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**“CY DEVANT SOLDAT...APRÈS HABITANT”:  
THE SETTLING OF THE CARIGNAN-SALIÈRES REGIMENT IN NEW FRANCE**

Mémoire présenté  
à la Faculté des études supérieures de l'Université Laval  
dans le cadre du programme de maîtrise en histoire  
pour l'obtention du grade de maître ès arts (M.A.)

DÉPARTEMENT D'HISTOIRE  
FACULTÉ DES LETTRES  
UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL  
QUÉBEC

2005

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## Résumé

Ce mémoire de maîtrise porte sur l'apport colonisateur du régiment de Carignan-Salières en Nouvelle-France. Venu avec une mission militaire, ce régiment voyait son mandat changer une fois dans la colonie. Les autorités coloniales voulaient que ses hommes restent s'établir au pays pour le renforcer davantage comme habitants. Toutefois, l'historiographie a largement négligé ce rôle colonisateur du régiment, se penchant plutôt sur ses faits militaires. Les écrits des contemporains, pleins d'hyperboles et d'enthousiasme pour le projet colonisateur, ont coloré l'historiographie sur le régiment et la perception populaire. Ce mémoire veut se détacher de cette vision du régiment et d'étudier objectivement son rôle colonisateur. Une identification rigoureuse des soldats-colonisateurs est faite, suivie des analyses sur leur établissement et mobilité. Il en résulte une démythification du régiment et une meilleure connaissance des facteurs qui ont influencé l'établissement et la mobilité de ses soldats.

## Summary

This masters' thesis studies the colonizing role of the Carignan-Salières regiment in New France. Sent with a military mission, this regiment saw its role change once in Canada. The colonial authorities wanted the men to remain as settlers to further reinforce the colony. However, historiography has largely neglected the colonizing role of the regiment, focusing instead on its military exploits. Contemporary authors, full of enthusiasm and exaggeration for the colonizing project, have tainted the historiography and popular perception of the regiment. This thesis aims to distance itself from this perception and to objectively study the colonizing role of the Carignan-Salières regiment. A rigorous identification of its soldier-settlers is made, followed by analyses of the soldiers' settlement and mobility. The result is a demystification of the regiment and a better understanding of the factors that influenced the settlement of its soldiers.

## **Foreword**

Even though this master's thesis bears my name only, it is not through my efforts alone that it has come to be. As such, I would like to thank all of those who have contributed by whatever means to its success. In particular, I would like to thank Johanne Daigle for welcoming me to Université Laval and starting the whole process going, Marc Vallières for guiding my first steps, and Alain Laberge for taking me the rest of the way. The cartographic assistance of Laura-Lee Bolger is also greatly appreciated.

On a more personal level, I would like to thank my parents for their support throughout this process, and especially Annie for her unflinching love and support when it was most needed.

Peter J. Gagné

Lévis, April 2005

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## Introduction

For New France, when one speaks of settlers and soldiers, these are normally two distinct subjects. However, the Carignan-Salières regiment is an exception to this rule. The military role of this regiment during its three years of service in the colony has been written about on several occasions. However, a second role was given to its soldiers: Once the military mission was completed, the authorities encouraged the soldiers to remain in the colony as settlers.

These men make up the largest group of settlers in New France who arrived as a single group. As Edmé Rameau de Saint-Père writes, “C’était un grand pas dans le peuplement de ce pays, qui n’avait jamais reçu et ne reçut jamais depuis une immigration de cette importance.”<sup>1</sup> This group takes on even more importance when one considers that it is linked by multiple marriages to the *Filles du Roy*, who collectively make up nearly half of the marriageable women who arrived in Canada under the French Regime. However, despite the fact that “l’établissement...des soldats du régiment de Carignan-Salières marque un moment important dans le peuplement de la colonie,”<sup>2</sup> this second role given to the soldiers is not very well known and remains relatively obscure. It is this colonizing role given to the soldiers that this thesis proposes to study.

In order to study the settlement of these soldiers, this thesis will follow them from 1668, the year the regiment was demobilized, until 1681, date of the last general nominal census of New France. For the purposes of this thesis, only the common soldiers (including the 2 sergeants, 3 corporals, 5 *anspessades*,<sup>3</sup> 2 drummers, the piper and the surgeon of each company) will be studied, and not the officers (the captain, lieutenant and ensign). Nonetheless, the officers will be retained to show their influence with regards to the localities chosen for settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> Edmé RAMEAU de Saint-Père, *La France aux colonies: Études sur le développement de la race française hors l’Europe*, Paris, A. Jouby, 1859, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques LACOURSIÈRE. *Histoire Populaire du Québec. Tome 1: Des origines à 1791*, Sillery, Septentrion, 1995, p. 112.

<sup>3</sup> The first rank in a company of *Troupes de la Marine*. The rank of *anspessade* was abolished in 1762, at which time it became soldier first class. The word *lancespessade* comes from the Italian *lancia spezzata*, which means “broken lance” and was used to designate the elite guard of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.



In order to provide the necessary context of this study, a brief overview of the history of the Carignan-Salières regiment on Canadian soil is necessary at this point. The various companies of the regiment will be presented along with an explanation of the division of the regiment and an overview of the regiment's military role, in order to show not only this group's importance in Canadian history, but also its place in historiography. There will then follow an explanation of the regiment's demobilization, with particular attention paid to the official policy of settling the soldiers, all illustrated with opinions and observations drawn from contemporary correspondence.

### **The Regiment's Military Role**

In 1661, the threat posed by the Iroquois was a constant presence in the colony. The settlers worked their fields with a rifle always at hand. In order to remedy this situation and give some much-needed stability to the colony, Pierre Boucher, governor of Trois-Rivières, is sent to France this year to give an account of the situation to Louis XIV and minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Boucher's mission consisted in part in asking that soldiers be sent to defend the colony. The following year, a hundred or so soldiers are sent to Canada, but their small number does nearly nothing to eliminate the problem of security in the colony.

France's engagement in various European wars delayed the sending of a greater number of troops to New France for several years. In the fall of 1663, Marie de l'Incarnation writes, "Le roi ne nous a pas envoyé des troupes, comme il l'avait fait espérer, pour détruire les Iroquois. On nous mande que les démêlés qu'il a dans [sic] l'Italie en sont la cause."<sup>4</sup> The settlers of New France have to wait until 1665 for the arrival of the first full regiment of soldiers – the Carignan-Salières regiment. The troops begin arriving during the summer, with arrivals continuing until the fall.

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<sup>4</sup> Guy-Marie OURY, *Marie de l'Incarnation, Ursuline (1599-1672) : Correspondance*, Solesmes, Abbaye de Saint-Pierre, 1971, p. 712 (letter of September-October 1663).

How many soldiers, exactly, were sent to the colony? If we intend to find out how many soldiers settled after their service, we should first begin with an idea of how many soldiers there were in the regiment in total, to have an idea of the scale that we are dealing with and to know what percentage of soldiers eventually settled in New France.

The Carignan-Salières regiment was made up of 20 companies, with ostensibly 50 men per company. Each company included several ranks of soldiers: soldier, *anspessade*, sergeant, corporal (these last two being sub-officers) and a surgeon. There were also three or four officers per company – captain, lieutenant, ensign and cadet – this last rank not being filled in all companies.

To these 20 companies were added four companies taken from various other regiments, who came to Canada with the *chevalier* Alexandre Prouville de Tracy: the Berthier Company (Allier regiment), La Brisardière Company (Orléans), La Durantaye Company (Chambellé) and the Monteil Company (Poitou). Even though these companies came from regiments other than the Carignan-Salières, they can be considered as part of the same military unit as the “official” companies of the Carignan-Salières regiment, since they arrived in the colony at the same time, were under the same military command structure and carried out the same mission. The only exception was that these four companies were exempt from building the forts during the winter of 1665-1666. The total number of soldiers in these 24 combined companies is 1,200 men, with at least 72 officers.

If each company was supposed to be made up of 50 men, it was not always the case that they had exactly this number of soldiers. Some had more and some had fewer men. As Intendant Jean Talon wrote on October 4<sup>th</sup> 1665, just after his arrival in the colony, the 20 companies “sont encore aujourd’hui presque toutes plus que complètes, il s’en trouve entre autres, qui sont de 66 hommes.”<sup>5</sup> However, as Jack Verney notes, “inspection showed that one, the Froment Company, was seriously undermanned.”<sup>6</sup> It is said that the supplemental men in

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<sup>5</sup> *Les rapports des Archives nationales du Québec 1920-1975* (CD-ROM), tome 11 (1930-1931), Québec, Les publications du Québec, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> Jack VERNEY, *The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668*. Montréal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991, p. 14.

each unit were transferred to the undermanned companies, but for lack of official statistics, the number of 50 men should be retained as an estimation of each company's strength.

Only a few months after the first arrivals, the soldiers begin building a series of forts in the Richelieu River Valley: Fort Richelieu (Sorel), Fort Saint-Louis (Chambly) and Fort Sainte-Thérèse. During the winters of 1665-1666 and 1666-1667, the companies that are not stationed at these forts are quartered among the population of the three regional governments: Québec, Trois-Rivières and Montréal.<sup>7</sup>

In early 1666, the regiment undertakes an expedition into Iroquois country, led by Governor Daniel Rémy de Courcelles himself. A second expedition, under the aegis of the *chevalier* de Tracy, took place in the fall of 1667. From a military standpoint, these expeditions have a limited success, but the main objective is accomplished: the Iroquois asked for peace. Also, after three years of service in the colony, the regiment is demobilized in 1668. However, after the demobilization, a certain part of the soldiers remains in Canada to become settlers.

### **The Decision to Turn Soldiers Into Settlers**

According to historians Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse, the decision to give a second, colonizing role to the regiment could not have been made prior to its departure from France. "Il est évident que le ministre [Colbert] n'avait pas encore songé à permettre aux officiers et aux soldats, cette campagne terminée, de s'établir en Canada, ou, s'il y songeait, il se gardait bien d'en souffler mot car c'eut été rendre le recrutement presque impossible. Cette décision se fit alors que le régiment était en Canada."<sup>8</sup>

Intendant Talon already writes of settling the soldiers after their demobilization in a letter to Minister Colbert dated October 4<sup>th</sup> 1665. He states, "Je crois que je puis sans me trop engager vous répondre que pour peu que je fasse d'avantages aux soldats du Régiment de Carignan, il en demeurera beaucoup en ce pays si sa Majesté prend résolution d'en tirer ce

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<sup>7</sup> See Table 10 for a list of quartering locations.

corps.”<sup>9</sup> In order to entice them to make this decision, the colonial authorities give the soldiers several incentives. The immigration program of marriageable women as *Filles du Roy*, in operation since 1663, records its largest numbers of arrivals in the years following the regiment’s demobilization. The colonial authorities give each soldier who wishes to settle in the colony 100 *livres* or 50 *livres* and provisions for one year, in order to give him a proper start in his settlement. Each soldier who marries a *Fille du Roy* is also given the “*don du roi*” in addition to any dowry – usually 50 to 200 *livres*. The idea is that marriage ties the soldiers to the land, making them more stable – through marriage they will found a family and create “roots” in the colony.

For the purpose of this thesis, we studied only the common soldiers who remained in the colony after demobilization. We did not follow the officers, since the settlement of these men was more complicated, due to their “condition” or social status. Several are nobles, for whom it is necessary to find a wife of the same social status; others already have land holdings in France; and still others are considerably older than the common soldiers and do not want to live out their remaining years in a far-off colony.

### **The Myth of a Massive Demobilization**

The question, therefore, is this: Of these 1,200 soldiers who came to New France, how many of them stayed behind to colonize their new home? Contemporary writers, enthusiastic for the project, claim that it was most if not all of the regiment.

In a letter to Talon dated April 5<sup>th</sup> 1666, Minister Colbert writes, “Le roi a été très aise de voir...que *la plupart des soldats*...témoignent beaucoup de disposition de s’habituer dans le pays pour peu qu’on les aide à s’établir, car sa Majesté le juge si important...qu’elle désirerait *qu’ils demeuraissent tous* en Canada.”<sup>10</sup> Only one year later, and mere months before the demobilization, Marie de l’Incarnation writes on October 18<sup>th</sup> 1667, “On dit que

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<sup>8</sup> Régis ROY et Gérard MALCHELOSSE, *Le Régiment de Carignan : son organisation et son expédition au Canada (1665-1668). Officiers et soldats qui s’établirent en Canada*. Montréal, G. Ducharme, 1925, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> *Les rapports des Archives nationales du Québec, op.cit*, p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45, emphasis added.

les troupes s'en retourneront l'an prochain, mais il y a apparence que *la plus grande partie* restera ici, comme habitants, y trouvant des terres qu'ils n'auraient peut-être pas dans leur pays.”<sup>11</sup>

In the centuries following the arrival of the regiment, historians have maintained the ideas of “le plus grand nombre” and “la plus grande partie” put forth by contemporary writers. In 1744, Father Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix claims that “La meilleure partie du régiment de Carignan-Salières y était demeurée et après la fin de la guerre des Iroquois, *presque tous les soldats* s'étaient fait habitants, ayant eu leur congé à cette condition.” And as for the officers, “ils s'établirent *presque tous* dans le pays, s'y marièrent, et leur postérité subsiste encore.”<sup>12</sup>

One century later, Edmé Rameau de Saint-Père writes in 1859 that “ce licenciement dut procurer plus d'un millier de colons au Canada” in total. He underscores this estimate, specifying, “restaient donc huit à neuf cents hommes que l'on congédia.”<sup>13</sup> In 1871, Cyprien Tanguay claims in his *Dictionnaire généalogique* that “Le régiment de Carignan, qui fut *presque tout licencié ici*, jeta sur nos rives une nombreuse population appartenant à la meilleure aristocratie.”<sup>14</sup>

More academic-based studies would shed better light on this subject. It is not until 1903, in the first study dedicated to the Carignan-Salières regiment, that historian Benjamin Sulte gives a more realistic estimation of the number of soldiers who settled in New France. He notes that “Il est probable que pas plus de quatre cents hommes du régiment de Carignan sont restés dans la Nouvelle-France.”<sup>15</sup> Sulte elaborates, stating that “le chiffre de soldats licenciés ne dépassait pas quatre cents, dont plus d'un cent devinrent coureurs de bois et ne firent rien pour la colonie; une autre centaine exercèrent des métiers ou furent domestiques à

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<sup>11</sup> OURY, *op.cit.*, p. 787.

<sup>12</sup> Pierre-François-Xavier de CHARLEVOIX, *Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France: avec le journal historique d'un voyage fait par ordre du roi dans l'Amérique septentrionale*, Paris, Rollin Fils, 1744, p. 178-179. Emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup> RAMEAU de Saint-Père, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>14</sup> Cyprien TANGUAY, *Dictionnaire généalogique des familles canadiennes depuis la fondation de la colonie jusqu'à nos jours*. Vol. I, Montréal, Eusèbe Senécal & Fils, 1871-1890, p. IX. Emphasis added.

<sup>15</sup> Benjamin SULTE, “Le Régiment de Carignan”, *Mélanges historiques*, volume 8, Montréal, G. Ducharme, 1922, p.72.

Québec, Trois-Rivières et Montréal; deux cents optèrent pour l'agriculture, après avoir servi trois années chez les 'habitants,' selon la loi du pays."<sup>16</sup> In 1925, Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse reinforce Sulte's assertions, writing that "environ la moitié de son effectif dernier"<sup>17</sup> remained in the colony, which, according to the authors, comes to 403 soldiers.

Exactly how many soldiers remained in the colony remains an open question. Jack Verney puts the number at 404, comparable to the 403 given by Roy and Malchelosse. He states that of the 1,200 men who came with the regiment, a third died in Canada, a third returned to France and a third remained to settle. Historian Marcel Trudel lists 489 soldiers,<sup>18</sup> while the present study positively identifies 340 soldiers, to which are added 134 "unknowns" whose identification or status as settler cannot be confirmed. The average number from the sources cited above is 409 soldier-settlers who remained in the colony after demobilization.

### **The Myth of a Line of Defense Along the Richelieu River**

Popular history claims that the demobilized soldiers settled mainly in the seigneuries along the Richelieu River, which is known at the time as the "rivière des Iroquois." The idea behind having the soldiers settle in this area was to create a first line of defense with these soldiers-turned-settlers. As such, the colonial authorities were not so much asking them to follow the biblical injunction of beating their swords into plowshares,<sup>19</sup> but instead to be ready to use one or the other as necessary. The map of the Richelieu Valley still bears the names of the regiment's captains, to whom seigneuries were given, and which continue to identify modern-day towns: Sorel, Saint-Ours, Contrecoeur and Chambly.

Benjamin Sulte stated this idea clearly in 1903, writing, "Le plan de Talon consistait à former *une ligne militaire* entre les Iroquois et nous par le moyen de soldats licenciés qui deviendraient cultivateurs et, en cela, il disait se modeler sur le système colonisateur des

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.60.

<sup>17</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Marcel TRUDEL, *La Population du Canada en 1666 : Recensement reconstitué*. Sillery, Septentrion, 1995, p. 333-369.

<sup>19</sup> "And they will hammer their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks." (Isaiah 2:4)

Romains.”<sup>20</sup> *Abbé Ferland*, in his *Cours d'histoire du Canada II* (1882) writes that four companies, “choisies parmi celles dont les capitaines s'étaient mariés dans le pays ou étaient disposés à s'y marier,” remained in the colony, “afin de conserver les forts les plus avancés et défendre les habitants contre les incursions des ennemis.” He then puts a number to his assertion, adding, “il resta en tout plus de quatre cents hommes décidés à adopter le Canada pour leur patrie.”<sup>21</sup> Ferland claims that the four companies that remained were made up of 75 men each. He must be referring to the Chambly, Contrecoeur, Saint-Ours and Saurel companies, whose captains received land in the Richelieu Valley.

### Modern Historiography

Contemporary authors saw the soldiers as invested with a divine mission to combat the Iroquois. On July 28<sup>th</sup> 1665, Marie de l'Incarnation, referring to the Carignan soldiers, writes that “Ce qui les anime tous, est qu'ils vont à une guerre sainte, et qu'ils vont combattre pour la foi.”<sup>22</sup> She continues in a letter dated September 30<sup>th</sup> of the same year, “On leur fait entendre que c'est une guerre sainte où il ne s'agit que de la gloire de Dieu, et du salut des âmes,”<sup>23</sup> and again in a letter dated October 16<sup>th</sup> 1666, in which she adds, “c'est pour le bien de la foi et de la religion que [l'armée] va combattre.”<sup>24</sup> Since her correspondence, all that has been written on the subject of the regiment, up until *The Good Regiment* by Jack Verney (1991) treats the soldiers like knights on a crusade, without questioning the effectiveness of their military role or the success of the regiment, while neglecting its colonizing role. Most of the works on the regiment are only concerned with the period of its military activity, and the years 1665-1668 are prominently displayed in their titles.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>20</sup> SULTE, *op.cit.*, p.74. Emphasis added.

<sup>21</sup> J.B.A. FERLAND, *Cours d'histoire du Canada. Seconde partie, 1663-1759*. Québec, N.S. Hardy, 1882, p. 62-63.

<sup>22</sup> OURY, *op.cit.*, p. 740.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 768.

<sup>25</sup> ROY et MALECHOSSE, *Le régiment de Carignan: son organisation et son expédition au Canada (1665-1668), officiers et soldats qui s'établirent en Canada*, Montréal, Ducharme, 1925, 130 p.; Jack VERNEY, *The Good Regiment. The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668*, Montréal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, IX+222 p.; Georges-Robert GAREAU, *Le Régiment de Carignan, 1665-1668: essai d'identification des soldats*, Anjou, QC, Édition G-R Gareau, 2001, 173 p.

As Yves Landry points out, “Avant 1960, les travaux des historiens québécois étaient inhibés par leur désir de valoriser les qualités morales des immigrants.”<sup>26</sup> Even the study on the regiment by Roy and Malchelosse is very nationalistic, in the vein of François-Xavier Garneau. The authors describe a sort of “moral legacy” passed down to other French-Canadian soldiers who followed the Carignan-Salières regiment, from Admiral Phipps’ attack on Québec in 1690 to World War I. In his preface to this study, Aegidius Fauteux writes, “Les soldats du régiment de Carignan, n’ont-ils pas été la véritable pâte avec laquelle s’est pétri l’avenir du Canada?” According to him, Roy and Malchelosse identify the soldiers in order to “les situer à leur place dans le processus d’élaboration de notre vie nationale.” He even adds that the task of identifying the soldiers would be almost insurmountable for other researchers who are “moins patriotiquement obstinés.”<sup>27</sup>

Even though it does not follow in this nationalistic vein, Jack Verney’s study reflects his own interests. A soldier himself, Verney focuses his study on the military role of the regiment and neglects its colonizing role to a large extent, only mentioning it in passing.

The master’s thesis of Pierre Moula, while dealing with the settlement of the regiment, is at the same time too limited and too general to be of any use to the current study.<sup>28</sup> His identification of soldiers is limited to references in the Jetté genealogical dictionary, his study of settlement restricted only to the seigneuries granted to officers of the regiment on 29 October 1672 and his assessment of the success of the project based solely on the official correspondence between Intendant Talon and the Court of France. The conclusions drawn in this thesis are too general and not founded on tangible data. In short, his thesis does not shed any new light on the settlement of the regiment in New France.

It is one of the aims of the current thesis to debunk the patriotic and nationalistic myths that have been built up around these soldiers. It seeks not to look at these men as soldiers, but as

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<sup>26</sup> Yves LANDRY, “L’émigration française au Canada avant 1760: premiers résultats d’une microanalyse,” Andrée COURTEMANCHE et Martin PÂQUET, dir. *Prendre la route. L’expérience migratoire en Europe et en Amérique du Nord du XIVe au XXe siècle*, Hull, Vents d’ouest, 2001, p.81.

<sup>27</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op.cit*, p. 8-9.



settlers. In this manner, it will be possible to honestly evaluate their role as such. To borrow the premise of Gérard Bouchard in his study of the Saguenay, “la mythologie que [les compagnies de colonisation] ont suscitée est sans commune mesure avec leur véritable rôle.”<sup>29</sup> This assessment is also true of the Carignan-Salières regiment. It is commonly taken for granted that all of the demobilized soldiers remained to settle on the land that they were given and that these lands were all located in the Richelieu Valley. This study proposes to determine to what extent this common perception is true.

### **The Problematic: A Question of Mobility**

Where did the former soldiers of the Carignan regiment really settle – in the Richelieu Valley or throughout the colony? Were they mobile or sedentary, and what effect did their officers and their marriage have on their settlement? To respond to these questions, this thesis is going to study if the Carignan soldiers settled on their initial land grants or if they knew a certain degree of mobility. In this study, it is not a question of looking at a given place and studying the colonists who settled there, but of looking at a group of colonists and studying the places where they settled – their dispersion or mobility.

How is this study going to undertake the historical exploration necessary to resolve this problematic? According to historian Alain Laberge, mobility is often used by the migrant person to overcome obstacles, and the *migrant* does not become an *immigrant* until he attempts to settle.<sup>30</sup> This conceptualization will be used to guide the current study. It is therefore necessary to determine what were the obstacles for migrants at this time, including the Carignan soldiers.

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<sup>28</sup> Pierre MOULA, “L’établissement des officiers et soldats du régiment de Carignan-Salières en Nouvelle-France ou l’exemple d’une politique royale pour le développement démographique de la colonie (1668-1681).” Mémoire de maîtrise, Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux 3, 1999, 98 p.

<sup>29</sup> Gérard BOUCHARD, *Quelques arpents d’Amérique : population, économie, famille au Saguenay, 1838-1971*. Montréal, Boréal, 1996, p. 32.

<sup>30</sup> Alain LABERGE, “L’immigrant migrant ou les chemins de l’enracinement au Canada sous le Régime français”, Communication présentée au colloque “Mémoires de Nouvelle-France”, Commission franco-québécoise sur les lieux de mémoire communs, Poitiers-La Rochelle, septembre 2001, 19 p.

The three main obstacles are the nearly constant war with Iroquois, the need to obtain one's own land and the need to find a wife in a situation of uneven sexual distribution of the population.<sup>31</sup> As for the first obstacle, after their demobilization the former soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment knew a certain period of peace as a result of their military mission. This, in effect, was the reason why they were sent to the colony. On the land question, the colonial authorities also gave the soldiers land grants, which reduced the obstacle of obtaining property. Lastly, the *Filles du Roy* program responded in large part to the soldiers' need of finding a wife.

Given the partial or complete elimination of the three major obstacles of the time, the questioning can therefore be reformulated: Did these soldiers succeed in remaining stable on their original land? Was the network made up of the soldier's comrades and officers strong enough to encourage the soldiers to remain together as a group, and did the *Filles du Roy* have a stabilizing effect on the soldiers, or did they know a certain mobility in the search for a wife and a new, local network? Our analyses will attempt to determine the factors that had an effect on the soldiers' mobility or stability and determine the relative success of the soldier settlement program.

### **Sources and Methodology**

The corpus of sources for the present study is made up of material that will allow the author to identify the soldiers in question and to determine the events that will serve as points along the paths of their lives and which will permit a study of these paths to determine the soldiers' settlement and mobility. This corpus is made up of different types of sources: lists of soldiers (nominal rolls), genealogical sources (excerpts of parish registers) and demographic sources (databases). It goes without saying that these categories are not closed off, and refer mostly to the level of detail the information provides and the need to fill in gaps that may exist in some sources.

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<sup>31</sup> Raymond ROY et Hubert CHARBONNEAU, "La nuptialité en situation de déséquilibre des sexes: le Canada du XVIIème siècle", *Annales de démographie historique*, 1978, p. 285-294.

The first part of the methodology used consists in positively identifying the soldiers who settled in Canada. This process, the “identification phase” of this study, is described in the first part of Chapter 1. Four lists of soldiers were used to begin the identification process, which was completed by cross-referencing the names with the genealogical and demographic sources. These last two groups of sources allowed the author to confirm or reject preliminary identifications made using the four lists and allowed for the creation of a verifiable list of soldiers who settled in the colony, whose settlement could then be studied.

After identifying the soldiers who remained in Canada, the second part of the methodology used is the “settlement phase” of the study. In this second part of Chapter 1, information is collected on the soldiers that will allow us to follow them on their paths to settlement – to recreate their personal itinerary or their “rayonnement individuel,” as Lina Gouger describes it.<sup>32</sup> The bulk of this work consists in creating a collection of life events in order to reconstruct the personal path of each soldier – in other words, to undertake the “cueillette sérielle de données.”<sup>33</sup> This process consists in determining the various places of birth, baptism, marriage, etc. related to each soldier and his family.

During the settlement phase of the methodology, the genealogical and demographic sources used allowed the author to place each soldier at a given place at a given time – to determine their life events – and to see if the soldiers moved around and if so, where they went. To respond to this need, this category of sources includes the Jetté and Tanguay genealogical dictionaries<sup>34</sup> and the *Parchemin* and *Programme de recherche en démographie historique* (PRDH) databases.

In order to establish each soldier’s personal path to settlement, it is necessary to “dresser pour chaque individu...une fiche où sont consignés les ‘événements’ démographiques de son

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<sup>32</sup> Lina GOUGER, *Le peuplement colonisateur de Détroit 1701-1765*, Thèse de doctorat, Université Laval, 2002, p. 284.

<sup>33</sup> Johanne NOËL, *Le Peuplement de la seigneurie de Chambly, les alliances matrimoniales et l’enracinement: 1665-1740*, Mémoire de maîtrise, Sainte-Foy, Université Laval, 1988, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> René JETTÉ, *Dictionnaire généalogique des familles du Québec*. Montréal, PUM, 1983, 1176 p.; Mgr Cyprien TANGUAY, *Dictionnaire généalogique des familles canadiennes depuis la fondation de la colonie jusqu’à nos jours*. Montréal, Eusèbe Senécal & Fils (1871-1890). 7 volumes.

existence,”<sup>35</sup> and therefore to create a database that could contain all of this information. Actually, it was necessary to create several databases, with information pertaining to the identification of the soldiers in one, information on the life events of their itineraries in another and a third containing the means of making quantitative analyses all of this information.

The second chapter of this thesis examines the soldiers’ settlement in New France along two broad lines. The first consideration, “taking land,” examines where the soldiers first settled and the influence of their officers and their winter quarters on their choice of settlement. It also takes a look at whether the soldiers’ settlements made up the line of defense envisioned by the colonial authorities. The second consideration, “taking a wife,” looks at the impact of marriage on the soldiers’ settlement patterns.

The soldiers’ mobility is analyzed in the third chapter of this study, in order to determine what factors affected their mobility or stability. The author first explains how a move or migration is determined for the purposes of this study and presents the degrees of mobility used for analysis. Several factors affecting mobility are then analyzed, including the soldiers’ company affiliation, influence of the regiment’s officers, marriage, and the fur trade. The soldiers’ mobility is determined in relation to three points along the time frame of this study, and mobility is examined with regards to the concentration of soldiers in various locations, their redistribution among the towns and governments of the colony and in relation to the Richelieu Valley in particular.

The conclusion gives an evaluation of this military colonization of New France, in order to respond to the main questions of this study: Were the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment mobile or sedentary after their demobilization, and where did they settle? The answers to these questions allow this study to determine to what degree these men succeeded in the second role that was given to them: becoming settlers and contributing to the stability of the colony.

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<sup>35</sup> BOUCHARD, “L’histoire démographique et le problème des migrations: l’exemple de Laterrière”, *Histoire Sociale/Social History*, vol. VIII, no. 15 (mai 1975), p. 21.

## Chapter 1: Identifying and Following the Soldiers

### 1.1 A Historiography That “Doesn’t Count for Much”

Gérard Malchelosse accurately assesses the historiography of the Carignan-Salières regiment in his introduction to Benjamin Sulte’s study writing, “Ce qu’on ne saurait perdre de vue, ici, c’est que tout ce qui a été écrit sur le régiment de Carignan, depuis 1903, ne compte guère.”<sup>36</sup> He is not necessarily speaking here of the works on the military exploits of the regiment – the construction of the forts, the two campaigns against the Iroquois, etc. – what one could characterize as the “collective” history of the regiment as a military entity. He is speaking of the “individual” history of the regiment, of the men who were its soldiers.

Before Benjamin Sulte’s “Régiment de Carignan” was presented at the *Société royale du Canada* in 1902, historians only considered the regiment as a collective and almost mythic entity whose whole was greater than the sum of its parts. The “parts,” actually, did not count at all for them. Benjamin Sulte was the first to seriously undertake the question of what were the parts that made up this whole – to ask who were the soldiers that belonged to the Carignan regiment.

However, “M. Sulte ne s’est jamais flatté d’avoir levé complètement le voile mystérieux dont était enveloppé le régiment de Carignan,”<sup>37</sup> as Aegidius Fauteux states in his introduction to Roy and Malchelosse’s study. Even though Sulte shed some light on the history of the regiment as lived by its soldiers, he still did not put the focus on identifying them individually. He opted instead for the officers, the second part of his study being “une revue biographique sur les officiers de ce corps d’élite.”<sup>38</sup> Fauteux adds, “Jusqu’ici nous n’avions guère pu nous intéresser qu’aux chefs, qu’aux officiers...Mais au fond, combien plus intéressants encore sont les simples soldats.”<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> SULTE, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>37</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Gérard Malchelosse, in the introduction to SULTE, *op.cit.*, p.6.

<sup>39</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

This is exactly what Roy and Malchelosse did in their 1925 study – focus on the soldiers. Before their work on the regiment, there were no researchers who sought to continue Sulte’s work, to pick up the trail, dissipate a bit of the mystery surrounding the regiment and continue the identification of its members down to the common soldiers. Sulte made the first steps and laid the foundations of the path to follow, but he did not get to the end of the road.

Roy and Malchelosse cleared the road a bit further, by attempting to respond to the questions set forth by Aegidius Fauteux in his preface to their study: “Qu’était au juste ce régiment pourtant si fameux, de quels éléments avait-il été composé, quelle était son organisation intérieure, et surtout quel appoint exact a-t-il été en définitive à la colonisation de la Nouvelle-France?” Even if “ils n’ont pas dit le dernier mot sur ce célèbre régiment qui tient tant de place dans notre glorieuse histoire,” writes Fauteux, “ils ont si largement rétréci le cercle d’inconnu qui l’entourait.”<sup>40</sup>

This thesis seeks to take its place as the humble continuation of the road cleared by Benjamin Sulte and continued by Roy and Malchelosse. Sulte opened up “dans la paroi du mystère la large fissure où d’autres passeraient à la suite.”<sup>41</sup> The current study does not claim to entirely dissipate the mystery of the identification of the Carignan soldiers and their contribution to the colonization of New France, but rather seeks to shed a bit more light on these questions.

## 1.2 The Identification Phase

To begin this identification research, the author followed the example of another study on French soldiers who settled in Canada in the time of New France. Demographer Yves Landry undertakes the subject of the soldiers of the Seven Years’ War who decided to remain in Canada to settle.<sup>42</sup> A large part of his study, before undertaking the question of settlement *per se*, consists in establishing the exact number of soldiers from the La Sarre and Royal Roussillon battalions who settled in New France at the end of the war. He does not attempt to identify the entire regiment, only those soldiers who settled in Canada. In other words,

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<sup>40</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>41</sup> Aegidius Fauteux, in the preface to ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

before studying the settlement of these soldiers, it is necessary to identify exactly who it was that settled.

The first section of the present thesis follows Landry's example by first identifying the soldiers who remained in Canada after their service. Since the resulting list of soldiers would be used to analyze the regiment's settlement and mobility, as accurate and complete a list as possible was needed to get the most accurate results out of the subsequent analyses. The identification phase was therefore a meticulous process whose aim was to get the most complete list possible of soldier-settlers. Several sources were used to compile and complete the demographic information on each soldier. These sources can be placed in two categories: the first being lists of soldiers and the second genealogical sources.

### 1.2.1 Beginning the Identification Process: Lists of Soldiers

We went through the following four lists with a fine-toothed comb before comparing them with the information in the genealogical dictionaries consulted. In chronological order, the four lists are those found in *Le Régiment de Carignan* by Roy and Malchelosse, *The Good Regiment* by Jack Verney, the 1666 "recensement reconstitué" by Marcel Trudel and the list in Georges-Robert Gareau's "essai d'identification des soldats."<sup>43</sup> Since these lists – which include all 24 companies – are all based on the 1668 regimental roll, they were used as the basis of the identification phase. Unfortunately, the original roll only includes the soldiers' nicknames or *noms de guerre*. Each of these four lists attempts to add a bit more information to this roll.

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<sup>42</sup> LANDRY, "Mortalité, nuptialité et canadienisation des troupes françaises de la guerre de Sept Ans.", *Histoire Sociale/Social History*, 12, 24 (1979), p. 61-86.

<sup>43</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE. *Le Régiment de Carignan: son organisation et son expédition au Canada, 1665-1668*, 1925; VERNEY. *The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668*. (1991); G-ROBERT GAREAU, *Le Régiment de Carignan, 1665-1668 : essai d'identification des soldats*. Anjou, QC, Édition G-R Gareau, 2001; TRUDEL, *La Population du Canada en 1666 : Recensement reconstitué*. Sillery, Septentrion, 1995. Even though Gareau's study contains errors and omissions, it was retained for this thesis due to the fact that it identifies several soldiers that the other lists do not identify, based partially on the use of confirmation and scapular lists.

Roy and Malchelosse based their list on the 1668 roll, as presented to the *Société royale du Canada* in 1922 by François-J. Audet.<sup>44</sup> They note that the roll was probably drawn up in the fall of 1667, before the return of the first contingent to France. As such, it may include soldiers who returned to France in the course of the following year. The authors point out the fact that “tous ces noms, hors quelques-uns, sont des appellatifs ou sobriquets de guerre.” They used information found in notarized documents, parish registers and “d’autres sources semblables [qui] fournissent des renseignements utiles”<sup>45</sup> in an attempt to put a name to each nickname, as our study would also do. However, their list is little more than the 1668 roll with the baptismal name of each soldier added to his nickname, when possible, with passing references to the Tanguay genealogical dictionary, notarized documents and other sources where complementary information can be found.

Since Gareau based his study in large part on the work of Roy and Malchelosse and can be considered the revised and corrected version of their list of soldiers, these two sources were consulted at the same time, in order to compare their data. Gareau also consulted lists of individuals who were confirmed or who took the scapular – two religious ceremonies that were performed *en masse* for the regiment’s soldiers.<sup>46</sup> His presence on one of these lists along with known soldiers could therefore indicate that an individual was also a soldier. The complementary information that Gareau gives in his list – marriages, land transactions, notarized documents – can help confirm or reject an identity. However, there is often missing information in his entries on each soldier, and his study is unequally documented.<sup>47</sup> The identifications and assertions that Gareau makes must be verified before inclusion in the present thesis.

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<sup>44</sup> François-Joseph AUDET, “Le rôle des soldats du régiment de Carignan-Salières qui se sont faits habitants de Canada en 1668,” *Mémoires de la Société royale du Canada* 16 (1922), 129-141.

<sup>45</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 82 & 84.

<sup>46</sup> According to Marie de l’Incarnation (letter of September 30<sup>th</sup> 1665), 500 took the scapular in Québec City.

<sup>47</sup> He often leaves out the dates of documents as well as the name of the notary or the place where the document was drawn up. Places of land transactions are given only occasionally, sources are rarely cited (notaries or others) for the other events listed (contracts, etc.) and Gareau regularly confuses marriage contract dates with the ceremony date, even though these two events almost never occurred on the same day. He sometimes even lists major life events, like the death of Jean Guillet, without giving a date.



Jack Verney introduces his list of soldiers by acknowledging that while the 24 companies had a combined strength of 1,200 men, his list only includes about a third of this number. “Unfortunately no complete roll has come to light so far, and this one... is nothing more than a consolidation of the available information and, therefore, is far from comprehensive.”<sup>48</sup> He also points out that there is no source that gives either the total strength of the regiment on its arrival in 1665, nor the number of soldiers who returned to France in 1668. Verney compiled his list from the original 1668 roll, to which he added information from other sources.<sup>49</sup> His list not only includes soldiers who remained in Canada in 1668, but also those who returned to France and those who were killed in Canada. Verney gives very little complementary information, which is usually limited to notes such as “settled in Canada in 1668.”

The fourth list used to identify the soldiers is the one in Marcel Trudel’s “recensement reconstitué,” *La population du Canada en 1666*.<sup>50</sup> Censuses of New France were carried out for the entire colony in 1666, 1667<sup>51</sup> and 1681. Researchers are immediately confronted with a problem for the first two censuses: the Carignan soldiers are not enumerated.<sup>52</sup> However, Trudel fills this gap by providing a list of soldiers and officers in his “reconstituted census,” dedicating an entire section to the regiment. His list includes the “officiers et soldats des troupes arrivées en 1665 et qui sont au Canada au printemps de 1666.”<sup>53</sup> It therefore does not list only those who settled in Canada after 1668. Trudel identifies the soldiers not only by their name, but also with detailed complementary information, such as their place of origin, company, rank, age and other information. He also notes which soldiers are identified as *habitants* in the 1668 roll.

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<sup>48</sup> VERNEY, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

<sup>49</sup> *Le Dictionnaire généalogique des familles canadiennes* de Cyprien Tanguay, le *Dictionnaire Biographique du Canada*, “Le Régiment de Carignan” de François Audet (Société Royale du Canada, 1922) et la collection Leymarie des Archives Nationales du Canada.

<sup>50</sup> TRUDEL. *La Population du Canada en 1666: Recensement reconstitué*. Sillery, Septentrion, 1995, 379 p.

<sup>51</sup> The 1667 census is an attempt to correct the errors and omissions in the previous year’s enumeration.

<sup>52</sup> Hubert CHARBONNEAU et Yolande LAVOIE, “Introduction à la reconstitution de la population du Canada au XVII<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Étude critique des sources de la période 1665-1668”, *RHAF*, vol. 24, no. 4 (mars 1971), p. 487.

<sup>53</sup> TRUDEL. *La Population du Canada en 1666*, p. 333,

### 1.2.2 Verification with Genealogical Dictionaries


Once our initial *Settlers* database was in place after cross-referencing the above-mentioned lists, there was now a master list of names – based on the four versions of the 1668 roll – that could be used for this study. However, given the aforementioned limitations, omissions and errors of the four lists consulted, the names on the *Settlers* list were still considered unconfirmed at this point in the identification process. It was necessary to verify two things about the men in the *Settlers* database: that they were indeed soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment and that they settled in Canada after demobilization. The next step in the identification phase, therefore, was the verification of the names on our list to confirm this. The genealogical dictionaries compiled by René Jetté and Cyprien Tanguay were used for this step.

The verification of this list of soldier-settlers began with the Jetté dictionary,<sup>54</sup> which allowed for the confirmation of many identities and the addition of some new names to the list. Jetté clearly identifies individuals as soldiers of the regiment, even listing their company affiliation. However, there are 78 soldiers on the final *Settlers* list that are not identified as such by Jetté, including 14 who are not included at all in the dictionary. The subsequent use of complementary sources, notably the *Parchemin* and PRDH databases, would be needed to confirm these 78 men as soldier-settlers. Nonetheless, like Marcel Trudel, René Jetté gives detailed complementary information for each soldier (origin, marriage, children, death, etc.), and identifies each individual by a standardized family name.

The *Settlers* list was then verified using the Tanguay genealogical dictionary.<sup>55</sup> While compiling his dictionary, Cyprien Tanguay had access to certain parish registers that have since been lost or destroyed, so it is possible that his work may contain information not found in the Jetté dictionary. However, the Tanguay dictionary also includes a great deal of errors

<sup>54</sup> JETTÉ: *Dictionnaire généalogique des familles du Québec*, Montréal, PUM, 1983.

<sup>55</sup> TANGUAY: *Dictionnaire généalogique des familles canadiennes depuis la fondation de la colonie jusqu'à nos jours*, Montréal, Eusèbe Senécal & fils, 1871-1890.



and omissions, and its accuracy is questionable.<sup>56</sup> All new information was therefore verified.<sup>57</sup>

Verifying the information compiled from the lists of soldiers with these genealogical sources not only allowed for the verification of the *Settlers* database, but also spawned the creation of two other databases of soldiers' names. The databases *Uncertain* and *Non-settlers* were created partially due to the question of accuracy of some sources, but also in response to a need to note questionable or potential identifications in a separate location.

The *Uncertain* database is a list of possible soldiers whose identification is questionable or whose settlement in Canada is impossible to confirm. It was conceived as a sort of "purgatory" where unconfirmed identities could be collected before being confirmed as settled soldiers. The *Non-settlers* database includes soldiers of whom we are sure they left the colony or died before 1668. These two databases were created to have lists of unconfirmed soldier-settlers against which uncertain or difficult cases from the *Settlers* database could be verified.<sup>58</sup>

Several examples illustrate the usefulness of the *Uncertain* and *Non-settlers* databases. When creating them, it was assumed that some of the soldiers who were supposed to have died or left the colony might have in fact remained in Canada. Sure enough, by cross-checking the sources, the following errors from *The Good Regiment* were revealed: Nicolas de Chasy is said to have left for France in 1668, but he died in Canada in 1666; Pierre Salvaye (Salvail) de Froment is said to have gone to France in 1667 or 1668 and to have died there in 1689, but he was married in Canada about 1673-1674, had six children, and died

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<sup>56</sup> A volume of corrections, published in 1957 by Joseph-Arthur Leboeuf, notes the errors and omissions.

<sup>57</sup> See Section 1.2.3, "Example of the Identification Process" for an example.

<sup>58</sup> The following are examples of soldiers from the *Uncertain* database: Mathieu Binet was confirmed August 24<sup>th</sup> 1665 in Québec City with 19 known soldiers and received a land grant in Verchères from seigneur François Jarret de Verchères, ensign of the Contrecoeur Company, but he is only identified as a soldier by Gareau. Jean Chevalier and Pierre Pérusseau, witnesses to the marriage contract of Louis Fortin drawn up October 9<sup>th</sup> 1672 by notary Bénigne Basset, are identified in this document as soldiers of the Lafredière Company, like Fortin, but can not be found in any of the other sources consulted. Lastly, there is Pierre Tousignant dit Lapointe, who was married the same day as two other soldiers, all three couples having their marriage contract drawn up the same day by the same notary. He, too, is only identified as a soldier by Gareau.

some time before 1689 in Sorel; and Jean Lafond dit La Fontaine, said to have returned to France in 1668, died in Boucherville in 1711.

This concludes the methodological process used to identify the soldier-settlers of the Carignan regiment, but that does not mean that it is the end of the identification process itself. It was often necessary to return to sources that had already been consulted to verify new information or to follow a lead that was revealed after the first consultation of a source, even during the settlement phase of this study. The consultation of a source does not mean that no more information can be gleaned from it or that a second consultation is not necessary to verify or reject an identification that has already been made.

### 1.2.3 Example of the Identification Process

The case of Michel Potier is a good illustration of the identification process. Jack Verney lists a Michel Potier dit L'Angevin, who he claims settled in 1668, while Marcel Trudel lists a Michel Potier dit Langevin, identified as an *habitant* who enlisted with the regiment in Canada. This last piece of information served as a lead for further research and seemed to be confirmed by the Jetté dictionary, which revealed a Michel Pothier who was confirmed in Beauport in 1664, one year before the regiment's arrival. The Tanguay dictionary furnishes additional information in its entry for Michel Pottier, who married a woman named Jeanne Rigault, with whom he had three children: Pierre (baptized in 1676), Étienne (1678) and Paul (1681). The PRDH was then consulted, but no information was found for Michel Potier.

However, the PRDH could still be useful by changing tactic and searching for Potier's wife's name. Sure enough, there was a Jeanne Rigault, with precise dates for her children's baptisms, which corresponded with the approximate dates given by Tanguay (Pierre: March 9 1677, Étienne: March 17 1679 and Paul: May 8 1681). However, there was something odd about the information given: the father of these children was not Michel *Potier* dit Langevin, but Michel *Poirier* dit Langevin.

With this new name, the Jetté dictionary was consulted a second time. During the first consultation, Michel *Pothier*, the *habitant* who enlisted with the regiment had been found. However, the second consultation revealed that there was indeed a Michel *Poirier* dit Langevin who married a Jeanne Rigaud and who had the children Pierre, Étienne and Paul, with the same baptismal dates as those given by the PRDH. So, “Pothier” was changed to “Poirier” in our database, with the correct information. This proves, as Béatrice Craig writes, that “le jumelage des couples élimine presque complètement les problèmes dus à l’homonymie, permet de réduire le problème des prénoms qui changent et augmente la fiabilité des résultats.”<sup>59</sup>

#### 1.2.4 Identification Problems

In the identification phase of this study, one of the advantages that the author had over the previous studies on the regiment is the advantage of time. With newly-discovered or recently-published information, the errors and omissions of the past become clearer. Having four lists of soldiers to cross-reference allowed a perspective of comparison that was not available to the previous authors. However, due to the varied sources used in the previous studies and their sometimes-divergent conclusions on the identities of the soldiers, the four lists used were resistant to cross-referencing their information, and several difficulties were encountered in positively identifying the Carignan soldiers who settled in Canada.

These difficulties, most of which pertain to the population of New France in general, had to be resolved before continuing on to the settlement phase of the study, in order to arrive at an accurate list of soldiers. This accuracy would avoid combining the life events of two individuals into one itinerary or following the settlement path of the wrong person, both of which would falsify the resulting analyses.

One of the major identification problems is the existence of name variations. A different spelling of a given name can hide crucial information if each variation in spelling is not identified and the information is therefore not consulted. It is especially important to note

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<sup>59</sup> Béatrice CRAIG, “L’étude des mouvements migratoires en Amérique du Nord : sources et méthodes.” Yves Landry, *et. al.*,

these name variations for the *Parchemin* and PRDH databases, since the same individual may be listed in these two sources under several name variations, according to the spelling used in the original document, which is copied exactly in the entries of these databases.

Name variations, for the most part, are phonetic homophones of the “normalized” name given in the Jetté dictionary, similar to the homonym problem that Beatrice Craig speaks of above. For example, for the soldier Jacques *Énaud* dit Canada, we found no less than 20 variations: Énaud, Énaud, Énault, Énaux, Éno, Énos, Esnaud, Esnauld, Esnaut, Esneau, Esno, Hénau, Hainaud, Hainault, Hénault, Hénaust, Hénaut, Henaux, Henneau, and Héno.

The nicknames given to the soldiers pose another problem. “À cette époque il était d’habitude à peu près générale de donner à tout soldat un sobriquet. Avec le temps ce nom se greffait à sa personne et devenait le seul connu. C’est sous ce nom d’emprunt...que sont désignés la plupart des soldats dans [le rôle]...Devenus colons ou artisans, les noms véritables, le plus souvent, furent repris.”<sup>60</sup> In other words, each soldier had a “double life” – or at least a double name. During his military service, he was only known by his nickname, while in his civil life he was only known by his baptismal name. The challenge is to link these two identities into one.

A good example of a difficult nickname problem to resolve is that of *Georges d’Amboise*. Marcel Trudel identifies him as Martin Beaudry from the Contrecoeur Company, while René Jetté claims that Louis Lachaise, from the same company, bore this nickname. However, if we look at the latter’s parents, we discover that he is the son of Louis Lachaise and Marie *Georget*, and that he is a native of *Amboise*. So therefore “Georget d’Amboise” became *Georges d’Amboise* to identify the soldier Louis Lachaise.

Errors in correctly assigning nicknames are numerous. Aubin Lambert dit Champagne is said to be a soldier in the Grandfontaine Company, but this company’s Champagne is actually Nicolas Baron dit Lupien *ou* Champagne, who actually comes from the province of

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dir. *Les chemins de la migration en Belgique et au Québec: XVIIe-Xxe siècles*, Beauport, MNH, 1995, p. 23.

<sup>60</sup> Édouard Richard, *Rapport sur les Archives*, 1899, 31, cité dans SULTE, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Champagne. Aubin Lambert – from *Perche* – came to Canada in 1662. There is also Louis De Niort dit LaNoraie. G.-Robert Gareau identifies him as the drummer for the Lafouille Company, but gives as witnesses at his marriage Governor Daniel Rémy de Courcelles, Intendant Jean Talon, Louis Rouer de Villeray of the *Conseil Souverain* and Philippe Gauthier de Comporté, lieutenant of the LaFouille company and king's quartermaster. Would people of this stature have been witnesses at the marriage of a simple drummer? René Jetté identifies Louis de Niort as captain of the Lanoraie Company, which is much more credible.

Sometimes, it may be a question of a misidentification made due to a difficult or unusual name that may have been poorly transcribed or which is written in a modern source differently than it is in period documents. For example, the soldier identified in current sources as Sicaire DeGuire of the Contrecoeur Company is identified in contemporary documents as Zacharie Hire. There is also a "Jean Sendil" from the Sorel Company, whose real name is Pierre de Gencenay. It is possible that "Jean Sendil" is a mis-transcription of "Gencenay," though this hypothesis is nearly impossible to confirm.

There are also several nicknames that are quite popular in the regiment, which may designate several soldiers from different companies. Nicknames were not exclusive to one specific individual. Anybody originally from the province of Champagne could bear the nickname *Champagne*, and any soldier with the first name Pierre could be a "Lapierre." Indeed, there are six soldiers in the regiment named Pierre with the nickname Lapierre. To give a few examples taken from the *Settlers* and *Uncertain* databases, there are 6 SansSoucy, Lacroix, Lafortune, Lamontagne, LaPierre and LeBreton (plus 1 Petit Breton); 7 LaJeunesse; 8 Jolicoeur; 10 La Rose/LaRosée et Laviolette, 11 LaVerdure, 12 Champagne, 14 Lafontaine, and 15 Lafleur.

Often, sources misidentify or too quickly identify an individual who bears one of these nicknames, or ignore the fact that there may be two or more men with the same nickname in several companies. The table below shows examples taken from G.-Robert Gareau's study.

**Table 1: Identification Errors – Multiple Nicknames**

<i>Nickname</i>	<i>Mis-identification</i>	<i>Correct Identification (notes)</i>
DesMoulins (LaVarenne Co.)	Antoine Renaud	Jacques Desmoulins (Renaud arrived in 1659 with his mother)
Lafleur (LaFredière Co.)	Eustache Prévost	René Horieux (Prévost = Lamotte Company)
LaPointe (Monteil Co.)	Pierre Tousignant	Nicolas Audet
LaViolette (Berthier Co.)	Adrien Bétourné	François Carsi (Adrien Bétourné = Des Portes Company)
L'Espérance (LaFredière Co.)	Mathieu Binet	Jacques Viau (Gareau : Viau listed as La Varenne Co.)
Monturas (Froment Co.)	Pierre Lafaye dit Mouture	Pierre Montarras dit Marmande (Pierre Lafaye not called "Mouture", not from the regiment)
Sansoucy (Berthier Co.)	Léonard Giardin	Louis Bureau (Giardin is not listed in Jetté)

Another identification problem is the existence of doubles. By “blind doubles,” we mean the case of finding a soldier listed by his given name in one source and listed by his nickname in another – neither source sees their common error. In this case, the individual would be counted as two soldiers. It is also possible for a single source to list the same individual in these two manners, thus increasing the number of soldiers. Roy and Malchelosse recognized this possibility, noting, “il semble y avoir dans quelques compagnies une duplication de noms pour le même personnage.”<sup>61</sup> It is therefore necessary to find a source that links the soldier’s name with his nickname.

Doubles can be effectively eliminated by crosschecking sources. The Jetté dictionary lists a *Pierre Tabault* of the Contreœur Company, while Jack Verney lists a soldier from the same company only by the nickname *L'Esveillé*. These may appear at first to be two different men. However, Marcel Trudel lists a *Pierre Tabaux dit Léveillé* in the Contreœur Company, making the link between the name and nickname of this soldier.

Another example of a double that comes from several sources is the following case: G.-Robert Gareau lists a *Pierre Poinot dit LaVerdure* as corporal of the Chambly Company,

<sup>61</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op.cit.*, p. 82. However, the authors raise the question of whether this error wasn't actually voluntary on the part of the captains, who wanted to “grossir la liste en vue des profits.”



while Marcel Trudel lists a Pierre *Poirot* dit LaVerdure as corporal of the Froment Company. This double was noticed while sorting the *Settlers* database by rank, since these men with nearly identical names are the only two corporals identified as such in our database. They are, obviously, one and the same man.

If cases exist in the regiment of the same man bearing two different names, there also exist cases of two different men bearing the same name – two soldiers with the same name or a soldier and *habitant* who share the same name.

**Table 2: Cases of Double Names**

<i>Common Name</i>	<i>Person 1</i>	<i>Person 2</i>
Gazaille	Jean Blet <i>dit</i> Gazaille (Saint-Ours Company)	Jean Gazaille dit Saint-Germain (Contrecœur Company)
Antoine Dupré	<i>dit Rochefort</i> : Latour Company	<i>dit LaMontagne</i> : Petit Company
Jean Joubert	<i>dit Desfontaines</i> : Unknown company	No nickname: <i>habitant</i>
Jean Roussel	<i>dit LaTulippe et Montauban</i> La Colonelle Company	<i>dit LaRousselière</i> Lafredièrre Company
Jean Roy	<i>dit LaPensée</i> : Lafredièrre Company	<i>dit Petit-Jean et LeGascon</i> Salières Company

There is also a problem that is the opposite of doubles. There exist cases of false “fusion” of two different soldiers into one single identification. The following cases are taken from Gareau’s study:

- Jean Daniau dit Laprise of the Lafouille Company is identified as the Jean LeNiay from the 1668 roll. However, the latter is actually another soldier from the Salières Company (in the “*Uncertain*” database). The Tanguay dictionary clearly identifies these two men as distinct individuals, with different origins and ages.
- René Maillot dit LaViolette from the Des Portes Company is taken to be the “Adrien Bétourné dit LaViolette” of Roy and Malchelosse’s list, but these are in fact two soldiers who bear the same nickname in the same company.
- Charles Millouin dit LeBoesme of the Lanoraie Company is taken to be the same person as “Jean Boesme.” However, the Jetté dictionary clearly identifies these two names as belonging to two different people.

### 1.2.5 Gold Among the Sand

If there are several problems in the process involved in identifying the Carignan soldiers, it is nonetheless possible to find some “revealing” documents that identify men as soldiers of the regiment. Some documents, obviously, reveal more information than others. At the “general” level, there is the example of Jean Lariou, who is qualified as “cy devant soldat et après habitant” in a report of a healing that occurred in 1668. There are documents that are a little more specific, such as the contract that identifies Léonard Montreau as a “soldat de la Cie de M. de Froman [sic]” in 1668. The best case are acts like the land sale that identifies Jean-Baptiste Poitiers du Buisson as “habitant et soldat de la compagnie du Sieur de Chambly au régiment de Carignan” in 1668.

Nonetheless, if there is gold among the sand in the documents of New France, all that glitters is not gold. There are some individuals who are identified as belonging to the Saint-Ours Company, who are incorrectly assumed to be soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment. After the demobilization, captain Pierre de Saint-Ours went to France, but came back to Canada and was made the captain of a company of *troupes de la marine*. It is this to company – which arrived in 1683, after the departure of the Carignan-Salières regiment – that these cases refer. For example, there is Étienne Charpentier dit Saint-Laurent, whom René Jetté identifies as a sergeant of the Saint-Ours Company, but whose entry does not bear the mention “of the Carignan regiment.”

This concludes the section on the identification of the Carignan soldiers. The process began with four lists of soldiers that were verified and complemented by genealogical sources to create the databases *Settlers*, *Uncertain* and *Non-settlers*. The first of these was used to create the databases *Events* and *Analysis* that will be used to analyze the soldiers’ settlement and mobility in the following two chapters. At the end of the identification process, the result was a list of 340 soldier-settlers, 134 uncertain soldiers and 142 non-settlers, which gives 616 Carignan soldiers identified in all three categories – roughly half of the regiment’s total strength. Even though it is no longer strictly a question of the identification process, this question nonetheless remained open during the process of re-creating the soldiers’

individual itineraries. The documents consulted to create these itineraries could always confirm or invalidate a prior identification.

### **1.3 The Settlement Phase: Following the Soldiers in New France**

It is therefore with the 340 soldiers of the *Settlers* database that we continued on to the second part of our methodology: following their settlement on Canadian soil. The idea of this section is to recreate the “individual itineraries” of the soldiers in order to study where they settled, as well as their degree of mobility or stability. These itineraries would be created by stringing together the various events in each soldier’s life into a line that would lead from demobilization to settlement. It was important to have accurate and complete information on the date, place and nature of each event, in order to be able to sort the *Events* database by these criteria for the purpose of analysis.

Alain Laberge’s doctoral thesis deals directly with this subject, examining mobility, settlement and permanence in a rural setting.<sup>62</sup> However, while in his study his methodology consists of re-creating a seigniorial population by examining the space and the colonizing groups that inhabited it, our method consists of studying a colonizing group by examining the space that it occupied.

To re-create each soldier’s individual itinerary, it was necessary to compile all his life events during the period of study, from demobilization in 1668 until the census of 1681 – the last colony-wide census of New France. Geographer Serge Courville gives a period of two years for a colonist to settle.<sup>63</sup> Therefore, our 13-year period should more than suffice to not only determine the soldiers’ settlement, but to also get an idea of their degree of mobility.

The 1668-1681 time frame was respected for the collection of event data, except for the following events, if they occurred before 1668: confirmations, conversions, taking the

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<sup>62</sup> LABERGE, “Mobilité, établissement et enracinement en milieu rural. Le peuplement des seigneuries de la Grande Anse sous le Régime français (1672-1752)”, Toronto, York Univ., Thèse de doctorat (histoire), 1987, XVII-323 p.

<sup>63</sup> Serge COURVILLE, “Espace, territoire et culture en Nouvelle-France : une vision géographique,” RHAF, 37, 3 (1983) p. 422.

scapular, and marriage. The first three events, since they were performed *en masse* for the soldiers, may serve as an indication or confirmation of an identity. Mariages before the date of demobilization, though rare (there were only 25), will be important for later analysis.

Béatrice Craig notes that, “Recensements, registres paroissiaux et généalogies ont...permis aux historiens de faire progresser la connaissance des mouvements migratoires.”<sup>64</sup> This study uses these sources in the demographic component of the settlement phase and completes them with property information and notarized documents to get a more complete picture of each soldier’s individual itinerary. The method used could apply to the study of any group in New France, not just the Carignan soldiers.

### 1.3.1 The Demographic Component

The aim of the settlement phase of this study being to put together a database of events in the life of each soldier in order to re-create their individual itineraries, we therefore began collecting events for the most common situation: soldiers who married and had a family. In short, this was the main idea of the soldier settlement program – to entice them to marry and to found families in order to tie them to the land. They were also more “demographically active,” to use a phrase from Béatrice Craig,<sup>65</sup> leaving more traces of themselves in the parish registers due to the births of their children. We therefore began by simultaneously consulting the Jetté and Tanguay genealogical dictionaries, to extract the marriages, children’s baptisms, confirmations, census mentions, burials and other acts contained in them.

The Jetté dictionary may be seen as the condensed version of the *Programme de recherche en démographie historique* (PRDH) of the Université de Montréal. It contains not only acts found in parish registers from 1621 to 1730, but also marriage contracts (including those that were annulled), various notarized documents, census mentions, confirmation lists, the register of patients of the *Hôtel-Dieu de Québec* and information from various genealogical works. According to demographer Hubert Charbonneau, co-director of the PRDH, René

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<sup>64</sup> CRAIG, *op. cit.*, p.29

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

Jetté “a su mettre à profit la masse considérable de travaux qui nous séparent aujourd’hui de Cyprien Tanguay...grâce à lui, nombre de défauts imputés à Tanguay disparaissent.”<sup>66</sup> Prominent among the faults that the Jetté dictionary corrects is the distinction between birth and baptism, that between death and burial, the identification of illegitimate children and the inclusion of unmarried individuals.

In addition to including information that was used in the identification phase of this study, the Jetté dictionary also contains excellent base information to re-construct each soldier’s individual itinerary. René Jetté clearly lists each soldier’s marriage and the births of his children – the groundwork for his itinerary. In addition to this basic information, one can find dates for valid and annulled marriage contracts, summary information on censuses and the death/burial dates for the soldier and his family members.<sup>67</sup>

As stated above, the Tanguay genealogical dictionary may contain information not found elsewhere, but also contains numerous errors and omissions. For this reason, both genealogical dictionaries were consulted simultaneously, in order to compare information extracted from them.

Keeping in mind our period of study, we only retained marriages that took place before 1681, which leaves us with 18 soldiers who are identified as bachelors, even though they married after the end of our time frame. In the subsequent analyses, we refer to these men as “false bachelors,” since the lack of marriage before 1681 may lead one to believe that they remained bachelors during their entire life in the colony.

Information on a soldier’s children was noted the same way as that of his marriage: only children born before 1681 were retained for this study. For example, Antoine Émery from the Contrecoeur Company had a total of 20 children, but only the 8 he had before 1681 were

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<sup>66</sup> In the introduction to JETTÉ, *op.cit.*, p. VII and VIII.

<sup>67</sup> The Desjardins genealogical dictionary, a correction of the occasional faults found in the Jetté dictionary, could have been used for this study, but its main advantage – the fact that it continues its information past the end date of 1730 in Jetté – is of no use to this thesis, since this last date is well beyond our period of study.

retained. Three family sizes were noted, which would be used to compare soldiers in the analyses on mobility: no children, 1 to 5 children, and 6 to 10 children.

Though the genealogical dictionaries provided a great deal of information, as René Jetté states in the introduction to his dictionary, “les registres paroissiaux québécois de cette période ne renferment pas toujours toute l’information requise.”<sup>68</sup> This is exactly why we turned to other sources of information to complete the soldiers’ individual itineraries.

### 1.3.2 The Property Component

The demographic component of the soldiers’ settlement paths gave an initial idea of their individual itineraries, which were then completed by consulting sources that contain more property-related information. Two sources allowed for partial views – two “snapshots,” if you will – of the places where the soldiers settled, and served as confirmation of their presence at a certain location at a given time. However, as Beatrice Craig states, “Les registres paroissiaux sont plus fiables et plus utiles, mais ne sont pas sans défaut non plus. Ils ne sont vraiment exploitables que pour les couples et ils contiennent très peu d’informations sur les résidences précédentes des migrants.”<sup>69</sup> Due to these limitations, other non-religious sources were required to complete the soldiers’ itineraries. These sources furnish information that is more property related as opposed to life-event related.

In order to have an idea of where the soldiers were settled a few years after demobilization, we consulted the *Terrier du Saint-Laurent en 1674* by Marcel Trudel.<sup>70</sup> This reconstitution of the land occupation at the time, done in a very meticulous manner, allowed us to note each soldier’s place of residence and the land transactions for their property at the halfway point in our time frame. It allowed us to set a checkpoint at the year 1674 not only to see the state of affairs halfway through our time period, but also to have an indication of the “progress” of the former soldiers for two different periods: between their first settlement and 1674 and

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<sup>68</sup> JETTÉ, *op. cit.*, p. X.

<sup>69</sup> Craig, *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>70</sup> TRUDEL. *Le terrier du Saint-Laurent en 1674. Tome 1 : De la Côte-Nord au lac Saint-Louis*, 1998, 508 p. et *Le terrier du Saint-Laurent en 1674. Tome 2 : Du lac Saint-Louis à la Gaspésie*. Montréal, Éditions du Méridien, 1998, 404 p.

between this date and 1681. Trudel often indicates how long each individual had been on a given plot of land in 1674, thus allowing us to establish settlement prior to this date.

Trudel presents his information by seigneurie, with the date it was granted and the date of the first grants made by the seigneur. For the individual property grants, each entry normally contains the name of the owner in 1674, the proportions of the land, date it was granted, the transactions between the initial grant and 1674, and information on where the plot is located. These entries also specify the exact location of the land. This information may be as specific as the names of neighbors or geographical features, and is normally lacking in other sources.

For some seigneuries granted to Carignan officers, such as Saint-Ours, Trudel notes how many grants were made to former soldiers of the regiment. This information allows us to see at a glance how many soldiers settled in a given seigneurie and what their company affiliations were. The mention of the sales transactions for each plot of land can also provide complementary information on transactions between soldiers, and information on a soldier who was not owner or resident of the land in 1674, but who was a previous owner, settling there before this checkpoint.

Since there were many transactions between soldiers, Trudel's work also allows us to verify the identity of the individuals involved in each land sale. This verification allowed us to confirm the identities of several soldiers and also to note several name variations that were used in consulting or re-consulting other sources.

Another property-related source that was used for this study was the censuses of New France. Demographers Hubert Charbonneau and Yolande Lavoie critique the first two censuses of the colony and raise the question or problem of name variations that can be found in these enumerations.<sup>71</sup> As for the gaps that are infamous in the 1666 and 1667 censuses, Charbonneau, Lavoie and Jacques Légaré conclude that "tous ces chiffres doivent

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<sup>71</sup> CHARBONNEAU et LAVOIE, *loc. cit.*, p. 488 et 493-494.

correspondre à des valeurs minimales” for the 1681 census and that “il reste assurément possible d’en tirer un parti des plus intéressants.”<sup>72</sup>

Since Marcel Trudel’s “reconstituted” census of 1666 had already been consulted, we therefore proceeded to consult the annotated census of 1681.<sup>73</sup> This source allowed us to pinpoint the soldiers at a given place at the end of our period of study. Benjamin Sulte published a version of the 1681 census in his *Histoire des Canadiens-Français* in 1882,<sup>74</sup> but the information is limited to a simple list of names and ages for each locality. André Lafontaine published his “annotated census” in 1981. In addition to the information included in the census itself (size of cultivated land, name and age of the individual, his spouse and children, professions, etc.), Lafontaine adds useful notes, which give a good deal of complementary information to help confirm an individual’s identity.

One fault of this source is that it does not distinguish between the localities on the island of Montréal: Ville-Marie, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Lachine, etc. Another problem is that several soldiers – six in all – can be found in two locations. In two cases, it is a question of soldiers who married widows. With remarriages, the second land could be that which belonged to the wife’s first husband, which is exactly the case with our two soldiers. It could also be a question of land in a neighboring seigneurie, utilized only for farming and not as a residence, or a parcel of land in one of the towns that was used as a business. Whatever the situation, the course of a soldier’s itinerary and his mention in another source as *habitant* in one of the two *seigneuries* was enough to clear up the mystery of the two parcels of land.

#### 1.4 Filling in the Gaps

The consultation of these two property-related sources allowed us to arrive at a certain level of completion in reconstructing the soldiers’ individual itineraries. At this point in our

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<sup>72</sup> CHARBONNEAU, LAVOIE et Jacques LÉGARÉ “Le recensement nominatif du Canada en 1681”, *Histoire Sociale/Social History*, vol. 4, no. 7 (avril 1971), p. 77-98.

<sup>73</sup> André LAFONTAINE, *Recensement annoté de la Nouvelle-France 1681*. Sherbrooke, Éd. André Lafontaine, 1981.

<sup>74</sup> SULTE, “Recensement de 1681”, *Histoire des Canadiens-Français, 1608-1880: origine, histoire, religion, guerres, découvertes, colonisation, coutumes, vie domestique, sociale et politique, développement, avenir*, vol. 5. Montréal, Éditions Élysée, 1977, p. 53-92.



research, we had already amassed enough information for most soldiers to make a determination of their settlement and mobility. For a small percentage, it was determined that more information was needed to accurately gauge their settlement and mobility.

By providing a great deal of valuable information, the use of the *Terrier du Saint-Laurent* eliminated the need to consult notarized documents for the majority of the identified soldiers. For about 75% of them, we already had enough information to proceed with our analyses. But for the others – especially the bachelors and false bachelors – the sources consulted did not yet give a clear enough indication of their individual itineraries. Marriages and children’s baptisms, which make up a good portion of a married soldier’s itinerary, were lacking for them and the few events collected for these men in the *Events* database were not enough to give a sufficient idea of their path to settlement. Therefore, for this sub-section of our study group, the sources consulted had to be complemented with additional information of a different nature.

#### 1.4.1 Consulting Notarized Documents

Due to the lack of sufficient or conclusive information for this 25% of our soldiers, we therefore had to consult notarized documents in the *Parchemin* database to add information to the itineraries in question. Louis Lavallée demonstrates how, for the period of New France, “des archives notariales accessoires et complémentaires pourront éventuellement combler le vide temporel qui s’étend entre le mariage et le décès.”<sup>75</sup> This is exactly the reason why we now turned to this source: to fill in the voids in the individual itineraries of several soldiers. As Raymond Roy and Hubert Charbonneau point out, even though there are gaps in the parish registers of New France, the three censuses and other complementary sources – like notarized documents – “nous permettront de corriger une bonne partie des lacunes.”<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Louis LAVALLÉE, “Les archives notariales et l’histoire sociale de la Nouvelle-France”, *RHAF*, vol. 28, no. 3 (décembre 1974), p. 385-403.

<sup>76</sup> CHARBONNEAU et ROY, “Le contenu des registres paroissiaux canadiens du XVIIe siècle”, *RHAF*, vol. 30, no. 1 (juin 1976), p. 86.

The *Parchemin* database, created by the Montréal-based Archiv-Histo company, contains a total of 3,500,000 summaries of notarized documents of all types from 1621 to 1765. For the purposes of this thesis, given the number of soldiers in question – 340 in all – the *Parchemin* database was consulted for only the 25% for whom it was difficult or impossible at this point to sufficiently determine their settlement or mobility.

We did not retain all of the documents concerning the soldiers in question, notably those that were very close in date to another document concerning the same location, those that did not furnish additional information on a soldier and those that did not pinpoint him to a specific location. The documents consulted in *Parchemin* that were retained are those that can identify a soldier at a given place at a given time within our time frame. This essentially boils down to certain types of documents, such as marriage contracts and property transactions. Even if the place where the document was drawn up or the place where the transaction occurred may not be conclusive for our needs, these documents often contain mentions of the place of origin or residence of the individuals concerned, and this information, very valuable for our study, is what was retained from them.

One of the main difficulties in doing research in the *Parchemin* database, mentioned in the identification phase of this thesis, is the fact that the spelling of names is not normalized for the entries. The names in each summary are transcribed exactly as they are found in the original documents, which means that one must search for information on each individual under several different name variations.

#### **1.4.2 A Return to Demography**

Even after consulting the *Parchemin* database, there still remained soldiers whose itineraries were not yet clear. This problem was caused either by the fact that there were large gaps in their itineraries or by the fact that the events stopped several years before the end of our time frame. These situations made it impossible to determine the settlement or mobility of the given soldiers. In order to complete these uncertain itineraries, we then consulted the database of the *Programme de recherche en démographie historique* (PRDH).

The main advantage of the PRDH, other than the fact that it contains an incomparable mass of demographic information resulting from the systematic extraction of parish registers and other documents from 1635 to 1775, is the fact that it contains all mentions of an individual in an event. This includes when he is the “main actor,” such as the groom in a marriage, head of household in a census or the deceased in a burial, etc.; but also when he plays a secondary role – witness, godfather, father of a baptized child – even the simple mention of his name as father or late husband of another person mentioned in an event.

This type of mention as a secondary player in an event can be quite revealing, and it is on these secondary roles that our consultation of the PRDH was focused. These mentions cannot be found in the Jetté dictionary, which was already consulted for mentions of primary role. Hubert Charbonneau and Raymond Roy have proven the fact that mentions of witnesses in parish registers “peuvent nous révéler l’existence d’individus qui n’apparaissent ni dans les actes – en tant que sujet, père, mère ou conjoint – ni dans les recensements...On pense particulièrement aux immigrants restés célibataires.”<sup>77</sup>

Again, not all 340 soldiers concerned were the object of research in the PRDH database. Consulting *Parchemin* helped determine several soldiers’ itineraries, but others were still unclear. The PRDH was only used for those soldiers for whom the individual itinerary was still difficult or impossible to determine at this point. For some soldiers, events outside of our time frame (1668 to 1681) were retained if there was a lack of events within the period of study and these additional events helped to clarify the soldier’s itinerary.

### **1.5 Problems With the Itineraries**

In the itinerary phase of this thesis, a problem arose that affected the question of where the soldiers settled: that of the dates each parish was formally created and the dates the registers began. The fact that a baptism, marriage or burial took place or was recorded in a certain parish does not necessarily mean that the person in question lived there. Since there were not

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<sup>77</sup> CHARBONNEAU et ROY, *loc. cit.*, p. 91.

many parishes from 1668 to 1681, it is possible that an individual had to travel to the nearest church or chapel to take the sacraments, but that his actual residence was in a neighboring seigneurie. It was necessary to scrutinize the details of an event to verify if mention is made of the residence of the event's participants. Lacking such a mention, it was necessary to see how such an event fell in the soldier's itinerary, in order to determine if it was a question of simply a "liturgical visit" to take the sacraments and not a permanent move. The table below presents the parishes that existed before 1681, with the date that the registers began and the places of residence of the individuals mentioned in the register.

**Table 3: Parishes and Missions for the Period 1665-1681**

<i>Parish/Mission</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Places of Residence</i> <sup>78</sup>
Québec (Notre-Dame de Québec)	1621	Batiscan, Beaupré (côte de), Beauport, Cap-de-la-Madeleine, Chambly, Charlesbourg, Château-Richer, Contrecoeur, Dautray, Gaudarville, Île-aux-Grues, Île aux Oies, Île d'Orléans, LaDurantaye, La Pérade, Lauzon, Lintot, Louiseville, Neuville (Domboug), Portneuf, St-Gabriel (L'Ancienne-Lorette), St-Ours, Sillery, Sorel, Verchères
Trois-Rivières	1634	Batiscan, Champlain, Saint-François-du-Lac
Sillery (Mission St-Joseph)	1638	Gaudarville
Montréal (Notre-Dame de)	1642	Chambly, Contrecoeur, Lachine, Laprairie, Longueuil, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Repentigny, Verchères
Château-Richer	1661	Île d'Orléans
Ste-Famille, Île d'Orléans	1663	autres paroisses de l'île
Boucherville	1668	Chambly, Contrecoeur, Repentigny, Verchères
L'Ange-Gardien	1669	Québec
Cap-de-la-Madeleine	1673	Champlain
Pointe-aux-Trembles	1674	Contrecoeur, Repentigny
<b>Sorel</b>	1675	Contrecoeur, La Pérade, Louiseville
Cap-Santé (Portneuf)	1679	Grondines
Champlain	1679	Batiscan

There were also some "official" locations where certain religious ceremonies took place. It is important not to take these places or events as a migration when determining an itinerary. For example, at the time confirmations were only done at Québec City, Montréal and Sorel –

<sup>78</sup> According to the places of residence listed for the events retained for our *Events* database. The parishes and missions whose registers don't mention participants from outside the parish are Ste-Anne de Beaupré (1657); Laprairie (1670); Beauport (1673); L'Ancienne-Lorette and Lachine (1676); Cap-Saint-Ignace, Charlesbourg, Contrecoeur, Lauzon (Lévis), L'Islet, Montmagny, Neuville (Domboug), Repentigny, St-François de l'Île-d'Orléans, St-Laurent de l'Île-d'Orléans and St-Pierre de l'Île-d'Orléans (1679), Batiscan, Grondines and St-Jean de l'Île-d'Orléans (1680); and Baie-St-Paul (1681).

nowhere else. These events do not help determine a point on a soldier's personal itinerary, except if a mention is made of his place of residence in the act. Also, a baby could be born anywhere, but he or she had to be baptized in the closest church, which was not necessarily in the same locality as where the birth occurred. Again, the entire pattern of the itinerary was studied to determine the validity of the religious events' locations, which were also compared with those of secular events (land grants, contracts, censuses, etc.) to determine residence.

Another problem in determining an individual's itinerary is that sometimes the formal title to a parcel of land was not given until several months or years after an individual took possession of the land. When a settler took possession of his land, the seigneur gave him a *billet de concession*, a type of receipt that was later formalized with a notarized land grant. Several months or years could elapse between the emission of the *billet* and the drawing up of the official grant. For example, François Arnaud from the Loubias Company received a *billet de concession* on January 17<sup>th</sup> 1670 for a 4x60-arpent parcel of land on the Île Moras, but he did not receive a formal title for this land until four months later, on May 18<sup>th</sup>. There is also the case of Jean Seleurier, who bought some land at Saint-Ours on January 27<sup>th</sup> 1669, but who did not receive the official title until November 5<sup>th</sup> 1673.

Land grants can be a good complement to birth, death and marriage records in reconstructing each soldier's individual itinerary. However, they should not be taken at face value as a migration or as proof that a soldier actually lived at the place in question. At the time, it was possible – and quite frequent – for a settler to be given several land grants in different seigneuries. This does not mean, however, that each of these grants was developed or became the settler's place of residence. Along with other seigneurial obligations, a colonist had the responsibility of clearing his land in a given time frame and if he did not fulfill this duty, the land could be taken back and re-granted, without a formal notarized annulment of the original grant. It is also possible that a colonist may have been granted a parcel of land only sell it for a profit without ever living there. Each land grant was therefore compared to succeeding events to see if settlement actually occurred at the given location.

Despite the various difficulties in determining a soldier's place of residence at any given event, we nonetheless had to assign a "place" for the event, which was assumed to be the soldier's residence at the time of the event. All information available for each event was examined, and a place of residence was assigned for the event. This is in keeping with the methodology used by demographer Hubert Denis in his longitudinal study of spatial mobility based on the PRDH. We based our determination of place of residence on Denis's methodology: "Quand il y a présence d'une déclaration de résidence, cette dernière est automatiquement retenue. En cas d'absence de ce type de déclaration, le lieu d'enregistrement de la mention sera utilisé selon l'hypothèse que l'union enregistre généralement ses événements démographiques dans sa paroisse de résidence."<sup>79</sup>

## 1.6 Lost Soldiers

Despite the variety of sources consulted to recreate the soldiers' individual itineraries, there were some who nonetheless escaped our analysis or for whom it remained impossible to determine their settlement at the checkpoints 1674 or 1681. For still others, all trace of them is lost after a few years, never to be taken up again.

One possible explanation of this situation could be a soldier's participation in the fur trade. The consultation of trading permits or *congés* could fill this gap, at least in part. This information would probably not pinpoint an individual at a given place, but would at least give an explanation for the lack of other information and would also indicate a certain type of "extreme" mobility. However, official documents of this type do not exist for the time frame covered by this study. As Louise Dechêne points out, "L'habitude de consigner toutes les transactions relatives à la traite dans des contrats notariés, sociétés, prêts, embauche, est uniformément implantée au début du XVIIIe siècle"<sup>80</sup> - after our period of study. In addition, such an analysis is not appropriate to the present thesis, which seeks to study only those soldiers who settled on Canadian soil, not to determine the destiny of all soldiers.

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<sup>79</sup> Hubert DENIS, "Réflexions méthodologiques concernant l'étude longitudinale de la mobilité spatiale des unions à partir du Registre de la population du Québec ancien," Yves LANDRY, et. al., dir. *Les chemins de la migration en Belgique et au Québec: XVIIe-Xxe siècles*, Beauport, MNH, 1995, p. 33.

<sup>80</sup> Louise DECHÊNE, *Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVIIe siècle : essai*. Montréal, Boréal, 1988 (1974), p. 217.

## 1.7 A Database of Events

As all of the above sources were consulted, the information extracted was entered into the *Events* database, which contains a total of 2,687 entries. However, one entry does not necessarily correspond to one event. An “entry,” is defined as the notation of an event depending on the role played by the participant. A religious ceremony or notarized document – one “event,” – can generate several entries in the *Events* database. Let us take the example of a soldier’s marriage. For the soldier in question, the entry is noted as a marriage. But if three other Carignan soldiers are present at the marriage, entries are also made for each of them, though they are noted as wedding guests.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, for the “event” of the marriage, there are four “entries” in the database.

Information on the role played by a soldier in an event is important in determining his individual itinerary. There are roles that do not imply a physical presence at an event where the event took place. For example, if a soldier is present at the baptism of his child at Québec City, this does not necessarily mean that he lived in Québec City. But if the baptismal act specifies that the child was born in Charlesbourg and baptized in Québec, the mention of the child’s birthplace is a strong indication of the soldier’s residence.

We created *Events* entries for all 340 soldiers identified in the *Settlers* database. Therefore, the 2,687 entries in this database, divided among the 340 soldiers, gives an average of almost eight entries per soldier used to recreate his individual itinerary.<sup>82</sup>

Each entry in the *Events* database notes the date, place and type of event. All participants in the event are also noted in various categories: the main actor,<sup>83</sup> participants who are Carignan soldiers, and those who are not. Lastly, the name and type of authority who drew up the document are noted – priest, notary, judicial, hospital or other authority. A “notes” field

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<sup>81</sup> The term “guest” is used instead of “witness,” which has legal implications.

<sup>82</sup> 7.90 events per soldier.

<sup>83</sup> Which could be the soldier himself in the case of confirmations, land transactions, a census, burial or other events that concern him directly. For marriages, the “main actor” is the bride, and for births and baptisms, it is the child.

contains any precisions or specifications that could not be entered into the other fields, such as a mention of residence other than the place of the event.

The location of the event is noted rather than the soldier's residence *per se*, since this information is not always explicitly furnished in each act, and the string of places was used to determine residence. When the residence was given in the act and differed from the location of the event, this information was noted in the *Notes* field and signaled by a change in color of the name in the *Place* field of the database, so a difference was immediately apparent.

All of the information in the *Events* database could be sorted based on the type of information needed in each analysis. Events could be sorted by a soldier's name to see all the points on his individual itinerary, then put in chronological order to follow his path to settlement. If marriages were being analyzed, this type of event could be extracted from the database and also sorted by year of marriage or origin of the spouse. Different criteria could be combined and cross-referenced to produce the desired analysis. Examining how many soldiers were settled at Lachine in 1674 merely required sorting the database by this settlement date and location. Studying how many bachelors engaged in the fur trade meant comparing these two fields of information for the soldiers in the database.

The *Events* database therefore, created from the careful consultation and extraction of information from the corpus of sources, served as raw material to reconstruct the individual itinerary of each of the 340 soldier-settlers identified. It is the composition and direction of these itineraries, analyzed as a whole and in various sub-groups, that serves as the subject of the following chapter.



## Chapter 2: Settlement – Taking Land, Taking a Wife

Now that the soldier-settlers are identified and the events of their individual itineraries compiled, this chapter will undertake the analysis of our databases to determine where the Carignan soldiers settled in Canada. Questions concerning their mobility will be studied in the following chapter.

In the time of New France, settling meant taking land and taking a wife – a definition that is also the motivating idea behind the soldier settlement program. This chapter will examine to what extent the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment followed this program of “taking land, taking a wife” and will determine where they settled and whom they settled with. The various factors that influenced their decisions to choose a wife and a place of settlement will be examined and it will be determined if they indeed formed the line of defense that the authorities wanted. The present chapter will therefore determine the relative success of the soldier settlement program and if the factors that the authorities believed would affect the soldiers’ settlement indeed had the desired effect.

### 2.1 Taking Land

The identification phase of this study has already identified *how many* soldiers settled in Canada. There were roughly 1,200 soldiers in the regiment at full strength. Out of this number, we were able to identify a grand total of 653 soldiers (54.42%), which includes all men in the *Settlers*, *Non-settlers* and *Uncertain* databases, as well as the officers. The combined total of 474 *Settlers* and *Uncertains* – soldiers who either definitively or possibly settled in Canada – accounts for only 39.5% of the regiment. Of these 474 men, 134 are in the *Uncertain* database and therefore cannot be confirmed either as Carignan soldiers or as having settled in the colony. They can therefore not be used in the current study.

It can only be said with certainty that the 340 soldiers in the *Settlers* database were Carignan soldiers who settled in Canada. It is these 340 soldier-settlers from the regiment who are the object of study in this and the following chapter. However, the 340 confirmed *Settlers*

represent only 28.33% of the regiment. This number, obviously, is not much and is far from the assertions of “la plus grande partie” of the regiment settling in Canada, as put forth by contemporary authors and popular history. It is already possible, based on the low percentage of soldiers who definitively settled, to say that at the very best the program had a limited success.

### 2.1.1 The First Settlement

Before studying *where* the soldiers settled, we first looked at *when* they settled – the dates of their first settlement, or the beginning of their individual itineraries. In order to have a common date for all soldiers, 1668 shall be considered the year of demobilization, even though it seems that there were some companies that were demobilized in the fall of 1667.

The entries in the *Events* database were sorted chronologically for each soldier to determine when he first settled. By “settled,” we mean that the soldier took land in a definitive manner – normally by a land grant, the purchase of land or by the birth of a child at a given place. These two types of sources were necessary to overcome any omissions in either type of record (parish registers or land records) and to have viable information for both married and unmarried soldiers.

**Table 4: Number of Soldiers Who Settled Per Year**

	1665	1666	1667	1668	1669	1670	1671	1672	1673	1674	1675	1676	1677	1678	1679	1680	1681	After	Total
Married	1	4	21	49	35	29	47	25	32	5	2	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	256
Bachelors	0	0	2	7	8	14	11	8	9	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	65
False bachelors	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	1	6	0	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	2	19
Total	1	4	23	58	44	43	60	34	47	6	4	4	4	1	1	0	4	2	<b>340</b>

Based on this definition, the table above gives the number of soldiers who settled per year. The year of first settlement may fall at any point in our time frame (1668-1681). The fact that there are some soldiers who settled before 1667 can be explained by the fact that there

were *habitants* who enlisted with the regiment while it was in Canada, as Marcel Trudel has revealed,<sup>84</sup> therefore they were already “settled” in the colony prior to enlisting.

The hypothesis is that the majority of soldiers first settled in 1668 and in the years immediately following demobilization. With regards to the three checkpoints that we have set along the soldiers’ itineraries, this means that most of the soldiers should have settled before 1674,<sup>85</sup> with the numbers decreasing for 1674 and 1681. The following table gives the results of this analysis.

**Table 5: Percentage of Soldiers Settled by Time Before Settlement**

	0-2 yrs (1670)	3 yrs (1671)	4 yrs (1672)	5 yrs (1673)
Number	173	233	267	314
Percentage	50.88%	68.53%	78.53%	92.35%

In the first two years following demobilization, a little over half of the soldiers were settled. More than two thirds were settled by the following year, and over three quarters within four years. Five years after the demobilization, nearly all of the soldiers were settled. There are only two soldiers (0.59%) who settled after 1681, the end of our period of study. These results confirm the hypothesis on the time it took the Carignan soldiers to definitively settle in the colony. They show that for the soldiers, it was mostly question of a quick settlement in the years that immediately followed demobilization. Most of the soldiers began their individual itineraries as colonists shortly after their itinerary as a soldier ended.

After studying *when* the soldiers decided to settle, it was then determined *where* they decided to settle – where they took their first land and began their itineraries on Canadian soil. For each soldier, this place corresponds to his first place of residence, using the same criteria as for the date of their first settlement. Places where soldiers had their confirmation, marriage, abjuration, etc. are not taken into account, since they do not indicate that a soldier resided at the locality in question.

<sup>84</sup> TRUDEL, *La population du Canada en 1666*, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

<sup>85</sup> In addition to the other sources used, Marcel Trudel’s *Terrier du Saint-Laurent* was useful in determining settlement prior to 1674, the date that this work covers. Trudel furnishes dates that land grants, purchases and occupation occurred prior to the 1674 checkpoint.

For their first land, the Carignan soldiers settled in 52 seigneuries,<sup>86</sup> which gives a concentration of 6.54 soldiers per seigneurie. Of these seigneuries, there are 43 – 82.69% – with five soldiers or less. Out of the localities chosen for the soldiers' first settlement, there are only 11 seigneuries with ten or more soldiers among the general population. It is therefore possible to conclude that, in large part, the demobilized soldiers decided not to settle in large groups, at least at the outset of their itineraries. The authorities' hope the soldiers would stay together in large numbers did not materialize itself in their choice of settlement.

**Table 6: Military Population at the Soldiers' First Settlement**

<i># Soldiers</i>	<i>Seigneuries/localities (number: names)</i>
1	12: Cap Rouge, Deschailons, Île-aux-Grues, Labadie, La Durantaye, Lavaltrie, Lespinay, Repentigny, Rivière-Ouelle, St-Laurent IO, St-Pierre IO, Varennes
2	8: Bellechasse, Château-Richer, Île-aux-Oies, Linctot, Portneuf, Saint-Ignace, Sillery, Tremblay
3	7: Beauport, Cap-de-la-Madeleine, Dautray, Gaudarville, Île Ste-Thérèse, Lauzon, Verchères
4	2: Grondines, Saint-Jean IO
5	5: Batiscan, Île d'Orléans, La Pérade, Longueuil, Sainte-Famille IO
6	2: Nicolet, Saint-Gabriel
7	3: Boucherville, Laprairie, Saint-François IO
8 and 9	2: Charlesbourg (8 soldats), Contrecoeur (9)
10+	11: Chambly (21 soldats), Champlain (13), Lachine (20), Louiseville (11), Montréal (22), Neuville (11), Pointe-aux-Trembles (17), Québec (31), Saint-Ours (23), Sorel (29), Trois-Rivières (10)

To get an overall idea of the soldiers' distribution throughout the colony, a comparison was made between the regions where they settled. First, we looked at the distribution of the soldiers in the three governments of New France: Montréal, Québec and Trois-Rivières. Then, we compared urban and rural populations, looking at how many soldiers in these three governments settled in the government's main town. The percentage of the regiment that settled in each government is given in the table below, along with the percentage of that government's soldiers who settled in its town.

Various factors may have influenced the soldiers' decision of urban or rural settlement. One of the reasons why a soldier may have chosen to settle in one of the three towns is because he plied a trade. Even though we did not specifically study the trades of the former soldiers, this information was noted when found in the sources consulted. For soldiers who settled in the three cities, 17 out of 31 in Québec City plied a trade, 11 out of 22 in Montréal and 4 out of 10 in Trois-Rivières. Though this information gives some indication of a response to this question, in the absence of more complete documentary proof it is impossible to determine if the Carignan soldiers who settled in the urban areas chose to do so in order to exercise their profession. Since this question is not central to our problematic, further information was not collected to arrive at a definitive conclusion.

**Table 7: Urban vs. Rural Population for the First Settlement**

	Montréal	Québec	Trois-Rivières
% In the government	51	32	16
% In the town	13	28	18

Another reason why the soldiers may have chosen to settle in the cities is because they were quartered there. This close contact with the population over the course of two winters may have influenced their settlement decision. This hypothesis is easier to quantify with certainty. For Montréal, 8 out of 22 soldiers (36.36%) who chose the city for their first settlement were stationed there before demobilization, as well as 14 out of the 31 soldiers in Québec City (45.16%). For Trois-Rivières, seven out of ten (70%) were quartered there. These numbers seem to be inconclusive for Montréal and Quebec, but give a good indication that most of the soldiers who settled in Trois-Rivières at the beginning of their itinerary did so because they had been quartered there.

The presence of Lachine among the first settlement locations with the greatest military population is worthy of note. The possible factors for the concentration of soldiers and the evolution of the military population in this locality will be examined in the next chapter. However, the fur trade can already be evoked as one possible reason for the heightened

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<sup>86</sup> The term "seigneurie" is used to lighten the text, even though there are some localities cited that are fiefs, arrière-fiefs, or other subdivisions of a seigneurie as such, notably Lachine and Pointe-aux-Trembles, which are

interest of Lachine among former soldiers. One of the ex-military inhabitants of Lachine was François LeNoir dit Rolland of the Salières Company, who was proprietor of “Fort Rolland,” a trading post not far from the present-day Lachine Canal.

The question of Lachine led to an examination of the soldiers settled there. Of the 20 soldiers at Lachine, seven were from the Contrecoeur Company. This number is more than double the number of soldiers from that company who settled in the seigneurie of Contrecoeur. This latter location received only three soldiers from the company of its captain-seigneur. Since Captain Contrecoeur was granted a seigneurie, other seigneurial grants to the regiment’s captains were examined more closely.

Only six out of the 21 soldiers who chose Chambly as their first settlement came from Captain Chambly’s company. Captain La Durantaye did not succeed in convincing any Carignan soldier – from his company or the rest of the regiment – to settle in his seigneurie. However, 17 out of the 23 soldiers at Saint-Ours came from the Saint-Ours Company and 21 of the 29 soldiers at Sorel followed Captain Saurel to settle in his seigneurie. Similar trends were observed for non-military seigneuries: 9 out of the 11 soldiers in Louiseville came from the La Fougère Company, six of the seven soldiers at Saint-François de Île d’Orléans belonged to the Maximy Company and half of the soldiers at Trois-Rivières came from the Loubias Company, whose officers were granted four other seigneuries. These initial results led to a study of the question of the officers of the regiment’s on their soldiers’ settlement.

### **2.1.2 Influence of the Regiment’s Officers**

In their choice of settlement, did the Carignan soldiers follow their officers, as is popularly believed? Was their connection with their officer a factor in their settlement? The colonial authorities expected to see the military discipline and cohesiveness influence the soldiers’ choice of where to settle. After speaking of the seigneuries granted to the regiment’s officers, Marcel Trudel writes, “Il reste évidemment à vérifier dans quelle proportion ces

officiers-seigneurs ont, par la suite, réussi à grouper autour d'eux des censitaires-soldats."<sup>87</sup>

The current study plans to do just that.

The historiography on the regiment claims that the soldiers followed their officers to settle. Rameau de Saint-Père states that, "Les officiers obtinrent en concession des seigneuries, et il est probable qu'un grand nombre de soldats prirent des terres sous leurs officiers respectifs."<sup>88</sup> Roy and Malchelosse back up this statement, noting that "La correspondance officielle de l'époque nous apprend que la plupart des soldats du régiment de Carignan qui se firent colons eurent des terres dans les seigneuries concédées à leurs officiers où à l'endroit des quartiers d'hiver des différentes compagnies."<sup>89</sup>

In any seigneurie in New France, the presence of the seigneur had a great impact on the development of the land during the first ten years of a seigneurie, notes Alain Laberge.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, the study by Beauregard, Laberge, *et. al.* underscores the fact that "la présence du seigneur sur les lieux, dès le début, garantit une certaine avance dans le peuplement."<sup>91</sup> Even though this last study shows the importance of networks, the authors conclude that it is those ties created "dans le milieu" that are the most important for the settlers.

Historian André Sévigny studied the settlement of the *troupes de la Marine* that arrived between 1683 and 1715.<sup>92</sup> Given the great change in "perspective" between a three-year military enlistment and permanent settlement, Sévigny seeks to uncover the incentives for a soldier to change from a migrant to an immigrant. He notes that it is often the captain himself who recruited the soldiers, and that there could sometimes develop very close ties between the two. So when settling, "prendre racine aux côtés de son puissant capitaine et seigneur, quoi de plus rassurant?"<sup>93</sup> Sévigny also notes that for lack of a close relative in the

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<sup>87</sup> TRUDEL, *Histoire de la Nouvelle-France IV: La seigneurie de la Compagnie des Indes occidentales, 1663-1674*, Québec, Fides, 1997, p. 216. Unfortunately, his study is limited to three seigneuries.

<sup>88</sup> RAMEAU de Saint-Père, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>89</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op.cit.*, p. 83-84.

<sup>90</sup> LABERGE, *Mobilité, établissement et enracinement en milieu rural*, *op.cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Yves BEAUREGARD, Alain LABERGE, et al. "Famille, parenté et colonisation en Nouvelle-France", *RHAF*, 39, 3 (1986), p. 392.

<sup>92</sup> André SÉVIGNY " 'S'habituer dans le pays'. Facteurs d'établissement du soldat en Nouvelle-France à la fin du grand siècle", *Cahiers des Dix*, 46, 1991, p. 61-86.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

colony, “un camarade peut très bien aiguillonner le militaire indécis. Partout dans le monde, les armées sont le creuset d’amitiés indéfectibles, un phénomène plus fort encore, sans doute, en contexte de dépaysement et d’éloignement extrêmes.”<sup>94</sup>

Several authors show the importance of family bonds during settlement, especially “dans un contexte de faible densité démographique.”<sup>95</sup> However, none of the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment came with their families or met family in the colony.<sup>96</sup> Lacking a true family connection, the soldier’s company could serve as a family or “social cell,” instead. These men were “brothers in arms,” for whom the captain played the role of father. Jean-Pierre Chaline describes this situation as “la fraternité d’armes remplaçant d’une certaine façon la famille déficiente.”<sup>97</sup> Instead of settling near their family, it was expected that they would tend to settle near their surrogate family – their officer and fellow soldiers. This was one of the assumptions of the soldier settlement program – that the soldiers would settle in their officers’ seigneuries. It remains to verify the success of this hypothesis, as Marcel Trudel states. We therefore studied the relationship between the places where the soldiers settled and the presence or absence of their officer.

The seigneurie of Nicolet is a special case. Even though it was granted to Captain Arnaud de Loubias on October 29<sup>th</sup> 1672, he sold it on February 27<sup>th</sup> 1673. Loubias began to distribute land grants as early as 1670, but without giving formal titles. Due to the date that this land was sold, only soldiers who settled there before 1674 are considered to have settled in an officer’s seigneurie. There are also some arrière-fiefs in and around Montréal that were granted to officers, and it could be difficult to determine if soldiers settled at these precise locations. However, the information compiled by Marcel Trudel in his *Terrier du Saint-Laurent* is precise enough to make a determination. Despite this fact, these arrière-fiefs were not popular with the soldiers, as the table below shows.

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>95</sup> BEAUREGARD, LABERGE, et al., *loc. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>96</sup> With the exception of a pair of brothers and a father and son.

<sup>97</sup> Jean-Pierre CHALINE, et al., “Structures de sociabilité et stratégies familiales”, Françoise Thelamon, ed., *Aux sources de la puissance : sociabilité et parenté, actes du colloque de Rouen 12-13 novembre 1987*, Rouen, Publication de l’Université de Rouen, 1989, p. 127-134.



Captain Pierre Lamotte de Saint-Paul became commandant of Montréal, succeeding Zacharie Dupuy. Even though he did not receive any land grants, it is possible that some Carignan soldiers settled in Montréal to be part of the garrison and therefore settled there because of him. It is also possible that soldiers from other companies were recruited to be part of the garrison, but these hypotheses are impossible to prove.

**Table 8: Arrière-fiefs in and Around Montréal Granted to Officers**

<i>Arrière-fief</i>	<i>Officer</i>	<i>Company</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Bellevue (Montréal)	Louis Berthé de Chailly & Gabriel Berthé de Lajoubardière	Unknown	1 grant to a soldier, never settled
Brucy (Île Perrot)	Antoine Lafresnaye de Brucy	La Colonelle	Granted 1676, 1 soldier in 1674
Carion (Rivière-des-Prairies)	Philippe Carion du Fresnoy	Lamotte	No known settlers
Morel (Rivière-des-Prairies)	Paul Maurel de Sainte-Hélène	Lamotte	No known settlers
St-Amand (Berthier-en-haut)	Pierre Dupas du Braché	Unknown	Granted 1677, no soldiers in 1681
Senneville or Boisbriand (Montréal)	Sidrac Dugué de Boisbriand	Dugué	No settler at all in 1674

For 17 out of the 24 companies, at least one officer remained in New France. Officers from the following nine companies did not receive grants in Canada: Desportes, La Brisardière, La Fredière, La Tour, La Varenne, Monteil, Petit, Rougemont and Salières. For the most part, these officers did not remain in the colony. However, for the Monteil and Petit Companies, the only officer who remained did not receive a grant (Jean Lafond, Sieur de Lafontaine, lieutenant of the Monteil Company and Captain Louis Petit of the Petit Company). The Petit Company is an interesting case. Captain Louis Petit was not granted a seigneurie because he entered the Québec Seminary after demobilization and was ordained a priest in 1670. He nonetheless maintained his ties to his former brothers-in-arms: from 1675 to 1676 he was the resident priest at Saint-Ours.

We therefore have 17 companies with at least one officer who remained in Canada after demobilization. This study determined whether the soldiers from these companies settled in a seigneurie granted to one of their officers. The results are fairly surprising. For 10 out of

the 17 companies, not one soldier from that company settled in his officer's seigneurie. That leaves only 7 out of 17 companies whose officers succeeded in settling their own soldiers in their seigneurie. While this proportion represents slightly more than 41% of the companies, the 68 soldiers in these companies make up only 19.71% of the 340 soldiers who settled in Canada.

This result shows yet another facet of the failure of the soldier settlement program. Over 80% of the soldiers did not follow their officers to settle on their seigneuries, as the colonial authorities had hoped they would. The influence of the military commanders did not translate into their influence as colonizing agents.

Even though the analysis of the officers' influence on their soldiers' settlement gives low results overall, the results by company are varied. Some officers had more influence than others, notably Captains Saint-Ours and Sorel, who succeeded in settling most of their soldiers in their seigneuries – 60.52% and 79.31%, respectively. These two officers had exceptional success while 10 out of 17 companies did not succeed in settling any of their soldiers with the officers who remained in Canada.

There were seigneuries granted to the regiment's officers which received few or no soldiers. There are no soldiers at Lanoraye at our three checkpoints,<sup>98</sup> and the Île-Saint-Pierre, granted to Captain Froment, did not receive any soldiers, either. Berthier, granted to Captain Alexandre Berthier de Bellechasse, has no soldiers at the first two checkpoints and only three in 1681. Captain Berthier's other seigneurie, Bellechasse or Berthier-en-bas, has two soldiers in 1674 and before (the same two), though only one remained in 1681. Of the two seigneuries granted to Captain Olivier Morel de La Durantaye, Kamouraska does not have any soldiers at the three checkpoints and La Durantaye only welcomed one soldier before 1674, two in 1674 (one from the La Durantaye Company) and two in 1681. And even though Captain Saint-Ours succeeded in settling several soldiers on his eponymous seigneurie, there were no soldiers in his seigneurie of l'Assomption at the three checkpoints and only one soldier at Deschaillons before 1674.

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<sup>98</sup> Before 1674, 1674 and 1681.

Given the fact that there are nine companies whose officers did not receive seigneurial grants on which their soldiers could settle, we therefore studied if the soldiers from these companies settled in a seigneurie granted to *other* officers of the regiment. They may have settled with a Carignan officer, just not their own. It is also possible that there are other soldiers who decided for one reason or another to settle with a different officer from the regiment, even though their officer was granted a seigneurie. In other words, they could have settled with their officer, but chose to settle elsewhere.

In analyzing whether all of the Carignan soldiers in our sampling settled with an officer, three categories were used:

- **Their officer:** The soldier settled in a seigneurie granted to an officer of *his company*. This category is only valid for those soldiers whose officers remained in Canada.
- **Other officer:** The soldier settled in a seigneurie granted to an officer of the regiment, but from a company other than his own. This category is valid for soldiers whose officers did not remain as well as for those whose officers remained in Canada.
- **No officer:** The soldier did not settle in a seigneurie granted to *any* officer of the regiment. He settled on land whose seigneur had no affiliation to the regiment.

The results of this analysis, presented in the table below, show that only 41.18% of soldiers settled with an officer, be it “their” officer or one from another company. Though this number may not be negligible, it is far from authorities’ expectations that the vast majority of soldiers would settle with their officers and is therefore far from a resounding success of the program. What is more, 21.18% of soldiers who settled in Canada –more than half of those who settled with an officer – decided to “change allegiance” and settle on land granted to an officer from a company other than their own.

**Table 9: Settlement with an Officer from the Regiment**

Company <sup>99</sup>	Their Officer	Other officer	No officer	Total
Berthier	0	0	11	11
Chambly	5	2	4	11
Contrecoeur	4	1	15	20
Desportes	0	6	6	12
Dugué	0	1	8	9
Froment	0	7	3	10
Grandfontaine	0	3	14	17
La Brisardière	0	2	2	4
La Colonelle	0	0	6	6
La Durantaye	1	2	0	3
La Fouille	9	7	18	34
La Fredière	0	2	14	16
La Motte	0	2	4	6
La Noraye	0	5	5	10
La Tour	0	5	7	12
La Varenne	0	1	10	11
Loubias	3	4	13	20
Maximy	0	0	18	18
Monteil	0	2	17	19
Petit	0	8	1	9
Rougemont	0	0	1	1
Saint-Ours	23	7	8	38
Salières	0	3	8	11
Saurel	23	2	4	29
Headquarters	0	0	1	1
Unknown	0	0	2	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>340</b>

For the soldiers who settled with an officer from a different company, we looked at whether or not their own officer was present as seigneur. The result is not what was expected. Only 29.17% of soldiers who settled with an officer from another company came from companies whose officers did not remain in Canada or were not given land grants. This leaves a surprising 70.83% of soldiers who settled with an officer from another company despite the

<sup>99</sup> Companies with names in gray are those whose officers did not receive land grants in Canada.

fact that their own officer received a land grant in the colony. One of the principles of the soldier settlement program was that the soldiers would settle with their officers, but the above results show that this was not the case and provide another aspect of the program's failure. There were also 200 soldiers – 58.82% of all who remained in Canada – who did not settle with any officer at all. They decided to break with military camaraderie and discipline and settle on their own account in a seigneurie with no ties to the regiment.

In the question of the officers' influence on the soldiers' settlement, there is a factor that may come into play with some soldiers: if they are bachelors. It can be assumed that, for lack of the stabilizing factor of having a wife, the unmarried soldier may choose to settle with his military surrogate family and take land in his officer's seigneurie. Is this actually the case for the bachelors of the regiment? Did they settle with their officers or not?

For the 85 bachelors and false bachelors, the presence of their officers had no more effect than it did on the married soldiers of the regiment. Only 42.35% of the regiment's bachelors settled with an officer from the regiment (25.88% with their own officer, 16.47% with a different officer). This leaves 57.65% of bachelors who did not settle with any officer. For them, their captain did not take the place of their absent family. The presence of their own officers and other officers of the regiment was not a determining factor in their settlement. Once again, the program's failure is felt.

### **2.1.3 Influence of the Winter Quarters**

Another factor that may have influenced a soldier's choice of settlement is the place where he spent the two winters prior to being demobilized. Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse have already stated that the soldiers settled on the land grants given to their officers or at "l'endroit des quartiers d'hiver des différentes compagnies."<sup>100</sup> The fact that, outside of the forts, there were no military barracks where the soldiers could be quartered obliged the authorities to lodge them among the *habitants* of the colony. This close contact with the general population was apt to create ties with the soldier's quartering place and the people

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<sup>100</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 83-84.

with which the soldier lived. This thesis therefore studied what influence the winter quarters had on where the soldiers decided to settle.

**Table 10: Winter Quarters and Officers' Land Grants, by Company**

Company	Winter of 1665-1666	Winter of 1666-1667	Officers' land grants ( <i>Italics</i> =Captain's seigneurie)
Berthier	Québec	Québec	<i>Bellechasse, Berthier-en-haut, Lavaltrie</i>
Chambly	Chambly	Chambly	<i>Chambly</i>
Contrecœur	Montréal	Montréal	<i>Contrecœur, Île Beauregard, Verchères</i>
Desportes	Sainte-Thérèse	Sainte-Thérèse	(No officers remained)
Dugué	Montréal	Montréal	Île-Ste-Thérèse, arr-fief Senneville (MTL)
Froment	Trois-Rivières	Trois-Rivières	<i>Île St-Pierre</i>
Grandfontaine	Québec	Québec	L'Islet-au Portage, Pointe-à-l'Orignal
La Brisardière	Québec	Québec	(No officers remained)
La Colonelle	Sainte-Thérèse	Sainte-Thérèse	arr-fief de Brucy (Île Perrot),
La Durantaye	Québec	Québec	<i>La Durantaye, Kamouraska</i>
La Fouille	Trois-Rivières	Trois-Rivières	Louiseville, Dorvilliers, La Malbaie
La Fredière	Montréal	Montréal	(No officers remained)
La Motte	Québec	Fort La Motte	Arr-fief Carion (MTL), Arr-fief Morel (riv. des Prairies, MTL)
La Noraye	Québec	Québec	<i>Lanoraie</i>
La Tour	Québec	Québec	(No officers remained)
La Varenne	Montréal	Montréal	(No officers remained)
Loubias	Trois-Rivières	Trois-Rivières	Varenes, Du Tremblay, <i>Nicolet</i> , <sup>101</sup> Île Moras
Maximy	Ste-Famille, ÎO	Ste-Famille, ÎO	Île-aux-Oies
Monteil	Québec	Île d'Orléans	(No land grants)
Petit	Chambly	Chambly	(No land grants)
Rougemont	Sainte-Thérèse	Sainte-Thérèse	(No officers remained)
Saint-Ours	Sorel	Sorel	<i>Assomption, Deschailions, La Pérade, St-Ours</i>
Salières	Montréal	Montréal	(No officers remained)
Saurel	Sorel	Sorel	<i>Saurel, Villemur (Berthier-en-haut) 1672-74</i>
Headquarters	n/a	n/a	La Pocatière
Unknown	n/a	n/a	Arr.-fief Bellevue (MTL), Île-Dupas, arr-fief St-Amand (Berthier-en-haut)

For the Maximy and Monteil Companies, the soldiers are considered as having settled at their winter quarters if they settled in any locality on the Île d'Orléans.<sup>102</sup> Despite the fact that the Île d'Orléans was divided into the *arrière-fiefs* of Argentenay, Beaulieu, Charron, Lirec and

<sup>101</sup> Granted 1672, sold 1673.

<sup>102</sup> Even though the Maximy Company was quartered at Sainte-Famille.

Mesnu, it was only one seigneurie, and it is at the seigneurie level that this study is concerned with settlement and migration.

**Table 11: Settlement at Winter Quarters**

<i>Company</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Nearby</i>	<i>Total</i>
Berthier	2	5	4	11
Chambly	5	6	0	11
Contrecoeur	2	9	9	20
Desportes	0	10	2	12
Dugué	2	5	2	9
Froment	0	10	0	10
Grandfontaine	3	10	4	17
La Brisardière	0	2	2	4
La Colonelle	0	5	1	6
La Durantaye	0	3	0	3
La Fouille	3	28	3	34
La Fredière	3	5	8	16
La Motte	2	1	3	6
La Noraye	1	7	2	10
La Tour	3	9	0	12
La Varenne	3	1	7	11
Loubias	7	11	2	20
Maximy	15	3	0	18
Monteil	6	6	7	19
Petit	4	5	0	9
Rougemont	0	1	0	1
Saint-Ours	4	20	14	38
Salières	3	4	4	11
Saurel	21	6	2	29
Headquarters	1	0	0	1
Unknown	0	2	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>340</b>

The categories that were used in studying whether the Carignan soldiers settled at their winter quarters include not only the absolutes “yes” and “no,” but also the relative category “nearby.” This last category is used for those soldiers who did not settle at the exact location

where they were quartered (including the above exceptions), but who nonetheless did settle in a neighboring locality.

This analysis shows that only 26.47% of former Carignan soldiers settled at their winter quartering location. When added together with the number of soldiers who settled nearby their quartering places, the percentage rises to 48.82%, which is still below half of all soldiers studied. Slightly more than half of the soldiers (51.18%) chose not to settle where they were quartered. What is more, there are 6 out of the 24 companies for whom not one soldier settled at their winter quarters.

There are some quartering locations, like Fort Sainte-Thérèse, where none of the soldiers could settle afterwards, even if they wanted to.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, all the soldiers of the Desportes Company settled elsewhere. However, the Lafouille Company was quartered at Trois-Rivières, which could have welcomed several soldiers, though only 3 of the 34 men from this company settled there. All ten soldiers from the Froment Company decided to settle somewhere other than Trois-Rivières, as well.

From this analysis, it is evident that the fact of being quartered among the population did not have a significant impact on the regiment as a whole, as hoped for by the colonial authorities and stated by Roy and Malchelosse. Most of the Carignan soldiers did not settle where they were quartered. As such, this factor is insufficient in itself to explain why the soldiers did not settle with their officers.

Nonetheless, there were some companies with a high percentage of soldiers who settled at their winter quarters. Notable among these are the Maximy and Saurel Companies, of which respectively 83.33% and 72.41% of the soldiers settled at the quartering places. For the Saurel Company, the quartering location corresponds to the captain's land grant, so the two factors may have combined to ensure the success of this company's settlement. However, the Maximy Company is different. It seems that the attraction of the Île d'Orléans was

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<sup>103</sup> Fort Ste-Thérèse, located just 12 km from Fort St-Louis (Chambly), was abandoned after the winter of 1666-1667.



considerably stronger than that of the Île-aux-Oies, inherited by ensign Paul Dupuis de Lisloye.

Lastly, this thesis studied whether the influence of the winter quarters was stronger for soldiers who did not settle with any of the regiment's officers. Perhaps the time they spent among the population had more of an effect on their settlement than the time spent with their comrades. Most notable is the above-mentioned example of the Maximy Company, all of whose 18 soldier-settlers did not settle with an officer. Of these 18 men, 15 settled at their winter quartering location.

We also examined the influence of the winter quarters specifically on unmarried soldiers who did not settle with an officer, for whom it could be assumed that the hosts at their winter quarters may have made up for the lack of their own family and the lack of an officer-seigneur. However, the results are comparable to those for the regiment as a whole and therefore show no particular influence of the winter quarters on the regiment's bachelors. For unmarried soldiers, 25.5% did not settle with any officer but did settle at their winter quarters, comparable to 26.47% of the regiment as a whole. Soldiers who settled neither with an officer nor at their winter quarters make up 47.5% of unmarried soldiers, compared to 51.18% of the regiment as a whole.

#### **2.1.4 The "Line of Defense"**

One of the main facets of this study is the question of the settlement of the Carignan soldiers in the Richelieu Valley. Historiography and popular history claim that this is where the majority of the former soldiers settled.<sup>104</sup> But did the men of the Carignan-Salières regiment really settle there *en masse* to create the colony's first line of defense against the Iroquois? To respond to this question, we examined how many soldiers actually settled in all of the seigneuries on the south shore of Montréal,<sup>105</sup> with particular attention given to the military

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<sup>104</sup> Notably SULTE, "Le Régiment de Carignan," *loc. cit.*, p.65 and FERLAND, *loc. cit.*, p. 62-63.

<sup>105</sup> The seigneuries in this region where the soldiers settled are Bellevue (Vitré), Boucherville, Chambly, Contrecoeur, Laprairie, Longueuil, Saint-Ours, Sorel, Tremblay, Varennes et Verchères.

seigneuries on the banks of the Richelieu River granted to captains of the regiment – Chambly, Contrecoeur, Saint-Ours and Sorel.

The dispersal of the 340 soldiers in 61 seigneuries throughout our time frame (see map in Annex) reveals a lack of concentration in the military settlement, therefore at least a partial failure of the program. This dispersal could have been avoided by Intendant Talon, who was already aware of the need to encourage settlers to build their homes closer together. “L’une des choses qui a apporté le plus d’obstacle à la peuplade du Canada a été que les habitants,” according to Louis XIV’s instructions to Talon before he took office, “ont fondé leurs habitations où il leur a plu, et sans se précautionner de les joindre les unes aux autres et faire leurs défrichements de proche en proche pour mieux s’entre secourir au besoin.”<sup>106</sup>

The result was that, “étant ainsi épars, [les habitants] se sont trouvés exposés aux embûches des Iroquois,” who, according to the report, “ont toujours fait leurs massacres avant que ceux qu’ils ont surpris aient pu être secourus par leurs voisins.”<sup>107</sup> If one of the main ideas behind the settling of the Carignan soldiers was truly to create a line of defense, Talon should have insisted on the fact that they settle in a more compact area. It is difficult to make a line of defense with 61 points on a line that spans the length of the colony, stretching from Île Perrot to Islet-du-Portage. There is much too much space between the links of such a chain.

Benjamin Sulte writes of the soldier settlement program, “De tous ces projets, il n’est pas résulté la création d’un empire, mais seulement quelques groupes de cultivateurs aux environs de Montréal et *principalement sur la rivière Richelieu*.”<sup>108</sup> That several companies settled along the Richelieu is true, but can this region be called the principal settlement area of the regiment’s soldiers? Let us look at the military population of the Richelieu region’s seigneuries to find out.

<sup>106</sup> *Les rapports des Archives nationales du Québec*, op. cit., p. 15. (Letter dated March 27<sup>th</sup> 1665.)

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> SULTE, “Le Régiment de Carignan,” *loc. cit.*, p.65 – emphasis added.

**Table 12: Military Population of the Richelieu Valley Seigneuries**

Seigneurie	1 <sup>st</sup> Land	1674	1681
Bellevue	0	0	0
Boucherville	7	8	10
<b>Chambly</b>	21	17	11
<b>Contrecoeur</b>	6	11	10
Laprairie	6	7	8
Longueuil	5	2	3
<b>Saint-Ours</b>	21	25	19
<b>Sorel</b>	22	25	20
<b>Tremblay</b>	1	1	2
<b>Varenes</b>	1	2	1
<b>Verchères</b>	3	4	3
TOTAL	93	102	87

These numbers show that at the very most, 30% of the Carignan soldiers who remained in Canada (102 out of 340) settled in the Richelieu Valley. Only 27.35% of the soldiers chose this region for their initial settlement, with the military population of the region reaching its peak in 1674 to drop to its lowest point in 1681.

The fact that not even one third of the demobilized soldiers settled in the Richelieu Valley is far from a ringing success of the soldier settlement program and the creation of a line of defense for the colony. Over two thirds of the soldier-settlers settled in other parts of the colony and therefore did not make up the line of defense that the colonial authorities had envisioned.

One possible reason for this lack of settlement in the Richelieu Valley is the fact that there were many seigneuries granted to the regiment's officers that were not located in this region. This is an important fact that previous studies seem to ignore.<sup>109</sup> Of the 35 seigneuries, fiefs and arrière-fiefs granted to the Carignan officers, only seven (20%) are located in the Richelieu Valley. If the colonial authorities truly wanted to see the Carignan soldiers settle in this region, they needed only to distribute the officers' land grants exclusively in the Richelieu Valley and not as far away as La Malbaie and Islet-du-Portage.

<sup>109</sup> Notably SULTE, "Le Régiment de Carignan," *loc. cit.*, p.65 and FERLAND, *loc. cit.*, p. 62-63.

**Table 13: Seigniorial Grants to Officers, by Region**

<i>Region</i>	#	<i>Seigneuries, fiefs and arrière-fiefs (AF)</i>
Richelieu Valley	7	Chambly, Contrecoeur, Saint-Ours, Sorel, Tremblay, Varennes, Verchères
Government of Montréal (non-Richelieu)	15	Bellevue (AF), Berthier (en haut), Brucy (AF, Île Perrot), Carion (AF), Dorvilliers, Île Beauregard, Île Dupas, Île Perrot, Lanoraie, L'Assomption, Lavaltrie, Morel (AF), Pointe-à-l'original, Saint-Amand (AF), Senneville (AF)
Government of Trois-Rivières	5	Île Moras, Île Saint-Pierre, La Pérade, Louiseville, Nicolet
Government of Québec	8	Bellechasse (Berthier-en-Bas), Deschaillons, Île-aux-Oies, Kamouraska, La Malbaie, La Durantaye, La Pocatière, L'Islet-du-Portage

To examine this question a bit further, this study looked at the company affiliations of the soldiers settled in the Richelieu Valley. The aim was to see if the soldiers who settled there were from the seigneur's company or from other companies in the regiment. In other words, did these seigneuries attract soldiers from other companies, notably those whose officers did not receive land grants?

In the following table, the *Seigneur* column shows the company affiliation of the seigneur. For the Tremblay seigneurie, the seigneur was René Gauthier de Varennes of the Loubias Company, but there were no soldiers from this company that settled there. The *Officer Absent* column lists the companies whose officers did not remain or who did not receive land grants in Canada. Bold type in the table denotes companies whose officer was granted a seigneurie in the Richelieu Valley.

As this table shows, all of the military seigneuries in the Richelieu Valley succeeded in attracting soldiers from at least one company whose officer did not remain or did not receive a land grant in the colony. However, the lack of influence of the regiment's officers can also be seen once again. With the exception of the seigneuries of Varennes and Verchères, all of the military seigneuries in the Richelieu Valley attracted soldiers from companies whose officers received other grants in the region.

**Table 14: Company Affiliations of the Richelieu Valley Population**

	Companies Whose Soldiers Settled in the Seigneurie		
<i>Seigneurie</i>	<i>Seigneur</i>	<i>Officer Absent</i>	<i>Officer Present</i>
Bellevue	(civil)	none	none
Boucherville	(civil)	Desportes	Dugué, Grandfontaine, La Fouille, <b>Loubias, Saint-Ours, Sorel</b>
<b>Chambly</b>	<b>Chambly</b>	La Tour, Petit	Froment, Grandfontaine, La Durantaye, La Fouille, <b>St-Ours</b>
<b>Contrecoeur</b>	<b>Contrecoeur</b>	Desportes	La Fouille, La Motte, La Noraye, <b>Saint-Ours</b>
Laprairie	(civil)	La Varenne	<b>Contrecoeur</b> , Dugué, Grandfontaine, La Fouille
Longueuil	(civil)	none	<b>Contrecoeur</b> , La Fredière, La Motte, <b>Saint-Ours, Sorel</b>
<b>Saint-Ours</b>	<b>Saint-Ours</b>	Desportes, Petit, Salières	La Fouille, La Motte, <b>Sorel</b>
<b>Sorel</b>	<b>Sorel</b>	Desportes, La Tour, Petit	Froment, La Fredière, <b>Loubias, Saint-Ours</b>
<b>Tremblay</b>	(Loubias)	La Tour, Monteil	none
<b>Varenes</b>	<b>Loubias</b>	Desportes, Salières	Froment
<b>Verchères</b>	<b>Contrecoeur</b>	Desportes	La Fouille, La Fredière

## 2.2 Taking a Wife

In many studies of the pioneers of New France, the focus is put on the networks created in the provinces of origin, which then led to similar networks in the colony.<sup>110</sup> However, since there was such a wide variety in the origins of the Carignan soldiers – more so than for the civil settlers – this factor will not be studied in the present thesis. What is more, Jacques Mathieu and his collaborators show that factors of common origin are secondary to family strategies and the desire to establish one's children and transmit property to them.<sup>111</sup> The authors conclude that migration must be studied in the context of the relationship between land ownership, transmission of goods and the forming of matrimonial alliances.

Applying this conclusion to the mobility of the Carignan soldiers, we can assume that the land that was given to them as an incentive to settle was enough to remove the obstacles involved in the questions of land ownership and the transmission of goods. It therefore

<sup>110</sup> Notably Gervais CARPIN, *Le réseau du Canada : étude du mode migratoire de la France vers la Nouvelle-France, 1628-1662*. Sillery, Septentrion et Paris, Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2001, VI-552 p.

<sup>111</sup> Jacques MATHIEU, *et. al.* "Mobilité et sédentarité : stratégies familiales en Nouvelle-France", *Recherches sociographiques*, 28, 2-3 (1987), p. 211-227.

remains, according to Mathieu and his collaborators, for us to look at the marriage factor for the former soldiers, which is in response to the authors' injunction: "Il s'impose de revoir la mobilité des personnes, et en particulier des hommes par rapport aux femmes...à la lumière des stratégies et des situations de famille."<sup>112</sup>

Serge Courville gives two years as the crucial period for a settler's integration. According to him, "Pour l'individu qui ne participe d'aucune solidarité de provenance," such as the Carignan soldiers, "les deux premières années paraissent cruciales: ou il réussit à contracter une alliance matrimoniale heureuse qui lui permettra de s'intégrer à la communauté, ou il demeure étranger à tout contact, auquel cas il devra quitter, ce qui serait surtout le fait des célibataires et des couples isolés."<sup>113</sup> Jacques Mathieu confirms this idea, writing, "semblent réussir à s'enraciner dans un territoire neuf seulement des personnes pouvant nouer des relations familiales avec l'entourage."<sup>114</sup>

A surprising fact about the Carignan-Salières regiment is that there were only 273 out of the 340 soldiers (80.29%) who married, which leaves a large number of bachelors who settled, despite the fact that they never wed. Their settlement and isolation will also be studied. Of the 273 married soldiers, 18 entered into marriage after the period of study, which reduces the number of soldiers who married during our time frame to 255, or 75%.

### 2.2.1 Year of Marriage

In order to study the impact of marriage on the soldiers' settlement, we first asked the question: *When* did the soldiers decide to "settle down" and marry? How much time passed between demobilization and their marriage? Since it has already been seen that the soldiers settled *en masse* in the years following demobilization, it is assumed that there will be a similar pattern in their marriage dates – that most of the soldiers married soon after demobilization. If so, marriage can be seen as a prominent factor in the soldiers' settlement.

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<sup>112</sup> MATHIEU, *et. al.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>113</sup> COURVILLE, *loc. cit.*, p. 422.

<sup>114</sup> MATHIEU, "Structures familiales et réseaux de relations comme facteur d'identité", *Provence historique*, 35, 142, (1985), p. 420.

The following table indicates the date of each soldier's first marriage. Remarriages are not taken into account, and in the case of a marriage contract being drawn up one year with the ceremony taking place in the next, the date of the contract is retained, since what we are interested in here is how much time passed between demobilization and the decision to settle. The contract is proof of the soldier's decision to do so.

**Table 15: Number of Marriages per Year**

	Before	1666	1667	1668	1669	1670	1671	1672	1673	1674	1675	1676	1677	1678	1679	1680	1681	After	Total
No.	1	4	19	39	29	43	29	21	15	8	9	12	7	10	4	3	2	18	<b>273</b>

The years that saw the greatest number of marriages are 1668 to 1671, three years after the demobilization.<sup>115</sup> These results are more or less in agreement with the two years granted by Courville for settlement: 49.45% of the soldiers who married did so within two years of the demobilization, with 60.07% marrying within three years. These results are also in keeping with the hypothesis that most of the soldiers settled in the years immediately following demobilization, and that marriage was a prominent factor in motivating them to settle.

For soldiers who did not marry in the colony, it is possible that their profession was a factor in their settlement. Based on information gleaned from the sources used to create our databases, 37 out of 85 bachelors and false bachelors (43.53%) are identified as having plied a trade. Nearly a third – 12 out of 37 – are identified as servants. Even if exercising a profession could have helped bachelors settle in the colony, these results are inconclusive and need to be completed with further research to resolve this question. However, such research is not in the context of the present thesis.

A curious result is the fact that 6.59% of soldiers who married did so after the end of our time frame (1681). These 18 soldiers, together with the 67 bachelors from the regiment who settled, nonetheless seem to indicate that for the former soldiers of the Carignan-Salières

<sup>115</sup> There were 24 marriages before 1668, year of the complete demobilization. Since the demobilization began partially in 1667, the 19 marriages that year should not come as a surprise.

regiment, settling in New France was a little easier than for a simple *habitant*, since they did not return to France but instead remained in the colony as bachelors for a significant period of time before marrying.

Of the soldiers who married after 1681, most of them nonetheless settled before 1674. Only two out of the 18 settled after our period of study. The table below presents the list of these false bachelors with the date of their settlement and date of their first marriage. The *Delay* column shows how many years elapsed between their settlement and marriage. For two of the soldiers, their marriage is the first sign of settlement in the colony. For some, their profession could partly explain their delay before marriage.<sup>116</sup> Pierre Dextra waited so long to marry that he wed the daughter of his brother-in-arms Jean Gazaille. Louis Mageau married the widow of Bernard Delpèche from the Salières Company.

**Table 16: “False Bachelors,” With Settlement and Marriage Dates**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Settled</i>	<i>1<sup>st</sup> marriage</i>	<i>Delay</i>
Audouin, François	1687	1687-02-10	0
Beudoin, Antoine	1673	1687 vers	14
Bessière, Antoine	1673	1685-11-26	12
Boineau, Raymond	1668	1692-10-21	24
Bonin, Nicolas	1676	1685-01-08	9
Breton, J.-Baptiste-Guillaume	1671	1702-02-06	31
Bureau, Louis	1669	1685-07-25	17
Carsi, François	1688	1688-06-06	0
Châtenay, Jean	1679	1689-05-30	10
Dextra, Pierre	1673	1685-12-18	12
Germaneau, Joachim	1673	1684-04-30	11
Guillet, Jean	1676	1690-11-21	14
Herpin, Émery	1671	1689-09-14	18
Julien, Jacques	1668	1685-08-12	17
Lemerle, René	1674	1683-06-02	9
Mageau, Louis	1673	1689-01-08	16
Pagési, Jean	1672	1684-02-14	12
Régeas, Jean	1673	1683-11-25	10

<sup>116</sup> Antoine Bessière was the servant of Captain La Noraie until 1673. Raymond Boineau was a *coureur de bois* who settled at Lachine. Louis Bureau is not mentioned in the sources consulted as having taken part in the fur trade, but he was absent from the colony from 1669 until 1676 and again from 1676 until 1685, at which time he married.



Another important question regarding the false bachelors is that of their isolation from the rest of the regiment. Did they live apart from their former comrades, or did they live among them? Did their isolation lead them to remain bachelors until after 1681 or did the fact that they lived near their fellow soldiers make it easier for them to settle, despite the fact that they did not marry during the given time frame? The following table examines the places where the false bachelors settled and how many total soldier-settlers were at the same location.

**Table 17: Isolation of False Bachelors**

Place	Number of false bachelors / total military population			
	First Settlement	Before 1674	1674	1681
Champlain	1/13	1/12	1/11	0/9
Château-Richer	0/2	0/2	0/1	1/1
Contrecoeur	2/9	0/6	1/11	1/10
Gaudarville	1/3	1/3	1/3	0/1
Grondines	1/4	0/3	1/4	0/3
Île d'Orléans	1/23	0/21	1/19	1/14
Lachine	1/20	1/19	1/21	0/22
La Pérade	0/5	0/5	0/7	1/6
Lotbinière	0/0	0/0	0/0	2/4
Louiseville	2/11	2/9	2/11	0/5
Neuville	0/11	0/10	0/10	1/13
Québec	2/31	2/31	2/19	0/20
Repentigny	0/1	0/1	0/5	1/8
St-Fr-du-Lac	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/1
Saint-Ours	4/23	3/21	3/24	3/20
Sorel	2/29	1/22	2/25	1/20
Trois-Rivières	1/10	1/10	1/6	0/3
Absent	0/0	6/27	2/13	5/10

Two main results can be noted from the study of the false bachelors' isolation. The first is that the 18 false bachelors were not indeed isolated from the rest of the regiment. It is not until 1681, at the end of our time frame, that we find two false bachelors who are the only soldiers at the place where they settled: one at Château-Richer and the other at Saint-François-du-Lac. However, Jean-Baptiste-Guillaume Breton had previously resided at Sorel, which had a large military population, before settling at Château-Richer for the 1681 checkpoint, and Jacques Julien, at Saint-François-du-Lac at the end of our study, had resided up until that point at Trois-Rivières, where many of his former comrades from the Loubias

Company settled. The fact that both of the only two “isolated” soldiers were previously integrated into the military population of other locations before striking out on their own tends to show that it was indeed the fact that they were previously part of a network of their former brothers-in-arms that led to their settling, despite the fact that they remained unmarried until after 1681.

The second result that emerges from this analysis of the false bachelors’ isolation is that although they were not isolated from the rest of the regiment, the false bachelors were mostly isolated from each other and did not settle together in groups. The only places that received more than one false bachelor at any of the checkpoints were all locations with significant military populations: Contrecoeur, Louiseville, Québec, Saint-Ours and Sorel. The false bachelors did not settle mostly together among themselves, but with the married soldiers. Again, the presence of their former comrades can be cited as a probable factor in the settlement and relative stability of those soldiers who only married after our period of study. Though it can only be speculated, the fact that they lived among mostly married soldiers may have eventually overcome whatever obstacles they had to marriage and may have aided in their settlement.

### **2.2.2 Location of Marriage**

Another important question linked to the soldiers’ marriages is whether their place of settlement is the same as or different than their place of marriage. In other words, did the soldiers have to travel to another location to find a wife, becoming what Béatrice Craig calls, “faux migrants”?<sup>117</sup>

Alain Laberge shows that, along the multiple paths that lead to settlement, “la mobilité occupe une place déterminante, tant et si bien que l’immigrant continue largement d’être un migrant tout le long de cette route tortueuse qui ne conduit pas toujours où l’on voudrait aller.”<sup>118</sup> According to Laberge, mobility is often used by the migrant as a strategy to overcome obstacles, and the migrant does not become an immigrant until he finally settles.

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<sup>117</sup> CRAIG, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

The main obstacle for bachelors – the need to find a wife – often led them to travel away from where they settled. On this point, Laberge underscores the importance of marriage in the migrant's decision to become an *habitant*.

For this question, as with that concerning the soldiers' winter quarters, the seigneurie of the Île d'Orléans is treated as one locality, without distinguishing between the various parishes or arrière-fiefs. As with the analysis of the winter quarters, the category *Nearby* is once again used to indicate settlement that did not occur at the exact place of marriage, but in a neighboring locality.

The table below shows that 41.76% of soldiers settled in the same locality where they married. If we add settlements in nearby seigneuries, the result increases to 59.34%. However, 40.66% of the Carignan soldiers settled in a location other than where they were married. They therefore traveled to the latter location only to get married there. This number is nearly equal to that of soldiers who settled where they married, showing that there was a significant number of soldiers who had to search for a wife outside of their settlement area. However, with many of the Carignan soldiers' wives being immigrants like themselves, these men did not settle in their bride's parish, since she had not yet settled in the colony.

As an example of the long distances that some soldiers traveled for marriage, there were six soldiers, including Antoine Adhémar and André Poutré, who settled at Sorel and traveled all the way to Québec just to find brides. Other soldiers made the trip from Saint-Ours, Chambly, Contrecoeur, Verchères and the Montréal region to the capital to marry. What made these soldiers travel so far to find a wife? All six soldiers from Sorel who married in Québec married *Filles du Roy*. When we look at all 62 soldiers who married at Québec but who did not settle there, 56 out of 62 – slightly over 90% – married *Filles du Roy*.

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<sup>118</sup> LABERGE, "L'immigrant migrant...", *loc. cit.*, p. 3.

**Table 18: Settlement at Location of Marriage**

<i>Company</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Nearby</i>	<i>Total</i>
Berthier	4	3	4	11
Chambly	4	4	2	10
Contrecoeur	6	4	3	13
Desportes	2	7	0	9
Dugué	3	3	1	7
Froment	4	2	1	7
Grandfontaine	7	5	4	16
La Brisardière	1	1	2	4
La Colonelle	2	2	1	5
La Durantaye	0	3	0	3
La Fouille	7	16	3	26
La Fredière	3	5	4	12
La Motte	2	1	3	6
La Noraye	2	6	0	8
La Tour	6	4	1	11
La Varenne	1	5	2	8
Loubias	4	8	2	14
Maximy	10	2	4	16
Monteil	7	5	4	16
Petit	3	3	0	6
Rougemont	1	0	0	1
Saint-Ours	18	7	5	30
Salières	3	2	2	7
Saurel	12	12	0	24
Headquarters	1	0	0	1
Unknown	1	1	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>273</b>

### 2.2.3 The Filles du Roy

This last discovery led us to study the impact of the *Filles du Roy* on the soldiers' marriage patterns. How many soldiers married *Filles du Roy* and did this influence their settlement?

The *Filles du Roy* immigration program was necessary because at the time there were not enough marriageable women in the matrimonial market for all the men in the colony. As Yves Landry notes, “Le nombre d’hommes mariables à toujours été beaucoup plus élevé que celui des femmes...Jusqu’au début des années 1670, les hommes candidats au mariage étaient en effet au moins de six à quatorze fois plus nombreux que les femmes nubiles.”<sup>119</sup> With the addition of roughly 400 soldiers who were seeking to settle, it was necessary to find women for them to marry, otherwise they may return to France for lack of a wife who could create a stable tie to their new home.

**Table 19: Marriages between Carignan soldiers and *Filles du Roy***

	Before	1666	1667	1668	1669	1670	1671	1672	1673	1674	1675	1676	1677	1678	1679	1680	1681	After	Total
# of marriages	0	1	17	37	26	34	20	12	11	2	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	2	170

Exactly half of the soldiers who settled married *Filles du Roy*. The *Filles du Roy* program existed from 1663 to 1673, but as the table above shows, most of the marriages with *Filles du Roy* occurred in 1668, the year of demobilization, and in the years immediately following. This period also corresponds to the arrival of the largest contingents of *Filles du Roy*. Yves Landry notes that, “Près de la moitié des Filles du Roy ont débarqué au cours de [1669 à 1671], soit juste après qu’environ 400 soldats et officiers démobilisés du régiment de Carignan se furent établis au Canada.”<sup>120</sup> The authorities wanted to join together the two programs of female immigration and soldier settlement, which were implicitly complementary. This is at least one aspect of the soldier settlement program that seems to have worked as planned.

To complete the picture of the soldiers’ choice of wives, we also looked at how many “Canadians” - girls born in the colony – and how many immigrants other than *Filles du Roy* married the Carignan soldiers. Only 27.47% of the soldiers married girls born in the colony and a mere 10.26% married immigrants that were not *Filles du Roy*. For the years 1668 to

<sup>119</sup> LANDRY, *Orphelines en France, pionniers au Canada: Les Filles du roi au XVIIe siècle*, Montréal, Leméac, 1992, p. 120.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49-50.

1671, 83.57% of soldiers' marriages were with a *Fille du Roy*, with 94.87% of wives in 1668 coming from this group. Perhaps the soldiers were enticed by the promise of the “king’s gift” – 50 to 200 livres given as a sort of dowry by the king to any man who married a *Fille du Roy*. In any case, they seem to have had preferential access to the *Filles du Roy*.

**Table 20: Number of Marriages per Year, by Category of Wife**

	Before	1666	1667	1668	1669	1670	1671	1672	1673	1674	1675	1676	1677	1678	1679	1680	1681	After	
Filles du Roy	0	1	17	37	26	34	20	12	11	2	1	3	1	3	0	0	0	2	170
Immigrants	1	2	0	1	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	4	1	2	1	1	0	0	28
Canadians	0	1	2	1	1	6	7	7	1	4	7	5	5	5	3	2	2	16	75
Total	1	4	19	39	29	43	29	21	15	8	9	12	7	10	4	3	2	18	<b>273</b>

Historian Lina Gouger shows that it is not marriage with someone native to the place of settlement that is the stabilizing factor for an immigrant, but the simple fact of getting married.<sup>121</sup> In her study on Detroit, she analyses this phenomenon for immigrants who married a girl from Detroit and for those who married immigrants like themselves. She concludes that the origin of the wife is not a factor in settlement. It is the fact of being married or not that contributes to the permanence of an immigrant at a given place.

Our results seem to confirm this conclusion. It was not marriage with Canadians – girls from the colony – that tied the soldiers to their new home, but quite the opposite – marriage with girls from various origins, which amounts to marrying anybody. The *Filles du Roy* came from several regions of France and some even from other European countries. They were sent to marry the men of the colony in order to tie them to the land. In the case of the Carignan regiment, they fulfilled their mission.

Having looked at the settlement patterns of the former soldiers, the contemporary accounts and popular perceptions formed by them start to unravel. The officers and winter quarters, which were supposed to draw the soldiers to certain locations, did not have the persuasive

<sup>121</sup> GOUGER, *op.cit.*

power that the authorities had envisioned. Only the Filles du Roy seem to have truly lived up to their romanticized role of settling the soldiers.

After this examination of the settlement and marriage patterns of the Carignan soldiers, it remains to be determined if these two factors had a stabilizing effect on them, or if they knew a certain degree of mobility on their individual itineraries in New France. These questions will be examined in the next chapter.

### Chapter 3: Mobility of the Carignan-Salières Regiment

This thesis has analyzed where the Carignan soldiers initially settled, but another aspect of their settlement remains: their mobility or stability. Put simply, the problematic of this chapter is: Were the soldier-settlers mobile or sedentary? This chapter does not seek to study the soldier's contribution to populating the various regions of the colony, but to determine the factors that encouraged them to remain at their initial settlement or to move elsewhere. One hypothesis is that the presence of their fellow soldiers or officers may have influenced their stability. The colonial authorities certainly believed that the officers would have a stabilizing effect on their soldiers. Also, marriage or the fur trade may have pulled the soldier-settlers in one direction or the other, tying them to the land or luring them off into the woods. This chapter will examine the factors that influenced the soldiers' stability and will use the results to determine the relative success of the soldier settlement program. The hypothesis is that the soldiers will become more stable as time goes on.

Various degrees of mobility will be defined and analyzed for the regiment as a whole and for each of the factors that may have contributed to the soldiers' mobility. Some factors will be studied for the entire regiment and others for different sub-groups. Not all of these factors, it will be seen, had the same effect on all the regiment's soldiers.

This thesis takes as inspiration for its analysis of the soldiers' itineraries some of the methods of demographic history. Yves Landry writes that since 1960, Québec's historians have used the parish registers of the colony and the methods of demographic history "pour décrire le profil des immigrants et surtout pour analyser leur comportement démographique en matière de nuptialité, de fécondité et de mortalité."<sup>122</sup> However, "un nouvel élargissement de la problématique s'avère nécessaire," according to Landry, and "le recours aux sources françaises comme les registres paroissiaux et les actes notariés s'avère essentiel."<sup>123</sup> What

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<sup>122</sup> LANDRY, "L'émigration française au Canada avant 1760," *loc. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*



Landry proposes is “une microanalyse réalisée dans une perspective prosopographique et appliquée aux parcours individuels”<sup>124</sup> of the members of the group studied.

The present thesis can be regarded as a just such a microanalysis that Landry calls for. Even though it studies the demographic comportment of the Carignan soldiers in New France, not France, the parish registers and notarized documents it uses can be seen as being the sources from the point of departure for the soldiers’ internal migrations in New France and the analysis of the soldiers’ individual itineraries is done in order to “mieux comprendre les circonstances des migrations voire les facteurs influençant certains des partants,”<sup>125</sup> as Landry demonstrates such a microanalysis permits.

### 3.1 Determining a Move or Migration

Several notable works changed the vision of an “immigration” to New France by looking at this phenomenon instead as an extension of the internal migration of France.<sup>126</sup> Historian Leslie Choquette raises the question of scale in her study on mobility, noting the lack of studies that examine the importance of migration at an individual or community level. Another question of scale that she raises is that of the distance of migrations. If researchers are in agreement on long-distance migration, there is less consensus on shorter distances. The present study will give an operating definition of a move or migration and specify different levels of mobility.

Historian Robert Larin notes that about 70% of French immigrants came to Canada either as a soldier or indentured servant, and that “tous ces Français arrivaient au Canada par mobilité professionnelle.”<sup>127</sup> According to him, being a soldier was a profession subjected to a higher degree of professional mobility than others. Like Choquette, he raises the question of whether the soldiers were forced to immigrate by their duty to obey, though Choquette notes,

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<sup>124</sup> LANDRY, “L’émigration française au Canada avant 1760,” *loc. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Notably Leslie CHOQUETTE, *Frenchmen into Peasants: Modernity and Tradition in the Peopling of French Canada*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997, 397 p. and Robert LARIN, *Brève histoire du peuplement européen en Nouvelle-France*, Sillery, Septentrion, 2000, 228 p.

<sup>127</sup> LARIN, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

“some soldiers, however, chose military duty as a means of further emigration.”<sup>128</sup> They were conscious that their decision would lead to a greater degree of mobility. As Béatrice Craig writes, “les migrants n’étaient donc pas des vagabonds qui erraient à travers le continent, mais des individus ou des familles qui savaient exactement où ils allaient.”<sup>129</sup>

Yves Beauregard, Alain Laberge, *et. al.* show the importance of family ties “dans un contexte de faible densité démographique.”<sup>130</sup> For each *arrivant* studied in eight areas of observation, they created a data file in order to determine his “permanence” or not at the place of establishment. This method is appropriate for the present thesis, especially since it reveals a particular model for Chambly, a seigneurie whose population was based on the massive arrival of bachelors (Carignan soldiers) who had to find their spouse “à l’extérieur.” The data file for the present thesis is the *Events* database, whose entries on each soldier will determine his permanence or not at his first place of settlement.

In determining mobility, there are certain land transactions that may lead one astray and give the false impression that a move has taken place, even though the soldier in question did not change his place of residence. At the time, it was common for seigneurs to grant land to *habitants* who already had land elsewhere, with the aim of enticing them to move to their seigneurie. It is also possible that some *habitants* received land grants with the aim of having farmland in a new location or even in the hopes of reselling this second parcel for a profit. For the purposes of this thesis, the acquisition of a second or other parcel of land shall not be considered as a “move” on the part of the soldier without a corresponding sale of property on his part or without a baptism or other act at the new location to indicate a move on the part of the soldier and his family. In short, if there is no indication that the soldier left his first residence to live at the second location, this second or other grant shall not be taken into account.

There were also some soldiers who are “all over the map” – those to whom many land grants were made or who bought and then re-sold land in one or more seigneuries without

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<sup>128</sup> CHOQUETTE, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

<sup>129</sup> CRAIG, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

necessarily settling there. These cases were examined attentively, and the above rule was again applied in order to determine their places of settlement.

### 3.2 The Degree of Mobility

The soldiers' mobility was quantified for the intervals between the three checkpoints in our time frame. In other words, their mobility was noted on two occasions: between demobilization<sup>131</sup> and 1674 and between 1674 and 1681. Their places of residence at each checkpoint were compared to determine if a move had occurred between the beginning and end of both periods. A degree of mobility was then assigned to the result. Though the three checkpoints were used as reference points, the soldier's entire individual itinerary was taken into account in determining his degree of mobility, to make sure that the checkpoints accurately reflected his mobility.

In order to quantify the degree of mobility, we created a scale that could be applied to both mobility periods. One degree of mobility was attributed to each of the two periods: demobilization to 1674 and 1674 to 1681. The scale is as follows:

- **None:** the soldier remained in the same place for both checkpoints. In other words, he did not move to a different locality. For the purposes of this analysis, all of the Île d'Orléans is considered the same "locality."
- **Neighboring:** The soldier moved to a locality adjacent to that at the first checkpoint, either beside the first locality (on the same shore of the Saint Lawrence) or across from the first locality (facing the first locality on the opposite shore).
- **Same government:** The soldier moved to a new locality that is not neighboring the first, but in the same regional government (Québec, Trois-Rivières, Montréal).
- **Other government:** The soldier moved to a locality in a different regional government than the first.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> BEAUREGARD, LABERGE, *et. al.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>131</sup> The first checkpoint is actually the soldier's settlement before 1674. "Demobilization" is used here to lighten the text.

<sup>132</sup> An exception is made for moves between Grondines and La Pérade. Even though these two localities are in different governments, a degree of "Neighboring" will be assigned, since these seigneuries are indeed neighboring, and what mattered to the soldier was not the government, but the fact that the new land was located next to the first.

- **Dead:** The soldier died before the second checkpoint. To maintain our sampling of 340 soldiers, a soldier listed as dead for the first period is also listed as dead at the second.

Since sometimes a determination of residence could not be made for a given checkpoint, the following categories were also used:

- **Appears:** No residence can be determined for the first checkpoint, but can be for the second, therefore the soldier “appears” at the second checkpoint, since a move can not be determined. This should not be confused with a soldier’s first appearance in the colonial records.
- **Disappears:** A residence can be determined for the first checkpoint, but not for the second, so the soldier “disappears” from one to the next. This does not mean that he disappeared for good, and is mostly due to a lack of information for the second checkpoint. It does apply to soldiers who left the Saint Lawrence Valley, though only two fit this exception with certainty, according to our sources.<sup>133</sup>
- **Unknown:** The degree of mobility cannot be assigned, due to the impossibility of determining a place of residence for both checkpoints.

Despite the fact that degrees of mobility were assigned for only the two periods noted above, the entire course of a soldier’s individual itinerary was examined to make sure that it corresponded with the degree of mobility assigned for the two periods. Also, soldiers may have been mobile before taking their first land, but since the aim of this study is to determine their mobility after their initial settlement, this point is moot. Soldiers who settled in or after 1674 are therefore included in the *Appears*, *Disappears* or *Unknown* categories.

For the first mobility period (demobilization to 1674), 74% of the regiment is stable. If we include moves to neighboring seigneuries, the percentage rises slightly to over 77%. For the second mobility period (1674 to 1681), the overall stability rate drops to 55% – nearly 64% if neighboring localities are included.

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<sup>133</sup> One soldier went to Acadia and another went to present-day New York.

**Table 21: Degrees of Mobility for the Entire Regiment**

	<i>Demobilization - 1674</i>		<i>1674 to 1681</i>	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
None	252	74.12%	187	55%
Neighboring	12	3.53%	29	8.53%
Same govt.	21	6.18%	26	7.65%
Other govt.	14	4.12%	18	5.29%
Appears	8	2.35%	14	4.12%
Disappears	15	4.41%	26	7.65%
Dead	9	2.65%	28	8.24%
Unknown	9	2.65%	12	3.53%

Two conclusions are apparent from these results: the majority of soldiers were stable at the beginning of their itineraries, up until the halfway point in our time frame. However, this stability fell considerably in the second half of the time frame. If we eliminate the dead soldiers from the analysis (they are fairly numerous for the second period), we have revised stability rates of 74% and 60% for the two periods. The results still contradict what was expected. It was thought that the demobilized soldiers would move around for several years before settling permanently in one location and that at the end of the time frame, they would be more stable, having finally settled. Instead, what started out as a promise of high stability deteriorated towards the end of the period of study into a higher degree of mobility.

Of the 244 soldiers who are stable for the first period, 64.75% retained their stability for the second period, which is to say for the entire period of study. For the 96 who are not stable during the first period, 30.21% were for the second – they *became* stable. However, 35.25% of soldiers who are stable for the first period were not for the second – they *lost* their stability. More soldiers lost stability than those who gained it.

Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse put forth the idea that “un petit nombre de ces soldats après avoir opté pour la colonie changèrent d’idée et retournèrent en France...”<sup>134</sup> However, our analysis does not support this statement. Of the 340 soldiers studied, only one returned to France after settling in Canada. Louis Bolduc returned to France, but in 1686, after our period of study. Another, Jacques Pillereau, sold his property before returning to France in

<sup>134</sup> ROY et MALCHELOSSE, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

1673, but came back to Canada by 1681. If by a small number, Roy and Malchelosse mean two, then they are correct. Perhaps others returned to France without leaving the type of proof or clue to their decision as did Pillereau. If so, some of the 26 soldiers listed as “disappeared” for the second mobility period may fit this description. A more in-depth combing of notarial and other records would be needed to prove this hypothesis, though a lack of systematic records of this nature may hamper any attempt at such an analysis.

### **3.3 Company Affiliation**

For the first mobility period, the most stable localities are Sorel (22 stable soldiers), Saint-Ours (21), Lachine and Québec (18 each), Chambly (15), Pointe-aux-Trembles and Montréal (14 each), Louiseville (10), Neuville (9) and Champlain (8). For the second period, the most stable localities are Saint-Ours (19), Lachine (16), Sorel (14), Chambly and Pointe-aux-Trembles (11 each), Neuville and Québec (9 each), Boucherville and Contreccœur (8 each) and Champlain (6). Saint-Ours, Sorel and Lachine, among the three most stable localities for both mobility periods, seem to be popular places for the Carignan soldiers. They also seem to be exceptions to the “rule” of mobility that most of the other soldiers followed.

The fact that two of the most stable localities were granted to captains of the regiment prompted a study of stability by company. The hypothesis is that the most stable soldiers are the ones who decided to settle with their comrades and officers. The following two tables present the stability rate by company for each of the two mobility periods. In order to determine to what degree our hypothesis is true, we paid particular attention to the Saurel, Lafouille and Saint-Ours companies. These three were the most complete to remain in Canada, with 58%, 68% and 76% of soldiers remaining, respectively. What is more, the officers of these three companies were granted seigneuries where their soldiers could settle.

**Table 22: Mobility by Company, Demobilization to 1674**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appears	Disappears	Dead	Unknown	Total	% Stable
<i>Berthier</i>	8	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	11	72.73
Chambly	7	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	11	63.64
Contrecoeur	14	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	20	70.00
Desportes	7	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	12	58.33
Dugué	6	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	9	66.67
Froment	7	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	10	70.00
Grandfontaine	13	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	17	76.47
<i>La Brisardière</i>	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	75.00
La Colonelle	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	83.33
<i>La Durantaye</i>	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	33.33
La Fouille	32	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	34	94.12
La Fredière	9	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	16	56.25
La Motte	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	66.67
La Noraye	8	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	10	80.00
La Tour	7	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	12	58.33
La Varenne	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	11	81.82
Loubias	15	0	1	2	0	0	1	1	20	75.00
Maximy	15	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	18	83.33
<i>Monteil</i>	14	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	19	73.68
Petit	5	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	9	55.56
Rougemont	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100.00
Saint-Ours	28	1	3	3	2	1	0	0	38	73.68
Salières	7	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	11	63.64
Saurel	25	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	29	86.21
Headquarters	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.00
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>340</b>	

**Table 23: Mobility by Company, 1674 to 1681**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appears	Disappears	Dead	Unknown	Total	% Stable
Berthier	5	1	2	0	0	2	0	1	11	45.45
Chambly	5	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	11	45.45
Contrecœur	13	1	0	0	0	2	3	1	20	65.00
Desportes	6	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	12	50.00
Dugué	4	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	9	44.44
Froment	6	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	10	60.00
Grandfontaine	5	3	1	1	1	2	4	0	17	29.41
La Brisardière	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	50.00
La Colonelle	3	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	6	50.00
La Durantaye	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	66.67
La Fouille	21	1	5	4	0	2	0	1	34	61.76
La Fredière	8	2	0	1	2	1	2	0	16	50.00
La Motte	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	6	50.00
La Noraye	5	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	10	50.00
La Tour	6	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	12	50.00
La Varenne	7	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	11	63.64
Loubias	10	1	3	0	0	3	2	1	20	50.00
Maximy	11	2	0	0	1	0	3	1	18	61.11
Monteil	11	2	2	0	1	0	2	1	19	57.89
Petit	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	9	33.33
Rougemont	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100.00
Saint-Ours	27	3	2	2	0	2	1	1	38	71.05
Salières	6	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	11	54.55
Saurel	15	2	4	3	2	1	2	0	29	51.72
Headquarters	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.00
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>340</b>	

Stability rates are fairly high for all of the companies during the first period. On average, 74% of all soldiers were stable for this first period. The most stable companies for the first period are, in order: Lafouille, Saurel, Maximy & La Colonelle, La Varenne and La Noraye,



all with over 80% of soldiers stable.<sup>135</sup> As expected, two of the three most complete companies – Lafouille and Saurel – are on this list. There is only one company, La Durantaye, with fewer than 50% stable soldiers. The La Varenne Company has a stability rate of 81.82% soldiers, despite the fact that no officer from this company remained in Canada.

What seems out of place for the first period are the stability rates for the Chambly, Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours companies. All of these companies' captains were granted seigneuries, but their companies show below-average stability rates and none are among the most stable localities, with Saint-Ours in a tie for only tenth place. These results raise questions on the influence of the regiment's officers on their soldier's settlement, which is studied in the following section.

Stability rates fall for all companies during the second mobility period (1674 to 1681). Rates are no longer near the 80% seen in the first period. Also, while for the first period there were only two companies with a stability rate of 50% or less, the second period finds 13 companies – slightly more than half – at 50% stability or less. The average stability rate for the second period is only 55%. The most stable company, Saint-Ours, only attained a 71.05% stability rate. The three most stable companies for the first period – La Fouille, Saurel and Maximy – each lost over 30% of their stability by the second period, though the loss for the regiment as a whole was only 19%. This again points to a lack of influence of the regiment's officers on soldiers' stability.

### **3.4 Influence of the Regiment's Officers**

The question of the officers' influence, examined during the study of the soldiers' settlement, returns when considering their mobility. Were soldiers who settled with their officer more stable than those who settled with another officer or those who didn't settle with any officer? The officers were expected to have a stabilizing effect on their soldiers, so the presumption is

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<sup>135</sup> An exception is made for the two cases of 100% stability (Rougemont Company and Headquarters), given the fact that it is a question of only one and two soldiers, respectively.

that those who settled with an officer from their company would be the most stable of the regiment, with soldiers who settled with an officer from a different company less stable and those who didn't settle with any of the regiment's officers the least stable.

The following tables show the soldiers' mobility with regards to the regiment's officers for both mobility periods. Three categories of soldiers are compared in this study: those who followed *their* officer, those who followed an *other* officer from the regiment and those who followed *none*. The degrees of mobility defined at the beginning of this chapter are applied.

**Table 24: Officers' Influence on Mobility, Demobilization to 1674**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appear	Disappear	Unknown	Dead	Total	% Stable
Their	54	1	7	3	0	2	2	0	69	78.26
Other	45	6	9	3	3	3	2	0	71	63.38
None	153	5	5	8	5	10	5	9	200	76.50
Total	252	12	21	14	8	15	9	9	<b>340</b>	74.12

**Table 25: Officers' Influence on Mobility, 1674-1681**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appear	Disappear	Unknown	Total	Dead	% Stable
Their	37	4	9	6	2	4	2	69	5	53.62
Other	38	5	5	5	4	6	2	71	6	53.52
None	112	20	12	7	8	16	8	200	17	56.00
Total	150	29	26	18	14	26	12	<b>340</b>	28	44.12

The results are not what was expected to be seen. For the first mobility period, though soldiers who followed their officer were indeed the most stable, there was less than a 2% difference between this group and those who did not follow *any* of the regiment's officers, making the two groups virtually equal. By the second mobility period, soldiers who didn't follow *any* of the regiment's officers were the most stable. There is less than a 2.5% difference between all three groups of soldiers for the second period, showing no clear influence on any one group. Given these results, we can only conclude that for the regiment as a whole, the presence of the soldier's officer or another Carignan officer was not a factor in keeping the former soldiers stable.

There are several notable exceptions to this conclusion, such as the Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours Companies. The former only went from a stability rate of 70% to 65%, while the latter only dropped from 73.68% to 71.05%. These results are most likely due to the stability of the two captains themselves.<sup>136</sup> In 1667, Antoine Pécaudy de Contrecoeur married Barbe Denys, daughter of Simon Denys de la Trinité, a councilor in the *Conseil Souverain*. He lived out his days on his seigneurie of Contrecoeur. Pierre de Saint-Ours also married in Canada and had 11 children, which contributed greatly to his own stability. The fact that he received his commission as captain just three months before the regiment left France could also explain his decision to remain in the colony. The older captains at the end of their careers returned to France, while the zealous newcomer did everything to please his king.

Most of the other officers had little or no influence on their soldiers, and did not lead by example, as did captains Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours. Ironically, Jacques de Chambly, whose name was given to the fort and seigneurie in the Richelieu Valley and which is the most recognizable name of the regiment in our day, did not even stay in his own seigneurie. In 1673, he was named captain of Acadia, becoming its governor several years later. He then went to the Caribbean and lived out his days as governor of Martinique. His departure is probably what caused the stability rate of his soldiers to drop from 63.64% before 1674 to 45.45% after this date. If their captain was not stable, why should they be?

### 3.5 The Marriage Factor

Several authors have shown the stabilizing factor of marriage on migrants. Jacques Mathieu and his collaborators studied the impact of marriage by looking at where the married couple settled<sup>137</sup> and with regards to endogamy and exogamy.<sup>138</sup> However, our study of the impact of marriage on mobility will be guided by the findings Lina Gouger, who has shown that the

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<sup>136</sup> As a testament to their stability, the two families were also united in marriage. In 1701, François-Antoine Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, son of Antoine, married Jeanne de Saint-Ours, daughter of Pierre.

<sup>137</sup> MATHIEU, et al., "Mobilité et mariage dans le gouvernement de Québec au XVIIe siècle", Joseph GOY et Jean-Pierre WALLOT, dir., *Évolution et éclatement du monde rural: structures, fonctionnement et évolution différentielle des sociétés rurales françaises et québécoises, XVIIe-XXe siècles*, Montréal, PUM, 1986, p. 305-313.

<sup>138</sup> MATHIEU, P. THERRIEN-Fortier et R. LESSARD, *loc. cit.*, p. 211-227.

simple fact of getting married contributes to a migrant's establishment.<sup>139</sup> Jacques Mathieu confirms this assertion, stating "l'intégration s'achève par la conclusion d'alliances matrimoniales."<sup>140</sup> More detailed or complicated analyses do not respond to our problematic. We are merely trying to determine, as Gouger asserts, if getting married had a stabilizing effect on the Carignan soldiers.

In order to determine if marriage had a stabilizing effect on the soldiers, the mobility married soldiers was compared to that of bachelors and false bachelors for both mobility periods. The number of bachelors from the regiment who settled is interesting. Out of 340 soldiers identified, there were 67 bachelors, or 19.71% of the established military population. There were also 18 "false bachelors" – those who married after our time frame – who came from nine companies. Their marriage dates stretch from 1683 to 1692. If we add them to the bachelors, we have 85 soldiers who did not marry before 1681, or 25% of soldiers who settled in Canada after demobilization.

**Table 26: Mobility by Marital Status, Before 1674 - 1674**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appear	Disappear	Unknown	Dead	Total	% Stable
Married	202	10	16	9	1	8	3	6	255	79.22
Bachelors & False Bachelors	50	2	5	5	7	7	6	3	85	58.82
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>340</b>	

<sup>139</sup> GOUGER, *op. cit.*

<sup>140</sup> MATHIEU, "Structures familiales...", *op.cit.*, p. 417.

**Table 27: Mobility by Marital Status, 1674 - 1681**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appear	Disappear	Unknown	Dead	Total	% Stable
Married	159	25	21	11	7	6	4	22	255	62.35
Bachelors & False Bachelors	28	4	5	7	7	20	8	6	85	32.94
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>340</b>	

For the first mobility period, married soldiers are more stable than their unmarried comrades by slightly more than 20%. What is more, married soldiers account for 80.16% of all stable soldiers for this period. While stability rates are lower for the second mobility period, married soldiers became more stable than bachelors, with nearly 30% more of them stable than unmarried soldiers. For the second period, married soldiers make up 85.03% of all stable soldiers in the regiment. These results strongly confirm the hypothesis that married soldiers were more stable than their unmarried counterparts, though do not show any greater advantage of the Carignan soldiers over a regular *habitant*. Marriage seems to have had the desired effect of tying them to their new home, with married soldiers gaining nearly 10% stability compared to unmarried soldiers between the two periods.

What does stand out in this analysis, however, is the number of soldiers who disappeared during the second mobility period. Of the soldiers for whom all trace is lost, 62.5% are bachelors – more than three times the number of married soldiers who disappeared. Once again, this confirms the conclusion that married soldiers were more stable than their unmarried comrades. They also left more traces of themselves in the colonial records and are therefore easier to follow.

The examination of the influence of marriage on the soldiers' stability continues with an analysis of whether the size of a soldier's family was a factor in his stability. Three family sizes were used to compare the soldiers, based on total family size for the entire time period: families with no children, 1 to 5 children and 6 to 10 children. The assumption is that soldiers who had more children were more stable than those with fewer or no children.

**Table 28: Mobility by Family Size, Demobilization to 1674**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appeared	Disappeared	Dead	Unknown	Total
0 children	76	2	6	5	7	9	6	7	118
1- 5 children	133	8	13	8	1	6	3	2	174
6-10 children	43	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	48
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>340</b>

Comparing the results by family size, 64% of soldiers who had no children were stable – the majority of that category. For those with 1 to 5 children, 76% were stable, with the percentage rising to 90% stability for soldiers with 6 to 10 children. This is exactly the kind of progression that was expected to be seen: having more children implies greater stability for the soldier-settlers. It was harder for soldiers with large families to be mobile, and they were more concerned with settling their children than with changing their own settlement. However, the numbers for families with 6 to 10 children reveal even more than this.

If moves to neighboring localities are included, 97.92% of soldiers in this category remained in the same government, compared to 88.51% for families with 1 to 5 children and 71.19% for childless families. Larger families tended to stay in the same area, even when they moved. Also, the zeroes in the *Appeared*, *Disappeared*, *Dead* and *Uncertain* columns for large families are not found for the other family sizes. This means that not only were the soldiers with 6 to 10 children more stable, but that due to their numerous baptisms in the parish registers, their itineraries were much more easier to reconstruct, since they were not missing at any of the three checkpoints.

For the second mobility period (1674–1681), the overall results are the same, but the percentages diminish in scale for this second period: 37% of childless soldiers were stable, compared to 61% of those with 1 to 5 children and 75% of soldiers with 6 to 10 children.

**Table 29: Mobility by Family Size, 1674-1681**

	None	Neighboring	Same govt.	Other govt.	Appeared	Disappeared	Dead	Unknown	Total
0 children	44	7	6	10	9	21	12	9	118
1- 5 children	107	15	16	7	5	5	16	3	174
6-10 children	36	7	4	1	0	0	0	0	48
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>340</b>

Once again, there are zeroes in the *Appeared*, *Disappeared*, *Dead* and *Uncertain* columns for soldiers with 6 to 10 children, as for the first mobility period. What stands out, however, is the group at the other end of the spectrum: 21 soldiers with no children disappeared during this period. Only nine childless soldiers disappeared during the previous period. This number more than doubled, underscoring the precarious nature of the life and mobility of these soldiers, as well as the tendency for this group to leave less traces in the archives.

Remarriage could be a cause for mobility. If a soldier's wife died, he may marry a girl or widow from another locality who owns land or receives some as a dowry, and he may move to this new land. Being a widower could be an opportunity for a soldier to once again take up the "chemin de l'enracinement."<sup>141</sup>

Of the 340 soldier-settlers studied, only six lost their first wives and remarried within the period of study. These soldiers are François Banliac, Étienne Blanchon, Louis Denis, Christophe Février, Pierre Labbé and Noël Laurence. This last man married the widow of another soldier, Julien Latouche. In the opposite of what was expected, four out of six widowers were stable for both mobility periods. Noël Laurence is the only one for whom remarriage seems to have led to mobility. After his second marriage in 1674, he left Trois-Rivières, where he had been settled since demobilization, to move to Contrecoeur. The sixth widower, Louis Denis, changed governments during the first period (before his second

<sup>141</sup> LABERGE, "L'immigrant migrant...", *loc. cit.*, 19 p.

marriage) and died during the second. Remarriage did not have the destabilizing effect that was expected for the soldiers.

### 3.6 The Fur Trade

The regiment's bachelors left less traces of themselves in the parish registers and notaries' minutes than their married comrades. This fact is most likely due to their participation in the fur trade. Benjamin Sulte noted, "le chiffre de soldats licenciés ne dépassait pas quatre cents, dont plus d'un cent devinrent coureurs de bois et ne firent rien pour la colonie..."<sup>142</sup> Is this true? To respond to this question, we cross-checked the bachelors in the *Settlers* database against the soldiers whom our sources mention as taking part in the fur trade,<sup>143</sup> to see if most of the soldiers who were in the fur trade were indeed bachelors.

However, the sources consulted for this thesis only identify 24 soldiers who definitely participated in the fur trade. This could be due to the fact that participation in the fur trade can simply be impossible to prove or quantify, at least for this period. It would have been preferable to confirm this theory, but sources are lacking, given the fact that *congés* or fur trade passes were only issued after our period of study. Of the 24 soldiers mentioned in our sources as participating in the fur trade, half were bachelors during the period of study (8 bachelors, 4 false bachelors), obviously meaning that the other half was married, which is far from conclusive for this study. Both groups had equal numbers.

No matter what their marital status was, were the soldiers who participated in the fur trade more mobile than those who did not participate? The hypothesis is that those who participated in the fur trade would be more mobile than non-participants, since the nature of the fur trade was mobile. Though the 24 soldier-settlers identified as having participated in the fur trade represent only 7.06% of the 340 soldiers in the *Settlers* database, their mobility can nonetheless be compared against the rest of the soldiers.

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<sup>142</sup> SULTE, "Le Régiment de Carignan", *loc. cit.*, p.60.



We looked at the stability assessments for each of the two periods of our time frame and came up with assessments of whether a soldier was stable throughout the entire period, gained or lost stability as time went on, or disappeared from the archives of the colony. In order to follow our entire group of 340 soldiers, the categories “Unknown” and “Dead” were also retained, to explain the destiny of all soldier-settlers.

**Table 30: Mobility of Soldiers Regarding the Fur Trade**

	Stable throughout	Gained stability	Lost stability	Disappeared	Unknown	Dead	Total	% Stable
Participants	13	0	2	9	0	0	24	54.17
Non-participants	183	33	42	28	2	28	316	57.91
Total	196	33	44	37	2	28	<b>340</b>	

For soldiers who definitely took part in the fur trade, this activity does not seem to have had a negative effect on their stability. Less than 4% separates the soldiers from the two groups who were stable for the entire period of study. If we take into account changes in stability – soldiers who gained or lost stability throughout our time frame – 45.83% of those who engaged in the fur trade were stable, while 55.06% of non-participants were stable. Though this difference is more significant, it is far from a marked difference. Also, the results point more towards insufficient data. Mentions of participation in the fur trade in the sources consulted are mostly of an “official” nature, indicating that a soldier was a merchant/trader or signed a contract entering into an association with another individual or company to engage in the fur trade. These are not people who were necessarily mobile. Those who simply “took to the woods” did not leave these types of records and thus escape this study.

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<sup>143</sup> These are not necessarily mentions in “official” fur-trade documents. Sources may mention contracts, court cases, partnership agreements or other indications of trading activity, legal or otherwise.

### **3.7 Redistribution in the Colony**

The locations where the Carignan soldiers settled at the three checkpoints (Before 1674, 1674, 1681), allowed us to identify a total of 61 seigneuries where they settled over the entire time frame, which gives an average of 5.57 soldiers per seigneurie. Whereas in Chapter 2 we examined the first places where the soldiers settled, independent of time, the following sections will study their mobility or redistribution throughout the colony throughout the period of study.

This mobility can be quantified and studied by looking at the soldiers' settlement at the three checkpoints in our time frame, which serve as mile markers along their individual itineraries. By comparing the populations of each locality, notably the seigneuries with the least and the most soldiers at each point, we can determine the changing settlement patterns of the former soldiers and gauge their mobility. The hypothesis is that the soldiers will become more stable as time goes on, and that the line of defense will strengthen. The results will show if these presumptions are true or not.

#### **3.7.1 Checkpoint 1: Before 1674**

For the checkpoint "Before 1674," the soldiers were settled in 52 of the 61 seigneuries, which gives an average of 6.54 soldiers per seigneurie. Already, this result shows a lack of concentration in the military population and hints towards a failure of the idea of a line of defense. Six soldiers per seigneurie cannot assure an adequate defense against the Iroquois.

One can imagine that there were simply seigneuries that were granted in the course of our time frame and that the soldiers eventually found their way to the nine seigneuries that have no military population at the first checkpoint. However, the results are surprising when we look at the seigneuries with a low military population. At this first checkpoint, there are 13 seigneuries with only one soldier in the population and eight seigneuries with two soldiers (see table below). For the seigneuries with two soldiers, only one – Portneuf – welcomed both soldiers from the same company. For this checkpoint, only ten seigneuries had ten or

more soldiers among their population. The places with the largest numbers of soldiers at this time are Québec City (31 soldiers), Sorel (22), Saint-Ours and Chambly (21 each), Montréal and Lachine (19 each). See map in Annex for the distribution at this checkpoint.

For a certain number of soldiers, it is impossible to determine their settlement before 1674, even in an approximate manner. At this first checkpoint, there are 27 soldiers who are noted as “absent,” since it is impossible to determine their settlement. These 27 individuals may have been engaged in the fur trade, as several sources speculate many former soldiers were.<sup>144</sup> This fact would explain their absence from the religious and notarized records of the time.

**Table 31: Military Population Before 1674**

<i>Population</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Names of Localities</i>
0 soldiers	9	Beaumont, Beaupré, Berthier, Île Dupas, Lachenaie, Lotbinière, Rivière-du-Sud (Montmagny), Rivière-Ouelle, St-François-du-Lac
1 soldier	13	Bécancour, Cap Rouge, Deschaillons, Île-aux-Grues, Labadie, La Durantaye, Lavaltrie, Lespinay, Repentigny, St-Laurent IO, St-Pierre IO, Tremblay, Varennes
2 soldiers	8	Bellechasse, Cap-de-la Madeleine, Château Richer, Île-aux-Oies, Linctot, Portneuf, Saint-Ignace, Sillery
10+ soldiers	10	Chambly, Champlain, Lachine, Montréal, Neuville, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Québec, Saint-Ours, Sorel, Trois-Rivières

The popularity of Lachine, noted in the previous chapter, continues to be a factor. For their settlement before 1674, 19 soldiers chose this locality. The military population of Lachine is equal to that of Montréal at the same checkpoint and is fourth in order of importance, behind Québec (31), Sorel (22), Chambly and Saint-Ours (21 soldiers each). Besides the capital, which was the largest population center at the time, Lachine contains the largest military population for a locality not granted to a Carignan officer. The fact that Lachine was a fur-trading center is one possible explanation for its attraction. When we look at the total military population of the isle of Montréal, it is larger than that of Québec City: 19 soldiers each at Montréal and Lachine, plus 16 at Pointe-aux-Trembles, which makes 54 for the entire island – 23 more than in Quebec City. What is more, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Montréal and Lachine – all part of the same seigneurie – are all “civil” localities.

### 3.7.2 Checkpoint 2: 1674

For the 1674 checkpoint, the soldiers can once again be found in 52 of the 61 seigneuries, which maintains the average of 6.54 soldiers per seigneurie. This means that there was no increase in the military concentration in the colony since the previous checkpoint, and the line of defense is no tighter than it was before.

**Table 32: Military Population in 1674**

<i>Population</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Names of localities</i>
0 soldiers	9	Beaumont, Bécancour, Berthier, Deschaillons, Lachenaie, Lotbinière, Montmagny, Rivière-Ouelle, St-François-du-Lac
1 soldier	11	Beaupré, Château Richer, Île Dupas, Île-aux-Oies, Île d'Orléans, Île Sainte-Thérèse, Labadie, Lavaltrie, Lespinay, Portneuf, Tremblay
2 soldiers	10	Bellechasse, Cap-de-la-Madeleine, Cap Rouge, Île-aux-Grues, La Durantaye, Linctot, Longueuil, Saint-Ignace, Sillery, Varennes
10+ soldiers	11	Chambly, Champlain, Contrecoeur, Lachine, Louiseville, Montréal, Neuville, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Québec, Saint-Ours, Sorel

For this checkpoint, none of the seigneuries with only two soldiers had both from the same company. Also, there are 11 seigneuries with ten or more soldiers – one more than the previous checkpoint. The places with the largest military population also saw the number of soldiers and their order of importance change. The new order and sizes are: Sorel (25 soldiers), Saint-Ours (24), Lachine (21), Québec City (19), Chambly and Pointe-aux-Trembles (17 each), and Montréal (16). See map in Annex for the distribution at this checkpoint.

At the 1674 checkpoint, some locations granted to Carignan officers saw an increase in population. The military population of Contrecoeur rose from 6 to 11 soldiers. At the same time, the lure of the capital greatly diminished while that of Sorel and Saint-Ours grew. The lure of Lachine also grew, however, surpassing even the military population of Quebec City.

<sup>144</sup> Notably COURVILLE in “Espace, territoire et culture en Nouvelle-France...,” *loc. cit.*, et CHARBONNEAU et LAVOIE, “Introduction à la reconstitution de la population du Canada”, *loc. cit.*, p.496.

The military population of the island of Montréal remained at 54, but the order changed to Lachine, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Montréal, with Montréal falling from first to last on the list.

### 3.7.3 Checkpoint 3: 1681

For the checkpoint at the end of our period of study, the Carignan soldiers were once again settled in 52 of the 61 seigneuries, though not in the same 52 as at the previous checkpoints. The concentration of soldiers remained at 6.54 per seigneurie, meaning that throughout the entire period of study the military concentration of the colony never increased and the line of defense is no more tight at the end of the time frame than it was in the beginning.

In 1681, the 10 seigneuries with 10 or more soldiers had yet a new order of importance: Lachine now leads the list with 22 soldiers, followed by Sorel, Saint-Ours and Québec (20 each); Pointe-aux-Trembles and Neuville (13 each); Chambly (11); then Montréal, Contrecoeur and Boucherville (10 each). The lure of the Richelieu Valley seigneuries diminished, and Neuville and Boucherville are on the list for the first time. The military population of the island of Montréal fell from 54 to 45 soldiers, apparently to the profit of neighboring localities. Boucherville's military population rose at each checkpoint (7-8-10), as well as Lachenaie (0-0-2), Laprairie (6-7-8), Lavaltire (1-1-4), Repentigny (1-5-8) and Tremblay (1-1-2). The soldiers seemed to have made their way into the surrounding region.

There are 15 seigneuries in 1681 with only one soldier among the population – four more than in 1674, and the highest number with a single soldier for all three checkpoints. Seven seigneuries had two soldiers, though none of the pairs came from the same company. See map in Annex for the distribution at this checkpoint.

The results of studying the military population at each of the three checkpoints are the opposite of what was expected at the outset of this study. Instead of becoming more stable, the former soldiers of the Carignan regiment moved around at each of the checkpoints and did not come together for their settlement. The localities with the highest number of soldiers changed at each of the three checkpoints. More importantly, the number of seigneuries with

two soldiers or less was over half of those with a military population at each checkpoint, and the concentration of soldiers – the line of defense – never got stronger since the beginning of the period of study.

**Table 33: Military Population in 1681**

<i>Population</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Names of Localities</i>
0 soldiers	9	Beaupré, Bécancour, Deschailions, Île Dupas, Île-aux-Grues, Île d'Orléans, Labadie, Lespinay, Sillery
1 soldier	15	Beaumont, Bellechasse, Château Richer, Dautray, Gaudarville, Île-aux-Oies, Île Sainte-Thérèse, Lauzon, Montmagny (Rivière-du-Sud), Portneuf, Rivière-Ouelle, Sainte-Famille IO, Saint-François-du-Lac, Saint-Pierre IO, Varennes
2 soldiers	7	Cap Rouge, Lachenaie, La Durantaye, Linctot, Saint-Gabriel, Saint-Ignace, Tremblay
10+ soldiers	10	Boucherville, Chambly, Contrecoeur, Lachine, Longueuil, Montréal, Neuville, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Québec, Saint-Ours, Sorel

### 3.8 The Shifting Military Population: Highs and Lows

As mentioned above, at each checkpoint there were several localities with no military population. However, though there were nine seigneuries at each checkpoint with no soldiers, these localities are not the same for each checkpoint. In all, there were 16 seigneuries with no soldier for at least one of the three checkpoints. The table below lists the “vacant” seigneuries for each year. A blank column means that the locality, vacant for at least one of the other checkpoints, had soldiers settled there that year.

Five of the 16 seigneuries (31.25%) had at least one soldier at the first two checkpoints, but were “abandoned” by the soldiers by 1681. For seven out of 16 (43.75%), there were no soldiers until 1681. Two seigneuries (12.5%) had at least one soldier before 1674 and in 1681, but none at the second checkpoint and two more had no soldiers before 1674, but had a military population in 1674 and 1681. No single pattern can be observed from the shifting list of seigneuries without a military population, besides the fact that even though the concentration of soldiers never increased, their places of settlement constantly changed.

Perhaps something can be learned by examining the opposite of the previous study – the localities with the largest military population for each of the three checkpoints. Did some localities constantly attract large numbers of soldiers throughout the period of study, and did their numbers increase at these locations? The numbers in parentheses in the following table correspond to their order of importance for each checkpoint.

<i>Before 1674</i>	<i>1674</i>	<i>1681</i>
Beaumont	Beaumont	
Beaupré		Beaupré
	Bécancour	Bécancour
Berthier	Berthier	
	Deschaillons	Deschaillons
Île Dupas		Île Dupas
		Île-aux-Grues
		Île d'Orléans
		Labadie
Lachenaie	Lachenaie	
		Lespinay
Lotbinière	Lotbinière	
Rivière-du-Sud (Montmagny)	Rivière-du-Sud (Montmagny)	
Rivière-Ouelle	Rivière-Ouelle	
St-François-du-Lac	St-François-du-Lac	
		Sillery

**Table 35 Localities with the Largest Military Population**

<i>Seigneurie</i>	<i>Before 1674</i>	<i>1674</i>	<i>1681</i>
Boucherville	7	8	10
Chambly	21 (3)	17	11
Contrecoeur	6	11	10
Lachine	19	21 (3)	22 (1)
Montréal	19	16	10
Neuville	10	10	13 (3)
Québec	31 (1)	19	20 (2)
Pte-aux-Trembles	16	17	13 (3)
Saint-Ours	21 (3)	24 (2)	20 (2)
Sorel	22 (2)	25 (1)	20 (2)

The role of Lachine as a population center for the former soldiers is once again notable, especially when we look at which soldiers settled there. For settlement before 1674, more soldiers from the Contrecoeur Company were settled at Lachine than at Contrecoeur. Only three out of 20 soldiers of this company settled with their captain, while seven opted for Lachine at the first checkpoint. In 1674, one more soldier from the Contrecoeur Company settled with his captain, but there are still seven soldiers from this company at Lachine. In

1681, the numbers dropped to three at Contrecoeur and six at Lachine, but they clearly show the lack of influence that Monsieur de Contrecoeur had on his soldiers' settlement.

Another question that this analysis raises, however, is that of the settlement of soldiers in the three towns of the colony: Montréal, Québec and Trois-Rivières. The first two, as seen above, lost soldiers since the beginning of the time period. At the same time, localities like Boucherville and Neuville saw an increase in their military population. The question of mobility with respect to the three governments and their towns is examined in the following section.

### 3.9 Redistribution in the Governments and Towns

The distribution and *redistribution* of the Carignan soldiers in the three regional governments of Canada at the time – Québec, Trois-Rivières and Montréal – is another facet of their mobility. In order to study this question, it is necessary to not just assign one place of settlement for each soldier, but once again to observe their settlement at the three checkpoints. In this manner, the result will not just be a fixed view of their distribution by government, but will show an evolution or mobility, if one exists.

The following table shows the soldiers' distribution among the three governments for each of the three checkpoints. The table presents the military population for the entire government, with the military population of that government's town. On the government level, the total number of soldiers is given, along with the percentage of soldiers who settled there. For the town, the number in parentheses is the percentage of the military population of that government that was settled in the town.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>145</sup> To arrive at a total of 340 soldiers for each checkpoint, the following numbers must be added:

	<i>Absent</i>	<i>Dead</i>	<i>Disappeared</i>
<i>Before 1674</i>	27	0	9
<i>1674</i>	13	9	11
<i>1681</i>	10	26	30



**Table 36: Distribution of the Military Population by Government**

	Québec		Trois-Rivières		Montréal	
	Govt.	Town	Govt.	Town	Govt.	Town
Before 1674	105 (31%)	31 (30%)	53 (16%)	10 (19%)	155 (46%)	19 (12%)
1674	91 (27%)	19 (21%)	49 (14%)	6 (12%)	167 (49%)	16 (9.6%)
1681	82 (24%)	20 (24%)	40 (12%)	3 (7.5%)	152 (45%)	10 (6.6%)

As can be seen, the government of Montréal has the largest military population of the three governments at each of the checkpoints. This can be at least partially explained by the fact that the Richelieu Valley seigneuries can be found in this government. The Montréal government's military population varied between 45 and 49% of the regiment, while the military population of Québec fell from 31 to 24%, and that of Trois-Rivières dropped from 16 to 12% of soldier-settlers. The Québec and Trois-Rivières regional governments lost their initial military population, while the Montréal government saw a slight rise in this population before returning to a level just below where it started.

Connected to the question of the distribution of the military population by government is another: the number of soldiers who chose to settle in the town instead of the countryside and life in a rural seigneurie. Benjamin Sulte states that, "une...centaine [de soldats] exercèrent des métiers ou furent domestiques à Québec, Trois-Rivières et Montréal; deux cents optèrent pour l'agriculture, après avoir servi trois années chez les 'habitants,' selon la loi du pays."<sup>146</sup>

As for the soldiers who "optèrent pour l'agriculture," based on our results, Sulte's estimate is too low. Our results show a little more than his estimate of 200 soldiers, with the numbers fluctuating around 250 for each of the three checkpoints. Let us now look more closely at the numbers for the urban population.

The numbers drop off significantly at each of the checkpoints, to the point that the situation can almost be characterized as a military exodus from the towns of New France. For the checkpoint "Before 1674," there are 60 soldiers settled in the three towns, compared to 253 in the rural areas of the three governments. For 1674, the towns' population falls to 41

<sup>146</sup> SULTE, "Le Régiment de Carignan", *loc. cit.*, p.60.

soldiers and for 1681 there are only 33 soldiers in the towns. As far as the towns are concerned, it can be said that Sulte's estimation is incorrect. At most, 60 soldiers settled in the towns, slightly over half of his estimation, and this number falls as time goes by.

One reason for this systematic departure from the three towns could be the fact that the bachelors went to settle in the countryside once they found a wife – one couldn't work a farm alone, after all. We therefore looked at the number of bachelors in the cities before 1674 and how many remained there at the end of our period of study. Four categories were assigned: Still *present in 1681*, *moved* to another locality, *disappeared* from the archives or *dead*.

**Table 37: Destiny of the Bachelor Population of the Towns**

	Before 1674	Present 1681	Moved	Disappeared	Dead
Québec	<b>12</b>	3	4	4	1
Montréal	<b>8</b>	2	1	3	2
Trois-Rivières	<b>4</b>	0	1	2	1

As shown in the table above, a similar pattern is observed for each of the three towns of the colony. Few if any bachelors remained in the town where they were settled before 1674. While some of them moved, this does not explain their disappearance. More departures from the towns can be explained by death or disappearance from the colonial records. Once again, this result underscores the precarious nature of bachelor life in the colony.

### **3.10 Mobility and the Richelieu Valley**

The Montréal government is of particular interest, since it included the Richelieu Valley seigneuries. To follow up on the question of the line of defense, a summary study was made to show the changes in the military population of the Richelieu Valley. We first looked at the military population of these 11 seigneuries at each of the three checkpoints, as seen in the table below. Of the 11 seigneuries, seven were granted to Carignan officers: Chambly, Contrecoeur, Saint-Ours, Sorel, Tremblay, Varennes and Verchères (in bold type in the table). The other four localities were “civil” seigneuries where soldiers settled.

**Table 38: Changes in the Richelieu Valley Military Population**

<i>Seigneurie</i>	<1674	1674	1681
Bellevue	0	0	0
Boucherville	7	8	10
<b>Chambly</b>	21	17	11
<b>Contrecoeur</b>	6	11	10
Laprairie	6	7	8
Longueuil	5	2	3
<b>Saint-Ours</b>	21	25	19
<b>Sorel</b>	22	25	20
<b>Tremblay</b>	1	1	2
<b>Varenes</b>	1	2	1
<b>Verchères</b>	3	4	3
TOTAL	93	102	87
%	27.35	30.00	25.59
Officers' seigneuries:	75	85	66
%	22.06	25.00	19.41

Contrary to the popular myth about the regiment, the military population of the Richelieu Valley seigneuries never surpassed 30% of the former soldiers. On average, only 26.47% of all soldier-settlers settled along the Richelieu at any given point in their itineraries, which leaves 73.53% who never settled in the region where they are thought to have all settled. There was a slight increase in the number of soldiers in the region between demobilization and 1674, but its military population then returned to slightly lower than its initial level.

If we only look at the military seigneuries in the Richelieu Valley – those granted to Carignan officers – we see that they make up the vast majority of the region's military population, but that the civil seigneuries of the region welcomed about 5% of the soldiers who settled there. Even though this means that the seigneuries granted to Carignan officers contain 95% of the region's military population, they did not receive 95% of the entire regiment. The soldiers who settled in these seigneuries only account for a maximum of 25%

of the regiment as a whole. This result is far from the assertions that most of the regiment settled on the banks of Richelieu.<sup>147</sup>

**Table 39: Mobility with Respect to the Richelieu Valley**

Company <sup>148</sup>	Stable	Came	Left	Changed	Never	TOTAL
Berthier	1	0	0	0	10	11
<b>Chambly</b>	3	0	1	1	6	11
<b>Contrecœur</b>	3	1	0	0	16	20
Desportes	2	1	0	0	9	12
Dugué	0	0	0	0	9	9
Froment	4	1	1	0	4	10
Grandfontaine	1	0	0	0	16	17
La Brisardière	0	0	0	0	4	4
La Colonelle	0	0	0	0	6	6
La Durantaye	1	0	0	0	2	3
La Fouille	1	1	0	0	32	34
La Fredière	0	1	0	0	15	16
La Motte	0	2	0	0	4	6
La Noraye	0	0	1	0	9	10
La Tour	1	1	1	1	8	12
La Varenne	0	0	0	0	11	11
<b>Loubias</b>	1	1	1	0	17	20
Maximy	0	0	0	0	18	18
Monteil	0	0	0	0	19	19
Petit	1	1	2	2	3	9
Rougemont	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Saint-Ours</b>	22	3	2	0	11	38
Salières	1	0	0	0	10	11
<b>Saurel</b>	14	1	7	0	7	29
Headquarters	0	0	0	0	1	1
Unknown	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	56	14	16	4	250	<b>340</b>

<sup>147</sup> Notably in SULTE, "Le Régiment de Carignan", *loc. cit.*, p.65 and OURY, *op.cit.*, p. 787.

<sup>148</sup> Company names in bold type are those whose officers were granted a seigneurie in the Richelieu Valley.

We then looked at the soldiers' mobility with respect to the Richelieu Valley. Five degrees of mobility with reference to the region were assigned: how many soldiers were *stable* in the same Richelieu seigneurie, how many *came* to the region after settling somewhere else, how many *left* the Richelieu Valley, how many *changed* seigneuries within the region and how many *never* settled in the Richelieu Valley. The results are presented in the table above.

After seeing how few soldiers settled in the region, it should be no surprise that there are six companies without any soldiers who settled along the Richelieu, no soldiers from the headquarters staff and none for whom the company affiliation is unknown. Eleven other companies have less than five soldiers who settled in the entire Richelieu Valley. In all, 17 out of the 24 companies had zero to five soldiers in the region.

For those who did settle along the Richelieu, 62.22% were stable. Another 15.55% came to the region after settling elsewhere. However, this increase of is more than offset by the 17.77% that left the region. Half of those who left moved to other seigneuries in the Montréal government. The soldiers stayed in place, came or went, but very few – only four soldiers in the entire regiment (4.44%) – changed seigneuries within the Richelieu Valley.

The most stable companies are Saint-Ours and Saurel. The first succeed in keeping 22 out of 38 soldiers in the region (57.89%), with a net gain of one soldier (three came, two left). For the Saurel Company, 14 out of 29 were stable in the region (48.28%), but only one soldier came from outside the region, while seven left. What is an unexpected result – the opposite of the two companies mentioned above – is the stability of the Chambly and Contreccœur companies. For the former, only 27.27% of its soldiers were stable in the region, while the latter had a stability rate of only 15%. This result is despite the fact that the captains of these companies received seigneuries in the Richelieu Valley.

## Conclusion: Evaluation of the Military Colonization

At the end of these analyses, it remains to determine to what extent the program of settling the former soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment was a success. To this end, responses must be given to the main questions of this study: Did most of the Carignan-Salières soldiers settle in Canada? Did they settle in the Richelieu Valley and were they mobile or sedentary after their demobilization? The answers to these questions will allow us to confirm or deny if these men succeeded in the second role that was given to them by the colonial authorities: to become colonists and contribute to the stability of New France.

First, there is the question of the total strength of the regiment. In all, in the 24 companies – 20 that made up the regiment and four that came with the *chevalier* de Tracy – roughly 1,200 men came to New France under military orders in 1665. Early historiography on the regiment and popular perception claim that most of these men remained in the colony to continue to serve the king with a hoe instead of a musket,<sup>149</sup> but cross-referencing the lists of soldiers and verifying them with various genealogical and demographic sources seems to indicate that this assertion is not true.

This study succeeded in positively identifying only 340 of the 1,200 soldiers as having settled in Canada after demobilization. This number – between one quarter and one third of the regiment – can only be seen as a failure of the program. Even though modern historians estimate that about one third of the soldiers lost their lives during their service in the colony, half of the men who could have remained in New France after their service chose not to take part in the settlement program. Historiography is far from the true history with regards to the number of soldiers who remained, and the popular myth of white knights who conquered the Iroquois and decided to found and defend a new country should remain in the realm of patriotic legend.

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<sup>149</sup> Notably the letters of Intendant Talon (*Les rapports des Archives nationales du Québec, op.cit*, p. 37) Minister Colbert (*ibid.*, p. 45.) and Marie de l'Incarnation (OURY, *op.cit*, p. 787).

The second thing that popular myth would have us believe about the Carignan-Salières regiment is that the soldiers who remained in Canada all settled in the Richelieu Valley in order to make up a first line of defense against the Iroquois. Known at the time as the “River of the Iroquois,” it was hoped that this river would henceforth be known for its association with the warriors of another race, and that the French soldiers who settled there would protect their new country against its enemy. Once again, historiography and popular myth are shown to be untrue.

It is true that the names of the regiment’s captains still remain on the map of modern-day Québec in the Richelieu Valley: Chambly, Contrecoeur, Saint-Ours, Sorel – even the name Carignan can be found today, though Prince Carignan did not accompany his regiment to New France. The names of the regiment are there, but the soldiers were not – at least not in the numbers that one would have us believe. This region is not where most of the soldiers settled – there were never more than 30% of the former soldiers who settled in the Richelieu Valley seigneuries. Let us not forget that this number is only 30% of one third of the regiment, or merely 8.5% of the entire regiment. Even Captain Chambly, who lent his name to a fort and a seigneurie, did not remain there. He left his seigneurie in 1673 for Acadia, then for the Caribbean. He only spent five years in Canada after the demobilization, but his name, his fort and his legend remain.

The line of defense that the authorities wished to create never came to fruition. The soldiers were scattered among the population of Canada in seigneuries all up and down the Saint Lawrence Valley, from Île Perrot in the west to Islet-du-Portage in the East. Even though Intendant Talon was conscious of the fact that settlers’ homes should be built “de proche en proche” and the population should be further concentrated in order to defend it better, he missed his best opportunity to not only reinforce the colony in sheer numbers, but also from a military point of view, as well.

The program of settling soldiers had, at its core, the assumption that the soldiers would maintain their military camaraderie and discipline and that this fact would cause them to remain together as a group with their officers and brothers-in-arms. It was believed that if

the colonial authorities gave seigneuries to the regiment's officers, the soldiers would follow them and settle in these seigneuries with their fellow soldiers. This idea was good in theory, but does not reflect historical reality.

The former soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment settled in 61 different seigneuries or localities. Seigneuries were granted to the regiment's officers outside of the Richelieu Valley, as far away as La Malbaie on the north shore of the Saint Lawrence in the government of Québec. To grant seigneuries in such a vast territory and to allow 340 soldiers to settle in 61 seigneuries are not effective strategies in creating a line of defense.

Moreover, the fact of having their officers as seigneurs and their comrades as neighbors did not have the desired stabilizing effect on the soldiers. One would tend to assume that as time passed, the soldiers would become more stable, but the opposite took place. For the two mobility periods, the soldiers were more stable at the first, but after that their stability rate fell. The settlement seems to have gotten off to a good start, but the overall stability rate of 72% for the first period (demobilization to 1674) falls to 55% for the second period (1674 to 1681). It seems that military camaraderie faded with time – it was not enough, at least, to keep the soldiers together and stable. The soldiers preferred to take their chances elsewhere, on their own account, instead of remaining together. The line of defense – which never really existed – crumbled further.

There were no large villages or “encampments” of former soldiers, as hoped for and anticipated by the program. The seigneuries of Saint-Ours and Sorél succeeded in retaining a sizeable military population, but there were just as many soldiers who settled in Québec City or Lachine, which were not granted to the regiment's officers. Instead of having a handful of villages whose population was mostly made up of former soldiers, the military population was dissipated or scattered throughout the general population of the colony.

In general, the influence of the regiment's officers on the soldiers' settlement was negligible. Only 19.71% of all soldiers settled with an officer from their company. If we take into account soldiers who settled with any officer from the regiment (since not all officers



remained in Canada), we see that only 41.18% of soldiers settled with an officer, be it an officer from their company or another. Most soldiers – 58.82% – decided to not settle with any officer. It seems that they made a good choice, too, since soldiers who chose to settle on their own account were more stable than those who settled with an officer. Another aspect of the program's failure can be seen: the lack of officers' influence on the soldiers' settlement.

However, this fact does not mean that all of the officers failed to settle their soldiers. The Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours companies are exceptions to this rule, with regards to the stability of their soldiers. The former went from a stability rate of 70% to 65%, while the latter maintained a stability rate of 71.05% for both periods. This phenomenon is due at least in part to the involvement of the two captains of these companies, who not only saw to the settlement of their soldiers, but their own settlement, as well. While there were some captains like Jacques de Chambly who left the Saint Lawrence Valley for Acadia and other locations, captains Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours founded families in New France and even went so far as to unite their two families through the marriage of their children.<sup>150</sup> They served as examples for their soldiers, but unfortunately they were the exceptions to the rule.

Some authors, notably Roy and Malchelosse, raised the idea that the quartering of the troops may have influenced the soldiers' settlement. According to them, the fact that the soldiers spent one or two winters in a given location may have made them more disposed to settle in that place after demobilization. Once again, popular history on the regiment does not correspond with observed reality. Only 26.47% of all soldiers settled in the place where they spent the winters prior to demobilization. Quartering is far from being a determining factor in the settlement of the regiment. However, there is an exception to the rule once again: the Maximy Company. In large part, this company, which was quartered at Sainte-Famille on the Île d'Orléans, elected to remain there after demobilization. Out of 18 soldiers in this company who remained in the colony, 15 settled on the Île d'Orléans.

This example, as well as the other exceptions to the rule with regards to the soldiers' settlement patterns, shows that there were various factors that influenced the distribution and

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<sup>150</sup> One of Contrecoeur's sons married one of Saint-Ours's daughters.

redistribution of the soldiers, but no single determining factor for the regiment as a whole. Each factor affected the various companies differently. For the Maximy Company, it was where they were quartered. For the Contrecoeur and Saint-Ours companies, it was the presence of the captain as seigneur. However, these factors did not have the same impact on the regiment as a whole.

In general, the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment did not behave any differently with regards to their settlement than the civil colonists of New France, despite the fact that conditions such as the presence of their officers and comrades and the ready availability of land and spouses could have had a greater impact on their settlement and stability.

Marriage helped settle the soldiers on Canadian soil, but in this respect as well they are not so different than their civil counterparts of the time. What is surprising is the number of bachelors that chose to settle – 25% of the soldiers who remained, if we take into account the “false bachelors” who married after our period of study. In this respect, we can assume that the presence of officers and comrades-at-arms was a factor that replaced their missing family. For the soldiers who married, the *Filles du Roy* assured a sufficient number of potential wives and probably helped to keep a certain number of soldiers in the colony.

Alain Laberge has referred to the path to settlement as a “route tortueuse qui ne conduit pas toujours où l’on voudrait aller.”<sup>151</sup> According to our research, with the exception of a few exemplary companies, the paths to settlement taken by the soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment did not lead to where the colonial authorities had hoped they would. The program of settling soldiers did not reach its objectives of settling most of the soldiers of the regiment and to use them to create a line of defense in the Richelieu Valley.

Despite the fact that the program, as envisioned by the colonial authorities was not a success as planned, it nonetheless had a positive effect on the colony. The soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment helped to reinforce the population of New France, that is certain, it is just that they did not do so exactly the way that the authorities had hoped. The program brought

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<sup>151</sup> LABERGE, “L’immigrant migrant...”, *loc. cit.*, p. 3.

over 300 new settlers to New France, not counting the Filles du Roy who became their wives. These new settlers also had valuable military experience in the colony and could still be useful as soldiers and militiamen.

It is the author's hope that this study has contributed in a small way to the understanding of the Carignan-Salières regiment and has succeeded in debunking some of the myths surrounding the role its soldiers played in the colonization of New France. We noticed a lack of studies of the regiment's colonizing role in the historiography and have tried to fill this as best as possible in the context of a masters' thesis. Like Benjamin Sulte, Roy and Malchelosse, Jack Verney et G-Robert Gareau before, this study hopes to add to the knowledge on the subject and to cast a bit more light on it.

It will be the task of the next researcher to identify more soldiers and to complete the picture of the colonizing role of the Carignan-Salières regiment. A more in-depth combing of the records of New France may yield new confirmations of soldiers' identities, as well as a greater appreciation of the impact of their professions and the fur trade on their settlement. Also, an analysis of sociability between soldiers – their choices of godparents for their children and witnesses at their marriage – may reveal the networks that possibly existed between the soldier-settlers and add to an understanding of their settlement. Unfortunately, these analyses were not possible in the framework of this master's thesis, but hopefully the work done here will serve as a basis for further research.

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
## **Annex: Supporting Maps**

- 1) Settlement of the Carignan-Salières Regiment in New-France
- 2) Military Population Before 1674
- 3) Military Population in 1674
- 4) Military Population in 1681


### **List of seigneuries/localities on the following maps:**

1. La Malbaie
2. Beaupré
3. Île-aux-Oies & Île-aux-Coudres
4. Île d'Orléans
5. Beauport
6. Charlesbourg
7. Québec
8. Lespinay
9. Saint-Ignace
10. Saint-Gabriel
11. Sillery
12. Gaudarville
13. De Maur (Cap Rouge)
14. Neuville (Dombourg)
15. Bélair
16. Portneuf
17. Grondines
18. Sainte-Anne-de-la-Pérade
19. Batiscan
20. Champlain
21. Cap-de-la-Madeleine (incl. fiefs Marsolet & Hertel)
22. Trois-Rivières (incl. Labadie)
23. Louiseville (Rivière-du-Loup)
24. Île Dupas
25. Berthier-en-Haut
26. Dautray
27. Lanoraie
28. Lavaltrie
29. Saint-Sulpice
30. Repentigny
31. Lachenaie (L'Assomption)
32. Île Jésus
33. Île de Montréal (incl. Lachine, Montréal, Rivière-des-Prairies & Pointe-aux-Trembles)
34. Île Perrot
35. Sault-Saint-Louis
36. Laprairie
37. Longueuil
38. Chambly
39. (Du) Tremblay
40. Boucherville
41. Île Sainte-Thérèse
42. Varennes
43. Verchères
44. Vitré (Bellevue)
45. Îles Beauregard
46. Contrecoeur
47. Saint-Ours
48. Sorel
49. Saint-François-du-Lac
50. Nicolet
51. Godefroy (Linctot)
52. Bécancour
53. Deschailons
54. Lotbinière
55. Tilly (Villieu)
56. Lauzon
57. Beaumont
58. La Durantaye
59. Bellechasse (Berthier-en-Bas)
60. Rivière-du-Sud (Montmagny)
61. La Pocatière
62. Kamouraska
63. L'Islet-du-Portage

# Settlement of the Carignan-Salières Regiment in New France




	Seigneuries with no military population
	Seigneuries where soldiers settled
	Seigneuries granted to officers of the regiment
*	Granted to officers, but not occupied




Peter Gagne, historian  
 Laura-Lee Bolger, geographer/cartographer  
 2005

# Military Population Before 1674




Peter Gagné, historian  
 Laura-Lee Bolger, geographer/cartographer  
 2005

# Military Population in 1674



Peter Gagné, historian  
 Laura-Lee Bolger, geographer/cartographer  
 2005

# Military Population in 1681



Peter Gagné, historian  
 Laura-Lee Bolger, geographer/cartographer  
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