

**WASTED OPPORTUNITIES**  
**INEQUALITY AND FRAGMENTATION IN THE 2010 SOUTH AFRICA WORLD CUP**

By

Astrid Wood


Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master in City Planning

at the

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June 2008



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**WASTED OPPORTUNITIES**  
**Inequality and Fragmentation in the 2010 South Africa World Cup**

**By**

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**ABSTRACT**

Planning and preparations for the 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup are well underway and there is little doubt that South Africa will impress sports fans and spectators with the modern stadiums and tourist facilities. The 2010 World Cup is an opportunity to hasten social, cultural, environmental, economic, and physical growth. South African cities should use 2010 to improve the public realm and create new economic opportunities for South Africans.

Megaevents like the 2010 World Cup can generate economic investment and build an international image, but South Africa can also use World Cup funding to invest in the public realm. South Africa is economically, socially, and spatially fragmented. As South Africa struggles with issues of racism, inequality, crime, and poverty, development for 2010 offers an opportunity to unify the fragmented community through design. Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 World Cup can transform the city and stimulate new development patterns. Host cities can use new stadiums, transportation infrastructure, and tourist facilities as part of city improvement plans. Design, project siting, and city policies can alleviate or exacerbate urban fragmentation by enticing infill development or wastelands. Considering the enormous public expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial city improvements in the planning repertoire.

Unfortunately, World Cup planners are not maximizing this opportunity. Planning for the WC tends to focus on economic development and image enhancement, instead of the possibilities for city improvements. Ideal city development often conflicts with international hosting requirements and deadlines. Despite high expectations, infrastructure projects are too focused on the ephemeral and not on the permanent.

This thesis will examine the possibilities for cities to use the 2010 World Cup to hasten city development. The first chapter will detail the 2010 World Cup plan and the local stakeholders as well as the lessons learned from previous World Cups. The next chapter will examine the obstacles South Africa faces as it prepares for the 2010 World Cup and characteristics that make this host country different from previous World Cup hosts. Chapter three will describe the development strategy and explain how World Cup infrastructure can change the city. The next chapter will illustrate the World Cup conflict resulting from these development decisions. The final chapter will explain the reasons why local organizers are wasting this opportunity, instead exacerbating inequality and fragmentation, and conclude with suggestions for future World Cup planners.

Thesis Supervisor: Diane E. Davis



## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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This paper is dedicated to my homeland, South Africa. May you rise above your past.

My deepest gratitude to my loving and supportive family for their endless encouragement, these last two years and always. To my mother, who always supported me in my planning studies. Thank you Tzvee for being my editor, computer assistant and my oldest friend. A special thank you to Jonah, for being there when I was not and for being there even when you were not. Your love has sustained me.

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## **ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

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Astrid Wood received her Master of City Planning (2008) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a focus on city design, international planning, and environmental policy. Her current research focuses on international design and Africa. Her previous research interests include tourism, cultural production, and historic preservation. Her undergraduate thesis, "Endangered Museums: The Viability of Living History Museums in the Modern Era" examines the origins and development living history museums, explaining their former popularity and their current response to the challenges posed by competing forms of tourism. Astrid Wood received her Bachelor of Arts (2006) in architecture and city planning from Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. She is also a native South African.





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ODE TO FOOTBALL

PREFACE

<b>INTRODUCTION   THE IMPACT OF THE 2010 WORLD CUP ON SOUTH AFRICA</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1   SOUTH AFRICA PLAYS HOST</b>	<b>15</b>
<hr/>	
<b>1.1   SOUTH AFRICA WILL HOST THE 2010 WORLD CUP</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1.2   SOUTH AFRICA BIDS FOR FOOTBALL WORLD CUP</b>	<b>16</b>
Image 1.1   Mandela Hugs 2010 Trophy	17
<b>1.3   SOUTH AFRICA OBSESSED WITH SPORTS</b>	<b>18</b>
Image 1.2   South Africa Hosts International Sports Events	20
<b>1.4   THE 2010 GAME PLAN: SA'S 2010 WORLD CUP BID</b>	<b>20</b>
Image 1.3   Map of South Africa's World Cup Stadiums	21
<b>1.5   THE PLAYERS: AGENCIES AND STAKEHOLDERS</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>1.6   LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS WORLD CUPS</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>1.6.1   The 1994 USA World Cup Success</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>1.6.2   The 1998 France World Cup Success</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>1.6.3   The 2002 Asia World Cup Success</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>1.6.4   The 2006 Germany World Cup Success</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>1.7   DRAWBACKS TO HOSTING 2010</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2   OBSTACLES TO 2010</b>	<b>37</b>
<hr/>	
<b>2.1   SOUTH AFRICA'S 2010 WORLD CUP IS UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSORS</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2.2   SOUTH AFRICA'S COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH FOOTBALL</b>	<b>40</b>
Image 2.1   Every South African Plays Football	40
<b>2.3   HIGH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>2.3.1   South African Expectations</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>2.3.2   Business Support</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>2.3.3   International Expectations</b>	<b>46</b>
Image 2.2   "It's (South?) Africa's Turn!"	47
<b>2.4   DECAYING CITIES</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>2.5   DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIES AND NATIONAL INEQUALITIES</b>	<b>49</b>
Image 2.3   Relative Importance of 2010 Host Cities	49
Image 2.4   Pressures Facing South Africa as it Prepares for 2010	50
Image 2.5   Inequalities in South Africa	51
<b>2.6   FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE</b>	<b>53</b>
Image 2.6   Fragmented Municipalities	55
<b>2.7   ESCALATING CRIME AND INCREASING TOURISM</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>2.7.1   South Africa's Crime Problem</b>	<b>55</b>
Image 2.7   2007 World Cup Blog	56
<b>2.7.2   South African Tourism</b>	<b>58</b>
Image 2.8   International Tourist Arrivals (in millions)	59
<b>2.7.3   The 2010 Safety and Security Plan</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>2.8   SPIRALING COSTS AND LIMITED PUBLIC FUNDING</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>2.8.1   Funding 2010</b>	<b>64</b>
Image 2.9   South Africa's Stadium Investment for 2010 WC	65
<b>2.8.2   Build the Stadium, Create the Jobs</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>2.9   PRIVATIZATION</b>	<b>68</b>
Image 2.10   Construction Privatization in South Africa	69
<b>2.10   INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP</b>	<b>69</b>



2.10.1   World Cup Sponsorship .....	69
Image 2.11   Who Will Benefit From the World Cup?.....	70
2.10.2   The Development of Unofficial Enterprises.....	71
2.11   LIMITED CAPACITY.....	72
2.12   DEFEATING THE OBSTACLES .....	72
<b>CHAPTER 3   FRAGMENTING THE CITY</b> .....	<b>75</b>
3.1   SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES .....	76
3.2   THE DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENT WINS THE CUP.....	77
Image 3.1   Building the 2010 World Cup .....	78
3.3   THE FRAGMENTED CITY .....	79
Image 3.2   Graphic Model of the Apartheid City of South Africa .....	80
Image 3.3   Development in South Africa 1900-2000.....	81
Image 3.4   State of the South African Cities Analytical Framework .....	82
3.4   WHAT IS A WORLD CUP CITY?.....	83
3.4.1   Technology Changes the Nature of the Stadium .....	83
3.4.2   Masculinity in the World Cup City .....	84
3.5   CASE STUDIES: WORLD CUP STADIUMS AS NEW CITY CENTERS .....	84
3.5.1   Can Stadiums Revitalize Cities?.....	84
3.5.2   Stuttgart and its Center of Competence .....	85
3.5.3   Seoul Digital Media City.....	85
3.5.4   Reviving a Declining Chester, Philadelphia.....	86
3.5.5   Fan Parks Connect Denver, Colorado.....	87
3.5.6   Cities Need to Develop Local Business around Stadiums .....	87
3.6   REVIVING THE INNER CITY BY DEVELOPING THE SURROUNDING TOWNSHIPS .....	88
Image 3.5   World Cup Potential to Increase Physical and Social Mobility .....	90
3.7   BUILDING THE STADIUMS.....	91
Image 3.6   Table of Stadiums .....	92
Image 3.7   Construction of Johannesburg's Ellis Park.....	93
Image 3.8   Newspaper Clipping of World Cup Construction .....	94
3.8   STADIUM DESIGN AND URBAN FUTURES .....	94
3.8.1   Johannesburg's Soccer City vs. Ellis Park.....	95
Image 3.9   Johannesburg – Population Centers .....	96
Image 3.10   Johannesburg – Economic Centers .....	97
Image 3.11   Soccer City.....	98
Image 3.12   Soccer City Map.....	99
Image 3.13   Ellis Park .....	100
Image 3.14   Ellis Park Map .....	100
Image 3.15   Johannesburg - (Possible) Futures .....	101
3.8.2   Nelspruit's Mbombela Stadium.....	102
Image 3.16   Nelspruit Map.....	103
Image 3.17   Nelspruit Stadium.....	103
3.9   BUILDING COMMUNITY SPACES THROUGH FAN PARKS.....	104
3.9.1   Germany's Fan Parks.....	104
Image 3.18   2006 German World Cup Fan Park.....	105
3.9.2   South Africa Builds Fan Parks .....	105
Image 3.19   Concept of Cape Town Fan Parks .....	107
3.10   THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES .....	108
<b>CHAPTER 4   WORLD CUP CONFLICT</b> .....	<b>109</b>
4.1   CHALLENGES AHEAD .....	110
4.2   EGREGIOUS EXPENSES .....	110
4.3   DETERMINING STADIUM LOCATIONS .....	111
4.3.1   Cape Town .....	111
Image 4.1   Cape Town's Stadium Options.....	113



<b>4.4   TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND THE CITY: SQUATTERS MAKE WAY FOR 2010.....</b>	<b>114</b>
<b>4.4.1   Cape Flats Redevelopment .....</b>	<b>115</b>
Image 4.2   Informal Settlements in Cape Town's Townships .....	116
Image 4.3   New Buildings in Cape Town's Langa Townships.....	116
<b>4.4.2   Johannesburg - Inner City Redevelopment.....</b>	<b>117</b>
Image 4.4   Squatters in Johannesburg Downtown Building.....	119
<b>4.4.3   Johannesburg - Ellis Park/Bertrams Redevelopment .....</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>4.4.4   Kwazulu-Natal Redevelopment .....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>4.5   TRANSPORTATION UPGRADES .....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>4.5.1   Building the Gautrain .....</b>	<b>123</b>
Image 4.5   Gautrain Route Map.....	124
<b>4.5.2   Reforming the Minibuses.....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>4.6   GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES .....</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>4.6.1   Power Failures .....</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>4.6.2   Insufficient Provision of Water .....</b>	<b>126</b>
<b>4.7   WHO HOLDS THE POWER? .....</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>CHAPTER 5   LEARNING FROM 2010 .....</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>5.1   LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.....</b>	<b>130</b>
Image 5.1   Lasting Legacy of 2010 World Cup .....	131
<b>5.1.1   Improve International Image .....</b>	<b>132</b>
<b>5.1.2   Spend Cautiously .....</b>	<b>132</b>
<b>5.1.3   Use Stadium Development to Improve the City .....</b>	<b>133</b>
Image 5.2   Cycle of Fragmentation.....	133
<b>5.1.4   Invite Public Participation.....</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>5.2   LESSONS FOR FIFA .....</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>5.3   LESSONS FOR FUTURE WORLD CUP HOSTS .....</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>APPENDIX A   GUIDE TO THE 2010 WORLD CUP STADIUMS.....</b>	<b>139</b>
<b>APPENDIX B   THE 2010 SAFETY AND SECURITY PLAN.....</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>159</b>



## **ABBREVIATIONS**

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<b>AU</b>	<b>African Union</b>
<b>CAF</b>	<b>Confederation of African Football</b>
<b>CBG</b>	<b>Capacity Building Grants</b>
<b>COHRE</b>	<b>Center on Housing Rights and Evictions</b>
<b>COSATU</b>	<b>Congress of South African Trade Unions</b>
<b>FASA</b>	<b>Football Association of South Africa</b>
<b>FIFA</b>	<b>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</b>
<b>HSRC</b>	<b>Human Sciences Research Council</b>
<b>IDASA</b>	<b>Institute for a Democratic South Africa</b>
<b>IDP</b>	<b>Integrated Development Plan</b>
<b>JDA</b>	<b>Johannesburg Development Agency</b>
<b>LOC</b>	<b>Local organizing committee</b>
<b>MIG</b>	<b>Municipal Infrastructure Grants</b>
<b>MLS</b>	<b>Major League Soccer</b>
<b>MU</b>	<b>Management Unit</b>
<b>NICOC</b>	<b>National Intelligence Coordination Committee</b>
<b>NEPAD</b>	<b>New Partnership for African Development</b>
<b>NUHRY</b>	<b>National Urban Reconstruction Housing Agency</b>
<b>PSL</b>	<b>Premier Soccer League</b>
<b>SA</b>	<b>South Africa</b>
<b>SABRIC</b>	<b>South African Banking Risk Information Centre</b>
<b>SABFA</b>	<b>South African Bantu Football Association</b>
<b>SACFA</b>	<b>South African Coloured Football Association</b>
<b>SAFA</b>	<b>South African Football Association</b>
<b>SAIFA</b>	<b>South African Indian Football Association</b>
<b>SAPS</b>	<b>South Africa Police Services</b>
<b>TCC</b>	<b>Technical Coordinating Committee</b>
<b>WC</b>	<b>World Cup</b>





## ODE TO FOOTBALL

by Laijon Liu

Soccer starts,  
On earth peoples become fans;  
Care not wars, care not crimes;  
Carry our flags, songs, and drums;  
Everyone is dancing, chanting, harmonizing;  
Restarted our true engine of human life.

Soccer plays,  
On the pitch of our beautiful globe;  
Care not politics, care not separatisms;  
Carry our joys, passions, and oneness;  
Everyone is coming, watching, and sharing;  
Rebuilt our perfect sphere in one wholly piece.

Soccer ends,  
On the screens of common household;  
Care not victory nor defeat, honor or shame;  
Carry our beer, tears, hopes; a great memory;  
Everywhere we walk, meet, and argue...  
Rekindled our souls in her beginning and ending.

Soccer we play and live,  
On the street, beach, and green pasture;  
Care not hatred of past, injury of nightmares;  
Carry our sweat, spirit, and a virtuous living goal;  
Every moment of our game in life  
Refines our goodly being thru true love of beautiful game.



## **PREFACE**

---

Football is the most popular sport in South Africa and across the globe and the FIFA World Cup is one of the largest international events. This is an exciting time for South Africa. With such a complicated history, it is not surprising that expectations are high. High local and international expectations are almost prohibitive; it is easy to impress when prospects look grave and it is difficult to astonish when outlooks seem more certain and encouraging. It is even more exhilarating because this is the first instance when the FIFA WC is hosted on African soil. For planners, such as expectations make it even harder to impress. Some South Africans are disappointed by the lack of opportunities and continued inequality and poverty even under the country's new idealistic constitution. A similar reaction is likely to occur after 2010 if excitement is met with disappointment.

In the summer of 2006, while visiting South Africa, I frequently engaged in conversations discussing South Africa's involvement in the 2010 World Cup. As a planner, I was eager to evaluate the potential for city development. I hope my findings improve 2010 the 2010 development strategy.



## INTRODUCTION

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# THE IMPACT OF THE 2010 WORLD CUP ON SOUTH AFRICA

As a country, we are never going to close rank on politics, economic plans, or foreign policy. But we are mad about sports, so there is no argument about hosting the World Cup. We all want it.<sup>1</sup>

*-Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban, Rural and Economic Development at the Human Sciences Research Council*

Many people in the First World have a particular perception of Africa and still expect to see rhinos and zebras, and people wearing skins. People struggle to believe that a developed, industrialized Africa exists, with the skill and capacity that the rest of the world has.<sup>2</sup>

*- Tokyo Sexwale, Businessman*

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<sup>1</sup> Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban, Rural, and Economic Development at the Human Sciences Research Council admits that attitudes on the tournament have revealed that the public still feels it is well worth the sacrifices necessary to prepare for the World Cup. Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). The Guardian (London).

<sup>2</sup> Sexwale, Tokyo (July 18, 2007). Football Kept Us Alive. *FIFA.com*.

Planning and preparations for the 2010 South Africa (SA) Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup (WC) are well underway and there is little doubt that SA will impress sports fans and spectators with the modern stadiums and tourist facilities.<sup>3</sup> The 2010 World Cup is an opportunity to hasten social, cultural, environmental, economic, and physical growth. South African cities should use 2010 to improve the public realm and create new economic opportunities. Unfortunately, World Cup planners are not maximizing this opportunity. Planning for the WC tends to focus on economic development and image enhancement, instead of the possibilities for city improvements. Despite high expectations, infrastructure projects are too focused on the ephemeral and not on the permanent. Instead of leaving an eternal, enduring, encouraging, lasting legacy, the 2010 SA WC will leave linger debt and fragmentation.

In 2010, billions of people worldwide will focus their attention on SA. From June 11 to July 11, 2010, SA will host the FIFA WC. Although, SA has regularly hosted international sporting events, including the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC, this will be the first instance when the FIFA WC will be hosted on African soil. The cost and scope of the project is enormous. SA will host 64 football matches played in ten stadiums in nine cities - Johannesburg,<sup>4</sup> Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Nelspruit, Polokwane, Bloemfontein, Rustenberg, and Pretoria. Of the ten stadiums, five will be upgraded and the other five will be newly constructed. The ten stadiums in total will seat more than 570,000 people. In terms of the size of the television audience, the FIFA WC is bigger than the Olympics.<sup>5</sup>

Megaevents like the 2010 WC can generate economic investment and build an international image, but they can also change the built environment. There has been considerable research on the financial benefits of hosting a WC and some research on the more elusive benefits of branding, but very little studies have focused on the impact of the WC on the built environment. This is because this is the first time when a developing country will host the FIFA WC and the WC can be used to rebuild the city.

SA's WC is expected to be one of the most commercial and politically successful WC events in FIFA's 76 year history. International sponsorship, stadium attendance, and local and international

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<sup>3</sup> The FIFA WC is an international football, or soccer tournament held every four years since the first tournament in 1930. The tournament is organized by members of FIFA, the international agency responsible for organizing international football leagues in conjunction with the host country. The FIFA WC differs from other international sports events like the Olympics in that it is hosted in ten stadiums in the host country. Preparations are therefore considerable more complicated. Host countries typically prepare elaborate bids several years before the event but are only formally selected six years before the WC.

<sup>4</sup> Johannesburg is the only city to have two World Cup stadiums. It is the primary host city where the opening and closing football matches will be played.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to understand the differences between the Olympics and the WC. The Olympics is held in a single city while the WC is held across at least nine cities in a country. The enormous scale of the WC makes it incredibly challenging. Even developed host countries have difficulty providing sufficient sports facilities in so many cities. It was difficult for local organizers to demonstrate sufficient facilities in nine South African cities. Hosting in so many cities makes it even harder to ensure a lasting legacy for the built environment. Unlike the Olympics, WC host cities do not build elaborate athlete housing. Infrastructure tends to focus only on stadiums. This thesis will argue that WC should facilitate city investment in all host cities closer to the scale of the Olympics. 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info: [www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm](http://www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm).

excitement in anticipation of 2010 is expected to exceed previous records. Much of this enthusiasm results from the enormous challenges SA faces as it plans for 2010; 2010 marks SA's final emergence from apartheid and decades of international isolation, and SA will use 2010 as a chance to demonstrate the possibilities of a democratic SA.<sup>6</sup>

Economic expectations are high. In total, between 2006 and 2010, the gross contribution to national economy is expected to be R51.1 billion, which includes direct expenditures of R30.4 billion plus the multiplier effect of the total indirect impact on SA.<sup>7</sup> On the national level alone, the construction industry is estimated to contribute R29.3 billion to the economy, not including local provincial and city investment projects. This spending will sustain 368,250 construction jobs. The 33-day event itself is estimated to generate R15.6 billion from foreign visitors. The tourism industry is estimated to need 196,400 permanent and temporary personnel. There are an estimated 3.2 million tickets to be sold. Foreign visitors are expected to stay 15 days spending several considerable sums outside of the games daily. In addition, estimates expect an additional 100,000 African non-ticket holders and 25,000 overseas non-ticket holders to visit SA during the event and watch the games from the fan parks,<sup>8</sup> bringing the total number of visitors, including 36 teams with an average of 50 people per team, 11,000 media, 5,000 VIPs, and 500 FIFA officials, sponsors, and media to 400,000 visitors during the month-long event.<sup>9</sup>

This is an important event for Africa. SA is the first black, African country to host a FIFA WC. President Thabo Mbeki and Local Organizing Committee (LOC)<sup>10</sup> Chief Executive Officer, Danny Jordaan frequently declare, "An African World Cup captures Africanness" or 2010 will contribute to an "African Renaissance" or "Ubutu" (an authentic Africa). But nationally, the WC will be used primarily to leverage marketing and increase annual tourism. From the initial stages of the bid process, the SA LOC has committed to a use 2010 as a tool for growth and development within SA and throughout the continent. Mbeki stressed to FIFA President Sepp Blatter at the 2004 WC dedication ceremony, "We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidences from Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> R is the symbol for the South African currency called Rand. Whenever possible, financial figures will be written in United States Dollars. This document uses the current monetary conversion which at the time of publication 1 USD was equivalent to 7 Rand.

<sup>8</sup> Fan parks are public gathering places outside of the stadiums where crowds of non-ticket holders can gather and watch the football match live on large television screens. These fan parks provide a central location for revelry for those who could not afford tickets. Fan parks were an integral component of the South African bid and will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

<sup>9</sup> Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups: Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. *Politikon*, 34(1): 67:81.

<sup>10</sup> The Local Organizing Committee, or LOC, is the entity ultimately responsible for all matters relating to the administration and presentation of the 2010 WC. After SA was awarded the WC in 2004, the South African Football Association (SAFA), the agency previously responsible for all WC related matters formed the 2010 FIFA WC Organizing Committee of South Africa with all its responsibility. The LOC is structured such that various members represent sports, business, government, and entertainment sectors to ensure adequate preparations.

<sup>11</sup> *African Legacy*. Retrieved April 24, 2008, from SA2010: [www.sa2010.gov.za](http://www.sa2010.gov.za).

In addition to the economic and branding benefits of hosting the 2010 WC, the event can also be a powerful development tool. SA can use WC funding to invest in city improvements. The scars of apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of the South African city. During apartheid, governmental legislation restricted the movement of people and the development of the city. As a result, sections of the city developed independently, and despite the more than a decade of democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. South African cities remain economically, socially, and spatially divided. During the first decade of democracy, government policies promising jobs, education, and equitable access have failed to materialize. New opportunities intended to eviscerate past injustices resulted in disappointment. Meanwhile, wealthier South Africans fled the cities into secure, gated communities, and cities fell into disrepair. Some wealthy, White areas of cities like Johannesburg are as developed as Western Europe while nearby Black neighborhoods remain impoverished. Ideally, the 2010 WC offers these disenfranchised areas the opportunity to catch up to development elsewhere in the city.

Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 World Cup can transform the city and stimulate new development patterns. Host cities can use new stadiums, transportation infrastructure, and tourist facilities as part of city improvement plans. Design, project siting, and city policies can alleviate or exacerbate urban fragmentation by enticing infill development or wastelands. Considering the enormous public expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial city improvements in the planning repertoire.

This thesis will examine the possibilities for cities to use the 2010 WC to hasten city development. The first chapter will detail the 2010 WC plan and the local stakeholders as well as the lessons learned from previous WCs. The next chapter will examine the obstacles SA faces as it prepares for the 2010 WC and characteristics that make this host country different from previous WC hosts. Chapter three will describe the development strategy and explain how WC infrastructure can change the city. The next chapter will illustrate the WC conflict resulting from these development decisions. The final chapter will explain the reasons why local organizers are wasting this opportunity, instead exacerbating inequality and fragmentation, and conclude with suggestions for future WC planners.



## CHAPTER 1

---

### SOUTH AFRICA PLAYS HOST

This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build and unify the nation. It matters not that Bafana Bafana is unlikely to win.<sup>1</sup>

- David Carte, *Journalist*

For a long time nobody spoke about African football, but the word is coming. We have many difficulties. We have funds for football, but not for food or medicine. Football is a good thing. When the world watches South African football, they see us playing, not fighting.<sup>2</sup>

- Lagahi Digbeu Sylvain, *Journalist*

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<sup>1</sup> The newly integrated South African team, Bafana Bafana (meaning the boys) played its first game on July 7, 1992, and despite more than two decades of rest, the team beat Cameroon 1-0 at King's Park Stadium in Durban. Over the next few years, the team continued to shine qualifying for the 1998 and 2002 World Cups. Bafana Bafana is currently ranked at 53 by FIFA. *About SAFA*. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from SAFA Website: [www.safa.net/index.php](http://www.safa.net/index.php)  
Carte, David. (August 2006). Retrieved April 22, 2008 from CarteBlanche: [www.carteblanche.co.za](http://www.carteblanche.co.za)

<sup>2</sup> Sylvain, Lagahi Digbeu. (June 2006). Retrieved April 22, 2008, from CarteBlanche: [www.carteblanche.co.za](http://www.carteblanche.co.za).

### **1.1 | SOUTH AFRICA WILL HOST THE 2010 WORLD CUP**

From June 11 to July 11, 2010, SA will host the 19th FIFA WC, an international football tournament. Although, SA has regularly hosted international sporting events, including the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC, this will be the first instance when the FIFA WC will be hosted on African soil. In terms of the size of the television audience, the FIFA WC is bigger than the Olympics.<sup>3</sup>

The 2010 WC is expected to be one of the most commercial and politically successful WC event in FIFA's 76 year history. FIFA's confidence in SA is crucial for South African further development. Proponents have argued that the WC can be a powerful tool if wielded responsibly. SA can leverage the needs to host effectively with the country's needs to improve safety and security and redevelop the fragmented cities, all the while developing a profitable event. Opponents of the WC argue that these enchanting benefits are easily overstated. Plans for the game do not focus on redeveloping the country or investing in those areas most in need, instead focusing solely on the ephemeral demands of the month-long event. Opponents claim that host countries rarely profit and considering the flagrant need for basic services, that such frivolous investment on sports events is egregious.

### **1.2 | SOUTH AFRICA BIDS FOR THE FIFA WORLD CUP**

Although SA was the front runner for the 2006 World Cup, in July 2000, FIFA awarded the event to Germany, after SA lost by a single vote. The final vote was 12 votes for Germany and 11 in favor of SA, with an abstention from New Zealand's Charles Dempsey, who was instructed by the Oceania Football Confederation to vote for SA.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, FIFA decided to institute a system of rotating the privileges of hosting between continents with Africa being the selected continent for 2010.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa. Retrieved April 16, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info: [www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm](http://www.southafrica.info/2010/worldcup-overview.htm).

<sup>4</sup> Dempsey was instructed by the Oceania Football Confederation to vote for SA. If Dempsey bid as instructed the tie vote would have been decided by FIFA President Sepp Blatter who is a strong supporter of an African World Cup. Dempsey claimed that the pressure of deciding was too great and he therefore abstained.

<sup>5</sup> Baade, Robert A. and Matheson, Victor A. (2004). The Quest for the Cup: Assessing the Economic Impact of the World Cup. *Regional Studies*. 38: 4, 343-354.



**Image 1.1 | Mandela Hugs 2010 Trophy<sup>6</sup>**

*This now famous image of Former South African President Nelson Mandela smiling as he triumphantly lifts the WC trophy at the official 2010 host country ceremony mirrors sentiments of pride rippling throughout SA and even the world. "I feel like a young man of 50," said 85-year-old Nelson Mandela, the former South African president, who attended the ceremony.*

On May 15, 2004, SA was awarded the 2010 WC, beating bids from Morocco and Egypt, becoming the first African nation to host the FIFA WC. Not only was SA favored to win the event because of its 2006 loss but its bid was significantly better than that of either Morocco or Egypt. Both Libya and Tunisia were eliminated from the bid before the final selection. Specifically, SA's existing infrastructure was infinitely better than the other contending countries.<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to note that SA was the only Black, Christian country vying for 2010 and that must have played into FIFA's decision. If FIFA was going to bring the WC to Africa, it needed to bring it to a Black country. Likewise, the European agency was likely uncomfortable with a Muslim WC and probably quite concerned about terrorism.<sup>8</sup> In comparison to international terrorism events, which have never occurred on South African soil, SA's crime problem must have seemed minor. SA and particularly Black Africa are a much larger market than the North African countries. This meant that if FIFA chose SA, it would ensure decades of passionate Southern African fans.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Schmidt, Charles F. A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency Relations in South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep., 1975).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> It should be noted that this type of distinction is never made by FIFA, SA, or any other WC agency but it seems obvious to any scrutinizing observer. This blatant omission is also a concession that FIFA and the world are still not prepared for a Muslim WC. Ironically, as SA prepares for 2010, international concern over terrorism is growing considerably.

<sup>9</sup> Baade 2004

It is interesting to consider the state of SA when the nation lost the 2006 WC to Germany. In 2000, SA was still a humble democracy. The violent eruptions many had expected during the transition to democracy had been averted, but international investors were still cautious. Crime was at all time highs and economic growth still meager. By 2004, SA's economic growth was growing steadily and many international agencies had reinvested in SA seeing it as a rapidly growing new market. Four years later, SA was increasingly viewed as the foothold of Africa. Also importantly, by 2004, the ANC under the leadership of President Mbeki were strongly supportive of privatization and corporatization, which may have made international investors more comfortable with possible profits. Ironically, four years later, in 2008, economic investment and job growth has slowed, crime has not decreased as promised, and the anticipated transition from President Mbeki's privatization efforts to presumed presidential successor, Jacob Zuma may result in a shift away from privatization efforts.

In 2007, Brazil was the only country to bid for the 2014 FIFA WC, which according to FIFA's rotating system, is set to be staged in South America. According to FIFA, Brazil's bid was approved because it demonstrated capacity to host an exceptional international sporting event with its superior facilities and rich tradition of football. It is also the only country in South America that could manage such an enormous event. After the 2014 WC, FIFA is set to abandon its system of rotating tournaments around the continents. When asked why FIFA stopped rotating hosting privileges between continents, FIFA President Sepp Blatter said, "Something was missing. The competition was lacking, and football is competition."<sup>10</sup>

### 1.3 | SOUTH AFRICA OBSESSED WITH SPORTS

Sports have played a crucial role in SA, particularly as the country embraced the international arena in the post-Apartheid years. These mega-events have been a mixed blessing. Hosting these events has resulted in heavy financial losses for hosting agencies, but in more nuanced areas such as branding, the unintended (or perhaps intended) consequences have been mostly positive.

Despite its historical role as international pariah chose to pursue a hosting opportunity in 1990 to host the 1995 Rugby WC in 1990. After decades of blatant inequality, SA embarked on what Stephen Gill dubbed as the "global beauty contest".<sup>11</sup> Based on Gill's work, Black and Van der Merwe assert that the hosting of such international events is wrapped up in the global configurations of power, inequality, and identity. This situation was exacerbated in the aftermath of Apartheid whereby SA has launched into a frenzy pursuing such events in an attempt to heal its racial divide locally and its international image.

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<sup>10</sup> World Cup Will No Longer Rotate Among Continents. (October 30, 2007). *The Washington Post*.

<sup>11</sup> Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups: Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. *Politikon*, 34(1): 67:81.

Before the country's first democratic elections, the to-be new government having realized the immense opportunities sporting events offered the country for both ephemeral image-building and permanent institutional feats, was already vying for both the Rugby and Cricket WCs. The emerging democracy was able to achieve almost impossible prowess by marketing Nelson Mandela's international iconic appeal that for the most part superseded the practical constraints of hosting the 1995 Rugby Cup. Ironically, SA welcomed in its first democratically elected government both Rugby and Cricket, the bastions of Afrikanerdom and British Imperialism. Van der Merwe explains that hosting these events provided the divided people of SA with a divergent focus on national identity and racial reconciliation instead of concentrating on the pervasive poverty. That same ideal holds true of future hosting pursuits.<sup>12</sup>

The political rhetoric of the country has been represented through these three sporting events. The 1995 Rugby WC's slogan, "one team, one nation," proved a panacea for a country still reeling from the brink of civil war. Nelson Mandela's cornerstone phrase, the "Rainbow Nation" was built at the Rugby WC. Hosting agencies designed the event to depict the country's racial aspirations and indeed the sport demonstrated the power of the liberating nature of sports. The glory of the Rugby WC, when all of SA seemed to unite as the first multi-racial Rugby team soared to victory, became a beacon that all subsequent megaevents sought to recreate. The luster of the event remained for a number of years representing the possibilities of a united SA. The event was also indicative of the political leadership of Mandela who sought to unify the people first and foremost and saw international prestige and Pan-Africanism as secondary.<sup>13</sup>


Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, became president in 1999 just as SA was preparing to host the 2003 Cricket WC. His leadership style and emphasis on hosting an African WC in 2003 has permeated every aspect of the development of 2010. Namely, SA's decision to co-host 2003 with Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrated Mbeki's vision for SA to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically. Mbeki's political agenda to redevelop SA through the African Renaissance and his pandering to big business permeated the 2003 event. Van der Merwe explains that Mbeki's "African Safari" motif was his attempt to Africanize a sport which was introduced as a means of civilizing the British colonies. Although this choice created unnecessary political tensions, SA still successfully dispelled the myth that it could not host technologically advanced events. Business investment was of course at the heart of Mbeki's plans for this event.<sup>14</sup> 2010's emphasis on Africanism is the result of Mbeki's continued leadership.

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.



**Image 1.2 | South Africa Hosts International Sports Events<sup>15</sup>**

*Since the early 1990s, SA has been vying for every opportunity to host an international sports tournament, playing host to the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC. The overwhelming success of previous hosting opportunities helped the country win the 2010 FIFA WC. Successful hosting has increased international prestige and provided the country with investment.*

#### **1.4 | THE 2010 GAME PLAN: SA'S 2010 WORLD CUP BID**


SA utilized two prominent arguments when vying for 2010. Firstly, the development argument, claiming that hosting the event will jumpstart necessary infrastructure projects that despite their needs are stalled by cost. The second argument relates to the promotion of an improved image, an African Revival of sorts for the entire continent. Both these arguments are entirely sound and are the notable reasons why FIFA awarded the 2010 WC to SA; however, these arguments mask the overt lack of existing and/or buildable infrastructure necessary to host such a mammoth event.

What better way to show the world a new SA than to host one of the most popular international sporting events in the world. The bid book, written by the South African Bid Company, which was formed

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<sup>15</sup> Graphic created by author.

by members of South African Football Association (SAFA)<sup>16</sup> details the long-term and short-term improvements such as infrastructure upgrades, new stadiums, enhanced transportation links, improved telecommunications, safety and security, accommodations, and health care facilities. This magnanimous event is promised to be “an event to remember.”<sup>17</sup>



**Image 1.3 | Map of South Africa's World Cup stadiums<sup>18</sup>**

*The games will be held in ten stadiums in nine cities in SA. Five of SA's football stadiums will undergo major renovations to be completed in December 2008 and five new stadiums will be completed by October 2009.<sup>19</sup>*

<sup>16</sup> The South African Football Association, or SAFA, is the governing body of football in SA. SAFA was formed on December 8, 1991 as part of the process to rid South African sports of its racial divisions and prejudice. Four disparate football agencies Four different football agencies, the Football Association of SA, the South African Soccer Association, the South African Soccer Federation, and the South African National Football Association formed SAFA. Between 1976 and 1991, SA was prohibited from playing world football. SAFA's mission was therefore to remove the racially divisive elements from the game so that SA could once again compete internationally. As a result of this formation, in January 1992, SA was awarded observational status at international football competitions. Finally, in June 1992, SAFA was invited to join the world government body, FIFA as SA's official local agency. Being readmitted to FIFA was a milestone for SA, symbolizing the rebirth of a new SA. Before 2010, SAFA's major feat was to improve the rank of the national team. *About SAFA*

<sup>17</sup> Reader, please note that all bid books remain confidential. FIFA responded to my request for the 2010 bid book as follows: "The documents sent by the member associations of FIFA are considered internal communication and, as such, we are not in a position to provide them directly." Because I could not locate the exact wording and descriptions of projects in the 2004 bid, much of my information describing 2010 planning efforts was drawn from various South African government and ancillary websites. Because the plans continue to change and evolve the 2004 bid book was long outdated. My inability to gather the information directly from the 2004 book does not hinder the authenticity of this study.

<sup>18</sup> This map was taken from [www.sa-venues.com](http://www.sa-venues.com)

<sup>19</sup> A Guide to the 2010 Stadiums" detailing the construction work complete with maps, projected capacity, costs, and completion dates is located at the end of this document in Appendix A.

The games will be held in ten stadiums in nine cities. Five of SA's football stadiums will undergo major renovations to be completed in December 2008 – Soccer City in Johannesburg, Ellis Park in Johannesburg, Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria, Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenberg, and Vodacom Park in Bloemfontein. Five new stadiums will be completed by October 2009 – Green Point Stadium in Cape Town, Mbombela in Nelspruit, Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth, Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane in Limpopo, and Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban. The stadiums are mostly located five or so kilometers from the city center, along major highway.<sup>20</sup> As of October 2007, the estimated total costs to build these ten stadiums is R10 billion or USD 1.38 billion.<sup>21</sup>

To be selected, host cities prepared persuasive business cases demonstrating their ability to host the event. Host cities were selected by the LOC, the Development Bank of SA, the National Treasury, and the Ministry of Sport and Recreation. Officials from the South African construction industry were also consulted as to the selection of host cities. As part of the business plans, host cities were responsible for developing plans for supportive infrastructure including transportation upgrades and the development of sufficient hospitality. Cities are also responsible for developing the lasting legacy of the event and ensuring that all South Africans benefit from 2010.<sup>22</sup>

FIFA requires host countries to provide a number of guarantees to ensure a successful event. These guarantees promise mostly short-term benefits with some ancillary long-term improvements to SA.

- **Access to SA:** The Government has promised no country will be excluded from participating in the WC and therefore SA intends to provide extra visas to those affiliated with the WC. The Government has also promised in legislation to fulfill all needs of visitors.
- **A supportive financial environment:** The Ministry of Finance has agreed to waive taxes on imports and exports affiliated with the WC.
- **Safety and security:** The Ministry of Safety and Security, in affiliation with the SA Police Services (SAPS)<sup>23</sup> has agreed to ensure safety and security during 2010. A written security plan is currently being developed and implemented in conjunction with the LOC.

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<sup>20</sup> Despite planning policies advocating for urban stadiums near active areas, South African cities are developing suburban style stadiums outside of the city center.

<sup>21</sup> Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 25(4), 578-590.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> The SA Police Service, or SAPS, is national police force, the principle law enforcement agency in SA. SAPS was formed as part of a national strategy to integrate and unite the fragmented law enforcement institutions in SA and the homelands. SAPS, which is headquartered in Pretoria is organized into six divisions: Crime Combating and Investigation Division, the Visible Policing Division, the Internal Stability Division, the Community Relations Division, the Supporting Services Division, and the Human Resource Management Division. SAPS administers the national crime records and is responsible for disseminating national and local crime statistics to the nation annually.



- **Telecommunications:** The Ministry of Communications has guaranteed that the telecommunications infrastructure will be more than sufficient to manage communications for 2010 across wired and wireless national and international systems.
- **Transport:** The Government has guaranteed to install transportation infrastructure to accommodate the needs of visitors and athletes for the event.
- **Healthcare:** The Ministry of Health has promised infrastructure that can supply comprehensive medical and disaster-management services.
- **FIFA rights:** As part of the required promises, SA assured FIFA that it would be able to distribute and sell its commercial affiliates in the stadiums. FIFA has also been guaranteed that it will not be liable in any claims related to the events in SA or during the WC.<sup>24</sup>

SA is using this hosting opportunity to expedite related projects such as the USD 1.2 billion Gautrain, a high-speed rail linking Johannesburg and Pretoria, the new Mafikeng International Airport in Durban, the Statue of Freedom dedicated to Nelson Mandela in Port Elizabeth (remained Nelson Mandela City), and a signature-bridge in Coega.<sup>25</sup>

An efficient transportation system is an important element of an enjoyable stay and a successful WC. The Bid Book promised that all modes of transportation will be "in perfect order."<sup>26</sup> If visitors and players cannot travel between and within cities efficiently, then they may be late for matches. Constant delays, poor road infrastructure, and airport delays are all major problems in SA. This demand for improvements to the transportation network is part of the government's plan to alleviate poverty through the Extended Public Works Program. Additions such as the Gautrain, a train connecting Johannesburg and Pretoria and the completion of the Mafikeng Airport are part of this program. Although the government promised long-term benefits for all South Africans, the majority of the jobs are temporary. "Big business will no doubt benefit significantly from the 2010 effect, but this government is challenged to ensure that the periods preceding, during and after the Soccer World Cup, also materially impact on the lives of the majority of this country, who are poor, unemployed, and remain loyal supporters of soccer."<sup>27</sup> Private business will be the major profiteer from these WC projects.

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<sup>24</sup> *Guarantees*. Retrieved March 26, 2008, from South Africa 2010 Government Website: [www.sa2010.gov.za/government/guarantees.php](http://www.sa2010.gov.za/government/guarantees.php).

<sup>25</sup> Waltz, Clint. (January 25, 2005). *World Cup Soccer Economic Impact*. Alabama Institute for Sport and Fitness Management, Troy University.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

In addition to these measureable impacts, SA will benefit from improved marketing and branding generated by a successful event. "Leaving aside, for a moment, the direct benefits of the tournament to our economy and the immense legacy of sporting and social infrastructure that will remain, this is the single most important boost ever for South African tourism,"<sup>28</sup> Marthinus van Schalkwyk, the Environment and Tourism Affairs Minister said. The Bid Company's Tourism, Hospitality and Leisure Director, Gilliam Saunders says; "We may be able to project the tangible benefits but it is not possible to project the huge intangible impact that SA will experience over the next six years." Many of the expected visitors will likely visit nearby tourist attractions such as Cape Town's Table Mountain and Robben Island, the Union Buildings, Hector Petersen Memorial, Sun City, the Big Hole in Kimberley, the Greater St Lucia Wetlands in KwaZulu-Natal, the Mapungubwe Ruins in Limpopo, Kruger National Park and Sodwana Caves in Mpumalanga, and battle fields from the Anglo-Boer War, all of which are in or near the host cities.<sup>29</sup>

### 1.5 | THE PLAYERS: AGENCIES AND STAKEHOLDERS

In 2001, SAFA reorganized its mission to focus on a single goal, to bring the WC to SA. Because SAFA believed that hosting the WC would promote and facilitate the development of football through sustainable infrastructure and training initiatives, lead to the recognition of football as a national asset, and improve the image of SA as being stable, progressive, and innovative, it became the major agency charged with outlining the bid book and coordinating the bid process.<sup>30</sup> Underneath these seemingly benevolent goals, SAFA has developed an overt mission to create a beneficial relationship between football and the corporate world so as to enable Africa's ascendancy in the world of football.

To prepare the bid, SAFA developed the South African Bid Company to develop and compose the bid book presented to FIFA. Once SA was selected as the site for the 2010 WC, the South African Bid Company was dissolved and the LOC took over. In May 2005, Danny Jordaan joined five other staff to form LOC. In June 2005, the LOC moved into its new offices in a central location in Sandton, Johannesburg. On August 29, 2005, the LOC was formed as a nonprofit entity incorporated under Section 21 of the Companies Act. It was charged with the responsibility for collaborating with FIFA and the South African government. The initial investment for the WC was funded by FIFA but local investment has since been able to supplement FIFA's contribution. After the Germany WC concluded, FIFA sent representatives to the LOC offices in Sandton to ensure the completion of all the necessary planning.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Mokgola, T. (May 20, 2004). SA Looks Ahead to 2010. *BuaNews: Government Communication and Information System* (Cape Town).

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> *About SAFA*

<sup>31</sup> Jordaan, Danny. (May 25, 2005). Retrieved December 20, 2007, from Business Day: [www.worldcup2010southafrica.com/content/view/202/92/](http://www.worldcup2010southafrica.com/content/view/202/92/).

The LOC is responsible for monitoring the cities' preparations for 2010. The committee is responsible for acquiring the necessary corporate sponsorship for the U17 team and organizing media contracts. More than R3.3 billion from television deals is already guaranteed. Other sponsorship has been secured from First National Bank and Sasol for the U17 team with finances being coordinated with South African Airways, LG, Avis, and other American corporations to supplement the enormous costs of the event.<sup>32</sup>

The LOC is composed of a nineteen member board of directors who are leaders in the fields of sports, business, and government.<sup>33</sup> The board is composed of some of the most powerful individuals in SA today, some of which have been accused and/or convicted of crimes ranging from corruption to tax evasion. Although many of the board members may have noble goals, a great number are leaders of major South African corporations, and are therefore likely motivated by corporate greed and international ascendancy.

The Committee is spearheaded by the following four individuals. But are they fair, honest and qualified to manage the planning for 2010? Or is their integrity questionable?

- **Danny Jordaan** is CEO of the LOC. In 1997, Danny Jordaan was elected CEO of SAFA and headed the agency bid for both the 2006 and 2010 WC bids. He was an anti-Apartheid activist and a teacher who then became an ANC member of Parliament. He has spent more than 10 years pursuing SA's WC dream. His success in bringing the event to SA has made him very popular and as such as was voted 44<sup>th</sup> on the South African Broadcasting Company's 100 Greatest South Africans. In 2004, Jordaan was selected to be CEO of the 2010 LOC.<sup>34</sup>
- **Irvin Khoza**, as Chairman of LOC and vice president of SAFA, is responsible for leading the successful bid to win the 2010 WC. He made his fortune in a property deal and took charge of the then bankrupt Orlando Pirates, a team his uncle managed into the ground. Khoza was named chairman of the LOC despite being convicted twice (1979 and 1981) of insurance fraud for trying to profit from a fictitious life policy. He was also convicted of drug dealing and tax evasion in Zambia and forced by the South African Revenue Service to pay USD 10 million. Khoza was also convicted of keeping money earned from trading players instead of reinvesting in the club as required by law.<sup>35</sup> Khoza's previous corruption should make him ineligible to control billions of Rand, and yet somehow he is organizing 2010.
- **Tokyo Sexwale** is one of wealthiest and most powerful businessmen and former anti-Apartheid activist and political prisoner. Sexwale spent 13 years on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela and

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> *About SAFA*

<sup>34</sup> Jordaan 2005

<sup>35</sup> Who is Irvin Khoza? (December 10, 2004). *BBC Sport*.

Govan Mbeki.<sup>36</sup> While in prison, Sexwale completed a business degree at the University of SA. After his release in 1991, Sexwale was very involved in politics, serving as the Premier of the Gauteng Province until his split with the ANC in 1998. Sexwale founded Mvelaphanda Holdings, a mining company for oil, diamonds, and gold which has made him one of the wealthiest men in SA. He is the second-in-charge of De Beers Diamonds below Harry Oppenheimer. He also chairs other energy, electronics, import/exporting, and banking corporations. Sexwale's recent support for Jacob Zuma was considered a major cause of his 2007 control of the ANC presidency.<sup>37</sup> Certainly Sexwale's business interests conflict with his leading role in the planning and development of 2010. As a businessman he is going to be biased when making decisions that should benefit the entire country, instead building in areas that suit his business interests.

- **Selwyn Nathan** is CEO of Southern African Investments Ltd., a sports investment company, which focuses on building mass media support and sports brand ownership, while maximizing profit through investing in delivery platforms such as sports-related media and services. Nathan was asked to join the team because of his expertise in stadium development and his ability to gain sponsorship for 2010. As the CEO of a company that profits from building stadiums, he will profit from building stadiums in 2010. He may be swayed to build more stadiums or increase the costs for building the stadiums so that his company will increase its profits.<sup>38</sup>

Several government ministers are also serving on the board of the LOC. Because of the sheer scale of the event, almost every government department is playing a part in preparing the country. Different tiers of government have different responsibilities during this preparation period. The central government's main role during the preparation is ensuring infrastructure projects such as hospitals, roads, and emergency services are completed. The LOC has asked the central government to produce a government-driven integrated economic strategy for the areas around the stadiums to ensure that they do not become white elephants.<sup>39</sup> The central government's WC effort is driven by the Inter-Ministerial Committee, chaired by Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The Inter-Ministerial Committee comprises heads of the ministries responsible for delivering on the government's bid book guarantees. The committee meets monthly to report to President Mbeki on their activity.<sup>40</sup> The government has

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<sup>36</sup> Govan Mbeki is an important and popular ANC politician, and father of President Thabo Mbeki.

<sup>37</sup> Tokyo Sexwale: Football Kept Us Alive. (July 18, 2007). *FIFA.Com*.

<sup>38</sup> Other members of the board of the LOC include: Other members of the LOC board include: Professor Michael Katz (business), Anastasia Tsihlias (sport), SAFA CEO Raymond Hack (sport), SAFA chairman of the referee's appointment committee Mubarak Mohamed (sport), SAFA president Molefi Oliphant, Kenneth Lebenya (sport), Kaizer Motaung (sport), Koos Bekker (business), Zwelinzima Vavi (labor).

<sup>39</sup> Jordaan 2005

<sup>40</sup> The Inter-Ministerial Committee is comprised of the following ministers: Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, who is the chairperson, Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile, who is the deputy chairperson, Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad, Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, Deputy Minister of Finance, Jabu Moleketi, Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Minister of Trade and Industry, Mandisi Mpahlwa, Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Minister of Communications, Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, Minister of Transport, Jeff Radebe, Minister of Justice, Bridgette

committed twelve departments and a number of ancillary semi-public agencies to ensuring a successful WC.<sup>41</sup> President Mbeki said, "The good thing about it, is that it will be an integrated approach between the event organizer (FIFA), the private sector, and the government working...on a solid platform already established during the previous major events."<sup>42</sup>

New agencies like the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) is responsible for fulfilling the government's guarantees, ensuring that the government's major investment for 2010 support its overall priorities and that SA develops a lasting legacy for development, nation-building and African solidarity. The TCC works closely with the LOC and its organization structure is divided into the following tasks – infrastructure, security management, economic benefits, and social and political legacy, including international branding.<sup>43</sup> The 2010 Management Unit (MU) was formed to manage all 2010 projects and affiliated agencies in an organized manner. The MU falls under the leadership of the Minister of Sports and Recreation and is responsible for managing all elements of the government's responsibilities for 2010. Joe Phaahla is the Director-General of the MU.<sup>44</sup> In addition to the formal establishment of new agencies, a 2010 office working with the National Treasury has been charged with ensuring sound financial management of all 2010 projects.

The Host Cities Forum is a joint venture between the government and the LOC to manage all aspects of preparations to be completed in and by the host cities. This group meets monthly. The Forum is chaired by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government and is responsible for coordinating 2010 projects across local, provincial, and national spheres and for providing technical assistance to the host cities.<sup>45</sup>

The LOC is responsible for all final details regarding stadium and other sports-related infrastructure. The LOC is not the appropriate entity to be overseeing national planning efforts. The LOC is the agency responsible for organizing the 2010 WC. Physically, the LOC is based in Johannesburg and is not capable of managing projects nationwide. The LOC is composed of representatives of the sports, government, and business sectors; they are not planners and are therefore not demanding that 2010 projects improve urban futures. The LOC does not know the best means for jumpstarting the local economy in Polokwane or how to improve access to the waterfront in Port Elizabeth. Instead of hiring staff that could plan such complicated projects, the LOC is focused on the ephemeral success of the event in 2010. Although officially, all development projects are part of an Integrated Development Plan

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Mabandla, Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of Agriculture, Lulama Xingwana, and Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan.

<sup>41</sup> Other government ministers serving on the LOC board include: Minister Essop Pahad, the Minister in the Presidency, Minister Makhenkesi Stofile, the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Minister Jeff Radebe, the Minister of Transport, Jabu Moleketi, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and Sydney Mufamadi, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government.

<sup>42</sup> Mokgola 2004

<sup>43</sup> Guarantees. *South Africa 2010 Government Website*.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

(IDP), the IDP does not necessarily reflect the most pressing local demands. Therefore, development projects are scattered without a holistic or integrated approach to improve the city. The mission of the LOC is to develop a successful WC event, not to improve urban futures. The agency is not accountable to the public for insufficient planning.

The Premier Soccer League (PSL) began voicing displeasure with the LOC when they announced plans to renovate existing stadiums rather than building new ones. The PSL is worried that SA is not demonstrating a long-term commitment to football for future generations. Critics like PSL argue that the Rugby WC was a great success because SA significantly improved Rugby stadiums throughout SA. Johannesburg's FNB Stadium will be the largest new stadium and the only venue designated exclusively for football. Trevor Philips, CEO of PSL, says that the bid never proposed to build enough new stadiums to have a lasting legacy on the sport. Groups like PSL have gained support from host cities who want complete control over infrastructure and do not want the Central Government in Pretoria determining local needs.<sup>46</sup>

By creating the LOC, SAFA is able to distance itself from details and controversies around 2010 preparations. For 2010, SAFA is only responsible for training SA's football team by developing effective programming that identifies future talent who will make the team competitive in 2010. Before FIFA granted SA the WC, SAFA had considerable debt. As a result of the 2010 sponsorship, SAFA has paid off all major debtors including the South African Revenue Service.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.6 | LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS WORLD CUPS

Much of the excitement around hosting 2010 results from promises that sports investments guarantees profit. Early estimates of the 2010 WC's net economic impact on SA is measured at USD 3 billion, based on 230,000 foreign tourists arriving for the tournament and staying an average of 15 days. This impact represents a 1.5% increase in GDP.<sup>48</sup> This figure does not include the estimate of the economic benefit of expenditures by the local population on ticket sales and at-home viewing parties. The estimated benefit is therefore greater than USD 3 billion. Other figures estimate an output of as much as R21.3 billion into the national economy with an estimated R13.7 billion in direct spending by spectators and an increase in infrastructure value at R8 billion. SA expects an additional R7.2 billion in tax income.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Madywabe, Lungile. (October 23, 2006). Soccer's lasting legacy from 2010. Mail and Guardian Online. (Johannesburg).

<sup>47</sup> Jordaan 2005

<sup>48</sup> Maennig and du Plessis 2007

<sup>49</sup> Kruys, B. G. G. (April 2007). *Public Safety and Security during the 2010 Soccer World Cup*. Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria.

Despite the promised prosperity associated with international events, sports facilities rarely generate substantial profit.

Cities and nations must be careful not to fall into debt when planning events lest they never realize the positive economic benefits of hosting. Mayor Jean Drapeau famously said when planning Montreal's 1976 Summer Olympic Games, "The Olympics can no more have a deficit than a man can have a baby." Drapeau however could not have been further from reality. Montreal's initial estimates of USD 310 million soared to USD 1.5 billion. More than thirty years later, the city is still struggling to pay off the debt long after the infrastructure has become obsolete. The 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens followed a similar trajectory. Just three years after the event, the stadiums are already falling into disrepair since event planners have never found a post-Olympics use. Greece's national debt is above 6%, violating the EU's stability pact, has been attributed to residual Olympic debt.<sup>50</sup>

In order to avoid these pitfalls, SA must develop its infrastructure with considerations for immediate and long-term financial benefits. Cities must plan infrastructure projects to be long lasting. Barcelona estimated it built fifty years worth of infrastructure in just eight years. Manchester's USD 850 million in investments for the 2002 Commonwealth Games resulted in 16,000 permanent jobs. SA must develop varied jobs not just service and low-paying jobs.<sup>51</sup>

Tourism is of course the most immediate way to profit, injecting funds directly into the economy before, during, and after the games. Tourism can be especially salient in smaller towns. Tourism to the little Austrian host city, Lillehammer, soared 43% in the four years preceding and following the 1994 Winter Olympic Games. In the three years leading up to the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics, tourism jumped 8%, then soared to 12% during the host year, and 3.25% annually for the next five years. Simple considerations such as these and heeding the mistakes of previous host cities will help SA guarantee tangible benefits from 2010.<sup>52</sup>

Examining the planning process and aftermaths of previous WC events is critical for projecting the success of various aspects of the 2010 planning process and to forecasting the possibilities for 2010. Countries like SA want to host international events because of the event's financial possibilities as well as its ability to transform negative national perceptions. Although the long-term economic benefits of the 2010 WC on national economic growth are immeasurable, estimates can be developed by examining the economic benefits of previous WC events such as the 2006 WC on the German economy. Lessons from Germany provide a context for analyzing the potential costs and benefits to SA on a national level. Before a shovel is placed in the ground, SA must be able to clearly demonstrate the long-term economic benefits of building the necessary infrastructure in lieu of providing basic needs such as housing and sanitation.

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<sup>50</sup> Satchu, Jamil, Emmanuel Hembert, and Nicolass du Plessis. (2008). Building a Legacy. A.T. Kearney.

<sup>51</sup> Satchu, Hembert, and du Plessis 2008

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

Considering the proliferate expenses and escalating costs, it is even more pressing that SA demonstrate the significant economic benefits of such substantial investment.

WC events have the potential to be incredibly profitable national investments. The WC can only be as profitable as the American and German Games if most of the infrastructure already exists. If the country needs to invest considerably to host the WC as was the case in Asia and will be in SA, then the country must invest considerably more in supportive infrastructure and needs to yield greater profits. Likewise, if the stadiums do not already exist, then there is not likely a demand for such large stadiums. In WC host countries like Japan, where the country built the stadiums just to host the WC, these stadiums are wasteful since they will not likely be used after the event. For the most part, previous WCs were very successful and serve as models for SA.

### 1.6.1 | The 1994 USA World Cup Success

From June 17 to July 17, 1994, the host cities of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Orlando, San Francisco, and Washington DC earned more than USD 1 billion in direct spending during the 1994 US FIFA WC. Los Angeles, because it hosted the most games earned USD 623 million, New York was the next most profitable city earning USD 452 million, followed by San Francisco with USD 338 million and Boston with USD 255 million.<sup>53</sup> This economic analysis conservatively measures the economic impact based on initial attendance estimates between 90 and 95%, although actual attendance was higher. The city of Pasadena, located in the Los Angeles metropolitan area which hosted the finals in the Rose Bowl generated over USD 30 million in tax revenue based on stadium rental fees, parking revenue, concessions, and souvenir sales. The Pasadena Convention and Visitors Bureau reported an increase of USD 98.2 million in direct and indirect spending and 1,700 increase in part-time jobs. However, the hotel industry did not experience the financial profits as the rest of the country because visitors and businessmen who may have visited the city avoided the area during the WC.<sup>54</sup>

Overall, the 1994 WC garnered tremendous economic, social, and political benefit. As a prerequisite to hosting the WC, the US had to create a national football league, which went on to win several subsequent tournaments. Likewise, the tourism and hospitality industry profited greatly. Although spending remained mostly in host cities, since most hospitality industries are national corporations, profits were shared and distributed throughout the country. No studies have even whispered that the US did not benefit economically from hosting the 1994 WC. However, it is important to note that to host the WC, the

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<sup>53</sup> For comparison, the 1994 Super Bowl also hosted in Los Angeles that same year, an event which many consider to be the largest American sports event earned just USD 182 million.

<sup>54</sup> Waltz, Clint. (January 25, 2005). World Cup Soccer Economic Impact. *Alabama Institute for Sport and Fitness Management, Troy University*.



US did not need to invest in supportive infrastructure and as a result, preparations for the event were relatively minor and cheap.<sup>55</sup>

### 1.6.2 | The 1998 France World Cup Success

The 1998 FIFA WC was held in ten stadium in ten cities throughout France. The tournament was widely considered a success both spiritually and financially. France won their first WC title and was the first host country to win the tournament since Argentina in 1978. Because of France's relatively developed infrastructure, the country built only one new stadium, the Stade de France in Saint Dennis, an inner suburb of Paris and spent little renovating the rest of the stadiums. The France WC is widely seen as an incredibly profitable and successful event. The country was unified by the unanimous celebration around France's victory. As a developed country, the event took place without complication or serious unrest and profits soared high as people from all over Europe came to France to join in the revelry.<sup>56</sup>

### 1.6.3 | The 2002 Asia World Cup Success

In 2002, Japan and South Korea became the first to jointly host a WC event, splitting the 64 matches evenly between countries. More than three million spectators attended the matches with ticket sales accounting for USD 1.2 billion. More than 35 million viewers watched the WC live, making it one of the largest events in Asia.<sup>57</sup>

In the same manner that SA is designated an African WC, Japan was unwilling to be outdone by its former colony, South Korea and as a result felt the stinging disillusionment about the WC. Japan spent almost USD 5 billion building ten stadiums to match South Korea's number of stadiums. The most notable white elephant stadium, Sapporo, cost USD 400 million complete with a retractable field that costs USD 15,000 each use. Even before the WC began, Japan announced that only two of the ten stadiums would ever be self-supporting. Japan, like SA, assumed that building these ten stadiums would boost the economy, adding an estimated USD 25 billion, only to realize that such enormous development projects are short-term and leave the host country in debt.<sup>58</sup> South Korea on the other hand, spent USD 1.7 billion on infrastructure and built its stadiums with the intention of reusing them after the tournament for the Korean soccer league. The South Korean stadiums have been incredibly successful. South Korea used the new stadiums in conjunction with city development plans. Developers used innovative materials to cut

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Dauncy, Hugh and Geoff Hare. (1999). *France and the 1998 World Cup: The National Impact of a World Sporting Event*. London: Routledge.

<sup>57</sup> Parr, Rob. (April 2002). World Cup Brand Protection. *Brand Strategy*, 26-28.

<sup>58</sup> Plotz, David. (May 31, 2002). *Japan's World Cup Delusion*. Retrieved March 31, 2008, from Slate: [www.slate.com](http://www.slate.com).

construction costs and sited the stadiums so as to be easily adapted after the WC. As a result, the wiser South Korea's economic output was USD 9 billion or 2.2% of GDP.<sup>59</sup>

Attendance and tourism levels were nowhere near expected and as a result profits were considerably less. Hundreds of thousands of event tickets were never sold. Japan mistakenly projected an estimated 330,000 visitors would attend the WC, instead Japan had only 75,000 visitors, just 20% of the original estimates. This disappointing turnout as mirrored by a decline in the typical number of business travelers who avoided Japan during the event.<sup>60</sup>

Japan, like SA, expected the WC to promise painless salvation from its economic problems. Unfortunately, the 2002 WC failed to deliver the necessary "football magic" leaving the country in a worse situation. Such an inflated and then disappointing result can easily happen in SA. On a more positive note, significant corporate sponsorship rescued the financial depressing attendance supplementing some of the investment costs. Despite the financial failures, South Korea benefited greatly from the new stadiums and other supportive infrastructure; SA also needs new infrastructure and despite the financials of the 2010 WC, SA could benefit from the new infrastructure regardless.<sup>61</sup>

### 1.6.4 | The 2006 Germany World Cup Success

Less than two years have passed since Germany hosted the 2006 WC and already the economic benefits of the WC are estimated as high as USD 10.4 billion. This figure is significantly higher than the highest pre-2006 estimate of USD 2 billion, but with 3.3 million foreign visitors spending USD 200-265 per day, the overall effect is likely closer to USD 12-16 billion. This higher figure was determined by adding the USD 4.5 billion the German Hotel and Catering Association and the Postbank calculated was spent on food and hotels. The residual USD 8 billion resulted from foreign investment, tourist spending, and local resident spending during the month-long event.<sup>62</sup> Germany was able to recover its expenses through ticket sales, marketing revenue, and FIFA contributions. The LOC event made a USD 206 million profit and was able to partially repay the FIFA investment of USD 65 million. Much of this surplus revenue resulted from near capacity sales of match tickets for another USD 27 million in unexpected revenue.

Although at this early stage it is difficult to guess the cost-benefit structure of the 2010 WC, some financial issues are already developing. In particular, the high cost of seats at the WC stadiums is proving prohibitive for most South Africans. The LOC plans to sell 2.7 million tickets for a total of USD 638 million resulting in an average price of USD 236. With high unemployment exceeding 27% and 57% of people living below poverty, these ticket prices seem particularly pricey. With the median monthly income at just

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<sup>59</sup> Waltz 2005

<sup>60</sup> Plotz 2002

<sup>61</sup> Waltz 2005

<sup>62</sup> Maenning and du Plessis 2007

USD 280, the LOC cannot rely on the near capacity seating that Germany experienced. With the current entrance fees at SA's premier football matches at about USD 3 per seat, there are concerns about filling the large stadiums at such high ticket prices.<sup>63</sup> Event organizers should consider lowering the costs to be sure that the demographics inside the stadiums represent an equitable distribution of the country. Concerns about filling the stadiums at these high prices should be discussed before SA spends million expanding the capacity of the existing stadiums.

Likewise, SA cannot expect to mimic Germany's low security costs of just USD 33 million. SA expects to spend R6.8 billion (USD 1 billion) on security. Based upon the current crime conditions, SA should expect these costs to escalate.

Unlike SA, Germany's athletic and ancillary infrastructure was relatively developed even before the LOC began planning for the WC. Even so, Germany spent USD 1.9 billion on 12 stadiums; more than 60% of this funding was financed by the existing sports clubs and other private investors. Germany's private investors were eager to invest in the stadiums since they would surely yield profits from the upgrades as the stadiums continued to be used after the WC. SA's stadiums by contrast will be almost exclusively funded by public funds since the clubs cannot afford to contribute the necessary funds. Likewise, the private agencies are less likely to invest in the stadiums since they will not easily recover these expenses. Germany's ancillary infrastructure was also considerably more developed than SA's roads and communication systems. While SA projects manageable infrastructure costs, these costs are likely to escalate as construction gets underway.

## 1.7 | DRAWBACKS TO HOSTING 2010

Megaevents like the 2010 WC have the power to hasten social, cultural, environmental, economic, and physical growth. But ideal development goals that suit the needs of the city often conflict with international hosting requirements and deadlines. Events like 2010 can move nations to the next stages of development and help emerging countries like SA establish international legitimacy. Despite the successes of previous WC events, there are considerable drawbacks for a developing country to host. Firstly, the enormous cost involved with hosting the event. SA must develop almost from scratch a sports infrastructure and related transportation, safety, and communications infrastructure to meet the demands of 2010. SA may never use this infrastructure after 2010 and investment to meet the FIFA requirements is excessive given SA's standards. Although the majority of South Africans are major football fans, they are poor and it will be difficult for developers to earn a return on their investment in the stadiums considering the fact that most South Africans cannot afford football ticket prices.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

According to Maenning and du Plessis, who studied the 2006 German WC and its aftermath determined that stadiums are subject to the laws of diminishing returns displaying a negative social marginal utility. After the 2010 WC, many of these upgraded stadiums will not be regularly used. With so many mammoth stadiums, it is not possible to utilize them fully. SA is a relatively poor country and residents cannot afford to pay top prices for the types of events that developers hope to hold in stadiums with capacities above 50,000.<sup>64</sup> Although having these stadiums offers cities, especially the smaller, often overlooked cities with the opportunity to host mega sports and entertainment events, South Africans will not be able to pay ticket prices and therefore the stadiums will likely become white elephants on the landscape and economic losses for investors.

WC proponents have promised that hosting will deliver strong economic growth. Unfortunately, little of this potential prosperity will trickle from the corporations to the average South African. These years preceding 2010 are supposed to be the most economically profitable. But recent reports have concluded that poverty and unemployment in SA are at all time highs. Despite years of at least 6% economic growth, unemployment has continued to rise above 25%. Despite Germany's WC prosperity, unemployment increased in the years after the WC as the construction industry faced a post-event slump. SA will also experience similar economic scarcity in the years after the WC. Even if workforce projects like stadium and highway construction may alleviate some unemployment in the short-term, once these projects are completed, there are no long-term programs to reduce unemployment.

SA is anticipating significant increased spending in the hospitality industry as the country welcomes WC visitors. Although SA is expecting hundreds of thousands of visitors, as was the case in the 2002 Asia WC, those expectations can fall short. Concurrently, those visitors who may have been inclined to visit otherwise may be frightened off by the popularity of the WC. Germany, Asia, and the US, experienced declines in business tourism and Asia in particular experienced notable declines in all forms of tourism during the WC. In Germany, many cities not hosting WC events noticed considerable declines in rented hotel rooms which resulted from more people visiting the city currently hosting a tournament. Ironically, if SA does experience the projected number of visitors, those tourists will not likely return in the near future. Short-term tourism increased may lead to noticeable declines in subsequent years.

Location and climate may deter visitors from the Northern Hemisphere who want to spent time in a summer climate. Some statisticians attribute Germany's profits to its location in the heart of Europe hosting events during the warm summer months. This ascribes Germany's tremendous increase in tourism during WC to its central location and warm weather. Statisticians suggest that SA's distant location and the fact that it is hosting during its winter months will lead to only marginal increases in

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

tourism.<sup>65</sup> By contrast, SA is relatively isolated from other wealthy, football-loving countries and therefore visitors must spend considerable time and money just getting to SA. This may deter many visitors and lead to economic losses.

Finally, a considerable amount of revenue at previous WCs was generated through merchandizing. Since many SAs live in poverty, they will not be able to spend the significant amounts that German, American, and Asian locals spent on WC memorabilia. Event organizers have promised that hosting the event will revive beleaguered industries, in particular the textile industry. "The reason we're backing the WC is that there should be employment and procurement opportunities for locals. It shouldn't just benefit those who are already wealthy," says Tony Ehrenreich, Secretary General of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).<sup>66</sup> Ehrenreich continues explaining that while COSATU continues to support 2010, it insists that FIFA reduce the high licensing fees that textile producers will need to pay to sell t-shirts, caps, hats, and scarves.

Despite the enormous possibilities associated with hosting the 2010 WC, there are also possible drawbacks. As a developing country, SA is experiencing different preparation challenges than previous WC hosts. If successful however, the 2010 WC can help SA advance to the next stages of development.

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<sup>65</sup> While SA may experience increases with respect to its typically low tourism numbers during the winter months, these increases will be matched by decreases in the preceding and following peak summer months since some of those visitors may be planning to visit during the WC instead.

<sup>66</sup> The Congress of South African Trade Unions, or COSATU is a trade union federation founded in 1985 as the voice of all the 1.8 million trade union workers in SA. COSATU gained momentum by mobilizing the factory workers, increasing its power towards the end of Apartheid by organizing a series of highly effective wage strikes. Although COSATU forms the third section of the tripartite alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, it remains appropriately critical of the ANC government remain true to its roots advocating for the rights of the factory worker. Although COSATU is an avid supporter of SA's role as 2010 host, it remains critical of some of the preparations. South Africa's 2010 Cup Challenge. (July 7, 2006). *BBC News*.



## CHAPTER 2

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### OBSTACLES TO 2010

South Africa's efforts have been plagued by organizational snafus, spiraling costs, and the general feeling that a developing nation is not up to the task of hosting the world's biggest sporting event.<sup>1</sup>

- Cathal Kelly, *Journalist at The Star, Johannesburg*

There are always funds for projects like this but not for things like employing more Metro Police or housing street children. To spend R5-billion for a three week sporting event, but not on crucial services like housing shows that the priorities are skewed.<sup>2</sup>

- Robin Palmer, *Professor of Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal*

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<sup>1</sup> Kelly, Cathal. (October 5, 2006). South Africa Cup Full of Woes. *The Star* (Johannesburg).

<sup>2</sup> Robin Palmer, a professor of law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Gerretsen, Bronwyn. (August 18, 2006). South Africa World Cup Spending Slammed. *The Mercury* (Durban).

## 2.1 | SOUTH AFRICA'S 2010 WORLD CUP IS UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSORS

The 2010 WC is unlike any other previous FIFA WC events. Not only is this the first instance when a FIFA WC will be hosted on African soil, but SA is also the poorest and least developed country to ever host the WC. SA therefore faces unique challenges as a host country. It must balance the need to develop equitably and sustainably with the need to meet FIFA deadlines within the allotted budget.

SA is particularly challenged to meet international standards because of its relatively small population of uneducated, impoverished people. SA is the largest, least populated country ever to host the FIFA WC. With just 48 million people living in 1.2 million km<sup>2</sup>, SA is the most sparsely populated host country. It is also the poorest country ever to host with a GDP of just USD283 billion. SA ranks 121<sup>st</sup> on the Human Development Index below 0.5 which is considered "low development." By contrast, Germany has 82 million living in 357,022 km<sup>2</sup> earning USD3.3 trillion annually and the US has a population of 304 million living in 10 million km<sup>2</sup> earning USD14 trillion annually. SA is also geographically and culturally isolated. Previous host countries like Germany and US were considerably more capable of preparing such a mammoth international event.

In addition to poverty, unemployment, and other demands common in developing countries, SA also suffers from a history of distrust and anger resulting from decades of apartheid policies. Racism is an important lingering factor. Briefly, between 1948 and 1994, SA was governed by minority White rule and a doctrine of apartheid. Apartheid legislation classified South Africans according to racial groups and racist national legislation limited employment opportunities, residential locations, education, and personal movement. Under apartheid, South African Blacks were stripped of their citizenship. Apartheid was dismantled after the legislature instituted universal suffrage in the 1994 elections. Despite the more than a decade of democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. The scars of apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of 2010. In particular, urban infrastructure is fragmented and the country straddles the line of developing and developed. Some wealthy, White areas of cities like Johannesburg are as developed as Western Europe while nearby neighborhoods remain impoverished. Ideally, 2010 offers these disenfranchised areas the opportunity to catch up to development elsewhere in the city. Smaller cities which received marginal government investment during apartheid can use 2010 to develop impressive infrastructure and transform their relative importance nationally.

Before SA can rebuild itself, it must manage a variety of issues distinct to its particular stages of development and the particulars of the 2010 WC bid. Several factors impact the balance of gains, opportunities, losses, and burdens of hosting the 2010 WC.




- SA has a complicated relationship with football. The sport evolved from a British Colonial tool for submission to the “People’s Game” with several decades of international isolation in between. This 2010 opportunity is an exceptionally expressive international vote of confidence.
- Local and international expectations are high as spectators from SA and across the globe anticipate 2010.
- Deteriorating cities demand considerable more investment than infrastructure in more developed host countries. Different cities face different pressures which help and/or hinder their ability to impress. Inequalities are pervasive in SA, and even more so in areas that are still struggling to overcome development limitations remaining from apartheid. While all South African cities need to upgrade various elements of their infrastructure, some cities have to build considerably more to meet the current standards.
- Fragmentation and decentralization of governing bodies makes it increasingly difficult for municipal, provincial, and central governments to work together in preparation for 2010.
- Escalating crime rates make it difficult to manage increasing tourism. Although President Mbeki has promised to enact policies to lower crime rates, violence continues to intensify.
- WC costs are rising without adequate, long-term public financing planning. Unlike other host countries, 2010 is funded almost entirely by public funds and it is therefore essential that infrastructure provide lasting benefits to all South Africans.
- Despite socialist promises during this first decade of democracy, privatization has soared.
- International investment and sponsorship is expected to exceed all previous WC events. However, SA has also promised to promote the development of local entrepreneurship as part of the legacy.
- SA, like many developing countries suffer from limited physical capacity. This is particularly challenging as SA rushes to complete necessary infrastructure in an abbreviated time period.

These factors contribute to the challenging, complicated, and ambiguous nature of planning the 2010 WC. Recognizing these distinct differences between the characteristics of SA and other developed and developing countries will enable local organizers to see possibilities and envision a lasting legacy for SA.

## 2.2 | SOUTH AFRICA'S COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH FOOTBALL

This section chronicles the history of football in SA. Football was introduced by the British as a tool to tame the natives. Over time, the popularity of the sport contributed to its nickname, the "People's Game." Despite its controversial origins, today, football is the symbol of integration and a development tool. If South Africans could integrate football, then there was still hope for developing a fully integrated society. It is imperative to understand the popularity and distinctive role football plays in SA.



**Image 2.1 | Every South African Plays Football**

*This image displays the universal passion South Africans display for the sport. In this impoverished area, Black and White children play together. Age and color are of no regard. Building unity through the WC is one way of ensuring that future generations are more united than previous generations. Udesh Pillay, Executive Director of Urban, Rural, and Economic Development at the Human Sciences Research Council admits that attitudes on the tournament have revealed that the public still feels it is well worth the sacrifices necessary to prepare for the WC. "As a country we are never going to close rank on politics, economic plans or foreign policy," he says. "But we are mad about sports, so there is no argument about hosting the World Cup. We all want it."<sup>3</sup>*

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<sup>3</sup> Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). *The Guardian* (London).

SA has actively sought opportunities to host international events since the country was readmitted into the sports arena in the early 1990s. The government has used these opportunities to demonstrate overt political overtones including racial integration and Africanism. Because of its sheer size, this FIFA WC has greater potential to generate long-term, permanent improvement in SA and therefore the government should focus on creating holistic benefits for all South Africans. Time after time, leaders supporting the 1995, 2003, and now 2010 WCs have promised that these events are necessary to accrue elusive benefits by enhancing equality and human rights; however, SA's business-like approach to developing the events has diluted the perceived democracy in accordance with a more consumerist global sports milieu and globalization. Historically, SA has used its role as host to escalate international investment and corporate profit.

This opportunity to host the 2010 WC is a consequence of the country's elevated status in the world. Although the Rugby WC and Cricket WC were both important hosting opportunities, both events are considerably less important internationally than 2010. Rugby and cricket are considered White sports and these early hosting opportunities can be considered a remnant of their relative worth under apartheid. Football on the other hand is symbolic of a multicultural, multiracial, and truly democratic global sporting event. Based solely on audience size, hosting the Rugby and Cricket WCs was like a "dress rehearsal" for the Football WC.<sup>4</sup>

Although rugby, cricket, and football are well-embedded in SA, ironically, sports were originally brought to SA as part of the Colonial British civilizing mission as a means for assimilating locals into a "British way of life". Those South Africans that demonstrated an appreciation for British customs and particularly sports were elevated socially and economically. As a result, British sports were incredibly popular in the colony. Sports formed part of a "broader social fabric of everyday life" and therefore played a prominent role in the formation and reinforcement of racially-divided communities. Cricket and rugby were seen as the embodiment of British elitism and gentlemanliness, and therefore became the chosen sport of the Afrikaans community. By contrast, football because of its working class image in England the sport transplanted itself into the Black community. Van der Merwe explains that the White sports were often seen as a means of creating unity amongst the Whites to maintain social distance from the rest of the population.<sup>5</sup>

The game of football has historically followed the cultural attitudes of SA and the football leagues were segregated accordingly. While the White team, the Football Association of SA (FASA), was formed in 1892, leagues for Indians, Black Africans, and Coloureds, the SA Indian Football Association (SAIFA), the SA Bantu Football Association (SABFA), and the SA Coloured Football Association (SACFA), only

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<sup>4</sup> Van der Merwe, Justin. (2007). Political Analysis of South Africa's Hosting of the Rugby and Cricket World Cups: Lessons for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and Beyond. *Politikon*, 34(1): 67:81.

<sup>5</sup> Cornelissen, Scarlett and Swart, Kamilla. (2006). The 2010 Football World Cup as a Political Construct: The Challenge of Making Good on an African Promise. *Blackwell Publishing* (Malden, Massachusetts).

formed in 1903, 1933, and 1936, respectively. Although the sport remained divided, an interracial football board organized occasional mixed games into the mid-1940s. All mixing stopped in the 1940s with laws banning mixed sports. In 1958, FIFA officially recognized FASA as the sole organizer of football in SA. The following year, FASA launched the SA's first entirely professional football club league, which of course was reserved only for Whites.<sup>6</sup>

Until the mid-1950s, the world allowed SA's White team to play internationally. In 1957, at the first Confederation of African Football (CAF) African Cup of Nations in Khartoum, Sudan, SA was disqualified for failing to play with an integrated team. In August of 1960, SA was asked to desegregate its team as required by FIFA's non-discriminatory regulations. The team failed to do so. On September 26, 1961, SA's membership with FIFA was formally suspended. Then President of the Football Association of England, Sir Stanley Rous, opposed this suspension on the grounds that FIFA should not entangle itself in political matters and he defended SA against further attempts to expel the team. In 1963, Rous declared that if the suspension was not lifted, the team's competitive possibilities will be impeded and the suspension was lifted. The following year, in October of 1964, representatives from the African and Asian associations persuaded FIFA to reinstate the suspension. In 1976 as a result of continued political unrest and racial violence, SA was formally expelled from FIFA.<sup>7</sup>

During SA's formal suspension from international football, the popularity of football among Blacks increased while Whites increasingly supported rugby and cricket. Football remained popular amongst the Black community, becoming symbolic of the struggle for equality. Football was dubbed the "Peoples Game" since it united the Black community. Crowds attended tournaments in Black stadiums like the Orlando Stadium in the Johannesburg Township, Soweto. Black football stars like Jomo Sono and Kaizer Motaung became heroes to millions. During the apartheid years, football became an arena for those who were forbidden to meet and discuss politics to raise issues of class, globalization, and capitalism.<sup>8</sup> The 1987 film, *Cry Freedom*, depicts secret political meetings on the football field. This pervasive power of football is expected to permeate some of the most impoverished sectors of SA in a way that previous WCs could not. SA is hoping that the FIFA WC will bridge the racial divide and provide South Africans with a divergent focus.

Between 1976 and 1991, SA was prohibited from playing world football. SA was readmitted into the international football community as it began the path towards national suffrage. Four different football agencies, the Football Association of SA, the South African Soccer Association, the South African Soccer Federation, and the South African National Football Association, met in Johannesburg and formed the South African Football Association (SAFA) on December 8, 1991. SAFA's mission was to remove the

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Darby, Paul. *Africa, the FIFA Presidency, and the Governance of World Football: 1974, 1998, and 2002*. (2003). *Africa Today*. 50.1, 3-24.

<sup>8</sup> Cornelissen and Swart 2006

racially divisive elements from the game so that SA could once again compete internationally. In January 1992, SA was awarded observational status at international football competitions, and in June 1992, SAFA was invited to join the world government body,<sup>9</sup> FIFA as SA's official local agency. Being readmitted to FIFA was a milestone for SA, symbolizing the reconciliation.<sup>10</sup>

## 2.3 | HIGH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS

High local and international expectations are difficult to satisfy; in other words, it is easy to impress when prospects look grave and difficult to astonish when outlooks seem more certain and encouraging. Despite considerable challenges, national public opinion and international business interests remain dubiously high. This being the first instance when the FIFA WC is hosted on African soil makes 2010 even more exhilarating. For planners, such expectations make it even harder to impress.

### 2.3.1 | South African Expectations

Public opinion is integral to understanding the potential advantages of 2010. In 2005, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)<sup>11</sup> began conducting annual surveys of public expectations for 2010. HSRC selected 2,884 respondents from across the country, to serve as an entirely representative sample. These responses represent a wide range of opinions on the 2010 WC opportunity.

- Results of annual surveys conducted by the HSRC concluded that many South Africans believe the WC will bring economic prosperity in the form of job creation and work opportunities, although less than half of respondents expect these benefits to linger much past 2010. Respondents were almost evenly split, with 47% believing that the benefits of the event would be long-term and 44% expecting short-term benefits.
- Between 2005 and 2007, the percentage of respondents who believed that the WC would result in "increased business opportunities" decreased from 62% to 51%. According to Dr. Udesch Pillay, project leader of the HSRC's 2010 Project, this is an appreciable decrease that has resulted from a

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<sup>9</sup> The newly integrated South African team, Bafana Bafana (meaning the boys) played its first game on July 7, 1992, and despite more than two decades of rest, the team beat Cameroon 1-0 at King's Park Stadium in Durban. Over the next few years, the team continued to shine qualifying for the 1998 and 2002 WCs. Bafana Bafana is currently ranked at 53 by FIFA.

<sup>10</sup> *About SAFA*. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from SAFA Website: [www.safa.net/index.php?page=safainformation](http://www.safa.net/index.php?page=safainformation).

<sup>11</sup> The Human Sciences Research Council or HSRC was established in 1968 to conduct large-scale, policy projects for public sector users, NGOs, and international development agencies. Research is not specific to South Africa but focuses only on continental development. The HSRC aligns its research activities to South Africa's national development priorities, which currently include poverty reduction, capacity enhancement, job creation, and the elimination of inequality.

more visible planning process, respondents were beginning to "be more realistic and discerning about their expectations."

- Despite promises of prosperity, only 33% of respondents expected to experience personal benefits while the same number did not expect to receive any personal economic benefits. Expectations differed between racial groups with only a quarter of Black African respondents expecting personal benefits, but 69% of White respondents expecting to benefit from 2010. However, White and Indian/Asian respondents only expected short-term benefits while Black respondents expected a lasting legacy. Women also expected to benefit more from job creation than men.
- Although a majority of respondents believed that hosting the will solidify SA's position in the international arena, most doubted that they would personally experience these benefits.
- Detailed analysis of the surveys reveal that respondents are becoming more nuanced and critical of planning processes for 2010. Public assessment of the government's ability to meet the demands of hosting the event decreased 5%. Respondents noted their local municipality's failure to deliver basic services means that it will not likely be able to meet the more stringent obligations of hosting 2010.

### ***"Football Kept Us Alive"***

"The Makana Football Association was named after one of the great chiefs of our struggle. He was one of the first political prisoners sent to Robben Island. The Makana FA was based on the model of FIFA rules. We played 90 minutes. The pitch we played on had to be a certain shape and size and the goalposts had to be exactly the same distance apart. The players dressed in a certain way. Even the spectators dressed up in the different colours of their teams," recalls Sexwale.

Given that they were regarded as the worst enemies of the apartheid state and were banished to an offshore prison with no prospect of ever again returning to the life they once knew, football provided the political prisoners with some semblance of normalcy.

"The game of football kept us alive. Everything was prohibited on Robben Island, but we used to smuggle FIFA rulebooks underground. We even had 'professional' referees and proper disciplinary committees. The teams were divided according to their political affiliation. There were days when if the Pan Africanist Congress was angry, there would be no game. But the Makana Football Association was a vehicle that united all of us. It ran across all political barriers. We realised it was a very important tool for our own solidarity, unity and co-operation. I am not surprised the United Nations has less members than FIFA has," says Sexwale.

"Prisoners used any material they could lay their hands on to make a football. We played with whatever was available and the football nets were made from real fishing nets which had washed up on the island. We asked for permission to pick them up from the shore. By the time I came onto Robben Island, the Makana FA had made a number of strides. After many protests, we were eventually allowed to have our first proper soccer ball. It took about 15 years, but eventually Judy was allowed to bring us proper kit, with boots with studs, footballs, proper playing kit and even referees' whistles. Then you should have seen the games," Sexwale says with a broad smile.

- General public knowledge regarding the event has increased significantly in the last two years, but figures are still staggeringly low. In 2005, only 16% of respondents knew that SA was awarded the 2010 WC. Although this figure now stands at 89%, people living in rural areas still display frighteningly low knowledge of the event, with only 15-19% of respondents remaining ignorant of the event. In 2007, between 8-10% of respondents living in urban areas revealed that they did not know the event was occurring.
- Respondents noted that the main disadvantage of hosting would be an increase in crime, followed by fear that consumer prices will increase. Fear that crime will rise is normal considering the enormity of the event that produces an environment conducive to perpetuating crimes.

What is most important to realize is that when respondents were asked what areas they expected would benefit most from hosting 2010, 61%, the majority of respondents believed that the Gauteng Province (the economic heartland where Johannesburg and Pretoria are located) would benefit the most. Only 8% believed that the "poor and disadvantaged" or persons living in rural areas would benefit, while 17% said the benefits would go to the average South African urbanite. Thirty-nine percent of respondents expect the majority of accrued benefits to go to businesses and 29% expect it to go to the wealthy.<sup>12</sup>

The fantasies about the possible creation and accumulation of wealth dominate the national discourse about 2010. The date itself pervades everyday talk of symbolic power and imagined wealth to be gained through hosting. Detlev Krige in his 2006 dissertation, *Consuming the Imagination: Fantasies about Wealth and 2010 Soccer World Cup in Soweto* highlights the ways excitement about the WC is reconfiguring the national discourse, especially for low-income residents of Soweto. Krige argues that while the liberation struggle embodied a futurist unreality, contemporary visions about 2010 seem within grasp. This has led some excited Soweto residents to buy property to provide accommodation to 2010 spectators. Through these imagined realities, residents are reconfiguring their personal relationships with the city, the nation, and the globalizing world.<sup>13</sup>

### 2.3.2 | Business Support

Business agrees with the HSRC surveys, expecting the majority of the benefits, namely economic gains to go to businesses in Johannesburg and Cape Town, not to all South African cities as WC proponents promise. According to the 2007 International Business Report by Grant Thornton, 75% of

<sup>12</sup> Attitudes to the 2010 World Cup: Positive Expectations Continue, But Not Unabated. (February 7, 2007). Human Sciences Research Council. *Media Briefs 2007* (Johannesburg).

<sup>13</sup> Krige, Detlev. (September 4, 2006) *Consuming the Imagination: Fantasies about Wealth and 2010 Soccer World Cup in Contemporary Soweto. 2010 and the Life of the City*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

South African companies believe that 2010 will benefit them financially.<sup>14</sup> Research conducted among 200 privately held companies employing between 100 and 400 staff revealed that 47% of respondents believed that the greatest benefit will occur during the year preceding 2010, with only 14% expecting the benefit during the event itself. According to the survey, 60% of SA companies are diversifying their product or service to be more relevant to 2010 to maximize the opportunity. Although overall optimism amongst business remains high, it is lower than previous years. Grant Thornton attributes this “anomaly of lower than usual optimism during a business boom to non-business related factors such as increased crime and political uncertainty regarding the succession in South Africa’s presidency.” Leonard Brehm, Chief Executive Officer of Grant Thornton commented, “If our country is to meet the growth targets that have been set, all those working in South African business must be able to operate in a safe environment. This can only be achieved through strong sustained action by government security agencies at all levels, supported by culture of community participation in assisting with the detection and control of crime.”<sup>15</sup>

It seems obvious that business would benefit the most from hosting such a major international event. Hosting a WC event benefits the host country’s construction businesses. Small business and individuals may experience marginal economic benefits via secondary and tertiary spending, but the increased tourism associated with the event will mostly go to major corporations through the hospitality industry. Although there may be a temporary spike in employment during the years preceding the event, there is much less work once the event concludes. Business therefore rightfully presumes it will profit most during the building years between 2006 and 2010.

### 2.3.3 | International Expectations

2010 will be the first time FIFA has awarded the WC to the African continent. When selecting the host country, FIFA selected SA as a means of helping the developing country expedite the distribution of wealth services to all South African people. FIFA’s mission to utilize the WC to generate development was first announced during the 2006 WC, when FIFA announced a new slogan, “Develop the game, Touch the world, Build a better future.” According to FIFA, this slogan will serve as an anchor for host countries to ensure that the event leaves a lasting legacy. The Football for a Better World Alliance is responsible for creating funding through cooperation between government and nongovernmental agencies to build a better future for developing countries. It will ensure that SA utilizes this hosting opportunity to improve the living conditions for all South Africans.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Grant Thornton is the agency responsible for 2010 WC predictions used by the South African Bid Company to create the original economic evaluations for 2010.

<sup>15</sup> *SA Business Upbeat on 2010*. (February 1, 2007). Retrieved February 10, 2008, from SouthAfrica.info: [www.southafrica.info](http://www.southafrica.info)

<sup>16</sup> *Legacy*. Retrieved September 11, 2007, from South Africa 2010 Government Website: [www.sa2010.gov.za/africa/legacy.php](http://www.sa2010.gov.za/africa/legacy.php).



SA has received the complete support of the African Union (AU).<sup>17</sup> The AU has committed its countries to “full and substantive involvement in the preparation leading to the 2010 World Cup.” As a display of its strong support for SA as 2010 host country, in January 2007, the AU officially inaugurated 2007 as the International Year of African Football. The AU urged its member countries to develop national programs and identify WC ambassadors to help implement the International Year of African Football programming, “Sports for All”. The AU is seeking to promote football as an instrument for sustainable economic development and programming that alleviates poverty and builds solidarity within the world.<sup>18</sup>

In the last decade, it has become SA’s agenda to host an international sporting event once every five years. Hosting the 2006 Football WC was to be the crowning achievement of the emergent democracy. The country’s failure to obtain the hosting opportunity was its first setback in its pursuit of hosting opportunities. If the Rugby WC was designed to unify the people and build a Rainbow Nation, emphasizing the soft ephemeral benefits, and the Cricket Cup was supposed to demonstrate SA’s critical role as an emerging leader of Africa, focusing on the permanent quantifiable benefits, then the Football Cup must refocus on a more holistic rebuilding of South African cities.

## “It’s (South?) Africa’s Turn!”




Image 2.2 | “It’s (South?) Africa’s Turn!”<sup>19</sup>

*SA has been calling the 2010 WC, the African WC, but isn’t it the South African WC?*

<sup>17</sup> The African Union, or AU, is an intergovernmental organization consisting of the 53 African nations. The AU was established on July 8, 2002 to help secure Africa’s democracy, human rights, and sustainable economy by bring an end to local conflicts, creating a single-integrated defense force, and instituting a single currency, the Afro.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Graphic created by author.

This is not the first instance when a country has invested its hope to demonstrate its rebirth at an international sporting event. In April 1966, Munich, Germany was awarded the 1972 Summer Olympic Games. Germany hoped to present a new democratic and optimistic Germany to the world. Munich's official motto, the "Happy Games" and the emblem, the "Bright Sun" represented this intention. These hopes were dashed when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped and murdered 11 Israeli athletes live on international television. Instead of demonstrating a new Germany, 1972 led the German federal government to realize the inadequacy of its post-World War II pacifist approach to safety and security. This example demonstrates that the possibility for failure increases exponentially with expectation.<sup>20</sup>

### 2.4 | DECAYING CITIES

Decrepit cities demand considerably more investment than infrastructure in more developed host counties. While all South African cities need to upgrade various elements of their infrastructure, some cities have to build considerably more to meet the current standards. Cities are the ultimate beneficiaries of the investment. International sporting events like the WC can transform a city by renovating forgotten neighborhoods or upgrading an ailing transportation system. The 2010 WC can be a powerful tool to revitalize public facilities. But all these improvements are costly and cities are often left with lingering debt. Few international sporting events are profitable and those tend to be in cities and countries whose facilities require little investment. Long after the event is over and the debt is paid off, cities will be left with infrastructure improvements as an eternal memory.

Hosting 2010 allows cities to influence patterns of development by encouraging growth around the stadiums and linking neighborhoods via transportation projects. For example, Barcelona, Spain used the Olympic Games to regenerate rundown areas on the urban fringes; London, England plans to build its Olympic Park in the Lower Lea Valley, an area ripe for development; Seoul, South Korea used the event to alleviate urban housing shortages; and Athens, Greece developed a new transportation system to relieve its congestion. South African cities should use the event to fund infrastructure projects and build responsibility, taking debt to build needed infrastructure that will continue to benefit the city for the next half century.<sup>21</sup>

In comparison to previous WC events, shabby South African cities need considerable upgrades and infrastructure investment. While other host countries had to build or upgrade stadiums, SA needs to build and repair entire areas of many of the cities. While the larger cities need to rehabilitate large swaths of existing areas, especially in uninhabited downtown areas, some of the smaller South African host cities

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
<sup>20</sup> Reeve, Simon. (2000). *One Day in September*. New York: Arcade Publishing.

<sup>21</sup> Comparing the Olympic Games and the WC is difficult since the Olympics are only held in a single city and the WC is held in ten cities throughout a country. Olympic debt and development therefore focuses on city development while WCs tend to focus on national development.

need to build entirely new downtowns. This means that SA must invest noticeably more financial resources and capacity to meet 2010 requirements.

## 2.5 | DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIES AND NATIONAL INEQUALITIES

Each municipality has its own distinctive problems that must be addressed in their own ways. Differences between cities and national inequalities are severe. The number of people living on less than USD1 per day has more than doubled. The inequalities between cities have also swelled recently making it difficult for governments to make decisions applicable to all host cities.




**Image 2.3 | Relative Importance of 2010 Host Cities<sup>22</sup>**

*With the most international prestige, economic power, and people, Johannesburg stands out as the most important city in South Africa. Durban and Cape Town are also important. But other host cities such as Polokwane and Nelspruit are less important on a national and international scale.*

SA is a conglomeration of many different people, languages, and cultures creating diverse city landscapes. Each South African city has a different style and attitude. All the cities intertwine to create a unique country. Each host city was selected for the unique way it would intertwine its personality with the WC responsibilities. Different South African cities are facing distinct pressures that impact the way the city is developing WC facilities. Different cities are juggling their resources and their capacity in different ways.

<sup>22</sup> Graphic created by author. Relative importance based on population and economic potential from 2006 South African census.

Smaller cities are not managing the degree of complication as larger cities and they may therefore be able to focus a greater percentage of their resources on WC-related activities. It is important to consider the externalities of each city's WC preparation plans to realize how it relates to the city's unique plans. With the most international prestige, economic power, and greatest population, Johannesburg is the undisputed global city of SA and southern Africa. Not surprisingly, Johannesburg is hosting the opening, semi-final, and closing WC matches. Pretoria and Rustenberg/Sun City are within an hours drive of Johannesburg. Four of the ten stadiums will be located within or nearby Johannesburg. Durban and Cape Town for instance, will be able to use their stunning natural resources while Johannesburg will use its international status. Nelspruit is located at the most popular entrance to Kruger National Park and visitors to these matches will probably also enjoy a visit to the park. Port Elizabeth, a historically marginalized city, is using this opportunity to redevelop itself. City personalities as well as local pressures are an important prelude to understanding the different ways each city is meeting its host responsibilities. Hosting is therefore as much a responsibility and a burden as a means for gaining international attention, economic investment, and infrastructure.



**Image 2.4 | Pressures Facing South Africa as it Prepares for 2010<sup>23</sup>**

*In addition to the standard pressures of a developing country like poverty and inadequate infrastructure, SA must manage to build bridges between generations of racially divided people by improving education and reducing inequality, all while preparing to host one of the largest international events as the first African country to be awarded this opportunity. The country must also manage escalating costs and infrastructure.*

<sup>23</sup> Graphic created by author.




Image 2.5 | Inequalities in South Africa<sup>24</sup>

According to the Center for Justice and Crime Prevention, the greatest overall inequality is in Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal. Reducing the inequality in these provinces will require increased economic opportunity and education.

<sup>24</sup> Graphic created by author.

This competition occurs because no city wants to be the only city without a stadium, so every host city wanted to spend more than all the other cities building the most expensive and superior facilities. Such competition is not productive and has led to an enormous waste of money. The ridiculousness of competition between sports is demonstrated well in Durban. Construction of the King Senzangakhona Stadium will cost nearly R2 billion on the site of the old King's Park soccer ground located opposite the Absa Rugby Stadium. When completed, there will be two 50,000-seat venues across from each other. In an effort to initiate collaboration, the two stadiums combined parking and security infrastructure. This means that it is impossible for both stadiums to host events simultaneously and at any one time, one of the stadiums will stand empty. Such a situation is inappropriate considering the egregious budget paid for by public funds. Durban could have easily spent less money redesigning the Absa Stadium to suit the 2010 WC.

Hosting 2010 will change how cities are ranked nationally. Shifts in economic opportunities, international importance, and crime levels can influence how the cities interact amongst themselves. Although Johannesburg has historically been the economic leader, increased economic investment elsewhere may shift this paradigm. Immigrants tend to flock to Johannesburg where there has historically been more work opportunities than elsewhere but with increased building opportunities throughout the country, laborers may find that they prefer to live in Bloemfontein or Port Elizabeth instead. Population shifts may lead to crime shifts. Opportunity begets more opportunity and people may find it easier to work in cities other than Johannesburg. Likewise, 2010 will be amongst the first incidences when international sponsorship has taken place outside of the four largest cities (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban) and it will provide the international audience with a glimpse of small town life in SA. This may entice greater support, which in turn will help smaller cities repay their debt from infrastructure upgrades. On the other hand, Johannesburg's important role is an assertion of its dominance over the other South African cities and its declaration as a global city.<sup>25</sup> Johannesburg is already the largest, most populous,

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<sup>25</sup> Global cities are those cities that serve as financial and cultural leaders in their regions and within the world context. Cities like Hong Kong, New York, London, and now Johannesburg are examples of such cities. Global cities like Johannesburg serve as gateways for their respective regions. These cities are developing metropolitan regions that are distinctive from the rest of the country. Saskia Sassen defines global cities as those with global linkages between their respective regions and the world. Johannesburg, although not the official capital of South Africa is certainly the most cosmopolitan and worldly city in South Africa and suffered the most tumultuous transition to democracy during the last decade. Even now, Johannesburg has to cope with the largest social and economic disparities. Johannesburg is an entry point for international visitors and foreign direct investment; Johannesburg Airport is the entry point for international visitors and the city's stock market welcomes foreign direct investment. Johannesburg was a global city from its origins. The discovery of gold, its central location within SA and its proximity to Pretoria make it a global city. In his book, *The Making of Global City Regions*, Klaus Segbers measured the importance of globally active cities by examining the each city's ability to function as a hub linking its region to the world. Segbers determined Johannesburg's percentage of linkage at 41%, with its closest competitor, Cairo at just 35%, and Cape Town at 24%. Segbers equates Johannesburg to Shanghai which received a similar ranking at 42%. (Segbers 14) With the dissolution of power from the controlling apartheid government to the more capitalist private ventures, Johannesburg has flourished becoming not just South Africa's but Africa's most powerful global city representative. Johannesburg's sprawling spatial organization was able to adapt after the dissolution of the residential segregation. In the last decade, Johannesburg has fragmented considerably. New subcenters like Rosebank, Sandton, and Fourways have challenged and complicated the issue of redevelopment. Instead of trying to heal after the end of apartheid, Johannesburg was able to immediately build new world class suburbs on the

and wealthiest city in SA and with the four stadiums within one-hour of the city center, Johannesburg will receive a disproportionate share of infrastructural and institutional investment. This increases inner-city inequality. Smaller cities are challenged to attract tourists and residents.

The WC offers cities an opportunity to work together to achieve a common goal. Since a successful WC will bring prosperity and notoriety to all, cities should collaborate to develop the best WC on a national scale. Preparations should include determining the pressures each city is facing and the best means for alleviating the strain. WC funds should be shared to meet the different demands of the cities instead of funding unnecessary or excessive city improvements. Cities should also collectively brainstorm to determine the best ways to improve national failings such as the transportation, housing, and environment. The lasting legacy of 2010 will be a collaborative result in which the world will judge each city's ability to meet its WC responsibilities as if it were the entire country.

## 2.6 | FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE

City governments must unify themselves in the same way that they must defragment the built city. The 1996 Constitution created a decentralized government in which the country is divided into nine provinces and 284 municipalities which govern both urban and rural areas. The new South African government established a fragmented government form in which the decision-making process is dispersed throughout the system rather than centralized in one person, place, or legislative body. This means that SA places the responsibility for building the city and providing basic services with the local municipalities.<sup>26</sup> Although the three government tiers are supposed to be equal, in reality, there is an ongoing battle between central government and municipal governments with the provincial governments being relatively powerless.<sup>27</sup> This system of home-rule in which municipalities retain almost complete

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periphery. As a result, Johannesburg was able to capture the world's attention and consequently its investment before other South African cities. When the world lifted its economic embargo and international business was eager to return to South Africa, Johannesburg was able to offer appropriately accommodations. Notably, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, which could have moved anywhere, chose Sandton. Johannesburg's readiness has proved most timely helping the city establish itself as the global city in the region.

<sup>26</sup> Creators of this system opted for decentralization in opposition to the racist restrictions implemented by the central government under apartheid and to avoid following the path of many other post-Colonial African countries by becoming an oppressive dictatorship.

<sup>27</sup> The ANC united disconnected areas of cities into a single municipality and ensured that all areas of SA were included in a municipality. In urban areas, the municipality was formed by combining the city center and the townships into a single governing organization. In rural areas, municipalities may be a single city or an agglomeration of several small cities uniting for capacity.<sup>27</sup> In the six largest cities (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, and East Rand), are governed by a single-tier system in which the municipality and the city are one and the same. In fact, the nine provincial governments are so powerless that there is talk of dismantling the provincial government since they have relatively little jurisdiction anyway.

autonomy over actions has exacerbated differences between municipalities. Although cities were always considerably different, this system has worsened inequalities between different areas.<sup>28</sup>

Some municipal funding comes from local utility and property tariffs; the majority of funding comes from the central government levied from sales and incomes taxes. The central government funds municipalities through an Equitable Share, population-based, division of revenue system. The Equitable Share is an annual, unconditional grant given to municipalities to distribute as they please.<sup>29</sup> Khululekile Mase in his dissertation explains that the main problem with the Equitable Share distribution system is that it provides equal share to all municipalities regardless of individual pressures. This means that some municipalities do not receive adequate funding to meet demand while others are receiving too much.<sup>30</sup> If Equitable Share does not provide sufficient funding, municipalities can apply for different types of additional grants from central government. The most common type, the Municipal Infrastructure Grants (MIGs) are conditional capital grants earmarked for building and upgrading infrastructure. Municipalities may also apply for Capacity Building Grants (CBGs), which are grants designed to help local governments increase citizen participation and increase overall municipal capacity.<sup>31</sup>

Cities lack the institutional and financial capacity to actualize urban transformation. National divestment from cities has resulted in national funding decreases that make it difficult for cities to improve themselves. Between 1991 and 1997 national funding to local governments decreased 85% and between 1997 and 2000 funding decreased another 55%.<sup>32</sup> Reduced funding has burdened municipalities with the exacerbating infrastructural needs. Rural areas have been especially strained by the funding cuts and as a result rural municipalities have failed to meet infrastructure demands. Because infrastructure costs are higher in rural areas with limited capacity, national funding cuts have exacerbated the inferiority of rural municipalities. The 2010 WC offers cities the opportunity to receive national funding for local projects and make considerable urban improvements.

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<sup>28</sup> Johannesburg was always the economic and international base, Pretoria is the serious national capital, Cape Town is the European vacation resort, and Durban is the most liberal and integrated city. These city personalities remain even in recent years.


<sup>29</sup> The Equitable Share grants all municipalities a proportionate amount based on population, but does not account for need.

<sup>30</sup> Another issue Mase discusses is that some municipalities cannot spend the entire Equitable Share because they do not have the capacity to use the funds. A municipality for example may need upgrade to its water infrastructure but regardless of funding the municipality does not have the trained professionals to repair the ailing infrastructure. Instead of spending it, the municipality holds the funding for later in an investment account. Because interest rates in SA are so high, the municipality will hold the funding for later when an engineer arrives in the town. But the engineer never arrives and the money remains unused.

<sup>31</sup> Mase, Khululekile. (September 2003). *Equitable Share? An Analysis of South Africa's System of Fiscal Transfers to Local Government in Terms of How it Addresses Vertical and Horizontal Imbalances*. England: University of Birmingham.

<sup>32</sup> McDonald, David A and John Pape. (2002). *Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa*. New York: Human Sciences Research Council Publishers.





**Image 2.6 | Fragmented Municipalities<sup>33</sup>**

*South Africa is divided into nine provinces and 284 municipalities, which govern both urban and rural areas of the country. For the most part, the boundaries of cities and towns do not coincide with those of the municipalities. The new South African government granted considerable autonomy to the municipal governments and provides little oversight ensuring that these autonomous governments provide basic services.*

## **2.7 | ESCALATING CRIME AND INCREASING TOURISM**

Although annual tourism has been increasing since 1994, escalating crime continues to challenge the tourism industry and makes it difficult to promote SA to potential tourists. Increased crime may deter potential WC visitors. Violence at the 2010 WC will be incredibly detrimental to the tourism industry.

### **2.7.1 | South Africa's Crime Problem**

Escalating violent crime is destroying SA's social fabric, fragmenting the city, and hurting its international image. South African cities have become what South African writer Ivan Vladislavic calls "a

<sup>33</sup> Graphic created by author.

place of contested boundaries."<sup>34</sup> South Africans have barricaded themselves behind high security walls; some neighborhoods have formed alliances and closed off previously public streets hoping reduced traffic will reduce local crime. People live in constant fear and avoid public areas like city downtowns, preferring instead to spend time in privatized and presumably safer suburban malls. Every day the newspapers publish horror stories reminding people that their fears are substantiated as SA has one of the highest crime rates in the world. Arriving in SA to witness the scars on the urban landscape will make WC visitors feel uneasy.

**2007 Blog**

*World Cup Fan*

I am from Romania, and I want to come in South Africa in 2010. But I heard that the security is a big problem, especially in Johannesburg.....and the Black people don't like White people.

*South African Government*

That's a lot of rubbish. SA is a great country with a healthy thriving democracy. Racism is a thing of the past. The security for 2010 will be excellent.

**Image 2.7 | 2007 World Cup Blog**

*This excerpt from a 2007 internet blog demonstrates the feelings of the international audience and the SA government's inappropriate response.*

Rising crime is a serious WC challenge. Between 2004 and 2007, 2.5 million South Africans fell victim to violent crimes such as murder, attempted murder, rape, and robbery. This means that more than 848,000 people fall victim to violent crime in SA every year, says Pieter Mulder, leader of the Freedom Front Plus Party, an organization campaigning to reinstate the death penalty as a deterrent to violent crime. Between 1994 and 2007, 272,000 people were murdered in SA and residential burglary has increased by 8.3%. Internationally, five in every 100,000 persons is murdered per year; in SA, the figure is 40 in every 100,000. Worse still, only 10% of criminal cases end up in court.<sup>35</sup> The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) concluded that the distinctive feature of crime in South Africa is "not its volume but its violence." Between April 2006 and March 2007 there were 19,202 murders, 52,617 reported cases of rape, 218,030 assaults with the aim of causing grievous bodily harm, 9,367 indecent assaults, 13,599 car hijacking, 249,665 burglaries, and 12,761 robberies at residential premises in SA.

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<sup>34</sup> Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). *The Guardian* (London).

<sup>35</sup> In May 2007, the South African Broadcasting Corporation announced that the majority of criminal cases are never even tried in court. The Broadcasting Corporation cited SAPS's failure to properly prepare cases as a major cause of this impunity. He also cites the void of lawyers and judges to manage the overload. Kruys, B. G. G. (April 2007). *Public Safety and Security during the 2010 Soccer World Cup*. Institute for Strategic Studies University of Pretoria. Pg. 7-8

About 40% of these crimes were perpetrated by strangers.<sup>36</sup> All these figures lead to the conclusion that SA is experiencing a very serious crime crisis which needs to be addressed prior to 2010.<sup>37</sup>

South Africa has lost the idealism and strong leadership that led to free elections. Even Noble Prize winner Desmond Tutu has warned South Africa that it is losing its "moral direction." Tutu declared his horror at the high murder rates and child rape, explaining that South Africans have lost their "reverence for life." Tutu continued,

What has happened to us? It seems as if we have perverted our freedom, our rights into license, to being irresponsible. Rights go hand in hand with responsibility, with dignity, with respect for oneself and for the other. The fact of the matter is we still depressingly do not respect one another. I have often said that Black consciousness did not finish the work it set out to do...Perhaps we do not realize just how apartheid has damaged us so that we seem to have lost our sense of right and wrong.

In a 2006 speech at the University of Cape Town, Tutu questioned why a respect for the law, environment, and even life were missing in SA.<sup>38</sup>

Responses from the bi-annual Government Performance Barometer Survey conducted amongst a nationally representative sample of 3,500 South Africans provide some insight into the public opinion on crime at the 2010 WC. The 2007 results concluded that 60% of South Africans believe that crime has increased over the past six months and 50% think that the police are not doing enough to combat crime. The survey determined that 65% think crime will be a problem at the 2010 WC. Tracy Hammond at Markinor, the agency analyzing the survey results, concluded that "62% of people earning less than R1,199 per month think the police are doing enough to combat crime, whereas only 29% of people earning more than R8,000 per month think the same." Sixty percent of rural dwellers think police are doing a sufficient job, while only 47% of city residents agree. Similarly, only 9% of Whites think the government's performance in reducing crime is good, as opposed to 40% of Blacks.<sup>39</sup>

Agencies concerned about the safety and security at 2010 warn that if SA does not strive to reduce crime before 2010, the negative perception of the country may keep international visitors away and ruin the entire event. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party warns that, "SA, unfortunately, is perceived in many of the world as a crime haven" and once such a negative perception is

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<sup>36</sup> *Crime in South Africa*. (2007). Retrieved January 10, 2008, from South Africa 2010: [www.southafrica-2010-accommodation.com](http://www.southafrica-2010-accommodation.com).

<sup>37</sup> Nduru, Moyiga. (January 30, 2007). High-Profile Murder Sparks Debate on Violent Crime. *Inter Press Service News Agency* (Johannesburg).

<sup>38</sup> South Africa is Losing Its Way – Tutu. (September 27, 2006). *BBC News*.

<sup>39</sup> IFP: Crime will Affect 2010 WC. (January 12, 2007). *News24*.

cast, it is difficult to shift it. Buthelezi advises SA that they must reduce crime before, during, and after the event, otherwise reduced tourism threatens the event and any economic gains may vanish.<sup>40</sup>

The tourism industry is particularly concerned that escalating fear over rising crime rates may hurt the industry. US Ambassador Eric Bost put it bluntly saying that high incidence of crime may keep visitors away from 2010. "Who is going to be interested in spending a significant amount of money here on holiday, to have a good time, when you're concerned about the possibility of getting hurt?", Bost said.<sup>41</sup>

### 2.7.2 | South African Tourism

Annual tourism is rising despite simultaneous escalations in crime. The Department of Tourism has been actively involved in the preparation and planning for 2010. The tourism industry can benefit considerably from the WC. SA's tourism industry will benefit from the considerable excitement in the years preceding and following 2010. More than 4.6 million visitors arrived in SA between January and July 2006, a 15% increase over the same period in 2005. According to SA statistics, 20.3% of visitors in 2006 came from Africa and the Middle East, 11% from the Americas, 8% from Asia and Australia, and only 3.1% from Europe.<sup>42</sup> In 2006, more than 10% of foreign tourists come to SA to watch or participate in a sports event with spectators accounting for 60-80% of these arrivals. Previous sports events including the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC caused considerable tourism increases before and after the host year and SA can expect even greater increases because of the enormity of the 2010 WC.<sup>43</sup>

SA markets its scenic beauty, sunny climate, and cultural diversity to leisure and business travelers. The diversity of the climate, cultural, and tourist activities have contributed to its increasing popularity as a vacation destination. International tourism has surged since the end of apartheid. In 1994, SA had just 3.9 million foreign visitors; a decade later, tourism had more than doubled with the country hosting 6.7 million visitors. In 2005, SA experienced a 10.3% increase, or 7.5 million visitors and in 2006, another 13.9% increase to host a record 8.4 million visitors. Most visitors (74%) are from mainland Africa and 26% from overseas. About 92% visited for a holiday, but only 2.3% travelled for business. The South African Department of Tourism claims that tourism is the fastest growing industry in SA, contributing to 8.3% of the GDP, a considerable increase from previous 4.6% in 1993. In 2006, tourism constituted about 7% of employment nationally but its ability to create new jobs and contribute a greater share of the GDP

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
<sup>40</sup> Ibid..

<sup>41</sup> South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup. (January 31, 2007). *AllAfrica.com*

<sup>42</sup> Nduru, Moyiga. (January 30, 2007). High-Profile Murder Sparks Debate on Violent Crime. *Inter Press Service News Agency* (Johannesburg).

<sup>43</sup> South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup 2007

is a likely result of the 2010 WC. Increased international attention, updated infrastructure, and hospitality and of course the event itself will likely contribute to an unprecedented increase in tourism.<sup>44</sup>



**Image 2.8 | International Tourist Arrivals (in millions)<sup>45</sup>**

*SA has experienced impressive increases in international tourism since the end of apartheid in 1994. With this tourism increase come substantial concerns. But how will tourism numbers change before, during, and after 2010?*

The 2010 WC offers the tourism industry a unique opportunity to expand considerably and quickly. If the industry plans for the event, marketing the country and demonstrating its attributes, tourism throughout the country will blossom.

<sup>44</sup> People come to SA for business and cultural reasons (eco-tourists, paleo-tourists, and adventurers); in the future, because of the massive investment in sports facilities, sports tourism will also increase. Business travel to SA has been steadily increasing from 470,000 business visitors in 2006 to 550,000 in 2007. Business travelers spent three times the amount of the average leisure traveler and therefore SA hopes to increase the number over the next few years. There is an increase from R2.1 million spent by business travelers in 2006 to R2.4 million in 2007. Cultural travelers come to enjoy the diverse cultures, ranging from the warring Zulus to the Bushmen in the Karoo. Visitors have also started visiting to see the sites of apartheid including Robben Island where Nelson Mandela was imprisoned outside of Cape Town and the new Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg. Tours of cultural villages and townships have also grown dramatically. The variety of fauna and flora and the allure of the "Big Five" animals are contributing to increasing tourism. The number of national parks, including the world-famous Kruger Park, has increased to twenty-one and the South African government is committed to increasing the number of protected areas from 5.4% to 8%. Paleo-tourists flock to SA to see some of the greatest architectural sites including the world's richest concentration of hominid fossils in the Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, and Kromdraai sites in the Cradle of Humankind. With more than 3,000 kilometers of coastline, the Drakensberg Mountains, and the desert, it is no wonder that SA has become such a destination for adventure seekers. Department of Tourism. Retrieved March 10, 2008, from South Africa: Alive With Possibility: <http://www.southafrica.info/>

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

## WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

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- **Tourism Industry Benefits:** The tourism industry can benefit financially from 2010 by developing attractive tourism packages to entertain people before, after, and between WC matches. If visitors enjoy SA during 2010, they will probably return later.
- **Small Towns Benefit:** Small towns in particular stand to benefit from 2010. Upgraded football facilities in smaller towns like Bloemfontein and Polokwane may help bring tourists to these previously overlooked cities. These cities should market their facilities to international teams during the events as restful places to prepare away from the public's eye. Neighboring cities can become "satellite accommodations" helping small cities during peak demand. For example, George, a neighboring city to Bloemfontein will be running shuttle buses between the 2010 facilities and local accommodations. These shuttles can help alleviate the hosting strain on Bloemfontein while sharing the benefits of 2010.
- **Increased Capacity:** The enormity of 2010 offers SA an opportunity to increase capacity and train new hospitality staff. During 2010, demand for hospitality will be higher than usual and the country will need to increase capacity to meet the need. According to the South African Department of Tourism, one job of every twelve created in the next two years will be in the tourism industry. The tourism industry must develop training programs to provide staff with a skill and increase capacity after the event.
- **Make SA Tourism-Friendly:** 2010 will help SA acclimate to the importance of tourism as part of the national economy. The rapid saturation of tourists into the country will help natives become more comfortable with tourists, overall making the country more tourism-friendly.
- **Demonstrate Improved Tourism Safety:** The new safety and security plans will demonstrate before the world audience that SA is a safe and fun place to visit.
- **National Rebranding:** The most significant benefit will be the improved image and identity developed for 2010. The WC offers cities and attractions an unusual opportunity to rebrand themselves and appeal to a larger audience. With so much attention focused on SA, people are going to be interested in visiting and SA should expect a considerable increase in tourism for many years following 2010.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Cities are using 2010 as a chance to rebrand themselves internationally. (1) Polokwane, a rural municipality with a population of just 500,000, is using this unparalleled opportunity to market itself as a tourist destination, investment destination, and residential destination through publicity from a tremendous marketing campaign for both itself and the Limpopo Province. (Polokwane 2010 World Cup Presentation. (2007). Joint Meeting of Portfolio Committees on Local Government and Sports and Recreation.) (2) Cape Town is launching a specific plan to attract business tourists who tend to spend more than leisure visitors. Calvyn Gilfellan, Acting Chief Executive of Cape Town Routes Unlimited, the official tourism destination marketing for Cape Town and the Western Cape describes the city's action as follows, "While we have the world's eyes on us and we are preparing to receive thousands of soccer enthusiasts, we must use this opportunity to position our destination in such a way that those who will be visiting South Africa in 2010, do visit the Western Cape, and that they return soon for more, bringing with them their friends and family." Gilfellan concluded saying, "We believe that having conferences and events run parallel to the soccer tournament will help us to achieve this." (2010 Conference Fever Runs High in Cape Town and Western Cape. (October 29, 2007).

Sports and tourism industries have become intertwined in recent years as countries and cities have intensified hosting venues and events. Scarlett Cornelissen describes in her 2005 article, *Sports, Events, and Tourism Development* that the expansive growth of the international events and tourism sectors in conjunction with hosting, organizing, and publicizing the event, in turn feeds the development of local and national tourism. Cornelissen asserts that the changing nature of tourism economies and SA's development goals are transforming patterns of tourism investment such that broadcasting hosting activities and infrastructure upgrades are actually tourism tools that rebrand hosting countries and cities. In this way, there are close synergies between sports and tourism. Different types of sport elicit different types of tourism consumption. Active, event, and nostalgia are three different types of sports tourism and each attract a unique visitors. According to Cornelissen, the main impact of 2010 is not its immediate effect on visitors attracted to the event itself but its reinforcement of the local and national image for future tourism. Since cities are the key anchors for both production and consumption, they seek to benefit the most from increased tourism.<sup>47</sup>

### 2.7.3 | The 2010 Safety and Security Plan

Concerns that this mammoth event will lead to increases in national crime rates before, during, and after the event are mounting. The HSRC's annual survey concludes crime-weary South Africans list crime as the greatest disadvantage to hosting the WC. Between 2005 and 2006, concerns about crime as the major disadvantage rose 13%.<sup>48</sup> Despite the differences between respondents, concerns over crime are the one uniting force in SA. Udesch Pillay, Director of the HSRC said, "People see this [WC] as a

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*Destination Marketing Organization Cape Town Routes Unlimited. Press Release.)* (3) Port Elizabeth has been called "The Liverpool of the Cape," "The Northampton of South Africa," "The Detroit of the Union," but its most impressive rebranding is its recent official name change to Nelson Mandela Bay. All these rebranding are trying to tempt prospective investors and visitors to notice Port Elizabeth as more than the windiest city in South Africa. With its picturesque location along the Garden Route from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth is boasting its increasing number of annual water sports competitions in scuba diving, game fishing, surfing, and windsurfing in an effort to outdo rival city Cape Town. Physical changes such as airport upgrading and new conference centers will transform the way people visit SA and help bring needed economic revenue to many previously overlooked South African cities. Port Elizabeth has historically been known as the water sports capital of SA. But it wants to be known for its premier football leagues. The problem however is that before 2010, Port Elizabeth will not have any football leagues, and definitely not a premier league. Gary Baines in his article, *Scoring an Own Goal? Branding Port Elizabeth for the 2010 Soccer World Cup*, considers Port Elizabeth's rebranding pointless unless infrastructure upgrades are accomplished to impress visitors when they arrive. He has his reservations regarding the prioritization and scope of the WC upgrades however considering the relative unimportance and size of the city in SA. Baines asserts that hosting the WC should be integrated into the city's development plan to ensure that investments leave long-term benefits. Overall, the city must be mindful that it does not spend so much rebranding itself without accompanying it with actualized physical changes. (Baines, Gary. (2006). *Sideline Development Goals? Re-imagining Port Elizabeth for the 2010 Soccer World Cup*. Rhodes University.)

<sup>47</sup> Cornelissen, Scarlett. (2006). *Sports, Events, and Tourism Development: Exploring the patterns, possibilities and constraints of 2010 for urban tourism economies in South Africa*. University of Stellenbosch.

<sup>48</sup> The HSRC survey concluded that fears about crime increased from 19.1 percent to 28.3 percent in women, from 18.8 percent to 20.6 percent in men, from 15.2 percent to 28.2 percent for rural dwellers, from 18.9 percent to 25.3 percent in tribal settings, from 21.2 percent to 30.8 percent in urbanites, and from 15.5 percent to 25.3 percent in the informal settlements.

feeding ground that will enhance crime because there is so much up for grabs.”<sup>49</sup> During major international events such as the FIFA WC, criminals are able to sneak into the country via relaxed immigration practices and engage in criminal activities such as drug smuggling. Barry Gilder, Chairman of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), calls this one of the major challenges of reducing crime in SA in anticipation for 2010. Although SA has composed a plan to protect its borders, some criminals will surely sneak through.<sup>50</sup>

With so much police attention on the stadiums and the WC, criminals in other cities and other areas of event cities will be able to act freely. The South Africa Police Services (SAPS) has determined that most of the crime is occurring on the fringe areas. Therefore, SAPS concludes that crime will not be a problem at 2010 since it is mostly concentrated away from the stadiums. But with so many visitors coming to SA and so much international attention on the WC venues, SAPS must instead concentrate on protecting the international visitors. As a result, crime will surely increase in areas with decreased police presence. So while SA may be able to control crime temporarily while in the public limelight, these actions will not lead to decreased crime permanently.<sup>51</sup>

The 2010 Safety and Security Plan details the procedures and actions the SAPS will take to ensure the safety and success of 2010. The following plan will be implemented before 2010 in order to ensure its efficiency. FIFA strongly supports SA's safety plan.

- The plan calls for greater border security at land, sea, and air ports of entry to ensure that only those legally permitted to enter the country pass through.
- Police will patrol routes commonly taken by attendees such as the route from the Johannesburg airport to the stadiums and from the stadium to local hotels. Increased police patrols will focus on sections of the city where FIFA events are taking place including FIFA headquarters, hotels, stadiums, fan parks, restaurants, and other tourist venues.
- Dedicated teams will work closely with businessmen using mobile communications before and during the event.

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<sup>49</sup> Mannak, Miriam. (February 7, 2007). Crime, South Africa and the 2010 World Cup. *World Press* (Cape Town).

<sup>50</sup> Government and private agencies are collaborating to reduce such crime. Nine government agencies have teamed up to combat crime for 2010, forming the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), to “create a channel for the disposition of information across government.” The Ministry of Safety and Security has been working with the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) to prevent cash-in-transit heists and other organized crimes. SABRIC has been supplying the Ministry with “information that relates to intelligence regarding people who might want to mount armed robberies against financial institutions in the country.” Business Against Crime has also been collaborating offering CCTV systems for use during the event. Musanda Satellite Campus in Pretoria is offering additional training courses for intelligence officers to help train the many new recruits. Also the Electronic Communications Security Company is expected to open its new security operations center at the beginning of 2008, which will protect critical information and communication infrastructure from unauthorized access and attack. As for international terrorism, Barry Gilder, the chairman of NICOC, said that South Africa would be facing similar challenges with respect to terrorism and other international crime elements as previous FIFA hosts. Benton, S. (August 30, 2007). SA Intelligence Services Gear Up to Thwart Criminality During World Cup.” *BuaNews Online* (Cape Town).

<sup>51</sup> Alexander, Adam. Can Football Save South Africa from its Biggest Threat? (August 22, 2006). *The Raw Story*.



- In addition to command vehicles, a fleet of 40 helicopters will patrol the tournament areas with cameras providing live feed to operation headquarters in Pretoria. This will act as a force multiplier with senior police officers monitoring the cameras and communicating to ground patrol if they notice something is amiss.<sup>52</sup>
- Since 2005, SAPS has been actively recruiting resulting in a total police force of 192,000 by 2010, with 31,000 police dedicated exclusively to monitoring WC activities.<sup>53</sup>
- Special courts will be available 24-hours a day throughout the tournament so that criminals can be processed quickly and efficiently.<sup>54</sup>

Simultaneous increases in crime and tourism is not sustainable and many fear the potentially devastating violence that may erupt during the WC. Such an incident would destroy the tourism industry for decades and hurt SA's international image, and therefore must be avoided at all costs.

## 2.8 | SPIRALING COSTS AND LIMITED PUBLIC FUNDING

The 2010 WC is funded almost entirely by public funds. This makes it increasingly challenging for central and municipal governments to meet the demands of spiraling costs. Likewise, the government must justify these proliferate costs to a public demanding basic infrastructure.

<sup>52</sup> Appel 2007

<sup>53</sup> Between July 2002 and July 2007, SAPS has grown from 109,000 to 164,000 and the force is expected to increase to 192,000 by 2010. Between April 2006 and March 2007, 35,000 new recruits joined the reserve units and SAPS hopes to supplement permanent police units with an additional 100,000 reservists by 2009.<sup>53</sup> With 31,000 officers dedicated specifically to the WC, event organizers are not concerned about crime. But some evidence suggests that extra policing does not necessarily result in a simultaneous or proportionate reduction in crime. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's success in reducing crime in New York City is largely attributed to improving the neighborhood by focusing police activities on specific target areas such as drug abuse and petty crime consequently leading to a decline in other criminal activities (a practice often known as the Broken Window Syndrome). Such actions may yield better results than simply increasing the numbers of police officers.

<sup>54</sup> Other permanent improvements to SAPS include an improved communication system. By 2010, SAPS will institute a computerized performance management system to assess and evaluate police performance. In October 2007, Gauteng launched a new radio communications network featuring an automated vehicle tracking system that will indicate in real time the number and location of police vehicles. Improved tracking systems will help call center operators send the nearest available police vehicles via the fastest routes to the emergency. Likewise, the system will ensure that police officers are patrolling in their designated areas at all times. The Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal are expected to develop similar systems by 2010. Elaborate crime prevention command and control units and helicopters may meet the needs of the WC but are not practical for everyday crime fighting. Hiring additional police is the only long-lasting element of this plan. However, hiring additional police is insufficient if the additional police do not have reliable vehicles to get to crime areas quickly. Most importantly, the plan does not call for a national realignment to reduce the causes of crime as well as ways to improve reduction policies. The Crime Statistics: Are We Our Own Worst Enemy? (July 16, 2007). *Markinor News* (Johannesburg).

### 2.8.1 | Funding 2010

2010 costs are rising without adequate, long-term public financing planning. Unlike previous WC events, 2010 is funded almost entirely by public funds. As of October 2007, WC expenditures are estimated to cost USD2.4 billion (R17.4 billion), of which USD1.4 (R10 billion) is set aside for stadium infrastructure and the residual will pay for general infrastructure upgrades to transportation (roads, airports, public transportation system), communications (new international digital telecommunication system), and security (funding additional police and related technology). Host cities are expected to spend an additional USD400 million (R2.6 billion) on local improvements.<sup>55</sup> Deputy Finance Minister Jabu Moleketi said that costs could escalate to more than USD2.9 billion (R20.8 billion). He said that cost escalation is a key challenge. As central government coffers shrink, city rivalry will intensify.<sup>56</sup> Costs are also expected to increase as the value of the South African Rand continues to fall and labor costs increase. To place the high cost of the 2010 WC, despite Germany's highly developed sports facilities, the 2006 Germany WC cost USD1.9 billion in stadiums with another USD2.7 billion on WC-related infrastructure.<sup>57</sup>

Stadiums are the most significant cost. FIFA requires all stadiums comply with its international standards for size and quality. As a result, costs for stadium construction has escalated sharply from R818 million or USD113.7 million originally estimated in the Bid Book. Individual city budgets are high since every city wants the most modern stadium and most efficient public transportation system. Cape Town has set aside USD772 million for construction and upgrades,<sup>58</sup> Durban has allocated USD860 million (R6 billion) for 2010.<sup>59</sup> As rivalry between Cape Town and Durban intensifies, infrastructure spending will increase.

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<sup>55</sup> Campbell, Malene. (2008). The Impact of Major Sporting Events on the Economy and the People of a Developing Region: the Case of South Africa. Bloemfontein: *University of Free State*.

<sup>56</sup> Mokgola, T. (May 20, 2004). SA Looks Ahead to 2010. *BuaNews: Government Communication and Information System* (Cape Town).

<sup>57</sup> Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 25(4),pg. 581.

<sup>58</sup> Cape Town's budget is allocated as follows: USD386 million has been invested in the Green Point Stadium, a modern, all-weather, multi-purpose, environmentally sustainable and technologically advanced stadium; USD24.3 million in the Western Cape's public transportation system for an integrated rail, bus, minibus, taxi transportation system, developing route monitoring systems, fleet upgrades, and an integrated fare management system. Major investments like this are only possible because the WC expedites the development process and allows cities to implement changes quickly; USD186 million in improvements to Cape Town International Airports; USD21 million in improvements to the Foreshore Switching Station to guarantee electricity transmission; USD3 million in high-tech security equipment for efficiency and safety; USD1.4 million for tourism marketing; USD772 Million Plus in 2010 Opportunities in Cape Town. (April 2007). *US Commercial Services*. Issue 4.

<sup>59</sup> The budget includes a new football stadium, international airport, trade port, tram system, harbor upgrades, roads, railways, and beaches. Durban hopes that its warm, sunny weather will be most attractive to visitors in 2010. Funds have been allocated as follows: USD285 million (R2 billion) to build a 3.7 kilometer runway and terminal with capacity to handle 6 million passengers a year; USD285 million (R2 billion) for design and management of new Durban King Sensangakhona Stadium with the total construction costs still to be determined. Infrastructure Projects Create Opportunities for US Businesses in Durban. (January 2007). *US Commercial Service*. Issue 2.

CITY	COST (USD millions)	CITY POPULATION (2004)	CAPACITY
<b>New Stadiums</b>			
Cape Town	403.1	2,984,885	70,000
Durban	278	3,129,298	80,000
Nelspruit	118.8	484,245	45,000
Polokwane	111.2	532,673	45,000
Port Elizabeth	159.9	1,054,359	40,000
<b>Upgraded Stadiums</b>			
Bloemfontein	34.1	655,332	48,000
Johannesburg: Ellis Park	29.2		65,000
Johannesburg: Soccer City	208.5	3,225,407	104,000
Pretoria	25.7	1,531,954	55,000
Rustenberg	20.7	405,554	45,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,388.9</b>		<b>574,200</b>

**Image 2.9 | South Africa's Stadium Investment for 2010 World Cup<sup>60</sup>**

*New stadiums will be being built in Cape Town, Durban, Nelspruit, Polokwane, and Port Elizabeth. These smaller cities lack adequate sporting facilities and costs are expected to exceed USD214 million on stadium construction. Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Rustenberg are spending about USD60 million to upgrade stadiums. Total spending is estimated to exceed USD1.4 billion.*

## 2.8.2 | Build the Stadium, Create the Jobs<sup>61</sup>

Escalating costs have caused considerably uproar. The building costs were grossly underestimated in the Bid Book. The original costs of building all the stadiums were estimated to be less than R2 billion for both the construction of the new stadiums and the upgrading of existing stadiums.<sup>62</sup> Cape Town's Mayor, Helen Zille, and the Congress of the South African Trade Unions (COSATU) are questioning where financial resources will come from to finance the construction of new stadiums. They oppose taking funding from more pressing needs like housing and sanitation to fund WC related infrastructure.<sup>63</sup> Zille and COSATU are asking questions like, who is really benefiting from hosting the WC? Is there a more appropriate way to spend this money? Should the government be investing in new housing instead of stadiums? Although the government has promised that WC investment will benefit all South Africans, in reality, big business serves to profit from increased international prestige and investment. Zille has answered this question by using 2010 to distribute the benefits of expedited projects

<sup>60</sup> Maennig, W. and S. du Plessis. (October 2007). World Cup 2010: South African Economic Perspectives and Policy Challenges Informed by the Experience of Germany 2006. *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 25(4),pg. 581.

<sup>61</sup> This is a slogan from the San Francisco '49ers' campaign to try to get the city to build the team a new sports facility. It demonstrates the city's willingness to subsidize sports facilities hoping for economic returns.

<sup>62</sup> But according to the LOC, the Bid Book cost R15 million alone to produce, so clearly the LOC did not estimate the construction costs correctly. In response to such criticism, the LOC blames escalating costs on FIFA requirements and city competition. Madywabe, Lungile. (October 23, 2006). Soccer's lasting legacy from 2010. Mail and Guardian Online. (Johannesburg).

<sup>63</sup> Madywabe 2006

throughout the region. Developing an integrated public transportation system for example will leave a lasting legacy throughout the region.

These costs are proliferate considering the overwhelming need for better water and sanitation, health care facilities, adequate housing, and access to electricity as well as improved education and public transportation. The National Urban Reconstruction Housing Agency (NURHY) reports that more than 250,000 new homes could be built instead of the R9 billion being spent on the Johannesburg stadiums. The SA Government Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) claims that houses cost R35,000 per building and only citizens who earn less than R3,500 per month qualify. Instead of building stadiums for the WC, NURHY believes that SA should be spending money building as many as two million new housing units.<sup>64</sup> Steve Friedman of the Institute for a Democratic SA (IDASA) says that juxtaposing stadium expenditures against housing problems is an incorrect comparison. "The question is how many houses you can build, but whether you can show that money on stadiums won't help towards the creation of a better society where people can make their own choices. You might as well suggest that you don't hold elections because they cost a lot of money. Parliament costs money," Friedman says. Friedman argues that if the WC is profitable and delivers sufficient economic returns, then this was a wise investment but if only the wealthiest of the wealthy profit from the event, then the government has made a mistake.<sup>65</sup>

Proponents of sports stadiums claim that sports facilities improve the local economy by creating construction jobs and generating new spending in the local community. Advocates argue that new stadiums spur economic growth and that they are self-financing. WC proponents have promised that new economic investment will generate long-term economic investment in cities. Andrew Zimbalist, an economist from Smith College and an expert on the impact of sports stadiums on city economies, explains that these arguments are filled with incorrect economic reasoning that overstate the benefits of stadiums. In Zimbalist's book, *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes*, he argues that stadiums are only advantageous if they spur significant imports into the region. He argues that economic growth occurs when a community's resources (i.e. people, capital investments, and land) become more productive via "economically beneficial specialization by the community for the purposes of trading with other regions or from local value added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments." Building a stadium is good for the local economy only if the stadium is the most productive use of capital investments and workers.<sup>66</sup>

The following three American examples demonstrate the array of possible outcomes for building a new stadium.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Madywabe 2006

<sup>66</sup> Noll, Roger G. and Andrew S. Zimbalist. (1997). *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. *Brookings Institution Press* (Washington D.C.).

- Oriole Park in Baltimore, Maryland is the most successful American sports stadiums because it attracts about a third of baseball spectators from outside the Baltimore area.<sup>67</sup> South Africans are not likely to travel between regions to go to a football match because it is not part of the culture. For SA, this means that stadiums must attract considerable crowds for games after 2010. This is a huge problem; at the opening of the WC in 2010, there will be more stadiums than local leagues and South Africans will not be able to afford the ticket prices needed to generate a return on the investment.<sup>68</sup>
- The Denver Broncos is an example of an overestimated annual economic impact study and the failure of stadium to return profits. Early estimates promised nearly USD120 million, increasing to USD245 million in future estimates. Such promotional studies overestimated the impact of the facility because experts confused gross and net economic effects. Local spending on events in the stadium is a substitute for recreational spending elsewhere such as movie theatres and restaurants. Stadium profits are a substitute for revenue generated from other activities, which means that excess spending is shifted from one activity to another without increasing. This means that the overall economic benefit simply shifts from other investments and overall cities do not profit.<sup>69</sup>
- Renovations to Chicago's Soldier Field failed to generate promised economic investment. The USD660 million stadium renovation to Soldier Field, of which USD432 million was paid by Chicago taxpayers, failed to generate the projected revenue. Chicago Park District Officials expected the renovated Soldier Field to generate USD10 million annually for park district programs; unfortunately, the stadium failed to live up to expected economic returns and taxpayers continue to bear the financial burden.<sup>70</sup>

So, why do cities subsidize the cost of new sports facilities? Zimbalist explains that cities rationalize the considerable expense because stadiums generate more local consumer satisfaction than alternative investments. Sports captures public attention and helps the city develop a national and international image. Cities say that these societal benefits far outweigh the costs. Even if fans do not actually attend the games or buy sports-related products, broadcast and print media sell the stadiums. As long as there are sufficient fans, then South African WC host cities will generate continued interest in their stadiums. Stadiums can therefore be considered a public good or an externality benefitting all sports consumers regardless of future economic returns. Sports fans are therefore likely to support the building of a new stadium regardless of the city's ability to fund the project. Residents will support the stadium investment even if they themselves will never be able to attend a game because the pride of having a local stadium is enormous.<sup>71</sup> There is therefore almost always political and local support for construction

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<sup>67</sup> Although this is different sport and context, it remains relevant.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Stanek, Steve. (February 1, 2005). Chicago Stadiums Fail to Deliver Promised Benefits. *The Heartland Institute: Budget & Tax News*.

<sup>71</sup> Noll and Zimbalist 1997

of new sports facilities and for this reason, most WC cities are able to fund stadium budgets that far outweigh its means.

### 2.9 | PRIVATIZATION

Privatization of the landscape has virtually captured the South African city and threatens to derail the long-term legacy of 2010. If private entities control the design and development of public infrastructure for 2010, then these private interests may not develop equitably but profitably.


A variety of factors have been driving the increasing private sector involvement in South African development since 1994. Namely, the neoliberal policies of the ANC, rampant bureaucratic corruption, lack of alternatives, and lack of capacity. Because private entities could disassociate themselves from the apartheid government, in many ways, privatization has offered SA new opportunities. The neoliberal policies of the ANC have been the driving force behind the institutional support for privatization. Privatization is a growing cause of conflict. Trevor Ngwane of the Anti-Privatization Forum explains that the ANC is ruling in favor of class politics. Ngwane says, "The ANC is doing what the old National Party could not do because it can hide behind its struggle credentials and the peoples' trust of Nelson Mandela to get away with theft and murder." The ANC began in 1912 as "an organization of educated Africans and enlightened chiefs who wanted equal rights for themselves because they were civilized unlike the rest of the natives," Ngwane concludes. After apartheid, many South Africans assumed that the ANC would retain its radical rhetoric of the 1960s (i.e. to turn to the masses and develop infrastructure that served all South Africans). David McDonald, the director of development studies at Queen's University explains that when ANC leaders came to power, they failed to apply the socialist remedies to the problems as many South Africans had expected. Instead, they decided to correct the injustices of apartheid through free market capitalism. Nelson Mandela demonstrated this dramatic shift in the ANC when he said "Privatization is the fundamental policy of our government. Call me a Thatcherite if you will." Mandela's successor and current president, Thabo Mbeki famously said at succession, "I am a Thatcherite."<sup>72</sup> Ngwane explains that "there are very few viable political parties that do not support capitalism – even the South African Communist Party stands in support of the ANC."<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Carty, B. (February 9, 2003. Whose Hand on the Tap? Water Privatization in South Africa. *CBC Radio* (Cape Town).

<sup>73</sup> Jay, D. O. (2007). Privatization in South Africa: Starting Over. *The Dominion* (Johannesburg).

This is especially evident in the development of new corporate malls in Soweto. In October 2007, the Maponya Mall opened in Soweto. Developer Landmark Real Estate announced that this mall would be no different from any other modern mall in either its design or its retailers. The 55,000 square meter development is destined to become the "heartbeat" of Soweto. Fifty-five percent of the R55 million shopping mall is owned by Nedbank and the Masingita Group, with the remaining 45% owned by the developer. Ken Reynolds, Divisional Director for the Gauteng division of Nedbank Corporate Property Finance called the mall a "realization of a long-term goal for us to be instrumental in the



**Image 2.10 | Construction Privatization in South Africa<sup>74</sup>**

*The new South African government has failed to deliver the promises of apartheid. Instead of providing basic services as promised in the 1996 Constitution, South African leaders have privatized many amenities, putting the responsibility for building the new South Africa in the hands of the private market. Is the WC just another invitation asking private entities to build what the government cannot?*

## **2.10 | INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

2010 proponents promise that the WC will provide opportunities for the development of local entrepreneurship. Paradoxically, the 2010 WC could not be built without international sponsorship funds being used to build infrastructure projects. There is an inherent conflict between relying on international support which limits the possibilities for local industries and promising to advance local-owned businesses.

### **2.10.1 | World Cup Sponsorship**

Global reach during the WC is incredible and therefore sponsors pay considerably to penetrate the world market. Without corporate sponsorship, SA could not afford to build the stadiums, roads, and hospitality venues necessary for 2010. 2010 sponsorship is valued at R7.8 billion, a 40% increase since Germany in 2006. FIFA has already signed the six global sponsors for the 2010 WC, Visa, (paid between


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development of this dynamic suburb." Of the 46 stores, 65% are national tenants, 7.5% are franchises and 27.5% are independent retailers. Soweto, which has prided itself as being the heart of the resistance to apartheid has welcomed this class oppression. Ster-Kinekor wins Maponya Mall bid in Soweto. (2005). Retrieved February 3, 2008, from Primedia Newsroom: [www.primedia.co.za](http://www.primedia.co.za).

<sup>74</sup> Graphic created by author.

**WASTED OPPORTUNITIES**

USD150 million and USD200 million), Adidas (paid USD350 million), Sony (paid USD305 million), Emirates (paid USD195 million), Coca-Cola (paid USD500 million), and Hyundai-Motor (paid undisclosed sum). In addition to these billions in investment, there are also another fifteen official partners and local sponsors such as McDonald's and Anheuser-Busch.<sup>75</sup> In exchange for their generous support, corporations receive advertising bonuses during the WC.



**Image 2.11 | Who Will Benefit From the World Cup?<sup>76</sup>**

According to FIFA, 2010 sponsorship is valued at R7.8 billion, a 40 percent increase since 2006. FIFA has signed the six global sponsors for the 2010 WC: Visa, Adidas, Sony, Emirates, Coca-Cola, and Hyundai-Motor.

Advertising exposure during the WC has become incredible valuable, with SA receiving the highest demand from sponsors in FIFA WC history. Global sponsorship value has increased from USD2

<sup>75</sup> Viscusi, Gregory. (June 19, 2006). The High Price of World Cup Exposure. *Business Report*.

<sup>76</sup> Graphic created by author.



billion in 1984 to USD16.6 billion in 1996 and approximately USD43 billion in 2006.<sup>77</sup> According to William Fenton, the editor of *The World Sponsorship Monitor*, in 2006 alone, football attracted USD2.3 billion in new sponsorship. By contrast, the Olympics received USD776 million.<sup>78</sup> Clint Waltz at the Alabama Institute for Sport and Fitness Management at Troy University, asserts that the main investment category for sponsorship is sport with 65% of the 1994 US WC, 63% of the 2006 Germany WC, and 80% of 2010.<sup>79</sup>

The potential to lose financially is equally incredible at such mammoth events. The 2002 Asia WC took place immediately after a global advertising slump and never produced the profits many had predicted. 2001 was a difficult year for the market with the economic downturn of the US terrorist attacks permeating the event.<sup>80</sup>

### 2.10.2 | The Development of Unofficial Enterprises

Proponents of 2010 promised that it would expand opportunities for economic development and help alleviate poverty. Faced with the opportunity to enter the hospitality or construction industries, some South Africans are instead developing their own microenterprises. According to a 2008 audit by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the WC has already generated 80,000 job opportunities in local tourism, hospitality, and construction. By 2010, the tourism industry is going to comprise 12% of the country's GDP.<sup>81</sup>

Although the majority of the events will benefit wealthy corporate investors, some South Africans are finding ways to unofficially profit. In previous WC events, FIFA has strictly forbid unofficial vendors from selling trademarked merchandise, but in 2010 FIFA is permitting the informal sector to sell exclusive 2010 WC merchandise. This will create jobs and encourage formation of local businesses. FIFA has also been kind to local artists developing new art projects in preparation of 2010. Artists are building replica stadiums, 2010 stadium paintings, 2010 themed safety helmets out of mining hats, 2010 handmade bead jewelry, and 2010 t-shirts, and selling the goods at informal markets around the country. Other artists are making more niche collectables including 2010-themed papier-mâché decorated stones. Some of these artists have teamed up with corporations in more formal marketing campaigns. One artist is working with a major shoe retailer to display 2010-themed artwork in stores around the country. FIFA's relaxed attitude

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<sup>77</sup> Waltz 2005

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Robinson, James. (April 9, 2006). FIFA World Cup to Net \$1 Billion in Advertising Revenue. *ZenithOptimedia*.

<sup>80</sup> Robinson 2006

<sup>81</sup> Hamlyn, Michael. (January 16, 2008). 2010 A Chance for the Poor. *BuaNews* (Cape Town).

towards these vendors has helped develop considerable excitement in anticipation for the event while also allowing informal sectors to generate funds.<sup>82</sup>

### 2.11 | LIMITED CAPACITY

South Africa, like most developing countries suffers from a lack of innovation, skills, and experience needed to plan and develop 2010. This creates a challenge as SA struggles to design and build the necessary infrastructure.

The incredible demand for construction laborers and contractors will help cities develop critical skills in the workforce. As an unintended consequence of the delays, many enormous construction projects are occurring simultaneously throughout the country. Improving the skills of the local workforce is a major beneficiary of mega event planning. Skill development programs should develop skills beyond just hospitality and tourism sectors in areas such as project management, engineering, security, marketing, and construction. When Atlanta hosted the 1996 Summer Olympics, the city offered college students broadcasting internships and women were offered construction apprenticeships.<sup>83</sup> It is important that SA be mindful of hiring local laborers and training them with new skills instead of importing skilled workers. Cities should ensure that a certain percentage of workers are local residents and not new immigrants or imported laborers. This unparalleled demand has caused the need for new laborers to increase substantially. In essence, these building projects are serving as major workforce training projects demanding laborers learn the skills on the job. Likewise, various sectors that do not typically work together must collaborate to complete the project in a timely manner. This increased capacity will enable laborers to build other smaller projects throughout the country after 2010.

### 2.12 | DEFEATING THE OBSTACLES

SA is confronted by enormous challenges as planners develop the 2010 WC. 2010 is unlike previous or future WC events; the challenges confronting SA as it plans for 2010 are distinctive and preparations for the event must acknowledge for these complexities and use them to organize and improve SA for 2010 and beyond. Planners must be persistent and anticipate the success of the WC by planning proactively instead of just expecting positive results. Local organizers should use the tremendous energy and excitement around 2010 as the fuel to overcome these inherent paradoxes. The

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<sup>82</sup> Hamlyn 2008

<sup>83</sup> Satchu, Hembert, and du Plessis 2008

2010 WC must be used as the catalyst for change and not just a deviation from reality. Planners must anticipate, design, prepare, and arrange changes to the physical and institutional landscape. These changes must be appropriate to the city needs and carefully weighed against needs in neighboring cities. Careful consideration of urban issues may cause planners to weigh the egregious costs of stadiums versus the needs for housing and water infrastructure. Instead of asking these questions, in many cases, planners are disassociating themselves from the planning process allowing the local 2010 organizers to make most of the decisions. In essence, planners are expecting these major changes to just happen. There needs to be critical analysis to describe and explain the ways SA needs to change and a clear methodology to accomplish these changes within the 2010 redevelopment plan. Recognizing that SA's 2010 event is faced with hurdles and inconsistencies, planners must acknowledge these challenges and envision creative solutions to these impossible possibilities. These challenges are met with opportunities and will make the success of the 2010 WC even more impressive.



## **CHAPTER 3**

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### **FRAGMENTING THE CITY**

We have to focus very closely on all elements that concern the preparations for the World Cup, stadiums, transport, communications, security - all of these elements... We can't replicate Germany, but I am sure that what will be done will be sufficient.

We need both [jobs and housing]. You can't say stop this one and then we'll do another one tomorrow. Sure, we absolutely need houses, we need to work steadily to end informal settlements. That's very crucial. We can do both, we will do both.<sup>1</sup>

- *Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa*

The question is not how many houses you can build but whether you can show that the money on stadiums will help towards the creation of a better society where people can make their own choices.<sup>2</sup>

- *Steve Friedman, Director of the Institute for a Democratic South Africa*

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<sup>1</sup> President Thabo Mbeki told an independent newspaper in an interview at the South African Embassy in Berlin in July 9, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Steve Friedman of the Institute for a Democratic SA (IDASA) calls South African democracy into question asking if stadiums are the best appropriation of public finances. Madywabe, Lungile. (October 23, 2006). Soccer's lasting legacy from 2010. Mail and Guardian Online. (Johannesburg).

### 3.1 | SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

The scars of apartheid remain an important factor in the planning and development of the South African city. During apartheid, governmental legislation restricted the movement of people and the development of the city. As a result, sections of the city developed independently, despite the more than a decade of democracy, legacies of apartheid still linger shaping South African culture and policies. South African cities are fragmented with large undeveloped sections separating the wealthy areas from the former townships. South African cities remain economically, socially, and spatially divided. The 2010 WC is an opportunity to unify the fragmented city.

The 2010 WC can also be a powerful development tool. SA can use WC funding to invest in city improvements. Development projects and urban investments for the 2010 WC can transform the city and stimulate new development patterns. Host cities need to build new stadiums, transportation infrastructure, tourist amenities, and facilities. Design, project sitting, and city policies can alleviate or exacerbate urban fragmentation by enticing infill development or wastelands. Considering the enormous public expenditures, it is imperative for cities to include substantial city improvements in the planning repertoire. Cities should use 2010 to improve the public realm and create new economic opportunities for South Africans. As SA struggles with issues of racism, inequality, poverty, and now climate change, development for 2010 offers an opportunity to unify the community through design.

Considering SA's scarce financial resources and the growing demand for adequate housing, water, and power, many deem such WC infrastructure egregious. WC supporters promise that developing WC infrastructure will leave a lasting positive impact on each South African. If however, South African city planners can utilize the WC to revive the inner-city and bridge the gaps between communities, then WC investment is money well spent.

This chapter will discuss the future of South African cities and the revitalization possibilities for 2010 host cities. SA was awarded 2010 as part of FIFA's efforts to aid progress in developing countries. Host cities must therefore make noticeable infrastructure improvements that transform the city. Cities must be mindful of stadium designs and ensure that stadiums are fully integrated into city improvement plans. Stadiums are an integral redevelopment design tool. Football infrastructure can reshape the city through integrated development programs, public participation, and good design. Stadiums must be surrounded by supportive entertainment development such as restaurants and retail and provide sports spectators with a place to revel before and after the game. Perhaps the most significant change to the city is the creation of new parks. Cities are also building fan parks as new public spaces for spectators to partake in WC revelry. These public spaces are particularly important in SA where there are limited parks because safety in public spaces cannot be guaranteed. These fan parks have the potential to transform the way South Africans use the city and may leave the deepest impressions after 2010. The WC

development can change the city landscape inscribing it with a football legacy and unifying the spatial divide.

### 3.2 | THE DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENT WINS THE CUP

SA developed a groundswell of support when vying for the opportunity to host the 2010 WC based on compelling arguments made by the bid committee using three main contentions:


- **The Development Argument:** 2010 has deadlines and it is an opportunity to hasten necessary city improvements;
- **It's Africa's Turn:** SA would be the first African country to host a WC event; and
- **South Africans Love Football:** SA has one of the largest populations of football supporters.

The WC was awarded based on the pervasive and salient reasoning arguing for the need to accelerate development programs in anticipation for 2010 as well as FIFA's mission to bring the WC to Africa.

The development argument was suggested as a means of repairing the country from the spatial scars of apartheid, in which development patterns separated residential development according to race. As a result, SA developed the fragmented city. This legacy continued even after the post-apartheid transition and instead of the promised improvements, fragmentation, crime, poverty, unemployment, and atrocious living conditions have worsened in the last decade. The Bid Company promised that this hosting opportunity will provide SA with a chance to repair these apartheid scars and improve living conditions. Despite promises, the plans reveal no such preparations. Event organizers are primarily concerned with constructing the necessary stadium and related infrastructure for the event and have given little consideration for the city after 2010.

Part of the limitations stem from FIFA's restrictive policies regarding stadium requirements. For example, FIFA requires the host country to provide at least eight, preferably ten stadiums with seating capacity of between 40,000 and 60,000. For SA, this may be too many stadiums, leaving many stadiums barely used. FIFA also has considerable safety and technological requirements, which have increased the cost of the construction and are not necessary after 2010. FIFA asks that designers create stadiums that can remain relevant to local communities after the WC. However, FIFA's requirements do not necessarily meet the needs of SA's football community after 2010. As a result, many of the stadiums are well over budget and unnecessarily large, leading many to wonder if the stadiums will be fully used after

2010.<sup>3</sup> Despite these considerations, SA and the LOC are committed to developing the 2010 facilities to meet these requirements.



**Image 3.1 | Building the 2010 World Cup<sup>4</sup>**

*SA lacks sufficient infrastructure to host the 2010 WC. What little infrastructure exists is mostly decaying. Therefore, considerable investment and construction will be necessary to host the 2010 WC.*

Generations of South Africans have grown up in isolation and despite more than a decade of democracy, that legacy continues. During apartheid, interaction between residents of townships, inner cities, and suburbs was limited; not surprisingly, social, economic, and physical fragmentation resulted. The one unifying force is sports, namely football; people with nothing else in common find commonality in this sport. The 2010 WC can be a catalyst for change, forcing government and private industries to work together, to follow guidelines, to meet deadlines, and to actualize a meaningful transformation of the city.

City planners have placed a halo around the 2010 WC expecting it to be a panacea solving city struggles. "It will take a lot more than the World Cup to bridge the wealth gap" in SA where it remains amongst the most unequal in the world, writes Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) Provincial Secretary Tony Ehrenreich. WC opposition is concerned that with so much focus on 2010, there may be considerable disappointment when years of aspiration leave little lasting legacy. Cities do not exist for singular celebratory events. Therefore, there is concern that 2010 may create merely the illusion of progress which will collapse after the event. To remedy this, planners must help cities use the WC to make meaningful changes on the city landscape, namely uniting and redeveloping the city. Njabulo

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<sup>3</sup> There is also growing concern that if SA cannot demonstrate that stadium and related infrastructure will be completed before 2010, FIFA will take the hosting opportunity away and ask a more prepared country to step up as host. FIFA's President Sepp Blatter denies any such plans or suggestions that threaten to take the event away from SA.

<sup>4</sup> Graphic created by author.



Ndebele of University of Cape Town writes, "Holding major world events can be seen as a demonstration of what our new democracy is capable of...we [must] rather turn our enormous energy towards what truly makes us *world class*: ourselves, and how our towns and cities truly express who we wish to be."<sup>5</sup>

### 3.3 | THE FRAGMENTED CITY


The spatial landscape has been shaped by fear, poverty, inequality, violence, and disappointment. SA suffers a daily average of 50 murders, 700 grievous assaults, and 356 aggravated assaults.<sup>6</sup> Increased violence and subsequent fear has hijacked the socialist promises and turned the post-apartheid city into the fragmented city. Public space is all but nonexistent and remaining parks have become a proxy for the inequality in the city. Despite increased opportunities, economic investment meant to eviscerate past injustices has led to increased poverty and inequality.

Urban segregation in SA predates apartheid and developed around an elitist discourse on public health and community safety. Fear, self-righteousness, and the assumption of White superiority were ingrained into the urban fabric of the South African city. Economic and political power was the heart of the segregation; keeping people separate ensured complete control for the ruling powers who continued to profit from the inequality. Segregated townships were engineered to highlight racially-based inequality. During apartheid, white communities were generally located in the most fertile, desirable locations, enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world, while Blacks tended to be forced onto the least desirable areas, typically a great distance from the city center.

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<sup>5</sup> Ndelebe, Njabulo. (June 26, 2007). Bringing Township Life Into Urban Embrace. *Cape Argus* (Cape Town).

<sup>6</sup> Lafraniere, Sharon. (April 23, 2007). South Africa vs. Itself, in Race to Get Ready for World Cup. *The New York Times*.



**Image 3.2 | Graphic Model of the Apartheid City of South Africa**

*This model, developed by K.S.O. Beavon in his article "The Post-Apartheid City: Hopes, Possibilities, and Harsh Realities" in the book The Apartheid City and Beyond edited by David Marshall Smith, demonstrates the spatial stratification that developed in the apartheid city.*

SA is socially and spatially fragmented. Many expected that integration would follow the formal end of the 1950 Group Areas Act in the early 1990s. But economic disadvantage replaced laws and few Blacks were economically or politically mobilized. New opportunities intended to eviscerate past injustices resulted in disappointment. Many were confused with their new free status, which promised prosperity on paper but only brought disappointment. Meanwhile, wealthier South Africans fled the cities into secure, gated communities, and cities fell into disrepair. Development has occurred in the form of gated suburban malls and private parks. These development patterns stigmatize the disadvantaged as the “unproductive underclass” blaming them for increased violence. ANC promises of job creation, improved education, and access to basic necessities such as shelter, water, and electricity failed to materialize, instead creating the fragmented city. Thus, racism has changed from vulgar biological forms into class-based choices in which most South Africans are disadvantaged. More than a decade after the formal end of apartheid, the

Black majority is still trapped in the townships, but economic inequalities have replaced legislative restrictions.<sup>7</sup>

### Development in South Africa 1900-2000




Image 3.3 | Development in South Africa 1900-2000<sup>8</sup>


*Prior to government intervention, development in SA was organic, relying on the market to draw people from place to place. Johannesburg for example developed after the discovery of abundant gold resources. The Group Areas Act of 1950 formally restricted the movement of people and separated residential dwellings according to race. Even after the dissolution of these restrictions, most people remained in their current location, in many cases fortifying themselves in their original areas, creating an even more fragmented city.*

For the last several decades, SA has been growing without developing. John Friedmann, urban planner, explains the differences between development and growth. Development is defined as “the unfolding of creative possibilities inherent in society,” while growth is “an expansion of the system in one or more dimensions without change in its structure.”<sup>9</sup> This WC provides SA and its cities with the opportunity to develop, revive, and unify instead of just growing haphazardly.

<sup>7</sup> Less than 2% of land in South Africa has been redistributed since the end of apartheid. Instead the government has left it up to the market to redistribute the land to the “Black Diamonds,” the rising Black middle class. While the government has hoped that this rising middle class will take care of their brethren, in fact, as soon as those with means are able to leave the townships, they flee forgetting their neighbors quickly. Despite marginal improvements, physical and economic mobility has been limited.

<sup>8</sup> Graphic created by author.

<sup>9</sup> Friedmann, John. “A General Theory of Polarized Development”, in Niles M. Hansen (ed.), *Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development* (New York, 1972) pg. 84



**Image 3.4 | State of the South African Cities Analytical Framework**

*The 2004 State of the South African Cities Report Describes the challenges South African cities face such as unprecedented urbanization and a population growth. The Report explains that despite changing political environments, democracy is giving rise to independent, self-governing state with poverty alleviation programs and economic opportunities like the 2010 WC.*

John Friedmann's general theory of polarized development provides an applicable conceptual model to analyze the South African city. In *A General Theory of Polarized Development*, Friedmann states that a spatial system is comprised of a core and a periphery, and exists "where a core can be shown to dominate some of the vital decisions of populations in areas external to itself." In this traditional city model, the periphery is dominated by the core and maintains this periphery through the market system. Conflict and disparity exist between competing groups in the core and the periphery; spatial integration is achieved by increasing economic, social, and political unification.<sup>10</sup> To achieve development, SA must seek to spatially integrate the deeply divided core-periphery areas during the WC-related development. If organizers can use the WC to increase opportunity and form community cohesion within the city, disparity and ultimately conflict and violence will be reduced.

<sup>10</sup> Friedmann 1972 pg. 84 and Schmidt, Charles F. A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency Relations in South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Sep., 1975) pg. 483-490.

Friedmann's theories demonstrate that political change alone cannot transform the decades of fragmentation. Physical changes are necessary and with the WC, possible. Without the provision of permanent housing, social cohesion is impossible. Homelessness is an epidemic in SA, limiting the development of strong, unified cities and communities. In Cape Town there is a housing demand backlog of 350,000 homes, increasing by 25,000 per year, but Cape Town can only build 13,000 homes per year. This presents a growing crisis with people expected to be on the waiting list for twenty years.<sup>11</sup> The WC provides an opportunity for SA to expedite housing development.

### **3.4 | WHAT IS A WORLD CUP CITY?**

In the years surrounding an event as incredible as the FIFA WC, the city becomes myopic focusing entirely on the necessary actions. A WC city is developed exclusively and in preparation for a WC sporting event. In anticipation for 2010, the urban fabric of city has become littered with football-related highway billboards, lamppost flags, and advertisements. The 2010 WC literally becomes physically entwined within the city. South Africans are consuming football; school children play football in the streets. However, cities must meet the requirements of hosting without becoming exclusively dedicated to sports. Cities do not exist for a singular festival like the WC and therefore development must meet the needs of the population not the visitors. The city must continue to exist outside of the stadium.

#### **3.4.1 | Technology Changes the Nature of the Stadium**

Technology has made the boundaries between the stadium's inside and the outside more porous. The way we define the "stadium" and its "spectators" is changing in the new millennium. Giant screens in open air parks, advanced telecommunications, and the very nature of the city is transformed by crowds watching the football game. Clapperton Mavhunga, in his article *What is the Stadium?*, sees the stadium as the heart of the event but not the sole area of revelry. The broadcasted game carries excitement and turns homes, parks, sports bars, bus and railway stations, cars, and bicycles, into stadiums away from the stadium. Although typically fragmented, all of SA is united under this digital signal. "One place (the stadium) becomes present in many spaces; different people in different places enter the stadium through their TV screens, radio commentary, and internet and become one crowd in many places."<sup>12</sup> Such a cerebral image of the stadium makes it difficult to plan for it. The WC and technology enables people within SA to connect to each other and the world, but will the development schemes help people retain this connection after the event concludes?

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<sup>11</sup> Ehrenreich, Tony. (May 2, 2007). *The Ugly Reality of Our Beautiful City*. *Cape Argus* (Cape Town).

<sup>12</sup> Mavhunga, Clapperton. (2006). *What is the Stadium?* University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).

### 3.4.2 | Masculinity in the World Cup City

Margot Rubin argues that cities must be mindful not to build excessive masculinity during this transformative period. Since the bulk of WC fans are men, Rubin examines how the city will manifest the masculine features associated with 2010. Rubin contends that cities become the conceptualization of masculinity and in a sense the physical manifestation of the male fantasy as cities become “men’s playgrounds.”<sup>13</sup> What is the role of women in a city transformed in anticipation of a male-oriented event? For the last decade, the country has sought to redress the inequalities of apartheid by providing special opportunities to women. If the redevelopment of SA occurs in conjunction with the development of these highly traditional notions of masculinity and femininity, then it will be difficult to abolish the concept of sexism from the city.

## 3.5 | CASE STUDIES: WORLD CUP STADIUMS AS NEW CITY CENTERS

### 3.5.1 | Can Stadiums Revitalize Cities?

In the United States, cities commonly build sports facilities as a revitalization tool. Policies assume that attracting large crowds to a downtown area will underscore its vitality, centrality, and potential for additional economic activity and development. Large crowds will encourage private investment in entertainment facilities such as restaurants, bars, and retail. For this reason, cities often build shopping malls near new stadiums. Increased recreational and retail activity will attract additional private investment to expand downtown office complexes. New residential development will follow this influx of activity and a new downtown will be born. In the same way that tremendous skyscraper buildings like New York’s Empire State Building or Chicago’s Sears Tower were expected to serve as city landmarks, drawing centrality and activity to the city center, virtually every American city has rebuilt its baseball stadium. Cities rationalize tremendous investments in sports stadiums using this rationale that a single asset will have an investment domino effect.<sup>14</sup>

The long-term impact of stadiums on downtown redevelopment is still debated. Experts contend that stadiums alone do not provide a sufficient economic or social impact to justify the tremendous expenditures. Sport facilities are worth the expense if they anchor the city and provide spectators with a reason to come downtown. Integrating sports facilities into the existing urban fabric has been responsible for influencing development patterns in some cities, especially when restaurants, office complexes, and other recreational facilities are within walking distance of the stadium. Aesthetically pleasing and architecturally distinguishable stadiums have also had a greater impact on their neighborhoods. Oriole Park

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<sup>13</sup> Rubin, Margot. (2006). *Women’s Bodies in Masculinized Spaces: FIFA World Cup and the Women in their Cities. 2010 and the Life of the City*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

<sup>14</sup> Zimbalist, Andrew. 180-181

at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland and the Skydome in Toronto, Canada have attracted thousands of visitors who simply want to tour the facilities.<sup>15</sup>

Noll and Zimbalist, two prominent American economists who study impact of new stadiums on downtown revitalization, conclude that stadiums can be a source of local economic and community growth. Stadium success is determined by the magnitude of the government subsidies enticing nearby investment.<sup>16</sup> Noll and Zimbalist fail to recognize the societal unity that develops between city residents who support the same professional sports team. The importance of the stadium therefore supersedes the physicality of the stadium to impact the very nature of the city. SA should not develop stadiums solely for economic purposes, but should build them to anchor the social revitalization of the city. Cities cannot rely on private investors to compliment city investment strategies. Development must be coupled with greater city development strategies that aim to defragment the city. SA should place the stadiums as new focal points in the city. The city can create value in the surrounding landscape by inviting developers to build commercial, cultural, entertainment, and civic facilities around the WC stadiums. This will attract future development around the stadiums and make these expensive investments into new city centers.

### 3.5.2 | Stuttgart and its Center of Competence

Stuttgart, Germany used its role as host city to strengthen business and tourist attractions before, during, and after the WC. Professor Gunter Sabow of Stuttgart University explained in his article, *Stuttgart and its Center of Competence*, the ways that the city used the 2006 WC hosting opportunity to redevelop itself. Sabow argues that cities must build interesting, high-capacity, high-tech places that combine business and entertainment without constraining the important role of hosting. Stuttgart built the Kompetenzzentrum Telematik, Mobile Computing Customer Care Center (KTMC) which served as center for spectators in 2006. The KTMC now hosts 30 international companies including Daimler-Chrysler, Siemens, and Hewlett-Packard. This site distinguished and strengthened the position of business development in the city.<sup>17</sup>

### 3.5.3 | Seoul Digital Media City

Seoul Digital Media City (SDMC) is becoming the centerpiece of South Korea. SDMC was built by the government on the site of a former landfill as part of South Korea's 2002 WC development plans to attract domestic and foreign investment to support its growing high-tech businesses. The Korean

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<sup>15</sup> Noll, Roger G. and Andrew S. Zimbalist. (1997). *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. *Brookings Institution Press* (Washington D.C.).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Sabow, Gunter. (2006). *Stuttgart and its Center of Competence*. *2010 and the Life of the City*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

government built SDMC as part of its larger master plan to develop a future-oriented incubation site for technology venture firms. The Mayor of Seoul, Goh Kun, said that that SDMC was selected because of its close proximity to the Seoul WC Stadium which attracted great media coverage in 2002. The development will take advantage of the 2002 development of the WC Park (a park of similar size to Central Park in New York City) and the 7,000 unit residential development. Land values increased in the aftermath of the 2002 WC as a result of the stadium and subsequent development projects.<sup>18</sup>

### 3.5.4 | Reviving a Declining Chester, Pennsylvania

Football proponents argue that investment in local leagues and supportive infrastructure can revive declining downtowns. The establishment of a football team in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area will generate much-needed economic investment for the city of Chester. This investment comes more than a decade after Philadelphia was overlooked as a host city for the 1994 USA WC because of its insufficient stadium facilities. The lack of stadium availability has limited the city's involvement in football and hurt the city's national and international status. In February 2008, US Major League Soccer (MLS) announced that its first new team since 1996 will be located in the Philadelphia suburb of Chester. This USD30 million project will serve as the centerpiece of the city's waterfront renewal project. MLS will build a 20,000 seat stadium for an estimated USD115 million and develop a convention center along with commercial, residential, and retail infrastructure surrounding the stadium for an additional USD414 million. The project is expected to revitalize a declining area, southwest of Philadelphia, and generate substantial improvement throughout the region. Funding will come from a variety of public and private sources with USD30 million commitment from the City of Chester, USD10 million from the Delaware Port Authority, and USD47 million from the Pennsylvania state government. "We believe it is a good economic deal and we can demonstrate direct economic development that will return a lot to taxpayers," said Ed Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania. "If this sports stadium serves as the catalyst to revitalize the City of Chester, you won't be able to put that in an economic analysis. It won't be in a balance sheet." Chief Executive Officer of Chester, Nick Sakiewicz, explains that this investment project is more focused on investing in the local community and Chester than developing the sports league. Sakiewicz said, "It will be the people's team with a world-class stadium." The stadium is expected to showcase the determination of the City to revive itself.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Yang, Sung-Jin. (June 20, 2002). Seoul Digital Media City Envisions Super-Efficient Tech Hub. *Korea Herald* (Seoul).

<sup>19</sup> Gammage, Jeff. (February 28, 2008). *Major League Soccer Celebrates in Chester*. Retrieved March 3, 2008, from Anything Philly: [www.philly.com](http://www.philly.com).



### 3.5.5 | Fan Parks Connect Denver, Colorado

Denver, Colorado built a downtown stadium to jumpstart its inner city revival. Just a decade ago, Denver was a devastated economic wasteland. Denver's impressive regeneration began with the hosting of the 1976 Winter Olympic Games and continued for decades, transforming the city into a prosperous place for living and working. South African cities can learn a great deal from Denver's development of parks and public spaces. The city integrated the downtown through the largest system of parks and bicycle paths in US. Denver's convention center, baseball stadium, libraries, and businesses are connected through a network of paths. Denver cleverly built just 15,000 parking spaces for the 50,000 seat Coors Field Baseball Stadium, clearly too few spaces for a stadium with so many seats. As a result, spectators must park in convenient downtown parking areas scattered around the downtown and walk past entertainment and commercial facilities. This encourages spectators to frequent these city amenities either before or after a game, or even when they are not attending a game. Since the stadium opened in 1995, this experiment has generated USD200 million a year for the local economy. These impressive results were part of a well-planned scheme to revive the city, increase greenery, and redevelop local downtown businesses. South African cities can utilize this model as a means for defragmenting the city landscape and ensuring economic investment trickles into the city during and after 2010.<sup>20</sup>

### 3.5.6 | Cities Need to Develop Local Business around Stadiums

Chicago's U.S. Cellular Field, home to the Chicago White Sox Baseball team was built in 2001 for USD125 million, but the 2003 renovations cost an additional USD200 million in public money.<sup>21</sup> The project was supposed to revive the historically marginalized south-side of Chicago by providing the area with a local entertainment center. Despite renovations, recent attendance figures are well below expectations. Studies argue that the stadium failed to unify the area because the city never developed shopping or restaurants in the immediate area. As a result, spectators come to the games, spend money inside the stadium and then leave. The stadium stands as a white elephant providing the local community with little more than traffic. By contrast, Chicago's north-side baseball stadium, home to the Chicago Cubs, is one of the most vibrant areas of the city because of its plethora of local shopping, restaurants, and bars. Cubs fan come to the area early, spend money locally, and stay in the area after games conclude to partake in the revelry with fellow fans. Longer stays means that fans are spending money at local businesses and investing in the city's economy. South African stadiums will only generate meaningful, long lasting city improvements if the city encourages development surrounding the stadium.

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<sup>20</sup> Cuff, Martin. (2006). Inner City Success: The Denver Example. *The Property Magazine* (Western Cape).

<sup>21</sup> Stanek, Steve. (February 1, 2005). Chicago Stadiums Fail to Deliver Promised Benefits. *The Heartland Institute: Budget & Tax News*.

### 3.6 | REVIVING THE INNER CITY BY DEVELOPING THE SURROUNDING TOWNSHIPS

The WC development projects should be used to revive the inner city by supporting development in surrounding communities and former townships. Injecting funding into these decaying and forgotten areas will add vigor and creativity throughout the city.

Historically, inner cities have held wealth and opportunity. Living closer to the inner city therefore meant being closer to opportunity. For disenfranchised South Africans, the city was reserved for the White population, while they were relegated to space outside of town or the townships. Many still fear the impermanency of living in the city. The memory of the planned demolition of vibrant Black areas of the city such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg<sup>22</sup> and District Six in Cape Town<sup>23</sup> remain deeply inscribed in the collective memory. As a result nearly two decades since the repeal of the legislation restricting residential locations of Black Africans, many remain in the townships. This physical and physiological segregation is still a dominant feature of the South African city. According to Sharon Lafraniere redevelopment requires changing the perception of the space. Lafraniere explains that “space is directly lived through its associated images and symbols” and hence the space communicates nonverbally. Meaning can change over time.<sup>24</sup> For example, Tiananmen Square in Beijing was built as a symbol for socialist China. After the 1989 protests, Tiananmen Square became associated with the brutality of the same communist government. The reverse can occur in SA. Inner cities that have become synonymous with violence can become places of unity, where people can remember SA's football team scoring a goal. Through these collective memories, the place can reflect the development of a new intricate relationship between place and time. To redevelop the inner city, planners must rebrand new and existing development with consideration for the inscribed memories of hosting the 2010 WC.

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<sup>22</sup> Sophiatown was one of the four freehold townships outside of the City of Johannesburg and one of the few places where Black Africans could own land. During the 1940s and 1950s, Sophiatown became the symbolic center of Black culture, arts, politics, religion, and entertainment around Johannesburg. Sophiatown was a diverse area where Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians could assemble. According to the 1950 Group Areas Act, interracial interactions bred conflict and necessitated separation of the races. Because of this diversity, in 1953, the National Party decided to raze the town. Nelson Mandela and other ANC activists rallied to try to protect Sophiatown, but failed, and on February 9, 1955, residents were forced from their homes and relocated to an empty field in Meadowlands (now part of Soweto). The area was rebuilt as a white only suburb named Triomf (Afrikaans for triumph). In February 2006, the area was renamed Sophiatown but the vibrancy and culture remains only a memory.

<sup>23</sup> District Six is named for its location as the Sixth Municipal District of Cape Town. By the beginning of the 20th century, it was a flourishing, diverse area near downtown Cape Town, comprising nearly a tenth of the city's population. According to the 1950 Group Areas Act, interracial interactions bred conflict and necessitated separation of the races. District Six was deemed a slum and unfit for habitation because of its diversity. The government portrayed the area as crime-ridden and dangerous, but most residents believed that the government cleared the land because of its ideal location, sandwiched between Table Mountain and downtown Cape Town. On February 11, 1966, the government declared District Six a white-only area and removals started in 1968. Considerable opposition from individuals as well as international agencies delayed the removals, which continued until 1982. Continued conflict over ownership of the land has left it undeveloped. Today, the government recognizes the claims of former residents and has pledged to support rebuilding.

<sup>24</sup> Lafraniere, Sharon. (April 23, 2007). South Africa vs. Itself, in Race to Get Ready for World Cup. *The New York Times*.

SA's White population has also fled the inner cities. Extreme business divestment from the inner city occurred as crime escalated. Businesses and people fled to suburban privatized cities like Sandton, near Johannesburg, leaving inner cities to decay.<sup>25</sup> South African cities are dilapidated and dangerous. People are afraid for their safety and equally concerned that purchasing property downtown is a bad investment. Without considerable government and private investment to rehabilitate inner cities, it is not surprising that the inner-city remain abandoned. If SA put WC activities downtown, this would offer future opportunities to return and contribute to the beginning of spatial integration, fulfilling what Lafraniere calls the "transformation of spatial representations."<sup>26</sup>

Both Black and White people must be encouraged to repopulate the city with increasing residential dwellers as the primary objective of urban development policy. Significant development of the inner city cannot occur without support from thriving communities surrounding it. In order to revive South African cities, the government must develop new urban growth centers in and around the townships, while also continuing to invest in downtown redevelopment projects. Redevelopment projects are contagious. Blossoming redevelopment in one area can revive neighboring areas. Increased security, commercial activity, cultural expression, and connectedness are intertwined. Improved downtown spaces will increase activity, which will spur economic development and cultural expression. In reverse, increased cultural expression will increase connectivity and decrease crime which results from decreased inequality. To alleviate the feelings of impermanency and encourage community development, the city could also develop incentives for people to buy rather than rent. Special policies must be created to encourage increased residential development downtown, encouraging mixed-income and mixed-race developments. This will reduce the inherent ambiguities in the new SA, inviting all races to reunite in the inner city.


Policies must encourage inner city redevelopment while also enhancing the quality of life in the townships and increasing the connectivity between the townships. The disparity between the townships and the city cannot be exacerbated lest people continue to feel isolated. The economic base of the townships must be developed and strengthened to create interconnectivity between the city and the townships. Opportunities in the township and the city should be mutually exclusive to unify these fragments of the city. Including townships in the redevelopment of the inner city will make them a vital part

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<sup>25</sup> Sandton is a 156km<sup>2</sup> city in the northern part of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area. In 1969, the municipality was established as extension of the city as Johannesburg began expanding north of its downtown. Although it started as a residential community, it quickly became one of the wealthiest towns in the area. In the last fifteen years, the financial center of Johannesburg shifted from the downtown to Sandton. As Sandton developed, building a considerable amount of the city's A-grade office space, the downtown lost important businesses like Nedbank, one of SA's largest banks. Today, Sandton has become Johannesburg's new city center appealing to the international visitors and businessmen as well as middle and upper-class South Africans. The Sandton Convention Center is one of the largest convention centers on the African continent and the primary site for important events like the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Sandton also has a number of 5-star hotels and major tourist attractions including Sandton City and Nelson Mandela Square, two of the largest shopping centers in the Southern Hemisphere. Across the N1 ring road from Sandton is Alexandra, which although only 8 km<sup>2</sup>, has about the same population as Sandton and is one of the poorest townships in Johannesburg.

<sup>26</sup> Lafraniere 2007

of the city as a whole. The notion of marginal, satellite, or fringe communities must be replaced with a shared vision of inter-connected communities.<sup>27</sup>



**Image 3.5 | World Cup Potential to Increase Physical and Social Mobility<sup>28</sup>**

*WC-related infrastructure can connect the fragmented city by building pathways between communities. These pathways can be either physical as in improved road access or community participation. Reducing crime will also open the pathways. Situating WC venues on the outskirts of Soweto and downtown Johannesburg may encourage mobility unifying the people of the city.*

Parks and open spaces are integral for congregating. SA needs abstract space - unlimited or undefined spaces, organically developed, divorced from reality and human experience - which could provide an uncorrupted place for South Africans to congregate without the constructed fear of daily life. This space needs to incorporate a social and mental unification in addition to good physical form. The production of common space where people can freely interact on a regular basis is the best means of

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<sup>27</sup> Townships must be linked not just to the inner city but also to each other. A Malaysian investor, Newcyc, pledged to build a 27-mile, USD1.7 billion monorail connecting the central business district of Johannesburg with Soweto. Built entirely with private money, the light-rail system is expected to be completed by 2009. It is expected to ferry 1.5 million people on a daily basis, between 39 stations for 10 Rand per ride. The monorail is expected to reduce commute times from over an hour to fifteen minutes. This is a step in the right direction but additional such projects must be developed. Ndelebe 2007

<sup>28</sup> Graphic created by author.

linking the social and economic fragmentation. Increased cohesion and comfort can only occur through close, personal associations within the perceived space by establishing common routes and networks which link people and places to a daily urban reality (i.e. establishing regular commuting habits).

### **3.7 | BUILDING THE STADIUMS**

SA's original winning bid proposed 13 stadiums, three of which were rugby stadiums upgraded for the previous WCs.<sup>29</sup> Three of the stadiums were cancelled and the current plan calls for five new stadiums and five refurbished stadiums. When the final ten stadiums were selected, two of the three rugby stadiums had been dropped from the list and Cape Town and Durban were building new stadiums. The 64 football matches of 2010 will be played in ten stadiums in nine cities – Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Nelspruit, Polokwane, Port Elizabeth, Rustenberg, and Pretoria.<sup>30</sup> Stadiums are designed as versatile, multipurpose facilities intended to serve the needs of 2010 as well as future entertainment and community events. The ten stadiums in total will seat more than 570,000 people during the 2010 WC. This new plan promised SA more seats per game than any host country since the United States in 1994. The decision to build five stadiums has been divisive. Construction of all major stadiums and WC-related infrastructure began by February 2007.

To be selected, host cities prepared persuasive business cases demonstrating their ability to host the event. Host cities were selected by the LOC, the Development Bank of SA, the National Treasury, the Ministry of Sport and Recreation, and representatives from other South African cities. Officials from the South African construction industry were also consulted as to the selection of host cities. As part of the business plans, host cities were responsible for developing plans for supportive infrastructure. Cities are also responsible for developing the lasting legacy of the event.

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<sup>29</sup> Ellis Park in Johannesburg, Newlands in Cape Town, and Kings Park in Durban, all rugby stadiums, were three of the thirteen stadiums already upgraded to meet FIFA's eligibility requirements.

<sup>30</sup> Please see "Appendix A: A Guide to the 2010 World Cup Stadiums" for additional detail, images, and maps of each WC stadium.

WASTED OPPORTUNITIES












STATUS	CITY	CITY (2004) POPULATION	COST (\$ millions)	CAPACITY	EXPECTED DATE OF COMPLETION
<b>New Stadiums</b>					
	Cape Town	2,984,885	403.1	70,000	October 2009
	Durban	3,129,298	278	70,000	August 2009
	Nelspruit	484,245	118.8	46,000	April 2009
	Polokwane	532,673	111.2	46,000	April 2009
	Port Elizabeth	1,054,359	159.9	50,000	March 2009
<b>Upgraded Stadiums</b>					
	Bloemfontein	655,332	34.1	48,000	October 2008
	Johannesburg: Ellis Park	3,225,407	29.2	65,000	July 2008
	Johannesburg: Soccer City	3,225,407	208.5	95,000	April 2009
	Pretoria	1,531,954	25.7	50,000	December 2008
	Rustenberg	405,554	20.7	42,000	December 2008
<b>Total</b>			<b>1,388.9</b>	<b>574,200</b>	

Image 3.6 | Table of Stadiums

South African cities were selected based on the strength of their football clubs. After that, cities are ranked according to the plans for their stadium, infrastructure, and global context. Johannesburg naturally became the national host, holding opening and final matches, and the only city to have two WC stadiums. Durban and Cape Town are the other major host cities. Both cities have vibrant football clubs, although both cities needed new stadiums. Smaller cities like Nelspruit and Port Elizabeth were selected because of local development needs. Ancillary development in the smaller towns will provide them with much needed improvements as the lasting legacy. Hosting the event in a variety of cities scattered throughout the country ensures that all South Africans have access to the WC with the possibility of viewing matches at nearby stadiums.



**Image 3.7 | Construction of Johannesburg's Ellis Park<sup>31</sup>**

*Construction workers continue their efforts during the February 2007 inspection of WC stadiums.*

For the most part, stadiums are being built with public funds and will remain in the public domain. The National Treasury allocated R8.4 billion for the building and upgrading of WC stadiums.<sup>32</sup> Host cities are responsible for supplementing the residual financing necessary for construction of stadiums and supportive infrastructure. Ideally costs are kept to a minimum and stadiums are built in the most cost-effective manner. The five new stadiums will be built, owned, operated, and maintained by the host city municipality. Some host cities hope to offload the cost and responsibility for the new stadium into private hands after the event concludes. Soccer City, the largest and most expensive WC stadium which was

<sup>31</sup> Photo taken by author.

<sup>32</sup> The R8.4 billion is broken down as follows: R7.62 for stadium construction and upgrading, R580 million for the supply of utilities and services to the stadium, and R200 million for overlay items at each stadium. The funding is spread over four years starting in fiscal year 2006-7 with R600 million, with R1.26 billion, R3.6 billion, and R2.939 billion in subsequent years.

originally owned by SAFA was returned to the municipality in honor of 2010 and will henceforth be managed by the City of Johannesburg.




Image 3.8 | Newspaper Clipping of World Cup Construction

### 3.8 | STADIUM DESIGN AND URBAN FUTURES

The design and layout of the stadium as well as the city policies towards private development in the area are an important aspect of the stadium's impact on the city.

- A more attractive design will bring spectators who may not have visited the stadium otherwise. The local community also benefits from having an aesthetically pleasing stadium. A single improvement can create a domino effect enhancing the overall beauty of the area.
- The design of the stadium serves an economic purpose as well. Many new stadiums are built to include additional luxury seating so that owners can charge higher prices for seats.
- The precise location of the stadium may indicate its impact on the local community. Those stadiums that are situated downtown or in another central, convenient area may lure a greater number of spectators.



- The way the stadium is situated on the lot and the entrance and egress may entice or exclude spectators. The siting may also charm private investors to develop the immediate or surrounding vicinity.

The proclivity of the stadium towards lucrative ventures is necessary to attract future development. If designed with these considerations in mind, a stadium can rejuvenate a forgotten downtown; if the stadium is design and situated poorly, however, then it may never be used and become a scar on the city.


There are two stadium typologies - the suburban and the urban stadium. In the United States, urban, downtown stadiums tend to be more lucrative for developers and businesses in the immediate vicinity. Urban stadiums typically have a stronger impression on the cityscape and cultivate community. Suburban stadiums are usually located in picturesque settings and surrounded by greenery. Security concerns in and around stadiums is an important aspect in stadium design in SA. Suburban stadiums, because of the considerable open space adjoining the facility, tend to be easier to safeguard.

### **3.8.1 | Johannesburg's Soccer City vs. Ellis Park**

Johannesburg, population 3.3 million, is going to be home to two internationally-recognized sports facilities: Soccer City and Ellis Park. These two stadiums demonstrate the opposite ends of the spectrum; while Soccer City is the prototypical suburban stadium, Ellis Park is in the city center. Examining the impact of these two stadiums on the city provides insight into the ways 2010 interventions may impact other South African cities.

Little but tall grass existed in Johannesburg before the richest Witwatersrand (Afrikaans for white gold reef) was discovered in 1886 by an Australian named George Harrison on a farm about five miles west of the city's downtown. Within weeks, thousands of prospectors had set up tents in the area. Oppression, greed, and corruption followed as the government essentially enslaved the native population to extract the gold. Today, Johannesburg is SA's premier metropolis, with the majority of international investment, the main international airport, and all the disparity typical of SA.


Downtown Johannesburg is best described as featureless, with sprawl and traffic reminiscent of many American cities, complete with decaying office towers and blatant poverty. The Newtown Cultural District is the city's best attempt at a cultural district, complete with a historic brick making area, a new science museum, and the Johannesburg Art Gallery as well as centers for theatre, dance, and music.



**Image 3.9 | Johannesburg – Population Centers<sup>33</sup>**

*This concept map illustrates division between the population centers in Johannesburg. Johannesburg remains an unjust city with a large proportion of the population living in Soweto, southwest of the city’s main ring road but a majority of city landmarks, commercial, transportation, and natural amenities, north of Johannesburg’s CBD. Development typically occurs north of the city center around wealthy neighborhoods and private shopping centers. New malls, such as Fourways, are developing north of the ring road, about as far as one can live from Soweto. This style of development has led to a social and physical fragmentation in the city.*

<sup>33</sup> Graphic created by author using 2006 South Africa census figures and Google maps.



**Image 3.10 | Johannesburg – Economic Centers<sup>34</sup>**

*This image depicts the relative economic importance of areas like Sandton and Randburg over the city's main central business district. Malls are also key financial and social centers. Soweto and Alexandra remain separated from these economic centers as well as wealthy residential areas. The paradox between where people live and where the economic power is centered is key to the integrated divisions within cities like Johannesburg.*

The N1 ring road encompasses great disparity. In the 1980s, as apartheid crumbled, residents and businesses fled north. Today, the city's fanciest hotels and restaurants lay in ubiquitous suburban nodes surrounding by security walls. Places like Montecasino, an ersatz Tuscan villa housing a hotel, casino, mall, and an aviary; Melrose Arch, a gated community of condos, galleries, spas, and high-end restaurants; and Houghton embody the wealth of northern Johannesburg. Sandton has become the unofficial new downtown, housing most businesses, international hotels, and even the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. To the south lie the Black neighborhoods spawned from government location restrictions. Soweto, which stands for South West Townships, has a population of more than one million. Although formerly fairly impoverished, today it is a middle-class suburb. Neighborhoods like Orlando West

<sup>34</sup> Graphic created by author using 2006 South Africa census figures and Google maps.

## WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

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are havens for the Black Diamonds (nickname for wealthy Blacks), who built the first malls in Soweto in 2007. White tourists, who would have never entered Soweto, now tour the residences of Nelson and Winnie Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and Hector Pieterse. The only township north of the inner city is the Alexandra Township. The disparity between the races is most apparent in Alexandra, which sits on the doorsteps of wealthy Sandton. Unlike Soweto, Alexandra remains a compact, largely impoverished township. Despite its opportune location, Alexandra remains one of the most disenfranchised areas of Johannesburg.

Soccer City is located at the confluence of two major highways, the N12 and N1, situated at the southwest border of the city and Soweto. Hosting the opening and final match on the border of such a famous township demonstrates the city and the nation's commitment to increase equality. The stadium was originally built in 1987 with a capacity of 94,700. For 2010, the upper tiers will be extended to increase seating capacity and lighting will be installed. Soccer City is built in a suburban style with a great deal of greenery surrounding the stadium and a large parking lot to facilitate convenience. Unlike urban stadiums that typically have businesses surrounding the stadium, Soccer City is an island. People are not going to want walk from home to the stadium and there will be little business activity before or after the matches. The open design of Soccer City makes it easier to safeguard than a stadium located in a denser area. This may entice spectators who may avoid a game in the denser area of Ellis Park.




Image 3.11 | Soccer City




Image 3.12 | Soccer City Map

Stadium development should be connected with the city's redevelopment plan. Specifically, the city must redevelop the surrounding area to entice private developments in the vicinity. The area is already ripe for development. Although historically marginalized, Soweto's increased spending capacity has attracted private development. In October 2007, the first private mall, the Maponya Mall, opened in Soweto. Developer Landmark Real Estate announced that this mall would be no different from any other modern mall in either its design or its retailers. The 55,000 square meter development is the "heartbeat of Soweto."<sup>35</sup> Malls such as the Maponya Mall are located a distance from Soccer City and the two entities will not be able to work together to entice shoppers and spectators. The city should create development initiatives to lure development closer to Soccer City to ensure that the area remains vibrant even after 2010. Additional entertainment and business around the stadium and in Soweto would entice people to come to these previously avoided areas. Without greater integrated development planning, the 2010 WC will not facilitate increased unity.

Unlike Soccer City, Ellis Park is located just east of Johannesburg's central business district in a relatively dense location. Ellis Park was built in 1982 as a modern, multipurpose sport facility intended to revitalize Johannesburg's downtown. For 2010, the city is expanding capacity by 10,149 seats to hold a

<sup>35</sup> Fifty-five percent of the R55 million shopping mall is owned by Nedbank and the Masingita Group, with the remaining 45% owned by the developer. Ken Reynolds, Divisional Director for the Gauteng division of Nedbank Corporate Property Finance called the mall a "realization of a long-term goal for us to be instrumental in the development of this dynamic suburb." Of the 46 stores, 65% are national tenants, 7.5% are franchises and 27.5% are independent retailers. (Ster-Kinekor wins Maponya Mall bid in Soweto 2005)

## WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

total of 60,000 spectators. Ellis Park will host one quarterfinal match. Ellis Park is just a 15 minute walk from the city center. Ellis Park is already connected to the downtown via a series of parks including Joubert Park, Johannesburg's main park. This offers the city an unparalleled opportunity to bring thousands of people to the downtown, many for the first time in many years. Many people do not feel safe or comfortable downtown and therefore, the city needs to upgrade and rebrand the city center. Johannesburg needs to encourage local businesses to cater to the 2010 crowds and to provide spectators with the very best experiences. If people enjoy themselves and see that there is a reason to come downtown, then they may return in the future.



Image 3.13 | Ellis Park




Image 3.14 | Ellis Park Map

SA is wasting this opportunity to unify the urban landscape. This is especially so in Johannesburg where local organizers are spending billions on two stadiums and related transit and tourist infrastructure, but spending little to elevate the standard of living for the poor. Instead of unifying the built landscape, 2010 is exacerbating inequality and fragmentation in SA.

Despite promises that 2010 will leave a lasting legacy on the city, the stadium locations are not sited well and policies in the surrounding areas fail to entice new development patterns. Image 3.15 suggests an alternative future if stadiums were to be used more constructively. In this idealistic future, stadium locations are situated to invite new development in and around the central business district. In this case, development that typically occurred north of the downtown will be attracted to the higher land values around the new stadiums in the south. Johannesburg planners should develop mixed-use/mixed-income development to fill the land between Sandton and Soweto. This will begin to bridge the residual fragmentation between the people.




Image 3.15 | Johannesburg - (Possible) Futures<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Graphic created by author.

Building stadiums downtown can provide the ideal economic stimulus to the inner city. The billion-Rand Soccer City located across the road from Soweto demonstrates an obvious change from the apartheid days, which restricted Blacks to Soweto. Such investment will transform the southern portion of the city inviting new development to bridge the gap between Soweto and the downtown. Just east of the inner city, the revitalized Ellis Park will also contribute to the defragmentation of the city. It will serve as a bridge between the downtown and the fancy northern suburbs. These stadiums built in conjunction with attractive development incentives can revive and unify Johannesburg.

### 3.8.2 | Nelspruit's Mbombela Stadium

In rural communities, people need to see the benefits of the stadium immediately. Stadiums need to be more than just entertainment or business centers but city centers. Stadiums must be located in a central and convenient location and be designed to serve as a downtown anchor. The stadium should be located near the city center and must be carefully integrated into the city's development plans. The 2010 WC will put these smaller, lesser-known cities on the map, and therefore, their stadiums must be the focal point of the city.

Nelspruit, population 221,474, is the capital of Mpumalanga and the main gateway to Kruger National Park. It is the trading center for the smaller towns in Mpumalanga. Nelspruit is located 330 kilometers east of Johannesburg and 100 kilometers west of the Mozambique border. The city is a major stopover for visitors travelling to Kruger Park and serves as the major economic stimulator for the province. The 46,000 seat, R920 million, Mbombela Stadium is located six kilometers west of the city center. The roof supports are designed to resemble a giraffe, an apt symbol given the stadium's close proximity to Kruger. Visitors to Nelspruit will be able to watch a 2010 match on their way to Kruger. The precinct is designed to stimulate the development of a resort development to attract more visitors to the city for sports games and Kruger. The stadium is key to the development of a sports district with rugby and football fields. The stadium will also serve a dual role as a conference center. It is designed to stimulate job growth and encourage leisure and business tourism. "This venue will create the platform for people from all over SA and other parts of the world, to make the trip to Mbombela to share in a common passion in the form of sport and entertainment," said Mpumalanga Premier, Thabang Makwetla. With limited entertainment and business facilities, the new stadium will not only produce short-term construction jobs but encourage local economic growth.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> *Mbombela Sports Stadium Information*. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from Mbombela Stadium: [www.mbombelasportstadium.co.za/index.html](http://www.mbombelasportstadium.co.za/index.html).





Image 3.16 | Nelspruit Map



Image 3.17 | Mbombela Stadium

Notice that that the stadium stands like an island separate from the city of Nelspruit.

The Mbombela Stadium will become the focal point of the city. In anticipation for 2010, the Nelspruit city government built its new government headquarters on the outskirts of town near the new stadium as well as the Riverside mall, casino, hotel, and commercial complex. 2010 offered Nelspruit an opportunity to reinvest downtown and create a cohesive urban community; instead, the city is continuing its practice of abandoning the inner city and constructing a new civic center away from the unpleasant crime and grit downtown.<sup>38</sup>

### 3.9 | BUILDING COMMUNITY SPACES THROUGH FAN PARKS

Fan parks are integral to the success of 2010. SA will build fan parks in all host cities. Originally started in Germany in 2006, cities, independent of the LOC, organized fan parks or fan festivals to provide a place for fans to gather and celebrate while watching the game. These fan parks were so successful that FIFA insisted that SA commit to the idea. Fans who do not have tickets to games can still revel in the excitement watching all the action on a high definition big screen television in secure outdoor parks. Entrance is free to the parks. Six times as many people were in the fan parks at the 2006 WC as inside the stadiums.<sup>39</sup> Before 2006, host countries would discourage visitors from coming to the country if they did not have tickets. SA expects more than a million people to watch the matches in fan parks in each host city.<sup>40</sup> The fan parks also encourage people to stay longer even if they do not have tickets to many games. It elevates the spirit in the host country during the month-long event, providing a public space for everyone to party during the games. SA currently suffers from a significant lack of public space. If the parks are designed and developed with consideration for a lasting legacy, the additional public space can transform the city.

#### 3.9.1 | Germany's Fan Parks

In 2006, fan parks were scattered throughout public spaces in Berlin's city center. Berlin has experienced considerable and contentious redevelopment in the last decade, as the formerly divided city has tried to unify itself. Berlin, determined to use its hosting of the 2006 WC to boost civic consciousness and unity, developed a series of public urban spaces to revitalize the city and mobilize citizens and visitors. Events took place at more than twenty public spaces, which included streets, plazas, parks, and semi-public locations. In the aftermath of the event, Berlin used these parks to reduce divisions between city occupants. These spaces have been successful in both a social and economic revitalization of many forgotten areas of the city. Factors such as location, accessibility, and linkages with the urban fabric as well as the specific programming and media forms contributed to the widespread laudability of the parks.

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<sup>38</sup> Mabin, Alan. (2005). *Suburbs on the Veld, Modern and Postmodern*. Witwatersrand University (Johannesburg).

<sup>39</sup> Appel, M. (December 4, 2007). Fan Parks Fuel Local Business. *BuaNews* (Cape Town).

<sup>40</sup> Nevin, Tom. (October 2007). Fan Parks Will Attract One Million Visitors. *African Business*.

These parks facilitated a transformation in the public and private spaces during the WC and continue to have an impact on the social harmony of the city. Marie Selter and Theresa Golka in their article, *Learning from Berlin-The Soccer World Cup 2006 and its Impact on Public Space*, describe this transformation of public space for the 2006 WC. Since reunification, Berlin has been struggling to develop new public spaces and build unity between East- and West-Berliners. Selter and Golka explain that the parade of fan parks throughout Berlin created holistic unity between the stadium and different neighborhoods in the city. Berlin built a place where everyone could come together in support of the German team. This boosted civic consciousness and changed the way people interact with public space and with each other in public spaces.<sup>41</sup>



**Image 3.18 | 2006 German World Cup Fan Park**

*This 35,000m<sup>2</sup> fan park accommodated 10,000 fans between the hours of 2:30pm and midnight everyday of the event. Designers of the park tried to develop an equitable, cluster-free space. The park was also void of advertising. The success of fan parks in Germany, serving as the eleventh stadium made them popular with 2010 organizers.*

### 3.9.2 | South Africa Builds Fan Parks

Fan parks are particularly important and controversial in SA. High ticket prices have made entrance to the WC events prohibitive, pricing out most locals. The government and the LOC are mindful of creating an exclusive event while still acknowledging the need to demand high prices to repay the expenses. Although, fan parks generally are supposed to quell concerns that an elitist government is

<sup>41</sup> Selter, Marie and Theresa Golka. (2006). *Learning from Berlin-The Soccer World Cup 2006 and its Impact on Public Space. 2010 and the Life of the City*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

developing an elitist event, placing those without financial means to purchase seats outside the stadiums is reminiscent of previous apartheid practices. In essence, the government is welcoming everyone to the event, but formally separating spectators according to purchasing power. It is therefore imperative the fan parks leave a lasting legacy after the event, improving the community cohesion and general health and welfare.

Although there is consensus on the need and importance of fan parks, their location has been particularly controversial. Fan parks should be built in the townships to ensure that those with the least access are not excluded from the events. Fan parks will add greenery to dense townships. From a safety perspective, the density and informal networks may make it difficult to secure parks in the townships.

There has been some concern regarding security in the fan parks. High crime rates in SA and in general during international sporting events makes it difficult to guarantee the safety of people in the crowded, intoxicated parks. SA is therefore dispatching extra police to the fan parks to ensure that people are reveling safely. However, those cities that cannot afford additional police may have to cut back on the number of fan parks. Cape Town recently announced that tight budget constraints may result in fewer or smaller fan parks. Despite expanded police forces, there is still credible reason for cities to be concerned about protecting spectators in the fan parks.<sup>42</sup>


The construction of fan parks also poses a new challenge for city planners. Public space is all but nonexistent in SA, so each city must develop entirely new public spaces; if these parks are designed to be flexible and accommodating, they may change the way South Africans interact with the urban environment. Fan park designs should be useable after 2010. The typical design is a large open space just outside the stadium. But such spaces are hard to secure during the event and often remain vacant after the event. Some cities are also proposing smaller parks in the townships and scattered throughout the city and linking to a main fan park just outside the stadium. Cape Town for example is developing a number of smaller parks along a "Parade Route" from the hotel area through the downtown to the Green Point Stadium. These smaller parks are easier to secure during the WC and easier to adapt afterwards. Cape Town's plan weaves the fan parks through the city so as to be easily used by locals after 2010. The plan also integrates the fan parks into local business areas to encourage fans to spend locally.<sup>43</sup> Smaller cities like Polokwane are building fan parks that are much too large to be used by the local population after the event. Polokwane should consider developing its fan parks in a smaller, integrated manner, similar to Cape Town. Large, more sprawling cities like Johannesburg are having trouble determining where to place the fan parks and how best to weave them together. Designing parks in separate areas of the Johannesburg, placing one in Soweto and another in Sandton will homogenize the parks and reduce the possibilities for social integration. Cities should use the Cape Town plan as a model and develop fan

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<sup>42</sup> Appel, M. (November 21, 2007). 2010 Security Plan in Place. *BuaNews* (Cape Town).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

parks in a similar style. Reintroducing public space can provide a common ground needed to finally bridge the decades of divide and may ultimately leave the deepest impression of all the WC-related improvements on the city.



**Image 3.19 | Concept of Cape Town Fan Parks<sup>44</sup>**

*This concept drawing suggests an alternative to city planner's fan park designs. Cities are not developing complex fan parks systems to leave as a lasting legacy on city development. The brown parks are existing parks and the new suggested parks are marked in green. Public spaces can reunite the city and reintroduce green spaces.*

<sup>44</sup> Graphic created by author.

### 3.10 | THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

WC development can transform and unify South African cities, which have remained divided despite more than a decade of democracy. Although the apartheid policy restricting development patterns ended in 1994, planners have not yet unified the city. The same poor planning that limited the efficacy of previous development plans continues to fail in 2010 plans. Because of the scale and cost of stadium projects, they should have a lasting impact on the future of South African cities. Throughout the world, stadium projects have transformed neighborhoods and helped cities rejuvenate. Planning and urban design should be integrated into current WC stadium plans so as to maximize the possibilities for development. Time is running out; planners can still make minor changes to the sports developments that can have resonate throughout the city. If WC organizers do not actively use these stadium projects to unify the city, then these projects will not share the wealth throughout the city, instead exacerbating inequality.

## **CHAPTER 4**

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### **WORLD CUP CONFLICT**

The flames of racism, ignited by a minority at soccer matches cannot and must not be allowed to divide the family of football.<sup>1</sup>

- Tokyo Sexwale, *Businessman*

Everybody in the country should see themselves as participants, as contributors to this effort, to ensure we do indeed host a successful World Cup. All of us - business, trade unions, and everybody else should as a nation, treat it as a common project, a very important project.<sup>2</sup>

- Thabo Mbeki, *President of South Africa*

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<sup>1</sup> Sexwale, Tokyo (July 18, 2007). *Football Kept Us Alive*. Retrieved February 1, 2008, from FIFA: [www.fifa.com](http://www.fifa.com).

<sup>2</sup> President Thabo Mbeki told an independent newspaper in an interview at the South African Embassy in Berlin in July 9, 2006.

### 4.1 | CHALLENGES AHEAD

Poor planning has ignored public opinion and as a result conflict has arisen. Strict hosting deadlines make it difficult for government to listen to the needs of the people. This intense pressure has exacerbated conflict between city residents and city officials as well as between competing urban localities. Expensive and long-lasting stadium decisions must be made overnight and there is no time to carefully research the implications of these hasty decisions. The presence of squatters conflicts with the government's need to present a clean and organized city. The WC allows the central government to take a leading role in municipal and individual decisions. Such situations will inevitably cause conflict. Policymakers and social analysts must study and examine the way SA manages the event to determine the true efficacy of its democratic decisions. In this way, the WC is the first measure of South African democracy. This chapter will examine the ongoing conflicts between municipal and central governments and between cities and their people. By the conclusion, the reader will understand the inherent challenges of hasty development that test this budding democracy.

### 4.2 | EGREGIOUS EXPENSES

There is continued debate concerning the value of expensive infrastructure and the need to reduce expenses. Reducing the number of host cities may reduce costs but will keep the profits in fewer South African cities. As costs escalated, the LOC tried to reduce the number of host cities, but faced insurmountable opposition. No South African city wanted to give up the opportunity to host a WC match. Cities are eager to utilize the WC to gain national and international notoriety. New and improved infrastructure is an important lasting legacy of the event. It is also a way to disperse improvements throughout SA. The 2010 WC is almost entirely funded through public funds. In a country demanding improved health facilities, clean water, and electricity, public expenditures on five new stadiums seems profligate. The stadiums must therefore leave a lasting and meaningful legacy.

Football is the most popular sport in the country, but the decades of international isolation from sports left the industry without an opportunity to build proper stadiums. The LOC explains that a legacy of the event is the advancement of the sport. Investing in the development of football infrastructure is necessary, the LOC argues, to redress past imbalances. Danny Jordaan, Chief Executive Officer of the LOC, explains that the legacy of 2010 is more than just superior football facilities, but the emerging understanding that those facilities will be available to all South Africans.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *Legacy*. Retrieved September 11, 2007, from South Africa 2010 Government Website: [www.sa2010.gov.za/africa/legacy.php](http://www.sa2010.gov.za/africa/legacy.php).



Attendance at football matches is declining in SA. Stadium construction therefore seems like a waste of public funds. Labeling a stadium for a specific sport instead of sharing venues makes it even more difficult to fill the stadium. Originally, the LOC was planning to renovate existing rugby stadiums. LOC Chairperson Irvin Khoza explains that although other sports made their grounds available, the playing surfaces at most of these stadiums were not suitable for football. The issue becomes that it is difficult to keep the stadium from becoming a white elephant without developing some means of integrating the sports between stadiums.

Although most South Africans are excited for 2010, there is some mounting criticism of features of the stadiums projects. From a sports perspective, it is important for SA to have modern stadiums, but questions are mounting as to how the stadiums will be used after the event. Jacques Schippers of TotalGaz, who is coordinating energy procedures for the WC, said that "to increase or build new stadiums is not the way to go...for the month we host the World Cup they will be packed but when it's over, turnouts will drop again." The biggest problem he sees is that the South African football leagues are not "of the highest quality and the public would much rather sit at home and watch the English league on the pay channel than go out and watch their local sides play."<sup>4</sup> On average, the three major football clubs attract only a few hundred fans to each match. Although the sports clubs claim new stadiums will help the sport develop, given these attendance figures, it seems unlikely that the local clubs will fill these tremendous stadiums.<sup>5</sup>

Agencies bringing the WC to SA promise that despite enormous expenditures, the WC will bring economic benefits and prosperity to all South Africans. But actions taken in preparation for the WC suggest that this promised prosperity will not likely be felt by the majority of South Africans; instead, it will come to corporate investors and the tourism industry. The LOC has cited the 2006 German WC as well as previous WCs as the source for this expectation. However, financial gains are rarely experienced by developing countries that need to invest considerably in WC stadiums and related infrastructure. The profitability of this event and its impact on all socioeconomic levels in SA is therefore doubtful and considerable challenges lay ahead.

### **4.3 | DETERMINING STADIUM LOCATIONS**

#### **4.3.1 | Cape Town**

Contention between cities, their football leagues, and FIFA developed during the final stadium decisions. Football stadiums are central to the redevelopment of the city and can shape the direction of

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<sup>4</sup> I interviewed Jacques Schippers of TotalGaz in January 2008. She explained her perspective as an energy provider as well as her personal opinions on the stadiums.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

the city. To minimize costs, some cities are trying to modernize and repair existing stadiums, while other cities are building without concern for costs. The desire to curb escalating costs is mirrored by the desire to aid redevelopment strategies by placing stadiums in transitioning communities. FIFA requires host cities to demonstrate only "pleasant appearances" during the event which means that when selecting stadium locations, cities need to consider the skyline view of the city that will be filmed for the television audience. Internationally televised events cannot depict slums. FIFA has instructed SA that the locations of the stadiums must have picturesque settings.<sup>6</sup> Naturally, this has led to mounting tensions in the cities, particularly in Cape Town.<sup>7</sup>

The extensive debate in Cape Town during stadium selection illustrates the inherent contention in the planning process. The location of the stadium is the nucleus of Cape Town's redevelopment strategy. The stadium is the principally televised aspect of the city and therefore becomes the city's image. An attractive stadium will become the international image of Cape Town.

According to the Bid Book, the Newlands Stadium was to be the competition venue and Athlone Stadium was an additional practice venue.<sup>8</sup> Development opportunities were linked with Cape Town's Integrated Development Plan (IDP) which called for major development projects linked to the Athlone Nodal Plan, including the Klipfontein Corridor rapid transport system, completion of the Swartklip regional sports complex, the establishment of the Barcelona Green Belt, and the N2 Gateway Project with its integrated human settlement development. Cape Town preferred to host the 2010 matches in the Athlone Stadium, which would allow the city to fund stadium upgrades.<sup>9</sup> Having two internationally competitive stadiums would have boosted Cape Town's reputation as a sports city. But the Cape Town Football League suggested hosting 2010 at the Blue Downs Stadium, a 68,000-seat venue. Blue Downs is located in the Cape Flats Townships where football participation is more prevalent. The league considered this to be a more appropriate location given the extreme popularity of football within the townships, and assumed that having the stadium in the townships would ensure continued dedication to the sport. The league rejected the Athlone Stadium claiming that it was too difficult to expand the stadium to the needed size. FIFA rejected both the Blue Downs and the Athlone Stadiums as being located in an "unattractive location." FIFA also rejected the city's originally suggested Newlands Stadium arguing that it is too difficult to upgrade. Rebuilding the Green Point Stadium quickly became the only option. It was chosen for its

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<sup>6</sup> FIFA explicitly forbids cities from broadcasting cranes or other building sites in the city's skyline during the WC. Cities must rush to finish all the necessary construction before the event begins in 2010. SA agreed to these requirements before being awarded the event. Both FIFA and SA want to present footage of an impressive country.

<sup>7</sup> Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). *The Guardian* (London).

<sup>8</sup> Newland Stadium is located in an up-scale suburb of Cape Town, located at the foot of Table Mountain, where it could beautifully display the picturesque mountain for international television. The Newlands Stadium is a famous rugby and football venue recently upgraded for the 1995 Rugby WC and the 2003 Cricket WC.

<sup>9</sup> Athlone, built in 1971, has a capacity of 30,000, but was expected to be upgraded to seat 50,000. Renovations were expected to cost just R297 million for upgrades and the installation of modern communications technology. But its location along the football-loving Cape Flats made that impossible.

prime downtown location, its scenic surroundings, its ability to link with transportation infrastructure, and its capacity to seat 68,000 spectators.<sup>10</sup>



**Image 4.1 | Cape Town's Stadium Options**

*From right to left and top to bottom row: Athlone, Newlands, Green Point, and Blue Downs Stadium. Plans were made to demolish and rebuild the old Green Point Stadium instead of renovating the Athlone Stadium. This decision was made primarily based on location and the stadium's international image. Television viewers would see the poverty dominating South Africa when broadcasters panned out of the Athlone Stadium. Instead, television viewers will witness the picturesque Table Mountain and the natural splendors of Cape Town.*

FIFA pressured Cape Town to choose the Green Point Stadium citing the explicit rule forbidding cities from broadcasting informal housing and poverty. The Athlone Stadium, the Newlands Stadium, and

<sup>10</sup> Swart, Kamilla and Bob Urmilla. (2006). Soccer Stadium Venue Selection, City Selection City Legacies and the 2010 FIFA World Cup: A Case Study of Cape Town. *Cape Peninsula University of Technology and University of Kwazulu-Natal-Westville Campus.*

Blue Downs Stadium would have displayed the Cape Town Townships in the background. Instead, the city chose to demolish and rebuild the Green Point Stadium located in a predominately white, wealthy area near the downtown that conveniently displays Table Mountain in the background. The Johannesburg based, Mail & Guardian newspaper reported that a FIFA delegate said that Athlone, which is surrounded by low-cost and informal housing was not an appropriate site to host a billion dollar event. "A billion television viewers don't want to see shacks and poverty on this scale," he said. The Mail & Guardian explained that it was not just merely aesthetic motivations that led them to pursue the Green Point Stadium but its 20,000 extra seats will add millions of Rand in ticket revenue.<sup>11</sup>

Kamilla Swart and Bob Urmilla argue in their article, *Soccer Stadium Selection, City Selection, City Legacies and the 2010 FIFA World Cup: A Case Study of Cape Town* that perhaps Cape Town was too hasty in its decision to move the hosting from Newlands to Green Point calling it "short-sighted." Although Cape Town is facing increasing competition from other provinces for its tourists, the city still maintains dominance as the main tourist city with more than 80% of visitors coming to Cape Town. Swart and Urmilla argue that 2010's main impact is not the city's immediate economic gains due to 2010, but the reinforcement of the city as a place for future visitation.<sup>12</sup>

Who held the power in the Cape Town stadium debate? The conflict between the city and the league was ultimately dominated by FIFA who maintains taut control over all final decisions. FIFA retains strict regulations on the capacity and quality of all stadiums regardless of the long-term development goals associated with the city. In Cape Town, the city's Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is no longer congruent with the location of the stadium because FIFA determined the Athlone Stadium to be inadequate. FIFA's intervention may have lasting negative repercussions. With so much contention between the city and FIFA, there was no place for public input. Long after 2010, these stadiums will remain in the city as lasting memory of the event and therefore they should meet the long-term needs of the city and the IDP. Swart and Urmilla recommend that in the future host authorities and FIFA work together with central government agencies to avoid such complications. Decisions regarding infrastructural investment should ultimately be the decision of the city that will bear the consequences long after the event.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4.4 | TENSIONS MOUNT BETWEEN RESIDENTS AND THE CITY: SQUATTERS MAKE WAY FOR 2010

As the country prepares for the 2010 WC, many thousands of SA's poorest people face eviction from inner city suburbs and informal settlements. In order to fulfill the FIFA requirement to present only pleasantries, the government has proposed programming to clear all the informal settlements from the

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<sup>11</sup> Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). *The Guardian* (London).

<sup>12</sup> Swart and Urmilla 2006

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

cities by 2010. In its place, the government is promising to provide proper, permanent housing as a major legacy of 2010. Municipalities have developed comprehensive housing and city development strategies to eliminate the informal structures from cities.

Since the end of the restrictive housing policies in the 1990s, tension between the market forces and the constitutional rights of the poor has been growing. According to SA's 1996 constitution, all people are guaranteed the right to basic housing. Despite conflict, municipalities have continued to renovate their cities relying on the pervasiveness of the market. Market demand and growing privatization of the housing market has created conflict between the municipality and the people. Squatters, contesting their right to reside in informal settlements which they call home, have been ignored and marginalized in the courts. As a result, squatters are typically evicted to achieve a greater good like the 2010 WC.

#### 4.4.1 | Cape Flats Redevelopment

Work began in February 2005 in the Langa Township outside of Cape Town. Early grievances were quieted with promises of progress. The government claims that the multi-million rand N2 Gateway Project will benefit more than 100,000 squatters along the highway leading from Cape Town's International Airport into the city. A major bonus of hosting an event like WC is that municipalities are able to jettison infrastructure projects, bypassing the extensive bureaucracy typically associated with such a plan. However, there is insufficient time to gather public input. Nomaindia Mfeketo, Executive Mayor of Cape Town, supported the project saying that it will "bring quality housing to the poor of our City on a scale which has not been on the agenda before." Mark Julies of the Sobambisana Consortium, contractor on the project, explained the despite the expected 150-units per hectare density, the plan is create an urban environment consisting of open space, green space, semi-private space, and rainwater collection points. Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Housing, described the project as a "win-win for everyone in Cape Town," saying that inevitably in a project of this magnitude there will be dissent, but it is important to consider the greater good.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Van der Linde, Fidelia. (February 15, 2005). Housing Takes the High Road. *BuaNews* (Cape Town).




Image 4.2 | Informal Settlements in Cape Town's Townships<sup>15</sup>




Image 4.3 | New Buildings in Cape Town's Langa Townships<sup>16</sup>

*These nearly finished hostel-like residential buildings pictured above were built to replace the informal settlements in Image 4.2. Although at first glance these buildings seem like a considerable improvement, many residents are opposed to moving. These buildings are reminiscent of the hostels where men were housed when they originally came to the city to work. These hostels make people uneasy. The government built it thinking that this typology was familiar, but did not realize the negative connotation.*

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<sup>15</sup> Photo taken by author June 17, 2006

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

Despite government promises, interviews with residents in the Langa area in June 2006 revealed a growing cynicism.<sup>17</sup> The lack of public participation in the planning process has led to doubts about the long-term benefits of the project. Residents are distrustful of government policies in general and would prefer to live without government intervention. Field visits revealed an obvious need for improved service delivery, but residents seem to have acclimated and formed community ties. The government promised not to separate families or force them to move far from their current location. A laborer explained that he would not live in a house built by somebody else. Squatter settlements have developed in this area for many years without government intervention and many residents wonder why the government is intervening now. Although they remain excited for 2010, they think the country is embarrassed and want to hide them. In order to leave a lasting legacy, municipalities must gain the trust of the residents; otherwise, constant tension will blur the benefit of the redevelopment programs.

#### **4.4.2 | Johannesburg - Inner City Redevelopment**

Slum clearance is also occurring in Johannesburg. In 2001, Johannesburg launched its urban renewal plan to refurbish 235 “bad buildings” (namely apartment buildings and hotels) downtown. Since 2001, Johannesburg has evicted thousands of the poorest people from the downtown. Despite legal opposition from squatters, SA’s Supreme Court of Appeals allowed Johannesburg to evict 300 squatters from inner city buildings because the municipality classified them as unsafe. According to Johannesburg’s Inner City Regeneration Strategy, the elimination of such socioeconomic “sinkholes” is essential to increasing property values, raising private-sector investment, reducing crime, and the overall transformation of Johannesburg into an “African World Class City.” In accordance with this strategy, the council also introduced the Better Buildings Program which allows developers to take buildings that have extensive utility bills in exchange for rate rebates. The City claims it is trying to protect the needs of the city’s poor with the help of the Metro Evangelical Services and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless. Together, the once dilapidated Europa Hotel has been transformed into a low-cost, communal housing project.

In anticipation for the 2010 WC, the poor are being marginalized by the City and denied an adequate hearing before eviction. Underneath the rationale for the Court’s ruling is the realization that in order for SA to demonstrate pleasantries, the city must be free of squatters. Stuart Wilson of the Center for Applied Legal Studies in Johannesburg’s Witwatersrand University claims that the judge did not protect the squatters, instead exhibiting an arbitrary exercise of power. The squatters claim that because there is no clear strategy to provide them with adequate alternative accommodations, they cannot be evicted. Judge Louis Harms ruled that “the obligation of the occupiers to comply with that order is not

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<sup>17</sup> In June and July 2006, I informally met with and interviewed residents of the Cape Town Townships. Upgrades were already apparent and it became the subject of many conversations. Although some residents were optimistic the cynicism and mistrust of government intervention was apparent.

## WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

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dependent upon their being provided with alternative accommodation, even if the effect of complying with the order will be that they are left without access to adequate housing.” The Supreme Court of Appeal ordered the city to offer those evicted housing in a temporary settlement area. This ruling sets a precedence allowing other WC cities to clear the cities to make way for upgrades.

The Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) estimates that most of the 26,000 squatters living in the downtown area are not living in unsafe conditions. Jean du Plessis, Director of COHRE, called these practices a human rights violation.

These poor people choose to live in urban centers because they are located close to formal job opportunities or points of entry into the informal economy. They are themselves very often the victims of crime, unprotected by an under-resourced police force, rather than the criminals they are often made out to be. In the name of clearing these depressed areas, they are being forcibly evicted without any credible alternative housing or tenure options.

Many South Africans agree with COHRE’s response, claiming that the only way to make any money is to squat in the center city and save money on transportation. Nelson Khethani, a street vendor squatting downtown said, “To forcibly remove us from our homes and send us out of the city is like the racial segregation the apartheid regime used against us. We are not criminals—you can walk in here at 12 midnight and nothing will happen to you,” he said emphatically. “We have a building committee that controls who moves in and out, and we clean the building from top to bottom every Sunday ourselves.” Squatters like Khethani are asking the municipality to provide them with basic housing alternatives.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Poor Squatters Make Way for 2010 World Cup. (April 16, 2007). *United Nations: Integrated Regional Information Networks*.





**Image 4.4 | Squatters in Johannesburg Downtown Building<sup>19</sup>**

*This downtown building is officially vacant and long since abandoned but there is clearly evidence of squatting. Notice the curtain sheets covering the fenestration of the building to hide the number of people living in the building. FIFA and the South African government want images like this erased before 2010.*

#### 4.4.3 | Johannesburg - Ellis Park/Bertrams Redevelopment

Bertrams is a poor, decaying suburb just outside of the inner city, adjacent to the Ellis Park Stadium.<sup>20</sup> Bertrams currently houses plenty of unemployed squatters and illegal immigrants in dozens of dilapidated buildings. The neighborhood is essentially a no-go zone at night. Ismail Farouk, an artist and social development consultant, describes Bertrams as a poor neighborhood with considerable social problems including high unemployment, substance abuse, and xenophobia. "Rapid urbanization and transnational migration are both significant contributors to the ever increasing resident population who arrive in search of new economic opportunities. Yet, Bertrams seems to have little to offer global economies and has become a place of poverty. Bertrams has a history of displacement which dates back 80 years," says Farouk.<sup>21</sup>

The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) has identified Bertrams as part of the R2 million greater Ellis Park Precinct Upgrades in anticipation for 2010. The JDA intends to transform abandoned

<sup>19</sup> Photo taken by author June 30, 2006

<sup>20</sup> Bertrams is named after Robertson Fuller Bertram, a property developer who bought the area and developed into Johannesburg's oldest suburb in 1889.

<sup>21</sup> Gedye, Lloyd. (October 5, 2006). What World Cup? Cape Town: *Mail and Guardian*.

office buildings into affordable housing and develop viable retail, commercial, and entertainment venues. Lael Bethlehem, Chief Executive Officer of the JDA, says that the agency has been considering improving Bertrams for quite a while. The area has great potential for middle to low income housing because of its location near the downtown. Bethlehem says the 2010 WC is just the catalyst needed to get things moving. "2010 is a key moment and Bertrams must be ready by then. We don't want the area to look like it does now," says Bethlehem. "We would like to see quite an ambitious redevelopment of Bertrams." The JDA is offering tax breaks to investors that purchase property in Bertrams under the Urban Development Tax Incentive. Developers who construct new buildings in these areas will receive a 2% tax write-off in the first year, followed by a 5% annual write-off over 16 years. However, not all real estate agents are convinced that there will be a property boom in Bertrams. Safura Dangor of Dangor Property Services predicts that after the 2010 WC, things will go back to normal in Bertrams.<sup>22</sup>

Landlords have been returning to the buildings they previously abandoned and shamelessly evicting squatters so that they can profit from the anticipated increase in property values. Ismail Farouk accuses the JDA of not considering the needs of squatters in the buildings and just trying to profit from an increased tax base. Farouk warns that randomly evicting people is just pushing the issues "under the carpet." The JDA is "only interested in attracting new investment and have no interest in looking after the existing residents," says Farouk.<sup>23</sup>

These planning efforts seek to regenerate the city by ignoring the predominately poor population and the realities of the inner city. Claire Benit-Gbaffou raises the question, "The city, for whom?" in her writing, *In the Shadow of 2010*, in which she describes the redevelopment of the Ellis Park/Bertrams area. Benit-Gbaffou explains that while gentrification is necessary to stop urban decay, forced diversification targets the poor as undesirable residents. The City Councilor of the Ellis Park neighborhood said, "We need to remove these people, allocate them somewhere else. In the city we only need people who are able to pay. When we develop the city we'll make it expensive. There is no other way... You cannot stay in the city if you are not working." Benit-Gbaffou blames the JDA for not exerting its dominance over private investors and protecting the rights of low-income residents. The danger of fast tracking redevelopment projects of this nature is the temptation for the city to assert an authoritarian control over the powerless low-income community by ignoring public needs. She cautions the city not to take the easiest route to transform the city, but to try to develop a sustainable vision for the city by carefully consulting all the relevant stakeholders. Overall, the city's redevelopment strategy lacks a clear and coordinate vision. The Court's verdict upholding the City's and ultimately the 2010 redevelopment plan demonstrates the overt exclusion of current residents from the city's 2010 planning.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Benit-Gbaffou, Claire. (2006). *The City for Whom? The World Cup, Decision-Making Processes and the Poor in Inner City Johannesburg*. Johannesburg: Urban, Rural, and Economic Development, Human Sciences Research Council, University of Witwatersrand.

Ismail Farouk explains that these neighborhood regeneration programs need to highlight community-based, social and cultural programs instead of working against them. In order for the redevelopment to be successful, the city needs to upgrade the existing social infrastructure and develop new community facilities. There are very few social and recreational facilities. This limits the development of community and prevents the ostracized residents from having a voice. Businesses need to be community-led enterprises based in the Bertrams neighborhood, employing Bertrams residents. This will deliver local investment most directly. Farouk advocates that urban management interventions such as business-improvement districts will have the most potential to boost the local economy.<sup>25</sup>

Conflict is escalating as SA enters the global arena in 2010. SA's competitiveness in the global market is jeopardized by the informal housing. Ignoring constitutionality, South African cities have agreed to free the city of informal settlements by 2010 in order to welcome sports fans. Marie Huchzermeyer, professor at the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, writes in *The Struggle for In Situ Upgrading of Informal Settlements* that despite SA's desire to impress the world market in 2010, it must still be sensitive to the needs of its people. This global competition must be subordinate to the demands of dwellers. Rather, 2010 should be seen as a long overdue call for increased sensitivity to the needs of the informal settlers and the failures of the market policies. 2010 calls for extensive reform to the urban planning policies shaping the city and served as a tool with which to revive South African cities.<sup>26</sup>

Tensions are mounting because of conflicts with SA's interpretation of squatting. People settle informally on opportune, undeveloped land located near employment centers. Although, these informal settlements lack adequate amenities, South African cities have ignored them, violating the squatters' constitutional right to these basic services. Issues are only mounting now because the international audiences will pass the settlements in 2010 and see the failures of the new democracy. Rather than understanding the rationale for the informal settlement, cities are simply removing the settlements.<sup>27</sup> Such harsh controls resonate more with the old Afrikaaner government than with the socialistic ANC. Instead of just clearing the settlements, the government should recognize the informality as a process that can positively shape the city.

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<sup>25</sup> Farouk, Ismail. (September 4, 2006). Bertrams Neighborhood: Challenges for Development. *2010 and the Life of the City*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

<sup>26</sup> Huchzermeyer, Marie. (October 9, 2006). *The Struggle for In Situ Upgrading of Informal Settlements: Case studies from Gauteng*. University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

### 4.4.4 | Kwazulu-Natal Redevelopment

Similar housing development is also occurring in the Kwazulu-Natal. In Kwazulu-Natal, the government is planning to spend R1.4 billion eradicating slums in the townships where football training camps are expected to be held.<sup>28</sup> Kwazi Mbanjwa, Director General of Kwazulu-Natal, announced that more than half of the funding for slum improvements will go towards demolition.<sup>29</sup> Monica Mjuqu, a shack dweller at KwaMyandu, rationalized the government's actions saying that the government did not want visiting tourists to see that millions were being spent on a single event while the majority of the country still lived in poverty. "They are just ashamed of us and want us out of the way so that visitors coming to the country won't see the conditions we live under," said Mjuqu. Although the government explains that the timely upgrades were planned for a while but funding was only recently allocated. The government argues that plans for 2010 include billions in investment to upgrade many different aspects of South African cities including slum clearance. "The issue of slums being removed was there, even before it was announced that SA would host 2010. The 2010 WC will not happen in isolation, it will go hand in hand with service delivery," said Mandla Msomi, Kwazulu-Natal's provincial government spokesperson. "The issue of providing housing to those living in slums has always been there, but we have had to prioritize certain areas due to the World Cup." Nomfundo Mcetywa describes the government's actions as an attempt to "hide the shame of poverty."<sup>30</sup>

### 4.5 | TRANSPORTATION UPGRADES

Upgrades to public transportation are causing conflict because transportation infrastructure is costly and its location contentious. Cities lack a formal mass transit system, relying on the informal minibus taxis to transport people to and fro daily. South African cities are inwardly radial with all roads leading to the inner city. Minibuses must therefore take passengers into the inner city where they typically transfer to another minibus to travel onward. This system makes it difficult for riders to travel between townships. Likewise, there are virtually no taxis after 7pm thus confining the poor who typically do not own personal vehicles, to the dilapidated townships in the evenings. An efficient, reliable, and flexible transportation system can mobilize the country facilitating movement between townships even after dark.

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<sup>28</sup> Mahlangu, L. (September 4, 2007). Tshwane Uses 2010 to Fuel Township Development. Retrieved January 15, 2008, from 2010 World Cup Homepage: [www.sa2010.gov.za/news/070904tshwane.php](http://www.sa2010.gov.za/news/070904tshwane.php).

<sup>29</sup> Of the R1.4 billion, R121 million will be used to clear the shacks with only R112 going to rebuild housing development, and the remaining R1.2 billion spent upgrading the substandard hostels around Durban. The unequal distribution of funding contributes to growing tensions.

<sup>30</sup> Mcetywa, N. (November 11, 2007). Hiding the Shame of Poverty for 2010. *The Sunday Tribune* (Johannesburg).

#### 4.5.1 | Building the Gautrain

The Gautrain is an 80-kilometer, rapid transit railway system that will link Johannesburg, Pretoria, the Johannesburg International Airport, and Sandton. It will alleviate traffic on the congested roads in Johannesburg and Pretoria, and offer a public transportation option. It is the most expensive non-stadium project being built in anticipation for 2010 and one of the largest public-private partnerships in Africa. The train is expected to directly and indirectly expected to create 93,000 new jobs during construction with another 3,000 expected for operation of the train. Investors are already building new office blocks, shopping malls, entertainment, and residential developments along the train line. By the time the WC opens, the airport, Sandton, and Midrand stations are expected to be complete. By 2010, the Gautrain is expected to carry 135,000 passenger trips per day at a cost of R40 per ride, reducing the number of cars on the N1 highway, the major highway connecting Johannesburg and Pretoria by 20%. By 2011, the system will connect Sandton to Soweto.<sup>31</sup>


Much of the criticism around the Gautrain is concern about cost. COSATU has branded the Gautrain a "train for the rich." When it was first proposed in 2002, the anticipated cost was between R3.5 and R4 billion. A year later, after the completion of the Environmental Impact Assessment, the costs were increased to R7 billion. In 2005 when the construction company was finally selected, it was expected to cost R24 billion, with at least R7.1 billion coming from the central government. The Gautrain is the largest and most expensive transportation project ever proposed monopolizing central government funding typically shared amongst the provinces and municipalities. The Gautrain was never publicly debated and as a result, there is constant debate over the viability and practicality of the train.<sup>32</sup>

Critics also point out that ridership levels may have been inflated. Existing public transportation systems are underfunded and relatively underutilized, leading skeptics to doubt the Gautrain will be any more popular. High crime rates in the area and limited connections at train stations will certainly deter riders.<sup>33</sup> Tickets prices at R40 per ride are also prohibitive for low-income South Africans who may pay just R5 for a ride in a minibus taxi. Critics suggested a bus rapid transit system which can achieve similar levels of service at a fraction of the cost.

<sup>31</sup> Celean, Jacobson. (November 27, 2005). No Reversing Gautrain. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg).

<sup>32</sup> Cox, Anna. (November 1, 2005). Shilowa's R20bn Silence. *The Star* (Johannesburg).

<sup>33</sup> Interviews with residents of Johannesburg and Pretoria confirm this assumption that high crime rates will deter riders. For twenty years, trains have been a place for violence with people randomly setting trains on fire or holding the entire train at gunpoint. As a result, people in Gauteng are afraid and are not likely to use the train.



**Image 4.5 | Gautrain Route Map**

*Ten stations have been identified already. Most of these stations are located in wealthy areas of the city confirming the assumption that the train is for the rich. It also confirms the doubts regarding ridership since wealthier people are not likely to use the Gautrain.*

#### 4.5.2 | Reforming the Minibuses

There is also controversy and conflict over the increased regulation of the minibus taxi industry. The minibus taxis were an entrepreneurial venture developed by enterprising Black South Africans in resistance to apartheid. Essentially trapped in distant townships, many Black workers travel tremendous distances to work daily. The taxis provided people with a more direct, cheaper alternative to the national bus transportation system. Today it is a multi-billion Rand industry carrying more than 60% of daily commuters.<sup>34</sup> The 15-seat minibuses are dangerous and not roadworthy. Minibus drivers are known for having disregard for the rules of road and overloading the vehicles with passengers to increase revenue. Since the national deregulation in 1987, the industry has become incredibly corrupt and dangerous. Drivers have formed mafia-like associations which engage in anything from price-fixing to lucrative routes to gang warfare. It is common for taxi drivers to carry guns to shoot rival drivers and their passengers.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Sekhonyane, Makubetse and Jackie Dugard. (December 2004). A Violent Legacy: The Taxi Industry and Government at Loggerheads. *SA Crime Quarterly*. 10: 13-18.

<sup>35</sup> Dugard, Jackie. (May 2001). From Low Intensity War to Mafia War: Taxi Violence in South Africa (1987-2000). *Violence and Transition*, Series 4.

In 2000, the central government passed the National Land Transport Transition Act to formalize and regulate the taxi industry. This legislation has hit years of roadblocks and eight years later, very little regulation has actualized. With 2010 just around the corner, the government must act to guarantee the safety and efficiency of the transportation system. The Act calls to replace the 15-seat minibuses with 18- and 35-seat buses. The government has heard little from the taxi drivers themselves who have been unable to form a cohesive association to speak on their behalf. As a result, there has been disagreement as to the nature of regulation. Unemployment is a particular concern; drivers are concerned that larger buses mean fewer buses and fewer drivers. Researchers have tried to study prospective job losses, but threatened with violence, the team abandoned the research. The central government has set a goal to repair or replace 80% of the 1400 vehicle fleet by 2010. Given the considerable unrest, possibility for violence, and lack of public input or professional, reliable research, this goal is largely unachieved and dangerous.<sup>36</sup>

#### **4.6 | GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES**

Despite egregious costs and continued conflict, 2010 still fails to deliver basic services to South Africans. For the most part this results because SA's government lacks coordinating mechanisms within the management structure to organize national, provincial, and local institutions.

##### **4.6.1 | Power Failures**

In January 2008, South Africans experienced massive, widespread rolling blackouts, as supply fell behind demand, which threatened to destabilize the national grid. President Thabo Mbeki admitted that the privatization efforts were a mistake that was now adversely affecting the South African economy.<sup>37</sup> The Department of Public Enterprises declared these blackouts a national emergency when the mines could no longer function. Rolling blackouts are creating conflict between the national agenda and the country's WC responsibilities. The government admitted that the energy crisis would threaten the 2010 WC. Electricity generation continues to be limited because SA overstretched its resources promising to build so many new stadiums.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Taxi Recapitalization Program, South Africa. (March 19, 2007). *Engineering News*.

<sup>37</sup> Economists predict that the energy crisis has downgraded the GDP growth from the expected 6% to 4%. Global platinum prices hit record highs as mines were shut down during the power crisis. Mining companies estimate that the reduced mining capacity has severely downgraded the South African currency.

<sup>38</sup> *Power Outages Roil South Africa: The Country's Gold Mining Industry Struggles with Insufficient Power Supply*. (January 29, 2008). Retrieved April 28, 2008 from CNN Money: [www.cnnmoney.com](http://www.cnnmoney.com).

This energy crisis is not new but the government's continued insufficient response has slowed needed infrastructure upgrades. In the late 1990s, the South African government attempted to privatize the national power company, Eskom. When those attempts failed, the government denied Eskom's budget request. The Sunday Times based in Johannesburg reported that, "electricity supplies remain erratic, especially during the winter months of June and July, while visitors to Johannesburg's international airport can find themselves stuck for over an hour to have their passports stamped on entry." In response, Eskom tried to curb energy demand by initiated a series of rolling blackouts in Johannesburg. But despite efforts, the Department of Public Enterprise revealed that usage increased 4.3% in 2007. The power outages challenge the nation's ability to meet its targeted 6% growth rate in the years preceding 2010. Econometrix, a South African company that provides economic analysis, said that job creation will be slowed because of outages and "the ability to reduce inequality between rich and poor will take longer to achieve."<sup>39</sup>

### 4.6.2 | Insufficient Provision of Water

According to the South African constitution every person has the right to clean water. Still, surveys show that municipalities are failing to deliver the promised water and about 50 percent of South Africans live without the basic amount of free water. In SA, basic water is defined as 25 liters per person per day accessible within 200 meters of the home. Although SA is not water rich, it has not yet reached first order water scarcities; rather SA suffers from second order water scarcity, i.e., while there is sufficient water for everyone in SA, it is not allocated equitably. The delivery of water has been insufficient. Poor people suffer from what they consider to be high costs for what should be free. The system in which the municipality offers to relieve individual's water debt is not sufficient. People are outraged by government's continued failure to provide basic water as is required by the Constitution. Crowds have mobilized in various forms of protest including demanding that politicians halt privatization efforts. Frustrated crowds have been known to disconnect power and water from politician's homes.<sup>40</sup>

The privatization of water has been an incredibly contentious policy. The government has allowed private companies to deliver water for a fee, selling this basic human need, just like any other commodity sold on the free market. Water delivery companies promised to bring fresh domestic water to all households but now all households would need to pay a fee for the company to recover the costs of installing pipes. Those utilities that remained public were forced to reduce subsidies and operate like private businesses. Some cities simply turned their water utilities over to large water corporations in France and Germany. This system of "Water for Profit" is new. Most people had never considered the

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Carty, B. (February 9, 2003. Whose Hand on the Tap? Water Privatization in South Africa. *CBC Radio* (Cape Town).



concept of paying for water and when the water bills showed up, people ignored them. Most could not afford to pay for services that had once been free. To remedy this situation, the water utilities forced people to pay before they got the water. This has caused immeasurably sickness and death. Many people could not afford to pay and therefore live without access to fresh water. In 2000, thousands of people could not afford the newly raised water tariffs and as a result turned to other sources of water. Since most of SA's surface water is not suitable for consumption, SA experienced one of the largest cholera outbreaks in recent history.<sup>41</sup>

#### 4.7 | WHO HOLDS THE POWER?

Poor planning has caused conflict: local versus national governments, city versus city, rich versus poor, all versus some, FIFA versus host country, White versus Black, and WC spending versus basic needs. These conflicts have manifested as budgetary, bureaucracy, redevelopment, housing, utilities, and transport. Public participation is sorely lacking. In his article, *A Spatial Model of Authority-Dependency Relations in South Africa*, Charles Schmidt writes that only through cooperation can spatial integration be achieved. Building upon Schmidt's ideas, Njabulo Ndebele, Vice-Chancellor at the University of Cape Town, writes, "We have to develop a clearer vision of the type of communities we want before the next world event holds any emergent vision hostage to its glitter. Otherwise, it will come and go, abandoning us to our nightmares..."<sup>42</sup> SA needs to develop a strategy for ensuring sustainable dialogue between all sectors of the city bringing all the stakeholders together to develop and support a strategy for unifying the city. Strong commitment from politicians and business leaders to integrate community input into city planning is essential. 2010 calls the democratic process into question by demonstrating the apparent controversies and unrest evident in SA. It forces cities to ask themselves what is the best development scheme. Cities see 2010 as a chance to jettison infrastructure projects and transform the city by procuring funding from the central government. By contrast, the central government sees the WC as a chance to attract international investment and tourism. The people stand in the way of government action demanding beneficial development projects.

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<sup>41</sup> During the apartheid era, the ANC told the people living in the townships not to pay for their utilities because this will fund the White government. This culture of non-payment has contributed to this thirsty situation in many townships. When the ANC government started allowing private companies to charge for the water, they needed to explain to the township residents that now you have to pay for the utilities. Rationalizing the privation in this manner is not entirely accurate. Yves Picaud, the managing director of Vivendi Water in SA explains that people in the townships stop paying for water when the cost exceeds five percent of their income. In SA, the average township resident pays more than 20% of his income for water. It is just viable for the people to pay for privatization. (Carty 2003)

<sup>42</sup> Ndebele, Njabulo. (June 26, 2007). Bringing Township Life into Urban Embrace. *Cape Argus* (Cape Town).



## CHAPTER 5

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### LEARNING FROM 2010

This is not a dream. It is a practical policy...the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to [the] African renaissance...We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa's time has come.<sup>1</sup>

- *Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa*

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<sup>1</sup> President Thabo Mbeki speaking to Sepp Blatter at the 2004 WC dedication ceremony. *African Legacy*. Retrieved April 24, 2008, from SA2010: [www.sa2010.gov.za](http://www.sa2010.gov.za).


**5.1 | LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA**

Megaevents like the 2010 WC can generate economic investment, enhance international branding, and improve the built environment. Unfortunately, FIFA, the LOC, and South African planners missed this opportunity to redevelop and unify the city. Event organizers failed to recognize the possibilities for 2010 and as a result this is a wasted opportunity. The 2010 SA WC will probably be financially and promotionally successful. But because of poor planning, strict FIFA guidelines, SA's unique challenges, and resulting community conflict, World Cup development is not likely to create new spatial patterns; instead of repairing the divisions within the city, 2010 development is augmenting wealth in certain areas of the city through expensive sports stadiums without upgrading other neighborhoods. Instead of unifying the city, stadiums are increasing the social, economic, and spatial divide. Even so, hosting a WC is unprecedented opportunity for SA to improve its international image and elevate the football sport.

South Africans planners should develop an integrated 2010 legacy that highlights the advantages of the 2010 WC. The lasting legacy for cities varies depending on each city's investment to meet its distinct challenges. A good 2010 WC legacy can be any number of things, ranging from a commitment between government officials and the community to work collaboratively on WC projects and future development projects to a set of strategic actions that will unify the fragmented city. But the most successful 2010 legacy must be holistic and include changes to aspects of SA's infrastructure (stadiums and transportation), economic (international investment and job growth), environmental (city beautification and environmental remediation), sports (competitive sports teams and improved commercialization), and social (community revitalization and national pride) sectors. Nationalism has been used as the rhetoric for a lasting legacy since improvements in any of the five sectors would develop national pride. Eliminating any of these areas limits the efficacy of 2010's legacy projects.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> It is important to understand the differences between the Olympics and the WC. The Olympics is held in a single city while the WC is held across at least nine cities in a country. The enormous scale of the WC makes it incredibly challenging. Even developed host countries have difficulty providing sufficient sports facilities in so many cities. Unlike the Olympics, WC host cities do not build elaborate athlete housing. Infrastructure tends to focus only on stadiums. It was difficult for local organizers to create a significant lasting legacy in so many cities.



**Image 5.1 | Lasting Legacy of 2010 World Cup<sup>3</sup>**

Discussions over the lasting legacy tend to focus on the physical transformation of the city, but the lasting legacy can also be a change in the development dialogue. The lasting legacy of the 2010 WC can be more than just upgraded stadiums and new road connections; it should create an entirely new way of thinking about the city, municipal government, and the possibilities for SA.

Despite these criticisms of 2010 WC planning, there is also considerable success. The very fact that SA will host the 2010 WC will impress the world and demonstrates incredible achievement. By 2010, SA will have more stadium seats than any other country in Africa. SA will have upgraded five stadiums and built five new stadiums. Infrastructure across the country and in nine cities will be improved. SA is using the 2010 WC to experiment with new security procedures and expand its police force. A renewed attention to public parks can bridge the social divide. Cities will have new train networks and housing as well as an enhanced national and international status. International sponsorship is estimated to exceed all previous WC events; such substantial investment demonstrates international support for the South African government and its policies, and will likely continue years after the WC. Annual tourism is increasing in the years leading up to 2010 demonstrating a renewed interest in SA globally; this interest will continue to increase after the WC as well. South Africans are very excited to be hosting the WC. They are developing local entrepreneurship and merchandise. Hosting the 2010 WC will elevate the status of South African football as well. All this enthusiasm is important as SA tackles development hurdles.

<sup>3</sup> Image designed and developed by author.

There are important lessons learned from SA's mistakes. Future WC hosts should learn how to improve international image, spend cautiously, use stadium development to improve the city, and invite public participation.

### **5.1.1 | Improve International Image**

Despite criticisms of SA's 2010 planning, the elusive benefits of identity formation and national pride are the greatest benefits of hosting the 2010 WC. 2010 provides SA with an opportunity to rebrand globally. If the 2010 WC fails to provide positive economic returns, it will still provide a tremendous boost to the country's international image. People who have very little knowledge of SA will learn a great deal about the country just from watching the television cameras broadcast the city skyline. Such international recognition is even more important for a developing country which may not receive much international media without the event. Such a positive legacy cannot be achieved without such an international event.

The WC will demonstrate the attributes of cities previously ignored internationally. New branding may bring new residents to cities that were previously overlooked. For example, most immigrants tend to move to Johannesburg expecting that the largest city has the most likelihood of needing laborers, but with the considerable availability of work in smaller cities such as Polokwane, immigrants may move elsewhere. Internationally, people may choose Port Elizabeth over more popular and expensive vacation destinations such as Cape Town after seeing the city's attributes during the WC.

International sporting events also offer the host country a chance to improve their sports competitiveness. When the US was awarded the WC in 1994, it created a national football league. Likewise, SA is also using the 2010 WC as a chance to increase the competitiveness of its football league. This is one of the greatest legacies.

### **5.1.2 | Spend Cautiously**

International sporting events like the FIFA WC are increasingly sought after commodities for their capacity to expedite development goals. Instead of aiding developing countries, the rash commercialization of these sporting events can leave enormous debt and disappointment in their wake.

Cities are fraught with actualizing these promises and developing the best possible outcomes by building the infrastructure while managing expenditure commitments. Cities must manage misconceptions and misrepresentations and develop the best possible outcome that does not damage the national image or economy. During this process, capital is diverted to less productive uses such as stadium upgrades,


without contributing to economic growth. Although stadium development can be linked to social and economic development, such legacies are not common and can only be achieved through good design and community collaboration. During the years preceding international sporting events, there is no accountability for wasting funds. Corruption, greed, and corporatization can take control of city development. Host countries must careful not to overspend on short-term sports projects.

South African WC organizers assumed that in order to impress international audiences they must develop impressive sport-related infrastructure. But SA is more innovative and could have been the first host country not to succumb to worldwide demands for impressive stadiums, instead using the influx of funding to advance national development goals. By cutting costs on stadium development a few million, SA could have provided adequate housing to all citizens. That would have been an impressive legacy that would have earned world recognition and improved the national image.

### **5.1.3 | Use Stadium Development to Improve the City**

South African cities are facing immense problems emanating from the legacy of apartheid which places the country in an unusual position as both a developed and a developing country. The South African city has been shaped by fear, poverty, inequality, violence, and remains divided according to race and class. Increased violence and subsequent fear has hijacked the socialist promises and turned the post-apartheid city into the fragmented city. In spite of increased opportunities, economic investment meant to eviscerate past injustices has led to increased poverty and inequality. There is an overall lack of effective government management and accountability limiting the efficacy of local initiatives.

Poor design is a key failure in 2010 planning. Good design can help host cities utilize the construction of a new sports venue to transform the city. The way the stadium is situated on the site, the aesthetic features of the buildings, and the surrounding public spaces, contribute to the success of a new stadium. Designers should consider these design features in order jumpstart nearby investment and leave a lasting legacy of unity in the city.



**Image 5.2 | Cycle of Fragmentation<sup>4</sup>**

*Image 5.2 depicts the Cycle of Fragmentation. First, SA develops new initiatives to address equity and integration in preparation for the 2010 WC. Next, the government focuses on urban upgrading and infill development that contribute solely to an infrastructure legacy but ignore the other aspects of the legacy such as social integration. 2010 infrastructure investments reduce spending in previously advantage communities which in turn causes the wealthier areas to privatize which also removes funding for the upgrades from city coffers. As a result, infrastructure upgrades are not completed as planned and conditions in poor areas worsen, thus exacerbating the urban fragmentation. In order to avoid this cycle, SA must develop a comprehensive approach to solving the inequality and fragmentation in the city.*

#### 5.1.4 | Invite Public Participation

What is most amazing about the SA WC is the universal excitement in anticipation of 2010. South Africans are concerned with WC development and want to ensure that the world is impressed with SA in 2010. South Africans are huge football fans and as 2010 approaches, commonality is increasing. Generally, camaraderie can be sustained by national support in anticipation of 2010. This social cohesion can make it easier to plan pleasing projects, but it can also be overly dominant and restrict distinctions. Planners must balance these obstacles and use them to change the status quo, not force unnatural changes. WC conflict can be avoided if planners work with the local community and invite public participation; the city's development prospects are enhanced by active citizen participation. If people can work together in anticipation for 2010 then this may change the natural inertia to avoid community input. Strict deadlines conflict with urban development needs; decisions must be made quickly and there is not

<sup>4</sup> Image designed and developed by author.



time to gather public input. In this manner, 2010 is a paradox. The 2010 WC is supposed to be a chance for SA to flaunt a decade of democracy but by hastening construction projects to impress the world, SA is challenging the nature of democracy at home. Despite failures in the planning process, there is no public outcry not to host the WC, just requests to have greater legacy on South African cities.

## 5.2 | LESSONS FOR FIFA

Planners and developers are not entirely to blame for the missed opportunities; FIFA should require planning studies, economic impact studies, and public input, and ensure that FIFA requirements mirror the country's development demands. In this instance, FIFA requirements failed to recognize the possibilities for the 2010 WC. Strict FIFA regulations insisting that the 2010 WC be like previous WCs hosted by wealthier countries, limited the efficacy of 2010 development goals. SA is unlike any previous WC host country and should therefore have different hosting requirements. Hosting the WC in nine cities makes it difficult to leave a lasting legacy in any city. If FIFA permitted SA to host the WC in fewer than the required nine cities, planners could have used funds more constructively to make a more significant impact on fewer cities. FIFA should have required SA do more than just generate income during 2010, but consider the lasting legacy on the built environment. Although FIFA is not responsible for the wasted opportunities, it should have adjusted hosting requirements to suit the needs of South African development.

FIFA requirements should also include a clause necessitating public participation in WC designs. WC hosting opportunities should also be awarded earlier to help countries facilitate this obligation. Considerable conflict has erupted in the absence of public opinion in WC activities. South African democracy is challenged by the blatant absence of public input in the development process. In fact, the public should have its own representation (separate from other politicians) on the WC committee to ensure adequate voice.

In future WCs, FIFA should invite local planners to help develop the WC. The LOC is not the appropriate entity to be overseeing national planning efforts. The LOC is the agency responsible for organizing the 2010 WC. It is composed of representatives of the sports, government, and business sectors; they are not planners and are therefore not demanding that 2010 projects improve urban futures. Physically, the LOC is based in Johannesburg and is not capable of managing projects nationwide. The LOC does not know the best means for jumpstarting the local economy in Polokwane or how to improve access to the waterfront in Port Elizabeth. Instead of hiring staff that could plan such complicated projects, the LOC is focused on the ephemeral success of the event in 2010. Although officially, all development projects are part of an Integrated Development Plan (IDP), the IDP does not necessarily reflect the most pressing local demands. Therefore, development projects are scattered without a holistic

or integrated approach to improve the city. The mission of the LOC is to develop a successful WC event, not to improve urban futures. The agency is not accountable to the public for insufficient planning. Speaking about preparing for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA official Michael Palmer said, "When organizing an event, people need to identify their city's priorities. City priorities differ; what Joburg wants to achieve will not be the same as Cape Town," he said.<sup>5</sup> 2010 should not be a success for city redevelopment, but a reexamination of the people's priorities as a means of evaluating the success of democracy. This will ensure a lasting legacy.

### 5.3 | LESSONS FOR FUTURE WORLD CUP HOSTS

Megaevents like the WC offer extraordinary promise for economic investment, image enhancement, and city improvement. Although SA has not maximized the potential of the 2010 WC, it is still a great opportunity that will continue to provide positive returns years after the event. Even the more intangible benefits such as international recognition provide sufficient returns on the investment. Despite SA's failings, developing countries should still compete for international hosting opportunities like the WC. Potential 2010 disappointments provide valuable lessons for future WC planners and particularly for organizers from developing countries. The achievements and mistakes of the 2010 SA WC are of particular importance to organizers for the 2014 Brazil WC who should also use the WC to advance city development goals.

Megaevents should generate economic investment. Too often, WC investment goes primarily to the wealthy investors and corporations. Too often, WC-related investment increases wealth for the rich and exacerbates the financial inequalities in the host country. Brazilian planners should improve on South African economic initiatives to ensure that WC investment filters through to all Brazilians, by creating additional opportunities for local, independent merchandizing. Although WCs typically create thousands of jobs, the majority of these jobs are short-term jobs in the construction and tourism industry, and few of these jobs will remain after the WC concludes. Brazil should be mindful to ensure that WC investment creates permanent jobs.

Perhaps the most important lesson for Brazil and future WC host countries is to use the hosting opportunity to hasten development goals. Infrastructure design is a key challenge for future WC host countries. SA did not employ city planners and a result, urban design is absent from WC infrastructure. Simple features like stadium orientation, stadium materials, surrounding public spaces, parking lot layout, and highway connections can enhance the future viability of the stadiums. Brazil should hire urban

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<sup>5</sup> Sindane, Lucky. (September 7, 2006). *2010's Impact on the City Investigated: Speakers from Various Sectors Took Part in a Colloquium to Address Ways of Ensuring Johannesburg Gets Maximum, Sustained Mileage Out of 2010 World Cup*. Retrieved March 3, 2008, from Joburg News: [www.joburgnews.co.za/2006/sep/sep7\\_colloquium.stm](http://www.joburgnews.co.za/2006/sep/sep7_colloquium.stm).


designers to improve stadium designs to maximize the potential for stadiums to generate long-term positive impacts on the city.

Brazil should learn lessons from 2010. In particular, Brazil should pay attention to the public outcry over 2010 development decisions and ensure that it listens to the needs of the people for 2014. Likewise, FIFA should change the hosting requirements for Brazil allowing it to host in fewer cities so as to ensure a greater impact. FIFA can facilitate a renewed focus on urban planning and help Brazil to use WC-related infrastructure to improve the public realm. Like SA, Brazil will benefit significantly from an improved international image. Even if the megaevent does not provide Brazil with anticipated financial gains or city improvements, it will help the world remember the country.

Megaevents like the 2010 WC offer extraordinary promise and possibility. Both developed and developing countries should compete for international hosting opportunities like the WC. In particular, developing countries should use international sporting events as a chance to advance local development goals, but must remain mindful that WC hosting responsibilities mirror local development goals and that WC investment leaves a lasting and meaningful legacy.



## APPENDIX A | GUIDE TO THE 2010 STADIUMS



### THE STADIUMS

Five of South Africa's football stadiums will undergo major renovations for 2010 to be completed by December 2008:

- Soccer City in Johannesburg
- Ellis Park in Johannesburg
- Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria
- Royal Bafokeng Stadium in (Mafikeng) Rustenberg in North West province
- Vodacom Park in (Mangaung) Bloemfontein in the Free State

All new stadiums must be completed by October 2009. New stadiums will be built in:

- Green Point Stadium in Cape Town
- Mbombela in Nelspruit, Mpumalanga
- Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth
- Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane in Limpopo
- Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban

Kings Park and Green Point stadium will become completely new multi-sport facilities, Green Point complete with a retractable dome to protect fans and players from the Cape's unpredictable winter weather.


### SOCCER CITY IN JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG




Seating Capacity: 95,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

Soccer City in Johannesburg (formerly known as the FNB Stadium) is earmarked to host the opening and final matches in 2010. Originally built in 1987, Soccer City has hosted some of the most memorable football matches in South Africa's history. The Stadium will be enlarged by the addition of an additional tier for seating. An encircling roof will also be added. Changing rooms, executive boxes and floodlights will also be installed.




ELLIS PARK IN JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG



Seating Capacity: 70,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

Ellis Park Stadium is a major football venue in South Africa. The Stadium will undergo major renovations adding new upper tiers to increase seating capacity by 10,000. The Ellis Park district is expected to spend R2 billion upgrade over the next five years.




### LOFTUS VERSFELD IN PRETORIA, GAUTENG



Seating Capacity: 45,000


Expected Completion Date: December 2008

Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria (Tshwane) is situated just five kilometers from the city center and is home ground to the Sundowns Football Club, one of South Africa's premier professional clubs. The stadium, originally built in 1977 has undergone considerable renovations and its four major stands have been completely rebuilt. To qualify for selection as a first and second round venue, the floodlights, sound system, and scoreboard will be upgraded. Designated areas will be constructed in the lower level of the west stand. Loftus which will only need minor upgrades to meet requirements.






**ROYAL BAKOFENG SPORTS PALACE IN RUSTENBERG, GUATENG**



Seating Capacity: 40,000

Expected Completion Date: December 2008

The Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace only requires minor renovations for 2010. The Stadium, which opened in 1999, was completely funded by the Royal Bafokeng community (an administrative entity presiding over the world richest platinum mines). Capacity will be increased in the stadium by construction two additional rows of seating around the second level. New electronic scoreboards, floodlights, and a new announcement system will be installed.




### FREE STATE STADIUM IN BLOEMFONTEIN, FREE STATE



Seating Capacity: 40,000

Expected Completion Date: December 2008

The Free State Stadium is located just minutes from the proposed team hotels in Bloemfontein. Complete with ample parking surround the stadium and superb executive hospitality, the stadium will undergo minor upgrades, increasing its capacity and installing floodlights, turnstiles, a new sound system and electronic scoreboards. This stadium has been selected for first and second round matches.




**GREEN POINT STADIUM IN CAPE TOWN, WESTERN CAPE**




Seating Capacity: 68,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

The Green Point Stadium in Cape Town will be transformed into a new 70,000 seat, all-weather, multi-purpose, environmentally sustainable, modern stadium with the picturesque Table Mountain in the backdrop. Green Point is just northwest of the central business district and the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront. The popular Green Point market in the area around the stadium will no longer be permitted. The stadium has been affectionately called the “African Renaissance Stadium” and will fully comply with FIFA match stadium requirements.



### MBOMBELA STADIUM IN NELSPRUIT, MPUMALANGA



Seating Capacity: 40,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

The Mbombela Stadium in Nelspruit be built on open land just seven kilometers north of Nelspruit and is slated for completion in June 2009. The Mbombela Stadium's adaptable design will ensure a prosperous future use as multi-sport, entertainment, and exhibition venue. Mbombela Stadium has been proposed as a venue for both the first and second round matches in 2010.




**NELSON MANDELA STADIUM IN PORT ELIZABETH, EASTERN CAPE**




Seating Capacity: 49,500

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

The Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port Elizabeth will be a high-tech, modern venue. It will host the first and second matches of 2010. The stadium is centrally-located just two kilometers from the coast, close to the N2 highway, just 15 minutes from the city's main hotel area.




### PETER MOKABA STADIUM IN POLOKWANE, KWAZULU-NATAL




Seating Capacity: 40,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

The Peter Mokaba Stadium is located in Polokwane (formerly known as Pietersburg), the capital of Limpopo. The stadium's main stand and grass banks will be upgraded. The roof over the existing west stand will be replaced with a roof that covers the entire stadium. Twenty additional rows will be built around the entire stadium increasing the capacity significantly. The stadium will also install an electronic scoreboard, new floodlights, sound system, and fire detection system.




**KING'S PARK STADIUM IN DURBAN, KWAZULU-NATAL**



Seating Capacity: 60,000

Expected Completion Date: October 2009

The King's Park Stadium, located in Durban will be the site of the semi-final rounds of the World Cup. A new roofs will be added to the north and south ends of the ground and behind each of the goals to create an encircled oval stadium.







## APPENDIX B | THE 2010 SAFETY AND SECURITY PLAN

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### The Government's Response to the Crime Problem

Despite these seemingly obvious statistics, President Thabo Mbeki claims that crime rates have fallen ten percent since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Although widely condemned for his government's failure to reduce violent crime, Mbeki often points to the legacy of Apartheid which left institutional disparities that take years to defragment. In March 2007, Mbeki accused critics of his administration of racism claiming that the criticism stems from a "significant proportion of whites" who continue to live in fear of blacks because of racial prejudices. "For this section of our population, every reported incident of crime communicates the frightening and expected message that the kaffirs are coming!"<sup>1</sup> Mbeki is completely out of touch with reality. He says that police are capable of dealing with the crime and this has caused crime to decrease. The proof is he says is the immediate arrests and subsequent conviction of criminals. But according to the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends, SA has the second highest murder rate in the world and has the highest occurrence of rape of any country.<sup>2</sup>

The Ministry of Safety and Security has condemned those who complain about crime. Charles Nquakula who has been SA's Minister of Safety and Security since 2002, is planning the security plan for 2010. But he may not be the ideal planner considering his blatant disregard for the South African fears. In June 2006, Nqakula remarked that those South Africans who are unhappy with the crime situation in SA should leave the country.

They can continue to whine until they're blue in the face, they can continue to be as negative as they want to, or they can simply leave this country so that all of the peace-loving South Africans, good South African people who want to make this a successful country, continue with their work...Apartheid so insulated them, they did not see crime at all...So they think therefore that our country is tottering under such a wave of crime that they refer to it as a tsunami...They are the ones who are hurting our people. They should be the ones to leave the country.

This remark demonstrates his sheer lack of understanding of the causes and effects of the increasing crime problem.<sup>3</sup> As Minister of Safety and Security, Nqakula is charged with the responsibility of lowering crime and as a planner of 2010, he must develop means to protect all the spectators. How can Nqakula who clearly does not understand the crime situation successfully create a safety plan? Nqakula clearly

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<sup>1</sup> Kaffir is a racist term used to describe black Africans during the Apartheid years. Rice, Xan. Ready or Not. (June 3, 2007). *The Guardian* (London).

<sup>2</sup> Mbeki, T. (February 15, 2005). *State of the Nation Address*. Johannesburg, South Africa.

<sup>3</sup> SA Minister Defends Crime Remark. (June 21, 2006). *BBC News*.

failed to realize the consequences of his statement as many people from around the world are planning their possible travel arrangements to the WC.

Nqakula has also been criticized locally for promoting peace and democracy abroad during a spate of violent crime in Gauteng. While in Burundi, there was a killing spree in Gauteng in which an alarming number of SAPS officers were killed while performing their duties. Between January and July 2006, 54 police officers were killed in Gauteng while working. To quell fears, Nqakula announced that he would decrease crime by December 31, 2006. Despite his planning efforts, crime has continued to rise leading critics to assume that Nqakula is inept and therefore should not be responsible for planning the 2010 safety procedures.

The SA government has cited the success of the 2003 Cricket WC as an example of their ability to protect visitors. The report concluded,

Foreigners were generally very satisfied with the event and South Africa. Crime reports were at insignificant levels. 3% of visitors experienced an incident of crime whilst here. However, 99% of visitors (94% of those affected) said they would return again. Overall, safety and security, which was foreigners' number one concern before they arrive here, showed the biggest improvement in rating from before to after the event.

Overall 99 percent of visitors to the WC said that despite original concerns regarding crime, that they would recommend SA to other visitors.<sup>4</sup> There is no comparison between attendance and scale of the 2003 event to the enormity of the 2010 WC. Based solely on its television audience, the football WC is larger than the Olympics. SA is expecting hundreds of thousands of visitors, compared to a few thousand who came in 2003. Likewise, political, social, economic, and political variables have changed in SA which may contribute to increasing instability in the country during the event. Therefore, SA's proud admission is virtually meaningless as it relates to the 2010 WC.

In response to SA's lack of concern regarding 2010, FIFA has announced that it too is not concerned about crime at 2010. FIFA made the following announcement on its last visit to SA in 2006.

General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was possible to read press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit...We therefore came to the conclusion

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<sup>4</sup> Crime in South Africa. (2007). Available at [www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com](http://www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com).

that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries, they should not encounter any trouble.

FIFA continued by recommitting to SA for 2010 and complimenting the “comprehensive work schedule”, saying that the new stadiums, media centers, and hospitality will undoubtedly “satisfy every requirement for the event.”<sup>5</sup> Despite these apparent comforts, rumors constantly circulate claiming that FIFA is threatening to take the event away from SA and give it to other more developed, safer countries.

### **The 2010 Safety and Security Plan**

The South African government has given endless excuses for reasons why the visitors to 2010 will not be affected by escalating crime. They claim that their safety plan will protect visitors. In any case, SAPS claims that crime is mostly concentrated in areas away from the stadiums and other areas where visitors will be located and therefore will not affect them. FIFA's strong support of SA's ability to protect visitors has been the greatest compliment of SA's safety plan.

The likelihood for a significant number of crimes at the 2010 WC is high. During the 2006 WC, police registered 7,000 criminal incidents during the month-long event with as many as 9,000 people detained mostly for assault and theft or property damage crimes. Eighty percent of those arrested were Germans and the majority of the other foreigners spoke English.<sup>6</sup> Germany generally has a relatively low crime rate but during the WC, crime escalated. Revelers are careless targets and as a result the possibility for violent incidents is dramatically higher than the already extremely high number of SA crimes.

Andre Prius, the Deputy Commissioner of SAPS is in charge of safety and security at 2010. His experience organizing the security plans for the Rugby and Cricket WCs makes him a reliable choice for 2010. He often reminds the public that the police cannot prevent crime or change the causes of crime, they can only act as a deterrent. His safety plan for 2010 therefore only addresses ways to increase the strength of the police force as a deterrent rather than addressing any of the endemic causes of crime.

WC organizers, like most government officials claim that crime is not a problem in SA and visitors should not be concerned by inflated statistics. Organizers cite more than a decade of successful and safe hosting opportunities of high-level events such as the 1995 Rugby WC, the 1999 All Africa Games, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the 2003 Cricket WC. In 2002, SA pioneered a safety model for the 37,000 World Summit attendees. This plan was so successful that it has been

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<sup>5</sup> Crime in South Africa. (2007). Available at [www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com](http://www.southafrica-2010-accomodation.com).

<sup>6</sup> Krays 2007 pg. 7-8

## WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

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adopted by the United Nations as a model for its future mega events. SA's success as host has led other host countries to ask for assistance including 2007 Cricket World Cup's Caribbean hosts.<sup>7</sup>

The South African Government and the LOC have assured FIFA that SA will be able to manage the necessary institutional and infrastructure needed to protect the millions of attendees at the WC. SA's Comprehensive Plan for 2010 details plans for providing safety and security measures at the WC and the 2007 Budget Plan allocated R6.8 billion for crime prevention during the event. FIFA has endorsed the safety plans. After a recent visit to SA, Sepp Blatter, president of FIFA announced, "authorities have the know-how and resources to manage security during 2010" adding that SA police have provided an "excellent, comprehensive work schedule" that will "satisfy every requirement for the event."<sup>8</sup> According to a 2006 report to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, SA Police Services (SAPS) guaranteed the safety and security of those associated with the WC, stating the following,

The Government guarantees to undertake all security measures necessary to guarantee general safety and personal protection especially at airports, inside and outside hotels, stadiums, training grounds, the international broadcasting center, media centers, any official areas and other areas where accredited persons and/or spectators are present.<sup>9</sup>

According to SA's commitment to FIFA, the SA government is responsible for 80 percent of the security outside of the stadiums and 20 percent of security inside the stadiums; the LOC Safety and Security Department is responsible for the converse, 20 percent of safety outside of the stadiums, namely for the players and FIFA officials and 80 percent of security inside the stadiums. Agencies are responsible for paying the high costs of security measures accordingly.<sup>10</sup>

To protect and secure attendees, the LOC has proposed a plan that will be practiced implemented before 2010 in order to ensure its efficiency.

- The plan calls for greater border security at land, sea, and air ports of entry to ensure that only those legally permitted to enter the country pass through.
- Police will patrol routes commonly taken by attendees such as the route from the Johannesburg airport to the stadiums and from the stadium to local hotels. Increased police patrols will focus on

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<sup>7</sup> Appel, M. (November 21, 2007). 2010 Security Plan in Place. *BuaNews* (Cape Town).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Parliamentary Monitoring Group, *2010 FIFA World Cup: Submissions by Department of Home Affairs, Mangaung Municipality and South African Police Service to the Sport and Recreation Portfolio Committee, Education and Recreation Select Committee*, July 12, 2006. Available at [www.pmg.org.za/viewminute/php?id=8010](http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute/php?id=8010)

<sup>10</sup> Krays 2007 pg. 13

sections of the city where FIFA events are taking place including FIFA headquarters, hotels, stadiums, fan parks, restaurants, and other tourist venues.

- Dedicated teams will work closely with businessmen using mobile communications before and during the event.
- In addition to command vehicles, a fleet of 40 helicopters will patrol the tournament areas with cameras providing live feed to operation headquarters in Pretoria. This will act as a force multiplier with senior police officers monitoring the cameras and communicating to ground patrol if they notice something is amiss.<sup>11</sup>
- Since 2005, SAPS has been actively recruiting resulting in a total police force of 192,000 by 2010, with 31,000 police dedicated exclusively to monitoring WC activities.
- Special courts will be available 24-hours a day throughout the tournament so that criminals can be processed quickly and efficiently.<sup>12</sup>

Adding extra police and general force multipliers are the overall objectives of the safety and security plan. Such capacity building actions are essential. Eric Bost, US Ambassador to SA said in the November 26, 2006's Sunday Times, "In the three and a half months I have been here I have never, ever seen a local police officer just drive through [my neighborhood] in a car." Between July 2002 and July 2007, SAPS has grown from 109,000 to 164,000 and the force is expected to increase to 192,000 by 2010. Between April 2006 and March 2007, 35,000 new recruits joined the reserve units and SAPS hopes to supplement permanent police units with an additional 100,000 reservists by 2009.<sup>13</sup> With 31,000 officers dedicated specifically to the WC, event organizers are not concerned about crime. But some evidence suggests that extra policing does not necessary result in a simultaneous or proportionate reduction in crime. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's success in reducing crime in New York City is largely attributed to improving the neighborhood by focusing police activities on specific target areas such as drug abuse and petty crime consequently leading to a decline in other criminal activities (a practice often known as the Broken Window Syndrome). Such actions may yield better results than simply increasing the numbers of police officers.<sup>14</sup>

What is perhaps most important to note in the plan is the absence of many permanent institutional changes in the way in which SA manages its crime problem. The 2007 national budget allocated R6.8 billion specifically for crime prevention and justice services and promised an additional R88.2 billion by 2010. R666 million will be spent just on short term safety and security measures such as helicopters, national and local command and control centers, radio communication technology and CCTV cameras. Funding for long term safety measures such as the recruitment and training of additional police

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<sup>11</sup> Appel 2007

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> The Changing Face of SA's Police. (July 9, 2007). Available at [http://www.southafrica.info/what\\_happening/news/police-090707.htm](http://www.southafrica.info/what_happening/news/police-090707.htm)

<sup>14</sup> The Crime Statistics: Are We Our Own Worse Enemy? (July 16, 2007). *Markinor News* (Johannesburg).

## **WASTED OPPORTUNITIES**

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services has yet to be allocated. WC specifics such as police salaries, temporary police accommodations, and daily allowances for the 31,000 dedicated WC police officers have yet to be assigned.<sup>15</sup>

Other permanent improvements to SAPS include an improved communication system. By 2010, SAPS will institute a computerized performance management system to assess and evaluate police performance. In October 2007, Gauteng launched a new radio communications network featuring an automated vehicle tracking system that will indicate in real time the number and location of police vehicles. Improved tracking systems will help call center operators send the nearest available police vehicles via the fastest routes to the emergency. Likewise, the system will ensure that police officers are patrolling in their designated areas at all times. The Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal are expected to develop similar systems by 2010.<sup>16</sup>

Elaborate crime prevention command and control units and helicopters may meet the needs of the WC but are not practical for everyday crime fighting. Hiring additional police is the only long-lasting element of this plan. However, hiring additional police is insufficient if the additional police do not have reliable vehicles to get to crime areas quickly. Most importantly, the plan does not call for a national realignment to reduce the causes of crime as well as ways to improve reduction policies.

Organized crime and large-scale crime is also a major concern. Corruption at ticket sales has been a feature at previous WCs. During the Los Angeles Olympic Games, more crimes were perpetrated by convicted felons who were hired or volunteered to help during the games committed more crimes than any other group during the event.<sup>17</sup> Government and private agencies are collaborating to reduce such crime. Nine government agencies have teamed up to combat crime for 2010, forming the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICOC), to "create a channel for the disposition of information across government." The Ministry of Safety and Security has been working with the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) to prevent cash-in-transit heists and other organized crimes. SABRIC has been supplying the Ministry with "information that relates to intelligence regarding people who might want to mount armed robberies against financial institutions in the country." Business Against Crime has also been collaborating offering CCTV systems for use during the event. Musanda Satellite Campus in Pretoria is offering additional training courses for intelligence officers to help train the many new recruits. Also the Electronic Communications Security Company is expected to open its new security operations center at the beginning of 2008, which will protect critical information and communication infrastructure from unauthorized access and attack. As for international terrorism, Barry Gilder, the

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<sup>15</sup> The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007

<sup>16</sup> The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007

<sup>17</sup> South Africa: Crime May be Own Goal That Bedevils SA's World Cup. (January 31, 2007). *AllAfrica.com*

chairman of NICOC, said that South Africa would be facing similar challenges with respect to terrorism and other international crime elements as previous FIFA hosts.<sup>18</sup>

### World Cup Causes Crime to Increase

Concerns that this mammoth event will lead to increases in national crime rates before, during, and after the event are mounting. The HSRC's annual survey concludes crime-weary South Africans list crime as the greatest disadvantage to hosting the WC. Between 2005 and 2006, concerns about crime as the major disadvantage rose between 8 and 25 percent, depending on demographic, race, class, and location.<sup>19</sup> Despite the differences between respondents, concerns over crime are the one uniting force in SA. Regardless of race, Udesch Pillay, leader of the HSRC said, "People see this [World Cup] as a feeding ground that will enhance crime because there is so much up for grabs."<sup>20</sup> The survey also concludes that most South Africans are not as concerned about safety during the month-long event so much as general crime increases in SA.

During major international events such as the FIFA WC, criminals are able to sneak into the country via laxer immigration practices and engage in criminal activities such as drug smuggling. Barry Gilder, the chairman of NICOC calls this one of the major challenges of reducing crime in SA in anticipation for 2010. Although SA has composed a plan to protect its borders, some criminals will surely sneak through.<sup>21</sup>

With so much police attention on the stadiums and the WC, criminals in other cities and other areas of event cities will be able to act freely. Nqakula and SAPS has admitted that much of the crime is occurring on the fringe areas. As a result SAPS should focus more of its attention on these areas with increased crime. But with so many visitors coming to SA and so much international attention on the WC venues, SAPS must instead concentrate on protecting the international visitors. As a result, crime will surely increase with decreased police presence. So while SA may be able to control crime temporarily while in the public limelight, these actions will not lead to decreased crime permanently.<sup>22</sup>

The murder rate in SA rose most dramatically until 2001 and since then it has remained similar high levels. The SA government's insignificant response to this escalating crime problem has for the most part ignored the issue. For the most part, President Mbeki and Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and

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<sup>18</sup>Benton, S. (August 30, 2007). SA Intelligence Services Gear Up to Thwart Criminality During World Cup." *BuaNews Online* (Cape Town).

<sup>19</sup> The HSRC survey concluded that fears about crime increased from 19.1 percent to 28.3 percent in women, from 18.8 percent to 20.6 percent in men, from 15.2 percent to 28.2 percent for rural dwellers, from 18.9 percent to 25.3 percent in tribal settings, from 21.2 percent to 30.8 percent in urbanites, and from 15.5 percent to 25.3 percent in the informal settlements.

<sup>20</sup> Mannak, Miriam. (February 7, 2007). Crime, South Africa and the 2010 World Cup. *World Press* (Cape Town).

<sup>21</sup> The Changing Face of SA's Police 2007

<sup>22</sup> Alexander, Adam. Can Football Save South Africa from its Biggest Threat? (August 22, 2006). *The Raw Story*.

Security have pretended that there is no crime problem, claiming that racism is causing people to doubt the possibilities of the new black government. On the off chance that the politicians admit the problem, they use the old politician's trick of appearing to be doing something when in reality, they are not doing anything. According to the US State Department, "2010 will be more factor that will make the government here want to protect its citizens and visitors." Crime expert, Johan Burger, a researched linked to the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria believes that the inequalities in wealth are the major contributor to the rising crime rates across the country. He says, "But I think the government lacks a proper understanding of what we are confronted with...The idea that you can combat crime deeply rooted in socio-economic conditions with increased policing is a fallacy."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



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