

## CHRONICAL

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### FROM BORDERLINE TO BORDERLAND

Round table “From Borderline to Borderland: New Challenge of Remaking Eastern Borders”, which took place on November 19, 2009 in Vilnius in Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute in Vilnius (now Lithuanian Culture Research Institute (LCRI)) is our first local scientific event in Lithuania of European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) project named *Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe Eastern Peripheries*. Round table participants represent region of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland and such institutions as LCRI, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU), University of Białystok (UB) and Belarusian State University (BSU).

During this meeting was discussed such important questions as historical memory of region and its nowadays discourse, the particularity of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland in the context of European identity, historical and imaginary Eastern European maps, the cultural capital and industries in the condition of changing borders, virtual and geographical space, “territorialization” and “deterritorialization” as definition of boundary studies.

From the view of researchers the process of “territorialization” would become a mere transitory aspect of a more basic process of “deterritorialization”. Such a notion does not necessarily deprive boundaries of every meaning, but it relativizes their functions, detaches them from the idea of sovereignty. It makes them a “transitional object”, and an object of permanent transgression. New spiritual borders divide not only territories, but the cultural domain of values in the same space (W. Małgorzata Kowalska, Anna Shirokanova, Jovilė Barevičiūtė).

From the view of Larissa Titarenko, there is no need to divide the common history – necessary to build our future on it and to walk over three borders. It is an important task of intellectuals in the region to keep and strengthen the common heritage (including the historical and imaginary map of Eastern Europe).

Kowalska added that perhaps the most important question today is that of the importance of the European Union (EU) as a new – completely neglected by Gilles Deleuze – factor of territorialization. In fact, it has devised our region into two opposite parts: a “European” and a “non-European” one. In her opinion, the accent should be put on a community of laws.

Lithuania-Poland-Belarus borderland features for centuries due to mental structure and the distinctive cultural *epistēmē*. Lithuanians and Poles have a significant impact on EU accession, while increasing the feeling that *we* are the single European political community that from generation to generation is being developed by a European essence. In the same time participants touched the area of developing contradictory

processes of disappearances of the borders and strengthening in the Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland (Schengen or non-Schengen zones) (Lilijana Astra, Titarenko).

Žibartas Jackūnas touched a problem of re-interpretation of the traditional historical segments of people semantic experience in neighbor countries, making a special emphasis upon cultural heritage common to the three neighboring nations: Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian. The view on informational territory as space of new heterotopias where created a new kind of territories: informational territory (artificial digital worlds or cyber-space) and an idea about increasing hours of staying online and *Gen Z's* approach few examples are provided confirming the idea of global world concept intensification and territory concept fail. Such approach and view was the subject of fruitful participant's discussion (Rasa Levickaitė, Basia Nikiforova).

For Andrius Konickis the subject of "philosophy without borders, or the borders for philosophy" is a possibility to explain individual and national differences of philosophy which borders are not absolute or irresistible.

In the conclusion word Nikiforova added that discussion was a very productive and fruitful for the future researching cooperation and these is great possibility for the exchange of opinions and for a discussion of such subjects as a new situation and challenge of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland. She emphasized that this round table is a continuation of the long years common researching activity and cooperation with financial support of Lithuanian State Science and Study Foundation (LSSSF) and of COST.

Please see the exhaustive discussion here: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/limes.2010.09>

*Basia Nikiforova*

## Full discussion

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### FROM BORDERLINE TO BORDERLAND

Round table *From Borderline to Borderland: New Challenge of Remaking Eastern Borders*, which took place on November 19, 2009 in Vilnius in Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute (CPARI) (now Lithuanian Culture Research Institute (LCRI) is our first local scientific event in Lithuania of COST project named *Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe's Eastern Peripheries*.

**Round table participants** (according to alphabetical sequence): **Lilijana Astra** (CPARI); **Jovilė Barevičiūtė** (Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU)); **Žibartas Jackūnas** (CPARI), **Andrius Konickis** (CPARI), **W. Malgorzata Kowalska** (University of *Białystok*), **Rasa Levickaitė** (VGTU), **Basia Nikiforova** (CPARI), **Anna Shirokanova** (Belarusian State University).

**Basia Nikiforova:** Dear colleagues, this round table is a great opportunity to analyse two groups of the bellow-described problem and to search methodological ground of its research. The first one is the regionalist aspects of a borderland and its socio-political and cultural aspects of everyday life. The second one is global problems, which result from changing identity (including European), the creation of a new cultural capital and “new geography”, which should be called cybergeography or virtual space. We touched the area of developing contradictory processes of disappearance of the borders and strengthening of the Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland (Schengen or non-Schengen zones). The shadows of historical memory and historical retrospective reconstruction of borders are following our discussion.

As Étienne Balibar said in the Alexander von Humboldt Lecture (2004), “Europe as borderland”, “there is no “center”, there are only “peripheries“ <...> „each region of Europe is or could be considered a “center” in its own right, because it is made of overlapping peripheries, each of them opens (through “invasions”, “conquests”, “refuges”, “colonizations” and “post-colonial migrations”, etc.) to influences from all other parts of Europe, and from the whole world”.

Space, places and territories are social productions. Territory is a polysemic concept. Place is “events” created by territories, fluid areas of control produced by territorial negotiation (horizontal dynamics) and negotiations between places (vertical dynamics). Space produces places and is produced by places. Moreover, space, place and territories can be seen as the waves of territorialization and deterritorialization in an endless process. Place is an essential dimension of human existence. It is a form of seizure of the world, an *a priori* for Immanuel Kant, an ontological need for Martin Heidegger. Places are created by territorialization dynamics. They are sum of “events”. The territory is not “natural”, but it is a cultural artifact, a social product linked to desire, power and identity.

My point of view is the changes of places' functions (what Michel Foucault called heterotopy) as important subject of boundary study. There are also new temporary uses of these spaces and emerging of different functions, including new forms of control, access, surveillance, new forms of openness and closeness (passwords, access profiles, etc.). Informational territory creates new heterotopias, new functions for places and redefinition of social and communication practices. It is not the end of concrete place and its territory, but rather, a new meaning, senses and functions for these spaces. New heterotopias create the re-vitalization of places (tags and maps, using a *GPS* to find a location and electronically annotation of place, events mobilization in public space by *SMS*). The contemporary information society creates a new kind of territories: informational territory (artificial digital worlds or cyber-space). The informational territory is the territory in a place formed by the relationship between the physical and virtual, electronic dimensions of territorialities, creating a new form of territorialization.

The informational territory becomes more complex, because this territory is now related to other territorialities (laws, legislation, cultures, and politics). It goes through physical dimensions of territorialities, borders and borderlands. At the same time, as proclaimed by semiotician Alfred Korzybski, "the map is not the territory". In our case, the informational territory is not the territory in the common sense, it is a source of communication, information and navigation through states borders, but it does not abolish them. Good example is a documentary film "Breaking the Wall of Silence" about Tibetan broadcast in exile (director Oystein F. Rakkenes, 2008, Norway).

I want to invite you to the discussion about these questions: historical memory of region and it is nowadays discourse, the particularity of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland in the context of European identity, historical and imaginary Eastern European maps, the cultural capital and industries in the conditions of changing borders, virtual space *versus* geographical space, "territorialization" and "deterritorialization" as a definition of boundary studies.

You are welcome to start asking questions and making our discussion.

**Anna Shirokanova:** Basia, there was one moment, when you had told about horizontal and vertical dynamics, could you, please, tell more?

**B. N.:** Okay, this is an interesting theoretical aspect, when we speak about the fluid area of control. It has horizontal or vertical dynamics, when we discuss about new territorial relations. For example, horizontal dynamics is, when European Union (EU) changes the frontier inside it and vertical dynamics is negotiation about only places, let us say, Bask people and Spain, Irish people and Great Britain. Sometimes horizontal or vertical dynamics goes on in different territories and different states, but sometimes it is inside one state.

**Larissa Titarenko:** Dear colleagues, actually you have touched a very interesting issue of real frontier or real border, state border. This morning we have crossed this border, and although this is not China and we are peaceful, but we were trembling all the time, because these people have the right to kick us out without any expiation. When I cross the border I feel like a second-hand person, because I am from a non-

European country and it is not so respectful as EU, United States (US) or other countries. I feel like I am actually discriminated. Although I did nothing against Lithuania or EU, but I feel like I am guilty without any reason and it is not pleasant. This feeling is with us – from non-European Union countries. My presentation is about different interpretations of common cultural and historical heritage across the borders. In this highly qualified audience everybody knows about our common heritage. Actually, if we calculate, we can say that we were together in Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) for at least five centuries – it was one state, there were no nations like Lithuanians, Poles or Belarusians. There was just the nobility, and nobody asked about their ethnic roots; they asked about religion, social status, but not about ethnicity. Heritage is common, and it is clear that we have it as our common wealth, but it is only an objective fact. I remember my years at Soviet school where I had learned from my textbook that Belarusians were occupied by Lithuanian and Polish aggressors for some time, and there is no clear indication. Fortunately they were liberated by Russian brothers, big brothers and this idea is correct. They are Slavic brothers, but everybody knows that Polish are Slavic as well. Everybody knows now that there was a big research with genes, Belarusian blood is 30 to 50 per cent Baltic so we are brothers to Lithuanians as to Poles. The real ancient Russia was in Kiev, not Moscow so real Russians are Ukrainians and not Russians from Moscow. If current Russia wants brothers – they are Ukrainians. But as you know for political reasons, Belarusians are presented in Russian media as the closest state to Russia and simultaneously in Belarusian media. According to sociological surveys, Russians view Belarusians positively by more than 50 per cent; Ukrainians by about one third; Poles, sorry, much less; Lithuanians do not care. This situation is politically constructed, this is not historically rooted, it shows how several countries can interpret and reinterpret historical facts for their political needs. People of my age have one understanding of history, but people of Anna's age have completely the other one for the same period of time. So, I think our common task is to bring this real history of heritage and to share it. I know, that Lithuanians have stressed they have European roots, but we have the same roots and if you, Lithuanians and Poles, will not help us, so who will? Your big brothers in Europe like Germany are more interested in Russia than historical truth, so they probably will never agree that Belarusians have more in common with Lithuanians than with current Russians. But this is just a fact, we were in Russian empire just for one century and in the GDL for five centuries, so where is the truth? It is in both. Political thing is to stress one part and to forget the other. The scholars have to bring this truth to public. There is no need for us to divide the common history – we have to build our future on it. We have to walk over three borders.

**B. N.:** Thank you. Are there any questions? I do have a question. For me it is very interesting to hear your opinion about Belarusian people's view on European identity. Is it typical only of Belarusians?

**L. T.:** As a sociologist, I have to say some bad thing, because there were some research issues after the break of SU. In the first years of independence, self-identification as Europeans was rather high, especially among young people, before their

thirties, they felt like Europeans. But then, not only after 1994, when we elected our President, but later in these years of crisis and isolation everything was against people, not against government. Our people were under the influence of our media and Russian media, so they received this “Slavic brothers” information and we lost, this dimension was going down. From surveys 5 to 10 per cent of people mentioned this identity now, and in the beginning it was about 20-25 per cent, mostly among students. Even Ukrainians have lower identity as Europeans than before. I think now it is time to change, it is a chance.

**W. Malgorzata Kowalska:** Some sceptical questions. The first one is: you do not idealize too much the Lithuanian Duchy, do you? I think, it was not such fusion of all religions of people, especially after Lithuanian Duchy’s integration to Great Polish Republic (GPR). That is the first question – visuality of this mythical period. And the second question is more general. Can we really distinguish what are really roots and what is a political construction? Lithuanian Duchy and the first Great Poland were also a political construction. I absolutely agree with your European option for Belarus. But I have an impression that this kind of argumentation is a little ideological – we have a real history which connects us to Lithuania and Poland and we have a false history that relates us to Russia.

**L. T.:** Of course, you are right and I just focused on one aspect. Both are right. If we take only arithmetic, so five centuries are more than two centuries or one. I only want to stress that it was not just Belarusian state, but SU was also not a Belarusian state, it was international. There was no space for Belarus to improve their national identity. Why did Lithuanians have and keep theirs and Belarusians did not? Probably because they were more like victims of history. If they were the nobility, they tried to move to Catholics or other groups, not to be like common people. Majority of Belarusians lived like peasants and they were not happy. I think, any concept is a construction. Other people would say different. I am not against Russia, but I do not want the people to live with this mythology, Great Russian brother, because it was only for one century. And after that there was a big gap.

**W. M. K.:** You do not idealize the Lithuanian Duchy, do you?

**L. T.:** It is not idealization. It was my personal biography when I knew about history of Belarus only a few lines – that it was occupied by Lithuania and Poland. That is it. So I am totally against that kind of history, because it is not history, but its total ideology.

**W. M. K.:** My paper is very general. So I would like to make a few remarks. The concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, proposed by Gilles Deleuze as philosophical notions, describing the universal logics of social becoming, can be particularly well applied to the analysis of history and current situation of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland, given not only numerous changes of borders in this region but also transformations of their meaning. On the other hand, the honest and careful analysis of these changes and transformations of meaning should induce a revision of some important aspects of Deleuzian theory.

According to this theory, territory is a space, governed by a set of rules, named “code”. Territorialization is then synonymous with a certain codification, or the symbolic organisation of space. Deleuze and Félix *Gattari* have distinguished three fundamental types of code: cultural, political and economic, and, correspondingly, three fundamental types of territory: that of ethnic cultures, that of (nation) states and that of capitalistic market. The order between these three types of territory would be linear: the first is replaced by the second, then the second by the third. In other words: culturally organised spaces are decomposed, or de-coded and deterritorialized in order to be reorganised (reterritorialized) by the state political logics, then sovereign states are decomposed in their turn in this sense that they are submitted to the logics of transnational, global market.

Such a scheme, based on Western, more specially French history, has only a limited correspondence with the real history of our region. The main difference is that, in case of this region, the relations between ethnic cultures and sovereign states have been much more complex and non-linear. Though, in some periods, state, namely the Polish first Republic (called of “the two nations”), then Russian empire, finally the Soviet regime have systematically deterritorialized and reterritorialized ethnic cultures. They are striking to observe that, at least in Polish and Lithuanian cases, ethnic/cultural criteria of territorialization have constantly re-emerged and led – more particularly in the last times, after the downfall of communism – to deterritorialize political space of the region.

The second difference is that the three countries of our region apparently are not equally submitted to the logics of global capitalistic market. For both political and cultural reasons, Belarus, more related to Russia, does not belong to the European market space. Still it is extremely interesting to examine whether, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, despite that all our countries do not share the same destiny of economic semi-peripheries in the global world system. The question of economic borders within our region, or that of a virtually common economic territory and its place within the global market, is open.

It seems obvious that cultural, political and economic criteria of territorialization in our region have played not in a linear order, but all together. It is exactly that complex play, occurring through the whole history and up today, that allows us to speak, in respect of this region, not of borderlines, but of a borderland.

Perhaps the most important question today is that of the importance of the EU as a new – completely neglected by Deleuze – factor of territorialization. In fact, it has devised our region into two opposite parts: a “European” and a “non-European” one. What kind of “codes” has been used for that? For sure, the criteria were/are mix (cultural, political, economic), but the accent is put on a community of laws. The question is then whether, or under what conditions, our region can represent such a legal community?

**A. Sh.:** This is the question not only about periphery and center relationships but also about comparative history in our region for the last twenty years, because in my

encounters with colleagues from Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, we found out that there were so many common facts in history that we are not aware of.

**W. M. K.:** In what region and in what period?

**A. Sh.:** In our region in the 20th century. I wonder, why we do not know that there are different points of view, and the question is why we do not speak with each other? Why is it so, that we try to communicate with big brothers like Europe or Russia and not between ourselves? Can our communication influence or affect these power relations on a global scale?

**W. M. K.:** Do you mean we or people? Of course, we can, but my question here was not so much normative as pure descriptive. I wanted to show the cultural and political criteria of territorialization, of establishing borders between states, between nations. These criteria have constantly changed, despite what Deleuze and Guattari said, there has never been a simple succession of a cultural order by political order then by economic one. And this publication makes a borderland of our region. France is not a borderland, because the nation states, that political criteria have been strongly replaced within modern French state of a modern German state. There were different pre-modern French cultures and they have practically disappeared. In our part of Europe it is quite different. Cultures have reappeared in modern times. This Western scheme cannot be applied to our situation, but what can we do with that? Maybe this is a good situation, maybe it is not. It is good at least at one condition that we do not aspire to identify cultural and political criteria, that we are aware of this conflict between criteria. This conflict, this ambiguity is a borderland specific. If you accept this ambiguity, this crossing of different kinds of borders, it would be an interesting alternative to a Western model. But could we do it in the legal context of EU? I doubt it. We can do it, but not as Lithuanians or Poles who want to integrate Belarusians into European community. We can only do it as Europeans, with the political will of all Europe and, of course, of Belarusians and even Russians.

**Lilijana Astra:** Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland features for centuries due to mental structure and the distinctive cultural *epistēmē*. Cultural identity is constructed not only in the objective existence of common features such as native language, religion, traditions and historical experience, but also as meaning – *we* and the *other*.

Lithuania's case, even before independence, is that European identity has become a self-separation from the East base. In addition, democratic political system and the high standards of living have become potential sources of European identity formation. However, in the second half of the twentieth century a unique situation was formed: the cultural boundaries do exceed the limits continuously and simultaneously in all possible directions. On that occasion, change of the term limits itself – it is now impossible to identify where the end is what we call the national culture. Culture is not more or less homogeneous area, since all the localized cultural experiences are under postmodern power challenge.

This Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian peripheral expression of cultural identity throughout its uncertainty apply to the Western discourse. And today it is really a new



conceptual question – how to understand local experience and what may generally be recognized as its borderland experience – in the transition to the global European integration and globalization processes. Suddenly, all the essential cultural change in the mechanism, the value system is made, it appears that in general there was no intuitive self-consciousness of cultural traditions.

After all, yet there is no theoretical discourse, which would mark out earlier ideological balance of culture system framework, discuss its semiotic coding and recoding levels and methods as general processes of change interact with the experience of the changing cultural norms, values and creativity. It is really like Don Quixote consciousness fracture situation, which is analysed by the Lithuanian philosopher Algis Mickūnas. All of Don Quixote aspirations inevitably associated with the internal securities based on determining the coexistence of life and progress. They should be separated from the asset value. Value consists of the things that people appreciate, especially in the practical context – food, wealth, or even the deities and other images. They are artificial. Mickūnas' time value is corresponding to the English word *value* and the value – *worth*. And only the latter is a hit. This is found that created multiple identities of the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian space boundary can exist only when the European and national identity is not artificially complicated and not perceived as a once and for all formed constant. Lithuanian, Polish and Belarusian cultural self-perception in Europe is changing.

Lithuanians and Poles have a significant impact of EU accession, while increasing the feeling that *we* are the single European political community, that from generation to generation is being developed by the European essence. It is therefore necessary to consider postmodern possibilities of European identity – which means that the European identity should not become as the Europe's midmost. European identity should be created on universal universal values, preserving the national identity of the original identity.

**L. T.:** Question about your last statement, European values are also in transition, as you say?

**L. A.:** I mean, that we know we have an idea what is being created at this moment.

**L. T.:** What is the place for Lithuanians in EU as bearers of European values? On what level they accept these values?

**L. A.:** As our thinker Vytautas Kavolis wrote, this process is happening on two levels. At first we should recognize and study the heritage of Great Lithuania, because it is absolutely *terra incognita* and investigations have been started, but we have to answer complicated questions. The second level – we are involved in the globalization and EU, and so on. In sociology this is a process of anomia. I mean like a dark future – we do not know and nobody knows. We have coordinates, like a base for cultural self-perception and for this process of cultural identities on EU level. These are two levels in transition. This is not high theoretical level, there are no concepts or clear answers, and this is a process.

**W. M. K.:** First question is very stupid, but I do not understand. Do you count Poland as a part of GDL?

**L. A.:** This question is not in the correct form, it is impossible to answer. It is a very unknown and complicated process of becoming the Great Lithuanian Kingdom, we do not know the century and we do not know the answers.

**W. M. K.:** I have always thought that history was simple: there was GDL, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian, of course, and after that it was not any longer but the GPR and it was the end of GDL.

**L. A.:** I cannot answer *yes* or *no*, it is complicated.

**W. M. K.:** That is why Belarusian and especially Lithuanian can have historical objections at least.

**L. A.:** We do not have any materials. I know various interpretations, we know that generations of historians are contradictory. For instance, our Darius Baronas, he writes that processes were as you say, other. Tomas Baranauskas absolutely disagrees with this, and so on. I just would like to mention, that this is a good time, we are in the process and we will discover our history at last. We will wait for the answers.

**Žibartas Jackūnas:** My presentation could be called an improvisation. It concerns the phenomena, that we are not calling borders, boundaries, limits, borderlines. I would like to make some preliminary suggestions concerning a semantic conception of borders. According to it, the borders are not natural, but cultural phenomenon. The borders are, in essence, a cultural artifact. They are created or destroyed by the people themselves.

The borders as any other artifact cannot emerge and function independently of the process of interpretation and meanings which manifest themselves within the process. The meaning is a key factor determining the existence of borders. Any borders – let it be, for instance, the geographical borders between Europe and Asia, the frontiers between different states, the ethnic or cultural borders between some communities, – can really function under condition that the corresponding scientific, legal, geographical or cultural meanings are alive in the consciousness of certain interpretive communities.

The borders can have, apart from the semantic dimension, a physical dimension. It is worthy to note that some physical realities can acquire the status of borders provided the existence of the corresponding meanings in a generalized experience of people. The semantical borders can exist in the experience of communities notwithstanding the fact that physical borders or frontiers do not exist for a long time. This fact can be illustrated by the results of international sociological investigation which has been recently conducted by “Pew Research center”. According to the investigation, 40 per cent of Lithuanians are inclined to believe that some territories of neighbouring countries ought to belong to Lithuania; the corresponding figure in Poland is – 51 per cent, in Russia – 58 per cent. It is interesting to note that similar figures are characteristic of some Western countries (Italy, Spain). On the other hand, the physical borders lose their real status and significance in the cases when their semantic counterpart

becomes valueless, obsolete, needless. We are witnessing the similar process in the sphere of frontiers within the EU.

It is expedient to emphasize some other aspects of semantic conception of borders. The borders are a functional entity: like any other artifact, they function and are able to meet certain needs of a person or community. The borders are axiological – positively or negatively – sanctioned in the generalized semantic experience of the certain persons and communities. The notion of borders presupposes an existence, at least, of two entities (for example, territories, regions, ethnic groups, languages, confessions, worldviews, legal systems, experiences, etc.) which are somehow divided, limited by a certain border. In addition, these two entities are understood by an interpretative community as in some respect different ones, marked by the sign of semantic otherness. The semantic identity does not implicate logically the semantic difference and, consequently, the border.

There are, to my mind, two strategic options concerning the problem of borders of different kind – cultural, ethnic, economic, and political, etc. – in Europe. Both of them emphasize a necessity to strengthen the semantic identity of experiences that are characteristic of different states, communities, regions in Europe. The partisans of first strategy are inclined to adopt a, rather, declarative, theoretical attitude reflected by the principle *all different, all equal*. The differences are conceived as a source of progress contributing to the development and prosperity of nations and communities. The second strategy, marked by more pragmatic orientation, lays an emphasis on the factors of harmonization, cooperation, standardization, coincidence of different spheres of social, ethno-cultural, legal, and, political experience.

It seems to me that the only strategy by way of which one can reach some progress in the process of harmonization of the experiences of different communities or nations in Europe, to deepen their semantic identity, is following one: open, free interpretive attitude towards the realities and challenges of the contemporary world, particularly, to the processes of integration and globalization. As regards the region we are discussing now, the viable strategy could be, *inter alia*, to reinterpret the traditional historical segments of the semantic experience of people in the neighbouring countries, making a special emphasis upon cultural heritage which is, in a range of aspects, common to the three neighbouring nations: Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian. This reinterpretation presupposes some harmonization, closeness of value systems, standards of rationality or reasonableness, similar norms of semantic validity, rationally compatible interests, etc.

**L. T.:** Do you think that this task of harmonization is a task for intellectuals from EU countries or for all people from EU countries or all countries from this region, including so-called not European nations as Belarus?

**Ž. J.:** First of all I would like to say that experience is established or created not by any voluntary wish, but in the sphere of practice, of course intellectuals have a very strong influence on the process of formation of common experiences. The second aspect of your question concerns how largely this process can be conceived. I suppose EU practically is very interested in developing this semantic closeness, the closeness

of value system, because homogeneity of society is one of the conditions of peaceful life between nations. As regards the practical steps taken in political or economic level, they are very strong and very oriented towards harmonization and I can say different coincidental experiences, like political, economic, the way of life, it seems to me that other aspect of differentiation is much less tolerated and maintained by politics of EU, it is the opposite direction toward harmonization.

**L. T.:** They cannot have only this harmonization. There are some conflicts.

**Ž. J.:** But I am not quite sure what are very clear and rational arguments to adopt one strategy or another strategy. I suppose one and other strategies have weak points and we need to find some balance between these two tendencies of political life.

**W. M. K.:** But you think that this tendency to differentiation on the one hand and harmonization on the other can occur only at different levels, do not you? Differentiation is a cultural process, there can be differences between particular cultures, harmonization is on a legal level between different cultures it can be and must be common law. There is no conflict between these two levels.

**Ž. J.:** I am not quite sure. I suppose on the legal level it is really a very clear process of harmonization, on the second level it is some harmonization and value systems, for example, democratic way of life or democratic values, they are oriented toward the closer relationship and harmonization, I am not sure that this process will stop on this level.

**W. M. K.:** But democracy is based on law, on legal solutions, it is normal.

**Ž. J.:** I am quite sure, that any democratic systems cannot subsist on some general human value systems, they cannot exist and subsist without the morals.

**A. Sh.:** I am going to speak about the shifting meanings of borders. I think my topic is really closely connected with previous speech. Borders are now expanding into wide stripes of borderlands. What is more, we may speak now not only of clear-cut territorial borderlands, which are more or less common areas of sociological and cultural analysis. Borderlands are following the tendency to deterritorialization and subjectivization. This changes the understanding of borderlands as fixed or objectively observable spaces to the multiplicity of constantly moving and overlapping areas. It is possible to discern major factors that come into play here.

Firstly, the virtualization and digitalization of communication make it possible to organize and maintain wide networks in parallel to formal organizational hierarchies. Secondly, individuals step out more and more often as actors of social action of mass scale, which means that new borderlands are more subjective than earlier and may not be tied to any "outer" reference anymore.

While individuals take over decision-making function, all the knowledge they possess can be now capitalized in interaction. The *other* turns into the source of knowledge, and cross-border interactions become the universal mechanism of producing social and cultural capital. Borderlines used to divide and isolate large social entities. However, nowadays the border can become first of all the place of exchange. Any border acquires potential to serve as a line to be constantly crossed. By magnifying the border's quality of division, people may obtain an important source of mutual profit.

The growth of deterritorialization in distributing the social ties opens a whole range of opportunities for cross-border communication, which provides the tools for new ways of resolving old cultural dilemmas.

To sum it up, the borderland is now a growing area of deterritorialization, which is why it can produce new cultural capital rather than isolate groups of people. Possible mechanisms of interaction with the *other* now vary from smuggling to mutual enrichment through exchange. Such an understanding of borders opens up opportunities for overcoming old group prejudices, dynamization of the inner cultural milieus as well as for producing new cultural and social capital out of local sources, which in perspective may shift the centre-periphery relations.

**B. N.:** Do you think that in this deterritorialization situation in the place of state the region comes as definition?

**A. Sh.:** This is quite a vital idea for me. If you look at Europe, you can see that these particular interests expressed and realized on regional level can be much more effective than attempts to coordinate the whole Europe as universal entity. This aspect, this cumulative effect of interplay of regional interest can be really much more effective. There is legal side, especially the more profitable conditions of interactions within EU and less favourable conditions of cross-border interaction. In this way regionalization is something that would come as a consequence of deterritorialization.

**W. M. K.:** You think that what you called subjectivisation of borders can mean more conflicts, do not you?

**A. Sh.:** Yes, but these conflicts would not be penetrated by group, not that massive, because when every individual would appear as a set of personal borders and personal characteristics, then these conflicts would not divide the people as sharply as they would in the past, they would be more flexible and more resolvable.

**Jovilė Barevičiūtė:** Eastern Europe as a historical, political and cultural region, has no clearly defined territorial borders. The region itself comes into different definitions – basically they depend on two main factors. Firstly, from different historical periods of change which was exchanging certain social, political, cultural, economic circumstances, and simultaneously, the definition of Eastern European region itself. Secondly, from the different research contexts, where researchers have the choice, the different starting points and researching criteria. Therefore, social, political, cultural, philosophical scientists, studying the region boundaries, define them differently, by providing different versions of the definitions of those limits, claiming that these definitions pretend not to chrestomathical definitions but rather to open interpretations and academic debates. Various organizations, such as the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or the reference resource the CIA World Factbook suggest different classifications of this region. However, regardless of these constantly occurring difficulties, trying to define the boundaries of Eastern European region, it is

usually treated as including the post-Soviet East European countries, i.e. the so-called Eastern Bloc.

It is more difficult to define the Eastern European region as a virtual space than an empirical one due to contemporary information and communication technologies (new media), and through their certain raising territorial spatial transformations. Difficulty in defining territoriality of this region under conditions of the new media, which constitute technological virtual space, becomes even more problematic. Eastern European region in virtual space is de-territorialized, i.e. it is abstracted from concrete geographical points, and it becomes some kind of difficulty to define cultural derivative, whose regional identity is constantly developed and redeveloped. Under conditions of technological virtual space this region is included into the common cultural Western European region, adopting its habits of cultural commodifying, re-sourcifying, westernizing and consummating. In this way not only peculiar, taken from the tradition of Eastern European region, cultural features disappear but also the space of this region, concurring with its geographical territory.

However, the processes of deterritorialization of Eastern Europe as a cultural region are not one-directioned but they send for the responses – the processes of re-territorialization. Namely, due to these processes this post-Soviet region has not become an anonymous part of cultural Western European region and of its regional identity. Rather, the boundaries and identity of cultural Eastern European region are anew redeveloped: its cultural specificity maintains, revealing the Soviet cultural heritage and also imparting the new westernized, resourcified and commodified form. On the one hand, this post-Soviet re-development of Eastern European region still has preserved some Soviet traditions, on the other hand, it has already assumed many Western cultural habits. The redevelopment of Eastern European region nowadays becomes possible not only for cultural backwardness of the Western European culture but also for its openness to Western mentality, its adaptation and even, in certain cases, adoration.

**Rasa Levickaitė:** My subject is information society and as a short introduction I must state that my experiences are based on technical and technological background and the way technology scarifies the borders issue and there are no turns back to historical facts and the only turn is towards the future, what is going to be next. It might sound arrogant, which I do not want to be so, but technological impact causes absolute ignorance to borders, history and cultural differences, for example I take video, *Skype* classes from my Professor, he is from Illinois university, he is Indian. It is the same with our Japanese partners, *Skype* classes started from the fact that we had no money to travel far away, and then it came to the fact of time and now we have no problems, we do not need much budget, much time, the time is quite effective.

This paper is based on sociological insight into up-to-date world without borders concept: technological impact of *Gen Z's* borders perception.

The table bellow represents a short introduction to regimentation categories of three generations (hereafter *Gen*) which are used to determine a social, historical, technological, psychological environment change during the last fifty years in both the social sciences and popular culture.

**Table 1.** Categories of Gen X, Y and Z regimentation.

Gender	Born	Social environment	Technological environment	Historical environment
X	From the early 1960s to 1974	Living at home, remaining without a family or children, delaying a full career longer than any generation before them	Seeing the inception of the home computer, the rise of videogames, and the Internet as a tool for social and commercial purposes	Formed by political experiences and cultural perspective of the fall of Berlin Wall, collapse of USSR, Yugoslavia
Y	1975-1980	Shaped by the events, leaders, developments and trends of its time	Technology communicators	Seen as the ultimate rejecters of the counterculture which began in the 1960s, more involved with technologies than everyday events
Z	From the mid-1990s to late 2000s	Instant online, holding nick names	Fully technology communicators	Social networking – world perceived without time and space limits

Reynol Junco and Jeanna Mastrodicasa (Junco, Mastrodicasa 2007) conducted unique research into net generation college students (Gen X) presenting results of almost 8000 surveys. It is a cultural guide to understand how these college students use technology to build social networks and communicate. According to *Net Generation Survey*, 97 per cent own a computer and spend at least 3.5 hours a day online. In 2009 *DeLeon* has announced that teenagers (*Gen Z*) spend approximately 5 hours a day online. The research was conducted by *Cyber-sentinel* which provides software solutions allowing parents to block access to certain sites.

Following the idea of increasing hours of staying online and *Gen Z's* approach few examples are provided confirming the idea of global world concept intensification and territory concept fail. For example, *Gen Z Global Stage* new pilot program is an effort to cultivate a web dialogue among young artists across the globe, and to facilitate artistic collaboration using digital technology. The Web-based exchange will culminate in a multimedia theatrical piece on April 26, 2010. Another example is that social network as *Skype, Facebook, Twitter*, etc. (active user rate is constantly growing) is mostly used as the main channel of online communication also serving for news, sales, free downloads, dates and other social wants. In this case social networking loses categories of time and space providing world without borders concept.

**L. T.:** It is very interesting for me, but do you think, that this concept can be applicable to our region, maybe Lithuania, maybe Poland, maybe not Belarus, because our young people are not so technically aware. This is about generation.

**R. L.:** I teach Creative industries course in Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, so I teach to freshmen, 19-20 years old, they are fully technology communicators, they need Internet platform. I made my own website and put my lectures there, but it is not enough for them, they want video and so on and so on. I think that people living in open society and Lithuania is an open society for Internet use, figures are quite nice in this field. I do not know your situation, but I am almost sure that you do not follow what is going on with teenagers now.

**L. T.:** Do they communicate with our teenagers also?

**R. L.:** Of course, because I run a project which is ticketing and travel sales by Internet or social networks and we have a lot of bookings from Minsk. People buy online products, they pay with credit cards and they do not care about the borders at all. They come to Vilnius airport and they travel. The level of trust is very high.

**A. Sh.:** One thought. Today we started from this feeling of trembling and fear when crossing the border. When people do not feel any borders then this is the point when borders disappear. Completely new social feelings are born and probably this example of social networks is a way of old dilemmas and superstition go away.

**W. M. K.:** But do they really communicate through Internet? I think it could be only a play to watch some films, to listen to some music. There is no cultural communication.

**R. L.:** I have mentioned that there is no cultural dialog. I have a professor in Japan and interesting survey was done. Government has established a new project which will run until 2025. They will cover some expenses to Japanese youth who will travel abroad and spend leisure time more far than in China. Because traveling to China is very close. They want people to travel abroad and get new cultural experience, because they can make the virtual travels and can visit any museum using *Google* maps. The number of traveling Japanese young people is decreasing, because they can do it online.

**Andrius Konickis:** At first glance, philosophy has no borders or questions, because the questions of interest are eternal and equally important for everybody. But some doubts arise from certain common opinions as dividing philosophy to “Western” and “Eastern”. In fact, the eastern philosophy did not appear in the form given by ancient Greeks, but formed in Europe from ancient Greek example and with great difficulty punched the way out east because of the principal differences in eastern human physics and thinking.

Paul Valery states, that “philosophy is individual thing, so it is national”. The individual and national differences in people create additional obstacles for functionality of philosophy “without borders”. According to Hans Georg Gadamer’s concept of “unconditional value of poetical word” which the thinker extrapolates to philosophical concept, it is inevitable to state, that philosophy, like poetry is not translatable to other languages. Homer in Russian or Dante Alighieri in English is not Homer or Dante anymore. The same must be stated about Heidegger or Nikolai Berdeyev translations.

Antanas Maceina strictly states, that to philosophize authentically is like to create the true poetry and it could be done only in native language. It is not hard to disagree



and to provide convincing proof of philosophizing in absorbed language. But this step from one language to another might limit not only the recipients but the very philosopher's creative opportunities.

These borders in no manner are absolute or insurmountable but not to pay attention to them would be unforgivably careless.

**B. N.:** First of all I want to say that it is a great pleasure for us that our round table was held in the time very close to the anniversary of breaking of Berlin wall. Our discussion and presentations are different sides of the same problem. Our communication today was on semantic, philosophical, sociological and politological levels. I think, next time when we want to publish something in our international journal, we will create the conference call through *Skype* and Internet. It is possible to make a virtual space of our common scientific activity. Thank you for your participation, ideas and conclusions.

Dear colleagues, we hope that our discussion was very productive and fruitful for future researching cooperation. This year for most of us it is already the second possibility to exchange our opinions and discuss such subjects as cultural images of region, remaking Eastern borders in Europe, new situation and challenge of Lithuanian-Polish-Belarusian borderland. It is a continuation of our long years common researching activity and cooperation the results of which we see in many Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian publications and in research journal *LIMES: Cultural Regionalistics*.

Thank you very much for your active participation, especially for our colleagues from Belarus and Poland.