



Institutional Logics and Political Networks: A Theoretical Framework for Academic Staffing in Newly-Founded Management Departments in Turkey

Kurumsal Mantıklar ve
Siyasi Ağlar: Türkiye’de
Yeni Kurulan İşletme
Bölümlerindeki Akademik
Personel Seçimine Yönelik
Kuramsal Çerçeve

Şükrü Özen (*) Deniz Öztürk (**)

Abstract

This article develops a conceptual framework for explaining how individual embeddedness in multiple institutional logics at the field level and in political networks at the societal level influence managerial decisions within organizations. By considering the institutional and political environments surrounding management departments in newly founded universities in Turkey, we propose that the degrees of individual decision-maker’s embeddedness in alternative institutional logics (single vs multiple) and in different political networks (closed vs open) influence their decisions on hiring new academicians. We consider that organizational actors’ instantiations of logics together with political networks delineate their identities. Accordingly, decision-makers embedded in a single logic and/or a closed network will tend to hire academicians similar to themselves whereas those embedded in multiple logics and/or an open network will be more likely to hire academicians different from themselves. We also elaborate our conceptual framework by considering the influences of logic-related networks, decoupling in

(*) Sorumlu yazar/Corresponding Author, Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi, Cinnah Caddesi No:16, Kavaklıdere / Ankara sozen@ybu.edu.tr

(**) Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi, Cinnah Caddesi No:16, Kavaklıdere / Ankara, dozturk86@yahoo.com

academic staffing, geographic locations and ownership of universities. By doing so, we first contribute to a better explanation of institutional and political diversities in academic cadres in management departments in new Turkish universities. Second, we expand micro-level view of institutional logics by integrating societal level political networks into the analysis.

Keywords: Institutional logics, institutional complexity, political networks, embeddedness, hiring decisions, management higher education, Turkey

Özet

Bu çalışma, bireylerin alan düzeyinde çoklu kurumsal mantıklar ile toplum düzeyinde siyasal ağlara yerleşikliğinin örgüt içindeki yönetsel kararlara nasıl ettiğine dair kuramsal bir çerçeve geliştirmektedir. Türkiye’de yeni kurulan üniversitelerin işletme bölümlerini çevreleyen kurumsal ve siyasal bağlamı dikkate alarak oluşturduğumuz bu kuramsal çerçevede, karar vericinin farklı kurumsal mantıklara (tekli ya da çoklu) ve farklı siyasal ağlara yerleşiklik derecelerinin (kapalı ya da açık), yeni öğretim üyelerini işe alma kararlarını etkilediğini ileri sürmekteyiz. Örgüt üyelerinin kurumsal mantıkları canlandırmaları ile siyasal ağlarının etkisinin kimliklerini belirleyeceğini göz önünde bulundurmaktayız. Buna göre, tekli mantığa ve/veya kapalı ağlara yerleşik karar vericiler kendilerine benzer öğretim üyelerini seçmeye eğilimli iken, çoklu mantıklara ve/veya açık ağlara yerleşik olanlar kendilerinden farklı öğretim üyelerini seçme eğilimi göstermektedir. Ayrıca, geliştirdiğimiz kuramsal çerçevemizi, mantık temelli ağlar, akademik işe alımda ayırma davranışı, üniversitelerin coğrafi konumu ve sahipliği gibi etmenleri göz önünde bulundurarak detaylandırmaktayız. Çalışmamızda, öncelikle Türkiye’de yeni kurulan üniversitelerin işletme bölümü akademik kadrolarındaki kurumsal ve siyasi çeşitliliği açıklamaya katkıda bulunmaktayız. İkinci olarak ise, mikro düzeyde kurumsal mantıklar perspektifini toplum düzeyinde siyasal ağların etkisini de ekleyerek genişletmekteyiz.

Anahtar sözcükler: Kurumsal mantıklar, kurumsal karmaşıklık, politik ağlar, gömülülük, işe alma kararları, İşletme yüksek öğrenimi, Türkiye

Introduction

Recent scholarly work has particularly elucidated how organizations respond to competing or co-existing logics in an organizational field (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Goodrick and Reay, 2011). As organizations encounter multi-institutional settings, or “institutional complexity”, they respond this complexity in different ways depending on their contextual factors, which thereby embody different structures and practices (Greenwood et al., 2010 and 2011). Hence, the processes of how institutional complexity reflects itself to organizational practices vary;

one logic may be dominant to overwhelm the others, or multiple logics may be blended to engender hybridized set of practices (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010, 2013). Explanations about how different levels of homogeneity with respect to multiple and often competing logics are instantiated within the organizations has actually roots in individual cognition and action (Kraatz and Block, 2008; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Zilber, 2002).

Institutional logics not only direct interests of social actors and their guidelines for action but also their identities (Friedland and Alford, 1991). They can drive behavior only after a specific identity is introduced (Kraatz and Block, 2008). They frame the development of identities and thereby create a link between logics and individual behavior (Battilana and Lee, 2014). Identity, in turn, plays a role as a filter “for interpreting and responding to strategic issues and environmental changes” (Glynn, 2008: 408). According to Greenwood et al. (2011), how organizational actors respond institutional complexity depends on the extent to which they are identified with the organizational identity. When they are strongly identified with the organizational identity, for instance, they will tend to resist alternative institutional logics that challenge the existing identity; otherwise, they will compromise or replace the existing organizational identity with new identities promoted by the institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011).

Institutional logics at the field level, however, are not the only factors that shape individual behaviors within organizations. Organizational behavior can also be explained by social networks in which individuals and their organizations are embedded (Raider and Krackhardt, 2005). Extant literature has taken into account institutional logics and networks as interwoven (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2000; Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets et al., 2012; Besharov and Smith, 2014). Accordingly, individual and organizational identities are constructed within a network of field-level actors associated with institutional logics, and strong and weak ties with field actors drive individual and organizational responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Besharov and Smith, 2014).

However, it has been largely neglected that social networks to which individuals and organizations are linked can be *independent* from institutional logics, and can shape their behaviors through expectations, norms, and identities formed within the networks. For instance, in addition to the identities formed by the in-

stitutional logics at the field level, individuals and organizations may also acquire identities emanated from certain political, religious, or ethnic networks in which they are embedded. Inspired by Greenwood et al. (2011), we can also think that these social or political identities may also shape how organizational actors interpret and respond complexities in environment, depending on their alignment with those identities. This is particularly important to understand organizational behavior in an organizational field where institutional logics at the field level and political ideologies at the societal level are both candidates for influencing organizational behavior, such as academic hiring decisions in the Turkish higher education field. Then, how organizational actors interplay between logic-based identities and political network identities in responding environmental complexity becomes a theoretically significant issue to study.

In this paper, we aim at developing a conceptual framework that explain how individual embeddedness in multiple institutional logics at the field level and in political networks at the societal level shape managerial decisions within organizations. In predicting managerial decisions, we also consider that organizational actors are informed by their organizations' identities with respect to institutional logics and political networks. We particularly propose that the interactions between the degree of individual decision-makers' embeddedness in alternative institutional logics (single vs multiple) and in their egocentric political network ties (closed vs open) result in decisions on hiring new organizational members with varying embeddedness in institutional logics and political networks. In developing theoretical propositions, we particularly consider the case of academic staffing in management departments in newly founded universities in Turkey.

Basically, two motivations drive this study. First, the theoretical motivation is to expand the literature on institutional complexity by including political networks into the analysis. Secondly, the empirical motivation is to understand how academic hiring decisions are shaped in the Turkish management higher education field where both multiple institutional logics at the field-level and political ideologies at the societal level intervene (Üsdiken, 2004; Üsdiken and Wasti, 2009). By developing a conceptual framework based on the Turkish higher education case, we make two theoretical contributions; first we suggest that, where an organizational field is a political arena in which rival political camps attempt to control resources, such as the higher education field in Turkey, decision-makers' embeddedness in political networks, in addition to their embeddedness in institutional logics, equally shape their hiring decisions. Second, we suggest that

the embeddedness of decision-makers in a closed or open political network, and in a single or multiple institutional logics together influences to what extent decision-makers hire academicians similar to themselves in terms of political and logical embeddedness.

The paper is organized into five sections. First, we discuss theoretical insights for institutional complexity, actors' responses to it and implications of different network configurations for organizational decisions. Secondly, we focus on the prevailing institutional logics in management education in Turkey, and political polarizations in the Turkish higher education field. Thirdly, we introduce our model that explains how the degrees of decision-makers' embeddedness in institutional logics and in political networks together shape their hiring decisions. Fourthly, we elaborate the proposed model by taking into account different organizational and individual conditions. Finally, we conclude with the implications of the proposed model for the relevant literature.

Theoretical Insights: Institutional Complexity and Networks

Explanations about the mechanisms by which institutional logics influence individual action (Powell and Colyvas, 2008) remained scant in spite of the calls that 'there has been little effort to make neo-institutionalism's micro foundations explicit' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 16). Institutional logic, by definition, refers to material practices, assumptions, values and beliefs by which individuals provide meaning to their social reality, shape cognition and direct action in organizational fields (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Thornton et al., 2012). Thus, institutional logics 'underpin actors' frameworks for reason and belief' (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 35) and serve as organizing principles for individual action. Undoubtedly, institutional theory has mainly emphasized macro level aspects and paid limited attention to how institutions are transmitted and played out at the individual level. Individual level construction and transmission of logics deserves further consideration because it is at the individual level that logics are translated into action, action that either reinforces or reconstitutes the logics (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). Thus, how institutional logics shape individual attitudes and preferences, and whether diverse institutional logics produce variation in individual orientations is of theoretical concern. The process by which individual actors embedded in multiple logics select actions

in ambiguous situations is significant since individuals draw on different logics in different contexts (Greenwood et al., 2011).

As we stated earlier, institutional logics drive behavior by shaping identities that, in turn, filter possible responses of organizational actors to environmental changes (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Battilana and Lee, 2014; Glynn, 2008). Greenwood et al. (2011) suggested that identity should be considered at the institutional and organizational levels. At the institutional level, it can be seen as a set of claims to institutionally standardized social categories, e.g., “we are a university”, whereas at the organizational level, it is about enduring characteristics that distinguish the focal organization from the others in the same social category, e.g., “we are a research university” (Greenwood et al., 2011). Organizational identity prioritizes certain institutional expectations and pressures, and provides a repertoire of possible responses to them (Glynn, 2008). How organizational actors respond to institutional complexity depends on the extent to which organizational identity is strong, and whether they perceive the organizational identity positively or negatively (Greenwood et al., 2011). When organizational actors perceive the strong organizational identity positively, they will preserve the organizational identity by resisting the field-level pressures; otherwise, they will compromise or replace the existing organizational identity with new identities promoted by the institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011).

Thus, as driven by the identities defined by the field-level institutional logics, organizational actors combine, compromise or decouple multiple institutional logics (Pache and Santos, 2013b; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006). Enactment of multiple logics can be in several ways: (1) they may reconcile multiple logics by enacting a combination of practices drawn from each logic, i.e., combining, or (2) they may attempt to craft an acceptable balance between multiple logics in an altered form, i.e., compromising, by, for instance, bargaining with institutional constituents so that they alter their demands, or (3) actors can symbolically endorse practices prescribed by one logic, but actually implement those promoted by another logic, i.e., decoupling (Pache and Santos, 2013).

The degree of identification with single or multiple logics within the organization depends on how these logics are instantiated. This indeed requires emphasis on whether organizations embody multiple logics to understanding variation in how they do so. In this regard, the study of Besharov and Smith (2014) de-

veloped a framework for heterogeneity in which they have delineated the relationship between multiple logics in an organization on the basis of compatibility and centrality. Compatibility refers to the extent to which logic instantiations rule for consistent organizational actions. It is lower when logics provide contradictory prescriptions for action. For instance, Battilana and Dorado's (2010) study on how people were recruited to microfinance organization revealed that leaders opted for people whom were neither embedded in banking logic nor in social work logic; rather the newly-composed staff has been embedded into an integrated mission incorporating both logics thus representing high levels of logic compatibility among newly hired members. The degree of centrality refers to the extent which multiple logics within the organization are treated equally relevant to organizational functioning. It is lower when single logic is core to organizational functioning, and other logics are peripheral. The implication of this for academic staffing decisions is that decision-makers may tend to hire academicians who enact one logic.

In this study, we argue that institutional logics are not the sole factor that shapes identities of decision-makers and organizations in influencing their hiring decisions in academic organizational settings. We suggest that in addition to institutional logics, social networks in which decision-makers and organizations are embedded may also define their identities; e.g., "we are a free university", implying being free from, for example, a religious tutelage. A social network is defined here as "set of nodes (e.g., persons, organizations) linked by a set of social relationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a specified type" (Laumann et al., 1978: 458). As mentioned earlier, norms, expectations, and identities formed in the structure of social relations in which individuals are embedded in various degrees also shape their behaviors.

These social networks can be independent from institutional logics with which individuals are identified or they may be interwoven with them. In the former case, individuals may have ties with others in terms of their common characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, hometown, political views, school graduation, or friendship. In the latter case, networks that organizations or individual actors are connected to can be formed around single or multiple logics within an organizational field. Thus, to what extent the members can exercise degree of agency as they enact these logics is shaped by the nature of their networks. As argued by Greenwood et al. (2011), for instance, members' strong ties to field actors associated with the logic can reinforce the influence over behavior, on

the contrary weak ties provides more opportunity to deviate from the logic and view multiple logics more compatible. In the same regard, Glynn's (2000) Atlanta Symphony Orchestra study has shown that musicians having strong ties to professional institutions led them to enact aesthetic logic and was incompatible with the market logic carried out by administrators. Here, networks are not mere affiliations but social relations through which individual actors embody and enact field-level institutional logics.

The new institutional studies, particularly diffusion and institutional logics literatures, have employed network perspective rather in this regard (e.g., Besharov and Smith, 2014; Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011; Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury, 2009; Glynn, 2000; Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets et al., 2012). However, they have paid little attention to the issue of how organizational members' networks, not related to organizational field or institutional logics, but their social sphere of life shape their organizational decisions in conjunction with institutional logics they enact. In other words, less is known about how actors reconcile multiple identities associated with institutional logics and social networks in their actions. Therefore, in this study we basically adopt the former use of networks, i.e., social, particularly political, networks independent from logics, in developing our theoretical framework.

The basic premise of network perspective is that economic action, in our case "hiring", is embedded in structures of social relations (Granovetter, 1985). Here, embeddedness refers to the quality and network architecture of exchange relationships, i.e., structural embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997: 36). Also relevant to our topic, political embeddedness refers to formal and informal, individual and organizational ties to the state (Michelson, 2007: 353). The idea of political embeddedness comes from looking at ties to the state from the embeddedness perspective (Okhmatovskiy, 2010: 1023). In this study, we are basically interested in formal and informal ties of individuals and organizations not only to the state but also conventional (i.e., political parties) and non-conventional (i.e., social movement organizations) political entities.

The quality and network architecture of relationships vary according to the degree of strength and cohesiveness of ties (Gulati et al., 2005). The strength of ties is related to the intensity of interactions between actors, strong in the case of high interactions and weak in the case of low, whereas the cohesiveness of ties refers to whether the focal actor is connected to others directly or indirectly

through other actors, cohesive ties when they are direct, and bridging ties when they are indirect (Gulati et al., 2005). Although not necessarily, strong ties usually tend to be cohesive ties, and weak ties tend to be bridging ties (Burt, 1992). This overlapping between ties results in two basic structural configuration of egocentric networks: closed and open networks (Adler and Kwon, 2002). In a closed network, relationships are usually embedded in strong and cohesive (direct) ties. This network configuration promotes, and based on, trust, and reciprocity, and highlights the collective identity by developing internal relations only with those people whom are in the closed network. The actors in such network configuration tend to favor each other relatively more, solve common problems collaboratively, exchange information, and trust each other (Uzzi, 1996). On the other hand, in an open network, where weak and bridging ties usually dominate, actors are more likely to obtain new information and opportunities through their weak and indirect ties, filling the structural holes between disconnected actors (Burt, 1992 and 2007; Granovetter, 1973).

Closed and open network configurations have basically two implications for the academic staffing decisions. First, two configurations vary according to the degree of group pressures and obligations. In closed networks, the network implicitly dictates the importance of solidarity, compliance to norms and favoring the individuals from the same network in making hiring decisions. Hence, the actor feels the obligation and the responsibility to meet the expectations of the network members. In open network case, due to lower level network pressure and obligation, the decision-makers may enjoy greater agency in determining whom to recruit from members of different network encounters. Secondly, two configurations may also vary according the redundancy of information they provide (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). In a closed network where highly redundant information circulates within the network, actors who seek new members for vacant academic positions in their organizations are more likely to meet applications of those jobseekers who are from their close network since the information about vacant position is quickly disseminated within the network. On the other hand, in an open network which provides more non-redundant and new information, actors who make hiring decisions are more likely to meet jobseekers who have not known decision-makers personally but obtain the information about the vacant positions through their indirect relations, or simply through the ads for vacant positions open to the public.

Above discussions indicate that academic staffing decisions can be influenced by both institutional logics with which decision-makers are identified and

political networks in which they are embedded. One can simply think that decision-makers may tend to hire new members who are identified with the same logic as decision-makers are embedded, and those who are connected to decision-makers' own political networks, i.e., homophily assumption. However, in the real life, we can also observe that decision-makers may decide to hire new members embedded in opposite logics and in different political networks; i.e., heterophily assumption. Thus, the question here is to what extent staffing decisions may vary depending on whether decision-makers are identified with single or multiple logics in the field, and whether they are embedded in closed or open political networks. After illustrating the Turkish case below, we will attempt to develop a conceptual model to answer this question.

Developing a Theoretical Model for Academic Hiring Decisions in Turkey

In this section, we are going to elaborate institutional logics pertaining to the Turkish business education field, political context of Turkish Higher Education and associated political networks. Based on this discussion, we will then develop our theoretical model for academic hiring decisions in Turkey by also taking political and institutional context of academic hiring decisions into consideration. In doing so, we both review the related scholarly work and secondary data that will enable us to explicate how various institutional logics and political networks are instantiated in business education field. Although not systematically collected; articles from highly circulated national newspapers between 2008 and 2014, information from department websites, Council of Higher Education reports are analyzed.

Institutional Logics in Turkish Business Education Field

History of Turkey's higher education system starts in 1933, with the founding of the University of Istanbul, although its origin can be traced to the Ottoman period (Üsdiken, 1996: 36). Within a statist polity where the state led a modernization and development of the country, universities were seen as public institutions that would contribute to the modernization and nation-building project. Until the early 1980s, new universities were gradually established by both adopting the institutional model of the University of Istanbul essentially shaped by the conti-

mental-European tradition and following the US-based university tradition particularly after the 1950s (Üsdiken, 1996). Meanwhile, the professionally oriented schools in engineering, commerce, and accountancy, called 'academies' were also founded (Üsdiken, 1996). In this period, the number of universities, all public with semi-autonomous governance, has gradually increased to 27 (Günay and Günay, 2011). In 1981, the Turkish higher education system having previously autonomy in administrative and academic, but not financial, affairs, became centralized with the establishment of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), a governmental agency entitled with the planning, directing, and controlling all universities. Together with the establishment of YÖK, a new institutional regime was introduced by (1) converting all professional schools into universities, (2) bringing all universities under a unified form of governance with extensive powers granted to YÖK, (3) pushing universities to adopt the US-based administrative and educational structures, and finally, (4) permitting the establishment of private universities (Üsdiken and Wasti, 2009: 1069). Since then, the number of universities, public and private, has increased considerably: by 2015 there are 193 higher education institutions in Turkey, 109 public universities, 76 private universities, and 8 private vocational schools (ww.yok.gov.tr, retrieved in December 17, 2015).

Turkish higher education field is characterized by plurality of institutional forms stemming from different historical trajectories in both European and American traditions (Üsdiken, 2003). In parallel to the broader higher education system, Turkish business education field has been characterized with the multiple logics from the Early Republican era until the present day. The field has had multiple sources of influence; first the French (until early 1930s), then the German (between 1930 and 1950s) and lastly the American (1950s to present day) (Üsdiken, 2004). It is also argued that adoption and diffusion of these models in any novel context has depended on national level institutional frameworks on education, field-level institutional processes reflecting historical influences and inter-organizational effects and resources and finally proponents that different models were able to generate (Üsdiken, 2004; Kipping et al., 2004).

The Turkish higher education field reflected the multiple institutional models as a result of varying institutional effects. When the strong coercive mechanisms lack and legal framework has multiplicity; historical roots of organizations become more influential in determining their activities and structure thereby leading to higher level of divergence. Contrarily, strong institutional regime, such

as YÖK, tends to homogenize the field in accordance with what the coercive pressure features (Erden, 2006). Although our study encapsulates management departments established from 2009 to 2014; still the logics enacted by actors at high level positions concurrently reflect the premises of different historical traditions. Üsdiken (2003a), in his study on the content of business education and its shaping forces in Turkey showed that together with convergent pressures, present day business curricula of universities vary in line with the institutional models influential in early stages. The presence of multiple logics in the institutional environment suggests that new entrants into the field have variety of models to select but still this choice would be moderated by the nature of ties they have with the present organizations at the time of their founding. Thus, newly founded universities with organizational links to pre-existing ones are more likely to continue with the institutionalized practices of the latter (Üsdiken, 2003a).

We argue that the current business education field in Turkey embodies three co-existing institutional logics namely, *vocational*, *scientization* and *entrepreneurial* as presented in Table 1. The table classifies the co-existing institutional logics with regard to their main premises, outputs, curriculum structure and functional emphasis.

Table 1. Prevailing Logics in Business Education Field in Turkey

Prevailing Logics	<i>Vocational</i>	<i>Scientization</i>	<i>Entrepreneurial</i>
Main Premise	Professional training	Scientific research	Market-driven, action research
Output	Practitioners with managerial skills	Generalists	Entrepreneurs, Managers, Start-up owners
Curriculum structure	Higher course load Rigid programs Contextualized courses	Lower course load Greater discretion in program construction Universalistic,	Practice-oriented Project-based Courses on Entrepreneurship, Innovation, Technology
Functional emphasis	Teaching	Research and publication	Contributing to Regional/national development

Vocational Logic

The vocational logic associated with French and German influence has been mainly initiated through the creation of higher commercial schools at the beginning of 20th century by chambers of commerce and local business communities. The French imprint is more characterized with vocational orientation having book-keeping, commercial techniques, accounting and law as core subjects, further specialization areas and relatively heavy course load including large number of must courses (Üsdiken, 2004). German influence is more devoted to importation of business economics entailing that business enterprise could be made to produce better results with the knowledge provided by business economics (Üsdiken, 2003b). Hence, there was more emphasis on economics and business firm while accounting being primary concern.

The main premise of the vocational logic in business education is to equip students with professional training so that prospective graduates of the department envisioned becoming practitioners with managerial skills. The reflection of this logic on the curriculum exclusively revealed practice orientation. Not only providing education that aims to equip students with practical skills, instructors are also recruited on the basis of their practice-based competence while leaving research experience aside. The vocational logic enacted by commercial schools at the outset but later infused to the universities of our present time has been much devoted towards teaching practical techniques and skills with key focus on accounting. Curriculum is more inclined to be a rigid program with less number of elective courses. Mostly courses are more contextualized in nature dealing with national context albeit, Turkish context such as specific accounting related courses, law courses and other courses on Turkish Tax System, Turkish Banking System, Turkish Economy, Turkish Cooperatives. More emphasis was on specialized education in professional areas while disregarding advanced study (Kipping et al., 2004). In terms of its output, the business departments clearly aim to equip practitioners with professional skills. It stipulates the development of business and practical skills that would enable student vocational competence and fit between student capabilities and industrial interests. Therefore, teaching emerges to be the main functional emphasis of this approach while leaving research and publication partly aside. The vocational logic envisages research orientation and scientific engagement only if it is useful for the managers and directed towards development of guidelines practical methods for managerial problems.

Scientization Logic

The prominence of vocational logic governing business education paved way to scientific model from 1950s onwards. The post-WW2 period and rapprochement between Turkey and US revealed more sweeping away from the German inspired tradition towards more Fayolist general management framework (Üsdiken and Çetin, 2001). This was fostered with the shift in the kind of background required for managerial roles towards a more generalist education. The main premise of scientization logic was that business education could be made science-based and a practice of which could be built on knowledge derived from scientifically based research (Üsdiken, 2007). Scientization logic having its claim that management is a profession, discursively suggested the blending of managerialist and academic logics (Üsdiken, 2007). However, the actual practice reflected more emphasis on the academic drift at the expense of the managerialist component that the scientization logic implied.

The scientization logic associated with US influence was infused with liberalizing mission that would reflect itself both in output and curriculum structure. In terms of output, business education suggested training of generalists whom would be competent in several fields and activities. Students are promised with becoming equipped to take up high-level positions as generalists in all kinds (i.e. national and multinational companies) and prosperous future (Üsdiken, 2004). For the latter, liberalizing meant to develop the character of the student by having courses in liberal arts. In this view, the department internalizes both the liberalizing and training via professional education (Üsdiken, 2004). The inclusion of more general (liberal) component into the curriculum was manifested through having courses in literature, humanities, social, natural sciences and mathematics in the first two years where professional component is realized by offering more specialized courses in the remaining two years (Üsdiken, 2007). Teaching of business guided by this logic was more oriented to functional format differing from German tradition and consisted of separate courses of different functions in business firms (i.e. finance, marketing, production) and use of case-methods in lecturing. Students are granted with greater discretion in formulating their undergraduate programs via elective courses, more universalistic courses applying to any context and with lower course load.

Scientization logic with its functional emphasis on research and publication is more geared towards scholarly pursuits in which the advancement of scientific

knowledge is the sole aim. Hence, doing empirical research to guide management practice and solving actual problems of managers remained behind the efforts of theory development and rigorous theory testing (Üsdiken, 2004). As the logic implied research-based business education, academic staff is expected to be more research-oriented and more outward orientation in research and publishing. In order to trigger stronger research orientation, universities from this tradition put more pressure in making performance in publications in faculty recruitment and promotions. Moreover, they underline importance of publishing largely at US-based outlets and usually at the expense of localized interest in contributing to national literature (Üsdiken and Wasti, 2009). Usually criticized, scientization logic imported from US in peripheral contexts again lacked concern for contextualization. Specifically academics embedded in this logic have taken US academic environment as their primary frame of reference with respect to research and publication.

Although there has been US influence from 1950s onwards still resistance to incorporate scholarly research orientation remained intact. External and institutional factors in Turkish context contributed to this. The emphasis on teaching in business departments as a response to the rising demand for student places in universities and partly to train practicing managers were the major obstacles in the development of profound research orientation (Üsdiken, 1996). So the vocational logic again came to the foreground through more incentives for teaching, training and consulting.

Entrepreneurial Logic

Though following the traces of US influence, business education in 1990s and the period onwards underwent externally driven change. The entrepreneurial logic guiding the higher education field of this period has its roots in neoliberalism, market rationality and competitive market for education and research. Accordingly neoliberal agenda underlines the shift in the perception of the university from “a community producing knowledge as a public good for community uses” to “a market-led business producing knowledge as a private good for individual consumption” (Berg and Roche, 1997: 154). Hence, the main premise of entrepreneurial logic emerged to be engagement in market-driven and action research.

Under this logic, universities are no longer seen as producers of human capital or isolated islands of knowledge but also, devoted to position themselves as

significant players in achieving technology development and economic growth thus improving cultural life (Klofsten and Jones-Evans, 2000). Hence entrepreneurial university is seen more as involving strengthened steering core signifying that traditional academic values infused with stronger managerial perspectives (Clark, 1998). Cooperation with the external world, industrial linkages, continuous education, student employability, and contribution to firm success are important drivers in that respect. The main output of this logic proved to be training students to become prospective entrepreneurs and startup owners.. With more international influence on the agenda, the field became more intertwined with rankings, accountability pressures through national evaluation systems, scrutiny from public and private funding agencies and finally Bologna process. Main discursive element of this period emerged to be the marketization of business education in such a way that responsiveness of business departments to students (i.e. student employability) and firms (i.e. firm success and competitiveness) became crucial.

In line with the neoliberal policies, as public resources allocated to higher education have begun to shrink from mid-1990s onwards universities were urged to expand their funding base by finding alternative income sources and commercializing their research. This has also been the case with the Draft Law and policy papers having emphasis on how universities diversify their income and become entrepreneur (YÖK, 2007; TÜSİAD, 1994, 2003). Diversification has meant the decrease of share from central budget, increase in income produced by services provided by the university and increase in the student shares (Aslan, 2012). Thus the operationalization of entrepreneurial university from this viewpoint refers to the extent to which the university can finance itself and can generate resources to enhance its survival.

Business department's endeavor in gaining international recognition via seeking accreditation became more pronounced. These also indirectly contributed to the strengthening of scientization logic via putting more pressure on finding ways for increasing publications in international prominent journals or recruiting department members with good publication records. Yet, state-dominated nature of higher education system in Turkey affected the way that business education organized; instead of importing US education model, Turkey was more oriented towards taking curriculum and teaching content. While still American-modeled public universities and highly ranked private foundation universities in Turkey insisted on publication performance, overall the penetration of this model re-

mained very limited. In Turkish case, importation of entrepreneurial logic is in fact realized more discursively (i.e. having emphasis of entrepreneurship and regional development in their mission and vision statements) and instructively (i.e. teaching entrepreneurship, innovation and technology management). Hence the functional emphasis remained to be on contribution to regional and national development.

In terms of the curriculum structure, courses were designed to respond more to student demands that also triggered tailoring of education content to student career aspirations (Üsdiken, 2007). Teaching has become more project and practice-oriented, academic staff is more directed to make research with the industry partners. Entrepreneurial logic mostly found its presence in the departmental curricula. Though departments are discursively giving entrepreneurially motivated messages, still socio-economic conditions of the peripheral cities that these departments are located at were putting a strain on the achievement of entrepreneurship. Still however, departments included various courses related to entrepreneurship (i.e. Entrepreneurial Skills Workshops, Entrepreneurial Technology Commercialization, Entrepreneurship and Leadership, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) made agreements with KOSGEB (Small and Medium Enterprise Development Association) for Entrepreneurship Certificate Program, tried to arrange company visits and talks given by local entrepreneurs. Along with these, establishment of TechnoParks, Competition Centers, Business Incubator Offices, scoring high on the Entrepreneurial University Index of *the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey* (TÜBİTAK) became more pronounced.

Overall we argue that current state of business education entails multiple coexistence of vocational, scientization and entrepreneurial logics in which it does not cease as one logic gains prominence over the other. Rather business departments either enact multiple activities imbued with diverse logics or different logics independently co-exist inside the organization. The different cohorts of departments imbued with different logic combinations reflect different embodiments.

Turkish Higher Education in Political Context

Modern Turkey was built as a nation-state on the multi-ethnic legacy of Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. In the nation-building process, the ruling elite organized around the *Republican People's Party* (CHP) attempted to modernize

society in a top-down fashion based on a modernization project of which main principles were *nationalism*, *secularism*, *republicanism*, *populism*, *reformism*, and *etatism*. Among them, the first two principles, particularly, created tensions within the society that still continue to shape the state-society relations and politics. The nationalism, on the one hand, imposed in a totalizing manner “the Turkish identity” to non-Turkish ethnical identities, such as Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Lazs, Zazas, Albanians, and non-Muslim minorities such as Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. The secularism, which was formulated as *laicism*, on the other hand, discriminated against Islamic religious communities and social groups that idealized a society based on Islamic rules as well as against secular but non-Sunni Muslim groups, such as Alevis.

On this ground, the Turkish polity has been formed as a statist polity where a patrimonial state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and the *clientelistic* state-society relations have prevailed (Heper, 1985; Sunar, 1974). Coexisted with the legal-rational bureaucracy, the patrimonial-state is characterized by the top-down and arbitrary actions of the ruling political and bureaucratic elite, relatively independent from, and frequently against to the demands of underprivileged societal groups. In Turkey, this polity involved an ongoing conflict between the center and periphery of the society (Mardin, 1973). The center was represented by political, bureaucratic, business, and intellectual, including academics, elite groups (Heper, 1974), which constituted a coalition around the official modernization ideology of the state. The periphery, on the other hand, was constituted by emerging middle class, the rural upper class, artisans, religious, and ethnic (particularly, Kurdish) groups, which have challenged one or more principles of the state ideology, such as nationalism, secularism, and etatism (Berkman and Özen, 2008).

The unmet demands of the peripheral groups have been voiced by various political parties, such as the Democratic Party (DP), the Justice Party (AP), the National Salvation Party (MSP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP) since the transition to the multi-party politics in 1945. These political parties, which have been liberal and/or to varying degrees Islamist in nature, have frequently come to power through free elections. They have been in conflict with the state elites in various degrees, and therefore, overthrown by the military four times since the establishment of the Republic (Berkman and Özen, 2008: 2). Since the 2002 election, however, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a pro-Islamic party, has been in office after the land-slide victory in the election. Although the AKP

government has reformed the economic and political institutions in accordance with the liberal and democratic principles required for full-membership in the European Union, it has increasingly become authoritarian and patrimonial by changing the laws and regulations to allow arbitrary government interventions in support of politically privileged entrepreneurs and other societal groups (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014).

Another enduring characteristic of the Turkish politics, clientelism, refers to party politics as a means of participating in resource allocation through preferential treatment by political patronage (Heper, 2002). Clientelism inherently involves, what Jeperson and Meyer (1991) refer to as, interest intermediation through primordial relations. Thus, the Turkish politics has revolved around the struggle between political parties to seize governmental power in order to allocate resources controlled by the government to their constituencies by discriminating ‘others’ with opposing political views. For instance, the biggest family business groups in Turkey, which were organized around the Association of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSIAD) in 1971, have been rapidly grown by the nurture of the state as well as through the particularistic relations with the traditional central political and bureaucratic elite (Buğra, 1994) at the expense small businesses scattered around Anatolian cities. Similarly, as the Islamic movement has become increasingly powerful since the mid-1970s, pro-Islamic political parties, particularly AKP since the early 2000s, which has seized the center while pacifying the traditional central elite, have created their own big business groups by using similar patronage systems, now organized around the Independent Industrialist and Businessman Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), and the Anatolian Tigers Businessmen Association (ASKON) (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). Both traditional business elite and the pro-Islamic one have entered in the higher education field by establishing and sponsoring private universities since the mid 1980s.

Thus, these political cleavages in the Turkish political economy have reflected themselves in the higher education system. Since the higher education institutions were initially considered as the agents that would realize the modernization project of the ruling elite, academic staff, actually public servants, was largely recruited from those who were supposed to be loyal to the principles of the state ideology. Loyal academic cadres were going to be what Heper (1974) calls “academic intelligentsia” that fought against the first challenge to the state ideology by the Democratic Party government in the 1950s. However, due to the grad-

ual expansion of higher education as well as the development of relatively more democratic political life throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the academic cadres became politically more polarized. Nevertheless, YÖK, established after the 1980 military coup, fired hundreds of academics in 1983 just for their political views, mostly leftists, by depending on the Law numbered 1402. YÖK, as a guardian of the state ideology, has maintained its tutelage over the universities in terms of staffing issues throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s by putting pressures on academicians with oppositional political views, particularly those with pro-Islamic views because the traditional elite at the center perceived the rise of pro-Islamic bourgeoisie, and the increasing power of pro-Islamic parties as a serious threat to the regime. Particularly before and after the military intervention in 28 February 1997 to the coalition government of a center-right (True Path Party-DYP) and a pro-Islamic party (Welfare Party-RP), academicians with religious views were mobbed; their recruitments and promotions were delayed or blocked (Eğitim-Bir-Sen, 2014).

However, these attempts did not prevent further polarization of universities and academic staff during these years. After the enactment of the Law that allowed the establishment of private universities in 1982, new private universities were established either by the secular bourgeoisie or by emerging religious one, particularly connected with the pro-Islamic Gülen (or Hizmet) community (Dreher, 2014) and with AKP. Furthermore, the pro-Islamic AKP government, in power since 2002, has followed an expansion policy by establishing new public universities; the number of public universities increased from 46 in 2002 to 109 in 2015. Meantime, the number of private universities rose from 23 to 84 in the same period (Dünya, 17 October 2012; Günay and Günay, 2011). Then, AKP has enjoyed using the central power resided in YÖK to control universities and academic staffing, although it declared before the 2002 election that it would abolish YÖK.

In the hierarchical structure of the higher education field, the power is exercised by the government through YÖK, as the above examples suggest, or through the university rectors. Rectors are crucial in staffing decisions in universities because they are the ultimate authority to approve or reject the recruitment of academicians recommended by the faculty dean based on the report by jury members in evaluation committee. However, who actually makes a final decision also depends on the relative power of actors involved such as rector, dean or department head. According to the Higher Education Law, rectors in public

universities are assigned by the president of the Republic from the three candidates nominated by YÖK by considering those academicians who got the highest votes from academic staff participated in rectorship elections held at a university. In practice, however, YÖK has discretion to nominate, and the President has discretion to assign, anybody from the list, making the election a mere eligibility requirement.

These discretions at both YÖK and the presidential levels have usually been used in a way that the candidate with a political view similar to the dominant one in YÖK and that of the president at the time is chosen. When the government, YÖK, and the presidency have opposing political views at any given time; the assignment of university rectors becomes a conflictual issue between these bodies. However, in case of political consistency between these bodies, as occurred since 2008 when all these bodies have been occupied by those with pro-Islamic political views, the rector assignment becomes an issue of give-and-take. As for the private universities, one candidate for the rector position is nominated by the Board of Trustees, which is the highest decision-making body in private universities, to YÖK, and s/he is assigned as the rector after the approval of YÖK. The related regulation suggests that the nominee is approved by YÖK as long as he/she satisfies the eligibility requirements for rectorship (e.g., having a higher-education diploma, not sentenced for infamous crime and for 'the crimes against the state'). Thus, the private universities have long enjoyed in relative autonomy although they are also under the tutelage of YÖK.

However, after an intense political conflict emerged in 2012 between the AKP government and the Gülen religious community (Toruk and Olkun, 2014), which had once been strategic alliance in overthrowing the tutelage of the traditional elite, the government released a law draft for higher education in 2014 that provided YÖK with stronger hand in controlling private universities: in the draft, YÖK is entitled with the right to abolish a private university upon which its investigation concludes with "consistent inadequacies" in educational, administrative, and financial matters in a university, and to approve the members of board of trustees by the majority (two-third) of YÖK council (Radikal, 23 June 2014). Meantime, the government increased pressures on the Gülen community by accusing them for engaging in filling the academic positions in public universities with those loyal to the community (Sabah, 18 April 2014). Recently, in a private university supported by a big business group well-connected with AKP, the newly appointed rector was protested by a pro-Islamic group of students and acade-

micians at the university for his alleged connection with the Gülen community (Sabah, 27 October 2015). Upon protests, and a meeting between the president of the Board of Trustees, also the chairman of the board of directors of the sponsoring business group, and the prime minister, who initiated the establishment of that university, the president “heralded” via twitter that the rector protested was replaced by another one, who had of course a pro-AKP political view (Hürriyet, 6 November 2015; Star, 6 November 2015).

The Political and Institutional Context of Academic Hiring Decisions

As a result, higher education in Turkey has always been a political arena where opposing parties struggles for seizing power to control resources, including human resources, for their constituencies. Therefore, academic staffing decisions have frequently been contested by rival political camps. For instance, politically rival camps accused each other for engaging in “staffization” (in Turkish, “kadrolaşma”) (e.g., Sabah, 27 April 2012; Radikal, 1 September 2013; Cumhuriyet, 8 April 2014). Staffization means in the Turkish political vocabulary, filling academic positions with those from the same close political network as the decision-makers are belong to by discriminating against those outside the network. A common way for staffization is to limit the eligibility of those outside the circle for vacant academic positions as much as possible.

In Turkey, it is mandatory by regulations that all universities, public or private, put a job posting on one of the five national newspapers with the largest circulations to announce their vacant positions. After taking all applications for a vacant academic position, the dean forms a jury consisting of three professors or associate professors from the related field. After the jury reports written opinions about the applicants, the dean raises the issue in the Board Meeting in order to get diverse views. The dean offers the name of the eligible candidate to the rector whereby he makes the final appointment. However, one difficulty with hiring decisions in Turkish universities, as we stated earlier, is that various actors are involved in hiring decisions, rector, dean, department head, and jury members in evaluation committee. Who actually makes a final decision depends on their relative power. Although rector has always a right to make the final hiring decision, s/he tends to respect hiring-decisions made at the department or school levels. On the other hand, the weakest link in the decision-making is jury members due

to the ceremonial nature of evaluation as we will mention later. Thus, dean, particularly the founding dean, and department head emerge as the most powerful actors in making hiring decisions.

Their relative power depends, among other things, on how management education is organized in a university. In Turkey, business education has been basically organized at two levels: as a department under a school (or faculty), or as a school (faculty) itself. In the first option, management is a department, together with other departments such as political science and public administration, economics and international relations, under what usually called the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. In the second option, management education is organized as a school with departments of subfields such as marketing, finance, production/operations management, and management and organization. In the former, the dean may or may not be of management background, and usually delegate the authority for hiring decisions to management department head. In the latter, the dean of management school is usually of management background, and more influential on hiring decisions, particularly newly established schools since the subfield departments are not well established in newly founded schools. Hence, in our theoretical model, we consider the hiring decisions of whoever is the most dominant one in decision-making process: whether be department head in the former structure or the founding dean in the latter structure, both having management background.

Although the procedures to be followed for academic hiring decisions are strictly regulated by the Law, decoupling has been widespread in practice. In actual practice, for example, the individual who is to be hired is often determined in very advance by the decision-maker(s), in which the formal procedure is carried out ceremonially. Therefore, they put the specific fields of study or research topics, on which the person to be hired has already studied or published, on the ad as the requirements to become eligible so that job-seekers, except for the fixed one, are less likely to become eligible to apply for vacant positions. Hence, job postings in the Turkish academic field are generally “too specific to apply”. For instance, a newly established public university, which was introduced by the AKP government as “its prestigious project”, placed so specific job postings on the newspapers that via the witness of a public notary, an oppositional NGO succeeded to predict almost 100 percent correctly the names of the academicians who would be hired before the selection process ended (Akşam, 3 June 2011). More interestingly, another new public university announced its job vacancies

on a newspaper ad where the names of academicians to be hired were also given mistakenly across the vacant positions (Radikal, 1 September 2013).

This decoupling strategy has also been employed for the reasons other than staffization: namely, for inbreeding and performance concerns. Inbreeding, i.e., recruitment and promotion from within the university, has traditionally been the predominant policy in higher education in Turkey although some universities, particularly private ones, rely on external labor market (Üsdiken, 1996; Önder and Kasapoğlu, 2011). In this policy, departments employ their own graduates as assistants, and they are promoted to higher ranks till full professorship at the end of their academic carrier as long as they succeed to fulfill necessary requirements for each rank. Therefore, it is a norm in such universities to give a priority to their own staff in promotion and recruitment over the outsiders, although it contradicts with the regulations. Hence, the job postings of universities that use inbreeding policy become very specific to their own staff. Universities can also use the decoupling strategy when decision-makers perceive a specific academician as the one they actually need because of his/her academic qualifications, rather than his/her political views. Thus, since they already want to hire him/her for performance concerns, they describe the eligibility requirements specific to him/her for practical reasons.

There are also situations in which academic recruitments and selections are implemented in accordance with what the regulation exactly requires, i.e., the case of no decoupling. When decision-makers in a university without any political identity, and therefore, not engaging in any political networks, but only concerning with recruiting academicians best fitted with the institutional logic(s) they are embedded in, they might want to have alternatives as many as possible to choose the best fitted academicians. Or, regardless of the degree of its engagement in any political networks, a department, especially ones in young universities established in remote and underdeveloped regions, may desperately need human resources to fulfill the basic requirements for being an academic institution, i.e., smooth education. Since such departments lack necessary academic personnel, decision-makers may tend to attract academicians as many as possible through following the regulations.

Regarding the political identities of universities, we should note that although universities in Turkey vary in terms of their identifications with different political views, what is common to all is that they avoid declaring their political

identity, if any, to the public. Therefore, you never see any university in Turkey that has a slogan in its website like “we are a pro-Islamic university” or “we are a leftist university”, even if it actually has a political identity, and everybody knows this. This is because of both legal and technical reasons. To have a political identity for a university is legally forbidden although this legal requirement is always violated by the governments themselves, but more importantly, universities do not want to limit their admission potential to only those students with same political view as the university has by declaring their political identity. In other words, because of increasing competition in attracting students, universities want to admit students to fill their admission quotas imposed by YÖK regardless of their political views. Therefore, political identity at the university level in Turkey is an example of “subtle” identity that represents the conflict between the technical requirements in the higher education field and the political ideologies at the societal level.

A Theoretical Model for Academic Hiring Decisions

Drawing upon the above discussions on the political and institutional environments of management departments in Turkey, we propose the theoretical model in Figure 1 in order to explain how the interplay between institutional logics and political networks shapes academic hiring decisions in management departments. The model is designed for management departments in newly established universities, at least after 2008. This is because new universities hire academicians heavily from the external labor market since their inbreeding system, if they would have, has not been established yet due to their newness. Thus, our framework is limited to the decisions to hire academicians from outside, not those to promote insiders to higher ranks.

In our model, we mainly focus on decision-makers in managerial positions, founding deans or department heads, because they are exposed to multiple institutional logics in their routine and non-routine work and need to implement strategies on behalf of their organizations. They are also informed with, or part of, the political and institutional identities of the university and the department they are working for. Therefore, they are the actors who would reflect these identities in their hiring decisions. For this study, we assume that founding dean is the person who is influential in making the hiring decisions even if s/he may not literally be the founding one per se. Hence we do imply that founding dean does

not refer to the first dean appointed but rather is the one who plays acting role in the formation of academic staff. For the sake of simplicity, we thereby use the term “founding dean” in the conceptualization of our theoretical model. The level of analysis of our framework is individual since we focus in this study on how field-level institutional logics and societal level political networks are reflected in hiring decisions at the individual level. Besides, it is the individual level at which we can better understand how decision-makers’ engagement in the institutional and political identities of the universities and management departments of which they are the faculty members interactively drive their hiring decisions.

The dependent variable of the framework is the level of similarity between the institutional logic and political network embeddedness of decision-maker and the hired individual. A hired academician may enact a single or multiple logics similar to that of decision-maker, or s/he may reflect the enactment of single or multiple logics different from that of decision-maker. In a similar way, s/he may be embedded in the same political network in which decision-maker is embedded, or s/he may be from different networks. As presented in Figure 1, we argue that the level of similarity between decision-maker and hired individual in terms of logical and political embeddedness can be explained by two dimensions: namely, the decision-maker’s embeddedness in institutional logics and the decision-maker’s embeddedness in political networks.

The decision-maker’s embeddedness in institutional logics at the field level refers to the extent to which they enact single or multiple logics at the Turkish management higher education field, i.e., vocational, scientization, and entrepreneurial logics. It represents a continuum starting from being embedded in only one of the logics and ending with being embedded in all of the three logics at the same time. The decision-maker’s embeddedness in a single or multiple institutional logics may represent his/her individual identification not only with the field-level logics but also with the departmental identity based on the field-level logics. However, since we focus on management departments in ‘newly’ established universities, departments are less likely to have established identities. In the Turkish case, it is very rare that actors plan and design the identities of university and its departments to be established, and build an academic staff long before the admission of students (for an exception see Sabancı University, <https://www.sabanciuniv.edu/en/about>, retrieved in December 17, 2015). The common pattern in establishing public or private universities is to admit students for undergraduate programs immediately after the official establishment, and continue to hire

new members, as they are needed. Therefore, the logic-based identity of management departments is being constructed as new academics are being hired. Here, the founding dean, as being the primary decision-maker, is a crucial figure in the construction of departmental identity because his/her identification with the institutional logics, if any, would be more likely to influence which logic-based identifications academicians to be recruited would have.

The decision-maker's embeddedness in political networks refers to the degree of closeness (or openness) of political networks in which decision-maker is embedded. Decision-makers may be embedded in a relatively closed network with strong and cohesive political (pro-Islamic, secular, leftist, etc.) ties, or in an open network with weak and indirect ties connecting different political networks. This dimension is also a continuum that represents the degree of embeddedness in closed political networks. However, as different from the logic-based identity that is constructed in process, political identity is acquired at the outset while a university, particularly private one, is established. In the Turkish case, which political network establishes a university determines the political identity of that university, although this is not declared to public. In such cases, individuals who are embedded in the same political network are assigned as the rector and founding deans. Therefore, the compatibility between the political identity of a university and that of decision-makers is more likely. Similarly, when a private university is established by entrepreneurs who are not so much embedded in a single political network, decision-makers' political identities may also become diverse and reflect open political network architecture. As for the public universities, although they are not legally supposed to engage in any political network and to have a political identity, in the Turkish practice, any political party in power attempts frequently to control universities through staffization practices. Therefore, newly established public universities may also subtly acquire political identities. This is particularly true for new universities scattered among small Anatolian cities and with low status in the higher education field.

		Decision-maker's Embeddedness in Political Network Structure	
		Closed	Open
Decision-maker's Embeddedness in Institutional Logics	Multiple	(3) Embedded in any logic but in the same network	(4) Embedded in any logic and in any network
	Single	(1) Embedded in a same single logic and in the same network	(2) Embedded in a same single logic but in any network

Figure 1. Proposed Model of the Study

The interaction between these two dimensions yield four combinations of decision-maker's embeddedness in logics and networks as seen Figure 1: 1) single logic-closed network, 2) single logic-open network, 3) multiple logics-closed network, and 4) multiple logics-open network. These four combinations, in turn, lead to hiring decisions about individuals with different embeddedness in logics and political networks. The main assumption behind this causal relationship is that when a decision-maker is embedded in a single logic and/or in a closed network, s/he will tend to hire an academician embedded in similar logic and/or network (homophily assumption) whereas when a decision-maker enacts multiple logics and/or has open network, s/he tends to hire an academician embedded in any logic and/or in any network (heterophily assumption). Thus, the interaction between these two dimensions affects the level of similarity between the decision-maker and the hired individual in terms of the embeddedness in both logic and political network.

In Cell 1, the single logic-closed network case, decision-maker will tend to hire an academician who is embedded in a same single logic and in the same network as decision-maker is. First, since decision-maker is strongly and positively identified with a single institutional logic, his/her perceptions and interpretations about the qualities of academicians to be hired would be more strongly filtered

and driven by the institutional logic with which s/he is identified (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Greenwood et al. 2011). Therefore, s/he is more likely to hire an academician embedded in the same institutional logic than those embedded in a different logics or multiple logics. Secondly, s/he is more likely to hire an academician from the same closed political network rather than those belonging to other closed networks or embedded in open networks because s/he feels more strongly obliged, and/or the pressure of his/her closed network, to hire an academician from the same closed network due to the prevailing solidarity, cohesiveness, and reciprocity principles in the closed networks (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). To give an example, a founding dean, who is identified with scientization logic, and employed by a newly established public university which is more likely to be identified with the pro-Islamic AKP political network, will tend to recruit those academicians strongly enacted the scientization logic from among the members of the pro-Islamic AKP network. As a result, the level of similarity between the decision-maker and the hired individual in terms of both logic and network embeddedness is expected to be highest in the single logic-closed network case. Thus, we propose the following propositions:

Proposition 1a: When the decision-maker is embedded in a single institutional logic and a closed political network, s/he is more likely to hire an academician embedded in the same single logic and the same closed political network.

Proposition 1b: The level of similarity between the institutional logic and political network embeddedness of the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be highest when the decision-maker is embedded in a single institutional logic and a closed political network.

In Cell 2, the single logic-open network case, decision-maker is more likely to hire an academician who is embedded in a single logic but in any political network. As similar to the case in Cell 1, decision-maker who is identified with a single logic will tend to prefer an academician who is also embedded in the same logic because his/her mental map is imbued with that specific logic. However, decision-maker would enjoy greater agency in determining whom to recruit from members of different networks due to lower level network pressure and obligation in open networks. In addition, since s/he has relatively more ties, although weak and indirect, to different networks, s/he is more likely to have richer information about possible candidates for vacant positions from diverse networks. As an example for this scenario, we can imagine a founding dean with the vocational

logic in a new private university established by an entrepreneur with open political network structure. S/he will be more likely to prefer academicians identified with the vocational logic to those identified with a single logic other than the vocational one, or with multiple logics. However, these academicians to be hired by him/her would be from different political networks or from those embedded in open networks. Therefore, the level of similarity between the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be moderate: similar in terms institutional logic identification but dissimilar in terms of political networks. As a result, we suggest:

Proposition 2a: When the decision-maker is embedded in a single institutional logic and an open political network, she is more likely to hire an academician embedded in the same single logic but in any political network.

Proposition 2b: The level of similarity between the institutional logic and political network embeddedness of the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be moderate when the decision-maker is embedded in a single institutional logic and an open political network; similar in terms of the institutional logic identification, but dissimilar in terms of political networks.

In Cell 3, the scenario of the multiple logic-closed network, decision-maker will tend to hire academicians embedded in any of three logics or multiple logics but in the same closed network. The institutional logic enacted in this scenario may include diverse components from diverse logics such as emphasizing scientific research and carrying out projects for the regional development, yet still decision-maker may insist on incorporating people from a closed political network. The effect of closed network structure on staffing is associated with the impact of external pressure and obligation on the decision-maker's staffing decision. As an example for this case, we can consider the hiring decision of a founding dean who is embedded in all of vocational, scientization, and entrepreneurial logics and employed by a private university established by, for instance, the pro-Islamic Gülen community. S/he will be more likely to recruit those academicians identified with any logic or any combination of multiple logics, but embedded in the Gülen community. Thus, the resulting level of similarity between the decision-maker and the hired academician will be again moderate as similar to the case in Cell 2, but different in quality: they would be similar in terms of the network embeddedness but different in terms of logic identification. As a result, we develop the following propositions:

Proposition 3a: When the decision-maker is embedded in multiple institutional logics and a closed political network, s/he is more likely to hire an academician embedded in any single logic or multiple logics but in the same closed political network.

Proposition 3b: The level of similarity between the institutional logic and political network embeddedness of the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be moderate when the decision-maker is embedded in multiple institutional logics and a closed political network; similar in terms of the political network, but dissimilar in terms of institutional logics.

Finally, in Cell 4 where the multiple logics-open network is the scenario, decision-maker will be more likely to recruit academicians embedded in any one of institutional logics or multiple logics as well as in any political network. Since his/her network is open, s/he can attract individuals from different political networks. When this is coupled with the multiple logics that include elements from scientization, vocational and entrepreneurial logics, each new member of the academic staff is more welcomed to reflect the premises of different institutional logics that s/he is embedded in to the forefront and results with a more mixed staff. This scenario is the most appropriate for decision-makers to exercise their agency because they are less constrained by institutional logics and political networks. The hiring decision of a founding dean who is embedded in any combination of vocational, scientization, and entrepreneurial logics, and working for a private university sponsored by an entrepreneur having an open political network can be considered as an example for this case. S/he would be more likely to recruit those academicians who enact either one of three logics or enact a combination of these logics, and embedded in any or a combinations of political networks. Therefore, the level of similarity in terms of logic and network embeddedness of the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be lowest when the decision-maker is embedded in multiple institutional logics and an open political network. As a result, we suggest:

Proposition 4a: When the decision-maker is embedded in multiple institutional logics and an open political network, s/he is more likely to hire an academician embedded in any single logic or multiple logics and in any political network.

Proposition 4b: The level of similarity between the institutional logic and political network embeddedness of the decision-maker and the hired individual is expected to be lowest when the decision-maker is embedded in multiple institutional logics and an open political network; similar in terms of the political network, but dissimilar in terms of institutional logics.

Discussion

In this study, we have proposed a theoretical model that explains how academic hiring decisions in management departments in newly established universities in Turkey are shaped by the interplay between decision-makers' identification with the field-level institutional logics and their embeddedness in political networks at the societal level. Considering the filtering effects of organizational identities in institutional and political respects, we have particularly suggested that the degree of individual decision-makers' identification with multiple institutional logics (single vs multiple) and their degree of embeddedness in political networks (closed vs open) interactively shape their decisions in hiring new academic staff members with varying identification with institutional logics and embeddedness in political networks. In this causal relationship, we proposed that the embeddedness of decision-makers in single logic and/or the closed political network drive them to hire academicians similar in terms of logic and/or political network identification whereas the embeddedness of decision-makers in multiple logics and/or the open political networks lead them to hire academicians dissimilar in terms of logic and/or political network identification.

Our framework can be expanded in several ways. First, the framework can be further improved by relaxing the assumption that institutional logics and networks are independent. As we know from the literature, networks between organizations and between individuals formed around institutional logics within an organizational field can shape individual and organizational responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011; Glynn, 2000). In the Turkish case, although not so common, there are emerging academic networks formed around institutional logics within the field. Some research claim that academic meetings held in the management and organization field since 1992 enabled academicians from different universities and ranks to build open networks with bridging ties, and resulted in the enlargement of co-authorship and the fields of studies networks of particularly younger scholars as they participated in these meetings (Kırkbeşoğlu, Sözen, and Kurt, 2014; Sargut, Sözen, Kırkbeşoğlu, 2015). When we take into account these logic-related networks in addition to the political networks independent from logics, we can argue that such logic-related networks may suppress the effects of political networks because academicians are now connected each other through professional ties rather than political ties. Moreover, since these logic-related networks are by definition associated with institutional

logics, the degree of decision-maker's embeddedness in such network would have a moderating, rather than independent, effect on the relationship between decision-maker's identification with institutional logics and his/her hiring decision. For instance, a founding dean identified with a single logic and strongly embedded in a logic-based network will be more likely to hire academicians embedded in the same logic and the same logic-based network than the one identified with the same single logic but not embedded in the logic-based network.

Secondly, our framework can be further developed by considering the possibility of decoupling in hiring decisions. As stated earlier in this paper, universities avoid limiting their admission pool to the students with certain political identification compatible with that of their political identification, if any. This imperative may result in avoiding having a faculty cadre entirely homogenous in political view even if the strong political identification of the university requires so as in Cell 1 and 3. In other words, they do not want to look "too homogenous" in political sense, even if they want actually to be so. Accordingly, they might recruit few academicians, who have political views different from, but not radically opposing to, the political identity of the university. The common decoupling strategy in this case is not to assign such academicians to administrative positions, and/or not to allow them to involve in strategic decisions. Thus, they prefer to use them as "window dressing" to give a signal to audiences that they are open to all political views. This decoupling strategy can also be used when a university with a certain political identity has difficulties to find academicians necessary to fulfill the basic requirements of being an academic institution and/or to realize the requirements of institutional logic(s) it adopts in management department, for instance, lecturing, publishing in internationally indexed journals, or conducting industry-oriented projects. As we stated earlier, particularly public or private universities located in remote and less developed cities in Turkey have this problem. Then, what they do in this case is to follow exactly what the regulations requires in recruiting academicians without any decoupling, but, after hiring academicians, decouple those incompatible with the political identity of the university from managerial decisions.

The third area that we can refine our framework is related to the last point we have made above. Our framework can work in different ways according to where a university is located in Turkey: center or periphery. The center here represents big and developed cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, or relatively developed ones in vicinity to the three big cities, such as Bursa, Adana, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Es-

kişehir, Manisa etc. The periphery, on the other hand, represent the relatively less developed cities in the Eastern part of Turkey, such as Erzincan, Tunceli, Hakkari, Şırnak, Mardin, Bingöl, etc. In universities at the periphery, human resources constraints, as we stated above, prevent departments from building academic cadre as required by the adopted logical and political identities as in Cell 1, 2, or 3. Thus, actual identities can be constructed by whoever academicians can be found throughout the recruitment and hiring processes. Regardless of intended identities, this might push departments to have an academic cadre resembling the one in Cell 4, from any logic and any network.

Finally, our framework can also work in different ways according to the ownership of universities, public or private. As we stated earlier, private universities in Turkey may have more autonomy than public ones regarding financial, administrative and academic affairs although they are also under the tutelage of YÖK, and this tutelage has become strengthened currently. This relative autonomy may provide management departments in private universities with more room for establishing academic cadres according to intended logic and network-based identities. On the other hand, public universities, more dependent on the government through the appointment of rectors, and deans, are more constrained by the government policies and interventions. The governmental interventions may frequently be political in nature, and therefore, enforcing management departments to have academic cadres homogenous in terms of political network but heterogeneous in logic identification, i.e., Cell 3.

However, management departments in private universities, particularly those what Mızıkacı (2010) called “dubious demand absorbers”, are also constrained by the efficiency concerns, resulting in a rather *incremental* recruitment policy. Although all private universities are not allowed to make profit due to their legal status as foundation (*vakıf*), those defined as dubious demand absorbers are geared towards making more money in a short time. Therefore, as soon as the university is founded, undergraduate education in management is started by recruiting full-time and/or part-time lecturers to give the courses in the first year of the curriculum, which is determined largely by imitating the mainstream business curriculum in Turkey. At this stage, the political and/or personal networks that decision-makers are embedded in provides the main source of hired staff whereby similarity of institutional logics that both decision-makers and hired individuals are embedded in remains secondary. Since it is not always possible to find lecturers for all courses, the curriculum is subject to change in

line with academic staff at hand. This process is then repeated for the courses in the second and subsequent years of the curriculum. When the networks fail to provide required staff, they also apply to distant networks. As a result, since these departments avoid recruiting all academic staff needed for a four-year program at the outset with the aim of minimizing initial investment costs, they reflect patchiness with regard to curriculum and academic staff, resembling the case in Cell 3.

Conclusion

Early work on institutionalism recognized the challenges that emerge when organizations incorporate multiple institutional demands, however disregarded how actors experience this complexity at intra-organizational level. Yet only recently, the idea of multiple institutional logics in organizations is taken as an enduring phenomenon but still, institutional scholars mostly take logics as the sole factor that forms identities of decision-makers and organizational decision-making. We on the contrary suggest that together with individual level instantiations of logics, political networks in which both decision-makers and organizations are embedded in delineate their identities.

Our work is an effort to show how individual actors reconcile and interplay between their logic identities and political network identities in responding complexity. We proposed that interactions between the decision-makers' embeddedness in alternative institutional logics and in their political network ties end up with decisions on hiring new organizational members with different levels of embeddedness in logics and networks. The conceptual framework we developed for explaining heterogeneity in logic multiplicity and political network embeddedness offers insights on how individual identities evoked by multiple field-level logics and various societal political networks are manifested within organizations. We hope that these ideas enrich our understanding of academic staffing decisions in newly founded business departments by spurring future empirical research on the dynamics and implications of both different logics and networks.

References / Kaynaklar

- Adler, P. & Kwon, S. 2002. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. *Academy of Management Review*, 27 (1): 17-40.
- Aslan, G. 2014. Neo-liberal transformation in Turkish higher education system: A new

- story of a turning point: Draft proposition on the higher education law. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS)*, 12 (2): 255-283.
- Battilana, J. & Dorado, S. 2010. Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 53 (6): 1419-1440.
- Battilana, J. & Lee, M. 2014. Advancing research on hybrid organizing– insights from the study of social enterprises. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 8 (1): 397-441.
- Berg, L.D. & Roche, M.M. 1997. Market metaphors, neo-liberalism and the construction of academic landscapes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. *Journal of Geography in Higher Education*, 21 (2): 147-161.
- Berkman, Ü. & Özen, Ş. 2008. Culture and management in Turkey: State-dependency and paternalism in transition. E. Davel, J.P. Dupuis & J.F. Chanlat (Ed.). *Gestion en contexte interculturel: Approches, problématiques, pratiques et plongées: 1-29*. Québec, Presse de l'Université Laval et Télé-université (UQAM).
- Besharov, M.L. & Smith, W.K. 2014. Multiple institutional logics in organizations: Explaining their varied nature and implications. *Academy of Management Review*, 39 (3): 364-381.
- Buğra, A. 1994. *State and business in modern Turkey: A comparative study*. NY: SUNY Press.
- Buğra, A. & Savaşkan, O. 2010. Yerel sanayi ve bugünün Türkiye'sinde iş dünyası. *Toplum ve Bilim*, 118: 92-123.
- Buğra, A. & Savaşkan, O. 2014. *New capitalism in Turkey: The relationship between politics, religion and business*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Burt, R.S. 1992. *Structural holes: The structure of competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burt, R.S. 2007. Secondhand brokerage: Evidence on the importance of local structure for managers, bankers, and analysts. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50 (1): 119-148.
- Clark, B.R. 1998. *Creating entrepreneurial universities: Organizational pathways of transformation*. NY: Elsevier Science Regional Sales.
- Colyvas, J.A. & Jonsson, S. 2011. Ubiquity and legitimacy: Disentangling diffusion and institutionalization. *Sociological Theory*, 29 (1): 27-53.
- DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. 1991. Introduction. W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (Ed.). *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis: 1-38*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dreher, S. 2014. Islamic capitalism? The Turkish Hizmet business community network in a global economy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 129 (4): 823-832.

- Dunn, M.B. & Jones, C. 2010. Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55 (1): 114-149.
- Eğitim-Bir-Sen 2014. *Rakamlarla 28 Şubat raporu: Bir daha asla: 17 yıl sonra 28 Şubat*. Eğitim-Bir-Sen, Ankara.
- Erden, Z. 2006. *Histories, institutional regimes and educational organizations: The case of Turkish higher education*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Sabancı Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
- Friedland, R. & Alford, R.R. 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices and institutional contradictions. W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (Ed.). *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis: 232-263*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Glynn, M.A. 2000. When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity within a symphony orchestra. *Organization Science*, 11 (3): 285–298.
- Glynn, M.A. & Lounsbury, M. 2005. From the critics' corner: Logic blending, discursive change and authenticity in a cultural production system. *Journal of Management Studies*, 42 (5): 1031-1055.
- Glynn, M.A. 2008. Beyond constraint: How institutions enable identities. R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby & K. Sahlin-Andersson (Ed.). *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism: 413-430*. London: Sage Publications.
- Goodrick, E. & Reay, T. 2011. Constellations of institutional logics changes in the professional work of pharmacists. *Work and Occupations*, 38 (3): 372-416.
- Granovetter, M. 1973. The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (6): 1360-1380.
- Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91 (3): 481-510.
- Greenwood, R., Díaz, A.M., Li, S.X. & Lorente, J.C. 2010. The multiplicity of institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational responses. *Organization Science*, 21 (2): 521-539.
- Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E.R. & Lounsbury, M. 2011. Institutional complexity and organizational responses. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 5 (1): 317-371.
- Gulati, R., Dialdin, D.A. & Wang, L. 2005. Organizational networks. J.A.C. Baum (Ed.). *The Blackwell companion to organizations: 281-303*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Günay, D. & Günay, A. 2011. 1933'den günümüze Türk yükseköğretiminde niceliksel gelişmeler. *Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi*, 1 (1): 1-22.
- Heper, M. 1974. *Bürokratik yönetim geleneği*. Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi.

- Heper, M. 1985. The state and public bureaucracies: A comparative and historical perspective. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 27 (1): 86-110.
- Heper, M. 2002. Conclusion- The consolidation of democracy versus democratization in Turkey. *Turkish Studies*, 3 (1): 138-146.
- Jepperson, R.L. & Meyer, J.W. 1991. The public order and the construction of formal organizations. W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (Ed.). *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis: 204-231*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kırkbeşoğlu, E., Sözen, C. & Kurt, E. 2014. Türkiye’de örgüt kuramı çalışmalarının bibliyometrik profili: Atıf ağlarının dönemsel karşılaştırması. **22. Ulusal Yönetim ve Organizasyon Kongresi**: 197-204. Konya Selçuk Üniversitesi, Konya, Mayıs.
- Kipping, M., Üsdiken, B. & Puig, N. 2004. Imitation, tension, and hybridization: Multiple “Americanizations” of management education in Mediterranean Europe. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 13 (2): 98-108.
- Klofsten, M. & Jones-Evans, D. 2000. Comparing academic entrepreneurship in Europe– The case of Sweden and Ireland. *Small Business Economics*, 14 (4): 299-309.
- Kraatz, M.S. & Block, E.S. 2008. Organizational implications of institutional pluralism. R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby & K. Sahlin-Andersson (Ed.). *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism: 243-275*. London: Sage Publications.
- Laumann, E.O., Galaskiewicz, J. & Marsden, P.V. 1978. Community structure as inter-organizational linkages. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 4: 455-484.
- Mardin, Ş. 1973. Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?. *Daedalus*, 102 (1): 169-190.
- Marquis, C. & Lounsbury, M. 2007. Vive la resistance: Competing logics and the consolidation of U.S. community banking. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50 (4): 799-820.
- McPherson, C.M. & Sauder, M. 2013. Logics in action managing institutional complexity in a drug court. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58 (2): 165-196.
- Meyer, R.E. & Hammerschmid, G. 2006. Changing institutional logics and executive identities a managerial challenge to public administration in Austria. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49 (7): 1000-1014.
- Mızıkacı, F. 2010. Isomorphic and diverse institutions among Turkish foundation universities. *Education and Science*, 35 (157): 140-151.
- Michelson, E. 2007. Climbing the dispute pagoda: Grievances and appeals to the official justice system in rural China. *American Sociological Review*, 72 (3): 459-485.
- Okhmatovskiy, I. 2010. Performance implications of ties to the government and SOEs: A political embeddedness perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 47 (6): 1020-1047.

- Önder, Ç. & Kasapoğlu-Önder, R. 2011. Resource endowments and responses to regulatory pressure: Publications of economics, management, and political science departments of Turkish universities in indexed journals, 2000–2008. *Higher Education*, 61 (4): 463-481.
- Pache, A.C. & Santos, F. 2010. When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. *Academy of Management Review*, 35 (3): 455-476.
- Pache, A.C. & Santos, F. 2013a. Embedded in hybrid contexts: How individuals in organizations respond to competing institutional logics. M. Lounsbury & E. Boxenbaum (Ed.). *Institutional logics in action, Part B: Research in the sociology of organizations: 3-35*. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
- Pache, A.C. & Santos, F. 2013b. Inside the hybrid organization: Selective coupling as a response to competing institutional logics. *Academy of Management Journal*, 56 (4): 972-1001.
- Powell, W.W. & Colyvas, J.A. 2008. Microfoundations of institutional theory. R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby & K. Sahlin-Andersson (Ed.). *The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism: 276-298*. London: Sage Publications.
- Purdy, J.M. & Gray, B. 2009. Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52 (2): 355-380.
- Raider, H. & Krackhardt, D. 2002. Intraorganizational networks. J.A.C. Baum (Ed.). *The Blackwell companion to organizations: 59-74*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Reay, T. & Hinings, C. R. 2009. Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. *Organization Studies*, 30 (6): 629-652.
- Sargut, A.S., Sözen, C. & Kırkbeşoğlu, E. 2015. Akademik gruplar arasında yapısal boşlukları köprüleyen ağların oluşması: Ulusal yönetim ve organizasyon kongreleri yeni kuşak akademiklerin sosyal sermayelerini nasıl artırdı?. *23. Ulusal Yönetim ve Organizasyon Kongresi: 78-84*. Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi, Muğla, Mayıs.
- Smets, M., Morris, T.I.M. & Greenwood, R. 2012. From practice to field: A multilevel model of practice-driven institutional change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 55 (4): 877-904.
- Suddaby, R. & Greenwood, R. 2005. Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50 (1): 35-67.
- Sunar, I. 1974. *State and society in the politics of Turkey's development*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi.
- Thornton, P.H. & Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105 (3): 801-843.

- Thornton, P.H. 2004. *Markets from culture: Institutional logics and organizational decisions in higher education publishing*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Thornton, P.H., Ocasio, W. & Lounsbury, M. 2012. *The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure and process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Toruk, İ. & Olkun, E.O. 2014. Ekonomi-politik bağlamda yaşanan AK Parti-Cemaat olaylarının Türk basınına yansımaları: Yeni Şafak, Star, Zaman, Bugün, ve Milliyet örneği. *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 377-400.
- Uzzi, B. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of organizations: The network effect. *American Sociological Review*, 61 (4): 674-698.
- Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 42: 35-67.
- Üsdiken, B. 1996. Importing theories of management and organization: The case of Turkish academia. *International Studies of Management & Organization*, 26 (3): 33-46.
- Üsdiken, B. 2003a. Plurality in institutional environments and educational content: The undergraduate business degree in Turkey. R.P. Amdam, R. Kvalshaugen & E. Larsen (Ed.). *Inside the business schools: 87-109*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
- Üsdiken, B. 2003b. Türkiye’de iş yapmanın ve işletmenin akademikleştirilmesi, 1930-1950. *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 58 (1): 119-147.
- Üsdiken, B. 2004. The French, the German and the American: Higher education for business in Turkey, 1883-2003. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 31: 5-38.
- Üsdiken, B. 2007. Commentary: Management education between logics and locations. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 23 (1): 84-94.
- Üsdiken, B. & Wasti, S.A. 2009. Preaching, teaching and researching at the periphery: Academic management literature in Turkey, 1970—1999. *Organization Studies*, 30 (10): 1063-1082.
- Weber, K., Davis, G.F. & Lounsbury, M. 2009. Policy as myth and ceremony? The global spread of stock exchanges, 1980–2005. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52 (6): 1319-1347.
- Yıldırım, N. & Aşkun, O.B. 2012. Entrepreneurship intentions of public universities in Turkey: Going beyond education and research?. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 58: 953-963.
- Zilber, T.B. 2002. Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meanings, and actors: The case of a rape crisis center in Israel. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45 (1): 234-254.

Media sources

Akşam, 3 June 2011. Noter tasdikli torpil kadrosu.

Cumhuriyet, 8 April 2014. Bu da noter tasdikli kadro lotosu.

Dünya, 17 October 2012. 10 yılda 92 üniversite açıldı.

Hürriyet, 6 November 2015. İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi'nde Prof. Dr. Ali Atıf Bir'in yerine Prof. Dr. Cengiz Kallek atandı.

Radikal, 1 September 2013. Kayırmacılık: Bir ahlak tutulması.

Radikal, 23 June 2014. 10 maddede yeni YÖK yasası.

Sabah, 27 April 2012. Giresun'da akademik kadrolaşma şikayeti.

Sabah, 27 October 2015. Şehir Üniversitesi öğrencileri 'paralel' rektöre karşı ayaklandı.

Star, 6 November 2015. Murat Ülker 'Hoca'yı kırmadı, rektör değişti.