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Institutional Logics:
On the Constitutive Dimensions
of the Modern Nation-State Polities

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European Forum

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The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying the extent to which *Europeanisation* shapes the adaptation patterns, power redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of ‘interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of corporate interests, and the domestic changes in the forms of political representation.

ABSTRACT*

The politics of the European states system, due to the cultural and competitive framework of this system, organized around distinct variants of a common cultural model. This system generated four predominant institutionalized models of the polity, models which, when delineated, help to clarify the historical differentiation and development of the modern politics. In addition, these institutionalized models have wide-ranging effects on social structuration, agenda and policy formation, and identity formation. This paper consolidates and systematizes some basic intellectual results on these topics.

This paper takes up the idea that the different national states of the modern European states system organized around distinct models for constructing community and mobilizing collective action. This variation seems sufficiently systematic and constitutive that one can delineate distinctive “institutional logics” (Friedland and Alford 1991) differentiating the historically predominant Western politics. The paper concentrates on developing one fundamental distinction, distinguishing two especially consequential dimensions of institutional models. While based upon familiar ideas, these dimensions have not been sufficiently conceptualized and articulated. Doing so would bring substantial analytical benefits to current institutional and macrohistorical sociology, as this paper will attempt to illustrate.

To anticipate, the first dimension of structuration concerns the contrast between more “statist” models of organizing authority (Nettl 1968) and more “civil society” forms (a now standard contrast in the literature but variously conceptualized). The second dimension concerns the contrast between more corporate and more associational models of the organization of society (a contrast also with a long conceptual heritage). Juxtaposing and then integrating these dimensions (after conceptual clarification) yields a typology of four predominant institutional models within the European polity system: four predominant variants of a more general European cultural model of the polity. Strikingly, these models delineate well the Anglo, Nordic, Germanic, and (to a lesser extent) Latin political trajectories, as they consolidated in nation-state formation during the last half of the nineteenth century, establishing powerful legacies enduring through the 1960s and beyond. The paper illustrates how the idea of dominant institutional models, if more clearly established, can aid in

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organizing and systematizing a wide range of observations about historical and institutional development within the “modern world system”— the primary objective of this paper.

In addition, invoking clearly delineated institutional models can help greatly in explaining a wide range of cross-national variation in social activity: for example, in patterns of formal organizations, agenda and policy formation, collective participation and action, and identity formation. Illustrating the current and potential explanatory utility of this kind of institutional analysis is a second (and secondary) objective of this paper (a task that necessarily includes a brief characterization of how institutional models generate causal effects).

In pursuing these objectives the paper draws upon and seeks to develop further so-called “sociological institutionalism” (Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987). It is motivated by a concern for consolidating basic theoretical results – surely one of the core tasks of any discipline.

ANALYTICAL CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVE

There is now a rich body of comparative work contrasting fundamental elements of social organization and culture in the modern world system. This literature ranges over variation in organizational practices (for example, Hofstede 1980), status systems (Lamont 1992), policy formation (Dobbin 1994a; Ziegler 1997), national membership (Soysal 1994; Brubaker 1992), class formation (Biernacki 1995), social movements (Birnbaum 1988; Rucht 1996), and so on. Many of these works employ the idea of underlying institutional variation generating patterned national differences.

Consider a few important examples. Frank Dobbin shows that political and business figures in France and the U.S. drew different lessons from nineteenth-century railroad development, producing over time variant “revealed industrial policies.” Relatively similar public sector involvements were “concealed” as state actions in the U.S. while “revealed” as state actions in France. Different institutionalized models of the polity explain these different understandings (Dobbin 1994a, 1996). Richard Biernacki argues that different institutional arrangements at the time of industrialization produced different constructions of labor (and different factory organization) in Europe (Biernacki 1995). For instance, in England a relatively fully developed commodity market provided a model for the construction of labor as another market commodity. In contrast, Germany had less developed commodity markets, and instead drew upon feudal models of service (like the *corvee*) as templates for industrial employment – leading both employers and workers to understand industrial labor in a different way. Yasemin Soysal shows that different European countries have established distinctive “incorporation regimes” for absorbing immigrants, based upon previously institutionalized models of national membership. These models constitute a basic “repertoire” for states and societal actors in constructing new policy strategies (Soysal 1994:36). Variation in these repertoires seems to explain well the national variation in immigrant discourse, instruments of migrant incorporation, and the collective organization of migrants themselves.

Despite the interest of these path-breaking studies (and others), there has been little consolidation of the underlying institutional dimensions that might help to organize – and hence theorize more confidently – the array of presumably inter-related findings. That is, with a few important exceptions to be discussed, there have been few broadly generalizing efforts to clarify the analytical dimensions along which the modern polities fall, since Parsons’ efforts with his “pattern variables.” More prominent in the literature has been an emphasis on rather narrowly conceived institutional factors (like the features of governmental structure emphasized by recent “historical institutionalism”

[Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992]) or even a historicist insistence upon unique institutional configurations or even contingency, often coupled with the intimation that broader institutional generalization is suspect or even futile.

Of course there remain attempts to produce some generalizations about the basic institutional matrices that constitute political worlds. Most conspicuous has been the attention to variation in the “statism” of the modern polities (Nettl 1968; Badie and Birnbaum 1983). Others have explored the contrast between more “collectivist” and “individualist” social organization (Triandis 1995; Dumont 1986). The field has probably been overly focussed on the former contrast – degree of statism – while simultaneously glossing over the different ways in which this variation is conceptualized and invoked as a causal force (on which more below). Further, the (less prominent) discussions of collectivism/individualism across the modern polities have tended to conflate elements associated with statism with elements associated with corporate social organization or corporatist interest structuration. It seems imperative to distinguish and conceptualize these (and other such) distinctions more sharply, and then to explore how such dimensions of institutional organization might be related. For instance, in an important but insufficiently attended corrective, Kenneth Dyson distinguishes statist and “stateless” governance from *Gesellschaft* versus *Gemeinschaft* society (Dyson 1980:49 and Ch. 2). Relatedly Rainer Baum has discussed parallel differences between “authority codes” (Baum 1977). This paper proceeds in a similar direction, taking off more immediately from John Meyer’s contrasting of statist, corporatist and liberal systems (Meyer 1983), and from other efforts within sociological institutionalism (for instance, Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Dobbin 1994a).

There are two core ideas stemming from sociological institutionalism of relevance here, ideas also implicit or explicit in a number of the works referred to above. First is the argument that a good number of the modern polities (including importantly the historically dominant ones) formed around differing distinct *models* for achieving social mobilization and constructing collective agency, models having obvious religious and military derivation. The different models – the topic of this paper – were institutionalized in constitutional, legal, and administrative procedures, and carried by the various cultural practitioners who both staff and monitor such systems (jurists, lawyers, journalists, academics, clerics, other professionals). Once achieving such embodiment in institutional structure, these models begin to operate as massively reified and conventionalized collective representations (in Durkheim’s sense, or Berger and Luckmann’s). The institutionalist emphasis on “models” rather than merely “structure” is not a semantic matter; rather it is meant to mark the “virtual” character of polity structure in the European world system (Giddens 1984). That is, it intentionally invokes imagery of differently constituted and envisioned

political worlds or cosmologies, with differently constructed sociopolitical entities, relations, and operating logics. This highly “imagined” nature of European sociopolitical development – and the extreme historical and anthropological peculiarity of its form – is constantly elided in currently dominant social scientific imagery (Meyer 1988; Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

The second guiding idea is that institutional structures can operate in constitutive ways, not just as regulative structures or as “opportunity structures” (Searle 1995; Thomas et al. 1987: Ch. 1; Dobbin 1994b). While these differing institutional effects are in no way mutually exclusive, the differences and possible relationships have not been sufficiently expressed. This issue is taken up later, but a main claim – just to mark it here – is that much social activity and structure exists not merely in external-causal relation to the institutional models of the polity; instead, some causal effects should be seen as endogenous to institutional structure, specifically as extensions or enactments of it (Thomas et al. 1987:Ch. 1; Jepperson 1991). For instance, the different citizenship identities and postures apparent across the modern polities are obviously not an external-causal effect of institutional models, but rather reflect direct enactments of them – a “constitutive” causal connection in philosophical parlance (Searle 1995:27-29,43-48).

This paper will briefly address these important causal issues, in seeking to illustrate the explanatory utility of invoking variation in polity models. However, as indicated it will concentrate on the necessary prior task of delineating some first-cut variation in these models. Accordingly it proceeds in the following fashion. The first section describes main constitutive dimensions of models of the polity within the Europe-centered states system. The second discusses how different historical trajectories map onto this typology. The third section discusses changes in polity models in the contemporary historical period. The fourth section provides illustration of the current and potential explanatory utility of invoking these polity models.

DIMENSIONS OF MODELS OF THE POLITY

Recent historical work has dramatized the extent to which the “European world system” of capitalism and Christendom featured remarkable competitive and cultural “intensification” (Mann 1986; originally Weber 1927). That is, in its ecological aspects it selected ruthlessly for polities that pursued an intensive mobilization of internal resources and activities (Wallerstein 1974; Mann 1986; Tilly 1992; Jones 1981 for review). Also, in its cultural aspects it spawned highly ideological and purposive polities, projects organized around expansive religious and post-religious visions of development and progress (McNeill 1963; Thomas and Meyer 1984; Hall 1986; Eisenstadt 1987; Meyer 1989). Hence this

“world system” established both considerable ideological motivation and substantial competitive pressure for “rationalizing” social structures – as Weber and others have noted. This rationalization involved religious and economic *models* for intensively organizing individual activity around various (imagined) collective goods.

These rationalizing models varied in two especially prominent and systematic ways, shortly to be illustrated. First, they varied in imagery about how individual activities are to be assembled into identity clusters and linked with (imagined) collective functions: in effect, imagery about social ordering and coordination. Second, they varied in imagery about how the collectivity is to establish collective agency so as to mobilize resources in the pursuit of collective goals.¹

Along the first dimension (“organization of society,” for short), some polities, most often those with pronounced estate legacies, sustained corporate models and practices of social organization over their politico-economic consolidation during the nineteenth century. Others – those without or breaking with an estate legacy – organized more around socially constructed public actors and their associational efforts. One can contrast then two main models of the organization of society: *corporate* and *associational* (a variant of the old “community versus society” distinction).² In a philosophical idiom this dimension represents the “ontological” dimension of social order: the co-construction of social entities, relations, and collective functions.

Along the second dimension (“collective agency”), some polities – most often those with strong theocratic or militarist legacies – sustained a statist organization of authority, locating social charisma in a political center buffered from society (Badie and Birnbaum 1983).³ Others (most often those outside the

¹ This variation can be directly linked to the kinds of geomilitary, economic, and religious forces charted in the macrohistorical literature. Some of the connections are already well established: for instance, how lower exposure to military competition tends to generate less state expansion and sometimes less of a state/society separation (see Tilly 1992; Collins 1986). This topic – how historical forces have generated the constitutive models and structures under discussion – will be touched upon in the next section. But it cannot be pursued properly in this paper.

² The locus classicus is Toennies' distinction of *Gemeinschaft* vs. *Gesellschaft* (Toennies [1887] 1957). Toennies himself drew on earlier antinomies in social thought, notably Hegel's distinction between a "family society" and a "civic society." Durkheim in turn employed the contrast to distinguish "mechanical" vs. "organic" forms of solidarity. I draw more directly on Max Weber's reworking of the antinomy to denote two primary types of solidary social relationships, also called *Vergemeinschaftung* and *Vergessellschaftung*, translated by Henderson and Parsons as "communal" and "associative" relations (Weber [1922] 1947:136-157).

³ Joseph Nettl as far as I know coined the term "stateness" (Nettl 1968).

Latin orbit, or on military peripheries) located charismatic authority more in society itself, with government as an instrument of that society. One can then contrast, within the modern Western system, two main forms of collective agency: *statist* and *societal*. In a philosophical idiom this dimension represents the “teleological” dimension of social order (the linking of the mundane world and sacralized goals).⁴


These two dimensions can be brought together in a typology, representing four main models of modern nation-state polity: herein called liberal, corporatist, state-corporatist, and state-nation. (See Figure 1.) To anticipate, the “state-corporatist” form, as the label indicates, represents both a corporate organization of society and a statist organization of collective agency. In sharp contrast, the “liberal” model represents associational organization, and locates sovereignty and capacity for collective action in society rather than in an insulated collective center. The “state-nation” form shares the associational organization of society, but features statist collective agency. The “social-corporatist” model differs from the liberal form along the other dimension (“organization of society”), sharing the societal location of collective agency, but organizing society in a more corporate fashion. Needless to say, there are other historical differentiae – one additional one will be introduced – but these, given the nature of the European polity system, seem basic to how the different polities were constituted. Accordingly the current paper focuses upon them.

Further, and strikingly, these historically predominant models of the polity arguably capture well the actual institutional trajectories of the Anglo, Nordic, Germanic and (to a lesser extent) Latin orbits. This association of political orbits (and core countries) and distinct models of the polity is neither an inevitable nor obvious outcome. In fact, recent historical sociology has understandably become suspicious of attempts to map actual political units directly onto institutional types. However, this is a matter to be resolved substantively, rather than via metatheoretic commitments. The substantive argument herein, empirical as well as theoretical, is that the particular historical processes and conflicts of the European system, together with its cultural framework, in fact both (a) generated a set of dominant polity models, and (b) precipitated a historical mobilization of core countries around one or other of these dominant models. The paper in its entirety provides the arguments and evidence for these assertions.

⁴ Note that common uses of “collectivism” (or distinctions of “individualism” and “collectivism”) tend to conflate the two dimensions of structuration that I purposefully distinguish here. In some discussions “collectivism” may connote statist authority, in others a more communal culture or social organization. It is useful to keep these uses distinct, as the main typology of this paper will show.

Figure 1

**FOUR PREDOMINANT MODERN POLITY MODELS
(ALONG TWO FUNDAMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF STRUCTURATION)**



Models of the Organization of Society (Relative "Corporateness")

The two models of social composition and coordination represent two main routes away from medieval and early-modern society. In more corporate models, society remains envisioned as a communal *order*, with subsidiary elements – often collectivities themselves – carrying out explicitly imagined and differentiated public roles or functions. In contrast, in more associational models society is imagined more as a fellowship of members, initiating lines of public action. In historical relief, this distinction contrasts the estate-based systems that organized around modernized and democratized corporate relations (for example, between guilds, occupations, classes, elites), from those systems building around ideas of highly socialized and coordinated “actors.”

Both models of organization are religious in origin and form: one the one hand, the sacralized order; on the other, the priesthood of all believers. Consider Ernest Barker’s remark: “We have to distinguish the *universitas*, or corporate unity, from the *societas*, or partnership, in which the members remain distinct, in spite of their connection, and the unity is thus 'collective' rather than 'corporate'” (quoted in Dumont 1986:73-74).⁵ This distinction corresponds with a fundamental historical differentiation between a society of Estates and a society of individuals organized into classes or other associations (Anderson and Anderson 1967:242-243). For instance, Catholic social doctrine was notoriously a corporate theory, emphasizing “the role of vertically organized functional groups – with control over their own internal structure” (Hammergren 1977:452). Over time the Continental European polities both developed new individualized social structures and modernized in varying ways and degrees their historic oligarchic and corporatist structures of guilds, independent cities, churches, estates, and the like (Naumann 1984). Britain in contrast broke much earlier with its estate tradition, and the U.S. polity, even more distinctly, was individualist and anti-corporatist *de novo*.⁶

The corporate systems organize around an explicit social control model: in effect a system or functional theory of society. In a corporate system social structure is reified. Society is a sacralized structure of roles, a communal order constituted by differentiated collective functions. Collective solidarity is expressed by a functional theory of roles, and corporate contexts are full of ideology about roles and structures. Social organization is envisioned as rational

⁵ Barker draws on Otto von Gierke's distinction between *universitas* (a corporate body or corporation) and *societas* (a partnership), and his broader discussion of how “organic” ideas were replaced by “collective” ideas of plurality, especially in legal doctrine. (See Gierke [1881] 1958:89-90.)

⁶ I concentrate on the corporate form, as corrective to the Anglocentric social ontology built into much contemporary social science.

and planned, rather than natural and emergent as it is depicted in associational imagery. Thus, the social structure itself is typically moralized: society is more a rationalized union of subunits, rather than merely a facility for them (Swanson 1971a).

In corporate organization the subelements of society are pictured as representing different socially-defined functions. The elements are typically themselves groupings or orders, with group rights accorded to them. (They are often "delegated polities" themselves [Crouch 1986:193].) For example, in Latin America the Church, Army, and aristocracy have been central corporate elements (Wiarda 1974; Stepan 1978). In Southern European corporatism, society is a confederation of corporate elements: orders, guilds, communities, leagues, military-religious orders (Wiarda 1982:25, drawing upon Eric Wolf). In Northern European corporate organization, the corporate elements are economic sectors and their elites, given functional interpretations (especially in Scandinavia).

In associational systems, the other main form of coordination, society is envisioned as a system of action generated by subunit "actors." Actors are reified and sacralized; social structure arises from their communications and exchanges (Baum 1977). Associational models are then ideologies about the commitment and capacities of public actors (rather than about functions and roles); these actors are primordial subunits of society. Social coordination is an epiphenomenal outcome of their mutually-adjusting actions. Whereas collective requirements and duties are stressed under corporate organization, rights and choices are more prominent here.⁷

⁷ The Aston group of organizational analysts stressed the fundamental distinction between the differentiation and authoritative control over persons, versus the differentiation and coordination of activities. Using this distinction one can characterize a range of different organizing structures, extending from low structuration of both persons and activity, through various intermediary mixes, to high structuration of both (Pugh 1976; Scott 1987). This distinction applies to the organization of polities as well as formal organizations. In corporate polities, where a structure of relations is reified and taken for granted as natural, people and their identities are the objects of control efforts and the subjects of coordinating theories. In associational systems, where (in contrast) entities rather than relations are reified and taken for granted as natural – that is, individuals and various public actors – organizing efforts focus upon the rationalization and coordination of activities. See Jepperson and Meyer 1991 for a development of this dialectic and application to cross-national differences in formal organizations.

Models of Collective Agency (Relative "Statism")

The second dimension of structuration, collective agency, distinguishes more statist versus more societal organization of collective sovereignty and agency. Statist systems locate collective purpose and authority in a differentiated and insulated organizational center, that is in a unified state apparatus. In contrast, more societal systems locate purpose and authority in society at large, with government an instrument and expression of society.

The typology distinguishes two very different institutionalized political models of collective agency, distinguishing visions of administration (and "steering") versus representation of society.⁸ Variation in collective sovereignty and agency reflects the differing legacies of theocratic, feudal, and revolutionary models of rule, models that had imprinting effects on the political trajectories of Western states (see for instance Dyson 1980:53). In France and Germany, especially Germany, a strong centralized bureaucracy preceded the establishment of parliamentary institutions. The subsequent traditions of the German *Beamten* or French *Fonction Publique* have no Anglo counterpart (Heper 1987:19). The Anglo tradition featured a "strong society and weak state," with a polity of "fused functions and divided powers" (Huntington 1968:Ch. 2).⁹ The strength of both the British and American polities was located in a highly rationalized civil society, rather than in an institutionally embodied "myth of the state" (Cassirer 1966).

These differences are revealed in distinctive legal traditions. Anglo traditions of the "rule of law" are quite distinct from those of the *Rechtstaat* or *Etat de Droit*; the latter two identify the rule of law with the state's authority, while the former locates sovereignty in society (see Sartori 1962). In absolutist traditions, law emanates from an Enlightened center, and the legal order confers fixed duties and entitlements upon individuals, seen as liberating them from personal dependencies (Unger 1976:186ff).

"Statist" models then feature imagery of central administration and planning of society: what Dyson calls "integrated models of public power" (Dyson 1980). The state represents and arrogates the public realm in these

⁸ In this discussion I invoke an old distinction in the history of political thought. For example, Jean Bodin long ago distinguished between the imagined location of sovereignty and the more specific ways in which governmental authority is exercised. (For a discussion see D'Entrevies 1967:100.) This old distinction is a reflection of a general principal/agency antinomy, representing both the imagined ultimate locus of authority (sovereignty) and its delegated agency structures. In application of this distinction to modern polity formation I draw heavily upon work by Kenneth Dyson, especially Dyson 1980, and of course upon Nettl 1968.

⁹ I will need to qualify this standard characterization shortly (in part due to the intervention of John Padgett, to whom I am grateful).

systems, while society represents a private sphere subject to state tutelage. In this model the state is envisioned as a sponsor of a higher moral order (Daalder 1983:3): it is a charismatic center representing the nation. The obvious religious analogue is theocratic organization, and a liturgical entry of authority into society. (Analysts have often represented the French state as a secular replacement of the Catholic church.)

The state in this model is also the primary locus of social rationality. It is represented as carrying a powerful universalizing and rationalizing intelligence; an aura of "inspired officialdom" is present (Dovring 1978:149). Society is in turn an arena of "particularity" and conflict of interests (Dyson 1980:228-230). Politics must be grounded in an "objective" search for national interests; individual activism is partisan and threatening (Dyson 1982). State officialdom must govern individuals' or groups' access to the public arena.

"Societal" models of authority in contrast features imagery of politicking, interest formation, representation, and bargaining. Authority lies in a "public," that is, in society. Society retains more collective agency, through its various modalities of public action (interest groups, "public opinion," etc.). In this model, government is more an instrument wielded by society, and thus has less independent legitimation and standing. Access to the public sphere is less restricted than under statist authority. There is less actual organizational integration of administration, parliamentary, judicial, policing, executive, and planning powers in a unified apparatus.¹⁰

In Anglo societal traditions (Britain and its [former] colonies), images of state and society are sharply separated, but both are independently valorized and do not necessarily exist in opposition. Because much authority is left in society, in a "public sphere" outside of the state apparatus, the state/society distinction does not represent a public/private distinction as well as it does in the statist systems. In Continental statist traditions, where the state is a "summation of economic, social, cultural as well as political spheres" (Whitaker 1977:32), society is less independently legitimated, and state and society often stand in antagonistic relation. Because the state organizational system annexes the public sphere, there is a starker divide between public and private domains.¹¹

It is crucial to underscore that strong *polities* should not be identified with statist collective agency. Needless to say, Britain and the U.S. were powerfully mobilized "strong" *polities*. The early centralization and powerful administrative

¹⁰ Nettl notes that "statism" typically refers to the joining of government, bureaucracy, and legislature into one collectivity (Nettl 1968:570).

¹¹ Roman law, on which Continental legal traditions are based, provides for distinct public and private law (*res publica* and *res privatea*) [Merryman 1969].

development of England is well established in the historical literature (for instance, Brewer 1989), and analysts from Tocqueville onward saw the strength – collective organization and mobilization – of the U.S. polity (Bright 1984 for review). But these systems did not, in comparative relief, develop and organize around a *myth of the state*, and accordingly did not integrate and buffer governmental functions to the same degree, or as sharply differentiate state and society.

Among other things, this point means that statism should not be identified with big government (or societal agency with small government). While statist models and size of government (or government activity) are correlated, it is important to keep them conceptually distinct. To repeat, the statist/societal distinction codes the location of collective agency, not the size of the governmental instrument. Thus, one can find "societal" agency conjoined with expansive governmental activity (and one could find statist sovereignty with relatively limited government activity¹²). The import of sustaining this distinction will become apparent in discussing the differences between the Nordic and Germanic orbits, and in understanding post-WWII political change in the Anglo systems (see below). Arguably these distinctions have not been sufficiently established in the literature.

The Source of Collective Identity

The discussion has attended to the dimensions of models having to do with the organization and purposive mobilization of society. Left out so far has been the imagined nature and source of the “society” – the collective identity – that the polity is mobilizing for.

In all the European systems this identity was pictured as some sort of natural or spiritual “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), but the specific constitutive features varied, in a systematic way. The Western tripartite ontology established two socially-exogenous sources of identities, by picturing the social domain as suspended between spiritual and natural domains and hence organizing both natural and spiritual inputs (Eisenstadt 1987; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Recognizing this ontology helps to contextualize the literature on collective identities (and viz. nationalism). This literature describes two main elements in construction of European collective identities: imagined natural connections (specifically, kinship-based, ethnolinguistic ties), and imagined spiritualized connections (specifically, political and ideological commitments) [Smith 1991; Brubaker 1992]. Both elements are present in all the modern polities, but the specific articulation varies in important ways.

¹² Such systems are more readily apparent outside the modern Western orbit.

Rogers Brubaker has suggested a useful distinction between what is constitutive versus expressive of a collective identity (Brubaker 1990:386). He contrasts the historical legacies of Germany and France in these terms. In comparative relief the German collective identity was imagined somewhat more in “naturalized” terms of kinship: these ties constitute the nation, while political forms were ideally to reflect authentic descent. In contrast, the French nation was constituted more by political (“spiritualized”) imagery. To be French was to be (in effect) spiritually French: for example, those who were educated in French political culture could be members of the French nation independent of ethnicity or descent (Brubaker 1990:389; Dumont 1986:130-131 for a similar argument).¹³ Like that of France, U.S. nationhood is constituted by “creedal” definitions (Hartz 1964; Bell 1990). Americans also claimed to embody the fulfillment of a utopian project with universal validity, but in this case one directly legitimated by religious ideas.¹⁴ In further contrast, Britain has been characterized as having a pre-modern collective identity, with nationality grounded in myths of dynastic continuity and in the associated imperial project (Nairn 1977; Brubaker 1990:399).

This dimension of models of the polity – the imagined primordial core of collective identity – is analytically separable from the previously discussed institutional dimensions, and itself has substantial causal import. For instance, Brubaker as well as Pierre Birnbaum (and his colleagues) have invoked models of identity as shaping immigration regimes and as structuring citizenship and immigration politics.

Further, the imagined core of collective identity can be sacralized to varying degrees, becoming the locus symbolization, identification, and “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm 1983). The extent of such reification and sacralization obviously varies: both over polities (for example, religious polities claiming direct godly preferential status) and over time (for example, the imperial visions of the era of high nationalism versus the tamed nationalisms of contemporary Europe). These variations will also be considered in the discussion of contemporary institutional change. The first task, however, is to apply the basic distinctions that have been advanced.

¹³ It is easy to exaggerate and reify this distinction, and Brubaker and others have been criticized for doing so. For example, John Hutchinson usefully reminds that “...’ethnic’ and ‘civic’ are ideal-typical categories, and all nations draw on aspects of both. ... They denote different modes of identification...that wax and wane in relation to each other due to specific factors. In the late nineteenth century the influx of large-scale immigration of Jews from Russian and eastern European provoked strong ethnocentric reactions in civic France... .” And this civicness was “built upon older assumptions about a Gallic France which was the heir to Rome and also the chosen daughter of the universal Church” (Hutchinson 2000:12, 4).

¹⁴ O.W. Holmes: “It is our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one.”

FOUR PREDOMINANT POLITY MODELS

This section turns to the predominant polity models, showing the utility of describing different national polities as institutionalizing in different ways – and to different degrees – four basic models of social organization and collective agency. In discussing each of the dominant polity models, I concentrate on a political system (or systems) that most clearly organized around the model under discussion – for example, Germany for the “state-corporatist” model. I highlight main characteristics drawn from an extensive literature on national histories of political and social organization. I then discuss a number of countries that represent less canonical or more unique cases.

The State-corporatist Model

Wilhelmine Germany is the classic example of a state-corporatist model. Other Germanic polities also represent this model (as does Japan to some extent [see next section]).¹⁵

Germany has both a strongly corporate and statist heritage. Society itself was historically envisioned as a hierarchic communal order, institutionalizing substantive (as well as procedural) rules for proper public authority. One still finds legacies of both an authoritarian (Prussian) state tradition, and medieval corporate doctrine: doctrines of society as a properly functioning organism (Baum 1968).¹⁶

German statism was revealed in the historical absence of a German equivalent to "government" in its broad sense (Johnson 1978:180). The state referred to both the institutions of government and the organized political community as a whole: a shorthand for the rules and norms by which the community attains coherence (ibid. p. 181). In this tradition, a centralized bureaucracy mediates between state and society; the *Beamte* in self-conception are representatives of the nation (see the review in Rosenhaft and Lee 1990). German higher civil servants were traditionally an estate of state servants,

¹⁵ I reify the "Germanic tradition" here to some extent. For example, I stress the Prussian heritage; Southern German traditions were less collectivist (Baum 1968).

¹⁶ The language of public proclamations is often quite revealing of underlying models of the polity. For example, a common Prussian colloquialism called for individuals to "do one's damn duty and obligation" (Baum 1968). University students in 1949 were encouraged to "learn their duty within the social body"; "public order is the citizen's first duty." Carlo Schmid when Vice President of the Bundestage was quoted as saying that "German youth needs to be educated to disobedience" (Phillips 1989:2). In West Berlin into the 1980s one could still see signs such as "Schwimmen is fuer Nichtschwimmer strengt verboten."

wearing uniforms reflecting their status.¹⁷ "As in no other country, higher officials in every German state personified intelligence and culture and became bearers of political development" (Anderson and Anderson 1967:389). Otto Hintze classically argued that the underlying model of the Prussian state stressed loyalty and devotion in return for patriarchal care. This tutelary imagery was assimilated into business organization and management as well.

Correspondingly, in this tradition notions of "civil society" were "neither linguistically nor culturally grounded" (Bendix 1990-1991:149). By the end of the nineteenth century, sovereignty belonged to the state as such, not to the people or to a particular organ or even the monarch (ibid.). Individual rights developed in connection with the consolidation of a strong state, rather than being won in opposition to state power (Braunthal 1989:309). A prominent historian has remarked that German discourse employed a similar language of rights as the rest of the West, but differed substantially in the content of such discussion, envisioning the state as elevating the individual into a realm of freedom (Krieger 1957:8).¹⁸ Weimar theorists discussed how one might synthesize the individual liberties of Western tradition with the "social liberty" of Eastern collectivism (ibid. pp. 464-465). German liberals were not supportive of popular assemblies and did not push for ministerial responsibility to parliament (Rosenhaft and Lee 1990).

The long dominance of Hegelian thinking about the state was related to "the entirely private notion of society in Germany" (Grimm 1985:100). State-corporatism generates a distaste for an interest politics: society should occupy a higher stage where government reflects a normatively proper general will and a more "objective" system of policy-making (Schram 1971; Scheuch 1988:90). State-sponsored "peak" associations were constructed to facilitate economic and political ordering (Anheier 1991); ideas of individual voluntarism, outside of state-led channels, were little established. The idea of the state as existing above democratic politics has been an enduring one (Dyson 1975). Over time group pluralism gained more acceptance, but until very recently there has been a powerful ambivalence toward the interest group bargaining characteristic of the liberal systems (Scheuch 1988:89ff). Ideas of the common good have remained substantive ones: ideals of a solidary integration of society and substantive

¹⁷ Late nineteenth century Prussia provided over 100 different classes of decorations to bestow to public officials (Anderson and Anderson 1967:230).

¹⁸ Ernst Troeltsch's discussion of "organic liberty," even if exaggerated, is instructive here. "Liberty is not equality but service by the individual at his place in the function (*Orgunststellung*) allotted to him" (though the individual may then "freely exercise his criticism"). German liberty is "a secularization of the religious sense of duty and, in particular, its intensification into an activity of creation in common" (Troeltsch quoted in Dumont 1986:135).

justice, rather than open-ended process-based ones (Rueschemeyer 1973:90-91). In this vision, politics should be grounded in an objective search for national communal interests; individual activism is partisan and threatening, and disagreement on public matters traditionally carried moral opprobrium (Dyson 1982; Lewin 1948). One attains the collective good by finding technically correct solutions (Dyson 1982).

The corporate model of German society is revealed in interest organization and representation: historically, interests attained constitutional representation *if* they fit into a desired pattern (Hirsch-Weber 1958:273). For example, in the Wilhelmine period, social classes – although not the working class – were given direct representation in the state apparatus (Mann 1987). The Bonn Republic sustained a "corporatist rather than individual-liberal approach to organizing social groups" (Crouch 1978; Unger 1976:218-219). Various corporate status groups have persisted, some deriving explicit rights from the state, and mediating between state and society in sectoral areas (Dyson 1982; Crouch 1980). For example, until very recently judges and civil servants were organized in a manner akin to guilds, and depicted in law and public discourse in this fashion (Schram 1971). Similarly, the German business elite at least through the 1950s conceived of itself as a *Funktionselite*, a functional extension of *Stand* notions (Hartmann 1959:265).¹⁹ Historically unions have been accorded rights by the state and have shared responsibility for industrial governance; social welfare activities have been explicitly delegated to churches. A corporate aura still surrounds occupational structures (for example, in the extensive use of apprenticeship training, or the continuing neo-patrimonial organization of German academe).

Changes. During the Bonn Republic, Germany underwent a reconstruction of the corporate subelements of society: society remained a national community and corporate order, but the subelements themselves became less corporate. Also, models of authority have democratized; the 1960s in particular reflected a substantial weakening of statist ideology.²⁰ The political parties became more independent and important institutions, rather than just having a delegated role in the state (for a review see Smith 1989). Neoliberal ideas were conjoined with *Rechtstaat* ideas in notions of the "public service state" (Dyson 1977). Large areas of administration have been turned into quasi-judicial processes (Dyson 1982), federalist and "subsidiarity" principles have further weakened centralist emphases, as has the related spread of administrative

¹⁹ In this model, individuals in an organization constituted a community, with managers responsible for the personnel, and the latter in a state of dependency.

²⁰ One symbolization: in the Bundeshaus, the government bench was originally on a dais several feet about the floor; ministers literally looked down on parliamentarians. It was moved to the floor in 1969.

responsibilities over a wide range of para-state bodies (Katzenstein 1987). Kenneth Dyson (1977) discusses dramatic alterations in bureaucrats' role conceptions.

However, the state still remains a moral and tutelary agency, and models of society as an organic unity persist. For example, the Constitutional Court continues to make pronouncements on the proper social functions of the family, with the suggestion of access to a natural law (see Scheuch 1988). The parties remain to some extent *Staatorgane*, having some delegated constitutional and moral functions (Smith 1979:67; Heper 1987:18). There has nevertheless been some convergence with both the liberal and social-corporatist systems.

The Liberal Model

The U.S. is the purest example of a liberal model. Britain and the other Anglo systems are also instances, as is to some degree Australia (see next section).

The liberal systems, featuring associational organization and societal agency, variously sacralize society and the individuals and associations that are envisioned as constituting it. The U.S. was "capitalist de novo" (C.W. Mills' phrase), without either a feudal (estate) or absolutist tradition. It represents the "first new nation" (Lipset 1963) most exclusively organizing around "civil society" (Bell 1990:48). In its composition, it is a "universalist national collectivity" (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985), alike a spiritual fellowship of common believers rather than a unified corporate order as in the state-corporatist polity. Political community is sacralized directly via "civil religion" doctrines, rather than indirectly via a Church or State (Bellah and Hammond 1980).

The U.S. especially shows a weak mythic elaboration of an authoritative center: government was originally a "state of courts and parties" (Skowronek 1981). In this vision, popular sovereignty is expressed through debate in a common public, rather than through functional representation of corporate estates. There is an associated great reification of public opinion. James Bryce spoke of "government by public opinion" in the U.S.: "in no country is opinion so powerful as in the U.S.: in no country can it be so well studied" (Bryce 1923:251). Individualist religious or quasi-religious solutions are sought for most problems (Susman 1984:80ff); a "logic of community building" and voluntarism obtains whereby community is built by individuals taking action (Varenne 1984).²¹ Society is represented as a congeries of identities and interests allowing one to form such groups; such identity and interest differentiation is thought to be natural and is highly legitimated. For instance, in American

²¹ This imagery remains conspicuous in contemporary American-suffused "communitarianism" in political theory (for example, Etzioni 1993; Bellah et al. 1985).

tradition people can be proud of their “ethnicity” rather than feeling civically disabled by it – in strong contrast with the French (statist) logic of the “indivisible republic.”

Britain had early experienced a transformation of corporate estate structures into a class-based system, through revolution and commercialization. Parliament, for example, was much less an assembly of estates here than elsewhere. In Britain society is conceived in more "organic" terms than in the U.S. (Beer 1956:22): social groupings are more organized and articulated within a status order capped by an integrating social establishment. But comparison with systems other than the U.S. places Britain firmly in the associational camp, at least for purposes of first-cut clustering.

Regarding collective agency, "it was society which, until recently at least, absorbed the state" in Britain (Johnson 1978:182). The Crown, for example, symbolizes a hierarchy of *society*, not an independent state: an embodiment of society – an "Establishment" – runs the state.²² Joseph Schumpeter classically argued that a status order dominated economic and political orders (Bell 1990:48). There is no notion of an integrated governmental hierarchy making up a state (Dyson 1980:271). British governmental traditions stress devolution of public authority into society, and distaste for officialdom and bureaucracy (see Thomson 1940:83-86 for a classic treatment). Government "operates on the same plane as other political actors" (Hayward 1976): in liberal ideology and jurisprudence, in a dispute government is merely another party – a very different imagery than that obtaining in the truly statist systems.

In England, and then in the U.S. even more prominently, public and private spheres were closely intertwined, while in governance, legal, political, and administrative forms of control were distinguished and separately institutionalized. The U.S. shows a remarkable interpenetration of public and private spheres, with government modulating the mix. It becomes difficult to describe the profile of political intervention into (versus buffering of) social domains, since civil society is so public in authority and functions (with extensive social authority left with business and professional elites in society, for instance), and government so colonized by social forces.

It is instructive to note that European continental politico-theoretic traditions largely identify sovereignty with legitimacy, while the Anglo-Saxon tradition of organization sharply distinguishes the two concepts (Hennis n.d.). Wilhelm Hennis has pointed out that Anglo-Saxon commentary pays prominent attention to the problem of citizen "obedience," concerning citizen determination

²² In Stanley Rothman's terms, the Crown represents the British community qua community in its total historical development (Rothman 1970 :494).

of whether the sovereign is operating in a legitimate manner. This focus is absent in Continental and Germanic tradition; obedience in these discourses is a superfluous rather than a focal concept.

Changes. In the liberal systems state activity and resources expanded greatly with British imperial efforts and then again with the world wars (especially since WWII; see Jessop 1980 for a discussion). But the state remains a political manifestation of society. Power is diffused through the proliferation of independent centers of decision (Dyson 1980:67). Policy making has remained reactive compared to Germany or Sweden (Jordan and Richardson 1982). Labor party ideology has been etatiste, but its practice has been voluntarist (Birnbaum 1982). English governance reveals a "virtually nonexistent planning structure" (ibid.), without an institutionalized bureaucracy of the Continental sort; it is more a "policy community" centered around Parliament and the government's ministers (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974). However, according to specialists such as Samuel Beer and Keith Middlemas, Britain has become markedly more "collectivist" in the post-War period – in the terms here, more statist. So Britain moves somewhat toward the state-nation systems (not yet described), but it should still be seen as a "liberal" representative, when placed in comparative relief. Expanded government activity, and even an elaborated welfare state, need not indicate a move from societal to statist collective agency. Indeed the "contradictions of collectivism" discussed by Beer (Beer 1982) are best understood as flowing from the dilemmas of an expanded government facing a liberal society.

The U.S. like Britain has experienced an expanded government. But it still squarely represents the liberal cell. (As will be discussed, over time all the systems reveal expanded government activity, so the baseline for comparison changes.) Having said this, one can detect some reduction in traditional reliance on the self-governance of "civil society," and some "corporatization" of the makeup of American society – viz. the transformation of interest and ethnic groups into proto-corporate subcommunities. These should be seen as nascent institutional shifts, of causal consequence.

The State-nation Model²³

France generated and is the archetypal representative of this form.²⁴ Far more weakly representative are other Latin systems: for example, Italy, Belgium, and Spain (to be discussed in the next section).

²³ Others have referred to a "Jacobin" polity.

²⁴ "France is a state-nation, rather than a nation-state" (Hayward 1973:4).

The state-nation model is associational rather than corporate in its rationalization of society, but statist in the way it locates collective agency. In France, revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes aggressively reorganized the polity around a central state apparatus and a plebiscitary public: Jacobin ideology and practice was explicitly anti-corporatist (an attack on the *Staendestaat* [Poggi 1978]). Jacobin perceptions still linger in collective representations of society as composed of centrifugal forces threatening the integrity of the state (Hayward 1982). Interest groups are condemned – and legal tradition restricted the development of them – but society organizes around them anyway, without celebrating voluntarism as does the liberal system.²⁵ In French models people are human beings and citizens first; group identities – for instance, religious ones or ethnic ones – must be sequestered from the public sphere, rather than allowed to constitute it.

In organizing ideals of authority, popular sovereignty is unmediated, and "the Renaissance antithesis of sovereign individual and sovereign state has persisted in sharper terms than in England" (Thomson 1964:126). But it is the Nation that rules, not the people: deputies represent the will of the nation, not segmental citizen voices (Sartori 1962; LaPalombara 1969:178ff; Unger 1976:163-164). Ideas of a fully popular sovereignty were quickly marginalized in post-revolutionary imagery. Scholars can even claim that, until very recently, "French political science has [had] little acquaintance with the notion of citizenship" (Leca 1990:144), or that, in typical French administrative ideology, "consultation takes place so that the administration can explain its decisions to the groups affected by them" (Suleiman 1974:333). The state in French political cosmology became a transformative center, the primary representative of the nation. State officials were bearers of a "transcendental rationalism" (Birnbaum 1988:74); educators referred, for example, to the importance of "learning the milieu of the 'senior executives' of the Nation..." (Marceau 1977:229). This imagery helps to explain the periodic legitimation of ideas of popular dictatorship: governance by one man, but democratic in source (see Bryce's early discussion [Bryce 1921:vol. 1 p. 291]).

Society in this system is not independently legitimated and is associated with protest, schism, and irresponsibility (as in the much debated relatively

²⁵ "Although the concrete historical effort of Frenchmen has consisted for centuries in demanding from the state the liberty to constitute in actual fact 'partial societies,' this has remained for French democratic tradition within the category of the *sein*; it has not reached the level of political theory, the *sollen*... Hence there is widespread consensus to condemn interest groups morally, or more exactly, to condemn their unwarranted interferences in politics (Lavau 1958).

recent images of the "delinquent society").²⁶ It is said to lack a consensual basis (Faucheux, Amado, and Laurent 1982:353). The public has traditionally been represented as a manipulable mass rather than an informed body (Hayward 1982:125). In a Rousseauist variant, the general will emerges if citizens are *unable* to communicate (Bendix 1990-91). Demands for participation have until recently been interpreted as interference (Bourricaud 1958). "Allegiances to peripheral structures of territory or of class have remained strong, and have clashed incessantly with a state which claims to incarnate legitimacy" (Birnbaum 1990:249-250). This system generates a classic dualism, an oscillation between authoritarian rule and periodic revolt: a pattern first analyzed by Tocqueville (Tocqueville [1856] 1955:210-211) and then noted for each subsequent political regime through the present.²⁷

The state-nation polity is mirrored in the stratification structure of society. Laurence Wylie and many others have remarked upon the hierarchical structure of French society, with its caste-like elements: in Wylie's characterization, each group "barricades itself behind its 'acquired rights' and resists all movements for change" (Wylie 1957). Occupations are legally codified in a manner not true of the U.S. or Britain (Marwick 1986:24). Titles and status are dignified; formality is tied to authority or function (for example being a boss), rather than based in social background as in England (*ibid.* p. 355; Crozier 1964).

Changes. The long history of state/society tension has persisted in France, with the state struggling to manage a fractious array of insulated castes and classes. State institutions continue to limit participation and representation, redirecting popular forces into protest efforts. Political regimes continue to struggle with varying allocations of executive, representative, and plebiscitary powers.

In the 1970s and '80s, however, there have been indications of a "gradual abandonment of the traditional Jacobin approach to defining French politics and society" (Safran 1985:270; Schmidt 1996), with distantly parallel developments in Italy. Anti-etatisme has become more fashionable. Governments in both France and Italy have pursued devolution with some seriousness (perhaps especially the French Socialist government of 1981-86) [Schmidt 1996]; the partial decontrol of the broadcast media in these systems is perhaps an even more serious indicator of institutional change. There has been a great expansion

²⁶ A representative quotation, from Pompidou in 1969: "History has demonstrated that our people, who by nature are given to division and the most extreme individualism, has only been molded into the French nation by means of the state" (quoted in Tarle 1979:44).

²⁷ See Siegfried 1956 on "stable instability," Stanley Hoffman on France's "limited authoritarianism" and "potential insurrection against authority" (Hoffman 1963), and also Dyson 1980:258-264, Schonfeld 1976:138-142, and Wilson 1982 for reviews.

of voluntary associations, consumer groups, and citizen lobbies, as well as heightened grass roots militancy; efforts that both indicate and foster a slow modification of the traditional centralism characterizing these systems.²⁸

The Social-corporatist Model

The Nordic countries best represent this polity form. Like the state-corporatist systems, the social-corporatist polity also organizes the collectivity as a communal order. But while this polity employs extensive governmental activity, the state has historically been envisioned more as a natural extension of a governing societal community. Crucially, unlike the Germanic legacy one does not find the same centralist arrogation of collective agency or the equivalent state/society divide. Government rather intermediates the organized interests of society (Olsen 1983).

In this connection, many social scientists refer to the Nordic model as a "guardian society" or "welfare society." In this vision, society is an integrated partnership, a "national social community" organized around a "comprehensive system of community norms" (Heclo and Madsen 1987:27; Anton 1980:177). For example, the Swedish Social Democrats in the 1930s used the image of creating a "people's home" (*folkhemmet*) through welfare state programs (March and Olsen 1989). Humanitarian welfarist ideology dominates, especially in Sweden and Norway (Allardt 1984).

The social-corporatist polity is a rationalized functional community rather than a hierarchic order. Status is accorded narrowly to functional roles, with limited deference to hierarchy; deference is to specific functional competence (Eckstein 1966 on Norway). A clear hierarchy of functional estates is absent. Titles are functional rather than status-based; there is a conspicuous lack of honorific titles, social registers, and so forth. Both invidious comparisons between people, and the idea of charismatic personal leadership, are shunned (Torgersen 1974:207-225).

People enter the public sphere not as independent actors carrying private "interests," but as functionally-specific role players carrying delimited competencies, intensively mobilized into a multitude of formal organizations. Ideology and education systems emphasize proper acting out of the details of roles (see Eckstein 1966 on Norway). Interests and policy-making are organized around functional sectors, representing dense corporate organizational blocs: agriculture, labor relations, capital (see for example Anton 1969; Ruin 1982; Olsen, Roness and Saetren 1982; Kvavik 1976). In Norway, customary practice

²⁸ In this characterization of changes I draw in addition upon Safran 1985, Kesselman 1987, LaPalombara 1987, Haycraft 1985, Spotts and Wieser 1986, Ardagh 1987, and Hellman 1987.

prescribed the self-governance of functional areas by the people comprising the area (Kvavik 1976:159). Top groups form an establishment of association members (Elvander 1974:35). These polities are full of interest groups – here often called "popular movements" – labor groups, religious organizations, consumers associations, cooperative societies, temperance groups, adult education societies (Ortmark 1979), producing the highest organizational density in the world. Traditionally such groups had constitutions and were alike guilds in structure and operation (von Otter 1980:152).

All legitimated groups are to some extent integrated into public authority. Participatory rights are accorded to representatives of specific interests (Olsen 1983:166ff). Elective-representational channels operate within a frame set by the bargaining of corporate groups, distinguishing this system from the liberal polity (Rokkan 1968). In this model, democracy is achieved through corporate bargaining as much as through plebiscitary means; under such arrangements, unlike in the liberal system, expanded organizational participation is thought to *foster* democracy.

An ideology of community consensus frames policy-making. While "voice" is encouraged – for example, in Sweden papers are subsidized to speak from different political viewpoints in order to sustain a political dialogue (Hollstein 1983) – this is not a "pluralist" system. The emphasis is on incorporating voices into a harmonious community discussion. True opposition is dangerous. Analysts note the discouragement of overtly ideological discussions. Elites strive to convert political issues into technical problems: Heisler and Kvavik (1974:74) speak usefully of the "cooptive polity."

While state activity in Scandinavia is obviously (even notoriously) extensive, state and society are highly interpenetrated, and there is little institutionalized state-society opposition (and low salience of public/private distinctions) [Allardt 1984:172, Hernes 1988, Zetterberg 1984, Eckstein 1966]. "The absence of clearly defined institutional boundaries [between public and private] are among the hallmarks of Scandinavian historical development" (Hernes 1988:208).²⁹ This "absence" demarcates societal-type authority and thus is shared with the liberal systems. In the social-corporatist form, it in part follows from a model of the state as a "movement" or project fostering national progress. In Sweden, for example, the Social Democratic Party for many years was the carrier of the nation's transformative social project (Heclo and Madsen 1987:27,44). State structures are envisioned as coordinating and administering, rather than directing: authority models feature emphasis on rule-based

²⁹ "In Swedish and Norwegian public discourse the words 'society' and 'state' are used interchangeably, and not as dichotomies as in other languages" (Hernes 1988:214-215; also Zetterberg 1984:85 and Boli 1991).

coordination, rather than imperative authority. The role of central agencies is to facilitate and motivate the formulation of commitment and understanding, rather than to control (March and Olsen 1989): the implicit model is a collegium of governance of functional groups and sectors (Anton 1980:Ch. 4; Olsen, Roness and Saetren 1982:61). This imagery helps to explain why Joseph Nettl went so far as to describe the Nordic system as reflecting an "absence of state," when viewed comparatively (Nettl 1968).

Associated with this communal authority is an "absence of inherent distrust" between public and authorities (Zetterberg 1984:87) and a traditional image of the government as a benefactor rather than oppressor (Allardt 1984:181-182) – at least until very recently. There is "an extremely relaxed attitude of people toward their central government and public authorities. We do not, in fact, have many feelings toward the state at all..." (Andersen 1984:118). An aggressive "publicity principle" mandates extensive openness in government operations. This openness cuts the opposite way as well: in such a system, it is hard to escape the public. A writer for an underground paper in Stockholm complained that it is hard to remain underground: if the government finds you, they give you a subsidy (Richardson 1982).

Changes. The Nordic polities too have reconstructed their corporate subelements, individualizing them while sustaining organization around the nation as a community. Increasingly the subelements of society are more like liberal individuals, but ones who happen to be intensively organized within a matrix of formal organizations – which itself still has a corporate character.³⁰ Thus along this dimension one finds some convergence of the liberal and social-corporatist systems. In addition, in recent years the legacy of the expanded welfare state has stimulated an uncharacteristic state/society opposition in Sweden and Denmark. (See Gress 1988 for a review of statist tendencies and reactions against.) Thus, the social-corporate and state-corporate systems have to some degree begun to converge as well.

Other Countries, Relative to the Predominant Polity Models

The core allegation so far has been that a number of core polities within the European states system developed around distinct polity models. Now it is appropriate to discuss a number of additional countries relative to the typology, countries that represent less canonical or more unique forms – for reasons that can be theorized. I intend this discussion to provide additional application of the typology, and further contextualization of it.

³⁰ See especially the analyses in *Daedalus* 1984 (for example, Zetterberg 1984).

A number of polities in the modern states system did not form as clearly around one of the dominant models of the polity, for one or more of the following reasons :

- * because for historical reasons they developed a *mixed historical-institutional heritage*;
- * because they represent historical organization around a *distinctive* polity model;
- * because they are not constructed *national projects* to the same degree, and hence represent a distinctive type of polity;
- * or because they were *late entrants* into the European modernity project, and hence for an extended period not much rationalized by a modernist polity model.

Exemplifying these paths in turn (with no attempt to be synoptic in countries considered):

(1) *Mixed-model systems*: *Canada* is an example of a colloidal polity: it mixes French and British constitutional doctrines and political cultures. Hence it can be thought of as a hybrid of liberal and state-nation elements, with New World federalism admixed as well. For instance: an explicitly dual legal system is maintained, with the presence of French civil law in Quebec (Ehrmann 1976:14-15). Canada historically has been a coalition of subunits – provinces, socioreligious and linguistic groupings, institutional elites (Westhues 1977). This heritage enables one analyst to see Canada as on the way to becoming the first "post-modern nation-state": "a weak center acting as a kind of holding company" (*The Economist* 1991:18).

(2) *Distinctive models*: *Australia*, while in general terms a liberal form, is in many respects a unique configuration linked to its particular colonial trajectory; an example of statist liberalism. A strong reliance on government regulation and initiative is combined with contemptuous attitudes toward authority (Taft and Walker 1958). (Louis Hartz called Australia a "radical democracy" [Hartz 1964].) Organization and expression of interests is "Benthamite"; unabashed and economistic (Collins 1985, Bryce 1921). But liberal interests organize to invoke strong government intervention and regulation.

This uniqueness may be due to a configurational combination of founding populism, early colonial politicization of class relations, and simultaneous early assignment of much economic responsibility to the state. The resultant unique

assemblage can itself have causal effects of note, independent from any effects attributed to a "liberal model" and shared with other liberal systems.³¹

Japan entered the European world system as a distinctive state-corporatist form, with little construction of individualism, and no notions of popular sovereignty.³² The Meiji restoration borrowed largely from Prussian organizing models. The development of a distinctive form of popular sovereignty elements, and the reordering of society's corporate structures, were both post-WWII developments. Given its heritage, Japan remains the most state-corporatist of the rich democratic polities. One analyst says Japan could be called a "feudal democracy" due to the importance of occupational groupings having quasi-familial loyalties and obligations (Beer 1981:440). Society remains a minutely graded hierarchy of corporate bodies with powerful outsider/insider divides. Social organization employs a "metalanguage of group" (Eisenstadt 1996), and given the "assertive groupism" (Beer 1981:442) one does not find a common, integrated, public sphere in the Western sense. The bureaucracy is the central institution of the polity, coordinating semi-autonomous elites sharing power (van Wolferen 1989). Public opinion (in the Western sense) and law have not been strong independent forces until recently. While ideas of a governmental obligation to be responsive to social needs are well established, a clear-cut political theory of rights in the Western sense has not been present.

(3) *Less integrated national communities*: The so-called "consociational" systems are multinational polities with correspondingly distinctive polity models. For instance, Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum argue that *Switzerland* does not have a consolidated political "center" due to its cantonal federalism (Badie and Birnbaum 1983). It reflects both liberal and social-corporatist elements, sharing with the liberal systems little legitimation of bureaucracy and officialdom, but with social-corporatist imagery of public duty and corporatist decision-making practice (Katzenstein 1985). (For example, its 1874 Constitution was modeled on that of the U.S., but without any equivalent to the Bill of Rights.)

Netherlands, the canonical consociational polity, evolved from a liberal-commercial regime. The governing model is that of a patriciate, acting as the superordinate trustee for the people – a "Regent mentality" (van Mierlo 1986;

³¹ This form of configurational argument is less emphasized in this paper, given its simplifying and generalizing thrust. But it is entirely compatible with the main line of argumentation featured.

³² Both Robert Bellah and Shmuel Eisenstadt have argued that Japan should be seen as a fully distinct civilization, incorporating European techniques of governance while resisting the underlying universalistic ideas of morality and social authority (Eisenstadt 1996; Bellah forthcoming).

Goudsblom 1967:16). The various religious-based *zuiden* are corporatized within the broader polity, but individuals appear to be the main units and actors within them. Later evolution incorporated elements of Scandinavian welfare society development, and, starting in the 1960s, a partial deconstruction of the *verzuiling* system and a corresponding reconstruction of consociational practice (Bax 1990). To the extent the typology of this paper provides illumination of this distinctive polity, Netherlands should probably be seen as another hybrid of liberal and social-corporatist elements.

Belgium historically combines statist and corporatist elements in a federalized multinational polity. A 1972 Kultuurpakt regulated corporatist allocation of civil service jobs, money, and cultural decision-making between the three major pillars (Catholic, Socialist, and liberal-conservative). In this context, "[p]eople are less citizens than clients" of the polity (Huysse 1984:155). Constitutional amendments in the 1970s and 1980s greatly reduced the unitary character of the polity, and reinforced the Flemish/Walloon cultural differentiation – and so has current European economic and political integration, with its “Europe of regions.”

Austria even more than Germany is a state-corporatist regime, but until very recently a formal political democracy without a public sphere strongly established for debate and conflict. (Austria has been labeled as "DemoStalinist" by one Austrian journalist, Guenther Neuning.) It is in some respects an "artificial republic" (Wheatcroft 1988): until recently a strong intellectual current maintained that the "nation" was an inappropriate or irrelevant concept for Austria (see Bluhm 1973:Ch. 5). In the mid-1960s for instance only one third of the citizens saw Austria as both politically and culturally distinct (Katzenstein 1977).

(4) *Less- or late-rationalized polities*: A number of polities were late entrants into the modernist nation-state polity project, and hence are not well described by the main modernist polity models. For instance, the Iberian systems (*Spain, Portugal*) historically were imperial projects, their more traditional authoritarian corporatist forms sustained by colonial wealth until the recent period (Schmitter 1974; Stepan 1978). To some degree one might characterize them as a hybrid of state-nation and state-corporatist forms, due to the reliance upon state-licensed organizational intermediaries (Williamson 1985) as well as upon traditional social orders such as the church and army. With late decolonization and recent democratic consolidation has come institutional transformation – almost a leap from early-modern to late-modern polity forms, the latter referring in this case to experiments with devolution and linkages to the transnational European integration project.

Italy presents a parallel instance. In its historical development Italy developed some elements of a “state-nation” model as a normative ideal. But in this case society colonized a weak state apparatus. The state has been an “archipelago” of loosely connected institutions, akin to a feudal structure of centers of power and influence (Donolo 1980:165, 172): an “oligarchic democracy” until the transformations initiated in the 1960s and expanding in the 1980s (LaPalombara 1987). For example, during the 1960s, “Italian unions came to realize that the government was not the center of political power, or rather, that political power did not have a center, but was diffused throughout political and civil society” (Sassoon 1986:129). This pattern was emblemized by the mass media, often an instructive indicator of polity models. Until very recently, “Italian TV news [was] essentially a utility maintained by the parties to inform the public about their views and activities”; the television journalist was a party functionary (Hallin and Mancini 1985:58). Media instruments were partitioned out to the different parties, until the explosion of media outlets in the 1980s (Cavazza 1979; Sassoon 1986:157-158).

CHANGES IN POLITY MODELS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

The previous section discussed some contemporary institutional changes specific to each of the polity models. This section presents a more general picture of changes in the organizing models over during the post-WWII era, using the framework advanced so far as a device for systematizing existing observations in the literature, and for generating additional ones.

To anticipate, one can detect some convergence in basic institutional logics over this period: both a lessening of the distances between corporate and associational social organization, and also between statist and societal agency. Specifically, (a) all the polity forms have moved in a liberal direction, but with expanded government activity (at least until the post-Cold War period, to be discussed). Also, (b) traditional corporate organization has been transformed; at the same time, in the liberal systems one finds a partial corporatizing of the traditionally associational interest groups and subcultures. Separately, (c) nations have begun to lose some ontological standing as identities; relatedly, states have begun to lose political charisma, becoming themselves more mundane and rationalized vehicles as opposed to more sacralized projects.

The historical context of these shifts is of course the post-war spread of liberal models throughout the world system, due to the post-WWII settlement and reconstruction. These models have been propagated via an unprecedented world-level cultural and organizational development: an emergent “world polity” reflected in the explosion of international governmental and non-governmental organizations and transnational “epistemic communities” (Meyer,

Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997:145; Boli and Thomas 1999). “In many areas of social life, common models organized in world discourse arise and penetrate social life worldwide” (Meyer 1998:2). Relatedly, political discourse is increasingly organized around highly reified and stylized reference to varying models – as in current discussion of social welfare programs, labor market regulation, or types of capitalism (with their references to “American models” or to reconfigurations of a “European model”). This heightened reflexivity (of a sort) intensifies the social movement-like qualities of institutional change (by speeding institutional copying and creating ideological waves of reform). Ideological intensification and integration, together with increasing economic integration, has been a driving force behind the following changes.

Change in Social Composition/Coordination

Corporate organization has been transformed (partly through overt reconstruction, as with Germany and Japan). This transformation emerges as a central theme in Colin Crouch’s recent magisterial survey of “social change in Western Europe” (Crouch 1999): he highlights a fragmentation of Europe’s traditional corporate structures – organized religion, the patriarchal family, political party blocks, subcultural “pillars.” These forms are deconstructed; their authority over members “collapses” (p. 407). Nevertheless in comparative perspective Europe remains highly and relatively formally organized, but now in different ways: ways tied to an evolving “ethic of individualism” (p. 408).

Crouch’s summary picture, based upon a remarkable empirical synthesis, can be given additional analytic formulation via the conceptualization offered in this paper. The social-organizational structures of the more corporate European systems especially (Germanic, Nordic) have retained a corporate form, and society is still envisioned in a communal way. But the internal corporate elements (communities, sectoral elites, occupational groupings) are now less reified; they exist organizationally to some degree, but they derive their legitimacy not from their historical standing as distinct corporate orders, but from the rights and needs of individuals, together with the imagined functional requirements of the national (and increasingly European) political system.

European integration has reinforced and intensified this reconstruction. It has further compromised European national “corporatist” interest intermediation, and has encouraged more pluralist (associational) and multilevel repertoires (Schmitter and Grote 1997). As Crouch and others suggest, individuals have gained more independent public standing, and also have access to liberal (associational) repertoires that provide useful means for breaking away from more corporate embeddings. A kind of collectivized individualism has begun replace the earlier corporate cultures – a point to be returned to

momentarily – and hence from the corporate side the distance between the corporate and the associational systems has lessened. (In Japan as well scholars have found signs of declining group loyalty, both in business and family domains, associated with the importation of ideas of individual, ethnic, and gender rights from world society [Murakami 1987; Pharr 1990].)

Over the same period (the 1960s onward) one can also detect a vestigial corporatization of the associational polities. First, the differing “interest group liberalisms” (Lowi 1969) of the U.S. and England have taken on proto-corporate elements, with interest group sectors successfully colonizing segments of an expanded governmental apparatus (Lowi 1969; Beer 1965, 1982). Second, via the emergence of ideas of group rights, and more recently, of more intensified “multicultural” identities, various population segments (ethnic, racial, linguistic, sexual, physical) have attained proto-corporate status (Piccone 1991; Mann 1995). The more traditional associational imagery of a common citizenship dominating other possible identities – common to both French and U.S. cosmologies – has become less hegemonic, especially in the U.S. These developments seem real enough, but they remain politically contested and hence unstable (and they are not yet well accounted for or even well conceptualized). Nevertheless, from the associational side as well, the differences between corporate and associational organization have both changed and diminished.

Change in Collective Agency

Along the second dimension of the paper – collective agency – the statist and societal models have also arguably become less distinct – even though the modern systems have continued to differ substantially in the ways they allocate collective agency. There is clear historical reason for this convergence. The postwar era reflects both the consolidation and demise of modern statism: it is both the era of the welfare and planning state – the realization of the state as an organizational apparatus – and also of the decline of the myth of the state (cf. Mann 1993). This dialectical history has generated standardization and convergence.

Thus, the expansive statist visions of the 1950s and ‘60s (with its imagery of state “tutelage” of society and “commanding heights”), and the rapid increases in governmental expenditures of the 1960s and ‘70s, were followed (after economic crisis and international institutional reconfigurations) by the neoliberal assaults and market enthusiasms of the 1980s and ‘90s. In this last period, liberal logics – interest group rhetorics, ideologies of consultation and transparency, market enthusiasms – have been taken up aggressively by aspiring political actors and change-agents even in the statist systems (for instance, see Schmidt 1996 on France). Current experiments with devolution and pooling of

sovereignty (in macroeconomic and security matters) both reflect and drive a broader compromising of statist logics (Smelser with Badie and Birnbaum 1994). The European integration project is itself set explicitly against the charismatic state model. Further, much agenda-setting is now worked out (if “confusedly” [Mann 1998]) at the transnational level, in one way or another, rather than by separate statist projects.³³ This development further drains state charisma.

This phenomenon is quite general: tellingly, scholars detect dimming of state charisma in Japan (although obviously to a far lesser degree than in Europe).³⁴ Beginning with the Occupation and emerging more clearly in the 1990s, ideas of rights have taken hold in Japan and are replacing ideas of duty-based citizenship. Environmental, women’s, consumer’s, and minority-rights movements have emerged and have initiated both protest and legal action (in the case of the Ainu indigenous movement, tellingly, successful litigation on the basis of UN Declaration of Indigenous and Minority Rights). Nongovernmental organizations are taking off, if from a very low base; there is a growing notion of a public right to information. Governmental elites have tried to co-opt such developments, using state-organized advisory councils and mediation systems to remove contestation from public view and to tame it (Pempel 1982; Van Wolferen 1989). Nevertheless the developments seem to mark a real departure from one scholar referred to as the “exclusively state-oriented Japanese concept of publicity...” (Matsumoto 1978:50) – and hence some reduction of Japanese as well as European statism.

It has been the state mythos – statism as model – that has suffered in the contemporary world system more than actual governmental responsibilities (though the latter have certainly been reconfigured). The increasingly global political culture continues to work out new public responsibilities for states: for example, various “social charters” involving the environment or family or health or professions (Mann 1993:138-39; Meyer 1999). This form of transnationalism expands governmental jurisdiction and activities. However, it does so via the stimulation of organizational and interest fragmentation (Meyer 1999). States are increasingly networks of professionalized “receptor sites” tied as much to broader interest, movement, and epistemic environments as to one another (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Meyer 2000). Accordingly, scholars of public administration find (and often decry) “fragmented and disarticulated states” world-wide, with (by traditional standards) unclear organizational and jurisdictional structures (for example, Frederickson 1999).

³³ For instance, 70 percent of Dutch legislation involves implementation of EU initiatives.

³⁴ I draw in this paragraph upon discussions with Amy Searight, Northwestern University.

This expansion and fragmentation has been apparent in the societal-agency systems as well as the historically more statist ones. Governmental activity and functions expanded massively in all the societal-agency polities, the Anglo ones as well as Nordic, during the post-war period. Reflecting upon this phenomenon, some scholars have even claimed (controversially) that an institutional transformation has occurred: that collective agency has been increasingly been transferred to the state in the previously less-statist systems, with society less legitimated as the source of collective purposes and action (for instance, Gress 1988 on the Nordic systems; to some extent Ginsberg and Shefter 1999 and Piccone 1991 on the U.S.; Beer 1982 on Britain). Whatever the merits of this particular assessment, the underlying developments do seem to reflect convergence in institutionalized models of collective agency as well as in those of social organization.

Current Change (Including Change in Collective Identity)

Considering the two dimensions of structuration together, one finds the following variation in the current historical period. One can still demarcate more and less corporate sociopolitical organization. But now the more corporate systems remain distinctive by operating more corporately at the national level; they have partly deconstructed their previously highly corporate micro- and meso-structure. (This is less true of course in Southern Europe, where the family-based structuration is still constitutive, and it goes without saying that Japan remains distinctively and highly corporate in social organization.) One can also still demarcate more and less politically centralist models, but the contrast is now less stark than that observable in earlier eras: there is no longer such a sharp contrast between organization around myths of the state versus around myths of society.

Unsurprisingly institutional convergence is especially prominent among the continental European polities, and it is worth calling particular attention to this phenomenon. These polities have sustained a communal character when compared with the liberal systems. For example, there is still a more expansive conceptualization of collective goods than in the liberal systems: to take an emblematic example, public spaces – and cities in general – retain more status as sacrosanct collective goods (Crouch 1999:402). Relatedly, a distinctive “substantive” and “reflexive” law (and associated administrative traditions) continue to carry the European communal and statist legacies (Ladueur 1995; Peters 1996).

But the underlying cultural model of the polity has changed dramatically on the European continent. Employing the conceptualization advanced in the

basic theoretical section above, one might advance the following tentative sketch.³⁵

First, the dominant images of the polity in Europe – speaking now of public and normative accounts, not necessarily mass sentiments – depict a rather more mundane organization, governed by an imagined natural rationalism, rather than the more sacralized and charismatic project characteristic of the high nationalist period. The dramaturgy of mobilized nationalism and citizenship, in (national-) cultural competition, is greatly reduced. In this (European) picture the polity no longer really organizes for truly charismatic “nations”: nations experience substantial ontological deflation, and begin to be imagined more like ethnicities within a broader and more fundamental cultural identity.³⁶ At a minimum these national identities are highly “relativized” to one another (Waters 1995): countries may compete for leadership, but the primary legitimated identity is now a broader “community” of nations, carrying a broader world project, with (imagined) universal natural rationality, natural human rights, and science as guiding lights. This political “disenchantment” of countries, in Weber’s sense, is of course particularly pronounced in Europe. The European integration project is now the most charismatic political venture in Europe – and it decidedly does not have the kind of charisma that Weber had in mind (cf. Mann 1998).

Second, as nations have lost ontological standing, and states charisma, individuals in the emergent model have attained greater public standing than before, relative to government, corporate bodies, and collective identities generally. The polity is now envisioned as something like an intendedly rational organization of the conceived natural inclinations of individuals, and of the collective functions and entitlements imagined to follow from a universalistic “natural law” of human rights and morality. However, in Europe the expanded individualism takes a particular form: individuals are represented more as valued members of the polity, bearing natural rights, rather than as empowered citizens with voluntarist responsibilities in a common spiritual mission. (This latter model, the original American one, is still present in the U.S. though in decayed form.)

³⁵ The next paragraphs draw upon recent work by John Meyer and his colleagues (for example, Meyer 1998, 1999, 2000; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Meyer and Jepperson 2000).

³⁶ This imagery is especially apparent in the highly reconstructed history and civics texts, which carry cutting edge and legitimated discourses. For instance, McEneaney and Meyer 2000 report on studies of changes in national educational curricula. They note striking world-wide declines in teaching of national histories, languages, literatures, art and music, and shifts toward social studies and eclectic cultural appreciation. They see such shifts as moves away from curricula tied to the reifications of the high nationalist era (also Meyer 1999).

EXPLANATORY UTILITY

The primary objective of this paper – to delineate further a fundamental range of institutional variation – has now been pursued. This section moves to the secondary objective of the paper: illustration of the additional explanatory utility to be gained by invoking polity models to help to account for variation in many different domains of social activity. This section outlines explanatory applications concerning: formal organizations, agenda and policy formation, collective participation and action, and identity formation. The outline includes examples of direct applications of the ideas of this paper, applications of closely related ideas, and potential applications. The intention is stimulate both more theoretical systematization and more development of this kind of institutional analysis.

A concern throughout will be to show that institutional effects are not limited to the operation of institutions as opportunity/constraint structures for exogenously given actors and relationships. (This is arguably still the dominant conceptualization of institutional effects in sociology and [in particular] political science.) Instead institutional effects also include the operation of institutional models in “constituting” sociopolitical identities or scripting the enactments of identities. This contrast will be exemplified throughout and commented upon at the conclusion of the section.

Formal Organizations

A substantial body of comparative work has charted cross-national or cross-cultural variation in formal-organizational fields and structures (see Pugh 1976, Hofstede 1980, and Scott 1987 for reviews). In one sociological institutionalist argument, Jepperson and Meyer (1991) argued that much of this variation clusters around three different types of polities: “liberal,” “statist,” and “corporatist.” The argument proceeds as follows. The liberal polity (they concentrate upon the U.S.), in organizing around social actors, has historically produced extensive formal organizing, with organizational structures coordinating activity more than tightly controlling persons. The corporatist polity (they refer to Germany), in organizing more around constructed social functions, also has produced substantial formal organizing, but with different structures. These tend to feature more explicit differentiation and control over persons. The statist polity (they refer to France), organizing around both actors and functions, has suppressed formal organizing in society and has produced organizational structures featuring controls over both persons and activities.

The authors are able to allege a strong linkage of organizational cultures to polity types, and hence suggest the explanatory utility of invoking variant polity types. However they do not fully develop the causal connections between the two orders of variation. A fuller typology of polities, along the lines suggested in this paper, might facilitate excavation of these mechanisms and make apparent an even clearer organizational clustering.

Agenda and Policy Formation

Frank Dobbin's work (Dobbin 1994a, 1996), mentioned in the Introduction, powerfully illustrates variation, institutionalization, and generative effects of distinct political cosmologies. A main analytical point of his study of railroad development and industrial policy formation in the U.S. and France is that interpretations of railroad development were constructed via the myth of the state in France (and via its absence in the U.S.). These interpretations confirmed pre-existing political cosmologies and were powerfully consequential for the subsequent divergent development of industrial policies. This kind of analysis could be further generalized to other countries, using the kind of distinctions developed herein.

In a related example, also illustrating how foundational institutional models can construct issues and agendas, Meyer et al. (1988) consider variation in constructions of family violence and child protection. In institutional settings establishing the individual (and its rights) as foundational elements of social structure, child or spouse abuse (they argue) will more readily become matters of public jurisdiction than in settings where the individual is less constitutional. In contexts where families have a more corporate character, and where such family groupings are basic elements of social structure (such as in many Latin American settings), child or spouse abuse matters are less likely to enter the public sphere and become salient issues.

This kind of argumentation could be consolidated and generalized. The underlying idea, ubiquitous but still not extendedly developed, is that any basic institutional model makes certain types of issues more likely to arise than others (Douglas 1986). For example, much American social organization is constituted by rules defining the individual and its rights. In such a context, many issues arise having a religiomoral form, concerning the proper definition or obligations of personhood, and the proper coordination of rights. The politicization of abortion, for example, becomes more likely. And because of the American concentration upon establishing enforceable norms about individual rights, ready compromises about abortion become more difficult to establish. (See Glendon 1987 for a comparative discussion of abortion and partial example of this general line of argument.)

Further, any institutional configuration will embody conflicts between its different organizing principles, thus establishing persistent contradictions that reveal themselves in social issues (Friedland and Alford 1991). An example is provided by U.S. dramas of personal versus social responsibility. American discussions of "poverty," for example, have been highly constrained, rhetorical, and repetitive in part because they so readily become morality plays, focusing so centrally on individual responsibilities and "moral hazards." It is difficult for this discussion to take other directions without violating depictions of individual autonomy that have canonical status. Discussion of poverty can be proceed more straightforwardly in settings where the individual is less reified as an autonomous actor, and also where various "intermediate" groupings (families, communities, occupations, sectors, churches) have more corporate status, and can be assigned more collective responsibilities (Korpi 1980). A parallel example can be found in American discussion of educational reform. Once again, ideas of individual autonomy and choice construct and delimit discussion. It is difficult in this context to generate serious consideration of a European-style vocational education system, for instance, with its explicit tracking and apprenticeship elements. In continental Europe, where the individual in part occupies a social role that is under some degree of public jurisdiction and control, these practices seem more natural and legitimate. The difficulty of generating serious vocational/career counseling programs in the U.S. is a direct reflection of American individualist mythology.

Collective Participation and Action

Analysts increasingly invoke institutional structures as "opportunity structures" inducing or constraining activity – this is the staple imagery of so-called "historical institutionalism" (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). For instance, in a core analysis of this sort, Herbert Kitschelt (1986) argued that the organizational structure and policy-making capacities of different political systems affected the strategies and outcomes of antinuclear protest movements.

This basic form of institutional analysis – the "ecological" constraint or inducement of the strategic action of actors whose identities and interests are largely taken-for-granted analytically – can be supplemented. For instance, in his work on "states and social movements" Pierre Birnbaum posits both ecological and constitutive effects of institutional structuration. Consider his following sketch: "In strong states the state is the absolute tutelary power on which all hopes are pinned but against which people also feel inclined to rebel [...]. Many collective actions [...] are launched against the state. [...] [M]assive mobilization against the state rarely occurs in weak states, since conflict is

shunted into civil society with a minimum of state involvement” (Smelser with Birnbaum and Badie 1994:67-68).

In a set of analyses that invokes institutional variation closely related to that discussed in this paper, Elizabeth Boyle explores cross-national variation in legal activity and strategies (Boyle 1998; Boyle forthcoming). She considers possible effects of the degree to which government structures are buffered from society (“state/society differentiation”) and of the organizational centralization/decentralization of government. Empirically she finds that (1) lower state/society differentiation and lower centralization both lead to higher individual recourse to legal activity. In addition, (2) lower differentiation leads to higher citizen resort to the international legal community (specifically, higher human rights petitions to the European Convention System). Statism suppresses such claims. Also, (3) the two institutional variations appear to have affected the amount, focus, and effect of antinuclear power litigation in the 1970s, comparing the U.S., W. Germany, France, and Sweden. These results illustrate the explanatory import of the kind of institutional variation analyzed in this paper. They also recommend a further isolation and explication of the specific causal mechanisms linking institutional structure and outcomes.

In this connection, a forthcoming analysis directly applies the institutional distinctions developed in this paper. Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2000) analyze cross-national variation in the construction of and participation in voluntary associations (ranging from “old” social movement associations, to “new” social movement associations, to religious associations). The guiding idea is that different institutional orders will construct different types of associational and membership structures in society, and be more or less encouraging of individual participation in them. In statistical analyses of cross-national survey reports (the World Values Study), the authors find that (1) “statism” negatively affects levels of association, generally; (2) “corporateness” positively affects participation in “old” social movements (unions, professional groups, political parties); and (3) a general world shift is apparent (1970-90s) toward more liberal, non-corporate patterns of association. This paper seems directly to confirm the explanatory power of the distinctions developed in this paper.

This sort of analysis could be extended to politico-cultural change in single countries (or groups of countries). For instance, the political science literature is full of posited puzzles concerning the relatively rapid decline of U.S. “civic culture” orientations since the 1970s: for example, declining public confidence in institutions (Lipset and Schneider 1983), together with shifts in patterns of public activity (for example, the rise of more claimant, social movement, and administrative politics). These shifts may be directly attributable

to institutional changes in the American polity: the expansion and centralization of state functions and activity; the nascent corporatizing of interest and ethnic groups within a liberal constitutional framework; changes in the position of the U.S. in the world economy and polity (Kamens #; Jepperson and Kamens 1985.) Opportunities for this sort of analysis have not been much exploited.

Identities

Collective identities

A number of analysts have invoked institutional structure as a matrix for identity formation, if in various ways. For instance, Smelser, Birnbaum, and Badie invoke the French “model” of “a militant citizenry with rationalist ideals”; a model of citizenship that “leaves traditional values exclusively to the private realms” and “rejects any collective form of ethnic-based organization.” The “principle of universalistic integration supported by a strong state...” then generates a distinctive immigration politics (Smelser with Birnbaum and Badie 1994:69). Rogers Brubaker’s analyses of national membership take a similar analytical form (1990, 1992). Yasemin Soysal’s book on “incorporation regimes,” already mentioned, directly develops the idea that such regimes are based upon previously institutionalized models of national membership (Soysal 1994). Variation in the main locus of collective authority (in society versus in state) and in the organizational configuration of the state (more/less centralized) are the main axes around which the organizing models vary. In each of these analyses, foundational models are seen as constructing both organizing regimes and identity configurations.

Individual Identities.

Foucault’s work famously focussed on the “constitution of the modern subject.” A direct implication of sociological institutionalism is that the different modern polities construct “the subject” differently. The starting idea is that modern nation-states are cultural models “variously committed to individualism” (Frank, Meyer, and Miyahara 1995:362). For instance, David Frank et al. studied national variation in the size of the psychology profession, expecting that the greater the individualism of the polity, the greater the prominence of professionalized psychology – due to the greater salience of issues of psychological identity in the more individualistic cultural models. In their empirical analysis they found strong indication of this pattern: for example, the size of the profession (incorporating various controls) clustered in the following order (high to low)– Protestant countries, Socialist countries, Catholic Europe, Far East.

This line of analysis can be pursued in the following way.³⁷ The cultural models of each of the individualistic polities (as the above authors suggest) all give the individual a theorized public identity and status. Accordingly, there is every reason to think that people in these polities employ highly structured cultural scripts – for talking, for behaving, for “experiencing” society, even, more deeply, for assembling a distinctive personal identity. As the cultural models vary, we should then expect individuals’ public postures, behavior, talk, sentiment, opinion, and perceived experience to vary in highly structured corresponding ways. We should expect this both because people receive distinctly scripted public identities across polity types, and because they report on differently constructed public orders.

Extensive evidence seems to bear out these expectations. For instance, (a) despite all the internal diversity that can be present within countries, a person’s national membership – the passport s/he carries – has been a master and powerful predictor of features of individual identity and opinion. Also, (b) the variation does seem to cluster around different types of polity.³⁸ For example, people in the more liberal systems offer more expansive opinion and claim more public efficacy than people elsewhere. They do so not necessarily because of differences in depth socialization or in personal “values,” but more likely because they are enacting a distinctive model of citizenship. People in the statist systems show less of the exaggerated emphasis on voluntarism and individual responsibility found in the liberal systems. Instead organizing models in the more statist systems not only reflect more hierarchic imagery and practice, but also more “subject” constructions (and parallel enactments) of citizenship. The extent of scripting within dominant institutional models is extensive – there is strong evidence that even the main lines of individuals’ “experience” of or “reactions” to society are highly collectively codified and tutored. For instance, statist models tend to include collectively codified scripts of political alienation or rebelliousness, and, accordingly, more enactments of such behavior.

In effect, then, one can entertain and assess the argument that different institutional logics construct different forms of modern individualism. In so doing, the ideas of this paper may assist in bringing additional order to the rather scattered literature on national variation in personal and public identity (that is, in “selfways,” habitus, interaction rituals, and types of citizenship) [for example, Hofstede 1980; Peabody 1985; Markus and Kitayama 1991]. From this line of argument it also follows that any major reconfigurations of institutional models – as with current European integration – will likely change the scripting of individual sociopolitical identity in highly structured ways. For instance,

³⁷ This example draws upon work by the current author.

³⁸ In this paper I must leave these statements as allegations without providing documentation. See Jepperson 1992 for an initial conspectus of evidence.

European integration (and the reconstruction of organizing models that it has entailed) are almost certainly implicated in the much-mentioned but little theorized “increasing individualism” of contemporary Europeans.³⁹

An Analytical Note

This discussion of individual identity illustrates the following analytical point. In this particular case, it does not seem reasonable to represent people’s behavior as citizens and members as an external-causal adaptation to the opportunities and constraints provided by institutional structure. Rather it seems more plausible to represent such behavior, in the first instance, as endogenous to institutional models. That is, this empirical domain arguably provides an example of rather full institutional construction, wherein both identities, and behavioral scripts for the standard enactment of such identities, are highly codified and routinized collectively. Obviously not all domains of activity have this particular causal relation to polity structure. One might consider the following sketch of possibilities.

First, as with this example, we can consider what one might call “intra-polity” linkages. In this case the causal allegation is that an outcome exists because it is a part of the polity model. Some of Dobbin’s arguments about industrial policy formation have this character: Dobbin is arguing, at least in part, that main lines of industrial policy are a continuation of main lines of polity development. One of Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2000) arguments is that part of polity development in some systems proceeds via the construction of certain kinds of associational structures (an argument in keeping with Tocqueville’s characterization of the American system, for example). Arguments of this sort would seem to be a necessary corrective to the more dominant non-phenomenological imageries in social science, that tend to bracket

³⁹ If fully developed, this line of argument should provide for a more direct account of macrovariation in individual identities than attempts to ground such variation in depth socialization (as in earlier problematic ideas of “national character”) or in social-psychological reactions to experience of social organization. Such linkages undoubtedly exist to some degree, but there is reason to cast doubt on their strength and centrality. Such arguments have great difficulty in accounting for the homogeneity of talk and identity postures within national settings; the relatively limited connections between individuals’ talk and postures and their social positions or experiences or personalities; or their capacity and propensity to take up new talk and postures as collective circumstances change, or as they move from one society to another. Such conventional social psychological lines of argument, further, must rely upon rather elaborate and multilink social psychologies to connect socialization or experience to identity features and talk, and must deny the powerful indications of direct institutional construction and enactment – both questionable moves.

(or simply miss) the degree of collective “scripting” of social life in the modern polities (Meyer and Jepperson 2000).⁴⁰

Second, already established institutional models can be extended into new social or polity domains. Soysal’s argument about the construction of distinctive “immigration regimes” has this character: she says that core polity models serve as schemas for the construction of regimes for coping with immigration challenges.

Third, there is the “inter-institutional” idea that analytically separable institutional domains – for instance, the organizational fields of the economy – are partly adaptations to previously institutionalized polity models. The paper by Jepperson and Meyer on variation in formal organizing seems to posit this sort of connection.

These distinctions may be too sharp, or non-optimal. Further, any given argument might posit multiple linkages between institutional models and outcomes. At the same time, consideration of this set may give indication of the kind of analytical clarification that is now possible given the empirical and theoretical resources of the literature.

CONCLUSION

The take-off point of this paper has been the idea that the polities of the European states system, due to the cultural and competitive framework of this system, organized around distinct variants of a common cultural model. The model, bequeathed by Christendom, pictured various competitive projects, all rationalizing their social organization and their systems of collective agency.

Distinct models for pursuing this common rationalization consolidated in the “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm). They varied, on the one hand, depending on whether a structure of social relations remained central (the corporatist variant), or whether more emphasis was placed on constructing a system of social actors (the associational variant). They varied, on the other hand, depending upon whether the operative model of collective agency featured

⁴⁰ Causal accounts from so-called “historical institutionalism,” for example – as one prominent example of structural or socio-organizational imagery – emphasize structural features of society (such as economic or class structure) or of government (such as party systems, electoral systems, specific organizational features of the state). In addition, they emphasize adaptation to organizational arrangement, rather than enactment of models. Accounts of this sort can in principle generate explanations that either compete with or complement the explanations offered herein. A rare overt attempt to compare different sorts of institutional effects was contained in Meyer and Hannan 1979.

a charismatic center – the state – or instead an active societal community. Considering these variations together one can in fact discern four dominant polity models in the Europe-centered “world system.” These four models help us to theorize more clearly the actual historical differentiation, development, and contemporary change of the modern polities.

In addition, invoking these differing institutional models can help in explaining cross-national variation in social structuration, agenda and policy formation, and identity formation. This explanatory utility flows from the generative operation of polity models: that is, wide ranges of social life are arguably scripted extensions or enactments of dominant models of the polity.

This paper has simply tried to consolidate and systematize a few basic intellectual results on these topics. A number of further efforts along these lines would seem warranted. First, there is need for fuller analytical specification of the idea of institutional models, and of their dimensions. Second, as already mentioned, there is need for fuller reconstruction of the historical “genealogies” of models – an issue treated only en passant in this paper. Third, there is need for further analytical development of the different ways in which institutional models operate as causes. Fourth, along with such further development, there is need to bring this form of institutionalism more fruitfully into juxtaposition with other forms of institutional and structural argumentation. This paper has tried to stimulate and facilitate these broader efforts. Further clarification of the more general dimensions that underlie fundamental differences among the modern polities would allow much more cumulative and complete pursuit of comparative studies.

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