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SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE  
IN THE  
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN

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SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE  
IN THE  
ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN  
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## P R E F A C E

This manuscript has a long history. It deals with matters that I have wrestled with for at least 25 years. But which I have only come to understand perhaps in the last year or so. This is not to say that I understand them fully now. Indeed, in terms of comprehension of the dynamics of social change in my own environment -- the Caribbean -- I can claim now only to see a glimmer. Not the light.

But in order for us to move forward, a glimmer is better than no light at all.

The manuscript has a long bureaucratic history. It was first floated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in January 1973. By January 1974, I was still not sure whether the ECIA would be going through with the project. This was cleared up by February 1, 1974 -- with a request that my report be ready by May 1974.

At first, I thought it possible to meet the U.N. deadline with a "formula approach". Essentially, a report that would say what everyone knows already. A report that would benefit nobody except the 'consultant' who received a fee. But I was intellectually excited by the proposal.

The following is a verbatim reproduction of the ECLA proposal.



SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING  
CARIBBEAN: OUTLINE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT

1. The project would be exploratory, conducted by one consultant during a three-month period. It would draw upon the findings of whatever relevant investigations can be unearthed, on available statistics, and on discussions with informed persons. In view of the limited time and resources it would require a consultant already familiar with the topic.
2. The immediate purpose would be to obtain a fund of information and interpretation concerning social structural change in the English-speaking Caribbean countries comparable to that now being built up by ECLA for Latin America and usable in the periodic surveys of social change now planned. The longer-term purpose would be to develop hypotheses concerning relations between social, economic and political change for testing in subsequent investigations. The project would not include field research, but the report would be expected to include concrete proposals concerning research priorities and methods. The consultant should aim at a report of 100-150 pages, with copies of statistical and other source material not readily available elsewhere appended.
3. The project should cover the following topics (the consultant would be free to use his own judgement concerning their relative importance, the possibility of making meaningful statements on the basis of existing information, and the desirability of including additional topics):
  - a. Historical evolution of plantation society and economy; the typical social structure that has emerged. (This should be a brief introduction referring to published sources.)
  - b. Implications of recent economic, political, social and demographic changes and continuing constraints:
    - i) Social structural consequences of change in economic activities and appearance of new activities:

- The plantations: changes in forms of ownership, production techniques, markets, demands for labour, contacts with rest of the economy.
  - Peasant agriculture: changes in markets, production techniques, land availability, contacts with the rest of the economy.
  - Manufacturing: appearance of an urban working class.
  - Mineral exploitation.
  - Tourism  
(Footnote on p. 43 of Persistent Poverty offers a significant lead for this discussion.)
- ii) Social structural consequences of economic openness within small specialized economies:
- Income expectations.
  - Consumption expectations.
- iii) Social structural consequence of political independence:
- Growth and diversification of the bureaucracy.
  - Needs for planners and other specialists of national origin.
  - Growth of political parties and interest-group organizations.
- iv) Social structural consequences of the educational systems:
- Education following external models and reflecting prestige of the culture of the dominant centre.
  - Education as the main channel for upward mobility.
  - Educational crisis when the previous models are challenged and when the occupational structures cannot meet the expectations of the "educated".



v) Social structural consequences of ideological penetration, dependency, incompatibility between local realities and imported ideologies:

- Continuing intellectual dependence on the "mother country"; distorted impact of changes in the "mother country" itself.
- Developmentalist ideologies and planning recipes: difficulties of application in very small, open and dependent economies.
- Revolutionary ideologies and problems of their adaptations: Marxism, "Black power".

vi) Social structural consequences of ethnic diversity:

- Occupational division of labour and rivalries.
- Competing nationalisms and different external models.

vii) Social structural consequences of demographic change:

- Population increase and pressure on the land.
- Urbanization and rejection of the "rural".
- International migration; consequences for potential leadership, skilled labour supply, age and sex distribution, income from remittances of migrants, cultural influence of contact with migrants and returned migrants.

c. Similarities and differences in relation to the Latin American republics. (Social Change and Social Development policy in Latin America could serve as basis for a short discussion.

d. Hypotheses or conclusions concerning the predominant directions of societal change, compatibility or incompatibility of these with a viable and acceptable style of development, feasible strategies for different lines of change, possible agents of such strategies.

- e. Evaluation of information now available concerning the above topics; priorities in research; proposals for means of improving information at reasonable cost (in terms of specialized human resources as well as money) and making it readily usable by policy makers and change agents.

The intellectual excitement of the proposal needs no elaboration. Operating out of the purely intellectual mould, I have violated bureaucratic (and my own) deadlines over and over again.

What follows is a semi-intellectual-bureaucratic product. I have rushed through matters which require years of intellectual deliberation.

If the product is considered intellectually worthwhile, part of the credit goes to my colleagues in the University of the West Indies -- particularly those in Economics and Political Science. If it is satisfactory for the international bureaucracy, that would be fine -- the gravy, so to speak.

Nevertheless, I wish to express appreciation to Marshall Wolfe of the ECLA (Santiago Office) for affording me this rather unique opportunity to think through and to set out on paper, the basic parameters for change in my society.

December 1974.

VOLUME ONE


CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

A SYNTHESIS




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C H A P T E R I





## THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK

Contemporary West Indian society is a product of slavery and the plantation system of social organization. Every institution testifies to this. So too do the values, attitudes, traditions, and beliefs of the people. Any analysis of the present situation must begin with a recognition of this.

The present analysis of "social structural change" in the region is, therefore, developed in this context. Accordingly, in this opening chapter we present the bare outlines of that social framework.

Slave society centred on the plantation which had the features of a total institution. White European owners and managers presided over an operation that involved the forced labour of numerous black African people to produce sugar. African peoples were forcibly transported from their homeland and re-socialized as slaves in the New World. After being subjected to a process of "seasoning" to bend their characters to the needs of plantation work, the Africans were thrown together in batches consisting of different tribal cultures on individual plantations. Thereafter, they were forced to adapt the language and culture of their European masters. The Afro-saxonization of the transplanted African began from that time on.

Race was institutionalized from the very outset. A rigid caste system separated whites from blacks in slave society. After a time an intermediate group of 'brown' people (mulattos) developed from the illicit sexual encounters of blacks and whites. The mulattos were afforded better opportunities to assimilate European culture than the blacks; and by virtue of that, and their skin colour, were afforded higher social status.

Social structure typically reflects the distribution of economic power. In slave society the white people monopolized economic power. Accordingly, all social institutions were controlled and manipulated by them -- state apparatus, church, school, etc. What was called "representative government" was a government representing the planters; slaves had no representation. Church was the church of the planters; African religious rites were ruthlessly suppressed. And so on.

Emancipation of the slaves only modified the pattern of social organization. Since economic power remained firmly in the hands of the white planters, the social structure remained intact. The first modification came in response to the violently expressed demands of the ex-slaves for land and justice. The Crown intervened and planter representative government was replaced by Crown Colony government. The Crown, it was argued would govern on behalf of all the people. Yet the terms which qualified individuals for participating in the political process were based on the ownership of property. So, in effect, the Crown governed on behalf of the planters who continued to monopolize property.

The economically dominant white planter class continued to dominate the social structure. Race determined the economic well being of individuals. Whiteness was a passport to wealth; and blackness to poverty. Social status was determined by race and colour. Whites remained on the top of the social hierarchy, mulattos in the middle and blacks at the bottom. East Indians indentured labour came in to join the black Africans at the bottom of the social ladder.

The system of education developed during Crown Colony rule provided new opportunities for the social mobility of Africans and East Indians. The system was transplanted from England. And it was the chief mechanism by which non-whites came more fully to assimilate European culture. Acquisition of education increased mobility in two ways: it improved the income opportunity of the individual and enhanced his status by virtue of a capacity to be like a European. Thus elements of class entered the social matrix. Economic status and cultural attributes became linked with the existing race and colour dimensions of earlier slave society to define the structural bases of contemporary West Indian society.

Educational opportunities were open only to a few. The majority of people had to continue the struggle for land and for securing a decent level of living from wage work. This struggle was heightened during the 1930's when riots broke out throughout the region. Official response was a retreat from Crown Colony government

to universal adult representative government.<sup>1/</sup> This set the stage for the transition to constitutional independence.

Constitutional advances adjusted the legal framework but left the economic base intact. Economic power remains concentrated in the hands of foreign and local whites. So the social structure remains roughly the same as before; the modifications that are evident reflect the diversification and growth of the economies which enhance occupational mobility. Additionally, educational opportunities expanded with constitutional advances; thus broadening the base for mobility by that route.

The postwar diversification and growth of West Indian economies involved the emergence of new activities like manufacturing, tourism, mining etc., and the growth of urban centres. Demand for skilled labour expanded with the growth of construction, transportation, etc. An urban working class came into prominence. Distinctions now have to be drawn between "white collar", "blue collar" and "unskilled" elements of that class. The peasants and rural proletariat (wage workers) remain but the overall class structure is now more complexified than before the war.

Race, colour and class now have equal prominence in the social order. M.G. Smith has described West Indian society as being plural -- consisting of white, brown and black elements, each of which has a different culture, institutional pattern and political orientation. Each stratum of the three elements is said to have its own life style, values and social relationships.<sup>2/</sup> The thesis has been challenged by other Caribbean analysts who point to the existence of a set of values which are shared by all three layers identified by Smith. Furthermore, the plural society thesis fails to recognize the vastly expanded mobility between the 'black lower' and the 'brown

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<sup>1/</sup> Universal adult suffrage was first introduced in Jamaica in 1944 and subsequently in the rest of West Indian colonies.

<sup>2/</sup> M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965).

middle' strata in those societies that have experienced rapid industrialization.

By and large the middle class is no longer the exclusive preserve of brown-skinned persons. Education and skilled blue collar work opportunities have brought significantly large numbers of black people into the ranks of the middle class. Even if the distinction is made between "upper middle" (professional, technical and clerical) and "lower middle": (skilled workers), the upper middle cannot be described as exclusively brown.

It is true of course that there is a high correlation between colour and occupational status. The upper class consists almost exclusively of whites (including Jews, Syrians, Lebanese, etc.); and as we descend to social hierarchy the concentration becomes increasingly black. So that the "lower lower" class (i.e. unemployed people) are almost exclusively black. The reason for this is that these societies systematically discriminate in favour of persons of lighter complexion. In private sector, job selection, for example, foreign whites, local whites and non-black minorities (e.g. Chinese) are given preference over black people with equal skills. <sup>3/</sup>

The basic institutions of West Indian society to-day reflect the dominance of European culture. The legal framework is based on British Common Law. (Indeed, many of the laws on the Statute books were enacted by planter representative governments and clearly discriminate against black people and workers generally. <sup>4/</sup> The educational system is distinctly British with emphasis on grammar school type of training to the exclusion of vocational inputs. The Church is of England and of Rome. The political system is that of Westminster; the model being enshrined in the constitutions of the

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<sup>3/</sup> See, for example, Jack Harewood, Racial Discrimination in Employment in Trinidad and Tobago; and Acton Camejo, Racial Discrimination in Employment in the Private Sector in Trinidad & Tobago, in Social and Economic Studies, Sept. 1971.

<sup>4/</sup> Laws governing trade union organization, for example, are designated "Master and Servants" laws.

independent states. And the life styles of all groups reflect varying degrees of assimilation of the cultures of Europe and North America.

The status of individuals in society in normal inter-personal transactions is determined by not only race and colour but other ascriptive characteristics like manner of speech and of dress. The closer these are to the European norms, the higher the status accorded. As a corollary cultural manifestations of Africa and India are generally despised. <sup>5/</sup> Social mobility, therefore, requires a divorce of African and Indian culture and assimilation of that of Europe. The result is a continuous process of Afro-saxonization and Indo-saxonization of West Indian peoples.

Because the societies are culturally oriented to Europe and North America, and the economies controlled from those sources, the leadership at all levels of society is comprised almost exclusively of the Saxonized elements. In school, church, state, trade unions, farm organizations, etc., leadership is elitist and the elitism is based heavily on the capacity of leadership to move freely among European and pseudo-European officialdom. The bias pervades all levels of society; not just the middle class as some analysts seem to suggest. The point is that although different segments of West Indian society display different cultural attributes, all groups generally aspire in one way or another and certainly accept European cultural norms as superior. <sup>6/</sup>

Economic policy, consumer tastes and the general value system reflect this cultural dependency. It is this cultural dependency that perpetuates economic and political dependency. Thus we find

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<sup>5/</sup> Some legitimation of African culture recently has been accorded. But only for superficial manifestations of that culture. Although dress is acceptable to some extent, religion is not. And West Indians still despise our own language which is a blend of African dialects and English.

<sup>6/</sup> This must be qualified by the recognition of small groups, such as Rastafari, who completely reject European culture and have created their own brand of African culture.

economies which are functionally a passive part of an overseas economic system -- societies that produce what they do not consume and that consume what they do not produce. Appendage economies hinged on to the world capitalist system and depending on stimuli from outside to promote economic change. It is being argued here that this results not from so-called limitations of size but from deliberate choices made by official policy makers; both bureaucratic and political policy makers in the West Indies have been thoroughly brainwashed (socialized) by the "myth of resource insufficiency" as a direct consequence of cultural dependency.<sup>7/</sup> Accordingly, only policies which fit into the existing framework of neo-colonial economic relations are contemplated.

Dependence generates backward economic growth, a condition in which the economy expands but without benefiting the majority of the population.<sup>8/</sup> That is the present trend of change in the West Indies. The political process reinforces this trend. There are of course, currents in the contemporary situation which are moving towards a reversal of that trend. The increased relative importance of young people, growing unemployment, increasing disaffection with existing political organizations, rising costs of living, urbanization, etc., are contributing to a general reassessment of the situation by significantly large segments of the population.

The present study explores some of the dimensions of the dominant trends in West Indian society over the past two decades or so. Aspects of the social framework outlined in this chapter will receive further elaboration in some of the chapters that follow.

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<sup>7/</sup> See the stimulating paper by Louis Lindsay "Colonialism and the Myth of Resource Insufficiency in Jamaica" (I.S.E.R., U.W.I.) mimeo, March 1974.

<sup>8/</sup> For more discussion on the causality asserted see George L. Beckford (ed) Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness (Kingston, 1975).

The basis of this study is how people utilize their resources. It is assumed that people are important. Accordingly, we are concerned about how they live. How they utilize resources to satisfy their needs. In the Caribbean these needs are basic. Food, shelter and health.

In order to satisfy needs in any society, resources have to be transformed into the goods and services people want. Therefore the economics of a situation is critical. But economics does not exist by itself. Economics of any situation is dictated by the particular rules of the game. By the kind of society. By the kind of politics. By the kind of people.

That is to say, a study of any human society must be grounded in the realities of the particular social system. Social in the broadest sense. And system because every society has some order.

This study of West Indian Society, therefore, begins with a survey of the economy. Of West Indian resources and the exploitation (use) of them. Concern is with people, resources and production. Accordingly the concern must be extended to exchange; because all people cannot produce their particular needs. Some produce some things and exchange them for other things which are produced by somebody else. The mode of exchange therefore, is as important as the mode of production.


West Indian society begins and ends with production and exchange. The Marxian framework of analysis helps to explain why the production process leaves West Indian people poor. The Emmanuel framework of analysis helps to explain why the exchange process leaves the worker in the cane barefooted and poor. Our tentative attempt in this exercise is to integrate the two frameworks. To try to explain the poverty of West Indian people; and what they are likely to do about it.

Like every social analysis, the ideas here are tentative. We cannot predict with certainty human behaviour. Part of the difficulty derives from an absence of information. Information informs. The reader will therefore notice that more attention is

given to Jamaica than the rest of the English Caribbean. The reason is that there is more information (investigation) about Jamaica. But I am of the opinion that the general conclusions arrived at are representative of the capitalist Caribbean.



C H A P T E R    I I



EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE  
OF WEST INDIAN ECONOMY

Before Europe invaded the New World in the 15th century, the Caribbean islands were inhabited by two main tribes of indigenous Indians. The warlike Caribs and the peaceful Arawaks.

The original economy was based essentially on shifting agriculture, hunting and fishing. Over time the Caribs conquered territory from the Arawaks. And the latter kept moving northward in the process. Accordingly, by the time Columbus came, Arawaks were more concentrated in the northernmost islands.

Arawak economy was somewhat more organized than that of the Carib. Agriculture was better organized and fishing relatively well developed. Carib economy, on the other hand, was more of a war economy. Specialization was in hunting and weapon manufactures. Arawak economy was more diversified than Carib economy.

The invading Europeans transformed the Caribbean scene. There were no precious metals, like the gold and silver of the mainland (the Spanish Main). But the islands were strategic bases for the plunder of the Main. And the soils were suitable for producing "exotic" tropical commodities - sugar, cotton, indigo, tobacco, etc.

After the Papal Bull, Brazil fell to Portugal while Spain got the rest of Latin America. The Portuguese introduced plantation sugar in Brazil in the 16th Century. Thereafter King Sugar spread northward, like the Arawaks earlier, first to Barbados, and later up to Jamaica and Cuba.

The history of contemporary West Indian economy is rooted in sugar and slavery.

The indigenous Indian populations were harnessed by the conquering Europeans to provide plantation labour. But they did not survive the hazards of permanent agriculture. And the European diseases took a heavy toll on them. No Arawaks have survived to this day. And the Caribs are now few in number. <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Pockets of Carib people can be found to-day in places like Dominica where the mountainous terrain provided a hamlet for their safe withdrawal from the European invaders.

Millions of Africans were brought over to the Caribbean to provide the labour power needed for plantation production. And to-day Black People are the bulk of West Indian populations.

Slave economy persisted from the 16th to the 19th century -- some three hundred years or so. Emancipation came in 1838. And as Black People (the Africans) set about to make themselves independent of the brutal plantation, labour became scarce. So east Indians were brought under the indenture system, up until about 1917 when the Indian government terminated this scheme of semi-slavery. To-day East Indians are a high proportion of the population of the new plantation colonies, like Trinidad and Guyana. <sup>2/</sup>

Contemporary West Indian economy is more diversified than was slave economy. To-day, there is mining, manufacturing, tourism, and peasant agriculture. Plantation sugar remains as well.

Diversification, yes. But there is a great deal of structural continuity in the system. Later in this chapter, there will be occasion to support this assertion. A series of Tables provide the data there. But before that, we discuss the Caribbean in terms of the world economy.

## I CARIBBEAN IN WORLD ECONOMY

The Caribbean belongs to everybody outside. British, Dutch, French, American. There is constitutional independence -- Haiti, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana. But all are dependent economies. Cuba is tied into the international Socialist system of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The rest of the Caribbean is tightly locked into the International Capitalist System of the USA, Western Europe (and Japan).

Chart 1 is a picture of the world economic systems of to-day. The socialist world is split into two components -- East Europe and China. The break in relations between China and the Soviet


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<sup>2/</sup> They are the majority in Guyana and probably half of Trinidad's population.

Chart 1. -- The World System of Political Economy, 1974 \*

International Capitalist Systems  
(Ca. 2/3 Mankind)

International Socialist Systems  
(Ca. 1/3 Mankind)



\* The multinational corporation (MNC) dominates centre-periphery links within the international capitalist system. State agreements dominate the socialist links. Socialist links with Third World Nations are concentrated (India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, etc.). For further elaboration, see Anibal Pinto & Kñakal, *The Centre-Periphery System Twenty Years Later*; in *Social & Economic Studies*, March 1973.

Union in the early 1960's had repercussions on Cuba by 1966. Prior to 1966, China was the chief source of rice for Cuba. And rice is important in the Cuban diet. So that beginning in the late 1960's Cuba began to seek new sources and to increase its own rice production. Guyana is a major rice exporter in the region; and so a trade with Cuba developed.

The Cuban economy is linked with Eastern Europe. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is "first among equals" in that system. Cuban economy is a sugar economy. And the USSR is the single largest buyer of Cuban raw sugar. Nickel is the other important export in Cuba; and again the USSR is the largest buyer. <sup>3/</sup> In turn Cuba imports manufactures, fuel and capital goods (including weapons) from the USSR and the affiliated countries of Eastern Europe.

Cuba has some characteristics of a dependent economy. The "muscovado bias" of exporting primary commodities is present -- in sugar, nickel, fish and citrus fruits. "In mid-1968, Castro stated that numerous socialist countries maintain trade practices with the underdeveloped world similar to the practices used by the bourgeois, capitalist world." <sup>4/</sup>

According to one analyst:

Cuba accepted a dependent status in its trade relations with the USSR with the hope of receiving fair treatment with respect to terms of trade with the Soviets. However, statistical investigation accumulated in the 1950's and 1960's shows that the USSR has been giving preferential trade agreements to the countries of Western

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<sup>3/</sup> Currently, Cuba is the fourth largest nickel producer in the world "... Cuba is mainly exporting raw nickel to the USSR, which refines the ore and re-exports it to the socialist countries and the international market - (the USSR is the primary nickel producer in the international market)" Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburg, 1971) p.315.

<sup>4/</sup> Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ibid, p.318.

Europe as a result of benefits accrued from its trade with Eastern European countries. <sup>5/</sup>

From this observation, it would be perhaps fair to describe Cuba as a dependent Socialist economy.

The rest of the Caribbean are dependent capitalist economies. The English-speaking Caribbean is an extension of "monopoly capital". Sugar, mining, tourism, banking are all controlled by foreign enterprise. The multinational corporations (MNCs) control the main resource sectors. And some manufacturers as well. Interest is now concentrated on the English-speaking capitalist economy. <sup>6/</sup>

## II EVOLUTION OF WEST INDIAN ECONOMY

We begin with slave economy and look at how present day economy came into being.

### Slave Economy

Slave economy generated no national income; only domestic product. Table 1 is a simplified model of transactions in slave economy. Transactions are concentrated in the plantation sector which is, in reality, an extension of metropolitan economy.

Plantations provision themselves with consumer and capital goods. Consumer goods (foodstuffs) are produced by slaves on their provision grounds. And capital goods (fuel, lumber, etc.) are secured from the forested areas not in sugar production.

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<sup>5/</sup> Ibid p.319. The author made reference to the following article, Horst Mendershausen "Terms of Trade between USSR and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955-1957" Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1959, pp.106-118.

<sup>6/</sup> The term "West Indian" will be used to denote the English-speaking Caribbean: the islands and the mainland territories of Guyana and Belize. The islands are Jamaica, Cayman, Turks & Caicos, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, Montserrat, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago.

The plantation produces sugar for "export" to the metropole. Export is really a transfer. Plantations are owned by non-residents, (i.e. metropolitan-based "planters"). This abstract model in Table 1 assumes total absenteeism. <sup>7/</sup> According to Ragatz, by the 1830's most of the plantations "were in the hands of new owners, almost none of whom had ever been beyond the Atlantic or had the slightest intention of going there". <sup>8/</sup>

Gross domestic product consists of sugar output, ground provision output, and gross capital formation. Slaves provide the labour for this output. In return they get food; their own provision output plus imported cured meat, fish and flour. Surplus generated from slave labour accrues to the metropolitan landlords. They pay the "government" poll taxes; consume part of the surplus and invest the rest.

The plantation sector sells sugar to the metropole. And buys intermediate goods from the metropole. In this model, there are no resident households except the Maroons. <sup>9/</sup> So all savings and investments are by non-resident households. Government invests in "public" works. But this infrastructure is on behalf of plantations only. Maroons get no public roads.

Slave economy is plantation-metropolitan economy. <sup>10/</sup> A nineteenth century British economist <sup>11/</sup> rightly described the West Indies as "a place where England finds it convenient to carry on the production of sugar, coffee, and a few other tropical

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<sup>7/</sup> Absenteeism was indeed quite prevalent. See Lowell Ragatz "Absentee Landlordism in the British Caribbean 1750-1833" Agricultural History, January 1931. See also Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763-1863 (New York, 1963).

<sup>8/</sup> Ragatz, "Absentee ..." op cit pp.7-13.

<sup>9/</sup> Maroons are the run-away slaves (Africans).

<sup>10/</sup> For a more refined model of slave economy see Lloyd Best, Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy, Social & Economic Studies, September 1968.

<sup>11/</sup> John Stuart Mill.



Table 1 -- A Simplified Transactions Matrix for Slave  
Plantation Economy

Payments Receipts	PLANTATION	SUBSISTENCE (Maroons etc)	GOVERNMENT	NON- RESIDENT HOUSEHOLDS	NON- RESIDENT SAVINGS/ INVESTMENT	METROPOLE (R.O.W.)
PLANTATION	X		X		X	X
SUBSISTENCE (Maroons, etc.)		X				
GOVERNMENT	X					
NON-RESIDENT HOUSEHOLDS	X					
NON-RESIDENT SAVINGS/INVEST.	X					
METROPOLE (R.O.W.)	X			X	X	

Notation : Cells marked X indicate transactions (i.e. payments and receipts).

Empty cells indicate no transactions.

X = National Income.

commodities." The simplified matrix of Table 1 illustrates this beautifully. Transactions are plantation and metropolitan. Empty cells predominate otherwise. And national income is equivalent to the subsistence output of the Maroon sector. <sup>12/</sup>

Table 2 provides some accounting data for a St. Kitts plantation just before Emancipation. These data are reproduced from Douglas Hall, Five of the Leewards 1834-1870. <sup>13/</sup> Salaries accrue to European managers ("attorneys") and European professionals (medical personnel, bookkeepers, etc.). These are temporary residents with a short-view of a West Indian sojourn. Salaries and intermediate capital goods (lumber and 'miscellaneous') are the major expenses in the island. In 1833, for example, these represented over 73% of total expenditure in the island. Of the total, real island expenditure was roughly one half; salaries of temporary residents, the other half.

Slave provisions and medical attendance represented perhaps less than one half of the value of expenses for the small group of salaried Europeans. <sup>14/</sup> Slave population is given as 330. And it is doubtful that salaried employees could exceed 10-12.

The estate seems to have sold rum and molasses in St. Kitts. So that net expenditures in the island were about 20% of supplies from the metropole. Unfortunately, the table does not provide data on value of sugar shipped to the metropole. But what seems clear from the data as they are is that intra-island transactions were minimal compared to transactions with the metropole. These data, then, give some validity to the stylized model of Table 1.

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<sup>12/</sup> If we recognize the maroon sector as "illegal" according to established "authority" then national income would be zero. There are no nationals. Slaves are part of the capital stock; and landlords live in the metropole.

<sup>13/</sup> See Lloyd Best, op cit for a modified version of slave economy (Caribbean Universities Press, Barbados, 1971) p. 37.

<sup>14/</sup> In the table, provisions are grouped with "fodder" for cattle. Thus Hall rightly locates slaves with the capital stock. The total is £235 or less than one half of the £469 recorded for salaries.

Table 2

Island accounts of Nichola Town Estate, St. Kitts

Year	1830	1831	1832	1833	
	£	£	£	£	
Salaries	540	473	462	469	
Wages	-	-	-	-	
Lumber: staves, boards, shingles, puncheons, etc.	228	257	261	300	
Working animals	-	132	68	35	
Provisions and fodder	333	279	245	148	
Taxes	128	56	96	58	
Miscellaneous: paint, coal, lime, etc.	140	86	94	155	
Medical attendance and expenses	94	93	98	98	
Total of expenses in the Island	- 1,463	1,376	1,324	1,261	
Miscellaneous receipts, sales of old cattle, etc.	75	50	43	13	
Proceeds of rum and molasses	783	680	855	1,136	
Total receipts in the Island	- 858	730	898	1,149	
Net expenditure in the Island	605	646	426	112	
Supplies from England	400	400	400	500	
Total outstanding	1,005	1,046	826	612	
Sugar shipped for sale	Tons	198	145	185	197

Sources: Select Committee on the West India Colonies, 1848  
Minutes of Evidence, Mr. Benjamin Buck Greene.

Notes: (1) The order of the columns has been changed from  
the original so as to present a clearer picture.  
(2) There were no slaves bought or sold by the estate  
in these years. The slave population was about 330.

If we accept this St. Kitts estate as representative of West Indian plantations, then slave economy can be appropriately described as a "segmented economy". That is to say, it consists of producing units which are segmented from each other. Internal linkages are few, and are subordinate to linkages with the metropole.

That is the general pattern that persists to this day. Structural dependence on metropolitan economy is the characteristic feature of contemporary West Indian Economy.

During the postwar period, most governments introduced incentive legislation to promote industrialization. These programmes are aimed to attract foreign investors, on the assumption that the region is short of capital, entrepreneurial skill and technological know-how. Incentives provided include tax-free holidays, duty free imports, accelerated depreciation allowances, etc. And governments invested in "industrial estates" to provide the necessary infrastructure for firms. <sup>15/</sup> And so foreign-owned manufacturing activity developed to a significant degree especially in Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Barbados.

Other developments of a similar nature occurred in mining and tourism. Foreign oil companies had become established in Trinidad from early in the 20th century. And foreign aluminium companies began exploiting Guyana's bauxite as far back as 1917. They also appeared on the Jamaican scene with the discovery of bauxite there after World War II. In Belize, the vast forest resources were monopolized and exploited by a British firm for decades. Finally the postwar period was characterized by the rapid growth of tourism. And foreign corporations entered the tourist sector in Jamaica, Antigua, Bahamas, Cayman, Montserrat, Barbados, Grenada and St. Lucia.

Parallel with these developments in the productive sectors of West Indian economy was the expansion and growth of the traditional foreign-owned banking (financial) sector. From the early plantation

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<sup>15/</sup> The industrialization policies were an outgrowth of a classic study by W. Arthur Lewis, The Industrialization of the British West Indies (Puerto Rico, 1950).

days British and Canadian banks had serviced the export-import trade. These have all expanded. In addition, as the United States interest in production <sup>16/</sup> grew, American banks started to appear on the scene. Banks and non-bank financial intermediaries are thus basically foreign owned.

On the other hand, the establishment and growth of a peasantry created a new dynamism for economic growth and diversification. The African (ex-slave) population set out from the beginning to secure an economic existence independent of the plantation. They secured land wherever it was available and established farms. They produced food for sale in the domestic markets and they introduced new export crops as well. <sup>17/</sup> Production for the home market stimulated the development of the distribution, transportation and construction sectors of the economy. And it generated other internal linkages as well. This provided the basis for the emergence of a national economy.

In the struggle for economic survival, the peasantry revolted on occasions. And so induced political (constitutional) changes that led ultimately to independence in several countries in the 1960's. A peasant uprising in Jamaica in 1865 led to the introduction of Crown Colony government. And revolts throughout the region in the 1930's led to the introduction of adult suffrage and constitutional reforms leading to increasing autonomy and, later, independence for some.

The war years 1939-1945 are an important second phase in the transition from slave economy. Shortage of shipping affected exports and imports. This forced closure of the economy induced the development of manufactures which were previously imported. Production of processed foodstuffs, building materials, shoes,

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<sup>16/</sup> Chiefly mining, tourism and manufacturing.

<sup>17/</sup> See W.K. Marshall, Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies, Social and Economic Studies, September 1968 for an exposition of the growth of the peasantry.

matches, etc. led to import-substitution on a scale significant enough to convince West Indians that they too could industrialize. And this set the stage for the official industrialization policies introduced after the hostilities were over.

#### Transition from Slave Economy

One hundred and forty years after the abolition of slavery, West Indian economy displays certain basic structural features of slave economy. This will become clear in later discussion. Before that, a brief exposition of the evolution of the economy since Emancipation.

After 1838, there are two broad trends of economic change dominating the West Indian scene for the next 100 years. One is the establishment and growth of a peasantry by the ex-slaves and their descendants. The other is the reorganization and consolidation of the traditional plantation.

Over the period, the plantation sector was subject to numerous shocks. Emancipation raised the cost of labour immediately. Then in the 1840's the introduction of free trade exposed West Indian sugar to competition from other lower cost producers. Then the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 brought further competition from tropical Asia. And beet sugar production was gaining an ascendancy in Europe. Additionally, technological changes in sugar production increased the capital requirements of plantations. In the process, individual proprietary planters and smaller plantations fell victims to the corporate firms and the larger plantations which expanded acreage at the expense of the smaller estates. Capital became increasingly concentrated and the number of plantations declined dramatically.

During the 1930's British refining interests began producing sugar cane and raw sugar in the West Indies. These multinational corporations have since come to dominate production in most of the territories. And so the traditional plantation sector has remained foreign owned, as it was during the slave era. The output contributes to the domestic product. But only wages and taxes accrue to nationals.

On the other hand, the establishment and growth of a peasantry created a new dynamism for economic growth and diversification.

### Contemporary West Indian Economy

The character of the foreign-owned economic activities in mining, tourism, manufacturing and banking is similar in many respects to that of the slave plantation. They are West Indian extensions of metropolitan economy. Linkages are predominantly external, with the metropole. Contributions to the domestic product are high but income accruing to nationals is not as great. Technology is imported. Raw materials are exported in crude (or semi-processed) form. Shipping is controlled by metropolitan firms. And, of course, profits accrue to metropolitan residents.

Furthermore, these enterprises rely heavily on expatriate managerial personnel. These white people occupy privileged positions in much the same way that the planters did under plantation slavery. And the foreign corporations wield considerable political power. Their financial strength is used to manipulate the political process in their own interest.

The structure of contemporary West Indian economy can be better described and understood if we group the foreign-owned sectors together and the nationally-owned ones into two separate components. This is done in Table 3 which shows inter-sectoral linkages, with foreign-owned sectors designated as "overseas" and nationally-owned ones as "residential".<sup>18/</sup> This model matrix can be adjusted to suit individual West Indian economies. For example, mining may be absent in some countries and tourism absent (or insignificant) in others.

Table 3 suggests that there are few linkages between the overseas and residential components of the economy. That large transactions are concentrated in the overseas component and relatively

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<sup>18/</sup> The terminology is borrowed from L. Best and K. Levitt, Export-Propelled Industrialization in the Caribbean (mimeo, unpublished).

small transactions with the residentiary component. The predominance of empty cells and O's in the upper right and lower left quadrants; the clusters of X's in the upper left, and of S's in the lower right quadrants are to be noted in this connection.

The major payments by overseas sectors to residentiary sectors are to construction, government (taxes), and households (wages). Payments to construction are on the whole lumpy. These are mainly in the initial phase of industrial production and for hotel construction. In overseas sectors such as mining and manufacturing, the capital intensive nature of technology creates a limited number of jobs. Consequently, payments to households are relatively small. And in manufacturing and tourism payments to government are relatively small because of the tax holidays given as incentives to foreign investors.

The overall picture, then, is a lop-sided economy. The bulk of the economy's resources are concentrated in the overseas component while the bulk of the population are engaged in minor transactions within the residentiary component. So far as economic development is concerned, the linkage potential lies within the residentiary component. But resources there are restricted.

Some empirical support for the generalization of Table 3 is provided by the data in Table 4. That table summarizes inter-industry relations in the Trinidad-Tobago economy in 1962.<sup>19/</sup> First, the dominance of oil in terms of total output is to be noted. Oil accounted for about 44% of total output. By comparison other major sector shares were 'Distribution' 11%, 'Other Manufacturing' 9%, with 'Construction' and 'Services' about 6% each. Commenting on the Table, Francis observes that for oil:

Intermediate input as a whole is relatively low, only .2441. The highest cost coefficient, .2080, represents purchases from 'Oil' itself. All other cost coefficients are very small ..... Primary input is quite high,

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<sup>19/</sup> Reproduced from A.A. Francis, A Note on Inter-Industry Relations in the Economy of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962, C.S.O. Research Papers, No. 2 December 1965, pp 60-61.



Table 3. -- A Model Transactions Matrix for Caribbean Economy

Payments Receipts	O V E R S E A S						R E S I D E N T I A R Y								
	Plan.	Min.	Tour.	Man.	Bank	Met. (ROW)	Pea.	Dist.	Trans.	Cons.	Man.	Ser.	Govt.	H/H	S/I
Plantation	X			X	X	X									X
Mining		X		X	X	X									X
Tourism			X		X	X								0	X
Manufacture	X	X		X	X	X	0			0		0	X	X	X
Banking	X	X	X	X		X	0	0	0	0	0	0	X	X	X
Metrop. (R.O.W.)	X	X	X	X	X	X	S	S	X	0	S	0	X	X	X
Peasant	S		0			X		X			S			X	0
Distrib.			0	0			S		S	S	S	S	X	X	0
Transport	0	0	0	0			S	S		X	S	S	X	X	0
Construct.	X	X	X	X	X		S	S			X	S	X	X	S
Manufacture			0			0	S	S	S	X		S	X	S	0
Services	0	0	0	0			S	S		X			X	S	0
Govt.	S	S	S	0	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S	S
Households	S	S	S	0		X	S	S	S	X	S	S	X		S
Savings/ Investment	X	X	X	X	X	X	S	S	S	S	S	S	X	S	

Notation: Cells marked X indicate relatively large transactions (i.e. payments and receipts).  
 Cells marked S indicate relatively small transactions.  
 Cells marked 0 indicate minor (insignificant) transactions.  
 Empty cells indicate no transactions.

Table 4 : Input Structures

	Oil	Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco	Food Manu- factur- ing	Other Manu- factur- ing	Trans- portation	Distri- bution	Services
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	.2080	.0048	.0139	.0324	.1312	.0054	.0172
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	.0199	-	-	.0027	-
4	.0049	.0724	.0787	.0214	.1103	.0306	.0696
5	.0081	-	.0071	.0064	-	.0323	.0281
6	.0155	.0139	.0259	.0566	.0040	-	.0026
7	.0036	.0281	.0199	.0168	.0632	.0317	.0208
8	.0005	-	.0193	.0062	-	.0101	.0188
9	.0032	.0061	.0063	.0113	.0046	.0434	.0074
10	-	.0163	.0302	-	-	.0008	-
11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	-	.0163	.1368	.0442	-	-	.0014
13	.0002	-	-	.0081	-	.0209	.0327
Sub-total	.2441	.1578	.3581	.2035	.3132	.1780	.1986
Imports	.3930	.2522	.1914	.2227	.0250	.0838	.1173
Wages & Salaries	.0686	.1681	.1195	.1276	.2627	.2127	.2146
Government	.0664	.3114	.0236	.0663	.0532	.0348	.0556
Depreciation	.0965	.0287	.0209	.0328	.1159	.0111	.0387
Surplus	.1314	.0818	.2865	.3470	.2300	.4796	.3753
Sub-total	.7559	.8422	.6419	.7965	.6868	.8220	.8014
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
Total Output (\$mm.)	800	25	50	162	63	199	107

Table 4 : Input Structures - Continued

	Con- struction	Public Utilities	Sugar Manu- factur- ing	Sugar Growing	Other Agricul- ture	Banks and Financial Institu- tions
	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	.0402	.0406	.0059	-	.0046	-
2	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	-	-	-	.0026	-
4	.1704	.0097	.0142	.0714	.0454	.0018
5	.0297	.0168	.0185	.0298	.0072	-
6	.0691	.0031	.0185	.0304	.0367	-
7	-	.0276	.0110	.0058	.0033	.0188
8	-	.0014	-	-	-	.0976
9	.0009	.0388	.0104	.0087	.0039	.0017
10	-	-	-	-	.0013	-
11	-	-	.5079	-	-	-
12	.0039	-	-	-	.0013	-
13	-	-	-	.0084	-	.0318
Sub-total	.3142	.1379	.5864	.1545	.1063	.1517
Imports	.1756	.2942	.0666	.0234	.0498	.0223
Wages and Salaries	.2984	.4927	.1372	.3998	.2393	.1246
Government	.0331	-.0205	.0356	.0433	.0138	.0902
Depreciation	.0192	.0733	.0799	.0283	.0221	.0036
Surplus	.1595	.0223	.0943	.3507	.5688	.6076
Sub-total	.6858	.8621	.4136	.8455	.8937	.8483
Total	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
Total Output (\$mn.)	114	62	46	24	78	79

Source: A.A. Francis, Inter-Industry Relations in the Economy of Trinidad and Tobago, 1962. C.S.O. Research Papers (1965).

approximately .7559. In particular the primary cost coefficient for imports is very high, being slightly over 50% of primary input as a whole. The second highest cost coefficient is 'Surplus', .1314. This figure is almost twice as high as the fourth ranking primary cost coefficient for 'Wages and Salaries'. 20/

Dependence on imports, self-reliance for inputs, relatively large profits, and relatively low wage disbursements are the characteristic features of such foreign-owned sectors.

On the distribution side of the oil sector's operations we find that for intermediate demand, "the highest distribution coefficient represents sales of 'Oil' to itself. The second ranking coefficient represents sales to 'Transport' ... The remaining coefficients are rather small." Final demand is relatively high, the highest coefficient representing 'Exports' while remaining coefficients are very low. 21/

On the whole, West Indian economies can best be described as dependent. These economies depend heavily on external trade, finance, technology and management. In terms of their internal functioning there is a characteristic gap between the structure of domestic demand and domestic resource use. 22/ This dependence has significant repercussions on the functioning of the economy and on the polity. (These matters are considered in the next chapter).

Although all the economies are characterized by dependence, the degrees of dependence vary according to the nature of the dominant sector. Accordingly, for some purposes of analysis, it might be useful to utilize a typology of these economies. Some dominant activities are more labour intensive than others. And we would expect different patterns of political and social behaviour as between plantation workers, peasants, mine workers and urban workers.

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20/ Ibid, p. 59.

21/ Ibid, p. 64.

22/ See Havelock Brewster, Economic Dependence: A Quantitative Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973.

Furthermore, the nature of economic change varies as between commodities, in accordance with differential rates of growth of demand.

For present purposes, then, we introduce the following typology as a basis for looking at economic change and its consequences in the next chapter:

PURE MINERAL EXPORT	.....	Trinidad-Tobago
PURE TOURIST	.....	Bahamas, Cayman Virgin Islands Antigua Montserrat
PURE PLANTATION	.....	St. Kitts, Belize
PEASANT (EXPORT)	.....	Dominica St. Lucia St. Vincent Grenada
MIXED ECONOMIES	.....	Jamaica Guyana Barbados

In Jamaica, the mixture is mineral, tourism, plantation and peasant. In Guyana it is mineral and plantation. And in Barbados, plantation and tourism.

Economic typologies may prove useful in explaining social change among a group of countries. For example, we would expect different types of social formations in predominantly peasant societies (like Dominica) as compared with urban-industrial societies like Trinidad. And the overall rates of growth of the economies will vary with the comparative rates of growth of the dominant economic activity. For example, during the post-war period, the overall rate of economic growth has been greatest in those economies dominated by minerals and tourism than in those dominated by agriculture.

But rates of economic growth obscure differences in patterns of income distribution associated with different economic types. For example, income is likely to be more equitably distributed in pure tourist economies than in pure mineral economies since employment creation is greater in tourism than in mineral exploitation. Again the more diversified the economic base, the more diffused would

be income opportunities. The following tabulation is suggestive of this hypothesis. It shows the percentage distribution of incomes between business and labour for a set of countries. <sup>23/</sup>

	<u>Labour</u>	<u>Business</u>
Trinidad-Tobago	39	61
Jamaica	54	46
Guyana	60	40
25 Developed countries	81 - 87	13 - 19

In the "pure mineral" economy of Trinidad-Tobago the share of labour is much less than in the "mixed" economies of Jamaica and Guyana. And that of the mixed Caribbean economies far below labour's share in the more diversified developed countries. The pure mineral economy generates much more profits relative to labour because of the characteristic highly capital-intensive nature of production. Whereas in Jamaica the less capital-intensive activities in tourism, plantation and peasant agriculture, and manufacturing counterbalance bauxite's tendency to keep down labour's share. And in Guyana plantation sugar and rice have much the same effect.

The differences between economic types have non-economic consequences as well. The structure of the labour force in terms of occupational distribution, sex and age composition, etc., is likely to vary across the types identified. For example a higher proportion of women would likely occur in pure tourist economies than in pure mineral ones. And characteristics of the labour force in turn affect social classes and political organization.

In later chapters, an attempt will be made to explore some of these differences after consideration of sociological and political typologies have been presented and considered.

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<sup>23/</sup> These data relate to business as represented by corporate firms. The data are biased by the fact that not all unincorporated firms are family enterprises so that labour is not equal to business in those cases.

C H A P T E R   I I I





## ECONOMIC CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCE

The profile of West Indian economies has been adjusted by developments in recent decades. New sectors have emerged and traditional ones have either declined in relative importance or have disappeared altogether (sugar in St. Lucia and St. Vincent are examples of the latter). Notwithstanding changing profiles, the structural properties remain basically unaltered. The economies have failed so far to develop an internal dynamic for development. External dependence has deepened everywhere and, with that, a certain pattern of backwardness has been promoted.

The general pattern is one where foreign capital management and technology are combined with particular resource sectors to generate incomes for only a small share of the labour force and sometimes revenue for the public sector. The bulk of the population become increasingly alienated from the resources of the region. And their ever increasing impoverishment leads to social changes of profound significance.

The present chapter provides a description of the nature of economic change in various sectors and an analysis of some of the social structural consequences of those changes.

### I AGRICULTURE

The dichotomy between plantations and peasants (small farmers) remains firmly entrenched everywhere. No attempts have been made to introduce programmes of land reform.

The general pattern of change shows the following main trends: increasing control of farm land by plantations at the expense of small farmers, concentration of plantation land among fewer owners; increasing capitalization of plantations; improvements in production techniques by plantations; fragmentation of land in the small farm sectors; insignificant changes in techniques of production in that sector; often a reduction in the number of

small farmers and a decline in the land farmed by them. <sup>1/</sup>

Essentially, the position of the peasantry at any point in time is directly dependent on the plantation sector. In addition, plantations have direct control over the lives of rural wage workers. Changes within the agricultural sector need therefore to be analysed in terms of the interaction between these three basic groups. Peasants are in direct competition for land with plantations but many of them work on plantations part-time and are thus in competition for wage work with the rural proletariat. The latter have few alternative economic opportunities -- government rural public works schemes offer some wage opportunities; but political party patronage is the decisive factor on who gets a share of that cake.

Plantations then must be seen as being the chief institutions affecting the relative fortunes of both peasants and rural proletariat. As the plantations increase in economic importance, this influence becomes more marked. Expanding size, increasing capitalization and the modernization of technology have adverse effects on the other two rural groups. Less land becomes available to the peasantry and less labour opportunities become available to the rural proletariat and some peasants. The process results in increasing alienation of two groups which are already on the margins of society. But the degree of alienation varies as between the two groups.

For purposes of analysis it is useful to make a distinction between the 'margin of subsistence' and 'the margin of survival'. The margin of subsistence represents levels of living (consumption) which are barely tolerable by civilized human standards but which

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<sup>1/</sup> In the main sugar producing territories, foreign corporations are dominant plantation owners. Tate & Lyle, the giant British sugar refining enterprise produces 100% of sugar output in Belize, 92% of that in Trinidad, and 60% of that in Jamaica. And in Guyana, another British corporation -- Booker McConnell Ltd -- produces 98% of national output. Together, these two enterprises account for over 90% of total West Indian sugar production.

are achieved by the individual with the resources at his command. The margin of survival represents levels which are intolerable - i.e. the individual must rely on the goodwill of others or scuffle in order to survive. <sup>2/</sup>

For the West Indies as a whole, the 'small' peasant is on the margin of subsistence. (Middle and big peasants who have sufficient land resources to be able to hire wage labour and/or to secure machine capital generally achieve decent levels of living. But these are a minority of the peasantry.) The rural proletariat are, for the most part, on the margin of survival. Over time, the position of the peasantry shifts with changes in the fortunes of the plantation sector. During periods of plantation expansion the peasantry is forced back closer to the margin of survival. The opposite shift takes place during periods of plantation contraction. The position of the rural proletariat remains static over time -- on or about the margin of survival.

#### The General Pattern of Change

Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of census and survey data showing the position of the peasantry in relation to land, and relative to plantations. The small peasant is assumed to correspond to the size group less than 5 acres; the plantation falls in the size group over 500 acres. (Exceptions to this general rule of thumb should be made for places like Barbados where a farm of over 100 acres is a plantation. But no effort is being made for that kind of refinement in the present exercise.) Table 2 shows the size group distribution of all farms, by territory.

Comparing the data in these two tables reveals the dismal position of the peasantry. Everywhere the small peasant (less than 5 acres) dominate in number but they have only a small

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<sup>2/</sup> The distinction between subsistence and survival is critical. In the West Indies many people happen to survive because of a high propensity to share by those who can afford to subsidize others. This propensity operates at the level of family and friends as well as on a broader social scale.

Table 1: Proportion of Total Number of Farms by Size Group and Territory

Year	Territory	SIZE GROUP (Acres)					Percent
		<5	5 - <25	25 - <100	100 - <500	500+	Total
-	Belize	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1961	Barbados	98.3	.8	.2	.5	.2	100
1961	British Virgin Islands	36.6	52.7	9.5	1.3	0	100
-	Guyana	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1968	Jamaica	78.6	19.4	1.6	.4	.2	100
	<u>Leeward Islands</u>						
1961	Antigua/Barbuda	91.1	7.7	.59	.4	.26	100
1961	Montserrat	92.7		6.5		.7	100
1961	St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla	94.5	3.9	.7	.5	.45	100
1963	Trinidad & Tobago*	46.5	46.8	5.3	1.1	.3	100
	<u>Windward Islands</u>						
1961	Grenada	89.7	8.8	.9	.5	.1	100
1961	Dominica	75.2	21.5	2.3	.8	.3	100
1961	St. Lucia	82.5	14.9	1.9	.6	.2	100
1961	St. Vincent	89.0	10.1	.6	.2	.1	100

\*Provisional estimates for holdings of 1 acre and over (excluding land owned by Government).

Table 2: Proportion of Total Area in Farms by Size Group and Territory

Year	Territory	SIZE GROUP (Acres)						Percent
		<5	5 - <25	25 - <100	100 - <500	500*	Total	
-	Belize	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1961	Barbados	13.4	2.4	2.5	50.4	31.5	100	
1961	British Virgin Islands	5.7	43.7	34.2	16.4	-	100	
-	Guyana	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1968	Jamaica	14.9	22.1	8.3	9.9	44.9	100	
	<u>Leeward Islands</u>							
1961	Antigua/Barbuda	26.7	9.7	4.4	17.1	42.2	100	
	Montserrat	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
1961	St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla	15.0	5.2	4.3	18.9	56.6	100	
1963	Trinidad & Tobago*	6.9	30.7	15.1	16.2	31.1	100	
	<u>Windward Islands</u>							
1961	Grenada	23.9	19.7	10.3	31.1	15.0	100	
1961	Dominica	13.2	21.0	12.2	21.3	32.2	100	
1961	St. Lucia	18.0	19.6	1.2	17.9	33.8	100	
1961	St. Vincent	27.0	24.5	7.69	16.0	24.2	100	

\*Provisional Estimates for holdings of 1 acre and over (excluding land owned by Government).

proportion of the farm land. On the other hand, plantations (over 500 acres) are few in number but they have a large proportion of farm land. Barbados is perhaps the extreme case. There, small peasants are 98 per cent of all farmers and they exist on 13 per cent of all farm land; while the plantations (over 100 acres) are less than one per cent of all farmers with 82 per cent of all farm land. These tables clearly reveal the existing land alienation of the peasantry throughout the region.

It was suggested earlier that alienation of the peasantry has been increasing as a result of the incursion of monopoly capital. Table 3 provides some evidence of this for Jamaica. There we see that the number of small peasants and the acreage farmed by them increased between 1943 and 1961; but average farm size remained virtually unchanged. Over the same period, the number of plantations declined drastically; acreage farmed also declined but not to the same degree; so that average farm size increased appreciably. It is important to note that the total area in farms declined, at about one-half the rate of decline in plantation land.

Now these trends tell a story. Non-agrarian capitalism (mining and tourism) came on the scene in Jamaica during the period covered by the data. As well, the revolt of 1938 (to be discussed later) resulted in intensified government policy to provide land for the peasantry -- through "land settlement" schemes. Additionally the population of Jamaica increased from 1.3 million in 1943 to the present two millions.

The decline in total farm land shown in Table 3 is chiefly a result of mining developments. Metropolitan (U.S.A. and Canada) bauxite companies purchased considerable areas of land. And a good share of this was former plantation land -- particularly in St. Ann, traditionally a plantation ('pen-keeper' -- i.e. livestock ranch) parish. Nevertheless, the average size of plantation increased as the remaining plantation land became more concentrated among fewer plantations. The marked increase in small-peasant acreage between 1943 and 1968 is directly attributable to the government land settlement scheme. Government purchased several derelict plantations and

Table 3 : Peasant and Plantation Land and Labour, Jamaica, 1943-1968 (\*)

Years	1961			1968			
	Total	Small Peasants	Plantations	Total	Small Peasants	Plantations	Total
1943-1950	149,142	113,239	350	158,938	149,703	295	190,582
1951-1960	1,836,668	201,093	774,000	1,706,561	223,818	676,426	1,508,000
1961	-	1.8	2,210	-	1.5	2,340	-
1962-1968	44	84	17	42			

Small peasants refer to farm size group of less than 5 acres. Large peasants refer to farm size group of more than 500 acres. The 'total' columns refer to all farm size groups not shown in Table (i.e. farms of 5 - 500 acres).

sub-divided them for sale to peasants. The decline in plantation acreage, then, is partly a result of the invasion of non-agrarian capitalism, and partly a result of peasant substitution.

Although peasant acreage increased, the average size of peasant holdings remained static. In short the rate of growth of peasant farmers kept pace with the rate of growth of land operated by them. This is a crude indication that the economic position of the peasantry has remained virtually unchanged since 1943. <sup>3/</sup> If we assume that average household size of small peasants is five, then in 1968, the 150,000 small farms provided subsistence for 750,000 people on 15 per cent of Jamaica's farm land. While 350 plantation owners luxuriated on 45 per cent of all farm land.

Back in 1943, 530 plantation owners earned profits from 60 per cent of all farm land. As well, they benefited from capital gains on land values since that time. Census data reveal that productivity of plantation farm land tripled between 1943 and 1961. It is clear then that the economic position of plantation owners has improved appreciably, in both absolute and relative terms.

To return to the general West Indian situation, and the special case of the sugar plantation, we find an interesting interplay between plantations and some of the peasantry -- i.e. those engaged in cane farming. In that game, plantations win again; peasants lose. During the plantation labour crisis following Emancipation, and after numerous efforts to solve that crisis, plantation owners finally resolved to encourage peasant production of cane to provide the necessary throughput for their factories. This is the genesis of peasant cane farming in the West Indies. It began toward the end of the 19th century and today cane farmers (many of whom are peasants) produce one-half of sugar cane output in Jamaica and significant

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<sup>3/</sup> This inference is reasonable unless it can be demonstrated that land productivity on small farms improved substantially and that the terms of trade have shifted in favour of the peasant. Census data indicate a decline in land productivity. In any case it is clear that the position of the peasantry relative to the plantation has worsened over the period.



shares of output in Trinidad and Belize. (Ironically, the Guyana government is now encouraging peasant cane farming which never existed there before.)

Howard Johnson has analysed the origins of cane farming in Trinidad. He demonstrates the importance of the planter class to its development. Planters around the turn of the 20th century often provided land, as well as advancing capital and sometimes even supplied labour, to the cane farmers. Their encouragement of cane farming is explained by the fact that they anticipated certain benefits from its establishment ... Low prices emphasized the need for more economical sugar production. However the savings effected were mainly in the manufacturing process.<sup>4/</sup> Cane Farming involves more risk than processing. Furthermore, since factory owners are in a monopsonistic position they can determine the price paid to farmers growing cane. From the beginning, until now, the price was set at a disadvantage to cane farmers. Johnson concludes that "the cane farmer was plagued with three major problems -- lack of capital, inadequate transport facilities and an unsatisfactory cane-price formula. These difficulties have persisted up to the present" (p.73). The cane farmer is, in essence, a plantation worker who works for the plantation on his own land. His fortunes are bound up directly with those of the plantation.

The rural proletariat suffers a greater degree of alienation than the peasantry. Plantation strategy since Emancipation is to create a labour surplus in each economy. This was engineered by importing labour (under indenture) and by land monopoly. A more recent strategy is mechanization -- the substitution of capital for labour as the labour force became unionized subsequent to the revolts of the 1930's. According to Table 3, plantations in Jamaica maintained the same rate of employment per 100 acres of cultivated acreage; the number of workers employed increased from about 27,000

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<sup>4/</sup> Howard Johnson 'The Origins and Early Development of Cane Farming in Trinidad, 1882 - 1906', The Journal of Caribbean History, 5 (1972), 59.

in 1943 to about 32,000 in 1961, -- nearly 20 per cent. Meanwhile output per man working on plantations rose about 64 per cent over the same period. The real wage of plantation workers has remained virtually static.

In Jamaica, cultivated acreage on plantations actually increased during this period (from 160,000 acres to 191,000 acres). It will be recalled that total plantation farm land decreased. Improvements in technology -- both mechanical (labour saving) and biological-chemical (land saving) explain the sharp rise in productivity, per man and per acre. But the plantation worker has gained nothing from these improvements.

It is important to note that most of these improvements resulted from public sector investments, and that the industry is subsidized by governments throughout the region. The technological improvements have served to aggravate the unemployment situation. Machine capital displaces labour directly. So too does chemical technology which replaces workers with weedicides.

West Indian economies are all labour-surplus economies. Carmen McFarlane provides the following estimates for 1960 of open "long term unemployment". <sup>5/</sup>

	<u>Per cent of Labour Force</u>		<u>Per cent of Labour Force</u>
Jamaica	23.4	Grenada	22.3
Trinidad-Tobago	15.6	St. Vincent	22.8
Barbados	19.5	Dominica	16.1
St. Lucia	17.5	Others	n.a.

In such situations monopsonistic buyers of labour services, as plantations are in specific localities, do not need to pay wages higher than survival levels. The more so where plantations and other

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<sup>5/</sup> Carmen McFarlane, The Employment Situation in Overpopulated Territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean (ed Jack Harewood, St. Augustine, Trinidad, 1970).

capitalist monopolize land (thus restricting labour from own - account production) and where there are limited job opportunities available elsewhere.

The rural proletariat earns income working on the plantation, on the wharves shipping plantation products, and in other plantation related activities; they work as well with middle and big peasants, with other small capitalist, and with government and the petty bourgeoisie (service activity). The plantation worker suffers the most. Income is seasonal; and out-of-crop the worker lives off credit in order to survive. Crop-time work pays back this credit in good years; and it may not during bad years. The margin of survival is most pronounced among this category of worker. But all rural workers are pushed on to the margin of survival when there is depression in the plantation sector. For it is in that sector that economic action begins to multiply and to decelerate. Many small peasants are wage workers on plantations. They suffer as both peasant and proletariat.

## II MINERALS, MANUFACTURING AND TOURISM

Traditionally foreign investment was the basis for mineral exploitation in the region -- oil in Trinidad from early in the century and bauxite in Guyana beginning about 1917. This pattern extended into the postwar period with the development of new activities, mining (bauxite in Jamaica); branch-plant manufacturing (chiefly Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Guyana; and tourism in Cayman, Bahamas, Antigua, Montserrat, Virgin Islands and Barbados). The tremendous growth of foreign investment in these new activities deepened the dependent nature of West Indian economies.

### Mineral Exploitation

The characteristic feature of mineral exploitation is that it is highly capital-intensive; thereby creating few jobs and large profits. Furthermore it is usually land extensive as rival companies seek to control as much of the resource as possible in order to maintain and improve their competitive position in the

international industry. Mineral firms are part of multinational corporate enterprises with which they develop linkages; accordingly few linkages are made within the economy where minerals are being exploited.

The chief contribution to these economies are by way of payments of taxes to government, wages to the small group of workers employed, and substantial payments for construction during capacity expansion. Accordingly, changes of significance occur when governments increase revenues by direct participation and/or increased taxation. When the industry is expanding capacity; and when changes in production technology affect the number of workers employed. Examples of these types of change occurred in different parts of the region in recent decades.

In the area of government intervention, the most significant event was the nationalization of DEMBA <sup>6/</sup> by the Guyana government in 1971. The act of taking over ownership and control of the larger bauxite producer placed at the disposal of the Guyana public sector all the surplus which previously accrued to the foreign owners. Government is therefore able to utilize this surplus for national development. In this connection, plans have been announced for achieving the objective of providing basic necessities for all Guyanese people by 1980. The basic structure of the industry otherwise has remained unchanged. A managerial elite, high wage work force, and segregated housing and recreational patterns continue. But on the basis of occupational status, instead of race and colour, as under previous foreign ownership. Efforts are being made to integrate bauxite more with other sectors of the economy. For example, the use of local starches as flocculents is being actively considered; that would provide linkages with agriculture.

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<sup>6/</sup> Demerara Bauxite Company was a subsidiary of ALCAN prior to nationalization. It is now GUYBAU (The Guyana Bauxite Corporation). At time of writing Government announced nationalization of the other bauxite company - Reynolds.

Another act of government participation occurred in Trinidad where that government purchased shares in the oil industry. Increased taxation measures were also introduced recently (1974) in Jamaica on all bauxite-alumina producers there and in Guyana on Reynolds Limited (the other bauxite producer). These tax increases have been substantial. They provide governments with increased revenues and widen the financial scope for transforming these economies.

Capacity expansion has been most marked in the Jamaica bauxite industry which began around 1950 and mushroomed that country to the world's leading exporter of bauxite by the late 1960's. Capacity expansion creates jobs in construction, transportation, and involves substantial local purchases. But this is a jerky process which creates temporary effects. In Jamaica the "main" phase of investment were as follows:

- (i) 1950-1953: establishment of initial capacity by Kaiser, Reynolds and Alcan
- (ii) 1954-1955: lull
- (iii) 1956-1958: expansion of capacity of Kaiser, Reynolds and Alcan
- (iv) 1959-1962: lull
- (v) 1963 : completion of capacity by Alcoa
- (vi) 1964-1965: lull
- (vii) 1966-1969: expansion of capacity by Kaiser, Reynolds and Alcan and establishment of Alpart alumina plant. <sup>7/</sup>

One of the problems posed by such jerky patterns of capacity expansion is that on completion of these projects, "large-scale unemployment of skilled workers and spare capacity in the building industry usually result." <sup>8/</sup> On one project, for example, 5,000 workers were employed at the height of construction of a plant which would use a permanent work force of about 1,000.

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<sup>7/</sup> Norman Girvan Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica, 1972) pp 51-52.

<sup>8/</sup> Ibid, p.52.

There is a major adverse aspect of the growth of bauxite-alumina production in Jamaica which must be considered along with the discussion of capacity expansion. That is the large-scale land alienation associated with the process. Companies were allowed to secure freehold ownership of land. And in the scramble to control resources, land speculation and the loss of control of vast acreages resulted. The adverse effects on agriculture and on domestic food supplies have been severely marked. <sup>9/</sup>

Changing production technology has been most dramatic in the Trinidad petroleum industry. Modernization of the industry involved more capital intensive techniques of production and retrenchment of workers occurs from year to year in recent times. <sup>10/</sup>

#### Manufacturing

Official policy in the West Indies during the postwar period has been to encourage industrialization by providing incentives which would attract foreign investors to come and establish manufacturing plants. These incentives involved tax-free holidays, duty free imports of raw materials, accelerated depreciation allowances, etc. Two types of manufacturing industries were aimed at: import-substitution, and export-promotion. These programmes have provided the major basis for expansion of manufacturing in Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Guyana.

Although a substantial number of industries have been attracted, their overall impact on income and employment creation has not been substantial. According to Jefferson: <sup>11/</sup>

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<sup>9/</sup> See discussion in preceding chapter.

<sup>10/</sup> R.D. Thomas, The Adjustment of Displaced Workers in a Labour Surplus Economy (Kingston 1973).

<sup>11/</sup> Owen C. Jefferson, External Dependence and Economic Development -- A Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective (U.W.I. Dept. of Economics, mimeo, 1972) pp. 6-7.

Imports of raw materials, fuels, intermediate and capital goods, together with repatriation of profits etc. add up to a substantial proportion of the import-substitution sectors ... It has been estimated that only about 25 per cent of the output of firms producing under incentives in the manufacturing sector accrues as national income to the Jamaican economy. Furthermore, only about 13,000 direct jobs were created by these industries over a 12 year period in a situation where the labour force is growing by at least 20,000 annually. The situation in Trinidad is not markedly different.

And the export-promotion industries did not perform much better because of problems of marketing finished goods in the markets of industrial countries.

Undoubtedly, the industrialization programme has attracted several manufacturing firms to establish plants. And in the process urban employment has been created, leading to the emergence of a new factory class involving chiefly women in areas like textiles, cigarettes, etc. The question still remains as to whether the benefits of the programme outweigh the costs. For example, governments subsidy has been heavy -- investment in infrastructure and revenues foregone (both income and import duties).

### Tourism

The growth of the tourist industry was also stimulated by government incentives. Foreign investment has virtually transformed certain island economies where previously tourism was non-existent into pure tourist economies within the past decade or so. Cayman and Montserrat are two cases in point. Where an industry existed before, as in Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbados, capacity expansion has been rapid over the past two decades. It has been estimated that tourism now generates 66% of national income in Bahamas, 13% in Barbados and 6% in Jamaica. 11a/

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11a/ O.C. Jefferson, Ibid p.9.

The tourist industry, like mining and branch-plant manufacturing, characteristically has few linkages with the rest of the economy. The import content varies between 40 and 60 per cent; and profits are leaked from the economy to foreign investors. However, tourism generates substantial employment relative to other forms of foreign investment. The seasonal nature of employment bears features of the sugar plantation.

Expansion of capacity generates considerable employment during construction of new hotels. But, as in mineral exploitation, the pattern is jerky and presents adjustment problems for the building industry and skilled labour in that sector. The chief problem arising from capacity expansion is land alienation and land speculation. In the process, tourism retards the chances for agricultural development. Especially in the smaller islands "acreages formerly or presently under cultivation appear to be passing into foreign hands for development as retiree housing estates and recreational facilities such as golf courses." <sup>12/</sup>

In addition to competition with agriculture for land, tourism also "intensifies the existing bias against agricultural production by contributing both to the raising of the reserve price of labour and the inflation of land prices in some areas". <sup>13/</sup>

Other problems associated with the growth of tourism of the type promoted in the West Indies are the dependence on a narrow market and the demonstration effect on local tastes. North America (USA and Canada) accounts for 80 per cent or more of tourist arrivals. Depressions in that region are transmitted immediately and lead to unemployment and spare capacity in the industry. The luxury-type tourist industry generates a demonstration effect on residents who are thereby influenced in their consumption expectations towards imported luxuries in economies that can ill afford them.

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<sup>12/</sup> Beverly Watson, Supplementary Notes on Foreign Investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean (I. SER Working Paper No. 1, U.W.I., Kingston 1974) p.5.

<sup>13/</sup> O.C. Jefferson, op cit, p. 10.



### III CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE -- AN OVERVIEW

The general changes in different economic sectors discussed above have profound effects on different groups of population, on the social structure, on the economy as a whole, and on the politics of change. Some of these effects are described in this section but more detailed discussion must await exploration of the non-economic parameters of change in the next few chapters.

Perhaps the greatest pressure has been felt by the peasantry. Pressure from plantations, from mining, and from tourism -- all competing with the poor peasant for the limited land base of the island economies. Naturally, the peasant fared worst in this competition. His position is further aggravated by increasing population. The general trend has been one of increasing peasant population, via natural increase, on a declining land base.

Peasants managed to maintain an equilibrium over the period only where competition was not intense and where new income opportunities arose. Some of the Windward Islands are cases in point. There, with no mining anywhere and little tourism in Dominica and St. Vincent, with the demise of the sugar plantations in St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada, and with bananas emerging as a new cash crop, the peasantry managed to consolidate itself. Thus the Windwards remain predominantly peasant economies.

The relative decline of the peasantry in the region as a whole has had far-reaching effects. Peasants are the main source of domestic food supplies. And the relatively slow growth of food output associated with the demise of the peasantry has contributed to increased food imports and rising food prices throughout the region. The problem has been further aggravated in recent years with the world shortage of food and animal feeds. Food prices throughout have risen faster than any other set of prices in consumer price indices. The resulting inflationary situation has had serious repercussions, both social and economic. On the whole, the real income of working class people remained static or declined. Food shortages were so acute in some countries recently that systems of

rationing, hoarding and black markets developed. <sup>14/</sup>

Food shortages also have serious effects on the nutritional status of large groups of people. The region is already characterized by serious nutritional imbalances for certain groups. Malnutrition is common among infants, especially pre-schoolers. One recent survey in Jamaica, for example, indicated that "Below 1 year of age over 90 per cent of infants received less than the calorie intake recommended by FAO, and over 80 per cent received less than the recommended protein intake." <sup>15/</sup> More general evidence shows that severe infantile malnutrition is common in hospitals; that there is a high death rate in children under four years; that school children are under-weight and small for their age; and that low intakes of protein and calories are common among children and low income groups of adults. <sup>16/</sup>

The deteriorating economic situation of peasants and rural proletariat was instrumental in promoting rapid rates of rural-urban migration and of external migration throughout the region. <sup>17/</sup> Peasants contributed significantly to the massive wave of external migration during the 1950's. Sale of land provided the wherewithal to go abroad. The economic circumstances of the rural proletariat prevented external migration so they contributed chiefly to the wave of migrations to towns and cities. But the pace of urban industrial advance was not sufficient to accommodate them and many lacked the skills in any case. And so the growth of urban slums, of petty thefts, of prostitution and other urban social ills are associated with that change.

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<sup>14/</sup> During 1974 there were numerous occasions when housewives battled in supermarkets in Jamaica in order to secure some of the available supplies of basic food staples.

<sup>15/</sup> J.C. Waterlow, Observations on Nutritional Conditions in Jamaica (mimeo, CFNI, U.W.I. 1973).

<sup>16/</sup> Ibid, p. 102.

<sup>17/</sup> The evidence on this and more extended discussion of the phenomenon is presented in a later chapter on "Demographic Change and Consequence" (see Chapter IV).

Changes in the economic circumstances of the peasant reverberate on other sectors. The marketing of peasant output is carried on by higglers. <sup>18/</sup> And peasants buy consumer goods and farm inputs from shopkeepers. Furthermore, there is a substantial transportation network in the movement of produce.

Overall, the new modernizing sectors of West Indian economy advanced at the expense of peasants and consumers. The main beneficiaries are those who managed to secure relatively high wage employment.

Mining creates a virtual 'aristocracy of labour'. In addition to high wages, labour in that sector is well organized and manages to secure benefits (including wage increases) because labour costs are such a small share of total costs. But over time, labour displacement occurs as technology changes. <sup>19/</sup> Mining developments have also created company towns where segregated housing is typical. In some cases, segregated schools etc., exist as foreign companies feel obliged to provide foreign personnel with schools for their children. Jamaica is a case in point. <sup>20/</sup> White expatriate personnel enjoy positions of privilege in these localities and in the wider society. Race and colour stratification create social tensions and instability.

The public sector gained from mining developments. Increased revenues facilitated the expansion of the bureaucracy which has come to occupy a prominent position in most of these economies. The size of the public sector does not however reflect its capacity to influence change, as later discussion indicates.

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<sup>18/</sup> Referred to in some places as hucksters, etc. These are usually women who purchase from farmers and retail to consumers in a network of public markets.

<sup>19/</sup> According to R.D. Thomas, there is at present inadequate provision for displaced workers in the Trinidad petroleum industry. See Thomas, op. cit.

<sup>20/</sup> A mining company town in Jamaica is described by nationals as Johannesburg, indicating that the nature of housing and living conditions resemble those of the apartheid system of South Africa.

The main impact of manufacturing has been its influence on female participation rates. Light manufacturing activity opened up job opportunities for women, thus adjusting the profile of the urban working class. The share of skilled labour in the work force also increased as manufacturing developed. The 'blue collar' worker is now an important element in the occupational structure of the four more developed countries of the region -- particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago.

Tourism carries with it the good and the bad. The net contribution to foreign exchange is more often than not positive. And employment is created, for both males and females. However, the type of advertisements used by publicity agents encourage visitors to expect a kind of subservience which West Indians are no longer (if ever) willing to accept. The fact that visitors are white and that West Indians serving them are black accentuates the problem. As well, tourism is associated with certain social vices like homosexuality, prostitution, and gambling. And the demonstration effect of 'visitors' patterns of expenditure adjust the tastes of West Indians more and more toward imported consumer goods.

Overall, the new activities (mining, tourism and manufacturing) have affected the social structure by accentuating race, by adjusting the occupational composition of the labour force, by changing the rural urban composition of the population, and so on. Further discussion of these will be presented in later chapters.

On the political economy of change, it is to be noted that the main economic changes reinforced the already dependent nature of West Indian economy, long associated with plantation agriculture. With foreign ownership, with activities that have few internal linkages, and with a legacy of taste for imports, these economies are characterized by the phenomenon of producing what they do not consume and of consuming what they do not produce. To put it more elegantly, there is a marked and widening gap between the structure

of domestic demand and a structure of domestic resource use. <sup>21/</sup>  
This creates a situation of both functional and structural dependence.


Brewster's statistical analysis of the interrelationship between a number of functional variables for the Trinidad economy found no significant correlation between the manipulable variables of the economic system. When there is no correlation between wages, prices, exports and employment in an export economy it is impossible for government to plan. And he concludes that if governments are unable to plan they must appear to do so. Consequently, resort is made to symbolism, whereby symbols are created to give the impression that governments are planning. Such symbolism involves the proliferation of planning type agencies (e.g. Development Banks, Marketing Boards, Industrial Development Corporations) which expand the bureaucracy even further; but which have no real effect in transforming these economies from a condition of dependent underdevelopment.

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<sup>21/</sup> Havelock Brewster, Economic Dependence -- A Quantitative Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973.



CHAPTER IV





DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCE

This chapter considers the growth of population and the components of that growth; changes in the labour force in terms of its quantity and quality; and the question of race and class in the contemporary situation.

Emigration and Change <sup>1/</sup>

Given the patterns of economic change described earlier, it is hardly surprising that emigration has been a dominant feature of population change. The past few decades witnessed sharp declines in mortality and protracted high levels of fertility. But migration drastically dampened the picture. The largest wave of emigration began in the early 1950's. This movement to the United Kingdom was terminated with the British government's legislation of 1962 (the Commonwealth Immigrants Act). Subsequently, the movement was to Canada and the United States but this movement was more selective in terms of skills. It constituted a 'brain drain' which critically affected certain sectors in the West Indies. For example, health services were affected by migration of nurses and doctors.

The pattern of population change is shown by the data in Tables 1 and 2. Total population of the region rose from 2.7 millions in 1943 to 4.3 millions in 1970. Average annual increase of population for all 14 countries in that decade amounted to 56,000; Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana account for most (87%) of the increase. During the first intercensal period (1943-1960) annual rates of population growth were highest for mainland Belize and Guyana, over 3%. Trinidad also ranks high with 2.9%. Jamaica shows a moderate 1.6% while population declined in Montserrat (1.1%) and Turks & Caicos Islands (0.4%).

Emigration played an important part in these changes. Apart from Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Belize, emigration is a high

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<sup>1/</sup> Data in this section are derived from G.W. Roberts, 'Working Force of the Commonwealth Caribbean at 1970 -- A Provisional Assessment' (U.W.I., Dept. of Sociology, mimeo, 1974).

Table 1 : Population Movements in Commonwealth Caribbean Countries 1943-6 to 1970

Country	Census Population*			Average annual intercensal increase		Average annual (a) natural increase		Average annual (b) net emigration		(b) as % (a)	
				1943-6	1960	1943-6	1960	1943-6	1960	1943-6	1960
	1943 or 1946	1960	1970	to 1960	to 1970	to 1960	to 1970	to 1960	to 1970	6 to 1960	to 1970
Jamaica	1,237,000	1,609,800	1,848,500	21,900	23,870	32,890	53,520	10,990	29,650	33.4	55.4
Trinidad & Tobago	558,000	828,000	940,700	19,290	11,270	18,680	24,050	- 610	12,780	-3.3	53.1
Guyana	369,700	560,400	701,900	13,620	14,150	13,350	19,450	- 270	5,300	-2.0	27.2
Barbados	192,800	232,300	237,700	2,820	540	4,170	4,260	1,350	3,720	32.4	87.3
Belize	59,200	90,100	120,900	2,210	3,080	2,230	3,830	20	750	0.9	19.6
St. Lucia	70,100	86,100	100,900	1,140	1,480	2,020	3,100	880	1,620	43.6	52.3
Grenada	72,400	88,700	93,900	1,160	520	2,280	2,370	1,120	1,850	49.1	78.1
St. Vincent	61,600	79,900	87,300	1,310	740	2,130	2,750	820	2,010	38.3	73.1
Dominica	47,600	59,900	70,500	880	1,060	1,320	1,260	440	960	33.3	76.2
St. Kitts-Nevis	41,200	50,900	45,600	690	- 530	1,320	1,260	630	1,790	47.7	142.1
Montserrat	14,300	12,200	11,700	- 150	- 50	230	210	380	260	165.2	123.8
Cayman Islands	6,700	7,600	10,500	60	290	140	220	80	- 70	57.1	-31.8
British Virgin Is.	6,500	7,900	9,800	100	190	200	200	100	10	50.0	5.0
Turks & Caicos	6,100	5,700	5,600	- 30	- 10	130	140	160	150	123.1	107.1
TOTAL	2,743,200	3,719,500	4,285,500	65,000	56,580	81,090	117,380	16,090	60,780	19.8	51.8

\* The Censuses of Jamaica, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos were taken in 1943. For all other countries the Census year was 1946.

Source: G.W. Roberts, Ibid.

Table 2 : Intercensal Rates of Increase and Vital Rates 1943-6 to 1970

Country	Average annual rates of growth %		Average annual birth rates		Average annual death rates		Average annual rates of natural increase	
	1943-6 to 1960	1960 to 1970	1943-6 to 1960	1960 to 1970	1943-6 to 1960	1960 to 1970	1943-6 to 1960	1960 to 1970
Jamaica	1.56	1.39	34.5	39.1	11.6	8.2	22.9	30.9
Trinidad & Tobago	2.86	1.28	37.4	35.0	10.7	7.8	26.7	27.2
Guyana	3.01	2.28	41.0	38.5	12.0	7.7	28.9	30.8
Barbados	1.24	0.23	32.6	27.0	13.0	8.9	19.6	18.1
Belize	3.05	2.98	40.5	43.5	10.9	7.2	29.6	36.3
St. Lucia	1.48	1.60	40.8	43.4	15.2	10.3	25.6	33.1
Grenada	1.46	0.57	41.5	35.4	13.4	9.4	28.1	26.0
St. Vincent	1.88	0.89	44.8	43.9	14.9	11.0	29.9	32.9
Dominica	1.66	1.64	40.8	41.4	16.3	10.4	24.5	31.0
St. Kitts-Nevis	1.52	-1.09	39.0	37.7	13.5	11.6	25.5	26.1
Montserrat	-1.13	-0.42	31.2	28.5	13.6	10.9	17.6	17.6
Cayman Islands	0.74	3.29	33.6	29.8	9.4	5.5	24.1	24.3
Br. Virgin Is.	1.40	2.18	40.1	29.4	11.9	6.8	28.2	22.6
Turks & Caicos	-0.40	-0.18	39.0	35.4	16.1	10.6	22.8	24.8

Source: Ibid.

percentage of natural increase -- in excess of 33% in all cases, and rising to 123% for Turks and Caicos and 165% for Montserrat. For the region as a whole emigration was 20% of total natural increase.

Between 1960 and 1970 emigration again is a dominant factor. For the region as a whole net emigration is 52% of natural increase. And in St. Kitts (142%) Montserrat (124%) and Turks and Caicos (107%) emigration exceeded natural increase leading to declines in population. In four countries, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, and Dominica net emigration was between 70 and 90 per cent of natural increase. And in three countries -- Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago and St. Lucia net emigration was just over a half of natural increase. "The estimated loss by the entire region of 1.12 million during the ten years following 1960 is equivalent to nearly one-third of its population at 1960, which shows the extent to which rates of growth have been curbed as a result of the prevailing rates of emigration." <sup>2/</sup>

Emigration not only affected rates of change in population but its composition as well. According to Roberts:

It is clear that the movements have been strongly age selective, affecting for the most part persons within the age range 20 - 34 .... that postwar outflows have involved smaller proportions for males (relative to earlier periods) .... the major effects of which have been to curb the growth rates of populations and of the expansion of working populations and of women of child-bearing span. <sup>3/</sup>

That emigration affected females more than males in the age range 15 - 44 reduced the number of women of child-bearing span than would otherwise be the case. And the age selectiveness of emigration materially affected the growth of the labour force. Indeed, as will soon be observed, a decrease in the labour force was the result.

Emigration has other important effects as well. It accounts for the growing importance of remittances from abroad, contributes to the brain drain; and affects ideas about change. Migrants remit funds from abroad to support relatives still at home, and to save

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<sup>2/</sup> G.W. Roberts, Ibid, p.6.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid, p.8.

and/or invest. In some of the smaller territories, remittances represent the only substantial inflows of capital from abroad. Even in some larger territories, annual remittances represent a significant share of inflows. Data for Jamaica, for example, indicate that in several years remittances exceed inflows of private investment capital. The importance of remittances for a large country like Jamaica can be judged from the effects on the balance of payments.

The positive balance in respect of transfer payments has been an important factor in moderating the extent of the deficit on current account. Net receipts from private transfer payments increased steadily from the mid-fifties to a peak of J\$16.2 million in 1963. The key factor in this regard was the growth in remittances from migrants. <sup>4/</sup>

The \$16.2 million recorded in 1963 is to be compared with a net inflow of \$19 million private capital in a year when investment in bauxite expansion was heavy. <sup>5/</sup>

Apart from balance of payments considerations, remittances represent a major explanatory factor in the survival capacity of the major dispossessed groups of West Indian populations over the past few decades. The persistent high levels of unemployment and generally low levels of income of those employed could not be sustained by the internal propensity to share (noted earlier). It is clear that remittances contribute a certain measure of stability to the unstable socio-economic conditions of these societies.

Migration of skilled persons in the second wave of movement to the USA and Canada during the 1960's has serious repercussions on West Indian economies. The significance of this aspect is highlighted by the following evidence for Jamaica. Table 3 provides some data on the skill structure of migration between 1966 and 1968. 'Service, sports and recreation workers' comprised the bulk of

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<sup>4/</sup> Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica (Kingston, 1972) p.211.

<sup>5/</sup> With completion of ALCOA's project. See preceding chapter.

workers, about one half. The other half chiefly consists of 'professional and technical', 'clerical', and 'craftsmen, production process workers'. These three categories represent critical elements in the labour needs of any modern economy.

Concentrating on 'professional and technical' category alone, Girling has observed that whereas 1 out of every 25 members of the Jamaican labour force are in this category, 1 out of every 6 emigrants were. He estimates that it costed Jamaica some J\$9 million to produce these trained emigrants; and that income foregone as a result of the loss of these persons is about 1 per cent of the total GNP. <sup>6/</sup>

Finally, emigration affects the social system by its impact on the leadership profile, the seepage of outside cultural influences, and the ideas for change developed abroad by returning migrants. It can reasonably be argued that potential leadership for change is not likely to be found among emigrees because leaders tend to remain on the battlefield. But the political history of the West Indies indicates that most of the present and past leaders spent some time overseas in one capacity or another. Analysts have associated the movement toward political independence with the return home of many figures -- Garvey and Cipriani, for example. How important recent migrations will be in shaping the future policy is difficult to assess.

What is certain is that the exposure of migrants to metropolitan culture has a distinct demonstration effect on ideas for change and on tastes. The experience of black people living in white metropolitan society certainly facilitated the transmission of Black Power ideology from North America to the Caribbean during the 1960's; and returning migrants display consumption patterns which influence the consumption aspirations of others in the society.

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<sup>6/</sup> R.K. Girling, The Migration of Human Capital from the Third World; The Implications and some data on the Jamaican Case, Social and Economic Studies, March 1974, pp. 92-94.

Table 3 : JAMAICA HUMAN CAPITAL MIGRATION (Girling)

Year	1966		1967				1968			
	U.K.	Total	U.S.	Canada	U.K.	Total	U.S.	Canada	U.S.	Total
			1,357	403			1,777	291		
			110	37			150	15		
			686	555			1,347	407		
			83	49			146	39		
			501	528			1,117	499		
			66	144			111	26		
			4,152	575			7,798	453		
			694	106			1,078	54		
10	237		7,649	2,397	235	10,281	13,524	1,784	164	15,472
17	6,622		2,834	1,962	7,872	11,768	3,946	1,102	4,476	9,524
07	6,859	11,009	10,483	3,459	8,107	22,049	17,470	2,886	4,640	24,996

MIGRATION TO U.S. AND CANADA - 1967-1968

	1967		1968	
	Total	% of Workers	Total	% of Workers
Workers	1,760	17.5	2,068	13.5
	147	1.5	65	1.1
	1,241	12.4	1,754	11.5
	132	1.3	185	1.2
	1,029	10.2	1,616	10.6
	210	2.1	137	0.9
	4,727	47.1	8,251	53.9
	800	8.0	1,132	7.4
	10,046		15,308	

K. Girling "Migration of 'Human Capital' - Jamaican Experience"  
Social and Economic Studies, March 1974, p. 93.

Effects on the Working Force

Emigration was instrumental in adjustments in the size and composition of the working force. Table 4 presents data on the working force for 1960 and 1970. Substantial reductions in the work force are indicated, especially for females. Only Belize and the Virgin Islands show any increase in the total working force. The Virgin Islands are a transit stop for prospective migrants to the U.S. Virgin Islands so that represents a special case. For the region as a whole, the total working force declined by 12% between 1960 and 1970. Whereas, the male component declined by 7% the female component declined by 22%.

Roberts has provided estimates which isolate the effect of net emigration on changes in the male component of the working force. The following tabulation shows these estimates. <sup>7/</sup>

<u>Male Working force, 1960</u>	846,000
Decrements (1960-70) due to	
Net emigration	280,000
Mortality	58,000
Retirement	<u>73,000</u>
Total Decrements	411,000
Total Accessions (1960-70)	350,000
<u>Male Working force, 1970</u>	785,000

It will be seen from these data that net emigration represents 80 per cent of total accessions to the male working force over the decade.

Internal Migration

The rural to urban drift of population is yet another manifestation of the effects of economic change over the past few decades. Those from the rural sector who could not afford to go abroad drifted to the towns, as rural dispossession increased. Data

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<sup>7/</sup> G.W. Roberts, op cit, p. 12.



Table 4 : Changes in Size of Male and Female Working Force for  
14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1960 and 1970

Country	Male			Female			Both Sexes		
	1960	1970	% Change	1960	1970	% Change	1960	1970	% Change
Jamaica	381,700	332,100	-13.0	225,200	159,900	-29.0	606,900	492,000	-18.9
Trinidad & Tobago	192,700	172,500	-10.5	68,400	57,200	-16.4	261,100	229,700	-12.0
Guyana	124,500	128,900	+ 3.5	36,700	30,100	-18.0	161,200	159,000	- 1.4
Barbados	50,200	51,000	+ 1.6	34,900	32,900	- 5.7	85,100	83,900	- 1.4
Belize	21,400	25,500	+19.2	4,700	6,000	+27.7	26,100	31,500	+20.7
St. Lucia	18,200	17,200	- 5.5	10,400	9,300	- 5.8	28,600	26,500	- 7.3
Grenada	15,200	16,100	+ 5.9	10,000	9,800	- 2.0	25,200	25,900	+ 2.8
St. Vincent	14,300	13,600	- 4.9	9,100	7,400	-18.7	23,400	21,000	-10.3
Dominica	12,700	12,400	- 2.4	9,700	7,300	-24.7	22,400	19,700	-12.1
St. Kitts-Nevis	7,100	7,700	+ 8.4	7,100	4,700	-33.8	14,200	12,400	-12.7
Montserrat	2,300	2,400	+ 4.3	1,800	1,300	-27.8	4,100	3,700	- 9.8
Cayman Islands	3,100	2,200	-29.0	900	1,200	+33.3	4,000	3,400	-15.0
Br. Virgin Islands	1,700	2,800	+64.7	400	1,000	+150.0	2,100	3,800	+81.0
Turks & Caicos	1,200	1,000	-16.7	900	500	-44.0	2,100	1,500	-28.6
TOTAL	846,300	785,400	- 7.2	420,200	328,600	-21.8	1,266,500	1,114,000	-12.0

Source: Ibid (Roberts)

on internal migration for the region as a whole are not readily available; studies have been carried out only for Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. <sup>8/</sup>

One example from Jamaica gives some idea of the importance of internal migration for specific localities. Within a 12 month period:

In the parish of St. Elizabeth the number of registered live-births exceeded the number of deaths by approximately 3,350, while the loss of population through internal migration amounted to 2,632 persons. So that 79% of the natural increase of population was exhausted by intensive out-migration. On the other hand, to the natural population growth of the parish of St. Andrew amounting to 4,400 persons that year, there was added a migration gain of 17,500 persons, so that the natural population changes amounted to only 20.1% of the total population growth of this parish during the same period. <sup>9/</sup>

St. Elizabeth is a distinctly rural parish while St. Andrew is part of the metropolitan capital city of Kingston-St. Andrew. Overall, the pattern of internal migration in Jamaica has been towards the capital city but in more recent times with the development of mining and tourism, a drift towards rural towns has been noted. <sup>10/</sup> A similar trend is noted for Trinidad-Tobago; there "urban and suburban areas received 64.1 per cent of the total immigration". <sup>11/</sup>

Figures 1 and 2 show the patterns and intensity of rural-urban migration in Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica, respectively. These flows can be seen to be very substantial. Internal migration varies with levels of education. In Trinidad-Tobago 9.3% of movers had no education, 76.1% had some level of primary education, while those with secondary and higher education accounted for 14.6 per cent. <sup>12/</sup>

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<sup>8/</sup> See Kalman Tekse Internal Migration in Jamaica (Jamaica Dept. of Statistics, April 1967) and Joy M. Simpson, Internal Migration in Trinidad-Tobago (U.W.I., I.S.E.R. Kingston, 1973).

<sup>9/</sup> K. Tekse, Ibid, p.1.

<sup>10/</sup> G.W. Roberts, Demographic Aspects of Rural Development in Jamaica, Social and Economic Studies, September 1968.

<sup>11/</sup> Joy M. Simpson, op. cit. p.18.

<sup>12/</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

MIGRATION STREAMS 1946-1960

Figure 1  
TRINIDAD MAP






FIGURE 1

Jay Simpson, Internal Migration in Trinidad (ISER, Mona, 1974)

PORT OF SPAIN AND SUBURBS 1960

FIG. 2

Jamaica Map



1,000 MIGRANTS

MIGRATION INTO THE KINGSTON  
& ST. ANDREW AREA FROM THE  
COUNTRY 1959

TOWN PLANNING DEPARTMENT  
Information Dept. of Statistics  
Date Nov 1966  
10 5 0 10 miles

Source: Kalman Tekse, Internal Migration in Jamaica (Jamaica Department of Statistics Bulletin) Kingston, Jamaica, 1960.

In a study of the causes of internal migration in Jamaica, Nassau Adams concluded that distance and wage income differentials between regions are "of overwhelming importance in explaining the pattern of migration" for adult males. <sup>13/</sup> Migrants are most definitely attracted to areas where wage incomes are higher and distance serves as a cost deterrent to migration. That study also showed that the rate of unemployment and the degree of industrialization in the region of origin were significant factors, as were the average size of land holdings and the level of education in the destination region. It is of interest to note that the unemployment rate in the destination region does not serve as a major deterrent "the implication being that people are attracted to the high wage regions in the vague hope of being able to get a job, even if in practice the probability of succeeding is not very great." <sup>14/</sup> "The average size of land holdings also appears to be of some significance, at least where the destination region is concerned, regions with larger average holdings tending to be shunned by migrants". <sup>15/</sup>

The rapid rates of rural-urban migration have far-reaching social structural consequences. Urbanization without industrialization results in growing urban unemployment. The problem of urban housing becomes acute, and slums develop. Other social amenities in the urban areas, already inadequate -- health facilities, schools, etc. -- become further pressed. Demand for food supplies in urban areas increases as a result; and, as noted in an earlier chapter, food supplies are retarded by the movement away from agriculture. The fact that migrants are usually younger persons means that extra pressure is placed on certain facilities like schools. The tendency for most of the educational and training facilities to be located in the capital cities and towns helps to accentuate the drift from rural areas.

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<sup>13/</sup> Nassau Adams, Internal Migration in Jamaica -- An Economic Analysis, Social and Economic Studies, June, 1969, p. 150.

<sup>14/</sup> Ibid, p. 151

<sup>15/</sup> Ibid, p. 146.

West Indian people have a traditional bias against agriculture -- at least agricultural wage work -- on account of the historical legacy of slavery. The accelerated rural-urban migration in recent decades serves to reinforce this bias. Accordingly we find evidence, in several countries, of an excess demand for labour in plantation agriculture while there is considerable urban unemployment. For example, workers have to be imported from St. Vincent and other neighbouring islands for sugar cane harvests in Barbados while open long-term unemployment in Barbados stands at 8%, and open plus "disguised" unemployment is estimated at 20% of the labour force. <sup>16/</sup>

### The Labour Force

The two components of the labour force for consideration here are the working force and the unemployed. More data are available for the former. <sup>17/</sup>

Roberts utilizes a three-fold classification of the working force in the West Indies: government employees, non-government employees, and own account workers. These data are presented in Tables 5 and 5a.

Non-government employees are the bulk of the male working force: 57 per cent for the region as a whole; own-account workers are 25%; and government employees, 18%. The share of non-government employees is highest in Cayman, Barbados and the Virgin Islands; and is lowest in Jamaica. It would appear that 'pure tourist' economies offer greater scope for private sector employment than other types of economies.

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<sup>16/</sup> Carmen McFarlane, The Employment Situation in Overpopulated Territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean (ed. J. Harewood; U.W.I. ISER, St. Augustine, 1970. Short term unemployment in Barbados is estimated as 12.2%.

<sup>17/</sup> G.W. Roberts, Working Force of the Commonwealth Caribbean at 1970, op. cit.

TABLE 5: Size and Proportional Distribution of three categories of the Working Force for 14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1970 - Males

Country	Size of Working Force			% of Total Working Force		
	Government Employees	Non-Government Employees	Own Account Workers	Government Employees	Non-Government Employees	Own Account Workers
Jamaica	37,000	177,000	118,200	11.13	53.29	35.58
Trinidad & Tobago	50,100	99,000	23,500	29.05	57.34	13.61
Guyana	26,900	75,100	27,000	20.83	58.24	20.93
Barbados	9,500	37,500	4,000	18.56	73.59	7.85
Belize	3,800	14,100	7,600	14.81	55.48	29.71
St. Lucia	2,500	9,600	5,100	14.73	55.87	29.40
Grenada	3,400	9,900	2,800	20.81	61.70	17.49
St. Vincent	3,400	7,500	2,600	25.39	55.17	19.45
Dominica	2,200	6,600	3,500	17.75	53.60	28.65
St. Kitts/Nevis	1,400	5,300	900	18.68	69.09	12.23
Montserrat	600	1,300	500	23.80	54.40	21.80
Cayman Islands	300	1,700	200	13.91	74.97	11.13
Br. Virgin Is.	400	2,000	400	13.45	70.80	15.75
Turks & Caicos Is.	300	600	100	29.86	60.22	9.92
TOTAL	141,700	447,300	196,500	18.04	56.94	25.02

Source: Ibid.

TABLE 5(a): Size and Proportional Distribution of three categories of the Working Force for 14 Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 1970 - Females

Country	Size of Working Force			% of Total Working Force		
	Government Employees	Non-Government Employees	Own Account Workers	Government Employees	Non-Government Employees	Own Account Workers
Jamaica	26,700	97,900	35,300	16.70	61.23	22.08
Trinidad & Tobago	15,300	36,700	5,200	26.75	64.16	9.09
Guyana	8,400	17,100	4,700	27.81	56.62	15.56
Barbados	5,000	25,200	2,700	15.20	26.60	8.20
Belize	1,400	3,800	800	23.33	63.33	13.33
St. Lucia	1,500	5,700	2,200	15.96	60.64	23.40
Grenada	2,100	6,100	1,600	21.43	62.24	16.33
St. Vincent	2,100	4,600	800	28.00	61.33	10.67
Dominica	1,400	4,600	1,300	19.18	63.01	17.81
St. Kitts/Nevis	900	3,200	600	19.15	68.08	12.77
Montserrat	300	800	200	23.08	61.54	15.38
Cayman Islands	200	900	100	16.67	75.00	8.33
Br. Virgin Islands	200	700	100	20.00	70.00	10.00
Turks & Caicos Is.	200	200	100	40.00	40.00	20.00
TOTAL	65,700	207,500	55,400	19.99	63.15	16.86

Source: Ibid.



For own account workers, the largest proportion is reported for Jamaica (36%) and the smallest for Turks and Caicos (10%) and Barbados (8%). Relatively high shares are observed as well for Belize, St. Lucia and Dominica. It would appear from this that there is some association between the size of the resource base and the opportunities that exist for independent economic activity. But the evidence is far from convincing.

Government workers account for relatively high shares of the work force in Turks and Caicos, Trinidad-Tobago, St. Vincent, Montserrat, Guyana and Grenada -- over 20% in all cases. The lowest share shown is for Jamaica (11%). Relatively poor colonies seem to offer greater scope for government employment than relatively well endowed ones. And among the independent countries, the more diversified the economy the less important is government as a source of employment, as a comparison of Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica would seem to suggest. In the 'pure mineral' economy (Trinidad-Tobago) the scope for private sector employment is relatively small; and government has the wherewithal from mineral taxes and royalties to create public sector employment. While in the highly diversified mixed economy (Jamaica), the scope for own account work is relatively great and government employment is therefore relatively small. Guyana is a less diversified 'mixed economy' than in Jamaica. Accordingly, it occupies an intermediary position.

Roberts notes some other interesting characteristics of the working force. Own account workers comprise "very small proportions of the work force at young ages and move up steadily through the age scale." In general, "non-Government employment assumes more prominence among females than among males, and does not decline with age to the same degree as it does in the case of males ... Female involvement in own account category is generally lower than that of males."<sup>18/</sup>

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<sup>18/</sup> Ibid, p.15.

In terms of educational attainment, we find that of the three categories of workers, Government employees have the highest status "for the region as a whole only 8% of them have less than 5 years of formal schooling, while the proportions with GCE passes and with degrees and diplomas are comparatively high, being 12% and 5% respectively." Own account workers have the lowest status in educational attainment; 92% of them in the region as a whole have little more than primary schooling with only 1% having degrees or diplomas. 22% of own account workers are functionally illiterate (i.e. less than 5 years schooling) as compared to 15% for non-government and 8% for government workers.

Unemployment is a critical factor in all West Indian countries; and what evidence there is suggests that unemployment increased in recent years. The data also indicate that the problem is greater among young persons than among older ones; also among females as compared to males. Carmen McFarlane presents the following data on different types of unemployment in terms of per cent of the labour force as at 1960: <sup>19/</sup>

	<u>Long Term</u>		<u>Short Term</u>
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Open &amp; Disguised</u>	
Jamaica	9.2	23.4	13.0
Trinidad-Tobago	5.6	15.6	10.7
Barbados	7.8	19.5	12.2
St. Lucia	10.0	17.5	12.1
Grenada	7.8	22.3	15.7
St. Vincent	6.2	22.8	13.5
Dominica	4.0	16.1	8.1
Antigua	n.a.	n.a.	12.8
Montserrat	n.a.	n.a.	12.2

The rates in 1960 were all above rates recorded at the preceding census in the 1940's. Other available data indicate that educated persons and young people constitute an increasing share of the unemployed.

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<sup>19/</sup> Carmen McFarlane, op. cit., p. 4-10.

Survey data for Trinidad-Tobago indicate that the rate of unemployment was highest among persons who went to but did not complete Secondary School (20%) and among those who completed primary school but did not go further (18%). The unemployment rate was 6% or less for persons with no education and among those who had completed secondary school or attended university. In Barbados of the total unemployed nearly 50% had received seven years or more of primary education, and only 8% had less than 4 years education.

Young people suffer most from unemployment. In Trinidad-Tobago during 1967, 28% of the unemployed were under 20 years old and 25% were 20-24. While 15% of the total labour force were unemployed at the time, the rate for persons 15-19 was 34% and for persons 20-24 it was 23%. A similar picture is given for Barbados in 1966. For that population as a whole the unemployment rate was 13% but for persons 15-19 years old it was 32%. <sup>20/</sup>

It is clear that the problem of unemployment among the educated youth and youth generally is perhaps now at crisis proportions. The 5-14 age cohort at the 1970 census are now in the labour force. That group had increased from 27 to 31 per cent of the male population of the region between 1960 and 1970; and for the female population from 25 to 29 per cent. It is therefore quite likely that the unemployment rate for persons 15-19 has increased materially during the 1970's.

The unemployed youth represent perhaps the most frustrated and volatile group in contemporary West Indian society. And with increases in the numbers involved would seem to be the most potent source for meaningful change.

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<sup>20/</sup> These data are derived from Jack Harewood, The Under-Utilization of Available Human Resources, in Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean (ed J. Harewood, U.W.I. St. Augustine, 1970) p. 5-18/19.



CHAPTER V



POLITICAL SITUATION AND CHANGE

This penultimate chapter proceeds somewhat differently in concept and style from those preceding. (Any credit or failure in its results belong rightly to Louis G. Lindsay.)

Since politics is "the art of the possible", it seems to be necessary to begin normatively with precepts that derive directly and analytically from the society under scrutiny. So the opening section (1) will confront some aspects of the political economy of dependency - in their most obvious manipulative West Indian dimensions.

The basic normative premise is that people will do anything they can do to help themselves; that what they can do, is conditioned by what they think they can do; and that what they think they can do is determined by the particular process of socialization to which they have been exposed.

In other words, "what is" is not necessarily 'what people think is' in the short run; and in the long run as well.

It will be seen, here, that the normative determines the positive and vice-versa, as well. Thus the particular political economy of dependency demarcates a particular character of political process and change (if indeed the path is not unique?).

The specific imperial policy determines the particular constitutional form and political process. Accordingly, the first section considers the influence of the British system based on the Westminster Model. Change and continuity can be discerned in this discussion of Westminsterism and its political outputs in the West Indies. The particular type of political imitation generates a characteristic type of dependence which is explored in the second section. Alienation is the fundamental resulting situation.

The third section therefore outlines a specific model of social structural change integrating the basic elements of the social and political system. It provides the bare bones of a framework which is discussed in more detail in the final chapter.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

The West Indian polity reflects the dependent character of all colonial situations which are not transformed by revolution. Thus we find generally situations in which two party competing systems have developed after the Westminster model of Britain (the "mother country").

The whole political process now existing in the West Indies is based on an electoral system in which one, two or multiple parties compete every four-five years for the right to 'govern'. Competition is generally based on promises to the electorate who are never told how these promises are to be fulfilled. In between these four-five year contests the population do not influence decision making. And the elected 'decision-makers' tinker with an economic system which is entirely outside of their control.

Imperial-colonial economic relationships produce Imperial colonial political systems.

As J.E. Greene has indicated:

the political institutions which developed (in the West Indies) were essentially rooted in Imperial policy and were designed to execute that policy. Hence the colonial office in Britain created the civil service apparatus .. as a system of dispensing law, order and patronage. It also transplanted the institutions for local government administration. But withheld the substance of the people's participation. <sup>1/</sup>

The consequence of withholding popular participation is general social unrest and turmoil which are characteristic of all West Indian societies today.

In the next few paragraphs we wish to consider the relationships between types of West Indian economies and party politics. And to consider briefly the kind of social unrest which is manifested in the region from the 1960's up to the present time.

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<sup>1/</sup> J.E. Greene, the Developmental Bases of Political Change in the English Speaking Caribbean -- An Exploration Journal of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Summer 1974.



Green has presented a typology of West Indian polities based on the number of political parties and their persistence in the political process.<sup>2/</sup> He comes up with the following:

Two Party Persistent	:	Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana
Multiple Party Shifting	:	Bahamas, Dominica, St. Lucia Grenada, St. Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago, Antigua.
One Party Dominant	:	Belize, St.Kitts-Nevis (Anguilla) Montserrat, Cayman, Turks & Caicos, Virgin Islands.

It is interesting to try to link the economic typology presented in Chapter II above with this party political typology. Figure 1 makes this linkage. The association between types of economies and party politics in terms of the output of party types is not very clear.

One should expect to find more positive results than is revealed here; for example, Jamaica which is the most high "mixed economy" throws out a stable two party switching since 1944, with intermittent appearance and disappearance of third parties (from Millard Johnson to Lightbourne). Whereas the "mixed" (2 sector - 3 sector?) economy of Guyana throws out a 'dominant' one party with a 'dormant' second party -- Reference here are to PNC - PPP. It is not clear what intermediate position is held by Barbados; a 2-sector "mixed" economy - tourism and plantation. It would appear that these static pictorial presentations do not enough reflect differences in social structures. Hence an attempt must be made to bring race and class into the analysis.

In Figure 1, the "pure tourist" and "pure mineral" economies like, Bahamas-Montserrat; and Trinidad, are easier to follow in terms of the outputs of one party dominance in the party politics.

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<sup>2/</sup> J.E. Greene, Institutionalization and Change in Small States: Party Systems in the English Speaking Caribbean, (Dept. of Government, U.W.I. mimeo, 1974) p.26.

Clearly if everybody depends on one thing for a living, only one patron can survive long in systems based solidly on patronage. <sup>3/</sup>

Carl Stone's recent work provides empirical evidence of the influence of race and class in the political process in Jamaica and Greene and many others have analysed the impact of race on politics in Guyana. <sup>4/</sup>

The common racial division in West Indian societies is between white (the imperial connection) and non-white (the colonial side of the interaction). African people are the majority of the latter group for the region as a whole; they provide initial labour power under early imperialism. East Indians are important in Trinidad and Guyana where they represent some 40% and over 50%, respectively of the total population. So for purposes of the analysis of race, East Indians figure prominently in those two cases.

For the region as a whole, then it is useful at one level to link Africans and East Indians as one group -- the base foundation labour power. Both sets of people are categorized as "Blacks" in Figure 2.

The figure indicates that occupational mobility (and associated class position) of Black people is restricted. White people are at the top of the social hierarchy and other whitish minority groups (Portuguese, Lebanese, etc.) are close below them. Brown people and "certificated blacks" occupy an intermediate position between the whites and Blacks who are the majority of the population. Basically, the highest achievable position of blacks is the bureaucracy which


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<sup>3/</sup> We are here considering contemporary (one) party political outputs in Bahamas (Pindling); Montserrat (the Brambles - father/son); and Trinidad (Williams). "Now" being party politics in the shifting situations of the 1960's and 1970's. Shifting in terms of accelerating pace in the international capitalist politics-economies and West Indian reverberations.

<sup>4/</sup> See Stone, Race, Class Politics in Urban Jamaica (Kingston, 1974) and his Electoral Behaviour and Public Opinion in Jamaica (Kingston 1974) and J.E. Greene, Race vs Politics in Guyana (Kingston, 1974).

Figure 1

Political Elements in West Indian Economic Systems



services the state apparatus. And since the state apparatus is in a dependent patron-client relationship with the imperial power, patronage becomes important for mobility within the neo-colonial system.

Government and politics are dominated by patronage; and the limited resources available to the state and the population constrains the opportunities for mobility. Accordingly, the characteristic pattern is increasing alienation.

For the region as a whole, then the fundamental characteristics of the polity is that of dependency. Dependency creates numerous problems at various levels of the social process and in different dimensions of social activity. It leads to alienation and generates the internal power for social change. An understanding of the syndrome of dependency is critical to particularizing the nature of West Indian alienation; and the consequence of that for social structural change.

West Indian states are defined by the international community. It is the relation with the imperial power that determines each country's rights in the world as a whole. Thus the present status of each country is defined as follows:

<u>'Constitutional Monarch Independent'</u>	<u>'Associated Statehood'</u>	<u>'Colonies'</u>
Bahamas	Belize	Cayman
Jamaica	Antigua	Turks & Caicos
Barbados	St. Kitts (Nevis)	Pedro Cays
Trinidad-Tobago	Dominica	Montserrat
Guyana (Republic)	St. Lucia	Anguilla
Grenada	St. Vincent (Puerto Rico)	(St. Martin) (St. Thomas)

These distinctions in constitutional form have no importance, in fact.

All West Indian polities are dependent. And all produce the same results for the peoples of the region. Dependency generates myths, and symbols become the chief manifestations that fundamental change is being achieved. Myths are developed to maintain the

Figure 2

Race, Class and Occupational Mobility  
in the English Caribbean

Race/Colour	Occupational Status	Class
White (Foreign) White (Local)	Big Business (MNC's) Big Industrialists and Plantation Owners	Upper (Bourgeois)
Chinese Lebanese Portuguese, etc. High Browns	Small & Medium Business Independent Professionals	Lower Upper (Petit Bourgeois)
Browns "Certificated Blacks"	Bureaucracy Big & Middle Peasants	Upper Middle
Blacks	Skilled Workers ("Blue Collar" - Urban Proletariat)	Lower Middle
Blacks	Independent Artisans Small Peasants Rural Proletariat	Upper Lower
Blacks	Lumpen Proletariat (Unemployed-unskilled)	Lower

status quo ante. And symbols are manipulated to suggest to the population at large that better days are coming soon; and not 'bye and bye'.

The myth of democracy is paraded in the style of Westminster politics to provide fantasies of popular participation for the population. Symbols are manipulated to show that developmental change is occurring right before the eyes of the people.

Myths, symbols and fantasies produce the seemingly magical result that 'the more things change, the more they remain the same'.

## II DEPENDENCY SYNDROME AND SYMBOLS

The economic substructure gives shape to the political superstructure. In dependent economies where the structure of resource use is widely separated from the structure of peoples' demand, the manipulative powers of governing political authorities are reduced. Economic policy does not generate expected results in the conventional manner of independent capitalist economies. Because there are few links between the manipulable variables.

Table 5.1 provides some statistical evidence of the correlation between functional variables in the Trinidad economy. In the analysis done by Brewster <sup>5/</sup>, the evidence is that there are no significant interrelationships between these functional variables. Accordingly, he suggests that governments of such economies cannot solve pressing economic problems such as unemployment.

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<sup>5/</sup> H.R. Brewster, Economic Dependence ... A Quantitative Interpretation, Social & Economic Studies, March 1973.

Table 5.1

A Functional Matrix for the Trinidad Economy

Employment	Wage Rates	Exports	Import Ratio	Output	Consumption	Prices	Investment
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.	.684	-.277	.128	.085	.633	.437	.379
2.	-.684	.641	.245	.041	.019	.045	.689
3.	-.277	.641	.120	.676	.236	.030	.292
4.	.128	.245	.1201	-.321	.426	.261	.040
5.	.085	.041	.676	.265	-.232	.226	
6.	.633	.019	.236	.426	.265	.519	.133
7.	.437	-.045	.030	.261	-.232	.519	.074
8.	.379	-.689	-.292	-.040	.226	.133	.074

Source: See text.

"Prices cannot be kept down by operating on wages. Suppressing wage rises does not lead to increased exports; indeed, wage acceleration seems to go along to some extent with increased exports. Increased exports do not make for increased employed; indeed, there is even an inverse relation between them. Effectively, the level of employment cannot be manipulated by any of the recognized functional relationships of orthodox economic practice. As a result, although the solution of unemployment is the prime government economic responsibility it continues to grow larger from year to year.

Thus the most important area of economic policy is premised on economic relationships which seem to be non-existent but which are nonetheless supposed to be administered through a standard range of institutions - The Plan, the Planning Department, the Central Bank, the Industrial Court. The lesson is that the economic inter-relationships to which economic dependence leads cannot be rectified through instruments of technical policy since they are underpinned by the society's real transactions with the external world and with its internal sections.

#### THE SYMBOLISM OF DEPENDENCE

The economic and racial consequence of economic dependence are discussed in many places. Attention is now focused on certain symbolic responses to dependence. Since the political leadership of underdeveloped nations, with one or two exceptions, has apparently not considered it in its interest to discuss, publicly, fundamental notions and goals of development, significant sections of the populations of these countries have come to believe that the symbols of development constitute in themselves development.

This kind of symbolism has given rise to new psychological blockages to development, particularly in radical-type governments, which may be more difficult to remove than



the physical and political obstacles. For this reason, it is considered useful to point to the nature and origins of dependence symbolism. My analysis is based on personal observation and on close contact with political leaders and senior civil servants over the past fifteen years. Their responses to the inefficacy of policy under conditions of economic dependence must be viewed against a political background in which the prime concern and expectation focus on socio-economic change.

First, there is an agonizing period of discovery which shows up that, within the existing framework, virtually all the available instruments of policy are ineffectual. If a government cannot manipulate the instruments of policy, because they do not work it must pretend to do so - if it is unwilling or unable to alter the real transactions upon which they are premised.

Second, a predictable cluster of institutions develop, whose very physical presence is projected as the living symbols that governments govern. Central Banks, Local Commercial Banks, Planning Units, Industrial Courts, Tourist Board, Marketing Boards, Industrial Development Corporations, State Trading Agencies, etc., flourish but do they function? It is not much of an exaggeration to say that if these were all closed down it would have little or no real effect upon what actually takes place. Factories are built but do they produce? Nationals participate in the international corporations. And there are the corresponding postures; of activity, dedication and technological up-to-dateness. Eventually, all this gives way to a sober self-contempt. Since this third stage cannot be openly expressed, its characteristic is a retreat into relative seclusion, and sometimes even the contemplation of relinquishing office.

In the fourth stage, deceit and self-contempt combine to undermine the whole fabric of government, political and official. There is a realization that nothing is being done, nor can be done under existing circumstances, and the sham deteriorates into wide-spread corruption. A purge of selected elements then comes, often as a survival measure. This fifth phase is the stage of idolatry. There is a messianic flavour about it and indeed heroes and saints may actually be created at this time. Attempts are made to refurbish the civil service and there is a great posturing of religiosity and moral strength.

It furnishes the more mature frame of mind which is one of self-delusion. The main characteristic of this sixth stage is the elevation of compromise into a theory of achievement. Gradualism, solidity, responsibility are the concepts abroad at this time. Postures are rationalized on the basis of their pragmatism. And the new ideology dismisses criticism of its real deficiencies as unattainable idealism. In this stage, great emphasis is placed on pomp and protocol. They serve, in effect, by intimidation to emphasize an imaginary distance in status between believers and non-believers. The syndrome is complete when self-delusion becomes a psychopathological state of identification in which symbolism actually becomes realism. Dependency may now be legitimized in 'negotiated' economic contracts, 'associate' agreements and 'meaningful participation' whose word-imagery and quasi-legality are actually taken as conferring a relationship of equality and independence upon a situation which, in reality, is not." <sup>6/</sup>

To get the full import of what Brewster is saying above, the reader must read his full article. That is particularly important

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<sup>6/</sup> Havelock Brewster, *Economic Dependence - A Quantitative Interpretation*, Social and Economic Studies, March 1973, pp. 94-95.

in today's misconceptions about separating structure from function. Depending and dependent are of course two different matters, as Brewster clearly demonstrates in that article.

I am trying here to follow that path somewhat by suggesting that my stylized transactions matrix for 'Caribbean-type economy' in Chapter II defines structural dependence and therefore defines the functional dependence that Brewster describes for Trinidad empirio-statistically. It would seem to follow that if you cannot govern you must play like you can in order to maintain some self respect (or you disintegrate as a whole). The latter is the 'political economy of alienation' described in the next section.

The psychopathological stage that Brewster describes above comes from, and causes, the nonsense of "snow on the canefields" (GCE 'O' Level English composition) the positive insight of Sparrow's "Dan is the Man in the Van"; and the resultant 'fantasies of popular participation' in West Indian politics. 7/

When one begins to examine microscopically what passes for "education" (what is and what people think is are different) in the West Indies and what passes for government in the West Indies (here 'what is' and 'what people think is' needs deeper scrutiny), then the germs begin to appear. For example, we might begin to understand links between material poverty and technology (so-called scientific). 8/ The links between material poverty and spiritual escapism in certain expressions/forms of established worships in Churches of England and of Rome. 9/

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7/ The last little phrase is coined from Louis G. Lindsay work on 'Myths' (in process); and of 51 or any percent participation in dealing with the "Mothers". I think Lindsay's forthcoming Maternal Symbolism will elaborate the last point.

8/ Why, for example, does the University of the West Indies have 20 or so physicists studying the ionosphere and 2 animal scientists trying to provide more milk and meat for malnourished children?

9/ Consider here the links between the Church of England and Monarch of England who is the (motherly) titular head of West Indian States.

Consider as well the revealed preference for West Indian people to go to the balm-yard for spiritual upliftment; even after waiting on scientific doctors for hours on end (or because) and when scientific psychiatric resources are simply squandered on middle class disorders like alcoholism? It must, of course, be of some real scientific significance that alcoholism in Bahamas is second only to France and just above the Trinidad East Indian in the whole wide world. <sup>10/</sup>

It would appear that in the whole wide world, the West Indians rank highest in drinking and emigration. And in cricket sometimes, depending on mood.

### III ALIENATION AND CHANGE: OUTLINES OF A MODEL

Social alienation in the West Indian case derives from the particular deep roots in the international capitalist system. White foreigners from Europe-USA capture and still control the basic resources of these societies -- i.e. the true wealth. Black people provide the bulk of the labour power and brown people dominate the intermediary layer between these two groups. Small minority groups occupy the most powerful position, internally. Jews, Chinese, Portuguese, Lebanese etc., control enough resources to exploit the labour of Black people. They and local whites are the internal agents of imperialism.

The dialect of the West Indian social situation is explored here in an examination of the action-reaction and interaction relationships between groups of West Indian peoples and the characteristic modes of production and exchange that govern their daily lives. The analysis is intended to explain the rumblings of structural change which are now being clearly heard in different parts of the region. These rumblings are similar to those of a volcano.

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<sup>10/</sup> This statistical information was communicated to me verbally by close medical supervisor at the UWI in recent conversations (1975).

Figure 5.3 on the following page shows the basic elements and their interrelationships.<sup>11/</sup> The kernel is the white imperialism of Europe and the U.S.A. And there is an outer kernel (broken line circle) comprising Jews, Chinese, etc. Alienation intensifies in the downward direction. Black people suffer most. Integration intensifies in the upward direction, schematically, towards the older industrial societies of Europe and the older cultural societies like China and India. The older cultural/industrial society of Africa does not provide any basis for sublime integration.

The geo-historical origins of West Indian societies are critical in explaining their integration with the capitalist international. And the socio-psychological results of alienation of the majority of the population are the omens of structural change.

Suppression and repression of Black people are inevitable in the circumstances. The reaction to suppression and repression is intensified struggle by the oppressed for liberation. Thus the social situation has a volcano appearance when viewed upside down. The struggles of oppressed blacks must eventually blow the kernel out, in order to create a new social equilibrium in which the majority of peoples will have access to sufficient resources for a better existence.

Social turbulences in the West Indies during the late 1960's and 1970's reflect the rumblings of the dynamic model. The urban uprisings in Jamaica of 1968, the aborted palace revolution and black power outbursts of Trinidad in 1970, up to the "Dread Law" of Dominica in late 1974 are examples of a general phenomenon.

Rasta and black power ideology have gained an ascendancy in the process of reaction of Black people to the oppression of white imperialism. The Westminster-Washington "mother type" imperialism which filtered out the geo-historical origins of the African people produced the ideology of Rasta and Black Power as a reaction. Action

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<sup>11/</sup> This diagrammatic presentation was inspired by a discussion with Trevor Moo.

to contain that in the present neo-colonial phase is legislation of the type represented by the Gun Court Law in Jamaica and the "Prohibited and Unlawful Societies and Associations Act, 1974" of Dominica. <sup>12/</sup>

Reaction to this recent legislative acts of repression will be intensified organization by Black people to struggle for liberation. Meanwhile, significant numbers of minority groups emigrate in fear. Although they are numerically unimportant these groups control considerable capital. These groups have played a critical part in the process by which Black people are screened through the filter indicated in Figure 5.3.

The white filter is a plan to fool black people that integration upwards is truly possible.

It is not.

Yellow and High Brown concentration around the white kernel are significant at the West Indies % level!

Yellow people will either ho-long-a-long or flee the scene. Those who flee the scene emigrate to new horrors which they never dreamed of before and some will return indeed. But, again on what terms? --- their parents-ancestors from People's China or US China? Ying Yang and I-Ching do not provide very specific answers. All we know is that there is something old and good about "I-Man Ching". But how many of the billion plus Chinese in East China practice it is anybody's guess. Guess me this riddle and perhaps not!

The West Indian Chinese either occupy Governor's residences, or sell salt fish, or emigrate, or "run racket". In each of these cases they must compromise to white rule.


Even if they take to the people, street-yard, the problem remains one of patron-client. Guitar with friends is not far removed from trusting Miss Chin. And Miss Chin is not far removed

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<sup>12/</sup> The full text of this "Act" is reproduced in Chapter VI Section III.

Figure 5.3

Social Structural Determinants of  
Revolutionary Change in the West Indies



from Kings House. And people still need salt to eat food - fish, mackeral, or dat?

For white people produce the salt, Kings House, guitars, and fish and racket. So akso. Racketeers get cut down or run away to nothingness.

And nothing from nothing leaves nothing!

Nutten from nutten lef nutten (JA).



OMENS

Like the dependent economy, the dependent analyst must shake out the constraining psychic influences of alienation. Accordingly, the language of this concluding Chapter of Volume One is West Indian.

It is being asserted that contemporary rumblings in the West Indies today are a sign of future changes in the social-structural basis of the society. In that direction the chapter attempts to explain the significance of these rumblings. The politics of "dread" is chosen as a case study.

Political leaders are attempting marginal changes of securing more revenue to dispense patronage in order to alleviate the economic plight of the population. As well, cultural adjustments are being promoted. And new symbols of change are introduced in the rhetoric of the electoral elites "democratic socialism" and "cooperative socialism" in Jamaica and Guyana, respectively.

The deepening crisis in the international capitalist system immediately erodes short-run gains in revenues, through inflation. Symbols of participation by elites in providing labour power for development are invented but "kareba dressed middle class men moving stones in the bush provide but a moment of comic relief in the life of suffering peasants."<sup>1/</sup>

The Kareba type of symbolic reform is a reaction to the dread like action of Rasta, itself being a reaction to the oppression of Westminster style imperialism. The dynamics of West Indian social structural change is manifested in this type of adjustment at the cultural level. Government participation in resource ownership, of various types, are reformist attempts to alleviate material suffering, on the economic level.

Race and class are prominent in the manifestations of the dynamics of change. It is instructive, therefore to return to the discussion of the model of change presented in the preceding chapter.

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<sup>1/</sup> L.G. Lindsay, Colonialism and the Myth of Democracy in Jamaica (U.W.I., ISER, mimeo 1974).

Positive omens of change are to be detected there by those who understand the West Indian social scene, as elaborated in this study.

## I THE CONTRADICTIONS <sup>2/</sup>

Each group in West Indian society acts, reacts and interreacts with other groups in a game where the most oppressed must live by their wits. Structural change is blocked by manipulative devices of the ruling elites.

Now; one-and-one can mek two or eleven, depending on how you place one and one. Thats what the High Brown West Indian man thinks, of course. But who determines the placings of one and one. Hence, the result!

So, if Chiny smart and brown man think him smart BLACK MAN have fe outsmart de two-o-dem. So "Anancy" is born and is credited -- legitimated, whatever you wan call it!

But 'credit' and 'legit' are strictly speaking the language of white man. SO BLACK MAN IS CAUGHT IN THE KERNEL OF THE FILTER!

He becomes frustrated, alienated. He kicks against the pricks and is clean bowled - Back to the pavilion. Whose pavilion. Either aluminium roof, or zinc sheet, or canvas tent top, or bamboo curtain. To do what? Him e'yan bat again. No sah.

So black man emigrate, like Chiny man. And brown man and chiny man stop half way in newer metropolises. Miami, Toronto, and so.

Or in West Indian TAX HAVENS!


TAX HAVENS - for little girls. Without them what would little boys do?

But 'metropolises' are considered to be older civilizations. Some consolation. ARE THEY?

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<sup>2/</sup> The style of discussion here reflects the influence of Edward Brathwaite, Contradictory Omens (Savacou Publications, Mona, 1974).

C H A P T E R   V I



Oldness does not necessarily provide anchor.

So drifting is possible.

ALIENATED HIGH BROWN West Indian and Chiny man in new metropolises is no change.

BLACK MAN hardly KNOWS THAT AFRICA IS THE OLDEST CIVILIZATION. But that is only one-half of the story. For even when he knows he does not really believe, he has to argue the case and hide.

He is taught that Africa is backward-jungle-drum-beating natives. And that natives contaminate! So avoid the natives. Yet the natives of England contaminated the English West Indies to "Carib-bean"

Notting-Hill is not Miami-Beach-front-desk-tourist clerk. And Atlanta is hardly South Side Chicago. Nor is San Francisco for that matter near the South-Side and Harlem -

Notting-Hill Blacks are returning VEX now.

HARLEM BLACK MAN then (Garvey) and NOW.

Man will come and man will go but BLACK MAN LIVE FOREVER.

Sum and substance is that cultural exposure alone is no substitute for volcano-revolution.

If West Indian man can only see and act-out that "SUM AND SUBSTANCE" volcano must erupt!!

INSTANT RESULT!

Now the West Indian East Indian is a curious kettle of fish. Most are from India-Hindu. Fewer are TAMILS-MOSLEMS. Tamils are black people and moslems don't drink and smoke - The West Indian coolie man is therefore in a bind of "perpetual alienation". He must do the hardest back-breaking work in the sun plantations or don't drink or don't smoke, whichever option is taken, he remains unsure of himself and how to make the next move. To find passage money to India hard. HARD HARD.

India far and money hard to come by. So grow vegetables hard and send yu pickney them to medical school in new metropolies. Or cut sugar cane, drink white rum and tumble down. But drink and tumble in quiet - not in Carnival where everybody can see yu.

Who can do dat for how long without death -- cirrhosis?

So the West Indian East Indian explode inside himself -- like an internal volcano. Or he must pray "pseudo-white-style in-white-mosques". For salvation. Many of the latter need salvation after skanking in "fake" Indian haberdasheries and other Indian-West-Indian fake -- like writing Missus Queen English.

The lowest Indian East Indian who is high caste from East or West is whitish.

Whitish -- not "whitey". So he is caught in the intermediate grey of the model in Figure 5.3. Geo-historical roots are incapable of anchoring submarine! RESULT - Volcano!

Now to an examination of the dimensional shape of the downside-up tunnel-filter in Figure 5.3. The volcano end has the only opening. The other end is insecure for stability and for maintaining internal pressure. So internal pressure blows through the open end!

Ded or dread; and so we must come next to consider West Indian DREAD.

THE POLITICS OF DREAD IS DREAD. Simple as dat!

## II THE POLITICS OF "DREAD"

Dread is a terminology used by certain social groups in Jamaica and Dominica. These groups are but one expression of the action of proletarian and lumpen groups in the West Indies in recent years. The reaction of governments throughout has been the introduction of repressive legislation.

Dread as Action of Liberation

Dread means frontal assault on material dispossession to survive both materially and spiritually. Accordingly we need to consider the material side of dread and the spiritual side of dread.

The material side of dread is related to certain basic human needs like right food right time.

But food alone is not full human dignity even at the right time. The human dignity of dread then is to live as free as anyone likes without mashing up the brother. But the system stops the "stop mashing up the brother-sister."

So spiritual dread must withdraw. To negativeness or to come back again. The more positive dread will come back again -- either in direct spirit or flesh.

For spirit and flesh live together. You can't have one without the other.

So the politics of dread means positive change. And that is the only West Indian interpretation of the word Dread.

Dread is not locks. Dread is change up everything. Change up everything is revolution because sometimes not even you own mother know yu.

So Dread is revolutionary politics that must be funnelled to blow out the white kernel and free the mind totally. To liberate the resources of society. And thereby to liberate the people from bondage.

Official reactions to the politics of dread is the following type of legislation enacted in Dominica.

REACTION TO DREAD -- DOMINICA 1974

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1. This Act may be cited as the PROHIBITED AND UNLAWFUL SOCIETIES AND ASSOCIATIONS ACT, 1974.
2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires, "Association" means any group or body of persons, sharing common beliefs, practices, and ideologies, who unite either temporarily or permanently to achieve a common objective; Minister means Minister responsible for security, Police Force includes members of the Royal Dominica Police Force, the Special Constabulary and the Defence Force; Society means any group or associations of persons intended to be permanent or long-standing, formed for the purpose of sharing and propagating a common ideology and objective, whose members distinguish themselves by a uniform, or by their mode of dress and manner of wearing their hair.
3. Any Association or Society, whose members -
  - (a) plan, conspire or attempt to affect adversely public safety and order; or
  - (b) practise acts of terrorism, including shooting at or injuring a member of the Police Force, Defence Force or Rural or Special Constabulary, or of the Public, thereby undermining public order and public safety; or
  - (c) threaten or intimidate any public official, magistrate, judge of the court, member of a jury, any other person by reason of being a witness or likely to be a witness in any proceeding under this Act or employee in an essential service; or
  - (d) by the destruction of any cultivated plant, forest tree, root, fruit, vegetable production, animals, buildings or by the unlawful occupation of lands with acts of violence prevents the peaceful enjoyment of rights over property; or
  - (e) assault, beat, wound, hinder or prevents other persons from enjoying freedom of movement, or association on the grounds of their economic status, class, social background, race, place of origin, colour or religious persuasion; or



- (f) plan, conspire or attempt to affect public health by tampering with or fouling or poisoning water supplies, or in any manner to deprive the public of other essential supplies; or
- (g) entice or coerce children and young people under the age of 18 to join their membership, thereby preventing their attendance at school; or
- (h) are required to take any oath or engagement not required or authorised by law; or
- (i) are required to keep their names or the names of any of them secret from the public at large; or
- (j) shall have any committee or select body so chosen or appointed that the members constituting the same shall not be known by the society at large; or
- (k) the names of which as well as the names of any president, treasurer, secretary, delegates or any other officers shall not be entered into a book for the purpose, and to open to the inspection of all members of such society or association;

is hereby declared an unlawful association or society.

4. Any person who incites, aids, abets, counsels or procures by any means whatsoever, the commission of any offence under this Act shall be guilty of an offence.
5. Nothing contained in paragraphs (h), (i), (j), (k) above shall extend to the meetings of such societies or Lodges as the Free Masons, the Foresters, the Oddfellows and like Societies that have been in existence before the passing of this Act, and whose Secretary shall establish to the satisfaction of a magistrate that the Society or Lodge is being run in conformity with the rules that regulate such societies.
6. Any person who is, or becomes a member of an unlawful association is guilty of an offence against this Act.
7. Any member of an unlawful association who appears in public or elsewhere wearing any uniform, badge, or mode of dress or other distinguishing mark or feature or manner of wearing

their hair, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be arrested without warrant by any member of the police force.

8. (1) A member of any unlawful association arrested under the provision of the preceding section shall not be entitled to or granted bail.
  - (2) A member of an unlawful association arrested under the provision of the preceding section shall be brought before a magistrate within 48 hours, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays excepted.
  - (3) Any person, who, having been arrested under any of the provisions of this Act and who escapes, and any person or persons who aid and abet such person or persons to escape, shall be equally guilty of an offence against this Act and on summary conviction shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months.
9. It shall be an offence to harbour or recruit in the membership of any unlawful society or association any child or young person below the age of 18 years.
- (b) On conviction of an offence under this section, a magistrate shall impose a sentence of two years imprisonment on a person so convicted and may order the young person to resume schooling.
10. It shall be an offence against this Act to harbour or conceal any member of an unlawful society wanted by any member of the police force to encourage support, conspire with, aid and abet, any unlawful society or association or any member thereof in the furtherance of any of its objectives or in the infringement of this law.
- Provided that the presence of a member of an association or society designated unlawful, in the home of his parents will not in itself make the parents guilty of an offence under this section.
11. NO PROCEEDINGS EITHER CRIMINAL OR CIVIL SHALL BE BROUGHT OR MAINTAINED AGAINST ANY PERSON WHO KILLS OR INJURES ANY MEMBER: OF AN ASSOCIATION OR SOCIETY DESIGNATED UNLAWFUL: WHO SHALL BE FOUND ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT INSIDE A DWELLING HOUSE.

12. (1) A member of the police force may arrest without warrant any person whom he has reasonable cause to suspect to be a member of an unlawful society.
  - (2) A member of the police force may with a warrant, issued by a magistrate or Justice of the Peace so enabling him to do, with proper assistance, enter any home by force, and breaking of doors if necessary, and search the same if he has reasonable cause to suspect that a member of an unlawful society or association may be hiding therein and may search other places and premises not used as a home without warrant, where he has reasonable cause to suspect that a member of an unlawful society or association may be found.
  - (3) No proceedings either criminal or civil shall be brought against any member of the Police Force for any action taken in performance of his duty(ies) under this Act.
13. A Society or association might appeal from the decision of the Minister who designated it an unlawful society or association to the High Court.
- (b) The Minister or the society or the association may appeal on a point of law from the decision of a Judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal.
14. The Society or Association designated in the Schedule to this Act is hereby declared an unlawful society or association.
15. (1) The Minister may by regulations -
- (a) add to these acts in section 3 the commissions of which shall make a society or association unlawful;
  - (b) amend, alter, or add the names of other societies or associations to the Schedule of this Act;
  - (c) prescribe anything which under this Act fails to be prescribed;
  - (d) generally make provisions for the carrying out of the purpose of this Act.

(2) Any subsidiary legislation made under paragraph (b) of the preceding sub-section shall be subject to negative resolution.

16. Persons shall be tried summarily for offences against this Act, and if found guilty shall suffer the penalties set out in the following section.

17. A magistrate before whom anybody is convicted for being a member of an unlawful society or association shall impose a sentence of nine months imprisonment in case of a first conviction, and of one year in case of a second.

(2) A person convicted before a magistrate for harbouring or concealing a member of an unlawful society or association, or of aiding, abetting, counselling or advising such a society or association shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one year.

(3) A person guilty of an offence against this Act for which no penalty is prescribed, shall be given the sentence set out in subsection 1 of this section.

SCHEDULE

(section 12)

That society or association of persons commonly called the DREADS

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The right of appeal against conviction, and more discretion for the magistrate of the penalty for a first offence were amended.

The Act received the unanimous legislative approval for it's sanction as law .....

III OMENS

Legislation of the type described by the Dominica Act is an omen of official reaction to the positive actions of Black people to change the system.

Such reaction is bound to stimulate further action for systematic change.

Omens of such concrete action are not yet in view at the time of writing.

The Dominica case is only an example of a general West Indian phenomenon in the mid-1970's.

The dialectic of action-reaction of this type will continue to be played out on this basis during the rest of the 1970's and into the 1980's.

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