

**How Green is Green?
Conflict and Collaboration Among Environmental Advocacy Groups**

by

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Abstract

The goal of this thesis is to better understand negotiations among environmental advocacy groups. While formal negotiation analysis has focused extensively on negotiations among environmental groups, business, industry, and government, scant attention has been paid to complex multi-party negotiations among environmental advocacy groups. A coalition of New England environmental groups, known as the Northern Forest Alliance, presented an opportunity to explore this topic.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One contains a discussion of the negotiation analytic, theories of coalitions, the differences between interests and values, and environmental values. Chapter Two contains the history of the Alliance from its inception in late 1990 through the early spring of 1994. Chapter Three includes three perspectives from which to view the analysis. They include the Alliance as: 1) a web of complex relationships; 2) a marketplace where individual actors seek to gain publicity, funding, leadership, and power; and, 3) a forum where the building and maintenance of relationships, the trading of goods, and a debate and dialogue over core community values take place.

I conclude that environmental groups represent a broad spectrum of interests and values. Negotiations among environmental groups are complex, involve shifting multi-party coalitions, and are laden with a tension between groups competing for individual gain and collaborating together in order to obtain joint gains. Competitive efforts over publicity, money, and leadership explain many interactions within a group such as the Alliance. However, the strength of a joint public message by many groups, the possibility of joint funding by foundations, and the force of skilled leadership also offer incentives for extensive collaboration. Furthermore, consensus decision making, process opportunism, and single text negotiation also improve collaborative efforts. Last, while an examination of groups' interests provides insight into interactions among groups, an analysis of values held by individuals and groups helps further explain both division within the Alliance and the Alliance's struggle toward a shared and common vision of the future.

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. . . conflicts among conservationists are as frequent and bitter as those between them and the parties they seek to restrain and reform. Pronounced differences in ends separate those who would preserve the environment for recreation from those who would develop its resources, albeit wisely, in the public's economic interest Even those in closely related fields often find themselves at odds: the optimum conditions for ducks are not the most conducive for the propagation of fish, and "outdoor recreation" ranges from wilderness backpacking to roadside picnicking. Yet in spite of evidence to the contrary, politicians, journalists, scholars, and the public at large usually refer to "conservation" as a unified interest.

Roderick Nash (1976), noted conservation historian, in The American Environment: Readings in the History of Conservation

INTRODUCTION

On a hot muggy New England day during the summer of 1993, a member of an environmental coalition of some twenty different organizations put down the phone, stepped out of the office, and said:

For the first time, we are about to put out a public policy statement from the coalition. We've been over this document a hundred times and everyone has agreed to sign off on it. Then, what happens, but one of the groups calls up and pulls their signature. What are they doing? Now it won't be a full coalition press release. They just don't want this to work. They don't have any vision, and they're going to screw it up (recollection of author, Montpelier, Vermont, July 1993).

How could this be? If environmentalists are too busy bickering and fighting amongst themselves, who will advocate for open space preservation, natural resource conservation, clean water and air, and the protection of biodiversity for future generations? If environmental groups, with seemingly similar interests and goals, cannot agree on a simple press release, how can even more divergent interests such as government, business, and industry come to agreement about our pressing and complex environmental problems?

Twenty years ago, professional mediators Gerald Cormick and Jane McCarthy employed mediation to resolve a dispute over the damming of the Snoqualmie River in 1974. Since that time professional "neutrals" have utilized alternative dispute resolution to resolve conflicts involving land use, natural resource management, public lands management, water resources, energy, air quality, and toxics control between environmental advocacy groups, business interests, property owners, Native Americans, and government agencies. By 1984 Gail Bingham (1984) had identified over 161 cases that had utilized environmental dispute resolution. Professional mediators and negotiation analysts have continued to investigate environmental disputes in such works as Bacow and Wheeler's (1984) Environmental Dispute Resolution and, Susskind and Cruikshank's (1987) Breaking the Impasse , and numerous articles in such journals as Environmental

Impact Assessment Review. Surprisingly, however, this literature has rarely, if ever, explored the conflict described above: inter-group conflict among environmental advocates. The subject is ripe for study.

A full exploration of conflict among environmentalists and the collaborative attempts to manage that conflict is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a coalition of environmental groups in the northeastern United States provided an opportunity to investigate this subject further. The coalition, the Northern Forest Alliance, established in December 1990, includes over twenty environmental groups.¹ The Alliance focuses on the Northern Forest, an area roughly defined as 26 million acres of public and private land stretching from the Adirondack Park in New York in the west to the northern Maine shores of the Atlantic in the east while passing through northern Vermont and New Hampshire in between. Unlike the large publicly-owned forests of the western United States, over 85 percent of the Northern Forest is privately-owned.

This thesis is directed at three audiences: environmentalists, parties to an environmental negotiation, and negotiation experts. First, this thesis is written for environmentalists in New England and elsewhere. Environmentalists are all too familiar with conflicts that tear at the fabric of their community. This thesis will provide for them the first glimpse of how formal negotiation analysis might illuminate conflict as well as successful collaboration among groups. A better understanding of the complex dynamics carried out in negotiations among environmental groups should help guide the way toward more effective environmental advocacy. Second, this thesis will provide parties to any environmental negotiation an inside view of the dynamics of negotiations among environmental groups. This view will reveal that environmentalists are embedded in a

¹While twenty-six groups met to discuss the fate of the Northern Forest, the Alliance has been a loosely-bounded and changing coalition of individual groups whose membership in numbers is not easily defined. While a core of groups and individuals have been involved since its inception, other groups have entered and withdrawn. Furthermore, the Alliance draws different numbers of participants to different meetings and to different joint actions. Thus, the Alliance is not twenty-six environmental groups, or even thirteen such groups, but a flux of several groups depending on time, action, and place.

complex matrix of relationships, interests and values, and that such factors as publicity, funding, and leadership motivate them to do what they do.

Third, this thesis will hopefully be one of a number of studies by negotiation analysts into the conflicts that pervade the environmental community and the negotiations that take place among environmental organizations. The analysis will explore the complex coalition politics involved in such a multi-lateral negotiation as the Alliance. In addition, it will investigate the bruising competitive dynamics of the Alliance as well as attempts to manage this competition through such tactics as process opportunism, strategic sequencing, and consensus decision-making. Furthermore, it will provide examples of disagreements and conflicts that might be addressed through third party intervention. Fourth, this thesis will attempt to persuade all readers of this work that environmentalists, rather than being a simple, single-minded, monolithic interest group, are actually a diverse set of organizations and individuals with complex and often contradictory relationships, interests and values.

This thesis is organized into three chapters. Chapter One begins with a general discussion of the negotiation analytic and continues on to describe coalitions, prior explanations for environmental conflict, interests and values, and environmental values. Chapter Two details the history of the Alliance from its inception in late 1990 through the early spring of 1994. Examples of both conflict and collaboration are offered in the case study. Chapter Three analyzes the data provided by the case study in three sections. Section One discusses the parties involved in the Alliance and explains the Alliance as a web of complex relationships. Section Two takes a closer look at some of the issues in the Alliance such as publicity, funding, leadership, and power, and explains the Alliance as a marketplace where individual actor seek to maximize their individual self-interest. Section Three analyzes the underlying values held by members of the Alliance and, expanding upon the metaphor of the environmental advocacy marketplace, explains the Alliance as a forum where the building and maintenance of relationships, the trading of

goods, and the debate and dialogue over core community values take place. Finally, the conclusion offers insights for environmentalists, parties to an environmental negotiation, and negotiation experts obtained from the three-part analysis of the Alliance.

Methodology

The sources used in this case study include: general publications, public and confidential documents, meeting notes, and personal interviews. The case study includes background research on the Northern Forest issue in such general publications as the Wilderness Society's Wilderness and the Appalachian Mountain Club's Appalachia. Public documents produced by the Governor's Task Force and the Northern Forest Lands Council were also studied. In addition, Alliance members made available files containing monthly meeting summaries, memorandums, correspondence between Alliance members, and funders' briefings. Such documents are noted by their type and date, but the authors of such publications are kept confidential.

In addition to written material, the researcher attended four day-long monthly Alliance meetings from December 1993 to March 1994, and interviewed sixteen members of the Alliance. While interviews are noted in the text by number (for example, Interview #1) so as to provide consistency of attribution throughout the text, individual respondents are not identified in order to protect their confidentiality. Confidentiality of sources was maintained because the Alliance is an on-going affair in a charged public atmosphere and some information divulged by respondents might prove sensitive to other Alliance members.

As Sebenius (1992) has noted of negotiation analysis in general, this research approach is "radically subjective". The experience, knowledge, and beliefs of the respondents as well as their interactions in meetings provide the raw data for analyzing and comprehending the complex phenomenon of multi-party negotiations. Semi-structured interviews focused the discussion on various conflicts, collaborative efforts, and

events in particular, while at the same time provided the respondents the freedom to diverge from specific questions and to divulge new and often times unexpected information.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS

The understanding of such a complex phenomenon as the Alliance requires an understanding of a diverse set of ideas and concepts. The interests expressed, discussed, and acted upon in a complex dynamic such as the Alliance can generally be defined as a negotiation. As H. Peyton Young in his 1991 Negotiation Analysis states: "Negotiation is the process of joint decision making. It is communication, direct or tacit, between individuals who are trying to forge an agreement for mutual benefit" (Young 1991, 1). The negotiation analytic, generally, a process of both conflict and collaboration, or claiming and creating value, as Sebenius generally describes it, can illuminate the workings -- the dynamic processes -- of the Alliance. Since the Alliance is a multi-party, or multi-lateral negotiation between a number of different organizations, coalition analysis offers a detailed explanation for the various alliances, group formations, and cleavages that occur in the negotiations that make-up the Alliance. These concepts help to illuminate a complex, dynamic process that is not simply a static organization known as "the Alliance", but a multi-faceted, multi-level on-going negotiation.

The negotiation analytic tends to focus on interests, the creation of value as a measure of those interests, and the distributive difficulties of dividing up this total value. However, the analytic subsumes values, in another meaning of the word, under a schema of interests. By values, I mean highly valued beliefs, principles, or standards. In contrast, past researchers of environmental conflict have generally separated conflicts of interests and values, and suggested that interest-based and value-based models offer different and not necessarily complimentary views of environmental conflict. While the negotiation analytic can explain many dynamics of the Alliance, a better understanding of the values

held by participants in the Alliance may be useful in expanding upon the understanding of the Alliance. The work of such authors as Ehrenfeld, and Dizard concerned with the ideologies, values, and underlying beliefs of environmentalism will be useful in distinguishing between both opposing and shared values held by Alliance members.

I. The Negotiation Analytic

The negotiation analytic presented by Sebenius (1992) provides an opportunity to look at both conflict and cooperation within the Alliance, or, as Sebenius characterizes negotiation, as the tension between creating and claiming value. Negotiation theory offers a general framework for addressing the interactions within the Alliance. Bacow and Wheeler's as well as Susskind and Cruikshank's work draws from a seminal body of negotiation theory laid out in works such as Fisher, Ury and Patton's (1991, 2nd ed.) Getting to Yes and Raiffa's (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation. Known as principled, interest-based negotiations, or mutual-gains bargaining, this "theory" attempts to focus on interests rather than positions, fairness rather than power, and collaborative rather than adversarial relations. Sebenius (1991) summarizes the negotiation analytic approach as a systematic whole that can be applied to particular problems in three stages. First, the analyst uncovers the various parties' interests, or the "raw material of negotiation." While Sebenius notes the connection among positions, issues, and underlying interests is not simple, a teasing out of interests can often result in overcoming incompatible positions that often are staked out for a host of reasons, least of which may be the parties' underlying concerns and needs. On the other hand, interests may strongly conflict, and a focus on overt issues may better lead to an agreement.

Second, Sebenius notes, the analyst evaluates the parties' alternatives to a negotiated agreement, or the "limits of negotiation." The fundamental test of a proposed settlement is to ask if the joint agreement developed between the parties holds greater value than any other action that might be taken away from table. Alternatives to the

agreement may include possible agreements among potentially opposing coalitions within the negotiation, potential coalitions with parties outside the negotiation, or action taken independently by one party. Sebenius notes that perceptions of alternatives may change during a negotiation with new information, counter moves of other parties, or new opportunities. Alternatives to agreement are not fixed once parties sit face-to-face at the table, but can change over time, and can be enhanced away from the table in order to improve one's bargaining position at the table.

Third, the analyst investigates the possible agreements between parties, or the negotiation's "potential" and how these parties address the "negotiator's dilemma," managing the tension between creating and claiming value. Sebenius discusses the "zone of possible agreement", the overlap that may occur between different parties' interests so that an agreement can be reached. Sebenius notes that negotiations are characterized by an inseparable process of creating and claiming value. Both parties may benefit from some kind of agreement, but within that range of possible agreements, each party will want to maximize its own self-interest.

While the two processes of creating and claiming value can be differentiated in theory, they are much harder to separate in practice. Creating value can improve on alternatives to negotiation through: 1) cultivating shared interests such as relationships between parties; 2) exploiting economies of scale; and, 3) dovetailing differences. Claiming value involves the distributive aspects of a negotiation, where a gain for one party is ultimately a loss for the other. Tactics for claiming value may include, making commitments, influencing aspirations, bargaining "tough", or even misleading the other parties. Ultimately, negotiators are caught between these two activities. On the one hand, cooperation may lead to improved joint gains, but the benefits of cooperation are not often known ahead of time. Moreover, attempts at creating value may lead others to exploit one's work so that the overall gains are made larger, but one's own share is made smaller. Sebenius states: ". . . competitive moves to claim value individually drive out cooperative

moves to create it jointly" (Sebenius 1991, 30). On the other hand, early attempts at claiming value may prevent expansion of joint gains, and furthermore, lead to an escalation of conflict that severely limits any potential for such gains. Any negotiation is likely to be characterized by this tension between competition and collaboration, between claiming value and creating it.

II. Coalitions

The negotiation analytic framework provides a general framework for understanding the Alliance. However, because of particular characteristics of the Alliance, further refinement of the analytic is needed to explain the negotiations among member groups. Coalition analysis provides the additional tools needed to understand the complex workings of the Alliance as a multi-party negotiation.

Negotiations between members of the Alliance are characterized by the particular entity in which they take place. The Alliance is neither a forum for clearly divergent, separate parties negotiating over a specific case or general policy, nor a clearly established organization within which its members carry out internal negotiations. The Alliance is, in and of itself, a coalition. Furthermore, the individual members of the Alliance may belong to other coalitions outside the Alliance, or may form coalitions within the Alliance. Consequently, to refine the general negotiation analytic for this particular case, a general understanding of coalitions will further illuminate the particular negotiation dynamic of the Alliance.

Raiffa (1982) argues that multiple-party negotiations bring a "richness of detail" to the subject of negotiation. In a standard two-party distributive bargain, the two parties face off with reservation prices unknown to one another. These two reservation prices anchor and establish a potential zone of agreement. If a seller's reservation price, the least amount of money she is willing to accept, is less than the buyer's reservation price, the most amount of money he is willing to pay, a bargain can be struck somewhere within the

overlap in reservation prices. In three-way bargains, these reservation prices become more complex: "We can think of the three-party pure coalition game in part as a set of interlocking two-party distributive bargaining games, where each of the players in any such game has a reservation price that is determined to some extent by the other negotiations that can take place" (Raiffa 1982, 274).

In a coalition such as the Alliance, the negotiations between the organizations might best be explained, as a "bruising" strategic game of dynamic interlocking coalitions in which each separate organization attempts to maximize its reservation price through multiple negotiations with other organizations. Individual groups attempt to form coalitions with others so as to maximize both joint gains and individual gains, and at the same time, in order to improve their bargaining position, they can attempt to construct "side deals" with other parties that may improve upon their position. What makes this particularly bruising is that all parties are operating in an acutely self-interested and strategic way, so that the constant threat of new alliances and new coalitions, and the breaking of current coalitions, pervades the dynamic of the process.

On the other hand, in "real life", Raiffa acknowledges that a reservation price can become a complex set of economic, non-economic, and nonobjective values. Each party will be neither monolithic nor fully cognizant of its own value structure. Thus, multilateral negotiations can also be described as a more ambiguous situation in which one's own interests and other's interests are not so clearly or easily defined so that the stark, strategic behavior of a "pure coalition game" is softened enough to allow for a workable multi-party "compromise". Since each party cannot necessarily know for certain what is in their best interest, and since the line between joint and individual gains may not be particularly clear, the ambiguity of actual negotiations allows for agreements to take place, with uncertainty not as a hindrance but as a facilitator of that agreement.

Lax and Sebenius (1991) offer an analysis that expands upon Raiffa's discussion of coalitions. Lax and Sebenius focus on three tactics distinctive to multi-party situations. 1)

party arithmetic, or adding and subtracting parties to the negotiation; 2) process opportunism, or affecting the process of the negotiation, such as who can talk to whom; and, 3) strategic sequencing, or how and in what order different entities are involved and included in negotiations. They make use of the term "natural coalition" defined as ". . . parties -- regardless of nominal side -- who have powerful shared interests, who are able to make highly valuable trades, or who, as a unit, can extract significant value from others without much risk of being split." (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 158). While sides may be ostensibly apparent in a negotiation, the U.S. and Canada for instance, different coalitions within such sides may actually form natural coalitions with one another because of shared interests, say both Canadian and U.S. labor. Lax and Sebenius state: "In particular, this can lead to blurring the concept of side in negotiation -- where more than one entity nominally comprises a side, but 'internal' divisions and coalitions cutting across the different sides may act in concert" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 188).

In general, Lax and Sebenius argue that coalition tactics aim to affect the zone of possible agreement among all the players. The three tactics -- party arithmetic, process opportunism, and strategic sequencing -- can affect this zone of possible agreement, or bargaining set, by: 1) affecting the alternatives to negotiation agreement, such as improving one's alternatives away from the table; 2) affecting the joint gains that might be realized by all parties; 3) credibly committing to positions within the perceived zone of possible agreements, essentially presenting others with a firm take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Party arithmetic can help improve a party's strength both away from and at the table, thus improving its alternative to agreement while limiting the other side's alternatives to agreement. For example, when Chile was set to nationalize a copper mine owned by Kennecott Corporation, Kennecott had already wisely allied itself with international financiers through a complex and extensive loan arrangement, other governments, and its customers. These alliances both brought additional forces to bear on the actions of the Chilean government, and shared the corporation's risk across many parties in face of

whatever actions the Chilean government ultimately took. The authors conclude: "While the specific methods are particular to a given context, the intention is clear: affecting the bargaining range in a favorable manner by adding parties to the interaction that desirably affect no-agreement alternatives" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 166).

Process opportunism can be utilized to improve the joint gains potentially realized by all parties involved in a negotiation. For example, in the treaty negotiations for the Law of the Sea, the coordinator of these talks carefully identified differences of interests among the some 140 countries including differing assessments of probabilities, different aversions to risk, and differences in time preference for various outcome. The coordinator then established a process that would carefully build agreement. Much like a "three-ring circus", as Lax and Sebenius describe it, the coordinator built agreement first from a central ring of a few participants who could invent new ideas and develop means to break impasses in the negotiation. Second, key delegates were then invited from outside this small group to test and refine ideas. Third, and finally, these well-developed strategies and proposals would be presented to all negotiators in the large, joint sessions. The coordinator developed a process to generate knowledge, that was then carefully diffused to respected key players, and only finally, was presented to all negotiators for discussion and debate. Lax and Sebenius conclude: "Coalition building and breaking can take place by stages, in separate places, and among carefully chosen subsets of the participants" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 173).

Strategic sequencing can be utilized to credibly commit to positions within the perceived zone of possible agreement. For example, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury brought key parties on board step-by-step to secure an international agreement to bring the value of the dollar down. Informing his administration superiors only vaguely as to his intentions, the Secretary in a meeting first brought the Japanese and the U.S. together to oppose West Germany. When West Germany succumbed to this coalition, the Secretary then used this three-way coalition to bring along Britain and France. With firm

commitments by each party along the way, the Secretary was able to forge an agreement through increasingly powerful coalitions. As the authors note, the prior commitments of other parties are used as resources in order to gain the support of subsequent parties. The authors note that commitments are powerful for four particular reasons: "First, commitments . . . carry costs to reversing. Second, the agreement could become something of a focal point and gain psychological prominence and attractiveness. Third, renegotiation can become increasingly costly and uncertain. Fourth, potential opponents may become isolated, thwarted from forming effective opposing coalitions, or coopted" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 186).

While this brief description has equated party arithmetic with affecting alternatives to agreement, process opportunism with improving joint gains, and strategic sequencing with credible commitments, the authors also explore how each tactic might affect the zone of possible agreement through the other two intended effects on negotiated outcomes, for example, utilizing party arithmetic to obtain joint gains or to extract value from others. In conclusion, the authors state: "To us, a virtue of this framework lies in its capacity to make ready sense out of apparently highly diverse phenomena observed in multi-party settings" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 189).

Lewis A. Coser's (1956) Functions of Social Conflict also details a framework for understanding coalitions. Coser, reviewing and expanding upon the work of Georg Simmel's (1955) Conflict, explores the functions of social conflict, arguing that ". . . a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life" (Coser 1956, 31). As part of his work, Coser explores how conflict might create associations and coalitions. A common "enemy" may lead to full blown organizations with clear boundaries, missions, and identities, or simply instrumental temporary associations formed to address the common threat. While in the individualistic society of America conflict may not result in permanence of social institutions, "In such cases conflict may at least bring about an association of otherwise isolated individuals for

the purpose of fighting for a specific goal" (Coser 1956, 142). Noting the strong emphasis in American culture on pragmatism, individual interest and success, Coser argues that this society sees the rise of "pressure groups": ". . . otherwise unrelated or even antagonistic individuals and groups, banded together to influence public policy in a direction desired by their members" (Coser 1956, 143). Coser writes of coalitions: "Coalitions, as distinct from more enduring types of group formation and unification, permits the coming together of elements that, because of mutual antagonisms, would resist other forms of unification. Although it is the most unstable form of socialization, it has the distinct advantage of providing some unification where unification might otherwise not be possible" (Coser 1956, 143).

Coser argues that coalitions, particularly those with strongly divergent interests, must keep to the close purposes for which they were formed. In particularly large groups, "the common bond, must, says Simmell, be based on the smallest common denominator if the group is not to split up" (Coser 1956, 144). This common bond may entail shared interests, such as mutual interest in the passage of a piece of legislation, or destruction of a common enemy, or shared values, for example, a common belief that abortion is wrong. In a large coalition, even more so in large groups encompassing divergent interests such as political parties, "the immediate purpose must be even more exclusively the common bond, since other purposes may activate those hostilities that the members have put aside in order to concentrate on the purpose at hand. If the coalition should diverge from this purpose, it would risk breaking up on the rocks of antagonistic interests of its members" (Coser 1956, 145). Consequently, while a perceived threat may induce a coalition, a coalition often does not maintain itself beyond that specific and particular threat: ". . . a common enemy promotes coalitions, but more than a common enemy is required to transform coalitions into unified systems or groups" (Coser 1956, 146). Coser notes that the word coalesce stems from a word meaning "to grow together". Despite the likelihood of only a temporary existence, coalitions can over time through common association,

compromise, and the development of group loyalties, purposes and norms, develop into a more formal, substantial group.

Coalescing that leads to the transformation of a coalition raises an important question: at some point in some coalitions' lives, does the zone of possible agreement become not merely a field of overlapping individual interests, but a collective interest from which individuals draw a common set of values and a shared identity? Or, asked in another way, when does the collective become more than the sum of its parts? When do compatible or shared interests become transformed into commonly held values? This question can only be answered fully through understandings of group formation and evolution, organizational loyalty, and sociological questions of identity and association. However, an understanding of environmental values, and a comparison of the role of values and interests may shed some light on the importance of common values in bringing and holding the Alliance together.

III. Three Prior Explanations for Environmental Conflict

The contrast between interest-based and value-based approaches to conflict is a common dichotomy in conflict resolution research.² Do differing interests or contrasting values underlie conflict? Furthermore, does a focus primarily on interests or an emphasis on values lead to better resolution of conflict? These two approaches to understanding conflict in general are present in much of the discussion regarding environmental conflict in particular. Such authors as Bacow and Wheeler (1984), Amy (1988), and Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990), suggest that environmental conflict can be explained both by opposing interests and clashing values.

Bacow and Wheeler begin their Environmental Dispute Resolution with a brief investigation of the nature of environmental conflict. While written over ten years ago, it

²See "Value Differences and Conflict Resolution" for further details in regard to these two approaches to conflict analysis (Druckman, Broome, and Korper 1988).

provides the beginnings of an understanding of environmental conflict in particular. Bacow and Wheeler first note that in a dispute parties have different stakes in the outcome. They write: "A simple assessment of the distributional consequences -- who wins and who loses -- can provide important insights into the politics of environmental controversies" (Bacow and Wheeler 1984, 5). The authors also find that disputes are usually not a simple zero-sum game with clear consequences and obvious winners and losers. Environmental conflicts in particular often involve great uncertainty. Thus, conflicts can arise over different assessments of outcomes and the likelihood, or probability, of such outcomes occurring. The authors note that: "To the extent that environmental disputes are triggered by different assessments of impacts, they are really conflicts over values" (Bacow and Wheeler 1984, 8). Conflict can also arise over the scope of a dispute, how the parties delineate the boundaries in which to place their concerns and take action. These conflicts might be disagreements over political boundaries, geographic boundaries, or even temporal boundaries, where parties might disagree whether the dispute involves only those living today, or also those future generations yet unborn. Last, the authors note that conflict can arise over different assessments of risk. Even if probabilities and the magnitude of certain consequences are agreed upon, parties may disagree over what types of risk are and are not acceptable.

Amy, in his Politics of Environmental Mediation, more formally than Bacow and Wheeler, describes three models of general environmental conflict: the misunderstanding model, the conflicting interests model, and the basic principles model (Amy 1987, 177). Amy places conflict in a more structured framework than Bacow and Wheeler. Amy argues that the first two models are found in environmental mediation, but the third is "radically different" (Amy 1987, 165). According to Amy, in the misunderstanding model of conflict, disputes are caused by misunderstandings and miscommunications. At the root of such disputes are "psychological problems, personality conflicts, miscommunication, and misinformation" (Amy 1987, 165). Amy argues:

It is assumed that once we can see beyond these misunderstandings, we will see that there are few real or basic conflicts of interests between environmentalists and businessmen. While these two groups may have different interests, they are not incompatible. . . . And it is this assumption of the basic compatibility of developmental and environmental interests that makes possible the whole notion of a nonadversarial, win-win approach to environmental controversies (Amy 1987, 166).

Amy's model of conflicting interests suggests that disputes are not brought about by mere miscommunication, but by fundamentally different and conflicting interests. Amy describes this model as: "essentially a pluralist theory of environmental politics -- one which assumes that interest conflicts in this area are natural and inevitable" (Amy 1987, 173). According to Amy, who is quite critical of this model, matters of right and wrong are put aside and replaced by a notion of equally legitimate, but competing interests that must be reconciled through compromise, or "splitting the difference". Amy argues: "Again, the vision of politics espoused in this model is a pluralistic and materialistic one -- politics involves the competition between various groups over the distribution of resources, and goods in society. Thus, environmental politics is assumed to be not so much about establishing correct principles as about bargaining over who gets how much of what" (Amy 1987, 180).

Amy's third and final model is one of conflicting basic principles. Rather than misunderstandings, or competing interests, clashes of strongly held values underlie environmental disputes. In this model, conflicts might involve divergent moral principles, legal rights, or world views. Amy distinguishes conflicts of principles from interests, in part, by noting that many environmental groups "see themselves not so much as another interest group, but as part of a movement which is dedicated to creating an environmentally sane society" (Amy 1987, 174). Environmental politics is not about interest groups vying for pieces of the pie, according to this model, as much as moral actors crusading "to get basic moral principles embodied in law" (Amy 1987, 176). Amy argues that interest-based views of conflict tend to "personalize and depoliticize" disputes,

to present conflict as singular, isolated, specific, and local. In contrast, a principles view of disputes tends to see specific conflicts as manifestations of larger national, political and social debates, of more systematic and pervasive problems.

While Amy's model is certainly more formalized than Bacow and Wheeler's, it includes many of the same ideas. Improvements in communication, as Bacow and Wheeler note, particularly from experts such as social and natural scientists, might help resolve disputes by aiding parties in developing a common understanding of a problem. Amy's conflicting interest model is not unlike Bacow and Wheeler's model of distributional disputes where disputes arise over who gets what and how much. Though Bacow and Wheeler only mention it in passing, they acknowledge that conflicts arising over different assessments of outcomes, probabilities and risk are essentially conflicts over values.

Crowfoot and Wondolleck in their Environmental Disputes, lay out a framework of environmental disputes similar to Amy's framework. Rather than ascribe names to the models of conflict, they choose to describe the three categories as "perspectives" Under the first perspective, environmental conflict is inherently a misunderstanding about the "relationship between the environment and the economy" (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 10). While an underlying consensus exists about the dual importance of the environment and economic development, the dynamic nature of society and the environment leads to different groups coming to understand the necessary adaptations that must take place to accommodate this expected change. Education, special experts, and reference to social contracts such as laws and regulations help individuals adapt to change. Environmental conflicts are problems to be solved by "expert knowledge and the judgment of societal leaders" (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 11).

Under the second perspective, both consensus and conflicts exist about the natural environment. As Amy argues in his conflict of interest model, this second perspective defines environmental conflict as the differing and competing interests of social groups. Conflict is not about varying speeds of adaptive change, but about interests with "different

goals and responsibilities as well as different values" (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 12). In a political democracy, environmental laws and regulations serve as agreements between interest groups. These agreements are "explicit rules" of behavior for the various societal groups regardless of whether they actually concur on the whole or not. This perspective at heart is about "political pluralism" and the legitimate exercise of the right to hold and express divergent interests under such basic social contracts as the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

The third perspective suggests that environmental conflict is "deep and pervasive" within society. On the one hand, economic and government institutions coercively hold society together despite inherent fundamental and divergent societal differences. These interests exploit the environment for material gain. Schools, churches and other social institutions attempt to convince citizens that this utilitarian view of the environment is both necessary and beneficial. Citizen participation is valuable only in so much as it elicits support and defuses potentially destructive conflict. On the other hand, citizen groups at the same time attempt to convince citizens that such social institutions are neither in the interest of those who lack power, nor those who wish for the long-term preservation of the natural world. Modern industrialization leads to exploitation of the environment. Only "under a new philosophy and technology of social production" can the relationship between society and the environment be repaired (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 14). Under this third perspective conflict is about principles and ideals, about maintaining and enhancing one's own power while undermining other's power in order to advance one's beliefs.

Amy's and Crowfoot and Wondolleck's models diverge in some respects. First, Crowfoot and Wondolleck see misunderstanding not merely as a psychological barrier, but as differing placements on a societal learning curve. Second, while both describe their second model as one of political pluralism, Amy carefully distinguishes between interests and values while Crowfoot and Wondolleck do not. Third, Crowfoot and Wondolleck

take Amy's general conflict of values model and more specifically characterize it as a battle between the haves and have nots, a contest for citizens' allegiances between a highly technological-industrial power base and individual activists who desire a complete reordering of that power base.

Despite these differences, Amy and Crowfoot and Wondolleck generally lay out three quite similar frameworks for understanding environmental conflict: an interpersonal model analyzing misunderstanding and miscommunication; a pluralistic political model analyzing competing interests; and an ideological model analyzing values and principles. While it is likely if not outright certain that misunderstandings, miscommunications, and psychological and strategic barriers occur in the negotiations among Alliance members, this work will primarily utilize the latter two political models to help explain and illuminate the Northern Forest Alliance.³

IV. Interests and Values

What precisely are interests and values? How do they differ? Ury describes interests as: ". . . needs, desires, concerns, fears -- the things one cares about or wants. They underlie people's positions -- the tangible items they say they want." (Ury 1993, 5). Fisher explains interests similarly: "Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide" (Fisher 1981, 41). On the other hand, Christopher Moore explains: "Values disputes focus on such issues as guilt and innocence, what norms should prevail in a social relationship, what facts should be considered valid, what beliefs are correct, who merits what, or what principles should

³In negotiation analysis there is a growing body of work on barriers that prevent conflict resolution. Much like Amy's first model, they explore such problems as strategic barriers, the principle/agent problem, cognitive barriers, and reactive devaluation of compromises and concessions in order to better understand why parties often ". . . conspicuously fail to satisfy the economist's criterion of Pareto efficiency" (Mnookin 1993, 235).

guide decision-making" (Moore 1986, 174). Amy states of conflicts involving values: "The principles may take various forms in different controversies -- some may involve basic moral principles, others basic legal rights, and still others might involve what could be called 'world views'" (Amy 1987, 74).

Environmental conflict may be about interests, underlying wants or needs. It might also be about opposing world views: what is true, what is right, what is good. Parties in a values conflict may see interests clearly, who wants what for instance, but they do not consider those interests legitimate. Interests are not merely different or opposing, but in a values model of conflict interests are either right or wrong depending on the values underlying those interests. In describing the interest-based model of environmental conflict, Amy states: "They [researchers of the 1970's Tocks Island Dam dispute] found that this dispute did not simply involve competing self-interests, but a choice among alternative conceptions of the regions future, and at a deeper but still articulated level, among alternative conceptions of man's appropriate relationship with nature" (Amy 1988, 175). While interests are about what we want, values are about who we are. Negotiations involving interests are about advancing one's self-interest through the exchange of interests prized differently. Debates involving values are not trades or barter, but clashes of different conceptions of self and one's self in relation to others and the world. In debates over values, the goal is to convince others of the accuracy, truthfulness, and rightness of one's argument. To trade or barter one's values would be to "sell-out." To compromise, in the sense of to make accommodations toward the other side, will neither advance one's self-interest nor improve joint gains, but will compromise, in a pejorative sense, one's most deeply held beliefs and ideals. To negotiate over one's values is to greatly risk giving up what one believes in and who one is.

V. Environmental Values

While the negotiation analytic and coalition analysis can provide a detailed understanding of the complex dynamics of the Alliance, to ignore deeply held beliefs and values may unduly cramp the analysis of this environmental coalition. Thus, a more detailed understanding of environmental values is in order. While interests are the underlying wants and needs of the individual parties in the negotiation, values embody deeply held beliefs about the world, about nature and human's relationship to it. While the interests of the Alliance members may be specific to their particular wants and needs, if values are a source of conflict, they are likely rooted in a long-standing history of western thought in general, and the American experience in particular. A framework for better understanding environmental values would help to make sense of those conflicts that appear to center around strongly held principles and beliefs, as well as help explain why particular environmental groups might band together.

The ecologist David Ehrenfeld (1993) describes two primary strains of environmental thought in American intellectual history. The father of the first school of thought is geographer George Marsh.⁴ In 1865 Marsh published a masterwork of human's influence on nature. Acutely aware of the impact of humans on "the spontaneous arrangements of the organic and inorganic world," Marsh proscribed responsibility in the face of such power. Ehrenfeld states: "Looking at Marsh's work, we can see that he was not only the founder of the idea of conservation, at least in America, but also the founder of a particular school of conservation -- the interventionist, managerial school, which takes our disruptive presence in the natural world for granted and makes no judgments about it" (Ehrenfeld 1993, 178). The father of the second school of thought is John Muir. In 1868, Muir made his first visit to California. Writing about this visit some ten years later, he

⁴Nash notes that Gifford Pinchot is "most closely associated with the history of conservation in the United States" (Nash 1976, 39). According to Nash, Pinchot's reading of Marsh as well as his love of the outdoors propelled him to study forestry in France, which eventually led him to become the first head of the United States Forest Service.

remembered standing on the docks of San Francisco and responding when asked where he wanted to go: "To any place that is wild." Ehrenfeld comments: "It was Muir more than anyone else who established the other great school of conservation, in which conservation became synonymous with rejection of change and with the preservation of wilderness, through the erection of fences to protect nature from all but the most passive human presence" (Ehrenfeld 1993, 178). While Ehrenfeld explains the tenets of conservationism and preservationism, he argues that the ultimate success of "efforts to stop ruining nature" will depend on a third way. This third way involves humans participation in nature, neither controlling it nor protecting it, but living within it: ". . . the destructive changing of nature ceases, when people who are not actively trying to save the world play and work in a way that is compatible with the existence of other native species of the region" (Ehrenfeld 1993, 184).

Jan Dizard (1994) expands upon these themes in the context of a New England environmental conflict. Dizard explores "the contested meaning of nature" through an actual controversy over deer hunting in the Quabbin Reservation in central Massachusetts during the early 1990's. This issue not only created conflict between hunters and animal-rights activists, but also between members of the same Sierra Club chapter. Dizard divides the parties in the conflict, those in favor of a controlled deer hunt and those against such a hunt, into two philosophical camps: those who would accept active human intervention in a protected watershed and those who would not.⁵ Those who would accept human intervention view nature as "random, chaotic, and ceaselessly changing" (Dizard 1994, 133). Thus, regular and systematic intervention is necessary to insure that nature meets the needs of humans. On the other hand, critics of human intervention view nature as "benign, self-healing, paradoxically every changing and ever constant" (Dizard 1994, 132).

⁵This controversy arose over land that had been protected when people had been moved off the land in the 1930's and a giant reservoir had been constructed to supply the metropolitan region of Boston. Ironically, the land was protected, not in spite of human use, but because of human use of the land and its waters.

Human intervention only serves to disrupt the balance of nature, and every new attempt at intervention only leads to further destruction. Dizard classifies these two schools of thought as stewardship versus preservation. Like Ehrenfeld, Dizard raises the possibility of a third, complementary view of nature in the spirit of Aldo Leopold's work, that the use of nature must be met with ". . . the ethical imperatives of modesty and circumspection" (Dizard 1994, 134).

Dizard expands this dichotomy of environmental values from one of preservation versus conversation to one of rights versus responsibility. Dizard notes that the conflict over rights is essentially one over the extension of the claim to rights, first from land owners, then to all white, male citizens, to citizens of color, to women, to the current debate over the rights of the fetus, to the rights of animals. Dizard notes that this notion of rights causes a particular dilemma for its advocates. If everyone (and everything) is granted rights, and self-interest is allowed to operate, some "invisible hand" must exist so that individual self-interest is transformed at a larger scale into the common good. If such a micro to macro-scale transformation does not occur, Hobbes' ungoverned life -- nasty, brutish, and short -- would prevail. Thus, argues Dizard, advocates for the preservation of nature, and implicitly, the rights of natural things, need a equilibrated view of balanced nature in order to justify the granting of rights in the first place, much like advocates for individual rights appeal to the "invisible hand" of the marketplace to steer individual self-interest toward a common good. When natural things are granted rights to exist autonomously, free of human intervention, the balance of nature will restore the common good. Of course, as Dizard continues the argument, if natural things are granted rights, if they should be left alone, then it is incumbent on humans to check the human impulse to intervene, exploit, and conquer. Preservation is as much about the control of human action and impulse, as it is about the protection of nature.

On the other hand, for those who view nature as anything but benign, as chaotic, unpredictable and indifferent to human needs and wants, management of nature is an

imperative to protect the species, especially since we are only natural creatures who must, by our nature, utilize our genetic gifts of reason and invention in order to survive. With the acceptance of human intervention, however, comes also the need for responsibility. Since we cannot help but intervene, we must do so responsibly. Stewardship, as Dizard calls it, both protects humans from the whims of nature, and nature from the whims of humans. However, this position is also not without its complications. If humans must intervene in nature, we must accept responsibility for our actions. Despite the fact that we know extremely little about the natural world, despite our bungled and failed attempts in the past, ". . . we ourselves must establish the parameters and regulate the elements that we think ought to be in balance" (Dizard 1994, 151). Thus, the problem of accountability arises. If we are responsible, who is this "we" and how do "we" exercise it. Furthermore, since the species and nature are an on-going concern, the problem of accountability in environmental management is intensified when one begins to consider today's decisions on tomorrow's children. Dizard argues: "In matters environmental, the true judges, the real winners and losers, are never present when they are most urgently needed: they are yet to be born. As a result, our sense of accountability is, at best, weak" (Dizard 1994, 153).

Dizard sees hope in the third way professed by Leopold and advocated for by Ehrenfeld. The discussion of, not if we manage, but how we manage, must be brought to the forefront: ". . . we must stop talking abstractly about nature and natural balance and instead focus on determining how we want to shape our environment. Let us be explicit about what we value and why, and then face up to what these preferences require of us" (Dizard 1994, 168). However, Dizard completes his work less optimistic than when he began. He concludes: "If we cannot agree on the nature of nature and accept ourselves as responsible shapers of what we want nature to be, we are not likely ever to agree on how we ought to live with nature It is sad, grievously sad, that the people who love the land, albeit in different ways and with different needs, cannot unite and agree how best to defend it" (Dizard 1994, 172).

While the complexity and diversity of environmental thought is not likely to be fully captured in such a simple dichotomy of conservation versus preservation, the two schools of thought do provide a general framework for understanding conflicting values within the environmental community. Furthermore, this dichotomy is pervasive in much of the literature on environmental values and ethics.⁶ As Norton (1991) argues, rather than viewing these two perspectives as distinct and operational in the world, these perspectives should be viewed as ideal arguments. They describe two extremes of possible environmental world views, with actual environmentalists likely incorporating concepts of both ideals in their own world views, and each falling somewhere on a continuous spectrum of values, rather than in one or the other clearly discrete philosophic camp.⁷

VI. Summary

This thesis attempts to understand the real world example of the Alliance within the theoretical framework of negotiation analysis, examining interests, considering alternatives to agreement, and potential zones of possible agreement. To enhance this general framework, this thesis will utilize coalition analysis -- who sides with whom for what reasons -- in general, and how party arithmetic, process opportunism, and strategic sequencing in particular, are used to affect the zone of possible agreement. However, as Coser suggests, a coalition such as the Alliance may be involved in a process of transformation as well as in a negotiation over individual interests and potential joint gains. Furthermore, since other analysts of environmental conflict have argued that

⁶Ethicists and philosophers have utilized a variety of categories for explaining differing and/or opposing environmental views. Norton (1991) differentiates Pinchot's "scientific management" with Muir's "ecstatic science", dividing up today's environmentalists generally between aggregators like Pinchot who tend to defend natural resources in utilitarian terms, and moralists like Muir who tend to defend natural resources on moral grounds. Thinkers like Arne Naess divide the environmental movement between shallow and deep ecologists. Deep ecologists maintain a biocentric view of the world, giving equal moral ground to the rights of nature and humans, while shallow ecologists still maintain an anthropocentric view of the world, prescribing preferential rights for humans (Norton 1991; Sessions 1985).

⁷Norton describes world view as: ". . . a constellation of concepts, values, and axioms that shape the world its proponents encounter" (Norton 1991, 9).

environmental conflict might be viewed both in terms of interests and values, this thesis will also consider the underlying values held by Alliance members, and how these values contribute to both conflict, collaboration, and the potential transformation of the Alliance's individual members into a more unified, cohesive group.

CHAPTER TWO

CASE STUDY

Several events in the 1980's raised concerns among environmentalists and others that the Northern Forest was in jeopardy. In 1982, a timber company long established in the region with land assets of some 976,000 acres was purchased in a hostile takeover by British Financier, Sir James Goldsmith. The lands, not a contiguous parcel, stretched across portions of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York. After a series of further trades, in which the French utility and telecommunications firm Cie Generale Electricite (CGE) acquired most of the lands, CGE began to sell off its new holdings. Ninety-six thousand acres were put up for sale in New York as a single parcel and purchased by a Georgia company interested in both developing some of the land and managing the rest as timberland. Ninety-thousand acres were put up for sale in New Hampshire and Vermont and eventually sold to Rancourt Associates, a mobile home park developer from Nashua, New Hampshire. Seven-hundred-and-ninety-thousand acres in Maine were sold piecemeal.

Much of the region's citizens feared that the acres sold to private speculators would be subdivided and intensively developed. In addition, New Englanders feared that the traditional timber industry would fade and fold, taking with it the major source of employment in much of the region, and the new owners would deny traditional public access to their private lands. The speculative nature of the sales signaled a sharp end to the stable forest ownership of the last one-hundred years, and stirred fears that wildlife habitat, recreational areas, and the economic viability of small forest tract ownership were at great risk. These worries spurred Congress, on the initiative of Senators Leahy of Vermont and Rudman of New Hampshire, to establish a multi-state Governor's Task Force in 1988. In 1990, in conjunction with the U.S. Forest Service, the task force

completed the Northern Forest Lands Study (NFL Study). In 1990, as part of the 1990 farm bill, the Northern Forest Lands Council was established to put into practice the action plan developed in the NFL Study. The Council included four governor-appointed members from each of the four states, representing forest landowners, environmental groups, state natural resource agencies and local communities (Northern Forest Lands Council 1994).

During 1990, two concerns developed in the New England environmental community. First, environmentalists feared that the work of the newly formed Council would continue to come under attack by property rights groups and others hostile to the work of the interstate task force. Citizens of local communities feared that the Council might impose its will on private land, though the Council was granted no regulatory power. The most extreme groups vehemently opposed the Council's existence. In a meeting in Bangor, Maine, angry demonstrators waved the placard: "Forest Council PUKE!".

Second, because the Study on which the Council was founded generally emphasized continuation of "current land ownership and management patterns," at least some environmental groups feared that the Council would not go far enough in protecting the Northern Forest (Northern Forest Lands Council 1994, 11). As the regional director of the Sierra Club said: "We feel that the answer is public acquisition of large blocks of forested land" (Lepisto 1991, 15). Consequently, a respected regional group convened a conference of New England environmental groups in late 1990 with the intent of finding ways to both support and challenge the work of the Council. Out of this conference arose the Northern Forest Alliance (NFA).

I. Conflict and Collaboration Prior to Formation of the Alliance

Conflict was not new to the twenty-five environmental groups that met to discuss the fate of the Northern Forest in Pinkham Notch in December of 1990. Conflict between

groups had been commonplace. In fact, no comprehensive coalition of environmental groups had formed in New England since the passage of the Weeks Act in 1911, when the Appalachian Mountain Club, the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, and others banded together in a decade long fight to establish the White Mountain National Forest. One professional forester remarked in correspondence to an Alliance member in late 1991: "In my personal opinion, it is a minor miracle that such an Alliance exists at all, and I marvel at the fact that these quite disparate groups periodically sit around the same table" (Correspondence, December 8, 1991).

Two particular conflicts exemplify the atmosphere that prevailed between New England environmental groups prior to 1990. The first conflict occurred in 1988. The Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests was instrumental in the state-federal purchase of 45,000 acres of the Nash Stream in northern New Hampshire. While the state of New Hampshire balked at an original selling price of \$212 an acre from the then owner, British financier Sir James Goldsmith, savvy New Hampshire developer Rancourt purchased 90,000 acres of the pristine forested land. Within two months, Rancourt sold back 45,000 of those acres to the state and federal government for \$282 an acre, or for a return of \$3.1 million (Boucher 1989, 23). To insure that the state would never develop this land, with money originally appropriated for expansion of the White Mountain National Forest, the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests and the state of New Hampshire arranged for the federal government to buy a development easement from the state. While the state group defended the purchase as doing what was practically possible, national groups criticized the federal purchase of an easement in letters and public testimony before Congress.⁸ Since the state had purchased the land to protect the land from development in the first place, the nationals questioned why the federal government had to turn around and protect the land from the state. When an

⁸For a detailed description of state, national, regional, and independent groups, please see Appendix A.

environmentalist and a key player in the purchase was asked if the public had received a good deal, he responded: "I'll be torturing myself with that question for many years to come" (Boucher 1989, 41).

The second conflict arose over a 1989 proposal for Maine Woods Reserve made by the Wilderness Society. While the Society attempted to distinguish such a reserve from federal wilderness areas, forests, and parks, acknowledging "the special character of the Maine Wildlands requires special solutions," Maine citizens and environmental groups were rankled by the proposal (Boucher 1989, 41). Aggressive federal action in the woods of Maine was the last thing on any reasonable Maine resident's mind. As early as 1931, in the spirit of "Maine is for Mainers," attempts at creating a Katahdin national park were thwarted by the Governor of Maine, Percival Baxter, who was putting together his own version of a state park with help from the Appalachian Mountain Club and, ironically enough, the Wilderness Society (Wuerthner 1988). One Maine paper responded to the Wilderness Society call for a reserve: "The Wilderness Society, like the Sierra Club, wishes to keep Maine's wild lands undeveloped for the comfort and convenience of folks from away who wish to come here occasionally to hunt and fish. Lots of Maine people have a different idea" (Boucher 1989, 41). A Maine environmentalist stated: "People went berserk. This is the kind of thing they fear" (Interview #13).

Conflict between state and national groups was the norm among environmental groups in New England. However, several groups had also collaborated with one another prior to the formation of the Alliance. National groups had formed a caucus to address the Northern Forest, which included the four most active national organizations in the region. Initially, three groups had jointly prepared a Northern Forest platform, and soon after, a fourth national organization joined the loose coalition. Regional groups and state groups had formed the North Woods Coalition. The regional-state coalition had formed to undertake an extensive inventory and mapping of the natural resources and features of the region.

In addition, one state and one independent group developed a more collaborative working relationship during the management planning process for the Nash Stream parcel. Initially, the state and the individual group had locked horns over the management plan that was developed for the parcel after its purchase. "Initially," the independent member stated, "they didn't want to deal with me. They were horrified" (Interview #5). The independent group was notorious for such radical activities as spray painting slogans on a paper mill and dumping fish over a game warden. However, after several public meetings in which the state environmental group chaired the proceedings, the state group began to see that the "radical" independent group brought real issues such as biodiversity to the table, while the independent group began to see the value of citizen participation, tolerance, and collaboration with others. Later, thinking back upon the development of the Nash Stream management plan, the activist participant said: "The experience taught me I could be more effective not being in fight with everybody, but participating in respectful interchange" (Interview #5).

II. The Alliance is Formed

With both a long history of distrust and disagreement and a recent history of increasing cooperation among sub-groups of the New England environmental community, the Alliance was formed in December of 1990. Attendees at the December formation included such national organizations as the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, the Wilderness Society, regional organizations such as the Appalachian Mountain Club and the Conservation Law Foundation, such state groups as the Adirondack Council, the Vermont Natural Resources Council, the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, and the Natural Resources Council of Maine, and such independent groups as RESTORE: The North Woods. The new Alliance proclaimed their mission to be: "To develop and advocate a comprehensive regional policy and action plan to maintain the

integrity of the Northern Forest Lands and provide for sustainable natural and human communities" (Appalachia March 1991, 14).

Despite this common mission statement, resistance to working together was strong. One member of the Alliance remarked: "In December of 1990 there was tremendous resistance in coming together. We had spent as much time arguing as working together, particularly between state and national groups, rather than identifying our common interests" (Interview #9). A representative of a state group stated: "We were pretty polarized initially. You didn't dare mention federal action to state groups while the nationals were advocating for a ten million acre park" (Interview #1).

A. Conflicts Arise over Membership

As might be expected, the Alliance soon after its formation faced the question of membership: who should and shouldn't be at the table? Initially, for the first meeting of the Alliance, the regional environmental group that convened the conference had prepared an extensive invitation list. A member of this convening group said:

It was clear who the major players were, which groups were asked to participate. We decided for some not to participate. For example, timberland owners organizations weren't advocacy groups. Their members themselves were sometimes corporations. This wasn't the forum, we felt. The first step was bringing conservation groups together. The next step is to reach out to those with similar interests (Interview #9).

However, by June of 1991, membership within the Alliance became a matter of debate. Should Alliance meetings be open to all interested parties, or should the non-Alliance members attend only through invitation? In July, the Alliance developed guidelines that included: 1) membership required a majority vote by the initial Alliance members; 2) each organization would be represented by one individual; 3) invitations could be extended to others to attend meetings upon a vote; and, 4) matters other than membership or organizational issues would be decided by consensus. At least six additional

environmental groups expressed interest in joining the Alliance and were later admitted, primarily during 1992. However, two groups who had signed on early in the Alliance's efforts eventually left. One state group removed themselves from the Alliance in February 1994. A professional forestry organization decided in the fall of 1993 to remove themselves from active participation in the Alliance.

The professional forestry organization attended Alliance meetings from its start in the early months of 1991. In late 1991, one member of the professional organization wrote to the Alliance: "Keep up the good work with the Alliance -- there is tremendous value in its existence" (Correspondence, December 8, 1991). However, by the spring of 1992, differences between this organization and others in the Alliance developed. A major conflict erupted when a representative of the forestry organization attended the June 1992 meeting and was found to be an employee of a major timber corporation as well as a member of the forestry organization. Some Alliance members argued that this was not acceptable. Other members, up in arms, suggested that the delegate was a spy for industry. The representative disagreed. The Alliance should be open to all sides, he argued, and besides, many employees of the company were also members of the various environmental groups sitting right there at the table.

While the forestry organization survived this attack, in the summer of 1993 the forestry organization became increasingly dissatisfied with its membership in the Alliance. One member of the professional organization expressed great concern that the Alliance viewed purchase of forest land by a "forestry buyer" as a threat. How could forestry be a threat when this was the very practice the organization was founded upon and actively carried out? In September of 1993, the professional organization finally removed itself from the Alliance. One member of the Alliance explained the divergence as follows: "A couple of leaders in the organization had made the effort to be committed, but as the Alliance became more of an advocacy group, the professional nature of the foresters

clashed. They still get all the materials, though they are not officially on the list and don't sign on. Friends of the Northern Forest is what they are, I guess" (Interview #9).

B. The Alliance Draws Closer Together

In September of 1991, in a two-day meeting at Elizabethtown, New York, the Alliance began to draw closer together. A common understanding of the issues at hand, and who might play which role in the working group known as the Alliance began to develop. At this meeting, members stayed overnight in a log cabin. The group ate together and shared in the cooking and cleaning. In the evening, a noted national organization representative presented his experiences as a key player in the 1970's Alaska Lands Coalition. He argued that successful coalitions needed vision, members, leadership, trust, a division of work based on that trust, a creative environment and resources. One regional member described the meeting as notable in the transformation of the Alliance as a group: "It started to be more than sharing notes, but a broad acceptance of the idea of collective action for more power and influence. Like a particle and a wave, individual particles doing what they do, but together they form a coherent wave with a common sense of direction" (Interview #9). That evening, one member asked Alliance participants to share their personal experiences with the Northern Forest, and why they were involved in the issue. One national member said: "We shared stories. Everybody had an identity, where they were raised, what they were into. It was like the dating game" (Interview #6). Another member described the event as: ". . . the combo was magical. It took this loose group and transformed it into first gleamings of a structured Alliance" (Interview #9).

By the end of the gathering, Alliance members had developed a proposed short and long-term strategy, established "Principles of Behavior," and created working groups to further explore such issues as legislation, economics, land protection, and state initiatives. The eight Principles included: 1) agree on vision and strategies (but agree to disagree

when necessary); 2) establish working groups; 3) set deadlines; 4) be creative; 5) be bold; 6) be respectful of each other; 7) assign responsibility; and, 8) trust each other.

C. Conflicts Arise over Public Statements

While the Elizabethtown meeting helped to draw individual organizations further into the Alliance, the months that followed that meeting were filled with conflict and disagreement. State groups objected to attempts by nationals to impose their agenda, one of broad-scale land acquisition and wilderness designation, on the states. National groups feared that state organizations were entrenched in state and local politics, unwilling to act in the face of the threat to the Northern Forest. This larger conflict often centered around publicity: the public statements and proclamations both individual organizations and the Alliance might and did make.

For example, at a workshop organized by an association of small woodland owners in January 1992, a woodland owner stood up and exclaimed that the Alliance had adopted a detailed, unified strategy for the Northern Forest. An environmentalist conspiracy was about to attempt a hostile takeover of the woods meant for all of Maine's citizens. While a state Alliance member in attendance attempted to explain that the Alliance as a whole took no formal positions, the small woodland owner pulled out a regional Alliance member's publication indicating 1991 Alliance accomplishments, including preparation of a strategic plan. This must be sure evidence that the "enviros" were taking over the woods exclaimed the woodland owner. Finding its credibility publicly eroded by this publication, the state group returned to the next Alliance meeting and demanded that the Alliance insure a way to prevent public position-taking, or that group would have to remove itself from the coalition.

In the February 1992 meeting of the Alliance, the members agreed that the Alliance would not make policy statements in its own name unless agreed to unanimously by all members. Rather than describe such unanimous decisions as Alliance decisions, the

members agreed to the wording: "members of the Northern Forest Alliance" (Meeting Summary, February 12-13, 1992). In addition, members agreed to add to meeting summaries and other such primarily internal documents: "This document is not a policy statement" (Meeting Summary, February 12-13, 1992). Despite this attempt at a consensual joint resolution in regard to public statements, the division between state and national groups over publicity has continued.

In April of 1993, the potential publication of an article in the Northern Forest Forum, a newspaper originated by one of the independent members of the group to provide a public forum for detailed discussion of the Northern Forest, yet again raised the hackles of state groups. The article, written by a national member and entitled "It Is Time to Draw a Line", called for a proclamation boundary for the Northern Forest, a permanent, federal designation that would lead to recognizing the Northern Forest as a legitimate political entity. The monthly Alliance meeting quickly erupted into a fierce debate.

State groups adamantly opposed the publication of the article. Some national groups concurred, arguing that the article would: ". . .undermine the Alliance's ability to communicate a unified message in support of our three part package at this critical time" (Meeting Summary, July 22, 1993). Together they argued that separating policies in regard to land acquisition from other key policies as good forest practices and community development would give ammunition to counter groups. Wise use advocates would point out that the Alliance really only wanted to grab large tracts of private land. But others in the Alliance saw the debate, not as one over strategy, but as one over control. One independent member stated: "He didn't get Alliance approval. What right do we have to tell him? He didn't criticize other groups or the Alliance You've got this extreme, paranoid viewpoint from some groups. They won't let anything go out that is an Alliance product without complete consensus. Three-quarters want to do some things, one-quarter just want to keep their turf safe and avoid getting their agenda messed up" (Interview #3).

Following the debate over the proclamation boundary, the same national group attempted to publish a brochure on the Northern Forest under its own name. This brochure, to be distributed across all four states, included a map of the region with outlines of "suggested wildland areas" identified on the map key as "samples of wildland areas which could be added to public ownership" (The Great Northern Forest 199-). A state group vehemently protested the distribution of this brochure in its own state. One Alliance member stated: "This map showed how we needed ecological reserves. I thought it might be confusing, but the map was on such a small scale -- a concept thing. The state groups got berserk. They wouldn't let them pass out brochures. To prevent warfare, the national copied a picture over the map specifically for that market" (Interview #3). A member from the protesting state explained the conflict from their perspective: "State and national groups disagree over the size of protected areas, how strongly protected areas ought to be wilderness areas. We talk about protected areas, but what do we mean: zoning, regulations? Who's in charge? Invariably, state groups don't want to come out on this issue -- it's practically driven" (Interview #1).

This conflict continues to play itself out in the disagreement surrounding, not only specific publications, but the member's willingness to let Alliance staff act as official spokesperson(s) for the coalition as a whole. To date, Alliance members individually sign on at their discretion to each joint statement and position paper, and no individual has the authority to "speak" for the Alliance.

D. The Alliance Develops a Comprehensive Strategy

In April of 1992, two significant events occurred. First, a state member wrote a letter to the Alliance that urged its members to develop a "big picture" for the Northern Forest. In addition, the Alliance agreed that a smaller group of people were necessary to developing a framework for a comprehensive strategy. Known as the "rubber room

group," this group was to be the impetus for further strategic and organizational development of the Alliance.

The state member's letter, stated, in part:

I believe the time has come for the groups and individuals participating in the Alliance to roll up our collective sleeves and try to define a comprehensive package of strategies we believe necessary to preserve and enhance the Northern Forests in the region When I suggest that we work together to define a comprehensive set of solutions for the Northern Forests, I do not mean to suggest that we forego organizational identity or other ongoing efforts. Rather, it seems more than prudent, and possibly exhilarating, to attempt to outline what a comprehensive package of strategies would work together most effectively to achieve the objectives we share in common (Correspondence, April 14, 1992).

While disagreements continued within the Alliance, the call for a comprehensive strategy brought the Alliance closer together much as had the fall 1991 meeting in Elizabethtown, New York. One Alliance member explained it this way:

There are difficult times during growth. You're wrestling as network, as an alliance with common mission. I remember it happening, one individual or another emerges, at different times, different people, the leader of the moment. This is what we have to do, they say, with such force or such clarity. In this case, one member had written how critical it was that we must have clear strategy, what we were working towards. This was a real turning point (Interview #9).

During this meeting the Alliance agreed that the rubber room group was necessary in order to develop the framework for a comprehensive Alliance strategy called for in the state member's letter. The smaller group included representatives of state, regional, and national groups. In May, the rubber room group set a goal of six months within which to develop an overall conservation strategy. The group laid out a general action plan including federal actions to protect the Northern Forest, state by state actions, and community initiatives.

In July of 1992, the rubber room group decided to utilize a "strategy notebook". This working document, not meant for public distribution, would help members develop a strategy that was "fluid, flexible, and multi-dimensional, not a static "solution" to 'fix' the

problem" (Meeting Summary, July 15, 1992). The first additions to the notebook included strategies regarding public land acquisition, land use regulation, private forest practices, economic reform, ecosystem and human health, public property rights, and education. Through a series of eight to ten meetings, the rubber room group worked through potential policies and strategies for the Alliance. Each issue was talked about in detail in order to gain an idea of the values underlying potential strategies. One state member of the rubber room group said: "We had to grapple with fact that groups were different. We had to answer: what lands to protect; what does wilderness mean; what do communities need? We had to put it in such a way we could get investment from the larger group. It was very hard working with the inter-organizational dynamic" (Interview #16).

Through the use of the notebook, members hoped to develop a detailed, step-by-step strategy for the Alliance. While the strategy notebook became too detailed and cumbersome to provide that comprehensive strategy, the final outcome of the work was three broad common objectives. These objectives were stated in a September 1992 meeting as: 1) to protect adequate public land to ensure ecological integrity, wildlife habitat, public access, recreational opportunities, and high quality forest products; 2) to conserve adequate private forest land to ensure ecological integrity, wildlife habitat, public access, recreational opportunities, and high quality forest products; and, 3) to support healthy human communities through the Northern Forest by building empowerment and improving economic health (Meeting Summary, September 23-24, 1992). By May of 1993, the three objectives set out in September were further refined and working groups were established around the three identified policy priorities: 1) to identify and protect permanently protected wild core areas and connected corridors; 2) to support sustainable managed private forest lands; and, 3) to support healthy, viable human communities.

The strategy notebook and the process of developing a comprehensive strategy are viewed differently by members of the Alliance. One state member said of the notebook: "We haven't used it in a while, but it helped us to get down a common purpose It

wasn't a static, but an evolutionary document. It helped the Alliance evolve. It was the process not the product that counted" (Interview #16). While many members saw this year-long process as necessary to develop trust and cooperation among Alliance participants, other members of the Alliance have viewed this process as a frustrating hindrance to action. One independent member said: "Lots of people are process people. It's a contest of who puts out more paper, the Alliance or the Northern Forest Lands Council. Draft after draft creates the illusion of progress without leading to progress" (Interview #3). A national member, perhaps more circumspect, said of the general Alliance process: "Once a month our meetings are made up of time spent making simple decisions, addressing issues that have to be overcome. What do I lose by cooperating with you, what do I gain? These don't necessarily go away, they just come up in different ways" (Interview #2).

E. The Alliance Pursues Joint Funding

The further refinement of the three broad objectives of the Alliance was, in part, brought about by the decision to hold a joint funders' session in Boston in May of 1993. All groups would present a comprehensive strategy for the Northern Forest in front of over twenty foundations. Prior to 1993, the Alliance had explicitly agreed not to team up and collectively seek funding from the same foundations. Members expressed concerns that collective fund raising might lead to further competition between groups. Furthermore, some raised concerns that one regional group had already received monies to help coordinate the Alliance. Alliance members concluded in the September 1992 meeting "that fund raising is a critical issue that could unravel the entire Alliance" (Meeting Summary, September 23-24, 1992).

Despite these concerns, some limited sharing of funds had already occurred between members. One regional group had provided funds to coordinate the Alliance, and covered the salary of the sole staff person of the Alliance. In the spring of 1992, one

regional group financially aided a state group in continuing the work of that state's representative on the Northern Forest Lands Council. In the fall of 1992, some members of the Alliance agreed to provide and help seek limited funding for the newly established Northern Forest Forum.

In March of 1993, the Alliance agreed to a joint presentation before funders. Alliance members sought to establish explicit, clear ground rules for their organizations, including attendance limited to one representative per group, and the designation of primary spokespeople for the entire Alliance. The intent to meet jointly in front of funders fed many groups' anxieties. Members feared individual groups' monies would be swallowed up by the growing Alliance. "I take on faith," one member wrote anxiously, "that for the purposes of this briefing the funders are interested most immediately in the coordinating aspects of our work, and that they recognize that the expectations will remain that individual groups will be submitting proposals for collective baseline and individual baseline work" (Correspondence, April 29, 1993).

Others suspected that individual organizations would use the funders' briefing to grandstand and advance their own organizations at the expense of others. State, regional, and national members of the Alliance feared that the executive directors of the organizations would attend the briefing and turn it into a fight for money. With executive directors at the meeting, the blatant competition for dollars might undermine the hard work of the program staff. One national member commented: "Executive directors often cannot focus on the issue. Their egos, their fears of loss get in the way. They're type A people. They're like bumper cars. They deal with one another in so many different forums competing for attention and dollars" (Interview #8). While Alliance members admitted that they would have had little control over whether their executive directors attended or not, the funders resolved the issue by expressing "a strong preference for hearing presentations from the lead program person from interested organizations rather than Executive Directors" (Memorandum, March 10, 1993). One state member said: "We

breathed a sigh of relief when funders asked that the executive directors not come" (Interview #16).

Despite overcoming this hurdle, the difficulties of balancing the financial well-being of each organization and seeking joint gains by collective fund raising continue. For example, in a February 1994 meeting of the Alliance, members discussed whether or not to mention specific organizations alongside particular Alliance activities in a joint funding proposal. The following dialogue occurred between a national group and others:

State Member #1: Let me make the audacious statement that we strike the names of groups.

National Member: On issue of taking organizations' names out. For three years, we took the lead on the Jewels Report. This is a solid niche for us. If by striking our name, this intimates an Alliance activity, it could strike a strange shadow on our own fundraising.

State Member #2: All of us have taken a lead in some cases.

Independent Member: Jewels is a lot stronger because the Alliance signed on. We'll write letters of support that you took the lead.

National Member: You have to demonstrate that group specifically did lead. There has been no money from central Alliance on this. (Meeting notes, February 2, 1994).

While Alliance members successfully overcame the fears and anxieties raised by a joint funders' briefing, the on-going need for funding for both the Alliance and individual organizations, and for the recognition for work done in order to justify that funding, continues to raise fears and create tensions within the Alliance. As one state member said: "Money has been a real problem. It has brought the issue of control to the surface. It's repressed when the discussion is not tangible. When it's policy talk, you can gloss over it" (Interview #12).

F. Conflicts Arise over Administration

In addition to developing a comprehensive strategy, the rubber room group also helped formalize the organizational structure of the Alliance. In March of 1993, in the

same meeting where the Alliance agreed to pursue a joint funders' briefing, a chair and vice-chair were elected. Members agreed that the current chair of the coalition, a respected representative of a regional group, would continue until an election the following fall. Members had agreed that chairpersons would: ". . . forego representation of their own organization's interests when serving in the capacity of Alliance Chair".⁹ In addition, the Alliance established a steering committee. The committee would be "open to all Alliance members who are prepared to make the commitment to attend meetings on an approximately monthly basis" (Memorandum, March 10, 1993). While the steering committee did not eliminate anyone from the Alliance, it did concentrate monthly decision-making in a smaller group of organizations than belonged to the full Alliance.

In July of 1993, the newly established Interim Administration Committee that had grown out of the rubber room group recommended administrative procedures, selection of an Alliance fiscal agent, and hiring of a full-time staff director as well as additional staff. To some, this increasing organization formalization was viewed as a necessary step to meet the goals of the coalition in the public debate over the fate of the Northern Forest. One national member said: "The rubber room group realized a bunch of people is fine, but if you are really going to do something -- develop goals, meet those goals, explore opportunities -- you need to include staff to help get from A to B to C. Most realized that if they wanted the Alliance to continue, they could not rely on the good will and time of individuals" (Interview #8). To others, it was a suspect transformation, moving the Alliance from an expected network of individual groups to an unintended and unwanted independent organization having and driving its own agenda. Yet to others, it was the unnecessary bureaucratization of an organization in search of a vision. One independent member stated: "It's corporate-like, I think . . . similar to the University of Michigan hospital I worked in: all white, upper middle class, articulate, but little connection with

⁹"Campaign for the Northern Forest." 1993. Confidential document prepared by the Northern Forest Alliance

the real world. There's incredible peer pressure. It's bureaucracies. The stuff coming out of the Alliance has the same wording as government agency and business. Most people want to do the right thing, but don't know what they're working for" (Interview #3).

With the administrative recommendation on the table, consensus could not be reached. Consequently, the Alliance decided to give members not voting at the meeting a 48 hour period to cast their vote. Shortly after the meeting, one independent organization exercised its option and voted no on all accounts. This "no" vote caused a subtle but important shift in the decision-making rules of the Alliance. Previous to this meeting, the Alliance stated in their Organizational Structure and Principles: "Alliance decision will be made by consensus."¹⁰ Afterward, the Alliance agreed to amend these principles to state: "The Alliance and Steering Committee will strive for consensus (where consensus does not necessarily imply unanimity). Where no consensus exists a vote will taken with a 2/3 majority necessary to adopt a decision" (Memorandum, August 5, 1993).

In the fall of 1993, the Alliance returned to the issue of chair and co-chair. This decision involved a "wrenching session" as one member described it (Interview #12). First, state groups believed that the holding of the chair and the fiscal agent might allow one group to drive the agenda of the Alliance. One member argued: "The chair has been the same all along. If the Alliance is more than a product of this group, then we need more" (Interview #11). Second, state groups were not certain whether the Alliance's sole staff person reported to the Steering Committee of the Alliance or to the regional organization since funds for the staff person were funneled through this group. "Who is in charge of the Alliance?" they wondered. Third, some groups feared that the chair was really a means for one organization to enhance its war chest. Active leadership allowed the chair to obtain increased funding for their organization. One member stated: "One observation is that the chair group has used the Northern Forest to build itself, grow in

¹⁰"Campaign for the Northern Forest." 1993. Confidential document prepared by the Northern Forest Alliance.

size as result of involvement in the issue. Their clout, visibility, and membership has grown on this issue. Was there a need and they filled it or did it offer them a lot in terms of growth?" (Interview #13).

After heated discussion in this fall meeting, the chair was re-elected, and co-chairs, one from a national group, and another from a state group, were also elected. One Alliance member described the event as "bruising": "In the end there was no other choice. We were going round and round, then the person who state groups were backing declined to run for chair. It was the old chair again by default" (Interview #12). While some national groups saw this "end around" as staved off by the creation of the co- and vice-chairs, others maintain that the delineation between the one regional group and the Alliance has grown "blurrier and blurrier" and will not simply go away. "Are we a network, or are we an entity? That's the debate," one state member said (Interview #11).

CHAPTER THREE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIANCE

Alliance members are faced with two sets of different and often contradictory questions as they approach participation in the Alliance. First, individuals as representatives of distinct and separate organizations must answer:

Should we belong to the Alliance? Who can speak for our organization? How much authority will we give up? Who will wield power over us? Who might we gain power over? How do we defend our familiar turf?

Second, individuals as members of the collective must consider:

Who should belong? What kind of entity are we? Who can speak for us? Who gets to do what? How do we fund ourselves? Who benefits and who does not? Who's in charge? Who is not?

These are the questions that individuals as members of the Alliance have wrestled with and attempted to answer. Resting within this complex dynamic is a tension between maintaining organizational self-interest, identity and security while seeking out the possibility of joint gains, identity and security through collective action. At every step, whether it be decision-making over policy, strategy, publicity, money, or leadership, individuals are faced with choosing between many alternatives. To add to this confusion, individuals must make these decisions embedded in a diverse set of affiliations: affiliations with such groups as the Alliance, other individual environmental organizations, and outside interest groups.

To make sense of this complex on-going process, Section One will explore the conflict between state and national groups and explain how differing relationships contribute to this conflict. Relationships between the parties within the Alliance and the cross-cutting nature of the affiliations held by Alliance members will be discussed. Section Two will explain the conflicts surrounding money, publicity, and leadership as competitive

games much like in a marketplace. In addition, the incentives for building joint gains through money, leadership, and consensus decision-making and process opportunism will be discussed, along with the shifting power among the various Alliance coalitions. Section Three will further build on the exploration of parties and issues by exploring the underlying values that are intermingled with the parties, their relationships to one another, and their individual and collective interests. The Alliance as a forum for debate and dialogue will be contrasted to the view of the environmental coalition as a marketplace of environmental advocacy.

I: The Parties: The Negotiation as a Web of Relationships¹¹

A. The Primary Cleavage in the Alliance : State versus National Groups

The case study reveals that some of the most obvious conflicts that pervade the Alliance are between state and national groups. State groups view state action as the most necessary to address the problems of the Northern Forest, often focusing on forest practices, or state land acquisition. National groups favor broad, overreaching federal solutions that entail, not necessarily designation of a national park, but some kind of federal protection for "wildlands". State groups usually do not support public statements about Alliance positions, particularly in regard to the designation of large tracts as wilderness, wildlands, or protected areas. National groups have more than once "overstepped" their bounds to attribute public statements to the full Alliance. State groups tend to be wary of the formalization of the Alliance as an organization. National groups support the development of administrative procedures, staffing, and creation of an actual organization with fiscal autonomy as opposed to a loose network of individual groups. In part, state groups may reflect New England politics, known for its

¹¹Appendix A details the members groups in the Alliance. Please note that land trusts are not considered in any detail in this analysis because of their low participation level in the month-to-month work of the Alliance.

parochialism, fear of outsiders, or outright "xenophobia" as one Alliance member described it, and a fierce "Yankee" independence that seeks to do things "the Maine way" or the "Vermont way".

A national member of the Alliance explained the state's perspective:

The struggle is reflected in their concern for their own dirt. They see that their responsibilities stop at the state borders. They have resistance to see the Northern Forest as a region. It's seen as radical, leftist. . . . People say "the forest" as if it were five different forests (Interview #10).

A state member put it in different terms:

State groups tend to have an angle national groups don't share. Nationals don't have to have that sensitivity. . . . Each state is distinctive, has its own way of solving problems. The differences are enormous, the level of industry, how people make money. New York, for instance, has a large percentage of public lands where Maine has little. The New York region's economy is based on recreation. Maine's is based on forest products. There are enormous differences in way things are done. We can't always come up with blanket solutions when our needs are so radically different (Interview #13).

Whereas national members tend to see state groups as conservative, parochial, and resistant to change, state groups tend to see themselves as pragmatic, experienced in the political subtleties of their state, and open to politically acceptable change. Whereas state groups tend to see national groups as brash, inexperienced in the ways of each state, and attempting to foist their agenda onto others, national groups see themselves as visionary, experienced in the requirements of national campaigns, and as educators who must help state groups see the "bigger picture".

An understanding of the relationships external to both the state and national group representatives can help explain this on-going conflict. All Alliance organizations have members, boards of directors, and outside parties with whom they must maintain on-going relationships. In fact, much of the power and effectiveness of each group is derived from these relationships. Effective internal relationships help lead to an efficient organization, clear-cut and effective policy, and a clear sense of organizational mission and

direction. External relationships lead to that organization's ability to function well in the larger world of politics. For example, strong ties to Congress by national groups provide access to the decision-making apparatus that can introduce new bills and enact laws to meet the interests of those groups. Strong ties to state legislators can be the source of effective policy formation for state groups.

B. Relationships: Pulling Apart and Binding Together

1. Relationships External to the Alliance that Exacerbate Conflict

State and national groups must maintain vastly different relationships both internal to their organization and external to both the Alliance and their own organization. These differences can lead to conflict as groups strive to protect those relationships, while other groups, without such connections, attempt to stake out positions that may threaten or even sever those relationships.

The conflict over publicity, over who should say what where, raises an interesting question that leads to a better understanding of the ties that bind the "conservative" and "parochial" state groups. Who do state groups fear will hear of distasteful and unacceptable policies or strategies? Which relationships are state groups attempting to protect: internal ones between members and the organizational staff; internal ones between staff and the board of directors; or external relationships between staff and other interest groups in the state?

Ties to constituents might certainly influence an organization's actions. One member of the Alliance explained it this way. "Some groups originally were foresters, sometimes even forest industry people, loggers. People on the boards and members still may consist of these constituencies. Our members come from a different audience. Deals may have been made, and compromises struck over years that now may tie their hands" (Interview #2). For instance, one regional group has experienced internal tension between hikers and activists. Some recreationists are quite wary of activism. Groups may be

unwilling to take public positions of strong environmental advocacy in order to appease and maintain their membership. If an organization were to lose its membership, it would lose a major source of funds, and a great source of power in terms of political clout. An organization representing 10,000 members is more likely to influence decision-makers seeking votes than one representing 100 members.

However, both state and national groups are more accountable to a board of directors than directly to their membership, despite the fact that most state and national groups derive substantial funds from member dues. One representative of a state group said: "From time to time we do polls of our members, but policy decisions are made by the board and staff" (Interview #1). Another state group representative said: "I respond primarily to the board, but I do conduct member surveys" (Interview #11). A national staff person said: "Our organization is not driven by members -- our general principles are why people join, but we don't do lots of communication with our members. We don't ask them in frequent way, 'How are we doing?' People join agreeing with our direction" (Interview #2). Of course, board decisions will likely be influenced by the board's perception of its members, but in the case of Alliance groups, this influence appears at best to be indirect. Since membership does not appear to be a major influence over the actions of Alliance groups, perhaps the differences between boards of directors might better help explain differences between Alliance groups, and particularly between state and national groups. If board members are in turn members of divergent interest groups, they may very well wish to limit the positions that state groups take on any issue, particularly one as controversial as large scale land acquisition.

Do boards of directors influence the positions Alliance members take? One state group, whose representative said, "I'll admit I've been a player in the rift between the state groups and others," is directed by the most diverse set of interests of any of the Alliance organizations' boards (Interview #11). This particular board is comprised of major state political players, businessmen, including owners of ski areas and forestry companies

sometimes, as well as conservationists. No other board of directors, even among other state groups, includes such a diverse set of interests. Not only is this the most diverse board, but of the state organizations, it appears to keep the tightest rein on its representative to the Alliance. For example, when asked about the debate over an Alliance spokesperson, the representative of this state group explained: "I am tied into responsibility. When I speak as me, and don't balance, when I make mistakes, I have to be accountable to the board and the whole organization. If I really screw-up, I could be fired" (Interview #11). No other state or national member put this board-staff relationship in such clear terms. One other state group emphasized that staff often make day to day policy decisions. Another state group emphasized that the board was consulted infrequently. At least in one state, the diverse board of directors keeps careful control over positions taken within the Alliance by its representative. This relationship between the Alliance member and their board representing diverse interests does explain why this one state would resist further publicity by the Alliance as a whole. However, the other states have been as active in resisting such publicity. Why?

Even the Alliance member discussed above, who has the most reason to explain the state-national conflict as derivative of the directives of organizational directors, stated: "State groups, all of us, have a deep responsibility to the mixed constituents of the state, not just our members. This ties what we're willing to do" (Interview #11). Despite ties to their member constituents and boards of directors, state organizations generally returned to their working relationships within the state as the major explanation of their resistance to broad publicity by the Alliance. One state member said: "While nationals may wing in and out, we're still trying to plug on with land acquisition. Our view derives from daily and weekly interaction with legislators, citizens, and state leaders. We have a sense of what can be done" (Interview #1). Another state member explained:

We've got ninety years of history balancing, working with people. We'll be here when its all over. . . . Nationals appeal or protest a decision, but they

don't necessarily have to answer to people on the next project. They have the luxury to do this. I am so visible in our state. This is not true for national organizations. What I say on Tuesday I must remember on Friday. This is a small state (Interview #11).

Working relationships external to state organizations tend to be the ties that bind state organizations, ties the national groups either did not mention, or simply do not have.

These ties would help explain why state groups are so adamant against adverse publicity in their individual states. Because they are particularly conscious of their working relationships, not only for work on the Northern Forest, but for a multitude of other issues such as air and water pollution, energy conservation, land planning, and transportation, they must maintain a credible image in their own state in order to continue their work. Public proclamations or even vague suggestions of large-scale acquisition of forest land threaten the relationship between state organizations and other interests within the states; they threaten long-term relationships in which the state organizations have invested a great deal of time and effort.

One member described this as follows: "We have to make sure, we have to pull in lots of people beforehand. We have to bring in something that is moderate enough to get passed. The fear is, if you get on something that you can't implement or get support, you lose face and will not be able to work with people again" (Interview #11). Another state member said: "You don't propose things that won't win, though we have taken on major groups for such issues as dioxin and expansion of the turnpike. You do things when they are likely to be a success, even if you think it will be a damn hard battle. In a sense, that's [credibility] all we have. In dealing with decision-makers, we have to be accurate and not hyperbolic" (Interview #1). The national groups' politically valuable relationships tend to lie elsewhere. Thus, they are not bound so closely to the politics of any one state, nor the concerns of credibility that follow these relationships. National groups are experienced in dealing with broad-scale efforts to protect major lands in the realm of the interest-group politics of Washington D.C. State groups are generally quite familiar with advocacy work

on the state level, but rarely, if ever, extend their efforts to federal legislation. As state groups report, national groups are more free to stake out controversial public positions and advance "radical" ideas because they do not have long-standing state and interest-group based relationships to protect and maintain.

As well as the national groups, independent groups are not typically bound by outside working relationships. Given their relative youth as organizations, their small membership, and lack of historical ties to particular issues or processes, they do not have extensive external working relationships to maintain. Take for example a brief exchange that occurred during an Alliance meeting between an independent and national group member:

National Member: Staff couldn't be listed in the Jewels report. The Alliance doesn't exist. If we have a media coordinator who cannot talk to the media

Independent Member: I was surprised, flabbergasted that staff couldn't talk to the media (Meeting Notes, January 6, 1994).

No state group weighed in alongside the national and independent group's concern regarding a media spokesperson. The particular relationship ties of state organizations seem to differentiate them, not only from national groups, but from small, independent groups who have no particular long-standing relationships that might be threatened or destroyed.

The maintenance of these on-going relationships external to state groups can be seen as the state groups' alternatives to agreement. If an alliance cannot be forged with other environmental advocacy groups within the Alliance, state groups can return to the familiar setting of the state political scene to attempt to forge solutions with traditional working partners. National groups do not have this alternative. If the issue dies on a regional basis, or the Alliance were to fall apart, national groups might very well have to turn to completely different issues. If the traditional power base of national groups is in the

Congress, the inability of the nationals, and/or the Alliance to make the Northern Forest a national issue, would lead the nationals to have far fewer means to reach solutions to the problems that beset the region. The case study suggests, in some ways, that state members are the most threatened and defensive and, consequently, the most adversarial in their relationship with others. However, the fact that they have a set of on-going relationships to carry on regardless of the rise or fall of the Northern Forest issue suggests that the nationals are the ones who have more to lose if the Northern Forest issue were to fade away or the Alliance were to disband.

2. Relationships Internal to the Alliance that Enhance Collaboration

Relationships outside the Alliance create different incentives for Alliance members, affect potential alternatives to agreement for state members in particular, and help contribute to coalition politics between state and national groups. In contrast, relationships within the Alliance can help lead to collaboration among groups. While conflict may have been the notable feature of relations between New England environmental groups prior to the Alliance, the Alliance has led to the forging of new collaborative working relationships between various groups. The relationships within the Alliance are characterized by several features which bind the Alliance together as a working group: the participation of the same individuals over time, regardless of organizational loyalty; development of professional relationships; development of personal friendships; and establishment of trust.

Interestingly, the same individuals have participated in the Alliance over time though their individual organizational affiliations have changed. One member of the Alliance was originally a staff person for a state group, who was later hired as the staff person for the Alliance as a whole. One regional leader of a national group left and formed his own independent advocacy group, but remained a member of the Alliance. The original coordinator of the Alliance, operating as a staff person for a regional group,

began his work as a representative of a state environmental group who continues to participate in the Alliance. Another Alliance member who began as a national representative, was taken up as a part-time staff person for the Alliance as a whole, then recently came to represent another different national group. While individual organizations may have changed staffing over the life of the Alliance, the actual individuals participating in the coalition have remained surprisingly constant. This leads to a personal investment in the Alliance that may extend beyond organizational loyalties, as well as an investment in the professional and personal relationships that have developed.

Professional relationships between members of the Alliance have both helped in the development of the Alliance and have been forged within the Alliance. In the contentious Nash Stream management planning process, the independent member and the now regional member forged a relationship that has continued on in the Alliance. As the independent member stated of the Nash Stream Process: "It helped them get to know me better. Dealing with the individual made them more comfortable" (Interview #5). New professional relationships have also developed since the inception of the Alliance that provide incentive for members to continue to collaborate. A state member said of the developing professional relationships within the Alliance:

For me, the connections, friendship and professional ties have been invaluable. To know people well enough that when I have problems, I can think of two or three people to call, is important. Recently I wanted to know the impacts of a national group's litigation on the use of state wildlife refuges. I called a member of the Alliance representing them, and he called national headquarters. A day later I had the information. Before, who knows what the hell they were doing. I didn't know anybody (Interview #11).

Personal friendships either in existence prior to the Alliance or developed within the Alliance have also led to collaboration. One national member said of the national groups: "There's a good chemistry between principals. One leader and I have known each other for years" (Interview #6). Several Alliance members mentioned the importance of

the September 1991 meeting when Alliance members were able to share in simple group activities as eating, cleaning, and storytelling. As one member stated, the Alliance became a "dating game" of sorts, a forum for people to investigate and develop personal friendships. As Fisher writes: "The more quickly you can turn a stranger into someone you know, the easier a negotiation is likely to become. You have less difficulty understanding where they are coming from. You have a foundation of trust to build upon in a difficult negotiation." (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1981, 37).

Trust becomes an integral component of the relationships that develop within a negotiation. As one member put it, trust is built from both personal and professional relationships. The Alliance member stated: "Trust is at one level a basic interpersonal thing, some confidence that they will behave a specific way. At the next level is an organizational trust, a common trust and not competitiveness" (Interview #9). Many members of the Alliance referred to developing "trust" as integral to the Alliance's success. One member put it this way: "Common goals and trust are the two things that will keep us together. Group formation can either be negative like labor disputes, or positive with goals that keep you together" (Interview #7). A national member stated: "Organizations and people form coalitions. They generally come to trust each other. The comfort level evolves to a point people can work with each other" (Interview #4). Personal and professional relationships carried out successfully over time have developed trust among the group members, who often before the Alliance, had little opportunity or inclination to work together. Face-to-face contact and working side-by-side have helped develop a reservoir of experience that diminishes uncertainties as to other's behaviors and motives, and tends to diminish the "sidedness" characterized by groups who are engaged in outright conflict.

Perhaps the best example of this increasing trust and the importance of personal relationships occurred in September of 1993. A national office decided to close a state-based satellite office due to fiscal reasons. When the staff member found out, he explained

his impending lay-off to the Alliance. While this very national group had stirred anger and resentment only a few years previously, on this day all members of the Alliance, including state groups, came together to unanimously recommend this staff member's continued employment. When the national office closed the office despite the protest, the Alliance agreed to temporarily fund the former national staff member through the crises. As a member said: "This showed that the Alliance can close ranks" (Interview #4).

C. A Web of Relationships Internal and External to the Alliance

Relationships outside the Alliance tend to differentiate groups from one another. State groups have professional relationships to other interest groups in their state which limit the range of policies, positions, and particularly, public statements, such groups are willing to make. National and independent groups, and regional groups to some extent, tend to have fewer of these professional relationships within state boundaries, and consequently, are more free to advocate policies or solutions more politically daring than state groups. These external relationships tend to create an implicit coalition between state environmental groups and other interest groups outside the Alliance. Because Alliance members are bound to other interest groups outside the Alliance the negotiations within the negotiation do mimic the negotiations outside the Alliance. As external interest groups limit state organizations' zone of possible agreement within the political arena of their own state, so do state groups narrow the zone of possible agreement for national and independent groups within the Alliance. A simple example of this narrowing of the zone of agreement occurred when a state group was "humiliated" in a public meeting with small timberland owners. The state organization came immediately back to the Alliance and ostensibly worked to ensure that they would not be embarrassed again. But in addition, the state group's actions essentially had the same effect on the Alliance as it had on the state member in the more public forum: public statements about strategies for large scale government land acquisition were challenged and consequently, further public releases

about such strategies were affected. As one state member said about another public meeting where an environmentalist's pronouncements were challenged: "It's bad to see others distort our language. It makes us more vague and suspicious. We can't even say what we want" (Interview #16). By limiting or removing issues in a public forum, other interest groups, knowingly or not, affect and can even limit the agenda of the internal negotiations among Alliance members. Environmental groups are affected by and reflective of negotiations between more diverse interest groups in the larger political arena.

At the same time, however, developing and developed relationships within the Alliance allow organizations to collaborate more effectively as trust develops, and provide a counter to the relationships outside the coalition that may draw state members, in particular, away from the Alliance. Negotiations within the Alliance, while affected by and linked to negotiations outside its boundaries, pull members away from this larger negotiation through time taken, effort made, and relationships developed, and help solidify environmental groups on the whole as a distinct coalition. In addition, what paradoxically enhances the stability of the Alliance is the diverse affiliations that any one Alliance member has to many different parties: his or her executive director, board of directors, members, external working interest groups, personal friends and professional colleagues internal to the Alliance, and sub-coalition members within the coalition of the Alliance. While these diverse affiliations create conflict, their criss-crossing nature tend to produce stability overall. Coser explains that "stability within a loosely structured society, often inadequately identified with the absence of conflict, can be viewed as partly a product of the continuous incidence of various conflicts crisscrossing" (Coser 1956, 77).

Each member of the Alliance exists in a web of relationships with many other parties, which, on the one hand, tends to limit the zone of possible agreement and intensify disagreement, while on the other hand, because of the cross-cutting and diverse relationships, provides an underlying foundation of stability beneath the on-going conflict.

As Coser argues, ". . . multiple group affiliations of individuals make for a multiplicity of conflict criss-crossing society. Such segmental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one axis" (Coser 1956, 78-79).

The multiple affiliations of any Alliance member tend to blur the potential zone of agreement due to the uncertainty and difficulty of establishing a clear reservation price given the many affiliations one must consider in determining that price. As Raiffa and Coser suggest, the ambiguity of the complex "real" world helps to ease distinct cleavages between individuals and groups, and thus reduces the potential bruising coalition game that might otherwise erupt.

II. The Issues: The Negotiation as a Marketplace.

Within the web of relationships described in Section One, members of the Alliance must negotiate over such issues as policy, strategy, and administration. Alliance members must develop a comprehensive policy for the Northern Forest, strategize on how to most effectively implement that policy through influencing others outside the Alliance, and at the same time negotiate how they might best manage their own internal affairs. Serious conflict has developed between groups in negotiations over strategy, publicity in particular, and on-going administration of the Alliance, funding and leadership in particular.

Publicity, money and leadership have led to negotiations which are frequently perceived by Alliance participants as distributive in nature. As Sebenius writes: "Crucial aspects of most negotiations, however, are primarily 'distributive,' 'win-lose,' or constant-sum; that is, at some points in the process, increased value claimed by one party implies less for others" (Sebenius 1992, 29). State groups often wish to minimize publicity by the Alliance. National groups often wish to increase publicity by the Alliance. All groups must "feed at the same trough" of funding supplied by regional foundations. Members of the Alliance view leadership as a prized means to distinguish their organization and its

value from others. Alliance negotiations can be seen, as Raiffa calls it, a "bruising" strategic game in which individual players through dynamic interlocking coalitions attempt to maintain and increase their wealth in a "free-market" economy of environmental advocacy. As Sebenius suggests: "Think of issues as different types of commodities and of negotiators as traders in a market. Depending on preferences, endowments, and institutional and legal arrangement, as well as on relative market power, certain items will enter the market and possibly be traded while others will be kept out" (Sebenius 1983, 283). Each individual organization within the Alliance can be seen as a rational, self-interested party attempting to maximize its utility in the marketplace.

This vague "utility" might be an organization's desire to lead on a particular issue, to increase a budget, or to gain a certain status in the eyes of others. Ultimately, the organization must capture funding from members, individual donors, and foundations in order to survive. An organization might capture funding by taking the lead on a particular issue, gather publicity as it does so, and consequently, bring in additional funding to fuel its growing success. While this economic view of environmental advocacy groups might be distasteful to those who view environmentalism as the promotion of a better and more ideal alternative to a polluting and rapacious industrial society, the model of environmental organizations as economic bargainers attempting to further their own organizational well-being does help explain the interactions within the Alliance. As a study of leadership development by the Conservation Fund initiated in 1988 concluded, "money and time" are foremost on the minds of conservation organization leaders (Snow 1992, 44). As one member of the Alliance said: "Groups often see one another as competitors. To the extent which it is true, it is remarkable, the competition over the number of dollars, influence, access to the press and legislators, and the competition for power" (Interview #9).

A. Claiming Value over Publicity, Money, and Leadership

1. Publicity: to say or not to say.

The "bruising" economic game takes place over such commodities as publicity, money, and leadership. The debate over Alliance publicity and a spokesperson can be explained in part by the different external working relationships of state and national groups. But the debate over publicity also entails a competition for control of the press among groups. Each group seeks out favorable press to advance its own image in the public eye. In a zero-sum game, national groups lose media attention by not making joint Alliance statements in regard to land acquisitions. National groups first coalesced in order to make the Northern Forest a national issue. Increasing press attention to the issue will lead to expansion of the campaign, particularly if the issue receives national press attention. Independent groups gain power by gathering attention in the press. Good publicity can lead to both more members and more funds. State groups gain, or at least maintain credibility by preventing such statements from being made. They maintain their own power within their state by limiting nationals "grab for press" and defending their turf from outside influence. Furthermore, they protect their working relationships with outside interest groups that might be offended and threatened by particular public statements.

As a particular example of this competition, in early 1994 a small "upstart" member of the Alliance received favorable press. The Bangor Daily News editorialized:

. . . a fledgling, energized environmental group . . . is wielding inordinate clout The organization has just two full-time staffers, 200 benefactors, and a mailing list of 3,000. . . . Maine's mainstream environmental organizations . . . have suffered attrition in political momentum to the new wave Greens and ad hoc activists in this state. They now have a new competitor to whom they turned over a dynamic niche market and tools to control the way land and water is used in the state (Woodward 1994, 10).

With recognition such as this, small independent groups are able to gain prestige, influence public opinion, and eventually, more members and their dollars. Groups unable to

influence the press, or who receive negative press, or likely to lose power in the outside political arena. Furthermore, they are also likely to lose influence within the Alliance itself, especially to the extent that the internal negotiation is linked to the larger environmental negotiation. In so much as any group can be successful in gaining press attention individually and outside the Alliance, the more compelling will be the need to grant this group increasing internal influence within the Alliance.

In the battle for the press, national and independent groups tend to band together, advocating for further publicity, particularly around public acquisition, while state groups oppose this publicity. A national group and an independent group caused turmoil in the Alliance when they wished to publish an article regarding the regional proclamation boundary entitled, "It Is Time to Draw A Line." Both independent and national groups support an Alliance spokesperson, but state groups typically do not. The press issue tends to lead to a national-independent coalition and a competing state coalition.

However, state group's opposition to national's publicity may have successfully slowed national group's attempts to seek out press and have even limited national's own internal publications, creating a reluctant coalition between national and state groups. At the same time, the Bangor Daily News piece offered credibility to an independent organization as has the publication of the Northern Forest Forum for another independent group. Unrestrained by the state and national groups' implicit agreement, independent groups under their own name have freely pursued and obtained credibility and legitimacy through both the mainstream press and independent publications.

2. Funding: the other kind of green.

Press attention is not the only commodity at stake in the environmental marketplace. Funding is a constant source of competition between groups. Regional and state groups typically have access to fewer than thirty funders for major financial support. While most groups report reliance on donations and membership fees as well, foundation

support typically makes up from forty percent to sixty percent of state and regional organizations' budgets. One member explained: "Each foundation often has a niche, be it forestry or sustainable agriculture. Some are state-based, some are New England-based. In any case, there aren't lots of them, but there are many groups" (Interview #8). While national groups typically obtain substantial funding from outside of the region, they too compete for regional dollars, as well as sometimes face financial woes. One national group, for instance, closed one state satellite office focused primarily on the Northern Forest and reorganized its regional office due to its need to achieve a balanced budget.

Money, or its perceived lack, creates continual friction among groups, between large and small groups, and even among the large national groups. Both state and national groups within the Alliance face financial conflicts of interest between the needs of their own organization, others' organizations, and the Alliance as a whole. Groups with fewer financial resources face constant anxiety that the resources of large groups will draw more funds to them and severely threaten poorer groups' continued existence. Furthermore, groups fear financially more powerful groups will have a larger say in the decision-making of the Alliance. To address these concerns, the Alliance has attempted to insure the equality of all groups in order to avoid creating a "second class" of citizens. For example, in a January 1994 meeting, one national member remarked in regard to the preparation of a joint umbrella funding proposal: "I fear creating different classes of citizens. Let's stay away from numbers by organizations. Does it mean if you become chair of a working group, you get \$10,000. Do we want to set it up so people would compete?" (Meeting notes, January 6, 1994).

However, at the next Alliance meeting this national organization felt compelled to promote its own efforts. As mentioned in the case study, the representative of this group remarked: "If by striking our name, this intimates an Alliance activity, it could strike a strange shadow on our own fundraising" (Meeting notes, February 2, 1994). Funder recognition of individual organizations satisfies not merely a need for prestige but a need

for the real dollars that might follow such recognition. This example illustrates that not just state groups, but all groups, are compelled to distinguish themselves from the Alliance. Equality of groups might be well and good, but the need for money and funder recognition requires that individual groups pursue their own individual self-interest by standing out from others. After all, if one group is no different than another, why should foundations want to fund one over the other? Individual organizations must continually watch out for their own well-being regardless of the collective efforts that take place.

Individual group interest also conflicts with the financial needs of the Alliance as an entity unto itself. One of the concerns of many groups, particularly state groups, is that the Alliance will compete for funds with the established organizational members. As one representative of an Alliance group stated: "There's a new kid on block -- raising its bright, happy face" (Interview #8). When state groups and some regional groups compare their own budgets to the Alliance, they find that the difference between the two has become increasingly smaller. The Alliance threatens, in their view, to become another equal and powerful competitor, competing side by side with more established groups for funding. On the other hand, for national groups, the budget of the Alliance is not overwhelming and appears both realistic and manageable. While state groups wish to restrict the financial growth of the Alliance, nationals appear to be supportive of the Alliance's expansion.

The politics of the state and national coalitions played out in the following statements that transpired in a discussion over the central Alliance's budget. One regional group said: "This is a large budget. I'm curious to the strategy about building up such large budget. If we get this kind of money, I hope we have a place to spend this." A state group concluded: "My organization also feels the numbers are very large. I agree with them [the regional group]." On the other hand, a national group responded: "When we look at our travel budgets, this is modest." And another regional group concurred: "We've already raised this much for half the year. My view is this is fairly modest. When

you add up all groups, it's \$3 million. 10 percent of the whole is modest for the central Alliance. This is a time to stretch, not rein staff in. It's a time to reach for our potential" (Meeting notes, February 2, 1994).

National groups may want to use the successful collaborative efforts of the Alliance to obtain further funding, or further power, which would explain their need to push joint public statements on major land acquisition as well as the need to encourage the growth of the central Alliance. One national group member noted: "There are great things to be gained if the issue gets increasing national attention. If it becomes a national issue though, state groups are not structured to compete. They don't know how to lobby in D.C. If the campaign moves national, state groups, or the largest or most powerful group in the state, face changes in the structure of things" (Interview #2). National groups serve to benefit by a nationally recognized campaign. The Alliance can become the vehicle for such a campaign. As one national member put it: "Centralized operation is what nationals are interested in" (Interview #6).

State groups may focus their competitive efforts on the Alliance itself as a competing organization, at least in part, to protect their own organizations and to minimize conflicts between existing and established state groups. State groups need one another as allies in the state coalition to equal, or at least combat, the power of the national groups. Any overt fighting over funding between state groups might lead to defections to the national coalition, isolating one or two state groups. This isolation would reduce such group's ability to participate in the Alliance, share in the joint gains the Alliance does achieve, and influence the national groups through the internal negotiations of the Alliance.

The independent groups tend to move between the state and national coalitions. In regard to money, the independent groups tend to align themselves with state groups. In regards to publicity, these groups tend to align themselves with the nationals. For a small, grassroots organization with limited funding, surviving on a shoe-string budget, anxiety

over funding is particularly acute. A budget rapidly exceeding one's own as well as increases in central Alliance staff, staff who will be paid salaries certainly higher than one's own, are two events likely to provoke a response from small and poorly funded groups.

While state and national groups once again form familiar coalitions in regard to financial resources, the two regional groups appear split on this matter. For one regional group, the Northern Forest issue is one of many issues tackled by the advocacy group. The Alliance as a separate entity might very well threaten the funding sources and prestige of this regional group. On the other hand, the other regional group is heavily invested in the Northern Forest issue, in terms of dedicated financial and staff resources. This group may see the growing Alliance, not as a threat to itself, but as a vehicle to greater regional visibility and strength. This proposition leads to the third important commodity in the environmental marketplace -- leadership.

3. Leadership: vision or control?

Leadership is closely linked to the other commodities in the environmental advocacy marketplace. Leadership means visibility, which means publicity, which means money. As one member put it: "There is the fear that some groups will become too powerful, will be looked at as leading the issue, then they'll obtain funding for it, leaving other groups high and dry" (Interview #2). Leadership is a prized commodity in the environmental marketplace. If a group can lead the charge, it can drive and influence the environmental agenda. Leadership means control. As one state member said: "Money has been a real problem which has brought the issue of control to the surface There is the perception that control of the Alliance rests with the chair. This means funding, access to funders, and it's caused a problem" (Interview #12). This bruising battle for the prized commodity of leadership has been most overt in the conflict over who ought to chair the Alliance. All groups covet this prize. As one national group representative

described: "They're [the regional group] the hub. While others would like to be, they're not able to right now, at least for the moment" (Interview #4).

By challenging the chair in the September 1993 meeting, state groups attempted to challenge the power, or at least the perceived power, of the Alliance chair. At least some groups perceive that the regional group has used the chair as a means to further individual organizational goals. These opponents argue that this chair role helped to not only change that particular organization's focus from recreation to conservation advocacy, but also to increase significantly its ability to leverage foundation dollars. As one member explained: "The organization spawned the Alliance and is closely tied to it. The observation is that the organization has used the Northern Forest issue to build itself, to grow in size as a result of involvement in this issue" (Interview #13).

This conflict over leadership tends to be one of the more suppressed conflicts between groups, and manifests itself usually in indirect attacks, rather than outright debate. For example, the states have expressed this conflict in terms of "concerns" about the dual roles of fiscal agent and chair. One state member said: "We've had concerns that the chair and the fiscal agent cause a conflict of interest" (Interview #11). In addition, rather than directly attacking the leadership, in one meeting a state group raised concerns about the tax status of the Alliance. The state group stated that the Alliance might be considered an independent 501(c)(3) despite its current "non-tax" status as an arm of the regional group, exposing the Alliance to outside suspicion about its financial arrangements. While the state group overtly expressed concern that this uncertain tax status would cause outside suspicion, one Alliance member explained later: "This issue, technical in nature, points to control" (Interview #12). The debates about the dual role of certain organizations, and the tax-status of the Alliance, have really been masked attacks on the leadership of the Alliance.

Those members who discussed the divisive issue of leadership believed that it was not addressed openly out of the implicit agreement to "not challenge a friend" and because

"it's hard to talk ill among friends." The question of leadership, while often not expressed openly, might be one of the most divisive potential issues within the Alliance. Why is this so? As the comments of these members suggest, personal relationships in the Alliance not only aid collaboration among groups as discussed earlier, they also obscure and intensify conflict. Coser argues that closely knit groups with a substantial degree of personal interaction tend to suppress conflict. He argues: ". . .the acting out of such feelings is sensed as a danger to such intimate relationships, and hence there is a tendency to suppress rather than allow expression of hostile feelings" (Coser 1956, 152). Since such hostilities are not expressed openly, they tend to accumulate and intensify. When conflict breaks out openly, the very "root of the relationship" may be threatened. Personal relationships within the Alliance tend to cut both ways. They can aid members in collaborating and minimizing conflict, while at the same time, such relationships can obscure or suppress conflict, so that it festers dangerously beneath the surface.

4. Power: who's on top?

Conflicts over money, publicity, and leadership suggest that power is an integral component of the negotiations as economic bargains.¹² At first glance, it might seem those groups with the largest market share, that is the national groups with the biggest budgets, more members, and professional resources, have the greatest relative market power in the environmental marketplace. Independent groups, with few resources, scrap at the bottom. State groups, most threatened and contentious, appear on the next rung of the ladder. The regional groups stand in the middle, and the national groups, least threatened by changes in working relationships, public image, funding and leadership as the issue moves from the state to the national stage, rest at the top. As one national group

¹²Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991) loosely define power as holding more resources such as money, connections, staff, knowledge, and weapons than others. They also detail such negotiation power as developing a better alternative to agreement, improving working relationships, understanding interests, inventing elegant options, and making carefully crafted commitments.

put it: "It is easier to be a national group. Not as many things threaten us" (Interview #2).

However, this hierarchy of power is not as simple as it seems. As Fisher argues, there are multiple sources of power in a negotiation including alternatives to agreement, people, interests, options, objective criteria and the power of commitment (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991, 179). State groups, in some respects, have less to lose if the Alliance were to fail. They can return to the politics as usual of their state. National groups, on the other hand, will have failed once again to promote a New England environmental issue as a national issue. Furthermore, state groups have been somewhat successful in limiting the press activities of national groups. For example, by encouraging the Alliance to put off discussion of the creation of a press spokesperson during most of 1993 and the first half of 1994, the state groups have essentially prevented this issue from being talked about let alone acted upon. State groups have successfully banded together despite their differences in an attempt to balance the power of the national and regional groups, groups which threaten to utilize state groups' traditional power base to further their own interests. While it might seem that the nationals would benefit from action separate from state organizations, the fact that all groups believe strong support at the state level will be necessary to advance and strengthen the recommendations of the Northern Forest Lands Council binds nationals to state groups despite the national groups' frustration. National organizations simply do not have the grassroots support that state groups can deliver.

While one might expect independent groups to have the least power in the coalition, they have far less to lose than more well-established groups in terms of prestige, recognition, members, and funding. Unlike the state groups with the power of an alternative to agreement if the New England environmental community cannot agree, the independent groups have power precisely because they have no real commitment to any alternative to agreement. Somewhat like free agents, they move between coalitions of groups in attempts to maximize their well-being. As one member said of one independent

group: "They're totally unencumbered" (Interview #7). These groups have advanced their own organizational welfare through working outside the Alliance, piggy-backing on the Alliance, and persuading others through good ideas.

First, independent groups have been particularly successful in furthering their own individual causes through the use of the mainstream and alternative press. While state and national groups locked horns over press strategies, the independent groups moved ahead despite the Alliance. This has lent them both credibility and power. As one national member said of the independently-produced newspaper: "The member has used it as a bully-pulpit for different voices. It's brought tangibility to the Northern Forest. It comes out on a regular basis. You can feel it and smell it. It is a real piece of paper. There must be something to the issue if this exists, people think. It has pictures, drawings, and opinions. It makes the issue tangible" (Interview #4).

Second, the independent groups, by being part of the Alliance, have also gained legitimacy by taking part in the work of more mainstream organizations. By taking part, they have prevented their marginalization by both outside groups and other environmental groups. Additionally, through participation in the Alliance, independent groups have gained access to large funders and developed professional relationships and personal friendships that they might not otherwise have had. Third, while the independent groups lack such resources as large budgets, professional and salaried staff, and well-developed organizational structure, they bring to the table a well-developed and strongly held set of values, as well as ideas for how to put these values into action. As a member said of one independent group: "They've come up with half the ideas" (Interview #3). The independent groups bring to the table the power of strongly held values and good ideas.¹³

At least one regional group has also advanced its own welfare through the Alliance. The coordinating regional group of the Alliance has been particularly successful

¹³For a further discussion of values and independent groups see Chapter Four.

in promoting the Northern Forest as an issue, the Alliance and its own organization. It has been able to leverage the participation of state and national groups, who are dependent on this one group's leadership to mitigate against the strong state-national coalition conflicts that might threaten to rend the Alliance in two. By playing a somewhat neutral role as a bridge between parties, by serving as the facilitator for collective action that might result in exceptional joint gains in political power and foundation funding, the regional group has gained a major leadership role in the New England environmental community.

B. Creating Value through Publicity, Leadership, and Money

While competition over power can lead to conflicts between organizations, and quickly turn into a bruising competitive game of "king of the mountain," Alliance groups also stand to jointly gain substantial benefits from collaborating rather than competing with one another. Collective action can lead to greater power for all participating groups. Individual organizations can share the specialized skills of each group. National groups can provide federal lobbying expertise, and skilled staff persons such as economists and long-time veterans of coalition-advocacy. State groups can bring a detailed knowledge of the workings of each state, as well as grassroots support through their members. Collective action can prevent duplication of effort, and delegate responsibility in an efficient manner. One member said: "There are so many research needs: economic research, economic programs, forest practices. You have to divide and conquer" (Interview #7). As Sebenius argues: ". . . though many people instinctively seek 'common ground' and believe that 'differences divide us,' it is often precisely the differences among negotiators that constitute the raw material for creating value" (Sebenius 1992, 29).

Ultimately, collective action provides a powerful message in the larger political arena outside the environmental community. The Alliance can increase the power of all its members in the larger negotiation between the Northern Forest Lands Council, state and federal legislators, other interest groups such as the major timber corporations and private

land owners, and the general public. One member stated: "You need public support. No single group could do this issue unless the entire conservation group spoke in a unified voice, not with thirty different messages" (Interview #7). As one national member put it: "Statements are a great deal more powerful if twenty some groups sign-on" (Interview #6).

Members of the New England environmental community may also bear costs for not participating in the Alliance. First, groups not participating do not have access to the funding obtained jointly by Alliance members. Second, groups not participating may be seen by the public as narrow-minded, parochial, not tending to a major issue in the region, and ultimately, left behind in the charge for leadership on an important environmental issue. As one member explained the reason for participation: "People didn't want to be left out" (Interview #4). Third, when groups do not participate, their peers in the environmental community may view the organization as having failed in the important collective effort to help save the Northern Forest. One member of the Alliance evaluated another group's exit from the coalition as: ". . . dropping out is just nuts. They could take credit without doing much. They could still back away if they wanted. It's unbelievable. It's a sign of complete implosion within the organization" (Interview #3).

1. Funding: Changing the Game

Alliance members stand to gain financially if they act collectively. As one Alliance member simply described it: "Dollars and the potential for fundraising brought people to the table" (Interview #7). Prior to the formation of the Alliance, the coalition of national groups had a difficult time obtaining foundation funding from regional funders. In addition, national groups acting on their own were not successful in drawing money from donations and new members through the Northern Forest issue. Regional and state groups had been more successful in raising foundation dollars. By coming together for research and inventory needs, they were able to obtain joint funding. But it was only

when these two separate coalitions began to draw money from the same funder, that the financial impetus for a coalition developed. This funder decided they wanted to make the Northern Forest a priority issue. One Alliance member described it this way: "We realized that we had to stop competing so much. One key funder . . . made it clear that if we wanted dollars, we'd have to stop this willy-nilly proposing around the Northern Forest. They wanted to see coordination. The reality of a major sugar daddy potentially putting in mega-bucks was too tempting not to comply" (Interview #4).

Other factors certainly aided increased collaboration, such as the formation of the two separate coalitions, increased dialogues between groups led by a regional group, and a growing awareness of the regional nature of the issue spurred on by the Governor's Task Force. However, money was a particularly powerful impetus for cooperation. Foundations outside the environmental community played a key role in bringing the Alliance together through potential offers of funding. Funders to a great degree control the marketplace of environmental advocacy. It was a dramatic shift in that market that compelled groups to come together. While groups anxiously continue to protect the financial health of their organizations, they must also limit their individual dollar-seeking in order to obtain further funding. The funders helped to substantially improve the separate organizations' self-interest in collective action. In short, funders changed the game.

2. Leadership: bringing the parts together.

Questions over leadership, as described earlier, can lead to intense conflict between groups. The competition for who gets to "rule the roost" can be particularly bruising. However, leadership can also substantially aid collaboration between groups. While the role of "coordinator" of the Alliance has led state groups to challenge a regional group, the actions of this regional group have also helped to bring the individual parties together. This regional group coordinated the first meeting, has served as chair through the life of the Alliance, and has acted as the coalition's fiscal agent. In the absence of a more formal

structure early in the Alliance's history, this regional group provided a surrogate one. As one national member put it: "They were crucial for coming together" (Interview #4). Another national member stated: "They are a regional group in the middle. They're positioned that way, and have accepted the role. Other groups can pivot around them. They act as bridge between the two groups [state and national groups]" (Interview #2).

This group stood in a particularly advantageous position to lead the formation of the Alliance for several reasons. First, they had the staff and facility resources to provide coordination such as mailings, minute taking, and as simple a resource as a place to hold the first Alliance meeting. Second, this regional group has historically been involved in the Northern Forest, primarily in New Hampshire, but also in Maine, and was instrumental in the establishment of the White Mountain National Forest at the turn of the century. Third, the group has significant membership in all four states, and was based in the region, rather than in Washington, D.C. for example, where many national groups are based. Fourth, the group was relatively free from bias, both geographically and politically. The group was located in Massachusetts, a part of New England, but separate enough from the Northern Forest so as to not create divisions between the state groups which would have developed had it been located in one of the four Northern Forest states. In addition, the group had not actively been involved in advocacy or litigation, and had a strong recreationally-based membership, thus making it more politically benign than some other regional or state groups. In short, it was ideally suited to act as a pivot between the various environmental groups in the region. It could act as a bridge between state and national groups. As one member stated: "The group is able to look up and down, not in a hierarchical way, but between. They're the hub" (Interview #4).

The skills of the individual representing this organization are important as well. As one member stated: "Almost everyone could work with him" (Interview #4).

Organizations are typically the unit of the analysis in this study because organizational necessities, affiliations, resources, and missions help explain the Alliance and its conflicts.

However, people and personalities also cannot be overlooked. Just as personal relationships bind individuals together within the Alliance, so too does the leadership of individuals help the Alliance coalesce.

The coordinator of the Alliance had represented a state group previously, and had been involved in the purchase of the Nash Stream easement. Through the management planning process, this individual had gained the respect of one of the more "radical" groups that was to later join the Alliance. The individual's low key style, calm manner, intelligence, strategic skills, and a willingness to take on a facilitative leadership role helped ease the initial anxieties of various groups, and later helped weather the storms the Alliance faced as it developed. One group member said: "He's the driving force" (Interview #5). Another member said: "There was much hostility between the state and national groups, lots of conflict. It's a real success we've come together on a common issue. That's a real miracle, a testament to him and his staff person. They had to keep an eye on the goal, to keep the Red Sea from crashing in" (Interview #10).

While leadership can threaten to tear the Alliance apart, it was certainly necessary to compel the establishment of the Alliance. While state groups may wish to further their own strength by challenging the leadership of the coalition, they also risk losing an integral element that has encouraged collaboration between the groups and led to the joint gains offered by cooperation. Of course, the role of leadership changes over time. As the Alliance has formalized, leadership by this particular group has become less important. As it becomes more established, the coalition can bear to delegate responsibility, as the election of vice and co-chairs attests to. In addition, different individuals at different times may take on the mantle of leadership to help improve collaboration among groups. For example, by asking group members to share their personal stories in the September 1991 meeting, one national member helped the members begin to see themselves personally as part of a larger collective effort. The reading of a letter by one state member in the April 1992 meeting provided the impetus for the Alliance to develop a more formal strategy and

internal organization. Another member has acted as a major source of new and innovative ideas. As one member explained in the case study: "One individual or another emerges at different times to become the leader of the moment. This is what we have to do, they say, with such force and such clarity" (Interview #9).

3. Managing Competition to Improve Collaboration.

The Alliance has also improved the opportunities for collaboration by managing the process so as to prevent competitive behavior among organizations from driving out attempts at joint cooperation. The Alliance has done this through such procedures as single-text negotiation, consensus decision-making, process opportunism, and strategic commitments.

The strategy notebook aided the Alliance in exploring interests, uncovering underlying values, and ultimately arriving at an overall strategy to which independent, state, regional, and national groups could lay claim. While the outcome was not a formal, ratified contract or agreement, the process of negotiating over the notebook helped center the group's efforts on a single document, provide a tangible, on-going record of their efforts, uncover underlying interests, and focus the members of the rubber room group on an objective text and not on each another. As Raiffa argues: "I have talked extensively to professional negotiators, who have reinforced my conclusion based on personal observation: many-party negotiations are often too diffuse to be effective unless they focus on a single negotiating text" (Raiffa 1982, 254).

Up until March of 1993, the decisions of the Alliance were made by consensus. Consensus decision-making allowed groups anxious over decision-making in the new coalition, such as state and independent groups, an incentive to participate. Because a majority vote could not silence a minority opinion, state and independent groups could be assured that their wishes would not be overruled. Particularly for state groups, this

allowed them to go slowly, vetoing any potential action or decision that might threaten their influence with external relationships and their control over their home turf. As one member said: "As a principle, it was the only way to keep some groups within the Alliance. People didn't feel they were going to get steamrolled by whatever faction" (Interview #12). This voting rule also allowed flexible participation in the coalition by other groups. Since there was no incentive for minimal majority coalitions to form, as would happen in an organization governed by a majority voting procedure, Alliance members did not have to debate the entrance or exit of most organizations. In turn, this probably prevented bruising battles over membership that would have resulted from constant attention to the potential of new majorities that might have overwhelmed particular organizations.

However, the Alliance discovered that consensus decision-making had its limitations. First, while insuring "buy-in" by all parties, consensus decision-making often did not prove efficient in terms of effort and time. One state member said: "Everybody feels they have to participate in every decision. People take on tasks like editing that are better left to subcommittees or individuals" (Interview #12). Second, because any one group retained veto power over any decision, the coalition had to discuss and debate issues until they were resolved and agreed upon by everyone, or such issues were tabled due to lack of agreement. This tabling of contentious but important issues may have added to the complaints of state groups that the issue of leadership was not dealt with directly, and that the complaints of nationals that a spokesperson for the Alliance has not been adequately addressed. While the consensus voting rule brought reluctant groups on board, it also has frustrated decision-making within the coalition, and possibly buried important issues, thus exacerbating lingering disagreement and hidden conflict. Third, some members saw consensus not as agreement, but as coercion. One member said: "I have no problem with disagreement. But other groups will not only say something's a bad idea, they'll say we're undercutting their efforts. They say people lump all conservation

groups together thus what you do affects us. You are going to polarize people. So we oppose it, they say. I think it's enforced consensus" (Interview #3).

The coalition has dealt with the frustration over consensus decision-making in at least two ways. First, in such contentious issues as publicity, the Alliance agreed to allow flexible sign-on of public documents. Once a joint document was prepared by Alliance members, each individual organization had the option to sign or not. Even to date, no public documents are signed onto jointly as the Alliance. This "compromise" has allowed national groups to press their agenda publicly, while allowing state groups who might be more reluctant to sign-on to certain documents or position statements to gracefully refuse such agreement. Documents may be agreed upon at meetings, but organizations still retain the right of refusal upon signing the document. As one state member said: "This gives us the flexibility to agree when we agree, and not to be lumped into the same bunch when we don't agree" (Interview #11). This sign-on rule has preserved the spirit of consensus at the table, while allowing for less than full Alliance participation in action away from the table. One national member described it this way: "There's broad recognition for media with some moderately active passivity. In other words, there's agreement to let others do it by not actively standing in the way" (Interview #15). However, as some members have complained, this sign-on rule has tempered the power of the collective message that the Alliance could deliver with full agreement to external decision-makers in the Northern Forest Lands Council, state legislatures, and Congress.

Second, the Alliance mitigated the drawbacks to consensus by simply changing the decision rule. As of August of 1993, the Alliance amended their decision-making rule to state that the Alliance would "strive for consensus (where consensus does not necessarily imply unanimity)" and take a "two-thirds majority necessary to adopt a decision" where consensus could not be achieved (Memorandum, August 5, 1993). With the formerly reluctant groups of the Alliance now more invested in the coalition, and the need for a more efficient decision-making rule increasing as the time for an intensive public campaign

drew closer, the Alliance could more formally establish voting rules that would facilitate quick decision-making.¹⁴ However, this decision came at the risk that some "minority" groups might leave the Alliance as they realized they could no longer influence Alliance policy or strategy. While this has not happened, the full implications of this new voting rule have not probably yet been played out. In addition, since the new rule does not precisely specify when consensus is not achieved, the new rule has left unclear precisely how the Alliance should act when strong disagreement arises. The Alliance must now answer: is consensus "not achieved" after one hour of debate has elapsed, one day of debate, or after a consensus has been achieved that there is no consensus?

The members of the Alliance have also encouraged collaboration by decreasing the incentive for Alliance meetings to become a forum for fundraising and grandstanding by executive directors. The Alliance asked the executive directors to stay at home. Lax and Sebenius deem this "process opportunism:" ". . . tactics that depend on more complex structural or process restrictions such as who can directly talk with whom, how information is transmitted, who may speak for whom, and which parties must approve the actions of others" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 188).

In the beginning of the Alliance, one member stated: ". . . there were bitter meetings early on with the executive directors. Since they were charged with maintaining their organization's identify, they couldn't work together" (Interview #7). Another Alliance member stated: "There was so much ego in the previously existing conflict, it was counterproductive to get together" (Interview #15). Executives were too worried about the prestige and financing of their organizations, while the program staff could have the "luxury", as one member called it, to focus on the broader policy issues. The Alliance,

¹⁴The Northern Forest Lands Council (NFLC) was set to release their Findings and Options in September, and the Alliance expected that the Draft Recommendations would soon follow. The Draft Recommendations would serve as the basis for the report that the NFLC would deliver to Congress. Consequently, Alliance groups wanted to encourage grassroots activists and others to make both written and oral comments to the NFLC.

primarily led by a regional and national group, opted to include only program staff people not directly involved in the on-going fundraising and financial administration of the organizations in the month-to-month workings of the coalition. As mentioned in the case study, foundations later supported this process intervention by requesting that only the program staff attend the 1993 funders' briefing.

The competitive-collaborative structure of the Alliance now begins to look more complex. While the state and national groups account for two Alliance coalitions, with the national-independent and national-regional groups as two other coalitions, the Alliance is also a coalition of program staff of each organization set apart from their particular organization's executive director. By removing the competitive players from the table, collaborative efforts are more likely to take place. Furthermore, this establishes a relatively stable structure because it's unlikely that executive directors outside the program staff would form any kind of counter-coalition with one another precisely due to their competitive nature. Of course, this structure also creates problems by adding to the complexity of the negotiations away from the table. As one member put it: "The problem with not having them [the executive directors] at the meetings is that we cannot make real decisions" (Interview #3). Program staff, no matter how successful at collaborating with one another, must still return to their executive directors to convince them of strategy and policy.

However, the coalition of program staff can influence this negotiation away from the table through strategic commitments by participants at the table. Program staff may not be able to directly commit to policies and strategies. However, by hammering out hard won agreements with other program staff before returning to their directors, they can use the power of the program staff coalition to negotiate with their executive directors. "You mean, I spent an entire day hammering this out, and now you tell me it's all wrong," a program staff member might say, "What am I supposed to do? Go back and throw up my hands? We'll look terrible. I'll look terrible." As Lax and Sebenius note: "To the

extent partial or full commitment to an emerging interpretation or agreement resulted from such subgroup interactions, it could become harder subsequently to dislodge" (Lax and Sebenius 1991, 186). In addition, the program staff coalition may invent options that never occurred to individual organizations. Staff can return to their organization to persuade their director to consider a whole new approach to a problem or issue.

Of course, the implicit coalitions between program staff and their executive staff can also be used as bargaining chip to counter the program staff coalition. At one Alliance meeting a state group responded to a call for consensual approval of the central Alliance budget by stating: "I have to run it by our new executive director to see if it is kosher" (Meeting notes, February 2, 1994). Individual members of the program staff coalition can refuse to commit to decisions by strategically appealing to their absent executive directors.

C. *Creating and Claiming Value in the Environmental Marketplace*

Within a web of relationships, members of the Alliance must negotiate over a host of issues. Cross-cutting coalitions from both within and without the Alliance, diverse sources of power, and the uncertainty of best promoting individual organizational self-interest through individual pursuit or collective action make the dynamics of the Alliance complex. This analysis of the conflict and collaboration between environmental groups suggests that the very factors that can lead to one, also lead to another. Personal relationships can lead to cooperation between groups, and can also threaten unity by repressing the expression of conflict. The search for publicity can advance one group's interests over another, aiding groups in developing a reputation, gaining prestige, members, and money. But publicity can also provide power for all groups. Joint gains come from acting publicly in unison to influence decision-makers to advance everyone's interests. Money can lead to intense competition between groups intent on maintaining and improving their own financial well-being. But money can also bring groups together, particularly when suppliers of that money literally change the game from one of

competition to one of collaboration. Leadership can provide a particularly choice reward for any one group, threatening other groups, but without leadership, collaboration and the joint gains that result are much less likely. The causes of conflict and collaboration are not easy to untangle from one another. As Sebenius reports of an eminent scholar and public figure: ". . . he had known that conflict could coexist with common interest but had thought, or taken for granted, that they were essentially separable, not aspects of an integral structure." (Sebenius 1992, 30). Conflict and collaboration are intimately interwoven with one another.

Dynamics within the Alliance do not necessarily look that different than companies vying for market share, or lobbyists competing for congresspersons' votes. In this sense, the dynamics within the Alliance seem little different than the dynamics of the marketplace or the dynamics of interest group politics. The Alliance, rather than being exceptionally different from the larger political scene, is simply a microcosm of the larger negotiation. While in the outside game, "everywhere there are interest groups shouting to protect their piece of a limited economic pie," so are there different environmental groups vying to protect and promote their piece of the environmental advocacy marketplace (Norton 1991, 10). On the other hand, because the market is so small, and the players are so few, this "inside" negotiation is even more intense than the bruising external battle of interest group politics. As one Alliance member said of some groups: "They're willing to blast each other, but not the forest industry. If they did the same thing to the forest industry as they did to one activist, I'd be happy" (Interview #3). The battle for "good" press and the control of the press, the limited resources of foundations, private donors, and members, and the importance of leadership in building and maintaining organizational strength all lead to particularly intense conflict between groups. In this sense, Alliance negotiations are not merely a microcosm of the larger political negotiations, but an intensification and concentration of the competitive dynamics of broader environmental negotiations.

However, the threat of a common enemy can encourage fiercely competitive groups to put their pursuit of self-interest aside for the collective interest in combating and defeating this common enemy. Coser calls this "antagonistic cooperation" and describes it as: ". . . the combination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed" (Coser 1956, 140). From the inside, the Alliance can appear to be an intensification of the pursuit of self-interest expected in larger and more diverse public forums. However, when wise use groups or the Council support positions most Alliance groups can agree are worth fighting, the Alliance can suddenly seem to coalesce. When stakes increase, and outside threats as well as opportunities approach, groups may put their individual claims aside. As an example, as the Northern Forest Lands Council's public listening sessions approached in March of 1994, the Alliance monthly meeting focused far less on matters of internal concern, and far more on getting grassroots support out to the sessions, questioning the Draft Recommendations of the Council, and considering how to precede as the Council completed its work.¹⁵ One independent member's hopes seemed to be confirmed. Just prior to these listening sessions, the member stated: "I hope differences dissolve during the listening sessions. They're the product of idle hands. I think we have to worry about how to work when engaged. Now that the listening sessions are on, we have to go down or stay up together" (Interview #5).

III. Core Values: The Alliance as a Forum for Dialogue and Debate

Within the complex web of relationships described in Section I, over publicity, funding, leadership and other issues discussed in Section II, members of the Alliance must negotiate. At times, the dynamic of the Alliance appears to be a web of relationships in

¹⁵The Listening Sessions were public meetings held across New England so that Northern Forest Land Council members could hear the comments of the public on the Draft Recommendations they released in March 1994.

which individual actors are pulled in different directions as they seek to maintain or build relationships with other parties, either within or outside the Alliance. At other times, the dynamic of the Alliance appears to be a marketplace of commodities, where individual actors strive to maximize their self-interest through the uncertain and precarious balance between individual and collective action, between claiming and creating value. Viewed together, individual actors in the Alliance, attempting to maximize their organizational utility, responsible to diverse relationships that may cause conflict both between parties, and difficult choices for any one party, must negotiate over and between a range of issues that may inspire collaboration within coalitions, or conflict with rival coalitions.

However, this view is still incomplete. Many members of the Alliance expressed hope that they might be the "mothers and fathers" of a revitalized environmental movement in New England. They hoped they might look back and tell their children of their accomplishments in saving the land and its people from excessive development, corporate clear cutting, and international exploitation. Others expressed belief that out of the Alliance might arise a new vision for the Northern Forest, a new perspective from which all New Englanders might look out at and act toward the landscape. One national member argued: "The Alliance is an exceptional group of people. We can do something important. It's bigger than just this issue. We can be an example for others. Our philosophy is: if we want to change the landscape, how do we make changes within the Alliance, respect each other, and care for the land? We can prove that a diverse group can come together and stay together, that on some things, you can't shake us from them" (Interview #2).

Formal negotiation analysis, while explaining many dynamics of the Alliance, does not seem to adequately take full account of these feelings about, if not the actuality of, the work of the Alliance. As Dorfman argues in the afterword to When Values Conflict: Essays on Environmental Analysis, Discourse, and Decision: ". . .we frequently do not admit that we are motivated by higher values. They are considered to be inappropriate in

hard-headed analysis, and indeed, the analyst is constantly enjoined to keep his personal preferences (i.e., higher values) out of his analysis. Our argument entails that higher values do have a proper and necessary place in any analysis" (Tribe, Schelling, and Voss 1976, 167). As one national member stated: "There are core values in the Alliance and the public that are held strongly, but not recognized, so they have no validity in decision-making. We need someone to lead the way" (Interview #2). By taking values into account in this analysis of the Alliance, one might view the Alliance not just as a negotiation, but as a forum, not unlike a modern-day public square where both the business of the market and the business of law and ethics are conducted. In a forum, members of a community seek to meet their individual needs and to discuss the collective business of the community. At the forum, people meet, relationships develop, goods are haggled over and traded, ideas are debated, and the community both discusses and expresses its deeply held values and beliefs.

A. The Underlying Debate between Conservationists and Preservationists

In the midst of the complex multi-party dynamic, the parties in the Alliance must not only address different interests, but also the historic and philosophic dilemma between the "conservationist" and "preservationist" ethic in American environmental thought. As Norton concluded in a study to uncover the common ground between philosophers and environmental/natural scientists, the dilemma for environmentalists is speaking of value, that is, the intrinsic worth of nature, in two inadequate languages, loosely defined as conservation and preservation. Norton argues that the dilemma for environmentalists is a "dilemma in values, conceptualizations, and world views . . ." (Norton 1991, 5). Thus, environmentalists are faced with more than the difficulties of managing between a complex set of internal and external relationships and balancing between claiming and creating value based on one's self-interest.

Preservation and conservation, or preservation and stewardship as Dizard describes them, are familiar dichotomies that are represented in the Alliance. Groups, rather than simply describing themselves in one or the other term, tend to combine elements of both ethics. Consequently, groups lie on a spectrum of values that stretch from strongly held preservationist beliefs to a firm commitment to conservation and resource use on the other, without a necessarily clear division between the two schools of thought being apparent.

1. Independent Groups

Where the Alliance's divergent values become most prominent, is not between state groups, nor even necessarily between state and national groups, but between independent groups and the rest of the Alliance. Here is where Dizard's distinctions between stewardship and preservation, rights and responsibilities, become most prominent. One of the two independent group members explained it this way:

I enjoy the real world. It gives me a sense of security. Most things are uncertain, unclear, but with our work there are two certainties: 1) if it doesn't happen, bad things will follow; 2) we're not trying to impose an ideological basis on ecosystems. We're trying to insist that human activity has a heavy impact, that it be done respectfully, according to the limits of reality. If you can justify clear cutting scientifically, though I doubt you can, I'll listen. I feel like when the natural world shows us that we're wrong, we'd do well to change our tune. Put the burden of proof on those with the untenable position. We can't fail in the court of truth. We will prevail, not to win, but because of biotic integrity. We'll be freed to be free to cleanse ourselves. Wilderness is fun, there's no place like it (Interview #5).

For this member, nature is not merely a place to recreate, or a place to protect from harmful human activity, it is the highest court of law, where right or wrong in certain and practical significance are determined. In this member's view, it's not merely that natural things ought to be ascribed rights, but that the natural world determines right and wrong. In the state and even national members' expression of values, humans are the ones that must balance stewardship and preservation, right and wrong, truth and lies. The court

remains a human one where people sit on the bench weighing the alternatives. For this independent member, humans are being judged, not nature. In this case, nature is not only ascribed rights, it is right. It is the final arbiter of truth, justice and even existence. This member stated: "The ecological integrity of the region is not a resource: it is the source of continued life; it is the life-support system" (Correspondence, March 23, 1992). For preservationist-minded Alliance members, the Northern Forest is not a resource to be used or not used, it is the very sustenance of life.

Another independent group described a somewhat similar outlook on the natural world and the problems that face the Northern Forest region. This member argued:

We are not anti-people. Groups are very defensive about putting people first. Ecological reality determines everything else though. You cannot ignore. If we ignore, it doesn't matter what we do to ourselves. We have to worry about taking nature into account, the way we have treated nature. The emergency is with nature, not people. There aren't people starving and pestilence here, though there are problems. But with nature, with species destruction, dams, pollution, abused ecosystems. Our baseline is 1492, the last time the Northern Forest was healthy, an ecologically sustainable system. We need to leave things the way they are, patch things back together, emulate the processes and systems of the past. The working forest doesn't work (Interview #3).

This independent member, much like the other independent group, ascribes to the belief that the foundation of truth rests in the natural world, or in an "ecological reality". Nature is the final judge, and yet, it is a justice system threatened with great harm. The verdict might well be delivered in the annihilation of both the defendants and the judge. While other groups within the Alliance may be wary of the industrial society, this member rejects it outright and calls for a return to nature as best we can. This member said:

"Conservationists have been worried about people, clean air, clean water, and toxics. But no one works on conserving wilderness, on native system rehabilitation. I reject the paradigm as is. I base it on ecoreality as best we can know it from science. And we know quite a lot. If political reality is not in line, then we need to change it. Political

reality is whatever you want it to be. Let's change it" (Interview #3). For this independent group, people are the problem. Nature is consistent, permanent and absolute. Humans and their institutions are inconsistent, temporal, and malleable. As Dizard's argument suggests, it is human institutions that must be molded to nature in the preservationist ethic.

2. *National Groups*

National groups, while not typically as "radical" as independent groups, tend to fall towards the preservationist view of the environmental values spectrum. However, they differ in that nature is viewed less as the final arbiter of justice, and more so as an entity with which our own human community must find a way to properly overlap. The independents tend to view nature as the overreaching and fundamental source of justice and truth, the court where humans will meet their judgment, one way or another. In this sense, these independent groups go beyond Dizard's ascription of rights to natural objects, to the notion that it is nature that is in fact the granter of rights, responsibilities, and fundamentally, existence itself. The nationals appear to view nature less like an avenging god or stern judge, and more as a system misunderstood by humans, and in threat of destruction by human activity and ignorance. In this sense, nationals are struggling with an understanding of the ideal relationship between humans and nature, whereas the independents are more clear that the relationship is clearly wrong and must be changed. One national member, traditionally one of the more staunch advocates for preservation, stated:

Traditionally, we have "blocked up" public lands that we should stay out of. This has been good and necessary work. But in a sense this is dividing up the landscape. How do people relate to this? We can't protect the whole landscape until we see how the parts fit together. Setting aside parcels is part of puzzle, but not all of it. By setting up this office to work with private lands, I see we have a role in piecing together this puzzle. We have an economist looking at rural economics, how resources are used, for example (Interview #2).

While this member was more reluctant to expressly say that humans have a place in the natural world, this national group has begun to shift its focus toward an understanding not merely of the preservation of nature, but of the integration of humans into nature.

Another national group stated an even more overt philosophy that struggles to combine preservation and stewardship: "Nature as a community and people as community are totally interdependent. . . . We can't have a breakdown in the human community. If the human community falls apart, it effects the environment. We can't keep human communities "sustainable" if we destroy the natural community. If we do that, we destroy ourselves." (Interview #10). While nationals may fall toward the preservationist end of the ideological spectrum, they are struggling with the role of humans in this preservationist ethic, and the place of humans in the natural landscape.

3. State Groups

State groups generally express values that fall more toward the stewardship end of the ideological spectrum. However, at least some state groups echoed a similar desire as the nationals to better understand the choices between stewardship and preservation. One state member stated: "It's easy to have Yellowstone, just draw a boundary. The hard part is to include the working forest, to include communities without demeaning the quality of the natural environment and without making second class citizens of people. . . . We're not focused just on wildlands or people, but ways to benefit both in the long-run" (Interview #14). What distinguishes this group from other state groups is its more hard-hitting advocacy for large scale land acquisition. In fact, this group was established with the strong support of a national group that was intimately involved in the Alaska Lands Act of the late 1970's that set-aside over 100 million acres for parks and wildlife refuges. In this sense, of the state groups, this organization falls furthest toward the preservation end of the spectrum. As one member described the difference: "That group is much more wilderness advocacy than ours with our land trust and education components. Our take is tempered by this role" (Interview #11).

The four state groups that typically form the most solid coalition against nationals tend to distance themselves from the more overt preservation philosophies and positions, certainly of the independent groups, and also of the national groups. One state member said: "Our view includes humans. We are not hard core preservationists, though we do fight to preserve wilderness. We do get involved, but we're much more interested in working out the relationship between humans and the environment" (Interview #1). Another state member stated: "We see that nature, the natural world, is a key component to the human condition. That without a healthy environment, the quality of life is diminished. Some definitely try to portray us as a preservationist group, but we have no problem with the working forest. Man can exist in and can be a steward, can improve upon the conditions received from the last generation" (Interview #12). As another state member said: "The three of us are not super environmental advocacy groups. We are land and resource based groups that are struggling to resolve natural resource conflict, not beating down big environmental causes so to speak" (Interview #11).

However, even the state group with the closest ties to forestry, a traditional proponent of the conservationist call for the wise use of resources, must struggle with its dual mission to wisely use the state's natural resources and to completely reserve areas of special beauty. In this sense, the organization, unlike a professional forestry association, attempts to bridge the gap between conservation and preservation. For this organization, it is a continual challenge to determine precisely how the tension ought to be addressed. "How do we test to figure out how much shouldn't be managed? We tend to be site specific. When others say, "We need 50 percent set aside" I wonder, "Where do they come up with the numbers" (Interview #11), However, while this organization does not fall squarely on the stewardship end of environmental values, it represents most strongly the stewardship model. Unlike any of the other state groups, this group holds land in trust and derives income from the on-going stewardship of forested land.

B. How Differences in Values Lead to Conflict

It is probably no accident that two of three objectives set out by the rubber room group included both "protection" of public lands and "conservation" of private lands. The Alliance as an organization wrestles with the "radical" preservationist values expressed by some members of the coalition, typically independent and national groups, and the more "status quo" conservationist values of other groups, typically state groups. This tension between these two strains of environmental values creates conflict. As one member said: "The spectrum of philosophies representing the Alliance causes problems. Some groups are inherently conservative and some are more radical. Coming up with policies, positions, and strategies that meet everybody's needs is hard" (Interview #12). Opposing views of nature have contributed to such conflicts as debates over publicity, precisely because the independent groups favor a large scale change to existing practices, including major land acquisition and the establishment of ecological reserves. On the other hand, state groups adamantly oppose such large-scale change, and expect to work with, not entirely against, such opposing interests as timber corporations who extol the virtues of the "working forest."

This clash of values has also arisen in the question of who belongs at the Alliance table. The forestry association historically tied to extensive forest use as well to the current timber industry, could not maintain its membership in the Alliance. Just before resigning, the association "quibbled" with the statement that "conservationists" opposed such forest purchases, and argued that a better label for such groups would certainly be "preservationists" (Correspondence, June 23, 1993). At least some groups within the Alliance had seen the sale of major tracts of lands to another timber-products corporation as further evidence of the unraveling of the region's ecological health. But for the association, forestry, albeit good forestry, was their very bread and butter. The association valued resource use too much to fit into the more conservation-preservation values of the other Alliance organizations. Some Alliance members were particularly

incensed at the notion the association would be connected with a major timber corporation. This seems to suggest the rift that Crowfoot and Wondolleck point out when they describe environmentalism as advocating the position that only "under a new philosophy and technology of social production" can the relationship between society and the environment be repaired (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, 14). Not merely the association itself, but the forestry group's association with "industrial society" through its manifestation in a major timber-products corporation, complete with smokestacks spewing billowing white clouds of putrid-smelling smoke into the cool air of an otherwise pristine countryside, may have been rejected by the Alliance.

The dichotomy between preservationist and stewardship values help explain some of the conflicts within the Alliance. The forestry association left, in part, because they fell too far toward the stewardship-conservation end of the ideological spectrum. The debate about major land acquisition may, in part, be about clashing values between those who value stewardship and those who value preservation. The debate over both the greenline article and the brochure suggest that a state group, uncomfortable with the push of a national and an independent group towards the preservation end of the spectrum, caused them to fight such a threat to their values. State groups may coalesce in part because of their similarly held values, and may minimize conflict within this internal coalition by viewing other groups as "too radical", shoring up their own values against a possible onslaught by the more adamantly preservationist independent groups. On the other hand, by continuing to work with, or at least tolerate, the independent groups as part of the Alliance, the state groups implicitly condone these preservationist values in a way that they would not or could not in regard to the conservationist values of the forestry association.

While clashing values play a role in the conflicts within the Alliance, such conflicts can also be explained in part by differing political roles. In the case study, one member of the Alliance described the resignation of the forestry association as follows: "A couple of

leaders had made the effort to be committed, but as the Alliance became more an advocacy group, the professional group clashed" (Interview #9). Another member said political or strategic values held by different groups play as much a role in conflicts between groups as deeply held values about nature and human being's relationship to it. This member said: "Some are very activist where others are not activist at all. Some may talk to legislators, but not view themselves as a lobby. More so, they see themselves as an organization that promotes from an educational point of view" (Interview #15). Some groups focus more on education, others more on advocacy, and others more on scientific expertise and technical development. Some groups have registered lobbyists, others are comprised primarily of attorneys, and yet other groups draw from grassroots activists. These differences in means -- how to achieve a goal -- not ends -- the goal to be achieved -- certainly also contribute to conflict within the Alliance.

C. Changing Values and the Search for Vision

While conflicts based on values might threaten to break the Alliance apart at its seams, such conflict over values is neither ultimately nor necessarily divisive. It is not all together clear that groups share fundamentally different values. Some members argued that their values fundamentally differed from others. One independent member said: "There is no vision for the Alliance because fundamentally we don't agree. You might have some people say we agree in general. Some groups do have similar goals. But most of these groups want to maintain status quo. They got into it to prevent change. They believe fundamentally in the Council's 'existing land use patterns have served the region well'" (Interview #3). However, other members argued that Alliance members shared certain fundamental beliefs. One national member of the Alliance stated: "We share basic values: a love of the land, concern for future generations, our responsibility. That's what we go back to. In this sense, we're interchangeable" (Interview #2). While conservationist and preservationist values are often posited as contrasting extremes, as the

spectrum of ideologies explored in a previous section suggests, groups values tend to be more ambiguous and less certain than the terms used to describe them. Thus, claims of stark value differences might very well be explanations concealing differences in interests, namely, which groups get to take the lead and achieve success in implementing those values.

Several groups mentioned that their values were in a state of flux. More than one group had recently revised their mission statement, a direct expression of the values the organization hopes and believes underlie it. Consequently, values, while seemingly fixed and impervious to change, can often be in a state of flux. Tribe (1976) argues that values are not necessarily the reliable well-spring from which interests and actions arise. Rather, values themselves may be in a state of flux. Tribe argues:

. . . perhaps in environmental matters even more than in others, most people lack clearly arguable ends and values at any given time, and have only vague ideas about what they might regard as desirable or undesirable; such inchoate values are crystallized into distinct preferences or criteria of choice only through the concrete process of seeking means to attain them and gradually discovering what such means entail. There is no "spook . . . which posits values in advance" (Tribe 1976, 68).

While Alliance groups fall differently upon the ideological spectrum, a surprising number of national, regional, and state groups expressed a common struggle to understand the relationship between humans and the natural world. Alliance groups share the current dilemma faced by the environmental movement at large as expressed by Snow. He argues: "There has emerged within the movement no shared, positive understanding of the human relationship to the natural world. Consequently, environmentalists lack a consensually accepted set of ideals and values. They therefore ricochet back and forth between two apparently exclusive world views and sets of value assumptions" (Snow 1991, 9). What Alliance groups appear to have in common is not any well-articulated and collective vision of the human-environment relationship, but a shared desire to develop this vision. In

search of this vision, the groups are buffeted and pulled apart by two divergent historical perspectives that are powerful but insufficient.

The issue of trust mentioned by so many members appears to be bound up with this search for a collective vision. One national member described it this way: "Trust is being able to work together on common goals, to trust in the community. It has to do with forgiving and forgetting past grievances, deciding with honesty. To a degree, the common goal or issue is more important than the success of any organization. The end is not a successful organization, but a strong, healthy environment. They are means, not ends." (Interview #10). The personal relationships that are so important to the collaboration of individual members of the Alliance is bound up with trust, which is in turn bound up with at least some sense of a common goal or vision. In this sense, trust extends beyond Fisher, Ury and Patton's broad implicit definition of knowing someone well. Trust is also knowing that you share some common vision for the future.

This search for common vision is what, in particular, makes the Alliance unique from typical environmental negotiations among diverse interest groups such as environmentalists, developers, business persons, and others. In these typical negotiations, the parties may reach a shared set of overlapping interests, or at least strive toward a zone of possible agreement. Parties may be able to work together, and even like each other, but they may not come to the trust born from developing, expressing, and sharing common values. The parties in the Alliance, at least at times, are working towards, or at least longing for, more than a common interest, or the maximum value of their shared interests. Alliance members are seeking a common vision of the future, a vision of the ideal relationship between humans and the environment. In this sense, the Alliance is a negotiation within a larger forum, a place where citizens of the environmental community exchange goods and discuss and debate who they are and what they stand for.

Members of the Alliance are struggling toward a language of value that extends beyond mere individual self-interest. Tribe argues: "The translation of all values into

individualistic, want-oriented terms thus creates . . . distortions. . . . an inchoate sense of obligation toward natural objects is flattened into an aspect of self-interest . . ." (Tribe 1976, 74). To view the Alliance only in terms of interests, overlapping interests, and zones of possible agreement is to flatten the Alliance itself into an endeavor no different than bargainers in a marketplace haggling over fruit, or traders on the floor exchanging commodities. That the marketplace model helps explain many dynamics of the Alliance is not to say that it captures, however, the full dynamics of the Alliance. For the assumption that at least some Alliance members make is that natural resources are not necessarily commodities at all. Even more conservationist-minded organizations struggle with the question: to what extent do natural resources represent commodities, and to what extent do they represent something else? This is not merely a negotiation over interests, or uncertainty over individual wants, but a philosophical questioning of the nature of nature as Dizard describes it.

To view the Alliance only in terms of interests is to view reason only in the service of passion, and not passion in the service of reason. Tribe argues: "For the premises of secularized transcendence deny the existence of anything sacred in the world and reduce all thought to the combined operations of formal reason and instrumental prudence in the service of desire" (Tribe 1976, 77). While the interest-based approach tends to premise all argument on the validity of individual wants, the value based approach attempts to turn this underlying dictum on its head. As Hardin (1968) points out in his metaphor of the tragedy of the commons, human reason, in the service of human wants, can lead to collective disaster, and the annihilation of the individual carrying individual self-interest to its logical, but ultimately, self-annihilating end. To see the actions of the Alliance as both a debate about values, and a struggle toward value, is to see passion in the service of reason. In other words, deeply felt values and beliefs, in their seeming fuzziness, their resistance to hard, rigorous, analytical argument, come in the end to serve reason, the imminently reasonable and practicable realization that it is not wise to foul our own nest,

that in fact, such behavior is deadly. This is more than pushing the Pareto-frontier to its maximum and staking a claim on the maximized curve. In a sense, it is asking fundamentally in which direction the Pareto-frontier lies in the first place.

To consider the Alliance interactions, in part, as a debate over values and the potential for achieving a transformative set of shared values is to consider the Alliance in a fuller light. In this light, not only may parties, issues and interests change over time, but so may the fundamental values that inform individual actors and their motivations and actions. The Alliance is not only a set group of interrelated parties, a place of exchange, of barter and trade, but it is also a place of debate, a place for exploration and understanding, a place for questioning and searching for one's "rightful" or "truthful" place in the world. This is not to say that negotiation is not what goes on, to a great extent, only that it is not inclusive of all activities that are carried out and interactions that occur. As in a Roman forum, the "business" of the Alliance extends beyond the exchange of goods.

Protected from the more threatening realm of public politics, safe from misinterpretation by adamant opponents such as the wise-use advocates, members of the Alliance are free to express the uncertainty and ambiguity about their basic values and beliefs. In this more private forum a discussion over values, over the unknown relationship between humans and the nature, can take place. Within this debate lies the potential for a transformation, as Coser suggests, a transformation of relationships, of issues, and of values that motivate and inform the individual members of the Alliance. Coser argues: "At times, however, common values and norms develop in the course of struggling together. In this event the coalition or association may slowly become transformed into a more permanent group" (Coser 1956, 146). By entering into the dialogue of the Alliance, knowingly or not, organizations embark on a process that challenges, tests, and possibly transforms not only their organizational interests, but their values, identities, and relationships.

While Sebenius (1983) mentions that an analysis of negotiation tends to commence with a given set of parties, issues, and fixed values and preference orderings, even the more "radically subjective" negotiation analytic, with the formal restraints of game theory and decision analysis relaxed, still tends to analyze multi-party dynamics as one of discrete and atomized actors participating in a process viewed subjectively from each individual player's view. To consider the interactions, in a part, as a forum for both the debate about values and the expression and realization of a shared set of values is to further relax the assumptions of more formal analysis. To see the Alliance as a forum is to see individual actors within a community struggle toward a common set of values, which in turn inform those actors of whom they are in relation to the community: that is, the collective Alliance, the New England environmental community, and the human and natural community of the Northern Forest. While the first two sections of this analysis depend on a somewhat static view of individual actors, this last section attempts to make room for a potential transformation, not only of the Alliance, but also of its individual members. In a negotiation, the self remains static -- you and I decide in a process of creating and claiming value how best to meet our individual interests -- but in a forum of ideas you and I decide not only what we want, but who we are and what we ought to be -- the self itself may shift. In a forum of ideas, ideals, and values the self becomes as dynamic as the shifting coalitions of parties and the quest for both creating and claiming value.

Perhaps the final questions that ought to be asked are these: have individual "selves" been transformed in the Alliance? Has the Alliance itself been transformed into something more than a loose coalition of fiercely independent and self-interested organizations? Some say no to these questions. One independent member said: "People haven't changed much in their views since joining the Alliance. I haven't seen any major shifts, but maybe it's been a reality check" (Interview #3). However, an often reluctant state group said: "I have to say after the Alliance got together, we checked out for a while, despairing that we'd ever agree on anything. At a point, the corner was turned, and

we decided we would be able to agree. . . . Initially, you didn't mention federal action to state groups while nationals were advocating for a 10 million acre park. We've come a long way." (Interview #1).

The potential for a shared vision is seen by some in the Alliance as the means to revitalize the stagnant New England environmental community, to find the "spark" that first propelled the national movement from the first Earth Day in 1970. One national member said: "I see a tremendous opportunity for the organization to cross the line from inertia and separateness, from movement stagnancy, to a real spark, a reason for being" (Interview #10). Other groups, who either do not believe a vision is developing, or disagree with the vision that is developing, believe that the best the Alliance might achieve is a some kind of middle ground, a compromise of the diverse values and policies advocated within the Alliance. One national member said:

There's a constant energy to devolve to the lowest common denominator. It's very powerful, but you must resist it. Sometimes the Alliance has failed to resist, but in many instances it hasn't. But the Alliance doesn't have the vision that we need 10 million acres of wilderness. In terms of clout, it has astounding potential if it ever could agree on truly bold agenda. Even if an Alliance vision didn't have lots of public support initially, we could muster it maybe. But this probably won't happen (Interview #4).

Another independent group was even more skeptical and stated: "Most people want to do the right thing, but don't know what they're working for. They're process people. Only a few have vision, sense of a bigger vision. Groups couldn't afford to be left out. Two members did feel vision might arise. But one national had no illusion that the coalition could do more than it did" (Interview #3).

Whatever individual's views, the Alliance has arrived at a broad, if not detailed mission statement and action plan for the Northern Forest. Members refer to this statement as the Alliance mantra. This mission statement reads: "To establish a sustainable 26 million acre Great Northern Forest Ecosystem, including preserved wild core areas connected by corridors; managed forest lands; and healthy, viable human

communities" (Campaign for the Northern Forest 1993). As one member said of this, "the strength of the mantra is to draw a circle around basic values." In some sense, it seems to express the underlying values of the individual organizations, and a common vision in the spirit of the "third way" spoken for by Dizard, Ehrenfeld and Snow: the "third way" that environmental advocates must strive to achieve in order to secure a place for humans in the landscape and the nature in the midst of humans. Snow defines this "third" way as: ". . . one that incorporates human activities as long as they do not threaten thresholds inherent in ecological systems, opens the possibility of a truly positive ideal of humans living, creatively and freely, but harmoniously, within a larger ecological context" (Snow 1991, 191). Is this three-prong vision of the Alliance just a horse trade between state and national groups? After all, state groups got their forest practice concerns and a recommendation for state control over these practices, while national groups got their wildlands and a recommendation for federal-state partnerships to protect them. Is it simply a rehashing of the old philosophical dichotomy between conservation and preservation forced into a contradictory and vague mission statement impossible to achieve? Or, is it something else, perhaps a new integrative vision for the Northern Forest? Only the success of the Alliance in the larger negotiations within the region, and the state of the Northern Forest and its occupants fifty or one hundred years hence will provide the answers to these questions.

CONCLUSION

What lessons might be learned from this case study? The introduction proposed four goals of this thesis. First, a study of the Alliance would uncover at least some obstacles to cooperation among environmental groups and suggest means to improve cooperation among these groups. Second, the work would provide parties to any environmental negotiation an inside view of the dynamics of negotiations among environmental groups. Third, this thesis would suggest that negotiation among environmental advocacy groups was a topic that deserved further attention by analysts of negotiation. Furthermore, the conflicts within the Alliance and the members attempts to manage those conflicts might point the way for appropriate interventions by third party neutrals. Fourth, an examination of the Alliance would help dispel the myth that environmental groups are a monolithic interest.

For Environmentalists

For environmentalists, the analysis of the Alliance reveals at least four insights. First, the very same interests that lead to conflict, such as publicity, funding, and leadership, can also lead to collaboration. While groups may tend to see themselves as competitors in the intense and narrow market of environmental advocacy, joint as well as individual gains can be obtained. Successful coalitions are able to manage the tension between creating and claiming value by utilizing such techniques as a single negotiating text, consensus decision-making, process opportunism, and strategic commitments.

A single negotiating text can help focus a diffuse and scattered discussion on one joint problem-solving task that takes members' attention away from each other and draws that attention toward a common objective. Consensus decision-making can allow a diverse set of groups with perceived power differences to collaborate in a common

process. The disadvantages of consensus decision-making can be mitigated by allowing such flexibility as independent sign-on of press releases and other such contentious documents. Process opportunism by deft facilitators can contain competitive behavior and enhance cooperation. For example, the Alliance has improved its chances for success by minimizing executive directors access to monthly meetings and joint funding proposals. In addition, by encouraging professional and personal relationships between program staff through retreats and consistent monthly meetings, a strong coalition of players from separate organizations has been built. Strategic commitments, implicit or explicit, can also help build agreement from the "inside out". By gaining program staff commitment to issues or policies before negotiating the issue outside the Alliance with executive directors and boards of directors, the power of the staff coalition can be utilized to leverage further agreement.

Second, environmental groups ought to consider their diverse sources of power before ruling out or entering into collaborative efforts with other environmental groups. The environmental marketplace is represented by a diverse set of coalitions where power may be had through a variety of channels. Professional staff, technical expertise, grassroots membership, fundraising ability, access to local, state and federal decision-makers, good ideas, strongly held values, and unique positioning with the environmental community can all provide leverage in a negotiation. Independent groups should not underestimate their power of free agency, freedom from large organizational constraints, innovative ideas, and the ability to piggy-back onto a larger, more powerful organization. National groups should not overestimate their power, and should recognize the strong power base of state groups that includes on-going commitments to working relationships outside the environmental community all together and the ability to bring grassroots members as well as state decision-makers on board to particular platforms.

Third, leaders intent on building coalitions among environmental groups should not fear a large number of diverse organizations wishing to form an alliance. Individual

environmental organizations are not monolithic sides in a multi-lateral negotiation. Instead, the environmental community is a community of individuals and organizations with cross-cutting affiliations and loyalties, ranging from personal friendships to working relationships external to the environmental community. In a multi-lateral negotiation, any number of coalitions may form: state and nationals, small and large, staff and executive directors, poor and rich. While these crosscutting relationships bind groups in ways that may limit the range in which they might seek agreement, these diverse affiliations also provide organizational stability, mitigate against stark, conflict-inducing cleavages, and provide enough uncertainty and ambiguity to limit the bruising tactics of pure coalition games that might otherwise erupt.

Fourth, environmentalists engaged in negotiations with other similar groups, more than fully aware of the constraints of the environmental advocacy marketplace, should not lose sight of their negotiations as a forum for the exchange of affections and ideas, and for the expression and development of deeply held values. The environmental community, while increasingly professionalized and sophisticated in its strategies, policies and administration, should not lose sight of its origins as a movement, nor its potential for transformative change. Meetings between groups not only pose difficult bargains over publicity, funding, and leadership decided through the exercise of power, but also opportunities to build friendships and debate, discuss, and even transform deeply held values organizations and individuals hold dear.

By discussing values overtly, groups such as the Alliance can accomplish at least two objectives. First, members can become more aware that their decision-making is a complex act that involves relationships, interests, and values. Discussions of values help acknowledge the complexity of the process into which members have entered. If competitive efforts are kept in check, groups can explore indeterminate values and uncertainties together. By entering into a forum such as the Alliance, organizations will embark on a process that challenges, tests, and possibly transforms not only their

organizational interests, but their very values, identities, and relationships with one another and the natural world. Second, a discussion of values allows members to engage in an analysis, not only of how to meet their self interest, but what their self interest is in the first place. Individuals cannot act on their self-interest unless they know what it is. Often, this self-interest is determined through identification with and the belonging to a group holding a common set of values. To posit self-interest as given is to ignore the shifting determinations of self-interest in a coalition such as the Alliance. It is also to ignore the possibility that we might transform our notion of self-interest from one that is less desirable and more destructive, to one that is more desirable, that is, more in keeping with human survival and happiness as well as long-term ecological health.

For Diverse Parties in an Environmental Negotiation

For diverse parties in an environmental negotiation, this analysis suggests that a view of environmentalists primarily as idealists, ideologues, moralists or "tree huggers" is short-sighted. Participants in environmental mediations should be cognizant that environmentalists are economic actors, competitive players in a limited market controlled to a large extent by private, quiet, but powerful foundations who can dramatically effect the incentives of the environmental advocacy marketplace. This realization might serve the interests of a diverse set of parties for at least three reasons. First, by recognizing environmentalists as economic actors, parties may be able to better understand the motivations behind particular attitudes and positions. While environmentalists themselves may focus on value-based and ideological arguments, other interests ought to keep in mind that at least in some cases those arguments are tempered by and bound up in more pragmatic questions of organizational survival, identity, and advancement.

Second, by recognizing environmentalists as economic actors competing in a particular type of market, parties may find that the range of interests to trade upon may be increased. Environmental groups may not only want to further certain policies, positions,

and values, but also to insure their funding for coming years, to stake out a viable competitive position vis-a-vis their fellow environmental groups, to assume leadership in the environmental community on particular issues, and to control what does and does not appear in the press. Third, like any other economic actor, environmentalists are motivated by market forces beyond their control. If the market changes, they must change too. Environmentalists' zone of possible agreement may be constrained or improved by outside foundations who often control some if not many of these groups' purse strings.

For Negotiation Analysts and Neutrals

For negotiation analysts and professionals mediators and facilitators of environmental disputes, this thesis suggests that negotiation analysis is useful in understanding an environmental coalition and that a neutral's participation in negotiations among environmentalists might prove fruitful.

The use of formal negotiation analysis to understand an environmental coalition such as the Alliance should both reinforce the power of the analytic as well as question the full scope of its power. Negotiations among environmentalists can be successfully analyzed by considering relationships, interests, joint gains, individual claims, the tension between creating and claiming value, and such tactics as process opportunism and strategic commitments. Furthermore, by looking at the diverse interests and the distributive nature of some interactions, the negotiation analytic can help dispel stereotypes about environmentalists as monolithic, ideological, single interest players in the larger game of politics. But, the negotiation analytic also glosses over an element, or, at least a potential element, of the complex multi-party dynamic. Such multi-party, intra-environmental negotiations may be more than a negotiation; they may be a forum where a community of citizens builds relationships, exchanges goods, debates and expresses values, and derives its very sense of who it is and ought to be.

Professional neutrals might have a place in the formation and building of environmental coalitions. Environmental groups, competing for publicity, money, and leadership often find themselves in conflict with one another. While members of the Alliance have been at least somewhat successful in the management of these conflicts, both training and limited intervention by third-party neutrals would be useful in improving collaborative efforts among environmental groups.

First, training in principled negotiation, as Fisher calls it, would add to the tool chest of skills environmentalists bring to the Alliance table, and to other tables where they negotiate. Because many environmentalists come to the table as current or former grassroots activists, lobbyists, and attorneys, they may be more skilled in advocacy, interest group politics, and litigation than in negotiation among equals in a private setting. Training based on such books as Getting to Yes and Getting Past No can teach such skills as "go to the balcony" rather than react to attack, "step to the side" rather than argue, "reframe" the statement rather than reject it outright, and use the "power to educate" rather than to escalate a fight (Ury 1993). In addition, for the chairs and co-chairs of the Alliance, further training in such skills as party arithmetic, process opportunism, and strategic sequencing may help leaders to better structure the Alliance so as to facilitate cooperation and agreement. Training in principled negotiation and in coalition-building tactics would have an added benefit for environmentalists. Environmentalists are often skeptical about participating in general negotiations over issues they hold dear. A better understanding of negotiation would both help them to make better decisions about entering into consensus-building efforts involving diverse interest groups and make them better consumers of such services were they to enter into such efforts.

However, neutrals should be warned that it is not clear exactly how much a lack of negotiation skills hinders the efforts of individuals in the Alliance. While one member argued that the Alliance was all "process people", another member stated they were "a bunch of advocate types used to functioning in an aggressive manner" with "minimal

attention to process" (Interviews #3, #13). How negotiating training might improve the work of the Alliance in particular, and environmental advocacy groups in general, needs to be explored further.

Second, professional neutrals might have a role in intervening in particularly bruising disputes among environmental groups. The conflict over leadership is particularly difficult to resolve within the Alliance because of personal friendships, the unwillingness of members to "speak ill" of a friend, and the fear of and desire for influence and control. A third-party focused on the process of decision-making, not the decision, might help the Alliance address conflicts over leadership. A third-party neutral could encourage members to discuss this difficult issue more openly as well as be able to reframe and refocus personal attacks that might erupt in such a charged discussion. Furthermore, since the issue in question is the chair, no Alliance member would likely be "neutral" enough to chair such a discussion over leadership. A third-party acceptable to the Alliance could facilitate such a discussion without being accused of furthering their own influence over the Alliance.

However, two warnings are in order for such an intervention. First, environmental groups have limited budgets and might be neither willing nor able to spend scarce funds on untried means to improve collaborative efforts. Second, while negotiations among diverse interest groups may be quite willing to seek out third-party help, a more unified and ostensibly cohesive group such as the Alliance might be less willing to allow outsiders to influence their internal decision-making. Environmental groups may be quite unwilling to admit to themselves that they cannot always manage their own internal affairs. Furthermore, they may fear that the public will perceive the use of a neutral as an admission of divisive conflict and serious in-fighting, thus eroding their credibility and effectiveness in the public debate over the Northern Forest. Last, environmentalists may not perceive a neutral as one of their own kind. While in environmental negotiations among diverse interest groups third-party neutrality encourages diverse interest to come to

the table, among environmental groups this disinterest might be seen as a lack of commitment to and belief in strongly held values. If the neutral is seen as disinterested in environmental concerns, the parties may have a difficult time perceiving such a neutral as having any credible role in their on-going activities and decisions.

For All Readers

This analysis of the Alliance suggests that environmental groups are not simply all the same shade of green. The many members of the Alliance are represented by a diverse set of organizations, from large national advocacy organizations with million dollar budgets and millions of members, to small grassroots start-ups with ten-thousand dollar budgets and no members. The web of relationships that each organization must operate within, and the various issues of policy, strategy, and administration that each organization must address, are complex and multi-faceted. The environmental community is not homogenous. Its loyalties rest in a host of different, and sometimes seemingly contradictory relationships that include: relationships internal to any one organization, relationships to other organizations in coalitions within the environmental community, and relationships to other outside interest groups external to the community all together. Thus, groups have different allegiances that affect the agreements they might reach among one another.

In addition, the groups represent a spectrum of values ranging from staunch preservationists to less certain conservationists struggling to balance natural resources as commodities and natural resources as inherently valuable. Even if the groups are considered to have similar interests and values in general, they compete with one another for access to and control of the flow of information to the press, the same limited pot of funding, and for the few positions of leadership available on cutting edge issues. At least in the microcosm of the Alliance, New England environmental groups are neither monolithic nor motivated by only a few overriding concerns.

What does it all Mean?

What is at stake when environmental groups fail to agree with one another? Staunch advocates of private property rights might exclaim that much would be gained. In response to the Northern Forest Lands Council draft recommendations, one property rights advocate commanded: "Stop the radical preservationists, conservationists and environmentalists who . . . are self righteous, and sacrifice people for trees" (Northern Forest Lands Council 1993). On the other hand, from an environmentalist's perspective, much would be lost. As one member of the Alliance said: "If we fail as an Alliance, the forest is going to lose out in the future" (Interview #10). If one argues, as might staunch private property advocates, that "the best stewards are private land owners" then little is lost if environmental groups fail (Northern Forest Lands Council 1993). However, if one accepts Hardin's (1968) conclusion that the pursuit of individual self-interest can lead to collective disaster, then the need for wise collective action on pressing environmental and natural resource problems becomes obvious.

The formal analysis of negotiation holds the promise that, by better understanding negotiations, individuals can become better negotiators. At least in principled negotiation, better negotiators lead to better agreements, agreements that are wise, efficient, stable, and even fair. If agreements are Pareto-inefficient, we lose out on joint gains that might have satisfied our wants even more. In addition, inefficient outcomes result in scarce resources that are lost to other matters of priority and concern. Nowhere is this need for better agreement more important than in agreements reached on environmental matters. At worst, if agreements we reach on natural resources and the environment are Pareto-inefficient, not only may people have less rather than more, not only may trees and wildlife disappear, not only might people lose their jobs, not only might people lose their sense of place and their sense of themselves, the well-being of future generations of living beings, of which we are a part, may be irrevocably impaired, if not destroyed.

An understanding of how individuals and organizations conflict and how they might collaborate on environmental matters is not only interesting, it is necessary and imperative. One logical place for this investigation to focus is on environmental groups. As one member of the Alliance argued: "If the environmental community cannot agree, how could anyone else?" (Interview #9). Here might be found important lessons for how we might and might not go about negotiating and interacting with one another in order to address our relationship to the natural world in which we live. Furthermore, successful negotiations among environmental groups may help lead the way to better and more broad agreements for society at large. Rather than an end, this thesis might serve as a beginning for further investigation into negotiations among environmental advocacy groups.

Topics for Further Study

This thesis has uncovered at least three topics that bear further explanation. They include economic influences on environmentalists, trust, and the elements of a successful environmental coalition. First, this analysis of the environmental marketplace is only an initial step in exploring the economic forces at work upon environmental organizations. More formal models of the marketplace could be developed, more quantitative investigation into the market might take place, comparison between other markets might be made, and the important relationship between foundations and environmental organizations could be explored further. Second, the issue of trust was stressed repeatedly by members of the Alliance, but only generally explored in this study. Beginning with Sabel's (1992) "Studied Trust", a researcher might more thoroughly determine what precisely trust is as perceived by the participants in a group such as the Alliance, what elements need to be in place to establish it, how it can be fostered, and how it is linked to both shared interest and common values. Third, because this study only includes one case and the Alliance has not completed its work, it is not clear what particular elements are necessary for a successful environmental coalition. Comparative

case studies of the Alliance, and other environmental coalitions such as the Alaska Lands Coalition of the late 1970's, and more recent coalitions such as the Greater Yellowstone Coalition might be undertaken.

APPENDIX A
PARTIES IN THE NEGOTIATION
Members of the Northern Forest Alliance

I. NATIONAL GROUPS: National groups draw on a national or international membership, and address environmental issues geographically across the U.S., as well as undertake litigation in various federal courts and lobbying and legislative campaigns at the federal level. National groups may be organized in various ways, which might include regional and state offices, as well as local chapters.

Environmental Airforce: Founded in 1991. 160 pilots nationwide. 1993 overall budget: \$143,200. Recruits and organizes general aviation pilots to fly on behalf of non-profit conservation groups. FAA-certified pilots donate their time, and in most cases, the use of their aircraft, without charge. Overflights help to survey remote areas, track endangered species, design and monitor nature preserves, and take aerial photographs for scientific studies and publicity.

National Audubon Society: Founded in 1905. 600,000 members worldwide. 90,000 members in the northeast. 1993 overall budget: \$43.4 million. Organized in chapters from local level. Organization focuses on public policy affecting wildlife and wildlife habitats through science, education, and grassroots advocacy. Organization manages six national wildlife sanctuaries in region, three national education centers, as well as numerous chapter-managed local sanctuaries.

National Wildlife Federation: Founded in 1936. 5.3 million members and supporters worldwide. 500,000 in northeast. 1993 overall budget: \$87.7 million. Organized through independent, affiliate organizations. Mission is to educate, inspire, and assist individuals and organizations of diverse cultures to conserve wildlife and other natural resources while protecting the Earth's environment to promote a peaceful, equitable, and sustainable future.

Natural Resources Defense Council: Founded in 1970. 170,000 members nationwide. 17,137 members in northeast. 1993 overall budget: \$17 million. Utilizes legal action, scientific research, and citizen education. NRDC is a public interest organization dedicated to preserving the Earth's natural resources and improving the quality of the human environment.

Sierra Club: Founded in 1892. 600,000 members nationwide. 100,000 members in the Northeastern U.S. 1993 overall budget: \$43.2 million. Governed by a volunteer board of directors, organized in chapters at the local level. Mission includes: "To explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives."

Wilderness Society: Founded in 1935. 304,000 members nationwide. 62,400 members in the northeast region. 1993 overall budget: \$16.5 million. The society is devoted to protecting wildlands and wildlife; establishing a nationwide system of ecological reserves; safeguarding the integrity of our nation's private, state, and federal public lands including national forests and parks, wildlife refuges, national seashores, recreation areas and public domain lands.

II. REGIONAL GROUPS: Regional groups draw on a regional members, and address issues geographically across the region, including New York, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. Members may also be drawn from the other New England states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, as well as New Jersey. Groups may undertake club activities throughout the region, litigation in federal courts in the region, and lobbying and litigation at the state level. Regional groups may be organized via local chapters, and/or in regional and state offices.

Appalachian Mountain Club: Founded in 1876. 55,000 members region-wide. Overall 1993 budget: \$9 million. Includes local chapters that promote hiking, canoeing and other recreational activities, as well as an extensive system of camps, cabins, and huts. Undertakes research, advocacy, and education. Organization promotes the protection, enjoyment, and the wise use of the mountains, rivers, and trails of the Northeast.

Appalachian Trail Conference: Founded in 1925. 24,000 members nationwide. Overall 1993 budget: \$2.1 million. Dedicated to protecting and promoting the Appalachian Trail across its 2,147 mile length from Mt. Katahdin in Maine to Springer Mountain in Georgia through 32 member clubs which manage and maintain the trail in cooperation with federal and state agencies.

Conservation Law Foundation: Founded in 1966. 6,500 household members region-wide. Overall 1993 budget: \$2.6 million. Public interest, member supported environmental law organization whose attorneys and scientists use law to improve resource management, environmental protection, and public health throughout New England. Works to develop environmentally sound and economically efficient regional energy, water, land use and transportation policies.

III. STATE GROUPS: State groups draw primarily on state members, and address issues geographically within a state. Groups may undertake club activities, litigation in courts, and lobbying at the state level. State groups are financially independent, but may be affiliated with national groups.

Adirondack Council: Founded in 1975. 18,000 members. Overall 1993 budget: \$1.15 million. Dedicated to protecting the natural and open-space character of the Adirondack Park through public education, monitoring, aiding, and encouraging state government agencies, undertaking research and policy analysis, and pursuing

litigation when necessary. Unlike other state groups, the Council's primary focus is Adirondack Park, rather than the state as a whole.

Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks: Founded in 1901. 1,500 members. Overall 1993 budget: unavailable. Mission is to protect and enhance the natural resources and human values of the Adirondack Park and New York State Forest Preserve through stewardship, education, and vigilance. Participation in Alliance limited due to staff and resource limitations.

Green Mountain Club: Founded in 1910. 5,200 members. Overall 1993 budget: \$665,000. Dedicated to making recreational and resources available to the general public through the maintenance and protection of the 440-mile Long Trail in Vermont. The Club builds and protects trails, publishes guidebooks and maps, and educates the public on the wise use of wilderness and back country areas of the state.

Maine Audubon Society: Founded in 1843 as Portland Society of Natural History. 7,000 member households. Overall 1993 budget: \$1.5 million. An organization (not affiliated with National Audubon Society) dedicated to the protection, conservation, and enhancement of Maine's ecosystems through the promotion of individual understanding and action. Combines diverse educational and informational activities with responsible advocacy for quality and sound resource management.

Natural Resources Council of Maine: Founded in 1959. 7,000 members. Overall 1993 budget: \$1.3 million. Citizen-supported environmental advocacy group that advocates to protect, conserve and restore Maine's natural environment now and for future generations. Led efforts to manage growth and development, reduce solid and toxic waste pollution, clean up water and air, and promote sustainable transportation planning. The goal of the Council is to develop environmentally and economically sustainable initiatives while recognizing the environmental, economic, and spiritual importance of protecting the integrity of the natural ecosystem of which we are part.

Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests: Founded in 1901. 11,000 members. Overall 1993 budget: \$1.8 million. Through land protection, education, forest management, and advocacy, provides a unique blend of use and preservation for advocacy of sound forest management as well as promotion of wilderness. In addition to advocacy and education work, the Society owns and manages forested public reservations, permanent conservation areas, and conservation easements on private lands. A hallmark of the Society is its commitment to balancing ecological and economic needs by forging consensus among development, conservation, forestry, and business interests.

Vermont Natural Resources Council: Founded in 1963. 5,200 members. Overall 1993 budget: \$553,000. With a mission to foster a land ethic which sustains that quality of life produced by a harmonious relationship between humans and nature, the Council is dedicated to promoting the protection and wise use of Vermont's natural resources. Activities include advocacy, research, education, legislative, and grassroots lobbying on issues such as land use planning, wetlands protection, forestry, and sustainable agriculture.

IV. INDEPENDENT GROUPS: Independent groups have been founded recently, have few members and small budgets in relation to other groups, and focus on particular natural resource and wildlife issues within the region. While they might also be referred to as grassroots, radical, or fringe environmental groups, "independent" captures their independence from more established environmental groups and constituencies while not attempting to categorize them in any political or ideological sense.

Northern Forest Forum: Founded 1992. Not a membership organization. Overall 1993 budget: \$40,000. Published under the aegis of the Northern Appalachian Restoration Project of Earth Island Institute, the Forum publishes a bimonthly newsletter with in-depth articles discussing such issues as biodiversity, ecological reserves, forest practices, wildlife restoration, property rights, and analysis of Northern Forest Council findings and recommendations. Working in affiliation with the Preserve Appalachian Wilderness, it advocates for fundamental economic, social, political, and cultural transformation in order to assure the ecological and evolutionary integrity of the region.

RESTORE: The North Woods: Founded in 1992. Number of members unknown. Overall 1993 budget: \$120,000. Purpose is to restore, preserve, and defend the natural ecological integrity of the North Woods through public awareness and citizen activism. Advocate recognition of North Woods as an ecological whole, major expansion of public land ownership, and large scale restoration of natural systems and processes. Advocate for the reintroduction of the eastern timber wolf into New England, and the natural restoration of the Atlantic salmon through declaration as an endangered species.

V. LAND TRUSTS: Land trusts are non-profit organizations dedicated to preserving open space, productive, recreational and scenic lands. They accomplish their mission through outright purchase of lands, purchase of conservation or agricultural easements, or interim holding for later purchase by other organizations. Trusts typically do not take on advocacy roles, nor directly participate in controversial issues. While land trusts sign-on to many Alliance activities, they do not participate in any direct advocacy.

The Trust for Public Land: Founded in 1972. Provides interim protective ownership for lands of scenic, recreational, or cultural significance. Arranges for long-term stewards and permanent funding for protection of interim holdings.

Vermont Land Trust: Founded in 1977. Mission is to protect lands that help give Vermont and its communities their distinctive character. Mission is achieved by accepting, purchasing, monitoring, and enforcing conservation easements on resource lands.

SOURCES: Campaign for the Northern Forest 1993; Martel and Holman 1994.

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