



UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL



C.1
—

GENERAL
E/CN.12/874
8 February 1971
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

.....
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Fourteenth session

Santiago, Chile, 28 April-8 May 1971

POPULATION TRENDS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

Conference document

71-2-718

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. Introduction	1
2. The present situation and the foreseeable future ..	3
(a) Rates of increase and their determinants	3
(b) Geographic distribution, urbanization and internal migration	11
(c) Life expectancies, age and sex distribution ...	16
(d) Types of countries	18
3. Inter-relations between demographic change, social and economic change, and public policies	20
(a) Social stratification and families	20
(b) Social services	25
(c) Employment	36
(d) Saving	38
(e) Land use and tenure	40
(f) Natural resources and space	42
4. Population policies	45
(a) Delimitation of population policy	45
(b) Conceptions and ideologies concerning the role of population in Latin American development ...	48
(c) Governmental policies and attitudes	53
(d) Objectives and instruments of a population policy	57

1. Introduction

During the past two decades the rapid growth and geographical redistribution of the population of most Latin American countries have increasingly forced themselves on public attention as problems demanding a more adequate understanding and some kind of policy consistent with over-all development policy and with national conceptions of a viable future social order. Extremely divergent views on the meaning of these phenomena and what should be done about them continue to be advanced, and much of the information that would be needed to verify essential aspects of the different hypotheses continues to be lacking or of dubious reliability. Nevertheless, the prolonged polemics have contributed to a better appreciation of the complexity of the factors involved and the inadequacy of the simply complacent as well as the simply denunciatory approaches. The researches carried out by the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE) and by increasing numbers of other institutions and scholars have done a great deal, even in the face of baffling inadequacies in the basic data and a continuing failure on the part of most Governments to allocate adequate resources to the collection of demographic statistics, to clarify present trends and permit trustworthy projections of the future.

In August 1970, the first Latin American Regional Population Conference ^{1/} assembled nearly 200 papers discussing and reporting on research concerning fertility, mortality, migration, urbanization and

^{1/} Held in Mexico, D.F.; co-sponsored by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Latin American Demographic Centre, and the Colegio de México. Titles cited below without references to place and date of publication are papers presented to this Conference.

/regional distribution

regional distribution of population; relationships between population and economic and social development, future population trends, population policies, and the state of demographic research and teaching in Latin America. These papers, presenting an extremely wide range of theories, opinions and empirical data, provide a favourable opportunity for an overview of the population question in Latin America, advancing beyond previous studies.^{2/} The beginning of a new decade, expected to serve as a framework for the formulation of long-term development strategies, makes such an overview particularly necessary. However, the fact that most countries are conducting their decennial censuses in 1970 or 1971 means that it is not worthwhile to accompany this overview by detailed recent statistics. For the most part, the demographic statistics and projections now at hand derive from the 1960 censuses, and are readily available in other publications.

The following pages will first summarize very briefly the present demographic situation of Latin America, giving particular attention to the likelihood of continuity or important change in the past trends that necessarily serve as bases for statistical projections of the demographic future and to the light thrown on these questions by the preliminary data now becoming available from some of the new censuses. It will then discuss the main social and economic factors that have been identified as exerting a significant influence on population change and that, at the same time, are influenced or constrained by population change. It will here be necessary to cover a wide range of topics on which there is no consensus among authorities. In several instances, it will not be possible to do more than summarize the arguments that have been advanced and express a tentative preference based on ECLA's general diagnosis of development problems and requisites. The crucial question of policy formulation will then be explored. An attempt will be made to summarize objectively the relevant ideological positions.

^{2/} See First Part Economic Survey of Latin America 1969 and Chapter XVIII in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

Finally, the need to give population policy a legitimate and clearly defined place within a long-term development strategy, will be confronted with the need to realistic criteria for what the Government can justifiably do or refrain from doing while they are still struggling to evolve such a strategy. In population as in all the other areas of public social action, commitments are now being made, programmes are gaining momentum, and pressures are being generated that will not wait until the State is ready and able to integrate them into a comprehensive strategy.

2. The present situation and the foreseeable future ^{3/}

a) Rates of increase and their determinants

A country's over-all rate of population increase has three immediate determinants - the rates of fertility, of mortality, and of migration across its borders. For Latin America as a whole, it is generally agreed that the major possible variations and the main incognita as to future population growth as well as age composition depend on the first of these variables.

There is ample room for further lowering of mortality rates, if these are compared with the rates attained by high-income countries. Future declines are expected to be relatively slow compared with the recent past, but in their effects on over-all rates of increase should be at least sufficient to offset initial declines in fertility.^{4/} Only a few of the smaller and poorer countries still have the potentiality of very large declines over a period of a few years that produced, for the region

^{3/} For a more detailed discussion of the questions treated in this section and supporting statistics, see Chapter IV in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America, op.cit as well as the papers of the Regional Conference.

^{4/} For the region as a whole, a decline in the gross death rate from 10.0 in 1965-1970 to 7.0 in 1980-1985 is projected. The expectation of life at birth should rise by 6.5 years between the same periods. Projected trends for individual countries differ widely from the regional average. At one extreme, the gross death rate of Argentina would rise lightly, from 8.6 to 9.0, because of the aging of the population. At the other extreme the Haitian and Bolivian rates, the highest in the region, would decline from 19.7 to 13.7 and from 19.1 to 16.3 respectively. Other countries with present rates for above the regional average are Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

as a whole, the rapid acceleration of population growth over the past few decades. Rising mortality rates are not to be expected anywhere unless catastrophes now unforeseeable intervene, except in Argentina.

It is highly improbable that international immigration will ever regain the ability to play the important part in quantitative increase that it did in a few Latin American countries in the past. Emigration has present and potential importance only for a few of the small Caribbean countries. The future role of international migration will be mainly qualitative, and will depend on the balance between Latin American ability to attract migrants with needed skills and ability to limit the out-migration of nationals possessing such skills. Unfortunately, the latter current seems likely to predominate. Migration may also be of some importance in changing the balance of population between certain countries within the region, and the progress of economic integration may facilitate population movements between Latin American countries. Even this is questionable, in view of the growing dimensions of structural unemployment in almost all the countries and the resistances that migrations of this kind encounter once they reach a scale large enough to alter significantly the demographic traits of the host country.

Attention thus centres on the future behaviour of fertility, as not only the variable most likely to undergo major change but also the most susceptible to influence by public policies intended to control the rate of population increase. A high proportion of recent demographic research and writing has been devoted to this variable.^{5/} The extremely youthful age composition resulting from the combination of high fertility and declining mortality in recent years gives an enormous momentum to further population increase, ensuring that crude birth rates will remain high and

^{5/} More than 40 of the papers submitted to the Latin American Regional Population Conference dealt with fertility. See, in particular, the conference paper by Walter Mertens, "Fertility and Family Planning Research in Latin America".

that the over-all rate of increase might not be affected for some years after the beginning of a decline in fertility rates for women of child bearing age. According to historical precedents, changes in the reproductive behaviour of women have been slow and gradual, with a few recent exceptions (Japan, Taiwan). Projections of variations in population growth rates using different assumptions concerning fertility trends thus point to the probability of a relatively narrow range of alternatives. According to the low variant used in recent projections made by ECLA and CELADE, the population growth rate for Latin America as a whole might drop from 2.83 per cent in 1960-1965 to 2.69 per cent in 1980-1985. According to an intermediate set of assumptions it would rise slightly to 2.91 per cent, and according a high variant the rate might rise to 3.19 per cent. This would mean total regional populations in 1985 of 411 millions, 425 millions, and 440 millions, respectively, compared to 238 millions in 1965.^{6/}

Demographic projections are necessarily based on past trends and on the possibilities for modification of these trends demonstrated by past experience. Demographers are well aware that such trends may not be a reliable guide to the future.^{7/} Advances in contraceptive techniques,

6/ See Tables 9-11 in Chapter IV of Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America, op. cit. These totals include the 20 Latin American republics and 4 Caribbean countries. If all Caribbean countries and territories are included the totals rise by nearly 8 millions for 1965 and 10 millions for 1985.

7/ "El cálculo de poblaciones futuras por medio de proyecciones de tendencias pasadas dentro de marcos estrictamente demográficos tiene sus riesgos en cualquier época. Esto es particularmente cierto en América Latina en el período que se analiza. El supuesto de continuidad en las tasas de crecimiento debe llegar a ser, tarde o temprano un supuesto contrario a los hechos." (Irene S. Taeuber, "Tendencias demográficas futuras en América Latina"). "The predictions of demographers / have all been dependent upon one premise: 'If present trends continue...' It is an ancient statistical fallacy to perform extrapolations on this premise when in fact the premise is invalid. It is my major point that recent trends have not continued, nor are they likely to do so. ... /recent/ developments are so new and so novel that population trends before 1960 are largely irrelevant

the spread of public and private family planning services, the increasing pervasiveness of the mass communication media, and the drastic changes in social patterns, livelihood, physical environment and consumption stimuli, to which most of the Latin American people are now exposed might, in some combination as yet undefinable, bring about unprecedentedly rapid change in reproductive behaviour, and thus in population growth and age distribution. As in the case of mortality in the recent past, technological change and organized public action might make fertility changes much less dependent on the economic and social gains that seem to have been their previous requisites.

It is well-known that two countries of the region, Argentina and Uruguay, have not shared in the regional pattern of high fertility and accelerated population increase. In recent decades their demographic patterns have been closer to those of Europe than to those of the remainder of Latin America. Two other countries, Chile and Cuba, are well along the way to moderate fertility and moderate rate of increase. The Chilean birth-rate fell from 37.1 per thousand inhabitants in 1963 to 27.8 in 1969. More recently, a few small countries have moved in the same direction. The Costa Rican birth rate, nearly stable at a very high level up to 1963, fell from 45.3 in that year to 34.5 in 1969. Panama shows a smaller drop from 41.0 in 1960 to 38.0 in 1969. The English-speaking countries of the Caribbean all show significant downward trends during the 1960s.

7/ (continued) in predicting what will happen in the future." (Donald Bogue, "The End of the Population Explosion", (Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office, Research Papers, No. 4, December 1967.) Nathan Keyfitz, making a distinction between simple projections and projections that aspire to serve as predictions, has remarked on the wide discrepancies between past predictions and what has happened, and on the paucity of evaluation studies: "... miles de páginas impresas dan cifras futuras, unos cuantos cientos de páginas establecen los supuestos sobre los que se basan dichas cifras, unas cuantas docenas cuando mucho evalúan los métodos mediante la comparación de proyecciones pasadas con el desarrollo subsecuente." ("La proyección y la predicción en demografía: Una revisión del estado de este arte".)

/In Brazil,

In Brazil, national vital statistics are too incomplete to indicate whether the over-all rate (estimated to be around 33) has changed significantly, but in the city of Sao Paulo, after remaining nearly stable for several years, the birth rate fell from 31.9 in 1963 to 25.1 in 1968.^{8/} In a few other countries with complete birth statistics (according to the 1969 Demographic Yearbook) the birth rate also shows a declining trend. In El Salvador the rate remained around 49 up to 1963, then fell to 42 by 1969. In Guatemala, a similar decline from a rate around 49 began two years earlier. In these latter cases, however, the decline may be due, at least in large part, to changes in levels of mortality and in age structures and the extent to which there has been a real decline in fertility deriving from changes in the reproductive behaviour of the population is unknown. Verification would require observation of the evolution of other indices that cannot be calculated through the information available for these countries. In Chile, Costa Rica and Panama, however, declines in the gross reproduction rate (relation between members of the female births in two successive generations, assuming that the females survive up to the end of their reproductive period) confirm the trends indicated by the birth rates.

It is interesting that in various countries a decline in the birth rate begins sharply around 1963, following a period of stability. This trend can be observed both in countries in which fertility had previously fallen to a moderate level, and in countries with stable high birth rates in which no previous declines had been observed. Programmes for diffusion of contraceptive practices were too incipient in the early 1960s to have had any significant influence on fertility. Neither does the rapidity of the decline correspond to the historical experience of slow diffusion of birth control practices in different social classes. A plausible hypothesis would be that during this period large numbers of persons already trying or wanting to control their fertility gained access through their own initiative to more efficient methods of doing so.

^{8/} Olavo Baptista Filho, "Extensión del período de formación profesional y el comportamiento de la natalidad".

Preliminary data from six 1970 censuses suggest that in the few countries in which the demographic transition to lower fertility began some time ago it has proceeded more rapidly than expected, but that elsewhere decreases in fertility, if present, are not yet sufficient to do more than offset declining mortality. (It deserves emphasis that the preliminary totals frequently suggest erroneous conclusions when allowance is not made for under-enumeration.) Three countries show discrepancies on the low side between census population and projected population that are too large to be accounted for by under-enumeration. In Argentina, the projected population is 4.8 per cent higher than the census population (24,444,000 against 23,323,000). If one allows for some under-enumeration (probably less than 3 per cent), the population has been increasing a little more slowly than expected. In Chile, the discrepancy is 10.2 per cent (9,735,000 against 8,835,000) so that the real slackening in population growth must be quite significant. In the Dominican Republic, the discrepancy is 6.6 per cent (4,277,000 against 4,012,000). In this case, the discrepancy is harder to explain. Mortality may have remained at a higher level than expected or under-enumeration may have been extensive. No significant drop in fertility has been detected nor expected, in view of the characteristics of the country. In Panama the projected population was about 2 per cent below the census population (1,399,000 to 1,425,000), a discrepancy that might easily be doubled once under-enumeration is allowed for, although fertility declined more substantially during the decade than the projection assumed, so that a discrepancy on the high side might be expected. A positive balance in international migration or a more rapid decline in mortality than was assumed in the projection may have offset declining fertility, but present information does not permit verification of these hypotheses. In Mexico, a discrepancy of 3.4 per cent might be accounted for mainly by under-enumeration. Thus, the Mexican rate of population increase has not slackened significantly. In the particularly interesting case of Brazil, preliminary census figures indicate a population of 92,300,000, differing only 1.5 per cent from the projection for the census date (93,687,000); the percentage of under-enumeration in Brazil may be relatively important, and in all probability would more than offset the 1.5 per cent discrepancy.

/Whether this

Whether this is owing to the maintenance of fertility at higher levels than expected or a more pronounced decline in mortality than expected, or both, cannot be determined until the full census results are available.

Elsewhere demographers are watching anxiously for signs of change in reproductive behaviour and speculating on the influences at work. Even the highest fertility rates in Latin America are well below the biological maximum, and increases would be theoretically possible, although not all likely. Some degree of control over fertility is exercised, through some combination of actions influenced by social and cultural patterns, whether or not these actions are deliberately directed toward fertility control.^{2/} Even though the fertility rates for women of reproductive age continue at high levels in most of the countries, the over-all rates can conceal shifts that will be important for the future. In Mexico, for example, women in the youngest reproductive age group (15-24) show fertility rates significantly lower than did women in the same age group a few years ago,

2/ A widely used classification distinguishes eleven "intermediate variables" as the only factors through which cultural conditions can affect fertility:

- I. Factors Affecting Exposure to Intercourse (Intercourse Variables)
 - A. Those governing the formation and dissolution of unions in the reproductive period.
 1. Age of entry into sexual unions.
 2. Permanent celibacy: proportion of women never entering sexual unions.
 3. Amount of reproductive period spent after or between unions.
 - B. Those governing the exposure to intercourse within unions.
 4. Voluntary abstinence.
 5. Involuntary abstinence.
 6. Coital frequency.
- II. Factors affecting Exposure to Conception ("Conception Variables")
 7. Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by involuntary causes.
 8. Use or non-use of contraception.
 9. Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by voluntary causes.
- III. Factors Affecting Gestation and Successful Parturition ("Gestation Variables")
 10. Foetal mortality from involuntary causes.
 11. Foetal mortality from voluntary causes.

(Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, "Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytical Framework", Economic Development and Cultural Change, IV, 3, April 1956; Spanish version in Kingsley Davis, La Sociedad Humana, Tomo II, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires 1957.)

/resulting from

resulting from some combination of later marriage, wider use of contraception, and abortions. In the over-all rate, this decrease is offset by higher fertility among women 30-39 years of age, probably resulting from better health in this group and diminished mortality of male partners. If the newer reproductive pattern among the younger women persists and means that they are going to choose fewer children for the whole of their reproductive span, the over-all rate will eventually begin to drop.^{10/} Fertility differentials according to levels of income and education and degree of urbanization have been demonstrated for almost all the Latin American countries. It is reasonable to suppose that if urbanization continues and levels of education and income rise - and particularly if incomes and access to education are more evenly distributed - over-all fertility rates will decline.

On the basis of such evidence, inconclusive as it is, demographers are inclined to expect the beginning during the 1970s of pronounced declines in fertility in the more economically and socially dynamic countries of the region. How fast and how important this decline may be "remains a matter of speculation at this moment".^{11/}

Later sections of the present survey will enter further into the evidence bearing on these speculations, although the discussion will perforce be inconclusive. For the present, two generalizations can be made with confidence.

First, whatever the changes in fertility, population growth rates will remain for many years at high enough levels to bring about enormous increments to the population. As the population base expands, even rates of increase much lower than the present will produce very large absolute increments. It would be impossible to derive from existing evidence any plausible prediction as to when and whether Latin America will attain a

^{10/} Centro de Estudios Económicos y Demográficos, El Colegio de México, Dinámica de la Población de México (Mexico, D.F., 1970), pp. 60-61, 83, 187.

^{11/} Walter Mertens, op. cit.

stationary population, but such an event could hardly come about before the year 2050 and before the regional population has reached several times its present size.^{12/}

Second, decreases in fertility and in family size are bound to be very unevenly distributed, and probably with a continuing inverse relationship to capacity to bear the burdens and take advantage of the opportunities presented by increase in the number of children. The decline of fertility will proceed in the more urbanized and more dynamic countries, and in countries able to support relatively high levels of education and social services, before it begins in the smaller and poorer countries, which already have the highest fertility rates of the region. Within countries, fertility will decline in the wealthier, more "modern", more urbanized localities before it does in the poorer and more rural internal regions. As to social classes and income groups, it is well-known that the middle and upper strata already practice family limitation more consistently and effectively than do the lower strata particularly the urban marginal population and the rural masses. This differential will probably continue, whatever the speed and effectiveness of the diffusion of fertility limitation practices among the latter groups.^{13/} If so, continuing population increase may be an important factor in accentuating the multiple imbalances and distributional inequities that now characterize Latin American economic growth and social changes.

(b) Geographic distribution, urbanization and internal migration

It is well-known that rapid population increase in most Latin American countries has been accompanied by increasing unevenness in the geographical distribution of population and by peculiarly rapid and concentrated urbanization. Within the past two decades there have been certain important advances in the frontiers of land settlement and a number of new urban

^{12/} It has been calculated that the population of a country will continue to grow for 65 to 70 years after a unitary rate of reproduction (two children per couple surviving their parents) has been reached. If Latin America were to reach a unitary rate in 1980-1985, the population would become stationary 552.4 millions in 2045. A unitary rate in 1990-1995 would mean a population of 654.8 millions in 2050, and a unitary rate in 2000-2005 would mean a population of 783.2 millions in 2070. (Projections by U.S. Bureau of the Census, May 1970.) A unitary rate before 2000 seems highly unlikely.

^{13/} In Chile, crude birth rates fell between 15 and 23 per cent in the most urbanized provinces between 1961 and 1967; in predominantly rural provinces the drop was much smaller. While the rate of legitimate births fell, the rate of illegitimate births (accounted for mainly by the poorer strata) remained constant.

growth poles in previously empty regions can be identified. Nevertheless, most of the regions previously empty or thinly populated have remained so; in most of the longer-settled predominantly rural regions, net population growth has been moderate, and some have become stationary or lost population. In fact, the areas that have lost population include various thinly populated zones of relatively recent frontier settlement, such as the Argentine Chaco.

Since there is no reason to doubt that the rate of natural increase in rural areas is as high as that in urban areas if not higher, it is obvious that rapid and concentrated urbanization must involve a very considerable transfer of rural people into areas defined as urban. While variations between countries are wide, it can be roughly estimated that for the region as a whole, half of a natural rural population increase of 3 per cent per year has been moving out of the rural category and contributing directly from a third to a half of urban growth. This newly urban population, predominantly of young adults retaining typically high rural fertility rates also accounts for an important proportion of urban natural increase.

In spite of a fair number of local investigations and a great deal of discussion it is not much easier now than in 1959 ^{14/} to make sound generalizations about the causes, characteristics and consequences of this phenomenon. Part of the difficulty derives from the inadequacies of past census data and the fact that most of the data available derive from the 1950 and 1960 round of censuses, while the cities have grown enormously during the 1960s and the composition of their populations may have changed significantly. Part derives from the ambiguities of terminology. Neither the term "migrant" nor the terms "urban" and "rural" can be given satisfactory all-purpose definitions. This difficulty, in turn, derives from the complexity and diversity of the processes involved. There are

^{14/} In 1959 a seminar co-sponsored by the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America and Unesco brought together studies constituting the first broad inter-disciplinary survey of urbanization in the region. (Unesco, Urbanization in Latin America, 1961.) See also Geographical Distribution of the Population of Latin America and Regional Development Priorities", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, VIII, 1, March 1963.

many kinds of urban as well as rural areas. The "urban" character of a modern metropolis with several millions of inhabitants is quite different from the urban character of a new and specialized centre of heavy industry, a traditional medium-sized provincial capital, or a small town providing marketing and administrative services to a limited rural hinterland. Zones of modern mechanized farming, plantations, traditional haciendas, compact village settlements, Indian communities, and dispersed minifundio cultivators are equally diverse, culturally and demographically as well as economically. The composition of migration to and from the different kinds of urban and rural setting in all probability quite different. Almost any assertion concerning urbanization and migration may be valid for some urban areas and some migrants. Subject to these cautions, the weight of recent evidence supports the following conclusions:^{15/}

(1) Migrants arriving in the large cities are an extremely heterogeneous group in respect to education, occupations, and social characteristics. They are predominantly from smaller cities and towns. The view still repeated in articles on urban problems that the migrants are mainly uprooted peasants and youth from peasant families is untenable, although such migrants may be of considerable importance in certain cities. (It should also be kept in mind that, from the standpoint of the modern metropolis, the cultural traits of small-town migrants may appear "rural".)

(2) Through a process of self-selection, the migrants have been predominantly young adults, better educated and possessing higher levels of skills than the averages for populations of their places of origin, although below the averages for the native populations of the cities to which they have migrated. The evidence does not support the view that the migrants have been "marginalized" in higher proportions than the

^{15/} These conclusions are drawn mainly from two papers presented at the 1970 Latin American Regional Population Conference: Juan C. Elizaga, "Migraciones Interiores: Evolución Reciente y Estado Actual de los Estudios"; John J. Macisco Jr., "Some Thoughts on an Analytical Framework for Rural to Urban Migration".

native urban population. There is evidence, however, that as the scale of migration to some of the great cities has continued to increase it has become less selective and less predominately urban.^{16/}

(3) The investigations that have been made do not support the hypothesis that "step-wise" migration has been important; that is, that migrants have moved first to the smaller local urban centres, then to the great cities. The gap between rural natural and net rates of population increase, however, demonstrates that large numbers of rural people are somehow becoming "urban". Part of this would be due to the growth of small centres above the dividing line of 2,000 used to distinguish rural from urban, but a part must also be due to a replacement in the small towns and provincial cities of the out-migrants by rural in-migrants.^{17/}

(4) In some of the larger countries there are indications that the concentration of urban growth in the largest centres is beginning to be reversed. Some second-rank cities are growing faster than the main agglomerations, and there are significant increases in the numbers and

^{16/} See Alan B. Simmons and Ramiro Cardona G., "La selectividad de la migración en una perspectiva histórica: El caso de Bogotá (Colombia) 1929-1968"; Jorge Balán and Elizabeth Jelin, "Migración a la Ciudad y Movilidad Social: Un Caso Mexicano"; and Jorge Balán, "Migrant Native Socio-Economic Differences in Latin American Cities: A Structural Analysis" (with commentaries by various sociologists) Latin American Research Review, IV, 1, 1969. The hypothesis has also been advanced, on the basis of studies in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago, that migration to the great cities is selective of both extremes of the socio-economic continuum. (Bruce H. Herrick, Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile, MIT Press, 1965.)

^{17/} In Colombia, "a fill-in migration pattern (in which rural migrants move to villages and small towns, and from which other residents move on to larger towns and cities) seems to fit the considerable amount of admittedly fragmentary evidence better than a stage or step migration process ... The significance of this fill-in process, if substantiated by further studies, is very great. It would mean that the smaller towns are passing through a deeper crisis than is usually assumed. The large towns, after all, are receiving the more dynamic and younger migrants; the small towns lose some of their best people who are replaced by peasants without skills and without capital". (Towards Full Employment. A Programme for Colombia prepared by an Inter-Agency Team organized by the International Labour Office. ILO, Geneva, 1970, Appendix 5, paragraph 9.)

quantitative importance of small towns.^{18/} However, the predominance of the main agglomeration is commonly so great that the limited changes observed may not lead to a significant diminution in this predominance. In Colombia, on the other hand, the increasing predominance of Bogotá has transformed a process of urban growth previously much more balanced than in the other countries. At the same time, in some of the larger countries the relative importance of the urban population, and within this population the importance of the largest centres, has grown to a point at which the share of migration in further city growth is bound to decline and the inter-urban character of such migration is bound to be accentuated.

These tentative conclusions are based on mainly field investigations in a limited number of cities and for different periods during the 1950s and 1960s the possibility cannot be ruled out that predominant trends elsewhere are different, in respect to the importance of rural migrants and the differential marginalization of migrants, or that predominant trends have changed since the date of the investigation. They also do not throw sufficient light on the future. While the rate of growth of population is relatively inflexible in the short term, the currents of geographical redistribution of such population might change considerably within a few years. The great urban agglomeration may well be increasingly strangled by inability to offer minimum infrastructural services and amenities, while the benefits now sought from residence in such agglomerations will certainly be more evenly diffused by innovations in mass communications and transport.

The most important factor may well be the ability of different kinds of locality to offer employment, or at least a marginal livelihood, under the conditions of worsening maladjustment between supply and demand for labour that can be foreseen. The receptiveness of the population, rural as well as urban, to any incentives to migrate will probably continue to increase. National policies and measures concerning industrial location,

^{18/} Dinámica de la Población de México, op. cit., pp. 124-125, 132; also John V. Grauman and Chia-Lin Pan, "Rasgos distintivos de la Urbanización en América Latina". Conclusions concerning the importance of this trend wait an analysis of the 1970-1971 censuses.

highway and other public works construction, agrarian reform, and distribution of social services and social assistance can influence decisively the scope and directions of such migration. The difficulty is, that the stimuli provided by public programmes are likely to provoke migratory flows larger than can be absorbed productively.

It has been suggested that a slowing down of urbanization might mean postponement of the expected declines in national birth rates, in view of the weaker rural motivations and means for fertility control. This factor, however, may well be offset by the accelerating penetration of urban cultural traits and aspirations in the countryside.

(c) Life expectancies, age and sex distribution

The average life-span in Latin America as a whole has increased markedly during recent years, and this increase is expected to continue. For the region as a whole, the expectancy of life at birth is expected to rise from 60.2 years in 1965-1970 to 66.7 years in 1980-1985. The latter life expectancy is 9 years greater than that projected for Asia as a whole, and only 6 years less than that projected for the high-income countries taken together. The past increases have been very unevenly distributed; the smaller and poorer countries are expected to gain more rapidly than the rest during the coming years, but will still lag behind in 1980-1985. The same forecast can be made for the poorer and more rural internal regions of each country. For example, the life expectancies projected for Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador range between 56.8 and 63.9 years, with Bolivia and Haiti at 50.0 and 53.5 respectively, while Brazil is expected to reach 67.6, Colombia 65.5, Mexico 68.6, Peru 67.0, and Venezuela 70.2.^{19/}

The high rates of fertility and of population increase, however, mean that even changes of these dimensions in life expectancies will have little effect on the age distribution of the population and the notoriously high ratios of population in the ages conventionally defined as those of dependancy to the population in the "active" age groups. The percentage of population in the 0-14 age group would decline only slightly, according

^{19/} See Chapter IV in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

to median variant projections, from 42.5 per cent in 1965 to 41.4 per cent in 1985. The potentially active age group 15-64 would rise slightly, from 53.8 per cent to 54.4 per cent. The age group 65 and over, in spite of a very rapid increase in numbers resulting from greater average longevity, would increase only from 3.6 per cent to 4.0 per cent of the total. The averages, of course, conceal very significant differences between countries. In Argentina, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay, the youthful population, already far below the regional average, will decline more sharply, and the aged population, already above the regional average, will rise considerably. In Chile and Cuba, the percentages in the middle "active" age group will rise significantly if the decline in fertility continues. In Argentina and Uruguay, where there is little room for further decrease in fertility, the cohorts born in past periods of higher fertility are reaching retirement age, and the percentages in the "active" age group will decline in relation to the two dependent groups combined.^{20/} In a few of the smaller countries the percentage in the 0-14 group will continue to rise.

It follows that the very high ratios of dependent population (under 15 and 65 and over) to potentially active population will not change very much over the next 15 years except in the four countries named above. According to one projection, the ratio for the region as a whole would decline from 86-100 in 1970 to 84-100 in 1985, compared to ratios of 57 and 58 for the "developed" regions of the world and 81 and 77 for the "developing" regions as a whole.^{21/} Since dependency ratios in the four countries named above are only slightly higher than the average for the "developed" regions, ratios in most other Latin American countries are well above the regional average, in a few instances the development population being practically as large as the population in the active age span. Various implications of these dependency ratios will be discussed in later sections.

^{20/} This trend is also owing in part to the fact that the cohorts affected by the large-scale immigration of working-age adults in the past are now reaching retirement age.

^{21/} The dependency ratio thus defined is, of course, much smaller than the real dependency ratio mainly because of the limited participation of women in the active population.

Within the Latin American countries both the age distribution and the sex distribution of the population are being affected significantly by the currents of geographical redistribution and urbanization. In view of the inadequacies of information on migration these phenomena can be mentioned only in very general terms. It is clear that young adults are over-represented in the populations of the cities that receive such migration and under-represented in the rural zones and small towns that are sources of migrants. Women are over-represented in migrations to the cities and in migrations over short distances. Men are over-represented in migration to zones of land settlement and in migrations over long distances. These differentials might be expected to have important repercussions on the relative dynamism of the labour force and in capacities for innovation in the zones of out-migration and in-migration. The differential migration of women should have repercussions on the formation of families. These topics have been the subject of speculation for some years, but relevant information continues to be scanty.

(d) Types of countries

The above summary suggests that the Latin American countries fall into several distinct groups in regard to their population structures. These groups coincide in the main with types that can be distinguished on the basis of other social and economic characteristics. For present purposes it is unnecessary to enter into a systematic discussion of the typologies that have been proposed.^{22/} So as to guard against over-generalization, however, it may be useful to indicate roughly the distribution of the Latin American population among groups with differing demographic situations and differing combinations of factors influencing future evolution. These differing situations suggest the desirability of corresponding differences, at least in emphasis, in national population policies:

(1) About 10 per cent of the population of the region lives in two countries (Argentina and Uruguay) in which fertility and mortality have fallen to levels similar to those of the highly urbanized and industrialized countries of other regions.

^{22/} See Chapters III and XVIII in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America. See also Carmen A. Miró, Aspectos Demográficos de América Latina, CELADE, Document A/88.

(2) About 7 per cent lives in two countries (Chile and Cuba) in which the transition to a similar demographic pattern seems to be well under way,

(3) More than 67 per cent lives in five large countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) with high rates of population increase up to the present, with rapid urbanization and considerable economic growth, but with great and probably widening inequalities between internal regions, urban and rural zones, and economic sectors.

(4) About one per cent lives in two small countries (Costa Rica and Panama) with very high rates of increase up to the present, but with recent indications of the beginning of a transition, and with urbanization, income levels and educational levels above the regional average.

5) About 9 per cent lives in seven small countries with no more than 6 million inhabitants in 1970 (Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic) with very high rates of population increase, with urbanization, income levels and educational levels lower than in any of the preceding groups, although with rates of growth in these factors falling in the same range as the countries in group 3.

(6) About 3 per cent lives in two countries (Bolivia and Haiti) in which the highest mortality rates of the region limit population increase to moderate rates in spite of high fertility. In these countries levels of urbanization, incomes and education are even lower than in group 5, and rates of increase in these factors also tend to be low.

(7) About 3 per cent lives in four independent countries and nearly twenty other separate territorial units in the Caribbean areas; most of these small and densely populated countries and territories have rates of fertility and of population increase that have fallen significantly from previously high levels; in a good many of them emigration outside the region has helped to lower rates of population increase and has affected age distribution.

The justifications, practicability and objectives of public programmes designed to influence the demographic variables, and particularly the urgency of public support of such programmes, should vary considerably in the different groups of countries and even between countries within the groups. The case for action to reduce fertility rates, for example, should be strongest in group 5, while the need for exertion of influence on geographical distribution of population would be strongest in group 3.

3. Inter-relations between demographic change, social and economic change, and public policies

It can be assumed that the demographic changes summarized above influence and are in turn influenced by the whole range of social and economic change processes going on in Latin America, as well as the public policies that aspire to channel these changes toward development and enhanced human welfare. It can also be assumed that, while these influences can be separated for analytical purposes, they do not operate unilaterally and in isolation. The meaning of each factor depends on its insertion into a specific social and economic structure and its impingement on specific social classes and types of family within this structure. In a well-known folk tale a simple peasant giving shelter to a stranger on a cold night became suspicious of magic when the stranger blew on his hands to warm them and then blew on his soup to cool it. It would be just as ingenuous to be surprised if prosperity or poverty can promote rapid population growth and urban concentration under some circumstances and discourage these trends under others, or if these demographic trends can promote economic growth under some circumstances and frustrate it under others.

Most of the generalizations on the inter-relations between demographic change and other cultural, social and economic variables have been based on investigations focussed on the past of the high-income industrialized countries, or on incomplete models, or on suppositions that are of doubtful relevance to the real situations of Latin America. These generalizations have been subjected to searching criticisms, particularly in several of the documents presented to the Latin American Regional Population Conference, but empirical information is still insufficient and, an integral conceptual interpretation explaining the inter-relationships within the whole range of essential variables is lacking. The present section will thus perforce be limited to a very preliminary confrontation of these generalizations with a diagnosis of Latin American realities that has been set forth in previous ECLA studies.

(a) Social stratification and families

Demographic investigations and analyses, including a few relating to Latin America, have demonstrated fairly consistent relationships between social stratification and fertility. Fertility reaches its highest level

/in the

in the lower or poorer strata, declines in the middle strata, rises again slightly in the higher or wealthier strata. Roughly similar inverse relationships have been found between fertility and occupational levels (frequently used as the main indicator for social stratification), income levels, educational levels, residential pattern (large city, town, rural).

The influence of social stratification on fertility is exerted through the family, by shaping values and decisions, first on family formation, then on the number and spacing of children, then by helping to determine the family's capacity to act on such decisions and the means by which it chooses to do so. The strength of family motivations is more important than ready availability of means. It has been pointed out that in 19th Century Western Europe low fertility was attained through family decision, in spite of public disapproval and means of control that were inconvenient and difficult of access. In many countries today, fertility continues high in spite of relatively convenient contraceptive techniques and strong public support for their use.

It can be assumed that families of the urban upper and middle strata throughout Latin America have relatively well-defined objectives as to numbers of children and have access to effective means of accomplishing these objectives. The fact that the middle strata choose to have relatively few children can plausibly be attributed to the increasing strain exerted by larger numbers of children on their capacity to maintain the standard of living associated with their rather precarious middle status and on their capacity to educate the children to a level enabling them to maintain or improve this status in the next generation. The higher fertility of the upper strata can be attributed to their greater security and capacity to support a large family at their accepted standard. In both strata, restrictions of fertility seem to be quite recent and associated with the rapid "modernization" of these strata under the cultural influence of the high-income world centres. Until recently, in fact, numbers of children among the upper strata were so high that they were often accused of monopolizing the middle occupational roles to provide for them, thus inhibiting upward mobility. Rising income levels and greater security among the middle strata might encourage them to have more children, and

/greater insecurity

greater insecurity and the disadvantages of division of property among too many heirs might induce the upper strata to have fewer. In any case, it can be expected that the aggregate decisions of the families of these strata will produce moderate rates of population increase, with some fluctuations deriving from the economic and political state of the countries, and that in the countries in which economic growth and urbanization proceed with at least moderate speed, the proportion of families adopting and acting on decisions contributing to moderate fertility will increase.

The really urgent question concerns the families, a majority in most countries of the region, belonging to the rural and urban lower strata that in practically all societies have had the highest fertility rates, now no longer offset by high mortality. There is an abundant literature of explanations for the high fertility of the poor: the past need to have many children to insure that some would survive; the economic value of children in traditional agricultural and artisanal activities; the culturally-determined desire to beget many children as a proof of masculinity ("machismo"); the role of descendants as the only sources of social security for the aged; the inability of the marginalized lower strata to exert any foresight, or their lack of confidence that any restraint they might exercise in procreation would lead to improvement in their lot.

The lower strata undoubtedly comprise many types of families undergoing different kinds of change, but the sociology of the family in Latin America has received too little serious attention for it to be possible to construct a typology of families permitting assessment of the relative importance of these explanations. It can be assumed that the differences between urban and rural families of the lower strata are very wide in regard to motivations and it is probable that the differences can be nearly as wide between families in different rural settings or urban settings.

At present, under the conditions of social and economic change with many contradictions and discontinuities characteristic of Latin America, most families of the lower strata are exposed to conflicting values and motivations. Traditional motivations for high fertility continue to

/influence behaviour

influence behaviour after they have lost their relevance to the situation of the family and combine with reactions of apathy and passivity in the face of difficulties and sources of insecurity beyond the capacity of the family to resolve. The families in question are all (except possibly in some of the remotest and poorest internal regions, where high fertility is still offset by high mortality) affected by the specific kinds of "modernization" Latin America is now undergoing, but they are affected in largely unprecedented ways that make inferences drawn from the reproductive behaviour of traditional societies or of the poorer classes in high-income industrialized societies of doubtful validity as guides to the future. The consequences of present trends for the low-income families can be summed up as follows:

- (1) Increasingly pervasive exposure to modern mass communication media that do not require literacy: television in the cities, transistor radios almost everywhere.
- (2) Exposure to educational, health, and other public social services that are very unevenly distributed and generally of poor quality but that are much more widely accessible and more actively sought than was the case in societies at equivalent income levels in the past.
- (3) Access to mass transport, particularly buses, making movements between rural areas, towns, and cities unprecedentedly cheap and easy.
- (4) Exposure to modern consumption stimuli, frustrated in large part by low incomes and the bias of domestic industry toward production for the upper-income market.
- (5) Opportunities for employment in modern mechanized and rationalized enterprises widely known but accessible only to a small minority; for the majority "modernization" in this area takes the form of "marginalization": livelihood in the previous agricultural and artisanal occupations becomes more insecure and more unattractive in terms of relative if not absolute income levels, while part of the labour force previously in these occupations is displaced and becomes dependent on hand-to-mouth expedients.

Up to the present, the difficulties and forms of insecurity to which the urbanizing lower strata are exposed, have had no measurable impact on their reproductive behaviour; according to the fragmentary data, fertility rates in the urban marginal settlements seem to be as high as in the rural areas. It has been plausibly inferred that, while middle-class insecurity motivates low fertility, lower-class insecurity produces passive acceptance of high fertility, countered only by expedients that require least foresight, particularly abortion.

This does not necessarily mean that lower-class insecurity may not have different consequences in the future, as new and more convenient contraceptives become available and as "modern" urban values and consumption aspirations are internalized. There may be some temptation to under-estimate the capacity for foresight and decision-making among the strata in question, and to over-estimate the time-span needed for effective changes in attitudes toward fertility, often placed at a full generation. The weight of evidence, scanty as it is, suggests that decisions on migration are, in general, taken rationally, and in realistic appreciation of the range of alternatives for livelihood, none of them very inviting. Whether the fertility patterns of the urban and rural lower strata will change to an important extent as long as the trends toward marginalization continue is one of the many demographic questions that cannot now be answered with any confidence.^{23/}

In view of the probable wide differences between family structures and trends in different settings, it is unsafe to generalize either concerning the influence of family characteristics on fertility or concerning the influence of possible fertility changes on the family. If the woman is more motivated and takes the leading role in fertility limitation, as seems likely from the investigations, lower fertility would

^{23/} A 1969 study of fertility behaviour of lower class women in Rio de Janeiro indicated a very marked increase in knowledge and use of the more recent contraceptive techniques since the CELADE inquiry in 1963, although poverty and inadequate information hindered the effective use of these techniques. (George Martins, Fertility Behaviour of Lower-Class Women in Rio de Janeiro, to be published.)

be at once a consequence of a stimulus toward a more independent role for women in the family and the society. At the same time, female-centred families, in which the woman assumes main responsibility for up-bringing of children fathered by a series of male partners, have long been characteristic of the lower strata in some Latin American settings, although uncommon and deviant in others. Such patterns might be promoted by the combination of fertility control exercised by the woman and male inability to function dependably as breadwinner.

It would also be naive to ignore that a great deal of sexual activity capable of contributing appreciably to the birth rate in the absence of generalized resort to contraception or abortion, is divorced from any family structure, even the female-centered family. In many urban settings in which previous family patterns and controls are subject to strain and disruption this phenomenon, or at least the social evils deriving from it, seem to be gaining in importance. Young girls made pregnant in casual or experimental sexual encounters either resort to abortion or abandon their children. Investigations are needed to distinguish the real extent of this phenomenon from the alarmist generalizations sometimes made about it, and to test the hypothesis that it is self-perpetuating, as increasing numbers of children lacking any stable family up-bringing reach puberty.^{24/} To the extent that reproductive behaviour of this kind exists, the emphasis in most declarations concerning population policy on the right of the family to determine the number and spacing of children becomes irrelevant, and the problem centres on the right of the youth to have sexual relations without unwanted consequences, or the right of society to take measures combatting reproduction under such completely unpropitious circumstances.

(b) Social services

In relation to all of the public social services and the associated components of the level of living two main questions present themselves:

(i) What are the influences of population growth and redistribution on the

^{24/} In Venezuela, the Consejo Venezolano del Niño has estimated the number of abandoned children at 350,000. (La Mujer Venezolana y la Regulacion de Nacimientos, Centro Venezolano de Población y Familia, Caracas 1970, p. 13.)

capacity of the State to provide such services and on the capacity of the families to make use of them? (ii) What are the influences of the services themselves, and of the gains in levels of living expected to derive from them, on population growth and redistribution?

These questions cannot be answered by studies restricted to the demographic variables and the sectoral social services taken separately. The growth, distribution and content of the social services are influenced by the values and priorities dominant in a given society. Demographic trends intensify difficulties or facilitate opportunities that would be present in any case. The redistributive role of social services in most of Latin America has been limited; differences in access to such services coincides for the most part with differences in income levels, occupational levels, and urban or rural residence.^{25/} Within this over-all it would be difficult to demonstrate whether the social services have a significant role in the differences in demographic traits between social strata and localities.

As to the future influence of demographic change on the social services themselves, it can be assumed that in all social sectors declining fertility would enhance the capacity of the State to raise the quality and coverage of services and the capacity of families to take advantage of them. It must be kept in mind, however, that the unsatisfied backlog of demand for services and needs for improvement in nutrition and housing are so great that it would be unrealistic to expect demographic changes to bring about during the, short and medium term, any alleviation of the pressures on the State to allocate resources to social action. On the contrary, to the extent that families become able to control their own fertility they will also become better able to articulate and enforce demands for public action to help them meet their other needs. In the longer term, changes in age distribution will bring about important shifts in the relative importance of different social services and in the more specific activities in each sector. During the 1970s, however, this factor will be of minor importance except in the minority of countries mentioned above, in which the transition to new demographic patterns is well advanced.

^{25/} See Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America, Part II.

(i) Education. In most Latin American countries, the percentage of population in the age group 5-14, is between 26 and 28.^{26/} The size of the group is increasing by about 3 per cent annually. If it is assumed that the minimum objective for universal education calls for six years of schooling for each child, primary school enrolment should account for at least three-fifths of the age group, or more than 15 per cent of the total population. The equivalent percentage for most of the high-income industrialized countries would be 9 or 10, and the annual rate of increase between one and two per cent. The magnitude of the burden, under these conditions, of staffing and financing adequate educational services is too obvious to require extensive demonstration.

Nevertheless, the magnitude of the task has not prevented steady improvements in educational levels in most Latin American countries during recent decades. Enrolment at all educational levels has grown faster than population. Census data for around 1960 indicates higher literacy rates and more prolonged school attendance for the younger age groups than for the older, and there is no reason to doubt that the 1970 censuses will show similar trends. Education in Latin America is undergoing a complex crisis, in which costs have an important role, but it cannot be demonstrated that the large size and rapid growth of school age groups makes the cost of attending to their minimum formal educational needs prohibitive. Moreover, many educators are now convinced that, through intelligent use of technological innovations and the elimination of irrelevant subject-matters and out-dated teaching routines, the basic tasks of the schools could be accomplished in less time and expense per pupil.

^{26/} The exceptions are Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, and the English-speaking Caribbean countries, where the corresponding age group is smaller in varying degrees. The age group is one conventionally used by demographers. The age group 7-16, which would correspond more closely to normal school ages, would be only slightly smaller.

/In spite

In spite of the apparently favourable quantitative trends, the distribution of education remains qualitatively as well as quantitatively inverse to the social level of the different population groups. This differential derives partly from the capacity of the better-off strata to influence the distribution of educational resources, but it also derives from the disadvantages of the poorer strata in making use of whatever educational services are offered. This problem cannot be discussed here,^{27/} but it would seem that the high fertility of these strata is an important contributing factor to their very limited ability to make effective use of the schools. The large number of children in a family does not prevent their attendance for a few years of elementary schooling, but the associated over-crowding and malnutrition hamper their ability to learn, and as incidental costs mount in the higher years of the school system and the possibility of earning by the child appears, the likelihood of his continued school attendance becomes very small.

The geographical redistribution of population complicates the problem of distribution of educational services; urban zones of in-migration are under particular strain. However, the quality of educational services in rural areas and small towns is generally so poor that there is not likely to be much under-utilized capacity even when the child population begins to decline. It is more important that the differential ability of the cities to exert pressure for a share of public educational resources insures that the rural schools continue to be starved of funds and served by untrained teachers.

As to the influence of education on demographic change, the negative relationship between educational level and fertility, generally reaching significant dimensions for parents with more than four years of schooling and increasing the higher the educational level, is well-known, but the causative role of education can hardly be separated from occupation, income and urban residence.^{28/} Once families reach a situation in which they can

^{27/} See Chapter III in Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin America (United Nations publication, Sales No: E.68.II.G.7).

^{28/} See Chapter IV in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America and pp. 76-77 in Dinámica de la Población de México.

realistically expect to be able to maintain their children in school long enough to give them future status and occupational advantages, it is almost inevitable that the advantages of facilitating this by having fewer children would come forcibly to their attention.

It has often been repeated that the urban bias of rural education in Latin America helps to foster an undesirably high level of cityward migration. This is plausible, but there is no conclusive proof. Investigations to support the different proposition that the possibility of better education in the city is a primary or secondary motive for many families of migrants and migrant youth. The role of the weak rural school in persuading peasant youth to migrate is probably less important than the role of the small town school in persuading local youth to seek a more "modern" version of urban life.

The possibility of a direct and intentional impact by the schools on reproductive behaviour and attitudes toward population policy issues, through sex education, family life education, and what has been labelled concientización demográfica is only beginning to come under discussion and experiment.^{29/} Such education will probably be extended fairly rapidly in the schools attended by children of the urban middle strata. Its relevance to the schools of the high fertility lower strata is much more questionable, as long as children attend for only four years or less, in pre-adolescent ages, and from cultural backgrounds making communication with a teacher on such topics difficult. Exaggerated hopes have often been placed on the potential role of schools, unable to accomplish their minimum tasks of imparting literacy and the values of the national society, in promoting agricultural innovation, community development, etc. The immediate prospects for demographic and sex education seem no better, although in the longer term, assuming success in more general educational reforms and a very great expansion and transformation of adult education, their importance may become considerable.

(ii). Health. There is general agreement on the key role of public health and related activities in slashing mortality rates and thus bringing about accelerated population growth. This influence has been exercised mainly

^{29/} See Informe Final and working document of Reunión de Especialistas en Población-Educación, organized by Unesco, Santiago, 28 September-1 October 1970.

through activities of relatively low per capita cost and relatively undemanding of basic changes in the attitudes and ways of life of the beneficiaries: the control of mass diseases through inoculations, insecticides, improved water supplies and sanitation. There is still a good deal of room for improvement in the control and preventive activities. In particular, much of the urban population and most of the rural still lacks potable water and safe waste disposal. Air pollution, automotive traffic, and other concomitants of urbanization are bringing new health threats that will require control measures.

At the same time, the growth of population, its urban concentration, and the diffusion of "modern" attitudes through the mass media are generating an enormous demand for curative services. As the experience of the high-income countries indicates, the per capita costs of modern medical care are extremely high and tend to rise faster than general price levels. The capacity of the majority of Latin American families to meet such costs from their own resources is obviously very small, and the attempts of the State to do so are very far from meeting the demand. Within the over-all trend, the patterns of age distribution mean that demands for medical care of children will remain numerically predominant; and these demands will be swelled, as long as general living conditions do not improve markedly, by poor nutrition, poor sanitation, and deficient housing. The same conditions will increase the demand for curative services from the population of working age. The population in the upper age groups will remain a relatively small part of the total, but its absolute numbers are growing very rapidly, and adequate medical care for these age groups is particularly costly.

The family planning programmes that are being established within public health programmes will have to compete for resources with the whole range of preventive and curative services. It can be argued plausibly that these programmes will reduce the over-all curative needs to the extent that they succeed in reducing fertility; that they will reduce the present burden on the medical services, of dealing with the consequences of botched illegal abortions and that they will in fact provide better ratios of benefits to costs than will the curative services.

/Similar arguments

Similar arguments can be made for nutrition programmes. Nevertheless, these hypothetical benefits will not affect the real pressures on the health services. The unsatisfied potential demand for curative services is very great, and is sure to grow stronger whatever the trends in fertility. In fact, to the extent that families really practice "responsible parenthood" they will become ever more insistent on the medical care of the children they have. As in the case of education, demographic trends will intensify pressures that would be present in any case, and the reconciliation of these pressures with a sound system of priorities for allocation of resources to health is going to be very difficult.

(iii) Food supply and nutrition. During recent times, production of foods in Latin America has slightly better than kept pace with population increase, production capacity in most countries is undoubtedly adequate to maintain this trend during the foreseeable future, or improve it if appropriate organizational and technological changes are carried out. It is particularly unlikely that food shortages or famine will check population growth in Latin America.

At the same time, it is well-known that present levels of food consumption for the majority of the population in most countries are seriously deficient. The immediate problems lie in the inefficient organization of agricultural production and distribution (raising the costs of foods, making for sluggish response to demand, and bringing about wastage of up to 30 per cent of the foodstuffs between producer and consumer); in the low incomes that restrict the capacity of the majority to acquire enough food, and in the content of the diet, determined partly by poverty and partly by ill-advised consumption habits. Per capita production of proteins has fallen off and it can be deduced that protein malnutrition, already serious among the poorer

/strata, is

strata, is becoming more acute. This has particularly ominous implications for the future quality of the population, since protein deficiency in childhood affects the stature and probably the mental capacity of the adult.^{30/}

In regard to the distribution of foods, it hardly needs saying that statistically adequate supplies at the national level do not guarantee that the poor get enough to eat. At the same time, various dietary investigations have indicated a maldistribution of food within low-income families that affects particularly the numerous children; the parents consume most of whatever protein-rich foods the family is able to buy, and the consumption of protein does not increase with the size of family.^{31/}

(iv) Social security. Social security, in Latin American countries with high rates of population increase has thus far been limited to relatively small parts of the urban salaried and wage-earning population. The only countries that have managed to extend social security to the greater part of their active population are the minority with relatively high degrees of urbanization and moderate rates of population increase.^{32/} Thus, no clear out influence of social security on demographic change can be demonstrated, but there is an obvious relationship between high population increase, with the associated age distribution and traits of the active population, and inability to universalize social security.

Thus far social security legislation and programmes have given very inadequate attention to demographic information, while the information itself has been inadequate for social security planning. The emphasis in most Latin American programmes has been on the provision of medical services and on retirement pensions. The former have corresponded to a

^{30/} It has been pointed out that protein malnutrition, by reducing the stature and vigour of the population also reduces the per capita need for foodstuffs. If it were eliminated, the future adult population would be taller and more robust, and at the same time would require more food. (Howard A. Osborn, FAO Regional Statistical Advisor for Latin America, "Relaciones entre Niveles Nutricionales y Crecimiento de Población en América Latina").

^{31/} Ibid.

^{32/} See Chapter XIV in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

very strong demand, as indicated above, but have probably responded too predominantly to the curative side of the demand, have not been based on clear conceptions of priority health needs, and have not been co-ordinated with health services provided by other public agencies. Retirement pensions have commonly involved inequities between different groups covered by social security and the age for entitlement has commonly been set unrealistically low. As life expectancies rise and larger numbers of beneficiaries pass the ages of entitlement the systems become increasingly unable to meet their obligations. The only alternatives to more realistic actuarial bases for pensions - politically extremely difficult - are bankruptcy or dependence on inflation to wipe out most of the burden of pension payment.

Very few of the systems have tried to relate themselves to the predominance of children and youth of dependent ages in the population structures. Aside from the provision of medical services to the families of covered workers, the main way in which this could be done would be through family allowances to redress the disadvantages brought about by the combination of numerous children and low-incomes. It is often argued that family allowances would constitute an undesirable incentive to continuation of high fertility. This cannot be demonstrated, although the argument would probably have some validity if applied to families eking out a precarious day-to-day existence, in which children's allowances might be the largest and the only dependable part of total income. Family allowance systems seem to have had no generalized effect on fertility in the European countries in which they have been provided for many years, often with the deliberate intention of encouraging larger families. The few Latin American countries that have introduced family allowances within social security are Uruguay, with low fertility, and Chile and Costa Rica, both with declining fertility. It seems reasonable to expect that children's allowances, particularly if combined with well-conceived health, nutritional and social welfare services for children would, on balance, promote responsible parenthood and rational controls on fertility. However, the difficulties in the way of provision of such allowances to the families that need them most seem insuperable, without

/the accompaniment

the accompaniment of much wider changes in societal priorities, economic organization and income distribution. The financing of family allowances by payroll taxes, making them part of the wage bill, means in practice a redistribution of income within certain strata of the wage-earners, with part of the costs passed on to consumers of the products of the covered occupations - including the marginal families that receive no benefits. The public sector, under prevailing conditions, would be quite unable to finance children's allowances for all families with incomes too low for them to meet a defined standard of needs for their children.^{33/}

(v) Housing. There is no evidence that housing deficiencies up to the present have had any clear out influence on demographic trends in Latin America. It is probable that bad housing contributes to higher mortality rates, but this factor cannot be separated from other unfavourable aspects of the environment. It is also probable that housing shortages and high costs of housing enter into the motives that induce families of the urban middle strata to have fewer children. It does not seem that even the worst degrees of over-crowding or difficulties of newly formed families in finding living quarters have appreciable effects on the fertility of the poorer strata. In fact, once over-crowding and inability to meet the costs of conventional housing reach a certain point, these strata solve their problem through the well-known expedient of unconventional and unregulated types of shelter.

Public housing programmes have sometimes been accused, along with other urban services provided by the State, of stimulating the excessive flow of migrants to the large cities. It would be hard, however, to demonstrate direct stimuli of this kind. Investigations among urban

^{33/} According to the report of the Inter-Agency Team on employment policy in Colombia, "it is in any case questionable whether any country with a demographic problem like Colombia's can afford a family allowance system... It may be argued that the purpose is welfare, but family allowances are paid primarily to those with jobs in the modern sector (and government service), not to the unemployed or rural workers whose moral claim is incomparably greater. In any case the most effective form of protecting children from the consequences of poverty is to provide them with free milk and other forms of nourishment directly, through clinics and schools." (Towards Full Employment, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1970, para. 640.)

migrants do not indicate that the hope of better housing has any importance among the motives for migration. Moreover, given the dimensions of even the larger public housing programmes, migrants would have no access to such housing before several years' residence in the city. There may, however, be an indirect influence of some importance: large public housing programmes create opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled labour of the kind migrants can offer, and thus may attract a larger flow. In this respect, housing does not differ from any large-scale public works project.

From the other standpoint - the influence of demographic change on housing levels and housing programmes - the combination of rapid growth and concentrated urbanization has faced the State with unmanageable demands, and compelled the diversion of important public resources into housing programmes that have done very little to meet the needs of the poorer urban strata and practically nothing for the rural population.^{34/} Public programmes are now turning perforce to lower cost solutions intended to supplement the efforts of the families themselves: provision of urbanized building lots and materials, and various schemes of aided self-help. Nevertheless, housing demands with a strong political appeal are sure to exert very heavy pressures on public resources and organizational capacities throughout the foreseeable future.

Any reduction in the rate of population increase would not begin to affect the quantitative demand for new dwelling units for nearly twenty years, since this depends on the rate of formation of new families by young adults. It would affect the qualitative aspects of the need almost immediately, since small dwelling units would be less inadequate for families with fewer children.

(vi) Social welfare and other services relating to family and community life. A discussion of relations between these forms of public social action and demographic change would have to be couched almost entirely in terms of future possibilities. Up to the present, the coverage of

^{34/} See Chapter XIII in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

social welfare, community development and related programmes has been too limited to have any effect on demographic change, even if designed to do so, which has not been the case.

Quite recently, family planning advocates have begun to look to social welfare programmes and social workers as potential resources for the dissemination of receptiveness to family-planning, particularly among the marginal families. Efforts are beginning to give the training of social workers a demographic content. The results in terms of more effective promotion of family welfare may be of some importance, but it does not seem likely that the quantitative demographic trends will be affected significantly.

(c) Employment

In countries with the demographic structures and trends typical of Latin America the population in economically active ages is increasing by about 3 per cent annually. This potential labour force is predominantly youthful, particularly its urban component. It can plausibly be conjectured that in the larger countries with their high rates of urbanization and movement of population out of agriculture, new entrants to the male population seeking work in occupations other than agriculture each year amount to about 7 per cent of the total size of this population, or even more. As the population becomes predominantly urban and the movement out of agriculture declines in relative importance, as is bound to happen in these countries this, percentage will fall to about 5, as long as the over-all population growth rate remains at 3 per cent. Under favourable circumstances an abundant and youthfully adaptable labour force of this kind might be expected to be a very positive element for industrialization, and this seems to have been the case, in some countries at least.^{35/} At present

^{35/} In Mexico, "el crecimiento industrial se ha visto favorecido por una oferta abundante y creciente de mano de obra provocada por el intenso proceso de migración de la población rural a zonas urbanas, lo que además ha facilitado que los salarios reales se mantuviesen en niveles relativamente bajos e incluso decrecieran durante un largo plazo (hasta 1956)". The abundant supply of cheap labour also favoured the expansion of commercial agriculture in previously unexploited zones, and the large-scale construction of roads and irrigation systems that supported this expansion. However, the acceleration of population growth also "complicó el proceso ayudando que el descenso de los salarios reales se prolongara por un tiempo probablemente mayor del necesario". (Dinámica de la Población de México, op. cit., pp. 216 and 249.)

/however, the

however, the slowness in growth of new opportunities for productive employment, the widening gap between skill requirements in technologically advanced industries and the qualifications of the potential labour force, and wage rigidities that prevent ready absorption of low-productivity labour, mean that increasing unemployment and marginalization of the potentially active population are looked on as probably the most dangerous shortcoming in the trends of economic growth for the immediate future. This question will be discussed elsewhere and need not be treated further at this point.

It is obvious that even the most drastic reduction in fertility rates will not affect the rate of increase of the population in active ages for at least 15 years, and can have only a secondary influence, compared to other factors bearing on the percentage of the population of active ages actually seeking work, for several years after that. Any important decline in fertility would in all probability be accompanied by an increase in the proportion of women entering the labour force, and thus in the over-all pressure for expansion of employment.^{36/}

Discussion of the effects of employment on demographic change has centered on this last point. In the high-income industrialized countries, increased participation of women in the labour force has consistently been associated with declining fertility, and it seems logical that this should be so, whatever the cause and effect relationship. The few relevant studies that have been made in Latin America confirm the relationship for urban women, although not in a very pronounced way. Throughout Latin America female participation in the labour force is quite low compared to the countries of Europe and North America. In most Latin American countries, fewer than 20 per cent of the women of working age (15-64) are active, rising to 25 per cent in the countries with relatively low fertility, while in Western Europe 43 per cent and in Eastern Europe nearly 60 per cent are active. The low rates of participation in such countries as Argentina and Uruguay, in which the burden of child care is no more important than in Europe as a hindrance to female labour, suggests that the slack over-all demand for labour

^{36/} See Chapter IV, Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

(in combination with a probably declining cultural prejudice) keeps female participation low, and throughout Latin America this is sure to continue to be an important factor restricting any major impact on fertility. It has also been pointed out that the inhibiting relation exercised by female participation on fertility is probably limited to participation in the modern urban wage-earning activities. Increased participation in the traditional forms of agricultural labour, artisanal activity, home piecework, and vending would probably have no effect. Employment of young women in domestic service presumably has some retarding effect on family formation by them, but domestic service seems fairly certain to account for a declining share of female participation in the labour force almost everywhere.

In the industrialized countries during the twentieth century fluctuations in fertility have increasingly been associated with major changes in levels of employment and economic security. Fertility rates dropped during the depression years of 1930s and the subsequent years of war, then rose to unexpected heights, confounding previous predictions of low demographic increase, during the years of nearly full employment following the Second World War. Similar relationships might be expected in such countries as Argentina and Uruguay, but it seems probable that the depressive effects on fertility of unemployment and insecurity depend on the contrast with a previous period of relative prosperity. The high rates of unemployment and underemployment in Latin America, among populations mainly without previous experience of modern wage labour, and accompanied by uneven exposure to different features of modernization, have unprecedented traits that make it impossible to predict their impact, if any.

(d) Saving

Capacity for personal saving obviously should have a direct relationship with size of income and - ceteris paribus - an inverse relationship at each income level with size of family. It has been argued that reduction of fertility would bring about significant increased in savings available for capital formation and thus contribute to more rapid development. In its application to Latin America, however,

/this argument

this argument needs to be carefully qualified and some observers go so far as to deny it any importance, largely because of the extremely uneven distribution of incomes and the association of low incomes with high fertility. The consumption levels of the low-income strata are so low that it might take at least two decades before any of the per capita income gains that may realistically be expected would permit them to make a significant contribution to personal savings. In other strata - which for the most part are already attaining moderate fertility - changing cultural and other influences on the propensity to save will probably be of greater importance than fertility changes. Moreover, the strong pressure toward new forms of consumption that is now evident means that the diversification of consumption would immediately absorb any relative improvement in income that might be achieved by reduction of fertility.

Such arguments, while valid up to a point, do not confront the real potential importance of lower fertility for the use of family income. The assertion that low-income families cannot save is exaggerated, although their savings may not take conventional forms or contribute directly to investment in productive equipment. The ability of urban low-income families to devote a substantial part of their incomes to housing, once they have the opportunity and some assurance of security in this investment, is an impressive example. The potential economic importance of a lesser burden of fertility in such families would lie in the opportunity of "investing" in improvement of the quality of their children as human resources. Whether this opportunity would be realized would depend on the choices made by the families in disposal of their incomes, and this in turn would depend on the traits of the future society and the kinds of consumption it stimulates. Present trends, with increasing strain exerted upon the incomes of all social strata to respond to the "modern" consumption appeals disseminated by the mass media, suggest that this strain may exert a depressive effect on the fertility of population strata that are beginning to enter the market for modern consumer goods, but that lower fertility may not be reflected either in investable savings or in lines of consumption that really enhance the quality of the younger generation.

/The pressures

The pressures exerted by rapid population increase and urban concentration upon the capacity of the public sector to save and invest must also be taken into account. In the past, some of the countries have been able to maintain substantial rates of public investment in production and infrastructure only because most of the basic needs of the low-income strata - for education, housing, health care, incomes adequate for subsistence - could be ignored. This is no longer the case, as was stated above it would be unrealistic to expect that lower fertility and slower urbanization will bring about any alleviation of these pressures, but such demographic changes would help the public authorities to respond to them in a more meaningful way.

(e) Land use and tenure

In an isolated and static rural society, the main consequences of population increase for an indefinite period might be the gradual expansion of the area under cultivation or gradual impoverishment, depending on the availability of land. Both of these processes are visible in the rural zones of Latin America, but these zones are no longer isolated or static. Population increase combines with a number of other forces, inter-related but not all acting in the same direction, to make the pre-existing patterns of land tenure, cultivation, marketing, neighbourhood ties and urban-rural relationships less and less viable. In their present combinations, these forces point to widening disparities between rural population groups able to cope with change and the "marginalized" remainder, and increasing pressures on the State and the urban economy to absorb or subsidize the "superfluous" part of the rural labour force. The importance of the problem within the national picture of economic and social change, and the feasibility of policies to deal with it, is conditioned by the size of the country, the rate of population increase, and the degree of urbanization already reached, but the problem itself can be identified even in countries in which net rural population growth has fallen to zero and the urban population is in the majority.

/In all

In all of the types of countries distinguished in 2 above, agricultural enterprises now have at their disposal a wide range of techniques for increasing production with a stationary or declining labour force, whether or not they are economically or socially justified in using them. Subsistence production and local markets are declining in importance in relation to production for the national market, with consequent pressures toward rationalization of production and distribution. Rural non-agricultural sources of income tend to contract, although some new ones appear. Even the remoter rural zones are increasingly penetrated by influences that work against geographical immobility and passive acceptance of poverty: roads and cheap public transportation, mass communication media, public education and health services, and political appeals of urban origin. Within the range of present settlement patterns and forms of land tenure, the traditional haciendas and the minifundio settlements are both expelling excess population and absorbing little of the rural natural increase. The growing settlements of landless rural workers along the roadsides or on the fringes of the small towns demonstrate that an increasing share of the rural population finds no alternative to marginalized poverty. "Planned" agrarian reform and colonization settlements, which thus far account for a very small fraction of the rural population, do have the potentiality, if really vigorous agrarian reform policies are applied, of greatly increasing the capacity of agriculture to absorb labour productively and thus the capacity of rural areas to retain population. At best, however, this capacity has limitations. The new settlements will be able to offer incomes satisfactory to their members only if they restrict their numbers to those required for efficient operation and exercise selectivity. They cannot be expected to absorb the whole of the excess rural labour force, particularly the more marginal part of it.^{37/}

The forces at work, in their varying combinations, rule out the policy sometimes proposed, that most of the rural population increase should be retained in agricultural occupation until the urban economy

^{37/} For a fuller discussion of these questions see Chapters III and VII in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America.

becomes able to absorb productively the surplus rural labour force. Such policies could be applied only through rigidly authoritarian tactics that are neither practicable nor acceptable, or through an absolute lack of urban opportunities. The rural population would not even be able to maintain present levels of living, and these levels, sustained by primitive hand labour, are no longer acceptable to the rural masses, particularly the youth.

(f) Natural resources and space

Except in a few of the smaller countries of Latin America, natural resource endowment does not stand in the way of the support of larger populations at levels of living higher than at present, if the investments needed to take advantage of the resources can be mobilized, although these resources are rarely well-balanced or easy of access. It can be affirmed that several internal regions require a larger population for the efficient exploitation of their resources for development. The difficulty lies in the high global rates of national population increase and in the use or misuse of natural resources associated with present trends of economic, social and technological change.

Present use of renewable natural resources, particularly land, is extremely wasteful and destructive. Although the traditional optimistic view that the Latin American resource endowment is inexhaustible is still influential, it is now obvious that this is very far from true and that resources are now being squandered at an alarming rate. The monopolization of land that is most accessible and best suited for cultivation by the haciendas, has compelled overuse of the poorer hillside lands by minifundio cultivators, followed by soil exhaustion, erosion, and destruction of forest cover. Similar patterns have been reproduced by squatter settlement and slash-and-burn cultivation in areas that are still very thinly populated. Some forms of modern plantation agriculture also produce exhaustion and abandonment of huge land areas. Lumbering operations and fires are destroying forests without any provision for replacement. Even the resources of the sea are being threatened by uncontrolled exploitation. While population pressure is speeding up the process of destruction, it is not the crucial factor. In many densely settled regions elsewhere, peasant agriculture has continued for centuries without serious damage to land resources, while in much of

Latin America the destruction is greatest in thinly settled rural areas. Primitive systems of land use and systems that are technologically advanced and highly mechanized both contribute to the destruction. At both ends of the spectrum investment and the application of technology to land maintenance and improvement has been very small, compared either to such countries of peasant agriculture as China or to countries of modern "industrialized" agriculture, such as the United States. Reversal of the trend will require both large investments and a different approach to technological innovation. Bringing into use the nearly empty regions of Latin America - which are still pointed to in "populationist" arguments - in a manner that will not insure their destruction will require particularly enormous and carefully planned investments.

Non-renewable natural resources (mainly petroleum and metal ores) are being exploited for export as intensively as markets and technological resources permit, because of their key role in supplying the foreign exchange needed to keep the economies going. It is likely that by the time a much larger and more industrially advanced population requires these resources for domestic use, some of them will be exhausted and others obtainable only at higher cost.

Urban concentration and the rising importance in the urban level of living of certain forms of consumption - durable goods, travel, etc. - generate per capita demands on natural resources much greater than in any past civilization, along with the increasingly ominous by-products of air and water pollution, noise and enormous quantities of perishable and imperishable garbage that must be disposed of somewhere.

A peasant population can reach a high degree of density if the land is fertile and well-cultivated, without insuperable strains on resources or social organization. Within narrower limits, urban populations can also reach considerable size as long as the majority accepts low levels of living, limited spatial mobility, and high density of settlement. To the extent that the income levels and aspirations of the population rise, so that they travel extensively within the urban area and outside, purchase durable consumer goods, demand houses with gardens, and take vacations at the seaside or other resort areas, the strains on natural resources, on available space, and on social organization rapidly increase.

The high-income countries are now struggling with problems of this kind and have encountered a recognized deterioration of certain aspects of living conditions that offsets the gains represented by higher consumption levels. The Latin American countries, especially the larger more dynamic and more urbanized countries are now running into the same problems at much lower income levels and with much more limited capacity to resolve the resource and organizational problems. If private automobile ownership continues to expand at present rates, for example, the increasingly dispersed low density pattern or urbanization will make the costs of highways and other infrastructural investment increasingly prohibitive; enormous quantities of agricultural land will be devoured by urban sprawl, urban air pollution will become gradually worse and rising consumption of gasoline might eventually curtail the export role of petroleum for some countries and place an increasing strain on the balance of payments of others that import petroleum products.

Calculations of the quantities of non-renewable resources that would be needed if the rest of the world were to begin to use these resources at the rate already reached by the United States demonstrate that this would be out of the question. The United States, with 6 per cent of the world population, consumes half the world production of the more important minerals.^{38/} It has been estimated that at the current United States consumption level, the world could support a population of only 500 million, compared to the present 3,000 millions and the 7,000 millions likely in the year 2000. This is only one of the factors calling into question the viability for Latin America of the present models for development offered by the high-income countries. The opportunities offered by new technologies for substitution of raw materials and sources of energy, for re-cycling of water and minerals and for permanent high-yield exploitation of land resources and the sea are a sufficient promise of capacity to support the inevitable larger populations, but the promise will not be realized without realistic measures for the husbanding of natural resources and the channelling of consumption along lines that will not generate insoluble future problems and that will be compatible with fair access by the whole of the population.

38/ Stuart Mudd, Ed. The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources. Dr. W. Gunk, Publishers, The Hague, 1964, p. 238.

4. Population policies

(a) Delimitation of population policy

Various Latin American political leaders have proposed population policies since the 19th Century, and Governments have undertaken measures with the specific purpose of influencing population growth and distribution. It is only in the latter part of the 1960s, however, and in the context of changing and conflictive conceptions of the nature of the population problem, that the question has come to the fore of delimiting population policy and determining its place within the continually widening range of interventions by the State in the economy and society. This task has faced an initial contradiction: The "population" - the human race - is the subject and object of all public policy. It would be possible, although not very useful, to subsume all social and economic development programmes under "population policy". At the same time, the range of activities open to the public sector for direct intervention in demographic change is narrow. The public activities that have the greatest actual or potential influence on demographic variables are governed mainly by policy considerations in which this influence is secondary or disregarded. Other important influences fall outside the scope of public policy, whether because of prevailing values or because practical difficulties rule out public intervention.

The contradiction has manifested itself, as several observers have pointed out, in policy formulations too broad to be operational juxtaposed with a nearly exclusive concentration of attention, both in polemics and in operational programmes, on "family planning" as a means of influencing the fertility variable.

The most ambitious attempt to formulate a definition was made by a Meeting on Population Policies in Relation to Development in Latin America, held in Caracas in September 1967, following a Preparatory Seminar held in Washington, D.C. in March 1967:

"Debe entenderse por política de población el conjunto coherente de decisiones que conforman una estrategia racional adoptada por el sector público, de acuerdo a las necesidades y aspiraciones de la colectividad, para desarrollar, conservar y utilizar los recursos humanos /influyendo sobre

influyendo sobre la magnitud y el crecimiento probables de la población, su distribución por edades, la constitución y composición de las familias, la localización regional o rural-urbana de los habitantes, y la incorporación a la fuerza de trabajo y a la educación, con el fin de facilitar los objetivos del crecimiento económico y posibilitar la participación de la población en las responsabilidades y beneficios del progreso!"^{39/}

This definition has been subjected to a good deal of criticism,^{40/} and there is now wide consensus that a narrower definition is needed, limiting the scope of population policy to measures intended to influence population growth and distribution, with the proviso that such population policy must be integrated into an over-all development policy. Such a policy should seek, first, an adequate understanding of the implications of these demographic variables and the constraints they impose on the other areas of development policy, and, second, means of compatibilization and mutual support among the whole range of measures affecting these

^{39/} This meeting was co-sponsored by the Organization of American States, the Pan American Health Organization, the Population Council, and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, with the collaboration of the Government of Venezuela. Ministers and other public functionaries from 15 countries participated in personal capacities, along with invited experts.

^{40/} "Se torna difícil en estas circunstancias trazar una clara línea divisoria entre política de población y política económica y social, en general. Es esta dificultad la que debe haber llevado a los redactores de la definición de política de población que se adoptó en una reciente conferencia, a darle al término una acepción tan amplia que prácticamente quedaron englobados dentro de ella todos los objetivos del desarrollo." (Carmen A. Miró, "Política de Población: Qué? Por Qué? Para Qué? Cómo?") [The revision of the definition proposed by the Preparatory Seminar] "se produjo mediante supresiones, sustituciones y adiciones que reflejan claramente el 'tira y afloja' de las distintas posiciones en juego. El resultado es la típica definición que deja contentos a todos, pero que resulta inoperante tanto para un análisis teórico, como para una orientación de la acción política." (Gerardo González C., "Políticas de Población y Marginalidad Social"). "Un ejemplo de esta confusión está constituido por lo que planteó como objetivos de una política de población el informe final ... Si, en efecto, quisiera incluirse en lo poblacional todo aquello que tiene consecuencias en la población o de ella se deriva, tendrían que enumerarse todos los sectores o aspectos que constituyen una sociedad." (Roger Vekemans, S.J. "Política de Población: Esbozo de Status Quaestionis", DESAL, Santiago de Chile, Agosto de 1970.)

variables. The proviso points in the right direction for the future, but does not show how to solve the main immediate problems:

(1) In spite of a decade of development planning experiences, hardly any of the countries as yet have authentic, coherent and functioning development policies or strategies capable of providing the needed frame of reference for policies of demographic rationalization. As long as social and economic policy remains fragmented and sectoral, determined in large part by the relative strength of pressures from professional and bureaucratic groups, electoral clienteles, and the external sources of financial aid and technical co-operation, with the more specific programmes and regulations even within sectoral policy areas often conflicting directly in their import, it can hardly be expected that whatever activities are grouped under population policy can avoid taking on similar traits. In this respect, the problems of delimiting and formulating population policies resemble those faced by all of the broad inter-sectoral middle-range objectives that have been advanced as essential to development, such as income redistribution and human resources policy.^{41/}

(2) Demographers are not yet in a position to offer the public authorities incontrovertible advice on the inter-relationships between demographic change and development, or on the full long-term consequences of the measures that can be taken. This deficiency, like similar deficiencies in the other inter-sectoral policy areas, derives only partly from the dearth of basic research; the inter-relationships and consequences depend on prior definition of the patterns of development aspired to within specific types of countries. The character of the information needed on such topics as population redistribution, urbanization, occupation, and family structures also depends on the formulation of clear demands by development policy makers.

^{41/} See Chapters X and XI in Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America. Carmen A. Miró, *op. cit.*, lay particular stress on the need for, and present lack of, development policies into which population policies can be integrated.

(3) The dependence of future demographic change on trends and policies in employment, education, income levels and distribution, and technological innovations of many kinds, means that the measures governed primarily by population policy considerations will always have a secondary or auxiliary role - although this may be of considerable importance - within the over-all picture of influences on the demographic variables. Policies in all of these areas should take population objectives into account - once these are clearly formulated - and should make much fuller use than heretofore of the light that demographic analysis can throw on the feasibility of their targets and techniques, but in the definition of these policies other considerations, as important as their demographic consequences or more so, have to be taken into account. The potentially important area of policy for strengthening of the family, which now exists only in the form of small-scale and unco-ordinated initiatives, is bound to be much influenced by the dissemination of "family planning" in the narrow sense, but even here demographic objectives will have to be subordinated to objectives deriving from conceptions of human rights and the developmental role of the family. Policies affecting the geographical distribution of the population, which even the more restricted definitions bring within the scope of population policy, are in practice more likely to be dealt with in the context of regional development, urban development, and rural development policy.

(b) Conceptions and ideologies concerning the role of population in Latin American development

Several historical stages can be identified in predominant Latin American attitudes toward population, each associated with determined economic and social patterns, forms of inter-dependence with the rest of the world, and conceptions of the sources of national progress.

(1) From the time of independence in the early 19th century up to the 1920s: national progress and power were identified with rapid increase and "Europeanization" of the population. This predominant ideology (which encountered varying degrees of resistance from nationalist or nativist currents of opinion) was associated with

/economies almost

economies almost entirely oriented toward raw material exports and with the domination of landowning-commercial élites convinced of the ethnic inferiority of the masses of the population. Populations during this period were very small in relation to territory, rates of natural increase were low, and urbanization limited. European migrants were available in large numbers and the countries able to attract them forged ahead of the rest of the region economically in political stability; population increase through immigration meant that most of the increment could be incorporated directly into the labour force, at the modest skill levels called for by existing systems of production, the costs of up-bringing having been met by the country of origin.

(2) From the 1920s to the 1960s. The desirability of rapid population increase continued unquestioned, but a higher valuation was placed on the native population and more stress was placed on the need to raise its quality through education and other social measures. Accelerating urbanization was looked on with optimism as a stimulus to development through concentration of consumer demand and occupational skills. These views were associated with rising nationalism and the defense of indigenous against European and North American cultural traits; with a rapid growth of politically articulate urban middle strata; with a partial drying up of the preferred sources of migration; that coincided during the 1930s with economic depression, urban unemployment, and legal restrictions on immigration; with a change from the export-oriented economic patterns toward the growth (particularly during the 1940s and 1950s) of import substitution industries offering new job opportunities in the cities; and with a widening acceptance of development policies relying on industrialization, international financial and technical co-operation, Latin American integration, formal long-term planning, and socio-economic structural reforms.

(3) From the early 1960s to the present. Interpretations of the role of population change have become increasingly divergent, conflictive and ideologically charged. This stage is associated with partial frustration of the hopes invested in the global development policies current throughout the decade; with acceleration of the increase in

/numbers of

numbers of persons annually reaching working age, as a result of the speeding up of population growth since the 1940s; with the rapidly increasing visibility and scope of the problems of urban marginality, structural unemployment and under-utilization of human resources; with the widening gap between aspirations for social services and realizations; with the increasingly complex impact of technological and organizational innovations and consumption appeals originating in the high-income industrialized countries; with growing technical capacity for direct action on some components of demographic growth; and with the relatively sudden extension to Latin America of a world-wide campaign insisting on the catastrophic consequences of continued population expansion and on family planning as the only remedy.

At the present state, while the previous optimistic views and the traditional identification of national power with population size continue current and influential, several newer positions can be distinguished, each with a number of variants:

(1) Important sectors of opinion continue to envisage "development" as primarily the attainment of higher rates of increase in production and consumption, so as to close the gap between present levels and those of the typical North American or European country, and to assume that this can be done if the development and structural reform policies agreed upon during the past decade are applied more vigorously, and if international co-operation in trade and financial aid becomes more generous and more dependable. From this point of view, the absorption of the urban marginal population - and the underemployed rural population that feeds its growth - into productive employment and full participation in the social order depends primarily on the attainment of a high rate of economic growth. Any effective measure reducing the rate of growth of the population strata exposed to marginalization or reducing the rate of migration of these strata toward the cities alleviates the pressures for non-productive use of public resources, reduces the likelihood of violence, and gives the national authorities more time and greater flexibility in assigning resources to high-priority developmental tasks. The opponents of this point of view commonly caricature it as an

/advocacy of

advocacy of population control as an alternative to accelerated development, but it is improbable that anyone thinks in these terms.

(2) At the other extreme it is asserted that a strategy of development based on the premises summarized above would, even if feasible, produce nothing more than an unjust and unacceptable pseudo-development, perpetuating a noxious situation of dependency. It is inferred that authentic development will be possible only after revolutionary transformation of existing power structures and a breaking of the bonds of dependence. From this point of view, the dependent system of economic growth generates the growth of the marginal population by its very nature, and this constitutes one of the contradictions that will eventually bring about the breakdown of the system. Under present conditions, any measures of population control, if effective, would alleviate tensions and thus prolong the survival of economic and social structures that should disappear as soon as possible to make way for the building of a new social order. This position can easily be caricatured as an advocacy of increasing social pressures for the sake of provoking immediate changes. In some of its manifestations it does seem to involve a certain insensitivity to the immediate needs of the low-income strata, as well as a high degree of optimism concerning later capacity to meet these needs.

(3) A third point of view stresses the human welfare implications of rapid population growth and the right of the family to have access to means of limiting the number of children, irrespective of the implications for development and of public policy concerning population increase. This point of view is compatible with almost any interpretation of the development process and its requisites, but is commonly accompanied by a degree of skepticism concerning the ability of the public authorities to apply population policies based on the more ambitious developmental conceptions, and a willingness to settle for fragmentary measures responding to the immediate needs of families. Some advocates of this position limit their support to a certain range of family planning techniques considered morally legitimate, while others are prepared to support the free availability of abortion and other means.

(4) A fourth point of view, more complex and hard to summarize, accepts the human rights argument and also considers lower rates of population increase highly desirable for all the Latin American countries that have not yet undergone a demographic transition, whatever their future pattern of development. At the same time, the holders of this point of view feel that both the developmental urgency and the appropriate content of policies for demographic rationalization differ widely according to the circumstances of specific countries, that the relevance of such policies to the alleviation of pressures arising from marginalization is questionable, whether such alleviation is viewed as desirable or not, and that the capacity of the State to control population growth during the foreseeable future through the techniques now being advocated will probably be of much less importance than the changes in family life and cultural attitudes brought about by ongoing social and economic changes. This point of view accepts as partly valid the assertion that present campaigns for population control derive from determined conceptions of dependent development and are designed to facilitate the survival, with whatever reforms and improvements, of present economic and social structures. It does not accept the inference that such expectations constitute sufficient reasons to support reject the policies themselves, or take for granted that the results of the policies will necessarily correspond to the expectations of their sponsors. It assumes that in the short term, the developmental effects of such policies will be limited and more important for the welfare of families than for the resource allocation problems faced by the State, but that attention cannot be limited to the short term.

(5) Yet another position might be distinguished among some proponents of development policies and analysts of social change: to ignore the population problem altogether or to deny its importance, with the conscious or unconscious aim of minimizing any distraction of public attention from problem areas believed to be more urgent and more manipulable.

In the prolonged polemic over population policy, many intermediate positions can be distinguished, and often the ideological basis of a given

/position is

position is not made explicit. Public declarations on population policy tend to be phrased in terms intended to disarm attack or avoid stirring up political or religious sensitivities, and the strong terms in which the urgency of the problem is stated contrast with the ambiguity of the recommendations. Meanwhile, the unofficial polemics tend to remain a dialogue of the deaf, in which the parties refute their own caricatured version of the opposing position, or the supposedly unacceptable motives of its proponents, particularly when the strong support given by certain powers outside Latin America to determined population policies comes under discussion. The position taken by the main external source of development aid and advice has produced, on the one hand, a sometimes grudging acceptance of population control as one item in a "package" of policies expected financial aid, and, on the other hand, an automatic rejection of the desirability of control in the sectors of opinion preoccupied with dependence.

(c) Governmental policies and attitudes

Depending on the definition adopted, it can be affirmed that no country in Latin America has a population policy or that practically all of them do. Two Presidents of Latin American countries (Colombia and Dominican Republic) and two Prime Ministers of Caribbean countries (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago) signed the 1967 Declaration of Chiefs of State on the Population Problem, which combined a strong affirmation of the danger of rapid population increase with exclusive support of family planning as the remedy. In about half the countries, Chiefs of State or Ministers since 1967 have made public statements affirming or denying the desirability of lower rates of population increase. With some countries, leading public officials have expressed widely divergent views on population objectives.^{42/}

^{42/} In Brazil, in 1969, "de cuatro discursos de gobierno, tres fueron favorables a una política demográfica restrictiva y uno fue en favor de la política expansionista". (Glycon de Paiva, "Política Demográfica para el Brasil - Dificultades para Establecerla".) See also Rubens Vaz da Costa (Presidente del Banco de Nordeste do Brasil), "El Crecimiento de la Población y el Desarrollo Económico: El Caso Brasileño", Boletín de Población, II, 3, Mayo 1970.

Only one Government, that of Colombia, has incorporated broad population policy criteria and objectives (based on the Caracas Conference definition) into its most recent development plan, presented to Congress for approval at the end of 1969.^{43/} No Government has as yet fixed quantitative objectives for changes in the demographic variables.^{44/}

43/ The bases for the Colombian population policy are the following:

"a) Criterios:

1. El Estado debe intervenir con el establecimiento de una política, en cuanto el bien del conjunto social está comprometido, tanto a nivel macro-económico, como a nivel de la familia y del individuo, pero respetando sus derechos e intimidad.
2. La política de población se considera como un componente indispensable de la política general de desarrollo y por lo tanto se da énfasis a la educación integral.

b) Objetivos:

Dos son los objetivos inmediatos: lograr una mejor distribución territorial de la población y modificar el actual ritmo de crecimiento de la población por medio de una reducción de la fecundidad. Con relación al segundo objetivo de reducción del crecimiento de la población, por medio de una disminución de la fecundidad, la política contempla los dos niveles, el macro-social y el familiar; uno y otro dentro de un enfoque educativo hacia la responsabilidad. A nivel de la sociedad el Estado ha lanzado una amplia campaña socio-cultural en favor de la Paternidad Responsable por medio de la ley 75 de 1968.

Se busca reducir la ilegitimidad, aliviando así en parte el problema demográfico.

Al nivel del individuo y de la familia y como tarea propia del Ministerio de Salud Pública se prevea, dentro de los programas materno-infantiles, el suministro de la información y los servicios médicos de planificación familiar, tarea que cumplen igualmente el Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales y la Caja Nacional de Previsión Social."

(Gustavo Pérez Ramírez, "La Política de Población en Colombia, al Término de la Década del 60", citing Departamento Nacional de Planeación, "Planes y Programas de Desarrollo 1969/72, Capítulo I".)

44/ Quantitative targets for reductions in fertility rates have been cited for a few Caribbean countries. (María L. García, "Informe sobre el estado de los programas de planificación familiar en América Latina 1968," CELADE Serie A, N° 97.) These targets, however, seem to have been formulated by the family planning programmes for administrative purposes to show expected results of coverage of a target number of families, and have no official standing as policy objectives.

When one descends from the level of policy declarations to examine what has actually been done, in the name of population policy or otherwise, the differences between national positions become less evident. The practical policy has been one of laissez faire, combined with varying degrees of public support for family planning activities. Migration policy, once the only active component in national population policies, has received very little attention in recent years, except in the Caribbean countries, so that, in practice, population policy has become increasingly equated with receptivity to family planning. The process has been recently described and justified as follows:

"Los primeros pasos casi siempre fueron dados por iniciativa privada o entidades del mismo carácter que, generalmente se crearon específicamente para el fin con apoyo económico de organismos internacionales, sin encontrar mayor oposición de los Gobiernos respectivos. Y esto de no oponerse y dejar para ver las reacciones, no deja de ser una política bastante prudente, dadas las circunstancias. A medida que los servicios y programas privados fueron demostrando que tenían aceptación y que cumplían una necesidad no ofrecida por los gobiernos o autoridades gubernamentales, éstas fueron, poco a poco, y con grandes temores ... entrando a participar con la bandera de que el Estado debía ejercer control en una actividad que debía ser mirada con sumo cuidado por las implicancias médicas, sociales, económicas y morales que podía tener. Todo esto parecería confirmar las apreciaciones precedentes en el sentido de que ha habido y sigue habiendo temor a la definición abierta y franca, en muchos casos no por falta de convicción en las bondades del programa, sino por el posible mal uso que sectores de oposición gubernamental podrían hacer de estas medidas para criticarlas y atacarlas sin tener, generalmente, elementos de juicio suficientes ni para justificar ni para rechazar estas políticas."^{45/}

^{45/} Carlos A. Uriarte, "Información sobre la Situación de las Políticas", Seminario sobre Política de Población, Caracas, 25-28 Agosto de 1970.

Both the laissez faire approach and the identification of population policy with family planning have been criticized from several quite different points of view:

(1) It is argued that the attainment of a zero population growth rate in the shortest possible time is essential and that family planning, as now defined and practiced, is an ineffective means to this end, diverting attention from the need for more drastic measures of control. This point of view has hardly been represented at all in Latin America as yet, but has been advanced forcefully by Kingsley Davis and others, with reference to the world as a whole, including the countries that now have relatively low rates of increase.^{46/}

(2) It is argued that population control is undesirable, that family planning is an all too effective means of accomplishing it, and that the way in which family planning is being introduced in Latin America means that the national authorities are abdicating control over national policy in favour of international organizations and Governments acting for the furtherance of their own interests.

(3) It is argued that the demographic trends themselves, and the probable influence on them of the rapid expansion of family planning activities have implications for future development that policy makers and development planners cannot afford to continue to neglect. This point of view takes it for granted that policy should not be limited to population control or to family planning, but that family planning is a

^{46/} Kingsley Davis, "Política de Población: ¿Tendrán Éxito los Programas Actuales?", Demografía y Economía, 8, 1969. (Original English version published in Science, 10 November 1967.) The same arguments were reiterated in a paper presented to the 1970 Latin American Regional Conference on Population: "Orígenes de las Deficiencias de los Programas de Población Modernos".

desirable form of sectoral action within a broader policy.^{47/}

(d) Objectives and instruments of a population policy

The preceding discussion indicates that public activities intended to influence demographic variables will not wait upon the formulation of development policies capable of serving as a framework and that nothing is gained by defining population policy so broadly as to make it co-extensive with development policy. Under present conditions, population policy must aim at the reconciliation of three broad objectives: (1) to contribute to the enhancement of human welfare and human rights at the level of the family and individual; (2) to influence population growth, age distribution

^{47/} "Para aproximarnos a lo que proponemos definir como política de población, podemos comenzar por descartar lo que nosotros, numerosos latinoamericanos y, sorprendentemente, algunos norteamericanos creemos que no es. Nos referimos, claro está, a las acciones de planificación familiar que en la actualidad se desarrollan en todos los países latinoamericanos. Estas acciones las descalificamos como política de población, aun en el caso que se dieran - cosa que aún no ocurre en ningún país de la región - dentro de un plan coherente, como parte de una política de salud ... la planificación familiar se convierte en uno de los elementos a ser considerados dentro de una política de población ... Es por esto que consideramos altamente negativa la posición que, en general han adoptado en América Latina los encargados de la planificación económica y social de ignorar - no evaluando los efectos tanto demográficos como económicos - las acciones de planificación familiar que se llevan adelante en todos los países de la región. Esta actitud de avestruz puede reservarles grandes sorpresas en plazos relativamente cortos. Compilaciones hechas por el Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE), que indudablemente reflejan de manera incompleta lo que ocurre en la realidad, revelan que a fines de 1969 existían en la región más de 1 000 clínicas anti-conceptivas, de las cuales el 72 por ciento operaba en servicios gubernamentales. El número de clínicas existentes a fines de ese año representó un aumento de 43 por ciento sobre las que se encontraban en funcionamiento a fines de 1968." (Carmen A. Miró, "Política de Población: Qué? Por qué? Para qué? Cómo?.")

This source cites the notable decline in the Chilean birth rate during the 1960s as evidence of the effects of a family planning programme, embarked upon within the public health service and without any overt population control objectives. The same evidence has been presented by an authority on family planning both to refute Kingsley Davis and to argue in favour of the laissez faire approach: "Con sigilo o sin estridencias, por lo menos, debería iniciar el programa, limitándose a poner los métodos anti-conceptivos al alcance fácil ... de las personas que quieran

and geographical distribution so as to make them as compatible as possible with accelerated development and with more equitable distribution of the fruits of development; (3) to enhance understanding of demographic trends among political leaders, planners, and the public in general, and to ensure that these trends are more adequately taken into account in all areas of policy and planning. It has already been indicated that the range of instruments at hand for these purposes is narrow, and that the inclusion within population policy of many of the instruments theoretically applicable is ruled out by prevailing values or by the subjection of these instruments to other purposes.

47/ (Continued)

emplearlos. Son tantas que, en las fases iniciales, cabe prescindir de toda motivación y, particularmente, de la educación de masa que está erizada de peligro. Es ella la que despierta antagonismo. Por sí sola esa acción pone en evidencia e incita la demanda social de regulación. Llega a hacerse tan incontenible como para que no se atrevan a contrariarla la Iglesia ni los políticos. A esta altura procede quizá pedir un pronunciamiento del Gobierno y, en todo caso, impulsar la educación y la motivación. ... Dada la prodigalidad relativa de la ayuda internacional - que suele ser forzoso disimular en cierto grado - no son de temer por el momento, las estrecheces de recursos monetarios." (Hernán Romero, "América Latina, Chile y las Políticas de Población".) José Vera, "Población y Desarrollo: Notas para una Política de Población en América Latina", places a somewhat different emphasis on the place of family planning in development policy and its justifications: "En resumen, una política de población para América Latina debería incluir dos tipos básicos de acción: (a) programas educativos y, en casos extremos, de subsidios, destinados a proveer acceso real a la oportunidad de decidir conscientemente sobre el tamaño de sus familias a aquellas parejas que puedan verse afectadas por situaciones de desequilibrio demográfico; y, (b) reorientación de los programas nacionales de desarrollo en función del empleo pleno de la fuerza de trabajo. Es probable que una combinación adecuada de estos dos tipos de acción en América Latina contribuya al cumplimiento simultáneo de varios fines útiles: (a) aliviar el sufrimiento de millones de familias a las cuales el progreso de las técnicas de la salud ha otorgado el obsequio de una menor mortalidad, rápidamente negada en la práctica por el retraso de los restantes componentes del nivel de vida; (b) incrementar la racionalidad y en más de un sentido "humanizar" la planificación del desarrollo, mediante el simple expediente de organizarla en función del desarrollo de los seres humanos antes que de las cosas que los rodean y sirven y, (c) consolidar la obsolescencia de la idea de que la abundancia de recursos humanos en una sociedad puede ser la causa de su subdesarrollo."

(i) Instruments intended to enhance family welfare and act on the rate of population increase through the fertility variable. "Family planning has come to mean education in the advantages of spacing and limiting the number of children combined with demonstration of contraceptive techniques and supply of contraceptives, generally within public health programmes and directed almost exclusively to the female partners in regularly constituted families. Ideally public policy should reflect a broader interpretation of the term, and enhanced ability to plan the number of children should be combined with enhanced ability by the family to plan for the livelihood, consumption, housing, education and participation in local and national community life of its members. Alleviation of the burden represented by uncontrolled fertility can strengthen family capacity to exercise foresight in other areas but does not guarantee it. This consideration, however, points to problems of public capacity to apply a broader family policy, and of the compatibility of social and economic structures with a more participatory role by the low-income family, that are too complex to be discussed here.

Even in its present narrow interpretation, family planning is better suited to the enhancement of human rights and family welfare than to demographic rationalization. For the latter purpose, its effects are hard to predict, as the differing opinions of specialists cited above indicate, but whatever the effects, they will be irreversible and hardly manipulable in terms of any short or medium term quantitative objectives that public policy might set. The effects will derive from the aggregate decisions of millions of families, or simply of the women. A decision by the State to curtail family planning services on the basis of a judgment that population increase is shrinking too rapidly would be unacceptable in terms of the human rights justification of the programmes, and in any case would be ineffective, except in relation to the families too poor or too lacking in initiative to seek private sources of contraceptives.^{48/}

^{48/} In Chile the National Health Service has fixed a maximum quota for installation of IUD's of 15 per cent of women in the fertile age groups (100 per cent of women hospitalized because of induced abortions, 40 per cent of women giving birth in the hospitals, 10 per cent of other women). This quota seems to have been motivated in part by uneasiness over the rate of decline in the Chilean birth rate, and to have led to curtailment of family planning services in some hospitals once their quota had been passed.

Present family planning programmes in Latin America depend almost exclusively on two contraceptive techniques: the "pill" and the IUD. Both have advantages over earlier techniques, particularly for mass application, but neither is entirely satisfactory, and very great changes in contraceptive technology can be expected during the coming decade. It should be kept in mind that family planning programmes account for only a part, and generally a minor part, of the use of contraceptive techniques in the cities. The CELADE investigations among urban women 20-50 years of age, married or "convivientes" carried out in late 1963 and early 1964 revealed the following percentages using some contraceptive technique: Buenos Aires 84.5, Rio de Janeiro 38.2, Bogotá 36.6, San José 56.8, Panamá 30.7, Caracas 62.4 and Mexico 30.8. At that time, the IUD had not yet been introduced, use of oral contraceptives was only beginning, and family planning services in the cities were either non-existent or of very limited scope. Private practice of contraception is by now undoubtedly much more extensive, and has shifted toward more dependable techniques.

In the polemic over population policy well-known assertions that expenditures on family planning, considered as developmental investments, have a yield many times greater than other investments have been flatly contradicted by assertions that the resources devoted to family planning would be much better used on directly productive investments. There is practically no information, however, on the total sums devoted to family planning in Latin American countries, on the extent to which resources used for family planning are of a kind convertible to other purposes, on costs per client, or on costs

of "avoiding" a birth.^{49/} At present, a high proportion of the direct costs are met from external sources that would not be prepared to provide the same funds for other purposes,^{50/} and a high proportion of the infrastructural and personnel costs are indistinguishable from the over-all costs of the health services sponsoring the family planning programmes.

^{49/} One source estimates the cost of avoiding each birth (medical, educational and organizational costs of a family planning programme) at US\$ 10, and the annual cost for Latin America as a whole of avoiding 2,000,000 births, sufficient to bring the rate of population increase down from 2.9 per cent in 1970 to 2.3 per cent in 1980 at \$20,000,000. The basis for the \$10 estimate is not stated. (W. Brand, "Política de Población para América Latina".) The cost of "protection" of a couple for one year has recently been calculated at US\$6.95 for Chile; similar calculations for Asian countries reach lower figures, the differences being roughly proportional to differences in per capita incomes. (Warren Robinson, A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Selected National Family Programmes, cited in Bernard Berelson, "The Present State of Family Planning Programs", Studies in Family Planning, 57, September 1970.) Calculations have also been made of the actual and potential private market for oral contraceptives in Mexico. It is estimated that 3 million families (representing about 4.5 million "eligible" women) have expenditures over 1,000 pesos (US\$ 80) per month and that 2 per cent of this expenditure would be sufficient to provide oral contraceptives at existing market prices of 10-20 pesos per monthly cycle. At present sales levels, about 11 per cent of this potential market is realized (5.4 cycles distributed in 1968 per 100 women aged 15-44). Alfred D. Sollins, "Commercial Production and Distribution of Contraceptives", Reports on Population/Family Planning, 4, June 1970.

^{50/} USAID obligations for population and family planning activities in the Latin American region, channelled through various public and private organizations, rose from \$2,324,000 in 1967 to \$7,924,656 in 1968. The Ford Foundation, up to the beginning of October 1968 had granted about \$4,000,000 to Latin American institutions for research and training related to population. Other Governments outside the region, as well as other foundations, have provided smaller sums. (Agency for International Development, The Office of the War on Hunger, Population Service, Population Program Assistance, Washington, D.C., September 1968.) Foreign aid funds allocated by the U.S. Congress exclusively for population and family planning activities in the world as a whole outside the United States amounted to \$ 50,000,000 for 1969, \$ 75,000,000 for 1970, and \$ 100,000,000 for 1971, or about 2.3 per cent of official U.S. aid to less-developed countries for the fiscal year 1970. (Philander P. Claxton Jr. "La Política de los Estados Unidos respecto de los Asuntos de Población y Planificación Familiar".)

/As long

As long as the programmes simply respond to demand it does not seem that per capita costs need be very high; to the extent to which educational campaigns and extension to the rural population are envisaged, such costs would inevitably rise. Even if the opportunity to use earmarked external funds disappears, or is rejected as incompatible with national control over the programmes, it does not appear probable that the costs of family planning programmes expanding at a judicious rate in response to demand would require a really serious diversion of public resources from other developmental purposes. At the same time, such programmes cannot expect an overriding priority in the competition for public funds, and they are likely to share the vulnerability of all the newer social and economic programmes to budgetary cuts when public resources fall below expectations.

It is well-known that up to the present abortion has been the most widely used means of fertility limitation in the Latin American urban population, as in many other parts of the world. Reliable statistics are naturally lacking, since the only abortions coming to public attention are the failures requiring intervention by the public health services, but recourse to abortion seems to be widespread among all social strata. According to the 1963-1964 CELADE investigations the percentage of women admitting to one or more induced abortions reached 10.3 in Rio de Janeiro, 8.0 in Buenos Aires, and 7.1 in Mexico. Among the upper and middle strata it probably serves mainly as a last resort when contraception fails, but among the poorer strata it is the principal means used. Up to the present no important sector of opinion in Latin America has proposed legalized abortion as a legitimate means of family planning or population control. On the contrary, many of the initial family planning programmes have been justified primarily as a means of relieving women of the need to resort to abortion.

Whether this rejection will prevail permanently is problematic, in spite of the strong religious sentiments behind it, in view of the wide acceptance of abortion by the women themselves and the trend toward legalization of abortion in the rest of the world. The danger to the health of the pregnant women practically disappears when the operation

/is carried

is carried out in a clinic and new techniques promise to make the operation increasingly simple and inexpensive. The legal prohibition of abortion, as long as it cannot be effectively enforced, has justifiably been criticized as a form of discrimination against the poor. Women who can pay high fees can obtain abortions under safe conditions. The remainder also obtain abortions when they want them, but under conditions that produce an appalling amount of suffering and sickness, and many avoidable deaths. The main remaining objections are that abortion, as a recourse that does not call for foresight, contributes nothing to responsible parenthood and the developmentally favourable attitudes supposed to be associated with family planning; also, that the woman depending on this alone might have to resort to it very frequently.^{51/} As the use of contraceptives continues to spread, the main role of abortion whether legally or illegally, will probably come to be the repairing of contraceptive failures and the avoiding of consequences of casual sexual unions.

Sterilization has become an important technique of family planning programmes in India and Pakistan (mainly of men) and in Puerto Rico (mainly of women); in parts of the former countries payments are offered to persons submitting to sterilization. In the Latin American family planning programmes sterilization has been little used. Since it is normally offered to and accepted by only persons who have already produced all the children they want, its role in fertility reduction can be no more than supplementary to contraception.^{52/}

^{51/} "Tengo reservas respecto a su legalización. Entre ellas destacan el fatalismo de nuestra gente que prefiere afrontar el hecho consumado a tomar medidas preventivas y que, a poco de interrumpido el embarazo, la mujer recupera, de ordinario, su fecundidad. Podría producirse así una cadena sin fin inconveniente por sí misma y muy gravosa para nuestros servicios de atención médica." (Hernán Romero, *op.cit.*)

^{52/} According to the 1963-1964 CELADE investigation the percentage of women in the larger cities who have undergone sterilization, although small, is not negligible: about 6 per cent in Caracas, Rio de Janeiro and San José; 2 per cent in Mexico City, 1 per cent in Bogotá. Panama, however, is an exception: according to a recent study 20 per cent of the women in the conjugal unions surveyed had been sterilized. The effect of sterilization has been estimated at an average reduction of 25 per cent in the aggregate fertility of all women in conjugal union. See Robert B. Hartford and George C. Myers, Esterilización femenina en la ciudad de Panamá, su difusión, efectos y correlativos.

The nearly universal affirmation of the right of the family to determine the number and spacing of children, and the more qualified affirmation of the duty of the State to offer effective means for the family to act on its decision, leaves open the delicate question of the legitimacy of State activities to influence the family's decision, once the State has adopted objectives concerning population increase. Compulsion can be ruled out on practical grounds as well as moral considerations; it is hard to imagine the public authorities anywhere in Latin America invoking penal sanctions against parents, let alone compulsory abortion.^{53/} In principle, persuasive and dissuasive measures would be legitimate. The State already intervenes in many ways in the affairs of the family, through educational laws; social security provisions; and taxes, subsidies, etc. designed to promote, regulate, or discourage different forms of consumption and saving. It would be illogical to expect reproductive patterns, once these are conceived to be matters of importance to the society as a whole, to be left to the judgement of the family without any attempt at public influence on the decision. In practice, many present family planning programmes within public health services rely on a strong persuasive influence on the woman when she is most likely to be open to such influence - immediately after having given birth.

Various sources have proposed a wide range of measures intended to influence reproductive behaviour short of compulsion.^{54/}

^{53/} Penal sanctions and compulsory abortion have been seriously proposed to combat illegitimate births, as the least desirable contributions to the birth rate, but even here such sanctions would be neither enforceable nor socially tolerable.

^{54/} A leading authority on family planning, after summarizing proposals put forward or adopted in various countries outside Latin America, comments: "...not only are there ethical issues ... and political problems, but the practical problems are enormous. As has been said, if a country could administer such complex systems for demographic ends, it probably would not need to do so in the first place. It is, I think, fair to say that the field has been diligently looking for something to do 'beyond family planning', something practicable and ethical, economic, and with some chance of effectiveness, even on an experimental or demonstration basis. On the whole we have not found it, and we continue our search". (Bernard Berelson, *op. cit.*)

In the specific circumstances of the Latin American countries, however, practically all of them seem to be either of very minor importance, unacceptable in terms of values, inapplicable, or excessively expensive. Proposals to do away with legal relics of past policies favouring large families, such as prizes to women having more than a given number of children and laws prohibiting contraceptive sales and advice, are sensible but not very important. Proposals to do away with income tax exemptions for dependent children would affect only the upper-income minorities paying such taxes, who already control their fertility. Proposals for punitive taxation on families having more than a given number of children would, if enforceable, have a disastrous effect on the living conditions of children already born to low-income families, without any guarantee of bringing about a significant reduction in future fertility. In any case, such taxation would be completely unenforceable among the urban marginal population, the rural population, or the unwed mothers. Proposals to raise the minimum legal age for marriage or to promote late marriages by tax advantages to bachelors would in all probability have no effect on the reproductive behaviour of the strata now characterized by very high fertility, in the absence of cultural changes bringing the age of initiation of sexual relations into correspondence with the minimum age for marriage. In other strata, the effect on fertility would be of small importance, since with contraception generally practiced and relatively clear objectives for family size, births would be postponed rather than avoided. The provision of public payments for late marriage or for the spacing of children within marriage would be hard to administer, expensive, and unpopular. Universalization of retirement pensions and other benefits, so as to eliminate the "social security" incentive of having many children for support in old age, could not be financed through a contributory system, at the present income levels of the strata most in need of such security, and would be far beyond the financial capacity of the State. In any case, the relevance of such a measure to reproductive behaviour is questionable, however desirable it might be for other reasons. Publicly financed mass propaganda campaigns in support of family planning might be justifiable under certain circumstances; if

/preceded by

preceded by a broad public debate leading to a sufficient degree of consensus on the nature of the population problem and its policy implications; and if informed by a more adequate understanding of the motivations of reproductive behaviour in different social strata than now obtains. Otherwise, such a campaign might be self-defeating in terms of the resistances aroused.

To sum up, the capacity of the State to influence reproductive behaviour directly seems to be limited; this would apply to measures intended to stimulate higher fertility as much as to measures intended to depress fertility, particularly if the intention is to change the direction of trends in family behaviour. Various Governments in Western Europe have tried for many years to promote higher birth rates through exhortation, incentives such as family allowances, restrictions on contraceptive sales and advice, etc. The impact on reproductive behaviour seems to have been insignificant.

(ii) Instruments intended to influence population increase and quality through migration across national boundaries. The changing currents of international migration demonstrate how the developmental implications of demographic trends depend on changes in the patterns of economic growth and international inter-dependence. Up to the 1920s Europe, with a much smaller population than the present, seemed to be an inexhaustible source of migrants to Latin America and other thinly populated parts of the world. This stream has practically dried up, both because of full employment in the former countries of emigration and because of the declining relative attractiveness of opportunities in the countries of immigration. The slackening demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in Latin America as well as in the high-income countries means that Latin America has no interest in admitting immigrants of the types that would still be available, and has almost no possibility of relieving the domestic over-supply of labour by encouraging emigration. International migration in relation to Latin America has lost practically all of its importance for the quantity of national population, and is very unlikely to regain it. At the same time, the importance of international migration for the quality of population continues and is changing in ways that are, on balance,

/highly unfavourable

highly unfavourable to Latin American development. Ability to attract to Latin America immigrants possessing the skills and professional qualifications that are needed for the next stages of development is weak. The ability of the high-income countries to attract from Latin America emigrants possessing such qualifications - particularly engineers, physicians and nurses - has up to the present been strong. This problem has attracted international attention under the name of "brain drain", and a number of policy instruments have been proposed to reverse the trend. As in the case of the measures discussed above in relation to reproductive behaviour, most of these seem likely to be ineffective, unacceptable in terms of rights, excessively expensive, or inapplicable in the absence of broader changes in economic and social structures. Such measures include: provision of salary levels and opportunities to acquire consumer goods (particularly automobiles) matching those offered by the high-income countries; prohibition of the emigration of persons possessing needed skills, or the imposition of high taxes on such migration; requirement that graduates of national professional and technical training institutions work for a fixed period in national programmes to compensate for the costs of their training; reform of the training institutions themselves to bring their output into closer correspondence with national needs and overcome its dependence on the models, demands and incentives of the high-income countries. It is also possible that present economic and social difficulties and slackening demand for professionals in the countries that have exerted the strongest pull will reduce the importance of the problem as far as Latin America is concerned.

(iii) Geographical and occupational distribution of the population: objectives and instruments. The preceding pages have touched repeatedly on the relationships between population growth and its redistribution by geographical areas and sectors of economic activity within countries. For the short and medium term, the possibilities for planning of public action so as to control population redistribution in consonance with a determined development strategy seem to be more favourable than in the case of population growth. The range of instruments at the disposal of the State is wider, and it is more practicable and socially acceptable to

/aim at

aim at population redistribution objectives in the choice and manipulation of instruments.

It has also been indicated that measures bearing on population redistribution are more likely to be planned within a context of regional development policy, urban development policy, or rural development policy than as parts of a comprehensive population policy, although the latter solution would not be out of the question. In this examination of the instruments of a population policy it will thus be sufficient to stress the potential importance of the selection of objectives and instruments fitted to the circumstances of each country, and to take note of a wide consensus that in most countries of the region the next stages of development call for more decentralized patterns of urban growth and distribution of economic activities.

(iv) Information needed for population policy. Demographic information has three main sources: censuses, vital statistics, registers and sample surveys. All of these sources have serious deficiencies in relation to policy needs. Some of the shortcomings are inherent in the methods of data collection, wherever they are used, and in the recalcitrance of some of the phenomena to definitions simple and uniform enough for easy recording. Others derive from the lamentably low priorities given by most Latin American Governments to the careful collection and prompt dissemination of demographic information. Still others belong to the traits of under-development: illiteracy, marginality, rural isolation, political instability and deficient public administrative machinery set limits on national capacity to produce reliable demographic or other statistics. The second shortcoming is more readily remediable than the others; it requires only a moderate change in priorities for use of public resources, some attention to training of staff and, above all, a clearcut demand for better information from political leaders and planners.

Both in individual countries and in regional organizations, a great deal of effort and ingenuity has been devoted to techniques for the quantification of demographic and other factors related to development on the basis of whatever information is at hand. Under the circumstances, this is unavoidable and useful, but it has probably encouraged an illusion

/that more .

that more is known than is actually the case, and may have helped to perpetuate the low priority given to the painstaking and expensive collection of basic data. When estimates of this kind acquire authority by repetition from source to source without the caveats and methodological explanations supplied by their originators, and when they are incorporated in plans, it might sometimes be suspected that an imaginary country concerning which there is exhaustive information is being diagnosed and planned for, rather than a real country concerning which there is little reliable information.^{55/}

Population censuses. Over a long period, inter-American organizations have tried to strengthen and institutionalize the practice of taking censuses at the beginning to each decade. The high point of success came in the 1950 round; 18 out of the 20 Latin American republics (all except Peru and Uruguay) completed censuses at some time between 1947 and 1953. In the 1960 round, Bolivia, Cuba and Haiti failed to carry out censuses, and it appears that under-enumeration and delays in tabulations were more widespread than in 1950. It is probable that in the 1970 round the number of omissions will be about the same. It is naturally the countries with lowest incomes and highest percentages of rural population that find it hardest to make the considerable concentrated effort needed to set up a functioning census apparatus every ten years, although most of them have finally managed to do so. The censuses have been affected by varying degrees of under-enumeration,^{56/} and by doubtful reliability of answers to some questions as recorded by untrained census-takers.

^{55/} The report of the inter-agency team on employment policy in Colombia, repeatedly stresses the difficulties for its work presented by inadequate statistics and comments that "in some respects there has been an over-investment in analysis and an under-investment in basic collection of reliable statistics". (Towards Full Employment, op.cit., para. 929.)

^{56/} A number of census evaluations carried out in CELADE contain calculations of percentages of under-enumeration; for example, 3.46 for Colombia in 1964, 2.3 for Ecuador in 1962, and 2.9 for Mexico in 1960. Real under-enumeration, however, may be much higher, if probable failure to cover tribal populations and some of the more isolated and dispersed rural population nuclei is taken into account. See G. Mortara, "Evaluación de la información censal para América Latina", in Demografía y Salud Pública en América Latina, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1964.

A still more serious shortcoming has been slowness and incompleteness in tabulating and publishing the data.^{57/}

The censuses are the main sources for basic demographic information and projections. For year-to-year figures demographers are dependent on the trends revealed by successive censuses. When data from one census are more inaccurate than data from another to an unknown degree, and when the most recent census is several years in the past, the margin of possible error widens. While methods of making projections have been continually refined in recent years and cross-checking against other sources of information offers some protection, it should be kept in mind that most population figures for 1970, as well as projections for the future, still derive from censuses conducted around 1950 and 1960. The results may be tolerably reliable for population size, rate of increase, and age distribution at the national level, but can go far astray in regard to population redistribution within a country. This limitation is sometimes forgotten when non-demographers try to relate population trends to economic and social trends that can be measured through indicators collected year by year.

Vital statistics and other continuing series collected by the public administration. The possibility of presenting reliable birth rates, death rates and nuptiality rates, and of cross-checking census-derived information on population increase, has up to the present, depended on the maintenance of complete vital statistics registration. It is questionable whether this objective can be attained until a country has reached a certain level of urbanization, literacy, diffusion of property, and availability of social services requiring documentary evidence on the constitution of the family and the origin of the individual. Accurate statistical information is then a by-product of the social uses of the registration system. According to United Nations criteria - which have been characterized as excessively generous - vital statistics registration is incomplete in 15 out of 26 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

^{57/} In one case, detailed and complete results for the census of 1960 are still not available.

Sample surveys. The most practicable and flexible means of obtaining up-to-date information on internal migration, patterns of urbanization, family levels of living, incomes, occupations, attitudes and practices regarding fertility, and many other questions important to policy-making, is the sample survey. The shortcomings of vital statistics registration, mentioned above, have also led to promising experiments in the use of this technique (through continuous registration in a sample of the population, divorced from legal and administrative purposes) for the obtaining of more accurate vital statistics.^{58/} The need for systematic sample surveys and for the setting up of national institutions equipped to carry out such surveys has been reiterated during the past two decades, but up to the present no Government in the region has provided the minimum resources needed to make the sample survey a dependable policy instrument, although several countries may be on the point of doing so if their present plans are carried out and continuity is maintained. An important number of sample surveys of demographic questions have been made, including surveys of internal migration to capital cities (Lima and Santiago); of urban mortality; and of attitudes toward fertility among urban and rural women of different countries, but they have been organized mainly by regional institutions such as CELADE or by universities and have been financed mainly through grants from foundations and other institutions outside the region.^{59/}

^{58/} Forest E. Linder, "New Approaches to the Measurement of Mortality". Two experimental sample surveys of vital statistics have been carried out: One in an urban area (Guanabara, Brazil) and one in a rural area (Cauquenes, Chile). See United Nations, Guanabara Demographic Pilot Survey, Population Studies N°35; and CELADE, Encuesta Demográfica Experimental. Cauquenes, Santiago de Chile, 1968.

^{59/} The migration surveys are reported on in Encuesta sobre inmigración en el Gran Santiago (CELADE, Serie A., N°15) and in Encuesta de Inmigración de Lima Metropolitana (DINEC, Lima, Nos.1, 2 ...). The mortality surveys are reported on in Ruth Rice Puffer and G.Wynne Griffith, Patterns of Urban Mortality, Report of the Inter-American Investigation on Mortality, Pan American Health Organization, Scientific Publications N°151, September 1967. The surveys of urban fertility covered Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Mexico City, Panama, Rio de Janeiro, and San José; surveys of rural fertility have been completed in Chile and Colombia, and are to be extended to most of the countries covered by the urban surveys.

