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DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS

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Developmental Systems

While nomothetic theory struggles, another offshoot of comparative national systems since the early 1950s, development administration, has become a multi-disciplinary field in its own right. In the past two decades development has evoked images of economic well-being, social harmony, universal political participation, mass literacy, cultural freedom and other desirable objectives for mankind. It has held out hope for the poor, starving, diseased and downtrodden and promised accelerated progress for everyone else. Development administration, as an indispensable tool in the attainment of the good society, has attracted the mainstream of comparative administrators seeking ways to improve administrative performance and strengthen the planning and execution of development programs. It is grounded in normative concepts - that development is desirable, that development can be planned, directed or controlled in some way by administrative systems, that improvements in the quality and quantity of societal products is desirable, that obstacles to development can be overcome, and that macro-problems handicapping societal progress can be solved. Because the conditions of mankind are so obvious, so real, so compelling, development administration is also grounded in reality - the practical solution of human problems, the nitti-gritty of public administration, the real world of people, the practitioners' domain. Theory has a place, only in so far as it really helps the practitioner in his everyday confrontation with life. It is further grounded in a more questional assumption, that

Development is not a "natural" process which need only be let free to evolve, nor a series of bottlenecks which enlightened policy makers, like production expeditors, can break successively to permit restrained energies to flow freely. It is a series of humdrum tasks for which the physical, social, psychological, and institutional resources are seldom available in sufficient quantity in the proper combinations. The obstacles to achievement are so often overpowering, and time is a relentless enemy to those who hope to realize results in decades rather than centuries.

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It rejects any distinction between countries which appear to be generating their own changes, where growth is spontaneous, needing no artificial stimulus and where the capacity to cope with accelerating change is self-adjusting, and those which seem to lack the requisite components of self-development and where change has to be induced externally or through governmental action. All countries are developing, some at a faster pace than others, and in different directions. Each has different development problems. The most serious problem of all, however, is the persistent gap between rich and poor countries, fast developing and slow developing regions, and the possibility that the gap between them is widening or that some countries may actually be regressing.

Development administration had its origins in the desire of the richer countries to aid the poorer countries, and more especially in the obvious needs of newly emerging states to transform their colonial bureaucracies into more responsive instruments of societal change. The simple underlying conception was that the transfer of resources and know-how would hasten the modernization process from agraria to industria, using government and public sponsored bodies as change agents. The transfer of resources would be conducted through international bodies, mutual aid programs and bilateral agreements and the recipients would channel their new resources into areas which would generate change of their own accord, such as education, health, capital investment, communications, science and research, and administrative capability. Development proved to be much more complex. Which countries needed most help? Which countries should receive priority? Who could best advise on the specific needs of individual countries? Could domestic governments handle their aid wisely or would it be better to channel aid through foreign experts stationed in the country? Where would aid produce the best results, for whom, in which way, at what price, from whose viewpoint? Before long, technical assistance and foreign aid bureaucracies sprouted in the United Nations complex and in the foreign services of the major powers, and international experts with the requisite know-how became globe-trotters. Within assisted countries or potential /recipients, other

recipients, other bureaucracies sprang up to assist foreign experts, to devise ways and means of extracting additional international aid, to plan where to use foreign contributions, and to manage technical assistance programs, including how to disguise the use of external assistance on purposes for which they were not originally or ostensibly intended. Only a small part of foreign aid was free from obligations and commitments on the part of the recipient. Not all was donated in a useful form. Quite a bit was squandered on show places, white elephants, non-productive investment, and conspicuous consumption of élites.

Foreign aid did not turn out to be a universal stimulant. In Western Europe and Japan where war had temporarily reduced development capacity, it was successful. Elsewhere its effects were mixed. Some countries used their aid wisely, others frittered it away. For most newly emerging countries, it was a drop in the ocean compared with requirements. Domestic sources would have to be mobilized for development. An inventory of available domestic resources was required. Programs, projects and plans had to be devised for their most effective use, and these practical schemes activated through existing institutions and new creations. Once activated, they had to be properly managed. So development administration spread its interest from foreign aid programs to the domestic public policy problems of recipients. At the time, it was largely virgin territory. Many colonial administrators showed no interest or were too absorbed in evacuation problems. New political leaders had no experience in statecraft and very little technical competence. Few had the benefit of a highly qualified indigenous public bureaucracy, or business community or trade union movement or militia. As no one had tried before to accelerate development artificially, there were no guidelines. At first everything had to be improvised before any kind of base could be established from which coherent public policies could be formulated and practical programs implemented. Usually the developmental network had to be superimposed on a traditional law and order frame or placed alongside the existing structure. At any event it was something completely new and untried. It was innovating and challenging and most

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attractive to humanitarian professionals and normative social scientists who joined those already engrossed in foreign aid administration.

Proficient specialists soon found their efforts frustrated by poor administration. They were no longer working in organizational societies with bureaucratic peoples. Theirs was a new world. What at first glance appeared familiar proved something different. Nothing seemed to work properly. Time was perceived differently. Cooperation was half hearted. Business was more personal. The society lacked proper institutions. The organizations lacked proper methods. The people lacked proper skills. What was needed was the accumulated wisdom of the Western administrative systems. The new world had to be made in the image of the old. So bureaucratization was essential, institution-building unavoidable, and Western administrative folklore indispensable. Westernized élites accepted the prescription and quickly learnt the right things to do, at least according to the book. The rest of society was unmoved and would not abandon traditional ways. Western administrative precepts were not universal; there was no one best way. Something different had to be tried but no one knew what. So development administration began to look closely at indigenous administrative systems to see what might be useful for development purposes. In this endeavour, the ecological approach of Riggs and much narrow and middle range theory proved most useful.

Still the academic world was not content. If development was universal and if modernized societies had already experienced the problems confronting modernizing or transitional societies, these had to be universal. Perhaps they could be derived from historical models of the great powers, which in any case might prove useful to practitioners in the field groping for guidelines. With development becoming more magical every moment and more resources available for the study of anything about development, development administration became a catch-all for idiographic applied social scientists and nomothetic theorists. Development administration took off into modernization, nation-buildings, social change, industrialization, cultural anthropology, urbanization, political ecology and anything else that seemed to promise help for

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policymakers in developing countries. By now, the recipients of foreign aid had been pushed further and further into the background as the new wave of development theorists discovered that their own societies faced identical problems at a different level of complexity. Perhaps by studying the simple processes of the so-called underdeveloped countries, the so-called developed countries might learn something to their advantage. The wheel has almost travelled full circle. The result is absolute confusion. Nobody really knows what the word development really stands for anymore. Economists identify it with economic productivity, sociologists with social change, or social differentiation, political scientists with democratization or political capacity or expanded government, administrators with bureaucratization or optimum efficiency or performance or capacity to assume all burdens. Not surprisingly, nomothetic theorists are seeking a universal frame of reference and a conceptual scheme.

Development administration is not administrative development. It is that aspect of public administration which focuses on government influenced change toward progressive political, economic and social objectives, once confined to recipients of foreign aid but now universally applied.

Development administration thus encompasses the organization of new agencies such as planning organizations and development corporations; the reorientation of established agencies such as departments of agriculture; the delegation of administrative powers to development agencies; and the creation of a cadre of administrators who can provide leadership in stimulating and supporting programs of social and economic improvement. It has the purpose of making change attractive and possible

It consists of efficient management of public development programs and the stimulation of private development programs. Esman defines the tasks of nation building and socioeconomic development in broad political rather than administrative terms, as follows:

1. Achieving security against external aggression and ensuring internal order.

/2. Establishing

2. Establishing and maintaining consensus on the legitimacy of the regime.
3. Integrating diverse ethnic, religious, communal, and regional elements into a national political community.
4. Organizing and distributing formal powers and functions among organs of central, regional and local governments and between public authority and the private sector.
5. Displacement of vested traditional social and economic interests.
6. Development of modernizing skills and institutions.
7. Fostering of psychological and material security.
8. Mobilization of savings and of current financial resources.
9. Rational programming of investment.
10. Efficient management of facilities and services.
11. Activating participation in modernizing activities, especially in decision-making roles.
12. Achieving a secure position in the international community.

Though he has the Third World in mind, his developmental tasks are universal. Unlike others, he does not recommend anything for the underdeveloped countries that he would not recommend for the developed countries. The range of interests is wide, from philosophical speculation about the nature of development administration objectives to techniques for inducing peasants to adopt improved seeds, fertilizers and mechanical tools. The view of the administrator in a developmental system is not just that of program formulator, manager and implementor, but, following Almond, of policy maker and adviser, interest aggregator and articulator, and political communicator, adjudicator and socializer as well. A brief review of the major concerns of development administration should make this clear.

(a) Development theory

Why develop? What is development? What are (or should be) the objectives of development? What are the assumptions behind development? What is the impact of development on society? These are some of the questions which development theorists try to answer.

/While others

While others rush headlong into development, the theorists want to know to where they are rushing, for what reasons and with which motivations. The answers are by no means obvious. Development may destroy humanity and the planet. Development may keep more people longer in the same abject state of poverty, disease and pain. Development may create intellectual tyrannies, military and bureaucratic polities, technological enslavement. Common sense meanings may not be fulfilled in the post-industrial world, particularly if national development rather than international or human development receives priority.

(b) Development ideology

The goal of development is not Westernization or modernization into industria, but the employment of modern techniques, both technical and social, in the pursuit of societal objectives. It is the attainment of results, not rationality, form or ritual. To achieve this end, an ideology of development is essential, something Weidner described as a "state of mind" that fosters a belief in equitable progress and Esman saw as a doctrine incorporating (a) reliance on ideology for decision criteria, (b) priority to fundamental social reform, (c) political and social mobilization, (d) latitude for competitive political action and interest articulation, (e) ethnic, religious and regional integration, (f) governmental guidance of economic and social policy, and (g) commitment to the future.

(c) Development politics

Within society, people have different ideas about the future, and different abilities to realize their ideas. Development is controversial simply because it reflects the clash of ideas and power. Elites do not voluntarily preside over their dissolution. Nor are they united in everything they do. Further, they work within ecological restraints and cannot achieve all that they seek to do. Their priorities may not coincide with the values of the masses. Compromises have to be struck, concessions made, conflicts settled, hardcore resisters reconciled or imprisoned. Development is political. It depends on government action. It reflects the political culture. It is carried out by the living constitution. It is affected by changes in the political regime, party composition of the

/government, and

government, and personality of political leaders. Here development administration is fused with political science.

(d) Technical Cooperation

Technical cooperation has become big business. The United States has continued its substantial aid programs though the size of funds and the direction of their use have altered since the Marshall Aid program of the late 1940's. The United Nations complex has cajoled member states into increasing their international assistance contributions under its auspices. Private foundations, particularly in the United States, have assumed voluntary obligations to aid technical cooperation. Technical cooperation has involved more than the lending of experts and the gift or loan of resources. It has had far-reaching repercussions on recipient countries and donors. The recipients have experienced unexpected spin-offs in non-technical areas. The donors have been deprived of resources which they could have used for their domestic problems rather than in questionable foreign ventures. One disappointing area of technical cooperation has been in public administration itself largely because the transformation of the discipline since World War II was not reflected in aid mission which relied largely on pre-World War II notions and conceptions that had already been challenged at home. The transfer of know-how was not enough. It had to be related to the environment of the recipient, the nature of the polity and indigenous administrative styles, the kinds of practical programs being undertaken, and the whole circumstances surrounding the need for and operation of the required know-how.

(e) Institution-building

Technical cooperation has resisted the temptation to perform development activities on behalf of recipients, though in some cases there has been no alternative simply because the recipient had no means of carrying out the contemplated activities itself. Instead the emphasis has been on helping recipients to carry out continuing activities themselves by concentrating on institution-building, that is, the ability to routinize innovative activities. In some cases, this meant constructing bureaucracies, framing laws, building storehouses, ports, roads and other physical requirements, expanding education and health services. In other cases, it

/meant encouraging

meant encouraging political action, private entrepreneurship, community development. In public administration, it largely took the form of establishing institutes of public administration for research, education and training throughout the world and student exchange programs.

(f) Administrative Reform

Much of the work in public administration undertaken in newly emerging states was purely imitative of the great powers or exaggerated the administrative traits of the former imperial power. In the absence of any indigenous administrative tradition, the adoption of foreign patterns was accepted and performed to expectations until expectations changed and foreign patterns could not meet the challenge. According to performance standards in developed countries, the administrative systems of the Third World are grossly deficient. Maladministration is blamed. The emphasis is on improvement through transnational reform and internal multiplier effects. Gone are early simplistic notions of the "one best way" except in United Nations circles where the traditional universal principles approach have been codified in handbooks and manuals. In their place are various strategies which Ilchman has classified as (a) administrative systems approach which supports transnational administrative reform in balanced across-the-board form or unbalanced key segment form, (b) balanced social growth approach which does not advocate administrative improvement for its own sake but in close harmony with other societal improvement lest the public bureaucracy swamps other institutions, and (c) unbalanced social growth approach which permits autonomous administrative improvement whatever the consequences, with or without reference to the polity, and local political support. Again, development administration is fused with political science.

(g) National planning and budgeting

National planning is now accepted as an essential element in economic development. Donor countries have insisted on plans to reassure themselves that recipients really know what they are doing, while recipients have produced plans, not merely to attract foreign aid but as symbols of development ideology and guidelines to possible action in accelerating

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the rate of economic and social progress. Everyone plans but whether anything practical results from the process is a different matter. Macroplanning is comparable to nomothetic theorizing in that no-one has been able to activate the conceptual framework or translate the general objectives into practical programs and projects. Micro-planning which combines existing and contemplated projects and programs and frames budgets on that basis is more successful but constitutes budget-making rather than planning, a process that has fixed objectives in mind and decides on values and priorities. The preoccupation of economists with grand designs and project planning and implementation, econometrics and budget administration, public initiatives and cooperative ventures, has lessened their appreciation of the politics of plannings, particularly in the Third World where expedient political considerations override rational economic precepts, the statistical infra-structure is inadequate, and instability undermines projections.

(h) Technical administration

Development is centered on action programs in a wide range of technical fields - medicine, environmental health, school systems, higher education, sanitary engineering, traffic control, public housing, forestry, agricultural cooperatives, product design and so forth. Professional results are diminished by poor administrative arrangements in the technical sphere. The technicians have to be sensitized to their administrative environment and administrators have to be trained to work in a technical environment. In short, it is not enough to know what to do. It is more important to use effectively the knowledge at one's disposal.

(i) Non-bureaucratic mechanisms

The bureaucratic mechanisms of the developed countries may be inapplicable in a non-bureaucratized society or undesirable where they threaten a non-bureaucratic polity. In both cases, development administration seeks to use non-bureaucratic mechanisms in the administrative system. As alternatives to public authorities, development projects are administered by political parties, trade unions, private

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enterprise, religious bodies, and other non-public institutions. As effective controls of the public bureaucracy, development programs may be directed at strengthening a legal system or mass media or political cadres. Bureaucratic power may be fragmented by local government systems, regionalism, communes, rural government, and community development. Development administrators may prefer to use existing non-bureaucratic mechanisms, such as corruption (as a taxing device on the rich), unattached middlemen, and traditional folkways that impose administrative reform. The study of such mechanisms have helped developed countries in dealing with their non-bureaucratized minorities and problems of turbulence not susceptible to bureaucratic solutions. In this, the Third World may return something tangible on donor investment.

The study of developmental systems has revealed many ways to achieve the same objectives. To measure the performance of an administrative system - international, national or developmental - the whole environment, the demands made on the system, and its available resources, have to be taken into account. None of these is susceptible to precise qualification, or at this stage, complete identification. Though evaluation is likely to remain impressionistic for some time, much more is known about foreign administrative systems than ever before and considerably more is known about relationships both within and without them. The earlier naivity has been shed, perhaps not completely, and in its place more sophisticated multi-disciplinary tools are available along with a respect for complexity and an appreciation of human ingenuity. The whole study of administrative systems has added a new dimension to the study of human behaviour and many stimulating ideas have resulted. Admittedly basic concepts have been challenged and the validity of cherished principles doubted. The whole field is confused and confusing; conceptual frameworks crumble when put to the test of universality; existing methods are unsatisfactory; new operational techniques are needed. The higher quality of the theoretical work and its increased value to practitioners shows that people are aware of its shortcomings. This awareness will in time generate

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the impetus to break through existing barriers that handicap human development just as man has succeeded in his other endeavors, such as climbing the highest mountains, exploring the deepest underwater chasms, travelling beyond the stratosphere and discovering the secret of life itself. When he eventually succeeds, the returns to mankind will be equally if not more, impressive.

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