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**THE COLOUR OF DESERT: RACE,  
CLASS AND DISTRIBUTIVE  
JUSTICE IN POST-APARTHEID  
SOUTH AFRICA**

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CENTRE FOR  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Social Surveys Unit

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SOUTH AFRICA

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September 2005

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# The Colour of Desert: Race, Class and Distributive Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa

## Abstract

*This paper examines how racial differences affect perceptions of distributive justice in post-apartheid South Africa. In 'divided' societies, citizens might be expected to discriminate on the basis of race or culture in assessing the justice of other citizens' claims. South Africa is a prime example of a 'divided' society whereby, in the past, legislation and racial elite culture combined in pervasive discrimination. Given the continued importance of race in daily life in South Africa, we might expect that attitudes about distributive justice would continue to be racialised, with people considering members of the same 'racial group' as themselves as being more deserving than members of other groups. But evidence from both national data-sets and a new data-set for Cape Town in particular suggests that race has complex and often counter-intuitive effects on perceptions of distributive justice. By some criteria, and some analytic techniques, people do not discriminate on the basis of race when assessing desert; by other criteria, and other analytic techniques, desert appears still to be somewhat coloured in post-apartheid South Africa. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that the effects of race are either weak or work in counter-intuitive directions. Rich, white Capetonians are certainly more generous in their views on redistribution than is generally assumed.*

## Introduction: Race, Class and the Paradox of Generosity in South Africa

Does racial or ethnic diversity inhibit inter-class redistribution? In the industrialised democracies of the 'North', there is some debate over the possible trade-off between diversity and redistribution (see reviews by Miller, 2004; Banting and Kymlicka, 2004). Diversity might undermine trust and inhibit class-based solidarities. Members of a cultural group might discriminate against outsiders, or different groups might be unable to agree on what constitutes justice. In a multi-cultural society, poor people might misdiagnose the sources

of their disadvantage, identifying them in cultural rather than class terms. Explicitly 'multi-cultural' policies might exacerbate such factors. They might 'crowd out' redistributive policies, by diverting energy and resources.

The limited extent of redistribution in the USA has been explained in terms of diversity and racism. Gilens (1999), using primarily data from opinion polls, found that Americans support pro-poor interventions when these are targeted on the deserving poor but oppose 'welfare' in general because they suspect it favours the undeserving poor – who are defined in racial terms. Put bluntly, welfare is opposed because it is seen as helping lazy black people. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find a close correlation between ethnic diversity and redistribution, whether using cross-national data or data on states and cities within the USA alone. On the other side, other cross-national evidence suggests that the adoption of explicitly multi-cultural policies does not correlate with changes in the size of the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004). Attitudinal data from Canada confirms that diversity erodes trust, and trust has a positive effect on support for social programmes. But the effects of diversity on support for the welfare state are insignificant (Soroka *et al.*, 2004).

The issues are, typically, much starker in the countries of the 'South'. Members of racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious groups frequently resort to violence to protect their 'just' claims whilst refusing to recognise the claims made by members of other groups (Horowitz, 1985). Apartheid in South Africa was an extreme version of this intolerance and discrimination. Public policies entrenched a racially-differentiated class structure and income hierarchy (Seekings and Natrass, 2005). In the early decades of apartheid, the state ensured that white citizens enjoyed a privileged standard of living primarily through protected employment, protected that is from competition from black people. The state discriminated racially in regulating access to employment or public services (including education and health care). The official ideology of apartheid emphasised that each racial group (and each ethnic group within the African population) should look after its own: white South Africans were not responsible for the poverty of black South Africans; rich South Africans were only responsible for poor South Africans if they were members of the same racially-demarcated 'community'; other than at exceptional moments, the official and dominant ideology therefore discouraged the state playing a welfarist role across the population as a whole. Racial segregation, discrimination and hierarchy were enforced violently, whenever and wherever necessary.


South African society remains deeply racialised in the early 2000s, despite the deracialisation of public policy and the criminalisation of racial discrimination. White South Africans have the skills that enable them to earn higher incomes

through the market (in South Africa or internationally). The expansion of educational and employment opportunities for black South Africans has resulted in the middle and upper classes becoming multi-racial. But, across South Africa as a whole, most white people are rich whilst most black people are not (*ibid.*). This reality was simplified by Thabo Mbeki, then vice-president, in his notorious ‘two nations’ speech in 1998: South Africa, he said, comprises two nations, the first ‘white, relatively prosperous’ and ‘the second and larger nation ... black and poor’ (*Hansard*, 29 May 1998, col. 3378).

Post-apartheid South Africa is perhaps even more racially divided in social than economic terms. Most people continue to live in residential areas that are, in practice, racially segregated, and most children continue to attend schools with children of the same ‘race’. Few South Africans enjoy much inter-racial contact, as is clear from a survey conducted in 2000-01 by James Gibson (see Gibson, 2004). In Gibson’s survey, white, coloured and Indian respondents were asked a series of questions about African people, and African people the same questions about white people. Only 16 percent of the respondents, weighted appropriately, reported having ‘a great deal’ of contact at work with members of the designated group, whilst only 6 percent reported having ‘a great deal’ of such contact outside work. Another 13 percent reported having ‘some’ such contact at work and another 13 percent reported having some such contact outside of work. Eight percent said they ate meals ‘quite often’ with members of the designated group. A tiny 4 percent said they had ‘quite a number’ of friends in the designated group, with another 20 percent saying they had ‘only a small number’ of such friends. Overall, one in three South Africans reported any of the above; two out of three South Africans said that they had little or no contact with members of the designated group.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Gibson found evidence of inter-racial suspicion and distrust. The bars in Figure 1 show the proportion of the weighted sample who agreed (or agreed strongly) with each of seven statements about the designated group. Almost one in five South Africans agree that South Africa would be a better place without the designated racial group. Almost half agree that they do not believe what members of the designated racial group said, that they feel uncomfortable around them, and that they find it hard to imagine ever being friends with one of them. Almost two out of three South Africans agree that it is difficult to understand the customs and ways of the designated group. Without exception, larger proportions of African respondents agreed with these statements about white people than did white, coloured or Indian respondents when asked about African people (see Gibson, 2004: 123-4).

Figure 1. The limits to social deracialisation.



Note: responses to the racism question are actually *disagreements* with the statement 'most ... are *not* racist'.

Source: 2000-01 Truth and Reconciliation data-set; author's calculations.

Gibson shows that there is an inverse correlation between most forms of inter-racial contact and racial distrust: the more contact that respondents report with members of the designated group, the less likely they are to agree with statements indicating prejudice or wariness. The exception to this is contact at work, which has no significant effect on inter-racial attitudes. Gibson shows that contact is especially important to white, coloured and Indian respondents (*ibid*: 139-42).

Limited social deracialisation does not mean that there has been no perceived improvement in race relations. A series of surveys have found that South Africans believe that race relations have improved since the end of apartheid. According to Gibson's 2001 survey, 16 percent said that race relations had improved a great deal, and a further 45 percent said that race relations had improved somewhat. In 2003, a survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the Washington Post and Harvard found that as many as 68 percent of South Africans believed that race relations were better than they had been under apartheid, and as many expected that race relations would continue to improve over the next five years (Hamel *et al.*, 2004). But the same surveys



found evidence that *improved* race relations did not mean *good* race relations. Race relations remains a pressing problem for 49 percent of Gibson's respondents and a further 33 percent described them as important.

Nor does acknowledging that South Africa remains a racially divided society in social terms mean that this racial cleavage is the only or even most important social cleavage. A 2003 survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation found that more South Africans identified as the 'biggest division' not racial divisions but the 'division between poor and middle income/wealthy South Africans'. Similarly, the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found that almost as many people believe that there is 'strong' or 'some' tension between rich and poor people in South Africa as between different races (Roberts, 2004: 16).

One might expect that the over-riding racialisation of society under apartheid and the continuing salience of race have resulted in a close correlation between race and attitudes toward distribution or distributive justice. The government, African National Congress and the media frequently accuse white South Africans of being opposed to 'transformation', i.e. to redistributive social and economic policies. If this was the case, then we would expect to find that *attitudes towards redistribution correlate with race, and that South Africans will assess the desert of other members of their own racial group (i.e. 'insiders') more favourably or positively than that of members of other racial groups (i.e. 'outsiders')*. Attitudes and beliefs about desert in South Africa would be similar to those in the USA.

The actual history of social policy in South Africa throws up a complication. Apartheid notwithstanding, South Africa had a set of social policies that are unusually progressive and redistributive, relative to the rest of the developing world, by the time of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Seekings, 2002). One of the pillars of this redistribution is the public welfare system. South Africa has a set of non-contributory grants, for the elderly, children and the disabled, that serve to redistribute resources to the poor and reduce poverty significantly. South Africa spends about 3 percent of GDP on non-contributory grants (or social assistance), which is a much higher share of GDP than any other developing country. In the late apartheid and post-apartheid periods, this redistribution is in substantial part inter-racial. South Africa thus presents social scientists with what I have called the 'paradox of generosity': rich, white South Africans pay taxes that fund old-age and other pensions for poor, black South Africans. Why did a system founded on racial discrimination and consequent inequality develop such a redistributive welfare system? Progressive social (and tax) policies had their origins in the exceptional circumstances of the early

1940s (see Seekings, 2000, 2005a, 2005c), but at some point in the apartheid era public opinion among white South Africans might have swung into accord with the reality of growing inter-racial redistribution. It is possible that white South Africans were willing to support redistribution precisely because they are aware of their vulnerability as *racially*-identifiable members of a privileged class (Seekings, 2004). In other words, to turn around the ‘mis-diagnosis’ argument made by left critics of multi-culturalism in the North, white South Africans might worry that their class privileges will be mis-diagnosed as racial ones by most South Africans. Self-defence and hence self-interest therefore might make white South Africans *more* prepared to support redistributive policies.

This paper uses evidence from surveys conducted nationally and in Cape Town to explore attitudes towards redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa, and, in particular, the extent to which race affects people’s assessments of desert. Is desert ‘coloured’ in that race affects whether someone or some group is considered deserving? Using evidence from surveys means that this paper is subject to some of the standard criticisms of attitudinal data. Public opinion might not matter much in terms of public policy-making, there might be a weak relationship between reported attitudes and actual behaviour, and what people say they think might be affected by the methodology of one-on-one structured interviews.<sup>1</sup>

## **Race and distributive justice in South Africa**

Despite the importance of race and inequality in South Africa, little research has been conducted on how attitudes towards inequality are racialised. This is largely because there is little research into *any* aspect of attitudes towards inequality. The limited research on race and distributive justice in South Africa throws up some confusing findings.

The 2003 SASAS indicates both similarities and differences between the attitudes of white and black people towards income inequality and government policies regarding inequality. Almost all South Africans, regardless of race, concur that incomes are too unequal and that the government should take more responsibility to reduce inequality. But white and African people disagree in their attitudes towards land reform and affirmative action, with African people in favour and white people opposed (Roberts, 2004b).

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the use of vignettes described below was pioneered in the USA precisely to avoid some of the difficulties in interviewing people about views that they might not want to be seen to hold.

In the international World Values Survey (WVS), respondents were faced with a 'forced choice' question, choosing between the statements 'the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for' and 'people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves'. The 2001 WVS data shows that African and coloured people favour government responsibility more than white people (although a higher proportion of white people supported government responsibility in 2001 than in previous rounds of the WVS, in the 1980s and 1990s). The WVS also found some racial differences in opinions on the perceived causes of poverty. White South Africans are inclined to attribute poverty to laziness, whereas African people point to the unfair treatment of people by society. Further, forced to choose between the statements 'incomes should be made more equal' and 'we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort', African people incline toward the former and white people to the latter.

Studies conducted by the HSRC between 1994 and 2000 add to this picture through probing how respondents see their individual situation and that of their 'group' relative to other people or groups. White South Africans viewed their current personal position as good but the position of their group as bad, whilst black South Africans viewed their personal position as bad but the position of their group as 'OK'. Most black people also have muted expectations of changes in future for them personally, but are positive about the future of their group. The HSRC study also explored who it was that respondents compared themselves with. When assessing their individual situation, most people compared themselves on the basis of class (or, alternatively, with people in their neighbourhood or friends), not on the basis of race. When assessing their group situation, people were more likely to choose racial or ethnic comparisons in the mid-1990s, but by the late 1990s were shifting to a more class-based comparison (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 2001: 56-73).

These findings assess race in terms of the racial classification (however defined) of the respondent. Thus black and white respondents have different attitudes on some issues and similar attitudes on others. But, when people consider government assistance to the poor, they generally take into account the characteristics of the poor, and especially whether, in their opinion, the poor are deserving of assistance according to some moral, behavioural or demographic criteria. Respondents might believe that the government is doing too little for some poor but too much for others. Typically, 'lazy' poor people are considered less deserving than people who are poor because they are *unable* to provide for themselves (for example the elderly, the sick or disabled, or children). In societies where poverty is attributed to laziness, such as in the USA and East Asia, citizens tend to oppose more welfare spending by the government (but favour interventions such as income tax credits to the working poor). In some

societies, demographic or social factors might inform people's attitudes towards inequality-reducing policies. In the USA, the media-informed view that black people are especially lazy and thus undeserving results in widespread opposition to welfare spending in general (Gilens, 1999). In more obviously culturally-divided societies, perceived desert might well be perceived to follow cultural lines. For example, a Hausa person from northern Nigeria might believe that the Nigerian government does too little to help poor Hausa people but too much to help poor Yoruba people.

Elsewhere, I show that distributive justice perceptions and attitudes in South Africa are mutable, in that responses are sensitive to the precise phrasing of the question posed, and may change over relatively short periods of time. South Africans distinguish sharply between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor (Seekings, 2005b). In this paper I focus on how distributive justice perceptions are affected by race – meaning both the race of the respondent and the race of the prospectively 'deserving' subject or beneficiary of a pro-poor intervention or policy. I use survey data, but the exercise is similar in important respects to recent experimental research conducted by Justine Burns. In Burns' experiments, secondary school students in Cape Town played the 'dictator game', in which players are given money and then choose how much to pass onto anonymous 'partners', whose photo they have seen but otherwise know nothing about. Burns found that there was no direct race effect, i.e. that players did not discriminate against partners who appeared to be racially different. This behaviour appeared to be motivated by an aversion to inherited inequality, and racial appearance was taken as a proxy for inherited inequality (Burns, 2004).

Instead of conducting field experiments, I use experimental vignettes included in a survey instrument. My experimental vignette is based on a 'laid-off worker' experiment used in the USA by Sniderman and Piazza (1993), in their study of the nuances of American attitudes around race. Respondents are presented with a scenario in which a person is retrenched, and are then invited to suggest how much (if any) financial assistance that person should receive from the government whilst looking for work. The scenario varies insofar as the retrenched person is given different characteristics: white or black, male or female, younger or older, single or married, with or without children, and dependable or not dependable. Sniderman and Piazza found that white, conservative Americans are less supportive of government assistance in general than white, liberal Americans, but they are – counter-intuitively – more favourably inclined to supporting black claimants (i.e. retrenched workers, in the vignette) than white claimants. Even faced with an unmarried woman with children – i.e. a claimant who violates conservative family norms – white conservative respondents are more likely to support assistance if the claimant is black than if she is white. If the claimant is described as a dependable worker in

the vignette, then conservatives are especially inclined to discriminate in favour of a black person! Sniderman and Piazza continue to show that these counter-intuitive findings co-exist with less surprising findings when white Americans are asked about the justice of claims made by black people as a group. The point is not that one sets of responses is right and the other set wrong, but rather that people hold complex sets of beliefs. Failing to recognise this complexity, Sniderman and Piazza (1993: 86-7) conclude, leads too many commentators to see racism 'where it is not' and fail to see it 'where it is', and thus 'to ignore what they should criticise, and to criticise what they should defend.' Experimental vignettes have been used in South Africa by Gibson and Gouws in their studies of tolerance (Gibson and Gouws, 2003) and reconciliation (Gibson, 2004). In this paper, I report on the experimental use of the 'laid-off worker' vignette in a 2003 survey, alongside responses to more standard questions about attitudes to distributive issues.

Data come from the 2003 Cape Area Study conducted in South Africa's second largest city, Cape Town. Cape Town has long had a distinctive demographic, social and economic profile. The Western Cape never had a large 'African' population, and through most of the twentieth century there remained tight restrictions on immigration, residence and employment for African people. Even in the early twenty-first century, half of the population of Cape Town is 'coloured', only just over one quarter is African and just under one quarter is 'white'. There is rapid immigration of African people into the city from poorer, more rural areas of the Eastern Cape, but this immigration tends to reinforce rather than erode racial segregation and inequality because immigrants tend to have few skills. There is no significant African 'middle-class' in Cape Town, in contrast to the country as a whole. The resulting relationship between race and income is evident in Table 1. Cape Town's population comprises predominantly African poor strata, predominantly coloured middle income strata, and a predominantly white upper-income group. Only the coloured population shows marked heterogeneity in class and income terms, ranging from the very poor (in areas of, for example, Mannenberg and Bonteheuvel) to the rich (in, for example, Gatesville). Overall, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income in Cape Town is about 0.58.

Cape Town's demographic profile entails opportunities and constraints for analysing the racialisation of distributive justice norms and perceptions. The primary opportunity derives from the fact that the city's population comprises three racial groups that are both sizeable and are widely viewed as distinct. The constraint is that the close relationship between race and class makes it impossible to separate race and class effects. In Cape Town it is not possible to ask (for example) a poor white person what he or she thinks of the desert of a poor African person, because no white people are poor in absolute terms.

*Table 1: Household incomes by race, Cape Town 2002*

<i>Household income (Rands per month)</i>	<i>African (%)</i>	<i>Coloured (%)</i>	<i>White (%)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
0-1999	20	12	1	33
2000-5999	10	23	4	37
6000+	2	12	17	31
Total	32	47	22	101

Source: Own calculations using Cape Area Panel Study, 2002.

The 2003 Cape Area Study (CAS) focused on social and political attitudes and behaviour. It was designed not only to generate data for research but also to experiment with questionnaire design and to develop research capacity. Fieldwork was conducted in predominantly white areas by undergraduate students from the University of Cape Town and in predominantly African and coloured areas by a commercial social research company, with funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (as part of its support for the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town). African fieldworkers conducted the interviews in African areas and coloured fieldworkers did so in coloured areas, but in ‘white’ areas both the fieldworkers (university students) and the respondents were racially diverse. Fieldwork was conducted in September and October 2003.

The sample comprised 588 adults spread across metropolitan Cape Town. It in fact comprised three separate samples, one each for areas with predominantly African, predominantly coloured (or Indian) and predominantly white populations. Each of these samples was drawn using a two-stage cluster sample. Seventy ‘enumerator areas’ (EAs, as defined by Statistics South Africa for the 1996 Population Census) were selected on a probabilistic basis. White areas were over-sampled to cope with anticipated lower response. Then, in each EA, aerial photographs were used to select ten households. Within each household, fieldworkers were instructed to list the names and birthdays of all household members over the age of eighteen, and to interview whoever had the next birthday. The final, actual sample had three weaknesses. First, student fieldworkers were unable to complete their assigned interview loads, conducting a total of 188 out of 200 interviews in white areas. Secondly, almost one-third of the interviews were in ‘substitute’ households because the fieldworkers were unable to access the sampled household or the household member with the next birthday. Thirdly, although fieldworkers appear to have complied with the ‘next birthday’ rule, they did end up with a sample with an implausibly high proportion of women. The data reported in this paper are weighted to adjust for race and gender, so that the weighted sample corresponds to the total population of Cape Town (according to the 2001 Population Census).


## Are ‘the poor’ deserving?

Data from standard attitudinal variables in the CAS 2003 survey confirm the finding from previous surveys that there is wide support for redistributive policies among South Africans. Massive majorities (over 80 percent) in Cape Town supported the government ensuring that children from poor families have the same opportunities as children from richer families (question F.4), an increase in the value of the state old age pension (F.6) and government help for the unemployed (F.14). A similarly massive majority says that the government is doing ‘too little’ for the poor (F.38). Smaller majorities (less than 60 percent) supported the government reducing the differences between rich and poor (F.12) and the introduction of a basic income grant for all (F.13). Overall, the picture appears to be wide but not unconditional support for pro-poor interventions.

It should be noted that question F.6 refers to the non-contributory, ostensibly means-tested old-age pension that is the main pillar of South Africa’s unusual social assistance system. The pension is generous, paying about US\$100 per month, and it is paid to a very high proportion of elderly South Africans. Question F.13 refers to a policy that has been proposed (most notably by a government committee of inquiry in 2002) and widely discussed, but does not enjoy the support of the government.

These attitudes correlate weakly with social and demographic variables. Cross-tabulation suggests a weak relationship between race and attitudes, with white respondents slightly more likely to be opposed to pro-poor policies and coloured respondents slightly more likely to support them. Race affects attitudes on the different items in different ways. Whilst there was much less support for a basic income grant (F.13) among white respondents (and among respondents from high-income African and coloured households), white respondents were slightly *more* supportive of increasing the old-age pension (F.6) than poorer coloured and African respondents (see Figure 2). Regressing the composite variable derived from the factor analysis against race alone suggests that there is a significant but weak race effect, with being white correlating with a less pro-poor attitude; the coefficient of determination (i.e.  $r^2$ ), however, is very low (0.04). Gender, age, marital status and parental status are not significant, add little to the explanatory power of the model and do not affect the significance of race, but adding education removes the effect of being white relative to being African and adding an affluence variable largely removes the effect of being white relative to being coloured. Even with all of these variables included in the model, the  $r^2$  remains low at 0.08.

Figure 2: Attitudes towards pro-poor policies, by race



The Cape Town population seems to be broadly supportive of pro-poor policies. The most directly comparative variable is the CAS 2003 question F.28, which replicates a question used in the World Values Survey. Table 2 aggregates the responses into three categories: agree with the statement on the left, in between, and agree with the statement on the right. A comparison of Table 2 with WVS data for South Africa as a whole shows that the attitudes of white, African and coloured people in Cape Town are broadly in line with the attitudes recorded by the WVS. White respondents are less inclined toward state responsibility and more inclined toward individual responsibility than either African or coloured respondents.



*Table 2: Attitudes towards government and private initiative, Cape Town 2003*

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.						
F.28	The government should take more responsibility to ensure that every-one is provided for		People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves	Total	Mean score	S.d.
	Scores 1-3	Scores 4-7	Scores 8-10			
Total CT	35%	40%	24%	100%	4.8	2.8
African	36%	50%	13%	100%	4.6	2.6
Coloured	41%	29%	30%	100%	5.0	3.1
White	22%	50%	28%	100%	5.6	2.5

Note: S.d. is the abbreviation for standard deviation. The total data are weighted.

## **Does race affect whether some people are considered more deserving than others?**

Already it appears that some respondents are discerning between different pro-poor interventions, and hence perhaps different categories of poor people. The overwhelming support for increased old-age pensions (F.6) and for equal opportunities for children (F.4), even among the less pro-poor white respondents, suggest that the elderly and children are seen as deserving. Similarly, almost all respondents agree that the government should help the unemployed (F.14). In contrast, more respondents – including a majority of white respondents – are opposed to a guaranteed minimum income through a universal basic income grant (F.13). A basic income grant would be of primary benefit to those poor people who are not covered by the existing system of social assistance, which provides pensions or grants to the elderly, the disabled and poor families with children (through the Child Support Grant). The major hole in the social safety net is provision for the unemployed, i.e. working-age adults who are unable to work not because of age or disability but because there are no jobs. Whilst responses to F.14 show that South Africans think that the unemployed are deserving of some kind of assistance, this does not convert into support for a guaranteed minimum income for all (through, for example, a basic income grant).

There are two possible explanations for these attitudes towards the unemployed. The first is that some South Africans want the government to help the

unemployed through job creation or workfare, not welfare. Unfortunately we did not explore this directly in the survey. The second is that some South Africans favour support for some unemployed people but not all unemployed people, i.e. that they discriminate within the category of unemployed. This possibility can be examined using the CAS 2003 data. More specifically, the CAS 2003 data can be used to see if there is any evidence of racial discrimination in respondents' assessment of the desert of unemployed people.

The experimental vignettes included in CAS 2003 provide a more nuanced set of insights into the ways in which desert is linked to the characteristics of the beneficiary as well as those of the respondent. One vignette was a version of Sniderman and Piazza's laid-off or retrenched worker experiment. Respondents were told: 'The government provides grants to some people in need, especially the elderly. I am going to describe a situation, and then ask you what the government should do to help the person involved.' The description takes the following form:

A worker has been retrenched from a company. [He/she] is a [white/coloured/African] [man/woman], in [his/her] [20s/30s/40s], [single/married] and [with/without] children. [He/she] is a [dependable/not dependable] worker and now [is/is not] actively looking for work.

Ten different scenarios were used, each with about sixty respondents. The first scenario, for example, was this: 'A worker has been retrenched from a company. He is a white man, in his 40s, married and with children. He is a dependable worker and is actively looking for work.' The respondent is then asked: 'Should the Government provide financial assistance to this person whilst he/she is unemployed?' If the respondent says 'yes', he or she is then asked 'how much?'. We tried to ensure that each scenario was used in each EA in our sample so that each scenario was used with broadly similar sub-samples. The details of each scenario are set out in the first part of Table 3.

In South Africa there is no general public financial assistance for the unemployed. The Unemployment Insurance Fund provides earnings-related assistance for a limited period of unemployment, but only to people who have contributed to the fund in the past. Its limited duration and exclusion of non-contributors mean that only a very small proportion of the unemployed receive UIF benefits. Most unemployed are compelled to rely on their own savings or, more generally, their kin. The general scenario would therefore probably be understood as an extension of the existing welfare system.

In summary, the experiment involves a respondent (answering the questions) and a 'subject' or 'beneficiary'; the respondent makes an initial assessment of

the desert of the beneficiary; if the beneficiary is deemed deserving, the respondent is asked to assess what award or sum of money is appropriate. Respondents are thus making two assessments: should the subject get assistance? If so, how much? The first column in the second part of Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents approving of assistance. Data are given for each of the ten specified sets of characteristics of the retrenched worker.

Overall, six out of ten respondents favoured financial assistance to the retrenched worker, with three out of ten respondents saying ‘no’, 7 percent saying ‘maybe’ or ‘it depends’ and just 2 percent saying that they did not know. The variations between the scenarios were relatively small. A maximum of 76 percent of respondents supported financial assistance for a married, white man, in his 40s and with children, who was a dependable worker and was actively looking for work (scenario #1). A minimum of 49 percent approved financial assistance to an unmarried, childless, white man in his 20s (scenario #3). An almost identical proportion (50 percent) approved financial assistance to his African equivalent (despite the added stipulation that he was a dependable worker and was actively looking for work – scenario #5). These three cases indicate that the classic male breadwinner is deemed more deserving than the young man, suggesting a conservative, family-oriented conception of desert. The four most deserving scenarios, according to the initial assessment, all entailed subjects with children; the three least deserving scenarios all entailed subjects without children.

The pattern in the amounts that respondents awarded is broadly similar but not identical to the pattern of whether they favoured financial assistance at all. The amounts awarded were notional in that the question asked how much should the government provide per month. In Table 3, the first column for ‘mean amount’ of award includes only those awards greater than zero, i.e. where the respondent said ‘yes’ in response to the initial question about desert. There is considerable variation, with the mean award in the most deserving scenario – the older, married white man with children, who is a dependable worker and is actively looking for work (scenario #1) is almost double the mean award in the least deserving scenario – the coloured man, in his 30s, single and without children, but a dependable worker and actively looking for work (scenario #8).

The second column for ‘mean amount’ in Table 3 sets a value of 0 for cases where the respondent did not consider that the beneficiary should receive government assistance. The figures in this column thus combine the effects of both decisions, i.e. whether the beneficiary is deemed deserving and how much he/she should receive. These data confirm that scenarios #1, 6 and 7 involve the most deserving cases overall, and scenarios #3 and 8 the least deserving cases overall.

Table 3: Specification of and responses to each scenario in the vignette, Cape Town, 2003

Scenario	Characteristics of subject or beneficiary						Respondents' assessment of desert				
	Gender	Population group	age	Married?	Has children?	Dependable / looking for work?	% say yes	n	Mean amount (R) if yes	n	Mean amount (R) if yes or no
<b>1</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>white</b>	<b>40s</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>1302</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>993</b>
2	<i>Female</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>30s</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>907</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>514</i>
3	<i>Male</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>20s</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>356</i>
4	<i>Male</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>40s</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>834</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>533</i>
5	<i>Male</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>20s</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>899</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>438</i>
<b>6</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>African</b>	<b>20s</b>	<b>no</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>1039</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>711</b>
7	<i>Female</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>30s</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>991</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>689</i>
8	<i>Male</i>	<i>coloured</i>	<i>30s</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>689</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>398</i>
<b>9</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>coloured</b>	<b>40s</b>	<b>yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>1036</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>642</b>
10	<i>Female</i>	<i>coloured</i>	<i>20s</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>753</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>482</i>
Total							60	588	935	357	573

Notes: data are weighted. The most deserving scenarios are marked in bold, the least deserving in italics.

Table 4 pools together the different scenarios and then separates results according to the race of the retrenched worker (or beneficiary) and respondent, as well as the ensuing beneficiary/respondent pairings. (Data for a wider range of characteristics of the beneficiary and respondent are set out in Appendix 1).<sup>2</sup> On the face of it, the data in Table 4 suggest that the race of the beneficiary made no difference to the initial decision. Appendix 1 shows also that gender made a minimal difference; age, marital status and whether or not the respondent had children made some difference. These findings are corroborated by bivariate regressions: the respondents being married or being aged in their 40s was weakly significant (at the 10 percent level, with a z-statistic below 2) but with weak effects, whilst having children was significant (at the 5 percent level), but still with weak effects (having children increases the probability of being considered deserving by 8 percent). Neither the beneficiary's race nor gender was significant in even a bivariate regression.

The middle part of Table 4 suggests that the race of the respondent also makes relatively limited difference to whether or not the retrenched worker is considered deserving of public assistance. The results for other characteristics of the beneficiaries and respondents are shown in Appendix 1. Women were slightly more generous than men in their assessment of desert, married respondents were slightly more generous than unmarried ones, and – counter-intuitively, perhaps – white respondents were slightly more generous than either African and coloured respondents.

The limited effects of race can also be seen in the pairings reported in the third part of Table 4 (but note that the sub-samples are very small for some pairs, especially white respondents paired with white or coloured beneficiaries). The most deserving pairing is the pairing of white respondent and African beneficiary; the least deserving is the pairing of coloured respondent and African beneficiary. But the differences are not large: 67 percent versus 55 percent approving. These descriptive statistics seem to imply that respondents are slightly more positive about beneficiaries in the same racial grouping as themselves: African respondents consider African beneficiaries most deserving, coloured respondents consider coloured beneficiaries most deserving, and white respondents consider white beneficiaries at least as deserving as African ones.

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<sup>2</sup> Some caution is required when interpreting the data on the characteristics of the beneficiary. Only ten scenarios were used, out of a total of 144 possible sets of characteristics (gender having 2 values, race 3 values, age 3 values, marital status 2 values, parental status 2 values and dependability 2 values). This means that the variables are probably not entirely orthogonal, although calculations standard tests suggest that this is not significant. But not using all possible combinations might result in an exaggeration of respondents' generosity towards some characteristics (such as being older) and hostility towards others (such as being younger) – because the descriptions of older men perhaps tended to render them more deserving in terms of other variables than did the descriptions of young men.

But regressions do not reveal that same-race pairings are significant, even when controlling for race.

*Table 4: Perceived desert, by race of 'beneficiary' and respondent, pooled sample*


		% say yes	N	Mean amount (R) if yes	Std. dev.	N
<i>Characteristic of retrenched worker (beneficiary)</i>						
Race / population group	White	61	179	1035	768	80
	African	60	229	947	764	129
	Coloured	60	108	836	708	95
<i>Characteristic of respondent</i>						
Race / population group	White	64	139	1519	973	56
	African	61	197	685	399	112
	Coloured	59	234	913	750	136
<i>Respondent-beneficiary pairing</i>						
White-to-white		66	41	1959	1297	11
White-to-African		67	55	1486	817	28
White-to-coloured		58	43	1288	867	17
African-to-white		63	61	745	289	32
African-to-African		63	79	712	506	48
African-to-coloured		58	57	591	273	32
Coloured-to-white		58	69	1014	646	37
Coloured-to-African		55	93	900	794	53
Coloured-to-coloured		62	72	850	765	46

Note: mean amount awarded is only if an award was approved, i.e. if >0.

The importance of some of these factors is not the same, however, when it comes to the amounts awarded to deserving beneficiaries, as we can see in the third column of Table 4 (and in Appendix 1). White respondents proposed much larger grants or awards (to be paid by the government, it should be remembered). The mean award made by a white respondent was more than double the mean award made by an African respondent. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that white South Africans have much higher incomes and thus probably have a more inflated sense of what constitutes a reasonable minimum. Unfortunately our data on household income is poor, but we can compare responses in our vignette to the mean household income in the neighbourhood where the respondent is resident, using data from the 2001 Population Census. Figure 3 shows that the actual award rises with

neighbourhood income.<sup>3</sup> Figure 4 shows the awards made as a share of mean household income in the neighbourhood, both on an annualised basis.<sup>4</sup> Both figures use logged incomes on the x-axis and show the fitted regression line and 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 4 shows that, as household income rises, so the award declines as a share of household income. In low income neighbourhoods, the mean award is about one half of mean household income. In high income neighbourhoods, the actual award is much larger (as we can see in Figure 3), but the mean award is just one-tenth or less of mean household income. Bivariate regression shows that the mean award in a neighbourhood with a mean household income of R150 000 per year is about R400 per month higher than the mean award in a neighbourhood where the mean income is only R50 000 per year. Rich Capetonians are generous in absolute terms, but miserly in relation to their own affluence.

Figure 3: Award in relation to household income




More curiously, white beneficiaries were awarded the largest grants. Not only did white respondents seem to discriminate by race in their awards, proposing larger grants to white than African beneficiaries and the smallest grants to

<sup>3</sup> Note that the award is per month, the household income per year.  
<sup>4</sup> That is, the amounts awarded were inflated by twelve, to convert them from monthly to annual data.

coloured beneficiaries,<sup>5</sup> but coloured and African respondents also followed a similar pattern, although less markedly. Might this, perhaps, reflect setting the grant on an implicit replacement income basis, such that larger grants are awarded to people earning more before they were retrenched? This is how the South African UIF system works.

Figure 4: Generosity of award in relation to household income



## Multi-variate regression analysis

The real power of using vignettes is in multivariate analysis, i.e. analysing responses in terms of a whole set of variables, using the pooled sample, i.e. all 588 cases together rather than divided into separate sub-samples. Multivariate regressions allow us to examine the relationships between the characteristics of the beneficiary (i.e. the retrenched worker), the characteristics of the respondent him- or herself, and the respondent’s decisions. The regression analysis here proceeds in three stages. First, using probit regressions, we examine whether various sets of variables explain the initial decision of whether to identify the subject as deserving or not. Then we examine whether various sets of variables explain how much the respondent awards to the subject, if the respondent considers the subject deserving. Finally, we combine these in a Heckman two-

<sup>5</sup> But note that the n is small for white respondents, and thus especially in the pairings.



stage model. Heckman's technique is appropriate here because the initial decision of desert and the subsequent decision of how much to award are influenced by different factors. These stages are then repeated for respondents from each racial group.

Appendix 2 shows the regression results for a series of probit regressions in which saying 'yes' in the initial question (G.3) is the dependent variable. Model A shows the results for a probit regression using only beneficiary characteristics as independent variables. Model B shows the results for a probit regression against respondent socio-demographic characteristics alone. Model C shows the results for a probit regression using both beneficiary characteristics and respondent socio-demographic characteristics. Model D is a more parsimonious version of Model D. These are marginal effects models. The coefficients reported are the dprobit coefficients. The data are weighted by race and gender.

The basic findings are simple: neither the characteristics of the beneficiary (as set out in the scenarios, with the exception of one variable) nor the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are significant in influencing the initial assessment of desert. The exceptional variable is whether the beneficiary has children. This is significant at the 10 percent level in Model A and at the 5 percent level in Model D. In Model A, beneficiaries with children are 31 percent more likely to be considered deserving than beneficiaries without children. In Model D, the effect is reduced to 10 percent. In none of the models is the race of the beneficiary or of the respondent significant. Together, these variables explain very little of the variance in the initial assessment of desert (the pseudo r-squared is tiny in every model). Neither of our variables for the respondent's class – a crude household-level variable ("rich") or the mean household income in the neighbourhood ("neighbourhood income") is significant.

A very different picture emerges when we examine the size of the awards that respondents make to those subjects whom they have said are deserving. Appendix 3 reports the results of regression analysis of the amounts awarded by respondents who initially assessed the subject as deserving (i.e. answered yes to G.3). The regressions use logged data for the amounts awarded, transforming the initial skewed distribution into a reasonably normal one. Model A shows that none of the characteristics of the beneficiary correlate significantly with the amounts awarded. But there is a batch of significant correlations in Model B (and Model C, which combines beneficiary and respondent characteristics). Both African and coloured respondents make very much smaller awards than the omitted category of white respondents (even controlling for affluence); respondents with children make slightly smaller awards than those without, and respondents who are working make slightly larger awards than those who are

not (even controlling for race and affluence). Whether respondent and beneficiary are of the same race is not significant. Model A explains very little of the variance in awards. Model B compares much more (with an adjusted r-squared of 0.15). Combining the two in Model C results in a slightly higher adjusted r-squared (0.18). This is a semi-logarithmic model, with the coefficients indicating the proportional changes in the size of the awards made. Thus, in Model C, if the respondent is African then the award made is reduced by 65 percent and being coloured reduces the award made by 18 percent, relative to the respondent being white, and controlling for all of the other variables in the model.

Model D in Appendix 3 is a more parsimonious version of Model C, including just six variables. All of the correlations are significant, most at the 1 percent level, and the r-squared is a high 0.36, meaning that these variables are explaining about one-third of all of the variance in the size of the award. Controlling for just these variables, the size of the award is larger if the beneficiary has children, and is smaller if the beneficiary is African or coloured; it rises with the respondent's neighbourhood income, but is smaller if the respondent is African or coloured. Controlling for the respondent's neighbourhood income has the effect of increasing the effect of the race of the respondent, not reducing it. In other words there are clear class and race effects in terms of the size of the award made: rich people are more generous, and white people are more generous even controlling for income. (Note that, as we have already seen, respondents in high-income neighbourhoods are generous in absolute terms, but not relative to their incomes).

The results of a Heckman two-stage analysis, using selected variables, are shown in Appendix 4. What the Heckman regression does is regress the size of the award on a set of variables whilst taking into account the prior probit regression on whether the respondent considers the subject deserving at all. It thus combines the steps treated separately in Appendices 2 and 3. It only makes sense to use the Heckman technique if the factors explaining one decision (is the subject deserving?) are different from those explaining the second (if so, how much should the subject receive per month?). The use of a Heckman analysis is shown to be warranted by the very low probability of the two equations *not* being independent of each other ( $p=0.008$ , significant at the 1 percent level).

In the initial assessment of desert, the race of the respondent is not significant. But the race of the beneficiary and whether the beneficiary has children are significant. Respondents considered African and coloured subjects more deserving, and subjects with children more deserving also. In the assessment of the size of the award, all of the race variables are significant, even controlling for class (i.e. neighbourhood income). The race of the respondent is very

significant, and has a substantial effect on the awards made (as we already saw in Appendix 3). The race of the beneficiary is now also shown to be significant, with African and coloured beneficiaries getting smaller awards than white beneficiaries. The coefficients on beneficiary's race are, however, much smaller than the coefficients on respondent's race.

Some of these results are somewhat surprising and some are very counter-intuitive. Insofar as race influences the first stage of assessing desert, it is only in that there is some discrimination in favour of African and coloured subjects. But the effects are small, and it appears that assessments of desert are influenced primarily by factors that we are not measuring. In assessing the appropriate size of an award or grant, race matters. Respondents in rich areas are more generous (but not in proportion to their incomes), whilst white respondents are more generous even when we control for neighbourhood income. This suggests that white South Africans – or, at least, white Capetonians – are prepared to be generous in part because they are rich and in part because they are white. Race and class both matter.

Much more counter-intuitive is the finding that all respondents are somewhat more generous towards white beneficiaries! Respondents do not appear to favour members of their own racial group. It appears that, in this experiment, South Africans are more inclined to support retrenched workers at the unequal level to which they might be presumed to be accustomed, which means replicating the racial inequalities of the past. Race might be seen as a proxy for income or standard of living, prior to retrenchment. This result would be less surprising in a society where income support (in times of unemployment, poor health or old age) is linked to previous income, as is the case in the 'conservative' or corporatist welfare regimes of continental Europe, including Germany (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin *et al.*, 1999). It is more curious, however, in South Africa, where benefit-defined welfare provision predominates, and income-defined benefits are limited to working people in formal employment.

## **Disaggregating by race**

It is possible that the factors that respondents take into account vary according to the race of the respondent. For example, white respondents might discriminate against African subjects but not coloured subjects. Appendix 5 reports the results of selected probit regressions on the initial assessment of desert, according to the race of the respondent. Among African respondents, neither the characteristics of the respondent nor the characteristics of the beneficiary are significant. Among coloured respondents, being rich increases the probability

that the respondent assesses the subject as deserving. More importantly, most of the characteristics of the beneficiary are significant. The beneficiary is more likely to be considered deserving if he is male or coloured, is married or has children. A beneficiary is less likely to be considered deserving if he or she is older. This perhaps indicates support for a male-breadwinner model (except for the age discrimination) together with some racial prejudice. Among white respondents, the characteristics of the beneficiary are not significant, but some of the characteristics of the respondent are weakly significant.

Appendix 6 reports the results of regressions on the amount awarded, by race of respondent, using only those respondents who considered the recipient deserving in the first place. The dependent variable is the log of the amount awarded, and the data are weighted by gender. Among African and coloured sub-samples, the characteristics of the beneficiary are not significant. Among the white sub-sample, however, they make a big difference. White respondents seem to discriminate against younger beneficiaries, against married beneficiaries and against coloured beneficiaries (weakly). In each sub-sample, different respondent characteristics stand out. Married African respondents, rich or childless coloured respondents, and white men are more generous.

Heckman 2-stage regressions (not shown in the appendices) are not warranted for the African or white sub-samples, because the two equations are not independent of each other. Among the coloured sub-sample, some of the characteristics of the beneficiary other than race are significant in the initial assessment of desert.

Overall, these regressions suggest somewhat different models operating among African, coloured and white sub-samples. Coloured respondents seem to discriminate more in the initial assessment of desert, according to the characteristics of the beneficiary (including race, with coloured respondents discriminating in favour of coloured beneficiaries). White respondents seem to discriminate more in the assessment of the award, i.e. in the size of the grant. There are no discernable patterns among African respondents.

## **Exploring further the construction of desert**

The CAS 2003 survey included two other features that allows for further analysis of what respondents do or might take into account when assessing the desert of subjects in the vignettes. First, the vignettes were followed by a series of attempts to persuade the respondent to change his or her mind, by presenting additional information. Second, various questions were asked which allow an analysis of whether assessments of desert were related to assessments of the

opportunities open to people. A full analysis of these data is not possible here, but some findings can be noted.

Respondents were easily persuaded to change their views on the desert of a subject when faced with counter-arguments. A minority of respondents who initially favoured financial assistance to the retrenched worker changed their minds when told that taxes might have to increase, and a large majority changed their minds when told that people like the subject might spend their money on alcohol. Most respondents who initially opposed financial assistance changed their minds when told that the subject might suffer ill-health or death as a consequence of being poor, or that the subject's children might drop out of school (see Seekings, 2005b).

This mutability of attitudes in the face of additional information is affected by race. In comparison to the regressions run on the initial responses to the vignettes, regressions run on *changing* responses show stronger results. For G.7, coloured respondents are more likely to punish a drinker by changing their mind and opposing financial assistance. For G.8 (but not G.9), African respondents are more likely to change their minds. But most of the characteristics of the beneficiary are statistically significant: the respondent is more likely to change his/her mind if the beneficiary is female, African, older or unmarried, and less likely if the beneficiary is coloured. Overall, the  $r^2$ s for these probits on G.8 and G.9 are 25 percent and 19 percent respectively.

Including data on respondents' attitudes towards the causes of poverty does little to enhance an explanation of how respondents reach decisions on the desert of the subjects in the vignette. Whilst white and coloured respondents do have different views on the causes of poverty to African respondents, these do not seem to explain differences in the assessment of desert. In explaining respondents' willingness to change their views, however, one or other of the factors is significant. When told that the retrenched worker might spend the government grant on drink, respondents are more likely to change their mind and oppose financial assistance if they are generally sceptical about government intervention. In other words, respondents who are generally sceptical about government intervention may sometimes support government assistance to the poor, in this case deserving retrenched workers, but they revert to more general scepticism when prompted by information about welfare recipients spending grants on drink. A respondent is more likely to change his or her mind from opposing to supporting financial assistance to the retrenched worker if he/she thinks society is broadly meritocratic. Put another way, believing that society is meritocratic might not affect whether or not a respondent deems a retrenched worker deserving of government support generally, but does push respondents to a more generous or supportive position when faced with evidence of real need.

Consideration of diverse variables has not resulted in any satisfactory explanation of initial decisions in the vignette, although it has helped to explain subsequent changes of opinion when faced with additional information. It is easy to show that race makes little difference, but it is hard to demonstrate clearly what it is that does make a difference. There is any number of possible reasons for this. One is that the attitudinal data are of poor quality. Contrary to this, factor analysis does point to some credible and explicable clustering of variables. A second reason is that the vignette (as well as some other questions) does not tap into the deeper axes of division over desert. The issues posed in the initial vignette, to be blunt, are just not divisive enough. A follow-up survey, the 2005 Cape Area Study, includes a more complex vignette (see Seekings, Jooste *et al*, 2005). The sample for CAS 2005 is much larger than for CAS 2003, so the result will hopefully be a much richer data-set.

## Conclusion

The data does reject the hypotheses that white respondents will discriminate strongly against African or coloured subjects, and that African or coloured respondents will discriminate in favour of subjects of the same racial group. Most of the analyses suggested that race did not affect the initial assessment of desert; if there was any effect, it was small. In other words, the initial assessment of desert appears to have been largely colour-blind. When assessing the amount that a deserving subject should receive, however, race did matter. White respondents were the most generous, even controlling for class. And, more curiously, respondents in general awarded white subjects awarded the largest grants. White respondents were also less likely to change their opinions when faced with the prospect of tax increases to fund their generous awards. This all provides some support for the hypothesis that the racialisation of privilege has made white South Africans *more* supportive of some forms of redistribution. White South Africans are certainly more generous than conventional portrayals suggest. These findings from the experimental vignettes in the CAS 2003 survey are not dissimilar to Burns' findings using data from field experiments.

There are limits to the generosity of Capetonians, however. Better-off, white respondents were opposed to a basic income grant, and significant minorities of African and coloured respondents were unconvinced. What we cannot tell from the 2003 Cape Area Study is the extent to which this opposition and uncertainty are due to scepticism about undeserving categories of poor, i.e. not everyone deserves a minimum income, and the extent to which it is due to a reluctance to pay higher taxes. The vignettes certainly provide evidence that minorities of

African and coloured people as well as white people considered some unemployed people as undeserving.

Clearly further research is warranted into all of these issues. The analysis of quantitative data from the 2003 Cape Area Study could usefully be supplemented with the findings of qualitative research on these issues, whether through in-depth interviews with individuals or discussion in groups. The kind of research conducted by Hochschild in the USA could be replicated in South Africa. Quantitative analysis could usefully be expanded through consideration of a wider range of scenarios.

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# Appendices

- 1 Bivariate analyses of assessment of desert and sums awarded
- 2 Probit regressions on initial assessment of desert
- 3 Regressions on sums awarded
- 4 Heckman 2-stage regressions on assessment of desert and sums awarded
- 5 Probit regressions on initial assessment of desert, by race of respondent
- 6 Regressions on sums awarded, by race of respondent

## Appendix 1. Perceived desert, by characteristics of ‘beneficiary’ and respondent

		<i>% say yes</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean amount (R)</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Characteristic of retrenched worker</i>						
Gender	Male	59	303	914	695	145
	Female	62	285	953	799	159
Race / population group	White	61	179	1035	768	80
	African	60	229	947	764	129
	Coloured	60	108	836	708	95
Age	20s	56	237	880	783	116
	30s	60	162	864	689	84
	40s	66	189	1056	750	104
Marital status	Married	65	156	1040	797	136
	Not married	57	349	851	702	168
Has children?	Yes	65	303	1031	734	165
	No	56	285	822	757	139
Dependable worker, actively looking for work?	Yes	61	289	935	857	150
	Not specified	60	179	934	630	154
<i>Characteristic of respondent</i>						
Gender	Male	58	230	940	733	113
	Female	63	358	930	734	195
Race / population group	White	64	139	1519	973	56
	African	61	197	685	399	112
	Coloured	59	234	913	750	136
Age	20s	59	140	938	896	74
	30s	59	139	980	673	68
	40s	66	111	780	495	50
Marital status	Married	69	297	935	716	143
	Not married	62	291	934	781	161
Has children?	Yes	61	426	874	682	223
	No	58	161	1093	889	81
Occupational status	Working	60	272	1097	856	133
	Not working					
Income	Rich	62	123	1197	743	48
Education	< grade 7	59	72	704	361	38
	Grades 7 - 9	60	132	763	562	83
	Grades 10 -11	62	131	792	615	73
	Grade 12	60	137	1124	865	59
	> grade 12	59	112	1427	1000	54

Note: mean amount awarded is only if an award was approved, i.e. if >0. Data generated using vignette.do.

## Appendix 2: Probit regression models for assessment of desert

	<i>Model A</i>	<i>Model B</i>	<i>Model C</i>	<i>Model D</i>
<i>Beneficiary characteristics</i>				
Male	0.11 (0.14)		0.12 (0.14)	
African	-0.06 (0.07)		-0.08 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)
Coloured	0.12 (0.12)		0.11 (0.12)	0.04 (0.05)
Aged in 30s	-0.09 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.12)	
Aged in 40s	-0.46 (0.42)		-0.52 (0.40)	
Married	0.31 (0.23)		0.34 (0.23)	
Has children	0.31* (0.19)		0.34 (0.19)	0.10** (0.04)
Dependable worker, looking for work	0.09 (0.06)		0.09 (0.06)	
<i>Respondent socio-demographic characteristics</i>				
Male		-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	
African		0.07 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)
Coloured		-0.10* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)
Married		-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	
Has children		0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	
Working		-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	
Rich		0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	
Neighbourhood income				-6.8e-08 (4.5e-07)
<i>Pairings</i>				
Same race			0.03 (0.05)	
n	541	541	531	506
pseudo r2	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01

Notes: All variables are dummies. Using weighted data. Standard errors reported in brackets. Coefficients are dprobits.

\* Significant at the 0.1 level. \*\* Significant at the 0.05 level. \*\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level

### Appendix 3: Regression models for assessment of award

	<i>Model A</i>	<i>Model B</i>	<i>Model C</i>	<i>Model D</i>
<i>Beneficiary characteristics</i>				
Male	0.12 (0.29)		0.12 (0.27)	
African	-0.20 (0.14)		-0.22 (0.13)	-0.32*** (0.11)
Coloured	-0.08 (0.26)		-0.11 (0.25)	-0.26** (0.12)
Aged in 30s	-0.04 (0.23)		-0.00 (0.22)	
Aged in 40s	-0.43 (0.93)		-0.38 (0.87)	
Married	0.39 (0.57)		0.38 (0.53)	
Has children	0.45 (0.40)		0.38 (0.37)	0.19** (0.10)
Dependable worker, looking for work	0.07 (0.12)		0.04 (0.11)	
<i>Respondent socio-demographic characteristics</i>				
Male		-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	
African		-0.67*** (0.13)	-0.65*** (0.13)	-1.06*** (0.18)
Coloured		-0.50*** (0.11)	-0.50*** (0.12)	-0.92*** (0.15)
Married		0.03 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	
Has children		-0.22** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	
Working		0.21** (0.08)	0.18** (0.08)	
Rich		0.17 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	
Neighbourhood income				2.7e-06*** (9.8e-07)
<i>Pairings</i>				
Same race			0.05 (0.09)	
Constant	6.34*** (0.29)	7.09*** (0.13)	6.87*** (0.31)	7.4*** (0.21)
n	311	311	307	303
r <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.17	0.22	0.37
Adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.15	0.18	0.36

Notes: All variables are dummies. Using weighted and logged data on awards. Standard errors reported in brackets.

\* Significant at the 0.1 level. \*\* Significant at the 0.05 level. \*\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level

## Appendix 4: Heckman 2-stage regressions

```

Heckman selection model                Number of obs    =      526
(regression model with sample selection) Censored obs     =      223
                                         Uncensored obs   =      303

                                         Wald chi2(5)     =     132.69
Log likelihood = -706.9068              Prob > chi2      =      0.0000
  
```

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% Conf. Interval
<u>Amount of award</u>					
Beneficiary is African	-0.45**	0.13	-3.46	0.001	-0.71 to -0.20
Beneficiary is coloured	-0.48***	0.14	-3.49	0.000	-0.76 to -0.21
Respondent is african	-1.20***	0.20	-6.12	0.000	-1.58 to -0.81
Respondent is coloured	-0.99***	0.17	-5.94	0.000	-1.32 to -0.67
Respondent's neighbourhood income	3.02e-06**	9.77e-07	3.10	0.002	1.11e-06 to 4.94e-06
Constant	8.24***	0.24	34.35	0.000	7.7 to 8.7
<u>Initial assessment of desert</u>					
Beneficiary is African	0.28**	0.13	2.15	0.032	0.03 to 0.54
Beneficiary is coloured	0.36**	0.14	2.52	0.012	0.08 to 0.64
Beneficiary has children	0.21**	0.10	2.08	0.038	0.01 to 0.41
Respondent is African	0.09	0.17	-0.56	0.578	-0.42 to 0.23
Respondent is coloured	-0.10	0.15	-0.65	0.513	-0.39 to 0.20
Constant	-0.06	0.16	-0.38	0.701	-0.39 to 0.26
/athrho	-1.23	0.25	-4.84	0.000	-1.73 to -0.73
/lnsigma	0.02	0.08	0.28	0.782	-0.14 to 0.19
rho	-0.84	0.07			-0.94 to -0.63
sigma	1.02	0.09			-0.86 to 1.20
lambda	-0.86	0.14			-1.14 to -0.58

```

LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) = 6.84   Prob > chi2 = 0.0089
  
```

## Appendix 5. Probit regression models for assessment of desert, by race

	<i>African Respondents</i>	<i>Coloured respondents</i>	<i>White respondents</i>
<i>Beneficiary characteristics</i>			
Male	-0.10 (0.24)	0.45** (0.20)	-0.23 (0.25)
African	0.01 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.12)
Coloured	-0.10 (0.21)	0.39** (0.15)	-0.17 (0.29)
Aged in 30s	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.25)
Aged in 40s	0.23 (0.60)	-0.95** (0.09)	0.15 (0.81)
Married	-0.13 (0.47)	0.77** (0.19)	-0.00 (0.58)
Has children	-0.10 (0.34)	0.74*** (0.19)	-0.09 (0.38)
Dependable worker, looking for work	0.02 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)
<i>Respondent socio-demographic characteristics</i>			
Male	0.08 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.08)
Married	0.07 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.09)
Has children	-0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.09)	0.08 (0.12)
Working	-0.06 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.08)
Rich	0.18 (0.14)	0.22** (0.09)	-0.16* (0.08)
n	184	217	124
pseudo r2	0.02	0.10	0.13

Notes: All variables are dummies. Using weighted data. Standard errors reported in brackets. Coefficients are dprobits.  
 \* Significant at the 0.1 level. \*\* Significant at the 0.05 level. \*\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level



## Appendix 6: Regression models for assessment of award, by race

	<i>African Respondents</i>	<i>Coloured respondents</i>	<i>White respondents</i>
<i>Beneficiary characteristics</i>			
Male	0.10 (0.37)	0.17 (0.43)	-1.18 (0.84)
African	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.32 (0.21)	0.18 (0.33)
Coloured	-0.06 (0.33)	0.03 (0.38)	-1.37* (0.75)
Aged in 30s	-0.03 (0.29)	-0.16 (0.35)	1.86*** (0.66)
Aged in 40s	-0.21 (1.17)	-0.93 (1.42)	4.60* (2.44)
Married	-0.10 (0.71)	1.01 (0.87)	-3.11** (1.53)
Has children	0.30 (0.51)	0.47 (0.61)	-0.54 (0.98)
Dependable worker, looking for work	-0.14 (0.16)	0.15 (0.17)	0.25 (0.30)
<i>Respondent socio-demographic characteristics</i>			
Male	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.48** (0.23)
Married	0.29** (0.14)	0.02 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.24)
Has children	-0.20 (0.13)	-0.29* (0.17)	-0.28 (0.25)
Working	0.09 (0.12)	0.16 (0.13)	0.00 (0.24)
Rich	0.08 (0.27)	0.36* (0.19)	0.05 (0.22)
Constant	6.47*** (0.39)	6.24*** (0.44)	7.61*** (0.89)
n	112	138	57
r <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.18	0.42
Adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.09	0.24

Notes: All variables are dummies. Using weighted and logged data on awards. Standard errors reported in brackets.

\* Significant at the 0.1 level. \*\* Significant at the 0.05 level. \*\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level

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The **Social Surveys Unit** (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the methodology, ethics and results of South African social science research. Our core activities include the overlapping Cape Area Study and Cape Area Panel Study. The Cape Area Study comprises a series of surveys of social, economic and political aspects of life in Cape Town. The Cape Area Panel Study is an ongoing study of 4800 young adults in Cape Town as they move from school into the worlds of work, unemployment, adulthood and parenthood.

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