

Playing Poker with a Committee: Assessing the  
Viability of Coalitional Coercive Diplomacy

by

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
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, 'coercive diplomacy', that is the strategic use of threats aimed at convincing an adversary to stop or undo 'hostile' actions, has become a principle crisis management tool of the Western powers. Yet as a strategy it has a relatively poor track record of success; a record that theorists have struggled to explain. Despite the fact that the majority of such engagements have been undertaken multilaterally, little work to date has focused on the impact that employing a coalitional 'coercing agent' has on the ability to craft a potent package of threats. This study aims to contribute to the debate by testing empirically the impact of coalitional dynamics on the ability of Western powers to employ coercive diplomacy. More specifically, it explores the theoretical tension between the anecdotal assumptions held by certain theorists regarding coalitional action problems (CAP) on the one hand and Jakobsen's four-point *ideal policy* of coercive diplomacy on the other. I explore this tension through two case studies: the employment of coercive diplomacy by NATO and the Contact Group aimed at halting Serbian aggression in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 and the Western coalition's attempt to roll back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The study finds that although CAP do arise as predicted, coalitions have effective mechanisms for overcoming them and thus are able to effectively implement coercive threat packages that approximate to Jakobsen's *ideal policy*.

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## **Table of Contents**

Chapter 1: Introduction.....	p. 5
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	p. 13
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methodology.....	p. 24
Chapter 4: Case Studies:.....	p. 36
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions .....	p. 76

## Chapter One - Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, coercive diplomacy has become an increasingly utilised mechanism by which Western democracies strive to shape their security milieu. The end of bipolarity led to a switch in security imperatives from nuclear deterrence to the management of crises emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, civil conflict and, more recently, terrorism. Relying on the *threat* of targeted force rather than the direct *use* of brute force, coercive diplomacy presented an option appropriate to such imperatives: one whose promise of achieving security aims without bloodshed was attractive to cautious democratic states.

Yet despite its appeal, coercive diplomacy can be a “beguiling” strategy<sup>1</sup>, as George and Simons warn, seemingly easier to carry out in theory than has proven to be the case in practice. This is evidenced by the relatively poor success record of the strategy<sup>2</sup>. Theorists have sought to explain this by highlighting a number of difficulties in employing the strategy. Among them is the inherent difficulty in attempting to both frighten and yet reassure the adversary at the same time as well as the fact that the strategy aims to reverse the actions of an adversary who, in undertaking the forceful action that precipitated the need for coercive diplomacy in the first place, has already accepted a high degree of risk. Fundamentally, it relies on the coercer’s ability to assess the motivations, psychology and domestic pressures of an adversary, leaving the ultimate decision as to whether escalation to brute force is necessary up to that adversary. In each of these ways, it is an unpredictable strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> George A. L. and Simons W.E., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, (Westview Press:1994), p10

<sup>2</sup> Robert Art and Patrick Cronin calculate only a 32 percent aggregate success rate for their case studies (Art R. and Cronin, P. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Washington, DC:USIP Press, 2003) p. 387). Similarly, Freedman states that strategic coercion “is not an easy option.” (Freedman, L. (ed) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, (Oxford: OUP, 1998) p. 17

My thesis aims to contribute a currently under-researched element to this debate by testing empirically the claim, made by some theorists, that coalitional action problems (CAP) may impede the implementation of a successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. Despite the many advantages of implementing coercive engagements through a coalition – including burden sharing, diversity of resources enhanced legitimacy and increased isolation of the adversary – such theorists have highlighted the numerous ways in which the presence of a coalition may inhibit the ability of groups of states to carry out coercive diplomacy. Summarised, these theories contend that coercive diplomacy can be likened to poker in that success frequently relies on the ability for a coercer to put a lot of political and military ‘chips’ on the table, often in situations of limited information, with the intention of bullying opponents into submission. Just as if, during a poker game, consensus was required from a committee of individuals (some of whom may not even want to play at all) before each bet was placed, the resulting compromise would likely lead to a series of weak and ultimately unsuccessful hands. So too, the CAP theorists hold, is often the situation with a coalition implementing coercive diplomacy. As Christopher Hill writes, “an explicit reference to possible military action if the target does not comply always risk events spinning wildly out of control. They are a gamble on big returns and big losses, which is why cautious democratic decision-makers are usually averse to them, while less restricted autocrats will at times be unable to resist the temptation”<sup>3</sup>

Up to now, however, these CAP studies have remained at the level of hypothetical conjecture – applying commonly-held assumptions about the nature of coalitional

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<sup>3</sup> Hill, C, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (London: Palgrave, 2003), p.143

politics to the exercise of coercive diplomacy. This paper uses focused case-studies to test whether these assumptions do in fact impede the development of a successful coercive diplomacy strategy, as set out in Jakobsen's<sup>4</sup> *ideal policy*

The main conclusion of the study is that CAP do, almost invariably, arise as predicted by such theorists. Differing risk-perceptions, strategic interests and overall commitment to the coercive operation all lead to disagreements between coalition members concerning acceptable levels of force, capability provision and use of ultimata. Yet in the cases studied here it was found that CAP did not impede the creation of an *ideal policy* given that they were mitigated by a mechanisms arising from i) growing pressure for action over time and ii) eventual leadership by a powerful member of the coalition who, acting through the mechanisms of persuasion, burden-taking and organisation, was able to keep potential 'weak-links' in the coalition from undermining the enactment of the *ideal policy*.

### Structure of the Thesis

This paper analyses the viability of coercive diplomacy in instances where the coercing agent is a coalition of states. The study proceeds as follows. The rest of Chapter One will set out the relevance and importance of the study, introducing a potential implication of the study for policy to be discussed, in line with the study's findings, in chapter six. Chapter Two will analyse the existing literature relating to both the theory of successful coercive diplomacy and to the practical impediments to this success that result from coalitional dynamics. This will provide a list of five

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<sup>4</sup> Jakobsen, P. V. *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998)

potential problems of coalitions which, when analysed in conjunction with Jakobsen's *Ideal Policy* of successful coercive diplomacy, will form the basis of the theoretical framework for the study set out in Chapter Three. In addition to outlining this theoretical framework, Chapter Three will outline and defend the methodology of the study and highlight its limitations. Chapter Four will encompass the analysis of three instances of coercive diplomacy from the Bosnian War and one from the Gulf crisis in line with this framework. Chapter Five will then discuss the synthesis of the findings of these cases, draw conclusions and suggest areas for future research.

#### Importance of study

The importance of this study arises most fundamentally from the increased prevalence of coalitional coercive diplomacy in the modern world. This, in turn, may be put down largely to i) the nature of the post-Cold War strategic environment and ii) to the inherent attractiveness of the strategy to modern democracies.

The end of the Cold-War removed a major tactical restraint in the use of Western coercive power since the use of coercion in any form no longer needed to be tempered by the fear of a nuclear backlash. For the sole remaining superpower, the USA, the disintegration of its main rival precipitated fierce debates over what role it should take on in the newly uni-polar world<sup>5</sup>. Whilst some believed that America should use its unrivalled power to lead the world in solving global problems, others argued that the US should use its new-found predominance as an opportunity to withdraw from costly excursions beyond its borders. In the midst of this debate, coercive diplomacy

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<sup>5</sup> See Posen, B "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*. 21(3): 5-53.



provided a middle ground; offering to make use of American power to manage the international security landscape whilst, in theory at least, absolving it from the use of large scale troop deployments with the attendant risk to American lives.

As the international role of the US changed, so too did the nature of threats to international security. With the potential for full-scale global warfare largely removed, Western foreign policy has moved increasingly towards management of crises emerging from poverty, economic underdevelopment, social inequalities, injustice, political oppression and weak or failing states. Rather than representing a clear-cut impetus for the use of brute force, such crises represent “a sort of hybrid condition, neither peace nor war, but containing elements of both and comprising the potential for transformation from peace to war”<sup>6</sup>. To take on such ‘crisis management’ expeditions, modern militaries have begun to evolve away from mass conscript armies designed for national territorial defence towards leaner professional militaries capable of external power projection. It is such focused power projection lies at the heart of coercive diplomacy

The notion of coercive diplomacy as a middle ground also manifests itself on a tactical level. As George points out, coercive diplomacy has often been chosen as the “‘default’ option by policymakers because the alternatives of doing nothing or using force are rejected, at least for the time being.”<sup>7</sup> In this sense, the increase in the use of coercive diplomacy may be put down to its attractiveness as a strategy for cautious, casualty sensitive democracies. The values and norms embodied in the political culture of mature democracies coupled with the power of the media to convey images

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<sup>6</sup> Snyder, G and Diesing, P., *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p.10.

<sup>7</sup> George, A ‘Introduction’ in Art and Cronin, *United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, *ibid.*2003 p.xi

of war to democratic audiences has precipitated a move away from brute force and destructive war towards discriminate, focused coercion. When implemented, force has increasingly become “selective and limited”<sup>8</sup> - aimed not at the physical destruction of the enemy’s society or even its armed forces, but rather at the leadership or regime. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy gives an adversary the opportunity to stop or back off before the resort to military operations. Thus, if successful, coercive diplomacy offers the tantalising possibility of a more ‘humane’ form of warfare.

Along with the increase in the attractiveness of coercive diplomacy as a tactic, the need for cooperation between states in the control of security problems has increased. The potential international fall-out from regional conflicts such as those in South Asia (Indio- Pakistan conflicts) and East Asia (Taiwan, North Korea); proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology; international terrorism; and the spill-over effect from weak or failing states in the global South are all of international concern and thus call for an international effort. This need to address such global problems therefore points to greater emphasis on coalitional coercion in the future. As Keohane notes, the strategy of the Bush administration has made considerable use of ‘multilateral coercive diplomacy’ in the aftermath of 9/11<sup>9</sup>. Furthermore, Daadler and Lindsay point out that the continuity of policy between Bush Senior, Clinton and Bush Junior suggest that the use of multilateral coercive diplomacy is not a function of partisan politics, but a general trend of the post-Cold War political climate<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Taken from *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, President William J. Clinton, December 1999

<sup>9</sup> See Keohane, R O. “Multilateral Coercive Diplomacy: Not Myths of Empire.” (Columbia International Affairs, 2005)

<sup>10</sup> Daalder, I and Lindsay J. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Brookings, 2003) p. 53

Such trends point to a need to analyse more robustly the ramifications of employing a coalitional coercing agent for the success of coercive diplomacy.

In terms of theory-building, this study questions the validity of Jakobsen's framework and seeks to contribute to the theory of successful coercive diplomacy by analysing the impact of employing a coalitional rather than a unilateral coercing agent. The study also has a number of important ramifications for policy. As will be explained in chapter three, the primary level of analysis of the study analyses whether the coalitional problems predicted by some theorists arise at all. Findings from this aspect of the study speak to a number of key policy questions: Given the obvious benefits of coalitional action on the one hand and the negative implications tested in this study on the other, a pertinent question might be whether the costs of keeping a coalition together may exceed its usefulness? If so, what is the optimal size of a coalition? Assuming that a unilateral action, while removing many of the impediments to successful coercive diplomacy is politically unpalatable, how small must a coalition be to be effective? What forms of coalition – UN peacekeeping, UN sanctioned multinational force, 'coalition of the willing' – is most effective? When is it preferable to trade multilateral legitimacy for coercive potency?

The secondary level of analysis in the study looks at the mechanisms by which coalition problems may be overcome. If, as some theorists have argued, a 'lead nation' is required for coalitions to effectively employ coercive diplomacy then what does this mean for the indispensability of the US in crisis management operations?

What might be needed to make coalitional CD successful *in the absence* of US input or firm leadership?

Leading on from this issue I shall focus on one policy question in the discussion section: the ability for the EU alone to successfully make use of coercive diplomacy. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the European Union, is designed to provide the EU with the ability to conduct military crisis management operations in line with the Petersburg Tasks. This study will address the potential problems that ESDP as a multilateral policy-set will face in implementing coercive diplomacy in such operations and will offer recommendations as to how the organisation can be structured so as to reduce the impact of these problems. These potential implications include organisational issues that impact decision-making and questions concerning enlargement as well as strategic issues concerning the types of operations that the organisation can conduct.

## Chapter Two - Literature Review

In this chapter I define pertinent terms and analyse the existing literature on coalitions and coercive diplomacy.

### Defining terms

A coalition may be understood as an alliance of actors formed to achieve a common aim, operating either through an established multilateral organisation or as an ad hoc collection of states<sup>11</sup>. First developed by George et al in 1971, coercive diplomacy is one variant of what may more generally be termed ‘strategic coercion’ – that is “the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices”<sup>12</sup>. Such a definition encompasses a number of concepts including deterrence – threats aimed at convincing an adversary *not* to initiate an action – and ‘compellence’ – “a threat intended to make an adversary *do* something”<sup>13</sup>. Strategic coercion has two principal variants: material – that is the destruction of an adversary’s capabilities – and psychological – focused on that adversary’s will to resist. The concept of coercive diplomacy, a variant of ‘compellence’, lies on the ‘psychological’ end of this spectrum.

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<sup>11</sup> Snyder, G. H. *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p4; Walt, M. *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)

<sup>12</sup> Freedman, L. ed., *Strategic Coercion*: 1998 *ibid.*, p.3

<sup>13</sup> Schelling, T. *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996) p. 22

## Theorising success

As set out above, this study makes use of Jakobsen's *Ideal Policy* framework in assessing the impact of coalitions. His framework sets out the four elements of a successful package of coercive diplomacy.

1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
2. A deadline for compliance.
3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
4. An offer of inducements for compliance.

In addition to that of Jakobsen, two major scholars, George and Schelling, have developed theoretical frameworks for understanding the conditions under which coercive diplomacy is likely to be successful.<sup>14</sup> Like Jakobsen's, these frameworks contain a list of elements that, if present, will maximise the chances of success in a coercive diplomacy strategy.

In his 1966 book, *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling's coined the phrase "compellance", a forerunner to the notion of coercive diplomacy, which he defined as an action intended to make an adversary do something in response. He posited five conditions that he saw as necessary for compellence success<sup>15</sup>. Five years later,

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<sup>14</sup> Schelling, T 1996 *ibid.*; George et al, *Limits to Coercive Diplomacy* 1971 *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> 1) The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that the costs of non-compliance will be unbearable. 2) The threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary; he must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to execute it in case of non-compliance. 3) The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand. 4). The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future. 5) The conflict must not be

Alexander L. George published *Limits to Coercive Diplomacy* in which he posited a highly detailed set of fourteen factors influencing the outcome of coercive diplomacy attempts, split into “contextual variables” and “conditions favouring success”<sup>16</sup>.

My decision to use Jakobsen’s framework will be defended in the methodology section (Chapter Three) but here it is important to note that both George and Schelling, develop frameworks based on the notion of a unilateral coercing agent and thus pay very little or no attention to the impact of coalitions on the success of the strategy. In his theory of successful coercive diplomacy, George only mentions the existence of a unilateral or coalitional coercing agent as one of his eight “contextual variables” – something to be taken into account in constructing policy rather than a variable that might fundamentally alter the ability to carry out the “factors favouring success” within his framework. His only conclusion as to how coalitions as a contextual variable, may impact on coercive diplomacy success is vague: “coercive diplomacy is likely to be more difficult to carry out when it is employed by a coalition of states rather than by a single government”<sup>17</sup>

Of the major theorists, only Jakobsen fully integrated the notion of the coalitional coercive agent into his theory. One of the three main questions of his study is “how the need to act collectively and coordinate policy through international organisations affects the prospects for implementing effective policies”<sup>18</sup>. Despite this aim, his study of the impact of coalitions on coercive diplomacy restricts itself primarily to the

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perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force. (Schelling 1966 *Ibid.*: 3–5, 69–76, 89–91)

<sup>16</sup> George et al (eds.).1971 *Ibid* .p.54

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid* p273

<sup>18</sup> Jakobsen 1998, *Ibid* p 130

classic collective action problem<sup>19</sup> which is to say the tendency of states to free-ride in the provision of 'public goods'. His conclusion on this issue states that "coalitional consensus concerning threats and use of force requires the presence of one or more states (k-group) willing and capable to take the lead and accept most of the costs"<sup>20</sup>

Despite establishing a useful initial analysis of the impact of coalitional dynamics on coercive diplomacy, Jakobsen's work lacks the analytical depth required to go beyond superficial conclusions. He concludes that the presence of a coalition can potentially undermine coercive diplomacy but does not then go on to provide a structured explanation for exactly *how* the presence of a coalitional coercing agent may undermine the enactment of the ideal policy. He develops his conclusions from the *outcome* of the coalitional coercive diplomacy rather than the *process* by which it is constructed. For example he doesn't analyse the disagreements by which certain threats are made and others discarded. His conclusion concerning the mechanisms by which CAP are overcome is also superficial. His conclusion that what is required for coercive diplomacy to be effective is the "presence of one or more states willing and capable to take the lead and accept most of the costs" again, fails to provide a full account of the actual mechanisms by which such a lead agent may mitigate the CAP of the coalition. This study seeks to address such gaps.

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<sup>19</sup> Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965)

<sup>20</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *Ibid.* p.138



## Coercive Diplomacy and Coalitions

In addition to the brief inclusions in the grand theories outlined above the existing literature on the impact of coalitions is limited to two short analytical pieces<sup>21</sup> Both of these pieces restrain their analysis to the level of hypothetical conjecture supported only by anecdotal references to certain cases. An overarching analysis of these pieces, when viewed in light of the theoretical work on coercive diplomacy, generates the following existing predictions concerning the likely impact of coalitions on coercive diplomacy.

Firstly, there is the belief that the need to satisfy the 'least enthusiastic' coalition members will lead to 'lowest common denominator' (LCD) threats. As Byman asserts, "to garner the necessary consensus the coalition will gravitate toward the most-restricted members preferences"<sup>22</sup> In his work George points out that there are a number of decisions that need to be reached by the coalition in commencing any coercive effort namely:

- 1) What to demand of the opponent;
- 2) Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand;
- 3) Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for non-compliance; and
- 4) Whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Waxman, "Coalitions and Limits on Coercive Diplomacy", *Strategic Review* (winter 1997): pp 38-47; Byman, "Coercion and Coalitions" in *The Dynamics of Coercion* (RAND: CUP, 2002): pp 87-106

<sup>22</sup> Byman 2002 *ibid* p. 94

<sup>23</sup> George, A. L. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991)

Yet, each coalition member brings to this decision-making process a differing set of threat perceptions, grand strategies, third party commitments, strategic culture<sup>24</sup>, political imperatives and vulnerabilities (that the coercion target could exploit). Thus, 'least enthusiastic' could entail the state that is least interested in securing whatever positive outcome is possible from the engagement or, on the other hand, the state that is most averse to the risk of damage to its assets of the risk of unforeseen escalation.

This notion of risk aversion speaks to the inherent contradiction that lies at the heart of coercive diplomacy. On the one hand, if successful, it promises to achieve foreign policy goals without the use of force and the consequent spilling of blood. As noted above, this is a key reason why it has become a preferred tactic of Western powers. On the other, in order to be successful, the *threat* of the use of force must be credible which means, most fundamentally, that the coercing states must *appear willing and able* to exercise such force. This is problematic for risk-averse democracies given that, if coercive diplomacy is carried out to the letter, the deciding factor as to whether force is employed or not is the reaction of the adversary, As George et al<sup>25</sup> point out, "the state that engages in coercive diplomacy can seldom have full or reliable control over the outcome because so much depends on the adversary's assessment of the situation". The implication of this is, as Brown asserts, "however carefully planned at the outset, even small doses of violence delivered incrementally can provoke a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation that escalates to a level of warfare that is

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<sup>24</sup> "The concept of strategic culture characterizes how a nation or group views the role of war, the use of force, and the nature of an adversary or threat in the international system; it also helps explain how actors confront such threats" (Kaye, D. 'Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East', *Washington Quarterly* vol. 27, no. 1, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 179-195)

<sup>25</sup> George, A et al, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971 , p293

disproportionate to the value of the interests initially at stake.”<sup>26</sup>. Those who seek peace must prepare for war: states, like poker players, must take large risks to achieve potentially large gains. Given such risk, caution amongst certain coalition members, it is predicted, will need to be appeased by the coalition restraining itself to minimal threats.

The second perceived outcome of the need to satisfy the least enthusiastic allies is that such states will impede the use of strong deadlines for compliance. As George points out, an ultimatum, that is to say a date after which non-compliance will face punishment, is a powerful, yet “risky”, tactic<sup>27</sup> in that, if imposed and subsequently violated, it puts the coercer in the difficult position of having to carry out its threat of force or back down. George highlights a number of variants of ultimatum: a) the ‘classic’ ultimatum, b) the ‘tacit’ ultimatum, c) the try-and-see approach, d) the gradual turning of the screw and e) the carrot and stick approach<sup>28</sup>. Each of these variants carry varying degrees of potency and attendant degrees of risk to the coercer. Given the assumption expressed above that coalitions will need to accommodate the most risk averse member, the implication is that coalitions will only apply the ‘weaker’ variants of the ultimatum, the “try-and-see” approach or the “gradual turning of the screw”, if indeed they agree on any deadline at all<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Brown S., *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Brookings, 2003) p.5

<sup>27</sup> George *ibid* p274

<sup>28</sup> George *ibid* p8

<sup>29</sup> Whereas the ‘ultimatum’ includes a strict time limit for compliance, the ‘gradual turning of the screw’ contains no specific deadline and seeks to increase the threat incrementally in response to the adversary actions. Similarly, the ‘try and see’ approach also contains no firm deadline, but, in addition, fails to include a specific threat.

The third notion is that coalitions will be less likely to back up their threats with the capabilities required to execute them. Here, theorists point to the classic ‘Collective Action Problem’ as the mechanism which hinders clear capability provision<sup>30</sup>. As explored above in the introduction, the impetus for the use of coercive diplomacy by Western coalitions is ‘crisis management’ aimed at minimising a particular threat to international security. In such cases, the maintenance of international security may be viewed as a public good, which is to say an outcome that is both non-excludable and indivisible given that if one member of a group “consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group”<sup>31</sup>. This means that there is a strong incentive for coalition members to ‘free-ride’ in terms of providing capabilities for any coercive operation. As Olson puts it, “even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest”<sup>32</sup>. In their classic treatment of peace as a public good, Olson and Zeckhauser<sup>33</sup> advance their “exploitation hypothesis” which further suggests that collective defence organisations incentivise smaller states to free-ride off of the capability provision of larger states.

The fourth assertion concerning the impact of coalitions on coercive diplomacy is that the shared control will lead to laborious decision-making that is ill-suited to a dynamic engagement with the adversary. As Byman and Waxman<sup>34</sup> point out, coercive diplomacy must be viewed as a dynamic rather than a static process based on

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<sup>30</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *Ibid.* p44

<sup>31</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective: Public Good and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)

<sup>32</sup> *ibid*

<sup>33</sup> Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. ‘An economic theory of alliances’ *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 48, no. 4 (August 1966)

<sup>34</sup> Byman and Waxman, “Defeating U.S. Coercion” *Survival* vol 41 (1999) 86–88.

a reciprocal engagement with an aggressive and determined adversary. Thus success in coercive diplomacy relies in large part on the coercer's ability to react quickly to unforeseen actions undertaken by the target. As Edward Luttwak puts it, "there are of course at least two conscious, opposed wills in any strategic encounter of war or peace, and the action is only rarely accomplished instantaneously, as in a pistol duel; usually there is a sequence of actions on both sides that evolve reciprocally over time"<sup>35</sup>. Key to such an engagement is *escalation dominance*: "the ability to increase the threatened costs to the adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to negate those costs or to counter-escalate"<sup>36</sup>. Amongst coalitions, escalating the threat often requires further negotiation between members which in turn takes time and strengthens the adversary's belief in the feeble nature of the coalition

The fifth assertion claims that coalitions will maintain multiple lines of communication that will 'muddy the waters' in terms of providing a clear threat. As George concludes, "the relationship between actions and words – the two levels of communication - is likely to be very important in employing the strategy of coercive diplomacy"<sup>37</sup>. Even within a single unilateral actor, "the leadership itself speaks with many voices at once, and there is no guarantee that every voice will convey the same message."<sup>38</sup> Similarly, a major potential problem with coalitions is that there is often not one singular set of words being expressed to the adversary. Multiple lines of communication will emanate from individual coalition members that will send differing messages as to the capability and particularly the will within each of the allies to carry out the force threatened by the coalition as a whole. As Byman and

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<sup>35</sup> Luttwak E., *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Harvard University Press, 2002), p.16.

<sup>36</sup> Byman and Waxman 2003, *Ibid* p.38.

<sup>37</sup> George, 1991 *Ibid*.p10

<sup>38</sup> Thies W., *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), p. 286.

Waxman assert, “coalitions rarely speak with a single voice – each member may also communicate threats or signal messages to the adversary, perhaps in conflicting ways”<sup>39</sup>. This presents a problem as “coercion is more likely to fail, when the adversary doubts the coercer’s intentions”. Conflicting signals emanating from various coalition members not only can contribute to such doubts, but also may encourage the adversary to “comply with some members demands but not others”

The sixth and final assertion made in the literature is that the existence of a coalition creates particular opportunities for counter-coercion by the adversary. More specifically, to the extent that the coalition is a requirement of the success of the operation in the first place, the adversary may see cracks in the cohesion of the alliance that can be exploited and thus be willing to concede to the demands. In other words, “coalition unity itself becomes a vulnerable centre of gravity that adversaries attempt to exploit”<sup>40</sup>. The issue here is that the adversary’s belief that it can split the coalition encourages it not to concede to threats – a problem that is unique to coalitions.

An important study carried out by Shultz<sup>41</sup> analysed the ways in which a democratic political system impacts on the ability for a state to implement coercive diplomacy. He found that the transparency of the political process in such states meant that leaders could not easily conceal the degree of domestic enthusiasm for any particular coercive enterprise. What this meant was, for coercive diplomacy engagements that enjoyed high domestic support, the potency of any threats issued was increased, yet lack of such support on the other hand made any threats largely impotent in the eyes

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<sup>39</sup> Byman and Waxman, 2003 *Ibid.* p. 100

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* p 92

<sup>41</sup> Shultz, K *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

of the adversary. Shultz does not analyse the implications of his findings for coalitions in his own work but an intuitive implication might be that those coalition members who show an unstable or unsupportive public opinion will become important targets for coalition-busting by the adversary.

### Conclusion

What these pieces do is highlight ways in which the inherent nature of coalitions might make them unsuitable for employing coercive diplomacy. What is lacking is a systematic testing of such intuitive assumptions; a study that operationalises these perceived hindrances through focused empirical analysis rather than cherry-picked anecdotal reference.

This study is an attempt to add such a level of analysis to the literature. In the next chapter, I set out my theoretical framework for achieving this.

### Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The fundamental puzzle of this study is:

Can coalitions of democracies successfully employ coercive diplomacy?

To get at this issue, I shall be asking a more focussed question, namely:

Do 'coalitional action problems' (CAP) undermine the ability of *groups* of states to implement Jakobsen's *ideal policy* of coercive diplomacy?

As noted in the preceding chapter, Jakobsen's *ideal policy* is a framework for coercive diplomacy that maximises the likelihood of a successful outcome for the coercer. It is specifically designed for situations in which "coercive diplomacy is employed by a coalition and the opponent has resorted to some sort of force".<sup>42</sup> To restate, the *ideal policy* consists of the following elements:

1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost.
2. A deadline for compliance.
3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
4. An offer of inducements for compliance.

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<sup>42</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *Ibid* p 63




As we explored in the preceding chapter, the existing literature on coalitional coercive diplomacy suggests certain potential pitfalls that arise from the coalitional dynamics within the coercer. To recap, theorists we explored in the literature review had certain key conclusions about the nature of coalitions and the viability of coercive diplomacy:

1. Needing to satisfy least enthusiastic coalition member will lead to 'lowest common denominator' threats
2. Needing to satisfy least enthusiastic coalition member (or the most risk averse) will impede the use of strong deadlines.
3. Capability-provision to buttress the threat will suffer from collective action problems.
4. Shared control means that the decision-making process within the coalition is slow impeding escalation control and swift response to adversary actions in a dynamic engagement.
5. Coalition will maintain multiple lines of communication that will 'muddy the waters' in terms of providing a clear threat.
6. Existence of coalition creates particular opportunities for counter-coercion by the adversary

The implication of such work is that there is a theoretical tension between the type of action required of the coercing agent as set out in the *ideal policy* on the one hand and the limitations of coalitional action suggested by the likes of Byman and Waxman on the other. It is this theoretical tension that provides the framework for this study.

Bringing these anecdotal assertions together with the *ideal policy* allows us to make certain predications about the likely nature of each of the ideal elements if hindered by CAP. These are summarised in the following table.



CD actions ( <i>Jakobsen's ideal policy</i> )	Conventional wisdom regarding coalitions	Coalitional Action Problem (CAP)	Predicted outcome of Coalitional Diplomacy	Coercive
"A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost"	<i>Threat:</i> Varying commitment to the coercive mission	<i>Threat:</i> Need to satisfy least enthusiastic	<i>Threat:</i> Lowest Denominator	Common
	<i>Capabilities:</i> No enthusiasm to risk assets for mission.	<i>Capabilities:</i> Free-riding	<i>Capabilities:</i> None guaranteed when threat issued.	
"A deadline for compliance"	Firm deadlines will be vetoed by risk-averse allies – will use weaker variants if any at all	Need to satisfy least enthusiastic	No deadline or weak deadline	
"An assurance to the adversary against future demands"	More aggressive coalition members will continue to maintain a bellicose stance towards adversary	Multiple lines of communication.	Individual members signalling larger threats to adversary	
"An offer of inducements for compliance"	States unwilling to bare the costs of inducements	Need to satisfy least enthusiastic. Free-riding	LCD No provision of 'carrots'	

In the above table you will notice I have broken down the first of these elements, the threat, into two parts: 1) the extent or size of the threat levelled at the adversary and 2) the provision of capabilities for the execution of this threat. Given the limitations of space and time, this study will limit its investigation to the first three elements of the *ideal policy*: Threat, capabilities and deadline. These elements represent the minimum required components of a coercive diplomacy and, whilst not *sufficient* to determine success, they are however *necessary*.

Thus if CAP theorists are correct, we should expect the following coded<sup>43</sup> outcomes to emerge:

Element of threat package	Potential outcome (predicted outcome of coalitional coercive diplomacy) <sup>44</sup>
Threat	Maximum
	High Compromise
	<b>Low Compromise</b>
	Minimum
Capabilities	All capabilities offered
	More than half of capabilities offered
	<b>Less than half of capabilities offered</b>
	No capability offered
Deadline	Firm Deadline
	<b>Weak deadline</b>
	No Deadline

The primary level of analysis in the study will determine which, of these potential outcomes, was produced by the coalition in each of the seven cases.

In cases in which coalitions did not follow the predicted outcome it will be determined whether the collective action issue simply did not arise or whether it did

<sup>43</sup> The coding for each of these potential outcomes was devised as follows. In the case of the threat, I looked at all of the options suggested by coalition members in the course of the negotiation. I then ranked the suggestions in order of coercive impact and assigned a category to each ranging from 'minimum' to 'maximum' threat in line with the values above. I assigned categories in the table rather than actual tactical options as each instance will have its own range of threat options that are tactically appropriate. By using such categories I was able to discern which of these tactically appropriate options was adopted by the coalition. In coding for capabilities I made an assessment of the military capacity, be it number of troops or number of air-attack fighters, required to execute the threat indicated in the threat package. I then compared this to the amount of capabilities that were either in the field or explicitly pledged by coalition members at the time the threat was issued and assigned them the values depending on the amount of capabilities offered as a percentage of what was deemed necessary. In terms of the coding for the inclusion of a deadline, the deadline was coded as 'weak' if the threat package included a reference to the time-scale allowed for compliance (such as "immediately") but did not set a specific date. If such a date was present, the deadline was coded as 'firm' whereas if there was no reference to time-scale at all, the deadline was coded as 'no deadline'.

The following gives examples of the kind of escalatory range of potential threats I look for in analysing the cases: [Non military measures (diplomatic sanctions → economic sanctions) Military measures i) Coercive presence (Protecting humanitarian aid → Protecting 'safe areas' from attack) ii) Coercive force (Forcefully opening transport routes for aid → Launching attacks on military capabilities → Launching attacks on leadership → Regime change)]

<sup>44</sup> The appearance of any of these 'predicted outcomes' is not necessarily proof of collective action problems. It may be the case that a tactical decision was made not to employ, say, a firm deadline. The collective action issue will only be examined if it is clear from the case that a more potent yet still tactically appropriate threat package was impeded by coalitional restraints.

but was overcome by a certain mechanism<sup>45</sup>. Analysing the mechanisms by which CAP are overcome will form the secondary level of analysis in the study.

I am, for the sake of this study, unquestionably taking Jakobsen's framework to be the *ideal policy* he maintains it is. I don't seek to test it for its outcomes but rather analyse the process of its production. In this sense, unlike in previous studies, I am not interested in the outcome of coercive diplomacy *per se*. Rather it is the construction of coercive diplomacy strategy that forms the focus. Can coalitions implement the *ideal policy*? Has Jakobsen, as he claims, created a policy that can be implemented when "coercive diplomacy is employed by a coalition"?<sup>46</sup> The rest of the chapter sets out my methodological approach to answering this question.

### Methodology

The paper analyses two conflict cases – the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and the Bosnian war (1992-95). The Bosnian case I shall analyse as three separate coercive diplomacy exchanges whilst the Iraq case will be analysed as a single exchange. This strategy of splitting conflicts into individual coercive diplomacy exchanges is largely a response to a key methodological constraint of such studies: namely the low number of cases upon which to base conclusions. This fact rules out the use of statistical methods and thus necessitates the use of focused case studies as the most effective method by which reliable conclusions may be drawn. By dividing each conflict involving Western intervention into a series of separate cases in which coercive diplomacy is

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<sup>45</sup> The appearance of any of the 'weak components' is not necessarily proof of collective action problems. It may be the case that a tactical decision was made not to employ, say, a firm deadline

<sup>46</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *ibid* p63

used the small-n problem may thus be mitigated. The case-study approach is, in any case, appropriate given the highly context-dependent nature of coercive diplomacy<sup>47</sup>.

My decision to use Jakobsen's framework stems from a number of factors. Firstly, Jakobsen explicitly developed his *ideal policy* to suit coalitions. Secondly, he developed the framework based specifically on case studies involving Western governments in the post-Cold War era – the same period that bounds this study. Thirdly, his framework has a manageable number of variables, making it more amenable than other theorists work<sup>48</sup> to use in policy and theoretical studies such as this one. In employing Jakobsen's framework, this study proceeds on the assumption that it is the optimum tactical framework for carrying out coercive diplomacy, an assumption that Jakobsen's own work finds warranted<sup>49</sup>. It does not seek to question the validity of this framework but, rather, to use it as basis for testing whether coalitions are actually able to effectively employ such a framework.

As stated in the previous chapter, the focus of this study is on the *process* by which coercive diplomacy packages are developed. This approach is partly in response to what Gholtz et al<sup>50</sup> call "The central problem in studying coercion" namely "the indeterminate relationship between actual rates of successful coercion and observable patterns of crisis outcomes". They posit that avoiding that problem requires scholars to "study the *process* of decision making rather than the *outcomes* of crises" and thus "use archival material to directly observe how leaders assess the seriousness of a

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<sup>47</sup> George 1991 *ibid* p14

<sup>48</sup> Note, for example, George's 14 point framework for understanding the success or failure of coercive diplomacy discussed above

<sup>49</sup> Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War*, pp.130-132

<sup>50</sup> Gholtz et al. 'Untangling Selection Effects in Studies of Coercion' (2006, under review)

given threat". Utilised in this study, such an approach – the study of process rather than outcome – is, in turn best served by case studies over other statistical methods

To get at this process in relation to the variables under investigation (threat, capabilities and deadline), I looked for the options that were suggested and how they related to the decision eventually taken. The nature of the coercive diplomacy package that emerges from the coalition is sculpted by negotiation through a number of channels. Bilateral contacts between heads of state and foreign ministers, through multilateral organisations such as the UN, NATO, OECD, IEA, CSCE and through numerous intelligence channels. The opaque nature of many of these discussions makes discerning the precise course of negotiation a difficult task. However, using formal documents such as draft Security Council Resolutions and statements, along with press reports and memoirs of key participants, it is possible to trace broad positions held by key parties and thus elucidate how these positions interacted to produce the coercive outcome. As such, I looked at statements of key diplomats as well as formal drafts of resolutions presented to the Security Council and other multilateral bodies. As such, my principal primary sources were official UN, NATO and EU documents, contemporary reports from the national newspapers of the states involved and, in certain cases, memoirs of key participants.

### Case Selection

My case selection began with a universe of cases<sup>51</sup>, including all instances of coercive diplomacy employed by the Western powers since the end of the Cold War. In the

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<sup>51</sup> See Appendix

initial selection two elements had to be present in an engagement to qualify as a case of coercive diplomacy; a) a demand must be communicated to an adversary that involves rolling back specific actions already undertaken by that adversary and b) explicit *threats* of force had to be employed by a Western coercer to pressure compliance with such demands. Using these criteria I constructed a table of 13 separate cases of coercive diplomacy which themselves could be broken down into a total of 33 actual engagements. These included five attempts to dissuade the support of terrorism, seven dissuading the acquisition of WMDs, and 21 attempting to roll back aggression of some form<sup>52</sup>

From this list, a number of methodological decisions narrowed my case selection to three cases occurring during the Bosnian crisis and the single case of Iraq. Firstly I narrowed my choice down to those in which the use of military force was a considerable element of the threat package, thus ruling out those, such as, Haiti and Libya, which were primarily sanction-based. The reason for this is my contention that cases where military assets are on the line have the potential to be more divisive than economic sanctions and thus one is able to better observe the coalitional dynamics that form the basis of this study<sup>53</sup>.

From the remaining cases, I sought to isolate those cases in which there was a strong will amongst a group of states to reach a certain political *end* in which coercive diplomacy was the *means*. To this end, the latter two Bosnian cases were used given

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<sup>52</sup> Note that the Libya case involved coercive diplomacy aimed at dissuading support for terrorism and acquisition of WMDs as part of the same package

<sup>53</sup> This is a point made by Lisa Martin who argues that a considerably greater deal of effort (in the way of carrots and sticks) is required to gain consensus on the use of force than on the implementation of economic sanctions (Martin, L *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: 1992) p 247)

my contention that the will to create an *ideal policy* will increase over time as other weaker but less risky variants fail<sup>54</sup>. The inclusion of the first Bosnian case, coming earlier on in the crisis, was motivated by a wish to determine whether this contention was correct. I selected the cases so as to minimise the bias against the coalition implementing an *ideal policy* that comes from the wish to at least attempt to achieve the ends without such a risky tactic. If my contention is correct, I would expect to see the *ideal policy* fail to emerge in the first Bosnia case for these reasons. The Iraq case was chosen given the sheer scale of the Iraqi transgression which would again, I contended, have created a strong will to act. My case selection is thus intentionally unrepresentative of the complete universe of cases listed in the appendix which include a mix in terms of severity of transgression and position within a crisis timeline. This I deemed an appropriate approach for a study that seeks to ascertain whether, even when the *ideal policy* is most desirable, is it still blocked by CAP?

#### Methodological limitations

Other studies of coercive diplomacy draw conclusions about the strategy based on the success or failure of the engagement. Here I do not look at whether the strategy was successful at each engagement but rather look at whether the coalitional coercive agent was able to carry out the *ideal policy* which would then, according to Jakobsen, lead to success. In this sense I bypass many of the methodological pitfalls of studies

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<sup>54</sup> Another advantage of the Bosnia case was that it allowed me to include the influence of “experiential learning”<sup>54</sup> in the analysis, which is to say the likelihood of an adversary’s reaction to the coercers in say exchange seven being influenced by his prior knowledge of their actions in exchanges one to six. Analysing all of the exchanges allowed me to trace and take account for such a learning process over time in a way that might be lost by simply analysing isolated exchanges across a number of cases. (See Leng, R. J., “When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (September 1983): 379-419)



of success such as the difficulty of proving causality given that many of the critical variables are psychological ones having to do with the perceptions and judgement of the target'<sup>55</sup>. What this does mean, however, is that the study must be extremely sensitive to instances in which there was a divergence from the *ideal policy* due to tactical choice rather than coalitional constraint. In this sense, it is important to remain sensitive to the fact that “coercive diplomacy is highly context-dependent”<sup>56</sup> and thus the line of causality between the existence of a coalition and the enactment of the *ideal policy* may be difficult to generalise from.

Linked to this, are the certain limitations that come from assessing the threat issued on a simple scale depending on its coercive power (in my study from a “minimum” to a “maximum” threat) and drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of coalitions based on such a scale. As Robert Art points out the degree of force needed in order to demonstrate resolution and establish credibility can vary enormously from one case to another and will depend on a number of factors including the nature of the coercer’s goals and the military capabilities and intensity of interests of the target<sup>57</sup>

A third potential methodological problem, and one which troubles many studies of coercion, is the self-selection bias that affects the issue of case selection. This problem was first identified by Fearon<sup>58</sup> who sought to illustrate, in relation to deterrence, the “implications of states’ strategic self-selection into international disputes”. The overall message of Fearon’s work is that whenever the cases we observe are the results of strategic decisions, we must be careful to ensure that we

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<sup>55</sup> George *ibid* p14

<sup>56</sup> George and Simons *ibid.* p270

<sup>57</sup> Art. R and Cronin,, 2003 *Ibid.* P.9

<sup>58</sup> Fearon J. “Selection Effects and Deterrence” *International Interactions*, 28 (2002) pp. 5-29

understand the selection process that produced that case. For studies that focus on the outcome (success or failure) of a coercive diplomacy, such a selection effect can greatly bias the conclusions drawn. Although my study does not focus on whether the coercive diplomacy exchange was successful for the coercer or not, the selection bias may still be influential in terms of how crises are self-selected by adversaries.

Unlike deterrence, coercive diplomacy is largely reactive so the crises emerge due to the decisions of the adversary. In that sense they 'self-select' the cases that will become coercive diplomacy exchanges. This has a number of potential ramifications for this study. Firstly, in carrying out a breach of international law, for example, the adversary will be aware that its actions will produce a response from the international community. They may not know exactly what this response will be but they will have likely made an estimate. Thus in deciding to carry out the act, adversaries show themselves willing to confront an international backlash and thus are potentially less likely to buckle in the face of coercive diplomacy. For this study, it could be the case that, given their knowledge of this self-selecting process, certain coercing states believe the likelihood of success in the coercive diplomacy to be low and thus become more risk-averse and less inclined to support large threats than they would in other instances of coalitional action. Secondly, the adversary's analysis of the potential international backlash may extend to an assessment of the likelihood of a coalition remaining cohesive enough to construct a robust threat package. In other words, the adversary may self-select those transgressions which he believes will lead to a split

coalition that would thus be unable to construct a strong threat package (or an *ideal policy*)<sup>59</sup>.

In terms of sources a key problem that affects such a study of modern crises is the lack of primary material that relates to the internal workings of the states. This is a particular issue in this study given that my focus is on the decision-making process and the various positions taken by key players. It is likely that the true nature of many of these deliberations will only come to light in the future with the publication of personal memoirs and the declassification of internal government documents.<sup>60</sup> Additionally, it is difficult to accurately trace the bargaining process that occurs between coalition members during crises given that much of the discussions relating to this take place 'off the record' behind the scenes.

Mindful of such potential methodological pitfalls, the following chapter applies the theoretical framework to the four cases under investigation.

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<sup>59</sup> This was almost certainly part of Sadaam Hussein's calculus in his invasion of Kuwait (to be discussed below)> It seems likely that he believed that the Arab/Western divide could be exploited to the extent that any international coalition would be unable to formulate a strong coercive package against him. Without such an assumption, he may not have instigated the crisis in the first place.

<sup>60</sup> Jakobsen, 1998 *Ibid* p 9

## Chapter Four – Case Studies

In this chapter I analyse the ability of coalitions to implement the *ideal policy* in four historical cases: one from the first Gulf War of 1990-91 and three from the Bosnian conflict of 1992-95. Each of these engagements qualified as coercive diplomacy exchanges as they contained the following elements: 1) A *demand* sent by the coercers to the adversary, that calls for the cessation or rolling back of aggression already perpetrated and 2) a threat to punishment in the event of non-compliance. For each, I analyse the ability of coalitions to formulate i) a threat, ii) capabilities for that threat and iii) a deadline for compliance.

### **The Bosnian War 1992-1995**

Western involvement in the conflict in Bosnia began in mid-1992 and culminated three years later with the launching of Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995. Here I analyse three instances of coercive diplomacy that took place during the war, one from August 1992, a second from February 1994 and a third from August 1995.

#### Case 1 – The Death Camps

##### *Narrative*

By early July 1992, the ‘airport agreement’, reached the previous month, had begun to unravel as the situation on the ground in Bosnia deteriorated. Despite the warring parties generally conceding to the previous request to concentrate all heavy weaponry

in UN approved areas, the BSA were increasingly impeding the transportation of humanitarian aid and had begun renewing their periodic attacks on Sarajevo airport. A meeting of the G7 in early July produced a number of firm statements indicating that the P3 would, through the Security Council, “consider other measures, not excluding military means”<sup>61</sup> to achieve key humanitarian goals in the region. Yet such threats did not progress beyond these statements during July with the only tangible alteration in force provision coming through an increase of just 500 troops; a change passed on July 13 as Resolution 764. A subsequent cease-fire agreement reached under the supervision of the EC/UN conference lasted all of 48 hours before being violated.

The impetus for the coercive strategy analysed here came in early August when reports of the existence of ‘death camps’ in Bosnia were circulated by the news media. Such was the international condemnation of what appeared to be the beginnings of another Holocaust on European soil, that Western leaders came under increasing pressure to cultivate a more decisive strategy in the region. It was the Bush administration who, facing domestic pressure from key political figures in his own party and particularly from the Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton, initiated discussions within the Security Council towards the adoption of a more forceful resolution. The consultations over this draft ran for a week from 6 August until its adoption, as resolution 770, on August 13 1992. This document set out the terms of the second major attempt at coercive diplomacy made by the Western governments in Bosnia

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<sup>61</sup> “Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia, Adopted at the Summit of the Group of Seven, Munich 6-8 July 1992”, Trifunovska S. (ed.) *Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994)

The demand, stipulated in the resolution, called for all parties to “stop fighting immediately” and allow “unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prisons and detention centres” for the Red Cross. The threatened action for non-compliance contained in paragraph 12, called on “states to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all means necessary to facilitate in accordance with the United Nations the delivery...of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. No deadline for compliance was stipulated beyond the demand for fighting to cease “immediately”.

In the event, the coercive threat stipulated in Resolution 770 was dissolved in the period immediately following its adoption. Transatlantic disagreements over what the “all necessary means” clause should entail led to the question of force being delayed until the EC-UN Conference held in London on 26-7 August. The agreement reached at this Conference was not buttressed with any threat of force and when the Serbs “unsurprisingly failed to honour the London agreement” no military reprisals were forthcoming to punish such non-compliance. The military presence was eventually increased in line with the weakest form of threat discussed above as resolution 776, passed on 14 September, which authorised “in implementation of paragraph 2 of Resolution 770, the enlargement of UNPRFOR mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

## *Analysis*

- Threat

The coercive strategy to be analysed here was that encapsulated within resolution 770. An analysis of the deliberations amongst the P3 in the run-up to this resolution indicates that the threat set out in that resolution was one of three possible choices that were on the table at the time.

The strongest of these involved operating with the Bosnian government and using airpower to forcibly open up relief corridors, provide security for humanitarian convoys and punish Bosnian Serbs for creating any impediment to the provision of relief supplies. Such a force would require a resolution that mandated “all necessary means”<sup>62</sup> to insure relief supplies got through – a stipulation that had been previously used in the Gulf War. The Americans hope was that “such a far-reaching authorization for the use of force, backed up by credible preparations, would intimidate the Serbian forces fighting in Bosnia into allowing the relief supplies to reach their destinations unhindered”<sup>63</sup>. This position was voiced by senior members of the US administration such as Senator Richard E. Lugar, the Republicans’ “main voice on foreign policy on Capitol Hill”, who “favoured the use of air strikes by planes based on American carriers in the Mediterranean Sea against large Serbian artillery”<sup>64</sup>. Such a robust plan was countered however by other P5 members who pushed for a more cautious approach. British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd,

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<sup>62</sup> Lewis, P., “Conflict in the Balkans: British and French Resist Bush Calls on Force in Bosnia”, *New York Times*, 8 August 1992.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Apple, R.W. “Conflict in the Balkans: Few Choices, Fewer Hopes; Bush, Under Pressure, Now Talks About Guns”, *New York Times*, 7 August 1992

repeatedly indicated that he saw the air strike option as “very extreme”<sup>65</sup> and, along with other European allies such as Germany, preferred to pin hopes on the looming London conference to resolve the crisis.<sup>66</sup>

A less forceful option involved using a multinational force to bolster the UN presence already on the ground and, under a UN mandate, forcibly secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies. This proposal was however also deemed too forceful by key P5 members. Both Britain and France, though understanding “the need for a show of force to demonstrate that they were not bluffing”, indicated that they would not support the high-level force suggested by the Americans, arguing that it would “create more problems than it resolves”<sup>67</sup> The option these nations supported was the ‘weakest’ of those proposed and involved bolstering the existing UN force. Britain and France favoured the expansion of the UNPRFOR mandate and personnel to include a very limited protection for supply convoys. Even this was opposed by the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali who wanted UN forces to be minimised in the Balkans in order to free them up for other missions in the third world.<sup>68</sup>

Of these options, it was the ‘middle’ option that was eventually formalised in Resolution 770. The “all means necessary” phrase was included, as was its expansion to “wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, but so too was the stipulation that any forceful action would need to take place “in coordination with the United Nations”. Yet the terms of the Resolution were so vague as to make this the

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>66</sup> Bonyon, M “Hurd rules out air strikes on Serboan attackers positions” *The Times (London)*, 5 August 1992

<sup>67</sup> Lewis *Ibid*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*



‘weakest’ variant of the ‘middle’ option. There was no specification of which country would carry out forceful actions or what exactly their mandate would be.

In this instance, the coalitional split occurred between the ‘P3’ of Britain, the US and France<sup>69</sup> with the Secretary General acting as a *de facto* coalition member. In the event, Britain and France vetoed the more forceful options tabled by the US. The ‘lowest common denominator’ option among the allies would have been the expansion of the UN force and this would likely have been adopted were it not for the opinion of the Secretary General. Even though the ‘middle option’ was therefore chosen, it was made so vague as to make it a largely impotent threat. Such impotency, and the underlying CAP, became evident in the period following the resolution when disagreements amongst the US and Europe impeded the formation of a force in line with the resolution. Thus, coalitional disagreements led to a moderate threat, in the first instance, that subsequently would become the weakest variant when the time came for implementation

- Capabilities

Given the vagueness of the threatened action, the second aspect of the credible threat – the provision of capabilities for its execution – was not clarified at all.

An analysis of the statements being made by the key coalitional partners reveals that the commitment to troops varied according to the type of action that would eventually

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<sup>69</sup> As is often the case in Security Council issues effecting Europe predominantly, the P3 would first meet to arrive at a consensus before then presenting plans to the Chinese and Russia and finally to the other ten members of the Security Council. In this instance, the coalitional split occurred before discussion could proceed to the other members of the Security Council.

be used. For a multilateral force above and beyond the UN deployment already in Bosnia, there were no firm offers of troops. The US had repeatedly maintained that it would not be providing any ground troops for operations in Bosnia and would only consider using its air and sea power to support a European ground operation. Other coalitional partners also expressed resistance to deploying national forces. Germany, conscious of its history of invasion in the area, ruled out its troops whilst the UK Prime Minister John Major made it clear that he was also reluctant to send British troops. The British position was one of typical risk-aversion. As one former minister said at the time - "People want to do something as soon as they see lots of children being shot at and one can understand that. But it's when you get down to the first body bags being brought back with British soldiers in them, that's when public opinion would turn against it"<sup>70</sup>. Russia's unwillingness to offer up any capabilities arose from a wish not to fight another Slavic nation<sup>71</sup>.

For the 'weaker' option – the beefing up of the UN force already on the ground - some troops were offered. A total of 5000 troops were offered by coalition members: 2000 from France, 1800 from Britain and 1200 from Canada<sup>72</sup>. Even though this amounted to "only half of what the most optimistic military planners thought were required to get the relief through"<sup>73</sup>

So for the actual threat that was formalised in the resolution, no capabilities had been offered at the time of its adoption.

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<sup>70</sup> Brown, 'Politicians divided on choices over Bosnia' *The Independent* August 5, 1992

<sup>71</sup> Lewis. *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> Judah 'UN ready to expand Bosnia peace force', *Times*, August 27 1992

<sup>73</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *Ibid* p 78

- o Deadline

The wording of Resolution 770 demanded that the parties to the conflict cease fighting “immediately”, yet this clearly constituted more an expression of the overall sentiment of the Council rather than a realistic timetable for compliance. In this sense, there was no deadline issued as such. An analysis of the deliberations of the Council members indicates that a clear deadline, suggesting either a time-frame or a date for compliance, was not formally suggested by any party.

*Discussion*

The summary table for this case looks like this:

	Threat	Capabilities	Deadline
	Low Compromise	No capability offered	Weak
Predicted Outcome?	Yes	Yes	Yes
- <i>CAP arise?</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
- <i>Overcome?</i>	No	No	

In terms of the threat issued it could be argued that it was only really the objections of the Secretary General that prevented the states involved choosing the ‘weakest’ option – that is the strengthening of the UN force already on the ground. In order to be palatable to those states, however, the middle option was left extremely vague – hence its classification as the weakest variant of the middle option.

It would seem that coalitional restrictions on the creation of a deadline – defined as a firm deadline being vetoed by less enthusiastic allies – did not arise in this case. At no

point was such a firm deadline proposed, thus suggesting a degree of consensus on the inappropriateness of such a stipulation amongst the allies.

Capability provision, appeared to suffer from the classic collective action problem as predicted by the CAP theorists. The cessation of the hostilities, the demand that the combatants cease fighting 'immediately', constituted a collective good in that all coalition allies could benefit from the improvement in the international security situation and from the removal of the domestic (not to mention moral) headache caused by the discovery of the 'death camps'. No one coalition member was willing to provide good. As one European diplomat was reported as saying at the time, "plenty of countries want forceful action, but not so many want to be shot at"<sup>74</sup>

#### Bosnian case 2: Marketplace massacre

##### *Narrative*

Despite the intense fighting and shelling of Sarajevo throughout the latter part of 1993 and early 1994, little mention of forceful attempts at intervening in the conflict were made by the Western powers. It took the public outcry following two events in early February to galvanise the West into formulating a coercive threat package aimed at stemming the violence.

The first event came on February 4<sup>th</sup> when mortar shells hit a line of people waiting for food leaving nine dead and fifteen wounded. This was followed, the next day, by

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<sup>74</sup> Lewis *Ibid.*

another massacre, this time involving a mortar shell striking a busy marketplace in Sarajevo killing sixty-eight. Following these attacks, it took just four days for a coercive threat package to be formulated. The initial official call for action came from the Secretary General who, on February 6, wrote letters to the both the President of the Security Council, and the Secretary-General of NATO requesting that preparations be made to launch air strikes<sup>75</sup>. Two days later, the EU met in Brussels and issued a statement<sup>76</sup> indicating that members would take "all the means necessary, including the use of air power," to force Serbian forces to lift the siege. The eventual coercive package was formulated on February 9<sup>th</sup> by NATO. The statement demanded "the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons (including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons) of the Bosnian Serb forces located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo"<sup>77</sup>. The deadline for compliance was set as "ten days from 2400 GMT 10th February 1994", and the threat for non-compliance was specified as "NATO air strikes" aimed at any such heavy weaponry still inside the exclusion zone.

Following the NATO statement the BSA, in keeping with a pattern of reaction that had successfully deterred coercive action up until this point, made a number of counter-threats<sup>78</sup>. The Soviet Union, opposed to air strikes from the beginning but without a voice in NATO, called a meeting of the UN Security Council aimed at possibly removing the threat of NATO air strikes. The meeting, which took place

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<sup>75</sup> "Letter Dated 6 February 1994 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1994/131, 7 February 1994 with Annex including "Letter dated 6 February From the Secretary-General addresses to the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Association"

<sup>76</sup> Smith, J. "European Union Issues a Warning", *New York Times*, 8 February 1994

<sup>77</sup> 'Decisions taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session' 9 February 1994, accessed at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940209a.htm> on 23 May 2007

<sup>78</sup> Silber L. and Little, A., *The Death of Yugoslavia* (Penguin Books, 1997) pp 343-4, 350-3.

between 14-15 February, allowed a number of states to voice their opposition to the NATO threat citing the potential risks involved, particularly to UN forces already on the ground. Despite this, however, no resolution was passed that contradicted the statement made by NATO. Failing to achieve UN support, Russia, in consultation with the UK, devised an alternative plan that could achieve NATO aims without the use of air strikes. Specifically, the plan involved Russia deploying 400 troops into the areas of Sarajevo that NATO was demanding the BSA retreat from. This gave the BSA a guarantee that the Bosnian army would be unable to capitalise on their withdrawal. Following this offer, the BSA withdrew in line with NATO demands and, following the formal assessment of this withdrawal by the UN Security Council on February 20, it was decided that air-strikes would not be required.

In this case, the market killing created the domestic political pressure to compel Western forces to make a credible threat to the Serbs. As one senior UN official stated on the day following the market attack, "we have the political will to use force against attacks on Sarajevo now" citing the domestic support amongst most Western countries arising from the public outcry to the attack<sup>79</sup>. It was at this stage of the Bosnian conflict that the Western coalition appeared eager to create a credible threat package that might approximate an *ideal policy*. An analysis of the negotiation process shows how this was achieved.

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<sup>79</sup> Lewis, P 'Terror in Sarajevo: UN seeks power for Bosnia strikes' *The New York Times*, February 7 1994

- Threat

In this case, there was one official threat that was tabled: the use of NATO airpower to destroy any heavy weaponry left in the exclusion zone after the deadline. The coalitional action problems emerged between those who wished to utilise this threat and those who did not.

The initial official threat proposal came from the Secretary General who, in his letter addressed to the Secretary General of NATO, requested that he “take action to obtain, at the earliest possible date, a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorise the commander-in-chief of Nato's southern command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city”.<sup>80</sup> The exact terms of the eventual threat were then established by France who called for all heavy weapons to be excluded from a thirty mile radius of Sarajevo and those not removed to be subject to air strikes once the deadline was reached.

The debate amongst the coalitional partners – this time including members of NATO – was whether or not to issue these strikes. Coalitional action problems did arise in the formulation of the threat as certain of the NATO members expressed reservations about the use of air-strikes. Britain, with troops already on the ground as part of the UN force along with a UK general who was leading the negotiations, was reluctant

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<sup>80</sup> ‘Boutros Ghali calls on Nato to step in’ *The Financial Times (London)* February 9 1994

from the start as was Spain, also fearing for its troops<sup>81</sup>. Equally, Greece, with its ties to Serbia, was outspoken in its opposition to the strikes with Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias stating on the day of the EU meeting, "Nobody will achieve anything with a military action."

In theory, the Secretary-General retained the authority to approve the actual launch of air strikes had that occurred thus making him a de facto coalition member. From the letter Boutros-Ghali sent to the Secretary-General of NATO on 6 February it is clear that he fully supported the use of air-strikes and so did not put any negative pressure on the coalition.

Placing some degree of in-direct pressure on the voting NATO members was Russia who, with historical ties to the Serbs and Serbia, retained, throughout the negotiations the threat to call a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to try to block air strikes<sup>82</sup>. Up until the day of the EU meeting, Moscow maintained that bombing Serbian positions would be the "least successful" response to the Market bombing<sup>83</sup>. The Russians did propose an alternative to either doing nothing or launching air strikes. The proposal stated that the United Nations add several thousand peacekeepers to its forces in Sarajevo and negotiate the voluntary withdrawal of the Serb artillery ringing the city.<sup>84</sup> This was not an alternative threat, but rather a means to achieve the ends

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<sup>81</sup> Sciolino, E. 'Clinton rules out quick response to Bosnia attack', *The New York Times*, February 7 1994

<sup>82</sup> Williams, D. 'US backs UN Plan for Bosnia Air strikes; Strategy proposed to counter Serb artillery' *The Washington Post* February 8 1994

<sup>83</sup> Cohen, R 'Conflict in the Balkans; European Union fails deadline to lift the siege' *The New York Times* February 8 1994.

<sup>84</sup> Williams, D 'Clinton seeks NATO deadline for removal of Serb artillery' *The Washington Post* February 9 1994.



without the use of coercive diplomacy. The plan failed to prevent the issuing of a threat.

Despite the presence of these varying viewpoints regarding the desirability of a coercive threat, it was the 'maximum' threat on the table at the time was eventually adopted.

- Capabilities

Capabilities to carry out this threat had been made available at the time the threat was made. Indeed, NATO heads of state had confirmed at their meeting held just under a month before the market place shelling that the alliance was ready "under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina". At the time the threat was made, NATO already had more than sufficient air capabilities across the Adriatic to carry out the threat that were already in the area policing the Bosnian no-fly zone – with "NATO bases in Italy... crowded with American, British, French, Dutch and Turkish attack aircraft, backed by US, British and French carrier-borne aircraft". It was believed at the time that such a force could "smoothly shift to this new role"<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Carter, D. 'Air strikes could open the road to negotiated end of Sarajevo siege' *The Times (London)* February 9 1994

- Deadline

The EU meeting that occurred the day before that of NATO indicated a split amongst key European allies over the issue of the deadline. The EU members, unable to agree on the French request for an ultimatum, issued a vague demand to the Serbs that called for the "immediate" lifting of the Serb siege of Sarajevo using "all the means necessary". Following this meeting, the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe told reporters that he believed the demand for the "immediate lifting" should be made more specific saying that "In my view, it means a matter of days,"<sup>86</sup> The issue of timing was an important one for certain of the NATO allies given that some, including France, Britain and Spain, had troops on the ground in Bosnia, who would need to "hunker down in event of NATO air strikes"<sup>87</sup>. Despite these reservations, the deadline included in the NATO threat package called for the removal of all heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone by "ten days from 2400 GMT 10th February 1994"<sup>88</sup>

### *Discussion*

In this case, something approximating the *ideal policy* was achieved. The summary table for the case looks like this:

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<sup>86</sup> Williams, D. 'US backs UN Plan for Bosnia Air strikes; Strategy proposed to counter Serb artillery' *The Washington Post* February 8 1994

<sup>87</sup> Williams, D 'Clinton seeks NATO deadline for removal of Serb artillery' *The Washington Post* February 9 1994.

<sup>88</sup> 'Decisions taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session' 9 February 1994, accessed at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940209a.htm> on 23 May 2007

	Threat	Capabilities	Deadline
	Maximum	All capabilities offered	Firm
Predicted Outcome?	No	No	No
- CAP arise?	Yes	No	Yes
- Overcome?	Yes	-	Yes

Each of the 16 members of the NATO alliance could had the power to veto any agreement made by the organisation and thus any member was a potential weak link in forming the coercive diplomacy package. In the event, three states, Britain, Canada and Greece, showed a marked reluctance, in the run up to the February 10<sup>th</sup> meeting, to support NATO air-strikes. Greece, an ally of Serbia, openly threatened to veto any bombing but ultimately only dissociated itself from the ultimatum without blocking it. Equally, between the bombing and the vote, both Canada and the UK were persuaded to change their views and support the coalition action. This about face can be seen from the statements of officials from both countries. Initially, British officials were vocal in their negative attitude towards military action with Defense Secretay Malcom Rifkind stating that despite the atrocity “the rest of the world can't send armies into a cruel and vicious civil war”<sup>89</sup> yet just three days later the British Foreign Secretary was speaking out in favour of the air strikes, stating that "the balance of risk and rewards has shifted".<sup>90</sup> Equally, as late as February 8<sup>th</sup> the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated his government’s belief that “air strikes are not the way to deal with the problem at this time until all other forces of action fail”<sup>91</sup>. Yet when it came to the actual vote, Canada supported the action asserting in a statement "Canada worked closely with other NATO countries to ensure that a positive response to the

<sup>89</sup> Williams, D ‘Outraged’ by Shelling, Clinton Says: ‘We Rule Out Nothing’ *The Washington Post*, February 6 1994

<sup>90</sup> Cohen, R, ‘NATO near consensus on Sarajevo ultimatum’ *The New York Times*, February 9 1994

<sup>91</sup> Fife ‘All ‘barbarity’ but no action: Canada, allies still debating over Bosnia’ *Tornoto Sun* February 8 1994

(UN) secretary general (Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request) would contribute to preventing further Sarajevo tragedies”.

What were the mechanisms by which these CAP were overcome? A key underlying factor in this case was the desire to maintain the credibility and reassert the role of NATO. Just under one month before the market place massacre, on January 10 and 11, there had been a meeting of NATO heads of state in which a new direction for the alliance had been discussed and its utility reaffirmed. This would be NATO's first test following this meeting and, as such, certain key allies were keen to show that the alliance was capable of more than mere words. As one senior NATO diplomat said: 'There was a recognition that there was a risk to the alliance . . . . That led people to say 'We have got to come to terms with this now'.<sup>92</sup> This was certainly the justification put forward by Britain. Douglas Hurd, the UK foreign secretary stated specifically at the time that Britain had backed the ultimatum because “there is a strong British interest in maintaining the strength and solidarity of NATO”.<sup>93</sup>

If concern for NATO provided an underlying incentive towards action, it was French leadership that provided the catalyst. Such French leadership was felt through three channels that approximated to three of Russett and Sullivan's<sup>94</sup> mechanisms for overcoming CAP. Firstly, by strongly advocating a robust, coercive reaction to the marketplace bombings, the strong international pressure for action that had built up since the atrocities was given a channel which, once in the public domain, became

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<sup>92</sup> Barber, 'Sarajevo Ultimatum: Nato lays to rest its past ambiguity on Bosnia' *Financial Times* 10 February 1994

<sup>93</sup> Stephens, 'Britain 'bowed to US pressure' over Bosnia ultimatum' *The Financial Times* February 11 1994.

<sup>94</sup> Russett, Bruce M. and John Sullivan. 1971. "Collective Goods and International Organizations," *International Organisation*. 25:4, pp. 845-65.

difficult to oppose. This was especially true as France, being the country with the largest UN contingent in Bosnia (amounting to 6,000, nearly half of the UN total) was able to deflect the argument used by 'weak link' states that any coercive action could endanger troops already on the ground. Thus "social pressure" was placed on these members given that France could counter Canadian and British arguments that fear of retaliation against its soldiers outweighed the ignominy of further inaction.<sup>95</sup>

The second mechanism by which French leadership impacted on the cost-benefit analysis of the 'weak-link states' was through the manipulation of incentives. In this case, France provided the rest of the coalition with a clear negative incentive by threatening to withdraw its troops from the region. This would have precipitated a crisis for the rest of the coalition. As French foreign minister Alain Juppe stated on the eve of the NATO meeting "If the alliance is incapable of making a decision, we will ask ourselves if we can continue uselessly to expose our soldiers,"<sup>96</sup> Thus, just as had been the case with the US in Iraq, the French used the hint of carrying out unilateral action in the event of non-agreement by the coalition to put pressure on the 'weak-links' in the alliance at crucial points.

This negative incentive incentivised particularly the US to support the threat given that the administration faced the prospect of introducing US troops in the event of such a withdrawal.. Once on-board, the US was able to exercise its soft-power influence to put pressure on the 'weak-link' states to comply. According to reports at the time, Britain agreed to the coercive threat package "only after a blunt warning

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<sup>95</sup> Koring 'Canada aggress to ultimatum: NATO to launch air strikes unless Serbs withdraw heavy guns' *The Globe and Mail (Canada)* February 10 1994.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*

from the US that refusal would permanently damage the western alliance”<sup>97</sup> Equally, Canada chose to back the proposal only in the face of pressure “particularly from the United States in the form of two telephone calls from President Bill Clinton”<sup>98</sup>

Thus the initial French leadership broadened into a "Franco-American joint leadership," and it was from “this partnership” that it became possible to broaden the effort into an “overall consensus in the 16-nation alliance”<sup>99</sup>

### Case 3 – Operation Deliberate Force

#### *Narrative*

The final attempt at coercive diplomacy by a Western coalition in Bosnia took over three months in its formulation. The impetus for the attempt came from the taking hostage of four hundred UN personnel at the end of May, the fall of several of the UN designated ‘safe areas’ throughout July and finally the spark - another market place massacre in Sarajevo at the start of September.

Beginning in July the Serbs launched fresh offensives on UN safe-areas. Srebrenica fell to the Serbs on July 11 after a five day assault, and over the following weeks, news began to emerge of mass executions of Bosnian men and boys. It was the fall of this key safe area and the assertion by Mladic that he planned to attack other safe

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<sup>97</sup> Stephens, ‘Britain ‘bowed to US pressure’ over Bosnia ultimatum’ *The Financial Times* February 11 1994.

<sup>98</sup> Koring ‘Canada agrees to ultimatum: NATO to launch air strikes unless Serbs withdraw heavy guns’ *The Globe and Mail (Canada)* February 10 1994.

<sup>99</sup> Cohen, R, ‘NATO near consensus on Sarajevo ultimatum’ *The New York Times*, February 9 1994

areas including Zepa<sup>100</sup> that compelled the French president Jacques Chirac to call on the West to take military action to protect the remaining safe areas. Failure to more adequately protect these safe areas would, he said, force France to withdraw its peacekeeping troops<sup>101</sup>. In the face of such pressure, a meeting convened on 20<sup>th</sup> July in London between Contact Group members as well as representatives from the UN, NATO and the EU. It was at this conference that it was decided that any attack on Gozrade would precipitate a “substantial and decisive response” and, according to a statement read following the conference, there existed “strong support for this to include the use of airpower”<sup>102</sup>. The credibility of this threat was backed up by the deployment starting on June 3<sup>rd</sup> of a 10,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force. The agreements made at the London conference were formalised at two NATO meetings on July 25<sup>th</sup> and August 1<sup>st</sup>. At the first of these, the deterrent threat was extended to all of the remaining safe areas.

On August 9 a memorandum was signed setting out the new rules of engagement for NATO on the ground in Bosnia. The new rules of engagement delegated considerably more decisive power to the UN and NATO generals on the ground in Bosnia, replacing the previous and more cumbersome ‘dual-key’ system which required that authorisation for all NATO operations on the ground had to be given by the UN in New York. This new system was put into action following another market place shelling in Sarajevo, which left 37 civilians dead on 28 August. Just as it had in February 1994, it was this atrocity that compelled NATO to employ its hitherto deterrent threat as part

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<sup>100</sup> Daadler I *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p68

<sup>101</sup> Whitney, C ‘Conflict in the Balkans: In Paris France asks allied forces to help hold ‘safe areas’ *The New York Times* July 13 1995

<sup>102</sup> Reuters, ‘Conflict in the Balkans; Excerpts from a statement on Bosnia’ *New York Times*, 22 July 1995

of a coercive diplomacy threat package aimed at compelling the Serbs to once again reposition their military assets to a distance at which they could no longer threaten Sarajevo. The immediate response to the massacre was purely coercive however as, on August 30, air strikes were launched against Serbian positions around Sarajevo, marking the start of Operation Deliberate Force. The threat of further air strikes became an element of coercive diplomacy package when, on September 1<sup>st</sup>, at a meeting between General Janvier and BSA leader Mladic, the Serbs were given an ultimatum, demanding that they cease all attacks on safe areas and withdraw their heavy weapons to beyond a 20km exclusion zone around Sarajevo or face further, more extensive air strikes. The deadline, made public in a press statement<sup>103</sup> on September 3<sup>rd</sup>, was set at 2300 local time on September 4<sup>th</sup>.

When a letter<sup>104</sup> sent by Mladic to Janvier confirmed that he would not be complying with NATO demands, NATO bombing resumed, continuing until 14<sup>th</sup> September at which point the US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke had obtained a document signed by both the BSA and the Serb leadership in Belgrade promising full compliance with NATO demands. Having been verified over the following week, Operation Deliberate Force was ended formally on September 21

Thus in this case, the coercive threat was agreed upon in mid-July at the London Conference and then formalised by NATO at its meeting on August 1<sup>st</sup>. Initially used as part of a policy of deterrence aimed at dissuading the Serbs from taking over the remaining 'safe' zones, this threat was added to an deadline on September 1<sup>st</sup> to be

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<sup>103</sup> Atkinson, R, 'New raids threatened in Bosnia, NATO ultimatum breaks impasse among commanders', *The Washington Post* September 3 1995

<sup>104</sup> Atkinson, R, 'In almost losing its resolve, NATO alliance forum itself', *Washington Post*, 16 November 1995



used as part of a coercive diplomacy threat package. Capabilities to carry out the threat came from the NATO aircraft already in the area.

- o Threat

The threat that was eventually used as part of the coercive diplomacy package in early September was agreed upon seven weeks before at the London conference held on the 16<sup>th</sup> July. In the run-up to the conference, and following the fall of Srebrenica, President Chirac of France put pressure on the other allies by stating that either the Serb offensives were met with a decisive military response or France would contemplate pulling its troops out of UNPROFOR. The military response suggested by France involved sending in ground troops to retake the safe areas by force. This would have led to the removal of UNPROFOR completely – a move that would have in turn entailed the US in particular being called on to provide anywhere up to around 25,000 U.S. troops to supervise such a withdrawal<sup>105</sup>. Clinton had repeatedly stated that the US was unwilling to put troops on the ground in Bosnia and overall there was little support for the French plan – a point noted by Chirac on the eve of the London conference, when he stated that “for the moment, we are alone,”<sup>106</sup> Thus in order to avoid accepting the costs of the French option “which could have been politically devastating for the administration, the Americans were forced to take the lead.”<sup>107</sup>. This involved pushing hard for the coercive use of airpower as a way of deterring the Serbs from threatening the remaining safe areas<sup>108</sup>. With US and French leadership, any reservations held by other NATO members, particularly the British who feared

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<sup>105</sup> Dobb's M. 'New US role in Bosnia is welcomed in Europe' *The Washington Post* Aug 31 1995

<sup>106</sup> Devroy, A 'Clinton Agrees to Plan defense of 'safe areas' *The Washington Post* July 15 1995

<sup>107</sup> Dobb's *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Daalder 2000 *Ibid* p69

that military action would put its own peacekeepers in even greater danger, were seemingly overcome. By the time the agreements made at the London conference were formalised by NATO on August 1<sup>st</sup> where there would reportedly be “no significant points of disagreement among the 16 NATO ambassadors<sup>109</sup>”.

- Capabilities

At the time of the threat, the capabilities to carry out air-strikes were already in the theatre given that NATO had already carried out bombing raids. The use of these capabilities was also freed from major CAP by the fact that the authorisation required to launch air-strikes had been streamlined in early August to remove the direct input of political figures. Under the revised system, the use of capabilities would be at the discretion of the NATO and UN commander on the ground. Under the new rules, Bosnia was split into two Zones of Authority (ZOA) meaning that AFSOUTH could respond to any attack on a safe area by hitting any target within their respective ZOA.

This loosening of the reins on the carrying out of the threat was, however, subject to coalitional disagreements. The US wanted to abandon the ‘dual-key’ procedure altogether but some European members, particularly the British, feared for their forces on the ground and wanted to retain more control over the use of force. The resulting alteration was a compromise in which the UN would retain some control. Whilst the Secretary General was taken out of the chain of command, the UN general would retain the ability to authorise or stop air-strikes in conjunction with the NATO commander.

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<sup>109</sup> Atkinson, R ‘NATO voes airstrikes to protect ‘safe areas’’, *The Washington Post* August 02 1995

- Deadline

The deadline, formed on 1<sup>st</sup> September then made public to the press on 3<sup>rd</sup> did not face CAP given that the decision to utilise strikes had been given over to the NATO and UN commanders on the ground and did not need to go through a further coalitional check. Between the two commanders with the authority to issue the deadline, Janvier and Smith, there were, however, disagreements as to the nature of the deadline. Whilst Janvier, favoured giving the Bosnian Serbs more time, Smith advocated a quick resumption of air attacks<sup>110</sup>. More specifically, according to a UN official at the time, "The United Nations wanted a 72-hour pause that would end Tuesday, while NATO favoured 48 hours"<sup>111</sup>. In the end, the deadline was set in accordance with the UN wishes but with a formal review of the situation after 48 hours.

### *Discussion*

	Threat	Capabilities	Deadline
	Maximum	Full	Firm
Predicted Outcome?	No	No	No
- CAP arise?	Yes	Yes	No
- Overcome?	Yes	Yes	Yes

In this case, the severity of the CAP were overcome by a number of underlying factors. Firstly, coalitional differences were simply not as stark as they had been in previous attempts. The kidnapping of the UN peacekeepers in May and the forceful overtaking of the safe areas meant that UNPROFOR troops, of which both Britain and

<sup>110</sup> Atkinson, R 'New Raids Threatened Bosnia; NATO ultimatum breaks impasse among commanders' *The Washington Post* September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1995

<sup>111</sup> Cohen, R, 'NATO Demands Serbs withdraw guns near Sarajevo' *The New York Times* September 4 1995

France had contributed significant numbers<sup>112</sup>, were in immediate danger. Secondly, a key element of the risk-perception of certain key coalition members, that had previously impeded their willingness to accept the use of air-strikes, had been removed. In late May 1995 the UK and France decided to re-group the UN personnel into more defensible positions. This meant they were far less threatened by the possibility of air-strikes and thus a significant element of their risk-perception was removed

Thirdly, CAP emerging over the use of capabilities and the deadline for compliance with the coercive threat were both mitigated by the fact that the NATO allies had previously streamlined the cumbersome U.N. chain of command for approval of the use of air-strikes. Such streamlining meant that coalitional action problems were minimised to those occurring between Janvier and Smith. What this effectively did, in Russett and Sullivan's terms, is "reduce the size of the group" making the decisions over the use of the threat. This meant that when disagreements, effectively CAP, arose, as they did over the exact nature of the deadline, a compromise solution could quickly be found. Thus CAP were overcome by the *de facto* reduction in the size of the 'coalition' to just the UN and NATO commanders on the ground.

As had occurred in the second Bosnia case (above) French leadership overcame the initial inertia of collective action. Firstly, France, once again, created the negative incentive of a threat to remove its troops from the theatre. Through this, France provided the coalition with a clear choice: either engage in a strong coercive threat package or deal with the consequences of the withdrawal of UN troops. Under a

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<sup>112</sup> Barbash, F 'Allied Military Chiefs Seek Bosnia Strategy' *The Washington Post* July 17 1995

NATO operational plan for assisting the withdrawal of the UN troops, approved on June 28th<sup>113</sup> as many as 25,000 US troops might be called into action. The US aversion to the latter option precipitated Clinton's subsequent pursuit of a leadership role in the crisis.

Secondly, French leadership also placed "social pressure" on the other members of the coalition. President Jacques Chirac frequently lambasted the United Nations and his Western allies, complaining of the international body's "congenital impotence" and accusing Western allies - by implication Britain and the United States - of "the kind of appeasement that led in the late 1930s to the rise of Adolf Hitler"<sup>114</sup>.

### **The First Gulf War**

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2 1990 began a process of crisis diplomacy that would eventually come to pit a 36-country strong coalition against an intransigent and defiant Saddam Hussein. The response of this coalition, led by the US, began with economic sanctions and defensive military deployments to Saudi Arabia aimed at dissuading Saddam from any attempt to push on from Kuwait into the hugely lucrative Ramallah Oil fields. It was towards the end of October that serious moves began to be made to develop the capability for an offensive military threat aimed at forcefully rolling back the Iraqi invasion. Thus the Western-led response to the Gulf crisis was a gradual increase in pressure on the Iraqi regime. As Secretary of State Baker states in his memoirs, US government actions in August 1990 were intended to

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<sup>113</sup> Bildt, C (1998) *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia* (London) p 41

<sup>114</sup> Cohen 1995 *Ibid*

“deter an Iraqi move into Saudi Arabia...[and undo] Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by the pursuit of a policy of coercive diplomacy against Saddam Hussein” – a policy that would “begin with diplomatic pressure, then add economic pressure...and finally move toward military pressure by gradually increasing American troop strength in the Gulf”<sup>115</sup>.

For the purposes of this study, it is the period in which the coercive diplomacy effort by the Western powers took on an offensive military dimension that is of interest: a period that began in earnest at the beginning of November and became official with the passage of Resolution 678 passed on 29<sup>th</sup> November. This formed the coercive package under investigation in this case study. The coercive threat specified as part of the resolution was to authorise member states to “use all necessary means to uphold and implement” the decisions previously made by the Security Council. The deadline for compliance was set as January 15, giving Iraq 45 days to restore the situation on the ground that prevailed before the crisis.

The failure to achieve Iraqi compliance with the demands set out in the resolution led to the initiation of the air war on January 17<sup>th</sup>. For the purposes of this study, this marks the end of coercive diplomacy against Iraq and the beginning of full coercion.

The Western handling of the Gulf crisis was seen as a success. Indeed, in the period following the crisis, it was thought that the Iraq model could set a new framework for the international handling of crises. How did coalitional dynamics play into this perceived success?

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<sup>115</sup> Baker, J. *The Politics of Diplomacy*, (Putnam, 1995) p. 277

- Threat

In the weeks before the passing of resolution 678 it is possible to discern five principal threat variants, increasing in their coercive power, that were on the table as potential threats.

The 'weakest' of the options was simply to delay the threat of force completely. Those who had, at least, leanings towards this option, included France and China and their position arose from a belief that a peaceful solution was still potentially possible and that sanctions should be given more time to work. One week before the resolution was passed, China made it clear that she saw force as an absolute last result, with Li Zhaoxing, China's foreign ministry spokesman explaining to reporters that ""As long as there is a gleam of hope for a peaceful settlement, unremitting efforts should be continued toward this,"<sup>116</sup>. Indeed, one analyst at the time was sceptical as to whether "some of the West Europeans", meaning particularly the French and Germans were intending to stall the definite threat of force indefinitely under the cover of waiting for the sanctions to work in order to "gain credit for standing up to aggression without really doing a lot about it"<sup>117</sup>. Even the Soviets, despite expounding a message of solidarity with the US, had reasons to stall the implementation of a threat of force. Keen to demonstrate that they could play an influential and responsible part in post cold-war politics yet, yet aware that, as one Soviet Official pointed out at the time, that influence was greatest whilst diplomats pursued non-forceful options, "because

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<sup>116</sup> Reuters 'Iraq is seen as Focus of Soviet-Chinese Talks' *The New York Times* November 23 1990

<sup>117</sup> Apple, R. W. 'The Nub Is Timing No Major U.S.-Soviet Rupture Seen, But Separate Focuses on Gulf Persist' *The New York Times* November 21 1990

the moment we resort to force, our role shrinks and the ones with the guns take charge."<sup>118</sup>

Of the options that included a mandate for force, the 'weakest' variant would issue a coercive threat without including specific authorisation to carry out that threat, thus requiring a further UN resolution in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. This lesser position was held by the Soviet Union – whose chief negotiator, Yevgeny Primakov, maintained that "authorizing the use of force should be approved only when the decision has been made to actually attack Iraq"<sup>119</sup>

A more robust threat of force would make no specific mention of "force" but rely on the phrase "all necessary means to uphold and implement [past] Security Council resolutions."<sup>120</sup>, This would allow the coalition to implement force without a UN coordinating structure whilst also specifying the timing and nature of any coercive operation, without constraint or the need for further authorisation from the UN.<sup>121</sup>. The fourth option on the scale of the coercive-impact of the threat would have included wording that specifically mandated the use of military force to reverse the Iraqi invasion. Such specific wording was resisted by the likes of China who were reluctant to explicitly sanction an armed attack.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Apple, R. W. 'The Nub Is Timing No Major U.S.-Soviet Rupture Seen, But Separate Focuses on Gulf Persist' *The New York Times* November 21 1990

<sup>119</sup> Rosenthal, A. 'MidEasr Tensions: US and Soviets urge more steps by UN in Gulf' *The New York Times* November 21 1990

<sup>120</sup> Goshko, J 'U.S. Gains Backing for Use of Force; 'Security Council Members Discuss Kuwait Resolution With Possible January Deadline' *The Washington Post* November 27 1990

<sup>121</sup> U.N. Draft offers one 'final' a change for Iraqi pullout' *The New York Times* November 27 1990.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*



The most robust threat, one that came to be discussed in US circles once a sizeable military presence had built up by late November, was to seriously undermine Saddam's ability to wage war in the future by threatening to destroy military facilities and even continue to Baghdad to remove Hussein from power entirely. This option was not clearly articulated however given that it was a goal not shared by all members of the coalition. Such a threat of force would have been mandated through the use of loose terminology relating to restoring "international peace and security in the region", thus allowing the US to "justify military operations that would go beyond liberating Kuwait to invading Iraq in an attempt to overthrow Saddam and destroy his military capabilities".<sup>123</sup>

- Capabilities

Capabilities for the threat were provided predominantly by the US. At the time of the resolution, there were some 500,000 coalition troops already stationed in Saudi Arabia, the vast majority, some 430,000, were US military personnel.<sup>124</sup> It was clear that the US push to secure some troops from as many coalition states as possible was entirely political and symbolic in nature. As "a senior U.S. military planner involved in the Persian Gulf deployment" said at the time of the resolution "I would hate to construct a war plan that depended on all those other countries . . . and faced some possible failure" with U.S. soldiers at risk, he said "you have to have enough Americans there to do the job, and I think that's what our plan is"<sup>125</sup>. The financial

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<sup>123</sup> Goshko, J 'U.S. Gains Backing for Use of Force; 'Security Council Members Discuss Kuwait Resolution With Possible January Deadline' *The Washington Post* November 27 1990

<sup>124</sup> McAllister, B 'Deployment One of Largest By U.S. Since World War II' *The Washington Post* November 9<sup>th</sup> 1990

<sup>125</sup> Smith R.J., 'February Would Be Best Time to Attack Iraqi Forces, U.S. Planner Says' *The Washington Post* 30 November 1990

burden of the deployment was mitigated considerably by donations of over \$54 billion from coalition partners to cover an estimated \$60 billion in costs for the US military. The bulk of this was provided by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (around \$16 billion respectively) with the rest coming from Japan, United Arab Emirates and Germany<sup>126</sup>.

- o Deadline

As became evident during the debate over the threat to be issued, there was a sizeable contingent within the coalition who were in no hurry to set a timetable for implementing force. Of the Western European members, both German and French officials indicated towards the end of November that they believed sanctions should be given a good deal longer before more coercive options were implemented. As one French official stated on 21<sup>st</sup> November, "does it really matter whether we wait a month or five months to send in the tanks?"<sup>127</sup>. Equally, the Soviets had been reluctant to impose a set deadline on Saddam as they believed that "a deadline would be interpreted in Baghdad as an unacceptable ultimatum, thereby making inevitable the very hostilities that the threat of force was supposedly designed to avoid"<sup>128</sup>

The requirement for a deadline was increased by the fact that Washington was worried about the possibility of resistance from Arab allies in the coalition should any use of force come to fall during the Islamic holiday of Ramadan during March. The importance of this holiday<sup>129</sup> meant that there existed a 'window' in which coalition

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<sup>126</sup> Brown, G (1997) *Coalition, Coercion and Compromise: Diplomacy of the Gulf Crisis, 1990-91* (Georgetown University: Washington) p 55

<sup>127</sup> Apple R.W. 'The Nub Is Timing No Major U.S.-Soviet Rupture Seen, But Separate Focuses on Gulf Persist' *New York Times* November 21 1990

<sup>128</sup> Brown, G (1997) *Ibid.* p67

<sup>129</sup> As well as the more favourable weather conditions in the earlier part of the year.

forces could attack running from early January to mid-March<sup>130</sup>. Thus in this way, coalitional constraints indirectly *increased* the likelihood of a deadline for compliance being included in the coercive diplomacy package.

The actual date of the deadline was dictated largely by the US needing to concede to more risk-averse coalition members. Originally, the Bush administration had pushed for a January 1<sup>st</sup> deadline but those coalition members reluctant to use force put pressure on the administration to agree to a date towards the end of that month in order to give such countries “a last chance to persuade him to surrender Kuwait without a fight”<sup>131</sup>. The deadline that was settled on in the resolution, January 15<sup>th</sup>, was proposed by the Soviet Union as a compromise<sup>132</sup>

*Discussion*

	Threat	Capabilities	Deadline
	High Compromise	All capabilities offered	Firm
Predicted Outcome?	No	No	No
- CAP arise?	Yes	Yes	Yes
- Overcome?	Yes	Yes	Yes

The Western handling of the Gulf crisis was, at the time, lauded as a great success and, in the aftermath, it was thought that the Iraq model could set a new framework for the multilateral handling of crises. Yet, looking at the table, we can see that CAP did arise in all three elements of the *ideal policy* Upon closer inspection this does not seem so surprising as one of the factors that allowed such a broad coalition to be

<sup>130</sup> Apple R.W. ‘The Nub Is Timing No Major U.S.-Soviet Rupture Seen, But Separate Focuses on Gulf Persist’ *New York Times* November 21 1990

<sup>131</sup> Lewis, P ‘U.S. Is Reported To Win Support For Use Of Force’ *The New York Times* November 26 1990

<sup>132</sup> Goshko, J ‘U.S. Gains Backing for Use of Force; ‘Security Council Members Discuss Kuwait Resolution With Possible January Deadline’ *The Washington Post* November 27 1990

formed was that the exact strategy to be used against Saddam was originally left intentionally ambiguous in order to allow each coalition member to justify its position to its domestic audience on its own terms. This ambiguity lay behind a great deal of the CAP the coalition faced. Yet such CAP were ultimately overcome and the necessary elements of an *ideal policy* achieved.

Three key features of the case worked to reduce the severity of the CAP.

Firstly, the formation and maintenance of a coalition determined to act against Iraqi aggression was facilitated by the scale and clarity of Saddam's transgression. The aggressive breaching of the sovereignty of a United Nations member proved a strong force pushing the coalition towards consensus. Linked to this, the need to maintain the reputation and role of the UN, an organisation fundamentally based on protecting states from aggression, also was an important underlying consideration which encouraged the coalition to deal adequately with the transgression.

Secondly, the invasion of Kuwait did present a genuine threat to many of the Gulf States and thus, despite the traditional Arab antipathy towards US presence on Arab soil, immediate survival relied on supporting defensive action by the coalition. Fear for their vital interests did help, in particular, keep the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait's government-in-exile) on-side. Equally, the precedent that would be set should Iraq have been allowed to 'get away with' such a transgression, was emphasised at points by the US and others who engaged in "arguments with smaller coalition members in which the President and the Secretary [Baker] emphasized that

every small state would be at the mercy of larger predatory neighbours if the United Nations failed to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait.”<sup>133</sup>

Thirdly, a degree of path dependency acted on the coalition to hold it together. The decision to contribute to the initial efforts devised in August to counter the Iraqi aggression was a relatively easy one even for the more reluctant coalition members. Again, the severity of Iraq’s transgression when coupled with the relatively limited nature of the initial response – sanctions aimed at coercing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and deterring a further attack on Saudi Arabia – allowed coalition members to ‘sign on’ to the initial international effort with relatively little costs. It was only over the subsequent months that the coalition strategy shifted towards military measures, with the key shift in policy coming with the US decision in late October to increase troop strength in the region and place them on an offensive footing. Thus, once ‘signed on’ the coalition members were subject to a certain force of path dependency as the costs of defecting from the coalition in the face of a gradual shift to a more offensive threat package, were considerable. “Being on board meant in a very real sense being lashed to the mast: the costs of resisting or opposing the decisions being taken in Washington (much less defecting from the coalition altogether) were so high they became virtually impossible to countenance”<sup>134</sup>

This tendency was also compounded by Iraq’s unwillingness to cooperate on a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Those coalition members who opposed the use of force were gradually brought round to the US position by the sheer failure of their

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<sup>133</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, “The Iraq Resolution: A US.-Soviet Collaboration,” *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.

<sup>134</sup> Cooper et al. ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Fellowship in the Gulf Conflict’ *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 106, No. 3 (Autumn, 1991) p. 402

own alternatives. Russia, for example, carried out bi-lateral attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis right up to the eve of Resolution 678, inviting Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow on November 28 in a final attempt to broker a non-coercive deal. It was only with the failure of this last attempt that Russia acquiesced. Key Arab states were also brought 'on-board' following the failure of their own bi-lateral negotiations. President Hassan of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, Yasir Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Ali Salin al-Bid, vice-chairman of the Presidential Council of Yemen, all arranged meetings with Saddam throughout November and into December attempting to broker peaceful solution. In each case, the attempt failed.<sup>135</sup>

Despite, these features of the case, considerable work still had to be done to keep several 'weak links' within the coalition – those states who provided negative or restraining force on the achievement of the *ideal policy* - from defecting.

In the aftermath of the crisis, it was widely lauded that it was American leadership which completed the bulk of this work. In his State of the Union address on 29 January 1991, George Bush pronounced that "For two centuries we've done the hard work of freedom, and tonight we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity". Furthermore, as Secretary of State James Baker asserted, in front of Congress, "We remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a successful response by the international community". There is little doubt that the influence of US leadership was

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<sup>135</sup>For a full overview of these proposals see Stein, J.G. 'Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?' *International Security* 17:2 (MIT Press, 1992) p172

significant yet how was this leadership enacted? What were the mechanisms by which the US asserted its influence?

In order to understand how US leadership functioned to overcome CAP we need to look more closely at the motives of each of the potential 'weak links' in the coalition. An analysis of the reservations of these states reveals that US leadership was felt in three principle ways: economic incentives, political incentives, and minimising perceived risk.

The 'weak links' varied in their importance to the coalition effort depending on their degree of influence. The coalition members could be divided into those UN Security Council members who had a *direct* influence on the coercive package agreed on as Resolution 678 – namely the members of the Security Council - and those who had an indirect impact either because their involvement was valuable *symbolically* or *strategically*.

The potentially most damaging 'weak links' in the coalition were those states that formed the 'P5' on the Security Council. There was, as Brown explains, a clear negotiation pattern by which the US gained support: "starting with U.S. British consultations, once sufficient common ground was established, the negotiators brought the French into the circle and then consulted with the Soviets to gain their concurrence. After the four powers were in general agreement, they would consult with the Chinese in an effort to win their support or non-objection, and then negotiate a "big five" agreed draft that would be presented to the other ten, non-permanent, countries on the council".

Of the P5, China, Russia and France all showed varying degrees of scepticism over the proposals of the US and thus could be considered potential 'weak links' in the coalition. For both China and Russia, US leadership functioned through the offer of considerable economic incentives in return for compliance. In the case of China, in exchange for not absenting on the November resolution the administration promised to renew high-level Sino-American relations<sup>136</sup> - relations that had been frosty since the Tiannamen Square incident in 1989. For the Russians, too – facing, as they were at the time, a major economic crisis - the cost-benefit analysis was largely based on economic factors. Despite an early show of support for the international response to Iraq's invasion, Gorbachev faced competing pressures within his own government throughout the crisis that, at times, made acquiescence with the US position politically problematic. The Soviet split was essentially between 'old' and 'new' thinkers. The more progressive elements in the government saw a great deal to be gained from cooperation with the coalition in terms of reducing the Soviet Union's international isolation – not least as a means to secure greater foreign investment - and becoming an influential shaper of the new security regime. The traditional military and bureaucratic elements, by contrast, stressed the importance of good relations with Iraq given that the country owed the Soviet Union "huge debts and employed over 7800 Soviet technicians"<sup>137</sup>. In the end, a \$4 billion Saudi loan, arranged by the US as "aid to help the Soviets through the winter"<sup>138</sup> appears to have tipped the balance in favour of compliance with the US.

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<sup>136</sup> Hoffman, D 'Chinese Trade Official Invited to U.S. Announcement Made as Administration Lobbies for U.N. Resolution' *The Washington Post* November 27 1990

<sup>137</sup> Brown 1997 *ibid* p. 37

<sup>138</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The Iraq Resolution: A US.-Soviet Collaboration," *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.



Of the non-permanent members, the US also used a variety of financial carrots to insure an affirmative vote on the resolution. The importance of such incentives was highlighted starkly by an officer from the Central African Republic who stated, when asked why his country had sent troops to Saudi Arabia: "We want some aid. The Americans are distributing money to those people who participate and we'd like some of it"<sup>139</sup>

Regional allies such as Turkey, Syria and Egypt, each important both strategically and symbolically, all received financial incentives either in the form of the forgiveness of debt in the case of Egypt<sup>140</sup> or the promise of substantial financial rewards from Saudi Arabia in the case of Egypt and Turkey. Conversely, failure to comply with US plans was swiftly met with punishment. A short while after the Yemeni delegate joined the Cubans in voting against the resolution at the Security Council, a senior American diplomat was reportedly instructed to tell him: "That was the most expensive no vote you ever cast" - meaning it would result in an end to America's more than \$70 million in foreign aid to Yemen."<sup>141</sup>

A more generalised dis-incentive employed by the US and one that kept the momentum towards coalitional action going by making it clear, at points of disagreement, that the US could potentially act unilaterally - a particularly unattractive option to a number of the states involved. The US, along with the UK, repeatedly pointed out that force could have been employed without a specific UN resolution within the terms of Article 51 of the Charter which authorizes self-defence

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<sup>139</sup> Jakobsen 1998 *ibid* p. 66

<sup>140</sup> Guldemir 'Caught in the Middle; Between US Pressure and Baghdad's menace' *The Washington Post* November 4 1990

<sup>141</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The Iraq Resolution: A US.-Soviet Collaboration," *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.

against aggression<sup>142</sup>. Thus, the US put pressure on the coalition to reach consensus by stressing that the availability of a less attractive alternative.

The incentives offered by the US also extended to promises, many vaguely termed, of potential political gains as a result of compliance. Ann Mosely Lesch<sup>143</sup>, for example, argues that Syria was hoping its support would give Damascus a larger regional role. Other objectives included being dropped from the United States terrorist blacklist, more aid from Saudi Arabia, and even the possibility of a return of the Golan Heights. Turkey, a key regional ally, was brought on board through promises to increase its role in NATO, substantial financial aid<sup>144</sup> and potential moves towards integration into the EC.

Beyond incentivising coalition members, US leadership included allaying the fears of coalition members in order to adjust their risk-perception. The differing risk perception of the coalition partners largely lay behind the CAP in all aspects of the threat package. The perceived risks of intervention included the negative impact on oil prices, the fear, particularly amongst the Russians and Iranians, of having a large number of US troops in such an economically and politically important area as well as the traditional antipathy amongst the Arab members of the coalition towards external intervention in Arab disputes. It was here that the whirlwind tour of coalition capitals undertaken by Secretary of State Baker in the run up to Resolution 678 was of vital importance. During these visits, Baker was able to reassure wary coalition partners that, for example, the US would remove its forces as soon as military appropriate

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<sup>142</sup> 'Baker Begins Round Of Gulf Consultations; U.S. Seeks Views of U.N. Council Members' *The Washington Post* November 15 1990

<sup>143</sup> Mosely Lesch, A. "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Winter 1991).

<sup>144</sup> Reuters, 'Turkey gets trade aid' *New York Times* November 12 1990

following any intervention and, particularly important in the case of Russia, that following the crisis the US would work with key allies on a broader Middle East peace and stability initiative<sup>145</sup>

Beyond forging a consensus amongst the coalition, US leadership also played the primary role in coordinating the military effort. This was seen most readily in the coordination of the international military build up in Saudi Arabia but also in the provision of financial capability for the effort. As Brown asserts, “In response to the needs of allies such as Turkey....the secretaries of Treasury and State began a broad international effort in early September to coordinate the international financial support for the coalition”<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Brown 1997 *ibid* p. 39

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.* p. 53

## Chapter Five – Discussion and Conclusions

As stated in Chapter three, the fundamental puzzle of this study was:

Can coalitions of democracies successfully employ coercive diplomacy? And more specifically: Do ‘coalitional action problems’ (CAP) undermine the ability of *groups* of states to implement Jakobsen’s *ideal policy* of coercive diplomacy?

To get at this question, I summarised the potential CAP into 5 points and then juxtaposed them with the four points of Jakobsen’s *ideal policy* to illustrate the seeming incompatibility of the features of coalitions and the *ideal policy* of coercive diplomacy. Restricting the analysis to the first two elements of the *ideal policy* yielded the following table:

<i>Ideal Policy</i>	Coalitional Problem	Action	Predicted Coercive Package Formulated by Coalition
"A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost"	<i>Threat:</i> Need to satisfy most risk-averse		<i>Threat:</i> - Low Compromise - Minimum
	<i>Capabilities:</i> Free-riding		<i>Capabilities:</i> - Less than half - None
"A deadline for compliance"	Need to satisfy most risk-averse		- Weak deadline - No deadline

The cases I chose were those in which there was a high likelihood of a strong collective desire to halt or reverse the actions of a target. In other words, I chose cases in which there was likely to be a desire amongst at least a considerable proportion of

the coalition to develop something approaching an ideal policy<sup>147</sup>. I did this in order to remove the possibility that the ideal policy wasn't achieved simply because it wasn't desired by the coalition. In practice, this meant choosing coercive diplomacy exchanges that either were based on a considerable transgression, as in the Iraq case, or those that came after a number of less coercive options to halt the transgression had failed, as in the Bosnian cases.

The analysis of the cases proceeded on two levels. The first level analysed whether the outcome predicted by the CAP theorists did in practice materialise. The second level of analysis focused on those instances in which the predicted outcome did not arise and sought to ascertain the mechanisms by which CAP were overcome.

Level One: Can coalitions implement the *ideal policy*?

The following table provides a summary of the instances in which the predicted outcome arose.

X = Predicted outcome arose  
 O = Predicted outcome did not arise

	Threat	Capabilities	Deadline
Iraq	High Compromise (O)	All capabilities offered (O)	Firm (O)
Bosnia 1	Low Compromise (X)	No capability offered (X)	Weak (X)
Bosnia 2	Maximum (O)	All capabilities offered (O)	Firm (O)
Bosnia 3	High Compromise (O)	All Capabilities offered (O)	Firm (O)

<sup>147</sup> For example, at the time of the third Bosnian case Clinton made the resolve of the coalition clear when he stated "We have to decide how to do this. What we mustn't do is to get into another situation in which the West's bluff is called once again" by the Bosnian Serbs (from Engelberg S 'NATO Bombing and Serb Hostage-Taking now a major turning point in War' *The New York Times* July 16 1995)

Looking across the cases we can see that in only one of the four cases did the coalition fail to create a coercive threat package that approached Jakobsen’s *ideal policy*. This would immediately appear to refute the pessimistic claim that coalitions cannot implement coercive diplomacy.

Looking at the three *ideal policy* elements more closely we can discern more fully how each element was constructed by the coalitions involved.

*Threat*

<i>Ideal Policy</i>	Coalitional Action Problem	Predicted Coercive Package Formulated by Coalition
"A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost"	<i>Threat:</i> Need to satisfy most risk-averse	<i>Threat:</i> - Low Compromise - Minimum

To recap, the collective action theorists hold that coalitions are unable to make large threats given that they will need to gravitate towards the ‘lowest common denominator’ – the coalition partner with the least will or least interest in taking on the risk of making large threats. As Byman, asserts, “to garner the necessary consensus the coalition will gravitate toward the most-restricted members preferences”<sup>148</sup>.

Looking across the summary table of the cases studied here, we can see that only in one instance did the threat eventually adopted within the threat package follow the CAP theorists prediction that either the ‘least forceful’ threat advocated (including no coercive threat at all) *or* a very low compromise threat would be followed. In the above analysis of the cases we saw that in each of the instances there were competing

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<sup>148</sup> Byman 2002 *ibid* p.72

opinions amongst the coalitional partners concerning the degree of threat to be advocated. Indeed, CAP, the “need to satisfy least enthusiastic” did arise in all of the cases studied to the extent that certain potentially important yet reluctant coalition members had to be appeased in constructing the threat. However, the results here show that such disagreements did not translate into ‘lowest common denominator’ threats, but rather, in three out of four cases, led to a ‘high compromise’. In Iraq, for example, the US wish to forcefully undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war in the future was tempered by risk-averse allies yet the scope of the intervention was still kept within the bounds of forcefully liberating Kuwait. Only in the first Bosnian case did collective action problems impede the issuing of the most robust threat, where objections from Britain and France to the US proposal of air-strikes led to a middling and ultimately impotent threat.

As this case illustrated, one way in which numerous competing parties could be satisfied was through restraining the coercive threats issued to vague threats of force. In the first Bosnia case the forceful wishes of the US were appeased with a UN Resolution that called for the use of “all means necessary” to achieve coalition goals yet the risk-averse members were also appeased given that it contained no specific information about the exact nature of the threat beyond stipulating that it should take place “in coordination with the United Nations”. By keeping the threat vague, and within the authority of the UN, the more reluctant members of the coalition could retain the ability to impede the actual use of the threat further down the line, as eventually occurred in this case.

## Capabilities

Recalling the outcome predicted by CAP theorists in terms of capability production:

<i>Ideal Policy</i>	Coalitional Action Problem	Predicted Coercive Package Formulated by Coalition
<i>"A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost"</i>	Capabilities: Free-riding	Capabilities: - Less than half - None

By these criteria, in only one of the four cases studied, Bosnia 1, did the 'free-rider' problem impede the provision of capabilities. Coming at the early stages of the Bosnian conflict, no coalition member, despite a unanimous wish to halt the violence, was yet willing to risk troops. The goal of the coercive diplomacy exchange thus represented a public good which no one state was willing to provide for the others.

Looking more closely at the remaining three cases, in the two later Bosnian cases, capabilities were provided by a number of coalitional partners through NATO whilst in the Iraq case, despite a wide coalition the vast majority of capabilities came from the US. In the Iraq case, those countries, such as Kuwait and Germany, that did not wish to accept the cost of providing troops for the threat, instead provided monetary compensation to those states bearing the brunt of the capabilities burden. This allowed them to restructure their capability provision in a way that suited their risk-perception - avoiding the risk of providing troops (and so 'free-riding' in that sense) - whilst still being seen to 'do their bit' by the other coalition members.



*Deadline*

<i>Ideal Policy</i>	<i>Coalitional Action Problem</i>	<i>Predicted Coercive Package Formulated by Coalition</i>
<i>"A deadline for compliance"</i>	<i>Need to satisfy most risk-averse</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Weak deadline</i></li> <li>- <i>No deadline</i></li> </ul>

A firm deadline was forthcoming in three of the four cases studied. Looking at the first Bosnian case, where no firm deadline was agreed upon, it could be argued that the coalition was still, at this early stage in the conflict, testing the resolve of the Serbs and so were relying on weaker timetable for compliance variants as predicted by CAP theorists – here approximating to George’s ‘gradual turning of the screw’<sup>149</sup>.

Disagreements over the use of firm deadlines did arise but resulted in compromise over the exact date rather than the vetoing of the use of a deadline altogether as predicted by the CAP theorists. Despite, in the second Bosnian case, no deadline coming from the EU meeting on 8<sup>th</sup> February, a firm deadline was, following rigorous diplomacy from the French in particular, forthcoming the day later at the NATO meeting. In the third Bosnian case, disagreement between the UN and NATO commanders over the deadline date were resolved with a compromise encompassing both wishes. Equally, in Iraq, disagreements voiced by some European members of the coalition meant that a 1<sup>st</sup> January deadline proposed by the US was postponed to 15<sup>th</sup> January. In all of these cases, disagreements over deadlines resulted in compromise rather than rejection.

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<sup>149</sup> George, 1997 *Ibid* p274

## Level Two: How may CAP be overcome?

In the cases studied here, CAP were overcome by a series of pressures, catalysed by timely leadership, which over time pushed the coalition towards consensus on the need for a coercive threat that approached the *ideal policy*.

### *Internal pressures towards extremes*

As established in Chapter 2, the *ideal policy* represents a robust coercive package that lies towards the end of a spectrum of coercive options against an adversary. These may include condemnation of a transgression, diplomatic and subsequently economic sanctions and eventually a series of increasingly forceful military threats. Confrontations will generally take such an escalatory character as the coercer tries to get a feel for the will of the adversary and, accordingly, the degree of coercing costs that will need to be born to convince said adversary to back-down. As each of these stages on the coercive scale fails to bring about the desired outcome the coercer must decide whether to increase the coercive threat or back down, either abandoning the coercive mission altogether or relying on purely diplomatic solutions. As the threats become larger and as the potential costs mount, there is a pressure for the coalition to polarise either towards withdrawal of the threat, or to escalation – to ‘cut and run’ or to push harder for ‘victory’. As we have seen, it is within these competing pressures that CAP arise.

In the cases studied here, two forces pushed the coalition, over time, towards escalation and the adoption of an *ideal policy*, thus mitigating the impact of CAP.

Firstly, many previously 'weak states' were convinced to support more robust threats simply given that other options had failed. My contention set out in Chapter 2, that the will of the coalition to create an *ideal policy* will increase over time as other weaker but less risky variants fail was thus vindicated by the cases here. As predicted, coming early in the conflict, the *ideal policy* was not achieved in the Bosnia 1 case, yet was achieved in the other cases following the failure of alternatives. In Iraq, Russia, for example, having spent most of the time up to the end of November in consultation with Iraq over a settlement, agreed to the robust threat included in Resolution 678 only given that Gorbachev had become "fed up with Iraq's President and had concluded that unless threatened with real force, he would never budge peacefully"<sup>150</sup> The failure of similar bi-lateral attempts by France as well as key Arab states also failed and led to the acquiescence of these nations. As Stein states, Saddam took none of these opportunities to begin a negotiating process. If he had, the willingness of the international coalition to use force would have fractured and there likely would have been no war."<sup>151</sup> Thus, an initial push towards consensus arose from the pressure of 'last resort'.

The second factor that pushed the coalition towards the *ideal policy* was the involvement of multilateral organisations whose presence increased the costs of withdrawal. In Iraq, the reputation of the UN was on the line from the outset of the crisis given its role as the upholder of international law and given the blatant violation of sovereignty committed by Iraq. Equally, in Bosnia, NATO's reputation became linked, within diplomatic discourse, with the successful completion of its mission.

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<sup>150</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The Iraq Resolution: A US.-Soviet Collaboration," *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.

<sup>151</sup> Stein, J.G. 'Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?' *International Security* 17:2 1992 (MIT Press) p172

Mindful of its precarious strategic justification in the post-Cold War world, potential 'weak-links' in the coalition, including particularly Britain, were pressured to support a robust threat in order to save the humiliation of NATO that would likely accompany a withdrawal. In this sense, the multilateral organisations, once implicated, pushed the coalition towards escalation through mechanism akin to "the tyranny of sunk costs"<sup>152</sup> – where the "sunk costs" represented to the previous blows to NATO reputation caused by Serbian intransigence. Secretary of State Warren Christopher summed up the pull of this mechanism on pressuring escalation when he stated, following the increase in coercive threat pushed through by the US in the second Bosnia case, "I feel that the risks to the reputation of NATO, to allied unity and to the credibility of our foreign policy are sufficient to justify a rethinking."<sup>153</sup> The presence of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia also added a concrete aspect to the role of multilateral institutions in overcoming CAP. As Cushman asserts, in Bosnia "the impetus for the use of force was frequently the need to protect peacekeepers, not the residents of the safe havens"<sup>154</sup>

### *The role of leadership*

As pressure grew on the coalition to escalate or withdraw the threat, it was predominantly leadership by one member of the coalition which functioned to steer the coalition towards escalation and ultimately to the *ideal policy*. Leadership leveraged the coalition in three key ways each of which corresponded to a particular

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<sup>152</sup> In Thucydides, Alcibiades states that "after having sailed out in such forces (the Athenians) ought not to disgrace themselves by going home with nothing to show for it." (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*. (New York: Penguin, 1972) p. 440

<sup>153</sup> Jehl, D, "From Indecision to Ultimatum" *The New York Times* February 14 1994

<sup>154</sup> Cushman, T. *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia* (New York: New York University Press, 1996)

leadership mechanism.: i) incentivising potential ‘weak links’ in the coalition (hegemonic persuasion), ii) increasing the costs of de-escalation or failure to escalate towards a robust threat (situational persuasion) and iii) accepting a disproportionate burden of capabilities required for the coalition effort (burden taking).

The first role of leadership was evidenced most clearly by the US in the Iraq case. In the four weeks preceding the vote on Resolution 678, Secretary of State Baker conducted a frenzied tour of coalition capitals in which he leveraged various facets of US soft power to bring about a consensus concerning the need to escalate towards a robust coercive threat package against Saddam. Such leadership was also in evidence in Bosnia where Canada, for example, was reportedly only brought on-board in February 1994 after two telephone calls from President Bill Clinton<sup>155</sup>. Such power was focused particularly on the potential ‘weak links’ in the coalition who were offered various incentives by the US in return for compliance. The key ‘problem states’ of China and Russia were both brought on board through promises of greater or renewed access to US trade and other economic opportunities. The unashamed nature of this tool was evidenced by the fact that the very day after Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, abstained on Resolution 678, he was welcomed for the first high-level Chinese visit to Washington since Tiananmen. Such incentivising also took the form of vague warnings about the potential implications of defiance of the world’s sole superpower. This form of persuasion was evidenced by loaded comments such as that of United States Ambassador, Michael Armacost, who reminded Japan during the

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<sup>155</sup> Koring ‘Canada agrees to ultimatum: NATO to launch air strikes unless Serbs withdraw heavy guns’ *The Globe and Mail (Canada)* February 10 1994.

Gulf crisis that "impressions forged in a major international crisis like this one do tend to have a durable lasting effect."<sup>156</sup>

This ability for a lead state to sufficiently incentivise potential 'weak states' is particularly important given the nature of coercive diplomacy as a dynamic interaction between coercer(s) and adversary. For every attempt at coercion, the adversary will invariably make some 'counter-coercive' moves in return. In the case of coalitional coercive diplomacy, one of the most important forms of counter-coercion is "coalition busting" – counter moves focused on breaking up the coalition. Fundamental to this tactic is the altering the cost-benefit analyses of certain states in a way that makes them question the wisdom of supporting any escalation of the coalitional effort. Successful coalitional coercive diplomacy therefore becomes a battle of persuasion between the leader and the adversary focused on potential weak-links' in the coalition. Such a battle was particularly evident in the Gulf case. As Brown asserts, "Iraq, in Saddam's apparent calculation, did not have to defeat the coalition; it only had to exploit its weaknesses in a way that would render it incapable of decisive concerted action".<sup>157</sup> Saddam's coalition-busting took two main forms. Firstly, he aimed to simply increase the perceived costs to the coalition members of intervention through making statements threatening to attack Middle East Oil fields<sup>158</sup>, kill foreign nationals held hostage in Iraq and turn any intervention into a "bloodbath" for coalition forces. Secondly, he took aim at the Arab members of the coalition by repeatedly linking his withdrawal from Kuwait with the Palestinian issue. The ability for the US to unilaterally incentivise such states was extremely important

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<sup>156</sup> Cooper et al. 1991 *Ibid* p. 397

<sup>157</sup> Brown, 1997 *Ibid* p58

<sup>158</sup> Reuters, 'Oil price soars on Iraqi threat Crude near 10-year high as Hussein warns of oil field attacks', *The Globe and Mail* 25<sup>th</sup> September 1990

in pushing the coalition towards the *ideal policy* rather than de-escalation or collapse. Such leadership thus relied on 'hegemonic persuasion' – the influence that the US can command by virtue of its vast power on the international scene. Through leveraging such power, by direct bribes, vague threats of future, such leadership was able, particularly in the Iraq case, to tip the cost-benefit analysis of 'weak states' in favour of support, or, at least, acquiescence.

The second role of leadership, particularly evident in the Bosnian case, was to increase the perceived costs of backing-down or withdrawing a coercive stance against an adversary. Here the role of French leadership was particularly evident and took two main forms. Firstly, domestic pressure within the coalition states was encouraged by France's ability to provide, for the public domain, a robust apparent response to the atrocities being carried out against civilians by Serb forces, whilst, given its position as the principle provider of UN troops on the ground, undercutting other coalition members arguments concerning the risk to such troops potentially posed by the enactment of that response. Failure to support such a robust response or offer an alternative thus became more costly domestically for certain coalition members.

Secondly, leadership was able to provide disincentives for the coalition away from inertia or de-escalation in the face of the adversary. Both the US in Iraq and France in Bosnia reminded the coalition, at key points of disagreement, that inaction or withdrawal on the part of the alliance, would precipitate some unilateral action on the part of either one of those countries. In Iraq, during the run-up to Resolution 678, Bush repeatedly asserted that the US could legally act to roll-back Iraq's invasion

purely based on the agreements already made at the UN. Such unilateral action was greatly feared by a number of coalition members for multiple reasons most notably including, among other factors, the potential for greatly enhanced US control of the Middle East. In Bosnia, the oft-repeated French sentiment that was expressed during key negotiations is best summed up by Mr Alain Juppe, French foreign minister, who said on the eve of the NATO meeting in February 1994 “If there is no agreement in NATO, then France will not live with the status quo”.<sup>159</sup> In this case, the threatened French action involved removing its national forces from the UN troops on the ground in Bosnia, this forcing a total withdrawal of said force – a move that was viewed as hugely costly, both symbolically and militarily, by other coalition members. The degree of situational power afforded the French by virtue of their large contribution of troops meant that they could effectively offer the coalition an ultimatum: make the coalition work or face the consequences of withdrawal.

This second form of leadership in evidence may be termed ‘situational leadership’: leadership which is wielded by *any state that is able, through a unilateral action, to alter a crisis situation in such a way that makes the situation worse for other coalition members than the status quo*. The difference between hegemonic and situational leadership emerges from the source of the power. Whilst hegemonic power comes from a pre-existing wealth of influence, situational power emerges from the particular context of the coercive diplomacy exchange. In the cases studied here situational persuasion acted through the mechanism of providing an ultimatum to the coalition which made escalation to an *ideal policy* the more beneficial option – if simply the ‘lesser of two evils’. The states that find themselves in this position will vary

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<sup>159</sup> Barber L. and Martin J. “Air attack threat against Serbs grows”, *Financial Times* 8 February 1994



depending on the context of the exchange. A counterfactual may illustrate the point. In the Iraq case, the large Arab states had a degree of situational power that was disproportionate to their actual military and political weight. Had one such states, say Egypt, defected from the coalition over, for example, the killing of twenty-two Arabs by Israeli troops at a Palestinian demonstration in Jerusalem on October 8<sup>th</sup>, it is possible that it would have brought other Arab states with it which could have led to a West vs. Arab war which in turn might have made the entire enterprise untenable for larger states such as France with significant Arab populations. Thus Egypt could potentially have employed leadership through situational persuasion to pressure the coalition towards an *ideal policy* or face the potential for internal collapse of the coalition

The third role of leadership in evidence here worked to decrease the costs of escalation through one state accepting a disproportionate amount of the associated costs. In Iraq the US provided the vast majority of the troops required for the effort. Of the thirty-six members of the coalition deploying forces in the Gulf, nine states contributed only naval vessels; a further seven states contributed only medical units; Canada and Italy contributed naval vessels and aircraft. The contributions were thus appropriate for a naval blockade or tending someone else's wounded, but not for an offensive operation against Iraqi forces. Indeed, only seven states deployed ground troops actually engaged in combat and of these, over 90% were provided by the US and UK. Indeed, US leadership on this issue even provoked anger with Congress. Upon Bush's decision to redouble the number of troops on the ground, Congressional leaders expressed anger at the fact that America, once again, seemed to be "going it

alone."<sup>160</sup>. In Bosnia, the risk posed to UN troops on the ground by NATO air strikes was shouldered disproportionately by France given the size of its contribution to UNPROFOR. This third type of leadership - burden-taking - thus was enacted simply through willingness of one state to shoulder the burden, be it military or risk-based, of any coercive threat.

Although, Jakobsen's conclusion over the importance of "burden-taking" by one state has been supported by the conclusions made here, the role that leadership can play has been seen to be broader encompassing situational and hegemonic persuasion techniques to influence coalition members. Further, it has been found that, though *necessary*, leadership is not *sufficient* to create consensus alone and may only act as a catalyst to steer the coalition towards escalation once pressure has acted on the coalition through 'last resort' and the presence of multilateral organisations.

#### The ESDP and coalitional coercive diplomacy

Here I apply the conclusions of the study to a key policy question – the potential future viability of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Despite the recent crisis in the European integration process arising from the French and Dutch referenda on the proposed new European constitution, many commentators continue to suggest that the EU, driven by key of France and Germany, is evolving into a significant 'strategic actor'. Central to this development is the ESDP which "establishes an institutional and procedural framework for limited security co-

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<sup>160</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The Iraq Resolution: A US.-Soviet Collaboration," *New York Times*, 2 December 1990.

operation in order to collectively shape the Union's external milieu<sup>161</sup>, using military coercion to back up its diplomacy"<sup>162</sup>. As such the ESDP stands as a full-scale European experiment in the viability of coalitional coercive diplomacy. This study has highlighted a number of issues that relate to the viability of this experiment. Here I focus on three relating to i) the decision making structure, ii) capability provision and iii) leadership.

### *Decision-making and the ESDP*

If it is to exercise effective coalitional coercive diplomacy the EU must devise effective decision making procedures. The potential for CAP is clear given that the EU consists of 27 member states, all with somewhat different geopolitical interests, political cultures and attitudes to the use of force. Indeed, such problems will only be exacerbated by enlargement as even greater and potentially more diverse sets of interests need to be accommodated in such a decision-making structure. Such issues may be mitigated to some extent by the development of a common strategic culture within the organisation that clearly establishes the level of force that may be applied, the circumstances under which such application should occur and, in the event, what the chain of command and rules of engagement should be. Although the European Security Strategy (ESS) has done much to clarify the threats and common security objectives of the EU, there is still much debate over the ways and means of implementing these policies. This is exacerbated by the variety in even fundamental

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<sup>161</sup> According to the European Security Strategy such shaping will focus on the three "Petersburg tasks" of peacekeeping, humanitarian missions and military crisis management (see EU Institute for Security Studies *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, (Brussels: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003)

<sup>162</sup> Hyde-Price, A 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:2 March 2006: 231

attitudes towards force amongst the EU members is huge from Sweden who last fought a war in 1813, to Britain and France who have shown themselves willing and able to launch major offensives abroad. Ultimately, however, it is the decision-making structures that will need revision. Under the current Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) intergovernmental agreement model, decisions over the use of force require unanimity from its members thus ensuring each member a veto vote over any decision made by the organization. This means that in theory, member states, whose ESDP contributions are limited, could veto or delay important security decision involving larger members<sup>163</sup> The EU needs to develop streamlined decision-making procedures that allow for more flexible non-majority voting, perhaps providing veto powers to the larger states: a decision-making system that more accurately reflects the distribution of power within Europe and one which is thus structured towards leadership by these powers.

As seen in the later Bosnian cases, NATO is able to overcome the problems caused by its unanimous voting system through strong leadership from the US yet in the EU, this leadership role is largely undefined. Structurally, the body which could provide such a role, the EU presidency, is hindered by a rotation of personnel between member states every six months which results in great inconsistency in both the potency of the leadership, depending on the political strength and resources of the presidency nation, and the strategic direction of the alliance given the varying security priorities and regional focus of the state in question<sup>164</sup>. With the lack of an obvious EU hegemon to

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<sup>163</sup> Fohrenbach, G. "Security Through Engagement: The Worldwide Underlying ESDP," in *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role*, ed. Brimmer E. (Washington D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University, 2002), p. 18.

<sup>164</sup> Menon, A. "Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance," in *Defending Europe The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, ed. Howorth J. and Keeler J. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 208

take over the US role (discussed more below), it is important that the EU presidency be restructured in order to include an institutional leadership role that may mitigate the problems of unanimous voting. In the meantime, two interim measures seem likely to prevail. Firstly, for security and foreign policy priorities, the decision-making process will likely continue to reflect its realist compulsion and remain inter-governmental rather than based within the EU voting structure itself. The second option is to routinely carry out coercion missions with just a limited group of European states. Reducing the size of the decision-making group was one of Russett and Sullivan's mechanisms for overcoming CAP and its effectiveness was illustrated in the third Bosnia case analysed in this study in which the delegation of the decision-making procedure to just the NATO and UN commanders on the ground greatly reduced the inertia that, this study suggests, plagues larger coalitions. Indeed, such a reduced European coercive coalition was utilised recently when the EU3 of the UK, France and Germany, attempted to coerce Iran into halting its enrichment program. In light of the conclusions of this study, such formulations should be encouraged, at least in the short term.

#### *Capability provision*

If it wishes to engage in effective coalitional crisis management the EU will eventually need to acquire credible military forces to back up its diplomacy. Illustrated by the example of NATO in the later Bosnian cases explored above, capability provision is aided by the presence of multilateral organisations as CAP problems of free-riding are mitigated by the pressure such organisations exert to contribute "what is necessary and perhaps fair" in the words of Russett and Sullivan.

In its current state, the European Rapid Reaction Force, lacks the capability to carry out anything but the 'softest' of the Petersburg Tasks and, according to one estimate, "mounting a combat operation of significant size is going to be beyond the Europeans until 2012". As stated throughout this study, coercive diplomacy relies on large gambles for large gains and, involving threats of military force always retains the possibility of spiralling and escalating out of control. Thus, for the time being, any coercive diplomacy operation carried out by the EU will need to be at least underwritten by one of the major players. Currently only France and the UK possess the military capabilities required to successfully project power into Europe's 'near abroad'. To develop a multilateral force that is able to engage in successful power-projection will need to incorporate light and more mobile land capabilities as well as air-craft carriers which allow for rapid deployment to crisis spots. This will involve a fundamental move away from the national defence forces, heavy on tanks and artillery, which characterised the NATO collective defence model towards a fuller commitment to a collective security association and the use of highly mobile multilateral expeditionary forces.

#### *Leadership and the ESDP*

The issue of leadership in the EU brings up one significant problem - the lack of hegemonic power. The US policy of selective engagement in crises abroad has shown itself to be a rather capricious and unreliable force in relation to crises in Europe – repeatedly reluctant to commit itself in the Balkans yet dogmatically pursuing expeditions in the Middle East. Indeed, it was largely such inconsistent power projection that fuelled the development of the ESDP as, by the late 1990s, the major

European powers had become convinced that they “needed other options”<sup>165</sup> Yet, the removal of US influence has meant the removal of the hegemonic persuasion that proved so influential in maintaining coalitional consensus in the Iraq and the later Bosnian cases. There exists no single state within the EU with sufficient economic and political weight to cajole multiple reluctant states and play the role of the hegemon. Rather, the EU resides in a state of “balanced multi-polarity” in which power differentials between the ‘Big Three’ of Germany, France and Britain, are relatively balanced. Injecting something approaching hegemonic persuasion into the ESDP will require that these three states work as a unit during crisis exchanges. This, in turn, will require that the three nations agree on a common strategic vision for the ESDP and, importantly, that they reconcile their different approaches to key geo-strategic questions concerning the use of force, the relative jurisdictions of NATO and ESDP and relations with the US<sup>166</sup>. Brought to a head during the split over the 2003 Iraq invasion<sup>167</sup>, such differences currently greatly undermine any possibility of quasi-hegemonic leadership amongst the Big Three.

In the absence of such cooperation, it is unlikely that one of these powers alone could wield the necessary power to hold together large coalitions like the one marshalled by the US against Iraq. The EU ‘Big Three’ do, however, possess the ability to exercise burden-taking and organisational leadership and the recent attempts at coercion carried out by the EU have made use of these mechanisms. Indeed, the EU Framework Nation concept endorsed on 24 July 2002 formally encapsulates such forms of leadership. Under the system, a single powerful state, acting in Europe’s

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<sup>165</sup> Posen, B. (2004) ‘ESDP and the structure of world power’, *International Spectator* 39(1): 5–17.: p10

<sup>166</sup> Davis, G. *U.S. Policy Toward The European Security and Defense Policy*, Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2 May 2002), p. 26.

<sup>167</sup> The divide was precociously categorised as symbolising ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe by Donald Rumsfeld

name, provides the bulk of the military assets (burden-taking leadership) and the command and control capabilities (organisational leadership) necessary for the planning, launch and management of coercive operations. Such a system was employed successfully in 2003 when France played the part of the 'Framework' or 'lead' nation in the execution of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

### Further Research

The study precipitates many areas for further research of which two are highlighted here. Firstly a useful study might expand the analysis to encompass the impact of CAP on the third and fourth elements of Jakobsen's *ideal policy*: namely "an assurance to the adversary against future demands and "an offer of inducements for compliance". Such a study might test whether the conclusions of this study hold true for these elements.

A second interesting area for future research would concentrate on the actions of the target of coercion and specifically the effect that being faced with a coalition effects how that target reacts to threats. Whilst this study has 'black boxed' the opponent, further research might analyse how the strength of the coalition (and thus the strength of the threat) was *perceived* by the adversary. Ultimately, it is the adversary's perception of the threat being faced that is the vital factor in determining the success of coercive diplomacy exchange. One potential approach for such a study would be to analyse the extent to which the adversary engages in the "coalition-busting" mentioned above. This may then quite reliably be used as a proxy for the adversary's



perception of the unity of the coalition and thus the potency of the threat. In other words, the extent to which the adversary chooses to expend its counter-coercive energy on breaking up the coalition tells us a great deal about that adversary's belief about the commonality of purpose within that coalition. Such a 'coalition-busting' strategy may be evidenced by the adversary targeting certain coalition members through counter-threats, diplomatic pressure or simply by maximising the threat of negative consequences of action in a way that plays on fears expressed by certain members of the coalition.

### Conclusion

The recent enthusiasm for coalitional coercive diplomacy to address international crises seems unlikely to abate in the near future. For cautious democratic states it offers the possibility of "the perfection of strategy" as Liddell Hart argued, "to produce a decision without any serious fighting"<sup>168</sup>. Yet, this study found that varying geo-strategic interests and risk-perceptions led to varying commitments towards the coercive enterprise which in turn did create coalitional action problems in each element of the *ideal policy* as predicted.

Rather than crippling the coalition, however, such problems were mitigated by the internal logic of coercive diplomacy coupled with concern for multilateral organisations and the pressure of last resort, which all tended, over time, to push coalitional coercive diplomacy from inertia towards polar extremes in which escalation to a robust threat package encapsulated within Jakobsen's *ideal policy* lay

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<sup>168</sup> Liddell Hart, *The Indirect Approach*, 1968, p.338

at one end of the scale and withdrawal and removal of coercive pressure lay at the other. As this process put a strain on the coalition partners, between the increasingly risk-averse and the bellicose, it was timely leadership, exercised through hegemonic and situational persuasion and burden taking, that acted as the glue that held the coalition together and acted to ultimately steer it towards the *ideal policy*.

Promising to reduce the number of dissenting states the recent tendency towards the formation of 'coalitions of the willing' led by a single powerful state, both encapsulated within the EU framework nation concept and recent policies pursued by the Bush administration, should, in light of these conclusions, be viewed as merely reflecting the realities presented by large-scale coalitional coercive diplomacy and the principal mechanisms that the Western powers have developed to mitigate such difficulties. Such formulations may, thus provide a middle ground between ineffective wholesale multilateralism and a politically unpalatable unilateralism.

## Appendix

### Western post-cold war coercive diplomacy operations<sup>169</sup>

Adversary (Location)	Date	Nature of Transgression	Demand	Coercive Threat
Iraq	1990 - 1991	Military Aggression	Withdraw from Kuwait	Sanctions Military threats
	Jan 1991-Feb 1991	Military Aggression	Withdraw from Kuwait and leave heavy weapons behind	Sanctions Limited use of Force
	1992 - 1993	Non-compliance	Stop violating no-fly zones and obstructing UN inspections	Sanctions Limited Use of Force
	1996	Military Aggression	Withdraw from Iraqi Kurdistan	Limited use of force
	Dec1997 - Feb1998	Non-compliance (WMD)	Stop obstructing UN inspections	Sanctions Military threats
	Nov 1998	Non-compliance (WMD)	Stop obstructing UN inspections	Sanctions Military threats
	2002-2003	Non-compliance (WMD)	Declare all WMD capabilities Cooperate with UN inspectors	Economic sanctions Military threats
Slovenia (vs Serbia)	1991	Military Aggression	End Aggression	Sanctions
Croatia (vs Serbia)	1991-1992	Military Aggression	End Aggression	Sanctions
Serbia/BSA (Bosnia)	Jun 1992	Military Aggression	End shelling of Sarajevo, the airport and interference with relief operation	Sanctions Weak military threat
	Aug-Nov 1992	Military Aggression	End aggression and interference with relief efforts	Weak military threats
	Apr 1993	Military Aggression	End aggression and sign peace plan	Weak military threats Tighter sanctions
	Aug1993	Military Aggression	Withdraw forces from positions overlooking Sarajevo	Weak military threats
	Feb 1994	Military Aggression	Withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo	Credible military threats
	Apr 1994	Military Aggression	Stop offensive: withdraw from Gozrade	Limited use of force
	Aug-Sep	Military	Stop attacks and cease	Limited use of force

<sup>169</sup> Adapted from Jakobsen, P. 'Coercive Diplomacy' in Collins, A (ed.) *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford: OUP, 2006)

	1995	Aggression	military activities, withdraw heavy weapons	
Haiti	1991-1992	Coup	Step down and restore president	Ineffective sanctions
	1993 -Apr 1994	Coup	Step down and restore president	More sanctions
	May 1994 – Sept 1994	Coup	Step down and restore power	Credible military threat
Somalia	1992-may 1993	Internal fighting	End fighting and interference with relief operation Hide weapons	Threats and limited use of force with troops on the ground
	June 1993 – Oct 1993	Internal fighting	End fighting, disarm and hand over power to representative councils	Threats and limited use of force
Kosovo	June 1998	Military Aggression	End violence, start negotiations, withdraw forces	Sanctions Weak military threats
	Sept 1998 – Oct 1998	Military Aggression	End violence withdraw some forces, accept deployment of observer force	Sanctions Credible military threats
	Feb 1999 – Mar 1999	Military Aggression	Give NATO access throughout Serbia Withdraw from Kosovo accept referendum on independence	Sanctions Credible military threats
	March 1999 – Jun 1999	Military Aggression	End violence, withdraw from Kosovo, accept peace plan	Sanctions Limited use of force
Libya	1992-1997	Non-compliance (WMD + Terr)	End WMD programmes Cease terrorist activities Hand over terrorist suspects Provide compensation	Sanctions Weak threats of force
	1997-2003	Non-compliance (WMD + Terr)	End WMD programmes Cease terrorist activities Hand over terrorist suspects Provide compensation	Sanctions Military threats
North Korea	2002 -	Non-compliance (WMD)	End nuclear programme	US sanctions Indirect military threats
Iran	2002 -	Non-compliance (WMD)	End nuclear programme	Weak threats of sanctions and force
Sudan	1998	Non-compliance (Terr)	Stop support and use of terrorism	Sanctions
Afghanistan	1998-2001	Non-compliance	Stop support and use of	Use of force

		(Terr)	terrorism Hand over bin Laden	Sanctions
	Sept – Oct 2001	Non-compliance (Terr)	Stop support and use of terrorism Hand over Al Qaida leadership	Sanctions Military threats
Pakistan	2001	Non-compliance (Terr)	End support for terrorism Support US war against Afghanistan	Threats of sanctions and force