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Expulsions in the Russian North: migration processes and neoliberal policy*

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Abstract. The article summarizes the results of a long-term study of changes in living conditions of the population in the North during the formation of trade capitalism and the spread of neoliberal policy. Expulsion is considered as an institutionally organized way of exception in the form of state policy, actively supporting social polarization, contributing to consumer way of natural resource development and extensive use of before-built infrastructure, and accompanied by the isolation of the experience, disregard of the interests and violation of the rights of residents. The article proves that Soviet policy, interested in attracting labor to develop the Russian North and used a distribution system of goods for these purposes, did not contribute much to the consolidation of labor migrants in the northern territories as it initiated their return to the homeland at the end of their labor biography. The position of a “temporary worker” was formed by the proposed privileges, which served as a compensation for work in adverse climatic conditions but did not contribute to the prospects for the development of the northern territories. At the same time, the interests of residents, who turned out to be cut off from prestigious jobs and found themselves in worse living conditions, were regularly ignored, and their rights were unrecognized. If, through vertical mobility and integration into the Soviet distribution system, it was possible to smooth out the inequities in the distribution of benefits, it became more difficult to hide this with the country's transition to the market and the beginning of a new phase of natural resource extraction. Moreover, considering the exclusion processes have become more widespread. Now not only the indigenous peoples of the North but also the second generation of migrants are among the vulnerable groups. The focus of the conflict has shifted and expressed itself in the relations between the residents of the Center and the regions.

Keywords: *social exclusion, expulsions, migration processes, neoliberal policy, Northern regions of Russia, development and colonization, Soviet heritage.*

Introduction

When studying and evaluating modern migration processes in Russia, domestic scientists observe a severe bias towards problems associated with migrants and migrant workers entering the country. Even though the number of people moving inside the state is higher than the number of international migrants (In 2017, the internal Russian migration amounted to more than 4 million people, while the number of international migrants who left and arrived was less than 1 million [1, Scherbakova E.M.]), and the possible consequences can be dramatic, the processes of internal migration and their relationship with the prospects for the development of regions are analyzed less frequently. So, when understanding the importance of migrants to solve the country's

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geopolitical interests [2, Rybakovskiy L.L.], their significance in the regions is ignored. Little discussion of the debate on the choice between future citizens and temporary workers [3, Mukomel V.I., p. 44], which at the regional level is directly related to the problem of forming a resident population or attracting temporary shift workers, as well as the issue of the relationship between indigenous people and migrants [4, Ryazantsev S.V.]. The studies do not consider the Soviet migration and its impact on the current situation; the topic of the “double” effect of migration on people forced to accept mobile labor flows at one stage of the life cycle and observe at another as they leave their homes. Finally, with a significant number of publications analyzing the impact of state migration policy, there is no criticality concerning the market itself [5, Lytkina T.S., Yaroshenko S.S.]. Researchers still pay little attention to the consequences of the current policy. They have little reflection on the uniqueness of Russia as a territory with many regions that have their characteristics of socio-economic development.

For some scientists, the study of migration processes in the Russian North may seem a far-fetched problem, since the harsh climate is an indisputable argument in favor of the outflow of the population. Moreover, there is a point of view that the development of a territory rich with natural resources is costly. It is so not only because it is cold, but also because of the surplus population, and therefore the ongoing relocation from the north to the south can be regarded as a positive market influence on the Russian economy [6, Smirnov S., Garcia-Iser M.; 7, Efremov I.A.]. They will be right, but only to some extent. We argue that climate is significant, but far from the main factor of northern migration. Firstly, the outflow of the population is observed even in territories with relatively favorable climatic conditions. Secondly, during the statistical registration of registration at a new place of residence, less than one percent of those who left indicated that they didn't comply with the climatic conditions as the reason for leaving; thirdly, in the late 1990s. The practice was widespread among northerners when, exercising their right to move under the resettlement program, they returned to severe climatic places and continued to work there (on the contrary, those who wished to leave could not afford this).

In this paper, migration processes in the Russian North are analyzed in the framework of the concept of expulsions as a form of institutionally organized exclusion. It is proved that, on the one hand, the outflow of the population is a consequence of the previously pursued Soviet policy, which was interested in the reproduction and maintenance of the workforce in the North, while ignoring the interests and non-recognition of the life experience of local residents; and on the other hand, the processes of expulsions, today directly connected with the new (self-expanding) economic boundaries of capitalism: the excessive exploitation of natural and labor resources for additional profit. We want to say that the processes of social exclusion give rise to the means of expulsion and show how they become inextricably interconnected.

New ways of exploitation are always aimed at finding vulnerabilities in politics and economics; they are generated by exclusion processes that contribute to strengthening structures of social inequality, while limiting the realization of civil rights and the ability to manage the life situ-

ation of low-resource groups. Despite the fact that “social exclusion” and “expulsion” have the potential of different levels of explanation (individual / territorial), the heuristic possibilities of these two concepts are essentially links in the same chain and consist in explaining the processes of capitalization. At *the individual level*, we have a system of limited external opportunities that determine access to material and social benefits and are manifested in the folding of individual resources and needs. At *the level of the territory*, we see the result of expulsion in the form of curtailing social and economic potentials, the absence of grounds for sustainable development: both the individual is deprived of the opportunity to manage life situation and the territory (territorial community) as a development strategy. The crowding out at the level of the northern regions of Russia is accompanied by the loss of priority rights to the territory and natural resources, as well as the deprivation of the possibilities for the remaining citizens to influence the decision-making processes on the nature of the development of the territory, followed by a decrease in their level and quality of life.

Aware of the close relationship between the concepts of “social exclusion” and “expulsions”, we are trying to strengthen S. Sassen's position: we complement the principle of unity of society and territory that she reflexes with K. Dorre's ideas about the dynamics of the development of capitalism (Landnahme). Whereas in Sassen expulsion is found in the “flight” of the population [8, Sassen S.], in our case it is in defensive strategies that are manifested in the use of resources of the past to compensate for the negative market influence [9, Burawoy M., Krotov P., Lytkina T.; 10, Yaroshenko S.S.; 11, Lytkina T.S.]. We also argue that a territory that loses highly qualified specialists of various professions fails the possibility of socio-economic development or, in the language of economists, “competitive advantages” (according to some scholars, expectations about the competitiveness of the North are inappropriate [12, Pilyasov A.N., Zamyatina N.Yu.]), is becoming more vulnerable to further exploitation: in areas with depleted human capital, the formation of adequate protection from the market is demanding. In turn, the absence of such protections from the market leads to the fact that capitalist players have even more (!) More privileges and opportunities to include territory in their accumulation strategies [13, Dörre K.]. In table 1, we give the main categories of the concept of expulsions based on the concept of expansion and the concept of exclusion.

Table 1

Expulsions: theoretical frames of the research

Concept		Mechanism of expulsion
<i>Expulsions</i> (S. Sassen)	<i>Expantion of capitalism</i> (K.Dörre)	Politics concerning the Russian North:
		Strengthening the structures of social inequality:

- power and financial communications
- polarization of society through a reduction in social protection and precarization of workers
- reduction and extensive use of the infrastructure with a deterioration in the quality of services provided
- spatial
- urbanization (city / village)

	<i>Social exclusion as a deprivation of the ability to manage a life situation (A. Sen, S. Yaroshenko, T. Lytkina)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • industry • class • gender <p>The process of producing a social position:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rights violation • ignoring interests • non-recognition of differences • isolation of experience
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Completed by the authors.

The expansion involves the spread of capitalism through the capture and capitalization of resources that were previously not goods. It is accompanied by power and financial communications focused on the capital, a consumer way of developing natural resources, the polarization of society, and the extensive use of infrastructure. In turn, an exception, as we noted above, means depriving one of the ability to manage one's personal life situation. It is facilitated by isolation of experience, non-recognition of differences, ignoring interests, and violation of rights. The combination of these two processes leads to the strengthening of inequality structures.

The scientific novelty of the article lies in the further development of the concept of expulsions, that is, the removal of local communities from managing the territory. The article deals with how the policy concerning the northern areas through the expansion at the macro-level leads to the reaction of the population at the micro-level. It means the migration outflow or disagreement with the (re) production of a social position in the face of limited life opportunities in the North. Before moving directly to the results of the study, we present the research strategy for studying the North.

Russian North: definition and study methods

The concept of "North" does not have an established explanation. It is preferably associated with historical, cultural and/or geographical representations than with administrative divisions. It is for this reason that Kostroma and Vologda Oblasts, which are not part of the Far North, or Tomsk Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Krai, which are partly part of the North, are often ranked among the northern territories of Russia. Given the high influence of state policy on the development of the North, incl. the creation of a system of incentives for the formation of a migratory influx in the Soviet period, the authors decided to allocate the North on the basis of the administrative-territorial principle. The first attempts to regionalize the North as the "Far North" were made in 1932. Until now, the concept of "remote areas" or "northern outskirts inhabited by indigenous peoples" has been applied relatively to the current northern regions [14, Fauzer V.V., Lytkina T.S., Fauzer G.N., p. 20]¹.

Our focus is on the regions of Russia, the territories of which are fully included in the list of areas of the Far North and equivalent localities. This list includes 13 constituent entities of the

¹ In 1945, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, were introduced two concepts: "Far North" and "areas equated to areas of the Far North". Subsequently, the list changed, but it expanded significantly in 1992. Recent changes were made in 2012. In May 2014, a list of land territories of the Arctic zone of Russia was determined. In our article, the Arctic zone is considered as the territory of the North.

Russian Federation (Table 2). The north is extremely polarized: almost half of the population lives in large and medium-sized cities, and the rest of the community lives in small towns and rural settlements². In total, 7 million 850.9 thousand people live in the North. Despite the impressive size of the population, it makes up only 5.3% of Russia's population. Compared to Moscow and the Moscow Oblast, the Russian North is a territory that is 163 times larger and has 2.6 times less population.

Table 2

*The population of the Russian North territories, 1989 and 2018.*³

	Census 1989			January 1, 2018				
	Total population, thous. people.	including:		Total population, thous. people.	including:		площадь территории, тыс. кв. км	Population density, persons per 1 km ²
		urban	rural		urban	rural		
Russian Federation	147 400.5	108 425.6	38 975.0	146 880.4	109 326.9	37 553.5	17 125.2	8.58
Northern territories	9 633.1	7 608.8	2 024.3	7 850.9	6 362.4	1 488.5	7 623.7	1.03
European North	4 769.4	3 806.8	962.6	3 372.0	2 754.1	617.9	1 332.1	2.53
Republic of Karelia	791.3	645.7	145.6	622.5	500.6	121.9	180.5	3.45
Komi Republic	1 261.0	952.3	308.7	840.9	656.8	184.1	416.8	2.02
Arkhangelsk Oblast	1 570.3	1 152.5	417.8	1 155.0	900.9	254.1	589.9	1.96
Nenets AO	54.8	34.3	20.5	44.0	32.0	12.0	176.8	0.25
Murmansk Oblast	1 146.8	1 056.3	90.5	753.6	695.8	57.8	144.9	5.20
Asian North	4 863.7	3 802.0	1 061.7	4 478.9	3 608.3	870.6	6 291.6	0.71
Khanty-Mansi AO	1 268.4	1 152.8	115.7	1 655.1	1 528.3	126.8	534.8	3.09
Yamal-Nenets AO	486.2	378.6	107.6	538.5	451.4	87.1	769.3	0.70
Tyva Republic	309.1	145.6	163.5	321.7	173.9	147.8	168.6	1.91
Rep. Sakha (Yakutia)	1 081.4	721.2	360.2	964.4	632.9	331.5	3 083.5	0.31
Kamchatka Krai	466.1	379.1	87.0	315.5	246.8	68.7	464.3	0.68
Magadan Oblast	385.3	325.6	59.7	144.1	138.2	5.9	462.5	0.31
Sakhalin Oblast	709.6	584.8	124.8	490.2	402.0	88.2	87.1	5.63
Chukotka AO	157.5	114.2	43.3	49.4	34.8	14.6	721.5	0.07

The proposed study is a logical continuation of the study of changes in living conditions of the population living in the North, after the collapse of the USSR. The collection of in-depth interviews carried out within the framework of a qualitative methodology was started in 1994 in the capital of the Komi Republic, Syktyvkar, and was caused by the first economic shocks that affected industrial workers. The study was longitudinal in nature and was initiated by Professor of the University of California M. Buravoy⁴. To understand the situation of workers better, we met them every two years and conducted in-depth interviews with families until 2002. Later (in 2010–2014), the focus was on the residents of the depressed town of Inta, located north of the capital of the

² According to official statistics (01.01.2018), 40% of the population of the North of Russia live in large cities - 3 million 152.0 thousand people and about the same in small cities, villages, and urban-type settlements (urban settlements). In medium-sized towns, there are 695.7 thousand people (9%), in small towns - 1 million 786.9 thousand people, and 727.8 thousand people account for the town. 1 million 488.4 thousand people or 19.0% of the Northerners live in rural areas.

³ Compiled from the 1989 census. URL: www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/census.php (accessed 09 December 2019) and Statisticheskogo sbornika «Chislennost' i migraciya naseleniya Rossijskoy Federacii v 2018 godu» [The statistical collection "Population and migration of the Russian Federation in 2018"]. URL: www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b19_107/Main.htm (accessed 09 December 2019).

⁴ Project "Economic Involution" (project leader M. Buravoy, University of California).

republic⁵. In-depth interviews were also conducted there, but that time we talked not only with ordinary citizens but also with the heads of government bodies and enterprises. We did not disregard the rural residents and, although it was the shortest project in the Udorsky and Izhemsky districts (2010)⁶; it forced to turn to the history of the socio-economic development of the republic and the development of the North.

Each time, changing levels of explanation (individual, local community, the population of the North), we pushed the theoretical framework: the theory of social exclusion - the regime of social exclusion - the concept of expulsion. Interviews with workers showed a sharp decline in their well-being and social status. The everyday reality of emerging Russian capitalism did not lead to the accumulation (activation) of internal resources, but their diversification and subsequent curtailment together with the level of needs. The closure of enterprises, prolonged non-payment of wages forced workers to transfer economic activity from the enterprise to the household [15, Burawoy M., Krotov P., Lytkina T.]. The workers tried to defend their rights, but received no support from the rest of society, resigned themselves to the miracle promised by the optimists of the market. They did not wait long. So, the waiting was replaced by an awareness of the loss of rights and injustice of the capitalist system. Their position was fundamentally different from the position of intellectuals, who continued to believe in the market and did not trust the state.

The split in Russian society led to the creation of many social positions. The individuals who occupied them in the struggle for limited resources began to unite into closed social groups. The social distance between them increased along with the growth of distrust and socio-cultural insensitivity to each other. As a result, the local communities of small northern cities in conditions of limited opportunities, having lost their self-sufficiency, and having gained the experience of failures, "closed". It was noted that the residents of the Komi Republic, forming survival strategies, do not resort to mass protests. They preferred mutual assistance practices that promote such a social organization of life, in which it becomes possible to exploit natural and human resources further and expand capitalism. Now, local communities have lost their relationship with the rest of society. Their previous status as conquerors of the North was lost. The strategies of behavior on the labor market, and indeed life in the North, no longer had anything to do with the demonstrative success models of a modern market society. They were among those expelled indigenous people whose interests and rights began to be ignored even before the advent of Soviet power and before the start of large-scale industrialization of the country. However, for all the complexity of the situation, they did not want to recognize vulnerable equality and still believed that indigenous people, despite the damage to their lifestyle, should be grateful to them for the development of territories in the Soviet years.

⁵ The basic research program of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the project "Social Potential of the Russian North: Networks, Trust and Mutual Assistance Practices" No. 12-U-7-100 (leader – T. Lytkina, ISEiEPS KomiSC UB RAS).

⁶ The project "Post-industrial transformation as a factor in reducing the peripheral space of the northern region" of the basic research program of the Presidium of the RAS, 2009-2011 (leader – T.E. Dmitriev, ISEiEPS KomiSC UB RAS).

If until now, the work has used high-quality methods for the study of sociology (case study), and a close look was focused on the Komi Republic, then in 2016, we turned to regulatory documents, analysis of statistics, and strategic planning documents for the development of the North. We are aware that each northern territory has its own experience in modernizing economic activity. Some areas are “richer” (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and NAO); the others are “poorer” (Tuva and Karelia). They had different periods of development and the extent of migration; the diversity of the ethnic composition of the residents was replaced by uniformity, and almost 100% is the indigenous population (Table 3). And yet, most of the areas were included in the northern ones even at the stage of formation of regulatory regulation of the North as territories geographically remote from resettlement centers located at the borders of the North of the country and requiring development. The exception is the Republic of Tuva, which was included in the list of regions of the North only in 1994⁷. It acts as a kind of enclave located in the south of Russia; it does not have a large-scale mining industry and, in many respects, resembles the “depressed” agricultural regions of the country. The remaining territories are characterized by a development cycle, when the depletion of natural resources sets in at the last stage, which leads to a decrease in economic activity, a drop in the level of population’s income, and degradation of the social sphere. An essential factor in the development of the region is the attachment to the place of residence, the interest of citizens in the development of the territory, and their ability to protect their rights, which is mainly due to the number of indigenous people and the proportion of locals in northern regions. The interest in protecting rights and influencing the development of the territory is higher where the percentage of indigenous people and natives is higher, as well as the likelihood of their participation in government.

Table 3

The share of the titular ethnic group and locals in the northern regions of Russia according to the population censuses 1939–2010, %⁸

Territories	Year of establishment	Titular ethnic group	Share of the titular ethnic group							Share of locals
			1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002*	2010*	2010*
Republic of Karelia	1920	Karelians	23.2	13.1	11.8	11.1	10.0	9.2	7.4	73.6
Komi Republic	1921	Komi	72.5	30.1	28.6	25.3	23.3	25.3	23.7	70.9
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	1922	Yakuts	56.3	46.4	43.0	36.9	33.4	45.7	49.9	78.5
Tyva Republic	1944	Tuvans	-	57.0	58.6	60.5	64.3	77.0	82.0	93.4
Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1929	Nenets	11.8	10.9	15.0	12.8	11.9	19.0	18.6	71.0

⁷ At that time, the Republic of Altai and Buryatia entered, but partially, therefore, unlike Tyva, they are not considered in our analysis

⁸ Completed using the results of census. URL: www.gks.ru, demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/census.php (accessed 09 December 2019) and Fauzer V.V., Lytkina T.S., Fauzer G.N. Vliyanie migracii na jetnicheskiju strukturu naselenija severa Rossii [The impact of migration on the ethnic structure of the population of the north of Russia]. In *Demograficheskij potencial stran EAJeS: sb. st. VIII Ural'skogo demograficheskogo foruma* [Demographic potential of the EAEU countries: Sat. Art. VIII Ural Demographic Forum. Volume II]. Ekaterinburg: Institut jekonomiki UrO RAN, T. II, 2017. pp. 541–548.

Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	1930	Mansi	6.2	5.0	2.5	1.1	0.5	0.7	0.8	31.1
		Khanty	13.1	9.0	4.5	1.9	0.9	1.2	1.3	
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	1930	Chukchi	56.3	21.4	10.9	8.1	7.3	24.0	26.7	31.0
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	1930	Nenets	29.3	22.4	22.0	11.0	4.2	5.3	5.9	36.9
Arhangelsk Oblast	1937	-**	93.6	91.5	92.1	92.4	92.1	94.4	95.6	82.0
Murmansk Oblast	1938	-**	84.0	85.3	84.6	83.8	82.9	86.3	80.8	53.6
Magadan Oblast	1953	-**	-	73.3	78.3	77.6	72.5	80.4	81.5	53.4
Sakhalin Oblast	1918	-**	82.9	77.7	80.4	81.7	81.6	84.8	82.3	68.0
Kamchatka Krai	1932	-**	79.7	82.5	83.0	82.9	81.0	83.6	78.4	57.4

* percentage of the number of persons who marked their nationality/place of birth; ** the share of Russians - if no titular ethnic group in the territory.

Thus, the article first summarizes the results of sociological studies that allow interpreting statistical data and assessing the main trends in the reactions of the inhabitants of the northern territories to changing policies. Then, based on official statistical compilations and bulletins of Rosstat (1990–2017)⁹, and the results of censuses (1989, 2002, 2010)¹⁰ the analysis of migration processes was completed. However, the study of the number and composition of migrants and the impact of migration on the structure of the permanent population of the North, does not allow us to determine the direction of migration flows and the intensity of migration in urban districts and municipal areas of the North. To implement this part of the study, we used recently published indicators from the Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System (UIISS)¹¹ and Databases of indicators of municipalities (DB IM)¹².

Northern Territory Development Policies: from Soviet distribution to Post-Soviet expulsion

We, Komi, do not know how to protect our rights. We have no natural resources left; the indigenous population does not dispose of them; nothing belongs to them; they have nothing from them (natural resources). We have lost our main trump card - natural resources. Oil, gas, etc., all profits, everything always leaves (m., head of the municipality, Udorsky district)¹³.

Today I want to say that it is becoming difficult for the poor reindeer herder to work. Today, expansion is in the oil industry. Today they are taking the land of these rein-

⁹ Serii «Chislennost' i migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii», «Demograficheskiy ezhegodnik Rossii», «Regiony Rossii. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie pokazateli» [Series "The number and migration of the population of the Russian Federation", "Demographic Yearbook of Russia", "Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators"]. URL: <http://gks.ru> (accessed 09 December 2019).

¹⁰ Perepisi naseleniya Rossiyskoy Imperii, SSSR, Rossii [Censuses of the Russian Empire, USSR, Russia]. URL: <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/census.php> (accessed 09 December 2019).

¹¹ Edinaya mezhvedomstvennaya informatsionno-statisticheskaya Sistema [Unified interdepartmental information and statistical system]. URL: <https://fedstat.ru/> (accessed 09 December 2019).

¹² Baza dannykh pokazateley munitsipal'nykh obrazovaniy. Rosstat [Database of indicators of municipalities. Rosstat]. URL: <http://gks.ru/dbscripts/munst/> (accessed 09 December 2019).

¹³ This and other interviews used in the article were a part of the project "Post-industrial transformation as a factor in reducing the peripheral space of the northern region" of the fundamental research program of the Presidium of the RAS, 2009-2011.

deer herders. Today, at the same level, they are equally involved in the competition for land leases for both the oilman and the reindeer herder. Is that right? Is this an approach? Why am I talking about the law? What is it? You need to paint all the rules of the game in this law. Who is a reindeer herder? It is their land; they didn't bring deer here, the deer was born here, this is their habitat (f., head of the enterprise, Inta).

The development of capitalism needs to expand the methods and forms of exploitation. The most favorable environment is in non-capitalist societies, esp. if they are subjected to harsh criticism and are full of faith in the ability of the free market to solve any problems - which Russia appeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The socialist system was not only unable to develop effective ways to regulate the market but also minimized market relations, being immune from market pressure [16, Burawoy M.]¹⁴. As a result, excessive optimism about the relatively smooth change of one regulatory structure (the worst version of socio-economic development) to another (ideal model) not only did not come true but also allowed the formation of an even stricter system of exploitation and violence. But before that, the Soviet system, as well as being introduced in the 1990s the market made the most discriminatory practices and methods of oppressing the previous regime.

Meanwhile, the foundations of colonization in the North of Russia, rich in natural resources, were laid in the 19th century. They are not accepted, as well as the fact that the ambitious plans of the tsarist government to transform the territory into a prosperous land were carried out in the context of catching up modernization modeled on the West European and American environmental management models [17, Korotaev V.I.]¹⁵. The development of the northern lands, regardless of ownership, consent or tolerance, was widely supported by the government, clergy, industrialists, and intellectuals¹⁶ without considering the life experience of the indigenous people of

¹⁴ The intensive planting of socialist ideology makes the forms of exploitation visible (transparent), while the rules of the game of the capitalist system led to their mystification.

¹⁵ At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, the policy of Russian statism took shape: the meaning of each and everyone is in serving the state. The state itself has lost its sacredness, turning into a police force and creating alienation between various classes of Russia. At the same time, the fierce competition began between Russia and foreign states (Great Britain, Norway, Germany), primarily regarding fisheries. Norway, which ranks second in the world in the number of fish caught, began to dictate its conditions in the fishing zone of Russian Pomors and actively displace them from the domestic market. Unlike Russians, Norwegians took a more active part in settlement of the border regions of the Russian North. As a result of this activity, by 1900, Russian colonists lived in Murman 44%, Finns and Norwegians 43.5%, representatives of the northern peoples (Karelians and Lapps) - 12.5% of the population. Whereas in the territories of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, Great Britain, Norway, and Germany claimed for natural resources, then in the Far East American industrialists poached and soldered the local population (Zulyar Yu.A. A previous look at the industrialization of Siberia. Part 1 [Predvzyatyy vzglyad na industrializatsiyu Sibiri. Chast' 1]. *Izvestia Irkutskogo State University. Series: Political Science. Religious Studies* [Izvestiya Irkutskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Politologiya. Religiovedenie], 2011, no.1, pp. 29-41). In other words, in a problematic socio-political situation within the country, Russia was urgently faced with the question of preserving the borders of the state and the right to use natural resources. The same problems persisted with the advent of Soviet power.

¹⁶ The solitary thoughts of scientists - opponents of the colonization of the North - were not accepted by the tsarist government. According to A.A. Charushin (1) should not recklessly follow the experience of other countries, forgetting about the peculiarities of the way of life of peasants; (2) nature itself is an unremovable obstacle, and this must be

the North and the practices of their interaction with nature. When ignoring the value system, the lifestyle of residents was stigmatized, and they were considered underdeveloped, aliens, “enemies of progress”, “native population”, “wild peoples” [21, Kamenev A.A., pp. 15; 16, Korotaev V.I., p. 46]. Active, enterprising, young people should have “rebuilt” the northern world; they should have settled the territory. In other words, the perception of natural resources in the form of a bottomless pantry of uncountable wealth and the possibility of enrichment was reflected in neglect of the balanced connection of the indigenous people of the North with nature¹⁷, which became the basis in the Soviet period for the formation of specific forms of exclusion through ignoring life experience and suppressing the personality in the process of reproduction and maintenance of the workforce.

During the catch-up modernization, the Soviet government continued not only the policy of colonization of the North but also statism, which already in the 1930s established itself in its extreme form - totalitarianism. Initially, the Soviet government actively collaborated with specialists in the previous system, preparing new personnel. The joint efforts of the “old” and “new” cadres of overtaking modernization have given acceleration. The population of the northern territories began to multiply and take shape as a result of intensive migration. At the same time, the North became a zone of industrial development and a place of punishment for those disliked by the state. In the Stalin period, these were, first of all, convicted for political reasons and special immigrants; later - representatives of the underworld.

During the development of the North, not economic surpluses were invested, but labor resources. If subsequently the cruel practice of using the GULAG system of the NKVD of the USSR was severely criticized, then the contribution to the development of the territory of local peasants (expropriation of peasant farms, forced labor at the same time at enterprises and on the ground) went unnoticed. Meanwhile, experiencing regular harassment by representatives of the Gulag system, residents were often simultaneously forced to solve food problems and work on logging sites. Formally, the state did not bear any responsibility for the situation of collective farmers, shifting this burden on themselves: with the growth of workdays, the monetary content decreased and often was not paid. Without undeniable facts of apparent resistance, expressed in refusing to work, wrecking and/or other methods of intentionally undermining the economy, the quality of life of peasants fell to the level of forced migrants [22, Lytkina T.S., Fauzer V.V., pp. 105].

reckoned with; (3) settler-colonists do not have the necessary resources to adapt to a new place (Charushin A.A. *Voprosy kolonizatsii Severa* [Issues of colonization of the North]. *Izvestiya Arkhangel'skogo obshchestva izucheniya Russkogo Severa* [Bulletin of the Arkhangel'sk Society for the Study of the Russian North], 1911, no. 4. pp. 259–265). Sorokin A. P. believed that no colonization of the North was necessary, it was enough to raise the agricultural culture of old peasants (Sorokin P.A. *Pechorskaya ekspeditsiya i kolonizatsiya Zyryanskogo kraya* [Pechora expedition and colonization of the Zyryan Territory]. *Izvestiya Arkhangel'skogo obshchestva izucheniya Russkogo Severa* [Bulletin of the Arkhangel'sk Society for the Study of the Russian North], 1911, no. 8–9, pp. 645–651).

¹⁷At the same time, it should be noted that the ideas of harmonizing the relationship between man and nature became spread a hundred years later.

Rather fast, the logging industry, with minimal financial outlays, became the “main foreign exchange shop”, ensuring further exploration work in the North. Subsequently, income from mining operations became the basis for the implementation of plans for expanded industrialization of the whole country. Along with the growing demand for qualified specialists for the oil and gas industry and coal mining, the need arises for the formation of a labor stimulation system in the North to attract new, already prepared by the network, young Soviet personnel. In place of forced migration carried out without taking into account the interests of the sending and receiving parties, the possibilities of accommodating people and creating basic social and living conditions for work and life, a system of benefits and benefits for “conquerors of the North” is being formed, new working cities are being developed with expanded infrastructure tour. In essence, the state, through negotiations with enterprises, delegated cares about its citizens. Enterprises became the epicenters of the distribution of goods [23, Burawoy M.], and they built neighborhoods of residential complexes, kindergartens, and sanatoriums. The scale and quality of the offered products depended on the prestige of the industry and were not linked to the development prospects of the northern territory. However, such concern for labor grants contributed to the formation of a consumer attitude to the place of temporary residence and the consolidation of their priority right to high incomes. In other words, the existing privileges and privileges contributed to the attachment of a person to the workplace, but not to the environment. Workers who come to the North primarily became part of labor collectives, not the local community involved in the development of the territory. The determination of the options for the development of the territory or the standards of comfortable living entirely remained exclusively in the competence of the state, proceeding from the interests of the mobilization type¹⁸.

Locals were mainly living in rural areas and became “cut off” from jobs in prestigious industries and the benefits provided to them¹⁹. They could partly overcome existing barriers to integration into the distribution system of the Soviet era²⁰ due to the logging sectors, which by that time had lost priority importance for the development of the economy, but still contributing impressive revenues to the country's budget. Their integration into the distribution system [24, Ladanyi J., Szelenyi I.] turned out to be conditional and not comparable either to the damage done to them in the implementation of the traditional way of life or to the size of the part of the income that they returned from the extraction of natural resources. Against the background of northern cities, the

¹⁸ Northern cities are predominantly built up with panel “boxes”. Architecturally, there are a few dwelling houses. All of them were built before the revolution or in the Stalin period. The exceptions are cities such as Salekhard and Khaty-Mansiysk. At best, the institutions of social and cultural life act as sights, which are more in the European part of the North than in the Asian part, but their number has significantly decreased since the beginning of economic reforms.

¹⁹ Indirect evidence is the national composition of the residents of “resource” cities. E.g., in the Komi Republic for 2010: 1.7% of the Komi live in Vorkuta, 7.9% in Ukhta, 11.4% in Inta, and 14.8% in Usinsk.

²⁰ First of all, due to existing restrictions on the passport regime, peasants did not have the right to move peasants even through the territories where the repressed were forcibly taken. After the abolition of restrictions in 1974, and which began certification on January 1, 1976, and ended only on December 31, 1981, a continuous flow of people and resources was established between the city and the village.

places of residence of indigenous people looked depressing: the infrastructure was inferior, the supply of goods was worse, and the quality of public services was lower. Meanwhile, the processes of Russian colonization of the North continued to be considered for the method of development of humanity and cultural enlightenment, poorly adapted to the living conditions of peoples [25, Rybakovsky L.L.].

The task of developing the North, which was to gain access to the extraction of natural resources, was achieved. Unlike capitalist countries, the specifics of the power and wealth manifestations [26, Walker R.] were reflected not in the individual but in-state megaprojects. It means large-scale industrialization, free aid to union republics, and developing countries to the detriment of creating a comfortable living environment for their citizens. But at the same time, the planned system restrained civic activity and participation in managing the development of the territory. It did not imply the formation of a collective northern identity. As a result, the residents of the northern territories, not having a history of joint activities that determine the socio-cultural attachment to the territory²¹, were unable to formulate common goals and ways to protect their rights, which led to the further actualization of historical discrimination practices. In other words, violation of rights, neglect of interests, non-recognition of differences, and isolation of the experience of residents were widespread in the new system. Still, the number of those excluded increased: they also included the second generation of voluntary migrants.

We affirm that today the Russian North is being supplanted and reflected not only in the prevailing practices of social exclusion but also in the expansion of capitalism: the seizure of resources and the development of capitalist production methods. First, in the 1990s, the industry of the North drowned in a deep economic crisis: more than half of the enterprises were declared bankrupt [11, Lytkina T.S.], and the remaining ones only strengthened the export-raw material orientation of the economy [29, Krotov P.P.]. Reducing the number of jobs contributed to increased exploitation. With non-payment of wages, the common practice of administrative leave, the living standards of northerners declined, and social protection curtailed. The labor collectives, which, under the previous political regime, had the potential for solidarity, lost their ability to mobilize. And the territories lost the ability to develop due to the transformation of the system of distribution of goods, tax policy for natural resource extraction²² and the criteria for receiving subsi-

²¹ The North was perceived as a "home", but not as a "homeland" (Heleniak T. The role of attachment to place in migration decisions of the population of the Russian North. *Polar Geography*, 2009, vol. 32, iss. 1–2, pp. 31–60. DOI: 10.1080/10889370903000398. Bolotova A., Stammler F. How the North became home. Attachment to place among industrial migrants in Murmansk region. In *Migration in the Circumpolar North: Issues and Contexts*, 2010, pp. 193–220).

²² In 2003, the regional share of the mineral extraction tax (MET) for gas was reduced from 20 to 0%, for oil - from 20 to 14%; in 2004, the regional share of mineral extraction tax on oil was again reduced to 5%, and since 2009, mineral extraction tax on natural gas and oil has been fully credited to the federal budget. In 2017, the federal center reduced the rate of income tax payable to regional budgets from 18 to 17%. It also reduced the share of excise taxes on petroleum products credited to the local budgets to 61.7%. Finally, in 2018, the regions lost part of their budget revenues due to the severance tax index NDPI, which reduced the income tax base (Yushkov A.O., Oding N.Yu., Savul'kin L.I. Sud'by rossiyskikh regionov-donorov [Fates of Russian donor regions]. *Voprosy ekonomiki* [Issues of Economics], 2017, no. 9, pp. 63–82. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2017-9-63-82).

dies from the federal budget²³. Even though the northern regions of Russia continue to provide 38.4% of revenues to the federal budget, they do not have financial independence, the ability to diversify the economy and overcome the consequences of its resource specialization.

The expulsion / exclusion we can observe on the examples of emerging structures of social inequality [32, Lytkina T.S., Smirnov A.V.]. According to statistics, the average monthly wage in the North of Russia remains higher than the national average, but the gap continues to narrow. If in Russia in 2006 real incomes of the population exceeded the level of 1991, then in the North, despite their growth in the 2000s, they never returned to their previous level. The processes of (re)production of poverty are proceeding more intensively, and the poor are becoming more and more. Today, the proportion of the poor with incomes below the subsistence level in the northern regions is 15.4% compared with the national average of 13.2%. At the same time, the standard of living of rural residents, as before, is much lower than that of the city, and men are in a better position than women. The most significant type of inequality is sectoral due to the unique role of natural resource extraction in the economy of the North. However, the spread of the shift method of labor deprives residents of highly profitable jobs.

The expulsion of the North is accompanied by a contraction of the social and engineering infrastructure of settlements [32, Lytkina T.S., Smirnov A.V.]. The auxiliary support of the mining industry is also deformed or lost: geological exploration, and hydrometeorological service [33, Epov M.I., p. 8]. GRP per capita in the northern regions is declining, while natural resources are becoming depleted. The result of economic activity was the fact that the industrial cities of the North are leading in terms of environmental pollution and anthropogenic impact on the environment [34, Bityukova V.R.]. Finally, the removal of the state from solving the problems of the North led to a massive outflow of the most qualified population and the spread of pessimism. After 1989, out of 117 cities in the North only in the territorial centers, some mining and defense settlements (29 cities), the population increased; in the remaining 88 settlements (75.2%), it decreases. The area began to lose creative potential, which no less leads to a decrease in the quality of life and the loss of prospects for the development of the territory. Some rushed to big cities to obtain a prestigious education, in search of decent incomes and opportunities for professional self-realization, others are deprived of choice, build life strategies that contradict the values of individ-

²³ Today, the priorities of the federal authorities in investing in the territories are mainly political. The interests of large business are concentrated in projects for the extraction and transportation of oil and gas (Zubarevich N.V. *Regiony Rossii: neravenstvo, krizis, modernizatsiya* [Russian regions: inequality, crisis, modernization]. Moscow, Nezavisimyy institut sotsial'noy politiki [Independent Institute of Social politics], 2010. (In Russ.)). E.g., in 2005-2015, the share of investments in fixed assets in the gross regional product (GRP) of the Komi Republic increased from 29.4 to 33.5%, with more than 82% of investments in oil and gas production, as well as pipeline transport. Excluding these types of economic activity, it turns out that other investments fell from 9 to 6% of GRP. Today, the priority geostrategic territories of the Russian Federation are the Crimea, the Kaliningrad region, the North Caucasus, the Far East, and the Arctic zone (Ob utverzhdenii Strategii prostranstvennogo razvitiya do 2025 goda [On approval of the Spatial Development Strategy until 2025]. URL: <http://government.ru/docs/35733/> (accessed 09 December 2019)). The political interests and the struggle for state support and benefits are guided by today's initiators of the expansion of the Arctic zone, and the northern territories, which did not achieve entry into the Arctic zone, drop out of federal programs and cannot count on the formation of development strategies.

ualism, freedom, and democracy, for the sake of which the country's transition to the market was carried out in 1991.

Outgoing migration as a defensive reaction to market and state pressure

Today, normal parents who want to see their children happy, they will not leave them here at Inta because they have to eke out a miserable existence here, in the sense that there is no work here (f., Mr. Inta).

I would move at a late age. If only in one [apartment] was the daughter, and in the neighborhood - me. It's undoubtedly easier there; you don't need firewood, then try to buy firewood for this salary here. Firewood, a car, costs 3,500. Well, where can you buy a firewood car with such a salary? Buy and be hungry for a month. And for the winter you need three cars (f., Usogorsk village, Udorsky district).

Since the early 1990s, population losses from migration amounted to approximately 2.3 million people or 24% of the population. Outflows in the European and Asian parts of the North were different in different periods. If before the beginning of the 2000s, a more intensive migration outflow was in the Asian part, then in the European part of the North. As a result, the decrease was approximately the same (1.1 million people each). Stable trends in the migration outflow of the population continue to be observed in the vast majority of cities and territories. Each year, the North loses about 30-40 thousand people. In areas of the Far North, the outflow of the population is three times more intense than in the areas equated to them. The most significant population decline was in 2015–2017. It was observed in the Chukotka and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs, the Republic of Komi, and the Magadan Oblast. Some cities and areas in these territories lose up to 4% of the population per year. It is evident that the life of rural residents in the North is less attractive than in the southern and central areas of Russia: since the beginning of market reforms, the number of rural residents of the North has decreased by 26% (Fig. 1). In comparison, in Russia, it has only reduced by 4%. The urban population of the North during this period decreased by 16%, and Russia - increased by 1%.




Fig. 1. The permanent population of the Russian North according to censuses 1939-2010 and at the beginning of 2018, thousand people²⁴.

New places of residence of northerners are distinguished by a more favorable climate and high quality of life. First of all, these are the capital regions: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Leningrad Oblasts. About a quarter of migrants from the North move there. Return flows from capitals are almost half. The situation is similar in the case of large southern regions: Krasnodarskiy Krai, Belgorod and Voronezh Oblasts, Crimea, etc.

Although the northern cities, even the largest ones, do not withstand competition with the central and southern subjects of the federation. Within the territories, there is a “pulling” of the population to the capital’s centers, where the prospects of life, on the one hand, are more favorable (better infrastructure, more jobs, and higher incomes), and on the other - more accessible (less money is needed for moving, educating children). That is why the migration situation in the most densely populated areas looks relatively stable. In municipalities with populations below 100 thousand people, the migration loss is four times higher than in large cities (Table 4).

Table 4

Migration in the largest municipalities of the North 2012-2017.^{25,26}

Municipalities	Population, thousand people, beginning of 2018	The rate of migration growth, per thousand people	incl., by type of migration		
			within a territory	between territories	international
Total	3316.4	0.5	4.3	-6.4	2.7
Arkhangelsk	356.9	0.0	6.6	-7.3	0.7
Surgut	366.2	10.4	3.5	1.7	5.2
Yakutsk	328.5	8.1	13.9	-6.2	0.5
Murmansk	295.4	-9.9	1.2	-13.4	2.3

²⁴ Compiled by the authors

²⁵ Compiled by the authors based on data of the PMO, Rosstat.

²⁶ At the beginning of 2018, in the northern regions of Russia, there are 15 towns with a population of more than 100 thousand people, in which 42.2% of the population of the North live. Two urban districts previously had a population of more than 100 thousand people. Still, today they have ceased to be large: Vorkuta (the population decreased from 216.2 thousand people in 1989 to 77.3 thousand people in 2018) and Magadan (decreased from 163.6 to 99.7). One urban district is approaching 100 thousand people and may soon become one of the largest - Khanty-Mansiysk (98.5 thousand people at the beginning of 2018).

Petrozavodsk	279.2	9.8	8.0	-0.4	2.2
Nizhnevartovsk	275.4	0.5	-1.1	-3.6	5.2
Syktvykar	260.8	0.6	7.2	-6.5	-0.1
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	206.1	6.4	6.7	-4.5	4.1
Severodvinsk	184.3	-6.3	2.6	-9.7	0.7
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy	181.2	-0.8	1.9	-10.8	8.1
Nefteyugansk	127.0	-6.1	-5.1	-4.1	3.1
Ukhta	117.8	-5.9	5.2	-11.7	0.5
Kyzyl	115.9	-4.7	2.7	-7.8	0.3
New Urengoy	114.8	-7.4	-2.5	-7.2	2.3
Noyabrsk	106.9	-14.0	-5.3	-12.2	3.5

The decline is especially typical for rural areas of the North. It is villages and urban-type settlements that continue to provide an influx into cities within territories. Mostly rural youth aged 15 to 19 years throw home places. Migration is connected with getting an education, to which the girls are more inclined. According to the analysis of official statistics at this age, girls make 29.5% more movements than boys. If parents from villages support their children to apply to educational institutions of the nearest cities in the territory, then urban ones go to metropolitan universities outside the territories. Studying at central universities and employing children outside the territory subsequently suggests a strategy for parents to move to their children after they retire (at the age of 55–59). This decision is actively promoted by resettlement programs, esp. for areas of the Far North (Novy Urengoy, Noyabrsk, and Vorkuta). Parents of rural youth, deprived of state support in the implementation of migratory installations, as a rule, remain at home.

Obviously, as the population of villages and urban-type settlements decreases and grows older, the possibilities for replenishing the population of cities will decrease. We can already observe these trends today in the Murmansk region, where the share of the rural population is only 8%. In cities such as Noyabrsk, Nefteyugansk, Novy Urengoy, Nizhnevartovsk, and Norilsk, intraregional migration has long been negative. These cities are less surrounded by rural areas and there are no large educational institutions providing internal migration growth of northern cities²⁷. Another situation is, e.g., in the town of Ukhta (the Komi Republic): lacking a metropolitan status, due to a large university and rural surroundings, has an increase within the territory at a high level of 52.4; in Syktvykar - the administrative center with universities - migration is 72.4²⁸.

Together with school graduates, the North is losing the most qualified personnel. Citizens with incomplete higher education (a decrease of 10.0 people per 1000 residents), higher education (9.2), and full secondary education (6.6) have the highest propensity for outbound migration. The migration loss of citizens with an initial professional is only 1.2. If we measure the educational potential of the population as the total duration of education in years, then it turns out that for a year, migration leads to the export of about 1.3% of its educational potential outside the North.

²⁷ According to the analysis of municipal statistics, an 84% variation in the intraregional migration growth of large cities in the North is determined by the proportion of students in the urban population.

²⁸ When calculating, the given student population in towns was considered according to the monitoring of the effectiveness of the activities of educational institutions of higher education in 2017 (URL: <http://indicators.miccedu.ru/monitoring/?m=vpo>).

Instead, the northern territories receive less qualified personnel [35, Fauzer V.V., Lytkina T.S.]. As a rule, scientists focus on the fact that population reduction, deterioration of the age structure, and the outflow of educated citizens negatively affect the demographic and labor potentials of the territory [36, Fauzer V.V.], which is undoubtedly true. But it also adversely affects the social well-being and quality of life of the remaining residents of the North [37, Lytkina T.S.; 38, Lytkina T.S.].

In absolute terms, the most massive outflow of the population falls on working age (23 thousand people per year)²⁹. Together with the natural processes of population aging and low birth rates, this leads to the aging of the age structure of the population. In rural areas, these processes are faster. Since 2002, the average age in the North has grown by 3.1 years; in rural areas, it has increased by 3.7 years. In Russia, it increased by 2.4 years (moreover, in the city and the village equally)³⁰. In 2017, every fifth resident of the North was older than working age, and the demographic burden on the able-bodied population has almost reached the average Russian level (716 and 764, respectively). The deformation of the age composition results in a reduction in the proportion of the population of reproductive ages, a decrease in the birth rate, and, as a result, depopulation of the northern regions. In recent years, natural growth has been replaced by a decline in the Komi Republic, Murmansk and Magadan regions.

At the same time, we have the opportunity to observe the attractiveness of the North for labor migration, especially for men aged 20 to 54 years. The most significant number of labor migrants in 2015–2017 were immigrants from Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and the Omsk Oblast. As for neighboring countries, Ukraine (35%), Uzbekistan (12%), Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (10% each), Azerbaijan (6%), Belarus, and Armenia (5% each) took the most active part in the migration exchange. There are not many attractive cities for labor migrants, but higher wages distinguish all of them. First of all, these are areas of oil production of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. Half of the foreign labor migrants come here. No less attractive are the island areas (Novaya Zemlya, Kuril Islands, Sakhalin), recently associated with high defense activity and the development of sea transport routes. However, such labor migration provides migratory mobility without contributing to the growth of the resident population of the North.

The interest of mining enterprises in shift work organization makes high-wage jobs inaccessible to residents, which exacerbates their situation. At the same time, it should be recognized that with a further decrease in the level of comfortable living in the North, the availability of earnings stimulates travel beyond. At the same time, the outflow of the population is the higher, the lower the comfort of living and the possibility of professional self-realization, and today they are smaller than average in representations of northerners³¹. As an additional argument, we used the

²⁹ It is 1.7 times more than the outflow of the population older than the working age (13.5 thousand people).

³⁰ If in 1989 the specific gravity of children was 29.3, people of working age 61.8, and the proportion of people of older age groups was 9.0, today the ratio of three age groups in the North is as follows: 21.5; 59.1 and 19.4.

³¹ RFBR project No 18-410-110002 "Employment of the population in small business (the case of the Komi Republic)", 2018–2020 (project leader - M.Terentyeva).

indicator of life expectancy³², which is one of the most important indicators of socio-economic development of territories and quality of life. It showed that a massive outflow of the population is observed where the standardized mortality rate is high and exceeds 12: in Vorkuta, Pechora, Usinsk, Apatity and most rural areas of the North. The worst indicators are observed in Chukotka (29.9), where the life expectancy of men does not reach even 50 years. On the contrary, in Surgut, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Kogalym, Yakutsk, and Khanty-Mansiysk this mortality rate is low, and migration loss is not observed.

It is also essential to pay attention to the fact that more people want to go outside their places. Still, every year, along with a decrease in income of northerners, it becomes more and more challenging to realize migration intentions. Against the background of the lost benefits of living in northern cities and villages, the visible, attractive sides are a measured, calm life, the support of friends and relatives in solving everyday problems, as well as the nature of the northern region. However, the rejection of migration and attachment to native places are increasingly associated with a lack of individual (family) resources for departure and subsequent adaptation in a new home, while the apparent advantages of living in the north justify the preservation of the former place of residence. Indigenous people of the North, living in worse conditions compared with other northerners, are least inclined to leave. Indigenous Peoples of the North³³ almost do not participate in migration exchange. This issue requires further study.

Conclusion

Using the example of the Russian North, we tried to show the reasons that provoked its expulsion. They lie both in the recent past, and the neoliberal policy pursued today, namely: in the perception of the North as a territory rich in natural resources, and a dismissive attitude towards citizens. It was proved that the formation of local northern communities did not imply either the protection of the indigenous interests, the manifestation of civic initiatives and responsibility for the development of the territory, nor the formation of a collective northern identity.

In the Soviet period, identity was formed around the workplace, contributing (to) the production of social exclusion in the form of interaction practices with the superiority of some and the silent resistance of others. The Soviet distribution policy greatly facilitated it. On the one hand, it excluded local communities from the distribution of benefits, organizing a hierarchy of priority

³² To measure the impact of the quality of life on the migration growth rate of territories, a standardized mortality rate was used, which reflects life expectancy and the general level of well-being of the population. The linear correlation coefficient with migration growth in 195 towns and territories of the North was 0.55, which is significantly higher than the dependence on wages (0.07).

³³ The same territories, settlements with a predominance of the Russian population (according to the 2010 census) demonstrate mobility indicators several times higher than the areas with a predominance of indigenous peoples. It is true for peoples from different territories and belonging to different language groups. In those rare cases, when small nations participate in migrations, they quickly "dissolve" in another cultural environment. It, in our opinion, is connected with discriminatory practices of social interaction, captured by the indigenous inhabitants of the North. Thus, since 1989, the number of Veps in Russia has more than halved as a result of their migration to St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk.

sectors in the economy. On the other, through vertical mobility channels, it provided access to additional benefits: education, healthcare, and opportunities for professional and career growth.

With the beginning of capitalization, a new stage in the withdrawal of natural resources began, and the subsequent deformation of social relations aggravated the situation and led to severe obstacles to the development of the common interests of the northerners. The exclusion processes through a policy of ignoring the interests of northerners were continued and gained further distribution: now not only the natives of the North, but also the second generation of voluntary migrants born in the North and who became his hostages fall into the exclusion zone. Like more than a hundred years ago, the policy of forming a permanent population has been replaced by a system of temporary residence, but now thanks to the shift method of organizing labor. The work of residents not only becomes unclaimed but also less paid; there is extensive use of infrastructure. Migration moods become a defensive reaction of northerners to the market amid declining quality of life. As a result, the northern areas are massively abandoned by residents, including young and skilled ones, which provokes a further decrease in the attractiveness of life in the North for the remaining population.

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