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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

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NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS

An Organization Theoretical Analysis of the
Debate on Nuclear Energy in
Swedish and German Trade Unions

Thesis submitted for assessment
with a view of obtaining
the Degree of Doctor
of the European University Institute

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Florence

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by

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European University Institute (Florence)

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*Doch der Mann in einer heitren Regung
Fragte noch: "Hat er was rausgekriegt?"
Sprach der Knabe: "Daß das weiche Wasser in Bewegung
Mit der Zeit den mächtigen Stein besiegt.
Du verstehst, das Harte unterliegt."*

Bertold Brecht

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INTRODUCTION

The *institutionalization of ecological attitudes* in highly industrialized societies is the main interest of this study. Analyses of national politics often underestimates the competing and partially latent interests which are voiced by different political pressure groups. Therefore, I am interested in the *response of the workers' movement* to the ecological challenge. Although the labor movement does not support the cruder forms of ecologism such as no-growth claims, of all established political actors it is the most open to these demands. This is so because the ecological politics offers an utopia for a modern society. The labor movement has also the aspiration of being a socially progressive force of society that aims for social change. Most directly, the left-wing parties have to compete with other parties that attract the post-material electorate. However, the policy and strategy of working-class parties are not independent of *trade union policy*. It is self-evident that politicians of social democratic parties consult trade unions in order to formulate their political goals. But also on the national policy level, unions are often consulted in order to obtain a broad alliance for some political decisions. All these examples should illustrate that trade union policy and standpoints concerning the development of society are important for the better understanding of the political outcomes of society. Yet traditional union policy - and also trade union research - tends very much to generally ignore politics: "Unions are involved in a major way in a very significant activity - the political life of the country - and yet there is considerable evidence that they do not take that activity very seriously". (Crouch, 1982: 192) [1]

Trade unions represent working-class interests better than, for instance, parties on the left, since they are determined by the social stratification of their members. Furthermore, trade unions are one of the most important vital resources for the workers' movement. With both these aspects, trade unions provide an excellent opportunity for research on the adoption of new politics by the labor movement.

Modern society is constantly changing. Structural, occupational, technological etc. changes all have their impact on trade unions. Trade unions are obviously challenged by the expansion of white collar employment and individualized living and working conditions. These challenges imply changes in the working-class consciousness. Even more important for the survival of the organization and the mobilization of workers, they create or can reveal latent heterogeneity, or even antagonism between particular groups of employees. The conflict on ecological issues may be a case in point for the general character of conflicts in post-industrial society. This conflict may create new tensions within the labor movement, or it may reinforce older cleavages.

I wish to focus on trade union policy in *Sweden* and the *Federal Republic of Germany* over the last two decades. Both countries are highly interesting concerning their labor movement and environmental policy. Sweden enjoys a long social democratic tradition and is often taken as a case in point when it comes to the analysis of Western working-class policy. Some writers see in Swedish industrial relations and the favorable power position for the working-class the seed for a transition to a new kind of socialism. Analyzing Swedish trade union policy means looking at that Western capitalist country in which labor movement ideology is furthest developed, established and closest to societal transition. In the manner that this dissertation considers the major blue-collar *and* white-collar unions in Sweden, it hopes to give a more comprehensive picture of trade unions in modern society than analyses which concentrate on the coherence of the Swedish labor movement by focussing mainly on the blue-collar unions [2]. West Germany, on the other hand, is of special interest here because of its strength in new social movements, and the Green Party which has led the eco-ideological debate for more than one decade (see, e.g.: Brand (ed.), 1985; Klandermans (ed.), 1989; Müller-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Dalton and Kuechler (ed.) 1990).

The analytical focus lies on the *adoption of elements of new politics* by trade unions in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. Elements of new politics are deduced from the literature on new politics. They are analytical concepts which build upon cognitive perceptions. These perceptions are expressed in political discourse and steer collective action (see, e.g: Touraine, 1988; Gamson, 1988; Snow et al., 1986; Kitschelt, 1984; Lewin, 1984; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Instead of focussing on a wide range of new politics issues, I decided to analyze the trade union debate on *nuclear energy* during the last two decades. Even if this issue has some special features which may distort conclusions referring to new politics in general, it provides a good account of the contradiction between economic and ecological interests. However, this way of reducing complexity opens the analysis for a specific bias of the issue. It would have been desirable to include further issues in the analysis, but this was impossible because of limited research resources. Although nuclear energy is the empirical subject of the analysis here, I am particularly interested in *references* made in the debate on nuclear energy which stress aspects of different attitudes concerning the development of society. It should be made clear that it is *not* the interest of this study to analyze the debate on nuclear energy itself [3] but rather to use this issue for conclusions concerning new politics in trade unions.

A special feature of this investigation is the concentration on organizational cognitions and communication. In fact, the dependent variable is operationalized at

the semantic level. Often I even speak of organizational behavior when I actually mean organizational expressions at the congress or in trade union newspapers. Although verbal and written assertions are on a pre-action level, they may determine organizational action:

If a decision maker is heavily constrained to keep his assertions and actions consistent with each other, then he may not only monitor his assertions (to keep them sincere), but he may also monitor his actions (to keep them consistent with his assertions). To the extent that actions are monitored to keep them consistent with the assertions, the assertions themselves constrain action. Because in certain contexts actions and assertions can be mutually constraining, the use of suitable documentary material from which to derive a cognitive map promises to be fruitful in understanding not only the assertion themselves but also the actual choices of the decision maker. (Axelrod, 1976: 253)

Studies on social conflict stress the importance of collective symbolic struggles in modern society (Habermas, Touraine, Pizzorno, Gamson, etc.). Communication in organizations can be considered as the cement that holds organizations together *and* enables them to interact with the organizational environment (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, 1976). In order to grasp the organizational semantics, I apply a *quantitative content analysis* on congressional material and trade union newspapers over the time period from 1973 until 1989. As a frame of reference I use approaches of *organization theory*. Besides applying aspects of established organization theory (structural contingency), I also refer to organization theoretical approaches, which stress the importance of social processes instead of structure. These approaches (institutionalization, resource dependence, evolution and process theory) have increased in importance over the last decades. These approaches are particularly helpful in explaining social change. However, the analysis has been conducted in a manner that the individual trade unions remain in the focus of the analysis. In contrast to most quantitative analyses, I wish to avoid considering organizations just as suppliers of testable relations of variables. In order to achieve this aim, I orient my analysis on the logic of modern *comparative method* (Ragin, 1987).

I mainly use the data of a research project which I conducted at the departments of political science and sociology at the universities of Gothenburg (Sweden) and Paderborn (Germany) between 1988 and 1990. This investigation was made possible by research grants of the *Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research* (Forskningsrådsnämnden) and a scholarship of the *Swedish Institute*. The German part of the empirical work was supported by the *Ministry of Research and Technology* of the Federal Republic of Germany [4].

The dissertation consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, I wish to outline the theoretical implication of social development in terms of new and old politics. This chapter should provide evidence that there is a new cleavage structure in society that

adds to the already established cleavages. On this level, the role of trade unions will be discussed in the historical context of old and new politics. Chapter two serves to prepare and specify the empirical study of the content analysis of trade union newspapers and congress protocols. Elements of modern organization theory will be introduced and operationalized in analytical terms.

Part two consists of chapter three that describes the stands trade unions expressed on nuclear energy and new politics at the union congresses and in the trade union newspapers. This chapter documents the stands in a chronological manner. Since the analysis is conducted on a high aggregate level, I include a detailed appendix on the congressional expressions on new and productionist politics of all analyzed trade unions.

Part three addresses some special aspects which might influence the perception of new politics by trade unions. It is divided into three chapters which focus on organizational characteristics and the organizational environment. Chapter four analyzes the impact of organizational characteristics such as union membership, sector, and organizational structure. Chapter five summarizes some of the more central concepts of the alternative approaches of organization theory. The individual unions (nine German and eleven Swedish) are analyzed in respect of their organizational potential for new politics, the manner of the organizational communication and the intra-organizational conflicts between productionist and new politics. Chapter six, finally, refers to aspects outside the trade union organizations. Such aspects refer to the development of the national energy demand and the economy. In particular, socio-political aspects are given attention to. These aspects concern the socio-political importance of environmental questions and the status and character of new social movements and Green Parties in Sweden and Germany. Differences in party systems are also a major aspect of this chapter.

The analysis comes to the conclusion that Swedish and German unions are substantially different in their standpoints and behaviors concerning new politics. Structural aspects such as membership characteristics, organized sectors, etc. have less influence on union stands than expected. Cognitive processes are much more important. Particularly, the trade union ideology is responsible for the standpoints towards new politics.

The study focuses on the analysis of the period between 1973 through 1989. That means that trends in Germany resulting from the unification of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany could not be taken into account. However, the analysis focuses on institutionalization processes which are

not easily changeable. Therefore the results of this study are also relevant for the future Germany.

Footnotes:

1 This finding is also confirmed by works on the other side of the Atlantic: see for instance Masters and Delaney, 1987.

2 Almost all studies that stress the extreme strength of the Swedish labor movement and trade unions take very little account of this fact. They analyze almost exclusively the blue collar trade unions in Sweden. This view is certainly not appropriate for the present analysis.

3 Studies on Swedish and German trade unions that focus more directly on the debate on nuclear energy are for instance: Micheletti, 1985; Siegmann, 1985; Grumbach, 1986.

4 I wish to thank the students who were employed in this project for the data collection: Gunilla Augustsson and Gunnel Vessman in Gothenburg and Doris Witing, Stefany R. van Scoyk and Volker Eickhoff in Paderborn.

PART 1

Theoretical Implications,
Approach, and
Research Design

PART ONE:

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS, APPROACH, AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Part one prepares the ground for the empirical analysis. First of all, the theoretical implications should be spelled out. In order to do that, I refer to the concept of new politics, interest representation, and political opportunity structure in social sciences. Most of the examples refer to the two countries under investigation: Sweden and Germany. Although these debates cannot be comprehensive, they should serve as an orientation and specify the focus of this analysis. Chapter one concentrates on the role of trade unions within the framework of new politics and interest representation. It is argued that trade unions have good reasons to be responsive to new politics but that they may have as many good reasons to ignore or oppose it.

Chapter two describes the analytical and empirical aspects of this investigation. Mainly referring to theories of organization and trade unions, the chapter outlines propositions for the empirical analysis. Furthermore, I operationalize the semantics of productionist and new politics, in order to apply it in a quantitative content analysis of congress material and trade union newspapers.

CHAPTER ONE:

TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The starting point of this analysis has to do with the *new social cleavage* [1] around new and productionist politics that has emerged in most of the advanced Western societies in recent years. *New politics* is characterized by *simultaneous* stressing of (new) social *issues* such as environmental pollution, peace, participation right, etc., (new) *modes of collective action* like demonstrations, boycotts, spontaneity, etc., (new) *values* of self-realization, personal autonomy and identity, and new social *actors* that are young, highly educated, and rather distant from production, gathering in new social movements, and organizing in Green parties, etc. In political science, these aspects have enjoyed great attention in the last decade in the context of party research. However, there has already been a lengthy theoretical debate in sociology which may explain some of the roots of new politics. To this aspect, I will turn in the first section of this chapter. The second major element of the analysis focuses on *organizations*. Organizations are not only a subject of change but they create, stabilize or change political processes in modern societies. They define to a large degree the *political opportunity structure* for social change in general, and new politics in particular. Therefore, the view at the organizational level is essential in order to understand the possibility for political change. However, since the investigation of all societal organizations is a huge task, I wish to concentrate on specific organizations: *trade unions*. Trade unions are one of the major organizations of the labor movement (beside left wing parties). The labor movement and its organizations started out to transform capitalist society. However, after more than one century since its emergence the conflict between capital and labor has been institutionalized (Dahrendorf, 1959; Touraine, 1971) and trade unions have been integrated into (neo-) corporative politics in many countries (Schmitter, 1974). Nevertheless, the labor movement proclaims to be a social progressive force in current society that strives for the improvement of the material-living conditions for employees and for equality, emancipation, democracy, etc. If that is so then the question arises which place trade unions (and the labor movement) take within the new social conflict that is mainly promoted by other social actors such as new social movements (Touraine, 1988).

The last implication of this analysis takes it for granted that politics in general and organizational politics in particular is not a coherent result. There are a lot of competing views on different issues and within each societal unit (organization, state, society, etc.). Therefore, the interest here lies in the *intra-organizational diversity* of trade unions concerning new politics.

1. THE FEATURE OF NEW POLITICS AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGE

In a cross national study on 16 West-European countries, Lane and Ersson conclude: "The only traces of the emergence of new politics is found in the rise in the score for ecological and public sector issues." (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 272) [2] As we can also see from this study Sweden and West Germany score among those nations in which ecology issues play an important role. For these countries new politics have become a reality [3]. Although my investigation is an empirical study on trade union policy, the thesis is drawn from theoretical debates on *new social conflicts* which have increased in importance during the last decades and which certainly do not have their roots in the analysis of the labor movement. One can trace this tradition back to the works elaborating on the term *post-industrial society*. Daniel Bell (1973 and 1976) and Alain Touraine (1971) use this notion in a quite different manner. The former, from a more conservative standpoint, analyzes the structural shifts in the economic system of society from goods production towards service production, the predominance of professional and technical classes, the primacy of theoretical knowledge, and planning of technology. These changes have fundamental consequences for the social and cultural system. Bell (1976) evaluates the cultural outcome as boundless entitlementarism or even hedonism. However, Bell postulates great changes and problems for trade unions through these changes (Bell, 1972). Alain Touraine interprets the consequences of the structural changes in post-industrial society in another light. He goes along with Bell in the sense that he views knowledge and education as dominant resources of post-industrial society, but, in addition, he identifies the new social conflict among certain *social actors*: after the traditional class antagonism has weakened (because of the dissolution of determined life situations, the institutionalization of class conflict, and the ideological function of economic growth), there arises a *new social cleavage* between bureaucrats and technocrats who promote *production and economic growth*, on the one hand, and parts of the population that wishes to defend their individual and collective *identity*, on the other. Instead of exploitation (conflict between labor and capital), alienation is the crucial factor for a countervailing identity. Already in the late 1960s, Touraine labels the actors of social change by their occupational status: employees in large service organizations, academics, engineers, technicians, and scientists. In later works, Touraine et al. (1983) sees in the anti-nuclear movement the actor of social change (i.e. the collective entity in which the heterogeneous "anti" groups meet). Like other French observers of the labor movement (Gorz, 1982), he dismisses the working-class as actor for social transition.

Jürgen Habermas (1973) analyzes social crises in late capitalism. In his elaborated concept of the development of capitalism, he concludes that a system crisis will only

be perceived as such, when it goes along with a crisis of people's identity [4]. Later, Habermas (1981) elaborates his reflection on late capitalism in his analysis of the social development of modernity, when he speaks of the eroding of normative elements by formalized principles. He describes in detail this dynamic process as the *colonization of the 'life world' by the 'system'* [5]. The latter principle prevails and penetrates in more and more life areas. This social process has been supported by both labor and capital, and is inherent in socialist and bourgeois ideology. Habermas identifies the social conflicts in modern societies at the link between system and life world. As Habermas puts it, the new social conflicts do not revolve around distribution problems but rather around *questions of the grammar of life styles*. These conflicts, according to Habermas, occur in the area of cultural reproduction and they are *not channelled by parties and associations* (Habermas, 1981: 576; Habermas, 1973; see also Berger et al. 1973 for similar arguments). Habermas goes even further and postulates that the ideology of both the Left and the Right have no social utopia to offer anymore. That leads him to the conclusion of a 'New Obscurity' and 'the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies' (Habermas, 1986).

In this context, the concept of post-modern society as a complement of post-industrial society enjoys an increasing attention in social sciences. Ulrich Beck attempts to fill the prefix "post" with meaning (Beck, 1986: 12; Beck, 1987). He presents an inspiring concept of social development in terms of *Risikogesellschaft* (risk society). The basic point in his argumentation is the changing character of risks: in the 19th century risks were associated with certain social groups, and risks were locally and socially limited. In present risk society, however, risks are global. The production of wealth implies as a by-product the creation of risk. Risks, in this analysis, are historical products of social action and of certain actors in the industrial society (above all capitalist *and* the working-class!). Risks receive a social quality in modern societies and accidents cannot be avoided in the long run (Perrow, 1984). Beck points out that risks in modern society cannot be limited in place, time, and to social groups (see also Kuechler and Dalton, 1990: 281).

Since risks and even ecological catastrophes often cannot directly be perceived by human senses (such as radioactivity, acid rain, ozone hole), the personal effectiveness is based on personal conviction. *Fear* [6] is a basic concept in this analysis which even has the power of creating a *solidarity* of otherwise individualized members of society [7]. The special cleavage of a risk society divides into *winner of risks* and *losers of risks*. This is a cleavage between sectors, branches, firms, regions, and even nations. Higher productivity of one actor results more or less directly in disadvantages for another. For instance, the higher production of one industry increases the pollution in one region and directly aggravates the living

quality that might be important for other industries in this region (tourism, housing, etc.). Often these conflicts cannot clearly be identified, since there might be a time lag or the actor causing the worsening situation is not to be made out (e.g. too many, too far away). The cleavage cuts across otherwise coherent social units. For instance, it sets capital against capital, branches against branches, sectors against sectors, and firms against firms. The new cleavage does not halt for the labor movement: it sets labor against labor and also unions against unions. Ulrich Beck summarizes the dilemma of modern society: the minimization of conflict through economic growth is eroded by the intensification of conflict through an increase in endangerment (Beck, 1988: 239). In this sense, one may speak of a *politicization of industrial production* (Kitschelt, 1985; Beck, 1986: 300-74).

The fact that unions compete against each other is not a new phenomenon. There were always conflicts among unions to organize the same kind of employees, etc. However, these traditional conflicts could be overcome by arrangements among the unions. The new cleavage between unions has another quality: the advantage for one union (or its membership) is simultaneously the disadvantage for another. A similar conflict may be seen in the international trade union movement. National unions are not sufficiently able to limit the international competition among labor. Self-restraint of wages, or the relinquishment of environmental protection is often justified by the competitive situation of the world market. This often stops unions from claiming reasonable demands such as shorter working-hours, balancing of productivity, and environmental friendly production.

In an empirical study, Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff (1980; 1981) compare environmentalists, industrialists, trade unionists and the public, and they demonstrate that trade unionists differ considerably in their preference for productionist aspects from the public and environmentalists. The authors see in the environmentalists a form of middle-class radicalism that is an expression of a "counter-paradigm" to the development of economic growth oriented industrial development:

Environmentalists are opposed not simply to the way industrial societies go about achieving the goal of wealth creation: they are opposed to its central and dominant economic and material values. ... The goal of environmentalists is to realize a society in which alternative values and institutions can take root. Post-material values are the values which they want to see made real in some future utopia. (Cotgrove and Duff, 1981: 99)

Most theoretical studies of social change in the field of new politics stress the importance of two aspects: first, that the new social cleavage is intermediated by competing world views and, secondly, that collective identity determines these world views (see for instance the works by Touraine, Melucci, Pizzorno, Bourdieu, Gamson). Bourdieu (1987) stresses the importance of the making of a social class by daily

social actions which in turn is a condition for social power that is translated into politics by mediating interest groups [8].

New politics can be placed on a dimension that competes with the traditional left/right dimension between labor and capital. This new dimension may be called ecology versus growth dimension (Vedung, 1980) or technology/ecology dimension (Korpi, 1980: 16 and 1983: 142-52; see also: Petersson, 1979: 174). I wish to use in the following the terms *new* versus *productionist* politics.

On the *semantic* level, new politics consist of values that favor a decentralized and small-scale organization of society, and opposes the aims of established work-oriented politics. Human aspects, the defence of alternative life-styles and the protection of the environment have a higher priority than the improvement of material-living conditions. In particular, economic growth and technical progress are the negative symbols of productionist politics. Productionist politics consists of "industrial values" and the belief in work, in man's power over nature, in austerity and moral rigor, in progress, and in the link between industrialization and social and moral liberation (Touraine, 1987; 1988; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990).

Although the new/productionist political dimension does not replace the left/right dimension, it adds to the old political conflict and increases in importance. As the research on social cleavage structures indicates, it cannot be the point to stress keenly that one dimension dominates over the other [9]. More interesting is the fact that different cleavages are always relevant which erode or counteract against alliances on other cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Kitschelt, 1985).

2. INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN MODERN SOCIETY

In the first section, I attempted to outline the social cleavage between new and productionist politics. Now I wish to look at the *societal reaction* to this cleavage. One may argue that society will not react to the environmental issues at all. Niklas Luhmann (1986: 40-50 and 218-26), for example, points out that social systems can only react to environmental stimuli according to the mode they perceive the world (codes). He uses the term *resonance* for further clarification. There may be reasons why systems *cannot* deal with new problems: there might be too little resonance, i.e. the problem as such is not important enough for the social system to consider or does not fit into the available codes of the system. On the other hand, there may be too many resonance, i.e. the problem demands too much or fast adaptations etc. from the system. After looking at the codes of relevant social sub-systems

(economy, law, science, politics, religion, and education), he concludes that modern society cannot react to the ecological challenge within the framework of established codes. In contrast to Luhmann, one might argue that normative elements are more receptive for irrational aspects and that these life-world elements may erode rational elements (Berger, 1982, see also Gotsch, 1987 for a critical review of the literature).

In modern society, *organizations* play a decisive role in how society develops. They create, stabilize and change social and political processes in modern society [10]. As Charles Perrow puts it at the end of his book on complex organizations:

... it is through organizations (...) that classes are constituted and reproduced, stratification systems created and stabilized (and changed in some cases), political processes tamed and guided, and culture itself shaped and molded. (Perrow, 1986: 278)

Although the social development leaves room for more or less unpredictable power struggles, it is important to specify which standpoints social organizations take on ideas about the societal development in general and on controversial issues in particular. However, this assumption does not exclude that impacts for social change can come from other sources (e.g. social movements, charismatic leaders, catastrophes). But even in these cases, the social impacts on practical politics are filtered by organizations.

In modern society, the interest representation of capital, labor and the state have a prominent place. This is the premises of *neo-corporatism* (e.g.: Schmitter, 1974; Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982). Empirical studies confirm the importance of interest organizations for the countries under investigation here. In his analysis of "democratic corporatism" in small states where Sweden is one object of investigation Peter Katzenstein points out: "Politics is of great importance, but it is important within interest groups, determining which issues get on the public agenda and setting the parameters of political choice." (Katzenstein, 1985: 33; in the context of energy policy see also Sahr, 1985: 173-75) And more specific he notes for West Germany:

West Germany's political economy is founded on political inclusion of business and unions as well as conservative and progressive political parties. The Federal Republic favors the principle of market competition and international trade. The country's postwar experience, moreover, illustrates why democratic corporatism need not necessarily be considered anathema by Social Democrats who associate all corporatism with the repression or exclusion of labor. *West Germany comes closer than any other large industrial state to the logic by which political life in the small European states is organized.* (Katzenstein, 1985: 31; added italics D.J.)

However, Claus Offe analyses the consequences of the attribution of public status to interest organizations in detail. I would like to illuminate two aspects in this context:

first, the interest representation in corporatist societies is conducted by the most powerful interest groups that settle their conflicts at the expense of social categories (groups and issues) that are poorly organized (Offe, 1981: 128/9). In this context, it is important to be aware of two functions of the corporative politics:

The advantage of corporatist modes of interest representation over democratic representative ones resides in the potential of the former for *depoliticizing conflict*, that is, in restricting both the scope of the participants in conflict and the scope of strategies and tactics that are permitted in the pursuit of conflicting interests. (Offe, 1981: 141)

Second, as will be described in more detail for trade unions below, economic growth obtained a crucial status for de-politicization. Economic growth served as an ever growing pie from which capital and labor obtain ever bigger pieces.

Both sides [capital and labor; D.J.] have an interest in continuous economic growth, one, because it is the precondition for capital accumulation, and the other, because it is a requirement for successful interest representation. ... both employers and unions have a common interest in the preservation of the capitalist mode of production, the former for obvious reasons and the latter because that mode of production is the basis for their organizational existence, and with its transformation their fate would be uncertain or they would become superfluous altogether. (Erd and Scherrer, 1985: 120)

In this way, economic growth served indirectly other societal goals such as employment, monetary stability, demand stimulation, and even social equity (Schmitter, 1988: 503). Both capital and labor could win in this game. However, Philippe Schmitter (1989: 70) sees in the fact "... that the substantive content of interest conflicts (and, hence, an important measure of policy attention) has shifted away from class-based lines of cleavage towards a panoply of discrete issues focusing on consumer protection, quality of life, gender, environment, ethical and other problems, each with their respective movements" the main reasons why there may be no return to corporatism in the form as we have known it. The growing protest against the corporative compromise from outside the "growth coalition" is best described by the *politicization of industrial production* [11]. Josef Esser gives empirical evidence that German trade unions perceive membership interest selectively according to the achievement orientation in the tradition of "economic and technological progress fetishism" (Esser, 1982: 264/5). For the German unions, he concludes that the politics of trade unions lead to a fragmentation of the working-class between privileged groups such as male, industrial workers in stable employment positions in the primary industry sector, on the one hand, and women, foreigners, and other under-privileged occupational groups in the secondary industrial sector and those without work, on the other (see also: Offe, 1985e). Furthermore, he postulates the incapacity of integrating and channelling interests which are caused by social structural mobility, new social movements, etc. into the established political system (Esser, 1982: 47). A common pattern for this development is that trade unions' concentration on

material aspects above all wage policy (or other easily quantifiable issues) by simultaneous neglecting of societal political issues.

The second aspect stressed by Perrow is that organizations reproduce classes. However, there are several studies that indicate that the labor organizations tend to change their ideological core and the mission of the labor movement. In his classic study of the "iron law of oligarchy", Robert Michels demonstrates how secondary, organizational goals replace the mission of the labor movement and Lenin criticizes the defensive productionist "trade unionist" character of the labor movement. Alain Touraine and co-workers elaborate on the role of trade unions in present society. In their analysis of the labor movement they divide analytically the development of the *workers' movement*, on the one hand, and the *trade union* organization, on the other. The former lost its mission while the latter could establish themselves as *formal organizations* in society:

Unions may remain important, but what appears to have declined permanently is the "labor movement" as such - the capacity of organized labor to challenge the system of social and economic organization. Trade unionism was, at a given time, a social movement; it is now a political force that is necessarily subordinated to political parties and to governments because it tends to defend specific interests... Gone is the link between unions and alternative images of a reconstructed society. (Touraine, 1986: 172-3)

The described process is best seen in its historical development. In order to clarify this process for trade unions, I wish to place them within the conceptual framework of 'old' and 'new' politics or paradigms. .

3. TRADE UNIONS IN OLD AND NEW POLITICS

'Old politics' and 'old paradigm' are terms which describe the established mode of political performance. The former term emphasizes the social cleavage of established politics, the antagonism of working-class and bourgeoisie or the left-right dimension (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Hildebrandt and Dalton, 1979). The latter term refers to a comprehensive model of what politics is about: the social base of actors, issues, concerns, values and mode of action such as power and distribution relations (Raschke, 1980; Offe, 1985c). Old and new politics are concepts that refer to historical periods but as mentioned above also to semantic forms, social actors, issues, concerns and values, and modes of action. In this section, I wish to stress the historical aspect in more detail. This is important because interest groups of old politics are still the most important groups in present society (Micheletti, 1989). They transfer their values and attitudes of the period of their formation [12] on issues and ideologies of the present time.

Old politics and trade union policy: from antagonism to consensus

There are two periods within the framework of old politics (Sabel, 1981). The first apparently extends from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. This was the time of the formation of the trade unions' "new collective identity" (Pizzorno, 1978):

During this early period of capitalism, the division of labor was such that work relations bound workers together on the job and fused their relations at work with their lives at home. Work thus gave rise to an all-embracing community. Implicit in the idea of community is the idea of solidarity; and the institutional face of solidarity in a working community was the trade union. In this period, membership in trade unions was thus more a sign of a particular social identity than the result of a calculation of expected economic benefits. The leaders of these organizations were not plagued by the free-rider problem, because paying dues was a moral obligation, not an investment. (Sabel, 1981: 224)

In this first period of old politics, there was a well-defined antagonism between the social actors: capital and labor. With the exception of Luddism, both classes believed in social progress through technical progress. "Class conscious workers", Alain Touraine (1986: 152) notes, "accept the basic cultural values of an industrial society (such as belief in progress through improved industrial productivity) but see themselves as victims of the social control of economic activities." This conviction constituted the normative ground of the post war consensus, the second period of old politics [13].

Economic progress subverted the workers' commitment to the union. The normative ties of the membership to the organization were replaced by instrumental ones and the gap opened between specific organization self-interests and membership interests (Pizzorno, 1978). This development was determined by socio-structural changes such as social mobility, which resulted in the dissolving of the traditional working-class milieu (Mooser, 1984; P.A. Berger 1986; Lindhagen and Nilsson, 1970). One measurement of the trade unions' ability to insure organizational strength and survival in this situation was the formation of alliances with capital. In this period, consensus politics and economic growth obtained an ideological status (Sabel 1981: 209). This was the unquestioned prerequisite for social welfare. Capital and labor formed an alliance whereby "... capitalism as a growth machine was completed by organized labor as a distribution and security machine." (Offe, 1985c: 822)

In this logic, trade unions can be analyzed as *intermediary* organizations (see also chapter two). Walther Müller-Jentsch (1985; 1988) traces the historical lines of the evolution from 'classical' to 'intermediary' unions. The classical union emphasizes the role of unions as a social movement and expression of the socio-economic interests of their members. The struggle within the wage system and against the capita-

list order were the main points of reference. To consider trade unions as intermediary organizations takes account of changes which took place in the second period of old politics. Unions' "... politics are the result of the pragmatic resolution of differences between interests of capital on the one hand and labour on the other". (Müller-Jentsch, 1985: 4; for some empirical developments along these lines see for Sweden: Fulcher, 1988: 131; for West Germany: Bergmann et al., 1976; Esser, 1982). This pragmatic resolution of differences between the interests of capital and labor had fundamental consequences for trade unions as organizations. The formulation of interest shifted from antagonistic class interest towards general and compatible interests with the capitalist system (general welfare expectations and growth of profits through economic growth politics).

Since solidarity has faded, latent interest-diversity among the members could not be counteracted by an appeal on common normative grounds. In this way, the decoupling of industrial values from the ideology of class antagonism and class struggle during the consensus policy made the heterogeneity of the working-class become acute. The heterogeneity consists of sectoral, industrial, even non-work oriented interests and resulted in organizational weakness:

Under the influence of growing heterogeneity, or even antagonism between the interests of particular, increasingly differentiated groups of employees (resulting from cultural, economic and organizational processes of differentiation), the chances of realizing employee interest will lessen to the degree that the level of effective solidarity among the membership base shrinks, that is, in so far as these tendencies toward differentiation and division cannot be successfully counteracted. (Offe, 1985b: 164)

The replacement of normative ties by instrumental ties makes the labor movement and its organizations vulnerable to the "free-rider" problem (Olson, 1965). Furthermore, and more important for the investigation here, are the organizational and ideological problems resulting from social developments which challenge the economic growth consensus, on the one hand, and from movements and developments which are able to activate and mobilize "normative" resources, on the other [14]. Both conditions are present in the period of new politics.

New politics and trade union policy: the challenge of economic growth consensus
New politics can be best understood by the use of the concept of the new paradigm. Joachim Raschke (1980) speaks of the emergence of the paradigm of "way of life" or "mode of life" (Offe, 1985c). He identifies new actors, issues, values, and modes of action. I wish to concentrate on the semantics of new politics. New politics opposes centralized control, bureaucratization, regulation, and the priority of economic growth, etc. Autonomy and the free development of identity are values that are important. The "new" values of self-realization, autonomy and identity are not in

themselves new, but they are given a different urgency and priority (Offe, 1985c: 829). The empirical study by Cotgrove and Duff may clarify the point. They distinguish four dimensions: wealth creation versus limit of growth, authority versus participation, markets versus non-markets, individual versus collective. Environmentalists and trade unionists more or less go along with the authority/participation and market/non-market dimension. The fundamental differences, however, are on wealth creation/limits of growth dimension, especially concerning economic growth, and on the individual/collective dimension. For instance, two percent of the environmentalists give high priority to economic growth as opposed to 44 percent of trade unionists (46 percent of the public) [15]. Trade unionists go along with industrialists on economic growth questions, but on the dimension of "individual versus collective ideals" the public attitudes are closer to those of environmentalists than to the opinion of trade unionists. This result indicates the problem faced by trade unionist who take a stand together with industrialists on productionist issues *against* environmentalists, but take a stand *against* industrialists on other dimensions. New social movements, as a representative example of new politics, are most distinguished from other social actors because of their ideological stand (Melucci, 1989: 38-57; Offe, 1990; Kuechler and Dalton, 1990: 278-82) [16].

New social movements reject the major cultural values of industrial society with which the workers' movement is still largely identified. In particular, the challenge of the economic growth consensus between labor and capital by the new social movements erodes the established modes of interest representation in modern society (Offe, 1985c). Even if trade unions and the labor movement do not belong to the actor of social change in respect to new politics, they can hinder or promote social change in the way how both movements cooperate with each other:

The workers' movement can provide the nascent social campaigns with the image of a social movement, and in so doing can help them develop and discover their own identities. (Touraine et al., 1987: 294)

4. TRADE UNIONS AND THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE

Because of the status of trade unions as both a relevant political actor in the system of interest representation and of belonging to the labor movement, *trade unions are part of the political opportunity structure* for political issues in general and environmental questions in particular [17]. The reaction of traditional political actors may be classified either as an absorption or exclusion of new political movements (Nedelmann, 1984: 1040-44). More appropriate, however, is to shift the level of analysis from social actors towards *semantics* and *meanings* (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). This perception of social processes comes close to Melucci's approach that

focuses on collective identities, which in turn are not coherent, but results from a permanent negotiation process. By doing so, we can overcome the static dichotomy of absorption and exclusion and analyze more thoroughly the subtle intra-organizational changes within both movements. Most recently, research on new social movements stress the importance of the social context: "Social movements organizations develop out of existing networks of organizations which are necessary both to generate and to maintain them." (Klandermans, 1990: 123). And the impact and identity of collective actors can be supportive or opposing. The labor movement is a particularly important actor in this context (Tarrow, 1990).


As I have outlined above, economic growth and technological progress have been defined as a desired social outcome because they may satisfy the (material) needs of the members of society. In this way, technology itself has been perceived as politically neutral. An often stated argument is that decisions cannot be taken against the "natural power of technology". On the other hand, scientific judgement has often replaced political assessment which Habermas (1971) refers to as the 'scientisation of politics'. However, it is most likely that technological decisions are always connected to interests of certain societal groups. Therefore, it is fruitful to consider the political opportunity structure as determining the *power of definition* of political relevant issues. Beck (1988: 211-226) sees in the *definition relations* (in contrast to production relations) the crucial arena of political struggle in modern society [18].

Definition relation may fluctuate with changes in perception of relevant political actors. The conditions for change may be objective, such as structural changes, or subjective, such as changes of values. The incentives for change can come from outside but also from inside the organization. However, the basic point for changes in the definition relations is a social struggle of relevant political actors: "Sustained collective action involves a symbolic struggle." (Gamson, 1988: 219)

The Potential for Political Alliances

The description of the new social cleavage and the status of unions in society suggests that the response of unions can range from neglect to rejection to adoption of elements of new politics. The cultural heritage of union origin leads to the conclusion that trade unions are rather reluctant to cope with new politics. However, changes in the occupational structure and the aspiration of being part of an innovative social progressive force may facilitate the openness of trade unions to new politics (Cotgrove, 1982: 112-4). Furthermore, the labor movement does not act in isolation but is dependent upon alliances with other societal actors. Hypothetically, there are two alliances possible for the labor movement. I wish to refer to Claus Offe's model:

Figure 1-1: A Triangular Model of Political Cleavages and Potential Alliances



Source: original from Ofte, 1985c: 858 with some changes from Minckenberg and Inglehart, 1990: 90, and own changes

We are here interested in the alliances of the labor movement with elements of the new social movements (alliance III) and with the conservative-liberal right (alliance II). As suggested by Michael Minckenberg and Ronald Inglehart (1989: 90), alliance III may be labelled as new politics and alliance II as old politics. In Sweden, the "red-green" alliance between the agrarian Center Party and the labor movement is a form of alliance II. This alliance realized the Swedish welfare state of today (Esping-Andersen, 1985). In West Germany, the party coalition (alliance II) of Social Democracy was based on Liberals (Katzenstein, 1987: 35-45). In both countries, this era seems to be at an end and new or redefined alliances are needed. The new middle strata are crucial for the future of the labor movements:

... the social democratic road to power will depend almost entirely on the chances of a coalition with the white-collar middle strata. (Esping-Andersen, 1985: 38)

Gösta Esping-Andersen analyzes the new class alliances on the terrain of Social Democratic policy. My investigation focuses on the potential alliances of the labor movement on the ground of new politics. An alliance between the traditional left and elements of the traditional right would stress the importance of wealth creation by the mean of economic growth and social welfare. It is - more or less - a continuation of the "growth coalition". Its policy would aim to actively de-politicalize the concerns of new social movements, point out their illegal status, and irresponsibility and irrationality. Environmental protection and new energy resources would be seen as possibilities for high-technology growth industries. Paradigmatic changes and sub-

stantial claims of changing the industrial development in the sense of the 'old paradigm' would be neglected, marginalized, and forced to be articulated outside the institutional way of politics. In this alliance the new social movement represents a threat to well-known and popular political procedures and habits.

An alliance between elements of the traditional left and elements of new social movements would build on the left-orientation of some new middle class elements:

Thus, a highly "modern" social democratic party may hope to compensate for the losses resulting from its weakening roots in the working class by establishing links with the new middle class constituency of the new social movements. ... such an electoral realignment is not easy to accomplish unless very basic changes in the strategic priorities of social democratic parties are adopted, changes which would reconcile the interests of the industrial working class and unions, on the one side, and, on the other, the concerns of the new middle class movements (including parts of the "peripheral" clientele of new middle class human service professions) on a *strategic* (rather than tactical, electoral, and ad hoc) level. (Offe, 1985c: 865)

There are two driving forces for this alliances: first, the new middle class elements within the labor movement which has increased in the post war period could support this alliance. Second, this alliance could also revitalize the dying ideological sources of a left utopia (Habermas, 1986) by means of a "transfusion of new blood" from the new social movements. However, there are also a lot of reasons to avoid this alliance. For instance, the economic crisis may lead to concentrate more on "bread and butter" issues like economic growth. In fact, alliance III would mean to slip out of the "growth coalition" and endanger political successes of the past.[19]

Trade unions may not respond coherently to the challenge of new politics. Partly they are responsive, partly they look for other alliances in society. The form of this diversity reveals cleavages within trade unions along the new cleavage line. However, even if this process appears to be new, it may revitalize old conflicting positions within trade unions [20].

Interest Diversity and Trade Union Unity [21]

Increasing heterogeneity deprives unions (and all other intermediary organizations) of the resources for *mechanic solidarity* upon which grounds it is possible to reach *organic solidarity* for the organization (Streeck, 1987: 477). With the "extinction of the regular customers" (*das Aussterben des Stammkunden*) as Streeck (1987: 474) puts it the latent conflicts among employees become acute. This is especially the case if there are new actors who can formulate an alternative ideology and utopia for social development and by doing so threaten and compete with old and disillusioned ideologies (Rammstedt, 1981).

Being responsive to the elements of new politics may lead to intra organizational tension in trade unions. Amatai Etzioni considers the position of the labor movement as advantageous, when he sees the possibility of de-coupling productionist and non-productionist aspects by the division of labor (organization of interest) by trade unions and left parties:

We may say that the compliance division between party and union allows the labor movement as a whole to maintain the commitments of three types of members: those who are more oriented to the "sacred" (or normative) side will be more attracted to the party (e.g. non-working population groups such as teenagers, the aged; intellectuals); those who are more "profane" (or calculative) in their orientation will be more attracted to the unions (e.g., the majority of blue-collar workers); and those who wish to fulfill both psychological needs in the labor movement but do not wish to mix the sacred with the profane can also be satisfied, through both organizations. (Etzioni, 1975: 424/5) [22]

Etzioni concedes that unions have also to combine normative and calculative aspects but certainly he underestimates the conflicts which may emerge out of competing demands of "profane" and "sacred" needs. Although Etzioni puts a lot of effort into analyzing the tension between utilitarian and normative aspects, he never raises the question what would happen if both factors conflict in an antagonistic manner. That is to say, when sacred and profane interests exclude each other as it is the case in the new cleavage structure.

One cleavage that may be reinforced through the new cleavage is the one between *blue collar workers* and *white collar workers*. Colin Crouch expects three different developments among Western European unions in this context. He summarizes the succeeding problems of the expansion of white collar workers for the labor movement as follows:

"... there are three possibilities (here): (a) in those countries where unions fail to recruit an increasing proportion of the new work force, they will be better able to retain their old sense of direction, but will represent a declining minority of the work force; (b) where the new categories join unions but in separate white-collar or professional confederations, as in Scandinavia, the old social democratic component of organized labour will gradually cede dominance to "bourgeois" or non-partisan unions; or (c) in those countries where manual and non-manual workers are successfully organized within the same confederation (i.e. Austria, the UK and increasingly West Germany), the main confederation themselves will be vulnerable to change in character." (Crouch 1986: 6/7)

Another similar cleavage line that may be reinforced is the one between the *private* and *public* sectors. The private, competitive sector may be more in favor of productionist politics whereas in the sheltered public sector some sympathy for new politics may arise.

Furthermore, the new cleavage can reinforce and create *ideological cleavages* between the unions. As I have argued above, productionist politics is often associated with class compromises between labor and capital. This compromises have often

been criticized within the labor movement. In this sense, there can arise a conflict between - let us call them - "radical unions" and "moderate unions".

The new cleavage line may also imply qualitatively *new conflicts* within the union movement. *First*, groups of employees take a stand on issues which are not at all relevant for their own work area, but which they feel concern their living conditions. *Second*, unions which are by no means involved in the issue become obliged to take a stand on it, e.g. teachers' unions are obliged to take a stand on nuclear power questions. *Third*, union policy becomes obstructed by unions of other sectors, e.g. unions which organize nuclear power plant workers are criticized by service sector unions and *vica versa*. *Fourth*, central confederations, and even boards of some single unions, have to compromise on this conflict and cannot rely on a separation of tasks according to sectors and occupations. They are placed in the center of the conflict.

In its plainest form, the new cleavage line can create a new dividing line within the trade union movement between "new politics union" and "productionist unions". Empirically speaking, a mixture of established cleavages and additional aspects of the new cleavage may modify the policy of the trade unions. In the future, the new social cleavage can increase in importance for trade unions because of two factors. First, ecological problems become more and more obvious and catastrophes will happen in the future (Perrow, 1984). These accidents may vitalize elements of new politics. Second, the groups who value elements of new politics more highly increase in numbers and the more committed core of the working-class (blue collar workers) will decline in numbers. This development has fundamental consequences for the content and form of trade union policy in the future (Schmidman, 1979; Visser, 1990: 207).

5. CONCLUSION

In highly industrialized societies, a new cleavage has emerged that cuts across established organizations and political alliances. However, it is difficult to estimate whether or not society can respond to the challenge of new politics. Trade unions are one of the important actors of the institutionalized system of interest representation. Although the historical development of the labor movement gives little hope that unions may respond to new politics, there are also other indicators that unions may be open to new politics. In particular, changes in the occupational structure and the search for new alliances speak for the latter possibility.

The interest of this analysis is *whether* and *how* trade unions take up the issues and semantics of new politics. It is particularly interesting which stand the labor movement in form of trade unions takes in this conflict, since its role may have shifted from the actor of change to an object of change. Another interest lies in the question whether the change of new and productionist politics leads to *intra-organizational conflicts* within the labor movement. Trade unions are well suited for the analysis of cleavages *within* the labor movement because they are determined by social stratification of their members (Korpi, 1978).

The new social cleavage may create conflicts within trade unions which may run along the lines of their membership, societal coalitions, and ideological standpoints. As always in social research, these organizational factors may be altered by socio-cultural, political, economic, and situational factors. The question which of these factors play a decisive role is an empirical one.

Footnotes:

1 Different cleavages are always relevant and erode or counteract against alliances on another cleavage line (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Kitschelt 1985). Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson define cleavages:

A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflicts arise. The concept of cleavage is thus not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by conflict. (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 39)

The authors also stress the importance of distinguishing between latent and manifest cleavages. This distinction is important in order not to perceive cleavages as either dominant or absent. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their classic study emphasize the historical aspect of cleavage structures. They, too, stress the importance of different cleavages (center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and owner-worker). However, they may change in importance over time (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 6). According to this view the present analysis looks at the interplay among *both* the left/right and the ecology/growth cleavages as other investigations stress other conflicts such as the relevance of the religious cleavage in the union movement, etc. For the Western party systems Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 46) note that "... the interaction of the "center-periphery," state-church, and land-industry cleavage tended to produce much more marked, and apparently much more stubborn, differences among the national party systems than any of the cleavages brought about through the rise of the working-class movements." That means that old cleavages have fundamental impacts on current social conflicts. For instance, the ecology/growth cleavage - or as I will call it here the new/productionist politics cleavage - is strongly debated in terms and ideologies of older cleavages.

2 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson employ two different techniques in order to identify major issues. On the one hand, they check what various newspapers have focussed on in Keesings Contemporary Archives. This indicator has as a target *public opinion* activities. On the other hand, they identify those decisions in parliament that have or could have been the cause of shifts in government or in coalition patterns according to national specialists (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 255-276, and 359). In particular in Sweden, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, and Switzerland the ecological issue (nuclear energy, pollution, zero-growth politics) plays a dominant role. Furthermore, they find out that the ecology and public sector issues are highly correlated to each other (Pearson's $r = .62$; p. 273, table 8.1) and as the only issues are positively related to affluence (ecology: $r = .75$, and public sector: $r = .45$; p. 275 and table 8.2).

3 The major empirical and analytical contribution in the research of new politics stem from Ronald Inglehart (1977) who has conducted surveys in Western societies for more than the last two decades which indicate a value change from material towards post-materialist values. Also studies on political form and participation indicate a change of participation patterns (Barnes and Kaase, (ed.) 1979; Hildebrandt and Dalton, 1979) or even the political culture of Western societies (Baker et al., 1981; Gibbins, (ed.) 1989). In election research, changes are discussed under the heading de-alignment, re-alignment etc. or in social and political theory under legitimization crisis, discontinuity, fragmentation and overload. One outstanding empirical indicator are Green or Ecological parties which changed the party systems of a lot of Western (and partly Eastern) countries after several decades of stability (Poguntke, 1987; Müller-Rommel, 1985a; 1989; Vedung, 1980; 1989). New social movements (ecology, anti-nuclear, women, peace movements, etc.) probably show best the protests of new politics beyond the established channels (Brand et al., 1986; Brand, (ed.) 1985; Roth and Rucht (eds.), 1987; Müller-

Rommel 1985b; Offe, 1985c; Kriesi, 1989a; Klandermans (ed.), 1989; etc.). For an overview of recent trends see also Dalton and Kuechler (ed.), 1990. These are just some examples of the vast literature in this field.

4 Habermas builds heavily upon Lockwood's concept of crisis. Lockwood considers two aspects as important: the system integration and the social integration. One can only speak of a crisis when both factors come together. However, later Habermas develops a more sophisticated concept of integration and crisis (Habermas, 1981: 212-28).

5 As an empirical socio-historical analysis for the colonization of a traditional sector by an industrial sector in Germany see Burkart Lutz. He points out that the post war prosperity in Europe eroded the precondition for the reproduction of the type of worker that realized this prosperity (Lutz, 1984: 250-54).

6 *Fear or worry* is a central aspect in the evaluation of social action in the context of the reactions to ecological problems. Some, as Beck, see in the fear *against* certain technologies and developments a common dominator that can lead to collective action even if that action is not rational in the conventional sense of the word. Others cannot see the possibility that fear might lead to social action on society level (Luhmann, 1986: 237-48, in particular 246-48).

7 Beck (1983; 1986: part 2) takes a lot of efforts to clarify the process of individualization in modern society. In particular, the dissolving of class relations and class reproduction have fundamental consequences for the labor movement. Furthermore, Beck postulates that those groups feel most affected by risks which are mostly individualized (Beck, 1988: 93). However, I cannot go into more detail here and wish to refer to some empirical work in this context (Mooser, 1984; P.A. Berger, 1986; Lindhagen and Nilsson, 1970).

8 Since the following quotation summarizes this argument I wish to quote Bourdieu in some length:

Thus, alongside the individual struggles of daily life in which agents continually contribute to changing the social world by striving to impose a representation of themselves through strategies of presentation of self, are the properly political collective struggles. In these struggles whose ultimate aim, in modern societies, is the power to nominate held by the state, i.e., the monopoly over legitimate symbolic violence, agents - who in this case are almost always specialists, such as politicians - struggle to impose representation (e.g., demonstrations) which create the very things represented, which make them exist publicly, officially. Their goal is to turn their own vision of the social world, and the principles of division upon which it is based, into the official vision, into *nomos*, the official principle of vision and division.

What is at stake in symbolic struggles is the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions, that is to say, symbolic power as *worldmaking* power ..., the power to impose and to inculcate principles of construction of reality, and particularly to preserve or transform established principles of union and separation, of association and disassociation already at work in the social world such as current classifications in the matters of gender, age, ethnicity, region or nation, that is, essentially, power over *words* used to describe groups or the institutions which represent them. Symbolic power, whose form *par excellence* is the power to make groups and to consecrate or institute them (in particular through rites of institution, the paradigm here being marriage), consists in the power to make something exist in the objectified, public, formal state which only previously existed in an implicit state, as with the constellation which ... begins to exist only when it is selected and designated as such. When it is applied to social collective, even one which is potentially defined in the manner of the cloud, the performative power of naming, which almost always comes with a power of *representation*, brings into existence in an instituted form, i.e., as a corporate body, what hitherto existed only as a cereal collection of juxtaposed individuals. Here one would need to pursue more fully the implications of the fact that the symbolic struggle between agents is for the most part carried out through the mediation of professionals of representation who, accounting as spokes-persons for the groups at whose service they place their specific competence, confront each other within a closed, relatively autonomous field, namely, the field of politics. (Bourdieu, 1987: 13-14)

9 Walter Korpi wishes to stress the fact that the new political dimension does not replace the left/right dimension. In order to demonstrate this fact, he uses doubtful empirical evidence. However, also Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter (1985) stress the fact - although in another research interest - that different models of social order lead to the emphasis of different cleavage structures which all may be of relevance. Even within these different models they explicitly distinguish between principal and other relevant cleavages.

10 In fact that organizations are basic elements for society is mentioned in most of the major introduction texts on organizations. For convincing examples see for instance: Scott, 1987: 1; Perrow, 1986: 278; Thompson, 1967: 3.

11 Terms like *disorganized capitalism* (Offe, 1985a; Lash and Urry, 1987) also focus on this aspect although they have a wider process of disorganization in mind. The term *growth coalition* has been used by Ulrich von Alemann (1983) and Josef Esser (1982). Also Ralph Dahrendorf gives an example of this alliance and the consequences for new politics:

[The ecologists represent] ... a force for a new quality of life which the administrators of the social-democratic consensus fear for good reasons. This force cannot only cost the consensus parties votes, but it aims at their very core, at the assumptions on which the consensus is based. It is about changing the subject and the quest for something new - small wonder that

governments and opposition, trade unions and employers are united in condemning it! (Dahrendorf, 1979: 114; quoted from: Lauber, 1983: 340)

12 Stinchcombe (1965) postulates that organizations keep to the values of their formative years. For organizations of old politics, these values can be described as industrial values as outlined in text.

13 The ground for this consensus was shaped as early as the 1930s and 1940s in most of the corporatist countries (Katzenstein, 1985: 210). For Sweden it is even possible to identify tripartite constellations at the turn of the century (Johansson, 1989; Stråth, 1990)

14 For Sweden, an empirical study on the public affinity with social movements shows that new social movement are perceived more positively than old movements. On a scale from 0 to 10 new social movement score highest (peace movement: 5.8, and environmental movements: 5.6). The workers' movement obtains only a middle rank (3.8) while temperance (2.6) and Free Church movements (1.3) score lowest (Petersson et al., 1989: table 4.15).

15 In an international survey associated to the one of Cotgrove and Duff, the opinion to nuclear power was explored. It answered to the statement: "There is a need for nuclear power" on a 7-item scale in Britain and the USA: 25.5 percent (USA: 30.7) of the public agreed to this statement (only item 7) and 11.2 percent (9.3 percent) disagreed (item 1); 6.3 percent (10.3 percent) of the environmentalists agreed and 26.7 percent (34.5 percent) disagreed; 50.6 percent (70.2 percent) of the industrialists agreed and 1.5 percent (1.3 percent) disagreed; 27.9 percent (44.7 percent) of the trade unionists agreed and 10.1 percent (14.1 percent) disagreed (Kessel and Tischler, 1981; Fietkau et al., 1982)

17 As Offe (1990: 233-4) points out this ideology is not concrete one in the sense of anything like a historical design or positive utopia but is rather a "post-ideological" or even "post-historical" in nature.

17 Political opportunity structure is normally referred to as concept for the political mobilization of new social movements. "Political opportunity structures are compromised on specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others." (Kitschelt, 1986: 58) Sidney Tarrow (1983; 1988: 429/30) distinguishes mainly three dimensions: the degree of openness/closure of formal political access; the degree of stability/instability of electoral alignments; and the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners. All three dimensions are closely inter-related. Taken together they provide a concept for the chances for new social movements to influence politics. I wish to use the term here mainly under Tarrow's third aspect: the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners. Hanspeter Kriesi points out trade unions are often indirectly related to new social movements, i.e. a high amount of their members are also members or sympathizers of new social movements (Kriesi and van Praag, 1987). However, for the Dutch peace movement he finds out that in particular white collar unions, above all those which organize officials and social workers or teachers have closer relations to the peace movement (Kriesi, 1989b: 308, see also Klandermans, 1990: 122-36).

18 In the context of the resource mobilization of the (Swedish) working-class Walter Korpi comes to a similar conclusion:

Perceptions of what is just, fair and reasonable vis-a-vis other groups of citizens are largely dependent upon the power relations between these groups. Weak groups often learn, or are taught to accept, circumstances which stronger groups would consider unjust. Strong actors also tend to develop more long-range definitions of their interests than weaker groups. (Korpi, 1983: 18)

19 Bert Klandermans (1990) analyses the multi-organizational field of social movements in terms of *alliance systems*, consisting of groups and organizations that support the movement, on the one hand, and of *conflict system*, consisting of social actors that oppose the movements.

20 Empirical party research stresses the intra-organizational problems of left-wing parties which may also be true for trade unions or has a least substantial spill-over effects: "In most European countries, the socialist party's rank-and-file members as well as the party elite split into two groups: those with a traditional left-wing outlook who are concerned with the security of the working class and economic stability (the Old Left), and those with a New Politics orientation who rather emphasize the quality of life, the nature of economy, and the extent of democracy (New Left). The "New Left" in socialist parties stands in competition with New Politics parties regarding "new voter", while the "Old Left" is still fighting along the old cleavage dimension. The socialists are, therefore, trapped between two cultures... . Whatever the socialist parties might be able to gain from the New Left, they risk losing from among the Old Left Voters. Consequently, the only viable strategy for the socialists is to attempt some reconciliation of Old Politics (in order to integrate the majority of the Socialist party's voters) and a moderate version of New Politics (in order to attract New Politics parties' voter. A radical realization of "New Politics issues" is beyond the reach of the socialist parties." (Müller-Rommel, 1990: 229/30) Neil Carter (1991) describes also this tension within the British Labour Party.

21 This headline has been borrowed from an article by Claus Offe (1985b). Even if his scope of analysis is much wider, I think that the theme describes perfectly well the intra-union processes I wish to consider here.

For an analysis of the cleavage structure of national union movements in a comparative perspective see Visser, 1990; above all chapter 6.

22 For the analysis of the changing ideological roles and relationship between trade unions and political parties in West Germany see: Messeleken, 1970.

Chapter Two:

APPROACH, METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter outlines the general frame of reference of the analysis and its methodological translation. The research interest is to understand the conditions under which trade unions adopt elements of new politics, on the one hand, and to which intra-organizational tension the conflict between new and productionist politics may lead, on the other. For the analysis of these questions I decided to use *comparative organization theoretical approaches*. Modern organization theory has rapidly developed over the last decades. Today it is a mean to combine the analysis of structure and behavior. Furthermore, organization theory is one of the few branches in the social sciences that is well suited for the analysis of change (Touraine, 1988: 37). Finally, organization theory provides guidelines for identifying and operationalizing crucial variables and processes. The second aim of this chapter is to specify the semantics of new and productionist politics for the empirical analysis. For this purpose I developed concepts for a quantitative content analysis in this field.

1. ORGANIZATION THEORETICAL APPROACHES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS

Modern organization theory has rapidly developed during the last decades (for comprehensive overviews see for instance: Pfeffer, 1982; 1985; Perrow, 1986; Scott, 1987). In simple terms, perspectives shifted from focussing on structure and rational action and moved toward approaches that emphasize social process and the unpredictability of action (Zey-Ferrell, 1981; Türk, 1989). Scott (1987: chapter 5) points out that the individual perspectives of organization consist of various paradigms that acquire different theories, methods, and standards. He concludes that the differing assumption underlying these paradigms may be replaced but they cannot be disproved. The consequence of this is that I will not attempt to test these different organizational theories but rather I wish to remain within the logic of each paradigm and see what we can gain from it for the explanation of our theses. Each approach asks various questions and gets different answers. Furthermore, the different perspectives will be combined with some findings in the trade union research and serve as frame of reference for the present analysis. The following presentation of the different theories should not give a comprehensive overview of the individual theories but rather serve to isolate propositions and variables for the empirical analysis and make suggestions concerning the method.

The organizational approach that has become most prominent in the tradition of "rational" approaches (purposive, intentional, goal directed, rational emergent) is

structural contingency theory [1]. Structural contingency theory is most explicit about the relevant variables for the analysis [2]: organizational size, structure, technology and the environment are the major variables. The methodological approach is the comparative variable analysis [3]. Although the structural contingency theory is clear about the procedures of analysis, it is more problematic to deduce concrete explanations from it. Most explicit is Claudia Bird Schoonhoven about the theoretical status of structural contingency theory:

... contingency theory is not a theory at all, in the conventional sense of theory as a well-developed set of interrelated propositions. It is more an orienting strategy or metatheory, suggesting ways in which a phenomenon ought to be explained. ... Although the overall strategy is reasonably clear, the substance of the theory is not clear. (Schoonhoven, 1981: 350; quoted from Pfeffer, 1982: 162; see also Scott, 1987: 228-32)

The clear cut rational deterministic relationship has often been questioned on the ground of its insensitivity to cognitive limitations of individuals and organizations [4]. However, in global terms the basic variables in the structural contingency approach are: technology, the environment, size, and structure.

To make sure, *technology* is not used here in its commonplace sense of machines or devices for achieving higher efficiency, but in its generic sense of the study of techniques and tasks. Charles Perrow (1986: 140-155) stresses the importance of the technology of organization in order to clarify the *differences* between complex organizations. Technology has no coherent concept in organization theory (Scott, 1987: 210-239), although all organizations possess technologies. However, organizations vary to the extent to which techniques are understood, or routinized, or efficacious (Scott, 1987: 18/9). In order to elaborate these important organization theoretical concepts, Perrow takes as a starting point two characteristics that might provide a basis for a typology of technology: raw materials (things, symbols, or people), which are changed and tasks, or techniques of effecting transformation. Both types of technology vary in a number of ways above all from uniformity, stability and simplicity, on the one hand, and heterogeneity, flexibility and complexity, on the other.

In Sweden and West Germany, the technology of trade unions is *interest intermediation* [5]. Interest mediation is first of all dependent upon the character of the trade union *membership*. From this we may formulate the first proposition:

Proposition A1: *Character of Membership*

The stand on new and productionist politics is dependent on the stand of the trade union membership in this question.

All the outlined propositions in this chapter will be specified and operationalized in the following empirical chapters. Perrow develops an interesting concept of the technology of organization. He elaborates on two dimensions which illuminate the effectiveness and safety of a social system. In Perrow's terms technology can have linear or complex *interaction*, on the one hand, and a loose or tight *coupling*, on the other. We can assume that both dimensions are on a continuum but for reasons of simplification, we will work with these two dichotomies. For trade unions, the task to represent membership interests makes the interaction dimension. In this way, interests can be uniform or antagonistic. We may assume that homogeneous interests correspond with a linear interaction and heterogeneous interests correspond with complex interaction. As Thompson points out: "Homogeneity facilitates coordination because one set of rules applies to all positions in the group; and when changes in rules are necessary, one set of changes applies to all." (Thompson, 1967: 59)

A membership that has a more homogeneous attitude towards new politics (no matter weather pro or con) has a linear interaction; a union with a membership disagreeing on these questions has a complex interaction. With that we come to the second proposition:

Proposition A2: *Homogeneity of Membership*

Trade unions that have a linear interaction (homogeneous membership in terms of new and productionist politics) have no intra-organizational conflict in contrast to trade unions that have a complex interaction.

The other dimension of coupling grasps the organizational aspect in how far sections of a system are buffered. That means if a change of a one part or subsystem of the system causes the whole system to change, the system is tightly coupled. If the disturbance can be kept in one or a few subsystems of the system it is loosely coupled. We may refer this dimension to the individual trade union confederations. That means if one union organizes employees with positive *and* negative attitudes towards environmental protection this union is tightly coupled. If both kinds of members are organized in different organizations the interests are loosely coupled. This proposition is also valid for confederations organizing trade unions with differently complex membership interests:

Proposition A3: *Coupling*

Trade union confederations which are tightly coupled suffer under intra-organizational conflict while loosely coupled trade unions are buffered from intra-organizational conflicts.

Tight coupling is desirable for organizations since it saves energy and material costs, and avoids waste of resources. It promotes rapid decision-making, centralized deci-

sions, prompt schedules, rapid change where appropriate, and immediate response to deviation. The result of the interaction of both dimensions is pointed out by Perrow (1986: 148): "This is the basis of a serious organizational dilemma: tight coupling requires centralization, but interactive complexity requires decentralization, and it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to have both simultaneously."

The concept of *organization environment* is not typical for the different organization theories. The organizational environment in the tradition of structural contingency can be further specified. Although the whole environment has an impact on each organization (Thompson, 1967: 28), organizations do not react to the whole environment to the same extent. As Thompson points out, their major environment is that what has to do with the organizational task: the *task environment*. On the one hand, the task environment of trade unions are the sectors in which their members are employed. On the other hand, the task environment is the national economy, the state and other important actors. The task environment determines the *domain* of the organization. The domain consists of the claims the organization makes with respect to its technology. These claims immediately relate it to a number of other organizations and actors. The domain determines the other actors which the focal organization has contact to (Thompson, 1967: 25-38). In connection with new and productionist politics, the task environment is the sector (nuclear energy, energy, private, public, etc.) in which trade unions organizes their members.

Proposition A4: *Task Environment*

The stand on new and productionist politics is dependent on the sector in which trade unions organize their members.

Proposition A5: *Economy*

The stand on new and productionists politics dependent on the national economy.

It should be clear that the organization of interests is determined by both the membership and task environment of the organization. This fact has been taken as a starting point for the perception of organizations as *intermediary organizations*.

Trade unions are in many ways intermediary organizations [6]. Walther Müller-Jentsch (1988) points out that unions mediate between state and society, on the one hand, and the individual on the other. Furthermore, they mediate between the interests of capital and labor. Finally, they mediate between different levels of interest representation. In particular the first two levels are crucial for the present analysis. It cannot be the purpose to review the huge amount of literature on intermediary organization here. However, some aspects in this tradition are useful for

further specification of the empirical study. Analytical contributions in the tradition of intermediary organization focus - among others - on the partly competing dynamics of membership interests and requirements from the task environment and domain. Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck conceptualize these decisive organizational constraints in terms of a *logic of membership* and a *logic of influence* (Schmitter and Streeck, 1981; 1985; Streeck, 1987, Schmitter, 1989: 63).

The normative bounds of the membership of trade unions has eroded through processes of structural differentiation, formalization, and professionalization. Causality is becoming increasingly complex, organizational action, increasingly difficult. In this situation, Wolfgang Streeck (1987: 483/4) points out, the best that intermediary organizations can do is to "muddle through" or even better pursue a policy of "non-decision-making". However, there is a paradox: on the one hand, trade unions are becoming increasingly involved in more and more areas of politics, and as a consequence more and more is potentially possible to be influenced by the organization. This leads, on the other hand, to a dysfunctional result that less and less can be accomplished because each action implies feed back loops that may meet disagreement either in terms of the logic of membership or in the logic of influence. The vicious circle continues if the incapacity of action weakens the loyalty to the organization and also decreases a clear cut identity of the organization. In Streeck's view inter-organizational interlocking is the macro-societal functional equivalent for the increasingly micro-societal deficiencies of membership organization. The consequence is that organizations cooperate and exchange information, support, consensus, loyalty, etc. with other social actors. They sacrifice a good part of their autonomy in order to gain (limited) possibilities to act (Streeck, 1987: 488) [7].

Proposition A6: *Non-decision-making*

Trade unions tend to "non-decision making" in the context of new and productionist politics when membership interest is divided in this question or when the demands of the task environment are in contradiction to membership interests.

There are two further variables that have a prominent place in structural contingency theory: the size of organizations and the organization structure. However, *size* although easy to measure is a quite ambiguous variable. Blau and Schoenherr (1971) stress that size is the major explanation variable concerning the formal structure of organizations. According to Pfeffer, the basic arguments of the "size literature" are that size leads to increasing structural differentiation, formalization and administrative components, and that size is negatively correlated to centralization. The *formal structure* of organizations has often been a dependent variable of structural contingency theory and an independent variable for organizational behavior. The limitation of

available data make direct hypothetical assumptions difficult. However, there may be two competing impacts of size and union behavior which are intermediated by organizational structure:

Proposition A7: *Size and Structure I*

Large size may obstruct organizational flexibility and the responsiveness to demands of new politics through processes of formalization and administrative rationalization.

Proposition A8: *Size and Structure II*


Large size may promote organizational responsiveness to the demands of new politics through processes of structural differentiation.

In most of the empirical studies in the tradition of structural contingency theory, the variables have been analyzed by the mean of a comparison of organization. This means that organizations are needed that vary to a significant degree in terms of the presented variables (see below).

The alternative approaches are rather heterogeneous. They differ considerably in the degree they stress organizational behavior as externally constrained and controlled, random, and dependent on process and social construction. I wish particularly to refer to three different traditions: resource dependence theory, institutionalization theory, and organizing as social process.

All these alternative approaches give more attention to social processes in organizations and the mutual exchanges between organizations and their environment. By doing this they stress different variables and apply different methods than structural contingency analyses. Particularly, Karl Weick's concept offers a good framework for my analysis. This, above all, for two reasons: *first*, he suggests a concept for quantitative empirical research (Bougon et al., 1977; Bougon, 1983; Weick and Bougon, 1986). He refers to Axelrod (1976) who constructs *causal maps* or *cognitive maps* of decision-makers. According to Pfeffer (1982: 215-18), there are two dimensions that might be used to characterize causal schemata: they can show how differentiated and complex a social actor perceives an issue, and "... causal maps can permit the diagnoses of organizational problems arising from disagreement about organizational operations (Pfeffer, 1982: 217). *Second*, Weick gives an insight into the social process of organizing (Weick, 1979). For this purpose, he offers an evolution theoretical model of organizational development which can be applied to our topic [8]. As we can see from figure 2-1 the key elements are: ecological change, enactment, selection, and retention.

Figure 2-1.: Karl Weick's Model of the Organizing Processes
(Source: Weick, 1979: 133)



The whole organizational process of evolution is one of reducing ambiguity. The process of selection and retention reduces equivocality by applying inferred recipes (assembly rules or causal or cause maps) to new problems. *Ecological changes* provide the raw material for sense-making. It is the enactable environment (Weick, 1979: 132) *Enactment* is intimately entwined with ecological change and is the only process, where the organization directly engages an external environment. Enactment provides the equivocal raw material which will be selected in the next step. The raw material of ecological change could be anything, but it must - in one way or another - be in the communication logics of the organization [9]. This means that issues of new politics must enter into the trade union in a language it can understand and respond to [10]. For the focal organization, the process of enactment is crucial. Since there are many differently perceived environments there are a lot of problems in the process of enacting with the environment. The purpose of the *selection* process is the reduction of equivocality. The end-product is an accepted interpretation of reality. *Retention* involves the storage of successful sense-making which in turn determines the enactment and selection process for future events. Organizational retention is much more complex than those of individuals so that individuals can never fully understand the organization they interact in [11].

This frame of reference may be referred to the analyzed topic in the following way: ecological change has occurred through the emergence of new politics in modern society. The first step consists of the ability and willingness of trade unions to enact elements of new politics. Trade unions must develop an *organizational potential* for new politics, i.e. they must debate social issues in terms of new and productionist politics. As a next step they might select elements of new (or productionist) politics for their official world-view. This process I will call the *adoption of elements of new politics*. It is operationalized as the approved and established worldview of a trade

union (indicator are approved motions, newspapers stands, etc.; for further details see below). As pointed out, the retained world views (retention) are crucial organizational selection mechanisms for the interpretation of new issues and situations. For trade unions the trade union *ideology* serves as complex retained world views. We may formulate now some propositions in the tradition of organization theory that stress the importance of social processes. The mentioned concepts will be specified in the following empirical chapter:

Proposition B1: *Organizational Potential*

A precondition of the adoption of new politics of trade unions is the ability or willingness to enact elements of new politics.

Proposition B2: *Trade Union Ideology*

The trade union ideology is a crucial determinant for the process of adopting elements of new politics.

Besides the organizational aspects, the adoption of elements of new politics is also dependent on the organizational environment. In this context resource dependence and institutionalization theory shed some light. Resource dependence theory stresses that organizations are externally constrained but "... argues for greater attention to internal organizational political decision-making processes and also for the perspective that organizations seek to manage or strategically adapt to their environments." (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976: 79) While the structural contingency theory considers the environment to be a hostile alien element against which the organization must protect itself, resource dependence theory conceptualizes the environment as a pool of vital resources for the focus organization. This does not mean that this interaction is without its problems. The environment constrains and controls organizational action. But instead of conceptualizing environment and organization as two separate units where organizations must fight and buffer themselves against their environment, the resource dependence model emphasizes the interactive relationship between the organization and the environment [12]. This leads to it that in the tradition of resource dependence theory, organizations are perceived as coalitions [13] and groups (see also: Cyert and Marsh, 1963; Thompson, 1967: 126-128) which gain their power through their interaction with the environment. The intra-organizational processes are strongly connected with power relations. Instead of considering the efficiency of organizations (how well things are done) the interest lies in the effectiveness (what is done): "The effectiveness of an organization is its ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions." With this thought, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 11) stress the *political aspects of organizations*: "The effectiveness of an organization is a sociopolitical question."

In these terms, trade unions strive for the normative resources. One aspect of normative resources of political trade unions is the offer of a social utopia for a better society. New social movements attempt to offer exactly the same, and in doing so they compete with unions for this resource. This point brings us to another tradition of organization theory: institutionalization theory (Selznik, 1948; 1949). Pamela Tolbert argues for the combination of the resource dependence perspective with the institutional school. She points out "... that dependency relationships can, over time, become socially defined as appropriate and legitimate." (Tolbert, 1985: 1; see also Zucker, 1987: 447)

One important aspect in the institutionalization theory is the interplay between the manifestation of social action in the form of institutionalized rules and its changes through social action [14]. There is evidence that people express beliefs in order to make the situations more understandable and they construct plausible interpretations no matter how bizarre the situation. For that purpose people use socially determined typifications to make sense of a specific situation (Sproull, 1981). However, the social actions become objective constraints by the process of institutionalization:

While these accounts are socially created, they function as objective rules because their social origin is ignored. At the same time, ready-made accounts define the *possible* - institution makes clear what is rational in an objective sense. Other acts are meaningless, even unthinkable. (Zucker, 1977: 728) [15]

In this investigation, the comparison of national differences serves as distinctively different institutional environments concerning new and productionist politics.

Proposition B3: *Institutional Environments*

The institutional (national) environments have a crucial influence on the responsiveness of trade unions concerning new politics. the more pronounced the elements of new politics are in the organizational environment the sooner the organization will adopt to the environmental demands.

Proposition B4: *Resource Dependence*

The dependency of ideological resources is a crucial factor for the responsiveness to elements of new politics. The higher the resource dependence the higher the adoption of elements of new politics.

Proposition B5: *Process of Institutionalization*

Adopting elements of new politics is a "historical" process of institutionalization.

As mentioned above, resource dependence theory postulates that external resources have intra-organizational consequences in form of organizational coalitions and conflict. Faced with *conflicting demands*, the organization must decide which groups or world views to pay attention to and which to ignore or reject. Since trade unions need a big membership base *and* stable relations to other social actors, they may try

to match the different demands. However, that becomes difficult when interests become antagonistic. *Conflicts*, however, are important for the social evolution of organizations because their reference to different cause maps is a way to enhance variety and a way to register more of the possibilities that are present in the world [16]:

Proposition B6: *Conflict*

The responsiveness of a trade union concerning new politics is dependent on intra-organizational groups and results of intra-organizational conflicts and struggles. Intra-organizational conflict is a crucial precondition for the adoption of elements of new politics in trade unions.

To understand organizations as the result of shifting and changing coalitions implies that we have to consider *power* in organization, a neglected element in organization theory (Pfeffer, 1981: 9-18). Without going deeper into the discussion of the concept power, one may conclude that power is the capability of one social actor to overcome resistance in achieving a desired outcome (Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962: 32). Power in organizations is power over goals (Perrow, 1986: 259). This perspective leads to the consideration of union democracy in the contest of new and productionist politics (Lipset et al., 1956; Hemingway, 1978). Alessandro Pizzorno stresses the importance of democratic decision-making in organizations when the goals are diverse:

If the goals are multiple ... the decision to participate and the expression of consent do not necessarily coincide. They coincide even less when the organization enjoys something close to representational monopoly. In this case, in order to have a democratic organization, or even to obtain enough information for efficiency, "voice" - the vote, protest, or other ways of expressing opinions on part of the members - must be guaranteed. (Pizzorno, 1981: 258)

As mentioned above the analysis of causal maps reveals how complex an actor perceives an issue. This implies that there are different cognitive ways of organizing interests. In order to specify this aspect I wish to refer to two classical understandings of trade union policy and elaborate on the concept of different logics of collective action.

The classical exponents may be Lenin, on the one hand, and Perlman, on the other. In *What has to be done?* Lenin (1973: 397-440) points out that the labor movement left by itself would only create trade unionism that focuses on material aspects and which would be "working-class bourgeois politics". Trade unionism itself is concentrated on economic aspects and would, therefore, need the party control in order to enlighten the proletariat about its historical interest. Even when Lenin's interest focused on specific aspects of communist ideology, one can conclude that he stres-

sed the importance that trade unions should overcome their "economism" and include societal and political aspects in their perception and communication of social issues. Perlman (1966; first 1928) opposed this concept of trade unionism. In his classical critique of Lenin's approach in *A Theory of the Labor Movement*, he points out that the genuine interest of workers are job interests. Revolutionary ideology is mainly a alien invention of intellectuals that disregard the true needs of the workers. Perlman points out that "job consciousness" is the basis for trade union interest and that this interest is not at all in conflict with industrial society. He is very much in favor that trade unions improve the working and living conditions of the working-class, but preferably through reforms and cooperation with the employers than through revolutionary concepts. Trade unions should concentrate on their genuine tasks that is the improvement of material conditions, and that they should protect themselves from the influence of intellectuals and other seductive influences. However, Perlman does not reject the importance of the class conflict, but he believes that the contradiction between capital and labor is unnatural and will, in the long run, fade.

In the contemporary debate on trade union economism some evidence has been given that trade unions narrow their interests on material aspects:

In terms of the structural conditions under which the social identity of a union member is defined and experienced, unions have undoubtedly become narrower in 'scope' ...: they are more than before part of the institutional system at the work-place, but their presence in and their significance for their members' other spheres of life has declined. Unlike the 'social movement' that they were at the time of their origin, unions today appear very much as one functionally specialized organization among others, no longer aspiring to embrace their members as persons, but rather limiting themselves to offering specific services at market prices. In this sense, modern unions are much more secular institutions than they were in the past: much more impersonal, abstract, instrumental, and much less normative and 'moral'. (Streeck, 1982: 73)

However, even when the social development has placed emphasis on material aspects, unions still have a socio-political feature. This has been pointed out by Richard Freeman and James Medoff (1984) when they analyzed the consequences of the American unions in terms of two faces of trade unionism: a monopoly face and a collective voice/institutional face. I wish to elaborate on this aspect in terms of the dichotomy of *monological* and *dialogical* strategies of collective action (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). Monological strategies are those that build upon only one or a few established and accepted dimension or aspects of a given problem. The use of monological strategies is based on clearly defined fixed outcomes and only a limited number of aspects is taken into account [17]. Actions that build on dialogical interactions, in contrast, refer to strategies which may be differently interpreted and can always be discussed or questioned. This implies that dialogical communication is not

attached to a special dimension of a particular issue, but that all aspects are potentially relevant. Claus Offe and Helmut Wieselthaler (1980: 75) postulate that trade unions, in contrast to business organizations [18], are more likely to apply dialogical strategies since unions organize "... the entire spectrum of needs that people have when they are employed as wage workers." Instead of applying this concept to different kinds of organization, as intended by the authors (see also: Streeck, 1990; Traxler, 1991), I wish to distinguish the monological and dialogical logic of collective action among different trade unions.

In empirical terms, we may conclude that the communication on issues of new politics in trade unions lies on a continuum reaching from monological (or as I wish to call it here, pragmatic) levels of communication to dialogical or complex levels of communication (see for further details: Jahn, 1988b). Pragmatic communication may obstruct the communication on new politics issues and, hence, lead to an unresponsiveness to new politics. This process is reinforced since complex communication may lead sooner to intra-organizational conflict which, in turn, may lead to greater responsiveness to new politics.

Proposition B7: *Level of Communication*

The level of communication influences the degree of organizational conflict and by doing so also the adoption of elements of new politics. Dialogical or complex communication leads to intra-organizational conflict and monological or pragmatic communication avoids conflict.

Theoretically, there are possibilities to reduce the conflict on two dimensions. On the one hand, diverse interests can be organized in a way that interest conflict is minimized. This aspect has been discussed in the context of unions' technology in terms of (coupling). On the other hand, there may be strategies available which reduce the *expression* of heterogeneous interests:

An organization develops a set of concepts influenced by the technical vocabulary and classification schemes; they permit easy communication. Anything that does not fit into the concept is not easily communicated. (Perrow, 1986: 125)

That means the one in the power position of an organization controls the communication process. Consciously or not, they may steer the communication process on dimensions they wish or which favor them. For example, the communication of new politics issues may be exclusively led on the ground of technological or economic aspects or even be neglected.

2. THE COMPARATIVE METHOD

The *comparative method* in social science (Ragin, 1987; Berg-Schlosser and Müller-Rommel, 1987) attempts to reach a quasi experimental status by comparing social phenomena in a systematic manner. However, there are a lot of problems in selecting cases, variables and making them fit for comparison. The most profound decision to make is whether to follow a "qualitative" research design by looking at one or a few cases and the other possibility is to base the research on "quantitative" analysis by correlating variables. Both research strategies have certain implications - advantages and shortcomings - which cannot be reviewed here in detail (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 1990). In short, one may conclude that there is a trade-off between precise, but not representative case study research, on the one hand, and representative but rather formalized and inflexible variable-oriented research, on the other hand. In the latter approach the results "... are biased towards simplifying complexity through assumptions because the assumptions are often built into procedures themselves. Thus, these techniques do not decipher causal complexity but eliminate perplexing elements of it." (Ragin, 1987: 32). For comparative studies, the shortcomings of both strategies seem to be unavoidable and fatal: case study research - if systematically conducted - has fundamental limitations in the number of possibly manageable cases [19]. Variable based studies, however, have the fundamental problem of separating the characteristics of a case or research object (into variables) and deduce conclusions based on the relationship of variables instead of empirical entities (cases). I will orient my analysis to the *qualitative comparative analysis*. Charles Ragin (1991: 5) points out that this method is particularly suited for "... a better balance between discourse on variables and cases in comparative work. It allows holistic comparative analysis on cases, treating each case as a combination or configuration of conditions, and cases are compared as configurations."

I try to approach this dilemma by applying a "middle of the road" method. On the one hand, I will equally concentrate on some - for the theoretical implications - relevant cases. This means that I will not be able to go very deep into latent specialities of each case but rather follow a formalized and systematic research method. In particular, informal processes which are undoubtedly important in the context of this investigation must be neglected. I can only rely on official sources that are relatively easily accessible in order to do equal justice to all cases. On the other hand, the number of cases is not enough to generalize without limitations. However, the advantage of this method is that it is possible to get *systematic* insights into the standpoints of crucial trade union organizations of the two countries. Furthermore, the applied analysis of social discourses or cognitive maps (for these terms see

below) is an alternative to case studies as a means to analyze the social construction of reality (Pfeffer, 1985, 385; Weick and Bougon, 1986: 124).

The comparisons made in this study are based on differences between countries, over time, and above all between individual unions. The prior research on new politics and trade unions is very rare. In fact apart from one study by Heinrich Siegmann (1985) who analyzes the relationship between labor and environmentalism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States there is no comprehensive research focusing on new politics in trade unions. However, there are some studies with different research interests that focus on the stands of trade unions on (nuclear) energy. Since the debate on nuclear energy in trade unions is the issue for use in my analysis, I would like to refer to the findings of some of the major works in this field in order to specify my hypothesis (see appendix 1 for a more detailed overview over the literature).

Time

The time period of this analysis is oriented at the period of the interruption of continuity of the post World War II energy policy which was mainly caused by dramatic price increases of oil by the OPEC-states, on the one hand, and the period of the *politicization of industrial production* which took place in most Western countries in the 1970s, on the other. For both aspects, it is reasonable to take the year 1973 as the starting point for the analysis and to conduct the analysis until the present day (in this case the end of 1989 when the data collection for this project ended).

This analysis uses the comparison over time in order to identify processes of the adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions rather than to understand agenda setting processes. Nevertheless, the ups and downs of the issue are important and may disturb a clear analysis of the adoption processes.

The impact of time may be rather difficult to estimate. It is possible to distinguish two substantially different time effects. On the one hand, one may postulate that new politics increased more or less continuously in importance over the last two decades. That would mean that elements of new politics became also more dominant within trade union organizations (Proposition B5). Particularly Jürgen Grumbach (1986) postulates that the German trade unions adopted some standpoints of the new social movements by participating in expert groups and establishing energy experts and task forces. On the other hand, the responsiveness to new politics may be dependent on other factors, above all the economic development (Proposition A5).

That would result in it that trade unions are more open to elements of new politics in periods of economic prosperity while they stress productionist politics in time of economic hardship (Siegmann, 1985: chapter 3).

Countries

The emergence of new politics has some similarities but also some fundamental differences within Western societies [20]. Therefore, a cross-national comparison is very helpful. Although it would be desirable to include as many nations as possible into the investigation, this finds its limitation in the research organization and resources. I ended up with the comparison of two nations which are especially interesting in the light of both new politics and the labor movement: Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. Above all, there are two reasons why a comparison of Sweden and West Germany is highly interesting concerning new politics and trade union policy: the power position of the Swedish labor movement, on the one hand, and the strength of the German new social movements and Green Party, on the other [21].

Sweden is of analytical interest here because it can be viewed as that country where the labor movement was most strongly able to shape national politics in the highly industrialized Western world. In particular, the blue collar labor movement and the Social Democratic Party in Sweden have such a power base that some observers see Sweden as the model of a third way of societal development (e.g.: Adler-Karlsson, 1973; Stephens, 1979; Himmelstrand et al., 1981; Korpi, 1983; Milner 1989; Tilton, 1990). Social Democratic hegemony is rooted in Sweden's history and political culture. Some short descriptions should illustrate this point. Sweden has enjoyed a Social Democratic government since 1932, only interrupted by a bourgeois [22] government between 1976 and 1982. Even in this parenthesis, bourgeois policy was more "Social Democratic" than Social Democratic policy in other countries as, for example, in West Germany (Webber, 1985; Nedelmann, 1986; Hinrichs, 1988; Swenson, 1989) [23]. Many Swedish writers emphasize that Sweden is the country where the labor movement could best realize and fulfill its ideology (Adler-Karlsson, 1973; Korpi, 1983; Himmelstrand et al., 1981) [24]. Less evaluative, Heclo and Madsen stress the fact of Social Democratic hegemony. They argue that the national identity and the Social Democratic movement have tended to merge into one and the same thing (Heclo and Madsen, 1987: 44). Hence, it is possible to consider Sweden - and even more the Swedish trade union movement - as an ideal case for a study of the politics of a strong labor movement. Sweden will be a test case whether or not the labor movement is *actively* promoting new politics.

Furthermore, Sweden is interesting for this study because a lot of analysis conclude that the established Swedish policy-makers are exceptionally open to new demands, such as alternative life styles, non-productionist politics, and citizens' protest (Kitschelt, 1986a). This has also been supported - or has even been inspired - by studies on (nuclear) energy policy which have proclaimed that Sweden may be prepared to give up the productionist way of high energy consumption (Lindberg, 1977; Kitschelt, 1983; Sahr, 1985; Gottweis, 1986). Henry Milner attempts to combine Social Democracy tradition and environmental responsiveness. An additional principle of modern Social Democracy, he notes, is "... respect for the environment. Through creative decentralized planning, social democracy protects and enhances the natural environment as vital to human existence." (Milner, 1989: 5). However there are some socio-cultural indicators suggesting that the reverse trend may be true. For example, Donald Hancock quite outspokenly points out that economic production scores quite high among Swedish values:

Underlying shared elite attitudes supportive of parliamentarism and pluralism are common beliefs in the libertarianism and socio-economic progress. With origins in ancient legal codes, judicial and constitutional guarantees of individual liberties are firmly sanctioned by centuries of tradition in Sweden. Fundamental civil liberties - freedom of speech, assembly, publication, and religious dissent - comprise an integral component of the modern Swedish political system, as witnessed by the virtual absence of political prosecution and official censorship. Belief in cumulative material and technological-scientific progress is exemplified by the willingness of political and organization leaders to promote continuing efforts to attain greater prosperity and a more rational allocation of physical and human resources. (Hancock, 1972: 69/70)

Even if Hancock's conclusion was written two decades ago the postulated impacts of Swedish traditions may still be valid today. This gives doubts that there may be a substantial change in Swedish energy policy (Burns, 1985; Jahn, 1988a; Jamison and Eyeran, 1990; Flam, 1991). Substantial changes would mean that politics do not only change on the surface but implies that longlasting changes according to the concept of new politics take place. However, all the mentioned studies are mainly based on data of global national energy policies. It seems to be very reasonable to argue that in a country where organizations - and more specifically labor movement organizations - have a very high impact on politics the standpoints of these organizations are important to better understand what is behind this policy shift.

While Sweden is relevant for this study because of its strong labor movement and - supposed - responsiveness of established politics to new politics, *West Germany* is an interesting case because of the pronounced feature of new social movements and a relatively strong Green Party. New social movements have been present in West Germany for the last twenty years. The German new social movements can be considered as one of the strongest in modern society [25]. More often than not

demonstrations were violent and met the resistance of established political institutions. One reason for that may be the relative unresponsive behavior of German political organizations to new demands (Kitschelt, 1983; 1986a; Katzenstein, 1982; 1987) [26]. West Germany is therefore a case in point to study the impact of strong new social movements on the labor movement. In contrast to the actively policy shaping Swedish labor movement the analysis of the German unions focuses on the *reactive* promotion of new politics by the labor movement.

Transferring the findings of conducted analysis of the national politics to the organizational level we may specify the proposition on the institutional environment (B3) in both countries: First, one may expect that Swedish trade unions are by and large more open to the demands of new politics because of the open political opportunity structure for political alternatives (B3a: *Swedish responsiveness*). That by no means will say that trade unions are especially open to new politics but only that Swedish unions may be more open to it in relative terms than their German counterparts. The competing hypothesis would be that Swedish unions are formally open but that they do not adopt elements of new politics because of the traditional Swedish values that build upon productionist preferences (B3b: *Swedish unresponsiveness*).

Also for Germany we may come to similar competing hypothesis. On the one hand, it can be assumed that German unions are reluctant to adopt elements of new politics because they are part of a closed political opportunity structure (B3c: *German unresponsiveness*). In contrast to that the opposite hypothesis may be also plausible. The German unions are open to elements of new politics because the German new social movements are more pronounced and formulate a stronger counter-ideology against the established (most conservative and liberal) power holders (B3d: *German responsiveness*) which is also attractive for trade unions. The hypotheses which are deduced from national features need to be qualified by organizational characteristics of the individual trade unions.

Trade Unions

The individual trade union organizations provide the major important variables in this study. Before specifying the reasons for the inclusion of the individual trade unions I would like to make some general remarks on the different trade union systems in Sweden and Germany. However, it is impossible to attempt to draw a complete picture of the trade unions in both countries in this study. The overview should be brief and serve as a first approach. If not differently stated all data refer to 1985.

(a) A General Overview of Swedish and German Unions.

In both countries, the industrial union principle seems to dominate (for a comparative overview see: Clegg, 1976; Gourevitch et al., 1984; Taylor, 1989; Martin, 1989; Visser, 1989; 1990). This means that unions are grouped according to industries. However, there are some unions in both countries which are organized according to crafts or occupations. This mainly has historical reasons. The major differences between Swedish and German unions consist of the separation of white and blue collar unions in Sweden. In Sweden, there are three big trade union confederations [27]. LO, *Landsorganisationen i Sverige*, is the confederation for the blue collar trade unions. In 1985, there were 24 individual unions organized under the umbrella of LO. LO is strongly connected with the Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet*, SAP). LO has a clearly defined ideological view in the reformist Social Democratic tradition (Elvander, 1983). Traditionally, the LO has been open to technological innovations and even rationalization (Stråth, 1990; Tilton, 1990). LO soon developed an union strategy that builds upon social responsibility for the export industry. The Swedish labor movement very soon identified their interest in the national economy and, stands in sharp contrast to the German labor movement, which was most of the time in opposition to the political power holder.

Another important feature of LO and its member unions is their coherency. This results from both organizational factors such as work-place representation and the leading role of the LO confederation. The individual Swedish unions organize employees at the firm level in so called *arbetsplatsklubb*. These firm level organizations form in districts or *avdelningar*. This means that Swedish unions, in contrast to their German counterparts, also represent their members at the firm level. The German trade union system is characterized by its so-called dual representation of employees. Workers on the firm level are represented by work councils (*Betriebsräte*) which are not formally connected to a trade union organization. However, unions also have their representatives at the firm level in the form of union shop stewards (*Vertrauensleute*).

The trade union confederations differ considerably concerning their status and power within the national trade union movements. In the historical development, LO gained increasing influence over its unions (Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989) and determines blue collar union policy to a large degree. For instance, LO has the right to conduct collective bargaining on its own and agreements of member unions need to be approved of by the LO. Often this centralized collective bargaining of LO has been taken as a indicator of the Swedish Model of organized capitalism. Even if this system may have been undermined in recent years (Rehn and Viklund, 1990), the

power of LO in relation to its unions is still an important feature. Nevertheless, the big LO unions substantially shape LO politics. This is so because of vital personal links between individual unions and LO.

TCO, *Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation*, the confederation for the white collar unions is much weaker and, in contrast to LO, conducts no collective bargaining. This is done either by the individual unions or by so called *kartells*, collective bargaining bodies of groups of LO, TCO, and SACO/SR unions [28]. TCO has 20 single trade unions. The organization principle of TCO is similar to the one of LO. TCO is much less powerful in relation to its member unions than LO. Two factors may stress this point: first, as mentioned above TCO does not conduct collective bargaining on its own. TCO is mainly responsible for the coordination of general political questions. Second, TCO is officially a non-partisan trade union although there are closer contacts to SAP than to any other party. However, membership orientation and some individual union policy is open to liberal ideologies. In this respect, it is possible to consider the liberal ideology (and therefore the Liberal Party) as the main competitor of Social Democratic ideology in TCO. Since political issues are most often defined by political parties, TCO has difficulties in formulating a stand on political questions. This vacuum of ideological power gives space to economic power of the member unions. The most influential TCO union is SIF, *Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet*, but the other big unions of TCO are also able to shape TCO policy. SIF has often challenged TCO (Wheeler, 1975; Fredriksson and Gunnmo, 1985: 148-50) on collective bargaining aspects and also in political questions (e.g. ATP, the Pension Fond) [29]. The organizational and ideological characteristics make TCO unions much more vulnerable to intra-organizational conflicts than LO unions (Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985).

The German DGB, *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, is the confederation of seventeen (since 1989 sixteen) individual unions [30]. As TCO, the DGB is officially a non-partisan trade union. This was the price for union unity in the post-war period. However, the policy of the DGB more often than not is strongly oriented at the policy of the Social Democratic Party (SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*). As TCO, the DGB does not actively take part in collective bargaining and the individual unions have a strong influence over the DGB. Among the most influential unions are the *IG Metall* (IGM), *Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr* (ÖTV), and *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik* (IGC) which could increase their influence over the last decades (Armingeon, 1988: 45-48).

Concerning the union confederations included in this study, we may conclude that the LO is the strongest union confederation with a clear reformist Social Democratic ideology. TCO may be characterized as just the opposite: a relatively weak, officially non-partisan union. The DGB may be placed between these two confederations as a non-partisan but political trade union confederation. This may lead to a specification of proposition B2. TCO and the DGB may experience more intra-organizational conflict about new and productionist politics than LO because the latter can fill an ideological vacuum which the other confederations cannot fill (B2a: *Dominant Union Ideology*). Furthermore, one can postulate that Swedish unions, and here above all LO, identify themselves with the national economy which may make them more reluctant to give up their productionist view (B2: *Traditional Productionist View*). TCO may not fit as well into this picture, but it may still be closer to LO than to the German DGB that may more easily formulate an anti-productionist position because of its opposition to the conservative power structure in Germany. By and large, TCO may follow a policy that supports the national economy. Tommy Nilsson (1985) postulates that the ideology of TCO comes increasingly closer to the one of LO. That means that also TCO and its unions may favor a more productionist stand. Although these conclusions are also applicable to the member unions, they must be qualified by analyzing individual trade union organizations.

(b) The Analyzed Trade Unions.

The individual trade unions are the crucial cases in this study. Above all, the selection of the trade union organizations has been guided by the reflections on the aspects of the cleavage structure between productionist and new politics as described in chapter one. This means that there should be some unions which are most likely to oppose new politics and those which are most likely open to it. In addition, the new social cleavage may reinforce old cleavage lines. For that, I tried to include unions that differ in their organizational feature according to some relevant aspects. The following table gives an overview over the specific features of the analyzed trade unions (for more details see appendix: 2):

TABLE 2-1: Some Special Features of the Analyzed Trade Union Organizations.

	absolut numbers	percent of org. workers of resp. confed.	percent. white col. workers*	sector	energy sector**	percent of women	Ideology ***	Other important Features
DGB	7 719 468		22.3(10.6)	priv./pub.	-	22.1		confederation for all workers
IGM	2 553 041	33.1	18.0 (-)	priv.	+	14.7	activist	largest union
ÖTV	1 179 396	15.3	44.2 (7.3)	pub./priv.	++	29.9	?	very heterogeneous
IGC	649 569	8.4	19.2 (-)	priv.	++	18.7	accom.	changing ideology
BBV	371 228	4.8	86.7 (-)	priv.	no	57.6	activist	Priv.Sec. White Collar
IGB	356 706	4.6	8.2 (0.1)	priv.	+	2.0	accom.	homogeneous
GEW	194 028	2.5	26.0(74.0)	pub.	no	52.0	?/activ.	teachers
IGD	140 725	1.8	23.9 (-)	priv.	no	23.3	activist	workers' aristr.
Sum****	5 444 693	70.5	27.4 (4.2)			22.1		
LO	2 262 829		ca.20(a)	priv./pub.	-	43.1	S./tech	confederation for blue collar workers
SKAF	632 941	28.0	ca.33	pub.	no	79.2	S.	female members.
Metall	457 937	20.2	none	priv.	+	18.5	S./tech.	histor. leader
SF	209 539	9.3	ca.75	pub.	++	28.9	S.	heterogeneous
OP	47 110	2.1	none	priv.	no	31.1	S./prod.	workers' aristr.
SEF	28 868	1.3	none	priv.	++	0.6	S.	homogeneous
Sum****	1 376 395	60.8	ca.21			48.1		
TCO	1 108 463		100	priv./pub.	-	57.0	neutral	confederation for white collar workers
SIF	276 800	25.0	100	priv.	++	38.6	neutral	strongest/nuclear
SKYP	166 968	15.1	100	pub.	no	74.8	neutral	female domination
ST	120 989	10.9	100	pub.	++	67.5	neut/prod	heterogeneous
SL	67 534	6.1	100	pub.	no	75.7	neutral	teachers
Sum****	632 291	57.1	100			57.6		

Sources and explanations. All data refer to 1985 and are taken from: *Die Quelle*, 1986, vol.37, no.5; 312-314. Müller-Jentsch, 1989; Visser, 1989; LO, 1986; *Versamhatsberättelse of individual LO unions referring to figures of 1985*; TCO *Verksamhetsåret 1985*; Wordin, 1988: 420; and own calculations.

* since Beante (civil servants) cannot be considered as either blue or white collar workers, their percentage from the whole membership is given in brackets.

** no = no workers organized in energy sector.
 + = union organizes workers in energy sector, or is highly dependent upon energy consumption, or produces products for nuclear plants.
 ++ = union organizes workers in nuclear energy plants.

*** S = Social Democratic; tech. = technologically optimistic, prod = producer perspective or technologically radical (see chapter seven).

**** Sum refers to the sum or the average of the unions included into the investigation respectively.

(a) The proportion of white collar workers in LO unions has been estimated on the base that all members of the Insurance Employees' Union, Commercial Employees' Union, Musician Union, and 75 percent of SF and 33 percent of SKAF are white collar workers (see Wheeler, 1975; Visser, 1989).

First of all, unions differ according to the *members* they organize and the *sectors* in which their members are employed. The most obvious dividing line consists between white collar and blue collar unions, on the one hand, and private sector and public sector unions, on the other. Since social reality is more complex than analytical consideration, one can only speak of an approximation of these conditions in the empirical cases. This was easier for Sweden than for West Germany. In Sweden, trade unions organize workers according to whether they are white or blue collar workers. LO mainly organizes blue collar workers. However, there are some exceptions. Above all in *Statsanställdas Förbund* (SF) more than three-quarters of the membership is employed in lower-grade white collar occupations. *Svenska Kommunalarbetarförbundet* (SKAF) also organizes some white collar workers (Visser, 1989: 190/1; Wheeler, 1975: 9) [31]. TCO exclusively organize white collar employees.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, unions organize their members more strictly according to the industry principle so that a distinction among clearly white or blue collar unions is difficult to make (Hartfiel, 1966). Apart from the pure white collar unions GEW (*Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft*) and the *Gewerkschaft Kunst* (artists and musicians' union), all unions organize both blue and white collar workers [32]. However, the HBV (*Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen*), ÖTV (*Gewerkschaft öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr*), and the *Gewerkschaft der Polizei* (Police union) can also be viewed as mainly white collar unions.

As with blue and white collar unions, the distinction between private and public sector is much more important in Sweden than in Germany. It would be too much to list which of the approximately 40 LO and TCO unions belong to the private or the public sector (see for that the characteristics of the included unions). However, the membership of public sector unions in Sweden has increased in numbers over the last decades which may also lead to shifts in the power relation between private and public sector unions. The (ideological) domination of private sector unions has been challenged in recent years and it is most likely that this conflict will increase in importance in the next decades.

Among the DGB unions, the *Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands* (German Railroad Workers' Union), *Deutsche Postgewerkschaft* (German Postal Workers' Union), GEW, and *Gewerkschaft der Polizei* (Police union) exclusively organize public sector employees. With the exception of its members in the private (nuclear) energy, private transport and warehouse, the large majority of the membership of ÖTV is employed in the public sector (Visser, 1989: 88) [33].

The reflection on the union membership characteristic may lead to a specification of the above outlined proposition. White collar employees are more open to elements of new politics and influence their unions more to take a stand according to their attitudes (A1). This trend may be reinforced when white collar workers are employed in the public sector and weakened when they are employed in the private sector. Blue collar workers unions are either more in favor of productionist politics or they are rather unconcerned with the value dimension of new and productionist politics. Again, private sector membership may reinforce this trend.

In Sweden opinion pools demonstrate that women are significantly more opposed to expansion of nuclear energy than men. This fact leads to the hypothesis that a high

amount of women membership leads to an union policy that is more open to new politics.

In Sweden, four unions organize workers in the nuclear power plants: SEF, SF in LO, and SIF and ST in TCO. There are also unions which are strongly related to the nuclear industry either because they produce equipment for nuclear plants (Metall), or they are highly dependent on energy (Paper Industry Workers' Union, Factory Workers' Union) or gain benefits by constructing nuclear power plants (Construction Workers' Union). In West Germany, IGM, ÖTV, IGC, IGB, and IGBSE are called the "energy unions". This because of the same reasons as there Swedish counterparts. However, only ÖTV, IGC and IGM organize workers in the nuclear industry. However, IGM organizes only workers in one nuclear power plant. This leads to the specification of proposition A4 that unions organizing members in the energy, energy dependent or nuclear energy sectors favor a productionist union politics.

Unions were also chosen because of their *ideological stand*. That was easier for German unions. In West Germany, one can distinguish between accommodationist and activist unions and empirical studies have also been conducted along this line (Bergmann et al. 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988). IGB and IGC represent the former and IGM, HBV, and IGD, the latter group in this investigation. The empirical studies indicate that activist unions might be rather open for elements of new politics in sharp contrast to the accommodationist unions that favor quite outspokenly productionist stands (B2c).

Important in the context of ideological differences among Swedish unions is the dominant role of the central confederation LO over its unions, as mentioned above. Therefore, we might expect a quite coherent picture of LO unions. However, there are some investigations which show that GF may have a slightly different ideological attitude among the LO unions (Sandberg, 1984; 1989). The exception of GF might modify the "Traditional Productionist View" (B2a).

TCO is a contrasting case. TCO is merely the umbrella organization that formulates general political statements for the public. Big unions of TCO have a much stronger influence on policy of their confederation than LO unions. Therefore ideological standpoints were not decisive for the selection of TCO unions but rather size and economic power. Since, to my knowledge, there are no investigations that focus on ideological differences among the TCO unions one may presume that membership pressure is expressed more directly in TCO unions than in the other unions. This is

also the result of studies that focus on TCO policy (Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985).

Furthermore, the selection of the individual unions is guided by the desire to give a relatively *representative* picture of the trade union movements in both countries. Therefore the most influential unions were attempted to be included in the investigation. This is under two aspects: on the one hand, the historically most influential unions should be included but, on the other hand, also the biggest unions should be considered. Among all these factors, a compromise strategy had to be found [34]. Finally, the unions included into this study should make it possible to compare similar unions in both countries. This is difficult because unions organize their members in respect to different criteria [35].

3. THE DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY AS AN INDICATOR FOR THE ADOPTION OF ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS

In this section I wish to clarify how to empirically identify elements of new and productionist politics in trade unions. I will use the *debate on nuclear energy* by trade unions. Intense research on one single issue has several consequences which shall be discussed in the following section. An *issue* is a conflict between relevant groups in society over substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources (Cobb and Elder, 1983). In party and election research, issues have played an important role for a long time (e.g. Sjöblom, 1968; Janda, 1980; Budge and Farlie, 1983). I am not primarily interested in the issue setting and life cycle of an issue, but I wish to *use* an issue in order to reduce societal complexity (Budge and Farlie, 1983). Issues reflect the political world on a smaller scale, or as Lane and Ersson (1987: 40) put it: "Cleavages crop up in the political system as issues to be dealt with by the decision-making structures..." By considering only one issue, I reduced the complexity of the topic, but by doing so a bias of the issue influences the outcome of the research (e.g. the life-cycle, the development, situational factors, and the context of the issue). This seems to be unavoidable and must be taken into the account when we interpret the findings.

Gamson (1988: 220/1) suggests that themes or issues should be thought of as *packages* of idea elements in a dialectical manner. There is no theme without a counter-theme. Packages are relevant patterns of arguments which are shaped by the cultural frames of a society. The different packages constitute the relevant (the empirically existing) discourse on an issue. Social discourse is "... a particular set of ideas and symbols that are used in the process of constructing meanings relevant to the

struggle." (Gamson, 1988:221) [36]. Collective actors are important in creating and modifying the valid (socially legitimated) packages. The social discourse on nuclear energy of trade unions reflect the construction of meaning by the trade unions and is part of the definition relations as outlined in chapter one.

The debate on nuclear energy very well serves the purpose to identify standpoints in the context of new and productionist politics. Nuclear energy is debated very controversially, or as Wildavsky and Tenenbaum (1981: 11/12) put it, it is set in a "polarized issue-context" by a variety of politically relevant actors. A polarized issue context makes the actual issue less important. In this situation actors perceive all other actors with different opinion on the issue as enemies. References to "facts" are used to justify one's own policy and conviction. Several authors already used nuclear energy as an issue for illustrating the conflicting world-views about the development of modern society [37]. Also on the empirical level, findings show a very high correlation between post-material values and anti-nuclear attitudes. In most of the studies on new social movements, the anti-nuclear power movement is the movement with the highest post-material score (e.g.: Müller-Rommel, 1985a; Inglehart, 1989; 1990). Alain Touraine points out that the anti-nuclear movement is ".. the one [movement; D.J.] furthest from the assumption of industrial society." (Touraine et al., 1987: 221). Green party involvement and anti-nuclear power attitudes also correlate strongly (Pappi, 1989). Cotgrove and Duff demonstrate this point by illustrating the close relationship between environmentalists and anti-nuclear attitudes:

Nuclear power stations in particular have come to have a deep symbolic significance: centralized, technologically complex and hazardous, and reinforcing all those trends in society which environmentalists most fear and dislike - the increasing domination of experts, threatening the freedom of the individual, and reinforcing totalitarian tendencies. *Opposition to nuclear power is seen for many as a key issue on which to take a stand against the further advance of an alliance between state power and commercial interests.* For the objectors, the material advantages from nuclear power cannot justify the risks involved. (Cotgrove and Duff, 1980: 338; italics added, D.J.)

However, the general argument is that anti-nuclear attitudes coincide with the preference for a different concept of the societal development. As most of the analytical (Cotgrove and Duff, 1980; Kitschelt, 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986; Lewin, 1984) and empirical studies (Früh, 1981; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Braczyk et al., 1985; Asp, 1986; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) show, there are several relevant dimensions when social actors argue about nuclear energy. In particular, Gamson and Modigliani point out that attitudes must not be coherent and free of inherent contradictions.

For the moment, we may refer to the stand on nuclear energy of the trade unions as the dependent variable. However, this needs further specification. I wish to distin-

guish three elements of the analysis that may be considered on a continuum from relatively direct measurements of nuclear energy towards more context bound indicators. The latter focuses more specifically on productionist and new politics aspects. *First*, positive evaluation of nuclear energy may serve as a very rough indicator for productionist attitudes. However, nuclear energy may be negatively evaluated by actors who favor another energy resource. This negative evaluation would have nothing to do with the rejection of a productionist development of society. Nevertheless, the evaluation of nuclear energy is an important first step of the analysis, because it gives a first clue about more contextually related attitudes. The *second* way of analyzing the dependent variable takes advantage of the fact that the debate on nuclear energy is context bound and that different aspects are stressed when arguing for or against nuclear power. In order to make this idea accessible to empirical research, one can apply a research method that builds on *social discourse*. The basic assumption here is that social perceptions and preferences of reality are determined by individual or collective ideologies and socio-political orientations within a cultural and situational context [38]. The *third* indicator elaborates this point and builds upon those statements that refer to the semantics of new and productionist politics.

I wish to present some aspects of the applied content analyses in this study (for the technical aspects see appendix: 3). I use two different methods that complement each other: in order to obtain a reliable measure for the evaluation of nuclear energy I apply the *evaluation assertion analysis* as developed by Osgood, Nunnally, and Saporta (1956). This method measures intensities of evaluation on a range between -3 and +3. The interpretation of the EI-Index (Evaluation Intensity) is straight forward: empirical values between +/- 0.5 are rather neutral. Until +/- 1.5 the evaluation is clear but not extreme. A value up to +/- 2.5 can be considered as rather strong and above this level the evaluation is very extreme. The Evaluative Assertion Analysis is especially suited to measure intensities of evaluation but neglects all context variables. However, the dimensional content analysis and social discourse analysis are in particular suited to analyze the context.

The second content analysis builds upon categories and statements. The categories in the debate on nuclear energy can be deduced in several ways. According to conducted content analyses in the field [39] the categories shown in table 2-2 may be suited for the analysis of the nuclear energy debate in trade unions. Each category consists of several statements. Each statement is formulated positively *and* negatively in respect to nuclear energy. Statements which are not clearly pro- or anti-

nuclear energy are summarized under neutral. All in all, there are approximately 80 statements for each value.

TABLE 2-2: Categories in the Debate on Nuclear Energy

	pro nuclear energy	con nuclear energy	neutral
<i>Technical Aspects</i>			
<i>Energy Policy</i>			
- Energy Supply			
- Nuclear Energy and other Energy Sources			
<i>Economy</i>			
- Economic Welfare			
- Energy Costs			
- Price Comparison			
<i>Labor Market</i>			
- Employment Effects			
- Comparison of Employ- ment effects with other sectors			
- Work Environment			
<i>Security</i>			
- Safety			
- Safety in Comparison to other Energy Sources			
- Security Measures			
- Perception of Risks			
<i>Environment</i>			
- Effects on the Environment			
- Environmental Effects of Nuclear Energy in Comparison to other Energy Forms			
<i>Politics</i>			
- Nuclear Energy as a Political Question and its Legitimations			
- Political Procedures			
- National and International Aspects			
- Ideological Aspects			
<i>Future Society</i>			
- Societal Development			
- Organization of Society			
<i>Others</i>			

Both methods of content analysis give a detailed picture of the standpoints on nuclear energy. The evaluative assertion analysis measures very exactly the evaluation of nuclear energy and some specific aspects of it (reprocessing, waste storage, phasing-out schedules, etc.) but is not able to take this context into the account. The

latter aspect is exactly the strong point of a quantitative content analysis built on statements. However, the statements can only be measured in relative broad categories. Furthermore, content analysis building on statements is unable to measure intensity. Both content analysis complement one another.

For the analysis at the more abstract and analytical level, I constructed an index that builds more directly upon the theoretical aspects of the literature on new politics. In this view, productionist and new politics are two competing *paradigms* concerning the development of industrial society: "Paradigms are not only beliefs about what the world is like and guides to action: they also serve the function of legitimating or justifying courses of action. That is to say, they function as ideologies. ... The struggle to universalize a paradigm is part of the struggle for power." (Cotgrove, 1982: 88) [40] At this point, I wish to illustrate the competing paradigms of productionist and new politics in an *ideal-typical* manner.

The concept of different paradigms has been extensively applied in the field of new politics (Raschke, 1980; Cotgrove, 1982; Kitschelt, 1984; Offe, 1985c; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). However, the analysis of world views remains always a bit arbitrary. The following classification of the semantic of productionist and new politics is based on the findings of the above mentioned works [41]. In order to construct an index which may indicate the adoption of elements of new politics, I singled out statements which are possible to identify in the empirical material. For that I distinguish between three dimensions and twelve subdimensions: *first*, statements that indicate different economic world views; *second*, statements that refer to the relationship between social needs and the manner of production; *third*, statements of societal development and political process [42]. The following statements represented in table 2-3 serve to identify the semantics of new and productionist politics in the debate on nuclear energy.

Table 2-3: Dimensions and Indicators for New and Productionist Politics in Trade Unions within the Context of the Debate on Nuclear Energy

Dimensions	Subdimensions	PRODUCTIONIST POLITICS	NEW POLITICS
		Statements (Indicators)	
ECONOMY	Economic Concepts	- Exclusion of social costs; business accounts or quantification into money terms	- Emphasis on social and "intangible" costs
	Economic Assessment of Nuclear Energy	- Stability of costs - Phasing-out is economically irrational because of high investments	- Instability of costs - Phasing-out is economically feasible; investments should more strongly focus on alternatives
NEEDS	Core Values	- Economic growth is necessary - Preference to improve material living standards; without nuclear energy is misery	- Economic growth is not necessary - Preference to maintain material living standards; no misery without nuclear energy
	Nature	- There are no limits to growth - Cheap energy is needed for improving production and the living standard	- There are limits to growth - Expensive energy is needed in order to save resources and the environment
PRODUCTION	Knowledge	- Technological progress solves present and future problems - Preference to combine alternative technologies and nuclear energy	- Technological progress cannot solve present and future problems - Preference for alternative technologies in order to phase-out of nuclear
	Organization of Production	- Preference of large-scale production; small-scale production is unrealistic - Continuation of present development of energy production	- Preference for small-scale production; large-scale production is inhuman - Break-off with the present development of energy production
	Employment and the Organization of Production	- High energy supply creates employment or reduces unemployment - Employment aspect is most important in the context of nuclear energy	- There is no deterministic causal relationship between energy supply and employment; increased energy supply does not reduce unemployment - There are more important aspects than employment aspects in the context of nuclear energy; there are higher goals than employ.
SOCIAL	Societal Freedom	- Nuclear energy prevents or creates energy political options - Nuclear energy is important for the well-being of future generations - Nuclear energy creates the material base for social reforms - Nuclear energy improves living conditions in developing countries	- Nuclear energy determines or limits energy political options - Nuclear energy endangers future generations - Nuclear energy does not create the material base for social reforms - Nuclear energy endangers conditions and traditions in developing countries
	Democracy and Participation	- Nuclear energy does not endanger democracy; phasing-out may lead to an endangerment of democracy - Construction delays are dangerous for future energy supply or employment	- Nuclear energy endangers and leads to a police-state (Atomstaat, Kärnsamhälle) - Construction delays may open up the possibility of rethinking about nuclear energy
AND	Rationality	- Fear and worry is unnecessary and irrational in decision processes	- Fear and worry is well-grounded and should be taken into consideration in decision processes
TOPICS	Risk Assessment	- If nuclear energy is dangerous we will phase out; as long as it is not proven that nuclear energy is dangerous we continue with it - Risks of nuclear energy are acceptable; some risks we must take - Occurred accidents do not prove that nuclear energy is too dangerous - There is no danger of genetic damages; there are threshold values	- As long as it is not clear that nuclear energy is completely safe, we should not construct or use nuclear energy and we must shut down existing plants - Risks of nuclear are unacceptable; nuclear energy has a another dimension of risks than other dangers of life - Occurred accidents show that nuclear energy is too dangerous - There is a high danger of genetic damages; there are no threshold values; radiation is always dangerous

The following brief description of the dimensions should only give an overview about the content of the paradigms of new and productionist politics. The literature mentioned above discusses these concepts in greater detail. Particularly Cotgrove (1982) and Kitschelt (1984) give a systematic and detailed overview.

(1.) *Economy*: The discussion on new and productionist politics stresses the fact that there are two competing economic concepts. On the one hand, radical productionist conceptualize costs by means of business accounts. If social costs are included into the business account they enter it in terms of quantified money terms. Proponents of new politics stress to a higher degree "intangible" costs (life, traditions, culture, ecosystems etc.) which cannot be translated into money terms. On the ground of these different preconditions, one can identify conflicting economic assessments of nuclear energy: on the productionist side, costs of nuclear energy are stable and investments are profitable as long as the profitability is not undermined by political action. On the other hand, costs of nuclear energy are perceived as unlimited.

(2.) *Needs and Production*: This dimension stresses different values and needs, on the one hand, and different principles of production for the satisfaction of this values and needs, on the other. The creation of wealth for productionist is a moral imperative (Cotgrove, 1982: 28). The defining characteristic of new politics is the contrasting paradigm or ideology that questions the emphasis on wealth and material well-being that is prevalent in modern society (Cotgrove, 1982; Kitschelt, 1984: 20-3; Dalton et al., 1990: 10/1). Economic growth is a key concept. Considering these core values, proponents of productionist and new politics have different perceptions of nature and knowledge. Productionists see nature as an ample reserve which should mainly serve the needs of humankind and can be exploited by needs of technological progress. The opposite position stresses the limited resources which demands a careful treatment of natural resources. Human knowledge, in particular in form of technological progress, is limited and therefore the natural balance should not be disturbed. Consequently, both world views are for substantially different concepts of societal productions. Productionists want a continuation of large-scale production. For trade unions employment aspects are most important in this concept. From the point of view of proponents of new politics a reorganization of societal production is necessary that stresses small-scales and human organization of work. In this view the results of production are more important than just high employment rates.

(3.) *Utopias of Societal and Political Development*: The last dimension focuses on different perceptions of social development and grounds for decision-making of social

development [43]. Both world views answer the question about the societal consequence of nuclear energy differently. The notion *utopia* is not being used here in a sense of an unattainable dream: rather it is a set of beliefs about how society should really work (Cotgrove, 1982: 46). For productionists, nuclear energy opens up new possibilities while it is the opposite in the view of new politics. The rationality for decisions are also different. Productionists prefer an instrumental rationality and demand a separation of facts and values, and thoughts and feelings. Furthermore they are prepared to take certain risks. Proponents of new politics, in contrast, wish to integrate facts and values, and rationality and emotions. They are much less prepared to take risk which they also see much higher and severe than productionist.

All the statements of the described dimensions - economic concepts, social needs and production, and utopias of societal and political development - are included into an index that indicates the adoption of elements of new politics [44]. The index may be an indicator for more complex cognitive maps [45]. Technically, the ANPE-Index (Adoption of New Politics Elements) can take values between -100 (absolute rejection of new politics elements and absolute stress of productionist aspects) and +100 (absolute adoption of new politics elements and absolute rejection of productionist aspects). However, since the index is limited by its potential maximum value, the number of cases and the fact that it refers to relatively abstract or extreme concepts it can be expected that it scores most frequently around 0 [46]. Unfortunately the ANPE-Index is not as straight forward as the EI-Index. Since the index builds upon the fact that statements are mentioned which refer to new *or* productionist aspects a low value can be caused either by a high number of both new *and* productionist statements or by not referring to those arguments. From the empirical distribution it is fair to conclude that a score of +/- 8.3 can be considered as containing some elements of new or productionist elements (2 statements dominated), up until 20.8 (5 statements dominated) the direction can be considered to be quite clear. All values exceeding this value are extreme for trade unions in this study [47]. However, this clear guidelines are only valid for the individual motions, debates or newspaper articles. The mean values are often much lower because a substantial number of the analyzed material does not contain elements of new and/or productionist politics and is therefore 0.

Footnotes:

1 Pfeffer (1982: 1-40, in particular table 1-1, p. 13) distinguishes theories between two dimensions. On the one hand, the level of analysis can either be on the individual, coalition, and other sub-units or encompass the total organization. Since I am interested in the total organization all theories on the other level can be dismissed for my analysis. The other theories that can be subsumed into the categories which are purposive, intentional, goal directed, rational. These are beside structural contingency theory, market failures/transaction costs, and Marxist or class theories. The latter two theories are not well fitted for the analysis of voluntary organizations. Market failure/transaction cost theories

have greater relevance for commercial than noncommercial enterprises (Pfeffer, 1982: 134; Williamson, 1981: 35) The Marxist approaches are rather relevant for the analysis of the work organizations and the nature of employment relationships than the behavior of voluntary organizations (Pfeffer, 1982: 163).

The perspective of the second group of theories is externally constrained and controlled. Here population, ecology and resource dependence theory is placed by Pfeffer. The former approach is disqualified for my analysis because it can only be applied to populations of organizations. The major research interest is the life cycles of organizations. Since we neither consider population of organizations nor a time period, where we can make out life cycles, this approach is excluded from this analysis. The third set of theories perceive organizational action as emergent, almost-random, and dependent on process. It is also social construction. Pfeffer encounters here theories that consider organizations as paradigms, decision process and administrative theories, and institutionalization theory. Decision process theories such as the garbage can model are not completely applicable in my investigation because concrete decisions are not in the focus of the analysis. However, some elements are discussed because concrete decisions are touched upon. I have subsumed as social process theory an approach - besides organization as a paradigm and institutionalization theory - that builds upon organizational cognitions. In particular, Karl Weick's evolutionary approach to organizing as a social process is applicable at the organization level as well. For that, however, cause maps, one key element in this theory, must be referred to the entire organization instead of individual actors. In conclusion we have one representative here from all three classes of organization theory: rational theory (structural contingency), external constrained theory (resource dependence), and social process theory (institutionalization, social process of organizing).

2 The name *contingency theory* is based on the assumption that one or a set of relatively independent variable(s) has a more or less direct effect on another (set of) dependent variables. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) coined the label *contingency theory* (Scott, 1987: 88) by stressing the fact that the *environment* determines organizational structure and behavior. They conclude: "Internal attributes of organization, in terms of structure and orientation, can be tested for goodness of fit with various environmental variables and the predisposition of members." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: 209) Perrow's concept of technology elaborates on the membership characteristic and puts it in a more sophisticated analytical framework. However, Perrow deduces the term *contingency theory* from the causal relationship between *technology* and organizational structure and behavior: "One merit of the "technological school," or contingency theory as it has come to be called, is that, it provides for some independent leverage in constructing typologies, because it focuses on something more or less analytically independent of structure and goals - the tasks or techniques utilized in organizations." (Perrow, 1986: 141)

3 It must be noted that these analyses concentrated more on the impact of organizational structure and/or organizational efficiency. This emphasis on formal or economic factors is not implicit in the approach, but it is also possible to refer it to organizational goals and organizational behavior (e.g. Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). However, the argument often goes that technology and environment have an impact on organizational formal structure (processes of formalization, bureaucratization, rationalization, professionalization, etc.) which in turn has an effect on organizational behavior and orientation.

There has been some work done on trade unions within this tradition. Most explicit, Child and Associates (1973) and Wolfgang Streeck employ an organization theoretical approach. The former develops a more general organization theoretical framework for the analysis of trade unions while the latter investigates the organizational impact of neo-corporatism (environment) on the social structure of West German labor unions (administrative rationalization) and its consequences for the organization of its membership (Streeck, 1981 and 1982). Axel Hadenius (1976) traces the very organizational development of the Swedish blue collar trade union movement in order to explain the impact of centralization of decision-making and integration of organizational units in union representation. For the American context, Delaney and colleagues (1988) attempted to explain political lobbying behavior by employing a set of organizational variables.

4 Two challenges within the concept of structural contingency theory are of special importance: first, Herbert Simon (1957) develops the concept of *bounded rationality* in which rational behavior is oriented at satisfaction instead of goal maximization. The notion *satisfaction* implies that the process of choice is ended when an option is available that satisfies the actors' aspiration level. However, the concept of bounded rationality is very time-dependent. As soon as new information is considered the basis for satisfaction may erode (Pfeffer, 1982: 5-8; Wiesenthal, 1987: 46-51; Wiesenthal, 1988: 76-85). Furthermore, bounded rationality choice recognizes that search is costly and that heuristic factors are important for the decision-making process. The other important qualification of the deterministic rational implication of the contingency theory has been elaborated by John Child (1972). He concedes that the relationship between the variables leaves enough space for "strategic choices" for the leaders of organizations. While bounded rationality opens the door for cognitive, situational, etc. interpretations, the latter makes it possible to look at intra-organizational power relations. Both aspects, however, are elaborated upon in the framework of the other theoretical approaches. However, for the empirical analysis I wish to specify some analytical concepts of the structural contingency approach.

5 The technology of business trade unions as they are more common in the USA is wage. Political or social trade unions, however, strive, besides for the improvement of the economic situation of their members, also for more abstract goals and they have a broader societal perspective. Therefore political trade unions are often caught between the interests of their members, the national economy, social justice and equality, and reform politics and the transition of society. As a consequence, when the interests of the members become diversified and social development is ambiguous, organizations get into trouble. This reflection on trade union technology was inspired by a personal conversation with Charles Perrow at the Annual Congress of the Austrian, German and Swiss Sociological Associations in Zürich, autumn 1988.

6 There are two different traditions in the trade union research of intermediary organizations. One is based on studies of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main in West Germany (Bergmann, et al., 1976; Müller-Jentsch, 1985). Starting from Marx's view of trade unions as revolutionary and Goetz Briefs' analysis of the transition of trade unions from the "classical" to the "institutionalized" trade union (*befestigte Gewerkschaft*: perhaps better translated by consolidated unions. Institutionalized unions, however, is the translation of Müller-Jentsch) the authors analyze trade unions on a continuum from state controlled/yellow unions to revolutionary/syndicalist unionism. Intermediary organizations are in the middle of this continuum and reach from cooperative trade unionism over 'social contract' bargaining to militant trade unionism (Müller-Jentsch, 1985: 15-19).

The other tradition deduces the term intermediary organization from organization theory and neo-corporatism. In particular, Wolfgang Streeck's work (1981; 1982) on the formalization and professionalization of West German trade unions builds upon the Max Weber's work on charismatic and bureaucratic leadership. He brings together Webers's famous account of the "routinization of charisma" in terms of neo-structural organization theory in the tradition of Blau and the neo-corporatist system of interest intermediation. He then perceives trade unions on a continuum from social movement to "work organization". Trade unions move aside from the social movement and are now voluntary organization or intermediary organizations, half way towards the work organization (Streeck, 1981: 24-41).

7 That a higher degree of environmental coordination with other organizations etc. is expected to decrease the organization's uncertainty but simultaneously increases the dependency is a common argument of organization theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1987: 129).

8 Weick starts out from a work by Donald T. Campbell who is one of the most important contemporary exponents of an evolutionary model adapted to social behavior. In this context, he refers above all to the following work of Campbell: Natural Selection as an Epistemological Model. In R. Naroll and R. Cohen (eds.), *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology*. Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, pp. 51-85 (1970); On the Genetics of Altruism and the Counter-Hedonic Components in Human Culture. *Journal of Social Issues*, 28 (3): 21-37 (1972); Evolutionary Epistemology. In P.A. Schilipp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper* (Vol. 14-1). LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, pp. 413-463 (1974).

9 March and Olsen distinguish between an access structure (enacted environment) and decision structure (part of the selection process) (March and Olsen, 1984: 746). See also Luhmann's (1986) concept of organizational resonance and codes in the context of ecological communication.

10 It should be noted that the selected cause maps are used for the selection of enacted environments. In this way, there is a double selection process: the selection of cause maps (by effectiveness criteria), and the selection of elements of an enacted environment (by the selected cause maps).

11 As Weick points out a fact that explains as to why people in organizations seem to act in ways that contradict what they say. The same impression I got, when I started with interviews of trade union officials on this issue. The development of the DGB to express their opposing attitude towards nuclear energy was seen as a result of a long-lasting process that could only lead to the present decisions in the eyes of the interviewees.

12 Another direction of this tradition considers the interrelationship of organizations (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Recently, Hannan and Freeman (1988) analyzed the life span and mortality of American labor unions from 1836 until 1985 in this tradition.

13 Although the analysis of coalition formation and coalition behavior can start with ideas from political science on coalitions, organizational coalitions differ in several basic ways: *first*, most organizations have much more elaborate control and socialization systems, which means that there exists an ideology of an overarching organizational goal and more trust and commonly shared values than in legislature. *Second*, coalitions in organizations have a history which is often not considered in the research of experimental groups, one direction of coalition research in political science. The *third* difference is that organizational coalitions are not rational in the sense of maximization of profit. Instead of keeping the coalition as small as possible (but certainly big enough to win) which would guarantee the highest win, organizational coalitions normally strive to be as big as possible, a sign of social rationality (legitimation).

14 Concerning our research interest, it is interesting to note what Philip Selznick, the "father" of institutionalization theory thought about the analyses of organization. Scott concludes: "He [Selznick; D.J.] proposes that we will learn more interesting things about organizations if we do not attempt to examine the satisfaction of all needs of the organism but, like Freud, focus on those needs "which cannot be fulfilled within approved avenues of expression" (1948:32) (quoted from Scott, 1987: 65)

15 Lynne Zucker refers in the first sentence to: A. Schütz (1962) *Collected Papers I: the Problem of Social Reality*. in: M. Natason (ed.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. In the last sentence she refers to an unpublished paper by J. Meyer (1971): *Institutionalization*, Stanford University.

16 Weick speaks against compromises and in favor of conflict. *Compromises* take away the resource to react because only composites have been retained: "The crucial point is that, in effecting the compromise solution, important adaptive responses have been selected against and nonadaptive, moderate responses have been preserved." (Weick, 1979: 220)

17 Since the monological logic reduces complexity to a relatively easily overlooked dimension it may be referred to as *the logic of the highest common denominator* (Kevätsalo, 1986: 35-7).

18 I do not wish to go deeper into the problematic application of the concept of monological and dialogical logics of collective action in *different* interest groups. There seems to be some evidence that business organizations also apply dialogical strategies (Streeck, 1990; Traxler, 1991). However, this concept still seems to be useful for analyzing trade union organizations. It is also compatible to the social theory of "communicative action" (Habermas, 1981, especially vol.2: 367-452). However, the empirical judgement of the intra-organizational process in trade unions are different. The authors referring to (German) trade unions as intermediary organizations (Müller-Jentsch, 1985; Streeck, 1981; 1982) postulate that economism of trade unions increases and dialogical dispute fades. On the other hand, Claus Offe comes to the conclusion that the replacement of representative democracy by corporative decision making leads - at least for the West German case - to an increased *intraorganizational* and *noninstitutional* conflict (Offe, 1981: 150-155). In particular, the former aspect implies that trade unions conflict about social issues in their organizations.

19 The number of comparisons increase rapidly with the increase of the number of cases: N of comparisons = $(N \text{ of cases} * (N \text{ of cases} - 1)/2)$. That means that a comparison of 19 cases - as in this study - leads to 171 possible comparisons. This number is impossible to handle considering the aspiration of qualitative research.

20 See for instance: Inglehart, 1977; 1981; Brand (ed.), 1985; Kitschelt, 1986a; 1986b; Jahn and Müller-Rommel, 1987; Poguntke, 1987; Dalton, 1988; Müller-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Dalton and Kuechler (eds.) 1990; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991. These works strikingly demonstrate that one cannot conclude that all countries experience the same development of new politics. However, the basic characteristics, as described above, are more or less the same. There is cross-national variation concerning the expression and chances of new politics.

21 However, there are some additional points which are helpful for the comparison of Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany because some "variables" are rather similar in both countries. In Sweden and West Germany, environmental issues play a relatively important role over the last decades. For instance, the Swedish *Riksdag* (parliament) election of 1988 has been labelled as the "ecology election" and also in 1976 and 1979, nuclear energy played a very important role in the election campaigns and public debate. In West Germany the electoral success of the Greens is the most obvious indicator for the significance of environmental issues over the last decade. Furthermore, both countries have nuclear power plants. Additionally, Sweden and West Germany have similar trade union systems - a more research pragmatismal reason of a comparison of Swedish and West German unions - which makes a comparison at all possible. Finally, both countries have trade unions which perform quite well in comparison to declining unionism in most other major industrial societies (Katzenstein, 1987: 28).

22 The terms, socialist and bourgeois, are accepted for differentiating between the socialist parties (Social democratic party and Communist party) on the one hand, and the Liberal, Center, and Conservative parties on the other. This distinction, therefore, is used in a neutral sense.

23 Douglas Webber argues that in the 1970s the labor market policy of the bourgeois government in Sweden had more Social Democratic features than the labor market policy of the German Social-Liberal government. Birgitta Nedelmann compares the cultural institutionalization of the commitment towards full-employment in both countries. She concludes that in Sweden even bourgeois governments have to obey to the "cultural milieu" that has been shaped for more than half a century by Social Democrats. An important element within Swedish politics is the common sense or *samförstånd* (Henningsen, 1986: 227-230). The People's Home, *folkhemmet*, is another important concept in this connection that was introduced by Per Albin Hansson in 1928. That means that all members of Swedish society should live equally. It is possible to see in this concept a first loosely defined social welfare program that aimed to improve the living conditions of ordinary citizens (Hadenius, 1985: 41). This cultural common sense and the welfare program of the Social Democratic Party was the base for the *Saltsjöbaden* agreement between Social Democrats, LO and the Swedish Employers' Confederation in 1938. One can easily refer the *solidaric wage policy* to these cultural roots as well. The solidaric wage policy attempts to decrease the wage drift on the labor market. This concept is the key element of Swedish (blue) collar trade union policy (Meidner and Hedborg, 1984). Walter Korpi (1978: 74/5) stresses the importance of the homogeneity of Sweden which facilitated the realization of these concepts. He encounters the following factors: racial and ethnic homogeneity, relative weakness of the church and religion, the late and rapid industrialization. Certainly geographical (rough climate, relatively peripheral) and historical factors (early centralization and administrative system) played important roles in shaping Sweden to the country which it is today.

24 However, this positive appraisal has also been counter-balanced by authors who stress the totalitarian character of Sweden (Huntford, 1972; see for a debate Henningsen, 1986). Particularly interesting is the changing opinion of Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. He wrote a "creed" for the *functional socialism*, a third way between capitalism and socialism in the late 1960s. In his later writings he criticizes the material world picture of the Swedish way. This finds its expression in the writing of the *Strangulation of Culture in Sweden* by the same author (Adler-Karlsson, 1983).

25 Comparative analysis of new social movements and Green Parties stress the fact that Germany plays a model in this respect. See for instance: Brand, 1985; Müller-Rommel (ed.), 1989; Chandler and Siaroff, 1986; Poguntke, 1989a; Dalton et al. 1990: 4/5.

26 New politics was first analyzed in the West German context. This is also an indicator of the importance of the Federal Republic of Germany for this analysis. The basic consideration in terms of new politics have been elaborated upon in the late 1970s (Dalton and Hildebrandt, 1979; Baker et al., 1981). That Dalton and Hildebrandt published their article two years before in a German political

science journal may also be an indicator that also American scholars first preferred to express their ideas in the German context. Ronald Inglehart also found most support for his thesis of a value change in West Germany and Chandler and Siaroff connect value change and party politics and conclude that the Green Party in the Federal Republic of Germany is "... the first successful postmaterialist party." (Chandler and Siaroff, 1986: 305)

27 For an overview see: Andersson, 1975; Forseback, 1977; Elvander, 1983; Martin, 1984.

28 SACO/SR, *Sveriges akademikers centralorganisation/ Statstjänstemännens riksförbund*, which will not be analyzed here, is the trade union organization for academics and high ranking white collar employees. Whereas LO and TCO often cooperate SACO/SR frequently goes its own way in stressing achievement aspects over solidaric aspects. While LO unions organize more than 2 million members and TCO unions more than 1 million, the 26 SACO/SR unions come to about 200 000 members.

29 There is also often a conflict between SALF, *Sveriges Arbetsledareförbund* (Swedish Association of Supervisors) and SIF and TCO. However, SALF is not a constant member union of TCO.

30 Beside the DGB and its unions, there are three smaller union confederations which I will not analyze in this study (Markovits, 1986; Milke and Vilmer, 1983, from where the following data stem). While the DGB organizes about one third of the employed population or more than 80 percent of the organized work force, the white collar workers' unions in the *Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft*, DAG, organizes two percent (or around 5 percent of all organized employees). The DAG opposes the unitary union system. The *Deutscher Beamtenbund*, DBB, or German Civil Servants' Federation organizes civil servants opposed to the unitary union system. It organizes 3.5 of the working population (8.7 percent of all organized employees). Finally, there is a small Christian trade union, *Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands*, CGB with 1.2 percent of the employed population (3 percent of all organized employees).

31 Bain and Price (1980) classify three LO unions as non-manual: *Försäkringsanställdas förbund* (Social Insurance Employees), *Handelsanställdas förbund* (Commercial Employees) and the *Musikerförbundet* (Musicians). However, some other unions may also have small numbers of white collar employees among their membership.

32 For Germany, I consider *Arbeiter* as manual or blue collar workers and *Angestellte* (employees or clerical staff) as white collar workers. However, there are also *Beamte* (tenured civil servants for whom collective bargaining is prohibited; see for a glossary of the terms: Markovits, 1986), a group of employees that is made by its status. *Beamte* can be both blue or white collar workers.

33 Almost half of the membership of the *Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft* (Horticulture, Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Union) is employed in the public sector (Visser, 1989: 88).

34 Since the selection of the individual unions had to take place relatively early in the research process insights which have been obtained in the research process were not available in the beginning. However, the selection of the unions seems reasonable to me. There is always the temptation to include one or more additional trade unions. In particular the construction workers' unions in both countries or a white collar union in the social and commercial sector in Sweden. Furthermore, a union exclusively organizing workers in the public sectors - apart from the teachers union - would have been desirable for West Germany (e.g. Postal Workers' Union or Railroad Workers' Union). However, this was prohibited by lack of further research resources.

35 The comparison between two countries is also a difficult undertaking because union structures in two countries - even though relatively similar in both countries - are quite different. Alone the fact that LO organizes 24 unions (as of 1989 23) and TCO 20 and the DGB just 17 (as of 1989 16) makes it extremely difficult to pick corresponding unions. For instance, to find a counterpart for HBV would have led to the inclusion of three TCO unions (Union of Commercial Salaried Employees, Swedish Bank Employees' union, and the union of Insurance Employees). On the other hand, also in this research design several compromises had to be made. For instance SF and ST organize railway and postal workers which in turn are two individual unions in the Federal Republic of Germany.

36 See also: Gamson, 1990; Habermas, 1981; van Dijk, 1985; Gamson, 1988; Galtung, 1989. Jürgen Habermas describes at length the communication process in society. However, important in the context of social discourse is that understanding always refers just to a part of the actors' world view and that all pre-understanding remains latent in the communication situation (Habermas, 1981: 149/59, vol.: 1).

37 See for instance Touraine et al., 1983; Kitschelt, 1983; 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986; Vedung, 1980; Lewin 1984; Gamson, 1988; Häusler, 1988; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; von Oppeln, 1989.

38 The analytical framework can be based on inter-subjective procedures (van den Berg and van der Veer, 1989), cultural frames (Gamson, 1987; 1988; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) or - as proposed here - deduction from analytical and theoretical concepts. The latter approach may be seen as superior because it is connected to social theory or at least to social scientific debates.

39 The conducted content analyses that have been used for the categories here are: Braczyk et al., 1985; Früh, 1981; Kitschelt, 1984; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Lewin, 1984; Grumbach, 1986; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986. However, I adjusted these categories for the analysis of the nuclear debate in trade unions. That means that labor market arguments have an individual dimension because this is

the major domain of trade unions. Furthermore, most empirical content analyses (Braczyk et al., 1985; Früh, 1981; Holmberg and Asp, 1984) do not include analytical aspects concerning my research question. Analytical analyses (Vedung, 1980; Kitschelt, 1984; Meyer-Abich and Schefold, 1986) often refer to very abstract and complex aspects which are not easily accessible for empirical research. Compromises also had to be made because a large scale data collection needs to be clear enough for coding assistants who are not familiar with the lengthy and often difficult debates on the topic. The data collection of social discourses is based on "intelligent" coders who also read between the lines (the latent content of a text). This requirement increases the validity, but decreases the reliability.

In each country two independent native speaking coders worked on the material. The reliability lies by about 80 percent (all valid codings divided by all invalid codings). However, this reliability score refers to the individual statements. Combination of statements in levels, dimensions, and indices increase this value since confusion most often exists between similar statements. At this point, I wish to thank Gunilla Augustsson, Eva Berndtsson, Gunnel Vessman, Volker Eickhoff, and Doris Witting who collected the data in a thorough manner.

40 The concept *paradigm* builds on the pioneer work by Thomas Kuhn (1970). Kuhn was struck by the fact that science does not progress by subsequent steps where the next discovery follows the former. In contrast, he found out that some aspects of science undergo a revolutionary change. Subsequent researchers perceive some area of scientific phenomena within different frameworks. "Facts" become different meanings and significant. Examples for this process are the combustion theory of oxygen which displaced phlogiston theory, and the plate theory of continental drift.

41 However, partly substantial modifications and adjustments had to be made particularly in the more abstract dimensions, because authors base their indicators on a qualitative content analysis or questionnaires. Although Kitschelt points out that his analysis may serve as a starting point for a quantitative content analysis (Kitschelt, 1984: 23) his analyzed statements are too abstract and ambiguous for direct application. Furthermore, in order to obtain ideal-typical classifications, the authors rely on extreme standpoints and statements by clearly identifiable proponents and opponents of new politics, etc. With trade unions I have to deal much more with a "mixed type" (Kitschelt, 1984: 146; Cotgrove, 1982: 47/8, 91/3) and therefore I need another calibration of my instrument which has to be based on more concrete concepts.

42 In addition, the literature on new politics often refers to the left orientation: new politics goes along with left attitudes and productionist politics with a preference for market economy (Kitschelt, 1984: chapter 4; Poguntke, 1989a; 1989b; Dalton, 1988; etc.). These dimensions, however, are supposed to be relatively independent from the evaluation of nuclear energy by trade unions. This is reason enough to exclude the left/right dimension from the calculation of the index.

43 Although this dimension builds heavily on Kitschelt's work it includes different aspects as well. This because of two reasons: *first*: Kitschelt summarizes in his dimension "Politik und Gesellschaftsvisionen in der Energiekontroverse" arguments which are very much removed from the direct debate on nuclear energy and which can hardly be found in verbal statements but refer to a lengthy chain of arguments. An analysis of these argumentation chains would need a more thorough analysis of different social actors and their ideological and philosophical standpoints. A task a quantitative content analysis cannot fulfill in such a detail. As Kitschelt points out his analysis concentrates on *extreme* actors concerning the nuclear question. For instance he confronts statements of energy enterprises, on the one hand, with statements from anti-nuclear power movements, on the other hand. Furthermore he also includes scientific contributions such as articles and books which obviously concentrate stronger on ideological and philosophical aspects than political actors do in their programs and daily politics. *Second*, Kitschelt focuses more on political than societal aspects. By doing so he neglects arguments that address concepts of societal development in the nuclear energy debate.

44 For the construction of indices see for instance: Friedrichs, 1980: 165-72; Krippendorff, 1980: 40-2. The advantage to apply an index consists of the fact that it reduces complexity and increases reliability.

45 It is clear that this measure represents the concept of cognitive maps on a very aggregated level. However, the index is based on the fact that actors express causal relationships.

46 The ANPE-Index is an index that takes into account the conflict between elements of new and productionist politics. Therefore it builds upon a NP-Index (Elements of New Politics) and a PP-Index (Elements of Productionist Politics). Both indices are put into relation to their theoretical maximum value and the number of cases. The index is calculated according to the equation below:

$$\text{ANPE-Index} = \text{NP-Index} - \text{PP-Index}$$

$$\text{NP-Index} = \Sigma ((x / n) / N) * 100$$

$$\text{PP-Index} = \Sigma ((x' / n') / N) * 100$$

x = number of all statements referring to new politics

n = number of potential (maximum possible) statements referring to new politics


x' = number of all statements referring to productionist politics

n' = number of potential (maximum possible) statements referring to productionist politics

N = number of cases taken into consideration

Since there are 24 statements for new politics and also 24 statements for productionist politics the index reaches +100 only when there are all 24 new politics statements mentioned but no productionist politics statement. Each statement scores 4.17 on the ANPE-scale.

47 The distribution and statistics of the ANPE-Index is given below:



ANPE				
Mean	-45.325	Std Dev	10.692	Range
Minimum	-45.833	Maximum	41.667	87.500
Valid Cases	1383	Missing Cases	875	

PART 2

Adopting and Disseminating
Elements of New Politics by
Swedish and West German
Trade Unions

PART 2

ADOPTING AND DISSEMINATING ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS BY SWEDISH AND WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS

Part two consists only of one chapter that attempts to empirically specify the adoption and dissemination of elements of new politics in Swedish and German trade unions. The presentation of the empirical data is conducted in this chapter on a very aggregated level. However, the method of content analysis allows for documentation of the processes in greater detail. Since the more detailed presentation may distract from the general argumentation I document the congressional debates in a chronological manner in appendix 4.

CHAPTER THREE:

ADOPTING AND DISSEMINATING NEW AND PRODUCTIONIST POLITICS AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESSES AND IN THE TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP NEWSPAPERS

In this chapter, I wish to clarify the *dependent variable*: to what degree did trade unions adopt elements of new politics? The indicator for the adoption of elements of new politics relies basically on two aspects. First, I will analyze the adoption of new politics at the trade union congresses. Second, the disseminated picture of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspapers will be investigated. Both indicators together are used for a classification of trade unions as rather open or closed towards elements of new politics. In particular I will concentrate on the national differences so that we will get a preliminary answer to the above formulated hypotheses (B3) whether German or Swedish unions are more open to elements of new politics. The second question that will be considered in this chapter is: *if* trade unions have adopted elements of new politics is this a continuing process (institutionalization) or is it ad hoc, situational or unsystematic (B5)?

Before I analyze the adoption of elements of new politics at the trade union congresses and in the membership newspapers I wish to give a brief account of the involvement of trade unions in decisions on nuclear energy in Sweden and Germany.

1. TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT IN DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

As has been outlined in chapter one, trade unions shape the political process, stabilize present conditions or promote social change. This they do not do only by open intervention but rather by defining what can and should be done in society.

Therefore the ideologies, values and beliefs of interest organizations constitute to a large degree the underlying power structure of modern societies. This is also true for energy policy (Lönnroth et al., 1977; Sahr, 1985). Apart from other interest groups, trade unions have been represented in the decision-making committees on nuclear power since the 1950s in both countries.

In Sweden, trade unions belong to those actors that have the most frequent contact with government agencies (Petersson, 1989: 112-36). Even more important, LO could influence the energy policy through its close relationship with the Social Democratic Party. TCO has also debated the nuclear power issue since the beginning within the advisory council *Ingenjörsrådet* (Council of Engineers) in which among

others SIF, ST, and SKTF participated [1]. TCO was also represented in several decision-making and advisory bodies and gave a substantial number of *remiss replies* (Micheletti, 1985: 54/5). For instance both LO and TCO were represented in the board of *delegationen för energiforskning* (DFE; Committee of Energy Research) (Wittrock and Lindström, 1984).

In Germany, the DGB was involved in nuclear energy policy-making through its later chairman Ludwig Rosenberg. Ludwig Rosenberg was a member of the *Deutsche Atomkommission* (DAtK; German Atom Commission) and the *Kernreaktor Bau- und Betriebsgesellschaft GmbH* (KBB, a private enterprise for construction and operation of nuclear power plants) and also chaired the DGB Committee on Nuclear Energy. The ÖTV had personal connections with the nuclear industry (DAtK and RWE, one of the biggest enterprises in the energy sector, and Bayerwerke AG) (Radkau, 1983: 430-34; Grumbach, 1986: 99-148).

Although trade unions were not the major promoter of the nuclear power programs, they were still fascinated by the technological potential of an energy resource that would make it possible to reach an independent and unlimited national energy supply. This fascination went together well with the (socialist) values of technological, industrial and social progress. By and large, these values remained unchallenged until the early 1970s.

For the analysis of the adoption of elements of new politics it is necessary to find sources that can be systematically analyzed over time. Expression of official opinion can take various forms. The most formalized and momentous opportunity for trade unions to express their opinions are of the *trade union congresses*. However, trade unions can also state their opinions and exercise their influence, for example, through press releases, reports, especially-written policy declarations to the government and other relevant political actors, speeches, interviews and debate articles in newspapers and magazines. Another opportunity for expression is participation in governmental bodies and expert committees, personal networks and other lobbying activities. But for the symbolic conveyance of trade union attitudes to a larger audience and in particular to the membership, the *trade union newspaper* is the essential medium. Trade union newspapers promote intra-organizational communication and dissent trade union attitudes to their members, the public and other relevant political actors. Trade union newspapers are one of the major means in the symbolic struggle of trade unions.

For the study of the adoption and dissemination of elements of new politics, I concentrate therefore on the analysis of trade union congresses and trade union newspapers. First, I present the adoption of elements of new politics at the union congresses and in the union newspapers respectively. After that I summarize this findings in form of a typology of different union behaviors.

2. NEW POLITICS AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESSES

The periodical trade union congresses, which take place every three to five years, are the supreme policy-making bodies of all analyzed Swedish and German trade unions in this investigation. Nuclear energy has been dealt with at the trade union congresses of all observed trade unions in this analysis. Of course, this differs from congress to congress and union to union in varying degrees. In some unions, decisions have been explicitly made on nuclear energy. In fact, it is only correct to speak of a *decision* on nuclear energy when it was the major issue of a motion. Nuclear energy was often only mentioned in the context of other issues such as energy policy, economic policy, or environmental policy. However, my major concern is to identify typical argumentations referring to new and productionist politics *within the framework* of the nuclear energy debate in trade unions. Therefore I also attempt to include motions that treat nuclear energy as just one aspect among others. What we can see from the decisions on motions which do not deal mainly with nuclear energy, is how unions act with motions which evaluate nuclear energy in a different manner. Since the context of argumentation is important, we may find some interesting regularities here. These regularities will serve as indicators for the *stands* on new and productionist politics. Before we have a closer look at the adoption of elements of new politics at the trade union congresses, I wish to address a few words to the congressional procedures of Swedish and German unions which might have an impact on the overall treatment of the issue [2].

In contrast to the German unions, all members in most Swedish unions are eligible to propose a motion to the trade union congress. However, motions are often formulated by local districts, the board or other union subgroups. Each motion is available at the congress in printed version along with a comment of the board. This comment (*styrelsens utlåtande över motionerna* or *förbundsstyrelsens yttrande*) plays a crucial role for the following congress procedures. The comment may summarize different motions and gives advice on how the congress should decide on the motions. There normally follows a debate on the motions. The final decision is then made on the recommendation of the board rather than the motions. In TCO unions the board of the local district often gives a comment on the motions of members of its district

(avdelningsstyrelsens yttrande), before the central union board expresses its recommendation. These may often only be the approval but it can also be a longer statement. At the TCO congress the role played by the local district boards is taken on by the boards of the individual member union from where the motion is proposed.

In German unions, motions are usually formulated by official organs such as local and district sections, the youth and women's departments and, of course, the executive committee (*Geschäftsführender Vorstand*) itself. At the DGB congress, most individual trade unions frequently propose motions. A very important "motion commission" (*Antragskommission*) attaches its recommendations to every motion, urging the congress delegates to approve, reject, or alter the proposal. The recommendations of the German union motion commissions are similar to the statements of the union boards in Swedish trade unions. The work of the motion commission consists also of the summarizing of several motions into one general motion (*EntschlieBung*). This general motion is often a compromise of different opinions which attempts to soften conflicting issues by framing them into a broader context. Similar to the Swedish unions, the delegates receive a booklet of all motions, *EntschlieBungen* and the recommendations of the motion commission. After there has been a debate about the issues that have been defined by the motion commission, the delegates vote on the motion commission's recommendation [3]. A simple majority decides the fate of all motions except those which address aspects of unions by-laws.

In both countries, the decisions of the union congresses are often difficult to estimate and are far from being clear. Besides clear-cut acceptance and rejection of a motion, there are other more equivocal decisions. For instance, motions are *supplemented to others*. As a consequence that means that the motion loses importance without being rejected. This procedure has often been used in order to compromise standpoints. It can happen that motions with very different standpoints are supplemented to another motion. A softer way of rejecting motions is to consider them as *responded to*. This means that the congress considers the claims of the motion as already fulfilled either by the acceptance of other motions, by political steps already taken or other circumstances. As a consequence, the congress gets rid of the motion without an open rejection.

The union debates on motions are often as well very difficult to estimate. It can happen that the debate comes to new conclusions before unknown arguments have been introduced which could have had fundamental impacts on the final decision. The most usual case, however, is that debates revolve around congressional procedures or express general solidarity for union standpoints, the board, or other

speakers. In this investigation, all debate contributions have been analyzed that refer to the motions which are concerned with nuclear energy.

The pure quantitative view at the trade union congress motions concerning nuclear energy reveals that the issue had not at all the same status of importance for Swedish unions as for their West German counterparts. However, there are some differences between the Swedish unions, especially between LO and TCO. The confederation of the white collar unions, TCO, had a much more obvious congressional treatment of nuclear energy than LO. However, in comparison to German unions the amount of TCO congressional treatment is still rather modest.

Table 3-1: Frequencies and Context of all Congressional Motions and Debate Contributions on Nuclear Energy of DGB, LO and TCO Unions from 1970 to 1989.

Union	Motions		Context				Congress- ional Decisions*	Debate		Motions and Debate (sum)	
	Frequency	Percent	Nuclear Energy	Energy Policy	Ecology	others		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
DGB	24	10.3	8	14	-	2	yes (1)	21	13.4	45	11.5
IGM	41	17.6	28	8	3	2	no	30	19.1	71	18.2
IGB	30	12.9	-	24	-	6	no	8	5.1	38	9.7
IGC	19	8.2	14	3	-	2	yes (2)	11	7.0	30	7.7
ÖTV	71	30.5	31	32	-	8	yes (3)	47	29.9	118	30.3
HSV	23	9.9	6	15	1	1	yes (1)	19	12.1	42	10.8
IGD	17	7.3	10	7	-	-	yes (1)	21	13.4	38	9.7
GEW**	8	3.4	8	-	-	-	yes (3)	-	-	8	2.1
Sum	233	100.0	105	103	4	21	(11)	157	100.0	390	100.0
Average:	29.1		13.8	12.9	.5	2.6		22.4***		48.8	

Union	Motions		Context				Congress- ional Stand*	Debate		Motions and Debate (sum)				
	Freq. (a)	Percent (b)	Nuclear Energy	Energy Policy	Ecology	others		Freq. (a)	Percent (b)	Freq. (a)	Percent (b)			
LO	6	7.1	20.0	1	5	-	-	no	21	11.2	28.0	27	10.0	25.7
SEF	4	4.8	13.3	-	4	-	-	no	21	11.2	28.0	25	9.2	23.8
Metall	9	10.7	30.0	4	5	-	-	no	8	4.3	10.7	17	6.3	16.2
SF	8	9.5	26.7	2	6	-	-	no	11	5.9	14.7	19	7.0	18.1
SKAF	1	1.2	3.3	-	1	-	-	no	1	.5	1.3	2	.7	1.9
GF	2	2.4	6.7	2	-	-	-	no+	13	7.0	17.3	15	5.5	14.3
Sum	30	35.7	100.0	9	19	-	-		75	40.1	100.0	105	38.7	100.0
Average:	5.0	6.0		1.5	3.2	-	-		12.5	6.7		17.5	6.5	

TCO	29	34.5	53.7	3	25	1	-	yes (1)	23	12.3	20.5	52	19.2	31.3
SIF	9	10.7	16.7	5	3	-	1	no	8	4.3	7.1	17	6.3	10.2
ST	11	13.1	20.4	3	7	1	-	yes (1)	70	37.4	62.5	81	29.9	48.8
SKTF	4	4.8	7.4	-	-	4	-	no	10	5.3	8.9	14	5.2	8.4
SL	1	1.2	1.9	1	-	-	-	no	1	.5	.9	2	.7	1.2
Sum:	54	64.3	100.0	12	35	6	1		112	59.8	100.0	166	61.3	100.0
Average:	10.8	12.9		2.4	7.0	1.2	0.2		22.4	12.0		33.2	12.3	

Total:	Sum:	84	100.0	21	54	6	1		187	100.0		271	100.0	
	Average:	7.6		1.9	4.9	0.5	0.1		17.0			24.6		

Explanations:

- For the Swedish unions percentages refer, on the one hand, to all analyzed Swedish trade unions (a) and, on the other hand, to all LO or TCO unions respectively (b).
- * Motions have been submitted to LO or SAP for further action.
- Congressional stand on nuclear energy means that the motion had nuclear energy as the major subject and the congress approved of this motion. In brackets the frequencies of congressional stands are given. IGC accepted two motions in 1988, ÖTV three in 1988, and GEW three: one in 1977, one in 1980, and one in 1986.
- ** No congress debate was available.
- *** The average of the debate contribution is calculated on the basis that GEW was excluded from the number of unions.

The individual TCO trade unions also had a more lengthy congressional treatment of nuclear energy than their blue collar counterparts. This is in particular true for ST, the public sector union that organizes members employed in nuclear power plants and also in public services. However, when we look at the subject matter of the motions [4] we can see that most motions deal with nuclear energy in the context of energy policy. This is closely related to the fact that - with the exception of TCO and ST - no Swedish union analyzed in the research took a congressional legitimated decision on nuclear energy [5]. A congressional decision on nuclear energy is *exclusively* here a concrete decision on a motion that has nuclear energy as the *major* issue. ST was also the union that most strongly debated nuclear energy at the congresses. However, in Sweden the highest amount of motions were proposed at the TCO congresses. SIF also debated the nuclear energy issue but the debate was not of much significance. SKTF and SL did not debate nuclear power to any larger degree.

The general level of the debate was much weaker in LO unions. LO, SEF, Metall, and SF are the LO unions that most frequently debated the issue among the analyzed LO unions. The debate in GF also was rather strong. Although GF only proposed a few motions dealing with nuclear energy, they had some extensive debates about the issue. Outstanding is the low congressional treatment of nuclear energy by SKAF.

German unions debated the issue much more than the Swedish unions. Of all the unions, ÖTV and IGM had nuclear energy most frequently as an issue at the union congresses. The other unions - perhaps with the exception of GEW [6] - also debated the issue extensively. The nuclear power issue was also much more in the center of the debate. While in Swedish unions, nuclear energy was debated mainly within the framework of energy policy, for German unions the issue received more special attention. Apart from IGM and IGB all analyzed DGB unions explicitly made a congressional decision on nuclear energy. Some unions, such as ÖTV, GEW, and IGC even revised their decision on nuclear energy. Surprising is also the fact that HBV and IGD debated the issue as much as the energy unions IGB and IGC. This is in particular true when we consider the high amount of debate contributions.

The following section will describe the debates on nuclear energy of the individual unions in greater detail. However, the focus is on the arguments of new and productionist politics.

Adopting Elements of New Politics at Trade Union Congresses

Adopting elements of new politics can be analyzed as a social process. Social processes are complex interactions of different actors, organizational environments and situations. However *time* may be one of the most prominent factors. In order to simplify the analysis in this section I do not refer to substantial changes of the organizational environment, etc. (see for that chapter six). Instead I concentrate on the question whether trade unions in Sweden and Germany increasingly adopted elements of new politics from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s or whether there are no special effects from this period to identify. For the analysis of time periods I classify the entire time period into four different phases. First, there is the initial time period up to 1975 before the nuclear issue reached trade unions to a large degree. Second, we may look at the time period between 1976 and 1980, as the time when trade unions first took a congressional stand. The years in the first half of the 1980s led to some re-assessments. The last time period starts in 1986, after the reactor accident at Chernobyl, and lasts until 1989 when the empirical analysis of this study ended.

For the analysis of trade union stands on new and productionist politics, we can distinguish two different kind of stands: on the one hand, we can consider the stand of all congress motions and all debate contributions of the congress participants. This is the (representative) *congressional stand*. On the other hand, this congressional stand is not the final approved stand of a trade union. Therefore I also analyze the *official stand* as well. For the official stand I analyzed the approved motions. Approved motions are one of the most important guidelines for political orientation. The determination of motions and political action may not be complete since strategic factors play an important role when formulating motions. However, in the context of party policy, it can be shown that party programs and government declaration are good predictors for government policy (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1990). Therefore we may expect a relatively high correlation between approved motions and trade union policy. If no motion was approved of, the debate contributions of trade union board members served as an indicator for the official stand. For the Swedish trade unions, I included in this case also the statements of the boards (*utlåtande över motionerna*) about the motions. Debate contributions of trade union chair persons and members of the board are another indicator for the official policy of a union. From their hierarchical status in the organization, they function as multipliers of ideas. Furthermore, it is very seldom that motions are approved of against the will of the "union elite". One can also conclude that approved motions are moderated through the board members who finally put the motion into practical policy.

As we have already seen in the section above, trade unions in Sweden and Germany debated nuclear energy to very different degrees. This is not only true in quantitative terms but also in terms of new and productionist politics. The first union that did debate nuclear energy at its congress was the German ÖTV. At the congress in 1972 a motion was approved of that stressed strongly productionist politics and evaluated nuclear energy clearly positively [7].

Table 3-2: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics (1970-1975)

	Congressional Stand				Official Trade Union Stand				
	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	YEAR
ÖTV	1.90	-25.0	.0	25.0	1.90	-25.0	.0	25.0	1972
ST*	-1.53	12.5	9.9	2.1	1.89	-8.3	.0	4.2	1975

* No motion were approved of at the congress. For these unions the stand of the union board has been taken as an indicator for official union stand.

In contrast to ÖTV which did not at all consider elements of new politics, ST at its first congress in 1975 was the first union to discuss nuclear energy in terms of new politics. However, even when the general congressional standpoint was anti-nuclear energy and open towards elements of new politics the official union policy stresses productionist politics and positively evaluated nuclear energy.

From the mid 1970s to 1980, most of the other unions took a stand on nuclear energy or had at least a congressional debate on the issue. Only Metall and SF did not debate the issue at their congresses and additionally SIF and SL did not express an official stand.

Table 3-3: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics (1976-1980)

	Congressional Stand				Official Trade Union Stand				
	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	YEAR
DBG	.23	-7.3	5.0	10.8	1.18	-20.8	2.1	22.9	1978
IGM	-.11	.7	4.7	4.2	.78	-10.4	2.8	9.7	1977/78
IGB	.02	-8.3	.0	2.8	.31	-8.3	.0	2.8	1980
IGC	-.13	1.6	5.4	4.2	1.78	-8.3	4.2	12.5	1980
ÖTV	-.28	.5	4.7	4.4	1.30	-8.3	2.1	6.3	1976/80**
HBV	-1.23	7.0	6.3	2.3	-1.00	-	.0	.0	1980
IGD	-1.09	4.4	4.6	1.4	-.30	.0	2.1	2.1	1977/80**
GEW	-2.35	19.2	16.7	.7	-2.38	37.5	20.8	2.1	1977/80**
LO*	-.22	2.1	2.1	1.4	1.15	-4.2	.8	1.7	1976
SEF	1.75	-8.3	.0	1.2	1.50	-8.3	.0	8.3	1976
MET									
SF									
SKAF*	1.50	-4.2	.0	4.2	1.50	-4.2	.0	4.2	1978
GF*	-.72	7.6	8.9	2.4	-.81	4.2	6.9	2.8	1978
TCO	-.81	1.0	5.1	4.4	1.70	-16.7	.0	11.1	1979
SIF	1.07	3.1	2.1	1.2	-	-	-	-	1978
ST*	-.72	3.1	4.1	2.4	1.10	-4.2	.0	1.7	1979
SKTF*	-1.27	.0	.5	.5	-1.00	.	.0	.0	1980
SL	-2.78	25.0	14.6	2.1	-	-	-	-	1977

* See table 3-2.

** Two congresses have been combined.

It becomes clear that some unions are quite open for elements of new politics. This is particularly true for both teacher unions and to a minor degree also for both printer unions and HBV. However, when we turn to the approved union stands, it is only in GEW and to a much lower degree in GF that elements of new politics dominate. All other unions that took a stand in this period express their preference for productionist politics. Particularly, TCO, the DGB but also IGM belong to the vanguard of productionist politics. In the first half of the 1980s this picture did not change dramatically. The lower score of the productionist value result mainly in the fact that the issue was less strongly debated than before.

Table 3-4: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics (1981-1985)

	Congressional Stand				Official Trade Union Stand				
	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	YEAR
DGB	.30	-.5	2.1	2.4	.97	-4.2	.0	2.8	1981/82**
IGM	-.57	4.2	6.3	2.1	1.00	-4.2	.0	4.2	1983
IGB	-.75	4.2	.4	.0	-	-	-	-	1984
IGC	2.00	-8.3	.0	8.3	2.00	-8.3	.0	8.3	1984
ÖTV*	-.66	6.1	9.0	3.5	1.38	-8.3	1.4	9.7	1984
HBV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IGD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GEW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LO*	-.66	2.1	2.1	1.4	1.33	.0	2.8	2.8	1981
SEF*	.62	-2.1	.5	1.0	1.18	-4.2	.0	.6	1981
MET*	-.26	1.8	2.8	1.4	-.46	.0	2.1	2.1	1981/85**
SF*	-.26	-2.1	1.8	3.6	-.46	.0	2.1	2.1	1985
SKAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GF*	-2.69	4.2	4.2	.0	2.38	4.2	4.2	.0	1982
TCO*	-1.00	4.2	3.2	.5	-.75	2.1	2.1	1.0	1982/85**
SIF*	.91	-4.2	.0	1.4	-1.50	-	.0	.0	1981
ST	-1.23	1.1	3.3	2.6	-2.05	8.3	16.7	8.3	1981/83**
SKTF	-1.50	.	.0	.0	-	-	-	-	1984
SL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

For * and ** see table 3-2 and 3-3.

There is only a change in TCO and ST. Both unions moved more to the new politics side. This move is rather ambiguous for TCO since the expressions are very vague and infrequent. That is also documented by the fact that the data rely entirely on statements of board members and that no new congressional decision was taken. However, for ST we may postulate a change of standpoints. At the congress in 1981, ST approved of an energy program that evaluated nuclear energy very negatively. In the context of this program, several elements of new politics were adopted. However, in this program productionist aspects are present as well although they are a minority. We may conclude that until 1985 only the GEW, GF and ST adopted elements of new politics in their official politics. The question now is how the period after the catastrophe of Chernobyl may have affected the standpoints towards new and productionist politics?

Table 3-5: Trade Unions Stands on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics (1986-1989)

	Congressional Stand				Official Trade Union Stand				
	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	YEAR
DGB*	-1.41	2.4	8.0	5.8	-1.25	.5	7.1	6.7	1986
IGM	-1.88	6.6	5.0	.1	-1.40	12.5	12.5	.0	1986
IGB	-.83	4.2	1.8	.4	-1.33	-	.0	.0	1988
IGC	-1.75	9.7	8.3	1.0	-.19	-4.2	1.4	2.8	1988
ÖTV	-1.53	8.2	6.4	1.2	-1.97	14.6	11.8	2.1	1988
HBV	-2.52	12.5	10.7	.0	-2.07	16.7	16.7	.0	1988
IGD	-2.17	12.1	7.4	.3	-2.60	12.5	6.3	.0	1986
GEW	-2.44	16.7	16.7	.0	-2.32	16.7	16.7	.0	1986
LO*	-.65	-.7	4.2	4.8	-.70	1.4	4.2	3.1	1986
SEF	.97	-3.6	1.3	3.8	.40	-8.3	.0	8.3	1986
MET*	.81	-1.7	3.6	4.8	-.64	-4.2	2.1	4.2	1989
SF	.09	-5.6	.9	4.6	1.50	-4.2	.0	2.1	1989
SKAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GF*	-1.76	20.8	3.5	.0	-2.16	20.8	10.4	.0	1986
TCO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1988
SIF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1987
ST	-1.50	.	.0	.0	-	-	-	-	1988
SKTF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1988
SL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1986/89**

For * and ** see table 3-2 and 3-3.

As we can see from table 3-5, in Germany, a kind of polarization between certain unions took place. Most analyzed German unions changed with their re-evaluation of nuclear energy also their standpoints towards new and productionist politics. Apart from IGC and IGB all German unions in this analysis changed standpoints and favored elements of new politics. This is particularly true for GEW, HBV and IGD. But also the more influential unions IGM and ÖTV adopted elements of new politics. However, for the DGB this re-orientation is not as clear as for the unions above mentioned. The 1986 DGB congress was very special because it took immediately place in the light of the reactor accident of Chernobyl (see appendix: 4). For LO unions we can see a return to productionist politics. SEF and SF both made congressional decisions that favor productionist politics, although their evaluation of nuclear energy is rather neutral. Metall and GF did not take a congressional decision but the statements of the board members indicate that Metall favors productionist politics and GF quite clearly favors elements of new politics.

The other interesting finding is that TCO and its unions entirely refrained from congressional treatment. Virtually no motion or debate contribution on nuclear energy

contained any element of new or productionist politics. Even more interesting is that nuclear energy was hardly ever a subject in a motion or contribution at TCO congresses after 1985.

From this chronological analysis we can conclude that - with the exception of IGB and IGC - all German unions adopted elements of new politics. At the beginning of the 1970s, all unions favored productionist politics. Therefore it is fair to conclude that unions open to new politics, institutionalized this stand over time. For Swedish trade unions this is only true for GF and perhaps ST. All other Swedish unions did not institutionalize elements of new politics. For LO unions we can even postulate a return to productionist politics. For the further analysis in the succeeding chapters, I wish to summarize the *last* congressional stand for all trade unions.

The Last Official Congressional Standpoints

The last official stand of a trade union serves here as part of the indicator whether trade unions have adopted elements of new politics or whether they are hostile to new politics. The last official stands of trade unions often date back several years ago. Therefore each table also shows the date when the last congress took place at which elements of new and productionist politics were debated. Table 3-6 reflects the last official stand of trade unions towards nuclear energy and the adoption of new and productionist politics. With the exception of SIF, SKTF and SL, all unions took an official stand, in terms defined above, after 1986. However, for IGB the 1980 official congressional decision was taken because in a later congress in 1988 no political statements in terms of new and productionist politics were mentioned.

Table 3-6: Last official Stand on Nuclear Energy and New and Productionist Politics

	EI	ANPE	NP	PP	YEAR
DGB+	-1.25	.5	7.1	6.7	1986
IGM	-1.40	12.5	12.5	.0	1986
IGB**	.33	-8.3	.0	2.8	1980
IGC	-.19	-4.2	1.4	2.8	1988
ÖTV	-1.97	14.6	11.8	2.1	1988
HBV	-2.07	16.7	16.7	.0	1988
IGD	-2.60	12.5	12.5	.0	1986
GEW	-2.32	16.7	16.7	.0	1986
LO*	-.70	1.4	4.2	3.1	1986
SEF	.40	-8.3	.0	8.3	1986
MET*	-.64	-4.2	2.1	4.2	1989
SF	1.50	-4.2	.0	2.1	1989
SKAF*	1.50	-4.2	.0	4.2	1978
GF*	-2.16	20.8	10.4	.0	1986
TCO	1.70	-16.7	.0	11.1	1979
SIF*	-1.50	-	.0	.0	1981
ST	-2.05	8.3	8.3	.0	1981
SKTF*	-1.00	-	.0	.0	1980
SL	-	-	-	-	

* No motion were approved of at the congress. For these unions the stand of the union board has been taken as an indicator for official union stand.

** Last stand with statements on new and productionist politics

+ Approved motion and debate contributions of union board members because of the special situation of the congress.

Table 3-6 shows clearly that DGB unions have been most open to elements of new politics. In particular GEW, HBV, ÖTV, IGD and IGM are among the six unions most open to elements of new politics. They were only overruled by the extreme pro new politics stand of GF. However, GF's standpoint is based on statements from the boards and not on approved motions. In contrast to these unions, IGC and to a greater extend IGB are both in favor of productionist politics. The DGB may also have adopted some elements of new politics. The standpoint of the DGB is difficult to judge at this moment since the congress took place in the middle of the aftermath of the Chernobyl reactor accident. Motions submitted to the congress were formulated several month before the congress and the debate was particularly affected by the impressions of reactor accident. Therefore the data are based on approved motions and the debate contributions of board members.

In contrast to the DGB unions, the LO unions favor productionist politics at their congresses. This is particularly true for SEF but productionist elements also dominate in Metall, SF, and SKAF. LO, although more open to elements of new politics than most other LO unions scores lower than the mean (3.4) and may also be classified as a productionist union. As mentioned above, GF is the extreme exception of the LO family. However, apart from SEF and SF no LO union took a stand in terms of an approved motion. Stands came only in the form of expressions from board members. This pattern of "non-decision-making" is even more true for TCO unions. No TCO union took a positive decision on a motion on nuclear energy and no TCO board member expressed a statement that contained elements of new or productionist politics after 1981 [8]. Therefore all the TCO unions' stands date back to the turn of the 1970/80s decade. In this analysis I also included the decisions from congresses which date back in time, because one can take it for granted that a non-revised decision is still valid today.

Among TCO unions we can identify three different patterns: first, there is the TCO confederation that favors clearly productionist politics. This congressional stand dates back from the very turbulent congress in 1979 (see for details: appendix 4). The congress immediately took place after the reactor accident at Harrisburg (Three Mile Island). Many union members expressing their opposing opinion of nuclear energy were against the manner in which TCO dealt with this issue (Micheletti, 1985). However, the outcome resulted in the approval of extreme productionist motions. In the early 1980s TCO softened its assessment but it never took any real steps to revise the attitudes from 1979. Even if the ANPE-Index in table 3-6 may overestimate the productionist stand of TCO, it is fair to conclude that TCO sticks to a rather productionist stand. The second pattern of TCO unions is represented by ST. However, like GF among LO unions, ST may be an exception among TCO unions. In its energy program from 1981, ST changed its then productionist stand and expressed their sympathy for elements of new politics. Between these two rather extreme patterns, we can identify the third and most common pattern among TCO unions. This consists of a union behavior that tries not to get involved in party-political issues which are controversial. In our sample, this is particularly true for SKTF and SL. Often outspokenly, union members expressed their wish that their union should not take a stand on politically controversial questions.

3. THE DISSEMINATION OF NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS NEWSPAPERS

A concentration on the trade union newspapers has the methodological advantage that they are relatively easily accessible and allow a systematic analysis over time.

However, there is disagreement to what extent trade union newspapers represent the opinions of official trade union policy. Before I address this question, I would like to turn to the unique character of the analyzed trade union papers.

The Character of Trade Union Newspapers

Trade union membership newspapers aim to combine organizational and membership interests [9]. Union papers write about current events mainly from the perspective of their members as wage earners. Being a wage earner is an important fact in a society that is built upon work. Therefore, a trade union paper supplies the member with a very special world view: a world view in the interest of a specific worker or employee. The interests of the wage earner are more diversified than ever which also affects the stand on current issues. The example of nuclear energy may illustrate this point very well. For one group of workers, nuclear power means a job or a workplace with all implication that they may have for identity, self-esteem, social relations, social status and economic income, etc. (Jahoda, 1979). Other groups may be more indirectly effected because their job is highly energy consuming. For others again, nuclear power is just a threat and has nothing to do with their individual job situation. Union newspapers have also political and organizational functions. One may distinguish three major functions in this respect: they promote the *intra organizational communication*; they *make the trade union attitudes public*; and they are a *counter-power to the bourgeois press* which dominates in both countries. These aims are stated by the trade unions themselves and they are also mentioned in the studies on the union press (Jühe, 1977: 7-10; Kniesburges, 1984; Wallander, 1982; Hadenius and Weibull, 1989: 86-113; Metall 1989: 257/8). These three aims, however, are often not easy to combine.

That the trade union press is very important for the trade unions is documented by the large amount of money which is spent in order to run the membership newspapers (for German unions see: Jühe, 1977: 43-46). Normally, each member receives a copy of the paper and the newspapers are distributed to several other individuals and organizations. Studies on readers' behavior show that more than three-quarters of the membership regularly read the paper (e.g.: Weibull, 1977; GF, 1978; Wallander, 1982: 34; SKAF, 1988; Infas, without date; Infas, 1977/8; Kniesburges, 1984: 61-63; Bang, 1989: 12). The status of trade union newspapers can be easily seen by reviewing some numbers that may illustrate the importance of the "forgotten press". More than 3.5 Mio. people in Sweden (almost half of the population) and 7.6 Mio. in West Germany receive *their* trade union membership paper. A number that is even difficult to reach for general mass media.

However, there are some important differences among the analyzed papers. The biggest difference exists between the membership papers of the individual trade unions, on the one hand, and the newspapers edited by the confederations, on the other, which are mainly designed for the trade union officials. The confederation papers also differ in the rate they are distributed. The papers of LO and TCO appear weekly and bi-weekly respectively. *LO-tidningen* addresses many more daily political issues than the *TCO-tidningen*. The DGB paper, *Die Quelle*, appears only once a month and contains much less but longer articles. Of course all confederation papers address trade union issues and the policy and problems of the individual trade unions.

The appearance of individual membership newspapers differ considerably among the unions and this has also changed over time. They have a large format or a small one. They have a daily newspaper design with a lot of important news on the front page or they look more like weekly magazines. They appear either weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. Although all papers focus on the concerns of their membership, some report and debate more general events and topics and other are more narrow in scope.

In particular, the teachers' unions in both countries run newspapers that deal mainly with the immediate concerns of their members. General political issues that have nothing to do with school education, wages or the union organization are rarely presented in these membership papers. As a consequence of this both papers of the teachers' unions have not been included in the analysis [10]. Also the papers of SEF (*Elektrikern*) and SKTF (*SKTF-tidningen*) frequently contain less general political information than the other union papers. On the other hand, apart from *TCO-tidningen*, the confederation papers are more comprehensive. This is particularly true for *LO-tidningen* that covers a huge range of general political issues beside the union concerns. *Die Quelle* still with a rather broad coverage is more directed to "union insiders" and contains more expert information than *LO-tidningen*. *TCO-tidningen* is more designed for the "public" than the other confederation papers. Apart from union concerns (that includes economic issues of course), *TCO-tidningen* is not so much concerned with politics in general, but more frequently stresses entertaining issues. The only membership union paper that is more open to general issues is the paper of the IGM *metall*.

All the differences of the papers certainly influence the picture presented of the individual trade union newspapers. Important in this study, however, is the representation of new politics of the trade union papers (inference from medium to sender). The newspapers have been chosen because they react more directly to political events

and contain more information and evaluations of political actors and events than expressed at the highly formalized trade union congresses. Therefore, trade union membership newspapers are especially suited for longitudinal analysis.

The Presentation of New Politics in the Trade Union Membership Newspapers

This section is guided by the theoretical work done on organizational evolution and learning, especially in the tradition of cognitive theories of organizations (e.g.: Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Weick, 1979; Weick and Bougon, 1986; Hedberg, 1981; Kieser, 1985). The crucial question here is how the trade unions adopted elements of new politics in their newspapers. Just as important as the learning process is the process of "unlearning" (Hedberg, 1981) or erasing of obsolete elements of the retention section. Also in this chapter, I will rely on the indices developed in chapter two.

In what follows, I will review whether or not trade union newspapers in Sweden and West Germany adopted elements of new politics or focused more strongly on productionist aspects. For that, I will analyze the trade union newspapers in a chronological manner and only the more distinct aspects will be mentioned [11]. The presentation of these aspects will be done in turn for the three different trade union movements (DGB, LO, TCO). In treating each union movement as a whole, we may identify the unions which welcomed elements of new politics more, those that adjusted more hesitantly, those that tried to avoid the adoption of elements of new politics and those that fought against elements of new politics by stressing more frequently productionist politics (see for a similar classification of organizations: Miles, et al. 1978). Since I am interested here in the enactment process of new politics in general, I will include all types of articles into the analysis.

(a) DGB Unions

In the first period from 1973 to 1976, productionist aspects quite clearly dominated among the trade unions which published articles with a stress on productionist or new politics elements. While 1973 is dominated by IGC's productionist articles (ANPE: -8.3 and -12.5) in 1974, also IGB and ÖTV published articles that contain elements of productionist politics. Although the productionist aspects dominate in all mentioned unions, some elements of new politics are also voiced. For IGB a letter to the editor pointed to the importance of elements of new politics. In particular, ÖTV represented both sides by two articles (ANPE: -12.5 and 8.3 respectively). ÖTV's endeavor to present both sides of the coin can also be seen by an article of a guest author (expert). Although very positive to nuclear energy (EI = 2.33), this contribution contained substantial aspects of both productionist and new politics (MP = 16.7

and NP = 12.5). However, in particular in letters to the editor productionist aspects were heavily stressed in the ÖTV paper. In 1975, apart from IGB that published an editorial article that contained a heavy stress on productionist aspects, the articles in the papers of IGC and ÖTV were not very profiled in terms of our analytical categories. Nevertheless, partly extreme positive evaluations of nuclear energy dominated. In 1976, the picture did not fundamentally change. IGM also joined IGB, IGC, and ÖTV with rather productionist articles (ANPE up to -12.5). In particular, an article in the paper of ÖTV scored as high as -41.7. Taking all analyzed publications of DGB unions, we can conclude that in the beginning productionist aspects determined the view of West German unions (mean of ANPE = -8.3). However, a certain controversial debate took place in this period (STD of ANPE = 12.2) [12].

In 1977, the DGB unions participated rather actively in the "symbolic struggle" concerning nuclear power. As outlined later (chapter six), anti-nuclear protest of citizen initiatives and partly violent anti-nuclear demonstrations but also pro-nuclear protest of concerned work councils brought the nuclear issue to the daily agenda. The protest reached a new, more controversial dimension which should not end until 1980. An indicator for this is that in the period from 1973 to 1976, 16 articles were published that contained a substantial amount of elements of productionist and new politics but 64 alone in 1977. More unions also took part in this period. In addition to the unions that had already printed articles before, the HBV and the DGB paper also published articles. Both "newcomers" clearly expressed a productionist opinion. The three articles published in HBV's paper had an ANPE mean of -9.7 and the DGB paper was even clearer (ANPE mean: -21.8). IGB also belonged to the "productionist hard-liners" at this time. Even if the other unions mentioned some elements of new politics, these aspects were alien to IGB. If political aspects were raised at all in IGB's paper, they favored a productionist view (ANPE mean = -13.1). But also in IGM, IGC and ÖTV, the productionist picture dominated. However, all three unions debated the issue and critical letters to the editor were responsible for the publishing of elements of new politics. The comparison of the amount of productionist politics between all articles with and without the letters to the editor makes this point clear. For instance, in the IGM's paper elements of new politics dominated when taking the letters to the editor into consideration (ANPE mean = 2.6; without letters -3.5). But also for ÖTV and IGC, the letters to the editor played a crucial role for the presentation of elements of new politics (ANPE mean for all articles without the letters to the editor and including the letters to the editor: ÖTV: -9.6 and -3.9, IGC: -15.5 and -8.3). Particularly during the time of the work councils' protest, which considered the DGB policy as too hostile against nuclear energy, the publications of the DGB unions extremely stressed productionist aspects.

In summation: in 1977 when the issue of nuclear energy was politicized the papers of DGB unions took a stand that clearly favors productionist aspects (ANPE mean: -6.9). Although some unions debated the issue controversially in their paper, the most critical voices were expressed in letters to the editor. This is true above all for IGM, but also for IGC and ÖTV. Excluding the letters to the editor, the picture turns quite clearly towards the productionist side (ANPE mean = -12.9).

In 1978 and until the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the debate in the papers of the DGB unions was not so extensive as before. However, the articles published in the unions papers of IGM, ÖTV and IGB left no doubt that the outcome of the first politicization would result in a clear productionist stand of those DGB unions (the mean over all DGB unions is: -12.5). In particular, IGM (ANPE = -20.8) and ÖTV (mean of ANPE: -19.4) left no doubts that DGB unions favored a productionist policy at that time. There is the only one exception of IGD. Although IGD took a rather productionist stand at their congress in 1977, the *druck und papier* published quite critical articles against nuclear power that challenged the positive relation between nuclear power and employment and used harsh words like "Nuklearfaschismus" (nuclear fascism) (ANPE = 12.5).

The publications of the DGB unions in 1979 reconfirmed their productionist stand (mean of ANPE: -6.9; also the evaluation of nuclear energy remained all in all positive). Again ÖTV was most extreme in its productionist stand (ANPE mean: -21.9). But also IGM (-11.1) and IGB (-8.3) favored productionist politics during that year. IGC also published an article that favored nuclear energy but by including the letters to the editor this impression changed (mean of ANPE: 0). HBV joined the positive assessment of productionist politics (ANPE: -2.1) leaving again IGD as the only DGB union with a preference for elements of new politics (ANPE: 8.3). Remarkable was also the publication in the DGB officials' paper. Apart from an article that favored productionist politics, the paper published an interview with a board member and energy expert of the French union confederation C.F.D.T. This interview did not only give a negative impression of nuclear power but also introduced some arguments of new politics to the readership of *Die Quelle*. However, apart from this interview and the publications of the IGD paper there is no indication that the DGB unions would have changed their productionist attitude as an immediate consequence of the Harrisburg accident.

1980 can be seen as the beginning of change concerning attitudes among some DGB unions. The constellation described in the following section remained until the

Chernobyl accident and created the base for a cleavage among the trade unions in terms of new and productionist politics. Nuclear power was strongly discussed in 1980 and 1981. After that the debate gradually faded, however, without losing the same polarizing fronts. It is therefore possible to summarize the unions' attitudes as expressed in their membership papers from 1980 until 1986 before the Chernobyl catastrophe. All in all, the German unions were still in favor of productionist politics and evaluated nuclear energy positively (mean of EI and ANPE respectively: .37 and -1.9). However, some important qualifications must be made. IGM is the most remarkable example for a trade union that changed its attitude. In 1980, *metall* published articles on nuclear energy that contain a substantial number of elements of new politics (mean of ANPE: 18.8). With that IGM left the camp of the productionist unions as HBV did (mean of ANPE: 12.5). Other unions did not follow this way. Above all, IGB exclusively published positively about nuclear energy and favored productionist politics (mean of ANPE: -13.0). The same is true for ÖTV (mean of ANPE: -11.9). However, ÖTV had a very lively discussion in its paper, and as before in *metall* most letters to the editor introduced elements of new politics into the trade union. Taking the letters to the editor into account, the dominance of productionist politics becomes rather small in *ÖTV magazine* (mean of ANPE: -1.5). The DGB, IGC and IGD did not discuss the issue in its paper during the whole time period.

The constellation before Chernobyl can be summarized as follows: some unions, among them IGB, ÖTV, IGC, and the DGB favored productionist politics. However, ÖTV and the DGB also presented aspects of new politics. IGC completely refrained from a discussion of the issue. This is surprising since IGC organizes workers in the nuclear sector. On the other hand, we find that IGM, HBV, and IGD which favor elements of new politics. In particular, the two former unions shifted from a productionist politics which they represented in their papers until the end of 1979 towards more openness to elements of new politics. The IGD's paper has already shown since 1978 its sympathy for elements of new politics.

Chernobyl had an extreme impact on the population in West Germany. Essential for the DGB unions was the fact that the DGB congress took place only four weeks later, while the impact of Chernobyl was still fresh in the minds of the members. Daily media attention and new information about the consequences of Chernobyl accompanied the congress. 1986 was the peak year of trade union publications on nuclear energy in West Germany. It is most interesting that the same pattern that existed before Chernobyl prevailed. HBV, IGD, and IGM stressed elements of new politics (mean of ANPE: 14.6, 10.2, 6.8 respectively). Striking is also the fact that in opposition to former years the letters to the editor revised the impression towards

more productionist politics. This is in particular true for IGM that is more open to elements of new politics when we do not take the letters to the editor into the account (ANPE: 9.4). IGB still favored productionist politics (ANPE: -12.5) and IGC published a balanced article that contains as many productionist as new politics aspects. An article by an energy expert of the DGB and other publications show that the DGB paper distributed articles with elements of new politics (ANPE: 20.8).

It is astonishing how stable the attitudes towards productionist and new politics remained in the trade union newspapers. With the exception of the publication in the DGB paper, the unions expressed more or less the opinion, which had existed before Chernobyl. However, it must be recalled that the analysis here is based on statements concerning new and productionist politics. This analysis is not the same as the analysis of the evaluation of nuclear power as such. This is also important for the analysis of 1987 to 1989. All German unions verbally express their negative attitude towards nuclear energy. However, they differ clearly in the degree to which they reject nuclear power. IGD (EI = -2.86), IGM (-2.04), and HBV (-1.67) are most strong in their rejection while ÖTV (-1.53) and DGB (-1.27) are less radical. IGB (-.13) and IGC (-.05) only express a very moderate criticism of nuclear energy. In terms of new and productionist politics, IGM shows a stable preference for elements of new politics (mean of ANPE: 8.3). IGB in contrast favors productionist politics (-4.2). In the ÖTV paper, elements of new politics are mainly expressed in letters to the editor. The other articles are rather moderate in their stress of elements of new politics (6.3). The publications in the DGB paper after 1986 gradually contained fewer and fewer arguments concerning new politics (mean of ANPE: 6.3). IGC, IGD, and HBV did not publish articles with a higher stress on new and productionist politics from 1987 to 1989.

(b) LO Unions

The Swedish public dealt earlier with the nuclear energy issue than what the German public did, and that was also the case for the trade union newspapers. Although SEF, SKAF, LO and Metall published articles on nuclear power in 1973, it was only Metall that debated it in a political respect. While the paper itself favored productionist aspects, a letter to the editor stressed new politics aspects. This is even more true for 1974, when the debate on nuclear energy reached the LO unions. While the letters to the editor contained a substantial amount of elements of new politics (Mean of ANPE: 13.5), the Metall union paper illuminated mainly productionist aspects in their reports and news on nuclear energy (Mean of ANPE: -8.3). LO, SEF, SKAF, and SF also debated the issue more extensively. It is highly interesting that a rather critical attitude dominated when all LO unions' publications are taken

into account (EI mean = -.5) and that the aspect of new politics dominated in this initial period of time (ANPE mean = 6.0). Apart from critical letters to the editor which are also responsible in LO for the high new politics score, it is surprising how comprehensive unions like LO, and SKAF had already presented the issue in 1974.

The intensive period of opinion-making came to concrete terms for the Swedish LO unions in 1975. Although the number of publications in the trade union press remained high in the years to come, a stable productionist stand among most of the LO unions can be identified. Therefore, it is reasonable to summarize the years from 1975 to 1978. However, it is important to note that some LO unions allowed an intensive readership debate in the form of letters to the editor. For instance, the score for all LO unions in this time period is considerably lower when taking the letters to the editor into account than excluding them (ANPE: -4.2 and -8.5, respectively). In particular, Metall's paper had an extensive debate and LO, SKAF, and SF published membership opinions. Since the letters to the editor express deviant opinion from the more general union stand, I will present both figures when they are substantially different.

The LO unions which most clearly stressed productionist aspects in the nuclear power debate are SEF (ANPE: -13.0), SKAF (-12.5), SF (-11.5) and Metall (-8.3). During these years, GF also had a preference for productionist aspects of nuclear energy (-4.2). All these unions, except SEF, published letters to the editor that were quite critical of productionist politics and moderated the reported scores substantially or as in the case of GF, where even the general picture were changed (SKAF: -8.3; SF: -7.5; Metall: -1.7; GF: 5.8). LO itself published articles that were rather balanced in their emphasis on productionist and new politics (LO: -3.2). In particular, a report of a guest author about the demonstration at the Barsebäck nuclear power plant contains many aspects of new politics (ANPE: 37.5). This article was the only one article in which elements of new politics dominated to a larger degree. All other publications in *LO-tidningen* preferred productionist political aspects over new politics and by excluding this article LO's paper also fits into the scheme of productionist politics of the other LO unions (-8.3). All in all, it is impressive how coherent the productionist stand on nuclear energy has been in this time period among all the LO unions, including GF.

The accident at Three Mile Island caused a strong political response in Sweden. Demands of a referendum of the anti-nuclear power movement has always been rejected by the Social Democrats (SAP) and other influential parties and groups. However, immediately following the Three Mile Island accident, the party leader of

the SAP, Olof Palme, suggested conducting a referendum on this issue. The blue collar trade union movement formulated a so-called working-class line together with the Social Democrats. All unions but GF supported this line and the spokesman of this line 2 was Rune Molin, a board member of LO.

LO unions were engaged in the nuclear energy issue in periods when it was politicized (see also chapter six). However, it is difficult to measure the public attention on the Harrisburg issue at the point when it turned into a party-political issue rather than just a news item. This fact may legitimate an analysis of both years simultaneously. Particularly in 1979, there might be a bias in the data that nuclear energy was more critically perceived only for the fact that the trade unions reported of the accident itself. The ANPE-Index documents that the attitudes of Swedish blue collar trade unions remained relatively stable. Again the extensive membership debate in some union papers make it necessary to report the index once in reference to all union publications, including letters to the editor and once without the letters to the editor. Without the letters to the editor, we see a clear dividing line between GF, on the one hand, and all other LO unions, on the other. As mentioned above, GF did not support the "working-class" line but the more radical line three against nuclear power. The letters to the editor in *Grafia*, however, moderated the quite strong openness to new politics (all articles: 9.4; without letters to the editor: 13.9). This means that also GF had a controversial debate in its paper during the time of the Harrisburg accident and referendum but that the letters to the editor favored more productionist politics than elements of new politics. However, GF is the only LO union in this sample that clearly revised its stand. As we could see from the analysis of the congresses, this shift had already occurred *before* the accident of Three Mile Island. GF's anti-productionist - and also anti-nuclear - stand was reinforced by this accident rather than being initiated by it. The other LO unions stuck to their preference of productionist politics, particularly when we exclude the letters to the editor from the analysis. Again, as all the years before, SEF quite clearly favored elements of productionist politics (-11.5). This time also SF, the other LO union that organizes members in the nuclear power plants expressed much sympathy for productionist politics (-11.5). The other organizations were less strongly committed to productionist politics as SEF and SF but were clearly on the productionist side (SKAF: -5.6; LO: -4.4; Metall: -4.2). As mentioned above, letters to the editor in most of LO unions favored elements of new politics over elements of productionist politics (ANPE mean for all publications in the period of 1979 to 1980 are: LO: -3.6; SEF: -11.5; Metall: -.3; SF: -3.8; SKAF: -2.5; GF see above). Particularly in Metall, SF, and SKAF, the membership could express its disagreement on the official trade unions stands. However, there can be no doubt that the influential forces in LO and its

unions favored productionist politics during the period of the Harrisburg accident and the referendum campaign.

After the referendum, nuclear power disappeared from the political agenda. The union publications concerning nuclear power were very rare between 1981 and 1985, and only Metall, SEF, GF, and SF published articles with political elements. The general picture remained unchanged. Metall expressed its productionist opinion (-8.3) but again letters to editor expressed the opinion of the opposing side. SF (-6.9) stuck as much to their preference of productionist politics as GF favored elements of new politics (10.4). How will the trade union papers report about the Chernobyl catastrophe? Again I will not attempt to draw a comprehensive picture of the union publications but concentrate on the analytical aspects.

First of all, it is important to recall that the Chernobyl accident did not get as much media attention in the trade union press in Sweden, as it had in former years during the time of the reactor accident at Three Mile Island and the referendum campaign. Chernobyl had an impact on the trade union publications though. However, the general pattern also remained in 1986 but with some interesting aspects. SEF (-12.5) and GF (12.5) are the two trade unions that expressed the expected opinions towards new and productionist politics. Metall and SF, however, are neutral in the newspapers (mean of ANPE for both: = 0). For both unions, one can say that the immediate reaction to Chernobyl was an expression of new politics elements and that later elements of productionist politics dominated again. In the papers of LO (3.5) and SKAF (8.3), however, elements of new politics dominated. The high score of *Kommunalarbetaren* (SKAF's paper) is based on a rather critical editorial by the chief editor. Most interesting, however, is the fact that SKAF and also Metall did not give much attention to Chernobyl in their papers. This even led to it that both papers did not publish articles on nuclear energy after 1986 and until 1989, when this investigation ended. In particular for *Metallarbetaren*, it is most astonishing that the debate on nuclear energy completely disappeared after 1986.

Interesting is now to see whether the critical attitude of *LO-tidningen* prevailed during the years following Chernobyl. The period from 1987 to 1989 experienced a gradual disappearance of the nuclear issue in the Swedish media in general. Other environmental aspects dominated. In 1988/9 the debate on the phasing-out scenarios started and a slowly increasing debate on nuclear energy was revitalized within the Swedish unions. However, the union press neglected the issue with the exception of the LO confederation. The overall assessment of productionist politics became more positive over the years again (mean of ANPE from 1987 to 1989: -.3; only 1989: -

4.9). GF's few publications confirmed the union's stand against nuclear energy (12.5). SEF (-4.9) and SF (-1.2) expressed their preference for productionist politics in their papers also in the period between 1987 and 1989. The low score is due to the fact that LO unions did not debate the issue any more in a political manner. As we could see above, the frequency of articles in the post-Chernobyl period is rather moderate indeed. This is highly interesting taken the fact that LO planned and initiated an extensive attack on the parliamentary decision to start the phasing-out program in the mid-1990s. This again gives an indication that energy policy in LO is an affair on the elite level and congressional legitimation or membership debate and information is not viewed as very important. Secret collaboration with the SAP is the more successful way for LO to push through its energy policy.

(c) TCO Unions

Three TCO unions also took up the nuclear issue in 1973. All of them debated it in terms of productionist and new politics. SIF published an interview with a natural scientist that leaves a positive impression of nuclear energy and stressed also the productionist aspects. TCO and ST in contrast, introduced elements of new politics to their readership. However, the TCO media attention was rather modest. Instead of joining the public debate on nuclear energy as had been done by the LO unions, TCO unions refrained from a lengthy discussion in their papers. This holds true until 1977. In this time, productionist aspects dominated in the paper of TCO (mean of ANPE in the period between 1974 to 1976: -8.3) and SKTF (-2.1) the only two unions that debated the nuclear issue in a political manner. However, when the issue was politically controversial and determined the political agenda as it did at the 1976 election, TCO unions refrained from political statements.

In 1977 and 1978, TCO attempted to formulate a stand on nuclear energy together with LO. It was also the time, when individual TCO unions tried to take up the issue in their membership papers. Similar to the LO unions, the TCO unions also stressed productionist aspects at this time. All unions were rather similar in this (means of ANPE for TCO: -7.7; SIF: -9.7; ST: -6.9; SKTF: -8.3). However, letters to the editor in TCO's paper emphasized new politics elements.

1979 and 1980 were the years when the number of articles on nuclear energy was at its highest in the papers of TCO unions. Elements of new politics were more frequently presented in TCO papers, although productionist aspects still dominated. This is in particular true for TCO (-4.2) and SIF (-8.3). ST published more frequently elements of new politics in their paper than the other TCO unions (7.5) [13].

Elements of new politics were mentioned particularly in the context of the Harrisburg accident. In 1980, the TCO unions returned to a presentation in which productionist aspects dominated again (ANPE mean for all TCO unions for 1979 and 1980 respectively: -1.8 and -3.0). It seems to be fair to say that TCO unions kept their rather productionist world view on nuclear energy. ST might be an exception of that in 1979.

From 1981 to the accident of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, no publication but one contained sufficient numbers of productionist or new politics. The exception is a publication in ST's paper that quite strongly stressed elements of new politics (12.5). SKTF even refrained completely from publishing on nuclear energy after 1980! In 1986, all other TCO unions published articles in which elements of new politics dominated. In particular, ST was outstanding in that (18.8). SIF (3.6), on the other hand, was less open to elements of new politics, leaving TCO (8.3) somewhere in the middle [14]. Most interesting, and typical for TCO unions, is the fact that the publications were very rare. This is also true for TCO after 1986. This is in particular interesting because the debate about the realization of the phasing-out plan started in Sweden in 1988/89. There are some indicators that TCO refrained from taking up the issue because it would again diversify the members (this argument has been confirmed through conducted interviews). Only the two energy unions (SIF and ST) presented some articles on nuclear energy to their readership in 1987 through 1989. Surprisingly, however, the articles in SIF's paper contained a substantial amount of elements of new politics (9.7) while in ST's paper productionist elements dominated (-6.3). The strong productionist score in the ST paper results mainly from articles about the working conditions in Swedish nuclear plants.

In summation: both LO and TCO unions started the debate on nuclear energy rather openly in the early 1970s. Most unions considered elements of new politics besides productionist ones in the initial period between 1973 and 1974. In 1975 LO unions more strongly emphasized the productionist aspects. This stand was consolidated in the latter years in the mid 1970s. TCO in contrast did not take up the nuclear issue in their paper during the time when it was controversial in the realm of party politics. Only at the end of 1976 and in 1977 and 1978 TCO, formulated a common stand with LO on Swedish energy policy. This was also the time when other TCO unions increased the number of articles on nuclear power in their paper. While TCO unions and in particular the TCO paper published most frequently articles on nuclear energy in times of nuclear accidents, LO unions increased its publication during political events. This was true at the "nuclear energy election" in 1976 and also during the referendum campaign in 1980. However, unions of both union confederation took a

clear productionist stand in this time. ST's and GF's publications might be a kind of exception.

In terms of the theoretical elements outlined above, we can conclude that the unions in both countries adopted elements of new politics in the initial period. These aspects were often expressed in the letters to the editor that functioned as a promoter for elements of new politics in this period. But in the mid-1970s productionist standpoints were taken by all Swedish and German trade unions. In the late 1970s, some unions - above all the printer unions in both countries - revised their retained productionist world views. Other unions followed slowly. In Germany, IGM and HBV, in addition to IGD, may be considered to be the most open unions for elements of new politics. A union that revised its stand more hesitantly was ÖTV and the confederation DGB behaved in the same way. For Sweden, only GF and ST can be put into this category. LO, although productionist, was relatively tolerant concerning elements of new politics. SEF and SF in Sweden and IGB in Germany were unions opposing all influences of new politics. They strongly stressed productionist aspects in their argumentations. Most other Swedish unions and IGC tried to avoid a lengthy debate in their papers. However, the reactor accident of Chernobyl helps to clarify the stands of the trade unions. Most Swedish unions - with the exception of GF and perhaps SIF and ST - manifested their productionist stands. IGC and IGB superficially changed their evaluation of nuclear energy, but they did not revise their productionist stands. Chernobyl had a strong impact on unions that were hesitant in adopting elements of new politics. In particular ÖTV conducted a substantial shift from productionist to a moderate preference of new politics. DGB also falls into this category.

For Germany, it is even possible to conclude that a cleavage in terms of new and productionist politics occurred between the unions during the early 1980s. This picture was also valid after the Chernobyl accident. Although all German unions changed their official positive attitude towards nuclear energy, some unions (IGB and IGC) remained committed to productionist politics. Other unions such as ÖTV and the confederation DGB changed their stand but only the unions which had already shifted attitudes in the early 1980s "unlearned" productionist aspects. That means that in these unions productionist aspects fade away while elements of new politics remain. These unions - IGM, IGD, HBV - are unions which dissented a rather unambiguous positive picture of new politics. In Sweden, it is not possible to identify a similar trend. However, there are some exceptions such as GF, and perhaps SIF and ST. Important is the fact that Swedish unions never unlearned the productionist elements of politics.

The Dissemination of New Politics in Trade Union Newspapers in 1986-89

In order to estimate the *current* dissemination of elements of new politics, I focus on all articles published after the reactor accident at Chernobyl in May 1986 with exception of letters to the editor. For this analysis I consider and combine two related but different aspects. First, the *mean* of the ANPE-Index of the articles published between May 1986 and December 1989. Second, the *frequencies* of elements of new and productionist politics in the mentioned period. For this procedure, I standardized the papers' appearances *as if* the respective papers would appear weekly.

The two different indicators measure two aspects. On the hand, some unions published articles that contain a relative high amount of elements of new politics in *each* article. These are in particular GF, HBV, and IGD. In contrast, SEF and IGB published rather substantial numbers of elements of productionist politics in the individual articles. On the other hand, unions frequently publish articles that contain elements of new or productionist politics, but each article contains only a few political arguments. This can be documented by the summation of all elements of new and productionist politics over the period 1986-89. Particularly, IGM frequently publishes articles with only same political arguments. The average number of elements of new politics brings IGM's paper only up to rank four, while it by far outnumbers all other papers when we look how frequently *metall* refers to elements of new politics. The same but weaker trend is also true for DGB's and ÖTV's paper. GF's paper is an example for the opposite. Although articles in *Grafia* contain a lot of elements of new politics in each article, there are very few articles published. Both indicators, however, correlate significantly ($r = .64^*$).

In order to combine both indicators to one index, I set the highest values equal 100. All other values are in relation to this value. The advantage of this procedure is that we can combine both indicators without losing the interval scale of the data. Table 3-7 documents the mentioned data.



Table 3-7: The Adoption of Elements of New and Productionist Politics in Trade Union Membership Newspapers between 1986 and 1989

	Average ANPE of each Article (1)	Rank of (1)	Frequencies of ANPE (3)	Rank of (3)	Combined Index (1 and 3) (5)	Rank (5) (6)
DGB	21.20	10	36.13	4	39.42	7
IGM	45.44	4	100.00	1	100.00	1
IGB	-32.24	16	-26.44	15	-40.35	15
IGC	8.32	11	9.42	11	12.20	12
ÖTV	25.68	7	47.12	3	50.06	5
HBV	83.36	2	25.92	6	75.13	4
IGD	75.36	3	54.45	2	89.25	2
GEW
LO	8.16	12	13.09	9	14.61	11
SEF	-31.36	15	-82.46	16	-78.26	16
Metall	6.64	13	1.57	13	5.65	13
SKAF	22.24	8.5	5.24	12	18.89	10
SF	.40	14	.52	14	.64	14
GF	100.00	1	21.20	7	83.34	3
TCO	28.56	6	10.73	10	27.02	9
SIF	36.40	5	35.86	5	49.69	6
ST	22.24	8.5	20.68	8	29.51	8
SKTF
SL

The total index shows that the IGM paper most strongly disseminates new politics elements. At the second and third places there are the printer unions, fourth comes HBV's and fifth ÖTV's paper. A bit surprising is the relatively high score for *SIF-tidningen*. The three papers of the union confederation are in the middle range: firstly DGB's paper and already below the mean (29.8) TCO's and finally *LO-tidningen*. Extremely productionist are the papers of SEF and IGB, but also SF's, Metall's and IGC's paper score at the end of the scale.

4. ADOPTING NEW POLITICS

In the last section of this chapter, I wish to summarize the findings of the sections above and to develop an index that estimates the overall adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions. For this I rely on both the assessment of new and productionist politics at the union congresses and the world views concerning new and productionist politics disseminated in the trade union newspapers. The idea behind this procedure is that the symbolic struggle in modern society is dependent on

both formal decisions and the disseminations of world views. The former aspect is reflected by the analysis of the last official stand at the trade union congress and the latter aspects is reflected by the world views disseminated in the trade union newspapers. However, before I will turn to this point I wish to analyze the connection between official congressional stand and the dissemination of new politics in the trade union newspapers.

New Politics in Trade Union Newspapers and Congressional Stands

Considering all 54 analyzed congresses and comparing the assessment of new and productionist politics in the membership newspapers at the year of the congress and the years before and after the congress, we can conclude that there is a stable correlation ($r = .69$). This correlation is stronger for LO unions ($r = .80$) and lowest for TCO unions [15]. In order to specify the high relation between official and newspaper stands, I compare the latest official stand at the union congress with the assessment of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspapers after the Chernobyl reactor accident (1986 through 1989).

For the last official stand, I use the data from table 3-6 above. However, all data are related to the maximum value as described above. Table 3-8 shows the data for all analyzed unions [16].

Table 3-8: The Current Stant on New Politics at the Trade Union Congresses
the Trade Union Newspapers

	Last Congressional Stand (1)	Newspaper Stand 1986-89 (2)	Differences between 1 and 2 (3)
DGB	2.40	39.42	-37.01
IGM	60.10	100.00	-39.90
IGB	-39.90	-40.35	.44
IGC	-20.19	12.20	-32.39
ÖTV	70.19	50.06	20.14
HBV	80.29	75.13	5.15
IGD	60.10	89.25	-29.16
GEW	80.29	.	.
Mean DGB*	36.66	46.53	23.64
LO	6.73	14.61	-7.88
SEF	-39.90	-78.26	38.36
Metall	-20.19	5.65	-25.84
SKAF	-20.19	18.89	-39.08
SF	-20.19	.64	-20.83
GF	100.00	83.34	16.66
Mean LO*	1.04	7.48	24.78
TCO	-80.29	27.02	-107.31
SIF	.	49.69	.
ST	39.90	29.51	10.39
SKTF	.	.	.
SL	.	.	.
Mean TCO*	-20.19	35.40	58.85
Mean all unions*	16.20	29.80	28.74
STD all unions	84.99	12.43	

* mean for column (3) is based on the absolute sums.

Unions most open to new politics in their last congressional stand also print articles which contain elements of new politics in their union paper ($r = .76$). However, they vary to a rather high degree. GF, HBV, IGD, and IGM print articles that contain the most elements of new politics. SF, Metall, and IGC give relatively little attention to new politics and SEF and IGB even stress productionist politics more than new politics. Comparing DGB, TCO, and LO unions, we can conclude that the DGB unions published the highest amount of elements of new politics followed by the TCO unions, while the LO unions are last. However, the rather high value for TCO unions must be qualified. First of all, SKTF is omitted from the calculation, because it has not published any article on nuclear energy since 1985. The other TCO unions and TCO itself also did not publish a lot on the issue after 1987, so that the data may overestimate the real amount of the presentation of new politics. In general, one can

conclude that the index scores more positively towards the new politics side because a lot of articles stem from the time of the reactor accident at Chernobyl in 1986.

Column three shows the differences between the official congressional stand and the assessment of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspaper. A positive value means that the congressional stand is more open to new politics than the assessment in the union papers. Particularly ÖTV was much more open to new politics at its last congress than in its paper. The same is true for GF and much less so for ST and HBV. TCO is the extreme opposite. The congressional stand is much more negative towards new politics than the assessment in *TCO-tidningen*. This may be so since the congressional decision dates back to 1979. The same trend is true for IGM, SKAF, DGB and IGC. However, all these unions are within the range of the standard deviation [17]. With the exception of the TCO unions' papers, it seems to be fair to conclude that trade union newspapers reflect the opinion of the official union policy, when it comes to new and productionist politics. The deviant behavior of TCO unions can be seen from the average of the absolute sums of the differences. In so far, we can confirm that union newspapers represent the opinion of the official stands although they also represent diversified opinions. Methodologically that means that trade union papers are well suited for an analysis of trade union standpoints.

Adopting, Opposing and Neglecting New Politics: A Typology of Trade Unions

In this final section of the chapter, I wish to present a total index for the adoption of elements of new politics. As mentioned above this index includes both the last official stand at the union congress and the dissemination of new politics in trade union newspapers. The total index is based on the sum of the relative values of the last congressional stand and newspaper stand between 1986 and 1989. As the other values, this total index is also put in relation to the maximum value. Table 3-9 summarizes this index:

Table 3-9: New and Productionist Politics in Swedish and German Trade Unions (Total Index)


	Index	Rank
DGB	22.81	8
IGM	87.32	2
IGB	-43.77	15
IGC	-4.36	11
ÖTV	65.59	6
HBV	84.77	3
IGD	81.46	4
GEW*	80.29	5
Mean DGB unions	46.76	6.8
LO	11.64	9
SEF	-64.45	-
Metall	-7.93	12
SKAF	-.71	10
SF	-10.67	13
GF	100.00	1
Mean LO unions	4.56	10.2
TCO	-29.06	14
SIF	.	-
ST	37.86	7
SKTF	.	-
SL	.	-
Mean TCO unions	4.4	10.5
Mean all unions	25.67	8.5
STD all unions	52.18	4.76

* Index is based on congress motions only.

GF, IGM, HBV, and IGD are unions that clearly adopted elements of new politics [18]. Even if ÖTV is not as decisive as the mentioned unions, it clearly belongs to the unions that are open for elements of new politics. ST and the DGB are also above the mean. However, their openness for new politics is not as clear as for the others. This is also supported by the fact that ST did not take any decision towards nuclear energy after the early 1980s. The low DGB score results from the special character of the 1986 congress as mentioned above. Taking the mean as the dividing line for new and productionist politics, we can conclude that LO, SKAF, IGC, Metall, SF, and TCO are productionist unions. IGB and, above all, SEF are extreme examples of productionist unions. GEW can also be counted to the unions open to new politics. GEW fell out of the analysis because it did not publish any articles in their newspapers. However, in sharp contrast to the other unions that are in this category, GEW took a decisive pro-new politics stand at their congresses. Therefore, it is fair to subsume

GEW into the category of unions open to new politics. The other unions without clear stands on new or productionist politics form an own category: this are unions which avoided to take a stand or to express their opinion. These are all TCO unions (SIF, SKTF, SL). Although this pattern is rather usual for Swedish unions, it took on extreme forms in this unions (see appendix 4 for an illustration). It needs to be mentioned that among the Swedish unions only SEF, SF and ST took clear congressional decisions. The first two unambiguously in favour of productionist politics. ST took a congressional decision in favor of new politics. Nevertheless, also ST refrained from taking clear stands - in both the newspaper and at the congresses - in the second half of the 1980s. GF, the other Swedish union that is open to new politics, never clearly approved of a motion that contained elements of new politics. Instead all these motions were handed over to the LO confederation or the Social Democratic Party. This also shows the difficulties for Swedish unions to take a stand on controversial political issues. The following figure attempts to place the trade unions within three dimensions of new politics, productionist politics and neutral stand.

Figure 3-1: A Triangle Model of Union Decision on New and Productionist Politics



5. CONCLUSION

The findings of this chapter indicate that there is a substantial difference between German and Swedish trade unions in respect to their ability and willingness of adopting and disseminating elements of new politics. By and large, German unions are open for elements of new politics while Swedish unions are rather closed. That means that the findings of the analysis confirms the hypotheses B3b, B3c and reject the hypotheses B3a, B3d. However, these findings need further specification concerning the impacts of the organizational environment. For the moment, we can summarize the results of this chapter in what follows. The unresponsiveness of Swedish unions takes two forms: on the one hand, they stick to productionist politics. This standpoint is most common to LO unions. On the other hand, Swedish unions are unresponsive because they neglect the issue; i.e. they do not debate nuclear energy or do not take any congressional decision on the issue. This congressional behavior is in sharp contrast to the involvement of trade unions in the political process in Sweden. Although the "non-decision" behavior is most common among TCO unions it is also true for LO unions. Congressional legitimized decisions on nuclear energy have only been taken by SEF, SF, and ST in Sweden.

In both countries there are exceptions. In Sweden GF and ST are "deviant" cases. Both unions adopted elements of new politics. The exceptions in Germany are IGB and IGC which did not adopt elements of new politics. While it seems for Sweden that these two unions are more or less the only representatives of "new politics" unions for Germany the two "exceptions" may be representatives for a broader group of trade unions.

Concerning the second question about the institutionalization (B5) of elements of new politics there are four points to make: *First*, there are nine trade unions that have not changed their stand on new and productionist politics during the last two decades. GF and GEW have always been open to new politics, although the decision of GEW was taken rather late in 1980. In the GF newspaper we also find some indicators that productionist politics played an important role until 1978. On the other hand, there are the devoted productionist trade unions, which did not change their standpoints: IGB and SEF. SKAF, SIF, SKTF, and SL are the unions which attempted avoiding any stand on new and productionist politics. *Secondly*, we can distinguish those trade unions that shifted towards a more positive attitude towards new politics. With the exception of ST, they are all DGB unions: IGD, HBV, IGM, ÖTV and the DGB. *Thirdly*, there is TCO that changed from a productionist policy to a more neutral stand. TCO took a clear productionist stand in the late 1970s. In times of increasing ecological awareness, however, TCO very carefully expressed some sym-

pathy for environmental concerns. However, it never addressed substantial aspects, but only paid some lip-service that environmental factors are important and should be taken into TCO's policy. *Fourthly*, there is a trend among the most influential LO unions that indicates that productionist politics are more highly valued in the most recent years than in the 1970s. To these unions belong LO, SF, and Metall.

The unions that adopted elements of new politics can be divided into two groups. For the first group the adoption of elements of new politics was a lengthy process (IGD, IGM, HBV, GEW, GF and ST). GF re-assessed its stand before the turn of the 1970/80 decade and GEW never took a productionist stand. The other unions mentioned changed their position in the early 1980s. The other group, consisting of ÖTV and the DGB, re-assessed their stand of new and productionist politics after 1986. This was not so much a lengthy process but can rather be interpreted as an ad hoc decision in face of the aftermath of the Chernobyl reactor accident. A long lasting adoption of elements of new politics can only be postulated for the first group of unions that institutionalized these elements over a longer time period. An indicator for this deep-rooted processes is that no union of the first group has still a substantial amount of elements of productionist politics in their congressional or newspapers stand. ST is an exception in this. ST has not unlearned elements of productionist politics. This is documented in the fact that the ST paper contains also currently elements of productionist politics and that ST refrained - in sharp contrast to the other unions in this group - from congressional decisions in the mid and end 1980s.

In the following chapters in part three I wish to focus on some aspects that might be of special importance for the different trade union behaviors. I distinguish between organizational characteristics, intra-organizational processes, and organizational environments.

Footnotes:

1 The other unions were: the Union of Commercial employees (HTF) and the Union of Civilian Employees in the Defence Force (FCTF).

2 However, there may be some deviations from the general pattern described here (Bergmann, 1979; Markovits, 1986; Lewin, 1980).

3 There are some congressional procedures in several unions that support the standpoint of the motion commission. For instance, even if only minor changes of one motion are suggested it is necessary to vote down first the original motion in order to vote for the new one (which is an altered motion). Since this procedure is very time consuming and confusing it is often rejected by delegates.

4 The coding of this classification was guided by the headlines of the motion. This could be partly misleading. Particular in the case of the 1979 TCO congress, it would be fair to say that nuclear energy was much more in the center of the congress motions than suggested by the data here.

5 According to Michele Micheletti (1985: chapter 4) the only TCO union which took a clear decision on nuclear energy was the *Union of Theatrical Employees* (TF). TF expressed its opposition to

nuclear power. Also the syndicalist union *Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation* (Central Organization of Swedish Workers; SAC) had congressionally decided to oppose nuclear energy. SACO/SR had decided not to become involved in the issue at all.

6 For GEW no debate protocols were available at the DGB archives and also GEW did not cooperate with the author in this question.

7 Although there is a clear correlation between EI (the evaluation of nuclear energy), on the one hand, and ANPE, on the other, the differences are large enough to conclude that we measure two different concepts (Pearson's $r = -.73$; N of valid cases = 388). The same correlation is for the whole congress motions, congress debate, trade union membership papers: $r = -.69$; N of valid cases = 1262.

8 There are some decisions taken on motions that had, beside other issues, nuclear energy as a subject. However, these motions (TCO 1985 and ST 1987) did not address elements of new and productionist politics.

9 In both countries there is not very much systematic work done on trade union papers. An exception is the relatively comprehensive overview by Jühe (1977). For more recent information and more formal facts, see the collection of productionist by Niedenhoff and Pege (1987: chapter O) and the annual *TS-boken*. Furthermore, there exists one analysis for the membership newspaper of the metal unions in both countries. Both are dissertations, one at the University of Lund, Department of Comparative Literature, and the other at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Göttingen. Kristina Wallander (1982) analyses the literary productionist of the Swedish Metalworkers' union from 1890 till 1978. Maria Kniesburges (1984) looks at the German Metalworkers' Union in order to analyze its function in the opinion-making process. Finally, there are some unpublished master's theses: Sverinsson, 1984; Svensson and Johansson, 1989; Eliasson, 1989; Vessman, 1990. A comprehensive study of the Danish trade union press is in progress (Bang, 1989) and to my knowledge the only project that systematically analyzes several aspects of the union press (public and union membership attitudes towards union press; readership and readership behavior; situation and attitudes of journalists in the union press; analysis of the contents of the union paper of LO - the Danish union confederation - and several membership union).

For the West German unions, it would have been possible to include newspapers for officials which most individual unions run. However, there are no equivalent papers for Swedish unions. Also the more general and public feature of membership newspapers gives a more comprehensive picture of a union's world-view than more specialist papers. The same is true for membership papers that address only certain occupational groups among the membership. In so far, it is possible to consider the general membership newspapers as the most important union publications (Jühe, 1977: 13-18).

10 The teacher union newspapers were analyzed after the reactor accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The result was that there were no articles that met the coding instruction (headline referring to nuclear energy). On the base of this impression it was concluded that the papers should be excluded from the analysis.

11 In methodological terms, I will only consider those articles that score higher than 8 either on the productionist politics (MP), new politics (NP) or ANPE scale. Please recall that the indices in this section score from 0 to 100 for the two former and -100 to +100 for the latter index. For a documentation of the following interpretation consult table A3-1 and A3-2 in the appendix.

12 The STD for all articles over the period 1973-89 is 10.3. The mean is $-.88$ by 910 valid cases for the variable ANPE.

13 SKTF published a rather small number of articles. The ANPE-Index scores -8.3 in 1979 and $+8.3$ in 1980. This judgement, however, is based mainly on letters to the editor which make 80 per cent of the publications. Excluding the letter to the editor SKTF scored 4.2 for both years.

14 In 1986 letters to the editor played no substantial role about the assessment of new and productionist politics in the papers of TCO. The same is also true for the period after Chernobyl until 1989.

15 The regression coefficient should not be interpreted here in the crude statistical way but rather heuristically since the data and number of observations are often rather low (for all unions 37; for LO unions 13, DGB unions 19). Particularly for TCO unions $r = .52$ is based on just 5 observations. When we consider only the membership papers, i.e. excluding the papers of the confederations, the correlation for TCO unions is even negative ($r = -.54$) but is based on only 3 observations. In contrast to TCO unions, for LO and DGB unions the correlation between the ANPE-Index at the congresses (official stands) and in the membership papers increases when we focus exclusively on membership unions (DGB: $r = .70$, $N = 15$; LO: $r = .81$, $N = 10$). For the one who opposes the application of Pearson's r here, I refer to table A3-3 that confirms the impression described here.

16 Some unions could not be included in this analysis. This is SL and SIF because they did not take a congressional stand in terms defined above. GEW, SL, SKTF could also not be analyzed because they did not publish articles on nuclear energy after 1986.

17 Excluding the extreme value of TCO from the analysis leads to an increase of r up to $.87$.

18 All these unions are outside the range of the standard deviation from -29.84 and 73.90 .

PART 3

Some Determinants for the
Adoption of Elements of New Politics
by Swedish and West German
Trade Unions

PART THREE:

SOME DETERMINANTS FOR THE ADOPTION OF ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS BY SWEDISH AND WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS

The following three chapters attempt to give empirical evidence for some factors that may influence the adoption of elements of new politics by the trade unions. The aspects chosen can be divided into two areas. On the one hand, organizational characteristics can be responsible for the union perception of new and productionist politics. In particular, the impact of the union membership, the organization of different groups of membership, the organized sectors, and aspects of the organizational structure can be relevant. All these aspects are analyzed in the tradition of the structural contingency approach in chapter four. But organizations are also different according to their principles of organizing. The possibility of voicing demands which refer to new and productionist politics in the trade unions are substantively different. Also the other key variables of modern organization theory such as organizational conflict, communication and ideology are analyzed in chapter five. On the other hand, I will focus on some relevant impacts of the organizational environment (chapter six). In this chapter, the influence of the national energy policy and the economic development is analyzed, as well as the impact of the new social movements and the public opinion, the political parties and the color of the governments.

The data for the different analysis come from different sources. While the data for the organizational characteristics stem from official union statistics which have a rather different quality for each union, the data for chapter five result from the content analysis of the union congresses. The interaction between organizational and environmental aspects make it necessary that we have a more flexible measure for union perception of new politics than in the other chapters. Therefore, in chapter six I will mainly rely on the dissemination of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspapers as dependent variable.

The different subjects and analyses also make it necessary that we apply different methodological approaches. In chapter four and five, I rely mainly on classical correlation measures, on the one hand, and the analysis of "truth tables" as suggested by Charles Ragin (1987), on the other. Ragin proposes that this method is able to "test" hypotheses for a low number of cases. This method is in particular suitable for the purpose of this chapter because it enables us to identify the cases. That means that we can refer the results of the individual trade unions which make it possible to find rules and exceptions in relation to specific trade unions. However, hypotheses tests in the tradition of this method are not as hard as quantitative analysis claims are

otherwise: "The typical end product of a Boolean analysis is a statement of the limits of the causal variables identified with different theories, not their mechanical rejection or acceptance. " (Ragin, 1987: 123) Chapter six focuses on interactive and rather complex relations. Therefore, I have chosen to apply a more narrative method in order to specify the impact of the different organizational environments.

The analyses of the following three chapters are heavily dependent on the quality of already conducted research on trade unionism, value change, attitudes towards nuclear energy, new social movements and political parties. This research is differently developed in both countries. This certainly makes it sometimes rather difficult to conduct a stringent comparative analysis. Particularly difficult is the fact that there has hardly been any analytical work done in Sweden that includes the entire spectrum of Swedish trade unions. Mainly the work focuses exclusively on the blue collar unions and, here particularly, on the LO confederation. Although some work exists on TCO unions, systematic comparisons of both union organizations have hardly ever been conducted. Therefore, most of the independent variables had to be gathered within the context of this investigation.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS

In this chapter, I wish to address some questions concerning the relationship between organizational characteristics and the unions' stand on productionist and new politics. In particular, I will stress factors *inherent* of the union organization. Although it is impossible to isolate external and internal factors of organizations in reality, the major emphasis in this chapter is analytically on organizational characteristics that are different between the individual trade unions. In doing so I refer to basic elements of structural contingency approaches. Three sources of influence on trade union policy in the context of new and productionist politics should be illuminated: first the impact of union membership (Proposition A1, A2, A3); second the impact of the task environment of the trade unions (A4); and third the impact of some aspects of the organizational structures (A7, A8).

1. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNION POLICY

The membership of a trade union organization can have a direct impact on trade union policy. In our case, the relationship would be straight forward: if a trade union organizes members that typically favor new politics, the trade union will follow a policy that favors new politics. The same relationship can be postulated for productionist politics. In order to analyze this relationship, I wish to present some data from German and Swedish surveys, on the one hand, and derive some conclusions from related international investigations on new politics, on the other. However, the membership/union policy causality is already weakened by the fact that unions never organize their workers according to pure analytical categories. Therefore, it is furthermore essential to analyze the impact of union membership in the light of their homogeneity and heterogeneity concerning new/productionist politics attitudes. A further special aspect in this context are the union confederations which organize, first of all, union organizations. They are only indirectly concerned with membership interest in the sense of individual members. However, confederations are in particular responsible for the aggregation of worker interests in more general terms since they represent these interests to other social and political actors, etc.

Union Membership Opinion and Union Policy

The membership of a trade union may be the most obvious explanatory variable for the trade union policy. W. Richard Scott (1987: 161) points out for organizations in general: "Of all the many resources required by organizations, the most vital are the contribution of its human participants." Also the research that considers trade unions

as "intermediary organizations" (Müller-Jentsch, 1985; 1988; Streeck, 1981; 1987) stresses the importance of the normative ties, personal involvement, and commitment of the members to the trade union organization (logic of membership), even when these ties are weakening and are partly replaced by external resources.

However, there are some problems concerning the data for an analysis of this relationship. There are no surveys that have analyzed new and productionist politics on the individual level which also included detailed data on union membership. Before I describe the German and Swedish cases more specifically, I would like to refer briefly to some investigations that strongly stress the link between non-productionist attitudes and the occupational structure. "Occupation is generally a good and economic indicator of the position in social space ..." (Bourdieu, 1987: 4) and also Claus Offe stresses the special feature of service work:

Service labour is, therefore, always located at the intersection of two rationalities: (i) the rationality of 'industrial economy' based on contractual employment, which entails the detailed specification of means and ends, direct vertical control over work activity, little scope for manoeuvre and high levels of standardization; and (ii) the rationality of 'mediation and conciliation' typical of service activities, which require room for manoeuvre precisely in order to respond as services to specific situation. (Offe, 1985d: 107)

Most of the empirical studies have their theoretical roots in the hypothesis of "middle-class radicalism" as first outlined by Parkin (1965). For instance, Stephen Cotgrove and Andrew Duff analyze the British environmentalist movement and compare the values of environmentalists, trade unionists, industrialists and the public. They found that environmentalists are significantly more often employed in service, welfare and creative occupations (3.15 times more often than the public) and much less so in clerical commerce and industry occupations (0.46) (Cotgrove and Duff, 1980: 340-3). The authors postulate that "... the new politics cuts across the trade union economism..." and "... will present a serious challenge to the parties of the left to come to grips with conflicts of values and beliefs which run deeper than simply a reordering of priorities". (Cotgrove and Duff, 1981: 344 and 348). A French analysis by Monique Dagnaud and Dominique Mehl (1983) elaborate the argument by connecting structural and occupational changes and societal conflict. Going out from a premises of different capitals developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1983) they start their argument by stating:

The possession of a certain amount of cultural capital is gradually becoming the key that opens the door to the corridors of power. At the same time, the number of people included in the wage-earner middle strata is expanding at breathtaking speed as a result of an equally breathtaking expansion of the educational system. The intelligentsia is losing its monopoly of expertise and of intellectual discourse which is spreading to new occupations and penetrating into every corner of society. (Dagnaud and Mehl, 1983: 817)

They distinguish between elite, sub-elite and counter-elite. The elite are the established decision-makers who put decisions into effect. Sub-elite and counter-elite are relevant social actors, because they possess cultural capital (e.g. education) and social capital (e.g. occupations) just like the elite. The counter-elite sympathizes with social change, whereas the sub-elite are more motivated to oppose the economic and political establishment in order to gain their own place in the existing power structure.

In the empirical part of their study, the authors identify the sub-elite in industries that rely heavily on technological innovations such as energy, oil, chemicals (827). The counter-elite consists of middle management executives in health and social services and technicians, and above all teachers. The first group is more motivated to fight the economic and political power of the establishment and to demand its own place in the existing power structure. It acts mainly on issues of social power and feels closer to the technostructure and the bourgeoisie. The second group is more concerned with cultural change and "... would appear to be inspired by counter-cultural issues and to feel themselves closer to wage-earners or "the masses"..." (Dagnaud and Mehl, 1983: 838/9). Trade unions are an important agent for social influence for both sub-elite and counter-elite. The former group attempts to establish its ideas through trade unions representation at the firm level. The latter group considers trade unions to be an actor for social change for an alternative society. Needless to say that both interests can be in sharp contrast.

The last investigation which I wish to mention in this context analyzes the Dutch social movements (ecology, peace, anti-nuclear, women's, and squatter's movements). In my presentation here, I will focus on the data of the anti-nuclear movement. In the search for the class base of new social movements in the Netherlands, Hanspeter Kriesi (1989a) conceptualizes the mobilization potential for new social movements on a scale which reaches from 0 (no potential) to 20 (all members of these group are potentially ready to engage in new social movement actions). Using Wright's class concept his results show that "Wright's new middle class" is very diversified in these terms: expert non-managers show the highest mobilization potential (9.2) whereas uncredencial managers have the lowest (5.2) (Kriesi, 1987: table 3). Moving away from ideological implication of class analysis, he applies occupational segments for identifying mobilization potential. Kriesi discovers five distinct occupational groups *within* the new middle class: protective workers, craft specialists, technical specialists, administrative and commercial specialists, and social and cultural specialists. This study also confirms and specifies the findings of the investigations above mentioned: teachers and social and cultural workers are most likely ready to participate in the Dutch anti-nuclear movement. Their index lies clearly

over the one of the total population (6.8). For teachers, the index is 9.1 and for social and cultural services even 10.3. Furthermore, this study shows also another interesting fact. The "classical" working-class is not very enthusiastic about new social movements in general and the anti-nuclear movement in particular. While lower level employees score similar in comparison to the total population (6.9) skilled (6.7) and unskilled workers (5.9) score lower than the general population. The results are not only true for the readiness to participate but also for the actual participation in the anti-nuclear movement. With some modification, we can conclude that the groups which are least penetrated by "... the "new" paradigm are exactly the "principle" classes of capitalist societies, namely, the industrial working class and the holders and agents of economic and administrative power." (Offe, 1985c: 835).

Before I apply the results of this studies to the membership of trade unions, I wish to present some survey data from West Germany and Sweden. Unfortunately, no survey has asked the question about specific trade union membership or includes a sufficient number of interviewees so that reliable conclusions would be possible. The best we can get are surveys that asked about union membership in general terms. However, for the Swedish unions I was able to use the data from the election studies conducted by Sören Holmberg from the University of Gothenburg. However, the data does not allow for an in-depth look at the individual union level. First, I wish to present some more general data about the attitude towards nuclear energy and occupational groups that may allow some inference for the trade unions.

Table: 4-1. The Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy of Different Occupational Groups in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1988 (percent).

	pro	con	no opinion	blank	sum percent	N
West Germany:						
Skilled workers	12	68	21	-	101	96
other workers	10	62	29	-	101	53
High-ranking white collar workers	21	63	16	-	100	24
other white collar workers	11	71	18	-	100	248
Population	11	70	18	-	99	1010
Sweden:						
Skilled workers	40	40	19	1	100	396
other workers	32	42	24	2	100	614
High-ranking white collar workers	54	37	9	1	101	335
other white collar workers	38	46	15	1	100	769
Population	39	42	17	1	99	2529

Sources and explanations: The data were taken from two surveys conducted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg in the context of the election survey study in summer 1988 and the Emnid-Institute in March 1988. The questions asked were quite similar in both countries: "There are different opinions on nuclear power as a energy source. Are you mainly for or against it that nuclear energy is used as energy source in Sweden or do you not have any special opinion on that." (Holmberg, et al. 1988: 44) and "Are you basically for the construction of nuclear power plants - or are you against it - or does it really matter to you whether nuclear plants are constructed or not?" (Emnid, 1988 (no. 2/3): 10). More specifically the occupations are: skilled workers: industriarbetaren; Facharbeiter. Other workers: övriga arbetare; sonstige Arbeiter. High-ranking white collar workers: högre tjänstemän och storföretagare; Leitende Angestellte and Beamte. Other white collar workers: lägre tjänstemän och tjänstemän i mellanställning; sonstige Angestellte and Beamte. For further details see: Holmberg, et al. 1988: 324-331.

Table 4-1 indicates one striking difference between Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. In Sweden, nuclear power is much more accepted by the population than in West Germany (Holmberg, 1989a). However, I do not want to elaborate on this point here (see: chapter six). Within relative terms, we find striking similarities in both countries which are also in agreement with the findings of the reported studies above. In both countries *leading white collar workers* favor nuclear power strikingly more than other occupational groups. For Sweden, we can also conclude that this group is most determined in their view on nuclear power; i.e. the number of "no opinion" answers is relatively low. Only nine percent express that they are indifferent to this question. On the other hand, we also identify the same groups which are most strongly against nuclear power: *other white collar workers*. From the Swedish data which distinguished lower and middle white collar workers, we can conclude that the higher the status of white collar workers the more pro-nuclear the attitude. *Blue collar workers* are also more positive towards nuclear energy the higher their occupational status. However, they do not considerably differ from the rest of the population. Interesting, however, is the fact that the blue-collar worker (other workers) in relation to other occupations is most frequently *indifferent* to this question. From the presented data we can conclude that the conflict between productionist and new politics (or more precisely in this case between pro and con nuclear attitudes) is more a specific *white collar problem*. However, it also affects the labor movement as whole in particular when one expands the notion of the labor movement. Himmelstrand et al. reflect upon the incoherence between industrial workers and service workers:

Unemployment is seen as the greatest threat by more industrial workers than service workers; for the environmental problems it is just opposite. As we have already pointed out the trade union movement has traditionally emphasized problems of employment and production more than external environmental problems - a position which now must be re-assessed in a manner which provides the responsiveness of the labour movement to new issues arising. (Himmelstrand et al., 1981: 209)

It is frequently stated in the literature that white collar unions have it more difficult to bind their membership to the trade union organization (Armstrong, et al., 1986; Ericsson, 1983; Carter, 1986). Reasons given for this are that white collar workers have a broader spectrum of political opinions, they are less inhibited by occupational solidarity and culture, and they have internalized an ethic of professionalism and white collar status which limits party-political support. In organizations white collar workers are more likely to "voice" discontent and "exit" (Schmidman, 1979: 143; Taylor, 1987). However, structural changes such as the increase of white collar employment may reinforce this process and even affect blue collar unions (Crouch, 1986; P. Berger, 1986).

Moving back to the organizational level, one can conclude that the white collar worker problem is not only acute in TCO but also some LO unions are "victims" of this structural change. As Rune Nordin notes around 80 percent of industrial workers vote for the Social Democrats or Communists in Sweden. However, members of LO unions that organize members in the service sector (*SKAF, SF, Handelsanställda Förbund, Försäkringsanställdas Förbund*) vote significantly more frequently for the bourgeois parties. Furthermore, he notes that - with the exception of SKAF - these unions are careful in formulating their organizational goals because of this. Apart from SKAF all these LO unions changed their names in the way that they replaced the term *arbetare* (workers) to *anställdas* (employees) (Nordin, 1988: 353-357). A typical way for the white collar unions of "solving" this problem is to refrain from politics at all. In particular, the Swedish trade union research postulates that the white collar union confederation TCO comes most likely into trouble when issues get politicized in party-political terms (Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985). Unfortunately, these investigations refer exclusively to TCO unions and do not include LO unions.

Data from the 1988 election study of the University of Gothenburg support the impression that TCO members are more critical towards nuclear energy and that they sooner take a stand on that issue. However, for the Swedish unions, we can specify this findings. In Sweden, one of the strongest (economic) tensions exists between the private and public sector. However, we may also assume that the sector differences result in different attitudes towards nuclear power. This in particular when we control the differences in attitudes between LO and TCO members by private/public sector.

Table: 4-2. Trade Union Membership Opinion of Nuclear Energy in Sweden in 1988 (percent).

	pro	con	no opinion	blank	sum percent	N
<i>LO Members</i>	36	44	19	1	100	869
in Private Sector	43	39	17	2	101	502
in Public Sector	26	50	23	1	100	359
<i>TCO Members</i>	40	47	14	1	102	549
in Private Sector	47	37	15	1	100	272
in Public Sector	33	56	11	1	101	274
<i>Population</i>	39	42	17	1	99	2529

Source and Explanation: see table 4-1.

From the data of the survey, we can conclude that union members in the private sector are mostly in favor of nuclear energy and members in the public sector are more critical. This finding is true for both LO and TCO members. However the differences are more pronounced for TCO members. LO members, particularly in the public sector, are most frequently indifferent to the issue.

It is rather difficult to isolate the effect of public sector members and *women* membership. In their study about the referendum on nuclear energy in Sweden, Kent Asp and Sören Holmberg conclude that gender may have an important impact on the election behavior although strongly filtered by party affiliation (Holmberg and Asp, 1984: 338/41). Women voted significantly more against nuclear energy than men. This trend is also true for West Germany, although here occupational and age factors have a much stronger impact (Emnid, 1988: A16). However, since I am not able to control this factor empirically we should keep it in mind as a reinforcing factor.

For West Germany, it is only possible to compare members with non-members. However, combining the data about the occupational status and the opinion towards nuclear energy may lead to similar conclusion for German union members than for their Swedish colleagues. A comparison of the data from 1986 and 1988 shows that trade union members most strongly lost their interest in nuclear energy. Shortly after Chernobyl, only 7 percent of the union members were indifferent towards nuclear power, in contrast to 9 percent of the general public. In 1988, 26 percent of the trade union members had no opinion towards nuclear energy in contrast to only 18 percent of the general public. That means that for trade union members the indifferent opinion increased by 19 percent whereas it increased only by 9 percent for the whole population. This shift lead to the consequence that union members less frequently opposed nuclear energy in 1988 than what the general population did (63 to 70 percent).

Table: 4-3. Trade Union Membership Opinion of Nuclear Energy in West Germany in 1986 and 1988 (percent).

	pro	con	no opinion	blank	sum percent	N
1986:						
Union Members	23	70	7	-	100	124
Non-Members	25	65	10	1	100	885
Population	24	66	9	1	100	1017
1988:						
Union Members	10	63	26	1	100	155
Non-Members	11	71	17	-	100	842
Population	11	70	18	-	100	1010

Source and Explanation: Emnid, 1986: No. 5/6 and Emnid, 1988: No. 2/3. For 1988 data see table 4-1. In 1986 the questions were slightly different. On a card the interviewees could choose: *pro* = "I am sufficiently informed about nuclear energy and I am in favor of the further development of nuclear plants in the Federal Republic of Germany" and "I am not sufficiently informed about nuclear energy but I am in favor of the further development of nuclear plants". *Con* = "I am sufficiently informed about nuclear energy and I am against the further development of nuclear plants" and "I am not sufficiently informed about nuclear energy but I am against the further development of nuclear plants". *No opinion* = "The whole debate about the further development of nuclear energy does not matter to me."

From the above investigations and survey data, we may make some inferences on the trade union membership opinion of the individual trade unions. Trade unions which organize a high number of white collar workers are more likely confronted with new politics issues than their blue collar counterparts. This may be the case for ÖTV, HBV, and GEW in Germany and all the TCO unions in Sweden. However, it is relatively sure to conclude that SKTF and above all GEW and SL have a membership that is quite coherently against nuclear energy. Most studies on environmentalism and new politics point out that teachers and employees in social and cultural services in the public sector belong to those groups that are most strongly committed to new values. LO unions are more difficult to classify in terms of blue and white collar workers. A number of authors have classified all of the LO unions as blue-collar unions, although admitting that some LO unions organize also lower-grade white collar employees (Nilstein, 1966; Wheeler, 1975). Jelle Visser (1989) is more concrete in the way that he notes that more than three-quarters of the membership of SF is in lower-grade white collar occupations. SKAF also has some white collar

members. More than 100 000 members work as nurses and in similar occupations [1]. I suppose that it is fair to say that around one-third of SKAF's members are white collar workers. Table 4-4 summarizes the arguments so far and refers them to the trade union policy.

Table 4-4.: Assumed and Real Relationship between Membership Opinion and the Adoption of Elements of New Politics

	Latent Membership Potential				Intra-Organisational Features					
	High Degree of: White Collar Workers	Public Sector Workers	Women	Index of Latent Membersh. Potential	Voiced Membership Potential		Adoption of New Politics			
					assumed	real match	assumed	real match	assumed	real match
DGB Unions										
IGM	no	no	no	0	no	some ½	no	yes	no	0
IGB	no	no	no	0	no	no 1	no	no	no	1
IGC	no	no	no	0	no	some ½	no	no	no	1
ÖTV	yes	yes	no	2	yes	yes 1	yes	yes	yes	1
HBV	yes	no	yes	1.5	some	some 1	some	yes	yes	½
IGD	no	no	no	0	no	some ½	no	yes	no	0
GEW	yes	yes	yes	2.5	yes	yes 1	yes	yes	yes	1
Match for DGB Unions:						79				64
LO Unions										
SEP	no	no	no	0	no	no 1	no	no	no	1
Metall	no	no	no	0	no	some ½	no	no	no	1
SF	yes	yes	no	2	yes	some ½	yes	no	no	0
SKAF	some	yes	yes	2	yes	no 0	yes	no	no	0
GF	no	no	no	0	no	some ½	no	yes	yes	0
Match for LO Unions:						50				40
TCO Unions										
SIF	yes	no	no	1	no	some ½	no	no	no	1
ST	yes	yes	yes	2.5	yes	yes 1	yes	yes	yes	1
SKTF	yes	yes	yes	2.5	yes	yes 1	yes	yes	no	0
SL	yes	yes	yes	2.5	yes	yes 1	yes	no	no	0
Match for TCO Unions:						88				50
Match for all Unions:						72				53

Explanation: assumed means the relational outcome which is to be expected if the membership opinion would have a direct effect on organizational features. Real refers to findings of the proceeding analysis. The index of new politics potential is the sum of white collar members, public sector members and women. White collar members scores 0 (no) when less than 25 percent of union membership are white collar workers, .5 (some) when there are more than 25 but less than 40 percent, 1 (yes) more than 40 percent. Public sector score 0 (no) when the majority of the union members is not employed in the public sector and 1 (yes) when the majority of the members is employed in the public sector. The score for women is .5 when there are more than 50 percent female members and 0 when there are less. Women score only .5, because the impact is not so clear and interacts strongly with the other factors. The assumed organizational potential for new politics scores no if the index of potential for new politics is lower than 1, some when it scores between 1 and 2, and otherwise yes. The organizational potential for new politics is no when the index is lower than 10; some when it is lower 20; and yes when it is greater than 20 (compare table 6-1. for the values). The match scores 0 if the assumed and real feature disagree completely (e.g. yes and no; no and yes), ½ if there is some match, and 1 when there is a complete match. The summary matches are the percentages in relation of a complete match (100 percent).

In this analysis, I concentrate only on the unions with a membership of individuals. That leaves the confederations out of the analysis. It is *assumed* that a trade union has a membership potential for new politics when it has both a high amount of white collar workers and public sector employees. If there is a high amount of white collar workers or public sector workers and a high number of women, then it is supposed that there is *some* membership potential as in the case of HBV.

First, we can have a short look at the membership potential. It has been operationalized in terms of the expression of elements of new politics by trade union members

either in their trade union *or* at the congresses of their confederation (compare appendix: 4). This *voiced* membership potential is rather strongly correlated with the *latent* membership potential deduced from the union membership composition. In approximately three quarters of the cases, unions with a *latent* membership potential (deduced from occupations, private/public sector, and gender) have also a *voiced* membership potential. This is particularly true for TCO (88 percent) where only SIF does not fit this assumption because it has more voiced membership potential than assumed. It is least true for LO unions (50 percent) where Metall and GF have a higher voiced membership potential as assumed and SKAF has a lower. For the DGB unions, the relation proved to be correct in around 80 percent of the cases; however IGM, IGC, and IGD have a greater voiced membership potential than expected from their membership.

Second, the relationship between latent membership potential for new politics and the adoption of elements of new politics matches in 53 percent of the cases. It is highest in DGB unions where only IGM and IGD do not confirm the hypothesis. Both unions adopted elements of new politics although their membership lets us assume the opposite. Two TCO unions confirm to the hypothesized relationship: SIF and SL. However, the other two - SKTF and SL - did not adopt elements of new politics although its membership characteristic would have suggested it. The match between assumed and real adoption of elements of new politics is at its lowest for LO unions. It matches only for SEF and Metall. The two public sector unions SF, with a high amount white collar workers, and SKAF, with a high amount of women membership, did - contrary to the assumption - not adopt elements of new politics. The opposite is true for GF. Here we would not assume from the characteristic of the membership that GF adopted elements of new politics [2].

We may conclude from the analysis of the latent membership potential for new politics that it has an impact on the voiced membership potential but that the impact on the actual union stand is much weaker. Surprising in this context is that latent membership potential is not only filtered out but, on the contrary, that some unions are more open to elements of new politics than the membership characteristic let us assume. In the latter case organizational and other factors must work to reinforce elements of new politics that cannot be explained by referring to variables of structural contingency approaches. Before I will come back to this point in the next chapter I wish to analyze other aspects that depend on the union membership.

Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Membership

Trade unions differ fundamentally according to the homogeneity of their membership. The major reasons for the degree of membership homogeneity lies in historical and traditional reasons. In general, one can say that Swedish unions are more homogeneous at the individual union level than German unions. A simple indicator for that is the fact that the 17 DGB unions (from 1989 16 unions) organize the whole spectrum of employees whereas in Sweden that is divided into more than 40 unions when we only consider LO and TCO and into even more than 60 when we include also SACO/SR. The diversity between the confederation of white and blue collar workers leads to the conclusion that the unions are less diversified in terms of the heterogeneity of their members. In organization analytical terms, one can speak of the fact that Swedish trade unions are loosely coupled while DGB unions are tightly coupled. The major function of loose coupling is that the interests of the different trade unions are buffered from each other. Applying the model of Charles Perrow, we may conclude that Swedish unions are more stable because of their loose coupling. However, also the complexity of the trade unions are different. Complexity, I wish to use here, in contrast to the meaning of the term in chapter five, in the way how diversified the members of a trade union are in their attitude towards new politics. In these terms, a trade union that organizes both kinds of members is more complex while unions which organize exclusively either members with pro-nuclear attitudes, on the one hand, or anti-nuclear attitudes, on the other hand, are rather homogeneous or in organization theoretical terms linear. I wish to analyze these categories, first, in terms of craft and industrial trade unions and, second, by looking at the confederations.

(a) Craft and Industrial Unions

In general, Swedish and German trade unions are organized according to the industrial principle, i.e. everybody employed at the same work-place belongs to the same union regardless of trade. However, there are some trade unions in both countries that are still quite homogeneous or have a tradition as a craft union. This is particularly true for the printer and teacher unions in both countries and for SEF. IGB comes also quite close to these kinds of trade unions, although it has more features of an industrial union than the above mentioned unions. Because of the homogeneity among the members, we may expect no large intra-organizational conflicts within this unions.

With the exception of IGD, all these unions did not suffer under a very high degree of intra-organizational conflict (for the operationalization of organizational conflict see chapter five). However, the reasons for this are quite different. SEF and IGB have a

low conflict level, because their membership is clearly not concerned with elements of new politics. For GEW and GF, the low conflict level results from the opposite reasons: the members agree on it that elements of new politics are important. SL, however, followed the TCO device "not to get involved." Therefore SL avoided intra-organizational conflict through measures which do not depend on their membership but rather the union's ideology (see chapter five). IGD together with IGB and GEW were those German unions among the analyzed DGB unions, which suffered the least from intra-organizational conflict. Also in this case the ideological stand may contribute some explanation for this fact as I will demonstrate later. As mentioned above, although IGB is an industrial union, it comes rather close to the type of a craft union in terms of the homogeneity of its members. This is also certainly true in terms of new politics. Miners, the major categories of members, are rather traditional blue collar workers who are most likely not penetrated by elements of new politics.

Generally speaking, industrial unions have a less homogeneous membership than craft-like unions. However, there is a fundamental difference among the analyzed industrial unions. One can distinguish three different kinds of membership influences: first, there are those industrial unions which membership is presumably more or less coherently non-receptive for elements of new politics. These are Metall, SIF, IGM, and IGC. However, attitudes of white collar technical workers which are organized in IGM, IGC and SIF are difficult to estimate, but by and large, one can predict that these categories of employees are more positive towards productionist aspects than towards elements of new politics (see also the conclusion from Dagnaud and Mehl above). Second, unions like HBV, SKAF, and SKTF may have a membership that is mainly in favor of new politics. Although higher ranking white collar workers may be more productionist, the survey results demonstrated that low-grade white collar workers are the stronghold of anti-nuclear attitudes. The third group of unions are those that are most likely to be very diversified on issues that are concerned with new politics because they organize simultaneously members that favor a productionist policy or are occupationally effected and those that are most likely opposing it. In particular, that should be the case in ÖTV, SF, and ST.

The group of unions which are presumed to be more or less coherently opposing elements of new politics would be Metall, IGM but also IGC and SIF. However, in reality IGM is quite the opposite. IGM is a union that seemed to be one of the most open unions for new politics and it is that individual union that suffered most under intra-organizational conflict. This can certainly not be explained by its membership.

The group of industrial unions that are most likely open for elements of new politics HBV, SKTF, and SKAF show a rather different behavior in Germany and Sweden.

While HBV is open to new politics and in relation to other industrial German unions does not suffer extremely from intra-organizational conflict, SKAF and SKTF both tend to ignore the issue. They also do not suffer from organizational conflict. In the case of SKTF it seems to be likely that potential membership protest was suppressed through organizational procedures (see appendix: 4). Interviews with SKAF officials give the impression that SKAF does not consider nuclear power as a trade union issue at all.

When we look at the unions that organize both groups of employees the hypothesis that the membership diversity is expressed through a high level of organizational conflict is only confirmed for ÖTV and ST. These two unions also belong to the ones which have most strongly integrated elements of new politics. In sharp contrast to that, SF represents the opposite. For a long time, SF attempted to avoid a debate on nuclear energy and SF's current stand is rather productionist. The intra-organizational level of conflict is also low. This is rather surprising, because SF organizes a membership that is, on the one hand, most likely to oppose nuclear power (public sector employees) and, on the other hand, organizes workers in nuclear power plants.

(b) Confederations

The confederations of trade unions are only indirectly connected with the membership of their trade unions. However, they represent the aggregated interests of all their *member unions*. Union confederations are most likely to be less strongly committed to the logic of membership in terms of individual employees and most strongly to the logic of influence, because their major function is to represent the interests of its member unions in relation with other social and political actors. It should be noted that this conclusion is valid only in relative terms. The confederation must also adhere to the logic of the membership. However, this logic is different from the trade unions that represent employees. However, there is the exception of LO which is also able to conduct collective bargaining and falls therefore more strongly than the other confederations between a classification of union and individual membership.

Confederations are mainly responsible for formulating the political goals of their trade unions. In order to fulfill this task, they are constantly exchanging information with their member unions and policy stands can be seen as compromises between the individual unions and the confederations. In particular, Swedish trade unions often refer to the fact that their confederations are responsible for the formulation of political stands. This is most obvious for TCO unions. In all analyzed TCO unions, statements have been made that the individual union should not deal with political issues but that it should be left to the confederation. Concerning this conviction, it is

surprising that the TCO confederation also was not able or willing to debate this issue in a lengthy manner. There was a readiness to deal with the issue in a technocratic manner. But as soon as it came to a political issue, TCO did not feel responsible for an intra-organizational debate. Many members voiced that TCO should refrain from a political stand on nuclear power. And it seems that TCO, after a hot and painful debate at the 1979 congress, refrained from an intra-organizational debate in the 1980s. The paid lip-service of the importance of environmental aspects was never formulated in a manner that practical political decisions could result from it. As Wheeler and Micheletti could demonstrate, TCO is not able to take a stand on political issues that are not concerned with the work-place or firm, on the one hand, and/or party political, heated issues, on the other. Although TCO has an ideology in the area of industrial relations which seems not to be so different from LO (Nilsson, 1985), it has no organizational power to take a stand on general political issues.

By and large LO member unions also have a tendency not to get involved in general politics and leave that to LO or the Social Democratic Party. The LO confederation is much more powerful in formulating an ideological stand on general political issues. However, as the debate on nuclear energy suggests, the board of LO is not so particularly keen on debating such an issue in its organization or even to take a clear congressional stand. Rather LO attempts to influence politics through personal and political contacts with the Social Democratic Party.

The DGB is rather different in taking a political stand on controversial issues such as nuclear power. Although the DGB is much less powerful than LO in respect to its influence over the policy in West Germany, it nevertheless attempts to formulate stands on general political issues. It should not be understood that the DGB keenly debates general political issues. Union policy is mainly oriented towards economic aspects at the firm level (Leminsky, 1977: 288). But in relative terms, the DGB is more open for general political aspects as the Swedish unions.

We can summarize that all confederations were an important forum for the debate on nuclear energy concerning their member unions. However, the differences between the German and Swedish confederations far outnumber the similarities.

2. THE TASK ENVIRONMENT OF TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS

The task environment defines the interaction of an organization and is defined as all aspects of the environment "... potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment ..." (Dill, 1958: 410; Thompson, 1967; Scott, 1987: 211). Although there may be some analytical overlapping between the task environment and the characteristics

of union members, the important analytical difference is the outer-organizational orientation of the focal organization. As outlined above, the task environment determines the domain of an organization. All unions have partly the same domain. As Streeck (1982: 57/8) points out, task environments have changed over the last decades towards increasing neo-corporative interactions with state agencies. These more general changes can be distinguished from more specific task environments which vary between different trade unions. These task environments bring trade union officials together with their employer counterparts in energy enterprises and establish stable relationships and interactions. This process, in turn, creates and shapes common interests and values. In the case of trade unions and nuclear energy the task environment may be the sector(s) in which the unions organize their members. We can formulate the hypothesis that a union having members organized in the energy sector, highly energy consuming sector or even in nuclear power plants, etc. may be more in favor of nuclear energy and may have adopted a productionist policy. Unions in the service sector, on the other hand, are less productionistically oriented because of their task environment.

In the analysis, I wish to distinguish between the direct involvement of trade unions through members that are actually working in nuclear power plants and nuclear enterprises, on the one hand, and those unions whose members' work in occupations that are highly dependent on energy supply, on the other. The latter unions may be in favor of cheap energy since it decreases the costs of the products produced in that sector. Both variables must not be positively correlated as in the case of ÖTV, SF, and ST where the members in the (nuclear) energy sector are just a small minority.

For German trade unions, the impact of the task environment is rather strong because of the dual system of industrial relations. In particular, the *Gesamtbetriebsräte*, i.e. joint committees of the work councils of all plants belonging to one company, which have been introduced as a consequence of the 1972 amendment of the Works Constitution Act, are a powerful factor in the context of workers' representation in the Federal Republic of Germany. These bodies do not formally belong in the influence area of the trade unions. So it was that in 1977 the work councils of nuclear energy enterprises and above all the *Gesamtbetriebsrat* of a large electricity company (*Vereinigte Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen, VEW*) organized a congress that should express the opposing opinion to the official trade unions policy (Grumbach, 1986: 198-204; Siegmann, 1985: 15-18; see also chapter six). This short remark about the pressure of the task environment already gives an account of which way it may influence the policy of the individual unions. For Swedish unions, the problem between the trade union representatives in the work-place and general union policy

may be smaller. However, the major industries that employ the members of a union may have also here a profound impact on the union policy. This is particularly true, when employers and unions follow a cooperative strategy as it is true for most Swedish unions.

Table 4-5.: Task Environment and Union Policy

	Substantial Amount of Members in Energy Depen- dent Sectors	Members in Nuclear Enterprises	Opposing the Adoption of Elements of New Politics		
			assumed	real	match
<i>DGB Unions</i>					
IGM	yes	yes	strongly	no	0
IGB	yes	no	yes	yes	1
IGC	yes	yes	strongly	yes	1
ÖTV	no	yes	yes	no	0
HBV	no	no	no	no	1
IGD	no	no	no	no	1
GEW	no	no	no	no	1
Match for DGB Unions:					71%
<i>LO Unions</i>					
SEF	yes	yes	strongly	yes	1
Metall	yes	no	yes	yes	1
SF	no	yes	yes	yes	1
SKAF	yes	no	yes	yes	1
GF	no	no	no	no	1
Match for LO Unions:					80%
<i>TCO Unions</i>					
SIF	yes	yes	strongly	yes	1
ST	no	yes	yes	no	0
SKTF	yes	no	yes	yes	1
SL	no	no	no	yes	0
Match for TCO Unions:					25%
Match for all Unions:					63%

Explanation: Agreement scores 1 when the assumed and real union stand match. The assumed opposition to elements of new politics is 1 when the union organizes members in energy dependent and/or nuclear enterprises and it is 0 otherwise.

Table 4-5 shows that there is a strong match between the assumed union stand and the real one among the LO unions. It is less clear among the TCO unions. SIF which organizes members in both energy consuming industries and nuclear power plants corresponds to the expected relationship that it is not open for elements of new politics. ST, where members in the energy sector are only a minority does not follow the

opinion of these members in their official policy. Although five out of seven DGB unions match the assumed relationship, it is most interesting that this is only true for two of the four "energy unions", namely IGB and IGC. ÖTV does not match and is in the same position like ST. Most strikingly, however, is the strong disagreement between assumed union stand and the real one in IGM.

We can conclude that the impact of the task environment on the union policy is far from being perfect although the matches between task environment and union stand are higher than between union membership potential and union stand. The "energy unions" of the DGB fit only in two of the four cases. The same proportion is true for the TCO unions where one "energy union" matches to the assumed relationship and the other does not. Only the LO "energy unions" match completely. However, this match may be due to other factors such as the union ideology, which will be outlined later. Furthermore, one can conclude that the pure fact that *some* members are employed in the nuclear industry must not lead to it that the respective union takes a productionist stand. Rather than organizing a minority of workers in the nuclear sector the more productionist unions are organizing large numbers of workers in the energy sector. This is in particular true for IGB, IGC, SEF, Metall, and within some limits for SIF. Another important factor that may influence trade union policy is the organizational structure.

3. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS

Social structure influences or even determines organizational behavior was the major focus of organization theory until recently. In these studies, the trade-off between rational and normative elements have a prominent place in the analysis. Some investigations on trade unions applied this model (Child, et al., 1973; Edelstein and Warner, 1975; Etzioni, 1975). Two studies concentrated especially on the structural development of German and Swedish trade unions respectively. Wolfgang Streeck (1981 and 1982) focused on the introduction of computer technology in some German unions. In this analysis, the processes of organizational rationalization through formalization, centralization and administrative rationalization are stressed. Axel Hadenius (1976) analyzed the process of organizational centralization and professionalization in LO. Both studies come to the quite similar result that the process of centralization resulted in instrumental commitments of the members to the organizations. Normative elements eroded as an incentive for being a union member and were replaced by instrumental exchange relations.

Both studies stress the consequences for social integration of the members and the democratic processes in trade unions. Direct democracy is replaced by representative

democracy and political interests are reduced to material ones. A process of *structural de-ideologization* has taken place [3]. Axel Hadenius (1976: 190) refers conclusions taken from business trade unionism to the development of LO and postulates that LO comes closer and closer to this type of unionism. Streeck (1981: 446-455) goes even further in his conclusion. He notes that ideological interests have become irrelevant for trade unions. They are only voiced by "freischwebende" (Mannheim) and "wirtschaftsfremden" (Weber) groups such as students, intellectuals, etc. So long, ideological interests do not effect productionist interests they are tolerated by the union leaders. However, the contradiction between economic and life-style aspects is in the center of radical environmentalism and the adoption of elements of new politics be - at least partly - at the expense of productionist interests. According to Streeck (1981: 450), a revitalization of the social movement of trade unionism (from where the trade union has once originated; Streeck, 1981: 24-41; Touraine, 1986) can only be expressed outside the organization and most likely even against it. The organization theoretical approaches that emphasize communication in organization stress the importance of organizational structure (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, 1976: chapter four). In this view one purpose of structure is to provide stability, regularity, and predictability in the organization:

Generally, the organizational structure limits and guides communication flows. Just by knowing the formal structure of an organization ..., we can usually predict a great deal about the nature of communication flows within it. (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, 1976: 89)

However, as we have seen above, in relation to Swedish unions German unions seem to be still responsive to social issues. Does that mean that Swedish unions are more centralized than German unions? Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensive data makes it difficult to elaborate on this hypothesis in detail. However, there are some indicators for organizational rationalization.

Centralization

An indicator for centralization which is often used in the literature on trade unions is the number of departments in relation to the membership size of a trade union (Hadenius, 1976; Armingeon, 1988: 68) [4]. When we transfer the results of the organizational centralization processes to the adoption of elements of new politics, then we may conclude that centralized trade unions adopt fewer elements of new politics than less centralized trade unions. This hypothesis implies that centralization leads to more formal and instrumental relations which, in turn, prevents or obstructs the adoption of new ideological elements.

Table 4-6.: Organizational Structure and New Politics in Swedish and German Trade Unions.

	Number of Departments	Departments/ Members	index of assumed adoption	Adoption of New Politics index	match
<i>DGB Unions</i>					
IGM	159	16 057	0	1	0
IGB	19	19 354	0	0	1
IGC	67	9 695	0	0	1
ÖTV	147	8 023	0	1	0
HBV	49	7 576	0	1	0
IGD	56	2 513	1	1	1
GEW	-	-	-	-	-
Average:	82.8	10 536	Match of all DGB Unions:	50	
<i>LO Unions</i>					
SEF	30	962	1	0	0
Metall	134	3 417	1	0	0
SF	303	692	1	0	0
SKAF	55	11 508	0	0	1
GF	84	561	1	1	1
Average:	121.2	3 428	Match of all LO Unions:	40	
<i>TCO Unions</i>					
SIF	28	9 886	0	0	1
ST	104	1 134	1	1	1
SKTF	253	735	1	0	0
SL	252	293	1	0	0
Average:	159.3	3 012	Match of all TCO Unions:	50	
				Match of all Unions:	47

Sources and explanations: The data for the DGB unions are from: Niedenhoff and Pege, 1987; for IGB from Armingeon, 1988: table 3.10; the data for LO are from: LO (1986); TCO: SIF (1985); ST (1985); SKTF (1988); SL (without date). For Germany data refer to *Verwaltungsstellen* and in Sweden to *avdelningar*. All data refer to 1985, except: IGB 1980, SKTF and SL 1988/89. For IGB, HBV, and IGD the data refer to districts (Bezirke). This unit has been chosen by Streeck, 1981: table XI-5 and Armingeon, 1988: table 3.10. It excludes local groups (Ortsgruppen, -vereine, and -verwaltungen).

First of all, it should be noted that the applied indicator for centralization is somewhat ambiguous when it is used in isolation. There are more specific processes at work as the historical and analytical studies of the above mentioned authors show. Other structural factors must also be considered. For instance, the IGB has a membership that is very much concentrated to certain geographical regions (mining areas). As a consequence, this union may not need so many local departments. Swedish unions may also have other organization structural channels for communication such as the union clubs (Molin, 1985). The indicator reflects the centralization of

a trade union in rather general terms and it was relatively easily to obtain for the different organizations.

It is highly interesting how the departments differ in size. On the average, German union departments are around three times bigger than the Swedish. This is not only due to the bigger size of German trade unions. The analyzed DGB unions also have less departments than Swedish unions in absolute figures. This is particularly true for IGB but also the number of departments of HBV, IGD, and IGC is rather modest in comparison to Swedish unions. But Swedish unions are also very different in this dimension. SKAF of LO and SIF of TCO have few departments and the average number of members in each department corresponds very well to the German standards. On the other hand, there are unions that exceed the number of two hundred departments. SF, SKTF, and SL but also GF because of its small size, have a relatively low number of members per department. SEF, ST and Metall have middle-sized departments.

From the size of the departments, one could hypothesize that all DGB unions apart from IGD, SKAF and SIF are rather centralized, SL, GF, SF, and SKTF are rather decentralized, while SEF, ST, IGD, and Metall stand in the middle. This would mean that the first group is presumably not open for new politics issues and that the latter group is most likely open to them.

However, this relationship does not seem to be confirmed. Highly centralized organizations such as IGM, ÖTV, and HBV adopted elements of new politics. However, the two German "productionist" unions are among the three most centralized unions. The "decentralized" unions SL, SKTF, and SF also do not fit into the framework. For LO unions, only GF and SKAF adopted new politics in the predicted way.

The results show that the indicator for centralization does not explain so much about the trade unions' policy. Less than half of the cases match the assumed relation. The bleak picture painted by Wolfgang Streeck is not confirmed by my comparison of German and Swedish trade unions. German unions are by and large more open to the issue of nuclear energy and debate this issue in much broader terms than Swedish unions, despite the fact that they are highly centralized.

Size


Size is a variable that is rather closely connected to centralization. However, the size of an organization has no unambiguous effect on the formal structure of an organization and its theoretical status is problematic. The basic arguments from the litera-

ture on size are that size leads to increasing structural differentiation and is positively related to formalization. It is negatively related to centralization. The size of the administrative component is also positively related to size of the union, though whether there are increasing or decreasing administrative economies of scale is unclear. Most interesting is the trade-off between centralization and formalization as mechanisms of control (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Pfeffer, 1982; Scott, 1987: 241-249). Michele Micheletti hypothesizes the impact of size on the trade unions' debate on nuclear energy very correctly:

The size of an organizational membership can also complicate the definition of member interest and its representation by the leadership. Large memberships may be heterogeneous, signifying that groups of members are different and have potentially conflicting interests. Another consequence of large organizational size may be complex decision making procedure and structures, signaling that policy making is cumbersome, time-consuming, elite-dominated and bound by establish practice. In short, it may be difficult for new ideas, procedures and participants to enter the policy making process. (Micheletti, 1985: 143)

German unions are by and large bigger than Swedish unions. According to the hypothesis of organization theory, this should lead to a higher degree of formalization but also to decentralization and structural differentiation. Both factors may influence the political outcome:

Figure 4-1: A Simple Model of Organizational Size, Structure and Organizational Behavior



In particular, the German unions seem to have reached a size where structural differentiation has been conducted. Most German unions established individual departments such as youth, women, etc. departments. These departments are able to develop own infra-structures and in some cases, they organize own congresses. As we can see from the analysis of the congresses of the individual trade unions (see appendix: 4), these departments were particularly important in promoting elements of new politics in the trade union organization. Above all, the youth departments of several DGB unions brought elements of new politics into the trade unions since the mid 1970s. These departments are also the units in German trade unions which aggregate interests and voice it more strongly. Swedish unions are mainly organized according to local districts. This is particularly true for LO unions, where even a huge union like Metall has no youth or women's department. It has been argued that the centralization of LO unions has been counter-balanced by the increasing establishment of union clubs (Molin, 1985). Union clubs are union bodies at the work-place. Molin considers the union clubs as partial functional equivalents for the numerical decrease of union departments. However, one should keep in mind that work-place organizations are more likely to be concerned with job interests or interests more or less immediately deduced from work-places. Regional departments are broader in scope and political debates in these organizational units - if they take place - are more likely to be diversified. One reason for this is the different background of the participants. In so far, it seems to me that the "replacement" of local departments by union clubs does not serve the purpose that a trade union enlarges its political perception that has been narrowed as described in the literature on the centralization of LO.

In conclusion: it is most plausible that the structural differentiation effects the organizational policy. However, it is not possible to make general conclusions since Swedish unions have no similar departments and the variable "countries" is too unprecise to prove this hypothesis.

4. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the impact of some organizational characteristics on trade union policy concerning new politics have been analyzed. It has been demonstrated that the latent membership potential for new politics (A1), derived from investigations on new politics and surveys on nuclear energy in both countries explain a substantial part of the voiced membership potential for new politics. While in LO unions this potential is hardly voiced at all, it seems to be filtered out by organizational procedures in TCO unions. Only the German unions show a rather clear relationship between general membership potential and union policy. However, in German unions, the membership

potential also is modified when it comes to the adoption of elements of new politics. However, the interesting fact for German unions is that the membership potential is not eliminated by organizational filters but rather the other way round; unions that have been assumed *not* to have adopted elements of new politics had adopted them.

The homogeneity of the membership (A2) contributes to the explanation of the level of intra-organizational conflict. The task environment (A4) of the "energy unions" has only a very limited impact on trade union stands. In particular, the German unions do not match in this respect. In contrast to the DGB unions, the impact of the task environment matches almost perfectly for the analyzed LO unions. TCO unions take here a more ambiguous position between the LO and DGB unions.

The degree of centralization seems not to effect the adoption of elements of new politics to any larger extent. However, the impact of size is ambiguous. For some unions, their large size led to the establishment of special subunits. More important than the sheer number of departments (degree of centralization, A7) is the character of these units (structural differentiation, A8). Geographical units seem to have a limited impact while occupational, status, or other (youth, women) departments influence union policy substantially.

Swedish unions are less tightly coupled (A3) concerning the organization of members with new *and* productionist world views than German unions. This is so, above all, because blue and white collar unions are organized in separate trade unions in Sweden. The loose coupling of competing interests buffers LO from challenges of employees with new politics attitudes. This is particularly important since LO's productionist (and pro-nuclear energy) stand influences substantially Sweden's energy policy.

While I concentrated in this chapter on organizational features I will focus on social process in the next chapter. With that I will leave explanations drawn from structural contingency approaches and turn to aspects of alternative approaches of organization theory.

Footnotes:

1 These numbers I received as an answer of a letter with specific questions.

2 For the printer unions there may be other explanations for the membership potential for new politics such as that traditionally educated craft workers may be more critical and open to elements of new politics. However, this way of arguing is different from the one mentioned above.

3 In particular Wolfgang Streeck combines the organization structural changes and the development of neo-corporatism to a functionalist complementary picture. Also in the Swedish context it is easily to see that the relation between the neo-corporative policy under a Social Democratic govern-

ment and Social Democratic (blue collar) trade union movement found its organizational equivalent in centralization processes of LO.

4 Another indicator which has been used by Streeck is the number of trade union officials at the trade union headquarters in relation to all trade union officials. Unfortunately, there are no data for TCO unions and also none for some DGB unions. Furthermore, centralization measured by the proportion of departments to members is more appropriate for the analysis of communication processes in trade unions. It may give an idea how difficult it is for a member to reach organizational attention. One can certainly conclude that it is easier to reach organizational attention when the unit is small than when it is large.

CHAPTER FIVE:

CONFLICT, COMMUNICATION, IDEOLOGY AND ADOPTING ELEMENTS OF NEW POLITICS: ORGANIZING AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

In this chapter, I turn my attention to the key variables of the alternative approaches of organization theory. However, the focus remains on intra-organizational processes. The analysis concentrates on subsequential processes: First, it is asked whether elements on new politics can be voiced in trade unions (B1). The next sections focus on intra-organizational conflicts (B6) and different levels of intra-organizational communication (B7). One extreme form of intra-organizational communication is neglecting an issue and non-decision making (A6). This pattern may occur when intra-organizational conflict is expected. As outlined in chapter two, retained world views may have an profound impact on how new issues are perceived. Trade union ideology (B2), as a major element of cognitive retention of world views, may be a potent predictor for the stand on new and productionist politics in trade unions. Table 5-1 gives a short summary. The operationalization of the indices and their implications are the subject of this chapter:

Table 5-1: Indicators for the Social Process of Adopting Elements of New Politics by Swedish and German Unions

unions:	(1) Organizational Potential of New Politics (OPNP)		(2) Organizational Level of Conflict (OLC)		(3) Level of Communication			(4) Union Stand		
	Rank	Value	Rank	Value	Rank	Level	Value	Rank	Value	Year
DGB	5	36.0	2	70.8	(4)	complex	3	8	22.81	1978
IGM	7	32.8	1	74.4	(4)	complex	3	2	87.32	1977
IGB	16	3.3	17	5.1	18.5	pragm.	-5	15	-43.77	1980
IGC	10	23.1	5	35.4	10	pragm.	0	11	-4.36	1980
ÖTV	4	38.5	3	51.0	9	complex	1	6	65.59	1972
HBV	9	25.5	6	32.1	7.5	complex	2	3	84.77	1980
IGD	6	35.1	7	30.9	(4)	complex	3	4	81.46	1977
GEN*	3	48.0	11	15.0	(4)	complex	3	5	80.29	1980
DGB Unions' Average	7.5	30.3	6.3	39.3	7.6		1.3	6.8	46.76	
LO	13	14.4	10	16.5	9.5	pragm.	-1	9	11.64	1976
SEF	17	2.1	14	9.9	16	pragm.	-2	16	-64.45	1976
Metall	12	19.2	9	20.0	(12)	pragm.	-2	12	-7.93	1981
SF	14	5.4	12	14.7	15	pragm.	-1	13	-10.67	-
SKAF	19	.0	18.5	.0	(12)	pragm.	-5	10	-7.71	1978
GF	2	53.7	15	7.5	2	complex	3	1	100.00	1978
LO Unions' Average	12.8	15.8	12.1	11.4	11.8		-1.3	10.2	4.56	
TCO	11	20.7	8	28.5	7.5	complex	2	14	-29.06	1979
SIF	15	4.2	13	11.0	(12)	pragm.	-1		-	
ST	1	74.0	4	46.5	1	complex	4	7	37.86	1975
SKTF	18	1.4	16	6.0	17	pragm.	-4		-	
SL	8	29.2	18.5	.0	16	pragm.	-3		-	
TCO Unions' Average	10.6	25.9	11.5	18.4	10.7		-1.4	10.5	4.40	
Average for all union		24.6		25.02					25.67	

All ranks with decimal point or which are in brackets indicate that more unions have the same value.
 * For GEN all calculations are based solely on motions.
 ** SF took the first stand on nuclear energy that included elements of new or material politics in 1985. The score was then 0.0.

1. THE ORGANIZATIONAL POTENTIAL FOR NEW POLITICS IN TRADE UNIONS

The first aspect, which I wish to analyze is the *organizational potential* for elements of new politics. Organizational potential refers to the extent to which elements of new politics were voiced at the union congresses of the respective trade unions. The crucial difference between latent membership potential and organizational potential is that the latter implies that elements of new politics have *entered* into the trade union. When the union deals with elements of new politics, it is - in terms of organization theory - an *enacted* environment. The organizational potential for elements of new politics does not mean that elements of new politics dominate in the union. However, organizational potential may be the first precondition for adopting elements of new politics. Therefore we may conclude that a union with a high organizational potential for new politics also adopted elements of new politics. It can be argued that a potential for new politics may be activated when situations arise which support new politics. An organizational potential for new politics will be operationalized here as to which degree elements of new politics were debated during the entire investigation period in the individual trade unions. For this analysis, *all* motions and debate contributions are included, regardless of the fact they were either approved of or rejected. However, all empirical features exclusively refer to the congress material. That means that potential expressed outside of the union congress is not included in the analysis here. As a consequence, a potential for new politics is not determined by membership characteristics etc., but rather by congressional procedures. For example, SKTF gives a lot of indicators that there is a potential for new politics among its members (through voiced membership protest at the TCO congress, formation of groups outside the union, etc. For more details see: Micheletti, 1985). Congressional practice and procedures, however, avoid and obstruct open expression about issues like nuclear energy that might have an effect on the trade union stand in more political aspects. In so far, I will measure a potential of new politics that is *filtered by the trade union organization* [1].

The index designed to measure the organizational potential for new politics is quite straight forward. It sums up the average amount of statements that refer to elements of new politics of all motions and debate contributions at the congresses of the individual union [2].

As we can see from table 5-1, the potential for new politics is different in each individual trade union organization. It ranges from 0 indicating that there has never been any aspects of new politics mentioned to 74 showing that nuclear energy has been debated in terms of new politics. The average of the values and the ranks show that the DGB unions are those unions that have the highest organizational potential for new politics [3]. The TCO unions also rank quite high. The unions in the LO confe-

deration have rarely dealt with elements of new politics. However, among the unions are some interesting differences.

The teachers' union GEW is the union with the highest organizational potential for new politics among the DGB unions. SL, the Swedish teachers union, also scores second highest among the TCO unions. However, ST has the highest score in TCO. As mentioned above, ST among others also organizes state employees in the administrative and service sectors and members in the nuclear power plants. At this point, it is quite similar to ÖTV in Germany which also belongs to those unions that have a high organizational potential for new politics. We can see from the statistics that the potential for new politics is at its highest in white collar unions of social, educational and administrative sectors. However, this conclusion needs some further substantiated qualifications. There are the exceptions of HBV and, above all, SKTF. The former scores relatively moderate, the latter is at the very end of the scale. This may be so for various reasons. HBV mainly organizes administrative services, an occupational group that is not so devoted to new politics as white collar workers in the social and cultural sectors. As mentioned above, SKTF may have organizational constraints which keep the issue latent in the union organization.

The following ranks - 6 and 7 - are taken by two German blue collar unions (IGD and IGM). While the Swedish printer union GF is the exception among Swedish blue collar worker unions, IGM differs substantially from its Swedish counterpart. Concerning the level of organizational potential for elements of new politics, IGM can be considered as a moderately open union for new politics concerns. However, this is also true for Metall on a much lower level which is - next to GF - the most open LO union. It is essential to note that LO unions score very differently from DGB unions.

In particular, GF is outstanding in their potential for new politics. GF was the only LO union that did not support the official policy of LO unions on the nuclear power issue in the referendum. In other areas, GF also has another attitude than LO and it is fair to say that GF is often in conflict with LO on several political issues. One reason for this may lie in the fact that GF is not as committed to Social Democracy as the other LO unions. However, on this point we will receive further confirmation, when we look at the level of communication in the trade unions. Without GF, LO unions would have an average ranking score of 15 instead of 12.8 now. That shows that the organizational potential for new politics in LO unions is very low in comparison to DGB and TCO unions.

Particularly surprising is the low potential for elements of new politics in the public sector unions of LO. Both SF and SKAF belong to those unions that have the lowest

organizational potential for new politics. SKAF, for instance, did not consider any element of new politics at its congresses and SF started relatively late in 1985 to debate nuclear energy in some depth. It is also a fact that the municipal trade unions in Sweden have no *organizational* potential for elements of new politics. This is true for both the blue collar municipal union SKAF and its white collar counterpart SKTF.

The unions organizing technical white collar workers, also including workers in the nuclear industry, probably best represented by SIF and IGC [4] have a very low profile in terms of an organizational potential for new politics. However, this is more true for SIF than for IGC. The two energy unions with a very homogeneous membership, SEF and IGB, both score at the end of the scale. For both unions elements of new politics do not belong to the congressional agenda.

The three trade union confederations have a quite similar score compared to the average of their member unions. In particular, the Swedish unions fit very well into that model (rank deviation from the mean of the rank of the member unions is: -.2 (LO) and -.4 (TCO)). Only the German confederation DGB was confronted with more elements of new politics than the average of all analyzed DGB unions (+ 2.5).

In summation: the first look at the organizational potential for new politics gives the impression that it is dependent on the membership of each trade union, whether or not a union organization includes elements of new politics in their congressional agenda. As demonstrated in chapter four, the latent membership potential is translated into voiced membership potential in three-quarters of the analyzed unions. Latent membership potential, however, is translated into organizational potential in only 44 percent of the cases. This is mainly due to the fact that TCO unions rejected dealing with nuclear energy at the congresses of individual unions (the relation between voiced membership potential and organizational potential is only true in 38 percent of the cases among TCO unions, but 71 for DGB and 80 percent for LO unions). An interesting difference between LO and TCO unions is that latent membership potential is not even translated into voiced membership potential, while TCO unions stop voiced membership potential from becoming organizational potential for new politics. However, *if* elements of new politics enter into the trade unions, then there is a rather high possibility that the unions adopt elements of new politics [5].

Another interesting question in this context is to what extent the organizational potential for new politics causes conflicts between productionist and new politics *within* the union organizations. Before I turn to this aspect, I would like to address the question of union democracy in this context.

New Politics and Union Democracy: A Digression

The literature on union democracy often points out that the decision process in trade unions are far from being democratic. A major problem of trade union democracy consists of the often conflicting principles of administrative and representative rationality. Administrative rationality is linked to the requirement of trade union efficiency. In order to translate union goals into politics and to gain influence in the political struggle, expertise, routinization of operations, specialization of functions, directness of communication, and rapid decision-making are necessary. Representative rationality, conversely, is important for the definition of union goals and requires flexibility of operations, duplication of functions in order to put checks and balances in union control, a multiplicity of communication, and a lengthier decisional process. As Child and his co-workers note:

Conflict between the two rationalities is manifested above all in regard to the source and arrangement of power. Administrative rationality speaks for a unified and co-ordinated system of control, in which the prime source of authority is located at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Representative rationality speaks for a division of power and control, for the opportunity of action taken by one party to be revised by that of other group. (Child et al., 1973: 78)

Robert Michels' concept of the "iron law of oligarchy" focuses on the dominance of administrative rationality, resulting from the very existence of organizations. Michels points out that the orientation of organizational needs hinder the "struggle about ideas" within parties and unions (Michels, 1970: 343/4). It can also be argued that there is a tendency towards an "oligarchy of ideas" at work in organizations. Lenin's (1973: 397-440) critique of trade unions for their tendency to focus on the protection of economic interests at the expense of broader political and social considerations suggested just this. Child et al. (1973: 81) points out that a "... change in a unions environment can have profound effect on the historical progression of the union to the axes of administrative and representative effectiveness". However, without going further into the vast field of union democracy [6], we may see the differences between official and congressional opinion and organizational potential for new politics as an indicator for union democracy. From the eleven unions that possessed more organizational potential for new politics than the average, only three did not adopt elements of new politics. These were IGC, TCO and SL. In particular for TCO and SL, we can conclude that both unions tried to suppress the conflict about new and productionist politics. As documented in the appendix 4, SL suppressed membership protest by referring to the union constitution that does not allow to debate societal questions in SL. In TCO it came to a hard intra-organizational conflict in 1979, when the board opinion was in sharp contrast to the members' opinion. Later TCO was also successful in not letting the issue appear onto the congressional agenda again.

There are also more effective measures for avoiding decisions that cannot be measured by the indices here. Only issues that are allowed to enter into the organization may be discussed and decided upon. As we could see for SL and also partly for TCO, issues can be kept away from the congressional agenda. SKAF, SKTF and SF are very successful in this. SKAF officials stated in interviews that the union is not the place for political discussions. SF avoided the issue completely until the government took actions against nuclear energy. In this period, SF made it clear that it was in favor of a continuation of productionist politics.

Non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) or *non-agenda setting* (Crenson, 1971) is difficult to measure and to analyze. However, the comparison between German and Swedish trade unions make it doubtful that Swedish unions did not need an intra-organizational debate on nuclear energy in their organizations. Other international comparisons also seem to support the impression that unions in other countries debated the nuclear issue (Touraine et al. 1987; Siegmann, 1985; Logan and Nelkin, 1980) [7]. The deficiency of intra-organizational democracy also has societal consequences which will be briefly discussed upon in the conclusion.

2. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRODUCTIONIST AND NEW POLITICS

New politics can be either rejected, neglected or integrated in a non-conflicting manner. Substantial conflict and disagreement may also occur whether or not the individual trade union pursues a more productionist politics or adopts the demands of new politics. Like the analysis of the organizational potential for new politics, the analysis of the *organizational level of conflict* between productionist and new politics is also limited to the expression of this conflict at the congresses of the individual trade unions. I am interested here in the degree of conflict between productionist and new politics within the individual unions during the last two decades. In order to measure the organizational level of conflict, I wish to present an index that sums up the degree of conflict as it was expressed at the trade union congresses in the motions and debates [8].

Intra-organizational conflict is an important element of organizational learning in organization theoretical approaches which emphasize the meaning of social processes (Weick, 1979: 220/1). Organizations consist of intra-organizational coalitions which are loosely connected entities around certain issues etc. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Olsen et al., 1972) Therefore we can hypothesize that unions with a high amount of organizational conflict are more apt to adopt elements of new politics than ones with a low level of conflict.

As we can see from table 5-1, German trade unions suffered much more under intra-organizational conflicts than did their Swedish counterparts. In particular, IGM, DGB, and ÖTV score very high in this respect. The only exceptions are GEW and IGB. The former union is coherent in its positive stand towards elements of new politics whereas the latter does not seem to be subject to this conflict because of its consistent preference for productionist politics.

In Sweden, TCO unions are more affected by the conflict between new and productionist politics than LO unions. However, there are substantial differences among TCO unions. ST and, to a lesser degree, TCO are rather strongly affected by this conflict. SIF and SKTF, on the other hand, do not seem to be exposed to this conflict to the same degree. SL had no organizational conflict about new and productionist politics whatsoever. As we will see later the level of communication seems to be responsible for the low degree of intra-organizational conflict in these trade unions. LO unions are not as strongly subject to intra-organizational conflicts as the other trade unions. In particular, SKAF, SEF and GF do not seem to suffer from any greater conflict. This is again due to very different reasons. SKAF did not have any great conflict, because it did not go into a lengthy congressional debate. The issue never came up in SKAF. SEF has no intra-organizational conflict concerning new and productionist politics because its membership quite uniformly supports the productionist politics of its union. The exact opposite is true for GF. GF is rather conformist in accepting elements of new politics. The question in GF is only about the degree of the adoption. A bit different from the other LO unions are Metall and LO. Metall has always controversially debated the issue, although the debate was neither especially emotional nor did it divide members in a fundamental way (see appendix: 4). Some of these controversies also affected the LO confederation. Rather surprising is the low degree of intra-organizational conflict in SF that organizes workers in state owned nuclear power plants and employees in the public sector. However, quite similar to SIF, SF could avoid that conflict because it rather pragmatically debated the issue, as we will see in the following section.

The relationship between a high level of intra-organizational conflict (above the mean) and the adoption of elements of new politics is not perfect. Six from the eight unions that adopted elements of new politics experience intra-organizational conflict. Two unions - TCO and IGC - had intra-organizational conflict but did not adopt elements of new politics. All in all approximately in two thirds of the cases, there is a positive relationship between intra-organizational conflict and the adoption of elements of new politics [9].

3. LEVELS OF COMMUNICATION

The level of communication can determine the way in which reality is perceived and social problems are handled. Communication, as defined for instance by Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers (1976: 9) is "... the process by which an idea is transferred from a source to a receiver with the intention of changing his or her behavior. Such behavior may encompass a change in knowledge or attitudes as in overt behavior." In order to approach this aspect, I first wish to conceptualize different levels of communication. In a second step, I will refer to this concept in the individual trade unions. The final goal of this analysis is then to see in which respect the trade unions differ in their treatment of the nuclear power issue on the communicative level.

With reference to the theoretical works cited in chapter one and two, I will argue that it is possible to distinguish between two different levels of communication in the debate on nuclear energy in Swedish and German trade unions. On the one hand, the level of communication can be oriented on a pragmatic persuasion of trade union goals. The pragmatic strategy focuses on concerns rather closely connected to the workers or employees. This concept comes rather close to Selig Perlman's concept of pragmatic trade unionism as outlined in chapter two. Each trade union has to take these immediate concerns into account in order to fulfill its task. Trade unions' immediate concerns are, for instance, negotiations about wages, work time, working environment, etc. An issue like nuclear energy affects jobs in a broader way as well. Nuclear energy is a technology which has consequences for the whole national economy. The trade unions in Germany and Sweden are economically responsible unions (Flanagan et al., 1983). This means that within their pragmatic strategy of dealing with present issues (national) economic interests also play an important role. Perlman (1966) makes this point clear by elaborating on the concept of pragmatic union behavior:

Trade unionism, it was then thought, should concern itself only with wages, hours, and watchful scrutiny of the operations of the governmental bodies administering labor laws and social insurance. This limited conception of the task of the trade union pertaining to shop management revealed itself in the very term designating the trade agreement - "wage agreement" (*Tarifvertrag*). (311/2)

And concerning national economic interests:

And as unionism takes more and more of a hand in running the productive process, it comes to depend for guidance less and less on a dogmatic anti-capitalist philosophy, but more and more on a pragmatic faith in industrial government through co-operation of equally indispensable "functional" classes. (317)

The point here is that a pragmatic union strategy is also communicated in pragmatic terms. A *pragmatic communication* is *limited* to certain aspects of a problem as the terms "monological logic of collective action" (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980) or "instrumental communication" and "profane" and "calculative orientation" (Etzioni,

1975) suggest. In empirical terms, the pragmatic communication of nuclear energy in trade unions is limited to economic and technical aspects of the problem.

I developed a classification that distinguishes the degree of "pragmatism" on a scale from 0 to -6. It is based on the relative amount of statements devoted to technical, energy political, economic and labor market aspects. The categories are derived from the empirical distributions of the different categories. The higher the relative frequencies the higher the (*minus*) score for pragmatic communication. The highest value (-6) is applied to cases where the trade union absolutely does not communicate the issue in a more lengthy manner [10]. This concerns SKAF, SKTF, and SL.

In contrast to the more pragmatic level of communication I will describe a complex way of communication. *Complex communication* is not bound to a certain aspect or dimension of an issue. It extensively includes the political and social consequences of trade union behavior and socio-technological developments. Lenin was the classical promoter of a more complex world view of trade union policy. A complex communication is closely related to the "dialogical logic of collective action" (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980) and "expressive communication" involving "sacred" or normative aspects (Etzioni, 1975). All other aspects that do not belong to the pragmatic ones are included in an index that attempts to grasp the degree of complex communication.

The index which has been constructed for the degree of complex communication corresponds with the one for pragmatic communication and can vary between 0 and (plus) 6. It takes into consideration whether the relative amount of statements of the remaining categories exceeds a certain number. The categories that take the value 0 or 1 are left-ideological, security, and environmental aspects. Since aspects of societal and political development are in particular important for this study, this value can vary between 0 and 3 [11].

Left-ideological aspects are mainly concerned with the ownership of energy industries, state intervention, and social equality, etc. In so far, they are more "classically" left issues (for a content analytical operationalization in a broader context see: Thomas, 1979: 398-402). An ideological trade union in the more traditional sense, i.e. in the left-right dimension would score high in this category.

Security and environmental aspects consider a broader spectrum than just economic concerns. They assess the technical and economic development in light of their consequences for the security of the population or the environment. In particular, a complex technology like nuclear energy *can* be seen more or less accenting to these

aspects. (At this point of analysis I do not distinguish whether the aspects are referred to in a positive or negative way concerning nuclear energy.)

Societal and political aspects have more importance in this study. It has been argued that the nuclear energy issue represents an issue that divides groups, because it stands for a certain future development of society and implies different political consequences. Because these statements play a central role in the analysis, the value for this category can vary between zero and three.

The sum of the values makes an index for the level of communication of trade unions that ranges from -6 to +6. Since pragmatic communication is a contrast to complex communication, the pragmatic aspects score negatively while the complex aspects score positively. This allows to separate pragmatic unions (negative score) from more complex unions (positive score). The index refers to the debate in the trade union. It includes - as the other indices introduced in this section - all motions and debate contributions. The index says something about complexity of communication within the trade union organization but does *not* tell anything about its formal stand or policy. Table 5-2 summarizes the different levels of communication and how they were applied by the individual trade unions.

First of all, it is striking that West German trade unions debate the issue of nuclear energy much more than Swedish unions. This previously mentioned fact is confirmed again, when we consider the levels of communication of the congress motions and debate. In this context, it is important to mention that three Swedish trade unions score highest in the pragmatic categories because they tend to completely neglect an intra-organizational debate on nuclear energy. It is SKAF belonging to the LO confederation and SKTF and SL of TCO. These trade unions did not discuss the issue in any lengthy way.

Table 5-2: Levels of Communication in the Debate on Nuclear Energy in Swedish and German Unions

Union	(1) Pragmatic Aspects		(2) Left-Ideological Aspects		(3) Security Aspects		(4) Environmental Aspects		(5) Societal and Political Aspects		(6) Summary Index	(7) Level of Communication	N	Total N						
	Rank	Value	Index	Rank	Value	Index	Rank	Value	Index	Rank					Value	Index				
DCB	7	58.4	-1	6.5	5.7	1	6	21.1	1	10	4.0	0	10	10.9	2	3	complex	470		
ICM	9	59.7	-1	9	5.1	1	5	21.6	1	9	2.5	0	9	11.0	2	3	complex	435		
ICB	19	84.7	-5	15	2.4	0	15	8.9	0	16	2.4	0	19	1.6	0	-5	pragmatic	124		
ICG	11	63.5	-2	13	2.6	0	7	21.0	1	11	3.4	0	12	9.4	1	1	pragmatic	233		
OTV	10	62.2	-2	11	4.0	0	8	20.8	1	13	2.8	0	11	10.4	2	1	complex	856		
HRV	2	53.9	-1	14	2.5	0	1	30.4	1	7	14.5	0	8	11.1	2	2	complex	280		
ICD	3	54.2	-1	3	7.2	1	3	24.7	1	12	4.9	1	13	8.5	1	3	complex	223		
GER	1	52.0	-1	4	6.4	1	2	26.6	1	12	3.2	0	7	11.7	2	3	complex	94		
DCB Unions ¹	Average	7.8	61.0	-1.8	9.4	4.5	0.5	5.6	21.1	0.9	12.1	3.2	0	11.1	9.3	1.5	1.3		339.4	2715
LO	14	66.3	-3	1	14.1	1	16	7.6	0	3	8.7	1	16	3.3	0	-1	pragmatic	92		
SFP	16	71.8	-4	6.5	5.7	1	13	15.1	1	6	5.7	0	18	1.9	0	-2	pragmatic	53		
Metall	17	79.4	-4	5	5.9	1	18	2.9	0	2	8.8	1	17	2.9	0	-2	pragmatic	68		
SF	13	66.0	-3	2	7.5	1	9	18.9	1	18	0.0	0	14	7.5	0	-1	pragmatic	53		
SKAP ²	18	80.0	-6	18	0.0	0	19	0.0	0	18	0.0	0	3	20.0	1*	-5	negl./pragmatic	5		
GF	4	55.4	-1	10	4.1	0	4	23.0	1	9	4.1	0	4	13.5	3	3	complex	74		
LO Unions ¹	Average	13.6	67.8	-3.5	7.1	7.5	0.7	13.2	13.5	0.5	8.8	5.5	0.3	12.0	5.8	0.7	-1.3		57.5	345
TCO	15	69.3	-3	16	2.3	0	14	10.9	1	8	4.6	1	6	12.3	3	2	complex	219		
SIF	12	65.3	-3	18	0.0	0	11	17.3	1	1	13.5	1	15	3.8	0	-1	pragmatic	52		
ST	8	59.3	-1	12	3.4	0	10	17.5	1	5	6.5	1	5	13.1	3	4	complex	290		
SKPP ²	6	56.0	-6	18	0.0	0	17	4.0	0	4	8.0	1	1	32.0	1*	-4	negl./pragmatic	25		
SIP ²	5	55.5	-6	8	5.5	1	12	16.7	1	18	0.0	0	2	22.2	1*	-3	negl./pragmatic	18		
TCO Unions ¹	Average	9.2	64.4	-3.8	14.4	1.9	0.2	12.8	15.2	0.8	7.2	8.2	0.8	5.8	9.7	1.6	-0.4		120.8	604

Explanations: The values in the table are the percentages of the respective aspects in relation to all statements.

* The low level of communication (smaller 50) brings the index of pragmatic communication to -6 and limits the index of complex communication to a maximum of 1. These unions are also excluded from calculations of the average values. However, they are included in the average calculation of the indices.
 negl./pragmatic means that the communication is pragmatic because it neglects to debate the issue.

IGB's pragmatic orientation is outstanding, because it focuses on pragmatic aspects up to almost 85 percent. With this score, IGB surpasses unions with a high pragmatic communication like Metall (79 percent) and SEF (72 percent). The unions which are least likely to limit their debate on pragmatic aspects are mostly German unions. Among the seven unions which focus less than 60 percent on pragmatic aspects five are German (GEW, HBV, IGD, DGB, and IGM). However, GF takes the fourth place and ST the sixth, indicating that non-pragmatic communication is not only limited to German trade unions. When we compare the average of the relative frequencies of the pragmatic aspects in the DGB, LO, and TCO unions, we can conclude that German unions are less strongly bound to these aspects than Swedish unions. LO unions stress close to 70 percent pragmatic aspects (with the exception of GF with 55.4 percent). However, considering the fact that two out of our five TCO trade unions entirely neglected the debate, we can conclude that TCO debated the issue of nuclear power in a most limited way. However, if we take only those unions into account that are not ruled out because they have neglected the intra-organizational debate, TCO unions come closer to their German counterparts.

Pragmatic Aspects

The trade unions also differ within the pragmatic categories. Generally speaking, Swedish unions stress more the (national) economic aspects and German unions put a substantially greater emphasis on labor market aspects.

In terms of energy policy, all LO unions rank quite high. TCO unions also consider nuclear energy mainly in terms of energy policy. With the exception of IGB and IGC, the DGB unions are not very concerned with energy political or technological aspects. However, it should be noted that this conclusion is only true in relative terms. In absolute terms, energy political and technological aspects are the most frequent aspects in all categories for all unions. Even the unions which stress least these aspects, use about one-third of their arguments by looking at energy political aspects. In particular, the LO unions are very much occupied by energy political aspects which are often connected with economic aspects. In terms of economic aspects, Swedish and German unions differ most clearly. This is true for both LO and TCO unions in Sweden. Only GF and, to a lesser degree ST, give less importance to economic aspects. In Germany the unions which organize workers in nuclear plants or related industries (ÖTV, IGC) and HBV also stress more frequently the economic aspects of nuclear power than the other unions.

Table 5-3.: The Pragmatic Level of Communication (percentage of all statements).

union	Technology and Energy Political Aspects		Economic Aspects		Labor Market Aspects		Sum per-cent	N (100 percent)
	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent	Rank	Percent		
DGB	14	37.3	13	7.7	3	13.4	58.4	470
IGM	10	40.9	12	8.0	8	10.8	59.7	435
IGB	1	61.3	11	8.9	2	14.5	84.7	124
IGC	6	44.2	9	9.9	9	9.4	63.5	233
ÖTV	12	38.0	7	11.8	4	12.4	62.2	856
HBV	13	37.5	8	10.0	13.5	5.4	52.9	280
IGD	16	31.4	15	5.8	1	17.0	54.2	223
GEW	15	34.0	14	6.3	5	11.7	52.0	94
DGB unions' average	10.9	40.6	11.1	8.6	5.7	11.8	61.0	339.4
LO	3	47.9	6	13.0	13.5	5.4	66.3	92
SEF	4	47.2	1	20.8	15	3.8	71.8	53
Metall	2	55.9	5	13.2	7	10.3	79.4	68
SF	6	43.4	4	15.1	12	7.5	66.0	53
SKAF*	-	80.0	-	0	-	0	80.0	5
GF	5	45.9	16	5.4	16	4.1	55.4	74
LO unions' average	4.2	48.1	6.4	13.5	12.7	6.2	67.8	68
TCO	9	41.5	3	16.4	6	11.4	69.3	219
SIF	11	40.3	2	17.3	10	7.7	65.3	52
ST	8	43.1	10	9.3	11	6.9	59.3	290
SKTF*	-	40.0	-	8.0	-	8.0	56.0	25
SL*	-	22.2	-	22.2	-	11.1	55.5	18
TCO unions' average	9.3	41.6	5.0	14.3	9.0	8.7	64.6	187.0

* Because of a low N of statements (≤ 50) all these unions are not included in the calculations of the value averages as well as the ranks.

The other interesting finding is that German unions are much more concerned with labor market aspects. DGB unions take labor market aspects into account twice as much as LO unions. In particular, the DGB, IGB, ÖTV, and a bit surprisingly IGD quite frequently stress these aspects. IGB is very much concerned with labor market and employment aspects but also with technological and energy political aspects. The emphasis on the latter aspect can be explained by the strong involvement of IGB in energy political questions. Most of the arguments stress the important function of coal in Germany's energy policy. Much attention is also given to the high temperature reactor which makes it possible to refine coal processing. As mentioned above, coal directly competes with nuclear energy as an energy source in West Germany. In addition, the labor market for miners is severely declining so that it is understandable

that IGB is cautious about the employment effects of nuclear energy and the consequences that it might have for the coal industry. More surprising is the high amount of labor market statements of IGD. In that, IGD is the only German trade union which is not involved in energy policy through its members but stresses labor market aspects more frequently than the average. IGC is the opposite. Although involved in nuclear energy through its members, IGC does not place very much emphasis on labor market aspects.

One reason for the stronger emphasis of German unions on labor market aspects is certainly the high unemployment rate that has existed for more than a decade in Germany. Labor market aspects have to be taken into account whether one argues for or against nuclear power. In Sweden, this aspect is less relevant. As it has often been stated in interviews there will be no unemployment for workers in nuclear plants who are skilled and highly qualified.

Complex Aspects

The non-pragmatic aspects are very different in character. They contain all other remaining facets of an issue, as outlined above and presented in table 5-2, I will present these aspects along the lines of left-ideological, safety and environmental, political, and societal aspects.

(a) Left-Ideological Aspects

In comparison to all other unions, LO unions score highest in terms of left-ideological aspects. In particular, the confederation LO extensively included this aspect in their congressional motions and debates (14.1 percent). Only GF scores much lower than any other union in the LO confederation, but its score is still higher than any one of the TCO trade unions which are the other extreme in this respect. This confirms again that TCO unions try to refrain from statements which may express their sympathy for any left or right ideology. The German unions score rather moderately in this dimension. Although these aspects are included in the argumentation of DGB, IGM, IGD, and GEW - the two latter put the most emphasis on the left-ideological aspects, - other unions (IGB, HBV, IGC, ÖTV) concentrate much less on left-ideological aspects in the debate on nuclear energy.

(b) Safety and Environmental Aspects

Concerning security and environmental aspects, we can see that German unions put much more stress on the former aspects while the Swedish unions put more emphasis on the latter. In particular, TCO unions and, above all, SIF stress *positive* environmental aspects of nuclear energy (more than 85 percent of SIF's environmen-

tal statements are positive). But also Metall notes the positive environmental aspects of nuclear power (83 percent of the environmental statements are positive). The confederation LO is more critical in its emphasis on environmental aspects (only 43 percent are positive). The only German union that stresses environmental aspects to a large degree is IGD. But in sharp contrast to the Swedish unions only one quarter of the environmental statements are positive towards nuclear power.

(c) Political and Societal Aspects

By looking at the societal and political aspects, we can discover a substantial difference between LO unions, on the one hand, and TCO and DGB unions, on the other. LO unions, again with the exception of GF, stress political aspects only half as often as TCO and DGB unions. This is particularly true for SEF but also for LO and Metall. However, the TCO and DGB unions have exceptions. SIF, for instance, does not give a lot attention to societal and political aspects. IGB is the union which least frequently stresses these aspects of all trade unions in this investigation. In contrast, GF, ST, and TCO include most frequently societal and political aspects when debating nuclear energy. It is only at the fourth place that the first German union, GEW comes. The unions HBV, IGM and ÖTV and the confederation DGB devote more than ten percent to societal and political aspects. IGB, SIF and all LO unions (with the exception of GF) include least frequently social and political aspects in their debate on nuclear power. A comparison of LO, TCO, and DGB unions shows that the TCO unions score highest on the political dimension when we exclude SKTF and SL which neglected the whole debate. However, the DGB unions are not far from TCO unions in this, and surpass them if we also take SKTF and SL into the account. As mentioned above, LO unions give very little attention to social and political aspects.

The index for the *level of communication* combines the indices discussed above. It is the summation of all the applied indices [12]. We can distinguish the two kinds of organizational communication: pragmatic and complex-ideological.

With the distinct exception of GF, all LO unions fit into the category of pragmatic trade unions. This is most clearly true for SKAF, SEF and Metall. Although the LO confederation without a doubt can also be classified as pragmatic, it is the least pragmatic of the LO unions. Most likely because more societal and political aspects are debated in the confederations rather than in the individual trade unions. GF is not typical for a LO union. This may not be limited to its debate on nuclear power. It is clearly a complex debating trade union. By dealing with broader social and political aspects, it even tends to neglect the domain of LO-ideology: left-ideological aspects.

For TCO unions, the analysis reveals a fundamental difference. On the one hand, there are pragmatic unions like SIF, SKTF, and SL. The two latter unions can be called pragmatic because they avoid (SKTF) or do not see it as a trade union task to deal with political issues (SL). On the other hand, TCO and, above all, ST debate the issue of nuclear energy in a rather complex manner. This is less surprising for TCO since it is the "political head" of the white collar unions in Sweden and the organization where white collar union interests should be translated into politics. However, we can also see the limitation of the complex communication of TCO, it is above all in the dimension of left-ideological aspects. ST is more interesting. ST is one of the most complex debating union in the whole survey. The results of its communication level are in sharp contrast to the established view of Swedish white collar unions as non-political. However, although ST is not as extreme as TCO and SIF, it does not place much emphasis on left-ideological aspects.

For the DGB unions, we can conclude that all unions except IGC and IGB are complex-ideological. This is particularly true for GEW, IGD, HBV, DGB, and IGM. ÖTV is less complex but it may still fit better into this category than into the pragmatic one. IGC and IGB fit much better into the pragmatic category. For this reason, IGC can be considered as a less pragmatic trade union when we compare it to the rest of pragmatic unions in Sweden. IGB, in contrast, represents one of the most pragmatic trade unions of the whole survey.

The relationship between the level of communication and the adoption of new politics is very close. Only in the case of TCO, where the level of communication was complex, no elements of new politics were adopted [13] and pragmatic debating unions did not adopt elements of new politics ($r = .71^*$, $N = 16$). The level of communication is not without context. One important aspect here may be the union ideology to which I wish to turn now.

4. TRADE UNION IDEOLOGY AND NEW POLITICS

Trade union ideology may play a fundamental role in the stand that trade unions take concerning productionist and new politics. Union ideology, in terms of organization theory, may be interpreted as worldviews of retained successful sense-making (retention). The review of the literature showed that ideology seems to have been the best explanatory variable particularly for American unions. Rebecca Logan and Dorothy Nelkin (1980) demonstrated that different economic interests of trade unions is closely connected to their attitude towards nuclear power. Their conclusion is that "business" unions incline to take a pro-nuclear stand and that "social" unions open their politics for anti-nuclear influences [14]. Heinrich Siegmann (1985) arrives to

quite the same conclusion when he compares the relationship between labor and environmentalism in the USA and West Germany. For Sweden and West Germany, however, the dichotomy between business and social unions does not work out for a lot of reasons. Unions in both countries are "socially responsible", participatory, centralized and have a global influence over national politics (Cella and Treu, 1987; Martin, 1989; Taylor, 1989: 18-46). Alain Touraine stresses the importance of different ideological commitments and its impact on the responsiveness of trade unions to new politics. He revealed fundamental differences between the two major union confederations in France. The *Confédération générale du travail* (C.G.T), the communist trade union federation, is strongly committed to the attitudes of industrial culture and distrustful of the anti-nuclear movement. The other French union federation *Confédération française du travail* (C.F.D.T.) opened its politics more to the new demands but it suffered from internal conflicts (Touraine et al., 1987: 209-224).

As outlined above, among other variables the unions have been selected because of their different ideologies. In West Germany, one can distinguish between accommodationist and activist unions and also empirical studies have been conducted along this line (Bergmann et al. 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988):

There have always been two main groups of unions within the DGB, which we have decided to call activists and accommodationists, roughly corresponding to the more general notions of "radicals" and "moderates". This cleavage, based both on political attitudes and on tradition, has been the principle axis along which intra-DGB politics revolved throughout the post-World War II period. (Markovits, 1986: 20)

Whereas Andrei Markovits analyses this cleavage by considering the politics of the DGB, IGM, IGC, IGBSE, and IGD, Christoph Weischer attempts to trace back the historical roots of these traditions to the beginning of the German trade union movement. Unfortunately, he does not refer to the political actors in the trade unions in a systematic manner but is rather sketchy in his argumentation. The already "classical" study by Joachim Bergmann, Otto Jacobi and Walther Müller-Jentsch (1976: 173-93) compares the programmatic attitudes of accommodationist (*systemkonformen* or system conformist) and activist (*systemkritischen* or system critical) unions with the example of the German Construction workers' union (IGBSE), on the one hand, and the Metall workers' union (IGM), on the other. In order to do this, they analyzed the attitudes of unions concerning nationalization, the perception of the state, and the role trade unions are supposed to play within capitalism.

Weischer (1988: 233-263) notes that "activist union policy" aims to fight the deterioration of the employees by means of shorter working hours, state control over research and technology politics, and an extension of co-determination. Weischer identifies the radical tradition, above all, in HBV and IGM, the youth departments,

and education centers. Markovits also sees the strongholds of activist unionism in the IGM, IGD, *Gewerkschaft Holz* (carpenters' union), and *Gewerkschaft Leder* (leather workers' union) (Markovits 1986: 20/1). To this group, one can also probably add the GEW which has been strongly influenced by communist traditions.

However, there have been some substantial changes along this line. IGC, once belonging to the activist unions became one of the most radical accommodationist unions, and the ÖTV and the Postal Workers' union (*Deutsche Postgewerkschaft*, DPG) steadily drifted to the left within the spectrum of DGB politics. According to Weischer, the reformers and pragmatists became so-called "modernizers" in the 1970s. Above all, the IGC and its leader Hermann Rappe form this wing. But also the IGB, *IG Bau-Steine-Erden* (construction workers' union), and the *Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung* (textile workers' union) belong to this group. The aim of the accommodationist unions is to achieve material welfare through means of technological progress, improvement of international competition, etc. In order to pursue this goal, they are open for cooperation with employers and they try to attract the increasing group of technicians.

We can refer to the relationship with the Green party as a first indicator for the ideological stand of trade unions concerning new politics. Both types of unions are different in their relationship with the Green party and environmental politics. – Whereas the accommodationist unions oppose any Green politics, the activist unions turn less reluctantly to Green issues such as ecology, critique of economic growth, women, and the third world. The latter group has also close contact with Green politics and new social movements, especially with the peace movement (Armingeon and Schmitt, 1986; Swenson, 1989: 228-31). For the relationship between trade unions and the Greens, Markovits (1986: 444-446) points out:

Although the activist unions are as hostile to the Greens' forms of no-growth ecologism as their accommodationist colleagues, one can nevertheless detect a growing eco-consciousness among certain unions belonging to the former group. This in no way implies that the activists have resolved the contradictions inherent in the dichotomy between economy and ecology. Rather, one could argue that reformers within the unions have been forced to begin a lengthy process of reflection with regard to ecology and "new social movements." (Markovits, 1986: 446)

For West German unions, one can derive the hypothesis that the most progressive unions in a leftish sense are the most open to Green politics, whereas the more accommodative unions of pragmatic Social Democracy are the most hostile. For the unions in this investigation, we may hypothesize on the basis of their ideology that IGM, IGD, and HBV are most open to elements of new politics and that IGB and IGC are the most reserved. The remaining unions may take a middle position, where GEW

and ÖTV are closer to the activist wing, and the DGB stands nearer the accommodationist camp.

For the Swedish union movement, it is much more difficult to find indication for ideological currents. However, they may exist. As Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen (1987) point out, policy and politics in Sweden can only be understood by being able to understand the power struggle *within* Social Democracy. However, it causes substantial difficulties to find empirical indicators for differences in intra-union ideology in Swedish unions, particularly *within* the big union confederations.

The most obvious ideological difference exists between the two big trade union confederations in Sweden: LO and TCO [15]. LO and its unions can be connected with a (pragmatic) Social Democratic ideology. TCO, although officially having a neutral stand concerning party politics, most often is in agreement with LO positions (Elvander, 1983: 379-383). Over time, one may conclude that ideological differences between LO and TCO have diminished (Nilsson, 1985). However, since TCO members often favor the politics of other parties, above all, the politics of the liberal *Folkspartiet* (fp), TCO tries not to get involved in party politics when issues are heated. Nevertheless, on the elite level TCO is clearly oriented towards Social Democracy. However, within LO or TCO there are hardly any analyses of different ideological groups. The disagreements between Swedish unions exist more in economic or organizational conflicts, which above all rise between private and public sector unions (Fredriksson and Gunno, 1985: 148-151; Olson, 1989: 137-170; Swenson, 1989). In so far, the ideological difference consists of a (pragmatic) Social Democratic ideology (LO) and of a heterogeneous or more neutral ideology in political parties' terms (TCO).

In his analysis of the internal union opposition in LO, Walter Korpi (1978: 237-269) finds that the vast majority can be labelled Social Democrats but it should be brought to notice that a Communist faction also exists. This does not exclude the fact that there have been disagreements on single issues within the Social Democratic faction as well. Unfortunately, Korpi does not analyze these conflicts in a systematic fashion, so that we may identify groups or even unions which are more or less Social Democratic or committed to Communist ideas. Leif Lewin also exclusively concentrates on LO unions and identifies a few stronger Communist groups among some local districts particularly in the north of Sweden.

For TCO, there is also no investigation that tries to explain intra-organizational cleavages systematically. By specifying the consequences of TCO's neutral stand policy, Christopher Wheeler postulates that TCO's political influence is at its greatest as long

as the issue is kept away from politicization, i.e. taken up controversially by different political groups, above all parties. Wheeler illustrates this with the example of the dispute on supplementary pensions which took place at the end of the 1950s and had its peak around the referendum on this issue in October 1957:

As the tensions created by the heterogeneous political party support among TCO's membership, which in turn reflected economic cleavages within the organization, became manifest, there was no position which TCO could take which would not offend one or another important segment of its membership. Worse yet, the willingness of some of TCO's most important leaders to try to use the organization to influence white-collar voters created the preconditions for a total breakdown in organizational cohesion. (Wheeler, 1975: 91)

In these cases, TCO and its unions try to formulate a neutral stand. However, that is only successful as long as all unions remain neutral and do not change their politics. As Wheeler points out that was not the case any more, when SIF, the biggest TCO union, made an arrangement with the employers against the official policy of the TCO-board. This conflict resulted, after the public political dispute, in a second internal conflict that lasted several years following the referendum (Wheeler, 1975: 88-90). Similar intra-organizational conflicts occurred within the debate on nuclear power (Micheletti, 1985). However, neither of the authors connect the particular conflict to more general cleavages within TCO and its unions. It seems from these analyses that intra-organizational conflict in TCO and TCO unions is predominantly a result of membership pressure of different unions and that these different standpoints are directly related to individual or sectoral advantages or disadvantages of certain membership groups.

Another analysis by Åke Sandberg (1984; 1989) may shed some light on different trade union strategies concerning attitudes in the context of the introduction of new technologies and work-place organization. He classifies attitudes either as "technically-optimistic", on the one hand, and as producer oriented or "technically-radical", on the other. The former view is described as follows:

With an optimistic approach to technology, technological development is seen as both necessary and desirable. Nothing should be allowed to prevent it, and our task is to promote it give it as much free play as possible. (Sandberg, 1989: Ch1, p. 10).

In contrast to the technically-optimistic view, the technically-radical view focuses attention on both the products and the production system. This broader approach to looking at the introduction of new technology and the work organization also implies a socio-political view, while the technically-optimistic view focuses rather on procedures and technical aspects.

A radical approach involves a critical view of technological development. Such development is not good as it stands, but it is possible to get it on to other, alternative tracks. (Sandberg, 1989: Ch1, p. 10)

While analyzing program declarations of some Swedish unions, he concludes that the influential unions such as LO and Metall express the former attitudes and that GF, the food processing workers' union, and ST lean more to the latter [16].

Important in the context of ideological differences among Swedish unions is the dominant role of the central confederation LO over its unions. This role was shaped during the historical process (Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989). Therefore, we might expect a quite coherent picture of LO unions. LO was able to formulate a distinct union ideology. The major goals of it are a class-based pursuit of full employment, technical progress, solidaric wages, active labor market policy, and collective capital formation (Meidner and Hedborg, 1984; Tilton, 1990: chapter nine). In the context of LO's historical perception of technical progress, it is important to note that LO explicitly supports and even promotes it:

Rationalization must be considered a natural, continuing effort to improve the results of production and to enhance the development of human culture. The trade union movement cannot turn itself against these efforts. (*LO's 15-mannakommitté*, 1941: 144; quoted from Tilton, 1990: 191)

LO and the Social Democrats, in general, faced difficulties to match the material goals of this strategy with its resulting consequences. In the 1960s, the costs of technological progress and the implied geographical mobility for the worker created a growing resistance (Martin, 1984; Tilton, 1990: 209-14) [17]. Although the elite of LO listened to these complaints and more strongly stressed the qualitative aspects of work-life, it did not move away from its technically-optimistic ideology:

The Swedish union movement demonstrates a unique commitment to rationalization and efficiency, one that derives from the Social Democratic goal of material abundance, not from an acceptance of capitalist imperatives. (Tilton, 1990: 214)

In the context of the perception of technological development, two points are important: first, LO supports and even promotes technological progress and is therefore strongly committed to the values of industrial society. Second, LO unions do not fundamentally differ in this respect - apart from GF.


Officially, TCO does not have such a pronounced ideology on socio-technological developments, although it is fair to conclude that also TCO supports technological progress. However, the TCO unions exercise a much more independent policy from its confederation. This means that more differences may exist between the individual TCO unions.

Concerning the consequences for new politics, one can assume that with the exception of GF, LO unions are ideologically rather reluctant to integrate elements of new politics into their programs and mainly adopt more or less the standpoint of the LO confederation. For TCO, one may expect either a neutral stand - or total neglect of an issue that polarizes the membership. A third possibility is that a union stand would coincide with its membership. Since the TCO confederation formulates also political stands of its member unions, it may be a "bit more political" than its member unions. That means that both union confederations in Sweden have a more representative political function in relation to their member unions while the German unions are also political on the individual union level. Furthermore, Åke Sandberg's investigation suggests that ST may be different from other TCO unions. However, he gives no suggestions for other TCO unions. It also seems true that ST is more active in other field of politics as well. Considering this, one sees that it is different from other TCO unions of this investigation. However, the political activities of ST are never as pronounced as they are in DGB unions or LO unions.

Figure 5-1 may be an approximation of the results of the reviewed literature. The band cutting through the figure indicates the hypothetical openness of the trade unions for new politics. Left of the band we may expect a certain openness for elements of new politics. The unions at the right of the band may be rather unresponsive to new politics. The unions which are touched by the band may be partially receptive due to ideological reasons.

The ideological stand seems to have a fundamental impact on trade union stands towards elements of new politics. All the German activist unions are open to new politics and also the unions classified as moderately activist have adopted elements of new politics. The opposite is true for accommodationist and neutral unions. None of the unions classified as neutral or accommodationist have adopted elements of new politics. This conclusion is true for both the Swedish and the German types of accommodationist trade unionism. Unions classified as less neutral and more activist adopted at least some elements on new politics or they are not completely opposed to them. All in all, we can see a relatively high correlation between the general ideological stand of trade unions and their attitude towards new politics [18].

Figure 5-1: Ideological Space of Swedish and German Trade Unions



The ideological impact is even higher on the level of communication [19]. The less a union follows an accommodationist and/or politically neutral ideological strategy and the more it favors activist unionism and is technically-radical, the more the union communicates social matters in a complex manner. As outlined above, it is rather difficult to protect a union from the influence of social change once it has left the pragmatic level of communication. We may conclude that ideology matters in how far German and Swedish unions are responsive to elements of new politics [20].

5. CONCLUSION

The steps which are analyzed in this chapter can be seen as ranging from relatively non-filtered membership opinions to strongly filtered organizational standpoints. The filters are different organizational factors and can roughly be divided into entry filters (which issues come on the agenda), tolerance filters (is it possible to express diversified opinions), communicational filters (how it is possible to communicate an issue in the organization), and decisional filters (which official stand is valid). As we have seen from the debates within the trade union confederations and the congresses of some individual trade unions in the proceeding chapter, most unions have a *voiced membership potential*. A *voiced membership potential* for new politics can be

considered as the pure fact that members of individual trade unions express their preference for elements of new politics either at the congresses of their union *or* at the congresses of the union confederation. In these terms, only IGB, SEF, and SKAF seem to have no potential for elements of new politics, and for LO and Metall it seems to be very low. The members of the TCO unions, ST, SKTF, and SL, expressed their concerns quite clearly at the TCO congresses above all in 1979. Members of SF also (weakly) expressed some interest of new politics at the LO congress in 1981. The first organizational filter is the agenda control (B1). In particular, LO unions are not very much affected by elements of new politics in their organizations. The weak membership potential cannot be translated into an organizational potential for new politics. Most striking is the fact that most of the considered TCO unions filter out membership potential for new politics in the next stage: voiced membership potential is not translated into organizational potential (A6). Some TCO unions are quite explicit in their expression that political issues have no place at all in their organization. In particular, SIF, SKTF, and SL adopted this strategy to eliminate further discussions in their organization by pointing out that these issues have nothing to do with trade unions' concerns. However, if a union debated the issue it has been summarized as the *organizational potential for new politics*. The next step was to identify whether this potential leads to any *intra-organizational conflicts* (B6) about new and productionist politics. Only two unions which had an organizational potential for new politics did not suffer from an intra-organizational conflict. Those were GF and GEW. Both unions showed a relatively coherent new politics stand which seemed to be not fundamentally questioned within the organization. The next factor is strongly connected to the former and it is difficult to proclaim any causal relationship. One should rather think in terms of an interactive relationship. It is the communication procedures in an organization (B7). This means that we can distinguish between different *levels of communication*. I have attempted to find indicators for two rather distinct types of organizational communication: a pragmatic type of organizational communication and a complex-ideological one. One can conclude that all unions with a high organizational potential for new politics apply a rather complex-ideological, organizational communication ($r = .83$). Only IGC tried to limit this potential and the organizational conflict by limiting the debate on pragmatic categories. On the other hand, no union without organizational potential for elements of new politics applied complex-ideological communication.

In organization theoretical terms one can say that German unions are much more affected by the conflict between new and productionist politics because they deal with the issue in a more complex manner, on the one hand, and they are more closely coupled, on the other (see chapter four). In empirical terms the first aspect is represented by the fact that German unions, in general, take more complex aspects

into consideration when debating nuclear energy than Swedish unions. Leaving the pragmatic level of communications implies the risk that consensus is more difficult to reach (Perlman, 1966; Offe and Wiesenenthal, 1980). The next chapter will focus on the different impacts of the organizational environment.

Footnotes:

1 I distinguish here between *organizational potential* for new politics, *voiced membership potential*, and *latent membership potential*. Latent membership potential is presumed to be potential deduced from certain characteristics of the union membership (see chapter four). I speak of voiced membership potential when union members *voice* their opinion on new politics. This must not be within the individual union but can also be at the congresses of the confederations. However, membership potential for new politics must not be expressed in organizational potential. An organizational potential for new politics must be observable in the *individual* union organization.

2 More formally the definition of the Organizational Potential for New Politics (OPNP) is the sum of the NP means of the motions and the debates for all union congresses:

$$\text{OPNP} = \Sigma \text{MEANS of NP (motions)} + \Sigma \text{MEANS of NP (debate)}$$

Explanations:

OPNP = Organizational Potential
of Elements of New Politics
NP = Elements of New Politics
(see above: NP)

The scale of the index, as all other indices presented in this section, has a point zero but the range of the scale is not limited.

3 For a similar analysis of comparing different subgroups by means of ranks see: Katzenstein, 1985.

4 With some reservations one could also include IGM here. I decided against that because IGM does not organize members in nuclear energy enterprises to the extent that SIF and IGC do.

5 The correlation is significant: $r = .69^*$ ($N = 16$).

6 For some analysis that stress different aspects of union democracy see for instance: Lipset et al. 1956; Hemingway, 1978; Lewin, 1980; Jahn, 1988b.

7 However, open opposition to union policy does not seem to be tolerated in Swedish unions. After describing a number of methods to sanction deviant members by leadership Lewin sums up:

All this adds up to a rather dark picture of the respect for minority rights within the Swedish trade union movement. The leadership perceives that influencing membership opinion is one of its primary duties and that broad base of support for union ideology is an important objective for the movement. In the case of the wage policy of solidarity they have often been successful. Nevertheless, in the process of influencing opinion, excessively harsh methods are sometimes used. (Lewin, 1980: 156)

That also pressure above all in moral terms is used may be true also for other ideological conflicts. In this context, Michele Micheletti reports that "Lasse Karlsson, a LO official ... was released from some of his duties due to his viewpoint on nuclear power." (Micheletti, 1985: 115). In consideration of these reports one may conclude that LO's coherent Social Democratic ideology has quite substantial consequences for diverse alternative ideological standpoints. Leif Lewin's examples of how union leaders deal with members who voice disagreement with the collective affiliation of unions local districts with the Social Democratic Party reminds of the criminal actions one is used to hear of in American unions:

Concerning how those workers are treated who prefer to remain outside the trade union movement, 21 percent of the members said that they had noticed harassment directed against the outsiders in the form of "snide remarks and verbal pressure," but even more serious are "anonymous letters," "threatened beatings," "verbal abuse and violent actions," and "sanctions by the leadership." (Lewin, 1980: 156)

8 More formally the operationalization of the Organizational Level of Conflict (OLC) between productionist and new politics is the sum of the standard deviations of the ANPE of the motions and the debates of all analyzed congresses:

$$\text{OLC} = \Sigma \text{STD of ANPE (motions)} + \Sigma \text{STD of ANPE (debates)}$$

Explanations:

OLC = Organizational Level of Conflict between
Productionist and New Politics
ANPE = Adoption of Elements of
New Politics (see above: ANPE)
STD = Standard Deviation

9 There is also no perfect relation between latent or organizational potential and intra-organizational conflict. However in three quarters of the cases organizational potential is positively associated with intra-organizational conflict. (This is only in half of the cases true when we look at latent membership potential and intra-organizational conflict). This result means that there is a high chance of intra-organizational conflict if elements of new politics are debated in terms of new and productionist politics in trade unions.

10 The assigned values are scaled according the following principle:

Sum of the Relative Frequencies of Technological, Energy Political, Economic, and Labor Market Aspects	Assigned Value
0 - 49.9 percent	0
50 - 59.9 percent	- 1
60 - 64.9 percent	- 2
65 - 69.9 percent	- 3
70 - 79.9 percent	- 4
80 - 100.0 percent	- 5
low degree of communication	- 6

A low degree of communication exists when the expressed statements are not higher than 50. In these cases, the other values of the complex categories (see below) are not allowed to extend 1 because the relative frequencies are not sufficiently reliable. This applies only to the Societal and Political Aspects where the value can vary between 1 and 3.

11 The values of the index for the level of complex communication have been calculated in the following way: the values for left-ideology, security, environment, and societal and political aspects have been summed up. The index is in proportion to the index that measures the pragmatic level of communication and can score between 0 and 6. Therefore, the whole level of communication varies between -6 (pragmatic communication) to +6 (complex communication). The sub-indices are equal to 0 if their relative frequencies are not larger than the displayed values. The ranges for the values are deduced from the empirical frequencies:

Aspect	Relative Frequencies	Assign Value
Left-Ideology:	5.0 percent	1
Security	10.0 percent	1
Environment	4.5 percent	1
Societal and Political	8.0 - 9.9 percent	1
	10.0 - 11.9 percent	2
	12.0 percent	3

12 The index comes more or less to the same results whether it is based on the index or the sum of the ranks. In the latter case, the rank of the societal and political aspects has been weighted twice as much because of the importance of these aspects (the same has been done for the index based on the classifications as outlined above). The only substantial difference is that HBV scores higher and IGM lower when applying the ranking technique. However, this affects by no means the classification of the trade unions in terms of pragmatic and complex level of communication.

13 One should *not* perceive a complex level of communication as an *indicator* for new politics. An argument that speaks against this interpretation is the complex level of intra-organizational communication in German unions in periods when they still favored productionist politics. In particular, OTV in the 1970s is a case in point for a complex but productionist trade union. However, the difference between Swedish and German unions may have fundamental historical reasons. LO has always been rather pragmatic and reformist since the beginning of the century. German unions, in contrast, were always relatively ideological (Perلمان, 1966).

14 The classical study in which trade unions were classified - among others - as business and revolutionary unions is Robert Hoxie's (1966) study on *Trade Unionism in the United States*. His 'business' and 'revolutionary' unionism, translated as 'economic' and 'political' unionism, gained wide currency during the period after the Second World War among writers on comparative unionism (Martin, 1989).

15 There is also SACO/SR which is not analyzed here. SACO/SR has no socio-political world-views as LO and TCO and differs also in other respects from the two bigger confederations (Elvander, 1983; Nilsson, 1985). SAC, on the other hand, is rather radical and open for new politics. For instance, its membership newspaper *Arbetaren* even served as a voice for the alternative movements in Sweden

(Rubert, 1985: 233). However, it is by far less important than all the other Swedish trade union confederations.

16 Sandberg identifies the technically-radical attitude also at the local level of SIF at the Ericsson telephone company factory in Stockholm. However, since this conclusion refers only to the local level I did not use it here as an indicator for SIF as a whole. GF is also less committed to social democratic ideology. This has been stated in conducted interviews with GF officials and is also confirmed by the data above.

17 Tim Tilton points out: "Swedes in the northern reaches of the country quipped that AMS, the Swedish abbreviation for Labor Market Board, stood for 'All Must (Go) South' ('Alla Måste Söderut').

18 The correlation between the openness to elements of new politics measured by the last stand and the trade unions' general ideological stand is rather high ($r = .82^{**}$ ($N = 16$); $\text{Eta} = .85$). The ideological stand has been operationalized according to the three dimensions mentioned in the text (political versus neutral; activist versus accommodationist; technically-optimistic versus technically-radical). The index is documented in table A5-1. Even if this index remains a bit arbitrary because of the complex character of union ideology and the lack of available information, it is clear that ideology has a profound impact on the adoption of elements of new politics.

19 The correlation between the ideology and the level of communication is $r = .83^{**}$.

20 A multiple regression with the variables organizational potential for new politics, organizational level of conflict, level of communication, ideology, and last stand comes to an adjusted R Square = .60 (R Square = .71), when the last stand is the dependent variable. When the level of communication is the dependent variable the adjusted R Square is .78 (R Square = .84). However, since this statistical procedure is not really appropriate for this data (low number of cases, scaling quality) I did not elaborate the argument along this line. However, the substantial results are also confirmed through the analysis above.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In this chapter about the organizational environment and the assessment of productionist and new politics of trade unions I wish to analyze the following three aspects: economic, socio-cultural, and political. However, even if these aspects are analytically distinguished, they are interrelated in reality. The empirical analysis relies on very global indicators and should therefore not be overestimated but serve as an orientation.

The perception of nuclear energy may be dependent on the national energy policy and the economic development of a country (A5). As it has already mentioned, trade unions are cooperative and nationally responsible political and social actors in both countries. They were often involved or, at least, consulted in questions of the development of the national energy policy, and they also considered the data of the national economy when formulating trade union goals. The reference to the national economy may lead to it that trade unions favor productionist politics in times of economic problems, and *if* they stress stronger elements of new politics, they do this in times of economic prosperity.

The impact of public opinion on trade union policy has to be seen in the background of the national energy policy and economy. However, the general socio-political atmosphere may have a profound impact on trade unions, particularly when they have political aspirations (B3 and B4). The influence of public opinion and of new social movements are analyzed here under the same heading and should be conceptualized as the degree of *politicalization of industrial production*, a term elaborated by Herbert Kitschelt (1985).

The last aspect focuses on different political environments. One may assume that the Swedish political system gives more support for new politics, since it is more responsive and integrating than the German system (Kitschelt, 1983; Kitschelt, 1986). While the Swedish political system have integrated elements of new politics from the very beginning, the German system provokes open conflicts (B3a and B3d). This in turn may result in feedback loops: the more profiled alternatives become the stronger the influence is an - initially unresponsive - established actors such as trade unions (B3b and B3c).

1. THE ENERGY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY AND THE ASSESSMENT OF NEW AND PRODUCTIONIST POLITICS

The Energy Policy in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany

In relative terms Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany make substantial use of nuclear energy. Of the 26 nations that use nuclear energy in 1985 West Germany is among the more average users of nuclear energy. Around 30 percent of the electricity production is generated by the 19 reactors at 16 sites. Six further reactors were still planned in 1985 [1]. The Swedish nuclear power program is much more ambitious. Only in a short time, Sweden increased its nuclear electricity share to around 43 percent. Per capita Sweden is the leader of all nuclear energy countries in the OECD and surpassed even France which is known as a nuclear power nation (OECD, 1987). The twelve reactors are very centralized and are located at only four different sites. Sweden is the smallest country in the world that possesses its own manufacturer of reactors. One reactor line (boiling water reactors, BWR) was designed and constructed by the Swedish company ASEA. 9 of the 12 reactors are BWRs (Swedish Government, 1987). Additionally, Sweden possesses substantial domestic uranium resources, so that it appears feasible to consider nuclear energy as a domestic energy resource.

Sweden, in contrast to West Germany, was very effective in implementing its nuclear power program. The Swedish nuclear power program was less than half as much delayed as the German one (Kitschelt, 1986). Most interesting is the fact that Sweden became a leading nuclear power nation, after the parliament had decided in June 1980, as a consequence of the consultative referendum, to phase out nuclear power in 2010. Within the scope of this decision, nuclear power is to be phased out at the fastest feasible pace giving due regard to the electric power needed to maintain employment levels and the general welfare. The parliament decided that the last reactor in Sweden must be shut down permanently no later than the year 2010. Different than in Germany, the Swedish nuclear program seems to follow rational political decisions. After the parliament had decided on twelve reactors, this program was effectively implemented. Whether or not, Sweden will stick to the phasing-out plan is still left open. In particular, the trends of recent debates (1990) give some doubts whether nuclear energy will have disappeared in Sweden by 2010 [2].

In West Germany, the nuclear program seemed to have reached a phase of stalemate. But that occurred rather unplanned. In the 1980s, the industry was mainly concentrating on the completion of facilities already under construction. No reactors have been newly ordered in recent years. The industry feels the financial risks of the nuclear technology. For monetary cost-benefit reasons, some German nuclear indu-

tries abandoned the reprocessing plant project. The only fast breeder reactor which is under construction in Germany has an unclear future after the increasing hesitation of private industry to invest into this project. The disagreement between the Social Democratic local government and the Conservative-Liberal Federal government also adds to the uncertain future of the fast breeder.

In more general energy political terms, Swedish energy consumption has increased during the last decades. The Swedish energy demand per capita is the highest among all European OECD countries and also the increase of the energy requirement is very high (second after Norway). This stands in sharp contrast to the thesis that Sweden might have changed its productionist policy (Lindberg, 1977; Kitschelt, 1983; Sahr, 1985; Jänicke et al., 1986). West Germany takes a more average position in both terms. For instance, the energy requirement increased in Sweden approximately 20 percent from 1973 to 1987 (1970 = 100). In the same time, the energy requirement increased in West Germany by 2.1 percent. Cheap energy is almost a cultural issue in Sweden (Jahn, 1987; Jahn 1988a). Tom Burns summarizes the Swedish view on energy:

... even in relatively energy-conscious Sweden, the "industrial complex" is not prepared to propose or to accept radically increased electricity rates ... (this has to do) with the fact that entire industries which have been and continue to be very heavy energy users - such as paper and pulps, alloy and light metall production - are of great importance to the Swedish economy. Indeed, such industries are closely associated with Swedish national identity. (Burns, 1985: 18)

Nuclear energy in Sweden is often associated with cheap energy. Probably one reason for that is the extreme dependency on foreign energy supply. In 1970, before the nuclear program was conducted, Sweden was to more than 75 percent dependent on imports in contrast to 50 percent in West Germany (OECD, 1987). Apart from water power, Sweden has no substantial national energy resources. The further exploitation of water power, however, is limited by the public protest that started in the 1970s. Consequently, nuclear energy was considered to be an appropriate alternative. As a consequence of the development of nuclear power, the energy import decreased in Sweden to around 37 percent in 1985, while it remained stable by 50 percent in West Germany. However, West Germany could always rely on the domestic coal industry. Table 6-1 summarizes some indicators that give a picture of the development of the energy policy in both countries and serves as data resource for the following analyses:

Table 6-1.: Some Data about the Development of Energy Policy in Sweden and West Germany

Year	Energy Requirement (a)				Development of Nuclear Energy (b)			
	Absolute		Increase (c)		Absolute		Increase (c)	
	SWED.	FRG	SWED.	FRG	SWED.	FRG	SWED.	FRG
1973	47.3	266.2	6.5	6.9	0.5	2.6	60.0	30.0
1974	44.7	258.5	-5.5	-2.9	0.5	2.7	0.0	3.9
1975	46.8	241.2	4.7	-6.7	2.7	4.8	440.0	77.8
1976	49.6	262.6	6.0	8.9	3.6	5.4	33.3	12.5
1977	48.6	261.9	-2.0	-0.3	4.5	8.1	25.0	50.0
1978	48.9	272.2	0.6	3.8	5.3	8.0	17.8	-1.2
1979	51.3	286.5	4.9	5.3	4.7	9.5	-11.3	18.8
1980	47.7	274.5	-7.0	-4.2	5.9	9.8	25.5	3.2
1981	49.3	261.5	3.4	-4.7	8.4	12.0	42.3	12.5
1982	46.9	252.3	-4.9	-3.5	8.7	14.2	3.6	18.3
1983	48.5	252.7	3.4	0.2	9.2	14.7	5.8	3.5
1984	51.2	262.4	0.2	3.8	11.4	20.7	23.9	40.8
1985	55.0	268.5	7.4	2.3	13.1	28.1	14.9	35.8
1986	55.3	270.6	0.6	7.8	15.6	26.7	-4.6	19.1
1987	56.4	271.7	2.0	0.4	15.1	29.2	9.4	-3.2

(a) Total Energy Requirements (TER) in Mtoe (millions of tons of oil equivalent). TER are made up of indigenous production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers ± stock changes. For further details see OECD, 1987: V-XV.

Source: OECD, 1987: *Energy Balances of the OECD Countries 1970-1985*. For 1973 to 1985. OECD, 1989: *Energy Balances of the OECD Countries 1986/1987*. For 1986 and 1987.

(b) Primary energy (fossil fuel) equivalent needed to produce the given output of nuclear electricity in Mtoe.

Source: see (a).

(c) Percentage change from previous year.

The perception of nuclear energy may be dependent on the increasing rates of the energy requirement and/or the development of nuclear power. By and large, we can conclude that the increase in the energy requirement was high for Sweden in the 1970s, while the German energy requirement has mostly increased since 1983, following a decrease in the 1970s and early 1980s. By comparing the increase rates of the energy requirement and the assessment of new and productionist politics in the trade union newspapers as documented in table A6-1 through A6-17, we cannot find any larger correlation [3]. However, that does not mean that trade unions do not consider the general national energy demand, when they evaluate nuclear energy. The fact that the energy demand is an important factor within the argumentation has

been outlined above. However, it indicates that the energy requirement does not correlate strongly with the assessment of new and productionist politics of trade unions.

This seems to be different for the development of the nuclear energy program. In both countries, the development of nuclear power started on a larger scale in 1975 and had strong annual increase rates in the 1970s until the accident at Three Mile Island (see table 6-1). Particularly in Sweden, the energy supply from nuclear energy decreased by around 11 percent in comparison with 1979, the previous year. However, it is important to note that the efforts to increase the amount of nuclear energy became real in the 1980s. By the turn of the decade, both countries had developed only one-third of their present amount of nuclear energy. In only eight years, this amount was tripled. This happened despite other impressions given in the public. In particular for Sweden, this is an interesting fact since the referendum conducted in March 1980 decided to have nuclear energy only for a limited period. In 1980, the Swedish nuclear industry was still rather small. In only five years, this picture changed completely when the last reactor was completed in 1985. A complex and large Swedish nuclear industry became reality and this will make an intended phasing-out difficult. This development falsifies hypothesis formulated at the turn of the 1970/80 decade that the Swedish nuclear energy policy indicates an end of productionist politics (Kitschelt, 1983). Helena Flam (1991) makes this strikingly clear by comparing the anti-nuclear movements in several West-European countries. In so far, Sweden may only differ from other industrial countries in that it has not decided to further develop its nuclear program. In contrast, the German energy policy has not given up the option of a further development of nuclear energy; although at the end of the 1980s it seemed unlikely that nuclear energy may have a growing future (Joppke, 1990). As outlined in chapter three, in the first half of the 1970s, all unions expressed a productionist stand, when the basic decisions in favor of nuclear energy were taken. However, more important than the annual energy requirement rates may be the data of the national economy for the assessment of new and productionist politics.

The Economic Development in Sweden and West Germany

Both countries, Sweden and West Germany, managed the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s relatively well. While Sweden gave more preference to ensure full-employment than to keep inflation low, the opposite may be true for Germany (see table A6-18 and A6-19). The average growth rate over the whole period from 1973 to 1989 was 2.1 percent for Sweden and 2.6 percent for Germany. The average consumer price increase was 8.5 percent in Sweden and 3.8 in Germany and the average unemployment rate was 2.3 percent in Sweden and 4.7 percent in Germany.

In most of the trade union literature in Western countries, Swedish and German unions are taken as the prominent examples of responsible trade unions (e.g.: Taylor, 1989; Gourevitch et al., 1984; Müller-Jentsch, 1985; Flanagan et al., 1983). That means that trade unions care about the national economy. A common argument in this context is that the employees are best served when the economy booms and productivity increases. This attitude may lead to the conclusion that trade unions in both countries stress productionist aspects in the debate on nuclear energy, when the economy is down. However, *if they turn to elements of new politics, they do that in periods of relative unproblematic economic development.*

For the Swedish unions, we find a moderate negative correlation between the increase rate of the consumer prices and the assessment of productionist and new politics [4]. This is in particular true for TCO and the energy unions, SF, Metall, and less so for ST and SEF. However, the inflation rate was highest in Sweden between 1974 and 1981. As we will see later that was also the time when the issue was politically most controversial. Therefore it is fair to conclude that the economic situation may have been just one factor that is responsible for the assessment of productionist and new politics. This conclusion is even more true for the West German case. For the German unions, the correlation between economic factors and the assessment of new and productionist politics is even weaker [5]. These results are in accordance with the findings of Heinrich Siegmann (1985: chapter three) who rejects the hypothesis that a good labor-environmentalist relation correlates positively with the economic well-being in West Germany and the USA.


2. THE POLITICIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

The concept of the politicization of production will here be approached by combining two aspects: the development of public opinion towards nuclear energy, on the one hand, and the development and character of the anti-nuclear movements, on the other.

Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy in Sweden and West Germany


The presentation of some results of representative national surveys over time implies fundamental restrictions and difficulties. Questions are slightly different, asked in different contexts, etc. I cannot go deeper into these problems here. Nevertheless, the comparison of some survey results may illuminate some trends and relations between public attitudes at least in global terms.

Figure 6-1.: The Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy in Sweden 1973-1988



Explanations: Data for 1973-75 from Sahr, 1985: 41, table 12. The question was: "Today the question about nuclear power's future development is discussed. Some are for and some are against a development of nuclear power as an energy source. What do you think?" I summarized the answers "Completely for nuclear expansion" and "For expansion with some hesitation" to pro-nuclear energy; "Completely against nuclear expansion" and "Against expansion with some hesitation" to anti-nuclear energy; "Equally for and against" and "Don't know, no opinion" to no opinion. Sahr took the data from: Holmberg et al., 1977: 55, table 6. For other years see explanation from table 4-1.

Figure 6-2.: The Public Opinion Towards Nuclear Energy in West Germany 1974-1988



A very first look at the development of the representative surveys shows that in Sweden the attitude towards nuclear energy remained relatively stable from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. In West Germany, in sharp contrast, public opinion shifted from a rather indifferent and positive attitude towards an anti-nuclear opinion [6]. Most interesting is the fact that the public opinion in both countries was rather similar until the early 1980s. After that the Swedish curve shows a decrease of people disfavoring nuclear energy, while in West Germany critical attitudes remained stable. However, Chernobyl was the watershed in West Germany. Anti-nuclear opinion dominated by two-thirds. The Swedish population that was heavily affected by the radioactive fall-out of Chernobyl also reacted quite strongly and favored a fast phasing-out of nuclear power shortly after the accident. However, less than half a year after the Chernobyl accident, the Swedes went back to their less critical attitude towards nuclear energy (Jahn, 1988a: 45-47). And probably even more important: 70 percent of the Swedish technical elite wanted to keep nuclear energy even after 2010 (Westerståhl and Johansson, 1987: 8-11; 37/8). As we can see from figure 6-1, in 1988 the public opinion was rather similar to the time before Chernobyl in Sweden. The interesting fact for West Germany is that Chernobyl was not the peak of anti-nuclear opinion. In contrast to the accident at Three Mile Island, the German public became even more critical towards nuclear power during the following years. According to the survey data not much more than 10 percent still supported nuclear power in West Germany in 1988. Important for these fundamental differences is most probably the character of the new social movements and their social and political consequences in both countries. Before I come back to this point, I wish to present a brief summary of the public debate on nuclear energy in Sweden and Germany.

The Anti-Nuclear Protest in Sweden and West Germany [7]

The anti-nuclear protest was perhaps the largest oppositional movement in postwar Swedish society (Flam, 1990). However, even at the very beginning, when the debate exceeded the inner circles of expert groups, nuclear energy was also debated in the parliament. This debate was initiated above all by the Center Party (Nelkin and Pollak, 1977; Holmberg and Asp, 1984; Sahr, 1985). However, in 1970 and 1971 the parliament approved of the development of eleven nuclear power plants by 1980. In 1972, an environmental group took legal action against a nuclear plant at Ringhals. Friends of the Earth collaborated with local groups to obstruct plans to build a plant 20 miles south of Stockholm. In 1973, the Center Party had already attacked the nuclear power program, and called it a "symbol of bureaucratic centralization". However, the oil supply was interrupted in the winter of 1973/4. In 1974, a

survey suggested that around half of the Swedish population opposed the construction of nuclear energy. The government concluded that the population should be better involved in the decisions on nuclear power and initiated that the issue should be debated in "study circles", a system of study groups managed by the political parties and interest groups such as trade unions, temperance groups, and religious groups and financed with government funds. Between 1973 and 1975, the Swedish mass media took up the issue of energy policy and, according to Holmberg and Asp, were important in the opinion making process on nuclear power. The debate on nuclear energy was most heated between 1974 and 1976 with demonstrations for a referendum on nuclear power in spring 1975 and in spring 1976. In August 1976, a demonstration against the nuclear power plant in Barsebäck took place. A first political climax was reached in the so-called nuclear power election in 1976, where the Social Democratic Party lost its government majority for the first time in 44 years. The Social Democrats had difficulties with nuclear power as soon as the issue was translated into moral terms which did not fit into their traditional party ideology (Nedelmann, 1984: 1042; Sahr, 1985). However, being in power the bourgeois prime minister Fälldin had to approve that the Barsebäck reactor could operate which brought him a loss in credibility. In 1978, finally, the bourgeois government resigned because of the nuclear power issue and the next Swedish election should take place in September 1979. However, on April 4, 1979 the Harrisburg accident occurred. On the same day the Social Democrats suggested that a referendum should be held in the spring of 1980. It seems to be that the Social Democrats wanted to disconnect the nuclear power issue from general elections (Holmberg and Asp, 1984). However, also in the 1979 election, the second election in which the Social Democrats could not gain government control, nuclear energy was the most important single issue (Holmberg and Asp, 1984: 54; Gilljam and Holmberg, 1990). The heated debate went on until March 1980, when the referendum was conducted. In 1979, the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power was established. In that time the Social Democrats were eager to translate the question on nuclear energy into a question of left and right. Instead of voting for or against nuclear energy, three alternatives were presented to the Swedish people. This made it possible to translate the question into the party political logics. The conservatives and the Swedish Employers' association (SAF) stood for the line 1 which was most positive towards nuclear power. Line 3 was represented by the Communists and the Center Party and demanded a phasing-out within the next ten years. The Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and the blue collar trade union LO stood for line two. Rune Molin, member of the LO board and current industry minister was the spokesman for this line. Michele Micheletti suggests one reason for the existence of not two but three referendum alternatives:

parties; D.J.), SAF, and the Federation of Swedish Industry was out of the question. The presence of a rather large group of social democratic party sympathizers who were undecided about (or even negative to) nuclear power quite possibly also promoted the formulation of a third referendum alternative, an alternative which made the issue a question of left and right. (Micheletti, 1985: 128)

The majority for the "working-class line" 2 was as small as one can imagine. It received 39.1 percent, only .4 percent more than line 3, that was for a fast phasing-out. It was the first and, until then, only point in time that nuclear energy had a supportive majority among the Swedish people, when it was politicized (see figure 6-1). However, this marginal defeat of the alternative line against nuclear energy had fundamental consequences for the anti-nuclear power movement. Within two years, the campaign against Nuclear Power lost more than half of its membership and at a demonstration against Barsebäck in summer 1982 only 6 000 people participated (in contrast to 20 000 before in 1976) (Rubert, 1985). Although environmental issues remained important, the fight about nuclear power was settled. At the election in 1982 only two percent of the voters announced that nuclear energy is the most important issue of the election in contrast to the 26 percent of 1979. In 1985, this number even decreased to one percent and reached three percent in 1988 (Gilljam and Holmberg, 1990: 33). However, environmental issues increased steadily in this time from 6 percent in 1979 to 46 percent in 1988. In this context, it is difficult to say whether nuclear energy can be subsumed into energy political or environmental questions. Nuclear energy was revitalized in 1986, when the Chernobyl accident occurred and at the end of 1989, when the Finance Minister at that time, Kjell-Olof Feldt, initiated a debate on the phasing-out plan of nuclear energy. The reorganization of the government also shows the problems with nuclear energy today and in the foreseeable future. Brigitta Dahl, the environmental minister, was quite determined that she wanted to begin with the phasing-out in 1995. In 1988, the Swedish parliament passed the closing down plan. According to this, two plants are to be closed down between 1993 and 1996. However, organized interest groups in Sweden mobilize for a new battle on nuclear power. At their congress in September 1990, the Social Democratic Party postponed the start of the phasing-out plan and left more doubts than ever whether Sweden will have phased out of nuclear energy in 2010.

As in Sweden, the debate on nuclear energy in Germany started to become controversial in the early 1970s. Unlike Sweden the conflict began *outside* the established channels of politics. This may be one decisive reason why the German new social movements appear to be more obvious and more powerful and radical (Roth, 1985; Brand, 1985; Rucht, 1990). Anti-nuclear power movements and "citizen initiatives" expressed their disagreement by demonstrations and other means. In 1973-1974, protests consisted of a few local struggles over planned nuclear reactors. In particu-

lar, the struggle over the site of Wyhl, on the upper Rhine, was significant because a peaceful occupation of the site lasted several months. The movement gained substantial support from the local population and made the conservative county government (*Landesregierung in Baden Württemberg*) uncertain of its energy policy. The Wyhl conflict had a signal function for other grass-roots and more conventional movements. In particular, engaged scientists and clerical groups played an important role in the mobilization of the new social movements in Germany. Protest was not only directed against the individual project but rather against the state itself. In particular, left-oriented groups felt alienated by the government policy of the Social Democratic Party [8]. The citizen initiatives were considered as the only democratic expression of people's opinion by some critical groups. Others, however, saw in the trade unions the actor of change. They believed that the unions were more radical than the SPD (von Beyme, 1990: 348-360). The local demonstrations gained national attention in 1976 and 1977. The anti-nuclear power movement organized several demonstrations with thousands of participants. At Brockdorf and Grohnde, two other sites of planned nuclear plants ended in direct and violent confrontation with the police. The police was prepared to react in a paramilitary fashion (Rucht, 1990) and confirmed by doing this the hostile attitudes to state authorities. In 1977, the movement mobilized a demonstration against the construction of the fast breeder in Kalkar. The police blocked highways to prevent the protesters from gaining access to the Kalkar district.

At that time within the DGB, there were two task forces which were to coordinate the member unions' positions on energy, science and research, and environmental questions. The anti-nuclear demonstrations often delayed or obstructed the construction and production of nuclear power plants and as a result the trade unions, in fear of losing jobs, tended to oppose them. In extreme cases, the issue was described as a dichotomy between "economy and ecology". In 1976-77 the conflict grew more sharply, when employees of the nuclear-power plants and other nuclear enterprises organized a pro-nuclear-power demonstration that took place at the same time as an anti-nuclear-power demonstration.

The opinion of the unions shifted towards a more critical stance after a meeting at the Ministry of Research and Technology (*Bürgerdialog Kernenergie*) in July 1977. The DGB demanded a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal as a precondition for the further development of nuclear energy. This viewpoint was strictly opposed to by workers of firms in the nuclear energy and related sectors. In the summer of 1977, an increasing number of meetings were organized by the work councils [9] of these firms. Protest was often directed against critical voices in the Social-Liberal government, the Social Democrats and also the DGB. The peak of these

actions was reached when the central work council of a large electricity company (*Gesamtbetriebsrat der Vereinigten Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen, VEW*) organized a congress that the invited boards of several DGB unions did not attend. The DGB position was sharply opposed, and even speakers from company management received enthusiastic applause while the speaker of the DGB was met with expressions of displeasure. In fact, the very organizational existence of the DGB was endangered by the controversy over the nuclear energy issue. It seemed for a while that the work councils would establish a para-union organization (Grumbach, 1986: 200).

In a DGB meeting held in November 1977, the DGB board tried to unify the polarized groups. The official position of the union shifted towards the demands of the work councils and a debate on "*Atomfilz*" (atom nepotism) arose. This debate was initiated by an anti-nuclear power faction inside and outside the unions, which accused the unions of collaborating with capital (Mez and Wilke, 1977; Hallerbach, 1978). From the end of 1977 an organized group against nuclear power also existed in the DGB (*Aktionskreis Leben*) (Brandes, 1978: 205).

In this time, the political parties responded to the movements. The relationship was ambiguous. On the one hand, several hearings and meetings were organized that dealt with the issues of the new social movements. On the other hand, there was a warning that communist groups would undermine the aims of the movements and provoke violence. The closeness to the Communist East Germany facilitated stigmatization of left-ideology from the very beginning. As in Sweden the public hearings were considered as serving the purpose to supply the audience with information. The political elites in both countries believed that the protest against nuclear energy was based on misinterpretations of technological facts. Once these misunderstandings were solved, the further development of nuclear energy would not be obstructed anymore. However, the protest resulted in substantial delays in the construction of nuclear power plants. The protest against individual projects had its social roots more and more in alternative or counter cultures in the cities of West Germany. In these places, the movements established networks and an infra-structure that made it to a strong counter force against the established policy makers. New forms of living were exercised and local and even national newspapers facilitated the communication and dissented alternative interpretations of social events (Huber, 1980; Roth, 1985). At the same time, the environmental movement was stabilized through the institutionalization of alternative projects, scientific institutes (*Öko-Institute*), election lists and *finally* the Green party.

In April 1979, there was a hearing in Gorleben, where experts gathered to debate nuclear energy. This hearing gained enormous public attention, because the reactor

accident at Three Mile Island occurred at the same time. Pro-nuclear power experts had a difficult stand in this hearing. At the end of March, more than 100 000 people gathered for the until then largest demonstration in post-war Germany. At the same time a parliamentary expert group (*Enquete-Kommission "Zukünftige Kernenergie-Politik"*) met for the first time. The *Enquete-Kommission* had important impacts on German trade unions. The trade unions were represented in this group which, according to Grumbach (1986: 217/20) initiated important learning processes. More important in general terms was the fact that the group investigated advantages and disadvantages of both nuclear and non-nuclear "energy paths". The conclusions, although ambiguous, contained the message that a non-nuclear future would be possible and not be associated with disastrous consequences for the labor market, economy and wealth.

In 1979 and 1980, a new protest wave started against the reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf, a village in Bavaria. In this demonstration, some trade unionists and Social Democrats moved to the side of the critics. After some further demonstrations in Bonn (November 1979) and Brokdorf (January 1981), the protest against nuclear energy faded. However, the anti-nuclear movement remained alive although other ecological and social (e.g. acid rain, middle-range nuclear missiles) problems received higher priority. After the change from a social-liberal to a conservative-liberal government and the entry of the Green Party into parliament, environmental questions gained further importance. The counter-culture of the new social movements fertilized the ground for a broader eco-consciousness in the Federal Republic of Germany as one may conclude from figure 6-2. Against this background, the accident of Chernobyl triggered off a substantial re-orientation of the whole population that did not halt after the immediate influence of Chernobyl. Although the administrations in Germany did not react differently from the Swedish ones (Jahn, 1988a) [10] contradictory information spread by government authorities led to an increasing loss of credibility and the anti-nuclear movement came to live again. Dieter Rucht summarizes the effects of Chernobyl:

The nuclear industry and regulatory agencies lost much credibility, the movement was revitalized, and new strata, among them many young mothers, joined the movement. Now, the large majority of the Social Democrats, the Liberal Party and the trade unions took an anti-nuclear stance. ... Even the conservative government, at least rhetorically, now agreed that nuclear power would be viable for a transitory period of only some decades. (Rucht, 1990)

However, even before Chernobyl, the nuclear power program had reached a stalemate. No new contracts for nuclear plants were ordered and the rather surprising abandonment of the reprocessing plant by the industry for economic cost-benefit reasons added to the crisis of the nuclear industry in West Germany. Most significant for the decline of the popularity of nuclear energy are also economic crimes and ir-

regularities with the handling of atomic material in a handful of chemical firms in Hanau close to Frankfurt. It seems to be that the social consensus in favor of nuclear energy of the 1960s has turned into a social consensus against it in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, it is important to note that despite the broad anti-nuclear power coalition of the Greens, SPD, FDP, churches, etc., the CDU/FDP coalition government remains firmly pro-nuclear in terms that it supports the further use of the existing nuclear power plants during their entire life-spans (Joppke, 1990) [11]. More important than the protest waves is the different character and strategy of anti-nuclear movements in Sweden and Germany.

The Cognitive Elements and Strategies of Environmentalism

The Swedish new social movements have institutionalized the general Swedish political culture (Rubert, 1985: 201). They are pragmatic, reformative, consensus-oriented and their protest is not so much against public institutions but rather focus on specific issues. Different from Germany, new social movements in Sweden originated out of established interest groups, and so it is no wonder that the anti-nuclear protesters organized themselves as public pressure groups. In particular the youth groups of the older environmental organizations and political parties were the origin and most often also the organizational form of the Swedish new social movements (Flam, 1990; Jamison and Eyerman, 1990). In contrast, the German movements originated out of groups that are opposed to the state and its institutions in more general terms. The student movement and the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (left groups that were formed outside the parliament and mainly established in the period of the coalition government of the CDU and SPD) were the major roots for the new social movements in Germany. In so far, the term grass-roots movements is much more applicable to German than Swedish new social movements. The literature on comparative social movement research also stresses the fact of the different state responses. The early response of Swedish parties and government incorporated the environmental movement at an early stage so that the movement was not able to articulate its demands in its own terms. In Sweden in the early 1970s, two parties, the bourgeois Center Party and the Communist Party took an anti-nuclear stand. In contrast, the Green Party in Germany was needed in the early 1980s as a voice of a clear anti-nuclear stance (Rucht, 1990). Most important was the "incorporation pressure" (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990) and political response of the established organizations and in particular the labor movement [12] for the "ideology" of the Swedish movement:

More than in other countries, the movement was listened to and allowed to participate in the making of energy policy. This meant, however, that environmental movement organizations consciously narrowed

their focus ... the movement accepted the knowledge perspective and frameworks of the established political culture. (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990: 48)

In the 1980s, the authors see an even more growing institutionalization of the environmental organizations in Sweden. Instead of generating broader ideological alternatives to the established society, the movements in Sweden spread information and worked on a more pragmatic level. To be sure, elements of new politics like decentralization, limits to economic growth, etc. are also alive in the Swedish environmental movement. But they are subordinated to more technical aspects of individual issues. In this the German movements differ fundamentally. The counter-cultural milieu was built upon alternative cosmopolitical world-views that challenged the established value standards of industrial society and political institutions (Brand, 1982: 129-95; Raschke, 1987: 20-26; Offe, 1985c).

The political ideology and socio-political context also determine the political strategies of the movements. Assimilative strategies, such as lobbying, petitioning government bodies, influencing public opinion through referendum campaigns, dominate in Sweden, whereas the German anti-nuclear movement applied more confrontational strategies, such as demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, exemplified by occupations of nuclear plant sites and access roads (Kitschelt, 1986: 67-72; Joppke, 1990). All that results in that the counter culture was a more limited affair in Sweden (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990).

Trade Unions Response to the Politicization of Production

Trade unions respond to the anti-nuclear protest to a rather different degree. The whole work here can be considered as an analysis of the response of trade unions to new politics. In this section, however, I wish to stress the response to the more concrete nuclear conflict in Sweden and West Germany. As an indicator, we can relate the periods of the politicization of production to the amount of publications in the trade union newspapers [13]. The result based on inspection of table A6-1 and A6-17 is that Swedish unions respond much more directly to the politicization of the nuclear power issue than the German unions. In particular, the confederations, LO and TCO, and Metall responded quite strongly. In the middle field are SKAF, SIF and ST. The rest of the Swedish unions still have a high relation between their amount of publications and the politicization of production. Only SEF is an union which publications did not follow the public debate on nuclear energy. German unions responded much less directly. Only IGB has a score that comes close to the Swedish unions. IGD and even the DGB have a rather low correlation between the frequencies of their articles and the public debate on nuclear energy. The other DGB unions lie in the middle.

The politicization of the nuclear energy issue can take two different forms. On the one hand, the issue can be politicized because of occurrences such as accidents of nuclear plants. Examples are the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. On the other hand, the issue may be politicized in terms of a (party) political debate. Although both forms may correlate strongly with each other, the latter may be distinguished from the former. In Sweden for instance, the latter form of politicization existed at the 1976 election, the first legislation period of the bourgeois government and the referendum. In West Germany, the political debate was a major issue in 1977, 1981, and in the post-Chernobyl period.

For Sweden, we can identify two different patterns along this line. LO unions debate nuclear energy more frequently, when it is politicized in party political terms, while TCO unions give more attention to the issue at times of accidents. Most extreme is SIF in that. At the 1980 referendum, SIF published hardly more than in the annual average. However, this result is less true for the confederations although this trend is also clearly identifiable. This result again shows that LO unions are more open to the political debate than TCO unions. TCO unions, in turn, respond more strongly to current events than taking up the (party) political debate. For the DGB unions, we cannot make out a similar trend as for the Swedish unions (see tables A6-1 through A6-17).

However, qualitative impacts of the politicization of production on trade unions are more important than quantitative responses. This aspect I wish to consider in the rest of this chapter.

3. NEW POLITICS AS A CHALLENGE OF TRADE UNION IDEOLOGY

The preceding sections should have given evidence that the socio-political environment is rather different for trade unions in Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. However, I concentrated only on the politicization of production, although the general political climate also favors the policy of pragmatic Social Democracy and trade unionism in Sweden while the rather conservative general political climate works more against Social Democratic visions of creating a fair society in West Germany (Webber, 1983; Nedelmann, 1986; Hinrichs, 1988). But also the role of new politics in relation to the old cleavage structure is different in both countries. A look at the party systems in this respect is rather illuminating.

Political Parties and New Politics in Sweden and West Germany

A lot has already been said about the opinion of the political parties on nuclear energy in both countries. However, in this section, I wish to summarize the stands of the political parties, because they are relevant actors for the orientation of trade unions. In particular, the role and attitude of the Green and Social Democratic Parties has important impacts on the stand of trade unions in both countries. However, a first brief look at the political parties may be helpful in order to estimate the ideological potentials for new politics in each party system.

The Swedish party system has had a very stable structure since the 1920s (Vedung, 1988). There are two blocs: the socialist bloc consisting of the Social Democratic Party (s: *Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet*) and the Communist Party (vpk: *Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna*) and the bourgeois bloc. The bourgeois bloc consists of the conservative party (m: *Moderata Samlingspartiet*), the Liberal Party (fp: *Folkspartiet*) and the former farmer party, the Center Party (c: *Centerpartiet*). Since 1981, there exists a Green Party (mp: *Miljöpartiet de Gröna*) that succeeded in entering into the Parliament (*Riksdag*) for the first time in 1988. With the Green Party, the Swedish party system for the first time in 70 years received a new party into Parliament. The Swedish party system is characterized by the predominance of the Social Democrats which have governed since the mid 1930s only to have been interrupted between 1976 thru 1982. However, even if the Social Democrats could establish a hegemony (Heclo and Madsen, 1987), it was almost always dependent on the support of other parties. This was above all the Center Party from the 1930s until the 1960s. This "Red-Green Coalition" was the base for the creation of the Swedish welfare state. The Communist Party was also loyal to the Social Democrats when they were needed. However, the vpk never participated in a formal coalition with s. Above all, the strength of the Social Democrats in Sweden is grounded in two pillars. First, the Social Democrats were able to mobilize the support of the working-class better than in other countries and the Social Democratic reform policy created the ground for its re-election (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985). The other factor for the strength of the Social Democratic power is a function of the bourgeois party disunity (Castles, 1978). The relative power of the parties can be seen from the data of table A6-20 in the appendix.

The post-war German situation is rather a reverse case for Social Democracy. For the first time, the Conservative Party (CDU: *Christlich Demokratische Union*) united all center-right forces in Germany and became the first German catch-all party (Katzenstein, 1987: 36). The closeness to the Communist world and the support of the West-Alliance created an anti-left atmosphere, which put the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) on the defense from the very beginning.

The Liberal Party (FDP) beside the CSU (the conservative complement of the CDU in Bavaria) has been in Parliament since the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Conservative Party was in power from 1949 thru 1969. The last legislation in a coalition government with the SPD. From 1969 thru 1982 the SPD and FDP formed a government coalition. In 1982, the Liberal Party changed over to a coalition with the CDU/CSU which has remained the government for the rest of the analyzed period here. In 1983, the Green Party (*Die Grünen*) changed the stable German party system. Its first electoral success was repeated at the general election in 1987. Also in state elections (*Länderwahlen*) the Greens could enter into the parliaments and they are today an additional political force in Germany. About the electoral strength of the individual parties consult table A6-21 in the appendix.

In broad terms, there are two political dimensions which are relevant in the context of new politics (Vedung, 1980; Cotgrove, 1982: 112-4). On the one hand, the parties differ in their left/right ideology and, on the other hand, there are differences in the dimension of new and productionist politics. Although precise measures are missing, there are some analytical and empirical works done in both countries.

In Sweden the analysis of the left/right placement has a long tradition (Särilvik, 1974). Political parties are placed on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). According to this measure, recent empirical investigations (Holmberg, 1989b) come to the following results. Figure 6-3 shows the positions of the six parties which are in the Swedish parliament on a left/right scale. Over the last decade, there have been no substantial changes with the exception of the Center Party (c) and Liberal Party (fp) which changed positions several times and that there was a slight shift to the right of the whole party system. However, for our purpose it is sufficient to estimate the ideological position in relative terms. For West Germany, I have to rely on data from 1979 for the SPD, FDP, CDU and CSU (Schmitt, 1987: 113-25).

For both Social Democratic parties, we come to amazingly similar results. The German SPD scored 3.6 in 1978/9 and the Swedish (s) 3.4 in 1979 (and 3.8 in 1988 indicating a shift to the right). We can also see that the Communist party (vpk) occupies the left spectrum in Sweden. The Social Democratic Party (s) stands in the middle between the vpk and the bourgeois parties. The *Miljöpartiet de Gröna* (mp) can be placed left of the bourgeois parties but right of the Socialist bloc. The left/right placement of delegates of the German *Die Grünen* differ fundamentally from their Swedish counterpart as data from 1985 suggest (Poguntke, 1989a: 329). The Green Party in Germany is clearly left of the established political parties. Its mean scores 2.5 and comes close to the left score of the self-placement of vpk party elites

(1.8) in Sweden and differs fundamentally from the score of 4.2 in 1988 for the Swedish Greens.

Figure 6-3: The Swedish and West German Political Parties on a Left-Right Scale.



Explanations: Abbreviations are the same as usual except G = Die Grünen.

Already the placement on the left right dimension gives doubts about the similarities of the Swedish and German Green Parties as has often been suggested (Poguntke, 1989a and 1989b; Kitschelt, 1986b and 1988). It seems that the Swedish Green party has more of the characteristics of a "pure green reformist party" and the German Greens come closer to the "alternative green radical parties" as suggested by Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. He points out that green parties may be classified into two different types:

- *pure green reformist parties* that do not reject free economic enterprise. These parties prefer to select genuine ecology issues that do not bring them deeply into policy conflict with the established parties over the social welfare state and foreign policy. In terms of coalition stands, the reformist greens seek an alliance with social democratic parties rather than with radical new left parties. Among these parties are the greens in Belgium, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, and France.

- *alternative green radical parties* that seek fundamental changes in social and political institutions and stand for a new alternative, social-radical, democratic paradigm. Most of these parties reject a coalition formation with social democrats. Rather, they seek alliances with radical new left parties. Among them are the green parties in the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg, and Austria. (1985b: 491).

This has fundamental consequences. In the beginning of the 1980s the German Green party was the first possibility for the more radical German left to identify with a political party for more than two decades. In Sweden, this was always possible within the vpk or even the Social Democrats. The conclusion of Jamison and Eyerman is therefore plausible that:

... the Swedish Greens have little of the influence from the new left that has characterized the Green parties in some of the other European countries, in particular West Germany. Instead, most new leftists who have stayed active in politics have tended to gravitate to the social democrats. (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990: 55)


On the productionist/new politics dimension, it is more difficult to find data for the German parties. We can take for granted that the Green party is most radical in their positive stand on new politics. A study on "new politics in old parties" (Schmitt, 1987) comes to the conclusion that the SPD is most open to new politics among all the established parties in West Germany. In particular the "ideological" wing - in

contrast to the pragmatic "trade union" wing - is most open for new politics concerns. The trend suggested by data from the end of the 1970s may be reinforced by recent changes in the party's board. The Liberal FDP is also open for new politics, but it is split between "economic liberalism" and "citizen liberalism". Within limits the CDU is also open for new politics, but to a lesser degree. The CDU is split between more ecological openness of its "social religious" wing and a reluctant "law and order" faction. The only party that adopted no elements of new politics is the Bavarian CSU. In Sweden we can again make use of the 1988 election study survey. On a scale from 0 (no green elements) to 10 (strong green elements) Mikael Gilljam and Sören Holmberg placed the Swedish political parties (see also Bennulf and Holmberg, 1990). The Greens score highest (8.35) followed by vpk (7.06) and c (7.01). All these parties can be called the soft parties. They all gained votes in the 1988 election which has been called the "environmental election" (Bennulf and Holmberg, 1990; Esaiasson, 1990). Then there is a gap until the s (5.29) and fp (4.36) follows. Relatively non-affected by green concerns is the Conservative Party m (2.42) in Sweden. As in Germany, there has been a shift towards environmental policy in Sweden. The Swedish Social Democrats also suffer from the split between a "trade unionist" wing that gives priority to material security and an "environmental" wing which places on ecological issues. In particular, the Environment Minister, Brigitta Dahl, stands for the environmental open faction in the Social Democratic Party. The recent cabinet change and the integration of the nuclear energy issue into the industry ministry may be a compromise that benefits the trade union wing. However, the SAP has suffered from fundamental vote losses in strata that favor a more eco-conscious policy. It will be interesting to see in which direction the Social Democrats will move to in the nearest future. The Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, similar to the leader of Liberal Party Bengt Westerberg and the leader of the Conservative Party Carl Bildt stand for pragmatic technocratic types of leadership, attuned to the mass media and enamored by high-tech future.

All in all, there is a clear relation between left and new politics and right and productionist politics [14]. The important difference between the Green Parties in both countries is the fact that the German Green Party closed a substantial vacuum within the German party system. It could create a distinctive political image as a progressive *left party*, on the one hand, and as an *ecological party*, on the other. Although the established political parties in Sweden failed in terms of their "material-growth" politics [15] and by doing so produced one major cause for the foundation of the Swedish Green Party, the Swedish Greens had difficulties in occupying a genuine political niche in the Swedish party system. The vpk and s filled the left ideological spectrum which is so important for the German Greens. The new politics ideology was also covered by vpk and c. However, the ecological stand of the left vpk and the bourgeois c was subordinated to traditional left and conservative values. Therefore it

is wrong to conclude that the Center Party would be a postmaterial party (Kitschelt, 1986b). As Frauke Rubert (1985) points out the ecological policy of vpk and c never challenged fundamentally the industrial system. Also in the referendum campaign these two established parties harmed the development of grass-roots initiatives (Flam, 1990: 49-56) and the Swedish Greens have to compete with these two parties:

Figure 6-4: The Swedish and West German Party System on a Left/Right and New/Productionist Politics Dimension



... the Environmentalist party was exposed to tough competition on its own home turf, the field of ecological concern. That the Center party and, to a lesser extent the Communist party would marshal all their strength to fight the threat posed by the "green" challengers could not have come as a surprise. More astonishing was the strong competition from the Christian Democrats [a small party not represented in parliament; D.J.], which in the campaign came out as astute advocates of a clean and pristine environment. The Environmentalist party, consequently, had obvious difficulties in finding a philosophical niche it could claim as its own. (Vedung, 1988: 106)

This may also be one reason why the Swedish Greens came much later and with less electoral support into the Swedish parliament than the German Greens. In conclusion: the Swedish Green party stands only on the ecological leg while the German Greens have, in addition, a progressive left image.

The situation for the two Social Democratic parties is also different. The Swedish s was most of the time in the government and when it failed, it failed to a large degree because of a new politics issue. The official policy of the SPD under the chancellor-

ship of Helmut Schmidt was also rather opposed to the new social movements and the Green Party. The shift towards a more ecological view was mainly conducted in the time when the SPD was in opposition. Needless to say that large parties such as the Social Democratic parties in Sweden and West Germany have almost always had factions that were from the very beginning more open to environmental concerns. Only in recent years, the Swedish Social Democrats attempt to conduct a more convincing environmental policy because of the threat of enormous potential vote losses. However, as described above, this revitalizes the old conflicts in particular concerning the nuclear energy issue and it seems that the old politics faction could gain ground at the latest congress of the Social Democratic Party.

The Green Ideology Challenging Trade Unions

It seems fair to say that the Swedish political environment does not have many incentives which may initiate a change within trade unions towards new politics. From that point of view, the policy of GF and ST seems to be rather surprising and exceptional. The political environment may also explain why the German trade unions are much more effected by the new politics. Ecological issues are important in Sweden. However, they do not have the character of a counter-culture, but are rather managed on the elite level (Bennulf and Holmberg, 1990). Therefore, environmental issues do not create conflicting cleavages to the same extent as in Germany.

The political environment has not only an impact on the formation of Green parties but also influences the politics of other political organizations. Green party vote may be one indicator for the degree to which the labor movement's ideology competes with the new politics ideology. For the Federal Republic of Germany Paul Windolf and Joachim Haas conclude:

The new "cleavage" which split the political landscape on the left in West Germany also penetrated union membership. The ideological challenge of the "Green" members is likely to gain momentum in the near future. One way or another the unions will have to respond to new demands if they want to keep their members. (Windolf and Haas, 1989: 158)

LO has less problems concerning the competitive influence of an alternative ideology, because it has a clear political ideology to offer. Fair and equal pay in form of solidaric wage policy is a leading and so far successful political ideology (Meidner and Hedborg, 1984; Swenson, 1989). LO can motivate its members not only by effective work-place and collective bargaining representation but also by an ideological commitment (Swenson, 1989). One can say that LO is able to fill the room of a political ideology. This is not the case for TCO and DGB. Both unions leave an ideological vacuum. However, the two organizations deal with it in substantively different ways.

TCO does not offer an independent ideological stand. Either it refers to work-place issues in a rather technocratic manner and appeals to individual cost-benefit calculations or it copies - in a slightly different and less party-ideological profiled way - the LO ideology (Nilsson, 1985). TCO may be highly effective in work-place matters, but it can not bind its members by means of its own ideology [16]. That may also be one answer to the question why TCO comes into trouble when issues leave the technical level and get politicized. The ideology of the DGB unions suffers from the hegemony of a rather conservative state and legislative constraints of a dual labor market. This also leads to it that it can not handle its own tasks as successfully as LO. This, in turn, may have reinforced or even created the intra-organizational division as Peter Swenson (1989) points out much more elaborately than I can do here. The ideological vacuum cannot only be explained as a consequence of corporatist politics (Streeck, 1981: 450). If this hypothesis was correct, Swedish unions would have at least as many problems with their ideology as German unions. However, as Wolfgang Streeck points out correctly DGB unions are challenged by *different* ideologies. The green ideology is just one that competes with pragmatic Social Democratic, social-religious, selective work-place (power of work councils), etc. ideologies. In sharp contrast to TCO, activist trade unionism in Germany *intends* to be ideological. And the advantage of the Green ideology in the form it has taken in Germany may be that it provides an alternative utopia which is attractive for certain trade unions. This is not so surprising as Peter Swenson believes when he concludes: "Astonishingly, IG Metall moved towards the view that Germany should consider bidding "farewell to the growth-society [*Abschied von der Wachstumsgesellschaft*]." (Swenson: 1989: 218) In so far, one can interpret the re-orientation of some DGB unions towards a more sympathetic relation with Green groups as the beginning of the formation of a new alliance between two social progressive ideologies. This alliance may be a hope for the German left. Although the Swedish left is much stronger out of its own power position and policy outcomes, it needs - as many analysts suggest (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Swenson, 1989: 231) - new social alliances with elements of the new middle class. Of course, different elements of the new middle class lead to different alliances and priorities (Offe, 1985c). In terms of new and productionist politics, it can be closer to either the one or the other side. However, it will be difficult to compromise these two groups of the new middle class. In particular when trade unions still wish to maintain the compromise with capital only the more productionist oriented middle class is available for trade unions.

The results of this chapter may also be interpreted in light of institutionalization and resource dependence theory. In this view, the impact of the organizational environment on the cognitive process of trade union organization becomes relevant. For

instance the strong energy use of Swedish society can almost be seen as "cultural". The ten times higher increase rate of energy requirement in comparison to the Federal Republic of Germany over the last 20 years may be just one quantitative indicator. Safe energy supply is important in both countries. But the debate in Sweden still contains statements of the kind that without nuclear energy Swedish society would fall into misery, with high unemployment rates and a low living-standard. This way of arguing is rather outmoded in Germany, while it was frequently used in the 1970s it seemed to have disappeared in the 1980s. In view of the low energy increase in Germany, these horror pictures of energy shortages became obsolete. These national differences are institutionalized into the views of the argumentation of trade unions in both countries. Swedish unions stress more the productionist aspects of energy policy, while German unions place less stress on productionist aspects. However, this conclusion is only true in relative terms and needs to be modified by organizational factors as outlined in the chapters above.

The institutionalization of (energy) world views within trade unions is influenced by the socio-political environment. The "alternative" interpretations of an "economic growth society" became established in Germany, although it is certainly too much to say that they are dominant. The Swedish movements and Green Party dissented more technocratic and pragmatic world views which have a lower profile and are therefore less powerful as alternatives to the existing productionist ones. One of the consequences is that the world view expressed by the alternative movement in Sweden is less likely to be institutionalized in trade union policy than in Germany. The lower level in organization environmental variation (in terms of evolution theory of organizations) in Sweden leads to it that alternatives appear to be meaningless or even unthinkable (Zucker, 1977 and 1987). The high ideological commitment to pragmatic Social Democracy of LO unions may lead to a unresponsiveness to ecological issues and values in terms of new politics. At the first look, that may not be so important for LO unions because they are buffered from alternative world views through their own ideology, character of the membership, and the pragmatic communication procedures. However, it can have an indirect effect. The Swedish labor movement is made by the Social Democratic Party and the blue collar trade unions. If the party needs to revise their politics, because they want to attract parts of the new middle class that favor ecological issues more than the productionist attitudes of most trade unionists, the latter could become a substantial obstacle. Although this danger seems not to be so presently acute, it can rapidly change when electoral fortune fades.

German unions institutionalized alternative world views to a larger degree than most of the Swedish unions. However, this was not only promoted by the general values

in society but also because the Green movement in Germany occupied an ideological resource which is valuable for the labor movement in the Federal Republic of Germany. This challenge affected trade unions in Germany in a fundamental way.

4. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the focus was on the organization environmental impact on trade unions' perception of new and productionist politics. Although it turned out that economic and energy political factors do not have a very strong *direct* impact on trade union policy (A5); it should be recalled that these factors are very important in the argumentation of trade unions. That means that they are *indirectly* relevant for the perception of new politics (B3). However, the debate on nuclear energy is a symbolic struggle in industrial society (Gamson, 1988). This struggle seems to be much more pronounced in German society than in the Swedish. In particular the different characters of the new social movements and the Green parties have the strongest organization environmental impact on trade union policy in both countries.

The results give also some evidence for the interpretation of the tradition of institutionalization and resource dependence theory (B3 and B4). Factions within the trade unions were attracted by the non-material values and used the ideological resource of the new social movements and the Green party within the trade union. This resource is much more available in Germany than in Sweden where the new politics movement is less ideological. German trade unions are challenged by the Green ideology, in contrast to Swedish unions. Helpful for the process of institutionalization of new politics in German unions was also the fact that the German Social Democrats were not in government position. This facilitated the experimenting with alternative world-views. In particular, LO and its unions formulated their own ideology which is based on pragmatic Social Democracy. This ideology is historically manifested and takes the form of a "Social Democratic hegemony". The function of this closed ideological milieu of Swedish blue collar trade unionism is a relatively unresponsiveness to ideological trends that do not obey to the logic of the established ideology. As a consequence, resource dependence theory contributes much less explanation for LO than for the DGB unions. TCO unions buffer themselves from the influence of the organization environment through a non-ideological stand. TCO tends therefore much more to symbolic policy. This fact is clearly expressed by the behavior of the TCO trade union newspapers which publish articles in agreement with trends in the public opinion which, however, have little to do with congressional stands of TCO unions. On the socio political level, we can conclude that the pragmatic political culture in Sweden makes it difficult for elements of new politics to be adopted (B3b). In contrast, the conflict culture in Germany seems to be more open to

new politics in the end (B3c). However, German political outcomes are based on conflict and different power distribution. This may alter when power relations change. Swedish political outcomes are based on consensus. As a consequence, changing power distribution do not challenge political outcomes as they do in Germany. As a conclusion, we can say that the environmental impacts are essential for the adoption of new politics in trade unions but that they are heavily filtered through intra-organizational factors.

Footnotes:

1 In 1989, four of the six planned reactors were in operation. The two remaining are still planned. In 1989, the share of nuclear electricity increased to 34 percent in Germany and almost 47 percent in Sweden (Hoffman, 1990: 153). For the near future, one expects that Germany will increase the share of nuclear energy slightly while the Swedish program will stagnate (Economic Commission for Europe, 1989).

2 Sören Holmberg (1989a: 73/4) points out that about two-thirds of the Swedish parliament members have expressed their belief that nuclear energy will be phased out in 2010, but around 70 percent of the population does not believe that the phasing-out plan will be conducted as announced.

3 The correlation between the increase rates of energy requirement and new and productionist politics is rather low. It never exceeds $r = .55$ (highest values for SEF and ST .55 and .53 respectively) and the average of the absolute r is around .27. It is .21 for DGB and .26 for LO unions. TCO unions score higher (.40). SIF and SKTF in the predicted direction, i.e. the higher the energy requirement the more productionist statements, and TCO and ST in the other direction. The correlation is often positive indicating that a high energy requirement comes together with a preference of elements of new politics. Time correlates even higher (average of absolute $r = .32$). However this is rather different for German (.43) and Swedish unions (.24).

4 All other correlations between the GNP and unemployment rate were rather low in Sweden (average of absolute $r = .28$ and $r = .18$ respectively). The average of the absolute r with consumer price increase is .45. It was highest for TCO: $r = -.72$; SF: $r = -.61$; Metall: $r = -.60$; SKAF: $r = -.47$; ST: $r = -.45$; and SEF: $r = -.42$. The correlation did not increase when taking the misery index (sum of the unemployment rate and inflation) as dependent variable.

5 The average of the absolute r is .27. It is only higher for IGD (-.58) and IGM (-.51). However, there is a moderate correlation between the rate of unemployment and the assessment of new and productionist politics (average of absolute $r = .40$). However, this correlation is positive indicating that a high rate of unemployment goes together with a preference of elements of new politics. Since the unemployment rate increased fundamentally in the 1980s when the German unions re-evaluated its politics it is better to conclude that this reorientation was initiated by socio-political than economic factors.

6 The same trend is also confirmed by media analysis in West Germany. Hans Mathias Kepplinger (1988) points out that the German media shifted from a positive evaluation towards a negative one of nuclear energy already in the mid-1970s long before the substantial nuclear accidents happened.

7 More detailed analysis on new social movements and the anti-nuclear movements see for instance for Sweden: Nelkin and Pollak, 1977; Rubert, 1985; Sahr, 1985; Flam, 1990; Jamison and Eyerman, 1990. West Germany: Roth, 1985; Brand et al., 1986; Roth and Rucht, 1987; von Oppeln, 1989; Joppke, 1990; Rucht, 1990. For a comparison of Sweden and Germany see Kitschelt, 1983 and 1986a. The conclusions of this section have been taken mainly from the mentioned literature.

8 A case in point may be the introduction of the *Radikalerlaß* (a law that did not allow citizens that are organized in extreme left or right groups to work in the public sector) by the first Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt. In practice this law is mainly applied to left ideological individuals and much less to people from the right wing.

9 *Betriebsräte*: worker interest groups in the firms which are not formally affiliated with the unions.

10 However, because of the centralized organization of Swedish authorities it could not happen that authorities announced contradictory evaluations and recommendations as some county governments and authorities did in Germany. However, the information itself released by the government was also in Sweden contradictory aimed to calm down the population (Anér, 1986).

11 It is also important to consider that this anti-nuclear power coalition is not so coherent as it seems from the description. For instance, factions of the SPD are more positive towards nuclear energy than others. They may also be prepared to compromise the ten-year moratorium scenario of the party congress in Nürnberg in 1986. Also the Greens and the anti-nuclear movement may have wings

that are more open for compromises in the question of nuclear energy in the way that they do not support the immediate phasing-out demand of more radical wings (Joppke, 1990). However, the overall picture, particularly in comparison to Sweden, is anti-nuclear in Germany.

12 Jamison and Eyerman stress this fact: "Finally - and perhaps most significantly of all - the environmental movement, almost from the moment that it first emerged in Sweden, was subject to counter attack and incorporation pressures from extremely powerful and well-organized "old" social movements of the working-class." (Jamison and Eyerman, 1990: 35). This led to it that the movement seldom could take the initiative but rather had to react. The parliamentary and administrative incorporation functioned as a constant constrain and demobilization factor during the 1970s. Furthermore, the ideological response of the left split the movement into several groups.

13 The independent variable has been summarized on an ordinal scale reaching from 1 (no politicization) to 4 (fundamental politicization). The estimations are taken from the reviewed literature in the preceding sections. The degree of politicization are the following:

	Sweden	FRG
1973	1	1
1974	3	1
1975	3	2
1976	4	4
1977	4	4
1978	4	3
1979	4	4
1980	4	3
1981	1	4
1982	1	2
1983	1	1
1984	1	1
1985	1	1
1986	4	4
1987	2	3
1988	2	3
1989	2	3

14 The figure is deduced from the data and literature mentioned in the text. However, slight modifications have been made. This concerns mainly the German parties since the German survey dates from the time of the government coalition of the SPD and FDP. Therefore, the FDP is placed slightly to the right of the political middle and not as the data suggest more to the left. The new/productionist politics placement of the German parties is an estimation deduced from the mentioned literature. It is important to note that parties are not as coherent as the figure may suggest (Schmitt, 1987).

15 The material growth failure of the established parties is described by Evert Vedung:

The material-growth failure of the political system, combined with the failure of the Center party to halt nuclear power and the failure to dismiss the issue once and for all in the 1980 national referendum, created the condition necessary for the emergence of an ardently anti-nuclear, anti-growth, proecological, prosmall-scale and decentralist Environmentalist party in September 1981. (Vedung, 1988: 99)

16 This impression is easily confirmed by looking at the eye-catching publications to several aspects of the working life by TCO and its unions. A comparison of the unions' headquarters is also illuminating. In contrast to the DGB and LO headquarters, the TCO headquarter reminds more of a enterprise of a service organization than of a trade union office. That the physical image of an organization is an important indicator for organizational behavior has been stressed by Jeffrey Pfeffer (1982: chapter eight).

CONCLUSION

The findings of this investigation are rather surprising in respect to trade unionism and the political opportunities for new politics in Sweden and Germany. Although scholars of trade union research emphasize the similarity of the trade union systems in Sweden and Germany (e.g.: Clegg, 1976; Taylor, 1989; Martin, 1989; Gourevitch, et al, 1984; Cella and Treu, 1987), both countries fundamentally differ in their trade union policy when, it comes to new politics. Not only is the outcome opposing but also the whole self-image of trade unions concerning political questions is different. Swedish unions come close to Selig Perlman's idea of pragmatic unionism. German unions are much more political in the sense that they debate societal issues within the trade union which are not directly connected to the basic union tasks.

The *second* surprising finding has to do with the political consequences of this investigation. Although these interpretations are partly speculative, they are supported by most recent findings in the field. The responsiveness of the Swedish political system to new demands, which some authors connected with a detachment of productionist politics (Kitschelt, 1983; 1986a), cannot be confirmed on the organizational level when considering trade unions. The hypothesis formulated in the same context that institutional structure in Germany was closed must be rejected from the findings of my analysis. The consequences of the findings will be discussed in respect to political alliances in section two and implication for representative democracy in section three. Before, however, I wish to summarize the major variables and their relation to each other according to the adoption of elements of new politics by the analyzed trade unions.

1. TRADE UNIONS AND NEW POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY

The findings of this investigation indicate that it is a difficult process for trade unions to adopt elements of new politics. More surprising is that some unions are rather open for new politics. This should not be mistaken that trade unions may be at the forefront of new politics, but that some unions are somewhat able to open their policy to new political demands. By and large Swedish trade unions are not very responsive to new politics. Either they favor productionist politics - most common among LO unions - or they aim to avoid the issue - most common among TCO unions (see also figure 3-1). The only exceptions are the printer union GF from LO and ST from TCO. While it is the exception that a Swedish union has adopted elements of new politics, many German unions are faced with the new cleavage of new and productionist politics. This cleavage, however, reinforces first of all the ideological differences between German unions. Representatives of productionist unions in Germany are IGC and IGB. However, there are more trade unions in Germany which have

similar attitudes. All other *analyzed* unions adopted elements of new politics into their official policies. Only German unions and GF institutionalized new politics in the way that they integrated substantial amounts of new politics and simultaneously "unlearned" productionist politics. These unions are: IGM, IGD, HBV and GEW. ÖTV and the DGB joined this group only after the reactor accident at Chernobyl. They, as does ST, have still productionist world views in their political statements. The adoption of new politics was a lengthy process (proposition B5). In the 1970s between most of the "new politics unions" was a dividing line between a productionist leadership and a part of the more critical membership. This dividing line diminished, when these unions moved away from productionist politics. However, what are the major organizational features of trade unions which adopted elements of new politics?

In order to single out the major important variables I wish to apply the *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA) [1]. I included the most important variables into the analysis which can be easily measured in a dichotomized form (a condition for QCA) and which might have an impact on the adoption of elements of new politics. These variables are: membership characteristic, task environment, organizational structure, organizational potential, organizational conflict, organizational communication, ideology, and countries. The result of this analysis is that the eight trade unions which adopted elements of new politics can be classified into four types. Three aspects are *necessary* for the adoption of elements of new politics by the analyzed trade unions: *first*, the organizations need to enact elements of new politics, i.e. there must be an organizational potential for new politics. *Second*, the issue must be debated in a complex or dialogical manner. *Third*, the ideology of the trade union must be supportive for elements of new politics. These three factors are present in *all* trade unions that adopted elements of new politics.

The most frequent type of unions that adopted elements of new politics in addition to the necessary features also has the following characteristics: organizational conflict and they are German. 63 percent or five cases match this type (note that there are multiple classifications). These unions are the DGB, IGM, ÖTV, HBV, and IGD. The next most frequent type (38 percent) has the following characteristics (beside the necessary ones): latent membership potential (membership characteristic), not organized in the (nuclear) energy sector, and is German. Unions that belong into this category are the DGB [2], HBV, and GEW. The third type of union that adopted elements of new politics has also a latent membership potential, organizes in the energy sector, is not centralized, and experienced intra-organizational conflict. Unions in this category are the DGB and ST. Finally there is GF that has no membership potential, does not organize in the (nuclear) energy sector, is not centralized, has no organizational conflict and is Swedish.

Another way of presenting a summary of the findings confirms the result that organizational potential, communication and ideology are the decisive variables. This presentation relies also on the dichotomized variables and shows the percentage value to which the relations are confirmed by the analyzed trade unions. For instance, the relation between the three necessary variables and the adoption of new politics corresponds in 95 percent of the cases (only one case did not match in each instance). This strikingly confirms the propositions: B1, B2, and B7. Taking as a threshold value 75 percent also organizational conflict (B6) and the country is important for the adoption of new politics by trade unions [3]. For Germany the resource dependence proposition (B4) explains a lot. Particularly in connection with the impact of the different institutional environments, proposition B3 is plausible for both countries. In contrast, up and downs of the national economies have only little impact on union stands on new and productionist politics (A5).


Most surprising is the fact that the character of the membership (A1) matches only in about half of the cases. The task environment (energy sector; A4) matches with the outcome variable in three-quarters of the cases. However, this relation diminishes to 57 percent, when we consider unions which adopted new politics. And also the organizational structures seem to have little effect on the political outcome (A7), although there are some indicators that organizational size and structural differentiation promote the adoption of new politics (A8).

However, all variables may not have a direct influence on the adoption of new politics but may influence and reinforce other variables. Figure 1 aims to summarize these relations.

The socio-political environment has an impact on both the union membership and the union ideology. The higher the degree of the politicization of production the higher the protest potential of union members. This in turn is very much dependent on the character of the membership. White collar workers in the public sector are most critical of the productionist development in society (latent membership potential). All unions with this kind of membership experienced a voiced membership protest either in their organization or at confederation congresses. On the other hand, the socio-political environment has an substantial effect on the trade union ideology. However, this impact is much stronger in Germany, where Green ideology is a challenge for trade union ideology. Swedish blue collar unions are resistant to this challenge, because they do not need the resource "ideology" to the same degree as their German counterparts. TCO unions buffer their organization through entering (organizational potential) and communication filters that aim at non-decision-making

(A6). TCO unions, however, are fundamentally challenged when political issues exceed their pragmatic-neutral policy.

Figure 1.: Major Relationships of Most Important Variables



Membership characteristics and union ideology have an impact on the organizational potential for new politics. The organizational potential, i.e. the degree to which nuclear energy is debated in terms of new and productionist politics *within* the union organization, is at its highest in white collar unions and/or above all in activist trade unions. Both factors may contradict their impact on the organizational potential for new politics. So it happens that unions with a membership potential have no organizational potential because of the union's ideological stand. Examples for this are SKTF, SL, and SF. But, as in the case for IGM, IGD, and GF missing membership potential is counter-balanced by the union ideology. A strong organizational filter is the kind of intra-organizational communication. This intervening variable is closely related to union ideology. Activist unions or unions which are also critical of the productionist development of society in other areas allow a complex intra-organizational communication, while devoted Social Democratic (LO unions) and non-political trade unions (TCO unions) limit their intra-organizational communication to pragmatic aspects of an issue. In fact, only TCO is an exception. This exceptional situation oc-

curred through profound membership pressure at the union congress in 1979. However, TCO was able to limit the union policy again to the basic trade union issues.

In this context, it needs to be mentioned that *situations* can have a profound impact on political outcomes. As Marsh and Olsen (1976) suggest, organizations can be "garbage cans" where individual priorities use situations for desired decisions. This is in particular true for organizations that have no clearly defined organizational goal. Unions with an unclear goal came into trouble when the nuclear power issue was politicized, as in the case of the reactor accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. In this sense, the German activist and the Swedish neutral unions both have an unclear defined goal. The former because the goal of a trade union is deduced from a socially progressive ideology that aims not only to improve the material status of employees, but also to provide an utopia for a better society. In this perception, trade union activity is not limited to work-place issues. However, these goals are not the same for all members. One may conclude that the more issues are relevant to union policy the higher the probability that the membership is diversified on some of the issues. In this situation conflict between different factions arises that may be aired through different issues. On the other hand, ideological neutral unions have no reference point for what they should stand for, if they leave the genuine trade union task. Workers' interest is not clearly defined and in a situation of uncertainty, no guidelines are available. As the *garbage can* model suggests, these kinds of organizations tend to become organized anarchies in which decisions are taken by chance and determined by situations. In this view, problems are attached to solutions and participants struggle for control over organizational goals. The congresses of TCO and ST, about the time of the Three Mile Island accident, the DGB and, to some extent, IGD in 1986 are cases in point to illustrate just this. The communication got out of hand. Aspects which do not belong to the traditional trade unions policy emerged at the congressional decisions. Leadership and procedures were challenged. Decisions were influenced by chance. However, the outcome of the decision was less clear for German trade unions, because here two intra-union factions are well established. They possess more resources and an infra-structure, when problems appeal to the solutions of one of these groups. In TCO the intra-organizational protest was not institutionalized. Through its non-political procedures, TCO never established politically diverse intra-organizational groups. So when it came to protest in TCO, no infra-structure existed to voice deviant opinions in an effective manner. The board of TCO was able to overrule the protest and succeeded in limiting union policy to non-political aspects. LO, and also SEF, gives evidence for the garbage can argument from the opposite point of view. Both unions also had their congress approximately half a year after Chernobyl. Both union organizations did not suffer any fundamental intra-organizational conflict. It was even so that new politics arguments

were hardly mentioned at all in this situation. This shows that these two unions have no intra-organizational factions in respect to new politics because their union goal is clear.

Intra-organizational *conflict* is also highly determined by the character of the union membership and above all union ideology. Both variables are mediated by the organizational level of communication. With the exception of IGC, no union suffered from organizational conflict that applied a pragmatic communication. However, conflict must not be disadvantageous for an organization. As Karl Weick (1979: 220/1) points out conflict is a mean to remain responsive to organization environmental change.

Another important aspect that influences intra-organizational fragmentation has to do with the organization principles of employees. The separation of blue and white collar workers into two different organizations has consequences which can be explained within organization theory (A2; A3). Through a loose coupling, organizations can be sheltered from substantial problems (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1986; Weick, 1976). In empirical terms, this means that member groups which antagonize issues are organized in different organizations. Here again Swedish unions are in a privileged position. White and blue collar workers are organized in different confederations and in addition they are organized in smaller more coherent units (trade unions). A rough indicator for that is the number of trade unions. Except smaller union confederations, the DGB organizes its members in 17 (since 1989 16) union organizations. In Sweden, LO and TCO alone come to more than 40 individual trade unions and an inclusion of SACO/SR unions brings this number to over 60. According to Charles Perrow (1984 and 1986) linear (here: homogeneous membership or pragmatic communication) and loosely coupled systems are less endangered by disturbances than complex and closely coupled systems. This interpretation is also applicable to the differences of the degree and status of conflict between new and productionist politics in Swedish and German trade unions. In so far proposition A2 and A3 contribute to the understanding of intra-organizational conflict. However, loose coupling of competing interests has also consequences for society as a whole. To this point I wish to come back in the last section of the conclusion.

Most surprising is the fact that variables deduced from structural contingency theory are not as determining as expected. Membership potential (white collar workers in non-productive sectors) and the task environment (energy sector) is not essential for an union stand on new politics. Three (without the DGB) of the eight unions that adopted elements of new politics organize sectors that have to do with (nuclear) energy.

Variables deduced from alternative organization theoretical approaches are more essential: organizational potential, communication and ideology are indispensable variables for the adoption of new politics. Intra-organizational conflict is also an important feature of this process. Only GF and GEW had no intra-organizational conflict of those unions which adopted elements of new politics. This leads to the conclusion that adopting elements of new politics is a social process.

What do the results have to do with the policy of the labor movement and the development of new politics in both countries?

2. THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL ALLIANCES

As outlined in chapter one, the labor movement may form an alliance either with elements of the political right or with elements of new social movements. In both groups, the elements of the new middle class are crucial. Gösta Esping-Andersen (1985: 313) stresses that "... the rising new middle strata of white-collar and technical employees now occupy center stage and will determine whether social democracy can renew itself for a new era of mobilization of power." However, it is important to keep in mind that the new middle class is a very heterogeneous group. As we could see from figure 1-1 in chapter one, elements of the new middle class are present in both social units that might form potential alliances with the labour movement. Chapter four strikingly demonstrated that the new middle class is strongly divided concerning their preference of new and productionist politics. This cleavage within the new middle class implies fundamental restrictions for class alliances for the labor movement. Potential alliances depend on an essential degree on the stand the labor movement takes in this respect. In particular the role of trade unions are important in this context, since they are by tradition close to material concerns of their members. The preference of productionist politics of trade unions may facilitate the option to form an alliance with elements of the middle class at the Right. Not considering the arch-conservative part of this group, the majority of this new middle class segment, which might be a potential alliance partner for the labor movement, is devoted to liberal values of competitiveness and individual freedom on the ground of productionist politics. In contrast to this possibility, the preference of elements of new politics by trade unions opens the possibility to form a new alliance with segments of the new middle class which are close to values of environmental protection, etc. This kind of alliance implies a fundamental challenge to the continuation of the established development of industrial society.

The results of this study suggest that the economic growth consensus is not challenged in a fundamental way in Sweden as it is in Germany. Trade unions in Sweden are actors of stability in this respect. They prefer the continuation of quantitative economic growth. However, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden has problems in keeping its electorate. In consideration of this, it attempts to appeal to members of society that favor elements of new politics. This may have spill-over effects on trade unions. However, more promising for the Swedish labor movement is an alliance with liberal forces. Liberals in Sweden support a lot of elements of the Swedish welfare state and go along with the pragmatic Social Democrats which proclaim that an increasing economic growth is necessary for social reforms. An alliance with the Liberals would also have the advantage for the Social Democratic Party not to confront the productionist policy of the trade union movement. In Germany, the political situation is different. The Green ideology challenges the Social Democratic ideology. Both ideologies have much in common and therefore an alliance between "red" and "green" is within the realm of possibility. As we have seen from the analysis, German trade unions are also not an obstacle for a move towards Green politics. However, this conclusion is only true within limits. Certainly trade unions are not open to all kinds of Green politics. But in relative terms, one observes a certain responsiveness of German trade unions for a change away from the established economic growth policy. However, it is also important to note that there is a substantial opposition to this kind of policy within the trade unions. The faction of accommodationist trade unions in Germany would certainly oppose an alliance with elements of the new middle class from the new social movement segment.

The fundamental changes in recent times that happened in connection with the unification of West and East Germany certainly enhance the status of productionist politics. This is so because of the much weaker position of both the SPD and the Greens due to the losses in the last national election and the increasing importance of economic problems. However, as we could see from the analysis a re-orientation is a lengthy and prevailing process. Some of the German trade unions have institutionalized elements of new politics. They may remain alive in trade unions. To speculate about the future of new politics in Germany is a difficult undertaking in the present situation.

3. INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRACY

As has been pointed out in chapter one, relevant political actors such as trade unions are responsible for the *definition relations* in modern society. The mode of interest politics of trade unions leads to some critical reflections of the practice of democratic procedures. Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to conclude that the pat-

tern found in the context of the debate on nuclear energy is also valid for other political areas, I wish to elaborate a bit on this point. Swedish trade unions in general and the mentioned trade unions in particular are not very keen on debating political issues such as nuclear energy that are not immediately related to traditional trade union tasks. This becomes strikingly obvious when we compare Swedish with German unions. This political pattern is important for national politics in general. As mentioned in chapter one, Peter Katzenstein (1985) notes the importance of interest organizations in the small European states. This conclusion is in particular true for Sweden. Claus Offe (1981) points out that the public status of interest organizations may have fundamental consequences for representative democracy. Even when trade union representatives point out that an issue like nuclear energy is not a genuine object for trade union debates, an attitude frequently referred to by Swedish union official in interviews, it is highly interesting that this political abstinence does not seem to be valid for the elite level of these unions. With the exception of SL and GF, all the analyzed Swedish trade unions participated in expert groups and forums that define the future of Swedish energy policy (see for instance: LO, 1990: 5; ST, SIF, SKTF, 1990; Fabrik et al., 1990). The Swedish way of reaching political consensus favors interest organizations that have the resources to participate in the political process. Trade unions were always involved in this process. There is not any doubt about LO's engagement in energy political questions. After the parliament decision of an acceleration of the phasing out plan for Swedish nuclear power plants an expert group was created which consists of the prime minister, the energy minister and two LO representatives. This group gave guidelines for the future Swedish energy policy (SAP ed., 1990). LO again increased its influence on nuclear power, when the issue was taken away from the Ministry of Environment and given to the Ministry of Industry, the appointed minister of which is the deputy of LO.

However, Swedish trade unions, above all those of LO, participate to a fundamental degree in politics *without* being, on the one hand, representative and, on the other, a political forum for their members. Decisions and lobbying activities are limited to the union elite level. This conclusion is also true for TCO and its unions. Confining themselves to pragmatic strategies may strengthen the position of trade union organizations but in the long run they cannot participate in many important political questions without becoming irresponsible (Offe, 1981; Olson, 1986; Schmitter, 1986; Scott, 1987: chapter 12). Participation in national politics demands democratic intra-organizational decision making. And that is not the case when debates on important issues are not promoted or even obstructed. Trade union's political activity can only be accepted, when trade unions are political trade unions otherwise they have to take the role as a representative of workers at the firm level.

The separation of blue and white collar unions reinforces the trend of non-representative policy making in Sweden. The politically influential LO is sheltered from fragmentation, because TCO integrates most of the heterogeneous groups which favor elements of new politics. Consequently, LO can go on with its traditional interest policy that favors economic and material aspects without paying attention to new needs which might emerge in society.

The national differences of the politicization of production and the different character of new social movement and the Green parties may be summarized that the Swedish political system is more closed than expected from previous investigations. The German is more open (rejection of B3a and B3d and confirmation of B3b and B3c). However, this is a functional interpretation and not a static one: the Swedish system is in the end closed *because* it is initially open and the German system is in the end open *because* it is initially closed.

The analysis of trade unions' standpoints towards elements of new politics in Germany and Sweden suggests that the changes in favor of new politics are more likely in Germany than in Sweden. This conclusion is in contrast to most analyses in related areas of the 1970s and 1980s (Lindberg, 1977; Kitschelt, 1983; 1986a; Sahr, 1985; Jänicke et al., 1986). However, it confirms the finding of more recent studies which notice that changes in environmental policy are not so far reaching as originally expected in Sweden (Burns, 1985; Vedung, 1988; 1989; Jahn, 1988a; Eyerman and Jamison, 1990; Flam, 1990; 1991).

We may also conclude from the comparison of the Swedish and German labor movements that labor, if left to its own remains in the tradition of industrial society (Touraine et al., 1987). The case of Swedish unionism shows that unions do not actively promote new politics [4]. However, the German case demonstrates that labor may react positively to new politics when there are social impulses for it in society.

Footnotes:

1 Ragin (1987; 1991) provides a detailed discussion of the rationale and logic of this method. Here I only sketch an outline of it. OCA is both analytically formal and causal in orientation. Generating inferences is based on data reduction logic rooted in Boolean algebra. It is qualitative since it does not use or depend on probability, frequencies, or statistical inference. OCA is *case oriented* in that each instance is considered in its entirety. For applications of this method see also the special issue of *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, XXXII, 1-2 (1991).

2 The DGB falls in more categories because, as a confederation, it has no organizational characteristics that build upon membership that consists of employees (latent membership, task environment, structure). This condition has been coded as "don't care" values. The result is that this variables are treated as both values in the dichotomized variables.

3 For the relations see the following matrix:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Lat. M. Pot.	-	56	53	47	63	50	56	56	44	56
2	Task Env.		-	60	40	81	56	75	75	63	75
3	Structure I			-	0	53	33	47	47	20	47
4	Structure II				-	47	67	53	53	80	53
5	Org. Pot.					-	74	89	89	74	95
6	Org. Confl.						-	84	84	79	79
7	Org. Comm.							-	100	74	95
8	Ideology								-	74	95
9	Country									-	79
10	Adoption of New Politics										-

For the specification and operationalization of the notions see the respective chapters. (1) has been coded 1 if there is an assumed membership potential, i.e. a substantial amount of white collar members in the public sector, etc.; (2) 1 = *not* organizing members in the (nuclear) energy sector; (3) Structure I is coded 1 when the number of union departments is low in relation to the number of member (centralization) and (4) Structure II is coded 1 when the number of union departments is high (structural differentiation); (5) 1 = there is an organizational conflict; (6) 1 = there is a high degree of intra-organizational potential; (7) 1 = complex communication; (8) 1 = activist or technically radical; (9) 1 = Germany; (10) 1 = adopting new politics. For the inter-correlation of some similar variables in terms of Pearson's *r* see the appendix (table: conclusion A-1).

4 This does not mean that LO, for instance, is opposing new demands at all, but it will only accept them if it can fit them into its own outlook and attitudes. It is most likely that LO unions deal with new politics issues in a technocratic manner. For instance, the promotion of environmental protection and new energy resources is preferred as a high-technology growth industry, and it is unlikely to lead to a change from productionist to new politics.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1:

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TRADE UNIONS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

In the brief presentation of the research on trade unions and nuclear energy I distinguish between studies focusing on West German or Swedish trade unions, on the one hand, and international or comparative studies, on the other.

For the research on West German unions, we can distinguish two waves of publications which mainly concentrated on the conflict in the context of nuclear energy and trade unions. The literature of the first wave, published in the second half of the 1970s attacked the positive stand of West German unions on the nuclear energy issue. In particular, their unresponsiveness or even hostile attitudes towards the upcoming anti-nuclear movements and citizen initiatives, on the one hand, and undemocratic intra-organizational procedures in general, on the other, have been in the focus of these articles. These articles stress factors such as ideology (industrial values such as nuclear energy as progressive productive force), social orientations (towards the Social Democratic Government, energy enterprises), and the economic situation for the explanation of the positive attitudes towards nuclear energy of German trade unions. But these articles also concede that there are differences between the German unions: traditional conservative and unions organizing workers in nuclear power plants or construction of nuclear plants are more pro-nuclear, while more left unions have a more critical attitude towards nuclear energy [1]. But also trade unions expressed their opinion in form of articles primarily published in the trade unions' newspapers and readers edited by the *Ministry of Research and Technology* [2]. Although the conflict between trade unions and new social movements is mainly stressed some authors also point out that both movements are complementary. From the point of view of anti-nuclear arguments trade unions are also an emancipating social movement and have therefore points of contact with new social movements (Dyllick et al., 1978: 90). Leminsky from the union side concedes that the union policy is oriented towards economic aspects at the firm level, and faces difficulties as soon as the political debate leaves these areas (Leminsky, 1977: 288).

The first more coherent analysis has been presented by Barbara Klaus and Karl Stiller (1979). They compare printed material (member newspapers, and printed statements) of the ~~*Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund*~~ (DGB), the German Trade Union Federation and five individual unions which organize workers in the (nuclear) energy sector: *IG Bergbau und Energie* (mining, coal, oil production), *IG Bau Steine Erden* (construction of reactors and buildings), *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik* (enrichment of uranium, reprocessing, storage), *IG Metall* (construction of reactors, instruments and fuel fabrication) and *Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr* (energy and special transport

1 In two readers (edited by Mez and Wilke, 1977; Hallerbach, 1978) rather spontaneous remarks than scientific analysis dominate. Nevertheless, the arguments in these readers identify conflicting dimensions which are still relevant in further analyses: (a) nuclear energy is perceived as a progressive productive force, (b) it is in accordance with the energy policy of the social democratic government, (c) nuclear power serves economic growth and social and technical progress, and finally (d) increasing unemployment makes the employment argument important (Brandes, 1977: 124/5; 1978). The first argument has been researched further by Dyllick et al. (1978): trade unions connect the success of their policy with the production system of industrial (capitalist) society which has to lead to a conflict with groups which oppose the destructive consequences of such a society. This conclusion leads to the dichotomy of economy versus ecology. Trade unions are not only ideologically associated with industrialist-capitalist society they also favor economic growth policy through personal interest networks. However, Brandes makes two further qualifications: (e) he points out the union enterprise interests which are to a certain degree dependent on the trade union involvement by co-determination, and (f) he describes the different attitudes of the individual unions (Brandes, 1977: 127-132). In particular traditional conservative unions (*IG Bergbau und Energie*, *IG Bau Steine Erden*) and unions organizing workers in nuclear power plants (*IG Metall*, *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik*, *Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr*) or constructing nuclear power plants (*IG Bau Steine Erden*) are in favor of nuclear energy. Unions which have a critical stand on nuclear power (*Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner Deutschlands*, *IG Druck und Papier*, *Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff*), however, try to avoid expressing their view or doing it very moderately.

2 The authors of these articles (Leminsky, 1977; Mehrens, 1978; Pfeiffer, 1978) were convinced that economic growth was necessary and nuclear energy was essential to achieve this goal and to avoid a shortage of energy in the beginning of the 1980s. The fight against increasing unemployment had highest priority. However, the authors rejected an economic growth in quantitative terms of Gross National Product increases and preferred qualitative growth. This term, yet a bit unclear, stresses the importance of public services, environmental, housing and public traffic improvements, and the increase of welfare in developing countries. Above all they emphasize the importance of the replacement of the free market mechanism by a structured and steering state intervention. However, nuclear energy is also important for qualitative economic growth.

enterprises). Their conclusions, however, more or less confirm the results mentioned above. They conclude that the investigated unions evaluated nuclear power positively, that intra-organizational debates took place in *IG Metall* and *Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr*, but it stopped after a decision in favor of nuclear energy was taken in 1976 and 1975 respectively. Arno Klönne in his foreword to Klaus and Stiller's book does not see a change of the pro nuclear energy position of trade unions after the reactor accident in Harrisburg. However, it seems to him that there might be a "slight correction of course" (Klönne, 1979: IV). In the years after the Harrisburg accident, there were a lot of publications concerning different aspects of the issue. It seems that in this time, a convergence of standpoints between trade unions and new social movements took place (Elsner and Grumbach, 1982; Grumbach 1986: 184).

The second wave of publications took place in the mid 1980s. These publications are of book length and analyze different aspects of the relationship between trade unions and nuclear energy or environmentalism in more detail. Jürgen Grumbach's (1986) interest lies in the question how German trade unions can formulate a employees' interest when a (energy) technology is still in the research phase. Grumbach concludes that organizational structure functions as a filter of interests that impede the perception of new problems or limit it to compatible known areas (25).

In order to operationalize the different aspects of interest in energy research, Grumbach deduces dimensions from the evaluative criteria of the *Enquete-Committee* of the German *Bundestag* on the Future of Nuclear Energy Policy ("Zukünftige Kernenergiepolitik") and above all a "value tree" of the DGB [3]. Grumbach analyzes congress material, reports, and trade union membership newspapers [4] of the four German "energy unions" *IG Bergbau und Energie*, *IG Metall*, *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik*, and *Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr* and presents the results separately for the period from 1954 to 1972 and from 1973 to 1984 [5]. After an intensive debate on nuclear energy in the 1950s, unions seem to have lost interest and in times when crucial decisions are taken the German

3 This "value tree" (Wertbaum) has been deduced from interviews with trade union officials of the economic policy department of the DGB executive committee in a research project on Social Acceptability (*Sozialverträglichkeit*) of Energy Supply Systems by the nuclear research center in Jülich (*Kernforschungsanlage Jülich*) (Kenney et al., 1984). In this project, representatives of several organizations (parties, churches, unions, enterprises) have been interviewed. For each organization a so called "value tree" has been created in order to follow different paths (twigs and branches) to its ideological roots. The priorities have been identified under the heading of societal goals, indispensable conditions, and requirements for the energy system. For the unions, the most important aspects have been: peace, full-employment, increasing welfare (societal goals); protection of life and health, preservation of the environment, no restriction of democracy, preservation of free-choice options for future generations (indispensable conditions); security of supply, adjustability, economic, sufficient supply, and fulfillment of requirements for acceptability (requirements for the energy system). These dimensions were again divided into 35 sub-dimensions. Grumbach derives from his analysis to the following classification:

- 1) Reference to Energy Policy
- 2) Influence on Jobs
 - in the Energy Sector
 - in the whole Economy
- 3) Economic Political Dimension
 - Structural Political Impacts
 - Level of Energy Prices
 - International Competition
 - Status in the System of Social Production
- 4) Socio-Political Dimension
- 5) Environment and Security
- 6) International Dimension
 - Reduction of Conflict over Resources
 - Prevention of Military Proliferation
- 7) Security of Trade Union Organization

4 However, Grumbach does not analyze the membership newspapers of the individual unions since that would not be possible for him because of limited research resources. Instead he concentrates on the analysis of *Die Quelle* (the monthly journal of trade union officials in the DGB), *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* (a scientific and para-scientific monthly journal edited by the DGB), and *WSI-Mitteilungen* (monthly scientific journal of the *Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI)*, economic research institute run by the DGB; until 1971 *Wirtschafts- und Wissenschaftliches Institut der Gewerkschaften (WWI)* (64/5 and footnote 17).

5 I neglect here the digression on the congressional decision of the *Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund* after the Chernobyl accident because that chapter is only a descriptive appendix and does not belong to the actual analysis.

trade unions were not involved. Therefore decisions appear to unions as unchangeable (*Sachzwänge*). With the first oil crisis in 1973, the union debate on nuclear energy started again. Then the different dimension showed shifting emphasis and change in evaluation. However, until 1977 the unions supported the pro nuclear energy course of the social-liberal government. Later, apart from *IG Bergbau und Energie* which expressed a positive stand on nuclear power, the unions formulated a more critical attitude towards nuclear energy. A decoupling of the positive relationship between energy supply and economic growth is even expressed. However, protest of the work councils changed the attitude again to a pro-nuclear stand. Although unions mainly rely on *information* of the government and industry, Grumbach sees learning effects through the participation in the Enquete-Commission of the *Bundestag* and the establishment of trade union *energy experts* and *departments*.

For Sweden, there are only very few studies that analyze the ecological attitudes of trade unions. In fact, there is no study addressing this question directly. Only one dissertation (Michele Micheletti, - 1985) focuses on the debate on nuclear energy in TCO at the turn of the decade (1970/80). However, this study focuses on the organizational problems of the Swedish white collar union confederation TCO, to formulate a political stand on the nuclear energy issue. Micheletti analyzes in particular the 1979 TCO congress which took place after the reactor accident at Three Miles Island. She takes nuclear energy as an example to demonstrate (a) the mode of organizing white collar interests and (b) the form of organized protest against official policies in white collar trade unions. The former aspect concentrates on the difficulties in representing white collar workers and the latter focuses, on the one hand, on protest within TCO and, on the other hand, on protest from outside TCO, i.e. mainly the mass media. Micheletti seeks to illustrate that TCO is not able to take a stand on highly politicalized issues. Her conclusion: TCO is - in the light of its internal structure, heterogeneous membership, and socio-political environment (blue collar unions and social democratic dominance, fragmented bourgeois parties) - not capable of acting politically. Michele Micheletti gives a lot of important empirical insights into the decision-making process of TCO on nuclear power which will be used throughout this work in order to illustrate the process.

In 1980, Rebecca Logan and Dorothy Nelkin [6] published an article on *Labor and Nuclear Power* in which they analyse trade unions in the United States. They found out that the nuclear issue has become a source of tension within the labor movement and that there has never been one consistent — opinion on nuclear energy in the trade unions in the USA. The strongest support for nuclear power within the AFL-CIO comes from the construction unions: "Construction workers clearly benefit from employment in nuclear industry, but they do not themselves face the radiation hazards experienced by operation and maintenance workers." (Logan and Nelkin, 1980: 10/11) However, unions organizing workers in the nuclear sector feel the trade-off between safety versus jobs. The authors give quite impressive examples of industrial blackmailing and unions' dilemmas. Another interesting result of their analysis is that *social unions*, i.e. unions which have a broader ideology and the aspiration to change society towards more equality and justice have a more critical attitude of nuclear energy whereas *business unions* which orient their politics at more short time material success support the development of nuclear energy. Social unions are also more apt to cooperate with anti-nuclear movements while the business unions often form alliances with the management of nuclear power plants. Logan and Nelkin conclude:

Yet the tradition of social unionism in the American labor movement demonstrates that union behavior is not based solely on economic self-interest: values and "world views" often shape policies. It is this persistent ideological thrust in the labor movement that creates the potential for a labor alliance with anti-nuclear groups and gives hope to anti-nuclear activists. (Logan and Nelkin, 1980: 34)

In 1981 a comparative study of all nine EC countries was conducted at the Institute of Future Research at Berlin. In this project, Lutz Mez et al. (1981) [7] describe the standpoints of the governments, parties, and trade unions towards nuclear power. This thorough report, which has not been widely

6 Dorothy Nelkin published widely in the field of political decisions and participation in the nuclear energy debate. In her collaboration with Susan Fellow (1978) and Michael Pollak (1977; 1980; 1981) she compared energy politics in different Western nations.

7 I wish to refer to this report by Mez et al. 1981. This is a bit ambiguous because the report is designed as a cumulative report. The first report is dated with 1979. However, the first supplement of 1981 contains the descriptions of the standpoints of the European trade unions.

acknowledged [8], contains documents on decisions and debates from the 1950s to 1981. However, the report aims to describe and document rather than analyze the conflict on nuclear energy. To my knowledge apart from the works by Mez only one article used the data from this project. Michael Pollak (1981) who published before with Dorothy Nelkin on the nuclear debate in France, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany presents in his article an analysis of the debate on nuclear energy in the Western Europe trade unions. He noticed that the new social conflict may diversify the unity of trade unions. In particular, when unions participate in broader political areas as unions do within the neo-corporative pattern foremost in Scandinavia, Austria, and West Germany, they suffer from this conflict. In countries with a strong central union organization and a national interest in nuclear power (e.g. strong own atomic industry, energy dependency from abroad, own uranium), trade unions take a positive stand. Furthermore, trade unions in the communist or socialist tradition see in nuclear energy a positive productive force whereas unions in the Christian tradition emphasize negative aspects. In particular at the French unions, Pollak demonstrates the different attitudes of C.G.T. and C.F.D.T. While C.G.T. remains in the communist tradition and favors nuclear energy as long as it builds on French and not American technology, C.F.D.T. has a quite critical attitude of nuclear power. Finally, Pollak also takes the social basis of trade union membership into account. Unions organizing white collar workers in the service sector are more critical of nuclear energy. Bringing together all these factors, Pollak concludes that unions' unity may suffer since it is increasingly impossible to define an objective worker interest. Since the nuclear issue separates important parts of the union membership, this conflict reveals cleavages which the unitary trade union ought to have overcome (Pollak, 1981: 134-6). In particular, he makes out this conflict in ÖTV and GEW in West German unions.

Heinrich Siegmann (1985) compares the relationship between trade unions and environmental groups in the United States and West Germany. His research interest lies in the compatibility of organized labor and environmental groups. For his research, he considers five explanations and evaluates them on a conflict-cooperation continuum:

(1) The perception of a built-in contradiction between employment and environmental protection goals necessitates conflicts between labor and environmentalism; (2) differences in demographic and socio-economic composition of the two movements prevent cooperation; (3) internal, organizational will formation and decision making processes favor the persistence of conflicts; (4) existing political/ institutional features in the two countries prevent increased labor-environmentalist cooperation; and (5) cleavages of values, ideologies and world views going far beyond those of the first explanation prevent changes of the LER [Labor-Environmentalist Relationship, D.J.]. These explanations are complementarity rather than mutually exclusive ... (Siegmann, 1985: 7)

He rejects the explanation that there is a dichotomy between employment and environmental protection. This dichotomy, however, *has been* important for tension of both movements but the conviction that alternative energy production creates jobs rather than destroys them has become increasingly common within the labor movements in both countries (40). However, he concedes that nuclear power and the necessity of economic growth remains a conflicting issue and can still be labeled as a built-in dichotomy between labor and environmentalists (51). Second, Siegmann does not find support for "... the contention that economic crises conditions have affected the LER negatively." (65) [9]. However, he finds out an important difference between US and West German unions: the cleavage between pro and con environmental attitudes in the former unions is *vertical*, i.e. along industrial sector lines, whereas the latter, despite of unions' differences, is *horizontal*, i.e. across the various unions but dividing the leadership from a good part of the membership (76).

8 Most of the literature on energy policy which has been considered here does not refer to this report. This is also true for comparative analysis (e.g. Kitschelt, 1983; 1984; Radkau, 1983; Grumbach, 1986; Siegmann, 1985).

9 He postulates two competing economic explanations: first, economic crisis increases the importance of employment arguments whereas good economic conditions give more room for environmental concerns for labor unions and a better chance to implement them against the employers since unions' bargain power is stronger. Second, the opposite direction is also plausible. Based on empirical observations by Logan and Nelkin (1980: 8) there is a higher collaboration between management and unions against environmental regulation in times of economic prosperity. This refers more to business unions which "sell" this cooperation as a service in order to gain higher wages.

Although he identifies substantial differences between *unions*, where *white collar unions* are more open to environmental demands and have a stronger anti-nuclear stand than their *blue collar* counterparts he rejects the hypothesis that demographic and socio-economic differences between trade unions and environmentalists result in incompatible attitudes of labor and environmentalists.

For the next explanation, Siegmann considers the internal decision making process at congresses, membership newspapers, and for Germany the role of work councils. His hypothesis is that *democratic unions* are more open to environmental demands except in cases where the leaders are already open for them. Relying mainly on the work of Klaus and Stiller (1979), he concludes for the German unions that the pro-nuclear leadership of the most influential unions controlled all decisions, even when there had been controversies at the congresses and in the union press. Furthermore, the strong influence of work councils on trade union policy - in particular pro-nuclear power demonstrations in 1977 - results in tensions between labor and environmentalists. He concludes: "... the important consequence to note for the LER is that shortcomings of union democracy hindered official labor-environmentalists cooperation but fostered unofficial ties involving activist parts of labor." (124).

The distinct political frameworks in the USA and Federal Republic of Germany are significant for the Labor-Environmentalist Relationship for Siegmann in his next explanation. In contrast to the USA, Siegmann concludes for Germany that *unions are integrated* into the political system in West Germany. They take part in political decisions and support the market economy and social order. The homogeneity of *unitary trade unionism* in Germany [10] has discouraged cooperation with environmentalism.

In his last explanation, Siegmann considers the *conflict between new and old politics*. This dimension contributes more explanation of the labor-environmentalist conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany than do the left-right patterns (160). Mainly drawing from election results and surveys, he concludes that the rise of the Green Party and "post material values" has elite challenging consequences. Apart from the conflicting values, this makes a lot of the labor-environment conflict since unions belong to the elite in West Germany.

The review of literature illuminates important aspect, however, none of them, except the study of Heinrich Siegmann, focuses explicitly on the treatment of elements of new politics by trade unions. The latter analysis, however, does not apply a systematic analytical and methodological approach [11]. Probably as a consequence of that no investigations develops analytical and methodological tools for a systematic analysis that combines the aspects of the others. In order to come closer to both I wish to refer to elements of organization theory. However first I will formulate some broader hypothesizes that will guide the empirical analysis.

10 Unitary trade unions or *Einheitsgewerkschaft* is a special feature of post war trade unionism in West Germany. The price for this unity is, however, the formal non-partisan stand of trade unions in Federal Republic of Germany (see for this term: Markovits, 1986: chapters 1 thru 3).

11 First, Siegmann gives no answer to his own thesis if labor and environmentalists could cooperate: "The main question, which this book will address, is whether and under what conditions the labor-environmentalist conflicts indeed are inevitable; or whether, and how, the two movements COULD cooperate more." (1) What he suggests in his study is that economic and socio-demographic factors do not separate these movements but rather their value orientation and political and organizational variables. But what that means for the research question remains unanswered. Second, his theoretical framework is inconsistent. In a short theoretical remark, he states that he wants to follow an analysis that "... breaks down vague generalizations into actual mechanisms and weigh the importance of one factor against another (not necessarily quantitatively) rather than trying to find one explanatory theory." (9) Although this might be possible, Siegmann could not isolate the different explanations sufficiently. This is a consequence of some methodological decisions. Siegmann often applies one model to the German case and the other to the American without "testing" one model on both countries or to "control" some variables by others. For instance, ideological differences of trade unions are only considered in the American unions but not in the German. His comparison of issues, countries as well as unions, are not suited to come to the conclusions Siegmann makes. The union systems in the USA and Germany are so different that it is difficult to refer the differences of the "labor-environmentalist relationship" to the variables mentioned above. The American labor movement is also not the best case in point for a representative labor movement. The analyzed unions are exclusively unions involved in "polluting sectors" or directly benefiting from it. In order to find out the relationship between labor and environmentalism also unions in other sectors are important actors. For instance, Micheletti's study shows quite clearly the problems of white collar unions with the nuclear energy issue.

Appendix 2:
A BRIEF POTRAIT OF THE ANALYZED TRADE UNIONS

Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)

The DGB organizes the whole spectrum of employees, i.e. white collar workers as well as blue collar workers, private and public sector, academics, etc. [1]. In 1985 the DGB had 7 719 468 members [2]. In the analyzed period there was just one change of the union's leader. Heinz-Oskar Vetter was chairman of the DGB from 1969 until 1982. He, as his predecessor Ludwig Rosenberg, are "... both clear moderates in the labor movement ..." (Markovits, 1986: 20/1). Since 1982 Ernst Breit is the leader of the DGB. He was previously head of the Postal Workers' Union. Recently, in 1990, Heinz-Werner Meyer from the IGB has become the chairman of the DGB.

The DGB and its member unions are social or political unions in the sense that they aim to combine the societal, economic, social and cultural interests of the employees (DGB, 1987: § 2). The DGB itself does not organize any employees but trade union organizations. The DGB obtains 12 percent of the fees charged by the member unions from their members. The average density rate of the DGB unions lies around 34.7 percent (number of members divided by the number of gainfully employed) in 1985 (Müller-Jentsch, 1989: 68).

However, the DGB can be viewed as a weak confederation in comparison to the large member unions. One indicator for that is that the DGB chairman is often recruited from small, less important unions. In the post World War II period the strength of the large unions even increased over time (Armingeon, 1988: 45-48).

IG Metall (IGM)

The German Metalworkers' Union is the largest single trade union in the Western world. It organizes 2 553 041 members in different sectors, such as steel industry, car industry, electronic industry, but also smaller industries like watch and toy production (Markovits, 1986: 158-266; Streeck, 1981). Because of its size - it is more than twice as large as the second largest union - and its enormous political influence among the DGB unions the IGM has been included into the analysis. The union density of IGM lies over the average of German trade unions by about 55 percent [3]. The union is directly involved in the production of reactors and other instruments for the nuclear industry but does not organize workers in nuclear power plants. However, because of historical reasons, IGM organizes workers and employees in the HEW (*Hamburgerische Elektrizitätswerke*), the energy sector of the city of Hamburg that runs nuclear power plants. The chairmen of IGM from the beginning 1970s was Eugen Loderer (1972 - 1983), Hans Mayr (1983 - 1986) and from 1986 Franz Steinkühler. Franz Steinkühler is a charismatic type of leader and stands for a new trade unionism which opens trade unions for ecological issues (IG-Metall, 1989). IGM often takes the leading role in the annual collective bargaining and was a rather fighting trade union in the 1960s. IGM quite clearly belongs to the activist wing of the trade union movement in West Germany.

1 For more comprehensive overviews of West German unions see for instance: Bergmann et al., 1976; Bergmann et al., 1977; Brandt et al. 1982; Leminsky and Otto, 1984; Esser, 1982; Markovits, 1986; Müller-Jentsch, 1986; Armingeon, 1988. An important material collection is Niedenhoff and Page, 1987.

2 In order to compare the number of the membership for all 19 trade unions, the year 1985 has been chosen. The data for the DGB unions have been taken from Müller-Jentsch (1989).

3 The membership density refers to the gross density (union members divided by gainfully employed persons) in 1985 and the data stem from Armingeon, 1988: table 4.5. For the calculation and implication between different gross and nett densities see also Müller-Jentsch, 1986: 84-89. I do not go deeper into this debate because the union density should simply give an idea about the differences in the organization of employees in West German unions.

Furthermore I refer to arguments mentioned above Streeck, 1981: 43/4 and Markovits, 1986. Information about the involvement in the nuclear power industry is taken from Klaus and Stiller, 1979: 35 and above all from letters of the individual unions of specific questions of the author. The following unions did not answer to my letters: LO, SF, GEW, IGC.

Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)

The Public Service and Transport Workers' Union is the second largest union in the DGB and its membership is constantly increasing. ÖTV is the German trade union that organizes most of the workers in the nuclear plants. However, these workers are only a minority among ÖTV's members (in 1987 approximately 5.5 percent work in the public energy sector and around 4.0 percent in the private energy sector and nuclear energy sector; ÖTV 1988: 602/3). The major groups organized in ÖTV belong to both the municipal and state public sector and the spectrum of occupation ranges from blue collar workers, for instance, in the local rubbish collection to administrative personnel in communities and state bureaucracies, social occupations in schools and hospitals to university professors. It is by no means a speculation to conclude that ÖTV has by far the most heterogeneous membership of all considered unions here. ÖTV has 1 168 254 members and a union density of only 24 percent. However, the numbers vary substantially among the different industries. The union density is fundamentally higher in the energy sector as in other sectors which ÖTV organizes (Bayer et al., 1981; Armingeon, 1988). All these are reasons enough to include ÖTV into this investigation. The chairman of ÖTV was Heinz Kluncker for 18 years (1964 - 1982). Since 1982, the leader of ÖTV is a woman, Dr. Monika Wulf-Mathies.

Sometimes ÖTV tries to get the leadership in the annual collective bargaining. ÖTV's role as an activist union is not quite clear. However, in the context of the "emergency laws" [4] ÖTV took an activist union stand (Markovits, 1986: 98/99; Weischer, 1987: 221-225) and it seems that ÖTV shifted towards the activist side in the last two decades (Markovits, 1986: 21).

IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IGC)

The Chemical, Paper and Ceramic Workers' Union is the third largest DGB union with 638 176 members and a density-rate of 57 percent. It organizes blue and white collar workers in the private industry. The big chemical enterprises are the main sectors that IGC organizes. Members of IGC work in different nuclear sectors within the nuclear fuel cycle, above all in the enrichment process, fuel fabrication, reprocessing and the treatment of radioactive waste.

Apart from the industries which IGC organizes, it is very interesting to include this union because of its ideological shift from an activist towards an accommodationist union in the 1970s (Markovits, 1986: 267-326). In particular, the chairman Hermann Rappe (from 1982; before Karl Hauenschild was chairman of IGC from 1969) stands for a modernist union policy. IGC tries to attract the highly educated technical skilled workers. Economic growth and the modernization of the national economic scores among the highest goals of the policy of IGC. IGC is relatively reluctant to include ecological politics and the Green Party is often considered as the enemy of Social Democracy and therefore for the IGC (Rappe, 1985). However, in contrast to IGB, IGC is an accommodationist union that organizes its members in booming industries.

IG Bergbau und Energie (IGB)

The Mineworkers' Union has the highest density (92 percent) of all German unions. However, a big amount of its 356 706 members are pensioners. In the IGB, traditional working-class elements are still alive, as Wolfgang Streeck puts it (1981: 43). The co-determination is a major ideological conviction that has been realized to a large degree in the mining industry. IGB organizes a homogeneous mainly male membership. However, IGB suffers from an extreme decline of the coal industry. The chairman of IGB was Adolf Schmidt (1969 - 1985). Since 1985 Heinz-Werner Meyer leads the IGB who is the successor of Ernst Breit as DGB chairman in 1990.

The IGB is not directly involved in nuclear energy but is an important union concerning the energy sector in Germany. Coal is still an important energy resource in the Federal Republic of Germany. In order to settle the conflict of competition between nuclear energy and coal, a so-called "Century Contract", *Jahrhundertvertrag*, of the government has been proposed and is in power until the 1995.

4 The emergency laws, *Notstandsgesetze*, consist of a package of legislation and constitutional amendments which aimed at expanding the government's power in the event of severe internal unrest. This issue has often been taken as one indicator for activist and accommodationist unions in Germany (Bergmann, et al., 1976; Markovits, 1986; Weischer, 1988).

In this contract, coal gains subsidies (*Kohlepfennig*). However, the coal sector is in a deep crisis. Challenged by cheaper import coal and the decrease of the oil price, the German coal sector fights for its survival.

IGB has been taken into the investigation since it is a traditional working-class union with an accommodationist ideology in the energy sector.

IG Druck und Papier (IGD)

The major reason to include the Printers' union into this investigation lies in the fact that IGD belongs to the "aristocracy of labor" (Markovits, 1986: 363-414). IGD has 140 725 members and reaches a density of 47.6 percent. The IGD has been shaken by the rationalization in the printing industry. The chairman of IGD was Leonhard Mahlein (1968 - 1983). In 1983, Erwin Ferleman took over the leadership. In 1989, IGD merged with other smaller unions to *IG Medien*.

IGD has also been taken into the investigation because it is an outspoken activist trade union with communist elements. Because of its long and controversial tradition in German labor history, Andrei Markovits and Thomas Ertman conclude: "Although it is one of the DGB's smallest members, the printers' union (IG Druck und Papier) must be included in any comprehensive study of the West German trade-union movement." (Markovits, 1986: 363). In so far, this study follows the advice of the above mentioned authors.

Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (HBV)

The Commerce, Banking and Insurance Workers' Union organizes 371 228 members, most of them are white collar employees. As the name suggests HBV organizes workers in three different areas. The union density-rate lies only by about 11 percent although it has doubled from the beginning of the 1970s. The HBV is especially exposed to competition with the DAG. From 1970 to 1980, the chairman of HBV was Heinz Vietheer and Günter Volkmar was the leader of HBV from 1980 to 1988. As of 1988, Lorenz Schwelger is HBV-chairman.

Ideologically HBV belongs to the activist trade unions. HBV has been taken into the investigation because it is a - more or less - pure white collar union in the private sector with an activist trade union policy.

Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW)

The Education and Science Union organizes teachers and academics in the kindergarten, school, university, and other scientific and educational organizations. Since the GEW is organized more according to the occupational rather than the industrial system, it stands in direct competition with ÖTV. GEW has 194 028 members and a union density of 25 percent. Its Chairman was Erich Frister (1968 - 1981) and Dr. Dieter Wunder (from 1981).

Within the GEW exists a strong Communist wing which often leads to quite radical policies. In comparison to ÖTV, GEW is more radical but also more concerned with academic problems. The GEW has been taken into the investigation because it organizes those occupations that is said most likely to be open to ecological, green politics.

For Sweden, the selected trade unions are either a member of LO or TCO.

Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)

In 1985, LO was the confederation for 24 blue collar trade unions [5]. In 1985, LO had 2 262 931 members in the private and public sector. The union density-rate of LO unions lies around 90 percent

5 For more comprehensive overviews of the post war period of Swedish trade union movement or the development of LO unions see for instance: Hadenius, 1976; Forsebäck, 1977; Lewin, 1980;

and is the highest in the Western world (Kjellberg, 1983: 278). LO has the right to intervene in the collective bargaining of its individual trade unions. Heclø and Madsen (1987: 133) stress the importance of the election of Stig Malm as the successor of Gunnar Nilsson (1973-1983) from the Metal union for the LO chairman. It was an important policy signal that private sector unions still play the leading ideological role in relation to the numerically increasing public sector unions.

Similar to the DGB, LO announces in article 1 of its constitution that it aims to represent the interests of the employees in the labor market and economy as well as their participation in the societal development on the ground of political, social and economic democracy. The historical development of the Swedish labor movement resulted not only in a strengthening of LO in relation to its member unions but also increased the power of the reformist and pragmatic wing of the Swedish blue collar trade union movement (Elvander, 1983; Martin, 1984; Swenson, 1989). In comparison to the West German unions, LO may be considered as a reformistic union in the sense of the accommodationist unions. This is only true in terms of the ideological strategy (modernization of the national economy, preference of economic growth policy, etc.). The term accommodationist, however, would be quite misleading in the Swedish context because LO is - in the very contrast to the German unions - a strong trade union which is even able to shape Swedish politics to a great degree. This for instance is true in the context of the solidaric wage policy and wage-earner funds. Essential for an understanding of LO's policy is its strong interrelation with the *Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet* (SAP), the Social Democratic Party.

What has been said here about LO is also valid - by and large - for the LO member unions, since LO is quite dominant concerning the ideological leadership over its member unions. However, LO's domination above its member unions should not be interpreted as suppression or as conflicting competition. LO's strength originates rather from the coherence of its unions. And even if LO dominates, it is the large or historically dominant unions that make out LO's power and it is therefore also necessary to look at individual LO unions. However, since the influential unions (metal workers' union, construction workers' union, factory workers' union) may have quite similar attitudes, I shall concentrate more on exceptional cases within the "LO family" concerning my thesis. Particularly interesting within the LO is the difference between private and public sector unions mainly between Metall and SKAF. The relation between both unions is not without tension and has certainly increased since 1978 when SKAF by-passed Metall in membership size caused by fundamental shifts towards public sector employment in the Swedish labor market (Elvander, 1988: 68/9).

Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundet (Metall)

The Swedish Metall workers' union is the most influential trade union in Sweden, because of the historical ideological leadership (Swenson, 1989; Tilton, 1990). With 457 937 members it is the second largest LO-union. Metall organizes its members according to the industry union principle. The largest sectors are the engineering industry (*verkstadsindustrin*) and the metal and steel production in the private industry. Its members are involved in the production of reactors for nuclear plants. The chairman of Metall was Bert Lundin until 1981 and then Leif Blomberg.

Metall belongs to the more productionist unions although there might be trends of a change in that perception (Sandberg, 1984; Riegler, 1987). However, Metall mainly stresses labor market and economic aspects and questions of social justice and welfare, i.e. old politics issues. Ecological policy does not take a big place in Metall's outlook or is clearly subordinated to economic (growth) aims (Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundet, 1989: in particular 34/5).

Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet (SKAF)

Since 1978 the Swedish Municipal Workers' Union is the largest LO union with 632 941 members in 1985. The number of its membership increases strongly with the expansion of the public sector. SKAF organizes blue collar workers in the communes and county districts (*landsting*) of Sweden, although there are also some white collar workers among them. The major occupations organized by SKAF are low skilled nurses (*vårdbiträden, undersköterskor, skötare, vårdare, barnskötare*, etc.). SKAF does not

organize workers in the nuclear power or energy industry. However, SKAF organizes around 6.000 employees working for the distribution of electricity and heat in communes and county districts such as electricians, mechanics, and repair men. An outstanding feature of SKAF is the very high number of female members. The chairmen of SKAF were Bengt Blomdahl (1973-1978), and Sigvard Marjasin (1978-1989). Since 1989, a woman is chair-person: Lillemor Arvidsson.

As mentioned above, SKAF as the biggest Swedish trade union today and organizing members in the public sector is often in conflict with private sector unions, above all Metall. However, this conflict or disagreement between the two unions is mainly based on the conflict caused by the different developments of the two sectors rather than ideological differences. On ecological issues, SKAF seems to have a more half-hearted attitude. For instance, at its 1988 congress the claim to outline an environment political program was rejected.

SKAF is interesting for this investigation because it is the representative of the increasing public sector trade unions in Sweden. However, being a LO union with material attitude but also having a high proportion of female members - who have significantly more negative attitudes towards nuclear energy than men in Sweden - makes it even more interesting, because one may expect some intra-organizational differences within SKAF.

Statsanställdas Förbund (SF)

The Swedish Union of State Employees is the third largest trade union within LO. It organizes 209 539 members in the public sector. SF is a very heterogeneous union and is a result of the amalgamation of several public sector unions. The intra-union structures of SF still represent the characteristics of the original organization. That means that the individual sections within SF are rather independently. SF is interesting for this investigation because it organizes workers in the nuclear power plants and - for a LO union rather unusual - organizes a large amount of white collar workers (Wheeler, 1975; Visser, 1989: 190/1). As far as the majority ownership of nuclear power plants lies in the hand of the state SF organizes these workers. This has been the major reason to include SF into the investigation. Other large enterprises which are organized through SF are the Swedish post, railway, and army.

Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (SEF)

The Swedish Electricians' Union organizes electricians in the private industry. Among these electricians, some also work in the nuclear power plants of *Sydkraft*, a private energy enterprise run by some South Swedish communes. Nuclear energy in Sweden is partly run by state enterprises and partly by private or semi-private enterprises. In the first case, SF organizes the blue collar workers in the second case SEF. SEF is strongly male dominated and has 28 868 members. Sterner Samuelsson (1966-1976), Stanley Jämtsved (1977-1987) and Hans Schoug (from 1988) are the chairmen of SEF.

SEF is interesting for this investigation, since it organizes blue collar workers in the nuclear power plants but also because it is a homogeneous blue collar, skilled, male workers' union highly concerned with energy policy. This means that SEF may be an ideal case for a materialist union with a deep rooted Social Democratic tradition.

Grafiska fackförbundet (GF)

The Graphic Industry Workers' Union has 47 110 members. GF has been taken into the study because printers traditionally belong to the core of trade union "intellectuals" or the "aristocracy of labor". Printing unions normally have deep roots in the labor movement. However, GF only recently was founded (1973) by the merging of several already existing unions in the printing industry. Since then, the chairmen are Olle Åstrand (1973-1976), Stig Nilsson (1976-1983), Åke Rosenquist (1983-1988), and Valter Carlsson (since 1988).

As its German counterpart GF has been heavily hit by the rationalization in the printing industry. However, it took a very active step in order to steer the development of the introduction of new technologies and by doing so moved quite drastically away from a mere material policy. GF is of interest in this study because it allows to compare the differences and similarities between printer unions in Sweden and West Germany which have similar traditions and problems.

Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO)

The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO changed its official English name from the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees) is the confederation of 21 individual unions [6]. TCO organizes 1 108 463 members. The density-rate of TCO unions may lie around 75 percent and is the highest among all white collar unions in the Western world (Kjellberg, 1983: 278). The membership of TCO strongly increased in numbers during the last decades particularly in the public sector. TCO organizes white collar workers in both the private and public sector. In several areas, TCO competes with the academic trade unions of SACO/SR. The chairman of TCO is Björn Rosengren, former chairman of SKTF.

The major difference between LO and TCO and its member unions consists of the officially proclaimed party-political neutrality. Although TCO in fact follows a similar policy like LO, it does this less ideologically and more pragmatically (Elvander, 1983: 379-83; Nilsson, 1985). TCO's political influence is greatest when party-political involvement is at its lowest. Politicized issues are likely to divide and weaken TCO. This hypothesis has been formulated by Christopher Wheeler (1975) for the supplementary pension dispute and has been confirmed by Michele Micheletti (1985) for the wage earner funds and the nuclear energy conflict of the late 1970s. However, Nils Elvander (1983: 382) points out that TCO may be more interested in equality questions among the genders than LO, most likely an indicator for its character as a white collar worker union in which women are in majority. The self-understanding of TCO is that it represents the workers' interest "... through collective bargaining, industrial action, and the public policy process." (TCO (ed.) 1988: 2). In so far, all the considered unions are social unions in the sense that they do not aim exclusively to represent the members' interest at the job and labor market but also in more general political terms (in contrast to business unions, for instance). Because of the limited influence over its individual unions and its (party) political abstinence, TCO can be considered the weakest union confederation of this investigation.

Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet (SIF)

The Swedish Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry is by far the largest and most influential trade union within TCO. In 1985, SIF had 276 800 members. Almost two thirds of SIF's members work as white collar workers in the ore-mining and metal, chemical, and construction industry, the three largest industries which SIF organizes. In SIF, male white collar workers are clearly in the majority. SIF also organizes white collar workers in both the nuclear power plants and in industries that produce equipment for the nuclear industry (above all ASEA). Similar to SEF, SIF only organizes those white collar workers in nuclear plants owned by private energy enterprises. The chairmen of SIF are Sture Lindqvist (1970-1978) and since 1978 Inge Granqvist.

SIF is the *enfant terrible* in the TCO family. In several situations SIF followed a policy that favored their members regardless of the attitude of TCO or other TCO unions (Wheeler, 1975). SIF is by far the most important union in TCO and has therefore - beside its involvement in the nuclear energy sector - been included into the investigation.

Sveriges Kommunaltjänstemannaförbund (SKTF)

The Swedish Union of Local Government Officers organizes 166 968 white collar workers in the communes and county districts and is the second largest TCO union. SKTF organizes administrative personal, engineers, technicians and social workers. By and large, SKTF is the white collar counterpart of SKAF. Like SKAF, the vast majority of SKTF's membership is female. SKTF does not organize workers in nuclear power plants, however, part of SKTF's membership also works in communal energy enterprises. The chairmen of SKAF were Sven Ahlgren (1970-1976), the present TCO chairman Björn Rosengren (1976-1983), and Sture Nordh (since 1983).

6 The number of TCO unions varies a bit. In 1985, there were 21 unions. However *Sveriges Arbetsledareförbund* (SALF) is not a steady member and often changes the total number. For more comprehensive overviews on the white collar unions in Sweden see for instance: Nilstein, 1966; Wheeler, 1975; Micheletti, 1985; Nilsson, 1985. The data for the TCC unions refer - as for all other unions - to 1985 and stem from: TCO 1985 verksamhetsberättelse.

The reason to include SKTF is that this union is one of the most influential ones in TCO and the white collar counterpart of SKAF. As a white collar union in the public sector, we may expect that SKTF faces intra-organizational problems in the context of nuclear power.

Statstjänstemannaförbundet (ST)

The Union of Civil Servants organizes 120 989 members in administrative occupations in the state sector. Among the largest employers are the state owned telephone company, state authorities, universities and high-schools. ST is the third largest TCO union. ST organizes white collar workers in nuclear power plants which belong to the state owned energy enterprises (*Vattenfall*). Also white collar workers in the state owned energy sector (*Energiverket*) are members of ST. The chairmen were Gunnar Petersson (1971-1979) and from 1979 Olle Söderman. ST is the white collar counterpart of SF.

ST is also very influential among the TCO unions. This and the fact that ST organizes workers in the nuclear power plants are the reasons why ST has been included into the investigation. Furthermore, ST's membership is very heterogeneous and in many respects the range of its membership is comparable with that of ÖTV.

Sveriges Lärarförbund (SL)

The Swedish Union of Teachers has 67 534 members who are mainly employed in public schools on the compulsory level. Especially in secondary level education there is a strong competition with the teachers' union of SACO/SR. There is also another teacher trade union within TCO *Svenska Facklärareförbundet* (SFL) or Swedish Union of Specialist Teachers that organizes teachers such as professional teachers, kindergarten teachers, sports teachers, etc. In the beginning of 1991 SL and SFL merged.

SL has been taken into the analysis because of the same reasons why the GEW has been included. Also in Sweden survey data often indicate that teachers belong to those groups that are most open to environmental issues.

Beside the selected unions, there may be other unions which are relevant in the context of this research. However, all research has its limits and all in all, I believe that the selected unions can be legitimated in the way that they are a reasonable compromise between theoretical implications, representativity, and research and financial resources [7].

7 Beside the unions mentioned above, there are further unions which organize workers in the nuclear or related industry (however, not workers in nuclear power plants). Because of limited research resources, these unions and other interesting unions could not be taken into the study. For instance, the construction workers' unions in both countries would have been interesting cases because they gain a lot (jobs for several years) but do not have to bear the burden of dangerous jobs in the sense of radioactive pollution etc. As Logan and Nelkin (1980) found out for the USA, these unions are especially positive towards nuclear energy. That seems also to be true for West Germany and Sweden. The Factory workers' union in Sweden would have been an interesting case for the comparison to IGC. However, it does not organize workers in the nuclear energy industry as does SEF. Among the TCO unions the *Sveriges Arbetsledareförbund* (Swedish Association of Supervisors and Foremen, SALF) would have been interesting to analyze because it organizes white collar workers in higher positions - also in the (nuclear) energy industry. However, SALF is very difficult to analyze because it is not a steady member of the TCO and material was difficult to gather. Finally, a comparison between LO, TCO and SACO/SR would have been interesting as well. SACO/SR also has membership unions which organize engineers and teachers - mainly on the higher and academic level. Therefore SACO/SR unions would have met the analytical implications. However, research resources are limited and it was simply impossible to include more unions. Furthermore, SACO/SR has not a self-understanding of being a union that is involved in general politics.

Appendix 3: THE LOGIC OF THE CONTENT ANALYSES

Content analysis has some specialities which make them different from other methods in social sciences [1]. Klaus Krippendorff (1980) demands explicitness when applying content analysis. This is important not only in order to meet certain scientific standards of a replicable data collection and analysis but also because of crucial inference from the data to the context:

Whereas all scientific research is motivated by the desire to know or to better understand a portion of the real world, a content analysis must show interest in *two kinds of reality*, the reality of the data and the reality of what the researcher wants to know about. In content analysis these two realities do not overlap so that the researcher will have to find ways of regarding the data he can analyze as symbolic manifestations ~~or as~~ indicative of the phenomena of interest. (Krippendorff, 1980: 170)

However, inference never yields absolute certainties [2]. It can be related to different empirical phenomena [3]. I am here concerned with the adoption of elements of new politics by trade unions. Inference will be made from the content of the text and will be referred to the union organizations [4]. For that, I content analyze two kinds of printed material: congress material (motions and debates) and trade union membership newspapers. That means all those congress motions, debates and newspaper articles, will be considered that refer to nuclear energy. For the articles, the headline is the deciding criterion, whether they are to be included or not. If the headline indicates that the article may contain statements on nuclear energy this article will be included.

Some other features of content analysis are quite advantageous for the purpose of my research interest. Content analysis is a method which is an unobtrusive technique, it is context sensitive, it structures diverse material, and it can cope with large volumes of data (Krippendorff, 1980: 29-31). In particular, the latter three aspects are of importance here. The advantage of being context sensitive - i.e. data are generated within the original context - lies in the possibility to identify trends and patterns which are not manipulated by the intervention of the researcher or through retrospective sense-making by an interviewee, for example. Content analysis is relatively explicit in its selective perception of reality in contrast to narrative research methods which are difficult replicable, because they are

1 For that see: Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985; Merten, 1983; Früh, 1981; Lisch and Kriz, 1978; Ritsert, 1972 just to mention some texts that either give comprehensive overviews or present stimulating and partly provocative insights.

2 This point has also been made by Krippendorff (1980: 99) and is confirmed throughout the literature. The main goal of a content analysis is the accurate registration of individual elements in a text. In order to obtain this goal a lot of rules and devices are developed and *reliability* is the key-word of the methodology of content analysis (Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1969). Kracauer (1952/3) criticized the quantitative feature of content analysis but his concept of an alternative qualitative methodology was never convincingly realized. Furthermore the dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative content analysis caused a lot of confusion and was not very fruitful as most of the newer works on content analysis suggest. However, reliability has also been challenged in light of theoretical relevance. Jürgen Kriz, for instance, questions the entire concept of reliability between coders (Lisch and Kriz, 1978: 84-105). His argument is that texts are never perceived similarly by the entire readership and that the coding procedure therefore must concede the same freedom. This point is certainly relevant but within limits. Most messages which are of interest are not manifest. Interpretation of latent contents of the text is necessary which gives room for disagreement. Reliability tests are helpful to control the process of data collection and the level of generalization of the findings.

3 For instance, inference can be made to the communicator, the recipient, or the situation and it can refer to the text (symbolical content analysis), the content of the text (semantical content analysis), or the causes and effects (pragmatical content analysis) (Krippendorff, 1980: 33-48; for a typology of content analyses using these elements see: Merten, 1983). The potential use of content analysis may be summarized by the classical formulation by Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool (1952) (expanded by Holsti, 1968: 603-607): *Who says What, Why (Holsti; D.J), to Whom, How, and with what Effect?*

4 Krippendorff sees in the analysis of the communication in social organizations an important tool to make inferences on organizational policy and its consequences: "Content analysis of media in institutional context can lead to inferences regarding competition of communication modes of dominance, which social changes are speeded up or retarded, or how power is distributed in society." And, in reference to the neglecting of issues: "Within institutional contexts the activity of saying something is often more important than what is being said." (Krippendorff, 1980: 45-47; quoted from: 47)

immediately connected to the personality of the researcher. However, the shortcoming here is that a lot of latent aspects beyond the scope of the content analysis gets lost. Furthermore, content analysis selects the natural text under aspects of theoretical device and constructs an analytical "reality" under relatively clear defined criterion. This in combination with the possibility of coping with huge amounts of data makes it possible to come to relatively representative results. Patterns, trends, and differences between individual research objects can clearly be identified [5].

All major introductions of content analysis and also studies that have applied the *evaluation assertion analysis* (e.g.: Holsti, 1962 and 1969; Deetjen, 1977 and 1986) agree that it has a high degree of reliability. However, although I facilitated the method by looking only at evaluation referring to an Attitude Object (for the terminology see the text below) directly (the inclusion of indirect evaluation - i.e. where AOs takes the place of a common meaning - implies further methodological problems; see Lisch and Kriz, 1978: 148/9; Kriz, 1981: 206-246; Merten, 1983: 196) there are extensive coding instructions needed. In addition to Osgood's et al. lengthy instructions, I also developed more specific lists in order to increase the reliability. We can conclude that the method is reliable in relative terms but cannot claim to be an absolute measure.

The recoding unit is the word or in the terminology of this method the attitude object (AO). In this study the attitude objects are several technical or conceptual aspect of nuclear energy. A general index reflects a summary of all evaluations. In order to obtain the EI-Index (Evaluation Intensity) the following procedures are necessary:

For this analysis the attitude objects are underlined (red) in the text. In a second step the sentences with an evaluation of an attitude object are extracted from the texts and transformed in the way that the Attitude Object (AO) is at the beginning of the sentence followed by the Connector (C) which connects a common meaning (the evaluation) with the Attitude Object, mostly these are the verbs in a sentence. Finally, the Common Meaning (CM) is noted. This is an evaluative word or phrase which has a common meaning in the language. Since language feeling is necessary this method has been conducted by native speakers. This method, although very time costly, is a relatively reliable evaluative method which is acknowledged in social sciences in the field. However, to reduce the effort some simplifications have been applied in this analysis.

For instance the evaluative assertion analysis considers parts of the sentences which mention the term nuclear energy (AO) and which implies an evaluative statement. Both the connector (c) and common meaning (cm) are evaluated separately between -3 and +3. The stronger the connector between AO and cm the higher the value, e.g. is (+3), can (+2), seems (+1) etc. The cm is evaluated according to the positive or negative connotation it implies, e.g. very necessary (+3), very dangerous (-3), etc. In order to calculate the Evaluation Index (EI) the relative sum of the common meanings is divided by the absolute sum of the connectors. In order to get reliable results the number of evaluative statements should be at least 3. Since a low N results in inflationary high evaluations all evaluations with N lower 3 are not allowed to

5 However, in recent years content analysis has been accused of being a method that looks at relations of isolated elements rather than grasping meaningful structures of the text (van den Berg and van der Veer, 1989). To compensate for this deficiency, one can look at social discourses or cognitive maps of social actors. Van den Berg and van der Veer apply a method that builds on social discourse of a labor dispute in the Netherlands by utilizing different "ideal-typical" frames of reference (employers' versus employees' viewpoint). In my study an "ideal-typical" dichotomy of arguments that go along either with pro- or anti-nuclear attitudes is also applied.

A *cognitive map* is an aggregate of information which enables actors (individuals, groups, organizations, states, etc.) to perceive large scale environments beyond the range of immediate perception (Axelrod, 1976; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Bonham and Shapiro, 1986). This method has also been applied to a large degree in organization theory that stands in the tradition of ethnomethodological and phenomenological tradition (Bougon et al., 1977; Weick and Bougon, 1986; Weick, 1979; Eden and Sims, 1979; Sheldon, 1980; Hedberg, 1981). Also for the analysis of environmental and energy policy cognitive maps have been a tool for analysis (Roberts, 1976; Bonham et al., 1978; Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978). Both methods, social discourse and cognitive map approach, attempt to analyze the perception of reality by actors as coherent "world views". The ANPE-Index aims to grasp the standpoints on a productionist/new politics dimension and may be considered as a measure for cognitive maps in respect to new and productionst politics.

be higher than 1.5. These cases are indicated with * in the text. Osgood et al. describe at length how to evaluate the single statements. Nevertheless, a lot of rules must be applied in order to handle ambiguous evaluations.


Concerning the dimensional content analysis, Krippendorff points out that reliability increases when the categories are formulated in the language which is applied in the analyzed material. In order to meet this demand I formulated *statements* out of the theoretical and empirical literature on the social discourse on nuclear energy. As much as possible I relied on statements already applied in similar content analyses (Asp et al., 1985; Braczyk et al., 1985) which is also a way of getting more reliability because statements are already supported by empirical analyses [6]. All statements are available in Swedish and German and the analysis has been conducted by native speakers. The recoding unit of this analysis is a theme or statement (an utterance that meets the criterion of a statement). Each statement has only been coded *once* in one context unit (article, motion, debate contribution). Similar to the evaluative assertion analysis each statement is always connected to an actor who makes the statement.

In order to refer the statements to specific actors an actor list is developed. This actor list is used for both the identification of the actor who made the statement (Actors) and other actors (Object Actors) who are evaluated by the actors. For a detailed analysis actors are, furthermore, specified (Actor Specification I) according to different departments or attitudes and policies (Actor Specification II). Furthermore, for the evaluation of the object actor an evaluation list is available. Figure 1 summarizes the coding possibilities: an actor makes a statement on nuclear energy (a) and/or evaluates another actor (b). First, the actor (or communicator) is identified (box A; e.g. LO, the Swedish trade union confederation for blue collar workers) including his available specification (box B; e.g. the union board). This actor expresses her or his opinion towards nuclear energy, i.e. makes a statement (box C) [7]. In addition, or without making the above statement, the actor may evaluate another (object) actor (b and c). For that the evaluated object actor (box D; e.g. the Social democratic Party) is identified with a number of qualifications (boxes E and F; e.g. the party leader and anti nuclear policy). Finally, the evaluation needs to be noted (c) (box G; e.g. is realistic). The statement could look like the following example: "The LO board warns that a phasing-out of nuclear energy today is a waste of natural and economic resources. Therefore, the decision of the social democratic party leader to phase out of nuclear energy already in the mid 1990s is not a realistic way of tackling the problem of saving energy."

6 In this phase of my research I received indispensable help from Kent Asp and above all Per Hedberg. Both have experiences since more than one decade in conducting content analysis on nuclear energy in Swedish mass media.

7 The statements were coded, first, according to their pro or con nuclear energy tendency. Another code was used whether the statement refers to a "fact" (*is* expressions) or an "aim" (*should* expressions). A neutral code was used when the aspects were mentioned but without any evaluation.

Figure 1: Logical Construction of Coding Instruction



Evidence about the empirical connection between data and the inference from them is important for content analysis. Typical sources of contextual knowledge are theories and models about the object under investigation. Furthermore, checks can be built in that rely on *representative interpreters* (Krippendorff, 1980: 171/2). There are two kinds of representative interpreters I have used. First, I conducted several interviews with trade union officials and editors of the trade union newspapers. I did interviews which focussed on special aspects which were concerned with the variables included in the investigation. For these interviews I applied a check list (Merton and Kendall, 1979). I also conducted similar interviews with researchers in the field. Second, I presented preliminary results at international conferences and at seminars at Swedish universities [8]. It is this contextual knowledge that enables

8 Presentations at Swedish Universities:

Making it Count: A Research Design For The Analysis of New Politics in Swedish and West German Trade Unions. Paper prepared for presentation in the Seminar on "Comparative Politics" at the Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University at the 3rd May 1990.

Trade Unions and New Politics - A Framework for the Analysis of Trade Union Policy. Paper delivered at the Sociology Department of the University of Gothenburg, February 7, 1990.

Conference Papers:

Making it Count: Towards an Empirical Assessment of the Institutionalization of Ecological Issues in Established Politics, paper prepared for the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Bochum (West Germany), 2.- 7. April 1990, in the Workshop on: Methodological Issues in the Study of Contemporary Political Activism.

Organizational Dilemmas of Political Trade Unions in Western Europe: An Organization Theoretical Analysis of the Debate on Nuclear Energy in Swedish and German Unions. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, August 1989 in the Section: Political Organizations and Parties.

Trade Unions and the "New" Middle Class: Challenges and Responses. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Paris (France), 10.-15. April 1989, in the Workshop on: The New Politics and the New Middle Class.

Changes in the Logics of Trade Union Policy? Trade Union Response to the Ecological Challenge. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Rimini (Italy), 5.-10. April 1988 in the Workshop on: Policy Change in Perspective.

the researcher to place the data in a suitable context and thus provides a "logical bridge" for making inferences.

Gibt es Soziale Grenzen des technischen Fortschritts als gewerkschaftliches Organisationsproblem? Paper delivered at the Congress of the Austrian Sociology Association in the Workshop on: 'Social Borders of Technical Progress' in Graz (Austria), 22.-24. October 1987.

The Greening of the Red? New Social Issues and Trade Unionism. Paper prepared for the project on: 'European Perspectives' of the United Nation University (Tokio) at the 'Gothenburg-Workshop on New Social Movements in Europe', September 19. - 22. 1987 in Stenungsund (Sweden), organized by the University of Gothenburg (Department of Peace Research and Human Ecology).

Changes in the Political Culture - Challenging the Trade Union Movement: The Case of Nuclear Power in Swedish and German Unions. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Amsterdam (The Netherlands), 9.-15. April 1987 in the Workshop on: Culture and Politics.

Challenges to the Political Culture in West Germany: Sources and Perspectives, Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in Washington D.C., USA, 28.-31. August 1986 (together with Ferdinand Müller-Rommel).

The Determinants of "New" Protest Potential and the Institutional Conditions for open Articulation - An International Comparative Study. Paper delivered at the ECPR-Workshop Session (European Consortium for Political Research) in Göteborg (Sweden), 1.- 6. April 1986 in the Workshop on: Dynamics, Strategy and Efficacy of Political Protest.

See also my publications: Jahn, 1988a; 1988b; 1989; 1990a

Appendix: 4

A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SWEDISH AND GERMAN TRADE UNIONS

In this appendix I analyze the congressional material of all 19 trade unions during the period of 1970 to 1989. For the analysis of the material, I will present the content of the motions and congress debates under the aspect of their evaluation of nuclear energy, and their statements concerning productionist and new politics. The rather detailed and systematic documentation of the individual congresses should serve the purpose of clarifying the content of the applied indices which will be used in the more aggregated comparative analyses. Some footnotes also contain examples which I consider as especially helpful in the illustration of the indices. The analysis which is conducted by means of categories deduced from the literature on the discourse of energy policy as described in chapter two focuses on the cognitive elements of trade unions. The description of changes and developments over time may be an equivalent for more detailed case studies (Weick and Bougon, 1986; Pfeffer, 1985) [1]. It is even superior to narrative case studies because it reduces the information systematically so that it makes a comparison between a larger number of organizations possible. The more formalized procedures also serves as a control against biases which the researcher may convey in his research subject when analyzing complex material [2]. However, a disadvantage of this method is that some peculiarities of the individual unions are neglected. At this point, detailed case studies are better suited.

1. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF THE LO UNIONS.

Having taken a short look at the frequency of the motions dealing with nuclear energy, it leads to the result that LO and its five analyzed member unions never paid much attention to the nuclear energy issue at their congresses. This may be seen as sharp contrast to LO's political stand on this issue. It could be concluded that LO is highly involved in the nuclear energy question on the political level, and does have influence on Swedish politics without having much discussion on the organizational level of their own unions. Whether these discussions have not been necessary or if they have been systematically avoided, cannot be decided here. I would rather consider the congressional treatment of nuclear energy under the aspect of my thesis which is the adoption of new politics, on the one hand, and the intra-organizational conflict arising because of that, on the other.

Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO)

LO dealt with nuclear energy in six motions. Two of the motions were proposed at the 1976 congress, three in 1981 and one in 1986. The motions of the 1976 congress were proposed by a district branch of the *Träindustriarbetareförbundet* (Wood Industry Workers' Union) and a district branch of SEF. The first motion was very critical of nuclear energy (EI = -2.63). It demanded that nuclear energy should not be developed before the problems of final waste storage have been solved. The second motion, however, was clearly positive about nuclear energy (EI = 1.5) and stressed that nuclear energy is the only alternative for becoming less dependent on oil imports. Both motions agree in so far that nuclear energy should be state controlled or even nationalized.

The first motion had some elements of new politics (ANPE = 8.3) [3]. SEF's motion, however, did not address questions of new or old politics. The statement over these motions of the LO board [4]

1 However, Karl Weick and also Jeffrey Pfeffer suggest that cognitions of actors in organization are analyzed by means of *causal maps*. They put causal relationships in the foreground of the analysis. I will analyze the debate on nuclear energy with the EI- and ANPE-Indices. These indices themselves do not reflect explicitly causal relationships. However, as outlined above, the indices, in particular the ANPE-Index, imply causal cognitive relationships.

2 Narrative case studies often make sense of a situation by telling a story. This story, however, is heavily biased because the researcher often adjusts deviations so that they fit into the overall interpretation. Readers of those narrative case studies have seldom the chance to detect these biases. It is particularly difficult to find out whether facts contrasting to the researcher's interpretations are considered at all or are simply neglected or omitted. In this context, it is often fatal that the research shift focuses in order to make the overall interpretation more plausible. Furthermore this leads to the suppression of contradictory facts. As Karl Weick (1979) and Michel Bougon (1983) point out sense-making is often retrospective and unless something is attended to, it does not exist.

3 In particular the Wood Workers' union stressed the fact that the worries and fears in the general population should be taken into the account; an argument very seldom expressed by LO unions: "The private energy enterprises have also no understanding at all for the well-grounded worries against the further development of nuclear plants." (De [privata energiförmedlare; D.J.] har heller ingen som helst förståelse för människors berättigade rädsla för en ytterligare utbyggnad av kärnkraftverken.) Also the chosen words expressed a quite critical attitude towards nuclear power: "We propose that the

evaluates nuclear energy on a rather neutral basis (EI = 0.45). Positive environmental and energy political aspects are contrasted with problems of waste storage and costs of nuclear energy. The final conclusion, however, was rather positive towards nuclear energy by demanding "... a continuation of a careful development of nuclear energy." The board's statement also contained elements of both new and old politics. For instance, LO had already pointed out at this time that the costs of nuclear power would be rather unpredictable (*osäkra faktorer*). However, the productionist elements finally dominate (ANPE = -4.2). The debate and speeches over these motions and economic policy were in general mainly concerned with the demand of the nationalization of energy enterprises and the wage earner funds which were at that time hotly debated. Therefore the debate does not add much to our thesis. The congress decided to follow the recommendation of the board to approve SEF's motion with the exception of the demand of nationalization. The Wood Industry Workers' motion was considered as responded to [5]. All in all one can conclude from the 1976 congress that productionist politics dominated in LO productionist. This is particularly true for the approved motions.

In September 1981, a year after the referendum on nuclear energy in Sweden, there had been three motions submitted to the congress and all of them were rejected. The Stockholm district of SF proposed a rather negative motion on nuclear energy (EI = -2.66). It stressed the fact that nuclear energy would create new dependencies from uranium instead of oil. Furthermore, uranium mining in Sweden would increase environmental problems and could endanger a phasing-out of nuclear energy because a new industry would have been established by the time when one wants to phase-out. It would be difficult to close down this industry. This motion integrated a few elements of new politics (ANPE = 4.2). The other two motions submitted by local branches of *Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet* (Food Workers' Union) and SEF rather mentioned than dealt with nuclear energy. By stressing the importance of the availability of cheap energy SEF's motion contained productionist politics elements (ANPE = -4.2). The LO board evaluated nuclear energy positively in its statements over the motions and also stressed the importance of productionist aspects (EI = 1.33; ANPE = -4.2) [6]. The board rejected the demand of the nationalization of energy enterprises. Furthermore, it explicitly supported uranium mining in Sweden. The board also supported SEF's motion but recommended to view it as responded to. After a debate which did not deeply discuss nuclear energy, the congress accepted the boards recommendation to partly reject the motions and to consider parts of the motion as responded to.

The 1986 congress took place in September, approximately five months after the Chernobyl accident. The motion jointly proposed by local branches of *Pappersindustriarbetareförbundet* (Paper Industry Workers' Union), *Byggnadsarbetareförbundet* (Construction Workers' Union), and SEF, the unions effected most directly by energy prices or the construction of nuclear plants, stressed the trilemma between oil dependency, environmental effects of fossil energy sources and nuclear energy. Striking is the fact that the motion did not mention at all security aspects or the reactor accident at Chernobyl. In contrast, all alternatives to nuclear energy were seen as hazardous for the environment. Therefore it is not surprising that a positive evaluation of nuclear energy dominated (EI = 0.92). A phasing-out of nuclear energy is considered as "painful". The weighting of the pros and cons of nuclear energy showed a domination of elements of productionist politics (ANPE = -8.3). The unquestioned precondition for any energy policy and social welfare would be cheap energy [7]. The motion was

congress may decide that no new nuclear plant should start its operation before the question of the life-dangerous waste has been solved." (Vi föreslår därför att kongressen beslutar att uttala sig för ... att inga nya kärnkraftverk igångsätts förrän man löst frågan med det livshotande avfallet.)

4 The statement of the board was also concerned with another motion on energy policy that did not consider nuclear energy. Therefore the concern with the analyzed motions and in particular with nuclear energy was rather limited.

5 Decision often refers in detail to different aspects of a motion. Here and in what follows I attempt to summarize the decision for the whole motion. This sometimes turns out to be a bit problematic. However, it is necessary in order to obtain a picture of the congressional decisions at all.

6 However, the positive assessment of nuclear energy refers only to the time until the referendum decided to phase-out of nuclear energy in 2010. LO and its unions almost always stress the fact that they will keep to this agreement. However, that does not stop them to stress all the advantages of nuclear power.

This evaluation of nuclear energy (positive but with the demand to phase-out in 2010) also implied some methodological problems since a statement that demands a phasing-out scores negative to nuclear energy. This problem has partly been solved in the way that this option received a special code.

careful in its formulation but attempted to make clear that a shut down of nuclear energy in Sweden would be out of the question. The LO board's statement over the motion stressed the necessity to develop alternative forms of energy and is more critical towards nuclear energy than the motion (EI = 1.5; ANPE = 4.2). However, the statement remained very much on energy political aspects and does not refer to security problems or any other aspect of nuclear energy. It stressed to stick to the referendum decision to phase-out in 2010 but not before. LO expressed a critical opinion towards nuclear energy but without revising earlier decisions. Former decisions should still be valid. Therefore the board suggested to consider the demands of the motion as responded to. In the following debate four out of five contributions evaluated nuclear energy negatively but stressed rather weakly aspects of new politics. Two speakers from Metall were rather critical about nuclear energy as were all other speeches made by LO officials among them a contribution by Rune Molin, later industry minister in the Social Democratic government. The only contribution giving a slightly positive impression concerning his judgement of a phasing-out was from Arne Angelöf, a LO official. By summing up all elements of productionist and new politics of *all* debate contributions, we come to a MP of 20.8 and a NP of 20.8, resulting in a balance of both elements. However, the "openness" to new politics is mainly based on the fact that alternative energy resources were accepted and should be developed. The statements did not refer to aspects that may imply a change of the economic growth and centralized policy. This will also be expressed in later discussions on the further exploitation of water power in Sweden. As an alternative to nuclear energy it is often suggested that Sweden should exploit its last untouched rivers in the north. This argument which is not only common for trade unions suggests to replace one big-scale technology by another and can only be interpreted as a continuation of productionist politics.

All in all the debate on nuclear energy at the LO congresses focuses on technical or economic aspects and is not concerned with political or societal ones. The issue never fundamentally divides the congress members. However, there are some critical voices from unions that are not immediately affected by nuclear energy (with the exception of SF). However, the energy unions clearly express a positive assessment of nuclear energy. They also stress aspects of productionist politics. SEF is the union that of all three considered congresses stands behind productionist politics. LO also quite clearly supports the side of productionist politics. After Chernobyl, LO is careful not to change politics. Although some very critical statements about nuclear energy were expressed by important members of LO, no congressional stand has been taken that could commit LO to any policy. The exception is the commitment to the referendum decision. However, in light of Chernobyl the referendum decision serves - again - as a good excuse to postpone fundamental decisions into the future (or into non-public expert groups). In the next sections, I wish to look in more detail at the congressional decisions of some of LO's member unions, in order to obtain a more detailed picture of processes of the adoption of new politics in LO unions.

Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (SEF)

SEF held its congresses shortly before the LO congresses during the same years. There was one motion submitted in 1976, two in 1981, and one in 1986. All motions that deal with nuclear energy evaluated it positively and contained mainly technical and energy political information.

The 1976 motion stated that nuclear energy is the only realistic alternative to oil. However, the motion pointed out that exaggerated security demands by a "vociferous opposition" would obstruct further development. Conserving of energy was closely connected to negative employment effects (8). With statements of this kind, the motion was stressing productionist politics (ANPE = -8.3). All very short contributions to the debate on the motion spoke in favor of it as did the statement of the board. The board of SEF stressed the importance of state influence in the energy sector. Also its evaluation of

7 The following sentence may give a good example for LO's "causal map": "Cheap energy is an important precondition for national competition as it is a precondition for higher productivity and therefore also for high welfare". (Billig energi är en viktig konkurrensförutsättning liksom en förutsättning för den höga produktiviteten och därmed för en hög välfärd.)

8 The two following examples should illustrate the material and determined attitude of SEF: "Nuclear power is the alternative to oil which seems to be most realistic today. But here the development is obstructed by a vociferous opposition and security demands which lack any parallel." (Kärnkraften är det alternativ till oljan som i dagsläget verkar vara mest realistiskt men här begränsas utbyggnaden av en högljudd opposition och krav på säkerhet som saknar motstycke.) SEF also pointed out that saving energy would have bad consequences: "Another alternative for a decrease of oil imports is to decrease the energy use which, on the other hand, cannot be done without effects on employment". (Ett annat alternativ för att sänka oljeimporten är att minska energiförbrukningen, vilket å andra sidan ej kan ske utan återverkningar för sysselsättningen.)

nuclear energy was clearly positive (EI = 2.0). SEF exclusively considered technical, energy political, labor market, and left ideological aspects when debating nuclear energy. Security and environmental or even political and social aspects were beyond the perception of SEF.

The 1981 congress did not change this positive picture of nuclear energy either (EI = 1.0 and 1.5 respectively). Both motions only stressed energy political, economic, and left ideological aspects and neglected all others. A short remark of the SEF board supported the motions. The board also expressed its support of the referendum decision. The debate contained six contributions all except one were in favor of nuclear energy and the proposed motions. If the contributions contained statements of productionist or new politics elements at all, they tended to be in favor of the former. The contribution that evaluated nuclear energy negatively (EI = -1.5*) stressed the fact that nuclear energy would create new dependencies that would make a later phasing-out difficult. However, this debate contribution was short and not very specific. As the 1976 motion both motions were approved of by the congress.

At the 1986 congress one motion was proposed which was concerned with nuclear power. The motions confirmed the referendum decision that nuclear energy should be phased out in 2010. However, it stresses that it is important for Sweden as an industrial society to have cheap, safe, and environmental friendly energy. This motion even if rather moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy, is quite clearly in favor of productionist politics (EI = .40*; ANPE = -8.3). The congress also followed this time the board's suggestion that the motion should be approved and all of the debate contributions supported the motion. It was stressed that nuclear energy would have no alternative. In particular, the debate contributions emphasized the positive environmental effects of Swedish nuclear energy. A phasing-out of nuclear energy before 2010 would have negative economic, employment, and environmental effects. In particular it was expressed that Swedish nuclear plants are completely safe although it was acknowledged that the worries of parts of the population would be justified. However, all in all the contributions were rather positive towards nuclear energy (mean of EI = 1.05) and contained a substantial amount of productionist politics (mean of ANPE = -2.8).

At the SEF congress of 1986 the motion also stressed productionist politics elements. The statements were limited to the energy political and economic areas. In the debate, productionist aspects dominated as well. However, shortly after Chernobyl SEF also referred to safety, environmental, and even social aspects. However, pragmatic arguments still dominated approximately two-thirds of all the statements consisted of pragmatic arguments. It was particularly common to place emphasis on the fact that nuclear energy has more positive effects on the environment than do fossil fuels. In SEF's opinion, however, the development of waterpower in the north of Sweden would be the best alternative to nuclear power.

Over the considered time SEF did not change its productionist perception of energy policy. This often goes along with a positive evaluation of nuclear energy but is also valid when the congress shortly after Chernobyl is a bit more critical of this technology. SEF prefers a large-scale energy production, preferably with nuclear energy. However, if this is not possible anymore after the phasing-out in 2010, SEF will promote a large-scale production with water power, etc. Throughout the years, all motions exclusively stressed pragmatic and left ideological categories. That Swedish economy needs cheap energy is the precondition for all decisions concerning energy politics. A unique characteristic of SEF's motions is the emphasis on state intervention and nationalization. With that SEF is a clearly leftist trade union. However, in terms of new and productionist politics, SEF gives no reason to doubt that a productionist development would be the only possible and feasible energy policy for Sweden.

Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundet (Metall)

At the last four congresses Metall dealt with nuclear energy. First at the congress in 1977, a motion submitted by a north Swedish district of Metall (Umeå) demanded to take the initiative to debate nuclear energy in both society as a whole and in Metall. The board of Metall dealt with this motion in the context of several other motions so that it is impossible to refer the statements to this particular motion. However, nuclear energy played no role in the board's statement. The congress followed the recommendation of the board and considered the motion as responded to. There were no evaluations or statements that could be taken as an indicator for productionist or new politics.

At the 1981 congress, two motions were proposed which evaluated nuclear energy rather differently (EI = 1.5* and -1.5* respectively). In particular the motion that was proposed by two members from

Sandviken, a town rather close to a nuclear power plant (Forsmark), evaluated nuclear energy negatively and also contained some elements of new politics (ANPE = 8.3). The motion demanded that Metall should work on a phasing-out plan. The motion stated that the lack of such a plan could endanger the whole phasing-out idea and that the money used for nuclear energy would be better spent for alternative energy resources. The other motion proposed by the same district only mentioned that after the referendum the debate on nuclear energy had diminished and that it would now be possible to decrease the oil consumption through nuclear energy for a certain time. The board's statement dealt again with these motions in the broader context of other motions so that no evaluation of nuclear energy can be identified in it. However, the board recommended to the congress to consider both motions as answered. No debate on these motions took place at the Metall congress in 1981.

The motions and the board's statement concentrated exclusively on energy political, economic and left ideological aspects. In so far, Metall debated nuclear energy at its congress in the same fashion as SEF. In sharp contrast to SEF, however, is the fact that two different attitudes concerning nuclear energy were voiced. Whether or not this also indicates a disagreement on productionist and new politics remains unclear. The mentioned objections to nuclear energy fit into the categories of new politics.

At the congress in 1985, two motions were again submitted to the congress that evaluated nuclear energy very differently. One motion, submitted by the local districts of Norrköping and Motåla demanded a phasing-out of the nuclear power station at Barsebäck as fast as possible. Barsebäck is a very controversial nuclear site situated just thirty kilometers from Copenhagen, the Danish capital. Furthermore the motion noted that Sweden would have a energy surplus after having started the operation of two new reactors (Forsmark III and Oskarshamn III). This energy surplus would lead to the fact that new energy technologies would not be tried out. This negative evaluation of nuclear energy (EI = -1.5*) was counter-balanced by a motion proposed by individual members from Osby in the very south of Sweden. This motion demanded quite strongly a further development of nuclear energy (EI = 3.0). In contrast to the former motion, this motion stressed elements of productionist politics (the ANPE score is 4.2 and -4.2 respectively). It painted a bleak picture for the case that nuclear energy would be phased out. This scenario also included environmental aspects. Nuclear power would be much better suited to prevent damage to the environment than methods that "go back to grandfather's times" like burning peat and similar things. The motion was very polemic in its judgement over alternative energy technology.

The board of Metall reconfirmed to stick to the referendum decision and was also optimistic that it would be possible to develop alternative energy resources until 2010 (the reason why the EI is -1.0* and ANPE = 4.2). The congress followed the recommendation of the board and rejected the motion that considered nuclear energy so extremely positively and considered the other as responded to.

Beside the board's statement there were four debate contributions. In his congress presentation on "industrial development" the Metall board member Hans Olsson pointed out that Metall will neither work for a faster phasing-out nor for continuation after 2010. In a broader context he stressed the importance of public control over large enterprises. Conny Wilander, a member from the district of Norrköping, pointed out that a lot of Metall members were active in the referendum campaign and that nuclear energy would affect the vital interests of Metall members. She was quite clear that nuclear power should be shut down in 2010 and pointed out that energy saving measures would create jobs and save the equivalent of two to three nuclear plants. Although her evaluation of nuclear energy is rather negative she seldom referred to aspects of new politics (EI = -2.21; ANPE = 4.2). In his concluding remarks, Hans Olsson from the board of Metall summarized his former arguments in that he stated that Metall should not take a stand on nuclear energy. This would be a political question. Within the energy political context Metall could only work for employment advantages of its members. And that would be possible in both cases with or without nuclear power.

Both motions and the debate stuck to statements concerned with energy policy. More than 85 percent of the statements referred to pragmatic aspects. The different standpoints towards nuclear energy in the motions and the debate, however, also disagreed about the environmental effects of nuclear plants.

The first Metall congress after Chernobyl was held in September 1989. Four motions contained statements about nuclear power. At this congress, we can also identify two substantially different

attitudes in Metall. From the four motions, two evaluated nuclear energy positively and two negatively. The more critical motions were proposed by the district of Luleå in north Sweden, and by seven districts of central Sweden; among them - as in 1985 - the district of Norrköping and Motala. The former motion stressed the economic and environmental advantages of nuclear power in normal operation. However, the risks are high and the worries of the population should be taken seriously. Since the 1980 referendum decision is unclear about concrete measurements of a phasing-out, the motions demanded that concrete steps should be taken so that Sweden develops national alternatives that take environmental and employment effects into the account. This should then lead to a new referendum in which one can decide about a faster phasing-out than originally planned. Although this motion is rather moderate in its negative evaluation of nuclear energy it contains some elements of new politics (EI = -.60; ANPE = 8.3). Also the other motion (EI = -1.50*; ANPE = 4.2) stressed the fact that no concrete measures had been prepared for a phasing-out. The most positive motion towards nuclear energy came from the district of Söderfors, a district close to a nuclear power plant (Forsmark). The motion referred to a recent parliament decision to speed up the phasing-out plan. The motion pointed out the negative consequences of that policy for energy prices, the national economy, energy shortages, and employment effects. The alternatives to nuclear power would all have their disadvantages and were not able to substitute nuclear energy in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the motion demanded, that Metall should declare that it is against a phasing-out that would imply a threat to the living standard, employment and the environment and that nuclear energy should be used until realistic alternatives will exist. This demand would have been a blanco cheque for nuclear energy. The motion scores high in both its positive evaluation of nuclear energy and productionist politics (EI = 2.54; ANPE = -12.5). The other more moderately positive motion came from the district of Trollhättan (EI = 1.33; -4.2). Stressing the fact that large-scale wind power would be neither technically possible nor economically feasible, the motion demanded the further development of water power as the only alternative to nuclear energy. However, water power could only partly substitute nuclear energy.

Without making any statements of its own, the board recommended that the extremely positive motion should be rejected and all other motions should be seen as responded to. As usual the congress followed the recommendation of the board.

The debate was introduced by a contribution of the Metall deputy Arne Angelöf. He pointed out that Sweden was the only nation on earth that decided to phase-out of nuclear energy and that the national electricity amount is very high. This he considered to a great advantage for Sweden. In his speech, he was confident in the ability of Swedish industry to meet this challenge by developing new energy techniques. Although the evaluation of nuclear energy in his speech scores slightly negatively, the expressed statements about his firm belief in technological progress results in a productionist politics score (EI = -1.0; ANPE = -4.2). Another contribution of the district of Trollhättan in favor of the district's motion contained neither statements nor evaluations which could be coded.

As at the other congresses, the emphasis of the motions and the debate was on pragmatic categories. Around three quarters of all statements stress energy political, economic and labor market aspects. However, 16 percent of the statements stressed the *positive* environmental effects of nuclear power.

Metall also accepted at this congress an environment program (Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundet, 1989). Metall is the first LO union to formulate such a program. It debates global, regional and local environmental threats and formulates Metall's standpoints on it. The possibilities to influence the improvement of the environment have also been formulated. But also in this program Metall is firmly convinced that an environmental policy must be made that agrees with the industry. Metall has great hope that Swedish industry will solve the environmental problems through technological innovations. Most critique is devoted to the fact that clear guidelines for industries are lacking.

Two facts are most interesting in the congressional debate on nuclear energy in Metall. First, there were two rather different motions submitted at all congresses of Metall [9]. The positive motions have been voiced from districts either close to nuclear plants or from south and middle Sweden. The more negative motions came from the north of Sweden and the districts of Norrköping and Motala. Secondly, the board was rather neutral in its evaluation of nuclear energy and often recommended the

9 This can be seen in the relatively high STD of the EI index: 1981: 2.1; 1985: 3.2; 1989: 1.8. However, it should be noted that 1981 and 1985 only two motions were submitted and that therefore the index is a bit arbitrary.

rejection of the extremely positive motions. This is also expressed in the fact that Metall always hesitated to take a clear stand on this question. It is rather peculiar to consider motions as responded to (the decision most frequently chosen) when no stand at all was taken before. The policy in Metall shows some equivocalities: the new environment program stresses the importance of trade union engagement on societal questions. At the congresses, however, aspects beyond rather pragmatic ones are very seldom mentioned. In particular the conviction expressed by board member Hans Olsson seems to be typical for Metall: first of all, energy policy would not be made by Metall and, furthermore, Metall should just look at the employment consequences for its members. This conviction is very difficult to combine with an environmental responsibility of a union as expressed in the environment program of 1989.

However, the disagreement about the evaluation of nuclear energy did not result in a disagreement about the future development of society in terms of productionist and new politics. Even if there are some indicators of that in the 1989 congress it would be far too much to conclude that Metall would face a conflict between productionist and new politics in its organization. As mentioned above Metall follows an extremely pragmatic strategy in dealing with important societal questions. The leadership expresses a firm belief in technological progress and Swedish industry. These may be indicators that Metall - despite the fact of some intra-organizational disagreements on technical questions on nuclear energy - can be seen as a productionist trade union.

Statsanställdas Förbund (SF)

Besides SEF, SF organizes workers in nuclear power plants among the LO unions. As we have seen above one SF district proposed a motion to the 1981 LO congress in which nuclear energy was evaluated negatively. However, at the congresses of SF nuclear energy played a minor role. In 1973, one local district from the north of Sweden (Porjus) already submitted a motion in which nuclear energy was mentioned as a technique that leads to big-scale energy production. However, this statement was not evaluated in any way.

In 1977 SF addressed nuclear power in one motion that demanded a more extensive debate on nuclear energy. However, the SF board did not see any particular reason for a more intensive debate on the nuclear energy issue and recommended to consider the motion as responded to. Neither the motion nor the board's statement evaluated nuclear energy or expressed arguments that could be summarized under the heading of productionist or new politics here.

At the congress in August 1981 there was no motion on nuclear energy proposed. It had to wait until the next congress in August 1985 that SF addressed the question of nuclear energy again. At that congress, two motions on nuclear power were proposed. Both were very different in their evaluation of nuclear power. One motion was proposed by the district of Bispgården. The positive evaluation of nuclear energy was supported by some arguments of productionist politics (EI = 1.86; ANPE = 8.3). A phasing-out before 2010 was considered to be a waste; rather the phasing-out plan should be oriented on the life span of the nuclear plants. The other motion proposed by the district of Gävle, quite close to a nuclear plant (Forsmark) stressed the fact that nuclear energy would frighten millions of people and that most countries would have already limited their ambition to develop nuclear energy further. However, it was also stated that alternative energy technologies could not solve the energy problem as well so that only nuclear fusion (a technology *not* analyzed in terms of nuclear energy in this investigation) would be the only solution (EI = -2.38; ANPE = 0).

The board expressed in its statement that SF will stick to the decision of a phasing-out in 2010. However, it criticized that there would be no concrete plans, for how the phasing-out should be conducted. It also stressed the fact that it should be ensured that the security investment pays for itself. Concerning the two motions, the board suggested to reject them both. This decision was carried out by the congress.

Nuclear power was debated in the larger context of economy policy and gained only spotlight attention. The debate contributions were diversified in their evaluation of nuclear power as were the motions (STD of debate: EI = 2.0; motions: 2.99 motions). A worker from the nuclear power plant at Forsmark expressed his conviction that this technology is completely safe. He also stressed the employment effects of nuclear energy (EI = 2.4; ANPE = -4.2). The other contribution stressed similar aspects. In addition, some even emphasized that energy questions are too important to be decided upon by private enterprises. Therefore public intervention is necessary. However, SF gives more

attention to security aspects than for instance SEF does. The board of SF was very reluctant in taking a stand on this question.

At the congress in September 1989, the first to take place after the Chernobyl accident, SF had four motions that also included statements on new or productionist politics. If they evaluated nuclear energy or expressed arguments concerning productionist and new politics, they were positive about nuclear power and favored productionist politics (means: EI = 1.67; ANPE = -5.6). The motions stressed the fact that energy consumption would still increase and that cheap energy for Swedish industry is essential. Most of the motions expressed their disagreement with the government proposal to already start the phasing-out of nuclear energy in the mid-1990s. The motions were proposed by several different districts (Västra Sverige, Mellersta Norrland, Norrbotten). The board sympathized with all of the motions; but it pointed out that one should stick to the referendum decision. Although the evaluation of nuclear energy is negative, due to the fact that it reconfirmed the phasing-out plans and considered some aspects of new and productionist politics, in end effect, the motion favors productionist politics (EI = -1.65; NP = 8.33; MP = 16.7; ANPE = -8.3). Although the instrument of energy regulation through prices were considered, SF made it clear that the energy policy must be based on a large-scale production. In conclusion, the board suggested to accept two of the four motions. The congress accepted the board's recommendation. The debate contained four brief contributions. Three of them were negative to nuclear energy and one extremely positive. If there were arguments concerning new and productionist politics, they favored productionist politics. Above all, the debate contribution of the same worker from Forsmark who already expressed his opinion at the congress in 1985 was very much in favor of nuclear power. After Chernobyl, he argued filters had been installed and security had increased, and because of these new filters Swedish nuclear power stations were the safest in the world. However, the motion he spoke for had been considered as responded to. Although the debate expressed more critical aspects towards nuclear energy, it strongly favored productionist politics (means: EI = -.86; ANPE = -5.6). At this congress, SF also mainly refers to pragmatic categories (90 percent of the motions and 71 percent of the debate).

Over the years, we can conclude for SF that it very reluctantly started a debate at all. Although members of SF work in nuclear plants, the issue was raised very peripherally in 1973. Although the public debate in the mid 1970s was very heated in Sweden, the SF board could not understand why nuclear energy should be treated differently than other technical aspects in the energy area at their 1977 congress. Also in 1981, one year after the referendum on nuclear energy, SF did not deal at all with the issue. A controversial but pragmatic debate came up at the congress in 1985. Still SF did not see any reason to take a stand on this issue. It was only, when the government suggested to start the phasing-out period of nuclear energy in the mid 1990s that SF took a stand in which it claimed a careful conduction of this plan. Disagreement was not expressed in the motions, even though, the debate showed some different attitudes towards nuclear power. Throughout the years, the debate never addressed aspects beyond the pragmatic categories and questions of ownership. One can certainly conclude that SF belongs to the pragmatic and productionist trade unions in LO.

Up until now, we may conclude that even the LO unions which are involved in nuclear energy did not take a greater interest in the issue in a broader societal context. They dealt with nuclear energy as a primarily technical issue by referring to pragmatic aspects. This gives some doubts, whether unions more removed from nuclear energy deal with the issue at all.

Sveriges Kommunalarbetareförbund (SKAF)

SKAF dealt with nuclear energy only at the congress in 1978. Also at this congress nuclear power was only mentioned and not discussed in a motion that dealt with the exploitation of Baltic Sea gas. Their overall evaluation of nuclear energy was rather positive (EI = 1.5^{*}). The motion was very technologically optimistic and also scored on our productionist/new politics scale (ANPE = -4.2) [10]. The board was rather positive concerning the message of the motion. However, it considered the demand that the government should start working in favor of this technology as already fulfilled. The congress followed the board's suggestion and considered the motion as responded to.

10 The sentence that mentioned nuclear energy illustrates the technic-optimism of SKAF: "The natural gas resources of the Baltic Sea could revolutionize the energy supply together with the already established nuclear power." (... naturgasförekomster i Östersjön ... kunna med sin förekomst revolutionera kraftförsörjningen tillsammans med redan etablerad atomkraft.)

At all other congresses in 1973, 1983, and 1988, nuclear energy was no issue for congressional motions or debates in SKAF.

Grafiska fackförbundet (GF)

Considering the pragmatic treatment of the nuclear energy issue in the LO unions, analyzed so far, it is surprising that GF a LO union which is relatively distant from nuclear energy in its membership, dealt with the issue rather extensively. At three congresses nuclear energy was an important political issue.

At GF's 1978 congress, a motion proposed by the district of Stockholm evaluated nuclear power decisively negative (EI = -2.88). This motion is by far the one motion of all LO unions that considered nuclear energy in a broader social context and stressed a lot of aspects which may be subsumed under the heading of new politics (ANPE = 37.5). The motion started out with the conclusion that nuclear energy would not be just a technical or economic problem but also a moral affair that concerns human responsibility for future generations. The risk of radiation would be too high because all life in regions where nuclear power plants operate could be erased. The higher the amount of nuclear plants in operation, the higher would be the risk of a heavy accident. Besides technological problems concerning the waste disposal, nuclear energy is viewed as being in the interest of capitalist profit making. Nuclear power also leads to an undemocratic society and police state [11]. The only solution would be an immediate shut-down of the nuclear reactors.

The board of GF critically evaluated nuclear energy in its statement about the motion and made it clear that GF is not against the technological development itself but that it should be steered in the interest of the workers. The board also suggested some editorial changes and recommended to consider the motion as responded to but also to submit (överbära) it to the Social Democratic Party. The statement of the board had a quite clearly negative attitude towards nuclear energy as well (EI = -2.43) and also contained some elements of new politics (ANPE = 8.3). However, it is more open for technological developments in terms of productionist politics. The following debate showed a rather controversial character in which two speakers favored nuclear energy (EI = 1.5°, and 2.5) and two disfavored it (EI = -1.5°, and -1.5). The critical contributions demanded to approve the motion and the two others spoke against it. The editor of GF's newspaper Michael Jernevall expressed in two debate contributions his critical attitude towards nuclear power. The two positive contributions, one of them from a member of the board of GF (Karl-Erik Alm), also contained elements of productionist politics. By summing up the elements of new (NP = 25.0) and productionist politics (MP = 16.7) there remains a dominance of elements of new politics (ANPE = 8.3). However, as already mentioned, the debate was not without disagreements (STD: EI = 2.15; ANPE = 7.6).

The motions and also the debate differ fundamentally from those of other LO unions. Only around 40 percent of the statements in the motions and 56 percent in the debate referred to pragmatic categories. The motion contained to nearly one third security aspects and to nearly 20 percent political and societal.

In the referendum debate, GF also took a critical attitude towards nuclear power. In sharp contrast to all other LO unions, it did not support line two but line three that demanded a shut down of nuclear plants within the next ten years. In particular, the district of Stockholm was strongly opposed to the pro-nuclear policy of LO and SAP (Grafiska fackföreningen, 1980).

The congress in 1982 had the same pattern, however, in a weaker form. One motion was proposed to the congress which evaluated nuclear energy extremely negative (EI = -3.0). It demanded an instant phasing-out of nuclear energy and a solution for the waste problem. As in the motion, it was also in the board's statement about the motion that new politics elements slightly dominated (in both cases is ANPE = 4.2). The board also evaluated nuclear energy negatively (EI = -2.38). Without further

11 Since the statement on the undemocratic tendencies is very illustrative I wish to quote the motion in this point: "Nuclear power implies a danger for a democratic society. It is a technology which is difficult to steer democratically. It creates a vulnerable society which demands a strict control over its citizens. But we do not want a police state - we want a state of free human beings and a decent state under the rule of law." (Kärnkraften medför faror för det demokratiska samhällsskicket. Den är en teknologi som är svår att styra demokratiskt. Den ger ett sårbart samhälle, som kräver en hård kontroll av medborgarna. Men vi vill inte ha en polisstat - vi vill ha en stat för fria människor och ett hederligt rättssamhälle.)

debate, the congress approved the recommendation of the board to hand over the motion to LO and the Social Democratic Party.

The treatment of nuclear energy at this congress was much more similar to the one in other LO unions. Pragmatic aspects dominated. However, the evaluation of nuclear energy was in sharp contrast to all other LO unions.

At the 1986 congress in August, no motion on nuclear energy was proposed. However, the board formulated a statement on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons in which nuclear power was very critically evaluated (EI = -2.81). The ANPE-Index also scored very high (20.8) clearly indicating that new politics elements are still dominant in GF. Five short contributions to the debate all supported the board's statement (EI-Index = -1.5*). After some editorial changes, the statement was approved by the congress.

The debate at the 1986 GF congress again stressed non-pragmatic aspects (around 46 percent). New politics elements also dominated in GF. With this characteristic, GF is clearly an exception among the pragmatic LO unions. It is interesting to see that GF has had an anti-nuclear stance from the mid 1970s to the present day.

For the LO unions, it is fair to conclude that only GF has adopted elements of new politics. All other unions favor productionist elements of politics. This is especially true for SEF. It is also in LO and Metall that productionist elements dominate over elements of new politics. The public sector unions, SF and SKAF, also do not show indications for a more favorable stand towards elements of new politics. The most striking results for the LO unions - with the exception of GF - is the fact that nuclear energy has never been controversially debated in ideological terms at the congresses. This does not mean that there has not been any disagreement on nuclear energy. In Metall, we can particularly identify motions that favor and disfavor nuclear energy. Surprising is the passive role of SF which organizes members in the nuclear power industry. Only when the government concretized a phasing-out scheme, SF took a stand in favor of nuclear energy. The pragmatic treatment of the issue of all LO unions (exception GF) also leads to the conclusion that unions like SKAF are not at all interested in energy questions that concern the organization of Swedish society. Although representatives of LO unions are present in all important commissions on energy policy (see for instance: *Socialdemokraterna* (ed.), 1990) and try to influence energy policy (LO (ed.), 1990; *Fabriks, Gruv, Metall och Pappers*, 1990), these unions are not very keen on debating the issue at their congresses. This might have some implication on democratic decision making in society in general. However, if nuclear energy does not diversify blue collar unions in Sweden what is then the attitude of white collar workers unions? This question I will pursue by looking at TCO and some of its member unions.

2. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF THE TCO UNIONS.

TCO and some of its member unions have been dealing more extensively with the nuclear energy issue than the LO unions. This is particularly true for ST and TCO itself. Apart from the fact that TCO unions are very careful in taking a congressional stand on motions that only deal indirectly with nuclear energy (only 7.4 percent of all the analyzed motions were accepted in contrast to 23.3 of LO and 15.9 of DGB unions [12]) the approved motions are usually positive towards nuclear energy and the dominance of productionist politics is overwhelming. However, there is still some disagreement within TCO unions. In order to specify this statement I wish to look at the congresses of some individual TCO unions.

Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO)

TCO dealt with nuclear energy at their congresses in 1979, 1982, and 1985. Before 1979 and at the 1988 congress nuclear energy was not an issue for a congress motion. However, the 1979 TCO congress stands out from all other congresses of Swedish unions because nuclear energy played an immensely important role at this congress. At later congresses nuclear power was treated within the framework of energy policy or environment policy and it only gained a marginal status within these motions.

12 This number of approved motions should not be confused with taking a stand on nuclear energy. Table 3-1 gives an account of the amount of approved motions that deal directly or mainly with a decision of nuclear power.

In the late 1970s, TCO attempted to take a stand on the nuclear energy issue which should have enabled TCO to influence Swedish energy policy but at the same time should not have divided its membership. TCO was careful in formulating a stand on nuclear energy which resulted in an energy report (*Energipolitiskt program*) that was submitted to the 1979 TCO congress. The report, quite in favor of nuclear energy and large-scale energy production, was part of the focus in a lot of motions [13]. All in all there were 25 motions proposed to the congress which were dealing directly or indirectly with nuclear energy. Most of these motions were submitted by ST (nine), SHSTF (five), and SL (four). The following table specifies the motions and the expressed attitudes towards nuclear energy and new and productionist politics.

Table App4-1: Nuclear Power at the TCO Congress in 1979

Motion from	EI	NP	MP	ANPE	TCO's Board proposal and congressional decision **
SIF	-1.86	12.5	4.2	8.3	responded to approval
SIF	1.50*	0	16.7	-16.7	approval
SKTF	-2.00	12.5	4.2	8.3	responded to approval
SKTF	1.00	0	0	-	approval
ST	-	0	0	-	responded to approval
ST	-	0	12.5	-12.5	responded to approval
ST	-2.82	16.7	4.2	12.5	responded to approval
ST	-2.33	20.8	0	20.8	responded to approval
ST	-2.14	12.5	4.2	8.3	responded to approval
ST	-2.00	12.5	8.3	4.2	responded to approval
ST	-1.50*	4.2	0	4.2	responded to approval
ST	-1.00*	4.2	0	4.2	responded to approval
ST	1.50*	0	12.5	-12.5	responded to approval
SALF	2.60	0	16.7	-16.7	approval
SHSTF	-3.00	8.3	0	8.3	disapproval
SHSTF	-3.00	8.3	0	8.3	disapproval
SHSTF	-2.65	16.7	4.2	12.5	disapproval
SHSTF	-1.95	16.7	0	16.7	disapproval
SHSTF	-1.50*	0	0	-	disapproval
SL	-2.89	29.2	4.2	25.0	responded to approval
SL	-2.40	8.3	0	8.3	responded to approval
SL	-1.50*	8.3	0	8.3	responded to approval
SL	-1.50*	4.2	0	4.2	responded to approval
SFL	-	0	0	-	disapproval
SFL	-1.50*	4.2	0	4.2	disapproval

* indicates that the number of evaluations is lower than 3 and is not allowed to exceed +/-1.5.

** Both are synonymous.

Four motions evaluated nuclear energy positively, eighteen negatively, and three did not evaluate it explicitly. The positive motions were submitted by SIF, SALF, SKTF, and ST. Apart from SKTF, all these motions contained arguments in favor of a productionist politics. In particular, SALF's and SIF's positive motions scored high on the productionist politics side. The motions sought to link the arguments of cheap energy supply, national economy, productionist welfare and employment [14]. Nuclear power was considered to be a cheap energy resource that would make it possible to decrease the dependency on oil. The negative motions were submitted by SIF (one motion), SKTF (one), ST (six), SHSTF (five), SL (four), and SFL (one). For most of these motions it is fair to say that they

13 See Michele Micheletti, 1985: chapters 3 and 4 for a detailed description of the process of creation and evaluation of TCO's endeavor to take a stand on nuclear energy.

14 This argumentation chain can be illustrated at the example of SALF's motion: "Sweden is a relatively small country which is dependent on its trade with the rest of the world. In order to sustain the Swedish export it is necessary to keep a competitive Swedish industry. An energy price that fundamentally exceeds the costs for energy production in other countries influences our industry negatively so that Swedish production becomes more expensive than foreign products. The Swedish economy will face difficulties to manage employment if the costs of energy increases." (Sverige är ett förhållandevis litet land, som är beroende av sin handel med övriga världen. För att upprätthålla svensk export behövs en konkurrenskraftig svensk industri. Ett energipris, som starkt överskrider andra länders kostnad för energiproduktion, verkar hämmande på vår industri, då svenska varor blir dyra i förhållande till utländska. Det svenska näringslivet får svårt att klara av sysselsättningen om energikostnaderna blir höga.)

contained elements of new politics. In particular this is true for the motions of SL, ST and SHSTF. Some of these motions challenged the link between cheap energy and positive employment effects [15]. It was also doubted that nuclear energy is a cheap energy resource; and even if it was cheap the waste of a high energy consuming society was not seen as a desirable model for a future society. The safety of nuclear reactors was also questioned and the consequences of radiation for future generations were illuminated. Some motions also stressed the negative political effects of a "nuclear society" (kärnkraftssamhälle) that would lead to undemocratic tendencies and control of citizens. However, one major point of criticism of most of these motions was that the TCO energy report was too biased pro-nuclear and that TCO had taken a stand without asking it membership or at least initiating a broader debate in TCO and its unions. The rather limited scope of the report, concentrating on technological and pragmatic aspects, was also heavily criticized. The motions ranged from the maximum values in their evaluation of nuclear energy and, in their majority evaluated nuclear power negatively (mean: EI = -1.10; STD: EI 1.8). In terms of new and productionist politics, the range was also quite wide (from -16.7 to 41.7). The motions mainly favored new politics elements and were highly diversified (mean: ANPE = 6.7; STD: ANPE = 11.9).

However, in their statements on their members' motions the board of SKTF and SHSTF recommended a rejection of these motions and evaluated nuclear energy positively in their own statements and, as in the case of SHSTF, referred to elements of productionist politics (SHSTF: EI = 1.84, ANPE = -12.5; SKTF: EI = 1.5*, ANPE = 4.2).

In their statement the TCO board expressed the importance of Swedish energy autonomy. Nuclear power would be one option and one should keep this option open. The statement in itself is extremely positive towards nuclear energy and also favors productionist politics (EI = 2.38; ANPE = -8.3). The recommendation of the TCO board can be seen from the table above.

The debate dealt mainly with the TCO report and the procedures taken by TCO to reach a stand on the issue [16]. The evaluation of nuclear energy reached from an EI of 2.00 to -1.50 with a mean of -.08 (STD = 1.5) [17]. The opening speech by Erik Wångby, a representative of the TCO board and participant of the TCO expert committee on energy policy, contained a maximum of productionist politics elements (MP = 41.7; ANPE = 37.5). Statements about the necessity of cheap energy, the link to economic growth and employment, the importance of nuclear energy in industrial countries in order to solve the energy problems of underdeveloped countries, etc. are all present in his contribution. However, he emphasized that security aspects always have priority over economic aspects. In Erik Wångby's view, however, the accident at Three Mile Island, which happened just one month before the congress, did not give any new insights so that a revision of the safety evaluation of nuclear energy could not be justified. If expert groups came to other conclusions, they would be taken into account. Among others, high ranking speakers from other TCO unions also participated at the congress debate. Inge Granquist, chairman from SIF, and Olle Söderman, who became ST's chairman in November 1979, both spoke in favor of the TCO board's suggestion. However, they did not raise any new aspects on the issue. The other contributions from members of SKTF, SLF, SALF, and SIF were more concerned with the energy report and the manner TCO reached to a decision than illuminating

15 The department of immigration within ST made this argument quite clear and furthermore stressed the instrumentalization of employment blackmailing by the proponents of nuclear power: "The threat of unemployment is often used in order to make Swedish workers and employees accept the destruction of the environment, the development of nuclear power plants, the exploitation of rivers, and continued waste of energy. According to these theories mass-unemployment would occur if we stop the energy growth. It is self-evident that all work needs energy but it is not at all clear that there is a connection between employment and the degree of energy consumption." (Arbetslöshet används ofta som ett hot mot svenska arbetare och tjänstemän för att få dem att acceptera miljöförstöring, utbyggnad av kärnkraftverk och älvar samt fortsatt slöseri. Enligt dessa teorier skulle massarbetslöshet bli följden av ett stopp för energianvändningens tillväxt. Att allt arbete kräver energi är en självklarhet, men något klart samband mellan sysselsättning och energianvändningens storlek föreligger inte.) The motions argued further in favor of a restructuring of Swedish industry.

16 The problem of formulating a stand on nuclear energy is *not* my major concern here. As for the other congresses, I am mainly interested in how far productionist and new politics elements are presented in the motions and debates. For more detailed information about the former aspect consult: Micheletti, 1985; in particular pp. 86-96.

17 The number of motions and contributions to the debate may sometimes vary to the actual number because only those items were considered that fit into the coding instructions. Motions and debates without reference to coding categories have been neglected. Since it was a coding rule to subsume the statements of the board to the debate these statements account for the more positive score of the evaluation of nuclear power.

substantial aspects concerning nuclear power. Interesting is the fact that the two contributions from SIF members, by Birgitta Furuhausen and Stig Söderberg, differed in their evaluations. The former was critical of nuclear energy whereas the latter by using productionist politics arguments was in favor of it. The contribution by the member of SALF was in favor of nuclear energy by stressing the importance of cheap energy and the link to employment (EI = 1.27; ANPE = -8.3). He stressed the fact that a phasing-out or limitation of the nuclear program would result in negative employment effects in the affected areas. The contributions of the members of SKTF and SLF were slightly critical of nuclear power. However, they both voiced their support for the TCO board policy position. Ulla Eriksson (a member of the ST executive board) spoke against the TCO report. Her attitude towards nuclear energy was rather critical and she stressed some aspects of new politics (EI = -1.50*; ANPE = 4.2). She questioned the taken-for-granted concept of wage earner interest and the impact of nuclear energy on democracy [18]. She ended her speech by recommending that the congress should give its approval to a number of motions that opposed the TCO report. Two other speakers, both from SIF, and again the TCO energy expert, Erik Wångby, addressed the congress and urged congressional approval of the report.

From the statistics of the debate which also include the statements of the individual union's boards and the TCO board, it is fair to say that the debate was relatively balanced in terms of productionist and new politics but rather diversified (ANPE mean = -.63; STD = 10.0). After all the interventions of the individual union boards, the TCO board and speeches of influential trade union representatives it is not surprising that all the critical motions on nuclear energy were rejected and the more favorable were accepted. In all cases, the congress followed the proposal of the TCO board. However, four members of SIF and three of SHSTF submitted their *reservation* to the congress decision. This is a common Swedish way of letting a decision pass and simultaneously expressing one's deviant standpoint [19].

There is a clear correlation between a positive evaluation of nuclear energy, and a positive congressional decision, and the expression of elements of new politics: the more productionist elements, the more likely the approval of the motion and the more new politics element, the more likely is the disapproval of the motion [20]. The congress gained a lot of attention from the Swedish mass media. They questioned the democratic procedures of the TCO congress. Membership protests all over Sweden mainly initiated by individual local groups started shortly after the congress (Micheletti, 1985: 96-99).

To sum up, in this congress we can identify some particular patterns. First, there was a clear cleavage at the 1979 TCO congress between those favoring nuclear energy and productionist politics and those being against nuclear energy and in favor of new politics. The former attitudes were coherently represented by SALF and the latter by the teachers' unions SL and SFL. Secondly, the cleavage line cut across individual unions, above all ST, SKTF, and SHSTF but also SIF. Thirdly, the cleavage was vertical, i.e. the "grass roots" members expressed anti-nuclear attitudes and favored new politics whereas the boards supported a pro-nuclear policy and productionist politics. This conflict was in particular strong in SKTF and SHSTF where the boards recommended disapproval of critical motions of their sections and proposed oppositional assessments in their statements. Finally, the two critical contributions at the debate were voiced by women, all other positive contributions came from men.

18 It is most interesting that a higher TCO official questioned the taken-for-granted concept of wage earner interest: "It is said that the wage earner interest should be decisive for the TCO point of view on general political issues. But have we investigated which type of society wage earners want? What do we wage earners mean by terms such as good environment, a meaningful leisure time, a meaningful job and a fair global distribution." (Man säger att löntagarintresset skall vara styrande då TCO tar ställning i samhällsfrågor, men har vi utrett vilken typ av samhälle som löntagarna vill ha? Vad menar vi löntagare med god miljö, meningsfull fritid, meningsfullt arbete och rättvis fördelning globalt?) Concerning democracy she pointed out: "Do we know today which "control society" we may get 20 years from now if we continue the development of nuclear energy? That I do not know and neither do I know how much the wage earner interest is concerned with questions of control and supervision." (Vet vi vilket kontrollsamhälle vi kan få 20 år framåt med en fortsatt utbyggnad av kärnkraften? Det vet inte jag, och jag vet inte hur långt löntagarintresset sträcker sig i fråga om kontroll och övervakning.)

19 Thomas Anton (1980: 166) relates the possibility of placing a *reservation* to the political culture of the Swedish elite: "It is thus the perfect way to express individual preference without destroying the general consensus - the perfect Swedish device."

20 The correlation between the EI-Index and the congressional decisions is: Cramer's V = .87; Contingency Coefficient = .77. The correlation between the ANPE-index and decision is: Cramer's V = .73; Contingency Coefficient = .72. The variable "decision" is ordinal scaled (approved = 1; submitted as material = 2; responded to = 3; disapproved = 4).

Although the motions and the debate frequently referred to pragmatic aspects, they also stressed more than 12 percent political and societal aspects. These latter aspects were mainly used to criticize nuclear power. Energy political, economic, and labor market aspects were used to support the application of nuclear energy. The striking difference between approved and the rest of the motions and the debate is that the former referred much less (less than half) to political and societal aspects. However, as we have seen before in the LO unions, environmental aspects were mostly used to support nuclear power. This is a striking fact, considering that the Harrisburg accident happened just one month before [21]. Also interesting is the fact that TCO did not refer to left ideological aspects at all confirming that TCO is an non-(partisan) political trade union.

At the next TCO congress in 1982, only three motions dealt with nuclear energy. However, nuclear energy was never the major object of the motions and therefore very few statements have been made concerning our research question. Two motions were submitted by ST and one by SKTF. All motions evaluated nuclear energy negative (ST: EI = -1.5* and -0.5 respectively; SKTF: EI = -1.5*) and contained some elements of new politics (ST's motions showed an ANPE of 4.2 and 8.3 respectively, SKTF had 4.2). This is mainly because alternative energy technologies were more accepted and their development promoted. The congress followed the TCO board's recommendation to consider the motions as responded to. However, the board's statement about the motions like the short debate contained no or hardly any negative statements on nuclear energy and no or very few statements concerning new politics. However, interesting is the fact that TCO mentioned left-ideological statements by demanding state or communal intervention in the energy sector.

All in all, one may conclude that a carefully critical but not negative attitude towards nuclear energy was expressed at the 1982 congress. No deeper disagreement was obvious. The smooth rejection of these motions also indicates that the issues were not at all hot at this congress. However, in reports TCO made clear that it still stuck to productionist politics [22].

This picture did not change at the 1985 TCO congress. One motion was proposed by the district of SKTF in Nybro. In the framework of environmental questions it was stated that the final waste storage would still be unsolved and environmental damages would be the cost of our welfare. The motion demanded that TCO should work nationally and internationally in order to protect the environment and to develop a report on environmental problems that can be used for the everyday trade union work. The SKTF board rejected these claims as did the TCO board (the first part was considered as responded to) because there would already exist enough general productionist that formulate a stand on environmental questions. A special report on environmental problems for trade unions would therefore not be necessary. Without any debate, the congress approved of the TCO board's proposal.

At the congress in 1988, nuclear energy was neither debated nor was any motion concerning it proposed. However, an environmental program was approved. The program demanded that conflicts about different social goals should be solved in the way that e.g. employment arguments should not hinder the improvement of the environment (TCO, 1989). Most interesting is the fact that such a program was considered as superfluous just three years ago at the TCO congress in 1985. In this time,

21 Safety aspects were not frequently mentioned. However, the debate revolved more around them (22.2 percent) but after all less than 10 percent of these statements were convinced that nuclear energy is dangerous. The fact of the low number of safety aspects in the motions is probably due to the fact that the motions were formulated before the accident at TMI (Three Mile Island).

22 In a report not analyzed here TCO expressed: "The reason why TCO is involved in the energy issue is explained by the same reason for TCO's involvement in other general political issues. ... One important union demand is that Swedish energy policy should be conducted in such a way that it helps strengthen the economy and, thereby, secures full employment and facilitates reforms of working life and general society. A good supply of energy for the competitive sector is essential for industrial development. (Secondly,) the union members are, and will in many ways continue to be, directly influenced and involved in work dealing with energy supply. They must be able to take advantage of their knowledge and experience and also be given good work opportunities." (Quoted from: Micheletti, 1985: 141) This quotation is taken from a preliminary report published in 1981 (*Energipolitisk program för TCO. En översyn inför 1982 års kongress*. TCO, 1981, Stockholm) and presented and accepted by the TCO congress in 1982 (*Facket och den tekniska utvecklingen. Energipolitisk program*. TCO, 1981, Stockholm). See also: *Handlingsprogram för TCO 1983-1985* (TCO, 1982, Stockholm).

environmental concerns gained a much higher status in Swedish society so that TCO probably felt obliged to pay some lip-service to it.

The TCO congresses during the last two decades demonstrated that TCO only took up the issue when it was brought into the organization through political pressure. TCO was taken by surprise that a technical issue such as nuclear energy should suddenly be so political. Similar to the 1986 DGB congress shortly after Chernobyl, the reactor accident of Harrisburg brought TCO into trouble. Membership protests, however, could not change the productionist politics of TCO. The board firmly stuck to a more favorable policy to nuclear energy and productionist concerns. In the 1980s, nuclear energy was not an issue for TCO anymore. Even after Chernobyl, no congressional debate emerged again. There is certainly something to the fact that TCO officials were not keen that this issue was brought up again in their organization. By comparing TCO with LO we may conclude that TCO avoided, not to say suppressed, an open debate on such a controversial issue like nuclear power. It may be fair to say that the membership of TCO unions may be more diversified on the issue than members of LO unions. TCO unions after all organize members in nuclear plants, high energy consuming industries as well as employees in those sectors most opposing nuclear energy such as social and cultural workers, teachers, etc. (see also chapter seven).

Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet (SIF)

SIF debated nuclear energy at two congresses: in 1978 and in 1981. In 1978 there were seven motions submitted to the congress. Five were extremely positive to nuclear energy and demanded that SIF should work for the development of fast breeder reactors. All these motions that scored between 2.40 and 3.0 have been proposed by one and the same member: Bertil Persson [23]. Another motion from a member of the Helsingborg district was strongly opposing nuclear power and contained several elements of new politics (EI = -2.7; ANPE = 16.7). In particular, it pointed out that the risk to endanger the life of future generations by using nuclear energy would not be justified. This motion also heavily criticized TCO's and LO's policy on this issue. The board of the district where the motion came from indicated the dilemma of TCO unions: on the one hand, TCO would like to be a party-politically neutral organization, but on the other hand, TCO would like to take a stand on important societal questions [24]. The other motions did not evaluate nuclear energy so that the average score comes to a positive evaluation of nuclear power of 1.59 but also to a positive assessment of new politics: ANPE of 4.2. The statements of the local district boards and the debate did not concentrate on nuclear energy very much. The congress debated the question how SIF and TCO could take a stand on questions with societal and political relevance and simultaneously remain party-politically neutral. The congress did not make a statement on the energy issue but left this to the TCO congress in the next year. All motions were considered as responded to.

The motions and debate mainly referred to pragmatic aspects. However, 22.5 percent dealt with security risks. In contrast to the 15 percent environmental statements, the former were more critical than the latter (33 percent of the security aspects were positive towards nuclear energy but 83 percent of the environmental). The differences of attitudes concerning nuclear energy but also between new and productionist politics were rather pronounced (STD: EI = 2.42; ANPE = 11.0).

At the SIF congress in 1981 two motions were submitted. Both again by Bertil Persson. Both motions were positive towards nuclear energy (EI = 2.74 and 1.50* respectively). However, again like three years ago, they did not score much on the productionist/new politics dimension (ANPE = 0 and 4.2) although they express an extreme technology belief. Without debate the congress followed the recommendation of the board and rejected both motions.

23 Bertil Persson was an active union member and a member of the conservative party (*Moderata Samlingspartiet*). He was also SIF's spokesman in *Sydskraft*, the South Swedish public owned power enterprise.

24 "TCO is in the unenviable situation of being a party neutral organization but at the same time it cannot refrain from taking a stand on issues important for its members." (TCO befinner sig då i den icke avundsvärd situationen att man skall vara en partipolitiskt neutral organisation, men kan samtidigt inte avstå från att yttra sig i för medlemmarna väsentliga frågor.)

At the following congresses in 1984 and 1987 nuclear energy was not debated again like it had not been debated at the SIF congress in 1972 and 1975.

SIF, although directly involved in nuclear energy through its members, did not debate nuclear energy to any large extent at its congresses. The dilemma of a party-politically neutral organization led to a more or less complete neglect of the issue. It is fair to say that one member of SIF stands for the positive motions in SIF. However, there are also more critical voices in SIF. This impression is also confirmed from the analysis of the 1979 TCO congress. The 1980s, however, did not openly diversify SIF on the nuclear energy issue.

Statstjänstemannaförbundet (ST)

ST is probably the individual union in Sweden that debated nuclear energy most extensively. All in all 10 motions and 70 debate contributions were submitted to four congresses.

Already at the congress in 1975 a member of the nature conservation section of ST proposed a motion that strongly rejected nuclear energy and contained a lot of new politics elements (EI = -2.67; ANPE = 41.7). Probably for the first time a motion of a Swedish trade union questioned the link between energy consumption, employment and living standard. The motion also focused on the extreme high security risk that would be a threat to human kind and the environment. However, by quoting the Industry Ministry on the decision of the parliament on energy policy, the board's statement evaluated nuclear energy positively by stressing productionist elements (EI = 1.89; ANPE = -8.3). The board's proposal to the congress was that ST should not take a stand on the issue and that the motion should not lead to any concrete action (att motionen inte skall föranleda någon åtgärd). A debate with six contributions followed. All contributions that evaluated nuclear energy were critical and contained elements of new politics. However, a member from the section ST-vattenfall, that organizes workers in the energy sector pointed out that ST has members in nuclear power plants. If the congress would approve of the proposed motion - which demanded a phasing-out - it would be impossible for those workers to remain members of ST.

All in all, the debate evaluated nuclear energy more negatively than positively. Including the positive statement of the board the diversity at this early ST congress was quite substantial which is documented by the standard deviation of the ANPE-Index (means: EI = -1.24; ANPE = 5.2; STD: EI = 2.16; ANPE = 14.2). The congress decision followed the proposal of the board that the motion should not result in any action.

The next ST congress took place in November 1979 several months after the turbulent TCO congress. At that time the decision had also been made that there would be a referendum in Sweden on this issue. Seven motions were proposed that dealt with nuclear energy. All motions evaluated nuclear energy negatively and were quite homogeneous in that (EI = -1.98; STD = 0.5). Elements of new politics also dominated (mean: ANPE = 10.4) and one motion even scored up to an ANPE of 33.3. The motions containing elements of new politics originated from different ST sections; among others from employees of universities, the state owned telephone enterprise *Televerket*, and county administration divisions. More than a quarter of all statements referred to political and societal aspects. This is an outstanding high amount which indicates that ST-members considered this issue in a broader social context. However, the board's statement evaluated nuclear energy positively and contained elements of productionist politics (EI = 2.33; ANPE = -4.3). It was stated that the nuclear energy option should still be kept open because it seemed to be the only alternative to oil by then (together with hydro power). The board proposed to consider all the motions as responded to. However, one member of the board, Ulla Eriksson, made a *reservation* to this decision. As we have seen at the TCO congress she had a more critical attitude towards nuclear energy than TCO board members in general.

The following debate was rather polarized. 31 contributions [25] could be coded that dealt with nuclear energy. 13 of them evaluated nuclear energy negatively, eight positively and nine were without or with balanced evaluations. The standard deviation also indicates that the debate was quite

25 The debate on nuclear energy came up several times in different contexts at the ST congress. Therefore it is difficult to draw a coherent picture here. It was also not without problems to detect all the debate contributions and it is possible that not all are included. However the general picture drawn here may reflect the debate rather realistically in terms of my thesis.

diversified (EI: STD = 1.86; mean = -0.33). The chairman of ST, Gunnar Petersson, noticed that the members' opinion on this issue was not unified and that most likely it would be very difficult to unify it. However, he stood behind the decision of the TCO congress. He suggested to approve the recommendation of the ST board to consider the motions as responded to. He thought that it would not be good to debate the issue again before the referendum. However, due to the fact that ST needs its own generated material, he conceded that ST must work on it. His speech did not contain a clear evaluation of nuclear energy nor did it contain elements of new or productionist politics. However, the debate was also diversified in terms of productionist and new politics. Ranging from -25.0 and 25.0, the mean of the ANPE is 0.0 and the standard deviation is 12.0. Not surprisingly the positive debate contributions originated from energy sectors of ST and the critical from research, teaching, administrative etc. sectors of ST. Speakers from the Stockholm district (AB-distrikt), by far the largest district of ST (26), were almost always against nuclear energy and their speeches scored among the highest in terms of new politics. Members of SIPRI, a department of the peace and research institute, were also rather critical to nuclear energy and productionist politics as was a member of the department of county administration (115 ST-länsstyrelsen). The new politics aspects referred to reach over the whole spectrum of statements: Fear for the life of future generations, doubts about the democratic control of nuclear energy etc. etc. were expressed. The debate contribution which evaluated nuclear energy most positively and contained elements of productionist politics were expressed by members of the districts of Uppsala (C-distrikt), Västmanland (U-distrikt), and the department of fishing (223 ST-Fiske). They stressed the close link between cheap energy, living standard and employment. The capacity of nuclear energy to create meaningful jobs and positive environmental effects was also stressed. About 56 percent referred to pragmatic, a quarter to security, and more than 12 percent to societal and political aspects. These figures confirm the impression from the motions that ST members debated nuclear energy in a broader context than other union members.

However, besides the expressed polarized attitudes there was also a group of members from different departments that demanded that ST should refrain from taking a stand on such a politically controversial issue at all. Britt Uhrenius from the immigration department (429 ST-Invandrarverket) proposed that "Statstjänstemannaförbundet should work for it that TCO does not take a positive or negative stand on any referendum alternative." The congress decided to follow the board's recommendation to consider the motions as responded to and to accept the proposal of Britt Uhrenius.

In October 1981, ST held an extra-congress. One reason for conducting this extra congress was to decide on an energy program for ST. The board of ST proposed a "suggestion" for such a program (ST, 1981). The nine pages long paper dealt in 27 points with the future energy policy of Sweden. It illuminated several aspects of energy policy such as the meaning of energy policy for trade unions, the consequences of the referendum, social control of the energy sector, different energy resources, employment, environmental and political aspects. Nuclear power was one important element in the program. No doubt was left that nuclear energy should be phased out because of its risks and danger to the environment. Uranium mining in Sweden should also not be started, because it would make a later phasing-out too costly and, therefore, would bind Sweden to stick with nuclear power. The evaluation of nuclear energy was clearly negative (EI = -1.82). New and productionist politics aspects were also considered but equalized each other (MP and NP = 8.3; ANPE = 0). Interesting in this context was that ST did not play nuclear energy against water power as was frequently done by LO unions. The program noticed that one should first become clear about the real consequences of a phasing-out of nuclear power and a reduction of oil import. After a lengthy debate, some alterations were made which resulted in a slightly more negative evaluation of nuclear energy (EI = -2.05) and gave new politics elements a higher priority (ANPE = 8.3). The changes mainly concerned a more determined stand against the uranium mining in Sweden. The higher new politics score results from the

26 The Stockholm district of ST is four times larger than the next biggest district of Malmöhus in the south of Sweden. ST's organizational principle is rather complicated. There are local districts and departments. There are 24 districts, one in each county of Sweden. The districts organize contacts and co-operation between the members of the different government agencies. The departments or sections (*avdelningar*) organize employees in the different government agencies. The size of these departments differs considerably: for instance the largest department organizes almost 16 000 members whereas the smallest just 14. The biggest departments with more than 10 000 members are ST-Televerket (telephone enterprise), ST-Postverket (post), and ST-ATF (university). ST organizes workers of energy sectors in two departments: ST-Energi (157 members) and ST-Vattenfall (3.097 members). Members from the energy sector account for around three percent of the membership. The 101 departments or sections are divided into about 700 branches and local units (all data apply to 1989; for an overview see: Statstjänstamannen (without date); Statstjänstamannen, 1990).

newly included demand that energy consumption should be lowered through price and tax intervention and the stronger emphasis of decentralized organization of energy supply. The use of coal was also more strongly supported than in the original suggestion. Furthermore, a new point was included that demanded that communes should be mainly responsible for the energy policy in the country but that should not result in an obstruction of the phasing-out of nuclear power.

The debate was diversified but less so than two years ago. 25 contributions to the debate have been coded. They were mainly critical of nuclear energy and favored elements of new politics (means: EI = 1.04; ANPE = .3) [27]. The proponents of new politics came again from the Stockholm district (AB-distrikt), and the telephone company (ST-Televerket). However, they never put much stress on the new politics aspects. The stronghold of productionist politics that was much more outspoken than their new politics counterparts came from the districts of Halland and Uppsala. Of particular interest were the contributions of the district of Halland where the nuclear plant of Ringhals is situated, because they were clear in their emphasis on productionist politics (ANPE = -12.5 and -16.7 respectively). In one of the speeches, it was pointed out that communes (Varberg) where nuclear plants are situated could reduce taxes and increase the living standard in the town. If a phasing-out would be conducted these benefits should still be guaranteed for the commune. The other contribution which stressed productionist aspects made it clear that ST's energy policy is unrealistic: "... we say no to nuclear power, no to oil, no to water power, no to everything. But we cannot do that. We need some sort of energy." Both contributions stress the importance of further research in the nuclear energy sector ("research is not dangerous"). As pointed out earlier, the degree of diversification was not as strong as two years before (STD: EI = 1.36; ANPE = 6.5). One reason for that may be that ST accepted a relatively critical energy program towards nuclear energy that satisfied the demands of the biggest part of its members.

The approved energy program of ST is outstanding not only because a Swedish union clearly took a stand against nuclear energy but also because it stressed approximately only 57 percent pragmatic aspects. Apart from labor market aspects in which context nuclear energy was evaluated positively, all other categories referred to nuclear power in a more critical manner. About 15 percent of the statements in the program stressed the negative environmental effects of nuclear power and almost a quarter of the statements was devoted to societal and political aspects. The debate differed from this pattern because the speakers of productionist politics voiced their opinion more strongly than before. It was also here that the pragmatic categories were as much emphasized as in other Swedish unions (around 70 percent), but security and environmental statements still have a higher status in the pro-nuclear contributions in ST than in other Swedish unions (around 15 percent).

At the 1983 regular congress, the energy action program was only shortly debated. Seven contributions debating this issue and addressing nuclear energy were coded. All evaluations of nuclear energy were critical of it and, if the contributions contained elements of new or productionist politics, they stressed the former. However, the debate kept a very low profile in all of these categories and controversy was also low (STD: EI = .67; ANPE = 2.1) [28]. Even when the controversy of this issue decreased, ST's debate was quite non-pragmatic. 60 percent referred to the pragmatic categories but 10 percent stressed societal and political aspects.

At the congress in 1987, only one motion was submitted that demanded an accelerated phasing-out of nuclear power. However, this demand was framed into a motion that spoke for an environmental program for ST and 16 other demands were also made. The board of ST proposed to consider the motion as responded to. However, it agreed on the demand that ST should develop its own environmental program. Without further debate, the congress approved the recommendation of the board.

27 The low ANPE score results in the fact that most debate contributions were short and did not contain any statements referring to new and productionist politics.

28 The debate was rather superficial. All evaluation indices for this congress have less than three evaluations. As pointed out in chapter three on the methodology the index requires at least three evaluative statements. Therefore the measures are rather unreliable and it is only possible to conclude that the contributions *tended* to be more critical than positive of nuclear energy. Although the new/productionist politics index has no frequency restriction, it should be noted that apart from one contribution, never more than one statement has been mentioned. In this area, interpretation of the data should also be done with caution.

To conclude: Since 1975, ST has been involved in an extensive congressional debate on nuclear energy. Up until 1983, the issue was very controversially debated. Although the majority of the proposed motions and the debate contributions were negative towards nuclear energy, the board refrained from taking a stand on the issue until 1981. When the issue was politicized, we can identify all controversial attitudes in ST. Groups stressed new politics elements to a very high extent as other groups stressed elements of productionist politics. The demand not to take a stand at all was also voiced. However, over time ST changed its attitudes from trying to avoid a decision to taking a stand against nuclear power. ST is unique in the fact that it also debated the issue at the elite level in a very complex manner (i.e. on the decision-making level). The anti-nuclear energy program of 1981 is just one example of this. With this program, ST is the only analyzed union in Sweden that took a negative stand on nuclear energy. However, during the latter part of the 1980s the issue did not receive much congressional attention anymore. Nevertheless, all measures indicate that ST quite clearly favors a more non-productionist politics.

Sveriges Kommunaltjänstemannaförbund (SKTF)

As we can see from the TCO congresses, SKTF members did not get tired of proposing motions which contained a quite substantial amount of elements of new politics and evaluated nuclear energy negatively. The SKTF board, however, was also very eager in rejecting those member motions. What is then the picture of the SKTF congresses?

At two congresses SKTF dealt with nuclear energy: at the congress in 1980 and 1984. In September 1980 three motions, all evaluating nuclear energy negatively were proposed (mean: EI = -1.36; ANPE = 0). There was only some disagreement concerning the evaluation of nuclear energy and also in the emphasis on new and productionist politics (STD: EI = 0.99; ANPE = 5.9). Quite a substantial amount of the statements (about one third) of these motions referred to political and societal aspects. Among others, the motions demanded a revision of SKTF's and TCO's energy policy and a stronger support for alternative energy resources. However, one motion demanded that TCO should refrain from expressing an opinion on nuclear energy at all [29]. This motion had been criticized by the local district board. It stressed the importance that TCO also addressed politically important and controversial questions such as energy problems. Otherwise the local district boards expressed no other statements that could be coded. The SKTF board pointed out that the issue had been extensively debated at the last TCO congress in 1979 and that there was a broad consensus on that issue ("Kring det beslut som fattades förelåg en bred enighet vid kongressen"). The board regretted that SKTF members at the local level were not especially interested in debating the issue in the study circles. In other words, the SKTF board noticed a membership passivity. The SKTF board supported the demand of one motion to increase the debate in SKTF but recommended to reject all other demands or to consider them as responded to. At the debate two contributions spoke in favor of one of the motions two against them. Otherwise, the debate did not express a lot of statements or evaluations. The congress accepted the recommendation of the board.

At the 1984 congress, there was one motion proposed by a member of the district of Nybro on "Swedish environment" that only very peripherally touched upon nuclear energy in the way that it indicated that the waste problem was still not solved. It also brought to notice that it would be very urgent that trade unions become concerned with environmental questions and that they should not only concentrate on the work environment. However, no statements were made that score on the

29 The motion by the local district of Stockholm should be quoted on this point because it represents a typical problem of TCO unions: "However, the future application of nuclear power is to a high degree a politically controversial question. We think that the proper behavior of union organizations is that they should stay neutral and leave it to the members to form an opinion on their own. They can then exercise their influence through political parties or other interest organizations. The involvement of TCO spokesmen in the referendum has had a negative impact on the solidarity and identification of big membership groups with their organization and has made it more difficult for them to engage in trade union work." (Den framtida användningen av kärnkraften är däremot i hög grad en samhällspolitiskt kontroversiell fråga. Vi anser att den riktiga rollfördelningen i denna fråga är att de fackliga organisationerna håller sig neutrala och överläter till sina medlemmar att själva göra sina ställningstaganden och utöva sin påverkan genom de politiska partierna eller andra intresseorganisationer. Företrädare för TCO har inför folkomröstningen agerat på ett sätt som har haft negativ inverkan på stora medlemsgrupperligars solidaritet och identifikation med organisationen, och har försvagat deras engagemang för det fackliga arbetet.)

dimension of productionist/new politics. The motion was supported by the district board. The SKTF board expressed its sympathy for the general concern of the motion but did not see reason for any concrete actions. It recommended to consider the motion as responded to.

Only very few speeches of the debate addressed the nuclear issue. One member of the Nybro district spoke in favor of the motion. He accused TCO of hesitating to take a stand on the problem of waste disposal even though they supported the decision to develop nuclear energy further. The chairman of SKTF, Sture Nordh, pointed out that it is important that SKTF has a leading idea (huvudinriktning) on this question and therefore the congress should support the recommendation of the SKTF board. The congress followed the board's recommendation to consider the motion as responded to.

SKTF is a most peculiar union in the question of nuclear power. There are some indications that the board is not very much interested in a discussion about the issue of nuclear energy and that it attempts to avoid a stand by means of congressional procedures and redefining reality. Indicators for this are, for instance, that the SKTF board in 1980 proclaimed that the debate at the TCO was unified and that members were passive about that question. It may be that SKTF members were not particularly active in the study circles but no other TCO union was as diversified at the TCO congress in 1979 as SKTF (and SHSTF). Member motions were put down by the board. To maintain, just one year later, that the decision was unified is really confusing the facts. In 1984 the procedures at the SKTF congress were also peculiar. The board takes a stand in the way that it agreed on the importance of environmental questions and that TCO would keep an eye on it. This "non-decision" is then taken by SKTF chairman Sture Nordh as a guideline in this question. By analyzing the congress material, it is fair to make the conclusion that it is more than doubtful that the board of SKTF attempted to define a stand on nuclear energy in cooperation with its members.

Sveriges Lärarförbund (SL)

The Swedish Teachers' union dealt only in one motion with nuclear energy. That was at its congress in 1977. The north Swedish local district of Umeå submitted an extremely negative motion on nuclear energy that contained a quite substantial amount of elements of new politics (EI = -2.78; ANPE = 25.0). The motion stressed the danger of nuclear energy and the unsolved problem of waste-handling. The negative environmental effects and the negative consequences for future generations were also emphasized. It doubted the efficiency of nuclear plants and also stressed the general problem of energy waste (*energislöseri*). The motion demanded a referendum on this issue. Although the motion also addressed pragmatic aspects of almost 60 percent it strongly emphasized political and societal aspects (17.6 percent). Security aspects also played a large role in the negative evaluation of nuclear energy (17.6 percent).

SL's board, however, pointed out that the motion is - according to the union's constitution § 1 - beyond the union's tasks (*går utöver förbundets ändamål*). SL's board noticed that societal and political questions can only be treated by TCO and not by SL. The congress decided - without debate - that the motion should not lead to any action (*motionen inte skall föranleda någon åtgärd av kongressen*). That was the end of congressional treatment of nuclear energy at SL congresses.

For TCO, it seems to be clear that there is a contradiction between the politics of the board(s) and the union members. This, although true for other unions as well is strikingly clear when the majority of motions that are against nuclear energy are rejected and the "hard-liner" motions of further industrial development are accepted. The disagreement between the boards and the membership is in particular strong in TCO and SKTF. Furthermore, it is fair to conclude that TCO and some TCO unions - above all SKTF, SL, but also SIF - try to avoid dealing with this issue at all. They aim to narrow union politics down to the "bread and butter" issues of the job. However, among TCO unions ST is a union that stands out from the rest of TCO unions. Initially, it was very hesitant to take a stand but later it formulated an energy program that seems to be rather critical of nuclear energy and productionist politics. ST is also different from other TCO trade unions because it deals with political and societal aspects at the higher organizational level as well, i.e. it includes ideological aspects of the development of future society (in programs and approved motions).

3. NUCLEAR POWER AT THE CONGRESSES OF WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS.

In West German unions, nuclear energy was strongly debated from the mid-1970s until the end of the 1980s. Significantly more motions on nuclear energy have been proposed at trade union congresses in West German unions than in Sweden. Table 3-1 shows that ÖTV accounts for approximately one third of all motions and debates on nuclear power. In general, one can conclude that in the Federal Republic of Germany the major debates took place in the individual unions instead of the mother organization, although the DGB took up the debate as well.

Nuclear energy was often the major issue of the motions proposed to the congresses of the "energy unions" ÖTV, IGM, and IGC. IGB, in sharp contrast to the mentioned energy unions, preferred to debate nuclear energy in the context of energy policy in general. Already from this first look at the data, it is striking that HBV and IGD were quite engaged in this issue. The former union even outnumbered the amount of motions of IGC and - including the debate contributions - comes close to IGB.

When it comes to congressional decisions, we can see that most German unions took an explicit stand on nuclear energy - in some cases these decisions have even been revised later. Only IGM and IGB decided on nuclear energy in the context of motions that deal implicitly with nuclear power or put nuclear energy in a broader context. However, when the issue was politicized the DGB often dealt with it and its stand has been decisive for other German unions as a compromise of the union movement on this issue. This is in particular true for the DGB decision in 1986.

Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)

The DGB dealt with nuclear energy at its last four congresses: in 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1986. In 1978, six motions were submitted to the DGB congress. Three of them evaluated nuclear energy negatively and the other three were positive. However, only one motion, from the youth department of the DGB, contained elements of new politics (ANPE = 12.5; EI = -1.79). In particular, the motion questioned the link between increasing energy supply and positive employment effects. The other motions which evaluated nuclear energy negatively were submitted by the postal workers' union (DPG) (EI = -2.13) and the district of Baden-Württemberg (EI = -.80). The motion that most clearly favored nuclear energy and elements of productionist politics was proposed by the ÖTV (EI = 2.42; ANPE = -12.5). The motion expressed the conviction that the final waste storage has already been solved, a fact that was later always a point of conflict. Furthermore the motion urged the congress to work for it that the reprocessing plant should be constructed as fast as possible. Nuclear power was seen as a safe technology that would produce cheap energy and create jobs.

The motions by the youth department and the Baden-Württemberg district were considered as responded to (*erledigt*) whereas the ÖTV and DPG motion were taken as material to the approved motion. The approved motion was rather moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy but was clear in its preference of productionist politics (EI = .36; ANPE = -33.3). The seven pages long motion was proposed by the DGB board. It stressed the importance of economic growth, the relation between energy supply and employment, and a preference for large-scale production. Although the motion mentioned probable risks of nuclear energy, it gave many solutions to how this risk could be handled. In addition, a motion was approved that evaluated nuclear energy positively in the context of coal and energy policy (EI = 2.0; ANPE = -8.3). This motion was submitted by the district of *Nordrhein-Westfalen*.

The debate contained four contributions. One by the chairman of DPG Ernst Breit (later DGB Chairman), two by members of IGM, and one by the DGB youth department. The speech of the DPG chairman was moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy but contained several elements of new politics (EI = .61; NP = 16.7; ANPE = 8.3). He stressed the point that nuclear energy should not be applied as long as there are any doubts about its safety. The speeches by one of the IGM members evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive and contained a lot of elements of productionist politics. It stressed the importance of economic growth and positive employment effects of nuclear energy (EI = 2.1; ANPE = -25.0). The more moderate contribution by IGM's chairman Eugen Loderer stressed some technical and political problems of nuclear power (EI = .8; ANPE = 0). In particular he focused on the decision-making processes and acceptance of nuclear power. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress of the safety of waste storage. The contribution of the member of the youth department quite clearly opposed nuclear energy (EI = -1.29) but it did not refer to any element of new or productionist politics.

From this DGB congress where nuclear energy was first debated and decided upon, one can conclude that both sides of politics were already represented in 1978. The DGB decided to take a quite outspoken stand on the productionist side. In that, it was supported by its strong trade unions IGM and ÖTV. The new politics elements were voiced by the youth department and - more surprisingly - the postal workers' union expressed its criticism of nuclear energy. This motion was even backed up by DPG's chairman Ernst Breit who also stressed some new politics elements. About two thirds of the statements in the motions and debate referred to pragmatic aspects. However, all contributions stressed the importance of the societal implication of nuclear energy. In particular, this is true for the approved motions. This indicates clearly that the debate at the 1978 congress was also rather complex. However, most of these statements were quite positive to nuclear energy.

In 1981 the DGB conducted its fourth extra congress. At this congress, the DGB formulated a general program. Nuclear power was part of section 14: energy policy. In this context, six proposals were submitted. Four were more or less neutral towards nuclear energy and contained only few elements of productionist politics (EI = -.29; -.06; .57; ANPE = -4.2; .0; -4.2). The former were submitted by IGM (approved of with changes), the second by GEW (rejected), and the latter was the final approved version of the DGB board. The fourth proposal by the district of Baden-Württemberg (rejected) did not contain any evaluation or elements of new or productionist politics. However, there were also two motions that evaluated nuclear energy more positively but which did not refer to our categories of new and productionist politics. These positive motions were submitted by the DGB board (responded to or *erledigt*) and ÖTV (approved of) (EI = 1.67 and 1.33 respectively).

The debate did not focus very much on nuclear power. One contribution by the DGB board supported the motion of the GEW (EI = -.67; ANPE = 4.2) and the youth department stressed the importance that unions must attract the youth through its policy. However, the speech is neutral concerning our measures.

As in 1978 the DGB accepted also in its extra congress in 1981 the slightly more positive proposals towards nuclear power (mean EI = 1.18 in 1978 and .95 in 1981). The change in the ANPE from -20.8 to -4.2 cannot be interpreted as a substantial change of politics but can rather be explained by the very infrequent references to those statements that we defined before as elements of new and productionist politics. The conclusion is that the DGB still stuck to its positive evaluation of nuclear energy but that the conflicting elements were not acute at this congress.

In 1982, the next regular DGB congress took place. Four motions were proposed to the congress that dealt with nuclear energy. The picture is the same as at the former congresses. The approved motion proposed by the DGB board was positive towards nuclear energy and contained a few elements of productionist politics (EI = 1.0; ANPE = -4.2). This motion was opposed by a rejected motion of the youth department (EI = -1.77; ANPE = 16.7). The latter motion pointed out that nuclear energy is unacceptable since it endangers future generations in a way it was never known before in history. It also stated that society will reach limits of technological progress. The two motions from DPG were rather moderate (EI = .86; .0; ANPE = -8.3; -4.2). Both were supplemented as material to the approved motion. There was no debate on these motions at the congress. Pragmatic aspects made again about 60 percent of all statements. Security aspects also scored relatively high as at the other congresses as well. The left-ideological statements were mentioned particularly often in the approved motions (around 14 percent) and were concerned with the public ownership of energy enterprises.

The last DGB congress that has been analyzed here is the 1986 congress. This congress is of special interest because the DGB officially changed its positive stand on nuclear energy and proclaimed to work for a phasing-out of nuclear power. The important question, however, is whether the DGB also changed in terms of new and productionist politics.

The 1986 DGB congress took place just four weeks after the reactor accident at Chernobyl. However, the congress had been planned a long time before and motions on nuclear energy were also already prepared. After the Chernobyl accident the proposers of the "leading motion" [30] themselves - DGB

30 A leading motion (*Leit Antrag*) aims to summarize the opinions of different attitudes of different unions and should serve as an orientation of trade union policy in the future. In particular, a leading

board, IGC, IGM, and ÖTV - suggested substantial changes in the original motion. In the form of an *Initiativantrag* [31] the mentioned unions and in addition IGB suggested a phasing-out of nuclear energy. This alteration of the original motion should take the changed situation after Chernobyl into account. However, it could not prevent a controversial debate at the congress in which the chairpersons of concerned unions expressed their opinions. The motion committee suggested some changes in order to balance the motions in accordance to other suggestions voiced at the congress. This final version of the motion was carried by just one vote against it. In formal terms of my analysis, the motions had the following characteristics: The leading motion formulated before the Chernobyl accident evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive and stressed productionist aspects of politics based on the already known argumentation chain that energy supply, economic growth and employment are positively related (EI = 1.5; ANPE = -20.8). Another motion proposed by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen was also formulated before Chernobyl. It criticized the fast breeder and further expansion of nuclear energy but stressed the importance of the high temperature reactor for the coal industry. However, the motion is rather moderate in its evaluation (EI = -.84; ANPE = 4.2).

At the congress, there were several suggestions how to change the original motion. All these changes refer to § 5 (the peaceful use of nuclear energy; *die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie*) and were made in form of *Initiativanträge* [32]. First, ÖTV chair-person Monika Wulf-Mathies and colleagues proposed substantial changes for the original motion (EI = -1.07; ANPE = 0). The negative evaluation was based on the conviction that Chernobyl had demonstrated that nuclear energy must be abandoned. The other two *Initiativanträge* which suggested alterations of the original motion were less negative towards nuclear energy and stressed fewer elements of new politics (Heinz Putzhammer from GEW: EI = -.86; ANPE = -4.2; Siegfried Weiss: EI = -1.0; ANPE = -8.3). Changes which were made by the motion committee in Monika Wulf-Mathies' *Initiativantrag* made the motion appear more negative towards nuclear energy but moderated the motion in terms of new politics (EI = -1.20; ANPE = -8.3). For instance, the motion committee changed the formulation that the energy policy should be changed to a more general statement that nuclear power should be utilized for just a limited time. The congress accepted the motion with the suggested changes of the motion committee.

Apart from motions which suggested changes of the leading motion two further independent motions were proposed. First, one motion by the youth department that was formulated before the Chernobyl accident and that mainly dealt with the reprocessing plant. It rejected this plant completely and by doing so the motion also referred to some elements of new politics (EI = -2.6; ANPE = 12.5). The second motion was submitted by Lorenz Schwegler et al. a board member of HBV (chairman since 1988) and was formulated after Chernobyl (initiative motion). He evaluated nuclear energy negatively and demanded a change of the energy policy. This motion also contained elements of new politics (EI = -1.86; ANPE = 12.5).

The debate was controversial about the way and the pace of a phasing-out. However, all contributions verbally evaluated nuclear energy negatively. The mean of the EI of all debate contributions is -1.66 but the differences are still quite substantial (STD = .93). Nine contributions spoke in favor of the version that finally was approved of by the congress and two expressed their disagreement. Those contributions which disagreed with the later accepted motion evaluated nuclear energy more negatively than the average. However, in terms of productionist and new politics no such difference can be identified.

As mentioned above many influential members of the German union movement participated in the debate. In what follows, I wish to summarize the contribution in the light of their evaluation of nuclear energy and their attitudes towards new politics. First, Karl Heinz Hoffmann, deputy chairman and energy expert of the ÖTV expressed his opinion. Although he evaluated nuclear energy rather negatively, his speech was balanced in terms of new and productionist politics (EI = -1.39; ANPE = 0). Heinz-Werner Meyer, chairman of the IGB (chairman of the DGB since 1990) was more moderate in

motion summarizes results of expert groups etc. which worked between the congresses and translates these (new) insights into unions policy.

31 An *Initiativantrag* (initiative motion) is a motion which is formulated shortly before a congress because of special reasons.

32 Since the more productionist statements were also expressed in the unchanged parts of the motion, the evaluation of those statements were not affected by the alterations. That means in analytical terms that all suggested changes also receive the values of the statements of the unchanged parts of the motion. Therefore the whole motion still has a quite "productionist" trend.

his negative evaluation of nuclear energy and balanced his argument on new and productionist politics (EI = -.64; ANPE = 0). Both speakers pointed out that the compromise expressed in the motion is quite difficult to accept for some members of the unions because it affects their vested interests as wage earners in the energy sector. The next speaker, Ernst Haar chairman of the Railroad Workers' union (GdED), evaluated nuclear energy more negatively and stressed elements of new politics (EI = -1.5; NP = 16.7; ANPE = 12.5). He demanded a phasing-out of nuclear energy because this technology would be impossible to handle (*unbeherrschbar*). Furthermore he stated that nuclear energy had demonstrated that society believes too much in technological progress. The next speaker, Franz Steinkühler, current chairman of IGM, is quite radical in his rejection of nuclear power. He expressed the conviction that the unsolved situation of the final storage of radioactive productionist endangers the mankind for several thousands of years and under the applause of the congress audience, he concluded that nuclear energy is only possible, if we would accept a police state [33]. These strong expressions are also reflected in the indices which are more negative to nuclear energy and contain more elements of new politics than the average (EI = -2.15; NP = 16.7; ANPE = 12.5). Also Lorenz Schwegler, chairman of HBV since 1988, was strongly against nuclear energy and stressed aspects such as the endangered lives of future generations through nuclear energy (EI = -2.39; ANPE = 12.5). However, Franz Steinkühler as well as Lorenz Schwegler both suggested to approve of the recommendation of the motion committee.

The other contributions which were more negative to nuclear energy than the average have been expressed by members of the GEW, HBV, the youth department, and a member of the DGB board. The two contributions by the GEW evaluated nuclear energy rather negatively and stressed new politics elements (EI = -2.76, -2.64; ANPE = 8.3, 12.5 respectively). The most negative evaluation of nuclear energy stemmed from a member of HBV who also rejected the suggested version of the motion (EI = -2.88). The contributions of the DGB board member (EI = -2.06) and the youth department (EI = -2.37) were not distinct in their emphasize of elements of new politics (ANPE = 4.2). The contributions that still contained the most elements of productionist politics and /or evaluated nuclear energy less negatively came from two members of the DGB board (EI = -0.5; ANPE = -4.2 and ANPE = -4.2), the motion committee (EI = -.60), the food processing workers' union (*Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten*; NGG) (EI = -.24), and the Artists and Musicians' union (*Gewerkschaft Kunst*) (EI = -1.0; ANPE = 4.2).

The decision of the congress had to be seen in the light of the Chernobyl accident. If the accident at Chernobyl would not have happened, the motion committee would have accepted the original motion. The motion committee would have also taken the motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district as material and would have rejected the motion of the youth department. (Grumbach, 1986: 277). However, after Chernobyl and the congress debate, the congress accepted the leading motion in the version mentioned above. The motions of the Nordrhein Westfalen district and the youth department were considered as responded to as were the suggested changes of the original motion by the other motions. Not surprisingly, the motion and debate was rather complex by stressing security, left-ideological, and political and societal aspects.

Over time, we have identified a cleavage within the DGB congresses. On the one hand, there are the influential groups and unions that favor nuclear power. In particular, ÖTV and IGM took a quite clear positive stand on nuclear energy. These groups also stressed productionist politics. On the other hand, there was a relatively small group that had opposed the main stream of productionist politics, namely the postal workers' union, the district of Baden-Württemberg, and the youth department. These fronts are persistent in the DGB up until the beginning of the 1980s. The exceptional situation of the congress in 1986 led to a more critical estimation of the productionist social development. Interesting is the fact that the leaders of IGM and HBV took relatively clear positions in favor of new politics. However, during all the years the DGB has discussed nuclear energy in relatively complex terms when the issue had been politicized. This was true for the congress in 1978 and 1986. At the other two congresses in 1981 and 1982 political aspects were less relevant. In order to get a more detailed picture of the shift in attitudes of the German unions, I wish to look at some individual trade unions of the DGB.

33 In his own words: "In this country, nuclear energy can only be pushed through by means of a police state." (Die Kernenergie ist in diesem Lande nur noch mit polizeistaatlichen Mitteln durchzusetzen). See congress protocol: 389.

IG Metall (IGM)

IGM dealt with nuclear energy at four congresses: in 1977, 1980, 1983, and 1986. In 1977 there were eleven motions which dealt with nuclear energy submitted to the congress. The mean of the evaluation of all motions [34] is rather balanced $-.11$. However, the standard deviation of 1.73 shows that the motions were very different in their evaluation of nuclear power. However, the mean of ANPE-Index indicates that productionist politics elements were dominant in comparison with elements of new politics (mean of ANPE = -2.3). There existed also on this level substantial disagreement (STD: ANPE = 12.7).

In eight motions, nuclear energy was the major issue. All of them were responded to (*erledigt*) and an *EntschlieÙung* on energy policy was approved of. Four of the motions were negative to nuclear energy and three were positive (one without evaluation). The most negative motion also contained a lot of elements of new politics (EI = -2.30 ; ANPE = 20.1) and was submitted by the youth department of IGM. In more than four pages, the youth department stressed that nuclear energy will threaten citizen rights and democracy. Important for the union's self-understanding is the fact that the youth department challenged the suggested and frequent argument that energy increase is more or less directly related to positive employment effects. In contrast the youth department concluded that achieving full-employment at any price would be inappropriate for union policy. By weighing the employment and security aspects, the youth department came to the conclusion that the risks of nuclear energy are too enormous. The other motions which evaluated nuclear energy negatively originated from the north German districts (Wilhelmshaven and Emden: EI = -2.29 , -1.5° ; ANPE = 8.3 , 4.2 respectively) and from a district in the industrial Ruhr area (Dortmund: EI = -1.5° , ANPE 4.2). The positive motions were quite moderate in their positive evaluation (EI = 1.0° , $.86$, 1.50°) and - except from one - did not contain a lot of productionist politics elements. The motions that scored highest on the productionist politics scale came from the local district of Mülheim an der Ruhr, a site where equipment for nuclear reactors is produced (*Kraftwerks Union*, KWU) (ANPE = -12.5). This motion postulated that it is common knowledge that energy demand, economic growth and employment are positively correlated. This chain of arguments were also presented in the approved *EntschlieÙung* that even exceeded the positive evaluation of all other motions which were positive towards nuclear energy and also contained many elements of productionist politics (EI = 1.61 ; ANPE = -16.7). A further development of nuclear energy was seen as unavoidable. Measurements of conserving energy or the development of alternatives should not lead to an increase in energy prices. Furthermore, the *EntschlieÙung* demanded that administrative and technological procedures should be developed that would make misuse of nuclear technologies impossible and so that it would be possible to export nuclear equipment also to third world countries.

The debate included 13 contributions. Eight of them rejected the *EntschlieÙung*, seven of them suggested the acceptance of the motion of the youth department instead. Five contributions spoke in favor of the *EntschlieÙung*. Not surprisingly, all contributions that supported the *EntschlieÙung* evaluated nuclear energy positively. Surprising, however, is that the evaluation of these contributions was so strongly positive (EI = 2.68 , 2.82 , 2.75 , 2.04 respectively; one contribution could not be evaluated). Those in favor of the motion from the youth department scored between -1.5° and -2.52 . In terms of new and productionist politics there was also a clear dividing line between the contributions of the debate ranging from NP = 37.5 (ANPE = 33.3) to MP = 20.8 (ANPE = -20.8). The attitudes expressed in this debate of the IGM were extremely diversified (EI Std = 2.3 ; ANPE Std = 14.2).

One can conclude that the motions stressed positive economic and energy political aspects, on the one hand, and the security risks, negative environmental and social effects, on the other. However, the two latter aspects played only a minor role so that the conflicting line on nuclear energy at the IGM congress in 1977 was represented by positive economic versus negative security effects. The positive stand for the approved *EntschlieÙung* resulted from its firm positive stress of energy political (33 percent of statements), economic (17 percent), and labor market (8 percent) aspects. However; it was also pointed out in the *EntschlieÙung* that nuclear energy might be safe or that sufficient safety standards could be reached (25 percent). Environmental aspects had been completely neglected in the *EntschlieÙung*. Political and societal aspects, however, also played a fundamental role in the approved *EntschlieÙung*. The debate reflected the same trends as the motions, however, in a weaker form.

Instead of stressing political arguments, positive environmental effects of nuclear energy were mentioned.

In summation: the congress of IGM in 1977 contained both elements of productionist and new politics. The actors of the different viewpoints were from the work councils of enterprises that produce nuclear power equipment and the official power holders, on the productionist politics side, and from the youth department and some local districts (above all Wilhelmshaven), on the new politics side. However, their decision clearly preferred productionist politics and accepted nuclear power.

It was also at the IGM congress in 1980, that nuclear energy was controversially debated. There were five motions dealing directly with nuclear energy in the context of energy policy. Another motion only mentioned nuclear power (this was the second accepted motion at this congress containing statements on nuclear power). We can again identify the same pattern of congressional treatment as in 1977. However, this time the *EntschlieÙung* moderated the evaluation of more determined motions (EI = -.05). Although the overall ANPE-Index shows that productionist politics were favored (ANPE = -4.2) the *EntschlieÙung* also contained several elements of new politics (NP = 8.3). This is due to the statements that energy policy should be changed in favor of alternative and renewable energy sources. However, productionist politics elements still dominated (MP = 12.5). The *EntschlieÙung* was particularly careful in pointing out that security problems may exist. Nevertheless, there was optimism that these problems could be solved. A motion from the work council of the reactor producing enterprise KWU in Mülheim an der Ruhr quite clearly indicated that the workers' interest in cheap energy was to guarantee economic growth and increase in the standard of living. The highly positive evaluation of nuclear energy (EI = 2.30) is connected with a rather productionist argumentation (ANPE = -16.7). The opposite is again true for the motion of the youth department (EI = -2.46; ANPE = 20.8). In more than three pages, the motion indicated, for example, that democratic freedom has already been endangered through the security measures. Nuclear power was seen as unnecessary and obstructing a reform of energy policy. The other two motions, slightly more positive and productionist, did not add much to the understanding of the different opinions at this IGM congress.

Eight speakers participated in the debate. Four disfavored the *EntschlieÙung*, and three of them suggested to accept the motion of the youth department instead. A contribution, which had been made by a member of the local district in Darmstadt, was especially strong in its negative evaluation of nuclear energy and stressed elements of new politics (EI = -3.0; ANPE = 16.7). The three contributions in favor of the *EntschlieÙung*, all favored nuclear energy and partially contained elements of productionist politics (up to ANPE = -12.5). Like the motions, the debate was rather diversified in terms of new and productionist politics (STD: motions ANPE = 15.7; debate ANPE = 10.9).

In 1977, the motions and debates were not only very diversified in terms of the evaluation of nuclear energy but also in their preference of productionist and new politics. However, in 1980, after the experience of the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the *EntschlieÙung* was very balanced in its evaluation of nuclear energy, in contrast to a clearly positive *EntschlieÙung* in 1977. The positive evaluation in the motions mainly came from statements that stressed the advantage of nuclear energy for the economy. The *EntschlieÙung*, however, also pointed out that nuclear energy had positive technological and labor market effects. The conviction was also expressed that the security could be improved to acceptable standards. Some of the motions and the contribution to the debate stressed the fact that nuclear energy could have negative effects on the employment situation. In the debate, critical voices also stressed the negative political and social aspects of nuclear energy. The actors of pro and con opinions were still the same: work councils of nuclear power enterprises, on the one hand, and the youth department, on the other. At this congress, IGM also did not limit the discussion about nuclear energy to pragmatic categories. In particular, security and political aspects of nuclear energy made nearly one third of all statements. However, the effect of nuclear power to the environment was only very seldom mentioned.

At the IGM congress in 1983, two very different motions were submitted. It was again an *EntschlieÙung* and a motion by the youth department. The former was slightly positive towards nuclear energy (EI = 1.0) whereas the latter was clearly negative (EI = -2.14). The different evaluation of nuclear energy was also connected with different attitudes towards productionist and new politics (ANPE = -4.2 and 12.5 respectively). The approved *EntschlieÙung* stressed the known aspects: positive energy (44 percent of all statements), labor market (11 percent) and security aspects (22

percent). However, more than ten percent of the arguments demanded the nationalization or state control of nuclear energy. The motion of the youth department based its negative evaluation on negative employment and security arguments. At this IGM congress, the positive nuclear energy /productionist attitudes were also in conflict with negative/new politics attitudes (STD: EI = 2.22 and ANPE = 11.8). The actors were the same ones as earlier: the established power holder against youth department. The shift from clear positive attitudes towards nuclear energy to a more neutral evaluation of it in 1980 leveled off in a slightly positive evaluation in 1983. For the first time, the motion contained less political aspects than at the former congresses. Nevertheless, IGM gave quite a lot of attention to security and left-ideological aspects at this congress. However, there was no debate on nuclear energy at this congress.

In 1986 the next IGM congress took place five months after the DGB congress in May 1986 where the DGB had taken a critical stand on nuclear power. In a relatively short time IGM experienced two changes in leadership. After 13 years, Eugen Loderer had resigned in 1983 and Hans Mayr took his place. Franz Steinkühler, charismatic and dynamic, was a new type of trade union leader. In 1983, he was deputy chairman, and would have the option to become chairman at the next congress. This became true at the IGM 1986 congress. As we will see the new chairman contributed quite substantially to the debate on nuclear power.

21 motions dealing with nuclear energy were submitted to the 1986 IGM congress. All of them were negative towards nuclear power. Most of them contained elements of new politics. None stressed productionist politics. A motion by the local district of Darmstadt was strongest in stressing elements of new politics (ANPE = 20.8), pointing out that a nuclear accident may erase whole continents, making life impossible for future generations. Other motions that scored quite high on the new politics scale were proposed by the youth department, and the districts of Augsburg and Amberg in Bavaria, where the controversial reprocessing plant was to be built. The former motion was taken as material, (with two others) the latter motions were seen as responded to (*erledigt*) as 17 others. The approved *EntschlieÙung* also evaluated nuclear energy negatively and contained elements of new politics (EI = -1.4; ANPE = 12.5). The elements of new politics consist of: a reevaluation of the risk perception as unacceptable, the demand of a change in energy policy towards decentralization, and an international abolition of nuclear energy. By looking at the mean values, we can see that the *EntschlieÙung* was more moderate in its critical evaluation of nuclear energy than the average of the motions but that it was above the average in terms of new politics (mean of all motions: EI = -2.02; ANPE = 7.6).

Nine debate contributions were made. Three in favor of the *EntschlieÙung*, three against it. One contribution wanted the more radical motion by the Darmstadt district to be accepted. All the contributions speaking against the approval of the *EntschlieÙung* disfavored stronger nuclear energy than the rest of the debate contributions. In a lot of the speeches the *EntschlieÙung* was seen as a confirmation of the phasing-out demand of the DGB. The DGB decision was seen as a compromise, a common dominator. The critical contributions questioned whether it could be the policy of IGM to remain on the level of this compromise or if it would be better to develop the DGB decision further. These contributions expressed the wish that IGM would become active in further political action against nuclear energy. If IGM would not attempt to act further in a progressive way, these contributions stressed, IGM could not be a political union. A member of the work council of the nuclear enterprise KWU, however, pointed out that an immediate phasing-out was not possible because due to a lack of alternatives. Furthermore, he stressed that the *EntschlieÙung* was a compromise which he could accept, but he and workers in the nuclear industry could not go further. The last speaker was the new chairman Franz Steinkühler. Although his speech did not contain any elements of new or productionist politics, he was quite determined in his phasing-out demand with which he evaluated nuclear energy more negatively than the average of the speakers at the congress (EI = -2.09; EI mean = -1.54).

The motions (both approved and responded) differ from former years in that they stressed stronger than before the *negative* political and societal aspects and relied even less frequently on pragmatic aspects. Furthermore, it is interesting that the 1986 IGM congress had the lowest diversity rate in terms of the evaluation of nuclear energy and the conflict between productionist and new politics (STD: EI = 1.0; ANPE = 4.8). It seems that the long existing intra-union opposition to nuclear energy could gain ground and that there was no pro nuclear faction which strongly voiced its opinion, in IGM in 1986. In so far this is only true as we rely on the presented material here. Certainly, there were workers in IGM whose job was directly dependent of nuclear energy and who have had difficulties in

accepting the anti-nuclear stand of their union. However, Over the years IGM has become a union that is relatively open to new political concerns. The potential for new politics has been already present in IGM since the mid-1970s, expressed mainly in motions by the youth department but also supported by larger groups in IGM represented by certain local departments. However, important is that also the power holders in IGM seem to have changed their attitudes. This is also connected with a generational change in the leading positions in IGM. The new chairman, Franz Steinkühler, may represent a new kind of union leader who creates a new type of political union for modern society. In this context, it is also important to note that IGM intends to be a political union which is a sharp contrast to most of the Swedish unions.

IG Bergbau und Energie (IGB)

A special feature of IGB is that it has a smaller union congress (*Gewerkschaftstag*) every year. However, the following analysis includes only the bigger union congresses (*Gewerkschaftskongreß*) which are held every fourth year. Although energy policy is one of the major interests of IGB and has been debated throughout the years, nuclear energy was a subject in only several motions at the congresses in 1980, 1984, and 1988. Another unique feature of IGB concerning IGB congress motions is that they are relatively short and IGB is very careful not to reject motions.

In 1980, there were five motions proposed, three slightly critical to nuclear energy, one neutral, and one positive. The positive motion was slightly altered (to a more positive assessment of nuclear power) before it was to be accepted by the congress. The negative statements toward nuclear energy referred to the unsolved waste storage and the competition between coal and nuclear power. Coal was presented as the more reliable and national energy source. However, when it came to the high temperature reactor, the evaluation of nuclear power was more positive. The high temperature reactor makes coal refining possible. The high temperature reactor is often considered to be the only technological possibility to produce such high temperatures which are necessary for the coal refining. No motion gave any hint of new politics elements including the one that considered nuclear power more critically. In contrast, some motions stressed elements of productionist politics. For instance, it was stated that people who are against the peaceful use of nuclear energy are also against progress in general. Three motions were approved of at this congress, one with a slightly negative evaluation of nuclear energy (EI = -1.0), one clearly positive (EI = 1.77) and one more neutral (EI = .14). The motion which was positive towards nuclear energy also contained elements of productionist politics (ANPE = 8.3). There was no debate about these motions.

Although there was some diversity concerning the evaluation of nuclear power, (STD: EI = 1.44) there was none in respect to new and productionist politics (Std: ANPE = 0). IGB followed a clear productionist politics which was also expressed in the categories which were referred to. More than 90 percent of the statements focused on pragmatic aspects.

This did not change much at the congress in 1984, where eight motions were proposed that contained statements on nuclear power. The evaluations (two slightly positive, four slightly negative, one clearly negative, and one without evaluation) were based on the same arguments that had been made four years ago. However, the most negative motion contained one statement of new politics. It demanded that costs for reprocessing and final waste storage should be included in the calculation of atomic electricity. Furthermore, it challenged the argument that electricity from nuclear energy is good for the environment and is cheap. The motion pointed out that filters for coal power stations would be cheaper than all the by-costs of nuclear energy. However, it would be too much to conclude that IGB is on its way to become a new politics union (ANPE of 4.2 is still rather marginal). All these motions were taken as material for a motion on energy and resource policy that itself did not contain any argument concerning nuclear power. However, the motions and the debate also focused more on the negative employment effect of nuclear energy for the coal sector. In particular, in the three debate contributions, approximately half of the arguments addressed this aspect. All in all, the treatment of nuclear power was a bit less pragmatic than four years ago although the vast majority still concentrated on pragmatic aspects (around 80 percent).

In 1988 16 motions contained arguments on nuclear power. All except one evaluated it negatively. However, the evaluation was rather moderate. Five motions also contained elements of new politics. Apart from the already known arguments of the other congresses, the motions stressed the unacceptable risks of nuclear energy and demanded the development of alternative energy resources. As in most other unions, the motion of the youth department was extremely against nuclear energy

and contained more arguments of new politics than most of the other motions (EI = -2.0; ANPE = 8.3). However, all motions were taken as material for the approved motion proposed by the board. This motion did not contain any argument of productionist and new politics but was clear in its rejection of nuclear energy (EI = -1.33).

The debate included five contributions that evaluated nuclear energy or contained arguments for or against nuclear power. Like the motions also the debate contributions were moderate in their evaluation. Productionist politics was never really challenged, as one contribution pointed out: "we are certainly all for progress".

In all motions and the debate, labor market arguments played an important role. These arguments were more frequent in IGB than in any other union (around 20 percent). One can get the impression that the accident at Chernobyl revealed the latent conflict between coal and nuclear energy which had been concealed through government intervention. Coal was declared as *the* alternative for the German energy policy. Coal would be not only more reliable than other energy sources such as nuclear energy, but also less dangerous and more suitable for the environment. However, this conflict between coal and nuclear energy has never been a conflict between new and productionist politics in IGB.

If we consider the attitude towards new politics in IGB through time, we may conclude that IGB belongs to the more productionist trade unions in Germany. The positive attitude towards productionist politics did not change through the re-evaluation of nuclear energy after the Chernobyl accident and the DGB congress in 1986. The relation between nuclear energy and coal was never without reservations. The threat of nuclear power was too strong for the jobs in the floundering mining industry. There was never much enthusiasm about the development of nuclear energy in IGB as in the other energy unions. Only the high temperature reactor was considered as a technology that may open new possibilities for coal-refining. The shift from a positive assessment of nuclear energy to a negative one was not difficult for IGB. Now coal could increase its status in the energy policy in West Germany and the jobs in the coal sector would become more stable. Coal should gain the reputation of being a reliable, national but also clean alternative to nuclear energy and also to other alternatives. However, the criticism of nuclear energy was still moderate. Probably because IGB did not want to endanger the current compromises. A conservative government in Germany was still quite reluctant to prolong the contract for electricity production through coal. Furthermore, it was more than doubtful that a conservative government would initiate a phasing-out of nuclear energy. In terms of my analysis there are not many hints that there was a stable opposition against the productionist politics in IGB. The few new politics arguments did not challenge the productionist politics in any fundamental way. The political and societal arguments were seldom referred to and if that had happened as at the congress debate in 1988, they were more in favor of a productionist development. At the congress in 1988, more than 80 percent of all statements referred to pragmatic categories.

IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik (IGC)

Although IGC organizes workers in nuclear industries in the area of reprocessing and enrichment (larger sites are in Hanau: Nukem, Alkem, RBU, and Transnuklear), it came relatively late to a congressional decision on nuclear power, if one compares it with ÖTV (1972) or IGM (1977). At the congress in 1980, IGC faced six motions dealing directly with nuclear energy and in the context of energy and economy policy. The motions were very diversified in both their evaluation of nuclear energy and their preference of new and productionist politics (STD: EI = 2.0; ANPE = 16.2). As in IGM, the youth department was responsible for a motion that contained a lot of new politics elements (NP = 33.3) and evaluated nuclear energy very negatively (EI = -2.57). Besides stressing the unacceptable risks inherent with the use of nuclear energy, the youth department elaborated the argument that nuclear energy would lead to a police state [35]. Furthermore the motions pointed out that conserving energy would not lead to a decrease of "so-called welfare". Rather, new jobs would be created through

35 A quote from the motion of the youth board: "Our biggest worry about the further development of nuclear plants is the development of our democratic state towards a police state. Barbed wire, guarding around the clock, political examination of all employees that have direct or indirect access to nuclear plants are necessary in order to ensure a perfect supervision of nuclear plant." (Unsere größte Sorge bei der Weiterentwicklung von Atomkraftwerken ist aber die Entwicklung unseres demokratischen Staates zum Polizeistaat. Stacheldraht, Bewachung rund um die Uhr, politische Überprüfung aller Arbeitnehmer, die direkt oder indirekt Zugang zu Atomkraftwerken haben, sind notwendig, um eine lückenlose Überwachung von Atomkraftwerken und Entsorgungsanlagen zu gewährleisten.)

insulation of flats etc. The immense high costs of research and development of nuclear energy would also hinder any attempt of the development of alternative energy technologies. Another motion from the shop stewards of BASF, Siegle, Stuttgart-Feuerbach of the district of Baden-Württemberg also stressed fundamental elements of new politics (ANPE = 29.2). The motion contains most of the arguments already mentioned in the one from the youth department but it also stressed the point that nuclear energy has been made to a myth in modern society that originated from a time in which unlimited growth seemed to be possible. Even more the motion said that this picture had only been instrumentalized to make profits. However, the board of the Baden-Württemberg district submitted a motion containing some elements of productionist politics and in contrast, to the former motion from the same district, it evaluated nuclear energy positively. The other motions came from the "industry committee chemistry" (*Industriegruppenausschuß Chemie*) that evaluated nuclear energy positively (EI = 1.5; ANPE = -4.2) and the district Hannoverisch-Münden from the tyre firm Continental that were clearly negative towards nuclear power (EI = -2.11; ANPE = 4.2). Following the motion committee all motions except the motion of the district board of Baden-Württemberg were responded to (*erledigt*). The latter was included at material for the approved motion proposed by the board of IGC. The approved motion stressed the connection between energy supply and economic growth that would lead to the regaining of full-employment. This motion contained some elements of productionist politics (ANPE = -8.3) and evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive (EI = 1.78).

The debate was also diversified (STD: EI = 1.76; ANPE 11.7). Eleven contributions were made, five in favor of the board's motion and two against it. The motion of the board was not only criticized by contributions opposing nuclear energy but also by a speech which proposed that the motion of the Baden-Württemberg district board should be accepted (this speech did *not* come from the district of the motion). This contribution pointed out that the motion of the board was rather unclear in its demands on waste storage and the necessity of nuclear power. Other contributions such as the one by the district of Saarbrücken contained new politics elements (ANPE = 12.5). This speech was extremely negative towards nuclear energy (EI = -2.89). In sharp contrast to this contribution, the speech of the chairman of the industry committee was most pronounced in its emphasize of productionist politics (ANPE = -20.8; EI = 1.27). Hermann Rappe, who would be later chairman, also contributed to the debate. He spoke as a representative of the board and pointed out that a limited extension of nuclear energy was necessary for a needed limited economic growth. In terms of the analytical aspects, his contribution scored clearly pro nuclear and productionist politics aspects dominated (EI = 2.0; ANPE = -8.3).

The approved motion based its positive evaluation of nuclear energy on energy political (44.4 percent) and economic aspects (33.3). Security and environmental aspects were completely neglected. However, the approved motion conceded negative political and societal aspects. The debate and the other motions also stressed the other categories, in particular security aspects. We may conclude that the debate and general discussion on nuclear energy was rather complex at the 1980 IGC congress but that the approved motion stressed the pragmatic categories more. Furthermore, we can also see that IGC had a diversified membership in terms of new and productionist politics. The promoters of new politics were the youth board and lower levels of the Baden-Württemberg district. Other individuals also voiced their opinions in favor of new politics. However, strong and influential groups in IGC (industry committee, board) were in favor of productionist politics and nuclear power. As it was at the IGM congress in 1977, the approved motion proposed by the IGC board was decisively more positive towards nuclear energy than all other proposals. Also the personal engagement of the future chairman Hermann Rappe influenced the decision of IGC towards productionist politics.

At the congress in 1984, one motion of the board on economic policy that contained some evaluations on nuclear energy was approved of without further debate. The motion only stressed pragmatic categories. It emphasized the importance of an economic growth policy. In terms of the evaluation of nuclear power and productionist politics, there were no changes in comparison to the approved motion of 1980 (EI = 2.0; ANPE -8.3).

How did IGC interpret DGB's phasing-out decision at its congress in September 1988? There were twelve motions proposed to the congress. Some were very definite in their rejection of nuclear power. Most surprising was the extremely negative evaluation of nuclear energy by one of the three motions proposed by the union local of Hanau (EI = -2.82). The nuclear firms in Hanau had been shaken by scandals because of their treatment of nuclear material. Often they faced the threat of closing down

due to corruption. The motion stemming from a firm of the union local demanded a step by step phasing-out because scandals throughout the years had proven that nuclear energy was impossible to control and to master. The other two motions of the board of Hanau's local union were much less opposing of nuclear power. However, they stressed that the fast breeder and the reprocessing plant were not necessary. They demanded a thorough investigation of the scandals at the nuclear firms in Hanau, and they also pointed out that a fast shut-down would not be possible. The most radical motion in terms of new politics was proposed by the union local of Schwandorf (ANPE = 20.8). At Schwandorf, a German reprocessing plant (Wackersdorf) was to be constructed. The motion demanded a phasing-out as soon as possible. The reasons given for this were manifold: nuclear energy would lead to conditions similar to a civil war (*bürgerkriegsähnliche Zustände*). The police had misused its competence and proved that the "atomic state" with police supervision is close. The incidents in Hanau were also said to have proven that nuclear energy is neither technologically nor humanly possible to control. The proposed motion by the district Nordmark-Berlin also contained several elements of new politics (ANPE = 16.7). The motions of the Baden-Württemberg district, the youth department, and the union local of Bielefeld contained several elements of new politics (ANPE = 12.5). All these motions except the most negative motion of the Hanau union local (responded to) and the one of the board of the Hanau union local (approved of) were taken as material to the energy commission of the IGC board. The motion proposed by the IGC board evaluated nuclear energy very moderately (EI = .03). In linguistic terms, it is interesting that the motion avoided to speak of a phasing-out (*Ausstieg*) but rather referred to a conversion (*Umstieg*) from nuclear energy to other energy resources. The motion stressed the importance of energy and cheap energy prices for the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, it pointed also out that nuclear fusion would be based on nuclear technologies. Therefore, the motion concluded, it would not be feasible to give up nuclear energy at the present time. Nevertheless, IGC would also stay behind the decision of a step by step phasing-out of the nuclear energy "... in the form we know it today" (*Kerntechnologie gegenwärtiger Prägung*). Words clearly against nuclear technologies were only said against the fast breeder and the reprocessing plant. This motion (MP = 8.3) was accepted, which like two others were very moderate in its evaluation of nuclear energy. It did not contain any statements of new or productionist politics (EI = .4 and -1.0).

At the congress in 1988 we can also identify substantial differences between all proposed motions and the approved ones, and this in both their evaluation of nuclear energy and new and productionist politics (means of all motions: EI = -1.75; ANPE = 9.7; means of approved motions: EI = -.19; ANPE -4.2). Without any debate, the congress followed the suggestion of the motion committee.

In summation: the divergence between approved and other motions in IGC is very extreme. The motions did not only differ in their judgement of nuclear energy and new and old politics but also in their communication. The approved motions restrict their argument to more than 70 percent on pragmatic levels, whereas all motions refer to this level only at 55 percent. In particular, considering the approved motion of the IGC board, it seems to be doubtful that IGC supported a phasing-out of nuclear energy, although it literally used the phrase of "phasing-out as soon as possible". Doubts come up when expressions are used like "we need substitutes for nuclear technology as we know it today". This phrasing can lead to all kinds of interpretation. These doubts are confirmed by the fact that IGC still sticks quite firmly to productionist politics strategies for the further development of industrial societies. Throughout the years, there has been no substantial change in IGC's productionist politics. There might be some changes concerning alternative energy resources which were more accepted by all political actors in the 1980's than in the 1970's. But the ANPE-index shows that IGC still belongs to the productionist trade unions in Germany. However, there was a deep cleavage within IGC between some districts and the youth board, on the one hand, and influential occupational groups and the board, on the other. In particular the union leader Hermann Rappe stood firmly for a productionist politics of his union.

Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)

ÖTV had nuclear energy quite early on their congressional agenda. Firstly, ÖTV dealt with nuclear energy in a motion at the congress in 1972 and at all following congresses in 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988, nuclear power gained congressional attention. At three of these congresses ÖTV specified its attitude to this issue in the way that motions concerning nuclear energy were approved of.

Even before the politicization of the energy policy, the ÖTV board proposed a motion more than ten pages long to the congress in 1972. This motion on energy policy exclusively stressed positive aspects

of nuclear power. It evaluated nuclear energy clearly positive (EI = 1.90) and also contained a lot of elements of productionist politics (ANPE = -25.0). It was the first time that the connection between economic growth, energy supply, and employment was made explicit in a congress motion on nuclear energy. In order to reach this goal, cheap energy was considered necessary. The motion also criticized the obstruction and the delays of the nuclear plant construction through protest actions. However, no word was said about the reasons of the protest. The motion was accepted only with minor editorial alterations and it was not debated [36].

The issue was debated in a rather complex manner. Pragmatic statements made only around 40 percent of the statements. In particular, nuclear energy was seen as an energy resource that was safe, reliable, environmentally safe and supportive for a desired social development. For instance, nuclear power was also considered to be an appropriate technology for further desired centralization and technological development. In environmental terms, nuclear energy would also be superior to fossil energy resources and the risks of accidents were viewed as lower than those of other technologies. The conclusion was that the governments on the federative and county levels as well as the European commission should promote nuclear power. However, ÖTV demanded state supervision in the energy sector and even nationalization of energy enterprises when necessary. Simultaneously, it also demanded free competition in the energy sector.

In 1976, an approved *EntschlieÙung* on energy policy evaluated nuclear energy positively (EI = 1.67), however, it did not mention elements of new or productionist politics. This motion conceded that a "dialogue with the population" would be necessary in order to activate the energy program as soon as possible. This motion expressed the conviction that the protest against nuclear energy was based on a misinterpretation of the protesters which could be easily resolved. The motion also contained a statement that was often repeated in formulations of other trade unions - in modified versions even after Chernobyl: *if the security of the employees and the population (in this order; D.J.) is guaranteed during the construction and operation of nuclear plants nuclear energy could receive priority.* However, the motion - like the later mainstream argumentation - did not give any clues how this vague statement should be used in practical policy. It made interpretation possible for a wide range of attitudes.

The debate consisted of only one contribution from a member of the energy sector. He pointed out that the formulation above mentioned concerning the security of nuclear energy may lead to the impression that nuclear power has safety risks. He pointed out that the workers in nuclear plants are completely convinced of the safety of nuclear power which could be guaranteed through the strict - the strictest in the world - examinations of the German administration.

As in 1972, ÖTV debated nuclear energy in relatively complex terms in 1976. Even if the safety of nuclear plants was perceived as guaranteed, it was conceded that nuclear energy needed a social dialogue. However, the debate in the unions was very unified. Nobody voiced critical opinions towards nuclear energy or the concept of a productionist society. This was to be changed at the next ÖTV congress.

In the 1980s, ÖTV faced an intra-union conflict like most of the other German unions. 20 motions were proposed at the 1980 congress which contained very different standpoints (STD: EI = 1.94; ANPE = 13.0). The district of Siegburg (three motions with the highest score of EI = -2.75; ANPE = 16.7), Göttingen (EI = -2.75; ANPE = 16.7) and Hannover (four motions: EI = -3.0; ANPE = 16.7) most strongly favored elements of new politics and opposed nuclear energy. All these motions originated from county districts (*Kreisdelegiertenkonferenz*), basic organizational units of the union at the local level. Of the thirteen motions proposed by the county districts, only two evaluated nuclear energy positively (Lübeck and Düsseldorf). In contrast, the higher union level of the district conferences (*Bezirkskonferenz*) evaluated nuclear energy positively. Only one out of six (Niedersachsen: EI = -1.4; ANPE = 16.7) evaluated nuclear power negatively. On the district level (*Bezirke*), ÖTV also had its strongest promoters of nuclear energy. In particular, the district Northwest (EI = 2.13; ANPE = -12.5), Niedersachsen (EI = 1.69; ANPE = -12.5), and Hessen (EI = 1.9; ANPE = -16.7) belonged to the strongholds of productionist politics. An *EntschlieÙung* on energy policy was proposed by the district of Baden-Württemberg. Its evaluation towards nuclear energy was also positive (EI = 1.21) and it contained no element of new politics (ANPE = -12.5). However, this version of the *EntschlieÙung* could not gain the approval of the congress. A supplement (*Ergänzung*) to

the *EntschlieÙung* was included that pointed out that ÖTV takes the concerns of many people seriously, and that ÖTV is not biased or ideological, and not on the side of those who make their profit through nuclear power. Furthermore, it stressed that the discussion on nuclear energy should take new scientific results into consideration and should be continued. This left the decision open for further alterations. The modified version of the *EntschlieÙung* contained some elements of new politics although elements of productionist politics dominated over elements of new politics (NP = 4.2; ANPE = 8.3). In terms of the evaluation of nuclear energy evaluation, the approved version was not as positive as the original *ErschlieÙung* (EI = .93).

The debate counted 15 contributions, four in favor and five against nuclear energy (the rest without evaluations). As one can expect from the motions, the debate was very diversified in its evaluation of nuclear energy and new and productionist politics (STD: EI = 1.95; ANPE = 11.5). Speeches against nuclear energy spoke against the trend of accepting this technology because one is afraid to lose jobs. Nuclear power would have the potential to destroy the base for the biological existence of human-kind (Heinrich Halberstadt). On the other hand, we can find nearly ideal-typical statements of productionist politics that stress the connection between full-employment, economic growth, increased energy supplies etc. [37]. Heinz Kluncker, chairman of ÖTV, also contributed to the debate. His long speech (four pages) outnumbered all other debate contributions in its emphasis of elements of productionist politics (ANPE = -25.0): The overall evaluation of nuclear energy was also clearly positive (EI = 1.82) [38]. At that time, Heinz Kluncker was a member of the board of the nuclear council (Nuklearrat). He reported of an investigation trip to the USA which he took in order to assess the accident at Three Mile Island. He stressed the fact that trade unions in other countries would support nuclear power. According to Heinz Kluncker, the Swedish trade unions would support nuclear power in their majority as do the American unions. He pointed out that the visions of an "Atomstaat" (Atomic State) is based on emotions which in turn would not be a good alternative for rational actions. He also considered the security risks of nuclear power to be acceptable.

The comparison of all motions (and the debate) and the approved *EntschlieÙung* shows that it evaluated nuclear power positively, contrasting to the majority of the expressed opinions at the congress. The *EntschlieÙung* also focuses much more on economic aspects than the rest of the contributions. In particular, environmental and societal aspects are completely neglected in the approved *EntschlieÙung*. At the 1980 congress of ÖTV, we can conclude that the major opposition against nuclear energy and the potential for new politics is located at the lowest union level, the county districts. On the higher level, more productionist attitudes exist. In particular, the chairman of ÖTV influenced the congress towards a productionist politics.

Four years later at the 1984 congress, eleven motions were submitted which contained statements on nuclear power. Again they were very diversified in terms of both their evaluation of nuclear energy and new and productionist politics (STD: EI = 1.31; ANPE = 10.2). Although at this congress no motion that focused on nuclear energy was approved of, one can identify a fundamental shift of the motions which were proposed by the districts. In 1980, these motions were mainly positive towards nuclear energy and contained elements of productionist politics. In 1984 in contrast, except from one motion (Rheinlandpfalz), all motions of the districts evaluated nuclear energy negatively and contained more new politics elements than productionist. However, the motions which were more positively decided

37 One member, Hans Kaifer, made this connection explicit: "Full-employment, dear colleagues, is the base for our demand of the right of work. ... In order to reach the aim of full-employment, however, an active and qualitative growth policy is necessary. But, more growth means simultaneously more energy. People demanding less growth or even zero-growth because of increased energy demands may have solved the social question personally but for our society we risk the social peace." (Vollbeschäftigung, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, ist die Grundlage des von uns immer wieder geforderten Rechts auf Arbeit. ... Um allerdings das Ziel der Vollbeschäftigung zu erreichen, ist eine aktive und qualitative Wachstumspolitik die Voraussetzung. Mehr Wachstum heißt aber auch zugleich mehr Energie. Wer wegen des steigenden Energiebedarfs weniger Wachstum oder gar Nullwachstum fordert, für den mag zwar persönlich die soziale Frage gelöst sein, für unsere Gesellschaft hingegen gerät der soziale Frieden in Gefahr.)

38 Heinz Kluncker was heavily criticized because he gave his speech after the list of speeches had been closed. He announced that he just wanted to contribute for clarification. These contributions are possible according to the constitution of ÖTV even when the list of speakers is already closed. However, as some delegates saw it, he misused this right and held a devoted speech in favor of nuclear power.

upon by the congress [39] were in favor of or less critical towards nuclear power and contained fewer elements of new politics. One of the two motions that contained new politics elements was altered from a NP = 25.0 in its original version to a version with a NP of 4.2 which was passed on as material.

The motions with the most elements of new politics came from the district of Niedersachsen (ANPE = 25.0), and Bayern, and the county Nürnberg (both ANPE = 20.8). The motions of the districts of Hessen, the county of Darmstadt and the youth board also contained elements of new politics. However, the youth board did not play an outstanding role in ÖTV as in some other unions. The positive and more productionist motions came from the district of Rheinland Pfalz and the county of Salzgitter. The statistics of all motions show that negative attitudes towards nuclear energy were dominant and that elements of new politics were clearly preferred over elements of productionist politics (means: EI = -1.53; ANPE = 12.5).

The debate was also diversified (STD: EI = 1.44; ANPE = 9.3). However, the debate contributions contained more elements of productionist politics than the motions. In particular, the contributions of Karl Heinz Hoffmann, deputy chairman and energy expert of ÖTV, and of Monika Wulf-Mathies, the new chair-person of ÖTV, contained elements of productionist politics (EI = 2.0; ANPE = -8.3; and EI = .64; ANPE = -16.7 respectively).

At the 1984 congress, the motions and debates also contained quite a lot of non-pragmatic aspects so that it seems fair to say that ÖTV is not fixed to a pragmatic communication on the nuclear power issue. However, this trend weakened in 1984. An important change between the 1980 and 1984 congresses is the shift towards elements of new politics in higher union levels. This may have been one important precondition for the more substantial shift in 1988.

At the congress in 1988, ÖTV had to translate DGB's decision to phase-out of nuclear energy into its union policy. The congress had to deal with 34 motions (35 versions of motions). In most of them, nuclear power was the major concern. Although the statistics are not very impressive in terms of the diversification of this congress there was a fundamental cleavage between new and productionist politics in ÖTV (STD: EI = 1.10; ANPE = 8.0). Except two, all motions evaluated nuclear energy negatively. However, in terms of new and productionist politics they vary substantially. The motions with the highest degree of new politics elements were proposed by the county of Wiesbaden and the district of Nordrhein Westfalen I (NP = 29.2 and 33.3 respectively). In particular, the former motion, which was considered as responded to, was very concrete in its formulation of an *immediate* phasing-out by stressing the negative genetic effects, high costs, and risk of nuclear energy among others. Within ÖTV there was some confusion and disagreement about DGB's decision to phase-out of nuclear energy as in other unions. They did not know what the phasing-out would mean in concrete terms. In particular, the timing of a phasing-out caused a lot of disagreement.

The two motions which evaluated nuclear energy positively both contained elements of productionist politics and were proposed by the county of Düren (MP = 8.3). The motion from the youth department was again not more critical to nuclear energy or productionist politics than the other critical motions (EI = -2.0 and -3.0; but only ANPE = 0). The average evaluation of nuclear energy of the six approved motions was more critical towards nuclear energy than the average of all motions (EI means: approved = 1.97; all = 1.73). The approved motions also contained more elements of new politics than the rest of the motions (ANPE mean: approved = 14.6; all = 9.6). For instance, the approved motion from the ÖTV board postulated that a phasing-out of nuclear power would be necessary and possible. No further subsidies for nuclear energy should be granted and the atomic laws (Atomgesetze) should be changed so that a precondition for a shut-down would be established. For that ÖTV would support a re-orientation of the energy policy. More radical is the previously mentioned and approved motion from the district Nordrhein Westfalen I that addressed the question of nuclear energy and the Third World. The motion stressed the negative function of nuclear energy for these countries: nuclear energy would threaten and diminish life chances in developing countries and - through possible accidents of nuclear plants - not only there but also in Germany. A phasing-out in Germany also would not damage life and working conditions in the Third World countries but rather improve them. A

39 No motion that contained statements over nuclear energy was approved of at the congress. However, five motions were taken as material to an approved motion that did not contain statements on nuclear energy. The other six were rejected or responded to.

phasing-out of nuclear energy would finally create less problems for future generations. The motion also stressed that nuclear energy would be the most expensive method of electricity production when one takes the waste (*Entsorgung*) costs into the account. The approved motion of the Berlin district pointed out that the risks of nuclear power as demonstrated by the catastrophe at Chernobyl would be no longer acceptable and that a German phasing-out would be important to set a worldwide signal. However, the congress followed the suggestion of the motion committee and considered more radical motions as responded to (no motion was rejected). However, that was also true for the motions that were less negative towards nuclear energy.

Among others, the debate circled around two versions of a motion of the board. The two motions were quite similar in their evaluation of nuclear energy. However some delegates wished for an approved motion that would be more concrete for further political steps [40]. Contributions more critical of nuclear energy were quite emotional (see for instance the contribution by Heiner Halberstadt or Ingeborg Schulz). All contributions more in favor of nuclear energy considered the original version of the motion as suggested by the board as a compromise. These contributions stressed the necessity that the employees in nuclear plants also need the solidarity of their union. What these members need, would be a longer phasing-out period as suggested by many others. However, it was clear that these motions opened the floor for different interpretations. For instance, one contribution pointed out that the phasing-out suggestion would not affect certain kinds of reactors such as the high temperature reactor. Other contributions stressed that a shut-down of nuclear plants could only happen when alternatives are available - and that would not be the case by now. From the 20 contributions, thirteen were against and three in favor of nuclear power. In eight contributions, elements of new politics dominated and in three, elements of productionist politics. Karl Heinz Hoffmann, the energy expert of ÖTV, and Monika Wulf-Mathies also contributed to the debate. Both speeches were (slightly) against nuclear energy but were rather modest in their adoption of elements of new politics (EI = -.93; and -1.5; ANPE = 4.2; and 0). Karl Heinz Hoffmann confirmed the decision of the DGB to phase-out of nuclear energy. However, he pointed out that the ÖTV would have to take into the account the worries of those who wish to shut-down nuclear power immediately, and those who would be worried about their jobs. He also mentioned that ÖTV must see the political constraints. National (conservative government), international (the European Common Market) but also organizational factors (compromise with other unions) would obstruct a more radical policy of ÖTV. Monika Wulf-Mathies also stressed the necessity of the solidarity of ÖTV with the members who are employed in nuclear plants. These employees had made enormous sacrifices in order to make a compromise possible. The chair-person of ÖTV also stressed the political constraints mentioned by Karl Heinz Hoffmann. However, in her demand she was determined that it would be necessary to phase-out of nuclear energy, but she believed that this way would only be successful if it was made in agreement with the employees in the energy sector.

At this congress, ÖTV also kept to its complexity in communication. Security, societal and political aspects played an important role, particularly in the approved motions. Although the decisions taken by ÖTV still left a wide range of interpretations open, it is astonishing how critical ÖTV became of nuclear energy through the years, considering the fact that members of ÖTV are directly affected by a shut-down of nuclear energy. ÖTV is a trade union that changed its policy from a clear protagonist's position concerning nuclear power and productionist politics to the viewpoint of a more radical union opposing nuclear energy and adopting elements of new politics. The proponents of new politics in ÖTV were originally in the counties. They first voiced their opinions at the 1980 congress. At the congresses in 1972 and 1976, no indication of new politics could have been identified before at the congresses of ÖTV. However, new politics penetrated into higher union levels, and at the 1984 congress the majority of the districts expressed in one way or the other their sympathy for new politics concerns. This was the precondition for a "radical" change in 1988. It is a bit surprising that the youth department of ÖTV were rather passive in promoting elements of new politics. Of course, the motions of the youth department were negative towards nuclear energy and contained elements of new politics but they were not as outstanding in this as the motions of the youth departments of other unions. However, the board expressed through Karl Heinz Hoffmann and also Monika Wulf-Mathies that it was not eager to become a protagonist of new politics. In that, ÖTV differs fundamentally from IGM whose

40 That can also be seen from the statistics. The proposed version by the board and the version with the suggested alternations scores relatively similar in their evaluation of nuclear energy but differs more strongly in terms of the adoption of elements of new politics (EI = -1.35 and -1.29; ANPE = 8.3 and 12.5 respectively).

chairman expressed rather clearly his sympathy for elements of new politics. One reason for this hesitation of ÖTV board members may be that ÖTV's members in the energy sector are better organized than members in other sectors of ÖTV, and that their density rate has declined over the last decades (Armingeon, 1988: 80, 167-68, 210). Nevertheless, this group which makes around 10 percent of the membership of ÖTV may still be a group that favors nuclear energy. Like the ST union in Sweden, ÖTV settled the conflict between productionist and new politics by shifting towards a preference of new politics. Whether that will lead to further intra-organizational tension, cannot be decided at this point in time.

Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (HBV)

We address now the question if and how those German unions whose members' occupation and industries are not directly affected by energy policy deal with the issue of nuclear power. To start with, I wish to have a closer look at the German Trade, Banking and Insurance union. HBV had motions that dealt with nuclear energy at three of its congresses. The first time in 1980 the debate was hot and especially diversified. 16 motions were submitted. Four of them were relatively balanced in their evaluation of nuclear energy or did not express an evaluative statement (EI = -.31 and .25), three were very moderate in its negative evaluation (twice -1.0* and -1.25), while the rest expressed more clear criticism of nuclear power (from -1.5 to -2.44). The motion committee suggested to approve of the *EntschlieÙung* of the union board (*GewerkschaftsausschuÙ*). Although this *EntschlieÙung* was critical towards nuclear energy, it contained a lot of productionist politics elements (EI = -.31; ANPE = -20.8). The motion conceded that nuclear energy would be associated with ecological, political and social risks but this may not lead to a rejection of nuclear energy because that would result in a very high damage of the national economy. A precondition for solving the problem of unemployment would be an active economic growth policy. However, if investigations may prove that nuclear energy is not sufficiently safe, the operation of nuclear power should be stopped in Germany and abroad. The motion was challenged by most other motions at this congress. In particular the motions of the state district of Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, and the Hamburg district contained elements of new politics (ANPE = 33.3; 20.8; and 29.2 respectively). The motions referred to already known arguments. Nuclear energy is too expensive, when waste and reconstruction costs are included. It is a burden for future generations, and it also implies the problem of state surveillance and control of workers. Furthermore, they also questioned the necessity of nuclear energy for the improvement of the living standard and made associations to the destructive forces of atomic bombs. One aspect, however, that had not been stressed so much in motions of other unions was the problem of nuclear plant reconstruction. The motion of the youth department was quite clear in its rejection of nuclear energy and its preference of elements of new politics (EI = -2.0; ANPE = 12.5). The congress experienced a very hot debate. Eight of the 18 contributions explicitly rejected the boards *EntschlieÙung* and only three spoke in its favor. The contribution of the youth board (Rüdiger Beins) contained the most elements of new politics and was one of the most negative evaluations of nuclear energy (EI = -2.10; ANPE = 25.0). On the other hand, a speaker from the Nordrhein Westfalen district and the chairman of another district were in favor of the *EntschlieÙung*. Their contributions also contained several productionist politics elements (ANPE = -12.5; -4.2 respectively). The debate led to a revision of the motion committee's suggestion. The issue should be further debated in the union committees. In order to do that, all motions and the debate should be taken as material. However, one motion of the Baden-Württemberg district was approved of. The Baden-Württemberg district was very active in proposing motions on nuclear energy to the congress (from the 16 motions six and additional five of local districts came from Baden-Württemberg). However, the approved motion was rather unclear in both its evaluation of nuclear energy and political statements (EI = -1.0*; ANPE = none).

The motions and debate in HBV were quite complex and did not stick to pragmatic categories. They especially referred to security but also to political and social aspects. However, there was a strong disagreement between the motions about productionist and new politics and not so much in terms of the evaluation of nuclear power (STD: EI = 0.69; ANPE = 14.9). The conflict line was between the union board whose proposed *EntschlieÙung* contained many elements of productionist politics and several state and local districts. However, the pressure of these districts led to a revision of the committee board's proposition. Although the youth department belonged to those strongly opposing nuclear energy, it did not play a major role in the debate on new politics in HBV. This was mainly done by individual districts.

At the congress in 1984, nuclear energy played only a minor part in the motion (*Initiativentrag*) on environmental and energy policy. The motion stressed the necessity of renewable energy resources, but in terms of nuclear power it pointed out that it should be limited to a very small amount, which was to be seen as absolutely necessary [41]. This motion mainly argued on the pragmatic level [42].

The next congress took place in October/November 1988. Five motions were proposed to the congress. All extremely negative towards nuclear energy and all contained several elements of new politics (means: EI = -2.55; ANPE = 12.5). Apart from one rejected motion, which demanded in brief and provocative terms a phasing-out, all other motions were responded to. Most of these motions came from state districts (Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg) but one was also proposed by the women's committee. This motion was extreme in its negative evaluation of nuclear energy but did not concern itself with new politics more than the average (EI = -2.71; ANPE = 12.5). After several editorial alterations, the motion proposed by the Nordrhein Westfalen district was approved of. From all proposals, it contained the most elements of new politics (ANPE = 16.7). It demanded the immediate phasing-out of nuclear energy. After the 1986 DGB congress, it was clear that a phasing-out should take place. As mentioned above in the following opinion making process in the trade unions, disagreement occurred about the time range of the phasing-out. HBV took a more radical stand in this debate. It demanded an immediate phasing-out. In 1988, this attitude was not challenged very much in HBV (STD: EI = .37; ANPE = 5.3). As in other unions conflict diminished, when the board gave up its strict pro-nuclear stand and its preference for productionist politics. The debate contained only one contribution by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen that supported the motion which had evaluated nuclear energy negatively (EI = -2.33). However, it contained no statement concerning productionist and new politics.

In summation: HBV changed its opinion concerning new and productionist politics over the last decade. However, nuclear energy was always seen in a critical light. When HBV took up the debate in the early 1980s, there was a disagreement between board members and individual districts, above all from Baden-Württemberg. This disagreement led to heavy internal debates. However, the HBV board attempted to compromise. At the next congress the issue was not as prevalent as four years ago and a motion mainly concerned with environmental and energy policy was approved of, that evaluated nuclear energy rather neutrally. This motion had no profile concerning new and productionist politics. In 1988, the union was then quite clear in both its negative evaluation of nuclear energy and in its preference of elements of new politics.

IG Druck und Papier (IGD)

At three conferences IGD dealt with nuclear energy in a quite controversial manner. In 1977 eight motions had already been proposed that dealt with nuclear power. Three of them were positive and five negative towards nuclear energy. The positive motion also contained some elements of productionist politics. For instance, it was stressed that energy supply and economic growth would be necessary for employment. The originally proposed *EntschlieÙung* by the district of Rheinland-Pfalz-Saar were altered through a supplement motion as a result of the congress debate. These alterations led to a slightly more moderate version of the still positive motion (EI = 1.11; ANPE = -4.2). However, the five other motions were partially extreme in their rejection of nuclear energy by stressing new politics aspects. For instance, the motion of the youth board pointed out that the accidents in German nuclear plants between 1972 and 1976 were reason enough to phase-out. The motion that was considered as responded to, stressed the negative employment effects of nuclear power and

41 This formulation has often been used in all trade unions. However, its interpretation is difficult in the political practice and has most often been used as a support of nuclear development. In ironic terms one may say - and probably one comes quite close to the real stand of DGB unions at this time - that the union took a "clear yes-but" standpoint. The following sentence from the HBV motion makes this ambivalence clear: "The government is asked to work for an energy political program that contains: ... The reduction of the use of nuclear energy to an absolutely necessary level, the improvement of safety in the application and solving of the nuclear waste problem." (Die Bundesregierung wird aufgefordert, ein energiepolitisches Programm zu entwickeln und umzusetzen, das insbesondere gekennzeichnet ist: ... Reduzierung der Nutzung der Kernenergie auf das unumgängliche Ausmaß, Verbesserung der Sicherheit bei deren Verwendung und Lösung des Problems der nuklearen Entsorgung.)

42 There was no debate available in the congress protocol.

emphasized that if the money had been spent for other energy resources, it would have cheaply created more jobs.

In the debate, two speakers opposed nuclear energy and the suggested *EntschlieÙung* and recommended the approval of the motion of the youth department. The contribution from the district that proposed the *EntschlieÙung* defended their motion against the one of the youth board. The main argument was that the *EntschlieÙung* had a broader political view than the motion of the youth department that only looked at nuclear energy without seeing the whole energy political context. With only a few votes against it, the congress supported the suggestion of the motion committee and accepted the *EntschlieÙung* with the above mentioned alterations.

We can recognize that the opinion in IGD was quite diversified about the issue. However, it was never expressed in very strong terms as, for instance, in IGM, IGC or ÖTV (STD: EI = 1.75; ANPE = 8.4). On the one hand, there was the majority of IGD in favor of nuclear energy (however with certain reservations). On the other hand, several state districts and the youth department opposed this official strategy by stressing new politics aspects. In all motions no matter whether positive or negative, IGD stressed the importance that nuclear energy should be controlled by co-determination and through society. Labor market effects also gained surprisingly strong attention. However, more than two thirds of the statements focused on pragmatic aspects. In sharp contrast to the Swedish printer union, IGD did not debate nuclear energy in a more complex and critical manner at the 1977 congress. The approved motion was rather productionist and did not contain any elements of new politics.

At the congress in 1980 two motions were proposed. Both evaluated nuclear energy negatively and both contained elements of new politics. The motions stressed the danger of nuclear power and the risks for future generations. However, the motion by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen was more moderate and demanded a stop of construction and operation of nuclear plants until clarification was reached about its safety (EI = -1.71; ANPE = 4.2). The other motion by the youth department was more extreme (EI = -2.54; ANPE = 8.3). It demanded a shut-down of all nuclear plants. The reasons given stressed security risks and environmental problems, which even occur when nuclear plants run without complocation because radiation is also released during normal operation. Other reasons given were profit interest of capital, the rationalization effect for jobs and the unsolved final waste storage. In seven speeches, these motions were debated. Three in favor of the motion of the youth department and two were in favor of the motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district. However, all contributions that evaluated nuclear energy were negative and no productionist politics statement was voiced. But vital disagreement existed about the degree to which IGD should disfavor nuclear power. At the end, the congress accepted a revised suggestion of the motion committee and approved the more moderate motion of the Nordrhein Westfalen district.

Like three years before, IGD decided for the more positive motion and opposed the suggestion of the youth department that most strongly challenged the majority opinion in IGD. But this time the evaluation was negative. Elements of new politics also dominated but to a lesser degree in the approved motion (mean: all motions ANPE = 6.3; approved motion ANPE = 4.2). The disagreement on nuclear energy and new and productionist politics in the motions was rather moderate (STD: EI = .58; ANPE = 2.9). However, the debate was a bit more diversified in these terms but it would be too much to say that the issue created a cleavage in IGD (STD: EI = .36; ANPE = 6.4). Again property and societal control over nuclear energy was one of the major concerns of IGD. Security, political, and societal aspects were also important so that it is fair to say that IGD debated the issue in a rather complex manner this time. IGD seems to have shifted from a committed productionist union to a moderately open union for new politics concerns. In particular in the debate, elements of new politics were often mentioned (mean: ANPE = 11.1). However, the approved stand was least penetrated by new politics concerns. At the next congress in 1983, nuclear energy was not on the agenda.

In October 1986, IGD experienced a dramatic dispute over the six proposed motions. All motions were extremely negative to nuclear energy and clearly on the new politics side (mean of EI = -2.47; mean of ANPE = 13.2). However, the motion that was suggested to be approved of by the motion committee was too moderate for some congress delegates. Although this motion did not differ so much in terms of its evaluation of nuclear energy and new politics from the other motions (EI = -2.73; ANPE = 12.5), several congress delegates criticized that the would-be accepted motion was not concrete enough. In particular, one speaker pointed out that other motions focused on further aspects, for

instance, the misbehavior of the police during demonstrations against nuclear plants, discrimination against demonstrators, etc. The motion committee, the IGD chairman and other higher trade union officials were also accused of reinterpreting the 1986 DGB decision in their interest. Elements of new politics also clearly dominated (means: EI = -1.92; ANPE 10.4). The debate ended with the withdrawal of the would-be-approved motion by the district of Nordrhein Westfalen. Instead, the congress approved of a motion that stressed the more general political aspects by the district of Hessen. Of course, this motion was also negative towards nuclear energy and contained elements of new politics (EI = -2.6; ANPE 12.5).

At this congress, IGD also debated the issue in a relatively complex manner. More than ten percent of the approved motions and around 15 percent of the debate referred to political and societal aspects. The anti-nuclear faction within IGD took advantage of the situation shortly following Chernobyl and the DGB congress to bring their union to a clearly anti-nuclear stand. However, although the debate was hot, there were no fundamental disagreements (STD: ANPE = 6.1 (motions), ANPE = 7.2 (debate)). No motion or debate contribution expressed preferences for nuclear energy. The disagreement existed in political terms. It was exactly on this level that the more radical wing could gain ground at the 1986 congress in contrast to the congresses before.

To this extent, IGD changed its attitudes towards nuclear energy from a positive evaluation in 1977 to a moderately negative decision in 1980, and to an extremely negative decision in 1986. Like in other unions, the youth department was one of the major challengers of the established policy in IGD.

Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW)

The last German union which I wish to analyze here is the teachers' union. GEW dealt with nuclear energy at three congresses: in 1977, 1980, and 1986. As early as in 1977, the GEW dealt with two motions on nuclear power. One motion was clearly against this technology and contained several arguments of new politics. For instance, we can find statements like: there is no positive relationship between economic growth and employment; even under normal operation the radiation of nuclear plants cause high death rates of babies, cancer risks and genetic damages; nuclear power is expensive and paid for by public spendings, this is particularly true when considering the costs for waste storage which would make nuclear energy the most expensive kind of energy; the massive police and army (Bundesgrenzschutz) control of nuclear power plants is a threat to democratic rights, etc. However, the congress decided to approve of a motion which only required that the DGB revise its stand on nuclear energy from 1977. No evaluation or other statements were made. The extreme motion (EI = -1.93; ANPE = 25.0) mentioned above, was seen as responded to (*erledigt*) through this one-sentence motion [43].

Although approximately two thirds of the statements refer to pragmatic categories, GEW debated the issue in a rather complex way as seen in the mentioned motions. Social, political and above all security aspects played a big role in the argumentation of the motion.

At the next congress in 1980, there were four motions proposed by the state districts of Hamburg, Berlin, Bayern, and Bremen respectively. All motions were extremely negative towards nuclear energy and contained a lot of elements of new politics (means: EI = -2.45; ANPE = 17.7). This time the motion with the highest amount of elements of new politics was approved of by the congress (EI = -2.38; ANPE = 37.8). With this approval the standpoint of GEW on nuclear energy was clear.

In terms of the communication level, we can identify that the approved motion less often focuses on pragmatic aspects than the rest of the motions. However, social and political aspects have a lower status in the approved motion than the average. With about 6.5 percent, it stressed only half as much political and societal statements as did all motions. Disagreement in terms of new and productionist politics existed only, in so far that some motions were more radical in preferring new politics elements than others. Productionist politics played only a minor role in the motions (mean: MP = 1.0). At the GEW congress in 1983 nuclear energy was not on the congressional agenda.

43 Unfortunately, I could not analyze the debate of this and the other GEW congresses. The material is not available at the DGB archive and GEW did not cooperate in this question.

At the congress in November 1986, GEW had one motion on nuclear power. It was proposed by the district of Berlin. With some alteration, this motion was approved of by the congress. The motion was quite clear in its rejection of nuclear energy (EI = -2.32). In terms of new politics, it also left no doubts that it favored elements of new politics over productionist politics (ANPE = 16.7). However, the motion was not as detailed as the motion six years before. Besides the demand of a step-by-step phasing-out of nuclear energy, the motion made associations between nuclear energy and the atomic bomb and claimed that there is no peaceful nuclear energy. The motion also heavily stressed non-pragmatic categories, above all security aspects.

Through the years, GEW made its stand on nuclear energy relatively clear. In the beginning, already in 1977, it seemed that GEW hesitated to take any stand on the issues, although there were clear indicators that GEW had a group of strong proponents of new politics in its union. In 1980, the union formulated its most elaborated congressional stand in terms of new politics. For GEW standards the *relatively* moderate expressions shortly after Chernobyl were a bit surprising. However, this less concrete stand also did not give any doubt that GEW belongs to those unions that are the promoters of new politics in the Federal Republic of Germany. GEW has always debated nuclear energy in a rather complex and ideological manner. Above all, security aspects played a very central role in the evaluation of nuclear power. This does not mean that pragmatic categories did not play any role in GEW. In particular, in 1977 and 1980 more than half of the statements referred to aspects of energy policy, economy and labor market.

Table A3-1: The Adoption of Elements of New and Productionist Politics of West German Unions

IDN UNION	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE	IDN UNION	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE
0000 DGB	7700	2.50	23.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	37006 IGB	7402	1.50	2.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
0009 DGB	7703	1.18	19.00	8.33	33.33	-25.00	37005 IGB	7407	2.57	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
0012 DGB	7703	1.81	17.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50	37009 IGB	7408	-1.33	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
0011 DGB	7703	2.14	10.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	37012 IGB	7505	2.73	4.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
0006 DGB	7704	2.68	9.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	37038 IGB	7710	2.73	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
0008 DGB	7704	1.57	14.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	37036 IGB	7710	3.00	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
0007 DGB	7704	1.14	41.00	4.17	50.00	-45.83	37035 IGB	7711	2.10	9.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
0005 DGB	7705	1.75	4.00	.00	33.33	-33.33	37031 IGB	7711	2.19	6.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
0003 DGB	7706	.63	43.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	37032 IGB	7711	2.29	3.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
0015 DGB	7909	-1.50	12.00	20.83	12.50	-12.50	37030 IGB	7711	1.50	.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
0017 DGB	7911	1.21	19.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	37040 IGB	7711	.64	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
0042 DGB	8609	-1.17	19.00	20.83	.00	20.83	37044 IGB	7812	1.50	14.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1041 IGM	8702	-.88	14.00	8.33	12.50	8.33	37054 IGB	7909	1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1042 IGM	7611	1.59	8.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	37054 IGB	7911	1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1039 IGM	7612	2.67	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	37075 IGB	8002	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1036 IGM	7701	-.75	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37072 IGB	8007	2.35	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1038 IGM	7701	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37068 IGB	8007	2.31	5.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
1048 IGM	7702	-2.21	7.00	20.83	8.33	12.50	37070 IGB	8008	2.00	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1034 IGM	7703	-2.00	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37073 IGB	8009	2.33	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1104 IGM	7703	-2.80	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37077 IGB	8011	2.00	4.00	.00	29.17	-29.17
1070 IGM	7704	.88	11.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	37093 IGB	8112	2.00	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1089 IGM	7705	1.00	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	37103 IGB	8204	1.81	11.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1075 IGM	7705	.00	.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37126 IGB	8606	1.67	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
1077 IGM	7705	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37143 IGB	8705	-1.43	8.00	8.33	.00	8.33
1072 IGM	7707	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33	37141 IGB	8705	2.50	8.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
1045 IGM	7708	-1.00	1.00	12.50	.00	8.33	33050 IGC	7311	1.84	18.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
1106 IGM	7710	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	33051 IGC	7312	1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1049 IGM	7712	2.10	7.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	33052 IGC	7412	.67	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50
1052 IGM	7712	1.22	8.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	33034 IGC	7703	2.25	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1113 IGM	7802	2.25	5.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	33026 IGC	7703	-2.30	7.00	8.33	.00	8.33
1116 IGM	7904	.73	4.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	33031 IGC	7704	.00	.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1115 IGM	7905	1.22	10.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	33030 IGC	7704	.00	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
1114 IGM	7906	2.15	5.00	.00	16.67	-16.67	33025 IGC	7705	.48	13.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
1193 IGM	8005	-2.42	12.00	16.67	.00	16.67	33016 IGC	7705	2.33	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
1030 IGM	8101	-1.75	8.00	20.83	.00	20.83	33018 IGC	7705	1.25	2.00	12.50	.00	8.33
1010 IGM	8607	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	33022 IGC	7711	2.36	16.00	.00	4.17	8.33
1011 IGM	8607	.00	.00	8.33	.00	8.33	33004 IGC	7712	1.97	16.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
1144 IGM	8608	2.15	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	33005 IGC	7712	2.44	7.00	.00	20.83	-20.83
1142 IGM	8609	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33	33013 IGC	7906	.61	14.00	12.50	.00	8.33
1017 IGM	8610	-2.55	4.00	12.50	.00	12.50	33014 IGC	7907	-1.00	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
1018 IGM	8612	-2.50	6.00	16.67	.00	16.67	33011 IGC	7911	1.50	1.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
1001 IGM	8702	-1.71	9.00	8.33	.00	8.33	33012 IGC	7912	-1.50	2.00	12.50	.00	12.50
1174 IGM	8801	-2.80	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33							
1060 IGM	8912	-3.00	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33							

Table A3-1 continued on the following pages

Table A3-1 continued on the following pages

IDN	UNION	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE	IDN	UNION	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPZ
32002	OTV	7405	2.64	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	34001	HBV	7700	1.67	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
32014	OTV	7405	-.29	28.00	12.50	4.17	8.33	34003	HBV	7700	.90	10.00	4.17	20.83	-16.67
32015	OTV	7406	1.71	13.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	34007	HBV	7900	1.60	9.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
32018	OTV	7407	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	34006	HBV	7900	-2.38	8.00	8.33	.00	8.33
32078	OTV	7603	1.62	34.00	.00	41.67	-41.67	34013	HBV	8000	-2.33	6.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32054	OTV	7701	2.14	8.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	34010	HBV	8001	-1.50	1.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32062	OTV	7703	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	34011	HBV	8002	.00	7.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32058	OTV	7703	-.67	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	34020	HBV	8606	-2.15	14.00	16.67	.00	16.67
32067	OTV	7704	-2.37	15.00	8.33	.00	8.33	34022	HBV	8609	-2.67	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32068	OTV	7704	-2.58	12.00	12.50	.00	12.50	35515	IGD	7801	-3.00	4.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32045	OTV	7705	1.08	16.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	35518	IGD	7900	-1.23	9.00	16.67	8.33	8.33
32049	OTV	7705	.75	7.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	35509	IGD	8608	-2.57	12.00	8.33	.00	8.33
32051	OTV	7705	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	35510	IGD	8608	-2.48	15.00	8.33	.00	8.33
32048	OTV	7705	-1.33	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50	35505	IGD	8608	-2.60	7.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32047	OTV	7705	-2.00	4.00	16.67	.00	16.67	35506	IGD	8608	-2.52	11.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32043	OTV	7706	-.50	7.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50	35507	IGD	8608	-2.73	4.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32040	OTV	7707	1.22	9.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	35508	IGD	8608	-2.59	16.00	25.00	.00	25.00
32033	OTV	7710	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33	35504	IGD	8608	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
32031	OTV	7711	1.68	9.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	35502	IGD	8611	-2.86	9.00	12.50	.00	12.50
32034	OTV	7711	1.30	23.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	35501	IGD	8612	-1.70	24.00	25.00	16.67	8.33
32030	OTV	7712	2.56	9.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32073	OTV	7808	.36	29.00	4.17	37.50	-33.33								
32072	OTV	7809	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32081	OTV	7810	.58	21.00	.00	16.67	-16.67								
32080	OTV	7904	1.36	39.00	.00	37.50	-37.50								
32079	OTV	7904	2.16	17.00	.00	20.83	-20.83								
32075	OTV	7906	1.19	21.00	4.17	20.83	-16.67								
32204	OTV	7907	2.00	6.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32090	OTV	8001	.48	10.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32097	OTV	8009	2.00	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32162	OTV	8102	-2.33	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50								
32164	OTV	8103	2.67	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32168	OTV	8104	2.33	3.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32166	OTV	8104	-3.00	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32170	OTV	8105	-2.00	6.00	12.50	.00	12.50								
32171	OTV	8107	1.67	6.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32172	OTV	8112	1.16	9.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32110	OTV	8411	-.14	27.00	12.50	.00	12.50								
32113	OTV	8411	-.57	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32112	OTV	8412	-1.89	8.00	16.67	.00	16.67								
32142	OTV	8607	1.67	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32143	OTV	8607	.00	.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32147	OTV	8608	1.90	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50								
32150	OTV	8608	.50	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32151	OTV	8608	2.04	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33								
32153	OTV	8608	-2.35	13.00	16.67	.00	16.67								
32146	OTV	8608	-1.72	10.00	20.83	.00	20.83								
32152	OTV	8608	-1.00	9.00	20.83	.00	20.83								
32127	OTV	8611	-2.67	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32129	OTV	8611	-2.00	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32132	OTV	8611	-1.92	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32128	OTV	8611	-1.22	10.00	12.50	.00	12.50								
32136	OTV	8612	-.12	38.00	29.17	20.83	8.33								
32139	OTV	8612	-1.86	8.00	8.33	.00	8.33								
32185	OTV	8703	-2.38	3.00	16.67	.00	16.67								

Number of cases read = 163 Number of cases listed = 163

table A3-1 continued on the following page

Table A3-2: The Adoption of Elements of New and Productionist Politics of Swedish Unions

IDN	NEWSPAP.	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE
49822	LO	7409	-1.41	13.00	20.83	4.17	16.67
49820	LO	7410	-.37	56.00	25.00	33.33	-8.33
49817	LO	7411	-2.36	17.00	25.00	.00	25.00
49888	LO	7610	1.58	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49887	LO	7610	-4.40	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49846	LO	7710	-1.11	12.00	37.50	.00	37.50
49844	LO	7711	2.86	7.00	.00	8.33	-12.50
49843	LO	7711	-1.71	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49910	LO	7801	1.71	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49906	LO	7805	-1.00	8.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
49886	LO	7904	-.25	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49885	LO	7904	-1.75	6.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50
49883	LO	7906	1.67	9.00	12.50	.00	12.50
48740	LO	8001	-1.75	4.00	8.33	.00	-25.00
49878	LO	8001	1.20	5.00	.00	20.83	8.33
49867	LO	8003	.00	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49863	LO	8003	1.50	2.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49861	LO	8003	-.67	17.00	8.33	16.67	-8.33
49869	LO	8003	-.67	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
49864	LO	8003	-.14	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49866	LO	8003	-1.67	8.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
49868	LO	8003	-1.67	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40012	LO	8605	-.88	13.00	16.67	.00	16.67
40018	LO	8605	-2.25	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40017	LO	8605	-1.26	13.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40007	LO	8609	-2.67	16.00	16.67	.00	16.67
40006	LO	8612	-1.17	9.00	12.50	.00	12.50
49815	LO	8704	1.48	37.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49857	LO	8802	3.00	3.00	16.67	.00	16.67
49853	LO	8806	.50	4.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
49852	LO	8809	-2.82	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
48724	LO	8906	-1.37	12.00	20.83	8.33	12.50
48713	LO	8908	1.34	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
48714	LO	8909	1.95	36.00	.00	29.17	-29.17
48716	LO	8909	1.95	21.00	.00	20.83	-20.83
48722	LO	8910	-2.50	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
48721	LO	8910	-2.33	25.00	25.00	4.17	20.83
40331	LO	8911	-1.89	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40332	LO	8911	1.89	29.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
40333	LO	8911	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40334	LO	8911	-.96	18.00	20.83	.00	20.83
40335	LO	8911	-1.80	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40336	LO	8911	-2.19	17.00	20.83	.00	20.83
40337	LO	8912	2.50	9.00	.00	20.83	-20.83

IDN	NEWSPAP.	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE
40105	METALL	7300	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40104	METALL	7300	-1.94	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40234	METALL	7400	-1.50	4.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40099	METALL	7400	-2.33	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40101	METALL	7400	-2.89	10.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40097	METALL	7400	-2.76	10.00	20.83	.00	20.83
40098	METALL	7400	-2.80	5.00	20.83	4.17	16.67
40439	METALL	7500	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40450	METALL	7500	1.76	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40312	METALL	7500	2.47	6.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40313	METALL	7500	.00	4.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40436	METALL	7500	1.36	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40029	METALL	7500	1.20	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40258	METALL	7500	-.75	8.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40028	METALL	7500	-2.54	5.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40264	METALL	7500	-1.47	6.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40425	METALL	7503	1.84	8.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40033	METALL	7509	.65	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40034	METALL	7510	1.50	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40239	METALL	7600	-1.18	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40089	METALL	7600	-2.63	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40092	METALL	7600	-2.50	4.00	20.83	8.33	12.50
40231	METALL	7601	-1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40309	METALL	7700	-.50	4.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40041	METALL	7700	.00	.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
40061	METALL	7705	2.43	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40059	METALL	7708	-2.67	5.00	16.67	4.17	12.50
40070	METALL	7800	.40	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40082	METALL	7800	2.50	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40069	METALL	7800	-1.50	2.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40074	METALL	7800	-2.09	11.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40272	METALL	7902	2.50	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40271	METALL	7903	-2.50	7.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40269	METALL	7903	-.32	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40245	METALL	7912	.03	13.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40243	METALL	7912	1.50	1.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40302	METALL	8001	-2.63	7.00	12.50	4.17	8.33
40440	METALL	8001	.75	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40254	METALL	8002	.00	.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
40449	METALL	8003	.22	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40287	METALL	8003	2.38	8.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40299	METALL	8003	1.54	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40280	METALL	8003	-2.85	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
40285	METALL	8003	-1.63	12.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40286	METALL	8003	-3.00	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40292	METALL	8003	.00	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40294	METALL	8003	-2.70	9.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40112	METALL	8503	.88	3.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
40110	METALL	8505	-2.20	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40122	METALL	8605	-2.75	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40114	METALL	8612	2.17	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33

table A3-2 continued on the following pages

table A3-2 continued on the following pages

IDN	NEWSPAP.	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE	IDN	NEWSPAP.	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE
49993	SEP 7502		.25	4.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	40322	SF 7911		-2.67	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33
49992	SEP 7501		2.67	3.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50	40327	SF 7912		-1.36	11.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49989	SEP 7601		1.80	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	40213	SF 8001		2.28	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49987	SEP 7609		-.50	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	40221	SF 8002		1.98	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49982	SEP 7705		1.60	42.00	.00	31.33	-31.33	40211	SF 8002		1.89	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49981	SEP 7706		.29	12.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	40212	SF 8002		-2.43	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
49978	SEP 7805		.	.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	40210	SF 8002		2.38	7.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
49977	SEP 7809		.75	12.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	40209	SF 8003		2.00	7.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
49976	SEP 7811		1.00	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	48793	SF 8103		2.57	15.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49974	SEP 7904		1.50	1.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	48795	SF 8104		.09	9.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
49973	SEP 7905		1.20	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	48771	SF 8502		2.59	7.00	4.17	25.00	-20.83
49966	SEP 8001		.	.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	48761	SF 8604		1.82	11.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
49968	SEP 8001		.35	13.00	.00	16.67	-16.67	48767	SF 8609		-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
49959	SEP 8002		.36	9.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50	48758	SF 8704		-.25	9.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33
49964	SEP 8003		-1.17	6.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	48758	SF 8706		.40	5.00	.00	.00	8.33
49958	SEP 8007		2.38	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	48748	SF 8803		-2.00	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33
49912	SEP 8009		1.50	1.00	1.50	8.33	-8.33	48744	SF 8806		1.00	11.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
49931	SEP 8606		-2.33	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	49840	GF 7503		-2.11	13.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
49927	SEP 8612		.66	25.00	.00	25.00	-25.00	49839	GF 7610		.22	4.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
49923	SEP 8702		2.24	12.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	49834	GF 7701		-2.71	19.00	25.00	.00	25.00
49924	SEP 8702		.52	9.00	8.33	16.67	-8.33	49835	GF 7703		-2.63	6.00	16.67	.00	16.67
49921	SEP 8704		1.45	7.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	49828	GF 7801		2.75	8.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
49916	SEP 8803		1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	40353	GF 7900		-2.88	17.00	.00	.00	37.50
40024	SKAF 7405		-.74	15.00	25.00	4.17	20.83	49825	GF 7911		-2.20	19.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40045	SKAF 7500		1.57	4.00	.00	16.67	-16.67	49826	GF 7911		-2.73	19.00	.00	.00	29.17
40046	SKAF 7500		2.44	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	40347	GF 8001		-2.86	7.00	25.00	.00	25.00
40054	SKAF 7600		2.39	11.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	40348	GF 8002		.96	10.00	4.17	20.83	-16.67
40052	SKAF 7600		-.82	10.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	40350	GF 8002		2.57	5.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
40057	SKAF 7700		-2.43	3.00	12.50	4.17	12.50	40346	GF 8003		-2.82	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40137	SKAF 7901		-1.34	16.00	16.67	8.33	-8.33	48734	GF 8004		-3.00	7.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40136	SKAF 7902		1.45	4.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	48733	GF 8004		.	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40133	SKAF 7904		.	.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	48732	GF 8004		.	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40139	SKAF 7912		1.07	6.00	12.50	4.17	8.33	48728	GF 8004		.	.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
40147	SKAF 7912		-2.68	8.00	12.50	4.17	8.33	48730	GF 8004		.	.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40446	SKAF 8000		.00	2.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	48726	GF 8004		.	4.00	29.17	4.17	25.00
40448	SKAF 8001		.21	13.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50	48731	GF 8004		-2.89	.00	41.67	4.17	37.50
40447	SKAF 8001		-1.64	23.00	25.00	.00	25.00	49952	GF 8203		.	.00	12.50	4.17	8.33
40145	SKAF 8001		2.60	5.00	.00	12.50	-12.50	49953	GF 8403		.	.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40119	SKAF 8001		-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33	49954	GF 8610		.	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40462	SKAF 8001		-2.33	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33	49951	GF 8702		.	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
40142	SKAF 8002		2.45	4.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	50011	TCO 7310		-1.03	13.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40141	SKAF 8002		2.08	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	50016	TCO 7503		-1.17	19.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40444	SKAF 8003		1.50	2.00	4.17	12.50	-8.33	50019	TCO 7611		-.45	20.00	.00	25.00	-16.67
40158	SKAF 8608		-1.94	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33	50021	TCO 7709		.	.00	4.17	16.67	-16.67
40178	SF 7703		2.52	11.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	50024	TCO 7712		1.32	11.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
40180	SF 7706		-.90	11.00	.00	8.33	-8.33	50415	TCO 7712		-1.63	9.00	8.33	.00	8.33
40192	SF 7804		1.28	14.00	.00	20.83	-20.83	50027	TCO 7802		.	.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
40196	SF 7806		1.47	26.00	.00	8.33	-8.33				.				
40193	SF 7812		-2.65	12.00	12.50	4.17	8.33				.				
40199	SF 7909		-2.25	6.00	8.33	.00	8.33				.				
40321	SF 7910		-2.54	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33				.				
40198	SF 7911		-1.71	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33				.				

table A3-2 continued on the following pages

table A3-2. continued on the following pages

IDN	NEWSPAP.	DATE	EI	N	NP	PP	ANPE
50028	TCO	7802	-1.00	8.00	12.50	4.17	8.33
50305	TCO	7802	1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
50034	TCO	7812	2.33	12.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
50014	TCO	7900	-1.34	16.00	12.50	4.17	8.33
50035	TCO	7904	1.31	6.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
50037	TCO	7905	-2.38	25.00	25.00	4.17	20.83
50076	TCO	7905	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
50038	TCO	7906	-1.11	12.00	16.67	.00	16.67
50210	TCO	7912	1.50	2.00	16.67	4.17	12.50
50045	TCO	8001	-1.20	16.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
50046	TCO	8001	-1.90	11.00	4.17	16.67	-12.50
50050	TCO	8002	-2.68	7.00	12.50	.00	12.50
50059	TCO	8002	1.33	6.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
50004	TCO	8606	-2.40	8.00	8.33	.00	8.33
50006	TCO	8606	-2.50	4.00	8.33	.00	8.33
50003	TCO	8609	.00	.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59899	SIF	7310	1.31	9.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
59896	SIF	7702	2.29	7.00	.00	12.50	-12.50
59897	SIF	7702	-1.33	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59892	SIF	7702	.	.00	20.83	8.33	12.50
59884	SIF	7801	1.64	19.00	4.17	25.00	-20.83
59887	SIF	7801	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59888	SIF	7803	2.00	8.00	.00	20.83	-20.83
59890	SIF	7804	1.50	1.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59889	SIF	7903	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59876	SIF	7903	-1.00	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59875	SIF	7906	.93	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59873	SIF	7908	.	.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59870	SIF	7910	2.00	4.00	.00	20.83	-20.83
59881	SIF	7911	2.43	5.00	.00	25.00	-25.00
59879	SIF	7911	-1.00	4.00	12.50	12.50	-12.50
59853	SIF	8001	.65	11.00	.00	20.83	-20.83
59855	SIF	8001	1.04	9.00	.00	29.17	-29.17
59854	SIF	8001	-2.49	13.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59858	SIF	8001	-2.64	5.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59865	SIF	8002	-3.00	3.00	20.83	4.17	16.67
59867	SIF	8002	-2.25	3.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59868	SIF	8002	-2.09	11.00	29.17	4.17	25.00
59862	SIF	8003	.80	5.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59848	SIF	8605	-1.70	8.00	16.67	4.17	12.50
59845	SIF	8605	-1.23	11.00	20.83	.00	20.83
59844	SIF	8606	-.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59843	SIF	8606	-1.50	2.00	8.33	.00	8.33
59849	SIF	8609	1.50	2.00	.00	16.67	-16.67
59839	SIF	8803	-1.47	9.00	20.83	.00	20.83
59840	SIF	8803	-3.00	3.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59835	ST	7309	-.18	13.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59820	ST	7802	2.63	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59826	ST	7809	1.71	7.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59821	ST	7811	-2.40	4.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59823	ST	7811	-2.57	7.00	12.50	.00	12.50
59819	ST	7902	2.33	3.00	.00	8.33	-8.33
59816	ST	7910	-2.53	17.00	25.00	.00	25.00

Number of cases read = 269 Number of cases listed = 269

Explanation:

- IDN Identification Number of Article
- NEWSPAP. Trade Union Paper
- DATE Year and month of publication
- EI EI-Index
- N Number of evaluative statements
- NP New Politics Index
- PP Productionist Politics Index
- ANPE ANPE-Index

1e A3-3: Congressional Opinion, Official Stand, and
 Dissemination of New and Productionist Politics
 in Trade Union Newspapers (ANPE-Index)

ons	Year*	Congressional Opinion	Official Stand	Newspaper Stand
DGB	1978	-7.3	-11.1	-21.8
DGB	1981	-1.0	.0	-4.2
DGB	1983	.0	-4.2	-4.2
DGB	1986	2.4	1.6	2.3
IGM	1977	.8	-16.7	-4.0
IGM	1980	.5	-4.2	1.4
IGM	1983	4.2	-4.2	.
IGM	1986	6.6	12.5	5.9
IGB	1980	-8.3	-8.3	-6.9
IGB	1984	4.2	.	-4.2
IGB	1988	4.2	.	-2.5
IGC	1976	1.6	-8.3	-6.3
IGC	1980	-8.3	-8.3	-4.2
IGC	1988	9.7	-4.2	1.7
ÖTV	1976	.	.	-8.2
ÖTV	1980	.5	-16.7	-12.5
ÖTV	1984	6.1	-8.3	-8.3
ÖTV	1988	8.2	12.0	2.1
HBV	1980	7.0	-12.5	3.3
HBV	1988	12.5	16.7	4.2
IGD	1977	2.1	-4.2	8.3
IGD	1980	9.2	4.2	8.3
IGD	1986	12.1	12.5	10.8
GEM	1977	.	.	.
GEM	1980	.	37.5	.
GEM	1986	.	16.7	.
LO	1976	2.1	-4.2	-.9
LO	1981	.0	.0	-2.8
LO	1986	-.7	1.4	2.7
SEF	1976	-8.3	-8.3	-7.9
SEF	1981	-2.1	-4.2	-6.4
SEF	1986	-3.6	-3.6	-4.2
METALL	1977	4.2	.	-3.3
METALL	1985	.8	.0	-2.1
METALL	1989	-1.7	-4.2	.
SF	1985	-2.1	.0	-3.0
SF	1989	-5.6	-6.3	.9
SKAF	1978	-4.2	-4.2	-2.6

Continued: Table A3-3

Unions	Year*	Congressional Opinion	Official Stand	Newspaper Stand
GF	1977	7.6	4.2	12.5
GF	1980	4.2	4.2	6.3
GF	1986	20.8	20.8	12.5
TCO	1979	1.0	-10.9	-3.9
TCO	1982	4.2	2.1	2.1
TCO	1985	4.2	.	.
SIF	1978	3.1	.	-8.3
SIF	1981	-4.2	.0	-3.1
ST	1975	12.5	-8.3	.
ST	1979	3.1	-4.2	.8
ST	1981	.7	3.1	-1.0
ST	1983	3.1	2.1	.
ST	1987	.	.	6.3
SKTF	1980	.0	.	1.4
SKTF	1984	.	.	.
SL	1977	25.0	.	.

Number of cases read = 54 Number of cases listed = 54

* Year of the congress. The index for the newspaper stand is the mean value of the year of the congress and the years before and after the congress.

Table A5-1.: Union Ideology and New Politics

Unions	political versus neutral	activist versus accommo- dationist	tech-radical versus tech-opti- mistic	confederation	summary index	Ideology
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DGB	1	0	0	-	1	1
IGM	1	1	0	-	2	1
IGB	1	-1	0	-	0	0
IGC	1	-1	0	-	0	0
ÖTV	1	0	0	-	1	1
HBV	1	1	0	-	2	1
IGD	1	1	0	-	2	1
GEW	1	0	0	-	1	1
LO	1	-1	-1	1	0	0
SEF	1	-1	-1	-	-1	0
Metall	1	-1	-1	-	-1	0
SF	1	-1	-1	-	-1	0
SKAF	1	-1	-1	-	-1	0
GF	1	0	1	-	2	1
TCO	0	0	0	1	1	1
SIF	-1	0	0	-	-1	0
ST	0	0	1	-	1	1
SKTF	-1	0	0	-	-1	0
SL	-1	0	0	-	-1	0

Explanations:

- (1) political unions score 1, neutral -1, weak political 0;
- (2) activist unions score 1, accommodationist -1, not clearly to decide 0;
- (3) technically radical unions score 1, technically optimistic unions -1, no clear information 0;
- (4) LO and TCO obtain a bonus because they are mainly responsible for their unions political stand
- (5) sum of rows 1 thru 4.
- (6) Dichotomized Ideology index.

A6-1: New Politics in the DGB Paper Die Quelle (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0
1974	0
1975	0
1976	0
1977	61	1.72	98.5	1024.2	-925.70
1978	0
1979	14	.08	118.2	59.2	59.00
1980	0
1981	5	2.29	.0	19.7	-19.70
1982	0
1983	0
1984	5	.50	.0	19.7	-19.70
1985	0
1986	33	-.49	137.9	78.8	59.10
1987	28	1.05	78.8	39.4	39.40
1988	9	1.67	59.1	19.7	39.40
1989	14	1.50	.0	.0	.00
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169	---	-.02	492.5	1260.7	-768.20

A6-3: New Politics in the IGB Paper einheit (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	4	.00	.0	.0	.00
1974	11	1.81	.0	63.2	-63.20
1975	15	1.56	.0	.0	.00
1976	4	.00	.0	.0	.00
1977	65	1.91	15.0	391.2	-376.20
1978	9	1.21	.0	18.1	-18.10
1979	22	1.71	.0	63.2	-63.20
1980	28	1.96	.0	117.4	-117.40
1981	50	1.95	.0	46.1	-46.10
1982	11	2.08	.0	27.1	-27.10
1983	2	.	.0	9.0	-9.00
1984	2	1.50	.0	.0	.00
1985	2	2.25	.0	.0	.00
1986	67	.55	14.7	88.4	-73.70
1987	24	.14	18.1	54.2	-36.10
1988	19	-.20	.0	.0	.00
1989	22	-.52	9.0	.0	.00
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357	---	1.12	56.8	877.9	-821.10

A6-2: New Politics in the IGM Paper metall (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0
1974	0
1975	0
1976	4	.91	.0	43.3	-43.30
1977	31	.54	143.0	195.0	-52.00
1978	2	2.25	.0	43.3	-43.30
1979	8	1.37	8.7	78.0	-69.30
1980	8	-2.18	52.0	.0	52.00
1981	8	-.74	52.0	8.7	43.30
1982	6	-1.88	.0	.	.
1983	0
1984	0
1985	0
1986	54	-1.34	307.3	61.5	245.80
1987	27	-1.49	46.9	9.4	37.50
1988	29	-2.46	55.2	.0	55.20
1989	12	-2.28	43.3	.0	43.30
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189	---	-.66	708.4	419.2	269.20

A6-4: New Politics in the IGC Paper Gewerkschaftspost (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	9	1.67	.0	90.3	-90.30
1974	0	.00	.0	.0	.00
1975	4	1.00	.0	.0	.00
1976	9	-1.50	18.1	18.1	.00
1977	61	1.49	54.2	523.6	-469.40
1978	0
1979	4	.61	54.2	90.3	-36.10
1980	4	.	.0	.0	.00
1981	4	1.46	.0	18.1	-18.10
1982	0
1983	4	2.35	.0	.0	.00
1984	0
1985	9	2.06	.0	18.1	-18.10
1986	30	-1.29	54.2	54.2	.00
1987	13	.36	18.1	.0	18.10
1988	17	-1.50	36.1	18.1	18.00
1989	9	.26	18.1	18.1	.00
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177	---	.54	253.0	848.9	-595.90

A6-5: New Politics in the ÖTV Paper das Ötv-magazin (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0				
1974	30	1.45	108.3	180.6	-72.30
1975	9	.67	18.1	18.1	.00
1976	13	.31	18.1	180.6	-162.50
1977	126	.49	360.0	1210.9	-850.90
1978	30	1.25	18.1	288.9	-270.80
1979	43	1.40	18.1	397.2	-379.10
1980	30	.98	36.1	126.4	-90.30
1981	17	1.44	.0	126.4	-126.40
1982	0				
1983	0				
1984	9	.14	72.2	144.4	-72.20
1985	0				
1986	48	-.76	198.6	90.3	108.30
1987	30	-1.28	90.3	54.2	36.10
1988	13	-2.15	36.1	.0	36.10
1989	9	-1.50	.0	.0	.00
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	407	.19	974.0	2818.0	-1844.00

A6-7: New Politics in the IGD Paper druck und papier (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0				
1974	0				
1975	0				
1976	0				
1977	0				
1978	4	-2.58	33.3	.0	33.30
1979	4	-1.23	33.3	16.7	16.60
1980	0				
1981	0				
1982	0				
1983	0				
1984	0				
1985	0				
1986	22	-2.46	250.0	33.3	216.70
1987	4	-3.00	.0	.0	.00
1988	0				
1989	4	-2.78	8.3	.0	8.30
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	38	-2.41	324.9	50.0	274.90

A6-6: New Politics in the HBV Paper Ausblick (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0				
1974	0				
1975	0				
1976	0				
1977	19	.89	59.1	197.0	-137.90
1978	0				
1979	19	.16	39.4	78.8	-39.40
1980	14	.23	118.2	.0	118.20
1981	0				
1982	5	-2.33	.0	.0	.00
1983	0				
1984	0				
1985	0				
1986	19	-2.57	78.8	.0	78.80
1987	9	-1.67	19.7	.0	19.70
1988	0				
1989	0				
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	85	-.88	315.2	275.8	39.4

A6-8: New Politics in the LO Paper LO-tidningen (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	1	-.67	.0	.0	.00
1974	4	-2.60	65.0	59.6	5.40
1975	3	1.40	10.8	5.4	5.40
1976	57	.49	34.0	85.1	-51.10
1977	14	.18	59.6	43.3	16.30
1978	12	.11	5.4	43.3	-37.90
1979	45	-.16	172.3	310.2	-137.90
1980	45	-.10	189.6	316.0	-126.40
1981	1	-1.50	.0	.0	.00
1982	1	1.50	5.4	.0	5.40
1983	3	.00	10.8	5.4	5.40
1984	3	-1.75	10.8	.0	10.80
1985	1	-2.00	5.4	.0	5.40
1986	30	-1.22	124.6	73.3	51.30
1987	4	1.83	43.3	21.7	21.60
1988	10	-.05	65.0	59.6	5.40
1989	12	-.57	54.2	86.7	-32.50
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	246	-.22	856.2	1109.6	-253.40

A6-9: New Politics in the SEF Paper Elektrikern (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	5	1.50	.0	.0	.00
1974	14	-1.00	39.4	59.1	-19.69
1975	9	-.38	59.1	19.7	39.40
1976	24	.45	19.7	118.2	-98.50
1977	19	.13	59.4	374.2	-314.84
1978	19	.81	19.7	197.0	-177.27
1979	28	.42	19.7	137.9	-118.20
1980	76	.76	59.1	472.7	-413.64
1981	43	1.87	19.7	78.8	-59.10
1982	14	1.00	.0	39.4	-39.40
1983	5		.0	.0	.00
1984	28	-1.07	.0	19.7	-19.70
1985	0				
1986	33	.15	118.2	295.5	-177.30
1987	33	.55	177.3	275.8	-98.50
1988	19	.94	.0	59.1	-59.10
1989	14	-1.50	19.7	.0	19.70
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	383	.31	611.0	2147.1	-1536.14

A6-11: New Politics in the SF Paper StatsenstMild (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	8	1.29	.0	6.6	-6.60
1974	9	1.21	13.1	19.7	-6.60
1975	0				
1976	5	-.17	6.6	6.6	.00
1977	9	1.46	.0	32.8	-32.80
1978	19	1.41	6.6	65.7	-59.10
1979	17	1.32	13.1	52.5	-39.37
1980	25	1.22	45.0	187.6	-142.58
1981	11	.95	19.7	46.0	-26.30
1982	6	-.03	13.1	6.6	6.50
1983	5	.24	6.6	.0	6.60
1984	5	1.50	.0	6.6	-6.60
1985	13	-.25	46.0	72.2	-26.20
1986	13	.48	52.5	59.1	-6.60
1987	9	.03	46.0	52.5	-6.50
1988	22	-.38	99.0	77.8	21.20
1989	13	.35	6.6	13.1	-6.50
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	189	.66	373.9	705.4	-331.45

A6-10: New Politics in the Metall Paper Metallarbetaren (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	3	.04	6.2	12.4	-6.20
1974	7	-.28	12.4	37.1	-24.70
1975	27	1.20	12.4	123.8	-111.40
1976	6	.44	12.4	24.8	-12.40
1977	12	1.93	.0	12.4	-12.40
1978	10	.01	24.8	68.1	-43.30
1979	13	.30	31.0	43.3	-12.30
1980	24	.27	92.9	167.1	-74.20
1981	0				
1982	0				
1983	1		6.2	.0	6.20
1984	1	-1.50	.0	6.2	-6.20
1985	4	-.66	18.6	24.8	-6.20
1986	10	.33	24.8	18.6	6.20
1987	3	-1.25	.0	.0	.00
1988	1		.0	.0	.00
1989	0				
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	122	.07	241.7	538.6	-296.90

A6-12: New Politics in the SKAF Paper Kommalarbetaren (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	7	-.45	9.8	.0	9.80
1974	17	-.07	59.1	19.7	39.40
1975	12	.72	9.8	78.8	-69.00
1976	12	1.14	.0	68.9	-68.90
1977	7	.50	9.8	19.7	-9.90
1978	9	.25	9.8	19.7	-9.90
1979	26	.05	49.2	108.3	-59.10
1980	28	1.07	88.6	206.8	-118.20
1981	5	-.55	.0	.0	.00
1982	5	-1.75	.0	.0	.00
1983	0				
1984	0				
1985	0				
1986	7	-.29	19.7	9.8	9.90
1987	7	.00	9.8	.0	9.80
1988	0				
1989	0				
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	142	.05	265.6	531.7	-266.10

A6-13: New Politics in the GF Paper Grafia (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0
1974	0
1975	3	-2.11	54.2	.0	54.20
1976	10	.22	.0	81.3	-81.30
1977	10	3.00	.0	.0	.00
1978	10	.63	13.5	40.6	-27.10
1979	13	-2.33	270.8	.0	270.80
1980	41	-2.03	361.9	120.6	241.30
1981	0
1982	3	.	27.1	.0	27.10
1983	3	-1.00	13.5	.	.
1984	3	.	40.6	.	.
1985	0
1986	3	.	40.6	.0	40.60
1987	3	.	40.6	.0	40.60
1988	0
1989	0
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	102	-.52	862.8	242.5	566.20

A6-15: New Politics in the SIP Paper SIF-tidningen (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	5	1.28	11.4	34.2	-22.80
1974	3	.	.0	11.4	-11.40
1975	0
1976	0
1977	16	.82	57.0	91.2	-34.20
1978	16	1.32	11.4	159.6	-148.20
1979	25	.57	57.0	239.5	-182.50
1980	8	.14	68.4	91.2	-22.80
1981	3	.	.0	11.4	-11.40
1982	3	-.43	.0	.0	.00
1983	0
1984	0
1985	0
1986	16	-.58	125.4	68.4	57.00
1987	5	1.42	11.4	11.4	.00
1988	14	-1.12	125.4	45.6	79.80
1989	0
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	114	.38	467.4	763.9	-296.50

A6-14: New Politics in the TCO Paper TCO-tidningen (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	3	-1.03	13.5	.0	13.50
1974	3	-1.32	20.3	33.9	-13.60
1975	5	-1.00	27.1	60.9	-33.80
1976	3	-.69	.0	20.3	-20.30
1977	10	1.19	20.3	74.5	-54.20
1978	15	1.36	13.5	81.3	-67.80
1979	16	-.15	52.7	52.7	.00
1980	20	-.62	40.6	101.6	-61.00
1981	3	-1.50	13.5	6.8	6.70
1982	0
1983	0
1984	5	-1.50	.0	.0	.00
1985	3	-3.00	.0	.0	.00
1986	16	-1.57	60.9	20.3	40.60
1987	5	.30	.0	.0	.00
1988	3	2.25	.0	.0	.00
1989	0
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	110	-.52	262.4	452.3	-189.90

A6-16: New Politics in the ST Paper Statistiska tidsningen (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	5	-.18	59.1	.0	59.10
1974	0
1975	0
1976	0
1977	24	1.07	.0	19.7	-19.70
1978	19	1.96	19.7	137.9	-118.20
1979	38	-.98	256.1	39.1	217.00
1980	14	-1.68	.0	59.1	-59.10
1981	9	-1.93	39.4	.0	39.40
1982	0
1983	0
1984	0
1985	0
1986	14	-.81	177.3	.0	177.30
1987	0
1988	14	.	78.8	137.9	-59.10
1989	19	-.96	.0	39.4	-39.40
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	156	-.44	630.4	433.1	197.30

h6-17: New Politics in the SKTF Paper SKTF-tidningen (1973-1989)

Years	Freq.	EI	NP	PP	ANPE
1973	0
1974	0
1975	2	2.40	.0	31.0	-31.00
1976	2	-2.59	20.6	.0	20.60
1977	2	-1.00	.0	.0	.00
1978	2	2.32	.0	20.6	-20.60
1979	2	1.50	.0	10.3	-10.30
1980	5	-9.96	92.9	72.2	20.70
1981	0
1982	0
1983	0
1984	0
1985	2	-1.50	.0	.0	.00
1986	0
1987	0
1988	0
1989	0
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	17	.02	113.5	134.1	-20.60

Table A6-18: Some Indicators for the Economic Development in Sweden from 1973 to 1989 (annual changes in percent)

Year	GDP(a)	Consumer Prices(b)	Unemployment(c)	Employment Measures(d)
1973	4.2	6.7	2.5	2.8
1974	3.2	9.9	2.0	2.5
1975	2.7	9.8	1.6	2.2
1976	0.4	10.3	1.6	2.5
1977	-1.5	11.4	1.8	2.9
1978	2.0	10.0	2.2	3.3
1979	4.0	7.2	2.1	3.5
1980	1.4	13.7	2.0	2.8
1981	0.0	12.1	2.5	2.7
1982	1.1	8.6	3.2	3.3
1983	1.8	8.9	3.5	3.8
1984	4.0	8.0	3.1	3.4
1985	2.2	7.4	2.8	3.0
1986	2.3	4.3	2.7	3.0
1987	2.9	4.2	1.9	3.0
1988	2.3	5.8	1.6	3.0
1989	2.1	6.4	1.4	-

Explanations:

(a) Growth of real GNP/GDP (percentage change from previous period). Source: OECD, 1990: *OECD Economic Outlook*, 47, June 1990, Paris.

(b) Percentage change from previous year. Sources: OECD, 1989: *OECD Economic Outlook*, 46, Paris; p. 176: Table R11, for 1973 to 1987 and OECD, 1990: *OECD Economic Outlook*, 47, June 1990, Paris; p. 130: Table 49, for 1988 and 1989.

(c) Standardized unemployment rates as percent of total labor force. Source: OECD, 1990: *OECD Economic Outlook*, 47, June 1990, Paris. For a detailed description of the source and methods see: OECD, 1985: *Standardized Unemployment Rates. Source and Methods*. Paris.

(d) Employment measures (relief work, other protected employment, retraining) by the labor market board. Own up-dated calculations according to Martin, 1984: 343; table 3.1. Source: OECD, 1984: *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden*, Paris. Page 62; table E for 1973 to 1977; OECD, 1987: *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden*. Paris. Page 109; table F for 1978 to 1987. For 1988 and 1989 no data were available.

Table A6-19: Some Indicators for the Economic Development in West Germany from 1973 to 1989 (annual changes in percent)

Year	GDP(a)	Consumer Prices(b)	Unemployment(c)
1973	5.4	6.9	0.8
1974	3.1	7.0	1.6
1975	-0.3	6.0	3.6
1976	4.2	4.5	3.7
1977	3.2	3.7	3.6
1978	3.4	2.7	3.5
1979	3.2	4.1	3.2
1980	1.6	5.5	3.0
1981	1.2	6.3	4.4
1982	2.5	5.3	6.1
1983	0.7	3.3	8.0
1984	1.3	2.4	7.1
1985	1.9	2.2	7.2
1986	2.3	-0.2	6.4
1987	2.4	0.2	6.2
1988	3.8	1.3	6.2
1989	3.7	2.8	5.5

For explanation see table A6-18.

A6-20: The Swedish Parliamentary Elections 1970-88 (Percent of valid votes)

Parties	1970	1973	1976	1979	1982	1985	1988
M	11.5	14.3	15.6	20.3	23.6	21.3	18.3
C	19.9	25.1	24.1	18.1	15.5	9.9	11.3
kdm	1.8	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.9	2.5	2.9
fp	16.2	9.4	11.1	10.6	5.9	14.2	12.2
s	45.3	43.6	42.7	43.2	45.6	44.7	43.2
vpk	4.8	5.3	4.8	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.8
mp	-	-	-	-	1.7	1.5	5.5
Others	.5	.5	.3	.8	.2	.5	.7
Blank votes	.1	.1	.3	.5	.8	.9	1.2
Voting turnout	88.3	90.8	91.8	90.7	91.4	89.9	86.0

Source: Wörlund, 1989: 80.

A6-21: The Elections to the Bundestag 1969-87 (percentage of list vote)

Parties	1969	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987
CDU/CSU	46.1	44.9	48.6	44.5	48.8	44.3
SPD	42.7	45.8	42.6	42.9	38.2	37.0
FDP	5.8	8.4	7.9	10.6	7.0	9.1
DKP	.6	.3	.4	.2	.2	*
Die Grünen	-	-	-	1.5	5.6	8.3
Others	4.8	.6	.5	.3	.3	1.4
Voting turnout	86.7	91.1	90.7	88.6	89.1	84.3

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), 1989: 78; Katzenstein, 1987: 38, for the data of the German Communist Party DKP (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei). In these years the category others has been adjusted accordingly.

* no data for DKP. Votes for DKP are in others.

Conclusion A-1: Pearson's' r for the major variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 White Collar	-								
2 Women		-							
3 Size		.73**	-						
4 Centralization			-						
5 Ideology									
6 Org. Potential									
7 Org. Conflict									
8 Org. Comm.									
9 Adoption of New Politics									

For Pearson's' r's I used the highest level of measurement as constructed in the proceeding chapters. However, the presentation of the data has more heuristic aims than clear statements in statistical terms.

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