

CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS

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Professor Nowell-Smith tells a story of an Oxford don who thought it his duty to attend Common Room, and did so conscientiously, though his presence was a source of acute distress both to himself and others. This story is told in illustration of a discussion of the question whether conscientiousness is good without qualification. The philosopher's comment is "He would have done better to stay at home," and he reinforces this view with the historical judgment that "Robespierre would have been a better man (quite apart from the question of the harm he did) if he had given his conscience a thorough rest and indulged his taste for roses and sentimental verse."¹ The harm, in these cases, he points out, seems to spring, in part at least, from the very conscientiousness of these people, and he concludes that we have no reason for accepting the principle of the supreme value of conscientiousness and that there is nothing either self-contradictory or even logically odd in the assertion "You think that you ought to do A, but you would be a better man if you did B."²

This judgment, it should be noted, is a *moral* evaluation. "Better man" here means "ethically better." It explicitly excludes "better" in the sense of "more useful or less harmful to society" in the reference to Robespierre. Further, it is not restricted to the mere right or wrong of overt acts, saying, for example, that Robespierre would have done less that is objectively wrong if he had attended to his roses more and his conscience less, for it is a judgment on the moral character of the *man*, not merely on that of his overt acts, and moral judgments upon a man must take account of every feature of his personality concerned in the performance of his acts, i.e., his motives, intentions, character, beliefs, abilities and so forth. What we have here, therefore, is the contention that in some cases where conscientiousness would lead to more harm than good (as it may do in cases of mistaken moral judgments or other ignorance) a man may be a morally better man by stifling his conscience and doing what he believes he ought not to do. It is not claimed that this will always be true in such cases, and it is not denied that conscientiousness is to some degree a value. But it is denied that it is the only moral value, or a value with supreme authority above all others,

or that it is an essential feature of all moral value.

These denials are not uncommon among contemporary moralists, but it should be noted that they constitute a rejection of the major tradition in moral philosophy, from Plato to the present day. They also conflict with the convictions of the common man expressed in such injunctions as "Let your conscience be your guide," "Do what you yourself believe to be right, not what others tell you," "Act on your own convictions," "Always act in accord with your own conscience," "To thine own self be true." Conscientiousness is firmness of purpose in seeking to do what is right, and to most people it seems to be the very essence of the moral life and a value or virtue in some sense "higher" or more important than any other. Among philosophers this view is notably expressed in Joseph Butler's doctrine of the "natural supremacy" of conscience and in Immanuel Kant's insistence that there is nothing good in itself, intrinsically good, save the good will, and that this consists in the will to do one's duty for duty's sake. There are, evidently, some complex issues and confusions involved in these sharply varying positions and to clarify them we shall need to begin with an examination of what is involved in conscience itself.

Analysis of Conscience

Conscience involves both a cognitive and an emotive or motivational element. The cognitive element consists in a set of moral judgments concerning the right or wrong of certain kinds of action or rules of conduct, however these have been formed. The emotive or motivational element consists of a tendency to experience emotions of a unique sort of approval of the doing of what is believed to be right and a similarly unique sort of disapproval of the doing of what is believed to be wrong. These feeling states, it is generally recognized, are noticeably different from those of mere liking or disliking and also from feelings of aesthetic approval and disapproval (or aesthetic appreciation) and from feelings of admiration and the reverse aroused by nonmoral activities and skills. They can become particularly acute, moving and even distressing, in the negative and reflexive form of moral disapproval of one's own actions and motives, the sense of guilt and shame. In this form (indeed in both forms) they may have some notably irrational manifestations, but the sense of shame also has a very valuable function as an inhibitory motive upon the person who contemplates the possibility of doing what he believes to be wrong.

These are the commonly recognized aspects of conscience, and they frequently function quite uncritically. Because of this uncritical emotive reaction conscience all too frequently moves people to approve or disapprove actions and rules concerning which adequate reflection would

lead to a very different verdict, and sometimes it afflicts people with a quite irrational sense of guilt. These deplorable effects of some manifestations of conscience are a large part of the reason for its devaluation in the judgment of many modern moralists. What these thinkers rightly deplore is the uncritical emotive reaction which the person who experiences it calls his conscience, particularly when the emotive element in it inhibits any critical activity of the cognitive element. But it is not necessary, and it is not usually the case, that the emotive element in conscience stifles the critical, and there is no justification for jumping to the conclusion that conscience should be ignored. For critical ethical thinking is itself usually conscientiousness, and conscience can be trained to be habitually critical.

For clarity of thinking on this question we need to distinguish between the critical and the traditional conscience. The latter is uncritical. Here the emotive element attaches to moral ideas accepted from the tradition without critical re-evaluation of them. Its strength lies in this perpetuation of tradition, but this is also the source of its errors. It is this blind but emotive perpetuation of an outgrown and mistaken condition that contemporary critics of the supreme evaluation of conscience, for the most part, are concerned to deplore. And thus far they are right. But one would be unfair to such critics if one were not to recognize that their efforts to point out the errors of the tradition are usually also conscientious and are not merely the echoing of another tradition. Sometimes their critical ideas are boldly new and very commonly they are presented with persistent and painstaking care and in spite of personal cost. Nietzsche and Marx, Schweitzer and Gandhi, as well as Robespierre, were thoroughly conscientious men. Their ideas were new but were held with great emotive strength and tenacity. The same is true of the prophets of Israel and the great moral innovators of other religions. Indeed, the outstanding examples of conscientious men are not the mere sustainers of a tradition but the thinkers who try to improve the tradition.

This fact of the vitality of the critical conscience shows the superficiality of Freud's identification of it with the superego and of the explanation of it as an aftereffect of early social conditioning, as put forward by many psychologists and sociologists, and uncritically adopted by many philosophers. On this view the moral judgments which tend to arouse spontaneous emotions of approval or disapproval, shame and guilt, are those which we learned to make in our childhood and which we then heard expressed by those around us accompanied by strong manifestations of moral approval and disapproval. The child, it is pointed out, must naturally assimilate the tendency to feel similar emotions whenever he himself makes a moral judgment, and this emotive tendency remains

with him in adult life together with the tendency to frame and express such judgments. Conscience is then said to be simply the inward echo of the emotionally expressed judgments of our childhood social environment. This may be accepted as part of the explanation of the emotive element in the uncritical traditional conscience, but as an explanation of how men come to feel the way they do about the results of their own original critical thinking, and of the motivational drive conscientiously to do original critical ethical thinking, it is woefully inadequate.

It is not difficult to see how the cognitive element in conscience, the judgment of right and wrong, becomes critical. To some extent it must be so from the beginning. A favorite word in every child's vocabulary is "Why?" And especially does he ask for reasons when told that he *ought* to do something he does not want to do. If moral injunctions are accepted as such on mere authority it is because it is implicitly believed that the authority *has* good reasons for issuing them, or else that the demand or example of this authority is in itself a sufficient reason for obedience or conformity, as with kings and deities. Apart from authority, reasons for moral rules have to be found in their relevance to the needs and security and peace of the community and the well-being of the person himself. But always, it is a distinguishing mark of a *moral* rule that it is one for which it is believed that reasons can be given. Critical thinking about moral rules is therefore stimulated whenever the reasons presented seem inadequate, beginning with the child's "Why?" and whenever there is a conflict of rules.

This critical thinking at first accepts as its basic principles the sort of reasons customarily given for moral rules and injunctions—the traditions of the tribe, its peace, security, prosperity and honor, revelations from divine sources, and so forth. But at a higher level of critical thinking conflicts are found between these basic principles themselves, and man is directed to the philosophical task of thinking out the *most* basic of all principles—if any such can be found. The search may end in scepticism and confusion, but so long as the thinker is prepared to accept any reason at all as a reason why something "ought" (in the ethical sense) to be done he is also convinced that he ought to do that which his search for reasons has led him to believe that he ought to do. Further, the experience of finding reasons for rejecting old views and accepting new ones impresses upon him the need and value of the search. Thus, so long as he recognizes any moral reasons at all he must recognize a duty of continued critical examination of moral ideas. The critical conscience thus becomes its own stimulus to further critical thinking. Conscience takes the form of the firm conviction, not merely that one ought to do what one believes one ought to do, still less that one ought to do without question what one has been taught one ought to do,

but that one ought to think for oneself as to what one really ought to do and then act on one's own convictions. And the emotive drive is apt to attach itself as firmly to this last formulation of the cognitive element in conscience as ever it does to the other two.

Conscience, Love and Personal Integrity

It is clear that the motivational element of conscience in its most developed form is not merely the continuing echo of approvals and disapprovals of specific rules and actions impressed upon us by the social environment of our childhood. Yet the emotive content is continuous through all the changes in the sort of action the contemplation of which arouses it. One can imagine a youth of the eighteenth century feeling strong moral approval of a man who challenges a dangerous opponent to a duel in defense of his wife's good name, and later, in his maturity, feeling similar moral approval of another man who faces social obloquy for his refusal to fight a duel in similar circumstances because he is opposed in principle to duelling. In both cases it is the manifestation of courage in defense of principle that calls forth the moral approval, but his judgment has changed as to the mode of action appropriate to such defense. We see that what has changed is the specific sort of action that calls forth approval and disapproval, while what remains the same is the specific sort of reason that is held to be appropriate for judging an action to be worthy of approval or disapproval. And this we would find to be true in general (if we had space to demonstrate it) through the whole process of critical re-examination of moral judgment. Moral approval and disapproval attach to whatever we find to have reasons for approval. These reasons, in the course of thinking, become more and more specifically formulated and more and more highly generalized into abstract principles of moral judgment and they are only changed as change is seen to be needed to bring them into consistency with one another. Emotive unwillingness to accept some of the consequences of this process of ethical thinking sometimes inhibits and distorts it, but through it all the emotive drives of approval and disapproval tend to attach themselves to whatever lines of action are thought to be characterized by the recognized reasons for such attitudes.

On account of the complexity of all their implications the exact and proper statement of these basic ethical principles is a matter of very great difficulty. Yet there is a degree of agreement as to general principle which is really remarkable considering the complexity of human conduct and the diversity of traditional moral judgment with which we start. Thus, there is almost universal agreement that the fact that an act may have bad consequences for some persons is a good reason for disapproving it, and the reverse if it would have good consequences. Similarly there are cer-

tain rules of justice that are generally recognized, such as that of impartiality in the distribution of goods and burdens, the keeping of contracts and promises, the making of reparations, and the equitable application of the law. Questions arise as to how far the duties of beneficence should go, as to what to do when principles conflict in practical application, as to whether all principles can be comprehended under some one principle, and so forth. But the general trend is clear. Moral approval and disapproval are moved by the thought of the effect of our actions upon the weal or woe of human beings. This is the root of conscience. If some conscientious thinkers, such as Nietzsche, seem to be an exception to this rule it is because they have developed unusual or paradoxical views of what really constitutes true human weal or woe, or how it can best be promoted.

This connection of conscience with reasons for action bearing on the effects of action on human well-being enables us to understand the distinctive feeling-tone of moral approval and disapproval—i.e., their difference from mere liking and disliking, and from other emotions such as the aesthetic, and from nonmoral admiration and its reverse. The moral emotions are often mingled with these others, but they are also different. There is in them a distinct element of concern for human welfare which is gratified by what promotes it and distressed at anything that seems injurious. For this reason the moral emotions have often been identified with sympathy, but they are not mere passive feeling states. There is in them an element of active concern for human values with an impulse to give help where it seems needed. For this reason these emotions are responsive to judgments about the effects of human action, bringing forth a positive response of approval to that which seems helpful and the reverse toward the hurtful. For this reason also moral approval is a gratifying emotion, inducing a favorable reaction, while moral disapproval is apt to become a source of distress and an occasion for anger. For moral approval, we can now see, is a specification in action of the most deeply satisfying of all human emotions, that of love, in its most general form of expression.

Moral approval, then, is a development of the basic social interest of man as a social animal, it is an expression of the general sympathetic tendency of concern for human values with special attention to those depending on the orderly life of the group. It is an expression of the desire to create and maintain those values. Its conflict with other motives is, therefore, a conflict of desires. But this particular conflict, the conflict of conscience (moral approvals and disapprovals) with other desires (temptations) is not just an ordinary conflict of desires. It is a conflict in which the integrity of the personality is peculiarly involved. In an ordinary conflict of desires, in which there is no moral issue, the best solution is

for one of the desires to be completely set aside and fade into oblivion without regrets, the opposing interest being completely triumphant. And, for the integrity of the personality it does not matter which interest gives way. But if the conflict be between "conscience" (the interests involved in moral approval and disapproval) and "temptation" (some opposed interest or desire) then it does matter which triumphs. The integrity of personality is involved. It tends to dissolve as a person slips into the habit of doing things he believes to be wrong. He loses his self-respect and his firmness of purpose. For a time the sense of guilt depresses. Later it tends to be repressed. With these psychological repressions the personality tends to manifest either general weakness or the over-compensations which give a false impression of strength as they manifest themselves in irrational drives. The guilty conscience and the repressed conscience are at the root of most of the disorders of personality, whether the guilt itself be reasonably conceived or not.

It is evident, therefore, that the emotive or motivational element that manifests itself in conscience is rooted in conative tendencies or interests which are of basic importance in the life of man. This psychological conclusion has, in recent years, been strongly emphasized by a number of workers in the field of psychotherapy, notably by Erich Fromm, who argues strongly that only in what he calls the "orientation of productive love"³ can the personality of man develop continuously and with the integrity necessary for mental health. From this conclusion concerning the psychological need of this type of orientation Fromm also develops a most important theory of conscience. What we have distinguished as the critical and uncritical (or traditional) conscience he distinguishes as the "authoritarian" and the "humanistic" conscience. The former he dismisses as the internalized voice of an external authority, but the latter, he maintains, is "the reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning or disfunctioning. . . . Conscience is thus . . . the voice of our true selves which summons us . . . to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously. . . . It is the guardian of our integrity."⁴

If Fromm's psychological analysis of the growth and structure of personality is accurate in essentials, and if our account of the growth of the critical conscience out of the uncritical is also correct, then we must recognize that conscience at every stage is, as Fromm says of the "humanistic" conscience, "the reaction of our total personality to its total functioning," its "voice" is the experience of the constraint of the personality as a whole, in its seeking of a growing creative expression with integrity or wholeness, upon the occasional and temporary impulses and desires which would tend to stultify its creativity and destroy its integrity. It is because doing what we believe we ought not is destructive of that integrity that conscience demands that we always act in accord with our

own convictions; and it is because the fundamental orientation of human life is social and creative that ethical thinking tends, through the course of history, to clarify itself in the light of principles which tend to formulate moral judgments as expressions of impartial concern for human well-being.

The Authority of Conscience

It is time now to return to the question with which we started. Is it true that a man would sometimes be a better man (i.e., morally better) for refusing to obey his conscience rather than obeying it? It should be noted that the question is not whether the consequences to himself or to others might be better in general, but whether he would, himself, be a morally better man for acting in this way. This raises the question whether it is ever morally right to go against one's conscience. Is it ever right to do as you think you ought not to do? And this, again, is not the question whether conscience is always right in what it commands us to do, but whether it is ever right to disobey those commands, thus choosing to do what we believe to be wrong? The traditional answer is given by Joseph Butler in asserting the "natural supremacy" of conscience, which "magisterially asserts itself and approves and condemns." "Had it strength as it had right: had it power, as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."⁵ Against this we have the contemporary challenge voiced by Nowell-Smith.

One serious objection to this modern challenge to the traditional view is that it is necessarily futile and worse than futile, as a guiding principle of moral behaviour. It is futile because, though a man may believe that *perhaps*, in some cases, it *may* be that he would be a better man if he did not do what he believes he ought to do, he can never believe this in any particular case, for that would be to believe that he ought not to do this that he believes he ought to do, which is self-contradictory. Thus this piece of ethical theory is so paradoxical that it can never function as a guide to action. Further, it is worse than futile, for it implies, not merely that moral judgment may be mistaken (and therefore needs critical examination) but that the very effort not to do wrong may itself sometimes be wrong—that the conscientious effort to try to find out what is really right and act firmly in accord with one's own convictions, is sometimes wrong and we have no way of knowing when it is wrong. From this state of mind the only reasonable reaction is to abandon the ethical inquiry and the ethical endeavor and make the easiest and most satisfactory adjustment we can to the mores of the community and the practical exigencies of our personal situation.

The logical alternatives, therefore, are either to abandon the moral standpoint entirely, or to affirm, with Butler, the moral authority of every

man's own conscience. The fact that judgments conscientiously made may be in error does not imply that this assertion of the sovereignty of the individual conscience must lead to either conflict or chaos. It rather avoids conflict, for each person, in asserting the rights of his own conscience, at the same time affirms the right of freedom of conscience for others. And it avoids chaos because, laying the injunction upon us to exercise continuous critical examination of our own moral judgments, it points us on the only possible way to consistency and order in moral judgment, by finding our errors and rectifying them. A community of people open-mindedly seeking the best formulation and reformulation of its moral rules, and abiding by its most intelligent findings, is more likely to maintain order with progress than one in which conscience operates in any other way, or in no way at all.

We must conclude, then, that if one were to accept Nowell-Smith's critique of conscience one could not apply it to the decision of any moral question in one's own conduct, and that its acceptance, if taken seriously, would be apt to have a deteriorating effect upon personal moral endeavor. But it is still possible to grant it theoretical credence and apply it to our evaluation of the moral value of the personality of others. This is what Nowell-Smith does in the cases of Robespierre and the Oxford don: Robespierre would have been a better man if he had indulged his taste for roses and sentimental verse rather than follow the demands of his conscience that he strive by whatever terrible means seemed necessary to carry through the program of the revolution; and the Oxford don would have been a better man if he had allowed his personal distaste for Common Room society to overcome his sense of duty which required him to attend it.

This is a judgment on the moral quality of the man as affected by his act of choice. The choice with which we are concerned is not that of his decision as to whether A or B is the right thing to do but his decision as to whether he would do what he believed to be the right thing or follow his personal wishes to do something that he found much more agreeable to himself. The latter act is the one he would do if he had not given any consideration to the effect of his actions on other people, or the needs of the social structure of which he is a part, except so far as his own interests were involved, and, coming as it does after he has considered these things and formed a judgment as to what they require of him, it is a decision to set aside the results of this thoughtful examination of the possible consequences of his conduct and do the thing he personally wants to do and would have done if he had never given the matter any ethical thought at all. When the issue is thus clearly stated it is very difficult to see how any thoughtful person could judge the unconscientious following of inclination to be the act of a better man,

or an act that tends to make a better man, than the careful thinking and active self-determination involved in conscientiousness. It seems evident that those who have expressed the view that the following of personal inclination is sometimes morally better than conscientiousness are confusing this issue with another to which we must next give attention.

Conscientiousness and Other Values

For Immanuel Kant there was nothing good in itself, good without qualification, except a good will, and a good will, he explains, is good, not because it is a will to produce some good, or even the greatest possible good, but simply by reason of the nature of its volition as a will to do one's duty, a will to do what is conceived as right. Thus, for Kant, an action only has *moral* worth if it is done from a sense of duty, not from any inclination, even that of an impartial desire to promote general human well-being. Kant does not deny that good-natured inclinations have value, but he insists that the will to do one's duty has incomparably higher value and that it alone is of distinctly moral value. Kant's position here is an extreme one. Conscientiousness is regarded not merely as an essential part of moral value but as the only truly moral value and supreme among all values. Against this Nowell-Smith is not alone in protesting, and it is this rejection of the extravagant claim for conscientiousness as compared with other values, that seems to him to justify the notion that there are some occasions when some other value should be preferred and conscientiousness rejected.⁶

It is true, as Nowell-Smith says, that "we normally think of moral worth as meaning the worth of any virtuous motive and we normally think of sympathy and benevolence as virtuous motives."⁷ It is also true, that, contrary to Kant, we normally judge a right action done out of sympathy and good will to be morally better than the same action would be if done solely from a sense of duty but without sympathy or good will.⁸ These normal judgments I think we must fully endorse, but they do not involve the implication that a man can be morally justified (i.e., can be a "better man" than he otherwise would be) in performing an act, even of sympathy and good will (let alone indulging an interest in roses), which, in the circumstances, he regards as wrong.

There is a story told by Mark Twain of two ladies who lied to protect a runaway slave even though believing it wrong to do so and fearing that they might suffer in hell for their sin. In such a case we see a conflict, not merely of conscience with desire, but of the uncritical or traditional conscience with the critical. The deeper level of conscience, which they might well have called their "intuitions," urged the protection of the poor, frightened slave. They were not sufficiently capable of philosophical thinking to formulate a philosophical critique in support of

their own deeper insights, so they remained superficially of the traditional opinion that their action was wrong. But their choice was actually a conscientious one, true to the deeper levels of conscience, and we tend to endorse their decision because it is endorsed by our consciences too. But this example (and others like it) is not a case of judging that the motives of love and sympathy were here better than conscientiousness, but of judging that the will to do good, seen as the very root of righteousness, is better than the will to conform to rules uncritically accepted as right. Such a judgment is far from the same as judging that the Oxford don would have been a morally better man for indulging his reluctance to attend Common Room than he would for conscientiously fulfilling what he believed to be his duty in the matter.

If we accept a teleological ethics then we recognize that the purpose of moral rules is to protect and promote the more important aspects of social well-being. We then see that the motives of love and sympathy, if sufficiently strong, enlightened and impartial, would achieve the purposes of moral rules better than the moral rules do, and would also achieve other good purposes beyond them. A world of saints would be a better world than a world of conscientious persons without mutual love and sympathy. Seeing this, though there are no saints, we endorse such elements of saintliness as there are (i.e., love and sympathy expressed in this enlightened and impartial way) and recognize them as morally good and as expressions of a better type of personality than one in which conscientiousness is found without these motives. But this recognition of the greater value of enlightened and impartial good will, or love, can never involve a rejection of conscientiousness in favor of such love, for such love includes and transcends all that conscientiousness stands for. Such love is the fulfilling of the law and the fulfilling, not the rejection, of the conscientiousness which supports the law. Thus, while a teleological ethics rejects Kant's apotheosis of the will to do one's duty as the only intrinsic moral value it does not lead to an endorsement of the view that we should sometimes judge a man as morally better for neglecting his conscience to indulge some other inclination. If, on the other hand, we were to accept a deontological ethics we should find that to speak of a conflict between conscientiousness and an enlightened and impartial love and sympathy (or any other good motive) as a conflict between different moral values involves a category mistake. For conscientiousness and other good motives, on this view, are not moral values in the same sense. An act of love is not made moral by the kind of consequences at which it aims. The only moral actions are those which intentionally adhere to intuitively discerned principles. So whatever value is attached to love and sympathy, it is not moral value. Moral value belongs alone to conscientiousness. Thus a man could never become morally better by rejecting

the morally valuable motive of conscientiousness for some other motive to which only nonmoral value is attached. This deontological theory Nowell-Smith, I think rightly, rejects, but it is well to see that it, too, involves a rejection of his theory of the comparison of conscientiousness with other moral values.

Returning to the teleological point of view, and reflecting on the deontologist's claim, we can perhaps see the reason for the basic confusions that haunt people's minds on this question of the relative value of conscientiousness and impartial good will, or love. Conscientiousness is uniquely a moral motive in that its end is morality itself, the keeping of moral rules. All other motives, if without conscientiousness, are at best nonmoral (operating without concern for moral rules) or at worst immoral—consciously in opposition to them. This is true even of love and sympathy, simply as such. But if the teleological point of view is correct it is not true of love and sympathy *with a concern for impartiality*, for this latter is the very basis of moral rules and such love is of the essence of the moral life. Thus conscientiousness and impartial good will share together the unique character of being moral in the sense of being motivated by a concern for morality as such, the former for the rules which formulate it in lines of conduct, and the latter for the basic principle of impartial concern for human well-being in accordance with which the rules merely formulate the guiding lines. But this merely means that impartial good will is a motive characterized by the critical conscience, while conscientiousness without love, sympathy or good will is an operation of the traditional or uncritical conscience alone. Thus the motive that is of uniquely moral value and of supreme moral authority is love finding expression in the form of the critical conscience.

The main conclusions, therefore, of this paper may be summed up briefly thus: (1) Conscientiousness, if it be properly critical, is good without qualification, but an uncritical conscientiousness is not. (2) Since we cannot be saints we need to be conscientious, and this includes both the effort to find out what we really ought to do and the effort to do it to the best of our ability. (3) We should also cultivate the motive of impartial love or good will, for it functions as both an illuminating guide and support to our efforts to be conscientious and is itself of intrinsic moral value. (4) We can be righteous, and to that extent good, men merely by being conscientious, but we can be much better men by being not only conscientious but men in whom, without conflicting with conscience, the effort to be conscientious is made unnecessary by the outflow of spontaneous good will. These are very ordinary conclusions, but it takes clear thinking to keep them free from some very extraordinary objections.

NOTES

1. P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (London, 1954), p. 247.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
3. Erich Fromm, *Man For Himself* (New York, 1947), pp. 92-107.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-160.
5. Joseph Butler, *Five Sermons* (New York, 1950), p. 41.
6. Nowell-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 259.