

# I. EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION AND ITS REGION(S)

## EUROPEAN *DEMOS*: DEMOCRACY DEFICIT AND NATIONAL FEELINGS

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The level and scope of European Union (EU) integration activities are showing the aspects of civilizational development with a huge impact on the world system of civilizations and make more evident the fact that the future of EU depends on the attitude of European policy-makers to the national, cultural, and political identities. Interest in the identities has been reinforced in recent years by the failure of EU Constitutional Treaty and further attempts to reach an agreement about the new Treaty. This failure stimulated cogitations on both the subject of Constitutional Treaty and the features of the European *demos*. Spirited discussions pointed to the so called “deficits” – “community deficit”, “legitimacy deficit” and, as a consequence, to the “democracy deficit”. Thus EU future can be seen as depending on the removal of these “deficits”. How can this be done under the prevailing political attitude of denationalization? The problem of European *demos* was aggravated by the enlargement of EU: new Member states are loaded with different historic experience and clearly visible features of national sense. National feelings have been the main force raising people for national liberation movement or national revival. This experience must be taken into account while discussing new political guidelines for the construction of European *demos*. The social content of *demos*, including identity, common history and the sense of “unity in diversity”, could be accumulated through the loyalties and bonds of affection to one’s nation, culture, language, and historical myths; thus, the attitude of denationalization requires a modification.

Keywords: denationalization, EU Constitutional Treaty, European *demos*, legitimacy deficit, national identity, nationalism, Soviet occupation.

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At present it is becoming increasingly apparent that the future of the EU, as a civilizational construct, of the cohesion of this construct with the world transforming power and the concrete shape of the “unity in diversity” depends on the prevailing attitude of European politics towards national, cultural and political identities, as well as on the

established guidelines of European policy in regard to these identities. The subject-matter of identities and the nationalism associated with them has “come back” into the spotlight of the researchers and has stimulated a wide variety of new investigations. This wave of investigations is closely connected with another wave – the researches of social, collective and cultural memory. Currently these waves of investigations have been intensifying each other. Why is it so? Because it is the social, collective and cultural memory that sustains and forms national, social, and cultural identities. Other important question attracting ever widening interest of researchers is that the forms of collective memory are needed for the construction and implementation of the features of European identity, however weak it may be, or disseminating and making operative at the national level the “Idea of Europe”.

When speaking about identities we presuppose the subjects of these identities. The subject of political identity of solitary states is quite obvious, it being the societies of those states that bear peculiarities of national identity. The citizens are at the same time the countrymen, since they belong to the traditional ethnic, religious ethnic and cultural ethnic communities. Thus, it is possible to claim that political identity is closely linked with other identities which are characterized by ethno-cultural features. According to Michael Bruter, political identities are comprised of two distinct but interacting dimensions, civic and cultural which both are tied to political symbols (Bruter 2005). Naturally, the question arises: what is the subject of EU’s political identity? Drawing a parallel, we should consider this subject to be “EU society” or “EU civic society”, i.e. *demos*. We also hear speaking about the “European nation” perspectives. Does such a society virtually exist? Are we observing a more vivid features of it? Relying on the results of Eurobarometer polls, which show that only some 3 percent of EU residents consider themselves pure Europeans, with 7 percent claiming that their Europeanness is more important than their national identity, Richard Bellami draws a reasonable conclusion that: “there is little in the way of a pan-European demos” and “EU identity is weak” (Bellami 2006: 183). EU cannot strengthen its existence without relevant public space or without definite democratic procedures of the elections of the representational governmental bodies. Bearing in mind the deficits of legitimacy, communality and constitutionality typical of EU which are being widely discussed by researchers and politicians, it may be admitted that at best only parts of foundations for EU *demos* creation are being laid at the moment.

The problem of EU *demos* has come up while discussing the reasons and factors of the failure of EU Constitutional Treaty. After the “No” vote the wave of proclamations from politics and analysts that the entire process of European integration and the functioning of EU were in crisis rose up. The researchers pointed that “The nature of the supposed crisis ranged from “existential” to “political”, to “profound”; it was a crisis of “confidence” and of “identity” that called into question the future of EU” (Dinani 2006: 63). Of course, in these statements we can see some exaggeration due to the first moment disappointment; nevertheless, the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty and its impact on the future of the EU have encouraged the researchers of different spheres more thoroughly to analyze the inner contradictions of the EU

development and governance. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty has been recognized as the turning point in the EU development, setting up new conditions of the EU existence.

The rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty (for details see Heinsworth 2006) has shown that the EU failed to supplant the inherent inconsistency, which was becoming increasingly sharp, with the euro-integration overstepping the sphere of economics and embracing social and cultural spheres. This inconsistency has resulted from the dual origin of the EU since the political power stems from both the agreements of national states and from supranational power center, which functions under a “deficit” of democratic legitimacy. Consequently, it is reasonably claimed that “The Union’s legitimacy problems lie in a lack of basic and uncontested “vertical consolidation” of constitutional order” (Puntscher Rickman 2007: 134). However, this consolidation is directed not only to the problems of governance, but also to those of creating a society being governed. So far, it has not yet been decided what governs what. Whether it is the agreements of states that govern the EU or is it the later that governs the member states.

There is another layer of legitimacy problems stemming from the Interinstitutional Agreements that have been concluded between the main governmental bodies of the EU, namely The Council of the European Union, the Commission, and the European Parliament. According to Daniela Kietz and Andreas Maurer, despite the fact that these Agreements “are an established part of the mass of informal and formal rules structuring EU decision-making and interinstitutional relations, there is as yet no common understanding of their role and functions in the institutional and legal system of the EU – neither in political science nor legal studies” (Kietz, Maurer 2007: 20–21). Accordingly we can draw a conclusion that this sort of problems avoids the attention of general public.

The EU legitimacy problem is closely connected with the EU *demos* problem. Andrew Gamble draws our attention to the fact that two attitudes to the EU legitimacy prevailed and stood out on the EU political level, with one part deriving legitimacy from the agreements signed by the states, whereas the other part deriving it from the universal democratic principles and common citizenship. The implementation of the latter issues is the matter of the supranational political power center. Consequently, the power center promoting the development of the EU is entirely separated from the level of national countries. The Constitutional Treaty has tempted to combine these different attitudes; however, the inconsistency which appeared to be fatal has not been eliminated. As a result, the Treaty has not satisfied either of these attitudes bearing political layers (Gamble 2006: 35). Another important fact is that, according to Gamble, it was not quite obvious who is the subject raising the Constitution and ratifying it. In other words, on the part of the subject no statement like “We the people of Europe” has been made. Unfortunately, such statement could not have been made anyway, since it was unacceptable for many countries, which still have no clear vision of the EU state model and are trying to maintain the powers of their national countries.

The lack of the European communality is strongly emphasized by Amitai Etzioni, who deals with the problems of the EU development and the EU future prospects.

In his opinion, the rejection of the Treaty shows that it is the question of the democratic governing of EU that comes first. How could really democratic EU governance be established? It could be implemented only by creating the subject that could be able democratically set up governmental institutions and entrust them to govern itself. According to Etzioni, the EU's "democratization requires a significantly higher level of community than the EU now commands or ever commanded even before recent enlargement" (Etzioni 2007: 31). How could such a normative-effective community characterized by the core of moral culture be built? Can it be created as an entirely new society, dissociated from the still existing national and other societies with, let's say, "strong identity? This is the question which arises particularly because of the attitude of EU political layer against any kinds of "strong" identities that could become a source of nationalism. This disposition is enhanced by a rather wide-spread ideology of the "post-national" identity, supported by the political EU layer, which derives the political power from the universal democratic principles and civic values. From the point of view of the "post national" identity, political power is based on a pure civic community, dissociated from any essentialities, origins and histories as well as from culture, since it is the culture that upholds these matters. This suggests that the EU does not need any more common culture, and hence, any cultural identity, since common moral and civic values are quite enough. In this respect, the question how political values could be transformed into common values and how to make people undertake them is totally evaded. This problem, by the way, is typical of all theories, bearing utopian features.

However, is it worth and reasonable to deepen the discrepancy between national feelings and matters and the European civic values, which strengthens the arguments of Euro-skeptics? Etzioni maintains that "there is no need to abolish loyalties and bonds of affections to one's nation, as long as on *selected* matters the loyalty to the new, encompassing community, trumps that of loyalty to one's nation" (Etzioni 2007: 34). What encourages people to unite in view of the new and changed attitudes to the phenomena of social reality? People's attention has always been drawn by moral concerns that usually have the power to unite. Therefore, it is obligatory to speak about them. Political processes should stimulate the search for common values, hence, for social cohesion, causing the sense of new communality, without which the EU *demos* is unimaginable. To eliminate "the deficit of community" it is necessary to encourage the consideration of the transnational values and the rights connected with them. Consequently, the democratization is possible only through building a community, which needs the sphere of transnational communication, particular ways and means of interaction.

While raising the question what the subject of the European political identity is, we should also discuss the content of the collective memory of the subject, since this content must sustain its political identity. The creators of the European political identity are facing the task to simultaneously "construct" European society and its memory, which requires certain common narratives. Taking into consideration the circumstances of the formation of national identities in the Modern times and the

development of those identities in the XX century, it is worth considering, what could be the basic discursive elements that reveal the idea of European identity and help unite the EU society, *demos*.

## 2

We are inclined to believe that many of the problems concerning the EU development, the rejection of EU Constitutional Treaty and other important matters connected with the development of EU after the acceptance of Lisbon Reform Treaty are and will be in one way or another linked with the attitude of political denationalization which prevails at the European political layer. Jiří Přibáň, who has analyzed the EU development and its peculiarities, expresses his opinion concerning the EU political attitude in the following way: “The European Union has been symbolically constructed as a civil alternative to the ethnically burdened nation states” (Přibáň 2005: 139). The denationalization attitude supports the model of the EU governance. The EU governance is inculcating the notion of the Network Europe, envisaging Europe as the community of citizens only who communicate on the basis of common rules in the environment of common institutions. The people join the associations or communities whose interaction makes up the nets. These nets involve sport clubs, cultural, educational institutions and business spheres as well as political, financial and legal communities. The main objective of the European politics is to promote the development of such nets, reinforce them and coordinate their work (Leonard 1999). The model of the Network Europe is associated with the policy of weakening the power of nation states. Some part of state powers is transferred to the regions, thus promoting the direct regional links as well as the direct cooperation between the regions and Brussels. How and why has such an attitude of denationalization been established?

After the World War II the fathers of European unification set the objective to create Europe free from any preconditions for new wars, let alone for the people’s slaughter. The main organizer of various atrocities was obvious – it was the German fascism and **nationalism**. Since other countries had invoked nationalism for their own purposes as well; nationalism was conceived as the basic phenomenon that must be erased. Nationalism became the Other in respect of which the vision of new Europe and European policy of development was established. In post-war Germany the political construction of national identity was provided to reach the determinate goal: “the past is excluded from any sense of ‘us’” (Müller-Härlin 2003: 276). The common political agreement was entrenched that the future of the new Europe entirely depends on the establishment of the attitude of denationalization. What is the source of nationalism? It actually springs from national feelings or at least from those that are considered to be national, which are supported by the national states, their policy, their cultural and political symbols and historical narratives. Thus, the environment of the suspicion for the manifestation of nationalism or alleged nationalism developed a habit to associate with nationalism all kinds of national feelings, manifestations of nationality, as well as all sorts of considerations of national questions. It is worth to notice that



according to Frantz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowski, who are leaning upon Federico Mancini and Joseph H. H. Weiler, though initial steps in making new Europe were considering as efforts to establish “European entity of constitutional nature”, yet soon “European integration become dissociated from any reference to the vocabulary linked to the nation-state: there are no European laws but regulations and directives; there is no government, but a commission; the whole construct was coined a Community, later a Union, but not a state” (Mayer, Palmowski 2004: 583). We can see that the development of the EU after Reform Treaty will acquire more features of state construction.

The political attitude of denationalization was analyzed and developed in their own way by the thinkers of deconstructive trend who put forward the principle of “unconditional hospitality to the Other”, which has to become the basic landmark of the Euro-integration policy, as well as the followers of Giorgio Agamben, urging to create a-territorial “Europe of strangers” (Agamben 2000: 23–24). In this respect the considerations of Jürgen Habermas are of particular significance, while he associates the future of Europe with the development of “constitutional patriotism”. Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility to discuss these trends of political thought in detail. However, we will throw some light on several important aspects revealed in Jacques Derrida and Habermas considerations.

The assumption made by Derrida is that the old Europe has already exhausted all the possibilities of self-identificational discourses; therefore, the intellectuals should be committed to guard the idea of Europe and the underlying possibility to create a different Europe, which is not confined to its identity, but is moving towards the position it has not reached yet (Derrida 1992: 29). The main obligation of Europe is to meet strangers with hospitality and kind-heartedness, not only integrating them but also accepting their difference.

Habermas envisages the future of Europe as a supranational formation, stretching far beyond the system of a federal country which should be based on the EU Constitution and the civic European identity stemming from it together with “European constitutional patriotism”. The backbone of the civic European identity should be created not out of certain common identities or European essence, but rather out of the painful learning experience of European communities and its results. An important role is played by the historical experience of the old European countries, especially Germany. However, this learning experience was very different. For example, Germany has learnt some things, whereas the societies which went through its aggression have learnt quite different things. The societies which started developing Western democracy sustained the results of World War II quite differently from the modern post-communist countries. Habermas suggests, however, that the new EU members are not too much concerned about learning or its results: they simply do not seem to be willing to share the sovereignty with Brussels. This reluctance has no reasonable background. Actually, it was the post-communist elites that unanimously rushed to share the sovereignty of their countries with Brussels, since after the fall of the Berlin wall such sharing helped them to keep their political and economical power most effectively. Speaking about the arguments in favor of the EU Constitution

Habermas suggests replacing the notion of ethnic nation by the concept of a civic nation (Habermas 2001). The identity of the civic nation suppressing the oneness of the ethnicity as well as the threat of nationalism emerges from the common processes of European democratic development. According to this conception, the key issue is the democratic public spirit that defines and embeds the abstract and legally mediated solidarity of the strangers in the EU space. Naturally, such abstract solidarity should acquire a more concrete content, but where should we look for it? Moreover, this solidarity should dissociate itself from the national cultures. In other words, this solidarity which, in its turn, has been strengthening the civic identity must create an entirely new content. From Habermas considerations we may assume that this new content might be filled with the common fate of all the European citizens. Nevertheless, so far such common fate is a total abstraction for most Europeans, since it still has not been decided neither on the ways of EU *demos* creating, nor on the prevailing social model, nor on the limits of the enlargement that could give this *demos* a more definite geographical “body”.

The EU Constitutional Treaty is absolutely necessary in order to consolidate all political forces to unanimously create the EU *demos*, the civic society, characterized by the civic transnational identity. Another important objective is to expand the European civic space, ensuring the participation of the citizens in solving both the European and the local problems, and, finally, to create the system of the European parties. Habermas has concretized his ideas in his well-known program statement “Unsere Erneuerung” (Derrida, Habermas 2003), which was also signed by Derrida. Both philosophers agree that it is extremely difficult to define the European identity, because many things which originated in Europe and testified Europeanness, such as Christianity, democracy, human rights, humanism and others, have already widely spread throughout the world, so they are no longer considered to be the peculiar features of Europeanness. While the New Europe is created from national states, the vitality of the European identity can be sustained only by the realization of common political fate and a convincing vision of the future. The most promising expectation regarding the future is that in Europe which has experienced various dramatic conflicts there has been established the attitude to recognize and admit the difference of the Other. It is this attitude that should be considered as the key feature of the Europeanness, as well as the backbone of the creation of the new political and civic European identity. The new features of Europeanness include the intolerance to violence, a belief to solve all sorts of controversial problems on the grounds of solidarity as well as a critical attitude to the omnipotence of market economy. It is suggested that the European *demos* should be created through the normative formations of the civic values, which are supposed to replace the essentialist and essentializing features of different identities as well as the features of the conceptions of the citizenship that sustain the disjuncture from the “others”. These values should encompass the commitments to democracy, freedom, and the European social models, since they should become the background for developing the tolerance and respect for diversity and difference.

It takes no effort to observe that in order to avoid the trap of the essentialism you can readily get into another pitfall. While the content of the pragmatic political definitions depends on the consensus of the political elites, the development of the civic society becomes exclusively the matter of the power of the political elites. Thus, the underlying and exemplary representative European democracy comes to be destroyed. Consequently, the “deficit” of democracy is not being reduced – still worse – it becomes an unsolvable and even non-solvable problem. On the other hand, nobody can tell whether the political attitude to “erase” the essentialism linked with the origin and the place of birth will not stimulate new manifestations of various kinds of nationalisms and certain made up or “revived” cultural and ethnic exclusiveness.

The experience of the 20<sup>th</sup> shows that national issues can turn into aggressive nationalism. However, on the other hand, as nationalism is historically related to the development of the democracy, it is only natural to speak about national democratic forms. Supplanting or marginalizing the expression of national issues, the abstract civic principles seem to hang in the air and lose contact with the diversity of ethnic or ethnic religious formations. Consequently, there is a threat that the ethnic cultural and religious communities could invoke those principles in order to consolidate their insularity as well as to reinforce their political power. Dominique Schnapper has precisely noted that some unsoundness (or even perversity) is typical of the construction of the European policy by trying to restrict the powers of the national states and by weakening the national political identity, at the same time developing the regional policy, that is strengthening the links with the regional authorities, which often seeks to snatch more powers from the state authorities and encourages the expression of the local “strong” ethnic and religious identities (Schnapper 2002: 8). At present the rise of regional nationalisms has already been making a great influence on the EU policy.

The attitude of the unconditional European openness to the Other and the program of the civic Europeanness being inculcated intersects with the tendency of the conspicuous spreading of radical ideologies. This tendency is regarded not as the manifestations of the old nationalisms, but rather as a by-product of globalization or response to the process of globalization. Having discussed the peculiarities of this tendency, Mary Kaldor comments that at the moment different political ideologies such as market fundamentalism, global Islamism, Europeanism, cosmopolitanism and, naturally, nationalism are fiercely competing with each other; all these phenomena being closely connected in the global world, thus from the point of view of cosmopolitan policy an attempt should be made not only to entrench the human rights all over the world, but also to develop the strategy of survival of different cultures in the process of globalization (Kaldor 2004: 174).

### 3

The construction and realization of the EU *demos* has become especially problematic (maybe it will be otherwise?) after the recent enlargement of the EU. How is the attitude of denationalization conceived by the societies of new Member States or,



moreover, is it conceived at all? While considering this question, we will refer to the example of Lithuania. Special attention should be drawn to one specific aspect, which is actually evaded by the researchers of the post-communist societies, that is the fact that the societies and nations which have experienced the policy of Soviet denationalization alongside with the intense Russification have entered into the realm of the new kind of denationalization policy. Thus, first and foremost, it is important to highlight the peculiarities of the policy of Soviet denationalization.

Soviet denationalization was continuously and remarkably ingenuously implemented by erasing, even burning out the Other of the past that embraced the existence of a formerly independent state (the “fascist regime of Antanas Smetona”, “the so-called independence”), the values of independence and statehood, and, particularly, the tragedy of the pre- and post-war transportations as well as the struggles of the post-war armed resistance. The Other of the past was characterized by an extremely dangerous for Soviet reality feature regarded as a lethal infection, namely, “the bourgeois nationalism”. That nationalism had to be supplanted by upbringing a new Soviet man, i.e. an internationalist. Like the postwar Germans could not imagine talking about their life during the years of the fascist dictatorship, the Lithuanians and the citizens of all occupied Soviet republics, similarly, could not dare to speak openly about the existence of the independent state, occupation, transportation and the post-war resistance. The attitude of the extermination of “bourgeois nationalism” slightly resembles the attitude of the European denationalization since the Other possessing the features of nationalism is being erased and marginalized. Yet, it is that Other in whose regard the landmarks of the future policy are being established together with the program of the individual identity forming and self-training. Here we have in mind certain logic, which is defined by the very action of “erasure” or dissociation, rather than the similarity of the policy being implemented. The Soviet erasing of the Other was based upon the society’s fear stemming from the experience of the “gulag” system and other atrocities of Stalinism.

Lithuania’s liberation from the Soviet Union should be regarded as the manifestation of the national liberation movement, since the nation that has accumulated the statehood experience was escaping from the iron grip of the occupation. In spite of being erased from the public consciousness it was the surviving and still vital Other that was invoked to summon the Lithuanian society and the Lithuanian nation for the breakthrough of liberation. That Other included the experience of national statehood, the tragedy of transportation as well as the history of the armed postwar resistance, stimulated by the national feelings and national values. In other words, the national liberation was sustained by national feelings and by the rhetoric upraising of the national symbols and cultural forms. It was the feeling of the identification between the nation and the state as well as the statehood that mattered most of all. Such identification is not an exceptional nationalist feature of the Lithuanians and other societies of some new Member States. It is also typical of other European nations, though it is not expressed so notably. Having reviewed the debates in Denmark on the European integration, Lene Hansen notices: “In the context of Danish debates on European

integration, the most important consequence has been a preoccupation with the nation-state as the optimal model for embodying political identity, trust and authority” (Hansen 2003: 312).

After Lithuania had regained its independence it soon became evident that for the Western observers and analysts who were nurtured in the environment of suspicion regarding nationalism, the rhetoric of the national liberation and revival seemed to be not quite acceptable, rather strange, and needing to be promptly changed. It were nationalist traditions that certain political thinkers had in mind when they exaggeratingly warned against the future of post-Soviet states be shaped by the past (Habermas 1994: 66). The Lithuanians came to be looked upon as the nation which is too much exalted, “far too” overestimating the significance of the national and religious symbols as well as its history. Thus, it can be stated that after the regaining of independence Lithuanian society became frustrated because of the uncertainty concerning national, civic, and cultural identity. This uncertainty is aggravated by ever widening gap between the political elite, decisions makers and the public interests.

Our political elite has not considered publicly either the attitude of denationalization, or the landmarks of creating the civic Europeanness, or the new problems raised by that policy. It seems that the post-Soviet elite was very quick to conceive the attitude of the European denationalization and managed to adapt to it. How did it happen so?

In order to answer this question, we should find out what kind of political elite governed and is still governing Lithuania. In Lithuania, which has regained its independence, the political and economical power has been retained by the communist nomenclature that has accumulated a very wide experience in the policy of Soviet denationalization, in the fight against the “bourgeois nationalism” as well as in the upbringing of the “new man”. Consequently, the local political elite did not have to change the basic attitude regarding the national question. All it had to do was to endue that attitude with a new kind of rhetoric. The former Lithuanian communist elite of nomenclature has retained the political and economical power and has adjusted to the EU political elite on the grounds of Euro-integration and its ideology. National issues were either marginalized or left for self-extinction. The questions of the national and cultural identity and the potential threats to it have become “old-fashioned”, inappropriate and have been pushed into the sphere of the manifestations of nationalism to be supplanted. Thus, it may be claimed that the Lithuanian society is experiencing a certain both national and civic identity crisis, which is being stimulated by an extremely large wave of emigration. This does not allow the society to properly conceive and assimilate civic European values.

Two main attitudes can be distinguished in regard to the EU development. Some hold that it is the incoherence of the policy of denationalization that causes most problems, so it just should be enhanced. We are inclined to support the other attitude, maintaining that it is necessary to look for the ways how to invoke the “glue” of national feelings and values which could reinforce the social and cultural cohesion in

the process of creating the EU *demos*. Of course, we should take into consideration the dangers of nationalism. In the words of José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, “it is simply wrong to think that a single market can be sustained without social cohesion, a political vision and the solidarity that flows from the feeling of belonging to a common Project” (Barroso 2005). These words point to the problem of social content of integrational drives and the need of a more determinate European community and in their own way reassert the conclusions made some time ago by Michael Wilkinson: “Faced with the combination of the apparent intransigence of national democratic structures, and the increasing opposition to the development of market (re-)regulation without democratic legitimization, Europe is perhaps in need in developing new democratic governance and effective global management” (Wilkinson 2002: 186). Thus national democratic forms and national feelings seems to be necessary for any roads to new democratic European governance and European *demos*. The more so that the manifestations of a modern nationalism can be regarded not only as the response to the threats posed by globalization, but also to the too forthright policy of denationalization which is let down from “the top”.

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## EUROPIETIŠKASIS *DEMOS*: DEMOKRATIJOS STOKA IR NACIONALINIAI JAUSMAI

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### Santrauka

Gilinantį į Europos Sąjungą (ES), kaip į pasaulinę civilizacijų sistemą keičiančio civilizacinio darinio integracinius procesus, aiškėja, kad ES ateitis priklausys nuo to, koks požiūris į nacionalinius, etnokultūrinius bei politinius tapatumus išivyras tarp šios bendrijos politikos formuotojų. Domėtis įvairiais tapatumais paskatino ES Konstitucinės Sutarties nesėkmė, sukėlusį svarstymų bangą apie naują Europos „išradimą“ ar „pagrindimą“. Keltas esminis klausimas – kas yra Konstitucinės Sutarties subjektas ir kokie europietiškojo *demos* bruožai? Išryškėjo ES būdingos demokratijos, legitimumo ir visuomenės stokos, tad tolesnė integracija įsivaizduotina kaip jų šalinimo vyksmas. Klausimas – kaip šitai galima daryti vyraujant politinei denacionalizavimo nuostatai, kuri buvo įtvirtinta dedant naujos Europos pagrindus? Politinę denacionalizacijos nuostatą palaiko pastaraisiais metais išplitę postnacionalinio tapatumo, europinio konstitucinio patriotizmo, taip pat besąlygiško svetingumo diskursai. Legitimumo ir kitokių stokų bei europietiškojo *demos* problemos ypač suaktualėjo išsiplėtus ES. Priimtų valstybių visuomenėms ir tautoms būdinga kitokia istorinė patirtis, stipresni nacionaliniai jausmai, kurie ir padėjo išsivaduoti iš sovietinės okupacijos. Į šias jausenas būtina atsižvelgti svarstant europietiškojo *demos* kūrimo planus. Socialinių europinės visuomenės turinį derėtų kaupti ir kurti ne atmetant nacionalines jausenas, o pasitelkiant prisirišimą prie tautos, kultūros, kalbos bei istorinių mitų, tad kyla būtinumas keisti politinę denacionalizavimo nuostatą.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: denacionalizacija, ES Konstitucinė Sutartis, europietiškas *demos*, legitimumo stoka, nacionalinis tapatumas, nacionalizmas, sovietinė okupacija.

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