CHAPTER I

CHINESE HISTORY AND CH'ING INSTITUTIONS:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW

China's cultural evolution from neolithic times through the Ch'ing period may be viewed as a process, not always gradual, of expansion, incorporation, and progressive integration. Some recent scholars, notably Ho Ping-ti, have emphasized the pristine origins and independent early development of Chinese civilization, but for most of Chinese history, "barbarian" influences have contributed significantly to the character and quality of Chinese culture.[1]

China's direct cultural roots may be traced to the Yellow River Valley some seven thousand years ago. There, sustained by the rich and uniquely self-fertilizing soil known as loess, a neolithic culture eventually developed that exhibited many of the traits that have come to be identified with Chinese civilization in its mature form: the cultivation of millet, rice, and other staple crops; the domestication of animals such as pigs and dogs; the use of silk and hemp for clothing; distinctive housing, food preparation, and artistic styles; divination; ancestor worship; and ideographic writing. Over a period of time, this northern Chinese culture base interacted with other neolithic cultures scattered throughout various parts of East Asia, receiving enrichment without losing cultural predominance. The result was the emergence around 1800 B.C. of China's first fully historic dynasty, the Shang (traditional dates: 1766-1122 B.C.).

Many aspects of Shang life show unmistakable neolithic origins, but the Shang dynasty marks a dramatic new stage in China's cultural development. Building mainly on indigenous foundations, the Shang peoples in north China developed a sophisticated socio-political system based on ancestor-related theocratic rule over city-states, as well as an advanced bronze technology, a highly refined writing system, and well-defined forms of social, economic, and military organization. Shang archaeological sites have been found in at least ten modern provinces, in-

dicating the wide spread of Chinese culture by means of both trade and military expansion.[2]

The long-term cultural legacy of the Shang was primarily one of attitudes: an obsessive concern with ritual *(li)*, a strongly bureaucratic outlook (especially evident in an abiding love of hierarchy, order, and classification), a consuming interest in the family and in ancestor worship, a fully articulated script, and the beginnings of *yin-yang* style art motifs and metaphysics. Significantly, we find in Shang culture "a congruence of function and expression between religious practice, political organization, kinship descent, artistic expression, and divination forms,"[3] suggesting the remarkable integrative capacity of traditional Chinese civilization as early as Shang times.

The Chou dynasty (traditional dates: 1122-256 B.C.) replaced the Shang in what became a familiar conquest pattern. In traditional Chinese historiography the Chou is considered to be the "Golden Age" of Chinese history, a time of peace and prosperity under sage kings and "feudal" institutions.[4] But by the sixth century B.C., the political and social structure of the early Chou had begun to break down. Widespread fighting among contending Chinese "states" *(kuo)* proved disruptive and demoralizing. New technological developments contributed to important economic and social changes.[5] In the midst of the chaos and uncertainty, the search began for a means of restoring unity and tranquility to China. This quest led to a flowering of Chinese philosophy as impressive as the roughly contemporary great age of Classical thought in the West.

Between the sixth and the third centuries B.C., a succession of brilliant and articulate Chinese thinkers offered a wide variety of solutions to China's pressing social problems. Confucius (c. 551-479 B.C.) and his followers, notably Mencius (c. 372-289 B.C.) and Hsün-tzu (c. 300-235 B.C.), advocated a return to the lost virtues of the early Chou, to family-centered ethics, ritual, and social responsibility. The followers of Mo-tzu (c. 470-391 B.C.) criticized the excessive ritual, lack of religious spirit and particularism of Confucianism, but shared many of the same general social goals and ethical concerns. By contrast, the Taoist philosophers Lao-tzu (sixth century B.C.), Chuang-tzu (c. 369-286 B.C.), and their disciples sought release from social burdens; they were at heart individualists and escapists, concerned less with changing the world in an active way than with finding their special niche in the natural order. Related to the Taoists, at least in their interest in nature and natural process, were the followers of Tsou Yen (fourth century B.C.), who developed an elaborate cosmology based on *yin-yang* principles and the so-called "five agents" or "activities" *(wu-hsing)* associated with the elements of wood, metal, fire, water, and earth *(mu, chin, huo, shui, t'u)*. Other schools of thought, such as the School of Names

(ming-chia) contributed to the development of epistemology and ontology, but left little long-term philosophical legacy in China.

Ironically, it was the school of thought known as Legalism, which can barely be called a philosophy, that exerted the most immediate and profound influence on Chinese society. Legalism was little more than an administrative approach emphasizing government by punitive law rather than morality (contrary to the Confucian ideal), and state power as an end in itself. But guided by these basic principles and blessed with capable leadership, the Ch'in state—one of several major contenders for political supremacy during the late Chou period—embarked on a systematic campaign of conquest that resulted in the fall of the Chou ruling house in 256 B.C. and culminated in the subordination of all China by 221 B.C.[6]

The Ch'in dynasty lasted only fifteen years, but it left an imprint on Chinese culture for the next two millennia. Its sovereign, King Cheng, who adopted the title of emperor *(huang-ti)* for the first time in Chinese history, brought unprecedented cultural unity to China. Dismantling the vestiges of Chou feudalism, he instituted a nationwide system of freehold farming and imposed centralized, bureaucratic rule over the entire realm. At the same time, he standardized weights, measures, coinage, axle lengths, and even the Chinese script. Less laudably, the first Ch'in emperor imposed rigid thought control on Chinese intellectuals and tried to suppress all non-utilitarian works. This policy, commonly known as the "Burning of the Books and the Burying of the Scholars" *(fen-shu k'eng-ju)*, although not entirely successful, resulted in the destruction of great amounts of priceless literature, and created countless later controversies over the authenticity of reconstituted texts.[7]

The harsh policies and rapid changes introduced by the first Ch'in emperor, which may have helped stifle emerging capitalism in China,[8] led to widespread disaffection and rebellion. Within four years of the first emperor's death, the Ch'in dynasty was overthrown.

The Han dynasty that followed (206 B.C.-A.D. 222) was one of the most glorious periods in all of Chinese history. Indeed, later generations of Chinese proudly called themselves "The People of Han" *(Han-jen)*. The key to Han administrative success was the creation of an effective blend or balance of diverse cultural elements—a government that was Legalist in structure but Confucian in spirit.[9] This eclecticism was also evident in Han Confucianism itself, which drew freely upon other ideas, including Taoism and especially *yin-yang/*"five agents" cosmology.[10] Han art and literature reflected a similar balance of cultural influences—not only Confucian and Taoist, but also courtly and popular, foreign and native.[11] Further, the Han period witnessed the incorporation of the so-called "Ten Wings" *(shih-i)* into the *I-ching* and the elevation of the work to classic status. In fact, a

great deal of the most stimulating and influential scholarship of the Han period developed out of research on the *I-ching*.[12]

The legacy of Han culture was enduring. In its institutions, ideology, artistic and literary accomplishments, economic policies, and even its system of foreign relations, the Han set the style for most later dynasties. Important changes took place over the next two thousand years, to be sure, but a Han scholar would have had very little difficulty adjusting to life in any subsequent dynasty up to the late Ch'ing. One could hardly make the same claim for a Roman patrician in nineteenth-century Italy.

The fall of the Han in A.D. 222 ushered in an extended period of political disunity known as the Six Dynasties (A.D. 222-589). For much of this time, China was divided into two distinct areas, north and south, with the dividing line about the Huai River. The north suffered repeated barbarian invasions and chronic political instability, while the south remained immune from barbarian conquest and comparatively stable. But these were not China's "Dark Ages," especially in the south. In fact, traditional Chinese culture flourished, receiving enrichment from Indian Buddhism, which spread rapidly in China during the centuries following its introduction during the later Han period. Buddhism brought to tormented and disillusioned Chinese individuals a hope of escape from worldly suffering and sorrow. It introduced new ideas of reincarnation, kharmic retribution, and the release of Nirvana, and exerted a lasting influence on many aspects of Chinese philosophy, religion, art, literature, music, and architecture. At the same time, Buddhist monasteries began to exert their influence on Chinese economic, social, and even political life, in both north and south. Undoubtedly, the nearly universal acceptance of Buddhism by all levels of society by the sixth century, together with the strong memory of Han unity and glory, contributed to the political and cultural reunification of China in A.D. 589 by the Sui dynasty.

During the Sui-T'ang period (A.D. 589-907), Buddhism received official patronage, becoming an integral part of state ritual and Chinese high culture generally.[13] But a series of politically-inspired persecutions directed against the Buddhist religious establishment in the mid-ninth century effectively undercut Buddhism's institutional power in China.[14] Meanwhile, Confucianism, which had been used selectively by the Sui-T'ang rulers as a convenient source of political theory and ritual precedent for the conduct of imperial affairs, witnessed an intellectual revival. Thereafter, Buddhism continued to inspire, but never to dominate, Chinese intellectual life. Controlled by the state from above, it became appropriated by Chinese popular religion from below.[15]

The intellectual vitality of the T'ang was but one indication of the general growth and refinement of Chinese culture during the period. Like the Han, the T'ang was expansive, cosmopolitan, creative, and self-

confident. In the words of Michael Sullivan, "T'ang culture was to the culture of the Six Dynasties as was Han to the Warring States, or, to stretch the parallel a little, Rome to ancient Greece. It was a time of consolidation, of practical achievement, of immense assurance. . . . T'ang art has incomparable vigour, realism, dignity; it is the art of a people thoroughly at home in a world which they knew to be secure."[16]

In government, the Sui-T'ang examination system represented a major advance over the Han recruitment apparatus in opening channels of bureaucratic mobility. Although social origins, family connections, and proper "breeding" still gave distinct advantages to well-born candidates for official position, the T'ang marks the beginning of a trend toward the replacement of aristocratic rule by "meritocratic" rule in Chinese government.[17] By Ming-Ch'ing times (1368-1912) the process was largely complete (see below).

After a brief period of disunity following the downfall of the T'ang, the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) re-established centralized rule over all of China. Building on early T'ang political institutions as well as late T'ang economic foundations, the Sung carried traditional Chinese culture to new heights, combining remarkable administrative stability with unprecedented agricultural, commercial, and industrial growth. China's numerous advancements in science and technology in this period were as impressive as those in artistic areas such as landscape painting, although not, of course, in the eyes of Sung scholar-artists.[18]

The Sung is also noteworthy for a second great flowering of Chinese philosophy—an outgrowth of social and economic changes, the Confucian revival begun in the T'ang, and technological factors such as the invention of printing, also a T'ang development.[19] During the Sung, "neo-Confucianism," as expounded by such brilliant and diverse thinkers as Chou Tun-i (1017-1073), Shao Yung (1011-1077), Chang Tsai (1020-1077), the great synthesizer Chu Hsi (1130-1200), and his intellectual rival Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193), not only reasserted (and in many cases redefined) the ancient principles of Confucius and his more immediate successors, but also buttressed these principles with cosmological and metaphysical speculations inspired by Buddhism and Taoism. Not surprisingly, the *I-ching* was crucial in the process, providing concepts and convenient categories of explanation for virtually all of the great neo-Confucian minds of the period.[20]

Mongol rule during the Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) tarnished somewhat the bright cultural image of the Sung, and brought with it both rising despotism and racial discrimination against Han Chinese. Yet the harshness and oppressiveness of Yüan administration could not stay the advance of traditional Chinese culture, which flourished in such areas as art, vernacular literature, and especially operatic drama. Moreover, in time the

Mongols became increasingly sinicized, as a comparison of the administrative attitudes and personal lifestyles of Chinggis Khan and his grandson Kubilai Khan amply illustrates. In testimony of the Yüan dynasty's patronage of Confucian scholarship, at least in its later years, the civil service examinations, which had fallen into abeyance, were reestablished in the early fourteenth century. Characteristically, however, the Mongols imposed a rigid orthodoxy on the content of the examinations, incorporating the commentaries of Chu Hsi into the official examination syllabus, where they remained until 1904.[21]

The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) expelled the Mongols, but continued the trend toward despotic rule by means of the early abolition of certain important institutional checks on imperial power, including the office of Prime Minister. Overall, however, Ming despotism neither stifled artistic activity nor hindered commercial growth. What is more, contrary to stereotype, the Ming was a time of considerable vitality and diversity in Chinese intellectual life. The great scholar and Confucian activist Wang Yang-ming was a towering figure in Chinese philosophy during the Ming era, but he did not stand alone.[22] Nonetheless, it must be said that on the whole, Ming culture lacked the cosmopolitan spirit and sparkling creativity of earlier dynasties such as the Han, Tang, and Sung.

With this brief historical overview as a backdrop, we may dwell at greater length on the Ch'ing dynasty, the chronological context of our analytical study. As I mentioned previously, the Ch'ing represented the culmination of China's entire cultural tradition, a period, in the words of Ch'ing chroniclers, "unparalleled in history."[23] What were the basic institutional features of this great dynasty?

In its broad outlines, and in most specific respects, the government of the Manchus was patterned on the Ming model. At the top stood the emperor, the Son of Heaven *(T'ien-tzu)* and supreme executive of the imperial Chinese state. He was, in the well-chosen words of John Fairbank, "conqueror and patriarch, theocratic ritualist, ethical exemplar, lawgiver and judge, commander-in-chief and patron of arts and letters, and all the time administrator of the empire."[24] To play all of these roles effectively required a ruler of heroic talent and energy, and in the first two centuries of Ch'ing rule there were several such individuals.

Below the emperor lay a complex bureaucratic apparatus designed for stability at the expense of administrative efficiency. At the metropolitan level in Peking, the conduct of governmental affairs rested with the Grand Secretariat (and after 1730, the Grand Council), the Six Boards or Ministries (Civil Office, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishments, and Public Works), and a special "imperial bureaucracy" for the administation of the emperor's palaces, bodyguards, and estates.[25] A censorial system, designed to be the "eyes and ears" of the emperor, supervised governmental affairs

Nor was this all. Only a small fraction of the empire's total number of degree holders (over a million, at times) could expect to gain one of the 20,000 or so civil government positions. *Chin-shih* status almost automatically placed an individual in the middle stratum of the nine-rank bureaucracy, which ranged from metropolitan posts such as Deputy Commissioner in the Transmission Office (rank 4A) or Reader in the Grand Secretariat (rank 4B), to local offices such as Circuit Intendant (rank 4A), Prefect (rank 4B), and District Magistrate (rank 7A). But *chu-jen* degree holders could be assured of only the most minor posts, and *sheng-yüan* had virtually no opportunities for regular bureaucratic employment. The vast majority of *sheng-yüan* languished as "lower gentry," enjoying certain gentry privileges to be sure, but forced to "plow with the writing brush" by teaching in local schools or serving as family tutors. Many of these individuals became small tradesmen or entered other "demeaning" occupations in order to sustain themselves.[32]

Yet for all the frustrations of examination life, with its fierce competition and tightly controlled degree quotas, the lure of gentry status and the ultimate possibility of bureaucratic service, with its rich social and financial rewards, kept the vast majority of Ch'ing scholars loyal to the system and the state.[33]

Bureaucrats, for their part, had every reason to support the status quo. But the alien Manchus—outnumbered by the Chinese perhaps 100 to 1—made every effort to ensure administrative control through an elaborate system of checks and balances inherited from the Ming and refined for their own purposes. One important check on the bureaucracy was the despotic power of the emperor, which reached new heights in the Ch'ing period.[34] Another was the appointment of equal numbers of Manchus and Chinese to head the top-level organs of government, and the practice of appointing a careful mixture of Manchus and Chinese to oversee provincial administration. Typically, a Chinese served as a governor, while a Manchu occupied the position of governor-general.[35] A third check was the use of "ideologically uncommitted" Manchu Banner forces to maintain military control at the capital and in the provinces.[36] Other checks included the effort to balance regular and "irregular" bureaucratic appointments,[37] the frequent transfer of officials (usually every three years or less), and rules prohibiting bureaucratic service in one's own home province. Even the mandatory retirement of officials for up to three years of mourning *(ting-yu)* for deceased parents may be viewed in part as a control device.

Social controls included close state supervision of Chinese religious life and merchant activity[38] as well as registration systems for taxation *(li-chia)* and rural surveillance *(pao-chia)*.[39] But successful administration, especially in the countryside, depended on an alliance between officialdom and the gentry class; a district magistrate's bureaucratic reach could not possibly

at all levels, receiving reports from officials and complaints from various other groups. Censors had direct access to the throne, and the power to impeach other officials.[26]

Provincial administration fell under the jurisdiction of governors-general (usually in charge of two provinces) and governors (in charge of a single province). Their responsibilities overlapped considerably and they were expected to cooperate harmoniously. Below them, in each province, were various "commissioners" in charge of financial, judicial, educational, and other civil affairs, as well as a military commander-in-chief in charge of provincial garrisons of the Chinese constabulary known as the Army of the Green Standard.[27]

The lower levels of administration were divided into circuits *(tao)*, prefectures *(fu)*, and districts *(hsien)*. At the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder stood the district magistrate *(hsien-chih)*, who had direct responsibility for 100,000 to more than 250,000 people. Horribly overburdened, the magistrate functioned as a kind of mini-emperor, playing the role of "father and mother" *(fu-mu)* to his constituents, undertaking ceremonial responsibilities, dispensing justice, maintaining order, sponsoring public works, patronizing local scholarship, and all the while collecting taxes for the state. Assisting the magistrate in these multifarious tasks were personal secretaries and a small army of *yamen* (office) clerks, runners, and other socially disesteemed but administratively essential functionaries. These low-level personnel relied on informal fees for their livelihood, a fact which often encouraged corruption.[28]

Officials from the district magistrate all the way up to Grand Secretaries and Grand Councillors were drawn from the elite pool of successful examination system candidates, and all were imperially appointed. Although lower degrees and even substantive offices might be purchased on occasion, especially in periods of administrative decline, on the whole the examination system provided the major means of bureaucratic mobility in Ch'ing times.[29]

The system imposed rigid requirements on candidates for degrees. Success in the examinations demanded diligent application from the age of five on. Beginning with primers such as the *Ch'ien-tzu wen* (Essay of a Thousand Characters), male students went on to memorize the Four Books and Five Classics—a total of some 430,000 characters—by the age of eleven or twelve. Training in poetry composition and the difficult "eight-legged essay" style followed.[30] In addition, aspirants for degrees had to familiarize themselves with a huge body of classical commentaries, histories, and other essential literary works. One could not normally expect to acquire the lowest degree *(sheng-yüan)* before the age of twenty-four, the middle degree *(chü-jen)* before the age of thirty, and the highest degree *(chin-shih)* before the age of thirty-five.[31]

extend to the hundreds of villages under his immediate jurisdiction. Thus a symbiotic relationship developed between officials and gentry. Gentry members in rural areas helped maintain local order and acted as buffers between the peasantry and officialdom, while urban-based bureaucrats helped to further gentry interests through direct patronage and official access to higher provincial authority.[40] Tension did exist between the two groups, but their common interests and similar backgrounds generally over-shadowed differences in outlook.

Contrary to stereotype, the gentry class was not simply a landed elite, although most of the gentry lived in rural areas, and many were indeed landlords, comfortably ensconced in country villas. By the early eighteenth century, income derived from local managerial services, such as the mediation of legal disputes, supervision of schools and academies, management of public works and welfare projects, militia organization, and proxy remittance *(pao-lan)* of peasant land and labor taxes to the district *yamen* clerks, began to replace landed wealth as the key economic underpinning of the gentry class—especially at the lower levels.[41] And for those gentry who were primarily landlords, collusion with officialdom usually enabled them to pay taxes at much lower rates than middle or poor peasants.[42]

The Ch'ing system of land tenure, based on a general freedom to buy and sell land, varied from place to place, depending primarily on productivity. Landlordism was much more prevalent in south China than in the north, not only because the land there was more productive, but also because so much property was corporately owned by wealthy clans *(t'ung-tsung)*. In the absence of primogeniture in China, private landholdings were often quickly broken up,[43] but wealth derived from corporately-owned property permitted many clans to undertake welfare and other social ser-vices on behalf of their members—services which might otherwise not have been provided. Hard-pressed individuals without clan affiliations were often out of luck in Ch'ing China.[44]

Although most peasants lived on the margin of subsistence, either as tenant farmers or as small independent landowners, they were part of a larger social and economic community. This was not simply one of China's million or so rural villages, but also one of approximately 45,000 cellular market systems, each organized around a market town *(chen)*. These basic "cells," which typically included between fifteen and twenty-five villages, were autonomous economic systems: "transport, trade, artisan industry, and credit were all structured . . . spatially [within the cell] according to the principle of centrality, and temporally by the periodicity of its market days." Such intervillage systems were, again to quote G. William Skinner, "the chief tradition-creating and culture-bearing units of rural China." Every few days "the periodically convened local market drew to the center

of social action representatives of households from villages throughout the system, and in so doing facilitated the homogenization of culture within the intervillage community."⁴⁵ Thus the rural sector of Chinese society, like Chinese society as a whole, was much more highly integrated than is commonly believed.

This survey of Ch'ing institutions has been essentially a-historical. Yet it is obvious that significant changes took place in China from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries in virtually every area we have discussed: the imperial institution, the structure of government (including the Manchu-Chinese dyarchy), the character and quality of the bureaucracy, the composition of the gentry, the effectiveness of government control and registration systems, relations between gentry and officialdom, the land tenure system, and even the "open-ness" of Chinese villages within the cellular market structure. Yet in all, one is most struck by the capacity of the Chinese traditional state and society, in Ch'ing times as in earlier periods, to accommodate change without fundamental disruption, to restore homeostatic balance. This capacity reflects, I believe, a deeply ingrained cultural outlook based on the idea of *yin-yang* alternation and accommodation. Whether expressed in the trivial comments of the K'ang-hsi emperor regarding eunuchs, or in the Mongol scholar Wo-jen's deep reflections on the dynastic cycle, we see evidence of *yin-yang* thinking as a means of explaining Chinese political and social behavior. The remaining chapters of this book will suggest in some detail the pervasiveness of this cultural outlook in other key areas of traditional Chinese life and indicate the relationship of each area to the others.

NOTES

1. See K. C. Chang, "The Origin of Chinese Civilization: A Review," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* **98**, no. 1 (January-March 1978): 85-91.

2. K. C. Chang, "The Continuing Quest for China's Origins," *Archaeology* **30**, nos. 1-2 (March-May 1977): 116-123, 187-193.

3. David Keightly, "The Religious Commitment: Shang Theology and the Genesis of Chinese Political Culture," *History of Religions* **17**, nos. 3-4 (February-May 1978): 211-224.

4. Significantly, Chou "feudalism" depended more on blood ties or pseudo-kinship relations than on Western-style feudal legal principles.

5. Hsü Cho-yün, *Ancient China in Transition* (Stanford, 1965).

6. Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 1-336.

7. Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier* (London, 1967).

8. Joseph Levenson and Franz Schurmann, *China: An Interpretive History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 71ff.

9. Etienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, translated by H. M. Wright (New Haven and London, 1970), pp. 3-27.

10. Fung, *A History*, vol. 2, pp. 7-167.

11. Michael Sullivan, *The Arts of China* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1977), p. 67.

12. Fung, *A History*, vol. 1, pp. 379-395; vol. 2, pp. 102-123.

13. Arthur Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (New York, 1968), chapters 2, 3, and 4.

14. In these essentially bloodless persecutions, more than 40,000 temples and shrines were confiscated and over 260,000 monks and nuns secularized.

15. Wright, *Buddhism*, chapters 5 and 6.

16. Sullivan, *The Arts*, p. 122.

17. P. T. Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China* (New York and London, 1962), p. 257.

18. Joseph Needham, "Science and China's Influence on the World," in Raymond Dawson, ed., *The Legacy of China* (Oxford, 1971). On the Sung cultural legacy, see W. T. de Bary, ed., *Self and Society in Ming Thought* (New York and London, 1970), pp. 8-9.

19. Jacques Gernet, *Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion 1250-1276*, translated by H. M. Wright (Stanford, 1962).

20. Fung, *A History*, vol. 2, pp. 407-592.

21. James T. C. Liu, "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?" *Philosophy East and West* 23, no. 4 (October 1973): 483-505.

22. W. T. de Bary, "Introduction," in de Bary, ed., *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (New York and London, 1975).

23. Frederic Wakeman, "High Ch'ing: 1683-1839," in James Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York, Chicago, etc., 1970), p. 1.

24. Quoted in Harold Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 4.

25. For a convenient overview of the Ch'ing political structure, see Albert Feuerwerker, *State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China* (Ann Arbor, 1976), pp. 35-75.

26. On the censorial system inherited by the Ch'ing, see Charles Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford, 1966).

27. Richard J. Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860," *Journal of Asian History* 8, no. 2 (1974), especially pp. 125-145.

28. See John Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York and London, 1972).

29. Ho, *The Ladder*, chapter 7.

30. Ichisada Miyazaki, *China's Examination Hell*, translated by Conrad Schirokauer (New York and Tokyo, 1976).

31. Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry* (Seattle and London, 1955), pp. 95, 120-137, and 165-209.

32. Ho, *The Ladder*, pp. 24-27 and 34-38.

33. See Frederic Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York and London, 1975), pp. 19-35.

34. Frederic Wakeman, "Introduction," in Wakeman and Carolyn Grant, eds., *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1975), p. 14.

35. John K. Fairbank, "The Manchu-Chinese Dyarchy in the 1840's and '50's," *Far Eastern Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (May 1953): 265-278.

36. Hellmut Wilhelm, "Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great Encounter," in Marius Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 288-289.

37. Chang, *Chinese Gentry*, pp. 116-117, 139.

38. Balazs, *Chinese Civilization*, pp. 3-27, especially 17; also chapter 5 of this book, notes 7 and 18.

39. Hsiao Kung-ch'üan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle and London, 1967), especially chapters 2, 3, and 4.

40. Watt, *The District Magistrate*, p. 14.

41. Wakeman, *The Fall*, pp. 30-34.

42. K. C. Liu, "Nineteenth-Century China," in P. T. Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago, 1968), vol. 1, book 1, p. 117.

43. Ho, *The Ladder*, pp. 162-165.

44. Hsiao, *Rural China*, chapter 8.

45. G. William Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13, no. 3 (July 1971): 272.