rather inauspicious note when, having concluded his chairmanship of the steering committee, Manningham Buller reluctantly admitted to the nervous meeting:

"The subcommittee has been sitting continuously for a considerable time on this problem of clause 4 and I regret to say that we have not been able to reach a conclusion as to the manner in which the amendments should be disposed of in relation to this very important article." ¹

Despite these evident "unionist" doubts with regard to the course of the debate, the meeting nevertheless went ahead with its discussion of the decisive subject. It was at this point that the more outspoken members of the integral federalist camp finally intervened in force, and attempted to gain the momentum which the fusionist Federation plans of Reynaud and Bonnefous had effectively taken from them. Thus, French federalist, M. Lussan, started the counter-attack by supporting the initial notion of convening a European Deliberative Assembly, but not according to the restrictive parliamentary-selective process advocated in the draft Report and Resolution. Instead, he argued in favour of some partial direct representation in the proposed Assembly of the 'living forces', that is - of the "diverse professional trade union, cultural and social organisations", etc: "If", he declared, "you want an assembly which really represents the countries, you must incorporate the living forces of these countries and not simply the political parties." This, he further implied, was also the view of the EUP chairman, Brugmans, who best represented the movement's aspirations about "internal" federalist plans. ² It was not altogether the case however, as was subsequently shown in the deluge of differing ./.

1. V.R. Op. cit. p.46 2. LUSSAN, Ibid pp.47-49.

./Integral federalist demands and amendments that followed, the most radical of which was Claude Hytte's call for a European Constituent Assembly in which 50% of its representatives would be drawn from among the "living forces", outside the traditional political-parliamentary sphere. The EUP delegates, in fact, were disastrously divided on the issue of the European Assembly, this split not simply occurring between the varying brands of integral federalism, but also between the integral federalists themselves and the supra-national, political orientated federalists among the MFE and Federal Union. This posed grave problems not only in connection to the mainly unpopular integral federalist amendments, all of which were defeated, but also with regard to the crucial amendments in favour of a resolute supra-national approach to the question of the European Assembly, which the Reynaud-Bonnefous motion best represented, and to which the integral federalists were completely opposed, due to the "mechanical" and fusionist conceptions of Federation implied in the motion.- As Jacques Freymond later wrote on this episode:

"... the federalists were themselves divided. There were the so-called 'international' federalists, who... wanted to go beyond national sovereignty... and there were the so-called 'integral' federalists who thought that the new European structure should preserve 'the national, professional, and spiritual communities that are the infrastructure of national collectivities'."¹

The full effect of this division became only too apparent in the subsequent discussion of the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment, which was now finally debated.

Bonnefous' formal presentation of the amendment did not, in fact, demonstrate the same political skills and debating ambivalence of his more senior colleague in the project. As a piece of rhetoric, it was most certainly quite an anti-climax to the complicated scenario which had preceded. But if the performance was relatively low-key, the implied message./.

1. Western Europe since the War op.cit. p.47.

Freymond was referring to a text written by Olivier Philip on the Hague Congress.

./o. let loose a wave of panic in the debating-hall. In short, like Coudenhove-Kalergi before him, Bonnefous described the joint amendment with an aura of radical transformation which it did not wholly entail. - Whereas Reynaud had actually stressed that he was not proposing any "immediate" institutional overhaul of European political administration, Bonnefous instead chose to present the motion for a directly elected European Consultative Assembly within the context and light of his preceding initiative in the French Parliament for a rapid convocation of a European Constituent Assembly. Though he was not actually proposing such a measure, there can be no doubt by the tenor of the speeches which followed that this is how the meeting appeared to understand his repeated reference to a European Constitution. Indeed, the tired and confused Political Committee had just gone through a colourful barrage of radical integral federalist amendments alluding, for the most part, to a weird form of Constituent Assembly; Bonnefous' proposal for a directly elected Assembly to boot was simply more than it could now tolerate!

Scenting the new mood of the meeting, Harold MacMillan was the first to pounce upon the apparent implications of the amendment and, unlike his earlier assault against Reynaud, this time his ruthless opposition struck a heavy blow to the motion. - As the 'Observer' commented: "This bold proposal raised the political temperature to a level at which Mr. Harold MacMillan M.P. felt impelled to pour a heavy douche of cold water on the sealots."³ - The proposal, he declared, was simply "too much and too soon", pointing to the considerable legislative and administrative difficulties which would have to be faced by the diverse European political institutions in arranging direct elections:

1. Cf. pp. I32-I36

2. BONNEFOUS, V.R. op.cit. pp.50-51.

3. Observer, article by W.P. Clark I6.5.48. op. cit.

"..How are they to do this within a year? By what machineries, by what legislative actions? We all have our different systems, but I should be very surprised if any of the Governments of any of the European Parliaments would in fact introduce legislation, and pass it by the end of the year which introduced a system of a European Parliament to be elected upon this basis. It does not seem really to me to be practical politics. Who is to make the list of voters, how is the voting to be? Is it to be on proportional representation? Who is to be the returning officer? Under whose authority are the elections to be held? What is to be its juridical basis? Why, all these great questions have got to be decided if we are to do anything except write constitutions in the air. It is quite easy to write constitutions. What is difficult is to make them effective and durable."¹

- By swooping down on the new apparent constitutional significance of the Reynaud-Bonnet amendment, MacMillan indeed showed himself to be the astute political operator of later 'Super-Mac' years. It was an easy demolition job: Of course the whole European constitutional and legislative framework could not be overturned overnight and, in this sense, all his "practical" probings were completely justified and necessary. Yet, had Bonnet not so unwittingly provided the opening for the smashing of the direct elections case, thus in effect committing political hara-kiri, had he in other words kept to the sage and judicious phraseology used by Reynaud, then perhaps MacMillan's powerful offensive might not have been so well mounted or received. Indeed, MacMillan's practical criticisms were reasonable *only* because the presentation of the amendment appeared to touch upon some constitutional undertaking at a European level. But in reality this was not the case; the direct election of a European Consultative Assembly did not actually involve any formal commitment by national Governments or Parliaments alike to even the minimal transfer of juridical or legislative powers, neither did it necessarily imply any official initiative towards drawing up even the basis of a European Constitution. In short, the view that the Consultative Assembly should be directly elected did not really alter the./.

I. MACMILLAN, V.E. op.cit. pp. 52-53.

./fact that its strict nominative status ensured that it would have no formal power at all to initiate action not condoned by the national governing bodies. Direct elections would surely increase the Assembly's popular standing and eventual influence, but they did not represent any practical encroachment upon the actual powers and decision-making structures of national political institutions. Seen in this perspective, MacMillan's insistence on the impossible requirements for administrative precision and exactly comparable electoral methods in the democratic selection of the proposed Assembly appear to be rather pedantic and restrictive, as recent experience of the 1979 direct European elections indicates.

MacMillan, nevertheless, was far from isolated in his highly efficient opposition to the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment. The much respected French delegate, André Noel, was also quick to follow suit, skating over his previous support in the French Assembly for a European Constituent Assembly, and pointing out the need for a gradual approach to the problem. In each country involved, he forcefully argued, there were forces strongly opposed to European Federation who would be well armed by any lack of "political maturity" shown by the Congress in supporting the type of amendment in question. Moreover, the cause of European unity would also be "gravely compromised" should the Congress go to "impose" its wishes in such a way upon Governments.¹ Subsequently, other respected international parliamentarians, notably Arthur Salter and E.P.U Vice-President Maccas, stressed the need to progress step by step, the former arguing in particular that the Congress had already committed itself to the longterm goal of going beyond national sovereignty and that it was best in the initial stages not to go "too far or too fast."² French delegate, Pierre Bourdan, however, came to Reynaud's and Bonnefous' defence, declaring that the major events of the last year had permitted the European idea to ./.

1. A. NOEL, V.R. op. cit. pp. 53-56.

2. SALTER, MACCAS, ibid. p. 57.

./-penetrate public opinion as never before and that the Congress had the duty to "strike the iron while it was hot." It was not a matter of pushing the Governments into actions which they did not want to take, but rather the need of the Congress to take the lead and point the way in submitting strong proposals. A gradual approach in all this, he passionately argued, would be long and complicated, and would serve only to "discourage" Europe's unification.¹

The tone of the debate was rapidly acquiring a bitter and resentful air, each personality seeming to speak from a virulent and entrenched position, and refusing to accommodate the views of others. In such an atmosphere, Henry Brugmans also felt compelled to defend the ideological position of integral federalism at the expense of resisting the collective-federation plans of the diminishing Reynaud-Bonnefous camp, whose views he regarded as pure "jacobinism at the European level."² He therefore intervened with a key speech in which he defended the extra-parliamentary conception of the 'living forces' against charges of it being corporatist, while saving most of his energy to attack directly the traditional state and central-parliamentary conceptions of European democracy, thereby also indicating the fundamental differences within the EUP itself whose MPE wing clearly supported such political arrangements at the supra-national European level.⁴ The EUP leader thus stated that European unity must entail "other forms" and "new forms of federal democracy", involving a "social enlargement" and "functional decentralisation" of the present political framework rather than any centralised political-electoral basis of one M.P. per million inhabitants as Reynaud was proposing for the European Assembly. Such a procedure, Brugmans argued, ./-

1. P. BOURDAN, V.A.R. op. cit. pp.57-59.

2. See Brugmans "L'Idée Européenne", op. cit. p.133.

3. André Noel had in fact commenced his speech making this charge against the federalists. V.A.R. op. cit. p.54.

4. Brugmans also pointed out this split with the MPE group at The Hague, see L'Idée Européenne, *ibid.* p.133.

./would.lack respect for the "basic communities,the regional, national and functional communities",and would instead be working in the direction of a "super-state" accompanied by "prejudice constitutional formulas." In opposition to this, he therefore supported the Lussan amendment.^I

As if this contribution was not already sufficient in placing the nail on the coffin of the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment,the "unionist" camp was delighted still further by the final and most poignant interjection to the debate when Mackay decided suddenly to arouse the fatigued meeting with a rather angry and abusive speech condemning the amendment and accusing Reynaud of wanting,in effect,to steal the show and gain a lot of publicity(which perhaps was not totally untrue). Mackay indeed thought that it was a "very silly amendment...quite unrealistic,which makes fools of everyone in this Congress and which will make the Congress the laughing stock of Europe." In a clear indication that he too had understood that Bonnefous was actually proposing the creation of a directly elected European Constituent Assembly,the veteran Labour campaigner for Europe in turn took pains to point out his own support for an eventual directly elected European Parliament,but that the constitutional arrangements for such a goal had to be worked out in consideration of the reluctance of national Parliaments and Governments. He then added:

"..Let us look what we are asked to do now. The French Parliament has had a resolution down for an Assembly for a European Federation for the best part of the last three months...but I have yet to learn that it has been debated by the French Parliament. Why does not M. Reynaud go to the French Parliament to have a little action there instead of coming here and bewitching people and try to ask them to come to some foolish idea of trying to get this through within six months in this silly way? If they mean action,why don't they take that action in their own Parliament? We have at least done it in Britain,we have at least debated it in Britain,we put our resolution down ./.

I. BRUGMANS, V.R. ,op. cit. pp.59-60.

./within two months. And we have debated it now and what has the Government said? The Government said: 'We agree with the ideas of your European Union, we agree that sovereignty must be proved. But we are not prepared to convene a constituent assembly at the present time'. And yet, in the face of that, in face of the strongest socialist... Government of Europe having decided that they are not prepared to take this step at the moment, we, who are here planning a Union of Europe have been asked to fly in the face of that and say that we want this done in six months. I do ask the members of this Congress to really face this problem with a little reality. It may suit very well for the papers tomorrow to contain this great resolution from M. Reynaud... But that is all moonshine and it is of no value in a practical way to secure the end that we want."¹

It was indeed unfortunate, and also indicative of the lax preparation with which Reynaud and Bonnefous had decided to launch their amendment, that the most savage and cutting opposition to it at The Hague should have come from a man so passionately committed to the same ideal and conception of Federation as they. The "unionist" barrage, launched by MacMillan and supported by Noel, plus the integral-federalist critique and MP&E isolation made certain that the joint amendment was hemmed in from all sides, despite the initial positive reception Reynaud had received. Moreover, his answer to this heap of criticism and abuse somehow failed to be recorded in the Committee's official Verbatim Report, while the meeting's minutes mention only his appeal not to delay European Union.² The various newspaper reports nevertheless recorded that the ruder parts of Mackay's speech were severely deplored by President Ramadier, who prevented their official translation into French, while Reynaud "gracefully and neatly pricked Mr. Mackay by saying that one of the drawbacks of Parliamentary experience was the custom of using adjectives rather freely."³

The debate on the Reynaud-Bonnefous motion ended on this rather sad note and in the final event the amendment only polled about a dozen favourable votes. Even Carandini, leader of the ./.

1. MACKAY, V. R. op. cit. pp. 60-61.

2. Political Committee minutes, p. II, CAEM BRUGGE.

3. Guardian, article 10.5.48. op. cit.

./more European-minded Italian delegation, felt obliged to steer a moderate "reasonable" course, in spite of his open "sympathy" for Reynaud's views,¹ though apparently Altiero Spinelli did vote in favour of the proposed amendment.² The "large majority" of the Congress, however, remained unfavourable,³ and the crucial clause⁴ was left in tact but for a slight change, proposed by Manningham Buller and supported by André Noel, to refer simply to a "European Assembly", thereby not drawing attention to its specific deliberative quality. - As Paul Reynaud later commented:

"Why was I so obstinate? First, because in a democracy no assembly can have prestige, unite people, take any effective action, unless it stems directly from the sovereign people. Also because if we were to raise the interests of Europe above those of the different nations it was necessary to give a psychological shock to public opinion in those nations. So it is to the people themselves, I argued, that we must talk by the democratic means of an election.

A British Conservative member of the House of Commons (ie. MacMillan) turned against me the old French proverb: 'Make haste slowly'. To this I replied that it was strange advice to give a man who was about to drown in a river and who was clutching for a branch to hold on to.

The congress at The Hague did in fact assemble some remarkable men and pass some excellent resolutions. But its timidity on the key questions of unity was so great that the Council of Europe, created a few months later on the principles laid down at The Hague, was afflicted from birth with congenital weakness."⁴

In a similar vein, Bonnefous recorded:

"The Hague Congress did not achieve all the objectives proposed by the more ardent partisans of European unity. A certain timidity, explicable by the desire to reconcile opposing tendencies, to smooth over transitions, to decline from asking the impossible, was well illustrated during the discussions and was translated into the final text of resolutions."⁵

1. Cf. p. 231

2. Information given to the writer by A. Spinelli, interview, Jan. 1978, Rome.

3. See Bonnefous L'Europe en Face de son Destin, op.cit.p.100.

4. See Reynaud, Unite or Perish (Simon & Schuster, 1951), pp.192-3.

5. Bonnefous, op. cit. p.100.

Such disillusioned verdicts were not shared, however, by all of the French delegation at that time, despite the rather Franco-British orientation of the battle which developed in the Political Committee. Paul Ramadier, for example, accused Reynaud of being "ahead of the times" - an accusation which Reynaud gladly accepted.¹ Similarly, Paul Bastid strongly argued in an editorial he wrote for 'L'Aurore' that the essential role of the Congress had been to "stimulate" the European campaign rather than disturb or confuse possible progress with difficult proposals.² René Courtin, on the other hand, displayed considerable sympathy for the Reynaud-Bonnefous amendment in a long article which he wrote for 'Le Monde' on the Hague Congress: "The majority", he stated, "wanted to avoid all adventure; it therefore made pronouncements contrary to its profound sentiments."³ From the British point of view, however, which was both mindful of the Labour Government's scepticism and of the Conservative Party's restlessness as regards the continued Empire and Commonwealth commitment, the ambiguous and less ambitious formula arrived at on the crucial issue of the European Assembly received general approval. Duncan Sandys in turn summed up this feeling when, in a speech made just after the Congress, he declared:

"The European Assembly for which the Hague Congress asked can at present have no legislative or executive powers but it can, none the less, play an important part in bringing about the unification of Europe. It will voice the desire of the common peoples of all countries to live together in unity and peace. This assembly, which must be chosen by the various parliaments with regard to existing party strengths, would provide a forum in which the problems of European unity could be publicly discussed. The meetings of such an Assembly will enormously help to develop among the peoples of our Continent the sense of being Europeans and of belonging together. This common outlook is the essential foundation without which no durable political or economic structure can be built."⁴

1. See Reynaud, "The Unifying Force for Europe", FOREIGN AFFAIRS op. cit. p.262.

2. Bastid editorial - L'Aurore, 12.5.48.

3. Courtin, articles for Le Monde, May 1948.

4. Sandys, press release after speech at Streatham 17.6.48.
SANDYS PAPERS.

It was a fitting conclusion to the drawn-out debate at The Hague over clause 4 of the draft Resolution. The project for a European Assembly, which would be neither rigidly fixed at an unauthoritative level nor immediately elevated to an unrealistic demand upon Governments, remained more or less at the same gradual pitch which Sandys had consistently advocated. The idealistic urge of the more impatient supporters of European unification at The Hague had been resisted, while the federalist camp itself had been hopelessly split. Yet even now, as the Political debate drew to an end, some of the more sceptical members of the British "unionist" camp wanted still more blood, and UEM delegate J. Henderson Stewart attempted to introduce an additional sub-clause emphasising the key inter-governmental role and initiative which the Council of Europe project as a whole would retain vis-a-vis the Assembly itself.¹ Again, it fell to the perceptive Miss Josephy to clarify the issue and wake the tired and worn delegates to the hidden dangers of this last-minute amendment:

"I apologise for getting up to speak at this hour of the morning but I do want the delegates to realise what they are doing if they pass this amendment. It is a very clever amendment, very clever indeed, it tries to put in something which all of us agree with at the beginning. It tries to put in that we want an emergency council of Europe. So we do... But please note what(it).. goes on to say, and this is the danger. It goes on to say that this emergency council of Europe having done all the things that we quite agree it should do, should also plan the subsequent stages of the political and economic integration of Europe. Not on your life, Mr. President, we can allow that to happen. The emergency council of Europe is a governmental body pure and simple and the future of Europe must be planned and can only be planned effectively by the representatives of the people."²

In this she was also supported by Leslie Hale, who added:

"The amendment would completely stultify the rest of the clause(4) which we have deliberated with so much care for the last few hours."³

The amendment was subsequently defeated, but it was again ✓/.

1. V.R. op.cit. p.62. 2. JOSEPHY, V.R. ibid. p.63.
3. HALE, V.R. ibid. p.63.

./..indicative of the shallow tactics which some members of the British "unionist" group thought fit to employ at The Hague.

The Political Debate at this historic 'Congress of Europe' came to an end the following evening, and on the Monday morning of May 10 the final Political Resolution was submitted to the Congress as a whole, now gathered together in full plenary session under Anthony Eden's chairmanship. It was indeed quite ironic that he, as the future British Prime Minister who would be a dogged opponent of organic commitment to a European union, was actually given the duty to read out the important list of proposals put forward by the Political Committee at the Hague Congress. Paul Ramadier, as President of the Committee, was in turn called upon to explain the motives and difficulties which were involved in drawing up this final Political Resolution. His report was both detailed and well balanced. First he drew attention to the generally agreed opinion that "the hour had come to constitute Europe" and to create a force capable of influencing political, economic and cultural affairs, as well as representing idealistic and humanistic aspirations and values. Similarly, while he pointed to the geographic unity of Europe, he was also careful to stress the free and open union sought, plus the broadening of horizons and collective progress which Europe would bring as a pillar to world peace. Yet such a process could not be rushed. Though he was personally in favour of Reynaud's plea for trans-national direct European elections, this should be seen as a "final goal" rather than the first step. Moreover, there would be many hurdles to cross before such a stage could be reached, and there was also the need to protect Europe's diversity and particularities. Nevertheless, Ramadier strongly appealed for a supra-national European spirit of justice and freedom, and concluded his powerful speech by asking the Congress to demonstrate such faith in Europe's "destiny" by voting in unanimity in favour of the proposed ./..

./Political Resolution.¹

Eden accordingly opened a brief general debate² on the Resolution in question, allowing first Italy's Nicolo Carandini to take the floor. The latter sadly summed up the general opinion of his delegation by explaining to Reynaud that his amendment had won over "our hearts, but not our reason". He then added: "We had to follow the counsel of reason." Reynaud, in turn, replied with a rather bitter but polite speech, again winning the sympathy and applause of the Congress. Accepting that the amendment had been defeated, he warned that the vicious circle of national interests and identity would continue if it was not broken by an appeal to the peoples as Europeans and not as members of individual states. He also pointed out the rather "macabre irony" which MacMillan's quip - "make haste slowly" - entailed for Europe in its actual state of crisis, while finishing his speech with a dry and determined pledge to continue the struggle for the idea put forward in his amendment until it would be finally achieved, if by then it was not too late!

The fighting tone of his speech was subsequently received by Eden in an embarrassed and evasive remark: "I am sure we are all grateful to M. Reynaud for the brilliant eloquence of his speech and the loyalty of his expression." After a flow of more general speeches, including one from the U.S. "observer" delegate Walter Macguire, the Chairman rather nervously made the following ambiguous point before putting the Resolution to the vote:

"I feel I ought to make it clear that no individual delegate nor indeed any national delegate nor indeed any national delegation can be bound by every detail of every decision of the Congress. In an unofficial Congress of this kind, immensely valuable as it has been, we can do no more than lay down the issues upon which the majority of the V delegates are agreed and the lines on which we are all invited to continue our work."

The following Resolution was then carried unanimously and the session closed:

1. Recognises that it is the urgent duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to assure security and social progress.
2. Notes with approval the recent steps which have been taken by some European Governments in the direction of economic and political co-operation, but believes that in the present emergency the organisations created are by themselves insufficient to provide any lasting remedy.
3. Declares that the time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources.
4. Demands the convening, as a matter of real urgency, of an European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations, from among their members and others, designed
 - a) to stimulate and give expression to European public opinion;
 - b) to advise upon immediate practical measures designed progressively to bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe;
 - c) to examine the juridical and constitutional implications arising out of the creation of such a union or federation and their economic and social consequences;
 - d) to prepare the necessary plans.
5. Considers that the resultant union or federation should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights, and resolves that a Commission should be set up to undertake immediately the double task of drafting such a Charter and of laying down standards to which a State must conform if it is to deserve the name of a democracy. Declares that in no circumstances shall a State be entitled to be called a democracy unless it does, in fact as well in law, guarantee to its citizens liberty of thought, assembly and expression, as well as the right to form a political opposition.

Requests that this Commission should report within three months on its labours.
6. Is convinced that in the interest of human values and human liberty, the Assembly should make proposals for the establishment of a court of justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter, and to this end any citizen of the associated countries shall have redress before the court, at any time and with the least possible delay, of any violation of his rights as formulated in the Charter.
7. Declares its conviction that the sole solution of the economic and political problems of Germany is its integration in a federated Europe.
8. Considers that any union or federation of European should be designed to protect the security of its constituent peoples, should be free from outside control, and should not be directed against any other nation.
9. Assigns to a United Europe the immediate task of establishing progressively a democratic social system, the aim of which shall be to free mankind from all types of slavery and from all economic insecurity, as political democracy is intended to protect it against the exercise of arbitrary power.

Declares that the union or federation must have as one of its objectives the improvement of economic, political, social and cultural standards of or in independent or associated territories, without prejudice to the ties which now bind its constituent parts to other countries beyond the seas.

Declares that the creation of a United Europe is an essential element in the creation of a united world. I

3) SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEBATES MAY 8-10

Economic Debate

If in the Political Committee the delegates had been split mainly in terms of those favouring gradual or radical progress towards European Union, the Economic Committee was more divided between the "Right" and the "left" wing in each national delegation as regards the precise economic ideology and doctrines which a united Europe should actually operate. This polemic in turn spilled over into exhausting argument about Europe's political and ideological position with respect to the growing East-West bloc confrontation.

The Economic and Social Report submitted to the Congress, in fact, gave a clear picture of its ideological preference on this matter, stating its less than enthusiastic view of those countries which accepted a certain degree of central economic planning, but adding that within a European Union "free enterprise and individual initiative" would probably have prime place, along with necessary "common plans and the common assumption or delegation of responsibilities." In the same context, the Report also drew attention to the catastrophic collapse of the European economy after the war, and America's generous aid in the subsequent attempts at reconstruction. The debate which took place did not demonstrate the same overt sympathies that figured in the report.

1. Final Political Resolution passed by the Hague Congress, IQ 54 & CAEM BRUGGE.
2. Economic and Social Report submitted to the Congress, CAEM BRUGGE.
3. Economic Debate, V.R., CAEM BRUGGE.

The arguments began early in the first session when the founder leader of the USSE and main British Trade Union spokesman at the Congress, Bob Edwards, warned that Europe must prepare for "the coming trading war" with the United States. He went on to declare his belief that the world was not so much split into two ideological blocs but rather that, on the one hand, the Soviet Union was seeking the "political domination" of Europe, while on the other hand, the United States sought the "economic domination" of Europe. He further warned, in a phrase that well indicated his LLP background, that the U.S.A. had an "abundance" of goods which would be ultimately dumped in Europe and thereby bring about "unemployment and a third world war." Another delegate shouted in reply: "We thank God for that abundance!" The debate in turn centred on a concerted effort by British Labour MPs and French and Belgian trade unionists to table a motion speaking of two blocs, East and West, neither of which corresponded to the needs or aspirations of Europe. They therefore demanded instead that "to avoid any danger of totalitarianism" the workers and their representative organisations should play a part in managing the European economy. This important amendment was deferred, after much discussion, to a drafting committee. In the revised version however, the term "management" of the economy was changed to "associated with the governing body." This was opposed by a group mainly of British economists, and especially Lord Layton, who argued that it simply was not true that trade unions were a safeguard, or the only safeguard against totalitarianism, and asked why a particular "minority interest" should be associated with the running of Europe. In the subsequent compromise, an insertion - "and other groups interested in production" - was made. At this point, 14 French and Belgian 'syndicalists' walked out together.

Still more trouble was in store at the final economic plenary session held on the afternoon of Monday 10 May, after a stormy all-night debate which lasted until 6 o'clock that morning. Indeed, when the agreed Economic Resolution was finally read out, the term referring to the role of workers and their representative organs to be closely associated with the European "governing body" was somehow omitted altogether in the list of proposals! At this, the leading French trade unionist, M. Mathé, sprang to his feet and protested angrily against yet another sign of calculated manipulation from the more Conservative orientated Committee leaders. He furthermore explained that certain French delegates who were members of the hard-pressed union 'Force Ouvrière' were by no means assured of the backing of the work-force in their support of European unity, and they really needed to create the conditions favourable to obtaining worker involvement, as well as having to protect themselves against the easy charges being levelled against them by the Communist trade unions, on their left flank, that they were simply selling out to international capitalism.

The situation facing the conference appeared to be serious. A major public split on such a sensitive issue would effectively wreck the great progress achieved in other spheres. This message, however, did not appear to impress Lord Layton, who stubbornly pointed out that it was impossible to solve major problems of economic philosophy and development within the space of 24 hours. Meanwhile, the French delegates started to challenge the Chair from the floor of the Hall. A tumultuous and disastrous split seemed to be inevitable. It was at this crucial point that Churchill made an impromptu entry, in a rather hurried effort to end the dissension:

"I think", he pleaded, "that we may congratulate ourselves on the success of this remarkable adventure. The experiment, tried in conditions necessarily immature, in some cases adverse, is none the less an experiment which all have need to help and which I believe none of those who have taken part in it will have cause to regret..."

./We have not in this gathering to dwell particularly upon our differences but upon our unity."

The conference calmed down a little, but the French delegates continued still to press their view, and in the end the platform decided to accept Mathé's amendment. Lord Layton conceded this ruling on worker participation and control with the grudging comment: "we are all workers." The Economic and Social Resolution was subsequently passed without dissension, and with the announcement: "Europe is unanimous." The main points in the text show just how much the Economic Debate at the Hague Congress went beyond OEEC limits and foreshadowed the later 'functional' integration of Europe:

The declared goal of the conference was full European economic unity. The immediate measures needed to put this policy into action included:—the progressive elimination of commercial obstacles and the reduction of customs duties between the European states; the necessity to pave the way for the free convertability of currencies and for the institution of multilateral clearing facilities; the promotion of a concerted programme in order to stimulate the development of agriculture and food production; the encouragement of specialized and common productive techniques, notably in the coal industry; the drawing up of a common programme of development for Europe's basic industries; the promotion of labour mobility throughout Europe and the improvement of working conditions, plus a coordinated effort to ensure full employment. In addition, a list of ultimate objectives was formulated, stipulating that European Union should assure:—the free circulation of capital, monetary unification, concerted credit and budgetary planning, an eventual customs union and the harmonisation of social legislation throughout the Community. The Committee also suggested that further studies should be carried out with regard to the establishment of a commission for migrants and displaced persons; the economic and social possibilities arising from./.

./ Marshall aid; the possibility to travel more freely throughout Europe; the elimination of double taxation and the harmonisation of fiscal charges; the economic problems and possibilities of the Ruhr area, etc. - It was a formidable list of proposals and was complemented by the crucial clause in the preamble to the Resolution insisting upon the direct involvement of "workers and their representative organisations" in the creation and development of a united Europe's economy.¹

Cultural Debate

Without doubt, it was the EUP federalists who attached the most importance to the Cultural Debate at The Hague, in addition to Denis De Rougemont's "Message to the Europeans", which was now programmed to be put at the final session of the Congress.² The meagre federalist impact in the Political Debate was a further stimulant. Indeed, federalist writer Jean-Pierre Gouzy has emphasised that if integral federalism made its mark at this Congress of Europe it was precisely in the "Message" and in the deliberations of the Cultural Committee.³ Similarly Henry Brugmans has pointed to the "concrete and useful suggestions" which were advanced by the Cultural Committee, despite the relative lack of attention which it received at The Hague.⁴

The Cultural Committee, under the chairmanship of Salvador de Madariaga and with de Rougemont as chief rapporteur, did in fact complete some important theoretical and practical work at The Hague, but did not actually endanger the gradual "unionist" stamp which the Congress subsequently projected in the movement's major political campaign for a European Assembly. Nevertheless, major contributions concerning a./.

1. Final Economic and Social Resolution passed by the Hague Congress, IO. 5.48. CAEM BRUGGE

2. Cf. pp. 151-157.

3. Gouzy, Le Fédéralisme d'Alexandre Marc, op. cit. p. 14.

4. Brugmans, L'Idée Européenne, op. cit. p. 132.

./Charter of Human Rights and a European Court "above the states" were put forward, though by now the Political Committee had taken up and monopolised these issues. Of more fitting value, perhaps, was de Rougemont's Cultural Report and his attempted definition of "European Man". Twenty years of "personalist"-federalist thought were put into this presentation, and its synthesis of humanism, christianity, individualism and collectivism is far too profound and sophisticated to analyse properly in this limited historical study. Suffice to say that it was a rather moving though optimistic report, stressing Euro-Man's qualities as opposed to the brutish acts which European society itself had fostered. - As de Rougemont stated:

"To whatever party or whatever country we belong, we realise that the present crisis in Europe involves something deeper than our economic and political systems. It involves a belief in Man and in Freedom which is, in the last analysis, our true common heritage. Only on such a basis can the sure foundations of this Union be laid. I

In short, de Rougemont's basic message was that European Man must become both "master of himself and a member of a wider community."

Not everybody, however, was in fundamental agreement either with de Rougemont's personalist conception of Euro-Man or his main tangible proposal for the creation of a European Cultural Centre. The ensuing debate has been well summed up by de Rougemont himself:

"The debates on my report...unfolded in the usual confusion, well illustrated by the following declarations: the novelist, Charles Morgan, wished matters of culture to be referred back to the governments, members of the Brussels Pact; the former minister Kenneth Lindsay thought on the contrary that 'our duty...is to set up a body competent to continue the work of the Congress'. Group Captain Cheshire, from Moral Rearmament, demanded first a return to God and went on to denounce my report as 'anti-Christian'. Finally, Lord Russell, while stressing that 'there is no reason to claim the superiority of Europe's heritage', ./.

I. Cultural Report submitted to the Hague Congress, and drawn up by Denis de Rougemont. CAEM BRUGGE. More details about the drafting of this text can be obtained at CEC GENEVA.

- ./..said that 'a Centre would assist men of different countries to maintain close contact and learn to know each other's point of view'...In the end the whole positive content of the Report was passed in the Resolution, voted unanimously. Centre, Charter of Rights and Supreme Court...All this saw the light of day from 1950 onwards with the application of the Resolutions of the Hague."I
- The Cultural Debate in fact had only taken one day to come to agreement; it was an astonishing contrast to the tedious arguments of the other two Committees.

4) CLOSING PLENARY SESSION, MAY 10 - CONCLUSION

"..the Congress has laboured heroically" wrote the 'Times'. - It was an accurate description. For nearly three days the Congress had indeed succeeded in getting through an enormous volume of work, spending night after night arguing about policies and aims for a Europe yet to be united, but, through the compelling example given by this spectacular gathering, now on the way to the crucial psychological breakthrough needed to surpass OEEC and re-activate popular European solidarity. - In the words of Joseph Retinger:

"The Congress received enormous publicity and the participants, once dispersed, added to it further and confirmed its impact. As a result the idea of European Unity was strikingly brought to the attention of public opinion." ²

The Closing Session of the Congress, held under the chairmanship of van Zeeland, and following on from a most successful open-air rally the previous evening³, did indeed express the emotion and joy of the tired delegates in their 'unanimity' for Europe and in their political confidence that the subsequent campaign would succeed. As even Edouard Bonnefous admitted: "On leaving the Hague most delegates were persuaded that the edification of a real United Europe was near."⁴ The immediate lead-./.

1. De Rougemont, "Campaign of the Congresses" op. cit. p.342. Also consult V.E. Cultural Debate, CAEM BRUGGE.
2. Retinger, Memoirs op. cit. p.221.
3. A Guardian report commented on this rally that Churchill might well have been "the first president of Europe", 10.5.48.
4. Bonnefous, L'Europe en Face de son Destin op. cit. p.100.

./up to the ceremony, however, had not lacked its moment of final drama when the federalists, disappointed by the main outcome of the Congress, threatened to withdraw and publicly disassociate themselves from the Resolutions. Their point of view was put across very well in an official EUP press statement claiming that, despite the enormous contribution which the holding of the Congress had made towards influencing public opinion about the European Idea, the actual "balance of the debates" and the "value of the conclusions" had been considerably "compromised." The Federalists notably "deplored" the procedure adopted in the organisation of the Political Debate and the lack of definition concerning the role of the "living forces" in the projected convocation of the European Assembly. Similarly, the Economic proposals lacked a social basis. In conclusion, the EUP confirmed that "half measures and palliatives" would not be enough to forge Europe, and that federalist principles of "justice and liberty" were needed.¹ - Despite the severity of this statement, Sandys managed at the very last moment to persuade his federalist critics that for the sake of unity they should stay and support the work of the Congress.² Another crisis had been averted.

The Closing ceremony at The Hague was thus allowed to commence and, after John Masefield read a poem of thanks to the Netherlands Organizing Committee followed by the presentation of a commemorative book to Churchill and by some pledges of support by leading women delegates, Duncan Sandys mounted the rostrum in order to review the results of the Congress and outline future plans, in his capacity as Executive Chairman of the International Committee. His speech effectively summed up the real progress made by the Congress, as well as the risks and difficulties involved in reaching broad agreement on the main issues, and the need to retain a sense of practical politics:

1. EUP Press statement, Hague Congress, CAEM BRUGGE.
2. Private information.
3. SANDYS, speech to Closing Plenary Session, 10.5.48.
V.R. pp. 30-33 CAEM BRUGGE.

As a reminder to his federalist critics, he started his speech emphasising the three official objectives which the Congress had been conceived to propagate, namely:—to demonstrate widespread support for European unity, to exchange views and arrive at agreed recommendations for action, and finally, to provide a new and powerful impetus to the campaign. He in turn pointed to the "great risk of failure or fiasco" and to the potential weakening of the campaign had the Congress revealed "deep rifts in our ranks or irreconcilable divergencies upon policy." Despite what he preferred to describe as certain "differences of opinion", Sandys believed that the debates had in fact resulted in "a most remarkable measure of agreement", and the hard tedious work of the Congress had demonstrated the striking seriousness, responsibility and determination of the participants to bridge differences and to find a basis for the realisation of the common European objective.

Looking to the current inter-governmental measures taken, he went on to declare that "the process of uniting Europe has now passed out of the theoretical stage." The continuing campaign, however, would be neither easy nor straightforward:

"But let us not in our enthusiasm exaggerate the progress that has been made or underrate the distance we have yet to travel. We are still a long way from the setting up of an international European authority endowed with effective powers and that is ultimately the real test of our sincerity and our determination.

It is also well for us to recognise that as we move forward from the stage of proclaiming principles to the stage of putting them into practice the difficulties will increase.

We know that the union of Europe will bestow untold benefits upon all people in all lands. But there is no good in pretending that this can be achieved without some temporary interference with certain national and sectional interests. We must, I am afraid, expect that vigorous resistance will be put up by those whose interests are adversely affected and that they will make every effort to mobilise and misuse patriotic sentiment, with the object of holding back their Governments. If the Governments are to be able to withstand these pressures, they must have the solid backing of informed and convinced public opinion."

This was, he stressed, the essential role of the European ./.

./campaign in its initial stage. It had to create a "counter - pressure of popular support" for the European cause by setting up a large and varied international organisation representing the cause in all its different aspects. He then explained that the limited role and composition of the actual International Committee was no longer sufficient to carry out such a mass campaign:

"We who have been privileged to play some small part in the initial stage are the first to recognise that it is no longer appropriate that this great Movement should continue to be confined to a limited circle of pioneers.

If our Movement is to be equal to the magnitude of its responsibilities, it must rest upon the broadest and surest foundations. The international organism which directs the campaign must derive its mandate from authoritative bodies in each country, which are representative of all that is important in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation."

The idea of constituting a more powerful and representative democratic front for European unity was thus officially launched, and the "European Movement", as a concrete conception, can be dated from this moment.

Sandys subsequently suggested that the overall organisation of the Movement should be focussed upon an International Council capable of giving thrust to the campaign.^I After the Congress, he developed the idea further (C.f. pp.257-266), while at the conference itself he publicly explained the proposed profile of the post-Hague European campaign:

"The campaign must be conducted through every channel open to us. Parliamentary action will become increasingly important. The European Parliamentary Union provides an effective instrument for the initiation and co-ordination of efforts in this vital sphere.

Outside Parliament we must employ methods available to us - public meetings, national and international youth rallies, studies and conferences upon special subjects, continuous contact with the press and every medium of modern propaganda. ...We must seek the co-operation of organised bodies of every kind - political parties, trade unions, professional and learned societies, youth movements and so forth."

I. The idea of setting up a larger movement with an International Council had been briefly discussed by the Executive on March 6, see (IG/M/7) CAEM BKUGGK.

Having arrived just before the final Closing Session of the Congress armed with his long-standing "Message to the Europeans", which was to be read out and then signed by all the delegates led by Churchill, de Rougemont was suddenly called for by Sandys. - The rest of the story is his to tell:

"..At the back of the hall, near the main entrance, I found Duncan Sandys and Randolph Churchill, who said to me: 'You want, I think, the congress to pass unanimously the text of commitment which ends your Message. Now I know at least thirty delegates who will oppose it because of the phrase - We want a common defence.- ' Sandys added: 'This phrase has not been debated by the Congress. I'm sorry, but we must forget about the Message.' My interviewer had followed me, his microphone in hand, trailing the wire behind him. I signed to him and speaking into the microphone I repeated what had just been said to me and ended: 'OK! During the next European congress, Stalin who is stronger than you are, will send fifty delegates. Et l'Europe ne se fera pas.'

I think that I raised my voice a little. The ushers asked us to leave. I sent for Retinger and Paul van Zeeland, who were on the platform. In a little room near the entrance, we sat down, six or seven of us, and after ten minutes of heated discussion, Paul van Zeeland who was to preside over the last meeting, proposed a compromise: I was to read the Message, leaving out the small incriminating phrase. This seemed sensible and harmless. In reality, it meant that the Message could no longer be signed, as that small phrase was part of it."

After Sandys' concluding speech to the Congress (described above), plus some additional final remarks by de Madariaga, Bichet and Ramadier, the highlight of the ceremony had been reached and de Rougemont was called to deliver his closing address:

"I was still very pale, it seems, when van Zeeland asked me to read my text. When I began the final commitment, Sandys made an imperious sign with his hand that no one should rise in the hall. I had a small revenge (but only of self-respect) while Senator Kerstens was reading my message in English. I had returned to my seat on the platform, just behind Churchill who was tilting his chair backwards and forwards and I heard him say aloud: 'But why! We should stand up at that! We should all stand up!' No one moved, however, and the congress ended in a blaze of ~~enthusiasm~~, but it had just killed the germs of any hope of a popular campaign, which would have reverberated throughout the whole of Europe." I

The practical tone of his speech and the clarity of his proposed strategy for the subsequent campaign indeed made the last-minute federalist critique of the Congress appear to be rather partisan and simplistic. Nevertheless, Sandys as usual had well outlined the methods and tactics for the European campaign, without actually defining the immediate institutional goals and ultimate political destination envisaged. He did, however, make an honourable cavalier-like gesture in declaring that the eventual European authority set up would be the ultimate and "real test" of "sincerity" and "determination" in the campaign. One year later, a Council of Europe with a Consultative Assembly was indeed achieved, while at a slightly later stage Sandys did in fact formulate precise proposals for the evolution of this joint institution towards a supra-national European Political Authority. He was good to his word, despite federalist accusations to the contrary. It was only when European political circumstances drastically altered, in the Spring of 1950, that his position and policy changed course, in response to the political realities of the time. For the moment, in any case, he concluded his speech at The Hague Congress on a radical note that even the federalists could not deny:

"Our only adversaries", he claimed, "are the timidity which arises from lack of imagination, the scepticism which springs from a restricted national outlook, the obstruction of sectional interests based upon a failure to comprehend the larger and overriding benefits to be derived by all, and lastly, the general inertia which throughout the ages has always been the chief obstacle to all great causes. These we can and shall overcome, by the strength of our own faith and the revolutionary zeal with which we proclaim it."

- It was Joseph Retinger who perhaps best summed up Sandys' powerful contribution to the Hague Congress, when he recorded in his memoirs: " I did not always see eye to eye with Duncan Sandys, but I must admit that he was superb at the Congress, displaying his organizing talent, energy, tenacity and, for once, admirable tact". The redoubtable Denis de Rougemont, however, came away with a rather different opinion.

- It was perhaps a rather fitting end to this climactic and extraordinary 'Congress of Europe', though de Rougemont's negative conclusion more than underestimated the remarkable success which the subsequent political and popular campaign for Europe had in its initial stage, and which the following chapters will describe in detail. The withdrawal of the signed pledge, moreover, was well compensated by the fact that nearly all the hopes expressed in de Rougemont's final Message were actually fulfilled in the years which followed on from this historic Congress. - The Message Concluded by declaring:

1. We desire a United Europe, throughout whose area the free movement of persons, ideas and goods is restored;
2. We desire a Charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression as well as the right to form a political opposition;
3. We desire a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of this Charter;
4. We desire a European Assembly where the live forces of all our nations shall be represented;
5. And pledge ourselves in our homes and in public, in our political and religious life, in our professional and trade union circles, to give our fullest support to all persons and governments working for this lofty cause, which offers the last chance of peace and the one promise of a great future for this generation and those that will succeed it." I

The Hague Congress was in turn pronounced officially closed, and the delegates stood up to applaud "United Europe!" - Not every one, perhaps, was quite sure whether they were applauding the beginning of an historic venture, or the end of a truly unique European experience.

I. Final 'Pledge' in de Rougemont's "Message to the Europeans" Closing Plenary Session V.R., p.38, 10.5.48.

- It should be noted how de Rougemont managed to slip in the notion of the "living forces" being represented in the projected European Assembly (clause 4).

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Part II


THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN
FOR A EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY 1947-1950

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the doctoral degree in the Department of History
and Civilization.



Board of Examiners : Prof. Hendrik Brugmans, Chairman
Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo
Prof. René Girault
Prof. Peter Ludlow
Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz

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PART II

THE CAMPAIGN MAY 1948-MAY 1949

- A. TOWARD THE FIVE-POWER AGREEMENT
OF JANUARY 28, 1949

- B. TOWARD THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE STATUTE
MAY 5, 1949



PART II THE CAMPAIGN: THE SETTING UP OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

MAY 1948 - MAY 1949

"The total results may appear slight. But the Hague Congress nonetheless marked a step toward the building of the new Europe. It was, first of all, the culmination of a movement, consecrating the heretofore disparate and uncoordinated efforts of the European militants. It was a major event for everyone who participated in it; from then on, the creation of Europe was to be taken seriously. The number and quality of the participants, their importance both in European affairs and in the politics of their own countries, contributed to the growing influence of this spectacular demonstration. The continent, once apparently condemned, seemed to come to life again. That Europe still had intellectual resources and men capable of original ideas could not now be denied after these discussions in which some of Europe's most brilliant minds had confronted one another." I

-The astonishing impact which the Hague Congress had upon the European political and diplomatic scene can be judged by the fact that nearly one year to the day later the main proposal for an official European Assembly within the framework of a Council of Europe was actually accepted and established by a formal treaty signed by the ten most important Governments of Western Europe. ² The subsequent inauguration of the 'Council of Europe' in May 1949, and the first session of the European Consultative Assembly in the summer of the same year, appeared to give concrete form to the hopes and ideals expressed at the historic 'Congress of Europe' of May 1948. The campaign which led to this speedy achievement was best summed up by two of the Honorary Presidents of the 'European Movement' in their foreword to the story of the creation of the Council of Europe, published on behalf of the Movement itself. - Paul-Henri Spaak, for example, stated:

"We, in the European Movement, have the right to be satisfied with the work we have done so far. The Hague Congress was a splendid and historic achievement. It was there that the idea./.

1. J. Freymond, Western Union Since the War, op. cit. p.48.
2. Statute of the Council of Europe, signed 5.5.49. by the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden & United Kingdom. Cf. pp.415-20

./of a United Europe passed from the world of dreams to the realm of reality. When the impartial history of these efforts to unite Europe comes to be written it will be recognised that it was thanks to the Hague Congress and to the subsequent campaign of the European Movement that the Council of Europe was established."¹

Similarly, Winston Churchill declared:

"The Hague Congress unanimously called for the creation of a European Assembly. Within a year that Assembly has become an established fact and its first session will shortly be opening at Strasbourg. Our Movement has made swifter progress than anybody versed in political affairs would have thought possible. The success which has so far crowned our efforts should inspire us to press forward together with renewed vigour in this momentous enterprise."²

It was no idle claim that nobody, not even Sandys, had dared to hope in May 1948 that just one year later the first major objective in the European campaign would be attained with the minimum of international disturbance and upheaval at governmental and parliamentary levels. Yet it was precisely this by - passing of national-institutional transformation which in the long run deprived the enterprise of its fundamental goal of organic European political unity. The apparent enthusiasm and optimism shown by the leaders of the European Movement in the summer of 1949 in fact concealed a very real, and ultimately essential defect in the edifice which they had so proudly moulded. The European Assembly had no political teeth, it had no formal powers. Its legitimacy derived not from any directly mandated or accountable sovereign base, but rather from an international ambassadorial treaty, while the finished product itself was modelled by Governments whose enthusiasm in some notable cases was rather limited, as was their vision of the Assembly's future role and development. The control with which they were allowed to hamper and harness the Assembly was total. In short, the European Assembly lacked a firm and clearly defined autonomous-sovereign base, strengthened by the resolute force of popular consensus. It was an Assembly inspired by a growing./.

1. SPAAK, foreward to The European movement and the Council of Europe (Hutchinson, 1949), op.cit.
2. CHURCHILL, ibid.

./number of European militants, but actually translated into reality by a limited number of pragmatic personalities whose actions were at times restricted by the complexities of the situation and perhaps by a rather narrow sense of the possible. The European Assembly was an important and successful European forum, stimulated by deep and visionary debate; but in the final event it proved to be a vacuous political institution unable to gain the necessary powers needed for fundamental structural change in Europe. It was not, nor did it ever become, a European Parliament.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed again that in the context of the time the campaign which led to the creation of the European Assembly was most successful. It also illustrated the same dilemmas and arguments between "realists" and "idealists" which had marked the Hague Congress and its preparatory stages. At the centre of the campaign it was the realistic views of Sandys and Retinger which prevailed, and evolved into a shrewd policy of countering and defusing the "practical" criticisms and objections of the more cautious Governments, not by outrightly opposing or ignoring these views, but by cleverly accommodating and reconciling official negative opinion within an ambiguous programme which nevertheless pushed towards an active and concrete European commitment. Paul-Henri Spaak later credited Sandys and Retinger as being the "two men responsible" for the success of the campaign, adding, with regard to Sandys, that "all doors were open to him and he visited all capitals, laid siege to all the ministries and overcame all opposition."¹ There can be no doubt that Sandys and his team performed a very astute and delicately close operation, leaving almost no scars upon the European governmental establishment. He in turn hoped and actively fought for longer-term change in the role and power of the European Assembly, with the influential backing of the European Movement. In the final event, however, it was not altogether clear whether the European governmental establishment, ./

1. SPAAK, The Continuing Battle, op.cit. pp.201-2

./or the European Movement itself became diverted towards an approach less vigorous than originally intended. - It is with this theme in mind that the following chapters will attempt to discern the fascinating campaign pursued after the Hague Congress for the creation of an official European Assembly.

A. TOWARD THE FIVE-POWER AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 28, 1949

CHAPTER 7. THE DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH MAY-AUGUST 18, 1948

I) Post-Hague Campaign Strategy - definition and direction

The three week interval between the closing ceremony of the Hague Congress and the subsequent meeting of the International Committee on May 29-30 was a period of delicate planning and action behind the scenes, and of deep re-assessment among the groups involved with regard to their subsequent policies and common strategy within the growing movement for European unity. The Congress itself had recommended that a broader coordinating body, representing all democratic tendencies in Europe, should be set up as a "central organisation", which would include a "general Council" representing the various movements and "eminent persons" involved in the campaign, along with an "executive Committee", assisted by a "General Secretariat" and various sub-committees.¹ The embryo of such an organisation, of course, already existed in the actual International Committee. But it was now clear that a larger and tighter organisation was needed to spread and bolster the campaign and gain greater influence, connections and, perhaps above all, direct access to as many interested politicians as possible. Sandys, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, had already outlined his plans for the future organisation of the campaign at the Hague Congress itself.² He now lost no time in formulating his strategy and proposals in more detail, and within two weeks he had already submitted two confidential memoranda to the International Committee on the subject.

The first draft, dealing with the "organisation of the future campaign",³ stressed that the co-operation hitherto between the various European pressure groups had been of "unquestionable advantage./.

1. Doc. T.35 "Permanent Organisation of the Congress" CAEM BRUGGE.

2. Cf. pp.240-243.

3. Sandys memorandum IC/P/24, May 1948, CAEM BRUGGE.

./for the general cause".The Hague Congress had in turn provided a "common mandate and programme of action." He warned,however, that if the campaign was to have the maximum effect upon public opinion,parliaments,and governments,it had to be conducted as a "single concerted operation." It was therefore necessary for the participating movements to work through an "international co-ordinating body",charged with formulating joint policy and the overall planning of the common campaign. This was particularly important in the forthcoming political campaign,in which a single organisation was needed to conduct relations with both Govern-ments and the mass media without any "duplication and inconsis-tencies." Above all,this single unified body should be responsible for the most important immediate goal of the campaign,described as:

"..the formulation of proposals for the constitution of the European Assembly;the planning of a concerted,popular and parliamentary campaign of action to secure the adoptions of these by Governments;the drafting in common of the popular manifestos,parliamentary resolutions,press statements,etc. necessary for this campaign;and finally the practical organi-sation of such an Assembly in the event of Governments declining to take the initiative."

The actual division of responsibilities proposed by Sandys for this co-ordinating body reflected his constant apprehension in assigning the more adventurous groups involved a free hand in carrying out a bold and boisterous campaign which would probably misfire and not reach the declared target. Thus,while assuring each group of their "continued autonomy in their respective spheres",he in fact strongly hinted that the EUP should not interfere with the political-parliamentary campaign,but should instead concentrate on winning over public opinion. The Anglo-French committees were also supposed to act within this sphere, but it was clear from past experience and present circumstances that Sandys had no intention of restricting his own political moves,nor those of his closer colleagues who shared his opinions and strategy. Of considerable interest,however,was the olive branch which he held out to the EPU,which,he suggested,should./.

./be recognised as the "appropriate organism for carrying out the parliamentary aspects of the common campaign and as the channel for coordinating and directing action inside parliaments and between parliamentary groups and for organising international gatherings of a parliamentary character in support of the cause of European unity." (The ILEC, as usual, was to be left to carry out its own economic and social studies). The final part of his report repeated his earlier structural proposals for a broader international Council based upon "truly representative" national groups, plus a balanced Executive, a General Secretariat, and various sub-committees. To this he added that the existing International Coordination Committee, since it was constituted on a similar basis, should act as a provisional directing group, along with the current Executive, up until the permanent Council was officially constituted. The Secretariat, moreover, would continue to be based in London and in Paris, thus enforcing the Anglo-French grip over the organisation.

The second memorandum circulated by Sandys dealt more with the "objectives and plans" of the campaign itself.¹ Right at the start, he emphasised that the Hague Congress Resolutions should be the basis and guide for all general propaganda purposes. This was clearly intended to counter any federalist initiative. The most urgent political aspect of the campaign, however, involved the organisation in each interested country of "representations to Governments" in order formally to present the Hague Congress proposals. Sandys put forward the following format:

"Each national delegation (to The Hague) should be asked to form an influential and representative deputation to call upon the Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers of their respective country. The deputations should explain the contexts of the resolutions and urge the adoption of the specific recommendations.."

He then added

"Special emphasis should be laid upon the request for the immediate creation of a European Assembly." v

1. Sandys memorandum IC, P/25, May 1948, CAEM BRUGGE.

The main emphasis in Sandys' report, it should be noted, concerned the European Assembly. It was an important reflection of his growing enthusiasm for the project, which was further illustrated by his recognition of the proposed Assembly as the key to the whole European campaign:

"Whilst all the decisions of the Congress are of importance the demand for the immediate creation of a European Assembly is the one which is most capable of striking the public imagination. Moreover, such an Assembly, once created, will provide a most powerful instrument through which continuous pressure could be exerted to secure the realisation of all the various objectives adopted by the Congress. The demand for a European Assembly should, therefore, be made the central and dominant feature of the whole campaign, which should be pursued with the utmost energy through every channel that is open to us."

This, in short, entailed a popular and parliamentary campaign operating at every representative level. It also meant having to tighten up and clarify demands about the role of the European Assembly itself. Sandys therefore suggested that a special committee be set up in order to "formulate proposals for the composition, method of selection, and terms of reference of the desired Assembly." Such a committee, he went on to state, should contain a two-thirds majority of parliamentary representatives and should work along-side the EPU. Finally, as another indication of his determination to pursue the European Assembly project, Sandys even appeared to entertain the eventual possibility of having to go over the heads of governments, declaring towards the end of his draft that "to establish an authoritative European Assembly on an unofficial basis will require about twelve months intense preparatory work." - Clearly, despite his enthusiasm for the Assembly, he did not underestimate the doubts and scepticism of some of the governments concerned, nor, on the other hand, the momentum which the Hague Congress had given to the European campaign. His hopes for a tightly unified plan of action, however, did not fully take into consideration the scepticism and outright hostility among certain groups in the European unity movement itself to continuing

./the campaign under his somewhat dominating and abrasive direction.

Already before the Hague Congress, in fact, serious doubts were expressed by the EUP leadership about the desirability of working under Sandys within a future organisation. In an important letter, sent on April 12, the EUP General Secretary, Raymond Silva, informed Sandys of his movement's views, claiming that "whether one likes it or not, the public will regard you as a Conservative, a former British Minister and Churchill's son-in-law". He then added acidly: "Europe can not be conceived without Mr. Churchill..but Europe will not exist either without the Socialists." - The meaning was clear. To the EUP, Sandys was now regarded more as a bogey-man than an asset. Nevertheless, the federalists still desired some sort of unity in the European campaign, though Silva explained that the movement should be much more sensitive to, and a greater reflection of, public opinion. His main structural suggestion, therefore, was the idea of setting up a more balanced "Presidium", comprising three personalities, Sandys included.¹ Alexandre Marc had explained the significance of this proposal in an interesting EUP circular, dated April 29, in which he called for a "re-enforced" Executive, along with a movement organised "according to federalist principles" - in other words, with considerable internal autonomy. The actual Executive, he suggested, should be directed by three Presidents dealing respectively with general coordination, propaganda, and liaison with Governments.² (Up until now, Sandys had effectively monopolised both the former and latter function.) Marc, moreover, was far from enamoured with Sandys' style of leadership, and the Hague Congress precipitated his resignation from the International Committee on this point. His protest was clearly registered to Sandys in a strongly-worded letter dated May 25, in which Marc bitterly complained about the latter's "unilateral, arbitrary and authoritarian" mode of decision making, and the "stifling" atmosphere in the movement provoked by secretive back-room conversations and tactical initiatives.³

1. SILVA, letter to Sandys, 12.4.48. EUP PARIS.

2. MARC "Projet d'Une Organisation Européenne", 29.4.48. CEC GENEVA.

3. MARC, letter to Sandys, 25.5.48. EUP PARIS

Similar feelings could also be discerned among the EPU leadership, despite Sandys' efforts to enlist their support. At the EPU Council meeting of May 12, held in the Chateau d'Ardenne, clear irritation was registered with regard to the moderate evolutionary line taken at the Hague Congress and, in consequence, the Council strongly approved of forging much closer links with movements of a more overtly "federalist" persuasion, especially with the EUP, USSE and NEI. The Council furthermore proposed that a new co-ordination committee be formed, with Coudenhove Kalergi as Honorary President (along with Churchill, Blum and Luigi Sturzo), and Bohy as effective President, while Sandys would be relegated to the post of Vice-President (along with Brugmans, Bichet and van Zeeland).¹ It was, in other words, a re-echo of Coudenhove's original plan of November 1946 to form a revived Pan-Europa under his own colours.² Sandys had not reacted positively to the first initiative and it was rather unlikely that he would willingly accept this current EPU proposal. The situation was indeed perfectly clear to the EPU leadership. The time had come for a 'coup de force'. Coudenhove explained what was really meant by the plan in a letter written at a later date to Mackay:

"At our Council meeting at the Chateau d'Ardenne, you declared that we must try and eliminate Sandys from the Presidency of the Coordination Committee and to replace him by Bohy. Upon your insistence, we took up negotiations with the Federalists and other groups to assure this change. In Paris we pledged to these groups that we would help them overthrow Sandys, and you were charged with proposing Bohy as Chairman of the Coordination Committee."³

On the decisive day of the meeting of the International Committee in Paris (May 29), the planned 'coup', however, went drastically wrong. Indeed, despite the preparatory arrangements for the removal of Sandys, Mackay actually took the lead in ./.

1. EPU Council meeting 12.5.48. official minutes, MACKAY PAPERS

2. Cf. p. 41.

3. COUDENHOVE, letter to Mackay 14.1.49., MACKAY PAPERS.

./nominating him as Chairman! The EPU and EUF delegates were left completely stunned and appalled. As Coudenhove again explained:

"Without having consulted or informed anybody, you rose at the decisive meeting of the Coordination Committee to propose as its Chairman not Bohy - but Sandys! This surprising action of yours violated the unanimous decision of our Council and also our pledges to the Federalists and other groups."¹

The fact that the election of officers was not even on the agenda was now forgotten, in the hastily improvised counter proposal by Coudenhove that Bohy and not Sandys should be nominated as Chairman. Brugmans, as originally planned, also gave his support to Bohy. Sandys in turn delivered a soft 'killer punch', exploiting the open panic and disarray among his critics: It was not correct, he ironically pointed out, to accept his nomination as Chairman by Mackay, since this would be a matter for consideration only when the Council itself would be constituted. Bohy in response felt obliged to withdraw his candidature in a timid gesture which indicated his personal unease at this premature attempt to unseat Sandys, as well as an appreciation that Sandys still commanded the mood and majority of the meeting. As a result, Sandys was then able to ride upon the band-wagon of apologetic good-will from among most of the other representatives, and was in turn "unanimously" re-affirmed as Chairman, up until the projected Council came into being. The EPU delegation, angry and deceived, withdrew from the meeting altogether, though Bohy nevertheless gave an assurance that they would keep in contact and work for the implementation of the Hague Congress resolutions, despite having no further direct association with the International Committee.²

1. Letter to Mackay, op. cit.

2. International Committee meeting, 29-30.5.48., official minutes (EX/M/I), plus accompanying papers, CAEM BRUGGE.

Attended by: Bastid, Brossolette, Courtin, Dautry, Noel (CFEU); ~~Berrens~~, Kerstens, MacMillan, Retinger, Serruys (ILEC); Bichet, Soyer (NEI); Brugmans, Josephy, Silva, Voisin (EUF); Bohy, Coudenhove, Maccas, Mackay, Trinquer (EPU); King-Hall, Lang, Layton, Sandys - Chairman (UEM).

Mackay, in open rebellion with his EPU colleagues, decided to stay put, however, and remain a member of the Committee. The reason for his strange and apparently treacherous behaviour is indeed difficult to gauge, in the same way as was his perceived volte-face at the Hague Congress. Always one with a predisposition for amateur intrigue and tactical manoeuvring, perhaps he had been persuaded by Sandys at the last moment to change sides, especially in view of the latter's growing enthusiasm for the European Assembly and the potential influence he might have upon the international political scene as a messenger of the powerful Churchill lobby. There is certainly evidence to suggest that Mackay maintained a friendly rapport with Sandys during this period.¹ Perhaps, on the other hand, Coudenhove had simply overestimated Mackay's lead in pulling the 'coup' against Sandys, while underrating his serious misgivings about the EPU itself under Coudenhove's control. By December, in any case, not only had Mackay fallen out with Sandys' cautious political strategy, he also led a rebellion in the EPU Council against Coudenhove. By January 1949, he started making overtures again to Sandys and the European Movement Executive! This will be explained later. For the moment Mackay remained loyal to Sandys, and thus provided a potential opening for the organisation of a strong parliamentary group which, as already noted, the latter dearly wanted. Likewise, Brugmans and the EUP delegation now reluctantly felt obliged to remain within the movement, even if this meant working under Sandys. The 'possibilist' viewpoint thus still prevailed, much to the dismay of the more radical and anti-unionist circles in the EUP, who did not seem to appreciate Brugmans' real fear of his movement becoming an isolated federalist sect. The EUP chairman would in turn pay dearly for his moderate approach at the next EUP Congress in November. Sandys, for his part, proved to be a little more adaptable and open towards other groups in the Committee after this 'red alert', seeking refuge instead by trying to exercise undue authority./.

1. See for example Fn.2, p.168.

./over the Secretariat.¹

The sensitive issue of chairmanship having been settled in Sandys' favour, the meeting subsequently adopted the major part of his proposals for closer organic unity between the groups involved in the European campaign. It was thus agreed that the movement's future coordinating machinery should consist of an International Council (based on representative national organisations), an Executive, a Secretariat (centred in London and Paris) plus special committees dealing with different aspects of the campaign. The provisional Executive would include Sandys as Chairman and Retinger as Secretary General, along with four 'Vice-Presidents' - Dautry for the CFEU, Brugmans for the EUP, Bichet for the NEI, and Sir Harold Butler for the ILEC. The special committees would start operating immediately and be composed of one representative for each respective member group, with Brugmans in charge of the committee for the popular campaign, Butler for the economic and social committee, Ramadier for the crucial institutional committee (which would put forward proposals regarding the composition, convoking and terms of reference of the projected European Assembly), Madariaga for cultural affairs (to be assisted by de Rougemont and Gibson), King-Hall for press and radio, Beddington-Berhens for finance (assisted by Christian Monnier and Silva)², and Drapier for the committee dealing with the proposed Charter of Human Rights. The idea of forming other committees concerned with the projected Youth Campaign, Eastern Europe, overseas attachments, Germany, and the plan for a European Court was also to be considered at an early stage.³ The one remaining gap in the campaign, resulting from the EPU withdrawal, was the need for a parliamentary sphere of operation. Either some sort of reconciliation between the Committee and the EPU was./.

1. This led to strong protests from Retinger for a "mutual respect, confidence and understanding" of roles within the movement, and to a personal accusation that Sandys was trying to run a "one man show". - letters to Sandys dated 17.7.48., 18.11.48. RETINGER PAPERS.

2. Berhens soon ceded this post to Monnier.

3. Official minutes (EX/M/I) op. cit.

./ necessary, or an alternative parliamentary group had to be set up from within the existing movement itself. Mackay and the British All-Party Parliamentary Group for Europe eventually proved to be most useful in this respect. For the moment, however, Sandys still held out some hope of patching up an agreement with the somewhat malleable and well-intentioned EPU Chairman, Georges Boky. Moreover, Ramadier's speedy consent in accepting the chairmanship of the Institutional Committee proved to be of immediate invaluable help in political circles, since, in addition to his considerable influence within the French Socialist Party, he also became a leading member of the French Government and Cabinet, first as Minister of State in July 1948, and then as Minister of National Defence from September 1948 to October 1949. These key cabinet posts soon provided a crucial launching pad in the diplomatic breakthrough achieved by the European movement, with the help of the French and Belgian Governments, in the summer of 1948. Before considering the effects which the European campaign had upon governments, we need first, however, to appreciate the growing tension over Europe which now reached crisis point on the international scene, and the way in which the European movement reacted to this challenge.

2) 'Cold War' Politics: the setting up the 'U.S. Committee on a United Europe'

During the six weeks before the next meeting of the International Executive Committee, on July 17-18, there was a sharp turning point in East-West relations which clearly affected the European campaign. Indeed, it was during these few weeks that the difficulty hitherto described as the 'German problem' suddenly broke out into the full-scale 'Berlin crisis', bringing with it the irreparable splitting of Europe into two hostile ideological blocs, and the first major international confrontation in Europe since the war. The restrictions plus openings which the escalation of the 'Cold War' presented the European Movement were crucial.

The 'Cold War' background to the "German problem" and to the decision to rehabilitate West Germany within the OEEC context has already been sketched out in an earlier section.¹ Suffice at this stage to summarise the following subsequent developments:- After the joint allied communiqué of March 7 favouring the setting up of a Federal Government, the Western zones of Germany were in turn included in the April ERP plan. The region's economic realignment and political rehabilitation with the Western European powers was finally sealed on June 4 when, following a conference in London between the British, French and Benelux Governments, the setting up of an International Authority was announced, with a view to boosting and supervising the industrial development of the Ruhr. On June 12, the Russians declared that the London recommendations contravened the Yalta and Potsdam agreements regarding the dismantling of German war industries. Finally, on June 18, the Western powers, acting with the 'German Economic Advisory Council', announced a currency reform for Western Germany, and on June 23 ordered that the new currency should also be applicable to the Western sectors of Berlin.² The Russians responded by introducing a new currency in East Germany and by imposing a complete blockade on all forms of traffic into Berlin. On June 25, the famous allied air-lift to Berlin was launched. The Russians in turn announced, on July 1, that the Four Power administration of Berlin had ceased and that the Western Powers no longer had any right to remain there. - For the first time since 1945 the fear of another war, even more destructive than the last, was widespread throughout Europe.

The 'Berlin Crisis' understandably accelerated the attachment of Western Europe to the United States of America, leading to the expansion of the Brussels Treaty Organisation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On June 11, the United States Senate overwhelmingly approved Senator Vandenberg's decisive resolution supporting the provision of military aid to Western./.

1. Cf. Ch. I.

2. France only reluctantly accepted this measure.

./, Europe, and authorising the U.S Administration to join the Brussels Treaty Powers in an enlarged defence pact. On July 6, the issue was discussed between high-ranking delegates from the U.S.A., Canada, Britain, France and Benelux. Another meeting was held on July 21 which gave the impulse to the final spurt of negotiations leading to the official signing of the N.A.T.O. treaty on April 4, 1949, (Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal also becoming members). The 'Atlantic Alliance' between America and Western Europe thus became a fundamental feature of European Governmental policy, and the development was not lost upon the leaders of the European movement, despite some nagging doubts by the former 'third forcists'. Sandys, in fact, clearly stated his own position in this context when he reflected back, some years later at the Council of Europe, that the 'Atlantic Alliance' was from the start the most "essential element" in any "realistic" European policy.¹ His initiatives on behalf of the European movement during the specific crisis period in question illustrated that this was more than a mere altruistic thought:

It was precisely during these tense weeks in June-July 1948 that Sandys went on an important mission to the United States, accompanied by Retinger and Monnier. At Washington, he managed to call upon President Truman, to whom he explained that the United Europe which he and his colleagues were trying to bring about would work in "very strict collaboration with the United States."² Sandys also contacted the influential U.S. Foreign Relations Committee activist, Senator Fulbright, who had been a major force behind ERP and a leading supporter of European unity plans.³ The purpose of the mission, however, was not simply to cultivate connections and enlist powerful support for the European campaign; it was also to find some hard American capital with which to finance directly the development of the projected 'European Movement'.

1. SANDYS, speech at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1965. 4th. sitting.
2. Sandys recalls, *ibid.*
3. See, for example, Fulbright's article 'United States of Europe', THE ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, Vol. 257, p. 257.

This attempt to raise American funds was clearly explained in a confidential report, written later by Monnier:

"Last Summer", he stated, "Mr. Sandys, Mr. Retinger and myself went to America to explore the possibilities of forming a powerful American group capable of providing funds for our Movement. The basis of a very powerful Committee was formed, but it was impossible to go further up until the Presidential elections. The collection of funds was postponed till the following day of these elections and till the day when we can send a new delegation to the United States."

He then added:

"I am personally convinced that a new visit, in appropriate conditions, will allow us to gather a very considerable sum for the European Movement in 1949." ¹

- What was the nature of this newly-emerging and potentially lucrative American Committee? Who represented it? Who was behind it? The group, in fact, became known as the 'American Committee on a United Europe'.² Its three leading executive directors were William T. Donovan (chairman), Allen W. Dulles (vice-chairman), and Thomas W. Braden (director). The organisation supporting it, and to which all three leaders were directly linked, was the newly-formed U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Important personalities such as Donovan - founding director in 1941 of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, and Allen Dulles - former head of the O.S.S. office in Geneva, were clearly well known among Churchill's war-time entourage. Moreover, it was highly unlikely that the well-informed and secretive Joseph Retinger did not suspect the organisation which backed these two figures, who were both more than instrumental in transforming the war-time O.S.S. into the 'Cold War' CIA. Allen Dulles in fact became Deputy Director of the CIA in 1950, and Director from 1953 to 1961. Indeed, any claim that the European movement delegation was "unwittingly" in contact with the CIA in the summer of 1948 must be treated with scepticism. However ./.

1. MONNIER, 'Rapport du Président de la Sous-Commission Financière (EX/P/53), 4.12.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

2. The U.S. Committee was overtly backed by American big-business interests. See U.S. Committee file CAEM BRUGGE.

./..it should also be stressed that the CIA at this time was above all regarded as a respectable and very necessary organisation of 'Ivy League' specialists in foreign affairs. It had not as yet been tainted with the list of "dirty tricks" later carried out under Dulles and his followers. Nevertheless, in the wake of the 'Watergate Affair' and the subsequent release of information about the CIA, it has now become an established fact that the 'US Committee on a United Europe' was meant to carry out "covert" operations and secret funding on behalf of the CIA within the European network. The less familiar figure of Tom Braden was crucial in this sphere and he actually became head of the CIA's International Organisations Division between 1951 and 1954. He later publicly stated that he was actively involved in the "pump priming" of the European Movement. The sums acquired by the movement were, however, mainly offered during the 1950's, and do not directly concern this study. Suffice to say that an estimated 1.72. million pounds was received by the Movement between 1951 and 1959, most of this sum being used by the European movement Youth Campaign - a relative trifle compared to the estimated 20 million pounds provided by the Soviet Union to the East-Berlin Communist Youth Rally in 1951. The point of interest, nevertheless, is that the ambiguous contacts already made in the summer of 1948 indicated the ideological turn which the European movement and campaign were taking, and the eventual undermining of a completely independent political line which the relatively vast sums later acquired from the CIA effectively implied.

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- I. For the U.S. Committee, the CIA, and the European Movement, see:
Sunday Times articles 'CIA Ghost Walks from Europe Past',
25.5.75.;
'US light on British Spy Secrets',
12.8.79.
Le Monde, article 'La CIA a financé Force Ouvrière et..
Mouvements européens', 18.6.75. ;
Time Out, article 'Uncle Sam Goes to Market', May 1975;
Libération, leading article, 26.4.77.
See also Brugmans L'Idée Européenne, op. cit. p.131.
- Much information is apparently given in an unpublished Oxford thesis on this subject by Xavier Rebattet, son of the the E.M. Paris Secretary during this period.

3) Representations to Governments

During the same period as the 'Berlin Crisis' further jolted the atlantic orientation of European governmental policy, as well as of the European campaign, the International Committee went ahead in organising representative and influential deputations to the heads of the various governments considered in the Hague Congress resolutions, urging especially the speedy creation of the proposed European Assembly. These representations were carefully prepared, and were, for the most part, well received, giving added impetus and publicity to the European campaign. This was especially the case in France and Belgium where the two delegations, led respectively by Dautry and Reynaud, and by Hoste and Drapier, were accorded the close attention of President Auriol and Premier Schuman for the French Government, and Prime Minister Spaak for the Belgian Government.¹ Similarly, the Italian deputation, led by Carandini and Spinelli, held positive talks with Prime Minister De Gasperi and his Foreign Secretary, Count Sforza, who, according to Spinelli, "listened cordially and had much to say."²

The formal reception given by the British heads of Government, however, upon whom, it was broadly acknowledged, western European policy as a whole depended, was not particularly positive. The bitter accusations made by Hugh Dalton at the Labour Party Conference in May against the few Labour MP's who had gone to The Hague already indicated the concern and alarm of the Labour establishment about ceding any governmental power to the "doctrinal altar of a federal Western Europe."³ It was clear in advance, therefore, that the European movement deputation of June 17 would not be welcomed with the same enthusiasm as were most of the delegations on the continent. - Harold MacMillan described the start of this episode as follows:

1. Deputations, Committee report (EX/P/3) CAEM BRUGGE; also Retinger letter to the various delegation leaders, 9.7.48., RETINGER PAPERS
2. Personal Diary of Altiero Spinelli, 7-14.7.48.
3. See report of the Labour Party 48th Annual Conference, Scarborough, 17-21.5.48. pp.117-119, 172-179. LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.
R.W.G. Mackay and H. Hynd effectively defended their attendance at the Hague Congress, charging the Labour Party with disloyalty to its European partners.

"We all met in Churchill's room in the House of Commons, to the number of a dozen or more. After agreeing our procedure, we marched in solemn procession, through the New Palace Yard, across Parliament Square, up Whitehall, till we reached Downing Street. Churchill led, with the usual cigar and the equally inevitable V-signs. The policeman on duty seemed a little surprised, as we dutifully followed our leader, two by two, like a school crocodile. But the traffic was stopped for our benefit, and we reached No. 10, into which I do not suppose Churchill had entered since the summer of 1945, in reasonably good order. - The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary (with a number of other Ministers) received us with appropriate courtesy and gravity."¹

The actual meeting² was opened by Churchill, who briefly outlined the aims of the European campaign and the emphasis which was placed upon a strictly "Non-party, All-party and above-party" approach to European unity. He also stressed that there was no desire whatever to obtrude on the Government's position, and that the deputation and Movement as a whole rested content with the purely unofficial presentation of ideas. In the same light, he also drew attention to the fact that the central proposal for a European Assembly entailed no commitment to any rigid constitution and no appropriation of any legislative or executive power. The Assembly would meet instead with the approval of Governments in order to discuss as a forum the whole question of European Unity. He therefore concluded by asking for the Government's broad official approval for the unofficial work of the European movement.

The Hague Congress Political Report and Resolution were in turn delivered by Mackay, who retaliated to the battering which he received at the Labour Party Conference by sharply pointing out the democratic and representative character of the Congress of Europe, which had been attended by 285 parliamentary representatives of all shades of opinion. Turning to the key proposal for a European Assembly, he not only claimed that the resolution in question⁴

1. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune op. cit. pp. 161-2.

- The delegation included: Boothby, C. Davies, H. Delargy, H. Hymn, Leyton, Lindsay, P. Macdonald, Mackay, MacMillan, Salter (all MPs) plus Berhens, Butler, Bonham-Carter, Hopkinson, Josephy, King-Hall, Rhys-Williams, and Sandys. - EUF Bulletin, July 1948, CEC GENEVA.

2. 'Report on the visit of the British Deputation to the P.M. 17.6.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./followed remarkably closely the lines of Attlee's own pronouncements on Western Union,he also drew a fine distinguishing point to Churchill's broad interpretation, stressing that the Assembly should offer "practical" and "effective" advice, and that although the Assembly's decisions would not be binding upon individual Governments they would have to be referred back to each Government for consideration. In other words, Mackay wanted to insure that governmental support for the project meant a clear commitment at least to the idea of drawing up some specific plan for a United Europe, if not a binding agreement to accept such a plan in advance. It was an ambiguous but crucial dividing line with Churchill's more co-operative and vacuous conception of the European Assembly.

The meeting subsequently dealt with the Economic and Cultural Reports, presented respectively by Lord Layton and Kenneth Lindsay. Attlee, in turn, attempted to lay most stress on the relatively harmless Cultural Report, saying how he and Bevin very much welcomed the "ventilation" of ideas and the need to carry out the suggestions put forward in the latter report. As regards the proposals of the European campaign as a whole, however, he stated that he was in agreement with the "general aims" of the movement, but that it was an unofficial organisation and must not "clog" or "overlap" the practical work of Government, nor impinge upon the extreme importance of working closely with the Commonwealth. On the subject of the European Assembly, he apparently ceded a little by saying that the Government needed to study the idea more closely, especially if the proposed Assembly was meant to be sponsored and mandated by Governments.

At this point, Mackay immediately realised that Attlee was attempting in effect to classify the Assembly as a purely inter-governmental body, and he interrupted to reiterate that it was to be composed on a mainly parliamentary basis with no advance mandate in the sense hinted at by the British Premier.

Attlee failed to respond to this clarification, but Bevin ./

./as Foreign Secretary, soon spoke up to make it clear that he was rigidly opposed to entering into any commitment which would entail discussions about sovereignty, and that he was even more concerned about the Communists "getting a foot in" the proposed European Assembly, with all the de-stabilising effects this would bring upon European policy. He therefore countered Mackay's point by stating: "If the Delegates were to be chosen on a Parliamentary basis, how would it be possible to keep the Communists out? It was exactly the sort of organisation that they would do their very efficient best to infiltrate."¹ In private conversation after the meeting, he again emphasised this fear, while at the reunion itself he tried to stress the serious work involved in constructing sound foundations for European unity, and that the European Assembly should only be a "cap" to the gradual preparatory stages still in course.

The meeting more or less ended on this note, though Mackay did manage to snatch Attlee's consent to prepare a more detailed memorandum on the subject, somewhat to Churchill's shock and displeasure it would seem. Sandys later described the results of the deputation in a rather optimistic light, stating that "We had a full discussion lasting about an hour and a half. Attlee was most sympathetic, though Bevin was rather more reserved... The deputation (he added) was well reported in most of the newspapers and on the BBC."² The report on the meeting, later drawn up by the European movement, also concluded on the same note:

"The impression given in private conversation was that the work of the Movement as a whole had the Government's full approval, but that Mr. Bevin felt so strongly about the question of a European Assembly at this stage that it would be difficult to get his blessing if it was decided to go on with the idea."³

1. BEVIN, quoted in the report of the meeting, op. cit.
2. SANDYS, letter to Coudenhove-Kalergi, attempting to show the latter personality that the European campaign was still making important political progress, 18.6.48. CAEM BRUGGE.
3. Report, op cit.

The campaign for the European Assembly of course continued, but Bevin's sharp objection and criticism were well-heeded and would be met in part by proposals later distributed by the Movement. In the meantime, Sandys and Retinger concentrated on privately securing the support of other European leaders, as well as attending to their interests in America. Mackay, for his part, soon drew up his own memorandum on the European Assembly project, and even enlisted Churchill's partial collaboration on the matter.¹ The actual proposals which he formulated at first appeared to very similar to the Hague Resolution dealing with the European Assembly. There were, however, crucial differences of emphasis, which in turn changed the gist of the original text in favour of a much firmer political commitment: For example, the initial sub-clause in the Hague text, describing the deliberative role of the proposed Assembly (ie. "to stimulate and give expression to European public opinion"), was now cut out altogether, leaving much more stress on the "practical measures" to be carried out by the Assembly in the gradual quest toward the "Union or Federation of Europe", and the "juridical and constitutional" implications arising out of this. Moreover, Mackay went on to link these proposed measures and plans to some sort of formal governmental initiative in this area, the proposals having therefore to be reported back to the Governments concerned. (There had been no mention of any governmental link in the Hague Resolution). Finally, he proposed as an additional clause that the Speaker in the British Parliament should assume the responsibility for carrying out the necessary steps for the convening of the European Assembly, as would appropriate authorities abroad, thus ensuring that it was above all a parliamentary-sponsored initiative, independent of Government designs and mandates. - "Half way to federalism" was the way Sir Arthur Salter² enthusiastically described this new personal memorandum of Mackay.² The direct private action taken./.

1. Draft memorandum on the European Assembly, June 1948, MACKAY PAPERS
2. SALTER, accompanying note, ibid.

./by Mackay, however, on what was after all the main political proposal of the Hague Congress, and which was now a central theme of the European campaign as a whole, was not appreciated by all quarters of the British unionist camp, as the subsequent period of internal debate and tentative reorganisation illustrated.

4) Internal Debate: the problem of coordination, 2nd USSE Congress
Puteaux, June 22, 1948

As the political and diplomatic campaign started to gather pace, the need to initiate the approved recommendations made by Sandys, regarding the formation of an International Council based upon representative national organisations, became a pressing objective. This was especially the case for the Anglo-French United Europe movements who up until now had managed to retain the structural leadership and initiative within the Movement as a whole. The British UEM General Purposes Committee lost no time in this respect, and by July 12 provisional recommendations for the setting up of a 'British Council' were already put forward. The proposed designation of posts within the Council, however, was not quite as balanced as one should have expected. From a formal and honorary point of view, there was of course an attempt to present the movement in a politically representative light, the proposed 'Presidency' of the Council going to the three Party leaders - Attlee, Churchill and Davies. Similarly, efforts were made to achieve some sort of equilibrium among the 'Vice-Presidents, who included Sir Harold Butler, Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, Victor Gollancz, Eden, Amery, MacMillan, Lady Snowden (President of Federal Union), Arthur Greenwood, Gordon Lang, Mackay, Bob Edwards, Bertrand Russell, plus leading Church and regional figures. - However, the chief executive and functional posts were a three-to-one monopoly of leading unionist UEM figures, Lord Layton being proposed as Chairman of the Council, and Sandys as Vice-Chairman, while Boothby was offered the post of Executive Committee Chairman; along with the lone federalist voice of Miss Josephy as./.

./Executive Vice-Chairman. Mackay, whose courageous leadership of the Labour Party European group and whose tactical efforts in support of Sandys at a particular sensitive moment had effectively put him at risk within his own Party and split him from his EPU colleagues, was rewarded with no specific organisational post or duty. He had, it seems, been put forward as Executive Chairman instead of Boothby, but clearly his outspoken manner and unreliable federation views and activities convinced the UEM leadership that Boothby - for all his cockiness - was a safer option. The membership of the proposed Council itself was to be limited to six persons nominated by each member organisation (ie. UEM, LLEC, British All-Party Group, Federal Union, and perhaps the USSE), plus another 50 members representing the political, economic and intellectual life of Britain.¹

The French Committee, in the meantime, also looked into the possibilities of forming a tighter and more representative Council, hoping to exploit the more favourable attitude of the French Socialist Party. Indeed, by the summer of 1948 the SFIO leadership was persuaded, especially by events in Germany, that an active European policy was now necessary, even if this meant engaging the wrath of the British Labour establishment who hitherto had been regarded as the key to European Socialist unity.² Blum and Ramadier, as the 'old guard' of the French Socialist Party, had of course already taken such a decision in April, and both had attended the Hague Congress.³ After the Congress, Blum jubilantly wrote that a new "bright horizon" and a "new phase in the history of the world" had been opened up, and that the "old traditional dogma of national sovereignty" had been seriously challenged by the concept of a collective "supra-national order" of Europe.⁴ Similarly, at the 40th Congress of the SFIO in July, André Philip spoke for the./.

1. UEM General Purposes Committee meeting, 12.7.48., official minutes (GP/M/3) CAEM BRUGGE. Those present included Bonham-Carter, Boothby, King-Hall, Lang, Rhys-Williams, Sandys and Amery (chairman).

2. See F.P. Ritsch The French Left and the European Idea, 1947-9 op. cit. pp.171-191.

3. Cf. pp.158-168.

4. BLUM, editorial in Le Populaire, 12.5.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./silent majority when he declared his open support for the current European campaign and the need to "invite the Government to organise Europe."¹ Even the pro-Labour Guy Mollet reluctantly joined his European-minded French Socialist colleagues in this policy by September.

The key to a more effective socialist commitment in France to the growing European movement lay, however, with the rather more doctrinaire activists in the influential French section of the USSE. Four leading members of the USSE international committee, namely Marceau Pivert, André Ferrat, Jacques Piette and Gérard Jacquet, were in fact representatives of the SFIO Direction Committee. Pivert, however, as the long-standing chief of the SFIO left-wing, was still adamantly opposed to committing the USSE to a pluralistic European movement organised by Sandys, and with Churchill apparently at the helm. Thus, despite some indications that other members of the USSE, such as Bob Edwards, were favourable to forming some sort of association with the Joint International Committee, a lot of ground-work, persuasion and moderate infiltration were still necessary in order to sway the socialist movement behind the unified European campaign, and thereby refute the accusations made by Labour about its "representative" quality. This much was appreciated by Rebattet, French Secretary of the International Committee in Paris, when he informed Sandys that an inner debate was being held by the USSE on the subject of "organic unity" with the European movement, adding that he personally doubted whether the present leaders would accept such a policy.² This debate soon came out into the open at the 2nd USSE Congress, held at Puteaux on June 22.

It is worth noting that on the eve of the Congress Léon Blum delivered an important pre-opening speech. He left the delegates with no doubt about his views in favour of a./.

1. F.F. Ritsch, op. cit. p.177.

2. REBATTET, letter to Sandys (GR/MCT/876), 9.6.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./unified concerted effort in the European campaign, including the active participation of Socialists, rather than their withdrawal into a doctrinaire recluse awaiting the day when only a Socialist Europe could be brought into being:

"Do we have to wait for this majority before realising the United States of Europe? European Unity will not be installed only by the forces of socialism... (but) a federal European or universal organism will itself be the start of socialist realisation."¹

As outgoing President of the USSE, Pivert did not appear to agree with this analysis and attacked the malaise of the SFIO, warning that world bipolarisation could only be halted by the creation of a purely Socialist Western Europe.² The subsequent election of the equally dogmatic Luxembourg Socialist, Michel Rasquin, as President seemed to confirm that the USS&E would continue in its purely socialist European strategy, as Philippe Serre and Gorkin advocated. However, the Congress was also attended by more moderate elements, especially the Dutch delegation under Jef Last, who found it "incomprehensible" that the USS&E should be so reluctant to join the united campaign for a European Assembly. He therefore proposed, on behalf of the Dutch delegation, that the USSE should "adhere totally" to the International Coordination Committee. Brugmans, who also managed to slip into the conference as a member of the Dutch Labour Party, similarly appealed for the USSE's full participation in the European movement, in order to strengthen the "progressive federalist minority" in the Joint International Committee, and to resist the "chaotic nationalism" which was still rampant throughout Europe. Henry Frenay, who was also present and eager to stake out his federalist-socialist credentials, suggested instead that the USSE could apply for "observer status" in the Committee, thereby avoiding any rigid policy commitment and loss of autonomy. The proposal was backed by leading British ILP delegates, Bob Edwards and Fenner./.

1. BLUM, Puteaux Congress, quoted in EUF Bulletin No.2, July 1948
CEC GENEVA.

2. F.F. Ritsch, op. cit. p.176.

./.. Brockway, as well as by the Belgian Socialist EPU President, Georges Bohy. Alexandre Marc, also in attendance at the conference, remained uncommitted and sceptical about this proposal, preferring instead to deliver a rather unpopular anti-parliamentary diatribe in favour of Europe's 'living forces'. After much debate and argument, the Congress finally supported Frenay's compromise proposals for "observer" membership of the International Committee, though it was clear that President Rasquin would hardly rush such a request to the Committee. On the other hand, there was strong feeling that the USSE should develop broader "organic" links with other 'progressive' groups in the European campaign who favoured at least a minimum of economic planning, such as the EUP, EPU and NEI. - In this sense, the rather obvious effort made by the federalist participants to cover their left flank appears to have been quite successful.

In the federalist camp itself, however, the deep divisions of outlook and organisational objectives which the EUP had openly displayed at The Hague had now reached such a point that Brugmans' moderate brand of leadership was seriously called into question. The post - Hague internal debate gave rise to a fundamental fight for power within the movement, the more extreme integral-federalists, on the one hand, attempting to clear the way for an extra-parliamentary campaign of the 'living forces', while on the other hand, the politically-minded MFE, now under Altiero Spinelli's renewed leadership, finally put up a strong resistance in favour of a fully-fledged campaign of support for a European parliamentary policy.

The French integral-federalists were the first to seize the initiative, and at the 'Fédération' sponsored congress of June 11-13 Marc and Voisin stoutly defended the need to set up ./..

I. 2nd USSE Congress, Puteaux, June 1948 - official minutes plus accompanying papers. CAEM BKUGGm.
Note also EUP Bulletin No.2, op. Cit., since the official minutes are not far from complete.

./extra-parliamentary "corps-speciaux", while Louis Salleron, the one time writer for "Je Suis Partout" and leading apostle of extreme right-wing maurrassien corporatism, "brilliantly" described the fundamental principles of federalism.¹ In contrast, Reynaud, Bonnefous and other parliamentary participants at the congress vainly argued in favour of direct political elections to the European Assembly and the need for establishing a new European sovereignty.²

In the meantime, Altiero Spinelli was somewhat ambiguously elected President of the MFE at the Milan meeting of June 10³, and in the first 'MFE Bulletin' of July 6 he launched into a stubborn appeal for the creation of a "real and actual higher supra-national state with a democratic structure..a European Parliament ..European citizenship, and supra-national sovereignty."⁴ At the subsequent EUP Central Committee meeting of July 15, he was more explicit, claiming that the EUP was in danger of becoming an organisation for the promotion of "sacred regional particularism". He in turn stressed the need to work strictly in line with the EPU, stating his preference to see the parliamentarians in the front line of the battle for the convening of a European Assembly, while the federalists should act as a broader and progressive back-up movement.⁵ This was in strict contrast to the EUP Executive Bureau report, which had emphasised the need for the EPU to recognise the major role which the 'living forces' should have both in the projected European Assembly, and in the current campaign.⁶ The main divisions in conception, however, became even more pronounced on the second day of the meeting, when the EUP ./.

1. EUP Bulletin No. 2., op.cit.

2. Ibid. - For more details on the 'Fédération' congress, consult 1948 press file CAEM Brugge.

3. On Spinelli's election, see Brugmans letters to Usellini, Cabelli, Monti & Olivetti, 26.6.48., plus Brugmans letter to Spinelli, 6.7.48. EUP PARIS.

4. A. SPINELLI, 'Lettera Federalista n.I', MFE Bulletin, 6.7.48.
MFE TURIN.

5. EUP Central Committee meeting, 15.7.48., official minutes
CEC GENEVA.

6. Official EUP note on coordination with the EPU, June 1948
CEC GENEVA.

./agenda for the second major congress, to be held at Rome in November, was at the centre of the discussion.

Spinelli came well prepared to the meeting, having worked since his election in June with Rossi and Calamandrei upon proposals favouring the convocation of a 'political' European Constituent Assembly, which Calamandrei would himself present to the EUP Congress. Furthermore, Spinelli had insisted prior to the Central Committee meeting that Brugmans should allow the Calamandrei report to be delivered to the Rome Congress as a condition for future co-operation between the MFE and the EUP. (The other conditions stipulated by Spinelli were: -no interference by the EUP in MFE affairs; the Italian delegation to Rome should consist solely of MFE members; the EUP should break off relations with other Italian federalist movements; and that he was prepared to ally himself with Brugmans, but not with Marc!) However, his diary of the meeting on July 16 recorded that he had to "fight hard" in order to secure that Calamandrei's Constitutional and Political Report could be delivered at Rome, while Brugmans, it appears, was more interested in discussing "functional problems", and Marc, along with Voisin, attempted to diminish the potential impact of the Calamandrei proposals upon the debating arrangements of the Congress. The official minutes of this EUP Central Committee meeting clearly confirm Spinelli's staunch defence of a strong political approach to the European campaign, and the support he received in this policy from Miss Josephy, though by no means the majority of the Committee. . In the final event he nevertheless managed to secure a place for the presentation of the Calamandrei Report at Rome, along with all the political implications arising from it, but had to accept that it risked being submerged in a general mixture of "functional" reports dealing with extra-parliamentary European activities. - As he privately reflected: "Voisin finally managed to gain approval, with only my vote against, for the setting up of a dozen committees, to deal with various problems - agriculture, universities, and God knows what else... The federalist level of this Central Committee is really exasperating. There is nobody in it./.

./with a real political mind."¹

What Spinelli, perhaps, did not appreciate fully enough at this stage, however, was that the EPU itself, in which he placed so much confidence, was also entering a period of crisis and reassessment, in preparation for the parliamentary conference at Interlaken, to be held in September. It is true that both de Menthon and Mackay were preparing radical proposals for some sort of European Constituent Assembly, of which Spinelli greatly approved, but this did not prevent the fact that, as a movement, the EPU lacked a firm homogeneous base and was fraught with personality differences, especially concerning Coudenhove's rather sensitive style of leadership. Moreover, Mackay was up to his old tactical tricks again, and was actually planning the submerging of the EPU into the more general 'Inter-Parliamentary Union'², in the hope of buying Labour Party support for a broader and less incriminating Western Union campaign.³ After gaining some initial double-edged help, however, he appears to have dropped the idea, though he still remained rather an aloof figure in the EPU as a whole, concentrating instead on leading the British All-Party Group, which under his influence actually rejected the somewhat ungenerous UEM proposals regarding the formation of a single 'British Council' for the European campaign.

In conclusion, the post-Hague Congress debate within the European movement let loose a chain reaction of doubts and inner struggles for power and influence. It was indeed an important transitional period for the groups involved in the European campaign, and reflected the considerable problems posed by the./

1. SPINELLI Diary: 18.6.48., 1.7.48., 15-16.7.48.

EUP C.C. meeting 15-16.7.48. official minutes, op. cit.

2. Inter-Parliamentary Union: founded in 1899 as a voluntary study group of international parliamentarians, meeting twice yearly.

3. MACKAY, letters to Dalton 14.7.48., and to Morgan Philips 7.7.48. 5.8.48. MACKAY PAPERS; NEC International Committee meeting, 20.7.48., official minutes, plus accompanying papers, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

./need for unified concerted action. Nevertheless, despite the internal battles and confusion over strategy, the International Executive Committee itself, under Sandys' strong leadership and Retinger's tactful persuading powers and dogged determination, managed to maintain a united front and eventually carry through the proposals for European political unity into the realms of official decision making.

5) The Breakthrough: memoranda of July 18 and August 18, 1948

The concentration of efforts within the Executive Committee, after the Hague Congress, on the primary objective of creating a European Assembly was now starting to have an effect upon key political circles on the European Continent. The Congress itself, of course, provided the chief source of momentum to the campaign, followed by the representations to Governments, and aided considerably by the fears provoked throughout Europe with the 'Berlin Crisis'. Added to this were the discrete but decisive private efforts undertaken chiefly by Sandys and Retinger in persuading sympathetic European Government leaders finally to take a strong public stand on the issue.^I The Belgian Premier, Paul-Henri Spaak, had already, in fact, delivered bold statements about the need for European unity, but could not afford to take up a definite programme of action which risked isolating him in official diplomatic circles, or drawing opposition from within his own vacillating Party, despite the popular note which the campaign appeared to strike. Likewise, the French Government did not wish to create friction with Britain or destabilise its fragile domestic make-up, although it too was favourable to closer European unity measures. The 'Berlin Crisis', and the rather heavy-handed American-British effort to force the pace of West Germany's economic and political recovery upon the French authorities, finally broke this diplomatic inertia. The process, ironically, was triggered off with the fall of the Schuman./.

I. See RETINGER memoirs, op. cit. p.223, plus SPAAK Cf. p.248.

./Government on July 19, after being defeated in the National Assembly over military credits. A new French Government was only formed five days later, during which time Bidault, as acting Foreign Minister, still attended the Brussels Conference of Ministers, where he was perhaps in a position to be even more outspoken and impulsive than under normal circumstances. He did not waste this valuable opportunity. The initiative which he took at the decisive meeting of July 20, however, would not have been made possible without the crucial intervention of the European movement.

Precisely two days earlier, the International Executive Committee had been re-convened in Paris under Sandys' chairmanship,¹ and lost no time in drawing up three important memoranda on the proposed European Assembly, which were to be delivered respectively to the "sixteen" Prime Ministers and Parliaments of Western Europe, and to the Conference of the "five" Brussels Treaty Foreign Ministers. The first memorandum, sent to the Prime Ministers, struck the most cautious note, emphasizing that the European Assembly envisaged would not interfere in any way with the authority of national Governments and Parliaments.² The memorandum sent to the Parliaments, on the other hand, stressed the practical role of the proposed Assembly in formulating European plans and recommendations for Governments, as well as the necessity to set up the Assembly by the beginning of 1949.³ The most pertinent memorandum in immediate terms, however, was despatched for the imminent attention of the Five Foreign Ministers. Referring to clause (4) of the Hague Political Resolution on the European Assembly, the new document further suggested that the Parliaments of the "sixteen" Western European nations, plus the corresponding body for West Germany, should be "invited to pass a resolution"./.

1. International Executive Committee meeting, 17-18.7.48., official minutes (EX/M/2). - Attended by: Aron, Courtin, de Menthon, Philip (CFEU); Berhens, Kerstens, Kettinger, Serruys, Vallée-Poussin, van Zeeland (IL&C); Brugmans, Josephy, Silva, Voisin (EUF); Bichet, Lamalle, Soyeur (NEI); King-Hall, Layton, Lang, Sandys-chairman (UEM). CAEM

2. Accompanying paper EX/P/I, annex A

BRUGGE.

3. Ibid. annex B.

./..asking for the convening of this Assembly. The memorandum went on to add that further agreements would have to be reached as regards the "precise terms of reference of the Assembly" and the "procedure to be adopted in selecting the members of the Assembly", as well as the specific organisational, administrative and budgetary arrangements to be made.¹ In other words, the Committee drew back from the temptation of proposing a precise plan for the European Assembly, in order to avoid a definite reciprocal rejection by the Ministers. Instead, they first sought to gain the Ministers' general approval of the project in principle, after which a commitment could then be extracted with regard to specific arrangements. Moreover, the leaders of the European campaign realised only too well that the project could only succeed if the European Ministers themselves appeared to be opting upon their own initiative. The initial idea of convening a European Assembly was brought to official attention, but the Ministers had to show their own public interest in the matter if the project was to make any further official progress. Nevertheless, the fact that such respected European politicians such as André Philip and Paul van Zeeland were among those responsible for the presentation of the memorandum of July 18 to the Council of Foreign Ministers certainly lent authority to the document, while in the meantime Bidault and Spaak (in his capacity also as Foreign Minister) had been softened up, if not fully informed, as regards the plan.

In due course, on the morning of July 19, Senator Kerstens was despatched to the Ministerial meeting at The Hague with a letter which he was to deliver personally, on behalf of the International Executive Committee, to the Conference, requesting the Ministers to give their "earnest consideration" to the proposals listed in the memorandum concerning the European Assembly.² On Tuesday./.

1. 'Memorandum regarding the Convocation of a European Assembly'
drawn up by the International Executive Committee 18.7.48.

CAEM BRUGGE.

2. Official minutes. (EK/M/2/), op. cit.

./July 20, Bidault, speaking still in the name of the French Government, gave his tenuous official support to the memorandum, calling for the creation of a European Assembly and declaring that the European Governments should facilitate the realisation of the "great movement of opinion launched at The Hague."¹ The arguments which he put forward were those which had in actual fact been developed at the 'Congress of Europe'.² It was certainly an historic diplomatic initiative by the French Foreign Minister, though inevitably diminished by the fact that he no longer in effect held office.

Though no objections were apparently raised to the idea in principle, Bevin was quick to point out that the project was "premature" and in need of more precise formulation. The European Governments and Parliaments, he maintained, should not become involved as yet in such a plan; the proposals and clarification should best be left instead to "private organisations".³ What Bevin in effect meant by this was that the project should be officially shelved until the proposals were of such a precise nature as to warrant an equally precise veto. The role played by Paul-Henri Spaak at this point was crucial. Initially he agreed with Bevin that a more precise formula was needed and should be drawn up by a private organisation. But this was not with the intention of thereafter rejecting the new proposals. Spaak hoped instead that the Governments would "seize" this clearer project, without thereby becoming directly involved in the initiative. He appeared, in this sense, to be at strategic odds with the European movement, though it has been noted that Sandys also contemplated the idea of having unofficially to convoke a European Assembly as a last resort.⁴ The Belgian Premier-Foreign Minister explained his motives shortly after, on July 24, in a private meeting with ./:

1. See Chronique de Politique étrangère 1948. Vol I No.3;p.36, Vol. I No.5, pp.18-20.

2. Article written on Bidault's initiative of 20.7.48. by W. Kerr in New York Herald Tribune .

3. Chronique de Politique étrangère, op. cit.

4. Cf. pp. 252, 253.

./Ramadier, when he admitted that he had apparently been influenced by Bevin's unexpected firm opposition to the project as it stood, and by the fact that Bidault was in any case a "ministre d'opposition" and would not have to pursue the proposals made. Spaak thus maintained that in actual circumstances the campaign for a European Assembly had a better chance of succeeding if it was initially pushed from an unofficial level.¹

Sandys had in fact already appreciated the point and, as a result of the ministerial conference, wrote on July 21 to all five Foreign Ministers stating that if neither Governments nor Parliaments would take the responsibility for convening the proposed European Assembly the International Committee would be willing to do so.² Spaak, in turn, grasped the initiative and declared in the Belgian Senate, on July 29, that he was in favour of a European Assembly, and that upon receipt of detailed recommendations from the International Committee he would be willing to approach other Governments with a view to securing their agreement. As he had explained to Ramadier a few days earlier, no European governmental action or commitment would be taken until the unofficial European movement itself took the risk of furnishing much clearer recommendations. He nevertheless stressed that his own preference was for some sort of governmental involvement, in order to ensure the proposed European Assembly some "official value and effectiveness:" With Ramadier's forceful collaboration, moreover, the Belgian Premier ceded that the establishment of some sort of limited inter-parliamentary study group, set up by the Brussels Treaty Governments but not necessarily engaging the responsibility of the latter, stood a chance of success in promoting the European Assembly proposal, especially since such a group would appear in governmental circles to be pursuing the specific issue "neither too rapidly, nor too energetically." The chief difficulty in all this, however, was Bevin's concern about ./.

1. Confidential summary of points raised in a discussion between Spaak and Ramadier, 24.7.48., about the convocation of the proposed European Assembly. CAE, BRUGGE.

2. SANDYS, letter to the "five" Foreign Ministers, 21.7.48. SANDYS PAPER.

./ Communist membership of the European Assembly, which led Spaak and Ramadier to agree that restrictive measures in this area should be proposed in order to placate the British Foreign Minister's main apparent reason for objecting to the project.¹ The same point was again stressed in private conversation between Spaak and Vallée-Poussin in preparation to the Belgian Premier's important declaration of July 29. - Not only should the Hague Committee propose clear suggestions as to the election of members to the Assembly in question, it would also "be easier to rally Bevin's sympathies if the mode of election would have the effect of excluding the Communists."²

In response to such requests and advice, the leaders of the International Executive Committee prepared a 'Preliminary Memorandum' to be submitted to the "five" Governments, signatories to the Brussels Pact. The document was drafted early in August and was mainly the work of Sandys and Ramadier (as President of the key 'Institution Committee'), along with de Menthon and Reynaud, and in consultation with Brugmans and Bichet.³ Sandys also met Spaak for private talks in London, on August 9, and subsequently informed Brugmans:

"I think this document will be acceptable to the Belgian and French Governments, and Spaak would be prepared to submit it on behalf of his Government as an official document for consideration by the next meeting of the Five Brussels Treaty Powers."⁴

Sandys indeed had every right to sound confident. Not only was the Belgian Premier becoming actively involved with the view to taking official diplomatic action, the new French Government, formed on July 24 under André Marie, was also openly committed to the growing European initiative, and contained several major European./

1. Note on Spaak-Ramadier talks, 24.7.48. op. cit.

2. Information in a letter written by Vallée-Poussin to Rebattet, 24.7.48. CAEM BRUGGE. On Spaak's declaration of 29.7.48. see Chronique de Politique étrangère, Vol. I No.3, p.36.

3. Information in letters from Sandys to Bohy, 6.8.48., and to Brugmans, 9.8.48. CAEM BRUGGE, SANDYS PAPERS.

4. SANDYS, letter to Brugmans *ibid.*

./..campaigners, including Blum (Vice-premier), Schuman (Foreign Minister), Reynaud (Finance Minister), P. Pflimlin (Agriculture), and Ramadier (Minister of State). Furthermore, the political climate in France was rapidly moving in favour of a direct European initiative. Already on July 16 Blum had confided that the majority of French deputies supported the idea of a European Assembly.¹ By July 26, over two hundred deputies had actually signed the motion presented by de Menthon and Bonnefous in favour of a European Constituent Assembly, while on July 28 the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee adopted the same motion by a substantial majority. Even the French President, Vincent Auriol, publicly identified himself in favour of a European Assembly. The French press similarly spoke out in favour, and looked to Bidault's dramatic gesture of July 20 as a continuation of the French "revolutionary tradition", as opposed to the "slow evolutionary" methods of the "Anglo-Saxons." Whether Bevin liked it or not, a "unique" atmosphere for "making Europe" now conditioned French political thought.²

The diplomatic breakthrough of the European campaign was close at hand. In the words of Joseph Retinger: "Suddenly, on August 15, Paul Ramadier, who had then become a Cabinet Minister, told us that he was willing to put this (European Assembly) proposal before the French Government, asking it to take the initiative in calling a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers..to discuss our ideas."³ According to Sandys, the French leadership was actually "pressing" the International Executive Committee to present their recommendations in time for consideration at the next full meeting of the Government, on August 18.⁴ The Committee Bureau subsequently met on August 18⁵ and rushed through the final approval of the text to be presented to the "interested Governments" in Europe, specifically viewing the "five" Brussels./.

1. BLUM, private talks cited in Spinelli Diary, 16.7.48.

2. See Année Politique 1948 (July) p.26., Le Monde editorial 23.7.48.

3. RETINGER memoirs, op. cit. p.222.

4. SANDYS, letter to Bohy, 19.8.48. CAEM BRUGGÆ.

5. Bureau meeting, 18.8.48., official minutes (EX/M/3), CAEM BRUGGÆ.
-attended by sandys, Bichet, Couffin, Butler, Nord, Retinger.

./..Fact covers, and especially France. The actual document, drawn up as a memorandum, clearly illustrated the influence which Ramadier and Spaak had exerted over the strategic thinking of Sandys and his Executive colleagues. In addition to repeating the broad terms of reference layed down at The Hague regarding the proposed European Assembly, and the hope that the Assembly would "ultimately embrace all the nations of Europe", the memorandum concentrated above all on proposing a scheme whereby Governments would be called upon officially to authorise the project, while having no direct involvement in the tentative formulation of procedure to be proposed with regard to the actual establishment of the Assembly. The text thus suggested that, "for reasons of speed and administrative convenience", the Five Brussels Treaty Governments should act as the convening authority for the European Assembly, and in turn secure parliamentary agreement for the setting up of a 'preparatory conference' which could by itself consider all matters relevant to the eventual convocation of the Assembly in question. This preparatory conference, the memorandum suggested, should be composed of about seventy five parliamentary and non-parliamentary delegates (one third of the seats being distributed respectively to Britain, France and Benelux), and should specifically consider the countries to be represented in the Assembly, the number and allocation of seats, the method for selecting candidates, the rules of procedure, the place and date of the first session, and the agenda for this first session. The memorandum also emphasised that the scope of the Assembly should include all OEEC countries, and not simply the Brussels Pact nations, though it was to the Governments of the latter formation that the conference recommendations should be presented.^I

In other words, the International Executive Committee still shrank back from making any specific proposals concerning the actual convening of the European Assembly, while at the same time./..

I. 'European Assembly - Memorandum submitted to the Governments by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity', 18.8.48. CISM BRUGGE

./a major effort had been made to meet Spaak's contention that the British Government would veto any move which threatened to directly commit it, in advance, to the effective convocation of the proposed European Assembly. The memorandum in this sense attempted to present the "five" Governments with a tentative plan of action, but not one which necessarily called for governmental participation or prior approval of the recommendations. The preparatory conference would only be entitled to the amount of authority which the Governments themselves were prepared to specifically transmit to it, be this at a diplomatic or parliamentary level. The main purpose in proposing a preparatory conference, however, was to transform the hitherto unofficial level of the European campaign to a level recognised by Governments and Parliaments, even if the precise formula for the European Assembly could not be foreseen. Indeed, while the campaign remained solely identified with an unofficial movement, as Bevin and Attlee preferred, it was only too easy for the latter personalities to discount any proposals made as being "premature" and "unrepresentative". If, on the other hand, the British Government, along with the other European Governments, could be sufficiently associated with the European Assembly scheme, without thereby being committed to the idea in full, then at least Bevin's objections would no longer be directed thereafter to "private organisations", but would have to be addressed instead to official European Governments, who, by this stage, were more likely to support the scheme and resist any outright rejection.

The memorandum of August 18 was subsequently sent off to the sixteen OEEC Governments, and delivered within hours by Ramadier and Schuman before the full meeting of the French Government, held that same day under the chairmanship of President Auriol. The document was endorsed in less than four hours, the main driving force behind this rapidity being Schuman himself, who considered the matter as very urgent.^I As the 'Manchester Guardian' also commented however, "the presence of M. Ramadier and M. Reynaud in the Government could only reinforce the tendency to support ./.

I. Continental Daily Mail 19.8.48., article by H. King.

./the cause of European unity", adding that "such a proposal has been expected for some time."¹

At the end of the meeting the following official communique was issued from the Elysée Palace to the international press:

"The Government has considered the Memorandum submitted by the European movement regarding the convening of a conference to prepare for the creation of a European Assembly. The Government has decided to give this project its active support and to initiate all necessary action."²

In turn, the French cabinet spokesman and Information Minister, François Mitterand, elaborated upon the communique, stating:

"Mr. Schuman communicated to his colleagues the broad lines of the memorandum...The French Government agreed to support the essential principles...and to commend them to the other nations concerned. For this purpose contacts will be established between the Foreign Ministers of the various nations, notably the States of Benelux and the United Kingdom in order to arrive at a common standpoint and, if an agreement is reached, to try and operate the provisions of the memorandum."³

The diplomatic breakthrough of the campaign for a European Assembly had been achieved in just over three months after the Hague Congress. It was indeed the most crucial stage in the campaign, since the failure to secure official recognition would have considerably reduced the status and attraction of the scheme, and might well have led to an abortive attempt to conjure a European Assembly on a popular and unauthoritative basis over the heads of governments, as was unsuccessfully attempted in later years among federalist groups.⁴ Moreover, it was also decisive that France, as the most influential power on the European continent and Britain's closest diplomatic ally, had been the first to extend official governmental recognition and approval of./.

1. Manchester Guardian, article and editorial on the French Government's initiative, 19.8.48.
2. Creation of the Council of Europe p.5. - European movement publication (INF/XO/E) 1949. See also The European Movement and the Council of Europe, op. cit. p.52.
3. News Chronicle, 19.8.48.
4. Cf. p. 463-476

./the European Assembly cause, since such a diplomatic initiative could not be ignored by the British Government. The Belgian Premier seems to have recognised the advantage involved with the French Government's rushed approval of the European Assembly memorandum, despite the fact that he too had seriously considered the possibility of launching the official campaign himself. - As Retinger later explained:

"This was all done in a hurry and Paul-Henri Spaak, who was resting in Biarritz, could not be kept fully informed. However, we telephoned him and told him that the French Government intended to accept our proposals. He then agreed to leave it with them as it would be easier for France than for Belgium to take the initiative and make the idea a success."¹

- The next few weeks soon illustrated whether this strategy would prove successful.

1. RETINGER, memoirs, op. cit. p.223.

I) International Reaction

"The response of France", commented a leading British press report, "came sooner than the most sanguine of the memorandum's signatories..could have hoped for. The rapidity of the response, it was stated in official circles..shows how great is the importance which the French Government attaches to the issue."¹

The French Government had indeed acted quickly on August 18, and despite the rather fragile circumstances in which it was holding power², its European initiative received the broad support of the 'third force' French political press. For example, the MRP organ - 'L'Aube' - soon declared, on August 22, that "federalism no longer seems a generous dream: it is a practical necessity...The solemn offer of August 18 is the first of the important acts of Robert Schuman at the Quai d'Orsay." Similarly, Orestes Rosenfield emphatically exclaimed in the Socialist Party 'Populaire' that the SPIO would support the European Assembly proposal, adding that "the moment has come to act. Only the creation of a federal parliament and a federal government can respond to the vital necessities of the hour." Léon Blum likewise expressed his strong approval of Schuman's decision in support of the European Assembly, and anxiously awaited British Labour reaction.³

The British Government, however, showed no marked enthusiasm for the project, as was publicly demonstrated in an interesting exchange of letters on the subject between Churchill and Attlee, published in the press on August 25. In the first round of this artificial dialogue Churchill argued ardently, in a letter written to Attlee on July 27, that the "creation of a European Assembly would represent an important practical step in the advance towards a United Europe", and that in this "the lead should be taken by Britain." Replying on July 30, the British Prime Minister stated that although he was "in sympathy with ./.

1. News Chronicle, article by W. Forest, 19.8.48.

2. Cf. p.298

3. European Movement Press file 1948, CAEM BRUGGE; F.F. Ritsch op.cit. pp.173-174.

./the movement", he thought that the matter in question was too important to be left to "independent organisations", adding that "I think it is not the right time for Governments to take this major initiative, when their hands are so full already with urgent and difficult problems." Three weeks later, in view of the French Government initiative, Churchill wrote again to Attlee, on August 21, expressing his disappointment at the "negative character" of Attlee's letter, and said that in view of the fact that the French Government had now taken up an active policy in favour of the European Assembly memorandum, he hoped that the British Government would in turn "find it possible to place themselves more in line with Western European opinion." Answering the same day, the British Premier once more repeated his doubts on the subject, drawing attention to Bevin's arguments and to the need, in any case, to consult the Commonwealth nations before being able to express "any definite view."¹

The British press, in contrast, was for the most part rather enthusiastic about the official French proposal. The 'Manchester Guardian', for example, was particularly favourable, claiming on the one hand that the European Assembly "could do little harm", while on the "positive side", it could bring Germany back into Europe and create a new European idealism and sense of solidarity. "It would be a grave responsibility", the same journal argued, "to stifle this by rejecting the first concrete proposal. There are times when even British caution and empiricism may be overdone."² The 'Observer', for its part, was most sympathetic to the French position: "We understand, they might say, that you British do not want to plunge head over heels into deep water; but what are we to think if you even refuse to test the water with your toes."³ The widely read 'Daily Mirror' also added its weight in favour of the campaign, exclaiming that "Europe can't wait!", and ./.

1. Churchill-Attlee correspondence July/August 1948: see Keesings Contemporary Archives 1948 p.9498, plus press reports 26.8.48.
2. Manchester Guardian, editorial on the European Assembly, 19.8.48
3. Observer, editorial 22.8.48.

./..complaining that the "Prime Minister's views are disappointing. They are vague and tepid."¹ The 'Daily Mail' for its part criticised the Government for being politically dogmatic on the subject², while the conservative 'Daily Telegraph' appeared to be unconvinced about Attlee's preoccupation with Commonwealth opinion, whose "solidarity" could in any case be counted upon, in view of the fact that no "irrevocable commitment" was involved in the European Assembly project.³ In reply, the Labour Party organ - the 'Daily Herald' - defended the British Government's cautious approach, arguing that its "hands are full" and that there should be "no rushing" the issue.⁴ The left-wing Labour weekly, 'Tribune', was not, however, totally convinced about the Government's evasion of the French initiative, and called out for a reciprocal British governmental statement stressing the economic co-operative road to Western Union.⁵ Other Labour circles acted with even more blunt criticism of the Government's European policy, Hugh Delargy MP. taking the lead in stating: "I think the Labour Government in this country has shown a definite lack of leadership in this matter."⁶ Yet it was perhaps the stolid editorial chiefs of the 'Times' who best reflected upon the deeper reasons behind the Labour Government's reluctance to be drawn into discussions over the proposed European Assembly, commenting immediately after the French initiative of August 18 that a moderate pragmatic approach to the question would best serve all interests:

"To bind the Powers of western Europe together is the first objective of British foreign policy. The signing of the Brussels Treaty and the institution of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation are both intended to bring about a close combination of the resources of western Europe in support of a common policy. All are agreed that this is the condition of survival. The question is, where the proposal for a European Assembly fits in? The tasks of military ./..

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1. Daily Mirror ,27.8.48.
 2. Daily Mail ,article 'Western Disunion',26.8.48.
 3. Daily Telegraph',26.8.48.
 4. Daily Herald ,26.8.48.
 5. Tribune ,editorial 'European Assembly',3.9.48.
 6. H. Delargy,quoted in Catholic Herald.,27.8.48.

./preparation and economic regeneration by which western Europe is faced, call for practical decisions, swiftly taken and firmly enforced. It is not likely that a large elected Assembly, called into being to debate publicly and at length all matters of common interest, could help the western European Governments to discharge these tasks. Every move to bring about greater unity in Europe demands encouragement and direct support and not a diversion from the serious business in hand."¹

The British Government indeed had much serious business in hand: Outside Europe, the Commonwealth and Dominions were undergoing the strains of Indian independence, Irish separation, Communist agitation in the far-East, and open war in Palestine; while inside Europe, the Berlin crisis and the deadlocked negotiations in Moscow, along with deep disagreements within the Council of the OEEC, were increasing the state of tension to a dangerous level. Moreover, the same French Government which so boldly took up the European initiative on August 18, actually fell from power on August 28, amid social upheaval and parliamentary opposition to Reynaud's proposed austerity measures, Communist-led industrial strife in the mines, and 'boulangist' agitation from Gaullist quarters. The subsequent Government, formed under Schuman, lasted little more than a week. It hardly posed any serious attraction to the British Government to become involved in "continental politics. Yet, it was the very dangers of disunity and internal collapse abroad which surely should have motivated British political leaders to take swift and drastic action, not simply in the economic and strategic affairs of Europe, but above all, in her political and structural capacity to survive. - As Harold MacMillan sharply quipped: "Mr. Attlee seems born to doodle while Europe burns."²

If, in Britain, the Government showed a marked procrastination in replying to the French Government's urgent call for a European political initiative, this was not the case among the other./.

1. Times, editorial 'European Unity', 20.8.48.

2. H. MACMILLAN, speech made at Gosport on 26.8.48., reported in Sunday Times and Observer 29.8.48., Guardian 30.8.48.

./Western allies: The U.S. State Department, for example, indicated support for a European Assembly on August 27, issuing the following statement from Washington:

"The U.S. Government strongly favours the progressively closer integration of the free nations of Western Europe. We believe that the world today requires the taking of steps which before the war would have seemed beyond the range of practical politics. We favour the taking by Europeans themselves of any steps which promote the idea of European Unity or which promise the study of practical measures and the taking of such practical measures."¹

Similarly, in Italy there was most positive reaction to the decision of the French Government, and on August 24 an official declaration of support was issued. On August 28, Count Sforza elaborated further in a long article published in the 'Corriere della Sera', in which he posed the question: "European Federation or wars without end?" The Italian Foreign Minister was by no means isolated, despite the hostile attitude of the Communists and Nenni Socialists. Indeed, the leader of the moderate Socialist Party, Giuseppe Saragat, strongly welcomed the French initiative, and called for a fully-fledged "federation of peoples", while his political colleague, Umberto Calosso, declared the urgent need for a European Constituent Assembly.² At the same time, the Dutch Prime Minister, Willie Drees, made a "friendly but non-committal statement" to a deputation from the UEM, on August 27. He would consider the proposal to form a European Assembly "as soon as the project was deemed opportune."³ It was in Belgium, however, where, despite the initial waverings of the acting Premier - Paul Struye, the most decisive action was taken. Upon his return to Brussels, Paul-Henri-Spaak took over responsibility and, in response to requests, entered into formal negotiations with France, with a view to forming a joint diplomatic strategy for the success of./.

1. See Times, 28.8.48.

2. Corriere della Sera 28.8.48., L'Umanità 28.8.48., EUF Bulletin No. 4. (September 1948). See also L. Levi Trent'Anni di vita del Movimento Federalista Europeo, (Milan, 1973), p. 109.

3. Creation of the Council of Europe INF/IO/E, op. cit., Manchester Guardian, article 'Dutch caution', 28.8.48.

./the European Assembly project. The outcome of his direct consultations with Schuman was a crucial joint agreement issued by the French and Belgian Governments on September 2, pledging their support for the European movement memorandum of August 18, and their intention to submit the report for recommendation to the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission in London.¹

The Chairman of the Commission, Gladwyn Jebb, reluctantly announced on September 8 that the Franco-Belgian proposal for discussion was accepted, and as a result, the memorandum was considered by the Foreign Ministers of the Five Brussels Powers at their next meeting in Paris, held on October 25-26. It was fortunate for the European campaign that this Ministerial meeting was attended both by Spaak and by Schuman, the latter having retained his post of Foreign Minister under the new and more stable French Government formed under Henri Queille on September 10. By mid-October, however, the British Government decided to propagate its own alternative European strategy, stressing economic rather than political integration measures. The protracted discussions which ensued must first be seen in the light of the political battles and debate which continued throughout this period within the European movement itself.

2) Internal Developments; 2nd EPU Congress, Interlaken
September 1-4, 1948

The International Committee had not been inactive during these important weeks which followed the French Government's declaration of August 18. Sandys, in fact, held two important talks with Spaak in order to discuss the French initiative, as well as the Belgian Premier's potential role within the European movement itself.² Similar moves were soon taken in hand in Italy, where./

1. See The European Movement and the Council of Europe p. 52, op. cit.; The Creation of the Council of Europe (INF/10/E), op. cit.; P.H. Spaak The Continuing Battle pp. 202-3, op. cit., News Chronicle article 'Belgium joins demand for a European Assembly', 9.9.48. 2. News Chronicle, ibid.

./Retinger held private talks with de Gasperi and Sforza,¹ while at the same time Rebattet and André Philip were actively at work in France trying to secure Léon Blum's official participation within the movement.² At the subsequent meeting of the International Executive Committee, held in Paris on September 11-12, it was announced that Blum, Spaak and Churchill had agreed to accept the joint Honorary Presidency of the 'European Movement', about to be officially launched, and that de Gasperi was soon expected to join their ranks.³ Meanwhile, the "tentative attitude of the Dutch Government" was also discussed, Sandys in turn being charged to approach the rather cautious Dutch Foreign Minister, Stikker, in an attempt to gain a more favourable commitment. An all-round effort would also be made to contact and convince the Commonwealth leaders of the need for European unity, prior to their international meeting at London in mid-October.⁴

All matters considered, there was indeed a strong feeling of optimism among the leaders of the European campaign, though Sandys still wisely refused to allow these high spirits to conceal the real difficulties which lay ahead. - As he confided to Sir Harold Butler:

"Yes, I think we can be well pleased with the progress we have made over the European Assembly. However, we cannot regard the matter as clinched until the support of the British Government is secured. Provided the Dominion Prime Ministers do not raise objections, I do not think that Bevin and Attlee will feel strong enough to stand out against the increasing current of opinion... A great deal more attention will have to be given to winning the support of the Dominion Governments."⁵

Similarly, he pointed out to his Executive colleagues:

"It will be seen that the only serious obstacle to the creation of the European Assembly is the attitude of the British Government. That, in turn, depends to some extent./.

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1. Note on Retinger's visit to Rome, October 1948, RETINGER PAPERS
 2. Information in letters from Rebattet to Philip 30.7.48., 25.9.48., 7.10.48. (Correspondence Rebattet) CAEM BRUGGE.
 3. Official Minutes, (EX/M/4), CAEM BRUGGE
 4. Ibid.
 5. SANDYS, letter to Butler 1.9.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./upon the attitude of the Governments of the British Commonwealth. Whilst this hesitancy in official quarters in London may result in some delay, it is unlikely that the British Government will wish to be the only one to resist a proposal which enjoys such wide-spread support not only on the Continent but also in the British Parliament and in the United States of America."¹

The growing opinion within the British Parliament in favour of a stronger European political initiative came more into light in the important European debate of September 15.² In the meantime, however, the thoughts of the International Executive Committee were concentrated upon the swelling support and publicity which the EPU Congress at Interlaken was attracting. The need for some sort of unity with the international parliamentary group was clearly a pressing issue. To this end, Sandys already tried again, with the help of de Menthon, to secure a renewed agreement with the EPU, and wrote to Bohy on August 6 pleading somewhat undiplomatically that "despite the reticence which we have experienced on your side we still sincerely desire co-operation." The conditions which he proposed for such a joint agreement included an official public recommendation at the Interlaken Conference itself for a single permanent liaison committee, the subsequent representation of five EPU delegates within this committee, and above all, the joint preparation of the Interlaken project for a European Assembly, to be drawn up by both the Joint International Committee and the EPU leadership. More pressure was quickly applied after the French Government's declaration of support on August 18, Sandys immediately appealing to Bohy that the International Committee's campaign was receiving broad approval from prominent parliamentary and political quarters, and that it was more than ever necessary to establish the "closest collaboration" between the two movements.³

The EPU leadership, however, decided to press ahead on its./.

1. SANDYS, executive memorandum 'Future Plans for the Campaign' September 1948. SANDYS PAPERS.

2. Cf. p.305

3. SANDYS, letters to Bohy 6.9.48., 19.9.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./own, discounting any co-operative measures which risked the reduction of autonomy in their parliamentary campaign.¹ This was especially the case as regards Sandys' potential intervention in the Interlaken proposals concerning the European Assembly and the joint scheme to be put forward by de Menthon and Mackay for a European Federal Constitution. Mackay, moreover, was also distancing himself from Sandys and Coudenhove, in a tactical political attempt to enlist Labour Party approval and European Socialist support for the Interlaken debate.² In the final event, however, there was a rather lame response to his hopes of rallying official Labour recognition. Morgan-Philips, it is true, made efforts to assure the European Socialist Parties that Labour did not object to their attending the Interlaken Congress, but he refused point-blank to carry out the same exercise within the Labour Party itself.³ Meanwhile, on August 20, Mackay sent his draft proposals for the convening of a European Assembly to Attlee, but received no official response.⁴

The Interlaken Conference of the EPU was officially opened on September 1, and for four days laboured in an exclusively parliamentary re-run of the more spectacular 'Congress of Europe', held four months earlier. All the active participants at the conference were parliamentary representatives, amounting to 250 in total, among whom 25 formed the British delegation (18 Labour, only 5 Conservative, and 1 Liberal). In further contrast to the Hague Congress, the Interlaken Conference centred around Coudenhove, as Secretary General of the movement, and as the sole non-parliamentary member.⁵ His opening address had all the mock paraphernalia that was expected at such a lofty gathering: "I should./.

1. This message was clearly indicated in letters from Bohy to Silva and Paul Rivet, (31.7.48., 27.8.48.), affirming the exclusive parliamentary nature of the EPU Congress. CEC GEN&VA

2. Cf. p. 276

3. M. Philips letter 'to the Secretaries of all Socialist Parties in Europe', 28.7.48. LABOUR PARTY PAPERS, MACLAY PAPERS.

4. MACKAY, letter to Attlee, 20.8.48. MACLAY PAPERS

5. Churchill had actually been invited to share Coudenhove's platform, but politely declined. - correspondence CEC GEN&VA August 1948

./.like to welcome",he proclaimed somewhat grandiosely,"you,the legitimate representatives of 250 million citizens of Free Europe, who have met here to ensure the convocation of a European Parliament and to establish the principles of a European Constitution."¹ In similar terms,Bohy rashly announced that the conference might well set in motion the official convocation of a European Constituent Assembly "within a space of six months."² - It was as if all of Europe was awaiting the results of the conference.

Despite such positive stirring words,the majority of the EPU Council still had little intention of conducting their campaign in strict harmony with the International Committee under Sandys' chairmanship. Coudenhove,above all,was still smarting from his embarrassing defeat in trying to oust Sandys from his post,and argued to the EPU gathering that co-operation between the two movements risked antagonising potential Labour support.³ In another bout of political ambidexterity,however,Mackay once again challenged the EPU Secretary General by taking the issue out of the Council's hands and putting it to the conference as a whole,with his strong recommendation for re-newed coordination between the two organisations.⁴ The EPU Congress in turn overwhelmingly voted in favour of forming "organic links" with the International Committee,leaving Coudenhove to communicate this message to the Committee.⁵

The actual political resolutions passed by the conference hardly facilitated the establishment of such links.⁶ Indeed,the tone of most speeches and declarations about the proposed ;/.

1. COUDENHOVE: 'Annual Report to the Second European Parliamentary Congress', Interlaken 1.9.48. CEC GENEVA.

2. BOHY, Opening speech, ibid.

3. COUDENHOVE, Opening speech, ibid.

4. MACKAY, draft recommendation on forming a 'Liaison Committee' EPU Council meeting, Interlaken, 4.9.48. official minutes.

MACKAY PAPERS

5. EX/M/4 ,op. cit.

6. Most speeches, declarations etc. on Interlaken Congress can be found among Mackay's papers, plus the CEC Geneva.

./European Assembly contrasted strongly with the moderate-sounding pragmatic approach taken so far by the International Executive Committee under Sandys' guidance. The final resolution on the subject, in fact, gave prime place not to any potential deliberative role which the Assembly might assume, but stated quite clearly instead that the task of the Assembly was to submit "immediate practical measures" for European Union. In addition, the proposed convening authority was not the Five Brussels Treaty Powers, but the 16 OEEC nations plus West Germany, the OEEC General Secretary being able to take charge of all necessary arrangements. Above all, although the representatives to the Assembly were to be initially selected by the existing national parliaments, "from among their members and others", a system of direct elections by universal franchise was tacitly envisaged, while the European Assembly itself was to be regarded as the "necessary starting point for the constitution of a European Federation." This message was actually sent out by the EPU conference to all 16 Governments and Parliaments, and as if this was not enough, the Congress also submitted a draft Federal Constitution, envisaging the setting up of a supra-national European Parliament with a directly-elected first chamber and an Executive chosen by, and collectively responsible to, this sovereign legislative body. Moreover the powers of the Federal Parliament were to be extensive as regards foreign and economic policy, while supra-national constitutional safeguards were envisaged in a Federal Judicature, with power vested in a Supreme European Court. In short, the Interlaken programme as a whole was the most audacious and clear-cut call to this date for a supra-national European political order.^I

It came as no surprise, therefore, that the small unionist-Conservative delegation, led by Boothby and Peter Roberts, ./.

I. 'The Union of Europe - Plan for a European Assembly to be convened forthwith to consider proposals for the Union of Europe', EPU Interlaken Conference 1-4.9.48., plus 'Charter of European Federation September 1948' - sent to all OEEC Governments and Parliaments. CEC GENEVA, MACLAY PAPERS.

./.. argued strongly against the constituent role proposed for the European Assembly, suggesting that it should only have a consultative voice, and protesting further that the Interlaken Conference had no authority to draft a constitution for Europe. Mackay replied fiercely: "Do we want a federal union, yes or no? Or are we simply to be content with a vague military alliance decorated with pleasing words and good will?" To this, he later added that "the effect of Mr. Boothby's amendments was not to have a Federation at all, but to create an advisory body." The amendments proposed by Boothby and Roberts, calling for a European Foreign Ministers' Council as the main transitory organ towards unity, were, in any case, quite soundly defeated, with only the Conservative group voting for them. At this point Roberts announced to the Conference, in the name of the Conservative deputation, that, since the British Conservative Party would not support the Interlaken Plan, the delegation would have to leave. As Mackay commented, "If Mr. Roberts' amendments contain the conception of what European Union is according to the Tories, they don't mean union at all."¹

Boothby, for his part, angrily denounced the Interlaken Conference as a "dismal fiasco", adding:

"Nothing practical has been achieved and the British delegation is split wide open... Although the Congress is not representative and possesses no credentials, it has attempted to draft a comprehensive Federal Constitution for Europe, thus usurping the function of the Assembly which it has expressed a desire to convoke. Instead of discussing the principles and objectives of European Union, it has indulged in an orgy of constitution-mongering to no useful purposes... The steamroller tactics of today's (debate) chairman, Mackay, were no more successful than the laissez-faire policy of yesterday's chairman, M. Boky."²

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1. MACKAY, 'Memorandum on Interlaken' MACKAY PAPERS Manchester Guardian article 'Federated Europe MP's disagree over Assembly's power', 4.9.48.
 2. BOOTHBY, article about the Interlaken conference, News of the World, 5.9.48. See also Boothby's letter to the Times, 1.10.48. - Cf. p.

There was no doubt to the fact that the Interlaken Plan deeply troubled the more moderate leaders of the International Executive Committee. This much had already been spelt out on the eve of the conference when warnings were sent out to the parliamentary delegates to avert a policy position which was not "parallel" to the memorandum submitted to the Governments on August 18, and which risked provoking still further objections by the British Government.¹ After the conference itself, Sandys was quick to disassociate publicly the International Committee proposals, now officially supported by the French and Belgian Governments, from the much more ambitious Interlaken Plan, stressing that "the creation of a deliberative European Assembly entails no consequential commitments and certainly no constitutional changes of any kind."² Mackay, in turn, refused to accept that there was any real difference in objectives between the Interlaken programme and the Franco-Belgian initiative:

"If the French Government proposals mean what they say, what is the difference? Why is one of a less ambitious nature than the other? Both want the Assembly to consider practical measures to secure the political and economic integration of Europe. The French ask the assembly to make recommendations for action; the Interlaken plan asks that any recommendations be embodied in a constitution and a draft agreement. Is this a fundamental difference? Mr. Duncan Sandys suggests that the Interlaken plan confers on the assembly constitution-making powers, which the French does not. This is quite incorrect. Under the Interlaken plan the assembly has no such power: any proposals it makes must be submitted to the respective Governments for their acceptance or rejection. If recommendations for action are to be made for European Union, some document, be it a memorandum, a constitution, or a treaty must be prepared."³

-Mackay's real crime in all this was not so much the goal which he envisaged, but the fact that he had indicated it so clearly. At this delicate stage of the proceedings, the pragmatic leaders./.

1. Letter from Kérettet to Vallée Poussin, 23.8.48. CAEM BRUGGE

2. SANDYS, letter to the Times, 22.9.48.

3. MACKAY, letter to the Times, 28.9.48.

In a private letter to Morgan Philips, (12.9.48.), Mackay further commented that the Interlaken Plan was completely in line with the "consequences" of the Hague Resolutions. MACKAY PAPERS.

./of the International Committee wanted to avoid at all costs the laying down of a "blue print" for supra-national European Union, which, in their opinion, would only assist the Labour Government to object even more strongly to a political initiative, and perhaps give cause to the French and Belgian Governments to reconsider their diplomatic opening of the European campaign. The Hague Congress, in this sense, was regarded as the most suitable basis for the campaign, since it used "catch all" phraseology, without attempting to define closely the fundamental consequences of such a political European initiative. This could be done at a later stage by legitimate representatives, within an established European political institution. For the moment, the European Assembly itself had first to be secured. Nevertheless, as the Interlaken debate had well illustrated, leading spokesmen for the Conservative-unionist camp had serious doubts about the perceived goals of the European campaign as a whole. These doubts would be expressed with more force at the Conservative Party Annual Conference, held shortly afterwards.¹ In the meantime, even the more rebellious wing of Conservative opinion, as characterised by the unpredictable Boothby, expressed deep concern about Mackay's motives and the issues involved in the Interlaken programme. "Like all fanatical federalists", Boothby argued, "Mr. Mackay persists in the attempt to force the pattern of events into the strait-jacket of his own blue print." He continued to state:

"..The Interlaken proposals, as they stand, would not be accepted by any European Government or Parliament. Not only are they quite unrealistic, but they do not touch the fringe of the problem which now confronts us. We have to create a comprehensive western union within a measurable space of time in order to save our civilisation from the suffocating tyranny of the Communist Empire."²

The first priority for Boothby was therefore the setting up of some semi-intergovernmental western European council with executive power in "certain specific fields", especially in joint ./.

1. Cf. p.306-7

2. BOOTHBY, letter to the Times, I.10.48.

./defence and economic policy. A "deliberative assembly", he further stated, would be of "immediate value from the social and cultural point of view."¹

In other words, even among the more progressive elements of the Conservative-unionist group, European Union was conceived at a joint-executive and functional level, as a confederal rather than federal enterprise. The distant and unclear objective of a more intricate European Federation was at best regarded as the ultimate destination of the project by personalities such as Boothby, MacMillan, and more so by Sandys. But in immediate and foreseeable terms, it was the perceived Communist threat to Europe, and the decline of Britain as an imperial power, which provided the main spurt to the campaign.

In contrast, Mackay identified the "European crisis" not in terms of external threats and imperial decay, but as a fundamental internal structural deficiency, resulting from inherent political insularity and increasing governmental incapacity to resolve modern socio-economic problems. "National sovereignty is the problem", he later stated, "which any political advance in the world must attack and tame. Any regional or world political authority to be effective must have power to deal with those political and economic questions which the member states cannot resolve by themselves...Insistence on state sovereignty is a much greater evil in the modern world than capitalism, Communism, or Fascism."²

Mackay's fusionist brand of European federal thought, and the EPU's radical stand as a whole in favour of an effective European Constituent Assembly, found strong support among the sympathetic supra-national inclined militants within the MFE. The EPU, Spinelli enthusiastically declared, should now become the "parliamentary nucleus for the future radical federalist party."³ He in turn./.

1. BOOTHBY, op. cit.

2. MACKAY Towards a United States of Europe (Hutchinson 1961), pp. 81, 92.

3. SPINELLI, 'Lettera Federalista', MFE Bolletino No. 3, 22.9.48.
MFE TURIN

./wrote to Brugmans, exclaiming that the "dubious" unionist stand previously taken at The Hague had now been "dissipated" by the bold Interlaken Plan, and that it was time to form a "federalist league" between the EUF and the EPU, which would result in the unionists being forced to "rally" to this new movement and thus "resolve the Churchill problem."¹ Brugmans was more cautious. Despite his initial doubts about the exclusively parliamentary organisation of the Interlaken conference, he admitted that, at the end, the congress had been a "great federalist victory." Mackay's plan was rather "centralist", but this was compensated by the fact that the European Assembly called for would include non-parliamentary representatives, while the conference as a whole had somewhat elevated the "militant phase" of the European campaign. Even so, in reply to Spinelli's audacious proposal to ditch the unionist camp, Brugmans stressed that Churchill and Sandys "are of considerable value to our cause", while, as International Executive Chairman, Sandys in particular had been very "effective" in pushing the Governments along. Above all, the EUF President argued, any joint EUF-EPU formation would lead to a counter popular and parliamentary unionist movement with the attractive figure of Churchill at the head, backed up by important interests.² Brugmans, nevertheless, was certainly in favour of achieving a broad alliance with the EPU, so long as it was in the orbit of the International Committee itself. Indeed, at the Executive meeting of September II, along with Bichet and Sandys, he was charged to negotiate a new united approach with the EPU.³ The political climate for achieving such an organic alliance in the campaign was far from favourable.

3) Political Debate: 'Feet on the Ground'

The official Franco-Belgian initiative of September 2, for the submission of the European Assembly memorandum to the next./.

1. SPINELLI, letter to Brugmans, 8.9.48. EUF PAKIS

2. BRUGMANS, letter to Spinelli, 13.9.48. BRUGMANS PAPERS; EUF Bulletin No.5 October 1948, on Interlaken C&L GENEVA

3. EX/M/4, op. cit.

./meeting of the Five Foreign Ministers on October 25-6, had by now caused quite a stir in political circles. Unfortunately, however, the well publicised press reports of the Interlaken conference had also led to public and political confusion as to the actual contents of the original memorandum and as regards the precise designs of the French and Belgian Governments. Under the increasing pressures of office and the diplomatic resistance of the Foreign Office, Bevin felt obliged to make a blunt policy statement on the subject, mixing his objections to the Franco-Belgian proposals with a stinging critique of the European campaign as seen by Interlaken. On September 15 he explained his views in a major parliamentary debate, denying on the one hand that the Government was only "lukewarm" to the idea of European unity, but severely castigating on the other hand any idea of organic union. He was particularly scornful of what he regarded as pseudo European gatherings:

"Our policy has not been a spectacular one. It is easy to call a conference. It is easy to have the floodlights. But with such a conception as Western Union..it is going to be a long, tedious and difficult job to build it firmly and establish it on sure ground...The intricacies of Western Europe are such that we had better proceed on the same principle of association of nations that we have in the Commonwealth. Britain..must remain the centre of the Commonwealth; she must be European. That is a very difficult role to play...

I think that adopting the principle of an unwritten constitution and the process of constant association, step by step, by treaty and by agreement..is the right way to approach the Western Union problem. When we have settled the matters of defence, economic co-operation and the necessary political developments which must follow, it may be possible..to establish among us some kind of assembly to deal with the practical things we have accomplished as Governments, but I do not think it will work if we try to put the roof on before we have built the building."¹

It was a much tougher reaction than expected, especially in view of the fact that the future negotiations about the Assembly hinged to a large extent on the British Government's attitude. As Paul-Henri Spaak recalled:²"What we now had to do was to ./.

1. BEVIN, Hansard, Debate on the Address, 15.9.48. pp.90-107.

2. SPAAK, The Continuing Battle, op.cit. p.203

./convince Bevin. At this time..he was already a sick man and very different from the Bevin I had come to know at the beginning of 1948. I have never understood why he changed his views as he did." Bevin's views were,nevertheless, strongly challenged by Mackay in the same debate,who argued that his resolution for a European Assembly would not hamper the groundwork for European Union,but would instead create the right and urgently needed conditions for progress on the matter:

"We must face the problem that no OEEC and no Brussels Pact will ever get a foreign currency for Europe...Unless we face this problem of the transfer of power to a new State,to a new authority,even in a limited way,we do not face the practical problem...

I think that it is completely dishonest for people to talk about the idea,to say they want to get some kind of United States of Europe,and yet not face the fact that if they are to do that,they must,in doing it,draw up some kind of document which defines the rights of the different States, the organisation of Government,and lays down the conditions in which political authority is to be agreed."¹

Mackay's juridical conception about the role of the European Assembly was not at all to Sandys' liking,and the Executive Chairman felt obliged to point out that the Franco-Belgian proposal for the creation of a European Assembly was of an "altogether less ambitious nature" than the Interlaken Plan which Bevin had so conveniently attacked. Indeed,Sandys went on to claim that "almost everyone" supported the British Government's "step by step" policy,and that the convening of a European "deliberative" Assembly,as proposed by the French and Belgian Governments,was "complementary" to such a policy.² Mackay,in turn,replied that he could not comprehend Sandys' position:"why does the International Committee treat the Interlaken Plan in such derogatory terms? Either the International Committee want the Assembly or not. The issue is a clear one."³ Sandys subsequently attempted to heal./.

1. MACKAY,Hansard 15.9.48. op. cit. pp.434-440.

2. SANDYS,letter to the Times,22.9.48. op. cit.

3. MACKAY,letter to the Times,28.9.48.

./..this growing public confrontation with Mackay, and the damage it was clearly causing the European campaign as a whole, by invoking a common though moderate formula, which was also meant to win favour with Bevin. The point he put across was one of the rare indications in public of his personal feelings on the subject:

"At the one extreme there are those cases like Mr. Mackay, who see no unsurmountable difficulty in the early creation of a 'United States of Europe', with a central government... Most people will agree (however) that we must advance step by step and not in one giant stride.. We should not attempt to define too precisely the constitutional form which may ultimately emerge. It is as though we were looking up at a high and unfamiliar mountain. Some are confident that they are able to scale the rocky peak; others think it would be rash to venture to the snow line. The truth is that it is still too far away to say what will be possible or impossible. Can we not therefore agree for the moment to keep an open mind and concentrate our energies upon first climbing the foothills, whence we shall get a clearer view of the further prospects." I

In all this, Sandys was in the unenviable position of having not only to moderate the committed efforts of Mackay, and to support in effect the tone if not the contents of Bevin's pronouncements on European unity, he also had to uphold the idea against the doubts of the Conservative Party annual conference, held on October 6-9 in Landudno. Indeed, despite evasive pronouncements by Churchill and Eden to this assembly about Britain being at the centre of "three circles"-the Empire, Europe and Atlantic unity, it was clear that grass-roots Tory opinion was more than sceptical about any European commitment which risked loosening ties with the Empire and Commonwealth.² - The popular right-wing Beaverbrook press had already stirred up Tory feelings by claiming that it was "impossible" to reconcile Britain's place within the Empire and in Europe.³ Similarly, L.S. Amery strongly argued in a UEM Newsletter that Britain should./.

1. SANDYS, letter to the 'Times', 16.10.46.

2. See Europe Unite (Churchill speeches 1947-8 - Cassell 1950) pp. 409-424; Times 'Mr Churchill's warnings to western world' 11.10.48.; Daily Mirror 'Speed unity in west - Eden', 7.10.48.

3. Daily Express, 16.9.48.

./..strictly refuse to be a part of any organic form of European Union.¹ At the Conservative Conference itself, he firmly declared: "Today British Foreign Policy means Empire Foreign Policy!"² The Conference organising committee, moreover, actually decided to shelve discreetly a rather tame motion standing in the name of More-Belisha supporting the "movement for a united Europe", while a resolution urging the integration of the Empire into "one great and strategic unit" was passed unanimously. As the Tory press barometer, the 'Daily Telegraph', commented: "The conference was enthusiastic on the question of imperial unity but the under-current of uneasiness as to how this might be impaired by pursuit of a closer association with Western Europe was unmistakable."³

Sandys himself seems to have played a rather low-key role at the conference. He did, however, offer his opinions on the sensitive issue of Europe and overseas commitments in an important letter to the 'Times', in which he took a considerably more progressive view on the subject than did the majority of his Conservative colleagues. "A European union of whatever nature", he diplomatically stressed, "will be nothing but an illusion unless it obtains the effective participation of Great Britain." Yet any such arrangement, he continued to argue, did not prejudice the cause of Imperial unity, since there was no fundamental reason why preferential trading relations could not be established between the Dominions and Western Europe. The proposed European Assembly, furthermore, "would be purely deliberative in character", and would raise "none of the difficult issues of sovereignty." Instead, its task would be the creation of a "European public opinion and the sense of being Europeans."⁴

Despite his relative isolation within his own Party on this key issue, Sandys seems to have caught the mood of public opinion, and even of the establishment press. Even the normally ./.

1. L. S. AMERY, UEM Newsletter, September 1948, ref. Manchester Guardian, 'Europe and the Commonwealth', 13.9.48;

2. Daily Graphic, 9.10.48.

3. Daily Telegraph, 'Conservative emphasis on Empire Unity', 8.10.48.

4. SANDYS, letter to Times, 18.10.48.

./sedate 'Times' finally conceded that the British Government should recognise the European Assembly proposal "more warmly", since it did at least represent "much genuine if muddled idealism on the Continent."¹ In an even more forthright commentary, the 'Guardian' chastised the "infinite patience and infinite delay" of Bevin and the Foreign Office, claiming that "little by little is not very satisfying in days of crisis."² Similarly, the socialist 'New Statesman' pleaded against governmental "complacency" and its slow "functional integration" proposals while French democracy was "gasping for life". "Neither Western Europe nor Britain", the same journal pointed out, "can ever be saved by letting France collapse."³ The Labour 'Daily Herald', however, was not concerned with continental politics, and bluntly declared in a phrase more akin to the right-wing imperialist press: "Britain is more than a European State. She is the mother Country of a great Commonwealth⁴"

Fortunately for the European campaign, and for Sandys in particular, the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, held in London on October 11-22, unanimously declared its support of Western European integration measures, expressing the view that it was desirable to go beyond the Five Power Brussels Pact, though the idea of political integration was received with slight caution, probably emanating from the British delegation. The final statement stressed, in any case, that "the maintenance and revival of democracy in Europe" was a chief concern of the Commonwealth nations. Moreover, a few days later, the South African Premier stated his clear support for a "Third Force Europe", while his Australian counterpart recognised the concern of his country in Europe as "direct and vital." - The main prop in Labour's defence against active endorsement of the European Assembly had collapsed overnight.⁵

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1. Times leading article, 17.9.48.
 2. Manchester Guardian editorial, 16.9.48.
 3. New Statesman and Nation, 4.9.48.
 4. Daily Herald article 'Union', 16.9.48.
 5. Daily Telegraph, 'Empire PM's back Western Union', 20.10.48.; Times, 'Democracy in Europe', 20.10.48., 'Commonwealth Approval of Western Union', 23.10.48.

At first, it appeared that Labour had drawn the lesson from the Commonwealth's embarrassing support of the European idea, and the 'Daily Herald' immediately published a rather strained statement of support for European union, exclaiming, in contrast to its previous declaration, that "a withdrawal of Britain and the Commonwealth from active participation in European affairs would greatly assist those forces working for the destruction of democracy. It is madness to believe that our scattered Commonwealth could pursue its ideals happily and prosperously in isolation, or even in association with America, if European democratic civilisation collapsed.¹ However, the official Labour Party policy document on Western Union, finally published on October 20 and entitled somewhat pedantically 'Feet on the Ground', put a damper on all hopes of a new European political lead by Labour. Though the document paid much lip service to the European idea and even conceived of a third force European policy aiming at "economic independence from America and political security from Russia", the crucial approach to, and specific scope of, Labour's European policy remained at the same functional and co-operative 'step by step' level:

"We must keep our feet firmly on the ground", the text declared, "and resist all tempting mirages which seem to offer a short cut to our goal..."

Federation would not solve the immediate problems of Western Europe, while the attempt to achieve it would exaggerate the differences between the West European States, instead of exploiting their common interests...

Moreover, the European countries differ greatly among themselves about the way in which a state's economic life should be organised; each country would do its best to insure that the federal government had as little power as possible to interfere in domestic politics; certainly socialists, at present a minority of about one third in Western Europe as a whole, would insist upon the right to organise socialism where they were a majority, as in Britain and Scandinavia."²

1. Daily Herald, article 'Unity', 21.10.48.

2. Feet On The Ground: A study of Western Union, LABOUR PARTY September-October 1948. ARCHIVES

The Labour Party policy, in other words, retained all its previous dogmatic assumptions and objections to European political union. It was a question essentially of building socialism 'in one country', and leaving any European socialist allies to fend for themselves. The text then went on to pose insular economic arguments based upon the pure short-term national interests of Britain, strongly opposing any immediate currency convertibility or a multilateral European trading agreement, on the grounds that the European continental regimes had failed to re-assert their economic potency mainly as a result of the policy of "uncontrolled capitalism" which they condoned. What 'Feet On The Ground' did not mention, however, was that five years of Nazi pillage and occupation was also a factor in the inflation, strife and economic discrepancies which separated the case of the European continent from Britain. Moreover, at a time when the British Pound was vastly overvalued, it was clearly in the immediate British 'national interest' not to enter multilateral trading arrangements and currency parity, but instead reap the short-term advantages of bi-lateral trade on an independent basis. Yet, despite this rather blatant national-orientated policy, later termed by Mackay as not so much "Feet on the Ground" as "Head in the Sand", the Labour text appears to have briefly influenced previously pro-continent press opinion. Even the international-minded 'Manchester Guardian' commented that "the castigation of the doctrinaire federalists is sharp and well deserved."^I

In France, however, the document was received with sadness and indignation. This was especially the case among the Socialists, among whom an outraged and deeply disillusioned Léon Blum was the most vigorous of Labour critics. Were the Labour Party and British Foreign Office, he asked sarcastically, the sole bastion of realism, while the French Socialists were lost in the clouds? The plans for European Federation supported by the latter, Blum continued in the same ironic tone, had a real and solid base, well connected to the ground. The British spoke of economic co-operation but could not,

I. Manchester Guardian, 20.10.48.

./ appreciate the need to integrate fully Europe's economy. "Why do our Labour comrades", he concluded, "who govern the most powerful democracy in Europe, and whose acts and example exercise a strong attraction to the continent, attempt to put a brake upon the federalist movement rather than offer their most powerful assistance?" The SFIO National Council was similarly disturbed by Labour's isolation. Already by the beginning of September Guy Mollet had reluctantly announced his party's full support for European Federation plans and the immediate European Assembly initiative, despite Labour's opposition. Now, in view of 'Feet On The Ground', a hurried attempt was made to enlist Labour support for a European Socialist Conference. (Mackay and Labour's 'Europe Group' applied similar pressure for such a conference). The Labour Party establishment, however, found the proposal completely unacceptable. The disgusted Blum in turn declared that if the goals of the continental Socialists were to be obtained, the British would just have to be left behind.^I

On October 24 Bevin arrived in Paris for the third and most decisive meeting of the Five Brussels Pact Foreign Ministers. Schuman and Spaak were ready with their formal proposal for a European Assembly. The French press was all keyed up for the occasion, while continental observers in general anxiously awaited the results of the meeting. It was hardly the most auspicious of moments for such a trans-national enterprise. Yet elsewhere, in Brussels, the Executive Committee responsible for the launching of this European campaign was about to put the seal on the official launching of the 'European Movement'.

I. F.F. Ritsch The French Left and the European Idea 1947-1949 op. cit. pp.180-183.; BLUM article in Le Populaire, 'Le Labour et le fédéralisme européen', 23.10.48.; European Socialist Conference proposals Labour NEC minutes 27.10.48. LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES, letter from Mackay to Morgan Philips 12.9.48. MACKAY PAPERS.

4) Official launching of the 'European Movement', October 26, 1948

In view of Britain's severe and bellicose attitude toward the the European Assembly campaign and, to a lesser extent, the awkward hesitation of the Dutch Government, it was clearly necessary for the European movement to present a more unified and representative picture of itself. As Sandys urgently emphasised: "it is more important than ever that the International Council... be rapidly constituted and be in a position to make authoritative pronouncements upon the broad issues of European policy."¹ Prior to such an international formation, however, the problem of constituting broadly based National Councils within the movement, and of reaching essential policy agreements between the existing member-organisations, were first necessary.

The position regarding the setting up of National Councils was a rather complex and tedious subject. Briefly, the basis of such Councils already existed in France and Great Britain, despite doubts in the All-Party Group led by Mackay; in Denmark, a National Council had actually been formed under Dr. Bogholm; in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland provisional committees had discussed the subject and were attempting to establish a broader base. This left the problem of Germany and Italy. The former's delicate international position prevented any serious progress on the matter, though a study group sponsored by the International Committee had been set up. In Italy there was the reverse problem, two rival committees having been formed: one as an up-shot of Spinelli's long-established MFE, and the other backed by Governmental sources under the tentative leadership of Sigs. Astuto and Orlando, the latter personality being classified by Spinelli as an ex-fascist agent! Retinger had ./.

I. SANDYS, circular EX/P/15 September-October 1948 CAEM BRUGGE
See also note from Dep. Secretary General to Sandys, 24.9.48.
CAEM BRUGGE

./gone to Rome at the beginning of October in order to try to clarify the situation, but succeeded only in antagonising the MFE leaders and Spinelli in particular. The problem remained an open one, though it was clear that Retinger and Sandys had a preference for the Government-supported group, despite its less legitimate historic background.^I

This less than impartial meddling by Sandys' lieutenant in the complicated internal affairs of the Italian federalist movement hardly enhanced the Executive Chairman's standing among the radical MFE leaders. It indeed provoked still more ill-feeling at a time when the need for fusion in the campaign and for a better understanding between the member groups of the International Committee were imperative. Retinger had wanted to avoid "controversy" between the EUP and the International Committee, but the seeds had long been set and his Rome visit gave the final boost to a re-newed resistance against the unionist camp.

Spinelli attended the EUP Central Committee meeting on October 4-5 with the intention of breaking with the Sandys' dominated movement, and branching out into a "federalist league" comprising the EUP and EPU. Anticipating such an attack, however, Brugmans was at his most conciliatory, suggesting that the EPU Interlaken Plan should be adopted as a "working base" for the projected EUP Congress in Rome. He furthermore proclaimed his own belief that the time for "doctrinal" federalist thought had come to an end, and that it was now necessary to concentrate all thoughts on forming a federated Europe, which in turn meant working in organic unity with the unionist camp, who apparently had "come closer" to the EUP view. Approving and surprised by Brugmans' "evolution" to the "European aspect of Federalism", which was "dominant in Italy", ./.

I. On the formation of National Councils, see: International Executive Committee meeting, 24.10.48., official minutes (EX/M/5), plus accompanying papers EX/P/22, EX/P/23 mod. CAZ, BRUGGE. For Italy, see note on Retinger's Rome trip, October 1948 RETINGER PAPERS, op. cit.

./Spinelli agreed with the EUP President's basic premiss, but argued that in order to effectuate a unified organic European movement, especially with close parliamentary links, there was no useful purpose served in forming an alliance only with the unionist camp. He therefore supported the general idea for a structural re-grouping into one movement, but only if there could be continuing collaboration with the EPU, unconditional support by British Labour Party members (ie. Mackay), and Italian participation in the Executive Committee of the future movement. Miss Josephy in turn supported Spinelli's view and tabled a motion whereby the EUP would officially take up the matter of the EPU's organic collaboration within the movement at the next Executive Committee meeting. The more doctrinaire integral federalists, however, led by Marc Hytte and Voisin, were strictly opposed to such a parliamentary emphasis, and even more concerned about Brugmans' apparent abandonment of internal-orientated federalism. Hytte was especially harsh and claimed that Brugmans had sold out to the unionist camp in the hope of a "quick and easy victory." There could be no reconciliation, he maintained, with personalities such as Sandys, Churchill and van Zeeland, who had nothing in common with federalist thought and who had, from the start, hampered and obstructed the federalist point of view from being heard. It was time, he concluded, to pull out and strike up a fully autonomous federalist movement. Brugmans, in turn, backpeddled a little and promised to obtain "administrative and political guarantees" for the EUP within the new movement. There followed a rather vague compromise notion in which the EUP would make it known that the projected European Movement should be "quickly organised", but according to democratic principles in which power would "emanate from the base" rather than from the top.^{I.}

I. EUP Central Committee meeting, 4.10.48., official minutes, plus accompanying papers Annex 1 & 2 CBC GENEVA
For EUP strategy vis-à-vis the new European Movement, see article by Silva in Problemes du Fédéralisme October 1948
CBC GENEVA

The EUF Central Committee had thus given the go-ahead for an organic association within the 'European movement', though in fact the degree of future involvement had been smudged over by the various guarantees ceded to both the political-minded and integral federalist wings. It was, nevertheless, an important though difficult decision, comparable to that taken on November 15, 1947, when the EUF first decided to enter the International Committee.¹ On both occasions Brugmans had been the leading advocate of collaboration: In November 1947 he had managed to retain the broad support of the EUF rank and file. November 1948, however, would be a different story. By detaching himself from the militant integral-federalist wing so conclusively, he did much to undermine his position of leadership, whereas the political and parliamentary MFE maximalistes remained sceptical. Indeed, already on October 22, Spinelli publicly complained that Brugmans and the EUF Executive representatives had not fully honoured their agreement, having undertaken conversations with the Sandys-dominated International Executive Committee, but not with the EPU.² Brugmans, for his part, remained optimistic and unaware of the trouble that was brewing within the EUF ranks. After the Central Committee meeting, he even told Sandys that both he and Silva "are extremely satisfied with the practical results and I am convinced that Rome can be the real 'Congress of Unity' we are aiming at."³

The International Executive Bureau meeting, held at Brussels on October 24, turned out in high spirits.⁴ Not only had the EUF formally come out in favour of forming a unified organic structure, the NEI had also held a successful annual congress backing a non-doctrinal moderate approach to the European campaign.⁵ Above all, /.

1. Cf. pp. 69-71.

2. SPINELLI, open letter MFE Bollettino, 22.10.48. MFE TURIN

3. BRUGMANS, letter to Sandys, 6.10.48. EUF PARIS

4. Executive Bureau meeting, 24.10.48. official minutes (EX/M/5)
CAEM BRUGGE

5. NEI Congress 17-19.9.48. Official Resolutions, pamphlet
CAEM BRUGGE.

./..despite lingering doubts among the federalist rank and file, plus the growing scepticism within the higher echelons of the Conservative-unionist camp, the campaign for a united Europe was finally beginning to cut ice at the inter-governmental level. The European Assembly project was about to be discussed in detail the next day, in Paris, between the Five Foreign Ministers and their diplomatic entourage. The fears of the preceding weeks about Britain's reaction were still foremost in the campaign leaders' minds, but there was at least strong cause for hope that the formidable Schuman - Spaak alliance might be able to pull off some sort of concession in their personal discussions with Bevin. It was in this eve-of-conference atmosphere that the International Executive Bureau, consisting of Sandys, Brugmans, Bichet, Courtin, Retinger and Butler, met in the private office of Paul van Zeeland at Brussels, and officially brought into being the 'European Movement'.

The meeting concluded that the new movement would be put into operation at both the national and international level. However, due to the fact that most of the projected 'National Councils' were still at a provisional stage in formation, it was clear from the beginning that it would be at the international level of the organisation where decisions would effectively be made. The federalist fears of a centralised and top-heavy European Movement were in this sense completely justified. This would be especially true for the first year of the Movement's existence, during which it was decided to retain the current Executive Committee as the main decision making organ of the organisation, being charged until January 1950 with taking all necessary practical measures in line with the still in-existent International Council. Upon its eventual formation, the latter body would thereafter take responsibility for the election of the Executive on a basis proportionate to member movements and national organisations. This did not alter the fact, however, that it would only be able to "confirm" the existing Executive during the ./..

./..first and most crucial year of the official campaign,while the Executive itself could Co-opt independently other personalities to its fold. Moreover,the International Council in question would be to a large extent the initial instrument of the existing Executive,since its membership would only partially include delegations from the National Councils,the other members comprising the Executive itself,with upto 15% supplementary representation of the founding and member movements(designated via the Executive),plus one member from each "associated" organisation. In other words, the broadly based infra-structure of the Movement would at first act only as a democratic 'fig-leaf' to the as yet unaccountable International Executive. Furthermore,since the latter body would elect its own Chairman by simple majority vote,Sandys would have no problem in dealing with the troublesome federalist minority. The only hint of any potential federal inroad into the central-decision making realm of the Movement lay in the election by the International Council of its own President and Vice-President, while the sensitive post of Secretary General seemed also to depend on election. Such potential openings, countered by the considerable difficulties in penetrating the hierarchical executive machinery of the European Movement,would give rise to intense debate and argument during the months which followed,and especially in the wake of the official inauguration of the International Council in February 1949. At the Executive Bureau meeting of October 24-5, however,at which the Movement was officially launched,any criticism appears to have been rather muted.

This crucial meeting terminated,as of course it needed to,not on a note of inner dissension,but of outer unity and consensus. The finale came on the evening of October 25 when,at a well publicised civic reception in the Town Hall of Brussels, Duncan Sandys proudly announced the official formation of the European Movement. Paying special tribute to the four famous Honorary Presidents of the new Movement, Spaak, Churchill, Blum ./..

./and De Gasperi, the durable Executive Chairman in turn explained the main hopes of the campaign for European unity:

"The next urgent step in the building of this new Europe is, we believe, the convening of a deliberative European Assembly, whose task it will be to create a European public opinion and a sense of solidarity among the peoples of our continent... Upon the outcome of this momentous crusade for the unity of Europe everything depends - life itself and all that makes life worth living. Unity offers us the only sure prospect for prosperity, freedom and peace. If we fail in this eleventh-hour to choose the course of reason, we shall be faced not merely with war but defeat and enslavement. We have it in our power not merely to save ourselves and our civilisation but to open vast new prospects for human happiness and endeavour. Our urgent task is to explain this vital issue to the people of every land and call for their support. If we do our part successfully, we trust the people to do theirs."¹

Thus, nearly five months after the historic Hague Congress, the co-ordinated European pressure groups which had formed the International Committee had now been transformed into a single and organic European Movement. Though these various groups retained their formal autonomy with regard to internal affairs, it was clear that the overall European campaign had taken on a strictly unified and somewhat unaccountable approach to the sensitive problems and dangerous challenges which lay ahead. In the opinion of Jacques Fréymond: "These changes of name may appear to be of secondary importance. But the European movement..fully intended to assume complete control of operations: its creation implied a real concentration of forces."² In retrospect, the launching of the European Movement has been judged as a "decisive move" and "crucial" for the future of the European groups:

"..The federalist wing was thrown into confusion, the reformed Socialist pro-Europe group was tempted into collaboration, and the European Movement itself was brought firmly into the mainstream of European party politics. It henceforth became, at the international level, an increasingly top-heavy co-ordinating body rather than a mass, popular movement."³

- As the European campaign intensified, so in turn the Movement became detached from its base.

1. SANDYS, statement at Brussels Town Hall, 25, 10, 48. SANDYS PAPERS, European Movement Press release No. 4, CEC GENEVA.

2. Freymond, op. cit. p. 51 3. C. Webb, op. cit. p. 317.

CHAPTER 9 THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE OCTOBER 1948 - JANUARY 1949

I) The Five Power Study Committee

At the same time as the official formation of the European Movement was being celebrated in Brussels, the Five Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of the Brussels Pact were busy in Paris striving to find some sort of agreement over the European Assembly memorandum now officially supported by the French and Belgian Governments. The British Government's clear unwillingness to become involved in any such trans-national political European institution had been well illustrated during the weeks preceding the Five Power conference of October 25-6. On the eve of the conference, a rather more ambiguous position was adopted in a tightly worded 'questionnaire' sent out by the British delegation, emphasising the Government's deep concern about the potential constitutional problems arising out of an unharnessed European Assembly, as set out in the memorandum. Was it the intention of those who drafted the memorandum, the 'questionnaire' frankly asked, to allow the proposed Assembly to pass from a stage in which it possessed no legislative or executive power to one where supra-national sovereignty would come into play? Or was the Assembly meant to remain "for an indefinite period" a purely deliberative body? Who would nominate the national representatives to the Assembly, it was further asked, and to whom would they be responsible? Would they be nominated on an individual or a government-sponsored basis? Was a "European Executive" envisaged? At the start of the whole process, moreover, was the preparatory conference to be composed of parliamentary or government representatives? The British authorities were adamant that only the latter alternative applied, both with regard to the European conference and any eventual European Assembly. In short, the British Government was prepared to tolerate the setting up merely of European inter-governmental machinery.¹

1. 'Questionnaire sent by the British Government to the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact Powers', October 1948 CAEM BRUGG.

The British 'questionnaire' nevertheless indicated that the Government did not feel inclined to reject the European Assembly project as a whole. Paul Reynaud put this down to the unexpected positive reaction of the Commonwealth leaders to European union on the eve of the Brussels Pact conference.¹ Paul-Henri Spaak, who was actually present at the meeting, discerned instead a change of emphasis in the British Government's position due to the crucial rallying in favour of the memorandum by the Dutch and Luxembourg delegates.² Be this as it may, Bevin proved less negative than feared, and put forward, "as a personal and tentative suggestion", the idea of setting up a 'Consultative European Council of Ministers', in other words, an intergovernmental European Assembly composed of delegates chosen by and responsible to Governments. It was no compromise, but it did at least provide an opening for further discussion. The French and Belgian Ministers still held out for a more independent European Assembly. They nevertheless decided to pick up Bevin's apparent olive branch, and the meeting as a whole agreed to set up a Five Power Study Committee which would consider both projects and make recommendations to the next regular ministerial meeting at the end of January.³

Spaak regarded this joint agreement, tentative though it was, as a "concession" from the part of the British Government.⁴ The French President, Vincent Auriol, was not so confident. Indeed, upon being briefed about the meeting by Schuman, he privately recorded that Bevin's position was conditioned by the "traditional British axioms" of an unwritten Constitution and opposition to a future European Parliament to which national Ministers might have to become responsible. "The Commonwealth countries", he concluded, "are warmer to European union than is Britain."⁵ The dangers of Bevin's intergovernmental opening had been well appreciated in the French capital.

1. REYNAUD, Unite or Perish (Simon & Schuster, 1951) p.196

2. SPAAK, The Continuing Battle, op. cit. p.204

3. Times, article 'European Unity - A British Suggestion', 27.10.48.

4. Ibid.

5. AURIOL, Journal du Septennet, 27.10.48.

This was not, perhaps, entirely the case among the leaders of the European Movement. Sandys, above all, was quite confident that the British Government's initiative represented not only a crucial shift towards becoming involved in the European Assembly project, but constituted also the actual key to the successful outcome of the campaign. In fact, already during the latter half of September he had formulated a strategy whereby a European Assembly and a European Council of Ministers could both be part of the same project. It was not altogether a new plan in the campaign. - The initial draft political reports for the Hague Congress had pin-pointed such a joint strategy, as did the final report itself. The actual Political Resolution approved at The Hague, however, had steered clear of such an initiative, concentrating instead upon the supra-national idea of the European Assembly as the main driving force in the campaign. Sandys had willingly gone along with this verdict, while the post-Hague initiatives did indeed draw attention only to the proposed European Assembly itself. The re-newed switch towards a joint proposal, in this sense, reflected the pressures upon the Executive Chairman both to accommodate as much as possible the British Government's view-point, and to placate the serious doubts which were surfacing in Conservative-unionist circles. It must be stressed, on the other hand, that Sandys was not intending to sell out on the European Assembly idea. Quite the reverse: by attaching the Assembly to an intergovernmental executive body, he instead saw the means of an intricate and complementary evolution between both the Assembly and Council towards a future organic parliamentary and governmental European machinery. - The radical 'rising star' in federalist circles, Henry Frenay, did not see it this way. Upon studying Sandys' proposals, he instead accused the latter of taking a "premature and arbitrary" position on this vital subject, adding that it would be a serious "error" to give re-newed attention to a future ministerial body when it was the European Assembly itself which would have the real "revolutionary capacity" to unite Europe.^I

I. Proposals sent by Sandys to H. Frenay, plus latter's reply letter to Sandys 30.9.48. SANDYS PAPERb

For the moment, Sandys nevertheless decided to maximalise the British Government's opening, especially with regard to the setting up of the Five Power Study Committee. After urgent talks with both Spaak and Schuman, he therefore announced that the European Movement warmly welcomed the decision to form an "Inter-Governmental Committee", which would "presumably" give prime place to studying the European Assembly proposal. In view of the British Government's 'questionnaire', he then went on to stress:

"The creation of a deliberative European Assembly naturally involves no transfer of sovereignty and raises no constitutional problems whatever. Other problems may be the question of whether the Communists shall be represented, and what terms of reference should be given to the Assembly. The Executive of the European Movement will report on these and similar points."¹

Similarly, the European Movement Executive Bureau sent out a statement re-assuring the Governments concerned that the projected European Assembly would have no legislative or executive powers up until the nations themselves decided independently to transfer sovereign rights to a European power.² As regards the representative role of the Five Power Study Committee itself, Sandys spoke in the name of the Movement emphasising the need to include a balanced list of high-ranking political leaders, despite the apparent inter-governmental character of the initiative:

"In the opinion of the Executive, the effectiveness of the new Inter-Governmental Committee will depend entirely upon its composition and the spirit in which the Committee applies itself to the task.

If it is a Committee of officials taking instructions from their respective Governments, it may do useful technical work of a preparatory character, but will produce no far-reaching results.

If, on the other hand, the Committee is composed of leading public figures representative of the main trends of political opinion in the five countries, it may produce proposals of first class importance.

An independent Committee of responsible political leaders would feel able to tackle broad issues of policy and to make bold recommendations to the five Governments in such a way./.

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1. SANDYS, quoted in the News Chronicle - 'One Europe and the Communists', 28.10.48.
 2. 'Observations on the Questionnaire' (EX/P/29) CAROL BURGESS

./as would be neither appropriate nor possible in the case of a Committee of technical experts."¹

The original idea of holding a representative preparatory conference, not strictly controlled and mandated by Governments, remained therefore the policy of the European Movement. This was also the way in which the French Government interpreted the agreement of October 26. On November 3, the French cabinet subsequently announced a highly respected and representative list of nominees to the Committee, namely: Léon Blum (ex-Premier and Socialist Party leader), Paul Reynaud (ex-Premier, Independent), Edouard Herriot (ex-Premier, Radical Party leader), François de Menthon (leader of the MRP), and Charles Corbin (former Ambassador to London). The French authorities further illustrated their feelings on the subject by referring to the commission in question as the 'Study Committee for European Union'. The French press similarly regarded the Committee as "a mark of real progress in the European idea", and considered it as having "uncontested authority" on the matter.² In Britain, however, the Study Committee was viewed in official circles in a much less representative and powerful light, and was the cause of yet another running dispute in public between Attlee and Churchill, the latter stressing the need for it to be "independent" and composed on an "all-party" basis, whereas the British Prime Minister insisted upon the technical role of the Committee, in which delegates were to be selected by the Government, to whom they would report and be responsible. All suggestions by the Conservative Party and by "private organisations", Attlee added, would be given "full weight" by the delegation.³ The controversy in turn spilled over into a sharp public clash in the House of Commons on November 18, when Attlee blandly announced that Hugh Dalton would lead the British delegation, the name being greeted with Labour cheers and Tory cries of "shame!" Churchill./.

1. SANDYS, News Chronicle, 28.10.48., op. cit.

2. See Le monde, 'Progres de l'Idée européenne', 30.10.48.;

W. Horsefall Carter Speaking European (Allen & Unwin, 1966)

p. 43. (Carter was actually secretary to the British delegation).

3. Attlee-Churchill correspondence 4-12.11.48. Keesings Contemporary Archives, November 1948, pp. 566-569.

./responded angrily by asking: "In coming to this decision did you take into consideration the fact that the formation of this Committee arose out of the Hague Congress (cries of no from Labour MP's), and that the Chancellor (Dalton)... did his utmost to prevent or spoil that conference, and is everywhere regarded as a protagonist against the policy of a United Europe, except upon a Socialist basis?"¹ Attlee remained unperturbed, reading out the list of the other members in the British delegation, namely: Sir Edward Bridges (Permanent Secretary to the Treasury), T.H. Gill (ex-president of the Co-operative Wholesale Society), Lord Inverchapel (former Ambassador to Washington), and Professor A.C.S. Wade. It was a most respectable technical delegation, but certainly not one to match the politically famous and representative group in the French delegation. - As the 'Observer' complained: "Mr. Attlee has chosen a British delegation to the Western Union committee which is neither representative of British national opinion nor worthy of the momentous issues at stake."² Hugh Dalton, the same paper added, was simply the "wrong man" to lead Britain in the talks. The disappointment felt by most of the British press was best summed up by a highly critical article in the 'News Chronicle':

"As a group they will hardly impress the world with the British Commonwealth's determination to achieve the unity of the continent of Europe.

There is a striking contrast between this team of five and that nominated by the French Government which includes three former Prime Ministers of France...

These British appointments are calculated to spread dismay about the future of a United Europe. They make nonsense of half the professions of the Labour party's recent pamphlet on continental union. They are so far below the level of events that ministers could hardly have found a better way of conveying the impression that they are very half-hearted about the great conception to which Mr. Bevin has pledged them."³

1. Hansard, 18.II.48. pp.566-569

2. Observer commentary in advance of the official naming of the delegation, 14.II.48.

3. News Chronicle, commentary, 'Half-Hearted', 18.II.48.

Though, to a certain degree, political opinion on the continent had been expecting some sort of official climb-down from the British authorities on the apparent concession made at the Brussels Pact meeting,¹ the hostile and rather unsuitable composition of the British delegation to the Committee clearly dealt a severe blow to those hoping to achieve substantial progress in the scheduled discussions on European unity. The initial French reaction was to request a postponement of the talks, originally planned to start on November 20. After further delay, the first session of the Five Power Study Group, or 'Herriot Committee' as it came to be known under the latter's chairmanship, was finally organised for November 26, by which time the composition of the other delegations had been announced and conformed to the French rather than to the British model. These other three delegations were composed as follows: Netherlands - J.W. Albarda (Labour Party), Senator Kerstens (Catholic Party and Chairman of the Dutch European Movement), J. Bruyns Slot (Calvinist Party); Belgium - Max Buset (Socialist Party President), A. de Schryven (Christian - Socialist Party President), Fernand Dehousse (Socialist and leading member of the European Movement), Paul van Zeeland (joining shortly after); Luxembourg - Michel Rasquin (Socialist Party and USSE Chairman), F. Loesch (Social Christian Party). The French and British delegations remained unchanged but for the replacement of Blum (due to illness) by Guy Mollet, and the belated addition of Sir Gladwyn Jebb to the British team.

On November 23, the European Movement had actually submitted a crucial memorandum to the Committee, explaining in detail the case for the creation of a European Consultative Assembly and a European ministerial Council together. The theme was further elaborated in various delegations to the Committee on December 8 and 9.³ In the meantime, the internal differences of strategy and opinion within the Movement itself emerged more strongly, despite the outer show of unity and drive.

1. See, for example Auriol Cf. p. 320; Le Soir de Bruxelles article 'La Fédération Européenne et les réticences de Bevin' 28.10.48.

2. INF/IO/E op. cit.

3. Cf. pp. 344-50.

2) Momentum and Friction in the Campaign, 2nd. EUP Congress,
Rome, November 7-II, 1948

As the official efforts to promote a united Europe were finally initiated within the confines of the Five Power Study Group, the broader campaign of the European Movement started to gather considerable pace and impetus. The formation of the Movement was also accompanied with the launching of the 'E' symbol for Europe, interpreted by Sandys and others as the post-war counter-part of Churchill's war-time 'V' for Victory sign. There was no doubt about the correlation between the two. Just as 'V' had become a symbol of resistance to German Nazism, now 'E' was seen as the symbol of resistance to Russian Communism.¹ The Movement, however, was not inspired solely by Cold War rhetoric. Sandys and the Executive Committee were, in fact, striving their utmost to broaden the appeal of the European campaign and intensify the message for unity of action. In this context, the growing involvement of André Philip within the Movement was decisive. Disillusioned with the continuing half-hearted European policy of Labour, and pushed on no doubt by the ailing Léon Blum, Philip and a group of SFIO federalists finally decided to gain a stronghold within the USSE and, in turn, open up the long-awaited possibility of securing the European Socialist group's active and organic involvement in the European Movement. 'By November, Philip was the dominant figure in the organisation and had brought about a thorough transformation of the group's structure and basic philosophy. The name was now changed to the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe; and its goals were established as, first, to achieve European unity through a non-partisan effort, and, second, to concentrate upon converting the unified Europe to socialism.'² By December, the SMUSE seriously indicated its readiness to campaign with non-socialist groups within the European Movement. The Executive Committee ./.

1. See, for example, Sandys' speech at Brussels, 26.10.48., as quoted in the Daily Telegraph, 'Campaign under E', 27.10.48.

2. F.F. Ritsch, op. cit. p185.

./of the European Movement, after having stalled on the issue in view of the previous dogmatic stand of the USSE, now saw every reason for collaboration, and finally accepted the request, adding that the aims of the two organisations appeared to be "perfectly compatible."¹

It was certainly an important opening for the Movement, since it could legitimately claim with still more force that it was now a truly representative international organisation, and not just an instrument of Churchillian propaganda. The SMUSE, moreover, did not simply behave as a socialist 'fig-leaf' to the campaign, but proved instead to be a highly vocal and effective left-wing within the Movement, as would later be illustrated at the inauguration of the International Council in February.² Furthermore the SMUSE did actually provide the key for the involvement of many illustrious Socialist leaders in the campaign of the European Movement, Guy Mollet soon joining its ranks, while the Dutch Labour Party as a whole became affiliated. André Philip himself proved to be a most worthy Executive leader within the European Movement, and a very useful envoy in gaining popular Socialist support for the growing campaign. His persuasive intervention behind the scenes at the Belgian Socialist Party Conference in November 1948, for example, was of crucial significance.³ It also helped to smooth the way in gaining the confidence of the Socialist EPU Chairman, George Bohy, who subsequently agreed to call a top level meeting at Brussels on November 14 between representatives of the EPU Council with Sandys and Retinger, as leaders of the European Movement Executive.

This meeting took place following yet another offer by Sandys to renew the EPU's membership of the International Executive Committee, in view of the popular decision at Interlaken to form "organic links" once more between the two movements. There were, he admitted to Bohy, some "incontestable divergencies" in./.

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1. Executive Committee meeting, 4.12.48. official minutes (EX/M/7) CAEM Brugge ; also consult Gironella-Retinger correspondence December 1948 CAEM BRUGGE. 2. Cf. pp. 389, 383.
 3. Philip met leading Belgian Socialists on 9.11.48. in order to obtain more support for the Movement. Drapier in turn told Rebbatet that Philip had "profoundly modified" the Party's position. Letter, 15.11.48. CAEM BRUGGE.

./the "general political declarations" of the two organisations, but this did not prevent a rapprochement concerning the basic aims and actions of the EPU and European Movement.^I The joint meeting of November 14, at which Coudenhove was also present, followed up this initiative. The atmosphere of the meeting seemed most cordial and conciliatory at first, Bohy going so far as to claim that the "only reason" which had prevented closer collaboration between the two movements had been the EPU's misgivings as to the "political orientation" of the International Committee. In view of the recent association of leading Socialists within the European Movement, the EPU Chairman explained, naming Blun, Spaak, Ramadier and Philip, this previous objection had been removed, and the way was now clear for closer collaboration. He also added, moreover, that there were no "doctrinal or party political reasons" which now separated the two movements, neither did there exist any "fundamental" or "irreconcilable" divisions about the proposed European Assembly; there remained only mere "differences of emphasis and presentation." It was at this point in the discussion, however, that the veneer of conciliation began to slip and the real bargaining positions emerged more clearly. In brief, the EPU initially indicated an interest only in forming a Liaison Committee, whereas Sandys wanted the EPU's full association within the European Movement. Coudenhove responded by suggesting that a "Super Coordinating Committee" could be set up, composed of five members from the EPU Council and five representatives of the European Movement Executive Committee. Bohy, in turn, made it "quite clear" that the EPU would "readily accept" Sandys as chairman of the proposed Committee. Sandys, for his part, was obviously unprepared to cede what in effect represented a take-over of the European Movement Executive, saying that "it would be very difficult for the five organisations which compose the Executive of the European Movement to accept./.

I. Sandys, letter to Bohy, 2.II.48., consult EX/P/37 CAEM BRUGGE.

./..that the Parliamentary Union should receive five times as great a representation on the Super Committee as them." He did, however, recognise the "great importance of adequate parliamentary representation" and therefore proposed as a "possible compromise" that half of the Super Committee should be composed of Members of Parliament. This proportion, he added, would include not only EPU representatives, but also those of other participating movements who were M.P.s. The meeting broke down on this point.¹

During the weeks that followed both sides continued to express their hopes of a positive settlement; but there was no real attempt to lower the stakes already committed on November 14. There ensued a 'waiting game' between the two organisations, Bohy, on the one hand pleading for a "fifty-fifty" proportional representation in the proposed Committee, while Sandys, on the other hand, regarded this as excessive. The tension mounted still further when the European Movement Executive decided to dispatch its memorandum of November 23 to the Five Power Study Committee without properly consulting the EPU beforehand. The EPU Secretary General, Coudenhove Kalergi, only made matters worse by angrily denouncing Sandys as wanting to downgrade publicly 'the EPU, adding that "Your 'E' symbol, made in England..will create distrust throughout the continent." In all this, the position of the European Movement Executive remained quite clear: the EPU were welcome to become fully affiliated to the Movement on the same basis as other member organisations, i.e. with four Executive representatives. For its part, the Movement would urge all its parliamentary members to join the EPU. Though Bohy was personally tempted by the offer, the EPU Council refused to budge. The remaining split resulted in separate representations being made to the Five Power Study Group, thus reducing the potential impact of a joint campaign.²

1. European Movement, informal minutes of joint meeting, 14.II.48.
CAEM BKUGGE.

2. Sandys-Bohy correspondence, November-December 1948; Bohy letter to Retinger, 25.II.48.; Coudenhove letter to Sandys, 4.II.48.; European Movement Executive meeting minutes (EX/M/7) op.cit., plus accompanying papers EX/P/43, 48, 52 CAEM BKUGGE.

Meanwhile, the difficulties of co-existence between the federalists and unionists in the European Movement itself emerged more clearly, in the wake of the Second Annual Congress of the EUP, held in Rome on November 7-II. Indeed, the Congress illustrated that there was little enough unity among the federalists themselves, let alone in the broader context of the European Movement:¹

From the formal point of view, the Rome Congress was quite a success, meeting in the presence of Italy's President Luigi Einaudi, Prime Minister de Gasperi, and Foreign Minister Count Sforza. The European Diplomatic Corps was also well represented, with the notable absence of Britain's Ambassador, while among the special guests who attended there were important personalities such as Giuseppe Saragat, Léon Jouhaux, and the French Minister of Information, François Mitterand. (Léon Blum had initially intended to participate, but was detained through illness in Paris). In the words of federalist writer Jean-Pierre Gouzy, however, "this congress might have been the last" to be held by the EUP.² It was indeed the scene of a violent clash of views between the hard-line integral federalists on one side, and the pro-parliamentary MFE maximalistes on the other, while the moderate "possibilistes" in the centre, represented by Brugmans and Silva, were attacked from all sides. André Voisin later drew attention to the "political battle" at the Congress, describing it as "particularly bitter."³ Spinelli, for his part, substantiated this observation by publicly complaining how the "radical", mainly Italian, federalist group fought for bold political measures, but was outnumbered by the moderate Brugmans' group supporting the "minimum programme" favoured by the unionists, in addition to the "ideologically anti-parliamentary" integral federalist wing, among whom, he added, there were former sympathisers of 'Action Française'.⁴

1. EUP Rome Congress, 7-II.11.48., consult: "Notes and Extracts", plus speeches, CEC GENEVA; MFE Bulletins 7-II.11.48., 4.12.48., MFE TURIN; Articles in December 1948 edition of La Fédération by Voisin and Max Richard, CEC GENEVA; Federal News No.164, December 1948, article by Josephy, 'All Roads Lead to Rome'; Cahiers du Monde Nouveau, December 1948; press reports. 2. GOUZY op.cit. p.14.

3. VOISIN, La Fédération ibid. 4. SPINELLI, MFE BULLETIN 4.12.48. ibid., 'lettera federalista' N. 5.

The specific issues at stake in this second EUP Congress of some 700 delegates, representing twelve different countries, centred essentially on the question of the European Assembly, and the level of collaboration within the European movement. - Brugmans, in his long speech to the conference, attempted to answer both questions in a manner which would appease his radical critics in the hall, while conform to the position of his unionist 'watch-dogs' in the gallery. (Sandys was invited as an observer to the Congress). The EUP Executive President thus boldly proclaimed, in contrast to his second intervention at The Hague, that the EUP needed to "reflect juridically about future constitutions", adding however, "but that does not signify at all that we are doctrinaire." History, he said, could not be prescribed in advance; the future was unknown, though some "improvisation" was necessary. As regards the European movement, he went on to appeal for a "fusion of democratic forces" to ensure the success of the campaign, adding, as compensation to the disgruntled integral federalists, that the European movement itself needed to retain its "supple, rich and diverse" form: "Autonomy at the base", he concluded, "and unity at the summit."¹ In this approach, he was soon supported by EUP General Secretary, Raymond Silva, who stressed that the initial problems encountered with the unionists had been overcome and that there now existed "a basis for solid collaboration" in the European campaign. Silva further added:

" It is because we want a European Federation that we are proposing a coherent and simple formula for unity which should, above all, produce the most effective results. Let us construct Europe which can only be federal, rather than follow federalism without constructing Europe. Europe is not only the objective, it is the chance for federalism."²

This 'possibiliste' message hardly convinced the more doctrinaire members of the integral federalist wing, though it was the maximaliste MFE wing which protested the most loudly. The "Spinelli side", Brugmans has explained, indeed launched into a "bitter attack" against Silva and the moderate centre, though Spinelli himself, ./.

1. BRUGMANS, opening speech at EUP Rome Congress, 7.II.48. CEC GENEVA.

2. SILVA, 'Rapport moral', ibid. CEC GENEVA.

./."who was always a loyal opponent of our tendency",refrained from adopting the "slanderous" critique expressed by his colleagues.¹ Brugmans,in the final event,made a "gallant attempt to shelter silva",declaring that the well-being of the EUF was in danger,and requesting that the "honest and objective majority" of the Congress should put an end to these "intrigues" which had "poisoned" the atmosphere of the meeting.² If indeed the Spinelli group had been vying for the election of their radical leader to the post of EUF General Secretary,they failed miserably. Spinelli did not even secure a place in the Central Committee,his candidature being blocked not only by the moderate possibilistes and by the corporatist orientated integral federalists,but also by some fainter hearts among the Italian delegation itself.³ Count Carandini,on the other hand,was elected and would later cede his place to Spinelli. Nevertheless,both opposing wings in the EUF did in effect combine to reduce severely the possibiliste direction of the movement. The agitated integral federalists,for example,managed to push through an important resolution,concerning the EUF's collaboration within the European Movement,which clearly confirmed the right of the annual Congress itself to decide upon major policy matters, and which re-emphasised the role that should be given to the "living forces" within the campaign of the European Movement.⁴ Of more importance,was the tactical radical base formed with the Spinelli maximalists in the election of Henry Frenay as President of the EUF Central Committee. Though Brugmans retained the Presidency of the Executive Bureau,it was clear that Frenay was now expected to play a most active role and act as an effective counter-balance to the moderate Brugmans-Silva axis.⁵ Frenay did not disappoint his radical supporters,and soon led a virulent EUF drive within the./.

1. BRUGMANS,letter to the writer,3.II.77.

2. 'Declaration d'ordre personnel',Brugmans,Rome Congress,CBCGENEVA.

3. SPINELLI diary 14.II.48.;'Notes and Extracts' op.cit.p.15;letter from Marc to Spinelli,16.II.48.,EUF PAKIS.

4. 'Resolution sur les Rapports de l'UEF avec les autres mouvements européens' - 'Notes and Extracts',op.cit.

5. 'Notes and Extracts' ibid.; EUF Central Committee meeting,Rome, 11.II.48.,official minutes,CBC GENEVA.

././European Movement in favour of a much stronger federal-political strategy in the campaign. The growing friction between the re-invigorated EUP leadership and the unionist directorship of the European Movement needs to be appreciated, however, in the light of the crucial and stormy political debate at the EUP Rome Congress.

Right at the start of the Congress, Brugmans made his own position quite clear, having been influenced to a considerable degree by Sandys' realistic appraisal of the European campaign: It was "inconceivable", he stated, to form a European Federation without Britain, and this being the case, the best available policy was one of expanding upon the European institutions to which Britain was already seriously committed, such as the Brussels Pact, OEEC, etc. There was no foreseeable possibility, he maintained, of winning British support for an "integral European Federal Constitution."¹ Spinelli sharply disagreed on this point, declaring that the Federalists should, if necessary, have the courage to "go against the current" in the struggle for a European Constitution. He went on to argue that European Federation was not something which could emerge "imperceptibly". Strong and clear measures were needed, as spelt out in the Interlaken Plan, otherwise the European campaign risked evading the vital European-sovereignty issue, and thus play into the hands of the "vague unionist" camp.² The veteran co-founder of the MFE, Ernesto Rossi, also drew sharp attention to the dangers of the EUP accepting strategic pre-conditions in the campaign for the European Assembly by being over-identified with the "establishment" view of European unity. He further warned against becoming intricately associated with "false friends" among the "unionists", "gradualists" and "diplomats" who perceived Europe in military and co-operational terms, refusing to consider the need to supercede national sovereignty within a European constitutional framework.³ The most dramatic moment in the debate occurred, ././

1. BRUGMANS, opening speech, op.cit.

2. SPINELLI, in MFE Bulletin 4.II.48., op.cit.

3. ROSSI, in special MFE Bulletin at Rome Congress, 7-II.II.48., op.cit. article 'Les Faux Amis'.

./however,when Carandini,former Italian Ambassador to London,spoke out for the maximalist wing in a long critique of British gradualism as personified by Bevin,Churchill,Eden and Amery. Though full European Federation was "unimaginable" without effective British participation,this was no reason,he declared,for the European campaign itself to be "conditioned" by Britain's lack of enthusiasm. Instead,he argued,a two-tier plan should be put into operation whereby those countries on the European continent,such as France,Benelux and Italy,who were prepared to federate should be allowed to do so,renouncing their current national sovereignty in favour of a larger European sovereignty. If the British did not at first feel prepared to follow suit,then they could apply for associate membership of the continental federation.¹ At this point,an angry and nervous Miss Josephy led the British delegation out of the conference room in protest.²

The political debate developed into a more fundamental and "violent" clash of views when Piero Calamandrei was finally able to deliver his long-awaited report on the European Assembly. The initial part of his paper explained the difference in conception between a European Union and a European Federation. The former organisation,identified with the unionist camp,was,he argued,basically an association of states,whereas Federation meant instead the creation of a superior "European State". Such a European "Super-State",he continued to explain in complete variance with integral federalist doctrine,involved having to transfer sovereignty upon a "centralised" basis.(Federal decentralisation applied only in the case where an existing expansive state was no longer capable of being governed from the centre). Drawing attention to the Interlaken Plan,he then outlined a clear programme of action for the EUP and European campaign as a whole. The Constitutional fusion of European sovereignty,he proposed,could./.

1. CARANDINI,speech at Rome Congress,CEC GENEVA

2. See Josephy article in Federal News No.164,op.cit.,plus article in Manchester Guardian ,'Federalists meet in Rome' 8.II.48., Herald Tribune article by B.McGurn written on 10.II.48., 'United Europe backers clash in Rome talks'.

./be accommodated in a scheme by which a state, or group of states, would take the initiative in convening a preparatory conference of government representatives. The conference could in turn agree to sign a treaty in favour of setting up a European Constituent Assembly, as well as form a permanent executive committee to organise the calling of the Assembly. The national Parliaments could then ratify the treaty, and the Assembly would be subsequently convened, even if not all nations, but at least some, were in favour. The European Assembly could in turn formulate a federal constitution to be submitted to each participating national authority for final agreement. The Constitution could then be formally put into operation among those states who agree to do so, some perhaps in advance of others.^I

The Calamandrei report, drawn up with the help of Spinelli and Rossi, appeared at first to be highly theoretical and utopian, and had certainly nothing in common with the internal-corporatist views of the integral federalists. Yet, although the latter group were clearly opposed to the fusionist-constitutional political strategy proposed, some of the less doctrinaire elements of the EUP might well have considered the report a little more closely. Calamandrei was in fact stressing, in more tactful form, the same doubts and practical options which Carandini had drawn attention to. In short, if the European Assembly was to have any fundamental political purpose and specific terms of reference with regard to the real structural transformation involved in federating Europe, then the minority British objection should not be allowed to obstruct the efforts of those states willing to set up an Assembly on such a specific basis. The conclusion, of course, pre-supposed that some states did have the will, and would be prepared to forge ahead in constructing organic European political unity in the initial absence of Britain's full participation. Was this so unwise and so unrealistic? In the ./.

I. CALAMANDREI, 'Report on the Convening of a European Assembly'
EUP Rome Congress, CEC GENEVA.

./immediate context of the time, it certainly appeared so. Yet, only two years later a rather similar initiative was actually carried out by the French, West German, Italian and Benelux Governments at a functional level. The 'Europe of the Six', it is true, drew upon no direct constitutional commitments, but it nevertheless proved that an organic European framework was indeed conceivable without any pre-condition of British participation. Moreover, by 1950 a functional rather than a political approach had become the order of the day only because Britain had successfully exhausted and sabotaged the official basis for a potential supra-national European political authority developing out of the Council of Europe. All this is later history. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that the radical position adopted by the MFE federalists in November 1948 indicated a more realistic appreciation of the British situation, in its ultimate non-committal form, than did most of the European campaigners at that time, Sandys included.

In the final event, the specific proposals and strategy in the Calamandrei report were not adopted by the EUP Congress. The final policy resolution instead confirmed that British reluctance to join in a European Federal Constitution would be "overcome", while the proposed constituent role of the European Assembly was alluded to only in a vague and general clause stating that measures favouring the construction of a European Constitution were "awaited" from the Assembly, no specific proposals or time limit being put forward. On the other hand, a long list of more immediate economic, agricultural and functional measures were passed by the conference, stealing to a large extent the thunder of Calamandrei's political report - just as Spinelli had feared. Only the Italian and Belgian delegations appeared interested in a direct constitutional strategy, while the integral federalists retained their fidelity to the functional involvement of the "living forces."¹

1. See list of resolutions, 'Notes and Extracts', op.cit.; SPINELLI, 'Lettera Federalista No.5., op. cit.; article in Times, II.II.48 'European Federalist Congress', in which the consultative as opposed to the constituent role of the Assembly was described as being the consensus view of the Congress.

Spinelli was bitter but not broken by the results of the EUP Congress. The federalist movement, he complained, had merely adopted the "vague and non-committal unionist formula"¹, while in private he recorded his deep frustration with the "timidity" of Brugmans and Silva vis-à-vis the European Governments. The EUP, he concluded, had failed to rally to the bold Interlaken Plan, and had neglected the effect upon public opinion which their support of the "federalist parliamentarians" would have had.² The MFE maximalist case, and re-assertion of international orientated federation plans had nevertheless made their mark at the second EUP Congress, despite the rearguard action of the integral federalists and tenuous defence by the possibilist centre. Above all, the EUP now had a radical and dynamic leader in Frenay, who remained insensitive to unionist arguments for moderation, and with whom Spinelli and his closer MFE colleagues soon formed a tight alliance, bringing the maximalist case more and more to the centre of EUP political affairs. In short, the results of the Congress upheld the immediate status-quo with regard to the strategy of the European movement, but it was only a matter of time before the gradualist policies of Sandys and Retinger would be seriously called into question. Voisin warned Spinelli and the MFE in this context that it was desirable to struggle against "timidity", but unwise to neglect "prudent" advice.³ These words of counsel could only be valued according to the results which Sandys and the Executive Committee of the European Movement effectively achieved.

3) Towards the Five-Power Agreement for a Council of Europe,
January 28, 1949.

Judging by the eloquent and forceful statements made by Sandys and his Executive colleagues during the period following./.

1. Lettera Federalista No. 5, op. cit.

2. SPINELLI diary, I4. II. 48.

3. VOISIN, article on the Rome Congress in December edition of La Fédération, op. cit. - 'Etape Romaine'. In the same article, Voisin attacked Spinelli for being a "hot-headed" constitutional theoretician, unappreciative of Sandys' "proven" European strategy.

./the establishment of the Five Power Study Committee, there seemed to be little reason in fact to doubt the European Movement's determination to achieve substantial progress in the campaign for supra-national European unity. Sandys, for example, delivered a most fiery appeal in Paris, on December 1, in favour of a democratic and independent Western Europe, declaring that Europe would never become a satellite of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, but would "always remain her own master." Giving a preview of the precarious balancing act shortly to be launched in direct talks by the movement, he went on to state:

"Urgent necessity compels the taking of immediate practical measures of functional co-operation. On the other hand, hopes of a happier and saner future inspire a more ambitious and idealistic approach, which has found expression in proposals for European Federation. There is no conflict between these two approaches. Both the spur of necessity and the inspiration of hope are essential to the success of our cause."¹

In similar terms, André Philip led the call in the French National Assembly for a supra-national approach to European unity, and was joined by the French Foreign Minister Schuman, who looked to an eventual European Federation as the only way of re-integrating Germany. Edouard Herriot and Pierre-Henri Teitgen also added their influential voice to the campaign.²

This renewed bout of French appeals in the European campaign was sparked off not only by an idealistic urge to unite, but also by the sudden spectre which West-Germany's re-birth now presented. On November 10, the British and American authorities in Germany indeed disturbed their French counterparts in announcing the promulgation of 'Law No. 75', which transferred the ownership of the coal and steel industries in their Bizone, (90% being in the British zone), to an envisaged "German Government, freely elected." The ./.

1. SANDYS, speech to the Anglo-American Press Association, I.12.48., SANDYS PAPERS.

2. French National Assembly debate on the Ruhr question, 10.11.48.; public speeches made by Teitgen and Herriot reported respectively in L'Aube, 2.12.48., News Chronicle, 3.12.48.

./announcement was in turn greeted with alarm and scorn by the French political leaders, who insisted that Germany's economic and political re-structuring should be treated essentially as a European problem, this being particularly the case for future ownership of the Ruhr.¹ Britain held firm in not wanting to become involved, and it was in this unsavoury atmosphere that the first session of the Five Power Study Committee on Europe was held. The prospects of the conference reaching agreement on a united political structure for Europe appeared singularly grim.

Yet, according to Retinger, who had exercised his public relations skills to the hilt on the eve of the conference, "a friendly atmosphere prevailed among the delegates right from the start of these difficult negotiations." He even added, in retrospect, that "in this we had succeeded and I left with a feeling of optimism in the outcome of the big battles that lay ahead."² The published accounts about the meeting, however, appear to tell a different story.³ - After appointing Herriot as Committee Chairman, the meeting had the immediate and difficult task of dealing with two rival plans: the first submitted by the Franco-Belgian team calling for a European Consultative Assembly based upon parliamentary lines, the second submitted by the British spokesmen - notably Dalton - proposing an inter-governmental European Council of Ministers. "There is no mistaking the enthusiasm and whole-heartedness of French support for a European Assembly", commented the 'Times', in a survey reporting the atmosphere surrounding the meeting.⁴ A British official who was actually involved in the talks, however, presented the following gloomy picture as to his delegation's order of conduct at the conference:

1. Keesings Contemporary Archives 1948 pp.9643-4,9688; see also a very strong commentary on the subject in New Statesman and Nation, 'France and the Ruhr', 27.II.48.
2. RETINGER, memoirs, op.cit. p.223.
3. See, for example, SPAAL, The Continuing Battle, op.cit.pp.204-5, REYNAUD, Unite or Perish, op.cit.pp.196-7, The Unifying Force of Europe, op.cit.pp.260-261.
4. Times, 'Promoting European Unity', 23.II.48.

"The instructions which Hugh Dalton had received, apparently, were to put up as much resistance as possible to this parliamentary project as being irrelevant to the practical work of intergovernmental co-operation and likely to be a nuisance. As Mr. Dalton explained, the British Government's concern was to complete the framework of the Five Power Brussels Treaty by its gradual extension to any and all member countries of the OEEC. The British Memorandum therefore proposed the formation of a...Council of Europe, meeting at regular intervals for the discussion of any question of common interest, but to be composed of national delegations exactly as the United Nations, headed by Ministers."¹

The crucial difference therefore remained between the Franco-Belgian plan for an independent parliamentary type of European Assembly with individual voting rights, and the British inter-governmental proposal for a more restricted forum in which national delegations would be instructed to vote en bloc with the minister concerned. The Dutch and Luxembourg delegates were edging in favour of the former plan, but, as Paul Reynaud explained, "the British Government instructed its representatives in such a fashion that it was impossible to reach agreement."² It was at this point that the "compromise" proposal submitted by the European Movement on November 23 came into play.

Having reunited after the closure of the EUP Rome Congress on November 11, the European Movement Executive Bureau had in fact formulated and approved a new text with regard to the convening of the proposed European Assembly. While retaining the same ambiguity of former declarations, it nevertheless offered useful advice concerning Britain's technical objections, as well as proposing a crucial "compromise", at the end, as to the unsolved argument between a parliamentary or inter-governmental approach to the European political institution in question. The new Memorandum, sent to the Five Power conference on November 23, thus./.

1. W.H. Carter, Speaking European (Allen & Unwin 1966), p.44.
2. REYNAUD, The Unifying Force of Europe, op. cit., p.260.
3. European Movement Executive Bureau meeting, II.II.48. official minutes (EX/M/6), CAEM BRUGGE. Attended chiefly by Sandys, Bichet, Dautry, Retinger, D'Estaing, Josephy, plus EPU guests Enzo Giacchero, Astuto De Luchesi.

./..conveniently dropped the previous call for a preparatory conference on the subject of the European Assembly, regarding the Five Power Study Committee as a more speedy solution. Next, in deference to the increasing official attention being given to the establishment of an Atlantic Alliance system, the document went on to suggest that the invitation to participate in the eventual Assembly should be extended not only to all the Marshall Aid countries, but also to Portugal, whose strategic value no doubt outweighed her democratic shortcomings. Of more immediate importance, in regard to Bevin's specific objections to the scheme, the Memorandum broached upon possible methods of keeping the French and Italian Communist Parties out of the proposed Assembly, suggesting that each national parliament participating in the project should be responsible for deciding upon the precise procedure for selecting delegates. This effectively by-passed the need for a blanket and uniform democratic procedure which, while causing no problems for British representation, would in fact produce Communist delegates from the other above two countries. The British Government, on the other hand, was not at all enthusiastic about the prospect of a parliamentary - type European Assembly, in which the Conservatives - and above all Churchill - would be represented. The Memorandum remained firm on this issue, and insisted upon the representative and non-mandated quality of the national delegations, though adding in re-assurance that "the fact that they (the delegates) are dependent upon the goodwill of their respective parliaments for their re-election when their term expires, should provide a sufficient check upon irresponsible action." It was also made clear that no immediate direct elections to the European Assembly were envisaged, whilst the Assembly itself should number between three and four hundred members, depending respectively whether seats were to be allocated according to population levels or national quotas.

The most important points brought up in the Memorandum of November 23 related, of course, to the title and terms of ./..

./reference of the proposed Assembly. - Whereas all the previous texts and declarations on this question had at least continually implied that it was really a matter of time before the European nations would decide to transfer sovereignty and set in motion an effective European Parliamentary system, the November Memorandum was less forthright, inserting the conditional clause that a federal parliament would doubtless appear, but only "if and when" governments so decided. For the meantime, it was stressed that "recent public discussion" had given rise to "misconceptions" regarding the "limited but immediately realisable" Assembly in question. The crucial point of the document was now clearly explained:

"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is desirable that the Assembly should be given a title and terms of reference which will make it clear that it is not a federal parliament, nor even a constituent or pre-constituent assembly, and that it possesses no legislative or constitution-making powers."

The official title suggested, therefore, was - "European Consultative Assembly", its specific terms of reference being listed as follows:

- a) To consider the relations of European nations with each other and with other outside countries with a view to formulating a common European policy;
- b) To examine practical measures designed to promote closer unity among the European nations in the political and economic spheres; and, in particular, to study the creation of international organisms for the direction in common of important services or activities;
- c) To study the social and juridical problems which are raised by such measures of integration;
- d) To consider methods for developing among the European peoples a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation, and for promoting cultural exchanges;
- e) To define the democratic liberties of the European peoples in a Charter of Human Rights; and for the purpose of guaranteeing these Rights, to examine the problem of creating a European Supreme Court backed with adequate sanctions;
- f) To consider means of associating in the solution of European problems States and territories in other continents which are linked with European countries; and, in particular, to consider the representation of these countries in the European Consultative Assembly;

./.

./g) To make recommendations regarding the above matters to the governments of the participating nations, either direct or through the medium of a European Council of Ministers."¹

The delicate balance and apparent moderation of the document were perhaps more difficult to refute or ignore than had been the 'catch all' resolutions produced some six months earlier at the Hague Congress. The current Memorandum, moreover, paid due tribute to the increasingly talked of "functional" approach to European unity, the troubled ownership of the Ruhr industrial basin having provoked attention to such a concept, (clause b), while Britain's concern about continuing links with her overseas territories was also covered in more detail than in the past (clauses a and f)². Above all, however, the memorandum addressed itself to the conflict over a parliamentary or inter-governmental European initiative, attempting to reconcile differences and square the circle. Thus, previous declarations referring to the sensitive "constitutional implications" or inherent "constitutional problems" in the work of the European Assembly were now completely dropped altogether from the text.³ Similarly, despite the general defence in the memorandum of popular and parliamentary involvement in the convening of the proposed European Assembly, part of the same text specifically declared: "Inter-governmental studies and negotiations must not only continue but must be intensified and accelerated." This policy was briefly, though firmly, explained in clause (g) of the specific recommendations put forward, in which the idea of establishing a "European Council of Ministers" was clearly proposed, in addition to setting up a European Assembly. This was indeed the essential "compromise" of the November Memorandum, the actual title of which read: "European Consultative Assembly and European Council of Ministers." In other words, the European Movement quite simply./.

1. European Consultative Assembly and European Council of Ministers Memorandum presented by the European Movement Executive to the Five Power Study Committee, 23.II.48. CAEM BRUGGE.
2. Clause (f) was also an opening with regard to the participation of Eastern European exiles.
3. Hague Congress Resolution, and Memorandum of August 18, respectively.

./..suggested that both the Franco-Belgian European Assembly plan, and the counter British inter-governmental scheme for Europe, could be accepted together, as one joint European package. It was an opening for which Sandys, above all, was responsible, and which had provoked strong resistance in radical federalist circles.¹ Yet, as the compromise stood, there was no intention on behalf of the European Executive Committee leaders to renege on Europe's long-term political and organic unification, nor to drop the European Assembly initiative itself. They looked instead to a joint evolution both of the Assembly and of the Council, and not the elimination of the former project by the latter. As the Memorandum concluded:

"The British Government has proposed that there should be formed a Council of Ministers of the European States. This is in line with the recommendations of the Political Report submitted to the Congress of Europe...

Provided that it is clearly regarded as an addition and not as an alternative to the Consultative Assembly, the British Government's proposal for a Council of Ministers should certainly be adopted."

- It was an opening perhaps capable of stimulating a compromise between the British and Franco-Belgian positions, but one which was also fraught with risks and constraints. It indeed marked both the start to Britain's active involvement in the project as a whole, and the commencement, in effect, of the European campaign's gradual slide away from a real supra-national strategy.

The long-term consequences of this latest initiative by the European Movement leaders were far from evident at the subsequent meeting of the Executive Committee on December 4-5 in Paris, where André Philip and René Courtin pressed for a programme emphasising the importance of organising European Federation at a quicker rate than Germany's recovery.² A joint study group was in turn set up./.

1. Cf. p321.

2. Official Minutes, EX/A/7, op. cit.; Philip 'Note sur la Déclaration Politique au Conseil International du Mouvement Européen' (EX/P/58), Sandys 'Remarques' *ibid.* The meeting was attended by: Bastid, Courtin, Dautry, de Menthon, Philip, Aron (CFEU); Brugmans, Josephy, Silva, Voisin (EUF); King-Hall, Layton, Sandys (UEMF); Richet, Caboumac, Lemalle, Poussin (IEI); Butler, Berbers, Comu, Retinger, Serrys (ELC).

./in order to draft a Political Declaration for the inaugural session of the International Council of the European Movement, now planned for February 1949.¹ The meeting was primarily concerned, however, in approving yet another text which would serve as a basis for direct talks with the Five Power Study Committee, the Memorandum of November 23 having resulted in an invitation by the latter group to the European Movement for a further explanation of the compromise formula put forward. The Executive statement drawn up for this direct exchange of views, planned for December 9, concentrated on the three main points contained in the previous Memorandum, in particular: the scope, the representative structure, and the relation of the proposed European Assembly vis-à-vis the ministerial Council.²

The deliberative scope of the proposed European Assembly was explained tactfully, the Executive Committee suggesting that the Assembly should be precluded by statute from discussing direct constitutional issues, military matters or clear subjects already under the consideration of the OEEC and other inter-governmental bodies. On the other hand, it was considered that the Assembly should be "entirely free to discuss any subject which is of common concern to the nations of Europe." In other words, the Assembly was not to discuss sensitive specific issues which were related to, or which might impede, the current practical European policies officially under review; but it should, nevertheless, be allowed to discuss broader long-term problems involved with European unity. This was a rather ambiguous formula. In the crucial debate about eventual juridical and organic union, for example, the agreed text reassuringly confirmed that it was "clearly not the function of the Assembly to draw up a European Federal Constitution", but then later insisted that it was "neither possible nor desirable to prevent discussion upon the constitutional problems of European union." Similarly, although the "technical aspects./.

1. The members of the study group included Boothby, Gollancz, and Layton (Britain), Aron, Cartin, Philip and Teitgen (France), plus unnamed EFM reps
2. "Summary of Statement by the Delegation of the European Movement to the Five-Power Committee on European Unity", Paris, 9.12.48., EXP/56, CAEM BRUGGE.

./of military co-operation" were not to be discussed, the Assembly was nevertheless deemed a "most suitable body to discuss the broad problems" of a common defence policy. Finally, it was also stressed that the Assembly should not prepare "detailed economic plans", but should discuss the "general problems of economic integration", even if this meant intruding slightly upon the work of the OEEC.

Regarding representation in the Assembly, the European Movement in turn proposed that, although the Five Brussels Pact Powers should carry out the initial preparatory work, the Assembly itself should not be identified in the public mind as being part of a "predominantly military" organisation. For this reason, the other free countries of Europe willing to participate in the scheme (ie. such as Italy) should be consulted before the final plans were announced. The actual procedure for selecting representatives to the Assembly was once more identified as being the ultimate responsibility of national parliaments, which alone were "capable of assuring the authority of the national representation", though the field of selection was to reflect not just the "relative strengths of political forces", but also include "leading figures from the spheres of religion, economics and culture." Each national parliament should choose its own method of selection, though consultations between political parties and other interests were nevertheless recommended prior to the final approval by parliaments of the national list. The "Communist Problem", in this context, was not to be "unduly magnified", since the relative strength of the Western European Communist Parties amounted to little over 10% of the total parliamentary force. Moreover, the preparatory text of the European Movement even went on to argue, in what seemed to be a sharp revision of previous thoughts on this sensitive subject, that there would be more advantages than drawbacks by the inclusion of Communists in the European Assembly:

"The presence of this element of fundamental opposition will have the effect of promoting a greater sense of ./.

./solidarity between the other members of the Assembly and will stimulate among them a stronger determination to bridge their differences."

Whatever the final official view on the issue would be, the European Movement, in any case, stressed that the idea of introducing a formal regulation for the exclusion of Communists from the Assembly would be "undemocratic and undesirable." Clearly the key to the problem still lay in allowing each national authority (parliamentary or governmental) to formulate its own method of selection, according to custom and viewpoint.

Finally, the relation between the proposed European Assembly and Council of Ministers, which was the crux of the whole "compromise" proposal, was explained in the following four clauses:

"The recommendations of the Assembly would normally be addressed to the Council of Ministers, which would provide an organism through which the governments could jointly consider the action to be taken upon them.

It is assumed that the Assembly will receive from the Council of Ministers some reply to its recommendations. The Council may send to the Assembly a written communication or, alternatively, may depute a representative to address the Assembly in person.

At times the Council will itself wish to refer certain matters to the Assembly for consideration in order to obtain an expression of European public opinion upon the issues involved.

It will be essential for the success of both institutions that confidence and mutual respect shall be established between the Council and the Assembly. However, the relationship between the two bodies cannot at this stage be precisely defined. It must be left to evolve gradually in the light of experience."

The guiding hand of Sandys was all too evident in this final crucial passage of the European Movement statement, stressing the evolutionary path, but unforeseen methods, for arriving at closer European political union. The most important point which he wanted to achieve was not to establish a strictly juridical rapport between the Assembly and Council, but to create instead ./.

./a fairly loose but expandable and adaptable basis for their co-development and inter-dependency, in the eventual hope that the latter ministerial institution would become collectively responsible to the Assembly, rather like the relationship between a government and parliament. This political strategy would become more evident at a later stage of the European campaign. He first needed, however, to secure a general approval for some sort of organic rapport between the proposed Assembly and Council, without over-restricting the deliberative rights of the former. - The radical federalists strongly objected to the risks involved in this shadowy strategy, whereas it would indeed take a lot of argument and persuasion to bring the cautious British Government delegates to accept the scheme in its initial form.

The European Movement delegation, consisting of Sandys, Bichet, Brugmans, Dautry, Vallée-Poussin, Retinger and Leenhardt, was subsequently received by the Five Power Committee at the Quai d'Orsay on December 9, where the compromise proposal of November 23 was explained according to the above preparatory statement.^I The impact and clarity with which the deputation was to have presented its compromise formula was partially undermined, however, by the reciprocal presentation of views which the EPU Council had been able to deliver to the Committee one day earlier, on December 8, in an official delegation composed of Coudenhove, Bohy, Coty, Gilson and Mackay. The EPU's list of proposals, mainly formulated by Mackay also contained a "compromise" between the British and Franco-Belgian positions, suggesting that a broad European Council of about 110 members should be established representing the OEEC nations and West Germany on the basis of one representative for every two million of population. National delegations to the proposed Council would be constituted by Governments, but should./.

I. 'Creation of the Council of Europe', INF/10/E, op.cit. pp.8-9; plus interesting articles in L'Aube and Le Populaire, 9.12.48. Leenhardt was theoretically representing the EPU within the delegation.

./..also include representatives nominated from outside Parliament and Government. Finally, while the Council itself would have "no executive or legislative power", it was meant to debate and make recommendations to governments on "any matter affecting the political and economic Union of Europe." In short, the EPU propositions appeared to be very close to the British inter-governmental plan for a European Council of Ministers, operating at an official co-operative level.¹ This was not what Mackay had really intended. As he explained in the House of Commons, in contrast to Bevin's position:

"A Council of Ministers can meet at any time. That is not what we are talking about. What I want is something bigger, something which will bring in a number of representatives so that we can have a wider discussion of the whole question of European Union and so that the discussion will be taken on to a larger field."²

Moreover, the EPU position itself was confused still further by Coudenhove's individual initiative in submitting his own memorandum on December 8, in which he called for both a European Council of Ministers and a European Consultative Assembly on similar lines to the European Movement's recommendations, while he also could not resist proposing grandiose statements about the German problem, the Russian threat, American aid, and the need to adopt his treasured Pan-Europa flag as the flag of Europe!³

Clearly, the case for a European Assembly could hardly have been put with less co-ordination from among the European pressure groups, despite the efficient efforts with which Sandys had managed to stream-line the organisation and proposals of his own movement. Indeed, right at the actual climax of the campaign, internal dissension within the various European groups themselves provided a fearful and potentially destructive back-cloth to the whole diplomatic saga: Inside the European Movement, the distant grumblings of EUP./.

1. For the EPU "compromise" proposal, 8.12.48., see "Propositions soumises per l'Union Parlementaire Européenne", plus minutes of British All-Party Group meeting, 15.12.48., MACKAY PAPERS; press reports 9.12.48.; Mackay press interview, 'Times' 10.12.48.; Sandys' letter to Bohy, 23.12.48., CAE; BRUGGE.

2. MACKAY, Hansard, 9.12.48., pp. 773-7.

3. COUDENHOVE's, separate memorandum, 8.12.48., MACKAY PAPERS.

./.. discontent now reached a dangerous level with the formal decision to allow Frenay a limited right of veto in the meetings of the Executive Bureau of the latter movement, along with his election as one of the four EUP representatives to the International Executive Committee of the European Movement itself.¹ The EPU Council, in the meantime, appeared shocked and outraged with Coudenhove's separate initiative on December 8, and Mackay now clearly presented the parliamentary movement with the tough demand either to restrict severely the apparent powers of the Secretary General, or risk an open split in the organisation. Failing to rally the majority of his EPU Council colleagues to his point of view, he subsequently broke with the parliamentary movement and led his Labour followers into the European movement itself, after which the British All-Party Group as a whole officially followed suit.² Coudenhove, for his part, remained unrepentant and defended his refusal to collaborate with the European movement on the grounds that the latter organisation was "at war with the British Government", and was controlled chiefly by a British clique which was Tory-dominated and consequently hostile to real European Federation plans.³ - It was in such an anarchical atmosphere that the Five Power Study Committee was to pronounce its judgement on the tentative political unity of Europe.

At an official level, however, the omens in favour of some sort of British climb-down on the European Assembly issue did not appear too inauspicious. On December 8 the French Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee overwhelmingly passed a motion strongly urging the Five Power Group to set up a parliamentary-type European Assembly.⁴ On December 4, the Italian Parliament also adopted./.

1. EUP Central Committee meeting, 17-18.12.48., official minutes,
CEC GENEVA.

2. EPU Council meeting, 29-30.12.48., official minutes, plus accompanying papers, MACKAY PAPERS; Mackay-Coudenhove letters, 1.1.49, 14.1.49., CAEM BRUGGE.; Cf. also pp.

3. COUDENHOVE, letter to Sandys, 18.1.49., CAEM BRUGGE.

4. See Année Politique 1948, p.236.

./by a large majority a motion presented by EPU leader, E. Giaccherio, boldly supporting the idea of European federation.¹ Strong pressure was also being put on the British Labour Party to reconsider its rigid European policy at the Committee meeting of the International Socialist Conference held on December 2-4, in which the French, Belgian and Italian delegates appealed for a spirit of compromise.² Yet it was the unofficial recommendations put forward by the European Movement and EPU delegations which in the final event provided the Five Power Committee with the adequate compromise formula in their discussions, despite the evident lack of coordination and agreement with which the deputations had delivered their proposals. On December 16, Hugh Dalton jubilantly proclaimed: "We are half-way across the stream."³ Likewise the French and Belgian delegates to the Committee could not disguise their satisfaction. After having worked through four plenary sessions and twelve sub-committee meetings, the Five Power Study Committee appeared to have adopted the "compromise" proposal, and unanimously agreed to adopt an interim report for consideration by the national Governments concerned. "British objections apparently vanished", Spaak recorded. "However", he then added, "appearances were deceptive."⁴

Indeed, while the British delegation, for their part, were still clinging to the more limited idea of a large inter-governmental assembly in which national representatives would participate only at the level of backing up the appointed governmental minister, the French and Belgian delegates to the Five Power Committee had clearly understood that the European Movement's compromise proposal for the creation of both a European Assembly and a Ministerial Council had been accepted. This was also the way in which the hopeful leaders of the European Movement interpreted events. Lord Layton, in fact, felt sufficiently confident to declare publicly that 1949./.

1. See Keesings Contemporary Archives 1948, pp. 9705, 9689.

2. See articles in Times and Guardian 4.12.48., plus Times commentary 'Socialist Efforts to Reach Agreement', 2.12.48.

3. See daily press 18.12.48., plus interesting analysis by Robert Verdier in Le Populaire 27.12.48.

4. SPAAA, The Continuing Battle, op. cit. p.204.

./ would be a year of destiny for the European campaign. He further explained:

"The coming into being of a Council for Western Europe next year will start a process of collaboration on a Parliamentary level parallel with the work being done on a Government level and official level under the Marshall Plan. It will set in train a process which the force of circumstances will turn in the direction of federation. It will be the first step of a start towards a Parliament of Europe."¹

Such confidence that the interim report of the Five Power Committee had indeed accepted the European Movement's compromise proposal was further reflected at an official level when, after two days of important discussions in London with Bevin, the French Foreign Minister Schuman declared to the press on January 14 that an Anglo-French agreement of this kind had been reached:

"It has been agreed", he stated, "to support a new proposal incorporating both the British plan for a Council of Ministers representing the Governments of Western Europe, and the Franco-Belgian plan for a Consultative Assembly representing the Parliaments of Europe."²

However, upon the resumption of the Five Power talks, a totally separate picture emerged. In the words of Paul-Henri Spaak:

"When the committee met again, on January 18 1949, Hugh Dalton, the leader of the British delegation, put forward a totally different counter-plan. Instead of the assembly originally envisaged there would be a body consisting of national delegations appointed by the various governments concerned, each headed by a minister; voting would be en bloc. This was unacceptable."³

The new draft was clearly not very much of a compromise at all, and was greeted by the four continental delegations with open resentment and hostility. "It would be a detestable solution", François de Menthon declared to the press, "It would be better to do nothing rather than give us a caricature of an assembly."⁴ Likewise, the./

1. LAYTON, speech at Central Hall, Westminster, 29.12.48., reported in News Chronicle, 'A new era or break up of Europe', 30.12.48.; Times, 'European unity: Lord Layton's hope for a new assembly', 30.12.48.

2. SCHUMAN, Kersings Contemporary Archives 1949 p.9754.

3. SPAAK, op. cit. pp.204-5.; Times, 'European Unity', 21.1.49.

4. DE MENTHON, quoted in Le monde, 'Pour entrainer l'Angleterre dans l'union européenne', 27.1.49.

./ French press itself mounted a bitter attack against Britain's apparently unreliable European policy. "Bevin re-affirms his hostility to the creation of a European Assembly" read the headlines of 'Le Monde', whose influential European reporter, Raymond Millet, strongly urged the French activists for European unity to be even more resolute in the face of such "negative" positions and "deceptions."¹ The French members of the European Movement Executive Committee did indeed respond to this new challenge and after an urgent meeting on January 25 they issued a stiffly worded communiqué expressing "deep regret" at the failure of the Five Power Group, and called upon the French Government to "insist" upon a European Assembly "elected independently of Governments" and equipped with "free voting" rights.² On the other side of the channel, the UEM cautiously decided to await the final result of the governmental discussions on the issue before declaring their position.³ Bevin, nevertheless, was under considerable pressure both from within his party and from the traditional press to cede in favour of the Franco-Belgian compromise. The left-wing Labour weekly, 'Tribune', for example, commented that the compromise proposal was an "eminently sensible" one, it being "difficult to think of any sound reason why the British Government should object."⁴ In a later edition, the same Labour journal was even more forthright in criticising the British counter proposal for an inter-governmental assembly:

"This body, as the French have indignantly pointed out, would be a thoroughly undemocratic institution, and it is difficult to see what function it could perform except that of emphasising and aggravating existing national differences."⁵

To this, the socialist 'New Statesman' added:

"Never officially explained, the motives behind this British attitude appear to be the reluctance of the Cabinet to risk having an Assembly in which the British delegation might include ..Mr. Churchill."⁶

Even the pro-'step by step' 'Times' found it difficult not to./.

1. Le Monde, leading article, 27.I.49. 2. Ibid.
3. UEM meeting of General Purposes Committee, 27.I.49., official Minutes. SANDYS PAPERS. 4. Tribune, 'Anglo-French talks' 14.I.49.
5. Tribune, 'What kind of unity', 28.I.49.
6. New Statesman & Nation, 'Western Union dissension', 29.I.49.

./accept the Franco-Belgian position, and appealed to Bevin to at least make "certain small concessions."¹

The final decision concerning the British proposal and the Franco-Belgian proposal, now supported quite openly by the Dutch and Luxembourg delegations, was to be made at the Consultative Council meeting of the Five Foreign Ministers, to be held in London on January 27-8. Having failed to reach a full agreement on the subject, the Study Committee reluctantly submitted both reports to the Council meeting. The Foreign Minister's conference commenced in what Spaak described as a "bleak atmosphere".² However, a "miracle" apparently happened, and Bevin did in fact grudgingly concede on some vital points. The general agreement finally reached on the evening of January 28 was announced in the following communiqué:

"After considering the valuable preparatory work accomplished in Paris by the Committee for the Study of European Unity, the Council agreed that there should be established a Council of Europe, consisting of a Ministerial Committee meeting in private, and a Consultative Body meeting in public."³

The actual detailed application of this "decision of principle" taken by the Council would be left to the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact, while the Council also decided to invite other European countries to take part in the subsequent negotiations. Nevertheless, the crucial point that both a Council and an Assembly should be created had been accepted, though the method of selection to the latter 'Body' would be left to each participating Government to decide. In this way, the four continental Governments were quite free to pass on this responsibility to their respective national Parliaments, with the view to constituting a democratic - parliamentary system of representation, to the sole exclusion perhaps of the Communists. On the other hand, the British Government could still decide to send a strictly mandated bloc of governmental representatives, though it was clear that in so doing they would prove to ./.

1. Times, 'European Unity', 26.1.49. 2. SPAAK, op. cit. p.205.
2. Keesings Contemporary Archives 1949 pp.9765-7. Foreign Ministers who attended the conference were: Bevin (GB), Schumann (F), Spaak (B), Stikker (N), Bech (L). Italian Foreign Minister, Sforza, also sent a memorandum to the Council, requesting Italy's eventual adhesion to the union.

./.. be the exception. There was evidently much precision and future formulation to be done, and many dangerous openings to be tackled before the proposed European Assembly could be properly installed. Even so, the leaders of the European Movement could be well pleased with the current outcome of their campaign. Despite some vital concessions in approach, they had conquered the major official obstacle and had won governmental approval of their plans at a European level, including that of the British Government which had been so hostile to the Hague Congress. It was no mean achievement within the space of only eight months. Sandys indeed received the news with a jubilant air of satisfaction, and immediately sent a telegram to the Five Foreign Ministers on behalf of the European Movement in which, for once, he showed a little of his true colours as regards the evolutionary and constitutional potential of the European Assembly project:

"The European Movement", he confidently declared, "warmly welcomes the decision to set up a European Council of Ministers and a European Consultative Assembly. The Assembly will provide for the first time an official, democratic instrument through which the voice of Europe can make itself heard and through which her peoples can participate in the momentous decisions which need to be taken for their material and spiritual survival.

The European Movement will do all in its power to assure the success of this great constitutional experiment, upon which the hopes of so many millions are centred."¹

Bevin also was only too aware of the potential evolutionary capacity of the new European institution which he had so reluctantly agreed to set up, and he was heard muttering: "I don't like it, I don't like it - when you open that Pandora's box you will find it full of trojan horses!"²

- The European Movement had won the first round of the contest, but clearly the political battle had only just begun.

1. SANDYS, telegram to the Five Foreign Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers, 28.1.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

2. BEVIN, quoted by W.H. Carter Speaking European, op.cit. p.45.

B . TOWARDS THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE STATUTE, MAY 5, 1949

The four month period which followed the Five Power agreement of January 28, and which led to the official signing of the Council of Europe Statute on May 5, 1949, gave rise to the most intense and publicly active phase of the European Movement's campaign for an independent and expansive European Assembly. It was also a period during which the Movement itself underwent a significant reshaping of profile and emphasis, broadening its role and influence while shedding the more particular and diverse structural features of the original Coordination Committee. Indeed, at the same time as the European campaign now approached its most strenuous stage in the thrashing out of the Assembly's independence and evolutionary capacity, so did the European Movement itself become increasingly absorbed in a strained ideological debate in which the centralised and over-wieldy executive organisation was called more and more into question by the grass-roots and radical member groups with whom it had lost touch. The vital political battles encountered with the actualisation of the Council of Europe, moreover, were accompanied by the beginning of a subtle shift in the Movement's strategy and the resurgence of the longer-term ideas and objectives for which the European Assembly, rather than the European Movement itself, was seen as the essential springboard. In a paradoxical way this most intense phase of the Movement's popular political campaign also represented its twilight hour. At the very moment of its breakthrough into the real political scene, there was a sober and growing realisation among the Movement's leadership that the actual creation of the official European Assembly would in fact transfer the main thrust of political activity to the legitimately selected European representatives who would thereafter carry the European mantle, though the Movement could of course remain influential behind the scenes. - It was in such a setting that the idealistic and realistic currents in the European Movement faced their most gruelling test in the whole campaign.

CHAPTER 10. A NEW OPENING TO THE CAMPAIGN

1) Initial reactions; the Brussels communiqué, February 5, 1949

The Five Power decision to set up a Council of Europe, including some sort of representative "consultative body", was generally well received on both sides of the Channel, though additional explanatory remarks and offers of advice were made prior to the publication of the more detailed provisional recommendations formulated by the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.

In Britain, for example, the 'Observer' regarded the London agreement as an "event of the first magnitude and an achievement which secures for its chief architects, Mr. Bevin, Mr. Schuman, and Mr. Spaak, a permanent place in European history." The same journal also warned, however, that there could now be "no turning back", that the "incisive, irrevocable step which crosses the borderline between the old Europe of sovereign and warring nations, and the new Europe of political unity" had at last been breached.¹ The 'Times', for its part, expressed "quiet satisfaction" at the agreement², while the 'Economist' regarded the compromise as "ingenious."³ Similarly, the Labour 'Tribune' thought that the agreement was the "best possible compromise", even adding that it constituted "a far reaching step", despite the "justified" precautions taken in limiting the functions and powers of this new European institution.⁴ The more internationalist 'New Statesman' was not so complacent about the official initiative, and pointed out that the Brussels Pact formula was devised in order to "conceal" rather than "resolve" Anglo-French differences over European unity. "This will not be in practise", the socialist weekly warned, "the fully fledged Assembly, the parliament of Europe, which the French desired. Delegations will not necessarily be parliamentary, but may be Government nominees."⁵

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1. Observer, 30.1.49.
 2. Times, 'Towards European Union', 31.1.49.
 3. Economist, 'Mr Bevin compromises', 5.2.49.
 4. Tribune, 'Council of Europe', 4.2.49.
 5. New Statesman & Nation, 'What sort of Western Union', 5.2.49.

The limits of the London agreement had certainly not escaped French attention, and there was clear disappointment among some sections of the committed European Left, despite the SFIO's enthusiastic endorsement of the project.¹ The French Communists immediately labeled the Council of Europe plan as a "facade for a war-making machinery." The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assembly, on the other hand, greeted the European initiative with considerable optimism, and adopted by 22 votes to 5 a motion which welcomed the Council of Europe project, though stressing that this was only the skeleton of European Union, and that fresh negotiations needed to bring concrete results as to the precise political, economic and cultural institutions envisaged.³ The French Government itself appeared to be pleased with the initial European breakthrough, and warmly congratulated the French delegation to the Five Power talks, as well as issuing a statement stressing the view that a major step had been taken in the direction of European Union.⁴ The French press repeated the same message. "A victory for France" was the judgement passed by 'Le Monde' regarding the outcome of the talks; the Consultative Assembly would be a vital sounding-board and would provide a solid foundation upon which to construct the European idea.⁵ The right-wing 'Epoque' was even more dramatic in tone, declaring that the London decision was the "starting point of one of the boldest and most important political experiments ever made."⁶ The MRP organ, 'L'Aube', was perhaps more to the point in emphasising the role of public opinion in the apparent successes gained at London, thus in effect drawing attention to the crucial involvement of the European Movement itself.⁷

A similar optimistic mood also prevailed in the Belgian ./.

1. See F.P. Ritsch, op. cit. pp.186-7.

2. Ibid.

3. See Times report, 4.2.49.

4. Ibid.

5. Le Monde, 31.1.49.

6. See Sunday Times commentary, 'French reactions', 30.1.49.

7. Ibid.

./..capital, where Prime Minister Spaak described the decision to form a Council of Europe as the start of a "great experiment", in which Europe's "fate" was at stake.¹ At the same time, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, warmly welcomed the invitation by the Five Powers to involve Italy in the subsequent negotiations, and he made an immediate broadcast to the nation declaring that European Union was the only way to prevent a Third World War.²

Nevertheless, despite the general approval and sense of relief throughout the European capitals that a compromise agreement had been reached in London, there still remained the difficult battles ahead as regards the precise details of this general agreement for the creation of a Council of Europe. The actual composition of the Assembly, as well as the respective rights and mutual relationship between the Assembly and Ministerial Committee, still had to be formulated, while the precise method of selection was also open to considerable ambiguity. The official reference in the communiqué of January 28 to what was termed as a 'consultative body' further indicated that the British Government was not prepared to accept the continental view that a parliamentary type European Consultative Assembly should be established, although Governments were quite free to constitute their national delegations on a parliamentary basis. Yet, the pressure for some sort of uniform parliamentary - delegated representation to the 'consultative body' was also strong in Britain. As the 'Observer' commented, "Is it too late to call on our Government to take an equally broadminded view? It is hard to avoid the suspicion that behind their anxiety to keep British representation strictly governmental lurks a fear that Mr. Churchill's towering personality, if admitted to the European Assembly, might steal the show."³

1. Observer report, O.I.49.

2. Ibid., plus Times, 31.I.49.

3. Ibid.

The Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission did little to allay such difficulties of procedure, though its initial draft regarding the form and functions of the Council of Europe did at least offer some clarification as to the respective roles foreseen for the Ministerial Committee and the Consultative Assembly. The recommendations of the Commission, issued on February 5 in an official communiqué, were as follows:

- "1) The Council should consist of a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly.
- 2) The Committee of Ministers should consist of one Minister from each participating country. It could discuss all questions of common concern to member countries with the exception of questions relating to national defence. The Committee would also be responsible for preparing the work of the Assembly.
- 3) The Consultative Assembly would act in a deliberative capacity and would make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. It would have no legislative or Constituent powers. Each Government would decide the procedure for appointing the representatives of its country.
- 4) The Assembly would discuss any question upon which its opinion was sought by the Committee of Ministers. Subject to certain rules to be agreed upon, one of the objects of which would be to avoid overlapping with the work of other international bodies, it would also on its own initiative be entitled to discuss problems of common concern to the member nations, in particular, economic, social, cultural and juridical problems, to examine practical measures designed to promote closer unity among them, and to consider methods for developing among the European peoples a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation. The Assembly would take its decisions by a majority of those present and voting.
- 5) The Assembly would normally hold one ordinary session a year. It would also have the power to appoint Commissions for a detailed examination or preparation of questions to be discussed at its next meeting. The Assembly debates would be public." ¹

These provisional suggestions clearly bore witness to the doubts and general scepticism of the Commission's Chairman, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who has since stated that when Britain./.

1. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, February 1949, p. 9795.

./, actually negotiated the statute of the Council of Europe," she saw to it that it was a mere shadow of a union."¹ The proposed inter-governmental restrictions to be imposed upon the Assembly through the control of the latter by the Ministerial Committee (clauses 2 and 4) were sufficient to ensure that any potential parliamentary development at the European level, or any possible organic European initiative, could only be taken with the prior approval of national authorities, the programme of the Assembly being pre-arranged and controlled by the Ministers concerned. On the other hand, the central part of clause 4 in the recommendations did allude to a more flexible deliberative procedure in which the Assembly itself might be able to take the initiative. But this would be "subject to certain rules" for which the Governments and Ministers involved would no doubt be responsible. In other words, providing the general sphere and contents of a private initiative by the Assembly would seem harmless enough to the national-mandated Ministers, the Assembly representatives could proceed to debate the issue. However, there was certainly no intention on behalf of the Commission drafters to offer the Assembly a 'carte blanche' to discuss any constitutional or political issue which the latter thought fit. In this crucial context, much depended upon whether the Ministerial Committee itself would have to abide by a unanimity rule, as seemed likely, or whether a simple majority would suffice for arriving at a joint decision. In the latter case, the potential openings in the deliberative role of the Assembly were of course considerably improved, since the majority of Governments involved would probably not be of the same non-committal persuasion as was the British Government towards an organic European political initiative stemming from the Assembly itself. The future outcome of this question was of vital concern. Nevertheless, one positive step had been taken inasmuch as the Brussels Commission now officially referred to a European 'Consultative Assembly' instead of 'consultative body', indicating that the representative institution in./.

1. See Lord Gladwyn, The European Idea (New English Library, London, 1967) p. 48

./ question was perhaps envisaged more on parliamentary than on inter-governmental lines, even if Governments retained final responsibility.

The official communiqué of February 5 concluded on a positive and optimistic note, emphasising that there had been "a large measure of general agreement" among the drafters in the Permanent Commission, though it was also recognised that "no final conclusions could be arrived at pending the convening of a conference at which it was hoped other European countries would be present" (ie. notably Italy and Scandinavia).¹ - Now that this official move had been taken, it was left to the European Movement to attempt to secure from the authorities concerned a more generous and effusive set of propositions for the planned Council of Europe statute.

2) A new role for the European Movement?

The International Executive Committee of the European Movement held its first major meeting of the new year on February 5-6, at which the Five Power agreement of January 28 and the provisional recommendations of the Permanent Commission with regard to the Council of Europe Statute were the main points of discussion.² The communication which was in turn sent by Sandys, on behalf of the Executive Committee, to the Five Foreign Ministers "warmly welcomed" the agreement to set up the Council of Europe, and further noted, "with much satisfaction", the draft details announced on February 5 regarding the role of the Assembly in particular, which, the statement read, "conform closely to the recommendations made by the Hague Congress... and further amplified in the memorandum submitted by the European Movement./.

1. Keatings Contemporary Archives 1949, p.9795, op. cit.

2. European Movement Executive Committee meeting, 5-6.2.49., official minutes (EX/H/8), CAEM BRUGGE. The meeting was attended by: BRUGMANS, Carandini, Frenay, Voisin (EUF); Sandys, Lang, Boothby (U.S.); Butler, Serruys, Kettinger, van Zeeland (EuEC); Bastid, Courtin, Dautry, Philip (CFEU); Bichet, Lamalle, Soyeur (BEI); plus Drapier, Kristensen, Madariaga, Honnier, Giacchero, Lindsay, de Kougenont as guests.
Note: the former IL&C was now called 'European League for Economic Cooperation' - EL&EC.

./to the Brussels Treaty Governments on November 23." The Executive Committee further emphasised, however, that their approval applied only in a general sense, and that there remained several specific questions as yet to be settled in view of the procedural recommendations issued by the Permanent Commission: For example, the Committee stressed that the Consultative Assembly should aim at including representatives of all the nations of Europe who practised democratic methods, which also meant the Western zones of Germany. The members of the Consultative Assembly, moreover, should not be rigidly mandated by Governments, but should be free instead to express their personal opinions, "deriving their authority from their national parliaments." The field of selection, on the other hand, should also include non-parliamentarians, while the Assembly itself should seat some 300 members and hold at least two or three sessions each year if it was to make "any real impact upon European public opinion."¹ These suggestions were in turn described by Sandys as being "very important", as he emphasised in a press conference the special significance of securing West German representation at the inaugural session of the Council of Europe.²

The Five Power Agreement of January 28 had not only provoked a deeper analysis with regard to the specific forms and procedural arrangements of the European Assembly. It had also demonstrated how the European Movement had momentarily influenced official European decision making. A legitimate European Assembly would in turn develop this pressure group function on an official basis. Indeed, the realisation that this might be their twilight hour as a political movement, riled with the growing rumblings of internal dissension among some of the member groups as to the role and accountability of the centralised Executive Committee, resulted in an urgent re-assessment at the Executive Committee./:

1. Accompanying paper to EX/N/8, op. cit., sent to the Five Foreign Ministers.

2. See New York Herald Tribune, 'Suggestion is made by the European Movement', 9.2.49.

./,meeting on February 5-6 of the goals and organisation of the European Movement. Detailed references were made at the meeting to the original programme of the Movement, drawn up at the Hague Congress, and there appears to have been a general consensus of opinion favouring a renewal of attention with regard to the proposed European Court of Human Rights, hitherto conceived as the second major objective of the European campaign, and for which the European Assembly itself had been seen as a pre-requisite. The overall political approach and programme of the European Movement, and the specific institutional-organic objectives envisaged, nevertheless remained hotly in dispute, especially with the growing maximalist profile of the EUP under Frenay. Questions of strategy and objectives were, of course, to be discussed and resolved at the approaching Inaugural Session of the International Committee of the European Movement, to be held at Brussels on February 25-8. In the meantime, Brugmans tried to recoup his waning authority among the increasingly impatient federalist movement by proposing a somewhat radical policy document clearly emphasising the need to institute an independent European political community, united around an "authoritative legislature and a real executive power."^I Though he still drew attention to the accompanying need for individual action and initiative, and for autonomous regional, social and spiritual communities, the EUP Executive President had evidently come round to the overriding necessity for a strong supra-national political approach to the campaign, as opposed to blurring the thrust of the federation case by over-emphasising the narrow dogma of integral federalism. In this context, his political contribution to the preparatory arrangements of the Brussels Congress was of considerable importance, as was that of the working committee members, Boothby, Philip and Courtin, in drawing attention to specific goals such as the European Court, in addition to general contextual problems concerning Germany, overseas territories, the ./.

I. BRUGMANS, 'Projet de Declaration Politique', (EX/P/67), accompanying paper to EX/M/8, op. cit.

././Atlantic Pact, and US-Soviet relations. ¹

The political profile and representative quality of the European Movement still rested to a large extent, however, upon the outcome of the Movement's tentative negotiations in the continuing saga with the wily and at times querulous EPU leadership. The internal struggle which now broke out in the EPU itself hardly facilitated a real meeting of minds between the parliamentary organisation and the European Movement. Indeed, in bitter reaction to Coudenhove's autocratic initiative on the European Assembly project at the Five Power talks in December, Mackay was finally provoked into open rebellion, and made his last stand at the EPU Council meeting of February 5-6, where he not only formally presented a plan to prise "all organising, executive and administrative work" from Coudenhove and his lieutenants, but also urged his EPU colleagues to collaborate more seriously with the European Movement. ² His proposals were not endorsed. In fact, after a preliminary meeting between the EPU leaders and the European Movement Executive Bureau, convened on February 4, ³ Bohy still insisted in correspondence with Sandys that the EPU should be entitled to a total of 15 representatives within the International Executive Committee, thus indicating once more the blatant lack of seriousness for which the EPU was renowned in its dealings with the European Movement. ⁴ Mackay and the British All-Party Group had by now expressed their frustration with the EPU leadership and their disapproval of the latter's blocking tactics in the efforts to unite the European campaign. They unanimously withdrew from the EPU altogether at a meeting held in the House of Commons on February 9. The same meeting also unanimously passed a resolution applying for the All-Party Group's full membership of the European Movement, on terms which would permit "adequate representation". ././

1. See EX/M/8, op. cit.

2. 'Draft Resolutions for consideration by the Council of the EPU at its meeting in Paris', 5-6.2.49. MACKAY PAPERS.

3. Information in letter from Bohy to Sandys, 6.2.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

4. Ibid., plus Sandys' letter to Bohy, 19.2.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

./.(ie. via the British Council of the European Movement). An executive committee was in turn appointed by the break-away parliamentary group, consisting of Mackay (chairman), Boothby, Barbara Castle, Hale, Lindsay, Macdonald, Shawcross (vice-chairmen), plus Hynd, Roberts and G. Wadsworth. This new parliamentary formation marked the beginning of a whole stream of allegiance switching from among EPU member groups who came round to the view that the cause of European unity would be best served by concentrating parliamentary activities within the one orbit of the European Movement. ¹

In the meantime, the application by the British Parliamentary Group for full membership of the European Movement sparked off a series of mixed reactions and slightly hesitant moves among the more radical member groups of the European Movement itself, some of whom had counted upon EPU support within the International Executive Committee. The EUP, above all, greeted the news with some sympathy for Mackay, but with a sense of loss in the fight against the unionist-dominated Executive Committee. It was with considerable reluctance, therefore, that the federalist Central Committee meeting of February 12-13 decided not to endorse the EPU Council's proposal for an extra-ordinary executive representation of some 15 delegates, preferring instead the idea of a numerically reduced International Executive Committee under a more effective control from the participating groups at the base. ² The UEM, moreover, was also initially embarrassed by the affair, and had adopted a cautious 'wait and see' strategy rather than any positive endorsement when Mackay had first shown signs of leading a break-away movement in early January. Nevertheless, by February 10 the new parliamentary group was given official approval by the UEM General Purposes Committee and, as a result, the official ./.

1. On the formation of the break-away British Parliamentary Group see Minutes of the All-Party Group meeting, 9.2.49., MACKAY PAPERS; Keesings Archives 1949 p.9820; article in 'Times', 11.2.49. (Barbara Castle did not remain long in this group, soon affiliated to the European Movement, due perhaps to her election to the NEC in 1950).
2. EUP Central Committee meeting, 12-13.2.49., minutes, CEC GENEVA.
3. See UEM GP meeting, 15-16.1.49., 27.1.49., minutes, SANDYS PAPERS.

./, setting up of the British Council of the European Movement, on February 16, decided most generously to allow up to ten executive representatives in the national organisation to be drawn from the All-Party Group, whereas the other participating groups (ie. UEM, SMUSE, ELEC and Federal Union) were to be allowed only two representatives, in addition to the vice-chairmen already proposed at an earlier date and who were mainly of a unionist persuasion.^I

All points considered, Mackay had for once proved to be a skillful tactician, whereas Sandys had finally decided bluntly to confront the reluctant EPU Council with a stunning 'fait accompli'. It was a joint strategy in the interests of both personalities, and one which Sandys would in turn exploit to the hilt in his subsequent struggle to extract more parliamentary factional spin-offs from the EPU into the growing orbit of the European Movement. It was also a policy which gathered more and more momentum in relation to EPU obstinacy and the approaching official inauguration of the European Assembly, by which time it would be crucial for the campaign to have secured the goodwill and active participation of European parliamentarians in the European Movement. However, this policy, now doggedly pursued by Sandys and his lieutenants, was also the first major sign in the campaign that the time was approaching when legitimately elected parliamentary representatives would soon be leading the battle to unite Europe, whereas the European Movement itself would thereafter have to be content in occupying an influential back-seat in these efforts.

Such a policy was not to the liking of some of the more adventurous European prophets in the EUM. The real ambition of the Spinelli-led maximalists, for example, was certainly the./.

I. Cf. pp. 269-7, see UEM GP meeting 10.2.49., minutes, plus Minutes of meeting to constitute the UK Council of the European Movement, 16.2.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

(See annex for those who attended the formation meeting, among whom again Barbara Castle was included).

./formation of a strong European parliamentary movement, but not one under the aegis of the predominantly unionist-orientated Executive Committee. Spinelli and his followers instead wanted to form a radical and supra-national 'European Party', acting as the outer prong of a maximalist 'federalist league'. The more dogmatic integral federalists preferred to pass over the political and parliamentary super-structure altogether, and were hardly likely to view an increasingly politicised European Movement with much sympathy, since this marked yet another step away from the corporatist involvement of the 'living forces'. The growing antagonism of the Spinelli group towards Sandys and the perceived unionist formula indeed allowed the integral federalists to exploit the moment and push the non-doctrinal Brugmans, and even Frenay, into accepting a representative formula for the European Assembly in which it was stressed that at least one third of the seats in the Assembly should go to the delegates of the non-parliamentary 'living forces.'¹ The message was clear: the integral federalists had no intention of allowing Europe to become the instrument of parliamentary forces, still less the European Movement itself. In counter-balance, however, the pro-parliamentary maximalist wing in the EUF managed to extract the Central Committee's commitment to the idea that the European Assembly should become a "real Federal Parliament for Europe."² In short, Sandys' open accommodation of EPU dissidents neither comforted his maximalist MFE critics in the EUF, nor did it enforce Brugmans' lonely struggle in circumventing integral federalist dogma. The prospects of Brugmans' long-awaited 'Congress of unity' did not appear too hopeful in view of the approaching inauguration of the European Movement's International Council.

The EUF Central Committee meeting of February 12-13 was in fact held at a time of considerable confusion among federalist./.

1. EUF CC meeting, 12-13.2.49. op. cit., annexed motion on the agreement to set up a European Assembly, resolution no.3.

2. Ibid., resolution no.5.

./circles as to their attitude not only with regard to the European Assembly, but also towards the European Movement itself. The meeting, convened during another financial crisis within the EUP,¹ was above all wary, and perhaps confused, as to how the International Council of the European Movement would elect the Chairman and Secretary General of the Executive Committee. It was conceded that there was "practically no way" of opposing Sandys' candidature for the former post, which was broadly regarded as his for at least another year. The post of Secretary General, however, could perhaps be challenged, and might at least go to "someone from the continent and of the left." The report on the whole subject of EUP involvement in the European Movement, drawn up chiefly by Frenay along with Brugmans' hesitant consent, went even further and declared:

"We have chosen to work for Europe with people who are not of our accord. We therefore need to mark out the limits of our collaboration. These limits were fixed at Rome."²

The Central Committee agreed, and proceeded to clarify the official EUP policy regarding participation in the European Movement, paying particular stress to the "federal character" of the Movement and to the essential necessity to maintain an Executive Committee which would be responsible to, and selected by, the participating member groups, instead of acting in the sole name of the annual conference of the International Council. Envisaging, nevertheless, the election of key Executive posts at the forthcoming congress of the International Council, the EUP meeting seriously considered proposing Frenay as a candidate for the office of Secretary General to the European Movement, viewing him as very well fitted for the job, which was by no means "incompatible" with his presidency of the EUP. Frenay preferred not to state his options immediately, though a few days later he informed Brugmans that his proposed candidature should not go forward until the European Movement could first agree on moving the main Secretarial office from London to Paris, which he assumed would be necessary once that the European ./.

1. See Brugmans-Frenay correspondence, 17. & 31. I. 49. BRUGMANS PAPERS
2. Annex to EUP CC minutes, op. cit.

./Assembly became established at Strasbourg, as now appeared more and more likely. The idea of the European Movement setting up a Strasbourg office does not seem to have crossed his mind at this stage.¹

In all this, it was clear that Frenay and his radical EUP backers were no longer prepared to tolerate what they had interpreted as being a drastic erosion of the EUP's role and influence inside the unionist-dominated International Executive Committee. The mounting rebellious tone of the policy statements and declarations stemming from the EUP Central Committee with regard to further collaboration in the European Movement were, in fact, the first warning shots of what later amounted to a full EUP break-away from the Movement, which had by then become almost completely detached from its base. The new radical stir within the federalist committee was also indicative of mounting dissatisfaction with Brugmans' moderate brand of leadership. The recent election of Frenay as President of the Central Committee, and his decision to ignore the hitherto ceremonial status of this office in his brusque usurping of the role which Brugmans had previously occupied in chairing the meetings and in strongly influencing policy commitments, may have given a more active flair and radical image to the conduct of EUP affairs, but it did not cut any ice within the broader European lobby. Brugmans, despite his tactical weaknesses, had all the same secured a certain status for his movement within the pragmatic and more influential circles of the European Movement. He had strenuously gained some respect and recognition for the EUP, despite the rough official treatment which it was first given by the elitist Anglo-French committee. He had, moreover, built up a strong personal rapport with Sandys, managing to inspire the latter with some of the broader aspects and idealism of European Federation, while some of Sandys' political realism also rubbed off on./.

1. See Frenay, letter to Brugmans, 18.2.49., BRUGMANS PAPERS.

./Brugmans himself. In short, prior to Frenay's sudden seizure of power within the EUF, Brugmans had managed, against considerable odds, to establish a serious working relationship between the federalist and unionist camps, without which the European campaign might have lost some of its zeal and idealism. The price of such positive collaboration had been the shedding of the more doctrinal idiosyncracies of integral federalism, and the shelving of a more radical maximalist campaign. The valuable bank of good-will which Brugmans had nevertheless established was now thrown away in an increasingly ambitious and aggressive EUF policy which only played into the hands of the more conservative-minded members of the unionist camp, while distancing the new brand of federalist leadership from the real central decision-making majority in the European Movement Executive Committee.¹

The scene was thus set for the official inauguration of the International Council of the European Movement. The Brussels Congress, held on February 25-8, was indeed convened at an opportune time both as regards an evaluation of the current achievements and the future goals of the European Movement, and in assessing the present and future organisational structure of the Movement at an international level. The historic back-cloth of the Hague Congress, and the not inconsiderable diplomatic progress made in the nine months that had followed, lent an air of success and optimism to this first official conference of the European Movement, leading also to the temptation in certain quarters to undervalue the resistance of national authorities and to overestimate the impact and future importance of the Movement itself. There were, in addition, various fundamental questions still to be settled regarding the composition, role, strategy and aims of the European Movement. The federalists were now spoiling for a ./.

1. Frenay's new brand of leadership indeed already led to some internal federalist discontent among the more moderate circles, and led to the eventual resignation of the Belgian federalist group's (MAPE) leader, Hamesse, who moved fully into the European Movement orbit. See Hamesse-Brugmans correspondence, 1949, BRUGHMANS PAPERS.

./fight on these issues, while increasing numbers among the unionist camp were beginning to get cold feet about the organic-political thrust of the European campaign and the type of commitment into which they were being drawn. Sandys in this respect, however, remained firmly convinced that a strong but pragmatic political strategy remained the key to the whole campaign. Nevertheless, he also realised that the European Movement itself would shortly have to adapt to the political realities, as well as the back-stage opportunities, which the legitimate selection of European representatives to the Consultative Assembly would imply. The need to formulate a diverse programme for the future attention of this representative European political institution was therefore necessary, even if this meant ceding to a major extent the the future political lead and direct active role hitherto taken by the European Movement. It was not a point of view shared by everyone at the Brussels Congress.

CHAPTER II. THE BRUSSELS CONGRESS*, FEBRUARY 25-28, 1949: INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL

I) Opening Plenary Session: the European Movement's role

"Throughout the recent meeting in Brussels of the International Council of the European Movement I constantly found myself wondering why the famous international personalities taking part were prepared to devote so much time and energy to the proceedings. What made the presence of these eminent delegates so significant? The answer was clear: it was not that politicians and economists held certain convictions, or even that Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Governments were in consultation. It was because of the rapid pace of advance towards European Union now being imposed by public opinion...

The plain truth is that there would not have been any great assembly in Brussels...and there would not have been any decisions by Governments to create a European Consultative Assembly, if there were not throughout the countries of Europe a solid mass of men and women who care profoundly for the ideas these things exemplify."¹

This brief introduction by Boothby to the Brussels Congress does in a way explain the serious though optimistic mood which prevailed at this first International Council meeting of the European Movement. It was not the somewhat free for all affair which had been the case at the Hague Congress in the previous year. Harold MacMillan indeed recorded that it was "certainly business-like and efficient."² Nor, on the other hand, was it viewed as being only a public demonstration in favour of a united Europe. The stage of inciting public opinion in general had been superseded. It was now a question of convincing the ruling political forces of Europe to put onto statute an authoritative and expansile European Assembly within the Council of Europe project officially under way. The role of the Brussels Congress was, in this sense, one of clarifying the objectives ./.

1. BOOTHBY, UEM News-letter, March 1949, SAIDYS PAPERS.

2. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit. p.163.

* For the Brussels Congress as a whole see conference file
CAEM BRUGGE.

./and major principles of the European Movement, and of consolidating its international structure, in order to extend and accelerate the first official steps already taken in the European unification campaign.

From the organisational point of view, the Congress was an orderly and impressive affair. Some 16 National Councils representing the Western European countries, plus another 6 National Committees composed of exiles from the Eastern States, had all been instituted in one way or another for the conference, and had filtered the number of delegates present to 140 in all, among whom the member groups were also represented. This relatively small number of representatives enabled a more detailed and thorough discussion of the vital issues in question. The manageable size of the conference did not, however, diminish the quality or impact of the distinguished personalities in attendance, among whom there figured the names of Winston Churchill and Paul-Henry Spaak, both Honorary Presidents of the Movement (the other two Presidents, Léon Blum and Alcide De Gasperi, being detained through illness in the former case, and because of urgent affairs of State in the latter), plus Harold MacMillan, René Coty, Léon Jouhaux, Guy Mollet, Paul van Zeeland, Fernand Dehousse, Ugo La Malfa, Enzo Giaccherio, Max Brauer, and all the familiar leaders of the International Committee. ¹

The general atmosphere at the start of the Congress was one of keen expectation, boosted by the Brussels public at large, who eagerly awaited the arrival of famous personalities, and whose city was decorated as in a carnival with the 'E' for Europe flags. The sympathetic or closely associated European Government leaders also followed the progress of the conference with close attention and a watchful eye for further potential openings in the European campaign. The French President, Vincent. /

1. Post-conference paper of list of delegates, drawn up by the European Movement, CAEM BRUGGE.

./Auriol, for example, made a point of receiving a delegation from the Executive Committee on the eve of the conference, and used this occasion to repeat his deep interest in the need to construct a United States of Europe, while declaring the continual support of the French Government for the project at hand.¹ This message was again repeated in a strong letter of support sent officially to Sandys by the French Foreign Minister, Schuman, in which the work of the European Movement was warmly applauded and the founding Congress at Brussels described as a "new major step towards effective European unity."² The Italian Prime Minister, for his part, also had a forceful message of solidarity with the Movement read out at the conference in his name. The U.S. Government similarly indicated its support of the Congress by sending W. Averall Harriman (roving representative for the Marshall Plan) to Brussels by special invitation. The Government in Brussels itself was, of course, directly represented by Spaak's involvement at the Congress. The British Government, true to form, officially ignored the event, despite various invitations to participate in one way or another.

The opening plenary session of the Congress itself was preceded by various fringe meetings which served as a fore-taste to the debates which followed. Belgian Premier Spaak, for instance, presided over a special luncheon of the Benelux committee on February 24, at which he emphasised the importance of Benelux as a "stepping stone" towards European integration.³ In the meantime, the European Movement Executive Committee also held a short preparatory meeting in which various draft proposals to be presented to the Congress were approved, along with the proposals to set up a Political and a Juridical Committee under the respective chairmanships of Boothby and Dehousse.⁴ This was in ./.

1. Le Monde, article, 26.2.49.

2. SCHUMAN, message delivered to Brussels Congress, 26.2.49.,
SANDYS PAPERS.

3. Times, article 'Inaugural Session of Council', 25.2.49.

4. European Movement Executive Committee meeting, 24.2.49., official minutes, (EX/M/9), CAEM BRUGGE.

./fact the first Executive Committee meeting in which SPUSE representatives officially took part, as well as various new delegates from the National Councils.¹ The SPUF chiefs were also out in force, and Frenay already chose the occasion to open his counter-attack against the growing centralising tendencies of the Committee, which the co-opting of selective national representatives to the Executive appeared to enhance. The Committee, he firmly declared, was a "federative and not a unitary" body. It was the first shot of the battle which he subsequently fought out on the floor of the Congress.²

The official inaugural session of the International Council meeting nevertheless went off without any hitches or embarrassing divisions. Opening the Congress, Paul-Henri Spaak drew attention instead to the great benefits which the unity of action since the Hague Congress had bestowed on the European campaign, drawing particular attention to the direct involvement of experienced Statesmen such as Ramadier, van Zeeland and Churchill. The unity of Europe, he resolutely declared, was an "absolute necessity", and the work of the European Movement "must now be held high and kept burning." The actual creation of a European Assembly, he went on to warn, was still "far from completed". The campaign of the European Movement was therefore crucial, as was the need to continue with "a spirit in which the ideal mingles with realism."³ This message was also repeated by Churchill, who, in his stirring but evasive opening speech stressed the "triumphant" and "passionate" force of the European idea, but then added with respect to the Movement's role in the current official talks on the Council of Europe project:

"I will not anticipate the discussions which are about to take place...we may clear the road, we may open the./.

1. The meeting of 24.2.49. was indeed attended by the following, rather numerous list of delegates: Brugmans, Carandini, Frenay, Voisin (EUF); Boothby, Belisha, Lang, Sandys (UEM); Berhens, Butler, Metinger, Serruys (ELEC); Courtin, Philip (CFEU); Bichet, Burdes, Lamalle, Soyeur (HEI); Gironella, Genet, Fivet, Trolodtch (SPUSE), plus 9 other national delegates. E./19, op. cit. 2. Ibid.
3. SPAAK, Brussels Congress speech, 25.2.49., (E/91 903, no. 10°)
C.A.M. BRUGMAN.

./..passage and smooth the path for the ponderous vehicles of executive responsibility, and furnish those who drive them alike with a theme and a plan. We may even, in the form of an active and ever-more dominant and vocal opinion, give them the fuel they need for their journey and the electric spark to set all in motion."¹

The actual details of the European Movement's strategy in the continuing campaign were left to Sandys to explain, as the opening plenary session proceeded to take account of the Executive Committee's report on the 'Objectives and Organisation'² of the Movement, presented by the Executive Chairman himself. Re-affirming the Hague Congress Resolutions as the source of the European Movement's programme of action, Sandys briefly described the basic internal structure of the Movement currently inaugurated. He then reached the most important part of his speech, relating to the political campaign pursued since the Hague Congress, in which the European Assembly project had prime place:

"Without waiting for the completion of our organisation, we have been initiating important political action...

The proposal for an Assembly has now been adopted officially by governments and it will soon be an accomplished fact. This heartening decision is due in large measure to the far-sighted statemanship of M. Spaak and M. Schuman. But I believe that they would be the first to agree that if there had been no Hague Congress and no European Movement to follow it up the idea of a European Assembly would today still be in the sphere of academic discussion."

He in turn continued to explain, in contrast to Churchill's elusive pronouncements, that the European Movement should not simply express its opinions about the European Assembly plan, but should actively pursue the matter, if possible, inside the corridors of power:

"Having had some share in creating it, the European Movement has a special responsibility for making the Assembly a success. First, we must use our influence to ensure that the composition and size of the Assembly, the method of selecting its members and the organisation of its Sessions and ./..

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1. CHURCHILL, Brussels Congress speech, 25.2.49., (4a), CAEM BRUGGE.
 2. 'Objectives and Organisation', European Movement Executive draft report for Brussels Congress, (C/P/I), CAEM BRUGGE.

./, and Standing Committees are such as to render it an effective institution capable of giving wide advice to governments and bold leadership to the European peoples.

Secondly, we have a continuing responsibility to intensify our studies upon the problem of European union so that we may be in a position to submit well-considered and authoritative proposals to the Assembly and to the European Council of Ministers."

Despite this resolute commitment to ensure that the proposed European Assembly would be an "effective institution", Sandys nevertheless realised that the necessary political strategy which the Movement needed to pursue demanded a cool analysis of what was immediately realisable, and a fine political sense of balance, neither bowing to governmental cautiousness nor adopting reckless tactics and policies which would allow the Movement's opponents to blast the European campaign out of the orbit of official recognition and decision-making. He therefore stressed the importance both of taking the lead ahead of governments, but of not over-stepping the mark:

"The influence of our Movement with governments, which is considerable, depends upon our always showing a sense of responsibility. That means we must resist the natural temptation to advocate projects which, though theoretically desirable, are politically impossible. Nevertheless, the European Movement must not hesitate to lead the way, a long step ahead of the governments, and must fearlessly and insistently demand all measures which are necessary and practicable."¹

Sandys' plea for a tough but realistic political campaign did not appear to make much of an impression on the new radical EUP leader, Henry Frenay, who soon mounted the rostrum denouncing both the limited ambitions of the unionist camp, and the attempts by the latter to construct an over-centralised and unified European Movement. The EUP, he strongly argued, was not to be put "asleep" in this way, nor was it to be satisfied with the "advice which is lavished upon us." It was wrong to assume, he sharply./.

I. SANDYS, Brussels Congress speech, ordinary plenary session, 25.2.49., CAEM BRUGGE.

./.continued to point out,that the activities of the EUP and of the European Movement as a whole might "overlap." The former movement was neither ~~subservient~~ to,nor an appendix of,the latter,but was an autonomous grouping which sought not merely the establishing of a "European Commonwealth based on fragile contracts",but rather the creation of a full "European Federation of countries exercising a part of their national sovereignty,first politically and then,as a result,in the economic,social,strategic and military fields." The setting up of the European Assembly was therefore welcomed by the EUP,but was seen as only the first step towards a much greater goal,which the federalist movement was not prepared to passively await or wholly rely upon the unionist-dominated international movement to bring about.¹

It was a tough opening by the unruly EUP President,and one which Brugmans,by contrast,attempted to apologise for in his own opening speech. "We are thus united to unite Europe",he bravely declared,"and,thanks to this unity,we have carried through substantial successes." Not to be outflanked by his more aggressive colleague,however,Brugmans also retained a certain critical air in his delivery,though he was careful not to call into question the merits of the EUP's strict collaboration inside the European Movement. "It is not enough to display our will for a united Europe",he went on to add,"that no longer teaches anyone anything. That is why the minimum programme of the European Movement neither disturbs nor exalts anyone any longer. That is why one question only is now of interest to the masses and of inspiration to the militants. Europe,yes,...but what sort?" He in turn indicated that this was not so much a question of wrangling over dogmatic issues,but rather the urgent need to rally and educate popular social forces with the "moral and intellectual" standards which Brugmans at least identified in the European ./.

I. HENRY FRENAY,Brussels Congress speech on behalf of the EUP,
ordinary plenary session,25.2.49.,(E 791 903, No.15) CAEM
BRUGGE.

./Idea. This, above all, entailed the breaking of nationalist thought and ideology. Brugmans thus made an important contribution as regards the broader "spiritual" side of the "popular education campaign (staking out his credentials for the post which he later occupied as founding rector of the College of Europe) and, in so doing, avoided any polemics between the federalist and unionist camps. The pressing cause of European unity, he firmly believed, superseded internal disputes over doctrine and strategy. By skating over these problems, however, he not only distanced himself from Frenay's excessive case for E.U.F. autonomy, he also failed to draw sufficient emphasis to the important, though sensitive, issue of transferring sovereignty to a supra-national base.^I The maximalist Italian delegation would later react most strongly on this crucial point, especially in view of evasive unionist pressures in the European Assembly debate. For the moment, however, the maximalist point of view was best presented by the former Rumanian Minister and E.U.F. sympathiser, G. Gafencu.

From the start of his delivery he asserted that Europe was in "complete crisis", and there was little point in putting forward only vague solutions. The time had come, he declared, to define clearly and in turn act upon either the unionist or federalist conceptions of a united Europe. Describing the latter thesis as a "strict collaboration between sovereign States", he pointed out the initial ease with which such a strategy could "re-assure Governments, seduce sceptics and facilitate official decisions." In the final event, however, he claimed that this policy offered no practical solution to the infrastructural problems of the European Continent since the dangers arising from "recalcitrant national interests" would not be overcome. Only a supra-national federalist approach could work in the last analysis. European federalism, on the other hand, had its "limits" and could not be fully applied to Britain, where there still ./.

I. BRUGMANS, Brussels Congress speech, ordinary plenary session, 25.2.49., (No. 20), CAEM BRUGGE.

./existed "natural and very understandable" objections and obstacles to such a supra-national commitment, and it was therefore better, Gafencu proposed, to allow the European Continent itself to forge ahead towards full federation, while Britain could remain "tightly attached" to the latter formation without having to practise its "federalist aspirations."¹ In other words, the two-tier European approach first mooted by the maximaliste MFE delegates at the EUP Rome Congress in November 1948 was once more proposed. The British delegation for the moment remained silent. Sandys still pinned his hopes upon a gradual evolutionary strategy towards an eventual supra-national commitment in which Britain would be fully involved at the same level as her European partners. This was probably the case also for MacMillan and Boothby, despite their confederal leanings. Nevertheless, the more national or Empire - orientated members of the British unionist camp, including Eden, Amery and perhaps Churchill, were not necessarily opposed to such a two-tier arrangement, though for the moment they were certainly not prepared to endorse the maximaliste MFE case.

The political dilemmas of European unity could, of course, be partially avoided by laying more stress upon economic and sectoral aspects of integration. Sir Harold Butler notified the conference in this respect of the scheduled European Economic Conference to be held in London under the auspices of the European Movement's Economic Section, of which he was chairman.² André Philip similarly stressed the economic context of the campaign, though this was intrinsically linked to political questions. Hence, he drew particular attention to the need to constitute an international authority for the Rhur industrial basin, while adding that "clear and concrete" proposals for the European campaign as a whole should be drawn up, presented to Governments and "realised progressively."³

1. GAFENCU, Brussels Congress speech, ordinary plenary session, 25.2.49., (No.21), CAEM BRUGGE.

2. BUTLER, speech (No.19), *ibid.* 3. PHILIP, speech (No.22) *ibid.*

André Philip's distinguished and vigorous involvement in this first major international congress of the official European Movement also highlighted the fact that the Movement comprised a broader political base and appeal than it was accused of having by Labour Party or Communist quarters. The assiduous entry of the Socialist SMUSE on the scene at Brussels further illustrated this point, and Marceau Pivert, as a leading spokesman for the movement, made it quite clear that Socialist participation in the European campaign was no mere illusion or false cover. The SMUSE's involvement represented a full-blooded Socialist wing in the European Movement:

"We are Socialists", he declared in his opening speech, "and if we are latecomers to your organisation it is because we did not wish to rally to your Movement as a mere handful of Socialists, but because we wanted to see the whole of Europe working at your side."

He went on to state:

"We are international democratic Socialists, because we have no understanding for socialism confined to one single country. We even hold that it is impossible to build up socialism in one country alone.

As Socialists, we support the European Movement in order to fight against the poverty inherent in national economies...

And we come as democrats respecting the varied elements which compose the European Movement and asking only equal rights, and the means to express ourselves freely and to propose the solutions which we believe to be the best...

We therefore come to the European Movement with the maximum of sincerity and confidence in you, promising to do the impossible, to win over all the workers who have not yet understood the necessity of this task of primary importance, so that they may all join us and that, together, we may build up a true European Socialist democracy which will protect the basic liberties of man, which will be made by the people, for the people, and will thus bring hope of peace to all humanity."¹

On the other side of the political spectrum, Italy's leading Christian Democrat delegate, Enzo Giacchero, spoke of the "spiritual values" of the "European family"², while Robert Bichet, as President of the WEI, declared somewhat polemically:

1. MARCEL PIVERT, Brussels Congress speech, on behalf of the SMUSE, ordinary plenary session, 25.2.49., (No. 16), CAEM BRUGGE.

2. ENZO GIACCHERO, speech (No. 17), ibid.

"If we look at that part of Europe which really enjoys freedom, we see that nearly everywhere Christian Democrat statesmen preside over or participate actively in the leadership and political life of the various countries." I

Thus, in an even more convincing way than at the Hague Congress, the Brussels meeting of the International Council clearly indicated the political diversity of the various groups affiliated to the European Movement. The intransigent and negative official boycott by the British Labour Party was especially noticeable with the now active and highly vocal involvement of the continental Socialists, whose presence quelled the charges of the European Movement being a right-wing, Churchill-dominated conspiracy. The election of officers, and more immediately, the actual political debate at Brussels proved this point beyond all doubt.

2) The Brussels Programme: European Movement policy debate

Nearly two thirds of the official time-table at the Brussels Congress was taken up by the work of the two main committees, dealing with juridical and political problems, and meeting in private.² The constructive and practical achievements of the Congress took place in this rather private and exclusive setting. The work of the political committee was especially important, since much of the European Movement's future official strategy with regard to the Council of Europe project was based upon the political formulations drawn up at Brussels. It was perhaps for this reason that Boothby, as chairman of the above committee had every reason to feel anxious about the problems and controversies which needed to be resolved at this crucial stage of affairs. He described the scene as follows:

"I was elected to the chairmanship of the political committee, and it was with a sense of awe, mingled with apprehension, that I approached the task of presiding over a gathering which ./.

1. BICHET, Brussels Congress speech, ordinary plenary session, 25.2.49., (No.17), CAEM BRUGGE.

2. See Official Programme of the Brussels Congress, SANDYS PAPERS.

./..contained some of the most distinguished international figures of our time.

There they sat, these men and women, eminent in so many walks of life, with paper in front of them and pencils in their hand and no other thought, or intention but to go on until success had been achieved."

The actual terms of reference of the political committee consisted in examining a draft statement submitted by the International Executive Committee, entitled 'Principles of a European Policy',² and to draw up a specific list of recommendations regarding the European Assembly campaign, based upon the position taken in previous official texts and in the light of present circumstances. The draft memorandum itself provided a stimulating and concise working base for the task of the committee, and was presented as a plan of action in favour of an "independent" political and economic European Union. The scheme was defended first on "moral grounds", the "love of freedom and hostility to totalitarianism" being held as the central tenet of the European Movement's political ideology. Respect for "Christian charity", "rationalism" and "diversity" were in turn seen as the basic reference points for a tolerant European society, in which the deep conviction to uphold political "democracy", the "rule of law" and the "fundamental liberties" of the individual constituted the practical forms of this ideology. The actual institutions envisaged for the organisation of such a free and democratic European Union were not mentioned in detail, though a key part of the statement indicated that the structure would have to rest upon a transnational sovereign base:

"The present regime of unrestricted national sovereignties", the text read, "by dissipating efforts in mutual opposition, constitutes, so long as it continues, an unsurmountable obstacle to the realisation of Europe's aspirations."

The draft memorandum then specifically stated:

1. BOOTHBY, News of the World article, 'The United Europe Movement passes another milestone', 6.3.49.
2. 'Principles of a European Policy', draft statement (C/P/3) submitted to the Brussels Congress by the E.M. Executive Committee, drawn up mainly by Courtin, Philip, Brugmans, Boothby, Mackay (with Sandys' supervision), CAEM BRUGGEL.

"The decision recently to establish a Council of Europe, is to be welcomed as a decisive step towards the joint exercise of certain defined sovereign powers."

In the same context, a European "Charter of Human Rights" was also called for, along with "common European institutions" in the economic field, the Ruhr Statute being seen as an initial step towards such a goal. This in turn led to the document's defence of European Union on "material grounds", the text pointing out that the economic legacy of the war could only be fully redressed by the creation of a "single European market and the progressive removal of national barriers against free movement of persons, goods and capital." This did not mean, however, that an inter-governmental campaign in favour of a European common market should take the place of a political solution. Indeed, as the draft statement especially pointed out:

"This will not be achieved merely by discussions amongst technicians or by negotiations between governments. The delicate function of arbitration which is required can alone be performed by a European authority, possessing sufficient political power to override selfish or obstructive interests in the various countries."

The exclusive technocratic drive which was soon to activate the "functional approach" to European unity was therefore rejected as an alternative method for the furtherance of the campaign:

"In the absence of joint political institutions", the text warned, "the European organisations and services, which are already in being or in the process of being created, will soon either become ineffective owing to the fact that they are not competent to take the necessary political decisions, or alternatively they will be driven by force of circumstances to usurp the functions of governments and set up in their place a technocracy. These alternatives are equally unsatisfactory."

The main gist of these important points from the draft report, outlined above, was retained in the final text, and thereby illustrated the continued adherence of the European Movement to a trans-national political strategy. There were serious problems, however, when the committee debated the "democratic" ./.

./definition of the proposed European Union,Altiero Spinelli insisting upon a more precise formula by which "democratic" was qualified not in the "confined" geographic quantity of the OEEC nations, but as regards those countries willing to respect and adhere to the proposed Charter of Human Rights which,he argued,was "the Hague formula and the essential ideal in the name of which Europe should be constituted."¹ More problems arose over the 'German question' when Bob Edwards led the call for the swift restoration of full democratic rights and diplomatic status to the Western Zones of Germany,while arguing that the international control of the Ruhr should be regarded as the first stage in the creation of common European industrial institutions.² In this he was well supported both by Miss Josephy³,and above all,by André Philip.⁴ The Socialist SUISE representatives were indeed highly effective in the debate, and showed their muscle especially with regard to Europe's ties with overseas territories,Marceau Pivert angrily denouncing the imperialist designs of certain sections of the European Movement,⁵ much to the irritation of MacMillan and Serruys.⁶ The final text nevertheless accommodated both Pivert's criticisms and the SUISE's demand to include some mention of the role of workers in a united Europe. As one anti-socialist observer to the proceedings commented:"The socialists were much better organised than at The Hague. In the political committee they constituted a disciplined and offensive bloc."⁷ On the other hand,however,the more conservative-minded delegates to the congress were far from routed by this surprisingly vigorous socialist participation,and Hore-Belisha above all made a point of underling the British unionist camp's "particular satisfaction" with the reference retained in the final text referring to the "traditional ties that bind us to countries⁴ overseas;these ties(he added)will always have priority."⁸

1. SPINELLI,official minutes of political committee debate,26.2.49. Brussels Congress, CAEM BRUGGE. 2. EDWARDS,ibid. 3. JOSEPHY, ibid. 4. PHILIP,ibid. 5. PIVERT,speech(Doc.No.26,AM No.3), plus official minutes,ibid. 6. MACMILLAN & SERRUYS,ibid.

7. See A. VOISIN ,article in 'La Fédération', 'Au dela de la politique churchillienne',April 1949.

8. HORE-BELISHA,speech at plenary session,28.2.49. CAEM BRUGGE.

The most damaging division of opinion during the two-day debate of the political committee, however, stemmed essentially from the tough maximalist stand taken by the Italian MFE delegation. The first serious indication of their angry mood came to light when Brugmans proposed a debate concerning the European Movement's attitude towards the Atlantic Pact, stating his own revised view favouring not so much a detached and "neutral" Europe, but instead an "independent" Europe, acting within the Western alliance system.¹ This provoked Carandini and most of his MFE colleagues (though not Spinelli) into a violent denunciation of Europe being intrinsically tied to American military designs and to a US-dominated Western Bloc model.² Nevertheless, the debate continued (no doubt to Sandys' embarrassment) and in the final event decided upon an evasive formula by which it was stated that Europe would provide for her own defence.

More serious division emerged not over the Western Alliance but over the actual political approach to the European Assembly campaign itself. The Italian delegation as a whole was indeed furious over the blanket approval with which the official Council of Europe project was welcomed as a "decisive step" towards union, and instead proposed an amendment claiming that it was, in fact, an "insufficient step" which did "not yet enable the joint exercise of certain defined sovereign rights." The amendment further added that since the Council of Ministers remained simply an offshoot of the "sterile sovereign state organisation", it would indeed be up to the European Assembly itself to act as the main driving force towards the constitution of a "United States of Europe." The means by which the Assembly should achieve this central integrating role, the Italian text continued, would be through bi-annual direct elections, Assembly representatives thereafter being able to vote according to their own conscience and to put through policies of "constitutional, political, economic and military" concern in favour of European Federation.³

1. BRUGHMANS, official minutes, op.cit. 2. CARANDINI, ibid; plus article by D. Anderson in New York Times, 27.2.49.; Spinelli Diary, 20.3.49.
3. See Doc. 37 AM 8, CAFFR BRUGGE.

The bold initiative taken by the Italian maximaliste deputation failed miserably to rally the majority of European Movement delegates, who plainly preferred the moderate and positive tone of the original draft. The actual clause in question was eventually altered only to sound even more favourable to the governmental action in setting up the Council of Europe, which was greeted in the approved text by the committee with "gratitude and satisfaction." The broad consensus of opinion at the Brussels Congress thus clearly indicated a concern not to ostracise the European Movement from the responsible main-stream strategy with which the Sandys-Retinger axis had guided the campaign into the realm of governmental decision making. Brugmans was not at ease with this strategy, but felt there was no viable alternative. The maximalistes thought differently, believing that if the European Movement now failed to strike a real blow for a fundamental structural transformation of Europe, the more sceptical governments would recuperate their losses, re-affirm their cautious lead at the diplomatic level, regain control over the forces of popular opinion, and subsequently mould the European Assembly project into a vacuous institution with no real authoritative scope. Boothby, as chairman of the political committee, did not appear to be over-interested in the loftier ideals involved in the European Assembly scheme. He was more concerned instead about ensuring the possibility of all-party representation in the planned Assembly, and tabled a motion for such a procedure.¹ Similarly, the French delegation was mainly subdued as regards the long-term impact of the European Assembly, though Courtin was quick to oppose Boothby's motion in view of the fact that French Communists as a result could be selected to the European Assembly.² This Franco-British dilemma was eventually resolved by the Congress accepting the broad sense of Boothby's proposal, along ./.

1. BOOTHBY motion, Doc. No. 86, CAEM BRUGGE.

2. COURTIN amendment, Doc. No. 105, CAEM BRUGGE.

See also article in Manchester Guardian, "A European Assembly", 3.3.49.

./ with the proviso that each Parliament should "be free to nominate only those delegates who undertake to contribute loyally to the establishment of democratic institutions in a United Europe." This formula, it was thought, would exclude the Communists entirely.

It was clear, therefore, that despite some vague references to an eventual joint exercise of sovereign rights, neither the approved document on 'Principles of a European Policy', nor the additional document passed by the political committee, entitled simply 'European Consultative Assembly', envisaged a bold supra-national political strategy. Instead, the ambiguous statements of the past in this context were either summarised or simply repeated. In concluding the work of the committee, Boothby spoke of the "revolutionary" and "practical" results of the discussions, and described the final formulation of the European Movement's political policy as "destined to exercise a great effect upon the course of events in Europe and in the world."¹ The Italian delegation did not share such a bloated view of the Movement's officially approved policy. Indeed, in a long and bitter statement to the final plenary session of the Brussels Congress, on February 28, Carandini exclaimed that the approved text was "far from being a dynamic document", and that it failed to explain how an effective transfer of national sovereignty to a European authority would actually take place. The political committee, he claimed had "lost sight of the fundamental goal of the European Movement - the creation of a European Federal State." Nothing would be achieved by inter-governmental agreements in the absence of a long-term strategy to secure an "international parliamentary treaty", and a short-term plan to provide the European Assembly with the "maximum political authority" possible. The approved policy documents, he concluded, simply lacked any expression in favour of a representative and sovereign Assembly. - The two texts in question are printed below:

1. BOOTHBY, Closing Statements, Doc. No. II4, 28.2.49. CAEM BRUGGE
2. CARANDINI, 'Final Declaration' for the Italian delegation, Doc. No. 102, 28.2.49., CAEM BRUGGE.

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN POLICY

1. In a world dominated by political and economic units of continental dimensions, the European nations cannot hope to survive on a basis of political or economic independence. Europe must unite, not merely to preserve the peace and freedom of her peoples and to recover and augment her material prosperity, but to assert once more those principles which are now menaced and which must be preserved and given new life by being enshrined in a new structure.

2. Love of freedom, hostility to totalitarianism of every kind, the humble and conscientious search for truth and, above all, respect for the human personality and for the individual as an individual—these are the essential characteristics of the true spirit of Europe. From them there springs, not a grudging toleration of diversity, but a glad recognition of its merit. These moral values, which are the product of two thousand years of civilization and were reaffirmed in the resistance to Nazism and Fascism, must inspire the organization of Europe.

3. European culture is expressed through that tradition of democracy which is shared by all our nations. All of us believe in a rule of law which is independent of the State, and which at the same time provides the foundations and fixes the limits of State authority. We believe that the human personality is sacrosanct and that the fundamental liberties attaching to it must be guaranteed against all forms of tyranny. We further believe that the individual exists only in relation to his fellows and as a member of organic communities. Such communities must, within the limits of their competence, enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, provided always that the necessary collective discipline is maintained. Finally, we believe that the concept of democracy implies freedom of criticism and therefore the right of opposition.

4. A political institution or an economic and social system is never an end in itself; it is merely a means of creating favourable conditions in which the human personality can develop and expand. Economic power should be regarded as a responsibility, to be discharged in the best interests of all. The methods employed, as well as the political and economic institutions to be created, must, above all, inspire a sense of personal responsibility and must encourage individual initiative to the maximum.

5. Europe is being born at a time when its constituent nations are undergoing a profound social transformation. Within the new organisms the workers must play their part in management and in the exercise of authority to the full extent of their technical and political capacity.

6. It is not a question of choosing between liberty and authority, nor between a free and a collective economy, but of creating a synthesis of the two, which, far from being in opposition to one another, can be combined for constructive purposes.

7. No State should be admitted into the European Union which does not accept the fundamental principles of a Charter of Human Rights, and which does not declare itself willing and bound to ensure their application. In consequence, the official adherence of certain European nations both in the West and in the East cannot be counted upon for the present. But the barrier which divides the free States from the other European nations must not be accepted as permanent. Our aim is the union in freedom of all the peoples of Europe

8. Western Germany must be invited forthwith (and the rest of Germany when possible) to become an integral part of this new community, in which the citizens of all the nations will have the same rights and the same duties.

9. Any Union must take account of the special ties which unite certain nations with countries overseas. The traditional links between European States and other self-governing countries overseas must be preserved and extended for the mutual benefit of all. Europe must also actively help territories which are now dependent to evolve towards a regime of autonomy. They must be permitted to participate fully in the political, economic and social benefits of the European association, and to be represented in European organizations according to the constitutional practices in each country.

10. European values can only be preserved in so far as they are given new life and substance through the medium of new political institutions. In the absence of such new institutions, the European organisations and services, which are already in being or in process of being created, will rapidly become ineffective, or will be driven by force of circumstances to usurp the functions of government by setting up in their place an uncontrolled technocracy.

11. The International Council of the European Movement notes with gratitude and satisfaction the decision taken by the Governments of the Five Brussels Treaty Powers to create a European Council of Ministers and a European Consultative Assembly, in accordance with the recommendations of the Hague Congress. This decision constitutes an important step towards the common exercise of certain defined sovereign powers.

12. In view of the profound structural alterations in world economy during the past quarter of a century, accentuated by two world wars, Europe cannot find a new stability without adopting a new economic policy. This policy should be directed towards the most harmonious and rational exploitation of Europe's resources with a view to improving steadily the standard of living of the European population. Only thus can Europe rehabilitate herself, contribute to universal prosperity, and provide for her own defence.

13. Such a new economic policy, in the establishment of which the O.E.E.C. at Paris can be of very great assistance, implies at least an overall plan of production for the basic industries of Western Europe and the progressive removal of the existing national barriers against the free movement of persons, goods and capital. The integration of the heavy industries of Western Europe is urgently required, for it is the necessary foundation of the economy of the Union as a whole. From this standpoint, the Ruhr Statute must not remain as an exceptional regime, but should be regarded as a step towards the creation of common institutions for Western Europe.

14. There are, thus, both moral and material considerations which demand the union of Europe. The tolerance of diversity, which has enabled her to play so notable a part in history, will find expression in a new order in which liberty joins hands with discipline. From this there will flow a fresh vitality, which will assure to Europe her independence and continued existence as a vital force for civilization in world affairs.

1.

I. 'Principles of a European Policy', final policy text adopted, (IHF/3/E), Brussels Congress, February 19-19, CAEM BRUGGE.

EUROPEAN CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

At its meeting in Brussels on February 28th, 1949, the International Council of the European Movement noted with gratitude and satisfaction the decision taken by the Governments of the Five Brussels Treaty Powers to create a European Council of Ministers and a European Consultative Assembly, in accordance with the proposals made by the European Movement following the Congress of Europe held at The Hague in May, 1948.

It was decided to submit to the Governments concerned the following Recommendations regarding the composition and organization of the Assembly:

1. The delegates to the Assembly should be nominated by the various national Parliaments in such a way as to represent the vital forces in each country.
2. Each Parliament should, however, be free to nominate only those delegates who undertake to contribute loyally to the establishment of democratic institutions in a United Europe.
3. The number of delegates, chosen to represent the countries which at present enjoy democratic government, should be at least 300.
4. It is highly desirable that each national representation should include both Parliamentary and non-Parliamentary elements. The Parliamentarians should (subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above) be designated in such a way that the parties constituted within each interested Parliament are appropriately represented. A due place should be accorded to active supporters of European co-operation.
5. The Assembly should, from the outset, be composed of representatives from all European countries enjoying democratic government, and should include representatives from Western Germany.
6. Apart from national delegations, another form of representation should be provided. The Assembly should elect personalities chosen for their representative European credentials, including citizens of countries which are at present unable to express themselves democratically.
7. In order to emphasise the fact that it is the function of the Assembly to represent the whole of Europe, it is suggested that a certain number of places in the Chamber of the Assembly should be reserved for representatives of the countries which cannot express themselves democratically. These empty places would demonstrate the solidarity of all the peoples of Europe.
8. The Assembly must have the right to discuss any questions of interest to the European community. Any issue which affects the organization of Europe, should be referred to the Assembly by the Council of Ministers for discussion.
9. The Assembly should, each year, hold two or three sessions and should sit for not less than forty-five days.
10. The Assembly should set up a certain number of Standing Committees.
11. The Assembly should be provided with an adequate Secretariat.

The other main policy document which was also adopted by the Brussels Congress related to the important proposition of the juridical committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Fernand Debousse, which called for the creation of a European Court. After considerable debate concerning especially the geo-political area in which the proposed European Court would have supreme jurisdiction, the operation of a filter system for cases to be referred to the Court, and the enforcement of decisions taken by the Court,^I the following list of recommendations was unanimously adopted:

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Whilst it is of importance that the Rights of Man should be effectively guaranteed in all European countries, the judicial protection of these rights is capable of being immediately assured in the States participating in the Council of Europe.

2. With this object, a European Court of Human Rights should be established by a Convention concluded between the Member States of the Council of Europe, regard being had to the undermentioned considerations:

3. The rights to be assured by the Court shall be those individual, family and social rights of an economic, political, religious or other nature in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which it is necessary and practical to protect by juridical process. (*A list of Rights is annexed hereto as a basis for consideration.*)

4. The Court shall have jurisdiction to determine all cases concerning the infringement of the above rights arising out of legislative, executive or juridical acts. If the Court determines that there has been an infringement, it may either prescribe measures of reparation, or it may require that the national authorities shall take penal or administrative action in regard to the persons responsible for such infringement, or it may demand the repeal, cancellation or amendment of the act.

5. The Governments of the Signatory States, as well as all natural or corporate persons, being either nationals of or domiciled in one of these States, shall have the right to appear before the Court.

6. Petitions shall not be considered by the Court until the internal judicial processes of the State concerned have been exhausted, provided that these function without unreasonable delay.

7. The Court shall be composed of nine members chosen from among persons of high moral and professional character.

8. There shall be constituted a European Human Rights Commission composed of seven members who shall be independent of any Government. The Commission shall supervise the observance of the above-mentioned Convention. It shall present an annual report to the Council of Europe. The Commission shall receive and investigate all petitions. It may carry out enquiries within the territory of the States concerned, which shall afford all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of such enquiries.

I. For juridical debate, see official minutes, especially Docs. 92-100, Brussels Congress, February 1949, CAE: BRUGGE.

9. If the Commission considers that a petition is well-founded, it may make appropriate recommendations to the parties concerned, with a view to resolving the matter by conciliatory methods. If conciliation cannot be achieved, the Commission may, whether it has made a recommendation or not, initiate proceedings before the Court, or it may authorize the parties concerned to submit to the Court any question or point of law raised by such petition.

10. In the event of failure to comply with a recommendation of the Commission or a judgment of the Court the matter may be brought before the Council of Europe. The latter shall call upon the party concerned to comply, and shall, in the event of continued non-compliance, decide upon such measures as may be appropriate.

The Juridical Section of the European Movement is preparing a draft Convention, embodying the above principles, for submission to the Council of Europe.

LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO BE ASSURED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT

(Submitted as a basis for consideration)

1. Security of life and limb.
2. Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.
3. Freedom from slavery and servitude and from compulsory labour of a discriminatory kind.
4. Freedom of religious belief, practice and teaching.
5. Freedom of speech and of expression of opinion generally.
6. Freedom of association and assembly.
7. Freedom from arbitrary interference with the family.
8. The sanctity of the home.
9. Equality before the law.
10. Freedom from discrimination on account of religion, race, national origin or political or other opinion.
11. Freedom from arbitrary deprivation of property.
12. Freedom of petition in respect of any infringement of the Rights guaranteed by the Court occurring within the territory of any State adhering to the Convention. I

The proposed Convention was thus to operate as part of the broader Council of Europe project (clause 2); indeed, the European Movement regarded the formal presentation of the proposed Convention as one of the initial and primary objectives of the European Consultative Assembly, once convoked. The problem remained, however, as to how precisely such a European Court, assuming it would be accepted by the participating governments, would effectively sanction the enforcement of its verdict./.

I. 'European Court of Human Rights' - draft Convention, adopted by the Brussels Congress, February 1949, (INF/2/E), CAEM BRUGGE.

./on those occasions when recalcitrant national governments or national juridical institutions might be in violation of its rulings. The drafters of the document clearly based their hopes on the powers of European public opinion in this matter, or failing this, in the potential sanctions which the Council of Europe itself might apply. This point was strongly challenged by the Italian delegation who argued that the "effective planning" and "full functioning" of the Court could not operate in such a way up until the Council of Europe itself became a "Central European Power" through a transfer of sovereignty, the Court being only a "basic expression" of this power.¹ As Carandini again stressed at the closing plenary session of the Congress:

"... it seems rather strange to us that the theme of a Court of Human Rights should be developed so well, whereas even the slightest allusion to the limitation of the sovereignty of national States has been forgotten."²

The debate came to a conclusion on this rather bitter note. The European Movement had tacitly decided to work within the confines of the Council of Europe project as specified in official circles, concentrating on measures which the European Assembly could in time adopt and press for, but no longer attempting to secure a more authoritative status for the Assembly itself. This, it was hoped, would be achieved at a later stage through the Assembly's own efforts in co-development with the Council. The European Movement would provide unofficial and indirect aid in the struggle, while pushing for concrete projects such as the European Court. The minority Italian maximalist delegation was at complete odds with such a gradual strategy but, despite Frenay's active leadership of the EUP, and the influential sympathy of leading figures such as André Philip, they could accomplish no fundamental turn among the moderate consensus which now dominated the European Movement as a whole. The Brussels Congress was in this sense the final breaking point between the unionist-./.

1. MILO DI VILLAGRAZIA speech, 27.2.49., Doc. 92, Brussels Congress
CAEN BRUGGE.
2. CARANDINI, 'Final Declaration', 28.2.49., op. cit.

./dominated leadership of the European Movement, and the militant supporters of constitutional federation plans among the maximaliste wing of the EUP. The Congress, in the same context, marked the complete ascendancy of the Sandys-Retinger axis in the overall control of the Movement. Indeed, despite the mainly honorary election of the French Trade Union leader, Léon Jouhaux, as President of the International Council, and the selection of André Philip as 'General Delegate' to the Executive Committee, in order to illustrate Socialist participation in the organs of the Movement,¹ the purely ceremonial renomination of Sandys and Retinger to their former posts succinctly indicated that any federalist resistance within the executive organisation of the Movement had no effect whatsoever.² Moreover, the original draft report presented at the beginning of the Congress by Sandys, concerning the 'Objectives and Organisation' of the European Movement was approved with hardly any alterations, Frenay's aggressive appeal notwithstanding.³ The newly-constituted central 'Executive Bureau' of the Movement similarly confirmed Sandys' moderate brand of leadership, support being assured from vice-presidents Layton (UEM), van Zeeland (ELEC), Dautry (CFEU) and Karl Wistrand (co-opted for Switzerland), while Bichet (NEI), Giacchero (co-opted for Italy) and even Brugmans (EUP) were hardly likely to lead an open revolt against him, this leaving Emile Rasquin (SMUSE) as the sole potential militant in the team.⁴ The Brussels Congress, in short, was a victory for the pragmatic strategists of the European campaign as it had developed from the Hague Congress. The Council of Europe project, despite its fundamental supra-national shortcomings and despite considerable maximaliste criticism, remained in tact.

1. See official minutes of the International Executive Committee meeting (EX/M/IO), 27.2.49., Brussels, plus accompanying papers, CAEM BRUGGE, plus Boothby article News of the World, op.cit., article by André Philip in Le Populaire, 'Après le Congrès de Bruxelles', 4.3.49., in which the Socialist involvement is well explained.

2. See EX/M/IO, op.cit. 3. See 'Origins, Objectives and Organisation', approved text (INF/I/E), Brussels Congress, CAEM BRUGGE.

4. See EX/M/IO, op. cit.

3) Brussels Congress conclusion: the European Movement's popular appeal

The inauguration of the International Council of the European Movement at Brussels was not organised only as a private conclave of the leading lights in the European campaign. It was also arranged as the first international gala of the officially constituted European Movement, and as such, the Congress attempted to stake out the popular appeal and broad support which the Movement was trying to conjure. The first public manifestation of the Congress, held at a well-attended gathering on the evening of Saturday February 26 in the Palais des Beaux-Arts, did in this sense provide a convincing array of publicly committed international leaders, from both sides of the political spectrum, who were ready to speak out for European Union. Meeting under the chairmanship of Paul van Zeeland, stirring speeches were delivered by Churchill, Spaak, Jouhaux, and Ruini (representing De Gasperi), along with other contributions from Belgian Minister Henri Heyman, and American observer W. Maguire.¹

The address delivered by Spaak on this public occasion was especially pertinent. Stressing first the view that to "make Europe" would be a long, slow and unspectacular process, and that despite the official machinery being in position the most important problems still remained to be solved, the Belgian leader then issued the following sober plea:

"People must not be discouraged or disappointed if in the months to come there are no achievements to compare with those of the past months. The making of Europe is a truly difficult task. On the road which will lead us to success there are many obstacles, but we shall manage to reach the end with courage, patience and goodwill. Do not forget that the making of Europe is not the making of a miracle. To have made Europe will be the magnificent reward of a long struggle... - to make Europe everyone must be prepared to make certain sacrifices."

He in turn concluded his public appeal by declaring:

1. See Nouvelles de L'Europe 'Le Congrès de Bruxelles.' (official pamphlet on the Brussels Congress printed by the European Movement), pp. 10-11, CAEM BRUGGE.

"..Europe will be principally the creation of Governments, of their wisdom and daring. But without you the Governments could do nothing. Behind their activities, there must be a movement of public opinion. When the difficulties come upon us, when we have passed from the enthusiasm of our first successes and when the only way to reach our goal is to come to terms with fundamental problems, the Governments will need to be upheld in their activities by a public opinion enlightened, generous and bold, which will help them to triumph over their difficulties." 1

Evidently, Spaak did not underestimate the problems which lay ahead in order to uphold popular momentum in what he feared might be a dull though gradually constructive Council of Europe project.

Léon Jouhaux, by contrast, struck a rather more optimistic note, directing his appeal not so much towards public indulgence with regard to long-term governmental policy, but issuing instead a direct plea for active worker participation in the European campaign:

"Trade unionism", he declared, "must be, and indeed is, associated with this immense task to which it must contribute with its experience, its unification, its will and its energy. Should this fundamental fact, this essential necessity, be misunderstood we should once again risk failing in our task. If workers' movements do not collaborate strenuously, if they do not profoundly participate in the realisation of this grandiose idea, this idea of peace, we risk another failure and that, at the present time, we cannot do. This experiment must succeed and for it to succeed it is necessary, I repeat, that the masses be brought into action by the trade union organisations. That is why I believe it to be important that workers' movements in all countries should join in the task of the constitution of Europe." 2

Despite the sincerity and eloquence of these appeals, as well as the popular throng of Brussels' citizens who excitedly attended the various rallies and fringe meetings held by the European Movement throughout the Congress, not all 'popular' quarters were convinced about the European message being ./.

1. SPAAK, speech at public meeting held in the Palais des Beaux-Arts, 26.2.49., Brussels Congress, DOC. 74, CAEM BRUGGE.
2. JOUHAUX, speech, *ibid.* idem., DOC. 75. For Churchill speech, see DOC. 71.

./put across. This was particularly the case among the 'workers' of the Belgian Communist Party who attempted to disrupt the open rally held by the European Movement on February 27 at the Brussels Bourse. Among a vast crowd of some 10,000, who came to hear Churchill, Spaak and Philip, plus Brugmans and Teitgen, address the meeting, some 150 Communist hecklers, methodically scattered, in fact attempted to disrupt the event and prevent the various speakers from being heard.¹ Churchill simply plodded on with his speech, looking towards a united Europe "as the sole means of preventing another war", and as "the best way for establishing the rights and freedom of the human race."² Spaak, for his part, defiantly baited the Communist disrupters, declaring above the noise "You are too few to stop us: today we are thousands, and tomorrow we shall be victorious!"³ André Philip similarly cried out "The unity of Europe for us is a question of life or death, and I do not understand that certain elements present do not realise that our whole existence is at stake!"⁴

The organised rage and agitation of the Belgian Communist Party in its attempt to disrupt the Brussels Congress only drew attention, in fact, to the status and current significance which the European Movement had now officially attained. The positive press coverage of the Congress further illustrated this fact, and helped consolidate the public standing and appeal of the Movement. - The 'Manchester Guardian', for example, concluded that the Brussels Congress had "done its work well" and had fostered the right sort of "European spirit" needed for the complicated unification effort. With regard to the actual political recommendations of the Congress, the same journal commented:

"The statement on the principles of a European policy is a crisper document than one might expect. It owes a good deal to the common sense of Mr. Robert Boothby, who has helped to exclude the grosser platitudes."

1. See 'Nouvelles de L'Europe', op cit., plus Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1949, p. 9840, and press reports listed below.
2. CHURCHILL, speech at the Bourse, Brussels Congress, DOC. 95, CAE-BRUGGE.
3. SPAAK, ibid. idem. DOC. 96
4. PHILIP, ibid.
5. See Manchester Guardian (weekly), reports and commentary, 3.3.49.

Similarly, the previously sceptical 'Economist' was full of praise for the Congress, stating that the meeting had been "better and more constructive" than the Hague Congress, especially with regard to the two "important" resolutions dealing with the proposed European Assembly and European Court.¹ The weekly 'Statist' gave an even more encouraging report after the closing session of the Congress:

"The results so far achieved by the Movement have been rather impressive, and the personalities greatly enhanced its standing... There can be little doubt that the Council has done magnificent work in the cause of European unity; and such is the caution of Governments, there is every reason to hope that the Council will find much more to do."²

From across the Channel, the work of the European Movement, and especially the election of Léon Jouhaux to the presidency of the International Council, was greatly welcomed in the French Press. 'Le Monde' devoted positive front-page coverage to the Congress.³ Similarly, the more conservative 'Figaro' splashed across its headlines: "The movement for European unity has become a living reality",⁴ while in the Socialist 'Le Populaire', André Philip expressed his considerable satisfaction with the results of the Congress.⁵ René Courtin in turn added his influential voice to the general press acclaim given to the Congress by singling out the special role accomplished by the Socialists at Brussels, claiming that the European Movement had now attained a "new mystique", as well as being able to offer urgently required political and economic solutions to the problems facing Europe.⁶ In Germany, the Social-Democratic Burgomaster of Hamburg, Max Brauer, returned from the Brussels Congress to declare in a major radio broadcast that the meeting had been an event of "superior international and historic importance."⁷

1. Economist, article "European Unionists at Brussels", 5.3.49.
2. Statist, leading article "United Europe", 5.3.49.
3. Le Monde, main article, plus report by K. Millet, 1.3.49.
4. Le Figaro, 1.3.49.
5. PHILIP, 'Le Populaire', 1.3.49., op. cit.
6. COURTIN, article in Le Monde, "Après le Congrès de Bruxelles", 13.4.49.
7. BRAUER, radio address, March 1949, 'Results of Brussels meeting' Europa Union

Thus, despite maximaliste criticism of the timidity in the Brussels Congress reports, the pragmatic gradualistic line taken by the majority of the International Council was well supported by the press. The Brussels Congress had now propelled the work of the European Movement into the foreground of political commentary and thought, whereas the popular manifestations of the Movement (indirectly aided by communist agitation) gave it the appearance at least of having a mass following. The Council of Europe project, and more particularly, the campaign for a European Assembly, had reached the zenith of its activity, and constituted an effective reference point for the planning of future European unity. The cautious warnings of Paul-Henri Spaak, however, served as a sharp indication that the stage of organic unification in Europe was far from achieved. The European Movement had brought forward the public campaign to a level where it could not be ignored by official circles, but in the final event the latter organs of responsibility would have to carry through the project on their own terms, and in their own time. The unionist and pragmatic majority in the European Movement leadership were confident that the project as it stood would provide a sufficient base for future development at an increasingly organic level. The maximaliste MFE militants, on the other hand, discounted any such possibility of institutional evolution so long as the edifice itself was not built upon solid juridical ground which ensured an effective transfer of national sovereignty, tacitly envisaged and recognised by a trans-parliamentary pact. The ten week period which followed the closing ceremony of the Brussels Congress on February 28, and which culminated in the final Ten-Power accord on the Council of Europe Statute on May 5, thus represented both the last stage in the post-Hague campaign for a European Assembly, and the first major cross-roads at which the maximaliste federalists openly disassociated themselves from the overall campaign, and publicly disavowed the official Council of Europe initiative.

CHAPTER 12. FINAL PHASE IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR A EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY,
MARCH-MAY 1949

I) Crisis in the Federalist camp; Doubts in the Unionist camp

There can be no doubt to the fact that the first International Council meeting of the European Movement left the idealistic federalist movement in a state of total ~~disarray~~. Indeed, upon his return home, Spinelli recorded that the EUP Central Committee was "in full crisis after the Brussels Congress", Frenay's outspoken position drawing further attention to the major splits within the movement.¹ The latter's quarrel with Brugmans, moreover, had now reached damaging proportions with both leaders severely criticising the respective positions adopted by each other at Brussels.² Clearly on the defensive, and somewhat disillusioned with the EUP's isolated posture as presented by Frenay, Brugmans even went so far as to claim that under actual circumstances the federalist movement could achieve no further progress, and added:

"To be quite frank, it has to be admitted that at the present time the European Movement as a whole has caught up with the doctrine of the EUP as a whole, though of course this does not signify that enormous differences do not exist between certain elements in one and the other. And since this is the case, I refuse to carry out a policy which, instead of directing and stimulating the European Movement, risks putting a brake on it and paralysing it."³

It was clearly the Executive President's final stand in his consistent and principled policy in favour of unity of action in the European campaign. As Spinelli somewhat blandly commented, "Brugmans has made it clear that he wants to pass over to the European Movement."⁴

Frenay, on the other hand, was equally firm in upholding his aggressive brand of leadership in the fight for a radical and autonomous federalist strategy, and came away from Brussels with the ./.

1. SPINELLI, personal diary, 20.3.49.

2. See Brugmans/Frenay correspondence, March 1949, BRUGMANS PAPERS.

3. Ibid., letter from Brugmans to Frenay, 7.3.49.

4. SPINELLI, op. cit.

./strict intention of wresting the organisational and financial independence of the EUP from the "strongly centralising" tendency of Sandys and the European Movement Executive Bureau.¹ This policy received strong support from the militant factions in the integral-federalist wing of the EUP where Alexandre Marc re-emerged as the champion for striking out a new and separate federalist programme which would negate the effects and results of collaboration with the unionist formations dating from the EUP's decision to participate in the Hague Congress project.² André Voisin in turn also echoed some of Marc's views, but felt that the integral-federalists should campaign both "inside and outside the European Movement", and re-new the emphasis in their campaign for the autonomous living structures which Europe should give expression to, rather than make demands only for a united Europe.³

An extra-parliamentary campaign in which the ideal of a supra-national Europe was given second-place to the dogma of the 'living forces' could not have contrasted more with the position of the maximaliste MFE wing on the other side of the EUP. Indeed, Spinelli's extreme frustration with the results of the Brussels Congress derived not only from the "false steps" which the majority of the European Movement had upheld, but also from the EUP's incapacity to put forward a "radical" political-sovereign formula, the federalist movement having either hidden behind the "empty unionist formula", or the "fantasy of integral federalism."⁴ The radical strategy which was advocated in place of the "sterile compromises" taken at Brussels, was explained in more detail by Spinelli at the Third MFE Congress held in Florence on April 23-25, according to the following constitutional outline:

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1. See Frenay's letters to Sandys, 8.3.49., 31.3.49., CBC GENEVA.
 2. Information in letter from Otto Alder (Federal Union) to EUP Central Committee, March 1949, BRUGMANS PAPERS.
 3. VOISIN, article in 'La Fédération', April 1949, op. cit.
 4. SPINELLI, Lettera Federalista No. 8, L'Europa Federata, 10.3.49. MFE TURIN.

"Federations are always born, and can only be born, through pacts between states which are prepared to irrevocably renounce certain of their sovereign powers by confiding them to a superior state.

The number of participating states could in the initial stage be quite small; the sovereign powers transferred to the federal state could be few and insufficient; the federal power could have various structural defects. All this could be put right at a second stage. But the initial pact itself between the states should include such provisions for the transfer of some portion of sovereignty to the federal state."¹

This call for an effective constitutional approach in which national sovereignty was not simply "exercised" in common, as according to the vague Brussels formula, but actually "transferred" to a legitimate political authority, received the broad support of the MFE Congress. Carandini, for example, re-affirmed the merits of the MFE's "realistic intransigence" on the issue, as opposed to the "timidity and opportunism" of other groups.² Milo di Villagrazia also insisted on the primary importance of the "fundamental political pact renouncing sovereignty, without which there could be no Federation, now or later."³ Piero Calamandrei added his prestigious voice in favour of an eventual directly-elected federal European political organ, envisaging a "European citizenship" above that of the nation states. He added, however, that despite the basic "antagonism" between the principles of Federation and the inter-governmental aspects of the Council of Europe project, the proposed European Assembly should be seen as a "germ" of the future European Federation envisaged by all maximalistes. The subsequent resolution passed by the MFE reflected this view in declaring that it was their goal to "transform the Consultative Assembly into a Constituent Assembly, in order to elaborate a FEDERAL PACT OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE."⁵ This was by no means intended, however, as an approval of the Council of Europe project in its./.

1. See 'Il Pensiero dei Federalisti Italiani al III Congresso Nazionale del MFE: rapporto del Comitato Direttivo Nazionale - Discorsi e Mozioni', Florence 23-25.4.49, MFE TURIN.-SPINELLI speech pp.37-56. 2. CARANDINI, *ibid.*, pp.56-66.

3. DI VILLAGRAZIA, *ibid.*, pp.69-86. 4. CALAMANDREI, *ibid.*, pp.146-150. 5. POLITICAL MOTION, *ibid.*, pp. 161-164.

./actual form. The motion indeed went on to state that the imminent creation of the Council of Europe did "not as yet constitute a decisive step towards a united federal Europe", in so much as the Council of Ministers had "no executive powers" and the Consultative Assembly had "no legislative powers", while national sovereignty remained unscathed. Moreover, the motion further declared that "British reluctance" to be committed to any potential federal development could only be overcome if "continental Europe" provided a "strong and decisive" example in favour of European Federation in such a way as to be "irresistible" to Britain.¹

In short, the MFE retained their previous two-tier European Federation formula, disassociating themselves once and for all from the current Council of Europe campaign as conducted by the European Movement. Nevertheless, Spinelli was still careful to stress the necessity to remain within the European Movement, in order to "exercise a continual critique of unionism" where it most mattered. The 'federal-pact' campaign of the MFE, however, would now be mounted separately, in the hope that the dissident EPU might also become involved, as well as the representatives who would eventually sit in the European Assembly itself.² Brugmans strongly disapproved of this policy, arguing that it was "premature", exclusively "political" and sectarian. He further accused the MFE leadership of contradicting federalist thought in their over "centralised" conception of a European "super-State."³ Indeed the long-simmering and fundamental differences within the EUP between the maximalist supporters of fusionist federation plans, the internal-orientated integral federalists, and the less-doctrinal possibilist centre could no longer be papered over. The federalist 'marriage of convenience' was breaking up, and Brugmans was practically helpless.

1. POLITICAL MOTION, *ibid.* 2. SPINELLI *speech, op. cit.*
3. BRUGMANS, article written after the III MFE Congress, entitled 'Positions Fédéralistes Européennes', later printed in La Fédération, July 1949, CEC GENEVA. (Cf. also p.48.)

At the same time as the federalist movement was openly divided over the Council of Europe project and federation plans in general, the unionist camp in Britain was drawing further away from any effective policy commitment towards a Europe united on supra-national or organic lines. Various doubts on the matter had, of course, already been expressed from the unionist side at the Brussels Congress in February.¹ These doubts were given much more voice at the British dominated European Economic Conference of Westminster, organised by the European Movement on April 20-25, under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Butler.²

In the first session of the "social and commercial committee" debate at the conference, in fact, the influential Conservative-unionist spokesman, L.S. Amery, put forward a resolution strongly opposed to any plan in favour of an eventual complete European Economic Union, arguing instead for the retention of bi-lateral commercial agreements in order to maintain special British trading arrangements with her overseas territories. To French anger and indignation, Amery further exclaimed that no government could abandon its sovereign powers over economic affairs and that Britain would always regard the Commonwealth and not Europe as her prior commitment. The French delegates, led by Serruys, in turn withdrew from the committee meeting, put forward a separate list of proposals, and pleaded with van Zeeland to straighten matters out with their reluctant British colleagues. The final text adopted by the conference sided more with the French point of view, and called for a "full customs union", then a "full economic union" for Europe, and for the retention of bi-lateral trading negotiations only during the initial stage in the elaboration of this plan. It was a paper victory for those in favour of organic union, but the doubts and reticence of the British unionist camp in this respect had clearly come to light.³

1. Cf. p.386. 2. For full details see conference file, CAEM BRUGGE.
3. See Westminster Economic Conference 'General Account and Resolutions' (INF/4/E), CAEM BRUGGE; UEM Newsletter, May 1949, SANDYS PAPERS; article by Courtin in Le Monde, 30.4.49., plus other reports printed on 22., 23.4.49.

2) Decision in the Parliamentary campaign

Despite dissenting voices among his unionist colleagues, Sandys continued to direct the political campaign for the European Assembly with increasing verve and determination, though never losing sight of the cool, pragmatic strategy which he had evolved since the Hague Congress, and which now had the formal stamp of approval of the International Council. From the long-term strategical view, as well as in the pressing tactical preparations of the campaign, the need to establish some sort of parliamentary wing to the European Movement was now of the utmost concern. The differences which still kept the EPU outside the official ranks of the European Movement had therefore to be settled, one way or the other.

On the eve of the Brussels Congress, Sandys had in fact contacted EPU President Bohy, and in private talks attempted once more to persuade the latter to put more pressure on the EPU Council to drop their intransigent line over representation in the Executive Committee of the European Movement. Further energetic negotiations were conducted by the Belgian parliamentarians behind the scenes at the Brussels Congress itself, where van Zeeland managed to convince Bohy to "abandon the 50/50 formula", insisted upon hitherto by the EPU Council, in favour of a "compromise proposal" whereby the EPU would be allocated 8 "voices" in the Executive Committee (i.e. double the number granted to other member groups). Negotiations on this generous offer broke down again, however, when Bohy insisted that he viewed 8 "voices" as meaning that the EPU Council, which could only manage to delegate "3 or 4" representatives, would nevertheless be attributed 8 full "votes".¹

1. See Bohy's letters to Sandys, 24.2.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

It was another case of Bohy's rather naive bargaining methods overriding a sane, common sense approach to the serious issues at stake. Both he and Coudenhove appeared to be completely unaware of the established influence and prestige of the European Movement, enhanced further by the Brussels and then the Westminster Congresses, as the major umbrella organisation for all the important pro-European forces and pressure groups. The setting up of National Councils by the latter was particularly dangerous for the EPU in this respect: Already the rebellious British Parliamentary Group under Mackay had switched sides, and had become fully affiliated to the British National Council of the European Movement. Other Parliamentary Groups would soon follow suit. Indeed, those Groups in France, Belgium and Italy were affiliated both to the EPU and the European Movement. It was only a matter of time before they would fully adhere to the latter formation. Similarly, among the cautious Parliamentary Groups in Denmark and Scandinavia the pragmatic and evolutionary approach to European unity pursued by Sandys and his Executive team had considerable more attraction than the erratic and radical stand taken by the EPU leaders.

After a further unsuccessful attempt by the Executive Bureau leaders of the European Movement to convince Bohy of the need for conciliation¹, the directing committee of the European Movement as a whole finally decided to draw an end to the saga and launch instead an official campaign to constitute a 'Parliamentary Section' inside the European Movement itself.² This decision, Sandys informed Bohy, was taken "in response to requests received from several parliamentary groups." It was also in order to accommodate those countries where the Parliamentary Groups were "not affiliated to the EPU, and therefore as yet not internationally organised" (ie. Britain). The ./.

1. See European Movement Executive Bureau meeting, 27.2.49, official minutes (EX/M/IO), op. cit.

2. See European Movement Executive Bureau meeting, 5-6.4.49., official minutes (EX/M/II), plus accompanying paper (EX/P/76) on constitution of a 'Parliamentary Section', CAEM BRUGGE.

./Parliamentary Section, Sandys continued to explain would be "responsible for the initiation of action in the parliamentary sphere to secure the implementation of the policy adopted by the International Executive." The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Section would be members both of the Executive Committee and of the Bureau. According to this scheme, invitations were already being sent out to the French, British, Italian and the three Scandinavian Groups to propose one of their representatives as Vice-Chairman. In the meantime, Sandys declared that Bohy himself was invited to become Chairman of the Parliamentary Section, "as a sign of our appreciation of the outstanding part which you have played in the parliamentary sphere in support of the European cause."¹

The dye had finally been set, Sandys having played Bohy's bluff with considerable conciliatory grace and political skill, the offer to Bohy being aimed at splitting the EPU Council still more and at isolating Coudenhove yet further. The Executive decision to set up a Parliamentary Section was taken on April 6. Bohy laid low for the moment, while by June the actual organisation was officially inaugurated by the European Movement.² Already by May, however, the immediate effects of the European Movement's parliamentary policy were felt, the Swedish and then later the Danish Parliamentary Groups being the first to fully switch their allegiances.³ In the final run-up to the agreement on the Council of Europe Statute, it was indeed the European Movement alone which remained at the centre of political attention and discussion, the EPU being practically dis-counted.

1. SANDYS, letter to Bohy, 6.4.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

2. Cf. pp. 430-I.

3. See letters to Coudenhove from the Chairmen of the Swedish and Danish EPU Groups, 24.5.49., 26.6.49., respectively,
CAEM BRUGGE.

3) The final push towards the constitution of the Council of Europe: reactions

The campaign for a European Assembly had by now attained its most exciting phase. At the official level, Bevin sent out invitations on March 7, on behalf of the Brussels Treaty Governments, requesting the participation of the Danish, Irish, Italian, Norwegian and Swedish Governments in the final formulation of the Council of Europe project, following on from the Five-Power Agreement of January 28 and the subsequent draft recommendations submitted by the Brussels Treaty Permanent Committee on February 5.¹ After receiving positive replies from all, a 10-Power "Conference of Ambassadors" was convened in London on March 28, under the chairmanship once more of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, in order to thrash out the last recommendations concerning the role and work of the Council of Europe, in preparation for the subsequent and definitive inter-ministerial meeting, held eventually on May 3-4. The pressures on the British Labour Government to establish, in partnership with the European Continent, a European political institution which would go beyond previously conceived inter-governmental and co-operative levels of decision making were now formidable. Even the left-wing 'Tribune' strongly appealed for Labour Party members to become "Europe-conscious", adding that "our proverbial insularity is by now wholly anachronistic and the sooner we realise and acknowledge this the better."² At the parliamentary level, Mackay once more drew up and tabled a motion in the House of Commons demanding that the planned European Consultative Assembly should be politically representative, free from governmental mandates, and regarded as the initiation of a future Federal European Parliament with supra-national powers. Among the 122 MP's who signed this motion, there figured the name of Mrs Barbara Castle.³

1. Cf. pp. 354, 360.

2. Tribune, editorial, 16.3.49.

3. See list (G9 F5 No. 5) who signed the motion (No. 21), entitled 'European Consultative Assembly', February 1949, ACKAY PAPERS, plus Hansard, 'Notices', 17.3.49.

Similarly, at the first full Executive Council meeting of the British Council of the European Movement, held on March 14, Barbara Castle, Mackay, and Bob Edwards, among others, approved a motion suggesting that another European Movement deputation be sent to the forthcoming 'Conference of Ambassadors', in order to "amplify" the International Council's programme with regard to the European Assembly.¹ The International Executive Bureau had already considered the idea and formally announced at its subsequent meeting on April 5 that the Ambassadorial Conference, already in session, had indeed allowed the European Movement to submit its views directly.² The following day, on April 6, a deputation composed of Sandys, Bichet, Brugmans, Lasquin, van Zeeland, Philip, Retinger, Giaccherio, Wistrand and Mackay was received by the conference at the Foreign Office, and in turn submitted a memorandum based on the Brussels Congress recommendations. It was the final official initiative undertaken by the Movement in the European Assembly campaign.

The memorandum, entitled 'European Consultative Assembly',³ dealt once more with the three main aspects of the European Assembly project, namely, the composition, the terms of reference, and the organisational scope of the Assembly within the Council of Europe scheme as a whole:-

The proposed composition of the Assembly was explained from the geo-political point of view with the now customary call for the "ultimate" inclusion of all the nations of Europe, but with the "initial" proviso that representatives should be designated by "democratic methods", which meant that Spain and the 'Iron Curtain' regimes were excluded for the moment, though Portugal was somehow deemed democratically respectable. In the./

1. UK Executive Council meeting, 14.3.49., official minutes (UK/E-M/I), CAEM BRUGGE.
2. European Movement Executive Bureau meeting, 5-6.4.49., official minutes (EX/M/II), op.cit.
3. 'European Consultative Assembly - recommendations submitted to the conference of ambassadors for the establishment of a Council of Europe' by a deputation of the European Movement', (E/P/74), 6.4.49., CAEM BRUGGE.

./..same 'cold war' context, the European Movement deputation also recommended that "as a symbolic gesture, a number of empty seats could be reserved for the European nations which, for the present, cannot express themselves democratically." Moving to the actual selection of representatives to the Assembly, the deputation went on to propose, in what constituted a partial pacification of the federalist point of view, that each national delegation ought to "adequately represent the vital forces in its country", which meant including not just "political leaders", but also "prominent figures in the nation's economic and spiritual life." In addition, it was proposed that in the selection of both parliamentary and non-parliamentary representatives to the Assembly "an effort should be made to include persons who have actively studied the problems of European unification" and who would therefore be able to make a "special contribution to the deliberations of the Assembly", in other words, members of the European Movement! The most sensitive suggestion, however, related to the desired all-party method of appointment to the Assembly, which would insure that it was not simply a government-appointed and mandated deliberative body. The European Movement's final formula on this crucial point read as follows:

"The political element in each national delegation should in general reflect the relative strengths of the political opinions represented in its parliament. Certain parliaments may, however, consider it desirable to exclude from their delegations representatives of political parties which are actively hostile to the creation of a united democratic Europe. It is recommended that no directive should be issued on this point, which should be left for decision by each parliament at its own direction."

It was hoped that in this way the Assembly would be essentially a parliamentary instrument including, in the British context, both Government and Opposition parties, while in the continental arena the Communist Parties could be "democratically" excluded. The European Movement delegation further requested that a limited number of places should be kept for "co-opted members", while./.

./the proposed size of the Assembly was put at 300, in order for it to have an "authoritative" voice, seats being allocated according to the relative size of populations, with special safeguards for the adequate representation of "less populous nations."

The terms of reference of the Assembly, proposed by the deputation, were summarised in the three following clauses:

- "(a) To study and discuss the broad issues of European policy as they affect the relations of European Nations with each other and of Europe as a whole with other outside countries;
- (b) To examine practical measures designed to promote closer unity among the European nations in the political and economic spheres, and to study the social and juridical problems involved;
- (c) To make recommendations to the European Council of Ministers on the above matters and on any other questions which the Council may refer to the Assembly for consideration."

Just as in the previous statement presented by the European Movement deputation on December 9, this rather tame list of duties was explained within a rather more ambiguous context. Hence, although the Assembly would clearly have a "consultative" and not a "constituent" role, it would be "neither possible nor desirable to prevent discussion upon the constitutional problems of European union." In short, "broad" questions of European concern, even if politically sensitive, should be debated by the Assembly, after which recommendations could be submitted to the Council of Ministers. This proposition was complemented by a vital clause which described the potential joint-evolutionary role of the Assembly and Council with regard to political initiatives in favour of closer European unity:

"In particular, it is assumed that any major issues relating to the organisation of Europe, such as the creation of new European institutions, will be referred by the Council of Ministers to the Assembly for discussion before final decisions are taken."

In brief, therefore, the European Movement was attempting both to secure the Assembly's freedom to discuss general issues upon its own initiative, while any specific issues of importance which ./.

./..might be avoided by the Council of Ministers would not escape the attention of the actual Assembly. The formula presented by the European Movement, however, ceded that the Council rather than the Assembly would be responsible for authorising such an initiative - a point which Sandys no doubt approved of, but to which the maximalist federalists were strongly opposed.

The third and final part of the memorandum delivered by the European Movement deputation dealt briefly with the organisational aspects of the projected Assembly, repeating the past requests for standing committees, a permanent secretariat, and the need for "at least two Plenary Sessions" each year, lasting "not less than 45 days" at a time. The delegation also stressed, in conclusion, that in order to avoid any doubt as to the role and status of the Assembly it should be officially designated the title of "European Consultative Assembly", rather than the over-general term "European Assembly", or for that matter the over-restrictive title initially given on January 28 - European "Consultative Body."

The political climax to this final phase of the European Assembly campaign was now in sight. Following the official preparatory discussions and the presentation of the above memorandum by the European Movement on April 6, there remained only one month before the final IO-Power decision would be taken on the Council of Europe Statute, the conclusive meeting of Foreign Ministers being scheduled to take place at London on May 3-4. In the meantime, the European Movement drew still more attention at the Westminster Economic Congress (see p.413) in calling for a 'European governmental body' to boost production and integration. Plans to set up a central office in Strasbourg, the certain location for the Council of Europe were also started, Rebattet having sought the collaboration of local Strasbourg dignitaries with the view to forming, in advance, a European Movement sponsored reception committee for the European Assembly delegates upon their ./..

I. FOR full details, consult 'Strasbourg Bureau' file, CAEM BRUGGE.

./eventual arrival in the Alsatian capital. The projected 'Strasbourg Bureau', moreover, would be a most suitable launching pad for the activities of the European Movement Parliamentary Section, now also in the process of being formed. On April 6, the Executive Bureau in fact gave the official go-ahead for the 'Strasbourg Bureau' initiative.¹ On April 8, Rebattet arranged a meeting in Strasbourg, chaired by the City Mayor, Charles Frey, in order to set up a provisional 'Strasbourg Committee of the European Movement.'² The Committee was formally constituted four days later, on April 12, under the presidency of a local university professor, M. Pautrier, and was subsequently inaugurated on April 29.³

By this time, substantial but not complete agreement on the Council of Europe Statute had been reached at the Ambassadorial Conference, the main details of the proposed text now being openly circulated and discussed among the press. The chief difficulties still to be solved included Britain's insistence upon the application of a unanimity rule for all decisions of the Ministerial Committee and the need for a two-thirds majority in the Assembly before any resolution could be submitted to the Committee. The French, for their part, wanted to substitute the proposed 'Council of Europe' title, with all its inter-governmental connotations to, simply, 'European Union'. The Foreign Ministers finally arrived in London on May 3, meeting under the chairmanship of Bevin representing Britain, with Schuman for France, Sforza for Italy, Stikker for the Netherlands, MacBride for Ireland, Rasmussen for Denmark, Lange for Norway, Unden for Sweden, Bech for Luxembourg, and, in Spaak's absence through illness, Ambassador de Thieusies for Belgium.⁴ On May 5, after considering the preparatory report, a full agreement was apparently reached and signed on the Council of Europe Statute. The full text of the communiqué and statute was as follows:

1. EX/H II, op. cit. 2. Rebattet compte rendu, 8.4.49., 'Strasbourg Bureau' file, op. cit. 3. Official minutes, 29.4.49., *ibid id em*.
4. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, vol. 7, 1949, p. 9973.

Communique, May 5 1949

"The Foreign Ministers of Denmark, France, the Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and the Belgian Ambassador in London, to-day signed the Statute of the Council of Europe and no agreement concerning the establishment of a Preparatory Commission of the Council of Europe.

The main feature of the Statute is the establishment of a Committee of Ministers and of a Consultative Assembly, which together will form the Council of Europe. Of these two bodies, the Committee of Ministers will provide for the development of co-operation between Governments, while the Consultative Assembly will provide a means through which the aspirations of the European peoples may be formulated and expressed, the Governments thus being kept continuously in touch with European public opinion.

It should be noted that questions of national defence are excluded from the scope of the Council of Europe. This is because there is no question here of any military alliance but rather, as the preamble to the Statute says, of a general desire to achieve peace and to bring about a greater unity for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing those ideals which are the common heritage of the peoples.

The inaugural meeting of the Council of Europe will take place in Strasbourg. It is hoped during August, and the first session will consequently be an event of profound significance in European history.

The conference took note of requests from the Helms and Turkish Governments to be admitted as members of the Council of Europe. It was the general view that the accession of these two States would be acceptable, and it was agreed that the matter should be dealt with under the Statute by the Committee of Ministers as soon as it comes into being. The possibility of accession to the Statute by other European States will be considered by the Committee of Ministers at the same time.

Before departing the Ministers met, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement for the establishment of the Preparatory Commission, to hold the first meeting of the Commission under the chairmanship of M. Schuman. They nominated M. Camille Paret, of the French Foreign Service, as executive secretary, and agreed that the next meeting of the Commission should take place in Paris on May 11."

Council of Europe Statute

Preamble.

"The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Irish Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilization;

Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source

of individual freedom, political liberty, and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy;

Desiring that, for the maintenance and further realization of these ideals and in the interests of economic and social progress, there is need of a closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe; Transformed that, in response to the need and to the expressed aspirations of their peoples in this regard, it is necessary inter alia to create an organization which will bring European States into closer association;

Have in consequence decided to set up a Council of Europe consisting of a Committee of Representatives of Governments and of a Consultative Assembly, and have for this purpose adopted the following Statute:—

Aim of the Council of Europe.

Art. 1.—(a) The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.

(b) This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by concerted and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal, and administrative matters, and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(c) Participation in the Council of Europe shall not affect the collaboration of its Members in the work of the United Nations and of other international organizations or unions to which they are parties.

(d) Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe.

Membership of the Council of Europe.

Art. 2.—The Members of the Council of Europe are the Parties to this Statute.

Art. 3.—Every Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realization of the aim of the Council as specified in Art. 1.

Art. 4.—Any European State, which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Art. 3, may be invited to become a Member of the Council of Europe by the Committee of Ministers. Any State so invited shall become a Member on deposit with the Secretary-General of an instrument of accession to the Statute.

Art. 5.—(a) In special circumstances a European country which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Art. 3 may be invited by the Committee of Ministers to become an Associate Member of the Council of Europe. Any country so invited shall become an Associate Member on deposit with the Secretary-General of an instrument accepting the Statute. An Associate Member shall be entitled to be represented in the Committee Assembly only.

(b) The expression 'Member' in the Statute includes an Associate Member except when used in connection with representation on the Committee of Ministers.

Art. 6.—Before issuing invitations under Articles 4 or 5, the Committee of Ministers shall determine the number of representatives on the Consultative Assembly to which the proposed Member shall be entitled, and its proportional financial contribution.

Art. 7.—ANY Member of the Council of Europe may withdraw by formally notifying the Secretary-General of its intention to do so. Such withdrawal shall take effect at the end of the financial year in which it is notified. If the notification is given during the first 3 months of that financial year, if the notification is given in the last 3 months of the financial year, it shall take effect at the end of the next financial year.

Art. 8.—ANY Member of the Council of Europe, which has seriously violated Art. 3, may be suspended from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Art. 7. If such Member does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a Member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine.

Art. 9.—The Committee of Ministers may suspend the right of representation on the Committee and on the Consultative Assembly of a Member which has failed to fulfil its financial obligation, acting each period as the obligation remains unfulfilled.

General Provisions.

Art. 10.—The organs of the Council of Europe are: (1) the Committee of Ministers; (2) the Consultative Assembly. Both these organs shall be served by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.

Art. 11.—The seat of the Council of Europe is at Strasbourg.

Art. 12.—The official languages of the Council of Europe are English and French. The rules of procedure of the Committee of Ministers and of the Consultative Assembly shall determine in what circumstances and under what conditions other languages may be used.

The Committee of Ministers.

Art. 13.—The Committee of Ministers is the organ which acts on behalf of the Council of Europe in accordance with Articles 15 and 16.

Art. 14.—Each Member shall be entitled to one representative on the Committee of Ministers, and such representative shall be entitled to one vote. Representatives on the Committee shall be the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. When a Minister for Foreign Affairs is unable to be present, or in other circumstances where it may be desirable, an alternate may be nominated to act for him, who shall, whenever possible, be a member of his Government.

Art. 15.—(a) On the recommendation of the Consultative Assembly, or on its own initiative, the Committee of Ministers shall consider the action required to further the aim of the Council of Europe, including the conclusion of conventions or agreements and the adoption by Governments of a common policy with regard to particular matters. Its conclusions shall be communicated to Members by the Secretary-General.

(b) In appropriate cases, the conclusions of the Committee may take the form of recommendations to the Governments of Members, and the Committee may request such Governments to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such recommendations.

Art. 16.—The Committee of Ministers shall, subject to the provisions of Articles 24, 25, 26, 27, 32, and 35 relating to the powers of the Consultative Assembly, decide with binding effect all matters relating to the internal organization and arrangements of the Council of Europe. For this purpose the Committee of Ministers shall adopt such financial and administrative regulations as may be necessary.

Art. 17.—The Committee of Ministers may set up advisory and technical committees or commissions for such special purposes as it may deem desirable.

Art. 18.—The Committee of Ministers shall adopt its rules of procedure, which shall determine among other things (i) the quorum; (ii) the method of appointment and term of office of its President; (iii) the procedure for the admission of items to its agenda, including the giving of notice of proposals for resolutions; and (iv) the notifications required for the submission of alternatives under Art. 14.

Art. 19.—At each session of the Consultative Assembly the Committee of Ministers shall furnish the Assembly with statements of the activities, accompanied by appropriate documentation.

Art. 20.—(a) Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers relating to the following important matters—namely: (i) recommendations under Art. 18 (b) alone of Council; (ii) questions under Art. 19 (reports of activities); (iii) questions under Art. 21 (a) (i) and (b) (publicity); (iv) questions under Art. 23 (initiative of Assembly); (v) recommendations for the amendment of Articles 1 (a), 7, 15, 20, and 27 (organization); and (vi) any other questions which the Committee may, by a resolution passed under (d) below, decide should be subject to a unanimous vote on account of its importance—require the unanimous vote of the representatives entitled to vote, and of a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.

(b) Questions arising under the rules of procedure or under the financial and administrative regulations may be decided by a simple majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.

(c) Resolutions of the Committee under Articles 4 and 5 require a two-thirds majority of all the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.

(d) All other resolutions of the Committee, including the adoption of the Budget, of rules of procedure, and of financial and administrative regulations, recommendations for the amendment of Articles of the Statute, other than those mentioned in paragraph (a) (v) above, and deciding in case of doubt which paragraph of this Article applies, require a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and of a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.

Art. 21.—(a) Unless the Committee decides otherwise, meetings of the Committee of Ministers shall be held—(i) in private, and (ii) at the seat of the Council.

(b) The Committee shall determine what information shall be published regarding the proceedings and discussions of a meeting held in private.

(c) The Committee shall meet before and during the beginning of every session of the Consultative Assembly, and at such other times as it may decide.

The Consultative Assembly.

Art. 22.—The Consultative Assembly is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe. It shall debate matters within its competence under the Statute and forward its conclusions, in the form of recommendations, to the Committee of Ministers.

Art. 23.—(a) The Consultative Assembly shall discuss, and may make recommendations upon, any matter within the aims and scope of the Council of Europe which (i) is referred to it by the Committee of Ministers with a request for its opinion, or (ii) has been approved by the Committee for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly on the proposal of the latter.

(b) In taking decisions under (a), the Committee shall have regard to the work of other European inter-governmental organizations to which none or all of the Members of the Council are parties.

(c) The President of the Assembly shall decide, in case of doubt, whether any question raised in the course of the Session is within the agenda of the Assembly approved under (a) above.

Art. 24.—The Consultative Assembly may, with due regard to the provisions of Art. 28 (d) (organization), establish committees or commissions to consider and report to it on any matter which falls within its competence under Art. 23, to examine and prepare questions on its agenda, and to advise on all matters of procedure.

Art. 25.—(a) The Consultative Assembly shall consist of representatives of each Member appointed in such a manner as the Government of that Member shall decide. Each representative must be a national of the Member whom he represents, but shall not at the same time be a member of the Committee of Ministers.

(b) No representative shall be deprived of his position during a session of the Assembly without the agreement of the Assembly.

(c) Each representative may have a substitute who may, in the absence of the representative, sit, speak, and vote in his place.

Art. 26.—The following States, as becoming Members, shall be entitled to the number of representatives given below: Belgium 6,

Denmark 4, France 18, Irish Republic 4, Italy 18, Luxembourg 3, Netherlands 6, Norway 4, Sweden 6, United Kingdom 18.

Art. 27.—The conditions under which the Committee of Ministers collectively may be represented in the debates of the Consultative Assembly, or individual representatives on the Committee may address the Assembly, shall be determined by such rules of procedure on this subject as may be drawn up by the Committee after consultation with the Assembly.

Art. 28.—(a) The Consultative Assembly shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall elect from its members its President, who shall remain in office until the next ordinary session.

(b) The President shall control the proceedings but shall not take part in the debate or vote. The substitute of the representative who is President may sit, speak, and vote in his place.

(c) The rules of procedure shall determine inter alia: the manner of the election and terms of office of the President and other officers; the manner in which the agenda shall be drawn up and be communicated to representatives; and the time and manner in which the names of representatives and their substitutes shall be notified.

Art. 29.—Subject to the provisions of Art. 26, all resolutions of the Consultative Assembly, including resolutions (i) embodying recommendations to the Committee of Ministers; (ii) referring to the Committee matters for discussion in the Assembly; (iii) establishing committees or commissions; (iv) determining the date of commencement of its sessions; (v) determining what majority is required for resolutions in cases not covered by (i) to (iv) above; or determining cases of doubt as to what majority is required, shall require a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote.

Art. 20.—On matters relating to its internal procedure, which includes the election of officers, the nomination of persons to serve on committees and commissions, and the adoption of rules of procedure, resolutions of the Consultative Assembly shall be carried by such majorities as the Assembly may determine in accordance with Art. 23 (c).

Art. 21.—Debate on proposals to be made to the Committee of Ministers that a matter should be placed on the agenda of the Consultative Assembly shall be confined to an indication of the proposed subject-matter and the reasons for and against its inclusion in the agenda.

Art. 22.—The Consultative Assembly shall meet in ordinary session once a year, the date and duration of which shall be determined by the Assembly so as to avoid so far as possible overlapping with Parliamentary sessions of Members and with sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. In no circumstances shall the duration of an ordinary session exceed one month unless both the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers consent.

Art. 23.—Ordinary sessions of the Consultative Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Council unless both the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers consent that it should be held elsewhere.

Art. 24.—The Committee of Ministers may convene an extraordinary session of the Consultative Assembly at such time and place as the Committee, with the concurrence of the President of the Assembly, shall decide.

Art. 25.—Unless the Consultative Assembly decides otherwise, its debates shall be conducted in public.

The Secretariat.

Art. 26.—(a) The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, a Deputy Secretary-General, and such other staff as may be required.

(b) The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Consultative Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers.

(c) The remaining staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, in accordance with the administrative regulations.

(d) No member of the Secretariat shall hold any salaried office from any Government, or be a member of the Consultative Assembly or of any national Legislature, or engage in any occupation incompatible with his duties.

(e) Every member of the staff of the Secretariat shall make a solemn declaration affirming that his duty is to the Council of Europe, that he will perform his duties conscientiously, uninfluenced by any national considerations, and that he will not seek or receive instructions in connection with the performance of his duties from any Government or any authority external to the Council, and will refrain from any action which might reflect on his position as an international official representative only to the Council. In the case of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General this declaration shall be made before the Committee, and in the case of all other members of the staff, before the Secretary-General.

(f) Every Member shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff of the Secretariat, and will seek to interfere therewith in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Art. 27.—(a) The Secretariat shall be located at the seat of the Council.

(b) The Secretary-General is responsible to the Committee of Ministers for the work of the Secretariat.

Finance.

Art. 28.—(a) Each Member shall bear the expense of its own representation in the Committee of Ministers and in the Consultative Assembly.

(b) The expenses of the Secretariat and all other common expenses shall be shared between all Members in such proportions as shall be determined by the Committee on the basis of the population of

Members. The contributions of an Associate Member shall be determined by the Committee.

(c) In accordance with the financial regulations, the Budget of the Council shall be submitted annually by the Secretary-General for adoption by the Committee.

(d) The Secretary-General shall refer to the Committee requests from the Assembly which involve expenditure exceeding the amount already allocated in the Budget for the Assembly and its activities.

Art. 29.—The Secretary-General shall each year send the Government of each Member of the amount of its contribution, and each Member shall pay to the Secretary-General the amount of its contribution, which shall be drawn to be due on the date of its notification, not later than 6 months after that date.

Privileges and Immunities.

Art. 30.—(a) The Council of Europe, representatives of Members, and the Secretariat shall enjoy in the territories of its Members such privileges and immunities as are reasonably necessary for the fulfilment of their functions. These immunities shall include immunity for all representatives in the Consultative Assembly from arrest and all legal proceedings in the territories of all Members, in respect of words spoken and votes cast in the debate of the Assembly or its committees or commissions.

(b) The Members undertake as soon as possible to enter into an agreement for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of paragraph (a) above. For this purpose the Committee of Ministers shall recommend to the Governments of Members the acceptance of an Agreement defining the privileges and immunities to be granted in the territories of all Members. In addition a special Agreement shall be concluded with the French Republic defining the privileges and immunities which the Council shall enjoy at its seat.

Amendments.

Art. 41.--(a) Proposals for the amendment of the Statute may be made to the Committee of Ministers, or in the conditions provided for in Art. 23, to the Constitutive Assembly.

(b) The Committee shall recommend and cause to be embodied in a Protocol those amendments which it considers to be desirable. (c) An amending Protocol shall come into force when it has been signed and ratified on behalf of two-thirds of the Members.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article, amendments to Articles 23-25, 28, and 29 which have been approved by the Committee and by the Assembly shall come into force on the date of the certificate of the Secretary-General, transmitted to the Governments of Members, certifying that they have been so approved. This paragraph shall not operate until the conclusion of the second ordinary session of the Assembly.

Final Provisions.

Art. 42.--(a) This Statute shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

(b) The Statute shall come into force as soon as seven instruments of ratification have been deposited. The Government of the United Kingdom shall transmit to all signatory Governments a certificate declaring that the Statute has entered into force, and giving the names of the Members of the Council of Europe, on that date.

(c) Thereafter each other signatory shall become a party to the Statute as from the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification."

- The considerable limits and tightly woven safeguards of the final Council of Europe Statute, printed above, did indeed appear to justify the cautious and subtle strategy evoked by Sandys, which had been at the centre of the European Movement's political campaign throughout the preceding twelve months. Indeed, the abrupt official rejection of the Movement's tame proposals regarding the debating role and representative independence of the projected European Assembly was a clear indication that a more radical maximalist approach would have received no consideration at all in an official capacity, so long as Britain remained at the centre of decision-making. The weighty pressures of British officialdom and orthodox cautiousness towards European unification, no doubt supported by the Scandinavian Governments, were only too evident in this final text, which stressed above all the precise ministerial controls to be exercised over the European Assembly. Article 22 thus drew attention to the purely "deliberative" capacity of the Assembly, while Article 23 made it clear that the Assembly could not initiate any policy discussions which did not have the prior mandate or approval of the Committee of Ministers. The Assembly itself, moreover, was to be composed as the national governments deemed appropriate (Article 25) and would be subject to a rule requiring a two-thirds majority in order for it to submit any resolution to the./.

./Ministerial Committee(Article 29). The latter body, on the other hand, was not obliged to refer any question to the Assembly. The Committee, furthermore, would have to decide upon all major policy matters according to a unanimity rule(Article 20), which in effect allowed each Foreign Minister the right to veto important resolutions. The Statute thus appeared to have fended off specific dangers of the Assembly getting out of hand and of the Ministerial Committee overriding individual national governmental policies, this being further underlined by Article 15b, which stated that even the recommendations of the Committee as a whole were not legally binding upon any member government.

Nevertheless, despite the considerable restrictions outlined above as to the scope and procedural independence of the Assembly, it should be stressed that even this minimal statute was a remarkable success in the context of the time, secured by the European Movement only one year after the Hague Congress. All was far from lost within the official framework of the Council of Europe Statute as regards the unwritten rights and potential openings of the European Assembly. Sandys would soon concentrate, for example, on exploiting the provisions in Article 19, in which the Ministerial Committee was to furnish the Assembly with statements and documents about its activities, seeing the possibility for the future co-evolution of the two bodies in question, and hoping to attain the gradual accountability of the Committee to the Assembly.^I Of more immediate significance to the campaign, was the fact that the general "constitutional problems of European union", to which the memorandum of April 6 had alluded, was not a subject specifically banned from the Assembly's agenda, the Ministerial control over the agenda no doubt being seen as a sufficient guarantee against any such initiative. - It was not a guarantee however, since the unanimity rule of the Council of Ministers applied only to policy matters and not to procedural decisions, which could be taken by a simple majority(Article 20). Provided such a majority of Foreign Ministers could be persuaded to ./.

I. Cf. pp. 444-9.

./request, or simply allow, an opinion of the Assembly on this matter, there was nothing to prevent the idea of a future European Constitution, or the need for supra-national political links, from being officially discussed by the European Assembly. Moreover, if a two-thirds majority among the Assembly representatives could indeed be attained, the Council of Ministers might subsequently find itself confronted with an official and public resolution in favour of such a policy commitment. It was certainly not unrealistic to suppose that a potential majority in favour of some sort of supra-national political initiative could be secured both in the Assembly and the Committee. The stumbling block in such a bold project, however, would be at the ministerial policy decision-making stage, where the national veto rule could be applied. In short, a political initiative in favour of organic union could be taken within the actual framework of the Council of Europe Statute, but the real acid-test for the success of such an initiative would rest upon the final moral pressure which an individual government would be prepared to confront in the exercise of its veto. In May 1949 there was still hope that the British Government would not react too negatively in this respect, especially if the political initiative in question emerged no longer from an unofficial European pressure group, but from the legitimate representatives of the European Assembly. On the latter point, in fact, the British Government already decided to bow down to the political pressures at home and abroad, and on May 5 Herbert Morrison actually announced to the House of Commons that British representation in the Consultative Assembly would include members of the Opposition, to be chosen by the Opposition itself, thus falling into line with the intentions of other member-Governments and rendering the European Assembly a parliamentary-representative quality, discounting the "democratic" exclusion of Communists. To sum up, the Council of Europe project still gave cause for./.

1. Hansard, 5.5.49., pp. 1219-20. Morrison added that the British delegation would not include "anti-democratic" members.

./great hope and considerable satisfaction, in the context of the time. Above all, the European governments, Britain included, had effectively invested a moral and political commitment to the European Idea, propagated by the European Movement; it was now a matter of finding ways to exploit and expand upon this trans-national political opening.

The reaction of the European Movement to the Statute was in this sense one of hope, from the long-term view, but of thinly-veiled disappointment in the immediate perspective, as was reflected in the communiqué¹ sent to the ten Foreign Ministers immediately after the rather tense high-level Executive Committee meeting of May 6-8.² The statement stressed, on the one hand, how the European Movement "warmly welcomed" the signing of the London agreement, which was carried out "exactly one year after the Hague Congress", and which "conformed broadly" to the proposals submitted since then. It also added:

"If this opportunity is used alike by governments and peoples with courage and a sense of responsibility, it may well be that before long there will grow out of this Consultative Assembly the future Parliament of Europe."

In contrast, the same communiqué went on to emphasise that the immediate limitations placed upon the Assembly's freedom of discussion were "psychologically unfortunate and may prove in practice unenforceable." In order to avoid "the risk of friction" between the Assembly and the Ministerial Committee, the text menacingly added, the Assembly should be given "considerably wider latitude in settling its own agenda." The urgent need to include West Germany within the Council of Europe project was also emphasised, in order to "avoid any disappointment and misunderstanding."

1. 'Observations upon the Statute of the Council of Europe', accompanying paper (EX/P/91) to minutes below, sent out on 9.5.49., CAEM BRUGGE.
2. European Movement Executive Committee meeting, 6-8.5.49., official minutes (EX/M/12), CAEM BRUGGE. - Attended chiefly by: Sandys (Chairman); Bichet, Brugmans, Layton, Rosquin (Vice-Chairmen); Philip Redinger (Secretaries), plus representatives of member groups and national Councils.

These faint signs of initial disillusion were not shared by all. Lord Layton, for example, jubilantly exclaimed in the subsequent UEM News-Letter¹ that the Council of Europe Statute marked "a landmark in European history...an immense step forward". He in turn commented:

"At this moment of its birth it is more important to emphasise its great possibilities rather than its limitations. For the first time representatives of the Parliaments of Europe will meet with official status and official responsibilities. After its first meeting we should be able to judge to what extent and how rapidly it can develop into a Parliament of Europe."

Layton also notified his colleagues that it would be a "grave error" to consider the actual formation of the Consultative Assembly and the Ministerial Committee as necessarily "two antagonist organs"; they were to be viewed instead as the two bases for a "future European government." He also stressed, in yet another indication of his considerable optimism in the project, that little by little the British Government would become more favourably disposed towards stronger measures of European integration, once that the Council of Europe had been able to demonstrate its seriousness of approach. However, it would be a tactical mistake, he argued, to push immediately for "supra-national" and "constitutional" changes, in the hope of setting up immediately some sort of European authority.²

In strong contrast, the federalists were completely opposed to Layton's policy of prudence, Spinelli taking the lead in the EUP Central Committee meeting of May 4-5 to push through a motion complaining that the restrictions in the Statute would mean that the Consultative Assembly would be "completely deprived of real power", and that priority should now be given to convincing the member states of the necessity to set up a "real federal pact" in order to achieve an eventual and effective European Federation.³ Spinelli repeated the same message in the UEM news./.

1. LAYTON, article in UEM News Letter, No. 14, "Landmark in European History", May 1949, SANDYS PAPERS.

2. LAYTON, letter to Sandys, I3.5.49., for circulation, SANDYS PAPERS

3. See EUP C.C. meeting, 4-5.5.49., official minutes, CEC GENEVA.

./bulletins of May 15 and June 15, in which he angrily denounced the "timidity" of the European Movement in not having campaigned more strongly for a real transfer of national sovereign powers, adding that it was now more urgent than ever to secure a "federal pact" for the establishment of a proper democratic European authority.¹ Moreover, he later denounced the Council of Europe as being simply a "grand international salon in which parliamentarians and Ministers spoke without end but also without any responsibility."² The same opinion was expressed by his radical colleague and President of the EUP Central Committee, Henry Frenay, who strongly criticised the "destruction" of federalist hopes by the strict and mingy limits imposed on the European Assembly by the British.³ Brugmans, for his part, later recalled the "dangerous concessions" that were necessary in the difficult process of drawing up a agreed Statute, adding honestly that the result conformed "grosso modo" to the cautious expectations of the European Movement.⁴

The centre ground of opinion in the Movement with regard to the Council of Europe Statute was indeed one of making the best out of what was given. André Philip, above all, adopted such a position, strongly pleading that the policies defended throughout the European campaign now needed to be translated into official action within the political confines of the European Assembly.⁵ Similarly, Sandys, prodded on by Mackay, set about intensifying the efforts to establish a Parliamentary Section of the Movement and to hold a preparatory Parliamentary meeting prior to the inaugural session of the European Assembly. In this connection, he boldly announced to the press that the European Movement ./.

1. SPINELLI, "Lettera Federalista No. 9", in Europa Federata, 15.5.49., plus article in same journal, 15.6.49., entitled "Consiglio d'Europa è un'alternativa", L'ESPRESSO, TURIN.
2. SPINELLI, in Storia e Prospettive del CFE, op.cit. p.161.
3. FRENAY, article in Combat, 'Alors-nous vers l'Europe?', 15.5.49.
4. BRUGMANS, L'Idée européenne, op.cit. p.111.
5. PHILIP, article in Populaire Dimanche, 'Pour l'organisation de l'Europe fédérée et planifiée', 15.5.49. See also Philip's article in Le Populaire, 'L'Assemblée Européenne de Strasbourg', 4.5.49.

./ would start to operate as an "international party".¹ Even Reynaud, for his part, admitted that the final Council of Europe agreement, for all its faults, was at least "half a victory" for the original Franco-Belgian project initiated by the European Movement.² Bonnefous recorded in retrospect, however, that the political openings for the European Assembly were stunted from the start.³

The various shortcomings, as well as the potential openings, of the Council of Europe Statute were analysed in depth not only by the European Movement; but also by the political press. The mixed reaction in the British press was rather well summed up by the 'Times', which, in a first account, stressed its satisfaction that the Statute did not entitle the Committee of Ministers to regard itself as a "European cabinet", nor the Consultative Assembly as a "European Legislature."⁴ Upon deeper reflection, however, the same journal anxiously commented:

"Of the two bodies the Assembly will attract the most interest. For all its limitations it will be, to some extent, a Parliament of Europe. Even without executive or legislative powers it will inevitably be widely regarded as the first tentative step towards a federal European State, and the appetite of its delegates or representatives is likely to grow with eating. In fact, in approving the idea of an Assembly at all, the ten Governments may have gone farther than they wished - or farther than they knew."⁵

Similarly, in France, 'Le Monde' attacked the "weakness" of the final agreement, but then added:

"In the end it is not prohibited to suppose that one day the Assembly will be elected by direct suffrage...and that it will receive, in certain areas at least, some legislative and constitutional powers."⁶

1. See 'New York Herald Tribune' article, 'European Movement to form a party to further its aims', 10.5.49., plus accompanying papers (EU/P/76, 82, 90) to EX/4: 12, op. cit. on the formation of a Parliamentary Section.
2. REYNAUD, Unite or Perish, op. cit., p.197.
3. BONNEFOUS, L'Europe en face de son destin, op. cit. p.120.
4. Times, 'Ten-Power meeting on the Council of Europe', 30.4.49.
5. Times editorial, 'Council of Europe', 3.5.49.
6. Le Monde, leading article by R. Millet, 6.5.49. See also editorial, 'Le Conseil de l'Europe', in same edition.

It was perhaps the socialist 'New Statesman', however, which best expressed both the sense of frustration and the rebounding hopes which the Council of Europe Statute provoked:

"It is no secret that in the drafting of the constitution of the Council the British delegates were the chief advocates of caution. In this respect they have certainly had their way. The Assembly is purely consultative, and even its consultative capacity is hedged round with a thicket of restrictions. ... It is possible that this restrictive constitution may have the opposite effect to that intended. When the Assembly gathers for the first time at Strasbourg, will its members be content to be treated as irresponsible children who cannot be trusted even to decide the subjects they are to debate? We very much doubt it. By cribbling and confining the Assembly in this way, Mr. Bevin may well give it that explosive, corporate independence of which he seems to be afraid."¹

- It remains for the conclusion of this study to show how these aspirations, widely held also by the mainstream of opinion within the European movement, failed to materialise into political fact during the first crucial sessions of the European Consultative Assembly.

1. New Statesman and Nation, editorial, 'Council of Europe', 14.5.49.

CONCLUSION

THE ECLIPSE OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER 13. CONCLUSION: THE ECLIPSE OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

1) The Council of Europe: preparations and first session

The Council of Europe came into official existence on August 3, 1949, by which date seven countries had ratified the Statute,¹ the remaining three subsequently depositing their ratifications before the opening session of the Consultative Assembly on August 10.² The inauguration of this unique and historic trans-national European political institution gave rise to considerable idealistic speculation regarding the future of the Assembly. Many papers talked in terms of a future 'Parliament of Europe.' In England, the 'Observer' went further, arguing that the project had many hidden opportunities, and that the long-awaited supra-national pacification of Europe was now practically at hand.³ Even the 'Sunday Times' considered that the "moral influence" of the Assembly's public debates "may become appreciable."⁴ The ailing but staunchly idealistic Léon Blum, on the other side of the Channel, similarly greeted the inauguration of the European Assembly as a "great commencement", drawing attention to the "joy", "enthusiasm" and "dream" with which the just and fraternal organisation of Europe had inspired the liberated peoples after the war.⁵ Yet, only one year after the start of this great political experiment, the hopes expressed in so many quarters about the Council of Europe dwindled into a bitter mood of frustration and disenchantment. The seeds of a future 'European Government and Parliament' had given root instead to what Boothby later described as a "talking shop in Strasbourg and an international bureaucracy without power."⁶

The European dream failed to materialise.

1. Great Britain (26.7.49), Italy (23.7.49), Denmark (14.7.49), Norway (2.7.49), Sweden (28.5.49), Ireland (1.7.49), Luxembourg (12.7.49). See Keesings Contemporary Archives vol. 7, op. cit., p. 101-9.
2. France, Belgium and Netherlands, *ibid.*
3. Observer, leading article, 7.6.49. 4. Sunday Times, 7.8.49.
5. BLUM, Le Populaire, 'Un grand commencement', 8.8.48.
6. BOOTHBY, recollections of a Rebel, (Hutchinson 1974), p. 216.

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It would be a vast oversimplification and error to state that the Council of Europe did not achieve very much at all. It did provide a most successful forum for the launching of the Schuman Plan, in May 1950, and for the creation of specific European functional agencies. The Council of Europe also brought into being the European Convention of Human Rights (November 1950), followed later by the setting up of a European Court. Many other European conventions regulating social, economic, cultural, medical, academic, commercial, industrial and trading activities, complementing OEEC, have been brought about through the channels of the Council of Europe as a whole.¹ Above all, the Council of Europe set an historic precedent in trans-national political co-operation, and in reaching common understanding between nations. It broke the ice existing between France and Germany; it helped reassert Western Europe's sense of unity in difficult times; it boosted the psychological and moral breakthrough between peoples, without which the present-day European Community could not have been built. It did not, however, set in motion the supra-national political unification of Europe. In short, many limited achievements and valuable precedents were achieved by the Council of Europe, but it did not produce any political miracles.

It is not within the scope of this book to give a detailed account of the first sessions of the Council of Europe, on which there is already a considerable amount of published material.² The present study is concerned instead in presenting the final act of the political campaign brought to birth by the European Movement and now carried through into the arena of the Consultative ./.

1. For list of initial achievements of the Council of Europe, see volume X of C.M. de Molènes, L'Europe de Strasbourg, (Houdil 1971).

2. See especially: A.H. Robertson, The Council of Europe: its Structure, Functions and Achievements (Stevens & Sons 1961) pp. 81-93; 'European Institutions', by same author, (Stevens & Sons 1970) pp. 6-71; S. Bonnefous, L'Europe en Face de son Destin, op. cit., pp. 121-149; European Organisations, (Allen & Unwin 1959) pp. 127-160; plus two interesting personal accounts by H. Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., pp. 165-227, and P.H. Spack, The Continuing Battle, op. cit., pp. 207-226.

./Assembly, during its initial and crucial formative period.

By November 1950, the Movement would be in a state of demise, Henry Frey bitterly announcing at the secrete EUP sponsored 'European Council of Vigilance' (or 'alternative assembly' as it was known) that for the preceeding 15 months, starting in August 1949, the European Movement had "fallen into political lethargy", having taken "no initiative" and "no action", and having proposed "no solution" to the problems and questions arising out of the establishment of the Council of Europe.¹ It was a just complaint with regard to some of the more unenthusiastic sections within the unionist camp, but was far off the mark concerning the work of the European Movement as a whole, and the Sandys-dominated Executive Committee in particular. In fact, already on June 17-19, Sandys chaired a crucial meeting at Versailles of the newly-formed Parliamentary Section and the International Executive Committee of the European Movement, in preparation for the first session of the Consultative Assembly.² The meeting, attended by an impressive number of eminent EP's, effectively undercut the prospects of a separate EPU initiative within the European Assembly. Having practically created a Parliamentary Assembly at Strasbourg, the leaders of the European Movement were now intent on establishing an efficient mouthpiece within the Assembly itself. The results of the Versailles conference, composed of many representatives who would shortly sit in the European Assembly, achieved just this, and after having thoroughly examined previous recommendations issued by the European Movement since the Hague Congress, a memorandum was formulated listing propositions to be submitted to the Council of Ministers, which were in turn defended in the first session of the Consultative Assembly. The memorandum in question³ clearly stated that the Council of Europe Statute should be interpreted in such a way so as not to "unduly restrict" the freedom of discussion./.

1. FREY, General POLITICAL Report to the III EUP Congress, Strasbourg, 17-19. II. 50., pp. 31-32, CEC GENEVA.
2. Versailles Conference, 17-19. 6.. 9., see file, SANDYS PAPERS.
3. Ibid., plus Executive Committee meeting, 19. 6. 49., official minutes (EX/M/13) and accompanying papers. CAEM BAGUE.

./of the Assembly and especially its capacity to draft its own agenda. In order to leave no doubt as to the "independent, democratic character of the Assembly", a separate Assembly Secretariat was also recommended, along with the suggestion to set up permanent Assembly Committees. It was also hoped that by the end of the first Session, the Committee of Ministers would be willing to "consider sympathetically any amendments to the Statute which the Assembly may wish to propose", and that such amendments would be "put into effect without delay." Regarding the actual agenda itself, the joint meeting strongly recommended that "at an early stage of the Session there should be a debate upon the policy of European Union and the aims of the Council of Europe." This important recommendation went on to propose that such a debate should cover, above all, the crucial political aspects involved in European Union at an organic level. The approved resolution read as follows:

"There should be a debate upon the problems of European Union from the political angle and upon the practical steps to be taken to achieve such union. The scope of this debate should make it possible for the Assembly to discuss in general terms the problems of the creation of supra-national European Authorities and the exercise in common of certain rights and powers."

There was clearly no case as yet to accuse Sandys and his closer colleagues of being over-cautious and inactive, the above recommendations in favour of a supra-national political initiative being submitted to the first meeting of the Committee of Ministers at Strasbourg on August 8, along with important proposals, drawn up by the European Movement Legal Committee, for a European Court and Convention of Human Rights.^I

In the meantime, nevertheless, more radical moves were being kindled among the federalist groups. Altiero Spinelli in fact disclaimed the Versailles meeting as being "a lot of talk, but nothing concrete achieved", and subsequently out-bid the ./.

I. Draft Convention, submitted by Teitgen, DeMousse, and Maxwell Pyfe, 12.7.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

2. SPINELLI, diary, 19.6.49.

./ European movement initiative by persuading the EUP Central Committee meeting of July 5-6 to re-affirm its policy in favour of a direct "European Federal Pact" formula.¹ R.W.G. Mackay, for his part, started to entertain the idea of launching a "federalist party" in the Consultative Assembly.² The impact of the European Movement's parliamentary strategy was assured, however, by the decision of the extraordinary EPU congress, held at Strasbourg on July 2-3, to recommend that EPU affiliated groups should finally join forces with the Parliamentary Section of the European Movement.³ The net result of this reluctant decision was that a combined force of some two-thirds of the representatives who sat at the first Session of the Consultative Assembly in August were affiliated to the European Movement.⁴ Hugh Dalton would as a result complain of the Movement's uncanny influence in "pulling the strings" in the European Assembly.⁵ MacMillan, later confirmed this observation, recalling above all the influence of the Movement's Executive Chairman:

"Sandys was not appointed a member of this first gathering but operated from the offices of the European Movement. Since a very large number of the members of the Assembly were well known to him, he exercised such influence behind the scenes, in addition to acting as Chief of Staff to Churchill."⁶

It must be stressed, however, that Sandys and most of the European movement leadership were very anxious not to monopolise openly the work and political activities of the Consultative Assembly. Indeed, the preceding campaign of the movement had been consistently in favour of an official and representative European forum for policy discussion, thus elevating the debate on the future political structure of Europe from the realm of ./.

1. EUP CC meeting, 5-6.7.49., official minutes, CEC GENEVA.

2. MACKAY, letter (for possible subsidies) to A. Rank, II.5.49, MACKAY PAPERS.

3. EPU Strasbourg Congress, 2-3.7.49., Resolutions, speeches, etc., CEC GENEVA.

4. Information in European Executive Bureau meeting, 7.8.49., official minutes (EX/M/14), CAEM BRUGGE.

5. See Daily Express article, "Puppets of Churchill", 25.1.49.

6. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., p.165.

./unofficial pressure groups to the practical level of legitimate political deliberation. Not all federalists agreed with this approach, envisaging instead some sort of European 'Estates General'. Nevertheless, Sandys' firm control over strategy was once more dominant in the decision taken by the European Movement Executive Bureau, at its meeting in Strasbourg on August 7, "not to create an unfavourable reaction among the members of the Assembly by an excess of zeal." Instead, the Movement was to endeavour to "exercise its influence, not by organised appeals to Members of the Assembly, but by private conversations with Members who are active supporters of the Movement."¹ Such back-room activities, in which Sandys was now a proven expert, were to be complemented, however, by the opening of the Movement's Strasbourg Office near the Assembly, the functions of which would be to offer advice and clerical assistance to members of the Assembly who were active supporters of the Movement, and to help the Strasbourg Committee of the Movement to popularise the idea of European union among the general public during the session of the Assembly.²

The European Movement's Strasbourg Committee indeed arranged an excellent welcome to the first session of the Consultative Assembly, which was opened with considerable fanfare on August 10, 1949, and a refreshing atmosphere of friendliness and good-will from among the local population greeted the European delegates upon their arrival in the city. The Alsace capital was once more 'en fête', excited crowds awaiting the arrival of Churchill and other famous personalities, while nearly every major building was draped in the colours of the twelve nations (Greece and Turkey having been invited to partake in the Council, after the Ministerial meeting of August 6). As Edouard Bonnefous, one of the leading French delegates to the Assembly, recorded:

1. See EM/EL, op. cit., plus accompanying paper (EM/P107), entitled 'Activities of the European Movement during the Session of the European Assembly', CAEM BRUGGE.

2. Ibid.

"A voluntary atmosphere very favourable to the European idea never ceased dominating the first session of the Assembly."¹

Likewise, Lady Rhys-Williams wrote back enthusiastically to her UEM colleagues:

"Strasbourg is wonderfully gay, with the flags of all the nations up everywhere. The green and white flag of the European Movement is one of the most popular and can be seen all over the town, including the back streets. The little green button-hole badge of the Movement gleams on the lapels of the majority of the delegates, including Mr. Churchill's."²

Even Maurice Edelman of the British Labour Party Delegation was initially seduced by the positive European atmosphere, and later admitted:

"When we first arrived at Strasbourg, a city beflagged and filled with cheering people, one could not help feeling that here was an idea capable of rallying and stimulating defeated Europe, for after all one has only to stay in Europe for a short time to realise that even those who are technically visitors are, in fact, psychologically vanquished."³

The practical scope for debate outlined by the Ministerial Committee meeting of August 8, however, fell well below the level of events, the proposed agenda for the Assembly being limited merely to the study of social, cultural, and restricted economic aspects of European co-operation, making no mention of political unification whatsoever.⁴ Moreover, the Assembly, meeting for the first time on August 10 under the provisional presidency of Edouard Herriot, was given only three days to reply. After a complex procedural debate in which Paul-Henri Spaak, recently relieved of the Belgian Premiership and forthwith elected as the first permanent President of the Consultative Assembly, appealed for "practical" and "disciplined" behaviour, a rather more substantial agenda was submitted to the Committee on August 13, and was approved three days later. The first and crucial item which the Assembly

1. BONNEFOUS, L'Europe En Face De Son Destin, op.cit. p.123

2. RHYS-WILLIAMS, UEM Newsletter, 'The Assembly Opens', August 1949, SANDYS PAPERS.

3. EDELMAN, see article, "The Council of Europe", in International Affairs, 1951, Vol. XXVIII, no. 3.

4. See 'Consultative Assembly Orders of the Day', II.8.-9., Appendix I, Call of Europe Documents 1949.

./ was now free to discuss related specifically to the "consideration of any necessary changes in the political structure of Europe to achieve a greater unity between members of the Council of Europe."

The historic debate on this vital subject, which took place on August 16-17, was one of the most memorable moments in the European campaign, and was not surprisingly dominated by the major personalities of the European movement.¹ In two important articles on the eve of this discussion, the veteran European campaigner, Léon Blum, had called for a "bold", "heroic"; and "revolutionary" stand, as well as a deep perception of the "fundamental problem" of European unification;² his faithful lieutenant, André Philip, did not disappoint him on the actual day of the debate. Taking the lead in demanding a modification of the Council of Europe Statute and an extension of the powers of the Assembly, Philip was in fact the first speaker to pin-point the central issue at stake when he declared:

"It is imperative that the Committee of Ministers shall not merely be an assembly of diplomats, using the right of veto which has already done too much harm in international assemblies for any of us to wish to introduce it on a permanent basis here, but it shall become a real political authority ruling by a majority, taking decisions and effectively responsible to the political Assembly which we form and which is, after all, the nucleus, we hope, of what will become a European Parliament."³

Likewise, Boothby made what the 'Guardian' described as the most eloquent and constructive speech of the afternoon, deploring the inherent evil of absolute state sovereignty, and passionately declaring the need for some "joint exercise" of sovereign powers at a European level within the Council of Europe framework.⁴ Even Harold Macmillan was less cautious than usual, and exclaimed:

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1. See Consultative Assembly 1st Session Reports, political debate 16-17.8.49., pp. 152-328.
 2. BLUM, articles in Le Populaire, "Un Grand Commencement" 8.8.49. op. cit., plus "Faire L'Europe En Pensant Au monde" 10.8.49.
 3. PHILIP, C.A. Report, op. cit. pp. 118-144.
 4. BOOTHBY, ibid., pp. 170-174, plus Recollections of a Rebel, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

"The Governments have given us a constitution. Let us build upon it. The Committee of Ministers is a European Cabinet in embryo. The Consultative Assembly is a European Parliament in embryo. This constitution can be made more flexible and more effective."¹

Paul Bastid went still further on this point, and demanded an "immediate" European executive, legislature and judiciary.² On a more cautious note, however, Lord Layton appealed for restraint, stressing that he was not committed to any federal solution at this early stage.³ Morrison, as leader of the British Labour delegation, in turn proposed a "functional" rather than a federal organisation of Europe.⁴ Subsequently Churchill, who at the opening of the session had been one of the fiercest defenders of the Assembly's autonomy, now somewhat disappointed his more radical European colleagues in the chamber by refusing to commit himself as yet to any specific political unification strategy, stating rather blandly with regard to European unity: "we must look at the girl before we marry her." He further added:

"..we must not attempt on our present electoral basis to change the powers which belong to the duly constituted national Parliaments founded directly upon universal suffrage."⁵

-As Labour's International Secretary, Dennis Healey, later reported to his colleagues at Transport House, "r. Churchill's speech was much more subdued than expected."⁶ In strong contrast, the veteran 'constitution mongerer', R.W.G. Mackay, sitting somewhat uncomfortably with the British Labour delegation, wound up the debate on the following uncompromising federal note:

"We are here in a great experiment. The future of Western Europe will be determined by the actions we take...I ask the Assembly to turn its back on the old conceptions of political sovereignty, on the old conceptions of anarchy between ./.

1. MACHILLAN, C.A. Report, op.cit., pp. 202-200.

2. BASTID, *ibid.* pp. 25,-260.

3. LAYTON, *ibid.*, pp. 148-154.

4. MORRISON, *ibid.*, pp. 227-232.

5. CHURCHILL, *ibid.*, pp. 282-286.

6. HEALEY, confidential report on the first session of the Consultative Assembly (10 -20.6.49) for the Labour Party International Committee, LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES.

./independent states of Europe, and to take its courage in its hands...I ask that we should, at the same time, declare that we shall secure a United States of Europe and the merging of individual sovereignties so as to bring about a political union on which alone the future well-being and prosperity of our great European civilisation depends." ¹

Thus, despite some cautious rumblings of dissent by Labour, and some less than committed pronouncements by Layton and Churchill (the latter concentrating on the need for Germany's involvement), this first major political debate in the Consultative Assembly was distinguished by the overt majority of opinion in favour of sort of European federal structure. As a rather optimistic Federal Union report commented: "it is not surprising that federation was the centre of discussion. As far as can be seen no delegate said that we must not federate." ² A more objective assessment of this opening scene at Strasbourg in the summer of 1949 was given some years later by a leading expert on the Council of Europe, who claimed:

"It is probably no exaggeration to say that many of the original Representatives to the Assembly believed that it was their task to create 'economic and political union' which they had voted for the previous year at The Hague, and that the function of the Council of Europe was almost that of a constituent assembly." ³

This point was also taken up by the 'Times' which, in the wake of the August 16 debate, commented: "It is difficult to see what purpose the Assembly can serve if it is not to prepare the way for some kind of federation." ⁴ On a more dramatic note, the 'Manchester Guardian' urged that "the federation of Europe must be realised at the first attempt, or the idea must be abandoned for a long time." ⁵ After the debate, in fact, the crucial issue of "necessary changes in the political structure of Europe" was referred by the Assembly to a newly-constituted 'Committee on ./

1. LACKAY, C.A. Report, op. cit., pp. 260-266.

2. 'The Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1949: History and Comment from a federalist angle', Federal Union report, October 1949, LACKAY PAPERS.

3. A.H. Robertson, 'The Council of Europe', op. cit., p. 83.

4. Times, leading article, 17.6.49.

5. Manchester Guardian, 17.6.49.

./General Affairs'(ie. Political Committee),which was to present its recommendations on the subject back to the Assembly on September 2. The Committee,chaired by Bidault and with Guy Mollet as Rapporteur,received 24 different proposals,including a key motion submitted by Mackay suggesting that a democratic European Federation should be established ,and that a Commission should be set up to draft a constitution. Another motion,proposed by Schuman and Bidault called for the creation of a "European political authority with limited aims but real powers" Finally,MacMillan actually put his name to two motions,one calling for a conference in order to decide the executive powers which should be conferred to the Committee of Ministers(submitted also by Boothby,Maxwell Fyfe,etc.),and another proposing an amendment to the Council of Europe Statute in order that the "Committee of Ministers shall be an executive authority with supra-national powers."^I

The evident departure from a normally more restrained European posture by the above Conservative representatives of the British unionist camp was a sharp indication of the compelling atmosphere at Strasbourg to achieve some sort of authoritative supra-national breakthrough within the Council of Europe framework,in this its first session. MacMillan,Boothby and Maxwell Fyfe were,however,taking considerable risks in view of the less than positive attitude of the British Conservative Party towards an effective European commitment(a subject to which we shall turn again shortly). Churchill,in this sense,proved to be much more evasive in his European policy pronouncements in the Consultative Assembly debate,though he was also careful not to go against the spirit of the occasion,and did not therefore completely close the door to future federal possibilities. As Boothby later remarked about Churchill's./.

I. See A.H. Robertson,op. cit. p.84,plus C.A. Report ,op.cit., pp.324-326

./ perceived commitment at Strasbourg to a united Europe: "He refused to be drawn. All he said was 'We are not making a machine, we are growing a living plant'."¹ Labour spokesman, Maurice Edelman, described the Tory leader's predicament in other way, dryly noting one year afterwards: "Rather coyly the Conservative Delegation did not state specifically in 1949, as it would do later in 1950, that it was not a supporter of a federal solution for Europe."² It was indeed evident, in the heady Strasbourg atmosphere, that as part of the European Movement, the unionist members of the Conservative Delegation needed, at least in this first session, to demonstrate their apparent European prowess in face of Labour's isolated policy of reluctance. It was again Denis Healey who clearly observed the full significance of this situation when he noted:

"It would be a mistake to regard the European Movement simply as the tool of the British Conservative Party... It would be truer to say that the British Conservative Party dishonestly identifies itself with the European Movement for the sake of the latter's international influence."³

The European Movement was indeed most active at Strasbourg, both in its sponsorship of parliamentary initiatives and in its more public efforts to sustain popular opinion behind the European campaign. It was in this context that Healey further observed that, whereas his Labour Party colleagues (MacKay apart) had brought no "concrete proposals" to Strasbourg, the European Movement successfully circulated "detailed policies" which it had formulated during the previous twelve months. "These policies", Healey continued to report, "can rely in advance on the support of half the Assembly. Consequently discussion on every issue tends to base itself round the proposals of the European Movement." He in turn concluded that "the Assembly tended to behave as an instrument of the European Movement."⁴ Similarly, MacMillan, ./

1. See Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel, op.cit., p.217.

2. EDELMAN, article, op. cit., p.25.

3. HEALEY, report on Consultative Assembly, op.cit.

4. Ibid.

./for his part, recorded that "behind the scenes Duncan Sandys continued to pull the strings."¹ The Movement as a whole, moreover, drew much popular support at the immense public rally which was organised in the 'Place Kleber' on the evening of August 12, attended by an estimated 20,000 people and addressed by Spaak, Churchill, Reynaud, Brugmans and others.² The European campaign had reached the height of its activity and appeal.

The practical initiatives at hand, however, were at first something of a let down, Guy Mollet presenting a rather pallid compromise formula on September 5, as rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, recommending no immediate specific changes in the political structure of Europe. Nevertheless, the Assembly in turn brushed aside this apparent attempt to reconcile British Governmental opinion, and strongly rallied to a bold amendment to the report, tabled by Mackay and Philip, which stated that "the aim and goal of the Council of Europe is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers."³ The General Affairs Committee was subsequently instructed to continue its study according to the above formula, and make some definite recommendations on the subject in time for the second session in 1950. The Assembly, in addition, submitted a long list of recommendations to the Committee of Ministers for amendments to the Council of Europe Statute designed to increase the powers and independence of the former body vis-à-vis the latter. These proposed amendments urged that new members of the Council of Europe must be approved by the Assembly; that the Assembly must be empowered to fix its own agenda independently of the Ministerial Committee; that the number of representatives should be doubled, etc.⁴ Following a lively economic debate on August 22-23, in which Reynaud made a strong federation speech, the Assembly also presented the Committee of Ministers with a series of ./.

1. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., p.176.

2. Ibid., pp.176-7, plus Bonnefous, L'Europe en Face De Son Destin op.cit., p.123.

3. C.A. DOCUMENTS 1949, no.173, Official Report, 5.9.49., pp.10.2-6.

4. Ibid.

./economic resolutions allowing the Council of Europe to encroach to a large and official extent on the work of the OEEC.¹ Finally, after another long and dramatic debate, in which Teitgen appealed as a former inmate of Buchenwald to reject the morality of 'My Country Right or Wrong', the Assembly further referred a formal proposal to the Committee of Ministers calling for the European Movement sponsored Charter of Human Rights.²

Thus, despite the supposedly low-key profile of the European Movement, the overall success at the first session of the Strasbourg Assembly seemed most impressive. In adjourning the session on September 9, Spaak indeed declared that the delegates had succeeded in making the Consultative Assembly "the first Parliament of Europe". He then added:

"I came here with the conviction that a United States of Europe is necessary. I leave with the certainty that a United States of Europe is possible."³

This effectively summed up the optimistic mood with which most delegates left Strasbourg. There was no mistaking the feeling that they were now actually 'making Europe'. The prestige of the Assembly, Brugmans has recorded, was "immense" during the Autumn of 1949, and the "decisive coup" was now expected.⁴ Raymond Silva similarly looked to the Assembly in the hope that it would "have the final voice" in the official European debate.⁵ Mackay, however, though still optimistic, could not completely conceal his fear and disappointment over the lack of clarification on the vital political issue at stake, and upon his return home he confided:

"In one sense Strasbourg justified itself by merely surviving. It was something never before attempted in history... The issue of whether we want a European Federal Parliament has yet to be decided; but if we do want to do it, it can be done."⁶

1. C.A. Doc. No.s 71-79. 2. C.A. Doc. No. 106.

3. SPAAK, C.A. Reports, adjournment of 1st Session, 8-9.9.49, pp. 126-30

4. BRUGMANS, *L'Idée Européenne*, op. cit. p. 144.

5. SILVA, *Journal de Genève*, II. IC. 49.

6. HACKAY, *Fabian Tract no. 280*, 'The Strasbourg Assembly'. See also his article in *Federal News*, 'European Union - Where does it stand now', December 1949.

Hackay's transparent unease with the underlying political situation was well founded. The first session of the Consultative Assembly had convincingly demonstrated that the majority of delegates were favourable to federation plans, and that they had certainly raised the level of the European campaign to an important height, but the specific "coup" towards an effective organic European Union had been somewhat misted over. The need to placate sceptical and hostile opinion in British circles, as well as in Scandinavia, had clearly placed a damper on the otherwise enthusiastic mood to go ahead with a more radical and immediate plan. Guy Mollet, as the key personality in the General Affairs Committee had, in this sense, striven to retain a rather vague formula, and was determined not to split ranks with Labour or cause divisions between the continent and Britain as a whole over European unity.¹ The British establishment press, in turn, gave reason to this cautious strategy, the 'Daily Telegraph' stressing its satisfaction with the fact that the Assembly had not tried to set itself up against the national Governments,² while the 'Times' warned against any misconceived European crusade.³ The blunt result of the Assembly's work, in this context, was later summed up by the 'Observer's' representative at Strasbourg as follows:

"It did not - this should be frankly confessed - change the political face of Europe. It had no power to do so. It did not even ask that any immediate sacrifice of sovereignty should be made by member governments. All it could do was to recommend, but even its recommendations proposed nothing that would affect... the complete freedom, in practice, of governments to act exactly as they pleased."⁴

Léon Blum was even more brutal in his appraisal, and declared that the Assembly lacked the "will" to forge ahead; the first session was "not a triumph" for Europe, it was not the "great commencement" that had been expected.⁵

1. See Herley report, *op. cit.*

2. Daily Telegraph, leading article, 2.9.49.

3. Times, leading article, 10.9.49.

4. See S. Strange, 'Strasbourg in Retrospect' World Affairs 1950, vol. 4, no. 21

5. BLUM, article in Le Populaire, "Le bilan de Strasbourg", Sept 1949.

2) Towards a European Political Authority?

For all its specific weaknesses, the political programme issued by the Consultative Assembly had, all the same, officially called for some sort of "European political authority" with effective power. The supra-national profile to the European political campaign remained a live issue. Indeed, on the eve of the Consultative Assembly's final formulation on the subject, the Executive Committee of the European Movement had actually considered the possibility of making recommendations regarding the creation of a political authority within the Council of Europe framework. No formal initiative was taken, however, in view of the debate which was about to take place in the Assembly itself on September 5.¹ Frenay later explained to his EUP colleagues that it was from this time onwards that the European Movement, under Sandys, chose to become the "arrière-garde" rather than the "avant-garde" of the European idea.² He chose not to mention, however, that during this very period two important working documents were circulated to the Executive Committee, both positively endorsing the need to pursue the idea of establishing a European political authority, while President Spaak, in winding up the work of the Consultative Assembly, called upon the European Movement for future help and guidance in the official campaign.³ The first of the documents in question, drawn up by the European Movement Secretariat, clearly indicated the connected role of the Movement to the evolving political programme of the Assembly:

"At all its conferences the Movement has emphasised the necessity for the creation of a European Supra-National Political Authority... The establishment of the Council of Europe, despite its purely consultative capacity, represents a first important step, and provides the foundation out of which there must progressively be evolved an institution possessing real power."⁴

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1. European Movement Executive Committee meeting, 3-4.9.49., official minutes (EX/1115), CAE: BRUGGS.
 2. FAZLEY, EUP report, 17-19. II. 50., op. cit.
 3. SPAAK, letter to Sandys, Deliberations, no. 1, Sept 1949, SANDS PAPERS.
 4. Accompanying paper (EX/PI7) to EX/1115, op. cit.

The second document in question, drawn up by Sandys himself, went still further, and actually outlined a programme of action for the eventual attainment of the political authority at issue. The circular was appropriately entitled: 'Creation Of A European Supra-National Political Authority. Some Personal Thoughts Upon The Possible Future Evolution Of The Council Of Europe, By Duncan Sandys.'¹ The contents of this important memorandum corresponded precisely to the description in the title. It was, without doubt, the most informative and the most reflective account written by Sandys on the subject throughout the whole of the European campaign.

The actual strategical clue to the document as a whole came towards the end, where Sandys succinctly stated that the Council of Europe should "transform itself imperceptibly" at first, only after which should this factual transformation be given "formal constitutional expression." In other words, his scheme was based on an empirical political approach, as opposed to a direct constitutional strategy. The supra-national goal and commitment which he had in mind, however, were left in no doubt, and in this sense the paper provides a powerful documentary refutation of the federalist myth, which till this day still exists, that Sandys never intended to go beyond inter-governmental or purely co-operative modes of European integration. Indeed, right from the start of the memorandum, Sandys clearly drew attention to the supra-national ideal which he had in mind, by exclaiming:

"Almost every measure for the closer unification of the European States, in both economic and social spheres, involves decisions of a political character. It is clear, therefore, that before any far-reaching progress can be made towards the realisation of this aim, there must be created in some form or another a European Political Authority, capable of formulating and executing a truly European policy designed to serve, not the separate interests of the component states, but the interests of Europe as a whole."

1. En/P/14, accompanying paper to EXH 15, op. cit., CAEM BRUSSELS.

In terms reminiscent of his long descriptive letter to the 'Times' one year previously, Sandys went on to present his case in stressing the gradual and pragmatic strategy by which the "European Political Authority" sought would be achieved only through "a number of intermediate steps" and by "successive stages" in the evolution of the Council of Europe as it actually stood. His plan, in short, was based upon a sage and complementary co-development of the Consultative Assembly and Ministerial Committee in gaining more and more legislative and executive rights and responsibilities. The initial stage in this scheme rested upon the Assembly first acquiring official independence from governmental control, and the freedom to discuss all matters of importance (excluding defence) upon its own initiative. This battle, currently in progress, had to be won, however, within the limits of the Assembly's legitimate consultative functions. Indeed Sandys went on to argue:

"At the present stage it would be unrealistic for the Assembly to claim legislative or executive powers, and, if it did, it would certainly have no hope of obtaining the approval of governments, from whom alone such powers could be derived. Thus, for the immediate future, it must be accepted that the sole constitutional function of the Assembly will be to make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers."

He now came to his crucial point of priority. - Once that the Assembly had asserted its deliberative independence, which it was in the process of doing, it was necessary to ensure that its consultative status vis-à-vis the Ministerial Committee should be fully recognised and developed, which in turn meant that the Committee itself needed to be in the position to request and receive recommendations from the Assembly on specific issues of increasing political importance and relevance, without actually disregarding the official Statute. He thus concluded:

"..so long as the Committee of Ministers itself has no power, the Assembly will have no power either. On the other hand, to the extent that the Committee of Ministers, in its ..

./ collective capacity, acquires power, the Assembly, as its advisor, will acquire it also. The objective must therefore be to build up the corporate strength and extend the competence of the Committee of Ministers."

In contrast, however, to the purely inter-governmental view of European integration, he then emphasised the need to push the Ministerial Committee towards a joint-collective role at a truly European level:

"..since the Committee is composed of leading Ministers... it is clearly capable, provided there is agreement among its members, of deciding anything and everything within the collective competence of the participating states..."

Any disposition to look upon the Committee of Ministers as nothing more than a forum for the exchange of views between governments upon European problems must be energetically resisted. From the start the Committee of Ministers must be regarded as an instrument for action. ...it must be clearly established that the function of the Committee of Ministers is not confined to the passive role of considering opinions and recommendations of the Assembly and of passing on those of which it approves to the Governments of the participating States. The principle must, on the contrary, be accepted that the Committee of Ministers has a collective responsibility for initiating positive action to promote the unity of Europe."

With an eye to the evolutionary nature of the unwritten British Constitution, Sandys in turn developed the central idea of turning ministerial "collective responsibility" into collective "accountability" vis-à-vis the Assembly, whose sovereign-democratic role and status would, as a result, be gradually registered and respected, without the need for any prior juridical agreement:

"..having secured for the Committee of Ministers an active and quasi executive role, steps must be taken to establish, in practice if not in principle, the responsibility and accountability of the Committee to the Assembly. In short, a relationship must be developed between the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly resembling as far as possible the relationship between a democratic parliament and its government."

Thus, contrary to the negative and over-cautious label which federalist writers and historians have attempted to pin on Sandys, at this crucial juncture of the European campaign he did indeed, %

./ propose a formula which both advocated the ideal of a democratic 'European Supra-National Political Authority', while at the same appeared to offer a realistic means of achieving this goal. His strategy was based essentially on a system of conventions and precedents, rather than according to a strict constitutional treaty which, while Britain was still regarded as the king-pin to European unity, had no possible chance of gaining official support. Hence, Sandys initial reliance on the "spirit of co-operation", out of which he hoped would grow an effective supra-national co-indentification of authority and accountability between the Ministerial Committee and the Assembly. On this crucial evolutionary point, he went on to prescribe a specific method of action by advocating that "special attention" should be paid to Article 19 of the Council of Europe Statute, which provided that "at each session of the Consultative Assembly the Committee of Ministers was to furnish the Assembly with statements of its activities accompanied by appropriate documentation."¹ It was a shrewd observation by Sandys, who, pointing to the Committee's failure to comply to this rule in the first session, strongly suggested that this "must certainly not be allowed to become a precedent for future sessions", and that it was "upon the implementation of the letter and spirit of Article 19 that the successful development of the relationship between the Committee and the Assembly will largely depend." Drawing attention to the potential and "most important" scrutiny system which the Assembly might therefore achieve with regard to the work of the Ministerial Committee, he further emphasised the existing rights of Ministers to intervene in the discussions of the Assembly. This privilege, he advocated, "should not be one-sided"; Ministers should also be asked to attend when, for example, their statements and policies were under discussion. He in turn induced:

1. Cf. pA17.

"The close contact which will be established between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers through these various channels will indirectly produce two very important results. First, the members of the Committee of Ministers, when faced with the task of preparing the joint statements of policy to be made to the Assembly, will find themselves obliged to reach agreement among themselves upon a common line of action. That in itself is very important. Secondly, the Committee of Ministers, desiring naturally to avoid public criticism, will be stimulated to go to the utmost limits of that which is possible, in order to satisfy the reasonable wishes and aspirations of the powerful body of European opinion represented in the Assembly."

To conclude, Sandys therefore looked to a "parallel" growth in the influence and authority of both political institutions represented in the Council of Europe framework, resulting in a united and democratic supra-national body which could in turn be officially recognised as such:

"...there will grow up in practice a relationship between the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers in many respects similar to that which normally exists between a parliament and a government. By this process the Council of Europe, whilst still on paper possessing no powers, may, within a comparatively short time, transform itself imperceptibly into something which for all practical purposes will be a European Supra-national Political Authority. It will then be time for the States concerned to consider whether it is desirable to give formal constitutional expression to that which in practice has already come to exist."

The vital political dénouement within the Executive Committee of the European Movement in favour of establishing a European Supra-National Political Authority had thus commenced, with Sandys taking the lead. The final formula of the Movement, however, which upon Mollet's official request would be communicated to the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee in January 1950, was far from settled. Sandys' proposals were in earnest and were meant for serious consideration, which can be judged by the fact that he circulated them not only within the close corps of the Executive Committee, but also among potentially hostile groups within his./.

./own Party, despite his pending re-election to Parliament. The UEM Newsletters also gave public coverage to his European convictions in this matter. The strategy he advocated, however, can be seen with the benefit of hindsight to have relied upon two false assumptions. -First, by emphasising the effective vanguard role of the Committee of Ministers in the gradual development of "collective responsibility", Sandys placed too much dependence on the good-will of national Governments involved, and on their readiness to "naturally avoid public criticism." He thought that the Assembly, by being practical and reasonable, would retain sufficient public confidence and political respect so as to ensure a reciprocal positive reaction and understanding from the part of the Ministers. The following months in the European campaign would prove, however, that the British Government in particular, and its representatives at Strasbourg, "were quite prepared to run the risk of unpopularity in Europe, with the knowledge that their European policy would no longer be effectively challenged by the Conservatives at home." -Secondly, in order for his corporate "parallel" development to work, not only did the Committee of Ministers have to adopt a collective profile, so too did the Assembly itself. It is true that at the first session many Assembly representatives sported the European Movement badge and displayed a convincing majority mood in favour of some sort of supra-national political structure for Europe. However, the "federal" majority had allowed the moment to pass, and by the time that the Assembly was next convened, in August 1950, the "functionalists", advocating only limited sectoral integration, would be in the ascendance, and the Assembly far from united. The unforeseen Schuman Plan of May 1950 would indeed give an unexpected jolt towards functionalism. Yet, already in September 1949, the cautious French rapporteur to the General Affairs Committee, Mollet, sent out a plan to his fellow committee members in which he posed the question whether the "functional" or ./.

./."federal" approach to European union should, in the final event, be supported. In short, the signs of a split in the Assembly, and a potential diversion of the hitherto political emphasis in the European campaign, were already on the cards.

To be fair to Sandys, however, he did somewhat optimistically plead to MacMillan, in receipt from the latter of Mollet's dangerous opening memorandum, that there was no fundamental contradiction between the two approaches, and he immediately tried to defuse this potential undermining of his own unity of action strategy with the following most illuminating argument:

"I consider that it would be most unfortunate and quite unnecessary at this stage for your Committee to go out of its way to divide people into federalists or non-federalists. ... Among those who sincerely want to work for closer union, there are some who prefer to talk about the ultimate ideal, namely Federation, and others who prefer to discuss the next immediate and practical steps. Among the so-called Federalists there are none with any experience or sense of responsibility who would be prepared to advocate a Federation today. Whilst among those who do not proclaim themselves Federalists there are few who would altogether exclude the possibility of Federation as an ultimate solution in future circumstances which cannot at present be foreseen. It is, in fact, more a question of temperament and vocabulary than of any fundamental difference."

In the same urgent tone, he added:

"In fact both federalists and so-called unionists want to go forward and recognise that the ultimate goal, whatever it may be, cannot be reached in a single giant stride, and that intermediate steps are necessary. Both groups (if they can be described as groups) are quite unclear in their own minds as to what these next intermediate steps should be. If only they will study the problem together, I am convinced that they would be able at each successive stage to agree upon the next immediate step to be taken. If, on the other hand, they try here and now to define in precise detail the final objective, they are bound to break up in confusion." ²

These were important, and indeed prophetic, warning signals by Sandys, indicating not only a thinly-veiled commitment to core./.

1. See Mollet memorandum: 'Plan for the detailed and objective and objective study of the proposals to achieve closer political unity between member-states', Sept. 1949, enclosed in letter from MacMillan to Sandys, 15.9.49., SANDYS PAPERS.
2. SANDYS, letter to MacMillan, 19.9.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

./sort of eventual federal European structure, but also a very clear preoccupation not to become bound by labels which risked disturbing the seemingly innocent path towards the "improbable" creation of a European supra-national political authority. He thus ended his personal appeal to MacMillan on the following distinctive note:

"The result of Mollet's proposal would be to throw all those, who are not at this stage prepared to label themselves as federalists, into the same camp as Dalton and his friends, who appears to want no progress at all...

If the federalist issue is raised in an acute form at this stage, it may obscure all the real issues and split the Assembly into two entirely artificial camps, accusing each other respectively of obstruction and lack of realism."¹

It was best, he added to concentrate initially on "immediate steps in the direction of closer political union, leaving vague for the moment the precise character of the constitution which may finally emerge."²

This somewhat dramatic plea by Sandys not to precipitate matters, and as a result, split ranks over tactical rather than fundamental objectives, was well argued, but no longer fitted the mood and pressures of the actual situation. His evolutionary policy depended upon a deliberate evasion of the precise political definitions and reference points which most of the groups and personalities involved in the European campaign were now wanting to come to grips with, one way or the other. Indeed, on his own side, Sandys' unionist and Conservative colleagues, perturbed by the apparent stand taken in the Consultative Assembly, wanted to make it clear that they had no intention of becoming committed to any federal or neo-federal goal, no matter how much, it was dressed up and disguised in gradualism. Bonham-Carter, for example, as Vice Chairman of the U.M., angrily declared, upon reading Sandys' formula on a European supra-national Political Authority:

1. SANDYS, letter, op. cit.

2. Ibid.

"I am disturbed by it because it appears to imply that that all members of the European Movement regard the creation of a Federal Constitution for Europe as a desirable aim...

It is not my aim to create a Federal Constitution for Europe, nor is it the aim of many of our colleagues in the UEM. I do not believe it to be Winston's? It is certainly not Mr. Amery's, Anthony Eden's nor Sir David Maxwell Fyfe's"

He went on to accuse Sandys of having misled his more cautious colleagues on the matter:

"I feel that the time has come when the position should be clarified. I know that in the past clarification has been avoided in order to preserve a united front, but I am beginning to have an uneasy feeling that some of us are sailing under false, or at least very ambiguous, colours and this memorandum has strengthened and confirmed my uneasiness." ¹

Similarly, on a less nervous but equally forceful note, L.S. Amery told Sandys that he was a "little perturbed" by the latter's formula, adding:

"I think it is essential to make it clear to our Continental friends that if and when it comes to anything in the nature of a surrender of sovereignty and to the creation of a supra-national legislature and executive, we must stand outside." ²

Even the more committed Harold Macmillan stressed when asking Sandys for help in the drawing up of a document for the General Affairs Committee:

"I must be careful not to put in anything which I could not defend and hope to carry through a Conservative Party meeting."

The Conservative Party itself had already officially emphasised in June, and again in July 1949, that its primary commitment was to the Empire and Commonwealth rather than to Europe. ⁴ In a strictly worded note sent to Sandys on the eve of the Conservative Party Conference, in October, the powerful '1922 Committee' further warned him not to risk "dividing" the Party over the United Europe. /.

1. DONHAM-CARTER, letter to Sandys, 4.II.49., SANDYS PAPERS.
2. AMERY, letter to Sandys, .VII.49., SANDYS PAPERS.
3. MACMILLAN, letter to Sandys, 22.9.49., SANDYS PAPERS.
4. See 'A Statement of Conservative Policy for the British Empire and Commonwealth', plus 'The Right Road for Britain', June, July 1949 respectively, CONSERVATIVE PARTY RESEARCH OFFICE
5. Letter to Sandys from A.B. Gridler, .10.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

./resolution down in his name. Sandys subsequently delivered a diplomatic speech to the Conference, nevertheless calling for a "strong and united Europe, linked through Britain to the British Commonwealth" - a point which Amery immediately expanded upon by saying that the Conference would not commit itself to any scheme which could "in the slightest degree mar the existing unity of the Empire, or stand in the way of its fullest development."¹

On the other side of the European campaign, however, the more federal inclined groups did not greet Sandys' political formula with the timid misgivings and caution with which it was greeted by the unionist camp, but wanted instead to go much further, and to push directly for a constitutional European plan. For example, the Third EPU Congress, held in Venice on September 19-22, led the field in re-affirming the Interleken proposals for a "Constituent European Assembly."² One month later Boky submitted a memorandum to the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee in which the EPU declared that the European Assembly, "whilst preserving its consultative character, should be given forthwith the mandate for preparing a Draft European Constitution", to be subsequently considered by the national Parliaments.³ Likewise, Robert Bichet declared, on behalf of his MEI colleagues, that "the Assembly should be granted the powers of a Constituent Assembly at its third session."⁴ Similarly, Mackay, the main propagator of constitutional federalism, also thought that the necessary political initiative towards federation should spring from the Consultative Assembly, and he privately complained to Sandys that the sort of "European Cabinet" visualised by the latter would never set in process the./.

1. See Conference Report, CP&O; Keesing's Contemporary Archives vol. 7, op. cit. pp. 10285-6; U.E. Newsletter, October 1949, plus Sandys' draft, SANDYS PAPERS.

2. EPU Congress Report, Sept. 1949, Political Resolution, CA 2.

3. EPU memo. 'The Structure of Europe', 17.10. 49, CEC GEN. SEC. ANNEXE.

4. BICHET letter to Sandys regarding the latter's formula, 6.10.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

./the positive measures hoped for.¹ André Philip also declared, upon being elected President of the S.M.U.S. on September 3, that it was up to the European Assembly to create a federal Political Authority.² At the subsequent Third S.M.U.S. Congress, held in Paris on November 5-7, Philip and Spinelli successfully pushed for a "federal pact" formula, envisaging the eventual transfer of key sovereign powers to a directly elected European legislature.³ In the meantime, moreover, Spinelli had also taken the lead in calling for a "federal pact" at the Extraordinary General Assembly of the E.U.F., convened in Paris on October 29-31. As he recorded, this crucial E.U.F. meeting in Paris was "completely different" to the Montreux Congress two years earlier, since it was now the "European federalist point of view which completely triumphed over the integral federalist one."⁴ The "Draft Federal Pact" which the Assembly approved was in turn submitted to the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee, and lent no doubt as to the firm supra-national federal view which the E.U.F. now represented. A key clause of the approved text declared:

"The first session of the Council of Europe marked at the same time a beginning and an end. It marked the beginning of a real and organic co-operation between the nations of Europe; it marked the end of the illusion that the aim of European unity can be achieved without political machinery on a supra-national level. The time has now come to draw the necessary conclusions."⁵

The E.U.F. memorandum, in turn, menacingly stated that the Consultative Assembly must "prevent" the Strasbourg experiment from "degenerating" further into an "irresponsible international technocracy", or into another sort of "diplomatic League of Nations". This could only be done, the text continued to declare, by the "urgent" approval by the Assembly of a Federal Pact providing for a bicameral European Legislature (one chamber being directly elected), ./

1. MACKAY, letter to Sandys, 10.10.49., AGLAY PAPERS.

2. S.M.U.S. press statement, 3.9.49., C.A.S. BRUNINGE.

3. S.M.U.S., III Annual Conference, Report, Nov. 1949, C.A.S. BRUGGE.

4. SPINELLI, 'Storia e Prospettive del E.U.F.', op. cit., pp. 164-5.

5. See E.U.F. Congress Reports, Oct./Nov. 1949, "Draft of a Federal Pact - for presentation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe" C.S.C. BRUNINGE.

along with a European Executive responsible to the Assemblies, and a European Supreme Court independent of parliament and government.¹

It was quite clear therefore that Sandys' cunningly vague, though refined evolutionary strategy for a European Political Authority satisfied neither the bulk of his cautious unionist colleagues, nor the radical federal movements. The shift towards entrenched positions and towards two separate camps was already under way, and Sandys was rapidly falling between two stools. Yet, perhaps there was still time to arrange another tentative compromise? The EUP, despite the ascendancy of the Frenay-Spinelli axis, had, after all, given a guarded pledge to push for the federal pact policy within the European Movement.² The S.I.U.S.E. had also issued a similar message.³ Moreover, Sandys still had some valuable allies who supported his pragmatic unity of action campaign. Among the federalists, for example, Brughans openly declared his current fidelity to Sandys' moderate and realistic European policy, arguing that it was not yet time for a "final struggle" between "nationalists" and "federalists", and that the vehicle of the European Movement still served a useful purpose.⁴ Miss Josephy, for her part, also expressed "unqualified approval" of Sandys' proposals for a European Political Authority.⁵ Paul-Henri Spaak lent his powerful support, at a meeting of the British Council of the European Movement in November 1949, to the "practical" and "realistic" strategy hitherto carried out by the Movement,⁶ while his faithful colleague, Drapier, also formally "adhered" to Sandys' point of view.⁷ In short, there was still some slender hope of pulling the European Movement together behind Sandys' strategy, but time was running out.

1. See 'Draft of a Federal Pact', *op. cit.*, "Essential Institutions".

2. EUP Congress Reports, *op. cit.*, European Movement Resolution.

3. S.I.U.S.E. Conference Report, *op. cit.*

4. BRUGHANS, report to EUP Extraordinary Assembly, 29.10.49., C.E.C.

5. JOSEPHY, see 'Summary of criticisms received on D.S. paper', GENEVA

6. SPAAK, speech to U.K. Council, 29.11.49., C.E.C. SANDYS PAPERS.

7. DRAPIER, 'Summary of criticisms', *op. cit.*

The case for patience and moderation in the campaign received a severe blow when, on November 5, the Council of Europe's Ministerial Committee brusquely communicated to President Spaak that it would not at present consider any of the proposed changes to the Statute, nor would it alter the official relationship between the Assembly and the Committee. Nearly all the policy recommendations presented by the Assembly were simply shelved. As Paul Reynaud complained, the Assembly's proposals, in aggregate, were either "refused" or "indefinitely postponed." Indeed, the only issue on which the Ministers would try "to meet the wishes of the Assembly" was in diminishing their control over the latter's agenda, though even this would be at a purely informal level.¹

The unexpected severity of the Ministerial communiqué, strongly influenced by British and Scandinavian pressure, not only placed the recent federalist policy documents in a more detached and confrontational light, it above all threw the evolutionary strategy advocated by Sandys, with its strong emphasis on Ministerial good will, completely off balance. The European Movement Executive, led by Sandys, was quick to close ranks, issuing a joint statement in which they expressed "profound disappointment" at the "entirely negative and dilatory attitude" of the Ministers towards the recommendations of the European Assembly;² but clearly, the decisive last ditch battle in the Movement was now drawing near. Sandys tried to stem the split, or at least reduce its impact, by suggesting that the Movement should set up an "Ad Hoc Political Authority Committee", which would consider the federal pact proposals of the EUP and ENUSE, along with his own revised proposals for a European Political Authority.³ A meeting of this proposed Ad Hoc Committee was finally convened./.

1. See Kessings Contemporary Archives, vol. 7, op. cit., pp. 103-4-5, plus REYNAUD, Unite or Perish, op. cit., pp. 201-204.

2. See statement issued at the European Movement Executive Bureau Meeting, 21.11.49., (EM/EN II), SANDYS PAPERS.

3. E / EN II ibid.

./in Paris on December 16, by which time even the Conseil Français had also been won over to the idea of a federal pact.¹ This crucial meeting, presided by Sandys, included the familiar leaders of the affiliated organisations and National Councils of the European Movement, notably Retinger, Brugmans, Leyton, Lhuillier, Serruys, Bichet, Gironella, Spinelli, Wistrand, Vallée Poussin, Frenay, Macdonald, Courtin, Beddington-Behrens, Fayat, Jacquet and Boothby.² Its results would constitute the final political act in the joint campaign:

Sandys clearly had an unenviable task in trying to find common ground in the formulation of a joint policy. The paper which he produced, and which according to Frenay he tried to bulldoze through the meeting,³ still strongly alluded to an eventual supra-national European Executive and Parliamentary Authority, but now also emphasised other specific European institutions of a more immediate supra-national character, including a Court and Commission of Human Rights, a European patent office, a European passport office, advisory departments on economic issues, etc., all of which could be set up in the near future by "Conventions" approved in the Council of Europe. The direction of these "institutions and services", he in turn proposed, could be entrusted to persons jointly appointed and "accountable" to the Consultative Assembly and Committee of Ministers, who subsequently could take "responsibility" for further "functions" entrusted by Governments through the creation of additional departments set up on the same lines as previously.⁴ Under pressure from his party, by his unionist affiliations and by the political reality of the time, Sandys, in short, was proposing an intermediary "functionalist" bridge between the present inter-governmental approach, strictly adhered to by the Ministerial Committee, and the eventual goal of a European political-federal structure.

1. See EUP C.C. meeting, 12-14.12.49., official minutes, CEC GENEVA.

2. E.M. meeting, 16.12.49., official minutes (PAC/M/I), CAEM BRUGGE.

3. FRENAY, letter to EM Executive, 17.12.49., SANDYS PAPERS.

4. See EM/P/120 (100), CAEM S 632.

This point was further illustrated at the meeting, where, according to the official minutes^I, "two definite trends of opinion" were discerned on the question of "approach", the first, supported by the French, Italian and Dutch representatives, being "federalist" or "contractual", the other, upheld by the British delegates, being described as "functionalist" or "evolutionary". The former approach was identified with the federal pact idea, by which the European nations would agree to "transfer certain precise powers and functions to a federal authority." The second approach was defined as follows:

"The 'functionalist' or 'evolutionary' approach envisages the joint direction of policy and action by the participating countries to a progressively increasing extent through the medium of common European institutions, without, however, in the first stage at any rate, irrevocably transferring sovereign powers to those institutions."

The 'functionalist' and 'evolutionary' approach were thus now identified as one. It must be stressed, however, that despite being pushed into a tight corner, Sandys was not advocating the strictly limited "functionalism" proposed by the British Labour delegates at Strasbourg. Indeed, whereas the latter group considered a 'functional' approach as a slight technical diffusion of what remained, and was meant to remain, a purely inter-governmental commitment, Sandys, on the other hand, viewed the approach within a "responsible" and "accountable" political light, and as the only possible practical option for the "first stage" in a more ambitious evolutionary strategy towards an effective supra-national political commitment in Europe.

Those upholding a 'federal-contractual' strategy at first remained unconvinced, Spinelli, Sironella and now also Brugmans declaring that it was necessary to draw up a federal pact from the outset, since no effective political authority could exist without clearly defined, written powers. Boothby, on the other hand, suggested that the federalists should accept and support the 'functional' approach whilst making it clear that it did./.

./not, in their opinion, so far enough, reserving the right to work within their own organisations for a more radical solution. It was "essential", he went on to argue in favour of Sandys immediate strategy, that the Council of Europe should achieve some power if it was not to be destroyed. Layton, along with his closer unionist colleagues, proved tougher, and maintained that a federal pact at the current stage would set back rather than advance the cause of European unity both in Britain and in Scandinavia. Courtin, for his part, boldly stood out in this final debate and strongly supported the federal pact plan, suggesting that it should be accompanied by popular direct elections to the European Assembly. The Anglo-French axis in the European Movement had at last broken down.

It was Frenay of all people, however, who finally came up with a compromise solution, repeating in effect the long-standing revivaliste formula for an initial two-tier European commitment. His proposal read as follows:

"A Federal Pact should be concluded between all the democratic European countries who feel able to do so.

This Pact should remain open to any other democratic European countries who wished to join later.

Preferential relations should be established between the States signatory to the Pact and other democratic European countries."¹

Despite strong objections by Layton, Sandys immediately seized upon Frenay's proposal, declaring that such a union concluded between certain states, while others at first felt unable to join, was "not incompatible" with his own "revolutionary" approach. With an eye for Britain's eventual transition and inclusion to the tighter pact, Sandys did, however, consider it "most important" that a group of nations concluding a federal pact should not on that account claim that those who did not sign the pact were "outside" the "European union". It would, he argued, be preferable to regard all members of the Council of Europe as./.

1. FRENEY, federal pact proposals, FAC/III, op. cit.

./constituting the "European union", within which certain states might conclude a federal pact. Although this was only "perhaps a question of presentation", it might, he stated, "prove to be psychologically and politically of great importance."

It was indeed a clear indication of the negative political climate in Britain regarding a real European commitment, and a vivid indictment of the declining interest for the idea within his own party, that Sandys, who had consistently and at some risk argued in favour of Britain's participation within and not on the sidelines of Europe, now had to grasp Frenay's two-tier solution, which in effect considered Britain as an associated member to a Federal Europe. He did so in the hope of Britain's full eventual inclusion. The Council of Europe was therefore to be regarded as the overall political authority within which various functional agencies and a numerically limited inner federation should work together and perhaps finally link up in a common supra-national commitment. This was the message which was approved in the final policy document, subsequently submitted by the European Movement to the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee², after a stormy two-day Executive meeting held on January 20-21, 1950. A full copy of this text is printed below:

1. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, A.S. Helford, officially asked the European Movement for its opinions on a European Political Authority on 2.11.49. See letter (EX/P/30), CAEF BRUGGE.

2. European Movement Executive Committee meeting, 20-21.1.50., official minutes (EX/R/18), CAEF BRUGGE.

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

STATEMENT

1. In 1948, the Congress of Europe, convened by the European Movement at The Hague, declared that "the time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources".
2. This principle has been recognised by the European Assembly which, in its first session at Strasbourg, proclaimed as its aim "the creation of a European Political Authority with limited functions but real powers."
3. In pursuance of this aim, it is necessary that all Member States of the Council of Europe should without delay conclude a Pact for the creation of the European Union. This Pact would provide for the establishment of a Political Authority through which the Member States would jointly decide by democratic methods a common policy in regard to the protection of human rights, external relations and economic affairs.
4. Under the direction of this Political Authority there should be created functional institutions dealing with such problems as currency, commerce, transport, investment policy, the co-ordination of basic industries, agricultural production, cultural and social questions, and defence.
5. Whilst it is essential for the effective operation of the European Union that all the Members of the Council of Europe should participate in the Political Authority, it is not on the other hand essential that all should participate in every one of the functional institutions.
6. The European Political Authority must be created within the framework of the Council of Europe which must be given adequate powers of initiation, execution and democratic supervision, including the power to create such new organs as may be necessary.
7. Those States which desire from the outset to establish closer organic links between one another should be encouraged to do so by the creation of a federal organisation, the structure of which should be decided by them after joint discussion between all Member States of the European Union. This federal organisation should remain open to other States which may wish to adhere to it at a later date.
8. Since it is in the general interest that the links which exist between European States and associated countries overseas should be maintained and strengthened, it should be open to these countries overseas to participate from the outset in these functional institutions which deal with matters in which they are interested.

It is important to note that this statement, issued by the European Movement, advocating the creation of specific European "functional institutions", pre-dated the declaration of the Schuman Plan by nearly four months. It is also worth observing, however, that whereas under the Schuman Plan a higher common authority was to be entrusted with the supply and management of European coal and steel, no umbrella Political Authority with supra-national potential was outlined, as was the case with the above European Movement's proposal. This is a point to which we shall shortly return. Suffice for the moment to stress that the so-called 'London Resolutions' temporarily re-united the two distinct wings within the European Movement, and were well received by most of the leading federalists. Brugmans, for example, optimistically declared that the resolutions represented the "burial of the functionalist" approach as a limited concept, and as such, constituted a "federalist victory."¹ Likewise, even Freytag stated that the "essential" tenets of the EUP had been "safeguarded".² Spinelli, on the other hand, continued to grumble that he would have preferred a document with more precision about "organic links".³

Beneath the surface, however, the apparent compromise of January 21 merely papered over the growing division within the European Movement, as the hopes for an effective European Political Authority began to crumble. The unionist camp drew further and further back from a supra-national policy commitment to Europe, whereas the federalists simply went their own way, the EUP Central Committee having already submitted its own separate proposals for a federal pact to the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee on December 21,⁴ while the new year saw the promotion of similar national campaigns especially in Italy and France.⁵

1. BRUGMANS, EUP C.C. meeting, 4-5.2.50., official minutes, CEC GENEVA.

2. FREYTAG, III EUP Congress Political Report, op. cit.

3. SPINELLI, EUP CC meeting, op. cit.

4. EUP 'Reply to the Questionnaire sent by the General Affairs Committee (AS/AG 19)', 21.12.49., CEC GENEVA.

5. see Spinelli, 'Storia e Prospettive del FE', op. cit. pp 164-7.

Indeed the Movement was soon cracked again by bitter disputes between the warring factions, its political energy being sapped further by the fact that Sandys, having regained his parliamentary seat in the British elections of February 23, remained nominal chairman of the Executive Committee (until his replacement in September by Spaak), but was increasingly drawn into the broader European Parliamentary arena of the Movement's activities, taking over the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Section from Coty, who had been "keeping the seat warm" for him. Bettinger, for his part, devoted his skills as Secretary General of the movement almost totally to gaining the good will and money of American sponsors. In short, the Movement entered into a dramatic period of inner decline. As Robert Boothby commented in May 1950:

"...the European Movement has been in a state of continuous and progressive disintegration; and, as a result, has ceased to give any effective leadership in the cause which we all have at heart. The cause of this is, in my opinion, the internecine disputes arising from the repeated attempts of our federalist friends to substitute a 'constitutional' for a 'functional' approach, as a result of which the Movement has literally been tearing itself to pieces."¹

The political campaign began to grind to a halt. In June 1950, Sandys made a last effort to influence the work of the Strasbourg General Affairs Committee by presenting yet another private document appealing for a united evolutionary approach, which, in addition to accommodating functional projects and inner federal links, also stressed the overriding need to "progressively confer" upon the European Assembly "certain real powers."² The final report by the Committee, entitled "European Political Authority", was, however, a most timid and pallid document and made only obscure references to the sort of institution in question.³ "The total result", as Hillan privately confided,

1. BOOTHBY, Memorandum on Policy, May 1950, CASE BRUNES. The document is also reprinted in Boothby's collections of a rebel, op.cit., appendix 2. 2. See "Personal reflections upon the future political structure of the European Union", 19.6.49., SANDYS PAPERS. 3. C.A. Docs 2 Session 1950

./."is rather disappointing, although very volubrious."¹ In the meantime, on May 9 1950, the European bombshell had already been launched elsewhere in the form of the historic Schuman Declaration.²

The Schuman Plan, out of which grew the present-day European Community, was not an overtly political project; it was not a direct product of the European political campaign which had been waged with increasing force since the Hague Congress up until the first session of the Council of Europe; it was not a project stimulated by any naive supra-national idealism indigenous to the Resistance years and subsequently channeled through to what attempted to be a representative popular movement. The Schuman Plan was instead the product of a new and elite technocratic breed, among whom the European Idea was the prominent motivating force and impulse, but was also the experimental framework for supra-national bureaucratic management stripped of political idealism and of effective political responsibility. Drawn up secretly by Jean Monnet and a small group of officials, the crux of the Plan entailed the proposed pooling of the entire French and German coal and steel production, along with that of other interested European countries, under a "common higher authority" which would be set up by joint governmental agreement and would have "executive powers" in this particular industrial sector. The 'functional' approach was clearly not "buried" as Bruggens had optimistically announced only a few weeks earlier. Indeed, right at the start of his famous speech, Schuman firmly declared in this respect:

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built upon concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."

Furthermore, despite Schuman's assurance that the Plan represented only "the first step in the federation of Europe", the scheme did not openly comprise the joint, evolutionary functional-federal approach for which Sandys had been striving. Indeed a crucial./.

1. MACMILLAN, letter to Sandys, 26.6.50., SANDYS PAPERS.

2. SCHUMAN DECLARATION, see Keesings Contemporary Archives vol 7

of Oct. 1950

3. Ibid.

./. tenet in the strategy advocated by Sandys, endorsed by the 'London resolutions' of January 21, was that the varied and multi-layer sectional integration projects should all fall under the ultimate executive responsibility of the Strasbourg 'Political Authority', represented by the Ministerial Committee and the European Assembly. The Schuman Plan, on the other hand, was proposing a technocratic "higher authority" independent of the political Council of Europe structure. As Harold Macmillan argued in this context:

"While the plan had many attractions, we were frightened of technocrats. We had not destroyed the divine right of kings in order to fall down before the divine right of experts."

Developing the story further, he went on to state:

"Certain changes Schuman...made. He...accepted, in addition to the High Authority, a Committee of Ministers and an Assembly of Parliamentarians, but these were both to be attached to the countries which were parties to the agreement. We wished these to be attached to the Council of Europe."¹

Duncan Sandys emphasised the same point when, as an official representative in the Conservative Party delegation to the second session at Strasbourg, he made an impassioned plea to avert the "technical" nature and "controversial" character of the Plan. He went on to declare that the Plan needed instead to fit into the politically responsible Council of Europe framework:

"Decisions of this kind cannot be left to international experts however competent they may be...If on the international plane we were to leave the experts not only to advise and execute but to decide the policy as well, we should find that we had created an irresponsible and autocratic technocracy which escaped all democratic control...The overall policy-making body must clearly be this Council of Europe and, in the main, this Assembly here in Strasbourg."²

Stating his "warm approval" of inner "federal constitution" schemes, he subsequently concluded that a real and effective,./.

1. MAC MILLAN, Tides of Fortune, op. cit. p.206.
2. SANDYS, speech, H.C. 50, Cm Report, 7-26 August 1950, Part III, sittings I.-17, pp.702-703.

./United Europe was the final goal for all:

"The Council of Europe must, I believe, be sufficiently flexible to allow its Members to advance by their own methods and at their own pace. The slowest must not be thrown out and the fastest must not be held back. Some may be more adventurous at the beginning; some may, in the long run, prove to have greater powers of endurance. We may travel by different roads, but I firmly believe that provided we give to one another support and understanding and encouragement, we shall somehow manage, all of us, to arrive together at the end of the journey."¹

Four days later, on August 22, he in turn submitted a report calling for the creation of "functional institutions" and for an inner "federal organisation", both being envisaged as part of the Council of Europe framework, and as the initial components of an eventual "European Political Authority".²

The separate Schuman Plan had, however, in the words of A.H. Robertson, "struck the popular imagination and seemed to point the way out of the difficulties in which the Council was floundering."³ By contrast, the creation of a political authority with limited but real powers remained the "long term objective" of the European Assembly, "but it had come no nearer to definition, much less to realisation."⁴ After a year's reflection and delay, the sights of the European Assembly lowered to considering immediate functional projects and pallid political initiatives. The French delegation which had led the federal field one year previously were now seriously split. On the one hand, Monnaud bitterly denounced the vague report of the General Affairs Committee, and still demanded a much stronger political initiative. On the other hand, Mollet would do nothing which might cause a breach with the British. André Philip, for his part, had lost all hope in the Consultative Assembly ever becoming a real European Parliamentary Assembly, and now looked to limited functional./.

1. SANDYS, speech, 16.8.50., op. cit.

2. SANDYS, Draft Resolution (As/AG 2 16), submitted to General Affairs Committee, 22.8.50., SANDYS PAPERS.

3. A.H. Robertson, Council of Europe, op. cit., p.86.

4. Ibid, p.87.

./initiatives, and above all, to a smaller federal organisation with its own responsible political machinery. On the British side, Mackay still valiantly pushed for a revision of the Council of Europe Statute, presenting his own 'Draft Protocol' towards the end of the session, in which he continued to hold the picture of an eventual European Federation and Constitution.¹ Italian delegate, Ugo La Malfa, also submitted a scheme in favour of increasing the consultative powers of the Assembly.² In the first event, however, both schemes were blocked by ministerial intransigence. The federal aspirations with which the first session of the Council of Europe had given so much expression to were now almost forgotten as functionalism became the order of the day and swept the field at Strasbourg. The Schuman Plan, moreover, with its strong emphasis on Franco-German reconciliation, implicitly indicated that Britain was no longer regarded as the centre-piece of a future European community. Continental Europe, the 'Europe of the Six', decided to break out on its own. The Labour Government's uncompromising attitude not to be committed in advance to the recommendations in the Plan was complemented by the Party's policy document, 'European Unity',³ which rigidly repeated that Labour would not be drawn into any scheme which could involve the surrender of sovereignty to a higher authority. On the Conservative side, Macmillan privately pleaded with Churchill to "give the lead" and resist "inaction" within the Council of Europe. "This is the first and supreme test", he appealed, "You cannot let down all Europe."⁴ But Churchill did. On June 27 he declared in the House of Commons:

"I cannot conceive that Britain would be an ordinary member of a federal union limited to Europe in any period which can at present be foreseen."⁵

In the Consultative Assembly itself, he went on to demand the formation of a European Army, but when Sandys actually ./.

1. See CA Recommendations, 1950

2. Ibid. appendix II to p. 54. 3. See LABOUR PARTY PAPERS.

4. MACMILLAN, memorandum to Churchill, 20.6.50., SANDYS PAPERS.

5. HANSARD, 27.6.50.

./ presented more detailed proposals to the Assembly's Security sub-committee, flying in the face of the Statute, Churchill ordered him from London to withdraw his plan. As Denis Healey commented:

"Personal relations inside the Conservative Party delegation were not good. Sandys irritated his colleagues repeatedly by riding unpopular hobby-horses of his own."¹

To sum up, the combination of the Schuman Plan, the Assembly's own divisions and timidity over an alternative political programme, the increasingly isolated position of Britain, and the European continent's final conceptional breakthrough that Europe could be constructed without Britain, all linked up into a disavowing of the basic political principles and strategies which had marked the European campaign hitherto. West Germany's economic recovery and inclusion into the European political scene in this second session at Strasbourg sealed the fate of the future campaign. Within a year or so, 'Europe of the Six' was established and many of the continental European activists transferred their energies to working within the latter framework. The hopes of a larger European Political Authority faded away.

3) Epilogue

"The European Movement", Healey succinctly remarked at the second session of the Strasbourg Assembly, "was much less influential than last year, and it is likely to decline still further."² It was an accurate analysis. The European Movement, with its political conceptions, inner divisions, and previous emphasis on the overriding need to include Britain within a future European Union, now resented into the background of international affairs, and would never re-occupy the prominent and historical role./.

1. See CA Recommendations, *op. cit.*, plus HEALEY, Report to Labour NEC on second session of the Consultative Assembly, August 1950, LABOUR PARTY PAPERS.

2. HEALEY, *ibid.*

./..which it held during the immediate post-war era. Strong official forces now came to dominate the European scene: functionalism swept through the integrating process of the 'Europe of the Six'; any lingering "third force" European political ideals from among the European Left disappeared in the wake of the Korean War and the firm consolidation of the Western-Atlantic Bloc; the Catholic and Liberal establishment in turn consolidated its political hold over the European continent, leaving British Labour out on a limb and forcing the British Conservative administration of the 1950's to come out clearly in favour of the Commonwealth and Empire rather than Europe. In such conditions, the committed British 'unionists' and the mainly continental 'federalists', who together basically comprised the European Movement, abruptly realised that they no longer shared the European limelight, and their uneasy alliance formally broke up.

Tired with the timidity of the European Assembly, and frustrated with the lack of political vigour of the European Movement, the EUP was finally provoked into open rebellion at its Third Congress, held at Strasbourg itself on November 17-19 1950, and decided to "take the campaign to the people" by actually setting up in Strasbourg an "alternative Assembly", known as the 'European Council of Vigilance', in conjunction with the EUCSE and EUI.¹ In addressing this so-called "popular council", Altiero Spinelli declared:

"We are sitting next door to an impotent Assembly. And it is therefore our duty to formulate a precise demand for an immediate international treaty between those governments willing to limit their own sovereignty...and to convoke a European Constituent Assembly."²

Henry Frenay, for his part, delivered to his federalist colleagues a long and blistering attack against the European Movement, and especially Sandys, claiming that the latter had dishonoured agreements while the Movement itself had achieved nothing in the last year. It was now time, he concluded, to dishonest commitments./.

1. On 'European Council of Vigilance', see federalist file CEE GENEVA, plus article by Josephy, "European Days at Strasbourg", in Federal News, Jan. 1951; Struggles, Public Opinion, vol. 1, p. 17.

2. SPINELLI, report, 21.11.50., printed in LES NOUVEAUX.

./.. and re-launch an independent federalist campaign.¹

The Spinelli-Frenay dominated campaign for a federal pact and the convening of a European Constituent Assembly in the final event came to nothing. Inside the Council of Europe itself, they did manage to bring an ambiguously worded draft before the Consultative Assembly in November 1951, but it was defeated, and provoked Spaak's resignation as President of the Assembly. The 'Ad Hoc Assembly' of the European Coal and Steel Community proved to be more receptive to the idea, but could not persuade governments to adopt the same attitude. By the mid-1950s the federalists, like the European Movement, slumped into the periphery of European political affairs, and it was Jean Monnet who again stole the limelight, after the defeat of the European Defence Community project, by forming his elite but effective 'Action Committee'. The popular political campaign launched at the Hague Congress of May 1948, rationalised at the Brussels Congress of February 1949, and finally suffocated by the immobile and timid formative sessions of the Council of Europe, now became a thing of the past. The fresh hopes and idealism of the immediate post-war years for the creation of a real and democratically-controlled united Europe evaporated instead into a quagmire of European technocracy and red tape, in which national interests remain those which are most vested and best defended. Many of the goals outlined at the Hague Congress with regard to human rights, economic co-operation, and cultural understanding have been accomplished in Europe; but the primary overriding goal of political supra-national unity still seems far away.

To sum up, the inspiring appeal of the immediate post-war European Idea has become stale. It was to the credit of the founding campaigners in the European Movement that the Idea achieved popular acclaim in the late 1940's. Yet, were they also responsible in not having maximalised the occasion, in having lost a unique opportunity to "make" Europe? The more radical federalist./.

1. FKENAY, EUF Report, November 1950, op. cit.

./ activists still to a large degree believe so, and point to the cautious leadership of the British unionist camp, and to Sandys in particular, as a convenient whipping-boy. This dissertation has attempted to strike a more balanced picture. There can be no doubt to the fact that the British unionist camp as a whole was not just cautious in its tactics, but also sceptical with regard to any fundamental European political commitment. This became increasingly the case as the return to power of a Conservative administration drew nearer. Leading figures such as Harold MacMillan, nevertheless strove their utmost to bridge the traditional doubts of the British establishment towards a continental commitment and the post-war necessity to re-vitalise the British political economy within a setting more apt to a post-imperial era. This was also the case with Robert Boothby. It was above all the case with Duncan Sandys. Motivated initially perhaps by an aversion to Russian Communism, by his war-time experience and by a need to make a name for himself, he did not remain long under the shadow of his eminent father-in-law. Indeed, despite federalist accusations to the opposite, there is considerable documentary evidence to show that Sandys was closely committed to the European ideal, also in its final supra-national form. His political formation and, above all, the political context of the time, resulted, however, in his adoption of a pragmatic approach to the problem of European unity. The frustration felt among some of the continental federalists with this approach is all too easy to appreciate. The fact of the matter, nevertheless, was that up until the Schuman Plan of 1950 the idea of uniting Europe in the absence of Britain was simply unacceptable to official European circles. In these circumstances, a 'maximalist' European campaign would hardly have succeeded. In fact, if there was a real 'culprit' in the story, it was not Sandys, nor even the two-faced sceptics in the British unionist camp. It was the British Labour Party. For, even if the Labour Government itself, under pressure from the Foreign Office, was only luke-warm to the European unity idea, ./

./it was essentially the Labour Party machinery, and especially the NEC, which proved to be the most dogmatically hostile. It was ironic, indeed tragic, that the most respected international socialist party, the party which had preached "revolution by consensus", and the adoption of "third way" political philosophy neither capitalist nor communist, proved to be intolerant of continental socialist appeals, uninterested in aiding the social progress of neighbouring countries, and unmoved on the political "third force" potential of a united Europe. The left wing of the Party, led by Crossman, Foot, Mikardo and even Barbara Castle, rebelled on the issue of Europe, but later succumbed to Party policy, and eventually led the anti-Europe Labour Party crusade. Having resisted the nationalist orientation of Labour Party policy in the 1940's, they went on to sabotage the opportunities which arose in this area during the 1970's. In the intervening period a European Community, for all its defects and weaknesses, was established. The British Conservative Party, having initially drawn back from a European commitment under the Churchill and Eden administrations, was eventually swung round by MacMillan to supporting Britain's membership of the European Community. Likewise, the Labour Government under Harold Wilson (a former leading member of 'Federal Union', it will be recalled) also applied for membership of the EEC in the late 1960's. By this time, however, it was no longer Britain which was exerting a blocking influence in the progress of the European unity idea, but France under De Gaulle. The wheel had turned full circle.

This was indeed the view taken some thirteen years ago when, in the wake of De Gaulle's "empty chair" policy and his veto upon British entry into the European Community, Duncan Sandys re-appeared on the European political scene and launched almost single handed a second Hague Congress, held on November 8-9, 1968. His address to the Congress, ./.

./..attended by many illustrious European political leaders, some of whom had participated at the 1948 Hague Congress, was as follows:

"Here in this hall, twenty years ago, after a devastating war, we called upon Europe to unite. The response was immediate and dramatic. Within a year the Council of Europe was created. This was followed by the Schuman Plan, Western European Union and the Treaty of Rome.

But we have not invited you here to a jolly birthday party to celebrate past achievements. Quite the opposite. We have called you to the sick-bed.

The European idea, after at first blossoming so vigorously, has now for several years almost ceased to make any progress at all...

But let us not imagine that this is the fault of one Government or one man. At various times different countries, including my own, have, by their inaction, contributed to the present stalemate. Let us not, therefore, waste time in recrimination about the past. Let us rather concentrate our attention upon shaping the future.

The choice is much clearer than it was twenty years ago. We can drift on, weak and divided. We can continue to deprive ourselves of the economic power which would be ours if only we could make up our minds to combine our immense human and material resources...

In short, we can take the view that old Europe has had her day and that the time has now come to hand over the torch to younger and more vigorous nations.


But that is not the mood of the peoples we represent. They have not lost faith in themselves. They have not given up the mandate to abdicate Europe's position in the world. On the contrary, they look to us to restore her strength, influence and independence - and the only way to achieve this is to create the United States of Europe...

The purpose of this Congress is to sound the alarm and to call for action, before it is too late." I

By "sounding the alarm", Sandys meant calling a European Governmental Summit which could initiate steps to expand Europe's economic and social integration, progressively re-enforce the democratic character of European institutions, allow British entry into the European Community, and above all, extend to the greatest degree possible the political spheres of the Community.

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1. SANDYS, speech made to the European Parliamentary Congress, The Hague, opening session, 8.II.68., SANDYS PAPERS.
 2. Recommendations approved by the Congress, ibid.

Within a year, a major European Government Summit was in fact held, and triggered off the motions which subsequently led to the direct elections of the European Parliament in June 1979. And yet, had not the first step been taken these thirty years ago, and had not the first European Assembly, for all its weaknesses, been achieved, the notion of a European Parliament might never have become a working reality. This European Parliament, now having been directly elected, might indeed fulfill the final pledge taken at the Hague Congress of 1948, and hopefully will be the "corner stone" of a great future for the present generation.



ABBREVIATIONS

C.F.E.U. Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie
E.L.E.C. European League for Economic Co-operation (originally ILBC)
E.M. European Movement
E.U.F. European Union of Federalists
E.E.P. European Recovery Programme
E.P.U. European Parliamentary Union
I.L.E.C. Independent League for European Co-operation
M.F.E. Movimento Federalista Europeo
M.R.P. Mouvement Républicain Populaire (Christian Democrat)
N.E.I. Nouvelles Equipes Internationales
O.E.E.C. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
S.F.I.O. Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
S.M.U.S.E. Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe
(originally entitled U.S.S.E., below)
U.E.M. United Europe Movement
U.S.S.E. (Movement) for a United Socialist States of Europe

In Footnotes:

C.A.E.M. BRUGGE - Central Archives of the European Movement,
Brugge
C.E.C. GENEVA - (Archives of) Centre Européen de la Culture,
Geneva
E.U.F. C.C. European Union of Federalists Central
Committee
E.U.F. PARIS (Archives of) European Union of Federalists,
French Section, Rue de Trévis, Paris.
M.F.E. TURIN (Archives of) Movimento Federalista Europeo,
Turin

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

The two basic and essential sources of archive material consulted for this book, containing a wealth of important and unpublished information, are:- the PRIVATE PAPERS OF LORD DUNCAN-SANDYS (deposited at Churchill College, Cambridge) and the CENTRAL ARCHIVES OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT (College of Europe, Brugge). The various national centres of the European Movement also, for the most part, retain limited primary source material, but very little of importance that can not already be consulted at Brugge. For this reason, I see no academic reason to list these national organisations. Other valuable archives used in writing this book include:- the RETINGER PAPERS (Polish Library, London), the MACKAY PAPERS (L.S.E. London), the BRUGMANS PAPERS (College of Europe, Brugge, plus correspondence papers from the archives of the Beweging van Europese Federalisten, The Hague). The archive collection at the EUROPEAN CULTURAL CENTRE, Geneva, also has a lot of useful material on the European Movement, and especially the European Union of Federalists and the European Parliamentary Union. The archives of the MOVIMENTO FEDERALISTA EUROPEO at Turin, and of the E.U.F. in Paris, have been of much complementary value to this work. The HISTORY RESISTANCE ARCHIVE CENTRE in Florence has a most interesting set of papers for researchers concerned with the background study dealt with in Chapter I, including the Rosselli papers, the Calamandrei papers, and speeches, correspondence etc. of Rossi, Spinelli and Salvemini.

The BRITISH LABOUR PARTY ARCHIVES (Transport House, London - since transferred to new Labour H.Q.) have been of particular help in analysing the position of the Party, the N.E.C. and of the International Committee with regard to the European Movement, which has been a vital theme in this book. The BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY RESEARCH OFFICE (London) has also been of limited help in supplying official Party material of the period in question.

(The British Government papers for this period were not available during the most part of my study, though they will be consulted before eventual publication of the text.)

The PERSONAL DIARY OF ALTIERO SPINELLI (1948-1952) has been an invaluable and colourful aid in my analysis of the federalist movement and its relations with the European Movement as a whole. The DALTON DIARY (L.S.E. London) also provided much stimulating back-ground information to my study.

2. PUBLISHED MATERIAL

(a) Press, periodicals, reviews, etc.

In addition to the collections of unpublished material contained in the various centres listed above, there is also a large amount of printed works relating to the European Movement's programme of action. The press files at these centres, and among the personal collections also listed, provide the researcher with a very detailed account of the European Movement's public role within the broader context of the time. The main journals consulted both among these vast collections and in public libraries include:- L'Aube; L'Aurore, Avantil, Cahiers du Monde Nouveau, Combat, Continental Daily Mail, Corriere Della Sera, Daily Express, Daily Herald, Daily Graphic, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, the Economist, Europa Federata, E.U.F. Bulletin, E.U.F. Lettre Circulaire, Federal News, Fédération, Figaro, Herald Tribune, Humanité, Journal de Genève, Italia Libera, Libération, Manchester Guardian, Le Monde, News Chronicle, New Statesman and Nation, News of the World, Nouvelles de l'Europe, Le Populaire, Observer, République Moderne, Le Soir de Bruxelles, The Statist, Times, Tribune, Sunday Dispatch, Sunday Times, U.E.M. Newsletter, Umanità, Unita Europea, etc. Among the various history reviews consulted in depth were the relevant sections of Année Politique, Chronique de Politique Etrangère, Current History, Foreign Affairs; and Keesings Contemporary Archives. Similarly the pertinent parts of Hansard, and of Documents Parlementaires, as well as the Reports and Documents of the (European) Consultative Assembly, have all been studied in detail.

(b) Secondary Works

This book is the first to deal seriously and ~~specifically~~ with the initial history of the 'European Movement'. Until now, the only other published account written on the subject was the book brought out by the European Movement itself in 1949, entitled The European Movement and the Council of Europe (Hutchinson). Other published works dealing with the historic background, the general context, and with particular themes contained in this study are briefly listed below:-

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

In this study of what was essentially an international pressure group, there are clearly far too many personalities involved for each to be given a biographical outline. The long list of members of the European Movement International Council are thus only very briefly described in the following pages, in an extract taken from the Movement's own publication in 1949: 'The European Movement and the Council of Europe' (see pp. 44-9). The more famous leaders involved in the Movement, such as Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, Paul van Zeeland, Paul Reynaud, Harold MacMillan, etc., are sufficiently well-known, it is assumed, not to warrant separate mention here. This leaves the important, but less familiar leaders of the Movement who figure as central characters in the present work, and whose bibliographical details are briefly sketched out below:

BONNEPOUS, EDOUARD. b.1907(France)

Member of resistance. M.P. (U.D.S.R.) for Seine-et-Oise 1946-1958. Senator since. President of French National Assembly's Committee on Foreign Affairs 1948. A leading French delegate to the European Consultative Assembly 1949. Minister of Commerce 1952. Minister of State 1953. Minister of Post and Communications 1953-1956. Minister of Transport and Public Works, 1957-1958.

BICHET, ROBERT b.1903(France)

Engineer background. Resistance organiser in Burgundy during World War II. Editor of Christian Democrat underground journal 'Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien'. M.P. (MRP) for Seine-et-Oise, 1945. Secretary of State for Information, 1946 (under Bidault). Founding President of NEI 1947, then Secretary General. Vice Chairman of the European Movement International Executive Committee, 1948. Member of European Consultative Assembly, 1949. Holder of Légion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre, Rosette de la Résistance.

BOHY, GEORGES b.1897(Belgium)

M.P. for Charleroi, President of Parliamentary Socialist Group in Belgium. Later President of the European Movement Parliamentary Council. Founding Chairman of the EPU, 1947.

BOOTHBY, ROBERT. b.1900

Educated at Eton and Oxford. M.P. (Conservative and Unionist) for East Aberdeenshire 1924-1958. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Winston Churchill) 1926-1929. Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Food, 1940-1941. A leading member of the European Consultative Assembly, 1949-1957. Life Peer 1958. Close colleague of Churchill, despite their many disputes and differences.

BRUGMANS, HENDRIK b.1906(Netherlands)

Student in Amsterdam and at the Sorbonne. Director of the Netherlands Workers Educational Institute, 1935-1940. M.P.(Socialist) 1939-1940. Arrested and imprisoned as hostage in Camp Geisel, 1942-1944, then worked underground for the 'Je Maintiendrai' resistance movement. Sent to report to Netherlands Government in exile, 1945. State Secretary for Press and Information in first post-war government, 1945. Founding Executive President of E.U.F., 1946. Vice Chairman of the European Movement International Executive Committee, 1948. Rector of the College of Europe, 1950-1972. Holder of the Charlemagne Prize and the Légion d'Honneur.

COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, RICHARD b.1894

Son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and Japanese mother. Founded the inter-war 'Pan-European Movement', 1926, and was of considerable influence behind the Briand Plan, 1929. After the Nazi occupation of Austria, 1938, he fled to France and then the U.S.A., where he became a Professor at New York University. Constituted with Fulbright and Bullitt the 'American Committee for a Free and United Europe', 1942. Returned to Europe, 1946, and was the founding Secretary General of the EPU in 1947. Honorary President of the European Movement, 1952. Holder of the Charlemagne Prize.

COURTIN, RENE b.1900(France)

Professor of Law at Paris University. Former Secretary-General at the Ministry of the National Economy, Editor of 'Le Monde' and later of the 'Revue d'Economie Politique'. Founding leader of the Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie, 1947. Leading member of the European Movement International Executive Committee, 1948. Holder of the Légion d'Honneur and the Rosette de la Résistance.

DAUTRY, RAOUL b.1880(France)

Engineer background. Leading member of the Economic National Council, 1926. Director of National Railways, 1936-1937. Minister (Independent) of Armement, 1939-1940. Minister of Reconstruction, 1944-1946. Head of French Atomic Energy Department 1947. Chairman of CFEU, 1948.

EDWARDS, ROBERT b.1906

Chairman of youth delegation to Russia, 1926, and later in 1933. Served with Republicans in Spain during the Civil War, along with George Orwell. National Chairman of Independent Labour Party, 1943-1948. General Secretary of Chemical Workers Union, 1947-1971. Founding Chairman of U.S.S.E., 1947. M.P.(Labour) for Bilston 1955-1974, and Wolverhampton S.E., 1974 till present. Leading British member of European Consultative Assembly in 1960's, and of the European Parliament in 1970's.

PRENAY, HENRI b.1905(France)

Military career up until French débacle, 1940. Founding leader of Resistance group 'Combat', 1941. Commissioner to Prisoners and Deportees in French Algiers Committee, 1943. Minister of Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees in provisional French Government, 1944-1945. E.U.F. Central Committee President 1948.

JOSEPHY, Miss F.L. b.1910

Student of French and German. British delegate to Liberal International during inter-war period. Executive member of Federal Union, 1940, later becoming President. Employed as a lecturer by the British army, 1941-1946. Unsuccessful Liberal candidate six times between 1939-1959.

LAYTON, WALTER b.1884

Economic-academic and journalistic background. Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations. Editor of 'The Economist', 1922-1938. Chairman of 'News Chronicle', 1930-1956. Chairman of the War Production Staff, 1942-1943. Peer, 1947. Vice Chairman of I.L.E.C., 1947, Treasurer of U.E.M., 1948. Leading Liberal delegate to European Consultative Assembly, 1949. Deputy leader of Liberal Party in the House of Lords, 1952-1955.

MACLAY, RONALD b.1902(Australia)

Academic-law career at Sydney University. Settled in England in 1934, as a solicitor. Prospective Labour Party candidate, 1935-1942. Chairman of Federal Union, 1942. War-time appointment with Ministry of Aircraft Production. M.P. (Labour) for Hull N.W., 1945-1950, Reading, 1950-1951. Member of Labour Party 'Keep Left' group, 1947-1948. Founding Chairman of Labour's 'Europe Group', 1947, and of the 'All Party Parliamentary Group for European Unity', 1948. Vice-President of the EPU, 1948-1949. Perhaps the most active delegate to the European Consultative Assembly, 1949-1950.

MARC, ALEXANDRE b.1904(Odessa)

Emigrated to France at an early age. Student in Germany. Left-wing intellectual in contact with the inter-war non-conformist circles 'Esprit' and 'Ordre Nouveau'. Leading resistance member of 'Combat' and 'Libérer et Fédérer', 1940-1943. Founding Secretary General of E.U.F., 1946. Founding Director of the 'Centre internationale de formation européenne', 1954, and author of many works on federalist-anarchist thought.

PHILIP, ANDRÉ b.1902(France)

Professor of Political Economy, 1926. M.P. (Socialist) 1936. Opposed to Vichy capitulation. Reached London and 'Free French', 1942. Resistance coordinator for the French National Committee, 1942-1943, and subsequently on the National Council of Liberation. Finance Minister, 1946. Minister of National Economy, 1947. Chairman of the SMUSE, 1949. Delegate General of European Movement, 1949. Active member of European Consultative Assembly, 1949. A close colleague of Léon Blum, a member of the SFIO Directing Committee from 1944, he was finally expelled by Guy Mollet from the Party in 1958, due to his opposition to its Algerian Policy.

PIVERT, MARCEAU b.1895(France)

Academic. Mutilé of World War I. Secretary of the powerful SFIO Seine Federation. Leading activist in the Popular Front, 1936, as head of the 'Revolutionary Left'. Escaped to America during the occupation. Founding French President of the USSE, 1947, and a vocal left-wing leader in the European Movement, 1949.

RETINGER, JOSEPH b.1888(Poland)

Studied in Paris, London and Munich. Director of the Polish Bureau, London, 1912-1914, and worked for Polish independence 1914-1918. Adviser in Mexico, 1918-1926, and then in London as agent for General Sikorski and the Polish Socialist Party in opposition to Pilsudski. Close collaborator of Prime Minister in exile, Sikorski, 1940-1943, and worked clandestinely in Poland, 1944. Leading member of I.L.E.C., 1946, and founding Secretary General of the European Movement, 1948. Later founder of the 'Bildberg' organisation.

ROSSI, ERNESTO b.1897 (Italy)

Disabled on active service in World War I. Economics Professor and writer. Loyal follower of Italian liberal-Socialist G. Salvemini. Founder with Salvemini and Rosselli brothers of Italy's first main anti-Fascist movement 'Non Mollare', 1924. In turn, member of 'Giustizia e Libertà'. Arrested 1930. Imprisoned and confined until 1943. Founding member of Resistance 'Action Party', and M.F.E., 1943. Close colleague and advisor to A. Spinelli.

DE ROUGEMONT, DENIS b.1906(Switzerland)

Academic and writer. One of the founders of the 'Personalist Movement' in France, 1933. Leading member of the non-conformist inter-war 'Ordre Nouveau' and 'Esprit' circles. Important contributor to post-war European federalist thought. Director, since 1949, of the European Cultural Centre, Geneva.

SANDYS, DUNCAN b.1908

Educated at Eton and Oxford. Foreign Office, 1930, in London and Berlin. Resigned, 1933, in protest against the Government's German policy. M.P. (Conservative) for Lambeth 1935-1945, Streatham 1950-1974. Married Diana Churchill 1935. An important member of the anti-appeasement group formed around Churchill. Norway Expeditionary Force, 1940. Disabled on active service, 1941. Financial Secretary, War Office, 1941-1943. Minister of Works, 1944-1945. Founding leader of the UEM, 1947. Founding Executive Chairman of the European Movement, 1948-1950. Member of the European Consultative Assembly, 1950-1951. Minister of Supply, 1951-1954. Minister of Housing and Local Government, 1954-1957. Minister of Defence, 1957-1959. Minister of Aviation, 1959-1960. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1960-1964. Life Peer, 1974. Holder of the European Movement 'Gold Cup'.

SERRUYS, DANIEL b.1875(France)

Civil Servant and aid to Clemenceau, then Poincaré. Chairman of the League of Nations Economic Council. Founding leader of the ELEC, 1947, and of the European Movement, 1948.

SPINELLI, ALTIERO b.1907(Italy)

Student of Law and member of Communist Party. Spent ten years in prison and six years in confinement on account of his political activities, 1927-1943. Left Communist 'call' in objection to Stalin's 'show-trials' in 1930's. Founding member of the 'Action Party', 1943, later becoming Secretary General. Founding leader of the M.F.E. and active European campaigner since the war. Advisor in European Affairs to Pietro Nenni (Socialist Foreign Minister), 1968-1969. E.E.C. Commissioner for Industrial Policy and Technology, 1970-1976. Founding leader of the 'Independent Left' Party (on Communist Party ticket) and M.P. since 1976. Leading member of the European Parliament.

VOISIN, ANDRÉ b.1912(France)

Teacher and journalist. Contributor to the nationalist, anti-democratic and anti-Semitic journal 'Insurgé', 1937. Director during the Vichy regime of the 'College of Syndical and Corporatist Studies'. Founding Director after the war of 'Fédération'. Central Committee member of the EUP and of the European Movement International Executive Committee. Later, adviser to the Chaban-Delmas Cabinet.

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, 1949

**INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN MOVEMENT**

PRESIDENTS OF HONOUR:

LEON BLUM
WINSTON CHURCHILL
ALCIDE DE GASPERI
PAUL-HENRI SPAAK

CHAIRMAN OF INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL:

LEON JOUHAUX Chairman of French Trade Union Con-
 federation (Force Ouvrière); Chair-
 man of Economic Council of French Republic
 (Socialist).

**CHAIRMAN OF INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE:**

*DUNCAN SANDYS Former British Minister (Conservative).

**VICE-CHAIRMEN OF INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE:**

- *ROBERT BICHET French Member of Parliament (MRP);
 former Minister; Chairman of *Nouvelles*
 Equipes Internationales.
- *HENDRIK BRUGMANS Professor at Utrecht University; Executive
 Chairman of *European Union of Federalists*.
- *RAOUL DAUTRY Head of French Atomic Energy Depart-
 ment; former Minister (Independent);
 Chairman of *Concil Français pour l'Europe*
 Unie.
- *LORD LAYTON British Economist (Liberal); Treasurer of
 United Europe Movement.
- *MICHEL RASQUIN Member of Luxemburg Parliament; Chair-
 man of Socialist Party; Chairman of
 Socialist Movement for the United States of
 Europe.
- *PAUL VAN ZEELAND Senator; Former Prime Minister of Bel-
 gium (Christian Socialist); Chairman of
 Economic League for European Co-operation.

DELEGATE-GENERAL:

*ANDRÉ PHILIP French Member of Parliament (Socialist);
 former Minister.

SECRETARY-GENERAL:

*J. H. RETINGER Polish writer; former Political Adviser to
 General Sikorski.

- L. S. AMERY Former Minister (Conservative).
C. ANTONIADI Former Rumanian Minister Plenipotentiary.
KARL ARNOLD Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia (Christian Democrat).
*PAUL DE AUER Former Hungarian Minister Plenipotentiary.
NICHOLAS BALABANOFF Former Bulgarian Minister.
LEOPOLD BARANYAI Former Chairman, Hungarian National Bank.
*PAUL BASTID Former French Minister (Radical Socialist); Member of Institut de France.—*C.F.E.U.*
LUDOVICO BENVENUTI Italian Member of Parliament (Christian Democrat).
CORNEL BIANU Member of Executive Committee of Rumanian National Peasant Party.
MUNIR BIRSEL Turkish Member of Parliament (Republican—People's Party); former Minister.
P. BOLLA Judge of the Swiss Federal Court.
*ROBERT BOOTHBY British Member of Parliament (Conservative);—*U.E.M.*
MAX BRAUER Mayor of Hamburg.
THEODOR BROCH Norwegian Member of Parliament (Socialist).
*SIR HAROLD BUTLER Former Director of the International Labour Office; Chairman of International Economic and Social Section of the European Movement;—*E.L.E.C.*
UMBERTO CALOSSO Italian Member of Parliament (Socialist).
ARTHUR CALTEUX Councillor of Luxemburg High Court of Justice.
*COUNT NICOLA CARANDINI Italian Senator (Liberal); former Ambassador;—*E.U.F.*
GREGOIRE CASSIMATIS Greek Member of Parliament (Socialist); former Minister.
MONSIGNOR FERNANDO CENTO Apostolic Nuncio in Brussels.
*S. P. CHAMBERS British Industrialist; Chairman of Finance Committee of the European Movement.
LEON CHEVALME Chairman of "Forces Ouvrières Syndicalistes Européennes"; Secretary-General of "Fédération des Métaux."
MARIO CINGOLANI Italian Senator (Christian Democrat).
ADAM GIOLKOSZ Vice-Chairman of Central Committee, Polish Socialist Party; former Member of Parliament.
*HUBERT CLEMENT Director of Luxemburg newspaper *Journal d'Exel*; former Minister.
RENE COTY French Senator (Independent); former Minister; representing International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.
RENE COURTHN Professor of Law at Paris University;—*C.F.L.U.*
*BERNARD DEMOUSSE Professor of Law, Liège University; Rapporteur of the Juridical Section of the European Movement.
SUHEYF DERBIL Turkish Professor of Law, Ankara University.

- *G. M. DIMITROV Secretary-General of International Peasant Union; Chairman of Bulgarian Committee of the European Movement.
- FRANCESCO DOMINEDO Italian Member of Parliament (Christian Democrat).
- *JEAN DRAPER Chef de Cabinet to the Belgian Prime Minister (Socialist); *Vice-Chairman of the Juridical Section of the European Movement.*
- *BOB EDWARDS Secretary-General, British Chemical Workers' Union:—S.M.U.S.E.
- HANS EHARD Prime Minister of Bavaria (Christian Democrat).
- BENGT ELMGREN Swedish Senator (Socialist).
- LAMBROS EUTAXIAS Greek Member of Parliament (People's Party); former Minister.
- PAUL FINET Secretary-General, Belgian Federation of Trades Unions.
- *HENRI FRENAY Former French Minister (Socialist); Chairman of Central Committee of E.U.F.
- *GRIGORI GAFENCU Former Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- MILAN GAVRILOVITCH Former Yugoslav Minister; Leader of Yugoslav Peasant Party.
- KARL GEILER Rector of Heidelberg University; former Prime Minister of Gross-Hessen.
- *ANDRE GENOT Secretary-General of the Belgian Public Services Trades Union.
- *ENZO GIACCHERO Italian Member of Parliament (Christian Democrat); *representing the International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.*
- *ENRIQUE ADROHER GIRONELLA Secretary-General of S.M.U.S.E.
- H. HEYMAN Belgian Minister of State; President of Lower Chamber of Belgian Parliament (Christian Socialist).
- LESLIE HORE-BELISHA Former British Minister (Conservative).
- *FELIX HURDES Austrian Minister of Education (People's Party); N.E.I.
- H. HYND British Member of Parliament (Labour).
- J. B. HYND British Member of Parliament (Labour); *representing International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.*
- *FRODE JAKOBSEN Danish Member of Parliament (Socialist); former Minister; *representing international Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.*
- FRANCES L. JOSEPHY Chairman of Executive Committee of Federal Union.
- JULIO JUST Former Spanish Minister (Republican).
- *PIETER KERSTENS Netherlands Senator (Catholic Party); I.L.E.C.

- *EUGEN KOGON Editor of German newspaper *Frankfurter Hfte.*
- FIAT KOPRULU Turkish Member of Parliament (Democrat).
- OLE BJORN KRAFT Danish Member of Parliament (Conservative); former Minister.
- *THORKIL KRISTENSEN Danish Member of Parliament (Radical); former Minister.
- JURAJ KRUNJEVIC Former Yugoslav Vice-Premier; Secretary-General of Croat Peasant Party.
- UGO LA MALFA Italian Member of Parliament (Republican).
- *DESIRE LAMALLE Member of National Committee of Belgian Christian Social Party:—*N.E.I.*
- *REV. GORDON LANG British Member of Parliament (Labour):—*U.E.M.*
- HERMODO LANNUNG Former Danish Senator (Radical).
- JOSE MARIA DE LASARTE Minister of the Interior of the Basque Government in exile.
- *RENE L'HUILLIER *Secretary-General of French Council of the European Movement.*
- ALBERT LILAR Belgian Senator (Liberal); former Minister.
- KENNETH LINDSAY British Member of Parliament (Independent); former Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Education.
- J. LINTHORST HOMAN Chairman of Netherlands Town and Country Planning Department.
- RODOLFO LLOPIS Former Head of Spanish Republican Government in Exile; Secretary-General of Spanish Socialist Party.
- ADOLF LUDWIG Member of Rhine-land-Palatinate Assembly (Social Democrat); Chairman of Rhine-land-Palatinate Trades Union Federation.
- EDUARD LUDWIG Former Austrian Minister (People's Party).
- JOHN MCCALLUM-SCOTT Secretary-General, Liberal International.
- HAROLD MACMILLAN British Member of Parliament (Conservative); former Minister.
- *SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA Spanish philosopher and historian; President of Liberal International; *Chairman of International Cultural Section of the European Movement.*
- THE VERY REV. W. R. MATTHEWS Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral.
- D. MATZANKIEFF Former Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary; former Director of Bulgarian National Bank.
- SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE British Member of Parliament (Conservative); *Rapporteur of the Juridical Section of the European Movement.*
- *FRANCOIS DE MENTHON French Member of Parliament (MRP); former Minister:—*C.F.E.U.*
- J. MEYNEN Netherlands Industrialist; former Netherlands Minister (People's Party).
- EDMOND MICHELET French Member of Parliament (Independent Popular Republican); former Minister; Chairman of the Association of former inmates of Dachau.

A. MILO IN VILLAGRAZIA	Italian Member of Central Committee of E.U.F.
GUY MOLLET	French Member of Parliament; Secretary-General of Socialist Party.
CHRISTIAN MONNIER	Vice-Chairman of International Finance Sub-Committee of the European Movement.
ERWIN MUELLER	Member of Saar Assembly (Catholic People's Party).
H. R. NORD	Dutch Jurist Netherlands Member of the Central Committee, E.U.F.
C. S. OFTEDAL	Norwegian Member of Parliament (Liberal).
H. OOSTERHUIS	Netherlands Member of Parliament (Socialist); Vice-Chairman of National Syndical Bureau.
HANS OPRECHT	Swiss Federal Minister; Chairman of Swiss Socialist Party.
ANDERS ORNE	Director-General of the Swedish National Debt; former Minister.
JAN PAULINY TOTH	Former Czechoslovak Minister Plenipotentiary; (Slovak Democratic Party).
HANS PERUTER	Austrian Member of Parliament (People's Party); former Minister.
CHARLES PEYER	Former Hungarian Prime Minister; Chairman of Hungarian Socialist Party.
CARLOS PI I SUNER	Former Minister of Spanish and Catalan Republican Governments.
MARCEAU PIVERT	French Member of Parliament member; of Central Committee of French Socialist Party.—S.M.U.S.E.
EDUARD RACZYNSKI	Former Polish Foreign Minister and former Ambassador.
PAUL RAMADIER	French Minister of National Defence (Socialist); former Prime Minister.
EMIL REUTER	Luxemburg Member of Parliament; (Christian Socialist); President of the Luxemburg Parliamentary Group.
PAUL REYNAUD	French Member of Parliament (Independent); former Prime Minister.
*LADY RHYS WILLIAMS	Hon. Secretary of British Economic Research Council.—U.E.M.
PAUL RIVET	French Member of Parliament (Socialist); Curator of "Musée de l'Homme."
CONSTANTIN RODOPOULOS	Greek Minister of Health (People's Party).
HENRI ROLIN	President of Belgian Senate (Socialist).
*DENIS DE ROUCEMONT	Swiss writer; Director of Cultural Bureau of the European Movement.
LEOPOLDO RUBINIACCI	Italian Senator (Christian Democrat).
HASAN SAKA	Former Turkish Prime Minister (Republican People's Party).
*E. M. SASSEN	Former Netherlands Minister (Catholic People's Party); N.E.I.
CARLO SCHMID	German Member of Parliament (Socialist); representing International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.
LOUISE SCHROEDER	Deputy Mayor of Berlin.

*J. S. SERRAENS	Netherlands Member of Parliament (Catholic People's Party); Vice-President of International Christian Trade Unions.
*DANIEL SERRUYS	French Economist (Liberal); former French Minister; <i>L.L.E.C.</i>
ANDRE SIEGFRIED	Member of the Académie Française.
IGNAZIO SILOHE	Italian writer; (Socialist).
*RAYMOND SILVA	French writer; <i>Secretary-General of Cultural Bureau of the European Movement.</i>
*HERMANN SMITT-INGEBREKTEN	President of Lower Chamber of Norwegian Parliament; (Conservative).
KARL SPIEKER	Member of Government of North Rhine-Westphalia (Centre Party).
*ALTIERO SPINELLI	Secretary of Italian Federalist Movement.
JEAN SPIROPOULOS	Professor of International Law, Athens University.
MANNE STAHL	Swedish Member of Parliament (Liberal).
RODOLPHE STADLER	Swiss Industrialist.
JAN STRANSKY	Former Member of Czechoslovak Parliament (Socialist).
*AGIS P. TAMBACPOULOS	Former Greek Minister (Conservative).
*PIERRE-HENRI TEITGEN	French Member of Parliament (M.R.P.); former Vice-Premier; <i>Chairman of Juridical Section of the European Movement.</i>
CHRISTINE TEUSCH	Minister for Cultural Affairs, North Rhine-Westphalia (Christian Democrat).
ZIVKO TOPALOVITCH	Yugoslav President of International Socialist Bureau for Eastern Europe.
ALI RIZA TUREL	Former Turkish Minister of Justice (Republican People's Party).
ETIENNE DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN	Belgian Senator; (Christian Socialist Party); <i>representing International Parliamentary Group of the European Movement.</i>
GEORGES VILLIERS	Chairman of French Employers' Federation.
*ANDRE VOISIN	Secretary-General of the French Federalist Movement:— <i>E.U.F.</i>
G. A. WICANDER	Swedish Industrialist.
*KARL WISTRAND	Swedish Senator (Conservative).
TERJE WOLD	Norwegian Member of Parliament (Socialist); <i>Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Steering.</i>

Footnote.

Unless otherwise indicated, the members of the International Council represent the National Council of the European Movement in their respective countries.

C.F.E.U. = Conseil Français pour l'Europe Unie.

E.L.E.C. = Economic League for European Co-operation.

E.U.F. = European Union of Federalists.

N.E.I. = Nouvelle Equipes Internationales.

S.M.U.S.E. = Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe.

U.E.M. = United Europe Movement.

* = Member of the Executive Committee.







