CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY:

MOHAMMAD-REZA SHAH REVIVALISM, NATIONALISM, AND MONUMENTAL ARCHITECTURE OF TEHRAN 1951-1979

BY TALIN DER-GRIGORIAN

BACHELOR OF ARCHITECTURE . UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
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**MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**
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SIGNATURE OF AUTHOR:

TALIN DER-GRIGORIAN, DEPARTMENT OF ARCHITECTURE
MAY 8, 1998

CERTIFIED BY:

NASSER O. RABBAT
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF ARCHITECTURE
THESIS SUPERVISOR

ACCEPTED BY:

ROY STRICKLAND
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ARCHITECTURE
CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDENTS

The thesis committee members include:

Sibel Bozdogan,
Associate Professor of Architecture.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA.

Shahla Haeri,
Assistant Professor of Anthropology,
Director of Women's Studies Program.
Boston University,
Boston, MA.

Afsaneh Najmabadi,
Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Barnard College.
Columbia University,
New York, NY.

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By
Talin Der-Grigorian
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ABSTRACT

This Master's thesis focuses on modern Iranian national/revival architecture
under the Pahlavi royal dynasty, in particular the reigning period of Mohammad-Reza
Shah.

I analyze and interpret three specific monuments:
the mausoleum of Reza Shah built in 1950,
the Shahyad Aryamehr Monument built in 1971 on the occasion of 2500-year monarchy,
and a prayer-house in Farah Park built in 1978.

These monuments participated and contributed to the national narrative through
revivalistic forms from the pre-Islamic architectural history,
hence they underlay specific political agendas and were nationalistic in nature.

The destiny of these structures after the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty,
raises issues of monumentality, permanence,
and the presence or absence of inherent meaning in architecture.

Thesis Supervisor: Nasser O. Rabbat
Title: Associate Professor of the History of Architecture

"He to whom love gives breath will never die.
The eternity of his life is written on the pages of the universe."

Hafez

To the memory of my grandfather, Harmik Hovnanian,
whose extraordinary humanity enabled him to transcend the boundaries of nationalism.
He loved Iran as passionately as his ancestral land.
In our age of segregation, to very few is given such otherworldly incarnation.

APPRECIATIONS

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This is the story of great men and women, great events, and great buildings; although 'greatness' defined as vice or virtue, is left entirely to the interpretations of history. It is through history that this story is narrated as a temporal procession and a reference point. By means of history the representations of power and ideology are explained in the tectonics of the monument.

My attempt is to analyze and interpret three specific architectural sculptures. The Aramgah of Reza Shah Pahlavi was built in 1950 in the southern region of Tehran, in the holy city of Ray. For the occasion of the 2500-year celebration of the Persian Empire the Shahyad Aryamehr Monument was built in 1971, in the western periphery of Tehran. And, a Namaz-Khaneh in Farah Park was built in 1978 as a prayer-house. Born out of particular social, political, and cultural contexts, they were destined to opposite fates. One failed new appropriation of meaning from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic and was destroyed without trace; one managed physically to outlive the shift of political power because it was able to appropriate opposite meaning; and the other refused to embody any ideology and thus faded as architecture. All three monuments were built with the approval of the last king of Iran, Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, who reigned from 1941 to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Aramgah, a copy of a building-type from the past; the Shahyad, the abstraction of the copy of a building-type from the past; and the Namaz-Khaneh, the abstraction of a function from the past; all three share in some and differ in other symbolic, ideological, and tectonic qualities which enable me to analyze them under the same light. In form, all three followed the basic prototype of the Zoroastrian fire temple -- the *chahar-taq* -- configuration. They embodied notions of Iranian nationalism, formal modernism, and revivalism of an ancient past. These architectural sculptures were part of a national narrative in a desperate need for recital. They contributed to and consolidated the national purpose under Mohammad-Reza Shah. Thus, they carried specific political agendas which underlay the construction of the history of modern Iran and all that related to and reflected Iranian national identity.

On a tectonic level of analysis, these structures are primarily *monuments in Tehran's urban fabric;* a condition which empowered the significant political, social, symbolic, and urban role played in the fabrication of a national narrative. The hidden agenda pertaining to the formation of these buildings were the controlling urbanism manifested in their presence at specific locations in the capital. The symbolic and monumental structures created pivotal points in the urban fabric which then generated axes. The esoteric versus exoteric importance of Islamic formal tradition represented their presence as objects instead of voids, aspiring to a centralized government and symbolizing a mighty monarch. By their location and form they undermined the influence of Islam on Iranian societies. According to their functions, a Muslim tomb, an urban marker, and a prayer-house, they could have had a traditional and 'typically Islamic' imagery. Yet, each intentionally broke from the Islamic conventions of building and iconography, and incarnated a modernistic version of pre-Islamic tectonics appropriated and interpreted from the remains of ancient structures still standing in Iran. They conformed mainly to Zoroastrian prototypes.

In terms of history, Iran left behind the Qajar dynastic rule with the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06, where after two decades of civil war and disintegration, in 1925 Reza Khan took over the government and launched a new socio-political era. The architectural revivalism, combined with national aspiration and western-modernist reinterpretation, coincided with the political attempts made by Reza Shah to link his new monarchy to the Achaemenian golden age of the 6th century B.C. This had less to do with cultural or social promotion -- though it did, despite itself -- but more with power politics. As there was a fundamental difference between the personalities of Reza Shah and his son and successor, Mohammad-Reza Shah, there also was such a difference in the definition that each ascribed to the form and function of state architecture. Their political and personal agendas were reflected in the architecture that each promoted. Whereas buildings became the symbolic expression of the state under Reza Shah, they became the manifestation of the shah under Mohammad-Reza. Under the latter, Iranian national identity was constantly filtered through the person of the leader. The last Shah's buildings were simultaneously the object on the stage of nationalism and the background upon which such a narrative became possible. In monotheist religions, the prophet is the mediator between ordinary men and god; in modern nationalism, the Shah was the middle-man between the Iranian

people and their national destiny. In the late 1960's and 70's, architecture made this ideology concrete.

The Aramgah was the intensification of a symbolic revived artistic tradition in modern Iran; the Shahyad, the epitome of Mohammad-Reza Shah's new architectural culture; and the Namaz-Khaneh, the institutionalization of rescued forms and concepts from a forgotten past. All three were revivalistic, nationalistic, modernistic; they reinforce the attempts of power politics of that particular era and ruler. Mohammad-Reza Shah sought a return to the roots, to an ancient glory, and thus a revivalism in architecture. His monuments used European modernism as a convenient means to symbolize the Great Civilization. His modernism was more that of style rather than deeds. In shape, they followed the forms of a reconstructed remote past. As a point of tension, Reza Shah's modernism was a copy of the canonical International Style; a westernization of the East. Whereas Reza Shah was inspired in the forms coming from Europe, Mohammad-Reza Shah criticized the western imports and looked to ancient Persia for such inspirations.

The development of Tehran as the capital of Iran was affected by urban alterations made through these structures. The holy aspect of Ray city was pivotal to the placement of the Aramgah. Tehran's westward expansion and its socio-political implications were fundamental to the construction of the Shahyad. And in Farah Park, as a bridge between two museums, the Namaz-Khaneh was a strategic move to undermine the significance of Islam in Iranian societies. Though Reza Shah's ruling period was entirely responsible for the modernization and westernization of the built environment of Tehran, Mohammad-Reza Shah's monuments took acute and overt form of pre-Islamic conventions and were symbolic and artistic in nature. The urban and architectural changes under Reza Shah from 1925 to 1941 were pointing towards a 'true' modernism in terms of style and architectural ideologies; whereas the architectural achievements under Mohammad-Reza Shah from 1950's to 1979 were clear efforts to revitalize a remote architectural past and bring nationalism to integrity.

Although this work is narrated through history, it deals first and foremost with buildings, the architectural objects, and eventually leads into the theoretical analysis advanced by scholars of politics and sociology. Theories of nationalism, revivalism, and modernism articulate the conclusions attained after having studied and analyzed specific monuments. I believe there is -- and certainly should be -- a great difference in the way in which each profession perceives and elucidates historic events. However, each subscribes its *own* to the greater enterprise of knowledge and contributes to it as a specific discipline with its hypotheses, methods, and conclusions. As architectural historians, the uniqueness of our contribution lies in the visual, physical, and material aspects of ideologies and human phenomena.

In addition, my purpose is to read and interpret the socio-political meanings of specific architectural artifacts in their historic context without sentencing or substantiating that which took place then and there. *A posteriori* condemnation or justification of the Shah and 'his' Iran has often been done and it is tempting to repeat them again. I try to refrain from this and operate within the boundaries of my own profession, training, and abilities.

This thesis is divided into three main chapters, wherein each building and its relevant history is analyzed and interpreted. My attempt is to demonstrate how each political and historical era is embodied in the building that came to symbolize it. The final chapter deals with the destiny of these three architectural sculptures after the Islamic Revolution. Through the analysis of these structures, I raise issues of monumentality, permanence, and the presence or absence of inherent meanings in architecture.

Figure 1.1 Reza Shah with one of his solders.

Wilber, Donald Newton. <u>Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran</u>. Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975, 00.

THE DOME . I

He was a big man. He stood tall and firm. He marched into Tehran in 1921,
crowned himself as king in 1926, and ruled a military monarchy until 1941. In a period
of two decades, he also managed to transform Iran into a modern nation-state. In 1948
the parliament granted him the posthumous appellation of Reza Shah the Great.

Often personally and at times sternly, Reza Pahlavi supervised the undertakings which modernized the Persian social and urban landscape.[1] Iran had entered a New Order which brought modernism, industrialism, nationalism, anti-tribal centralism, social reshuffling, educational development, state capitalism, and secularism. This order, modern in many of its aspects and essence, was in fact the institutionalization, intensification, and actualization of ideas of nationalism and modernism generated in the previous century. National consciousness and nationalistic sentiments which had started to appear in Iran in mid-19th century -- which in turn resulted in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06 and even the notion of Reza Khan as a secular/military/modern leader -- became the program of the country after the Pahlavi takeover. Therefore, the seeds of modernist/nationalist and even revivalist reforms of the 20th century are found in the social/intellectual movements of 19th century Qajar Iran.[2] The phenomenon of revivalism of the ancient past was initiated by Fath'Ali Shah Qajar in the 1830's.[3] However, the attempt to create homogeneous

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1. Among others, the following sources have been used extensively and as the main reference points:
Edvard Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 1982; on the modern Iranian history.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1991; on the phenomenon of nationalism.
H. Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 1977; on the history and analysis of Tehran.
Kamran Diba, Buildings and Projects, 1981; as reference to his own work and philosophy.
Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, 1980; as a window into the mind of the King.
2. In historiography, this idea has always been suppressed, especially by Pahlavi historians, in order to endow a unique function and image to the Pahlavi era.
3. "Fath'Ali Shah was the first Persian monarch since antiquity to revive the Achaemenian and Sassanian tradition of royal images cut into rock." Brookes, Douglas. *The Royal Iconography of Qajar Iran*. MESA paper, 1996, 2.

citizens within the boundaries of a homogenous nation-state, in the '*homogeneous, empty time*'[4] and space of the nation was a 'Rezaian' invention in Iran. This great task demanded major environmental and infrastructural reforms. Reza Shah gave a sense of unity to Persian nationhood by launching this undertaking and bringing Iran to a new level of national coherence. He either juxtaposed his symbols on already existing traditions; imported and superimposed European mainstream which as radically modern for Iran; or invested on the glories of the ancients to gain immediate eminence and permanent legitimacy to rule. In all cases, the 'now' took advantage of historic events and individuals to subscribe vigor to itself.

THE STORY

Reza Shah reinforced the new order by three pillars -- the modern army, the government bureaucracy, and the court patronage.[5] The first task of homogenization was the decentralization and weakening of the power of tribes which controlled the different territories and borders of Iran and historically upon which depended -- and more often did not -- the internal security of the country. Reza Shah "broke the power of the tribal chieftains who in the past had made government authority a fiction in many provinces."[6] The establishment of a centrally organized and controlled military structure was the uniform army which obeyed the state -- and only the state -- unconditionally. Policies towards tribes were related to the transformation of an empire into a single cultural and linguistic entity. With the homogeneous centralized army, the conceptual borders of the nation-state became actual and the autonomous provinces a unified organism.

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4. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1991, 24.
5. "The entire undertaking to promote both Western modernization and national consciousness was assumed by Reza Khan's strongly established state apparatus, which organized its forces to construct different aspects of national cohesion. Reza Shah's main and immediate policies focused on modernizing the administration, the army, economic development, the judiciary system, education, and communication." Vaziri, Mostafa. Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity. New York: Paragon House, 1993, 193. For more detail see Abrahamian, Edvard. Iran Between Two Revolution. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982, 136.
6. Graham, Robert. Iran: The Illusion of Power. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, 56.

The second task of homogenization was a uniform educational system, evenly penetrating the various cultural, ethnic, and linguistic segments of Iran. To this end, Reza Shah established a state-wide secular educational system which undermined the millennium-old power of the clergy and contributed to the unification of different ethnic groups under one flag. The educational reforms increased state school attendance by twelve fold.[7] The opening of the Tehran University, in 1934, for both genders was a revolutionary social and intellectual event. This secular educational framework was one of the first modern institutions which undermined the role and significance of the ulema. Reza Shah seldom negotiated on the affairs of the state with either the religious or the economic interest groups. His policies of reform were austere and final, especially in religious matters. In 1928 the parliament outlawed the traditional dress of men and made the wearing of western clothing and the Pahlavi cap compulsory. In 1936, it forbade women the wearing of the Islamic veil and costume.[8] As the public security and the shared knowledge, the appearance of modern citizens were orchestrated and coordinated. Secular, centralized, and state-controlled education was meant to bring the citizens of the modern state to a new level of understanding and communication outside the religious definitions of social behavior and interaction.

The next homogenization effort went to the construction of the infrastructure. The 1394-kilometer Trans-Iranian railroad stretched from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Roads made small towns accessible by car; factories, telegraph and telephone lines, electric light plants, and public buildings flourished all over the country; ports, dams, and waterways were built.[9] The separate and unrelated urban hubs were transformed into a network of socio-economic tableland. Through the physical connection: railroad and tele-

7. "The educational reforms were the most impressive of the civilian reforms. Between 1925 and 1941, the annual allocations for education increased in real terms by as much as twelve fold. In 1925, there had been no more than 55,960 children enrolled in 648 modern primary schools administered by state officials, private boards, religious communities, or foreign missionaries. By 1941, there were more than 287,245 children in 2,336 modern primary schools, almost all administered by the Ministry of Education." Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 144.
8. "He disregarded the age-old custom of sanctuary within the compounds of major shrines; outward public demonstrations on the ancient Day of Sacrifice and flagellation processions in the holy month of Muharram; and restricted the performance of passion plays mourning the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. Moreover, he opened to foreign tourists the main mosque of Isfahan; denied exit visas to applicants wishing to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, Medina, Najaf, and Karbala; ordered the medical college to ignore the Muslim taboo against human dissections; erected statues of himself in the main urban squares; and most dramatic of all, decreed in 1939 a state takeover of all religious lands and foundations." Ibid., 141.

phone, the linguistic connection: state education, the spiritual connection: flag and anthem, and the conceptual connection: the monarchy, people inhabiting Iran began to *imagine* themselves belonging to the Iranian nation: "an imagined political community."[10] With the new order of Pahlavi, the peripheral regions of Khorasan, Sistan-Baluchestan, Fars, Khuzestan, Lorestan, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan stood on the threshold of an imagined 'Iranhood.'

In the capital city of Tehran, Reza Shah modernized the urban fabric in a Haussmanian style (fig. 1.2). The city underwent large-scale and fundamental urban changes. The first symbol of modernism was the destruction of the historic fortifications. The twelve gateways symbolized the locations where the old regime had controlled the traffic of people and objects in and out of the city. Their demolition both enabled the physical expansion of the urban fabric and the eradication of the last traces of the *ancien regime* from the capital. This act was considered symbolic of the Shah's determination to modernize Iran.[11] The inner city was opened for expansion, with this came the possibility to decentralize the traditional bureaucratic network which consisted of interest groups with great socio-economic power: the bazaar, the ulema, and the old residential quarters. As part of a controlling urbanism to decentralize dense traditional centers, large avenues, urban squares, and pleasure parks replaced the spaces of a medieval city.[12]

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9. Tehran's water problem was temporarily solved by the construction of the Karaj canal in 1927. A 52 kilometers canal provided the north-west of the city with clean water. "In 1927 following a dangerous shortage of water, various schemes were considered to remedy this deficiency, resulting in the construction of artesian wells and a 52 kilometers canal bringing some of the waters of the Karaj river to the north-west of the city." Baharambeygui, H. Tehran: an Urban Analysis. Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 41.

This water solution would later become the main prerequisite to expand the city in westward direction. Tehran, for centuries had used the *qanat* system of the neighboring city Ray, to provide for its clean water from Alborz mountains in the north.

10. "In an anthropological spirit, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community; because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that many prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship." Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-7.

11. "A spirit of modernization gave rise to the demolition of much that had given Tehran its traditional appearance. The gateways, wall and moat of the city were certainly in conflict with the image Reza Shah had in mind and with the need to allow the city to expand naturally beyond its limits. These structures were also in extreme disrepair and still symbolized points of control where the old regime had exercised its power over citizens. All 12 gateways were gradually demolished between 1932 and 1973." Marefat, Mina. Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran 1921-1941. Cambridge, MA: Doctorate Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988, 75.

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The modern squares were analogous to the expanding and self-promoting central-ized Pahlavi government. The open spaces reflected the new state; by their own physical character, they also inspired openness, honesty, and democracy, at least in appearance. "Since the mid-twenties when Reza Shah began to strengthen the hand of central govern-ment, Tehran has reflected the aspirations of modern Iran... it must be regarded as the essential product of modern centralized Iran."[13] As social structures were reshuffled and traditional institutions undermined, a new relationship was introduced between the state and the people. Reza Shah created this new dialogue where the state was interacting with subject/citizens on a different level. "Reza Shah turned his people to face the state. He erected buildings to emphasize the centrality of the state and to symbolize a new relation-ship between citizen and state. They became employers, teachers, and sources of a new identity. Its imposing structure brought back the image of a golden age before Islam and intimated a rational future ahead."[14] The modern exoteric Tehran was superimposed on the traditional Islamic esoteric city (figs. 1.3 & 1.4). In this context, the statues, as the focus of vast urban voids, came to be seen as the objects portraying an authority. Figura-tive representation, in particular statues, in Islamic ideology was already problematic; however, the presence of such objects had a more profound meaning. First, they were objects versus spaces; this was a fundamental change from the Islamic understanding of space where the subject of attention was void rather than serving as an object. In contrast to the new city, the old town constituted of closely interwoven housing, and appeared as a unit. Streets seldom ran straight but in a curving fashion, without providing any long-

12. In 1920's "there were more than 1.8 square kilometers -- 9% of the whole city -- devoted to *maydans*." Marefat, Building to Power, 34. These were not the pre-modern naturally-evolved urban corners nor the open-ended centers of arbitrary public activities. These were political spaces. Reza Shah's squares were multi-functional: they marked a specific focus in the urban fabric, they were symbols of axial planning, and became the city's image captured in the homo-geneous, empty time of nationalism. Often, these new *maydans* capitalized on the familiarity of old gates to attain greater significance. They served to display statues of national heroes rather than to shelter public-urban activities. These images were selected men and events of past times meant to heighten public awareness of the national heritage of Iran. Ibid., 93. These squares served to conceptually connect a selected past and chosen heroes to contemporary Iranians, who, in turn, would feel an imagined sense of connectedness to each other through these signes. These urban space, although completely modern in form and essence, basically capitalized on the memory of the spaces of the old city to gain recognition and inflict national awareness.
13. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 23.
14. Marefat, Building to Power, 238.

range views to specific monuments. There was hardly any planned visual articulation by means of squares or wide streets. The Qajar capital was an introverted spontaneous work of art. The small and arbitrary open spaces were the shelter of collective activities; whereas the actual buildings were woven into the continuous urban fabric and disappeared within the general physical structure. Even the mosque and the bazaar were integrated into the larger townscape.[15] In the traditional city the facade became the inside of spaces, not as the line between the public and the private, whereas in the modern city the surface of individual buildings inherently carried representative meanings.[16] Modern buildings were "distinguished not only by their size and vertical organization, but also by the special treatment of their facades, which [stressed] their intrinsic importance [and] demonstrated their size."[17] The notion of monuments as free standing and self-actualizing bodies had to be introduced; by so doing Reza Shah altered the nature and character of the city, from an Islamic introverted urban fabric to a modern-western extroverted metropolis. These small-scale figurative statues were the forefathers of the monumental structures of 1950's, which symbolized an inspired nation, a selected history, and the monarchy.

In the same breath the first Pahlavi king took advantage of the legacy of the Achaemenian history to gain eminence. He vigorously launched into the revivalism of the ancient culture, with some sense of consciousness of Iran's social, religious, and political realities. The very first move was to adopt a dynastic name borrowed from the past. Reza Shah's "choice of the name Pahlavi was highly significant. This symbolized his desire both to associate himself with the glories of Iran's past and to give a sense of legitimacy to the dynasty. Pahlavi was the language spoken by the Parthians."[18] Similarly, in Iran, nationalism carried a dynamic quality of its own, embedded in history. "Nationalism

15. "Close to this arrangement of one- or two-storied houses and shops are the major monuments, particularly the mosques, whose location is indicated only by a gateway; this is often ornamented by stone carvings or tile work and occasionally by framing towers, but there is little indication of the nature, character, and size of the building beyond it. The whole town seems to be turned inward on itself." Brown, C.L. From Madina to Metropolis: Heritage and change in the Near Eastern city. New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1973, 294.
16. The exceptions include the Safavid structures of the great *maydan* in Isfahan, which were single object in the urban fabric. This idea of buildings as object was initiated by the Safavids and also practiced under the Qajars. Brookes, *The Royal Iconography of Qajar Iran.*
17. Brown, From Madina to Metropolis, 295.

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began to be a determinant of the political behavior of the traditional elements, even though it coincided far less with the self-interest of this group than with that of modernists. Iranian nationalists have clearly understood the importance of historical consciousness in spreading a nationalist sentiment; and in his campaign to straighten national unity, Reza Shah made especially heavy use of the awareness of a great history."[19] He was aware of the nuances of the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual Iran and the extent to which such unity was possible. His awareness of the significance of Islam for Iranian society kept his rule, in conjunction with revivalism, under some sort of social coherence; although the advanced theories on the superiority of the Aryan race by European scholars gave him the opportunity and the means to legitimize his own reign. Revivalism and industrialization, at the end of the day, served the one and the same purpose.

> Reza Shah's regime began propagating two thoughts in order to maintain the unity of Iran under his rule. First, was the idea of transforming Iran through modernization. Second, was the doctrinal and ideological idea for which Aryanism became the mechanism. The constitution of a national memory of the glorious past was a central element of Pahlavi policies designed to give a distinct sense of identity to the people of Iran. Pre-Islamic Zoroastrian emblems appeared on government agencies and buildings and special attention was paid to Zoroastrian festivals -- all to revive the past and to connect with it.[20]

This not so much because there was a genuine feeling of attachment of a revived greatness to a remote past but to legitimize the power to first, unite the inhabitants of Iran, and then to rule over them.[21] Though he initiated and instituted this process, Reza Shah never fully ascribed to this artificial construction as an end in itself. Although -- and because -- he was not educated, he was able to distinguish between function and fiction. His definition of nationalism always came back to the industrialization of the country. The towering man was honest, severe, and abiding about his intentions and actions towards a modern Iran.[22]

When a *new* is created, propaganded, and idealized, an *old*, and an association to the old is implied. The *new* inherently suggests the progressive, the modern; whereas the *old* hints to the ideas of rooted-ness and embedded-ness. The Pahlavi appraisal of the ancient

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18. "The need to justify the existence and legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty has been a continuing theme. It was less so with Reza Shah and has been more pronounced with his son." Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 55.
19. Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University Press, 1979, 27.
20. Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation, 197.
21. Although this act of unification or the generation of the sense of national unity is a work in constant need of doing and redoing.

dynasties -- Achaemenian, Parthian, and Sassanian -- meant an automatic legitimization of its rule. In this context, "...'new' invariably has the meaning of 'successor' to, or 'inheritor' of, something vanished. 'New' and 'old' are aligned diachronically, and the former appears always to invoke an ambiguous blessing from the dead... 'new' and 'old' were understood synchronically, coexisting within homogeneous, empty time. An idiom of sibling competition rather than of inheritance. If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future."[23] The glorification of a remote past was both a means of legitimacy for the first leaders of various nation-states and a connection to a vision in the future. These, among other factors gave Reza Shah the authority to reign over the 'Persian Empire' which was now reduced to a geographic territory by the name of Iran, but actually, almost virtually, in the hands of local tribal chiefs -- Turkomans, Kurds, Bakhtiaris, Lurs, Qashqais, Baluchis -- challenging the central government.

> The tension between archaism and futurism is another ambiguity in ideologies of delayed industrialization. The West is 'the new' and the native culture is 'the old' at the onset of contact. Archaism is an attempt to resurrect a supposed 'golden age.' This 'golden age' is usually not in the disagreeable recent past, but in a more remote period, and it can only be recovered by historical research and interpretation. Archaism may slip into a futuristic ideology. Whenever a resurrection of the past is contemplated, the question arises, 'What part of the past?' or 'Which age was our golden age, and why?' Some times the age selected is an immortal age, when the people in question enjoyed their greatest authority over others.[24]

In addition to the traditionally powerful ulema, the Islamic past was not remote enough to allow modern manipulations and interpretations. Typically, in the attempts of political legitimation through revivalism, an ambiguous and adoptable period of reconstruction is needed. In modern Iran's case, out of an expansive historic past, the Achaemenian

22. "Reza Shah's nationalism focused mostly on national identification and patriotic militarism. The first Pahlavi monarch tried hard to shift the individual Iranian's primary identity from family, clan, and tribe to a larger, all encompassing entity -- the ancient and splendid Iranian civilization and culture. He was also bent on reviving the so-called 'tradition of sacred kingship.' His ability to consolidate the central government's power over tribal chieftains and feudal landlords, and his success in enhancing Iran's international status was based on reviving an Iranian sense of national pride to oppose the country's traditional colonial enemies." Amuzegar, Jahangir. The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy. New York: State University Press, 1991, 140.
23. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 12, 187.
24. Matossian, in Hutchinson, J. & Smith, A. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 222.

Empire[25] seemed appropriate. It is true that the land of Persia throve during the Achaemenian rule, but it is also true that Achaemenian authority expanded over various ethnic groups and vast land; and the monarch played a central role in the socio-political structure of the empire. For Iran, the unquestionable days of glory and power were the Achaemenians under Cyrus the Great. Reza Shah attempted to create an identity based on the 'Aryanness' of Persians and their Zoroastrian tradition, with consciousness of its political aspect. In Tehran, the squares, statues, and state buildings were accomplices in the creation of a national image.[26]

Though architecture consisted of a mixture of Zoroastrian iconographic revivalism and military urbanism, the basic law governing tectonic forms was western modernism in terms of pure shapes, anti-ornamentalism, consistency of structure, harmony of parts, and to some extent unconventional technology. This definition altered subtly over the years in the Pahlavi era. The term 'modernization' or 'modern' Pahlavi architecture is used here in terms of abstraction of form; a purely formal not ideological concept. Modernism is defined as one imposed by the state not as having a social purpose. It is a formal vocabulary, not a social ideology. Whereas for Reza Shah revivalism was a political strategy to maintain power and modernism, a genuine belief in infrastructural progress. In later periods, these ideas became the *raison d'etre* of Pahlavi state monuments, an end in themselves, lacking meaningful national purpose.

The city's change of appearance did not result in major modification of social and psychological morphology, in a twenty-year time span. These reforms -- introduced rapidly and on material levels -- brought with them unforeseen problems. Reza Shah modernized the city but not the traditional social network. He changed the infrastructure of Iranian life without altering the social order.[27] The restructuring of Tehranian life led to

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25. In 559 B.C. the Achamenian Empire was established by Cyrus the Great who conquered as far as India and Egypt. Zoroastrianism was adopted as the official religion of the empire. Being one of the glamorous kingdoms of Iran, many archeological sites are still present in Iran, such as Persepolis. The Achamenians were defeated in 331 B.C. by Alexander the Great.

26. "...at many of the points of intersection monuments and fountains are placed. Along these new avenues are arising many new public and private buildings whose style of architecture keep the national spirit. While externally the Achamenian and Sassanian styles are employed in some instances, these buildings are constructed internally on western lines." Lockhart, Laurence. Famous Cities of Iran. 1939, 7.

major problems in urban population and power control. The reforms reinforced the verti-

cal axis of social promotion which stretched north to south on Pahlavi Avenue: the poor

south versus the rich north.[28] Interest groups entangled in this axial power struggle

included the merchants of the old bazaar, the residents of old quarters, the royal palace --

constantly moving north -- and the gradually maturing middle class. This vertical axis also

managed to undermine the central position of the bazaar in the context of the old city. The

axis shifted the entire focus of the modern city towards the west; exactly where the Pahlavi

Avenue stretched in relation to the bazaar. Even if Reza Shah managed to decentralize

some of the *bazaaris'* power, they posed a continuous challenge to the central government.

Inherent to the north-south axis was the age-old fresh water and air shortage, one of the

main incentive of this shift. The urban population growth took such momentum that it

remained the heart of Tehran's problem permanently. Throughout modern Tehran history

different administrations have struggled with the expansion of the city and the politics of

the inhabitants. By the end of Reza Shah's reign, the medieval Qajar town was trans-

formed into a 20th century modern metropolis with all its encompassing vices and virtues.

To complete his efforts of modernism, Reza Shah brought European architects to

design most of the architecture of his capital. At the peak of the European modern move-

ment of 1920's and 30's, western architects were engaged in all sorts of state commissions

to recreate the Iranian architectural profession and material culture.[29] They were needed

27. "Reza Chah a change les structures urbaines sans vraiment toucher aux structures sociales, alors qu'en Europe par exemple, c'est la societe industrielle qui a engendre la ville industrielle." Adams, Charles J. ed., Iranian Civilization & Culture: Essay in Honor of the 2500th Anniversary of the Founding of the Persian Empire. Montreal: McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973, 207.

28. This drive to north started with the 1870's urban reforms and population increase, wherein foreigners played an important role. "The early 1870's saw a rapid expansion of Tehran. The old ditch was filled in, and the bulky wall which had stood from the 16th century was pulled down, and a new octagonal-shaped wall, modeled after the Paris fortifications replaced it. The new wall, which was three-times the length of the previous one had twelve gates and enclosed an area of approximately 20 square kilometers. The northern development was the most significant feature of this rapid extension. Several foreign representatives who had previously rented accommodations in the old town, moved northwards. This area soon attracted high class Tehranis and remained a first class residential area. It had a better climate and great proximity to purer water resources. The physical distance between these residential areas and the bazaar became greater, resulting in the emergence of a new type of shopping area with an increased emphasis on foreign-type goods." Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 19.

to give a modern form to new functions traditionally absent in Iran. These included administrative offices, ministries, banks and museums. They also became a tool for the King to import new western style and juxtapose them upon the old city to gain recognition. However, it was an important pivotal point in the Iranian architectural profession. Iran left behind the traditional builder/craftsman known as *me'mar* for the new autonomous engineer/architect/artist. Under Reza Shah, Persian architects were able to create a consciousness of their profession and observe the significance of its eminence in the cultural construction of national identity. The profession gained a sense of dignity, self-worth, and self-recognition. This awareness was a result of a combination of different factors, among which was the dialectical relationship between the architectural profession and the authorities. Architectural form and political strategies were interwoven to give a new meaning to the profession of architecture and to the material culture of the state. For Reza Shah, architecture was a means to crystallize his efforts of state-building into a tangible reality. Pahlavi state monuments most often served an administrative function, at times glorified the ancient past, occasionally exalted the monarch, but predominantly symbolized the Iranian nation-state.

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29. The profession of architecture was institutionalized entirely by European architects who worked in collaboration with the Shah. The leading figures of the first generation were Nikolai Marcoff, Andre Godard and Maxime Siroux. These three were responsible for most of the first set of governmental buildings and the initial shaping of the city of Tehran. Similarly, they set the skeleton of architectural profession in Iran for the coming generations. "As partners in Reza Shah's modernization program, they established an educational system, developed a professional mode of operation, and left to their Iranian heirs a body of written and built work. Each had a lasting impact on the profession of architecture in modern Iran." Marefat, Building to Power, 116.

In 1946, the first Iranian Society of Architects was established. This marked the maturation of first Iranian architects and a collective professional consciousness. Often trained in Europe, they brought with them the International style modernizm. Although there existed a state imposed taste and at times revivalism of pre-Islamic iconography, these architects were free to join and contribute to the Modern movement in Iran. A few were key figures in the launching of a native-modern architectural tradition; these were Gabriel Guevrekian, Mohsen Foroughi, Vartan Avanessian, Keyghobad Zafar, Ali Sadegh, and Iradj Moshiri. "By the time of Reza Shah's 1941 abdication, these leading architects had begun to outline a distinctly Iranian modern architectural idiom. Although some of them began by sitting second chair to foreign architects and almost all took part in the production of monumental state architecture, they confidently established independent architectural identity. Their own work brought them out from under the shadow of Europe and Shah and into the limelight as the initiators of a new indigenous and professional practice." Marefat, Building to Power, 142.

The great war broke out in 1939, but not everywhere. British and Soviet troops entered Iran on August 25, 1941. Twenty-two days later,[30] Reza Shah abdicated his throne. "Do not fear difficulties. One must confront difficulties face-to-face in order to remove them," he said to his son and successor, before leaving Iran in 1941. The fall of his military monarchy had forced him into exile in Johannesburg where he died of a heart attack in 1944. The body embalmed in a coffin without ceremony was sent to Cairo.[31] Extended rituals finally brought the leader to Ray city in May of 1950, where he was given a burial in the building designed to shelter his remains[32] (figs. 1.5 & 1.6). The work started four years after his death and was completed in 1950. The final scheme proposed by three Iranian architects trained in Europe -- Mohsen Forughi, Keyghobad Zafar, and Ali Sadegh -- was approved by the young king, Mohammad-Reza Shah. All belonged to the first generation native architects who were involved in numerous large-scale projects sponsored by the state.[33] Reza Shah's resting place was one of the projects in 'Rezaian' spirit.[34] Though their main source of inspiration came from Europe, these architects managed to create forms which amalgamated the eastern and western traditions in a meaningful tectonic way (fig. 1.7).

> Upon the orders of his successor construction was begun in 1948 on a mausoleum at Shah Abdol-Azim. The structure was completed in March, 1950, and in April a group of high dignitaries set off for Cairo to escort the remains to Iran. Ceremonial stops were made at the Muslim shrines of Mecca and Medina, and at Ahwaz the body was put aboard a special train that reached Tehran on May 8. A slow procession moved through the streets of the capital, and then the remains came to their final resting place.[35]

This resting place was the city of Ray. "At the beginning there was fire. All creation seemed to be aflame. We had drunk the sacred haoma and the world looked to be as ethe-

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30. With British and Soviet influence, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his throne on September 16, 1941.
31. "At about five in the morning of July 26, the ex-ruler passed away, alone and unobserved. The body was embalmed, placed in a coffin without any ceremony, and then shipped to Egypt aboard an Egyptian naval vessel for temporary entombment at Cairo." Wilber, Donald Newton. Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran. Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975, 222.
32. The Aramgah or literally, 'the resting place' in Persian.

real and as luminous and as holy as the fire itself that blazed upon the altar."[36] The story

began with The Wise Lord, Ahura Mazda who summoned Ragha into being as the Twelfth

city of his vast universe. The ruins of Ray, which were situated five miles south-east of

Tehran, marked the site of Ragha -- the ancient city mentioned in the Avesta.[37] A city on

the Silk Road, it connected the east and the west in Persia (fig. 1.8). Its Islamic importance

lay in a shrine which held the body of Hossein, son of the eighth Imam Ali Reza; since, it

became a center of pilgrimage visited by Shi'a Muslims (fig. 1.9). However, the Mongol

invasions of the 13th century destroyed the prosperity of Ray forever. This proved to be a

blessing for Tehran, where the survivors migrated to the neighboring town and settled

there permanently.[38] In later centuries, Ray maintained its holy aspect, but never flour-

ished either politically or physically.[39] The founder of the Qajar dynasty, Agha Moham-

mad Khan besieged Tehran in 1785 and made it his capital: the Imperial seat and the Seat

of the Caliphate.[40] A century later, under the last vigorous Qajar ruler, Nasir al-Din Shah,

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33. Perhaps the best known architect of his generation, Mohsen Forughi -- born 1907 and died in
1980 -- was the first modern Iranian architect to participate in the Shah's building program. Edu-
cated in L'Ecole des Beux-Arts in Paris, he returned to Iran in 1936. "He became a central figure
in architectural education and was a key in the foundation of a recognized architectural profes-
sion in Iran. He made his mark as an educator and an architect involved in both government and
private practice." Marefat, in Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire. Paris:
Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 120. His main works under Reza Shah's patronage
were buildings for the Faculty of Law at Tehran University, the Ministry of Finance, and
National Bank. "His work was distinctly modern." Ibid. In the design of the Aramgah the 'pure'
European modern is transcended. The simplicity of forms and reserve of shapes are evidence of
that cultural background and conviction. Keyqobad Zafar Bakhtiyar -- born in 1910 and died in
1987 -- was educated in the Royal College of Arts of England. Zafar was member of the Il-
Khans, part of the Bakhtiyari tribe, and initially had to fight political opposition to establish him-
self as an architect. Like his partner, he was a modernist and "his larger projects were distin-
guished by an emphasis on simplicity and geometric volume." Ibid. The main core of the
Aramgah building testifies to the belief in simple geometric forms. The third partner was Ali
Sadegh -- born in 1908 and died in 1987 -- who went to Europe in 1930 and returned in 1937. He
received his education from Caen University and Brussels' Academy of Fine Arts. Initially, he
refrained from working for the government but soon was elected to the City Council of Tehran.
He maintained a private professional practice.
34. "Held as a national competition, the winning design was the collaborative efforts of Sadegh,
Forughi, and Zafar. As young architects returning to Iran after receiving their training abroad,
they had all worked for the National Bank, and were later active in the formation of the society
of Iranian architects. The original submission was approved by Mohammad-Reza Shah." The
modified design for the mausoleum to Reza Shah was published in the Architecte volume 5.
Marefat, in Adle, Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire, 120.
35. Wilber, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 222.
36. Zoroaster's grandson. Vidal, Gore. Creation. New York: Ballantine Books, 1981, 15.

Tehran experienced its first urban transformation. He rebuilt much of the city and sur-rounded it with a rampart. He also constructed an eight-kilometer, narrow-gauge railway to Shah Abdol-Azim, the holy shrine in Ray: the first modern connection between the two cities. Despite Tehran's increasing political, social, and economic importance, Ray pre-served its Islamic holy pre-eminence, but was reduced to a shrine, a cemetery, and eventu-ally an industrial zone by 1950's. The Qom Road -- later called the Aramgah Road -- connected the capital with city's cemetery[41] and the Tehran Refinery which was the sec-ond most important in Iran.

Shahr-e Ray was chosen as the site of the mausoleum -- Aramgah -- for the first Pahlavi king. This preference was not accidental. Historically, Ray and Tehran were both rivals and a complementary pair; Ray was the soul of Tehran, and Tehran the body of Ray. Each nurtured the other in its own capacities: spiritual and physical. Whereas Tehran pro-vided the seat of the government, the center of administration, and the city of the living; Ray offered the site of the holy, the place of prayer, and the city of the dead. Tehran was the rational whereas Ray was the mystic of the same entity. Despite Reza Shah's efforts to secularize Iranian society, the overwhelming majority clung to Islamic values and identi-fied with its material culture.[42] Accordingly, after the reforms of the 1920's and 30's, Ray's spiritual aspect remained intact. The road leading south to Qom, was a procession of Islamic shrines of saints; first in the heart of Ray: mausolea of Abdol-Azim and

37. The Avesta is the sacred text of Zoroastrian faith.
38. The evidence of the relevance of Ray to Tehran was still evident a century ago, in the presence of the *qanat* system, to import water from the mountains, which belong to the system of Ray rather than that of Tehran.
39. "The outset of the destruction of Ray, first by sectorial schisms and fanaticism in the sixth cen-tury, followed by its annihilation in the catastrophic sack by the Mongols in the year 1220 A.D., gave Tehran an opportunity for development and the increase in its population. Finally, in the second half of the tenth century, this green village attracted Shah Tahmasp the Safavid who ordered that ramparts be constructed around it, in the year 1553 A.D. From that time Tehran acquired the status of a city and grew systematically." Kadem, Ali. Tehran dar Tasvir. Tehran: Shoroosh, 1369, 9.
40. On Karim Khan Zand's foundations, Agha Mohammad Khan built a royal palace. The latter had held great feelings of hatred for the former; this act had symbolic connotations also.
41. In the 1970's, the new cemetery was called Behesht-e Zahra -- Zahra's paradise. Ray in general was a very sacred place for the Qajars who visited it regularly and were in good relationship with the clergies there. Ray was also where most of the Qajar royal family was buried. When Nasir al-Din Shah returned from his voyage to Europe, he chained himself in Ray as an act of purification before returning to the royal palace.

Emamzad-e Hamz-e next to each other, but with defined spacial hierarchy; then Qom itself, the Shi'a Holy City. The religious associations of the specific location of Shah Abdol-Azim and the spiritual status of the cemetery gave an immediate religious overtone to Reza Shah's mausoleum. The structure took advantage of the sacredness of the site to bestow symbolic and religious sainthood to the one buried there. On the local level, Aramgah invested on the juxtaposition of the building in relationship to the other Islamic shrines -- Abdol-Azim, Emamzad-e Hamz-e, and Emamzad-e Taher -- positioned directly behind it, and in the vicinity, Emamzad-e Abdol-Hassan and Emamzad-e Abdollah. The tectonic dialogue between the three structures created an inherent power by the monument's juxtaposition in Islamic architecture[43] (fig. 1.10). Due north-west, the mausoleum faced the Qom Road by which the site was approached. The Qom Road was renamed the Aramgah Road and no one questioned whose resting place it was renamed after. The city of Qom and the road leading to it from Tehran had historic and symbolic importance for the people. The superimposition of a name associated to the tomb of the first Pahlavi king was an attempt to attribute power to the ruling dynasty.

The road going south from Tehran forked off where one led to Qom and the other to Aramgah of Reza Shah (fig. 1.11). For the latter, an axial boulevard of 1500 meters was constructed, called the Aramgah Boulevard. The accentuated path led to -- and only to -- the tomb building. In the somewhat arbitrary urban planning of Ray, the Aramgah Boulevard created a marked directionality, strong local axiality, and a sense of procession essential to monumental architecture. This directionality played on notions of absolutism: one path, truth, and reality. As one approached the tomb, only in the background one noticed the domes of the other two shrines. The superimposition of Reza Shah's tomb in the pro-

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42. "Religion is still the biggest single binding cultural influence, and acts as the most common point of reference for all classes of Iranians. A firm belief in God remains the ultimate refuge from the arbitrariness of life. Meshed receives some 3.5 million Iranian pilgrims a year. Despite its continued strength, religion is being placed in an increasingly ambivalent position. For nationalistic reasons religion is encouraged; yet the authorities seek to suppress the influence of attitudes engendered by Islam when they conflict with modernization." Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 199.

43. "A characteristic peculiar to the architecture of power and wealth in the Muslim world was that its order and sense appear less in formal compositions than in the relationship of the monument of power to other monuments." Grabar, Oleg. The Architecture of Power: Palaces, Citadels and Fortifications. Architecture of the Islamic World. Ed by George Michell, New York: Wiliam Morrow & Co., Inc. 1978: 48-79, 79.

cessional experience of the complex, granted it an undisputed symbolic importance. This juxtaposition was noted in travel guides and other state propaganda. The tomb of Hossein in contrast to Reza Shah's were opposed in tectonics:

> Built in the 19th century in a somewhat baroque style, is noteworthy for its golden cupola, a dome and two minarets with curious bulb-shaped bases. The second is entirely made of white marble. Its lines are purposely sober, with a certain heaviness suitable for the memory of a great leader, the Restorer of the Motherland. One should approach Ray from the west. That is to say on the Tehran-Qom road rather than on the direct road on which leads directly to the center of the town. When you arrive in front of the Reza Shah monument, skirt around it to the south. This leads you to a shady small esplanade between the two mausoleums.[44]

The comparison was made between the two shrines emphasizing the latter; the accent was put on the modernity of its architecture: Iranian *but* modern. The westward procession was a key element in the experience of the tomb, and finally the new leader -- the Restorer -- was contrasted with a Shi'a saint -- Hossein. As built and propagandized, the monument was intended to become a shrine and a center of pilgrimage. Abdol-Azim Shrine was superseded by the new mausoleum. Through the site of the tomb, Reza Shah was made to acquire the status of a saint: national *but* muslim. As the nation, the attainment to saint-hood was artificial. Through site and architecture the new national hero immediately became a historic saint.

To promote national aspiration and to generate collective pride, the Pahlavi government initiated the systematic reconstruction of specific tombs through the Institute of National Heritage.[45] Initially launched by Reza Shah, the project was carried through by Mohammad-Reza Shah. These included significant personages in Persian history such as Ferdowsi in 1934; Sa'adi in 1948; Avicenna in 1951; Umar Khayyam in 1962; Nader Shah in 1960; and Baba-Taher in 1970 (figs. 1.12 & 1.13). Along the territorial treaties of nationalism, a tectonic expression was given to the imaginary temporal linkage of 'them then' and 'us now.' These heroes were opted for among the continuous chain of history and through architecture given a forged linkage to each other and to the 20th century. As part of the elitist discourse of national heritage, the new mausolea crystallized the network of fabricated solidarities between territories, histories, dead and living unrelated groups of

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44. Hureau, Jean. Iran Today. Editions j.a. Iranian Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1975, 80.
45. 'Anjoman-e Asar-e Meli reported on construction of mausolea in Karnameh, Anjoman-e Asar-e Meli. By Bahra al-Ulumi, Hossein. Tehran: University Press, 1976.

people.[46] The tomb of Reza Shah was lumped with the rest of mausolea of historic figures. Reza Shah was juxtaposed to Sa'adi and Hafez -- undisputed Persian historic figures. The Aramgah again took advantage of contemporary events to juxtapose itself on the stage of history to attain eminence. The old and the new were compared. The old gave an inherent status of succession to the new and thus an automatic legitimacy to rule and slide into the pages of Persian history. Concurrently -- being the 'new' -- the building captured all that was national about modern Iran. The form, position, color, and scale gave a new imagery to Iranian conceptual landscape. Up to the 1970's, no other monument was able to give shape to the imagined national spirit of modern nation-state; Aramgah of Reza Shah was the apogee of 'Iranhood.'

The form of the tomb was as simple as the man buried there (fig. 1.7). A structure in transition between the reign of Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah, it agreed with the aesthetic taste and national vision of both rulers. At the end of the 1940's, the artistic inertia cultivated under Reza Shah was quite strong. Mohammad-Reza, still young, did not dictate a form to this specific project -- as he would do increasingly through his reign -- although, he did approve the final design. The Aramgah was a copy of a form rescued from the past and made modern by means of technology and material: a modern-revivalist version of a *chahar-taq*[47] (fig. 1.14-1.16). Initially, the basic type of Zoroastrian fire temple, the form was retrieved by Muslim Persians and appropriated to new functions, one of which was the burial. Although Islamized, it always retained a strong association with the memory of the pre-Islamic past. *Chahar-taq* harbored a uniquely Persian type in tectonic language.[48] Arranged around the Zoroastrian sacred fire,[49] it was the manifestation of god on earth, placed at the center of the temple and worshiped from all four sides. The practice

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46. "Territorial identity came to be incorporated in their conversations, and the cultural achievements of past literary figures were lumped together as part of their territorial Iranian heritage. Due to a high-powered campaign both in education and in other state agencies, the stage had been set for cosmetically decorating the so-called age-old Iranian culture. Between the time of Reza Shah and the early period of his son's reign, the government used the millenary celebration of Ferdowsi, Avicenna, and other figures as an occasion to rebuild their tombs, as well as those of Saa'di, Hafiz, and Umar Khayyam, to glorify their national cultural achievements." Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation, 196.
47. Literally *chahar-taq* means 'four roofs' in Persian.

of worship from multi-direction evidenced both the duality of the ancient religion and its central focus: the only point of reference, in contrast to the directionality of monotheist religions, Islam in particular. In the Aramgah, the remains of Reza Shah replaced the fire, mirroring god.[50] Though he never acquired a hint of divinity, an attempt was made to sanctify his memory via formal and symbolic associations and juxtapositions of the tomb.[51] The entire complex followed dual concepts of centrality and directionality. It inspired a central focus and significance, namely the body of the Great King Reza and at the same time gave a definite sense of axiality for processional and ceremonial purposes (fig. 1.17). This focus implied an undisputed sense of symbolic importance and visual balance. It also pointed to the location of the body and an abstract re-creation of the King in the mind of the onlooker. Connected to the main building were other smaller rooms, perhaps for administrative or exhibition purposes. These annex buildings, by their low height, made the core seem larger, stable, and symmetrical. The four facades of the central box were protruded, giving depth and three-dimensionality to the whole, increasing the focus

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48. "A simple, square monument, a pavilion, conventionally termed a *chahar-taq* from the four open, arched sides of the building was associated with fire worship in Sassanian Zoroastrianism. It can be seen as a square structure, which arches on all four sides, and surmounted by a dome. The circular form of the dome is fitted onto the square ground plan by means of arched features in the corners. The weight of the dome is borne by the four main, load-bearing arches whose thrusts carry into the four heavy blocks located in each of the corners of the structure. In its forms, it embodies the most basic resolution of the square and the circle. The cubical volume of the base, viewed as man, earth, or the earthly paradise, is the supreme symbol of immortality and the most externalized manifestation of the Creator. By its four pillars it evokes the four elements, the four directions, the four winds, the four seasons, and the four colors. In short, it presents to the imagination those basic and most stable aspects of temporal life. Superimposed upon this rectangular space is the circular or spherical dome, representing the world of pure quality. Symbolizing the lightness and total mobility of the Spirit, it is a form that has no beginning and no end. Its sole point of reference is its center, through which developed the metaphysical axis that links it with the axis of the square resting below it." Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 75.

49. "According to traditional cosmology, fire is hot and dry. By its ability to mature, rarefy, redefine and intermingle, fire brings all things into harmony. Heat and light are the aspects of fire most important to architecture. In Iran, a country of intense sunlight, light has always been envisaged as the foremost aspect of fire. For this reason, many cosmologies have been developed in which the sun symbolizes the deity and its illumination, the means whereby all things in creation are brought into existence. There is a triadic relationship in some philosophical schools which sees the sun as the symbol of the Intellect or Spirit, gold as its microcosmic counterpart, more 'material' in this sense of body, and fire as soul which moves between these two poles. Light in its undifferentiated state represents the universal order and is polarized into the seven symbolic colors which represent its individual aspects." Ardalan, The Sense of Unity, 58.

50. This location contained profound symbolic meaning. If the new Cyrus is Mohammad-Reza Shah, then the new Ahura Mazda is Reza Shah.

on the main burial space. The use of *chahar-taq* configuration, as used historically both by Zoroastrians and Muslims, was a strategy to 're-present' the homogeneous Persian without the emphasis on religion. By the same token, the obvious use of the western-modern style in color and material was another aspect of its appeal and means of gaining eminence: homogeneously, Iranian *and* international.

The dome is a fundamental element in the tectonic vocabulary and carries ample symbolism. "The idea of the 'cosmic house' evolved from associating the domelike ceilings with the heavens. 'Cosmic tent,' 'majestic parasol,' 'cosmic egg' and 'heavenly bowl' preserve an ancient memory conveying something of the ancestral beliefs and esoteric meanings associated with the dome. Architecturally, the dome in all its manifestations is the locus of the Divine Throne, passive to the intellect, maternal in gender, and sublimely timeless in form."[52] The dome of Aramgah was dominantly visible until up to a point in the axial procession. As one approached the monument, it disappeared behind the cubic box carrying it (fig. 1.18). In shape, it was low and semi-oval. One range of glass opening went around the drum before touching the square body. The encircling glass window on the low drum -- visible from far only -- gave a floating effect to the dome and made it seem lighter. This can be interpreted as the spirit which hovered over the body of the King or it can be read as the 'Divine Throne' of the leader. On the other hand, the dome, along with the minaret -- has been an undisputed Islamic architectural element and a basic particular in the 'Islamic' imagery. A larger, more pronounced dome would have *looked* Islamic, most probably an undesirable formal expression for this tomb.[53] The dome-ness of the dome is notional and thus modern in essence. As the nation, it has to be imagined into importance and effectiveness. Symbolically, the dome brought the nation under one single -- white and pure -- umbrella. As Reza Shah gathered the different heterogeneous cultural/linguistic/ethnic groups under the same flag and gave them a singular sense of belonging;

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51. The idea of sainthood is significant in the Shi'a Islam. Therefore in the consciousness of Muslim Iranians, the sainthood of the King would have placed him among the religious saints. He entered into the pages of Iranian history as the Father of modern Iran.
52. Ardalan, The Sense of Unity, 74.
53. Moreover, considering the Sassanian fire temples as the prototype, the shape of the dome should have been much more accentuated.

so did his tomb. But, this also was imagined as the nation. As one approached the building, the dome disappeared. As the dome, the all-embracing, all containing boundaries of the nation was imagined.

The factor of directionality and procession was fundamental since the monument physically and conceptually connected itself to other points of reference. On the urban scale, it needed the axiality to influence the surrounding urban fabric. Through this a pivotal point was created attaching other physical points in space. At the same time, centrality was significant in the attention given to the body of the King and the symbolisms of a powerful central government. The building itself, as a free standing object, was reminiscent of his established powerful central government. The axial path leading to the tomb provided a space for ceremonial activities which also implied a procession with a strong intent of pilgrimage (fig. 1.17). In order to reinforce the impression of procession towards -- becoming -- divine entity, Persepolis was used as reference, since the type of a fire temple did not embody such strong directionality outside the scope of the building proper. The architectural element which flanked the building in the front and serves as a pedestal assisted this effect: a reminiscent of a reversed version of the Apadana staircase (fig. 1.19). The entire city of Persepolis was elevated on socles, here used as precedent and as visual association. Moreover, the reconstruction of Cyrus's tomb was also perceived as directional, elevated on a crepidoma (figs. 1.20 & 1.21). Likewise, one approached by the given path, constantly contemplating one's destination, yet once there, the procession broke in two side staircases, leading up the *takht*.[54] The socle of the tomb affixed its place in the space and in the urban fabric (fig. 1.22). This space was a *high place*, a place of privilege, of significance. Sassanians placed the relics of kings and saints on that privileged place. Similarly, Reza Shah's relics were place on a socle which functioned on two levels: one to define and provide the physically and morally elevated plateau and second, to carve an axiality and spatial progression. The socle represented the throne and the tradition of monarchy, a practice that Reza Shah aspired to and revived in Iran. By contrast, institutional Islamic structures are never raised on socles, perhaps because of the popular nature of the

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54. The use of the *takht* was initiated by Fath'Ali Shah Qajar, so the rupture of history is less severe, but under the Pahlavis it took a distinct and large-scale tectonic symbolism.

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religion. The use of the royal *takht* in the *talar* form was first revived by Fath'Ali Shah upon which he received his guest and showed himself to the people.[55] The Aramgah appropriated this royal symbolism as a uniquely modern Pahlavi tradition. The Pahlavi *takht* took an acute Zoroastrian and monarchial tone but in fact invested on both the Qajar royal conventions and the pre-Islamic glories to attribute power and legitimacy to itself.

The use of white marble was neither arbitrary nor accidental. Loyal to the canonical western modernism -- the International Style -- white symbolized openness, honesty, and simplicity in formal and structural expression. Reza Shah's struggle to 'open up' the Iranian woman to the modern world of equality of sexes was perhaps captured in the color of his tomb. He forbade the wearing of the veil and encouraged the involvement of Iranian women in the public spheres by educational and professional opportunities. The multi-color, multi-material, figural tilled surface of the traditional Islamic tombs and shrines were contrasted to the austere, monochrome, and uniform white marble of Reza Shah's tomb. As the homogeneous army and educational system, the building was uniform. Nationalistic notions of unity, oneness, and purity were inherent in the choice of the white color and material. The mausoleum became simultaneously modern, national, and intemporal. The unification of the nation was symbolized in the Aramgah of the man who advocated and implemented such changes.

A clear separation between the 'Islamic' and the modern-revivalist Pahlavi architecture was achieved mainly through the building technology, modern forms, monumental expression, and new materials. By altering the size, color, and material, and by keeping the main plan and elevation configuration, a simultaneous link to the pre-Islamic and a break from the immediate past, was achieved through architecture. The Aramgah due to its tectonic qualities was perhaps one of the last monuments which could bring together the eastern and western forms in a harmonious manner.[56] As Mohammad-Reza Shah took over the state, he became more and more involved in architectural projects and his own vision

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55. "Architecture reinforced the link to antiquity through the continued use of the *talar* in Qajar palaces. Essentially a chamber for the monarch to display himself to the people, the *talar* most likely dates to at least Achaemenian times. Qajar *talars* consisted of an elevated platform..." Brookes, *The Royal Iconography of Qajar Iran*, 2-3.

of the nation manifested in the tectonic language of forms. In contrast to his father, he gradually condemned the West and advocated the Persian-ization of Iran, according to his vision of *Iran-ness*. Under the reign of the second Pahlavi ruler, the nature of the architectural profession and the function of the architect changed. A different dialogue was shaping between the state and the architect. Nationalism became acute, ancient glories overt and the monarch central to the tectonic language of Iranian architecture.

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56. The political instability of 1950's disoriented the architectural profession. Contemporary architects struggled to create a professional identity in 'uniquely Persian' modern architecture. In an effort to give shape to monuments and mausolea there was a need to come up with new forms. The designs for the reconstruction of the tombs of Avicenna, Saa'di, Nader Shah, Umar Khayyam, Ferdowsi, among others, were the strenuous struggle to create the Persian-modern. As part of the political agenda, these structures embodied aspects of Persian revivalist architecture, simultaneously trying to break away from the Islamic imagery and to create the Persian-modern. The architect of some of these tombs, Seyhoun writes: "Ainsi un nouvel 'historicism' se developpa dans l'architecture des mausolees. La composition Ex-nihilo du plan, la recuperation des 'signes' exterieurs de l'architecture persane traditionnelle, et l'utilisation eclectique de technologies diverses, characterisent l'architecture monumentale de la periode. La preoccupation centrale de l'architecture se fond dans l'invention du fantastique, la recherche de l'original. L'absence totale d'un 'concept d'espace' d'ou l'importance de la facade comme l'aspect le plus representatif de l'architecture. L'histoire des rapports substiels de formes et de volumes se remplace par l'histoire des 'motifs'. L'orientation vers un centre religieux qui precedemment donnait une signification primordiale a l'architecture se voyait maintenant remplacee par des notions de modernisme et de progres de l'orientation vers le future." Seyhoun, H. L'Architecture de Houshang Seihoun. Tehran: 1977, 45.

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Figure 1.2 Map of greater Tehran.

Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. <u>Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire</u>.
 Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, end maps.

Figure 1.3 Tehran, esoteric city fabric.

Maheu, Rene. <u>Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire</u>.
   Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 184.

Figure 1.4 Tehran, exoteric city fabric.

Maheu, Rene. <u>Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire</u>.
   Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 183.

Figure 1.5 Aramgah, plan.

Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. <u>Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire</u>.
Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 121.

Figure 1.6 Aramgah, elevation.

Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. <u>Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire</u>.
 Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 121.

Figure 1.7 Aramgah, frontal view, due south-east.

Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. <u>Art and Architecture</u> 18-19,
June-November, 1973, 99.

Figure 1.8 Position of Tehran in relation to Alborz mountain range and the Salt Desert.

Baharambeygui, H. <u>Tehran: an Urban Analysis</u>.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 1.

Figure 1.9 Shah Abdol-Azim Shrine and Emamzad-e Hamz-e, Ray.

Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. <u>Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire</u>.
   Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 232.

Figure 1.10 Aramgah in relation to Abdol-Azim Shrine.

Wilber, Donald Newton. <u>Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran</u>.
    Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975, 00.

Figure 1.11 Map of Tehran, Aramgah and surrounding, Ray.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 158.

Figure 1.12 Tomb of Avicenna.

Bahra al-Ulumi, Hossein. Karnameh, <u>Anjumana-e Asar-e Melli</u>.
    Tehran: University Press, 1976, 97.

Figure 1.13 Tomb of Saa'di.

Bahra al-Ulumi, Hossein. Karnameh, <u>Anjumana-e Asar-e Melli</u>.
    Tehran: University Press, 1976, 177.

Figure 1.14 *Chahar-taq*, Naqarah Khaneh, Farashbadn.

Figure 1.15 *Chahar-taq*, fire temple, Neisar, restored.

Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 1.16 Formal analysis of *chahar-taq*.

Ardalan, Nader. <u>The Sense of Unity</u>. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 75.

Figure 1.17 Fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, Aramgah, March 21, 1976.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
   New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 314.

Figure 1.18 Aramgah from close.

Brown, C.L. <u>From Medina to Metropolis: Heritage and change in the Near Eastern city</u>. New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1973, 00.

Figure 1. 19 Reconstruction of Persepolis terraces of Apadana, by Beilager, 1971.

Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 1.20 Kuh-e Kawagia, the reconstruction of the Achaemenian faze, plan.

Gullini, Giorgio. <u>Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi</u>.
    Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 264.

Figure 1.21 Pasargade, the sacred space, Herzfeld reconstruction, axonometric.

Gullini, Giorgio. <u>Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi</u>.
   Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 262.

Figure 1.22 Formal analysis of *takht*.

Ardalan, Nader. <u>The Sense of Unity</u>. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 69.

Figure 2.1 Mohammad-Reza Shah with Queen Elizabeth in London.

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran. <u>Mission for my country</u>.
    Rome: Dino editor, 1977, 50.

He -- on the other hand -- was a short but a sophisticated man. Born a royal, he ascended the throne in 1941. He launched his White Revolution in 1963 and by 1970 began to talk about the Great Civilization. Internationally, his reign was marked by the celebration of the 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971. He left Iran in 1979 and died of cancer in 1980. His official name was His Imperial Majesty Moham-mad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, King of Kings and Light of the Aryans.[1]

"My sole aim in life is the constant improvement of the welfare of Iran and the Iranian nation. My deepest wish is to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the country, to bring the Iranian nation up to the level of the most progressive and prosperous societies of the world, and to *renew* the ancient grandeur of this historic land. In this task, I will withhold nothing, not even my life."[2] As the throne passed from Reza Shah to his son, Iran entered a new stage of national and royal imagery and thus, a new definition of architecture. The person of Mohammad-Reza Shah became more and more consequential in the making of the national identity and the state consciousness. There was a fundamental shift in the nature of the state and the image of the monarchy mainly as the result of the personality of the monarch. "Mohammad-Reza Shah [was] altogether a more complex character than his father. Reza Shah had a down-to-earth view of things; his son [went] beyond this and [sought] to give his rule a sense of divine mission."[3] By the time of his enthronement the basic projects of state-making were already accomplished by his father. The young Shah, educated in Europe, had a romantic vision of his position in the Iranian society, and from the very beginning he immersed into the nationalist/revivalist discourse and perceived it as an end in itself. Unlike his father, he believed that the glory of a remote

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1. *Shahanshah* and *Aryamehr* in Persian.
2. Mohammad-Reza Shah announced this on his coronation day. "He had borne his nation's burdens upon his shoulders for 26 years and worn his crown upon his head for 17 minutes when he began his coronation address." Shor, Franc. *Iran's Shah Crowns Himself and His Empress.* National Geographic Magazine, 1968: 301. Emphasis added.
3. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 42.

past could be rescued, and once this is done would bring supremacy to 20th century Pahlavi Iran. Within this fantastic construction was the Shah's own prominent placement; "the young shah seemed constantly groping for ways and means of putting the seal of legitimacy on this kingship and the Pahlavi dynasty. He wanted to be known as the heir to the throne of Cyrus, Xerxes, and Darius, and simultaneously restore bygone glories through the advent of the Great Civilization."[4] He relied on the image and significance of the monarch to lead the nation to the future. As the 1970's approached, Mohammd-Reza Shah lost the sensitive distinctions between the monarchy, the state, and the nation. These entities blurred into one: "Iran was he, and he was Iran."[5] The King's feelings of his own relevance in the destiny of Iran was partly due to his royalist background which eventually found justification in this sense of divine mission. "I believe in God and that I have been chosen by God to perform a task. My reign has saved the country and it has done so because God was on my side."[6] In the affairs of nationalism, the Shah was the "new way of linking fraternity, power, and time meaningfully together."[7] His formula of nationalism was quite different from that of Reza Shah. This had a direct effect on national narrative, institutions, and general mentality of the country.

> Mohammad Reza Shah's self-style 'positive nationalism' defined as 'a policy of maximum political and economic independence consents with the interest of one's country' essentially meant to reject nonalignment, which the shah called 'supine passive neutrality.' It differed significantly from Reza Shah's somewhat paranoiac suspicion of foreign powers. It welcomed military alliances and bilateral cooperation on the basis of mutuality of interests. Eroding the energizing appeal of this nationalism, however, was the absence of a positive, identifiable, and unifying *national* purpose. The Shah's nationalism was centered on past glories of the Persian Empire and on the prospects of an illusionist future that he called the 'Great Civilization.' It was mostly abstractions, and therein lay its relative impotence. Ancient laurels were too remote, too fragmentary, and too abstract to excite the rank and file. The promises of the Great Civilization were blurred, uncertain, and too far off to serve as an immediate challenge or incentive for the people.[8]

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4. Amuzegar, <u>Dynamics of Revolution</u>, 219.
5. Ibid., 218. He was "accused of treating Iran as a neo-patrimonial state, and considering his kingship and the nation as one and the same. What he dreamed for Iran, he was convinced, was in Iran's true interest. [He was] nationalist in the sense that Iran's national interests inseparably blended with [his] own personal and dynastic interests." Ibid., 143.
6. Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran. <u>Answer to History</u>. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980, 32.
7. Anderson, <u>Imagined Communities</u>, 36.

The lack of a tangible national purpose was partially accommodated by the idea of the Great Civilization. The sudden imposition of modernization and westernization on a non-Industrial country -- such as Iran -- was a disruption of the order of traditional society. An irreversible process was set in motion which did not contain traditional meaning for the people. "All ideologies of delayed industrialization are essentially revolutionary, uto-pian."[9] A collective memory of selected historic events and hope of an utopian future pro-vided a suitable national purpose. In order for the revolutionary social changes to happen -- or continue to happen -- nationalism had to be made *profitable* for everyone. It was one thing to mutate the environmental or technological aspects of historically rooted people, quite another to touch their age-old socio-psychological complex orders. "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. A heroic past, of great men, of glory, that is the social principle on which the national idea rests. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation."[10] Mohammad-Reza Shah's policies attempted to mold a national identity and purpose through the idolization of heroic men and occasions. The Achaemenian Empire and different Zoroastrian kings lumped together, were the undisputable common glory; Arab invasions of the 7th century, the common suffering; and the Great Civilization, both the present common will and the wish to accomplish great things again in the future. Iranian nationhood was complete if, and only if, the ancient tri-umphs and the future dream met each other in the *now* -- Iran on its way to a *bright* future.

8. Amuzegar, <u>Dynamics of Revolution</u>, 142. Mossadegh was the prime minister of Iran from 1951-53 who nationalized the oil. His formula of nationalism was quite different and Mohammad-Reza Shah played off of this to give a different nuance to his. "Mossadegh's nationalism lacked 'any positive content'; it was largely self-centered, incapable of 'national regeneration' and mired in 'irrationality'." Ibid. After the affair of Mossadegh between 1951 and 1953, the Shah's nationalism or his claims to nationhood had to be redefined. "Nationalism as a concept had thus been discredited. To meet this situation the Shah evolved the idea of 'positive nationalism.'" He wrote later, "Positive nationalism, as I conceive it, implies a policy of maximum political and economic independence consistent with the interest of one's country." Yet such nationalism did not capture the imagination of Iranians, "he therefore linked it with his vision of social change as the principal ingredient of democracy. The solution to this problem was as imperative as the solution to the problem of nationalism if the quest for a national ideology was to be successful." Sanghvi, Ramesh. <u>Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran</u>. London: Transorient, 1968, 223 & 226.

9. Matossian, in Hutchinson, Smith, <u>Nationalism</u>, 220.

10. Ernest Renan, in Ibid., 17.

Mohammad-Reza Shah increasingly talked about the Great Civilization in conjunction with his White Revolution, even though the latter predated the former by a decade.[11] His central role was underscored and thus became instrumental in patterns of Iranian life. In the 1960's and 70's, the purpose of social and industrial reforms were attributed to the approach of the Great Civilization (fig. 2.2). What the Shah really meant was often quite ambiguous even in his writings:

> From 1963 we set our people upon the *road* of common sense and progress, toward the Great Civilization. For 37 years all my political activities were carried out with the aim of *placing* my people upon the *path leading* to this Great Civilization. Indeed, the *road* to this Great Civilization was not an easy one. But it led toward a higher standard of living. What then, is this Great Civilization that I wanted for Iran? To me, it is an effort towards understanding and peace which creates the *perfect* environment in which everyone can work. I believe each nation has the right, the duty to reach or to return to a Great Civilization.[12] That is why Iran cannot but be unfaithful to its *ancestral*, universalist tradition. This tradition in fact always combined certain values and a certain *purely national* Iranian spirit with the best available in other civilizations. In our *march* toward this Great Civilization, Iran was one vast workshop.[13]

The ambiguity of time and place of the idea of the Great Civilization was both part of the political agenda which kept the monarchy in place and a result of the Shah's growing disconnection with Iranian realities.[14] As the past was being revitalized in half-mythical and half-true form, the future was being molded into being equally mythical and imaginary.

11. The White Revolution, also called the 'Shah-People Revolution,' starting in the 1960's, was a program for reform which underpinned major attempts to westernize the country and the people. The master-plan was systemized in 1963 with twelve set points. See Peretz, D. The Middle East Today. London: Praeyer, 1994, 521.

12. According to the Shah, nations either reach or *return* to the Great Civilization. For him, Iran was going to return to it since it was one once. Other nations have the right -- and should -- reach it. I think there is an essentialist racism implied here, where the embodiment of the Great Civilization is either inherent in certain nations and achieved by development by others.

13. Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, 175. Emphasis added. "In the late 1960's, the Shah set the early 1980's as the probable date for achieving this goal, but a decade later, he spoke about the end of the century." Saikal, Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah 1941-1979. London: Angus & Robertson, 1980, 137.

14. Fereydoun Hoveyda is the brother of Abbas Hoveyda -- the Shah's prime minister from 1965 to 1977, the longest in modern Iranian history. Fereydoun Hoveyda who was Iran's representative to UNESCO, remembers an encounter with the Shah, "The 'great civilization' was his hobbyhorse, his very own little invention, an imaginary world which was more real to him than reality. He interrupted me in mid-sentence to say, 'Everybody is saying nothing but good about it. What I develop in [Towards the Great Civilization] is crucially important for the country's future.'" Hoveyda, Fereydoun. The Fall of the Shah. New York: Wyndham Books, 1980, 29.

The Shah considered the simultaneous development of what he called, 'political, economic, and social democracy' inside Iran, to be essential if his absolute dynastic monarchy was to remain pivotal to the operation of Iranian politics, and if Iran was to preserve and develop itself effectively, and conduct an 'independent national foreign policy' with maximum regional security and stability. He claimed that by achieving this, Iran would reach the frontiers of what he called *Tamaddon-e Bozorg*, his ultimate goal. [15]

As the idea was elaborated and expressed in a variety of forms, the phrase *Darvazehay-e Tamaddon-e Bozorg*[16]came to be used constantly. 'Gates of the Great Civilization' or 'Threshold of Great Civilization' was the imaginary space upon which the nation was standing. "The Shah began to propagate in earnest that idea of Iran being at the *threshold* of the Great Civilization -- a national state of national well-being with industrialization achieved and a full regeneration of Iran's ancient heritage."[17] The term and -- in particular -- the concept began to be taken seriously and applied in different sectors of art and industry. An architectural journal wrote, "The Shahnshah Aryamehr himself has often said that there should be Iranian solutions to Iranian problems. Even 'far out' ideas like designing for a mobile future or moving the national capital must be taken seriously before the country is locked into its development plans. If Iran is to reach the *threshold* of the 'Great Civilization' its avowed goal, then it will have to invent unique programs to find *shortcuts* to the future."[18] This had become the national purpose, applied in various areas of Persian life by such propaganda.

The concept of a gate was a significant factor in the psyche of the King. After the Islamic Revolution, he wrote, "My country *stood* on the verge of becoming a Great Civilization."[19] The use of the past tense indicates that in his conception, Iran's Great Civilization cannot possibly be *imagined* -- and far less realized -- without the person of Mohammad-Reza Shah. He continued, "We were ignored for centuries. When we *re-entered* modern consciousness, it was only as a geographic *cross-roads*. We were merely a *guardian* of trade routes to the East."[20] In addition to 're-entering,' 'cross-roads,' and

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15. Saikal, Rise and Fall of the Shah, 137.
16. This translates as 'Gates of Great Civilization' in English.
17. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 17. Emphases added.
18. *Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow.* Art and Architecture 18-19, June-November, 1973, 140. Emphases added.
19. Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, 34. Emphases added.

'guardian,' the Shah also wrote about Iran 'entering the twentieth century' wherein the quality of 'gateness' is constantly implied. Similarly, a safe passage was constantly mentioned in regard to different issues; "Safe *passage* within a country is a basic prerequisite of national unity."[21] According to him, Napoleon "saw Persia both as the natural bastion of the West and its *passageway* to the East."[22] The geography of Iran was also interpreted as a passageway -- the gate between East and West; a highly important place in the geopolitics of post-colonial era. True that Iran was a passage to India for the British but for the Shah this took an exaggerated importance, considering modern air-traffic technology. In addition, the Shah's suggestion, placed the country in a political, cultural, and civilizational midway between these two already imaginary entities; thus -- in the context of modern history and politics -- attributed both great responsibility and eminence to Iran -- consequently to the King.[23] Mohammad-Reza Shah's preoccupation with the notion of 'transformation' was manifested in his writings as well as his state architecture: a gate, a passageway, a metamorphosis. Were these syndromes of the subconscious transition from a traditional land to a modern nation-state?

Historically, however, gates have been very significant for Tehran. Relatively young, it matured as a city in the age of fortifications and ramparts (figs. 2.3 & 2.4). Tehran identified itself and impressed rulers with its gates and fortifications. They disclosed the importance of Tehran in the rivalry of potential capital cities. In 1553, under the Safavids the first rampart was built; and later with the construction of the fortifications it became a

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20. Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, 52. Emphases added.
21. Ibid. Emphases added.
22. Ibid., 43. Emphases added.
23. This notion of Iran being the middleman between the East and the West was propagandized. The magazine Environmental Design writes in 1974,"If there is a meeting-place of East and West it is Tehran. It is the most extraordinary conglomeration of things Asian and European, it is possible to conceive. A typically Eastern city it has suddenly covered itself, with an outward Western veneer that sits as strangely upon it as a new transparent garment, thrown carelessly over an old shabby garb. Asiatic the city deep down at heart must always remain, and Western influences sit but lightly upon it. The atmosphere of the East is in its very being, unchanged and unchangeable beneath its outward covering. The most striking fact for reflection is that Tehran has not acquired its Western veneer, like many Indian cities, through the coming of the Western as a sojourner within its gates, but has itself of its own will adopted its western garb." Alemi, Mahvash. *Documents. The 1891 map of Tehran: Two cities, two cores, two cultures.* Environmental Design 0-2, 1984-85: 74-86, 84. However, in reality Iran in all the senses of the word -- besides the imagined one perhaps -- is East, and not an inch away: culturally, religiously, geographically, economically, socially, politically, etc.

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city of relevance. "The idea of making Tehran the capital can be traced to Karim Khan Zand[24] who, in 1759, gave orders to build a seat of government at Tehran. He commissioned the architect Ostad Ghollam Reza Tabrizi to rebuild the walls."[25] In 1870's, under the modernist reforms of Nasir al-Din Shah, the original four gates of Agha Mohammad Khan -- Shah Abdol-Azim Gate, Doolab Gate, Shemiran Gate, and Qazvin Gate -- were replaced by twelve new gates. The figure and number of city's gates, in each era of Tehran's history, marked a stage in the progression of its development and symbolized each ruler's contribution to the betterment of the city. From Shah Tahmasp the Safavid, to Karim Khan Zand, to Agha Mohammad Khan the Qajar, and finally to Reza Shah Pahlavi, the different gates emblematized socio-political and physical reforms of Tehran. In order to free the modernization of the urban fabric, Reza Shah pulled down most of the historic gates in 1930's. The demolition of gates was also seen as an act of progress. After their physical disappearance, they maintained their conceptual importance for the inhabitants as a spatial and collective memory. In the 1970's, Mohammad-Reza Shah imprinted on Tehran his own vision of a gate; one simultaneously looking towards the past and gazing at the future; one ancient *and* modern.

As a result of its geographic and topographic setting, the constant tendency to move northward characterizes the urban expansion of Tehran. With an altitude of 1143 meters above sea level, this region sits between the Alborz mountain-range in the north and the Salt Desert in the south (fig. 1.9). It is positioned on the northern edge of the great central plateau; it rises steadily towards the north, with a difference in level of several thousand meters between its southern and northern limits (fig. 2.5). The expansion of Tehran -- to either north or south -- is impossible after a certain distance of enlargement. However, in the past the natural tendency of the city's growth was on the north-south axis since there was a need to move towards the mountains as the source of fresh air and clean water. By the 1960's, this north-south urban axis became problematic in terms of its social and political intensity in the city's class segregation. The south included the industrial area and

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24. Karim Khan Zand ruled Iran between 1750 and 1779. In addition to the walls, he erected an audience chamber, administrative buildings and private quarters. Marefat, Building to Power, 6.
25. Ibid.

cemetery of Ray and the ex-fortified old Tehran; the north consisted of Shemiran and areas up to the slopes of Alborz mountain range. The poor south, with the dense bazaar and needy residential quarters was the binary opposite of the rich north, with new villas, modern mini-markets, and fresh air and water. Although this vertical axis of social promotion initially evolved out of historic and geographic rational, it changed in nature in the 60's. These two urban spaces -- set against each other -- soon took acute social symbolisms.

Spatial segregation and social struggle came to be embodied in the Vertical Tehran.[26] The 'natural' urban development was socially and symbolically asserted and reinforced by the royal family. The Shah and his entourage moved north in 1959 -- from the Marble palace of central Tehran to Niavaran royal complex in Shemiran -- abandoning the traditional heart of the city. By so doing, they reinforced the vertical axis of social promotion.

Tehran's water problem was solved in 'Rezaian' style. Reza Shah's Karaj canal was replaced by two dams which were channeled from the east and the west. "In 1960, the construction of the Karaj dam considerably increased the water supply of Tehran for it could produce more than 180 million cubic meters per year. In 1968, the need for further water supplies resulted in a new dam constructed on the Jarjud river to the north-east of the city"[27] (fig. 2.6 & 2.7). West Tehran up to the International Airport of Mehrabad and East Tehran up to Tehran-Pars were supplied with clean water, thus satisfying the first precondition for urban construction and east-west expansion. Despite the land reforms of the White Revolution,[28] the Pahlavi regime mainly promoted the urban culture of the Iranian society and not the rural. Moreover, the centralization of political, economic, and administrative establishments in Tehran created an overflow of migrants into the capital. "The population of Tehran [was] subject to a very rapid increase; a fifteen-fold increase in fifty years, from an estimated 200,000 in 1921, to three million in 1970. The census boundary of Tehran in 1966 differed from that of the municipal boundary, as it included additional

26. "La structure de Teheran selon un axe 'vertical' reliant la vieille ville proche du basar a Chemiran etait conforme a une logique ancienne dans l'expansion de la ville depuis ses origines, mais ce n'est que depuis les annees 1960 qu'une hierarchisation sociale et spatiale s'est imposee a l'evidence." Adams, Iranian Civilization, 208.
27. Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 133.
28. Mohammad-Reza Shah's land reforms had good intentions but failed to promote agricultural progress in rural areas, mainly because it was neither institutionalized by the government nor backed by wealthy landowners.

areas to the east and west. If the population of Shemiran and Ray [were] added, the total population would be 3 million, which [was] 12% of the total population of the country, and 32% of the total urban population."[29] As notions of state, king, monarchy, people, and country all blurred into each other in the mind of the Shah and the idea of the Great Civilization sunk into institutions and social groups, the need to decentralize the opposition was felt more acutely. As Mohammad-Reza Shah's power grew more central, so did state opposition. Rapid population growth, the reinforcement of vertical axis of social promotion, and the increasing overt centralization of state power obliged the government to think about ways to decentralize the power of urban interest groups, to find a solution for immigrants, and to break -- in appearance at least -- the Tehran vertical axis. For reasons of power politics, social reshuffling, and physical restrictions efforts were made to re-orient the city's expansion on the east-west axis. Thus, the first major urban plan of Tehran was realized in 1969 by Victor Gruen Associates and Abdol-Aziz Farman-Farmaian.[30] The proposal was designed to solve both major actual and socio-political problems.[31]

In 1970, with the master plan expansions the city-limits were set at 25 kilometers from Tajrish in the north, Ray in the south, Mehrabad Airport in the west, and Tehran-Pars in the east. The east and west developments were going to be the new urban polar binaries (fig. 2.8). Systematic and state-funded industrial and residential areas started to develop along the road leading to Karaj.[32] In the south, two kinds of city planning were scheduled: selected historic areas and sites were to be transformed into kitsch tourist spots, representing the *primitive* Tehran in contrast to the modern Tehran, no doubt, empty of people;

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29. Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 50. "According to the Iranian Statistical Centre, from 1956 to 1966, more than 630,000 people migrated to Tehran, which, on average, is more than 63,000 per year, a figure which accounts for approximately half of the annual growth of Tehran." Ibid., 57.

30. Hourcade, in Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire. Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 211.

31. "Le plan prevoyait de developper la ville vers l'ouest pour casser cet axe nord-sud qui l'engorgeait et accentuait les possition sociales. Il fallait donc d'urgence restructurere le sud de Teheran. L'idee etait logique et judicieuse, mais difficile a realiser sans volonte politique, car l'axe nord-sud de la ville etait ancien, logique et solide. Reza Shah aurait peut-etre fait quelque chose, mais sous le regne de son fils, la municipalite de Teheran se contenta de laisser les quartiers sud a l'abondon tout en faisant de beaux projets dans le cadre de l'Office pour le developpement du sud de la Capitale, et en interdisant farouchement de construire des logements dans ces quartiers populaires." Hourcade, Bernard. *Teheran: Evolution recente d'une metropole*, Mediterannee 16: 1, 1974: 25-41, 31.

other dense residential quarters were to be demolished and made into public parks and rec-reational zones.[33] The replanning and reorientation of the urban fabric and function of old Tehran was a strategy to reduce the power of certain interest groups who interacted and operated within the traditional spaces. In addition, the idea of 'recreational zones' such as parks were seen as unacceptable by the ulema in accordance with their Islamic notion of pleasure and social interaction. Western-style parks and 'promenades' did not occupy a place in the Islamic traditional city.[34] The urban plan of 1968 was to undermine the orga-nization and power of the bazaar, the ulema, and the masses. The destruction of physical space in the city translated into the reduction in social status and influence. Where could the *bazaari* operate on an urban level and independent of the authorities, but in the folds of the dungeon-like, dense, crowded, and familiar bazaar? Here, deals were made, ideas were exchanged, generations were shaped, and revolutions were planned. For the Pahlavi regime, the bazaar was dangerous.

District 1 of Kuy-e Kan -- 15 kilometers west of Tehran and areas surrounding Mehrabad Airport -- became a major development site. Two large-scale residential com-plexes were constructed. Due west, the first development on the north bound was the Fak-oori military residential quarter;[35] and the second housing complex was the Shahrak-e Ekbatan, which comprised of much larger and better buildings, and which was only par-

32. "Several industrial activities have been established on both sides of Karaj road along a distance of approximately 25 kilometers. These establishments are mainly modern and are the result of the development programs during the Third and Fourth Development Plans (1963-72). Starting from Kennedy street, towards the Shahyad Square, construction materials, foodstuffs and non-alcoholic beverages occupy the first section. The land price in this zone compared with the Cen-tral part of the city is much lower. One major handicap is the great distance from the labor force of Tehran. This problem has been tackled by providing bus services bringing laborers from their houses in southern and central parts of the city to the factories." Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 108.

33. "Repartis entre Karaj et Teheran-Pars, ces nouveaux poles urbains devaient etre relies entre eux par un reseau etendu d'autoroutes et un metro. Le sud devait etre totalement resturcture avec la transformation en lacs et jardins public; le vieux centre autour du bazaar devait etre renove en 'vieux centre touristique' apres la deplacement de la plupart des activites commerciales et arti-sanales." Adams, Iranian Civilization, 211.

34. The tradition of parks and promenades in Safavid capital city of Isfahan was an exception to this general rule.

35. This complex was completed and named only after the Islamic Revolution after General Fak-oori an air commander in the revolution. In this building complex, Soviet prefabricated technol-ogy was used for military personnel and their families. I obtained this information from my father, Greg Der-Grigorian who was engaged and involved in different major engineering projects of the time.

tially finished after the Islamic Revolution.[36] This consisted of "1000 three-room flats which were designed for government employees. The residential blocks were mostly occupied by middle income families."[37] Westward expansion, residential and industrial development, and the location of the International Airport in district one were fundamental in the choice of the site for the symbolic monument of the late Pahlavi era.

THE OBJECT

The fall of 1971 was marked by the celebrations of 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire, hosted by Mohammad-Reza Shah. The first part of the feast took place adjacent to the ruins of Persepolis. The occasion was inaugurated by the Shah's speech[38]-- standing in front of the empty tomb of Cyrus -- in an attempt to link the 'old' and the 'new,' to narrow the gap of twenty-five hundred years of history. The act of speaking to the dead and past generations is often a part of the discourse of nationalism (fig. 2.9). The union of *heterogeneous* people is made by their imaginary linkage to common *but* extraordinary past men and events. "Michelet not only claimed to speak on behalf of large number of anonymous dead people, but insisted, with poignant authority, that he could say what they 'really' meant and 'really' wanted, since they themselves 'did' not understand. In this vein, more and more 'second-generation' nationalists learned to speak 'for' dead people with whom it was impossible or undesirable to establish a linguistic connection."[39] The Shah spoke to Cyrus -- dead and disappeared -- advocating the knowledge of Cyrus'

36. After the Islamic Revolution it was left unfinished purposely because the plan of the complex read the word 'Shahanshah' -- King of Kings -- from air, quite close to the international airport. These were pored concrete and prefabricated parts buildings. Ibid.
37. Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 120.
38. Most interesting part of the king's address was, "O Cyrus, Great King, King of Kings, Achaemenian King! I, the Shahnshah of Iran offer thee salutations from myself and from my nation. Cyrus! We have today gathered at thy eternal resting place to say to thee: rest in peace, for we are awake, and will forever stay awake to guard thy proud heritage! We have now come here to declare proudly: After the passage of twenty-five centuries, the name of Iran today evokes as much respect throughout the world as it did in thy days: today, as in thy age, Iran bears the message of liberty and the love of mankind in a troubled world." Hureau, Jean. Iran Today. Editions j.a. Iranian Ministry of Information and Tourism. 1975, 60.
39. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 198.

expectations of the 20th century Iran. Mohammad-Reza Shah *knew* what the dead wanted, expected, loved, and aspired to. This ancient anxiety kept shaping the modern Iran of the Shah. Through the emotional speech the Shah made the link between himself and Cyrus; Cyrus and contemporary Iran, and contemporary Iran and himself -- constant legitimation of monarchial rule. By speaking with the Great dead, Mohammad-Reza Shah also gave an *exact* date as the beginning to *this* continuous and homogeneous nation.

After the opening speech, the mostly foreign dignitaries and friends and family of royals were entertained with elaborate fireworks, exquisite dinners, and a fantastic parade of Persian History;[40] "if nationalness has about it an aura of fatality, it is nonetheless a fatality embedded in *history*."[41] The second half of the celebration was set in Tehran with the dedication of the Shahyad Aryamehr Monument designed by Iranian architect Hossein Amanat[42] and erected especially for the occasion (figs. 2.10-2.13). "It was the Tehran opening of the Shahyad Monument which most restored the magic of the days and nights at Persepolis. Symbol of national continuity and soaring hope of the future, the Shahyad Monument is probably the most impressive architectural achievement of the Pahlavi era, Tehran's answer to the Arc de Triomphe and the landmarks of other great cities."[43] Architecture was the center and link of events, places, people, and times.

The Shahyad Monument was the abstraction of the copy of a revitalized form from ancient Persian history. It was a modernistic abstraction -- beyond recognition -- of a *chahar-taq*, as was the Aramgah of Reza Shah in a more direct formal language. The monument, in form, seemed as a strange marriage of a tower and a *chahar-taq*, with an acute

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40. The entire Iranian military force and different European artists were preoccupied with the preparation and design of costumes and decorations for the big parade. "French artists helped devise the 'authentic' uniforms in which the Iranian Army could parade dressed as Persians of centuries gone by. They sat watching the parade of the Shah's own incomplete vision of Iranian history." Shawcross, William. The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally. New York: Simonl & Schuster, 1988, 42. Each period in Persian history was represented by the march of the soldiers appearing as they have been during that time. Through the investigations of European orientalists, such as Arthur U. Pope, a specialist in Persian art and architecture, and with the talent of European artists, the clothing, armory, weapons, and head dresses were designed and made for the parade. For several months rehearsals were organized, men were prevented from shaving, and the entire ruins of Persepolis and the city of Shiraz went through a 'clean up.' Two-thousand-five-hundred years of History was being enacted in a single day. The Achaemenians, Parthians, Sassanians, Samanid, Buwayhid, Il Khanid, Safavids, and Qajars, one after the other marched ahead, as if history had really been both clearly ruptured and calmly harmonious.
41. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145.

modern gist.

> It looks like an entrance gate reaching an elevation of almost 45 meters, in addition to five meters sunk below the surface. Its ceiling has a distance of 23 meters from the ground and has an octagonal display of its form. The surrounding space of 65,000 square meters has been landscaped. The width of this monument's foundation is 66 meters and its construction has taken 30 months to complete. In its structure 25,000 pieces of stone and 900 tones of iron have been used. It represents a symbol of Iran's history of architectural art.[44]

The main central arch was an exact copy of the great *iwan* of the Sassanian palace of Ctesiphon, which by its size and structure impressed and inspired architects and kings of the region throughout time[45] (figs. 2.14 & 2.15). Simultaneously, Shahyad aspired to be a tower -- perhaps reminiscent of Persian tomb towers or towers of silence. However, in its urban/axial, visual/physical, ideological/philosophical, temporal/spatial, and symbolic/representative sense it was a gate. As I attempt to demonstrate, it was many different kinds of gates, except an actual gate. It was a *nationalistic* gate. As the existence of a nation is completely dependent on imagination of a group of people, so was this gate, depending on memory and illusion. All the qualities of its 'gateness' can -- and should -- be imagined, exactly as the nation is imagined. Shahyad -- the ultimate emblem of late Pahlavi rule -- was a perfect fit between intention, physical form, and the corresponding illusion.

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42. Hossein Amanat was around 30 years old when he designed Shahyad. A graduate of Tehran University's Faculty of Fine Arts and Architecture, "his professional career and the opportunity to open his own office came when he won the national competition for design of Tehran's Shahyad Monument." *Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, 126. He is of Baha'i faith. The idea of a *bab* or a gate is essential to the origins and ideologies of this religion; connection between *Bab, Babi, Baha'i* and the gate. The Baha'i Faith began in 1844 by a young Iranian merchant who proclaimed the advent of a new religious revelation. He is known as 'the Bab,' which means the Gate in Arabic. Born on October 20, 1819, the Báb's given name is Siyyid `Alí-Mohammad. He declared that his purpose was to prepare humanity for the advent of a new messenger from God.

    I was tempted to argue that the form of Shahyad -- a gate -- has a relationship to the religious convictions of the architect. However, this line of thought would have altered the nature of my paper, perhaps focusing on the relationship between architect and patron, and individual architects' direct influence on representative politics through architecture. I personally believe that Shahyad's 'gateness' was much related to the fact that its architect was a Baha'i. But this can not be verified without an interview with the architect.

43. Lowe, J. Celebration at Persepolis. Tehran: Franlin Book Inc., 1971, 95.

44. Karman, Hossein. Tehran dar Gzashte va hal [Tehran in the past and present]. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 2535 Imperial year, 314. The 25,000 pieces of stones were perhaps symbolically adjusted to the 2500 years of monarchy.

45. "The form of the main *tagh* -- ceiling -- is inspired from Takht-i-Kisra, the palace of Sassanian kings, which is formed by intersection of four diagonal elements and by using special Iranian geometry." Shahyad Aryamehr Booklet, published by the Pahlavi government describes in detail the building structure and concepts, 4. Today, the 6th century structure, Ctesiphon, Takht-i-Kisra, or Iwan-i-Kisra is located in Iraq.

In tectonic language of volumes and planes, the gate symbolizes many great things. The gate as a passageway is a visual expression and proclamation of new beliefs.[46] It inherently implies a shift in the temporal and spatial realities; from one time and place to the other which is, by its essence, different. It also implies a final metamorphosis or trans-formation in meaning. It demarcates both a beginning and an end to that which it edges (fig. 2.16).

> The traditional expression *bab*, when referring either to architecture or literature indicates a move-ment through defined space that occurs over a certain length of time. A gateway of a city and a chapter of a book are both known as *bab*, being either the beginning or the end of a journey. This fluid transfer of symbolic meaning, regardless of scale, is ever extended to the 'mouth' of a mountain pass, where *bab* reliefs announce the entrance into a distinct regional 'place;' gate-ways into cities have been likened to the orifices of the body.[47]

The gate simultaneously connects and segregates. It breaks time and space but it also joins them at a very special defined locus. 'Inside' is fundamentally, conceptually, and physi-cally different from 'outside,' demarcated and margined by the gate. However, the esoteric and the exoteric are both omnipresent in the gate. A gateway embodies the transformation of the essence. It is the hierarchic demarcation of time and space. The gate exhibits his-toric events and over time its presence reflects memories. It is a demarcation in time, because it symbolizes a historic turning point; Rome and Byzantium ceased to be world empires at the moment when the gates of Rome and Constantinople were broken. Today, one looks at the old gates as visual reminders of a narrated stories; the record of history. In narrating it something forgotten is constantly recalled. The idea of nationalism -- however artificial -- is a new awareness and self-identification; this cannot remain on the superficial level. It strikes to all aspects of communal and individual lives. "All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias... because if it can not be 'remembered,' must be narrated. Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of 'forgetting' the experience of this continuity engenders the need for a narrative of 'identity'."[48] The nation is narrated since it is forgotten -- or never existed -- and *must* be remembered to attain a sense of nation-hood. A nation's existence is conditional upon the narration of its own existence.

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46. As the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem was a declaration of the new faith for Islam.
47. Ardalan, <u>The Sense of Unity</u>, 73.
48. Anderson, <u>Imagined Communities</u>, 204.

How strange it is to need another's help to learn that this naked baby in the yellowed photograph, is you. The photograph is only the most peremptory of a huge modern accumulation of documentary evidence which simultaneously records a certain apparent continuity and emphasizes its loss from memory. Out of this estrangement comes a conception of personhood, identity (yes, you and that naked baby are identical) which, because it can not be 'remembered,' must be narrated.[49]

Memory is fundamental to the successful unification of a nation. As a nation Shahyad's endowment as a gate, depended on narration. Its existential function was to remind Iranians -- *all* Iranians -- of their homogeneous Iranianness. The name, Shah meaning 'king' and yad 'remember,' was the first crystallization of a chosen memory. As the nation was the monarch, and the monarch the monument, so the nation was the monument.[50] The modern gate of Iran embodied the nation's inspirations and patrimonies, the monarch's conceptions and dreams, and people's collective memories and visions. "The nation came to be imagined, and, once imagined, modeled, adapted, and transformed."[51] The nation took form in the tectonics of architecture, in the multifold -- often imaginary -- gates of Shahyad.

Shahyad was an urban/axial gate. As part of the political and environmental agenda to shift the momentum of Tehran's expansion on the east-west axis, the monument took its considerable role in district 1 of Kuy-e Kan (figs. 2.17-2.19). Functioning as a classic gate, it gave a meaning and an end -- or beginning -- to the main avenue stretching horizontally across the entire city. Human-made axis cannot stretch for ever, for if it does it will lose its essential reason of existence, its intensity and even its function of 'axisness' in terms of division and directionality. An axis is a symbol of the edge of domesticity, of civilization, of order, all inherent to the man-made environment. An eternal axis such as the equator

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49. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 204.
50. "According to its promoters, the Shahyad Tower is 'an immense national monument and audio-visual theater complex.' Its name: Shah (king) Yad (remembrance) is intended to remind coming generations of the works of HIM the Shahnshah Aryamehr." Hureau, Iran Today, 164. Also, "the new administrative and commercial center in Tehran is called Shahestan Pahlavi (Place of the Pahlavi Shahs). The ritual exposure of the Pahlavi dynasty and royal person can only be attributed to insecurity, vanity, or a belief that this encourages loyalty. This in part explains the elaborate celebrations at Persepolis in October 1971 commemorating 2500 years of monarchy; and the carefully orchestrated celebrations in 1976 for the fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty." Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 61.
51. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 141.

line is only possible in theory. Therefore, each physical/actual axis needs an end; a point where the barbarian begins and the civilized ends. In the history of cities, gates have often functioned as this cessation-point. Shahreza Avenue was that edge conceptually segregating between the old Tehran districts and the new Shemiran area. As the boundaries of a nation-state are conceptual but very real -- illegally crossing border of countries is a dangerous act -- so was the horizontal Shahreza axis in Tehran. This boundary was not real -- there were no physical obstacles in between north and south but the conceptual axis was very real. It *did* matter if one's villa was in the north or one's squatter in the south. As the nation,[52] the axis was simultaneously real and imagined. Shahyad was that epitome of Shahreza axis which divided the rich and the poor, the beautiful and the ugly, the new and the old, the aristocrat/elite and the blue collar worker/merchant. Socially, physically, and conceptually this monument ruptured the capital city into two binary poles -- and eventually the entire country.[53] This was the new -- and *imagined* -- horizontal axis of social promotion. It was meant to break the traditional vertical axis, to neutralize the power of the different interest groups and the masses. "Schematically, the town is laid out around two main lines formed, from west to east starting from the Shahyad Tower by Shahreza Avenue, perpendicular to this axis, Pahlavi Avenue."[54] Shahyad was designed as a significant point of reference, focus, and attention of Tehran (fig. 2.20). The prevalent presence of Shahyad, both symbolically and physically, was a result and cause of its placement in district 1. It promoted urban and industrial development by shifting the focus of the city on itself. This alteration, somewhat successful, was partially due to the rapidly growing middle class which did not fit either in the rich north nor were willing to live in the poor south. They needed a corner in the city.

Shahyad's effectiveness went beyond its large-scale urban role. It functioned even more aggressively on the local level, first as a monument and then as a gate. Set in the center of the largest square in the country, it congenitally imposed local axiality and order. *Maydans* were visual centers of the narration of national heroes and strategies of military

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52. Two nations do go to war against each other. The fact that their 'nationness' is imagined does not decrease the danger of that war.
53. Here, I refer to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
54. Hureau, Iran Today, 160.

urbanism, a planning tradition launched by Reza Shah. Historically, *maydans* were the most important urban spaces where royal rituals took place. The play of polo by the king was the manifestation of his power and courage. *Maydans* were also significant theatrical device where religious liturgies took place, particularly in the month of Moharam. The *taki-e* -- small neighborhood squares as openings in the dense urban fabric -- had religious connotations often placed at the crossing of streets. In *taki-e*s, Moharam decorations were displayed and passion plays -- *tazi-e* -- were performed.[55] However, as district 1 was a new and state-promoted urban development, these were less essential -- though present -- for Shahyad square. The site was a new interpretation of traditional religious *maydans* with national significance.[56] By its imposing presence, the monument shaped the activities of that particular district. It defined a microcosmic axis, it created a large open space, and it set a pivotal point. "Gateway to modern Tehran, the 45-meter Shahyad Tower points burgeoning traffic into the heart of the city."[57] Car and pedestrian traffic was formulated around the structure; and this created a particular sense of centrality and imposition. Thus, it was an urban marker around which movements and activities were shaped; towards which axes were directed; and off which orientations were adjusted.

During the pre-Islamic era, Zoroastrian fire temples -- *chahar-taq* -- functioned as markers in the vast land of Persia. They located the traveler in the space and fastened his sense of time. Their religious significance proved to be a spiritual incentive to travel or approach. The four open sides and the central fire enabled visibility from far distances.[58] During the Islamic era, the fire temples were replaced by Persian tomb towers in rural territories and minarets in urban areas. Fire temples and tomb towers in this aspect were related, in particular as markers of space and orientation. The mediaeval tomb towers of

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55. This ritual became institutionalized in late Safavid period and took even more importance under the Qajar who build the Taki-e Dolat in Tehran.
56. "Sites for monuments must be planned. This will be possible once replanning is undertaken on a large scale which will create vast open spaces in the new decaying areas of our cities. In these open spaces, monumental architecture will find its appropriate setting which now does not exist. Monumental buildings will then be able to stand in space. Only when this space is achieved can the new urban centers come to life." The Harvard Architectural Review IV: Monumentality and the City. 1984, 62
57. Graves, William. *Iran: Desert Miracle*. National Geographic Magazine 147, 1975: 2-46, 31.
58. "These pavilions may have served the double purpose of acting as a focal point of the religion as well as serving as a beacon and landmark for travellers. The light would have been visible for miles." Adams, Iranian Civilization, 16.

the northern regions of the country were 'markers' in the Persian tradition of building. These Islamic towers -- themselves probably derived from the Zoroastrian towers of silence[59]-- often symbolized locations of a special event or person, either in the city or rural areas (fig. 2.21). By the end of the 15th century these markers possessed defined function and form in Iranian architecture. A marker has an Islamic prototype and the invention of a new form was probably not necessary, unless for political and revivalistic reasons. The monument of Shahyad -- a marker of specific event and person -- was compared to Gombad-e Qabus.[60] In Iran, Element of Destiny,[61] it was stated, "The builders of the austere mausoleum of Qabus were astonishingly modern. The same inspiration can still be traced in the very modern Shahyad Tower"[62] (fig. 2.22). By its nature the tower-like marker being vertically visible, was a purely exoteric object, yet by its formal language implied esoteric beliefs. It connected the divine heavens to man's earth. In the modern age, Shahyad was the new marker of urban space and orientation. Its form -- taken from the Zoroastrian *chahar-taq* and the Islamic tomb tower -- was the manifestation of a contemporary marker, and, again as the nation, was imagined. In the highly mobile and extremely large-scale world, Shahyad was neither big, tall, nor bright enough to be visible from far. It neither performed the function of minarets in medieval towns, tomb towers in rural landscape, nor lighted fire temples in deserts. In a context such as Tehran -- one of the largest cities of the Middle East -- Shahyad's 'markerness' was only local; if it claimed to such notion, it must have been memorial.

59. Many different theories have been advanced on the origin of Persian tomb towers. The agreed theory is that the Sassanian towers of silence -- used to expose the dead bodies -- in combination with the *chahar-taq* has generated the form of the Islamic tomb towers.
60. Dating from 1006-7 A.D.
61. This book was part of a series of publications under the Ministry of Culture which mainly propagated the achievement of the Pahlavi regime.
62. Maheu, Rene. Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire. Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 253.

Shahyad was a visual/physical gate. It was the master door with which Mohammad-Reza Shah -- like Tehran's other shahs -- imprinted the era of his rule on the capital city.[63] Shahyad was *The Gate* of the second Pahlavi King of Kings. The monument was placed at the limits in entering Tehran from the International Mehrabad Airport and it served as propaganda being the gateway to the capital.[64] The presence of the monument -- emphasized by its location, color, size, and dynamic shape -- was visually and physically inevitable. In fact, most Tehranians associated Shahyad with the airport only. They experienced it in passing to the airport. Its placement *en route* to the largest airport of Iran was not accidental. The Mehrabad Airport was the most important air traffic center of the country.[65] Shahyad was also and more importantly the door to the outside world. It connected Iran and its citizens to the West; it made it part of the 'civilized' nations via flight. Through Shahyad, Iran was relocated to Europe and its progressive state of being. Shahyad was even meant to be seen from air, as the traveler was about to land at the airport; an entrance to Iran, before even landing on its land (fig. 2.20). In addition to the airport all roads leading north-western Iran were through the Karaj road and freeway, where Shahyad stood. For travelers with plane, car, and bus Shahyad was the modern gate. It inspired a sense of openness and centrality versus the old gates which mainly functioned to close and limit the edge of the city. The essence of old and modern gates was different and opposite.

Did modernity give a radically different meaning to gates? This modern gate did not act as an actual gate. It ceased to be a literal element which enabled people in or demarcated the edge; it was a conceptual, symbolic means of 'getting in' and 'being in.' Its sense

63. "The first sight of Iran a visitor gets on arriving in Tehran is of a somewhat peculiar architecture, that of a nation wishing to demonstrate its originality and its worth. The white 'Shahyad Tower' erected at the entrance of the capital city is the master door into modern Iran." Hureau, Iran Today, 8.
64. "When the new international airport is operating, what then will be the place and significance of the impressive Shahyad Monument which now marks the entrance to Tehran form Mehrabad Airport? As Tehran's newest monument, Shahyad has given Tehran one of the most imposing portals of any major city in the world today. Shahyad has managed to capture the grace and feel of Persian culture in a totally contemporary form." Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, 98.
65. "In 1970, out of a total of 374,604 tourists arriving in Iran, more than 118,470 arrived via Mehrabad airport accounting for more than 30 per cent of the total number of tourists. There are 18 airports in operation in Iran of which the International Airport of Mehrabad in Tehran is the most important one, through which Tehran is connected to major centers of the world. In 1968, 296,416 passenger arrivals, 305,626 departures, and 26,217 transit passengers, were recorded at the airport." Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 141.

of 'gate-ness' was not physical, but imagined. It did not have walls within which it could be framed. This gate did *not* have a door. It did not open or close, it did not protect, it did not segregate. It was just there. The belonging to this or that nation is conceptual and not actual. One does not have to be red, blue, or orange to belong to a nation; one becomes part of it through an institutionalized means of belonging. These are accomplished through flags, anthems, passports, and often fabricated historic narrations. None of these have the actual sense of belonging as opposed to that of traditional tribal or ethnic identities where there is an actual element of commonality. "The nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be 'invited into' the imagined community. Thus today, even the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization."[66] In this sense, Shahyad was an *open* gate, always enabling *naturalization* of all kinds of people -- the homogeneous Iranian. One could enter as wished, as long as one was able to *imagine* oneself part of the imagined community. Moreover, the idea of entering the city from air also relates to the idea of the nation. One does not have to physically be present in the territory of a nation-state to be a citizen of that nation. The entrance to that nation can be accomplished on a long distance basis; a permanent resident of Los Angeles of Iranian citizenship but of Kurdish ethnic group, speaking English only! Here, one did not have to be on the physical land to enter the country, although the notions of land and territory are fundamental to national sentiments. One was already *in* from the air; one was part of the nation without being physically there; and that only through the arch of Shahyad. This visual/ physical gate was imaginary and its 'gateness' possible only if imagined.

Shahyad was an ideological/philosophical gate. It *was* the *Darvazehay-e Tamaddon-e Bozorg*. It was the concrete manifesto of the Iranian national purpose: the Great Civilization of Mohammad-Reza Shah. His vision of modern Iran's future took a tangible shape in the symbol of his reign *par excellence:* Shahyad. To him, this future had a decisive shape and essence -- often as real as the nation. He saw himself as the pilot[67] of Iran, to the gates of that civilization. The fantastic notion of the Great Civilization and the role of the Shah

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66. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145.
67. The Shah had a passion for flying. He was a member of the Iranian air-force. The dynamic shape of Shahyad towards the sky might have some connection to this.

in its realization had a great effect on the final shaping of the monument. The fundamental difference between the two sides of a gate -- inside and outside -- was analogous to the essential conceptual difference between contemporary Iran and the Great Civilization. The dynamism of the form, stable on the ground and bursting to the sky, was the symbol of the nation's movement to the future: the Civilization. The sudden cut of the top of that dynamic form implied achievements still needed to reach that future.

> It is colossal without heaviness, wind filled like a sail with the promise of the future and as solid as history's millennia. The style, reportedly inspired by Antiquity, is astonishingly 'modern'. Its harmony might well have been broken by a feature which seems surprising at first glance: the tower is truncated; the whole dynamics of the building is suddenly interrupted high up on the sky-line as if work had voluntarily been called off on a given day... Present achievements are to be confirmed in the future. The message was: the base is solid, the impetus is given, the nation is heading towards *new destiny*... The future can but lie higher! Now the modern traveller can see for himself that the Shahyad Tower is not a vain symbol. Planes, trains, and roads take him to the most remote areas of this immense country.[68]

This narration of memory -- or that which must be remembered -- was simultaneously representing the Great Civilization and the means to attain it: this also made historic links for the plausibility in the narration. At the moment when Iranians -- *all* Iranians -- could imagine that the Great Civilization actually existed and could be arrived at by passing through *a* golden gate, that gate would -- indisputably -- be the great arch of Shahyad. The nation could imagine that the crossing of Shahyad's threshold would transform the entire state into a utopian civilization. The gates of the Great Civilization -- so much longed for and so central to the national unity -- froze in the tectonics of Shahyad. Through it Iran would have transformed into a Civilization: the purpose imaginary, the means imaginary, and the golden gate imaginary -- not unlike the nation.

Shahyad was a spatial/temporal gate. It was the gate of 'homogeneous, empty time' of the nation. It connected the ancient culture and people of Persepolis to that of modern Tehran. As the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire was transferred from Persepolis to Tehran, the event reopened at the foot of this monument (figs. 2.23 & 2.24). Symbolically, the gate held the omnipresent essence of the ancient capital of Cyrus the Great and the modern capital of Mohammad-Reza Shah. The transition from one city

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68. Hureau, Iran Today, 8. Emphasis added. The dynamic shape of Shahyad towards the sky might have some connection to this. The sudden cut of the top portion of Shahyad could have been also caused by its closeness to the airport and the problems pertaining to the landing of air-planes.

to the other was made by the inauguration of the Shahyad. Thus, the Achaemenian Persia was transferred to the 20th century Iran. This is similar to the gate of paradise, where the earthly world is transformed into a heavenly paradise across the gate. The transference of the event to the modern city carried its symbolic implications: the direct link between the ancient city of Persepolis as the capital of the Achaemenian Empire and the modern city of Tehran as the capital of the Pahlavi *Empire*; an indication of continuity and linkage. The metamorphosis of space and time from Persepolis of 550 B.C. to Tehran of 1971 A.D. was attained through this gate. The selected 'then' was linked to the 'inevitable now' so much in the need and want of transformation. Shahyad embodied an immediate temporal and spatial transmutation. More distinct was the main focus of the exhibitions: the Cylinder of Cyrus with the first human rights declaration. Facing this were displayed the 12 points of Mohammad-Reza Shah's White Revolution.[69] The two ideas of each era were juxtaposed: the declarations of Cyrus and Mohammad-Reza. The bridge between the glories 'then' and the promising 'now' was quite overtly made.[70]

Besides the actual inauguration in October of 1971, the program of the monument was also meant to create historic links and political legitimacy. It housed a series of museums and a large show-stage. Inside the monument, the visitor was invited to travel to other dimensions of time and space. Through modern technology, one visited the ancients, the contemporaries, and the coming generations; the dead, the living, and the unborn. The Pahlavi spoke for all three groups of all the lands and all the times, better than they ever could themselves. The slow-moving conveyer took one on a tour of the history of the world. 'Strange universe and new dimensions' were explored.[71] One entered the basement

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69. The 12 points of the White Revolution were: 1. land reform; 2. nationalization of forests; 3. public sale of state-owned factories; 4. profit sharing by workers in industry; 5. revision of the electoral law to include women; 6. literacy corps; 7. health corps; 8. development corps; 9. rural courts of justice; 10. nationalization of the waterways; 11. national reconstruction; 12. educational and administrative revolution.

70. "The black walls, the sober and pure lines, the proportions of the whole building create an intentionally austere atmosphere. Heavy doors open onto a kind of crypt where lighting is subdued. The shock is immediate. The little lighting there seems to issue from showcases here and there each of which contains a unique object. There are about fifty pieces *selected* among the finest and most precious in Iran. The place of honor is occupied by 'Cyrus's Cylinder'. The translation of this first 'Declaration of Human Rights' is inscribed in golden letters on the wall of one of the galleries; opposite, a similar plaque lists the Twelve Points of the 'White Revolution'." Hureau, Iran Today, 165. Emphasis added.

of the tower directly underneath the main vault and went underground. Once in, one was constantly on the move towards the top of the structure and thus progressing through a narrated, selected history: a procession from the Hall of the Ancient under the ground to the Hall of the Future on top. In tectonics, each hall was designed according to corresponding notion of space: the ancient with heavy, low, and dark tunnels and the future with high, light, central chambers (fig. 2.25). This positional and stylistic juxtaposition implied the complementary poles of selected history and their temporal/spatial transformation. Shows were self-explanatory in their attempts to revitalize the past, glorify the present, and connect to the future. Music and images played a vital role in exalting nationalism, "nothing connects us all but imagined sound."[72] In reality, Persepolis would have actually mutated into Tehran, if and only if Iranians -- *all* Iranians -- managed to imagine that Shahyad enabled such transformation. Or vice versa, as long as all Iranians imagined that such mutation was possible, then Shahyad would gain its quality of 'real gateness.' In any case, narratives involved and substantiated, were fabrications of the nation as a homogeneous entity. Ancient-ness and new-ness and the entire enterprise was real only if it could have been imagined.[73] Cyrus's declaration of the human rights was itself an imagined reality, shaped and molded by European Orientalists and executed and displayed by the Pahlavi regime. Modern definition of human rights is incomparably different from that of the 6th century B.C. The Halls of the Ancient and Future -- in reality -- were unrelated, disconnected, and non-linear. The temporal and spatial junctions of the past, present, and future took shape in the body of Shahyad; they were as real as the gate and the nation.

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71. Inside the audio-visual theater: "the visitor takes a narrow unlighted passageway and suddenly finds himself on a slow-moving conveyer. This '*machine for the exploration of time*' takes him through a series of seven halls. Lighting effects, movie projections, directional sound effects and captivating music take the traveller into a *strange universe* of completely *new dimensions*. And very gradually the History of the World, and of Iran, unfolds before his eyes. Atop the monument is the Hall of the Future, with a preview of the future development of Iran. A first show, devised in 1971, was replaced in 1975 by a new one which invites the visitor to discover Iran's geographic and natural diversity along with its historical and political unity. This was devised by a Czechoslovak firm; 12,000 meters of film and 20,000 color-slides." Hureau, Iran Today, 165. Emphasis added. Designed and built by Czechoslovakians; one of the best in the realm of technology in 1970's.

72. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145.

73. "The concept of 'ancient-ness' is relative and may lie in the eye of the beholder." Kohl, Philip L. & Fawcett, Clare. Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology. London: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 4.

Shahyad was a symbolic/representative gate. It represented the image of Moham-mad-Reza Shah in a stone Bible. The absolute power of the King and the significance of his person in the destiny of the nation was embodied in Shahyad. The Shah often talked about gates, passageways, cross-roads, threshold, etc. The binding element of two places and times was an important notion in his vision of the world. Similarly, as a king, he was the center of a royal monarchy and the attention of a vast land.[74] He saw himself a guide of the nation moving on to the future. He himself was the mediator between the common masses of Iranians and their future; and as such he felt he could -- and did -- eternally alter the destiny of the country. The Shah also saw himself as the link between the West and the East. He had spent most of his adolescence in Europe, educated and 'molded' as a Euro-pean; yet he was the king of an eastern people.

As one of its faces, Shahyad was the gate representing the King -- the element which would cause Iran's metamorphosis from 'progressing present' to the 'progressive future.' As the West was perceived as the 'already modern and industrialized,' the Shah hoped for Iran to reach western standards. He felt he was going to close the gap of progress between Iran and the West. Shahyad was the manifestation of the monarchy magically linking time and space. In form it evoked a simultaneous sense of centrality and directionality, and it created an open urban space for mobility and visibility. These spatial qualities symbolized the centrality of the Pahlavi government revolving around the monarch; yet at the same time, embraced national path upon which the state was marching. The reign of Pahlavi appeared as stable and solid as the Shahreza Avenue axis upon which Shahyad was hover-ing. As the reign represented, the monument was dynamic but solidly based; was power-ful, simple, and central. "The four legs anchored to the ground dart skyward in an artful ellipse bearing a massive, simple and powerful central body. The lines are pure and auda-cious"[75] (fig. 2.26). It might even have been the architectural manifesto of the Shah's White Revolution. He writes, "this program would construct a modern and progressive

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74. "Kingship organizes everything around a high center. Its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from population, who, after all, are subjects, not citizens. In the modern conception, state sover-eignty is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory. But in the older imagining states were defined by centers." Anderson, Imagined Com-munities, 19.
75. Hureau, Iran Today, 8. Emphasis added.

Iran on sound and strong foundations, so that my presence would no longer affect the destiny of the country."[76] This implied two ideas: one that of a large, grounded foundation -- which Shahyad embodied openly; second, the fact that he saw himself as the center of Iran's formation and destiny. The very presence of Shahyad as an urban sculpture and an identifiable object in the city, testified to this belief. The Pahlavis revived and preserved the ancient tradition of monarchy; however, they were advocates of modernity. They were both modern and ancient. Shahyad, by its attempt on modernism, its color and material inferred a sense of openness and honesty. By its form and prototype it inspired ancientness and timelessness. Translated into politics, it evoked ideas of democracy and fair rule but rooted and ageless.

Shahyad acted as the architectural manifesto of the Shah's monarchy, visions, ideologies, and ultimate aim. It became the symbol of the modern nation which marched forward -- captured in the dynamic form of the monument -- and connected to the past -- general configuration of the plan and elevation. As in the nation, in Shahyad the 'new' and the 'old' were omnipresent. *Par excellence,* it was the gate to the Great Civilization. It was the gate of the nation, with all its real and imaginary vices and virtues. Perhaps Shahyad was the Shah himself frozen in time and space, yet so dynamic and visionary -- simultaneously millennium-old and astonishingly modern. Through the tectonic language of form, shape, color, material, light, and sound; through architecture the nation was remembered, narrated, glorified and legitimized. "Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed."[77] As Mohammad-Reza Shah longed to be Cyrus the Great, as Pahlavi dynasty longed to be the Achaemenian Empire, as Tehran longed to be Persepolis, and as modern Iran longed to be ancient Persia -- they had to cross the magical arch of Shahyad. As such, the ultimate shaping of Shahyad could not have been other than as it was, in inspiration, intention, and relevant reality.

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76. Mohamad-Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, 102.
77. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 154.

Figure 2.2 A golden cameo of Mohammad-Reza Shah crowns the staircase of History inside the Shahyad Monument's audio-visual theater.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 25.

Figure 2.3 *Sepah* gate from the Qajar period, Tehran.

Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
<u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 67.

Figure 2.4 Old gate of Tehran, destroyed.

Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
<u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 22.

Figure 2.5 A south-north section of Tehran area, showing the altitude of the city.

Baharambeygui, H. <u>Tehran: an Urban Analysis</u>.
   Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 5.

Figure 2.6 Water resources of Tehran, external dams.

Baharambeygui, H. <u>Tehran: an Urban Analysis</u>.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 134.

Figure 2.7 Karaj dam, built in 1960.

Baharambeygui, H. Tehran: an Urban Analysis.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 135.

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Figure 2.8 Map of Tehran, urban zones.

Karaj Vardarvrd Latmar Shomali Kan Amirabad Shemiran Abbasabad Tehran Pars Downtown Area Doshantapeh Latmar Jonubi Shahr-e-Ray

0   4   8 km:

Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. <u>Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire</u>.
    Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 210

Figure 2.9 Mohammad-Reza Shah's opening speech at the 2500-year celebration.

Lowe, J. Celebration at Persepolis. Tehran: Franlin Book Inc., 1971, 35.

Figure 2.10 Shahyad, site plan.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 10.

Figure 2.11 Shahyad, east-west elevation.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 14.

Figure 2.12 Shahyad, north-south elevation.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 15.

FLOOR AT 43.50

FLOOR AT 39.50
DOME

FLOOR AT 33.00

FLOOR AT 23.40
MAIN ARCH 21.00

MUSEUM -5.00

Figure 2.13 Shahyad, south-north section.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 16.

Figure 2.14 Shahyad, due east.

Maheu, Rene. <u>Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire</u>.
Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 188.

Figure. 2.15 Ctesiphon, Sassanian palace, Iraq.

Figure 2.16 Formal analysis of gate.

Ardalan, Nader. <u>The Sense of Unity</u>. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 71.

Figure 2.17 Shahyad from air generating axis in the urban fabric, due east.

Beny, R. <u>Persia: Bridge of Turquoise</u>.
    Boston: New York Graphic Society, 1975, 64.

Figure 2.18 Shahyad, directing traffic.

Karman, Hossein. Tehran dar Gzashte va hal [Tehran in past and present].
   Tehran: Tehran University Press, 2535 Imperial year, 352.

Figure 2.19 Map of Tehran, Shahyad square and surrounding.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 98.

Figure 2.20 Shahyad from air.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny.</u>
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 206.

Figure 2.21 Formal analysis of *minaret*.

Ardalan, Nader. <u>The Sense of Unity</u>. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 73.

*T*he builders of
the austere
mausoleum of
Qâbus, in the eleventh
century, were
astonishingly modern.
The same inspiration
can still be traced
in the very modern and
majestic Shahyade Tow
Iranian art, three
thousand years old,
is a link between
East and West, and
demonstrates the
strength and lasting
quality of
an undisputed
creative genius.

Figure 2.22 Shahyad and Gombad-e Qavus.

Maheu, Rene. <u>Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire</u>.
  Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 253.

Figure 2.23 Shahyad, plan.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 17.

Figure 2.24 Persepolis aerial view and 2500-year celebration royal tents.

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
Bahar, M. <u>Persepolis</u>. Tehran: Sekeh Press, 1993, 86-87.

ELEVATION OF THE BASEMENT WALL

PLAN OF THE ENTRANCE TUNNEL

CROSS SECTION OF THE BASEMENT

LONGITUDINAL SECTION THROUGH THE ENTRANCE TUNNEL

Figure 2.25 Shahyad, plans and sections of interior halls.

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Shahyad Monument, handbook.
    Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 23.

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Figure 2.26 Mohammad-Reza Shah and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, approaching the arch of Shahyad.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 334.

Figure 3.1 Mohammad-Reza Shah and Farah Shahbanoo at Niavaran royal palace.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 312.

She was a smart but a beautiful woman. From a modest Persian family, she married the King in 1959. She bore the next heir to the Pahlavi throne in 1960. Although, in private she disagreed with some of Mohammad-Reza Shah's decisions and decrees, she remained supportive of him until his death. The first Shahbanou to have been formally crowned queen since Iran embraced Islam was Her Imperial Majesty Empress Farah Pahlavi.

Extremely complex sets of conditions and events caused the Islamic Revolution in 1979[1] (fig. 3.1). Some of these major sequels occurred in the 70's, following the 2500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire. From then on, Pahlavi politics took a different turn and changed in nature, which in turn, affected many aspect of Iranian life. In 1974, world petroleum prices increased fourfold. The national oil revenue of Iran became $20 billion.[2] At the turn of the decade, Mohammad-Reza Shah attained a strong confidence in his power over the country and his semi-divine mission for his people. Because of this and various other antecedents, he became extremely detached from the realities of Iran. The illusionary Great Civilization blurred and often superseded the evolving economy, social conflicts, and political underdevelopments. Petrodollars made everything possible.[3] The Shah's overconfidence externalized in a number of major decisions that he made and enforced between the oil boom and the dawn of the Islamic Revolution. These choices were partially due to the quadrupling of state income which convinced him that he would

1. The explanation of the reasons for the Islamic Revolution is both outside of the scope of this paper and too complex to sum up in few pages. Here, I only write about what is relevant to the destiny of the three monuments discussed in this paper. That which I do talk about is not as simple, as clear-cut, and as independent as stated here. These events are causes and results of many other factors, left out in this paper.
2. "Between 1974 and 1977, it topped $38 billion." Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 427.
3. "Avec 1 milliard de dollars de revenus petroliers annuels, Mohammad-Reza put se lancer dans la revolution blanche; avec 20 milliards, il pouvait rever de la 'grande civilisation.'" Hourcade, Bernard & Richard, Yann. Teheran: Au Dessous de Volcan. Paris: Autrement Revue, 1987, 237.

solve socio-political problems single handedly. <u>Philosophy of Iran's Revolution</u>[4] declared that the Shah, "the Light of the Aryan Race had eradicated from Iran the concept of class and had resolved once and for all the problems of class and social conflict."[5]

THE STORY

The first major decision during that period came in March of 1975. The Shah passed a decree for one-party state, dissolving the two-party system with which he had been satisfied since the 60's. The New Iran and People's parties merged to create the Resurgence party.[6]

> The main goal of the Resurgence party was to transform the somewhat old-fashioned military dicta-torship into a totalitarian-system one-party state. Absorbing the New Iran and the People's par-ties, the Resurgence party declared that it would observe the principles of 'democratic centralism,' synthesize the best aspects of socialism and capitalism, establish a dialectical rela-tionship between the government and he people, and help the Great Leader -- Farmandar -- com-plete his White Revolution and lead his Iran towards a new Great Civilization.[7]

The basic repercussion of one-party administration was the state's complete penetration in the affairs of the people. The independent socio-political institutions which could -- and would -- have challenged the state in many different realm of policies, ideologies, and pro-duction were eliminated. The phenomenon of competition -- so essential to progress -- was eradicated. Power politics became a work of art rather than a power struggle; it was molded as wished. Through the new reform policies, the state entered the core of private life in almost all arenas. Perhaps, for the first time in Iran's history, the privacy of the mostly introverted Iranian society was being both pierced and externalized by the authori-ties; these, specially included the propertied middle class, namely the much-feared bazaar and the religious establishments. This also intensified the control over the urban salaried

4. A handbook published by the Resurgence party in 1976.
5. Abrahamian, <u>Iran Between Two Revolution</u>, 441. The money was channeled in many different ways. True that a good bulk went to royal excesses, but it is also true that much greater sum was spent on the economy, either directly or through royal subsidies.The earlier plans concentrated mainly on the infrastructure; the later plans, Fourth -- 1968-73 -- and Fifth -- 1973-78 -- on human resources. See Abrahamian, 431.
6. The Resurgence party was called Hizb-i Rastakhiz in Persian.
7. Abrahamian, <u>Iran Between Two Revolution</u>, 441.

middle class and the rural masses. The Resurgence party seized the ministries that previously controlled thousands of livelihood; including ministries of Labor, Industry and Mines, Housing and Town Planning, Health and Social Welfare. The tightening of the party's surveillance over communications and mass media included the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Art and Culture, Science and Higher Education, and the National Radio and Television.[8] Through state control of cultural life, the somewhat spontaneous and autonomous artistic endeavors became systematized and institutionalized. The immediate impact was felt on the publishing realm where the number of titles dropped by 69%.[9] By the end of 1975, "twenty-two prominent poets, novelists, professors, theater directors, and film makers were in jail for criticizing the regime."[10] Performing and fine arts and the profession of architecture were also profoundly affected by this intrusion. Architectural discourse became institutionalized.

The state demonstrated its impertinence by breaking into the bazaar and ulema zone of dominion. It challenged the bazaar's economic basis by setting up state corporations to import and distribute food.[11] The state-controlled media began to talk about the need to uproot the bazaar and plan highways through the old city center. Large super markets and a state-run central market[12] were scheduled to be built. A shopkeeper told a journalist, "the big stores are taking away our livelihood. The government will flatten our bazaars to make space for state offices."[13] If the 'worm-ridden shops' were eradicated, the state would gain significant control over the economy and segments of the mass. Likewise, the state challenged the influence of the ulema, the other socio-political supremacy over the people, especially in the rural areas. Education -- traditionally entirely under ulema control -- had already been secularized and universalized throughout the country; now it was given a strong western tone and detachment under the new educational policies. This

8. See Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 442.
9. "The number of titles published each year fell from over 4,200 to under 1,300." Ibid., 443.
10. Ibid.
11. "The government had rushed into a territory in which previous regimes had feared to tread. Tehran shopkeepers protested that the government was using state corporations and large department stores to undermine the bazaar, 'the pillars of Iranian society'." Ibid.
12. Mainly modeled after London's Coven Garden.
13. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 444.

"reform reduced the clergy's power and prestige in the two most fundamental aspects of social order and deprived them of a large portion of their income... a moral challenge to their very independence and predominant place in Iranian society."[14] Increasingly, more students attended western universities.[15] The shaping of next generations -- a responsibility partially handled by *madrassas* -- was now operated entirely by the ministries controlled by the party, and that not of a 'modern progressive' nature but 'western secular.' Besides education, the Resurgence party took over a religious domain reserved only for the last Prophet; the Shah was claimed the sole spiritual leader of Iran. As such, the government scrutinized the accounts of the religious endowments; forbade any non-state-controlled publication of theology books; and sent special religious corps to the rural areas to teach 'true' Islam. There was an attempt to appropriate Islam to an image of national interest.[16] Religion -- a universal ideology by its nature -- was tailored to national aspirations and visions -- thus exclusion and limitation. As the education and the economy, it was institutionalized, systematized, and framed.[17]

The biggest blow to the Shi'a communities in general, and to the ulema in particular, came on March 1976. The senate assembly unanimously voted in favor of the King's decree to change the Islamic calendar to the Imperial calendar. The Shah had spoken on behalf of Cyrus in 1971 and thus had selected an exact date for the birth of the nation. Now this was actualized. The King's party declared[18] that in order to progress to the Great Civilization, the Muslim calendar will be substituted by a new royalist calendar allotting

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14. "The new Westernized school system effectively did away with the clergy's near monopoly in both secular and religious teaching." Amuzegar, Dynamics of Revolution, 270.
15. "The number of students registered in foreign universities, specially in North America and West Europe, increased from 18,000 over 80,000." Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 431.
16. "The Resurgence party was trying to nationalize religion by taking over the vaqfs, monopolizing the publication of theological books, and sending the religious corps into the countryside to turn the peasants against the spiritual authorities." Ibid., 445.
17. This expression comes from the French and British colonial practice of placing architectural pieces brought from colonized regions in frames specifically for this or that exhibition or museum. Paradoxically, these framed object were displayed as 'authentic' artifacts. This practice completely de-contextualized the object from any sense of time and space and, at the same time, rigidly separated it from the rest of similar artifacts. This *is* Egyptian, that *is* Chinese, those *are* Oriental. The only connection between them was the fact that they were all colonized.
18. The King's party "claimed the Shah to be a spiritual as well as a political leader; denounced the ulema as 'medieval black reactionaries.'" Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 444.

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2500 years for the whole monarchy and 35 years for the present monarch. Persian life

jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the imperial year 2535.[19] One of the few

'man-made' ideas, which is capable of conceptually uniting large groups of unrelated and

unfamiliar people, is a calendar. By its very nature, it rationalizes the life-time of the indi-

vidual in the temporal universe. It locates global and local events in that ambiguous and

intangible concept of time. It gives a logical meaning to the evolution of human existence.

It endows an intelligible order to human life. And finally, it stages a framework into which

the linear history of mankind is displayed, analyzed, and modified. The calendar is a

vitally important tool to fix a certain absolute in the constantly altering universe. In the

discourse of nationalism, the idea of secular scientific time turns around the calendar,

which is the representation of the homogeneous, empty time and without which national-

ism can not be understood. What unites modern men and women is the confidence that

they *know* about the activities of other people -- whom they have never met -- at a given

time, in a 'steady, anonymous, simultaneous' manner. [20] Mohammad-Reza Shah's decree

to change the age-old calendar disrupted this order in the lives of Iranians. The Islamic

calendar was perhaps one of the principles that *truly* united Iranians -- *all* Iranians. Shi'a,

Sunni, Christian, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Baha'i and ethnic and linguistic groups followed the

same ordering of time. The calendar gave their sociological conception a coherent mean-

ing and a plausible reality. The sudden jump of 1200 years disrupted this homogeneous,

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19. "On March 19, 1976, the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, the
    Shah issued another imperial decree: he officially changed the Iranian calendar. Iran would
    break with the Islamic world. To the surprise of many, he did not propose the adaptation of the
    Gregorian calendar of the West. Rather, Iran would institute the Sal-e Shahnshahi, the 'Imperial
    Year' or the 'Year of the King of Kings,' based on the putative founding of the first Iranian king-
    dom, the same event earlier celebrated at Persepolis. The year was no longer 1355. It abruptly
    became 2535. Orders were issued outlawing the use of 1355." Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure:
    The Fall of the Shah. Chicago: University Press, 1991, 82.
20. "The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time
    is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community
    moving steady down -- or up -- history. An idea of 'homogeneous, empty time,' in which simul-
    taneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by
    temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar." Conception of simultaneity "is of
    such fundamental importance that, without taking it fully into account, we will find it difficult to
    probe the obscure genesis of nationalism. These societies are sociological entities of such firm
    and stable reality that their members can even be described as passing each other on the street,
    without ever becoming acquainted, and still be connected." Anderson, Imagined Communities,
    24-26.

empty time through which different people imagined themselves active in the same conception of time. They were able to fancy living parallel lives on the same trajectory of time, and thus a place of omnipresent existence. If the diverse groups of people could conceive belonging to a nation-state, it might have been possible through the Islamic calendar. By annulling the calendar's place in Iran's collective reality and consciousness, Mohammad-Reza Shah both contested the venerated position of Prophet Mohammad and fractured the Iranian solidarity.[21]

Reza Shah had acted similarly when in 1925, he replaced the Arabic lunar calendar with the Iranian solar calendar. Sensitive to Islam, his intention was in the service of Iranian nationalism and not imperial grandiosity. In contrast, his son's decree was a means to link the present to the past in the temporal frame. Modern Iran would live according to the ordering of the Achaemenians. Prime Minister Hoveyda congratulated the Majles by declaring, "your decision is indeed a reflection of the historic fact that during this long period, there has been only one Iran and one monarchial system and that these two are so closely interwoven that they represent one concept."[22] The dismissal of the Islamic calendar undermined the very function of Islam in Iran. In justification, the Shah claimed that this would put Iran *ahead* of European countries in terms of progress, since from now on, 'they would look *forward* to us;' Iran in the year 2535 and Europe only in the year 1976! However, this was not the most important meaning and consequence in the change of the temporal order. The new calendar did not manage to orient 33 million unfamiliar people overnight, in linking them to each other, to the monarchy, to the dead, and to history. Nor

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21. Mohammad-Reza Shah "created and imposed an entirely new calendar. In the process, to make the recording of time, he substituted the establishment of the Iranian monarchy for the *hijrah* of the Prophet Mohammad. But by decreeing the year to be 2535, he also managed to disrupt the order of everyday life and the sense of coherence which that order gave the Iranian people. The new calendar contributed to breaking the conceptual mold by which the Iranian people had come to conceive of the order of their universe. The revolutionary implications were stunning. If the year could be altered from 1355 to 2535, then no established component of the Iranian order was fixed. Those who appreciated the readiness of the Shah to pursue Western ways expected he would attempt to join the West by adopting its calendar, a move made decades earlier by Ataturk as one means of propelling Turkey into Westernization. But others, who appreciated the Shah's keen sense of Iranian nationalism combined with his more recent grandiose depreciation of the West, could more readily understand his selection of an entirely new, solely Iranian calendar. Just as no one could crown either Reza Shah or Mohammad Reza Shah expect those rulers themselves, so no calendar was fit for Iran except its own." Zonis, Majestic Failure, 82, 289.
22. Hoveyda, Fereydoun. The Fall of the Shah. New York: Wyndham Books, 1980, 203.

did the conception of time change the European perception of progress in regards to Iran. Mohammad-Reza Shah disturbed the 'homogeneous, empty time' of the group of people who were to become -- and perhaps on the verge of becoming -- a nation. The imagination of an entire people proved to be short of such visions. The Shah weakened that which could make his people a nation and his country a state. The temporal conception of unity was also institutionalized by the central government; it was appropriated and given a selected meaning.

Mohammad-Reza Shah's decisions undermined the traditionally embedded social, religious, economic, and political orders of Iranian life. The state's only political party penetrated into people's private lives, destroyed all independent socio-political and cultural activities, and paralyzed the traditional networks of communication and performance. "All important decisions [were] by decree, imperial *farman*.[23] The monarchy [was] the country's only institution, around which all power [revolved] without any formal checks and balances."[24] This brought the homogenization of all arenas of creativity and production. It institutionalized everything; from religion: the spiritual life, to the calendar: the temporal perception, to the bazaar: the commercial enterprise; to education, and finally to arts. The very old and stable traditional values were brought into a new and imaginary level of coherence, equality, harmony, and meaning. The state's institutionalized life was constantly *naturalized* into the nation.

"My soul needs the artistic aspects of life. [Arts] allow me to overlook daily problems, insults, quibbles, and closed-minded attitudes. Artistic events allow me to get closer to the artists whom I have always praised."[25] The promotion of culture and art was left to

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23. *Farman* means edict in Persian.
24. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 129.
25. From an interview with the late Shah's wife, Farah Diba Pahlavi, published in the French magazine *Point de Vue*, a Persian translation of which appeared in the May 1997 issue of *Jahan* magazine in Los Angeles. The complete conversation is as the following. Reporter: It seems you are taking part in cultural and international affairs more frequently. Does this mean you want to put aside conservatism to some degree?
Shahbanou Farah: The ceremonial aspects of these events do not interest me much. I have always shown interest in art. I love music, ballet, the theater and painting. My soul needs the artistic aspects of life. These things allow me to overlook daily problems, insults, quibbles and closed-minded attitudes. Artistic events allow me to get closer to the artists whom I have always praised. They are very kind to me and I have a lot of respect for them.

Queen Farah,[26] who became entirely responsible for the Ministry of Culture; "over the years the Shah delegated more of his responsibilities to the Empress in these marginal areas so that they became almost exclusively her domain. The Ministry of Culture and Information, the museums, the various arts festivals and national television [were] all used as a means of royal patronage and extending the individual importance of those within her office, many of whom [were] often related to her and the Diba family."[27] In such political environment, architectural works and consequently the profession itself became a state tool to praise the royal dynasty. Architects who had gained semi-autonomy, influence, and dignity under Reza Shah's rule, now either became agents of the system or disappeared from the stage of production. Architecture surrendered to politics. By the turn of the decade, architectural propaganda of the regime and the revivalism of historic forms became 'naturalized' as professional behavior. The arbitrary revivalism of Achaemenian palaces, Sassanian fire temples, and such were perceived as *normal* acts of aesthetics. This architecture was functioning in a social and spiritual vacuum, because very few -- if any -- *actually* remembered and related to Achaemenian rooms and Zoroastrian temples of the 6th century.

> While traditional values [were] under attack, little of cultural work [was] being substituted. The aim [was] that Iran import whatever [was] culturally valid from abroad and the inherent Iranian genius [would] mold this into a new and regenerated national culture. Culture, in fact, [was] just another tool of the political system and survived only where it [was] allied to the system. Culture at this level [was] a plaything of the elite, in particular those surrounding Empress Farah, and existed in a complete vacuum.[28]

This contextual vacuum of homogeneous, empty space enabled architects to design build-ings and rationalize their aesthetics. If in the early years revivalism had to be justified either as part of the modern administrative building without traditional typology or as the symbol of the father of modern nation-state in his tomb, in the 1970's revivalism contained self-serving purpose. It did not need any justification either in the tectonics of architecture or in architectural ideology. Revivalism of form was an end in itself, regardless if it did not move nor relate to the masses. An architectural magazine declared in 1973, "The country

26. Farah Diba was the third wife of Mohammad-Reza Shah. She was an architect by training and this probably had formal and artistic impact on projects of her patronage.
27. Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, 139.
28. Ibid., 200.

is well on its way to industrialization and is beginning to turn back to its own cultural roots for inspiration in the design sciences and creative arts. This is particularly exciting in the field of architecture where a nascent design style is emerging, based on the materials, proportions, and motifs of ancient Iran. There is a contagious enthusiasm and an excitement at being involved in the pell-mell process of a country rapidly re-creating itself."[29] 'Re-creating' as in revitalizing the old or bringing modern into being? And later, "It will be interesting to follow the developments and see if Iran will create a valid contemporary design idiom derived from the roots of this ancient culture."[30] There was a *natural* absorption of revivalism in the architectural profession; it was so embedded that abstraction of ancient forms was superseded by abstraction of traditional functions. The prerequisite of Islamic building did not necessarily need an Islamic imagery or profile; the Islamic function did not need an Islamic form. The form was freed from the historic baggage; it was free of tradition. As there was a selected history constantly in narration, architecture had also the choice to select its forms from the large spectrum of history. These incoherent and fragmentary forms -- pulled out from many half-true half-mythical times and spaces -- were the new apparatus to create the Persian modern, true to its 'it-ness' and *free* from the western modern. As nationalism, architecture had given itself the choice of simultaneous inclusion and limitation of ideas, forms, and essence. The nation as an imagined political community is "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[31] As the state penetrated the architectural profession, it in turn became institutionalized and naturalized. All connections could -- or could not -- be made as wished to bring the nation to completeness. In 1975, the nation *was* -- or it seemed -- united. The nation *was* a nation -- a truly imagined community.

29. *Iran Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, 51.
30. Ibid.
31. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-7.

A Namaz-Khaneh, an Islamic religious place of prayer and meditation, was an example of an institutionalized/revivalized/modern architectural work (fig. 3.2). Designed by Iranian architect Kamran Diba,[32] it was the extreme modern abstraction of a traditional function crystallized in an ancient form. Sponsored by Plan and Budget Organization, Imperial Government of Iran and placed in Farah Park,[33] the prayer-house was built between 1977 and 1978 (fig. 3.3). The naturalism of a revitalizing form in the profession, manifested itself in this building. By its location, its form, its details, the dialogue between its formal parts, and its memory, it constantly undermined the Islamic values and superimposed new morality via tectonics. The simple scheme of the Namaz-Khaneh consisted of a cube within a cube. It acted as an object in the landscape, placed freely -- but not arbitrarily -- in the park dedicated to the Queen. On the north-west area of the vertical and horizontal axis of social promotion: the Pahlavi and Shahreza Avenues, it occupied a symbolic place in the larger urban fabric. Along the avenues leading to the rich areas of the city, it was a *bourgeois* cultural/recreational locus. In central northern Tehran it was one of the 'green' spaces implanted in the urban fabric during Reza Shah's reform era. These parks were often built on old residential quarters to create open and visible urban spaces. They were means of social control, particularly in the old areas with dense construction; their military urbanism functioned similar to that of modern *maydans*. The old military barracks, out of use, were often transformed into parks.[34]

32. Kamran Diba, born in 1937, was a graduate of Howard University, Washington, D.C. He returned to Iran in 1965 and opened his practice in Tehran. He is related to the Diba family and the Queen.

33. Farah Park was previously called Jalali-e and was a horse riding field. I obtained this information from Greg Der-Grigorian.

34. These had "a fairly regular distribution in the city, they [provided] good potential locations for public parks. In view of the government policy to decentralize these barracks there [was] a strong possibility that they be converted to areas of public recreation." Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 172.

Modern public parks are essentially different from and opposed to the traditional gardens. The old gardens had an acute sense of privacy, an enclosed and defined open-air space within the introverted city fabric. They were also used by individuals of importance and most often connected to the private residence. In terms of function, gardens were an inner open space, not much different from that of a large room. There was a clear hierarchy of space where the center was a focal point, a point of visual, physical, and functional reference. Entire gardens were designed around a central pool towards which processions took place and from which water was obtained (fig. 3.4). Although enclosed, there was visibility in the space proper, probably because of its scale and order. In opposition to the traditional Islamic gardens, the open nature of modern public parks enables easy and fast state access and visibility, hence control. However, they do not create visibility *per se*. Different groups of people in the same park often are not conscious of each others' place nor presence. Large size and arbitrary order prevent such conceptual mapping of things, activities, and people.[35] They also provide space for 'modern' interaction of citizens where the hierarchy of the social figures loose their intensity, hence significance and power. First, the space of modern parks undermine the religious structuring of society. Where the mosque or the bazaar provide an inherent sense of order and hierarchy of the people, the park's spatial ambiguity does not: ambiguity in terms of limits, departments, and actual confined and systematized space. The center of a park is not more important or symbolic than the peripheries. In fact, there is no center to a park; there are semi-defined 'places' often unrelated in the ambiguous limits of a park, but no hierarchy and juxtaposition of them; there is no grand order. These social/spatial qualities, consequently, undermine the values of a traditional society, where social hierarchy constituted the core and success of the tight network. Second, modern parks, by their function, undermine the Islamic notion of pleasure and recreation -- or at least pleasure in such ambiguous and uncontrolled manner. "Sociological factors and religious beliefs have limited the development of parks in the city in that cultural traditions have not emphasized recreation as a necessary part of life."[36]

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35. "For the colonial state did not merely aspire to create, under its control, a human landscape of perfect visibility; the condition of this 'visibility' was that everyone, everything, had a serial number." Anderson, Imagined Communities, 185.
36. "...Tehran has an inadequate provision of recreational areas. Only 2.1 square kilometers or 1.1% of the total built up area is devoted to parks." Baharambeygui, Tehran: an Urban Analysis, 172.

In parks the introverted social behaviors and thoughts are exteriorized and made visible. The edges of parks are not demarcated, protected, and internalized. Parks blur into public streets; an exterior in the exterior. In a highly traditional and religious context, parks are problematic. In the modern park, as the modern nation, the boundaries are not actual but conceptual; the fixed points constantly mobile and exchangeable; the connection of people and places selected and imagined; the center invisible or non-existent. Not surprisingly, the Aramgah of Reza Shah and Farah Park were listed as the most important parks as spaces of leisure. In this sense, even pleasure was institutionalized.

By its very location in a modern public park, the Namaz-Khaneh was a problematic placement for a religious function. A new context for social and religious activities was imposed upon the building function by the architect. A prayer house was given a new physical surrounding and hence dictated behavioral modification. The mosque, historically a focal point in the city, was now placed in the ambiguous, homogeneous, empty space: the park. In addition to the fact that it was not focal to the physical, visual, and symbolic roles, it was not a self-justified structure. The object in the park was itself a part of a larger project in the void context (fig. 3.5). The introverted space of Islam, the mosque -- a public space inside the inside -- was placed in a strange public extroverted void. The traditional public space -- the mosque -- was located in the modern public space -- the park. The double publicness of the context intimidated the prayer-house and hence became more private.[37] Moreover, prayer or meditation in Islam is a highly individual and private ritual. Muslims pray in silence even when doing it collectively; that which gives a coherence to the entire ritual is the body movement, not the sound. The inner spiritual space is the place of privacy between God and the worshiper. This link is direct, without intermediaries; it is fundamentally private. The function of a prayer-house is also essentially private; though its form is public. In the modern Namaz-Khaneh this function of form and function was reversed. The prayer-house structure was private in form but public in function; esoteric in form and exoteric in function. As such, it became the object, and not the void

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37. This in itself is problematic since the Islamic private space is understood in terms of the social notions of publicity and privacy, regulated by the laws of *mahram* and *na-mahram*. A son and a mother can occupy a private space alone together. However, two strangers of opposite sex cannot occupy that private space simultaneously. For them to occupy that space, either it has to be public or they have to be blood-relatives.

enabling action; whereas the mosque has been a space, a void, not an object. One only experiences the inner spaces of the mosque and often portions of the main entrance; but not the entire building as a single object. The mosque is the space of worship, not the object of worship. The Namaz-Khaneh became an object of worship, opposite to the notion of a traditional mosque. It was a work of art, not a cause of divine inspiration.

This architectural sculpture was physically located between the Carpet Museum and the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art (fig. 3.6 & 3.7). The institution of museum is a modern phenomenon with profound political meaning and imperial connotation. The existence of museums assists construction of the imaginary connections between the past and the present. Objects are selected, labeled, framed, and narrated: essential qualities of the imagined communities. In the colonial context, "museums, and the museumizing imagination, are both profoundly political. Ancient sites were successively disinterred, untangled, measured, photographed, reconstructed, fenced off, analyzed, and displayed. The census, the map, and the museum: together, they profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion -- the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry."[38] The site of the Namaz-Khaneh in between two museums had a political meaning and an implied shift in the conception of power and related institutions. In Farah Park, the two museums were the two points of destination, in between and around the vast homogeneous, empty space. Within the ambiguous spatial context of the park, the Namaz-Khaneh was the only fixed point. It acted as a bridge from a modern institution to another. The Contemporary Art Museum,[39] also designed by Diba, was on the west edge of the park and the Carpet Museum on the north-west. The prayer-house became merely a visual bridge, a sculpture between two

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38. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 164, 180.
39. For the Contemporary Art Museum the design team was Kamran Diba and P. Pezeshki and the client was the Plan and Budget Organization, the Imperial Government of Iran. The project was completed in 1977."The transformation of Tehran into a cosmopolitan capital took a major step forward in October 1977, with the opening of the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art. Set in Park Farah on the rapidly developing north side of the city, the new 7000 square-meter structure...The museum's collection, assembled under the sponsorship of Empress Farah." Dixon, John Morris. *News Report: Modern museum opens in Tehran.* Progressive Architecture 59, Jan-Mar. 1978: 27-28, 27.

modern museums -- modern, western, and secular in intention and institution.[40] Its 'bridge-ness' symbolically diminished the actual importance of an Islamic institution in the making of an Islamic society. As such, it also narrowed the socio-religious focus and importance that the architecture could have displayed. When thinking about architecture in terms of site, Diba writes, "Human interaction was to be stimulated and encouraged by location, in order to energize the environment."[41] The Namaz-Khaneh became an object in passing, not a place to arrive, perhaps a generator of energy. The building was not an end in itself in terms of importance and sacredness; it was a step in the process of 'going some-where else.' The Islamic institution gained a peripheral space and time instead of its his-toric central placement. The parallel analogy to the location of this building was the educational institution, taken away from the clerics. By altering the order of an already established society, the power of the clergy was undermined; similarly, by placement and ordering of materials in museums, the significance of the religious institution was weak-ened. The reordering of social norms to fit the western way of doing things -- state educa-tion and museums -- framed people and objects to guaranty a homogeneous product which went hand in hand with the nationalist agenda.

For Diba, the first function of architecture was linkage. Architecture was the means to bring the past to the present, "the historical dimension brought to light architecture of different eras with their underlying social and artistic attitudes. This revealed a continuity beyond any single generation, in short, *linking* the distant *past* to the functioning *present.*"[42] Architecture's function was to speak a language which did not limit itself to the appeal of one generation -- it went beyond. The 'distant past' -- indisputably pre-Islamic past -- came into being to intensify the contemporary life and all lives thereafter; to teach, to change minds, to shift the momentum of society. "Architects only stop short of putting words into people's mouths. They certainly can put ideas into their minds and pro-mote roles and actions."[43] Clearly, the revivalism of ideas and form was part of his philo-

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40. "We have also landscaped the grounds providing north-west entrance to the park and the Carpet Museum." Diba, Kamran. Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects. Germany: Hatje, 1981, 236.
41. Diba, Buildings and Projects, 6.
42. Ibid., 8.
43. Ibid.

sophical agenda, and why not his professional program? He saw architects and architecture as social, philosophical, ideological agencies in the making of a nation; agents who could change the beliefs and conviction of the people. When translated into a building-type or a formal vocabulary and in direct reference to the Namaz-Khaneh, the historic 'distant past' must be in reference to the main space of the Parthian palaces. The double walls functioned as protection of the manifestation of god on earth: the fire (figs. 3.8-3.10).

> When we study the origin of the plan, we see that this space enclosed as a central, traditional and symbolic space is always to be found in the oldest Persian buildings. In [Susa's fire sanctuary] a double wall protects the place of the fire at the centre of which the sacred fire was burning. Rooms and galleries around a yard were used for different sorts of trades, and as residences for the priests.[44]

Within the confines of the palace, the cube within a cube room was the central location where the sacred fire burned. Archeologists have disputed about the form either being a solid cube inside a cube or a *chahar-taq*. Later studies showed that the solid cube was the type used by the Parthians in their palaces and the *chahar-taq* mostly by Sassanians as free-standing structures of worship, primarily in the desert.

> ...basic *chahar-taq* types -- those seemingly open sided buildings -- had in fact originally been partially enclosed with a corridor running round all four sides. This outer corridor was pierced by narrow openings in each of the four sides. This version of the *chahar-taq* with its enclosing corridor could have functioned quite well as a fire sanctuary.[45]

Examples of double cubes are found in excavated sites on the great plateau, at Kuh-e Khwakjah, Tahkt-i Sulaiman, and Surkh Kotal.[46] The form -- by essence -- focused the centrality of the larger space. It accentuated a concentration of attention towards an inner point; it did not refer to an external -- and perhaps higher concept outside the building proper. This is contradictory to the very notion of an monotheist religious architecture in general. A mosque or a church -- though imposing and complete in and by itself -- constantly refers to a point and an idea superior to itself. In terms of direction, the mosque --

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44. Khansari, Mehdi & Yavari, Minouch. Espace Persan: Traditional Architecture in Iran. Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga, Editeur, 1987, 29. Such compositions are found in present-day Iraq: the palaces of Assur and Hartra. Both complexes are guided by the cube within a cube-type plan.
45. Adams, Iranian Civilization, 17.
46. "...au kuh-i Khwadjah, au grand temple du feu a Tahkt-i Sulaiman et dans la petite annexe sassanide de Surkh Kotal, les sanctuaires en forme de *chahar-taq* ou de sall carree a coupole sont entoures de coulaires." Splendeur des Sassanids. L'empire Perse enter Rome & Chine: 224-642. Bruxelles: Credit Communal, 1993, 54.

through the gate of mehrab -- points to Mecca; and the church -- through the altar -- to the East. Although the physical axis of these buildings end within the structures themselves, the conceptual directionality continues eternally. The cube within the cube focuses on itself; by its formal directionality is opposed to that of the Islamic notion of building. By reviving and appropriating a non-monotheist form to a monotheist function, the ambiguities became greater and the confusion severe.

The notion of esoteric and exoteric architecture was translated into tectonics by the two-layered walls: inner layer and outer layer which interprets in many different ways (figs. 3.11). Diba talked about the layers in conjunction with the change in masses' viewpoint. He tried to externalize the Iranian introverted society and analyzed Iranian spatial qualities through western filter. This is demonstrated in his analytic sketch of the veiled woman and the inner courtyard of the Islamic house (3.12). The exoteric and esoteric were of great significance; he writes:

> The patriarchal family as a social unit demanded privacy and internalization. The fanatical insistence on feminine concealment and the preservation of women for primarily private consumption played an important role in the creation of the 'chador' and the internal courtyard architecture. The fundamental distinction between western and middle-eastern vernacular architecture is the internally-oriented concept, which means that the exterior facade is often unimportant and curiously humble. On the other hand, the interior courtyard's facades are surprisingly active and ornate. There is a strong demarcation between private and public space, and 'in and out'. The entrance is not simply a means of going into the house or of protecting property, but a symbolic frontier which should be sealed off from even visual intrusions from outside. It is thus not surprising that elaborate houses in Persia had two parts, one called 'andarooni', the other 'birooni' -- insidy and outsidy where the latter provided a further buffer space between the women and children's area and the public streets.[47]

As Reza Shah and Mohammad-Reza Shah in their political endeavor, tried to open up and make a traditional society visible, so did architects already institutionalized/naturalized in that cultural environment. The layers of esoteric and exoteric architecture of Diba were also repeated in his Friday Mosque of Shustar New Town and the Administrative building of Jondeshapour University; he writes, 'each block of office spaces include two parallel 'skins:' the external 'skin' has a massif and solid aspect pierced at window location; it protects the vulnerability of the internal facade from climates. These two 'skins' touch only at the corners of buildings.'[48] The architect played with the geometric forms and rotations to achieve a spatial experience. The planes were twisted to create tension between the two

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47. Diba, Buildings and Projects, 9.

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facades of the cubes. Perhaps the inner cube symbolically functioned as the prayer area and the space between them as the courtyard.[49] Diba writes about the cube, "this is a sculptural environment which consists of a small open-to-sky room for prayer and contemplation. The inner room is shielded by an outer shell which protects it from alien intrusions -- visual and street noise."[50] The symbolisms of the two layers could be interpreted as the skins acting as the internal and the external aspects of human spiritual and social life; the private versus the public; the national versus the international; the body versus the soul (fig. 3.13). The inner cube was directed toward the Islamic center of the world: Mecca. Its four corners, therefore, pointed towards north-west, north-east, south-east, and south-west. The *qibla* wall was perpendicular to the south-west axis; the direction of Mecca from Tehran.

> The inner room is rotated within the outer shell to accomplish an axial orientation toward *qibla*, the direction Moslems should face when praying. Then, two parallel vertical, narrow slots are removed from the wall to open the box toward the same orientation. Non-parallel and slanted corridor walls emanate a tense and dynamic atmosphere. The tight interior space with high walls is designed to hard-edge the sky in angular fashion.[51]

On the other hand, the outer layer was oriented to the four cardinal directions. Each corner of the outer cube pointed to either north, south, east, or west. The juxtaposition of these two complementary elements of the same building enabled a dialogue between them and embodied an intention in each. The four cardinal directions of the external layer can be interpreted as the notion of worldliness and universality; whereas the *qibla* direction of the internal layer, obedient to the Islamic world only, symbolized the idea of the parochial and the local. The four cardinal axes were superposed on the unique axis of Mecca. The Namaz-Khane, not only by its directionality but also by its form, challenged the Islamic iconographic and conceptual values. The introduction to the building is given in Diba's

48. "Chaque bloc de bureaux comporte deux 'peaux' paralleles: la 'peau' externe a un aspect massif et solide avec des trouees a l'emplacement des fenetres; elle protege la vulnerabilite de la facade interne due aux rigueurs du climat. Ces deux 'peaux' se rejoignent uniquement aux angles des batiments." Diba, Kamran. *Batiment administratif: Universite de Jondishapour, Iran.* Architecture D'Aujourd'hui no. 205, Oct 1979: 38-41, 38.
49. This formal choice clearly broke from traditional imagery and familiar types of mosques design. Where the courtyard and four *iwan* scheme is characteristically an Islamic Persian mosque architecture, it was completely absent in this building.
50. Diba, Buildings and Projects, 236.
51. Ibid.

book: "Namaz-Khaneh: a cube standing on an open lawn. First impression: a parallel to the Ka'bah"[52] (fig. 3.2 & 3.14). The first visual impression of the cube, in an open space, was that of Ka'bah. The cube of Ka'bah and its central Black Stone are the center of the Muslim world and "represent a sanctuary consecrated to God."[53] The *tawaf* -- the ritual circumambulation of the Ka'bah -- occurs around this sacred space. Common men per- form their rituals *around* -- not inside -- the cube. The inner space is reserved for the divine and the semi-divines. The duplication or recreation of the form of it is forbidden; as there is one God so there is one Ka'bah. Rarely in the Islamic history a copy of the Ka'bah has been built. To the impression left by the Namaz-Khaneh, the dimensions came very close to that of the Ka'bah. The average length of Ka'bah is 12 meters, since the cube is not completely regular,[54] and the height is 13 meters. The dimensions of the Namaz- Khaneh were 10.80 meters in length and 8.10 meters high. The formal symbolism was intense; as Mohammad-Reza Shah challenged Prophet Mohammad by altering the Islamic calendar, his architect challenged the Ka'bah by building a modern one. The exchange of internal and external locations of man and god was also relevant to the symbolism of the Namaz-Khaneh. The inside became a place of contemplation, not the space around it. The modern Ka'bah was open to every common man and woman independent of religion. As the nation, the sense of belonging was imagined. One did not have to submit to the faith of Islam to enter, pray, and conjoin to the homogeneous, empty *god*.

In form, this architectural sculpture was extremely modern. "Smaller. Intimate. Sim- ple. No ostentation. Concrete walls with slits. Inside, the same again, at a slight angle. Above, the open sky. A place of contemplation."[55] Here, modernism was not a state- imposed taste, but a *true* modernism; simple in form, honest in structure, pure in material, and unornamented. It was modernism of poured concrete structures. The profession was

52. Diba, Buildings and Projects, 7.
53. Glasse, Cyril. The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. San Francisco: Harper Collin Publishers, 1989, 214.
54. The sizes are as the following: northeastern 12.63 meters, eastern 11.22 meters, western 13.10 meters, and north western 11.03 meters. The door on the north side in 2 meters high and 1.7 meters wide. Ibid.
55. Diba, Buildings and Projects, 7.

already naturalized, institutionalized, therefore state imposition of form was unnecessary. The desired taste was already inherent in the being of the architect; no external effort was necessary. Formal abstraction was the basic means of naturalizing this form and function.[56] The abstraction of the traditional form of the prayer building included the disappearance of an ablution pool; the dis-articulation of the *qibla* wall as a special surface; the replacement of carpet by grass floor; and the complete absence of a ceiling. As to the banding national rituals of clocks, calendars, and newspapers, here the ablution was only conceptual; the *qibla* direction supposed; the prostration only notional; and the enclosure conjectural. Besides its nationalistic qualities of imagined reality -- the imagined pool, *qibla*, floor, and ceiling -- the constantly missing or disappearing elements had a more immediate effect. The absence of the pool created a lack of temporal and spatial procession toward the directional-less *qibla* wall; the absence of the carpet disabled the constant dialogue between the body and the floor during prayer; and the removal of the ceiling negated the sense of enclosed security. In the Namaz-Khaneh, these architectural elements were abstracted to the extent that the traditional dialogue between human and building became impossible without the imagination of modern citizens. The formal abstraction killed the traditional function. Aside from being reversed in duty of form and function in terms of privacy and publicity, the extreme abstraction of the form overwhelmed the function. Eventually, the incoherence of form and function made the architecture impotent.

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56. "The most convincing quality of the buildings of Kamran Diba is the harmony established between the problem-solving process and an architecture and aesthetic vision evolved from functional demands. The results are not only functionally appropriate form and abstract viewpoint, but are also, in the best and widest sense, in keeping with Persian tradition and culture." Diba, Buildings and Projects, 7.

Figure 3.2 Namaz-Khaneh, Farah Park by Kamran Diba, 1977-78.

Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
    Germany: Hatje, 1981, 237.

Figure 3.3 Map of Tehran, Farah (Laleh) Park and surrounding.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 83-82.

Figure 3.4 Esoteric versus exoteric notions of space.

Ardalan, Nader. <u>The Sense of Unity</u>. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 68.

Figure 3.5 Model of Namaz Khaneh, plan view.

Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 235.

Figure 3.6 Museum of Contemporary Art of Tehran, Farah Park, by Kamran Diba, 1977.

Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 37.

Figure 3.7 Carpet Museum of Tehran, Farah Park.

Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
<u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 98.

Figure 3.8 Dura-Europo, palace of the citadel, plan.

Gullini, Giorgio. <u>Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi</u>.
    Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 333.

Figure 3.9 Qasr-e Shirin, plan of the palace.

Gullini, Giorgio. <u>Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi</u>.
    Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 370.

Figure 3.10 Qasr-e Shirin, Chahar-Qapu, plan.

Gullini, Giorgio. <u>Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi</u>.
    Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 428.

Figure 3.11 Model of Namaz-Khaneh, axonometric view.

Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 235.

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Total concealment of content.

Opening or introduction to outside world

Trust, exposure and familiarity.

Figure 3.12 Diba's sketch of *chador* and courtyard: "Houses and veil designed with the same frame of mind namely concealment of one's possessions (women and wealth)."

Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
    Germany: Hatje, 1981, 10.

Figure 3.13 Namaz-Khaneh, site plan, location of Carpet Museum and *qibla* direction.

By Talin Der-Grigorian.

Figure 3.14 The Ka'bah in Mecca.

Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 4.1 Mural painting of Imam Khomeini, Tehran.

Hourcade, Bernard & Richard, Yann. <u>Teheran: Au Dessous de Volcan</u>.
　　Paris: Autrement Revue, 1987, 128.

THE MONUMENT . IV

He -- above all -- was a striking man. In 1963, he was arrested for publicly criticizing the Shah. Expelled to Turkey, he later stationed himself in Iraq. As Ettela'at published an article insulting him in 1978, manifestations began in Qom, Yazd, and Tabriz. First of February 1979, he returned to Tehran to lead the Islamic Revolution. Three months later, Iran was declared Islamic Republic of Iran and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the jurisprudent.[1]

The three monuments, Aramgah of Reza Shah, Shahyad Aryamehr Monument, and Farah Park Namaz-Khaneh were destined to different fates as Iran passed from the Pahlavi monarchy to the Islamic Republic. The pivotal event in 1979 dramatically changed much, including the definitions ascribed to architecture. The three structures which had qualities in common in terms of ideology, intent, and even form, were approached differently during the revolution and were appropriated in varying degrees after the proclamation of the republic. That which happened to these structures entices one -- especially architects -- to think about the inherent or casual meaning of architectural works. "Architecture has the power to symbolize. It can -- and does -- express not only what exists but also what might be. Thus, when it changes dramatically, architecture forces us to a question: Does this change follow the shape of a culture or does it give shape to cultural dream?"[2] The sudden Islamic supremacy over Iranian life proved to be a new era for shaping culture and ideology. Architecture was not-- and could not have been -- ignored nor left to marginal appropriation of meaning.

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1. Jomhoori-e Eslami-e Iran and Fagih: jurist or jurist counsel.
2. "The expression of power is in many ways an automatic attribute of monumental architecture. Monuments reflect the glory, vanity, and power of the [leaders] under whose reigns they were erected and whose names are permanently celebrated in their inscriptions." Marefat, <u>Building to Power</u>, 233.

Perpetual human struggle for power constitutes the milestone of history. Since time immemorial, the manifestation of this effort crystallizes itself in *monuments*. These architectural objects, in turn, narrate the story of powerful men, eminent nations, ingenious ideas and imperishable civilizations. Each culture allocates a fixed form and meaning to architecture, believing that it will express its tradition eternally unchanged.[3] The monument is intended to preserve the continuity of ideas and events throughout time. In its initial intent, it functions as the most secure tie between the past, the present and the future. "Monuments are human landmarks which men have created as symbols for their ideals, for their aims, and for their actions. They are intended to outlive the period which originated them, and constitute a heritage for future generations. As such, they form a link between the past and the future."[4] Thus, the primary responsibility of a monument is to serve the memory of humankind; "a monument is an object whose function is to make us remember, whether it is men and events of the past or the gods themselves."[5] Simultaneously, the strong presence of the object in an urban fabric defines a space, marks a point, and refers to different times and spaces. "A monument is something that is involved with memory. The monument has the ability to get outside of itself and participate in a larger context because of its formal reference and because of the nostalgia it inspires. But, besides being a memory, a monument is a strong act of the presence."[6] This presence is radiated from the symbolism of ideologies, individuals, and powers that it carries.

However, the link of the past and the present often fails to realize itself; since eventually each successive age attributes its unique understanding of power to inherited structures. The monument -- maintaining its physicality -- surrenders its initial meaning to new interpretations and attributions. In a different period in history, it becomes a landmark of a new era, of new ideologies, and a new civilization. The function of linking the past, present, and future becomes imagined and only a construction of the generation who attempts to see itself connected to a specific past or future. *A posteriori* appropriation of

3. Grabar, *The Architecture of Power: Palaces*, 79.
4. Sert, Leger, & Giedion. *Nine Points on Monumentality* in The Harvard Architectural Review IV: Monumentality and the City, 1984, 62.
5. Choay, Francoise. *Alberti: The Invention of Monumentality and Memory.* in The Harvard Architectural Review IV: Monumentality and the City. 1984: 99-105, 100.
6. Grave & Giurgola, Ibid., 40.

significance by contemporary generations brings a past object into its monumental footing. Its conceptual monumentality is acquired if it manages to change meaning and yield the cycles of power struggle. Either it abandons to embody the initial symbolism and takes a new significance -- and thus physically persists -- or it is not able to mutate in intent and perishes forever. However, in this existential effort, the initial qualities of the structure play a fundamental role in its struggle of permanence. Certain characteristics of architecture enable it to appropriate change of symbolism and thus endure the test of time; and by so doing, be elevated to a status of monumentality. With revolutions, architecture remains unchanged and disappears; changes meaning and survives; or loses its quality as architecture.

In 1979, Iran experienced a revolution which resulted in the creation of the Islamic Republic: the only theocratic state of the modern world. This was the result of constantly accumulating socio-political tensions which started with the 2500-year anniversary of the monarchy and continued during the following years. The military operations of the *Mujahedin* fighters[7] began in the August of 1971. "Their first operations were designed to disrupt the extravagant celebration of the 2500-year anniversary of the monarchy. After bombing the Tehran electrical works and trying to hijack an Iran Air plane, nine *Mujahedin* were arrested. Despite these, in the next four years they carried out a succession of violent attacks. This included the bombings of Reza Shah's mausoleum."[8] The tomb was dynamited in the conflicts of 1978-79. Although the body of Reza Shah was rescued, the structure -- especially the central core -- was destroyed completely. The destiny of this building was sealed the moment the people of Iran revolted against the monarchy and the army restrained from fighting the people. The anger felt against Mohammad-Reza Shah's government was avenged on the tomb of his father. The royal symbolism that it carried was an ample motif for hatred. Yet, its non-Islamic and unrecognizable imagery contributed to its physical destruction. *A posteriori* analysis raises the question: If the mausoleum had embodied a traditional Islamic imagery and shape, would it have been treated as such? Would a more 'Islamic' expression have saved the actual building? Or, the memory associ-

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7. Freedom fighters with strong conviction and motivation for Islamic ideologies.
8. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 491.

ated with the one buried in the building was too strong for an image to prevent hatred? I wonder if the architectural expression, the tectonic language, the formal association with a recognizable history -- that of Islam -- would have prevented the violent treatment of a tomb. The bombing certainly did not carry strategic/political importance in terms of causing actual damage to a specific military setup or killing an influential statesman. As a result of both, the nature of the building -- a resting place of a dead man -- and its location -- Ray city in the south periphery -- the attack was clearly a symbolic act. Architecture, perceived as a permanent witness to history, was seen as a means to eradicate an unwanted ruling dynasty. The destruction of a symbol was the first step to the disintegration of the cause represented. The copy of a form from the past -- a remote past -- was neither abstract enough nor familiar enough for the physicality of the building to be spared.

That which remains today of the Aramgah is the empty lot of the resting place, the processional avenue leading to the non-existing monument, and a vague memory of a white building in the minds of old people (fig. 4.2). However, this very road leading to Qom and connecting to the ex-tomb is still called the Aramgah Boulevard. Although there is no trace of the building, the name persists under the Islamic Republic of Iran which has done a good job of changing names of and associations with the Pahlavi regime. The road is called Aramgah Boulevard perhaps because by now not many remember whose *aram-gah* it actually refers to! This proves that names, ideas, glories, and especially nations need to be narrated in order to gain meaning.[9] The plausibility of such concepts is only possible through narrations; words have no significance and figures no inherent meaning. Few remember what the original Aramgah Boulevard was used for; that space has lost its function of ceremonial processions, although it retains its name. As it were, today, the Shah Abdol-Azim shrine is using Aramgah's processional path to gain significance. Without architectural narrative of history or recitation of memory, people fail to recollect that which is -- or at least should be -- part of their national consciousness and collective memory. Reza Shah -- however good or evil -- belongs to the history of the Iranian modern nation which includes Iranians -- *all* Iranians. As much as this memory is in the homogeneous, empty time and space of the modern nation, it still exists and is of relevance.

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9. "The concepts and names only find particular significance as a result of the meanings and interpretations we give them." Vaziri, Iran as Imagined Nation, 70.

Like many other socio-political uprisings, the Islamic Revolution was initially spontaneous, at times violent, and mostly popular. The revolt was a result of an urban crisis as much as a socio-political struggle for power, justice, or ideology. And the gigantic stage for this crisis was the capital city with millions of actors.[10] In Tehran, after months of unrest, the largest manifestation occurred on the days of *ashura-tasua* on the 10th and 11th of November, 1978. Two million men and women marched the streets. 'Rezaian' large-scale boulevards, cut in the urban fabric to make military accessibility, now served to mobilize the masses. Shahreza Avenue became the main street of mass demonstrations, marches, and rallies. From the south, north, and center everyone marched west towards Shahyad Aryamehr Tower (fig. 4.3). Here, under the arch of this monument -- attributed to the 2500-year of monarchy -- anti-Pahlavi manifestos were declared, Islamic rituals were performed, and men were condemned. The Islamic Revolution which -- as it were -- started in the bazaar, came to its apogee -- and probably its success -- under the grand arch of Shahyad. The masses walked towards Shahyad on Shahreza Avenue, not because these spaces were there and had monarchial symbolism, but rather because these were made to serve such functions. The wide axial street, which cut the city in half and had an end point -- Shahyad in the largest *maydan* of the country -- was exactly the space needed for millions of demonstrators. The presence of the monument superseded its symbolism; it endowed the form with an allegory ascribed to it not by its author -- the Shah -- but by its users -- the people of the city. For angry Iranians in the streets of Tehran, Shahyad was not the symbol of 2500-year monarchy, but an urban marker at which their anti-monarchical activities assimilated and intensified. To the people Shahyad embodied a new significance which was not arbitrary. It achieved this meaning exactly because of its architecture: urban position of axial end-point and tectonic qualities of largeness, visibility, and perhaps beauty. "A monument cannot be dissociated form the realm of aesthetics, and it is also

10."En 1979 Teheran avait 5 millions d'habitants trop vite rassembles, qui ne se connaissaient pas et n'avaient pas construit les relations dialectiques et les rapports de force indispensables pour guerir les difficultes, les blocages puis les emeutes. Le cloisonnement de la capitale etait tel que tout dialogue ou confrontation etait impossible entre groupes sociaux, la capitale de Iran incarnait plus que tout autre ville ces nouveaux rapports Etat-compagne. Pour les Teheranais le seul 'adversaire' ou partenaire etait l'Etat qui a ete directement la cible et la vicitime d'une crise urbaine, devenue gouvernementale puisque l'Etat Pahlavi s'etait -- entifiet a l'urbanisation." Hourcade, Bernard. *Teheran 1978-1989: la crise dans l'Etat, la capitale de la ville.* Espaces et Societes 64-64, 1991: 19-38, 27.

connected with the idea of gigantism."[11] It appropriated new meanings because of its formal characteristics and the initial symbolism. It would not have had such imposing urban and formal qualities *if* it were not a symbol of the monarchy. It did exactly because it was. Monumental structures "constitute a value that is stronger than environment and stronger than memory."[12] Its initial form and function enabled it to both appropriate a new meaning and dictate new human behavior. Shahyad became the symbol of the Islamic Revolution *and* the space that embraced that outburst. Shahyad which used to remind all Iranians of the king, now became the representation of the only Islamic revolution in the history of Islam. "The traditional monument of remembrance -- whether of sacred laws or human deeds -- is overshadowed by a new mode of architectural memorization."[13] Shahyad changed its primary function of narration from the passive to the active mode; from just to remind to knowledge of an event.

So much imagination embodied in the monument exhausted the nation. But it did not take the authorities of the Islamic Revolution too much imagination or effort to furnish a new meaning to Shahyad. It changed meaning almost inherently -- automatically, without external state investiture. In a matter of months it became the monument of liberation (figs. 4.4 & 4.5). By the time of the establishment of the Islamic government, Shahyad had attained such allegory for the people of Tehran, that the destruction of it would have been perceived as an act of self-contradiction. It had become the symbol of freedom *par excellence*: a complete liberation from a 'despotic' ruler to a 'democratic' republic.[14] In any case, urban Tehran could not have done without Shahyad. However good or bad, it was that which gave it a coherent sense of direction and orientation, not to speak of its memory. "The city cannot do without [a specific monument] any more than we as individuals can banish the unpleasant memories of our childhood. Cities collect objects, and then time transforms their meaning. Symbols of authority, somebody's victory and every one's kitsch can turn into their opposites."[15] Naturally, Shahreza Avenue was renamed Azadi/

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11. Choay, *Alberti*, 100.
12. Rossi, Aldo. The Architecture of the City. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1982, 92.
13. Choay, *Alberti*, 105.
14. Neither Pahlavi was that despotic nor Islamic that democratic; both were struggles for power crystallized in and appropriated to the monument of Shahyad.

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Enghelab -- freedom/revolution -- Avenue and Shahyad itself, the *maydan* of Azadi. Shahyad was eventually declared the symbol of modern Islamic Tehran: as it were, the *gate* to the capital city. The destiny of this monument is an expression of the change of meanings appropriated to buildings. The essence of such architecture is in its destiny; whether it will survive or not; whether it will overcome its own symbolism and accommodate new power struggles. "The monument is a special kind of work of art within an even larger work of art: the city. It is both a public event and a form identified with a 'style,' unique in time and place, yet linking the city's past with its future. Always, therefore, the essence of a monument, like that of a city, lies in its destiny."[16] It is thus, that each year the celebration of the Islamic Revolution is marked by fireworks and religious gatherings in the Azadi Maydan (figs. 4.6 & 4.7). The emblem glorifying a secular royalist monarch a decade earlier, now stands for the freedom and democracy of intensely religious people. Through political manipulation and enactment of rituals, a completely different and opposite intent is ascribed to the monument. Its symbolism is appropriated to different means to the extent that few remember the not so remote history of an architecture.

I feel that which enables such diametric alteration in meaning, in this specific structure, is the abstraction of the copy from a remote past. Why did the Shahyad Monument -- clearly associated with Mohammad-Reza Shah -- survive and the Aramgah -- associated with Reza Shah -- did not survive the shift of power? Accidental perhaps; same as the life and death of men and women -- often without a rational reason -- so is the life and death of architecture. Yet, there were urban and tectonic reasons that Shahyad was able to outlive the political era for which it was built: the abstraction of the form and the ambiguity of its function. The primary function of this monument is symbolic; whether or not it has an actual function is a secondary issue. Shahyad is a monument of remembrance first, then a museum. So the actual function of the building was irrelevant and adjustable. The symbolic or imagined function was essential for a modern nation-state. Shahyad's imaginary but primary function was a gate of a nation. As the nation could have -- or not have -- been imagined, so was the function of this monument. What enabled the Islamic Republic to

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15. al-Khalil, Samim. The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq. London: Andre Deutsch, 1991, 132.
16. Ibid.

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15. al-Khalil, Samim. The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq. London: Andre Deutsch, 1991, 132.
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bestow a different function upon Shahyad? Maybe those who do not -- or can not -- remember the Pahlavis, have also forgotten the symbolism of this building in terms of its reason of construction, its formal prototype, and its story. "For the decision to believe can only be carried out successfully if accompanied by a decision to forget... the decision to believe... The loss of the critical faculty is not simply a by-product of the self-induced faith, but an essential condition for that faith to be held seriously."[17] Unlike the Aramgah, very few can relate the form of Shahyad to a *chahar-taq*: a Zoroastrian fire temple. The precedent is too abstract to be recognizable. Both the abstraction of the form and the urban function that Shahyad played came to save it from physical destruction.

Often, during the celebration of the Islamic Revolution, a fire is left burning on top of Shahyad's roof (figs. 4.6 & 4.7). In this sense, the formal significance -- reminiscent to a *chahar-taq* -- takes the image of a Persian form, emanating a feeling of Persian-ness which is quite free and independent of its pre-Islamic religious connections. Or more precisely, that religious meaning is translated into a national quality: Zoroastrianism not versus Islam, but complementary to Persian-ness. Shahyad now, with a fire atop, does not mean Zoroastrianism, but an attempt in making a uniquely Persian identity; whereas Shahyad of the Shah was intended to evoke a sense of Zoroastrianism negating Islam. The form can resurrect a past with both religious and national particularities. In 1980's that same form became an image with a different, solely national connotation: Iranian, but homogeneously Islamic, of course! With a new era, new symbols and meanings are needed; and by constantly going back to history, the contemporary comes into being, each time with a completely new essence.

> Such a deeply felt need arises only when the relationship between politics and society has gone profoundly awry through war or revolution, and tradition itself has completely lost its givenness. The need now is to create new traditions, new sources of coherence. By rising to self-consciousness, the formerly un-self-conscious changes. The unity of the community which can no longer be taken for granted is reduced to a frantic clinging to symbols and stock phrases, as though they were lifeless. Thus the Islamic Shi'a imager of the Iranian Revolution served the purpose of reconstituting a mystical Islam that has in fact never existed in quite this way before.[18]

Between 1971 and 1981, the monument was stripped off its religious symbolism and thus embodied only a national connotation. Shahyad became monumental and permanent;

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17. al-Khalil, The Monument, 16.
18. Ibid.

"...by permanence I mean the physical form of the past has assumed different functions and has continued to function, conditioning the urban area in which it stands and continuing to constitute an important urban focus. Persistence in an urban artifact often causes it to become identified as a monument, and that a monument persists in the city both symbolically and physically. A monument's persistence or permanence is a result of its capacity to constitute the city, its history and art, its being and memory."[19] Ironically, Shahyad was raised to monumentality only when all that it represented and symbolized crumbled down. Shahyad prevailed the test of time, since it still was a representative of the Shah or the negation of it when he himself had gone out of the realties of history. Shahyad still lives, speaks, and represents. Mohammad-Reza Shah does not. For that matter, neither does Imam Khomeini.

Immediately after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, cities and streets were re-named, institutions were abolished and recreated, rituals and links were forged, and maps were drawn. On the map of Tehran, Farah Park was renamed the park of Laleh -- Tulip -- Park.[20] As the name of the site changed with the shift of power, so did the perception of the Namaz-Khaneh as architecture. Its destiny, as a functioning building was condemned by the initial abstraction of the traditional form. The reversal of its traditional duties of form and function almost immediately were perceived problematic in the actual use of the building. The cube, as a non-directional, non-axial, and open-air object created an ambiguous space for the prayer of Islam. The embodiment of a monotheist conception in architecture is indisputably directional. This religious axiality of the world is particularly relevant to Islam where the imagined lines begin and end in Mecca. Through this definite axiality, a conceptual and a spiritual connection is made between man and God. On the earthly level, it creates a conceptual center and connects Muslims to each other. A cubic form lacks this essential functional and conceptual quality.

19. Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 59-60
20. Tulip flower was the symbol of all those who gave their lives either during the Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, 'or any other national cause. It goes back to the Constitutional patriotic songs.' Professor Afsaneh Najmabadi informed me of this fact.

The Namaz-Khaneh lost this fundamental claim to directionality; with this the imposing idea of singularity of God. Meditation in open-air and non-directional space -- in contrast to the enclosed, introverted, and traditional mosque -- constituted the main dilemma of the building. It became dysfunctional as a Muslim prayer space and hence a frozen object in the park; a "thing which has ceased to function and is thus becoming objects of mere knowledge."[21] Without function -- besides that of aesthetic -- architecture metamorphoses into sculpture. Almost never used before but particularly after the Islamic Revolution, the structure became a statue without significance or function. But monument harbors more than aesthetics as criteria: it is a memory, an urban consciousness, an object of function, and a subject of identity. Architecture cannot solely be an object of beauty: a sculpture.

> Monuments are more than aesthetic objects. In their deepest essence they are about memories, memories that constitute the very marrow of a city's identity, bestowing personality and charac-ter upon the city just as they do upon the individual. The form, shape, size and way of making of a monument, the story of how it came to be there, the trials and tribulation of those who made it, the manner of its placement in its city, all of these contribute to crystallizing the workings of memory. For these purposes it does not matter whether those memories are good or bad. But it does matter how they relate to their city, and which monuments survive to represent them. It is here that the question of responsibility -- individual and collective -- arises.[22]

Not surprisingly, the official map of Tehran published under the republic's authority, does not acknowledge the existence of the Namaz-Khaneh. In a map where the pedestrian paths of the park are prominent, the Namaz-Khaneh is left unmarked (fig. 3.3). A government which systematically and meticulously articulated all mosques, *madrasses*, and shrines, left the location of this building blank. This work of architecture has disappeared from the maps of Islamic Tehran. This fact shows that the building has become a *true* sculpture in a park with no urban significance, either as a functioning architectural work or as having any socio-political importance. Modern abstraction castrated architecture; it was stripped off its identity as architecture, it became a figure, a stone. Possibly extreme abstraction of form and function saved it from physical destruction, unlike the Aramgah. The lack of memory or association prevented popular or state hatred. The architecture did not have a recognizable imagery -- either Muslim or Pahlavi -- and the function was not associated to an act -- either spiritual or political -- so the extreme abstraction of the form and the func-

21. Choay, *Alberti*, 100.
22. al-Khalil, The Monument, 130.

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tion made the architecture impotent but also saved the building from destruction. The only theocratic republic refuses to perceive this prayer-house as an architecture worth recognition. Perhaps, a building's destiny which does not ascribe to traditional imagery assigned to its function is denial. It is dismissed of identity as architecture. Which is better for architecture, to be destroyed in dignity or survive as a stone? The same question is relevant to humans: to die with dignity or to live in nothingness? For architecture, the eternal question: permanence without significance or significance without permanence?

My final questions remain: Does architecture have an inherent meaning? Is that inherent-ness embedded in its memory? Its form? Its function? Its urban role? Or its permanence? Is the meaning in these, political? If monuments crystallize the memory of powerful men and important events, then, is architecture politics? In this case, it is *only* politics. "Politics as art is politics not art."[23] If the Namaz-Khaneh is art for art in a socio-political vacuum, then is its functional permanence restricted to that same vacuum? If Shahyad was devoid of its urban role, its formal abstraction, and its actual function-less-ness, would it have disappeared? And, if the Aramgah was apolitical or less-political in function, would it have outlived the era that created it?

And if there is no inherent power in architectural fabrics, forms, and spaces, why then the old bazaar -- as a social network as much as a physical place -- was so fundamental to the toppling of the fifth largest army in the world?[24] If the bazaar was merely a social network, then why did *bazaaris* refuse to give up their 'worm-ridden shops' in the poor south? Isn't it true that the these shops were instrumental to the preservation of their social power, well built communication system, and physical invisibility and inaccessibility? The dungeon-like bazaar structure was exactly the space which enabled such enterprises as the launching of a revolution. The same went for the ulema who sheltered their social, religious, and political operations in shrines, mosques, and *madrasses*. These alliances became invisible and thus invincible through architecture. Their political power depended

23. al-Khalil, The Monument, 57.
24. "By 1977, Iran had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf, the most up-to-date air force in the Middle East, and the fifth largest military force in the world." Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution, 436.

on space. Hence, architecture sheltered and protected -- not gained meaning in -- politics. Shahyad appropriated its own meaning the moment when it was able to shelter political activities through and in it. Shahyad survived a major shift of power -- which thousands of powerful men did not -- because it had a specific form, urban role, and means of appropriation. Aramgah did not persist because its inherent meaning was too powerful; it sheltered the King. That was its function and for that it perished. Still, its very destruction enabled a political dialectic; politics was expressed through architecture. The building invigorated such dialogue, not the reverse. The Namaz-Khaneh *a priori* refused any embodiment of political meaning, so it lived -- and will continue to do so -- because its appropriation is arbitrary and completely subjective. The Namaz-Khaneh constantly transcends temporary political intentions; it conforms with its own internal values: that of space. These qualities which result in a specific meaning -- or meaning-lessness -- are within the tectonics of the structure; in the curves of architecture.

"Do we condemn the late Shah's triumphal celebration of 2500 years of Persian monarchical rule, simply because we dislike these figures and disagree with [his] unsuccessful politics? Are the constructions of our own pasts or national identities more acceptable because they are ours?"[25] If nationalism is a construction then this or that style would do. Architecture's role in the task of identity politics might be -- or not be -- different since monuments can either be destroyed without trace, be appropriated anew, or simply be ignored. Is architecture a victim of different adaptations of nationalism by arbitrary groups of people, who *choose* to identify themselves with selected histories? Or, is architecture the silent spectator of human absurdity? Because after all, Shahyad is Shahyad. Those who *can* remember with some historic accuracy will do so with consciousness of its story, its origin, and a distorted version of its initial meaning. Eventually, *everyone* will associate Shahyad with the Pahlavi era, even those who perceive it as the symbol of freedom. Because there is always the question: Freedom from what? National appropriation of ideology to forms is temporary and ultimately powerless. Although 'nations' are man-made constructions, people exist. The quality of being 'Iranian' -- or anything else for that mat-

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25. Kohl, <u>Nationalism</u>, 5.

ter -- is an ambiguous social consciousness and a generic collective memory. 'A people' will never become a nation; nor will it ever be defined. All maps are carved on our bodies, not the boundaries drawn by powerful men.

> When I turned her around, her whole body was covered in bright pigment. Only the eye blue removed, made anonymous, a naked map where nothing is depicted. And all the names of the tribes, the nomads of faith who walked in the monotone of the desert and saw brightness and faith and color. Such glory of this country she enters now and becomes part of. We die containing a richness of lovers and tribes, tastes we have swallowed, bodies we have plunged into and swum up as if rivers of wisdom, characters we have climbed into as if trees, fears we have hidden in as if caves. I wish for all this to be marked on my body when I am dead. I believe in such cartography -- to be marked by nature, not just to label ourselves on a map like the names of rich men and women on buildings. We are communal histories, communal books. We are not owned or monogamous in our taste or experience. All I desired was to walk upon such an earth that had no maps.[26]

People -- with or without ideologies -- shape the path of existence and endeavor history. As history matters, so do the folds of architecture. A disappeared dome, a transformed gate, and an ignored cube come to testify to the meaning of these stories. They live -- or die -- in order to narrate history and they do so free of those agents who molded them into being.

26. Ondaataje, Michael. <u>The English Patient</u>. London: Picador, 1993, 261-62.

Figure 4.2 Shah Abdol-Azim Shrine and the empty lot of Aramgah.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 175.

Figure 4.3 "The mass demonstration of December 10, 1978, called for the abolition of the Pahlavi monarchy. In the background is the Shahyad Monument."

Abrahamian, Edvard. <u>Iran Between Two Revolution</u>. New Jersey:
   Princeton University Press, 1982, cover page.

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Figure 4.4 Shahyad during the 2500-year celebrations, 1971.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
   New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 4.

Figure 4.5 Shahyad during the celebration of the Islamic Revolution, 1980's.

Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
<u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 172.

Figure 4.6 Shahyad with fire works during the 2500-year celebrations, 1971.

Lowe, J. <u>Celebration at Persepolis</u>. Tehran: Franlin Book Inc., 1971, 35.

Figure 4.7 Shahyad with fire works during the celebration of the Islamic Revolution, 1980's.

Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality. <u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 175.

Figure 1.11 Map of Tehran, Aramgah and surrounding, Ray.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 158.

Figure 1.12 Tomb of Avecinna.

Bahra al-Ulumi, Hossain. Karnameh, Anjumana-e Asar-e Melli.
Tehran: University Press, 1976, 97.

Figure 1.13 Tomb of Sa'adi.

Bahra al-Ulumi, Hossain. Karnameh, Anjumana-e Asar-e Melli.
Tehran: University Press, 1976, 177.

Figure 1.14 *Chahar-taq*, Naqarah Khaneh, Farashbadn.

Slide, Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 1.15 *Chahar-taq*, fire temple, Neisar, restored.

Slide, Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 1.16 Formal analysis of a *chahar-taq*.

Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 75.

Figure 1.17 Fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, Aramgah, March 21, 1976.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. Iran: Elements of Destiny.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 314.

Figure 1.18 Aramgah from close.

Brown, C.L. From Medina to Metropolis: Heritage and change in the Near Eastern city.
New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1973, 100.

Figure 1. 19 Reconstruction of Persepolis terraces of Apadana, by Beilager, 1971.

Slide, Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 1.20 Kuh-e Kawagia, the reconstruction of the Achaemenian faze, plan.

Gullini, Giorgio. Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi.
Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 262.

Figure 1.21 Pasargade, the sacred space, Herzfeld reconstruction, axonometric.

Gullini, Giorgio. Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi.
Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 264.

Figure 1.22 Formal analysis of *takht*.

Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 69.

Figure 2.1 Mohammad-Reza Shah with Queen Elizabeth in London.
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran. Mission for my country.
Rome: Dino editor, 1977, 50.

Figure 2.2 A golden cameo of Mohammad-Reza Shah crowns the staircase of History
inside the Shahyad Monument's audio-visual theater.
Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. Iran: Elements of Destiny.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 25.

Figure 2.3 *Sepah* gate from the Qajar period, Tehran.
Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
Tehran at a Glance. Tehran: 1992, 67.

Figure 2.4 Old gate of Tehran, destroyed.
Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
Tehran at a Glance. Tehran: 1992, 22.

Figure 2.5 A south-north section of Tehran area, showing the altitude of the city.
Baharambeygui, H. Tehran: an Urban Analysis.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 5.

Figure 2.6 Water resources of Tehran, external dams.
Baharambeygui, H. Tehran: an Urban Analysis.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 134.

Figure 2.7 Karaj dam, built in 1960.
Baharambeygui, H. Tehran: an Urban Analysis.
Tehran: Sahab Book Institute, 1977, 135.

Figure 2.8 Map of Tehran, urban zones.
Adle, C. & Hourcade, B. Teheran Capitale Bicentenaire.
Paris: Institut Francais de Recherche en Iran, 1992, 210.

Figure 2.9 Mohammad-Reza Shah's opening speak at the 2500-year celebration.
Lowe, J. Celebration at Persepolis. Tehran: Franlin Book Inc., 1971, 35.

Figure 2.10 Shahyad, site plan.
Shahyad Monument, handbook.
Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 10.

Figure 2.11 Shahyad, east-west elevation.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 14.

Figure 2.12 Shahyad, north-south elevation.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 15.

Figure 2.13 Shahyad, south-north section.

Shahyad Monument, handbook.
Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 16.

Figure 2.14 Shahyad, due east.

Maheu, Rene. Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire.
Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 188.

Figure. 2.15 Ctesiphon, Sassanian palace, Iraq.

Slide, Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 2.16 Formal analysis of gate.

Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 71.

Figure 2.17 Shahyad from air generating axis in the urban fabric, due east.

Beny, R. Persia: Bridge of Turquoise.
Boston: New York Graphic Society, 1975, 64.

Figure 2.18 Shahyad, directing traffic.

Karman, Hossein. Tehran dar Gzashte va hal [Tehran in past and present].
Tehran: Tehran University Press, 2535 Imperial year, 352.

Figure 2.19 Map of Tehran, Shahyad square and surrounding.

Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 98.

Figure 2.20 Shahyad from air.

Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. Iran: Elements of Destiny.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 206.

Figure 2.21 Formal analysis of *minaret*.

Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 73.

Figure 2.22 Shahyad and Gombad-e Qavus.

Maheu, Rene. Iran: Rebirth of a Timeless Empire.
Paris: Editions j.a., 1976, 253.

Figure 2.23 Shahyad, plan.

<div style="text-align: right">Shahyad Monument, handbook.</div>
<div style="text-align: right">Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 17.</div>

Figure 2.24 Persepolis aerial view and 2500-year celebration royal tents.

<div style="text-align: right">Bahar, M. Persepolis. Tehran: Sekeh Press, 1993, 86-87.</div>

Figure 2.25 Shahyad, plans and sections of interior halls.

<div style="text-align: right">Shahyad Monument, handbook.</div>
<div style="text-align: right">Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972, 23.</div>

Figure 2.26 Mohammad-Reza Shah and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, approaching the arch of Shahyad.

<div style="text-align: right">Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. Iran: Elements of Destiny.</div>
<div style="text-align: right">New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 334.</div>

Figure 3.1 Mohammad-Reza Shah and Farah Shahbanoo at Niavaran royal palace.
Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. Iran: Elements of Destiny.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 312.

Figure 3.2 Namaz-Khaneh, Farah Park by Kamran Diba, 1977-78.
Diba, Kamran. Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 237.

Figure 3.3 Map of Tehran, Farah (Laleh) Park and surrounding.
Atlas of Tehran. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 83-82.

Figure 3.4 Esoteric versus exoteric notions of space.
Ardalan, Nader. The Sense of Unity. Chicago: University Press, 1973, 68.

Figure 3.5 Model of Namaz Khaneh, plan view.
Diba, Kamran. Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 235.

Figure 3.6 Museum of Contemporary Art of Tehran, Farah Park, by Kamran Diba, 1977.
Diba, Kamran. Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 37.

Figure 3.7 Carpet Museum of Tehran, Farah Park.
Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
Tehran at a Glance. Tehran: 1992, 98.

Figure 3.8 Dura-Europo, palace of the citadel, plan.
Gullini, Giorgio. Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi.
Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 333.

Figure 3.9 Qasr-e Shirin, plan of the palace.
Gullini, Giorgio. Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi.
Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 370.

Figure 3.10 Qasr-e Shirin, Chahar-Qapu, plan.
Gullini, Giorgio. Architettura Iranica: dagli Achemenidi ai Sasanidi.
Torino: Giulio Enaudi editore, 1964, 428.

Figure 3.11 Model of Namaz-Khaneh, axonometric view.
Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 235.

Figure 3.12 Diba's sketch of *chador* and courtyard: "Houses and veil designed with the
same frame of mind namely concealment of one's possessions (women and wealth)."
Diba, Kamran. <u>Kamran Diba - Buildings and Projects</u>.
Germany: Hatje, 1981, 10.

Figure 3.13 Namaz-Khaneh, site plan, location of Carpet Museum and *qibla* direction.
By Talin Der-Grigorian.

Figure 3.14 The Ka'bah in Mecca.
Slide, Rotch Visual Library, MIT.

Figure 4.1 Mural painting of Imam Khomeini, Tehran.
Hourcade, Bernard & Richard, Yann. <u>Teheran: Au Dessous de Volcan</u>.
Paris: Autrement Revue, 1987, 128.

Figure 4.2 Shah Abdol-Azim Shrine and the empty lot of Aramgah.
<u>Atlas of Tehran</u>. Tehran: 'Gita Shenassi' Map makers, 3441, 175.

Figure 4.3 "The mass demonstration of December 10, 1978, called for the abolition of the
Pahlavi monarchy. In the background is the Shahyad Monument."
Abrahamian, Edvard. <u>Iran Between Two Revolution</u>. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1982, cover page.

Figure 4.4 Shahyad during the 2500-year celebrations, 1971.
Beny, R. & Amirarjomand, S. <u>Iran: Elements of Destiny</u>.
New York: Everest House, 1978, fig. 4.

Figure 4.5 Shahyad during the celebration of the Islamic Revolution, 1980's.
Public relations office & international affairs department of the Tehran municipality.
<u>Tehran at a Glance</u>. Tehran: 1992, 172.

Figure 4.6 Shahyad with fire works during the 2500-year celebrations, 1971.
Lowe, J. <u>Celebration at Persepolis</u>. Tehran: Franlin Book Inc., 1971, 35.

Figure 4.7 Shahyad with fire works during the celebration of the Islamic Revolution,
1980's.
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