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**MORALITY AND JUSTICE:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE KOHLBERGIAN
MODEL OF EDUCATION**

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Author's Note:

      Given the limitations of the English language to provide a gender-neutral pronoun, the use of "he" throughout the thesis should be understood as a gender-neutral term, unless specifically understood to be otherwise by the context of the statement.

RESUME

        Le but de cet ouvrage est de démontrer le lien étroit entre la
moralité et l'éducation, montrant ainsi qu'une définition de la
moralité doit être obtenue afin de développer une théorie efficace
de l'éducation.   Pour parvenir a cette fin, j'ai donc choisi
d'éxaminer   deux   éléments   de   l'approche   cognitive   et
développementale à la moralité et l'éducation de Lawrence Kohlberg:
1) l'idée que la justice est la vertue suprême et qu'elle réside au
sommet de la hiérarchie des vertues, et 2) l'idée que la moralité
est indépendante de la religion.   Je remets en question l'idée que
la justice ne soit directement reliée qu'a notre faculté de
raisonnement, ainsi que l'affirme Kohlberg, et je soutiens pour ma
part que la faculté de raisonnement, dépourvue d'influence
spirituelle, n'est qu'insuffisante à l'érection d'un système
crédible de moralité, comme d'une théorie de l'éducation.

                            ABSTRACT

        The intention of this essay is to demonstrate the inextricable
link between morality and education, and to show that some
definition of morality must be reached in order to evolve a
successful theory of education. To achieve this end, I have chosen
to examine two elements of Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive-
developmental approach to morality and education: 1) the idea that
justice is the ultimate virtue and resides at the top of the virtue
hierarchy, and 2) the idea that morality is autonomous from
religion. I challenge the notion that justice is born directly
from our capacity to reason, as espoused by Kohlberg, and assert
that the faculty of reason, devoid of spiritual influence, is not
sufficient enough to erect a plausible system of morality, and
consequently, a theory of education.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the days of antiquity, the beginning of culture as we know it, the act or process of acquiring knowledge and consequently, the act or process of imparting that knowledge to others has been an integral component in the evolution of humanity. The education of our offspring is at the forefront of our concerns as it is with other species. It is a natural propensity of humanity to educate the young and themselves, continually exercising the quest for knowledge and weighing discoveries against theories of the past. During the last century or so, the importance of education has increased at such a substantial rate, that there has been a drastic increase in the proliferation of materials which pertain to this area.

Moral education has existed for years, in one form or another, but its parameters and definition have been somewhat vague and ill-defined. From my understanding, it is a system of education whose primary concern is not the dissemination of knowledge on such topics as history, science, language, geography etc. but with the moral development of the individual student. This concept of individual moral development has attracted the attention of many great thinkers not only in philosophy, but in psychology, theology and sociology. Adherents in this area have been constantly striving to advance a theory of moral education which would yield the most amicable results for all parties involved. As one would expect, however, many of the theories pertaining to what an

appropriate system of moral education should be are at variance with each other. The differences arise when one examines the fundamental questions which mould and structure the theories. Each theory is founded on its own understanding of what education ought to be. A close inquiry into questions which have pervaded mankind for thousands of years such as: what is education? what is morality? what is human nature? is necessary if one is to advance a plausible theory which can be entrenched into a given society.

From a philosophical point of view, the concern surrounding education takes its origin in ancient Greece where the discussion of virtue and justice evinced by Plato and Socrates has essentially inundated every facet of education. Virtue being closely linked to morality is at the heart of every educational theory. All education should lead to the enhancement of some set of morals or values which will in turn guide the individual and allow him to function in accordance with society. But who is to say what those morals should be? Who has the right to fashion a hierarchy of values which should be taught in the schools, and on what grounds are those values established? Maybe virtue should not be taught, maybe it can't be taught. If it is taught, however, one creates a whole new catalogue of quandaries involving value relativism. Can the same values be taught universally, or does each culture function in accordance with its own set of values which can never be applied to another? Plato addressed this issue by arguing that although individual cultures adopt certain values to govern their societies, they are not necessarily correct in doing so. He

postulated the existence of eternal Forms, absolute moral values which are not particular to one culture or another. These Forms act as ideal virtues, absolute values. An action can only be good if it partakes of the Form of Goodness in some way. His theory of the Forms has inspired numerous philosophers in the way they approach value relativism and education.

My purpose is not to examine Plato's theory of Forms, but to demonstrate by calling upon some of the great thinkers of the past, that morality and education are inextricably linked, and that some definition of morality must be reached in order to propound a successful educational theory.

To examine all the issues surrounding educational theory would be somewhat over-ambitious and would require years of research and devotion. I have chosen, rather, to resign myself to Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral education and to concentrate primarily on two issues: 1) the idea that justice is the ultimate virtue and resides at the top of the virtue hierarchy, and 2) the idea that morality is autonomous from religion.

This first issue embodies many interesting facets and questions and requires that one examine numerous writings ranging from Plato to Kant to Dewey to Piaget. The search for the ultimate virtue is not uncommon to philosophers, especially those who are immersed in the field of moral education. In his philosophic investigations, Kohlberg claims to have discovered a universal virtue which is not subject to cultural interpretations and religious attitudes. This virtue takes the name of justice and

resides at the summit of the Kohlbergian moral hierarchy. My aim and focus in discussing this element of the Kohlbergian model of education is not to contend with the idea that justice is the ultimate virtue, but to challenge the notion that justice is born directly from our capacity to reason, so long as one is exposed to the proper educational stimulus. Kohlberg places substantial emphasis on reason and the intellect and its ability to guide the moral agent involved. This becomes apparent when one realizes the philosophical origin of his opinions. Kohlberg is especially partial to the works of Immanuel Kant who claims that once pure reason is discovered, "it contains the standard for the critical examination of every use of it".[1] In this essay I would like to entertain the notion that one's reason, even when properly tutored, is not a sufficient enough entity to identify justice as the ultimate virtue. At the same time, I would like to challenge Kohlberg in his belief that justice stems from reason. I would submit that justice, like all other virtues, stems from religion, and that whether Kohlberg likes it or not, the fact that he elevates justice to such a lofty station, confirms the objectives of many divine scriptures.

The second issue is directly related to the first because it addresses the dilemma surrounding morality and religion. Kohlberg refuses to acknowledge a connection between morality and religion. By doing so, he subscribes to the pedagogical dictates of post-

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[1]Immanuel Kant, The Analytic of Pure Reason. p.102, cited in Udo Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald Publisher, 1983.

Enlightenment humanism. ⸢Once again, he inundates us with his overwhelming appeal to reason as the moral entity which, when finely tuned, can act as the ultimate moral guide. Kohlberg denounces the belief that morality stems from religion, and asserts that there is only one morality which is generated by reason and holds justice at the top. In the discussion surrounding this section, I shall attempt to challenge Kohlberg's claims concerning morality and demonstrate that morality is indeed a divinely created institution.

The principal aim and focus of this paper, therefore, is to attempt to restate the abstruse ideas of Kohlberg and to unbiasly display his convictions concerning justice and morality and then to submit my own thoughts and concerns about these matters.

I have chosen to study the Kohlbergian model for two reasons. One, it is a model which is based on few decades of research and study founded not only on psychological standards and norms but on philosophical premises stemming from Plato, Kant Piaget and Dewey. This is attractive for it demonstrates Kohlberg's desire to create a model of education which utilizes not only scientific empirical research but philosophical reasoning. A process which I feel is critical for any model of education to endure. Two, it is a model born directly out of a humanistic understanding of nature and morality which on a personal level is an intriguing and challenging issue.

The following is a brief description of the four chapters which comprise this paper. In chapter one entitled **Kohlberg's**

Theory I will first discuss the origin of Kohlberg's theory. In this ·section, I will identify for the reader some of the key elements of Kohlberg's model of moral education focusing on how some of the great thinkers of the past such as Plato, Kant, Dewey and Piaget have all contributed in some way to the development of his theory. I feel that it is important to identify those philosophers who have contributed so much to Kohlberg's thought process. By doing this, I will provide a sufficient foundation from which to extrapolate in chapters three and four.

As well in chapter one, I will briefly outline Kohlberg's six stages of moral development. This section will give a brief description of each stage and address the following issues: How does one exercise moral reasoning? How does one advance through the stages? Is one stage morally better than the next stage? Are stages universal in their application? The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with the major tenets of Kohlbergs' theory and to put them into a context which is pertinent to our discussion. In addition, I shall delineate the purpose and objectives of the Kohlbergian model of education. Kohlberg is fundamentally preoccupied with justice and its role in society. How does Kohlberg envision his model of education functioning in society and what is the end product if it is to be successful?

Chapter one will end with a brief summary of the aforementioned concepts and ideas and will include a statement which will set the stage for chapter two.

In the second chapter entitled **Kohlberg and Justice**, I will

represent Kohlberg's ideas concerning justice. This chapter will
be broken down into two sections. The first section adresses the
notion that justice is the ultimate virtue with relation to moral
reasoning and moral development and attempts to expound on this
idea giving full attention to Kohlberg's line of reasoning. The
second section confronts the issue of justice and Stage 6 while
also giving due attention to justice, morality and religion. Here
I shall explore the idea of justice as the ultimate virtue, and the
problems with Stage 6. In this section, we will examine the
effects of justice as the central and dominant virtue vis-à-vis the
individual and demonstrate that justice alone is not sufficient
enough to meet the demands of the Stage 6 thinker. It is my aim in
this section to demonstrate that at Stage 6, one feels the need to
examine metaphysical questions which justice, guided by reason,
can't contend with.

The purpose of chapter two is twofold. First, I wish to give
due attention to one of the tenets posited by Kohlberg, namely that
justice is the ultimate virtue and is born out of a properly
stimulated faculty of reason, and to juxtapose it with the
possibility that reason is not the sole generator of justice.
Second, I wish to prepare the way for chapter three where I will
entertain the major objective of this paper, namely that morality
and religion are bonded together, and by separating morality from
religion, Kohlberg falls victim to the tentacles of humanism and
all of its ramifications. In the summary of this chapter, I shall
launch into the idea that virtue (justice) and religion are

connected. Not only are they connected, but one is the predecessor of the other.

The third chapter is entitled **Morality and Religion**. Again, it is broken down into three sections. The first section offers a general background surrounding the controversial issues of morality and religion. It describes the fall of religion and the rise of reason in its stead, making reference to some of the greatest philosophers in Europe at the time. This secular revolution gave rise to the humanistic movement and provided the means for one to acquire knowledge without looking to the church or to God. This section addresses some of the pros and cons of this social metamorphosis and alludes to the works of some of the philosophers who directly influenced Kohlberg.

The second section outlines Kohlberg's perspective and attitude concerning this issue and focuses primarily on the naturalistic fallacy and the natural law theory. The naturalistic fallacy is an attempt for Kohlberg to discredit any conjecture that morality is divinely based. The natural law theory is a theory about morality which is accepted by Kohlberg. The bedrock of this theory is that there is a "cosmic" or "natural" justice, and it is discovered by one's capacity to reason.

The third and final section of chapter three will attempt to dismiss the ideas of Kohlberg concerning morality and religion and his over-zealous attachment to reason, as faulty. In this section I will endeavour to elucidate some fundamental quandaries surrounding Kohlberg's morality, and will attempt to postulate an

alternate view.   In my efforts to achieve this end, I shall utilize passages from both religious thinkers and well known philosophers, in an attempt to show the inextricable relationship between morality and religion.

In the final section, which I have entitled **Concluding Remarks**, I will endeavour to adjoin the three principle chapters and to make manifest the connections of my claims with those of Kohlberg's.

CHAPTER I

KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL EDUCATION

A) *Origin and Focus*

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral education has been derived from many different sources, which are both philosophical and psychological. Kohlberg embraces both the scientific and the ethical domains of study in order to ensure that his model of education can withstand the onslaughts of empirical and ethical scrutiny. He has adhered to the tenet that the only credible approach in erecting a system of education which is universally valid can be brought about by combining developmental social psychology and moral philosophy. Other disciplines of research may assist in the formation of an adequate system of education, but developmental social psychology coupled with moral philosophy are essential and critical to its success. According to Kohlberg, one without the other will not work. By combining these two disciplines of thought, Kohlberg claims to have achieved the following:

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I have...claimed to have defined an approach to moral education which unites philosophic and psychological considerations and meets, as any "approach" must, the requirements (a) of being based on the psychological and sociological facts of moral development, (b) of involving educational methods of stimulating moral claims, which have demonstrated long range efficacy, (c) of being based on a philosophically defensible concept of morality, and (d) of being in accord with a constitutional system guaranteeing freedom of belief.[2]

It is not within the jurisdiction of this paper to critically analyze each of the preceding claims, although I will be focusing quite intensely on the third claim, the claim that Kohlberg's approach is based on a philosophically defensible concept of morality. The point in citing the above quotation is to praise Kohlberg in his efforts to join developmental social psychology and philosophy, and for having commenced his journey on a solid foundation.

The fact that Kohlberg uses numerous outside sources, and many of those being philosophers, becomes evident upon reading the preface and introduction to his book The Philosophy of Moral Development. Plato's Republic, Emile Durkheim's Moral Education, Jean Piaget's Moral Judgment of the Child, and John Dewey's Democracy and Education were all books that Kohlberg studied at Harvard University. These along with other philosophers such as Socrates, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls have all greatly contributed

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[2] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education", in Brenda Munsey. Moral Development, Moral Education and Kohlberg. (Religious Education Press. Alabama, 1980) p.17

to the development of his theory. I would like to exemplify specifically from a purely philosophical vantage point the importance of the role that Socrates, Kant and Piaget played in moulding and shaping Kohlberg's line of reasoning.

For a system of education to be universally applicable, that is, a system of education that can serve cross-culturally and cross-religiously, its philosophical premises must be secure, and the concept of virtue must be defined. Kohlberg was cognizant of the importance of virtue and its implications on education at the genesis of his work. Education, apart from being a framework by which one is taught the arts and sciences, is a framework by which one is taught virtue, or where virtue is learned.

Kohlberg's theory focuses on conscious moral decision making and precludes cultural and ethical relativity. Having arrived at his conclusions, however, he has had to confront the same grand philosophical questions as the philosophers aforementioned. What is the nature of virtue? Is virtue innate; is it acquired from the environment or must it be brought into this world through questioning and dialogue? Kohlberg asks his readers to start with Meno's psychological question to Socrates (in Plato's Meno):

Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice but natural aptitude or instinct?[3]

Kohlberg responds to this by stating that the psychiatrist

cannot answer this question by appealing to traditional theories

of instinct, conditioning or cognitive development, but rather he must be cognizant of the philosophic question which lies at the

base of this issue and reply as Socrates did:

You must think I am singularly fortunate to know whether virtue can be taught or how it is acquired. The fact is that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue itself is.[4]

Kohlberg goes on to assert the following concerning the

paramount importance of how psychology must address philosophical issues when evolving theories of moral development:

Once the psychologist recognizes that the psychology of moral development and learning cannot be discussed without addressing the philosophical questions, What is virtue? What is justice? The only path to be taken is that by Plato and Dewey, which ends with the writing of a treatise describing moral development in a school and society that to the philosopher seems just.[5]

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[3] Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns. "The Meno" in The Collected Dialogues of Plato. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. Cited by Kohlberg in The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. p.xiii.

[4] ibid. p.xiii

[5] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. p.XIV

We shall further investigate this question on virtue when we deal with morality and justice in chapters two and three. It is important to point out at this time, however, that Kohlberg embraces these philosophical dilemmas evinced by the Greek philosophers. He doesn't cast them aside as meaningless metaphysical babble which can't be proved, but rather focuses on the nature of virtue, its origin and its function in education. Kohlberg makes the following claims about the nature of virtue which are taken primarily from Socrates and Plato:

¶ First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

¶ Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.

¶ Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.

¶ Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good that is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

¶ Fifth, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.

¶ Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all along dimly or at a low level and its teaching is more a calling out than an instruction.

¶ Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because the same good is known differently at different levels

and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.

¶ Eighth, then the teaching of virtues is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers.

Moral education is the leading of people upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before.[6]

One can see, therefore, that concepts such as "virtue", "justice" and "the good" pervade Kohlberg's line of reasoning and are the metaphorical pillars upon which his theory is built.

Another element of Platonic thought which Kohlberg utilises in order to discredit any claim that morality is divinely based (which we shall analyze somewhat critically in the following chapter) is that which Kohlberg calls the "naturalistic fallacy". Many theological educationalists are at odds with Kohlberg because they feel that morality should be taught, that there is a definite right way to do things and a definite wrong way. The right action is the action that God would have us do. The wrong action is an action which is at variance with the divine law. The issue of moral action is first recorded in Plato's <u>Euthyphro</u> where Socrates launches the question: is an action good because God deems it so, or is a good action good independent of God's judgment? Does God urge us to act in a certain way because that is the right way to act anyway? What the naturalistic fallacy states is that one

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[6] Lawrence Kohlberg. <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u>. New York:Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.30

cannot derive "ought" statements from "is" statements or statements of fact. With regards to the divine command theory, the fallacy is committed when one derives the statement "x ought to be done" or "x is just" from the statement "x is a command of God", or "x is in the Bible". The "naturalistic fallacy" is the fallacy committed by those who adhere to a moral because it takes its merit in divine authority. Kohlberg adheres to a view whereby morality is independent of divine command and can be derived directly from the human capacity of reason.

This sets the stage for Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth century moral philosopher who greatly inspired and influenced Kohlberg. Kant's morality, instead of being directed outwards to intangible deities, was directed inwards to the self. Our moral duty is what we must all attend to; it is our first duty. The human isn't seen as someone who requires moral dictatorship, but rather, he is seen as one who can manage and govern his own moral affairs. Man's reason is a sufficient enough entity to morally guide the individual. Kant accredits the individual with the ability to make his own moral decisions without having to appeal to any external aid or religious philanthropist. According to his philosophy, the rational will exists to make manifest moral imperatives. Individual duty and morality fall under the mandate of this rational will, and it need not be nurtured by religious practices and dogmas.

Kant further postulates that the good will, which alone is unconditionally good, leads invariably to acts performed out of

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moral duty, and motivated entirely by a motivation of that duty. Human dignity, justice, the categorical imperative; these are what lie at the base of all moral activity and their expression can be realized through the fine tuning of the rational faculty of reason. Kohlberg adopted these premises evinced by Kant and sought to develop a curriculum of education which would stimulate and activate one's reasoning abilities.

Kohlberg's principal interest in fostering these reasoning abilities was, on a larger scale, fuelled by his desire to analyze and stimulate moral growth or moral development. His theory of moral development as it is presently seen was greatly affected by the psychologist and moral philosopher Piaget. Piaget sought to define a common morality as no more than "a sum of relations between individuals, the sum of their different but related moral perspectives."[7] He focused on enhancing and improving the democratic ideal which he regarded as the "rational ideal". Although Piaget is known for only having spoken of two stages, his ideas and research was sufficient enough to capture the devout attention of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg built upon the foundation of Piaget and in a sense continued his work. Whereas Piaget spoke of moral stages in a loose sense, Kohlberg proposed that his stages are to be understood in the strong sense of Piagetan stages of logical and cognitive development. As Paul Crittenden states in his chapter on Kohlberg: "Kohlberg follows Piaget in focusing on

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[7] Paul Crittenden, Learning to be Moral. London: Humanities Press Int. Inc., 1990. p.72

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moral reasoning as the central issue in moral development; he also takes his cue from Piaget in concentrating on moral judgment in the domain of justice."[8]

As can be seen, therefore, Plato, Kant and Piaget were all dominant figures in developing many of the psychological and philosophical foundations for Kohlberg's theory. Let us now turn our attention to the empirical characteristics of Kohlberg's theory, characteristics which take shape in Kohlbergian stages.

B) *Six Stages of Moral Development*

It becomes evident after examining the works of Kohlberg that developmental social psychology and philosophy - together and in accordance with each other - are the essential and critical tools necessary to ensure the success of a theory of moral education which is justifiable empirically, and irrefutable philosophically. By combining the two disciplines, Kohlberg submits that he "can define a culturally and historically universal pattern of mature moral thought and action that meets philosophic criteria of rationality or optimality..."[9] As mentioned previously, Kohlberg has adopted the philosophic and psychological ideas of Plato, Kant, and Piaget and has sought to provide evidence for a pattern of

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[8] Paul Crittenden. <u>Learning to be Moral.</u> London: Humanities Press Int. Inc., 1990. p.74

[9] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education" in Brenda Munsey (ed.), <u>Moral Development, Moral Education and Kohlberg</u>. Alabama: Religious Education Press. 1980) p.17.

moral thought and action which is universal in its implication. Kohlberg's approach to moral education is greatly influenced by his scientific and socio-psychological beliefs. Whereas some educational theorists direct their programme at enhancing the student by teaching him morals, what is right and what is wrong, Kohlberg's approach seeks to provide and stimulate the appropriate circumstances, the appropriate moral dilemmas whereby the student is challenged to think morally. An atmosphere as such will steadily increase the student's ability to reason and think morally.

During his thirty-five years of research which began in 1953 and ended somewhat tragically in 1987, Kohlberg completed much field work in the area of moral education (something which had not been done previously). His field work took him to southeast Asia and other parts of the globe where he presented children from different cultures with moral dilemmas and gauged their responses. His findings have led him to believe that there is a universal sequence of development which people from every culture and ethnic background share. Moral development is universal and the way that people develop morally is universal.

This was consequently challenged by cultural relativists, who adhere to the view that because cultures are different and do not share a common ethical code, then the way a Taiwanese boy develops morally will be different from the moral development of an American boy, for example. Although it is not within the jurisdiction of this paper to focus on the multi-faceted question of cultural

relativity, it is a salient and crucial element in the theory of Kohlberg, one which separates him from the crowd.

Kohlberg's fieldwork has yielded much scientific and empirical data which he has accumulated throughout the years, and with these statistics, he has created a systematic chart reflecting the moral development of the individual. Taking from the work of Piaget and Dewey, Kohlberg has determined that there are six stages of moral development which every individual has access to, so long as the proper learning environment is created. The expediency with which an individual advances through these stages varies from individual to individual. The following quotation is taken from DeVitis and Rich's book, <u>Theories of Moral Development</u>. In effect, it is a quotation from Kohlberg which describes in a lucid and concise manner what the stages of moral development are and the various dynamic which accompanies them:

Stages are organized systems of thought, as about 67 percent of most subjects' thinking is at a single stage irrespective of which moral dilemma is used to test it. The typology is referred to as "stages" because they represent invariant developmental sequences: all movement is forward and does not omit steps, the stages arise one at a time and in the same order, even though children move through stages at varying speeds. The stages are hierarchical insofar as thinking at a higher stage comprehends within thinking at lower stages. Individuals prefer the highest stage available to them because higher stages can more adequately organize the multiplicity of data, interests, and possibilities open to each person. Thus the higher stages are not only more socially adaptive but are philosophically superior because they move the individual closer to basing moral decisions upon a concept of justice (Stage 6).[10]

As stated earlier, Kohlberg's technique of assessing stages of moral reasoning is based on a question and answer period, or a structured interview. These interviews contain stories which pose moral dilemmas. In each of the stories, the person is asked to imagine a situation where fictional characters have competing claims upon each other, and then is asked a series of questions which attempt to illicit the interviewee's justifications and explanations for his or her decisions.

One of the most recognized dilemmas is the Heinz story:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium, and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband,

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[10] Joseph L. DeVitis & John Martin Rich. <u>Theories of Moral Development.</u> Illinois: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1985. p.90

Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about $1,000 which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.[11]

Kohlberg discovered that the students' responses varied depending on their age and maturity. He also found that there was a sequential pattern of moral reasoning and was able to classify their answers and slot them into one of six stages. These stages are categorized by three levels of moral reasoning; a) preconventional , b) conventional and c) postconventional, and are clearly outlined by Uwe Gielen in his article "Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory" found in Lisa Kuhmerker's book, The Kohlberg Legacy. (see Appendix A, p.88).

At the preconventional level, the child is primarily concerned with the avoidance of physical punishment. In Stage I, his actions are characterized by his submission to superior power. He does not avoid cheating because he values honest behavior, but because he is frightened by the punitive measures which it might incur. It is justifiable to cheat so long as one is not caught. At Stage 2 however, the right action is any action which satiates one's own needs. Personal needs and gratification are at the forefront of one's thinking but from time to time the needs of others are considered. The motto "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine"

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[11] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.12

is a familiar guideline for action. The idea of sharing is present but only if there is some sort of personal gain. In Stage 2, the individual has developed a sense of fairness but for purely practical and pragmatic reasons. At the preconventional level, societal expectations remain external to the self.

At the conventional level, conventions, rules, obligations, and expectations are experienced as being part of the self. Stage 3 is characterized by an individual who is oriented towards pleasing others. He is concerned with finding acceptance within his peer group or family. One is concerned with being nice and living by certain rules of behavior which illicit positive reinforcement. The individual at Stage 3 has good intentions and has begun to become a conformer which consequently prepares the way for a more developed social sense. Moral role-taking focuses on specific relationships and emphasizes the general characteristics of a good person, but it neglects the viewpoint of institutional or societal systems. At Stage 4, however, the person recognizes the validity of social or ideological systems within which moral actions and expectations find their justification. "Doing one's duty" becomes his focus as he struggles to assist in maintaining the existing social order. He has developed a strong sense of loyalty to authority and he finds self-respect in fulfilling his obligation. His relationship and level of respect for others is also based on their ability to contribute to the established system.

At the postconventional level, a person has abstracted general

principles of freedom, equality and solidarity from more specific societal or interpersonal expectations, laws, and norms. At Stage 5, the individual carries with him some of his Stage 4 sensitivity about one's duty towards the system. He is concerned not only with maintaining the status quo, but with changing the law and order for the good of society. In his deliberations, he realizes that there are a variety of values, beliefs and opinions aside from what society has agreed upon. He works from a framework where "right" and "wrong" behavior becomes a matter of personal opinion, not something that can be forced upon him by conventional standards or family practices. His level of thinking is oriented towards the majority rule, but this is not some irrevocable decree which can't exercise some flexibility, as a Stage 4 thinker might feel. Uwe Gielen adds the following about Stage 5 moral reasoning:

> At Stage 5, moral reasoning reflects the prior-to-society perspective of the rational individual who is bound to society by an imagined social contract partially concretized by laws. The implicit and explicit social contract rests on principles of trust, individual liberty, and equal treatment for all, which should be at the basis of societal and interpersonal arrangements and relationships.[12]

It would seem that the individual by this stage has grasped the necessity of personal freedom while recognizing others as deserving equal rights and attention.

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[12] Uwe Gielen, "Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory" in The Kohlberg Legacy. Lisa Kuhmerker (ed.), Alabama: R.E.P Books, 1991 p.30.

At Stage 6, the person seems to transcend the dictates and exigencies of any societal ideologies. He is guided by his conscience and self-chosen ethical principles. He holds to these principles even if it means going against the rule of the majority. He has expanded the ethnocentricity of his view to embrace universal principles of justice. The equality of human rights and the respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals and as ends in themselves, are principles which amalgamate to form the bedrock of his ethical code. He is guided by ethical abstract principles instead of concrete moral rules, like The Ten Commandments. He places the value of human life to such a lofty station whereby it is seen as greater than the need for personal financial gain, or any personal gain for that matter. Stage 6 thinkers have become distinguished from property value and social standing. According to Lawrence Kohlberg, they show the greatest capacity for moral behavior.

What these stages are, are simply different ways of thinking about the same moral dilemma. If we take the Heinz story and ask two children what they think Heinz should do, they may respond in the following way: Child 1 "I think that Heinz should steal the drug, because his wife may be a very important person or own a lot of money." Child 2 "Heinz should not steal the drug because if he does, the police are going to lock him up." The two answers differ in their content but not in their structure. One child proposes that Heinz should steal the drug, the other is against stealing. This reflects a difference in content, but not a difference in

structure. The structure of the two answers is the same. Both answers are concerned with the physical aspects of the action, disregard the special moral value of the woman's life, and look at the dilemma from the point of view of a concrete, individual actor who is oblivious to shared expectations and feelings. The answers reflect a Stage 1 conception of morality. A person who is in Stage 4 can recognize the value of human life and can argue that Heinz is obliged to steal the drug in order to propagate and fulfil this end.

As mentioned earlier, Kohlberg was interested in proving that his theory of stages is applicable to all cultures and all societies and not particular to specific cultures. He did this by conducting a study in a Malaysian community and a Taiwanese community. He asked a question and directed it at a random group of ten to thirteen year old children from each culture, in order that he could make cross-references and comparisons. The question to be answered was: "A man's wife is starving to death but the store owner would not give the man any food unless he could pay, and he cannot. Should he break in and steal some food?" When the Taiwanese children were asked, the majority of them responded by saying that he should steal the food for his wife, because if she dies, he'll have to pay for her funeral, and that would cost him a lot of money. This sort of response falls into the parameters of Kohlberg's Stage 2. The Malaysian response was different, but it yielded the same result. When asked the question, they responded by saying that he should steal the food, because if he doesn't,

then his wife will die, and he will have no one to cook for him. This too is a classic Stage 2 response, and so Kohlberg was able to conclude that two groups of boys from two completely different backgrounds are likely to be at the same moral stage of thinking. Kohlberg has done numerous studies in Mexico, the United States, Turkey and Taiwan. His findings have led him to conclude that regardless of race, culture or religion, everyone will follow the same stage sequence, the only difference is the rate at which they pass through these stages.

Why should there be such an invariant sequence of development? This question posed by Kohlberg yields the following answer. At each stage, the same moral concept is defined, internalized and logically structured. When one advances to the next stage of moral development, however, the same moral concept is redefined and is more integrated, more general and more universal in its implications. For example, in Stage 1, as we have just seen, the value for human life is quite primitive, and may be equated with other values, such as the value of property, but as the child matures and advances through the stages, his understanding of the value of life changes with him. By Stage 5, for example, his conception of the value of human life far surpasses the value of property. According to Kohlberg, as one progresses through the hierarchy of stages, one's moral concepts become more structured, more organized and more comprehensive. One's vision extends from the ecosystem of self, to the existence of society, and the country etc. Studies have verified these claims by demonstrating that one

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is capable of understanding all stages up to their own, but no more than one stage beyond their own.

The following quotation taken from Kohlberg may assist in giving a clear and concise summary of the progress of moral thought through the six stages:

> Moral thought, then, seems to behave like all other kinds of thought. Progress through the moral levels and stages is characterized by increasing differentiation and increasing integration, and hence is the same kind of progress that scientific theory represents. Like acceptable scientific theory - or like any theory or structure of knowledge - moral thought may be considered partially to generate its own data as it goes along, or at least to expand so as to contain in a balanced, self-consistent way a wider and wider experiential field. The raw data in the case of our ethical philosophies may be considered as conflicts between roles, or values, or as the social order in which people live.[13]

This cognitive developmental approach, therefore, can be likened to the movement upwards in the education system. As one progresses from grade one to grade two, he does not forget all that he has learned in grade one. Rather, he incorporates what he knows and integrates it into his new way of thinking. His knowledge expands, and as it expands, so to does his experiential playing field.

In all societies studied by Kohlberg and his associates, he has found the same common denominators. Each society has the same institutional organizational pattern. They each have a government

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[13] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.26

of a sort, teaching institutions, laws, languages, families and a form of currency. Each society has the same basic social structures and is therefore similar to others. In addition, there are the same social roles which inevitably accompany these social structures which must be played out. The children are equipped with these role playing propensities, and they implicitly take the role of others toward themselves and toward others in the group.

The infrastructure of the societies may have existing and obvious parallels, but does that necessitate the existence of the same cognitive developmental structures, or the existence of the same moral values? Kohlberg claims that in the preconventional and conventional levels, or rather, Stages 1 through 4, moral content or value is "largely accidental or culture bound".[14] But he continues by asserting that in the higher stages, the moral content becomes much more uniform and homogeneous. He says: "...Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau, and Martin Luther King tend to speak without confusion of tongues, as it were." [15] What this quote suggests is that the ideal moral principles of any given society, or culture are fundamentally alike, and that most of these principles have gone by the name of justice. This assertion that Kohlberg makes will be dealt with in more detail when we entertain the notion of justice and its origin in chapter three. But what is important to note at this time is that there is a common moral focal point which

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[14] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.27

[15] ibid., p.27.

everyone shares, which becomes more attainable as we transcend upwards through the moral stages and this is justice.

Let us now proceed to the next section of this chapter where I will attempt to illustrate the aims and goals of Kohlberg's moral education theory.

C) *Vision for a Democratic and Just Society*

Although moral education has a somewhat forbidding sound to it, everyone in a teaching position is essentially a moral educator, whether they like it or not. Their job description implies that they constantly evaluate class behavior and student rapport. While doing this, they have a tendency to exercise their personal opinion, stating what is right and what is wrong. Their moral opinions may be pronounced having undergone no careful reflection as to the validity of their claims, or the ramifications thereof, yet they are flippantly stated, and in the eyes of a student, they are perceived as moral dogmas preached by a pedagogical leader. The students, therefore, for the most part, are being indoctrinated by the teachers, and are taught what is right and what is wrong, even if this is not the goal of the teacher responsible.

It has been found by Kohlberg that many educational institutions promote, whether that is their intent or not, some form of indoctrination, it can be very subtle and almost unrecognizable. At the same time, however, there is a growing

consciousness which seeks to offer a new environment in which the students can freely formulate their own moral opinions. Upon conducting many interviews with primary and secondary school teachers, Kohlberg noticed a growing commonality among the consciousness of the teachers. The following quotation is representative of this awareness:

> My class deals with morality and right and wrong quite a bit. I don't expect all of them to agree with me; each has to satisfy himself according to his own convictions, as long as he is sincere and thinks he is pursuing what is right. I often discuss cheating this way, but I always get defeated, because they still argue cheating is alright. After you accept the idea that kids have the right to build a position with logical arguments, you have to accept what they come out with, even though you drive at it ten times a year and they still come out with the same conclusion.[16]

The problem this teacher faces is not unique and is probably experienced by the majority of teachers at the junior high and high school levels. Put simply, she does not wish for her students to be indoctrinated by what she thinks is right, so she gives them ample space to develop their own conclusions about moral dilemmas, yet she is disgruntled when their conclusions are at variance with her own moral vantage point, i.e., their regard concerning cheating. This is a typical example of a teacher who is faced with the quandary of relativity. Kohlberg feels that he can demonstrate how this teacher and many others like her "can be freed from the

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[16] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981 p.7

charge of cultural relativity and arbitrary indoctrination that inhibit her when she talks about cheating."[17]

Kohlberg envisions a system of education whereby the student is granted the appropriate opportunities and situations to allow him to develop morally. What is important for Kohlberg, is not so much that the student becomes a good and kind person, but that he learns to make moral judgements and decisions based on his moral autonomy. Moral autonomy and learning to think independent of the group consensus, can only be activated if the necessary educational conditions are stimulated, and it is within the schools that Kohlberg wishes to implement his theory. Autonomy is not innate, it develops only through the educational stimulation which leads first to the level of accepting the group standards. Education, then, supplies the conditions of development which are defined by the 6 Stages. The aim of education for Kohlberg is recapitulated in one of his talks, where he borrows a quotation from Dewey, a moral philosopher who greatly enhanced Kohlberg's perspective on education:

> The aim of education is growth or development, both intellectual or moral. Only ethical and psychological principles can aid the school in the greatest of all constructions, the building of a free and powerful character. Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in psychological development can ensure this happens. Education is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable these psychological

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[17] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.7

functions to mature in the fullest manner.[18]

What is central to this claim is the importance of the
building of a free and powerful character. Kohlberg is known to
follow the philosophical tradition entitled liberalism or
rationalism. It is crucial, therefore, that one's freedom is not
jeopardized, and one's natural progress hindered. We shall deal
more thoroughly with the concepts of liberalism and its inherent
ramifications in chapter three.

Kohlberg envisions the classroom as being an ideal democratic
mini system. If there exists an issue which must be resolved, an
issue regarding fairness or cheating etc., the children should
discuss it among themselves, and not by subject to the dictatorial
authoritative power of the teacher. In this way, the child views
the ramifications of the decisions made, and can evaluate the
effectiveness subjectively. If such a democratic classroom was
established, then Kohlberg feels that a) the problem of moral
indoctrination would atrophy and b) the proper environment would
have been established to stimulate moral growth within the student.

Kohlberg's aim at a democratic and just society is reflected
in his theory and his ideologies. He believes in the American
dream of "life, freedom and happiness" and feels that if his theory
were appropriately supplanted into the schools then society would

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[18] John Dewey. Quoted by Kohlberg at the 30th Annual Conference
of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, New
Orleans, 1975 during his talk entitled "Education for a Society in
Moral Transition".

obtain the means to achieve this dream. Justice is at the core of
moral education for Kohlberg, and not until it is recognized as the
final aim of education, will there be true democratic freedom.

D) *Summary*

Lawrence Kohlberg with the influence of many psychologists and
philosophers including Plato, Kant, Dewey, Piaget and Rawls, has
constructed a system of moral education which aims at using
education as a means to develop the necessary cognitive stages in
order to develop morally.   The forms of research in
cognitive-developmentalism (a term which applies directly to
Kohlberg) have been on the organization of thinking (cognition),
and how that thinking grows and changes (development). Piaget and
Kohlberg have emphasized the doctrine of cognitive stages which
includes the claims that differences in stage are not only
quantitative (knowing more), but qualitative (a different way of
knowing). These stages form an invariant sequence, that is one
cannot skip a stage, people can only move through them at different
intervals. These stages form "structured wholes", they are like a
lens through which one's experience is filtered. A structure is a
way of organizing experiences and needs to be differentiated from
the content of thought.

As Kohlberg's stages demonstrate, anyone from the age of three
in a preconventional stage, to the age of sixty in a
postconventional stage can use the word "fairness", but the

organization of the meaning of the concept changes radically as one increases in stage development. These stages form hierarchic integrations, that is, later stages allow greater differentiation and integration of thought than earlier stages, and the later stages have at their disposal all the understandings and abilities gained at earlier stages. Being exposed to the proper stimuli, therefore, the child will develop morally at a faster and more autonomous rate than if he were not. The stimuli is critical and must be present to increase individual moral development. Kohlberg asserts: "The way to stimulate stage growth is to pose real or hypothetical dilemmas to students in such a way as to arouse disagreement and uncertainty as to what is right."[19]

If the school is going to be the intellectual playing field in order to stimulate moral judgement, then teachers are expected to present dilemmas in such a way so that they will inspire moral reasoning, and an attentive ear to the use of other children's moral reasoning. Using this educational approach, Kohlberg was able to stimulate one third of experimental classes to advance one stage higher than their classmates; a year later, they were still one stage higher.

According to Kohlberg, this developmental approach which focuses on being a catalyst for moral reasoning, can be easily practised by any teacher. Unlike so many other approaches, it ignores relativistic assumptions, and focuses on assumptions which

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[19] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.28

are based on universal goals and principles. The approach is independent of indoctrination, for it does not force the student to share the same moral philosophy as the teacher. Instead, it provides the appropriate atmosphere, where the child is free to interpret moral dilemmas using his own moral reasoning and judgement. The thrust behind this system is to let the child develop naturally into a moral being, not unnaturally.

It is important to remember the emphasis which is placed on Kohlberg's universal principle of justice. Talk of justice is predominant in Kohlberg's theory and deserves much attention and analysis. In the next section, I will look at the idea of justice as being at the core of moral education. I will also begin to look at religion as an important agent in moral education, and the possibility that justice without religion is not sufficient enough for peoples at Stage 6 to make universal and adequate moral judgements.

CHAPTER II

KOHLBERG AND JUSTICE

A) *Kohlberg and Justice as the Highest Virtue*

> The world will never be justly ruled until rulers are
> philosophers, that is, until they themselves are ruled by
> the idea of the good, which is divine perfection and
> brings about justice, which is human perfection.[20]

The idea that justice is human perfection as expressed in the
above quotation (taken from Plato's Republic) is echoed in slightly
different words by Kohlberg, but the meaning remains. Moral
development for Kohlberg is "a progressive movement toward basing
moral judgements on concepts of justice." The focal centre of all
our moral activity is justice. Justice has many guises and may be
interpreted differently at different stages. A preconventional
Stage 1 child will express justice differently than a Stage 6 moral
philosopher, for example. But as one progresses through the
stages, and gradually attains Stage 5 and 6, all the demands of
moral law become based on concepts of justice and involve two
principle elements; reciprocity and equality. One is said to
exercise reciprocity and equality concerning the law and its
function in maintaining the rights of the individual. Kohlberg
asserts that it is logical to expect that similar conceptions of

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[20] Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns (ed.) The Collected
Dialogues of Plato. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1961.
p.576

justice evolve in every society whether or not they become the political basis of morality as they have in North America.

Kohlberg believes that there is a universal value tendency towards justice or reciprocity. It is to this end that he wishes educational institutions to direct their interests. As an example of this assertion, Kohlberg uses his own son and elucidates quite accurately the universal pervasiveness of justice:

> ...at the age of four my son joined the pacifist and vegetarian movementand refused to eat meat because, he said, it is bad to kill animals. In spite of his parents' attempts to dissuade him by arguing about the difference between justified and unjustified killing, he remained a vegetarian for six months. However, he did recognize that some forms of killing were "legitimate." One night I read to him from a book about Eskimo life that included a description of a seal-killing expedition. While listening to the story, he became very angry and said, "You know, there is one kind of meat I would eat, Eskimo meat. It's bad to kill animals so it's all right to eat Eskimos". This episode illustrates (1) that children often generate their own moral values and maintain them in the face of cultural training, and (2) that these values have universal roots. Every child believes it is bad to kill because regard for the lives of others or pain at death is a natural empathic response, although it is not necessarily universally and consistently maintained. In this example, the value of life led both to vegetarianism and to the desire to kill Eskimos. This latter desire comes also from a universal value tendency: a belief in justice or reciprocity here expressed in terms of revenge or punishment (at higher levels, the belief that those who infringe on the rights of others cannot expect their own rights to be respected.[21]

In the above example, Kohlberg illustrates not only that justice is commonplace at all stages but that it manifests itself

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[21] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.15

in different forms. Kohlberg uses his son as an example because as a young child, he will think quite differently from the way an adult thinks, but his thinking is based on the same moral values, the values of life and justice. Kohlberg asserts that there is an obvious difference in the way a young child thinks as opposed to an adult, but this is principally a difference in stage development.

A difference in stage for Kohlberg means a different way of examining and experiencing justice. For example, when asked what justice was, a person in Stage 4 responded by saying that "law and order" was justice. By contrast, people at Stage 5 and 6 regard law and order as the perpetuation of justice. This example demonstrates the evolution of the developmental stages. The higher the stage, the more integrated and understood is the concept of justice and the ability for that person to reason morally.

Let us now examine and elaborate with more precision the primary tenets adhered to by Kohlberg concerning justice and stage development. On what grounds does Kohlberg make his claims that a higher stage is necessarily a better stage and that by its very nature, it will lead to a more morally just conclusion about specific dilemmas?

As we discovered in chapter one, Kohlberg is interested in evolving a theory of moral development based on developmental social psychology and moral philosophy. It is necessary to include both a psychological theory and a philosophical theory for two reasons. First, any theory based on philosophical reasoning and empirical data is a much more plausible and sound theory than if it

were founded on only one of these components. Second, Kohlberg propounds that stage development is not only a theory about the development of morality, but of the development of logic, and this falls under the jurisdiction of psychology. There is a twofold process which takes place in the moral development of the individual, one is the development of moral structures and the other is the development of logical structures. Although these structures complement each other, it is assumed that new moral structures presuppose new logical structures, that is, that a new logical stage is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a new moral stage. Whereas it is not within the parameters of this paper to analyse to any degree of profundity the social psychological claims which support the hypotheses regarding the development of logical structures, it is important to note that these claims stem from a scientific basis and inherent in this truth is the fact that they have been derived from empirical data.

Much of Kohlberg's psychological theory stems from the work of Piaget who has advanced many of the claims concerning logical structures and moral development. He also advanced the notion that any given stage, when formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor. To be in better equilibrium means to be able to resolve more conflicting claims within the context of a dilemma. An individual functioning in Stage 2 is in more disequilibrium than one functioning in Stage 3 because he confronts more unresolved conflicting claims. Kohlberg asserts the following regarding moral equilibrium:

> A moral situation in disequilibrium is one in which there are unresolved conflicting claims. A resolution of the situation is one in which each is "given his due" according to some principle of justice that can be recognized as fair by all the conflicting parties involved. [22]

Kohlberg asserts that from both a psychological point of view and a moral point of view, the subject will develop and strive to achieve higher stages so that he will be in a state of greater equilibrium.

Piaget has been the major contributor to the psychological theory of Kohlberg concerning stage development and logical structures. The philosophers which have had the greatest impact are those which fall under the tradition of "formalist" moral philosophy, primarily, Kant, Hare, Frankena, Brandt, Raphael and Rawls. They are termed "formalist" philosophers because they have all elaborated on formal criteria distinguishing moral judgements from nonmoral judgements. Perhaps the most influential of these philosophers with regard to Kohlberg's theory was Rawls.

Rawls developed what is called a normative ethical theory of justice from which Kohlberg formulates most of his ideas. One of the primary intentions of this theory is to find ways to "justify and prescribe principles of justice which he claims should underlie competent or considered moral judgements". [23]

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[22] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.194

[23] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.192

Kohlberg maintains that Rawls has succeeded in doing this and as a result has demonstrated why a higher stage is a better stage, "because its judgements more closely approximate Stage 6 judgements generated from the principles or model that Rawl's theory undertakes to justify." [24]

For Rawls, and for Kohlberg, exercising principles of justice is a way of arriving at an equilibrium among competing claims. What is important is that the individual comply with conditions of impartiality, universalizability, reversibility and the idea of the original position. Impartiality dictates that one doesn't know who is being judged, and therefore there is no possibility of a bias one way or the other. Universalizability ensures that the decision made is a decision which would be chosen by all the parties involved. This is in direct accordance with Kant's categorical imperative: "So act that the outcome of your conduct could be the universal will" or "Act as you would want all human beings to act in a similar situation." Reversibility is a method by which the moral player assumes the roles of all parties involved in the conflict. He gives equal weight to all of the positions objectively as though he does not know which of the players he is or will be. For instance in the example of the Heinz dilemma, someone who exercises the condition of reversibility will conclude that to steal the drug and save the life of the wife is the best option. He will perform what Kohlberg terms "moral musical chairs"

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[24] Lawrence Kohlberg. <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u>. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.192

whereby one objectively weighs the pros and cons of each position as though it were his original position. What is the point of view of the wife? The druggist? The husband? What is the best solution for all parties involved? If the husband steals the drug, how will the druggist feel? Does the value of life take precedence over the value of property? These are the sorts of questions that any moral agent implementing the requirements of reversibility will have to ask. The idea of reversibility is isomorphic with the Golden Rule: "It's right if it's still right when you put yourself in the other's place." The idea is to detach oneself from an egocentric position of what is right, a position that will do "justice" on an individual level, and to undertake the exercise of universal role playing. The purpose of this exercise is to derive a fair principle of justice. Kohlberg affirms the following concerning Rawls' theory, reversibility and justice:

> In Rawls's theory, a possible principle of justice is the fair principal of justice if it is the one that would be chosen under the original position, if one would choose it if one would not know who one would be in the society or situation after the principle was used. In this sense, the choice is reversible; we choose it in such a way that we can live with the choice afterward, whoever we are, as was the case for the procedure cutting the cake. [25]

The cake analogy referred to at the end of the quote is a good one to make clear the point of reversibility. If one person cuts

[25] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.197

a cake and the other distributes it, then the one cutting would ensure that the pieces are as equal as possible. The end result is that both parties involved can live with the results, they are exercising a fair principle of justice.

Kohlberg holds that the core structures of moral reasoning consist of the set of operations or ideas that define justice. He goes on to note that the two principle operations are those of equality and reciprocity. Reciprocity is not to be confused with reversibility. Reversibility is doing as you would have others do to you, whereas reciprocity is about desert, merit and reward. Reciprocity can be defined with varying degrees of reversibility. In Stages 1 and 2, the attitude which governs reciprocity is "do unto others as they do to you." In Stage 3, however, reciprocity becomes more aligned with reversibility in which case one starts to engage in ideal role playing. When the moral agent functions at a Stage 3 level of reasoning, his reversibility becomes reciprocity of perspectives, not actions.

The salient point at hand is that with increased reversibility, there is necessarily an increase in stage development, a greater degree of equilibrium, a more adequate way of defining human values and more just solutions to dilemmas yielding conflicting claims. This point has been derived not from conjecture but from empirical testing done by Kohlberg and associates. His field studies have led him to many pertinent conclusions about moral judgements, moral development, justice and the drive (both psychological and moral) to attain a higher stage

of thinking. He makes the following claims:

1. Moral judgements that are not reversible by the test of
    the original position or moral musical chairs are not in
    equilibrium.
2. Moral judgements that are not based on the principle of
    equality or equity (the difference principle) are not
    reversible and so are not in equilibrium.
3. When people become aware of the lack of reversibility of
    their judgements, they will change these judgements or
    principles to reach a more reversible solution.
4. This search for equilibrium is a basis for change to the
    next stage.
5. Our final stage, Stage 6, is in complete equilibrium; its
    judgements are fully reversible. This is not true of
    Stage 5 and even less of lower stages.
6. Because Stage 6 judgements are reversible, all Stage 6
    subjects agree, given common understanding of the facts
    of the case. [26]

The above claims have been tested and proved by Erdynast
(1973) who sought to verify their validity. He tested individuals
who ranged from Stage 4 to Stage 6 in their capacity for moral
reasoning. He gave all of the subjects the same moral dilemmas and
the results were phenomenal. There was complete unanimity of
thought among the Stage 6 participants. They agreed in the content
of the principles chosen, in their form of moral reasoning and by
the fact that they were all in complete equilibrium with regards to
the criterion of reversibility. By contrast, there was much
disunity of vision between the subjects of Stages 4 and 5. The way
that they arrived at their decisions were different, and so were
their answers to the moral dilemmas given. This exercise among

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[26] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.211

many others substantiates and confirms the above claims made by Kohlberg.

Kohlberg advances the notion that Stage 6 is the highest stage of moral reasoning, and is therefore the morally best stage to be in. He claims that all those who are using Stage 6 methods and principles will eventually agree on the "right" solution in concrete situations. In this stage, there is unanimity of thought concerning values, as well as a detached concern for equality and justice. The concept of reversibility or ideal role taking functions at such a level that the individual and the other parties involved are in complete equilibrium. For philosophical and psychological reasons, all individuals will naturally advance towards a Stage 6 level of integrating principles of justice. This is not to say that they will be successful in achieving this end, only that they are in the process of upward movement from one stage to the next.

According to Kohlberg, stage development is universal and cross-cultural. What this means is that everyone in every culture is converging at the same moral zenith. Everyone is climbing the moral ladder from Stage 1 to Stage 6 (if they make it that far) which implies that they are heading toward the same universal principle of justice and concomitantly learning how to integrate it into their capacity for moral reasoning. Kohlberg advocates that with the proper educational setting, and with the proper stimulation and encouragement of moral development on a world-wide scale, most people could or would eventually transcend to level six

and function within the same moral framework. In the lower stages, however, moral principles are still subject to cultural definitions, and the concepts of fairness and justice are very diverse.

Let us now turn to the next section in this chapter where we will analyse the natural outcome of justice when taken to its ideal end in Stage 6.

B) *Justice and Stage Six*

In this section, I shall attempt to recapitulate the ideas of Kohlberg concerning justice and Stage 6, while concomitantly introducing his notion of morality and how it pertains to justice at the highest stage.

After reevaluating his initial postulation, that there exists a Stage 6 level of moral reasoning which would see justice as its pivotal force and which would be the only domain where moral agreement would be universal, Kohlberg concluded that "Stage 6 has disappeared as a commonly identifiable form of moral reasoning".[27] This conclusion was based on the fact that none of his longitudinal subjects in the United States, Israel or Turkey had ever reached it. Kohlberg admits that the data which he has accumulated is not sufficient enough to verify his hypothesis that a Stage 6 exists. These findings, however, do not suggest the impossibility of a

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[27] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. p.270

stage 6, they simply impede its realization.

Kohlberg affirms that what he was originally calling his sixth stage in his book, The Philosophy of Moral Development, is merely a substage B which has many characteristics of a Stage 5 level of moral reasoning. People functioning at the substage B reflect two properties: "(a) an intuition of the moral content hierarchy explicitly argued for and chosen by our Stage 5 reasoners and (b) the fully universalized and morally prescriptive form of judgements of rightness and obligation ascribed to our theoretical notion of Stage 6."[28]

Despite all the data which points to the fact that Stage 6 doesn't exist, Kohlberg and his colleagues still feel it necessary to postulate a Stage 6 level of moral reasoning where true justice is fully realized. For Kohlberg, Stage 6 marks the culminating point of his entire theory of moral education. Having originally maintained that with the proper stimulation of one's reasoning ability, and with the necessary conditions promoting a natural developmental learning environment, the child will progress through the stages and will eventually arrive at a level (Stage 6) where his definition of justice is complete, it is therefore difficult to deny that this stage exists. Kohlberg and his colleagues choose to believe in the sixth stage and gear their efforts towards cementing its consummation:

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[28] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984 p.271

> We continue with the postulation because we conceive our theory as an attempt to rationally reconstruct the ontogenesis of justice reasoning, an enterprise which requires a terminal stage to define the nature and endpoint of the kind of development we are studying.[29]

Kohlberg tenuously adheres to the idea of a Stage 6 because it is at this level where his morality can be fully realized. Morality for Kohlberg is grounded in moral judgement, not in content. The guiding virtue of this morality is justice. In his conception of morality, moral principles at the highest stages are designed to reach agreement in situations of potential moral conflict or disagreement among individuals. Therefore, it would suggest that at Stage 6, there would never be a moral disagreement of the sort that we are discussing here.

In the end, however, Kohlberg doesn't make any real claims about Stage 6 or about justice as the highest virtue. His findings have led him to claim that:

> ...there are certain normative ethical conclusions which nevertheless remain my own philosophic preference for defining an ontogenetic end point of a rationally reconstructed theory of justice reasoning.
> In particular, we cannot claim either that there is a single principle which we have found used at the current empirically highest stage, nor that principle is the principle of justice or respect for persons.[30]

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[29] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. p.272.

[30] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. p.273

More and more towards the end of his works, Kohlberg relinquishes his belief that justice is the ultimate virtue, the culminating point of all moral activity. Moreover, he acquiesces to the possibility that there exists more than one virtue which could be empirically tested at the highest stage. He explores the idea that in addition to justice, the moral domain may also include the virtue of *agape*, or responsible love, which is emphasized by Christian ethical teachings. This virtue is the virtue we call charity, love, caring, brotherhood or community.   It   is interesting to note at this point, that although the virtue of justice is at the core of the Kohlbergian model of education, he does make an appeal to religion or virtues inspired by religion (i.e. *agape*) to make up for the lacuna which exists when justice operates as the sole and ultimate virtue.

It would seem therefore, that the moral agent operating at a high Stage 5 or possible Stage 6 level needs more than justice to satiate his moral exigencies. Justice alone is not adequate enough to allow the individual to make the proper moral judgements, judgements which should (according to Kohlberg) mirror those judgements made by others at that level.

With this in mind, let us turn our attention to the third chapter of this paper, where I will entertain, at a more profound level, the relationship between Kohlberg's morality which holds justice as the highest virtue, and religious morality.

CHAPTER III

MORALITY AND RELIGION

A) *Background and Focus*

The purpose and focus of this chapter is to align the educational theory of Kohlberg with the controversial and heated debate of morality and religion. This issue takes its roots in ancient Greece in Plato's <u>Euthyphro</u> where the question is launched whether something is "good" because God deems it as such, or whether God deems something as "good" because it is axiomatically "good". An ontogeny of this subject would far surpass the limitations of this paper (and my own finite knowledge for that matter), but it would suffice to say that the subject of morality as being autonomous from religion does provoke meritorious reasons for debate, especially in an age in which humanism has captivated the hearts of most of the Western world, and where freedom has become a modern deity.

The separation of morality from religion, or the crisis of Christianity, really began in the 17th century and was inspired by the European period of Enlightenment, the Copernican revolution in thought. There was a recognition in the power of reason, a recognition which elevated reason to a station where it displaced the importance of religious morality and in the end became the sole guide for moral decision making. There was an absolute belief in the power of reason and a conviction in the absolute certainty of

rational knowledge:

> Faith in the old presuppositions and authorities, for so
> long considered valid beyond question, gave way to a
> spirit of criticism. Reason claimed to be autonomous and
> set itself up as the unique court of appeal.[31]

With his new outlook on morality, man was free from the shackles of religion, from the irrevocable decree, from divine law. In Paris, the year 1792, God was publicly dethroned, and reason was erected in its stead. Immanuel Kant was the philosophical heir to reason and was proliferating material to enhance and justify the infallibility of reason. His epic works on the study of human dignity, the categorical imperative and the rational mind have literally flooded our philosophical textbooks and our social theories. Along with some other great thinkers including Nietzsche, Freud, Feuerbach and Marx, religion and the thought that morality was preceded by religion, eventually vanished.

This spirit of modernism has been the cause of our great technological advances and has guided us to great victories over barbarism. Former chief public-prosecutor at the State Court in Heidelberg, Germany, Mr. Udo Schaefer has given much thought and consideration to the development of man and morality. In one of his lectures given at the Landegg Academy's Third Annual Forum, he addressed the issue of global ethics while singularly giving due

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[31] Theodore M Greene, <u>The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion</u>, p.IX, cited in Udo Schaefer, <u>The Imperishable Dominion</u>. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.3

attention to the rise of reason and the fall of religion. In his appraisal of man's "newly-attained independence and maturity" due to the awareness and submission to the power of reason, Sheafer asserts that this new way of thinking has laid down the foundation for our scientific and technical civilization and that, as a consequence, there have been large strides taken in the area of law and order which have rectified us from our savage instincts:

> The principles of equality before the law and of the separation of powers, the triumphant advance of democracy, the abolition of torture and the humanization of penal law, in short, the modern constitutional state, a state which binds the power of the ruler to the law and protects the citizen from government arbitrariness.[32]

The plight of post-enlightenment religion was reinforced by the onslaughts of erudite and influential thinkers. For example, Feuerbach was intent on demonstrating that God was a mere reflection of man and that the relationship between man and God was merely a relationship between man and himself, his alter ego, on which he has conferred the highest attributes of his species: "Religion is human nature reflected, mirrored in itself", "God is the mirror of man".[33]

Karl Marx took this one step further and asserted that religion is determined by and dependent of social influences. It

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[32] Udo Schaefer, "Ethics for a Global Society", talk given at Landegg Academy, Third Annuel Forum, 1992.

[33] Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, p.28, cited in Udo Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.4

is the result of conflicting economic interests. When these conflicts die out, so too will religion. Marx's position undermines religion and declares it a "useful invention", as Schaefer puts it:

> The aim of his critique is to expose God and religion as an ideology, a 'useful invention' and an ideological superstructure of the ruling class. Religion is the self-assurance of man who is enslaved and alienated from himself. It grows out of the soil of poverty and exploitation.[34]

He goes on to quote Marx who alludes to the contemptible qualities which religion embodies:

> The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest against real wretchedness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.[35]

Next to Karl Marx, the thinker who has played so decisive a role in changing the face of our outlook towards religion, is Sigmund Freud. He regards religion as a 'hallucinatory delusion' or 'a universal obsessional neurosis' which, with the help of science, mankind will be able to eradicate.[36] Freud has become one

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[34] Udo Schaefer, <u>The Imperishable Dominion.</u> Oxford: George Ronald Publisher, 1983. p.4-5

[35] Karl Marx. <u>Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'</u>. Cambridge: University Press, 1970. p.131

[36] Sigmund Freud. "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices", in <u>Collected Papers Vol.II</u>. London: The Hogarth Press, 1924. p.34

of the priests of modern social science. He has discredited

religion in his work, The Future of an Illusion, as being the

outcome of infantile desires in adults who long for the shelter of

their childhood. According to Freud, religion was created as a

refuge for the weak and the lost.

Finally, although there are literally a plethora of sources

from which we could draw, we hear the echo of the words "God is

dead", words which were pronounced by Nietzsche some years ago, and

which are being parroted and billowed out in the modern Western

world. Nietzsche proclaims the death of God, and asserts that 'the

belief in the Christian God has become unworthy of belief'. Man

wishes to live without restrictions and even exercice control over

the eternity which is attributed to heaven. He strives to become

Godlike himself, to attain the 'superman' ideal, and wishes

therefore to depose God. God must die so that man can live.

Belief in the after-life is something for the 'sick and

perishing'.[37]

This emissary which proclaims the death of God offers no

alternate happiness and joy, but rather, his words invoke feelings

of terror and desolation:

> What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun?
> Whither does it move now? Whither do we move? Away from
> all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards,
> sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an
> above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite

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[37]Friedrich Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I:
'Backworldsmen'pp.30-31, cited in Udo Schaefer The Imperishable
Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.6

nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning?[38]

How ironic it is that the above quotation comes from Nietzsche's work entitled <u>The Joyful Wisdom</u>. Personally, the image and feeling of joy does not immediately flood my mind. This passage, however, does manifest a profound mourning caused by man's alienation from God, or alienation from divine morality.

The revolutionary movement of the Enlightenment, in the seventeenth century, accompanied by the principles of humanism essentially attacked the religious authorities, and cast doubt into the hearts and minds of the religious followers. In eighteenth century France, atheism reached its apex and the Christian revelation was supplanted with the works of Diderot, Helvétius, d'Holbach and Voltaire. A new religion was founded, the religion of reason. The age of reason and its dissemination into the modern world seeks to replace God with rational thought, and this is what Kohlberg adopts as his metaphysical substitute. Nietzsche's slogan "God is dead" has become the formula for the century. Achieving a secular society, that is, a society from which religion has been banned, and propagating the mature and autonomous human being, that is, one who has been emancipated from the traditions of the past and who is able to exercise self-determination, have become the

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[38] Friedriche Nietzsche, <u>The Joyful Wisdom</u>, No. 125, cited in Udo Schaefer, <u>The Imperishable Dominion</u>. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.6

goals and the orientation of the people. Udo Schaefer elucidates quite clearly the evolution of reason and its inherent ramifications:

> The belief in God has been replaced by the belief in reason and human progress, by the belief in the completion of history by science and technology. The messianic expectations have been replaced by the utopia of a man-made paradise. Man's conviction that he is able to create a better world, the "Messianic Kingdom", by rational analysis and political actions has superseded the transcendental promises of salvation. Thus, the world has been made rational and technical, and, as a consequence, utilitarian.[39]

This brief account of the fall of religion and the rise of reason sets the stage for our inquiry into Kohlberg's morality.

During a talk given by Harry Fernout in defence of Christian theology as a sufficient and necessary means to teach morality, Kohlberg was referred to as "flaming secular humanist". Although this account of Kohlberg may be somewhat harsh, it is no secret that Kohlberg divorces morality from religion and adheres quite adamantly to the presuppositions expounded by Immanuel Kant. Namely, that reason be the moral guide and executor, and that man be allowed to exercise his freedom so long as he respects the freedom of others. Kohlberg's morality is an extension of the humanistic movement, a movement which maintains freedom of thought, happiness and fraternity, basically the American constitution in its purest form. Kohlberg seeks to preserve this American dream

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[39] Udo Schaefer, from a talk entitled "Ethics for a Global Society", Landegg Academy, Third Annual Forum, 1992.

while at the same time enhancing the capacity for moral decision-making within the individual. His sense of morality has been moulded by Plato, Kant, Dewey and Rawls and its expression is evinced by his theory of stages.

Is morality innate, or is it learned? Is religion a vehicle for morality, and if yes, is it the sole vehicle? Is there such a thing as an absolute form of "goodness"? Can virtue be taught? These are the kinds of questions which are inherent in any advancement of a theory of moral education. They are the exact questions to which Kohlberg focused much of his attention in the development of his own theory.

In the following section, I will attempt to illustrate the position which Kohlberg endorses concerning morality, its genesis and its affiliation with religion, or rather, its estrangement from religion.

B) *Kohlberg's Morality*

Kohlberg's claim that morality is autonomous from religion is by no means an uncontroversial issue. It is actually the catalyst for many heated debates and strife and has caused the establishment of different paradigms of thought. After some reflection into Kohlberg's work regarding morality, one learns that he has developed quite a liberalist or rationalist attitude. This is directly revealed in his understanding of morality, and in the way by which he feels that morality is comprehended.

The purpose of this section is to elucidate some fundamental concepts which make manifest Kohlberg's position regarding morality and religion. In attempting to achieve this end, and to do Kohlberg justice, I shall focus on three subsections; 1) The theological approach to moral education (and Kohlberg's response to it), 2) Moral judgement as autonomous from religion, and 3) The Divine Command theory and the Natural Law theory. Before continuing, however, it should be noted that the question of morality as distinct from religion can by no means be dealt with within the confines of this chapter. The three subsections will, however, be sufficient enough to establish the fundamental claims propounded by Kohlberg and will provide the necessary substance needed to launch into section three.

B1. The Theological Approach to Moral Education (and Kohlberg's response to it)

In order to best understand the morality which Kohlberg advocates and how that morality is autonomous from religion, I feel that it is necessary and advantageous to describe at a rudimentary level the theological approach to moral education and from there to present some of Kohlberg's disagreements.

The theological approach to religious education relies on God or Allah as the external ultimate moral educator. It propounds that morals and morality take their origin in God, not from the individual, and hence, profound theologizing will result in a

strong moral character. It maintains that one cannot separate morality from religion, they are intrinsically related. Religion simply acts as a mirror reflecting the will of God on the individual. Morality is impressed upon the individual by the religious pedagogues, those who have devoted much study to morality and moral development. The outcome of this kind of moral education views God as an extrinsic variable crucial to the process of moral development.

In brief, the theological approach to education regards the religious leaders as disciples of a moral tradition, who have understood and internalized what morality is. They are then endowed with the position of moral educator where they can exercise their mandate and hopefully receive unquestioned loyalty. They have the authority to interpret morality and to exercise their judgement, and the individual student is taught, or indoctrinated, without the free reign of thought or judgement.

Kohlberg's main concerns with the theological approach to moral education is twofold. First, Kohlberg regards the process of moral development as a process which happens naturally as the individual reacts to his surroundings. One's morality isn't defined by a religious theologian, but via reason and role-taking. In this regard, it is not fair to force a theory of morality on him which could not only be wrong, but could impede his moral development. Secondly, Kohlberg adheres to the view that cognitive structural features, and not a "guiding light", are the core of moral development. These cognitive structures are moulded by one's

ability to reason.   One who is at a Stage 5 level of moral reasoning has attained a greater cognitive structural perfection than someone at Stage 2, for example.   Kohlberg places much stress on the developmental and social-psychological side of moral education and argues that the morality defined by theologians is only relevant to those directly related.   A Catholic educator, for example, may have a great deal of knowledge regarding moral education, but this knowledge is based on a paradigm of morality which is particular to him and to Catholics.   Kohlberg asserts that in order for his morality to be effective, he must formulate a conception of morality which is defensible by reference to moral philosophy, rather than Catholic theology, and this morality must be studied using the general methods and concepts of developmental social psychology.

Upon further elaboration concerning the relationship between moral development and religious development and by trying to establish the fact that moral development is necessary but not sufficient for religious development, Kohlberg makes two philosophical assumptions.   The first assumption is that morality is autonomous.   Kohlberg avows that morality should be a logically independent realm rather than the application of religious thinking to moral issues.   He goes on to say that only a small percentage of people appeal to religious doctrine in order to justify their moral judgement and that most people do not.   Kohlberg has found that moral development occurs regardless of whether someone subscribes to a specific religion or not.   That is to say that one can make

moral judgements and act morally devoid of any religious influence or command. This is not to say that religious followers are not moral. It is simply saying that it is not necessary to subscribe to the tenets of any one religion in order to be moral. Kohlberg claims the following regarding this subject:

> Our hypothesis, then, is almost the direct opposite of divine command theory, which derives moral judgement or consciousness from religious judgement and consciousness.[40]

The second philosophic assumption is that "the development of metaphysical reasoning presupposes the development of more certain moral or practical reasoning."[41] In expounding upon this point, Kohlberg asserts that religious structures which are metaethical or metaphysical structures presuppose normative or moral structures that they justify. While advancing through the six stages of moral development, one might pose the question "Why be moral?" This is a metaethical question which presupposes the existence of a normative structure of morality that is being called into question. Upon developing this line of reasoning, Kohlberg claims that "the existence or development of moral judgement, then, is presupposed by, or is necessary for, the development of metaethical judgement

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[40] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981 p.337

[41] ibid. p.336

and theories." [42]   He goes on to claim that it is not adequate. It becomes apparent that in order for one to answer the metaethical question "Why be moral?", one would have to appeal to additional social-scientific metaphysical or religious assumptions. Kohlberg uses these philosophic assumptions to prepare the way for his later claim supported by Kant and Dewey which states that morality is a normative rational structure, but when it is grounded in speculative metaphysics or religion, it becomes uncertain and imaginative.   The origin of these philosophical deliberations become apparent when one reads Kant and Dewey.   This is evident in the following quotation:

> When physical existence does not bear out the assertion, the physical is changed into the metaphysical. In this way moral faith has been inextricably tied up with intellectual beliefs about the supernatural. [43]

Morality for Kohlberg is not about the supernatural or religious convictions, as many theologians would postulate, it is about the form of moral judgement. Kohlberg divorces morality from religion and any theory which attempts to define morality in terms of its content. The following subsection elaborates on this idea.

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[42] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.337

[43] ibid. p.338

B2. Moral Judgement as Autonomous from Religion

Kohlberg's principal quandary with the above doctrine lies in his understanding of what moral development and moral judgement is. For Kohlberg, the basis or fundamental course of moral judgement lies in the process of human development itself. His research suggests that moral judgement, like overall moral development, is the process of personal self-constructed and self-regulated advance as one interacts with the environment. Kohlberg strongly emphasises the importance and need for the individual to develop naturally. It is in this way that he will come to develop moral judgement skills, not by way of a divine extrinsic source, but by way of internal philosophizing based on experience and reflection.

Kohlberg begins with a definition of morality which is completely different from the morality defined by religions. In this regard, he makes claims about morality which are defensible philosophically and scientifically, claims which can be upheld empirically. Kohlberg succeeds in achieving this end because his definition of morality is somewhat empirical and non-committal. In describing what a universal definition of morality should be, Kohlberg says the following:

> In my view a culturally universal definition of morality can be arrived at if morality is thought of as the form of moral judgements instead of the content of specific moral beliefs. Although philosophers have been unable to agree on any single ultimate principle that would define "correct" moral judgements, most philosophers concur on

the characteristics that make a judgement a genuine moral judgement (Hare, 1952; Kant, 1949a).[44]

What is important, therefore, is not the content of the moral belief, but the form of the moral judgement. A moral judgement, is a judgement about the right and the good of an action. This does not mean that all judgements about the "right" and the "good" are moral judgements, some are judgements of "aesthetic, technological, or prudential goodness or rightness".[45] A moral judgement can be moral without having to consider its content, its action, and without having to consider whether it agrees with our own standards. A universal moral judgement is attainable at a Stage 6 level of moral reasoning (discussed in chapter 2), and this is one of the aims of Kohlberg's theory. Here, one makes a moral judgement that is universalizable, a judgement that would apply to any other member of the sixth stage.

For Kohlberg, therefore, morality is rooted in the development of moral judgement, the stimulation of which, should be one of the aims of moral education. Kohlberg postulates with a certain degree of uncertainty that the stimulation of moral judgement will result in moral conduct. There has been some research indicating the correspondence between the two in chapter 7 of his book, The Psychology of Moral Development (1984).

According to the Kohlbergian theory, morality and religion are

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[44] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.301

[45] ibid p.301

two completely separate entities. Kohlberg's morality is necessary for religion and not vice versa. When describing religious theologians and their particular moralities, Kohlberg submits that all of their moralities are different even though they are divine in origin. The only thing which unites them is the form of moral reasoning which they adhere to when they attempt to justify their positions. It is the form that is universal, not the content.

It is important to note, before we continue with subsection three, that Kohlberg is not aiming to discredit religion or even completely divorce it from peoples' lives. He is arguing that religion shouldn't play a role in moral education within the schools. In some of his writings, Kohlberg even appeals to what religion has to offer as a possible solution to questions examined in Stage 5, or a possible Stage 6. Questions like "Why be moral? Why be just in a universe that is largely unjust?" The natural endpoint of these types of questions require one to evaluate the meaning of life, a subject which for Kohlberg is not a moral one, but rather, an ontological or religious one.

Let us now turn our attention to the third subsection where Kohlberg refutes the Divine Command Theory and advances the Natural Law Theory in its stead.

B3. The Divine Command Theory and the Natural Law Theory

In chapter 9 of his book, <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u>, Kohlberg discusses some fundamental themes which

pervade the subject of morality and religion. I shall attempt to recapitulate his arguments against religion as the divine proprietor over morality, and demonstrate how Kohlberg appeals to the Natural Law Theory as a viable theory which links morality with the natural cosmic order.

Kohlberg introduces the natural law theory by exemplifying two of its greatest members, Socrates and Martin Luther King. He pronounces both of them as great educators of justice who died for their willingness to teach their beliefs. In exalting these two great figures, these exemplars of justice, Kohlberg states the following:

> Their willingness to die for moral principles was partly based on their faith in moral principles as an expression of human reason and partly on their faith in justice, which had religious support.[46]

Here, one can notice Kohlberg's call to reason as the origin of moral principles and the unrelenting reliance on justice, a cosmic justice (if you will) whose purpose is not only to "resolve conflicts in a civil society" but to serve as the "reflection of an order inherent in both human nature and in the natural or cosmic order."[47]

Martin Luther King and Socrates were both concerned with the maintenance of social contracts and exercising justice to the

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[46] Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.318

[47] ibid. p.318

fullest, but they also recognized a natural or higher order which Kohlberg feels, is grounded in the human reason. Kohlberg adopts the Natural Law Theory into his own theory of stages and concludes with the notion that when one has reached a Stage 6 way of moral reasoning that these Stage 6 moral principles are "eternal" and "natural":

> ...Stage 6 moral principles enjoining the uplifting of human personality are "eternal and natural law" in the sense that they are the universal outgrowth of the development of human nature. On the side of a psychology of human nature, my theory says that human conceptions of moral law are not the product of internalizing arbitrary and culturally relative societal norms. They are, rather, outcomes of universal human nature developing under universal aspects of the human condition, and in that sense they are "natural".[48]

Kohlberg attributes morality to reason and submits that one can be a moral being without the influence of some divine command. The capacity for morality to exude from the individual is directly related to the ability for that individual to harness and ascertain his reason. The development of reason will inevitably lead to the desire to act on universal principles of justice as did Socrates and Martin Luther King. These universal principles of justice are fully appreciated at the Stage 6 level of reasoning but are similarly expressed at every stage. Reason and a belief in a natural cosmic order, therefore, are the sole elements needed to supply one with a moral code whose chief governor is justice.

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[48] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.319

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One theory in support of the union between morality and religion is the Divine Command Theory. Kohlberg addresses this theory quite extensively in chapter 9 of his book, The Philosophy of Moral Development. Kohlberg sees no place for the Divine Command Theory in his educational model. In his refutation, he draws upon Plato's Euthyphro once again to demonstrate a fallacy which he feels is of paramount importance in order to understand the relationship between God and morality. He terms this fallacy the "naturalistic fallacy" and feels that any proponents of the divine command theory are committing it. What the naturalistic fallacy states is that one cannot derive "ought" statements from "is" statements or statements of fact. With regards to the divine command theory, the fallacy is committed when one derives the statement "x ought to be done" or "x is just" from the statement "x is a command of God", or "x is in the Bible". This convoluted line of reasoning was manifested in Euthyphro's response to the question "What is piety?". Euthyphro responded to Socrates by saying that piety is acting in accordance with the will of the gods: "What is pleasing to the gods is holy, and what is not pleasing to them is unholy." [49] Socrates replies by trying to get Euthyphro to clarify whether an act is virtuous or holy because the gods command or approve the action, or whether the gods approve the action because it is virtuous and holy "in light of some standard or quality of

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[49] Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns (ed.), The Collected Dialogues of Plato. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. p.174

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the action independent of the gods' approval."[50]

According to Kohlberg, morality does not take its origin in divine command or decree, but in reason. Education should focus on enhancing moral reasoning capacity not on religious indoctrination of what a chaste and holy life ought to be. Kohlberg vehemently suggests that what the public schools have to do is to distinguish the sector of morality called "natural law" from the sector based on religious creed or revelation. Religious morality should not be taught in the schools because, according to Kohlberg, this limits the child's understanding of morality to one outlook. The child graduates with a heightened awareness about the teachings of Catholic morality (for example) but this awareness is narrowed to only that of a Catholic morality.

Kohlberg appeals to a Socratic method of teaching which focuses on the development of reason and the implementation of universal principles of justice within the school. He envisions a democratic mini-system which would give the student body much more control over itself. According to Kohlberg, the natural law theory is worthy enough to be practised in the schools:

> This theory...holds that there are universal or natural principles of justice that should guide all societies and that are known to us by reason independent of specific religious revelation or faith. It is such "natural law" morality, I said, that is the fit focus of moral

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[50] Lawrence Kohlberg, <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u>, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.315

education in the public schools.[51]

This quotation exemplifies Kohlberg's refutation of any appeal to a divine morality, and makes manifest the stress which he places on reason and the universal principles of justice.

Before we move on to the next section, I would like to conclude this section by informing the reader that there are many different theories concerning the relationship of morality with religion which Kohlberg and his contemporaries critically analyze and denounce as illegitimate possibilities. There are many theories which argue in support of their own religions as possessing the correct ethical code or way of action and Kohlberg deals with some of them in his works. In the end, his conclusions are the same however, that morality must be studied as an autonomous realm of discourse, separate from religion, and that the only morality which has any universality grounded in it is the morality derived from reason where justice is the ultimate virtue and principle aim.

Let us now turn to the next section where I will engage the reader with various concepts which surround the theme of morality. My approach will not be to choose and present the qualms of one hypothesis, but rather, I will attempt to demonstrate that morality does in fact rely heavily on religion and that reason alone is not a sufficient enough instrument to guide and direct the moral

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[51] Lawrence Kohlberg, <u>The Philosophy of Moral Development</u>. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.313

actions of the individual. I shall also attempt to show that although morality takes its roots in religion, it does not necessarily mean the denunciation of science or the recantation of the rational mind.

C) *Morality and Reason: A New Vision*

Let me begin by saying at the outset of this section that it is difficult to refute much of what Kohlberg is advocating simply because his concept of morality is understood only insofar as we are talking about the form of moral judgement. It is habitual to attribute morality to that sacred realm of rights and wrongs, an ethical code which when followed will yield the greatest harmony, an ideal of the self and society to which we should all strive. Kohlberg, however, completely divorces morality from its normal affiliations and defines it by its form rather than its content. Let it be clear that what is important for Kohlberg is not the action which the moral judgement yields, but rather, the form which the moral judgement takes.

Having said that, however, Kohlberg does make certain claims regarding morality, moral judgements, and justice as the core of morality which merit questioning and analysis.

As previously mentioned, Kohlberg's morality, viewed as the form of moral judgement, takes its root in one's capacity to reason. The natural development of reason occurs through role playing activities and proper stimulation. My contention with

Kohlberg really originates from this point. From what philosophical pretext does Kohlberg make such a definitive claim?

Let us briefly analyse the results which reason alone has produced.

It is evident that the utilization of reason, and with it, scientific progress, has brought many blessings, but it has also brought with it many dangers and risks that threaten our very existence. This realization has led to a remarkably ambivalent attitude towards science. On the one hand, there are those devout followers of reason and scientific theory who adhere to every advancement made by science and regard everything which carries a scientific label as true. On the other hand, there is an ever-increasing amount of scepticism, even hostility towards reason and science, founded in the accusation that science, with all of its technical possibilities, is exploiting nature to such drastic measures that it is responsible for our ecological crisis. They believe that science has become apocalyptic in nature and must be stopped.

Upon further inquiry into the outcome of science and reason, it becomes evident that science and reason do not have all the answers that humanity requires, and that maybe they need to be harnessed and employed within a pre-ordained moral framework.

They have led man into a state of materialism where he has lost touch with his religious propensities. Man has turned a blind eye towards metaphysics, yet it is precisely that which science is forcing him to investigate once again. And so we are faced with

many dilemmas which can no longer be ignored.

It would seem that the immortal words of Nietzsche ring loud and clear as he prophesizes about the future. Although he describes the death of God by man, and man's wish to live without restrictions and to become godlike himself, he also anticipates quite accurately what the repercussions of such disbelief would entail. In the book, The Joyful Wisdom, he describes the abdication of transcendence as a period of "gloom and eclipse, the like of which has probably never taken place on earth before". He predicted the following:

> What must all collapse now that this belief has been
> undermined, - because so much is built upon it, so much
> rests upon it, and has become one with it: for example
> our entire European morality [52]...Nihilism stands at the
> door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests? [53]

His definition of Nihilism is "That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking: "Why?" finds no answer." [54] And so, he draws upon the conclusion that this abdication of transcendence will eventually cause the breakdown of our societal pillars. Was Nietzsche correct in assuming this?

The atrophy which is prevalent in our societal framework can

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[52] Friedriche Nietzsche. The Joyful Wisdom. No.125, cited in Udo Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.6

[53] Friedriche Nietzsche. The Will to Power, 'Toward an Outline', p.1 cited in Udo Schaefer, ibid. p.7

[54] ibid. p.I,2

be seen as the effect of the depreciation of our value system. For centuries, religions provided us with the necessary guidelines to maintain a level of stability within our societies, but there has been a remarkable decline of our system of values primarily within the last twenty years, and it has been replaced with a new pluralism of varied value concepts.

As Udo Schaefer points out in his book, The Imperishable Dominion, there is not only the weakness of our current system of values which is under attack, but as well the supplantment of a "one dimensional rationalism", an attitude which does not allow anything to have validity unless it can be established by empirical reason." [55] This form of reasoning becomes problematic and questionable when applied to our cultural values and norms. It questions the established institutions of religion, law, morality and sovereignty. On the one hand, it gives us a sense of liberation, where our knowledge of things leaps into the future, but on the other hand, man has a need for a stable view of life and the world, "for emotional security in a community of like-minded souls, for certainty concerning the state of his soul and for a clear-cut purpose in life - and a rationalist attitude leaves this need unsatisfied." [56]

I think Arthur Schopenhauer says it best when he claims that our society:

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[55] Udo Schaefer. The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.33

[56] ibid p.33

...respects qualities of every kind - except the
spiritual ones: these are even contraband. This society
demands that we show unlimited patience toward every kind
of foolishness, buffoonery, absurdity and dullness;
personal qualities should beg forgiveness or else be kept
hidden." [57]

The above quotation cannot be refuted. One has only to look
into our societies to witness the moral degradation that is taking
place accompanied by the rise of insolence. But this has only left
us in an existential vacuum with a feeling of purposelessness.
It seems evident that the only thing that can give man any sort of
purpose is religion, and the re-institutionalization of a clear
value system. Without this, he will wander aimlessly, leading an
animalistic lifestyle in a bleak and lonely setting. In a
statement which I feel is eternally valid, Aristotle defined man
without morals, without law and justice:

Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be
isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all.
Injustice is all the graver when it is armed injustice;
and man is furnished from birth with arms (such as, for
instance, language) which are intended to serve the
purpose of moral prudence and virtue, but which may be
used in preference for opposite ends. That is why, if he
be without virtue, he is a most unholy and savage being,
and worse than all others in the indulgence of lust and
gluttony. [58]

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[57] Arthur Schopenhauer. Counsels and Maxims, V,9. cited in Udo
Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983.

[58] Aristotle. The Politics of Aristotle, Book I, 1253a26. cited
in Udo Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald,
1983. p.49

We have many secular values that act as substitutes for our religious values, but they aren't filling the voracious lacuna which exists.

It is my claim that a society is not able to survive for a long period of time without certain ultimate values, and without a framework with absolute limits to provide a sense of orientation. Kohlberg posits the absolute value of justice and suggests that reason provides the moral framework from which justice can be executed. I submit that absolute loyalty to the power of reason coupled with total abdication of religion is the primary cause of our societal breakdown and the integral component affecting the depreciation of our values. There is an unrealistic over-estimation of the power of reason. As Brezinka aptly states:

> The belief that man can understand social processes in their entirety and that he has the ability to act autonomously and practice self-determination by reason without any kind of commitment to authority is an illusion which amounts to the presumptuous claim of wanting to be like God both in knowledge and in the freedom to act.[59]

It would seem that morality, when extracted from its divine source, has no foundation, no hold, no support. Dostoevsky was referring to this consequence when he had Ivan Karamazov say: "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted. If there is no God, then nothing matters." All attempts of moral philosophy to

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[59] W. Brezinka. On the Role of Religion as a Comprehensive Social System of Orientation. p.115. cited in Udo Schaefer, The Imperishable Dominion. Oxford: George Ronald, 1983. p.33

found a rationalistic ethic based on reason which is practicable and generally obligatory have failed as well. Its failure, in which the British philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre recognizes the very cause of the crisis of Western civilization, is due to the fact that no moral rules can be deduced conclusively from an abstract concept of man, from man's "dignity". Immanuel Kant in his efforts to exalt the station of reason and renounce religious morality made various declarations concerning religious practices. He expressed that practices such as kneeling down or bowing, out of supplication or reverence for those things considered celestial, run contrary to human dignity. This human dignity, expressed by the categorical imperative and reiterated by Kohlberg, demands a Stage 6 Kantian principle of equal respect for all persons.[60]

Kohlberg acknowledges to a certain extent the outcome of liberalism and its inherent consequential features when taken to the extreme, but he still recognizes it as the dominant ideology of the Western world so long as it is formulated through Stage 6 reasoning. In commenting on the social awareness of the 1970's, Kohlberg asserts that there is both in youth and in adults a widespread questioning of democracy and social institutions, but he dismisses it as the result of the "inadequacies of the dominant Stage 5 liberal ideology of our constitutional democracy to resolve world moral problems."[61] The problem does not lie within the

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[60] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981 p.241

[61] ibid. p.241

liberal ideology, but at the stage within which that ideology is constructed. Kohlberg goes on to say the following:

> To overcome these inadequacies requires reformulation of the liberal ideology in the more morally principled terms of our Stage 6, along the lines of Rawls's effort, as opposed to the more utilitarian or more laissez-faire individualistic views of social contract liberalism found at Stage 5.[62]

My purpose in citing the above quotations regarding liberalism and Kohlberg's stages, is to clarify for the reader the fact that he does not necessarily endorse a "laissez-faire" individualistic view of social contract liberalism, but rather, a social contract liberalism which is formulated at Stage 6, where justice is defined and practised universally.

Reason, even functioning at a Stage 6 level cannot make "thou shalt" statements which are clear and acceptable to unanimous agreement. Even Kohlberg recognized that his rationalist assumptions regarding Stage 6 reasoning and agreement may have been uncertain and tentative:

> Thus, while there is still some tentative empirical support for a psychological claim of agreement in action choice at Stage 6, we are in no position to claim the empirical psychological truth that there is actual substantive moral agreement reached at the terminus of moral development. The metaethical ideal of moral agreement implied by our rationalists assumption has still uncertain meaning in terms of finding empirical agreement in highly developed and experienced moral

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[62] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Philosophy of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981. p.241

judgers in various culture.[63]

Kohlberg relies heavily on the writings of Kant which emphasize the importance of the dignity of man. This becomes problematic, however, when one attempts to define the dignity of man. The question as to man's dignity cannot be answered without a clear concept of man. The nature of man, however, is a question beyond rational, empirical and scientific knowledge. It cannot be seen under a microscope, and it cannot be agreed upon through philosophical debates. The concepts offered by the humanities are focused on man's biological nature. They reduce man to his biological, anatomical and chemical elements and deny his freedom and his dignity. Moreover, moral decisions based on reason alone, even if they could be made evident, cannot be invested with the inner authority, that urges the individual to comply with standards created by himself. The rhetorical question which must be asked at this point is: what can religion offer that reason can't?

Normative ethics has always had its basis in religion. Religion alone is able to create a system of transcendental values and ideals. It translates values into standards of behaviour, passes them on by education to the younger generation and keeps them alive in the consciousness of society.

I am not postulating that we allow religion to completely govern the area of moral education, but only that it be more

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[63] Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984. p.273

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seriously considered as a beneficial contributor to the moral

sphere.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the previous three chapters, I have outlined some of the fundamental tenets of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral education. I have specifically focused on three issues: 1) that justice is the ultimate virtue in the moral hierarchy, and that only when justice is exercised at a Stage 6 level of reasoning can there be harmony of judgement, 2) Kohlberg's emphasis on reason as that entity which can adequately guide one's moral judgements, and 3) Kohlberg's notion of morality and its autonomy from religion. In response to these elements of Kohlberg's theory, I have submitted several propositions regarding reason and morality which run contrary to Kohlberg's theory and which have given rise to specific conclusions.

My general response, however, after having critically analyzed numerous facets of Kohlberg's theory is that it is not a theory which is subject to many shortcomings. Kohlberg provides the inquirer with a model of moral education which is for the most part very philosophically and psychologically sound, and which is presently functioning in primary schools in states such as New York and New Jersey. The results have proven his hypotheses to be mostly accurate, at least from Stage 1 to Stage 4. But, when one inquires into the philosophical and psychological soundness of Stages 5 and 6, one may be disappointed. In The Psychology of Moral Development, it becomes apparent to Kohlberg that perhaps his understanding of justice as the ultimate virtue may be faulty and

with it the notion that Stage 6 even exists. As mentioned in chapter two (of this paper), Kohlberg maintains many of his original claims regarding moral judgement and stage development, but adds that perhaps his Stage 6 and his concept of justice as the core of morality should be reevaluated. Although there exist philosophical flaws, or incongruent facts, in the higher levels of stage development, they do not discredit the rest of the theory.

I have attempted to demonstrate, (perhaps a little too adamantly), what the effects of unbridled reason in a liberalist society can amount to. By doing this, I am not suggesting that Kohlberg adheres to the belief that one should be guided by a "one-sided rationalism". I am simply making the claim that reason, alone, does not seem to be sufficient enough to fulfil the needs of a Stage 6 thinker. It seems that one's reason is adequate and sufficient for those individuals moralizing between Stages 1 and 4, but upon reaching Stage 5, the moral agent begins to ask questions, the answers to which cannot be dealt with by reason alone.

In conclusion, I would like to leave the reader with one final quotation taken from Carter (1980), a philosophic critic referred to by Kohlberg. It is a sincere and concise passage which describes the achievements of Kohlberg:

> ...there is considerable cause for supposing that what Kohlberg really achieves with clarity is nothing more than a sequential typology of development in moral thinking from egoism to universalism, and from situation specific rules to universalizable and reversible judgements of principle. This in itself constitutes an enormous undertaking and, if successfully defended, would be a very significant breakthrough in Psychology,

Education and Philosophy.[64]

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[64] Carter (1980) Cited in Lawrence Kohlberg <u>The Psychology of Moral Development</u>. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1984, p.274

APPENDIX A

LEVEL AND STAGE	WHAT IS RIGHT	REASONS FOR DOING RIGHT	SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE OF STAGE
LEVEL I: Preconventional *Stage 1*- Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	Egocentric point of view. Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2- Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their own interests too.	Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everyone has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II: Conventional *Stage 3* - Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of you in your role as son, brother, friend etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concerns for others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eye and the eyes of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other person's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.

APPENDIX A - continued

Stage 4 -Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in the extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it", or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations.	Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
LEVEL III: **Postconventional, or Principled** *Stage 5* - Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some non relative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority and opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concerned that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."	Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6 - Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and the respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	Perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangement derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

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