

Do Parties Still Matter? The Politics of Gubernatorial Nominations

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
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
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
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# Do Parties Still Matter? The Politics of Gubernatorial Nominations

by

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## ABSTRACT

Who controls the nomination in gubernatorial elections? This dissertation seeks to answer this simple question. Parties have classically been the organizations held responsible for throwing their collective effort behind a candidate and controlling the nominations. Yet, in recent years, scholars have noted a steady weakening of American political parties through a succession of major alterations in the political landscape: the loss of patronage-based organizations traditionally used to uphold party organizations; competition from interest groups; and the ascendancy of media-based campaigns and political consultants which buoy candidates' personal organizations. Not only that, recent work suggests that national party organizations have displaced their state-level counterparts. The combined result of these strains on the party system, scholars conclude, is the rise of a candidate-centered politics and of an electoral politics that can no longer count parties as critical factors in the political system.

My dissertation tests whether parties have been dealt out of the nominations process in gubernatorial primary elections in six states: Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Texas. My principal evidence is elite public endorsements of candidates. I find that the tempo, quantity, and quality of endorsement activity varies from election to election according to many factors. My research finds that endorsement activity fluctuates within four principal domains – across election type (general or primary), across the level of competition in a given election, across party, and across states. Contrary to many recent studies, I do not find evidence of an “extended party” – of a broad set of actors (interest groups and highly-partisan influential elites) that help in the nominee selection process in four of my six case studies. Instead, I find many states with strong parties that expressly *do not* have large numbers of important groups and individuals involved. Moreover, in states in which major groups and influential individuals are involved to a high degree, I find evidence of weak, factionalized parties.

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND PUZZLE

Who controls the nominations process in gubernatorial elections? This dissertation seeks to answer this simple question. Parties have classically been the organizations held responsible for throwing their collective effort behind a candidate and controlling the nominations. Yet, in recent years, scholars have noted a steady weakening of American political parties through a succession of major alterations in the political landscape: the loss of patronage-based organizations traditionally used to uphold party organizations; competition from interest groups; and the ascendancy of media-based campaigns and political consultants which buoy candidates' personal organizations. Not only that, recent work suggests that national party organizations have displaced their state-level counterparts. The combined result of these strains on the party system, scholars conclude, is the rise of a candidate-centered politics and of an electoral politics that can no longer count parties as critical factors in the political system.

Although there is no question that these trends have had a profound impact on the American party system and have altered the behavior of parties, it is imperative to ask how uniform are these effects both nationally and across the fifty states. The focus of this dissertation is state-level political parties. The immense variety of regulations governing state parties and elections, should, *prima facie*, suggest wide variation in how state party systems have responded to the trends noted above. First, I assess in what ways party systems vary across the states. I shed light on three issues: Why the Democratic party in New Mexico, differs from the Democratic party in Massachusetts which differs from the Democratic party in Texas in terms of who is involved in party politics, in terms of how primary elections are contested, and in terms of what coalitions develop within parties.

The second issue revolves around the data that I use to address the question of how the variation across party systems can be explained. I have collected all publicly declared

endorsements of gubernatorial candidates in primary and general elections from interest groups, from individuals, from parties, and from many other political actors. For my purposes, endorsements serve as “signals” from elites regarding which candidate is most acceptable and ultimately most winnable. Hence, my questions vis-à-vis endorsements include: How important are endorsements in gubernatorial elections, and what is their purpose? Do some types of endorsements matter more than others? Do endorsements from officeholders, for example, trump endorsements from groups? What kinds of political players involve themselves in elections from one year to the next and what kinds of players engage intermittently? The dissertation analyzes what types group coalitions and what types of individuals emerge from election cycle to election cycle, and how these coalitions change over time. My investigation points to the social networks involved in gubernatorial elections and asks who is immersed in these networks. In addition, this dissertation sheds light on how campaigns think strategically about garnering endorsements and how individuals and groups deliberate on their decisions to grant or withhold endorsements.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that the data collected for this dissertation serves as a contribution to political science. My dataset is entirely original. Results emerging from it explain differences that appear from state to state, from election to election and from primaries to general elections. Such information is not only useful for the study of endorsements themselves, it is also worthwhile simply because the issues have received little attention from scholars.

This dissertation sheds light on these and related issues. I have mapped out the universe of publicly declared endorsements of gubernatorial primary- and general-election candidates in six states – Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, and Texas. Massachusetts served as my in-depth case-study, in which I have examined the thirteen elections between 1978 and 2002; in all other states, I examined a shorter time-period, between 1994 and 2002. The

chosen states represent different types with regard to party strength, levels of partisan competition, and endorsement activity.

### **The Argument in Brief**

Next to presidential elections and many senate elections, gubernatorial elections draw attention. In almost every election, endorsement activity occurs. Yet the tempo, the quantity, and the quality of endorsement activity varies from election to election according to many factors. My research finds that endorsement activity fluctuates within four principal domains – across election type (general or primary), across the level of competition in a given election, across party, and across states. Finally, I investigate *who* or *what* is doing the endorsing. Given such oscillations, what accounts for the variation?

My key findings are as follows:

*Parties:* I do not find evidence of an “extended party” – of a broad set of actors (interest groups and highly-partisan influential elites) that help in the nominee selection process in four of my six case studies. Instead, I find many states with strong parties that expressly *do not* have large numbers of important groups and individuals involved. Moreover, in states in which major groups and influential individuals are involved to a high degree, I find evidence of weak, factionalized parties. In addition, in the Massachusetts Democratic party I found that candidates often do not compete for the *same* endorsements. Rather, they look for endorsements that represent their contrasting ideological positions.

*Incumbents, challengers, and endorsements:* In general, in primary elections, incumbents typically do not collect many (if any) endorsements, unless they are “running scared.” When incumbents do not face any high-quality challengers they tend not to ask for endorsements and groups tend to reserve their endorsements for the general election. This often means, therefore,

that when incumbents are running, elections become low-information events; opposition-party high-quality or low-quality challengers in primary or general elections simply do not generate as many endorsements and therefore the *informational value* of endorsements diminishes significantly.

*Contested versus uncontested primaries and endorsements:* In general, contested primary elections draw greater endorsement activity than non-contested primaries. When there is an uncontested primary, the general election is typically where the endorsement activity is.

The next part of this introductory chapter proceeds by taking a step back to define some of the concepts dealt with in this dissertation. In the next section, I define the key concepts and variables employed in my study. I first define the term “party,” after which I discuss what constitutes a “party system.” Defining these terms up front avoids confusion, motivates and grounds the dissertation, and firmly establishes the fact that very real differences exist between parties of the same name across time and across space.

### **What is a Party?**

For all of the changes that have taken place in the development of parties in the twentieth century, from the “old” party to the “new” party (Schlesinger 1985), the essential definition of what a party is remains unchanged: a party is an election mechanism; a political party is “a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Downs 1957). Two points about this definition immediately strike one: first, the definition focuses on office seekers, not on voters; second, the definition excludes policy commitment. Yet both points focus on office seekers and the exclusion of policy commitment and leaves neither out of the process, for Downs’ entire theory of parties is predicated on the idea that parties seek

to maximize the votes cast for them, and that parties rely on voter preferences to accomplish this task. Voters, after all, must choose among competing parties. Downs' definition of party is both precise in that the focus is on electoral victory, and broad in that it allows considerable flexibility in determining what constitutes the "team."

Schlesinger (1985) argues that a theory of parties must not only define the term party, but must also define the term "party organization", because it is in the "organization" that the actual work of parties takes place. Schlesinger's characterization of party organization includes "all ... cooperative, deliberate activities among two or more people aimed at capturing elective office in the name of the party" (Schlesinger 1985). In historical terms, Schlesinger asserts, the development of party organizations came about because of the ongoing effort of each party to guarantee that a single candidate would stand in the general election and, moreover, that all elements of the party unite behind that candidate.

Parties do more than seek office, they do more than recruit and put forth a winnable candidate, and they do more than unite behind that candidate. Parties do more than organize elections. They also organize political life within legislatures and within the electorate. In the legislature, parties are institutions designed to advance the achievement of collective choices – choices that can only be accomplished through majority rule. Parties solve the problem of how to broadly coalesce around a set of values, interests, and concerns – they are the mechanism that allows politicians to achieve and maintain policy majorities.

In the electorate, parties serve a similar function. In order to win elective office, politicians must mobilize resources, workers, and ultimately voters. Politicians must persuade voters and must position themselves in relation to their opposition. To do so effectively, politicians turn to parties, for it is only in through the backing of an organized team or some very

potent organizational assistance that candidates can hope to get elected. Parties, therefore, help politicians resolve the problem of how to coerce rational and self-interested individuals into sublimating some of their personal interests to certain group interests (Olson 1965).<sup>1</sup>

Parties are vital to democratic health: they foster political participation through voter mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993); they provide information to voters; they create policy coalitions; they organize the activities of government to facilitate collective action. Parties articulate and aggregate interests, and they ultimately hold elected officials accountable. We might expect, therefore, that parties behave similarly across time and across space. No. Varying institutional arrangements, electoral conditions, and degree of factionalization all contribute to the diversity of party behavior. Why then, do we speak of state “party systems” beyond the national two-party system and how do we understand variation across these systems?

### **What is a Party System?**

A party “system” may be defined in any of several ways. On the one hand, some scholars draw a comparison between the American winner-take-all two-party system and the multi-party proportional representation systems of Europe, describing a party system in terms of the way electoral rules shape competition. On the other hand, scholars of American history describe a sequence of five (or possibly six) historical party systems and focus on the characteristics of the distinct coalitions that distinguished each. Finally, a third group of scholars, endeavoring to compare parties within states, have categorized states along dimensions which include the

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<sup>1</sup> Mancur Olson lays out *The Logic of Collective Action* succinctly: “But it is *not* in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. It does *not* follow, because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*” (Olson 1965: 2)



characteristics of party organizations and activities, the influence of these organizations upon voting behavior, party structure and recruitment patterns, inter-party competitiveness, and the ideological leanings of states and their parties.

Why is there such variation across the one hundred state Democratic and Republican parties? Why is the Massachusetts Democratic Party different from the Texas Democratic Party, and why do both of these differ from the national Democratic Party? To explain why variation exists between the two parties across the fifty states, we need to reflect on the historical development of political parties in the United States. The founders did not create a party system, nor did they encourage one to develop at the country's inception. They were, in fact, more interested in blocking party formation. George Washington, in his farewell address, "warn[ed] ... in the most solemn manner against the baneful effect of the Spirit of Party, generally" (Cunningham 1965). James Madison most famously and eloquently argued against parties, for, he said, they would only serve as a channel for factional choices.<sup>2</sup> Madison deemed factions odious because they were "adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Wills 1982). Organized interests, he insisted, would "invade the rights of other citizens" (Wills 1982); hence, he argued vigorously for a large, expansive national government which would make it difficult for majorities to form, let alone act in concert. A large national government was, he advised, the best check on majority power.

In spite of Madison's warnings and those of others, parties were created anyway. Some said they needed to exist for only a short period of time in order to serve a specific function, and then American life could move ahead without them. Nevertheless, the very fact that early architects quickly recognized the *functionality* of parties points clearly to their necessity. Parties

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<sup>2</sup> It is certainly ironic that Madison himself formed what became the basis for the first organized national political party, the Democratic Republicans, organized in opposition to the policies of president John Adams.

solve many problems, including perhaps the most basic of all political problems – the collective action problem. In a diverse, large republic – the very diverse and large republic that Madison urged – how do you patch together a majority? The answer: with political parties. Parties aggregate interests so that politicians can appeal to enough voters to form majority coalitions (Eldersveld 1966; Key 1964; Sorauf 1963). Parties exist because they solve multiple problems of governance.

If parties simply help facilitate governance through the aggregation of interests, then why do we find variation in party strength over time and space? It certainly cannot be the case that some states simply do not have as many collective action problems as others and therefore do not need as strong parties as others do. Returning to the original premise, I noted that the founders did not write parties into the Constitution nor did they even work to create a legal entity that resembled a party. Instead, both national and state politicians had to develop parties themselves.

Parties at both the state and national level were not created from above, but emerged from within to develop as separate, distinct entities (Huckshorn 1976). They did not start out as hierarchical organizations. Early state political parties were loose organizations of every shape and manner, lacking centralized authority, party discipline, and sustained membership. U.S. parties in general, until well after the Civil War, existed as private organizations outside the purview of the Constitution and of state laws. The early American state party system was uneven, incoherent and wildly diverse. Some states had, by the end of the nineteenth century, developed strong, effective parties performing all the classic functions of political parties. Other states produced immature party organizations that rarely performed any functions at all. Although state party organizations certainly matured as the country grew, the idea that some state parties were moribund and useless did not escape V.O. Key, who observed as late as 1956,

The most apparent, and perhaps the fundamental, incapacity of state parties lies in the frequency with which the leadership corps is fractionalized and lacking in both capacity and organization for action. Some state party organizations, to be sure, have an evident vitality as well as a fairly high degree of coherence. Yet, a more common situation is the almost complete absence of a functioning statewide organization” (Key 1956).

The historical development of each state – its demographic trends, evolving legal regulations, and other events in both the private and public sectors – greatly influences the structure and development of each state’s political parties. Much has been written about variation in state political systems, and scholars have attributed the variation to variables such as political culture, patterns of two-party competition, differences in state economies, constitutional and legal provisions, including the structure of the legislature, the organization and history of the parties, and the ways in which primary and general elections are carried out. I will discuss each of these variables in turn.

### **Political Culture**

An extensive literature links variation between states to the unique history and traditions of each state – i.e. the state’s *political culture*. The general argument asserted by proponents of the political culture argument is that “differences in the habits, concerns, and attitudes that exist” between states, “influence political life in the various states” (Elazar 1972, 85). These differences encompass aspects of state development such as population – the distinct racial, ethnic, and religious groups that historically dominated a state’s political life, e.g. the Irish Catholics in Massachusetts. Political culture scholars also examine the economic and social developments of a state and its critical political movements, such as the Progressive movement during the early twentieth century in Wisconsin, Minnesota and the Dakotas.

Elazar's (1972) distinction between states in which the "individualistic", "moralistic", and "traditionalistic" subcultures prevail, offers a widely cited framework within which to assess political culture. The "moralistic" political subculture identified by Elazar in the states of upper New England, the upper Middle West and portions of the West (a subculture which emphasized a positive view of government, bureaucracy and public participation) developed programmatic, issue-oriented groupings that ultimately resulted in ideologically distinct parties. His "individualistic" political culture states of the middle-Atlantic through Illinois (which value limited government) developed pragmatic, job-oriented parties that ultimately resulted in less ideologically distinct parties. Finally, his "traditionalistic" culture states of the South (which de-emphasize political participation and focus more on the maintenance of the existing social order) "tend to have loose one-party systems if they have political cultures at all" (Elazar 1972: 99).

#### **Historical Legacy of Local Party Organization Strength**

Mayhew (1986) endeavored to classify states on the historical presence or absence of local "traditional party organizations" (TPOs) during the 1960s and 1970s. Mayhew's five-point scale of "TPO-ness" measures the presence in states of local party organizations that (1) had substantial autonomy (i.e. were not dominated by corporate or labor power); (2) lasted a long time; (3) had a hierarchical internal structure; (4) regularly tried to nominate candidates for many offices up and down the ballot; and (5) relied on material incentives rather than purpose incentives to "engage ... people to do organization work or to supply organization support" (Mayhew 1986: 19-20). Mayhew scores all fifty states using his own judgment based on reading academic and journalistic literature on local parties in each state. Mayhew gives high TPO scores (4-5) to those states that were historically dominated by his "traditional" organizations (e.g. Tammany Hall in New York or the Pendergast Organization in Missouri). States with low TPO

scores (1-2) historically have never been dominated by such a party. Although TPOs have disappeared from the American party landscape, Mayhew contends that their historical presence can still be felt and can be associated with differences between states on a number of variables relating to public policy. He shows a link, for example, between the relative size of a state's public economy and the presence of a TPO – states with a history of traditional parties, he contends, tend to have *smaller* public economies than do states without such parties. Other scholars have used Mayhew's scoring to discern larger trends in American politics. Nagel's 1996 study examining voter turnout in gubernatorial and senatorial races since 1928 concluded that the collapse of TPOs accounted for "an important part of the decline in U.S. turnout since the 1960s," since, he argued, traditional, patronage-based party machines had historically mobilized lower socio-economic populations (Nagel 1996: 792).

#### **State Party Ideologies**

Recent work has shown wide ideological variation across states and has demonstrated the implications of such ideological distinctiveness on public policy outcomes. Erikson, Wright, and McIver's work (1993) established wide inter-party ideological variation across states based on attitudes exhibited by the elite (elected officials and party activists) and the mass (party identifiers in the electorate). Erikson et al. showed that state party ideologies are, in part, a reflection of state opinion, which itself is a reflection of the state's political culture – "the expectations and values that citizens (but mainly elites) share as they conduct the business of governing" (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993: 150). State public opinion drives the policy tendency of the states, they argue. "Over time, state electorates choose a mix of Democratic and

Republican policy-makers that reflects the degree to which the parties represent the electorate's ideological interests.”<sup>3</sup>

### **Party Competition and Party Strength**

Other scholars have attempted to show an association between the level of party competition and party strength. Strong party states (such as Northern and Midwestern states) tend to be those with historical legacies of strong machines. In these same states we find state legislative parties that are relatively cohesive on important issues and state parties that have wide influence over the choice of nominees (Jewell and Whicker 1994). Weak party states, especially Southern states, by contrast tend to be those states in which one party dominates and where political competition (where exigent) is much more prevalent within parties than it is between parties. Precisely because of this dominance neither party needs to be particularly well-financed or organized to win. The dominant party simply always wins, and the minority party neither has nor can collect the resources necessary to become competitive. Hence, the collective action problem is largely solved by default rather than by skillful coalition-building. Western states, however, which historically were home to the Populist tradition and to several anti-party organization and anti-boss movements, tend also to be relatively weak-party states with low levels of legislative party cohesiveness and low levels of party competition.

### **Intra-Party Competition**

In a related set of scholarly endeavors, political scientists have examined the factors that determine the *nature* of intra-party competition in the states – what happens when one party dominates, as in the South? Key (1949), for example, examined variation in factionalism in the Confederate South in order to explain electoral divisiveness. Riker (1962) gave formal

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[http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:pTeXKn37Se4J:sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/MW\\_041001.PDF+erikson,+and+mciver+1993](http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:pTeXKn37Se4J:sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/MW_041001.PDF+erikson,+and+mciver+1993)

development to Key's explanation, hypothesizing that when a single party dominates in a state, all electoral competition is channeled through the state's primary. The dominant party's primary, therefore, is the sole route to winning office, and as a result several candidates contest the nomination. By contrast, in states with high levels of inter-party competition, fewer candidates vie for office. This is because (1): the likelihood of actually winning higher office is lessened by the presence of a strong opposition party in the general election; and (2): candidates and party leaders alike try hard to keep competition and intra-party fragmentation to a minimum so as not to cause defeat in the general election. Berry and Canon (1993) call this conclusion the "opposition hypothesis."

An alternative hypothesis, which is not mutually exclusive with the previous one, suggests that *electoral structure* shapes electoral competition. Duverger (1954), in a cross-national comparison, asserted that first-past-the-post systems induce pre-election coalescence leading to two-party competition. He concluded that under proportional representation systems and other systems that reward more than one candidate, benefits are more spread out, making pre-election unity less imperative and less necessary, and multiparty systems tend to be the result. A similar logic applies to the American case and to the primary structure. Ten states in the American South offer runoff elections for cases in which no candidate receives a vote-majority in the first primary. Both Key (1949) and Canon (1978) argue that this *double primary* system encourages greater numbers of candidates to participate because, "even losers can secure rewards by bargaining and coalescing with the candidates competing in the runoff" (Berry 1993: 455). Berry and Canon's 1993 study, using a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of data from states going back as far as 1919, offers support for both hypotheses, but a nuanced support:

“[d]ouble primaries can be expected to produce the greatest increase in competitiveness over single primaries when the *opposition party is very weak...*” (Berry 1993: 470).

### **Reconceptualizing Parties' Electoral Role**

The explanations presented thus far inform us about the variety of political culture, party strength, party activity, and party structure across the fifty states. Yet these explanations leave unanswered questions. The first category of questions poses a critique of existing literature: While Mayhew's analysis of TPOs may shed light on public policy questions and even on political participation generally, it does not tell us whether the historical presence or absence of TPOs sheds light on the current condition of state political parties. TPOs vanished at the end of the 1960s. Then what? Do the remaining vestiges of TPOs tell us anything about the Massachusetts Democratic party or the Texas Republican party? Again, Elazar's political subcultures may conjure a familiar ring, yet the very notion that we could easily divide the hundred state parties into those that are programmatic and issue-oriented versus and those that discourage participation and maintain the overriding social order seems nearly impossible, given the nationalization of the parties and the fluidity of the concepts themselves. Further, Erikson, Wright, and McIver's research on public opinion, though extremely useful, cannot, in and of itself, tell us much about who controls nominations procedures in states and how powerful are the parties. Work on partisan competition in states does not shed light on who or what drives the competition or on what implications the level of competition has for the level of participation by certain interest groups, individuals, and other participants. Does the number of candidates in a given election, for example, drive levels of participation of interest groups and other actors?



Scholars of congressional, presidential, and gubernatorial nominations have tended to focus their attention on candidates – on their specific qualifications, qualities, and ambitions – not on the party insiders, the interest groups, not the activists that make up the increasingly wider range of nomination participants. Political science has produced solid research informing us of the ambitions, motivations, and qualities that make candidates successful. But it has, thus far, failed to explain how parties, especially at the nomination stage, affect candidates' personal ambition and the nomination process itself. By focusing attention on candidates and on party organization and on broadly based analyses of state party strengths and weaknesses, political science has failed to consider *additional* or *alternative* sources of party strength and weakness.

A literature now emerging is reconceptualizing the role of parties in elections by expanding the very definition of the word to encompass party elites who are not necessarily its “official” representatives and who neither hold elective office nor have any official link to the party. Recent scholarship has demonstrated, for example, that staff (campaign professionals and those who work in political offices in government) are party loyalists whose decisions about which candidate or member to work for often signal party insider support (Monroe 2001; Bernstein 2000; Bernstein and Dominguez 2003). Cohen et al (2001) have shown that candidates at the presidential level who receive the kind of broad-based support from party elites that is signaled through endorsements, are more likely to win their party's nomination. Developing a more thorough understanding of party coalitions adds several new sets of actors to the mix – loyal donors, activists who staff candidate campaigns, hired guns, interest groups, and other key players – and can help us better to understand their overall influence on the electoral process.

Cohen and his colleagues at UCLA employ the broader definition of party elites for the simple reason, they argue, that parties have experienced a resurgence since the 1970s because they have adapted to a changed environment. In adapting (Cohen et al argue), parties have abandoned traditional hierarchies and have developed more loosely structured networks – networks that incorporate people and groups who work regularly for the party and who control resources beyond simply their own votes. This definition of party includes groups that are allied to it over the long-term and who participate in its councils, such as unions and pro-choice groups on the left, and the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the Christian Coalition on the right. Cohen et al argue, quite simply, that “[l]eaders of such interest groups have loyalties both to their party and to their group ... [I]f they regularly involve themselves in party councils and in electoral politics on behalf of the parties, they are ... part of the party’s leadership” and an “arm of the contemporary political party” (Cohen et al. 2001). This new organizational form allows parties to continue to engage in their essential and classical functions – as organizations that put forth a winnable candidate and coalesce behind that choice.

Cohen et al’s broad definition of party raises important questions: do parties themselves really control nominations (presidential or gubernatorial), or is the power of interest groups such that they now can dictate which candidate will be nominated, or is what appears to be party stability actually a series of candidates with strong ad hoc followings?

### **Analyzing Endorsements in Elections**

The literature on participation in electoral politics is wide and varied. Over the last fifty years or so of political science research, scholars have unpacked the individual’s calculus of decision-making and voting, the group’s motivation and ability to participate, and the politician’s

decision to run for and maintain political office. In attempting to understand the endorsement process, we must deal with the following lines of research unpacked by scholars:

Do endorsements provide information to individual voters and, if so, how? This question is especially important since so many of the endorsements we examine occur in primary elections absent the party cue;

how do groups make decisions to endorse and what strings come attached;

and how and why do politicians give endorsements and also how do they secure them for themselves.

The current state of research on endorsements, however, deals with only one narrow band of the topic, and even there the evidence is scant. There are two main ways of analyzing the role of endorsements in the political process: empirical studies that examine the impact of specific endorsers in specific elections; and formal models that endeavor to determine what impact endorsements have on imperfectly informed voters. I shall deal with each of these in turn.

#### **Empirical Examinations of Endorsements**

Most *empirical examinations of endorsements* suffer from a short time-line and a limited number. Almost all (though not all) empirical studies, for example, restrict their examinations to one or two election cycles, meaning that they need to account for the idiosyncrasies in the election years chosen. Most scholars examining endorsements focus their inquiry on a particular type of endorsement (e.g. labor or newspapers), on a specific endorser (e.g the National Rifle Association or the Christian Coalition), or on a group of endorsements for or against specific ballot initiatives. The formal literature, by contrast, focuses almost exclusively on endorsements from interest groups.

The role of labor unions presents an interesting case in point, being one of the most active groups in electoral politics. They endorse; they rally their members; they launch massive get-out-the-vote drives, and much more. Yet we do not have a clear picture of how much labor union members buy in to the recommendations of the leadership when they enter the voting booth. For example, studies such as Converse and Campbell's (Converse and Campbell 1968; Kornhauser 1956; Sousa 1993) indicate that labor union endorsements affect the voting behavior of its members. Kornhauser et al *When Labor Votes* (1956), examines the voting behavior of Detroit UAW-CIO members in the 1952 presidential election, finding that, "On the whole, auto workers in the Detroit area were found to vote in agreement with union recommendations." However, a growing body of more recent studies suggest that labor's ability to successfully mobilize their membership depends on the group's organizational strength in a given locale (Radcliff 2001), on the degree to which members of the group have competing loyalties, on how well the group manages these (Clark and Masters 2001), and finally on how politicized the group members are in the first place (Gimpel 1998).

Newspaper endorsements, as a set of specific endorsements, differ dramatically from group endorsements. Newspapers simply take a side and declare that stance at a strategically opportune moment. They need not to mobilize members, nor do they need to pour resources into member education. Literature examining newspaper endorsements has found that endorsed candidates' vote share increases by about 1 to 5 percentage points as a result of an endorsement (Ansolabehere, Lessem, and James M. Snyder 2004).

Some investigations focus on specific groups during specific elections. A recent study by Kenny et al (2004) looks at the influence of the NRA in contested congressional elections in

1994 and 1996. They find that NRA endorsements had a statistically discernable effect on Republican candidates but not on Democrats in 1994, while they find no discernable effect of either in the 1996 elections.

Another study which examines a specific election centers on the effect of group endorsements in a presidential nomination contest. Rapoport et al. (1991) surveyed delegates to the 1984 National Democratic Party convention to discern whether group endorsements affected candidate support or pre-nomination activity. They found that unions and teachers' groups had a significant effect, while women's groups had no effect. They conjecture that the difference arises from each group's "history of partisan political involvement, their base in the workplace, and their more hierarchical structure" (Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991).

Schlozman and Tierney (1986), who analyze interest group activity, find no systematic evidence that scorecards or endorsements make any notable difference in electoral outcomes. Providing volunteers, they point out, requires local branches and large memberships – both assets that most interest groups and voluntary associations do not have. Maisel and Wayne (1993), suggest that interest groups have an occasional impact when they rate candidates, but that it is sporadic at best.

Based on the most recent literature, we conclude that in general terms single-issue groups, groups with money, groups with a large membership and those with a history of political participation are the ones best placed to persuade and mobilize members to participate.

#### **Formal Examinations of Endorsements**

The formal literature on endorsements began with a series of articles by economists McKelvey and Ordeshook in the mid-1980s. McKelvey and Ordeshook sought to resolve a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, study after study had demonstrated that voters relied on and possessed extremely low levels of information to make decisions in the voting booth. On the

other hand, the rational choice literature had developed lofty assumptions about the level of voter knowledge. Scholars sought to bring the informational assumptions of rational choice models into line with the empirical evidence which indicated low levels of voter information. When voters do not possess perfect information and when information is costly to obtain relative to its expected benefit, voters will, McKelvey and Ordeshook suggested, take their cues from other voters, from interest groups, from the historical behavior of candidates, and from poll results, with the result that voters behave as if fully informed. Thus endorsements serve as an informational shortcut. (Gregg 1970; Lupia 1991; Magleby 1984).

Uhlaner (1989) followed in McKelvey and Ordeshook's footsteps and made a case that individuals make their vote choice within a social structure. Individual affiliations to groups make a difference when and if group leaders choose to increase the consumption benefits of action to their members.

I seek to improve on the literature in two ways: 1) Because my examination of endorsements does not center on any single type of endorsement from a single group or type of group, but examines the universe of endorsements, I trace not only the impact of certain specific endorsements, but also the overall level of endorsement activity from election to election. 2) My research looks at a series of elections across both time and space, giving me greater purchase on how electoral activity differs across states and across elections.

## CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN

In the first chapter I outlined the driving question behind my research: who controls gubernatorial nominations? I then asserted that though parties have classically been the vehicles in charge of nominations, several major trends may have diminished the importance of parties and therefore their importance in the control of nominations. The task of this dissertation, I suggested, is to discern whether we find different constellations of “control” of nominations procedures in different states and why that might be.

Before attempting to discern *who* controls nominations in a given state’s gubernatorial contest, we must investigate what we mean by “control.” Further, we need to indicate how we measure “control.” However, even before we deal with either of these issues, we must develop familiarity with key aspects of state party nominations processes and procedures. The section that follows contains a very brief overview of the history of primary elections and how they came to be instituted. Next, there is an examination of the ins and outs of what are called *preprimary party endorsements*, one means by which parties fought the establishment of direct primaries. Preprimary party endorsements are one substantial difference found in the states under investigation. Finally, I continue my previous examination of nominations procedures and discuss what control means. At that point, I can specify some hypotheses.

### **Overview: Purposes and Functions of Primaries and Party Endorsements**

#### **Primaries**

During the early 1900s, most states passed legislation establishing state-run primaries as the principal method of selecting party nominees for elected office. Leon Epstein writes, “the direct primary quickly became as American as apple pie ... by 1917, all but four states had direct-primary laws for at least some state offices” (Epstein 1986). Malcolm Jewell agrees that “the adoption of the direct primary must have been one of the most rapidly adopted state reforms

not mandated or encouraged by the federal government” (Jewell 1984). While there are variations among states in terms of which offices employ the primary, no state is without a primary system for at least some offices. The main reason driving the adoption of the primary, argues V.O. Key, was the dual desire to “make feasible popular participation in nominations” and the move, especially by the Progressive movement, “to limit or destroy the power of party organizations” (Key 1964: 371). Progressives argued that party organizations were corrupt to the point of “political robbery,” and, said Wisconsin’s Robert La Follette, “If bad men control the nominations, we cannot have good government” (Torrelle 1920, cited by Jewell, 1984: 7).

Party organizations did not close shop, however. Instead, they adapted. They developed “coping mechanisms” which both maintained their power and asserted it in new ways (Walcott 1980: 37). The “power” that parties wanted to maintain, it should be noted, was the power to screen potential candidates – the power to present voters with a “slate” – the power to put forth a team of winnable candidates for general election. One coping mechanism that parties used to retain their power was the *closed primary* – a primary election that allows only those voters who register *in advance* of the election to vote. Eleven states have closed primaries. In half of the states, voters must establish their party registration nearly a year in advance of the election (Jewell and Morehouse, 2001). Fifteen additional states have a closed primary system that allows voters to switch party registration right up to election day. Jewell and Morehouse (2001) note that “little practical difference” exists between some of the more flexible closed primaries and some forms of open primaries, “except that a record is usually kept of each voter’s party registration” (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 104).



### Party Endorsement

Another mechanism party organizations adopted to ensure their survival was the *party endorsement*. Jewell notes that “If primary legislation was a weapon used by those challenging party leadership, the endorsement process may be considered a weapon used by party leadership to maintain a share of power. It was a reaction to the institution of the primary” (Jewell 1984: 40).

Party endorsement – also called preprimary party endorsement – is an official expression of preference for a candidate or a set of candidates by a political party. An *official political party*, however, can be conceived of in one of three ways: first, it can be the party as in the *party convention*; second, it can be the party as in an *official standing party committee* such as the state party central committee; or third, it can be the party as in an *ad hoc party body*. An official party endorsement is *not* an endorsement from a single party official, nor is it an endorsement from an unofficial party faction, nor even from a group of key members of a party. What distinguishes a preprimary party endorsement from other kinds of endorsements is that it truly is *official*: many states’ party rules and regulations and even some state laws *require* preprimary party endorsements and have specific dates upon which these endorsements must be made.

Scholars examining state political parties often divide preprimary party endorsements into two categories – those that are specifically sanctioned by state law, and those that are not. Endorsements sanctioned by state law are often referred to as “formal,” whereas endorsements without such sanction are called “informal.” Formal endorsements carry potential benefits for the endorsee, such as a notation on the ballot indicating party endorsement, a specific position on the ballot, or automatic inclusion on the ballot without needing to file petitions or pay fees. Informal endorsements are usually made by state party leaders or by party committees behind closed doors. A third category of endorsement lies somewhere between these two – it is a party

endorsement not written into state law, but required by party rule. This last type of endorsement does not carry any “official” advantages, but it may carry other advantages, some of which will be explored later in this dissertation. In Massachusetts, both parties require candidates to receive at least fifteen percent of their party’s convention vote to qualify for the primary ballot.

How effective are party endorsements of all kinds in helping the endorsee to win nomination? Jewell and Morehouse (2001) conducted an analysis of the rates of success by formal versus informal (party rule) endorsees in gubernatorial primaries over the period 1960-1980 and 1980-1988. Under both arrangements – legal and party rule – they found that “[t]he most significant finding is that when there was a contested primary the endorsee won over 80 percent of the time in the 1960-1980 period and only half the time in the 1982-1988 period... The overall success of endorsees, including both primaries that were uncontested and those they won, dropped from 91 percent to 74 percent” (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 110).

Preprimary party endorsements have diminished in efficacy since 1960 – they are no longer a sure-fire ticket to nomination for endorsees, nor are they an iron-clad control mechanism for parties. Yet Jewell and Morehouse (2001) assert that, in spite of their decline as effective instruments, preprimary endorsements occur *only in states with strong or moderately strong parties* (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 96). They make this claim based on matching a state’s party coalition strength (measured by the magnitude of the governor’s vote in the primaries 1978-1998) against the presence or absence of a preprimary endorsement (see Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 92-8).

### **Nominations Procedures**

“Boss” Tweed is supposed to have said, “I don’t care who does the electing, as long as I do the nominating.” E.E. Schattschneider contends that *nominations* are the “most important

activity of the party,” for it is through this act that the party’s united front is “expressed.”

Nominations, he says, are the “distinguishing mark of modern political parties; if a party cannot make nominations, it ceases to be a party” (Schattschneider 1942: 64).

The broad history of the twentieth century American political parties is indeed the story of how the circle of participants engaged in making nominations decisions has expanded. Party machines and parties in general lost some of their nominating power to primary elections and to open caucuses, the most well-known recent example being the banning of closed caucuses from the presidential nomination process in both parties following the 1968 election.

Though parties have lost nominating power, whether or not this loss caused or resulted in a loss of party power overall remains a subject for heated debate. Until recently, scholars were divided into two broad schools of thought on the subject: the decline-of-parties scholars and the parties-as-resurgent scholars. These two schools of thought focused on very different aspects of parties. The parties-in-decline group focused its energy largely on the variety of ways in which parties have been supplanted by alternative avenues of nomination, mobilization, and funding. The parties-in-decline group argued that parties lost control of nominations because the parties were displaced by technological innovations such as polling, direct mail, professional public relations firms and the internet, all of which enabled candidates to develop independent organizations that could reach voters themselves and which did not need party help to win. As a result, “candidate-centered” campaigns became popular in the literature and many political scientists provided evidence of the shift in behavior – (see Jacobson, 1983; Agranoff 1972; Sabato 1981; Sorauf, 1980 Crotty and Jaconsob 1980; Orren 1982 (see JOP 1986)). In addition, parties-in-decline scholars argued that parties have been displaced by the growing influence of

mass media. Television, some scholars contend, came to so dominate campaigns that parties lost out to television as critical information-providers for voters (Patterson 1993; Sabato 1981).

The parties-as-resurgent school of thought put the spotlight on organizations themselves, demonstrating the growth of party coffers, the expansion of party office space, and the professionalization of party staff. In general, scholars found increased activity at all levels – national, state, and local. Activity was measured in terms of the degree of bureaucratization of party organizations, the range and level of campaign activities and the amount of campaign money that was raised and distributed (Hernson 1993; Dwyre 1993).

A team of researchers at UCLA have put themselves squarely in the revitalization camp, arguing that presidential parties are “back” after having briefly lost control for a few years following the McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms of the 1970s. Cohen et al. (2001) contend that, since 1980, major political parties have effectively controlled the presidential nominations process and have coordinated their actions in selecting nominees. Cohen et al. clash directly with the parties-in-decline scholars, asserting that the “reports of the death of parties are...frequently exaggerated by scholars and others,” because analysts are confused by the significance of organizational form. “[O]rganizational form,” they write, “is not what makes a party. It is, rather, the will and the ability of party members to bridge their differences in a united front for the sake of contesting elections.” (Cohen et al. 2001: 75) The “new” party organizational form is a loosely structured network of elites rather than the traditional hierarchy that dominated party politics in the first half of the twentieth century. The fact that the parties *control* nominations is shown by the fact that they control the *resources* presidential candidates need to compete effectively in state primaries and caucuses – resources which include funding, expertise, and

“credible cues” from major players signaling both the support and the worthiness of a given candidate.

Cohen et al. have developed an innovative way to measure control of resources in presidential nominations contest. They collected all publicly declared endorsements of every presidential candidate that appeared in print news. This method allowed them to gather many factors into their data: U.S. senators, basketball players, party leaders, interest groups. Cohen et al. then weighted each endorsement and measured the impact of all endorsements on the nominations contest.

I have collected a similar list of endorsements for another executive office – governors. I examined all publicly declared endorsements of gubernatorial candidates in both primary and general elections in six states over a certain period of time. By examining a state-wide office in several states that differ across several axes, I can investigate the question of nomination control with great precision.

### **About the Data: Endorsements**

Primary elections clearly differ from general elections in that they are one-party affairs. The simple voting cue of party is absent. What other sources of information are available? Political scientists have theorized that voters use advice or statements of opinions by leaders (Berelson 1954), partisan identification (Campbell et al. 1960), particular events that take place during a campaign (Popkin 1991), and “the past” (Fiorina 1981) to help cue their vote. It would seem obvious, though, that endorsements from public officials and from interest groups provide a powerful, efficient, and low-cost information cue in the absence of party. The question is: To what extent does an interest group endorsement, or any endorsement for that matter, persuade a voter. Recent research by Lupia (2002), and by Lupia and McCubbins (1998), has found that

endorsements can indeed persuade, but only when the voter perceives that the endorser is knowledgeable and when the voter perceives that the endorser and the voter share common interests. Endorsements from individuals and groups, therefore, whom voters perceive as knowledgeable and who have clearly identifiable interests, significantly affect voter choice.

I collected publicly reported endorsements for gubernatorial candidates so that I could map the range of endorsements over time, and trace both how they operate from election to election and from candidate to candidate. Some elections have many endorsements from many different groups – others have very few. This fact raises a number of questions: Why? Does the candidate with the most endorsements always win? Where do endorsements come from? Is there a coalition that forms around a candidate that is consistent from election to election, or does the tenor of each election vary so significantly that coalitions develop anew for each election? Is there a tipping point in highly-contested elections? These are the sorts of questions my data throws up.

What does an endorsement mean? An endorsement can mean different things, depending on who is doing the endorsing. When a major group, such as the AFL-CIO or the NRA endorses a candidate, that endorsement brings with it not only major commitments of resources but also troops on the ground, office-space for campaigns, additional sources of advertising, fund-raising lists, phone-banks, and networks of activists. When a newspaper endorses, that endorsement comes at a critical moment in a campaign and can have a modest effect on highly-informed, politically attentive readers.<sup>4</sup> However, when a minor celebrity or a small group endorses, that endorsement may represent nothing more than permission to use the endorser's name.

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<sup>4</sup> Ansolabehere, Stephen, Rebecca Lessem, and Jr. James M. Snyder. 2004. Newspaper Endorsements in U.S. Elections, 1940-2002. *Unpublished*.

Endorsements can come with strings attached. Those already holding office can use endorsements as political favors – a thank you for support in the last election, or a *quid pro quo* for supporting the candidate on a specific issue. Interest groups often demand commitments from candidates when an endorsement is up for grabs. Before endorsing, the NRA requires a public statement of support from the candidate, along with the requirement that the candidate fill out a questionnaire in a way that is favorable to the NRA’s positions on firearms and related issues (Grossman and Helpman 1999). Under the same circumstances, the National Organization for Women requires the candidate to support unrestricted abortion rights and to make a commitment to fight for the Equal Rights Amendment. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that politically active groups serve as critical intermediaries between political leaders and citizens. Such groups spend most of their resources educating and mobilizing their membership on important political matters. Public endorsements from them can be seen, therefore, as a means of communication between informed group leaders – the elite – and less informed rank-and-file members. Endorsements, then, serve as informational short-cuts which encourage group members to behave in accordance with the wishes of the elite. In addition, the endorsement may have an effect beyond the group’s membership and may have an impact on both group sympathizers and group opponents. Clark (2001) writes that “...perceived group membership, in fact, may significantly extend electoral reach beyond formal ties...” (105).

### **Selection of the States**

I chose six states for this study: Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, and Texas. My choice was based on four criteria: 1) the level of party competition in the state over the time period being examined, 2) consistency in the “type” of primary in state elections (i.e. whether the state has an open or closed primary system; explained below), 3) the

consistency of the primary election type across the study’s time period, and 4) the electronic availability of multiple newspapers.

Level of party competition is one indicator of party strength. The more competition between parties, the less likely it is that a single party dominates, and the more likely it is that the two parties are equal contenders in elections. V.O. Key notes that where two-party competition is absent or weak, the result is multifactional parties that are unable to control nominations and cannot enact legislative programs (Key 1949; Key 1956). Weak parties appear, Key argues, because no force drives the majority party toward internal cohesion and discipline. Without an opposition party to serve as a countervailing force, a majority party fragments under its own power. Gray and Lowery (1996) suggest that high levels of two-party competition in a state mobilize group involvement in state politics and elections. High levels of party competition, they argue, raise uncertainty, because the potential for change in administration and policy becomes a real possibility, encouraging more groups mobilize in protection of their cause (Gray and Lowery 1996).

I chose states which maintained a high degree of party competition over the time period of this study (1994-2002), measured using the Ranney Index (see Table 2-1).

**Table 2-1: Index of State Party Balance**

	<b>Party Control (1980-1998)</b>	<b>Party Control (1999-2003)</b>	<b>Party Competition (1980-1998)</b>	<b>Party Competition (1999-2003)</b>
CO	0.412	0.417	0.912	0.917
OH	0.455	0.289	0.955	0.789
IL	0.488	0.519	0.988	0.981
TX	0.623	0.378	0.877	0.878
NM	0.624	0.617	0.876	0.883
MA	0.740	0.694	0.760	0.806

Source: Jewell and Morehouse (2001) pgs. 30-32; Bibby and Holbrook in Gray and Hanson (2002) pg. 88.

Another reason I selected these specific states is because of consistency in the type of primary they employ. Parties have wide room to maneuver when regulating their nominating



processes. Not only can they determine when a primary may be used, they can also specify its type. In every state indicated on Table 2, the type of primary has remained consistent over the study's time period. The states I chose employ three of the six types of primaries, and I excluded those states with open, nonpartisan, and blanket primaries because I wanted to limit the study to states in which differences between parties are apparent to voters.

A handful of scholars have undertaken research which examines the effects of primary type on nominations. Tobin and Keynes (1975), for example, found that nonpartisan groups are more likely to influence the gubernatorial nomination in states with open primaries than in states with closed primaries. In closed primary states, control over nominations tends to be held by a single leadership coalition, and candidates are likely to ask party leaders for assistance because party leaders serve as gatekeepers. However, much of Tobin and Keynes' research was conducted in the 1970s. Gerber and Morton (1994) found more recently that, because open primaries encourage crossover voting, the candidate with policy positions closest to the median voter is likely to be the nominee. This conclusion holds only for open primaries, however. It remains to be seen whether either of the conclusions above apply for the time frame of this study.

**Table 2-2: Primary Type**

	Closed	Semiclosed	Semiopen	Open	Nonpartisan	Blanket
Colorado		X				
Illinois			X			
Massachusetts		X				
Ohio			X			
New Mexico	X					
Texas			X			

Source: Federal Election Commission, 2001. *Closed*: party registration required; changes permitted within a fixed time period. *Semiclosed*: unaffiliated voters permitted to vote in a party primary. *Semiopen*: voters must publicly declared their choice or party ballot at polling place on election day. *Open*: voter decides which party primary to vote in privacy or voting booth. *Nonpartisan*: Top two primary votegetters, regardless of party, are nominated for general election. *Blanket*: voter may vote in more than one party's primary, but one candidate per office.

Finally, my states were selected on the basis of data availability. I selected states for which I could find electronic coverage during 1994-2002. Table 2-3 presents a summary of the

newspapers I used, including the date the newspaper coverage became available on LexisNexis, the circulation statistics of the newspaper and the population of the state.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 2-3: Newspapers Used by State**

	<b>Paper</b>	<b>Year LexisNexis Coverage Commenced</b>	<b>Circulation</b>	<b>State Population</b>
<b>Colorado</b>	Denver Westword	1994	108,000	4,757,264
	Rocky Mountain News	1994	288,889	
	Denver Post	1994	288,937	
<b>Illinois</b>	Pantagraph	1996	47,646	12,804,664
	State Journal-Register	1994	57,259	
	Chicago Daily Herald	1997	150,364	
	Chicago Sun Times	1992	481,798	
	Crains Chicago Business	1986	NA	
<b>Massachusetts</b>	Patriot Ledger	1995	64,935	6,473,285
	Worcester Telegram and Gazette	1996	102,592	
	Boston Herald	1994	241,457	
	Boston Globe	1988	450,538	
<b>New Mexico</b>	Albuquerque Tribune	1995	14,373	1,933,484
	Santa Fe New Mexican	1994	24,790	
	Albuquerque Journal	1995	109,693	
	AP	1998	NA	
<b>Ohio</b>	Crains Cleveland Business	1994	19,566	11,505,705
	Cleveland Scene	1999	95,423	
	Dayton Daily	1994	126,642	
	Columbus Dispatch	1992	252,564	
	Plain Dealer	1992	365,288	
<b>Texas</b>	Corpus Christi Caller Times	1999	60,858	22,818,647
	Dallas Observer	1993	109,242	
	Austin-American Statesman	1994	183,312	
	San Antonio Express-News	1996	222,536	
	Houston Chronicle	1991	553,018	

In addition, I gathered endorsement data going back to 1978 for Massachusetts elections, enabling me to explore one state in depth. For the years 1978 through 1990, I used the *Boston*

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<sup>5</sup> In half the cases (OH, IL, and MA), I excluded the Associated Press State & Local Wire because the source tended to return far more additional articles to sort through while not adding more quality to the data. I kept the AP sources for NM, TX, and CO since my endorsement count was so low and I wanted to ensure endorsements were not missed. In nearly all instances, when the AP reported an endorsement, the major newspapers also reported the endorsement and the timing of each report was almost exactly the same.

*Globe's* electronic archive located in the library of the *Boston Globe*. Although it is far better to use more than one source when creating event counts (Woolley 2000), no other newspaper in Massachusetts currently has as extensive and as well designed an electronic archive as the *Boston Globe*.

I should briefly mention a methodology I did not use. I did not take the name of an endorser, combine it with the name of a candidate and go looking in additional sources, such as magazine articles, Google searches and the like. Unlike Cohen et al. (2001), who often took the name of an endorser and then searched on that name, I seldom did it, both because the method introduces inconsistency when some endorsers are chosen but not others, and also because it is laborious. In other studies, researchers using endorsements as data have contacted the campaigns directly and have obtained endorsement lists from them (Dominguez, 2002). This is possible when examining a current campaign, but it is impossible once the campaign is over. Therefore, in the end, I chose a consistent and accessible methodology.

### **Years Selected**

My study focuses on elections from 1994 to 2002 in Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, New Mexico, and Texas, but in Massachusetts the timeframe extends back to 1978. Ideally, a longer time horizon would serve us well, for it would enable us to examine change (or lack of it) over time in terms of party strength in the states, in terms of the competitiveness in primaries and general elections, in terms of the ebb and flow of group participation, and in terms of the changing dynamics of party power. Because of limitations in available data and time, however, such a broad-ranging study was not feasible. Nevertheless, since one of the central goals of this project is to test recent claims made in the literature regarding what endorsements measure and how strong parties are, this goal can still be accomplished without a long time frame.

## **Office Selected**

The data for this study comes from media accounts, so it was necessary to study an office that has a high profile to be certain of press coverage. Also, it is far easier to find information about a state-wide race than about an office with a lower profile. Though I might have examined races for the United States Senate, I finally decided not to because congressional elections, in general, have received a good deal of attention in the literature during the past forty years, while gubernatorial elections remain an understudied area of American politics. Peverill Squire writes:

That state governors are important actors in the American political process is an obvious but underappreciated fact. Scholars of American government all but ignore the office and its holders in favor of studying national politics. In particular, relatively little is known about gubernatorial elections, compared to presidential or congressional campaigns, despite the fact that far more people know who their governor is than who represents them in the U.S. Senate or House (Squire, 1992: 125).

In addition, gubernatorial elections are thought to provide more fertile ground than do congressional elections for the study of contested primaries. John Bibby, for example, notes that “it is well documented that incumbent governors are more vulnerable to electoral defeat [in general elections] than are U.S. senators and representatives” (Bibby 1987: 72).

## **Method of Data Collection**

I employed Boolean searches on LexisNexis. I simply typed a list containing each candidate’s name for a specific election and used the search terms “endors!” or “favor!” or “support!”, requiring the candidate’s name and the search term to appear in the same paragraph. For primary elections, I covered the time period from exactly one year prior to the date of the primary through the date of the primary election itself. For general elections, I covered the time

period from the day after the primary through the date of the general election.<sup>6</sup> For each endorsement I noted the date of the article, the source of the article, and the date of the endorsement, if available.<sup>7</sup> In all, 2,132 names of people and organizations for the thirteen election cycles were gathered by examining over 20,000 newspaper articles.

Next, I coded the endorsements along several axes, including *type*. I identified nine endorser types: 1) self-proclaimed activists, 2) interest group leaders or representatives, 3) interest groups themselves, 4) media, 5) individual officeholders, 6) political party groups or individuals (e.g. Democratic City Committees, or “a member of the committee”), 7) non-office-holding political people (e.g. an aide to a politician or a former nominee), 8) prominent individuals, and 9) a miscellaneous category. I also coded sub-types where possible and expanded the types. Interest groups, for example, I divided into 37 different sub-types, including such categories as civil rights, conservative, environmental, gay/lesbian, housing, human services, industry, labor, liberal, minority, pro-choice, pro-gun, pro-life, taxpayers, and women's. A full listing of types and sub-types is available in Appendix A.

The endorsement data that I collected has several peculiarities worth noting. First, the timing of endorsements is not always clear. Most newspaper accounts are clear about the exact date on which the endorsement occurred, though some accounts simply tell the reader the candidate was endorsed by X or Y, leaving the date of the endorsement out entirely. How this issue is handled depends on which question we want answered. On the one hand, if we are interested in knowing when the public at large becomes aware of an endorsement, the absence of a date is of no consequence since it is the timing of the story – the point of public knowledge –

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<sup>6</sup> Each search yielded many extraneous articles that usually related to the normal business of government.

<sup>7</sup> In cases in which the article stated that a group or individual had endorsed the candidate “yesterday” or even “last week”, the approximate date of the endorsement was clear-cut. In some instances, however, the clarity of the date was not so clear. I rely, therefore, on the date of the article as the approximate date of the endorsement.

that matters. On the other hand, if we are interested in how an endorsement from group or individual X acts as a cue or as a signal to group or individual Y, then the timing of the endorsement itself, not just the date it is reported in the press, matters. We are interested in both, of course, but our primary interest is in how an endorsement serves as a cue. Hence, the exact timing of its occurrence counts. When collecting endorsements, I entered both the date of publication and the date the newspaper reported that the endorsement occurred. When a newspaper account failed to report the actual date of the endorsement, I entered “not available.” Because most reports were clear about when the endorsement was made, I used the article’s publication date as the best proxy I had for the date of the endorsement in all cases.

Another inadequacy of the data is that it is incomplete. Because I relied almost exclusively on newspaper accounts,<sup>8</sup> I did not collect the entire universe of endorsements for any given election cycle. Moreover, my sample is not random. It is much more likely for a newspaper to report the endorsement from a prominent group or individual (and much more likely for a politician to tout such an endorsement) than it is for a newspaper to report the endorsement from an unknown. This certainly skews the data. However, since I assume that the more prominent an endorser the more important the endorsement, the bias is slight.

I conducted in-person in-depth interviews with 18 people involved in Massachusetts politics, including former governors, former gubernatorial candidates, party leaders, political analysts, and journalists. In addition, I spoke with a variety of political observers in other states, party archivists and the like, either over the phone or through email. A complete list of

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<sup>8</sup> To check the veracity of my data early on in my data-gathering process, I consulted several large interest groups in Massachusetts to find out whom they had supported in each election and compared this with newspaper accounts. The newspapers failed to report the withholding of endorsements in two election cycles, but always reported the granting of endorsements.

interviews is available in Appendix B. Finally, I collected vote totals for every candidate in both primary and general elections. For the latter data, I used state-level returns reported in *Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections* for all states except Massachusetts. For Massachusetts, I used the city and town-level returns reported in the Secretary of State's publication, *Massachusetts Election Statistics*.

### **Specifying Hypotheses:**

#### **Incumbency:**

The incumbency advantage enjoyed by governors has been well documented. Incumbent governors in all fifty states nearly always win re-nomination when they run in primary elections, a fact which scholars attribute to their ability to ward off serious competition from quality challengers (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002; Cox and Katz 1996). Between 1980 and 2000, 46 percent<sup>9</sup> of incumbent governors were unopposed in their party's nomination (Bardwell 2002). When incumbents do face opposition, they rarely lose. Between 1980 and 2000, in 88 contested primaries, only five incumbents lost their party's nomination (Bardwell 2003). High job approval ratings, strong financial advantages, party endorsements, and success in prior elections all serve to deter potential challengers.

While incumbents enjoy strong name recognition, the perks of office, and usually a well-greased fundraising machine, challengers by contrast face an up-hill battle. They must spend large amounts on campaign advertising, travel, and staff. Bardwell (2002) finds that incumbent governors on average outspend their primary challengers five to one.

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<sup>9</sup> This excludes nominees in Virginia and Utah who were selected by state party convention rather than by direct primary.

Given the rewards of incumbency, it seems logical to expect popular incumbents to benefit from an “endorsement advantage” as well. We expect popular incumbents to receive high-quality endorsements – from major interest groups, from key players in state politics, from well-connected individuals, and from newspapers. By contrast, we expect vulnerable incumbents to face an endorsement disadvantage. Vulnerable incumbents not only suffer from low popularity ratings, they often attract high-quality challengers. Under those circumstances, the endorsement pie has more takers. Moreover, high-quality endorsers are wary of squandering their political capital on vulnerable incumbents and withhold endorsements accordingly.

#### **Candidate Quality**

Congressional literature has examined “challenger quality” in some depth (Cox and Katz 1996; Green and Krasno 1988; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). The general findings of these studies is that quality challengers – politically experienced, well-funded candidates – emerge when they are likely to win either because a seat is open or because an incumbent looks vulnerable. This finding holds for gubernatorial elections as well (Squire 1992). Candidate quality can be measured using a variety of factors. Here, I use Jewell’s (1984) measure of political experience, easily observed and easily assessed. His 4-point scale ranges from (4) = incumbent to (0) = political novice (see Chapter 3).

Just as we expect incumbents to have an endorsement advantage, we also expect quality challengers to benefit from high-profile endorsements. Because my measure of “quality” is Jewell’s measure of political experience, it assumes that those with wide political experience also have a large, well-connected network of friends and associates who can both assist with securing endorsements and offer endorsements themselves.



### **High Quality Endorsers**

Just as there are high-quality challengers in electoral politics, so there are also high-quality endorsers. Within the universe of potential endorsers in any given state, there are certain endorsements that campaigns covet because these endorsements endow the campaign with legitimacy -- with resources, momentum, and, ultimately, with votes. Certain features characterize high-quality endorsers: (1) They appear regularly from one election to the next because they are players in state politics and are actively engaged in elections on an ongoing basis. (2) They represent and command key constituencies. Labor groups, for example, both represent key constituencies and command respect from their leaders, while following the group's chosen candidate. Elected officials, whether state legislators or mayors, represent key geographic constituencies, are well connected within political networks, and can direct campaigns to the right point-people within their geographic unit to mobilize voters. (3) High-quality endorsers, such as newspapers are, well-known entities across a wide spectrum of voters. Even people who are not regular readers know the state newspapers and may respond positively to a campaign commercial touting a newspaper's endorsement. (4) High-quality endorsers grant their endorsement at a strategic moment in the campaign, an idea that will be developed further later. A high-quality endorser may wait until a critical point in the campaign season to bestow their endorsement because they are cautious, they wish to protect their reputation, or they wish to maintain their political capital.

### **Winning Coalitions**

While attracting a few key, high-quality endorsements is certain to demonstrate strength in any candidate, what a candidate really wants is a winning coalition of endorsers around him or her. Within the universe of endorsers, there is a sub-set, a group or groups that are notable not

only for size, but also for composition. These band together (informally and perhaps without knowledge of the other) from election cycle to election cycle and produce the winning nominee. We expect that where there are strong parties, there are strong, winning coalitions. And, of these winning coalitions, we expect them to be stable – to have the same general membership from election to election.

### **Parties**

What does a “strong” party look like, particularly during the nomination process? A party can certainly not influence, let alone control, the nomination process if its members are substantially divided on which candidate to support. Consequently, one criterion for a party is unity among elites. In addition, following the primary, the party should band together and should, at least some of the time, be successful in having its candidate win the general election. Strong parties unite to influence the nomination; weak parties do not unify at all. We should expect, therefore, to see parties that are unified during the nominations process, that demonstrate a united front, and select and support their nominee relatively early in the process.

### CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL RESULTS IN FIVE STATES

In this chapter, I systematically present the data gathered about endorsements of gubernatorial candidates in five of the six states in this study (excluding Massachusetts), focusing on timing, key actors, networks, and implications.

The main question under scrutiny is *who controls the nomination* in gubernatorial elections. Do parties ultimately command the nominations process, or must each candidate individually build their own candidate-centered organization in order to win the nomination?

I engage two theses regarding party control of nominations: the Jewell and Morehouse (2001) argument that party control of nominations flows from the presence or absence of preprimary endorsements; and the Cohen et al. argument that the hallmark of party control of nominations is the extent to which “the extended party” participates in electoral politics, cueing elites to select the most broadly acceptable candidate.

As pointed out in the previous chapter, Jewell and Morehouse (2001) argue that state parties are likely to control the nominations process, given certain institutional conditions, namely the presence or absence of party preprimary endorsements either by law or by custom. States with preprimary endorsements are cohesive and strong in their nominating processes, they argue. States without such systems tend toward party disarray. For Jewell and Morehouse, the storyline associated with preprimary endorsements is this: local party leaders are unified under a state chair. They control the nominations for governor by sending local delegations to the state convention and can count on them backing the chosen individual. A coalition around the candidate builds to the point that it can both sustain a challenge and carry over into the general election campaign. The stronger the party, they contend, the more likely it is that the party can successfully perform its three main functions – choosing a nominee, assisting the nominee in getting elected, and finally providing the organizational strength, once in office, to govern.

Cohen et al. (2001) identify partisan elites in presidential nominations contests and measure their behavior during the preprimary period. Cohen et al. contend that this approach allows them to capture the pool of important partisans involved in presidential campaigns and to assess how much institutional backing a given candidate has, as well as the impact of this support on the nomination process. They find that institutional backing matters – successful candidates have the full weight of the party, of partisan-aligned interest groups and of important individuals behind them. They find that the “party” is more than party chairs, governors, senators, and other members of the regular party apparatus. They find that the party also includes groups that regularly work for the party and who choose (endorse) the candidate that is not necessarily an ideological clone of the group, but is rather the candidate they deem most likely to win in the general election. Cohen et al. show that in order to compete successfully for the presidency, candidates really do need a broad set of inside interests on their side.

In this chapter, I employ several measures to discern partisan control of nominations. For every state, I use three tests designed by Cohen et al. (2001), I examine the quality of candidates running in each election, and I look at the presence or absence of preprimary endorsements and other institutional designs.

### **Methods of Discerning Partisan Control**

#### **Small World Test:**

Do political players and campaign backers encompass a “small world” – small enough that all candidates must compete *within* this limited group? In order to determine the answer, Cohen et al. examine to what degree the same people and the same groups endorse from one

election to the next. A considerable portion of repeat endorsers indicates to them that the size of the pool is relatively small and stable.<sup>10</sup>

**United Front Test:**

Do party leaders form a united front, focusing on the candidate most capable of uniting the party and of winning in the general? In order to determine the answer, Cohen et al. look at the pacing of endorsements throughout the primary and at how interest groups and other factional interests behave. A broadly acceptable candidate encourages party members to make endorsements at a faster rate than a candidate with narrow appeal. Interest groups and factional interests sometimes pass over the candidate most in line with their interests in favor of a candidate with broader appeal and greater ability to unite the party.

**Decisive Influence Test:**

Is the influence of the small world of party elites decisive? Cohen et al. develop a variety of measures for this final test, including the simplest – does the winner of the endorsement derby also win the nomination?

If the answers to all three questions are positive, then the party is strong, healthy, and in control of the nominations process.

**Candidate Quality:**

We would expect parties to endorse candidates who have significant office-holding experience. Parties, generally, tend to discourage “outsider” candidates; instead, they seek candidates with established records of success at the state-level or, at the very least, candidates with long-term service to the party organization. The congressional literature has examined “challenger quality” in some depth (Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Green and Krasno 1988; Cox

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<sup>10</sup> Cohen et al. weight their endorsers and hence are able to pluck from their data only those repeaters who they deem powerful in order to arrive at their “small world” conclusions. I do not weight my endorsers for reasons described in chapter 2.

and Katz 1996). The general findings of these studies is that quality challengers – politically experienced, well-funded candidates – emerge when their probability of winning increases because of either an open seat or because an incumbent looks particularly vulnerable.

I use Jewell’s (1984), four-point scale method of scoring individual gubernatorial candidates, based on their political experience. Unlike the Jacobson and Kernell, Jewell assigns different values for different types of political experience.

**Table 3-1: Multipoint measure of gubernatorial candidate quality**

Points	Type of Experience
4	Incumbent governor
3	Former governor
2	Elected state officeholder, member of Congress, state House Speaker, state Senate President, mayor of major city
1	Any person who formerly held any of the offices listed under measure 2, current state legislator or mayor of a small city, former candidate for governor or U.S. Senator
0	None of the above

Incumbents have an endorsement advantage, and quality candidates receive high profile endorsements. Because I measure of “quality” according to political experience, it follows that those with wide political experience also have a large, well-connected network of friends and associates who can both assist with securing endorsements and also offer endorsements themselves.

Before proceeding to the next section, I present a table summarizing the legal requirements surrounding primaries, the month in which the primary is held, and Jewell and Morehouse’s strength rating. In addition, full results of every election and timelines documenting endorsements granted election are available in Appendices A and B, respectively.

**Table 3-2: Summary of Primary Laws and Customs and General Information about the State Primaries**

	Party Gubernatorial	State Requirements for	% Contested Primary		

	Nominations		Primary Election Voting		Elections		Primary Date	Jewell & Morehouse Rating
	Preprimary Endorsement by Law	Preprimary Endorsements by Party Rule or Practice	Completely Closed	Open/Closed <sup>11</sup>	Democrat	Republican		
CO	X			X	33%	67%	Aug	Strong
IL		X		X	100%	100%	Mar	Strong
MA		X		X	86%	57%	Sep	Moderate
OH		X		X	33%	0	May	Strong
NM	X		X		50%	50%	Jun	Weak
TX				X	67%	33%	Mar	Moderate

Texas does not have preprimary endorsements.

## COLORADO

### Overview of Colorado Politics

Colorado is generally known as a Republican state, and it is the most Republican state in my dataset according to the Ranney (1976) measure of party control. The GOP has dominated both houses of the Colorado Assembly for almost all of the period 1960-2002, save four years. The Democrats, however, have dominated every single gubernatorial election between 1974 and 1994. Only in the last two election cycles have the Republicans made headway with the top office. At the federal level, however, Colorado has split between the two parties. Between 1978 and 1994, Colorado had one senator from each political party. This situation came to an end when Ben Nighthorse Campbell switched from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in 1995. In the House of Representatives, Colorado has had a four-to-two split, with Republicans taking the edge.

Colorado mandates a pre-primary endorsement. Every registered member of each political party may participate in their neighborhood precinct caucuses in April to elect delegates to the county convention that is held in May. At the May county conventions, candidates must win 30% (a sizable threshold) of the delegate vote to move to the state party convention. The

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<sup>11</sup> “There is little practical difference,” Jewell and Morehouse (2001: 104) write, “between some closed primaries that allow some voters change their status on primary election day and some open primaries that ask voters to publicly select their party preference on election day.”

state party convention operates under the same procedures as the county convention. Candidates must again win 30% of the delegate vote to qualify for the August primary ballot (Appleton and Ward 1997).

The two major parties in Colorado are highly polarized. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) list Colorado as one of the most polarized states in the nation. This division falls largely along city-suburb lines, with Democrats drawing strength from cities such as Denver, Pueblo, and Boulder, while Republican gains are drawn from the suburban-style city of Colorado Springs and the rural expanses along the western edge of the state.

According to Mayhew (1986) and Appleton and Ward (1997), party bosses and patronage politics are virtually non-existent in Colorado party politics, and, to some degree, it has ever been thus. The rank-and-file play the key role in nominations, these researchers argue. Mayhew reported these findings when he published research into the Colorado of the 1950s and 1960s, giving it a TPO score of 1 (Mayhew, 1986). Appleton and Ward investigated the parties of the 1980s and 1990s and reported the same finding. Volunteer party workers have as “their only reward ... whatever satisfaction they get out of their activity and whatever sense of accomplishment and prestige they may feel” (Martin 1960; Mayhew 1986). Yet the quantity and the type of endorsements candidates receive tell a different story. Party-affiliated insiders dominate the endorsements. For the three election cycles under investigation, I found only a small number of endorsements for candidates, but those endorsements were from major interest party-affiliated groups (Christian Coalition and the NRA on the right, and Colorado NARAL and the Sierra Club on the left), and from key party leaders in Colorado politics including U.S. senators, the mayor of Denver, and party chairs.



## **Overview of Colorado Elections**

1994

The 1994 Democratic primary was uncontested as popular three-term governor Roy Romer ran unopposed (he was first elected in 1986). Romer won the general election by nearly 18 percentage points, beating his Republican opponent Bruce Benson. Romer received endorsements in the Democratic primary just before the May endorsing convention. Most of his endorsements came from individuals – from former cabinet members, two former state senators and from prominent individuals, including land-owners in the Colorado Rockies and philanthropist Merle Chambers (see Table 3-3). These low numbers are not surprising, given that he was an incumbent (see Massachusetts chapter for more detail on this).

The Republicans ran three candidates in the 1994 primary, two of whom were low quality candidates who each earned under a quarter of the total vote share. The third candidate, oilman and former Republican Party chairman Bruce Benson won the primary handily with 61.4 percent of the vote. Benson garnered only two endorsements, both from business owners and both in March 1994.

The general election produced little more endorsement activity for either party, though the incumbent Romer earned more than Benson. Benson received four endorsements – support from the traditionally Republican-affiliated group, the NRA, and from the CEO of a natural gas company. Benson’s two additional endorsements came from two dispersed “groups,” according to press accounts, including a number of “prominent Colorado Democrats” and several “Latinos.” Romer received his seven endorsements throughout September and October from prominent Democratic-affiliated groups such as Colorado Clean Water Action, Colorado NARAL, and Hispanics of Colorado.

**Table 3-3: Count of Endorsements in Colorado Democratic Primaries by Year and by Type**

	Interest Group	Miscellaneous	Officeholder	Party Individual or Group	Prominent Individual	Total
1994	1	2	5		5	13
1998	4	3	3	2	1	13
2002	5		1			6
Total	10	5	9	2	6	32

**Table 3-4 Count of Endorsements in Colorado Republican Primaries by Year and by Type**

	Interest Group	Miscellaneous	Officeholder	Prominent Individual	Total
1994				2	2
1998	5	2	9		16
2002	3	1			4
Total	8	3	9	2	22

### 1998

In 1998, both parties held contested primaries. Each party ran two candidates, and in both cases the victor won by more than a ten-percentage points.

On the Republican side, state treasurer and former legislator, Bill Owens, the eventual winner, received three major endorsements at least eight months prior to the election (and five months before the endorsing convention). One of these was from House Speaker Chuck Berry and the other two were from key conservative groups, the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family. Owens also managed to win the support of moderate, pro-choice Republicans such as Bruce Holland, the chair of the Denver County Republican Party. Owens received the lion's share of institutional support, collecting endorsements from the entire GOP delegation to the U.S. House and from more than half of the members of the Colorado House of Representatives. His competitor, Colorado Senate President, Tom Norton, received four endorsements, two from each of two unions (the Colorado Association of Public Employees and the Colorado Education Association), one from former Senator Bob Dole, and an additional one from a state representative.

On the Democratic side, both candidates received support only from major players in Colorado, though the majority of endorsements and the breadth of inside support went to the current lieutenant governor Gail Schoettler, who was also the eventual winner. Mike Feeley, state senator and Senate Minority Leader, lost the primary to Shoettler, in spite of the fact that he had the full support of organized labor, the Democratic Leadership Council and a former attorney general. The AFL-CIO came out for Feeley nearly a year before the primary, in September 1997, but the remaining endorsements did not arrive until the endorsing convention and later. Gail Schoettler, on the other hand, received the endorsement of Governor Roy Romer in April 1998, followed by that of the mayor of Denver, Wellington Webb, two weeks later. She also received the endorsement of the Democratic State Party Chairman, Howard Gelts, just before the primary. She had the support of a broad range of groups, including women's organizations, Latino organizations, and real estate groups.

The 1998 general election was hotly contested between Schoettler and Owens, with Owens winning by just 6,297 votes, or 0.6 percent. Both candidates had roughly the same number of endorsements (see Table 3-5). Owens received support from a number of prominent Republicans, from two of the major newspapers in Colorado – the *Denver Post* and the *Rocky Mountain News*, but he also drew support from black leaders and from a handful of Democrats such as former Democratic state senator, Larry Trujillo. Owens managed to bring together moderate and more conservative factions of the Republican party, according to press accounts, as he crafted his 1998 campaign:

Owens, a Catholic who opposes abortion and has enjoyed the blessings of the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, has strong support in the Republican religious-right wing, which controls much of the party machinery, including the state chairmanship. At the same time, though, he has convinced key moderate, pro-choice Republicans to come along for the ride – perhaps because the latter group is so eager to reclaim the Governor's Mansion. (Denver Westword

(Colorado), April 9, 1998 Life of the Party: Winning the Governor's Mansion could be a religious experience for the GOP. Ward Harkavy)

Schoettler drew support from a variety of traditional Democratically-aligned groups, including the Sierra Club, NARAL, the AFL-CIO, the teachers' unions, the National Association of Social Workers and several out-of-state supporters, such as First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, former Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and movie actor Robert Redford.

**Table 3-5: Count of Endorsements in Colorado General Election, 1998**

	Activists	Interest Group	Media	Miscellaneous	Officeholder	Party Individual or Group	Prominent Individual	Total
1994		5	1	2		1	2	11
1998	1	8	2		9	6	6	32
2002		11	1	1	5			18
Total	1	24	4	3	14	7	8	61

**2002**

The 2002 Colorado primaries were also uncontested and the general election, though contested, was hardly competitive. Incumbent governor Bill Owens sailed to victory in the November election with 65 percent of the vote. The Democrats ran businessman and CEO, Rollie Heath, a candidate who had never before held elected office.

**Applying the Tests**

**Table 3-6: Summary of Test Results Applied to Colorado**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Candidate Quality
Democrats	1994	8%	100%	NA	4
	1998	23%	62%	No	2
	2002	50%	84%	NA	0
Republicans	1994	0	100%	No	0
	1998	13%	75%	Yes	2
	2002	0	100%	NA	4

NA is noted when the election was uncontested.

After examining the endorsement activity of groups and individuals in Colorado, a pattern emerges in which parties, major party-aligned groups and officeholder leaders become involved. This group is small indeed, though not “stable” in the sense that the same names do not appear again and again.

**Small World: Repeat Endorsers**

**Table 3-7: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Colorado Democratic Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=13	92%	8%
1998 n=13	77%	23%
2002 n=6	50%	50%
Average	73%	27%

**Table 3-8: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Colorado Republican Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=2	100%	0%
1998 n=16	88%	13%
2002 n=4	100%	0%
Average	91%	4%

The average number of repeat endorsers is paltry – 27 percent for the Democrats and 4 percent for the Republicans. The number of repeat endorsers within the Coloradoan Republican party is clearly lower than it is for the Democratic party – but the absolute number of endorsers is low too. Who are the endorsers? Table 3-9 below, displays a listing of the repeat endorsers for both the Republican and the Democratic candidates. The number of repeat endorsers is extremely low; moreover two of the repeaters endorsed *both* a Republican and Democrat. If an endorser supports both parties, can they be called part of the party at all? Are they part of the extended party? No. Groups endorse *both* parties when it is in their interest to be acceptable to both teams. It is a way to hedge their bets. The behavior of double-dipping on endorsements can be called all sorts of things (smart, a good use of political capital or otherwise), but one thing it is *not* is party behavior. If the very definition of party is to *unite* behind a team, then a group that roots for both teams is not behaving in the partisan mold.

**Table 3-9: Colorado Repeat Endorsers by Year and by Candidate (both parties)**

Endorser	Candidate	1994	1998	2002
AFL-CIO	Romer (D)	X		
	Feeley (D)		X	
	Heath (D)			X
Colorado Association of Public Employees	Feeley (D)		X	
	Norton (R)		X	
	Heath (D)			X
Colorado Education Association	Norton (R)		X	
	Heath (D)			X
Denver Mayor Wellington Webb	Schoettler (D)		X	
	Heath (D)			X

Labor is clearly the dominant endorser, appearing again and again through each election cycle. Labor, however, is not always supporting the ultimate nominee. The non-repeat endorsers, for both Republicans and Democratic candidates were a hodgepodge of supporters –generally individuals – who appeared for one election and then disappeared. Table 3-10, below, presents a lists of the non-repeat endorsers . The majority of individuals and groups are strongly party-aligned. They are “big” names. On the Democratic side, in the 1994 election, the non-repeat endorsers were “friends” of incumbent and unopposed Governor Roy Romer – former state senators, former cabinet members, and a series of prominent individuals such as philanthropist Merle Chambers. The 1998 primary election brought other individuals into the fray – a former attorney general, 66 Latino leaders, the Democratic state party chair, former governor Roy Romer, and former Senate Majority leader Ray Kogovsek. The Democratic Leadership Council endorsed Mike Feeley. The one non-party affiliated interest group that was not a repeat endorser was Coloradoans for Western Values – a short lived nonprofit designed exclusively for the re-election of Gail Schoettler.<sup>12</sup> The 2002 primary election had three interest group endorsements – from the Colorado Building and Construction Trades, Colorado NARAL, and the Colorado Professional Fire Fighters – each group endorsed challenger Rollie Heath in an uncontested primary. No individuals endorsed Heath, according to my search criteria.

On the Republican side, the non-repeat endorsers were also largely individuals – either officeholders or wealthy donors. The five interest groups involved in the 1998 and 2002 primary elections were two major conservative religious groups – the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, Small Business for Responsive Government and the Farmers and Ranchers

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<sup>12</sup> Coloradoans for Western Values was later found in violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act because it served an inherently political purpose.

Coalition, and finally a set of “community and advocacy organizations” which were not identified in the press.

**Table 3-10: Colorado Non-Repeat Endorsers who Endorsed Democrats**

Endorser	1994	1998	2002
66 Latino leaders		X	
airport contractors Robert and Linda Alvarado	X		
Coloradoans for Western Values		X	
Colorado Building and Construction Trades			X
Colorado NARAL			X
Colorado Professional Fire Fighters			X
Colorado Rockies ownership group	X		
Democratic Leadership Council		X	
Democratic state party chairman Howard Gelt		X	
former Romer cabinet members Cole Finegan	X		
former Romer cabinet members Ken Salazar	X		
former Romer cabinet members Penfield Tate III	X		
former state Sen Regis Groff	X		
former state Sens. Tom Glass	X		
Garts of sporting goods		X	
J.D. MacFarlane, former Colorado Attorney General		X	
Jerry McMorris	X		
Merle Chambers	X		
Micky Miller	X		
Millers of real estate development		X	
Oren Benton	X		
organized labor		X	
Ray Kogovsek		X	
Roy R. Romer		X	
Warren Toltz	X		



**Table 3-11: Colorado Non-Repeat Endorsers who Endorsed Republicans**

Endorser	1994	1998	2002
20 members of the Colorado Legislature		X	
200 doctors and medical professionals			X
25 House Republicans		X	
4 U.S. House Republicans from Colorado		X	
Bob Dole, 1996 Republican candidate for president		X	
Charles Steinbrueck	X		
Christian Coalition		X	
Community organizations and advocacy groups across Colorado			X
Doug Dean		X	
ex-senator and religious-right leader Bill Armstrong		X	
Focus on the Family		X	
House Speaker, Republican Chuck Berry		X	
Jack Kemp		X	
Joe Rogers		X	
Larry Trujillo, director of the state Department of Personnel and General Support Services			X
Robinson Dairy Inc. Chairman Dick Robinson	X		
Small Business for Responsible Government		X	
State Sen. Jim Congrove		X	
The Farmers & Ranchers Coalition			X
U.S. Senator Wayne Allard		X	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>4</b>

The Colorado case suggests that the “small world” test needs to be amended – that to measure simply the recurrence of endorsers, or even the recurrence of major endorsements (see Cohen et al.) – does not describe the real situation in a state in which the parties are so strong that endorsements do not act as a cue but as a stamp of approval.

**United Front, Decisive Influence and Candidate Quality**

Due to the small number of endorsers and candidates in the elections under scrutiny, it is hard to fin down the united front. Neither party had a united front in 1998 when both parties ran candidates for an open seat. What was the decisive influence? The winning candidate in Democratic primaries received an average of 84 percent of endorsements granted, while the winning candidate in Republican primaries received an average of 92 percent.

What of candidate quality? The results produced by Jewell's (1984) four-point scale are mixed, though predictable and understandable. In 1994 and again in 2002, the opposition party was up against an incumbent – an incumbent who, in both general elections, won by a sizable margin. It is difficult in such circumstances to find a high quality candidate – an ambitious politician – who is willing to run in an election with such high odds of failure. In both 1994 and 2002, the Republican and Democratic parties respectively, found a self-financed individual who could run a credible campaign, but who would also most surely lose.

In Colorado, the consequence of strong parties is a primary that is not divisive and, when an incumbent is not running, a highly competitive general election campaign as was the case in the 1998 general election contest between Schoettler and Owens, two high-quality candidates holding state-wide office.

## **OHIO**

### **Overview of Ohio Politics**

“Since their founding, the Ohio Republican and Democratic Parties have closely approximated the textbook description of traditional party organizations: autonomous, hierarchical institutions maintained largely by material incentives, dedicated to nominating candidates for most public offices and securing their election” (Appleton and Ward 1997).

Both parties engaged in major party renewal in late 1970s, which resulted in the development of a strong service orientation for existing and potential candidates. Aggressive Democratic fundraising efforts were dramatically fostered by the absence of any limits on campaign contributions. The OH chapter of the AFL-CIO, as well as other major organizations and the powerful OH House Speaker of the time, Vernal Riffe, made substantial contributions. With the help of augmented resources, the Democratic Party assisted candidates with massive get-out-the-vote drives, advertising campaigns, and voter registration. For its part, the state

Republican Party strengthened its ties to local committees, gave candidates campaign contributions, and built sophisticated headquarters full of the latest technology and capable, experienced staff.

In 1987, both parties benefited from a legal change that allowed for public financing of parties, an arrangement by which tax filers were able to direct one dollar of their state income tax to a state party fund that is divided among state and county party committees. The two state committees each receive one-quarter of the funds. The rest is spread among the counties in proportion to the fund donations that come from each county.

The Ohio Republican and Democratic parties have the informal power to endorse candidates during primary elections and to fill legislative, county, and municipal offices when vacancies occur between elections. Some counties use this power aggressively to endorse, to use slate mailers, to provide financing, and to offer use of the party's bulk-mail permit and access to poll books. Patronage is not yet dead in Ohio, according to Appleton. County party chairs can still provide jobs: "Even governors routinely defer to county chairs when dispensing state jobs and favors" (Appleton and Ward 1997).

Party endorsements in Ohio are made by state party committees which meet without a convention – the party leadership holds a slate-making session. The number and type of participants at these sessions is limited to a small body – far fewer people than would attend an endorsing convention. Moreover, access to these sessions is limited as well – they are closed to the press, and the ballot counts and details of the process are normally not released.

The main control that the parties exerted in the 1990s was the uncontested primary. "The traditional power of Ohio parties at the county and state level rests on their ability to build slates

and to endorse in order to minimize primary conflicts and craft the strong possible ticket,” (Morehouse, 40). Whereas this lack of contestation is a sign of strength for Republicans, it is a sign of weakness for Democrats, at least during the decade under investigation. The Republican Party’s strength lay in its ability to locate high-quality candidates and to keep the competition at bay. The Democratic Party’s weakness lay in its inability to cultivate, let alone to field any high-quality candidates for statewide races. The Republican Party’s potency lay in its ability to develop a stable of potential candidates through its success in legislative and statewide races. According to one press account, “state party Chairman Robert Bennett ... orchestrated his ballots” by, for example, tapping George Voinovich to run in 1990, and persuading Taft to wait until 1998. “Party insiders privately maintain that Bennett promised Taft a clear path to the nomination for governor in 1998 and was able to deliver. There was plenty of jockeying by Republican candidates this year, but by the Feb, 21<sup>st</sup> filing deadline, Bennett had his ticket lined up” (McCarthy 2002). Moreover, as Lee Fisher, the 1998 Democratic gubernatorial nominee, said about running for statewide office, “You’re not just running against [the Republican nominee], you’re running against the Ohio Republican Party.” (McCarthy 2002)

### **Overview of Ohio Elections**

The only contested primary in my entire dataset is the 1994 Democratic primary. The Democrats ran two low-quality candidates to face an extremely popular Republican governor, George Voinovich, in the general election. The candidates were a little-known state senator, Robert Burch, and a Miami University philosophy professor, Lyndon LaRouche ally and recently released prisoner, Peter Shuller.<sup>13</sup> The fact that Shuller managed to win 41.2 percent of the vote in the primary election speaks not of his potential or of his popularity, but rather of the failure of

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<sup>13</sup> The Ohio Democratic party endorsed Robert Burch, but Shuller still managed to achieve ballot access.

the Democratic Party to inform voters about the candidates' backgrounds. Even primary voters paid little attention to the contest.

Shuller received no endorsements that were reported in the press. Burch, on the other hand, did receive endorsements from party organizations and interest groups, and he received them early. Ohio holds its primaries in May. In October, 1993, 59 of Ohio's 88 Democratic county chairmen (the individuals themselves, not the executive committees that run the county Democratic organizations) endorsed Burch, with the AFL-CIO doing the same in December and the party's executive committee in February. Several additional party-affiliated groups and individuals also endorsed Burch in that time frame as well. Burch won the nomination in the May primary, but only collected two endorsements in the general election campaign and went on to lose colossally in November, with only 25.8 percent of the vote.

In 1998, both parties ran high-quality candidates in uncontested primaries. The Democrats tapped former Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, who had lost his re-election bid in 1994. Fisher wrapped up Democratic support early, winning the support of the Democratic Party County Chairmen's Association in September of 1997, followed by the endorsement of a 21-member Democratic Party screening committee in November 1997. The official party endorsement came in December, followed by endorsements from unions (the AFL-CIO and the teachers' union) and from prominent Democrats throughout the spring.

The Republicans ran Secretary of State, Robert A. Taft, and they threw the full weight of the Republican Party behind him early, starting with Governor Voinovich's formal endorsement one full year prior to the May primary (though Voinovich had announced as far back as 1995 that he backed Taft). Four days after Voinovich's May announcement, sixty percent of Ohio Republican county chairs formally endorsed Taft, as did former governor James A. Rhodes in

June. By November, Taft had the endorsements of ten of the eleven Republican members of Congress, nineteen of the twenty-one state senate Republicans, and fifty-eight of the sixty state representatives.

The 1998 general election was a relatively easy win for Taft, with Fisher earning 47.2 percent of the vote to Taft’s 52.8 percent. Taft won the support of all of the major Ohio newspapers, of many police organizations, and of several mayors (including Democratic mayors). Though Fisher received numerically more endorsements (see Table 6), Taft won many party crossover endorsements from Democrats, such as Ron Mottl a former Democratic congressman, and Democratic fund-raiser businessman Thomas T. George. Fisher’s support came from traditional Democrat-aligned groups – the Ohio AFL-CIO, NARAL and the Sierra Club – as well as from groups that often endorse Republicans, such as the Teamsters’ and various police associations.

**Table 3-12: Count of Endorsements, 1998 Ohio General Election, Fisher (D) v. Taft (R)**

Candidate	Interest Group	Media	Officeholder	Party Individual or Group	TOTAL
Fisher	16	2	8		26
Taft	6	4	5	1	11
Total	22	6	13	1	37

Taft ran for re-election in 2002 against Democratic nominee Timothy Hagan, former Cuyahoga County Commissioner and former chair of the County Democratic Party. According to one press account, the Democrats had considerable difficulty finding a nominee, because “the GOP’s dominance of statewide executive offices over the last eight years has contributed to the Democrats’ problem of finding enough candidates to fill out the ticket, let alone challenge each other in the primary” (McCarthy 2002). According to John Sauter, the Central Ohio Field

Coordinator for the Democratic Party, the Democratic party had to “pay candidates to run”<sup>14</sup> for office because of recruitment difficulties. Hagan received only three endorsements in the uncontested primary election campaign – endorsements from Ohio Democratic Party, from the AFL-CIO, and from the Civil Service Employees’ Association. In Taft’s uncontested primary election, he received five endorsements, the majority from unions, including the Teamsters’, the Carpenters’, and the Operating Engineers’. He also received an endorsement from the Ohio Right to Life Society. In the general election, Taft walked away with the election, as Voinovich had done in 1998, with 60.1 percent of the vote.

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<sup>14</sup> Phone interview with John Sauter, January 12, 2005.

## Applying the Tests

**Table 3-13: Summary of Test Results Applied to Ohio**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Candidate Quality
Democrats	1994	20%	100%	Yes	.5
	1998	36%	100%	NA	1
	2002	67%	100%	NA	0
Republicans	1994	0	100%	NA	4
	1998	0	100%	NA	2
	2002	0	100%	NA	4

### United Front and Decisive Influence

Using Jewell and Morehouse’s criteria to evaluate the strength of parties in Ohio – the average primary vote for all of a state’s governors for the last twenty years averaging 80-100 percent – we might conclude that both parties are strong. Indeed, after examining endorsement activity and noting that only major party-aligned groups and officeholder leaders make public endorsements and do so early, we might draw the same conclusion. A united front appears to exist. Ohio’s lack of contested primaries means no divisive primaries. It also means that, for both parties, 100 percent of the endorsements go to the eventual nominee, and hence, they ace the decisive influence test. However, other indicators point exactly the opposite way, at least for the Democratic Party – the massive dominance of the Republican Party in the legislature and in statewide offices means that the Democrats do not have a ready pool of potential candidates. The lack of contested primaries indicates that either ambitious quality candidates have decided *not* to run when sure to lose or that there were no quality candidates to begin with. The latter insight explains why the average candidate quality score for Democratic candidates is a dismal .5 out of 4, compared with the Republicans’ solid 3.3.



**Small World: Repeat Endorsers**

**Table 3-14: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Ohio Democratic Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=10	80%	20%
1998 n=11	64%	36%
2002 n=3	33%	67%
Average	67%	41%

**Table 3-15: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Ohio Republican Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=3	100%	0%
1998 n=14	100%	0%
2002 n=5	100%	0%
Average	100%	0%

Ohio’s Democrats fail the “small world” test, managing only an average 41% percent repeat rate, yet it is far higher than Ohio’s Republicans zero. The repeat endorsers in the Ohio Democratic party are the Democrats themselves (see Table 3-16), and the AFL-CIO. Not exactly a coalition of any sort. Absent are the major labor unions in the state, the individual county chairs, or any other party-aligned group. If the Democrats’ failure is that they lack any coalition, why are the Republicans so successful, yet have no repeat endorsers? The answer lies in the nature of the elections themselves – the kind of politics that occurs when popular incumbents run. As we shall see in the next chapter, campaign managers and strategists argue that incumbents are better-off *not* collecting endorsements because amassing a war chest of endorsements can be viewed as a sign of weakness (see especially the section on the 1986 gubernatorial election in the chapter on Massachusetts).

**Table 3-16: Repeat Endorsers by year, Ohio Democrats**

Endorser	1994	1998	2002
AFL-CIO	X	X	X
Democratic party county chairmen's association		X	X
Democratic Party's executive committee	X	X	
Ohio Democratic Party		X	X

The non-repeat endorsers involved in the Democratic elections are listed in table 3-17. None of the non-repeat endorsers endorsed Republican gubernatorial candidates in other elections, as occurred in Colorado. The individuals listed in Table 3-17 had good reason to *not* endorse in additional elections: they were probably not asked. Any candidate has his or her own personal following of friends and neighbors. Candidates can call on those individuals to secure an endorsement quickly and easily. It is harder to secure the endorsement of an interest group for it requires far greater effort than a quick phone-call. Often interest groups require lengthy “applications” for endorsements – position papers, a required discussion with the members, and general agreement with the group on its goals and mission. Groups have incentives to withhold endorsements, for they too wish to preserve political capital and stay in the good graces of the states’ power structure.

**Table 3-17: Democratic Non-Repeat Endorsers**

Endorsers	1994	1998	2002
18 of the 25 women on the executive committee of the Federated Democratic Women of Ohio	X		
59 of Ohio's 88 Democratic county chairmen--from the county chairmen as individuals, rather than from the executive committees that run the county Democratic organizations.	X		
Coalition of Concerned Black Citizens	X		
Enos Singer, Washington County Democratic Chair & Pres OH Dem Chair Assoc	X		
Franklin County Chairwoman Fran Ryan	X		
Plain Dealer	X		
United Auto Workers	X		
OH AFSCME	X		
Black Elected Democrats of Cleveland		X	
David Milenthal former media consultant to Celeste		X	
Former Gov. Celeste's former chief of staff Ray Sawyer		X	
Former Gov. Celeste's secretary Dora Globe		X	
Nineteen of Cleveland's 21 council members		X	
Ohio Education Association		X	
Vernal G. "Skip" Riffe III, a Scioto County commissioner, and Verna Kay Riffe children of late Speaker of OH House		X	
Ohio Civil Service Employees Association			X

**NEW MEXICO**

**Overview of New Mexico Politics**

New Mexico has a long history of two-party competitions. Party politics are fought over three of the vital sub-regions: the Hispanic North, Little Texas, and Bernalillo County, home of state's largest city, Albuquerque. The Hispanic North is comprised of ten counties which depend on patronage and government jobs, which are Democratic strongholds and which have given majority votes to every Democratic gubernatorial candidate since 1960. Little Texas is comprised of six counties situated in the southeastern corner of the state. This region is dominated by Republicans and has given majority votes to every Republican gubernatorial candidate since 1974. In recent years, the Hispanic North and Little Texas have declined in importance both demographically and politically, while Bernalillo County, now home to over 30 percent of the state's voters, is strongly Republican.

Until 1994, the Democrats dominated the governorship, holding it for all but sixteen years between 1949 and 1994. Republican Gary Johnson won in 1994 and again in 1998, but Democrat Bill Richardson won the governorship back in 2002. While Democrats continue to dominate the legislature and county government, as they have since 1933, Republicans have made considerable inroads. This growth in the Republican Party and the continued survival of the Democratic Party is due to the efficacy (or lack thereof) of their organization at the county level: the stronger the county organization, the stronger the party's showing in electoral competition (Appleton and Ward 1997).

### **Overview of New Mexican Elections**

Because of the lack of data availability on LexisNexis for 1994, I am only able to compare the 1998 and 2002 election cycles in New Mexico.

New Mexico is the only state in my study to hold completely closed primaries, meaning that anyone wanting to vote in a party primary must register well in advance of the primary. Many argue that such strict rules indicate strong parties who keep party business limited to partisans. Like Colorado, New Mexican parties have a legal preprimary endorsement system, although New Mexicans wavered on the subject of endorsing conventions. According to Morehouse, they have been "thrice legalized and then repealed" (Morehouse 1998, 22), but were reinstated in 1994 in an effort to achieve balanced slates between Hispanic and Anglo candidates (Morehouse 22, citing Jewell 1984, 48-9).

Morehouse (1998) refers to New Mexico as a weak party state because neither party has successfully prevented a major primary conflict with multiple candidates appearing on the ballot. Indeed, in the 1998 Democratic primary, five candidates appeared on the ballot, though 78.5 percent of the vote went to the top two candidates; in the 2002 Republican primary, four

candidates appeared on the ballot, though 94 percent of the vote went to the top two candidates. Moreover, major endorsements do indeed go to the winning nominee, but only after the March nominating convention, in April or May.

Endorsement activity in New Mexico gubernatorial elections is relatively low, both in primaries and generals. The situation is like Colorado's in that it consists largely of a few major interest groups, a handful of officeholders, and a few prominent individuals. In contrast to Colorado, however, the majority of endorsements come after the convention. In the 1998 election, former Albuquerque mayor Martin Chavez received endorsements from the two teachers' unions in April and May, as well as from AFSCME and other smaller unions. Chavez ran against four other candidates, but only one of his opponents won a double-digit percentage of the primary vote, Gary King. King won 30.4 percent of the primary vote; Chavez earned 48 percent. King garnered endorsements from environmental groups and from three state senators. The winner of the primary went up against incumbent governor Gary Johnson, who earned 54 percent of the popular vote.

**Table 3-18: Count of Endorsements in New Mexico Democratic Primary Elections by Year**

Election Year	Interest Group	Miscellaneous	Officeholder	Party Individual or Group	Prominent Individual	Total
1998	11		5	2	1	19
2002	4	1		1		6
Total	15	1	5	3		24

**Table 3-19: Count of Endorsements in New Mexico Republican Primary Elections by Year**

Election Year	Interest Group	Officeholder	Media	Miscellaneous	Prominent Individual	Party Individual or Group
1998	1			1		1
2002	3	4	3		2	2
Total	4	4	3	1	2	3

The Republican field of primary candidates in 2002 was crowded, with the ultimate nominee, State Representative John Sanchez (58.1 percent of the primary vote) running against Lieutenant Governor Bradley (35.3 percent of the primary vote). The remaining two low-quality candidates scored less than five percent of the primary vote each and received few endorsements. While the lieutenant governor received four endorsements, including one from the sitting governor, the remaining endorsements came from a talk show host, a retired general, and the *Albuquerque Tribune*. Bradley's main opponent, though a freshman state representative, had won his legislative seat by beating the longtime Democratic House Speaker in his home district – but his win was after several recounts and by only 206 votes. John Sanchez also had the formal backing of President Bush's New Mexico organization, who set their sights on winning New Mexico in 2004 and on courting the nation's fastest-growing minority group, as well as the GOP chair and several major Republican donors. Yet, even after the primary, the governor did not support Sanchez because he “left the party bitterly split ... [relying] heavily on a lavish media campaign that turned the campaign brutally negative in the end” (Russakoff 2002).

The 2002 Democratic primary was virtually uncontested. Bill Richardson had name recognition, inside support and the money to win. He received six endorsements – four from major groups, including AFSCME, NOW, the AFL-CIO, and the Navajo Nation Council, as well as two more from Democratic and Republican donors.

Richardson trounced Sanchez in the general election by nearly 20 points. In the general campaign, Richardson also received endorsements from several high profile Republicans, including the lieutenant governor, the senate majority leader, and from the usual Democrat-aligned groups – labor, teachers, and environmental groups.

## Applying the Tests

**Table 3-20: Summary of Test Results Applied to New Mexico**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Candidate Quality
Democrats	1998	16%	68%	No	1.25
	2002	17%	100%	NA	.5
Republicans	1998	0	100%	NA	4
	2002	21%	50%	No	1.3

It is difficult, based on the short time period and the small number of endorsements I collected, to draw a conclusion about the state of the two parties in New Mexico, yet some qualified findings can be offered. Clearly, though they retained the governorship, the Republicans had no high-quality candidate for the 2002 race, choosing a freshman state representative who was the darling of the national party but not as popular with the state party. Sanchez managed to win four endorsements from Republican-aligned groups in the general election (Right to Life of New Mexico, Associated Builders and Contractors, New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau and the New Mexico Federation of Independent Businesses), but these endorsements meant little when compared with the overwhelming support that his opponent received, not only from traditionally Democrat-aligned groups, but also from high-profile Republicans. While the Democrats had an exceedingly strong candidate in 2002, they could not find a group of strong candidates to run in 1998 against the popular incumbent governor.

### **United Front and Decisive Influence**

For all of the strength that is supposed to flow to parties from a primary system and from pre-primary party endorsements, New Mexican political parties could not coordinate themselves in several key ways. For example, in Ohio we saw that the strong Republican Party chose its nominees early and poured support into those candidates. In contrast, in New Mexico, support from external groups was not expressed until after the party convention, usually only two months

prior to the primary. Early support does not necessarily indicate party strength, especially when the support is spread thin, though when early support is united, it is a sign of a cohesive, forceful party that has aligned its groups and its troops behind the “chosen one.” We cannot say definitively that gubernatorial candidates in New Mexico run candidate-centered campaigns, for front-runner candidates received support from major state-wide groups in both primary and general elections, while other candidates received hardly any support in the form of endorsements (and in the form of votes).

The figures for the decisive-influence test are low, where applicable. The united-front test produces mixed results. Overall, it is hard draw a general conclusion. Major groups lined up for both candidates in the 1998 Democratic primary, but most of the support did not come early and it was not vast – i.e. only a few groups exhibited involvement.

**Small World**

**Table 3-21: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers New Mexico Democratic Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 NA	NA	NA
1998 n=19	84%	16%
2002 n=6	83%	17%
Average	84%	16%

**Table 3-22: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers New Mexico Republican Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 NA	NA	NA
1998 n=3	100%	0%
2002 n=14	79%	21%
Average	89%	11%

Using Cohen et al.’s test concerning the candidate’s support from a “small world”, New Mexican candidates score low. The average percentage of repeat endorsements for Democrats was a meager 16 percent, while, for Republicans, it was even lower at 11 percent. Table 3-23



shows who the repeat endorsers were (Table 3-24 presents the non-repeaters). A very small group indeed. The *Albuquerque Tribune's* editorial policy was not to endorse in non-contested races, so it did not endorse in the 1998 Republican primary. It did, however, choose not to endorse in the 2002 Democratic primary, but did endorse Bradley in the Republican primary.

**Table 3-23: Repeat Endorsers by year, New Mexico (both parties)**

Party	Endorser	1998	2002
D	AFSCME	X	X
	Albuquerque Tribune	X	
	New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance	X	
R	Albuquerque Tribune		X
	New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance		X

The results of the small world test in New Mexico are inconclusive. If groups hold back when an incumbent is running, then many groups could have withheld their endorsements in 1998, but come forward in 2002. In the Republican primaries, this was the case. There was less endorsement activity in 1998; more in 2002. In the Democratic primaries, the opposite occurred. *More* groups were involved in the 1998 Democratic primary than in the 2002 Democratic primary. The field of candidates, however, was wide open in 1998 and was tightly shut in 2002 with the only viable candidate being Bill Richardson. Perhaps groups were, once again, reserving political capital for a later time.

**Table 3-24: Non-Repeat Endorsers in 1998 and 2002 Democratic Primaries**

Endorsement Type	Endorser	1998	2002
Interest Group	Communications Workers of America, Local 7037	X	
	Concerned Citizens of Albuquerque	X	
	Fraternal Order of Police in Santa Fe	X	
	National Education Association of New Mexico	X	
	New Mexico Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO		X
	New Mexico Federation of Teachers	X	
	NOW Equality PAC		X
	sheet metal workers union	X	
	The Gay & Lesbian Voter Alliance	X	
	The Navajo Nation Council		X
Interest Group Leader	State Police Deputy Chief John A. Cordova	X	
Miscellaneous	Larry Willard		X
Officeholder	Democratic state Rep. James G. Taylor of the South Valley	X	
	Democratic state Sen Linda Lopez of the South Valley	X	
	Democratic state Sen Pauline Eisenstadt of Corrales	X	
	Former Lt. Gov. Casey Luna	X	
	Harry Bigbee, a retired Santa Fe lawyer and district judge	X	
Party Individual or Group	Billy McKibben, a conservative Republican		X
	Democrats	X	
	Rio Arriba County Democratic Party	X	
Prominent Individual	Deborah Dozier Potter Santa Fe real estate manager	X	

## TEXAS

### Overview of Texas Politics

Like other Southern states, Texas was a one-party, Democratic-dominated, state for the first half of the twentieth century. And, like other Southern states, Texas became more competitive. By the 1990s, it had become fully competitive.

Throughout the 1960s, Republicans progressively developed their organization. The initial impetus came from GOP-man John Tower's victory to the U.S. Senate in 1961. Tower was the first Republican senator elected in Texas since 1870, and he served four terms until 1984. The Republicans moved to develop their organization financially and professionally over

this time period. By the late 1970s, Cotter et al. (1984) ranked the Texas Republican Party's organizational strength as moderately strong, in the third highest category of four.<sup>15</sup>

Democrats, on the other hand, moved more slowly toward innovation. They did not professionalize or move to increase their financial base until well into the 1980s. Their slowness allowed the Republicans to make headway. By the 1990s, the Republicans were gaining wins up and down the ballot to the point that, since 2000, the Republicans control both houses of the legislature, the governorship and all other state-wide offices. Despite the Republican ascendance, however, the Democratic Party has not been completely usurped, and many elections remain competitive. When Senator Phil Gramm announced his retirement prior to the 2000 election, both Republicans and Democrats considered the chance of a Democratic win viable:

As it turned out, the race was not that close on Election Day. National tides and President Bush's popularity may have affected this outcome. Texas Democrats suffered losses in almost every key position, and national Democrats didn't fare much better. Neither national nor state Democrats could have known this early in the year, and both Republicans and Democrats behaved as though the election would be close right up until the last few weeks (Susswein, 2002).

Texas has no form of official (or unofficial) party endorsement in either party, and it has an open primary system, with the primary held in March. This leaves seven months for the general election campaign, a long time. However, Texas, like many other Southern states, allows for a runoff following the first primary if no candidate receives more than fifty percent of the vote. This was not an issue in any election under investigation, for a primary winner emerged with more than fifty percent in each case. The absence of party endorsement in the primary

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<sup>15</sup> The Texas Republican party scored a .651. The scale used was "weak" (0-.249), "moderately weak" (.250-.499), "moderately strong" (.500-.750), and "strong" (.750-1.00).

leaves little room for party leaders to exercise much influence in the primary, according to Morehouse (1998). Candidates therefore must develop personality-driven primary campaigns.

### **Overview of Texas Elections**

In the nine elections I investigated in Texas, only two elections were even remotely competitive. In 1994, incumbent Democratic governor Ann Richards had a primary opponent, Gary Espinosa, a retired sandblaster from Palestine who had never held elected office. Her opponent in the general election, George W. Bush, had also had a primary opponent who attained a mere 6.7 percent of the vote and who also had never held elected office. Following Bush's upset over Richards, Bush handily won the next election in 1998 by almost forty points, while his successor, Rick Perry, won the 2002 gubernatorial election by almost twenty points.

Land Commissioner and former Democratic Party Executive Director Garry Mauro ran unopposed in the Democratic primary in 1998, and then ran in the general against incumbent Bush. His campaign was more notable for the endorsements he did not receive rather than for those he did. Several top Democrats in Texas, including retiring Democratic Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock and Democratic State Comptroller and Lieutenant Governor candidate John Sharp, endorsed Bush, as did "dozens of other Democratic officeholders" even before the primaries were over (Ratcliffe and Bernstein 1998). The Democratic Party divided over Mauro. Sharp commented, "Garry obviously is from the liberal wing of the party. I'm from the more conservative wing of the party ..." (Ratcliffe and Bernstein 1998). In the general race between Bush and Mauro, Bush collected eighteen endorsements to Mauro's ten. Bush drew his support from officeholders from all over Texas, including 500 mayors and at least 100 Democratic county officials. Democratic officeholders went with the incumbent in droves and abandoned

party loyalty nearly altogether. The only prominent individual within the party that Mauro could count on was First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton.

The 2002 Democratic primary was a four-way race among wealthy Laredo businessman Tony Sanchez, former two-term attorney general and former three-term house member Dan Morales, Houston lawyer John WorldPeace and Waxahachie businessman Bill Lyon. Sanchez won the primary easily, despite the fact that he had never held elected office. He racked up the endorsements of several major Democrat-aligned groups, including the AFL-CIO, the Texas State Teachers Association and Democratic Party establishment leaders. These endorsements came in throughout January and February. The NRA also endorsed Sanchez just before the primary.

The explanation most often cited for Sanchez's win was his money and his ethnicity:

For many Democrats, electability seems to be the major issue. East Texas political scientist Charles Elliott, a former State Democratic Executive Committee member, counts himself among the new breed of Democrats practicing passionate pragmatism. He is backing Sanchez. "I think the best explanation for that is he is simply a man of considerable experience in a number of areas, and he is Hispanic," he said. "How does that sound? I want to win the election" (Herman 2002).

Sanchez went up against incumbent governor Rick Perry in the general election. Perry had become governor following Bush's election to the presidency in 2000. Perry won easily by roughly 18 percentage points. Of the 38 endorsements I collected for this election, more than half came from interest groups. The candidates roughly split the total number of interest group endorsements. Seven of the nine interest group endorsements received by Sanchez came from organized labor – from the AFSCME, the fire fighters, two teachers' unions, and several law enforcement unions. Perry also picked up labor endorsements from the Teamsters' and from three law enforcement unions. And Perry, as incumbent, also had the backing of nearly all the

major newspapers in Texas, save the *Austin-American Statesman* and the *Corpus Christi Caller Times*, plus the backing of 250 mayors, President Bush, and Sanchez's Democratic opponent in the primary – Dan Morales.

### Applying the Tests

**Table 3-25: Summary of Test Results Applied to Texas**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Candidate Quality
Democrats	1994	25%	100%	Yes	2
	1998	15%	100%	NA	0
	2002	13%	88%	Yes	0
Republicans	1994	0%	100%	Yes	0
	1998	0%	100%	NA	4
	2002	33%	100%	NA	4

#### Candidate Quality, United Front, and Decisive Influence

Republicans now dominate Texas politics, controlling every statewide office and the legislature, though not by as huge margins as in Ohio. Like Democrats in Ohio, Democrats in Texas had a tough time finding a high-quality challenger. Sanchez, while wealthy and therefore self-financing as well as Hispanic, lacked experience in elected office, yet the Democrats selected him over a candidate who not only had elected office experience but had held a statewide office. The reason was that former Attorney General, Dan Morales, faced a indictment over charges that he had given a cut of a tobacco case settlement attorney's fees to a friend. Overall, the average candidate quality score for Democrats was .57 (on the Jewell 4-point scale), compared to the Republican's 4.

Both parties score very highly on the decisive-influence test, because so many of the primary elections were virtually uncontested, and because, when the Democrats disagreed, many of them chose to go with the Republicans rather than find a more suitable nominee.

That being said, the general elections are, at the moment, highly skewed in the Republicans' favor. Given the level of bi-partisan report enjoyed by Republican nominees, it would be hard for one of them to lose to a Democrat. A united front has been easy enough for Republican nominees to attain, perhaps because most powerful Democrats see the writing on the wall and know they have to play along to get along.

**Small World: Repeat Endorsers**

**Table 3-26: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Texas Democratic Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=12	75%	25%
1998 n=4	50%	50%
2002 n=16	88%	13%
Average	71%	29%

**Table 3-27: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers Texas Republican Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=3	100%	0%
1998 n=5	100%	0%
2002 n=3	67%	33%*
Average	91%	9%

\*See table 3-29. The Texas Hospital Association endorsed a Democrat in 1994 and a Republican in 2002.

The endorsements candidates receive, on either hand, are mostly from interest groups and officeholders. Almost all interest groups appear only once in the data set – in other words, their endorsements are episodic rather than constant, and the parties fail the “small world” test, especially the Republicans who scored an average of 9 percent. Who were the repeat endorsers?

Table 3-28 outlines them below:

**Table 3-28: Texas Repeat Endorsers by Party**

Party	Endorser	1994	1998	2002
D	AFL-CIO	X	X	X
	Texas Hospital Association	X		
	Texas State Teachers Association	X	X	X
R	Texas Hospital Association			X

Candidates draw their support not from a regular pool of repeat players, but from a set of interests that services the particular candidate at the precise point in time. In many ways, the Texas Republicans are similar to Ohio Republicans when examining the repeat endorsers. The difference, however, is that interest groups participate at a higher rate in Texas than in many of the other states outlined thus far. Their participation is episodic not stable, but their participation is there nonetheless. Table 3-29 displays the interest group activity in Texas elections.



**Table 3-29: Interest Group Endorsements in Texas General Elections, 1994-2002**

Endorser	Bush (1994 & 1998)	Perry (2002)	Sanchez (2002)
AFSCME Texas Correctional Employees Council			X
Baptist Ministers Association	X	X	
Baptist Ministers Alliance		X	
Christian Coalition	X		
Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas		X	
Deputy Sheriff's Association of Bexar County			X
DPS Officers Association		X	
Harris County AFL-CIO			X
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce			X
Independent Bankers Association of Texas		X	
Independent Texas Voters	X		
Mexican-American Sheriffs Association		X	
San Antonio Police Officers Association		X	
Teamsters		X	
Texas Association of Business		X	
Texas Association of School Administrators	X		
Texas Farm Bureau	X	X	
Texas Federation of Teachers			X
Texas Hospital Association		X	
Texas Medical Association			X
Texas Municipal Police League Association		X	
Texas State Association of Fire Fighters			X
Texas State Teachers Association			X

## ILLINOIS

### Overview of Illinois Politics

The major issue dividing Illinois is regionalism. The Democratic base is squarely in Chicago, which makes up 23 percent of the state population, although its proportion is in decline. Republican support comes from suburban Cook County and from the five “collar counties” surrounding it. These six populous counties make up 62 - 63 percent of the state’s population. Hence, the deciding “swing vote” in Illinois resides in the political leanings of downstate Illinois (the other 96 counties).

Whereas once upon a time such geographic divisiveness was something the parties could “work with” – today, this is no longer the case. The Democratic machine of Daley and even before has a storied place in Illinois and national history. Illinois housed one of the largest political machines of all time, with patronage politics the name of the game. However, various court decisions, beginning in the 1970s and continuing up to the 1990s, significantly and dramatically undercut the power and reach of the machines, and rendered them obsolete. Today, an endorsement from either the Democratic or the Republican Party is no guarantee of victory. Elected office in Illinois is candidate-centered, not party-centered, according to (Appleton and Ward 1997). Candidates for statewide office develop their own elaborate fundraising apparatuses and need not rely on their respective parties for critical support.

As we shall see in the next chapter, Illinois politics bear a strong resemblance to Massachusetts politics in terms of endorsement activity. All nine Illinois elections I examined were contested. Moreover, every primary where there was no incumbent (the 1998 and 2002 Democratic and Republican races) was divisive, and the vote was split at least three ways (if not more), with the top three candidates earning at least double-digit percentages.

The Illinois primary is held in March, giving the parties sufficient time to pull together, unite, and mount an effective campaign in the general election. Illinois has relatively weak party endorsement rules: parties make informal endorsements, and the primary itself is an open one in which anyone can vote as long as they publicly declare their party preference.

### **Overview of Illinois Elections**

In 1994, incumbent Republican governor Jim Edgar ran for re-election and won easily with sixty-five percent of the vote. He ran against State Comptroller Dawn Clarke Netsch, the

first woman in Illinois to win statewide office. Netsch faced four contenders in the Democratic primary, though her main opponent was Attorney General Roland Burris. The endorsements received by the candidates were somewhat scattered. Of the interest group endorsements, Netsch received five, compared with Burris' two. Netsch's endorsements came exclusively from women's organizations – EMILY's list, the National Women's Political Caucus, the Illinois chapter of the National Organization for Women, and the Women's Campaign Fund. All but one of these organizations was from out of state. Burris on the other hand, received an endorsement from the Chicago Housing Authority Residents' Council and one from Operation PUSH (which later merged with Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition). The remainder of the endorsements came largely from officeholders and from local party organizations. Richard Phelan, the Cook County Board president, who came in a distant third in the primary, won the largest number of endorsements. However, his came entirely from local individuals, mostly Chicago – Democratic Party ward leaders and state representatives. Phelan's one major officeholder endorsement came from the powerful House Speaker, Mike Madigan.

The 1998 gubernatorial election presented both parties with an open seat. The Republican primary, however, was a cake-walk for Secretary of State George Ryan, who won the nomination with eighty-six percent of the vote. He had the support of the sitting governor, Jim Edgar, which he formally received in August of 1997. Although receiving only four endorsements in the primary, Ryan had the backing of nearly all of the Republican leadership in the state – the “overwhelming support among Republican legislators, county chairmen and other elected officials...” (Neal 1997). The Democratic ticket, on the other hand, was split six ways, though three of the six received under seven percent of the vote combined. For the top three

candidates, John Schmidt (Associate Attorney General), Roland Burris (former Attorney General), and Glenn Poshard (downstate U.S. House member), Poshard was a clear favorite, with endorsements from major interest groups and party leaders. As early as May 1997, nearly one year before the primary, Poshard had the public endorsement of former Senate President Philip Rock. His endorsement was followed by four Democratic state central committee members in June, and by that of the Democratic County Chairmen's Association in July. By January, he had the support of the AFL-CIO, AFSCME, the Illinois State Rifle Association and the Fraternal Order of Police, as well. In the primary, the party clearly united around Poshard and did it early.

By the general election, the unified support of the Democratic Party had shattered. I recorded only 16 endorsements in the general election. While Poshard, the Democratic nominee, received the support of the AFL-CIO, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Vice President Al Gore, and the *Pantagraph*, endorsements for George Ryan demonstrated his ability to cross party lines. Not only did he receive the support of seven Democratic and independent mayors, but also of the Illinois Education Association and AFSCME, along with the traditionally Republican Illinois Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, as the press reported, he "chose a woman for a running mate, courted the gay vote and cast his support for gun control as a key difference from his opponent. Along the way, he threatened to turn off his own party's right wing -- though his pro-life credentials helped keep many conservatives with him" (Schoenburg 1998). Ryan won, but only by 3.6 percent.

In the 2002 Democratic primary, the top two Democrats received roughly the same number of endorsements. U.S. Representative Blagojevich received 31 compared with former Chicago public schools' CEO Paul Vallas' 25. Blagojevich started receiving endorsements early

– by the end of 2001, he already had 15, five of which came from fellow members of Congress in May 2001. Several alderman and state representatives added their support in June, and by November he had won over the entire Sangamon county Democratic party organization, followed by the AFL-CIO.

Paul Vallas' endorsements did not start rolling in until January 2002 – just two months prior to the election. The majority of Vallas' endorsements came from state legislators. Despite the sharp difference in timing, Vallas and Blagojevich were separated by just two percentage points in the primary.

On the Republican side, Attorney General Jim Ryan easily beat his competitors by over 16 percentage points. He earned 29 endorsements, compared to state Senator Patrick O'Malley's two and Lieutenant Governor Corinne Wood's four. The Republican establishment threw its support behind Ryan early – by August 2001, Ryan had the full support of the sitting governor George Ryan, along with endorsements from former governors Jim Edgar and Jim Thompson, the Illinois House minority leader and the Illinois Senate President, and U.S. House Speaker Dennis Hastert.

Blagojevich won the general election by just over seven points. Like the 1998 general election, endorsement activity in the general was relatively low. I recorded only 16 endorsements in total – ten of which went to Blagojevich, and all of which were unsurprising. Various Democratic Party organizations mobilized behind the nominee, as did the AFL-CIO, the Illinois Education Association, and the Fraternal Order of Police. Ryan had received the endorsements of his rivals in the primary, along with the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses.

## Applying the Tests

**Table 3-30: Summary of Tests Applied to Illinois**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Candidate Quality
Democrats	1994	27%	39%	No	1
	1998	31%	67%	Yes	.75
	2002	25%	49%	Moderate	1
Republicans	1994	0%	100%	Yes	2
	1998	50%	67%	Yes	1
	2002	11%	83%	Yes	2

In assessing the level of partisan control in Illinois, divisive primaries alone tell us that parties have less command of their troops compared to the other states in the data set. Nevertheless, we have already seen that Republicans appear more focused than Democrats, given their high decisive-influence scores and high candidate-quality scores. The spread of endorsements for various Democratic candidates split the party enough to give them the lowest decisive-influence score (68 percent) of any state in the data set except Massachusetts. Yet, despite this, the Democrats demonstrated, in every election, that early support from party elites made a major difference. A united front composed of powerful members of the party most certainly formed early behind the 1998 Democratic nominee and somewhat behind the 2002 nominee. We saw, however, that such unity did not always hold through into the general election, as in the 1998 election when the GOP nominee, George Ryan, crossed party lines to peel away left-wing Democrats.

### Repeat

**Table 3-31: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Illinois Democratic Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=44	73%	27%
1998 n=54	69%	31%
2002 n=63	75%	25%
Average	72%	28%

**Table 3-32: Percentage of Repeat Endorsers, Illinois Republican Candidates**

Election Year	Non-Repeater	Repeater
1994 n=6	100%	0%
1998 n=6	50%	50%
2002 n=35	89%	11%
Average	80%	20%

Like many other elections in the dataset, the Democrats have higher repeat rates than the Republicans. Within the Democratic party the percentage of repeat endorsers is a little higher than other states; moreover, the repeat rate *stays* in the twenty-five percent arena consistently which does not occur in the other states. The list of repeat endorsers outlined in Table 3-33 shows a set of powerful groups and powerful people within the party; however, some groups endorsed in one party in one election and in the other party in another election, which, as I have said previously, is not *partisan* behavior per se, but rather self-interested behavior. Overall, we can conclude that the Illinois' Democratic party behavior begins to approach the behavior of partisan-aligned groups and individuals outlined by Cohen et al., but even there, the three big tests receive only a passing grade when taken together. On the Republican side of the equation, the repeat endorsement rate is low – and *only* groups that are counted as repeat endorsers are counted as repeaters because they also endorsed Democrats. The only major officeholder repeat endorser is the former governor Jim Edgar. Though the Republicans have a united front and score well on the percentage of endorsements going to the nominee, the very small number of endorsements makes these numbers somewhat suspect.

**Table 3-33: Illinois Repeat Endorsers by Year and by Party**

N.B. Some individuals' titles change (i.e. state senator becomes U.S. Rep), so they are listed twice, but counted once per election.

Party	Endorser	1994	1998	2002
Democratic Candidate Endorsements	AFL-CIO		X	X
	Chicago Daily Herald			X
	Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley	X		X
	Chicago Sun Times	X		X
	Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police		X	X
	Democratic County Chairmen's Association		X	
	former Senate President Philip J. Rock	X	X	

	former state Rep. Frank Giglio of Thornton		X	
	House Speaker Michael J. Madigan	X	X	
	Illinois Personal PAC			X
	Illinois Planned Parenthood			X
	Illinois State Rifle Association		X	
	NOW	X	X	
	Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition	X	X	X
	state Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Ill.)	X		
	state Rep. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D-Ill)			X
	state Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-Ill.)	X		
	state Rep. William O. Lipinski	X	X	X
	state sen. Connie Howard (D-Chicago)		X	
	state Sen. Louis S. Viverito of Stickney		X	X
	Stickney Township Committeeman Louis Viverito	X	X	X
	Thornton Township Committeeman Frank Giglio	X	X	X
	U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D)		X	X
	U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.)		X	X
	U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez		X	X
Republican Candidate Endorsements	AFL-CIO		X	
	Chicago Daily Herald			X
	Chicago Sun Times			X
	Gov. Jim Edgar		X	X
	Illinois Planned Parenthood			X
	Illinois State Rifle Association		X	

## CONCLUSION

Using the measures noted above, we can conclude that a strong party is one that prevents primary fights and builds a strong unified coalition of diverse sets of interests. It is clear from the data that strong-party states successfully prevent primary fights, put forth winnable candidates, and run campaigns that are most certainly *not* candidate-centered. *However*, strong-party states also appear to prevent primary fights almost completely, with the result that primary elections, with or without an incumbent, are virtually uncontested. The result of this situation is that primary elections are low on information, low on press coverage and low in participation. Candidates are chosen *not* by the “extended party,” but by key institutional party players. By contrast, weak to moderate party states have wild and divisive primaries, many more



endorsements and much more participation by friends, neighbors, key interest groups, and partisans.

My primary purpose in this chapter was to assess and analyze the party politics of the five states under examination using several indicators designed by previous scholars. A picture has emerged that calls into question the reliability of these indicators and also raises additional questions. Does a party need to score highly on all indicators in order to say that it definitively *controls* the nomination? And what does *control* even mean when a party is so decimated that it has to “pay people” to run under the party banner? The Ohio Democratic Party presents the starkest case in the data set. It does not suffer from factionalism nor from weak laws or rules preventing it from exerting power. It unites behind a nominee; groups and individuals stay involved over time demonstrating cohesion; the amount of endorsement activity is about equal to that of the Republicans; and primaries are not divisive. Yet the party has been unable to win a single non-judicial statewide office since 1992. The question is, even if party networks are both exigent and strong, if they are not influential at all, are they still in control? The word “control” connotes power, and for the Ohio Democrats, beggars cannot be choosers. Perhaps Ohio is anomalous. The other cases do not present as clear cut failures of the tests, but they still raise doubts. Part of the doubt stems from the very fact that the results are, to some extent, all over the place.

## CHAPTER 4: MASSACHUSETTS

A complete list of Repeat Endorsers in Massachusetts is available in Appendix C

Political scientist Murray Levin wrote, “Massachusetts is governed not by organized or disciplined political parties but by shifting coalitions of prominent individuals for whom personal loyalties and commitments mean more than party unity and party platforms (Levin 1962: 17).” Levin wrote this about the 1960 gubernatorial election. He argued that both parties in Massachusetts politics were dominated, at the time, by personalities – the Democratic party was run by ethnic groups distrustful of one another, while the Republican party was governed by homogenous group of Yankees – and that both parties were run by a small group of activists that created inbred, irresponsible parties (Levin 1962: 38).

Do Levin’s observations shed any light on Massachusetts politics of the 1980s and 1990s? This chapter analyzes endorsement activity in Massachusetts in depth. I was able to examine Massachusetts over a much longer time horizon than the five other states in this study due to the availability of newspaper archives at the *Boston Globe*. Moreover, I also personally interviewed several key players in Massachusetts politics to gain a greater understanding about the supply and demand of endorsements in election cycles.

Massachusetts is certainly considered a Democratic state. Democrats have dominated the state legislature since 1958 and currently control the entire Massachusetts congressional delegation as they have done for the past twenty plus years. The Republicans, however, have managed to compete effectively for several major offices, and have won every gubernatorial election since 1990. Moreover, Reagan carried the state twice, Republican Edward Brooke served two U.S. Senate terms from 1966 to 1978, and most recently, Joseph Malone was elected to statewide office as treasurer in 1990. This has led David Mayhew to suggest that

Massachusetts has a system of “split-level bipartyism” in which parties are competitive for prominent offices, but not for the rest.

What is most surprising about endorsement activity in Massachusetts is how much of it there is. In every other state in my dataset, except Illinois, the average number of endorsements per election cycle was below 15. The average number of endorsements received by Democratic candidates was seven times that (108). Only Illinois Democratic candidates came close, averaging 54 endorsements. Republican candidates in Massachusetts received an average of 21 endorsements per election, though there were considerable spikes in Republican activity that rivaled the Democrats. So what is going on in Massachusetts that accounts for this big comparative difference? Who is doing all this endorsing? Did the endorsements make a difference?

In the next section, I will examine each election in turn, presenting the raw data and tell the brief story of each election. After that, I will analyze the results and answer the key questions posed in this introduction.

## **Overview of the 1978 Election**

### **1978 Democratic Primary Election**

For all the discussion just noted above regarding the huge number of endorsements granted in Massachusetts gubernatorial elections, the 1978 primary and general elections are outliers for a number of reasons. First, the number of endorsements for all five primary candidates totaled only 27 (most Massachusetts primary elections had well over 100 endorsements). Second, the incumbent governor, Michael Dukakis, not only faced challengers in the primary – he also lost the primary. And third, compared to all other election cycles, only a small percentage (10%) of officeholders endorsed a candidate (most elections had over 35% of

officeholder endorsements). The driving force behind this anomalous state of affairs was the overall level of striking dissatisfaction with the sitting governor, Michael Dukakis.

In 1978, Edward J. King, the former Executive Director of Massport (the Massachusetts port authority), beat the incumbent Governor Dukakis by nearly nine percentage points in the primary – a trouncing. According to press accounts in the *Boston Globe*, many politicians chose to sit out the election due to their ire at Dukakis. Carol Surkin, a *Boston Globe* political columnist, wrote in September 1977 that Dukakis had “little support [in the legislature],” that he “lost most of his small bands of loyalists this year on the redistricting bill” and that he was “less effective with the day-to-day bargaining and negotiating required in the chief executive's role” (Surkin 1977). An article in October 1977 told of “a once stout supporter of the governor in the Legislature said ... he would have trouble getting five votes for Dukakis for governor in the General Court” (Healy 1977).

Dukakis' problems extended well beyond his relationship with the legislature. In the 1978 primary, several unions and organizations who had supported Dukakis in the 1974 election refused to endorse him in 1978. The State Labor Council, representing AFL-CIO unions, declined to endorse Dukakis as did the Massachusetts Teachers Association, and Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), a liberal advocacy organization. Dukakis had offended unions, especially public employee unions, by his budget cuts and tax cuts resulting in massive layoffs.

Christopher Lydon, a Boston-based journalist, wrote a book review of two Dukakis biographies for *Washington Monthly* in 1988 and summed up the first Dukakis administration well:

In 1975 Dukakis fell heir to the runaway deficits and cooked books of the affable Republican Frank Sargent. In the pit of the worst recession since the 1930s,

Dukakis found himself slashing hospital care for welfare families and, at the same time, breaking his no-new-taxes promise to save the state from insolvency. Dukakis offended everyone, listened to no one, lost contact with his legislature, and drew challenges against his own renomination from both the right and left fringes of his party. The mitigating details of that first term included some exemplary judicial appointments and an overhaul of court administration; major transit investments around Boston; and the rescue of rotting mill cities like Lowell and Pittsfield. But the details did not mitigate much: Lowell and Pittsfield both voted for Ed King. Dukakis was the last to learn of what his wife Kitty called his “public death.” (“Dukakis and the Reform Impulse – Book Reviews”, Washington Monthly, May, 1988. Christopher Lydon).

Dukakis received a total of six endorsements in the primary election – three from labor groups which he obtained in July and August, including the United Auto Workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (a major union at the time, with statewide representation in the major industrial cities in Massachusetts), and the vaguely worded endorsement of “unions representing 100,000 members.”<sup>16</sup> The sole officeholder endorsement came from the mayor of Pittsfield in January. He also received the endorsements of a “number of Democratic ward and city committees” and the endorsement of the *Boston Globe*. What was more surprising about Dukakis’ endorsements was the number of endorsements that were withheld altogether or given to his challengers. Dukakis, for example, was a state board member of the Massachusetts chapter of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) – a group that had endorsed and championed him in the 1974 election. In 1978, the group could not reach a two-thirds vote for any candidate. In addition, many groups including the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the liberal Citizens for Participation in Political Action, and a major union representing public employees, AFSCME, withheld their endorsements.

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<sup>16</sup> The reporting of this endorsement appeared in the *Boston Globe*: “Dukakis, according to his campaign’s Joseph Jamele, has the endorsements of unions representing 100,000 members. Democrat King has the endorsements of 17 unions that represent 400,000 members, according to Martin A. Burke 3d, the King campaign spokesman.” (*Boston Globe*, Sunday August 27, 1978. No author cited).

His chief rival, Edward J. King<sup>17</sup>, picked up twelve endorsements, largely from labor groups – the building trades, the sheet metal workers, the police, and the Teamsters. Half of his endorsements came in May, the rest arrived in August (see Appendix D for timeline). Edward J. King was a conservative Democrat who had real ideological differences from his rival Dukakis who hailed from the more liberal wing of the party. King was a pro-development Democrat who was also proud to join the anti-tax movement of the day. This led to several interesting endorsements in the general election, many of which came from staunch Republican-leaning groups and individuals, including the conservative anti-tax group, Citizens for Limited Taxation and the Republican nominee’s rival in the primary election, Edward F. King. Moreover, many Democrats could not bring themselves to endorse the Democratic nominee in the general election – Dukakis himself, along with Democrats lieutenant gubernatorial candidate Tom O’Neil, Representative Philip Johnston, and the mayor of Boston, Kevin White.

#### **1978 Republican Primary Election**

The Republicans ran two candidates in their primary – businessman and head of Citizens for Limited Taxation, Edward F. King and House minority leader Francis Hatch. The five endorsements recorded for this election all went to the convention-winning but ultimately primary-losing candidate, Edward F. King. He received endorsements from the Sportsmen’s PAC, the chair of the West Springfield Town Committee and two individuals, including Gordon Nelson, the state chair of the Republican party. Save for the Sportsman’s PAC and the endorsement of a wealthy donor, King received his three party endorsements the day of the convention, suggesting that party insiders had not dedicated enormous energy to fashioning a

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<sup>17</sup> Former Mayor of Cambridge Barbara Ackerman also competed in the election.

winning candidate. King’s opponent, Hatch, won the primary easily, with 56% of the vote, presenting himself to voters as a moderate Republican – liberal on social issues and a traditional Republican on items such as restricting state spending.

The results of the Republican primary reflect a view of primaries that would satisfy the progressive impulse to establish them in the first place. In this case, an ideological conservative candidate was favored by party insiders; a more moderate and liberal candidate was favored by voters. Moreover, the more moderate and liberal candidate would appear, on the face of it, to have been a candidate that had more potential to win in the general given both the voting demographics of Massachusetts at the time and the past history of electing moderate Republican governors.<sup>18</sup> As it was, however, Hatch lost the general election to a Democrat – a Democrat who earned a great deal of his support from conservative Republicans; while Hatch earned much of his general election support from liberal Democrats.

**Table 4-1: Summary of Tests Applied to 1978 Primary Elections**

	<b>Election Year</b>	<b>% Repeat Endorsers</b>	<b>% Endorsements go to Nominee</b>	<b>United Front</b>	<b>Average Candidate Quality</b>
<b>Democrats</b>	<b>1978</b>	<b>28% (n=25)</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>Republicans</b>	<b>1978</b>	<b>40% (n=5)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>0.5</b>

By Massachusetts standards, the 1978 gubernatorial election was a relatively low-endorsement affair for both Republicans and Democrats (the average number of endorsements was 103 for Democrats and 21 for Republicans for 1978-2002). The percentage of repeat endorsers was fairly standard for Massachusetts Democrats, not for the Republicans (the Republicans averaged a 21% repeat rate). The absolute number of repeat endorsements,

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<sup>18</sup> The most recent Republican governor Francis Sargent (an MIT alum), elected in 1970, raised \$100 million in new corporate taxes to pay for social welfare costs, while reducing the state budget by \$17.5 million by restricting Medicaid eligibility. He was also a champion of environmental protection and served as the keynote speaker at the first Earth Day at MIT.

however, was so low as to make the year somewhat anomalous.<sup>19</sup> Clearly the Democrats were divided and angry – the split within the party is clearly evident in the decisive influence test (the percentage of endorsements going to the nominee). The Republicans were also divided and hence failed the decisive influence test with *no* endorsements going to the nominee. No united front gathered around any candidate in either party. Although the repeat endorsement rate is somewhat high, the other tests truly reflect the division within both parties.

### 1978 General Election

I gathered a total of 126 endorsements for the 1978 general election (92 for King, 34 for Hatch). The 1978 general election turned Massachusetts politics on its head with liberals endorsing the Republican and conservatives endorsing the Democrat. Edward J. King's upset victory over a sitting governor in the primary sent many Democrats across the aisle. Republican Hatch picked up the endorsements of the Massachusetts chapter of Americans for Democratic Action, Citizens for Participation in Political Action, Boston's influential ward 5 Democratic City Committee, several Democratic state Representatives, and Dukakis' more liberal rival in the primary, Cambridge's Barbara Ackerman. Edward J. King, on the other hand, earned the endorsements of Hatch's more conservative rival in the Republican primary, Edward J. King, along with the endorsement of Edward J. King's group Citizens for Limited Taxation. Whereas from an endorsement perspective it appeared that Democrats and liberals flocked to Hatch, traditional Democrats also flocked to King, who also picked up endorsements from the AFL-CIO, the entire Massachusetts congressional delegation, the Democratic attorney general Francis Bellotti, President Carter, and 22 of the state's 39 mayors. Like the 1990 general election

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<sup>19</sup> The repeat endorsers for the Democrats were: The Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus, *the Boston Globe*, the UAW, the State Police Association, the Sportsmen, the Teamsters, and the National Association of Governmental Employees (NAGE).



between Silber and Weld, many Democrats defected from their party to endorse a Republican because of the selection of a more conservative Democrat in the primary.

## **Overview of 1982 Election**

### **1982 Democratic Primary Election**

The loss to Edward J. King, was, for Dukakis, a major blow but also an opportunity for serious soul searching. Richard Neustadt compared Dukakis' exile to Roosevelt's polio for character building. Dukakis returned to the political fray in the 1982 gubernatorial election determined to rebuild broken relationships and to form serious coalitions with groups and individuals whom he knew he had alienated in the first go-around. He put together a coalition, making a very explicit contract with key constituencies. In the 1982 primary Dukakis set up a "shadow government." He essentially hired his cabinet ten months (or more) prior to the primary, finding specialists in various policy areas to lead portions of his re-election campaign. Philip Johnston, for example, Dukakis' future secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), was a rising member in the House of Representatives. In the spring of 1982, Dukakis tapped Johnston to run the health and human services segment of the campaign. Johnston's main responsibility was to secure the endorsements of people and groups associated with health and human services. In return, these individuals and groups would play a "key role" in the policy in the transition period and beyond.<sup>20</sup>

The endorsements Johnston secured were not simply a rubber-stamp of approval from key groups. "It was a deep involvement at the grass roots," Johnston explained. "An involvement of money, field, and policy." Johnston met with the HHS community "constantly" garnering their support and their expertise. When an endorsement announcement came, Johnston said, it

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<sup>20</sup> Personal interview with Philip Johnston, July 6, 2004.

came with a photo opportunity, with a policy proposal, and the full weight of the key constituency loudly supporting Dukakis. Johnston said the campaign was far less focused on securing the endorsements of officeholders – in fact, he said, campaigns should “stay away from officeholders – except Kennedy” largely because officeholders do not necessarily have much to offer (money, votes, officespace, etc.) except for their name. Their endorsement is often the endorsement of a single individual who only offers that single vote. Cultivating endorsements from elected officials is, therefore, an inefficient use of campaign resources. That being said, on occasion, certain mayors, governors, or even some non-executives can “deliver” a city, a state, a key constituency. More often than not, however, according to former state representative, state Treasurer, and Democratic nominee for governor, Shannon O’Brien, “elected officials endorse to get resources, jobs, prestige, influence, access, rewards, and voice”<sup>21</sup> – i.e. elected officials endorse to serve their own self-interest – exactly the benefits the Dukakis campaign promised.

Although the 1982 Dukakis campaign employed and exhibited the “endorsement strategy” to a phenomenal degree (see the list of endorsements in Appendix D), the strategy itself was not unique to the Dukakis campaign or even to Democrats. Ron Kaufman, former national political director for the Republican National Committee, a former senior advisor to Massachusetts governor William Weld, and a Republican active in Massachusetts and national politics argued that “endorsements are important in how they fit a strategic goal. If you are running as an outsider you *need* outsider endorsements, not the Speaker of the House,” whereas if two already elected officials are squaring off against one another, it can and should become a “war of endorsements – you need to get inside endorsements.”<sup>22</sup> Kaufman also noted that successful campaigns have a “flow – a rationale for *every* day – a message for every day.” Put

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<sup>21</sup> Personal interview with Shannon O’Brien, July, 2004.

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July 2004.

into practice, that means that when a candidate goes to a school to discuss education, the campaign should also have some education groups announcing their endorsements in support of both the candidate and the candidate's plan. "Endorsements not only give you free media – they give you smart media," Kaufman said.

The 1982 campaign was indeed a "war of endorsements" between Dukakis and Edward J. King (hereafter referred to as King). I recorded a total of 206 endorsements granted to Dukakis and King – 94 went to Dukakis, 112 went to King. 59 endorsements came *before* the convention, held at the end of May. Dukakis received 23 of those to King's 37 (see Table 4-2 below for a summary of the timeline; see Appendix D for a complete listing). In November, 1981, Dukakis lined up the endorsements of the two liberal groups who had withheld their endorsements in 1978 – the ADA and CPPAX. Philip Johnston joined the campaign in November. In January, the Wellesley Democratic town committee sent him their endorsement. By April, many unions granted their endorsements, including the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 877, the United Steelworkers of America, District 1, New England and the international's president, William Irvin, and the United Transportation Union.

King also received early endorsements. By October 1981, he had pocketed 12, mostly from individuals including the governor of Alabama. He had lined up a number of business leaders – the presidents of Northeast Petroleum Corporation, Dart Containerline and a representative of direct-mail advertising agency headed by a conservative political fundraiser. He also had the support of members of the International Longshoremen's Association, the Teamsters and from U.S. Representative Nicholas Mavroules.

King maintained his endorsement lead over Dukakis throughout the spring, prior to the convention. By May, King had racked up 32 endorsements, almost exclusively from individuals.

Only two interest groups endorsed King before the convention – the AFL-CIO Labor Council (which also endorsed Dukakis) and the conservative group, Citizens for Limited Taxation.

Dukakis, by contrast, had endorsements from 8 interest groups before the convention – the ADA, CPPAX, the AFL-CIO Labor Council (like King), and five additional labor groups, plus labor leaders (the teachers, the operating engineers, the steelworkers, the United Transportation Union, and “65 labor leaders”).

**Table 4-2: Count of Endorsements by Month, 1982 Democratic Primary**

Article Year	Month	Dukakis	King
1981	October		12
	November	3	
1982	January	1	7
	February	3	6
	March	6	5
	April	6	2
	May	4	5
	June	14	1
	July	17	10
	August	19	34
	September	21	30
Total		94	112

Dukakis won the first endorsing convention since 1979 in May, 1982. He won by a margin of 2-1 over the sitting governor. According to one article about conventions that appeared in the *Boston Globe* magazine in 1990, “Dukakis saw the convention as a mechanism that could help him recapture the office. He organized the delegates like a man possessed ... though out of office, [he] was the insider to the delegates” (May 27, 1990, Sunday, MAGAZINE; Pg. 16 p “Conventional wisdom; In their current form, Massachusetts state political conventions are not serving the voters” by Robert L. Turner). Following the convention, King and Dukakis received about equal numbers of endorsements.

In terms of the *type* of endorsements received by both candidates, the results are fairly evenly matched. Dukakis received 10 media endorsements to King’s 11 (see Table 4-3). King

received far more officeholder endorsements than Dukakis (51 to 32). 22 of King’s endorsements came from local officeholders – mostly mayors – 18 mayors to be exact. It is difficult to know now, in 2005, exactly how powerful any one of these mayors were or if they could “deliver” their cities. On the interest group front, Dukakis received endorsements from 25 interest groups to King’s 29. The *type* of interest group endorsements both candidates received is revealing (see Table 4-5). Dukakis’ endorsements clearly came from the more liberal wing of the party – from one environmental group, from one housing group, from two liberal groups, from a women’s group, and from a group representing minorities. King, by contrast, received four industry endorsements, a pro-gun endorsement, a pro-life endorsement, and a taxpayer’s association endorsement.

**Table 4-3: Count of Endorsements, 1982 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type**

Endorsement Type	Dukakis	King	Total
Activist	2		2
Interest Group	25	29	54
Interest Group Leader	7	5	12
Media	10	11	21
Miscellaneous	6	3	9
Officeholder	32	50	82
Party Individual or Group	2	2	4
Political Person	1	1	2
Prominent Individual	9	11	20
Total	94	112	206

Now, I turn to the three tests to assess to what degree King and Dukakis relied on a small, relatively stable pool of endorsers or whether they developed personal followings; the degree to which a united front formed, and the degree to which these endorsements had a decisive influence. The Democratic primary was between two high quality candidates, so candidate quality is irrelevant to the discussion. Both candidates could expect to receive high quality endorsements and to have relationships with key groups.

**Table 4-4: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1982 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	1982	17%	46%	No	4
Republicans	1982	32%	45%	No	0

**Table 4-5: 1982 Repeat Endorsements by Candidate and Endorsement Type**

Candidate	Endorsement Type	Endorser	
Dukakis	Interest Group	Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)	
		Black Political Task Force	
		Citizens for Participation in Political Action	
		IBEW Local 2222	
		MA Federation of Teachers	
		MA Teachers Assn.	
		MA UAW	
		MA Women’s Political Caucus	
		National Association of Social Workers (8000)	
		SEIU Local 509	
		Media	Boston Globe
			Boston Phoenix
			Springfield Daily News
Officeholder	WEEI radio		
	state Rep. Lawrence Alexander (D-Marblehead)		
Party Individual or Group	U.S. Rep. James M. Shannon		
	U.S. Rep. Joseph Early		
	Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.)		
	Convention Endorsement		
King	Interest Group	AFSCME	
		Boston Building Trades Council	
		Citizens for Limited Taxation	
		International Brotherhood of Police Officers	
		MA Building Trades Council	
		MA Citizens for Life	
		MA State Police Association	
		NAGE	
		Teamsters Joint Council No. 10	
		Media	Lowell Sun
			Middlesex News
		Officeholder	Peabody Mayor Peter Torigan
			State Sen. William Bulger (D- South Boston)
U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland, a Springfield Democrat			
U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules			

The “small world test” measures the number of repeat endorsers. In the 1982 Democratic primary election, there were a total of 34 repeat endorsers – i.e. 34 (16%) of the 206 endorsements collected for the 1982 primary election appeared at least once in other primary

elections in Massachusetts.<sup>23</sup> 16% is not a terribly impressive number, especially when compared with every other Democratic primary election in the dataset except the 2002, when the repeater rate was only 10%. It is worth noting, that the Democratic primary elections of 1982 and 2002 both had over 200 endorsements – an enormous rate of activity compared to all other elections analyzed in this dissertation. Table 4-5 lays out the repeat endorsements received by King and Dukakis. The dominant repeat endorsers are labor groups. No groups “switched” between 1978 and 1982 from Dukakis to King or vice-versa. The only repeat endorsements retained by King were from the National Association of Governmental Employees (NAGE), the Teamsters and the Police. Dukakis retained the autoworkers and the *Boston Globe*. AFSCME, CPPAX, and the teachers withheld their endorsements out of anger at Dukakis, but an unwillingness to support King.

The majority of endorsements received by King and Dukakis came from individuals – mostly officeholders, but also from political people, prominent individuals, and representatives of the party. The majority of these individuals were *not* repeat endorsers, but rather constituted one-time endorsements for the particular candidate. Can we conclude, therefore, that King and Dukakis had personal followings that described candidate-centered campaigns? Is it the case that they were *not* competing for endorsements from a relatively small, stable pool of campaign backers, but rather casting for personal followings from a “sea” of occasional political players? The answer is yes and no. Several points need to be made.

First, Dukakis and King appealed to far different ideological wings (factions) of the Democratic party. In no other election under investigation was the split between two candidates of the same party as stark, as glaring, and as easily identifiable. King was a staunchly

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<sup>23</sup> The number of repeat endorsers drops down to 14% if media endorsements are excluded, as I point out later in the section on the Republican primary.

conservative Democrat – a socially and fiscally conservative Democrat who appeared to making his way toward the Republican party and who, in fact, did endorse two Republican candidates in the 1986 gubernatorial election. Dukakis, by contrast was staunchly liberal, both socially and fiscally. In many ways, therefore, they were not competing for the same endorsements. Dukakis hardly wanted the endorsement of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, just as King hardly wanted to be endorsed by the ADA. Dukakis and King were drawing from different pools, though both candidates, were, at the time, certainly still drawing the majority of their support from *Democrats*. Though King was edging in the Republican direction, the vast majority of his endorsements (though not all) came from clear-cut members of the Democratic party who would not consider endorsing a Republican – at least not in 1982. We shall see, in future elections, whether this ideological divide holds.

Second, the “sea” of non-repeat endorsers – the supposed candidate-oriented, occasional political players – was a sea filled with political strategists as opposed to celebrities, business leaders, and other non-political entities who entered the race. This is an obvious point. Both King and Dukakis were governors – they were political people with political friends in high places. Hence, the list of non-repeat endorsements is *not* a list of political novices. It is a list composed of several union locals – SEIU local 254, AFSCME Council 93, the Local 877 of the operating engineers – a list composed of interest group leaders, of political leaders – senate presidents, house speakers, and mayors – and of many other frequent political players. Yes, the list also has a small amount of miscellaneous people – of people who could certainly be called political neophytes – Red Sox players, for example. But overall, the non-repeat endorsers are inherently political people and groups. As mentioned previously, the vast majority of officeholder endorsements are not terribly important overall. Officeholders, in general, do not bring with their



endorsement vast (or even small) amounts of resources the way interest group or party committees do. Both King and Dukakis had a high number of officeholder endorsements. But they also had high-quality endorsements from groups and party players.

What about the timing of the endorsements? Did a united front form around Dukakis early? We employ this test by examining the pacing of the endorsements throughout the primary campaign. We assess whether Dukakis and King received endorsements from groups and factional interests who, ideologically, would have preferred the other candidate, but who went with the other because they believed he could do a better job uniting the party and winning in November. If we first examine how party members behaved, we see that the state-wide “official” party did not endorse. Both Dukakis and King received two endorsements each from groups or individuals classified as “party individuals or groups.” Dukakis received the endorsement of the Wellesley Democratic town committee in January and the convention endorsement in May. King was endorsed by two out-of-state national Democratic leaders – a representative of the Democratic National Committee, and a member of the Democratic Governors’ Conference. If we examine the behavior of interest groups we see no effort was made at forming a united front. The more conservative groups lined up for King; the more liberal groups lined up for Dukakis. There was nary a cross-over made. Dukakis received the endorsements of human service-type organizations and groups – the day-care alliance and the Legislative Council for Older Americans. King received the endorsements of industry groups and the NRA. The united front test fails.

One final note about timing. Many people I interviewed, while acknowledging the relative unimportance of officeholder endorsements overall, claimed that early endorsements from officeholders were critical to demonstrating momentum. Officeholder endorsements, they

said, were a relatively low-cost mechanism – usually a simple telephone call – that could establish a campaign’s energy. In the 1982 Democratic primary, there is no evidence of early endorsements from officeholders that appears to be important. Of the 32 endorsements King received prior to the May convention, 15 came from officeholders. Dukakis, who, ostensibly had more to prove, only had 5 endorsements from officeholders of the 19 endorsements he had lined up by the May convention – though one of his endorsements came from the influential mayor of Boston, Kevin White. King’s officeholder endorsements came from an out-of-state governor, two of his own appointees and three local officeholders – a former school committee member and two mayors (of Somerville and New Bedford).

#### **1982 Republican Primary Election**

The 1982 Republican primary began as a three-way race between state representative and assistant whip, Andrew Card, former Boston city councilor John Sears, and investment councilor John Lakian.

Appendix D outlines the endorsements earned by every candidate by the month in which they received the endorsement. Card finished last in the primary election with only 3.4% of the vote. He picked up a total of six endorsements – three media outlets (the Middlesex News, the Springfield Daily News, and WEEI talk radio) which all came less than twenty days before the election, the town chairman in Stoneham, JoAnn Anderson, and two interest groups – the Associated Builders and Contractors (which came in June) and the Massachusetts Conservative Political Action Committee which came in late August.

The Republicans endorsed Westwood investment counselor and first-time candidate John Lakian for elective office at their endorsing convention in March 1982. He won the support of party insiders – 200 Republican city and town chairmen, Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair and many members of the GOP state committee. Yet Lakian’s candidacy fell through after an

August 18, 1982 story ran in the *Boston Globe* detailing an “apparent pattern of discrepancies between the record and Lakian’s statements on his upbringing, education, military service and professional career...” (Robinson 1982).<sup>24</sup> By the time of the September primary, Lakian had only 34% of the primary vote.

Sears, the eventual nominee, had ten endorsements. He picked up at least one early endorsement from former ambassador and U.S. Senator Henry Cabot in October of 1981. Three of his endorsements came from unsuccessful former Republican candidates for state-wide office – Josiah Spaulding, a former Republican candidate for the US Senate, governor and attorney general; William I. Cowin, 1978 GOP nominee for lieutenant governor; and Charles Cabot, former candidate for attorney general. Sears also earned the endorsement of the *Boston Globe*, the Moderate Action Committee, and Neil Chayet, a lawyer and radio commentator.

None of the GOP candidates were high-quality which, in part, explains why the Republican machinery lined up behind the disastrous candidacy of Lakian. Another explanation was that Lakian was a multimillionaire, and, according to later press accounts, someone who appeared to be a “bright, dynamic newcomer” who many Republicans really believed had the ability to beat out a Democrat in November (Connolly 1994).

How do Republicans fare using the small world test in the 1982 primary? Clearly, despite the small repeat rate, the “official” party apparatus united behind Lakian. The remaining endorsements received by Card and Sears, save Card’s endorsement by the Builders and Contractors, were from political friends. Using the method of counting repeat endorsements, seven of the 22 endorsements earned by the GOP candidates were from repeat endorsers – four

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<sup>24</sup> According to the *Boston Globe* article, Lakian had made false claims that he had attended Harvard University, that he had received a battlefield promotion, and that his father had died of war wounds. Lakien sued the *Globe* for libel, but a jury found the “gist of the article” to be true.

of those were from media outlets. Of the remaining three, two came from interest groups (Associated Builders and Contractors), and one came from a partisan – Gordon Nelson, the former chair of the state GOP. The repeat endorsement rate, excluding media endorsements, is a meager 13%, but also almost the exact rate as the Democrats (14%) when media endorsements are excluded. The repeat endorsers are also spread out over the three candidates – Card picked up four; Lakian picked up two (two official, party-esque GOP endorsements); and Sears picked up one (*Boston Globe*). The world, in this case, is small indeed – so small as to be inconclusive. The decisive influence test falls in the same category; 45% of the endorsements granted in the 1982 Republican primary went to the eventual nominee – hardly a ringing endorsement. Half (5) of Sears’ ten endorsements arrived in July, before the *Globe* article ran which called into question Lakian’s credentials.

#### **1982 General Election**

The 1982 general election was not even close. Dukakis won handily with almost 62% of the vote. I recorded only 25 endorsements for the general election, 20 of which went to Dukakis. Half of the endorsements Dukakis picked up came from unions – and most of the unions were police unions. He also won the endorsement of Edward King, the governor, 31 mayors, and the *Boston Globe*. The only mention Sears received of Republican support was a *Globe* article indicating that “leading Massachusetts Republicans” endorsed him as did “prominent” Republican fundraiser, Lloyd B. Waring. Other than that, Sears’ endorsements were from obscure individuals and groups (a division of the Polish American Congress, the Suffolk County commander of the American Legion, and a retired chief justice of the Superior Court). Not exactly “opinion leaders.”

## Overview of the 1986 Election

### 1986 Primary Elections

The 1986 Democratic primary election was uncontested. The Republican primary election could just as well have been – the loser became the nominee. After the Lakian fiasco, things got worse:

“Gregory Hyatt [a state representative], poised to win the gubernatorial nomination, was undercut by bizarre reports that he had been seen sitting undressed in his office. Despite the ridicule, Hyatt nearly won the convention endorsement on the first ballot, only to lose to Royall Switzler [a former state representative] on a second ballot. Then Switzler was found to have inflated his military record regarding service in Vietnam, and he dropped out of the race before the primary. Hyatt’s name was still on the primary ballot, and he prevailed over an eleventh-hour entry, George Kariotis [a businessman]. Hyatt finally yielded to the state committee and stood aside for Kariotis to run and lose badly to Dukakis in the general election.” (Wilkie 1990).

Dukakis received three endorsements from repeat endorsers in the uncontested primary: the Massachusetts Teachers Association (January), CPPAX (April), and the AFL-CIO (September). The Republican party rallied around Kariotis in the summer. In July, Kariotis picked up the endorsements of three former governors, Edward J. King (the conservative Democrat), John A. Volpe, and Frank Sargent. Former U.S. attorney Elliot Richardson endorsed him, as did future GOP chair Ray Shamie and the Republican State Committee.

Not one endorsement could be found in the general election. Why? Two reasons. First, it seems evident from the data itself and also from interviews that endorsements are more important in primaries than they are in general elections. Because voters must distinguish between two or more candidates of the same party and because candidates must carve out a

significant segment of the party that they can lay claim to. The primary election stands as a critical time in which candidates within a party must distinguish themselves for voters and appeal to the party activists who dominate primary election environments. General elections, by contrast, are contests between two candidates from different parties. The party identification alone takes care of much of the information voters need. Endorsements from classically party-aligned groups simply do not have as much cache because they are obvious and therefore not informative. Incumbents, running in general elections, usually have an easier time coasting to re-election, though not always as Peverill Squire has pointed out (Squire 1992). According to Ron Kaufman, former chair of the Republican National Committee, incumbents do well *not* to work for endorsements in their re-election bids because it makes them look as if they are “running scared.”<sup>25</sup> That’s the demand side view. On the supply side, interest groups and individuals granting endorsements also need to play their political cards carefully. When an incumbent is running, particularly an uncontested one, groups tend to hold back on endorsements. This is no major surprise. With nothing to contest, why waste time, energy, and political capital on a race that is essentially a *fait accompli*.

**Table 4-6: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1986 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	1986	100%	100%	Yes	4
Republicans	1986	9%	9%	No	0

## Overview of the 1990 Election

### 1990 Democratic Primary Election

For the first time in thirty years Republicans and Democrats competed for an open seat in the gubernatorial race of 1990 and things finally turned around for the Republicans. Democratic

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<sup>25</sup> Personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July, 2004.

control of the executive came to a halt; the Republicans have held the office ever since. The Republican turnaround had more to do with a Democratic implosion than with a renaissance within the Republican party. At the time, fewer than one in seven of Massachusetts registered voters were Republicans. The party had not successfully elected a candidate to statewide office since 1972, had only one of the state's 11 congressional seats, had no officer in a statewide office, and were at a 4-1 disadvantage in the legislature. Despite this, Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists alike felt a Republican win in 1990 was likely (Kenney 1989).

1990 was not an easy year for a Democrat to run on the "record." Massachusetts was deep into a fiscal crisis. According to one press account, "Massachusetts voters were assured by Dukakis and other Democratic leaders throughout much of the past year and a half that all was well with the state, that the Massachusetts Miracle was intact. When they learned the truth, voters felt lied to, betrayed, and abused. And they are very, very angry - angrier, perhaps, than they have every been." (Kenney 1989).

Ambitious Democrats might have chosen to stay clear. U.S. Representative Joseph Kennedy did. So did Boston Mayor Ray Flynn. Two statewide officers and Dukakis supporters did enter the fray: Attorney General Francis Bellotti and Lieutenant Governor Evelyn Murphy. And outsider candidate John Silber, the president of Boston University, ran too.

The early support went to Murphy. In November and December of 1989, Murphy was endorsed by the Massachusetts chapter of the National Organization for Women, by several human service leaders and also by Alan Solomont, a nursing-home entrepreneur and major donor to the Democratic party who would later become the finance chair for the Democratic National

Committee. Solomont and NOW were both repeat endorsers. By the end of January, Murphy had lined up the support of several legislators and EMILY's List. And by the May convention, Murphy had the support of CPPAX, the ADA, the teachers, the nurses, and Phil Johnston. Much of her support was from repeat endorsers. By the May convention, Murphy had 28 endorsements (out of a total of 39 by the primary), and 9 of those 28 were from repeat players. The endorsements, in general, were the same endorsements Dukakis had picked up – groups like the ADA and CPPAX, the women's groups, and the human services.

Attorney General Bellotti did not receive any endorsements until April of 1990. These endorsements were from the mayors of Gardner, Fitchburg, and Worcester. Not quite a groundswell of support. By May he had picked up the Massachusetts United Autoworkers and the state police association. Despite this, by the end of the season, Bellotti had endorsements from 16 repeat endorsers; Murphy had endorsements from 12 repeat endorsers; Silber had 9.

Murphy did not win the convention endorsement. Bellotti did. Neither won the primary. Instead, Boston University President John Silber, an outsider candidate, won. Silber, however, managed to get past the 15% convention threshold with the ultimate inside support – the assistance of Senate President William Bulger. Despite Bulger's help at the convention, Silber had the fewest repeat endorsements – 10. Five of his repeaters were from media outlets. His earliest endorsement came from an out-of-state newspaper – the conservative New Hampshire daily, the *Manchester Union Leader*. Then, in April, Silber attracted the endorsements of several interest group leaders. An SEIU local leader, the general agent and secretary-treasurer of the 35,000 member Boston Building Trades Union, and the vice president of the Fire Fighters. These were groups that had ties to Silber and to Boston University. Edward Sullivan of SEIU, for example, represented 700 Boston University workers. Michael Mullane of the Fire Fighters



endorsed Silber. In 1983, Silber had implemented a policy at Boston University of providing full scholarships to children of firefighters killed in the line of duty. The endorsements were from the leaders themselves, not from the unions. Other labor leaders shied away from Silber. The Boston Globe reported that Domenic Bozzotto, president of the hotel workers' Local 26, "one of the more socially active unions in the state" said, " 'Silber? I didn't vote for George Wallace, so I won't for him ... For the first time in history, we're considering endorsing Republicans this year'" (Mooney 1990).

**Table 4-7: Repeat Endorsements, 1990 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type and Candidate**

Endorsement Type	Bellotti	Murphy	Silber	Total
Interest Group	9	7		16
Interest Group Leader			1	1
Media	3		5	8
Officeholder	3	4	4	11
Party Individual or Group	1			1
Prominent Individual		1		1
Total	16	12	10	38

**Table 4-8: Repeat Endorsers, 1990 Massachusetts Democratic Primary by Type and Candidate**

Bellotti	Interest Group	AFL-CIO Black Political Task Force Iron Workers Union Local 7 MA Building Trades Council MA State Police Association MA UAW SEIU Local 509 Teamsters
	Media	Boston Phoenix Middlesex News Springfield Union-News
	Officeholder	Fitchburg Mayor Jeffrey Bean U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA)
	Party Individual or Group	Convention endorsement
Murphy	Interest Group	Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Citizens for Participation in Political Action EMILY's List MA Nurses Association MA Teachers Assn. MA Womens Political Caucus NOW
	Officeholder	former state Rep. Mel King Secretary of Labor Paul Eustace state Rep. David Cohen (D-Newton) Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.)
	Prominent Individual	Alan Solomont
Silber	Interest Group Leader	Joseph Nigro, Boston Building trades union
	Media	Attleboro Sun Chronicle Boston Herald Lawrence Eagle-Tribune Lowell Sun Westfield Evening News
	Officeholder	former U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland of Springfield Peabody Mayor Peter Torigan Salem Mayor Neil Harrington U.S. Rep. Joseph Early

Table 4-7 presents the repeat endorsers by type and by candidate. Table 4-8 shows who the repeat endorsers were. The repeat rate for the 1990 election was fairly high – 33%. The repeat endorsers show the split within the Democratic party. Murphy and Bellotti picked up the liberal wing of the party and essentially split it – Murphy received many human service endorsements, yet Bellotti received the endorsement of SEUI Local 509, a human service local

representing 10,000 workers. Murphy received the support of the ADA and CPPAX, but Bellotti received the support of the Black Political Task Force. Silber picked up the more conservative wing, but only small pieces of it. Murphy withdrew her candidacy just seven days before the primary. Silber won the nomination with a ten point lead over Bellotti. The Democratic party was splintered. Using the decisive influence test, the party failed miserably. The two “insider” candidates received 75 percent of the endorsements – the nominee received only 25%. The two “quality candidates” who had vast amounts of elective office experience and statewide recognition lost to the candidate with no prior experience and no real statewide name recognition either.

**Table 4-9: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1990 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	1990	33%	25%	No	1
Republicans	1990	31%	60%	No	0

**1990 Republican Primary Election**

The 1990 Republican primary was a two-way race between state representative Steven Pierce and former U.S. Attorney and former Assistant Attorney General in the Regan administration William Weld. Pierce had served twelve years as a state representative from western Massachusetts. Neither candidate was a particularly “high-quality” candidate. On the quality scale, both earned zeros, for neither held a state-wide office nor held a leadership position in the legislature. Like other Republican races in Massachusetts, the endorsement activity was quite low comparatively speaking to that of their Democratic counterparts. Only 42 endorsements were recorded for the Republican primary. Weld picked up 25; Pierce had 17. Like their Democratic counterparts, Pierce and Weld’s endorsements show some ideological splits within the party. Pierce won the endorsements of more conservative-based groups –

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Citizens for Limited Taxation, and the Exodus Movement, a conservative church Group; among the endorsements Weld secured were the Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus, "moderate party leaders," and "several women's professionals."

As noted above in the discussion of the 1982 Democratic primary, many of those interviewed observed that early endorsements from officeholders are a very easy, low-cost method of exhibiting momentum. In the 1990 Republican primary, that is just what Weld did. As outlined in Appendix D, in October, November, and December of 1989, Weld obtained the public support of three former U.S. attorneys, four state senators, and several party leaders, including Gordon Nelson, the former state Republican party chair. Between January and July, Pierce only received three public endorsements – one from Citizens for Limited Taxation in January, one from the Republican convention in March, and one from Life Insurance Industries in July. After the initial spurt of energy for Weld in the fall of 1989, he too did not get many endorsements in the winter, save one from a repeat endorser, Associated Builders and Contractors. The party moderates appeared to come out early for Weld, then hang back, allowing Pierce to go on to win the convention endorsement. As far as Massachusetts Republicans are concerned, it seems, winning the convention endorsement appears to be the best way to predict a September primary loss. After the convention, all was quiet on the endorsement front until July, and then, only two endorsements, one for each candidate. There was hardly a groundswell of support from the interest group community, from officeholders, or from anyone else. A united front did not build behind either candidate.

Weld and Pierce both received about the same number of repeat endorsements. Of the 13 endorsements that came from repeat players, 6 endorsed Weld, 7 endorsed Pierce. Table 4-10 indicates who these repeat endorsers were. Many are media endorsements. The remaining repeat

endorsements, though few in number, do give us a brief snapshot of where the candidates stand. As noted above, it is clear, simply from looking at this short list, that Weld's moderation earned him the support of women's groups and that, most likely, he was pro-choice; it is equally obvious from Pierce's endorsements that he was pro-life and favored the tax-cutting ethos supported by Citizens for Limited Taxation. Thus, the Republican party was also split in the 1990 primary election. According to a press account citing a Republican strategist supporting Weld, the Pierce campaign "underestimated the large number of independent voters who would participate in the GOP primary" (Wilkie 1990). Because of Pierce's underestimation of the Independents and Weld's cultivation of them, Weld won the primary handily by over 20%.

**Table 4-10: 1990 Republican Primary Repeat Endorsers by Candidate and by Type**

Candidate	Endorsement Type	Endorser
Pierce	Interest Group	Citizens for Limited Taxation Life Insurance Industries of MA MA Citizens for Life
	Media	Attleboro Sun Chronicle Boston Herald Lawrence Eagle-Tribune Westfield Evening News
Weld	Interest Group	Associated Builders and Contractors MA Women's Political Caucus
	Media	Boston Phoenix Middlesex News Springfield Union-News
	Party Individual or Group	Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair

**1990 General Election**

The 1990 general election face-off between Weld and Silber was, in many ways, similar to the election of 1978 in which party aligned groups appeared to cross-over to the “other” side. Republican Weld, for example, received the support of Environmental Roundtable, Massachusetts Choice, and the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights. Democrat Silber received the support of Citizens for Limited Taxation, former governor Edward J. King, who had endorsed a Republican in the previous election, and Nixon administration secretary of state Henry Kissenger. A complete listing is shown in Table 4-10. Weld’s coalition of Democrats and Republicans won the day and he captured the governorship for the Republicans with 52% of the vote.

**Overview of the 1994 Election**

**1994 Democratic Primary**

The 1994 Democratic primary was a three-way race between state Senator Michael Barrett, former state Senator George Bachrach, and state Representative Mark Roosevelt. All were, according to the criteria employed, fairly low-quality candidates, scoring 1, 0 and 1, respectively. The winner would be up against incumbent Weld who did, eventually, trounce the

Democrat. Bachrach captured the more liberal wing of the party; Barrett ran as a business-oriented Democrat but failed to capture many endorsements from business-minded groups or individuals; Roosevelt, the eventual nominee, captured the “inside” support – the bulk of labor, officeholders (including both the House Speaker and the Senate President), and various members of the Democratic party.

No one candidate appeared to come out early with a sizable ground swell of support, though the first endorsement granted in the Democratic primary period came from the Democratic state committee chair Steve Grossman for Barrett. As if engaging in a tit for tat, in February, Roosevelt garnered the endorsements of the former Democratic National Committee chairman Paul Kirk, as well as the endorsements of “several dozen other prominent Democrats.” Over the spring and early summer, all candidates collected endorsements from individuals only, save the convention endorsement, which went to Roosevelt. No groups made public endorsements until late June. In July, Bachrach collected endorsements from a liberal group – CPPAX – a slightly leaning conservative group – the Fire Fighters, the UAW and the social workers. All but one of Bachrach’s interest group endorsements came from repeat endorsers. Roosevelt received endorsements from the AFL-CIO and from several labor locals which were never mentioned by name (see table 4-11 for a complete list of repeat endorsements).

**Table 4-11: Repeat Endorsers 1994 Democratic Primary**

Endorser	Bachrach	Roosevelt
AFL-CIO		X
Citizens for Participation in Political Action	X	
IBEW Local 2222	X	
MA State Fire Fighters Union	X	
MA UAW	X	
National Association of Social Workers (8000)	X	
NOW	X	

Compared to other years, a fairly small number of endorsements were granted (75), and many of these came from individuals – activists – who appeared to control much more than their

own individual vote. The number of repeat endorsers was 20 – or 27 percent, about average for Massachusetts Democratic elections. Roosevelt, who won the primary by 23 percentage points, only received 41 percent of the endorsements offered that year; scarcely decisive.

**Table 4-12: Summary of Tests Applied to the 1994 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	1994	27%	41%	No	1
Republicans	1994	0%	100%	Yes	4

#### **1994 Republican Primary and General Election**

The Republican primary was uncontested. Weld had only one reported endorsement – that of California Governor Pete Wilson.

In the general election, Weld defeated Roosevelt by 43 points – a higher margin than incumbent Dukakis had over the GOP’s last minute pick of James Kariotis. Weld received 24 endorsements; Roosevelt received 16. The only three interest groups endorsing Roosevelt in the general election were labor groups: the teachers, fire fighters, and the auto workers. Weld, by contrast, picked up 6 labor endorsements (mostly from police unions), but also had the support of two gay rights groups and the Black Political Task Force. Not only that, he had the endorsements of “800 Democratic and Independent” city officials. The re-election of Weld appeared to be irreversable and Democratic groups and officeholders decided to stay in the good graces of the governor rather than side with their party.

The 1994 election highlights some key points made in Chapter 3 regarding incumbency and party behavior. Most Democrats knew that it would be fairly difficult to defeat the incumbent. Ambitious politicians save their entry into a race for an election fight that is winnable. The Democratic candidates who ran had a difficult time drumming up support for their candidacies early in the process. Most interest groups stayed out of the race altogether, for



interest groups can also be thought of as “ambitious” in the sense that they save their political capital for events that pay dividends, either in the form of political favors later on or noteworthiness for having fought the good fight, or some variant of the two. Moreover, on the “demand” side of the equation, incumbent candidates may be advised *not* to collect endorsements publicly. Ron Kaufman, who consulted to the Cellucci campaign and was a close Cellucci advisor, commented that incumbents are best-of developing a strategy of “non-endorsements.” Getting too many endorsements, he said, “makes them look like they are worried.”<sup>26</sup> Finally, if endorsements function as a mechanism by which imperfectly informed voters receive information, then incumbents, being a known entity that is easily observable, need not work too heavily on garnering endorsements.

## **Overview of the 1998 Election**

### **1998 Republican Primary**

Weld ran for U.S. Senate in 1996 and lost. He resigned as governor in 1997 to press his case to become Ambassador to Mexico. He was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1997, however, Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci became acting governor and hence became the incumbent to beat in the 1998 primary and beyond. State treasurer Joe Malone challenged Cellucci in the primary. Malone received nearly twice as many endorsements as Cellucci in the primary, all told, including 8 of the 15 “top” Republican town or city committees. One endorser, Ray Shamie, former GOP state chair and mentor to Malone (Malone had managed Shamie’s 1984 unsuccessful bid for U.S. Senate) endorsed both candidates in June of 1997, then in February just before the convention announced his neutrality saying he was nervous about the fractious tone of the primary battle (Phillips et al. 1998). Cellucci not only had the incumbency advantage, he had

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<sup>26</sup> Personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July 2004.

the support of the former governor Bill Weld, the rising star in the Republican party, Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph Martin, and the convention endorsement.

Both Cellucci and Malone had nearly the same number of repeat endorsers – 4 (or 5, if you count Ray Shamie) a-piece. Three of Cellucci’s five repeat endorsers were newspaper endorsers. Ray Shamie and Weld were the other two. Malone’s repeat endorsers included Citizens for Limited Taxation, the mayor of Leominster, a small town with any army base, Life Insurance Industries of Massachusetts, and Ray Shamie. The majority of endorsements went to the primary loser and there was no clear united front of endorsements that developed around Cellucci. The incumbent Cellucci, however, sailed through the primary with a 17.4 margin of victory.

#### **1998 Democratic Primary**

In 1998, the Democrats nominated the state attorney General Scott Harshbarger. Harshbarger ran against former state Senator and chair of the Ways and Means Committee, Patricia McGovern and against former U.S. House Representative Brian Donnelly. Harshbarger received the most endorsements – 51. Donnelly received 21; McGovern received 24. Harshbarger had the support of 22 interest groups; Donnelly had 3; McGovern had 1. All three candidates had substantial support from officeholders, though again Harshbarger had the most, with 26 officeholder endorsements to McGovern’s 20 and Donnelly’s 18. See Table 4-13. Harshbarger also had the most number of repeat endorsements (13 of the 23 repeaters) from groups including the AFL-CIO, the Black Political Task Force, the Boston Building Trades Council and SEIU Local 509. The only interest group repeat endorser for McGovern came from out-of-state Democratic women’s fundraising group, EMILY’s List. And Donnelly’s only repeat interest group endorser was the Fire Fighters.

**Table 4-13: Count of Endorsements, Massachusetts 1998 Democratic Primary by Candidate and by Type**

Endorsement Type	Donnelly	Harshbarger	McGovern
Interest Group	3	22	1
Media		1	2
Officeholder	18	26	20
Party Individual or Group		2	
Prominent Individual			1
Total	21	51	24

The ideological splits that were evident in past Democratic primaries were not apparent in 1998. Many of the more liberal leaning groups stayed out of the 1998 primary – CPPAX, the ADA, and the human service organizations that had been active in past primaries. Moreover, it was fairly clear to most observers that neither McGovern nor Donnelly had much of a chance at winning the nomination. That being said, when examining Appendix D’s timelines, it is worth noting that unlike past primaries in Massachusetts, although the eventual nominee Harshbarger had amassed a great deal of early support from individual officeholders, the interest group support did not really start arriving until the summer before the primary, later than in most other campaigns. Like the 1994 election prior, the Democrats did not rally around a Democratic candidate. Many of them saved their endorsements for the general election and endorsed the Republican incumbent instead.

**Table 4-14: Summary of Tests Applied to 1998 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	1998	24%	53%	No	1
Republicans	1998	24%	35%	No	3

#### **1998 General Election**

The Cellucci v. Harshbarger general election was fairly close with a roughly 4 point spread. Cellucci won. Cellucci picked up a great deal of support from Democrats, including “more than a dozen high profile Democrats,” at least four members of the Worcester Democratic City Committee and others. He also received endorsements from some heavily-leaning

Democratic unions – SEIU, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, and the Fire Fighters – but he also received the endorsement of Citizens for Limited Taxation and Massachusetts Hunters. The Fire Fighters said it was among the first times the union had decided to endorse a Republican and they did so because their membership was beginning to lean Republican.<sup>27</sup> Cellucci’s running mate for Lieutenant Governor Jane Swift, said that the first thing their campaign tried to do, following the primary, was to “grab endorsements from the losing Democratic coalition...” to demonstrate “electability.”<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Swift said, the surprising thing about Cellucci’s endorsements in 1998 was that he received *any* of the labor support that he received.

The count of endorsements in the 1998 general election was fairly high, signifying a close election. Cellucci received 74 endorsements; Harshbarger received 68. Although there were a number of defections among Democrats to Cellucci, and no defections running the other way, Harshbarger did retain several key endorsements in his fold, including the teachers, the nurses, the AFL-CIO, and environmental groups.

## **Overview of the 2002 Election**

### **2002 Democratic Primary**

The 2002 election was for an open seat and on the Democratic side, the candidates lined up. The Democratic primary was unruly. Five candidates ran for the nomination. Senate President Thomas Birmingham and state Treasurer Shannon O’Brien were the two “inside” candidates with the highest candidate quality scores. They competed against former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, Steven Grossman, former chair of both the Democratic National Committee and the Massachusetts Democratic party Steven Grossman, and state senator Warren Tolman.

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<sup>27</sup> Personal interview with Robert McCarthy, May, 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Personal interview with Jane Swift, August, 2004.

Of the 202 endorsements granted in the 2002 Democratic primary, 147 of them went to O'Brien and Birmingham. The remaining 55 endorsements were spread out quite evenly across the additional three candidates. Table 4-15 shows the spread of the endorsements across the different types. In the interest group category, the number for Birmingham is artificially low. Birmingham, a former labor lawyer, called in his chits for the 2002 gubernatorial election and won the endorsements of labor groups across the state. Two of his endorsements were endorsements from "30 labor unions" and "43 labor groups." Of the specific unions mentioned, Birmingham had the support of the AFL-CIO, the two teachers unions and the nurses (all repeat endorsers). Birmingham, however, did not receive any other "type" of interest group support – not from any environmental groups or liberal groups or human service groups. Moreover, Birmingham's endorsements from labor came relatively late in the process. The AFL-CIO and the "30 union" endorsements did not arrive until June, followed by the Nurses and the Massachusetts Teachers Association in August. O'Brien's support was also fairly narrowly cast and fairly late as well. Of the 6 interest group endorsements she earned, four were women's groups (EMILY's List (March), Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus (May), NOW (August), and "prominent Women's Groups" (September)). The only other endorsements came from the Black Political Task Force and a Worcester union. Tolman, the liberal of the field running on money from Clean Elections, garnered the CPPAX endorsement (in August) and two environmental groups (in September). Reich received one from OutSomerville and Grossman had zero interest group endorsements.

**Table 4-15: Count of Endorsements, 2002 Democratic Primary by Type**

Endorsement Type	Birmingham	Grossman	O'Brien	Reich	Tolman	Total
Interest Group	10		6	1	4	21
Interest Group Leader	1	1	1			3
Media	1		2	2		5

Miscellaneous	1	3		1		5
Officeholder	62	5	41	7	12	127
Party Individual or Group	4	3	13		1	21
Political People			2			2
Prominent Individual	1	4	2	10	1	18
Total	80	16	67	21	18	202

What is striking about table 4-15 is how few interest group endorsements there are, overall, and how many officeholder endorsements there are. As noted earlier, officeholder endorsements are rarely worth much except a single vote. A primary, Joe Malone said, is a time “when you need foot soldiers – a strong volunteer base – the ability to hold signs.” Officeholders rarely deliver such tangible goods. Moreover, the vast majority of officeholder endorsements were from alderman and school committee members – only a handful of mayors and other leaders. Finally, if endorsements are supposed to provide informational cues to voters, the endorsements of low-level officeholders from small cities and towns fail to deliver on the informational value. How does anyone outside of Newburyport know the political leanings of its school committee members? Why would members of the general public even know the positions of state senators and representatives beyond their own? So why did O’Brien and Birmingham expend so much energy soliciting their support? As O’Brien pointed out in her interview, officeholder endorsements are generally fairly easy to obtain – often it is a single phone call, hence they are low-cost. Second, both O’Brien and Birmingham were officeholders and they felt they needed to demonstrate a wide range of support that emanated from within their own ranks to prove their viability. If one of them collected all the officeholder endorsements while the other decided not to expend the energy, then the public perception would be one of failure to attain the support even from “friends.”

Despite Birmingham’s strong labor support, he lost both the convention endorsement and the primary election. And despite O’Brien’s winning of the nomination, she did not have the decisive influence of endorsements nor the united front of support from the party. For all of the “endorsement activity” that occurred in the 2002 Democratic primary, the vast majority of it was “noise.”

**Table 4-16 Summary of Tests Applied to 2002 Primary Elections**

Party	Election Year	% Repeat Endorsers	% Endorsements go to Nominee	United Front	Average Candidate Quality
Democrats	2002	10%	33%	No	1
Republicans	2002	13%	100%	Yes	0

#### 2002 Republican Primary

In 2001, Paul Cellucci left Massachusetts to become Ambassador to Canada, leaving Lieutenant Governor Jane Swift the Acting Governor. The Republicans displayed a high-degree of party unity in 2002 when they ensured that incumbent Governor Jane Swift would not seek reelection. With poll numbers showing that any one of her Democratic rivals could beat Swift easily, the Republicans tapped Mitt Romney, a former Senate nominee in 1994, wealthy venture capitalist, and chair of the Salt Lake Olympic Committee in 2000 to seek the Republican nomination. The Republican party did their “tapping” behind-the-scenes, according to strategist Ron Kaufman. “Romney did not want *public* endorsements” when Swift was still planning to run in the primary. Instead, Romney and his Republican supporters sought private endorsements that were “used to help Jane make a decision.”<sup>29</sup> Those “private” endorsements became public at least twenty days before Swift publicly declared she would not seek re-election on March 19. By the end of February, five Republican town committee chairs announced their intention to endorse Romney, along with one Representative and one newspaper. Following Swift’s announcement,

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<sup>29</sup> Personal interview with Ron Kaufman, July 2004.

more endorsements rolled in, largely from officeholders. Romney ran unopposed in the primary and therefore did not need to collect a high number of endorsements to differentiate himself.

### **2002 General Election**

Romney faced state treasurer Shannon O'Brien in the general election. Like many other past general elections, O'Brien, the Democrat, collected nearly twice as many endorsements (57) as the Republican Romney (34). Both candidates received the "usual suspects" of endorsements from traditionally party-aligned groups. With the exception of a few Democratic activists and local officeholders who endorsed Romney, there was not a high degree of "cross-over" endorsing as had occurred in previous Massachusetts elections. O'Brien had the backing of the entire Democratic establishment – from every major elected Democrat to the AFL-CIO, to the teachers' union with no success in the end. Many Democratic strongholds defected and many independents tilted Republican.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

By going through each election in turn, this chapter has highlighted several important points about endorsements in gubernatorial elections – the behavior of candidates, the behavior of endorsers, and the behavior of parties. We can draw several conclusions:

*Incumbents generally avoid gathering endorsements; when incumbents run in a primary, endorsers tend to hold back.* Most of the time, incumbents are relatively safe. Even when incumbent Cellucci faced a challenger in Malone in 1998, it was Malone who had to collect the endorsements to prove his viability not Cellucci. In 1978, Dukakis was not a safe incumbent and endorsers wielded punitive power through withholding endorsements. When Dukakis fought back against incumbent governor Edward J. King in 1982, King faced a serious challenge; hence



both candidates needed to carve out their own piece of the ideological spectrum which they did through securing endorsements.

*Endorsements from officeholders are low-cost, low-yield mechanisms; endorsements from interest groups are high-cost but potentially higher-yield mechanisms.* An endorsement from a mayor, from a school-committee member, or from a sheriff is usually the direct result of the candidate asking for the endorsement. Typically, the officeholder need not do much more than lend his or her name to the candidate's list of endorsements. Occasionally, a mayor can "deliver" a city, but, more often than not, officeholder endorsements are little more than stamps of approval. Interest-group endorsements, by contrast, are offered more formally. Many interest groups have endorsement procedures and guidelines they must follow – they grant their endorsements at certain times of year, they have candidates fill out a detailed questionnaires, they ask candidates to speak to their members and so on. If they ultimately grant an endorsement, groups will not only donate money to the campaign, they will donate people, office-space, and membership lists.

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that Massachusetts gubernatorial candidates, both Republican and Democrat, collect far more endorsements than do their counterparts in other states under investigation. Why? I shall discuss the Democratic party first, then the Republican party.

First, it is important to understand *where* the endorsements come from. 47% of the endorsements received by Democratic candidates are from officeholders. Only Illinois Democratic candidates rival Massachusetts Democratic candidates – 50% of their endorsements come from officeholders. Moreover, the officeholders who endorse are either local politicians (42%) – mayors, school committee members, and other low-level public officials – or they are

state legislators (25%). This is very different from other states in which the number of officeholder endorsements to Democratic candidates hovers in the 20-30% range. Massachusetts has a lot of Democratic officeholders to choose from. But what prompts these candidates to seek such low-level endorsements in such vast quantities? The weakness of the Democratic party provides some insight. Because there is no cohesive party unit – nor a set of party leaders that can do the heavy-lifting – individual candidates must start from scratch at the beginning of every electoral season to patch together a winning coalition of elected officials. They must scramble to secure the endorsement of the local mayor before any other candidate beats them to the punch – without the local mayor’s endorsement, they may lose a pivotal machine or they might not *look* viable. Massachusetts Democratic candidates fend for themselves. The party cannot control *who* enters the race and it cannot stave off divisive primary fights.

In this void where the Democratic party is supposed to be, interest groups also participate far more heavily than in other states. In Massachusetts the absolute number of endorsements from interest groups far exceeds that of other states.<sup>30</sup> Between 1994 and 2002, the total number of interest group endorsements to Democratic gubernatorial candidates in Massachusetts was 57. In Illinois, that number dropped to 30. And in Texas, the number was 19. In that same time range, most of the interest group involvement was from labor organizations. Again, in Massachusetts, many more *local* unions made endorsements compared to other states. Just like with officeholder endorsements, the local level was where the action was. The organizational structure of unions and the relative autonomy of locals, enables labor to make multiple endorsements to Democratic candidates within a state at a variety of levels. This not only

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<sup>30</sup> The one exception is 1994. In that year, Texas gubernatorial candidate Ann Richards received endorsements from 12 interest groups. That same year only 10 interest groups endorsed Democratic gubernatorial candidates in Massachusetts.

enhances the pure number of endorsements, but it also provides organizational strength at all levels of a campaign for Democrats. In addition, the close relationship enjoyed by Democrats with labor bumps them up to equal footing with Republicans at least in terms of resources, given the relative edge Republican state central committees enjoy. Bibby and Holbrook (1999) point out that while Republican state party organizations serve as a relatively more important source of campaign funds for candidates, Democrats makeup for their relative weakness by relying on such allied nonparty groups.

Republican gubernatorial candidates in Massachusetts look a lot like their counterparts in other states, gaining endorsements from a mix of interest groups, officeholders, and party-aligned individuals and groups. Across the states, Republicans gain a plurality of their endorsements from officeholders (35% in Massachusetts, about 42% in New Mexico and Illinois, and Ohio and 24% in New Mexico, 18% in Texas). Still, like their Democratic counterparts in Massachusetts, Republican candidates collect a high number of endorsements from local individuals which gives them a higher absolute number of endorsements overall compared to other states (between 1994 and 2002, Massachusetts GOP candidates collected a total of 67 endorsements compared to a total of 47 in Illinois, and 22 in Ohio).

Although the Massachusetts Republican party began the 1980s with a weak party that could barely cobble together a nominee for governor, with the election of Weld, the party developed itself, at least at the gubernatorial level. Since that time, the party has dedicated itself to avoiding divisive primaries by selecting a nominee through the traditional party route, not by taking cues from interest groups or any other party-aligned group. “Official” party people – Republicans – selected Romney, not outside interest groups or prominent individuals.

## CHAPTER 5: REPEAT ENDORSERS AND THE SMALL WORLD TEST

In this small chapter I zero in on one test in particular: the small world test. Recall that the small world test assesses the number of repeat endorsers – the group of endorsers who appear in multiple elections. These people and groups are important to the theory of the “expanded party” because if there is, indeed, a small supply of “competent political personnel” and if candidates *must* draw upon the same limited pool of party leaders and activists to secure the resources and the funding necessary to successfully become the nominee then we can consider them part of the party. If, by contrast, candidates find their own sets of supporters who differ from election to election, then we can say that campaigns are indeed more candidate-centered than party-centered. The degree of repetition within the complete list of endorsements through consecutive elections is an “indication of the size of the pool from which candidates must be recruiting supporters” (Cohen et al. 2001: 31

One question we might ask is: do you need the repeat endorsers on your side to win the nomination? Do repeaters endorse winners or do they endorse losers? I pooled all of the endorsements for all of the years together to determine how many endorsements from repeat players went to the successful nominee. The number is small indeed. Of the 1267 endorsements I collected for primary endorsements, 996 (79 percent) came from non-repeat players. 271 (21 percent) came from repeat players; not a very high percentage at all. When repeat players endorsed, they endorsed winners 49 percent of the time. By state, there is, of course, more variation, but, overall, in four of the six states, repeat players endorsed winning candidates between 43 and 55 percent of the time. Only in Texas and Ohio did repeat players endorse winners 100 percent of the time, but nearly all of the elections in Ohio and Texas were uncontested, so this is not surprising.

What do these results tell us? First, they tell us that the size of the pool from which candidates recruit support from is big. Nearly 80 percent of a candidate's endorsement support is drawn from groups or individuals who only appear in one single election. One could argue that even if the pool is big, perhaps the 20 percent of repeat endorsements is critical to nomination. If winners received the support of the repeat endorsements *all the time*, then we could say yes, the pool is big, but a core group of endorsements exists that are must-haves. This is not the case. The repeat endorsers have nearly a fifty-fifty chance of choosing the winner. Any particular candidate might feel it is absolutely necessary to attain the support of the teacher's union, for example, but at least in the aggregate, such support does not guarantee a win by far.

Let us, for a moment, only examine contested elections. We know from previous chapters that political groups and individuals have their own calculus of whether to expend political capital or not. These political players tend *not* to endorse when there is an incumbent running (usually uncontested elections) both because incumbents do not ask for them and because the groups and individuals themselves determine it is a waste of political energy. We also know that they tend not to endorse as much in uncontested elections with or without an incumbent for much the same reason – the preservation of political capital. Finally, if we subscribe to the theory that these political players – and here I am referring specifically to the repeat players – should behave *as if* they were members of the party, then we should see them consistently backing winners and we should see this even when we eliminate uncontested elections from the mix.

According to my data, however, in contested elections, repeat players endorse winners only 43 percent of the time. This is hardly consistent and it indicates that interest groups and political individuals are not necessarily backing a winner as much as they are backing a candidate whose views align with their own. I expand on this point more in a moment.

Who are these repeat endorsers? And, is there a difference between the repeaters who endorse winners from the repeaters who endorse losers? In answer to the first question, the repeat endorsers are largely interest groups (45 percent) and officeholders (28 percent). Media endorsements make up 17 percent of the repeat endorsements. Only 7 percent of the repeaters came from official party individuals or groups. Within these broad categories the split of groups or individuals who endorse winners and losers is often close to 50-50, though the slight variations are revealing. Interest groups and officeholders endorsed the *loser* slightly more often than they endorsed the winner; the media endorsed the *winner* slightly more often than the loser. Official party people or groups, however, chose the winner 72 percent of the time. By contrast, the five repeat prominent individuals and miscellaneous individuals – celebrities, business leaders, and academics etc. – chose the loser 100 percent of the time.

These results are consistent with many of the insights from interviews I conducted. Let us isolate individual officeholders, celebrities and business leaders, excluding individual members of the party. How are endorsements from individuals attained and why are they granted? Most of the time, endorsements from individuals are, plain and simple, political favors. A candidate needs to show momentum, viability, or perhaps even needs to write a press release. The candidate calls his or her officeholder friend, business leader or friend of a friend and asks for an endorsement. The transaction is quick, it requires little more than a thank you note, and it can translate into a few notices in the press. This transaction yields few resources. The endorser endorses as a favor to a friend, as publicity for him or herself, or as a way to show involvement. I asked everyone I interviewed about their decision to endorse other candidates and all of the officeholders said they endorsed for the “you scratched my back I’ll scratch yours” reasons. There is little variation in the individual’s calculus to endorse regardless of whether the

individual is the Speaker of the House, a state-wide officer, or a member of Congress. The odds of endorsing a winner remained nearly 50-50. Hence, it is not just school-committee members and other low-level officeholders who do favors for friends. It is legislative leaders and ambitious politicians alike. The only officeholders who are calculating about whom to endorse tend to stay out of the endorsement game altogether, at least publicly. Many press accounts, for example, discussed the “behind-the-scenes” work of certain high-profile political leaders

If we unpack the list even more, the random nature of the list does not change much. Labor endorsements – the vast majority of interest group endorsements – are evenly split between winners and losers. The remainder of the repeat interest group endorsements are fairly evenly divided. Of the five pro-gun endorsements, for example, three went to losers and two went to winners. In two of those elections, 1978 and 1998, the pro-gun groups endorsed both a Republican *and* a Democrat.<sup>31</sup> The only environmental group that granted repeat endorsements occurred in Colorado. In 1998, the New Mexico Conservation Alliance endorsed Gary King, a Democrat. In 2002, the group endorsed Baca, a Republican. This suggests that groups are behaving like groups *not* like a party. They are endorsing the candidate(s) who is/are most ideologically aligned with their interests not picking a winner.

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<sup>31</sup> In Massachusetts in 1978, the Sportsmen’s Political Action Committee endorsed both Edward F. King (a Republican) and Edward J. King (a Democrat). They endorsed John Lakian in the 1982 Republican primary. In 1998, the Illinois State Rifle Association endorsed both Republican primary candidate Chad Koppie and Democratic primary candidate Glen Poshard.

## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The title of this dissertation is, *Do Parties Still Matter?* This suggests that parties did matter once. In what ways did they matter? Until the late 1950s, parties served as significant vehicles of voter mobilization largely because they remained labor-intensive organizations that focused on face-to-face contact with voters (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993). Voter mobilization, in turn, contributed to higher levels of participation overall in electoral politics. Until the Progressive reforms in the 1920s at the state level and the McGovern Fraser Commission at the national level in the 1970s, parties also solely controlled nominations. In controlling nominations, parties had the power to weed out candidates *before* the election, to choose a nominee who was broadly acceptable within the party then build substantial support and unite the party for the general election. In controlling nominations, parties had strength. When we imagine, therefore, what a weakened party is, we generally begin with the idea that a weakened party is one that does not have such power over nominations and that a weakened party is fractured.

The advent of primaries, the demise of machines and the attendant decline in patronage, and the introduction of mass media all contributed to the decline of parties as vital sources of mobilization and as the principal organization responsible for choosing candidates. For many scholars, party decline became the dominant story that could explain much of the major trends in American politics, from the decline in turnout to the growth of divided government and gridlock. Some scholars, however, noting an up tick in general partisan identification among voters and the growth of party unity in Congress and the attendant strengthening of party leaders, began to argue that parties were resurgent – not only resurgent, but approaching the model of Responsible Party Government advanced by the American Political Science Association in 1950. Yet, even if



parties had gained power in Congress and even if voters appeared to be more partisan once again, the loss of control over nominations remained.

Primaries have had a number of harmful effects on parties: they have increased campaign costs, diminished the capacity of party organizations to reward supporters through nomination, lessened the influence of party leaders on nominees, and increased intraparty factionalism. With all these as givens, Cohen et al. argued that, at least in presidential nominations contests, parties fought back even against the challenges posed by primaries and maintained their control of nominations; they just found work-arounds. The main “work-around” was an expansion of the conception of party. Parties, they argued, became less hierarchical and more like a loose network of interests. They adapted organizationally to the changed political environment. Thus, instead of having a small band of party leaders caucusing to choose the most suitable nominee at a given point in time, today a large swath of partisan-aligned interests send signals to each other via endorsements during the invisible primary to settle on a candidate who is broadly acceptable. To prove that such interests are acting more like parties and less like narrow interests, Cohen et al. show that interest groups often endorse candidates who may not necessarily toe their absolutist agenda – rather they endorse candidates who can win – candidates who are broadly acceptable to the median primary voter. Cohen et al. argue that parties beat back reforms and now control nominations as much as they ever did. Parties, therefore, remain strong, vital organizations that are very much in control of presidential nominations politics.

My dissertation tests this assertion – this idea that parties have become less hierarchical and instead now behave as a loose network of interests. I studied 32 nominations contests in six states over time. I examined closed and open primaries. I collected nearly 2000 endorsements for 76 candidates. I did not find evidence of a loose network of interests at the state level. Instead, I

found when parties are strong they remain hierarchical organizations that indeed do “control” the nominations mainly through limiting the amount of primary competition. Contrary to the Cohen et al. thesis, I found that where parties are weak, a loose network of interests does develop around a particular candidate – yet these interests are factionalized just as the candidates are factionalized. The interests, therefore, do not represent the “extended party” so much as they represent their own perhaps narrow ideological interests.

In addition, my dissertation uncovered some new findings about endorsement activity generally. I found, not surprisingly, that in primary elections, incumbents typically do not collect many (if any) endorsements, unless they are “running scared.” When incumbents do not face any high-quality challengers they tend not to ask for endorsements and groups tend to reserve their endorsements for the general election. This often means, therefore, that when incumbents are running, elections are low-information events; opposition-party high-quality or low-quality challengers in primary or general elections simply do not generate as many endorsements and therefore the informational value of endorsements diminishes significantly.

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## **APPENDIX A: ENDORSEMENT CATEGORIES**

### **Officeholders**

Local (Alderman, city council, mayor)  
State Legislative (state Rep., state Senate)  
State Legislative leaders  
U.S. House  
U.S. Senate  
Congressional leadership  
Sheriffs (county)  
State-wide officers (AG, Treasurer)  
Out of state: senators, house members, Attorneys General  
Cabinet secretaries (state/national)  
PLUS: former ones of all of these  
District Attorneys  
    Former US attorney

### **Political People (non-officeholders)**

    Aide/former aide  
    Nominee/former nominee  
    Candidate (previously never held elective office, mentioned)

### **Media**

Newspapers (state-wide; local; conglomerate (i.e. Community Newspapers))  
Columnists  
Industry-specific magazine/newsletter (i.e. Pool & Billiards Magazine; the Polish American)

### **Activists**

Individuals the newspapers call "activists"  
Issue-oriented activists (environmental activists; child-care activists)

### **Party People/Groups**

Ward/City Committees  
Ward/City Committee individuals  
County chairs  
State Committee members

State Committee leaders  
Nominating Convention  
"Activists" (i.e. Democratic Party Activists")  
College Dems/Republicans

### **Prominent Individuals**

Celebrities  
Business leaders (CEOs)

### **Interest Groups**

Unions  
Police, Teachers, Social Workers, Truckers  
National; regional (i.e. New England); state; locals  
Industry PACs  
Environmental  
Public Interest/Good Gov't  
Pro-Choice  
Pro-Life  
Women's  
Civil Rights  
Realtors  
Taxpayers  
Seniors  
National org (EMILY's List)  
Lawyers Groups  
Sportsmens/people

### **Interest Group Leaders/Individuals from the above-mentioned categories**

### **Miscellaneous**

Ad-hoc committee of physicians; auto-dealers; bankers  
Election-specific groups (Black Coalition to elect Mike Dukakis of 100 blacks)  
Professors (Lester Thurow; Gary Orren)  
Former college-president

## **APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

- Bachrach, George. Former state senator; political commentator. July 2004.
- Braude, James. Former executive director, Tax Equity Alliance; former city councilor; television and radio talk-show host. May 2004.
- Dukakis, Michael. Former Democratic governor; former Democratic nominee for president. July 2004.
- Grossman, Steven. Former chair, Massachusetts Democratic Party; former chair of Democratic National Committee. August, 2003.
- Holloway, David. President, National Association of Governmental Employees. May 2004.
- Johnston, Philip. Former secretary health and human services in Dukakis administration; former state representative. Chair, Massachusetts Democratic Party. July 2004.
- Kaufman, Ron. Former chair, Republican National Committee. July 2004.
- Malone, Joseph. Former Massachusetts state Treasurer; former Republican nominee for governor. June 2004.
- McCarthy, Robert. President, Professional Fire Fighters of Massachusetts. June 2004.
- Nelson, Avi. Political commentator. June 2004.
- O'Brien, Shannon. Former Massachusetts State Treasurer; former Democratic nominee for governor. August, 2004.
- Swift, Jane. Former state representative; former lieutenant governor; former Republican acting governor. August, 2004.
- Tolman, Warren. Former state senator; former Democratic candidate for governor. July, 2004.
- Buckley, Joseph. Service Employees International Union. April 2003.

**APPENDIX C: MASSACHUSETTS DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE REPEAT ENDORSERS BY YEAR**

X = Endorsement Withheld

	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002
AFL-CIO			X	X	X	X	X
AFSCME	X	X					
Alan Solomont				X			X
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)		X		X			
Attleboro Sun Chronicle				X			
Black Political Task Force		X		X		X	X
Boston Building Trades Council		X				X	
Boston Globe	X	X			X		X
Boston Herald				X		X	X
Boston Phoenix		X		X		X	
Citizens for Limited Taxation		X					
Citizens for Participation in Political Action	X	X	X	X	X		X
Convention endorsement		X		X	X	X	
Democratic State Committee chairman Steven Grossman					X		X
EMILY's List				X		X	X
Fitchburg Mayor Jeffrey Bean				X	X		
former Labor Secretary Paul Eustace					X		
former Mayor Jeffrey A. Bean of Fitchburg						X	
former state Attorney General James Shannon					X		
former state Rep. Lawrence R. Alexander					X		
former state Rep. Mel King				X	X		
former U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland of Springfield				X			
IBEW Local 2222		X			X		
International Brotherhood of Police Officers		X					X
Iron Workers Union Local 7				X		X	
Joseph Nigro, general agent, Boston Building trades union				X		X	
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune				X			
Lowell Sun		X		X			X
MA Building Trades Council		X		X			
MA Citizens for Life		X					
MA Federation of Teachers		X					X
MA Nurses Association				X			X
MA State Fire Fighters Union					X	X	
MA State Police Association	X	X		X			
MA Teachers Assn.	X	X	X	X			X
MA UAW	X	X		X	X		

	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002
MA Women's Political Caucus	X	X		X			X
Middlesex News		X		X			
NAGE	X	X					
National Association of Social Workers (8000)		X			X		
Newton Mayor David Cohen						X	X
Northampton Mayor Mary Ford					X	X	
NOW				X	X		X
Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian		X		X			
Salem Mayor Neil Harrington				X	X		
Secretary of Labor Paul Eustace				X			
SEIU Local 509		X		X		X	
Senate President William M. Bulger					X		
Sportsmen's Political Action Committee	X						
Springfield Daily News		X					
Springfield Union-News				X	X		
state Rep. David Cohen (D-Newton)				X			
state Rep. Lawrence Alexander (D-Marblehead)		X					
state Sen. David Magnani of Framingham						X	X
state Sen. Michael Morrissey						X	X
state Sen. Robert Creedon						X	X
state Sen. Stephen D. Brewer of Barre						X	X
state Sen. Susan Fargo of Lincoln						X	X
State Senate president William Bulger (D- South Boston)		X					
teacher unions							X
Teamsters				X			
Teamsters Joint Council No. 10	X	X					
U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Malden					X	X	
U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland, a Springfield Democrat		X					
U.S. Rep. James M. Shannon		X					
U.S. Rep. John Olver						X	
U.S. Rep. Joseph Early		X		X			
U.S. Rep. Joseph Moakley of South Boston						X	
U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules		X		X			
WEEI radio		X					
Westfield Evening News				X			
William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA)				X		X	
Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.)		X		X			
TOTAL	10	34	3	38	20	24	22

**Massachusetts Republican Candidate Repeat Endorsers by Year**

	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002
Attleboro Sun Chronicle				X			
Boston Globe		X				X	
Boston Herald				X		X	
Boston Phoenix				X			
Citizens for Limited Taxation				X		X	
Convention endorsement	X	X	X	X		X	
Former Gov. Bill Weld						X	X
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune				X			
Leominster Mayor Dean J. Mazzarella						X	X
Life Insurance Industries of MA				X		X	
Lowell Sun						X	X
MA Citizens for Life				X			
MA Womens Political Caucus				X			
Middlesex News		X		X			
Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman			X			X	
Sportsmen's Political Action Committee	X	X					
Springfield Daily News		X					
Springfield Union-News				X			
WEEI radio		X					
Westfield Evening News				X			
Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair	X	X		X			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>14</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>

## APPENDIX D: TIMELINES OF ENDORSEMENTS

States are listed in the order in which they appear in the text.

### COLORADO

#### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Colorado Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1994	March	Romer	Colorado Rockies ownership group
	May	Romer	airport contractors Robert and Linda Alvarado former Romer cabinet members Cole Finegan former Romer cabinet members Ken Salazar former Romer cabinet members Penfield Tate III former state Sen Regis Groff former state Sens. Tom Glass Jerry McMorris Merle Chambers Micky Miller Oren Benton Warren Toltz
	July	Romer	AFL-CIO
1997	September	Feeley	AFL-CIO
1998	April	Schoettler	Roy R. Romer
	May	Feeley	Democratic Leadership Council Organized labor
		Schoettler	66 Latino leaders Denver Mayor Wellington Webb Ray Kogovsek
	June	Schoettler	Garts of sporting goods Millers of real estate development
	July	Feeley	Colorado Association of Public Employees J.D. MacFarlane, a former Colorado Attorney General
		Schoettler	Coloradans for Western Values
	August	Schoettler	Democratic state party chairman Howard Gelt's
2002	February	Heath	Denver Mayor Wellington Webb
	July	Heath	AFL-CIO Colorado Building and Construction Trades Colorado Education Association Colorado NARAL Colorado Professional Fire Fighters



## COLORADO

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Colorado Primaries, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1994	March	Benson	Charles Steinbrueck Robinson Dairy Inc. Chairman Dick Robinson
1997	December	Norton	Colorado Education Association
1998	February	Norton	Doug Dean
		Owens	House Speaker, Republican Chuck Berry
	April	Owens	Christian Coalition Focus on the Family U.S. Senator Wayne Allard
	May	Owens	25 House Republicans
	June	Owens	Joe Rogers State Sen. Jim Congrove
	July	Norton	Colorado Association of Public Employees
		Owens	4 U.S. House Republicans from Colorado Small Business for Responsible Government
	August	Norton	Bob Dole, 1996 Republican candidate for president
		Owens	20 members of the Colorado Legislature ex-senator and religious-right leader Bill Armstrong Jack Kemp
2001	August	Owens	Larry Trujillo, director of the state Department of Personnel and General Support Services
2002	July	Owens	200 doctors and medical professionals Community organizations and advocacy groups across Colorado The Farmers & Ranchers Coalition

## NEW MEXICO

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, New Mexico Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1997	October	King	Democratic state Sen Pauline Eisenstadt of Corrales
	November	King	Democratic state Sen Linda Lopez of the South Valley
		Martin Chavez	State Police Deputy Chief John A. Cordova
	December	King	Democratic state Rep. James G. Taylor of the South Valley
1998	April	Martin Chavez	AFSCME Democrats National Education Association of New Mexico Rio Arriba County Democratic Party sheet metal workers union
	May	King	Communications Workers of America, Local 7037 Concerned Citizens of Albuquerque New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance
		Martin Chavez	Deborah Dozier Potter Santa Fe real estate manager New Mexico Federation of Teachers The Gay & Lesbian Voter Alliance
	June	Martin Chavez	Fraternal Order of Police in Santa Fe
	July	Martin Chavez	Harry Bigbee, a retired Santa Fe lawyer and district judge
	August	Martin Chavez	Former Lt. Gov. Casey Luna
2002	January	Richardson	AFSCME
	March	Richardson	New Mexico Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO
	April	Richardson	The Navajo Nation Council
	May	Martin Chavez	Albuquerque Tribune
		Richardson	Billy McKibben, a conservative Republican Larry Willard
	June	Richardson	NOW Equality PAC

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, New Mexico Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1998	March	Johnson	Linda Kay Jones
	May	Johnson	All-Indian Pueblo Council Republican Party
2001	September	Baca	Albuquerque Public Schools Superintendent Brad Allison Albuquerque Tribune New Mexico Conservation Voters Alliance
		Sanchez	Albuquerque police officers union
2002	March	Sanchez	Republican Party Chairman John Dendahl
	April	Sanchez	Col. Allen Weh, held fund-raisers for Bush and U.S. Rep. Heather Wilson Colin McMillan, former co-chairman of President Bush's New Mexico campaign Dona Ana District Attorney Susana Martinez George Yates, a Roswell oilman state Rep. Larry Larranaga
	May	Bradley	Albuquerque Tribune Gov. Johnson retired Gen. Gilbert Baca talk show host Larry Ahrens

## OHIO

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Ohio Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1993	October	Burch	59 of Ohio's 88 Democratic county chairmen--from the county chairmen as individuals, rather than from the executive committees that run the county Democratic organizations. Enos Singer, Washington County Democratic Chair & Pres OH Dem Chair Assoc Franklin County Chairwoman Fran Ryan
	December	Burch	18 of the 25 women on the executive committee of the Federated Democratic Women of Ohio AFL-CIO
1994	January	Burch	United Auto Workers
	February	Burch	Democratic Party's 87-member executive committee OH AFSCME
	April	Burch	Coalition of Concerned Black Citizens Plain Dealer
1997	September	Fisher	Democratic party county chairmen's association
	November	Fisher	Democratic Party's executive committee
	December	Fisher	Ohio Democratic Party
1998	February	Fisher	AFL-CIO
	March	Fisher	Ohio Education Association
	April	Fisher	Black Elected Democrats of Cleveland David Milenthal former media consultant to Celeste Former Gov. Celeste's former chief of staff Ray Sawyer Former Gov. Celeste's secretary Dora Globe Nineteen of Cleveland's 21 council members Vernal G. "Skip" Riffe III, a Scioto County commissioner, and Verna Kay Riffe children of late Speaker of OH House
2002	January	Hagan	Ohio Democratic Party
	March	Hagan	AFL-CIO
	April	Hagan	Ohio Civil Service Employees Association

## OHIO

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Ohio Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1994	February	Voinovich	OH Republican Party
	April	Voinovich	Local 1317 of the International Longshoremen's Association in Cleveland Pipe Fitters Local 120 of Cleveland
1997	May	Taft	60 percent county GOP chairman Voinovich
	June	Taft	former GOP Gov. James A. Rhodes
	July	Taft	board of directors for the Associated General Contractors of Ohio
	October	Taft	77 of the 81 GOP legislators Auditor Jim Petro Rep. Michael Wise, R-Chagrin Falls
	November	Taft	10 of the 11 GOP members of Congress from Ohio 19 of 21 state Senate Republicans 400 elected GOP officials and party officials 58 of 60 Ohio House Republicans 71 of 81 Republican General Assembly members and all GOP members of Ohio's congressional delegation. 81 of 88 county GOP chairmen
1998	March	Taft	Ohio Medical Political Action Committee, the political arm of the Ohio State Medical Association
2002	February	Taft	Ohio Right to Life Society
	March	Taft	Ohio State Building and Construction Trades Council
	April	Taft	OH Conference of Teamsters Ohio Vicinity Regional Council of Carpenters Operating Engineers' Union

## TEXAS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Texas Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1994	February	Richards	AFL-CIO Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas El Paso Municipal Police Officers' Association Houston Police Patrolmen's Union McAllen Police Officer's Union National Association of Social Workers Sierra Club Texas Conference of Police and Sheriffs Texas Hospital Association Texas PACE Texas State Teachers Association Trial lawyers
1998	January	Mauro	State Democratic Executive Committee's AFL-CIO Texas State Teachers Association
	February	Mauro	First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton
2001	August	Sanchez	Former Democratic gubernatorial nominee Garry Mauro
2002	January	Sanchez	AFL-CIO Democrat State Rep. Ruth Jones McClendon Democratic establishment leaders former San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros Four of five trial lawyers Morales hired
	February	Sanchez	Austin Gay/Lesbian Political Caucus Grocery store owner Joe Santos Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus Texas State Teachers Association
	March	Morales	Houston Chronicle San Antonio Express-News
		Sanchez	Austin American-Statesman Fort Worth Star-Telegram NRA The Dallas Morning News

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Texas Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1994	February	Bush	Southwest & Texas Cattle Raisers Texas Farm Bureau Friends of Agriculture Fund Young Conservatives of Texas
1997	September	Bush	New Hampshire Republicans republicans in the northern United States
	November	Bush	Top Democrat Bob Bullock
1998	January	Bush	HISD Superintendent Rod Paige Houston Federation of Teachers Gayle Fallon
2001	June	Perry	Texas Hospital Association
	November	Perry	Sen. Todd Staples, R-Palestine
2002	February	Perry	Texas Association of Business and Chambers of Commerce

## ILLINOIS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1994 Illinois Primary

1993	May	Netsch	former Senate President Philip J. Rock
		Phelan	Jacoby Dickens, chairman of Seaway National Bank
	September	Phelan	13th Ward Committeeman Madigan 14th Ward Committeeman Edward M. Burke 23rd Ward Committeeman 33rd Ward Committeeman Richard F. Mell state Rep. William O. Lipinski Stickney Township Committeeman Louis Viverito Thornton Township Committeeman Frank Giglio
	October	Burris	CHA Residents' Central Advisory Council
	November	Netsch	Ben Heineman, retired chairman of Northwest Industries Inc. EMILY'S List National Womens Political Caucus Womens Campaign Fund
		Phelan	Crate & Barrell President Gordon Segal Sam Zell, the corporate turnaround artist
	January	Netsch	Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization NOW
1994		Phelan	Ald. Ambrosio Medrano (25th) Ald. Billy Ocasio (26th) Ald. Ray Suarez (31st) Board of (Tax) Appeals Commissioner Joseph Berrios state Rep. Ben A. Martinez state Rep. Edgar Lopez state Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-Ill.) state Rep. Miguel Santiago state Rep. Ray Frias
	February	Netsch	Ald. Pat O'Connor Cook County Democratic Chairman Thomas G. Lyons New Trier Democratic Organization (Phelan country) Pool & Billiards Magazine State Sen. Howard Carroll
		Phelan	forty-six suburban mayors and village presidents Hillside Mayor Joseph Tamburino
	March	Burris	Chicago Sun Times Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition state Rep. Bobby Rush (D-Ill.)
		Netsch	11th Ward Democratic Organization Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley Chicago Sun Times County Commissioner John Daley state Sen. Carroll's 50th ward org.
		Phelan	House Speaker Michael J. Madigan state Sen. Penny Severns (Decatur) (running-mate to Phelan)

## ILLINOIS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1998 Illinois Primary

1997	May	Poshard	79 of 102 county chairmen; none from Cook County former Senate President Philip J. Rock
	June	Poshard	state central committee member Barb Brown state central committee member Mary Ellen Considine state central committee member Miki Pavelonis state central committee member Shirly McCombs
	July	Poshard	Democratic County Chairmen's Association
	August	Burns	former Illinois Sen. Alan Dixon Gene Callahan, Sen. Dixon's chief aide
	September	Poshard	88 of state's 102 Dem. County chairs Edmund Kelly, influential member, Chicago Democratic Organization
	October	Burriss Poshard Schmidt	most black ward committeemen former Senate President Philip J. Rock IBEW Local 134
	November	Poshard	City Clerk James J. Laski, unified support 23rd Ward Regular Democratic Org.
	December	Poshard	Illinois State Association of Letter Carriers
1998	January	Burriss  Poshard  Schmidt	Ald. Robert Shaw (9th) (South Side official) Cook County Commissioner Bobbie Steele Harold Murphy (D-Markham) state Rep. Lovana Lou Jones (D-Chicago) state sen. Connie Howard (D-Chicago) state Sen. William Shaw (D-Dolton) U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D) AFL-CIO AFSCME Berwyn Committeeman Thomas G. Shaughnessy Bremen Committeeman Terry Steczo Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police Cicero Committeeman Richard S. Caravetta Democratic County Chairmen's Association former state Rep. Frank Giglio of Thornton House Speaker Michael J. Madigan Illinois State Rifle Association James Sheehan of Proviso John McNamera of Worth Lyons Committeeman Jack E. Mikso Maine Committeeman Andrew Prsybylo Oak Park's Rock state Sen. Louis S. Viverito of Stickney Kevin Conlon of Rich
	February	Poshard	NOW suburban Committeemen Patrick Botterman of Wheeling William Gaynor of Orland George Dunne, head 42nd Ward Organization & former Cook County Board Pres. Pro-life Republicans U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez
	March	Burriss  Poshard	Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition U.S. Rep. Danny K. Davis U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.) Dem Vickie Moseley, Springfield, former legislator & candidate 99th House seat Illinois Democratic Hispanic Council

state Sen. Minority Leader Emil Jones Jr., D-Chicago  
U.S. Senator Dick Durbin

## ILLINOIS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 2002 Illinois Primary

2001	May	Blagojevich	U.S. Rep BILL LIPINSKI U.S. Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-Ill.) U.S. Rep. Luis Gutierrez US REP JAN SCHAKOWSKY US REP LANE EVANS
		Vallas	Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley Juan Rangel of the United Neighborhood Organization
	Jul	Blagojevich	DOUG SCOTT, mayor of Rockford
	Oct	Blagojevich	Ald. Edward M. Burke Ald. Richard F. Mell Ald. William J.P. Banks John Gianulis, Rock Island, cahir Democratic County Chairmen's Assoc. state Rep. William O. Lipinski state Sen. Carol Ronen
		Burris	Carol Moseley-Braun's state Rep. Danny K. Davis U.S. Rep. Bobby Rush (D)
	Nov	Blagojevich	gay and lesbian community Sangamon County Democratic Party
		Burris	Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition
	Dec	Blagojevich	AFL-CIO
2002	Jan	Blagojevich	cago and Northeast Illinois District Council of Carpenters Illinois Federation of Teachers Illinois Personal PAC state Rep. David Phelps state Rep. Jerry Costello
		Vallas	Chicago's Fraternal Order of Police Cook County Commissioner Calvin R. Sutker former Cook County Assessor Thomas C. Hynes former Sen. Jerome Joyce (D-Reddick). Glenn Poshard, the 1998 Democratic candidate for Illinois governor Lawrence M. Walsh (D-Elwood state Rep. George E. Sangmeister (D-Mokena state Rep. Julie Hamos (D-Evanston state Rep. Lou Lang, D-Skokie State Rep. Mary K. O'Brien (D-Coal City state Sen. Debbie Halverson (D-Crete state Sen. Patrick D. Welch (D-Peru
	Feb	Blagojevich	Alan J. Dixon Citizen Action
		Burris	15 black ministers Rev. Jesse Jackson, Rainbow Coalition state Rep. Jesse L. Jackson Jr. (D-Ill
		Vallas	black leaders Former U.S. Sen. Adlai Stevenson III Illinois Personal PAC Illinois Planned Parenthood



		Rev. Willie Barrow, co-chair of Rainbow/PUSH
		The Tribune
Mar	Blagojevich	Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley
		Chicago Sun Times
		HDO activist Ald. Danny Solis (25th
		Latino political establishment
		state Rep. Edward Acevedo (D-Chicago
		state Sen. Tony Munoz (D-Chicago
		The Pantagraph
		The Sierra Club Woods
		Wetlands Group
	Vallas	Chicago Daily Herald
		Chicago radio personality Steve Dahl
		five newspapers statewide
		The IHA
		The Pantagraph

## ILLINOIS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Illinois Primary, 1994, 1998, and 2002

1993	November	Edgar	Ameritech Corp. Chairman and CEO William L. Weiss East St. Louis Mayor Gordon Bush Joe Morris, a 42-year-old conservative lawyer Mike Dikta Richard Duchossois, chairman of Arlington International Racecourse Ltd.
1997	December	Edgar	Cook County State's Attorney Jack O'Malley
	August	Ryan	Gov. Jim Edgar overwhelming support among Republican legislators, county chairmen and other elected officials
1998	November	Ryan	International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150
	December	Koppie	group led by anti-tax extremist Jim Tobin
2001	January	Koppie	Illinois State Rifle Association
	May	Ryan	AFL-CIO
2002	August	Ryan	Schaumburg Township Alliance of Republicans
		Ryan	Former Gov. Jim Thompson Gov. Jim Edgar Illinois House Minority Leader Lee Daniels Illinois Senate President James "Pate" Philip JOHN SHIMKUS, R-Collinsville Sangamon County GOP Chairman IRV SMITH three-fourths of the 32 Republican state senators Treasurer JUDY BAAR TOPINKA U.S. House Speaker Dennis Hastert U.S. Reps. RAY LAHOOD, R-Peoria
	September	Ryan	Congressman Johnson state Rep. Ray LaHood, R-Peoria
		Woods	McHenry County Republican Chairman Bill LeFew
	October	Ryan	State Sen. Carl Hawkinson
	November	Ryan	McHenry County Republican Chairman Bill LeFew
	December	Ryan	Sangamon County Republicans
	January	Ryan	Edward Southwell Maine Republicans
	February	Woods	Illinois Planned Parenthood
		O'Malley	Illinois Citizens for Life PAC
2002		Ryan	The Illinois Federation for Right to Life Cuba Township GOP Illinois Citizens for Life PAC The Associated Fire Fighters of Illinois The Illinois Federation for Right to Life
	March	Woods	50 mayors
		Ryan	Chicago Daily Herald Chicago Sun Times George Ryan One of the largest downstate Teamster union locals state Rep. Donald Moffitt (R-Galesburg) The IHA The Pantagraph
		Woods	Bloomington Mayor Judy Markowitz

## MASSACHUSETTS

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, Massachusetts Primary, 1978

1978	January	Dukakis	Pittsfield, Mayor Paul Brindle III
	April	Withheld	Citizens for Participation in Political Action
	May	Dukakis	International Ladies Garment Workers Union
		J. King	Howard Phillips, national director Conservative Caucus Joseph F. Fitzpatrick VP New England Council several building trade union locals Teamsters Joint Council No. 10
	June	Ackermann	MA Caucus for Gay Legislation state Rep. Barney Frank
	July	Dukakis	MA UAW
		J. King	MA State Police Association
	September	Dukakis	Boston Globe
		J. King	U.S. Rep. Michael J. Harrington of Beverly
	NA	King	NAGE
		Withheld	MA Teachers Assn.

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, Massachusetts Primary, 1978

1978	May	F. King	Convention endorsement Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair William A. Casey, chairman W. Springfield Republican Town Committee
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**Timeline of Endorsements to Dukakis, Massachusetts Primary, 1982**

Year	Month	Endorser	
1981	November	Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Citizens for Participation in Political Action Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.)	Food and Commercial Workers Local 1445 Frank Manning, president MA Assn. for Older Americans & 100 elderly orgs Gary Orren, Harvard prof. Legislative Council for Older Americans MA UAW
1982	January	Wellesley Democratic Town Committee	MA UAW
	February	Boston Mayor Kevin White state Rep. Michael J. Barrett (D-Reading) State Sen. George Bachrach (D-Watertown)	Margaret Merry, former president of Wheelock College Marilyn Anderson Chase, executive director of the Roxbury Multi-Services Center
	March	David and Diana Rockefeller economist Otto Eckstein former Rep. David J. Mofenson Jerome Grossman MA AFL-CIO Labor Council MA Teachers Assn.	Tina Ponte, president UAW's community action program in Southeastern Massachusetts Women for Dukakis Committee (800)
	April	65 labor leaders International Union of Operating Engineers Local 877 MA Federation of Teachers United Steelworkers of America, District 1, New England United Transportation Union William Irvin, international representative of the United Steel Workers of America	198 current city council members, selectmen or aldermen 400 local officials 5 mayors 61 school committee members 7 county commissioners 801 business executives Boston City Council member Michael McCormick Chicopee Robert Kumor Donald B. Bruck, president of the Disc Technology Corp. Edward H. Pendergast, president of a consulting firm Holyoke Mayor Ernest Proulz MA Womens Political Caucus Mayor Antonio Marino of Lynn Medford Mayor Paul J. Donato
	May	Bill Geary, a former aide to Dukakis and candidate for Lt. Gov Convention endorsement MA Political Action Committee Daycare Alliance Voice of Teachers for Education (VOTE)	several former elected officials or who now hold appointive office Suffolk County Sheriff Dennis Kearney Worcester Mayor Sara Robertson 35 state legislators Black Political Task Force Chelsea Mayor Joel Pressman Former US Atty. Edward F. Harrington
	June	Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union Ann Pastreich, Lexington fire fighter Black Coalition to Elect Mike Dukakis 100 blacks Donna Kuha, former president of the Massachusetts Womens Political Caucus' Dorine Levasseur, president SEIU Local 925	
			July
			August

September	<p> Louis Pines, lt. governor  candidate, former state rep.  MA State Conference of  Bricklayers and Allied  Craftsmen (5000)  Metropolitan District  Commission Police Patrolman's  Union  National Association of Social  Workers (8000)  Registry Inspectors Assn.  SEIU Local 509  Sen. Edward M. Kennedy  state Rep. Lawrence Alexander  (D-Marblehead)  state Rep. Thomas J. Valley  (D-Boston)  state Rep. Walter Bickford (D-  Berlin)  state Sen. Allan R. McKinnon  (D-Weymouth)  U.S. Rep. James M. Shannon  U.S. Rep. Joseph Early  Worcester businessman Robert  Giordano  Worcester businessman Steven  Karchmar  AFSCME Local No. 1242  Boston City Council member  Bruce Bolling  Boston City Council member  Maura Hennigan  Boston City Council member  Terrence McDermott  Boston Globe  Boston Phoenix  Chelsea Record  Danvers Herald  Greenfield Recorder  IBEW Local 2222  MA Tenants' Organization  Malden's This Week  National and the MA Leagues  of Conservation Voters  Revere Republic  Springfield Daily News  Ward anticorruption  commission chair John Ward  Ward anticorruption  commission member architect  Peter Forbes  Ward anticorruption  commission member Louis  Weinstein </p>	<p> Ward anticorruption  commission member Suffolk  University Prof. Frances Burke  WCVB-TV (Channel 5)  WEEI radio </p>
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## Timeline of Endorsements to King, Massachusetts Primary, 1982

1981	October	<p>Charles Curry, representing the Democratic National Committee</p> <p>Conrad Everhard, president of Dart Containerline Inc.</p> <p>Democratic governor, Fob James of Alabama</p> <p>John Buckley Northeast Petroleum Corp.</p> <p>Margaret M. Heckler (R-Wellesley)</p> <p>Mark. E. Johnson, representing a direct-mail advertising agency headed by Richard Viguerie, conservative political fund-raiser.</p> <p>Officials from International Longshoremen's Assn.</p> <p>Pat Thibeaux, of the Democratic Governors' Conference</p> <p>Paul M. Weyric, executive director Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress</p> <p>Teamsters officials</p> <p>Thomas Kuhn, former Massport official, vice president for government affairs of the American Nuclear Energy Council, an industry group</p> <p>U.S. Rep. Nicholas Mavroules</p>	February	<p>Citizens for Limited Taxation</p> <p>former school committeeman David I. Finnegan</p> <p>New Bedford Mayor John Markey</p> <p>Somerville Mayor Eugene Brune</p> <p>state Auditor John J. Finnegan</p> <p>state Rep. Daniel F. Pokaski</p>
			March	<p>Lowell restaurateur X. L. Speronis</p> <p>MA AFL-CIO Labor Council</p> <p>Marion C. Buffone of Worcester</p> <p>Park Plaza President Roger A. Saunders</p> <p>theater magnate Sumner M. Redstone</p>
			April	<p>Boston lawyer Richard McCarthy</p> <p>John J.C. Herlihy, chairman of the Judicial Nominating Commission</p>
			May	<p>Associate Turnpike Comr. Raymond Fontana</p> <p>Boston Building Trades Council</p> <p>International Brotherhood of Police Officers</p> <p>MA Building Trades Council</p> <p>Metropolitan Boston District of the Building and Construction Trades Council</p>
			June	<p>developers and contractors</p>
			July	<p>Attleboro Mayor Gerald J. Keane</p> <p>Daniel Twomey, former president Police association</p> <p>Home Builders Assn. of MA</p> <p>NAGE</p> <p>Northampton Mayor</p> <p>Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian</p> <p>Pittsfield Mayor Charles Smith</p> <p>State Senate president William Bulger (D- South Boston)</p> <p>Taunton Mayor Richard Johnson</p> <p>Waltham Mayor Arthur Clark</p>
			August	<p>18 of 39 MA mayors</p> <p>AFSCME Council 93</p> <p>Beverly Mayor Peter Fortunato</p>
1982	January	<p>Fall River Mayor Carleton Viveiros</p> <p>former House Speaker and recently named Administration and Finance Secretary David M. Bartley</p> <p>John J. McGlynn, King's chief secretary, in Medford</p> <p>Lowell City Manager B. Joseph Tully, former state senator</p> <p>Springfield Mayor Theodore DeMauro</p> <p>state Rep. Michael C. Creedon (D-Brockton), chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee</p> <p>Superintendent of State Buildings Charles Buffone, former state representative</p>		

Boston Police Superior  
Officers Federation (230)  
Boston Red Sox Carl  
Yastrzemski  
Boston Red Sox Jerry Remy  
Brockton Mayor Paul V.  
Studenski  
Disabled Rights Union of MA  
Everett Mayor Edward G.  
Connolly  
Joseph Reilly, former pres. MA  
Citizens for Life  
Gloucester Mayor Leo Alper  
L. Joyce Hampers Revenue  
Commissioner  
Lowell Mayor M. Brendan  
Fleming  
MA Citizens for Life  
MA Coalition of Police  
MA Crime Prevention Officers  
Association  
MA State Police Association  
Malden Mayor Thomas Fallon  
Marlborough Mayor Joseph  
Ferrecchia  
MCAD chairman Leon  
Brathwaite  
Melrose Mayor James E.  
Milano  
Middlesex County Superior  
Court Officers Assn.  
Newburyport Mayor Richard  
Sullivan  
NRA  
Nursing home industry's PAC  
SEIU Local 254  
state affirmative action  
director, John F. Drewry  
state Rep. Royal L. Bolling Jr.  
(D-Mattapan)  
state Sen. Joseph F. Timilty (D-  
Canton)  
state senatorial candidate Louis  
A. Elisa 2d  
Teamsters Joint Council No. 10  
U.S. Rep. Claude Pepper (D-  
Fla.)  
Western MA Chiefs of Police  
Association

September

Westfield Mayor Michael  
O'Connell  
10 state senators  
65 representatives  
700 past and present elected  
public officials from cities and  
towns  
AFSCME  
Boston Police Patrolmen's  
Association  
Boston Red Sox Dwight Evans  
Boston Red Sox Jim Rice  
Fall River Herald News  
House Assistant Whip Vincent  
J. Piro (D-Somerville)  
House Majority Leader George  
Keverian (D-Everett)  
House Speaker Thomas W.  
McGee  
House Whip John E. Murphy  
(D- Peabody)  
Independent Taxi Owners Assn  
Lowell Sun  
Lynn Item  
MA Chief Probation Officers  
Assn.  
MA Federation of Physicians  
and Dentists  
MA State Automobile Dealers  
Assn  
Malden Evening News  
Medford Daily Mercury  
Melrose Evening News  
Middlesex News  
New Bedford Standard Times  
Salem Evening News  
Senate Majority Leader Daniel  
J. Foley (D-Worcester)  
Senate Whip Mary L. Fonseca  
(D-Fall River)  
Springfield Morning Union  
U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland, a  
Springfield Democrat  
Utility Workers Union of  
America Local No. 369 (2000)  
executive board  
WITS radio talk show host Pat  
Whitley

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1982

1981	October	Sears	Henry Cabot Lodge, former ambassador, US senator New England Patriots	
1982	March	Lakian	Convention endorsement	
	April	Lakian	Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair	
	May	Sears	Moderate Action Committee	
	June	Card	Associated Builders and Contractors	
	July	Sears	Charles Cabot, former candidate for attorney general Josiah Spaulding, a former Republican candidate for the US Senate, governor and attorney general Neil Chayet, lawyer and radio commentator The Coalition of Concerned Republicans Timothy O'Brien, former campaign treasurer for state Rep. William G. Robinson	
	September	Card		Middlesex News Springfield Daily News WEEI radio
			Lakian	The Polish American, a monthly journal
			Sears	Boston Globe
				William I. Cowin, 1978 GOP nominee for lieutenant governor

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1986

1986	April	Dukakis	Citizens for Participation in Political Action
	September	Dukakis	AFL-CIO
	NA	Dukakis	MA Teachers Assn.

### Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1986

1986	April	Hyatt	former Gov. Edward J. King
		Switzler	Convention endorsement
	July	Kariotis	Elliot Richardson former Gov. Edward J. King former Gov. John A. Volpe former Rep. Leon Lombardi of Easton Frank Sargent millionaire businessman Michael Valerio Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman Roger Wellington, president and chief executive officer of Augat Inc., a high-tech firm in Mansfield



**Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1990**

1989	July	Murphy	state Rep. Mary Jane Gibson (D- Belmont),
	September	Murphy	Secretary of Labor Paul Eustace
	November	Murphy	NOW
	December	Murphy	Alan Solomont dozen other directors of social service agencies Kip Ternan, Director of Rosie's Place
1990	January	Murphy	21 child care advocates from across the state 21 legislators 50 leaders of Massachusetts' minority community. Alex Rodrigues, commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Deborah Prothrow-Stith, the former commissioner of public health EMILY'S List group of about 20 state and local elected officials state Rep. Augusto Grace (D-Burlington) state Rep. David Cohen (D-Newton) state Rep. Joan Menard (D-Somerset) state Rep. Robert Durand (D-Marlborough) state Rep. Shirley Owens-Hicks (D-Boston)
	March	Silber Murphy	New Hampshire's conservative Manchester Union-Leader newspaper about 50 Environmental people Environmental Roundtable former vice presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro state Rep. Geoggrey Beckwith Women's Campaign Fund
	April	Bellotti  Murphy Silber	Fitchburg Mayor Jeffrey Bean Gardner Mayor Charles J. Manca Worcester Mayor Jordan Levy Citizens for Participation in Political Action Edward Sullivan, head of SEIU local Joseph Nigro, general agent, secretary-treasurer of 35,000 member Boston Building trades union Miichale Mullane, regional VP of International Association of Fire Fighters
	May	Bellotti  Murphy  Silber	MA State Police Association MA UAW state rep. Carmen Buell (D- Greenfield) Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) Hollywood Women's Political Committee MA Choice MA Nurses Association MA Teachers Assn. Philip Johnston (Sec. of Human Services, state Rep.) Mayor Albert V. DiVirgilio of Lynn Mayor, Kai Shang of Attleboro Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian Salem Mayor Neil Harrington state Rep. Marian Walsh (D-West Roxbury) state Sen. William Q. MacLean (D-Fairhaven) U.S. Rep. Joseph Early

June	Bellotti	Brockton Building Trades' Council Communications Workers of America/CWA Convention endorsement Iron Workers Union Local 7 Quincy and South Shore Building Trades' Council Somerville Mayor Michael Capuano
	Murphy	Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers of Springfield Local Union 357
	Silber	former U.S. Rep. Edward P. Boland of Springfield
July	Bellotti	11 of 12 Democratic county sheriffs DA Anthony J. Ruberto Jr. of Berkshire County DA John J. Conte of Worcester County DA Judd J. Carhart of Hampshire County DA Newman A. Flanagan of Suffolk County DA Ronald Pina of Bristol County DA William O'Malley of Plymouth County Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 26 IBEW MA Building Trades Council William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA)
	Murphy	Gloria Steinem Greater Boston Gay and Lesbian Political Alliance (500-member)
	Silber	Frederick A. Hurst, one of three members of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Worcester Police Officers' Union
September	Bellotti	100 liberal activists Boston Phoenix Brookline hometown paper Haverhill Gazette Leonard Zakim, executive director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith Lt. Gov. Evelyn Murphy Mayor Raymond Flynn Middlesex News Rainbow Coalition Springfield Mayor Mary Hurley Springfield Union-News state Sen. John Houston (D- Worcester) Transcript News Valley Advocate (Springfield)
	Silber	Attleboro Sun Chronicle Boston Herald Brookline Police Association David Nyhan Holyoke Police Department Lawrence Eagle-Tribune Lowell Sun Westfield Evening News

**Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1990**

1989	September	Weld	Carroll Sheehan (challenged 1974 Sargent from Right) former state Rep. Paula Lewellen of Bedford Young Americans for Freedom
	October	Weld	Anthony DeInnocentis, a businessman fomer assistant US attorney D. Lloyd Macdonald fomer assistant US attorney Gary Crossen fomer assistant US attorney Janis M. Berry Gordon Nelson, former state GOP chair
	November	Pierce Weld	George Kariotis 19 key Bush backers (moderate party leaders) b state Sen. Henri S. Rauschenbach of Brewster state Sen. Mary Padula of Lunenburg state Sen. Peter Webber of Pittsfield
1990	February	Pierce	Citizens for Limited Taxation
	March	Pierce Weld	Convention endorsement Associated Builders and Contractors
	July	Pierce Weld	Life Insurance Industries of MA MA Womens Political Caucus
	September	Pierce	Attleboro Sun Chronicle Boston Herald college Republicans Exodus Movement former Boston Mayor John Collins Lawrence Eagle-Tribune MA Black Republican Council Rev. E.W. Jackson of the New Cornerstone Baptist Church Sen. Robert Dole Westfield Evening News
		Weld	Association of Independent Truckers Boston Phoenix former Boston US Attorney Jeremiah O'Sullivan Middlesex News North Shore Weeklies Rudolph W. Giuliani, former US attorney, New York several top federal prosecutors several women professionals Springfield Union-News TAB Newspapers

**Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1994**

1994	January	Barrett	Democratic State Committee chairman Steven Grossman
		Roosevelt	Mitchell E. Kertzman, chairman of Powersoft Corp. & president of the Massachusetts Software Council
	February	Roosevelt	former Democratic National Committee chairman Paul Kirk former state Attorney General James Shannon several dozen other prominent Democrats
	March	Roosevelt	Indiana Gov. Evan Bayh
	April	Barrett	state Sen. William R. Keating
		Roosevelt	state Sen. Marc Pacheco (D- Taunton)
	May.	Bachrach	activist Jennifer Duryea Ald. Michael E. Festa, Melrose Ald. Paul Fitzgerald, Melrose Felix Arroyo former Labor Secretary Paul Eustace former Rep. Barbara A. Hildt Liz Belkin of Swampscott State Committee & School Committee member Marcia Sweeney state Rep. Nelson Merced
		Barrett	activist Catherine Gover activist Ed Flashenburg activist Jack Kennaday of Melrose activist James Morin activist Larry Kirby activist Mark Falzone activist Mark Rotondo activist Mark Teitelbaum activist Paul Brodeur activist Susan Tatelman activist Theresa Czerapica activists William and Mary Wasserman former Councilor Kathy Gardner-Gill former state Rep. Frances Alexander former state Rep. Lawrence R. Alexander
		Roosevelt	activist Andrea Watson activist Greg Nadeau Brian S. Dempsey Democratic State Committee member Grace Myette Democratic State Committee member Mark DiSalvo Democratic State Committee member Sharon Pollard Douglas W. Petersen Edward (Chip) Clancy James V. DiPaola Salem Mayor Neil Harrington state Rep. Michael P. Cahill state Sen. Thomas F. Birmingham state Sen. Walter J. Boverini William F. Cass
	June	Bachrach	40 female political figures Cambridge Mayor Alice Wolf Northampton Mayor Mary Ford

June	Roosevelt	Convention endorsement House Speaker Charles F. Flaherty organized labor Senate President William M. Bulger
July	Bachrach	Citizens for Participation in Political Action MA State Fire Fighters Union MA UAW National Association of Social Workers (8000)
September	Roosevelt	AFL-CIO
	Bachrach	Boston's Ward 21 Democratic Committee former state Rep. Mel King Jeff Jacoby U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Malden
	Barrett	Telegram & Gazette
	Roosevelt	40 southeastern Massachusetts officials Boston Globe Lieutenant governor candidate Bob Massie Springfield Union-News

**Timeline of Endorsements to Weld, 1994**

1993

April

Weld

California Governor Pete Wilson

### Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 1998

1997	January	Harshbarger	100 Democratic State Committee supporters 40 state representatives and senators House Majority Whip Rep. Barbara Gardner (D-Holliston) state Rep. Guy Glodis state Rep. Harold M. Lane Jr. D-Holden state Rep. John F. Merrigan, D-Greenfield state Rep. Patricia A. Walrath, D-Stow state Rep. Patrick F. Landers III, D-Palmer state Rep. Stephen Kulik, D-Worthington state Rep. Vincent A. Pedone, D-Worcester state Sen. Brian A. Joyce (D-Milton) state Sen. David Magnani of Framingham
	June	McGovern	Gloria Larson, former member of Weld's cabinet
	October	Harshbarger	25 of 160 House members state Rep. Janet O'Brien
	December	McGovern	Assistant Majority Leader Linda J. Melconian (D-Springfield) EMILY'S List state Senate Majority Leader Thomas C. Norton (D-Fall River), Ways and Means Chairman Stanley C. Rosenberg (D-Amherst)
1998	January	Harshbarger	William Delahunt (U.S. Rep, DA)
	February	Donnelly	Brockton Mayor John T. Yunits Jr. former Plymouth County Commissioner John R. Buckley Jr. former Weymouth state Senator Brian J. McDonald Quincy City councilor Stephen J. Durkin Quincy City councilor Timothy P. Cahill state Rep. Geraldine Creedon state Rep. Thomas P. Kennedy state Sen. Michael Morrissey state Sen. Robert Creedon U.S. Rep. Joseph Moakley of South Boston U.S. Rep. Richard Neal (D-Springfield)
		Harshbarger	Joseph Nigro, general agent, secretary-treasurer of 35,000 member Boston Building trades union Laborers International Union of North America, Tunnel Workers Local 88,
	May	Donnelly	Holyoke Mayor Daniel Szostkiewicz Mayor Michael McGlynn of Medford Mayor Patrick McManus of Lynn Mayor Richard Sullivan of Westfield Mayor William Stanley of Waltham Salem Mayor Stanley Usovicz Taunton Mayor Robert Nunes
		Harshbarger McGovern	Pittsfield Mayor Gerald Doyle behind-the-scenes convention help from a few other mayors, including Thomas M. Menino of Boston David Osborne, wrote Reinventing Government, form Cellucci supporter Northampton Mayor Mary Ford

June	Donnelly	Boston Carmens Local 589/ATU MA State Fire Fighters Union Norfolk County Central Labor Council
	Harshbarger	AFL-CIO Carpenter's Union Convention endorsement
July	Harshbarger	IBEW Local 7 Iron Workers Union Local 7 SEIU Local 285 SEIU Local 509
September	Harshbarger	Boston Building Trades Council Boston Herald Cement Masons Local 534 Everett Mayor David Ragucci Food and Commercial Workers Local 1459/UFCW Food and Commercial Workers Local 328 Food and Commercial Workers Local 791 Laborers Local 223 MA Organization of State Engineers and Scientists National Confrence of Firemen and Oilers Local 3 Newton Mayor David Cohen Operating Engineers Local 4 Operating Engineers Local 877 Operating Engineers Local 98 Salem Mayor Stanley Usovicz Springfield Mayor Michael J. Albano Teamsters Local 122 U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey, D-Malden Worcester-Framingham AFL-CIO Central Labor Council
	McGovern	Boston Phoenix former Mayor Jeffrey A. Bean of Fitchburg former state Sen. Robert D. Wetmore of Barre Mary O'Brien, Central Berkshire register of deeds state Rep. Daniel E. Bosley of North Adams state Rep. Emile J. Goguen of Fitchburg state Rep. Harriette L. Chandler of Worcester state Rep. Nancy Flavin of Easthampton state Rep. Peter J. Larkin of Pittsfield state Sen. Richard T. Moore of Uxbridge state Sen. Robert A. Antonioni of Leominster state Sen. Robert A. Bernstein of Worcester state Sen. Stephen D. Brewer of Barre U.S. Rep. John Olver

**Timeline of Endorsements to Republican Candidates, 1998**

1997	June	Cellucci	Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman
	July	Malone	Dorothea Vitrac (working with Malone to get term limits) Leominster Mayor Dean J. Mazzearella
	October	Malone	Ray Shamie, former GOP chairman
	December	Cellucci	Attorney Richard W. Hynes, son of former Democratic Mayor of Boston Bristol County DA Paul Walsh
1998	January	Cellucci	8 of 15 top GOP Committees Boston GOP City Committee Chair Plymouth County GOP Chairs, Betsy Sawyer and Joseph Lovetere Springfield GOP City Committee Chair
		Malone	state Sen. Bruce Tarr
	February	Cellucci	Former Worcester state Sen. Arthur E. Chase
		Withheld	Waltham GOP City Councilor Michael Squillante Ray Shamie RESCINDS endorsement
	March	Malone	Lyn Nofziger
	April	Cellucci	Barbara Bush Convention endorsement Former Gov. Bill Weld
		Malone	former Republican U.S. Sen. Alan Simpson of Wyoming former state Rep. Robert D. Hawke
	May	Malone	Fidelity Investments financier Thomas Lee Jim Davis, chairman of the New Balance athletic shoe company John Connors, CEO of advertising firm Hill Holliday Connors Cosmopolus Life Insurance Industries of MA Peter Brooke, chairman of venture capital firm Advent International Peter Lynch Peter Nicholas, chairman of Boston Scientific, a big medical equipment company Richard Egan, chairman of Hopkinton high-tech company EMC Corp. Staples chief executive Thomas Stemberg Terrence Murray, chairman of Fleet Financial Group Thomas May, chief of Boston Edison Co. Thomas Shields of Shields Health Care Group, a Democrat, Weld Appointee
	September	Cellucci	Boston Globe Boston Herald Community Newspapers Lowell Sun Melrose Mayor Patrick C. Guerriero Springfield Sunday Republican



**Timeline of Endorsements to Democratic Candidates, 2002**

2001	November	Birmingham	State Sen. Guy W. Glodis state Sen. Stephen D. Brewer of Barre
	December	Birmingham	Democratic City Committee chairman Jeff Krumrine of Newburyport Essex District Attorney Kevin M. Burke of Beverly former state Economic Development director David A. Tibbetts of Newburyport Gloucester city councilor Michelle Galante Mitchell Gloucester Councilor-elect Jeffrey T. Worthley Gloucester Mayor Bruce H. Tobey Jeff Sullivan of Saugus, president of the North Shore Building Trades Council Lynn City Councilor David D. Ellis Lynn City Councilor James M. Cowdell Lynn City Councilor Richard J. Ford Lynn City Councilor Salvy Migliacci Lynn City Councilor William R. Trahan Malden Mayor Richard C. Howard Mayor-elect John J. Guerin Jr. of Haverhill Middlesex Sheriff James V. DiPaola of Malden Peabody city councilor David Gamache Peabody city councilor Judith A. Selesnick Peabody Mayor Peter Torigian state Rep.s Eugene L. O'Flaherty state Sen. Frederick E. Berry of Peabody Swampscott School Committee member Richard Feinberg Wakefield Democratic Town Committee chairman Thomas Markha Grossman Barry Y. Weiner of Gloucester, DNC Finance Committee Bill Wasserman of Ipswich Democratic State Committee member Victoria Budson of Millis former state Rep. Sally Kerans of Danvers Fred Rich of Wakefield Jonathan Sclarsic, Brandeis Student Body President Nancy Kaufman of Swampscott, executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Boston state committee member Marcia L. Sweeney of Marblehead state Rep. Michael E. Festa of Melrose O'Brien Ald. Jane L. Lavender of Melrose Bruce Callahan of Lynn, secretary of the North Shore Labor Council City Councilor Deborah Smith Walsh of Lynn City Councilor Joyce A. Spiliotis of Peabody (who is also a state committee member) City Councilor Martin J. Gately of Malden Democratic ward chair Eric Wildman of Melrose former Essex County treasurer Kathy O'Leary former Salem Democratic city committee chairwoman Mary Lou Tuttle former state committee member David J. Shea of Salem Groveland Democratic Town Committee chairman John McCarthy Newburyport Democratic ward chair Barry Connell Newburyport Democratic ward chair Bonnie Salt of Newburyport Newburyport Democratic ward chair Karen Hudner

			Newburyport Democratic ward chair Paul Christopher Newburyport Mayor Lisa L. Mead Peabody Democratic City Committee chairman Richard Jarvis political consultant Helen Corbett of Danvers state committee member Kathleen Pasquina of West Newbury state Rep. Brian S. Dempsey of Haverhill state Rep.s Harriet L. Stanley of West Newbury
		Tolman	Melrose Alderman George J. Doyle Peabody City Councilor Barry Osborne Salem City Councilor Jim Tierney
2002	January	Birmingham	state Rep. Edward G. Connolly of Everett state Sen. Cheryl Jacques of Needham state Sen. David Magnani of Framingham state Sen. Pamela Resor of Acton State Sen. Steve Panagiotakos state Sen. Susan Fargo of Lincoln teacher unions U.S. Rep. Martin Meehan
	February	Reich Birmingham	John Landry, former chief technology officer for Lotus 17 of the state's 42 mayors Brockton Mayor John T. Yunits Jr. Holyoke Mayor Michael J. Sullivan Mayor Rita Mercier in Lowell Pittsfield Mayor Quincy Mayor William Phelan state Sen. Robert Creedon Taunton Mayor
	March	O'Brien Grossman O'Brien Reich	House Majority Whip Lida Harkins of Needham former Texas Gov. Ann Richards EMILY'S List Barbara Streisand NY Gov. Mario Cuomo Rep. Jim Marzilli, D-Arlington Warren Beatty
	April	Birmingham Grossman  O'Brien	Democratic political consultant Jack Corrigan Alan Solomont Economist John Kenneth Galbraith former congressman Rev. Robert F. Drinan Principal at AOL-Time Warner Inc. Principal at Kessler Financial Services state Rep. Robert P. Spellane, D-Worcester Weymouth Council President Thomas J. Lacey Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Greg Hargadon Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Jack Carey Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Joseph Connolly Weymouth Councilor-at-Large Sue Kay Weymouth Mayor David Madden
	May	Reich Tolman Birmingham	former Senator Bill Bradley Woody Allen law offices of Gallagher and Cavanaugh

	O'Brien	Medford Mayor Michael McGlynn Councilor-at-Large Joseph M. Petty Councilor-at-Large Michael C. Perotto Diane Saxe, a Democratic state committee member from Grafton District 2 Councilor Philip P. Palmieri District 4 Councilor Barbara G. Haller MA Womens Political Caucus Mayor Timothy P. Murray
	Reich	actress and former MTV deejay Tara Deshpande Tennebaum feminist author Carol Gilligan folk star Katryna and Nerissa Nields folk star Loudon Wainwright III group of 400 women state Rep. Pat Jehlen
June	Birmingham	30 unions AFL-CIO Sheriff John "Mike" Flynn state Rep. Thomas Golden
	O'Brien	Convention endorsement House Majority Leader Sal DiMasi House Speaker Thomas Finneran Saundra Graham, a delegate and former state Rep. state Rep. Carol Donovan Worcester union
July	Birmingham	Fall River Mayor Edward Lambert Melrose Mayor Rob Dolan Newton Mayor David Cohen
	O'Brien	Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay Rep. Emile J. Goguen Somerville Alderman-at-Large Bruce Desmond state Rep. Cory Atkins state Rep. Robert P. Spellane, D-Worcester
	Reich	Mayor Willie Brown of San Francisco OutSomerville

September	Birmingham	<p>15 house lawmakers  22 mayors  24 Democratic state senators  4 sheriffs  43 labor groups  5 sheriffs  Ald. John Stewart,  Ald. Sydra Schnipper  former School Committee member Richard Alfred  former School Committee member Rodney Barke  former School Committee member Suzie Heyman  Lowell Sun  MA Federation of Teachers  North Shore Labor Council  School Committee chairwoman Anne Larner  School Committee vice chairwoman Susan Albright  State Sen. Harriette L. Chandler  U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey</p>
	O'Brien	<p>Black Political Task Force  Boston Globe  chairman of the Board of Selectmen Gerald Wasserman  Democratic State Committee chairman Steven Grossman  Democratic Town Committee chairwoman Mary Ellen Herd  Parks and Recreation commissioner Richie Weitzen  Prominent Womens groups  Rep. Charles Murphy  School Committee member Paul Denver  Selectwoman Colleen Schaller  state Rep. Lida Harkins  State's two largest gay and lesbian weeklies  U.S. Rep. Richard Neal (D-Springfield)  Warren Democratic Town Committee</p>
	Reich	<p>6 newspapers  Boston Herald  Maria Echaveste, former deputy chief of staff to President Bill Clinton</p>
	Tolman	<p>Ald. Carleton Merrill  Ald. Kenneth Parker  Ald. Lisle Baker  Ald. Mitchell Fischman  Ald. Pauline Bryson  Ald. Scott Lennon  Ald. Stephen Linsky  Board of Aldermen President Brooke Lipsitt  Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers  Clean Water Action Vote Environmental  MA Sierra Club  Saugus Democratic Town Committee member Charles Gill</p>

**Timeline of Endorsements, Republican Candidate, 2002**

2002	February	Romney	Lowell Republican Committee Chair Paul Hoar Jr. Tewksbury Republican Committee Chair Doug Sears
	March	Romney	chairman of the Republican town committee in Scituate, Conley Ford Deseret News Former Hingham committee Chairman Carl Harris Rep. Paul K. Frost, R-Auburn Weymouth town committee Chairman Joe Curran
	April	Romney	Convention endorsement Former Gov. Bill Weld Joe Malone
	June	Romney	20 Republican legislators state Rep. George N. Perterson state Rep. Karyn E. Polito state Rep. Paul J.P. Loscocco state Rep. Robert S. Hargraves
	July	Romney	Former Gov. Argeo Cellucci Mayor Dan H. Mylott
	September	Romney	Lowell Sun MA Chiefs of Police Association state Sen. Robert L. Hedlund (R-Weymouth)

## APPENDIX E: ELECTION RESULTS

### COLORADO

				Vocation	Candidate Quality Score
1994	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>9-Aug-94</u>			
	Roy Romer	61,686	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>9-Aug-94</u>			
	Dick Sargent	30,326	17.0%	Investment Securities Broker	0
	Michael C. Bird	38,571	21.6%	State Senator	1
	Bruce Benson	109,462	61.4%	Former State Party Chair	0
1998	<u>General</u>	<u>1-Nov-94</u>			
	Bruce Benson (R)	432,042	41.1%		0
	Roy Romer (D)	619,205	58.9%		4
	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>11-Aug-98</u>			
	Mike Feeley	64,466	44.7%	State Senate Minority Leader	1
	Gail Schoettler	79,607	55.3%	Lieutenant Governor	2
2002	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>11-Aug-98</u>			
	Tom Norton	87,269	40.8%	State Senator	1
	William (Bill) Owens	126,613	59.2%	State Treasurer	2
	<u>General</u>	<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
	Gail Schoettler (D)	639,905	49.7%		2
	William (Bill) Owens (R)	648,202	50.3%		2
2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>13-Aug-02</u>			
	Rollie Heath	98,897	100.0%	Businessman	0
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>13-Aug-02</u>			
	William (Bill) Owens	189,705	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
	Rollie Heath (D)	475,373	35.0%		0
William (Bill) Owens (R)	884,583	65.0%		4	

ILLINOIS			Vocation	Candidate Quality Score	
1994	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>15-Mar-94</u>			
	Sheila Jones	23,191	2.1%	Political Activist	0
	James Gierach	26,752	2.4%	Lawyer	0
	Richard Phelan	160,576	14.6%	County Council President	1
	Roland Burris	401,142	36.5%	Attorney General	2
	Dawn Clark Netsch	487,364	44.3%	State Comptroller	2
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>15-Mar-94</u>			
	Jack Roesser	173,742	25.0%	Enginerring Firm Executive	0
	Jim Edgar	521,590	75.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
	Dawn Clark Netsch	1,069,860	35.0%		2
	Jim Edgar	1,984,291	65.0%		4
1998	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>17-Mar-98</u>			
	Jim Burns	55,233	5.9%	Former US Attorney	0
	John R. Schmidt	236,309	25.2%	Former Assistant Attorney General	0
	Roland W. Burris	290,393	30.9%	Former Attorney General	1
	Glenn Poshard	357,342	38.0%	Member of Congress	2
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>17-Mar-98</u>			
	Chad Koppie	98,466	13.9%	Airline Pilot	0
	George H. Ryan	608,940	86.1%	Secretary of State	2
	<u>General</u>	<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
	Glenn Poshard	1,594,191	48.2%		2
	George H. Ryan	1,714,094	51.8%		2
	2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>19-Mar-02</u>		
Roland Burris		363,591	29.0%	Former Attorney General	1
Paul Vallas		431,728	34.5%	Former City Schools Chief	0
Rod R. Blagojevich		457,197	36.5%	Member of Congress	2
<u>Republican Primary</u>		<u>19-Mar-02</u>			
Corinne Wood		246,825	26.9%	Lieutenant Governor	2
Patrick O'Malley		260,860	28.4%	State Senator	1
Jim Ryan		410,074	44.7%	Attorney General	2
<u>General</u>		<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
Jim Ryan		1,594,960	46.3%		2
Rod R. Blagojevich		1,847,040	53.7%		2

MASSACHUSETTS			Vocation	Candidate Quality Score	
1978	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>19-Sep-78</u>			
	Barbara Ackerman	58,220	6.7%	Former mayor of Cambridge	0
	Michael Dukakis	365,417	42.2%	Incumbent	4
	Edward J. King	441,574	51.0%	Former Commissioner of MassPort	0
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>19-Sep-78</u>			
	Edward F. King	110,932	44.0%	Businessman	0
	Francis W. Hatch	141,070	56.0%	House Minority Leader	1
	<u>General</u>	<u>7-Nov-78</u>			
	Francis W. Hatch	926,062	47.3%		1
	Edward J. King	1,030,294	52.7%		0
1982	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>21-Sep-82</u>			
	Edward J. King	546,335	44.8%	Incumbent	4
	Michael Dukakis	631,911	51.8%	Former Governor	3
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>21-Sep-82</u>			
	Andrew Card	40,899	3.4%	State Representative	1
	John Lakian	46,675	34.1%	Investment Councilor	0
	John Sears	90,348	65.9%	Former City Councilman	0
	<u>General</u>	<u>2-Nov-82</u>			
	John Sears	749,679	38.1%		0
	Michael Dukakis	1,219,109	61.9%		3
1986	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>16-Sep-86</u>			
	Michael Dukakis	499,639	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>16-Sep-86</u>			
	James Kariotis	11,787	18.5%	Businessman	0
	Royall Switzler	20,802	32.7%	Lawyer	0
	Gregory Hyatt	31,001	48.8%	State Representative	1
	<u>General</u>	<u>4-Nov-86</u>			
	James Kariotis	525,364	31.2%		0
	Michael Dukakis	1,157,786	68.8%		4
	1990	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>18-Sep-90</u>		
Evelyn Murphy		30,054	2.9%	Lieutenant Governor	2
Francis Bellotti		459,128	43.7%	Former Attorney General	1
John Silber		562,222	53.5%	Boston University President	0
<u>Republican Primary</u>		<u>18-Sep-90</u>			
Steven Pierce		176,184	39.4%	State Representative	0
William Weld		270,455	60.6%	Former US Attorney	0
<u>General</u>		<u>6-Nov-90</u>			
John Silber		1,099,878	48.3%		0
William Weld		1,175,817	51.7%		0



MASSACHUSETTS				Vocation	Candidate Quality Score
1994	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>20-Sep-94</u>			
	George Bachrach	120,567	27.0%	Former state senator	0
	Michael Barrett	111,199	24.9%	State Senator	1
	Mark Roosevelt	215,061	48.1%	State Representative	1
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>20-Sep-94</u>			
	William Weld	211,325	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>1-Nov-94</u>			
	Mark Roosevelt	611,650	28.5%		1
	William Weld	1,533,387	71.5%		4
	1998	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>15-Sep-98</u>		
Brian Donnelly		101,984	17.0%	Former US Congress Member	1
Patricia McGovern		189,686	31.7%	Lawyer	0
Scott Harshbarger		306,883	51.3%	Attorney General	2
<u>Republican Primary</u>		<u>15-Sep-98</u>			
Joe Malone		95,963	41.3%	State Treasurer	2
Paul Cellucci		136,258	58.7%	Incumbent	4
<u>General</u>		<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
Scott Harshbarger		901,843	47.4%		2
Paul Cellucci		967,160	50.9%		4
2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>17-Sep-02</u>			
	Steven Grossman*	5,976	0.8%	Former Chair, Dem Nat'l Committee, MA Dem Party	0
	Warren Tolman	132,157	17.7%	Former state senator	0
	Thomas Birmingham	179,703	24.1%	State Senate President	1
	Robert Reich	185,315	24.8%	Former Secretary of Labor	0
	Shannon O'Brien	243,039	32.6%	State Treasurer	2
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>17-Sep-02</u>			
	Mitt Romney	227,960	100.0%	Businessman	0
	<u>General</u>	<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
	Shannon O'Brien	985,981	47.4%		2
Mitt Romney	1,091,988	52.6%		0	

\*Included because I discuss his endorsements in the text.

## NEW MEXICO

				Vocation	Candidate Quality Score
1998	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>2-Jun-98</u>			
	Robert E. Virgil	10,483	6.5%	State Auditor	0
	Jerry Apodaca	16,303	10.2%	Former Governor	3
	Gary K. King	51,487	32.1%	State Representative	1
	Martin J. Chavez	82,147	51.2%	Former Mayor, Albuquerque	1
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>2-Jun-98</u>			
	Gary Johnson	64,669	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
	Martin J. Chavez (D)	226,755	45.5%		1
	Gary Johnson (R)	271,948	54.5%		4
2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>4-Jun-02</u>			
	Bill Richardson	147,524	100%	Former Member of Congress, Former Secretary of Energy	1
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>4-Jun-02</u>			
	Robert M. Burpo	3,864	4.2%	State Representative	1
	Walter D. Bradley	33,206	36%	Lieutenant Governor	2
	John A. Sanchez	55,102	59.8%	State Representative	1
	<u>General</u>	<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
	John A. Sanchez	189,074	41.3%		1
	Bill Richardson	268,693	58.7%		1

OHIO				Vocation	Candidate Quality Score
1994	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>3-May-94</u>			
	Peter M. Schuller	286,275	41.2%	Professor	0
	Robert L. Burch	408,159	58.8%	State Senator	1
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>3-May-94</u>			
	George Voinovich	750,779	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>1-Nov-94</u>			
	Robert L. Burch	835,849	25.8%		1
	George Voinovich	2,401,572	74.2%		4
	1998	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>5-May-98</u>		
Lee Fisher		663,832	100.0%	Former Attorney General	1
<u>Republican Primary</u>		<u>5-May-98</u>			
Robert A. Taft		691,946	100.0%	Secretary of State	2
<u>General</u>		<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
Lee Fisher		1,498,956	47.2%		1
Robert A. Taft	1,678,721	52.8%		2	
2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>7-May-02</u>			
	Timothy Hagan	467,572	100.0%	Former Cuyahga County Commissioner	0
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>7-May-02</u>			
	Robert A. Taft	552,491	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
	Timothy Hagan	1,263,924	39.9%		0
Robert A. Taft	1,865,007	60.1%		4	

TEXAS			Vocation		Candidate Quality Score
1994	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>8-Mar-94</u>			
	Gary Espinosa	230,337	22.2%	Retired	0
	Ann Richards	806,607	77.8%	Incumbent	4
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>8-Mar-94</u>			
	Ray Hollis	37,210	6.7%	Retired	0
	George W. Bush	520,130	93.3%	Baseball team owner	0
	<u>General</u>	<u>1-Nov-94</u>			
	Ann Richards	2,016,928	46.2%		4
	George W. Bush	2,350,994	53.8%		0
1998	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>10-Mar-98</u>			
	Garry Mauro	492,419	100.0%	Land Commissioner, Dem Party Exec.	0
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>10-Mar-98</u>			
	George W. Bush	576,528	96.6%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>3-Nov-98</u>			
	Garry Mauro	1,165,444	31.4%		0
George W. Bush	2,551,454	68.6%		4	
2002	<u>Democratic Primary</u>	<u>12-Mar-02</u>			
	Dan Morales	330,873	35.2%	Lawyer	0
	Tony Sanchez	609,383	64.8%	Businessman	0
	<u>Republican Primary</u>	<u>12-Mar-02</u>			
	Rick Perry	620,463	100.0%	Incumbent	4
	<u>General</u>	<u>5-Nov-02</u>			
	Tony Sanchez	1,819,798	40.9%		0
Rick Perry	2,632,591	59.1%		4	