# EUI WORKING PAPERS

IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

**From Governmentality to the Genealogy of Subjectivity:
On Foucault's Path in the 1980's**

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**From Governmentality to the Genealogy of Subjectivity:
On Foucault's Path in the 1980's**

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BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

> Mon problème, ou la seule possibilité de travail
> théorique que je me sente, ça serait de laisser,
> selon les dessins les plus intelligibles possibles,
> les traces des mouvements par lesquels je ne
> suis plus à la place où j'étais tout-à-l'heure.
> Collège de France, 30 January 1980

This paper will not to speculate upon the underlying intentions or motives behind Foucault's change from the 1970s to the 1980s. Instead, it goes back to the sources, especially the lectures he gave at the *Collège de France* , and elsewhere. (1) But it does not want merely to tell a story either. The limitations of space itself would forbid such an undertaking. Rather, the aim is to analyse these lectures, and Foucault's intellectual trajectory in general, in order to clarify a set of interrelated problems this change, or Foucault's last period, his work done between 1977 and 1984 poses; problems that were encountered in an attempt to use this body of work in concrete research.

The first problem is posed by the last two published books. It seems to me that it is hardly possible to make a proper sense of these two volumes, in light of the earlier work. It is, of course, possible to interpret them, to make hypotheses and conjectures, to put forward one's own interpretation. But without additional information, it is hopeless to bridge the gaps between the two books published in 1975-76 and in 1984. The term "meaning" refers here not to some deep, underlying, secret sense, but the difference something makes. And here, the personal doubts can be supported by the little difference these last books made so far. Though they became integral parts in some philosophical commentaries or works in Classical studies, have not been incorporated in concrete researches that use Foucault's work as a starting point.

This difficulty can be partly explained by the fact that the fourth volume of the series is left unpublished. But only partly, as

several problems would still be left open, especially concerning the link with both the present and his earlier work. Foucault realised that there is a problem here, at least since he was made aware of it by a conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow in 1983. (2) He must have tried to increase clarity. But at that period his greatest preoccupation, preceding questions of reception, was to finish first of all the research itself, (3) and had little time after.

However, there were some other reasons that prevented Foucault, or even made it undesirable for him to strive for a full clarity, to facilitate an easiness of understanding. First, this would have meant a commentary on oneself, a prescription of the reading, a pursuit of the game he wanted to escape and analyse. Second, he was well aware of the problems of contemporary academic life, the way ideas, books, and thinkers are immediately packaged for easy use, and wanted to avoid this. (4) It is significant that up till today, the few lapses or allowances he made in his American lectures and interviews still define the way he is received there. (5) But the anticipated French audience effects also put special constraints on the final output. Foucault's silence, his alleged failure, exhaustion, dead end, was a recurrent theme of the period. Foucault faced an almost impossible situation in the early 1980s, was caught between two different and opposed concerns. On the one hand, he wanted to escape the previous expectations, the role, the grid, that, he felt, the French audience put upon him, and several times expressed the wish to publish anonymously, so that his ideas could be heard in their difference; on the other hand, he had to show the coherence and the consistency of his project, had to be faithful to his early choices, to convince that his work is not haphazard or subject to change according to the winds of time. The published books reflect both concerns, making them even more difficult to read. One only has to recall the Introduction to *L'Usage des plaisirs* , its density and circularity, its seemingly repetitive character, where each return to the previous topic only gives another twist to it, following, sometimes with extreme faithfulness, often with cosmetic touches, Foucault's trajectory.

The second problem is given by the concept of governmentality itself. Its importance has been immediately realised, and the lecture where Foucault mentioned it first has been published, reprinted, and used ever since. (6) But the lack of other available sources often makes one forget that this was just a first formulation. As soon as one tries to use the concept in concrete research, beyond settling with a vague idea about a mentality to govern everything, immediately difficulties arise. These troubles are not solved even when the other lectures of the years 1978 and 1979 are consulted. A number of facts show that the concept remained underdeveloped.

First, after the "Governmentality" lecture, Foucault several times shifted the meaning of the term and the respective periodisation. To give only a few indications, governmentality sometimes referred only to the modern period, the emergence of bio-power, since the 18th century; sometimes it went back to the 16th century, to the crisis of pastorate; and another times it was used as a general horizon of the study of political power in general. The troubles are multiplied if we consider that apart from the manifold uses of this term, Foucault employed a number of other notions, sometimes sinonymously, sometimes in a complementary way: governmental reason, governmental rationality, political rationality, and the art of government. (7) At this point, one could attempt to collect all the uses of the term together, and try to develop a "comprehensive definition", but this would be quite alien both to the word and spirit of Foucault, and would not lead very far anyway. But a joint consideration of such definitions does provide a useful intermediate product. It points out that the major difference between the formulations of governmentality and the earlier conceptualisations of power lies in a distance. Instead of the earlier denouncing style and the implications that subjectivity is being produced by power, the approach is more cautious: Foucault is rather posing the question of how it happened that the subject became implied in the exercise of political power. (8)

The point of this analysis is not to be "critical", to claim that the concept of governmentality was confusing, unintelligible, useless.

It is rather the opposite: how this term could be made to function properly. Any conventional criticism would be improper anyway, as Foucault never used this term in proper print. All occurrences of the word were related either to his lectures, the outlines of his lectures, or occasional references in interviews - but even there in the close context of his lectures, or his work in progress, (9) never once in a finished article or book. There are three important cases where the term is significantly omitted. First, in the two major last published essays, he did not use the term once. (10) Second, while the concept of governmentality and his related work is mentioned in a review of his own work published in the *Collège de France* outline in 1981, it is missing from the related final publications. (11) But the clearest confirmation of this point is that while in the Intended Preface, he was using the term, and emphatically, it was again left out from the final publication, and never once appeared in the last two published volumes. (12)

Yet, the most significant shift in the use of the concept concerns not the gap between the oral and written material, but the lectures themselves. It is well-known that after two years of lectures on governmentality, getting ever closer to the present, Foucault suddenly took a deep plunge back in history and away from the concept. But, even if the fact is well-known, it has not so far been taken properly into account, though the exact circumstances should be analysed fully before one can opt for the use of the concept, and with full efficiency.

Two arguments can be posed that Foucault discarded the concept. The first, trivial argument could claim that he abandoned it because of the conceptual difficulties. The second would be a point analogous to the one Hennis made about Weber: no matter how long had he lived, Weber would have never come up with a theory of state, as it was not his problem. (13) The same may hold true for Foucault: the history of governmentality was proposed as an alternative to the theories of the state; but once Foucault realised that this was not his problem, he turned elsewhere. But, no matter how plausible they are, one fact falsifies these claims: Foucault did continue to talk about governmentality.

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(14) Instead of abandoning completely the word, by some reasons he put it rather in parentheses.

One could explain such a thing in general terms. A thinker may simply save a concept, a formulation, an example, until it is properly digested, the perfect formula or the proper place for it is found. It would be a mistake to argue that anything that remained unpublished at the death of a writer was effectively discarded. Foucault's work does give a number of related examples - let's just refer to his analysis of Alcibiades that was the starting point for the 1982 lectures in the Collège de France and elsewhere, and yet is hardly at all mentioned eventually in print. But in this case, such an explanation would not be sufficient in itself. As the abandonment of the concept of governmentality coincides with another major reorganisation in Foucault's work: the giving up of the study of power in general.

This happened in two steps, in the 1980 and 1981 lectures, presented by the highly theatrical arrangement of the first courses of the respective years. Here, only a very short analysis can be provided. The first lecture of 1980 starts with a detailed account of a story about the Roman emperor Septimus Severus, though last year, Foucault analysed German and American neo-liberalism, and for this year, he promised - again - the study of bio-power. (15) After a return to the story of Oedipus, already discussed nine years before, he drew the methodological conclusions, by way of a double reorganisation: explicitly, he displaced the former central concept of power/ knowledge in favour of the expression "government by truth"; (16) and implicitly, therefore, redefined the link between government by truth and governmental rationality, or governmentality: while in the last lecture of 1979, it was the latter which enveloped the former, this time, the relation was reversed.

There is a clear break between the 1970s and 1980, but it is only an intermediate step. The central concept of 1980 is still connected to the study of power, containing the word "government"; and the analysis of the last part of the first lecture

of 1980 gives five names to illustrate "government by truth": Botero, Quesnay, Saint-Simon, Rosa Luxemburg, and Solzhenitsyn. This is a tellin list: the contemporary problem, the present whose history Foucault is attempting to tell here is the links or hidden affinities between politics and economics, liberalism and socialism.

The following year, in the first lecture of 1981, there is no more talk about power or government, no allusion to problems of contemporary political thought, and no more gap between the title and the topic. Foucault announces the study of the links between truth and subjectivity, and not government and truth; specifies his approach to this issue, as different from both traditional philosophy and positivism; and states that his whole work has always been concerned with this question. He marks the break with the former work again in a theatrical manner. He starts the first lecture with the way the story of the elephants' marital habits were used as tales of moral conduct in different periods, and after giving two examples from the 17th-18th centuries, indicating this time a continuity, not a break, runs backwards through centuries, settling only in Antiquity, now for good. In the lecture given in the US at the end of the year, published as the first essay of the Afterword to the Dreyfus-Rabinow book, Foucault makes the same point, only even more bluntly: power is not his problem, and has never been so, even if his work got mingled with this question.

This claim is not something that should be taken lightly. It makes necessary to re-pose an old question, which is the consistency or the coherence of Foucault's work. Foucault's comments about his refusal to fit into the brackets or expectations of the others, or the results of his own past work, are well known. But this makes the the question of internal consistency all the more important. There is a difference between continuous innovation and haphazardness. And there are many facts showing that the consistency of his work has become a central preoccupation of the late Foucault. Thus, the abandonment of the concept of governmentality, the disclaimer about power, and the internal coherence of the work are central and connected questions for an attempt trying to make

sense of the last turn of Foucault, to assess its proper difference, especially from the perspective of this paper, which is concerned with the question of how to use his work best in concrete research. Now, again, several remarks of Foucault could be quoted to disqualify the very point of such an undertaking. But there is no question here of setting up a rule for others. Also, on several occasions, Foucault also stated that one should not write upon, or objectify, the thinkers one is using in one's own work. (17) But to say that therefore any discussion of questions of method related to the application of Foucault's work is pointless would be simply to deny the reality of a problem. As such a problem does exists. If it is generally acknowledged that Foucault's work is difficult to understand, requires a lot of efforts, then it is all the more so for any attempts to use his work in actual research. And this problem is not restricted to the most obvious point that a large part of the late work has remained unpublished, therefore its eventual use requires careful works of reconstruction.

Given that Foucault's whole work aimed at getting beyond the objectifying and subjectifying sciences, even if only in the sense of trying to set their limits and not disqualifying them, their methods obviously cannot be taken over directly. Nevertheless, there are obvious, promising advantages in the way these discourses build up their own momentum. The objective sciences can generate a cumulative growth of research findings, while the subject-centred discourses can always lean back to the work of the founder of the discourse, find a common source of inspiration, and can continue his work. It is clear that none of these could or should be followed in the case of Foucault. Yet, the complete discarding of considerations of cumulativity and continuity has the disadvantage that in this way, the eventual effect produced will be small, though such an effect is the aim of any work. Foucault is not alone here, but shares the fate of some of the most inspiring minds of our age, who could be compared to Foucault on matter of substance, method, style, and reception: Nietzsche, Weber, Elias, and Ariès. They all opted for independent and lonely work, refused the establishment of a personal school of disciples, but therefore had to put up with the problem of their work not

being continued, or being continuously and systematically misinterpreted, used well under its potential. (18) This poses a question: would it be possible to make use of the advantages of the cumulativity of research findings, and the continuation of previous personal works, without following the approach of the objectifying and subjectifying sciences, that, from the perspective of the questions studied by these thinkers, would represent fallacies? Or, is there no other way but the choice between the following three options: take for granted one's own subjective opinion, by giving up the possibility to question and transform one's own perspective; select a master, and join a school of followers who can continue the same work but unable to move beyond; or follow the logic of the positive sciences, and refuse any consideration of subjectivity?

Let us start the attempt to move beyond these three options on two separate tracks. The main methodological query posed to the objective sciences, according to Weber who follows here Nietzsche, is the neglect of perspective. Research tools or concepts should be taken over only if attention is paid to the perspective of their use. Now, much of the scholastic debate about the importance of perspective could be spared if we substitute this term with the word "problem". This would help to clarify a difference between different fields of knowledge: practical matters of problem-solving, where the definition of the problem as given in daily life can be taken for granted by those who work on the solution; disciplinary research, where it is the internal development of a discipline that poses such questions, that again can be taken as given for the researcher; and the cases of reflexive, or self-reflexive, problems, where the problem itself cannot be taken as given, but becomes a problem itself. The dependence of methods or concepts on perspective is pertinent, under normal circumstances, only to the last case. The question of the perspective therefore leads to the question of the original problem instigating a self-reflexive project.

Concerning the subjective approach, the dilemma of the master-disciple relationship can be avoided if not one but several

thinkers are used as reference points for thinking. The aim is not to continue the work of one thinker, but of a set of thinkers. This would seem nothing more but the reproduction of the establishment of a new discipline. But, combined with the previous result, it may also involve something quite different. The purpose is not to search for the common ideas, the similar concepts, in order to integrate the answers, which would usually lead only to the reduction of their specificity to the smallest common denominator; (19) but to establish the common points at the level of the questions themselves. This leads to the project of the reconstruction of the common problematics underlying the work of different thinkers; a project that would enjoy advantages of relying upon the cumulativity of findings without neglecting the question of perspective; and that could continue established paths of thought without being threatened by mere repetitiveness or the urge to move always "beyond". (19b)

Reconstructing Foucault's problematics

But in this paper, let us restrict the attention to Foucault. Fortunately, at this point Foucault, generally so silent about his work and its possible uses, does also give some help. As one of his most recurrent preoccupation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s was exactly the attempt to define "his problem". So far, these attempts have not received much attention, perhaps due to the widespread view that a person should be the last to be trusted about the assessment of his own work; or that such assessments are nothing more than accidental, leisurely overviews, based on simple recollections. However, in Foucault's case, the matter is completely different. First, he is not trying to explain or justify his works. He is not talking upon his purpose or the underlying meaning, only about his problem. This was what caused him trouble at that time, and not the justification of the correctness of his theories - something that for most researchers never created a headache. (20) And second, for Foucault, such reflections did not represent a mere pastime, but a work itself, work done on his own previous work: an attempt to specify his own problem on the

basis of a categorisation of his former work. The question is not what could have been their common goal, purpose, or motive, but what could have been the common problem each of them addressed, even if in different manners.

It is true that on several occasions, Foucault have already specified his problem earlier. (21) But during the years 1976 to 1980, exactly in the period of his crisis and reorganisation, such attempts have become very frequent, and led to continuously shifting results. With some exaggeration one could say that this was a returning topic in almost every lecture he gave at the Collège de France and elsewhere, a focal point in every interview. From around 1981, both the preoccupation becomes less urgent, and the results stable. What does all this mean: what difference does it make for us, and what did it produce for Foucault?

In these years, Foucault was trying to come to terms with his new project, to find its new focus and equilibrium. The two problems, the accomplishment of his current research, and the specification of his own problem, were simultaneous: he needed to specify his own problem in order to be able to solve the problems of his research; but he also needed to finish his new research, or at least produce some work, in order to find a proper occasion and frame for such self-reflections. This knot was dissolved only in 1980, when, after giving the lectures, he was able to produce the first manuscript version of *Les Aveux de la chair* . In its Introduction, which has been published, with some modifications, (22) Foucault presented finally a definition of his problem, and a categorisation of his whole former work that has remained stable, and was repeated, with minimal changes, up to the last interview and publications of 1984. According to this, Foucault's problem has always centred upon the question of the links between the subject and truth, but in the different periods, he studied this problem in different topics: in scientific discourses, in dividing up practices, and finally in the way human beings turn themselves into subjects. (23)

But this is only part of the story. Not only because given these preliminary findings, one should now go back to the work itself, and analyse whether such an assessment was correct. But because the finding of this problem for Foucault was a work on his own previous work; and the aim of such a work, like of all work, was not simply to define a truth, but to produce an effect. And, in fact, these reflections did not cease to produce effects for Foucault, in the sense of modifying the work itself. The first instance is the discovery of the concept of governmentality itself. The conditions of emergence of a concept may be in most cases only a matter of trivial detail. In this case, however, they provide a good illustration and a strong support for a methodological point. The governmentality lecture was the fourth lecture given in 1978. At the end of the preceding, third lecture, Foucault said something he did not do for almost a decade. He returned, for the first time since the late 1960s, on a positive note, to some of the findings of the *Order of Things* . But in a similar way, the effect of the review of the work can be seen in the way Foucault returned in 1981, after the Summer 1980 review of his works, to the study of sexuality in 1981, finally feeling himself ready to finish the project. But the most important effect of the work on his own problem was no doubt the new directions of the last years, beyond the topic of sexuality.

Reconstructing the intellectual trajectory

Before going into the details, however, let's first use these results and return to a short analysis of Foucault's encounter with power, as this is quite a crucial question for the perspective of this paper: the links between governmentality and the last Foucault, and their use for concrete research. If we do accept that Foucault's problem has always been the question of subjectivity and truth, then the relation between Foucault's problematics and his work on power must be clarified. In 1981, he explicitly and categorically stated that power was not his problem, in front of an audience that wanted to hear his views on power; but earlier in the 1970s, on several occasions he claimed the opposite. (24) How to make

sense of this contradiction, without invalidating the findings of the reconstruction of his problematics, and preserving the needed consistency of Foucault's work?

In order to answer these questions, another major reconstructive analysis would be necessary, this time of Foucault's whole intellectual trajectory. Here only the first steps of such an analysis can be indicated. As a starting point, a new term has to be introduced, Nietzsche's concept of the "will to knowledge". (25) There are two difficulties with this concept. The first is that Foucault did use this concept several times, together with the related concept of the will to truth, but this presents a rare and intriguing case of confusion in Foucault's thought. He several times promised and failed to distinguish between the two concepts, then left them altogether, together with the development of the term power/ knowledge; and finally returned to the will to knowledge in 1976, as a subtitle, claimed to be a tribute to Nietzsche, but using the term again not in the proper Nietzschean sense. (26) The second problem is that the original Nietzschean term is very closely associated to the concept of the will to power, therefore it is extremely difficult to give a short definition. Provisionally, as a shorthand, the *will to knowledge* stands for the pursuit of a kind of research where one is not following simply one's interests, curiosities, a conscious purpose, or an externally given goal, but starting from personal experiences pursues a line of investigation over which nevertheless maintains an organising control. To give an illustration, the usual model of academic research is that a student picks up a theme that raises his/ her curiosity. This is a completely "subjective" matter, not explained or dealt with. Then, in order to approach this question, one follows the professional procedures and methods given by the respective discipline. In the case of the *will to knowledge* , it is this organising control in terms of choices of method and reference points that is maintained and not ceded to the different disciplines; instead of subordinating research to their control, the researcher is using them as tools. This term can be compared to the concept of autonomy, with the difference that autonomy is a term of legal discourse, while

the*will to knowledge* cannot be rendered intelligible in the legal terminology of intentions and rights.

On the basis of this concept, let's give now a very short overview of Foucault's intellectual trajectory. All available biographical material affirms that at least since the early 1950s, Foucault pursued his own, personal line of research, with extraordinary zeal, discipline, and independence. Apart from the early book on mental illness that he wrote on request and before encountering Nietzsche, he finished his projects solely on his own, without paying attention to disciplinary-professional requirements, or possible reception. (27) The first deviation came about in the mid 1960s. When he was finishing the *Order of Things* , the structuralist "movement" started to break out. With it, Foucault suddenly must have felt the possibility of finding company, after so many years of lonely work, as he finished his book on some strong structuralist notes that were missing from his earlier works. (28) This modification did not fail to produce the due results: Foucault suddenly found a resounding success and a company. (29) For a short time, he accepts being a structuralist, even the guru of structuralism. But this happy feeling is soon followed by a hangover. He realises the manifold problems of this new allegiance. (30) This takes again a lot of time - let's not forget that the issue is a major existential transformation, and the external conditions both of his life and the world in general were quite peculiar at the time. But, finally, around 1971, he assesses the situation that he went completely astray in the whole of the 1960s, with his literary writings. The conclusion he drew was that he could no longer trust his own *will to knowledge* . He gave up control over his work, though not by returning to the academic disciplines, but to those engaged in actual struggles. (31)

The effective result is a sudden and complete reorientation of his work. He started to study a new topic, never mentioned before: social control. This was a theme not related to personal experiences, the only such topic ever encountered by Foucault. (32) It even led to the partial re-shaping of his whole personality: his old friend, Georges Dumézil claimed that it was not the real

Foucault, that he never believed in this figure. (33) And instead
of following his own approach, he relied upon a peculiar
combination of Nietzsche and Marx that had unfortunately close
links with the approach of critical theory. The choice was quite
clear, intelligible, and again following the advice of Nietzsche: not
being strong enough to pursue his own will to power - in this case,
a personal research - to the end, he should serve others. In this
sense, there was even a peculiar connection between the topic and
his personal experience: Foucault studied social disciplining
exactly at the moment when he felt that he needed to discipline
himself, and it was the topic of disciplining that provided occasion
for his self-disciplining. These curious cross-references no doubt
helped to introduce some ambiguities in a work that wanted to be
all so evident, and made it possible to be re-interpreted on the
basis of the late work.

When he finished the book in the mid-1970s, it was not only the
prison movement and the atmosphere of 1968 that was over, but
Foucault was also ready to escape the cage he made for himself. In
fact, his work in the 1970s is nothing but a series of changes, of
displacements, not simply in the well-known sense of the
continuous innovation, but also getting more and more back to his
own approach, or his own "problem". (34) With every new step,
his thinks the ordeal is over, and yet, soon realises that needs to
make another one. The publication of the two books, the six-
volume sexuality project, the lectures on war, the concepts of bio-
power, population, mechanisms of security, and finally
governmentality are all instances of the same continuous
displacement, not simply away from the previous ideas, but also
asymptotically back to his "own problem". Retrospectively, we can
assess that the crucial break came with governmentality. It was
this concept that led him back directly to the study of subjectivity.
But, nevertheless, even with this concept, he could not break
completely free from the remaining hold of the style and content
of the work of the 1970s. This work started with a break, and had
to be closed, counterbalanced with a similar break; the series of
continuous displacements were not sufficient. And this he must
have decided upon somewhere in late 1979, after his Stanford

lectures and the first talks with Dreyfus and Rabinow, and finally consumed in Summer 1980 - as the new break is effectively there. (35) He had to escape completely from the whole affair of the 1970s and power, in order to think again on his own.

Reconstructing the lectures of the 1980s

With these considerations in mind, after the reconstruction of Foucault's problematics and his intellectual trajectory, we can get a better understanding of the content and the stakes of the lectures Foucault gave in the 1980s. Let's start with a few general points. First, even if, on the basis of the record of publications, between 1976 and 1984 Foucault was working on the history of sexuality project, in fact, he only lectured for one year on this topic, in 1981 - even if he stated several times that he considered that the *Collège de France* lectures at once presented a good occasion and prescribed a duty to present his actual researches. (36) Besides lecturing on governmentality in 1978-79, he lectured on the techniques of self (in 1982, and basically even in 1980), and on parrhesia or truth-telling (1983-84). In sum, the two published volumes on sexuality represent merely 2/3 of the 1/4 of Foucault's work done in the last 8 years! Second, even if he arranged some material for publication, while other lectures have been published by others, and he tried to include references to the other topics of his lectures in the two published volumes, these do not even give a sufficient glimpse into the material covered in the lectures. The case is rather the opposite: it is only once the lectures are read that the significance of these comments can be realised. (37)

Having said all this, it would be a denial of the points of this paper if in the remaining few pages, it would shortly sum up the "basic points" of these lectures. Instead, only one analysis will be done: the showing of how, on the basis of the reconstruction of his own problem, or the return to it, Foucault draw his points in the 1980s beyond the question of truth and subjectivity. We have already seen that this seemingly minor, irrelevant preoccupation of

Foucault turned out to be a major, or perhaps the major, operator of the last period of his work. Once Foucault found his problematics, he was able to do three things. First, to could return back to the history of sexuality project, in order to finish it. But at this point, he encountered new difficulties. The first was of a methodological character: he had to come to terms with the analysis of a problem of continuity, while his archaeological methods were originally developed for problems of discontinuity. To this methodological problem, he found solution in the development of the concept of "problematisation". But the second was substantive. Due to the abandonment of his project in the 1970s, he needed to retrieve it now, and found it with success. But now, he faced the problem that in order to be able to finish his work, he had to drive his points further, to work along and further on, beyond the question of subjectivity and truth, as this latter no longer remained a hidden problem, but became conscious. Therefore, he had to move further, to raise and sustain again his interest, in order to be able to finish even the former sexuality project. With this, we arrive at the second major impact of the reconstruction of his problem: the possibility to continue his work in the direction instigated by, but not limited to, the question of the links between truth and subjectivity. This led him to the discovery of the concepts of "techniques" or "practices" of self. (38) Finally, the third effect was that once he found his problem, he was able to situate his own work within a broader horizon, along the work of others.

Partly, this is given by the well-known references to the history of the problem of Enlightenment as the major problem of modern philosophy, going back to Kant, and the recurrent presentation of his own tradition, which, however, is not without problems, due to anticipated audience effects. (39) But much more important than this situating among the work of others was that in this way, it became possible to situate the problem of Foucault on a broader horizon. This is the point at which, on the basis of Foucault's own self-reconstruction, this paper will go beyond what has been written down by Foucault. Because, at the end, his work did reach an at once very broad and very specific issue: the internal

<u>dissolution of order</u>. This is the fact that, for e.g., made possible the problematisation of practices Foucault wrote about in two published volumes.

The point is the following. It is obvious that the problem of order, peace, and tranquillity is at the centre of thinking since the earliest times, whether in the form of religion, myths, rituals, or laws. But this kind of thinking in general has two major models in mind, reflecting two major problems: the problem of military threat or conquest, or the problem of the creation and maintenance of order, the codification and fortification of rules, customs, laws. In other words, behind them, we find the two major, traditional models, or discourses, of power: that of the "War" and of the "Law". Critical discourse, as the lectures of 1976 partially reconstruct, is based since the beginning upon the counterposition of conquest and repression; while the mainstream, legal model, since the same period, and most often not in opposition but in close contact with the critical model, tries to answer the problem of how to create, maintain, preserve order. These are the two major aims of sovereign power in the feudal period, for e.g., and are well summarised in the titles of the two major novels of the 19th century, that were significantly Russian: War and Peace, and Crime and Punishment. (40)

However, what Foucault has discovered, or at least what he gave access to at the end of his work is a completely different kind of problem; a problem that, no matter how obvious it looks, has been shadowed so far by the other two problems, has been reduced to them, to their discourse. This is the case when the established order of things collapses internally, not caused either by external conquest, or a victory of the "marginal" forces of crime, sin, and disorder. It is this problem that establishes common points between such different historical periods as the 16th century Europe, the first and last days of the Roman Empire, or the crisis of Greek civilisation in the 7-6th centuries. Modernity can be considered as a civilisational answer to this problem.

If we meet this problem in its positivity, and separate it from the accounts that are given using the language of the other two problems, of law or repression, then a crucial thing can be perceived: this is a problem that unavoidably involves <u>reflexivity</u>. This is obviously not so for case of conquest: it only reinforces what was so far the trivial, makes it into a value, a goal. The discourse of law neither involves reflexivity necessarily and directly. In this case, all that matters is the proper formulation and specification, but the basic principles are ready-made. However, in the particular case of the dissolution of the order, the problem is exactly that the former ways and manners have lost all relevance, in their entirety. There is nothing "old" to rely upon. No solution is given, everything has to be invented. It is order, or the belief in order itself which has to be restored, from the scratch. And it can easily be seen that this is a problem that is impossible to solve in the traditional way, as first the conditions in which a solution could be possible have to be created.

One can illustrate this problem by making a distinction between tyranny and despotism. This at the same time illustrates the point how, in spite of its difference, this problem is usually subsumed under the traditional models, or discourses, and the problems it creates. For the first, one can refer to the work of Foucault on Oedipus; for the second, on the book of Wittfogel. Now, in common language, and unfortunately in most political theory, the two things are mixed together. Yet, both the underlying problem and their emergence is quite different. Tyranny is an attempt to solve, always and by definition unsuccessfully, but never without consequences, the problem of disorder - a good example is modern absolutism. It wants to restore, single-handedly, and outside the law that has become useless, order. Despotism has a quite different logic and dynamics: it results exactly where the order of things has not been broken, but became ever stronger and more compact. There is at the heart of Oriental despotism, and it is the example of a civilisation where order does not have a history.

In this way, by specifying the problem of the internal dissolution of order, a new kind of history was discovered, behind the histories of wars and conquests, and of crimes and legislation.

This new type of history has its special characteristics. The most crucial is that such a history cannot be but reflexive. The dissolution of order is an event that nobody can escape; and an event that has no internal, in-built, natural solution. The only "natural" solution would be a return to the previous order, but this is by definition impossible, as it is exactly its dissolution that is the problem. The result is an increased self-awareness, necessary reflexive activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that such periods, whether in Greece, Rome, or modern Europe, are accompanied by outbursts of philosophising. In fact, it was this problem and this period that gave birth to philosophy in Greece - with its centre, not surprisingly, being the order of the world.

But this is only part of the story. It would only give us an explanation for the birth of philosophy. However, the implications of this problem are much broader. The point is that the problem itself involves reflexivity. It is here that the true novelty of the situation lies: reflexivity emerges, enters the stage as any other activity of thinking, in the sense of problem-solving. The problem of order that the first Greek philosophers tried to solve was not simply a matter for philosophers, but was a matter of life and death in the "real world" as well.

All this does not mean that therefore philosophy directly entered political and social life. (41) Quite the contrary: the solutions of philosophers and statesmen were always different, and for obvious reasons: for the latter, the actual, surviving forces of the dissolving order always had to be taken directly into account. The key point is that from the perspective of this problem, there was no gap between real solutions and "mere" reflexive thought. Even if the solutions of statesmen and philosophers were different, they were of the same kind: they were not "material", but reflexive. (42) At this point, due to this problem, and here only, the history of thought and political history not simply interconnected, but

potentially inseparable. Throughout history, the earlier thoughts have later become used and deployed in actual problem-solving situations. This gives a very specific time-gap between abstract thought and history, and of the opposite kind as the one the can be characterised by Hegel: reflexive thought in this case does not come after history, but before; reflexive problems in reality are solved on the basis of earlier developments in thought, as problems of a reflexive kind are "problematised" on the basis of the available theoretical tools.

Foucault has never spoken of the problem of the dissolution of order in such terms. But it is only a very small step from his last writings, and is in the line of his own self-reflections. And it does help to clarify a large number of points with respect to his work - and not only the last period.

First, it helps finally to situate the question and the place of "thought" within Foucault's work. This word had a central place at crucial times. (43) But, also, this was used as a pretence for charges of idealism, whether on the part of those who were hostile to Foucault in general, or who tried to use only his ideas on power and the body, in order to make him "more materialist than the materialists themselves". But the reconstruction of Foucault's problematics does not leave room for such an interpretation. The question of the body is only an aside in Foucault's work, an instance of the way thought and reflexivity became a factor in reality; a proof that even the body cannot be taken as a stable reference point, outside thought. The problem of the dissolution of order dissolves the problem of idealism and materialism: if the real solution requires the work of reflexive thought, it is meaningless to make a charge of idealism - emphatically, to the extent of the validity of this specific case.

Second, in this way, the emphasis from thought as discourse (the level of answers) shifts to thought as problematisation (the level of questions). It was in this way that Foucault was able to solve the methodological difficulties encountered in the last period. It can be illustrated in the following way. Earlier, Foucault started

his analyses with the presentation of a radical break between modern and earlier practices - let's just think of the contrasting cases of the public execution and the time-table for young prisoners at the beginning of *Discipline and Punish* , or the two different treatments with which the *Birth of the Clinic* started. The break being given, Foucault only had to reconstruct the different rationalities or rituals separately. However, in the new works, he encountered the opposite problem, that of continuity. Here, he had to discover the starting point, the break. This problem can be illustrated by the tale of the elephant mentioned earlier, or the thematic continuity between Plato's *Apology* and a work on virginity by Gregory of Nyssa, mentioned at the beginning of the 1982 lectures. (44) This not only meant that he had to find the historical period with which he had to start the analysis, but also that he had to conceptualise in proper terms the role of thought in the new situation. Concerning the first, we know now what were the subsequent shifts in Foucault's time horizon: first, back to the 16th century (1978), then 3-4th centuries AD (1980), 1-2nd centuries AD (1981-2), and finally, 4-5th BC (1983-84). In other words, he went back in history exactly to the periods of dissolution of order. Concerning the second, and simultaneously with this historical retrocession, Foucault developed the concept of *problematisation* . When encountering a problem of continuity, he had to go back in time until discovered the original problematisation underlying the different solutions. This is in a sense a return to the original Nietzschean concept of genealogy, with its emphasis on the conditions of emergence; (45) but also a return to archaeology.

Foucault's last period can be called the second archaeological period, and its central category is *problematisation* , and not the games of truth. In the first archaeological period, the key concept was *discourse* . As it is well known, that was an attack on theory and the object-subject relations underlying it. A discourse is not the adequate or ideological representation of an underlying reality, but a specific answer, depending on the available tools, or stocks of discourse. But all this still moved at the level of answers, took the questions for granted, existing beyond thought, and was

not able to conceptualise change, put it rather in brackets. It is at this point that the second archaeology moves beyond the failures and omissions of the first. It conceptualises the way the question itself is posed, and thus explains the change to the extent that it is at all possible, by reconstructing the problematisation. And as all this is related to problems that are inherently reflexive, the danger of the illusion of autonomous discourse is not even posed. Discourse may not be autonomous, but a problematisation is, especially when the problem itself is reflexive.

Third, in this way we can revisit Foucault's famous claim about cutting down the head of the king in political discourse. The point is that the dissolution of order as a problem on its own did not even appear at the level of political discourse, being reduced to the language of morality or law: the prophecy of apocalypse, or the attempt to provide new laws. But the problem is quite different, concerns the creation of an order in reality as a the condition of possibility of legislation. This is the reason why liberalism, with its exclusively legal thinking, could not even grasp, beyond any justification, absolutism. Liberalism fails to understand the reality of the problem to which absolutism was the answer, and can't see the way the possibility of a liberal solution was laid down by the very reality of absolutism. Though absolutism and the monarchy were intertwined and associated with other, the disappearance of the king by no means eliminated all effects of absolutism. (45b)

Fourth, this also helped Foucault to situate the thematic of subjectivity and truth. It is true that in the last books, due to a number of reasons, he returned to the old topic of sexuality, and he kept placing the questions of truth and subjectivity at the centre of his work. But in the lectures of the last years, he carried forward his new project that obviously was of much more interest to him than the accomplishment of the sexuality books. (46) Even the central terms of his work shifted from subjectivity and truth: instead of subjectivity, he talked rather about the self (practices and techniques of the self), and in 1982, he spent a whole course trying to show how the knowledge of the self became

subordinated to specific concerns related to the concern with the self. Doing so, he gained a perspective on the question on the relation between truth and reflexivity.

In modernity, the two are related as a matter of evidence: we reflect upon ourselves in order to perceive and realise our true being. In the whole process, the idea is that we should discover objectively who we are, independently of our will, and, of course, our activity of the search. However, this link is not at all obvious. The Greeks and Romans also did reflect upon their own activity and self, without trying to discover their own inner truth. At this point, one could say, together with several interpreters, that all this is simply a matter of "difference". But this is not the major point. It is rather that since Christianity, we are using exactly the same methods to discover our true selves that the Greeks and the Romans were using to transform their being.

This peculiar twist no doubts helps to make sense of a number of curious facts of modernity: the constant attempts of self-reflection, both at the level of individual and society, and the recurrent, blatant failures; (47) the question of the lasting hold of the conditions of emergence, even if the conscious aim is different; and the question of self-reflexivity beyond the discovery of the self: whether, by reflecting not upon our true being, but on the techniques that are used for such reflection themselves, it is possible to gain control over them, and use in a different manner.

Fifth, it is also at that level that we encounter, in a brand new light, an old acquaintance, the concept of discipline or ascesis. From the distance of the work done till 1982, Foucault - and we - can look back on the concept of "disciplining" and "disciplinary society" in a new light, without the style, the denunciations, the one-sidedness of the earlier book, but without discarding the work it contains. The best way to illustrate this point is by evoking a few ideas from the 1982 course, with respect to Foucault's favourite reference point, Descartes. (48)

According to Foucault, up till Descartes spirituality, the work upon oneself, was considered to be a crucial precondition of the access to knowledge, to the status of a subject of knowledge. With Descartes, it has ceased to be so. This is a development that is analogous to the cases of Machiavelli and Adam Smith: the overthrow, from the inside, of a major tradition of thought; the last use of a given genre in order to make its further use impossible, to finish with it forever. Just as earlier, Machiavelli killed the mirror-of-princes literature, and the whole of traditional political thinking, and later, Adam Smith cancelled out moral philosophy from matters of economics, Descartes finished with meditation and spirituality as the precondition of philosophy. Taken together, these three steps led to the elimination of all references to spirituality from three major branches of philosophy: politics, epistemology, and ethics; in order to make exclusive way to professional knowledge, in each of these areas, at the price of denying the real effects of reflexivity and the necessary circularity these effects involve. It is only with paying due attention to the starting point, the "moving force" of thinking, the loss of familiarity, of the taken for granted; in one word, the emergence of the "gap", that this "price" was again noticed by some of the most inquisitive minds of our period, that philosophy and thinking again became possible, outside the closed and fairly restricted circle of professionality. (49)

However, between the three, there is a big difference: Machiavelli was more of the sign of the crisis as the solution. He is obviously not a modern thinker while, even if within certain limits, Descartes and Adam Smith both are: they are still considered major, living reference points, and in this sense, constitute breaks that are or were considered up to our very days. (50) And they both pose a problem, at the level of thought: can we accept that this is a mere issue of "sudden discovery" and "realisation" of the truth; or can we point out something "behind", that made them possible?

Opting for the second point does not necessarily mean that one has to accept that social history, economic development, or other

"real historical events" caused these changes, giving external periodicity to thought. The answer lies rather in the specific historicity of thought, with its manifold but specific contacts to social history; and in our specific case, the major condition of possibility should be searched for exactly in the spread of the techniques of self. Spiritual meditation, in the form of establishing a break with one's past and surroundings, was necessary in order to gain true knowledge before; knowledge different from familiarity. But once the methods of disciplining were spread, once education and military service did provide, in the form of a specific hierarchical and spatial arrangement, and the imposition of an external discipline before the proper development of an ability of reflective reasoning, making these partitions and breaks a "second inner nature" to practically everyone to whom the question of spiritual transformation could be posed, there was no longer any need for an additional, adult spiritual exercise. Descartes simply realised the fact that there is no longer need for the creation of a specific status for the "subject of knowledge", since, because of the general spread of these techniques, everyone who mattered around him was already shaped accordingly. In this way, the use of the techniques of self became superfluous in an adult age; and instead of mastering a certain coming to terms with oneself, the way they shaped at an early age the very form of subjectivity made it impossible to conduct a proper self-reflection. Because modern man is made with the help of these techniques, is a "subject of knowledge" since childhood, a philosopher without knowing it, he cannot get an access to the very mechanisms that formed his own being. This is the real point of the question of disciplinary society that is a valid diagnosis even beyond the last Foucault, and not any reference to external constraint, manipulation, closed space, or the body.

Sixth, all this helps to better situate the question of subjectivity. It is here that one of the crucial reasons of Foucault's discarding of the concept of governmentality can be located. As, almost immediately after the discovery of this concept, Foucault got involved with the issue of subjectivity, and in the seventh lecture of 1978 produced a crucial categorisation. But, then, he left this

whole topic, and went back to the original theme of the early history of governmentality. In 1980, he turned back to subjectivity, but still, could not quite escape the earlier logic of power. As, no matter how obvious it seems, it was not completely clear in the earlier works of Foucault that the issue of subjectivity is irreducibly an issue of reflexivity. (51) Therefore, beyond the problem of the objectifying and subjectifying sciences, beyond the attempts to reduce human beings to objects or assign to them, even if with their own co-operation, a fixed identity, the course of reflexivity can never be taken for granted. It may be that reflexivity can be manipulated by the most subtle manners of control. But it always assumes that in the very act of reflexivity, something is not reflected upon properly. And whenever it is brought to light, control does not operate any more - it becomes either an external constraint, or a technical tool over which one has control.

Seventh, in a most paradoxical way, after abandoning governmentality, together with power, beginning from the lectures of 1980, in his last years, and beyond subjectivity and truth, Foucault returns to this concept, as it is best indicated in the form of the overall title of the lectures of his last two years, "Government of the self and others". Following Foucault, we can state that this was the answer, in the form of a the problematisation, to problem of the disappearance of order.

The answer the Greeks gave, as it is well-known, was the invention of politics itself. (52) But it left open a question: how to link individuals to this new order? And here, still the old methods of traditional genealogy were used: birth rights; the only difference between aristocracy and democracy being the way the circle of those involved has been drawn. The emerging gap between descent and education was still neglected, and this eventually caused the decline of democratic politics. But there was another suggestion, of new methods, about doing work upon oneself as a precondition of the government of others. This was the proper reflexive answer, the birth of modern philosophy. And even if it was not accepted immediately, it became part of the

stock of reflexive answers, and was mobilised later in several occasions. It is this problematisation that underlines the formation of the self, the connections between the government of the self and others, beyond the questions of subjectivity and truth, up to our very days, even if in a very different form: the link between the private and the common interest. It is this tradition toward which the last Foucault had at once diagnostic and affirmative remarks. (53)

At this point, a number of new lines are opened up, both in terms of the review and the continuation of Foucault's work, that cannot be pursued in here. Let's just mention here two points. The first is that the Greeks had a word that stood for a great many different points: the constitution, citizenship, the distribution of offices, the "good" type of democracy, even the soul of the city: this was the word *politeia* . It is a second crucial and peculiar omission in Foucault that he never considered the full implications of this concept (though mentioning it often in the 1983 lectures), even if this is the term used by Plato as the title of his major work, this is the etymological root of such major modern terms as police, policy, and polity, and, in a way, in itself embodies the link between the government of the self and the others. It may even be risked to say that the real Greek invention in terms of politics was exactly the *politeia* , and not the modern connotations of the term "politics", that were partly even more ancient, (going back to Egypt and the middle-Eastern civilisations) partly much more recent (related to the concept of representation). (54) Whatever is in between, whatever can be specifically assigned to the Greeks - open public space, citizen rights, moral and civic duties -, where all embodied in this concept of *politeia* . (55) Second, something can be said about the curious term used by Nietzsche and Foucault for the definition of their method: *genealogy* . This is a term that itself invited misunderstanding and turns away attention: a word smelling obsolescence and idiosyncratic, antiquarian interest. Genealogy in the traditional sense is not simply the study of descent, of family lineage, but is the way in which before the break-up of order, the place of individual was marked out in

society. It is at once the representation of order, and the actual fitting of the individual into the order. As "family origin" in this sense embodied education; the important later distinction between acquired and in-born qualities were irrelevant for the world of "traditional" genealogies. It is this whole arrangement that has become questioned with the dissolution of order. This wa the problem that was tackled, first with respect to the entry into politics and then to education in general, in the new development in philosophy since Socrates and Plato. (56) The genealogy of Nietzsche and Foucault is the story of the effects of this reflexive inflexion, of the fitting of the individuals into a world without stable genealogies; of the emergence of ethics and subjectivity. As the term "Zarathustra" was used for the prophet of "beyond good and evil", genealogy is the discourse of the analysis of a world beyond (traditional) order. (57)

Notes

(1) These lectures can be consulted in tape in Foucault Archives at the Bibliothèque de Saulchoir in Paris. As the 1983 and 1984 lectures have only recently been made available, I did not yet have the time to study them properly. In general, I have to apologise in advance for the many references in this article that no doubt many will find tedious; especially as it is not yet properly completed. However, the topic of the paper made this unavoidable.
(2) 19 April 1983 conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow. See Foucault Archives, D 250 (5), p.30.
(3) In a follow-up conversation, he complained that he feels something is still not clear in the book. See 26 April 1983 conversation with Dreyfus and Rabinow, D 250 (9), p.22.
(4) See Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed), *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* (Routledge, London, 1988), pp. 52,
(5) See, for e.g., the remark made at the end of his 1983 Berkeley lectures on the aesthetics of existence, the only piece of thought of his six extraordinary seminars given there that became widely circulated; or the similar point about "bodies and pleasures" at the end of the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* , p.157.
(6) It has been recently reproduced in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, with two lectures by and an interview*

with *Michel Foucault,* ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

(7)   See Colin Gordon's Introduction to *The Foucault Effect* . I should mention here that this research in general owes a lot to the work of Colin Gordon which it tries to take up and continue.

(8)   The best such indication is given in the published outline for the 1978 course: "Political governmentality [is] the manner in which the conduct of an ensemble of individuals became implicated, in an ever more marked manner, in the exercise of sovereign power." See Michel Foucault, *Résumé des courses, 1970-82* (Paris, Juillard, 1989), p.101. I apologise for using my own translation.

(9)   See, for e.g., 'The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom', in James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (eds), *The Final Foucault* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988).

(10) See the "What Is Enlightenment" essay in the *Foucault Reader* and the "Subject and Power" essay as the afterword to the book of Dreyfus and Rabinow. In the latter, on p.224., Foucault uses the word "governmentalised", but it is only the verbal form of government, and specifically refers to the narrow, contemporary sense of government as the executive branch of the state.

(11) Compare the 1981 outline (*Résumé* , p. 135-6) with the "Subject and Power" essay, p. 208.

(12) Compare the 'Intended Preface' to the *History of Sexuality* in *Foucault Reader* , p.338, with the published 'Introduction' to *L'Usage des plaisirs* .

(13) See Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1988).

(14) See, for e.g., 'The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom", p.19; 'Technologies of the Self', in Luther H. Martin et al (eds), *Technologies of the Self* (London, Tavistock, 1988), p.19; and the sixth lecture of 1982.

(15) A recurrent fact about Foucault's lectures given in the second half of the 1970s is the gap between the titles and the actual topics; especially the continuous reference to bio-power in the title, and the failure to deliver: first in 1978, and then in 1979 and in 1980. See *Résumé* .

(16) This does not mean a complete discrediting of the former concept, only a specification, limitation of its validity. In one of his 1978 (?) lectures, when exercising an instance of self-criticism, Foucault made the following aside: "I am never completely wrong, but the point was not exactly that".

(17) See for e.g. Kritzman (ed), 250.

(18) This is the central contention of the work of Hennis on Weber and the "Weberians".

(19) See the links established between Nietzsche and Foucault as philosophers of power (this is a commonplace in the secondary literature), between Weber and Foucault as the students of bureaucratic-disciplinary control (for e.g. O'Neill, 'The disciplinary society: from Weber to Foucault', in *The British Journal of Sociology* 37 (1985), 1:42-60); and Elias and Foucault as students of the repressive aspects of the civilising process (Robert van Krieken, 'The organization of the soul: Elias and Foucault on discipline and the self', in *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 31 (1990), 2: 353-71).

(19b) See Stefan Rossbach, 'The Author's Care of Himself: On Nietzsche, Foucault, and Luhmann', seminar paper, 1992.

(20) Just think how meaningless would it be to ponder upon Marx's problem!

(21) See the *Archeology of Knowledge* ; the materials published by Eribon about Foucault's admission to the *Collège de France* , in the 2nd edition of his *Michel Foucault* (Paris, Flammarion, 1991) - the recent English translation, unfortunately, follows the first edition and omits these Appendices ; several interviews in cluded in the *Power/ Knowledge* collection, see for e.g. pp. 109-13,183-7, and 198-99; 'A Conversation with Michel Foucault', in *Partisan Review* 33 (1971), 2:201; 'Michel Foucault on Attica: An Interview', in *Telos* (1972), 19: 156; and especially the formulation in an 1975 interview published in English as 'An Interview with Michel Foucault' in History of the Present (1985), 1:3: "It is the constraint that interests me".

(22) Published in English as "(Auto)biography', in *History of the Present* , 1988, no.4.

(23) *Résumé* , 134-6; 'The Subject and Power', 208; 'Sexuality and Solitude', p.4; *Technologies of the Self* , pp.17-19.

(24) See the related references in note 21.

(25) See especially the *Gay Science* and the *Will to Power* . For an excellent commentary on Nietzsche of much relevance here, see Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988).

(26) See *L'ordre de discourse* and the 1971 course outline; and contrast them to the 1972 course outline.

(27) Eribon's book contains several telling examples. For example, nobody even heard of the Birth of the Clinic until he delivered the final manuscript to the publishers. (p.178, English ed. p.152)

(28) One only has to compare the 1964 "Nietzsche, Marx, Freud" essay with the *Order of Things* ; also, the way that while before 1965 and after 1969, he lists Dumézil, Canguilhem, and Hyppolite as his major sources of inspiration in his formative years, around 1966-67 he starts suddenly to refer, and exclusively, to Lévi-Strauss and Lacan.

(29) This is especially evident in a 1966 interview, published in *La Quinzaine Littéraire* (May 16 1966), 5:14-15. In general, whenever we catch Foucault talking in the name of a "we"; this is a sure sign that something was wrong around him at that time. For another telling example, in an 1973 lecture given in Brasil, recently published in German, where Foucault is talking as a "we" in the company of Deleuze, Guattari, and Lyotard. See 'König Ödipus: Der Mann, der zuviel wusste', in *Lettre International* (1989), 5: 68.

(30) See 'Politics and the Study of Discourse', in *The Foucault Effect*.

(31) In this type of analysis, it is not relevant whether Foucault was or was not conscious about these changes. It does not make a difference for the reconstruction.

(32) See 'Truth, Power, Self', in *Technologies of the Self*, p. 13.

(33) See Eribon, p. 252. (English version p. 238).

(34) See the differences between the original projects for the prison-book, as given by the lecture outlines and interviews, and the final outcome.

(35) One direct proof that at that period he was aware of the new break is given by an interview givrn in 1980, where he spoke about the need for anonymity, wishing to have his new works being heard, without associating them to the previous ones. This was repeated in 1984, around the publication of the two new volumes. See Kritzman (ed), p.325, and p.53.

(36) See especially the introductory comments of the first lecture given in 1976.

(37) See, for e.g., the 'Introduction' to *L'Usage des plaisirs*; or the chapter on the culture of the self in *Le Souci de soi* that contains a few hints of the topic of conversion, that played a central part in Foucault's lectures both in 1980 and 1982. Some other topics, like baptism, and the link between initiation rituals and techniques of self, are completely missing even from the published outlines.

(38) Both of these remarks can be found in the Introduction to *L'Usage des plaisirs*, but difficult to make sense of without some acquaintance with the actual trajectory.

(39) The first is the preference of Kant over Nietzsche, due perhaps to the unfortunate association between Nietzsche and his work of the 1970s, and his perceived need to become "more respectable" in the 1980s; the second is the recurrent comparison between his work and the Frankfurt school, especially frequent at the time of the planned meeting with Habermas.

(40) This comparison, by the way, has been also used somewhere by Foucault.

(41) Or whatever words can be used here. These are misleading, as it was exactly "politics" and "society" that were discovered as answers to this problem, in different periods.

(42) This made it possible that later, even completely different "real" problems became subordinated to these solutions on the order of thought. Let's just refer to the history of the idea of "just war", its progress from utopia to a sanctioned practice.

(43) This became the title of his chair in 1970, and was the way he defined his own work in the three major published reviews of his work published in the 1980s: the '(Auto)biography', the 'Intended Preface', and the 'Introduction'. For an excellent analysis of this and related points, see Maite Larrauri, 'La performativité linguistique au sein des expériences de la pensée', 1992, mimeo.

(44) See Résumé, 145-7, and *Technologies of the Self* , p. 20-21.

(45) See especially the *Genealogy of Morals* , Preface, section 6. This section strangely is not referred to in Foucault's well-known essay on Nietzsche's genealogy.

(45b) If, following Staniszkis, we identify the former communist party with the absolutist monarch, this also gives hints about studying the current East European changes. See Jadviga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991).

(46) In most of the interviews he gave in 1983-84, he complained about how bored he became with sexuality. See for e.g. *Foucault Reader* , 340.

(47) Perhaps the best example is how the most influential thinkers of our period have been all led astray both in their predictions and preferences, much more than their more down-to-earth contemporaries, in most cases lending indirect or even direct support to the totalitarian tendencies of the 20th century, be it fascism, communism, or corporatism. The list is remarkable, including Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, Heidegger, Lukács, Sartre - and the names could be continued. It no doubt has a large role in the current return to the most boring platitudes of liberalism.

(48) Only a few hints appeared in print, and even these make much more sense once the lectures are consulted. See *Foucault Reader* , pp. 371-2.

(49) The point obviously is not to deny the value of professional knowledge, but to assign its proper place in a universe of knowledge bigger than itself.

(50) See Husserl for the first, or some recent and influential schools of economics for the second.

(51) One of the reasons why Foucault may have been hostile for a long time to references to reflexivity was that, probably following

Nietzsche, he identified reflexivity with reactive thought and the search for the deep truths of the self.

(52) See Moses I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 53.

(53) Two examples can be given how Foucault was still hesitating about this issue. First, the Kant essay is generally considered as an affirmation of the tradition of the Enlightenment. Yet, in a discarded version, preserved in the Foucault Archives, Foucault is using the term "genealogy" to the Enlightenment (see D 250 (16), p.2). The second example is from the concluding methodological comments of the 1983 Berkeley lectures, where he stated that his aim was "to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy." (see 'On Problematisation', in *History of the Present* (1988), 4: 16.

(54) About this, see the recent work of Alessandro Pizzorno.

(55) What constitutes the difference between the real *politeia* and the philosopher's ideal was exactly the central theme of Plato's political work: (civic) education.

(56) The *Alcibiades* gives back the perplexity of contemporaries faced with the need to make a distinction between birth and education. This point, by the way, also helps to come to terms with the way Heidegger took the worst of Nietzsche, in terms of a wish to return to order in the traditional, pre-Socratic sense.

(57) This also helps to explain the co-existence of the crisis and dissolution of "disciplinary societies" with the emergence of "new tribalism", wishes of a return to pre-disciplinary order, that are again immediately belied by the way they use the worst kinds of the very disciplinary techniques to further their purpose. In spite of the emergence differences in reality, in this sense there are analysable, crucial common points between recent developments in Bosnia and the American university system (for the latter, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America* (N.Y., Norton, 1992)). Let's also remark here that this question of the dissolution of order is quite different from the question of the collapse of "traditional communities". Apart from analytical differences, the letter concept gives a kind of emotional evaluation, completely missing from the problem of order, as presented here.

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