# Justifying Power:
Ruling Group Dominance and Regime Justification in Multi-Ethnic States

By

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B.A., Politics
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Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
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ABSTRACT

The current but inconsistent upheaval in the Middle East suggests variations in what will topple regimes, and thus in how regimes have laid the groundwork to remain in power. This thesis examines variation in a social condition, relative dominance of a ruling ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society, as the source for systematic variations in how a mono-ethnic regime will justify its rule to the general population.

This thesis argues that the ruling group's relative dominance, defined as its relative percentage to other groups in the population, drives a regime's justifying argument to be either rooted in the presence of universally lauded institutions (democratic-institutional), the regime's demonstrated record of economic and social developmental achievements (economic-social developmental), or the regime's ability to further the interests of an identity common to itself and the population at large (identificational). Relative dominance, it is contended, affects regime behavior by influencing the functioning of two mechanisms: the degree to which a regime can tolerate public accountability and the extent to which it needs to reduce the salience of ethnicity in order to endure. The thesis hypothesizes that the former decreases and the latter increases as dominance decreases.

The thesis incorporates quantitative and qualitative analyses to measure and evaluate relationships between relative dominance and justifying arguments. It demonstrates the existence of relationships between dominance and regimes' justifying arguments by means of content analysis of senior leaders' speeches in eight Sunni-dominant, Shi'ite-subordinate countries--Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Case studies of one high-dominance country (the UAE), one medium-dominance (Yemen), one low-dominance (Iraq), and one outlier (Bahrain) then illustrate the speculated mechanisms in action.

In a world characterized by democratic norms and global advocacy of human rights, it is surprising that we should still see a number of states exclusively ruled by minority ethnic groups. Less surprising is that is that many of these states are currently experiencing popular unrest over the non-democratic nature of the ruling regimes. That these regimes managed for so long to balance the rational imperative of staying in power with that of international acceptance, necessary in the highly globalized world, raises the question of the different strategies that mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic societies use to justify their rule to their population in the first place. The following pages explore that very question, demonstrating that the relative percentage of the ruling ethnic group to other groups in the population influences the justifying argument the regime will employ to lay groundwork for its endurance over time.

I. Justification—How, What, Why

This paper takes as a starting point that all regimes that are not securely restrained by sincerely democratic institutions will seek to remain in power. In doing so, their strategic options can be seen as arrayed on a continuum, with pure repression on one end and democratization on the other. However, the strategies at both termini are suboptimal for a rational mono-ethnic regime seeking to retain power.[1] While these regimes often make ample use of repressive tactics to consolidate and reinforce their rule, repression alone is inadequate to build a foundation for longevity for two reasons. First, in today's highly interconnected world, it is necessary to assume that all regimes strive for some degree of

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[1] While most of the regimes discussed here incorporate a few members of non-dominant groups in their regime as a means of co-optation, the low status these individuals are generally permitted (albeit with exceptions) allows us to still justifiably call the regimes mono-ethnic.

D. Berman -- 3

international recognition, if only the lack of total rejection. The risks are overthrow from either within or without. As Etel Solingen notes, even regimes that implement autarkic policies to reinforce their domestic popularity ultimately strive for international prestige to validate such decisions.[2] As to risk of foreign intervention, recent and more distant history are both peppered with demonstrations of the danger of being a pariah state.

A strategy of pure repression is also suboptimal because it is costly--overall and in particular for a mono-ethnic regime. As Weber and Rousseau both observe, generating obedience by compulsion not only requires an unrealistic amount of resources, but is also unlikely to translate into a stable basis for rule.[3] Moreover, pure repression is particularly high-risk for mono-ethnic regimes, where violence is performed not simply by the state against the population but by one ethnic group against another, reinforcing the salience of ethnicity and with it the fundamental illegitimacy of the regime. This creates a cyclical trend toward more repression and, as a result, ever increasing instability for the regime. As such, while repression will inevitably play a role in the consolidation of an exclusive authoritarian regime, relying on repression alone to sustain itself in power is suboptimal for an ethnic regime. This presumably becomes more so as the relative size of the ethnic group decreases.

If pure repression is a suboptimal strategy for monoethnic regimes seeking to stay in power, democratization is equally so unless the country is fragmented into many ethnic groups (where no one group is larger than the minority in charge of the autocratic regime. If other ethnic groups are significantly larger, the proportion of power the existing autocratic regimes's ethnic group would hold would give it less basis for influence that if it held exclusive power. Needless to say, democratizing in one way or another is a worse option for a regime the smaller the relative size of its ethnic group. And of course, democratization is not in the interests of the ruling clique, who might lose power to other

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[2] Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2007.
[3] Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics* (New York: Palgrave McMillan) 2009, 100-102; Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," *World Politics* 38:3 (Apr 1986).

members of their ethnic group as well as to rival ethnic groups.

With neither pure repression nor democratization a good option, ethnic minority regime seeking to survive must explore other options to obtain compliance from the population at large, ideally planting roots for such compliance in a sense of rightfulness surrounding the regime's exclusive rule. In other words, the regime wants to make people comply *because they believe they should.* They may believe they should obey because it is morally right or because it is simply more beneficial than disobeying.[4] They will therefore try to justify their rule to the population, arguing to obtain the compliance they seek.

This idea of a regime's justifying argument is closely related to the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation; these are the terms in which the idea is generally treated in existing literature. While there is certainly no dearth of literature on regime legitimation, there is very little that seeks to establish systematic connections between the challenges to a regime's survival and its choice of argument to legitimate, or justify, itself. Exceptions often focus on single cases, such as Peter Ludz' study of regime legitimation in the former German Democratic Republic, or on the relationship between legitimation and a particular ideology, most often communism.[5] Indeed, beyond suggesting that regimes for whom legitimation by democratization is not an option possess pressing legitimation challenges, existing literature gives little attention to the agency of regimes in *choosing* a legitimation strategy, as a set of strategic actors with a distinct utility function.[6] Legitimation is instead often understood as influenced

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[4] Scholars who delve deeply into the question of legitimacy and the individual-level motives behind obedience often distinguish these two motivations. I accept both, focusing on the common denominator of obeying out of a belief that obedience is good.

[5] Peter Ludz, "Legitimacy in Divided Nation: The Case of the German Democratic Republic," in Bogdan Denitch (ed.), *Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis* (London: Sage Publications) 1979. Studies on Communist regimes' legitimation strategies include Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," *World Politics* 38:3 (Apr 1986), and the contributions in T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (ed.), *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (New York: St. Martin's Press) 1982.

[6] For an overview of literature on legitimation, see Denitch 1979.

by the demands of the population, in line with the long-standing "pluralist" paradigm of politics.[7] Even

the more modern version of the pluralist paradigm, which abandons its predecessor's "passive and

benign" view of the state, fails to acknowledge that the state can be more than simply reactive to the

population; it "retains [pluralism's] central insight that politics is best described as a process through

which the state responds to the diverse viewpoints and concerns of individual citizens."[8] While the

demands of its citizenry indeed influences a regime's legitimation strategy, the state's prerogative for

action as an autonomous, rational actor seeking to ensure its survival is generally undervalued.[9] This

paper seeks to contribute to the literature on legitimation strategies not only by illuminating the agency

of regimes in choosing them, which in turn suggests that the choice of justifying argument follows

from the survival threats a regime faces, but also by giving reason to believe that systematic

relationships can be determined between the level of threat to a regime's survival and the argument it

will choose. Indeed, as the next section will discuss, mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic societies

possess a particular need to justify their rule.

mono-ethnic Regimes' Need to Justify: Theoretical Approaches

Survival Challenges for Regimes in Ranked Multi-ethnic Societies

Multi-ethnic states yield unique challenges for ruling mono-ethnic regimes, which appear

through mechanisms of perpetuating salience of ethnicity and infusing ethnic divisions with hostility.

These challenges can be gleaned from the existing literature on multi-ethnic states, specifically from

the (overlapping) literatures on intergroup relations and institutional design in multi-ethnic societies.

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[7] Popular pluralist works include Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (London: Saunders and Otley) 1835; Harold Laski, *Authority in the Modern State* (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1919; and, among more modern works, Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Opposition and Participation* (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1971.
[8] Bruce Gilley, *Right to Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press) 2009, 61.
[9] Gilley, whose work focuses on the sources of legitimacy and foreign-policy implications of a regime's level of it, corroborates this point.

D. Berman -- 6

The former establishes that the general dominance of one group over another, all else equal, encourages salience of ethnic identities, which not only increases the need for repression when the dominant group is a minority but also impedes the successful construction or evocation of a collective identity centered around the regime. Following on Frederik Barth's discussion of the boundaries between ethnic groups as constructed, varying, and significant, Michael Banton argued that the level of privilege a group has vis-a-vis others and the exclusivity of the group together determine the character of other groups in competition, as well as the overall nature of relations between the various groups.[10] He specifically notes that if an exclusive group in a position of privilege decides to retain the hard boundary between them and other groups, they are "likely to develop images of themselves and of outsiders that will justify such policies." Meanwhile, people who feel themselves excluded are "likely to fight back, organizing to pursue their objectives, and developing an image of themselves which counterbalances the implication that they are unworthy of belonging to the privileged group," thereby developing a "group consciousness" around their group.[11] In other words, Banton argues that the establishment of a dominant ethnic "in-group" begets the creation of cohesive "out-groups," thus reinforcing and perpetuating rigid intergroup boundaries.12 As a result, ethnicity remains salient, perpetuating the perception of illegitimacy of any mono-ethnic regime and thereby the challenge to its survival.

Horowitz similarly argues that "ranked" ethnic systems are likely to perpetuate hostility and division in a multi-ethnic society. The mechanism by which it occurs, he argues, is a sense of self-worth that derives strongly from perceptions of one's group's self-worth, which is damaged in a ranked system in which the group is subordinate. Ethnic competition results, because people aspire to belong

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[10] Michael Banton, *Ethnic and Racial Competition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1983.
[11] *ibid*, 126.
[12] This goes to the logic of social identity theory. For a good discussion, see Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems, and Future Challenges," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 30:6 (Nov 2000).

to a group with a favorable comparative evaluation.13 Not only does ethnicity remain salient as a

result, but society is likely to become tense and conflictual as a consequence of enduring salience and

legitimation of the regime is therefore likely to become even harder.

Indeed, regime legitimation is also harder amid domestic instability; the connection between

perpetuated salience of identity and domestic instability is also discussed in the literature on

institutional design in democratizing multi-ethnic societies. This is captured in the debate over the

advantages and disadvantages of a consociational system. Arend Lijphart proposed the system as an

ideal solution for societies with a "deeply fragmented political culture" and where, as a result, stability

is lacking. Lijphart's advocates for consociational systems, which allow for governmental power-

sharing among ethnic groups, on the grounds that they "counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing

effects of cultural fragmentation."14 However, such systems are criticized for failing to do just that,

and instead keeping ethnicity salient. Horowitz, Eric Nordlinger, and Benjamin Reilly all question the

merits of consociational systems on the grounds that by indelibly embedding ethnicity into the

government, they encourage ethnic "outbidding" and subsequently reinforce ethnic divisions; this

would not only prove fatal to a democracy but impose significant challenges for an ethnic minority

regime.15

The literature establishes a solid link between salience of ethnic identity and domestic

instability. In addition, the debate over consociational systems also suggests that embedding ethnicity

into the government perpetuates the salience of ethnic identity, and that on intergroup boundaries also

suggests that generalized dominance of one group over another not only enhances ethnicity's salience

but infuses it with hostility. We should therefore expect that mono-ethnic regimes will face significant

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[13] Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1985, 146.
[14] Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21:2 (Jan 1969), 212.
[15] Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13:2 (April 2002), 1-3. Also Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies*: Electoral Engineering for Crisis Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2001.

challenges to their rule, as their very existence makes the society over which they rule disunited and unstable. Moreover, we expect that the degree of challenge to their legitimation stems from the degree of threat that the disenfranchised, insulted, and hostile excluded groups pose, which is largely determined by their size relative to the dominant group The greater the threat posed, the greater the effort required of the dominant group to diminish the salience of ethnicity--and the harder this goal is to achieve. Indeed, that minority mono-ethnic regimes face tremendous difficulties in consolidating their rule has been observed by Milne and Kuper, while their particularly conflict-prone nature has been determined by Cederman and corroborated by Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin.16

In sum, while all regimes seeking to remain in power might be compelled to craft a justifying argument to present to its populace, there is theoretical underpinning for the claim that the need is greater for mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic societies, and indeed that the exigency of it increases with a decrease in the relative size of the dominant group to the population at large. Moreover, because the threat to the regime's survival also grows – and becomes more multifaceted -- as the relative size of the group shrinks, we might find it reasonable to speculate that the relative size of the group drives the type of justifying argument a regime will choose. We therefore now turn to the possible types of arguments and their differences.

Types of Justifying Arguments

With the conceptual similarity of a justifying argument to legitimation, the types of justifying arguments that a regime might use are informed by studies of legitimacy. Scholars have identified a

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[16] R.S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Fiji, Guyana, Malaysia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press) 1980; Kuper; Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," *American Political Science Review* 101 (2007); James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara and David Laitin, "Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset," *American Political Science Review* 101 (2007). It should be noted that Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin reject Cederman and Girardin's broader finding, but in doing so note that a small number of conflict-prone ethnic-minority-regime outliers account for much of the correlation that the latter observe.

D. Berman -- 9

number of different types of legitimacy, each of which can correspond to a different argument a regime might to elicit regime-reinforcing compliance. Existing literature on legitimacy and legitimation suggests five key justifying arguments that regimes might logically employ to convince the population of its right to rule.

In his exposition on legitimacy as allowing for a much stable basis for rule than simple coercion or co-optation, Max Weber offered a taxonomy of types of legitimacy that remains widely accepted.[17] His three ideal-types – rational-legal, traditionalist, and charismatic legitimacy – suggest a gamut of justifying arguments. Rational-legal legitimacy, characterized by the presence of universally-acclaimed institutions, justifies rule by virtue of its "legality"; it is "domination as exercised by the 'modern servant of the state and all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him.'"[18] In short, the regime justifies itself with the argument that its rule is embedded in formally circumscribed powers. Traditionalist legitimacy, on the other hand, is characterized by rule on the basis of historical precedent for such a regime, entailing a process of identification among the population. The underlying justifying argument claims that the regime is justified because it is embedded in a culture that is shared with its people. Weber's third ideal-type, charismatic legitimacy, justifies rule based on the inherent beneficence of a particular leader or institution. The justifying argument inherent in this type of legitimacy is just that—the apotheosis of the specific leader or institution.

This typology of legitimacy suggests three types of arguments a regime might use to explain or justify its rule. The first is an argument based on the presence of widely-accepted legal, which is to say democratic, institutions; I will call this a *democratic-institutional* argument. Second is an argument emphasizing a common identity uniting the regime and its entire population, which I will call

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[17]   Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press) 1978.
[18]   Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1958, 79.

identificational arguments. The final argument, suggested by charismatic legitimacy, is based on the inherently good and even deific nature of a particular leader or institution. It generally entails a so-called "cult of personality" and is propagated in a broad propaganda scheme. Because a charismatic argument is unlikely to be articulated in the speeches of the seniormost leader, which this study evaluates as the source for justifying arguments, this type of argument will not be dealt with in this paper. It should, however, be considered in further study.

One more potential argument merits discussion. A significant addendum to Weber's typology of legitimacy comes from Seymour Lipset, consisting in justification for rule based on the regime's apparent success--"performance legitimacy".19 As Stephen White and Rigby and Feher contend, this type of legitimacy was sought by communist regimes, who intended to justify their rule by means of validating their economically-oriented ideology with successful economic performance.20 I call the justifying argument suggested by this type of legitimacy *economic-social developmental.*

Benefits, Disadvantages of Different Arguments for mono-ethnic Regimes—Why Expect Variation?

These three types of justifying arguments – democratic-institutional, identificational, and economic-social developmental – differ in two key ways, giving us reason to expect variation with the degree of dominance of the ruling regime's ethnic group in the population. The first difference lies in the mechanisms and degree of accountability the different arguments inflict upon the regime, which will logically vary with the degree and mechanisms of accountability that a regime can tolerate—a product of its group's dominance in society. In short, the justifying argument that a regime makes

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19 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53:1 (March 1959).
20 White; T.H Rigby and Ferenc Feher (ed.), *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 1982. A particular legitimation strategy discussed more in international relations literature than the comparative literature, nationalistic prestige-seeking, can be considered subsumed under performance legitimacy.

suggests the primary criterion by which it desires to be evaluated. That is to say, a democratic-institutional justifying argument, being rooted in the presence of democratic institutions and the rule of law, leaves the regime vulnerable to popular censure for if it is seen to comport itself disapprovingly. Even if the laws and institutions so lauded have limited power in practice, their presence and indeed emphasis by the regime suggests such accountability to the public, raising the public's expectation of its effective existence. Therefore, we might expect that the less secure its group's rule – the higher its dominance in the population at large – the less likely a regime is to make a democratic-institutional argument, because it becomes increasingly threatened by the democratic process (as discussed in section 1) and is therefore less likely to want to open itself up to criticism for not following through with potentially self-immolating behavior.

By justifying its rule based on economic and social successes, a regime justifying itself with an economic-social developmental argument makes itself vulnerable to backlash in the event that such successes end, even as a result of exogenous factors. Therefore, even though this argument does not explicate a mechanism for regime accountability, in communicating to the populace that it perceives its capability to advance development as its *raison d'etre*, it provides an *a priori* justification for its removal from power. Consequently, as with democratic-institutional arguments, we can expect a regime to be less likely to make itself vulnerable in this way the more vulnerable, and thus lower, its overall dominance in society is.

Identificational justifying arguments, which can be subcategorized into arguments evoking national, religious, and supranational identities, differ from the above two arguments in that they provide neither a mechanism nor a concrete logic of accountability. By suggesting to the population that it should be evaluated based on its support for national, religious, or transnational causes,

The degree and mechanism of accountability they provide is just one of the differences among the three justifying arguments discussed; the second difference between them is their potential for

marginalizing ethnicity as a salient identity in society. As discussed above, this is imperative for mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic states, the more so the lower the dominance of the ruling group in the state's total population.   Of the three arguments, only identificational has potential to reduce the salience of ethnic identity, by increasing the salience of another, all-encompassing identity over it. We might therefore expect that while democratic-institutional and economic-social developmental arguments increase in likelihood as the ruling group's dominance increases, identificational arguments increase in likelihood as the group's dominance decreases.

We can therefore distill the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between a ruling group's dominance in the population at large and the justifying argument it will employ:

H1: Democratic-institutional arguments will *decrease* in likelihood as dominance

decreases.

H2: Economic-social developmental arguments will *decrease* in likelihood as

dominance decreases.

H3: Identificational arguments will *increase* in likelihood as dominance increases.

The chart below summarizes the predictions and mechanisms driving them.

Table 1.

% Dominance	Ability to Tolerate Accountability	Need to Reduce Salience of Ethnicity	Dominant Argument
90%	highest	lowest	Dem-Inst
80%			Dem-Inst/Econ-Soc
70%			Dem-Inst/Econ-Soc
60%			Econ-Soc

D. Berman -- 13

50%			Econ-Soc/Ident'l
40%			Econ-Soc/Ident'l
30%			Ident'l
20%			Ident'l
10%	lowest	highest	Ident'l

This chart merits a few notes. First, the arguments are not all evenly distributed over percentages. Because of the fundamental illegitimacy of minority regimes, I expect that once dominance diminishes beyond effective bipolarity, presumably comprising less than 40-50% of the population, their ability to tolerate any accountability plummets and their need to reduce the salience of ethnicity soars.

The second note is that this presumes an effectively bi-ethnic society – that is, one in which 90% dominance means a single 10% minority group. If we do away with the assumption of a single unified minority (that is, non-dominant group), the predictions theoretically change a bit because the mechanisms operate differently. Let us consider each mechanism separately. The first, the threat accountability poses to a regime and the regime's subsequent ability to tolerate it, is altered in an obvious way: the divided nature of the subordinate sector of the population makes accountability harder to impose on a regime, thus reducing the threat of accountability and increasing the regime's ability to tolerate it.

The second mechanism, the threat posed by ethnicity being salient and subsequent need to deflect attention from ethnic identity, changes in a more complex way. Here, the main agent for change is the uncertainty added into the equation: a regime whose ruling group has 80% dominance over two 10% minority groups has equal theoretical potential to remain 80:20 or become 90:10, depending on with whom the separate minority groups decide to cast in their lot (and assuming, as I shall consistently

do in this section, that the ruling group remains cohesive and at least one group will always remain unaligned with the ruling group). Moreover, 40% dominance over two 30% groups is a potential 70:30, and 20% dominance over two 40% groups is potentially 60:40. 30% dominance over seven 10% minorities is potentially anywhere from 40:60 to 90:10, but because the efforts required to achieve higher dominance increases with the number of groups for which allegiance must be elicited, the likelihood of attaining higher dominance decreases beyond 40:60. Overall, to consider how the predicted justifying arguments might change, we focus on the amount of uncertainty in the ruling group's dominance, figured as the difference between its current relative dominance and the relative dominance it could feasibly attain by attaining the allegiance of one additional group. We can make the following observations:

1. The higher dominance of the ruling group, and consequently the smaller the subordinate component of the population, the less uncertainty in the group's dominance.

2. The lower dominance of the group, and consequently the larger the subordinate component of the population, the more uncertainty in the group's dominance.

If we then recall the theoretical grounding for assuming a steep dropoff in ability to tolerate accountability and upsurge in need to deflect from ethnicity when a regime loses numerical dominance and becomes minority-ruled, we can therefore make the following assumption: the lower the ruling group's dominance and consequently the higher its uncertainty, which is to say the more its dominance stands to increase and the greater the benefit the regime would derive from the increase, the greater the regime's incentives to reduce the salience of ethnicity. We might therefore expect a regime's need to reduce ethnicity to increase exponentially instead of linearly as the ruling group's dominance decreases among multiple groups.

D. Berman -- 15

II. Methodology

I contend that the argument a mono-ethnic regime in a multi-ethnic regime makes for its exclusive hold on power should vary with its dominance in the population. To test this, I analyze the speeches of senior leaders in eight states. For the sake of consistency I evaluate states in which the groups involved – and the dominant group – are the same, and that allow to control for regional effects. The states, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, are all Sunni-dominated regimes in states whose populations are generally bi-ethnic, featuring cohesive Sunni and Shi'ite components as their only significant minority groups. Indeed, the presence of nearby Shi'ite Iran with a history of impelling neighboring Shi'ites to anti-governmental action ensures that Sunni regimes are wary of their varying Shi'ite populations. And, importantly for our purposes, the degree of dominance of the ruling Sunnis in the population varies significantly across states. I hypothesize that as the degree of dominance changes across countries, the rhetoric will systematically vary in the extent to which it draws attention to its grounding in a system of universally lauded institutions, emphasizes economic and social developmental successes, and evokes a common religious, ideological, or pan-Arab identity. The number of national identity evocations are also evaluated, but because of the potentially divisive nature of national identity in multi-ethnic states they are considered as they compare to number of identificational evocations rather than as a distinct identificational argument.

There is a small body of literature corroborating this idea of rhetoric as a political tool that merits brief discussion. The basic literature discussing the formation of rhetoric in politics merits a brief discussion. The idea that political leaders have some degree of power to shape the worldview of

their constituents with their use of language was first substantively explored by Walter Lipmann, who

argued that leaders of a government control public opinion by synthesizing, simplifying, and

dichotomizing complex issues into stereotypes. Facilitated by the fact that the real environment is

"altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance,"[21] Lipmann's leaders

deliberately construct these "pseudo-environments" of stereotypes out of the belief that shaping public

opinion allows one to shape public behavior.[22] Murray Edelman advances this idea that leaders use

symbolic language to manipulate the public for their own ends.[23] These seminal works develop the

idea that language is used as a political tool. Other works on rhetoric take these two pieces as their

starting point, generally consisting of broad theoretical discussions or single-country case studies.[24]

As noted, this project seeks to capture regime's justifying arguments. Considering the

established utility of rhetoric as a political tool, it is reasonable to expect that senior leaders' annual

public speeches, the focus for this project, would also serve as an opportunity for the regime to

reinforce its rule by reiterating its justifying argument. As such, to test the hypothesis that a regime's

justifying argument will vary systematically with the ruling ethnic group's dominance in the

population, I perform content analysis on speeches from the most senior leader in each country, usually

the King or Emir, given on a particular annual occasion when the leaders would be expected to defend

their rule. I chose speeches given on one particular holiday, the state's National Day, pursuant to the

latter logic as well as to maximize consistency across countries, since many leaders indeed spoke on

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[21] Walter Lipmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.) 1922. p. 17.
[22] *ibid.* p. 31.
[23] Murray Edelman, *Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1964.
[24] See, for example, Stephen Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes," in L. Falkowski (ed.), *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 1979; *Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge) 2008; Jeffrey Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1987; B. Thomas Trout, "Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (September 1975); George Kateb, "The Novelty of the Iraq War," *The Good Society* 16:2 (2007); Xing Lu and Herbert Simons, "Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in the Post-Mao Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92:3 (August 2006); "Eradicating the "Little Satan": Why Iran Should Be Taken at Its Word," *Commentary* 127:1 (January 2007).

National Day. In cases where the senior did not give an annual speech on National Day, his (widely circulated) annual speeches to Parliament were used. I sought 5-10 annual speeches for each leader to minimize the effects on rhetoric, admittedly an overdetermined phenomenon, of exogenous shocks such as a war, an election, or an economic crisis that might reasonably be expected to influence a speech's content. The most recent speeches available for each regime were used.

Each speech was analyzed for the presence of an array of code words associated with a particular argument; the economic-social developmental argument was assessed by the number of successes or specific programs the leader identified. I then calculated the percent of total evocations that each particular argument comprised for the identificational and democratic-institutional, while development successes were calculated as a percent of the total word count of a speech. I then averaged all the percentages for each category in the total set of speeches for that country, which was used in the cross-country comparison. The goal is to establish a correlation between variations in level of dominance and variation in the frequency of keywords for each argument, to determine which (non-mutually-exclusive) arguments feature most prominently in a regime's justification for its rule. To alleviate the challenges for comparison that the difference in unit of measurement between the economic-social developmental and evocational arguments creates, a country's value for each argument will be considered for its ranking among the countries evaluated.

III. Findings

As the following graphs demonstrate, there appears to be some evidence for shifts in rhetoric correlating with shifts in degree of Sunni dominance. While a relationship between pan-Arab and democratic-institutional evocations appears elusive, social-economic development and national identity

D. Berman -- 18

evocations indeed respectively decrease and increase with an increase in Sunni dominance. The national identity relationship becomes stronger ($r^2 = 0.71$) if we drop Bahrain on account of its exceptional circumstances and the development relationship becomes stronger ($r^2 = 0.88$) if we drop the equally low-scoring Egypt and Jordan on account of their effective homogeneity (% Sunni $\geq$ 90), as will be discussed later. Although there appears to be no relationship between dominance and total identity evocations, a summation of the religious, ideological, and pan-Arab, some relationship appears to exist between dominance and religious evocations, with the latter increasing as the former decreases. Moreover, despite the absence of a linear relationship, what we can infer from the total identity evocation graph is that identity evocations become important when dominance is very low. This is indeed what we would expect. The results are presented in tabular and graphical format below. It should be noted that because ideological evocations only exist in the case of Iraq, they will not be considered in the analysis except in that one case. Moreover, total evocations as an average percentage of full text is also not treated, as it was intended merely to corroborate the assumption of consistency (which it appears to do). All values are the averages for a speech in that country.

Table 2.

	Bahrain	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
% Sunni Dominance	30	90	35	92	60	86	80	63
# Speeches	3	4	5	6	4	11	6	7
National*	56.1	68.55	20.52	56.77	52	47.91	64.47	47.3
Religious*	22.13	14.04	41.44	14.25	33.68	13.71	10.65	12.59
Ideological*	0	0	1.86	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-Arab*	8.9	12.9	36.24	14.55	0.73	25.54	16.32	19.54
Econ-Soc[+]	4.93	11.5	0.95	6.53	10.3	41.9	33.6	18.96
Dem-Inst'l*	12.03	4.53	0	13.67	13.63	12.69	8.57	20.64
Total Identificat'l Evocations**	31.03	26.93	79.54	28.8	34.4	39.25	26.97	32.13

Total Evocations[++]	58.33	63.25	218.2	97.83	75.25	93.64	129.67	124.29
Total Evocations[+]	5.83	4.3	4.64	6.87	4.95	4.56	4.97	7.23

* Percent of total evocations (national, religious, ideological, pan-Arab, democratic-institutional)
\+ Percent of full text
** Religious + ideological + pan-Arab
\++ Total number (average)

Fig. 1

Democratic-Institutional Evocations

Fig. 2

Economic/Social Developmental

$r^2=0.88$

% Full Text

% Sunni

(Egypt and Jordan omitted)

Fig. 3

Identificational Evocations
(Religious + Ideological + Pan-Arab)

% Total Evocations

% Sunni

Fig. 4.

Religious Evocations

Fig. 5.

Pan-Arab Evocations

The findings from this content analysis will now be examined in context, with case studies of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.

IV: Case Study 1: Iraq, 1968-2003

Occasion for speeches: National Day ("Revolution Day," the anniversary of the Ba'thist Revolution)

     Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime represents a scant 35% of the mostly Shi'ite population, a pattern of dominance established by the British during their rule over Iraq in the 1920s under a League of Nations mandate.[25] As a minority regime, Saddam Hussein's government had the challenge of attaining compliance from a general population in which it lacked any dominance at all without actually enabling the disenfranchised and discontented Shi'ites to threaten the regime's rule. Indeed, the Shi'ite population of Iraq had shown itself cohesive and restive over its peripheral lot since the first coup attempt by the predominantly-Sunni Ba'thists in 1963, with its resistance ultimately providing the key obstacle to the coup's success.[26] As early as 1969 the regime began a campaign of "harassment" of the Shi'ite hierarchy; it has been observed of the regime in the early 1970s that "the capacity of certain Shi'ite figures to command respect and to exercise authority within the community clearly unnerved a regime based on narrow circles emanating from the Sunni lands of the northwest."27 This view was inevitably reinforced by the sporadic continuation of Shi'ite protests of various impact throughout Saddam Hussein's tenure.

     I argue that the relative size of the mono-ethnic regime's group in a multi-ethnic society drives the argument the regime will use to justify its rule to the population, determining whether the rulers will predominantly rely on democratic-institutional (the regime merits perpetuation because it possesses and is embedded in a system of universally acclaimed democratic institutions), economic-social developmental (the regime merits perpetuation because it has brought developmental success to

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[25] For a discussion of British rule in Iraq see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2000, and Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq : A Political History from Independence to Occupation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2009.

[26] Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1994, ch. 4.

[27] Tripp, 201-204.

the country and its inhabitants), or identificational (the regime merits perpetuation because it is acts in the best interest of an identity in which it shares) arguments. Democratic-institutional arguments offer the most concrete and broad-ranging mechanisms of accountability for the regime, economic-social developmental less so, and identificational arguments the least, providing the least explicit rubric with which it desires to be evaluated. The various arguments' potential to detract from the ethnic nature of the regime, vitiating inevitable intergroup tensions where one group exclusively dominates another and thus reducing the threat to the regime' perpetuation, increases along the same pattern, being lowest with democratic-institutional and highest with identificational arguments. Since a regime exclusively populated by a minority group is the most threatened by public accountability and has the greatest need to detract from the regime's ethnic nature, I expect such a regime to adopt an identificational justifying argument. An analysis of speeches by longtime Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should demonstrate as much, showing few economic-social developmental evocations and even fewer democratic-institutional but a high number of identificational evocations.

The data reveals that Iraq's values for democratic-institutional and economic-social developmental arguments are zero and 0.95, respectively; a cross-country comparison shows that these are the lowest values for each argument. However, not only does Iraq have by far the highest value for identificational arguments overall, but it outranks every other country for all three composite non-national identities. (religious = 41.44, ideological = 1.86, pan-Arab = 36.24). The emphasis on trans- and supranational identities appear to come at the expense of national identity, which has by far the lowest value of all countries studied (20.52).

As noted, there is not a single evocation of a democratic-institutional argument. Indeed, Saddam's speeches do not even approach suggesting concrete measures of accountability, often straying toward abstract moralizing in general. There are even very few references to economic-social developmental successes, actual or potential, save for the occasional vague reference to potential

D. Berman -- 25

economic benefits from tightening pan-Arab relations ("[increased cooperation] has activated the economic markets" and "[as a result] products will grow both quantitatively and qualitatively") (Iraq 1999). The only other exception in the speeches evaluated is a short paragraph in which purported achievements are cited in a series of short rhetorical questions: "Shall we say that a great number of our Iraqi people were barefooted, and only a few of them thought that their life would be better the next day? Should we compare the number and the level of students in schools now and before? Should we talk about what we used to manufacture and how and what we used to import, from which countries and how? Or should we count down the number of workers in the countryside, and in the industrial and services sectors compared to their numbers now despite the unjust blockade? (Iraq 2001)" Not only does the rhetorical-question format seek to avoid initiating discussion on these points – Saddam actually follows up this list of questions with a dismissive "no, I will not burden you with these details" – but he ends the above list with what can only be read as an excuse for any present or future less-than-impressive development: "Should we mention the high level of the standard of living of the Iraqis prior to the buildup of the forces of the evil and the mobilization of their fire against Iraq in a timing and a way that made them think that they would indubitably destroy Iraq, its people, inspirations, role, and destiny?!" This approach, suggesting of the existence of "figures and achievements" quantifying the revolutionary regime's successes but assuring that he thoughtfully "will not bother [the audience] with them" is a regular feature of Saddam's speeches (this wording from Iraq 1998).

Moreover, Saddam regularly glorifies suffering caused by the absence of economic and social development for the sake of his regime's revolutionary causes. Discussing the international embargo against Iraq, he proclaims:

> If the enemies of Iraq imagine that they are able to deceive a people mobilized with all the factors of national zeal and the experiences of life it has experienced, ... a people that made tens of thousands of generous sacrifices of valuable lives every short period of time as a result of the shortage of food and medicine and due to the use of force, we say to them, in the name of the great people of Iraq, that they are wrong and it is better for

them to reread the ancient history and this glorious history carefully in order to derive the lessons that distance us from them from the abyss of their evils and their souls inciting them to evil (Iraq 1998).

In another case, he accepts that suffering may be the lot of the faithful in a prayer to God: "Oh Allah, (...) to You we bow in worship, capable in victory, hailing Your Will, grateful for the blessings You bestow upon us in this instance or in others, or wherever our feet are made to bleed by the blades, spikes and edges of the road, we will not change in this and in other endeavours.." Instead, he proclaims the revolution that ushered him into power as supremely good, but limits the discussion of its benefit to the sublime and metaphysical – in short, to phenomena that cannot be seen as a rubric against which his regime can be evaluated. A common theme is that the revolution serves the greater benefit of mankind, and suffering in its name is therefore going to that end: "The sacrifices offered along [the revolution's] course are not only for the sake of Iraq, but also for the sake of our glorious Arab Nation as long as the Revolution remains national and for the whole Nation as it is for Iraq, as it is for humanity in general (Iraq 1999)." Elsewhere he describes the lofty benefits of the revolution:

> [The revolution] is a state of evolution and ascent towards what is deemed to be almost impossible. (...) What I am referring to is its spirit, its ability to guide life and renew it along the best path there is. And I am referring to the intent of faith in the hearts of the men who caused the noble fount to gush out and who mustered up all the potencies in the hearts and minds of the people so that they may plant all that is useful and healthy in the womb of life. The July Revolution has not been a traditional course taken with the intention of weaving for the people an overall to cover blemishes that show through their tattered dress. It has been the sowing of healthy seeds where they should be sown before irrigating them with the water of life so that they grow green and blooming and fruitful. Its yield of fruit will spread the zeal rendered in sowing the healthy seeds. It will thus spread and extend the cultivation of life to a vast homeland (...) (Iraq 2000).

Saddam's articulation of the benefits the revolution brought to Iraq is similarly sublime and allegorical:

> Before the July Revolution, the condition in Iraq can be described as follows: It was a wasteland that had no agriculture to be taken into account and no livestock to be proud of although it had much water. Is it possible that life and land suffer from thirst while water exists?

D. Berman -- 27

The Iraqis knew that they had the potential, but they did not know how to muster up that potential. Their rulers did not take the responsibility on the basis of that potential. The leader and the guide who was able to put that potential on its right course had not yet emerged from among them. Even when some had discovered that potential, they did not know how to deal with it. Nor did they direct it where it should be directed so as to enable it to evolve into an effective act that could make life pulsate and fill hearts with happiness.

Each thing and each element in Iraq then stood isolated in its properties and characteristics from other things and elements. No reaction between them took place, since that reaction required first the presence of a catalyst to enable the principal elements to release the sparks of life. Their reaction would have purged souls, revived zeal, removed the veil from eyes and hearts and sent life flowing into its limbs that had gone dry and paralyzed.

That was how Iraq was then.

But a breeze blew on it. It was like indignation voiced by a gentle patient man. It was like the smile of a baby whispering to its mother, or playing with itself in celebration of life. It was like a prayer of a hermit giving God the adoration of great love. That breeze dipped out of the Great Sea of Omnipotence, after the Great Master of Omnipotence, the Merciful, the Compassionate had permitted that.

And there was rain!

It was clement rain, filling the sky of Iraq and falling abundantly on its parched land. The idle wells filed their beds and water overflowed all around. The immortal Tigris brimmed and so did the Euphrates. The main flow filled its tributaries. Life crept into every living thing and every dead thing was removed from the field. Together with that relieving rain, there blew pollinating winds. They speeded [sic] up the shaking of the date-palm trunks. Pollen was strewn over the heads of palm trees. Similar pollen was sent to every tree and every plant.

And there was life (Iraq 2000)!

Saddam Hussein clearly does not want his population to judge his right to rule based on the presence of either democratic institutions or economic and social development.

Instead, Saddam Hussein's speeches are replete with identificational evocations. The category of ideological identifications, evoking a political ideology, only has a non-zero value for Iraq. The particular ideology that is referenced, Ba'thism, is a socialist political ideology that is pan-Aran in root and has historically been used to martial nationalist sentiment, not unlike European national-socialist

D. Berman -- 28

parties. Although Saddam's speeches do occasionally reference Ba'thism, in which his rule is nominally couched, the total focus on ideological identity is low, amounting to only 1.86% of all evocations. Rather, Saddam's predominant emphasis is on the supranational identities, with religious and pan-Arab identities respectively comprising 44.44% and 36.24% of the total number of evocations. Many of the religious identity references consist of glorifications of God and historical religious figures, with frequent references to Iraq as the land of Abraham and thus the Iraqis as favored people (Iraq 1999 and 2000, e.g.). Benedictions are not uncommon, though: in one speech, nearly one-fourth is an extended prayer (Iraq 2002).

An examination of the context in which religious evocations appear suggests that such evocations can serve two different, if not entirely independent, functions. In addition to providing common ground around which both ruling Sunnis and majority Shi'ites can coalesce under the ruling regime, such an emphasis on God and His will has the effect of deemphasizing the regime's responsibility for the country's well-being, consequently avoiding any suggestion of the regime's accountability. Many of the religious epithets in Saddam's speeches appear as assigning God responsibility for events, either in the past or the future. The phrase "God willing" is a frequent feature of all of his speeches. It even appears twice in one paragraph in one case: "This year and the subsequent additional time will be the year and time, *God willing*, of the serious erosion of the embargo on Iraq. They will be, with the assets of the revolutionary, patriotic and faithful energy as well as the genuine national position of those who take it, the stock of the aquiver and the fountain of the great waterfall to conquer the embargo, break its restrictions, dishonor its masters, the evil and vile. *God willing* (Iraq 1998)."28 Elsewhere he argues, "Whenever your revolution has fallen short in any aspect which you might have wished to see happen otherwise, then its excuse is the fact that it has been true to its objectives; and success comes only from Allah (Iraq 2002)." Similarly, Saddam explicitly

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28 emphasis added.

assigns responsibility to God for his people's comfort and well-being in an extended benediction:

> Our Allah, our Creator; and Creator of the Heavens which You lifted without pillars;
> Creator of the earth which You stretched and tied to the strings of Your Will. (...) We
> accept your decision when you make what is difficult easy and reachable, or when you
> delay, in your own wisdom, our victory in the field, or the fruit of our effort and
> struggle, thus making our feet bleed due to the difficulties and sacrifices of the road. The
> hearts may be affected by time to the extent, and in the manner that You choose; but our
> conscience will remain strong and rich in the faith. We appeal to You to keep our hearts
> rich with comfort and content, and preserve our Iman and worship as the healing
> compassion in our hearts, which are most precious, as well as in every good deed which
> meets with Your satisfaction (Iraq 2002).

Though not properly an instance of an identificational argument because it serves more to reduce the accountability of the regime by deflecting blame for past, present or future misfortune from it, such religious evocations indicate the regime's inability to tolerate accountability and, by redirecting responsibility for misfortune away from the regime, reinforce its hold on power.

That said, Saddam's speeches also incorporate religious evocations that do appear to call forward a Muslim identity among his people. The glorification of religious figures and reference to Iraq in a biblical context, as described above, demonstrates as much, as do frequent mentions of religious concepts such as jihad (holy war). Arabs and specifically Iraqis are a "people of jihad (Iraq 1999);" as Saddam declares: "We all face the plight of the embargo, threats, conspiracy and the courses of evil coming from outside Iraq. We, all, live up to the honor of firmness, position and the ability to face the threats, relying on God, the Almighty, more confident of the relentless enthusiasm, which cannot be severed from its fountain and resort, of a great people of Jihad (Iraq 1998)." Beyond mentions of jihad, Saddam also advocates actions as being a "sacred religious duty (Iraq 1998)" and emphasizes that Iraq "is not only known for its civilization and humanitarian role, but also as a nation of prophets and messengers from which God had chosen them and selected it to be a cradle and historical depth for them and for their role (...) (Iraq 1999)." This use of religion to evoke a common purpose and destiny among his people promotes unity among Saddam's divided populace; thus we see

that the religious evocations in Saddam's speeches serve not only to deflect responsibility from the regime and therefore reduce the burden of accountability that it cannot tolerate, but also to reduce the salience of ethnicity by evoking an identity shared among the population as a whole as well as the regime.

The same holds for Saddam's tendency to evoke a pan-Arab identity. While for most leaders that this project evaluates the evocation of pan-Arab identity largely consists in the articulation of support for Palestine and opposition to Israel, in addition to their positions on other key pan-Arab issues, Saddam appears to try to affect a supplanting of the population's national identity with its common Arab identity. One key indicator of this is the prevalence of pan-Arab evocations compared to national identity evocations (20.52, the lowest value across countries). Another indicator is that Saddam pointedly and consistently uses the word *nation*, commonly used in reference to the country in all other leaders' speeches, to refer to the Arab people. For example, when he tells his people "you are part of a great nation (Iraq 2001 and *passim*)," he makes it crystal clear in context that he is referring to the *Arab* nation. This is particularly noteworthy if viewed alongside his tendency to address his audience as "fellow Arabs" or "Arab brethren," rather than the "countrymen," "citizens," or simply "brothers" favored by his counterparts in the other countries surveyed.

Saddam's interest in inspiring unity in the population by means of evoking a shared identity is reinforced by his tendency to dichotomize between sharers in the Arab identity and "others." Pan-Arab evocations go hand in hand with denigrations of America – Saddam refers to the White House as the "Black House" (Iraq 1999), and America as "the enemy of peoples in the world" (Iraq 2001) – and what Saddam deigns only to call the "Zionist entity" (*passim*). More broadly, his speeches are pervaded by an us-or-them approach, with frequent references to enemies, good versus evil, and God versus the devil. Indeed, his speeches are the only ones of the leaders surveyed that include the words "enemy," "evil," and "devil." He cites the "evil, covetous tyrant" is "the enemy of Allah (Iraq 2002)," avows that

"God is with you and no one but the devil will be with your enemies (Iraq 2001)," and generally follows commendations of the good with moralizing denigrations of the opposite. Of particular significance is his signature closing for all his speeches: "Long live our glorious Arab Nation / Long live Iraq / Long live Iraq / Long live Palestine, free and Arab / God is most great / God is most great / S*hame be on the despicable*."29 In addition, as noted above, Saddam's us-versus-them identificational argument is enriched by frequent advocations of jihad. Not only does he advocate jihad against Iraq's current enemies, but he identifies long periods of jihad in Iraq's history, with one such period being the Ba'th revolution that ushered his regime into power (e.g., the revolution as a "long march of jihad (Iraq 1998)").

By encouraging an "us versus them" perspective among the population, Saddam encourages unity of the ethnically divided "us" and justifies his own regime as embedded in, and a defender of, the "us" against the "them." Moreover, the presence of an opposing "them" permits the regime to deflect blame for a subpar performance. For example, Saddam exhorts his audience to action in support of pan-Arab causes on the grounds that "otherwise, the enemies of the Arab nation will inflict more injustice and tyranny upon you (Iraq 2001)," relegating blame for the sufferings of injustice and tyranny to these hostile "others." In short, not only does an identificational argument allow a leader to deflect attention away from accountability, but it detracts from the ethnic nature of his regime and thus vitiates the threats to his minority regime deriving from it.

Implications

A content analysis of Saddam Hussein's speeches suggests that Saddam's regime adopted an identificational argument to justify its rule to its population. The large number of pan-Arab evocations,

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29 Emphasis added.

substantiated in context, indicates a specifically pan-Arab identificational argument. Because a contextual analysis reveals a large number of the highly present religious evocations to function more as deflection of blame from the regime than necessarily evoking an identity – although a significant number of religious-identity evocations are present as well – we will call Saddam Hussein's argument predominantly pan-Arab identificational. Having established that, we now turn to the question of whether and to what degree this argument can be expected to have influenced its policy.

While an identificational justifying argument allows the regime a freer hand than a democratic-institutional or economic-social developmental on account of the few mechanisms for accountability that it suggests, it can still be expected to influence policies in some areas. In general, since Saddam's regime justifies itself with an identificational argument, we would expect him to have to exert a great deal of effort to keep the particular identities around which his argument centers, his population's Muslim and especially Arab identities, salient.

Saddam's Arab and Muslim Policies

Saddam Hussein's policies tended to be characterized by their pan-Arab orientation, reinforcing this study's conclusion that he justified his regime's rule with an identificational argument focused on his population's Muslim and particularly Arab (which incorporates the latter) identities. It is noteworthy that the policies he wants to emphasize – the only policies he mentions in his speeches – are those focused on strengthening pan-Arab unity. More than half of one speech consists of the policies Iraq has historically pursued to advance Arab unity (Iraq 1998). However, having communicated to the population that his right to rule stems from his ability to further pan-Arab interests, the security of Saddam's regime was heavily influenced by his ability to keep Arab interests salient and act in their support. This became difficult when domestic interest in an Arab identity began

D. Berman -- 33

to decline, and when Saddam found Arab interests clashing with national interests and the exigencies of

his regime.

The decline in interest in pan-Arabism among the Iraqi population has been hypothesized as

initiated by Iraq's loss in the Iran-Iraq War, with Saddam having abused it as a rallying cry to keep the

majority Shi'ites in the Iraqi population, who are Arabs, from supporting the Persian Shi'ite regime in

Iran.30 Iraq's 1990 invasion of fellow Arab country Kuwait further reduced the potential utility to the

regime of invoking an Arab identity among the population.31 That the majority of the Arab world

responded angrily to the invasion and supported the U.S.-led coalition against it certainly did not help.

According to most accounts, Saddam undertook the invasion as a way to flout what he perceived as

both domestic and international efforts to destabilize his rule; he expected that conquest would be

quick, easy, and justifiable to the Iraqi people as a "liberation."32 With these conditions in mind

Saddam sought to reorient his emphasis to favor Iraqis' Islamic identity instead of Arab, but the hostile

response of the Muslim Arab world similarly diminished this identity's potency for the regime.33

By demonstrating that his regime was clearly not working in the interest of the population as

Arab and Muslim people, in accordance with the argument with which he justified his rule, Saddam's

initiation (and subsequent loss) of the Gulf War dealt a devastating blow to his rule. 1991 saw serious

revolts among both Shi'ites and Sunnis, including Saddam's own tribesmen. Afterward Saddam found

himself forced to change his emphasis to tribal identities, relying heavily on co-optation and effectively

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[30] For a more detailed discusion see Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq : A Political History from Independence to Occupation*
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2009, pp. 235-36.

[31] Discussed in Adeed Dawisha, "'Identity' and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq," *Middle East Journal* 53:4 (Autumn
1999). See also Malik Mufti, *Sovereign Creations : Pan-Arabism and Political order in Syria and Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press) 1996; F. Gregory Gause, III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," *Middle East Journal*
56:1 (Winter 2002).

[32] F. Gregory Gause, III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," *Middle East Journal* 56:1 (Winter 2002); Efraim
Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," *Survival*, 33:1(1991).

[33] Dawisha 2009.

decentralizing the regime. His regime never regained its former stature or resilience.34

The case of Iraq illustrates the implications of adopting an identificational argument to justify a regime. Saddam found himself limited by the strong need to appear as acting primarily in the interest of the supranational identities he had emphasized, ultimately having to prioritize supranational interest over the immediate interests of his regime – or to call into question the very grounds on which his regime was justified.

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[34] Discussed in detail in Dawisha 1999 and 2009; Amtatzia Baram, *Building Toward Crisis* (Washington DC: Washington Institute of Near East Policy) 1998; Faleh Jabar, "Detribalization and Retribalization in Iraq 1968-1998," *Middle East Journal* 215 (Summer 2000).

V. Case Study 2: Yemen, 1999-Present

Occasion for Annual Speech: National Day (anniversary of unification of Yemeni Arab Republic and South Yemen)

Yemen is governed by a Sunni regime representing approximately 63% of the population, the vast majority of the remainder (36%) is Shi'ite. Since the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic and South Yemen in 1994 the country has been formally a presidential republic, led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. He has held the office since 1978 as President of the Yemen Arab Republic, being reelected in the unified country in 1999 and 2006. Since unification, the Saleh regime has contended with a troublesome Shi'ite rebellion in the north that it suspects is financed by Iran, as well as a restive troupe of Sunnis favoring secession in the south.[35] The challenge for his regime, then, is to protect his power against sectarian threats to his regime and secessionist threats from largely co-ethnic South Yemenis.

Here I contend that the argument that a mono-ethnic regime will use to justify its rule to the population will depend on the relative size of the ruling ethnic group. The three principal arguments tested, democratic-institutional, economic-social developmental, and identificational, vary in the degree to which they impose concrete measures for accountability on the regime and the potential they hold for diverting popular attention from the regime's ethnic nature. Because democratic-institutional arguments impose the most concrete mechanisms for accountability on the regime and have the lowest potential to divert attention from ethnic divisions, I hypothesize that they will be most commonly employed by regimes whose ethnic group has a significant level of dominance and least commonly employed by those with little or no dominance. Identificational arguments run the other way, offering few concrete criteria for accountability and carrying significant potential to supplant the salience of

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[35] "Yemen: A Shia Shadow," *The Economist* (375:8427), May 21, 2005; "Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen," Human Rights Watch report, October 2008.

ethnicity, and should therefore become increasingly favored as the regime's dominance decreases. Middle levels of dominance should have the highest levels of economic-social developmental arguments, for the moderate accountability mechanisms they establish and diversionary potential they offer. With a ruling group comprising 63% of the population, we should expect the speeches of the Yemeni regime to have particularly high levels of economic-social developmental arguments, absolutely and relative to democratic-institutional and identificational arguments.

The content analysis conducted in this project reveals moderately high levels of economic-social developmental arguments in comparison with other countries (18.96%, ranking third of the eight countries evaluated), which is indeed high relative to both the presence of identificational arguments overall and the religious (12.59%) and ideological (0%) composite identities, but the composite pan-Arab identificational and especially the democratic-institutional arguments are much higher than we might expect, with values of 19.54% (ranking third) and 20.64% (ranking first) respectively. The focus on these arguments detracts from the healthy nationalist focus we might anticipate, reducing it to the second lowest of all countries studied (albeit, at 47.03%, not significantly lower than several others).

As noted, President Saleh's speeches have a significant focus on economic-social developmental contributions of the regime, both past and future. That he desires to give it special emphasis is indicated by its presence at the very beginning of his speeches – he regularly launches into a list of government programs under way within the first few paragraphs, and in many cases it comprises the first substantive material he discusses. Despite always citing some successes ("In spite of the political and financial challenges our country has faced and challenges of the world financial crisis which badly affected the strongest world economies, we have achieved great accomplishments at the levels of construction, development, democracy and social progress (Yemen 2010)"), Saleh focuses much more on developmental plans than past developmental successes, demonstrating awareness of Yemen's laggard rate of modernization and the challenges that exist as a result. References to the

country's "economic shortcomings" are not uncommon (Yemen 2006 et al.). Steering attention toward the government's efforts to catalyze development, one particular topic President Saleh emphasizes is the construction of basic physical infrastructure in the country: "Efforts will continue to achieve more service and development projects. On top of the achieved projects was the modern roads network which reached to around ten thousands kilometers. This network connected the different parts of the country and facilitated the implementation of service projects in all areas. In regard to the construction of water dams and reservoirs, about 1250 projects were implemented while over 600 others are under construction (Yemen 2004)." He also touts the government's plans to develop a unified national curriculum for schools and encourage the diversification of resources and industries, with a particular focus on encouraging entrepreneurial and scientific advancements (Yemen 2005, 2010, et *passim*).

As the above citation suggests, the President is prone to delve into specifics, which reinforces the impression that his discussion of economic-social developmental programs are intended to impress. He is equally prone to openly identify Yemen's problems. For example, he admits to the rampant unemployment facing the country. It is noteworthy that Saleh speaks of "reducing unemployment" rather than, for example, increasing employment opportunities (Yemen 2005, 2009). He expresses his negative view of the country's current circumstances that the country in another speech: "The tasks of construction and its challenges are not simple. Our country still has many concerns, especially the development concern for which all efforts should be consolidated to achieve goals of economic progress and improve the living standards of citizens (Yemen 2006)." That he openly articulates the problems facing the country, as well as the specific plans his regime has implemented or will implement to resolve them, suggests his comfort with setting forth criteria against which his people will hold his regime accountable.

President Saleh emphasizes past or future economic-social developmental plans as we expect, but the number of democratic-institutional evocations are surprisingly high. As noted above, Yemen

has the strongest focus on democratic-institutional arguments of all countries studied. Not only are there are a surprising number of evocations, but the amount of attention Saleh wishes to draw to the country's democratic institutions is unanticipated. This focus is reflected in its appearance at the beginning of his speeches, sometimes even before developmental achievements. He frequently begins a speech by offering "greetings of freedom, democracy, and unity (Yemen 2004, 2005, 2008)." This particular triad appears often in his speeches, at the beginning as well as elsewhere. Indeed, the frequency with which he refers to Yemen as the Republic of Yemen is noteworthy in comparison with other evaluated leaders. While many countries' leaders are fond of bandying about words or phrases with democratic connotation, Saleh cites the specific steps his regime is taking to further advance democracy and even couples it with philosophic waxing on the merit of democracy:

> The establishment of the Republic of Yemen coincided with the adoption of democracy, multi-party system and political pluralism, and reactivation of the role of civil society institutions. The widest political reform process was achieved in our country either through the embodiment of the peaceful succession of power and holding free parliamentary, presidential and local elections or the establishment of constitutional institutions, widening popular participation in decision making, women participation, freedom of opinions, freedom of press and respect of human rights. Our adoption for democracy was emanated from our belief that democracy is the choice of the modern age and the foundation for construction, progress and real embodiment for people's running their own affairs.

> The homeland has become bigger by its unity and democracy and its weigh and role in different regional, national and international events were enhanced. Based on this fact, our country has hosted several democratic conferences and activities including the Emerging Democracies Conference, Sanaa Conference on Democracy, Human Rights and the Role of the International Criminal Court and the Conference of the League of Senates and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World. These activities created unprecedented world image for our country. The " Sanaa Declaration" came to affirm the principle of enhancing democracy, widening the popular participation, establishment of civil society institutions, respect of human rights and extending bridges of dialogue, contact and understanding among religions and civilizations. The declaration provided an objective and comprehensive vision which represents today an essential foundation for political and democratic reforms presented in the region. We in the Republic of Yemen welcome reforms that guarantee cementing democracy and widening the popular participation in the decision making. These reforms should come from within the will of peoples and go in harmony with their characteristics and fulfill their ambitions. It is an

opportunity to call upon everyone in the country especially political parties and organizations to enrich democracy with more democratic and responsible practices within the framework of commitment to the institution, executive laws and national principles away from vexations that could harm the homeland (Yemen 2004).

The philosophical merit of democracy always appears alongside specific practical measures the regime is taking to this end. Overall, the strong pragmatic focus of Saleh's speeches, characterizing his economic-social developmental as well as his democratic-institutional arguments, suggests a comfort with suggesting to the public a rubric against which his regime will be held accountable. That one such rubric is its following of democratic procedures and establishment of functional democratic institutions, which actually include a mechanism by which this accountability can threaten the regime's rule, indicates particularly strong comfort.

The regime's seriousness about promoting economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional arguments is made even more evident by the fact that discussions in those veins are coupled with explicit discussions of the government's efforts to stop corruption in both arenas. In some cases it is embedded in an economic-social developmental argument:

> The government should also implement all goals and aims included in development plans especially in the second five-year development plan. The government should continue economic, financial and administrative reforms in a parallel line with efforts to combat and uproot corruption. The government should wage a severe war on corrupters wherever they are. No single opportunity should be left for corruption and corrupters. We stress on the necessity of accelerating the approval of the international treaty to combat corruption. The legislative authority and the central organization for auditing and control should fulfill their duties against corrupters taking into account accurate and precise information away from vexatious intentions. Those who are responsible for monitoring corrupters should strike a good example by behavior, honesty and conscience (Yemen 2004).

Elsewhere, however, the discussion of corruption appears within a democratic-institutional argument. President Saleh emphasizes the importance of legitimacy of democratic processes; as he assures, "Preparations are underway to hold the election in democratic, honest and safe atmospheres and in an

absolute transparency (Yemen 2006)." Saleh cites the enactment of an anti-corruption law as well as the establishment of an institution, the Supreme National Authority to Combat Corruption, to support it (Yemen 2006, 2008). The emphasis on uprooting corruption further emphasizes Saleh's comfort with his regime being held accountable for economic and social developmental progress as well as functional democratic institutions.

Saleh's speeches do not reflect an over-strong emphasis on identificational arguments (32.13%, fourth out of eight). There are zero ideological evocations. Religious identity evocations are present, but not in an overwhelming quantity (12.93%, six out of eight, and very similar to most higher-dominance countries). Aside from the occasional interjectional invocation, most of the evocations appear in one of three contexts: entreaty for blessing or attribution of something as blessed; discussion of issues relevant to the Islamic world, and allusions to martyrdom. Saleh repeatedly speaks of "blessed unity (Yemen 2005, 2006, 2008, inter alia)," to the point that the phrase becomes epithetic. As for references to the Islamic world, the President occasionally treats the problem of Islamist terrorism, emphasizing the importance to Muslims of remedying this: "Dialogue is also an important method and Muslim clergies should fulfill their role in orienting the youths and protecting them from misleading ideas that end in extremism and terrorism (Yemen 2004)." Otherwise he simply refers to the existence of issues for the Islamic world: "In regard to Yemen stances towards Arab, Islamic and international issues, we will remain committed to the national solid principles and Arab and Islamic rights (Yemen 2006)." Finally, the word "martyr" comprises a large number of the evocations, generally used to recall the country's war dead. Many speeches begin with a tribute to them: "[Yemen's] achievements have all been possible due to our people's struggle, and the martyrs who fell while defending the revolution and unity. I salute all those faithful martyrs and pay them tribute (Yemen 2011);" "Our people was able to achieve its greatest accomplishment in an expression of loyalty to the sacrifices of the homeland's martyrs (Yemen 2004)." Overall, President Saleh does not seem overly interested in evoking an

ideological or religious identity.

Despite the lack of strong presence of identificational evocations overall, Saleh does evoke a pan-Arab identity with some frequency (19.54%, third out of eight). His evocation of the Arab identity is quite similar to that of other countries, mainly consisting of expressions of concern over current Arab trouble spots such as Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia and advocacy of political solutions for them. Though there is occasional moralizing – reference to "Israeli arrogance," for example (Yemen 2005) – the Arab identity evocations are not especially provocative. Saleh, for example, "reiterate[s] our support for the peaceful efforts exerted by the Palestinian authority (Yemen 2005)," renew[s] our call to all brotherly Iraqi people to work for the enhancement of their national unity and contribution in creating a better future in light of a democratic, free and unified Iraq (Yemen 2006)," and "reiterate[s] our continuous support for all efforts exerted for the sake of maintaining peace and stability in the brotherly Republic of Somalia (Yemen 2009)." He appears to evoke an Arab identity primarily by promoting sympathy for troubled Arab peoples and their relevance to Yemenis.

That President Saleh is interested in evoking an Arab identity among his population to at least some minimal degree is suggested by his occasional mention of the Arab "nation" once he introduces Arab concerns. This terminology is much rarer than in Saddam Hussein's speeches, though, and the predominant identity Saleh's speeches evoke is still the national (47.03% versus 19.54%); moreover, the shift in meaning is consistently preceded by a clear cue in the change of audience address from "fellow citizens" to "fellow Arabs," clarifying that Arab nationality and Yemeni nationality are not deeply entwined. That he seeks to give Arab identity minimal emphasis is reinforced by the fact that it is consistently raised – though it is raised consistently -- at the very end of the speech.

In sum, an evaluation of President Saleh's speeches reveals a strong interest in associating his regime with economic and social developmental success and, to a surprisingly large degree, functional democratic institutions. Pan-Arab identificational evocations are also present, but the latter two

D. Berman -- 42

dominate. This suggests that President Saleh is comfortable suggesting the existence of concrete

measures and mechanisms of accountability to his population. This does not contradict the prediction

that, based on the relative percentage of his ruling ethnic group, Saleh's regime would justify its rule

primarily with an economic-social developmental argument. The remaining paragraphs will discuss the

political implications of employing an argument that is both economic-social developmental and

democratic-institutional to justify a regime's rule.

Implications

Saleh's use of economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional arguments to justify

his regime's rule sets up his government to be held accountable for achieving developmental progress

and advancing and functioning within democratic institutions. The potential implications are clear: the

absence of perceivable developmental progress and either the absence of democratic institutions or

evidence that their functioning is less than democratic, may discredit the regime's justifying argument

and provoke threats to the regime's security. We might surmise that Saleh's emphasis on democratic

institutions may put his regime at particular risk, with such his ethnic group's dominance in a multi-

ethnic society small enough that he cannot truly permit democratic functioning without likely

sacrificing his own power.

President Saleh's Developmental and Democratic-Institutional Policies

Longtime Yemeni ruler President Saleh strongly justified the rule of his Sunni regime,

representing 63% of the population, with a dual economic-social developmental and democratic-

institutional argument, suggesting that his regime's rule is justified because of the developmental

D. Berman -- 43

successes it has achieved or is on track to achieve and the functional democratic institutions in which it is embedded. This study predicts the former, but expected less emphasis on the latter. As Saleh's speeches indicate with their catalogues of programs implemented toward developmental and democratic ends, his regime sincerely sought to promote economic development and democracy (albeit without risking its power.). However, under his rule Yemen has remained the poorest Arab country, with rampant poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment; moreover, Saleh's regime has not actually advanced its democratic march, being instead widely considered an autocratic oligarchy.[36] His inability to show positive development in these areas, having emphasized them so heavily as the argument justifying his regime's rule, has had negative consequences for his regime's security.

Yemen has been a locus of protests as part of the "Arab Spring," following closely upon the authoritarian Tunisian president's ouster by popular protest. However, it is widely reported that the contagion effect merely gave deep and widespread public discontent the catalyst it had long awaited. The key reasons for this discontent were poor economic conditions and the perception of corruption in both economic and governmental arenas. Protesters decried high levels of unemployment, the very problem of which Saleh so frankly spoke. As one scholar concluded in 2010, citing recent Gallup surveys: "What is most striking now, however, is that hope is gone; Yemenis no longer believe that they or their government can rise out of poverty. The loss of hope has been accompanied by gradual chaos [and] a lack of faith in the Yemeni government (...)."[37]

Protesters also voiced anger over the Saleh regime's less-than-democratic behavior. His recently announced plan to amend the much-touted constitution to allow him remain President for life was denounced, along with perceived rampant corruption in elections; in addition to improved

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[36] "Yemen Protests: 20,000 Call for Saleh to Go," BBC News, 3 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12353479; April Longley Alley, "The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen," *Middle East Journal* 64:3 (Summer 2010); Robert Burrowes and Catherine Kasper, "The Salih Regime and the Need for Credible Opposition," *Middle East Journal* 61:2 (Spring 2007).

[37] Nora Ann Colton, "Yemen: A Collapsed Economy," *Middle East Journal* 64:3 (Summer 2010).

economic conditions, Yemeni protesters are calling for "a more responsive, inclusive government."[38]

As Al Jazeera reports, "What the people really want to see is for a five-man presidential council to take control in the interim period, until elections can be held - because they simply don't believe that if elections are held under the current regime that they will be free and fair."[39]

It is a given that both the Arab Spring phenomenon and Yemeni discontent are complicated and multifaceted in their roots; this work does not strive to make broad causal statements about either. Nonetheless, the case of Yemen demonstrates the risks of employing an economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional argument to justify a regime's rule: if developmental successes are elusive and democratic institutions less than democratically functional, the regime, having suggested these areas as criteria along which they should be evaluated, invalidates its justifying argument. The result is a loss of justification and, inevitably, a loss of security for the regime.

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[38] Ginny Hill, "What's Next in Yemen?" BBC News, 29 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12309909.

[39] "Thousands in Yemen March Against Saleh," *Al Jazeera*, 25 March 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132511732578174.html.

VI. Case Study 3: The United Arab Emirates, 1971-Present

Occasion for Annual Speech: National Day (anniversary of the establishment of the federation of emirates)

The United Arab Emirates, established in 1971, is a federation of sovereign entities in which Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group by far, composing 80% of the population (the remainder being 16% Shi'ites and 4% other minorities). The country is unique in the region because it has seen little ethnic tension since its founding. Despite the continued salience of the Sunni-Shi'ite division, the two populations manage to coexist relatively peacefully in the UAE.[40] The federation has seen two presidents since its 1971 founding: Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who died in 2004, and his son Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who inherited the Presidency as Crown Prince and has been in power ever since. The challenge to the Zayed and then Khalifa regime is to prevent potential tension, with the threat of regime destabilization it bears, from becoming real.

I argue that the argument a mono-ethnic regime in a multi-ethnic society will choose to justify its rule will vary with the degree of dominance its ruling group has in the population, indicated by its relative percentage. This variance is driven, I contend, by the regime's shifting ability to tolerate being held accountable by the public and its shifting need to divert public attention from ethnicity. The latter varies inversely proportionally with dominance and the former proportionally. The three arguments treated in this study, democratic-institutional, economic-social developmental, and identificational, decrease in that order in the extent to which they impose concrete measures and mechanisms for holding the regime accountable, increase in that order in the degree to which they have the potential to

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[40] Discussed in, *inter alia*, Kristian Alexander, "Deciphering the UAE.'s Stand on Arab Revolutions," Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 1 March 2011, http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/deciphering-uaes-stand-arab-revolutions; Christopher Davidson, "Sunni-Shiite Hostility? The UAE Suggests Otherwise," *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 4 August 2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Aug/04/Sunni-Shiite-hostility-The-UAE-suggests-otherwise.ashx#axzz1WdQwUo2O.

detract from ethnicity. With the high relative dominance of ruling Sunnis over Shi'ites in the UAE, I predict that President Khalifa's government would favor a democratic-institutional argument, with a economic-social developmental argument also a strong presence and little or no focus given to identificational arguments.

The data generally corroborates this prediction, although the presence of democratic-institutional arguments is not as strong as we might expect (8.57%, sixth of eight) and the social-economic developmental argument appears especially strong (33.6%, second of eight). The UAE has the second lowest value across countries for identificational arguments overall (26.97%), with the lowest value for religion (10.65), a zero value for ideological, but a somewhat higher value for pan-Arab identities (16.32, fourth of eight).

President Khalifa's speeches have a surprisingly low level of democratic-institutional evocations, but they are present. They generally consist of assurances of the regime's commitment to democracy. As President Khalifa offers in one example: "We say with confidence that we will pursue the development of our capabilities, modernise our institutions, restructure practices in order to achieve our aspirations to live in a society, where justice and rule of law prevail and in a state devoted to the values of integrity, accountability, transparency, rights, freedoms and respect, promote thinking and analysis, creativity, and encourage dialogue, expression of opinion, participation in decision-making as per devotion to the values of loyalty and belonging to the homeland, preserve the prestige and sovereignty of the state, and national security and safety (UAE 2009)." On another occasion he similarly states: "We will embark on a march that culminates in more participation and interaction from all the citizens of the country. My dear countrymen and women, today, we stand at a threshold of a new era, whose ultimate objective is to entrench the rule of law and due process, accountability, transparency and equal opportunity (UAE 2005)." Elsewhere he clarifies, "Our policy is based on the commitment to the principles of the UAE constitution (UAE 2010)." On several occasions President

Khalifa explicitly extends political rights to women: "The UAE is working to enable women play their role in serving the society. To successfully achieve this, laws have been promulgated to protect their constitutional rights and to give them the opportunity to participate in legislative and executive institutions and in the decision-making process (UAE 2005)." Overall, President Khalifa's democratic-institutional evocations are general and keyword-oriented, lacking in specifics; nonetheless, the presence of general and keyword-oriented evocations suggest that the regime is not uncomfortable with the democratic process and being evaluated based on its presence.

Khalifa's speeches are heavily populated with economic-social development references. The value of 33.6% means that on average, over one-third of each speech is spent discussion past or future development successes. His discussions of developmental plans are frank and reflect the existence of a cohesive plan, or even explicitly state as much: "The government is working hard to achieve social development, to improve quality of life and to realize its developmental goals through a comprehensive national vision that aims to provide excellent educational standards, adequate housing and world class healthcare services in a sustainable environment. It also seeks to offer a highly advanced social welfare system that enables citizens to face hardships and challenges of life, improve public services, to empower women, support young people, to protect and care for mothers and children, senior citizens and people with special needs (UAE 2010)." His speeches all follow a similar pattern, listing with particular emphasis the government's progress in and efforts to further improve human development (including labor laws and education), investment and entrepreneurship, infrastructure, technological and scientific advancement, and the training and employment of women. The President cites specific laws and institutions the government has established, such as the Supreme Council for Mother and Child Care (UAE 2004), Sheikh Zayed Housing Program (UAE 2005), UAE Investment Authority (UAE 2007), and a law created to establish the National Authority for Qualifications (for education) (UAE 2010).

Economic success is regularly the first topic raised in the President's speech, as exemplified in

2010: "As our nation is bracing for its 40th year of achievements, we assure you that we are moving

from a strength to more strength, and that we are reaping the fruits sowed by our forefathers in terms of

best practices, building the nation's institutional and legislative frameworks, enjoying a strong,

diversified and free economy, a modern infrastructure, a sustainable social development, enhanced

cultural and societal identity and most importantly, preparing capable and skilful human resources

(UAE 2010)." The early mention of economic-social developmental successes continues after the

onset of the global economic crisis:

> Dear Citizens, on this occasion, we would like to assure everyone that our country is
> stronger and better off, since our economy is fine and our society enjoys welfare. The
> global financial crisis on its severity will not be a reason for hesitation or retreat, not a
> justification to lead us to a despair or inaction. We are confident that our people and the
> sources of our strength will continue steadily and consistently in implementing what we
> have adopted in terms of the strategies and plans.
>
> We will continue to ply with confidence and optimism the national capacity, and solid
> economy. We are grateful to God for endowing us with strong national economy and
> sound policies to overcome the most difficult stage of the crisis. The economic
> indicators of the growth in most sectors started to grow up gradually, beginning from the
> last quarter of this year (UAE 2009).

It is significant that President Khalifa emphasizes the role of "sound policies" in minimizing the effect

of the crisis on the country and "strategies and plans" that will "continue;" he clarifies that the regime's

successful management of the crisis will only further the successes it has already achieved. As he says

elsewhere in the same vein:

> The transformations experienced by our economy do not come from a vacuum, but
> through the regulations and standards to establish a new economic model, based on the
> philosophy and practices of community-based components of reality. This model is able
> to move us from the stage of gradual labor-intensive to a new stage, strong industry and
> the high-tech, capital-intensive, knowledge-based on advanced technology,
> environmental awareness to preserve the nation and protect the identity and increase
> availability of real jobs for our children.
>
> The success of the new economic model, requires from us a comprehensive clear vision,

the order of priorities, continuation of the economic policies, finance, credit, policies governing the labor market, emphasizing the unity of the market across the nation, link of education and training policies to the labor market, activation of Emiratization and replacement policy, efforts to modernize the management of the economy, and infrastructure development in less developed regions and improve the services.

Distinguished Citizens, five years later on the post of the Head of State, strategies have been set, legislation has been further developed, more factories have been established, roads paved, more universities opened. Those achievements were not the end in themselves, but the top priority was and still to build national capacity and launch national human energy directed toward the horizons of excellence, innovation, and competition (UAE 2009).

President Khalifa strongly alludes to the responsibility of his regime for past developmental successes and consequent ability to advance them in the future.

It is also noteworthy that the President's speeches consistently recognize national figures of the past or present, doing so in the context of recognizing their contribution to developmental successes. As President Khalifa says of the Supreme Council members and rulers of the various emirates, "I salute them for their good custodianship of our Federation and also for their sincere and tireless efforts to administer justice, maintain security, and mobilize resources to spur the growth of our country (UAE 2007)." He gives a similar encomium to former President Zayed: "This country owes its impressive prosperity, its distinguished international standing and its peace and tranquillity to the late Sheikh Zayed, for these achievements were only possible through his persistence, handwork, diligence and dedication. He led our nation into progress and prosperity over the years with prudence and patience. He cherished a dream and devoted his life to achieving that dream, using the oil wealth to build a modern state in which both UAE nationals and resident expatriates enjoy a decent living. His deep sense of commitment to the welfare of his people enabled him to overcome the hurdles that stood in his way, ultimately succeeding in bringing the country to where it is today (UAE 2004)."

The discussion of developmental successes, which, in comparison with Yemen, finds no dearth of past achievements to tout, includes plenty of specifics. President Khalifa gives details that would

bore the average American listener in citing his country's "economic miracle:" "Our economic miracle speaks for itself. The UAE's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at Dh284.5 billion in the year 2003 against Dhs.6.5 billion in 1972, representing an annual growth of 13 per cent. The country has also succeeded in diversifying its economic base, a policy that resulted in significant growth in the non-oil sectors. Non-oil sectors accounted for about 70 per cent of the GDP in 2003, compared to 35.4 per cent in 1972. It is our hope that the non-oil GDP will grow even further this year as we move ahead aggressively with our diversification policies (UAE 2005)." He draws particular attention to the UAE's comparative success and international recognition of it: "Our country is at the top, both at a regional level and at the level of the Arab world, with regards to welfare, social development, economic competitiveness, tourism promotion, attractiveness for investment, the use of IT technology and other fields (UAE 2007)." Elsewhere he proudly proclaims that "the UAE has turned into the world's renowned destination for tourism, investment and business management (UAE 2009)." Khalifa cites this high international status as justification for keeping the country on the same path: "Dear citizens, the spectacular achievements we have made and the high profile that our country has gained internationally require us to work, hard and with sincerity, to preserve these gains (UAE 2007)."

In identifying new policies and goals, President Khalifa is careful to discuss them as building upon the high development the regime has already achieved. For example, as he says in discussion of training youth, "We have been able to make significant steps (...) [B]ut we are still at the beginning of our journey. We still have more training and rehabilitation work to do (UAE 2004)." The same emphasis on *continuing* success appears elsewhere: "We shall continue to tread the path [of progress] (UAE 2005);" "We will continue to ply with confidence and optimism the national capacity and solid economy (UAE 2007);" "The government will continue its quest for economic development (UAE 2009)." Overall, the quantity and quality of attention Khalifa gives to economic-social developmental

D. Berman -- 51

arguments suggests he is quite comfortable being judged and held accountable for his regime's progress in this area.

As noted, Khalifa's speeches devote little attention to developing identificational arguments. The overall value for identifications (26.97%) and the values for composite religious (10.65%), ideological (0%), and pan-Arab (16.32%) identities are all very low compared to other countries evaluated. Evocations of religious identity in the President's speeches generally consist of thanking God for the blessings that have permitted developmental successes: "We are grateful to God for endowing us with strong national economy and sound policies (...) (UAE 2009)." These go along with entreaties that the blessings continue: "It is from the perseverance and dedication of our founding fathers that the nation derives its strength and pride. I pay tribute to those who have continued to keep the beacon of this nation ever shining through their handiwork and thinking. May the Almighty Allah bless us with strength, clear vision, and dedication so that we may continue to follow in the footprints of our founding fathers (UAE 2007)." Similarly, at the end of one speech: "We pray Almighty God to bless our drive for success and guide us to the right path of good for our country and its people (UAE 2005)."

Another significant category of religious identity evocations in presidential speeches are caveats against abandoning Muslim and Arab culture in the drive to modernization and the progress toward economic advancement inherent to it. As President Khalifa says while discussing former President Zayed: "[He] inculcated in our hearts and minds the love for our beloved country and advised us to keep away from any thing that could harm and contravene our heritage and our Arab and Islamic culture. Our adoption of the modernization path and adaptation to the prerequisites of the modern time doesn't mean by any way abandoning our values, principles and social traditions (UAE 2004)." He makes the same point while talking of efforts to incorporate women more in professional and political affairs: "The UAE is working to enable women play their role in serving the society. (...) This is so

that they may play their role side by side with their male compatriots in every area of national assignment, within the framework that protects our Islamic identity and Arab tradition and culture (UAE 2005)."

Another noteworthy context in which religious evocations recurrently appear in Khalifa's speeches is that of terrorism and the challenge of disassociating it from Islam. As President Zayed, Khalifa's predecessor, stated in his final National Day speech: "We say again today what we said many years ago, before the world became fully aware of the phenomenon of terrorism. We emphasize that neither religion, nor international law, nor any conventions on the Rights of Man can provide any justification whatsoever for the practice of terrorism (UAE 2003)." President Khalifa expounded on this point in 2010: "As we condemn terrorism in all its forms, we express our concern over the growing Islamophobia – or hatred for Islam. We urge the international community to exert efforts to prevent insults to Islam and to incite hatred against Muslim minorities (UAE 2010)."

Aside from a few references of solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world ("When a Muslim or an Arab feels hurt, wherever he may be, that hurt also affects the people of the United Arab Emirates (UAE 2007)"), then, most of religious evocations in the UAE President's speeches seem less like efforts to provoke a feeling of religious identification than efforts to manage an identity that already exists. God and the importance of his blessings are mentioned a handful of times in each speech, but only in passing and not frequently enough to convey intentionality. Islam is mentioned after the exaltation of economic and social modernization and a catalogue of governmental programs driving to that end, as an assurance that it will not be totally abandoned. In sum, then, both the quantity and quality of religious evocations in his speeches suggest that the UAE President is not overburdened with the need to draw out a religious identity from his populace.

Although a slightly more frequent figure of his speeches, pan-Arab evocations (16.32% versus 10.35% of all evocations) also do not seem to receive an significant amount of the UAE President's

D. Berman -- 53

focus. In addition to the context of assuring continued relevance despite modernization, as described above of Islamic identity, Arab identity evocations are primarily diplomatically worded statements of policy positions: "As for the Palestinian cause, we once again reaffirm our stand behind the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle and national rights to end the Israeli occupation and establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. We also appeal to our Palestinian brethren to unify their efforts to face the difficult stage ahead and urge the international community -- mainly the US (the major peace sponsor), and the Quartet to act effectively for the resumption of the Middle East peace process in order to end Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, achieve comprehensive and just peace based on international legitimacy resolutions and withdrawal of Israel from occupied Syrian and Lebanese lands (UAE 2004)." In addition to the Israel-Palestine situation, the President states his positions on areas of pressing Arab concerns including Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq; Khalifa clarifies that his government's foreign policy is "based on the UAE's deep commitment to the Gulf, Arab and Islamic identity (UAE 2004, UAE 2005)." Otherwise there are a few token references to "our Arab nation (UAE 2007, UAE 2004)," but nothing that detracts from a strong focus on the country of the UAE. Indeed, with 64.47% of all evocations being nationalistic, versus 26.97% being identificational, the UAE has the second highest national focus across countries; the highest surpasses it by a mere 4%.

The UAE is so enthusiastic about national identity and its ability to healthfully encompass all other identities that Khalifa has been frank about his interest in promoting it: "There will be no compromise with whatever threatens our values, our traditions and language, which are the heart of our national identity and the soul of the nation and our heritage. (...) Any infringement of our identity is an infringement of the country itself. Simply, it is a violation of the country's sanctity. In this connection, we have instructed that new year that lies ahead for the federation shall be the year of National Identity, to strengthen the national elements and components of our society and to specify the

threats to them (UAE 2007)." Overall the UAE President shows little interest in evoking any identity besides national; his strong focus on economic-social developmental successes and, to a lesser degree, democratic institutions and practices leaves little doubt that he desires to justify his government's rule with its ability to achieve in these latter areas, rather than in the pursuit of supra- or subnational identificational interests. This suggests a comfort with the concrete measures and mechanisms of accountability that economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional justifying arguments impose, as well as a lack of need to make ethnicity less salient.

Implications

The above examination concludes that the UAE regime favors an economic-social developmental argument to justify its rule to the populace. The potential implications of employing this type of argument is as discussed in the case study of Yemen – if the government cannot sustain economic and social development, its justifying argument becomes nullified and its security can suffer as a result. In the case of the UAE, the connection between regime security and an economic-social developmental argument may even be suggested by the surprising *lack* of destabilization the regime has suffered amid rampant regional protests.

<u>President Khalifa's Developmental Successes</u>

As their speeches indicate, both President Khalifa and his predecessor President Zayed worked toward developing the country with great enthusiasm and dedication. The result is that, as Khalifa himself points out, the UAE is one of the top performing economies in the world. It is also one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. While blessed with vast oil wealth, the ruling regime has

D. Berman -- 55

chosen to devote the income from it toward development, yielding an burgeoning and increasingly

diversified economy and a healthy, educated, technologically-advanced society.[41]

The UAE's neighbors have seen widespread destabilization with the pro-democracy "Arab

Spring" protests, with regime change being called for or effected in nearby Egypt, Bahrain, and even

adjacent Yemen. However, despite being less democratic than any of these three states – having a

Polity IV score of highly undemocratic -8 versus -3 (Egypt), -7 (Bahrain), and -2 (Yemen) – the UAE

has generally remained an island of stability.[42] Analysts agree that what has insulated President

Khalifa's highly autocratic regime is its developmental success. As journalist Angela Shah observes:

"To understand why the Arab Spring has largely passed by the United Arab Emirates, take a moment to

listen to Naser Al Hammadi. 'What more do we need?' says the 30-year-old electrical engineer. 'Here,

everything is taken care of. Our education. Our health care. We have free housing.'"[43] As Shah notes,

the U.A.E.'s wealth has shielded it from the sort of economic pressures that have sparked unrest

elsewhere in the region. Bank analysts in the UAE agree, as expressed in an April report: "For all its

debt woes and recent economic slump, the UAE's combination of vast hydrocarbon wealth and a

dynamic export-oriented service sector has created an economy that has delivered growth and relative

prosperity to its small local population."[44] Current reports even suggest that the Khalifa regime has

made the Arab Spring profitable for the country.[45]

In the words of one *New York Times* article, the Khalifa regime has withstood protests on the

level of its neighbors because of its ability to sustain the social contract it made with the population:

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[41]   Sources for economic data: International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Social data from World Health Organization and CIA World Factbook. See also "UAE: Country Profile," BBC News, 10 February 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737620.stm

[42] Polity Scores from 2008. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm#naf

[43] Angela Shah, "Why the Arab Spring Never Came to the UAE," *TIME Magazine*, 18 July 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2083768,00.html.

[44] Frank Kane, "Bank Says UAE Will Come Through Regional Unrest Intact," *The National* (UAE), 30 March 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/bank-says-uae-will-come-through-regional-unrest-intact.

[45] "Arab Spring to Boost UAE Economy, *ArabianBusiness.com*, 26 May 2011, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/videos/arab-spring-boost-uae-economy-401751.html.

"The allegiance of emiratis (...) to their rulers is underpinned by a social pact in which they receive benefits including free health care, education and even housing, along with guaranteed monthly salaries and subsidized food and fuel, paid for from the federation's vast oil revenues."[46] In short, while discontent is not totally nonexistent, the regime has won favor with the population for its ability to deliver.[47]

That said, it cannot be determined whether the regime's stability derives from its ability to deliver *on its promises* or simply to deliver *per se*. That is, it is hard to distinguish whether the regime has won popular compliance because it has corroborated its justification of its rule on its own terms or simply because such economic and developmental success gives the population less of an incentive to rebel. However, this examination has established that the Zayed and then Khalifa regime justified its rule on the premise of its ability to generate developmental success, being comfortable setting up measures and mechanisms of accountability because of the high dominance its ruling Sunnis enjoy; recent events have shown that in fact generating developmental success has insulated the regime from destabilization. Whether the regime has gained public allegiance by proving itself with the criteria it provided for evaluation or is simply benefiting from financial security proving a public soporific, will only become clear by witnessing the future fortunes of the regime.

[46] Angela Giuffrida, "Tensions Beneath the Stability in the UAE.," *New York Times*, 29 June 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/middleeast/30iht-M30-UAE-POLITICS.html?ref=unitedarabemirates.
[47] Kristian Alexander, "Deciphering the U.A.E.'s Stand on Arab Revolutions," Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 1 March 2011, http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/deciphering-uaes-stand-arab-revolutions.

VII. Case Study 4: Bahrain, 1971-Present[48]

Bahrain is ruled by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. Before declaring Bahrain a kingdom in 2002, King Hamad ruled the emirate of Bahrain as Sheikh Hamad after the death of his father in 1999, who had ruled since the country's independence from the United Kingdom in 1971. King Hamad's Sunni regime represents a mere 30% of the population, the remaining 70% being Shi'ite. Minority Sunni dominance was a legacy of British rule that the two Khalifa leaders perpetuated. The Sunni-Shi'ite division in Bahrain has remained salient, and Shi'ites have occasionally protested against their marginalization. Notable protests occurred in the late 1990s, around the time of the transition in leadership to the current King, in which Shi'ites called for representative government as well as a better economic disposition.[49] Consequently, King Hamad's regime faces the challenge of preserving his regime from a marginalized majority, leaving him little ability to tolerate accountability and greatly in need of diverting attention from ethnicity.

This study maintains that the argument a mono-ethnic regime will use to justify its rule in a multi-ethnic society is primarily driven by the relative dominance of its ethnic group, because the ruling group's relative dominance determines the degree to which it can endure public accountability without committing political suicide and the extent to which its survival requires reducing the salience of ethncity. The principal arguments discussed here – democratic-institutional, in which rule is justified by the embedding of the regime in a democratic system of laws and institutions; economic-social developmental, in which rule is justified by the regime's ability to generate developmental successes; and identificational, in which rule is justified based on the regime's ability to pursue the interests of a common supranational identity – all vary along these two axes, decreasing in the above

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[48] It is important to note that the Bahraini speeches analyzed *precede* the Arab Spring uprisings.
[49] "Assessment for Shi'ites in Bahrain," Minorities at Risk Project, updated 31 December 2006.
    http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=69201.

order in the degree to which they impose criteria and mechanisms of accountability on the regime and increasing in the potential for diverting attention from ethnicity that they offer. As a regime in which the ruling group represents a 30% minority of the population, this logic leads us to predict that King Hamad's regime will favor an identificational argument, with supranational identification evocations outnumbering national. Democratic-institutional evocations and attention to economic-social developmental programs should be few.

The data from content analysis of King Hamad's speeches shows Bahrain to be an outlier in most areas. Bahrain has a low level of total non-national identifications (31.03%, fifth highest of eight); of the composite identities only religious makes a respectable showing, with a value of 22.13% (third highest) in comparison with zero (ideological) and 8.9% (pan-Arab, second lowest). King Hamad's speeches show much more interest in evoking a national identity (56.1%, fourth highest). His economic-social developmental focus is unsurprisingly low, comprising on average only 4.93% of speeches (second lowest). More surprising is its number on democratic-institutional evocations: at 12.03% it ranks relatively low in a cross-country comparison, fifth out of eight, but is within two percentage points of most of the moderate- and high-dominance countries. By the numbers, it would appear that Bahrain's leader favors an identificational argument centered on religious evocations (22.13%, versus 8.9% and 12.03, and a comparatively minute economic-social developmental focus of 4.93%), albeit very slightly so and with a strong influence of democratic-social institutionalism. The following paragraphs will give context to the evocations and hopefully shed light on the regime' vague argument.

In accordance with our prediction, King Hamad appears to have little interest in portraying his regime as justified by developmental achievements. He does cite his regime's interest in advancing the country's development: "On this historic day, it is everybody's right to express pride over the achieved accomplishments of the comprehensive development, in all domains. Every body has also to

D. Berman -- 59

participate in confronting challenges and realizing the ambitions of the nation and the people towards progress, prosperity, welfare and molding a shining future (Bahrain 2005);" as he says of his regime's policies, "The target has always been to bring in every prosperity and progress and the raising of the living standard (Bahrain 2003)." References to social development is generally similar in its succinctness and orientation toward values instead of pragmatic specifics: "[National Day] is in recognition of your outstanding performance and achievement that you have fulfilled on the soil of these islands, where ages of civilization had melted together producing common values of co-existence, tolerance and enlightenment (Bahrain 2004)." Even when King Hamad elaborates a bit more, the attention he devotes is slight: "In this respect, we are exerting strenuous efforts to develop specialized administrations in all sorts of services for the benefit of all the citizens in this cherished nation, especially what pertains to housing projects, where we are keen to ensure to each single citizen, a decent life in a healthy and secure habitation in addition to developing educational curricula and health care for the citizens. To reinforce this trend, we have charged the economic development board to set up a 25-year comprehensive plan covering all the land in the country to determine its use, taking into account the interest of all (Bahrain 2005)." However, overall, King Hamad neither expounds upon development to any extent nor delves into specifics. This is especially surprising considering the astronomical development Bahrain has witnessed under the rule of King Hamad and his father; Bahrain has been ranked by the UN as the fastest growing economy and has a GDP per capita higher than Japan, France, and a host of other highly developed countries.[50] For whatever the reason, King Hamad does not suggest comfort with his regime being held accountable for economic and social developmental achievements.

King Hamad's speeches reflect a higher-than-expected focus on democratic institutions and practices. Such evocations largely consist of references to Bahrain's constitution and parliament: "We

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[50] Source: CIA World Factbook. Data from 2006.

also protect [our future] via the law that is derived from the principles and articles of the kingdom's constitution, a formula that will not be overstepped by any individual or voice in this country (Bahrain 2003)." Similarly: "On the scale of our national dialogue and within the framework of constitutional institutions and official tribunes, we are keen to implement understanding and conformity among different sectors of production and different sects of the nation with regards to issues of common concern of all citizens (Bahrain 2004)." On one occasion King Hamad explicitly expresses pride in the country's democratic march: "Brothers and Sisters, this year's celebrations of the National Day coincide with our passage from a phase to a new one of the democratic process (...) which is the source of our pride. We do appreciate the sincere efforts of the legislative authority in backing up and supporting the democratic process, in a way that contributes in a positive manner to the reinforcement of this experience, based on solidarity and firm cooperation between the Legislative and Executive authorities (Bahrain 2005)."

King Hamad seems particularly eager to draw attention to his interest in enhancing public participation in the political process. As he says amid a discussion of proposed reforms: "For the sake of these citizens, I call upon everyone to exert utmost effort in order to achieve their aspirations for a dignified living and to maintain all accomplishments and gains that are well appreciated by the world. Those achievements deserve every progress and follow-up with the aim to maintain the process of participation and openness (Bahrain 2003)." The new phase of democratic advancement that King Hamad lauds merits acclaim because it "reinforces popular participation in discussing the nation's causes, enactment of laws, decision making and determining citizens' needs through their own initiatives, within the framework of the constitution (Bahrain 2005)." He expresses appreciation for the general cooperation that the population provides their government: "[Successes of the legislative and executive councils] come after the political reform process was launched depending upon your effective and constructive partnership that helped us shoulder the responsibility. And honestly, your

D. Berman -- 61

true cooperation is gladdening, be it at freedom practices, the national and representative action, or performance of the press, culture and arts (Bahrain 2004)." Despite the fact that he does not address the presence of democratic institutions and practices to an overwhelming extent in his speeches, the degree and context in which they are mentioned suggests some comfort with being held accountable for their functioning.

With the exception of the religious, identificational evocations are uncommon in King Hamad's speeches. As noted, his speeches have the second lowest number of pan-Arab identity evocations among all leaders evaluated in this study. Where such mentions do appear, they are in political contexts. For example, King Hamad expresses sympathy for the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples on the their respective plights: "Within the framework of our Arab Joint action, we shall continue our support and back up to our nation's causes, expressing in this respect, our concern and pain for the persistence of the deteriorated security situation in Iraq, wishing success to the efforts aimed at achieving Iraq's security and stability, unity and territorial integrity, the efforts which Bahrain was at the forefront of the countries that called for and participated in. We also hope that the day is near for the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate rights for the establishment of their independent state, with Quds as its capital, within the framework of international legitimacy, in a way that will help attain just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East (Bahrain 2005)." The reference to *our nation* in a clearly Arab context is significant. The few remaining pan-Arab evocations refer to Arab leaders or countries in the context of improving regional cooperation. For example, he expresses confidence that "states and peoples of this Arab Gulf will witness further closeness (Bahrain 2004)," and references "our brother, the UAE President, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahiyan" in the context of upcoming Gulf Cooperation Council activity (Bahrain 2005). Such Arab identity evocations are, however, infrequent overall.

More frequent in King Hamad's speeches are religious identity evocations. Many of these

D. Berman -- 62

consist in entreaties for God's blessing, often as interjections: his speeches are peppered with "God willing" or the like, and past or future paths are often qualified with "with God's blessings." Moreover, they begin and end with "may God bless you all." Such evocations, as we have seen, are commonplace in Middle Eastern leaders' speeches. A small but critical group of evocations appear in a less common context, declaring affinity with other Islamic countries. For example, in one speech King Hamad suggests a desire to emphasize participation in a recent Islamic summit, in the context of foreign policy: "At the level of relations with our brotherly Islamic sates, will shall continue efforts aimed at unifying ranks to confront threats and attempts aimed at distorting the image of our true religion and drawing links between it and terrorism, underlining our strong condemnation of all sorts of terror acts which endanger lives of secure and innocent people. We glad in this respect to laud the positive outcome of the extraordinary Islamic summit, recently held in Mecca Al Mukarrama and the positive spirit which characterized the Islamic states' leaders, which promises of a comprehensive boost of the Islamic world, God willing, to cope with the historical movement of our contemporary world (Bahrain 2005)." This is an isolated instance, though, prohibiting a more significant conclusion than King Hamad is not wary of the possibility that his regime's advocacy of Muslim interests will be seen as justification for his rule. Thus, because the majority of religious references appear to be functioning more as a way to displace responsibility for future misfortune than to evoke a Muslim identity, as was the case with Iraq, the sizable number of religious evocations will not be considered as exercising an identificational argument. This is supported by the fact that even the attention King Hamad devotes to evoking religious identities is dwarfed by that he devotes to national identity, 56.1% versus 22.13%, suggesting that he does not see the existence of countrywide parameters as endangering his rule and therefore that he does not feel hard-pressed to evoke a supranational identity. This is surprising, as King Hamad's rhetoric does not appear to reflect a strong perception of threat from his ruling group's minority status within the country. We would expect this to be so if he sought to implement an

identificational argument.

Overall, King Hamad's justifying argument is rather a puzzle. The data does not indicate a strong preference for an identificational argument, as the relative percentage of Sunnis to Shi'ites would have us predict, but neither does it indicate a strong preference for a democratic-institutional or economic-social developmental argument. Particularly surprising is the fact that the former receives significant, if not overwhelming, attention. These intriguing findings suggest that King Hamad, with his mono-ethnic regime representing 30% of the multi-ethnic population at large, is at least somewhat comfortable providing concrete measures and alluding to the existence of mechanisms for his accountability, and does not feel an over-strong need to divert popular attention from ethnicity. We reach the tentative conclusion that King Hamad does not appear to employ much of a justifying argument at all, and what he does employ has elements of both a democratic-institutional and a religious-identificational argument. Because many of the religious evocations appear to function more as guarantors against being blamed for a future reversal of fortunes, I will consider his argument primarily democratic-institutional, but only weakly so. Before turning to a discussion of the implications of pursuing a justifying argument of this type, we will pause to consider the confounding factors that may be influencing King Hamad's behavior.

Confounding Influences

The evaluation of King Hamad's rhetoric yields two important questions: why he appears so comfortable being held accountable for the presence and performance of democratic institutions, and why he does not appear concerned about promoting another identity to detract from ethnicity, which after all renders his rule so fundamentally illegitimate. A closer look into Bahrain and the singular position of its Shi'ites suggests that a possible confounding influence on a regime's justifying argument:

D. Berman -- 64

a highly functioning state economy, especially one from which the ruled group is not excluded.

Indeed, as discussed briefly above, Bahrain has seen significant economic success; its GDP per capita

has remained at least $500 higher than the world average since approximately 1980 and nearly $1000

higher than the regional average.51 The rate of growth slowed from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s,

in parallel with the global rate of growth, but nonetheless continued to rise.   Bahrainis have seen a

number of social benefits as a result of the healthy economy, including being the first people in the

region to receive unemployment benefits.52

Overall, Bahrain's Shi'ites are considered a marginalized minority. The Minorities at Risk

project counts them as a consistently disadvantaged group, and they are reported to lack equality of

opportunity in their country. However, even under King Hamad's much more authoritarian father,

Shi'ites were encouraged to engage in economically beneficial industries, permitting them a "relatively

stable and protected way of life," in the words of one scholar.53 A 1980s study of Bahrain indicated

that business became a major outlet for Shi'ites, who at the time comprised 70% of the Bahrainis who

run and are employed in private businesses and an approximately equal percent of educated

professionals.54 It has thus been noted that "economic opportunities have offered the Shi'ites some

compensation for the religious and political discrimination exercised against them."55 Since taking

power, King Hamad has worked toward further equalizing employment opportunities for Sunnis and

Shi'ites in society.56 While Shi'a citizens face higher unemployment and tend to be employed in less

skilled jobs in the private sector, their standard of living is not one of gross disadvantage, and many

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51 Source: World Bank.
52 "Minister Lashes out at Parties Opposed to Unemployment Benefit Scheme," Gulf News, 22 June 2007,
    http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/minister-lashes-out-at-parties-opposed-to-unemployment-benefit-scheme-
    1.185248. (The scheme was approved and implemented shortly thereafter.)
53 Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf," in Martin Kramer (ed.), Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution (Boulder, CO:
    Westview Press) 1987, p. 175; Uzi Rabi and Joseph Kostiner, "The Shi'is in Bahrain," in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-
    Dor (ed.), Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) 1999.
54 Fuad Khuri, Tribe and the State in Bahrain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1981.
55 Kostiner, p. 176
56 MAR.

Shi'ite citizens acknowledge the positive steps that have been taken since King Hamad's accession to power.57

There is therefore reason to believe that the country's relatively high socioeconomic status diminished the incentives of Shi'ites to rebel (before the contagion effect from the Arab Spring became injected into their logic). King Hamad even felt his regime's rule secure enough to permit the key Shi'ite holiday of 'Ashura the status of a public holiday, being the only Sunni-dominated state in the region to do so. Additionally, he has not inhibited Shi'ites from holding a large number of seats in the elected lower house of the bicameral legislature he established, in spite of protests over the lack of actual power wielded by this so-called democratic body.58 Thus we see that the country's economic status has not only reduced King Hamad's need to diminish the salience of ethnicity, as this study predicted would be a serious exigency for his regime, and allows him to promote accountability-facilitating democratic institutions and processes with more comfort than we would expect.59

Implications

That said, what have been the implications of employing an argument that is nominally (religious) identificational but strongly features democratic-institutionalism to justify the rule of a group representing 30% of the population? As the case study of Yemen suggested, the risk of

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57 MAR.
58 Of course, the appointed upper house has the power to nullify any legislation enacted by the lower house, facilitating the King's retention of his job.
59 This raises the question of why King Hamad would not implement a strongly economic-social developmental justifying argument. This requires addressing two additional considerations: first, that the case of Bahrain suffers a serious dearth of data, with only three speeches (2003, 2004, 2005) being available, rendering conclusions on any observed patterns tenuous. It should be noted that the value for economic-social developmental arguments in each of the three speeches varies but never exceeds an unimpressive 9%. The second consideration is that the speeches do allude to the country's "successes" more frequently than this, but in terms too vague and subjective to be justifiably coded as an economic-social developmental argument. Whether this is intentional or simply a personal rhetorical inclination of King Hamad, cannot be determined without further research.

employing a democratic-institutionalist argument in any degree is that a regime sets itself up for criticism and accountability if the institutions do not appear to actually function democratically. Having been created by a minority regime, Bahrain's democratic institutions naturally merit much functional reproach. The implications of this type of argument should therefore be significant, with King Hamad setting himself up to be held accountable for the democratic nature of his institutions by frequently referencing and even lauding their existence.

King Hamad's Democratic-Institutional Policies

King Hamad has indeed devoted great effort to presenting a democratic face to his population. Since inheriting power he has evidenced much interest in moving away from the authoritarian regime of his father and toward more a more participatory style of governing, or at least much interest in being perceived as doing so. In 2001, he put forward formal proposals to turn the country into a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and an independent judiciary, which Bahrainis from all quarters strongly backed.[60] His proposal, which also sought to allow freer expression and amnesty for political prisoners, passed in a referendum vote that indicated over 98 percent approval from the population.[61] Despite widespread criticism that actual reforms have changed little in comparison to what was promised, and in particular that the elected house of parliament is rendered institutionally superfluous by the veto-wielding upper house, the King has encouraged parliamentary elections and appears to laud the purported democratic nature of his country.

However, the widespread criticism did not abate, and it would seem that the King's "democratic" endeavors have only fueled them. A number of Shi'ite organizations boycotted 2002

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[60] "Bahrain: Country Profile," BBC News, 4 June 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/790690.stm
[61] *Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge*, Middle East Report #40, International Crisis Group, 6 May 2005, p. 5.

elections in protest of the little power the elected house wields; allegations of a plot to keep Shi'ites underrepresented only hurt public opinion of the King's regime further.62 Over time, it has been noted, political constituencies that initially embraced the opportunity for participation have soured.63 Amid widespread discontent, the regime was observed to undertake a campaign of repression and arrests of Shi'ites in the run-up to the 2010 election.64 Shi'ites made a strong showing in that election, winning 18 out of 40 seats in the lower house.65 At the beginning of 2011 the Arab Spring spread to Bahrain, with pro-democracy protests overtaking the country such that King Hamad declared a state of emergency. As one analyst observed, unlike the demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia, protesters in Bahrain do not appear to be motivated by issues of poverty, but simply the desire for true democracy.66

Overall, Bahrain is an outlier in that its' leader's justifying argument has an unexpectedly large democratic-institutional component and unexpectedly small identificational component; I surmise that the surprising level of security this indicates that King Hamad feels is the result of Bahrain's high socioeconomic status (and relative inclusion of Shi'ites in the spoils), which rendered the subordinate Shi'ites less likely to revolt and made the King's regime better able to tolerate accountability. Nonetheless, the case of Bahrain illustrates that a democratic-institutional justifying argument is risky because it suggests to the population that the regime can be accountable for its advocacy of and functioning within these institutions, which the regime may only be able to advance to a point without endangering the security of its rule. This is of course not to say that if King Hamad had implemented a strong identificational justifying argument the Arab Spring would have passed his country by. However, even though his argument was only weakly democratic-institutional, by lauding his country's

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62 Hassan Fattah, "Report Cites Bid by Sunnis in Bahrain to Rig Elections," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 October 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/world/africa/02iht-web.1002bahrain.2997505.html.
63 MAR, p 6
64 "Bahrain: Elections to Take Place Amid Crackdown," Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/20/bahrain-elections-take-place-amid-crackdown.
65 "Shia Group Holds Strong Position in Bahrain Elections," BBC News, 24 October 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11615349.
66 Simon Atkinson, "Bahrain Economy: What Impact Will the Turmoil Have?" BBC News, 16 March 2011.

democratic institutions King Hamad set himself up to be criticized by his population when the democratic nature of the institutions was perceived as less than ideal, which invalidates some of the justification for his rule as a result. That he did so with the majority of the multi-ethnic population not being of his ruling ethnic group made this invalidation even more likely.

VIII. Conclusion

A content analysis followed by case studies of Iraq, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates indicates some evidence linking the relative percentage of a mono-ethnic regime's ruling group in a multi-ethnic society to the dominant type of argument the regime will use to justify its rule to the population. Iraq, a minority regime, pursues a predominantly identificational argument; the UAE, a high-dominance regime, pursues a predominantly economic-social developmental argument; and Yemen, a moderately dominant regime, pursues a hybrid economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional argument. A case study of Bahrain, an outlier, suggests the existence of confounding variables that influence the two mechanisms by which I speculate ruling group dominance drives a justifying argument – the degree to which a regime can tolerate the concrete measures and mechanisms of accountability that some arguments impose and the extent to which they need the potential to divert attention away from ethnicity that other arguments offer. Each case study demonstrates that the justifying argument a regime chooses has policy implications for that regime, as the reason he gives to validate his hold on power must be kept salient and true to avoid rule-threatening backlash. To conclude this work I will evaluate each argument for how it performed as well as the methodological approach and the implications of the connections found.

The Arguments: Consistencies, Curiosities, and Irregularities

Having operationalized all the arguments and examined the evidence for them in context, it is useful to return to the arguments to discuss whether they work as the logic of this project suggests. Each argument will be discussed in turn.

D. Berman -- 70

Economic-Social Developmental Argument. Based on the logic that this type of argument imposes some criteria against which to evaluate the regime and therefore a possible justification for disenchantment with it, though it does not suggest a mechanism for the regime's removal; in addition to the fact that this argument has little inherent potential to reduce the salience of ethnicity, I expected economic-social developmental arguments to be increasingly favored as the degree of the ruling group's dominance rises. The data, as shown on page [insert page], indicates that this is generally so.

The rough similarity in natural resources and developmental level of the countries involved allowed us to overlook a significant potential confounding influence on whether a regime will implement a predominantly economic-social developmental argument to justify its rule to the population: capability for economic development. That is, we would certainly not expect a regime ruling over an impoverished country with a low standard of living, high illiteracy, little infrastructure and few resources to justify its rule with the promise of economic-social developmental success regardless of its ethnic group's relative dominance in society. Conversely, a low- or moderate-dominance state with a very high performing economy and the capacity to develop it further might be more likely to pursue an economic-social developmental strategy than otherwise. This point is briefly discussed in the case study of Bahrain, albeit not in the context of this type of argument. Overall, considering that the connection between relative dominance of the ruling group and the prevalence of economic-social developmental arguments is corroborated by contextual analyses in case studies, and an over-high or over-low level of socioeconomic development does not appear to have influenced the data in the cases presented here, I conclude that there is a relationship between this type of argument and the ruling group's relative dominance in the population at large.

Democratic-Institutional Argument. This argument imposes not only concrete measures of a

regime's success but also mechanisms for holding the regime accountable; in addition it has little or no potential to divert the public's attention from ethnicity. I therefore expected democratic-institutional arguments, which would likely also shift away from emphasizing democracy to emphasizing the rule of law and institutions, to decrease in popularity as the ruling group's dominance decreased.

The data showed no identifiable relationship between these two variables, although the speculated shift in emphasis did in fact appear. Case studies also reveal an instance where, by the above logic, we are surprised to see a democratic-institutional argument (Bahrain) as well as an instance where we are surprised by its absence (the UAE). While the former can be explained in part by the greater regime security provided by a relatively high socioeconomic status, the latter suggests that other factors might also be influencing the presence or absence of a democratic-institutional argument. The key factor identifiable here is likely the authoritarian nature of all the regimes at hand. Indeed, they are all authoritarian by nature, being mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic society that seek to retain dominance. This leads us to question the initial logic behind the argument's prediction—to suspect that the mechanism by which relative dominance affects a regime's justifying argument, which deals with the degree to which a regime can tolerate putting forward concrete measures and means of accountability, is inadequate. It fails to account for the fact that even if a regime can *tolerate* such measures and means, it may not necessarily *want* them. Functional democratic institutions and practices are a threat to an authoritarian regime regardless of the relative percentage of its ethnic group. It is therefore be useful to consider factors that influence the desirability or exigency of a democratic-institutional argument.

The most obvious factor is homogeneity of the population, as is evident from looking at Egypt and Jordan, where where regimes' ruling groups have the highest levels of dominance (> 90% of the population) but low democratic-institutional values. In terms of the two mechanisms identified in this study, such regimes may be able to tolerate accountability more but because the need to deflect from

ethnicity effectively disappears, the motivation to incur the accountability at all diminishes. In fact, the apparent lower need for a democratic-institutional argument among regimes ruling relatively homogenous states suggests a broader confounding effect of homogeneity—it reduces the need for a justifying argument, at least in the ethnic context and thus via the mechanisms identified here, overall. While there certainly may be other internal or external factors impelling a regime in an ethnically homogenous country to implement a democratic-institutional justifying argument, the very need for justification in an ethnically homogenous society is fundamentally different from regimes' needs in a multi-ethnic society. We can understand the lower-than-expected presence of democratic-institutional arguments in Egypt and Jordan on these grounds.

In short, we might draw the theoretical conclusion that the relationship between ruling-group relative dominance and prominence of a democratic-institutional justifying argument should be normally distributed instead of linear. A look back at the graph of these two variables shows it to approximate the former more closely than the latter, with the highest value, Yemen, having 63% dominance. Indeed, the case study of Yemen revealed the hypothesized mechanisms by which relative percentage should affect justifying argument to be working as theorized. Outliers still exist, of course – and with such a small number of data points outliers are much more likely to significantly obscure any pattern in the data – but with this revision a relationship between relative dominance and prevalence of a democratic-institutional justifying argument becomes clearer.

Identificational Arguments. An identificational justifying argument attempts to validate the regime's rule by associating it with the best interests of an identity shared between the regime and multi-ethnic population. Thus, it fundamentally imposes few concrete means or measures of accountability but offers much potential to divert attention from ethnicity. We therefore expected such arguments to become increasingly prevalent as relative percentage of the ruling group decreases, as

such regimes have little ability to tolerate accountability and a strong need to reduce the salience of ethnicity. Identificational arguments were evaluated in this study as a summation of religious, ideological, and pan-Arab identifies, as well as for the presence of each particular identificational argument. The data indicated no relationship between relative dominance and ideological or pan-Arab identificational arguments, and a small relationship between relative dominance and religious identificational arguments as well as between the former and total identifications (the summation). However, because religious evocations also function as a way to displace blame for past, present, or future misfortune away from the regime, that relationship could not be corroborated in the case studies.

The small relationship between dominance and the summation identificational argument appears to be completely driven by the sky-high number of religious and pan-Arab evocations in Saddam Hussein's Iraq (35% dominance). Although they have a low value, ideological arguments appear only in the Iraq case; elsewhere they have a value of zero. That said, the Iraq case worked exactly as expected, with evidence that the regime clearly could not tolerate accountability, needed a diversion from ethnicity, and actively sought to use identificational arguments (particularly pan-Arab) to meet these needs. The question, then, is whether Iraq is *sui generis* or the other cases in which we should expect to see more prevalent identificational arguments, namely Bahrain and (to a significantly lesser degree) Kuwait and Yemen, are outliers.

That Bahrain is an outlier because of its high socioeconomic status has been established; we might expect Kuwait, one of the richest countries in the world that has been classified as a high-income economy by the World Bank, to be an outlier by the same logic. For Yemen, a much poorer state where poverty is indeed widespread, the prevalence of an identificational argument (pan-Arab) is actually quite high. We might therefore conclude that high socioeconomic status is a potential confounding influence on the relationship between relative dominance and identificational justifying arguments, as it likely is between dominance and democratic-institutional and economic-social developmental

arguments.

So much for states with unexpectedly low levels of identificational arguments, but what of

Qatar, which has a surprisingly high prevalence of pan-Arab identity evocations? Its high level of

socioeconomic development – Qatar has the second highest GDP per capita in the world[67] -- and lack

of homogeneity – albeit high dominance, 86% -- make this even more surprising. While it cannot be

definitively determined whether Qatar is *sui generis*, some knowledge about the country's background

suggests another possible confounding factor: discrepancy between the extent of alliance with the U.S.

and public opinion. Qatar has long been a particularly close U.S. ally in the region, especially

militarily, serving as main launching sites for the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Not

only has the regime withstood significant criticism domestically and throughout the Arab world for its

visibly close ties to Washington, recently leaked documents detail the regime's awareness of the danger

to it of appearing so pro-America as to be anti-Arab.[68] We might therefore understand a

disproportionately high number of Arab identity evocations as the regime's attempt to leave no doubt as

to its Arab allegiance. This is sheer speculation, of course, and unlike the potential confounding factor

of high socioeconomic status this condition appears to apply only to Qatar. Nevertheless, the effect it

may have is clear, as is evidence of the same motivation influencing other behavior by the regime.

Ultimately only further study can determine the breadth of applicability of this particularly specific

confounding factor.

However, the significant positive relationship between ruling group dominance and prevalence

of nationalist evocations militates in favor of a relationship between dominance and identificational

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[67] Source: CIA World Factbook.
[68] On relationship with U.S. and criticism for it, see Christopher Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,"
       Congressional Research Services Report, 16 May 2011, and Francine Kiefer, "Qatar: The Small Arab Monarchy with the
       Loud Democratic Voice," *Christian Science Monitor,* 27 May 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-
       Board-Blog/2011/0527/Qatar-The-small-Arab-monarchy-with-the-loud-democratic-voice. On leaks, see Scott Shane
       and Andrew Lehren, "Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 28 November 2010,
       http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?_r=1.

arguments. While not properly an identificational argument itself, because in a multi-ethnic society nationalist evocations has the potential of divisive, and especially when evoked by a mono-ethnic regime, the decline of national identity evocations with a decline in dominance clearly suggests a danger perceived from cultivating this identity. The desire to cultivate another potentially unifying identity in turn would appear to follow from that. The conclusion that can be drawn is that despite a dearth of evidence substantiating a relationship between dominance and identificational arguments, there is some support for the theoretical expectation that it exists.

Overall, a relationship seems to exist between ruling group dominance and the prevalence of economic-social developmental justifying arguments; if we account for the confounding factors of high socioeconomic status and effective homogeneity, a normatively distributed relationship also seems to exist between dominance and the prevalence of democratic-institutional arguments. Although the case of Iraq suggests that there is some reason to believe a relationship between dominance and the prevalence of identificational arguments exists, and potential confounding factors such as high economic status can be assumed to be influencing regime behavior, the number of observations are simply too few and the potential confounding variables too numerous to draw any definitive conclusions. For this, further study is clearly necessary.

Implications

This study appears to provide some corroboration to the hypothesis that the social conditions in a country influence a regime's justifying argument, showing in a relatively small-n study that some relationship between the dominance of the ruling ethnic group and certain justifying arguments. This study establishes that such relationships need further study, but also indicate that there is merit in doing so.

D. Berman -- 76

The existence of a relationship between the social underpinnings for a regime's rule and the argument it will make to justify itself is useful to know because it indicates systematic motivations for a regime's policies. For example, it is reasonable to expect that a regime finding it necessary employ an economic-social developmental argument will give the highest strategic priority to ensuring continued economic growth. More broadly, this suggests that a regime's justifying argument places restrictions on the policies it can pursue, domestically and internationally. The destabilization Saddam Hussein's regime suffered when he appeared to flout the interests of the pan-Arab identity he so devotedly cultivated best illustrates this.

This implication is useful both theoretically and practically. A key object of theoretical utility is international relations theory, in which domestic influences on foreign policy are poorly understood. If we logically assume that a regime's justifying argument significantly influences its grand strategy by imposing on it a strategic priority, and, as this study suggests, can establish systematic relationships between social conditions underpinning the regime's rule and justifying argument it will employ, we can assume systematic relationships between a certain set of social conditions and a regime's strategic priority, and consequently the outcomes it is likely to favor. Scholarship on state preference formation is thus a potential beneficiary from the insights this project provides.

Practical implications apply to policymakers, who can benefit from insights as to other regimes' motivations and thus the most effective incentives to achieve cooperation. Consider as an example the closer coordination that the U.S. seeks with China over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. Grossly oversimplifying the multifaceted motivations of all countries involved, we might assume that part of China's unwillingness to impose sanctions on its sometime Persian friend derives from the economic-social developmental argument it has consistently employed to justify its rule to the population, and the vast economic benefits it stands to incur from maintaining close relations with oil-rich Iran. Understanding the domestic drivers of China's policy and potential implications for deviating

from it can help policymakers in Washington design more incentives that are better targeted to China's needs and thus more likely to be effective.

In sum, this project has given support to the specific hypothesis that a ruling ethnic group's relative dominance will influence the regime's justifying argument, and subsequently to the broader hypothesis that the social underpinnings for a regime's rule influence the justifying argument. Because of the useful potential implications of this insight, additional work should be done not only to expand this particular study but to determine other social conditions that might influence regime behavior and test whether and how they do so.

APPENDIX A: Occasions, Dates, and Sources for Speeches Used

All speeches were used in their English translations, with the translation supplied by the news agency, media source, or scholar. Due to the possibility of error in translation, the most official translation possible was used.

- **Bahrain** (2003-2005): Bahrain News Agency: http://www.bna.bh/portal/en
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of independence from United Kingdom in 1971)

- **Egypt** (1999—2002): Al Jazeera News Agency: http://english.aljazeera.net/
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1953 Revolution)

- **Iraq** (1998-2002): Salomon Ruysdael, *Speeches of Deception: Selected Speeches of Saddam Hussein* (Lincoln, NE: Writers Club Press) 2003.
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1968 Ba'thist Revolution)

- **Jordan** (2006-2011): Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Washington, DC, official website: http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/jib/speeches/hmkaspeeches.shtml.
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of independence from the United Kingdom in 1946)

- **Kuwait** (2006, 2008-2010): State of Kuwait official website: http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/
  - ○ Occasion: Opening of Second Session of Parliament

- **Qatar**: (2000-2010): State of Qatar official website, webpage of H. H. The Amir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani: http://www.diwan.gov.qa/english/the_amir/default_nf.htm
  - ○ Occasion: Opening of Parliament (Advisory Council) Session

- **UAE** (2003-2005, 2007, 2009-2010): *Khaleej Times* (http://www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp), Emirates News Agency (http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1135099400124&pagename=WAM%2FPage%2FW-T-P-HomeE).
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1971 independence from the United Kingdom and subsequent unification of the emirates)

- **Yemen** (2004-2006, 2008-2011): SABA—Yemen News Agency: http://www.sabanews.net/en/
  - ○ Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1990 unification of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic)

APPENDIX B: Coding Rules[69]

1. Evocations. Evocations (democratic-institutional and identificational) are each a key word or phrase; each evocation is coded for only one argument. To normalize for speech length, each group of evocations was considered as (average) percent of total evocations in a particular speech. This list is generally exhaustive, with the possibility of inadvertent omission of some infrequent synonyms of keywords. The reader should note the conditions attached to the occasional keyword; this particular content analysis took advantage of the small number of countries involved to enrich a strict keyword analysis with consideration of context.

(a) Democratic-Institutional – keywords selected for their mention of or association with democracy and/or accountability.

Keywords: democracy/democratic, parliament, constitution, parliament, vote/elect/election, transparency, rule of law, institutions (with reference to government), name of specific democratic institutions (the name of the state's parliament, e.g.).

(b) Identificational – keywords selected for their evocation of or association with a specific identity.

Religious Keywords: God, religious, faith, Islam or any other specific religion, bless/blessing, miracle, martyr, heaven(s), names of biblical figures.

Ideological Keywords: Communism, socialism, capitalism, names of specific ideological groups or beliefs (Ba'thism, e.g.).

Pan-Arab Keywords: Arab, names of Arab countries or locations (except as cited as locations of summits or other events); names of countries or locations relevant for being antithetical to Arab interests (Israel, Zionist/Zionism, e.g.); "nation" where the word "Arab" precedes it within the last two sentences in the exclusion of a national reference, the phrase "Arab nation" appears earlier in the speech in the exclusion of a state-identity reference to the nation, or context otherwise clearly indicates reference to the Arab nation as opposed to the state. It should be noted that "nation" is consistently a pan-Arab keyword in Iraq.

Nationalist Keywords: the name of the state, "state" where it clearly refers to the entity instead of the government, citizens, country (except as preceded by "Arab," "Islamic," or another non-national evocative epithet) names of leaders or state officials, names of specific state laws and institutions without a specifically democratic identity (which are identified as democratic-institutional), nation/national (except as a pan-Arab reference, detailed above); specific or general ("founding father") historical national events or figures.

2. Economic-Social Developmental Achievements. The significant unit assessed here was sentence or paragraph; they are calculated as a percentage of the full text. For sentences or paragraphs to be

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[69] Further study should include the corroboration of coding by two independent analysts.

D. Berman -- 80

coded for this argument, their subject had to be plans, programs, or other actions taken by the regime for the explicit purpose of development. More broadly, the sentence or paragraph must explicitly indicate the regime accepting agency for developmental plans or successes, actual or anticipated.

APPENDIX C: Full Coding Results of All Speeches for Each Country

Country	%Sunni dom	National (%Evs)	Religious (%Evs)	Ideolog'l (%Evs)	Pan-Arab (%Evs)	Dem-Inst. (%Evs)	Econ-Soc (% text)	IDENT'L(R.+I.+P-A)
Bahrain	30	50.9	20.8	0	13.2	15.1	1.9	
		65	20	0	2.5	10	3.9	
		52.4	25.6	0	11	11	9	
(avg)		**56.1**	**22.13**	**0**	**8.9**	**12.03**	**4.93**	31.03
Egypt	90	67.9	12.5	0	14.3	5.4	14	
		72.4	24.1	0	3.4	0	13.3	
		69.2	13.5	0	11.5	5.8	6.6	
		64.7	6	0	22.4	6.9	12.1	
(avg)		**68.55**	**14.03**	**0**	**12.9**	**4.53**	**11.5**	26.93
Iraq	35	12.6	23.4	1.3	62.8	0	0	
		17	28.1	7.1	47.9	0	0.14	
		38.9	36.1	0	25	0	0	
		26.2	38.5	0	35.4	0	4.6	
		7.9	81.1	0.88	10.1	0	0	
(avg)		**20.52**	**41.44**	**1.86**	**36.24**	**0**	**0.95**	79.54
Jordan	92	55.1	19.4	0	24.5	1	2	
		45	10.4	0	29.6	14.1	4.1	
		67.9	17.3	0	8.6	6.3	15.5	
		57.1	20.8	0	10.4	7.8	5.4	
		63.6	10.2	0	11.4	14.8	3.7	
		51.9	7.4	0	2.8	38	8.5	
(avg)		**56.77**	**14.25**	**0**	**14.55**	**13.67**	**6.53**	28.8
Kuwait	60	62.5	21.9	0	1.6	14.1	2.5	
		46.1	44.7	0	1.3	7.9	25.4	
		52.4	36.1	0	0	11.5	5.3	
		47	32	0	0	21	8	
(avg)		**52**	**33.68**	**0**	**0.73**	**13.63**	**10.3**	34.4
Qatar	86	45.2	15.7	0	30.4	8.7	40.8	
		25.9	32.9	0	28.2	12.9	23.8	
		37.5	27.8	0	22.2	12.5	23.4	
		45.8	14.5	0	19.8	19.8	38.9	
		48.5	10.9	0	20.8	18.8	33.5	
		64.4	6.5	0	3.9	24.7	45.4	
		51.1	13.3	0	28.9	6.7	50.2	
		54.2	7.2	0	22.9	15.7	57.3	
		54.3	6.8	0	32	6.8	51.9	
		45.2	10.3	0	39.4	5.2	40	
		54.9	4.9	0	32.4	7.8	55.7	
(avg)		**47.91**	**13.71**	**0**	**25.54**	**12.69**	**41.9**	39.25
UAE	80	74.6	8.7	0	12.7	4	39.6	
		59.1	13.4	0	17.2	10.3	22.2	
		74	6	0	0	20	40	
		60.5	14.7	0	17.8	7	28.7	
		58.2	12.2	0	23.5	6.1	36.7	
		60.4	8.9	0	26.7	4	34.4	
		64.47	**10.65**	**0**	**16.32**	**8.57**	**33.6**	26.97
Yemen	63	38.6	12	0	28.3	21.1	22.3	
		37.9	15.2	0	19.7	21.2	25.7	
		46.2	12.1	0	21.4	20.2	32.6	
		51	10.8	0	22.5	15.7	17.3	
		45.9	15.3	0	29.4	14.1	20.4	
		50.9	12.9	0	15.5	20.7	12.8	
		58.7	9.8	0	0	31.5	1.6	
(avg)		**47.03**	**12.59**	**0**	**19.54**	**20.64**	**18.96**	32.13

APPENDIX D: Sample Speech

Speech: 2005 National Day Speech of the UAE's President Khalifa

Total word count: 2507
Total evocations: 126

National: 94 (74.6%)
Religious: 11 (8.7%)
Ideological: 0
Pan-Arab: 16 (12.7%)

Democratic-Institutional: 5 (4.0%)
Econ-Soc Developmental: 994 (39.6% of full text)

Fellow Citizens, Assalam Alaikum wa Rahamatullah wa barakatu As we commemorate the 33rd anniversary of our National Day, we do so with a deep sense of sadness and bereavement that has filled our hearts over the passing of our father, leader and founding father of our nation- the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

This country owes its impressive prosperity, its distinguished international standing and its peace and tranquillity to the late Sheikh Zayed, for these achievements were only possible through his persistence, handwork, diligence and dedication.

He led our nation into progress and prosperity over the years with prudence and patience. He cherished a dream and devoted his life to achieving that dream, using the oil wealth to build a modern state in which both UAE nationals and resident expatriates enjoy a decent living. His deep sense of commitment to the welfare of his people enabled him to overcome the hurdles that stood in his way, ultimately succeeding in bringing the country to where it is today.

Today, the UAE stands strong and united. Its federation is as solid today as it has ever been. The country has won for itself a respectable place among the comity of nations, thanks to its judicious policies, its astounding achievements, its security and stability and its prosperity and progress.

Dear Citizens.
Sheikh Zayed has passed away but his spirit and impressive legacy are immortal.
His values and style of leadership will remain the beacon which will continue to guide us as we strengthen our federation and maintain the achievements and gains that the country has made in various spheres of developments.

As for us, we remain committed to serving this nation and to ensuring that even greater prosperity is achieved. Despite our bereavement, I would like to say that Zayed has not left us. For he has immortalized himself in our hearts through his noble deeds. He will remain among us forever.

Dear Citizens With the 33rd anniversary of our federation, we have entered a new era, an era in which we will continue to be guided by Zayed's school of thought.

In full solidarity with my brother H.H Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai, and Their Highnesses, the Supreme Council Members and Rulers of the emirates, we will continue not only to sustain the gains of the UAE people but also to seek to achieve an even greater prosperity for our country. The efforts of Their Highnesses the Rulers of the emirates and their strong sense of dedication will continue to be an invaluable asset. The best tribute that we could pay to Sheikh Zayed is by following in his footsteps and maintaining the prosperity of our people, which was his paramount concern.

Dear citizens, The UAE under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed made formidable strides in every sphere of development. These achievements are too numerous to recount, albeit visible and tangible.

In short, Sheikh Zayed's achievements are simply unparalleled, and he will go down in history as the leader who successfully struck an amazing balance between nation-building and the development of human resources. His achievements were almost miraculous.

are His visionary leadership, strong resolve and great generosity have all combined to constitute a set of values upon which the UAE citizens will carry on the march of progress of their country.

Our economic miracle speaks for itself. The UAE's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at Dh284.5 billion in the year 2003 against Dhs.6.5 billion in 1972, representing an annual growth of 13 per cent. The country has also succeeded in diversifying its economic base, a policy that resulted in significant growth in the non-oil sectors. Non-oil sectors accounted for about 70 per cent of the GDP in 2003, compared to 35.4 per cent in 1972. It is our hope that the non-oil GDP will grow even further this year as we move ahead aggressively with our diversification policies.

As part of our diversification policy, we have attached great importance to industrial development and this has resulted in the emergence of many industrial firms. Consumer and manufacturing firms are now a feature of the UAE economy.

The country has also gained an international reputation in the exhibitions and tourism industry, thanks to its stability and security, its strategic location, and its modern infrastructure. Within the next few years, we will see massive tourism projects, including tourism resorts, commercial malls and the upgrading of the country's airports.

This successful economic move has had a positive impact in all of the services sectors. With the positive indicators of these economic achievements, we succeeded in building our modern infrastructure and then proceeded to new areas of national tasks. We have been able to make significant steps in the training and rehabilitation of our youth, who have now began to take up their right places in terms of national duties. But we are still at the beginning of our journey. We still have more training and rehabilitation work to do.

The training of all capable UAE nationals so that they may go into productive ventures is the country's major objective, and the one to which we give all our attention and concentrate all our efforts. Opportunities for employment in Government are no longer enough to cater for our youths who continue to graduate from institutions of higher learning. This has made it necessary for the private sector to play a national role in response to the support provided to it by the government. This role is to

absorb all our sons and daughters who complete their education and it is now high time that the private sector played a proper role in providing employment for UAE nationals seeking jobs.

The types of work change from generation to generation and from time or time, and this means that we must provide training opportunities to match, and to provide an educational system that is orientated towards modernization and development, so that it meets with current needs and the demands of the labour market. We will stand firmly with these educational institutions, and will offer them unflinching support so that they may discharge their duties effectively.

Although reports from the United Nations and its affiliated organizations show that the UAE has achieved, and continues to achieve, high rates of development of its human resources, we will continue to exert more efforts to provide better services for our citizens. The 2003 national budget targeted the maintenance of high quality health, educational and social services. The setting up of the Marriage Fund and the Supreme Council for Mother and Child Care are clear indications of our commitment to activate the role of the family, through which we now strive to solve the country's demographic problem.

My dear brother citizens, The UAE is working to enable women play their role in serving the society. To successfully achieve this, laws have been promulgated to protect their constitutional rights and to give them the opportunity to participate in legislative and executive institutions and in the decision-making process. This is so that they may play their role side by side with their male compatriots in every area of national assignment, within the framework that protects our Islamic identity and Arab tradition and culture.

UAE women have made tremendous progress in various areas at the local and international levels. They have boosted their role in social service and now occupy the highest executive posts in the new government. We shall continue to tread the path of the great leader in providing all the necessary support for women and to open up for them all opportunities to participate in various areas of national work.

We shall continue our efforts to provide appropriate and modern housing facility for every UAE national, no matter where he might be. The Sheikh Zayed Housing Programme is a big addition to this strategy. The programme seeks to establish integrated housing complexes and provides grants and assistance to UAE nationals in all parts of the country. An estimated Dh60 billion will be invested in the country's real estate sector in the next five years.

The preventive and curative services in our health facilities have reached impressive high standards using state-of-the- art-technology like radiology and nuclear medicine. The government has been undertaking since 2001 a five-year plan to set up a number of new stations and networks for power and water.

The late Sheikh Zayed has laid down concrete foundations for striking harmony and balance between sustainable development and the protection and conservation of the environment. He worked unprecedented miracle by turning the desert into green lush farm, forests, oases and parks. We will work hard to preserve the civilisational legacy left behind by our father and leader the late Sheikh Zayed who inculcated in our hearts and minds the love for our beloved country and advised us to keep away from any thing that could harm and contravene our heritage and our Arab and Islamic culture. Our adoption of the modernization path and adaptation to the pre-requisites of the modern time doesn't

mean by any way abandoning our values, principles and social traditions.

We are adopting all factors of progress in order to keep abreast of, and interact with the world around us, but, we, at the same time, stick to our national character and originality.
Dear nationals, Our Armed Forces have made major successive strides in building their self-capabilities and introducing advanced and sophisticated military technology, thus possessing the ability, force, vigilance and high efficiency aided by what we have provided them from high national qualified and specialized manpower in all fields. The role of the Armed Forces is not confined to the routine missions of maintaining security and stability for nationals and residents in the country, but have also carried out major humanitarian operations credited by the international forums.

The Police Force is also a major contributor to security and stability thanks after it has been equipped with modern systems and all factors of success. This helped it to become competent and able in fighting all forms and kinds of crimes.

As a result, crime rates in the country dropped to its lowest level in comparison to other countries, making us very proud of its national personnel which has proven high efficiency and competence to absorb modern technology, which in turn, helped them do their duties properly.

Dear nationals, The prominent place and high esteem and respect earned and enjoyed by the UAE at international scene is a fruit of our firm principles of foreign policy whose foundations were laid by the late Sheikh Zayed. This policy is based on the UAE's deep commitment to the Gulf, Arab and Islamic identity, its interest to boost and expand relations of friendship with other countries of the world, respect for neighbourhood and sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, non-interference into other states' internal affairs, settlement of disputes through peaceful means, commitment to the UN Charter and other international laws and conventions.

On the regional plane, we will continue to join hands with our fellows in the GCC to enhance joint GCC action in order to complete building and integration of its political, economic, social and security structures. We are confidently looking forward for the upcoming GCC summit in Bahrain.

We have high hopes that the GCC would be able achieve more valuable gains that will consolidate its drive towards progress and prosperity. We hereby reiterate the UAE's support for the Iraqi people with all its resources for their interest, dignity and stability. We also call our brethren in Iraq, in these delicate circumstance, to close their ranks and work hand-in-hand under the umbrella of national accord so as to hold the general elections and restore stability, security and prosperity to sister Iraq.

As for the Palestinian cause, we once again reaffirm our stand behind the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle and national rights to end the Israeli occupation and establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. We also appeal to our Palestinian brethren to unify their efforts to face the difficult stage ahead and urge the international community -mainly the US (the major peace sponsor), and the Quartet to act effectively for the resumption of the Middle East peace process in order to end Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, achieve comprehensive and just peace based on international legitimacy resolutions and withdrawal of Israel from occupied Syrian and Lebanese lands.

We warmly welcome the current peace process in Sudan and pray the Almighty God to make these efforts succeed in bring about just and lasting peace, enabling that sister Arab country to pool its

energies and resources towards a overall socio-economic development.

Dear brethren, We are for a world in which the spirit of justice, equality, responsibility, affective solidarity would prevail in facing problems faced by the humanity. However, anti-terror campaign should not turn the world attention away from more dangerous, serious and urgent issues like poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, wars, corruption, repression and social injustice. Tackling these issues is of very crucial importance because terrorism grows and prospers only in such an environment like this.

We renew our condemnation and denunciation of all forms and manifestations of bigotry, hatred and terrorism as they are running counter to the principles and values of our divine religions and the humanity at large. We use all our to coordinate and cooperate with the international community to fight terrorism regardless of its source, reasons and place.
We have recently issued an anti-terror crimes law which sets deterrent punishments for the perpetrators of these crimes.

As for the issue of our three islands occupied by Iran, we renew our call for Iran to settle the issue through direct dialogue and talks according to a clear-cut agenda or as per principles of the international law including the referral of the case to the International Court of Justice, if there is a need for that. We believe that the best way to iron out difference between nations is through building good relations based on mutual respect, good neighbourhood and reciprocal interests. This environment opens promising horizons for fruitful cooperation between the countries of the region in one hand and with other counties of the world on the other.

Dear nationals, We hereby renew our allegiance to our leader and maker of our modern UAE the late Sheikh Zayed may God rest his soul in peace that we shall work diligently in all domains to preserve our national gains and make more achievements in terms of progress and prosperity.

We are looking forward to you as an active, dynamic driving force in the national work. We are confident that you will spare no effort to usher into a new era of national development in order to give more strength to our federation, make more progress to ensure promising future for our next generation. We pray Almighty God to bless our drive for success and guide us to the right path of good for our country and its people.

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