



EUI WORKING PAPERS

IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

EUI Working Paper SPS No. 91/12

**Governments and Supporting Parties:
Definitions and Classifications**


JEAN BLONDEL

European University Institute, Florence

© The Author(s). European University Institute.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

European University Library



3 0001 0013 5840 9

Please note

As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is divided into six sub-series, each sub-series is numbered individually (e.g. EUI Working Paper LAW No. 90/1).

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES



EUI Working Paper SPS No. 91/12

**Governments and Supporting Parties:
Definitions and Classifications**

JEAN BLONDEL

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the author.

LIBRARY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
BADIA FIESOLANA
FLORENCE

© Jean Blondel
Printed in Italy in December 1991
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I-50016 San Domenico (FI)
Italy

GOVERNMENTS AND SUPPORTING PARTIES: DEFINITIONS AND
CLASSIFICATIONS

J. Blondel

There have so far been few attempts to look closely at the relationships between governments and the parties which support them. This could be because the concept of 'party government' appears to have been given little detailed consideration, even in the literature which is devoted explicitly to the subject (1). For instance, party government has been defined, in a somewhat simplified and rather vague manner as "that form of societal conflict regulation in which a plurality of democratically organised political parties play a relatively dominant role both in the socio-political mediation sphere and in the actual process of political decision-making (government sphere)" (2). Such a 'definition' (if the word applies in this case) says little that can be used for practical purposes, since what is a 'relatively dominant role' is clearly highly debatable; it also seems to assume that a government is either party or non party, which is manifestly not the case.

The problem of the definition of party government

There are probably many reasons why party government has not been given the attention which it merits: among these, one of the most important appears to be the tendency, common in the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, to view governments as almost passive subjects operating under the pressure of a variety of forces, among which parties, but also groups and indeed the civil service play a major part, a standpoint which corresponded to the 'corporatism' period in the analysis of political systems: "The severely limited role of parties and parliaments in policy-making seems to be a fact which can scarcely be disputed in empirical terms.... To the extent to which policy-making evades political control and guidance, it is determined by the particular interests of pressure groups, large enterprises and bureaucracies, while general and encompassing interests tend to be neglected." (1) Nowhere is the government mentioned at all as a possible independent actor. Quite apart from being simplistic in many ways, this approach has two specific defects in the context of party government. First, it places broadly on the same level parties and other groups, while the insertion of parties in the governmental machinery is manifestly broader and more wide-ranging: ministerial recruitment and ministerial policy are dominated by parties, in many cases at least, to an extent that is not achieved or even attempted by groups. Second, and more importantly, this view of the relationship between governments and supporting parties appears to posit that governments, that is to say specifically

leaders and ministers, are not major actors in the process of policy-making and development. At best, this is a hypothesis to test, not an assumption to make; as a matter of fact, impressionistic evidence suggests on the contrary that many governments at least are rather autonomous from the party or parties which support them either because these governments are allowed by the parties a substantial freedom of manoeuvre or because they - and in particular their leaders - control the supporting political parties. What has therefore to be undertaken is an inquiry into the links which exist between government and parties in order to assess where, to what extent, and for what reasons governments are relatively autonomous from or on the contrary dependent on these supporting parties.

Such an analysis requires in the first instance a precise definition of what is meant by party government, however. Perhaps the most systematic effort to do so is that of R.S. Katz who develops an incremental concept of 'partyiness of government' as well indeed as a concept of 'party governmentness' (4). He mentions three conditions which have to be fulfilled for a government to deserve the title, so to speak, of 'party government'. These are that "all major governmental decisions must be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people", that "policy must be decided within the governing party, when there is a "monocolour" government, or by negotiation among parties when there is a coalition", and that "the highest

officials (e.g. cabinet ministers and especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and be responsible to the people through their parties)" (5). R.S. Katz then goes on to note that this definition "represents an ideal type, rather like but in contrast to Dahl's (1971) type of polyarchy. As such it represents an extreme that may be approximated but is neither realised nor realisable in the ultimate sense. It is also a multidimensional concept. Thus a particular system may closely approximate the ideal type in one respect but not in another" (6).

R.S. Katz's analysis shows that the problem of defining party government is complex; perhaps even more interestingly, it also suggests that one should look for 'types' of party government. It is to the question of defining such 'types', of examining the dimensions along which these can be analysed, and of determining the political factors which may account for their existence that two subsequent papers are devoted (7).

Before undertaking such a task, however, some problems of definition, both theoretical and empirical, have to be examined. To begin with, two general points need to be made. First, government-party relationships are naturally a sub-set of a more general question, namely that of the relationship between governments and those bodies which are closely and continuously attached to them. In the large majority of contemporary polities these bodies are parties, but, even at present, not every country has parties and, of course, in countries without parties

governments rely on privileged groups, communal organisations in particular, especially those which are ethnic or religious; some governments of course also rely or are based on the military. As they emerge in a polity (often from within communal groups, but also from the military), parties gradually replace these bodies as the main channels having a privileged relationship with the government; but the relationship between governments and these groups will continue to exist for a period: this point is important with respect to relatively new parties and party systems which are not fully 'consolidated'.

Second, the relationship between government and parties is complex because governments and parties are different types of bodies, although they attempt to influence each other and are in many cases in very close association. Parties are typically large organisations, while governments are small bodies of top decision-makers. They thus complement each other, parties being spread out throughout the country, while governments are at the apex of the political system: they work together because they need each other. Yet they are also in competition, as governments wish to use parties to strengthen their support in the nation while parties wish to see governments adopt their goals. This opposition corresponds to a large extent to the distinction between the 'representative' and 'mobilising' functions of parties: to the extent that parties are 'representative', they attempt to influence governments; to the extent that they are mobilising, they are typically used by governments. But this distinction also

corresponds to an extent to the division between well-established and relatively new parties: in the first case, party members and even part of the leadership tend to press their views on the government; in the second, the party tends to rely on the national leadership and therefore to serve as an instrument of governmental action. Thus party-government relationships in the context of older established parties differ markedly from party-government relationships in the context of relatively new parties.

The fact that parties are large and complex organisations while governments are relatively compact bodies, even if they increased in size in recent years, does not mean only that the relationship between governments and parties will never be symmetrical; it also means that what has to be understood by party policies and by supporting parties is rather unclear and unquestionably varied. We can postulate that we know what we mean by government though, of course, there are many difficulties attached to attempts at defining the concept, both in theory and in practice (8); yet it is possible to adopt a relatively simple definition based primarily on cabinet members (for Western European countries) as well as (for presidential systems in particular) on a number of top presidential advisers who have cabinet rank. Such a practical definition may not be altogether watertight, but it is probably satisfactory for a study of government-party relationships. Difficulties are markedly more serious, on the other hand, when one comes to consider two other

Digitised version produced by the JUI library in 2002. The original is held by the University of Warwick. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Research Repository.

aspects of the problem of party-government relationships, the notion of party policy and the notion of supporting party.

Parties as decision-making bodies

The reason why the question of the definition of party emerges as a major difficulty is because we are concerned here with parties as decision-making bodies rather than with parties as organisations. Although there are serious empirical difficulties in analysing parties as organisations, the theoretical and specifically definitional problems are limited: we can circumscribe the bodies which constitute the party, at the national level as well as lower down the hierarchy, and examine their structure and their relationships; we can see what decisions these bodies take and conclude for instance that a given party is rather centralised while another is rather decentralised. Analyses of this type may still not be very advanced; but further progress in the field depends essentially on amassing and analysing the relevant data.

If we are to examine government-party relationships, on the other hand, it is not sufficient to look at parties as organisations: one must consider them as decision-making bodies. Yet what constitutes a party from a decision-making point of view is not altogether clear. The matter is clear in the limit-case of a wholly centralised party, such as a Communist party (of the traditional variety) in which policies are produced by a national

executive on a unanimous or near-unanimous basis. If we move away from this limit-case, however, what is to be regarded as a party decision becomes more problematic.

The difficulty arises for two reasons, which paradoxically have the opposite effect. First, the more a party is decentralised and indeed factionalised on the basis of ideological, personal, or geographical cleavages, the more it is difficult to determine which decisions can be regarded as party decisions in the full sense of the word. In a divided party, for instance because they are organised factions, a large number of views are aired: if factionalism is very high, it is indeed impossible to say which of these views are truly authoritative, as each view is likely to be supported by influential members of the party. Indeed, the top decision organs are likely to include members representing the various factions; as a matter of fact, in many cases at least, so will the government, as the examples of Japan and Italy indicate. In such a case, almost every policy which the government subsequently endorses and implements is likely to have originated in one of the factions. Thus, the more the party is factionalised, the more the party will appear to have been at the origin of governmental decisions, a conclusion which, prima facie, seems counterintuitive, since, in such a case, it is not the party as such, but elements from the party which are at the origin of the policies which the government comes to adopt.

Digitised version produced by the EU Library in 2007. Available at: <http://www.eulibrary.org>. © The Author(s). European University Institute Research Repository.

On the other hand, very decentralised parties are also unlikely to adopt formally many precise and detailed policies; they may not adopt any policies at all, as the example of American parties indicates: in this case, the burden of policy-making is left nearly entirely to the President and to Congressmen. Thus, while many ideas which eventually become government policy may originate from the party, very few of these ideas can be regarded as having the formal seal of approval of the party as such. Should one then say that the party is very influential (because ideas originate from it) or that it has little influence (because it takes few policy decisions formally)? Should one say in this case that the government has or that it does not have substantial autonomy of action? In order to solve the dilemma, we have to abandon a simple dichotomous distinction and adopt a somewhat more complex formula.

As a matter of fact, the operative distinction in this respect is provided by the concepts of aggregation and articulation. If we consider the two limit-cases, we can say that a highly centralised party is highly aggregative (by whatever means, including by coercion), while a very decentralised party remains at the level of articulation. The highly centralised party presents the government, on a plate so to speak, with policies to be followed (and it also tends to choose the ministers who will implement these policies). The government takes it or leaves it, though some leeway may exist at the level of application. If the government 'takes' the policy, it follows the party line; if it

does not, it opposes itself to the party, with the consequence that there might be serious conflict between the two bodies. The situation is clear-cut.

In the case of decentralised parties, on the contrary, nothing is clear-cut: a large number of views are articulated within the party, none of these views being truly authoritative at the level of the whole party, though they may be authoritative within each faction or segment. The party is not in a position to aggregate these views: it passes them on, so to speak, to the government, who might then do the necessary aggregation. It is no longer a question of 'all or nothing' as in the previous case, it is a question of 'more or less'. The government may therefore be less constrained, though it may often have to act more as a compromiser than as an arbiter.

Yet even this description is too simple in that we have considered only the limit-cases of fully centralised and fully decentralised parties. In practice, most parties constitute intermediate cases: they are relatively decentralised. One or more factions will try to control the decision-making organs. The result might be defined in terms of 'partly authoritative policies', in that decisions are taken by the party officially on these policies, but that these are contested by a substantial minority. The position of the government may then be relatively difficult, unless the majority and the minority are stable and well-defined: the government is then likely to reflect the views

of the majority and indeed to be composed exclusively of members of that majority; this has sometimes been the case in social democratic parties in Western Europe. If alignments are more fluid, on the other hand, and if the various factions find themselves successively in the majority and in the minority, the government has typically to follow a more tortuous path, while it also puts pressure on the party's decision-making organs. Moreover, this situation may often be both complicated and simplified by the presence of a coalition: when this is the case, the views of other parties have to be considered and, indeed, a coalition compact is likely to have been elaborated by the coalition partners before the government has come into being. This reduces the room for manoeuvre of the cabinet, but also helps to solve policy-making problems.

It is therefore not realistic to adopt an 'all-or-nothing' conception of the nature of decisions in political parties. One should on the contrary refer to degrees of 'authoritativeness' of the various policies on the part of the parties supporting the government. At one extreme, fully authoritative party policies are those which the party adopts (ostensibly at least) unanimously or near-unanimously. At the other extreme are the policies suggested in some quarters of the party but not formally accepted (nor formally rejected), either because formal authoritative mechanisms of decision-making do not exist (in the case of the wholly decentralised party) or because these policies are too contentious to be subjected to a formal

vote. In between are policies with various levels of 'authoritativeness', this 'authoritativeness' being measured by the extent of support which the policies obtain in the party. Moreover, policies supported only by a minority of the party need to be taken into account, since they can be taken up by the government, and have indeed, in a sense, originated in the party, although the government can probably exercise more discretion in such cases. One could thus construct an index of party policy 'authoritativeness' on the basis of the degree of support enjoyed by various policies in the party; at least a four- or five-point scale would seem to be realistic. One would in this way determine more precisely the extent to which policies can be truly described as party policies.

The concept of the supporting party

The overall aim of this analysis is to see how far parties influence governmental policy and how far governments, on the other hand, remain autonomous or even influence party policy. The parties which are being examined here are therefore those which support the government, not the opposition. Yet, as we found for the concept of party decisions, the concept of supporting party is more complex than it seems at first sight. Here again, a sharp distinction between supporting and 'non-supporting' parties corresponds to limit-cases only, namely those in which the number of significant parties is small, in which parties are disciplined and in which the government has majority support. This concept

tends therefore to apply primarily in the 'textbook' British or Commonwealth cases. As soon as one deviates from this 'pure' model (including in some real-world situations in Britain and in the Commonwealth), what is meant by supporting party becomes less clear.

Let us first consider the effect of indiscipline on support. Indiscipline relates to behaviour in the legislature and is therefore concerned with those party members who are congressmen or parliamentarians; but it relates also, indirectly but yet closely, to the party as a whole, in that the level of discipline in the legislature depends on the cohesion of the party in the country. If cohesion is strong, discipline will be high; indeed, it will be high even if there are factions or 'currents', as these will not or will rarely feel able to manifest themselves openly and solemnly in a vote. If cohesion is low, discipline will be low. Thus parties which are undisciplined have to be decentralised (though the converse is not necessarily true): they are parties in which there will be typically disagreements about policies: support for the government will therefore tend to be limited: one can therefore describe these parties as 'partly supportive'. If there is a permanent majority-minority cleavage, the support is likely to be well-defined in advance; if there is not, the extent of support will be more problematic. Governments are likely to be unstable and their policies are likely to be rejected often. For measurement purposes, one can define an index of support based for instance on the proportion of government

policies which have been adopted by party members in the legislature. The matter can be handled in practice in the same way as the question of party decisions which we examined earlier.

The question of the number of significant parties may not theoretically seem likely to have a direct impact on the nature of support; in practice, the impact can be large, as, the more parties are involved in supporting a government, the less this support is likely to be firm. When the government is based on a single party, the degree of commitment of the party will tend to be high, at least in most cases and most of the time, even if there are divisions in the party. In the overwhelming majority of cases, party members are motivated by the underlying desire that the party should win the next election.

When a coalition is set up, the degree of commitment of each party to the government is lower, except if a party dominates the coalition. In general, however, when there is a coalition, parties have to make substantial policy concessions in order for the government to come into being; this naturally alienates some members. If the partners in the coalition have a high level of cohesion, discipline will none the less be maintained, but there will probably always be a degree of suspicion, with the effect that support will have a conditional and at best somewhat temporary character.

Furthermore, support is likely to decrease as the number of parties in the coalition is large. In a two-party coalition, the refusal by one party to agree to a particular policy is likely to provoke the end of the coalition; this may not be the case if there are three or more partners, especially if the party which is in disagreement is a small one. The matter may be treated as an incident (as can be a case of occasional lack of discipline in a single party government). Yet the fact that this type of situation may occur suggests that 'support', in the context of a coalition and in particular a multi-party coalition, is less firm than in the context of single-party governments.

So far, we assumed that the party or parties in the government commanded a majority in the legislature, whether in a presidential or in a parliamentary context: this is of course far from being always the case. In presidential systems, the party of the President may not be the party of the majority in the Congress: this is frequently the case, as is well-known, in the United States. In parliamentary systems, minority governments are relatively frequent (9).

Minority governments are of many types: there are near-majority governments and true minority governments; a few are technical cabinets appointed to solve a particular problem. The distinction which is most relevant from the point of view of support, however, is that between minority governments set up after agreement with one or more parties in order to obtain a

working governmental majority and minority governments which use different majorities for different policies in order to continue in being.

The first of these last two types can be regarded as a weaker former of coalition in which one of more of the coalition partners chooses not to join the government (10). One or more parties support the government and at least proclaim that they intend to do so for a substantial period. In such cases, policy trade-offs occur between the government and the parties which do not join the cabinet; these trade-offs are also known. The arrangement is fairly solid, though the costs of withdrawing support are smaller than if the party belonged to the government.

The level of support is lower and less clear when a minority government has to find a different majority for each policy it puts forward. Yet this type of situation occurs fairly frequently, either when a party has obtained a near-majority at a general election (in a cabinet system) or, in a presidential context, if the party of the President does not have a majority in the legislature. Some governments are ideologically located in such a way that they can hope for the support of small parties on their Left or Right, depending on the circumstances. At first sight, in cases of this kind, it seems wrong to claim that the parties which vote occasionally for governmental policies truly 'support' the cabinet; yet they do provide some support. Indeed, the government may have to make some deals in order to obtain

Digitised version prepared by the EUISS Library © The Author(s) European University Institute. URL: <http://www.eui.it> Access on www.eui.it EurOpen Research Repository.

these votes: these parties have therefore some influence on governmental policy. Furthermore, the cabinet almost certainly anticipates the reactions of these parties to an extent and fashions its policies in such a way as to be able to obtain, when needed, the support required. These are therefore cases of 'partial support', somewhat analogous to those encountered earlier with respect to parties which lack discipline in the legislature.

There is thus a substantial range of types of support. Yet there is still a more extreme case, namely that of the opposition parties themselves. In many cases at least, the opposition does not vote systematically and all the time against the government; there may indeed be important occasions (with respect to foreign affairs for instance or in the context of national emergencies) when the opposition supports the government. As a matter of fact, if the opposition is not very disciplined, at least a proportion of its members may vote for many of the government's proposals. Moreover, in respect to the opposition as well as for parties which formally give support, the government may have to make deals in order to see a particular policy adopted on a consensual basis. The government may make policy concessions and accept proposals from the opposition parties. These are thus in some way involved in the policy-making process, in a limited manner, admittedly, but not necessarily to an insignificant extent.

The concept of supporting party needs therefore to be regarded, not as dichotomous, but as incremental: parties support more or less both governmental policies and the government in general. In some limit-cases they support fully the government (the textbook British or Commonwealth situations) or oppose it fully (as extremist anti-system parties may do, for instance); but many other cases are intermediate: this occurs, as we saw, if parties are not very disciplined, coalitions are large, or there is a minority the government. These cases of support have to be recognised as what they are, namely as cases of 'partial support'. The extent of the support can indeed be measured by reference to the proportion of cases where it occurs, either within a party lacking discipline or among parties which are more or less closely related to the government. If one adopts here also a four or five-point scale, it becomes possible to obtain a realistic picture of the general level, type, and extent of support given by parties to governments.

+++++++

Government-party relationships are a central topic in democratic societies (as well indeed as in non-democratic polities); but this central topic can only be examined systematically by going beyond the basic impression that parties develop programmes which, ideally at least, should be implemented by the governments which these parties support. Parties may not always develop programmes at all or they may develop these in some

fields only; moreover, parties may speak with more than one voice. Parties may also be related to governments in different ways: the support which they give may be tight or loose, permanent or occasional. We have therefore to monitor and measure these variations: if this is done, we can look forward to a markedly better understanding of the many forms which the relationship between governments and parties take in contemporary societies.

NOTES

1. This paper originates from discussions at the first Workshop on the Research Project on Government-party relationships which took place at the European University Institute on 24-28 September, 1990. It is the first of three papers designed to prepare the May 1991 meeting of the Research Project at which the empirical programme of the study will be finalised. I am most grateful to the participants at the September 1990 Workshop and in particular to R. Andeweg, C. Cansino, M. Cotta, and J. Nousinn for having presented some of the ideas on which this paper is based.

The literature on party government need not be listed here as a comprehensive bibliography of articles on the subject was circulated at the September Workshop. It is sufficient to mention the first two volumes on 'The Future of party Government' edited by R. Wildenmann, 'Visions and Realities of party Government' (F.G. Castles and R. Wildenmann, eds., 1986) and 'Party Governments: European and American Experiences' (R.S. Katz, ed., 1987) published by De Gruyter (Berlin) as part of the European University Institute Series.

2. A. Mintzel and H. Schmitt (1981) 'How to investigate the future of party government' (unpublished), quoted in R.S. Katz, 'Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception', F.G. Castles and R. Wildenmann, eds., op.cit. (1986), p. 42.

3. F. Lehner and K. Schubert, 'Party Government and the Political Control of Public Policy', EJPR, (1984), vol. 12, 131-46, p. 132.

4. R.S. Katz, op.cit. (1986), pp. 42 and foll.

5. ibid, p. 43.

6. ibid, p. 44.

7. This is the subject of the papers entitled 'A model for the analysis of government-party relationships' and 'The political factors accounting for the relationship between governments and the parties which support them'.

8. On the question of the definition of governments and the problems attached to that definition see J. Blondel, The

Organisation of Governments, (1982), London and Los Angeles: Sage, pp. 14-30.

9. See K. Strom, 'Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies' Comp. Pol. Stud. vol. 17 (2) (1984), pp. 199-228.

10. See K. Strom, op.cit., 'Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia' Legislative Studies Quarterly vol. 11 (4) (Nov. 1986), pp. 583-605 and especially at pp. 586-91.



EUI WORKING PAPERS

EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the
European University Institute, Florence

Copies can be obtained free of charge – depending on the availability of
stocks – from:

The Publications Officer
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy

Please use order form overleaf

Publications of the European University Institute

To The Publications Officer
 European University Institute
 Badia Fiesolana
 I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
 Italy

From Name

 Address

- Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
- Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
- Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1992/93

Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):

No, Author

Title:

No, Author

Title:

No, Author

Title:

No, Author


Title:

Date

Signature

EUI Working Papers as from 1990

As from January 1990, the EUI Working Papers Series is divided into six sub-series, each series is numbered individually (i.e. EUI Working Paper HEC No. 90/1; ECO No. 90/1; LAW No. 90/1; SPS No. 90/1; EPU No. 90/1; ECS No. 90/1).



December 1991

Working Papers in Political and Social Sciences

SPS No. 90/1

Reiner GRUNDMANN/Christos
MANTZIARIS
Habermas, Rawls, and the
Paradox of Impartiality

SPS No. 90/2

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/Ursula
JAENICHEN
Educational Expansion and
Changes in Women's Entry into
Marriage and Motherhood in the
Federal Republic of Germany

SPS No. 90/3

Nico WILTERDINK
Where Nations Meet: National
Identities in an International
Organisation

SPS No. 90/4

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD
Changes in Educational
Opportunities in the Federal
Republic of Germany. A
Longitudinal Study of Cohorts
Born Between 1916 and 1965

SPS No. 90/5

Antonio LA SPINA
Some Reflections on Cabinets and
Policy-Making: Types of Policy,
Features of Cabinets, and Their
Consequences for Policy Outputs

SPS No. 90/6

Giandomenico MAJONE
Cross-National Sources of
Regulatory Policy-Making
in Europe and the United States

* * *

SPS No. 91/7

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD
Is the German Dual System a
Model for a Modern Vocational
Training System?

SPS No. 91/8

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/
Gianna GIANNELLI/
Karl Ulrich MAYER
Expansion on the Tertiary Sector
and Social Inequality.
Is there a New Service Proletariat
Emerging in the Federal Republic
of Germany?

SPS No. 91/9

Giandomenico MAJONE
Public Policy Beyond the
Headlines

SPS No. 91/10

Giandomenico MAJONE
Market Integration and
Regulation: Europe after 1992

SPS No. 91/11

Jean BLONDEL
Ministers of Finance in Western
Europe: A Special Career?

SPS No. 91/12

Jean BLONDEL
Governments and Supporting
Parties: Definitions and
Classifications

SPS No. 91/13

Jean BLONDEL

A Model for the Analysis of
Government-Party Relationships

SPS No. 91/14

Jean BLONDEL

The Political Factors Accounting
for the Relationship Between
Governments and the Parties
Which Support Them

SPS No. 91/15

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/
Yossi SHAVIT

Persisting Barriers: Changes in
Educational Opportunities in
Thirteen Countries

