

THE TYRANNIES IN THE GREEK CITIES OF SICILY: 505-466 BC

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the tyrants that ruled Gela and Syracuse during the early fifth century BC. It will approach the subject in a thematic manner, considering several aspects of the tyrants' rule which warrant particular attention.

The first chapter will be concerned with our sources of information on the subject, with particular focus on the *Bibliotheke* of Diodorus Siculus. Being our main source of information, it is crucial that we understand Diodorus' work, especially since it has provoked much criticism in modern scholarship.

Chapter two will be concerned with the tyrants' foreign policy, in particular we will examine the tyrants' relationship with other Greeks in Sicily and Southern Italy, and then their brief encounter with the Carthaginians.

Chapter three is concerned with the tyrants' recruitment of mercenaries, an important subject given the militaristic nature of the tyranny, as well as a dominant theme in Classical Sicilian history.

Next, the unusual subject of the 'refounding' of already existing cities will be discussed. A phenomenon peculiar to Sicily, the four case studies give many clues regarding the nature of the tyranny in general.

The way in which the tyrants, particularly Hieron, were presented to the rest of the Greek world, and to their own citizens, will be discussed next, considering evidence provided by the tyrants themselves as well as others.

Finally, the impact of the tyranny on Sicily during the next century will be considered, with emphasis on the subjects already discussed in previous chapters, in order to conclude on the importance of the tyrants of Sicily in antiquity.

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|------------------|--|
| <i>AJA</i> | American Journal of Archaeology |
| <i>AJP</i> | American Journal of Philology |
| <i>ArchClass</i> | Archeologia Classica |
| <i>ASAA</i> | Annuario della scuola archeologica di Atene e delle missioni Italiane in Oriente |
| <i>BCH</i> | Bulletin du correspondance hellénique |
| <i>BICS</i> | Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies |
| <i>CAH</i> | Cambridge Ancient History |
| <i>CHA</i> | Cambridge History of Africa |
| <i>CP</i> | Classical Philology |
| <i>CQ</i> | Classical Quarterly |
| <i>GNS</i> | Schweizer Münzblätter |
| <i>HSCPh</i> | Harvard Studies in Classical Philology |
| <i>JDAI</i> | Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts |
| <i>JHS</i> | Journal of Hellenic Studies |
| <i>JRS</i> | Journal of Roman Studies |
| <i>MEFRA</i> | Melanges de l'Ecole française de Rome |
| <i>MonAL</i> | Monumenti Antichi pubblicati a cura dell'Accademia dei Lincei |
| <i>RE</i> | Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft |
| <i>REA</i> | Revue des etudes anciennes |
| <i>RA</i> | Revue Archéologique |
| <i>RhMus</i> | Rheinisches Museum für Philologie |
| <i>RSI</i> | Rivista Storica Italiana |
| <i>SCI</i> | Scripta Classica Israelica |
| <i>SNR</i> | Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau |
| <i>WS</i> | Wiener Studien |

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine two dynasties of tyrants, the Pantarids and the Deinomenids, who ruled in the Sicilian cities of Gela and Syracuse between 505 and 466 BC. The period of concern to us is, of course, one of great significance in the wider context of Greek history, even of the history of the Western world as a whole, with the Persians' failed attempts at subjugating Greece in 490 and 480-79 having a pivotal role not only in preserving Greek freedom but also in aiding its cultural, intellectual and political development, most notably in Athens. It is for this reason that the subject of Sicily during this time is usually treated as a peripheral matter, even though this is one of the most critical periods in that region's history. Although there were cases of tyranny in Sicily before 505, it is only at this point, at the end of the Archaic period, when tyrants in Sicily start making an impact on the Greek historical record such as other tyrants had done before, for example Peisistratos in Athens, and the Cypselids at Corinth. Tyranny was certainly not an unknown phenomenon in Sicily; both Panaetius of Leontini and the infamous Phalaris of Acragas ruled their cities in the seventh and sixth centuries respectively¹, and sixty years following the fall of the Deinomenids, in 406 BC, Dionysius took control of Syracuse and held power there for 39 years, his son ruling for a further ten until 357².

Despite the fact that the phase of tyranny in the early fifth century occurred at a time of great importance, that they reigned for a long time and had a huge influence on the island of Sicily for a long time even after their downfall, and that there is a healthy amount of coverage of their reigns in the surviving ancient sources, there seems to be only a small amount of scholarly interest in this subject. This is especially the case when it comes to scholarship in the English language. General works on Sicilian history include Moses Finley's *Ancient Sicily* and Woodhead's *The Greek Cities of the West*, but by far the best known study of this period is T.J. Dunbabin's *The Western Greeks*, which covers the history of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily from the beginnings down to 480 BC. However, this does not consider the reigns of Hieron and Thrasybulus, who reigned after the cut-off point of the book, leaving several important

¹ Panaetius and Phalaris – *Ar. Pol.* 1310b; for Phalaris also see Pind. *Pyth.* 1.95-8, where we hear of the bronze bull in which the tyrant's enemies were placed and roasted alive.

² For more on fourth century Sicily, see the final chapter, 205ff.

issues such as propaganda and the foundation of Aetna untouched. Dunbabin's work, published in 1948, is also very dated in parts, especially in regard to the many excavations that have taken place since. Anthony Andrewes' *The Greek Tyrants* does of course cover the whole period, but with such a small amount of space one is only given a general impression of the two dynasties, and even this coverage is shared with that of Dionysius and his successors. Aside from these, and more extensive general works such as the *Cambridge Ancient History*, in which David Asheri deals with the subject of Sicily for this period, one is left only with more specialised studies on tyranny such as James McGlew's *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*, although this does not necessarily mean the Sicilian tyrants get equal coverage with others. Nino Luraghi's study *Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia...* is the only publication wholly devoted to the tyrants of Sicily from the earliest times, and is relatively recent, but of course this would present problems to anyone interested in the subject but without a knowledge of Italian, and similar problems could be encountered with Berve's *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* and Mossé's *La tyrannie dans la Grèce antique*. There is, without a doubt, a need for a study of the Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants in the English language, and this thesis aims to fill that gap, which does not seem to exist for any other major dynasty of tyrants in Greece³.

Outline of the Thesis

During the course of this thesis we will examine the most important features of the rule of the tyrants in Gela and Syracuse, with the broad aim of understanding the nature of the two dynasties in comparison with those in mainland Greece in the Archaic age, as well as with those that followed, particularly Dionysius I. This will be a thematic study rather than a narrative of this time in Sicily. The reasons for this are mainly that there is limited space in this thesis and it is therefore preferable to select several important aspects of the tyrannies: foreign policy, mercenary use, city refoundation and propaganda, rather than taking a chronological

³ For example, Dionysius has been largely covered by Caven (1990); the Cypselids of Corinth in Salmon (1984); Polycrates of Samos in Shipley (1987); Theagenes of Megara in Legon (1981); the Peisistratids of Athens in Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) and Lavelle (2004); The Orthagorids of Sicyon in Griffin (1982); The Pheraean tyrants in Westlake (1935); and Pheidon of Argos in Kelly (1976) and Tomlinson (1972).

viewpoint in which the things that make the tyrants interesting and unusual may be lost in the narrative and left without being fully discussed. I have also chosen to focus on the Pantarid and Deinomenid dynasties alone, rather than on all the dynasties in the region at this time, so in particular the Emmenids of Acragas and Anaxilaid of Rhegium will not be major subjects of discussion, except in cases where they are closely involved in Pantarid/Deinomenid affairs, such as in the foreign policy chapter, or to provide further, contemporary, case studies that are important to put Pantarid/Deinomenid activity into context, particularly in the chapter on city refoundations. The reason for this omission is, again, due to the limits allowed for this thesis.

The first chapter will look closely into the main problem encountered when studying ancient Sicilian history, our sources of information. In looking at the history of Sicily during the early fifth century BC, we often find that we are mostly dependent on information found in the *Bibliothèque* of Diodorus Siculus. The first obstacle to overcome when using Diodorus is not in fact the text itself, but rather the attitudes towards the *Bibliothèque* that we encounter in modern scholarship, which all too often have a disproportionate effect on how we ourselves view the work, particularly on the subject of Diodorus' sources. In order to tackle this problem, the first part of this chapter will focus on clarifying the different attitudes towards Diodorus' work, so that we can identify the different reasons for them, and pick up on any serious flaws in their arguments (particularly in their methodology) later on. It is also important to note that although attitudes towards the *Bibliothèque* have developed and changed radically over the years, old suspicions still remain and Diodorus is still approached with a degree of mistrust and cynicism.

Before we look at the main problem of sources present in the *Bibliothèque*, the aims and objectives of Diodorus in writing his work are to be discussed, so as to introduce the work more fully and put criticisms of his work into context. This section will also help us in our main objective for this chapter, to see how far Diodorus' influence has coloured our own views of the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse. Since Diodorus is our most important source by some distance, it is naturally difficult to work out how much of what he tells us is accurate. Of course, tyranny can be an emotive subject for some writers, particularly if they have had personal experience of

it, but in the case of Diodorus there is an additional problem in that his views would no doubt be coloured by both contemporary (first century BC) ideas, and those of his sources.

A large proportion of the first chapter will then be dedicated to discussion of Diodorus' sources, and this is a clear sign of how much this subject has dominated the study of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* over the years. The main sources of concern to us here are Ephorus and Timaeus, and at this point each will be discussed to provide background information, such as evidence of bias in their texts, aims in writing, writing style and structure, their likely original contribution to the subject of the tyrants in Sicily, and modern scholarship on their work. This information will best equip us for dealing with the main problems at hand, Diodorus' own approach to using his sources, the extent to which he included their work in the *Bibliothēke*, and of course assessing his own personal input into his work. These matters have proved to be difficult to deal with in the past, the main problem being that only fragments of the works of Ephorus and Timaeus have survived to us. Here, efforts have been made to clarify the different positions held by scholars on how Diodorus employed his sources in writing the *Bibliothēke*, with the aim of answering the most important question of how much Diodorus himself is responsible for the presentation of the Sicilian tyrants in his own work.

The final section of the first chapter will examine the input of our other sources, most notably Herodotus, Thucydides and Pindar. The subject of sources is not of as much concern to us in these cases, especially in the case of Pindar who was a contemporary of the tyrants, and even had first-hand contact with Hieron himself. Regarding Herodotus and Thucydides, the focus is mainly on their concern for Western matters, and in the case of Herodotus, the important issue of his attitude towards tyranny, which has been the subject of much debate, and how much he let such prejudices (if any) affect his work.

Chapter two begins the main study of the tyrants themselves, and here we examine their approach to foreign policy, firstly concerning their relations with other Greeks, then with the Carthaginians. To start off, we will look at the issue of the straits of Messina, in particular the various struggles to control it. With the straits being so crucially important to trade between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, this forms probably the longest standing problem in the period of concern to us, and would naturally be a high priority target for any expansion-

minded tyrant. This section also introduces the subject of how the tyrants Hippocrates, Gelon and Hieron dealt with other tyrants in the region, in this case Anaxilas.

The theme of inter-tyrant relations is continued in the next section when we explore the alliance between the Deinomenid tyrants and those of Acragas, Theron and Thrasydaeus. This subject is particularly important for two reasons: firstly, because Theron was the primary ally of the Deinomenids, and secondly because it was this friendship with Theron that had caught Gelon up in the Himera campaign of 480, probably the most significant event of this era in the West. We will also see how this special alliance was challenged by the succession of Thrasydaeus to the tyranny in Acragas, and how it was so important to the continuance of tyranny in Syracuse.

Next, we move on to Hieron and his own particular concerns for the Greek cities in Italy, namely, his intervention in Sybaris in 476, and, more significantly, the battle at Cumae in 474, which both provided the tyrant with much needed military triumphs. However, we will also find evidence that Hieron had interests in the region beyond gaining token successes in battle, and the Italian theme is continued with an examination of his own policy towards the problem of the Messina straits. There are two events of note here, an earlier event, the refoundation of Catana as Aetna in 476, and the death of Anaxilas of Rhegium in 472, in which Hieron's approach to the Anaxilaid successors seems to signify a rather unexpected change of tack.

The focus switches for the second half of the chapter towards one particular episode in which Gelon clashes with a foreign force, the Carthaginians, at Himera in 480 BC. This is an event of huge significance, probably more than any event in the West up until the Athenians' doomed expedition to Syracuse in 415. During the course of this section, we will first examine the background to the conflict, starting with the relations between the Carthaginians and Greeks up until 480. This is so that we can put the Himera campaign into the context of any wider concerns that may have developed tensions between Carthage and the Western Greeks in general.

Finally, we come to the conflict itself, and here we will examine in particular the dating of the war, which will have all sorts of implications as we will find, including the causes of the

war, which is the next and the most important focus of discussion in this section. These will have a profound effect on how we should view the Himera campaign as a whole, as well as how we should view Gelon himself. The traditional view of the conflict, mainly imposed on us by the views of Pindar and Diodorus, is that it was equal in importance to the Persians' attempt to subjugate Greece under Xerxes. The aim of this section is straightforward, to test whether this view of the Himera campaign is an accurate one.

The third chapter will involve a shift of focus from the tyrants' policy regarding foreigners, towards the actual execution of that policy through military action. In particular, we will look into one of the main features that made the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse unusual and even innovative, the employment of mercenaries as a considerable section of their armed force. It is true that tyrants before the fifth century sometimes employed mercenaries and/or bodyguards, such as Peisistratos, and these other tyrants will be considered at length before the main discussion on the Sicilians, but what makes the Sicilian tyrants more unusual is their dependence on mercenaries for most of this period. Large scale recruitment did not otherwise take place until the fourth century, when there were specific circumstances which made soldiers want to become mercenaries, and made rulers need to recruit them. This chapter will discuss the reasons why the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse recruited mercenaries in large numbers long before anyone else.

This chapter will deal with Hippocrates, Gelon, Hieron and Thrasybulus in turn, and naturally this involves some discussion of their military exploits, particularly in the case of Hippocrates. These will be dealt with at length, as it is important to put the recruitment of mercenaries into their correct context, and we notice this immediately when considering the use of Camarinaean forces by Hippocrates, as well as his use of a bodyguard, and the reasons behind the change from using citizen troops to non-citizens. The use of mercenaries becomes more important under the reign of Gelon, and it is at this time that the reasons behind the tyrants' sustained use of mercenaries become far clearer. As it turns out, the reasons that we will discover tell us an immense amount about the fundamental differences between the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, and their earlier counterparts in Greece itself. Under Gelon, we also

discover for the first time a fair amount of information regarding the numbers of mercenaries employed, as well as Gelon's idea of settling mercenaries as a means of payment.

Discussion of Hieron's use of mercenaries is dominated by the policy of evacuating the city of Catana, resettling it and renaming it as Aetna, as it is very likely that Hieron had adopted Gelon's policy of settling mercenaries as payment. This will recur as a major event throughout the remainder of this thesis, such are its many implications, but some additional issues more immediately relevant to this chapter will be discussed here, most notably the numerous clues regarding the origin of the mercenaries themselves, as well as the first signs of discontent regarding the policy of settling mercenaries and making them citizens. This discontent, which had probably started under Gelon's reign, was a great contributor towards the ultimate end of the Deinomenid dynasty during the 460's, and its effects were to linger in Sicily for decades afterwards. The final years of the dynasty are also to be discussed in this chapter, as Deinomenid dependence on mercenary troops had reached its zenith under the reign of Thrasybulus, the last Deinomenid tyrant of Syracuse. This is an important time for the study of the tyrants in many ways, most notably in that it was impossible for a tyrant to maintain power when there was mutual distrust, even utter hatred, between himself and his subjects, even with huge and loyal mercenary armies at his command.

Understanding the tyrants' dependence on mercenaries is itself crucial to understanding another, even more unusual phenomenon that existed under the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, the 'refoundation' of already existing cities, which is the subject of the fourth chapter. There are four examples in Sicily during this period that require closer examination, at Camarina, Zancle, Catana and Himera. I do not think that there is a case to be made for naming Gelon's settlement of mercenaries, together with Megarians and Geloans, in Syracuse as a refoundation, as there is clearly no attempt to show Syracuse as a 'different' city in our sources, although of course there was a huge population shift to the city.

The chapter will start with a survey of colonial enterprises throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, so that it will be possible to make comparisons, for example, with the role of the founder in colonial myth, and also city foundation under the command of tyrants. The first example of refoundation in Sicily occurs in Camarina, around 492/1 BC, under Hippocrates.

Fully understanding this case can only be done when the history of Camarina is taken into account, as this produces clues regarding what really happened in 492/1. Hippocrates' motives in settling for Camarina instead of Syracuse are also discussed, as are those behind the actual refoundation itself. The actual changes that were made in the city also need close attention, particularly on the subject of who was actually settled in Camarina. The most important question, however, is quite simply whether Camarina can be regarded as a different city after it was refounded. Is 'refoundation' even an accurate term in this case?

The second example looks at the changes that took place in Zancle, particularly at the time of the Samians' expulsion from the city around 490/89, when Zancle was resettled and renamed Messana by the tyrant Anaxilas of Rhegium. Again, the history behind these events is crucial to our understanding of them, and once again it is dominated by the issue of controlling the straits of Messina that separated the cities of Zancle and Rhegium. The drifting apart of the two cities during the late Archaic period was complicated by the appearance of both Hippocrates, who briefly held Messana in the mid-490's, and the Samians who took over in 494. Once Anaxilas had the Samians removed from Zancle, he repopulated it with settlers from Messenia and renamed it Messene (later Messana). The main section of this discussion will therefore determine how different Messana was from its days as Zancle, and consider outstanding issues such as Anaxilas' own intentions for the city (did he really mean to refound it as a different city?) and the fate of the Zancleans themselves who had been caught at the centre of the whole episode.

Thirdly, by far the best known case of refoundation will be discussed, Hieron's removal of the people of Catana to Leontini, his replacing them with 10,000 new settlers, and the renaming of the city as Aetna, in 476 BC. This episode is of course best known for its celebration in epinician poetry, particularly Pindar's first Pythian Ode, but that will be discussed as propaganda in the following chapter. Here, as with the other examples, the focus will be on Hieron's reasons for the whole enterprise, the question of the degree to which the city differed from its pre-refoundation state, and of course who actually settled it. This example of refoundation also gives us more opportunity to find out how much the *oikist* actually conformed to the norms of city-foundation, for example his role in choosing the

settlers themselves, and also the survival of a founder-cult in Aetna itself. Uniquely in the cases of refoundation, we even have evidence for a constitutional monarchy existing in the new city. Also to be examined in this section is the effect which this episode had on the nearby city of Naxos, which according to Diodorus was also depopulated at the same time as Catana, and this apparently minor detail will turn out have an effect on what we could possibly deduce about Hieron's reasons for the foundation of Aetna. Finally, the subject of 'Doricisation' will be the subject of study, as it is a clear theme in Pindar that has had a great effect on how the episode as a whole has been viewed.

Lastly in this chapter we will look at the comparatively minor case of Theron of Acragas' refoundation of Himera, also in 476. This has often been assumed to be a copycat action of Hieron's activity in Catana, especially because Diodorus mentions it immediately after his description of Aetna's foundation. Nevertheless, we will find that Theron had very clear reasons for taking action in Himera, reasons that are very different to those of Hieron. Two major events that had taken place in Himera in the immediate past, the revolt against Thrasydaeus and of course the Carthaginian invasion, had left such an impact on the city that it was left vulnerable to further misfortune, and needed to be reinforced.

As has been said above, the next chapter in the thesis will be concerned with the propaganda produced during the rule of the tyrants, both by poets and by the tyrants themselves. The aim of this chapter is mainly to bring together all the various ways in which the tyrants were presented in that time, with particular interest in how the Deinomenids legitimised their own rule.

Although Pindar is the best known example of a poet being patronised by Hieron, others were also present at times during his reign, most notably Bacchylides, Simonides and even the tragedian Aeschylus. We will examine the commissioning of poets by Hieron himself, in order to make comparisons with other examples of tyrant commissioners from earlier in Greek history, for example in Athens and Samos. However, these poets seem to be used simply for private enjoyment, whereas the employment of Pindar, whose work was very public, obviously had differing aims. Next we will look at the poems of Pindar himself, in order to find out how he seemed fit to celebrate Hieron's rule.

Of the techniques used by Pindar in writing his odes to Hieron, the most important and clear attempts to legitimise his rule seems to come in the form of allusions to kingship, particularly Homeric kingship. The aim appears quite obvious, to disguise the simple fact that Hieron was a tyrant by attributing to him certain attributes only found in kings. For example, in the first Olympian Ode, Hieron is found holding a sceptre awarded to him by Zeus himself. Naturally, if Hieron's reign is divinely backed, as Pindar makes quite clear in this ode, then his reign is perfectly justifiable.

Pindar's odes are of course performed in the context of a victory at a Panhellenic games, and while the first section was mainly concerned with Hieron's wishes to justify his rule to his own subjects in Sicily, it was important also to ingratiate himself with the wider Greek world, in particular the so-called 'Panhellenic elite'. The odes themselves would have been performed at the sanctuary itself, as well as at the victor's home town on his arrival back from the games, but it is true that Hieron would have made strides towards recognition across the Greek world by being a victor in the first place. The positive outcomes of being a Panhellenic victor will therefore also be discussed here in this section.

As we move on to how the tyrants presented themselves towards the Greek world as a whole, we find that Pindar was also used for this very purpose, not only used to justify the tyranny to the Sicilians themselves. In particular, there is one passage where Hieron is likened to the king Croesus of Lydia, and contrasted to the tyrant Phalaris of Acragas, and while this can again be said to distance Hieron from tyranny, the passage can also be seen as an attempt to bridge the gulf between the tyrant and the Panhellenic elite.

The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the use of titles, perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the tyrants' presentation to the Greek world, and of course to their subjects. The first section will focus on the question of whether the tyrants officially had a title, such as *basileus* or *tyrannos*, and naturally this question is potentially of great importance as it can tell us much about contemporary attitudes to tyranny, which has been a matter of some debate. In order to find out, we will examine our literary sources such as Diodorus, Herodotus and Pindar, but as we shall find, this is complicated by the nature of our sources themselves. Other questions that will be explored here involve events soon after the Himera campaign

according to Diodorus; in particular, was Gelon really made *basileus* of Syracuse following his success, and what about the other honorific titles *euergetes* and *soter* attributed to him? Finally, the subject of dedications will be discussed, aiming to shed more light on the question of titular use. There are two main types of dedication, military and non-military (in the latter cases, the result of Panhellenic victories), but both are intended for Panhellenic audiences. The main question here is whether the Deinomenids went one step further than Pindar and actually proclaimed themselves king to the Greek world, or whether they deliberately avoided the use of titles in their dedications, as seems to be the norm in other Greek cities.

The final chapter will consider how influential the tyrants were in Sicily during the century that followed their downfall. This will be done by considering four different themes that have been thought likely to have been due to the tyrants' legacy.

The first of these will be the political situation at Syracuse immediately following the events of 466. Of course, the first priority for the Syracusans was to regain their city, both politically speaking, in that new institutions would have been established, and also in the sense that Syracuse had been settled with outsiders during the reign of Gelon. Here we will consider how the Syracusans dealt with both of these problems, and whether the tyrants' influence remained even despite the city's efforts to be rid of it. One of the biggest questions in this section will be how far the Syracusans went down the democratic route, and in particular, how much power was maintained by the *Gamoroi*. The position of the *Gamoroi* under the Deinomenids was a privileged one indeed, but they could also realistically claim much credit for bringing about the downfall of Thrasybulus, so we will therefore need to find out whether these points had an impact on the introduction of democracy. Also to be considered is the question of whether Syracuse tried to directly copy the Athenian system, as seems to be the case with the introduction of *petalism* in particular, and also to consider why the democracy in Syracuse essentially failed.

Following this, we will study the impact of the battle of Himera on the Carthaginians during the fifth century BC. The common perception is that Carthage focused solely on internal affairs following their embarrassment in Sicily, at least up until their reappearance on the island much later on, and this is entirely due to the comments made by Diodorus in his

account. This section will challenge this idea by examining the evidence for Carthaginian activity during the remainder of the century, and in particular focus will be on this age as perhaps the most significant era of exploration in antiquity. In addition, of course, there will be some focus on Carthaginian relations with the Greek cities of Sicily, and also on the question of how much of an impact the defeat at Himera actually had on Carthage.

The next section will consider the role played by mercenaries, particularly during the reign of Dionysius. The focus here will not only be on the dependence shown by this tyrant on hired troops, but also on tackling the question of why this is the case. Circumstances had indeed changed by the fourth century, with mercenaries becoming more readily available than they would have been during the reign of the Deinomenids, but were there any other factors which may be attributable to the earlier tyrants? Were there any parallels in the problems faced by Dionysius to those of the Deinomenids? Was the recruitment of mercenaries just standard practice in Sicily, even during the period between the Deinomenids and Dionysius?

Finally, we will look at the ways in which the Dionysian tyrants presented themselves to the world, with particular focus on the use of titles. This subject has created a good degree of debate, with greater evidence for titular use by Dionysius than for the Deinomenids. Of course, there have also been attempts to show that Dionysius also preferred to be called *basileus*. However, we shall find that the Deinomenids, especially Gelon, did have influence in this matter in a far more straightforward way, and can be seen even with the most superficial readings of the history of fourth century Sicily.

Stemmata




Figure 1 – Stemmata of the Sicilian Tyrants - Rhodes (2006) 75.

TIMELINE

c.505 – Cleandrus, son of Pantares, becomes tyrant of Gela, city wall built.

c.498 – Cleandrus murdered by Sabyllus, his younger brother Hippocrates inherits the tyranny.

498-4 – Hippocrates' campaigns in Sicily, in which Callipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zancle are annexed; The site at Serra Orlando is destroyed, but Morgantina is unscathed, probably submitting to Hippocrates.

c.495 – Ionians who are fleeing the Persians are invited to settle Cale Acte on the Northern coast of Sicily; The Samians take up the offer, but are intercepted by Anaxilas of Rhegium, who persuades them to settle in Zancle.

494 – Samians arrive at Zancle. Scythes, tyrant of Zancle is removed.

492 – Hippocrates' army defeats the Syracusans at the Battle of the Helorus River; Intervention by Corinth and Corcyra persuades Hippocrates not to take control of Syracuse, Camarina is ceded to the tyrant.

492/1 – Camarina refounded by Hippocrates.

491 – Hippocrates' campaigns continue into Sikel territory, attacking Ergetium and Hybla, where he dies. Hippocrates is succeeded by his sons Eucleides and Cleandrus, and together with the cavalry commander Gelon they defeat a popular uprising. Following this victory Gelon in turn seizes power from Hippocrates' sons to become tyrant of Gela. Start of the Deinomenid dynasty, in place of the Pantarids.

490/89 – Theron comes to power in Acragas.

489 – Anaxilas expels the Samians from Zancle, taking control himself. Zancle is resettled with Messenian immigrants, and renamed Messene (later Messana).

488 – Gelon wins the chariot race at Olympia.

485 – *Gamoroi* expelled from Syracuse, but on appeal to Gelon they are returned to the city; Gelon takes advantage of *stasis* in Syracuse to take control.

- Megara Hyblaea annexed by Gelon.

c.485-2 – Glaucus of Carystus made tyrant of Camarina.

- Camarina and Gela partly depopulated, with half the population of each city being relocated to Syracuse.
- c.483 – Aristocracies of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea are removed and settled in Syracuse, with the *demos* of both cities sold into slavery.
- c.482 – Terillus, tyrant of Himera, is expelled by Theron of Acragas; Terillus flees to his allies in Carthage, who start preparing to invade Sicily and reinstate Terillus.
- c.481 – Greek embassy to Gelon.
- 480 – The Carthaginians, led by Hamilcar, invade Sicily, landing at Himera; Theron, who is already at Himera, requests help from Gelon; Gelon arrives and tricks the Carthaginians into letting Syracusan soldiers into their camp, leading to a massacre, Hamilcar kills himself; Gelon pronounced *basileus* of Syracuse by an assembly of soldiers; Carthage agree to lopsided terms with Syracuse for peace.
- Anaxilas of Rhegium wins the mule-cart race at Olympia.
- 478 – Gelon dies, and is succeeded by his younger brother Hieron; Gelon is accorded heroic rites.
- 478 or 474 – Polyzelus wins the chariot race at Delphi; the Charioteer statue dedicated at Delphi as a result.
- 476 – Anaxilas of Rhegium dies, succeeded by his sons and their guardian, Micythus; Hieron builds relations with the Anaxilaidas.
- Hieron sends his younger brother Polyzelus on a campaign against Croton, to assist Sybaris; Polyzelus goes to Theron of Acragas to seek protection from Hieron; war between Syracuse and Acragas narrowly avoided through intervention of the poet Simonides; Polyzelus restored as tyrant of Gela.
- The citizens of Himera ask Hieron to help them remove their tyrant Thrasydaeus, son of Theron; Hieron betrays the Himeraeans' trust and tells Theron of their plans, leading to the execution of Himera's leading citizens.
- Catana refounded as Aetna by Hieron; the population of Catana and Naxos are moved to Leontini; 10,000 Peloponnesians and Syracusans settle in the new city.
- Himera refounded by Theron of Acragas.

474 – Hieron wins at the Pythia.

- Hieron's fleet victorious against the Etruscans at Cumae.

473 – Rhegium helps Tarentum against the Iapygians; Rhegium itself is invaded and occupied by the Iapygians.

472 – Theron of Acragas dies, succeeded by his son Thrasydaeus, tyrant of Himera.

- Thrasydaeus prepares for war against Syracuse, but Hieron in anticipating this marches on Acragas first, winning convincingly; Thrasydaeus is deposed and exiled to Megara, where he is then executed; end of the Emmenid dynasty and beginnings of democracy at Acragas, leaving Hieron and Micythus as the only tyrants remaining in the region.

471 – Hieron summons the Anaxilaid successors to Syracuse, to discuss the future course of the dynasty.

470 – Hieron wins the chariot race at Delphi, inspiring Pindar's first Pythian Ode.

467 – Micythus is honourably discharged from the guardianship of the young Anaxilaid.

- Hieron dies at Aetna, and is accorded heroic rites, as *oikist*; Hieron is succeeded by his younger brother Thrasybulus; Popular revolt against Thrasybulus' misrule at Syracuse.

466 – Thrasybulus allowed to go into voluntary exile in Locri. End of the Deinomenid dynasty.

461 – Anaxilaid expelled from Rhegium.

- Camarina resettled; The Aetnaeans are expelled from Catana and move to Inessa; the Catanaeans reclaim their city.




Figure 2 – Map of Sicily – Brock and Hodkinson (2000) 170.




Figure 3 – Physical Map of Sicily – From the Classical Association Wall Map of Roman Italy.




Figure 4 – Map of the Western Mediterranean – LaFleur (2001).

CHAPTER ONE

SOURCES FOR THE SICILIAN TYRANTS

To anyone undertaking a study of the tyrants in Sicily, or indeed any Sicilian history down to the Punic Wars, it becomes abundantly clear that the problem of literary sources is of the greatest concern, perhaps more so than for the study of the history of Greece proper during this period, and certainly more so than for later antiquity. Although many of the sources we have for early Sicilian history are much the same as what we find for the Greek mainland in the late Archaic period, (for example Herodotus is of great importance) these are naturally more focussed on the Eastern Mediterranean, and we only get comparatively brief, though extremely valuable, episodes of Western history. Sadly, any *Histories* that were written with Western Greece as their main focus, such as those by Timaeus and Philistus, are lost, aside from fragments that have survived from other, later authors¹. Occasionally we find a reference to this period in other works, particularly the *Politics* of Aristotle, which often discusses tyranny as a form of government, or also in the form of other writings such as the *Strategemata* of Polyaeus or the *Varia Historia* of Aelian, which may be considered less reliable because of their much later composition, their style of writing and also their own personal agendas. The *Odes* of Pindar and Bacchylides are of use, particularly for the study of how these tyrants wanted to be seen by others and to legitimise their rule, and even for learning about events during the tyrants' reign, although much of the detail again may prove to be unreliable due to its purpose of glorification of a victor. Pindar's contribution will be considered more fully in the chapter on Deinomenid propaganda. Also of great use are the *scholia*, comments found on the various manuscripts alongside the main body of the text. The *scholia* are almost always anonymous and therefore it is often difficult to judge their worth, indeed some examples can prove to be inaccurate, misleading or even nonsensical. However, the *scholia* for Pindar in particular prove to be particularly valuable and seem to be of a high quality, and these are sometimes useful for the purposes of this thesis.

¹ Other than Diodorus himself, the most noteworthy example of this is Polybius, whose twelfth book seems almost entirely dedicated to criticising Timaeus personally as well as methodologically, which may well have an effect on how accurately Timaeus' work has been preserved, see below 40ff.

While these sources, particularly Herodotus and Pindar, often contribute much to our knowledge of the tyrants in Sicily, another major source, Diodorus Siculus, can often be found to be more useful, although his work is problematic and often criticised. However, the *Bibliothēke* is particularly useful as Diodorus, as his epithet suggests, was a Sicilian from Agrigium, and therefore gave far more coverage to Sicilian history than others had. The Himera campaign of 480, which is given coverage by both Diodorus and Herodotus, is a good example of this, although we will later discover that the accuracy of these accounts is a different matter altogether. The main part of Diodorus' work that covers this period, Book Eleven, also picks up more or less from where Herodotus leaves his account of Sicily, at the Battle of Himera, and is the only real indication of what actually happened after 480, since many of the main historians of the Classical Period whom Diodorus used as sources are now lost.

This chapter will now consider more fully the historians themselves, starting with Diodorus, because he contributes more and is the most problematic to us. We will not only examine Diodorus' own *Bibliothēke* however, we shall also explore the contributions made by his mostly lost sources, Timaeus, Ephorus and Philistus. Finally the works of Herodotus and Thucydides will be considered for a sense of completeness.

Diodorus Siculus

The contribution of Diodorus to our knowledge of early fifth century Sicily is greater than any other authority available to us now. Even though we can learn little from him regarding events before the Himera campaign of 480, indeed there are only odd fragments of Book Ten surviving, his coverage of events during and after 480 are so important that if they did not exist we would be mostly unaware of the details of what happened at Himera, let alone the importance attached to it by the Greeks of Sicily. We would also have agonisingly little information on Hieron, despite his Panhellenic victories, and virtually nothing about Thrasybulus and the fall of the tyranny in 466, not to mention other tyrants such as Theron of Acragas. Yet despite the fact that Diodorus certainly has his uses to us, his contribution to our knowledge goes mostly unappreciated, and much of what has been written about the historian is really concerned with others, namely, his sources. Naturally, such an attitude towards Diodorus

is self-maintaining. Even if one were trying to write a more balanced account of his work, one would end up writing more on the subject of his sources because that is where all the research has been done before, and it is difficult to break free from the mould².

There is little known about Diodorus himself. We do know he was from Agyrium in Sicily, and after possibly a few years in Egypt, he moved to Rome at around 56 BC, presumably as an adult. It seems this is where he stayed until at least around 30 BC when his *Bibliothēke* was published; after this date his life, both in terms of events and length, is unknown³. What is known is that there was an almost insatiable hunger for books and higher education around this time in Rome, for example, Strabo tells us that for the first time, bookselling had become a real profit-making business⁴. Even figures of satire had been created later on, figures such as Petronius' Trimalchio who boasts of having not one but two libraries, one Greek, one Latin, and also a character described by Lucian who collects books simply to show them off to others⁵. It is this kind of atmosphere in Rome that allowed Diodorus to compile and successfully sell a work that, to many, is simply not of that high a quality. To make up for the lack of historical expertise that is sometimes apparent in the *Bibliothēke*, it seems that Diodorus relied on giving his work a didactic twist, in order to distinguish it from others, such as Timaeus, from whose work Diodorus is often accused of plagiarising.

Although Diodorus was hardly the first historian to moralise, for example we shall find later that Ephorus also did so, few historians have let it form so much of what was written, and so strongly at that. At the very beginning of his work, Diodorus explains his utilitarian aims to us, and what he hopes to achieve through them:

Τοῖς τὰς κοινὰς ἱστορίας πραγματευσαμένοις μεγάλας χάριτας ἀπονέμειν
δίκαιον πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις ὠφελῆσαι τὸν κοινὸν
βίον ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν· ἀκίνδυνον γὰρ διδασκαλίαν τοῦ συμφέροντος
εἰσηγησάμενοι καλλίστην ἐμπειρίαν διὰ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης

² To give an example, the introduction to Stylianos's 1998 commentary of Book Fifteen is 141 pages long, and of these 107 are on the subject of sources, including 48 on Ephorus' contribution. Sacks (1990) has a real attempt at studying Diodorus' own contribution to historical writing, concentrating in particular on the place of the work in its first century BC context, as well as the overall shape of the work itself, in terms of Diodorus' personal aims in writing. Instead of merely being a careless collection of other people's thoughts, Sacks describes the *Bibliothēke* as 'a document substantially reflecting the intellectual and political attitudes of the late Hellenistic period' (1990) 5.

³ Agyrium – Diod. Sic. I.4.4. Travels – I.83.8, also see Harmand (1967) 982 n.5 and Hornblower (1981) 25. Stay in Rome – I.4.3-4.

⁴ Strabo 13 C 609. See also Kenyon (1951) 81ff.; Reynolds and Wilson (1968) 22ff.

⁵ Petronius *Satyricon* 48; Lucian *Ind.* 1.8.

περιποιοῦσι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν.
Diod. Sic. I.1.1-2

His aims seem simple enough, to write about good men and bad men so that the reader may learn lessons from them, making himself a better man and thus benefiting the world. Throughout the *Bibliothēke* Diodorus does indeed stick to this plan, picking up on themes such as divine justice in order to make his point more explicit⁶. Whether every instance of such moralising is down to Diodorus, or to his sources, we cannot tell, and Stylianou also notes that there are varying degrees of moralising throughout the *Bibliothēke*, for example it is greater in Books XI-XV than in XVII-XX. The contribution of Ephorus to Diodorus' work ends during Book XVI, and it therefore seems likely given Ephorus' own reputation, that the sources used by Diodorus had some influence on his use of moral philosophy. However, I think it is unwise to go down the same route as Barber and claim that even Diodorus' aims are taken directly from Ephorus' work⁷.

Attitudes towards Diodorus Siculus

The study of the Western Greeks in modern times has been somewhat damaged by the reputation of Diodorus himself, in particular regarding his use of sources⁸. While things have recently changed so far as realising that Diodorus actually had his *own* beliefs and reasons for writing the *Bibliothēke*, rather than simply copying those of Ephorus in particular, there still seems to be an underlying belief in scholarship that Diodorus was really only as good as his sources, and that much of his work was literally taken word-for-word from historians such as Ephorus and Timaeus. This could be said to have reached a climax with Laqueur's extensive study of the entire surviving *Bibliothēke*⁹. Making the assumption that Diodorus directly lifted material from Ephorus' work, and simply added much smaller sections of Timaeus in order to make other points or arguments, Laqueur claims to prove that if one could positively identify the episodes in which Diodorus used Timaeus as a source, one would be left with 'pure

⁶ Diod. Sic. XIV.63.1, XIV.7.4, XV.48.4, XVI.61.1-64, XXI.16.5, XXII.11.2 are noted as examples by Stylianou (1998) 4.

⁷ See below, 31ff. Barber (1935) 70.

⁸ A summary of how this treatment of Diodorus developed since the late 17th century has been provided by Hornblower (1981) 19-22.

⁹ Laqueur *RE* s.v. Timaios (3) *VIA* (1936), col.1076-1203.

Ephorus' and could therefore make huge advances in understanding both historians. Laqueur's work will be discussed more fully, along with other arguments on the subject, throughout this chapter. However, this brief description is sufficient, for the moment, to illustrate how little Diodorus was actually appreciated as a historian in his own right, leading to an element of distrust regarding his reliability, and even competence (or lack of it). While questions certainly remain regarding Diodorus' ability as a historian, some attitudes have changed over the years in his favour, particularly due to the realisation that he actually had aims in writing that differed from those of his predecessors, and therefore must have had some kind of input, however historically sound it really was, into his own work. However, the existence of a mostly moral framework¹⁰ certainly does not inspire confidence in Diodorus' work as far as historical accuracy is concerned, and this is generally added to by the perceived inconsistencies, plain contradictions or wild exaggerations found in the text, which are still felt to be the legacy of his uncritical style and use of sources. It does still seem the general opinion that we would be far better informed if the works of Ephorus, Timaeus or Philistus had survived instead of Diodorus', at least in regard to Greek history before Alexander.

We should now determine what Diodorus was hoping to achieve by writing his *Bibliothēke*, in the context of the whole work and not only on tyranny. Then we will consider the subject at the core of the whole problem, the sources that Diodorus actually used, and consider their own aims and methods. Finally we will go on to how Diodorus used his sources in order to construct his *Bibliothēke*, with the focus mainly on Book Eleven.

Diodorus' aims

The reputation of Diodorus as an uncritical compiler, as far as his sources were concerned, may also lead one to presume that he could not have had his own personal agenda while writing his *Bibliothēke*. There is a problem with this assumption in that we cannot expect Diodorus to be totally opinionless, as he would be, without a doubt, the first historian not to let personal bias affect his work, and this would indeed be contrary to human nature. We must assume that Diodorus had some kind of aim in writing his work, otherwise he would not have

¹⁰ Diod. Sic. I.2.2.

written it in the first place. For example if his aim was to entertain people, he would have tried to make his work more enjoyable and easy to read. If his aim was to educate, he would have had several alternatives such as giving the *Bibliothēke* a moral or a didactic twist, or even aiming to achieve greater historical accuracy. In any case he would have had some kind of input. If Diodorus himself saw his work as an uncritical compilation of world history, he certainly would have been aware that it would be worth no more than the individual sources he would have used in compiling it, and instead perhaps would have billed it as an updated or even ‘new and improved’ Ephorus or Timaeus. This is contrary to how others in antiquity viewed the *Bibliothēke*. For example, one particular incident is mentioned in Diodorus’ fortieth book, in which he tells us that some of his work had actually been pirated and published before he had properly revised it, and this certainly implies that his efforts were very much in demand in the late first century BC¹¹.

Few scholars have broken free of the idea that Diodorus may actually show some independent thought in his work, despite stating his intentions near the start of the *Bibliothēke*. On a basic level, Diodorus states his aim of writing a concise, universal history that could be of use to both Greeks and Romans¹². This includes the use of a chronology which would be familiar to both peoples, which he maintains consistently throughout the narrative, noting the winner of the *stadion* race in every Olympiad, as well as numbering each year of the four that made up the Olympic cycle, also the elected Athenian archons were mentioned, along with Roman consuls. Any well-known person who died in a given year would also normally be noted at the start of a year’s narrative, for example Theron of Acragas in 472 BC¹³. However, as we have already found, Diodorus’ aims are not totally restricted to wanting to recall past events:

ἐξ ἀπάντων δὲ συμπληρουμένης τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἀποδοτέον τῶν ἐπαίνων τὸ πρωτεῖον τῇ τούτων μάλιστα αἰτία ἱστορία. ἡγητέον γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην φύλακα μὲν τῆς τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀρετῆς, μάρτυρα δὲ τῆς τῶν φαύλων κακίας, εὐεργέτιν δὲ τοῦ κοινοῦ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἐν ἄδου μυθολογία τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πεπλασμένην ἔχουσα πολλὰ συμβάλλεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, πόσω μᾶλλον ὑποληπτέον τὴν προφήτιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορίαν, τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας οἶονεὶ μητρόπολιν

¹¹ Diod. Sic. XL.8.

¹² Diod. Sic. I.3.

¹³ Diod. Sic. XI.53.1.

οὔσαν, ἐπισκευάσαι δύνασθαι τὰ ἥθη μᾶλλον πρὸς καλοκάγαθίαν.
Diod. Sic. I.2.1-2

Here we find a clear moral objective in his work, with the aim of preserving the reputations of those who deserve them, good or bad. This statement is apparently not enough to satisfy modern scholars, particularly those who are adamant that there is no real objective behind Diodorus' work, and that he was incapable of thinking for himself. For example, Barber, in his book on Ephorus, assumes that even *this* passage has also been lifted directly from his historian's own prooemium, but with no real reason for doing so, other than, it seems, to further discredit Diodorus and accredit more of his work to Ephorus (Ephorus himself also moralised to his audience)¹⁴. Some do manage to avoid such assumptions: for example, despite his belief that part of the beginning of Diodorus' narrative is heavily influenced by Posidonius, Nock does allow Diodorus at least to have his own opinions and credits his aims and objectives to the author rather than his sources¹⁵. What is more, these intentions are repeated throughout the work, showing that his intentions were at least important to him, rather than showing the comments in Book One to be only of token value. In one such passage, Diodorus clearly feels it is important to name those who had betrayed Greece by siding with the Persians in the invasion¹⁶:

Χρήσιμον δὲ διορίσαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλομένους,
ἵνα τυγχάνοντες ὀνειδούς ἀποτρέπωσι ταῖς βλασφημίαις τοὺς προδότας
γενησομένους τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας. Αἰνιᾶνες μὲν οὖν καὶ Δόλοπες καὶ
Μηλιεῖς καὶ Περραιβοὶ καὶ Μάγνητες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐτάχθησαν, ἔτι
παρούσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ Φθιώται καὶ Λοκροὶ
καὶ Θετταλοὶ καὶ Βοιωτοὶ οἱ πλείους τούτων ἀπελθόντων ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς
τοὺς βαρβάρους.

Diod. Sic. XI.3.1-2

It has been suggested by Drews that it is Diodorus' own views on these matters that leads to the confusion and contradiction that has been noted by those scholars such as Laqueur who criticise him¹⁷. It is Drews' belief that the sources that Diodorus chose, in order to form the bulk of his narrative, may have had opinions that clashed with Diodorus' own aim of making moral examples of past figures, or in the above case, entire nations who had sided with the barbarian enemy. Diodorus chose his sources depending on factors such as popularity, and

¹⁴ Barber (1935) 70.

¹⁵ Nock (1959) 4-5.

¹⁶ In the first half of this chapter alone, there are two more examples of this in 38.6 and 46.1.

¹⁷ This is the main conclusion that Drews gathers from his argument – Drews (1962) 392.

of course their historical ability, the latter of which may conflict with his own moral aims¹⁸. Diodorus' representation of Epaminondas, who is mentioned at other points in the *Bibliothēke* apart from the narrative of his life, also warrants attention¹⁹:

“Οτι Κροτωνιάτης τις Κύλων ὄνομα, τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ πρῶτος τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐπεθύμησε Πυθαγόρειος γενέσθαι. ὦν δὲ χαλεπὸς καὶ βίαιος τὸν τρόπον, ἔτι δὲ στασιαστὴς καὶ τυραννικός, ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. παροξυνθεὶς οὖν τῷ συστήματι τῶν Πυθαγορείων, ἑταιρείαν μεγάλην συνεστήσατο, καὶ διετέλει πάντα καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων κατ' αὐτῶν. Ὅτι Λῦσις ὁ Πυθαγόρειος εἰς Θήβας τῆς Βοιωτίας γενόμενος διδάσκαλος Ἐπαμινώνδου, τοῦτον μὲν τέλειον ἄνδρα πρὸς ἀρετὴν κατέστησε, καὶ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ θετὸς ἐγένετο δι' εὐνοίαν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπαμινώνδας τῆς τε καρτερίας καὶ λιτότητος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκ τῆς Πυθαγορείου φιλοσοφίας ἐναύσματα λαβὼν, οὐ μόνον Θηβαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπρώτευσεν.

Diod. Sic. X.11

In this example we have a mention of the great Epaminondas, in what seems to be a blatant attempt to get the man and all his good virtues included into the narrative, even where he is chronologically so far away from the subject at hand, the character of Cylon to whom Epaminondas is contrasted. Therefore Diodorus clearly has his favourites, and this reaffirms the idea that he did indeed have his own agenda in the *Bibliothēke*. This can also be seen in the case of Gelon of course, and his praise of the tyrant need not be simply lifted from Timaeus' own work, as we do have evidence, which we shall come to later in this chapter, that Diodorus was not completely uncritical of Timaeus²⁰. The final piece of evidence supplied by Drews comes in the form of Diodorus' confidence that his own form of history is better than those of others, by listing complaints of which at least one he claims can be applied to any historian before him²¹:

κειμένης γὰρ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τῆς ὠφελείας ἐν τῷ πλείστας καὶ ποικιλωτάτας περιστάσεις λαμβάνειν, οἱ πλείστοι μὲν ἐνὸς ἔθνους ἢ μιᾶς πόλεως αὐτοτελεῖς πολέμους ἀνέγραψαν, ὀλίγοι δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ἀρξάμενοι τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἐπεχείρησαν ἀναγράφειν μέχρι τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς καιρῶν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους χρόνους ἐκάστοις οὐ παρέζευξαν, οἱ δὲ τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων πράξεις ὑπερέβησαν, ἔτι δ' οἱ μὲν τὰς παλαιὰς μυθολογίας διὰ τὴν δυσχέρειαν τῆς πραγματείας ἀπεδοκίμασαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐ συνετέλεσαν, μεσολαβηθέντες τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῆς πεπρωμένης.

Diod. Sic. I.3.2

¹⁸ See Alvarez de Miranda (1956) 60.

¹⁹ Drews (1962) 388-9.

²⁰ See below 41, Diod. Sic. XXI.17.

²¹ Drews (1962) 384. See also Bury (1909) 236 and Croze (1923) 197 who, understandably, disagree with Diodorus' claim.

Importantly, Diodorus is not the only historian in antiquity who believed that the *Bibliothēke* was worthy of praise. Early Christian writers such as Eusebius and Justin cited his work as one of high morality, and much later on, by the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, Diodorus was again in high demand for the same reason with the *Bibliothēke* being translated into French, German, Italian, English and Latin²².

It may be possible to attribute some of the many apparent problems in Diodorus' text to the fact that his own beliefs and aims in writing, which he constantly reinforces, were in fact so strong that in the face of different views brought up by his sources, he stood by his own methods, with results that appear confused. It is where Diodorus is unable to reconcile his own beliefs with the historical records and anecdotes of others, that he gives the impression of a historian who is less capable than those he is using for information, and ultimately gets confused and contradicts himself as a result.

Diodorus' sources

Before we look at how Diodorus actually used his sources in his *Bibliothēke*, it is standard practice in Diodoran studies to consider his sources, whose works have survived only in fragments²³. The historians of concern to us here are Timaeus of Tauromenium (c.350-260), Ephorus of Cyme (c.405-330), and to a lesser extent, Philistus of Syracuse (c.430-356).

Philistus

The earliest of the three main sources of Diodorus, Philistus was a friend and adviser to the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, and not surprisingly is more sympathetic towards the tyrants than many other historians, for which he is criticised heavily by Timaeus²⁴. The only fragment of his work (an eleven book history of Sicily, split into two parts) that is to be used in this thesis concerns Hippocrates' refoundation of Camarina in 492, although this in itself is not found in

²² Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 1.6; Justin *Cohort.* 9. The British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books vol.53 (1960), s.v. *Diodorus* gives a full list of the various editions of the *Bibliothēke* during the Renaissance.

²³ Rutter (1993) 175-6, tells us how problematic the whole process of identifying sources can be, as it sometimes produces circular arguments and solid answers are a rarity. He also warns that even if a source can be identified with total accuracy, this does not mean all the detail in Diodorus is derived from the content of that source.

²⁴ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F38. He is also called *philotyrannos* by Plutarch (Dion 36.3). See Pearson (1987) 19-30 for more on Philistus (*FGrH* 556).

the fragments of Diodorus' lost tenth book²⁵. He is known to be an able and knowledgeable historian, influenced heavily by Thucydides, and used frequently by Diodorus Siculus, but most importantly for our purposes he was put in charge of the colonial enterprises in the Adriatic during the reign of Dionysius I, and therefore would have a clear idea of what they entailed, as well as having at least an awareness of the history and politics of his native Sicily.

Ephorus

Ephorus has been thought to provide Diodorus with the bulk of his information up to 340 BC²⁶, although not so much for the chapters of concern to us which are thought to be of Timaeian origin. This has mostly been assumed because of the historians' own backgrounds: Timaeus, being a Sicilian himself, is not only criticised by Polybius for favouring all things Western Greek and exaggerating their achievements, a trait often found in Diodorus' *Bibliothēke*, but Timaeus' main work of history was one of Sicily itself, the *Sikelikai Historiai* down to Agathocles' death in 289/8²⁷. Ephorus himself was from Cyme in Asia Minor, and therefore would have had no reason to give Western Greek affairs special attention as Timaeus did. However, it seems that the likes of Gelon and Dionysius I would still have received their fair share of coverage from Ephorus, though clearly not as much as Timaeus would have provided. Ephorus' work was an attempt at a 'universal history' covering events not only in Greece and its vicinity, but of all parts of the known world, so it is probable that Diodorus also considered Ephorus' account of Western Greek history in addition to that of Timaeus.

However, it is the way in which Ephorus wrote his histories that has become more controversial, in particular, Diodorus' reference to the work as being arranged κατὰ γένος²⁸. This method is said to be highly successful by Diodorus, but what does κατὰ γένος mean? There are three main arguments: firstly, Ephorus has written an episodic history, presumably with a broad chronological base; secondly, the books are divided by subject matter, so that each book has its own theme running through it; and lastly, the work has been divided so that each

²⁵ See the refoundations chapter, 138ff.

²⁶ E.g. Laqueur (1936).

²⁷ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 T6-8.

²⁸ Diod. Sic. V.1.4.

book is focused on a geographical area, for example Sicily, Egypt or Greece itself²⁹. The idea that Ephorus' history was episodic is not without problems, the main one being that 'episodes' of history are naturally going to be of varying length, and therefore divisions between the books may have been a difficult matter. Another problem is that some passages which are found in Diodorus, who employs an annalistic system, seem to be more 'episodic' than others, and these are then assumed to be due to Ephoran influence by those who believe in the episodic theory, thus backing up their own argument in a circular fashion³⁰. The theory seems to be over-dependent on the assumption that Diodorus' work is mostly derivative of Ephorus therefore, and since I think that this idea is not likely to be correct, it will be challenged later on in this chapter.

The second theory, of Ephorus' books being unified in theme, is even more a result of the belief that anything found in Diodorus must come directly from someone else's work. In the preface to his fifth book, Diodorus criticises Timaeus for his digressions and recommends the 'history by theme' approach instead. Since it is Barber's view that Diodorus' aims, and therefore the prefaces to each book, are directly taken from Ephorus' own work, he thinks it must follow that Ephorus too must have divided his work by theme³¹.

The third theory, that Ephorus' work was divided so that each book focused on a particular geographical region, is supported above all by Jacoby and Drews³². Drews' belief is based on the fact that the history of one region never seems to fall in the same book as the history of another region, at least as far as the fragments we have of Ephorus are concerned. Also, the works of other historians are sometimes divided in a similar, though not so extreme, manner. The books of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* are themselves split into chapters that deal with distinct regions of the Greek World, for example the narrative of the Persian invasion of Greece halts at one point in order to pick up on the Carthaginian invasion of Himera at XI.20. Again, in the preface to Diodorus' fifth book, the historian says that he himself will construct the book

²⁹ There have been advocates for all three views; Bloch suggests it is episodic (1940) 308ff.; Barber (1935) translates it as 'subject-system'; Jacoby *FGrH* IIc 26 rejects both views, saying it is divided geographically.

³⁰ Busolt (1893) 707 picks up on the story of Brasidas (Diod. Sic. XII.67-8), which is more episodic than most of Diodorus' work, and decides that this is a remnant of Ephorus' own account.

³¹ Diod. Sic. V.1. Barber (1935) 70ff.

³² Jacoby *FGrH* IIc 26; Drews (1963) 244-55.

κατὰ γένος, and then goes on to give a treatment of each of the Greek islands in turn³³. With a universal history, the switching from one place to another would be inevitable, whether from chapter to chapter or, as seems more likely in Ephorus' case, book to book. To conclude on this matter, it seems as if the final theory on the meaning of κατὰ γένος is most likely to be true of the three discussed, with the others appearing to be based only on presumptions regarding Diodorus' capability as a historian. It is possible that the meaning of κατὰ γένος is connected with the fact that Ephorus was writing a universal history, and more specifically, with his switching between regions taking place at longer intervals in the text.

There are other significant points to be made on Ephorus' work, in particular concerning his bias and aims. In Diodorus' own narrative there are several mentions of Cyme, Ephorus' home town, that seem to be completely unwarranted and have no known authority behind them³⁴, however this is only likely to inflate Cyme's role in Greek history and may not have too much of an impact on the narrative as a whole. A bigger problem is the apparent favouring of certain individuals and larger cities in Greece, and it is noted by Barber that, combined with the didactic aims also held by Ephorus, as well as the rhetorical skills the historian picked up from Isocrates, it is this bias that is by far the most damaging to the historical accuracy of Ephorus' work³⁵. The biggest example of this is the constant bias shown towards the Athenians during the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War, in comparison to Thucydides' own account. However, this entire chapter of Barber's work seems to be based on two great but unsafe assumptions: firstly, that since Ephorus seemed to be ready to exaggerate the role played by Cyme in such small ways noted above, then it must follow that he was ready to falsify information of far greater significance. Secondly, and more relevant to *this* chapter on our sources for Sicilian history, Barber is happy to assume that any example of bias shown by Diodorus, at least on the subject of mainland Greece in the second half of the fifth century, must necessarily be an example of Ephorus' own bias³⁶. In fact there is not a *single* reference to Ephorus' own work in the entire chapter on his bias, a shortfall similar to that suffered by the

³³ Diod. Sic. V.1.4.

³⁴ In Diodorus' narrative of the Persian invasion of 480, for example, there are three instances; in XI.8 we find that Leonidas is informed of his being surrounded by the Persians at Thermopylae, by Tyrastiades of Cyme; plus the Persian fleet had docked at Cyme both in the spring and the winter of 480 – XI.2, 27.

³⁵ Barber (1935) 85-6.

³⁶ On falsification - Barber (1935) 87; on bias - ch.6, pp.84-105.

work of Laqueur which will be discussed later on in this chapter³⁷. Barber's treatment of Isocratean influence on Ephorus suffers similar problems, with only two references to Ephorus' fragments and the rest based on Isocratean aspects of Diodorus' own work³⁸.

Regarding the known fragments of Ephorus' work which deal with the tyrants of early fifth century Sicily, there is not much material to discuss. We do know that Ephorus was known as φιλοτυραννότατος to Timaeus later on³⁹, but this is only because Ephorus excessively praised Philistus, who was a close friend of the tyrants in Syracuse in the fourth century. There is one idea in Diodorus' work that is perhaps attributable to Ephorus, that of Persia and Carthage joining forces to attack the Greeks in 480⁴⁰. The question of the causes of the Himera campaign are dealt with fully in a later chapter, but here it is only necessary to say that Ephorus' theory is unlikely to be true, and also that he was almost certainly the first major historian to have picked up on the legacy of Hieron's propaganda campaign in the 470's⁴¹. Diodorus clearly believes this version of the story (XI.1.4; 20.1), and it seems likely that Timaeus would also have incorporated this small nugget of pro-Western propaganda into his own work.

As far as the subject of the fifth century tyrannies in Sicily are concerned, it seems the case that Ephorus' importance is restricted to his being an authority for both Timaeus and Diodorus. This seems very likely considering Ephorus' position as perhaps the foremost Greek historian from the 'old' world (Greece and the East) to write extensively about the Greek West, and as Pearson puts it, was simply a 'standard authority'. We also know that Diodorus used Ephorus' work quite extensively, and he was probably his main source for many subjects, including Western Greek affairs⁴².

³⁷ See below, 47ff.

³⁸ Barber (1935) ch.5.

³⁹ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F115, 154 (Plut. *Dion* 35-6).

⁴⁰ Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F186 (sch. Pind. *Pyth.* I.146b).

⁴¹ See below chapters on propaganda, 176ff. See also Pearson (1987) 133-4. In the same fragment Ephorus records the number of troops offered to the Greeks by Gelon, which are the same as in Herodotus' account (VII.158) except the number of hoplites is, quite unusually, cut from 20,000 to 10,000.

⁴² For example, the accounts of Ephorus and Timaeus are compared when discussing the numbers of the invading Carthaginian army – Diod. Sic. XIII.54; 60; 80; XIV.54. However it is possible that Diodorus did not check Ephorus' account itself, but rather Timaeus' criticisms of it, which may not have been totally accurate – Pearson (1987) 34.

Timaeus

Of all the ‘lost’ historians of the Greek West, Timaeus is certainly the most familiar to those studying the subject. This is a continuation of how the historian was considered in the Ancient World itself, although of course he was not ‘lost’ to them as he is to us. Timaeus’ popularity throughout this age certainly had an impact on what has survived to this day, as although we do not have the bulk of his work, there are many sizeable fragments that have been found in later sources, including Diodorus himself, as well as a good supply of comments made by these on the historian, most notably by Polybius⁴³.

The reputation that Timaeus had in the Ancient World, particularly Rome⁴⁴, seems to stem from the fact that he was the first Greek (c.350-c.260 BC) to give more extensive coverage of events in Rome’s history⁴⁵. He was therefore used extensively as a source for this period in the Roman Republic, including the wars against Pyrrhus of Epirus, and Carthaginian history before the Punic Wars. His interest in the Western Mediterranean is due to the fact that he was a Sicilian himself, from Tauromenium, perhaps born in nearby Naxos. The reason for this ‘perhaps’ is that the year of Timaeus’ birth is uncertain, and he may have been born under the reign of Dionysius II, who had had Timaeus’ family removed from Naxos in 358⁴⁶. At some point between 339-329, Timaeus was banished again, this time to Athens, where he became associated with the Academy and the Peripatetics, and then composed his histories.

It is clear that Timaeus’ life experiences and associates in Athens, where there was a strong anti-tyrannical sentiment, had an impact on his writing. There are passages in Diodorus which are strongly anti-Dionysius⁴⁷, in particular a long speech occurring in Book Fourteen which is normally attributed to Timaeus, but only on the grounds that Timaeus was very well known for his inclusion of speeches in his Histories⁴⁸, and also the assumption that Timaeus

⁴³ See Pearson (1987) 37ff., 270-1.

⁴⁴ For example, Cicero praises Timaeus as a historian – *Ad. Q.F.* 2.11.4; *De Or.* 2.57; *Brut.* 66; *De Div.* 1.39.

⁴⁵ See Momigliano (1959), and Manni (1961) on Timaeus as a historian of Rome.

⁴⁶ For more references on Timaeus’ life see Pearson (1987) 7, 37-9, and future reputation 1, 7, 38-9, 264, 270-1.

⁴⁷ Caven however, claims that *in general* Diodorus is not conspicuously biased against Dionysius in his *Bibliothēke*, as although there are several such passages that give that impression, they are offset by other passages which are in fact positive and even laudatory – (1990) 3ff.

⁴⁸ Polyb. XII.25a, b. Diodorus himself admits that he sometimes added rhetorical material into his own work – XIV.65-9, XX. 1-2.

was the main source for Diodorus' Sicilian material. We do know that Timaeus verbally attacked Agathocles⁴⁹, and Diodorus himself makes it clear how unhappy he was with Timaeus' strong bias, and lack of consistency over such matters⁵⁰. Of course this criticism in itself has implications regarding Diodorus' competence as a historian that we shall come to later.

However, Diodorus' criticism of Timaeus is mild in comparison with that of Polybius, who was writing about a century after his subject. As Brown notes, virtually the entire twelfth book of Polybius' *Histories* is dedicated to attacking many aspects of Timaeus' work⁵¹. The biggest problem is Timaeus' criticism of others, in particular that aimed at other historians; for example his attack on Callisthenes in particular brought a strong reaction from Polybius, who states that Timaeus is guilty of hypocrisy, possessing himself the qualities for which he attacks Callisthenes⁵². Brown again notes that the rest of Polybius' criticism is based on three points: firstly Timaeus' use of speeches, which has been the subject of discussion since, secondly his lack of experience in the army and in politics, which Brown recognises as a result of Polybius' utilitarian view of historical writing, and thirdly the reputation which Timaeus' work later enjoyed, which was deemed to be unjustified by Polybius⁵³. It is Walbank's view that Polybius has an unstated motive in attacking Timaeus, in that Timaeus is a rival to Polybius to be the primary Greek historian of Rome, and Polybius is jealous of his rival's popularity⁵⁴. In other words, his criticisms of Timaeus may be telling us more about Polybius himself than about Timaeus, and presumably the criticisms did not carry much weight with Diodorus⁵⁵.

⁴⁹ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F124a, b; Polyb. VIII.10.12; XII.15, 23ff.

⁵⁰ Diod. Sic. XXI.17. Pearson (1987) 227 assumes that because Diodorus no longer could use Ephorus as a source at this point in the narrative, he was therefore still dependent on Timaeus for information despite obviously being unhappy with his account. In Diod. Sic. XIX.9.2-4, the portrayal of Agathocles is far from favourable, Pearson describing him as 'unscrupulous and treacherous', but Diodorus is forced to use Timaeus due to the lack of other sources. The same could be said for Polybius' own account, while Pearson recommends Polyaeus' account (V.3.7-8) as the most likely to match Timaeus' original. Plutarch similarly attacks Timaeus' slandering of Philistus in his life of Dion, ch.36.

⁵¹ Brown (1958) 93ff. Other examples of criticism include that by Istrus (*FGrH* 334 F59) from the 3rd century BC, and the scholar Polemon of Ilium (fr.45 - Book XII) from the 3rd/2nd centuries BC.

⁵² Polyb. XII.12b.2-3. Polybius later attacks Callisthenes himself, in a similar manner to Timaeus.

⁵³ See Pearson (1986) 350-68, on the use of speeches in Timaeus.

⁵⁴ Walbank (1968-9) 484. While Jacoby makes roughly the same point (*FGrH* 566, comm. p.527), some disagree; for example Lehmann (1967) 352-4.

⁵⁵ Indeed this is the opinion of both Marincola (2001) 139, and Walbank (1985) 262-79, who believe that Polybius was eager to prove himself better than Timaeus, who had become established as the principal historian of the Western Mediterranean. Sacks (1981) 66-78 also agrees, adding that Polybius is genuinely attempting to inform his audience about historical techniques.

It is another passage in Polybius that is of the greatest concern to us here, where he criticises Timaeus for his almost shameless promotion of the Western Greeks and their place in such areas as the arts, philosophy, and also their importance in history.

ἀλλ' ὅμως Τίμαιος εἰς ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων τοσούτους ἐκτείνει λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην ποιεῖται σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ τὴν μὲν Σικελίαν μεγαλομερεστέραν ποιῆσαι τῆς συμπάσης Ἑλλάδος, τὰς δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεις ἐπιφανεστέρας καὶ καλλίους τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τῶν μὲν σοφία διενηνοχότων σοφωτάτους τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, τῶν δὲ πραγματικῶν ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ θειοτάτους τοὺς ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν τοῖς μειρακίοις τοῖς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς καὶ τοῖς (περι)πάτοις πρὸς τὰς παραδόξους ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὅταν ἡ Θερσίτου λέγειν ἐγκώμιον ἢ Πηνελόπης πρόθωνται ψόγον ἢ τινος ἑτέρου τῶν τοιούτων.

Polyb. XII.26b.4-5

This is of obvious importance to us because it may have an impact on how he reported events in Sicily under the Deinomenids, particularly events such as the battles at Himera and Cumae, of which later comparisons were made with various battles during the Persian Wars. There is no actual evidence of this bias in our known fragments of Timaeus, but that does not mean that Polybius is wrong, as what we have is so little compared with what was available to Polybius himself, but we do know that Timaeus wrote about such famous figures as Gelon and Empedocles. As Pearson points out, there is little to be found on the subject of military history, and we are unable to compare his work on Himera with that on the Persian Wars, but the account of Aristodemus of Cumae's battle against an Etruscan army of 500,000 soldiers and 18,000 cavalry recorded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus is very likely to be Timaeian⁵⁶, the exaggeration perhaps affirming the belief that Timaeus was prone to bias towards the Greeks of the West and their achievements, but probably not conclusive evidence in itself.

Also of concern to us is Timaeus' apparent hatred of tyranny⁵⁷, however it does not seem to be directed to all tyrants. There are fragments that clearly support and praise the actions of Gelon. In contrast to other tyrants, whom Timaeus normally portrays as sacrilegious men who are too hybriatic and fall foul of the gods' wishes, Gelon is represented as an

⁵⁶ Dion. Hal. *AR* 7.3. See Pearson (1987) 41-2.

⁵⁷ For example his hatred of Agathocles – *FGrH* 566 F124a, b.

honourable, pious man, who according to Herodotus is also descended from the priests of Demeter and Kore at Gela, the first of whom in Gelon's family was Telines⁵⁸.

Γέλωνα Συρακούσιον καθ' ὕπνου δὲ βοῶντα (κεραυνοβλήης γὰρ ἔδοξεν ὄνειροις γεγονέναι) ὁ κύων θορυβούμενον ἀμέτρως γνοὺς ἐκεῖνον, καθυλακτῶν οὐκ ἔληξεν, ἕως ἐγείρει τοῦτον. τοῦτον ἐξέσωσέ ποτε καὶ λύκος ἐκ θανάτου· σχολῆι προσκαθημένου γὰρ ἔτι παιδίου ὄντος, λύκος ἐλθὼν ἀφήρπαξε τὴν δέλτον τὴν ἐκείνου· τοῦ δὲ δραμόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν λύκον καὶ τὴν δέλτον, κατασεισθεῖσα ἢ σχολῆ βαθρόθεν καταπίπτει, καὶ σύμπαντας ἀπέκτεινε παῖδας σὺν διδασκάλῳ. τῶν παίδων δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ συγγραφεῖς βοῶσι, Τίμαιοι, Διονύσιοι (–), Διόδωροι καὶ Δίων (–), πλείω τελοῦντα ἑκατόν· τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς οὐκ οἶδα.

Timaeus FGrH 566 F95 (Tzetz. *Chil.* 4.266)

This story, also mentioned in Diodorus⁵⁹, affirms the belief that Gelon, even as a young child, was enjoying divine favour and was clearly destined for great things in the future. Gelon of course did not become tyrant of Gela through right of birth, but gained it as a result of becoming one of Hippocrates' favourites, and this rise through the ranks of the Geloan army is highlighted by another of Timaeus' surviving fragments:

βαθυκρήμνοισι δ' ἀμφ' ἀκταῖς Ἐλώρου] περὶ τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν συνέστη Ἴπποκράτει τῷ Γελῳίων τυράννῳ πρὸς Συρακουσίους πόλεμος, ὁ δὲ Γέλων, <οὔ> οὗτος ἑταῖρος, ἰπάρχει τότε Ἴπποκράτει· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ φησὶ τῷ πολέμῳ εἰκὸς τὸν Χρόμιον ἐπιδείξασθαι πολλὰ ἔργα κατὰ τὴν μάχην. περὶ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πολέμου Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ ἰ δεδήλωκε· 'καθάπαξ γάρ' φησὶν ὁ δίδυμος 'οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην ἔχομεν εὐρεῖν περὶ τὸν Ἐλωρον τῶν συνηκμακότων τῷ Χρομίῳ τυράννων, ὅτι μὴ σὺν Ἴπποκράτει τοῦ Γέλωνος πρὸς Συρακουσίους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν Γέλωνα ἰπαραχεῖν κατέστησεν Ἴπποκράτης, σαφὲς ὁ Τίμαιος ποιήσει γράφων οὕτως· «Ἴπποκράτης δὲ μετὰ τὴν Κλεάνδρου τελευτὴν ἅμα μὲν τοῦ Γέλωνος ἐν τῇ τεταγμένῃ μεμενηκότος, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Γελῳίοις χαρίσασθαι βουλόμενος, μεταπεμπάμενος αὐτὸν καὶ παρακαλέσας ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις, ἀπάντων τῶν ἰπέων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐκείνῳ παρέδωκεν»'.

Timaeus FGrH 566 F18 (sch. Pind. *Nem.* 9, 95a)

The bravery shown in the battle at the Helorus river had led Gelon to his promotion to the position of cavalry commander under Hippocrates, which would presumably have been the highest position, given the probable importance of the cavalry in this area⁶⁰. As a man who was later heroised by the Syracusans, it is probably not surprising that Gelon should be treated as

⁵⁸ Hdt. VII.153, also Timaeus fr.96 (sch. Pind. *Pyth.* I.6.158), who is actually referring to Hieron, Gelon's younger brother.

⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. X.29.

⁶⁰ See later chapter on foreign policy, 66ff. Dunbabin (1948) 407-9, for a discussion of Timaeus FGrH 566 F19a, b which concern the destruction and rebuilding of Camarina immediately following Helorus. To be brief, the difficulties arise firstly because of similarities between the names 'Gelon' and 'Gela', and secondly because Gelon later destroyed the city as tyrant himself, which leads to confusion regarding which destruction is being referred to, and whether Timaeus himself was confused between the two events.

such by Timaeus; how else should one treat a man who saved the whole of Sicily from barbarian subjection? It is also highly unlikely, given Gelon's later status, that Timaeus would have had much evidence of a darker side to Gelon's personality available to him. There are signs of exaggeration in Timaeus' account of this time, for example his claim that Carthage was actually made subject to Syracuse following Himera, and was forced to pay tribute, is not something that is supported by other sources, not even Diodorus⁶¹.

We can safely assume therefore that Timaeus had a liking for Gelon in particular, but can we gather any information on the other tyrants of the age? The fact that Gelon was such an extraordinary figure in Sicilian history may not mean that we rule out any dislike towards these tyrants on Timaeus' part⁶². On Gelon's predecessor, Hippocrates (for whom, unlike his successors, there is no evidence to suggest he was styled *basileus*⁶³), there is very little by way of opinion that we can gather, unless the assumption is made that Diodorus used Timaeus as his main source on Sicilian history, in which case there is one fragment which is of interest:

Ὅτι Ἴπποκράτης ὁ Γελῶος τύραννος τοὺς Συρακουσίους νενικηκῶς κατεστρατοπέδευσεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερόν. κατέλαβε δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν ἱερέα καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων τινὰς καθαιροῦντας ἀναθήματα χρυσᾶ, καὶ μάλιστα ἱμάτιον τοῦ Διὸς περιαιρουμένους ἐκ πολλοῦ κατεσκευασμένον χρυσοῦ. καὶ τούτοις μὲν ἐπιπλήξας ὡς ἱεροσύλοις ἐκέλευσεν ἀπελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸς δὲ τῶν ἀναθημάτων ἀπέσχετο, φιλοδοξῆσαι θέλων καὶ νομίζων δεῖν τὸν τηλικούτον ἐπαναιρούμενον πόλεμον μηθὲν ἐξαμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ θεῖον, ἅμα δὲ νομίζων διαβάλλειν τοὺς προεστῶτας τῶν ἐν Συρακούσαις πραγμάτων πρὸς τὰ πλήθη διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν αὐτοὺς πλεονεκτικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ δημοτικῶς οὐδ' ἴσως ἄρχειν.

Diod. Sic. X.28.1-2

There is a clear comparison to be made here with the portrayal of Gelon, as Hippocrates is also shown to be a very pious individual, but interestingly he shows great concern for how war itself is to be conducted regarding issues of despoiling sacred objects, as well as wishing to be considered as a good ruler himself. This point is of great importance as it is made clear that Hippocrates was by no means a typical tyrant, only caring for his own excessive needs, but one who was concerned with ruling fairly over his people and setting an example to them. However one point of real concern to us is the last section of this story, where Hippocrates wishes not to set the Syracusans against the rulers of the city, but to let them

⁶¹ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F20 (sch. Pind. *Pyth.* II.2).

⁶² Although there is a case to be put that they may even have referred to themselves as *basileus*, which may cause more difficulties. See the later chapter on self-presentation on this subject (191ff.).

⁶³ See later chapter on propaganda (191ff.)

think that they ruled for all, not just for themselves. Oldfather dates this incident to the aftermath of the battle of the Helorus river around 491 BC⁶⁴, and although Syracuse was indeed left to rule itself until 485, the city only retained its independence following the mediation of Corinth and Corcyra according to Herodotus, and Hippocrates had instigated the battle in order to gain Syracuse for his empire⁶⁵.

Immediately following this episode, there is reference to Theron, tyrant of Acragas:

Ὅτι Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος
φιλανθρωπία πολὺ προεῖχεν οὐ μόνον τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν
Σικελιωτῶν.

Diod. Sic. X.28.3

Although this is a short passage, it does allow tyrants from outside Gela/Syracuse to be considered as beneficial to their people, in fact *even more so* than his fellow tyrants in Eastern Sicily.

Of course there is the point that Theron is also Sicilian, the group of people that Timaeus is most likely to praise excessively, according to Polybius, and also that Theron was a friend, ally and family member of Gelon, and therefore perhaps favoured by association. Brown also makes a brief study of Timaeus' treatment of Theron, in the context of the history of Acragas as recorded by Timaeus' fragments⁶⁶. A kind of 'rise and fall' storyline can be found within these fragments, as the decline of the tyranny of Phalaris (the ultimate stereotype of the 'bad' tyrant) is replaced by a period of prosperity, then excess leading to a moral decline of the city as a whole, before Theron and his family rescue the city by 'revitalizing' it with new blood from Rhodes. In other words, Theron's sole rule is seen as beneficial to the city rather than damaging, like that of Phalaris, and Brown contrasts this attitude to Polybius, who judges regimes by the type of constitution rather than the ruler(s)⁶⁷.

For Hieron and Thrasybulus, like Hippocrates, we have few fragments attributed to Timaeus, although we do have the entire eleventh book of Diodorus which contains the last years of the Deinomenid dynasty. Laqueur believes that Timaeus would almost certainly have

⁶⁴ Oldfather (1939) 97 n.3. This episode is examined in the refoundations chapter (138ff.).

⁶⁵ Hdt. VII.154.

⁶⁶ Brown (1958) 58. He is referring to Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F93a, b (sch. Pind. *Ol.* II inscr., 29d).

⁶⁷ Polyb. I.1.5; Polybius' sixth book is dedicated to a discussion of the Roman constitution, and in VI.2.8-10 we are told of the importance of the type of constitution to how well a state was run. Polyb. VI.2-9 is a discussion of the virtues and downfalls of the various constitutional forms.

disliked Hieron, as he was hardly a beneficial tyrant to his people and was guilty of many excesses typical of tyrants⁶⁸. However, as much as Laqueur's feelings on the subject seem reasonable, there is little evidence to support them. The episode involving Polyzelus mentioned in Diodorus⁶⁹, does appear as a fragment of Timaeus, and it does make the tyrant appear paranoid and fearful of potential challenges to his rule; but it hardly can be claimed as evidence of strong feelings against Hieron in the same mould as those against Agathocles and perhaps Dionysius. Another fragment refers to his chariot victory at Delphi⁷⁰, but that is it as far as definite fragments on the Deinomenids are concerned.

Overall, there is simply insufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that Timaeus was anti-tyranny in principle, but there are signs that he was concerned about the way in which these men actually ruled, whether the ruler was a tyrant or a constitutional king. It is made more difficult to determine by his alleged (but mainly unproven) bias in favour of all things Western, but this may be restricted to the key achievements he records rather than those who played a lesser part in the story.

Diodorus' use of sources

The biggest and most controversial problem in dealing with Diodorus' work is that of his use of these sources. Obviously the question of an historian's sources is an extremely important one, as it is not possible to construct a history without them, for even using one's own memory to recollect events can be considered a source in its own right⁷¹. It has long been felt that Diodorus' own sources for the majority of the *Bibliothēke*, but in particular those for the time of concern to us, were the *Histories* written by Ephorus of Cyme and Timaeus of Tauromenium⁷². However, Diodorus' own reputation as an uncritical compiler of information supplied by his sources, has led many to believe that it is possible to positively identify different passages and assign them more or less directly to a particular source. The most

⁶⁸ Laqueur (1936) col.1088.

⁶⁹ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F93b (sch. Pind. *Ol.* II.29d), Diod. Sic. XI.48.

⁷⁰ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F141 (sch. Pind. *Pyth.* II inscr.). Brown (1958) 64 is sure that he is also responsible for Diodorus' account of the refoundation of Catana (XI.49).

⁷¹ Thucydides' recollection of speeches is probably the best example of this – I.22.

⁷² Volquardsen (1868) was the first modern scholar to refer to various passages in Diodorus as 'pure Timaeus'.

extreme example of scholarship taking this view is that of Laqueur⁷³, who divided the *Bibliothèque* (at least up to Book Eighteen, from which point Ephorus could not have contributed) into Ephoran and Timaeian fragments. This was a very brave and extensive attempt to answer the most basic questions concerning Diodorus' use of sources, for example how he balanced the views of more than one source, whether successfully or not, to what extent Diodorus actually used his own judgement when compiling his history, and of course who Diodorus' sources actually were, in the many cases where they are not cited. This would hopefully then leave us better informed on the subject of Timaeus and Ephorus themselves. In order to solve these problems, Laqueur decided to attack them at their very root, in other words the many apparent contradictions and confusions in Diodorus' narrative that hinder our understanding of the events concerned⁷⁴.

Laqueur's work, despite being an admirable effort to clarify the source question conclusively, has been heavily criticised by many scholars over the years, for example by Hammond⁷⁵. This is mainly because of the shortcomings in Laqueur's method and also his attitude to Diodorus, which is really the most extreme example of the criticisms aimed at the historian. In regard to Laqueur's method, the worst aspect, as pointed out by Brown, is that there is no effort made to examine the *already known* fragments attributed to Timaeus and Ephorus, from sources other than Diodorus⁷⁶. How can one possibly identify an unnamed source for an historical passage if much of the information we actually have on that source is simply ignored? The other problems lie in the dangerous assumptions made by Laqueur which render the rest of the work quite pointless, for example the old assumption that Diodorus was using select passages from one historian, and adding some interesting points made by others while never including his own thoughts on the subject. This is contrary to clear evidence indicating that Diodorus did have his own opinions and included them in the work⁷⁷. Finally, the whole work is done with the objective of proving that Diodorus used Ephorus as the main

⁷³ Laqueur, *RE* s.v. Timaios (3) *VIA* (1936), col.1076-1203.

⁷⁴ Laqueur (1936) col.1076.

⁷⁵ Hammond (1937) 79-81.

⁷⁶ Brown (1952) 340.

⁷⁷ E.g. Diod. Sic. I.22.4, 83.8-9 (Egypt); XVI.83.3 (on Agyrium, Diodorus' home-town); of course Diodorus does not always have to tell us when he is using his own opinion, so there are in all probability many more examples. See above, 31ff., on Diodorus' aims.

source for his work, using parts of Timaeus to illustrate other points that otherwise would not be made, or for other points of view, resulting in contradictions in the text. Trying to prove a point like this is certainly impossible when other positively attributed fragments were disregarded, as how can one identify, for example, the writing style of a historian if that style has never been established from known fragments?

It is hardly necessary to discuss here the sources used by Diodorus in books other than Eleven, but one problem in particular does indicate others in Laqueur's work. The theory that if Ephorus' contribution was removed then we would be left with 'pure Timaeus' certainly does not hold true for some sections of Diodorus' narrative, for example smaller sections such as II.55-60, where Iambulus is named as the source, and V.42-6 which mentions Euhemerus. While this does not rule out Ephorus as Diodorus' main source, it does open up the possibility that Diodorus was not restricted to Ephorus and Timaeus alone, but did indeed use other authors, although how much they were used cannot really be determined.

Book Eleven itself is a problematic one. Described by Brown as a 'miserable narrative of events' and as 'inconsequential' and 'careless' it does in a way epitomise what many see as wrong with Diodorus in general⁷⁸. As regards sources, there is simply no mention of either Ephorus or Timaeus in the whole book, which survives in its entirety. However, this does not rule out their usage. Laqueur himself believed that Book Eleven was mainly the work of Ephorus, in keeping with his main theory. The reason for this is Ephorus fr.186, which maintains that Persia and Carthage acted in unison in invading Greece and Sicily:

οἷα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶι δαμασθέντες πάθον, ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὃ σφιν ἐν πόντῳ βάλεν ἀλικίαν, Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας] ἔνιοι μὲν Ἑλλάδα τὴν Σικελίαν ἤκουσαν, τινὲς δὲ Ἑλλάδα τὴν Ἀττικὴν. εἰκὸς δὲ ταῖς Ἐφόρου ἱστορίαις ἐντυχόντα τὸν Πίνδαρον ἐξηκολουθηκέναι αὐτὸν αὐτῶι. ἱστορεῖ γὰρ Ἐφορος τοιοῦτον, ὅτι παρασκευαζομένου Ξέρξου τὸν ἐπὶ τῆι Ἑλλάδι στόλον, πρέσβεις παραγενέσθαι πρὸς Γέλωνα τὸν τύραννον ἰκετεύοντας εἰς τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων σύλλογον ἐλθεῖν· ἐκ δὲ Περσῶν καὶ Φοινίκων πρέσβεις πρὸς Καρχηδονίους προστάσσοντας ὡς πλεῖστον δέοι στόλον εἰς Σικελίαν βαδίζειν <καὶ> καταστρεψαμένους τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φρονούοντας πλεῖν ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον. ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τὸν λόγον δεξαμένων καὶ τοῦ μὲν Ἰέρωνος συμμαχῆσαι τοῖς Ἑλλησι προθυμουμένου, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἐτοίμων ὄντων συμπρᾶξαι τῶι Ξέρξει, Γέλωνα διακοσίας εὐτρεπίσαντα ναῦς καὶ δισχιλίους ἵππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς μυρίους κατακοῦσαι στόλον Καρχηδονίων καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ Σικελίαν, καὶ διαμαχησάμενον μὴ μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐλευθερῶσαι, ἀλλὰ

⁷⁸ Brown (1952) 343.

καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. εἰκὸς οὖν ταύτῃ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ ἐντετυχηκέναι τὸν Πίνδαρον.

Ephorus FGrH 70 F186 (sch. Pindar *Pyth.* I 146b)

This is consistent with Diodorus' own feelings on the subject⁷⁹, but Laqueur neglects to mention two other perfectly reasonable possibilities; firstly that Timaeus also mentions this pact, although it does not appear in our extant fragments, or even that Diodorus used a third, unknown, source which Ephorus himself may also have used⁸⁰. Laqueur does, as ever, attribute some small sections of Book Eleven to Timaeus, but most scholars are in agreement that he supplied far more of Diodorus' information, especially for his Sicilian chapters⁸¹. In particular, Brown and Pearson have done the most to substantiate the claim that Book Eleven is mostly Timaeian, and although Pearson actually focuses on Book Thirteen in his criticism of Laqueur's theory, he does also bring Eleven into his own argument to prove it applies elsewhere⁸².

The bulk of the Sicilian narrative in Book Eleven starts with chapter 20, where we hear of the vast array of troops gathered by Hamilcar of Carthage, in preparation for their invasion of Sicily:

οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν πεζὰς τε καὶ ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις μεγάλας ἐξέπλευσεν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνης, ἔχων πεζὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῶν τριάκοντα μυριάδων, ναῦς δὲ μακρὰς πλείους τῶν δισχιλίων (amended by Dindorf to διακοσίων), καὶ χωρὶς πολλὰς ναῦς φορτίδας τὰς κομιζούσας τὴν ἀγοράν, ὑπὲρ τὰς τρισχιλίας.

Diod. Sic. XI.20.2

This account is consistent with the numbers given by the same author, in the first chapter of Book Eleven.

⁷⁹ Diod. Sic. XI.1.4, 20.1.

⁸⁰ Scherr (1933) 2, also omits this possibility. A candidate for an earlier source may be Antiochus of Syracuse (*FGrH* IIC, p.88), as Brown (1952) 344 suggests, as well as noting that there is no verbal link between Diodorus' account and the Ephoran fragment. Pearson (1984) 16, points out the danger in assuming that Timaeus did not mention the pact simply because his account has not survived to us.

⁸¹ Earlier scholars who held this belief included Volquardsen (1868), Meyer (1944) vol.4 pp.376-7 and Jacoby *FGrH* IIC, p.88. However, Jacoby does succumb to many of the same assumptions as Laqueur, in his coverage of the fragments of Ephorus. For example in *FGrH* IIC, p.88 Jacoby makes the 'Diodorus – Ephorus = Timaeus' mistake, while also concluding that Diod. Sic. X.33-4, where Gelon makes his promise of troops to the Greeks, must also come from Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F186, despite the existence of other sources who may well have recorded this, including Timaeus himself and perhaps even Herodotus VII.158. In reference to the same fragment, where Ephorus records the number of Greek troops at Himera, Jacoby not only assumes that Ephorus clearly uses Herodotus as a source (although Herodotus refers only to the numbers of troops promised by Gelon to the Greeks, not for Himera itself) but also that Ephorus' figures should be amended as a result.

⁸² Brown (1952) 337-55, Pearson (1984) 1-20. Pearson's main aim in this article is simply to show how Laqueur's own theories cannot be valid because of his technique in differentiating Ephoran passages in Diodorus from the Timaeian. Pearson chooses to concentrate mostly on Book Thirteen as Laqueur feels this backs up his theory most effectively.

ἀκολούθως οὖν ταῖς συνθήκαις Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν χρημάτων πλῆθος
 ἄθροίσαντες μισθοφόρους συνῆγον ἕκ τε τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ Λιγυστικῆς, ἔτι
 δὲ Γαλατίας καὶ Ἰβηρίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕκ τῆς Λιβύης ἀπάσης καὶ τῆς
 Καρχηδόνας κατέγραφον πολιτικὰς δυνάμεις· τέλος δὲ τριετῆ χρόνον περὶ
 τὰς παρασκευὰς ἀσχοληθέντες ἤθροισαν πεζῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τὰς τριάκοντα
 μυριάδας, ναῦς δὲ διακοσίας.

Diod. Sic. XI.1.5

The figures for infantry are quite consistent, not only with each other but also the numbers given by Herodotus⁸³, although the second Diodorus passage does claim *more than* 300,000 infantry went to Sicily. Although this may be a sign of subtle exaggeration on existing figures, it is not really enough to arouse great suspicion. As regards the number of ships, Brown claims that the later passage, XI.20, is guiltier of exaggeration than the other, as the number of warships mentioned is suddenly ten times greater than the number mentioned in XI.1, as well as including the 3,000 supply ships⁸⁴. However, this was amended by Dindorf from *δισχιλίων*, as it seems to read in the original manuscript, to a more consistent *διακοσίων*, assuming that there was a mistake in the transmission of the text at some point⁸⁵. However, rather than attributing XI.20 directly to Timaeus, as others may have done, owing to that historian's criticism at the hands of Polybius for exaggerating the importance of Sicilian events, Brown decides to attribute it to an anonymous author he calls the "Ἀμίλκων" source (in reference to the unusual number of times this form of Hamilcar's name appears in Diodorus' narrative), noting that Timaeus, where compared to other sources, is usually more conservative with his figures than other historians and far less prone to exaggeration⁸⁶. Despite the initial problem of Brown and his ignorance of the work done by Dindorf⁸⁷, we will continue considering his "Ἀμίλκων" theory throughout this chapter, as his main argument does not rest solely on this passage, but concerns Book Eleven as a whole, as well as being a good example of how varied the theories are on the matter of Diodorus' sources.

It seems as if Pearson does not want to comment on the listing of Carthaginian troops, but does, like Brown, emphasise the importance of allowing for other sources, in the context of

⁸³ Hdt. VII.165.

⁸⁴ Brown (1952) 347-8.

⁸⁵ Dindorf (1878) 367.

⁸⁶ Ephorus actually halves the number of hoplites offered by Gelon to the Greeks, given by Herodotus (VII.158), from 20,000 to 10,000 (Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F186 (sch. Pind. *Pyth.* I.146b).

⁸⁷ The amendment has, in general, been quite uncontroversial except in this case.

the Persia-Carthage agreement in XI.20⁸⁸. Already it seems as if we are moving away, not only from Laqueur's Ephorus theory, but even from the idea that there was a *single* main source for Book Eleven. This is further realised when one is reminded that there is far more happening in this book than affairs in Sicily, in particular the Persian Wars, various conflicts within Greece proper, and events of note that occurred in the Persian Empire itself, and also in Rome.

Contrary to Laqueur's view that the narrative is littered with contradictions⁸⁹, both Brown and Pearson seem to find Diodorus' account of the Carthaginian invasion quite clear, with one section logically following another regardless of the source being used. It is Brown's opinion that the anonymous 'Αμίλκων' source is still in use when we come to the start of the invasion itself, noting that many key features are consistent, for example the theme of the importance of the cavalry, where the Carthaginians lose theirs at sea, the Greek cavalry take huge numbers (10,000) of prisoners in the early stages of the conflict, and of course Gelon's plan to sabotage Carthage's use of Selinuntine cavalry which meant a comparatively easy victory for the tyrant⁹⁰. Brown also points out the consistent use of καταπεπληγμένους (dismay) throughout not only the Sicilian narrative, but also in terms of the Greeks in the face of the vast Persian force, and there is also the theme of the inadequacy of Theron of Acragas⁹¹. The dismay theme perhaps indicates the use of a particular source through *both* the Sicilian and Greek narratives, which further complicates matters, but the theme of Theron's inability is consistent with Herodotus' account, rather than in the main thread of Diodorus' narrative where the cause of the war is attributed to Persian and Carthaginian aggression, rather than the removal of Terillus of Himera by Theron, which is not mentioned at all⁹². We may get the impression from Diodorus that Theron was (understandably) unable to defend Himera himself, but not that the war was his responsibility to start with. However, Brown does seem correct regarding his main point of consistency. The use of the 'Αμίλκων' source is thought to

⁸⁸ Pearson (1984) 16.

⁸⁹ Laqueur on Himera – (1936) col.1083ff.

⁹⁰ Diod. Sic. XI.20.2, 21.2, 4-5

⁹¹ Diod. Sic. XI.16.1, 21.1, 23.2, 33.4, 41.4. A search for καταπεπληγμένους and its derivatives shows that Diodorus likes to use this word more than any other Greek author, particularly around books XI and XIV.

⁹² See later chapter on foreign policy, 96ff.

continue until 21.3, which is recognised as a break by both Brown and Laqueur⁹³, but the main difference between the two lies in the fact that Laqueur reckoned it to mark the *end* of a small break in the use of the main source, from πλησιάσας τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἱμεραίων ... (21.1) to the rejoining of the main narrative at ... εὐθὺς ἐζήτει, ... (21.3). Brown sees καθόλου δὲ Γέλων στρατηγία καὶ συνέσει διαφέρων εὐθὺς ἐζήτει ... as the start of a new section where Diodorus is using a new source, until he resumes work with the ‘Ἀμίλκων’ source at the start of 22.4. There seem to be two reasons why Brown sees this as a break in the text: firstly there is the use of Hamilcar’s personal name, in that it is only mentioned once in the first ‘Ἀμίλκων’ section (20-21.3), whereas it is mentioned at five separate occasions in the passage using the ‘new’ source (21.3-22.3), including four in close proximity. The second reason involves the actual subject matter of the narrative, which involves the formulation of a plan by Gelon to gain entry into the Carthaginian camp, which is carried out to perfection.

καθόλου δὲ Γέλων στρατηγία καὶ συνέσει διαφέρων εὐθὺς ἐζήτει, δι' οὗ τρόπου καταστρατηγήσας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀκινδύνως αὐτῶν ἄρδην ἀνελεῖ τὴν δύναμιν. συνεβάλετο δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον πρὸς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν μεγάλα, τοιαύτης γενομένης περιστάσεως. κρίναντος αὐτοῦ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς ἐμπρῆσαι, καὶ τοῦ Ἀμίλκα διατρίβοντος μὲν κατὰ τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατοπεδείαν, παρασκευαζομένου δὲ θύειν τῷ Ποσειδῶνι μεγαλοπρεπῶς, ἦκον ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ἰππεῖς ἄγοντες πρὸς τὸν Γέλωνα βιβλιαφόρον ἐπιστολὰς κομίζοντα παρὰ Σελινουντίων, ἐν αἷς ἦν γεγραμμένον, ὅτι πρὸς ἦν ἔγραψεν ἡμέραν Ἀμίλκας ἀποστεῖλαι τοὺς ἰππεῖς, πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐκπέμψουσιν. οὔσης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης καθ' ἣν ἔμελλε συντελεῖν τὴν θυσίαν Ἀμίλκας, κατὰ ταύτην Γέλων ἀπέστειλεν ἰδίους ἰππεῖς, οἷς ἦν προστεταγμένον περιελθεῖν τοὺς πλησίον τόπους καὶ προσελαύνειν ἅμ' ἡμέρα πρὸς τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ὡς ὄντας Σελινουντίων συμμάχους, γενομένους δ' ἐντὸς τοῦ ξυλίνου τείχους τὸν μὲν Ἀμίλκαν ἀποκτεῖναι, τὰς δὲ ναῦς ἐμπρῆσαι. ἐξέπεμψε δὲ καὶ σκοποὺς εἰς τοὺς ὑπερκειμένους λόφους, οἷς προσέταξεν, ὅταν ἴδωσι τοὺς ἰππεῖς γενομένους ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους, ἄραι τὸ σύσσημον. αὐτὸς δ' ἅμ' ἡμέρα τὴν δύναμιν διατεταχῶς ἀνέμενε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν σκοπῶν ἐσομένην δῆλωσιν.

Diod. Sic. XI.21.3-5

The reason why this passage, as well as that which follows, describing the execution of the plan (22.1-3), is thought to be of a separate source is that this passage seems to attribute Gelon’s victory ultimately to chance and Gelon’s ability to use it to his advantage. The passage which seems to mark a return to the ‘Ἀμίλκων’ source (22.4ff.), is said by Brown to claim the victory was only due to Gelon’s skilled generalship, with no reference to the good fortune he also enjoyed. Brown then goes on to make a suggestion that is the *reverse* of what is normally

⁹³ See Brown (1952) 352-3.

accepted, by proposing that Timaeus himself is the source for the story of Gelon's cavalry plan, and therefore is *not* forming the bulk of the narrative for the Carthaginian invasion, as is normally thought to be the case. The use of what Brown calls an 'improbable device' by this source is apparently typical of the kind of historian that Timaeus was, who did not mind adding such stories to his narrative, as long as it helped to emphasise Gelon's (and the Siceliots') great achievement⁹⁴. While this may indeed be the case, the theory that Timaeus *only* provided for this small section of the narrative on the Carthaginian invasion is by no means flawless. One could easily apply the same idea, that the more improbable events were a result of Timaeus' effort to enrich the tradition of Gelon's triumph and help immortalise his name, to the events of chapter 20, where the Carthaginian fleet carrying the cavalry and chariots were *all* destroyed in a storm, along with Hamilcar's supposed comments on how the war had been decided before the Carthaginians had even reached Sicily.

οὗτος μὲν οὖν διανύσας τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος καὶ χειμασθεὶς ἀπέβαλε τῶν σκαφῶν τὰ κομίζοντα τοὺς ἵππεῖς καὶ τὰ ἄρματα. καταπλεύσας δὲ τῆς Σικελίας εἰς τὸν ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ λιμένα διαπεπολεμηκέναι τὸν πόλεμον ἔφησε· πεφοβῆσθαι γὰρ μήποτε ἢ θάλαττα τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐξέλῃται τῶν κινδύνων.

Diod. Sic. XI.20.2

Taking into account what we already know of Timaeus, it certainly would not be surprising if this was an extract from one of the speeches that he had liked to compose himself. Another problem with the account of the Carthaginian invasion that Diodorus has given us is that there still seem to be contradictions within the text which concern Laqueur. One of these occurs in a passage which is 'cut out' by Laqueur to reveal the Ephoran material, 21.1-3, where he notes the sudden switch of Gelon's location from inside Himera's city walls, to the Syracusan camp when the battle starts later on (22). These passages have also been separated by Brown (see above – 20-21.3 ('Amílκων' source), 21.3-22.3 (Timaeus?)), which may explain the difference, but Pearson has a different view, that this kind of 'free movement' in 21.1 is typical of Timaeus' own style of writing, clearly conflicting with Brown's view of more than one source being used here⁹⁵.

⁹⁴ Brown (1952) 353. For the emphasis on Western Greek achievements, see above 42ff..

⁹⁵ Pearson (1984) 17. Pearson claims that another example of this 'free movement' is found in XIII.85ff., where Diodorus describes the siege of Acragas, another Sicilian episode, which is studied by Pearson himself earlier in this article, and is attributed to Timaeus as a result of the style.

Pearson finds different explanations for other contradictions discovered by Laqueur, for example in one instance (XI.22.1) in Diodorus' description of the battle at Himera.

τῶν δ' ἰπέων ἅμα τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολῇ προσιππευσάντων τῇ ναυτικῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατοπεδείᾳ, καὶ προσδεχθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν φυλάκων ὡς συμμάχων, οὗτοι μὲν εὐθὺς προσδραμόντες τῷ Ἀμίλκᾳ περὶ τὴν θυσίαν γινομένῳ, τοῦτον μὲν ἀνεῖλον, τὰς δὲ ναῦς ἐνέπρησαν· ἔπειτα τῶν σκοπῶν ἀράντων τὸ σύσσημον, ὁ Γέλων πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει συντεταγμένη προῆγεν ἐπὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

Diod. Sic. XI.22.1

Pearson thinks that Diodorus would have expected his audience to realise that there were two different series of events occurring simultaneously in the narrative, concerning the Greeks inside the city, and those outside, led by Gelon⁹⁶. Diodorus intends his audience to understand that the Greeks outside the city were mobilised when the scouts raised the signal before they set fire to the ships, but Laqueur decides to take the narrative too literally, interpreting the passage as a clash between two sources, one saying the signal was raised as soon as the Greek cavalymen entered the camp, the other saying that the signal was the smoke raised from the ships set on fire.

There is a similar complaint by Pearson soon after, when describing XI.38.2-6, on Gelon's burial. Laqueur thinks there is a contradiction between Diodorus saying that Gelon's wishes not to have an elaborate funerary monument were obeyed, and the following description of his burial which took place in the magnificent Nine Towers on land owned by his wife, and Laqueur comes to the usual conclusion that there are two sources (Ephorus, then Timaeus) stuck together⁹⁷. Pearson notes that while Diodorus wants to show how Gelon's fame lived on despite his monument being destroyed by the Carthaginians, there is another point that goes unelaborated which means that Gelon's wishes were in fact met, because the Nine Towers complex already existed by the time he died and it is this rather than his personal monument that gains Diodorus' attention. Therefore it is possible that Diodorus is not contradicting himself here, it is only the case that Diodorus is emphasising the wrong point (Gelon's fame) rather than explicitly saying that his wishes were indeed met⁹⁸.

⁹⁶ Pearson (1984) 17-8.

⁹⁷ Laqueur (1936) col. 1087.

⁹⁸ Pearson (1984) 18.

Returning to the Carthaginian invasion, there is, in conclusion, still much conflict in scholarship concerning the correct identification of Diodorus' sources for his narrative, plus that of the order in which they were used, and they are questions that may well remain unanswered unless the relevant passages of Timaeus, Ephorus or perhaps another historian such as Antiochus of Syracuse, ever come to light. Only in one part of Diodorus' account do we have positive evidence regarding identification of an original source, this is for Diodorus' statement that Himera occurred at the same time as Thermopylae, obviously connected with Ephorus' claim of a Persia/Carthage plot mentioned above⁹⁹:

συνέβη γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ τὸν Γέλωνα νικῆσαι καὶ τοὺς περὶ Θερμοπύλας μετὰ Λεωνίδου διαγωνίσασθαι πρὸς Ξέρξην, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες τοῦ δαιμονίου περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ποιήσαντος γενέσθαι τὴν τε καλλίστην νίκην καὶ τὴν ἐνδοξοτάτην ἦτταν.

Diod. Sic. XI.24.1

Herodotus himself differs on this matter, his (Sicilian) source informing him that it occurred on the same day as Salamis¹⁰⁰. Brown suggests two reasons as to why this difference happens: firstly the author may be giving Himera 'chronological priority', adding to its importance, or secondly that there was a naval conflict after Himera which led to Herodotus' comparison with Salamis¹⁰¹. The latter seems unlikely considering there is no mention of such an event in any of our sources. Another reason for choosing a comparison with Thermopylae may be related to the fairest victory/most honourable defeat comparison, as in both cases the defeated side suffered such severe losses only a few actually survived to report the loss¹⁰². There are further parallels pointed out by Brown, for instance the contempt held by Hamilcar and Xerxes for the Greeks, and the destruction of their fleets. The earliest known parallel made between Himera (plus Hieron's victory at Cumae) and the Persian Wars is found in Pindar's First Pythian Ode:

λίσσομαι νεῦσον, Κρονίων, ἡμερον
 ὄφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσα-
 νῶν τ' ἀλαλατὸς ἔχη, ναυ-
 σίστονον ὕβριν ἰδὼν τὰν πρὸ Κύμας,
 οἷα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶ δαμασθέντες πάθον,
 ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὃ σφιν ἐν πόν-
 τῳ βάλεθ' ἀλικίαν,

⁹⁹ See above, 39.

¹⁰⁰ Hdt. VII.166.

¹⁰¹ Brown (1952) 351.

¹⁰² Himera – Diod. Sic. XI.24.2, Thermopylae – Hdt. VII.229-32.

Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας. ἀρέομαι
 πὰρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθηναίων χάριν
 μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' <ἀπὸ> τῶν πρὸ Κιθαιρῶ-
 νος μαχᾶν,
 ταῖσι Μήδειοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι,
 παρ<ᾶ> δὲ τῶν εὐυδρον ἄκταν
 Ἴμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις,
 τὸν ἐδέξαντ' ἀμφ' ἀρετῆ, πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν καμόντων.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.71-80

The context of this ode was to celebrate Hieron's victory in the chariot race at Delphi, probably in 470 BC. This would place it very early as a potential source for the history of Deinomenid Sicily, only being composed ten years after Himera and four years after Cumae. Here the comparison is made between these two Western battles and those at Plataea and Salamis. It is therefore possible that this ode, or at least people's memories of it, may have acted as the root source for the various accounts of Herodotus (who claims to use a Sicilian source¹⁰³) and as the original authority used by Ephorus, and therefore also Diodorus.

Overall, it can hardly be said that Diodorus excels as a historian. It is true that, at times, the *Bibliothèque* can be very muddled and even plain contradictory, however, it has clearly been shown that Diodorus was more than a compiler of stories, cutting out passages from Ephorus and Timaeus and pasting them into a very extensive scrapbook. Some of the harsher criticisms that have been levelled at the *Bibliothèque* have been shown to be without any grounding in actual fact, in particular those of Barber and Laqueur. The flaws evident in these criticisms make them, in themselves, worth criticising at the most fundamental level. To put it simply, it is not possible to examine the contributions of Ephorus and Timaeus to the *Bibliothèque* if the fragments that actually survive from these historians are totally ignored, as they are by Barber and Laqueur. Sadly, the book of concern to us, Book Eleven of the *Bibliothèque*, suffers from a similar problem with no references to either Ephorus or Timaeus evident, and this makes the task of deciding whether a passage is 'Ephoran', 'Timaeian' or even 'Diodoran' so difficult, as to almost make it futile without further evidence. Yet, Ephorus and

¹⁰³ It is worth noting that there is another synchronisation later on in Herodotus' work, that of the battles of Mycale and Plataea – IX.90. Marincola notes this occurrence as 'suspiciously similar' to the claim that Himera and Salamis were synchronised (see his notes on De Sélincourt's translation of the *Histories*, p.600 n.40). See also the foreign policy chapter below, 92.

Timaeus are *still* assumed to make the greatest contribution to Book Eleven, such is the way that they dominate Diodoran studies.

On a more positive note, we have found how Diodorus himself had an impact on his work, for better or for worse, through his very definite moral aims in writing the *Bibliothēke*. At least in this case of criticism of Diodorus, his bias towards those who set a good example for others to follow, allows for his own contribution to the work, and tells us something constructive about Diodorus as a historian. Nevertheless, such is the reputation of Diodorus and the course that Diodoran studies has taken, some have even tried to attribute his very aims to other authors.

Herodotus and Thucydides

While Diodorus certainly provides us with most of our information (and also problems) on the subject of the Sicilian tyrants, it is also worth emphasising the importance of the contribution from earlier historians, particularly Herodotus, towards our knowledge of the reign of Hippocrates and of Gelon up until the Himera campaign. This will be noticed in the chapter on foreign policy in particular, as without Herodotus we would be left with only a very confused version of events from Diodorus, without knowing the crucial events before the Carthaginian invasion, especially involving Theron of Acragas' annexation of Himera¹⁰⁴.

It is also worth saying a few words about Herodotus himself at this point, although it would be impossible to make a summary of Herodotean scholarship in general that would not take up too much space and leave many important questions unconsidered as a result. Instead we will concentrate only on the questions of Herodotus' approach to tyranny, and both his and Thucydides' treatment of Western Greek history, these being the most central and obvious problems for our purposes.

Herodotus has traditionally been viewed as a democrat in the past, for example von Fritz wrote an article about Herodotus' pre-occupation with 'freedom', especially as a contrasting concept to the yoke of tyranny and oriental despotism that was often borne by

¹⁰⁴ See below 92ff.

peoples in the Persian Empire¹⁰⁵. Such freedom was of course enjoyed by the citizens of Athens following the fall of the Peisistratid tyranny, a point often emphasised by Herodotus¹⁰⁶. Of course this point has usually been backed up by the general belief, at least in the modern, Western world, that democracy is very much a desirable thing and autocracy is necessarily a terrible form of government, not surprising considering the historical background of the 20th century. Surely therefore, Herodotus must have favoured democratic government, how could he, or anyone, not prefer it to tyranny? Unfortunately for us, it is just not this simple. The democracy in Athens was, of course, a far more extreme form than we are used to, and was prone to problems more acute, for example demagoguery and ostracism.

Even our preconceptions about tyranny are unsafe, and we must come to the terms with the idea that at least for a time in Greece, the word *tyrannos* was not a term that caused revulsion as it would now¹⁰⁷. However, the use of *tyrannos* did gradually become less neutral in Greece as the Classical Period progressed, though it seems that feelings towards tyranny varied depending on a particular city's own experiences with it, for example, Corinth seems to be amongst the earliest to denounce it as a terrible phenomenon due to its own suffering in the hands of the Cypselid dynasty¹⁰⁸. Parker has shown that the word *tyrannos* itself had developed its negative connotations in Athens first, so that when considering the work of historians, Thucydides (being the first to write history in the Attic dialect) was the first to fully distinguish *tyrannos* from *basileus*¹⁰⁹. But what about Herodotus' own feelings on the subject, even if he was not *fully* aware of the differences between tyrants and kings, was there any kind of distinction made, and can we learn anything from his *Histories* that may affect his account of the reigns of Hippocrates and Gelon?

The question has been raised on a number of occasions, but with differing answers depending on how one chooses to go about finding it. The most successful effort at trying to

¹⁰⁵ Von Fritz (1965) 5ff.

¹⁰⁶ Hdt. V.78.

¹⁰⁷ For perhaps the best example of this see the later chapter on propaganda, particularly on the use of *tyrannos* by Pindar, 193ff., where the term is clearly interchangeable with *basileus*.

¹⁰⁸ Hdt. V.92. The speech of Sosicles is in the context of a debate on whether to reinstate Hippias as tyrant of Athens. Of course the question of how much of Sosicles' speech is genuine, and how much input Herodotus himself had into it, would carry great weight in the debate on Herodotus' own approach to tyranny.

¹⁰⁹ Parker (1998) 164.

prove that Herodotus was *not* anti-tyranny in principle, or at least that he did not let his prejudices affect his work, is that by Waters¹¹⁰. In general, his work is based on the careful study of 15 'core' tyrants, those who play the greatest part in Herodotus' narrative, though not necessarily those who are involved in the main thread of the story, the expansion of the Persian Empire and its attempt at subjugation of the Greeks. However, before Waters goes into this discussion of individual tyrants he also considers the two main passages often used as evidence for Herodotean views on types of government, the constitutional debate in Persia and the speech of Sosicles on why Hippias should not be restored as tyrant in Athens¹¹¹. In the case of the constitutional debate, Waters is of the opinion that if Herodotus wanted an opportunity to express his thoughts on why monarchy/tyranny was a bad form of government, then contrary to what one may initially think, this is not an ideal point in the narrative. Why would it be ideal when a monarchical style of government wins the day? It seems even less likely when one considers that the arguments made against monarchy are hardly upheld by the rule of Darius which follows the debate. While these are valid points, and Waters is also correct in saying that it is only with the preconception that Herodotus was anti-tyranny (as opposed to anti-democracy or anti-oligarchy) that one could come to this conclusion regarding this passage, the constitutional debate was an excellent opportunity for Herodotus to voice his own opinions, whether he was in favour of monarchy or not, and a similar opportunity presents itself in Sosicles' speech.

Waters points out that although the context of the speech is meant to point out the evils of tyranny, this is never actually done in the speech itself. The first half, especially the part concerning the early life of Cypselus, is distinctly anti-oligarchic. It is clear that the prophecies from the Delphic oracle spell the end of Bacchiad rule in Corinth and that this is certainly not made out to be a bad thing for the city itself, and the actions of the Bacchiadae in trying to destroy Labda's baby certainly do not arouse any sympathy for them from the audience. The rule of Cypselus is treated very briefly indeed, although what is said is enough to give a very bad impression of him, being a violent man who exiled many and killed even more, and this is

¹¹⁰ Waters (1971), also (1985).

¹¹¹ Waters (1971) 11-15. Hdt. III.80ff. (Persian debate), V.92 (Sosicles' speech).

not mentioned by Waters. In the account of Periander's life there is only one instance of 'bad rule', this being the tyrant's trickery in robbing the women of Corinth of their clothes and jewellery, in order to dedicate it to his late wife, Melissa. Waters feels that this passage is distinctly 'tongue-in-cheek' on Herodotus' part, it is a massive anti-climax to what is supposed to be a harrowing account of the evils of tyranny, brought to us by a citizen of a country that had all too much experience of them. This episode of Periander's reign is more cheeky than evil, although his committing necrophilia (again with his dead wife, and again conveniently ignored by Waters) is indeed disturbing. While Waters seems to be right about the under-emphasis of the Cypselids' bad rule, he himself is guilty of being selective in his search for relevant material.

On the other side of the argument, we have an article by Ferrill which examines the use of the terms *tyrannos*, *basileus* and *monarchos* in Herodotus' work¹¹². Ferrill argues against the more conventional idea that these three terms were interchangeable to Herodotus, which has been argued by scholars such as Andrewes and White in the past¹¹³, by considering the circumstances in which these alternative titles were used. It appears that the term *basileus* was far the most commonly used title in the *Histories*, being found 860 times compared with 128 mentions of *tyrannos* and 19 of *monarchos*, but Greek tyrants are only called *basileus* 8 times, and in each case, bar the last, convincing arguments are put forward explaining why the title is used¹¹⁴. Likewise, there are around 20 cases in Herodotus' work in which the constitutional

¹¹² Ferrill (1978) 385-98.

¹¹³ Andrewes (1956) 27 argued that although the Greek tyrants were mostly named as *tyrannos*, and Eastern kings as *basileus*, there are cases where tyrants are called *basileus*, the most famous example being that of Telys of Sybaris where he is called both *tyrannos* and *basileus* in the same chapter. White (1955) 1-18 noted that although the term *tyrannos* had indeed become more derogatory in the Attic use of the word, historians such as Herodotus continued with using it as interchangeable with *basileus*. More recently Parker (1998) 161-5 has also advocated the idea of interchangeability in Herodotus.

¹¹⁴ Ferrill (1978) 388-91. Of the eight instances, two are in direct speech to a tyrant (fisherman to Polycrates, III.42; ambassador to Gelon, VII.161), one in direct speech from a tyrant to his son (Periander to Lycophron, III.52), implying that the use of *basileus* was preferred to *tyrannos*. Scythes of Zancle (VI.24) is clearly favoured by Herodotus, perhaps explaining his use of *basileus* to describe him rather than the more accurate *tyrannos*, whereas Cypselus is called *basileus* by the Delphic oracle (V.92), whose utterances were recorded and so this was unlikely to be Herodotus' own words. Aristophilides of Tarentum (III.136) has not been positively identified as a tyrant, and little is known about him, but it is not inconceivable that as a Spartan colony, Tarentum may have had a constitutional monarchy. In the case of Telys of Sybaris (V.44), where he is clearly named as both *tyrannos* and *basileus* in the same passage, Ferrill argues that the use of two sources, as is clearly stated by Herodotus, leads to this apparent contradiction because one account is clearly favourable to both Sybaris and Telys, in which he is called *basileus*, and the other is clearly unfavourable, which includes the word *tyrannos*. Finally, Aristagoras is described as fearing the loss of his kingship at Miletus (V.37), and Ferrill suggests that Herodotus was

monarchs of the East are described as *tyrannos* or a derivative, however, in these cases the king (or satrap in one case, Artayctes – IX.116) is shown to be ruling despotically, and even cruelly¹¹⁵. In the famous constitutional debate in Persia, Darius, the advocate for monarchy, uses the word *basileus* while making his case, while his opponents prefer to use *tyrannos* to describe the situations in which the monarchy begins to abuse its power¹¹⁶. The term *monarchos*, at least according to Ferrill, is the only term of the three which is actually interchangeable with either *tyrannos* or *basileus*, and this is because of its truly neutral meaning of sole ruler¹¹⁷.

Taking both the work of Waters and Ferrill into account, we come to the seemingly contradictory conclusion that Herodotus did indeed abhor tyranny, even using *tyrannos* as a derogatory term for non-tyrants, but was not necessarily disgusted with all tyrants themselves, and was even ready to applaud some whose legacy had positive aspects. However, anticipating this, Ferrill notes at the end of his article that the recording of such achievements, for example Gelon's victory at Himera, should not be allowed to hide the fact that Herodotus found their rule despicable, giving a more familiar example of the construction of autobahns in Germany under the Third Reich to illustrate this¹¹⁸. Great achievements do not necessarily equate to good rule.

Herodotus and Thucydides on Western Greek Affairs

It is true of course that we are hardly overwhelmed with information concerning the Western Mediterranean, that is if we only take note of the greatest of the early writers to concern themselves with history, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. Herodotus, whose main concern was the rise of Persia up to and including their invasions of Greece in 490 and

recording what he imagined may have been the thoughts of Aristagoras himself, though also admitting that no strong argument could be made otherwise, as Aristagoras was clearly unpopular and could not be described as ruling as a *basileus*.

¹¹⁵ See Ferrill (1978) 391-7. Examples include Astyages and his plot to murder Cyrus (I.109) and Cyaxares' treatment of some unsuccessful Scythian hunters (I.73). One additional example of interchangeability of titles is shown by Parker (1998) 162, in the case of Philocyprus king of Soli, whom is said to have been praised by Solon but yet is described by Herodotus as a tyrant – V.113. This example is apparently unknown to Ferrill.

¹¹⁶ Hdt. III.80ff.

¹¹⁷ Ferrill (1978) 397 n.38 considers all 19 cases of the use of *monarchos* in Herodotus.

¹¹⁸ Ferrill (1978) 397 n.38.

480-79, may be expected never to give much coverage because the Greeks of the West were not involved in the war. We find that the West is only mentioned if it is relevant to the narrative, the most notable case being the Greek envoys sent to Syracuse in order to convince Gelon to help with the war effort¹¹⁹. Therefore Herodotus' own personal circumstances which led to his moving to Thurioi in Italy, does not seem to have influenced his work.

Xenophon is, naturally, the least useful for our period, as his *Hellenica* is wholly focused on 411-362 BC, but even so his coverage of major events in the West during this period is virtually non-existent. This point is made all the more significant by the fact that one of the major figures of this age, Dionysius, is almost absent, and the city he ruled, Syracuse, was arguably the most powerful state in the Mediterranean basin¹²⁰. Thucydides gives far more coverage, but his narrative, being centred on the Peloponnesian War, treats Western affairs as a peripheral matter, of importance only when the Sicilians become involved in the war themselves, from Book Six onwards. A brief history of Sicily starts Book Six, from the first mythical inhabitants (the Cyclopes and the Laestrygonians), through the settlement of the Sicans, Elymians, Sicels and Phoenicians, to the founding of the Greek colonies, along with about a paragraph on the history of each major city¹²¹. The last of these cities, Camarina, is discussed at length later on, and we find that Thucydides is certainly a significant source in this case and provides us with useful information not found elsewhere¹²². However, it must also be

¹¹⁹ Hdt. VII.153-67. See also the chapter on foreign policy 93ff.

¹²⁰ Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 72, list Syracuse during the fourth century BC as the largest Greek polis that ever existed, at least during the Archaic and Classical periods. The size of the polis is estimated at around 12,000 km², almost 50% larger than Sparta's territory at the height of its power (c. 8,400 km²). See also Fischer-Hansen, Nielsen and Ampolo (in Hansen and Nielsen (2004)) 225 and Karlsson (1992) map 2.a.

¹²¹ Thuc. VI.1-5. Hornblower (2004), in his recent study of the relationship between the odes of Pindar and the works of Thucydides, makes much of the common interest in colonial myths between the poet and the historian, 103-7. The point is also made that Sicily (and also Magna Graecia to an extent) formed the core of interest in both cases, with Thucydides including colonial myths in the context of his brief history of Sicily, which introduced the involvement of the various Siceliot cities in the Peloponnesian War, and many of Pindar's odes dedicated to Western Greeks, including many of the tyrants in Sicily. On the odes dedicated to the Deinomenids, see the later chapter on propaganda, 181ff.

¹²² See the refoundations chapter below - 138ff. Dover (1965) 2-5 comes to the conclusion that Thucydides' source for his treatment of the foundation of Greek cities in Sicily is Antiochus of Syracuse, being preferred over the other possible candidates Hellanicus of Lesbos and Hippys of Rhegion. The reasons for this are firstly, because Hellanicus' work was criticised by Thucydides as inaccurate (I.97.2, although this is in reference to Hellanicus' *Attic Chronicle*, rather than his other chronological work *Priestesses of Hera at Argos* which would have been used in this case) and since Hellanicus' work was well known, it is unlikely Thucydides would have risked using it for fear of being criticised for repeating the same inaccuracies himself. Hippys is ruled out because of Thucydides' omission of the foundations of Zancle and Himera in his account. It seems extremely unlikely that a Rhegian historian would have

pointed out that Thucydides' contribution to the history of Camarina, as we shall find, is not without very great problems, leading one to assume that the historian did not have such matters very high on his agenda regarding historical accuracy.

Conclusion

In addition to the conclusions made at the end of the Diodorus section above¹²³, a possible problem with how modern scholarship has approached the *Bibliothēke* is that it is not viewed as a work of its time, in other words, a time when it would have been easy to find a copy of Ephorus or Timaeus' work, which would render Diodorus' vast work utterly pointless if it were, say, chunks of Ephorus, Timaeus and Hieronymus simply glued together to form one book and paraded as his own. There is also the point that it took Diodorus around 30 years to compile the *Bibliothēke*, in other words, plenty of time to produce a decent work, and too long a time to spend doing something so completely useless. Diodorus would certainly not have been writing his *Bibliothēke* for a future age, say 2000 years later, when his own work would be available to read but when his sources were not, he would have written it for his *own* age, and this fact may possibly have been forgotten by the scholars who criticise the historian, often so viciously.

In the case of Herodotus, it seems that the main problem in judging his approach to the subject of tyranny, is of what question we are actually asking ourselves. Although it may not seem an obvious concern when at the outset, we must consider whether we are looking at Herodotus' treatment of tyrants in general, which does on the whole seem quite stereotyped with numerous themes reappearing throughout the *Histories*, indicating that Herodotus did have certain negative preconceptions about these rulers. On the other hand, his treatment of

left these out of his own work, and since it is also Dover's opinion that Thucydides was following his source extremely closely, so much so that it compromised his own normal use of vocabulary, then it follows that Thucydides could not have used this source. Dover's preferred option is Antiochus of Syracuse, who wrote a history of Sicily down to 424 BC, and whose known opinions tend to coincide with those of Thucydides. Antiochus was little known in Greece itself, so Thucydides could have safely summarised his material, presenting it as his own, with the additional point that as a Syracusan, Antiochus would have been more aware of the histories of Syracusan sub-colonies such as Camarina. The problems regarding Thucydides' accuracy on Camarinaean matters may be put down to careless research, a poor understanding of comparatively insignificant affairs in a faraway place, or even a zealous need to over-summarise his source's material, some of which is duplicated in Herodotus (VII.154).

¹²³ See above, 56.

particular tyrants seems to produce different results, with many certainly getting a far better press than others, seeming to imply that Herodotus accepted that there were, simply, good and bad monarchs, and his favourable portrayal of Gelon is one such example. Finally, on the subject of the coverage of Western Greek affairs given by the major historians of the Classical age, it seems that the subject suffered from the same Hellenocentricity (in this case referring to the land of Greece itself, not its people) as it has in modern scholarship. In the case of Xenophon, this neglect of Western Greek history is total, whereas in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides the Greeks of Italy and Sicily only appear when relevant to the narrative, and is sometimes treated without proper care.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TYRANTS' FOREIGN POLICY

As we now move on from our sources to their contents, we will examine many of the most prominent features of the tyrannies in Gela and Syracuse in the early fifth century BC. Clearly, given the rapid expansion of the tyrants' territory in Eastern Sicily, not only during this time but also during the reign of Dionysius I a century later, it makes sense to start with the tyrants' policy towards the other Greek states in Sicily. Also, since as we shall find out the two are clearly linked in both ages, the relations between the tyrants and the other superpower in the Western Mediterranean, Carthage, will also be examined. The main event of concern to us here, the Himera campaign of 480 BC, is of such great significance that it is necessary to examine it nearer the beginning of this thesis, so that much of the relevant background information is already provided for later chapters.

Relations with other Greeks

As we always discover, the relationship between one Greek *polis* and another is absolutely crucial to its well-being, not only with those neighbouring states who were often regarded as a threat at their own boundaries, but also those further away, with whom important commercial and political links may have been held. We can be sure that these would have applied to the Greek colonies as much as in the Greek mainland, and perhaps were even more important when a region, say Spain or North Africa, had been colonised for the first time and a new Greek city found itself surrounded by foreign peoples. Many colonial ventures were even undertaken by citizens of more than one Greek city, for example Gela was settled by both Rhodians and Cretans. We also know that it was possible for an *individual* Greek to foster links with other individuals abroad, in particular through guest-friendship (ξενία)¹ and marriage, and this is naturally more common amongst the more prominent figures in society². These two main points of inter-state relations and guest-friendship naturally come together in cases where such

¹ See Mitchell (1997) 12-4 for a brief description of the nature and development of *xenia*.

² Mitchell (1997) 13, also Herman (1987) 34-40.

an individual is a monarch, whether as a constitutional king or as a tyrant. One might expect a monarchic state's policy to be less consistent, particularly when passing from one king to the next, but this would especially have been the case when a state is under a tyranny, a type of government which often turns out to be a relatively short interlude rather than an established constitutional office³, and is best shown when a tyrant chooses to ally himself with other tyrants, which is hardly an unknown occurrence at this time. This chapter will examine the relationships that existed between the tyrants of Gela/Syracuse, and the other Greeks of Sicily and Italy; in particular the focus will be on the other tyrants in cities such as Acragas and Rhegium, and also on the Greek cities of the Campania region in Italy.

The Tyrants of Gela

The earlier period of tyranny in Gela gives us little information regarding their relationship with other tyrants in Sicily, mainly because the tyranny of the period that is most associated with Gelon and others, the Emmenid dynasty in Acragas, was not yet established, and Anaxilas was only tyrant of Rhegium later on in the rule of Hippocrates. The only other tyranny of the period we know of is that in Selinus, which existed just before Cleandrus' rise to power in Gela. Firstly there is Peithagoras, who is known only for being killed and replaced by Euryleon, a Spartan who had gathered the troops of the now dead Heraclid Dorieus⁴. Dunbabin thinks that the presence of Euryleon at Selinus may have influenced Cleandrus' own successful attempt at tyranny in Gela; his reasons for believing this mainly involve the likely concerns about the old trade routes from Sicily to Greece being disturbed by the Carthaginians⁵. However this is simply speculation, with no positive evidence to support the claim, and in any case it is far from being evidence of any relations between Cleandrus and Euryleon.

We are already heading towards the end of Hippocrates' reign in Gela before we find any more information regarding policy towards other Greeks, which beforehand we can only assume was very aggressive (given that most of Eastern Sicily was now under the tyrant's

³ This is simply because we cannot use standard models as examples, as we can for other institutions that may be found in a Greek polis.

⁴ Hdt. V.46. On Dorieus see Von Stauffenberg (1960) 181ff., Dunbabin (1948) 326ff.

control), and apparently without concern for ethnicity, whether Dorian or Chalcidian, or indeed Greek or native Sicel. Up until this point the only tyrants encountered are those set up by Hippocrates himself, in particular the Coan Scythes in Zancle⁶, but with Hippocrates' taking of Zancle (at an uncertain date before 494 BC) we find that his interests come into conflict with those of another tyrant, Anaxilas of Rhegium.

Zancle had been a focus of conflict from the beginning of the fifth century onwards. Earlier in its history the city had had a close relationship with Rhegium, the city it had probably founded itself. The co-operation between the two cities may have lasted down to the start of the fifth century, and ended not long before Hippocrates built up his empire in Eastern Sicily. The first signs of change came in the coinage of Zancle, which were firstly of an artistic nature, and rather than being consistent with typical Italian designs, started to become more 'Sicilian', perhaps indicating a change in political allegiance, though not necessarily so. A change of standard also followed, from the Aeginetic standard to the Euboic-Attic standard, and this was the case in both Rhegium and Zancle, but there also seems to be evidence for a brief spell of experimentation on Zancle's part⁷. Having no natural port of its own, Rhegium was more or less wholly dependent on the co-operation of its mother-city across the straits of Messina, so it was naturally a matter of great concern to Rhegium when Zancle broke away to form new links. A quarrel between the Zancleans and Rhegium is also noted by Pausanias, and although his account does arouse suspicion of confusion with the Samian episode⁸, it is in agreement with the basic theory of strained relations between the two cities⁹. There is further evidence in the form of a dedicatory bronze greave at Olympia inscribed Δανκλαῖοι Περίνον, indicating hostilities at least before Zancle's change of name to Messana at around 489 BC¹⁰. The importance of Zancle cannot be understated; not only was Rhegium dependent on Zancle's co-operation for survival, but control of the straits of Messina had enormous economic advantages, since they

⁵ Dunbabin (1948) 377. Gela, being on the south coast of Sicily, would have shared such concerns with Acragas and sometimes Selinus, although Syracuse would have had easier access eastwards to Greece.

⁶ Hdt. VI.23.

⁷ See Dunbabin (1948) 386, who suggests an attempt at forging closer links with other Italiot cities, and Dodd (1908) 56ff. for discussion of the numismatic evidence.

⁸ Hdt. VI.22ff.

⁹ Paus. IV.23.6-7.

were the primary trade route connecting the Eastern Mediterranean with the West. Rhegium's control of the straits was only possible with the co-operation of Zancle, who, having a large sickle-shaped harbour, combined with the location, was the perfect trading post. For a few years, Zancle was part of the large empire in Eastern Sicily formed by Hippocrates, and remained under his influence during the period of Samian occupation that followed, at least until Hippocrates' death¹¹. The ensuing power-struggle and the continuing interest in the Straits of Messina held by the Deinomenids after Hippocrates does become a major yet perhaps understated theme, which certainly does have an effect on many decisions made throughout the Deinomenid dynasty.

One of the most significant developments of this period is the rise of the tyrant Theron in Acragas, around 489 BC, who became the primary ally of Gelon. The city of Acragas itself almost certainly had links with Gela before Theron, not only because one of Acragas' founders in 580 was a Geloan (the other being Rhodian)¹², but also because of their both being on the south coast of Sicily, they shared similar concerns, for example the native Sicilians further inland, and also their maritime trade links with the Rhodians¹³. Later on, during the reign of Hippocrates, there is a case to be made for identifying Aenesidemos, a prominent member of Hippocrates' bodyguard and later tyrant of Leontini, as an Acragantine and perhaps even as an Emmenid (sharing his name with the father of Theron himself)¹⁴. If this is true then it would be evidence not only of a close relationship between the Emmenids and Pantarids, but also between Acragas and Gela as a whole, since these would have been two of the foremost families in their respective cities even before the tyranny in Acragas was established¹⁵. Another positive sign of good relations between the two cities was the fact that the Western boundary of Hippocrates' empire where Gela's territory met directly with Acragas, is never mentioned in our sources as a

¹⁰ *SEG* 15.246. It should also be noted that the name Zancle seems to have been briefly restored to the city at some point in the mid-5th century, going by numismatic evidence - Head (1911) 154 inc. fig. 82. See later chapter (146) on refoundations for the renaming of Zancle.

¹¹ See later chapter on refoundations (147) for more on the Cale Acte enterprise and Samian episode. Also see below (91) for Carthaginian policy, which considers the importance of the Cale Acte enterprise and of gaining Zancle, in terms of breaking up the pro-Punic bloc.

¹² Thuc. VI.4.

¹³ See Dunbabin (1948) 235ff.

¹⁴ See Dunbabin (1948) 383-4.

concern to the tyrant. Considering Hippocrates' very aggressive foreign policy, this would seem very surprising indeed if Acragas was not supposed to be an ally of Gela's. It seems likely that when Theron came to power in 490 or 489 BC¹⁶, there were already friendly relations between the two cities, and therefore the later relationship between Theron and Gelon need not simply be considered as tyrants looking after their own kind. This new personal alliance between the two tyrants was cemented by the marriage of Gelon and Demarete (Theron's daughter) and also of Theron and the daughter of Polyzelus¹⁷. However, it seems that this new alliance simply strengthened the older one between the two cities. As significant as this agreement must have been to the tyrants, there is little other than the marriage alliance that informs us about the nature of the pact itself. Presumably there was a non-aggression pact which allowed the tyrants to build up their own empires without having to concern themselves about the boundary that divided them, but there also seems to be an agreement by which one tyrant is obliged to assist the other in times of crisis. However, the only evidence we have for this is the build up to the Himera campaign in 480 BC¹⁸. Of course this may not have been the only reason for Gelon's intervention at Himera, as although it is probable that the Carthaginians were only concerned with returning Terillus to power in Himera, and not about conquering all of Sicily, Gelon may have viewed the Carthaginian presence on the North coast as a threat nonetheless.

Following Himera

After the events of 480 BC, circumstances had changed greatly regarding Gelon's standing in Sicily, and this was not restricted to greater respect. The apparent collapse of Carthage as a Mediterranean power (if some of our sources are to be believed), along with its reversion to African affairs, maritime exploration¹⁹ and the rebuilding of its military powerbase, meant that her allies were significantly weakened, despite their virtual non-involvement in the

¹⁵ Theron's brother, Xenocrates won the chariot race at the Pythian Games in 490, a victory celebrated by Pindar in his Sixth Pythian Ode. It is probable that Theron had not yet come to power in Acragas since there is no mention of him in the ode, but it would have been very soon before the start of the tyranny.

¹⁶ The only account we have of the rise to power of Theron is in Polyaeus (*Strat.* VI.51) but this is too similar to the rise of Phalaris and therefore arouses suspicion of inaccuracy.

¹⁷ Sch. Pind. *Ol.* II inscr.

¹⁸ Theron as cause of the conflict – Hdt. VII.165, Theron requests help – Diod. Sic. XI.20.5, Gelon obliges – Diod. Sic. XI.21.1ff.

conflict in 480. Himera itself was now part of the Acragantine empire, which would have further weakened relations between the allies of Carthage, as the chain of pro-Punic cities running from Carthage to Rhegium had been broken, isolating Rhegium and Zancle (now known as Messina²⁰) from the others. This now meant that Anaxilas was forced into reconciling with the Deinomenids.

Μοῖσα, καὶ παρ Δεινομένει· ὦ Μοῦσα, πείθου μοι χορεῦσαι καὶ παρὰ τῷ
 Ἱέρωνος υἱῷ Δεινομένει, ποιήνῃ καὶ ἀντέκτισιν τῷ νικηφόρῳ ἄρματι τὸ
 ἐγκώμιον παρεχομένη. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρία ἡδονὴ τῷ παιδί ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς νίκη.
 Δεινομένης δὲ υἱὸς Ἱέρωνος ἐκ τῆς Νικοκλέους τοῦ Συρακουσίου θυγατρὸς
 κατὰ Φίλιστον καὶ Τίμαιον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Ἀναξιλάου θυγατρὸς καὶ τῆς
 Θήρωνος ἀνεψιᾶς οὐκ ἐπαιδοποίησεν ὁ Ἱέρων προγαμήσας ταύτην· ὅθεν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ παῖς ὁμώνυμος τῷ πάππῳ· Δεινομένης γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ Ἱέρωνος.
 Sch. Pind. *Pyth.* I.112

This marriage between Hieron and the daughter of Anaxilas meant that further links were established between the various dynasties of tyrants in Sicily, in a similar fashion to the earlier marriages between the Deinomenid and Emmenid families. Dunbabin notes other developments in the relationship between Rhegium and Syracuse in the coinage, as Rhegium had adopted the Euboic-Attic weight standard soon after 480, therefore harmonising its standard with that used all over Sicily rather than in Italy, but also that the control exercised over Messina by Anaxilas is seemingly unaffected by the aftermath of Himera²¹. We can probably infer from this that Gelon may have realised the usefulness of having Rhegium and Messina ruled by one government, and that there was no need to win control of the straits of Messina as Anaxilas was powerless to assert himself in that area. It may also have been the case that in the years immediately following Himera, Gelon may not have wished to risk his high position in Syracuse by campaigning even further, and may have settled for strong influence in the straits rather than direct control.

Selinus, Carthage's other Greek ally, does not feature in Sicilian affairs until long after Himera, and we may assume that links with Carthage had been either weakened or severed altogether as a result of Carthage's withdrawal from Sicilian affairs.

¹⁹ On Carthaginian activities in (and around) Africa, see the final chapter on the aftermath of the tyranny (217).

²⁰ See later chapter on refoundations for Zancle's renaming – 146ff.

With Gelon's death in 478 BC, there is a very real (although theoretical) possibility that his policy towards these other Greek states was overhauled by the wishes of his successor Hieron, such is the problem when dealing with monarchic states (see the beginning of this chapter). There are many episodes within the reign of Hieron that may inform us about his own plans, but none immediately following the death of Gelon. The earliest information that we have is for the year 476, two years after, at least according to the chronology of Diodorus Siculus. This turns out to be one of the more eventful years in this region's history, with three events being of interest to us, and although they may all seem unrelated to each other at first glance, this may not actually be the case.

The first of these events to occur, at least in Diodorus' narrative, is the death of Anaxilas of Rhegium.

ἔτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξίλας ὁ Ῥηγίου καὶ Ζάγκλης τύραννος, δυναστεύσας ἔτη δέκα ὀκτώ, τὴν δὲ τυραννίδα διεδέξατο Μίκυθος, πιστευθεὶς ὥστε ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς τέκνοις τοῦ τελευτήσαντος οὖσι νέοις τὴν ἡλικίαν.
Diod. Sic. XI.48.2

The end of Anaxilas' reign may be far more significant than this short reference by Diodorus may suggest. The tyrant's rule had become an established fact during the eighteen years of its duration, and this no doubt brought a degree of stability in Rhegium itself, and even in Messana, which was crucial for the interests of everyone, especially following Himera. A change of ruler at Rhegium, as at Syracuse, could easily destabilise the region, and this uncertainty would probably have been enough to figure as one of Hieron's main concerns at this time. At this point in time Hieron's plans for the region seem unclear, as there was a choice to be made of either attempting to recapture Messana for his own empire, as Hippocrates had done, which would leave Rhegium powerless and itself vulnerable to Syracusan aggression, or to assist Micythus and Anaxilas' sons in securing their position in Rhegium, and maintaining stability in the region. The rewards for taking control of the Straits of Messina, a major trade route, would be massive, and would be of great assistance to Hieron in securing his own

²¹ Dunbabin (1948) 431. Rutter (2001) notes that these 'mule-car and hare' types (no.'s 2472-6, 187-8) were Anaxilas' second issue of coinage, and the mule-car legend is a reference to Anaxilas' victory in that event in Olympia in 480 (Pollux 5.15).

position, but this had to be weighed against the costs of war, and possibly the creation of problems abroad, especially with Rhegium's own Italian neighbours.

The second episode, which concerns the younger brother of Hieron, Polyzelus, will be discussed in a moment, as the third incident may have possible connections to Hieron's policy towards Rhegium and Messana. This is the refoundation of Catana, which was later celebrated by Pindar in his First Pythian Ode, and is the focus of further discussion later on in this thesis²².

Ἰέρων δὲ τοὺς τε Ναξίους καὶ τοὺς Καταναίους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἀναστήσας, ἰδίους οἰκήτορας ἀπέστειλεν, ἐκ μὲν Πελοποννήσου πεντακισχιλίου ἀθροίσας, ἐκ δὲ Συρακουσῶν ἄλλους τοσοῦτους προσθείς· καὶ τὴν μὲν Κατάνην μετωνόμασεν Αἴτην, τὴν δὲ χώραν οὐ μόνον τὴν Καταναίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου προσθείς κατεκλήρουχεν, μυρίου πληρώσας οἰκήτορας. τοῦτο δ' ἔπραξε σπεύδων ἅμα μὲν ἔχειν βοήθειαν ἐτοίμην ἀξιόλογον πρὸς τὰς ἐπιούσας χρείας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς γενομένης μυριάνδρου πόλεως τιμὰς ἔχειν ἥρωικάς. τοὺς δὲ Ναξίους καὶ τοὺς Καταναίους ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ἀνασταθέντας μετώκισεν εἰς τοὺς Λεοντίνους, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων προσέταξε κατοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Diod. Sic. XI.49.1-2

It would have become apparent to Hieron that there was still room for expansion in Sicily, as Messana, in the North-Eastern corner of the island, remained the only city in Eastern or Central Sicily outside the influence of Syracuse or her ally Acragas²³. Since 476 was also the year of Anaxilas' death, and whether he was already gone, or was ailing, by the time of the decision to remove the Naxians, it certainly would have made Hieron's (possible) ambitions achievable. The reasons for the refoundation of Catana are, fortunately, spelt out very clearly by Diodorus.

τοῦτο δ' ἔπραξε σπεύδων ἅμα μὲν ἔχειν βοήθειαν ἐτοίμην ἀξιόλογον πρὸς τὰς ἐπιούσας χρείας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς γενομένης μυριάνδρου πόλεως τιμὰς ἔχειν ἥρωικάς.

Diod. Sic. XI.49.2

The first reason is said to be to provide a base for loyal soldiers who could be used for campaigning, or in the event of attack from other Greeks, or, though highly unlikely, the Carthaginians, while the second reason is that Hieron founded Aetna as a means of being remembered as a hero after his death. We can also now examine the question of why Hieron chose Catana as the site of his new settlement in the first place rather than, for example, Leontini

²² See the following chapters on city refoundations, mercenary usage, and propaganda and self-presentation.

²³ See figure 2, p.24.

or Gela, for it does seem that Messina would almost certainly have been Hieron's ultimate target for expansion, and Catania, being far closer to Messina, would be an obvious place from which to base an attack.

An intended attack on Messina would also explain two unanswered questions – Firstly why did Hieron chose Catania to refound in the first place, and secondly, why were the Naxians also removed? The first answer may be fairly straightforward; Catania would have been the nearest major city, although it was still quite a distance, to Messina, and also would have lain, as it does now, on the main route from Syracuse to Messina²⁴. Hieron may also have considered it safer to have a friendly base to retreat to in times of danger, rather than having to pass through the territory of a potentially hostile city as Catania may have been. The other advantage was that Catania was situated with easy access to the rich Eastern plain, so therefore would have been a fine reward to soldiers settled there.

Another point of interest in this episode is the expulsion of the Naxians. Their removal is curious, as it surely could not have been carried out to free up land for the new colonists, as Diodorus may be seen to imply – not only was Naxos too far away from Catania, but it would also have been cut off from the main settlement by Mount Etna itself. Although it is very fertile, as is the entire plain in Eastern Sicily, the land used by the Naxians would not have been very much in addition to the more easily accessible land to the south, as Naxos was a very minor city in size, its fame coming only from its status as Sicily's first Greek colony and as a mother city to others. Like Catania, Naxos was also situated on the main route along the East coast. Removing Naxos would clear the way for the advance north to Messina, but most importantly, it would also provide a friendly harbour from which to attack²⁵, just as Hieron would have used Catania as an infantry base. In fact, Naxos may have been the best harbour available to Hieron, aside from Syracuse itself, and being far closer to Messina than the capital, it would have been ideally placed for shelter on a day-to-day basis.

Unfortunately for the purposes of this theory, even though Messina may have seemed an obvious target for expansion, there is no record of such an attempt on gaining the city. It may

²⁴ See figure 3, p.25.

be that the victory in Cumae provided Hieron with his moment of glory²⁶, and events in 473 culminated in the fall of Rhegium to the Iapygians, which may have changed the circumstances in the area significantly²⁷.

The Polyzelus episode is a particularly important one in regard to this chapter, as it directly involves Hieron's closest ally, Theron, and almost results in a break in relations between Syracuse and Acragas in 476.

Ἱέρων δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Γέλωνος τελευτὴν τὸν μὲν ἀδελφὸν Πολύζηλον ὀρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, καὶ νομίζων αὐτὸν ἔφεδρον ὑπάρχειν τῆς βασιλείας, ἔσπευδεν ἐκποδῶν ποιήσασθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ξενολογῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν σύστημα ξένων παρασκευάζων ὑπελάμβανεν ἀσφαλῶς καθέξειν τὴν βασιλείαν.

Diod. Sic. XI.48.3

Hieron's jealousy towards his brother is blamed here for the temporary break in the relationship between the two tyrants, which soon follows. We also find that Hieron is worried that his brother may even usurp the tyranny from him, hence the bodyguard. While Diodorus seems to want us to think that this is purely paranoia on Hieron's part, Polyzelus' popularity could have been a real danger to the tyrant's position in Syracuse. It is very likely that Polyzelus was already the ruler over Gela at this time, just as Hieron was during Gelon's reign, due to the inscription found on the base of the Charioteer statue in Delphi, commemorating Polyzelus' victory in Delphi in 478 or 474.

[μνᾶμα Πολύζαλός με Γέλας ἀνέ[θ]εκε[ν] ἀ[ν]άσσ[ον]²⁸

This was later amended (perhaps following the fall of the Deinomenids) so that there was no mention of Polyzelus as ruler of Gela, but it is safe to assume that he did hold the same position there as Hieron did before. The inscription is interpreted by Asheri as meaning that Polyzelus was resentful at his secondary position in the Syracusan empire, and therefore wanted to make himself appear more important than he actually was²⁹. Hieron was probably aware of the Delphi inscription and would have been in contact with Polyzelus himself, and an excuse

²⁵ The existence of a good harbour at Naxos is considered most probable by Dunbabin (1948) 8-9, based mainly on the topography of modern Giardini-Naxos.

²⁶ See following chapter on propaganda.

²⁷ See below, 80.

²⁸ CEG 397. See also following chapter on propaganda.

²⁹ Asheri (1988) 149.

may not have been needed for Hieron to take action against his brother if there seemed to be a threat posed to his position.

Hieron was soon presented with an opportunity to be rid of this threat.

διὸ καὶ Συβαριτῶν πολιορκουμένων ὑπὸ Κροτωνιατῶν καὶ δεομένων βοηθῆσαι, στρατιώτας πολλοὺς κατέγραψεν εἰς τὴν στρατιάν, ἣν παρείδου Πολυζήλω τὰδελφῶ νομίζων αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν ἀναιρεθήσεσθαι. τοῦ δὲ Πολυζήλου πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν οὐχ ὑπακούσαντος διὰ τὴν ῥηθεῖσαν ὑποψίαν, δι' ὀργῆς εἶχε τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ φυγόντος πρὸς Θήρωνα τὸν Ἀκραγαντίνων τύραννον, καταπολεμῆσαι τοῦτον παρεσκευάζετο.

Diod. Sic. XI.48.4-5

This sudden reverse in the relationship between Acragas and Syracuse, although it is salvaged again soon after, is the first sign of difficulty with Hieron's primary ally in Sicily, and without the support of Theron it was possible that Hieron's position as tyrant of Syracuse might have become precarious, especially since it was still the early years of his reign. Diodorus' account tells us that Polyzelus, on hearing of his assigned task in Italy, refused and went instead to Acragas where he took refuge, whereas Timaeus' own account says that Polyzelus actually went to Sybaris and won an unexpected victory, and then went on to Acragas³⁰. This account also claims that peace was eventually secured by the intervention of the poet Simonides.

However Diodorus claims that it was in fact another episode which had given Hieron the opportunity to make peace with Theron.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Θρασυδαίου τοῦ Θήρωνος ἐπιστατοῦντος τῆς τῶν Ἱμεραίων πόλεως βαρύτερον τοῦ καθήκοντος, συνέβη τοὺς Ἱμεραίους ἀπαλλοτριωθῆναι παντελῶς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸν πατέρα πορεύεσθαι τε καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζον, νομίζοντες οὐχ ἔξειν ἴσον ἀκουστήν· πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἱέρωνα πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν κατηγοροῦντες τοῦ Θρασυδαίου καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι τὴν τε πόλιν ἐκεῖνω παραδώσειν καὶ συνεπιθήσεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Θήρωνα. ὁ δὲ Ἱέρων κρίνας εἰρηνικῶς διαλύσασθαι πρὸς τὸν Θήρωνα, προὔδωκε τοὺς Ἱμεραίους καὶ τὰ βεβουλευμένα λαθραίως ἐμήνυσεν. διόπερ Θήρων ἐξετάσας τὰ κατὰ τὴν βουλήν, καὶ τὴν μήνυσιν ἀληθινὴν εὕρισκων, πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἱέρωνα διελύσατο καὶ τὸν Πολύζηλον εἰς τὴν προὔπαρχουσαν εὖνοιαν ἀποκατέστησε, τῶν δὲ Ἱμεραίων τοὺς ἐναντίους πολλοὺς ὄντας συλλαβῶν ἀπέσφαξεν.

Diod. Sic XI.48.6-8

Once again the city of Himera, now fully under Acragantine control following the battle of 480, had become the focus of attention from the tyrant of Syracuse, and also became a tool by which that tyrant would secure his position in Eastern Sicily. It was again to involve the ruler of Himera itself, this time Thrasydaeus the son of Theron, only this time his position was not

³⁰ Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F93

threatened by an invading force, but rather the discontent of his subjects. We will encounter Thrasydaeus again later³¹, but he is already showing the negative qualities so often associated with the final tyrant of a dynasty, in the form of his harsh and oppressive rule, which we also see later in the rule of Thrasybulus at Syracuse³². Hieron decided against helping the desperate Himeraeans, instead choosing to take the opportunity to save his most important alliance, by betraying Himera to Theron and regaining his trust. This is probably one of the most extreme examples of unscrupulousness displayed by one of the tyrants of the period, on a par with Hippocrates' treatment of the people of Zancle and their leader Scythes³³, but was just as effective in that Hieron's friendship with Theron was restored, with or without Simonides' aid, just as Hippocrates retained his influence in Zancle by helping the Samian settlers. Polyzelus himself seems to have been restored to his position in Gela, which may be equivalent to being Hieron's primary heir to the Syracusan leadership, although Diodorus is vague in telling us that he was restored to Gela by Theron rather than Hieron himself³⁴. It may be the case that Hieron was willing to settle for taking Polyzelus back, as a minor drawback in aid of peace with Theron, and it is also likely that Polyzelus would have felt more comfortable himself, being on good terms with Theron and also, being in Gela, in close proximity to his friend in Acragas.

The intention to intervene at Sybaris in 476 is the first example of Hieron taking an interest in the affairs of Southern Italy, at least aside from Rhegium, which would have been of direct importance to Sicily itself. It is possible that Sybaris had some sort of link with the Deinomenids, although it is not possible to speculate on what kind of relationship there was, or even if Hieron may have had his reasons for making war against Croton itself. Sybaris had already been destroyed by Croton around 511-10 BC³⁵, and was not rebuilt by the Sybarite

³¹ Thrasydaeus succeeds Theron as tyrant of Acragas in 472 – Diod. Sic. XI.53, see below 81.

³² Diod. Sic. XI.67.5-6. Of course it is difficult to tell to what extent these portrayals are simply caricatures of 'the last tyrant' and how much is actually true.

³³ Hdt. VI.23-4. See later chapter on refoundations, 148.

³⁴ By Hieron's death nine years later, Thrasybulus becomes tyrant of Syracuse, leaving the question open of whether Polyzelus was really restored to his position in Gela, and of whether the tyranny at Gela was the place of the primary heir, similar to the role of the Prince of Wales in modern Britain. The fact that we hear nothing of Polyzelus following 476 may also be interpreted as meaning that he had died before Hieron, since if it had been the case that Polyzelus simply fell out of favour with the tyrant, especially following the death of Theron in 472, one might expect that he fought Thrasybulus for the succession in 467, of which there is no evidence, and which is unlikely since Thrasybulus only ruled for eleven months, most of which seems to have been spent in conflict with the Syracusans themselves.

³⁵ Diod. Sic. XI.90, Aelian *NA* XVI.23. See also Dunbabin (1948) 362ff.

exiles from Posidonia until 453, but it may be that a small settlement of the same name had existed between these dates³⁶. Croton itself would have been in control of large sections of Southern Italy by the time of the Deinomenids, and so it may be the case that Croton was attempting to reassert its authority in the area. This may also have been perceived as a threat to Hieron's own territory in Sicily.




Figure 5 - Map of Southern Italy, from Brock and Hodkinson (2000), 171

As well as the Sybarites and their colonies in Italy, it may also be the case that other cities in the region sought friendship with the Deinomenids in the face of Crotoniate aggression, in particular Locri, which later received Thrasybulus following his expulsion from Syracuse³⁷; and Rhegium, as Anaxilas' position had been weakened following the fall of the Carthaginian force at Himera, and perhaps also Cumae, further north in the Bay of Naples. The Cumae episode in 474 is known primarily as Hieron's greatest military achievement, a naval one, which

³⁶ Coins bearing the bull of Sybaris and tripod of Croton, that can be dated to after Sybaris' destruction, have been found – Head (1911) no.95.

³⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.68.4.

along with the battle of Himera was celebrated by Pindar in his First Pythian Ode, being compared to the battles of Salamis and Plataea³⁸.

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἱέρων μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων, παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν πρέσβεων ἐκ Κύμης τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ δεομένων βοηθῆσαι πολεμουμένοις ὑπὸ Τυρρηνῶν θαλαττοκρατούντων, ἐξέπεμψεν αὐτοῖς συμμαχίαν τριήρεις ἰκανάς. οἱ δὲ τῶν νεῶν τούτων ἡγεμόνες ἐπειδὴ κατέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Κύμην, μετὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων μὲν ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς, πολλὰς δὲ ναῦς αὐτῶν διαφθείραντες καὶ μεγάλη ναυμαχία νικήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν Τυρρηνοὺς ἐταπείνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ Κυμαίους ἤλευθέρωσαν τῶν φόβων, καὶ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας.
Diod. Sic. XI.51

What is often understated is that this seems to be part of a wider effort by Hieron to either control or influence the Greek cities of Southern Italy, which had so far been more or less confined to the toe. With the Carthaginians no longer a threat, and no longer able to assist their other main allies in the Mediterranean, the Etruscans³⁹, it seems that Hieron was now attempting to gain control of the sea along the western coast of Italy, as Dionysius I was to achieve a century later, while this was still possible. Syracusan control had probably only reached as far north as Posidonia, the Sybarite colony, but it is likely that there was contact with Cumae itself, if not actual Syracusan influence⁴⁰. There is also some evidence of the Syracusans' presence elsewhere in the region, this time in Lipara.

Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας· θέρους γὰρ δι' ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρατεύειν. νέμονται δὲ Λιπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κνιδίων ἄποικοι ὄντες. οἰκοῦσι δ' ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων οὐ μεγάλη, καλεῖται δὲ Λιπάραι· ... κεῖνται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὗται κατὰ τὴν Σικελῶν καὶ Μεσσηνίων γῆν, ξύμμαχοι δ' ἦσαν Συρακοσίων.
Thuc. III.88

Although this passage of Thucydides refers to the mid 420's, it is a possibility that Syracuse had been in control of Lipara and the surrounding islands since Hieron's time, especially if he did want to take control of the coastal area⁴¹. In the bay of Naples itself, it is clear that Hieron maintained a Syracusan presence even following the defeat of the Etruscans,

³⁸ Pind. *Pyth.* I.71-80 – see below, 92.

³⁹ See later section on Carthaginian policy, 92.

⁴⁰ This is argued by Schwabacher (1952) 5, and De Sensi Sestito (1981) 617, who claim that there was such influence before the battle of Cumae, probably through Posidonia, as a result of the aid given to Sybaris in 476.

⁴¹ See also Diod. Sic. XII.54.4, and Antiochus – *FGrH* 555 F1. Frederiksen (1984) 93, also believes in the Syracusans' presence at Lipara.

and the most clear attempt was the establishment of a garrison on the nearby island of Pithecusae.

ἔχει γὰρ τοιαύτας ἀποφορὰς ἡ νῆσος, ὑφ' ὧν καὶ οἱ πεμφθέντες παρὰ Ἱέρωνος τοῦ τυράννου τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐξέλιπον τὸ κατασκευασθὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν τεῖχος καὶ τὴν νῆσον· ἐπελθόντες δὲ Νεαπολίται κατέσχον.

Strabo V.4.9

These fortifications lasted after the fall of the Deinomenid dynasty when they were abandoned following a volcanic eruption on the island⁴². Syracusan influence in the bay of Naples can also be found, or at least assumed, in other aspects of life in the area. The first, for which we have positive evidence, is the coinage of Neapolis (Naples) a *polis* founded by the Cumaeans following the fall of the Deinomenids. Silver didrachms produced at Naples around the mid-fifth century bear a representation of Athene wearing a Corinthian helmet, which seem to imitate those of Syracuse which had been minted since around Hieron's reign, plus others with a representation of a figure with her hair in a bun, thought to be connected with the cult of Parthenope, also copying those of Syracuse⁴³. The cults of Demeter Thesmophoros and Athene Sicala also seem to be importations from Sicily⁴⁴.

Following the fall of Thrasybulus in 466, Frederiksen points out that Syracusan control, or perhaps only influence, was maintained for a short while. The main occurrence was the intervention of Syracuse against the Etruscans at the island of Elba in 453 BC, mainly being concerned with the piracy that was being practised in the area at the time, quickly followed by their attacks on the Etruscan coast itself, implying that even the democratic government in Syracuse had certain ambitions for the region and it was not a strictly Deinomenid policy⁴⁵. Hieron had therefore made great advances as far as controlling affairs in Italy were concerned. Not only had he gained valuable allies such as Locri and the Sybarite cities, as well as being on good terms with Rhegium, he also now had the standing to influence events on the coast of Italy, as well as proving that the threats posed by Croton and the Etruscans would come to nothing.

⁴² Frederiksen (1984) 94 places the garrison on Monte Vico, where the Aragonese castle now stands, as this position has commanding views of the Italian coastline, and is also very secure from attack itself.

⁴³ See Rutter (2001) nos. 27-33 – Athene type, and Rutter (2001) nos. 37-41 – ‘Parthenope’ type.

⁴⁴ *IG XIV 756a*; *NS* (1892) 202.

⁴⁵ Frederiksen (1984) 94, *Diod. Sic. XI.88*. Frederiksen also here tries to connect the constant Syracusan interference in the bay of Naples with the foundation of Naples itself by Cumae.

A year after Hieron's expedition to Cumae, in 473, Rhegium had been further weakened following its giving of aid to Tarentum, which was warring with the Iapygians. As a result of the Tarentines' loss in this conflict, Diodorus tells us that the Iapygians actually took control of Rhegium themselves⁴⁶, but this is almost certainly an exaggeration on Diodorus' part, as soon after we find that Micythus is still in control by 467 when he is honourably discharged from office by Hieron. Herodotus says that this episode was the main example of Tarentum's failed attempts at gaining control of the Iapygians of South Eastern Italy, and while Rhegium had lost 3,000 men in this one battle, the number of those Tarentines lost was never recorded, being so large it was thought incalculable⁴⁷. While this may not have damaged the relations between Syracuse and Rhegium at the time, or perhaps even made it easier for Hieron to assert himself in the Straits of Messina, a major diplomatic setback in the tyrant's reign came in 472, with the death of Theron of Acragas:

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων κατὰ μὲν τὴν Σικελίαν Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνων δυνάστης ἐτελεύτησεν ἄρξας ἔτη δέκα καὶ ἕξ, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν διεδέξατο Θρασυδαῖος ὁ υἱός. ὁ μὲν οὖν Θήρων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιεικῶς διωκηκῶς, καὶ ζῶν μεγάλης ἀποδοχῆς ἐτύγχανε παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ τελευτήσας ἠρωικῶν ἔτυχε τιμῶν, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ζῶντος ἔτι τοῦ πατρὸς βίαιος ἦν καὶ φονικὸς καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἦρχε τῆς πατρίδος παρανόμως καὶ τυραννικῶς. διὸ καὶ ταχέως ἀπιστηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων διετέλεσεν ἐπιβουλευόμενος καὶ βίον ἔχων μισούμενον· ὅθεν ταχέως τῆς ἰδίας παρανομίας οἰκείαν ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου καταστροφήν.

Diod. Sic. XI.53.1-3

One of the reasons why Hieron had enjoyed much success overseas was that he had little to concern him on the home front. As Diodorus tells us, the stability brought to Acragas, and therefore much of Sicily, by Theron's sixteen-year reign meant that the Deinomenids did not need to concern themselves about their western border, with the odd exception of the Polyzelus episode⁴⁸. The problems in Acragas soon became apparent as Theron's rather beneficial rule in the city was replaced almost predictably by the despotic rule of Thrasydaeus, who had already displayed his leadership style when he was a 'sub-tyrant' in Himera, again during the Polyzelus episode. Diodorus deliberately contrasts the reigns of both men, describing

⁴⁶ Diod. Sic. XI.52.

⁴⁷ Hdt. VII.170.

⁴⁸ See above, 78.

Theron as δυνάστης, and Thrasydaeus as ruling τυραννικῶς⁴⁹. While the first example of Thrasydaeus' rule in Himera turned out to be to Hieron's advantage, the second in Acragas most certainly was not.

μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς Θήρωνος τελευταίην πολλοὺς μισθοφόρους ἀθροίσας καὶ τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων καὶ Ἱμεραίων προσκαταλέξας, τοὺς ἅπαντας ἤθροισεν ὑπὲρ τοὺς δισμυρίους ἵππεις καὶ πεζοὺς. μετὰ δὲ τούτων μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, Ἱέρων ὁ βασιλεὺς παρασκευασάμενος δύναμιν ἀξιόλογον ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα. γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἰσχυρᾶς πλείστοι [τῶν] παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλληνας ἔπεσον.
Diod. Sic. XI.3-4

There seems to be no real reason given for this conflict, in which Thrasydaeus lost heavily. The only real clue may be that Hieron seems to have anticipated this problem well in advance, and actually marched on Acragas before Thrasydaeus could mobilise his army. This could imply either that there was a quarrel involving the two tyrants beforehand, or even that Diodorus is trying to hide a conflict instigated by Hieron himself. It is also reasonable to assume that Diodorus is showing Hieron to possess the same leadership qualities as Gelon did at Himera, in acting quickly and decisively, in marked contrast to the more 'tyrannical' tyrant. As a result, Thrasydaeus was exiled and executed at Megara in mainland Greece, democracy was introduced to Acragas, and its empire dissolved. Representatives were sent to Syracuse to secure peace, which was granted, but there is a marked change in Hieron's rule following the events of 472 BC. The collapse of the tyranny at Acragas meant that now only Micythus at Rhegium remained as a tyrant in the region aside from Hieron himself, and the rise of democracy in those cities formerly subject to Acragas provided a fresh threat to Hieron's position in Syracuse. This threat potentially came from two sources, either from cities now liberated from the Emmenid dynasty (including Acragas itself⁵⁰) or from democratic factions from within Syracuse itself. Hence we find Hieron taking radical measures to protect his position in the city:

⁴⁹ It may also have been the case that Diodorus himself viewed this change from δυνάστης to τυραννικῶς as a predictable one, and as a result it may be difficult to figure out whether Diodorus has exaggerated his account as a result.

⁵⁰ The evidence also seems to imply that Gela itself, where the Deinomenids came from and originally ruled, was under the control of Acragas by the end of the Emmenid dynasty, as the city is actually summoned to help the democrats in Syracuse in their war against Thrasybulus in 467/6 - Diod. Sic. XI.68.1. Gela is summoned along with Acragas, Selinus, Himera and the Sicels. The apparent change in Gela from Syracusan rule to that of Acragas may be connected to the Polyzelus episode, and may explain why it was Theron himself that restores Polyzelus to his former position, as Diodorus tells us (XI.48.8).

καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα Περσικὰ καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικά ἐστὶν (πάντα γὰρ ταῦτὸν δύναται)· καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅσα τυγχάνει τις λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ' εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἷον περὶ Συρακούσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, καὶ οὗς ὠτακουστάς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἱέρων, ὅπου τις εἶη συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος (παρρησιάζονται τε γὰρ ἦττον, φοβούμενοι τοὺς τοιούτους, κἄν παρρησιάζωνται, λανθάνουσιν ἦττον)

Arist. *Pol.* 1313b11

The eavesdroppers (ὠτακουσταὶ) that were employed by Hieron to ensure against those who are plotting against him, are likely to be the inspiration behind the περίπολοι who are mentioned in a fragment of one of Epicharmus' plays as Persian style night-watchmen who are shown to be beating up a vagabond⁵¹. Although this is perhaps not the most reliable picture we may have of Syracuse under Hieron, it may give us an idea of the kind of situation the tyrant now found himself in, with his primary ally dead and the threat of a democratic movement ever present.

It is clear that Hieron still had influence in Rhegium, however, and in 471 he summons the sons of Anaxilas to Syracuse in order to make sure that they would succeed to the tyranny, having now come of age⁵². Under Hieron's instruction, they were to hold their guardian Micythus to account for his nine-year reign, take any action against him if necessary, then assume control themselves. This they did, reluctantly, and Micythus himself retired to Tegea, despite the sons' realisation that he was more suited to the job than they were. This is quite indicative of the good relations shared between Syracuse and Rhegium, at least after Himera, and Hieron himself never needed to concern himself with a city that had previously been a threat. It is unclear what Diodorus means at the beginning of this passage, as he seems to imply that Gelon had shown great kindness towards Anaxilas during his reign, although this may be in reference to the aftermath of Himera, when the tyrant was quite well-disposed to his enemies.

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἱέρων ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων βασιλεὺς τοὺς Ἀναξίλα παῖδας τοῦ γενομένου τυράννου Ζάγκλης εἰς Συρακούσας μεταπεμψάμενος μεγάλαις δωρεαῖς ἀνεμίμνησκε τῆς Γέλωνος γενομένης πρὸς τὸν πατέρα αὐτῶν εὐεργεσίας, ...

Diod. Sic. XI.66.1

⁵¹ Epicharmus fr.35 (Kaibel).

⁵² Diod. Sic. XI.66.

Although there is no reason given, the sons of Anaxilas were expelled from Rhegium and Zancle in 461 BC⁵³. This may simply be because they were the only tyrants left in the region and were left isolated, especially since there was plenty of anti-tyranny sentiment around Sicily at the time, the Catanaeans had finally reclaimed what had become Aetna for themselves, and the mercenaries settled by the tyrants, particularly in cities such as Acragas and Gela, were expelled. By this time the Deinomenid dynasty had already been finished for five years. The last Deinomenid tyrant, Thrasybulus, did not seem to care much for foreign support, and seemed to be content with using his mercenaries and Aetnaeans as a bodyguard⁵⁴. Most of the rest of the Sicilian Greeks however seemed to oppose him, at least when asked to do so, and this isolation could only have one result, as at Rhegium. The Syracusan empire, at least according to Asheri, was now split into five new states, Syracuse, Aetna (then Catana in 461), Naxos, Leontini and Camarina⁵⁵.

The Tyrants and Carthage

While there are far fewer episodes of concern to us regarding the relations between the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse and the Carthaginians, the fact is that there is far more to this aspect of Sicilian history than the Himera campaign of 480 BC. Only by taking into consideration the relationship between the Greeks of Sicily and the Carthaginians and Punic Sicilians before the tyrants' own era, can we identify issues which are continued into the fifth century and also therefore determine those which are peculiar to our own period. The events that we do know of are all datable to the sixth century BC, and as we shall see, they are dominated by the issue of trade in the Western Mediterranean, even more so than the Greek colonisation movement which also features strongly.

⁵³ Diod. Sic. XI.76.5.

⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. XI.67.5-68.4. See below chapter on mercenaries, 133.

⁵⁵ Asheri (1988) 156ff. However this does not mean that Syracuse had no influence over its neighbours at all, and we will also find that Syracusan influence survived to some extent in the Bay of Naples (see 78 above), even to the time of Dionysius I. See the final chapter, 214.

Greeks and Carthaginians before 500 BC

The earliest event which may be seen to involve a clash between the Greeks and the Punics was the settlement of the Cnidians, led by Pentathlus, at Cape Lilybaeum on the western end of Sicily at around 580 BC. Although Lilybaeum was not yet settled by either the Phoenicians or the Carthaginians, this would clearly have been of concern to them as a potential threat, either economically or otherwise, to the other Punic cities of Western Sicily, Motya, Panormus and Soloeis. This enterprise was opposed by the Punics and their native Elymian allies, and the Cnidians were forced to move on, eventually settling at Lipari.

οἱ δὲ Λιπαραῖοι οὗτοι Κνιδίων μὲν ἦσαν ἄποικοι, τῆς δὲ ἀποικίας ἡγεμόνα γενέσθαι φασὶν ἄνδρα Κνίδιον· ὄνομα δὲ εἶναί οἱ Πένταθλον Ἄντιοχος ὁ Ξενοφάνους Συρακούσιος ἐν τῇ Σικελιώτιδι συγγραφῇ φησι. λέγει δὲ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ Παχύνῳ τῇ ἄκρᾳ τῇ ἐν Σικελίᾳ κτίσαντες πόλιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐκπίπτουσιν ὑπὸ Ἐλύμων καὶ Φοινίκων πολέμῳ πιεσθέντες, τὰς νήσους δὲ ἔσχον ἐρήμους ἔτι ἢ ἀναστήσαντες τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, ἃς [καὶ] κατὰ τὰ τὰ ἔπη τὰ Ὀμήρεια Αἰόλου καὶ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἔτι ὀνομάζουσι. τούτων Λιπάραν μὲν κτίσαντες πόλιν ἐνταῦθα οἰκοῦσιν, Ἴεραν δὲ καὶ Στρογγύλην καὶ Διδύμας γεωργοῦσι διαβαίνοντες ναυσὶν ἐς αὐτάς.

Paus. X.11.3 (Antiochus of Syracuse fr.2)

This episode is viewed by Warmington as part of a larger Greek effort to remove the Punic cities from Sicily altogether⁵⁶, coupling it with the foundation of Acragas in 580 as a further example. This may seem to be a bit of a generalisation on Warmington's part, as he seems to imply some kind of united effort by *all* of the Greeks to remove the Punics, even though in this case it is not even made clear that the Cnidians were being aggressive, it is possible to interpret their actions as such. Diodorus also mentions Pentathlus, this time allying the Cnidians with Selinus against the Elymians of Segesta, and omits the Punics of either Sicily or North Africa, although it must be noted that these Elymians had a close relationship with the Punics, and Asheri notes the settlement at Lilybaeum would most likely affect Punic affairs rather than Elymian⁵⁷. Although Diodorus mentions the arrival of the Cnidians at Lilybaeum,

⁵⁶ Warmington (1969) 41. He cites Thuc.VI.2.6 as further evidence, although here Thucydides is referring to an idea that the Phoenicians once occupied a greater part of Sicily and were pushed westward by the Greeks, with no mention of an effort to completely remove them from the island. The leading state in this 'effort' is said to be Selinus, probably because of its proximity to the Punic cities.

⁵⁷ Asheri (1988) 749.

there is no mention of any settlement, and he goes straight to their helping the Selinuntines, and ensuing expulsion to Lipara.

οἱ δ' οὖν περὶ τὸν Πένταθλον πλεύσαντες τῆς Σικελίας εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὸ Λιλύβαιον τόπους κατέλαβον Ἐγεσταίους καὶ Σελινουντίους διαπολεμοῦντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. πεισθέντες δὲ τοῖς Σελινουντίοις συμμαχεῖν πολλοὺς ἀπέβαλον κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πένταθλος. διόπερ οἱ περιλειφθέντες, ἐπειδὴ κατεπολεμήθησαν οἱ Σελινούντιοι, διέγνωσαν ἀπιέναι πάλιν ἐπ' οἴκου· ἐλόμενοι δ' ἡγεμόνας τοὺς οἰκείους τοῦ Πεντάθλου Γόργον καὶ Θέστορα καὶ Ἐπιθερσίδην, ἀπέπλεον διὰ τοῦ Τυρρηνικοῦ πελάγους. προσπλευσάντων δ' αὐτῶν τῇ Λιπάρᾳ καὶ φιλόφρονος ἀποδοχῆς τυχόντων, ἐπίσθησαν κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων κατοικῆσαι τὴν Λιπάραν, ὄντων τῶν ἀπ' Αἰόλου περιλειμμένων ὡς πεντακοσίων.

Diod. Sic. V.9

Pentathlus may have been the original inspiration behind the idea of the Heraclids returning to reclaim land that should have formed part of their inheritance. This is a theme that I shall return to at the end of this section, and although it is certainly not proof of Greek unity, there was a strengthening of unity amongst the Punic cities, as we shall see later on.

The Phoenician Silver Trade

As anyone who is familiar with the Phoenicians and their colonies would accept, the dominant features of that civilisation were its trade activities in the Mediterranean, and their reputation for seamanship which was second to none at the time. It is also known that the Phoenicians had knowledge of far-flung places such as the far side of the Iberian peninsula, Britain, and perhaps even the islands of the Atlantic as far as the Azores, before anyone else⁵⁸. According to Velleius Paterculus, Phoenician activity in the Mediterranean existed even when the Heraclids were returning to Greece, and the foundation of Gades (modern Cadiz), situated beyond the straits of Gibraltar, occurred eighty years after the fall of Troy, at around 1104 BC⁵⁹. Although there was much confusion amongst the ancient sources, especially with the kingdom of Tartessus which had disappeared by Velleius Paterculus' time⁶⁰, it is clear that the Phoenicians were active in this region long before the Greeks were. Other achievements

⁵⁸ The Azores claim is based on a find of eight Punic coins from the third century BC on Corvo Island in 1749. See Pfeiler (1965) 53. Diodorus may also record the discovery of Madeira by the Phoenicians, and it is very likely that they also knew of the Canary Islands, due to their close proximity to the African mainland.

⁵⁹ Velleius Paterculus *Hist. Rom.* 1.2.3.

⁶⁰ Aubet (1987) 220.

probably included the first circumnavigation of Africa itself, apparently under the orders of the Egyptian Pharaoh Necho around 600 BC⁶¹. These events occurred mainly because of the tireless desire for profit amongst the Phoenician merchants, particularly those of Tyre, and it is the Tyrian exploration of the Southern Iberian peninsula that is of concern to us here. The great success enjoyed by the Phoenicians and their trade activities seems to have been instigated by their dominance of the metals trade in the Mediterranean; for example their initial reasons for appearing in North Africa were to exploit deposits of gold, whereas the rich sources of tin in the West Country would have been the reason behind their likely visits to Britain. However it seems that the mines in Spain and Portugal were the most rewarding, for example the mines at Rio Tinto produced gold, copper, lead, iron, and in particular, silver⁶². Tyrian investment in the area was huge, and Cadiz became the centre of the Western silver trade⁶³. The archaeological evidence for mining activity in the area is very rich, and we know of techniques of extraction from the silver ore that were advanced for its time, such as the adding of lead, as well as mining implements that have survived to us⁶⁴. The immediate success at Tartessus led to the foundation of more colonies and trading posts in the area, in spite of the unusually long distance between Cadiz and Tyre, and must be considered as the city's primary overseas interest. This was due not only to the huge wealth of silver ore in that area, but also the comparative rarity of silver, compared with gold, in the East itself.

The Western Mediterranean had now become of great importance to the Phoenicians, and likewise it was only the Phoenicians who had ventured so far West on a regular basis, helping to ensure that trade routes were safer perhaps than normal, at least between the far west and Carthage. However, the situation was about to be changed both in the Western and far Eastern Mediterranean, by the arrival of two different foreign peoples who also posed different

⁶¹ Hdt. IV.42.

⁶² Aubet (1987) gives a very useful survey of the Phoenician silver trade and mining, 236ff. The discovery of silver in the Tartessus area is described by Diodorus (V.35), where we learn that following a forest fire the Iberian natives found rivulets of silver originating from the main source of ore. After the Phoenicians learned of this, they bought the potential mines from the natives in exchange for exotic, yet ultimately worthless objects. The mines at Rio Tinto were said to be exploited around 750-570 BC.

⁶³ Diod. Sic. V.35.

⁶⁴ See Aubet (1987) 238. This evidence dates back to around the 8th or 7th centuries BC, as does the archaeological evidence for Cadiz itself, and therefore seems inconsistent with the traditional foundation date of Cadiz in the late 12th century, as the link between the two would be understandably strong considering the Tyrians' reasons for settling the area.

threats to Phoenician stability. The fall of Tyre at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonians after a siege of thirteen years (586-73)⁶⁵, along with the rest of the country, would have brought the Phoenicians' involvement in the Western Mediterranean to a quite abrupt end, and this would have been due to the highly centralised nature of the silver trade, with Cadiz and other Iberian colonies directly under Tyrian control. This event had a clear effect on both mining and economic activity in the peninsula, with mines sometimes being abandoned early in the 6th century, such as that at Rio Tinto. Another reason behind the end of Tyrian control was the appearance of Phocaeen traders, not only in Spain but also settling the Western Mediterranean in general, for example at Massilia in Southern France and Alalia in Corsica. There is an example of a related occurrence in Herodotus, where the Phocaeans are invited to settle permanently in Tartessus by King Arganthonius himself, although this offer was declined and instead the king donated a large sum to Phocaea in order to build a magnificent city wall⁶⁶. This episode may indicate that while the appearance of the Phocaeans in Spain was clearly a problem to the Tyrians, they were welcomed with open arms by the Tartessians themselves, relieved at the Phoenicians' departure. Aubet also notices a development in the nature of the settlements that were not abandoned, but instead had become "thoroughly Punic" rather than Phoenician, plus the appearance of new, larger urban centres such as that at Ibiza⁶⁷. This particular development was the result of a strengthened relationship amongst the Punic cities in the West following the fall of Tyre, in particular the rise to prominence of Carthage, who would have been the obvious successor as a major centre of the Punic world.

It is at this point, at around 580 BC, that we find the first instance of a clash of interests between the Greeks and Punics in the Western Mediterranean, this being the Pentathlus episode. It seems unlikely that it is simply a coincidence that the first recorded clash should happen at the same time as both Tyrian withdrawal and the first Phocaeen settlements in the same region. Although we are dealing with Sicily and not Spain, and the Cnidians and not the Phocaeans, it is a time when the Phoenician colonies were likely to be far more sensitive to any such perceived

⁶⁵ Josephus *Contra. Ap.* I.156.

⁶⁶ Hdt. I.163.

⁶⁷ Aubet (1987) 273.

threat to their prosperity or even existence, having already viewed the failure of the venture in Iberia.

However the changes that had occurred in the West following the fall of Tyre were certainly not restricted to population movements, or cultural or economic changes and developments. It has generally been noted in modern scholarship on the Phoenician West that there was a significant and necessary change in policy, both in defence of their economic interests and of the colonies themselves, mainly instigated by the Carthaginians who had begun building what is usually referred to as a Punic empire, although it may be the case that unity was in fact a popular move amongst those 'conquered'⁶⁸. Carthaginian trading policy was more aggressive than that of Tyre, and the most detailed and accurate summary of this policy is that of Gsell, who describes it as having four main features. Firstly, new markets were to be opened at any realistic opportunity, and this included the founding of new colonies, the formation of treaties, and, where needed, force. Secondly, any areas lacking in foreign competition would be exploited fully, thirdly, agreements would be made with areas not fully in the control of Phoenician colonies in order to regulate trade with them, and lastly, piracy was to be stopped in order to protect trading ships, posts and cities⁶⁹.

It is most likely therefore that the Carthaginians were eager to preserve Punic influences in the region closest to it – Western Sicily, and this would no doubt have been even more important when the Pentathlus episode, and the later Dorieus episode, is taken into consideration. The reasons for wanting to maintain a grip on Western Sicily were dominated by trade with the West, especially Spain and its resources of metal, since if control of the Western point and Northern coast of Sicily were lost, especially to the Greeks, trade routes would be severely disrupted from the Punic point of view⁷⁰. Relations between the Greeks and the Punic would have been further strained by the foundation of Himera on the North coast of Sicily,

⁶⁸ E.g. Asheri (1988) 749-50, Warmington (1969) 42ff. The building of this empire is mostly dominated by the appearance of Malchus in our sources, who led campaigns in Sardinia and Sicily itself (Justin 18.7). The nature and purpose of these campaigns are quite unclear, as although he is described as attacking Acragas and Selinus, these are found to be flourishing according to the archaeological record at this time. Attacks against native Sicilians and also Punic are also possible, and Malchus is eventually banished from Carthage, only going on to attack his own hometown. See Krings (1998) 33-92 for a source-based approach to this character.

⁶⁹ Gsell (1921-4) vol. IV 113.

⁷⁰ Dunbabin (1948) 329.

which was not only well placed to disrupt trade but also menacingly close to the Punic cities themselves. Dunbabin suggests that the foundation of Soloeis, just to the East of Panormus, was a deliberate effort by the Punics to safeguard the city by using a sort of advance guard against further Greek expansion westwards⁷¹. The other Greek neighbour, Selinus, had soon become an ally of the Carthaginians, perhaps as a result of close trade relations or Carthage's military prowess, or both. Another development in Western Sicily was the growth of the Punic island-city of Motya to cover the whole of the island⁷², as well as the defensive wall built around the perimeter. Despite its growth into the most important of the Punic-Sicilian cities, excavations have shown that Greek imports from the seventh to the sixth centuries were in a steady and fast decline⁷³, suggesting further breakdown in already strained relations.

While we know that the Carthaginians certainly had an aggressive economic policy, it also seems that they were unable to trade without regular disruption from pirates, particularly those Greeks that had settled at Lipara who blocked the most direct routes to the West coast of Italy, and especially to the Etruscans and Rome itself. Diodorus mentions this being a problem when Pentathlus and the Cnidians settled Lipara and the surrounding islands, which gives the impression that they were an indiscriminate menace to Greeks and non-Greeks alike⁷⁴.

Two steps were taken in order to bring a halt to the pirates' activities in the Western Mediterranean, the first being the strengthening of the Carthaginian military presence, in particular the navy for this specific purpose⁷⁵. It is however the diplomacy between Carthage and others, in particular the Etruscans and also Rome, that has gained most attention, as this was part of the overall plan not only for protection of trade, but also for its expansion. These treaties normally set out specific areas where the participating cities were allowed a strong economic

⁷¹ Dunbabin (1948) 327.

⁷² Whitaker (1921) – expansion of Motya over cemetery, and relocation of cemetery to Sicilian mainland 314, plus figs. 88,90; city wall 142ff., 208. Also Dunbabin (1948) 332.

⁷³ See Whitaker (1921) figs. 84-7. This idea of decline is based on the volume of Proto-Corinthian ware which is greater in comparison to Corinthian ware, and Early Corinthian which is greater than both Middle and Late Corinthian ware combined.

⁷⁴ Diod. Sic.V.9.

⁷⁵ The wealth of the city, as a result of the success of the metals trade, meant that Carthage was also able to recruit mercenaries, particularly from Africa itself. This was much needed as the size of the population of Carthage was by no means the equal of its monetary resources, explaining the prominence of mercenaries in the city's armed forces in battle.

presence, and areas where they were not⁷⁶. However, these treaties must not be understood to exclude other people, such as the Greeks, from the Carthaginian trade network, as they only emphasise special agreements that were deemed necessary. The Carthaginian treaty with Rome that was (apparently) made in 507 BC, has been recorded by Polybius⁷⁷.

This treaty has been the subject of much debate, especially on the question of its date⁷⁸, but it is clear from this account, quoted directly from the tablets found at the Treasury of the Aediles, that it is intended to protect Carthaginian trade interests (as well as Carthage itself, as is probably meant by the reference to the 'Fair Promontory'), as well as ensuring Rome's own territory in Latium against Carthaginian attack⁷⁹. This promise is also extended to parts of Latium *not* under Rome's control, although such an eventuality is prepared for by saying that any land in Latium taken by Carthage would immediately be transferred to Roman rule. Another region that is covered in the treaty is Sardinia, where restrictions are put on Rome's influence on the island, particularly economic influence, and this region's importance is more fully appreciated when the Carthage-Etruscan alliance and also the Phocaeen settlers at Alalia in nearby Corsica are taken into consideration. Herodotus records events caused by increasing piracy on the part of the Phocaeans of Corsica, which culminated in the Battle of Alalia at around 535 BC⁸⁰. Despite a Phocaeen victory, the loss of two-thirds of the Greek fleet and damage caused to the rest meant that they had to flee to Rhegium, and Corsica was claimed by the allies. Even though Sardinia itself was not under Greek influence, the Alalia episode shows how important this area of the Western Mediterranean was to the Carthaginians' trade interests.

⁷⁶ Asheri (1968) p.750. For more on relations between Carthage and the peoples of Italy, see Gras (1980-1) and Colonna (1980-1).

⁷⁷ Polyb. III.22-3.

⁷⁸ See Cornell (1995) 210-4, which provides a good summary of the problems of dating this treaty and how scholars have attempted to prove/disprove the date of 507 BC, the first year of the Republic at Rome. Polybius dates it to the consulship of L. Junius Brutus and M. Horatius, and takes it directly from bronze tablets stored in the Treasury of the Aediles, on the Capitol. The problem arises from the fact that the first treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians was said by Diodorus (taken from Fabius Pictor) to have taken place in 348 (16.69.1), and this is also Livy's first mention of contact between the two (7.27.2). However, Livy also states that the treaty was renewed for the *third* time in 306 (9.43.13), meaning there were two previous renewals *plus* the original treaty. As it happens, it is thought that Fabius Pictor would not have known about the tablets on the Capitol, as they were only discovered at around 152 BC (see Walbank (1957) on Polyb. 3.21.9-10). The discovery of Etruscan-Phoenician inscriptions at Pyrgi, dated to around 500 BC, further supported Polybius' own account by showing that there were at least good relations between the two, as does Aristotle's recording of similar Carthaginian trading agreements (*Politics* 1280a36).

⁷⁹ See Walbank (1957) on Polyb. 3.22, Scardigli (1991) 47-87.

⁸⁰ Hdt. I.166-7. See also Thuc. I.13, who mentions a battle following the foundation of Massilia.

As a result of the securing of the Punic trade network in the Western Mediterranean, Carthage had probably rivalled Tyre itself in its wealth, and used this wealth to further secure itself through the recruitment of mercenaries. Such a move, as well as the other developments discussed above, seems justified given the rise of the Greeks in the Western Mediterranean and the perceived threat, both military and economic, that they posed⁸¹.

As we move on to the era of tyranny in the Greek cities of Sicily, we find that there is one episode during Hippocrates' reign that may give an indication of a policy towards the Carthaginians, or more broadly speaking, the Western Mediterranean as a whole.

Ζαγκλαῖοι γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ Σικελίης τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον πέμποντες ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην ἀγγέλους ἐπεκαλέοντο τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐς Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν, βουλόμενοι αὐτόθι πόλιν κτίσαι Ἰώνων· ἡ δὲ Καλὴ αὕτη Ἀκτὴ καλεομένη ἔστι μὲν Σικελῶν, πρὸς δὲ Τυρσηνίην τετραμμένη τῆς Σικελίης.

Hdt. VI.22

Although the point is not made in this particular passage, it is almost certainly the case that Zancle was under the control of Hippocrates himself⁸², with the tyrant Scythes being subordinate to him. Therefore, when the Samians were invited to Cale Acte by the Zancleans, Hippocrates would almost certainly have had a say on this matter and perhaps even suggested it in the first place. This would seem less surprising when we realise a reinforcement of the area would help ensure it *remained* under the tyrant's control. While the main threat to the north-eastern extremity of Sicily was presented by Anaxilas of Rhegium, who did indeed take control of Zancle after its abandonment by the Samians around 489, it is also possible that Hippocrates had intended to disturb the chain of pro-Punic cities that stretched from Motya and the other Phoenician colonies in the western end of Sicily, through Himera which dominated the north coast, to Rhegium. Even if this chain did not *physically* threaten Zancle itself, it was certainly capable of disrupting Greek trade on the northern side of the straits of Messina, which was of course the main advantage of holding Zancle in the first place. In stretching his control of the north coast just a little further westwards, Hippocrates' access to the Western Mediterranean via

⁸¹ Warmington (1969) 41-6, Asheri (1988) 750-2.

⁸² A successful siege of the town is listed by Herodotus himself in VII.154, and this can only precede the appearance of the Samians at Zancle, as following the five years of Samian domination the city falls under the control of Anaxilas of Rhegium at around 488 BC.

the straits would have been opened up to him, and the Carthaginians would have had one more potential trading rival in the region.

However, this did not happen, as the Samians were persuaded to take Zancle, and five years later Anaxilas expelled them and took control of the straits for himself. Therefore it is not possible to ascertain whether Hippocrates had a wider agenda in inviting the Samians to Sicily, and we must move on instead to the reign of Gelon and his campaign against the Carthaginian invasion of Himera around 480 BC.

The Himera Campaign

Before going on to details such as why the Battle of Himera took place, a preliminary question of some importance is that of the date of the conflict. This is because the only real clue (aside from the possibility that it occurred before the Greek embassy to Syracuse, see below) is the idea expressed in many sources that the battle took place on the same day as either Thermopylae or Salamis/Plataea⁸³. This idea almost certainly originated in the court of Gelon or of Hieron afterwards, but for the idea to spread as it did we must surely rule out the Battle of Himera occurring before the embassy to Gelon, as unless the battle took place at *roughly* the same time as Thermopylae, etc., the idea would surely have seemed implausible. Asheri describes the synchronicity theory as a myth, but although it almost certainly did not take place on the same day as one of the battles in Greece, there is a feeling amongst some scholars that it may be at a similar time if there was a joint Persian/Carthaginian venture as is said by Diodorus⁸⁴. Another argument in our sources is that the ‘alliance’ between Persia and Carthage was a result of the Greek embassy to Syracuse, although this is unlikely as Carthage would have been left with too little time to prepare, if the date for the Greek embassy can be correctly put at 481 BC⁸⁵. However, there is also a strong case to be made that Diodorus’ sources for this episode, Ephorus or Timaeus, are less than reliable, as we shall see later.

⁸³ Thermopylae – Diod. Sic. XI.24.1, Salamis/Plataea – Pind. *Pyth.* I.72-80. These are often also referred to in other sources such as Arist. *Poetics* 1459a24, and Herodotus also mentions the possibility of Himera coinciding with Salamis.

⁸⁴ Diod. Sic. XI.1.4. Diodorus probably used Ephorus (fr.186) or perhaps Timaeus, see chapter one above, 55.

⁸⁵ Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F186.

Relations between the Sicilian tyrants and the Carthaginians are brought into focus rather suddenly in our sources, with virtually no indication of any trouble between the two under Hippocrates, or earlier in the reign of Theron, other than possibly strained relations in the sphere of Western trade. Under the reign of Gelon we apparently find positive evidence for earlier conflict in Herodotus.

Οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγον, Γέλων δὲ πολλὸς ἐνέκειτο λέγων τοιάδε· «Ἴσθες Ἕλληνας, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην ἐτολήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες ἔλθειν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐμέο πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο, ἐπισκήπτοντός τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω πρὸς Ἐγεσταίων φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλα ὠφελία τε καὶ ἐπαυρέσιες γεγόνασι, οὔτε ἐμέο εἴνεκα ἦλθετε βοηθήσοντες οὔτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρηξόμενοι, τό τε κατ' ὑμέας τάδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βαρβάροισι νέμεται. Ἄλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δέ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπίκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνήστις γέγονε.

Hdt. VII.158

In Herodotus we find that Gelon had already been at war with Carthage, in the course of which he asked the Greeks for assistance, and this does seem to be a different episode from his request to them to avenge the death of Dorieus, where the Segestans are blamed, and also to free the *emporía*⁸⁶. Asheri finds it inconceivable that any great conflicts between Gelon and Carthage should have occurred before Himera, and puts it down to propaganda, typical of the sort later produced in Hieron's reign. He also says that any conflicts that may have occurred before were most likely boundary disputes involving Theron of Acragas and the Punic cities/Elymians⁸⁷. I also believe this to be the case, as it is difficult to imagine any great efforts on Gelon's part to challenge the Carthaginians' presence in the Central/Western Mediterranean without a navy (before he assumed control of Syracuse in 485), or indeed during the early years in Syracuse when he was building up his naval forces.

The impression is given in the above passage that there are no longer any problems existing in Sicily, and that Gelon is therefore free to help if he wanted to. What this could mean

⁸⁶ There are a number of differing views on what is meant by the 'freeing' of the *emporía* e.g. the guarding of commercial routes - Luraghi (1994) 310-2, and even where the *emporía* of concern to Gelon were situated e.g. Sicily - Macan (1908) 221, recently Kufofka (1993-4) 225 n.22, Rouillard (1995) 106; Africa - e.g. Dunbabin (1948) 412, n.2. See also Zahrt (1993) 370, Ameling (1993) 20, Sartori (1992) 90-1, Mafodda (1992) 267 - on the similarities with the 'freeing' of Greece in Pythian I; also Krings 313 (1998), Luraghi (1994), 311-2.

is that the famous Battle of Himera had already happened, if this is the previous war against Carthage mentioned by Gelon. The battle does not seem to involve any great naval element, and therefore could realistically count as the earlier conflict with the Carthaginians, if it were not for the claim that Himera coincided with the battle of Salamis. Herodotus later tells us (giving an unnamed Sicilian source) of another account which says there was trouble brewing in Sicily at the time, in the form of Terillus of Himera's plea for help to the Carthaginians, following the tyrant's expulsion by Theron of Acragas which directly led to the battle of Himera in 480:

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίῃ οἰκημένων, ὡς ὅμως καὶ μέλλων ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Γέλων ἐβοήθησε ἄν τοῖσι Ἑλλησι, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ Θήρωνος τοῦ Αἰνησιδήμου Ἀκραγαντίνων μουνάρχου ἐξελασθεῖς ἐξ Ἰμέρης Τήριλλος ὁ Κρινίππου, τύραννος ἐὼν Ἰμέρης, ἐπήγε ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Φοινίκων καὶ Λιβύων καὶ Ἰβήρων καὶ Λιγύων καὶ Ἐλισύκων καὶ Σαρδονίων καὶ Κυρνίων τριήκοντα μυριάδας καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Ἄννωνος, Καρχηδονίων ἐόντα βασιλέα, κατὰ ξεινίην τε τὴν ἑωυτοῦ ὁ Τήριλλος ἀναγνώσας καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν Ἀναξίλεω τοῦ Κρητίνεω προθυμίην, ὃς, Ῥηγίου ἐὼν τύραννος, τὰ ἑωυτοῦ τέκνα δοὺς ὁμήρους Ἀμίλκα, ἐπήγε ἐπὶ τὴν Σικελίην τιμωρέων τῷ πενθερῷ Τηρίλλου γὰρ εἶχε θυγατέρα Ἀναξίλεως, τῇ οὖνομα ἦν Κυδίππη. Οὕτω δὲ οὐκ οἶόν τε γενόμενον βοηθέειν τὸν Γέλωνα τοῖσι Ἑλλησι ἀποπέμπειν ἐς Δελφοὺς τὰ χρήματα. Πρὸς δὲ καὶ τάδε λέγουσι, ὡς συνέβη τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης ἐν τε τῇ Σικελίῃ Γέλωνα καὶ Θήρωνα νικᾶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Καρχηδόνιον καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τοὺς Ἑλληνας τὸν Πέρσην.

Hdt.VII.165-6

Since in the first account it is made clear that there was no current threat to the Greeks in Sicily, it therefore seems as if there are two distinct possibilities regarding the date of the battle. The first is that it occurred before the embassy sent to Syracuse and therefore also the Persian invasion, meaning that Gelon was free to help but chose not to, and the source for this may originate from the ambassadors themselves. The other, Sicilian, source says the battle came after the embassy's visit, therefore defending Gelon's actions, and the tyrant's subsequent popularity amongst the Sicilians following the battle means that this chronology is indeed plausible. The tradition that the battle occurred on the same day as that of Thermopylae, or Salamis, may stem from the comparisons made by Pindar in *Pythian One*, and Herodotus' source in Sicily may well have been influenced by the propaganda of the age. So it seems that both sources used by Herodotus would have had strong agendas, one pro-embassy which would have wanted to make Gelon seem as selfish and disagreeable as possible, and the other

⁸⁷ Asheri (1988) 767.

defending Gelon, clearly linked to the tradition that the battle occurred on the same day as Thermopylae or Salamis.

The question of the cause of the war also seems to warrant discussion, as there are two very different accounts given by Herodotus and Diodorus, which attribute the war to different causes. However, there seems to be very little question regarding which of the two is actually closer to the truth.

ὁ δὲ Ξέρξης πεισθεὶς αὐτῷ καὶ βουλόμενος πάντας τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀναστάτους ποιῆσαι, διεπρεσβεύσατο πρὸς Καρχηδονίους περὶ κοινοπραγίας καὶ συνέθετο πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατοικοῦντας Ἑλληνας στρατεύειν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρόνοις μεγάλας παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις καὶ καταπολεμῆσαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας.

Diod. Sic. XI.1.4

Diodorus' account is quite plain and straightforward, stating that it was the Persians who had approached the Carthaginians, and persuaded them to attack Sicily at the same time as they invaded Greece itself. This idea has been mostly discredited by modern scholarship, mostly because the idea of co-operation between the two seems for some reason implausible: in other words, why would Carthage co-operate with an empire which had annexed its own mother city, Tyre? While of course this is certainly not enough to rule out a joint venture between the two, and doesn't take into account the Phoenicians' reaction to being controlled from Persia, Diodorus' account can still be shown to be unreliable, mainly because of the sources that the historian is likely to have used, in particular Timaeus⁸⁸.

It does seem that Diodorus used a source with a strong bias towards the Sicilian Greeks, such as Timaeus⁸⁹, although it probably cannot be ascertained given the state of the whole debate on Diodorus' sources⁹⁰. Firstly, the Greeks of Sicily are totally absolved of blame for the invasion. There is not even the slightest hint of why Carthage may want to conquer the whole of the island, in addition to the Greeks of Italy, other than because the Persians had convinced them to. As we shall see later, Herodotus does attribute the cause of the war to the Greeks. Another point to be made, is that this passage can be taken as yet another example of the importance

⁸⁸ For Polybius' criticisms of Timaeus, see previous chapter 41-2.

⁸⁹ Diodorus' own account of the embassy to Gelon (X.33) bears similarities to the problems discussed by Polybius, such as whether the Greeks would consider having Gelon as a commander, that exist in Timaeus' account.

attributed to the Battle of Himera, as equal to that of Salamis or Plataea, in that it was part of the greater Panhellenic struggle versus aggressive barbarians, and even happened at the same time. Again this idea can be traced all the way back to contemporary propaganda, in particular Pindar's First Pythian Ode⁹¹, and judging by Polybius' comments is also typical of the bias shown by Timaeus. Diodorus himself seems to agree with his source, perhaps also allowing pro-Sicilian bias to colour his judgment.

The account given by Herodotus (quoted above, p.94) is far more detailed, and far more reliable than that of Diodorus. We learn that the Battle of Himera was the direct result of the expansion of Acragantine territory to include Himera, which was previously under the control of Terillus. We cannot know for sure how popular Terillus actually was in Himera, but it is likely that, as with many of the tyrants that came to power in Greek cities, there were those who immediately suffered, in particular the aristocracies, and it is possible that the invasion was the result of a plea for help from the Himeraeans themselves⁹². The tyrant of Himera was also the father-in-law of Anaxilas of Rhegium, who gave Terillus his support, as well as convincing Hamilcar of Carthage⁹³ to join in recapturing Himera by offering his own family as hostages. Asheri suggests a date of 482 BC for the expulsion of Terillus, which is based mainly on the appearance of Acragantine-style coinage in the city at this time⁹⁴. The involvement of Rhegium in these events is normally understated, even ignored, even though this could hold the key to figuring out why exactly the war happened, particularly when considering Diodorus' claim that the Carthaginians wanted to conquer the Greeks of both Sicily and Italy. Being allied with Terillus and Anaxilas does seem to conflict with the idea that the war was aimed against all Greeks in the area.

As I have already said above, this story is given by Herodotus as a sort of counter against the claim that Gelon was able to send troops to Greece. It therefore seems as if there are *three* different versions of the general story of Himera, firstly that it happened before the Persian

⁹⁰ See above chapter on sources, 35.

⁹¹ See chapter on propaganda below, 177.

⁹² An epitaph containing Himeraean names was found at Ravanusa, which would, at the time, have been under the control of Acragas. This is reckoned to date to the early fifth century. See Jeffery (1961) 278 n.58, Mingazzini (1938) 662ff. This probably indicates the existence of Himeraeans exiled under Terillus.

⁹³ To whom Terillus was a guest-friend – Hdt. VII.165.

invasion, for whatever reason, and Gelon chose not to assist the Greeks even though he was able to, secondly, the more propagandistic view that Gelon could not assist due to the impending invasion by Carthage, which deliberately happened at the same time as the Persian invasion, being a joint effort against all Greeks. Thirdly, Gelon was unable to assist the Greeks because he either was preparing for, or was expecting to prepare for, the assistance Theron of Acragas would have needed against the Carthaginians. This last version of events seems the most likely, being the one with the least obvious bias. The first is probably a version originating from the account given by the ambassadors of mainland Greece, although it is difficult to tell how much it had been corrupted by Herodotus' time, the second coming from Deinomenid and pro-Siceliot propaganda. The view that the war was started by the appearance of Acragantine troops at Himera is also backed up by the fact that even in Diodorus' account, we find that Gelon in fact kept his troops at standby in Syracuse itself, and they were only sent once Theron, already at Himera, had requested assistance:

διὸ καὶ Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνων δυνάστης, ἔχων δύναμιν ἰκανὴν καὶ παραφυλάττων τὴν Ἰμέραν, φοβηθεὶς εὐθὺς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀξιῶν τὸν Γέλωνα βοηθεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. ὁ δὲ Γέλων καὶ αὐτὸς ἠτοιμακῶς ἦν τὴν δύναμιν, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἰμεραίων ἀθυμίαν ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν κατὰ σπουδὴν, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν πεντακισμυρίων, ἵππεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους.

Diod. Sic. XI.20.5-21.1

This certainly does not suggest any previous part played by Gelon in the events leading up to Himera. In fact, it suggests that the Carthaginian invasion took Theron himself by surprise, no matter how long the enemy had actually been preparing for it. What this means is that, as Herodotus suggests, the Battle of Himera was initially caused by a collapse in relations between Greek cities in Sicily, in this case between Acragas and Himera. Rhegium, Carthage, Syracuse, and also Selinus (allied with Carthage: Diod. Sic. XI.21.4ff.) entered the war as allies (on one side or the other), not as the main protagonists, and therefore the battle is not the Western front of the famous struggle between Greek and barbarian, as many sources, ancient and modern, would have us believe, but rather a squabble for power between two Greek tyrants which results in a war between their more powerful allies.

⁹⁴ Asheri (1988) p.771, fig.83. The Acragantine style simply refers to the appearance of the crab on one side of the coinage, as well as the Himeraean cock. See Head (1911) 144.

From this point until much later on in the fifth century⁹⁵ Carthage simply disappears from Greek affairs. The shock of the heavy defeat as well as the conclusion of a peace agreement meant that Carthage was unlikely to be of concern to the Greeks in Sicily for a long time. This is made explicit by the account of Diodorus, who describes the Carthaginian envoys as begging for forgiveness as well as asking for mercy, fearing a Greek invasion of their own city. Although it is likely that the Carthaginians were all too ready to make peace with Gelon, one is left wondering whether the plea for forgiveness is a deliberate addition by Diodorus himself, who is so concerned with showing that it was the Carthaginians who were to blame for the conflict, rather than the original conquest of Himera by Theron, which goes by unmentioned in Diodorus' account.

Conclusion

While much of the military activity in Sicily during this time occurred under the reigns of Hippocrates and Gelon in the early fifth century, it is the reign of Hieron that tells us most about the relations between the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, and the other Greeks of the Western Mediterranean. Several important points have emerged during the course of this chapter, the first of which is the importance attached to the straits of Messina, which seems to dominate Deinomenid policy in particular throughout this time, and this is not only found in events which clearly involve the cities of Rhegium and Zancle/Messana, such as during the aftermath of Himera, and the Cale Acte enterprise, but we have also found that Hieron's refoundation of Catana in 476 is indicative of that tyrant's policy of regaining control of the straits.

Relations between the tyrants of Syracuse and those of Acragas are also of great importance, and the degree of co-dependency between the two cities is shown up in several episodes, usually involving younger members of the Deinomenid and Emmenid dynasties. Hieron's attempts at reconciling with Theron following the Polyzelus episode speak volumes

⁹⁵ See final chapter for the re-appearance of Carthage in Greek affairs, and their other activities in the Mediterranean during the fifth century BC.

about the critical nature of their relationship as allies, as do the problems faced by Hieron following the death of Theron himself in 472.

The dealings with Theron following the Polyzelus episode also mark some of the first real efforts at diplomacy between the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse and a Western neighbour, and an even greater example is the appearance of Hieron in affairs in Rhegium. The tyrant's dealings with the young sons of Anaxilas show how important it was that Hieron had some allies in the region who were, like Hieron himself, tyrants, especially following the conversion of Acragas from tyranny to democracy. These dealings also mark a significant shift in the tyrant's policy towards the straits, from the aim of conquest to one of co-operation. Finally, regarding the Greeks in the West, we find that Hieron was also interested in Central Italy for various reasons, and that the appearance of the Deinomenids in that region would have a long-lasting effect.

On the matter of Deinomenid relations with the Carthaginians, we have found that far from being a one-off in Punic-Greek relations at this early time, the Himera campaign was in fact a climax of events, in more ways than one. The reason why this is important is that the events of 480 need to be put into the wider context of both Punic and Greek activity in the Western Mediterranean, especially during the preceding sixth century. Carthaginian trade in this region had come under much pressure from other Greeks such as the Phocaeans, so we should not be surprised that relations between the Greeks and Punics should boil over at some point, particularly with the impact that Phocaeen interference in Spain would have had. We must remember that the Carthaginian way of life itself was at stake during this time. However, despite all the efforts made to prove otherwise, we have also found that the reasons for the Himera campaign were markedly different to those recorded by Diodorus. Instead, it is the much briefer account of Herodotus which proves to be most useful to us, although strangely, Diodorus' account does also give hints, in the form of slight inconsistencies, that it is Herodotus telling the truth in this matter. The main point to be made here is that the Carthaginians were certainly not the aggressors in this case, but rather it was Theron, tyrant of Acragas and ally of Gelon, who held ambitions for the city of Himera.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TYRANTS' USE OF MERCENARIES

In the last chapter we examined the tyrants' approach to foreign relations, both Greek and Carthaginian, and broadly speaking this chapter aims to do the same, only instead of looking at the Sicilian tyrants' *political* approach to dealing with other cities, we will now turn to the tyrants' *military* approach, in particular the strategies employed for increasing and maintaining their power in Sicily. Much of the tyrants' military activity from Cleandrus down to Thrasybulus will be considered and discussed, but we will focus on only one particular aspect of it, the hiring and use of mercenary troops. There are several reasons for this: firstly, the use of mercenaries either in war or as a private bodyguard is something that is frequently associated with the tyrants of Greece in general, as we shall find in the first part of this chapter, but the sheer scale of mercenary recruitment by the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse make it especially worthy of consideration. Elsewhere, we only find such vast numbers of mercenaries appearing much later on in the fourth century; thus the tyrants of early fifth century Sicily can truly be considered ahead of their time. The second reason is the impact of the tyrants' mass-recruitment, to be discovered only when the tyranny had ended in 466 and the various peoples of the Deinomenid empire were trying to re-establish themselves in their own cities, as well as their own identity as citizens of these cities. This will be seen in the final chapter of this thesis where we consider the aftermath of the tyranny in Syracuse. Finally, connected to this last point, we can only fully understand the next chapter on the phenomenon of the refoundation of cities in Sicily, if we understand how central the recruitment of mercenaries was to the Sicilian tyrants' military policy, as we will soon discover.

Tyranny, Mercenaries and Bodyguards

The employment of mercenaries is, as is stated by Aristotle in the example below, a theme commonly associated with the Greek tyrants. Here a clear distinction is made between the rule of a king, who concerns himself with issues affecting the people and therefore can count on them for military aid, and the tyrant, who in looking after his own interests alone,

finds himself having to recruit help from elsewhere, not being able to trust the people he rules over.

βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηθέν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρημάτων τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικά μᾶλλον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτικὴ, τυραννικὴ δὲ διὰ ξένων.

Aristotle *Politics* 1310b40-11a8

It is easy to see why such perceptions would be so common. The use of mercenaries in battle would have appeared as a sort of intrusion by foreigners into the military duties of a citizen, just as a tyranny appeared to invade their political duties. The difference most strongly expressed in this passage is that of the tyrant's lack of concern for the people, and therefore his unpopularity, hence the dependence on mercenary support. This alludes to an earlier point made by Aristotle concerning the deviations from standard forms of government; in this case tyranny is a deviation from monarchy, and as with the other deviations (oligarchy from aristocracy, democracy from polity), it only benefits those in power as opposed to the common interest of *all* citizens¹. Aristotle's generalisation does not seem to be supported by our sources in general; in fact the practice of employing mercenaries seems mostly restricted to those tyrants from the late Archaic Period and afterwards, and does not become standard practice until the fourth century, i.e. Aristotle's own time. Evidence for this is found in the *Panegyrikos* of Isocrates.

Πολλῶν γὰρ κακῶν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοὶ πλείω τῶν ἀναγκαίων προσεξευρήκαμεν, πολέμους καὶ στάσεις ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐμποιήσαντες, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀνόμως ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν.

Isocrates *Panegyrikos* 168

The numbers of mercenaries are said to be due to the continuing warfare and civil strife in Greece, not only because many found themselves impoverished by the pitiful economic situation and therefore were desperate for employment, but also because their employment simply maintained a vicious circle – people were poor, many of these became mercenaries, the

¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1279a32-b11.

mercenaries enabled their employer to continue with their warring, and those affected by the wars became poor².

During and following the prolonged Peloponnesian War, specialisation in military disciplines became necessary on the battlefield as warfare became more complex and demanding. The use of mercenaries became more widespread generally, especially with auxiliary troops such as slingers and peltasts³. The reasons behind the more common use of mercenaries in the fourth century were therefore not only social and economic, although these would have been the overriding factors behind these people's decision to become mercenaries, but also because there was a huge demand for them in military terms. Aristotle's statement concerning the tyrants' dependence on mercenaries seems to be fairly accurate, at least in his own time, for those of Pherae in Thessaly, and of Syracuse, during the fourth century were prime examples of mercenary employers. However in this chapter we will look at how the Sicilian tyrants prior to this period made use of their mercenaries, and the circumstances in which they were employed. To do this it is also necessary to examine how tyrants before and after used them.

I will include some discussion of bodyguards, as well as mercenary forces, that had been granted to various tyrants of the Archaic age, such as Peisistratos of Athens and Theagenes of Megara. The reasons for this are firstly that they are armed forces intended for the tyrant's personal use, even when they are employees of the state itself. Secondly, the act of granting the bodyguards in the first place can tell us much about what certain groups of people thought of these individuals, in other words whether they were popular with the hoplite classes, or with the aristocracy. The significance of the tyrants' popularity will be made clear during the course of this chapter.

The history of Greek warfare sees many noticeable changes in character, and there are many reasons for this; for example, there is a close link between the rise of hoplite warfare and the spread of political influence amongst the hoplite classes around 700 BC, for example in

² Fuks (1972) 26-31 elaborates on this theme, particularly emphasising poverty as the reason for the problem of the 'floating' population.

³ There are countless examples of the use of slingers from abroad, see Pritchett (1991) 54-5 for the full range of nationalities represented (including non-Greeks) most notably the Rhodians and Balearic

Argos, probably the earliest example in Greece⁴. War itself can also bring about permanent changes, but in the case of the prolonged Peloponnesian war it was the peace afterwards that is sometimes said to have forced changes⁵, when soldiers returned home to find their land ravaged, or even neglected to the point of uselessness, a result of decades of continuous fighting. However, the area that seems to have produced the majority of mercenaries, the Peloponnese⁶, particularly Arcadia, was less affected by the war, and Attica itself seems to have recovered fairly quickly with less damage done than has been imagined⁷.

Parke has also suggested the apparent decline of the *polis* in Greece during the fifth century BC⁸, with many of these being unable to provide employment to its citizens, but this argument is found to suffer from the over-generalisation that the *polis* system was dominant, whereas much of Greece was still based on a tribal system, again including much of the Peloponnese, and was only turning towards the *polis* system during the fifth century. More recent studies into the political systems prevalent in Arcadian communities have shown that much of the area was either in a stage of transition or was still dominated by a tribal system⁹. The likely effects of the tribal system on military service in Arcadia have been described by Rawlings, and to summarize, the point is made that rather than finding a situation where the armed forces have a clear and defined loyalty to their state, as one would expect in a *polis*, in a tribal system the obligation is towards a chieftain, whose intentions may conflict with his own armed force¹⁰. In situations such as this, it is possible that wealthy mercenary employers could easily exploit a rich source of frustrated and impoverished soldiers, without too much risk of becoming embroiled in Arcadian political affairs¹¹.

The best known employer was Cyrus, a Persian who failed in attempting to usurp the throne using 10,000 Greek mercenaries, who had to return to Greece under the leadership of Xenophon, who later wrote an account of the expedition, the *Anabasis*. The tyrants of the 4th

Islanders. Peltast warfare famously originates from Thrace – Eur. *Alc.* 498, *Erechtheus* fr.370; Xen. *Mem.* III.9.2; *POxy* X.1241.18-9, see Best (1969).

⁴ See Andrewes (1956) ch.3, Kelly (1976) ch.7, Tomlinson (1972) ch.7 on Pheidon's tyranny in Argos.

⁵ Parke (1933) 20.

⁶ On the demand for Peloponnesian, especially Arcadian, mercenaries, see Trundle (2004) 75-6.

⁷ See Strauss (1986) 43-5 and Hanson (1998) 131-73.

⁸ Parke (1933) 20.

⁹ See Roy (1996) 110-1; Nielsen (1996) 117-63 and (1999) 16-79.

¹⁰ Rawlings (1996) 81-2.

century, such as those of Pherae, also exploited their opportunity to establish themselves with the help of mercenaries, being wealthy enough to support a private force.

Tyrants and the Hoplite revolution

In the many cases in the Archaic Period where a tyrant appears in a given city-state, it is usually the result of some sort of class-conflict, where the general population rally around an individual who at least appears to promise changes, and this usually occurs in states where there is a realistic hope of breaking the aristocracy's dominance of political life. This dominance was traditionally based on the exclusive role of the aristocracy in warfare, but with the so-called 'hoplite revolution', where the benefits of the heavy infantry had been realised, the classes that formed the hoplite force demanded more influence in government, now that they were dominant on the battlefield, a development discussed by Aristotle¹². Here the future tyrant (sometimes an aristocrat himself) can take advantage of the unrest by becoming allied with the masses, assuming a position as leader, and seizing power. The first tyrant to do this seems to have been Pheidon of Argos¹³, who according to Aristotle was originally king but was later classified as a tyrant¹⁴, possibly because of his association with the hoplites, with whose help he gained control of a sizeable proportion of the Peloponnese. It may at first seem doubtful that a person in the highest of constitutional offices would risk his own position by giving the hoplite classes military influence, but we do not know the exact circumstances surrounding this decision, and it is the case that his reign in the early 7th century became the last time at which Argos would be in such a powerful position in the Peloponnese. It may also be the case that Pheidon was not in a strong position to begin with, as Pausanias tells us that Argive laws reduced the king's power so it perhaps was only of symbolic value¹⁵. If this was so then Pheidon may have secured his influence in Argos by allowing the hoplite classes to

¹¹ For more detail on the reasons behind Greeks serving as mercenaries, see Trundle (2004) 40-79.

¹² Arist. *Pol.* 1297b.

¹³ See Kelly (1976) 112 n.1 on Pheidon as the 'innovator', for example being the first tyrant and first to use hoplite warfare.

¹⁴ *Pol.* 1310b25-28, 39ff. This has been explained by both Kelly (1976) 113-4 and Tomlinson (1972) 81 as meaning that Pheidon had extended his powers beyond those which he had inherited as part of the constitutional kingship, into those powers held by the aristocracy.

¹⁵ Paus. II.19.2.

fulfil their potential¹⁶, and in this way both Pheidon and the hoplites would pose a threat to the aristocracy who dominated affairs in Argos.

Tyrants' Bodyguards

There are many examples in Greek history of tyrants coming to power with the aid of a bodyguard, the most famous being Peisistratos, who gained a bodyguard by pretending he had been attacked¹⁷. There are several sources that deal with Peisistratos and his rise to power, in particular Herodotus and the *Athenaion Politeia*, but also Plutarch's life of Solon which adds a few interesting details to the story¹⁸.

καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν, συλλέξας δὲ στασιώτας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ὑπερακρίων προστάς μηχανᾶται τοιάδε· τρωματίσας ἑωυτόν τε καὶ ἡμίονους ἤλασε ἐς τὴν ἀγορὴν τὸ ζεῦγος ὡς ἐκπεφευγῶς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, οἳ μιν ἐλαύνοντα ἐς ἀγρὸν ἠθέλησαν ἀπολέσαι δῆθεν, ἐδέετό τε τοῦ δήμου φυλακῆς τινος πρὸς αὐτοῦ κυρῆσαι, πρότερον εὐδοκιμήσας ἐν τῇ πρὸς Μεγαρέας γενομένη στρατηγίῃ, Νίσαιάν τε ἐλὼν καὶ ἄλλα ἀποδεξάμενος μεγάλα ἔργα. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἔδωκέ οἱ τῶν ἀστῶν καταλέξασθαι ἄνδρας τριηκοσίους οἱ δορυφόροι μὲν οὐκ ἐγένοντο Πεισιστράτου, κορυνηφόροι δὲ· ξύλων γὰρ κορύνας ἔχοντες εἶποντό οἱ ὄπισθε. Συνεπαναστάντες δὲ οὗτοι ἅμα Πεισιστράτῳ ἔσχον τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

Hdt. I.59

Here we learn that Peisistratos had appealed directly to the people of Athens for protection, heading towards the agora, where it was likely that there were many of the lower classes present and which perhaps would have had the same effect as appearing at the popular assembly with a realistic cross-section of Athenian society. The bodyguard itself (κορυνηφόροι – ‘club-bearers’) was provided by the state, and therefore probably consisted of Athenian citizens. Also of significance is Peisistratos' reputation from a previous expedition to Nisaea, where it is likely that he would have endeared himself not only to the troops he was commanding but also the general population of Athens. Plutarch in his account tells us that it

¹⁶ It is thought that Pheidon's standardisation of weights and measures may have been of greatest help to the poorer citizens of Argos, in that they were no longer being shortchanged by wealthy traders at the marketplace, as this kind of exploitation was certainly possible beforehand. The benefits to Argive trade and commerce (for example see Ure (1922) 154-83) are considered to be of secondary importance by Kelly (1976) 113-4.

¹⁷ We will also find later on that Dionysius I of Syracuse used a similar trick in obtaining a personal bodyguard - Diod. Sic. XIII.96.1ff., Ar. Pol. 1286b40.

¹⁸ Hdt. I.59, Ath. Pol. 14.1 Plut. Sol. 30.

was the popular Assembly at Athens that had granted the bodyguard¹⁹, and the series of events does seem to be directed against the aristocracy in general²⁰.

ἐκ τούτου τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἦν ἔτοιμον ὑπερμαχεῖν τοῦ Πεισιστράτου, καὶ
 συνῆλθεν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ὁ δῆμος. Ἄριστωνος δὲ γράψαντος ὅπως δοθῶσι
 πεντήκοντα κορυνηφόροι τῷ Πεισιστράτῳ φυλακὴ τοῦ σώματος, ...
 Plut. *Solon* 30.2-3

So popular was this decision in fact that it seems the people themselves were as effective a weapon as the bodyguards they granted. The *Athenaion Politeia* gives a similar description, and at the start of the chapter where these events are described, we are told that Peisistratos was inclined to democracy, further emphasising the public's support²¹. In Herodotus' account we are told of when Peisistratos had finally secured the tyranny at the third attempt.

Πειθομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, οὕτω δὲ Πεισίστρατος τὸ τρίτον σχὼν Ἀθήνας
 ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισι τε πολλοῖσι καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν
 μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ συνιόντων, ...
 Hdt. I.64

It is noticeable that when Peisistratos gathers support in this case, they are referred to as ἐπίκουροι ('helpers'), a commonly used term for mercenaries, rather than κορυνηφόροι, probably meaning that either Peisistratos' original bodyguard was removed by the state itself, or they had become absorbed into his army of supporters. We do know that he still had a number of supporters in Athens and Attica, who joined him in his march against the city, and according to Herodotus was away for ten years gathering support elsewhere, after his second attempt failed.

It is also clear that Peisistratos was not a one-off case of a tyrant gaining power through popular support. Another case that is very similar is that of Theagenes of Megara, who according to the *Politics* of Aristotle, gained public support by going out into the countryside and destroying any livestock that belonged to the aristocracy grazing on public land. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle includes Theagenes in a short list of tyrants who gained power by being

¹⁹ Plut. *Sol.* 30.

²⁰ Kelly (1976) 113-4, and Tomlinson (1972) 81, both explain that it was Pheidon's extension of his own constitutional powers by usurping those of the aristocracy, that constitutes his own transition in status from king to tyrant.

given a bodyguard by the people, almost certainly for protection from the aristocracy²². Social unrest is the crucial element in the making of a tyrant, and the degree of military capability within the hoplite classes, in contrast with that of the aristocracy, would therefore be the indicator of whether there was any attempt at gaining political power, and whether or not they enjoyed any success. It is probably for this reason that we rarely find tyrants in such strongholds of cavalry warfare as Boeotia, or, at least until the 4th century, in Thessaly. This is also consistent with Aristotle's comments on the share of power in a city²³, mentioned earlier in discussion of the hoplite revolution. Another region where cavalry warfare was dominant was Sicily itself, so the obvious question that springs to mind is why there were tyrants in Sicily or in Thessaly at all. Unfortunately there is no known account of the rise to power of Cleandrus, the first of the tyrants of Gela, a fact which means we may never know the answer for certain, but we may be able to find some clues in the rise of the tyrants of Pherae.

We find Pherae to be a prosperous coastal town, enriched by the sale of corn grown in Larisa, particularly since Greece was, generally speaking, impoverished by the Peloponnesian war. Wealthier than most in Pherae was Lycophron, the eventual founder of the dynasty, who also made many in the lower classes considerably richer and therefore gained their support. Lycophron used his immense wealth to full advantage by hiring mercenaries, (we do not know how many, though we find that his successor Jason had a force of about 6,000). With a large number of mercenaries Lycophron was able to take Pherae by force, and perhaps with little real opposition, firstly since he enjoyed the support of the masses, but also probably because the local aristocratic families and their horses were unlikely to pose a threat to the mercenaries, who being far more experienced after the Peloponnesian War would have been likely to cope even in the face of a very large cavalry force. If control over Thessaly increased as gradually as our sources indicate, and the major cities were taken one by one, it seems unlikely that Lycophron at any time would have had to face the *full* Thessalian cavalry force of 6,000²⁴ and he therefore may not have encountered many problems, especially considering the difficulties

²¹ *Ath. Pol.* 14.1.

²² *Ar. Pol.* 1305a24, *Rhet* 1357b.

²³ *Arist. Pol.* 1297b.

²⁴ *Xen. Hell.* VI.1.8-9.

suffered by the Thessalians of facing a strong hoplite force without having effective infantry oneself. It does seem that Lycophron would have been very fortunate indeed to have been given his chance just as the Peloponnesian war had finished, and when there were plenty of poverty-stricken, but also hugely experienced soldiers all desperate to earn money by any means. By Jason's reign the tyranny had actually gained in popularity at Pherae, and the mercenaries had been used to take control of most of Thessaly, largely due to the fact that local hoplites were hardly renowned for their abilities, being dependant on the cavalry for defending their open and flat territory. Combining popular support with wealth, the Pheraeans used mercenary forces with great success. This extract from Xenophon's *Hellenica* perhaps best illustrates the importance of mercenaries to the Pheraeans, and probably also to Xenophon himself.

καὶ μὴν οἴσθ' ὅτι ξένους ἔχω μισθοφόρους εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, οἷς, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐδεμία πόλις δύναιτ' ἂν ῥαδίως μάχεσθαι. ἀριθμὸς μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλοθεν οὐκ ἂν ἐλάττων ἐξέλθοι· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων στρατεύματα τοὺς μὲν προεληλυθότας ἤδη ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἔχει, τοὺς δ' οὐπω ἀκμάζοντας· σωμασκοῦσί γε μὴν μάλα ὀλίγοι τινὲς ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει· παρ' ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς μισθοφορεῖ, ὅστις μὴ ἰκανὸς ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ ἴσα πονεῖν.

Xen. *Hell.* VI.1.5

In Sicily, it can be argued that there is a similar dependence on mercenary forces during the early 5th century, and the Pherae model seems especially relevant, as has been said above²⁵ because of the similarities between Sicily and Thessaly, both falling under tyrannies despite very strong and influential aristocracies and also therefore strong cavalry forces. Before looking at the examples of mercenary use in Sicily, the conquest of the Greek and Sicel cities in Eastern Sicily itself will be considered, in order to construct the background to a period of great military advancement.

Mercenaries in Sicily

Gela before the fifth century

Under the tyrants, the territory controlled by the Geloans had grown outwards from the plain surrounding the city, to roughly a third of the island of Sicily by the middle of Gelon's reign in 485. We cannot be sure when this expansion had started, but it is clear that the bulk of

the conquests came under the reign of Hippocrates (498-1), who with the aid of Gelon's generalship of the cavalry, had taken control of the major Chalcidian cities (including Zancle until 494/3), the Etna region and plain, including the Sicel towns, and part of the Syracusan territory. As pointed out by Dunbabin, it is not certain that the expansion began with Hippocrates²⁶, for we do not know whether his predecessor and founder of the dynasty, Cleandrus (505-498), had any such plans himself. Asheri suggests that it was Cleandrus who had built Gela's first city wall²⁷, probably indicative of earlier conflict with the Sicels who occupied the Heraian hills surrounding the Geloan plain.

It does seem that problems had existed in Gela before the tyrants had come to power. The Geloans held a fairly large territory consisting of the plain in which the city was situated, along with several passes running through the hills nearby. Sjöqvist's own impression of Gela's early history resembles that of Syracuse, in other words, a difficult time in which the colony was isolated, being surrounded by hostile native Sicels²⁸. Whether the Greeks instigated the problems (as seems to be the case in Syracuse) is not clear, but the example of a large Sicel town situated at Butera, overlooking Gela, where there seems to be a break in habitation from around 600 to 300, suggests that we have evidence of possible earlier conflict in which Gela had successfully asserted itself²⁹. Therefore, in consideration of Gela's situation, it seems probable that the city wall may have been built even prior to Cleandrus' rule.

By 580, Acragas was founded by Geloans, probably in conjunction with the Rhodians³⁰, and the new city, under its tyrant Phalaris (from around 570), had a policy of expansion very soon in its history, including the infamous story of the conquest of the Sican town of Vessa by dishonourable means³¹. It seems that Gela and Acragas held similar views on dealing with the Sicels and Sicans respectively, especially with the appearance of Geloan-style fortifications in Acragantine controlled Sican territory³². The evidence conflicts with Dunbabin's idea that the invasion of Sicel territory began with Hippocrates, or perhaps

²⁵ See above, 107.

²⁶ Dunbabin (1948) 380.

²⁷ Asheri (1988) 759.

²⁸ Sjöqvist (1973) ch.4.

²⁹ Sjöqvist (1973) 39, see Adamesteanu (1958) for reports on the excavations at Butera.

³⁰ Dunbabin (1948) 310, Rhodians – Polybius IX.27, sch. Pind. *Ol.* II.82d.

³¹ Polyæn. V.1.4.

Cleandrus³³. He dismisses the idea that the conquests were made under the Geloan oligarchy, regarding it as too strong a change of policy for such a type of government to make, being far more likely to be a result of the change of government from oligarchy to tyranny, or from tyrant to tyrant. While this may be true when considering the conquest of other Greek cities under Hippocrates, it seems that the conflict with the Sicels was a constant problem throughout Geloan history, rather than one that was started under the tyrants. In other words, there was never any major change in policy in the oligarchic period, because the hostile atmosphere was present from Gela's earliest days.

It seems therefore that by the time that Hippocrates had succeeded his brother, Gela was already in a fairly strong position, and any conflict in the region was the result of Sicel uprisings against Geloan rule. However, the achievements of Hippocrates and his generals cannot be allowed to be understated by this, as even aside from maintaining control over the local Sicels, the conquest of the Greek and Sicel cities in Eastern Sicily stands as one of the great, although often unrecognised, military achievements in Greek history.

Hippocrates

The chronology of the earlier stages of Hippocrates' career is unclear, but Dunbabin suggests that one of the first incidents of his reign somehow involved the destruction of two sites, those at Mte. Bubbonia, a Sicel 'palace' and at Mte. San Mauro, a Geloan outpost³⁴. Dunbabin also tells us that the destructions took place at roughly the same time, and comes to the conclusion that despite a previously amicable relationship, Hippocrates led the Geloans to destroy the 'palace' at Mte. Bubbonia, after which the undefended Mte. San Mauro was attacked and destroyed in revenge. However, Asheri prefers to date the destructions to the late 6th century, and Sjöqvist seems to imply that Mte. Bubbonia was in fact already Hellenised by the mid-6th century³⁵. Asheri and Sjöqvist were writing at a time following the further excavations at the sites by Adamesteanu, and therefore with the benefit of new evidence not

³² For Acragantine expansion, see Adamesteanu (1961) and De Miro (1962).

³³ Dunbabin (1948) 380.

³⁴ Dunbabin (1948) 379.

³⁵ Asheri (1988) 758, Sjöqvist (1973) 40-3.

available to Dunbabin, so it seems likely that the sites were destroyed before the time of Cleandrus and Hippocrates, thus confirming that Gela did indeed have an aggressive Sicel policy before 505³⁶.

Following his brother's murder by Sabyllus in 498³⁷, the first step Hippocrates would have needed to take would be to secure his own position as tyrant. The possibilities concerning the political climate in Gela are endless, as the events and character of Cleandrus' reign are totally unknown, but we do have a fragment of Timaeus which seems to tell of difficulties³⁸.

βαθυκρήμοισι δ' ἀμφ' ἄκταις Ἐλώρου] περὶ τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν συνέστη Ἴπποκράτει τῷ Γελῶϊων τυράννωι πρὸς Συρακοσίους πόλεμος, ὁ δὲ Γέλων, <οὔ> οὗτος ἐταῖρος, ἰππάρχει τότε Ἴπποκράτει· ἐν δὴ τούτῳ φησὶ τῷ πολέμῳ εἰκὸς τὸν Χρόμιον ἐπιδείξασθαι πολλὰ ἔργα κατὰ τὴν μάχην. περὶ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πολέμου Τίμαιος ἐν τῇ ἰ δεδήλωκε· «καθάπαξ γάρ' φησὶν ὁ δίδυμος ὀυδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην ἔχομεν εὐρεῖν περὶ τὸν Ἐλώρον τῶν συνηκμακότων τῷ Χρομίῳ τυράννων, ὅτι μὴ σὺν Ἴπποκράτει τοῦ Γέλωνος πρὸς Συρακοσίους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν Γέλωνα ἰππαρχεῖν κατέστησεν Ἴπποκράτης, σαφὲς ὁ Τίμαιος ποιήσει γράφων οὕτως· «Ἴπποκράτης δὲ μετὰ τὴν Κλεάνδρου τελευτὴν ἅμα μὲν τοῦ Γέλωνος ἐν τῇ τεταγμένῃ μεμενηκότος, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Γελῶϊοις χαρίσασθαι βουλόμενος, μεταπεμψάμενος αὐτὸν καὶ παρακαλέσας ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις, ἀπάντωντῶν ἰπέων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐκείνῳ παρέδωκεν»'.

Sch. Pind. *Nem.* IX.95 (Timaeus fr.18)

It does also seem likely that the old land-owning aristocracy would have wanted to recover power, if the transitional periods of other Greek states are anything to go by. To gain power for himself, Hippocrates would require the aid of a Geloan citizen force (this would of course be subject to popular feeling towards Hippocrates, Cleandrus' murder and tyranny in general, but it is probable that the return of oligarchic government would have been even less popular, as is usually the case in the Greek colonies, e.g. Syracuse pre-485). This citizen force may have taken the form of the bodyguard mentioned by Herodotus, of which Gelon was a member³⁹.

The first concrete information we have on Hippocrates' reign is that concerning his conquest of Eastern Sicily. Herodotus produces a list of Geloan activities after telling of Hippocrates' accession, but there is debate over whether we can take it for granted that the list is chronological.

³⁶ Adamesteanu (1957).

³⁷ Hdt. VII.154.

³⁸ Schol. Pind. *Nem.* IX.95 (Timaeus)

³⁹ Hdt. VII.154

... ἐνθαῦτα ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν μουναρχίην Ἴπποκράτης, Κλεάνδρου ἐὼν ἀδελφεός. Ἐχοντος δὲ Ἴπποκράτεος τὴν τυραννίδα ὁ Γέλων, ἐὼν Τηλίνεω τοῦ ἱροφάντεω ἀπόγονος, πολλῶν μετ' ἄλλων καὶ Αἰνησιδήμου τοῦ Παταΐκου [ὄς] ἦν δορυφόρος Ἴπποκράτεος. Μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον δι' ἀρετὴν ἀπεδέχθη πάσης τῆς ἵππου εἶναι ἵππαρχος· πολιορκέοντος γὰρ Ἴπποκράτεος Καλλιπολίτας τε καὶ Ναξίους καὶ Ζαγκλαίους τε καὶ Λεοντίους καὶ πρὸς Συρηκοσίους τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων συχνοὺς ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο ἐν τούτοισι τοῖσι πολέμοισι ἐὼν ὁ Γέλων λαμπρότατος.

Hdt. VII.154

Although it is not certain, Callipolis, being a sub-colony of Naxos, is reckoned to be situated in the region of Mt. Etna, and if this is true and the list is chronological, it proves to be a strange route for Hippocrates to take. One would naturally expect Leontini, being just beyond the Heraian hills, to be Hippocrates' first target for expansion, and this is the stance taken by Asheri⁴⁰, who prefers the more logical approach to taking Herodotus' account too literally. However there are several other theories concerning the route taken and also therefore, the intentions of Herodotus. If we look firstly at the literary account, there are two main theories. Firstly there is Macan's idea that Herodotus has paired the cities together because each pair formed a separate campaign⁴¹, but while the first pair (Callipolis and Naxos) seems likely considering their size and probable proximity to one another, the others (Zancle and Leontini; Syracuse and the Sicels) are more doubtful, in particular the last. The main problem with the last line is that the campaign against the Sicels was likely to be a constant problem, requiring several battles and sieges over a large area, rather than a single campaign. Pareti prefers to see Herodotus' account as building up the campaign as a whole, starting with the smaller conquests such as Naxos, through the larger cities like Leontini, to the ultimate prize of Syracuse⁴². Although there is a sense of belief in a chronological order by Pareti, it is not as strong as in Dunbabin's account, who takes the view that it makes more sense to attack weaker opponents first, if possible, leaving the stronger enemies isolated and without allies. There are several problems encountered if this approach is taken, the first involving Leontini; in other words, would Gela be under threat from a Leontine attack if left unguarded? This seems increasingly likely if Hippocrates is attacking Leontini's own mother-city (Naxos), and sister-city (Callipolis). My own opinion is that the Leontines would not have known of

⁴⁰ Asheri (1988) 759.

⁴¹ Macan (1908).

Hippocrates' intentions regarding the Chalcidian cities until he had attacked one of them, by which time he would have been close enough to Leontini for them to concern themselves more with protecting their own city rather than leaving it unprotected and attacking the Geloan plain. Therefore a chronological approach by Herodotus is still a strong possibility⁴³.

A different approach to the question of Hippocrates' early campaigns was made by Adamesteanu, who chose to use aerial photography as a tool for discovering the most likely route taken by Hippocrates' army⁴⁴. The results of the research indicated that a route towards the Etna region, ignoring Leontini, was certainly possible, if a pass situated near modern Caltagirone was taken, en route to Morgantina, another Chalcidian settlement. Extensions to the city of Morgantina were made at Serra Orlando, the excavations of which had shown signs of destruction around the start of the 5th century⁴⁵, although Morgantina itself was left apparently unharmed. Sjöqvist concludes that Morgantina must have submitted to Hippocrates in the face of destruction, and takes the use of the Doric form of the name in local inscriptions to mean that the town was made a Dorian power base⁴⁶.

It seems increasingly likely in view of this evidence that the sequence of conflicts given by Herodotus enables us to reconstruct the route taken by Hippocrates, and the mention of the barbarians probably refers to the campaign in which Hippocrates was killed. However, I feel it is necessary to cast doubt over whether Zancle was taken by the tyrant before Leontini, as seems to be reckoned by all those mentioned so far, apart from Asheri. While it is understandable that Hippocrates would prefer to eliminate the weaker Chalcidian cities before attacking the larger Leontini, it does not make sense to risk approaching an even larger, more distant, and more difficult city to besiege such as Zancle, at least when he had the choice of taking Leontini while he had easier access to the city through its north gate. Such a move against Zancle would also have caused tensions with Rhegium, which was already losing its precious contacts with Zancle⁴⁷, so an attempt on the city by Hippocrates would only

⁴² Pareti (1914) 43.

⁴³ See figure 3, p.25

⁴⁴ Adamesteanu (1962a, b; 1963).

⁴⁵ Sjöqvist (1962a, b; 1964), Stillwell (1963).

⁴⁶ Sjöqvist (1973) 45-7.

⁴⁷ See previous chapter, 67.

complicate matters by presenting the tyrant with enemies (Rhegium and Leontini) on two fronts.

The sources covering these events unfortunately give virtually no details on how each city was taken near the end of Hippocrates' reign (except for Polyaeus' dubious description of Ergetium's downfall⁴⁸), or details of any battles that had taken place, except perhaps at the Helorus river⁴⁹.

Unfortunately it seems that Hippocrates' primary motive in attacking the Chalcidian cities in Sicily is unknown, and there has not been much discussion regarding the subject, probably because it is a question that can never have a definite answer. However we can probably rule out prejudice against a particular group, as the empire consisted of Sicel, Chalcidian, and Dorian elements; thus it may be understood as an attempt on gaining the whole of Sicily, with the territorial gains of its ally Acragas being taken into account. One interesting suggestion is that of Sjöqvist, as although he expresses doubt as to the real motives behind the expansion, he puts forward the idea that it may have been a joint effort by Gela (co-founded by the Cretans, along with Rhodes) and Acragas (co-founded by Gela itself, again, along with Rhodes) to bring Sicily under the control of the descendants of Minos, legendary king of Crete, although Sjöqvist's view is based on the need for some kind of motivation from Crete's mythological past⁵⁰. This idea seems more credible when considering the possible motives of Hieron in founding Aetna, in particular Pindar's allusion to the restoration of Heraclid rule in Sicily, showing that such motivations as these were not unknown⁵¹. However the question of Hippocrates' ultimate motive, if there was one other than a simple greed for power, will remain unanswered unless there is more evidence to assess.

⁴⁸ Polyaeus. V.6, for the passage see below, 114.

⁴⁹ See refoundations chapter, 141.

⁵⁰ Sjöqvist (1973) 47-8.

⁵¹ See later chapters on refoundations and propaganda, 163 and 183.

Hippocrates' Mercenaries

As we now start looking at evidence for the use of mercenaries by Hippocrates, we have already found evidence of some kind of private force above⁵². Whether the bodyguard mentioned by Herodotus was granted to him, as were those of other tyrants beforehand, we cannot say, but it may indicate that the tyranny in Gela was initially a popular one, at least during the reign of Cleandrus and for the early part of Hippocrates' reign. Judging by Gelon's appearance, it was a citizen force; there is no doubt that Gelon was of a Geloan family, however the other figure mentioned, Ainesidemos, is more obscure. It is possible he was from Leontini, as he was later made a sub-tyrant of that city in the style of Scythes of Zancle⁵³. This may be more likely according to Dunbabin, who says that Aenesidemos may have been related to the Emmenid tyrants of Acragas⁵⁴, and tells us that he may have been the individual who embodied the good relationship between the two dynasties, though Dunbabin does not produce any real evidence to support this claim. Whether Ainesidemos was Leontine, Acragantine, or neither, he is surely an example of a personal ally of Hippocrates' (perhaps even a volunteer), rather than a mercenary. The only mention we have of mercenaries being employed by Hippocrates is in a passage from the *Strategemata*, a work by the 2nd century AD rhetorician Polyaeus.

Ἴπποκράτης κρατῆσαι τῆς Ἐργετίνων πόλεως ἐσπουδακῶς, ὅσους Ἐργετίνους εἶχε μισθοφόρους, τούτοις ἔνεμεν ἀεὶ τῆς λείας τὸ πλεῖον μέρος καὶ μισθοὺς μείζονας ὑπερεπαινῶν αὐτούς ὡς προθυμοτάτους καὶ μάλιστα χαριζόμενος, ὡς πλείονας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ἔχοι συμμάχους. ταῦτα ἠγγέλλετο τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει· οἱ δὲ ζηλώσαντες τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν στρατευομένων ἐθέλοντες πάντες ἐξῆλθον καταλιπόντες ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν. Ἴπποκράτης φιλοφρόνως δεξάμενος τοὺς ἄνδρας, αὐτῆς νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ Λαιστρυγονίου πεδίου προῆγε, τοὺς μὲν Ἐργετίνους τάξας πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην στρατιὰν πρὸς τὴν ἠπειρον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπεφράχθησαν πρὸς ταῖς ραχίαις τῶν κυμάτων οἱ Ἐργετῖνοι, τοὺς ἵππεῖς προπέμψας Ἴπποκράτης τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἔρημον οὖσαν κατελάβετο καὶ τὸν κήρυκα πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προειπεῖν ἐκέλευσε καὶ σύνθημα Γελώοις καὶ Καμαριναίοις ἔδωκε κτείνειν ἀδεῶς Ἐργετίνους ἅπαντας.

Polyaeus *Strategemata* V.6

This interesting story is typical of what is contained in Polyaeus' work, in that it can sometimes be fairly useful, but its main aim was to educate on the subject of military strategy,

⁵² Hdt. VII.154; see also 111 above.

⁵³ See 148 in the Refoundations chapter.

⁵⁴ Dunbabin (1948) 383

especially for those involved in the Roman expeditions to Parthia, rather than to provide an accurate record of military history for its own sake. This is made more vivid by the inclusion of mythical *stratagems* alongside those from historical events. In the text itself, we find another example of the unscrupulousness of the tyrant, which begs the question of whether it is actually true (it does seem to be consistent with Hippocrates' character from episodes in Herodotus, in particular the Cale Acte enterprise) or if it is simply a fabrication, a result of Hippocrates' own legacy. The mention of the Laestrygonians, a Homeric people, in the passage does nothing to aid the credibility of the account. Dunbabin views the text as being more informative rather than simply being an example of storytelling, especially regarding some of the detail given on Ergetium itself, but in view of the difficulties of using Polyaeus, it is unlikely that this account contributes as much as Dunbabin reckons⁵⁵. Also, going back to the main point of the composition of Hippocrates' force, although there is a mention of mercenaries near the start of this passage, the Geloans and Camarinaeans at the end of the text may suggest that at this time it was still citizen forces and allies that formed the bulk of Hippocrates' armed force.

However this suggestion is challenged by another piece of evidence which may indicate a mercenary element in Hippocrates' army connected to the tyrant's refoundation of the city of Camarina, a source of troops for the Ergetium campaign around 492/1⁵⁶. This occurred around the end of Hippocrates' reign, following his victory against the Syracusans at the Helorus river. It is very possible that many of those settled at the city (probably more of a reinforcement than a refoundation) were soldiers who had served Hippocrates in his conquest of Eastern Sicily. This would aid Hippocrates if he were to attack Syracusan territory again, and also create a useful buffer zone between Gela and Syracuse. An epigram from the Appendix to the Palatine Anthology helps us to discover where Hippocrates' settlers originally came from:

Πραξιτέλης ἀνέθηκε Συρακόσιος τόδ' ἄγαλμα
καὶ Καμαριναῖος· πρόσθ' ἄρ' ἐν Μαντινέᾳ
Κρίνιος υἱὸς ἔναϊεν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ πολυμήλῳ
ἔσλὸς ἐὼν καὶ φοι μνᾶμα τόδ' ἐστ' ἀρετᾶς.

⁵⁵ Dunbabin (1948) 403.

⁵⁶ See later chapter on Refoundations 143ff..

This is dated by Dunbabin⁵⁷ to the time following the Camarinaeans' forced move to Syracuse under Gelon, but what is more important is Praxiteles' three-fold identity, particular his claim to be a Mantinean from Arcadia. This area of Greece is one of the more likely to produce mercenaries, in particular because of its relative poverty in comparison with the rest of Greece, as despite the impression of Arcadia given in the text itself, it is a mountainous region much of which is unsuited to cultivation⁵⁸. This epigram may identify Praxiteles as a mercenary recruited and settled by Hippocrates.

Gelon

The first real glimpse we have into the *whole* force used by the Sicilian tyrants is under the reign of Gelon, who had usurped the tyranny from Hippocrates' sons after crushing a citizen uprising. It is possible that the uprising took place because the Geloans were simply fed up of campaigning, which is certainly possible if Hippocrates' force did consist mainly of citizens. The extent of Hippocrates' conquests may indicate that while the initial campaigns against the Sicels may have been necessary for Gela's own security, those that followed such as at the Chalcidian cities and the battle at the Helorus river, may simply have been viewed as indicative of Hippocrates' greed for power and influence throughout Eastern Sicily, rather than to the benefit of Gela itself. It is my opinion that it was from Gelon's reign onwards that we find the mass-recruitment of mercenaries, due to the lack of support shown from the Geloan citizens themselves.

Here we are already seeing differences between the example of the Sicilian tyrants and that of the Pheraeans. Rather than progressively gaining the support of the masses, the impression we get from the account of Herodotus was that the tyranny in Gela may have become less popular⁵⁹, particularly by the later stages of Hippocrates' conquest of Eastern Sicily, where the citizen forces may have started to tire from continuous campaigning that only

⁵⁷ Dunbabin (1948) 416 – also *Olympia* V, 389 ff., Pace (1927) 41.

⁵⁸ See the introduction to Roy (1999) 320ff. for a general survey of the economy in Arcadia, the rest of the article going into more detail.

⁵⁹ Hdt. VII.155.

served the tyrant's lust for power rather than benefiting the Geloans in general. From the time of the establishment of Gelon's rule over Syracuse in 485, it becomes clearer that the tyrant is eager to gain the support of the wealthy, by his re-establishment of the *Gamoroi*, or the land-owning classes, in Syracuse, after they had been expelled by the commoners in a long-awaited revolt:

Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ εὖρημα τοὺς γαμόρους καλεομένους τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ τε τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, καλεομένων δὲ Κυλλυρίων, ὁ Γέλων καταγαγὼν τούτους ἐκ Κασμένης πόλιος ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας ἔσχε καὶ ταύτας· ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδιδοῖ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἑωυτόν.

Hdt. VII.155

It may be the case here that the Syracusans were ready to accept the return of the *Gamoroi* if it meant they were kept in check by the tyranny of Gelon, although it may have been puzzling to them as to why Gelon was bringing the *Gamoroi* back to the city. This behaviour continues when the wealthier classes from the cities of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea are transplanted into the new capital whereas the commoners are sold into slavery:

Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς πολιορκεόμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν παχέας, ἀραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῷ καὶ προσδοκῶντας ἀπολέεσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἀγαγὼν ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας πολιήτας ἐποίησε· τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἔόντα μετὰ τιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου οὐδὲ προσδεκόμενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι, ἀγαγὼν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας ἀπέδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγήῃ ἐκ Σικελίης· τῷτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Εὐβοέας τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίηε δὲ ταῦτα τούτους ἀμφοτέρους νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον. Τοιοῦτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ τύραννος ἐγεγόνεε μέγας ὁ Γέλων.

Hdt. VII.156

It may be that in the cases of Megara and Euboea, Gelon has found a way of appeasing the aristocracies in those cities he had fought by making them citizens, and assuring their loyalty towards him, just as he had done with the Syracusan aristocracy. Herodotus makes it clear in his account that the conflict was the business of the aristocracy in Megara, rather than one that concerned the lower classes too much, but this probably does not rule out their participation if it was a state matter, and they were presumably dragged into the conflict to help provide hoplites and light-armed troops. This makes Gelon's treatment of these classes seem all the more vicious, and it is made perfectly clear by Herodotus that Gelon held the people of these cities in very low regard, through his use of the word ἀχαριτώτατον.

In the case of population movement, the Megarian and Euboean aristocrats had been put in a position where they would probably pose little threat to Gelon himself; their position in Syracuse would probably have been similar to that of any other new arrivals to the city, and they would have no privileges aside from those awarded to a normal citizen, the full privileges normally being reserved (at least in Syracuse) to the descendants of the original settlers of the 8th century – the *Gamoroi*⁶⁰. In this case they would hardly be expected to fight for their ancestral rights if placed in a city where they effectively had none; any privileges which they may have enjoyed beforehand would only have marked their position in their own city and not elsewhere, so being new arrivals and having different heritage, albeit probably with more wealth, they would not have enjoyed any special status in Syracuse. Nevertheless, the impression gained from this passage is that these aristocrats were lucky to be given a second chance in Syracuse, in contrast to the treatment shown to the commons, and perhaps even owed their allegiance to Gelon in return for his leniency.

This unusual situation of a tyrant being at least agreeable to the aristocracy, does turn out to be to Gelon's advantage. A cavalry force would be far more difficult and more expensive to hire than an infantry force would be. This is because the main driving force behind those who wanted to be mercenaries would be poverty, and it is unlikely that a man capable of rearing a horse would be so desperate as to become a mercenary. However, there are cases, especially in the 4th century, of mercenary cavalrymen being employed, for example by the Phocians in the Third Sacred War in 355-46⁶¹, also in some bodyguards of the age, including that of Philip II of Macedon⁶² and also the Scythian ἵπποτοξόται in Athens. Trundle does inform us that most of those mercenaries found in the Greek mainland were either light-armed troops or cavalrymen, but I think that the circumstances present during most examples of mercenary usage in Greece were quite different to those in Sicily⁶³. As has been discussed already in this chapter⁶⁴, there was a far greater demand for specialised troops by the fourth century, and it would only be under particular circumstances in which a professional cavalry

⁶⁰ See Whibley (1913) 115-6.

⁶¹ Diod. Sic. XVI.30.1-3.

⁶² Demosthenes 9.49.

⁶³ Trundle (1999) 33.

force would have been necessary, for example when one is faced with opponents with a strong cavalry themselves, such as the Macedonians or the Persians, rather than in early fifth-century Sicily. Further to this, it does seem likely that virtually all of Gelon's cavalry would have been taken from the aristocrats of Sicily itself, that being a major horse-breeding area and comparable in numbers and strength even to Thessaly⁶⁵. In addition to having access to the strong cavalry forces available in Eastern Sicily, it would now also be possible to raise revenues and therefore recruit large numbers of mercenaries. As the coverage of events during and following Gelon's reign becomes fuller, we can get some idea of the numbers involved in Gelon's forces. When Gelon appears to offer his services to the Greeks as they prepared for the Persian invasion, Herodotus tells us of the numbers offered, and although it is not entirely reliable, it is useful.

Ἄτιμῆς δὲ πρὸς ὑμέων κυρήσας οὐκ ὁμοιώσομαι ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ἔτοιμός εἰμι
βοηθῆειν παρεχόμενος διηκοσίας τε τριήρεας καὶ δισμυρίους ὀπλίτας καὶ
δισχιλίην ἵππον καὶ δισχιλίους τοξότας καὶ δισχιλίους σφενδονήτας καὶ
δισχιλίους ἵπποδρόμους ψιλούς ...

Hdt. VII.158

The numbers themselves are large, when combined with other figures given concerning the number of mercenaries employed by the Sicilian tyrants⁶⁶, and we realise that a significant proportion of the 20,000 hoplites would have consisted of mercenaries. As for the light-armed troops, when one thinks of the highly skilled light-armed forces under Iphicrates during the early fourth century⁶⁷, one might assume that a similar proportion of the 4,000 troops under Gelon were also mercenary. However, it is probable that these roles were mainly taken up by poorer soldiers who could not afford armour; specialisation in these fields, just as in Greek warfare in general, did not become commonplace until the 4th century, so even though one

⁶⁴ See above, 102.

⁶⁵ See Spence (1993) 30-2, and Worley (1994) 107 on the strength of the cavalry in Sicily and Magna Graecia. Examples of this strength are usually in reference to the Sicilian Expedition of 415, (Thuc. VI. 70.2-3, VII.4.6, 6.2-4, 11.2, 13.2, 44.8), but also in the Carthaginian invasion of 480 BC (Diod. Sic. XI.21.5-22.1) and as allies to the Spartans against the Boeotian invasion of the Peloponnese in 369, of which the Syracusan cavalry numbered only 50 (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.20-2), though this was probably due to the difficulties of transporting the horses by sea. The importance of the horse in Magna Graecia is also manifest in Cumae, where according to Frederiksen it is a favoured motif in pottery, see (1984) 74, n. 133-4, and also (1968) 3 where he discusses the fame later enjoyed by the Campanians as a whole for their cavalry.

⁶⁶ E.g. Gelon's enrolment of 10,000 – Diod. Sic. XI.72.3; Hieron's settlement of 10,000 probable mercenaries at Aetna – Diod. Sic. XI.49.1; Thrasybulus' enrolment of 15,000 (up to 10,000 were Aetnaeans) – Diod. Sic. XI.67.7.

could not rule out foreigners (in particular the native Sicels) who wished to become light-armed mercenaries, there was not necessarily a demand for unspecialised troops in the early 5th century. It may be a coincidence, but it happens to be the case that the main centres for specialisation in the arts of slinging and archery also happen to be the co-mother countries of Gela – Rhodes and Crete respectively. With these points in mind, it seems likely that most of the light-armed infantry were citizen troops. Also interesting is the large fleet offered of 200 ships, for if we are to compare the numbers to those provided by Herodotus for Salamis for example, they would have provided the largest contingent, even more than the Athenian contribution of 180⁶⁸. 200 triremes would equal 40,000 men required as rowers and other crewmembers, but it is also unlikely to have consisted of many, if any, mercenaries: again, mercenary rowers do not appear in our sources until the 4th century, as according to Casson, with increased specialisation and a shortage of skilled, or even willing rowers, many Greek states were forced to recruit professional rowers⁶⁹. It also seems as if these ships were crewed by citizen forces, perhaps with some *Kyllyrioi*, free native Sicels, and other allies mixed in, with slave crews (according to Casson) being far rarer than is often assumed⁷⁰.

It is probable, therefore, that the vast bulk of Gelon's mercenaries would have been active on foot, and heavily armed. As regards numbers of mercenaries, we do have a few indicators from different points in the Deinomenid dynasty. For example, 10,000 mercenaries were enrolled as Syracusan citizens by Gelon, and at the end of the dynasty in 466, we find that Thrasybulus used a force of 15,000 – comprising of mercenaries and allies from Aetna – a city that may have been populated in part by mercenaries settled there by Hieron 10 years earlier⁷¹.

There is one particular problem that affects what we can gather from the Herodotus passage, namely the context of the account, which is Gelon's reply to the request for help from the Greeks who were about to face the Persian invasion of 480 BC. Taking into account the

⁶⁷ In particular their famous victory over the Spartans at Corinth in 390 BC. Xen. *Hell.* IV.5.1.

⁶⁸ Hdt. VIII.42-8 (Salamis), other numbers - VIII.1-2 (Artemisium), VI.8-9 (Lade).

⁶⁹ Casson (1971) 323-4, for examples see Demosthenes 50.7-16, 18, 51.6.

⁷⁰ Casson (1971) ch.13 (appendix).

⁷¹ See above n.66. Gelon apparently leads 50,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry to Himera (Diod. Sic. XI.21.1), a very large force even compared to those offered by Gelon to the Greeks, and that presumably contains a number of allied troops. If Gelon were to use his whole mercenary force, as would seem reasonable given the circumstances as well as the expendability of mercenaries, they would form a large proportion of the total force available to Gelon.

similar position that the Greeks in Sicily were in, with the Carthaginian invasion likely to have been imminent, it would not have been feasible for Gelon to supply much, if any, help to the Greeks. The fact that his forces would be unavailable means that Gelon could afford to 'offer' whatever he liked, as long as it was paired with the unacceptable prospect of the tyrant being the supreme commander of the Greeks. On the other hand, would he 'offer' the entire forces at his disposal, or only part? If Gelon was unlikely to be able to help the Greeks, it is possible that he may be overstating how much help he could give, so the tyrant could be taunting the Greeks by showing how large his own force is. This is possible if Gelon feels that the needs of his own country were ignored by the Greeks of the East (the forthcoming invasion, vengeance for the death of Doreius, and the freeing of the Western *emporía* – as stated in Gelon's speech⁷²) and therefore Gelon may also feel justified in rejecting their requests in return.

A possibility when reading into the large proportion of mercenaries in Gelon's army is a reduction in dependence on citizens themselves, and perhaps this is because they were deemed potentially less trustworthy by the tyrant, who preferred to enlist those who he felt to be either dependent on him for pay, in the case of the mercenaries, or fairly well-disposed to him in the case of the aristocracy, Syracusan and otherwise. The idea that Gelon may have been unpopular with many of the Syracusans is hardly an absurd one, especially since we are considering the time before the Himera campaign, and only a few years after Gelon had taken their city and reinstated the *Gamoroi* against their wishes⁷³.

This resentment amongst the citizens of Syracuse would have grown further as a result of Gelon's policy of settling his mercenaries in the city and even making them citizens themselves. It is likely that those who were resident in Syracuse beforehand would have seen their own identity 'diluted' as a result of the new settlers, in other words, if the new settlers are now Syracusan citizens, then how are the old Syracusans going to be distinguished from them, and would they all enjoy the same rights regardless of family origins? This leads us to a problem which has been highlighted by several scholars, that of the distrust shown to foreigners, and the polarisation of native and foreigner, 'insider' and 'outsider', that can be said

⁷² See previous chapter on foreign policy, 93.

⁷³ Hdt. VII.155.

to be typical of the construction of identities (of many kinds) in Greece⁷⁴. Mercenaries were very much the ‘outsiders’ in Greek thinking, but there is a danger of attributing this attitude simply to xenophobia, as although distrust of those outside one’s own city-state (never mind those outside Greece itself) is commonly found, the situation with mercenaries is more complex. It must be remembered that during the period of concern to us, the late Archaic/early Classical period, the norm in Greek inter-state warfare was simply to find two masses of highly organised hoplites/citizens/farmers pitched against each other. The fact that they have been described here as hoplites/citizens/farmers is of great importance, as firstly, the armies concerned consisted solely of those fighting for the sake of their own city, home, and family, and secondly, they were not subjected to what they considered the slavery of dependence upon others for their livelihood on a day-to-day basis. Trundle explains that this would bring a clash with the ideas of *eleutheria* (freedom) and also *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency), and even makes the point that in Athens paid jury-service or military service (for citizens) only avoided being similarly attacked because there was no individual employer, as such⁷⁵. Mercenaries (whether foreigners in Greece, Greeks serving abroad or Greeks serving in another Greek *polis*) were therefore contrasted with the hoplite/citizen/farmer as stateless and slaves to their employers. Although, as Nussbaum points out in reference to Xenophon’s 10,000, mercenary armies could even be considered mobile city-states, especially when one takes into consideration the ‘hangers-on’⁷⁶, and Dalby even goes so far to compare such examples to colonial enterprises⁷⁷, this opinion was still widespread in Greece. Therefore when the mercenaries, who had already invaded the citizens’ privileges (or obligations) in military terms, had then claimed equal political rights in Syracuse, the ‘insiders’ would have undoubtedly felt that they had been done a great injustice, by a tyrant who may also be seen as an ‘outsider’ in political terms. In view of all this, one should not be surprised at the reaction shown towards the settled mercenaries after the end of the Deinomenid dynasty, when firstly they were expelled from Catana, then

⁷⁴ In particular Finley (1956) 109, McKechnie (1989), Hornblower (1991) 11, Cartledge (1993) whose focus is mainly on the subject of polarisation, and Hall (1997).

⁷⁵ Trundle (1998) 11-2; an example given of such an attack is Demosthenes XIX.287, and a defence seems to have been made against an attack in Isaeus II.6.

⁷⁶ Nussbaum (1967) 9.

⁷⁷ Dalby (1992) 17-20, in reference to Thuc. VII.77.4-5.

excluded from holding public office in Syracuse, and following the mercenaries' violent reaction to this they were besieged at Ortygia and exiled to Messenia⁷⁸.

Nevertheless, following Gelon's success in thwarting the Carthaginian invasion, by winning the battle at Himera in 480 BC, the tyrant had become immensely popular in Syracuse, therefore making his position in the city safe, and after his death in 478 he was accorded heroic rites⁷⁹. Although Diodorus Siculus tells us that Gelon's reputation ensured the continuance of the tyranny until the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466, in reality it only secured the succession of his brother Hieron.

Hieron

While Hieron's predecessors both achieved much on the battlefield, whether against fellow Greeks, native Sicels or the Carthaginians, there seems to be little evidence to suggest that Hieron himself was too concerned with military affairs in Sicily itself, the only major military action being the naval expedition to assist Cumae against the Etruscans in 474 BC⁸⁰. The main reason for this was that much of Sicily was already under the control of the tyrant or one of his allies, and the Carthaginian threat had been eliminated, at least for the time being, at Himera in 480. This situation, rather than benefiting Hieron, actually seems to have damaged his chances of ruling successfully. The primary reason for this was Gelon's victory at Himera, and his popularity as a result. On his succession, Hieron found himself in the position of having to legitimise his own rule as tyrant, a task made far harder by the standards set by his brother. Since the Carthaginians were now ruled out as a threat, it seemed as if Hieron could not gain a reputation through military means, and therefore his refoundation of Catana as Aetna in 476 is generally thought to be the method by which the tyrant would try to win himself fame throughout the Greek world. Even though one might expect the Cumaean expedition to give us more information on mercenary use, it turns out in fact to be the opposite. The expedition to Cumae was a naval one, and aside from the probable use of marine infantry in the sea-battle

⁷⁸ Diod. Sic. XI.72-3, 76. This episode, along with the political circumstances in Syracuse following the fall of the Deinomenids, is discussed far more fully in the final chapter, 206.

⁷⁹ Diod. Sic. XI.38.5.

⁸⁰ Diod. Sic. XI.51.

that ensued, there is absolutely no evidence of mercenary use in Diodorus' account, which is brief.

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἱέρων μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων, παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν πρέσβων ἐκ Κύμης τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ δεομένων βοηθῆσαι πολεμουμένοις ὑπὸ Τυρρηνῶν θαλαττοκρατούντων, ἐξέπεμψεν αὐτοῖς συμμαχίαν τριήρεις ἰκανάς. οἱ δὲ τῶν νεῶν τούτων ἡγεμόνες ἐπειδὴ κατέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Κύμην, μετὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων μὲν ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς, πολλὰς δὲ ναῦς αὐτῶν διαφθείραντες καὶ μεγάλη ναυμαχία νικήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν Τυρρηνοὺς ἐταπείνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ Κυμαίους ἠλευθέρωσαν τῶν φόβων, καὶ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας.
Diod. Sic. XI.51

The Aetna episode is one that has received a lot of attention in modern scholarship, and has mainly been restricted to studies of the methods in which the new foundation was celebrated, for example by the poets who were visiting Sicily at the time, especially Pindar. However, for our purposes, the sequence of events during the foundation itself, in particular Hieron's real motives and the ethnic make-up of the new city, will turn out to be of more relevance. The account of Diodorus tells us that the Catanaeans and Naxians were expelled and replaced with 5,000 settlers from the Peloponnese and the same number of Syracusans, the reasoning being that Hieron might have a force ready if he needed it, as well as to receive honours after death⁸¹. The first point that will prove to be of concern to us is that the population of the new city was deliberately split between Syracusans and Peloponnesians. We are given a little more detail in a scholion to Pindar's first Pythian Ode, where we find that there were also settlers from Gela and Megara Hyblaea⁸². It is possible that many of these were Geloans or Megarians who had already been moved to Syracuse under Gelon, especially when one realises that Megara had been completely depopulated in 483, according to Herodotus⁸³. The reasoning behind this has often been explained in reference to Pindar's First Pythian Ode, in particular the 'Hyllos' passage.

ἄγ' ἔπειτ' Αἴτνας βασιλεῖ φίλιον ἐξεύρωμεν ὕμνον·
τῷ πόλιν κείναν θεοδμάτῳ σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ
Ἰλλίδος στάθμας Ἱέρων ἐν νόμοις ἔ-
κτισσε· θέλοντι δὲ Παμφύλου
καὶ μὰν Ἡρακλειδᾶν ἔκγονοι
ὄχθαις ὑπο Ταυγέτου ναίοντες αἰ-
εὶ μένειν τεθμοῖσιν ἐν Αἰγιμιοῦ

⁸¹ See later chapter on refoundations, 158. Diod. Sic. XI.49.1-2.

⁸² Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* I.62 (120)b.

⁸³ Hdt. VII.156.

Δωριεῖς. ἔσχον δ' Ἀμύκλας ὄλβιοι
 Πινδόθεν ὀρνύμενοι, λευκοπώλων
 Τυνδαριδᾶν βαθύδοξοι
 γείτονες, ὧν κλέος ἄνθησεν αἰχμᾶς.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I. 60-6

This explanation is not without its problems; in particular it must be pointed out that neither the populations of the Peloponnese, nor that of Syracuse, from where the settlers were taken, were entirely of Dorian stock. In particular it is the identity of the 5,000 Peloponnesians that must be put into question, and it is here that the mercenary question comes into focus. Firstly, it is known that mercenaries were given plots of land and settled in the Greek world, whether for strategic purposes or payment or even both, and there are examples in Sicily, two of which occurred before the foundation of Aetna, and may be taken into account as certain precedents. These examples are the refoundation of Camarina by Hippocrates in 492/1⁸⁴, the first case of refoundation known to us, which was possibly a strategic move to protect his capital Gela from Syracusan forces, and then the settlement of 10,000 mercenaries in Syracuse itself by Gelon, probably as a means of payment⁸⁵. In the case of Camarina⁸⁶, we have already found the Arcadian from Mantinea called Praxiteles, who claims to be a Camarinaean and Syracusan⁸⁷.

There is a likelihood in the cases of Camarina, Aetna, and in other evidence, that a number of mercenaries from Arcadia in particular were to be found on the island. Having origins in one of the more impoverished regions in Greece, one might expect that the Arcadians were more likely than most to seek employment as mercenaries, and their appearance is even less surprising in consideration of other evidence⁸⁸. Later on in the fifth century, but mainly in the fourth, we find many references to Arcadian mercenaries, and one's attention is immediately drawn to the works of Xenophon. The *Anabasis* provides us with perhaps the largest single group of Arcadian mercenaries, estimated by Roy to number 4,000 in all⁸⁹. If this

⁸⁴ See later chapter on refoundations, 138.

⁸⁵ Camarina – Thuc. VI.5.3, Schol. Pind. *Ol.*V.19 (Philistus fr.17c), Hdt. VII.154; Syracuse - Diod. Sic. XI.72.3.

⁸⁶ See above 116ff.

⁸⁷ Anth. Pal. Appendix – Dedicatory Epigram 43 – see above 116.

⁸⁸ Roy (1999) 320ff., Lewis (1994) 150, Trundle (2004) 53-4, also Guarducci (1953), (1959-60). The political reasons for the large number of Arcadian mercenaries have already been discussed above, see 116.

⁸⁹ Roy (1967) 308.

is correct, it is a startlingly massive group which can only affirm the belief that Arcadia provided more mercenaries (in general, not just in the *Anabasis*) than any other region in Greece. Further supporting this view is a fragment of the *Φορμοφόροι*, a play by the comic poet Hermippus dated to 430-20 BC.

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
 ἐξ οὗ ναυκληρεῖ Διόνυσος ἐπ' οἴνοπα πόντον,
 ὅσσ' ἀγάθ' ἀνθρώποις δεῦρ' ἤγαγε νηὶ μελαίνῃ.
 ἐκ μὲν Κυρήνης καυλὸν καὶ δέρμα βόειον·
 ἐκ δ' Ἑλλησπόντου σκόμβρους καὶ πάντα ταρίχη·
 ...ἀνδράποδ' ἐκ Φρυγίας, ἀπὸ δ' Ἀρκαδίας ἐπικούρους.
 Hermippus fr.63 ll. 1-5, 18 (Kock)

This passage certainly implies that it was Arcadia that provided the bulk of mercenaries to Hermippus' home city, Athens, and it must be considered a valuable reference in that it shows mercenary service to be a typically Arcadian occupation, just as it shows the Hellespont to be the typical origin of tunnyfish. This evidence has led some to believe that the link was made also in Arcadia itself, in particular in Cooper's study of the temple of Apollo *Epikourios* at Bassae⁹⁰. Here it is put forward that the epithet *Epikourios* does not refer to the meaning 'saviour' (in reference to the Athenian plague of 430), but rather 'mercenary', which, as Trundle points out, appears reasonable because the term ἐπίκουρος was still being used to describe mercenaries by this time, the 420's BC⁹¹.

Returning to Xenophon, in his *Hellenica* we learn more about the traditions of Arcadian warfare. The appearance of Lycomedes, a nobleman from Mantinea, into the narrative is greeted by Xenophon with a description of the quality of Arcadian soldiering.

ἐγγενόμενος δέ τις Λυκομήδης Μαντινεύς, γένει τε οὐδενὸς ἐνδεῆς χρήμασι τε προήκων καὶ ἄλλως φιλότιμος, οὗτος ἐνέπλησε φρονήματος τοὺς Ἀρκάδας, λέγων ὡς μόνοις μὲν αὐτοῖς πατρίς Πελοπόννησος εἴη, μόνοι γὰρ αὐτόχθονες ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκοῖεν, πλείστον δὲ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φύλων τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν εἶη καὶ σώματα ἐγκρατέστατα ἔχοι. καὶ ἀλκιμωτάτους δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀπεδείκνυε, τεκμήρια παρεχόμενος ὡς ἐπικούρων ὅποτε δεηθεῖεν τινες, οὐδένας ἤροῦντο ἀντ' Ἀρκάδων. ἔτι δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμονίους πώποτε ἄνευ σφῶν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας οὔτε νῦν Θηβαίους ἐλθεῖν ἄνευ Ἀρκάδων εἰς Λακεδαίμονα.
 Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.23

It is the speaker's opinion that the Arcadians are physically the strongest race in Greece, and they are favoured as mercenaries or allies over any other people, a fact which

⁹⁰ Cooper (1978) 20-8.

⁹¹ Trundle (1998) 3-4. See also 106 above, where the term is used to describe Peisistratos' 'helpers'.

appears to be a source of immense pride to Lycomedes, and gives an impression that his people have *long* been the best, not just at that time. This arrogance is crushed, in a manner that seems very satisfying to Xenophon, by the Spartans and their allies in what became known as the ‘Tearless battle’ of 368 BC, where not one soldier of the victorious army was killed⁹². The Arcadians’ pride is nonetheless clear to see from this passage. A point that according to Parke contributed to many Arcadians becoming mercenaries may also be alluded to here – for a region with poor resources such as Arcadia, it was very overpopulated⁹³. This episode immediately follows an event of great regional importance – the formation of the Arcadian League in 369 BC⁹⁴. This is seen as the point where Arcadian mercenaries literally disappear from the scene, and this is explained by Trundle as marking the point where the Arcadians became a united and powerful force in the Greek world, rather than being swallowed up in the Spartan-controlled Peloponnesian League⁹⁵. In other words the Arcadians became identifiable as a force in their own right, at least in military terms, in contrast with being known as paid mercenaries in foreign service. The perceived lack of influence in overseas affairs before 369 may also be partly attributed to Arcadia being a landlocked region, hindering attempts at foreign trade or colonisation, also its relative poverty in comparison to other regions in Greece, and of course there was the fact that Arcadia was politically fragmented into *poleis*, but the new League provided Arcadia with an opportunity previously unavailable to it, to flex their muscles as a united force in Greece⁹⁶.

To return to fifth-century Sicily, the appearance of Hagesias, subject of Pindar’s Sixth Olympian Ode, whose family was from Stymphalos but who was himself a prominent Syracusan, and victor at Olympia late in Hieron’s reign, shows that the Arcadians may have been considered fine professional soldiers a hundred years before Xenophon. There is also Phormis of Maenalus, whom Pausanias records as having made a dedication at Olympia, as

⁹² Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.27ff.

⁹³ Parke (1933) 11.

⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* VI.5.6ff.

⁹⁵ Trundle (1999) 37-8.

⁹⁶ Presumably in a similar fashion to the successful Achaean League under Aratus in the third century BC. See Larsen (1968) for more on these confederacies in Greece. However, a strong self-identification as Arcadian (alongside that of being from a particular city, for example, Tegea) seems to have come much earlier, probably around the late sixth century, see Nielsen (1999) 16-79, Morgan (2003) 38ff.

Praxiteles had done, and also served in the armies of Gelon and Hieron⁹⁷. This evidence indicates that Arcadians were being employed not only in the rank and file of the army, but also in posts of command. These are described by Parke as becoming *hetairoi* to the tyrants, in particular those of distinguished Arcadian families⁹⁸.

It is quite feasible therefore that many of Hieron's settlers were mercenaries, being hired in exchange for being settled, and of the same nationality as those in Camarina, if Diodorus is correct when stating that half of the new inhabitants of Aetna were of Peloponnesian origin. It is an accepted fact that where there is firstly, a demand for mercenaries, secondly, sufficient capital for use as payment, and thirdly, poverty-stricken men of military capability, the conditions are correct for the appearance of mercenaries in the historical record. There is a strong likelihood, as we shall see, that these three criteria would apply to Hieron and the Arcadians in fifth-century Sicily, and perhaps earlier.

Firstly there is the question of why exactly Hieron would need to create a new ultra-loyal city, of which a substantial part would be populated by professional soldiers. It is true that Hieron was hardly enjoying the safest position in Sicily: being a tyrant he was always at risk of losing his power to a popular revolt as had happened to many before, the situation accentuated by the reputation of his brother Gelon and the pressures of having to legitimise his rule to his subjects. For this purpose the new city turned out to be entirely useful, at least to Hieron's own successor Thrasybulus, who found himself reliant on his supporters in Catana when the Syracusans had finally grown tired of tyranny in 466. But rather than simply waiting for the Syracusans to revolt, it seems likely that Hieron may have had plans to prove to his subjects that they were better off under his rule. It seems unlikely that this would have been achieved simply through the foundation of Aetna and the fame it brought. In fact glorifying the new city may have had the effect of taking prestige away from the city of Syracuse rather than bringing glory to it. It is therefore possible that Hieron had greater intentions.

⁹⁷ Paus. V.27.1.

⁹⁸ See above n.97.

These possible intentions, the re-inclusion of Messina into the Deinomenid empire, have already been discussed above⁹⁹. To briefly remind ourselves, Messina (previously Zancle) once formed part of Hippocrates' empire, but following the city's settlement by the Samians (c.494-89 BC), Anaxilas of Rhegium took control and re-named the city Messina. Once Rhegium had seized control of the city it became difficult to recapture, especially since the city was an ally of the Carthaginians, but following the events at Himera in 480, where the Carthaginians and their allies were heavily defeated, the Deinomenids would no longer have been threatened militarily. Anaxilas' death in 476 would also have made Hieron's possible ambitions seem achievable, and the refoundation of Catana as an infantry base settled by mercenaries, as well as clearing the port of Naxos to be a naval base, would have provided a platform from which to attack and regain Messina. However, as has also already been stated in the second chapter above, no move towards Messina during Hieron's reign is recorded by our sources. It may be that the victory in Cumae provided Hieron with his moment of glory, and events in 473 culminated in the fall of Rhegium to the Iapygians, which may have changed the circumstances in the area significantly. These events were followed up with Hieron's victory in the chariot race in Delphi in 470, and in 467 we find Hieron encouraging the sons of Anaxilas to take control of Messina from their guardian Micythus, which confirms to us that Hieron continued to have interests in the region, though now with a different approach. This seems to be the last major event of Hieron's reign before his death that same year.

It is beyond doubt therefore that the straits of Messina were always a focal point for Hieron's ambitions. Fortunately for both the tyrant and for our own purposes, the actual payment of the mercenaries is an issue far less problematic, as it would have come in the form of a plot of land in the extremely fertile volcanic plain around Catana, a method that was certainly the safest way of ensuring a mercenary got paid for his service, rather than relying solely on booty won through plunder, and therefore almost guaranteeing the mercenaries' loyalty to their paymaster¹⁰⁰. This would be considered a great reward to most mercenaries, but one cannot imagine what it may have meant for an Arcadian, who was used to living in a

⁹⁹ See previous chapter on foreign policy, 73.

mountainous region which was not likely to see much agricultural produce, and also provided little opportunity for trade and even less for a chance to join a colonial enterprise.

This lack of opportunity would have been the factor which made many Arcadians choose the adventurous and rewarding job of professional soldiery – the third of the criteria necessary for the existence of mercenaries mentioned above. The Peloponnesian League, which would only have been recently founded at this time (in 506 BC), may already have brought to the fore the problems regarding Arcadia's identity abroad and the wish to express it¹⁰¹, and therefore it is likely that the seemingly rich tradition of mercenary service in Arcadia alluded to by Lycomedes may have stretched back to this time.

The study of the refoundation of Catana has usually revolved around the propaganda produced to promote it, and discussions of Hieron's motives for it do seem to favour such evidence, especially Pindar's First Pythian Ode, ahead of the account of Diodorus Siculus. When Diodorus has been used, it has been done to support the idea of the creation of a new centre of the Dorian way of life, as seems to be implied by Pindar, or to focus on Hieron's wish to be given heroic rites after death. However, they do not seem to take into account the various political and military events of the age, and certain details given in Diodorus' account are left unexplained by these ideas, in particular the reasons for choosing Catana as the site for the new city, and the depopulation of Naxos. The idea that Hieron may have targeted Messana does explain these problems that are concerned with the foundation itself, and perhaps will also help in understanding the phenomenon of the Arcadian mercenaries in Greek history.

The new inhabitants of Aetna, together with those settled in Syracuse, would now have become objects of hatred in much of Greek Sicily. Although this would have been expected at the outset by all involved at the time, this only becomes clear to us through our sources' coverage of the tyranny's aftermath. Such policies of settling mercenaries in already existing cities would have caused great resentment, and this problem arose for more than one reason. Firstly there is the anger of those displaced by the new settlers, namely the Catanians and

¹⁰⁰ For more on payment of mercenaries (and all paid soldiers) see Pritchett (1971) ch.1; also, on booty and its legal ownership, normally a crucial source of mercenary pay, see *ibid.* ch.3 and 4.

¹⁰¹ These problems are mentioned above (117 n.58) but on the subject of mercenaries see also Trundle (1999) 37-8.

Naxians, of which we hear little until after the end of the tyranny. Secondly there would have been a far more widespread resentment that mercenaries should be allowed equal political rights as the existing inhabitants of Eastern Sicily. The reasons for this have already been discussed in the context of Gelon's mass-settlement and therefore they will not be discussed again here¹⁰².

Finally there is one point yet to be discussed, that is whether it is still accurate to describe Hieron's settlers as mercenaries, given that they were now citizens of a city under the tyrant's rule. This may depend on which term we think would have been applied to them in the eyes of their contemporaries, as these terms do not all simply mean 'mercenary'. The subject of the Greek terms for mercenary has been the focus of some discussion¹⁰³, and the contemporary term *ἐπίκουρος*, which simply means 'helper' or 'ally', a term also used in Homer, may not have been deemed accurate in describing the new settlers, although it is also viewed as a dated term which was barely accurate anyway¹⁰⁴. The later term *μισθοφόρος* which simply refers to payment or hire, would have been more accurate as the settlers could be seen to be being paid continually by being allowed to stay in Aetna, and the term did not refer directly to being a foreigner, but since the term was not yet used in Greece in Hieron's time, it cannot be considered in this context. I therefore think that because of the fact that the Greek word *ἐπίκουρος* is not a precise term and is therefore quite flexible, it would not be that inaccurate to use it to describe the settlers of Aetna at this time.

The foundation of Aetna can in general be seen as both a success and a failure, depending on which of Hieron's motives behind the foundation is examined. While the new city did provide a new base of ultra-loyal citizens who proved their worth after Hieron's death, it did not endear him to the Sicilian public as he may have hoped, because they were not used for any military campaigns which would have brought him a reasonable amount of credibility. In fact it seems as if the new foundation would have been an unpopular move, alienating his citizens by cheapening their citizen status, and no doubt upsetting the Catanaeans and Naxians expelled from their homes.

¹⁰² See above 117ff. See also the final chapter on the aftermath of the tyranny, 222ff.

¹⁰³ See Trundle (1998) 1-12 for a general overview. Individual studies include Lavelle (1989).

Thrasybulus and the fall of the Deinomenids

The recurrence of popularity for the tyranny in Syracuse itself was therefore short-lived, as Hieron tried desperately to emulate Gelon with little success. By the time Thrasybulus succeeded Hieron after his death in 467, popular support had seemed to decline rapidly, but again we are mostly dependent on Diodorus for this period in the history of the dynasty. Hieron himself is described as a fairly unpleasant character, being described by Diodorus as greedy, violent and ignoble. It may be that this idea of decline in Sicily is simply a product of Diodorus' views on tyranny, but when one bears in mind the difficulties Hieron must have found when succeeding a brother who was accorded heroic rites in Syracuse, and the effort he made to continue the Deinomenids' reputation, some sort of decline was almost inevitable.

μετὰ δὲ τὴν Ἱέρωνος τελευτὴν παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν Θρασύβουλος ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑπερέβαλε τῇ κακίᾳ τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλεύσαντα. βίαιος γὰρ ὢν καὶ φονικὸς πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνήρει παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ φυγαδεύων ἐπὶ ψευδέσι διαβολαῖς τὰς οὐσίας εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν ἀνελάμβανε· καθόλου δὲ μισῶν καὶ μισούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐξενολόγησεν, ἀντίταγμα κατασκευάζων ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν. αἰεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθόμενος, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ὑβρίζων, τοὺς δὲ ἀναιρῶν, ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ἀποστῆναι.

Diod. Sic. XI.67.5-6

The reign of Thrasybulus may never have stood a chance of being a success, but the situation was made even worse by the harsh nature of his rule, which Diodorus emphasises by referring to how many of the Syracusans were wronged by the tyrant, and how Thrasybulus then opposed the people themselves with his own mercenary army. There follows a siege of the island of Ortygia, part of the city of Syracuse, in which Thrasybulus is finally defeated and forced into exile, and democracy is introduced in the various cities that made up the tyrant's empire. The first point to be made is that the good relationship between the tyrants of Syracuse and the aristocracy is finally broken, and in some ways we have a situation similar to those we sometimes find just as a tyranny is being established. However, Thrasybulus is left without any allies in the city itself, and is forced to recruit even more mercenaries, using the confiscated properties to fund his forces. The tyrant, despite all his efforts, is doomed to failure, being

¹⁰⁴ Trundle (1998) 3-4, 7-8.

besieged on the island with few allies and with both the commoners and the aristocracy opposing him¹⁰⁵.

Conclusion

The situation we find in Sicily is therefore similar in some respects to that we find in Pherae, especially in the degree of dependence on mercenaries shown by the tyrants, and also the ambitious, yet mainly fulfilled plans of conquering the surrounding area. However the differences between the Sicilians and the Pheraeans, and for that matter most of the other Greek tyrants, whether they employed mercenaries or not, are striking. As was said earlier, virtually all tyrants come into power through class-conflict, and the way Gelon gained Syracuse is no exception, yet he was the only tyrant to champion the aristocratic cause as opposed to the common cause. Knowing that the aristocrats owed their return back to Syracuse to Gelon, he was assured of their support, and therefore had the advantage of having a strong cavalry force together with the wealth to actually buy an infantry force.

However, the Thrasybulus episode does remind us that a tyrant cannot be completely dependent on mercenaries, for support from either the commons or the aristocracy is ultimately the factor that decides whether a tyrant is successful.

Following the end of the tyranny, the Greek cities of Eastern Sicily took a long time to recover from the heavy influx of mercenaries. It is recorded by Diodorus that of the 10,000 mercenaries settled in Syracuse by Gelon, 7,000 were still there when democracy was introduced¹⁰⁶. When the original Syracusans decided to exclude these ex-mercenaries from office, the mercenaries seized parts of the city, but were finally defeated in battle. Similar problems also existed in Catana, and once again it was the original inhabitants, allied with the native Sicels¹⁰⁷, who succeeded in driving the mercenaries out of the city. In fact, all mercenaries who had been settled in Greek cities were driven out, but were allowed to settle in

¹⁰⁵ Again, there is a close parallel with the siege of Dionysius I, also set on Ortygia, only in that case Dionysius is returned to power by his Campanian cavalry force. See final chapter, 224.

¹⁰⁶ Diod. Sic. XI.72.3.

¹⁰⁷ This factor gives a vital clue as to how unpopular the tyranny, and also the city of Aetna, was with the Sicels at this time, in that they are actually allied with other Greeks in order to get the Aetnaeans removed. See Sjöqvist (1973) ch.4 for more on the good relations between the Sicels and the various Chalcidian cities in Sicily.

Messana. It is possible that the mercenaries were suspected of supporting tyranny and wanting to reinstall Thrasybulus. It is significant that in Sicily mercenaries were always associated with tyranny following their expulsion, to the point that there is no evidence for mercenary use on the island for about fifty years after, until the Athenians' expedition in 415¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁸ Thuc. VII.48.5.

CHAPTER FOUREARLY CASES OF REFOUNDATION IN SICILY

Having considered the tyrants' use of mercenaries and found them to be ahead of their time in many ways, we now turn to a more unusual, yet related, phenomenon in the Greek world, the mass removal and mass settlement of people. We have already encountered two examples quite briefly, those of Zancle/Messana and Catana/Aetna¹, as these are clearly major events during the era of tyranny in Sicily that have major implications. Following this chapter we will encounter the refoundation of Catana again, in the context of the propaganda produced in celebration of Hieron's 'new' city, Aetna, so these events can tell us a great deal about the tyrants' domestic and foreign policies. The focus of this chapter however will be to view the refoundations in the wider context of Greek colonisation and the foundation of cities, both in the Archaic and Classical periods.

By the fourth century BC the 'refounding' of cities in Sicily had become a strangely familiar occurrence on the island, proving to be particularly popular with Syracusan rulers such as Dionysius I, but if we are to look solely to the reigns of the tyrants in the early fifth century BC, there are several examples to be found which seem to be the very first of their kind. The refoundation and renaming of Catana by Hieron in 476 is celebrated by Pindar in his first Pythian Ode, and is emulated by Theron of Acragas during the same year, at Himera on the north coast. Before these, there is the example mentioned in Herodotus, concerning Anaxilas of Rhegium's refoundation of Zancle in the north-eastern corner of the island, at around 489. In a similar vein, there were movements of population from Gela, Camarina, Megara Hyblaea and Euboea (a so far unlocated city) to Syracuse under Gelon during the 480's, with all but Gela being completely depopulated². This episode however will not be discussed here, as it is clearly a case of the strengthening of the city of Syracuse rather than a refoundation. The earliest known example of a refoundation is that undertaken by Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, at nearby Camarina.

¹ See above chapters on foreign policy and mercenaries, ch.2 and 3.

² Hdt. VII.156.

Tyranny and City foundation

The subject of colonisation and city-foundation is one of the most misunderstood aspects of Greek history; many who do not specialise in the subject, but let it form a part of their work, often fall into inaccurate presumptions, usually based on perceptions shaped by modern colonialism. Therefore it is necessary to discuss briefly the nature of Greek colonial enterprises, in order to form more accurate models to compare with the examples in Sicily.

According to Graham, there are three basic types of founder present in our sources, types that reflect the political climate of the period very closely indeed, but also tell us much about how the role of founder was viewed by those who ruled the mother-city³. First we have the earliest cases of Greek colonisation, often private enterprises which seem to have little in common with state affairs, largely typical of the often self-seeking character of aristocratic rule. These founders act independently of the mother-city in virtually every manner, from the initial stages of planning and settlement down to their often monarchical rule. After death the founder was normally accorded the rites of a hero-cult and burial in the agora. It is during this period, starting with the 8th century BC, that most of the Greek cities in Sicily were founded, and these are typical examples of early Archaic colonisation. Much later on, in the fifth century, we find examples of colonies planned and established by the mother-cities themselves, protecting state interests. We usually find the founder undertaking a temporary role of overseeing the foundation and returning home afterwards. Several examples of this type of colonisation were carried out by the Athenians (including Amphipolis), and one example by the Spartans at Heracleia in central Greece, usually to consolidate their presence in regions already controlled by them, and to protect their allies and fellow colonies⁴. Usually a form of government based on that of the mother-city was adopted, for example Athens would wish for democracy to be installed in its colonies, immediately lessening the responsibilities traditionally placed on the founder, due to a clash with the founding city's political interests.

The age of tyranny in Greece, which is sandwiched in between these two periods, provides us with examples of another type of colonial activity, where a family member of the

³ Graham (1964) 29-39.

⁴ Amphipolis - Thuc. IV.102ff., Heracleia – Thuc. III.92ff., Diod. Sic. XII.59.5.

tyrant was sent as founder under strong influence from the ruler. The Peisistratids in Athens and the Cypselids of Corinth in particular provide us with evidence⁵, and they tend to reflect more imperial ambitions, satisfied by overseas acquisitions, with loyalties clearly with the tyrants, rather than the leader of the enterprise or the mother-city. The foundation of colonies on the order of tyrants is therefore by no means a unique occurrence confined to Sicily. The three stages of colonisation were formed by changes in the colony's intended allegiance – firstly the *oikist*, then the ruler of the mother-city, and finally the mother-city itself. Therefore the tyrants can be seen to form a sort of intermediary stage between colonisation being a wholly private affair, to becoming an imperialistic, state enterprise, although of course the chronological framework would be far less clear cut than this summary suggests.

Camarina

Following its foundation by the Syracusans around 599/8, Camarina is said to have been depopulated by its own mother-city following a revolt in 552/1⁶. We hear little of Camarina until the events of 492, where the defeat at Helorus resulted in the Syracusan forfeit of its dependent colony to Hippocrates, who proceeded to refound it⁷. This lasted until another revolt against its ruler Glaucus (from Carystus in Euboea and therefore not a local ruler of the city)⁸, who had been placed in power following Gelon's conquest of Syracuse in 485. The city was destroyed, and its inhabitants placed in Syracuse, only for the city to be refounded again by the Geloans in 461⁹:

καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾠκίσθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν· οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων δι' ἀπόστασιν, χρόνῳ Ἴπποκράτης ὕστερον Γέλας τύραννος, λύτρα ἀνδρῶν Συρακοσίων αἰχμαλώτων λαβῶν τὴν γῆν τὴν Καμαριναίων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς γενόμενος κατᾠκίσε Καμάριναν. καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατᾠκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶων.

Thuc. VI.5.3

⁵ Peisistratids – recolonisation of Sigeum (Hdt. V.94ff.); Cypselus – Ambracia (Ps. Scymnus 435f, Strabo X.452), Leucas (Strabo loc.cit., Nic. Dam. fr.57.7, *FGrH* IIA 357), Anactorium (Strabo loc. cit., Nic. Dam loc. cit.); Periander – Potidaea (Nic. Dam. fr.59, *FGrH* IIA 358). See Graham (1964) 29ff.

⁶ Thuc.VI.5.3.

⁷ Thuc.VI.5.3, Hdt.VII.154, Schol. Pind. *Ol.V.19* (Philistus fr.17c).

⁸ The revolt occurred at an unknown date, though it almost certainly fell between 485 and 482.

⁹ Thuc.VI.5.5, Hdt. 7.156, Diod. Sic. XI.76.5, schol. Pind. *Ol.V.16*, schol. Aeschin. *Ctes.186*.

The first case of depopulation in 552/1 is sometimes assumed to be one of destruction, for example by Woodhead¹⁰, but Dunbabin admits that the term ἀναστάτων can be used simply to mean exile¹¹, which seems more likely when considering the evidence to be discussed. Dunbabin's suggestion comes in the context of a discussion concerning the continuation of settlement after the 550s, an idea supported in particular by rich grave evidence discovered at excavations made in the 1950's, indicating a period of prosperity and not just mere existence¹². As well as the mention of a 'Parmenides of Camarina' noted by Diodorus as the victor of the Olympic foot-race in 528¹³, there is also the scholion to the fifth Olympian ode of Pindar, referring to Philistus' account of the episode¹⁴.

Φίλιστος δὲ ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φησὶν, ὅτι Γέλων Καμαρίναν κατέστρεψεν·
 Ἴποκράτης δὲ, πολεμῶν Συρακουσίοις καὶ πολλοὺς αἰχμαλώτους λαβῶν,
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποδοῦναι τούτους ἔλαβε τὴν Καμαρίναν καὶ συνώκισεν αὐτήν.
 Schol. Pind. *Ol.V.19* (Philistus fr.17c)

The word συνοικιστής in the final line has been examined by Asheri, where it is found in the context of the resettlement of Gela by Timoleon, and he notes that acts of reinforcement of a colony were often regarded as those of a co-founder¹⁵, perhaps indicating that after Hippocrates had gained the city, he had placed settlers there to dwell together with those Camarinaeans remaining. While this idea is certainly disputed, together with the other evidence it suggests that Thucydides' belief in a long period at Camarina without inhabitation is almost certainly erroneous, though we can only guess at whether any of the original Camarinaeans remained after 552/1, or if it was completely repopulated by Syracuse soon after the revolt.

The rather brief reference of Thucydides to ἀναστάτων in the description of Syracusan dealings at Camarina following 552/1 may be treated in a similar fashion to an initial statement of Herodotus, concerning the depopulation of Miletus by the Persians during the Ionian revolt¹⁶. As noted by Graham¹⁷, the Milesians' fate is expanded upon, so that by the end of the account our first assumptions concerning this episode are proven wrong. Although in this case it is true

¹⁰ Woodhead (1962) 46.

¹¹ Dunbabin (1948) 107.

¹² Pace (1927) 37, 99ff., Richter (1949) 188, Dunbabin (1948) 106 n.3.

¹³ Parmenides of Camarina - Diod. Sic. I.68.6.

¹⁴ Schol. Pind. *Ol.V.19* (Philistus fr.17c).

¹⁵ Asheri (1970) 621.

¹⁶ Hdt. VI.18-22.

¹⁷ Graham (1992) 310-2.

that Miletus was totally abandoned by its Greek inhabitants (this has been supported by archaeological evidence), we find that many Milesians escaped, but the majority were captured and resettled by the Red Sea, rather than being killed or enslaved, as we would naturally believe if Herodotus had not expanded further on events at the time. We even find that those resettled were employed in the Persian army, though with little success¹⁸. We are not told of the fate of those Camarinaeans exiled, suggesting a fairly small number, most probably the instigators of the revolt, and it is likely that any spare land would have been settled by Syracusan reinforcements, a very common practice particularly where the mother-city and colony were in close proximity. It also seems that Camarina was still considered a Syracusan possession, hence the revolts and its later forfeiture, thus it would be unlikely that the Syracusans would leave this land free and unexploited and, more importantly, vulnerable to attack. Westermarck and Jenkins suggest that Camarina would have been virtually independent of Syracuse by this time, believing that evidence uncovered at the Rito necropolis near Ragusa (site of the Sicel settlement of Hybla Heraia) shows signs of strong Camarinaean influence¹⁹, but it does still seem that Syracuse felt it had a right to control Camarina.

The position of Camarina as a Syracusan possession also eased the problems often posed by reinforcing a colony, most importantly the new colonists' political, religious and economic status. In other cases this could be done through *isopolity* (shared citizenship – at least to an extent), such as in the case of Miletus and its colony, Olbia²⁰, but this may have not been necessary in the Camarinaean case, and it is likely that Syracusan citizens would have been free to settle at the colony²¹:

Τῶν δὲ εἶπον πολίων πασέων πλὴν Συρηκουσέων οὐδεμία ἀπέφυγε δουλοσύνην
πρὸς Ἴπποκράτεος. Συρηκοσίους δὲ Κορίνθιοί τε καὶ Κερκυραῖοι ἐρρύσαντο
μάχη ἐσσωθέντας ἐπὶ ποταμῶ Ἐλώρω· ἐρρύσαντο δὲ οὗτοι ἐπὶ τοῖσδε
καταλλάξαντες, ἐπ' ᾧ τε Ἴπποκράτει Καμάριναν Συρηκοσίους παραδοῦναι·
Συρηκοσίων δὲ ἦν Καμάρινα τὸ ἀρχαῖον.

Hdt. VII.154

¹⁸ Hdt. IX.99.3, 104.

¹⁹ Westermarck and Jenkins (1980) 12, excavation report for Rito necropolis - di Vita (1956) 198.

²⁰ Graham (1964) ch.6, Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.93.

²¹ The Praxiteles epigram, see below 143ff., may also be considered evidence for the idea of shared citizenship between Syracuse and Camarina, although Praxiteles does also mention himself as a Mantinean, so it may reflect more the idea of multiple *identities* than of shared citizenship.

The events at Camarina in 492/1 are not documented much better by our sources than those of the sixth century. Following the battle of Helorus, and probably intervention from the mother and sister-cities of Syracuse, Corinth and Corcyra, Camarina was added to Hippocrates' empire as a means of ending the conflict. The exact nature of this intervention is not well known, as to whether it merely took the form of mediation or of arbitration, but it has been suggested that Corinth and Corcyra would have had their trade interests at heart, being the only Greek naval powers with Western interests²². It is probably more useful to look at the position of Hippocrates immediately following Helorus, as despite the victory he still did not enjoy control of Syracuse itself. One way in which he could gain control was by taking advantage of an uprising in the city, an event which did not take place until after Hippocrates' death although it was a possibility at the time. To take Syracuse by force would have been extremely difficult – no siege put upon the city ever succeeded until the Roman conquest and nevertheless would have required a strong navy (we must remember that the heart of the city lay not on the Sicilian mainland, but the heavily fortified island of Ortygia), not possessed by Hippocrates at the time. We must also take into account that an attempt to take Syracuse by sea would not only be defeated, but probably the Geloan fleet would be totally wiped out by the Corinthian and Corcyraean contingents, who had already expressed their interests in preserving Syracusan autonomy. If this happened, Hippocrates and his successors would stand little chance of ever gaining Syracuse, barring a revolt from the native *Kyllyrioi*. It was therefore in the interests of both sides, and the mediators themselves, to come to an agreement.

The scholion mentioned above (p.139) tells us that this event followed a destruction of the city by Gelon, but there are problems in taking the statement at face value. Pareti²³ believes the scholion to be reliable, for Gelon was indeed a general serving under Hippocrates and could have been in charge of the destruction. Dunbabin disagrees, preferring to explain the scholion's account simply as a mistake, where the scholiast has himself confused the the events of 492/1 with the evacuation of Camarina during Gelon's reign in the 480's, and therefore *accidentally*

²² Dunbabin (1948) 401-2, Macan I.1.214.

²³ Pareti (1914) 38-9.

attributes the earlier events to Gelon²⁴. If the destruction by Gelon was indeed misplaced, it may be possible that Camarina was not completely destroyed, or even harmed as much as we may think²⁵. This may seem increasingly plausible given that, as we shall find, Hippocrates clearly had plans for the city.

Of the actual refoundation by Hippocrates we have very little information. The scholion seems to be telling us of a co-existence of Camarinaeans with new settlers of Hippocrates, and omits the crucial element of its possible rebuilding. Thucydides is the only source of any substance, explaining that the city was given in exchange for Syracusan prisoners of war, and that Hippocrates acted as the *oikist* of the repopulated city²⁶. This latter point is of the greatest concern to us here, and despite the lack of any sort of detail regarding what his duties were, we have an example of how uniquely, as in many cases, the tyrants in Sicily operated in such matters. Even compared to those in Greece itself, the Sicilian tyrants exercised their power in an extremely totalitarian manner, shown here in the refoundation of Camarina through the presence of the first tyrant-founder. This was to become a consistent trend amongst the Sicilian tyrants of this period, with Anaxilas of Rhegium becoming founder of Messene after Hippocrates' death, Hieron at Aetna, and Theron of Acragas at Himera, all to be discussed later, as well as the more general trend of mass population movement.

The case of Hippocrates at Camarina, as with the other examples of refoundation in Sicily, is clearly different from other examples of city-foundation in the Greek world, in that the founder is also the head of state of the mother-city. The situation may simply imply a more hurried and unceremonious version of a foundation, in which the tyrant chose to act as founder himself because of the close proximity to Gela, though it would be natural to assume that Hippocrates would have had very clear reasons for carrying out this costly project. No such reasons are explicitly mentioned in our sources; for example we have no evidence of any sort of hero cult celebrating Hippocrates as founder of Camarina. This may be, as Malkin suggests, that Hippocrates may not have had the time to establish one²⁷, or perhaps it is due to the fact that the

²⁴ Dunbabin (1948) 408-9.

²⁵ Unfortunately the excavations at Camarina have not shed much light on this problem.

²⁶ Thuc. *loc. cit.*

²⁷ Malkin (1987) 239, although also admitting that such cults in Sicily were posthumous anyway, until that of Dion, established in 356.

inhabitants were exiled during the reign of Gelon, and any traces of evidence for a founder-cult in Camarina would therefore be slight. If the settlement was simply a co-existence as the scholion may be telling us, a founder-cult would be far less likely to be established, even if the enterprise was planned and led by Hippocrates himself. We must also remember that it is only Thucydides who notes the changes at Camarina as an actual foundation, and if he was to be mistaken (as he clearly is on the subject of continuation of city life after 552/1), then it would obviously not be good evidence for the view that Hippocrates himself must have taken, especially since there was no precedent available for comparison and emulation.

It seems probable that Camarina would have been used to settle Hippocrates' army, in particular the mercenaries who would have been requiring payment, while providing a base for continuing hostilities against Syracuse and those Sicels who retained independence²⁸. Syracusan territory would have immediately bordered the territory of the capital at Gela, and thus Camarina provided a sort of buffer zone to it in the East of the island. There is also an epigram found in the Appendix to the Palatine Anthology:

Πραξιτέλης ἀνέθηκε Συρακόσιος τόδ' ἄγαλμα
καὶ Καμαριναῖος· πρόσθ' ἄρ' ἐν Μαντινέᾳ
Κρίνιος υἱὸς ἔναιεν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ πολυμήλῳ
ἔσλος ἔων καὶ φοι μνᾶμα τόδ' ἔστ' ἀρετᾶς.

Anth. Pal., Appendix - Dedicatory epigrams 43

This is dated by Dunbabin²⁹ to the time following the Camarinaeans' forced move to Syracuse under Gelon, perhaps identifying him as one of the many Arcadian mercenaries used by the tyrants of this era, and more precisely as one settled at Camarina by Hippocrates³⁰.

Further evidence suggesting a military motive for the settlement is found in Polyaeus, concerning his account of the final military campaigns of Hippocrates.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπεφράχθησαν πρὸς ταῖς ῥαχίαις τῶν κυμάτων οἱ Ἐργετῖνοι, τοὺς ἵππεῖς προπέμψας Ἴπποκράτης τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν ἔρημον οὖσαν κατελάβετο καὶ τὸν κήρυκα πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προειπεῖν ἐκέλευσε καὶ σύνθημα Γελάοις καὶ Καμαριναίοις ἔδωκε κτείνειν ἀδεῶς Ἐργετίνους ἅπαντας.

²⁸ It seems that Camarina would have been an ideal base from which Hippocrates could maintain control over the Sicels in the far south of Sicily – see above chapter on foreign policy. Close contacts seem to have been established between Camarina and the Sicels of Hybla Heraia (modern Ragusa) before Hippocrates, as the finds at the Rito necropolis show (di Vita [1956] 158), so we could assume that the Sicels would have been within fairly easy reach from Camarina. It is worth pointing out that Hybla Heraia is almost certainly not the Hybla later attacked by Hippocrates with Camarinaean forces; this city is more likely to be Hybla Geleatis in the Etna region – see Stauffenberg (1963) 176.

²⁹ Dunbabin (1948) 416 – *Olympia*, V, 389 ff., Pace (1927) 41.

³⁰ See previous chapter, 115 ff. on Arcadian mercenaries.

Polyaen. *Strategemata* V.6

This campaign was directed against the Sicel city of Ergetium around 491, and included amongst the tyrant's ranks at this time were a number of Camarinaeans. It seems more likely to me that these forces were taken from those settled at Camarina a year earlier, rather from those remaining from the original settlement³¹.

The issue of motive is representative of the difficulties we have in comparing the refoundation of Camarina with the norms of founding Greek colonies in general. Other themes that are unapproachable include the role of oracles and divine participation, which are so often crucial components of the foundation myths³², but are completely absent in the case of Camarina, perhaps indicating a new 'foundation' was never the intention, and thus was never regarded as such.

Our ideas of how much the population of Camarina changed, as far as the proportions of ethnics in the city are concerned, can be looked at through the *defixio* mentioned by Dunbabin, probably from after the refoundation of Hippocrates³³:

Μένων Δαμέα ἐν[γράφει Εὐκλ]είδαν Ἄρχεδάμον
Ἄριστόδαμον Χαιριτόα[ν τ]ε Θαλες Χίρονος Ηερακλίδα
Ἄρχύταν (or Ἄρκύλαν) Σοσίας Ἄρχία Συμαρία
Σικανᾶς Τιμοκράτειαν Πολομαίνετον Προδόξο

It is Dunbabin's opinion that the population was not changed much in that way, the names being almost all of the Doric type, particularly of Syracusan origin, concluding that many of the new settlers were Syracusan by descent³⁴. We do not know, however, the circumstances of this *defixio*'s writing (or even the date for sure) and therefore it may not be representative of the population as a whole. We have also seen possible evidence for the settlement of mercenaries at Camarina, and the names listed could be partly explained by the presence of settlers from other parts of Doric Greece (including outside Sicily), in particular from Gela itself. One possibility is the continued existence of many of the original Camarinaeans in the refounded city, and also therefore following the earlier events of 552/1 BC.

³¹ See mercenaries chapter above, 116.

³² For example the case of Eryx, see Malkin (1994) 203-17.

³³ Pace (1927) 161, no.12.

³⁴ Dunbabin (1948) 402.

Whether the Geloans, Camarinaeans, or even Hippocrates himself even considered this event to be a foundation of sorts, we do not know; this idea we owe entirely to Thucydides, whose knowledge of the matter has already been put to doubt. There seems to be no clear change in the city's character, identity or institutions to support such a theory. We do know, however, that we are dealing with a case of mass settlement akin to colonisation, and one that is clearly significant enough to be recorded as such. As for the events in Camarina that followed its 'refoundation' of 492, they are at least worth mentioning here not only for the sake of the story's own completeness, but also because they are clearly connected to the events already discussed.

Camarina was completely depopulated by Gelon after he had taken control of Syracuse, before his preparations for war with the Carthaginians, so therefore around 485-482 BC. The population, along with half of the Geloans and a select number from Euboea and Megara Hyblaea (the rest of whom were sold into slavery) were settled in Syracuse itself.

Αἱ δὲ παραυτίκα ἀνά τ' ἔδραμον καὶ ἔβλαστον. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Καμαριναίους ἅπαντας ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας ἀγαγὼν πολιήτας ἐποίησε, Καμαρίνης δὲ τὸ ἄστυ κατέσκαψε, τοῦτο δὲ Γελῶν ὑπερημίσεας τῶν ἀστῶν τῶν τούτοις Καμαριναίοισι ἐποίησε· Μεγαρέας τε τοὺς ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς πολιορκεόμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, ...

Hdt. VII. 156

This was almost certainly done with the aim of boosting not only the wealth of Syracuse, explaining why the more 'useful' citizens of Megara and Euboea were retained, but also strengthening it. As we have seen in previous chapters, the recruitment of mercenaries formed a central component of the tyrants' military force, and while it is clear that the wealthier the city of Syracuse was, the more mercenaries it could support; it is also possible that it was those mercenaries originally settled in Camarina who provided the extra military strength, and Praxiteles the Mantinean was an example of this. The next thing to happen to Camarina was, naturally, its rebirth in 461 BC,

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Καμάριναν μὲν Γελῶσι κατοικίσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκλήρουχσαν·

Diod. Sic. XI.76.5

Although there is a mistake by Diodorus, who tells us that Camarina was originally settled by Geloans³⁵, we can nevertheless see what is going on in this passage, as the Camarinaeans of old are reclaiming their land and re-apportioning it between themselves. These are of course the most central components of a ‘foundation’, but this does not mean it was considered as such at the time; we are quite simply unable to say whether the population were likely to view Camarina as a new city or simply as a continuation of the old one.

The Camarinaean story down to 461 BC seems to be of great importance when considering the other examples of ‘refoundation’ and mass-movement in Sicily, in particular the higher profile case of Hieron’s refoundation of Catana as Aetna. The events at Camarina may have provided a crucial precedent, and therefore a justification for actions, including the unpopular process of shifting the entire populations of Catana and Naxos to Leontini, one by which Hieron can be seen to emulate the activity of his popular brother Gelon.

Zancle/Messana

The episodes concerning Zancle in Herodotus, in particular the Hippocrates/Scythes episode could easily be used as a prime example of Herodotus’ disgust with many of the tyrants³⁶:

Ζαγκλαῖοι γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ Σικελίης τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον πέμποντες ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην ἀγγέλους ἐπεκαλέοντο τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐς Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν, βουλόμενοι αὐτόθι πόλιν κτίσαι Ἰώνων· ἡ δὲ Καλὴ αὕτη Ἀκτὴ καλεομένη ἔστι μὲν Σικελῶν, πρὸς δὲ Τυρσηνίην τετραμμένη τῆς Σικελίης. Τούτων ὧν ἐπικαλομένων οἱ Σάμιοι μούνοι Ἰώνων ἐστάλησαν, σὺν δὲ σφι Μιλησίων οἱ ἐκπεφυγότες. Ἐν ᾧ τοιόνδε δὴ τι συνήνεικε γενέσθαι· Σάμιοί τε κομιζόμενοι ἐς Σικελίην ἐγίνοντο ἐν Λοκροῖσι τοῖσι Ἐπιζεφυρίοισι καὶ Ζαγκλαῖοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, τῷ οὐνομα ἦν Σκύθης, περικατέατο πόλιν τῶν Σικελῶν ἐξελεῖν βουλόμενοι. Μαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Ῥηγίου τύραννος Ἀναξίλεως, τότε ἐὼν διάφορος τοῖσι Ζαγκλαίοισι, συμμείξας τοῖσι Σαμίοισι ἀναπείθει ὡς χρεὸν εἶη Καλὴν μὲν Ἀκτὴν, ἐπ’ ἣν ἔπλεον, ἔαν χαίρειν, τὴν δὲ Ζάγκλην σχεῖν, ἐοῦσαν ἔρημον ἀνδρῶν. Πειθομένων δὲ τῶν Σαμίων καὶ σχόντων τὴν Ζάγκλην, ἐνθαῦτα οἱ Ζαγκλαῖοι, ὡς ἐπύθοντο ἐχομένην τὴν πόλιν ἐωυτῶν, ἐβοήθεον αὐτῇ καὶ ἐπεκαλέοντο Ἴπποκράτεια τὸν Γέλης τύραννον· ἦν γὰρ δὴ σφι οὗτος σύμμαχος. Ἐπεῖτε δὲ αὐτοῖσι καὶ ὁ Ἴπποκράτης σὺν τῇ στρατιῇ ἠκεβοηθέων, Σκύθην μὲν τὸν μούναρχον τῶν Ζαγκλαίων ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν ὁ Ἴπποκράτης πεδήσας καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα ἐς Ἴνυκα πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε, τοὺς δὲ

³⁵ There is of course an alternative, and that is that Hippocrates’ own settlers in Camarina are reclaiming the land, and that these are naturally called ‘Geloans’ by Diodorus as a general term despite the likely mix of ethnicities. This would be just the same as saying that the original settlers of Syracuse were Corinthian, even though there is a likelihood that some settlers were not from Corinth.

³⁶ Hdt. VI.22-3.

λοιποὺς Ζαγκλαίους κοινολογησάμενος τοῖσι Σαμίοισι καὶ ὄρκους δοὺς καὶ δεξάμενος προέδωκε. Μισθὸς δὲ οἱ ἦν εἰρημένος ὅδε ὑπὸ τῶν Σαμίων, πάντων τῶν ἐπίπλων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων τὰ ἡμίσεα μεταλαβεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλι, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν πάντα Ἴπποκράτεα λαγχάνειν. Τοὺς μὲν δὴ πλέονας τῶν Ζαγκλαίων αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνδραπόδων λόγῳ εἶχε δήσας, τοὺς δὲ κορυφαίους αὐτῶν τριηκοσίους ἔδωκε τοῖσι Σαμίοισι κατασφάξαι· οὐ μέντοι οἱ γε Σάμιοι ἐποίησαν ταῦτα.

Hdt.VI.22-3

However, as an example of mass exile and repopulation in the West, it is often looked over briefly before moving on to the subject of Hieron at Catana. Considering the notoriety of the Hippocrates and Scythes episode, the importance of the straits of Messina, and the significance of the city's renaming as Messana, this is wholly unjustified.

Like Camarina, Zancle was the focus of more than one incident of concern to us, both involving Anaxilas of Rhegium and his determination to gain full control of the straits of Messina. The background of this issue has already been discussed in the foreign policy chapter and it is not necessary to repeat it here³⁷, and neither is it necessary, in consideration of the great opportunity handed to Anaxilas, and undoubtedly support from the tyrant's subjects, to discuss his principal motives in convincing the refugees from Samos to take Zancle, and to take it himself later when relations with Zancle had not improved.

The first case of resettlement at Zancle, involving the Samians, does not involve a change of the city's name, but it is clear from the evidence available to us that the Samians were in firm control when the coinage of Zancle is considered (see below p.149). There is disagreement, however, concerning the fate of the Zancleans themselves. It seems to have been the opinion of both Thucydides and Aristotle³⁸ that the Chalcidian Zancleans were completely driven out, although under differing circumstances, as Aristotle tells us that a number of Samians were accepted into the city by the inhabitants first, although this could be a reference to the earlier presence of Samians in Zancle and Rhegium.

Now it is probable that a number of Zancleans remained in the city after the influx of Samians - it is possible that many were sold into slavery as Herodotus tells us³⁹, but it is difficult to account for the 300 Zancleans handed over by Hippocrates to the Samians, whom he says were spared from execution. There are references made by Pausanias to victories by

³⁷ See chapter two, 67.

³⁸ Thuc. VI.4.5-6, Arist. *Pol.* 1303a35-6.

Messenians of Sicily, Leontiscus and Symmachus, who are said to be of the old Zanclean stock rather than of the Peloponnesian sort⁴⁰. The re-adoption of the name Zancle after the reign of the Anaxilaidis also indicates the survival and continued presence in the city of Chalcidian Zancleans, as does the use of the Ionic name ΜΕΣΣΕΝΙΟΝ (as opposed to the Doric version ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΟΝ which would have been used by the Peloponnesians) on coinage until about 460, even though most, if not all the (Ionian) Samians were expelled during Anaxilas' refoundation. The leniency shown by the Samians to the Zancleans after their conquest may simply be a matter of morality, in particular disgust at the actions of Hippocrates, but it is tempting to see it also as a matter of strengthening their own position, for the 300 handed over to them were the major figures in Zancle at the time – i.e. wealthy, or perhaps even as a gesture made by those Samians in charge towards their fellow aristocrats⁴¹. Dunbabin suggests that these original Zancleans may have been allowed to retain citizenship, which may explain why they retained a degree of influence even after the expulsion of the Samians⁴².

For our purposes, probably the most significant question when considering this particular episode of Zancle's history is the role played by Cadmus, son of Scythes, perhaps the same Scythes as the Coan sub-tyrant of Zancle, during the earlier period of Geloan domination down to the appearance of the Samian refugees. Cadmus became the leader of the Samian-dominated city after giving up his tyranny over Cos and restoring power to the people, thus it is not surprising that he is portrayed by Herodotus as an honourable man later trusted by Gelon to take charge of mediation with Persia⁴³. It is thought to be likely that Cadmus was originally put in charge of the Cale Acte enterprise, a settlement which Herodotus says was proposed by the Zancleans (i.e. Scythes – hence the choice of *oikist*) to the Ionians around the time of Lade⁴⁴, but was probably instigated by Hippocrates in order to provide a base from which to attack the native Sicels. We know of no other candidate who could possibly have been *oikist*, and perhaps the family ties with Scythes in Zancle would have ensured a ready source of help if it was

³⁹ Hdt. VI.23.

⁴⁰ Paus. IV.2.10.

⁴¹ Hdt. VI.23.

⁴² Dunbabin (1948) 300.

⁴³ Hdt. VII.163-4. It is interesting that Scythes himself makes his way to Persia, and is also held in great esteem, this time by the court of Darius, Hdt. VI.24.

⁴⁴ Hdt. VI.22-3.

needed by either tyrant. It therefore does not seem so surprising that Cadmus gave up his tyranny in Cos, which by then was little more than a 'puppet'-tyranny, being supported by the ruling Persians, when considering his option of leading a colonial expedition, and the prospect of receiving a hero-cult after his death.

The most obvious problem with the idea that Cadmus was leader of the Samians is that he would have stolen Zancle from his own father, hardly an example of filial devotion we would expect from a man worthy of such praise from Herodotus. The biggest cause of confusion is whether one reads the passage concerned as containing *παρὰ* or *μετὰ*, regarding his actual association with the Samians. Dunbabin and Macan are in agreement that the passage should be read as *μετὰ*, meaning that he was indeed the leader of the Samians, but perhaps reached Sicily in advance and therefore was not directly responsible for the Samians' actions at Zancle, who had in fact betrayed their would-be *oikist*⁴⁵. The support given by Cadmus to Gelon later certainly suggests some anti-Anaxilas feeling on his part, and it may be that Cadmus was aware of how Anaxilas had led the Samians astray, although this could also have been due to the expulsion of the Samians following the refoundation of Zancle by that tyrant.

There is no evidence indicating any sort of claim to refoundation by Cadmus or the Samians themselves, although their presence was felt at Zancle for a mere five years. Like the settlement of Camarina by Hippocrates, it was certainly a significant event that may have resembled such a description. This idea is reinforced by numismatic evidence from the five years of occupation, where the appearance of the lion's scalp on the obverse and a Samian galley on the reverse indicate Samian domination of the city⁴⁶. It is also believed that the appearance of one of the first five letters of the Greek alphabet often found on the reverse represent each of the five years of Samian presence⁴⁷. This short period is partly to blame for the lack of details we have on how the city operated, but it does seem as if Anaxilas' plot did not succeed – why else would he expel the Samians from Zancle, if they co-operated with Rhegium as would have been his original intention? The links Cadmus had with the Deinomenids later

⁴⁵ Dunbabin (1948) 392, Macan (1908) 230.

⁴⁶ See Head (1911) 152ff. There are differences, for example the Zanclean coins depict an actual lion's head whereas in Samos we find a lion's scalp, with no eyes, from the Samian Heraion, and the Samian galley does not commonly appear until the fourth century – Head (1911) 602ff., Robinson (1946) 15.

suggest that Zancle remained under mostly Geloan influence following the Samians' arrival, thanks mostly to Hippocrates' choice to let them stay in the city rather than help Scythes.

The refoundation of Anaxilas at around 490-89, which had started with the expulsion of the Samian contingent in Zancle, is probably the first example of a deliberate resettlement *together* with a change in the city's name, in the history of Sicily. Our main source for this episode is Thucydides, who tells us of the three stages of the operation:

ὕστερον δ' αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ Σαμίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἰόνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἱ Μήδους φεύγοντες προσέβαλον Σικελία, τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους Ἀναξίλας Ῥηγίωνων τύραννος οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν.

Thuc. VI.4.5-6

This took the form of expelling the Samians, next to repopulate Zancle with people of differing origins, and finally to rename the city Messana⁴⁸ after Anaxilas' own homeland. Anaxilas' reasons for carrying out the first stage are quite clear – the Samians did not co-operate with him, leaving Rhegium in a similar state as before⁴⁹. The repopulation of the city which naturally follows, in particular the origins of the new inhabitants, is of significance because it seems typical of the way many colonial enterprises were undertaken in that invitations to join in the enterprise do not seem to be restricted to any particular group of people, unlike other contemporary Sicilian moves e.g. Dorians (as at Aetna) or Ionians (Cale Acte). It may be that Anaxilas' experiences with the Samians at Zancle deterred him from restricting invitations to a particular group, where loyalties would more likely be split between the mother-city of the colony, and that of the colonists themselves, whereas the main unifying force in a more heterogenous state would more likely be the *oikist*⁵⁰. Therefore the inhabitants would identify themselves more as citizens of their new home, rather than retaining their old identity and ties of loyalty as perhaps the Samians did as refugees, the coinage of Messana being a good indicator of this. Conforming to the norms of colonisation would have given the enterprise a sense of

⁴⁷ See Robinson (1946) 13-20. These also appear later on Samian coins themselves, see *BMC (Ionia)* 358, no's 92ff.

⁴⁸ Or more precisely for this particular time, Messene, if we take account of the numismatic evidence discussed above, but I shall only use the name Messana as a matter of consistency, unless a point is to be made about the change of dialect in the name.

⁴⁹ Dunbabin (1948) 395.

⁵⁰ See McGlew (1993) 23 for discussion of heterogeneity in colonies, e.g. Heracleia, Thasos.

validity, as far as identifying Messana as a brand new colony was concerned, a theme we shall examine at length when discussing Hieron at Aetna.

If we are to use our experience gained with the brevity of Thucydides' dealings with such matters⁵¹, it is possible to consider other possibilities when looking at the question of Messana's heterogeneity. It is useful to remember that Thucydides is one of two sources that tells us of the complete expulsion of the original Zancleans from their city, as he does in the case of Camarina in the late 550's, and again in doing so he is at odds with the other evidence except Aristotle:

Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίουσ ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί
Arist. *Pol.* 1303a35-6

If we are to believe Thucydides, we must assume that many Zancleans returned after the Samians' expulsion, at the invitation of Anaxilas. One could take the view that Thucydides' statement of heterogeneity is actually an *effort* to support his view of all Zancleans being expelled by the Samians earlier, therefore also explaining the reappearance of the name Zancle after Anaxilaid rule. However I do not think that the numbers of Zancleans remaining would have been sufficient to rename the city as Zancle without an earlier input of old Zancleans or other Chalcidians, or even to explain the usage of the Ionian name Messene without there being a substantial Ionian contingent in that city, in addition to the Messenian (Peloponnesian) population also present. Therefore I agree with Thucydides' account of a broad invitation to all, or at least differing kinds, of Greeks, while maintaining the belief that some Zancleans remained after the Samian conquest.

The Messenian contingent in the refounded city are said by Pausanias to have existed after they and Anaxilas had defeated the Zancleans themselves, and had them expelled:

τότε δὲ τοὺς Ζαγκλαίους ὃ τε Ἄναξίλασ ναυσὶν ἀνταναγομένους ἐνίκησε καὶ οἱ Μεσσηνιοὶ μάχη πεζῇ· Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ κατὰ γῆν τε ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων καὶ ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐκ θαλάσσης ὑπὸ Ῥηγίων πολιορκούμενοι, καὶ ἀλισκομένου σφίσις ἤδη τοῦ τείχους, ἐπὶ τε βωμοὺς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ καταφεύγουσιν. Ἄναξίλασ μὲν οὖν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις παρεκελεύετο τοὺς τε ἰκετεύοντας Ζαγκλαίων ἀποκτείνειν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς γυναιξὶν ὁμοῦ καὶ παισὶν ἀνδραποδίσασθαι· Γόργος δὲ καὶ Μάντικλος παρητοῦντο Ἄναξίλαν μὴ σφᾶς, ὑπὸ συγγενῶν ἀνδρῶν πεπονθότας ἀνόσια, ὅμοια αὐτοὺς ἐς ἀνθρώπους Ἑλληνας ἀναγκάσαι δρᾶσαι. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τοὺς Ζαγκλαίους ἀνίστασαν ἀπὸ τῶν βωμῶν καὶ ὄρκους δόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ παρ' ἐκείνων

⁵¹ See above 141ff.

λαβόντες ὄκησαν ἀμφοτέροι κοινῆ· ὄνομα δὲ τῇ πόλει μετέθεσαν Μεσσήνην ἀντὶ Ζάγκλης καλεῖσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐπράχθη τῆς ἐνάτης καὶ εἰκοστῆς, ἣν Χίονις Λάκων τὸ δεύτερον ἐνίκη, Μιλτιάδου παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἄρχοντος.

Paus. IV.23.8-10

As I have said already, the account bears a striking resemblance to Herodotus' account of Samian dealings with Zancle, but we may be free to assume that a portion of Messenians were resident there following the refoundation, although the details concerning the expulsion of the Zancleans seem unlikely. Evidence supporting this idea comes in the mention of a failed helot uprising in Messenia around 490/89⁵², which possibly led to a ready source of refugee-colonists following the revolt, just as the Samians were five years earlier.

ΑΘ. Αἰσchrῶς γοῦν ἠμύναντο αὐτούς, ὦ Κλεινία. τὸ δ' αἰσchrὸν λέγω οὐχ ὡς οὐ νικῶντές γε οἱ τότε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καλὰς νενικήκασι μάχας· ἀλλὰ ὃ φημι αἰσchrὸν τότε εἶναι, τότε λέγω, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνων τῶν πόλεων τριῶν οὐσῶν μίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμῦναι, τῶ δὲ δύο κακῶς οὕτως εἶναι διεφθαρμένα, ὥστε ἡ μὲν καὶ Λακεδαίμονα διεκώλυεν ἐπαμύνειν αὐτῇ, πολεμοῦσα αὐτῇ κατὰ κράτος, ἡ δ' αὖ πρωτεύουσα ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις τοῖς περὶ τὴν διανομήν

Pl. *Laws* 692d

Ἐρετρικὴν οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος. ὁ δὲ λόγος, εἴτ' ἀληθῆς εἴτε καὶ ὄπη ἀφίκετο, τοὺς τε ἄλλους Ἑλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐξέπληττεν, καὶ πρεσβευομένοις αὐτοῖς πανταχόσε βοηθεῖν οὐδεὶς ἤθελεν πλὴν γε Λακεδαιμονίων· οὗτοι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πρὸς Μεσσήνην ὄντος τότε πολέμου καὶ εἰ δὴ τι διεκώλυεν ἄλλο αὐτούς—οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον ὕστεροι δ' οὖν ἀφίκοντο τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης γενομένης μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ.

Pl. *Laws* 698e

However, the only source we have for this uprising, the *Laws* of Plato, is problematic. While Taylor acknowledges some sort of Spartan-Messenian conflict around the time of Marathon (despite the lack of any other evidence), he nevertheless admits that the facts are likely to be exaggerated in the Spartans' favour⁵³. Others also recognise the possibility of an uprising, but Plato's reputation for poor historical ability is a major problem⁵⁴. It is still a possibility however, especially when considering Anaxilas' own Messenian background⁵⁵, that the refoundation may have been planned as a result of the uprising in the Peloponnese, knowing that many Messenians would prefer to flee rather than risk capture or death if the revolt against

⁵² Pl. *Laws* 692d, 698e.

⁵³ Taylor (1934) 74, 81.

⁵⁴ England (1921) 18, Wallace (1954) 32. Wallace's recognition of a Messenian uprising is based heavily on the evidence concerning Zancle/Messene.

⁵⁵ Thuc. IV.6.4.

the Spartans were to fail. A comparison with the Cale Acte enterprise of Hippocrates is therefore quite easily made, and if a second wave of Messenian immigrants were to come to Sicily after the fall of Ithome in 460⁵⁶, this would certainly make their contingent one of the largest in Sicilian Messene, and could therefore be the reason for the Doricisation of the name, with local coinage now bearing ΜΕΣΣΑΝΙΟΝ as opposed to ΜΕΣΣΕΝΙΟΝ⁵⁷. No other participants in the colony are mentioned by our sources, but we should not think that Messana consisted solely of Messenians, old Zancleans and possibly other Chalcidians. It does seem clear though that the objective of gaining control over the straits of Messina worked, as not only is this attested in numismatic evidence, in particular the appearance of the mule-cart, celebrating Anaxilas' victory at Olympia in 480 on (Sicilian) Messenian coinage, but also in the fact that the renaming from Messana back to Zancle occurred soon after the end of the Anaxilaid dynasty⁵⁸.

As I noted earlier, the heterogeneity at Messana may have helped validate Anaxilas' population changes as a true colony, as would the change of name. But the most important information we need concerning this question is whether there had existed a sort of hero-cult after the tyrant's death. The period between Anaxilas' death in 476 and the end of the Anaxilaid dynasty in 461 would have been more than enough time to organise a cult, but again no such thing is recorded in our sources. The problem with finding evidence of a founder cult where the hero celebrated is a tyrant, is that following the fall of the tyranny the cult would immediately be discontinued, and evidence of it erased⁵⁹. Acts such as digging up bones of a tyrant and moving them elsewhere are common and sometimes recorded, but in this case we simply have no information⁶⁰.

The refoundation of Zancle by Anaxilas is also significant for another reason that has hardly been recognised, probably in part due to the prominence of the earlier Samian episode, but mostly because it provides an example of a rare phenomenon realised only in 1991. An article by A.J. Graham published that year examined a public inscription found in Teos in Asia

⁵⁶ Thuc. I.103.

⁵⁷ Dunbabin (1948) 398-9.

⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. XI.76.5.

⁵⁹ See McGlew (1993) 24, 132, 182, also see chapters 1 and 5.

⁶⁰ The remains of both Hieron and the Cypselids of Corinth seem to have suffered exhumation, Strabo 6.2.3. See also McGlew (1993) ch.1 and 4.

Minor, which had clarified an obscure sentence in Pindar's Second Paean⁶¹. To be brief, it was then understood to refer to the refoundation of Teos by Abdera, which itself was a Teian colony. Graham names more possible examples of a colony re-settling its mother city, at Miletus and Eretria after the Persian Wars (while admitting there was no evidence, they are put forward as possibilities) and at Sybaris in the fifth century, this time with evidence too doubtful to be certain⁶². In the case of Zancle, we seem to have enough evidence to support the idea of a refoundation, it is named as such by Thucydides, and the change of name from Zancle to Messana is certain, as is the almost complete change in population. In Strabo we have an account of the foundation of Rhegium, and there we find that the founder (and therefore the mother-city) was Zanclean⁶³. This is disputable, for there are other possible founders named in other sources, but according to Malkin, the most widely recognised is Antimnestos of Zancle⁶⁴. I will not discuss further the question of Rhegium's founder, but I do think that Anaxilas' refoundation of Zancle has a strong case for being another example of a refoundation of a mother-city.

The refoundation of Zancle certainly differs from that of Camarina in many respects, for instance the change of name seems to introduce a personal aspect to the affair, but on the whole we still seem to be dealing with a reinforcement, especially when considering the lack of a founder-cult or other efforts to identify Messana as a different city from Zancle. However it is in the next case, the refoundation of Catana by Hieron, that we encounter just that.

Catana/Aetna

The refoundation of Catana by Hieron in 476 BC is by far the best known case of its kind, and for many reasons. The first reason is the coverage given by the poet Pindar, particularly in his first Pythian Ode celebrating Hieron's victory in the chariot race in Delphi in 470, a poem which has been the subject of much discussion. In addition we have fragments of the lost *Aitnaiai* of Aeschylus, and the poems of Bacchylides and Simonides, all three of whom had visited Sicily at some point during Hieron's rule in Syracuse. Another important source is

⁶¹ Graham (1991) 176-8, see Graham (1992) 44-73 for a fuller report.

⁶² Graham (1992) 69-70.

the coinage minted in celebration of Aetna's foundation, which is of great value not only because of the high quality often associated with Greek-Sicilian coinage, but also because it seems to have been a favoured medium for propaganda purposes. There is also the sheer scale of the operation, not only in the number of colonists and the size of the land allotments, but also in the numbers shifted to Leontini. Finally there is the seemingly complete lack of scruples displayed by the tyrant himself, not only concerning the displaced populations, but also the Leontines who were made to suffer severe overpopulation in their city in the name of Hieron's agenda of self-advancement.

This episode has, as I have already mentioned, received much attention from scholars, but much of what has been written has concentrated mainly on the propaganda produced to legitimise the foundation⁶⁵. The issue of the city's (and its founder's) promotion will also be examined, but for the first part we will concentrate on the events of the foundation itself, in a similar manner to the earlier examples discussed above. The fullest account of the foundation we have in the sources is that of Diodorus Siculus.

Ἱέρων δὲ τοὺς τε Ναξίους καὶ τοὺς Καταναίους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἀναστήσας, ἰδίουσ οἰκήτορας ἀπέστειλεν, ἐκ μὲν Πελοποννήσου πεντακισχιλίουσ ἀθροίσας, ἐκ δὲ Συρακουσῶν ἄλλουσ τοσοῦτουσ προσθείσ· καὶ τὴν μὲν Κατάνην μετωνόμασεν Αἴτην, τὴν δὲ χώραν οὐ μόνον τὴν Καταναίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὴν τῆσ ὁμόρουσ προσθείσ κατεκληρούχησε, μυρίουσ πληρώσας οἰκήτορας. ... τοὺσ δὲ Ναξίους καὶ τοὺσ Καταναίους ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ἀνασταθέντασ μετόκισεν εἰσ τοὺσ Λεοντίνουσ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων προσέταξε κατοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Diod. Sic. XI.49.1-2

There seems to be no episode preceding the events at Catana mentioned by Diodorus to prepare us for Hieron's actions, making the refoundation seem far more sudden and unplanned that it must have been in reality. Although the frequent movement of focus from one part of the Mediterranean to another which is found in Diodorus' history can sometimes make events seem more spontaneous than they actually are, there is no real switch of location here from the preceding episode, where we hear of Hieron's dealings with Theron immediately beforehand. This need not necessarily represent a change in the source used but rather a typical example of how episodic Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* can be. The account given tells us that after expelling the

⁶³ Strabo VI.257.

⁶⁴ Malkin (1987) 31-41.

Catanaeans and Naxians from their land and moving them to Leontini, Hieron replaced them with 5,000 settlers from the Peloponnese and the same number of Syracusans. We also hear that land outside Catana was included into the new settlement, and divided equally between the settlers. The reasons given for this act were that Hieron might have a force ready if he needed it, and also to receive honours after death, as founder both in name and duties carried out.

There are many points open for discussion here, even before we look at Pindar's first Pythian Ode, and it seems appropriate to start with the expulsion of the inhabitants of Catana and Naxos. The first thing that strikes one when reading the passage is that their movement is clearly forced, as is their settlement at Leontini. There seems to be little or no regard for the welfare of the Catanaeans or indeed the Leontines, or even concern that such a move would cause great unrest and resentment that could lead to an Ionian uprising dangerously close to the capital at Syracuse. We can guess that Hieron must have felt comfortable enough despite this, and that Leontini's close proximity to the capital ensured easy control, otherwise he surely would not have made the move in the first place. There is no evidence indicating an Ionian uprising during this time. We will look further into the Ionian question when we consider Hieron's motives, along with the inhabitants of Aetna itself, but it is also noticeable that those who joined in the enterprise, or at least their origin, were picked by Hieron himself. This is in conflict with the view that the leaders of colonial enterprises allowed a more heterogenous settlement to develop than one would expect to find in Greece itself, because participation was open to all (or at least most) Greeks⁶⁵, whereas in this case we find in Diodorus that the population was deliberately split between Syracusans and Peloponnesians. We are given a little more detail in a scholion to Pindar's first Pythian Ode, where we find that there were also settlers from Gela and Megara Hyblaea⁶⁷. It is possible that many of these were Geloans or Megarians who had already been moved to Syracuse under Gelon, especially when one realises that Megara had apparently been completely depopulated in 483, according to Herodotus⁶⁸. In addition to this, the identity of the 5,000 Peloponnesians must also be put into question, especially in consideration of the strong military motive behind the enterprise. The invitation of

⁶⁵ Dougherty (1993) 83-98; also see the following chapter on propaganda and self-presentation, 181ff.

⁶⁶ See above, 144ff.

settlers from the Peloponnese has become a familiar theme in this chapter, and once again thoughts turn to the probability that the settlers at Aetna were intended as mercenaries, being rewarded with plots of land in the rich Eastern plain. The benefits of such an arrangement have already been discussed, both in the section on Camarina and the previous chapter on mercenaries⁶⁹. We have already found, when discussing Camarina, that a large number of Arcadian mercenaries in particular were to be found on the island⁷⁰, and if this is again the case with Hieron's own forces, then the presence of Arcadians (i.e. non-Dorians) in this new city would therefore indicate a more heterogenous city than that which Diodorus describes, a factor which we will consider again when we look at Pindar and his attempts to glorify Aetna.

Following the events at Himera in 480, where the Carthaginians and their allies (including Anaxilas of Rhegium, amongst others) were heavily defeated, terms were made which effectively ruled the Carthaginians out as a threat to the Deinomenid dynasty, or indeed to anyone in Sicily until much later on in the century.

παραγενομένων γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνας τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων
πρέσβων καὶ μετὰ δακρύων δεομένων ἀνθρωπίνως αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι,
συνεχώρησε τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐπράξατο δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον
γεγενημένας δαπάνας, ἀργυρίου δισχίλια τάλαντα, καὶ δύο ναοὺς
προσέταξεν οἰκοδομῆσαι, καθ' οὓς ἔδει τὰς συνθήκας ἀνατεθῆναι.

Diod. Sic. XI.26.2

This would have seriously undermined the strength of the tyranny at Rhegium; in particular, it would have been particularly difficult to maintain a hold on Messana, the importance of which we have already discussed. 476 was also the year of Anaxilas' death, and whether he was already gone, or was ailing, this would also have had a huge impact on the stability of the dynasty. It is after considering these events that we find the importance of direct control over the territory of Naxos⁷¹. Removing Naxos would clear the way for the advance north to Messana, and perhaps also provide a friendly harbour from which to attack⁷², just as he would have used Aetna as an infantry base. The consideration of Naxos' depopulation will be discussed further later in this chapter.

⁶⁷ Schol. Pind. *Pyth.* I.62 (120)b.

⁶⁸ Hdt. VII.156.

⁶⁹ See above, 143.

⁷⁰ *CAH* VI 150, also Guarducci (1953), (1959-60).

⁷¹ See the foreign policy chapter above, 72ff..

The reasons for the refoundation of Catana are, fortunately, spelt out very clearly by Diodorus.

τοῦτο δ' ἔπραξε σπεύδων ἅμα μὲν ἔχειν βοήθειαν ἐτοίμην ἀξιόλογον πρὸς τὰς ἐπιούσας χρείας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς γενομένης μυριάδρου πόλεως τιμὰς ἔχειν ἥρωικάς.

Diod. Sic. XI.49.2

The first reason, to provide a base for loyal soldiers who could be used for campaigning, or in the event of attack against Syracuse, while the second reason is that Hieron founded Aetna as a means of being remembered as a hero after his death⁷³. We can also examine the question of why Hieron chose Catana as the site of his new settlement in the first place, rather than, for example, Leontini or Gela, for it does seem that Messana would almost certainly have been Hieron's ultimate target for expansion, and Catana, being far closer to Messana, would be an obvious place from which to base an attack⁷⁴.

As for the second motive, this is the first case of refoundation in Sicily where we have evidence, and abundant evidence at that, of personal ambition playing a primary role. Much of the evidence we have comes in the form of propaganda, which we shall look at in the next chapter, but if we are to stay with the historical account of Diodorus for the moment, we find some evidence of Hieron's success in establishing his own hero-cult. In the account of the tyrant's death in 467, Diodorus informs us that Hieron was indeed accorded a cult as founder of the city:

Ἱέρων δ' ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων βασιλεὺς ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῇ Κατάνῃ, καὶ τιμῶν ἥρωικῶν ἔτυχεν, ὡς ἂν κτίστης γεγονὼς τῆς πόλεως. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἄρξας ἔτη ἔνδεκα κατέλιπε τὴν βασιλείαν Θρασυβούλῳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ, ὃς ἦρξε Συρακοσίων ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.

Diod. Sic. XI.66.4

It is implied in Diodorus' account that Aetna continued to exist in the historian's own time, i.e. the first century BC. We find that the city of Aetna is actually relocated to Inessa following the original Catanaeans' seizure of their homeland, and given the continuation of Aetna's name and identity up until Diodorus' time, it also seems possible that Hieron was still

⁷² See earlier chapter on foreign policy for Hieron's ambitions for Messana, 72ff.; and also for the potential uses of the harbour at Naxos.

⁷³ These military motives have already been discussed in the foreign policy chapter above, 72ff.

⁷⁴ See chapter two, 73ff. on Catana's ideal site for a military base.

remembered as its founder four hundred years later⁷⁵. In Aetna's case it seems that the identity of the *polis* was more fixed upon the citizens themselves, and on its founder, rather than the geographical location of the city, perhaps not surprising considering Aetna was, quite simply, Catana with a fresh population make-up.

ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Δουκέτιος μὲν ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἡγεμῶν, χαλεπῶς ἔχων τοῖς τὴν Κατάνην οἰκοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν τῆς τῶν Σικελῶν χώρας, ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ' αὐτούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατευσάντων ἐπὶ τὴν Κατάνην, οὗτοι μὲν κοινῇ κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺ κατοικισθέντας ὑφ' Ἰέρωνος τοῦ δυνάστου ἐπολέμουν· ἀντιταχθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ Κατάνη καὶ λειφθέντων πλείοσι μάχαις, οὗτοι μὲν ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης, καὶ τὴν νῦν οὔσαν Αἴτην ἐκτήσαντο, πρὸ τούτου καλουμένην Ἴνησαν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης ὄντες ἐκομίσαντο πολλῶ χρόνῳ τὴν πατρίδα.

Diod. Sic. XI.76.3

There is no evidence to the contrary, but the survival of the tyrant's cult is subject to the same dangers as any other founder cult, i.e. dominated by the fickle political interests of anyone who happened to control the city at any given time. It is not unheard of for a city's founder to be replaced by another because circumstances demand it, probably the main reason for the existence of several different foundation legends in the cases of several cities for example Rhegium⁷⁶, or even in an attempt by another city to establish a claim on the city in question. Any problems which a ruler of Aetna may have had with the identity of the founder would have been magnified by this particular founder's other role as tyrant.

Hieron seems to have played a very active role in the refoundation of Catana, if the account given by Diodorus is true. Here we find Hieron taking complete control over affairs in the new city: in addition to the choice of colonists mentioned above, the tyrant also chooses the new name for the settlement, and perhaps more importantly, it is Hieron who we find dividing and distributing the land equally amongst the 10,000 settlers⁷⁷. We would normally expect such duties as this to be passed on to a subordinate, perhaps even the new king of Aetna, Deinomenes, but Hieron, realising the significance of land distribution in foundation legend,

⁷⁵ There is no evidence that the relocation of the city of Aetna to the site of Inessa had any impact on Hieron's hero cult, as may be expected. Although it is not mentioned by Diodorus, Hieron was likely to have been buried in the Aetnaean/Catanaean agora as 'founder' of Aetna, so there is a problem regarding the Catanaeans return to their home city in 461 BC and, in particular, the fate of Hieron's remains afterwards. It is not inconceivable that the remains were exhumed and shifted, along with the city itself, to Inessa, but there is simply no evidence to affirm the idea. It is highly unlikely that the bones of Hieron remained in the Catanaean agora, a burial spot reserved for the founder alone.

⁷⁶ Malkin (1987) 31-41.

chose to take responsibility himself. In order to be remembered as the founder of the new city, the tyrant needed to carry out the necessary duties (including land distribution) so as to fulfil this role, otherwise it could be argued that he was not the founder at all, but simply the leader of the mother-city. The identity of the founder could easily become challenged, especially for political reasons⁷⁸. Difficulties were often realised where more than one figure is given responsibility according to the foundation legend, or even where there is more than one founder mentioned, for example in the legends of Gela or Camarina⁷⁹. So by taking an active role as founder, in combination with his position as tyrant of Syracuse, Hieron made his position virtually indisputable. It is difficult to imagine Hieron's identity as founder being seriously challenged considering the wealth of propaganda material that has survived even to our own time.

Pindar's first Pythian Ode is the other major piece of evidence used in discussion of Hieron's Aetna, and seems to be the favoured source of many who have dealt with the subject in recent times. In fact, this ode is also a favourite of those studying Pindar and epinician poetry in general, since the occasion of victory celebration in Sicily, along with the grand descriptions of Mount Etna, the new city of Aetna, and of course its founder, make this poem one of Pindar's finest. Firstly we must continue examining the nature of the foundation itself, along with that of the city, in consideration of this poetic evidence in addition to Diodorus' history, for even aside from the propagandistic aspects which dominate the poem, there is much factual information to be gained from the city's description.

Probably the most useful passage in this ode starts with the mention of the new king Deinomenes, Hieron's son, continuing down to the references to Himera and Cumae in the context of a prayer to Zeus.

Μοῖσα, καὶ παρ Δεινομένει κελαδῆσαι
 πίθεό μοι ποινὰν τεθρίππων·
 χάρμα δ' οὐκ ἀλλότριον νικαφορία πατέρος.
 ἄγ' ἔπειτ' Αἴτνας βασιλεῖ φίλιον ἐξεύρωμεν ὕμνον·
 τῶ πόλιν κείναν θεοδμάτῳ σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ
 Ὑλλίδος στάθμας Ἰέρων ἐν νόμοις ἔ-
 κτισσε· θέλοντι δὲ Παμφύλου
 καὶ μὰν Ἡρακλειδᾶν ἔκγονοι
 ὄχθαις ὑπο Ταυγέτου ναίοντες αἰ-

⁷⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.49.1.

⁷⁸ McGlew (1993) 20-2.

⁷⁹ Thuc. VI.5.3.

εἰ μένειν τεθμοῖσιν ἐν Αἰγίμιου
 Δωριεῖς. ἔσχον δ' Ἀμύκλας ὄλβιοι
 Πινδόθεν ὀρνύμενοι, λευκοπώλων
 Τυνδαριδᾶν βαθύδοξοι
 γείτονες, ὧν κλέος ἄνθησεν αἰχμᾶς.
 Ζεῦ τέλει, αἰεὶ δὲ τοιαύταν Ἀμένα παρ' ὕδωρ
 αἶσαν ἀστοῖς καὶ βασιλεῦσιν διακρί-
 νειν ἔτυμον λόγον ἀνθρώπων.
 σὺν τοι τίν κεν ἀγητῆρ ἀνήρ,
 υἱῷ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, δᾶμον γεραί-
 ρων τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἠσυχίαν.
 λίσσομαι νεῦσον, Κρονίων, ἡμερον
 ὄφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσα
 νῶν τ' ἀλαλατὸς ἔχη, ναυ-
 σίστονον ὕβριν ἰδὼν τὰν πρὸ Κύμας,
 οἷα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῷ δαμασθέντες πάθον,
 ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὃ σφιν ἐν πόν-
 τῳ βάλεθ' ἀλικίαν,
 Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.58-75

The reference to Deinomenes is significant as it raises questions concerning the constitution at Aetna, the position of Hieron in relation to Deinomenes, and the existence of kingship in Greek colonies. The strangeness of this reference to Deinomenes as βασιλεύς is that it is extremely rare to find a Greek colony ruled by a king (the Battiads of Cyrene being the only obvious example), especially in Sicily, where oligarchies and tyrannies dominate. The Deinomenid tyrants themselves never seemed to have used the title of king; in fact, in instances where one would expect the tyrants to tell others of their position, they decline to do so, simply naming themselves along with their city, for example Hieron's dedications to Olympia following his successful expedition to Cumae⁸⁰.

Ἰάρων ὁ Δεινομένεος
 καὶ τοὶ Συρακόσιοι
 τῷ Διὶ Τυρρανῶν ἀπὸ Κύμας.
Meiggs and Lewis 29, SEG xxxiii 328 (Olympia V 249.3)

While this appearance of βασιλεύς is a surprise in itself, it is the consequences of Pindar's mention of kingship at Aetna that make it even more interesting. For example, the first thing that strikes one when reading the first Pythian Ode is that it is addressed to 'Hieron of Aetna', and since Deinomenes is king of that city, logically Hieron himself would become his own son's subject. It is of course ludicrous to come to this conclusion; there is simply no way that Hieron, as tyrant of Syracuse which rules *over* Aetna, would regard himself as subject to his

own son. There are two points to be made here, firstly that the name 'Hieron of Aetna' would be another example of the interchangeability of Greek identity (originally Geloan, then Syracusan and Aetnaean at the same time), as is the earlier reference to Praxiteles the Arcadian mercenary (Mantinean, Syracusan and Camarinaean)⁸¹. Secondly, and more importantly concerning the question of the Aetnaean constitution, it is quite obvious that Deinomenes would have been the second-in-command in the city and his father would have exercised real control, with Aetna still coming under the control of the Syracusan empire.

There is in fact a hint in the poem that suggests a more familiar arrangement – that Deinomenes was one of the sub-tyrants installed to govern a city in the large Syracusan empire⁸². Here we find that Hieron is named as the 'ruler who instructs his son' (σύν τοι τίς κεν ἀγητῆρ ἀνὴρ, σὶ δ' ἔπιτελλόμενος) perhaps letting it slip that Hieron enjoys real control over Aetna whereas Deinomenes is still learning for the future. This system is certainly not strange; for example, after Gelon shifted the centre of power from Gela to Syracuse, Hieron (Gelon's brother) was put in charge of the old capital, under Gelon's supervision, whereas Thrasybulus (a younger brother, Hieron's successor) took over at Gela after Hieron's accession to the tyranny. We have also seen non-family members installed, for example Scythes at Zancle. In the light of these examples, it seems likely that although Deinomenes' official title is 'king', a more accurate description would be 'sub-tyrant'. It seems appropriate at this point to refer back to a point made concerning the nature of colonial enterprises⁸³, in particular the form of government employed in the new settlement, and the influence of the mother city's own constitution and involvement in the enterprise. As in cases where the colonies are founded on the order of tyrants, in particular those set up by the Cypselids and Peisistratids, the influence of the tyrant is very strong, setting up family members as leaders and with the colony's loyalty intended to remain with the tyrant. In other words they are examples of imperial colonies, with the aim of extending the tyrant's authority overseas or, in this case, overland. The case of Aetna, apart from the fact that Hieron himself acted as founder, is almost exactly the same.

⁸⁰ Diod. Sic. XI.51.1-2; see also chapter five on propaganda, 188-9ff.

⁸¹ *Olympia*, V, 389 ff., Pace (1927) 41, also see above 143-4ff.

⁸² Pind. *Pyth.* I.69-70.

⁸³ See above, 137 (Graham (1964) 29-39).

Although Catana was already under Syracusan control, a new government was formed at the new settlement that could easily, and ultimately, be controlled by Hieron himself.

Another useful section of the first Pythian Ode is sandwiched between the two that have been considered above, and concerns in particular the theme of Doricisation in that part of Sicily⁸⁴. This is a theme that has been of interest to many historians considering this period of history on the island, particularly Asheri⁸⁵. The reason for this is not only the celebration of the Doricisation of Catana in Pindar, but also the concentration of the Chalcidians of Catana and Naxos together with those of Leontini, which made that city the only one in the Syracusan empire with a significant (or perhaps any) Ionian population. The emphasis on Doricisation in these few lines of Pindar makes it clear that the refoundation was meant to be seen as a statement of Dorian supremacy and right to rule in Sicily, carried over from mainland Greece to the Greek West⁸⁶. However, it is misleading to presume that the move was fired by nothing but discrimination, for Pindar also gives very clear reasons for the Dorians' right to control in Sicily, this being the precedent set by the Heraclids. The presence of the Dorians in Greece, particularly the Peloponnese, is explained in Greek legend as being the result of conquest, as the Dorians were the vehicle by which the sons of Heracles – the Heraclidae – exercised their divine right to rule, inherited from their heroic ancestor. This was the right the kings at Sparta used to legitimise their own rule, as members of that family. Burton takes the view that the new foundation by Hieron was seen by the poet as 'a fresh outpost of the Dorian way of life'⁸⁷, and this view is endorsed by Dougherty, although she sees it in the wider context of Greek order over barbarianism. It is with discussion of ancestral rights to rule in Sicily that we now find ourselves focussing on propaganda produced after the foundation itself, in particular that contained within the first Pythian Ode.

This passage in the First Pythian Ode seems to imply that while the Heraclidae had enjoyed great success in Greece itself, the same work had to be carried out in Sicily. It is therefore thought by Dougherty to mean that Hieron had inherited responsibility from the Heraclids, thus Hieron was obliged to refound Catana, since it was his duty as a Dorian to do so.

⁸⁴ Pind. *Pyth.* 1.62-6.

⁸⁵ Asheri (1988) 150-2.

By founding Aetna ‘under the laws of Hyllos’ rule’⁸⁸, the tyrant was continuing the tradition by building a major new Doric centre, and the installation of Deinomenes as king (under the rights of the Heraclids) may be seen to imitate the ways of another great Doric kingdom – Sparta. The Heraclid right to rule in Sicily was not a new or original idea of Hieron; in Herodotus we find a mention of Dorieus, the Spartan prince who, disgusted with his half-brother Cleomenes’ accession to the throne, departs to Sicily in order to found a city on Mt. Eryx, which Heracles had visited in his travels⁸⁹. The attempt failed, but we hear about Dorieus again through Gelon’s reply to the Greek embassy, shortly before the Persian invasion⁹⁰.

It seems that this ode of Pindar was composed to confirm the divine backing necessary for continued prosperity at Aetna, and this is revealed to us through the poet’s mention of sailors taking a fair breeze as a good omen:

ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρώτα χάρις
 ἐς πλόον ἀρχομένοις πομπαῖον ἐλθεῖν
 οὔρον· ἐοικότα γάρ
 καὶ τελευτᾶ φερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν, ὁ δὲ λόγος
 ταύταις ἐπὶ συντυχίαις δόξαν φέρει
 λοιπὸν ἔσσεσθαι στεφάνοισι ν<ιν> ἵπποις τε κλυτάν
 καὶ σὺν εὐφώνοις θαλίαις ὄνυμαστάν.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.33-8

The announcement of Hieron’s victory at Delphi, and in particular, of the city of Aetna, could be interpreted in a similar manner. Although Apollo is not mentioned here, it may have been considered crucial to gain his support in particular. The significance of Apollo’s role in city foundation is clear enough as we have seen, despite the doubtfulness surrounding the necessity of visiting his oracle, through the cult of Apollo Archegetes at Naxos, a unifying cult for all Greeks in Sicily. It seems quite appropriate therefore, that the occasion of the announcement of Aetna’s foundation should have been the Pythian Games in honour of Apollo, a stroke of luck which certainly would not have done any harm to Hieron’s cause, or indeed to that of the city, but whether or not it was a pre-planned propaganda exercise remains to be seen.

⁸⁶ See Dougherty (1993) 93ff., also Kirsten (1941) 58-71.

⁸⁷ Burton (1962) 91.

⁸⁸ Pind. *Pyth.* I.62.

⁸⁹ Hdt. V.43. On Dorieus in Sicily, see Malkin (1994) 203-18.

⁹⁰ Hdt. VII.158.

Although the First Pythian Ode is certainly the grandest piece of propaganda that has survived to us, it is not the only celebratory literature we know existed at the time. Aeschylus was another poet we know spent time in Sicily at this time, and we know from surviving fragments that he composed a tragedy called the *Aitnaiai*⁹¹, apparently intended as an omen of good luck. According to Macrobius⁹², the play is about the rape of Thalia, a young Sicilian girl, by Zeus. The pregnant Thalia is hidden underground until she later appears holding her twin sons, known as the Palici. The Palici were native Sicilian gods, whose ancient cult was placed near the hot springs of Mt. Etna⁹³, and by incorporating the Palici into Greek myth, Aeschylus is said by Dougherty to be legitimising Greek presence in Sicily⁹⁴. This was done by showing Greek presence on the island to be continuous since the birth of the Palici in a bygone age. The emergence of the Palici from underground is then said to be foretelling the reappearance of the Greeks at Mt. Etna later on – in particular the foundation of the city that bore the volcano's name. In the First Pythian Ode, Pindar seems to take Aeschylus' ideas one step further. Instead of portraying the foundation of Aetna simply as a symbol of Greek precedence over barbarian land, we are given the image of Zeus' victory over Typhon, in other words the foundation of Aetna, supported by Zeus, has not only defeated the barbarians but the forces of chaos associated with them, through Typhon⁹⁵:

ὄσσα δὲ μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεὺς, ἀτύζονται βοᾶν
 Πιερίδων αἴοντα, γᾶν τε καὶ πόν-
 τον κατ' ἀμαιομάκετον,
 ὅς τ' ἐν αἰνᾷ Ταρτάρῳ κεῖται, θεῶν πολέμιος,
 Τυφῶς ἑκατοντακάρανος· τὸν ποτε
 Κιλικίον θρέψεν πολυώνυμον ἄντρον· νῦν γε μάν
 ταί θ' ὑπὲρ Κύμας ἀλιερκέες ὄχθαι
 Σικελία τ' αὐτοῦ πιέζει
 στέρνα λαχνάεντα· κίων δ' οὐρανία συνέχει,
 νιφόεσσ' Αἴτνα, πάνετες χιόνος ὀξείας τιθήνα·
 τᾶς ἐρεῦγονται μὲν ἀπλάτου πυρὸς ἀγνόταται
 ἐκ μυχῶν παγαί· ποταμοὶ δ' ἀμέραισιν
 μὲν προχέοντι ῥόον καπνοῦ
 αἴθων'· ἀλλ' ἐν ὄρφναισιν πέτρας
 φοίνισσα κυλινδομένα φλὸξ ἐς βαθεῖ-
 αν φέρει πόντου πλάκα σὺν πατάγῳ.
 κεῖνο δ' Ἀφαίστοιο κρουνοῦς ἐρπετόν

⁹¹ Aeschylus fr.24-33 (Mette); fr. 6-10 (Radt).

⁹² Aesch. fr.27a (Mette).

⁹³ Diod. Sic. XI.89.

⁹⁴ Dougherty (1993) 89-90.

⁹⁵ Dougherty (1993) 93-4.

δεινοτάτους ἀναπέμπει· τέρας μὲν
θαυμάσιον προσιδέσθαι,
θαῦμα δὲ καὶ παρεόντων ἀκοῦσαι,
οἶον Αἴτνας ἐν μελαμφύλλοις δέδεται κορυφαῖς
καὶ πέδῳ, στρωμνὰ δὲ χαράσσοισ' ἅπαν νῶ-
τον ποτικεκλιμένον κεντεῖ.
Pind. *Pyth.* I.13-28

In addition to literary celebrations, which include a fragment of Pindar's which links founders to civilisation and everlasting fame, while also providing a pun on Hieron's own name:

ΙΕΡΩΝΙ

Σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω,
ζαθέων ἱερῶν ἐπώνυμε
πάτερ, κτίστορ Αἴτνας·

νομάδεσσι γὰρ ἐν Σκύθαις ἀλάται στρατῶν,
ὄς ἀμαξοφόρητον οἶκον οὐ πέπαται,
ἀκλεῆς <δ'> ἔβα.

Pind. fr. 105ab (Snell)

and another of Simonides which again refers to Greek control of Etna⁹⁶:

ἡ δὲ Αἴτνη Σικελίας ὄρος ἀπὸ Αἴτνης τῆς Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Γῆς, ὡς φησιν
Ἄλκιμος ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας. Σιμωνίδης δὲ Αἴτνην φησὶ κρῖναι
Ἥφαιστον καὶ Δῆμητραν περὶ τῆς χώρας ἐρίσαντας.
sch. Theocr. i 65-6 (Simonides *PMG* fr.552)

the coinage of Aetna also contains many clues into how Hieron chose to promote his new city. Once again it is Dougherty who provides the most insight into this particular medium used by the tyrant. The first point that must be made even before we consider the coinage itself, is the effectiveness in using coinage to convey a message. Of all the media used for propaganda purposes, coinage is perhaps the most effective, for it is used by all citizens, every day, especially in view of the common opinion held that the issue of ancient coinage was of at least as much political importance as economic. The coin in question, a silver Attic standard tetradrachm (a higher denomination that may not have been accessible to everybody)⁹⁷, displays on its reverse the enthroned Zeus with a perched eagle – in other words a visual form of Pindar's description of the god in his First Pythian Ode.

⁹⁶ Pind. fr. 105a, b; Simonides – *PMG* fr.552.

⁹⁷ Head (1911) 114-5, Hill (1906) 43-5. The Attic weight standard was universal amongst the Greek cities of Sicily from around the mid-sixth century until well into the Classical Period, see Head (1911) 115ff.



Figure 6 - Zeus Aetnaeus. Silver Attic Tetradrachm (Reverse), c. 476-61 BC. Brussels, Coin Cabinet of the Royal Library. Copied from Dougherty (1993) 87.




Figure 7 - Zeus Raping Thetis. Black and white engraving from Paestum, c. 330-10 BC. After Sir William Hamilton's *Collection of Engravings from Ancient Vases*, vol. 1, plate 16. Vase now lost. Copied from Dougherty (1993) 88.

καὶ τὸν αἰχματὰν κεραυνὸν σβεννύεις
 αἰενάου πυρός. εὕδει δ' ἀνὰ σκά-
 πτω Διὸς αἰετός, ὠκεῖ-
 αν πτέρυγ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν χαλάξαις,
 ἀρχὸς οἰωνῶν, κελαινῶπιν δ' ἐπὶ οἱ νεφέλαν
 ἀγκύλω κρατί, γλεφάρων ἀδὺ κλάι-
 θρον, κατέχευας· ὁ δὲ κνώσσων
 ὑγρὸν νῶτον αἰωρεῖ, τεαῖς
 ῥιπαῖσι κατασχόμενος.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.5-10

Dougherty notes that the artist's aim must therefore be the same, the message is of kingship, sovereignty and absolute power⁹⁸, and this is reinforced when other details are taken into account, such as the staff and thunderbolt held by the god, and the name ΑΙΤΝΑΙΟΣ, an epithet of Zeus, the patron deity of Aetna. Other details point to local Sicilian characteristics, such as the scarab and Silenus on the obverse⁹⁹, and while Dougherty includes these in the Pindaric theme, there does also seem to be a connection with Aeschylus' preference for Hellenising the native Sicilian features and incorporating them into the Greek world. Finally, continuing with the visual material we have, there is a neck amphora from Paestum, now lost, but dated to 330-10 BC, which portrays the rape of Thalia – possibly a scene from the *Aitnaiai*¹⁰⁰. Here we have a scene similar to that of the play, in that Zeus takes Thalia for himself just as Hieron takes the land at Aetna. This is also indicative of the strong political and cultural influence of Sicily in Italy¹⁰¹.

As I said earlier, the inclusion of Naxos in Hieron's plans may seem a fairly minor detail at first, but I feel it is possible that it may have played a part not only in Hieron's military and ethnic policies, but could also legitimate the Syracusans' (and more precisely, his own) claim to Greek Sicily. Naxos enjoyed a fairly privileged position as the oldest Greek colony in Sicily, and with this position firmly established in the minds of the Greek Sicilians, the positions of the next oldest colonies were often disputed, particularly between Syracuse and the Naxian/Chalcidian sub-colonies of Catana and Leontini. However, it is worth noting that if Naxos' existence was ever to be discontinued, then the next oldest colony could make a

⁹⁸ Dougherty (1993) 86.

⁹⁹ The scarabs in the region of Mt. Etna were of enormous size (sch. Ar. *Peace* 73) and Silenus also appears in earlier Catanaean coinage, see Head (1911) 131, probably because of his links with Dionysus, who is also a common occurrence on the Greek coinage of Sicily, e.g. in nearby Naxos – Head (1911) 159-61.

¹⁰⁰ Kossatz-Deissmann (1978) 36.

legitimate claim to precedence on the island. It is possible that Hieron had this in mind, although there is no mention of such a motive in our sources, or any indicators, such as a move of the cult of Apollo Archegetes to Syracuse.

One question that may be asked in consideration of this evidence, is whether Hieron did entertain the ideas of Doricisation or of Greek order in foreign lands in his mind at the time of the refoundation of Catana. Of course, there is no sure way of determining the truth behind Hieron's actions, and as has been pointed out by Malkin, the account of Diodorus shows the event from the point of view of those around him, rather than Hieron's own¹⁰². His self-aggrandisement, especially considering his position of trying to emulate his popular brother, certainly does seem to imply that he may have considered the Doricisation of his empire. However, there are cases to be made against the idea that Hieron had Doricisation or even Hellenisation in mind. The existence of non-Dorian mercenaries from Arcadia (as mentioned earlier) certainly does not support the idea that Hieron was trying to build a great new Doric centre, and on the point of Hellenisation it is also the case that Catana was already a Greek city, not a Sicel one. However these may not have been of enough importance as to prevent Hieron from gaining as much propaganda material as possible from this episode.

Considering how much evidence has survived to this day of Hieron's promotion of the city of Aetna, and in spite of the difficulties experienced by the Aetnaeans themselves soon after the fall of the Deinomenids, it is fairly safe for us to judge Hieron's efforts at self-aggrandisement as successful. This judgement is based not only on the continuation of the city's name for at least four centuries, but also on the consideration of Hieron's position as tyrant. Gaining a reputation such as that of a founder, and enjoying such a reputation long after death, would normally have been difficult enough, but even more so for a tyrant who would normally be the subject of future vilification.

¹⁰¹ Also see the foreign policy chapter above, 76

¹⁰² Malkin (1987) 238.

Himera

Θήρων δὲ μετὰ τὴν Ἴμεραίων σφαγὴν ὄρων τὴν πόλιν οἰκητόρων δεομένην, συνώκισεν εἰς ταύτην τοὺς τε Δωριεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς βουλομένους ἐπολιτογράφησεν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν μετ' ἀλλήλων καλῶς πολιτευόμενοι διετέλεσαν ἔτη πενήκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ· τότε δὲ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων χειρωθείσης καὶ κατασκαφείσης, διέμεινεν ἀοίκητος μέχρι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς καιρῶν.

Diod. Sic. XI.49.3-4

Immediately following the Aetna episode in Diodorus, we find yet another example of refoundation by the tyrants in Late Archaic Sicily, that of Himera by Theron of Acragas. It is notable, though not of great importance, that although it is the fourth instance of its kind, no single dynasty of tyrants carried out more than one refoundation itself (for although there is a degree of continuity between Hippocrates and Gelon, there is no family link, and more importantly Gelon usurped the tyranny from Hippocrates' sons around 491/0¹⁰³). What it does indicate is that the idea of refounding cities and its benefits had obviously spread across the various tyrannies in the vicinity. The account given by Diodorus implies, though never actually stating that it was the case, that Theron had refounded Himera mainly in emulation of Hieron, an idea that seems to permeate through modern scholarship too¹⁰⁴. That the refoundation occurred in the same year as Hieron's may be considered proof enough, and it is also the case that Theron would have known about Hieron's plans long before they were put into practice.

The refoundation itself was a result of the city losing many of its inhabitants, who were put to death after complaining to Hieron about their treatment in the hands of Thrasydaeus, the son of Theron. Those Himeraeans involved were under the mistaken impression that Hieron was still on bad terms with the Acragantine tyrant, and they offered the city of Himera itself to Hieron in return for help¹⁰⁵. The Himeraeans' confidence in Hieron was betrayed, Theron was informed, and many were arrested and executed. The actions of both Hieron and Theron make the reader think back to Herodotus' story about the Zancleans treatment at the hands of Hippocrates, as discussed earlier, but it is difficult to tell whether the Himeraeans posed a threat to Theron, Thrasydaeus or to Acragas itself. Considering the situation Himera was in at that

¹⁰³ Hdt. VII.155.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. Asheri (1992) 151.

¹⁰⁵ This followed the protection given by Theron to Hieron's brother Polyzelus, whom he tried to send on a potentially disastrous campaign to aid Sybaris against Croton – Diod. Sic. XI.48.3-5; see also the chapter on foreign policy, 76ff.

time and concerns Theron may have had for it (see the next paragraph), it seems unlikely that there was any real threat to Theron, or that he would have wanted to destroy it, rather that the tyrant decided to make an example of some of the leading Himeraeans who may have confided in Hieron.

Theron's concerns over Himera are dominated by the fact that it had lost much of its population, but perhaps this may not only have been due to the revolt in 476. A look at events in the city four years earlier, during the Carthaginian invasion of 480 BC, tells us that Himera was the first target of Punic machinations, and suffered heavily at the hands of a huge infantry force (300,000 infantry, if Diodorus' figures are to be believed¹⁰⁶). We are told that the citizens were routed before they sent for help from Gelon at Syracuse.

τὴν ἄλλην ἀγορὰν κομίζειν. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν στρατιωτῶν
ἀναλαβὼν ἦκεν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν Ἱμεραίων τοὺς ἐπεξιόντας
τρεψάμενος καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνελὼν κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει. διὸ καὶ
Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνων δυνάστης, ἔχων δύναμιν ἰκανὴν καὶ παραφυλάττων
τὴν Ἱμέραν, φοβηθεὶς εὐθὺς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀξιῶν τὸν
Γέλωνα βοηθεῖν τὴν ταχίστην.

Diod. Sic. XI.20.5

Therefore it is likely that the city was suffering from underpopulation even before the revolt four years later. Theron may also have had it in mind to settle certain people that would ensure loyalty to the tyrant and his own city, for example mercenaries or veterans awaiting rewards for service, as Hippocrates and Hieron had probably done themselves. This was especially important now that the Himeraeans had revolted against Theron's own son, Thrasydaeus.

Although its mention immediately following the events at Catana certainly does imply that it was meant to be more than a reinforcement of a subject city, it is not explicitly stated by Diodorus (our only literary source) that Theron's re-settlement was a refoundation. The evidence, or lack of it, and the circumstances tell us that maybe Theron did not mean it to act as a rival to Aetna. Therefore it is difficult to judge Theron's intentions, but the other previous examples of refoundation (Camarina and Zancle) can hardly be considered major enterprises dominated by egocentric ambition in themselves either.

¹⁰⁶ Diod. Sic. XI.1.5.

Reporting on excavations conducted at the site of the ancient city in the 1970s, Bonacasa notes a 'revolution' in the city planning, datable to the first quarter of the fifth century BC, i.e. the period concluding in Theron's refoundation in 476¹⁰⁷. Not only was there noticeable enlargement of the city, but also it seems that the orientation of the city plan changed with it, so it became parallel to the coastline, running along the hill slope. Bonacasa does not attribute this change in city planning to Theron, but it is made clear that changes were made at this time – in particular the expansion of the city into the plain of Buonfornello is believed to be the tyrant's work. This expansion of the city may indicate certain ambitions for the city of Himera; perhaps the re-settlement of the city was simply not enough and Theron wished to strengthen his hold on that area (close to the Punic settlements of Soloeis and Panormus, and also the pro-Punic native Elymians). The current situation, as already mentioned when discussing Aetna, with the Carthaginians weakened after the battle of Himera, left the Punic cities and allies (the Elymians, Rhegium and Selinus) vulnerable and they may have become a target for Acragantine expansion, or the situation may simply have given Theron a chance to build up his defences. This does only remain an idea, and a similar one to that given when discussing Hieron's activities at Catana and Naxos, but it is possible, especially with Theron and Hieron now on friendly terms. There are no recorded instances of attacks on the Punic cities at this time, but defensive measures for the vulnerable Himera may have been considered necessary. It is easy to say with hindsight that there was no chance of further attacks by the Carthaginians on the Greek cities during Theron's reign, but we cannot know for sure the degree of fear for safety felt by the Greeks at the time, especially those based near the Punic cities. We must remember that the threat was always there, even if it was not an immediate one in the 470's, just as the Persians posed a constant threat to the Greeks even following their failures at Salamis and Plataea.

Noticeable in the same report is Bonacasa's description of Theron's actions in Himera as a 'Doric recolonisation'¹⁰⁸. Thucydides' statement of Himera being a Dorian city certainly backs up this idea¹⁰⁹, but it is made clear in Diodorus' account, that it was not only Dorians who were invited to settle the area but other Greeks too. This may have been intended to contrast

¹⁰⁷ Bonacasa (1976) 42-51.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 44

with the new Dorian centre built at Aetna, but it was possible that in reality the two were similar – in other words both had minority groups, for example Arcadians at Aetna, but the majority were Dorians. Therefore it is possible to call both cities ‘Dorian’, for it is quite naïve to assume that even cities in Greece proper were totally homogeneous, for example Sicyon which was predominantly Dorian but also had a pre-Dorian minority, famously championed by the Orthagorid tyrant Cleisthenes a century earlier¹¹⁰.

One feature that makes Theron’s ‘new’ settlement different from Hieron’s is that while Aetna, under pressure from the native Catanaeans, struggled with its own existence soon after the Deinomenid dynasty had ended, Himera flourished until it was destroyed by the Carthaginians in 409 BC¹¹¹. The absence of internal (or indeed external) conflict following 476 BC indicates that Theron had settled new inhabitants along with old ones with much success – it is not indicative of any ill-feeling towards Theron or the new settlers – despite the presumably violent circumstances surrounding the events of 476 BC, and also the factor of a tyrant’s involvement¹¹². The case of Himera therefore seems more like a routine reinforcement that a refoundation, with far sounder reasoning behind it than the propaganda exercise carried out by Hieron.

Conclusion

Having studied the main cases of refoundation in Sicily at this time, a number of significant issues have been raised. Firstly it has become clear to us that the tyrants had different motives in mind in carrying out these acts of mass-resettlement. In the cases of Camarina and the Cale Acte enterprise, both of which were instigated by Hippocrates, there is clearly a military motive, in the first case to provide a buffer zone between Gela and the Syracusans, and in the second, the planned conquest of the native Sicels. In the cases involving Anaxilas, his quarrels with the Zancleans may seem more personal¹¹³, as may the renaming of Zancle as Messina, after his own homeland. However, it seems that the city of Rhegium itself must have

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. VII.58.

¹¹⁰ Hdt. V.67-8.

¹¹¹ Diod. Sic. XIII.62.

¹¹² Diodorus tells us that Theron was in fact very popular, unlike his son Thrasydaeus - Diod. Sic. XI.53.2.

¹¹³ Paus. IV.23.6-7.

been the primary cause for Anaxilas' interest in Zancle, since without its help Rhegium would struggle to sustain itself, but co-operation between the two cities would make both extremely prosperous. Of course we cannot deny that the thought of wealth must have appealed to Anaxilas, but his own position would be at stake if he were not to act on the Rhegians' behalf. Thirdly, while it is possible to make a case for military motives behind Hieron's foundation of Aetna, it is clear that the tyrant's reasons were almost entirely, overwhelmingly in fact, personal and political. Hieron's wish to emulate his older brother led him to go to extremes in order to gain fame after death. Finally, we find that Theron's refoundation of Himera, despite first seeming like a propaganda exercise in emulation of Hieron (mainly because of its being placed immediately after the Aetna episode in Diodorus' work), it was most likely a reinforcement of a vulnerable subject-city, and a new military base similar to Hippocrates' Camarina.

In consideration of the question posed in the introduction, that of adherence to the ways of earlier colonial enterprises, we do find a lot of effort was made by Hieron to legitimise his foundation, probably fearing disapproval and non-recognition as a founder, so he went to great lengths to make sure that colonial traditions, especially concerning the role of the founder himself, were adhered to. This is also evident in the celebratory literature, where divine support in particular is stressed. In the other three cases, we find some traditional aspects of colonisation surviving, for example an open-mindedness when it comes to the settlers' nationality, but we usually find that this is due to an awareness of the difficulties otherwise encountered. On the whole however, the three other cases of refoundation do not show much of a regard for tradition, for example a founder cult is not established in any case. This would naturally lead one to consider whether the tyrants (apart from Hieron) actually regarded their work as refoundation at all, or if it is just the imagination of the ancient authors at play and these cases were meant as reinforcements.

So how does one account for the sudden appearance of refounded cities in Sicily at this time? It may be possible that the case of Aetna has simply made the refounding of subject cities appear more significant and a common occurrence in early fifth-century Sicily, whereas in fact the cases of Camarina and Himera could be considered quite unspectacular and, in any case, better described as reinforcements than refoundations. What is also likely is that the events at

Camarina had opened the floodgates as far as possibilities were concerned, for at least in the first three cases, the refoundations were undertaken on a larger scale each time, from mere reinforcement at Camarina, through larger immigrations of settlers and a change of name at Zancle, to a completely new city at Aetna. In other words, the events at Camarina had raised an awareness in Sicily of the benefits of shifting populations around, as well as the comparative ease of doing so in Sicily/Southern Italy, and the tyrants become more daring in their plans.

Aetna's prominence as perhaps the most famous city-foundation in Greek history makes it seem an obvious model of a typical refoundation, but in fact it seems as if Aetna is an outlier as far as Archaic refoundations are concerned, although the political and military climate of the period may have linked it closely to the refoundation of Himera by Theron. Although the foundation of Aetna had some other advantages, it was above all a propaganda exercise. Perhaps the most valuable lesson learned here is not to assume that the most prominent example of a particular practice is necessarily the most typical, in other words, Aetna must be considered wholly unusual of the way the Sicilian tyrants refounded cities rather than as a typical example.

CHAPTER FIVETYRANNY AND SELF-PRESENTATION

This chapter is a study of the methods used to represent the Deinomenids, through the poetry and histories written by others, and also how the tyrants presented themselves. This issue has been the subject of more scholarship than any other aspect of the dynasty, and is potentially big enough to warrant far more than the single chapter I am including in this thesis. It is therefore my aim to give an account of the main questions that have been raised in this area, how these have been tackled by various scholars and to give an impression of how much we can know. The evidence to be studied, whether direct or comparative, does seem to be of a greater volume than that studied in the previous two chapters, and includes a number of the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides, the histories of Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, and of course the tyrants' dedications at the Panhellenic sanctuaries at Olympia and Delphi. There are a number of different aspects to this subject, which will be considered; firstly, the commissioning of famous poets by the tyrants in Greece, which will involve comparative study, and next the efforts made by these poets to promote their patron's position. This is followed by a look at how competition at the Panhellenic games themselves could be considered a political exercise, and finally a look at the use of titles by historians and poets, and then the tyrants themselves, in order to find whether there were any in use during the time of the dynasty.

Before starting, it is necessary first to consider the evidence itself, as even though it is basically the same as has been used earlier, we must be aware of factors such as the audience, in addition to the usual reasons for writing and of course any bias. The political leanings of the historians Herodotus and Diodorus have already been considered in chapter one, and while in the case of Herodotus there seem to be mixed messages concerning his attitude towards tyranny, Diodorus is usually simply dismissed as never expressing his own opinion and therefore not of great worth¹. As we shall see, however, Diodorus is at least quite consistent in his use of titles and does not seem to write with strong bias as far as the tyrants are concerned. The poets Pindar and Bacchylides are, in my opinion, far more potentially dangerous and should be treated with

¹ See chapter one above, 30.

great care when used to reconstruct history. Their works are of course influenced by the wishes of their patron, so in studying the tyrants' self-presentation they are of great use, although there is obvious difficulty in how much input the patron would have had, and whether certain details were ever intended to be highlighted by the patron himself. In many of Pindar's and Bacchylides' odes (perhaps including those for the Sicilians) there may have been little or no input by the patron, depending on how intellectually able the patron actually was, and also on other factors such as the distance between patron and poet at the time of the poem's composition. We must therefore be careful not to readily attribute certain ideas in the poetry to the tyrants' own wishes rather than putting them down to the poets themselves. This problem is virtually non-existent in the case of dedications left at Olympia or Delphi – these are extremely simple, especially in comparison to an epinician ode, with no need for artistic skill, and one cannot imagine a dedicatory inscription that is contrary to the tyrant's wishes.

The problem of the audience for whom the poems and dedications were meant is one that will figure greatly. The epinician ode was traditionally performed twice – once at the sanctuary following the victory, and again on the athlete's return to his city. This means two audiences, the so-called 'Panhellenic elite' at the sanctuary, and the athlete's fellow citizens, regardless of social standing, and here we will therefore find themes discussed in the context of epinician poetry to be intended for both, or either, audiences². The medium of dedicatory inscriptions is different, in that they will only be viewed by visitors to the Panhellenic sanctuaries, many of whom would be of high birth and from the many other Greek cities in the Mediterranean; therefore one would expect these inscriptions to be aimed solely at those who are forming an opinion of the dedicator from outside, again, including the 'Panhellenic elite'.

Tyrants and Poets

Attempts were made to legitimise Hieron's rule in Pindar's *Odes*, which were originally performed to celebrate his victories in the Panhellenic Games at Olympia and Delphi, and one which is often singled out is his victory in the Pythian chariot race in 470, celebrated by

² See Lefkowitz (1995) and Morgan (1993).

Pindar's First Pythian Ode³. That is not to say that other odes of Pindar, and also of Bacchylides, are not of use.

However, it is necessary first of all to consider the fact that Pindar, together with Bacchylides, Aeschylus and Simonides, was invited over to Sicily and patronised by Hieron⁴. Even in comparison to the poets who had been recruited by tyrants who had preceded Hieron, these were particularly prominent figures in Greek literary circles. Previous tyrants who we know had certainly commissioned poets before the Deinomenids are Polycrates of Samos and Hipparchus of Athens. In Samos we find the poets Ibycus and Anacreon, but the poetry immediately seems different to that found in Sicily. According to Himerius⁵, Anacreon was first employed by Polycrates to satisfy his son's love of music; the tyrant's son was also named Polycrates and was perhaps a sub-tyrant at Rhodes, and while the younger Polycrates does seem to have been praised much in Anacreon's poetry, it does seem to be in an erotic rather than a political or military context⁶, and it was also noted that the vast majority of the poems were secular, rather than involving the gods or sacred festivals, such as the Panhellenic games⁷. Bowra notes that Anacreon's poems involving Polycrates have an 'air of artificiality' about them, perhaps implying that the poet was under some pressure to produce songs even if he was not feeling particularly inspired by the tyrant himself, although he may have had a close relationship with the elder Polycrates of Samos if Herodotus' story is true⁸. Ibycus seems to have been employed at Samos for the same reasons, as Bowra notes an 'unashamedly secular air'⁹ present in his poems. The most famous of his works comes from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, and although it is not attributed to Ibycus, it is considered very likely indeed to be his¹⁰. It seems from what survives that it was written in honour of Polycrates the younger, being

³ Many of Pindar's *Odes* are dedicated to the Greeks of Sicily, 15 out of 46 as opposed to no Paeans, for example, and of these *Ol.* I, and *Pyth.* I, II, and III are dedicated to Hieron, in addition to *Ol.* VI (Hagesias of Stymphalos) which alludes to him, and *Nem.* I and IX, which are dedicated to Chromios, who was probably a prominent figure in Aetna, which refer to his adopted city.

⁴ Aeschylus' *Aitnaiai* has already been the subject of discussion in the previous chapter, 165ff.

⁵ *Oration* 29.22ff. Himerius was a Bithynian rhetorician of the fourth century AD.

⁶ Himerius *Oration* 28. Virtually all this poetry is lost, and aside from a few fragments which refer to enemies and lovers of the younger Polycrates, our only sources of information on Anacreon's poems in Samos are of a much later date. The story of Smerdies, a lover of Polycrates who has his hair cut off by the tyrant, is well attested in the ancient sources: Stobaeus *Ecl.* 4.21, Athenaeus *Deipn.* 12.540e, Aelian *VH* 9.4. see Anacreon fr. 46d, 47d (*POxy.* 22.2322).

⁷ Sch. Pind. *Isth.* II.1.

⁸ Bowra (1961) 277. Herodotus refers to Anacreon as reclining with the tyrant shortly before Polycrates' murder – III.131.1.

⁹ Bowra (1961) 251.

compared in beauty to the legendary prince Troilus. Again, according to Bowra, the poet seems particularly uninspired and unimpressed by Polycrates and his love interests, and we find that Ibycus and Anacreon were often treated as a like pair in antiquity¹¹.

Also commissioning poets were the Peisistratids in Athens, who likewise, according to some sources, employed Anacreon following Polycrates' death, and also Simonides long before he left for Sicily, although there is little of his work which can positively be ascribed to this period¹². Hipparchus in particular invited these poets over, apparently with the same desire for erotic poetry as the younger Polycrates¹³, but all that survives is an epitaph for the daughter of Hippias, which is ascribed to the poet by Aristotle and recorded by Thucydides, where she is congratulated for not committing *hubris*, as might normally be expected of tyrants (and presumably their families)¹⁴. Unusually, aside from a commentary fragment which, for some reason, refers to Peisistratos as a siren, the only other poem attributed to Simonides at this time is a couplet praising the Tyrannicides, inscribed on the base of the famous group by Critius and Nesiotes of 477 BC¹⁵. This attribution is not entirely reliable, many inscriptions were later said to be by the poet even if they were not, and it also seems strange that the Athenians should have chosen an associate of the Peisistratids to celebrate their death. Other poets invited to Athens, or thought to have been friends of the Peisistratids, included Orpheus of Croton, who apparently lived with Peisistratos himself, Onomacritus of Athens, the collector of oracles who was not patronised but was a close friend who even followed the Peisistratids to Susa, and Lasus of Hermione, who was said to have organised competitions and performances in Athens, but perhaps more importantly is credited with being the first to write on the subject of musicology¹⁶. There is little to suggest that these poets were commissioned to bring praise to the Peisistratids, or even in some cases that they were commissioned at all, for example Onomacritus seems to

¹⁰ Ibid. 250. *POxy* 15.1790, Ibycus 1 (*PMG*).

¹¹ Ibycus 1.41-8, Bowra 256. Athenaeus *Deip.* 1250e, Aelian *VH* 9.4, Philostratus *Ep.* 8.1, also all talk about Polycrates and his private life. Arist. *Thesm.* 159-63 pairs the two poets together under Polycrates' patronage.

¹² Aelian *VH* 8.2 says both poets spent time at Athens, also ps. Plato *Hipparchus* 228b (Anacreon), 228c (Simonides).

¹³ *Ath. Pol.* 18, Thuc. VI.54.2.

¹⁴ Simonides epigram 85 (Diehl), Ar. *Rhet.* 1367b19, Thuc. VI.59.3.

¹⁵ Simonides fr.76 (Diehl).

¹⁶ Orpheus of Croton – FGrH 697 fr.9 (Asclepiades of Myrlea), Onomacritus of Athens – Hdt. VII.6.3, Lasus of Hermione – Arist. *Vesp.* 1410-1 (where he is said to be in competition with Simonides), Suda λ 139 (Λάσος).

have been a friend who happened to write poetry, and according to Slings, all except Onomacritus had contacts with prominent Athenians even after the Peisistratids' fall (perhaps explaining the unlikely attribution of the Tyrannicides inscription to Simonides)¹⁷. It is Osborne's view that there was no attempted monopoly on lyric poets by the Peisistratids, who rather wished to create a cultural atmosphere in the city¹⁸.

One thing that strikes one about the tyrants before the Deinomenids, or at least those of whom we are fairly well informed, is that they did not seem to feel the need to justify their rule to their subjects through poetic means, although in the case of Polycrates perhaps his major public works could be a substitute. The reasons for this may be simple, for example Polycrates did not actually *succeed* anyone, taking control himself, and his military achievements certainly proved he was a strong leader and therefore he was under little pressure to prove himself as Hieron was. In the case of the Peisistratids, the tyranny seems to have had fairly strong public support, as can be seen even in the later years of Hippias' reign (it was the Alcmaeonidae with their Spartan allies who ended the tyranny in 510, and even then there is no sign of popular support for Hippias' ejection¹⁹) and the general prosperity enjoyed in Athens at the time. This is in sharp contrast to the pressure Hieron would have been under to prove himself following his famous brother's death, and the unpopularity of the dynasty which manifested itself following Hieron's own death²⁰.

Homeric Kingship

In her article on Deinomenid self-presentation, Harrell devotes much space to the allusions to Homeric kingship in Pindar's Odes, which seem to be an attempt to legitimise the tyranny by making it seem more traditional, and therefore with a kind of precedent in Homer's kings²¹. In addition to this, the suggestions are also made that Hieron's rule was beneficial to

¹⁷ Slings (2000) 65.

¹⁸ Osborne (1996) 285.

¹⁹ Andrewes (1956) 113.

²⁰ Thrasybulus' (Hieron's younger brother and successor) was overthrown in 467-6 BC, although it is difficult to tell how much of the decline of the Deinomenid dynasty recorded by Diodorus (XI.67.7) was part of a motif rather than based on actual fact. There was also a revolt following the death of Hippocrates (c. 491 BC), who may also have become unpopular due to his over-working of the citizen army – Hdt. VII.154, see also above chapters on foreign policy and mercenaries, 117ff.

²¹ Harrell (2002) 444-6.

his subjects, through the inclusion of such qualities as *eumomia* and *hesychia*, and also the impression is given that Hieron's power came from, and was supported by, Zeus himself,

Aside from the usage of actual titles in Pindar, we shall first examine the usage of Homeric symbols of power and traditional qualities attributed to Homeric rule. The first imagery that Harrell considers is the reference to a θεμιστεῖον ... σκᾶπτov in the First Olympian Ode²², which is wielded by Hieron in Sicily. This is in reference to the sceptre that one finds so often in Homer's epics, accompanied by the adjective θεμιστεῖον which means it is *rightfully* held by the tyrant. The sceptre itself is the subject of a paper by Easterling, who notes the use of the sceptre in 'solemn verbal interchange' and thus the importance of order in such meetings as we find in the *Iliad*, and Finley makes the important connection between order and *themis*²³. Gerber, in his commentary to Olympian One, notes that Zeus' gift of the sceptre to Hieron gives the tyrant a role reserved only for kings, the dispensation of *themistes*, or divine ordinances and precedents²⁴, whereas Mondì sees the sceptre as a kind of manifestation of the power of Zeus' main weapon, the thunderbolt. This interpretation leads Mondì to conclude that the bearer of the sceptre must also receive *time* from others, as Zeus does, or otherwise face punishment²⁵. Harrell's own opinion seems to be that despite the uncertainty on what the function of the sceptre actually was, the point to be made was that it was an object strongly reminiscent of Homeric kingship, authority and divinely backed rule, in particular the debating in the first book of Homer's *Iliad*²⁶. The association with *themis* is also strongly emphasised in most scholarship on the subject²⁷, but probably the most important is that of Detienne and Vernant, who consider the impact of the marriage between Zeus and Themis herself²⁸. The marriage followed that between Zeus and Metis, which together with the second marriage ensure the permanence of Zeus' rule on Olympus, for just as Metis intervenes in the balances of

²² Pind. *Ol.* I.12 – celebrating his victory in the single horse race in 476 BC.

²³ Easterling (1989) 105-7, Finley (1978) 112.

²⁴ Gerber (1982) 33.

²⁵ Mondì (1980) 211-2. This conclusion is reached in consideration of the Thersites episode in the *Iliad* (2.211-77), where he is punished for withholding Agamemnon's right to *time* by demanding that the Greeks return home. Even though the Greeks are in favour of returning, they do not openly agree with Thersites because, according to Mondì, they do not want to argue against Agamemnon's right to *geras* (a gift of honour, taken from booty), just as they would not want to argue against Zeus' same right.

²⁶ Homer *Iliad* I.53ff. Harrell (2002) 441-2. See Easterling (1989) 104-21 for more work on the sceptre in Homer.

²⁷ The most useful study of divine justice is H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, 1971).

²⁸ Detienne and Vernant (1991) 107-8.

power (as she did during Zeus' usurping of the throne of Cronus) and judges the future in terms of what can be done to achieve a successful result, the marriage to Themis represented permanence and stability, and thus ensured that the situation on Olympus simply could not change.

Regarding the first Pythian Ode, it follows that with Zeus as the patron deity and Hieron the founder of Aetna, the city is also assured a permanent and successful future²⁹. It must be noted at this point that Bacchylides also refers to Zeus as being the source of Hieron's power, with the tyrant being honoured as the one to rule over more Greeks than any other³⁰. As Harrell concludes, the reference to θεμιστεῖον ... σκᾶπτον would remind those in Sicily that Hieron's rule not only derived from Zeus, but as will also be seen with mentions of *dike* and *eunomia*, his rule resembled Zeus' rule on Mount Olympus³¹. *Dike* (Justice) and *Eunomia* (Good Order) were two of the three *Horai*, born to Zeus and Themis, who represented the nature of Zeus' rule³², and again here we find references to these not only in Pindar, but also Bacchylides, where *dike* as a feature of Hieron's rule features even more strongly:

φρένα δ' εὐθύδικ[ο]ν
 ἀτρέμ' ἀμπαύσας μεριμνᾶν
 δεῦρ' <ᾄγ'> ἄθρησον νόω·
 Bacch. 5.6-8

Whereas Pindar actually asks of Hieron, as a duty expected of monarchs:

νώμα δικαίῳ πηδαλίῳ στρατόν
 Pind. *Pyth.* 1.86

As Harrell says³³, these immediately remind the reader of typical Homeric and Hesiodic kingship, in particular the image of the decisive and just king in the *Theogony*³⁴, where this ability is granted by the Muses. However, the term which Harrell feels is most explicitly used of Hieron in Pindar is the reference to *eunomia*:

ᾄγ' ἔπειτ' Αἴτνας βασιλεῖ φίλιον ἐξεύρωμεν ὕμνον·

²⁹ The representation of Zeus as the patron deity is present not only in Pindar (Pythian One), but also other media, for example the issues of coinage where we find a depiction of Zeus, the sceptre and the resting eagle as described at the beginning of the Ode (*Pyth.* 1.5-10). This and the other media used in celebrating the foundation are discussed by Dougherty (1993) 85-94.

³⁰ Bacch. 3.11-2.

³¹ Harrell (2002) 442.

³² The third of the *Horai* (according to Hesiod's genealogy), perhaps appropriately not found in Pindar *Pyth.* I, was *Eirene* (Peace). See Stafford (2000) 45-74 (Themis) 173-198 (Eirene).

³³ Harrell (2002) 443-4.

³⁴ Hesiod *Th.* 84-6.

τῷ πόλιν κείναν θεοδμάτω σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ
 Ἰλλίδος στάθμας Ἰέρων ἐν νόμοις ἔ-
 κτισσε· θέλοντι δὲ Παμφύλου
 καὶ μὰν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἔκγονοι
 ὄχθαις ὑπο Ταυγέτου ναίοντες αἰ-
 εὶ μένειν τεθμοῖσιν ἐν Αἰγίμιου
 Δωριεῖς.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.60-5

While there is an opinion that this is referring directly to the general state of affairs in Sparta, as a result of the Lycurgan constitution³⁵, another opinion is that this does not *necessarily* have to be the case, as Ostwald makes the point that *eunomia* is a political condition relevant to *any* state in Greece and not just Sparta. Harrell confirms this point by finding a connection between the appearance of *eunomia* (as the daughter of Themis) with the θεμιστεῖον...σκῶπτον³⁶, and therefore showing that Pindar is not necessarily making a connection between Aetna's new constitution and Sparta's more established case. Through reference to the τεθμοί (ordinances) of Aegimius referred to in line 165, we are also given the impression that Aetna was to be a city ruled by law, as opposed to one ruled over by a tyrant, as they are described by Ostwald as a regulation imposed by an external authority, in this case Aegimius, one of the ancestors of the Dorian race³⁷. This, as Pindar puts it, is the case in Dorian cities all over the Greek world, and is another step towards making Hieron's position (in this case solely in Aetna) more acceptable to others.

One more quality associated with Hieron's rule, this time the daughter of Dike herself, is *hesychia* (quiet)³⁸:

σὺν τοι τίν κεν ἀγητῆρ ἀνὴρ,
 υἱῷ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, δᾶμον γεραί-
 ρων τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.69-70

Again, as Harrell notes, the harmony brought by Hieron is dual – both the internal situation between ruler and ruled, and the external situation, with no foreign enemies threatening Aetna³⁹. The internal situation is brought about by what Pindar calls the distribution

³⁵ Kirsten (1941) 63-7.

³⁶ Ostwald (1969) 75-80, Harrell (2002) 444-5. Reference is also made by Harrell here to Pind. *Nem.* IX.30-2, which emphasises that lawfulness already existed in the new city of Aetna.

³⁷ Ostwald (1969) 13-9, (1973) 680-1.

³⁸ Pind. *Pyth.* VIII.1-4.

³⁹ Harrell (2002) 446-7, also Burton (1962) 175-6 on the issue of the duality of the *hesychia*.

of honours to the people - 'δᾶμον γεραίρων'. This is reminiscent of the actions of Zeus immediately after his defeat of Typhon and accession to Olympia's throne:

δή ῥα τότε ὄτρυνον βασιλευμένον ἠδὲ ἀνάσσειν
Γαίης φραδμοσύνησιν Ὀλύμπιον εὐρύοπα Ζῆν
ἀθανάτων· ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐν διεδάσσατο τιμάς.
Hesiod *Th.* 883-5

Therefore Hieron, in Pindar's view, is using Olympus itself as a prototype for his own city, by dividing and sharing honours in order to gain authority, as Zeus does. The redistribution of honours on Olympus, according to Clay, was at the very core of the beginnings of the Olympian order, and this was shown through four of the Homeric Hymns, where the permanent order was disrupted by certain events, for example the birth of Apollo or Hermes, then restored by the distribution of honours to them⁴⁰.

As for external affairs, Hieron, along with his family, is even credited with the freeing of all Greeks from foreign rule, amongst other things:

λίσσομαι νεῦσον, Κρονίων, ἡμέρον
ἔφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσα-
νῶν τ' ἀλαλατὸς ἔχη, ναυ-
σίστονον ὕβριν ἰδὼν τὰν πρὸ Κύμας,
οἶα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶ δαμασθέντες πάθον,
ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὅ σφιν ἐν πόν-
τῳ βάλεθ' ἀλικίαν,
Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας. ἀρέομαι
πᾶρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθηναίων χάριν
μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' <ἀπὸ> τὰν πρὸ Κιθαιρῶ-
νος μαχᾶν,
ταῖσι Μήδειοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι,
παρ<ἀ> δὲ τὰν εὐυδρον ἄκταν
Ἴμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις,
τὸν ἐδέξαντ' ἀμφ' ἀρετᾶ, πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν καμόντων.
Pind. *Pyth.* 1.71-80

What is most striking about the theme of *hesychia* following a defeat of external threats, is the analogy which is made with Zeus' defeat of Typhon at the beginning of the Ode, where Typhon is said to be on the same side as the Phoenicians and the Etruscans⁴¹. The point is also made by both Dickie and Lloyd-Jones, that Hesychia herself is an opponent of Typhon (and therefore Hieron's enemies) as is Dike, for as long as a city has an atmosphere of restraint and quiet, any transgression of this quiet (a *hubris*) is therefore a transgression of both *hesychia* and

⁴⁰ Clay (1989) 15, referring to the hymns to Demeter (II), Apollo (III), Hermes (IV) and Aphrodite (V). See also Detienne and Vernant (1991) 107-9.

*dike*⁴². One final point to be made here is that Hieron again finds himself carrying out the duties of a Homeric king in his bringing of *hesychia* to Aetna itself, by fulfilling the role of a military commander, as he is named as such in line 73 of the First Pythian Ode⁴³.

The attempts to make Hieron's reign seem more legitimate did not stop at comparisons to epic rulers, elaborate as they were. Although his entry and victories in the Panhellenic Games partly contributed towards greater recognition in the Greek world, his location outside of Greece proper, as well as his position in Sicily itself, would have alienated him from the greater Greek community, in particular the aristocracy. While the discussion has so far been dominated by Hieron's wish to justify his rule in the eyes of the Sicilians, we must now examine how he tried to gain acceptance from the Panhellenic elite, in particular, one imagines, to give the impression that he was a legitimate ruler and not a despot, especially in post-Persian Wars Greece. This will be examined in the context of Pindar's Odes, but also much of the discussion will focus on how the Deinomenids wished to represent themselves in the Panhellenic sanctuaries, through the medium of dedications, and also their participation in the games themselves.

Competition at Games

As we have often seen throughout antiquity in general, it is not unusual to find prominent political figures such as Hieron appearing and even competing at the Panhellenic Games; other famous examples include Alexander I of Macedon at Olympia in 476, Alcibiades at Olympia in 416 and of course Nero⁴⁴. It is also very well known that victory at such games could bring great benefits to that citizen, for example the erection of statues, and in some cases even hero cults following the victor's death⁴⁵. It would therefore seem, even without exploring the subject too deeply, that a victory at a Panhellenic games would be greatly beneficial to anyone seeking political influence or simply recognition, not only in one's own city-state but also in the Greek world as a whole.

⁴¹ Pind. *Pyth.* I.15-28. See Lefkowitz (1976) 119-20, Dougherty (1993) 94, Burton (1962) 104-6 and Trumpf (1958) on this issue.

⁴² Dickie (1984) 93-4, 8 and Lloyd-Jones (1971) 49-50. A similar contrast is found in Pythian Eight.

⁴³ See Carlier (1984) 165-72 and Yamagata (1997) 11.

⁴⁴ Alexander I – Justin 7.2.14; Alcibiades – Thuc. 6.16.1-2; Nero – Suet. *Nero* 21-4.

⁴⁵ For an example of this see Currie (2002), who examines the case of Euthymus of Locri.

While it is also generally recognised that the games at Olympia were the most highly regarded, certain individual events were also given more prominence. The *stadion* race, being the only event held at every Olympic games since the first in 776 BC, was so significant that each Olympiad (a standard measurement of time in antiquity⁴⁶) was given the name of the victor, just as in Athens a single year was named after the archon of the city. Other events were also viewed as opportunities to show off one's wealth, for example entering a team in a chariot race was a greater exhibition of monetary resources than an entry in a single horse race or more still the mule race. On the other hand, entries in the race in armour could be seen as a proud expression of hoplite status, although this could perhaps vary depending on how important hoplite warfare was in a given city. As we shall see, however, there could be even more read into the act of entering a chariot team into a major games than merely a show of wealth.

Before looking at how chariot racing was viewed in general it is necessary to examine first how much political influence could be attained through a victory at the games, as the effect would be noticeably greater than merely competing, regardless of the event entered. In Athens we have details of how many privileges were enjoyed by a crown-games victor: firstly *sitesis*, the right to dine at the Prytaneion at public expense for life (also awarded to victorious generals, and the descendants of the Tyrannicides) and also *prohedria* which allowed the victor to enjoy a leading place in both processions and the viewing of festivals in the city⁴⁷. As O'Kell points out, the latter would simply increase visibility and recognition amongst citizens, while the former privilege could result in greater contact with the archons and other prominent citizens, allowing for a greater, and more direct, input into political affairs⁴⁸. In addition, the victor was allowed to enter the city in a chariot through a breach in the city wall, otherwise reserved for successful generals⁴⁹. Although we have few details on how victors were received in Greek cities other

⁴⁶ For a good example of the use of Olympiads for dating, see the method employed by Diodorus Siculus, who includes the name of the *stadion* winner at Olympia for dating the relevant years, as well as the names of Athenian archon and Roman consuls, e.g. XI.1.2 – ‘Ἐπ’ ἄρχοντος γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Καλλιάρχου Ῥωμαῖοι κατέστησαν ὑπάτους Σπύριον Κάσσιον καὶ Πρόκλον Οὐεργίνιον Τρίκοστον, ἦχθη δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἡλείοις Ὀλυμπιάς πέμπτη πρὸς ταῖς ἑβδομήκοντα, καθ’ ἣν ἑνίκα στάδιον Ἀστύλος Συρακόσιος. ...’.

⁴⁷ See the Prytaneion decree (*IG* I² 78, II² 77, I³ 131) of 426/5 BC, which gives us this information, and Thompson (1979) who argues that the decree simply confirms such privileges that already existed in the city, and introduces new benefits to hippic victors, allowing for the expense of keeping horses. See also Xenophanes fr.2 DK, Plato *Apology* 36d.

⁴⁸ O'Kell (2003) 65.

⁴⁹ Kurke (1998) 141.

than Athens, it is likely that in most cases they would receive similar treatment. However, the fact that Athens was a comparatively large and wealthy state would naturally mean more victors and more prominent citizens in general, all competing for influence amongst a large populace. One can also imagine the influence that would be held by a victor from a far smaller state, for example Epharmostus of Opous in Eastern Locris, who became a victor in all four crown games – a *periodonikes* – when he won the wrestling at Olympia in 468⁵⁰.

Competing in the hippic events of a major games, aside from the point that it is an obvious method of showing off one's wealth, is also reckoned by Davies to have been a tool of expressing an interest in furthering a political career⁵¹. The example of Alcibiades is the best known, where he enters seven chariots into the race at Olympia in 416, and finishes first, second and fourth. This is used as a means to gain political support in order to gain command of the Sicilian Expedition, where it is explicitly mentioned as a means of gaining honour⁵². It is also noticed by Golden that Alcibiades' initial success came when he was around thirty years of age and therefore eligible for the office of *strategos*, which he gained in the elections the following year⁵³. While I agree that such victories would undoubtedly be rewarded with political influence, and might be a precursor to such a career, I do not think that hippic victories themselves necessarily brought any more prestige than athletic victories. However, the very nature of hippic events could easily lead to an assumption that this was the case. One factor of course is the high profile of the hippic events, due simply to the sheer excitement generated by chariot races, but more importantly it may be expected that most, if not all competitors in a chariot race would be politically influential to start with, or at least with greater potential for future influence. It surely cannot be disputed that the wealthy were more politically active and influential, and were more likely to hold major offices, than the poorer citizens, even in democratic Athens. It is also the case that it is a much easier way of achieving a major victory (providing one has the money to be able to afford horses) than in an athletic event. Entering a chariot did not necessarily require any actual input other than owning the horses and chariot, and then paying for the transport and other costs of the equipment, horses and of course the

⁵⁰ This victory was celebrated by Pindar in his Ninth Olympian Ode. A victorious athlete's political potential is discussed by Kyle (1987) 155ff.

⁵¹ Davies (1971) 369-70.

⁵² Thuc. VI.16.1-2.

charioteer himself. This meant an easy means for the wealthy to compete and win in major games without even having to attend in person. Also, only in a hippic event was it possible to enter more than once in a competition, and while Alcibiades may well have been the first to enter seven teams into one race, he was very probably not the first to enter more than one. The arguments that support the theory that hippic victories may have been more prestigious still tend to focus on the victory itself, rather than on the use of horses, and in actual fact there is little to differentiate hippic from athletic victories, other than the fact that it is, by its very nature, bound to involve the more politically influential because of the costs involved.

For a man in Hieron's position, it is obvious that a victory in the games could not improve on his standing as autocrat over most of Eastern Sicily, aside from gaining heroic or even divine status. Even comparing Hieron's victory at Delphi to Alcibiades' own exploits at Olympia (and possible ambitions at Athens) is difficult even though both are ultimately aiming for public acceptance or support. While Hieron's social standing was not upwardly-mobile, it certainly was extremely vulnerable, so the victories (or at least his entry into the games) were probably useful as further attempts at legitimising his rule in Syracuse in the eyes of his subjects. The epinician odes performed⁵⁴ may have been the primary means of achieving this, as well as the prestige gained from being a victor. It is also suggested by OKell that a victory in the chariot race could compensate for a lack of ancestry, noting the case of Teisias in 416, where he gave money to buy a team to Alcibiades in Argos, who claimed the team was his own, and therefore also the victory that followed⁵⁵. This seems to have been intended as a political act by Teisias, adding prestige to himself and his family, but this would not have helped Hieron in his very different quest for legitimacy as a sole ruler.

The Deinomenids and the Greek world

Even though the epinician odes were performed at the sanctuaries, it seems that they were more concerned with the tyrants' position in Sicily itself, in an attempt not only to make

⁵³ Golden (1997) 334.

⁵⁴ Although his victory at Delphi was the most famous, he also enjoyed success at Olympia.

⁵⁵ OKell (2003) 70, Dem. 21.147, Plut. *Alc.* 16.

the tyrant's rule more palatable, but also to justify it in general. We shall now move on to how the Deinomenids actually represented themselves, and how others actually saw the position they held. The use of titles by the historians and poets who wrote about them, Diodorus, Herodotus and Pindar, will be considered, then to follow we will study the dedications left by the Deinomenids at the Panhellenic sanctuaries. It is only through the study of dedications that we can get a clear picture of how the tyrants wanted to be represented in the wider Greek world. But as has been said already, the Deinomenids also found a need to appear acceptable in the eyes of the Panhellenic aristocracy, and to start off we will return to Pindar's First Pythian Ode to find how this was done.

The reason for returning briefly to the poem is that Hieron appears to be likened to Croesus, the king of Lydia, who is depicted in sharp contrast to the infamous Phalaris of Acragas.

ὦ φίλε, κέρδεσιν ἐντραπέ-
 λοις· ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας
 οἶον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει
 καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς. οὐ φθίνει Κροί-
 σου φιλόφρων ἀρετά.
 τὸν δὲ ταύρω χαλκῆω καυτήρᾳ νηλέα νόον
 ἐχθρὰ Φάλαριν κατέχει παντᾶ φάτις,
 οὐδέ νιν φόρμιγγες ὑπώροφια κοινανίαν
 μαλθακὰν παίδων ὄαροισι δέκονται.
 Pind. *Pyth.* I.92-98

One may first see this simply as associating Hieron with a near-legendary king, just as he is compared to those of epic through usage of Homeric and Hesiodic symbols and attributes of their rule. However, the reasons behind the comparison here are very different. We find in Croesus a non-Greek king who was participating in the traditional Greek practice of gift-exchange amongst the various aristocracies, for example Solon is welcomed as a guest during his travels⁵⁶. As Kurke describes him, he is a fantasy figure in a sort of cult celebrating *habrosyne*, e.g. luxury and splendour, where the king is enjoying extraordinary wealth together with almost unlimited power⁵⁷. In other words, we have an example of an ideal where enjoying vast amounts of wealth was looked upon with admiration as opposed to jealousy. Therefore by associating himself with this cult of *habrosyne*, Hieron himself could be looked upon by the

⁵⁶ Hdt.I.29-34.

⁵⁷ Kurke (1999) 134-7.

Panhellenic elite in near-equal terms even to Croesus. There are also other points that can also be made here about why Croesus was an ideal figure for Hieron to identify himself with, the first being his participation in the tradition of gift-exchange – a true sign of aristocracy in Greece and one which Hieron would have wanted to emphasise tremendously. As Segal puts it, one aim of Pindar while writing for patrons such as Hieron or Arcesilas of Cyrene was to promote such ideas of aristocratic values in order to legitimise their prominent position in society⁵⁸.

Another point why Croesus was used in this way was his nationality, as even though he was not actually a Greek, being a Lydian residing on the fringes of the Greek world, he was Hellenised and still readily participated as a Greek aristocrat would, for example in gift-exchange and guest-friendship, and therefore was accepted into the realm of the aristocracy of Greece itself. The Deinomenids were of course Greek, but they were also, like Croesus, on the fringes of the Greek world in Sicily, and thus one would expect Hieron to find it more difficult in typical Greek-aristocratic activity, especially due to his position as tyrant which may have been seen as unsavoury in many cities, notably Athens, Sparta and Corinth, which had all expressed very strong anti-tyranny sentiments⁵⁹. The reference to Croesus would therefore remind the Panhellenic elite to look beyond Greece proper to find men worthy of their acquaintance. Finally there is the point that Hieron is a tyrant, a position surrounded by questionable and suspicious ways and means. This problem is tackled by Pindar by contrasting Croesus, who has now become likened to Hieron, to Phalaris of Acragas. Kurke sees more than just the one obvious contrast (between good and bad) being made in this passage⁶⁰. While the first is seen as generous, the other is abnormally savage, the first is a constitutional king, and the other an unconstitutional tyrant, one is associated with gold (his wealth and generosity), the other with bronze (the hollow bull statue in which the tyrant's victims were roasted to death). This last contrast may even be in reference to the 'golden' and 'brazen' ages of man described in Hesiod⁶¹. It therefore seems in consideration of Pindar's aims in writing the ode, that Croesus, being rich, powerful, generous, and of course on the fringes of the Greek world, was

⁵⁸ Segal (1986) 124-5.

⁵⁹ It is also interesting, though probably coincidental, that the Greek word *tyrannos* was of Lydian origin.

⁶⁰ Kurke (1999) 135.

⁶¹ Hesiod *Works and Days*, 109ff. (the age of gold), 139ff. (the age of bronze).

the perfect man to compare to Hieron in order to achieve success. In Bacchylides' Third Ode, there seems to be a similar attempt to associate Hieron with the Panhellenic elite:

λάμπει δ' ὑπὸ μαρμαρυγαῖς ὁ χρυσός,
 ὑψιδαιδάλτων τριπόδων σταθέντων
 πάροιθε ναοῦ, τόθι μέγι[στ]ον ἄλσος
 Φοίβου παρὰ Κασταλίας [ῥ]εέθροις
 Δελφοὶ διέπουσι.
 Bacch. 3.17-21

In this short excerpt from the ode, Hieron's wealth is praised in a much more straightforward fashion, and here also is mentioned the tyrant's generosity, not only in the form of *xenia* to other men, but also in his many dedications to the gods. In other words he is as wealthy as Croesus, but also just as pious and as generous to all. Hieron's wealth, we can assume, has come from the same source as his immense power, as Bacchylides claims, from the gods themselves⁶².

Basileus, Tyrannos, Oikistes

The study of the Deinomenids' use of titles is one that has generated much debate, in fact probably no other subject concerning these tyrants has become so widely known. It has huge consequences for the study of political philosophy in a fairly unclear period, particularly with general attitudes towards both tyranny and kingship. Here I wish to examine how the tyrants were represented, both by themselves and by their contemporaries, and differing stances taken on the subject.

Firstly I will continue with studying Pindar's *Odes*, and the representations made within them, before going on to examine the evidence for the Deinomenids' own preferences. The most controversial feature of Pindar's *Odes* (at least when considering the Deinomenids) is his use of the term *basileus*⁶³ in describing both Hieron and his son Deinomenes, who may have been a sub-tyrant of Aetna, of the Scythes-type⁶⁴. There is little comparative material in Pindar to consider: the only other individual referred to as *basileus* is Arkesilas IV of Cyrene, who was

⁶² Bacch. 3.9-16.

⁶³ Hieron – *Ol.* 1.23, *Pyth.* III.70, Deinomenes – *Pyth.* 1.60.

⁶⁴ See the chapter on Refoundations, regarding the Samian episode at Zancle for Scythes, and the refoundation of Aetna on Deinomenes' likely position in the new city.

known to have been a hereditary king⁶⁵, and the only other instance of a Deinomenid being referred to as a king (aside from the inscription by Polyzelus found with the Charioteer of Delphi, to be discussed later⁶⁶) is in Diodorus, following Gelon's victory at Himera:

διὸ καὶ τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐπισχῶν, τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποδεξάμενος, συνήγαγεν ἐκκλησίαν, προστάξας ἅπαντας ἅπαντῶν μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων· αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ μόνον τῶν ὅπλων γυμνὸς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἦλθεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ χίτων ἐν ἱματίῳ προσελθὼν ἀπελογίσατο μὲν περὶ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους· ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἐπισημαινομένων τῶν ὄχλων, καὶ θαυμαζόντων μάλιστα ὅτι γυμνὸν ἑαυτὸν παρεδεδώκει τοῖς βουλομένοις αὐτὸν ἀνελεῖν, τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τοῦ [μὴ] τυχεῖν τιμωρίας ὡς τύραννος, ὥστε μιᾷ φωνῇ πάντας ἀποκαλεῖν εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ βασιλέα.

Diod. Sic. XI.26.5-6

In his translation of Diodorus, Oldfather argues that Gelon was in fact *officially* proclaimed king by the assembly of soldiers, therefore meaning that a contrast was made between (unconstitutional) tyranny and the (constitutional) position which Gelon now held⁶⁷. Dunbabin disagrees, saying that the fact that *basileus* immediately follows two honorific titles, *euergetes* and *soter*⁶⁸, implies that *basileus* too is meant as an honorific title⁶⁹. However, the central argument against the idea of a constitutional kingship under Gelon (also therefore held by Hieron and Thrasybulus), is that the tyrants never refer to themselves as *basileus* in surviving inscriptions⁷⁰, and this seems to be the standard position to be held. The argument that Pindar is using *basileus* because of the possible negative connotations associated with *tyrannos* runs into problems when Pindar uses the latter term quite comfortably, and even in a positive light in

⁶⁵ *Pyth.* IV.2, V.15. See Chamoux (1953), Carlier (1984) 474-6, and Drews (1983) 121-8 on the Cyrenean kings.

⁶⁶ See below 201.

⁶⁷ The Loeb edition of 1946, p.195, n.1.

⁶⁸ The two titles *euergetes* and *soter* are almost certainly a legacy of Diodorus' sources and are very unlikely to have actually been given to Gelon. Both titles were commonly used by Hellenistic kings, most famously the Ptolemies, so it seems likely that Diodorus' use of these titles is either derived from a Hellenistic source, or is indeed his own contribution, remembering that the time of his writing the *Bibliothēke* coincided with the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty (c.60-30 BC). Rutter (1993) 176ff. opts for the latter theory, on the grounds that Timaeus is likely to have been the main source for Diodorus' Sicilian narrative, but in fact had died before the use of *soter* and *euergetes* became commonplace in the Hellenistic kingdoms. Also, the stereotyped image of Gelon as 'good king' in the Hellenistic style is further evidence for post-Timaeian influence, see Cairns (1989) 17-21.

⁶⁹ Dunbabin (1948) 426-7. Sacks (1990) points out Diodorus' own fascination with certain individuals' benefaction to society, as well as the attribution of honours to these individuals such as Gelon – see 61-82. What is also made clear is Diodorus' tendency to exaggerate on these issues, in particular deification (73ff. – the example is given of the 'deification' of Q. Mucius Scaevola (XXXVII.6) which is not recorded in the surviving decrees - *OGIS* 437-9). Given Diodorus' admiration for Gelon above others it is probably wise to treat the attribution of such titles with caution.

⁷⁰ Again, with the exception of Polyzelus and the Charioteer inscription.

another of the odes to Hieron⁷¹. Harrell argues that the fact that he is called *basileus* by Pindar is to continue with the allusions to Homeric kingship – in other words what would be the point in trying to convince everyone that his rule is divinely ordained and likened to that of Agamemnon if he does not even refer to Hieron with the title of a typically Homeric leader, i.e. a king?⁷² Using *tyrannos* in *Pythian One* or *Olympian One*⁷³ would defeat the point of promoting the Homeric idea, regardless of whether *tyrannos* had any negative connotations. It therefore logically follows that two conclusions can be made: firstly, there is no negative background to using *tyrannos*, at least at this time, and the word can also be used interchangeably with *basileus* when describing a sole ruler, and secondly, the cases in which Pindar uses *basileus* alone are those where he is promoting the idea of a Homeric kingship in fifth-century Sicily. Whether the Deinomenids did consider themselves as *basileis* rather than *tyrannoi* is therefore still to be determined, although I think the evidence so far indicates that there was no preference and certainly no title that caused them displeasure⁷⁴.

The strongest case that has yet been made in favour of the Deinomenids using *basileus* as an official title is that of Oost. His argument is, firstly, that there is little difference in meaning (at least this early in Greek history) between *basileus* and *tyrannos*, noting Isocrates' loose usage of the two without meaning to offend, and also the change in Pheidon of Argos' position from *basileus* to *tyrannos*⁷⁵. Therefore, Oost says, we cannot rule out the use of *basileus* by the Deinomenids even if they were regularly referred to as *tyrannoi*. However, there are immediately flaws in this argument, in that, firstly, the change in the position of Pheidon from *basileus* to *tyrannos* does indeed indicate a difference between the two, in order for such a change to be identified, and secondly there is no evidence that the Deinomenids referred to themselves as *tyrannoi* either. Oost goes on to describe how Herodotus, Diodorus and Pindar are all immediately dismissed when describing Gelon, Hieron or Thrasybulus as

⁷¹ Pind. *Pyth.* III.85.

⁷² Harrell (2002) 441. It must however also be noted that at no point in any of the odes addressed to Hieron does Pindar use the term *anax/wanax*, which would certainly bolster the idea that Pindar is alluding to Homeric kingship.

⁷³ These are the two odes where the idea of Hieron's promotion to a Homeric-style king seem to be expressed most strongly.

⁷⁴ *Pythian Three*, where he calls Hieron a *tyrannos* and *basileus* within fifteen lines of each other (III.70, 85) indicates a lack of real preference. Displeasure with either can be ruled out as he is referred to as each in more than one ode, and it is likely that a problem with one title would have almost certainly meant the title was not used again, or even having the title edited out in severe cases.

*basileus*⁷⁶. Although this is a point of much worth, the fact is that even if one does not immediately discount the sources who describe various Deinomenids as *basileus*, it does not follow that the Deinomenids *themselves* used the title. If one was to take this stance, one would encounter difficulties because Pindar uses both titles, but it cannot follow that the Deinomenids *officially* used both. In the case of Herodotus, Gelon is also referred to as *tyrannos*, but since there are no references to the period after Himera, we cannot tell if Herodotus regarded Gelon as king. Diodorus uses *basileus* consistently to describe the Deinomenids after Himera, until the reign of Thrasybulus becomes more *tyrannical* in our own sense, where *tyrannos* is used thereafter⁷⁷. It does therefore seem that we are at the mercy of our sources – we are getting mixed signals either because of a blurred line of distinction between *basileus* and *tyrannos*, or, in the case of Diodorus, because titles are distributed as the *author* seems to deem fit. The problem therefore still remains, and is complicated by Diodorus' claim that Gelon was made *basileus* by the assembly of soldiers⁷⁸. One could easily read further into this statement by saying that the office must have been hereditary, therefore all who succeeded Gelon would also have been *basileis*, and they are described as such by Diodorus⁷⁹. So why is Thrasybulus then described as a *tyrannos*, and clearly with a negative intent? The answer must be that Diodorus is describing Thrasybulus as regards his manner of rule, and not his official constitutional position. Could this mean Diodorus is assuming a sort of moral aspect as being essential for a monarch to be a *basileus* as opposed to a *tyrannos*?

One other title that almost certainly would have figured in Hieron's plans for gaining acceptance, whether at home in Sicily or abroad, is *oikistes*⁸⁰. The main reasons for this were firstly that founding a city would be the ultimate legitimisation of one's rule over it, but also because it ensured that Hieron would be remembered after death in Aetna at least, even if his name was vilified in other parts, as it was. The first point is especially important in the context

⁷⁵ Oost (1976) 224-5, Isoc. 2.1, 4, 35-6, Ar. Pol. 1310b25-7.

⁷⁶ Oost (1976) 227. for Hieron as *basileus* in Pindar, see above, n.39; Herodotus – (Gelon) – VII.161, 159 (Oost claims that Hdt. is claiming Gelon as *basileutatos*, even though it is clearly in *contrast* to Agamemnon, not in comparison); Diodorus – (Gelon) – XI.23.3., 38.2, 3, 7, (Hieron) – XI.38.3, 7, 48.3 (along with Theron of Acragas), (Thrasybulus) – XI.66.4, 67.1, 68.7.

⁷⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.67.6ff.

⁷⁸ Diod. Sic. XI.26.5-6.

⁷⁹ See above, n.49.

⁸⁰ See the chapter on city refoundation; also Dougherty (1993) 83-98, Malkin (1987) 237-40 on the importance of the title of *oikistes* and the Deinomenids.

of legitimisation in the eyes of the Greek world, because the city of Aetna (where Hieron is proclaimed by Pindar to be from) is the one place where Hieron is, strictly speaking, more than a tyrant and with an *undisputable* place in the new city's brief history⁸¹. The second point is only really of relevance when considered in the context of propaganda aimed at the Sicilians themselves, rather than the whole Greek world, but this seems to be just as important to Hieron if we consider one of Pindar's *hyporchemata*.

Σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω,
ζαθέων ἱερῶν ἐπώνυμε
πάτερ, κτίστορ Αἴτνας·

νομάδεσσι γὰρ ἐν Σκύθαις ἀλάται στρατῶν,
ὅς ἀμαξοφόρητον οἶκον οὐ πέπαται,
ἀκλεῆς <δ'> ἔβα.

Pind. fr.105ab (Snell)

This poem celebrates the immortal fame enjoyed by a founder, through cult. While the first half seems to concentrate on how Hieron was always destined to enjoy such fame, in reference to the word-play on Hieron's name, the second gives an example of an opposite case of the Scythian nomad who enjoys neither fame nor association with any centre of population⁸². That Hieron was indeed worshipped at Aetna after his death is attested by Diodorus⁸³, and thus we can see how the tyrant wanted to be seen as a typical aristocrat, an Homeric style king and a founder all in one. It must also be noted that of all the cases of refoundation in Sicily during the time of the Deinomenids and of Cleandrus and Hippocrates, Hieron's is the only one where we have specific evidence indicating a wish to be known as *oikistes*, although the others are often termed foundations or refoundations by ancient and modern authors alike.

Dedications

Finally, we are going to consider the dedications left at the Panhellenic sanctuaries to discover how the Deinomenids described themselves. It has been long known that the Deinomenids never referred to themselves as *tyrannos*, *basileus* or any other title, political or military, in inscriptions, although Polyzalus' Charioteer, which was later amended, announced

⁸¹ Pindar names Hieron as *oikistes* in *Pyth.* I.31, and Hieron's intention to be known as such is mentioned in Diodorus' account of the foundation – XI.49.2.

⁸² Dougherty (1993) 97-8.

⁸³ Diod. Sic. XI.66.4.

that he had ‘ruled (ἀνάσσειν) over Gela’⁸⁴. However, Harrell notes that the dedications do not necessarily reflect actual titles held by the Deinomenids; rather they reflect how the tyrants wanted to be perceived by the rest of the Greek world, in particular the aristocracy⁸⁵, and we have already looked at an example of this from the ‘Croesus’ passage from Pythian One⁸⁶. In these cases, the standard protocol for dedicating monuments at Olympia or Delphi was to be named as a private citizen would be, with reference to name, patronymic and home city, and this was strictly adhered to by the Deinomenids, aside from the Charioteer inscription. This also applied to the coinage under the dynasty, where there is not a single use of any kind of title, only the name of the city, and this was for similar reasons as the dedications, that coinage was likely to travel large distances into other parts of the Greek world, where they will inevitably be noticed by the public at large, particularly by the aristocracy. Finley states that this was due to a certain stigma connected with the word *tyrannos*, especially following the threat of Persian despotism that had only recently been defeated⁸⁷. The Deinomenids were also now the only Greek tyrants to speak of at the time, and thus were isolated in that respect.

In studying the monuments of Olympia and Delphi, as opposed to the odes of Pindar and Bacchylides, we find the earliest evidence lies with Gelon’s victory in the chariot race of 488 in Olympia. We have no information about this event other than a report from Pausanias, who records the inscription on the monument which survives today, albeit with the inscription in a poor state⁸⁸.

τὰ δὲ ἐς τὸ ἄρμα τὸ Γέλωνος οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἐμοί τε παρίστατο
καὶ τοῖς πρότερον ἢ ἐγὼ τὰ ἐς αὐτὸ εἰρηκόσιν, οἱ Γέλωνος τοῦ ἐν Σικελίᾳ
τυραννήσαντός φασιν ἀνάθημα εἶναι τὸ ἄρμα. ἐπίγραμμα μὲν δὴ ἐστὶν
αὐτῷ Γέλωνα Δεινομένους ἀναθεῖναι Γελῶν, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τούτῳ τῷ
Γέλωνί ἐστι τῆς νίκης τρίτη πρὸς τὰς ἑβδομήκοντα ὀλυμπιάδας· Γέλων δὲ
ὁ Σικελίας τυραννήσας Συρακούσας ἔσχεν Ὑβριλίδου μὲν Ἀθήνησιν
ἄρχοντος, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἔτει τῆς δευτέρας καὶ ἑβδομηκοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος, ἦν
Τισικράτης ἐνίκᾳ Κροτωνιάτης στάδιον. δῆλα οὖν ὡς Συρακούσιον ἦδη καὶ
οὐ Γελῶν ἀναγορεύειν αὐτὸν ἔμελλεν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἰδιώτης εἶη ἂν τις ὁ
Γέλων οὗτος, πατρός τε ὁμωνύμου τῷ τυράνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμώνυμος.
Γλαυκίας δὲ Αἰγινήτης τό τε ἄρμα καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Γέλωνι ἐποίησε τὴν εἰκόνα.
Paus. 6.9.4-5

⁸⁴ Andrewes (1963) 25, 135, Dunbabin (1948) 427. The Charioteer of Delphi inscription – *CEG* 397, see below 201ff.

⁸⁵ Harrell (2002) 450. Also noted is the perception of entering hippic events as political acts (Raschke (1988) 38-41, Kurke (1991) 172-80) as discussed above, 188.

⁸⁶ Pind. *Pyth.* I.89-98, see above 189.

⁸⁷ Finley (1979) 56.

⁸⁸ *SIG*³ 33, Pausanias 6.9.4-5. This is discussed by Eckstein (1969) 54-60.

The simplicity of the inscription in fact becomes an issue in Pausanias' description, although his 'correction' is based on historical inaccuracy (he fails to realise that in 488 BC, Gelon was not yet in control of Syracuse, therefore the inscription is correct); this mistake would not have been possible if the inscription had not been in the style of a private citizen, so therefore it is indistinguishable from a standard dedication at Olympia⁸⁹.

It has become apparent over the course of this thesis that Gelon was hardly in need of propaganda at all, at least in comparison to Hieron⁹⁰. Gelon's military achievements, both in the conquest of Syracuse and the defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera, together with Diodorus' description of him as 'humane and gentle' in contrast to the image we get of Hieron as 'greedy and violent' certainly give this impression⁹¹. Not surprisingly, Hieron, who according to Kurke was in fact the *opposite* of the aristocratic ideals that he was desperate to be seen to have⁹², was in far greater need of positive propaganda than his brother. However, even though we have a greater number of inscriptions ascribed to Hieron (and they do become more elaborate, although this seems to be the norm anyway according to Steiner⁹³) we still find no references at all to any titles or any hints that Hieron is even a ruler. Harrell makes special reference to a posthumous dedication made by Deinomenes in place of Hieron, in honour of his victories at Olympia⁹⁴:

σόν ποτε νικήσας, Ζεῦ Ὀλύμπιε, σεμνὸν ἀγῶνα
 τεθρίπῳ μὲν ἄπαξ, μουνοκέλητι δὲ δίς,
 δῶρα Ἱέρων τάδε σοι ἐχαρίσσατο· παῖς δ' ἀνέθηκε
 Δεινομένης πατρὸς μνήμα Συρακοσίου
 Paus. 8.42.9⁹⁵

Although it is clearly more elaborate, it does not make any references to the political situation, with Harrell even noting that Hieron is *representing* his city rather than leading it⁹⁶. It is also made clear that this is a dedication by Hieron, as promised before his death, rather than

⁸⁹ Harrell (2002) 451.

⁹⁰ See above chapters on refoundations 174.

⁹¹ Diod. Sic. XI.67.2-3, 4.

⁹² Kurke (1999) 133-4.

⁹³ See Steiner (1993) 168 and (1994) 93, who notes the increasing elaboration in fifth century inscriptions. The point that we have more inscriptions from Hieron's reign than from under the other Deinomenids is not necessarily significant, as it seems only some have survived to us from the total number at the time.

⁹⁴ Harrell (2002) 452.

⁹⁵ *SIG*³ 35E, see Ebert (1972) 71-3, no.17.

by Deinomenes, who is also named with no title. In Delphi we find much the same thing, for example the remains of a huge tripod offering, this being two surviving bases with inscriptions, one of which names Gelon, but this could very well be the offering made by the Deinomenid family following Himera⁹⁷:

Φημὶ Γέλων', Ἰέρωνα, Πολύζηλον, Θρασύβουλον, παῖδας Δεινομένεως τοὺς
 τρίποδας θέμεναι, βάρβαρα νικήσαντας ἔθνη, πολλὴν δὲ παρασχεῖν σύμμαχον
 Ἑλλησιν χεῖρ' ἐς ἐλευθερίην.
 sch. Pind. *Pyth.* I.152

Again, the style is elaborate but still there are no references to titles, or for that matter the Syracusans themselves (although this could be because it is only dedicated on behalf of the Deinomenids). Harrell feels that the broadcasting of Gelon's achievement was done in a different way, through the huge offering celebrating a famous event (though this is not actually mentioned, it would have been well known) but also its placing opposite the Plataea offering of the same year, along the Sacred Way⁹⁸. One immediately thinks back to Pindar's inclusion of Hieron's victory at Cumae in the same breath as Plataea and Salamis⁹⁹. Another inscription found from a military context is that on a set of three helmets found at Olympia. These were dedicated following the victory at Cumae in 474, by Hieron, who this time states his name and father, and then includes the Syracusans as also responsible for the spoils given to Zeus from Italy.

Ἰάρων ὁ Δεινομένεως
 καὶ τοὶ Συρακόσιοι
 τῶι Διὶ Τυρρανῶν ἀπὸ Κύμας.
Meiggs and Lewis 29, SEG xxxiii 328 (Olympia V 249.3)

The main points to be made here are firstly that there is again no title, but according to Harrell there is a sort of hierarchy, with Hieron on the first line on the inscription and the Syracusans on the second¹⁰⁰. I myself feel that this is due simply to the size of the dedication, as the inscription as a whole can be seen from a single angle, rather than having the writing

⁹⁶ Harrell (2002) 452.

⁹⁷ The inscription is now attributed to Simonides (fr.106 Diehl, 141 Bergk., 170 Edmonds). Diodorus mentions the context of the dedication itself as being that of the aftermath of Himera - Diod. Sic. XI.26.7

⁹⁸ Harrell (2002) 454; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) no.27 (Plataea), 28 (Himera). The positioning of the dedications may simply be a coincidence, and it is also unknown which was placed first, but it is believed by some that there was some sort of competition between the two dedications, Gauthier (1966) 14, Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 61, Laroche (1989) 196, Krumeich (1991) 60-1.

⁹⁹ Pind. *Pyth.* I.71-80, see Gauthier (1966) 8-11.

¹⁰⁰ Harrell (2002) 453.

stretched around the helmet and therefore requiring handling in order to read in full, which may not have been possible for a visitor to Olympia. Another fairly simple explanation could be that the inscription is metrical¹⁰¹, but the main point should be that the credit for the victory is still seen as being shared between the tyrant and his people, in contrast to the view shared by Pindar, where Hieron single-handedly saves the whole of Greece, by his victory in Cumae¹⁰².

So where does all this fit in with the idea of ‘Panhellenic protocol’ discussed above? The main point to be made is that it was standard practice amongst victors (whether in war or athletics) to share their success with their *polis*, rather than claim the victory for oneself. This would normally bring great benefits to the individual of course, just as in Athens, where all city benefactors (εὐεργεταίς), including Panhellenic victors and successful generals, were allowed certain privileges¹⁰³. Kurke describes the nature of this in the context of *megaloprepeia*, which can be roughly translated as lavish expenditure by wealthy individuals¹⁰⁴. While this first of all seems to have been a mostly private affair, involving the practice of gift-exchange amongst the elite in Greece, it had also become a very public matter during the Archaic Age, whereas later still in Athens it had become a duty for the very wealthy to provide ships, horses, choruses for drama festivals, and so on, to the extent we find described in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*¹⁰⁵. Victories were also viewed as public benefaction, and therefore also a type of *megaloprepeia*, especially it seems, victory in hippic events which would have involved far greater expenditure than standard athletic events, and therefore also would still be restricted to the very wealthy in society. *Megaloprepeia* through city benefaction would therefore have been a standard feature of aristocratic life at this time, so it would have been important for the Deinomenids to be consistent with it in order to fit in with the Panhellenic elite, whether through victory in war or at the games.

As Harrell notes, sticking with the traditions concerning *megaloprepeia* and also others of the various aristocracies of Greece may have at least assuaged some of the stigma that would

¹⁰¹ See Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 62, the inscription is thought to be two choriambic dimeters followed by a paroemiac.

¹⁰² Pind. *Pyth.* 1.73.

¹⁰³ Xenophanes fr.2 DK, Plato *Apol.* 36d.

¹⁰⁴ Kurke (1991) ch.7 – ‘Adorning the city’.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Oec.* 11.8.

naturally have come with being a tyrant¹⁰⁶. At this time when the very freedom of the Greeks had been put under threat by Persian invasion, therefore resulting in a distaste for autocracy in general and a new sense of wanting to protect Greek values and their way of life, it was critically important to the Deinomenids that they should not destroy the aristocratic traditions concerning self-presentation at the Panhellenic sanctuaries, but continue them, as they did¹⁰⁷.

While attempts to mix in with the Panhellenic aristocracy would certainly make sense to us, given the tyrants' isolated position both geographically and politically speaking, is it consistent with the way other autocratic rulers in this period represented themselves to others? To be brief¹⁰⁸ it seems that these protocols were roughly adhered to, even though there is a case where the patronymic and city are left out in a dedication made to Zeus at Olympia, probably by Miltiades the Younger of the Chersonese, and although the circumstances of the dedication are unknown, the dedication itself is a helmet and therefore is probably from a military context¹⁰⁹.

Μιλτιάδης ἀνέ[θ]εκεν [τ]ῷ Δί.
IG I³ 1472

In another case, probably dedicated by his uncle, Miltiades the Elder, the city itself was given precedence in the inscription, but reference is clearly made to the leader of the military campaign, Miltiades, however this hardly seems to be a case of the general claiming victory for himself¹¹⁰.

Ζηνί μ' ἄγαλμ' ἀνέθηκαν Ὀλυμπίῳ ἐκ χερρονήσου τεῖχος ἐλόντες Ἄρατου·
ἐπῆρχε δὲ Μιλτιάδης σφίν.
Paus. 6.19.6

Hipparchus the Peisistratid is also credited with an inscription which omits his city, found at the Ptoion in Boeotia. While this is not a Panhellenic sanctuary, it did have a fairly high profile, and the inscription's attribution is fairly unreliable, but we find once again that there is no political office mentioned.

ἵππαρχος ἀνέθε[κεν] ἡ Πεισιστ]ράτο.
IG I³ 1470

¹⁰⁶ Harrell (2002) 455.

¹⁰⁷ The degree of distaste for autocracy in Greece is the subject of part of an article by Ferrill (1978) 394-8.

¹⁰⁸ This has already been considered in more detail by Harrell (2002) 456-7.

¹⁰⁹ See Kunze (1956) 69-71, Gauer (1968) 22-3.

However, it is noted by Oost that the actual use of titles in media such as inscriptions and coins is very rare, even in the Hellenistic age where actual kingship and therefore the use of *basileus* as a title was quite common, and therefore we cannot assume that there was no official title used by the Deinomenids just from this evidence¹¹¹. It seems that as far as presenting oneself to the rest of the Greek world was concerned, the tyrants and Hieron in particular preferred to hint at the legitimacy of their position in Syracuse, while the position itself was usually kept at a distance.

The only recorded instance of a Deinomenid referring to himself as a ruler in an inscription is found in the dedication now known as the Delphi Charioteer, dedicated by Polyzelus (who was made tyrant of Gela by Hieron¹¹²) following a chariot victory at Delphi in either 478 or 474¹¹³. While at first the inscription appears to read:

... Π]ολύζαλός μ' ἀνέθηκ[ε(ν)]

This turns out to be a later amendment, whereas the original inscription which can still be partly seen says

[μνᾶμα Πολύζαλός με Γ]έλας ἀνέ[θ]εκε[ν] ἀ[ν]άσσ[ον]

This is suggested to have been amended when the Sicilian cities turned to democracy following Thrasybulus' banishment in 466¹¹⁴, and therefore can be seen as an effort to bestow honour upon the city of Gela, over which Polyzelus ruled. This may be seen as a mistake on Polyzelus' part (although perhaps not an honest mistake) in that he confused the image of traditional Homeric kingship as expressed in Pindar, with the image of a private citizen supposed to be portrayed on dedications. In Harrell's words, Polyzelus simply "got it wrong"¹¹⁵.

¹¹⁰ This is ascribed by his nephew, Miltiades the Younger, also tyrant of the Chersonese, by Pausanias (6.19.6). See Berve (1937) 39, Blumenthal (1937) 476, Bengtson (1939) 13-4.

¹¹¹ Oost (1976).

¹¹² The position of tyrant at Gela was held by Hieron himself before the death of Gelon in 478.

¹¹³ CEG 397. See Wade-Gery (1933) 101-4, Ebert (1972) 60-3, Jeffery (1990) 266-7.

¹¹⁴ See Chamoux (1955) 26-31, Jeffery (1990) 266.

¹¹⁵ Harrell (2002) 458-61.




Figure 8 – The Charioteer (Delphi Archaeological Museum catalogue no. 3484)

Conclusion

There are so many facets of this subject that it is difficult to generalise about them, as well as the usual problem of generalisation about the tyrants. The evidence is however dominated by one tyrant in particular – Hieron – through his use of dedications but especially the epinician poets (as well as the recruitment of others such as Simonides and Aeschylus). This commissioning of famous poets from all over Greece is not unique in itself, but what makes it different to the other examples involving tyrants is that they seem to have been brought to Sicily for the purpose of propaganda. This propaganda came in the form of attempting to legitimise

Hieron's reign in front of a large, Panhellenic audience. This audience would also have viewed his famous victory in the chariot race in Delphi in 470, and also at Olympia beforehand. However, I think that it was the victory itself, and not so much the event that he competed in, that provided further propaganda-fodder, even though there are many cases of politically significant individuals competing in and winning hippic events. It is due to the fact that these events allow for easy participation and therefore victory that they became vehicles for political advancement. The matter of the propaganda produced by the poets is a complex one, as while it seems clear that there is usage of references to Homeric kingship, we cannot tell how much this actually figured in the tyrant's intentions. A possible clue is the use of ἀ[v]ῶσσ[ov] in the Delphi Charioteer inscription by Polyzelus, a typically Homeric term, perhaps indicative of real Deinomenid intentions in that field.

The use of titles by the Deinomenids is even more problematic. There is no mention of a title in the surviving dedications at Olympia and Delphi, but this need not necessarily mean the absence of titles being used altogether, the omission is simply part of the tyrants' attempt to fit in with the Panhellenic elite, and to simply follow precedents set many years before. The literary sources, having been reviewed, do seem to indicate the official use of the title *basileus*, although this cannot be proven until we have stronger evidence. The use of the term in Diodorus may be indicative of a change in attitude by the author when, in describing the reign of Thrasybulus, it is replaced by *tyrannos*. The fact he uses *basileus* without exception beforehand (even in description of Thrasybulus), and does not use it to describe the contemporary tyrants of Rhegium and Acragas, only means that Diodorus wants to show consistency on the matter of the Deinomenids' apparent kingship.

Before Hieron's reign there is little evidence to be considered, even taking into account evidence written after that time. Of Cleandrus and Hippocrates we hear nothing in terms of propaganda, and the only evidence of titles we find comes in Herodotus' narrative¹¹⁶. This absence can be explained when compared with the situations of their Deinomenid successors. Gelon did not recruit poets, as far as we know, but we do have dedications made by him in the traditional style. This could simply be a wish to be consistent with other dedications, or part of

¹¹⁶ Referred to as *tyrannoi* – Hdt.154-5.

a plan to associate himself with aristocrats in Greece proper – something which would have had more to do with Sicily's distance from Greece than perhaps an attempt at legitimisation. Gelon had no reason to legitimise his reign in the view of his subjects, at least after Himera (although this does not mean that Himera itself was not open to exploitation), and thus had no need to promote himself in an extravagant fashion. Hieron, on the other hand, had to live up to his brother's achievements and popularity, an almost impossible task. He also would have felt pressured to prove that his dynasty was worth continuing after Gelon, and that his reign was beneficial to his subjects, hence the propaganda. It is more or less accepted that despite the efforts of himself and his band of poets, he ultimately failed because he clearly was not the leader he said he was, and was not remembered as such by others following his death. From what we know of Thrasybulus, there is nothing to be said of any similar efforts. If we return to Cleandrus and Hippocrates, the main reason why we hear nothing in terms of propaganda was that there was no need for it. Although we have no positive evidence for confirmation, it is probable that Cleandrus became tyrant either because of popular unrest, or the possible threat of Sicel disruption¹¹⁷. He did not need to legitimise his role in Gela because he enjoyed his position for a good reason. Hippocrates spent much of his time campaigning, and although the indications are that he was by no means popular¹¹⁸, this was how he legitimised his own rule – through military achievement and possibly force. We see much the same with the reign of Gelon, although despite the military conquests in Sicily itself, we have no evidence of dedications made, possibly because none have survived to us. It may again be the case that when studying Sicily before Gelon, we are very much at the mercy of our sources.

¹¹⁷ See previous chapter on mercenaries for a discussion of the pre-tyranny period in Gela, and the city's problems.

¹¹⁸ Hdt. VII.155.

CHAPTER SIXTHE AFTERMATH OF TYRANNY AND THE DEINOMENIDS'LATER INFLUENCE

The Deinomenid era is clearly a significant one in the context of early Sicilian history, and one would reasonably expect that to be evident in the aftermath of the tyranny as well as during it. Many of the episodes studied so far were on a grand scale, for example the mass movement of peoples numbering in the thousands, relations with Carthage, a Mediterranean superpower with whom a battle was fought that was compared with the Persian invasion of Greece itself, and the propaganda produced for celebrations of the Panhellenic games. While it is impossible to fully explore the influence the Deinomenids would have had on later events, at least within the confines of a single chapter, it is worth looking at some events or processes that have either gained greater attention from scholarship, or are more closely linked to the issues discussed in previous chapters. For this purpose there will be four aspects of the following hundred years to be considered: first, the effect of the tyranny on the political situation in fifth century Syracuse, wherein lies probably the biggest question of all, that of whether they were to blame for the ultimate failure of the democratic government. Following this, the situation at Carthage will be examined, focusing in particular on whether their defeat at Himera was as influential as our sources, particularly Diodorus, make it out to be. Next a common theme throughout both these eras will be considered, in this case the use of mercenaries, particularly whether their later use can be attributed to Deinomenid influence, and finally the question of whether Dionysius was concerned about constitutional legitimacy will be tackled, bearing in mind that the question is equally valid concerning the Deinomenids. The main aim in this chapter is to explore the ways in which the Deinomenids did influence later events in Sicily, and to examine cases where this claim could realistically be disputed.

Syracuse after the Deinomenids

As the empire built under Hippocrates and the Deinomenids had fragmented, following the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466, there is simply not enough space here to go into much detail about how each of its constituent parts had been affected by the break-up, not to mention those cities formerly governed from Acragas, so the focus here will be on Syracuse itself. However, it is not too inaccurate to say that all the cities previously ruled from Syracuse had immediately turned to democracy as they gained independence, and those formerly ruled from Acragas were more than ready to help Syracuse itself as it was finally getting rid of the tyranny¹. However, difficult as it was for the Syracusans and indeed the whole of Sicily to be rid of tyranny, the legacy left by the Deinomenids was to prove just as destructive in itself, and amounted to far more than the bad taste left by Thrasybulus' gross misrule. In fact it was the various policies of the preceding tyrants, Hippocrates, Gelon and Hieron, which did the most damage to later attempts at peace and social harmony in Syracuse and other cities in Sicily. While the other Greek cities seemed ready to forgive Syracuse for its past empire building, it was the way in which the tyrants had built this empire that was the problem, particularly through the use of mercenaries. As we have found in previous chapters, mercenaries were hired in their thousands at the time, and many were rewarded with Syracusan citizenship or land elsewhere in Sicily, in lieu of pay, and often at the expense of the tyrants' subjects, the founding of Aetna on the site of Catana in 476 being the prime example². Aside from those citizens of Sicilian Megara and Euboea who were sold into slavery, many were shifted around to other cities, such as the Catanaeans and Naxians to Leontini, the wealthy Megarians and Euboeans, and also citizens of Camarina and Gela to Syracuse itself, and this was often a result of either the settlement of mercenaries or of general military policy³. It is not surprising therefore that when Thrasybulus was expelled, these people wanted their cities back. In cases such as Catana the problem could be solved by forcing Hieron's settled mercenaries from the city, action which would also have the support of Leontini, whose city would no longer be

¹ Democracy in Sicily - Diod. Sic. XI.76.4ff.; Aid at Syracuse - Diod. Sic. XI.68.1ff. This collective effort in liberating Sicily as a whole from tyranny is noted by Berger (1992) 37.

² Diod. Sic. XI.49 – see also above chapter on refoundations 154.

³ Megara, Euboea, Camarina, Gela – Hdt. VII.156; Catana, Naxos – Diod. Sic. XI.49.2.

bursting at the seams once the Catanaeans returned home. This was done, and the ex-mercenaries re-settled themselves at nearby Inessa. Diodorus' description of these events seems quite straightforward, particularly the expulsion of the Aetnaeans, in which the original Catanaeans were supported not only by Syracuse but also by the Sicels under Ducetius⁴, but in his account the troubles in Syracuse itself are made out to be more complicated. We can assume that some of those settled had returned to their respective cities, but for some this may not have been possible; for example, we never hear of Megara Hyblaea or Euboea actually existing following these cities' forced evacuation, and it may be presumed that they no longer existed at all⁵. Of course the mercenaries presented the biggest problem of all, being highly trained fighters as well as being actual citizens of Syracuse, and Diodorus records a number of 7,000 surviving down to the fall of the tyranny⁶. The establishment of democracy after Thrasybulus was accompanied by an exclusion of all 'new' citizens, established under Gelon, from magisterial posts, though presumably they had some democratic rights preserved as there is no indication of further exclusion at this point. However, this was enough to encourage the 'new' citizens to occupy both Ortygia and part of the mainland, resulting in a siege, followed by defeat for the ex-mercenaries. These were settled, along with other ex-mercenaries but for reasons not stated by Diodorus, in Messenia⁷.

Berger sees the reduction of rights afforded to the 'new' citizens as a deliberate attempt to be rid of them altogether, which is not an implausible interpretation considering the angst and tension which must have been present⁸. Such extreme circumstances must have been present in order to explain the 'bizarre coalition' between the *Gamoroi*, the *demos* and even the *Killyrioi*, according to Berger⁹, and although we are sometimes given the impression that the main concern at this time in Syracuse was the establishment of democracy, there is certainly an element of social revolution as well as political, such as the redistribution of lands not only in

⁴ Diod. Sic. XI.76.3.

⁵ Dunbabin (1948) 416-9.

⁶ Diod. Sic. XI.72.3.

⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.72.2-73, 76.

⁸ Berger (1992) 36-8.

⁹ Berger (1992) 38.

Syracuse but in much of Sicily¹⁰. This probably goes to explain the fate of those ‘new’ citizens in Syracuse who were not ex-mercenaries and were trusted by the ‘old’ citizens to a greater extent, being victims of the tyranny as well as being far less dangerous, militarily and politically, than the mercenaries who actually benefited from the tyrants¹¹. The coalition mentioned above can only be explained by differing expectations amongst the *Gamoroi* and the *demos*. The *demos* may well have expected the establishment of a full democracy as a result of the fall of the tyranny, as was meant to have happened following the expulsion of the *Gamoroi* in 485, and expected to follow the other cities in Sicily. However the *Gamoroi* themselves were probably entertaining different ideas. The *Gamoroi* may be considered to be another party that actually gained advantage from the tyranny, with their re-establishment in the city under Gelon¹². It is probably even the influence of the *Gamoroi* themselves which leads to the distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ citizens in Syracuse, as it reflects the same kind of social structure existent in the city before the tyranny, with the *Gamoroi* being the descendents of the original settlers led by Corinth in the 8th century, and later immigrants forming the rest of the *demos*¹³. It also seems likely that the *Gamoroi* would have been in favour of restoring the form of government existent before they were expelled in 485, and this is a preliminary problem posed in the arguments for the existence of a real Athenian-style democracy from 466 onwards.

The early evidence for the new regime does not tell us much about how radical a democracy it really was, but there is reason to believe that despite Diodorus’ own use of the word δημοκρατία (which will be discussed at another point in this chapter – p.213), Syracuse was not quite a democracy following the expulsion of Thrasybulus. Although there is mention of an assembly, it would be dangerous to assume that this represented a cross-section of the citizens of Syracuse – if this were the case, then how was the law excluding ‘new’ citizens

¹⁰ Diod. Sic. XI.86.3.

¹¹ Although Asheri (1992) 165-6, seems to collect this group of ‘new’ citizens together with the settled mercenaries as those who had benefitted from the tyranny, my own personal opinion is that being forced to move to Syracuse and having your home city destroyed does not count as favourable, although it may seem so in comparison to the fate suffered by those Megarians and Euboeans who were not settled in Syracuse.

¹² Hdt. VII.155.

¹³ This is another point raised by Berger (1992) 38.

from magisterial posts passed so easily, if they were represented in the assembly? What is likely is that the *Gamoroi* assumed power in 466, especially considering the fact that they suffered more than most under Thrasybulus and therefore would have wanted a quick end to the tyranny – in contrast to their treatment earlier on in the fifth century¹⁴. The state of affairs in Syracuse was not dissimilar to Athens at the same point, as those who had been ultimately responsible for the expulsion of the Peisistratids from Athens, the previously exiled Alcmaeonids, had been returned to power in 510, although this was actually the result of Cleisthenes' policy of bringing democratic government to the city¹⁵. Later on, in 454 BC, we have further evidence that the political situation in Syracuse was not quite democratic.

Τυνδαρίδης γάρ τις τοῦνομα, θράσους καὶ τόλμης γέμων ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πολλοὺς τῶν πενήτων ἀνελάμβανε, καὶ σωματοποιῶν τούτους ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τυραννίδα ἐτοίμους ἐποίει δορυφόρους.
Diod. Sic. XI.86.4

The attempt at tyranny by Tyndarides clearly could not have happened if the Syracusan *demos* were satisfied with their role in government, as it seems to be a fairly textbook attempt at tyranny. What is even more indicative of the situation in Syracuse is what follows soon after, when Tyndarides is arrested and condemned to death.

ἀπαγομένου δὲ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον οἱ πολυωρηθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνεστράφησαν καὶ τοῖς ἀπάγουσι τὰς χεῖρας ἐπέφερον. ταραχῆς δὲ γενομένης κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, συνεστράφησαν οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τοὺς νεωτέρισαντας συναρπάσαντες ἅμα τῷ Τυνδαρίδῃ ἀνεῖλον.
Diod. Sic. XI.86.5

The appearance of these *χαριέστατοι* (a clearly loaded term in favour of these people) seems to indicate the intervention of better, educated and more respectable citizens, in other words the aristocracy of Syracuse were busy defending their right to rule the city in the face of an uprising of the poorer citizen body. Diodorus immediately adds to this by mentioning that there were other attempts at tyranny, not just indicating unrest or a small group's greed for power, but more likely mass disenchantment with the *Gamoroi*. Following this, we have one of the most significant episodes in the short sixty-year interlude between tyrannies, the introduction of *petalism*.

¹⁴ See Diod. Sic. XI.67.5ff. for details of Thrasybulus' rule, which seem to show such a reverse in Deinomenid policy towards the wealthier citizens of Syracuse.

¹⁵ *Ath. Pol.* 20.

παρὰ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοις ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν ἔδει γράφειν εἰς ὄστρακον τοῦνομα τοῦ δοκοῦντος μάλιστα δύνασθαι τυραννεῖν τῶν πολιτῶν, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις εἰς πέταλον ἐλαίας γράφεσθαι τὸν δυνατώτατον τῶν πολιτῶν, διαριθμηθέντων δὲ τῶν πετάλων τὸν πλεῖστα πέταλα λαβόντα φεύγειν πενταετῆ χρόνον. τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ διελάμβανον ταπεινώσειν τὰ φρονήματα τῶν λειῖστον ἰσχυόντων ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι· καθόλου γὰρ οὐ πονηρίας κολάσεις ἐλάμβανον παρὰ τῶν παρανομούντων, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀυξήσεως τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐποίουν ταπείνωσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς νομοθεσίας ὠνόμασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὄστρακισμὸν, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι πεταλισμὸν.

Diod. Sic. XI.87.1-2

In the Athenian system, according to Aristotle, the Assembly had chosen which person had been most likely to aspire to tyranny, and had him exiled for ten years¹⁶. This was not a measure to punish the ‘offender’ but rather to warn against those who exerted *too* much influence. A possible problem in the interpretation of this passage is that since the Syracusans had introduced a measure already being used in the democracy in Athens, perhaps in direct imitation¹⁷, then the Syracusans must necessarily have introduced it for *precisely* the same reason, i.e. not only protecting the state from tyranny, but protecting the *democratic* state from tyranny. This is exactly the assumption made by Robinson in his article where he puts forward the case for democracy in Syracuse at this early time¹⁸. The very nature of tyranny, a measure resorted to by the masses as a sign of discontent, means that it is at least as much, if not more, of a threat to an oligarchic government than to a democratic one. Tyranny itself usually came about as a kind of ‘populist tool’, at least up to a point, just as Robinson says about ostracism. Therefore the fact that petalism was introduced in Syracuse is certainly *not* proof that Syracuse was democratic. Rutter also opposes the idea that petalism necessarily meant democracy, looking at the background of its introduction, i.e. Tyndarides’ attempt at tyranny, he concludes that it clearly was not a populist measure¹⁹. One feature of Robinson’s argument is that any participation of the aristocracy in public life is suppressed in favour of showing the regime to be a democratic one, on the basis that they are not explicitly mentioned in the accounts of

¹⁶ *Ath. Pol.* 22.8, 43.5. Interestingly, Diodorus himself states that the period of exile was five years, as in Syracuse (XI.55.2), but there is some evidence that Athens had changed from ten to five later on (Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F30).

¹⁷ See Berger (1989) 305-6.

¹⁸ Robinson (2003) 140-50.

¹⁹ Rutter (2000) 147-8.

government in post-tyranny Syracuse²⁰. If this is the case, then one is left wondering about the identity of the *χαριέστατοι* mentioned earlier. This argument also seems to misunderstand the powerful role played by the aristocracy in public life in the city, at least down to the end of the tyranny, and one can hardly expect the *Gamoroi* to have stayed quiet while the *demos* stole power for themselves, when they had held power in the city as recently as 485. Berger defends the idea that the aristocracy retained much influence in Syracuse following the fall of the Deinomenids, believing that because Syracuse was a smaller city than Athens, then it would have been easier for the aristocracy to influence political life, and so they were therefore more powerful in the city following the events of 466 BC²¹.

Further evidence cited by Berger in favour of aristocratic influence is in the almost immediate repealing of the petalism law²², when it was realised who exactly would suffer because of it. In his view the introduction of petalism in Syracuse was a risky venture that had backfired, and the damage done by the withdrawal of the *χαριέστατοι* from public life is explicitly displayed in Diodorus' account.

οὗτος δὲ ὁ νόμος διέμεινε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις κατελύθη ταχὺ διὰ τοιαύτας τινὰς αἰτίας. τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρῶν φυγαδευομένων οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ δυνάμενοι διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπανορθοῦν ἀφίσταντο τῶν δημοσίων πράξεων, καὶ διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου φόβον ἰδιωτεύοντες διετέλουν, ἐπιμελόμενοι δὲ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας εἰς τρυφήν ἀπέκλινον, οἱ δὲ πονηρότατοι τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τόλμη διαφέροντες ἐφρόντιζον τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τὰ πλήθη πρὸς ταραχὴν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν προετρέποντο.

Diod. Sic. XI.87.3-5

Here we find the same *χαριέστατοι* who had earlier defended the city from the followers of Tyndarides, being punished by the measure that they had helped to introduce themselves, and the city is once again at the mercy of those who are unfit to have such an influence, i.e. the poorer elements of society who lacked the education and government skills of the *χαριέστατοι*. Rutter therefore finds it incredible that the petalism law could have been

²⁰ Robinson (2003) 143.

²¹ Berger (1989) 305-6. Berger also believes the reference to a *politeia* (see n.26 below) in Syracuse (Ar. *Pol.* 1304 a27) is further evidence of greater aristocratic influence than in Athens, as is the difference in the length of exile under the petalism law (five years rather than ten), perhaps indicating some early awareness that the aristocracy would be worst affected – 306.

²² Berger (1989) 306.

repealed if the city was not being dominated by the *χαριέστατοι*²³. It is even possible that the use of the term *χαριέστατοι* is simply an effort by Diodorus to hide the fact that these are the *Gamoroi* themselves, and perhaps the use of the term *Gamoroi* was discontinued so that it would no longer bring back memories of the unpopular oligarchy, whose removal led to the establishment of tyranny in Syracuse²⁴. However, what is more likely is that with the chronological gap between Diodorus and the fifth century BC, such terminology was a legacy of his sources and indeed the term *Gamoroi* may even have been unfamiliar to Diodorus.

Even at this early stage of the 'democratic' period at Syracuse, we have found several important issues of concern to the citizens, and virtually all of these problems can be attributed to the legacy of Deinomenid rule in one way or another. The displaced 'new' citizens, not only in Syracuse but all over Sicily, had created havoc on the island, with a great number of these people moving back to their original homes, either of their own free will or through force, or to the 'mercenary colony' in Messenia. But while this problem had eventually been resolved in time, there were deeper issues and confusions evident in Syracuse. We seem to find the exact reversal of the normal case of affairs following a tyranny, in that the aristocracy, whether they were still called the *Gamoroi* or not, seem to have returned to being the ruling party, at least to a large extent. This meant that conditions suited a *return* to tyranny rather than an aversion to it, as was normally the case, for example in Corinth, which therefore explains the many further attempts at tyranny later on. The reasons why the *Gamoroi* seem to have returned to power are twofold: firstly the policies of Gelon and Hieron had actually *strengthened* their position in Syracuse rather than weakening it, since they were the only members of the population who seem to have actually been trusted, and these tyrants preferred to play to the city's strengths by opting to favour the wealthy rather than bothering themselves with the poor, thereby helping to fund the vast mercenary army. Secondly, the *Gamoroi* were likely to have gained confidence following Thrasybulus' expulsion, as since that particular regime had reversed the traditional Deinomenid policy and actually *targeted* the wealthy, it is very likely that the revolution of 466

²³ Rutter (2000) 148.

²⁴ Sacks (1990) 167 argues against the idea that Diodorus was totally anti-democratic, but does acknowledge that he was himself wealthy and tended to point out instances where the democratic constitution had failed because of its erratic nature.

was led by the wealthy themselves, therefore giving them confidence as they probably felt as if it was *they* who had saved Syracuse from tyranny, and that it was *they* who should occupy the power vacuum left afterwards. So, rather than a fresh, new, publicly-minded government taking office at Syracuse, it was rather the *status quo* which had won a victory, despite its defeat in 485.

As the fifth century progressed, we do find that the government in Syracuse becomes more democratic, regardless of whether it was called a δημοκρατία by sources such as Diodorus in reference to the time preceding tyrannism²⁵. The use of δημοκρατία by Diodorus is shown by Rutter to be a standardised term, applying it to describe post-tyranny governments in general, and this is said to be for two reasons²⁶. Firstly, the range of sources used by Diodorus is likely to bring many different descriptions of such governments, simply because his sources represent a wide range of differing ideas on what constituted democracy, and of course many sources would have represented different points of view simply because of the time in which they were writing. Diodorus would therefore be forced into making generalisations on such matters, as brevity would be an important issue for such a long work as his. Secondly, there is Diodorus' own time, the first century BC, in which such matters may simply not have been considered as important as they were in, say, Timaeus' time. A simple contrast between tyranny and a more constitutional government may have been considered sufficient for Diodorus' audience, many of whom were certainly not busy writing articles on post-Deinomenid government.

There are some ways in which the government at Syracuse may be shown to be more democratic, rather than being under the complete control of the aristocracy, but much of the evidence presented in modern scholarship tends to concentrate on negative incidents, and perhaps this is due to the attitudes of the various sources towards the *demos*. The harsh

²⁵ Diod. Sic. XI.72.2.

²⁶ Rutter (2000) 144-5. In the same article there are also arguments concerning Aristotle's own usage of terms such as δημοκρατία and πολιτεία, both of which are used to describe the situation in Syracuse. The usage of these words tends to depend on the point being made by Aristotle, and perhaps are used in order to give the reader a general example rather than a precise one, which may not be available to him. δημοκρατία and πολιτεία are good and bad forms respectively of the rule by many (1290a13-19), of which there are four variants altogether. πολιτεία is also used to describe a government that is a kind of mixture between democracy and oligarchy (1295a25-1296b12). See Lintott (2000) 152-66.

punishment of the Athenian captives in 413 is a typical example, where public anger simply overrides any suggestions for more lenient treatment by the moderates²⁷. Of course this is much later than the Tyndarides episode, so it is difficult to say how much of it was due to reforms between 454 and 412, the year of Diocles' reforms²⁸. The prosecution of the generals Phayllus and Bolkon in 453 and 451 respectively has also been used by Robinson to defend the idea of populist attitudes in Syracuse and therefore democracy at this early time²⁹. While I do not think that the prosecution of generals alone is strong enough evidence to support the argument³⁰, it does suggest the rise of demagogy in Syracuse, as the petalism episode perhaps also does when Diodorus describes the unsavoury characters replacing the *χαριέστατοι* (see above). Asheri also mentions the campaigns of Phayllus and Bolkon, but this time the focus is on the fact that they were carried out at all³¹. This interest in foreign affairs is quite typical of the way maritime democracies operate, and this is the first real example of such an interest in Syracuse since the Deinomenid age. In fact, Berger tells us that Syracuse had actually *adopted* the tyrant's foreign policy and had continued it for another 40 years afterwards³². However, while it is possible that the interest taken in the Tyrrhenian Sea may be significant, as it had been a favourite occupation of Hieron's, the concern about the Sicels is probably not that special for two reasons. First there is the fact that Ducetius was leading them during their great revival, and they were considered a major threat to the Sicilian Greeks at the time, and secondly, dealing with the Sicels had been a major issue since the city's foundation. One only has to consider the treatment of local Sicels, the *Killyrioi*, by Syracuse since the earliest times to realise that intervention in the interior was nothing new. It is probably still significant that

²⁷ Diod. Sic. XIII.19.4-6, 33.

²⁸ The reforms of Diocles, according to Caven (1990) 25, transformed the constitution of Syracuse from a *politeia* to a democracy. The only details we have on these reforms come from Diodorus (XIII.34.6), and involve the selection of magistrates by lot, and the number of generals being raised from three to ten. These seem to be in direct imitation of the Athenian system in the fifth century, and are significantly democratic in nature.

²⁹ Diod. Sic XI.88 (Phayllus), 91 (Bolkon). Robinson (2003) 144-5.

³⁰ This point is made by the 'Old Oligarch' (ps. Xenophon, *Aθ. Πολ.* I.3-9, 13-14, II.9-10, 17-20), although this particular source is known for its dislike for democracy, hence the author's adopted name.

³¹ Asheri (1992) 166.

³² Berger (1992) 39.

Syracuse was taking such action, but it may say more about the city itself than the tyrants who had ruled it³³.

Whether or not the government at Syracuse can really be described as a democracy before Diocles' reforms, the point at which it can very definitely be termed as such, the main point that stands out amongst others is that in the end, it failed anyway. It had failed in minor ways, such as in the case of petalism. But broadly speaking, popular government was brought to an end for many reasons. Demagogy, the Athenian expedition and the threat of Carthage were the most significant of these and the last of the three will be discussed more fully in the next section, but it was the populist politics in Syracuse (like in Athens itself) which had almost led to utter disaster, and had really exposed the potential failings of mass rule. Examples of this include the unwillingness by the demagogues (led by Athenagoras) to believe the report of an impending invasion in 415, an argument which turns out to be an attack on Hermocrates, accusing him of making up the story to cause alarm and take control of the city for himself, rather than an attempt to prove the rumours wrong³⁴. The failure to act decisively during the expedition was the result of demagogy such as this, and as it turned out, it had put the city in great danger. We have also already seen how the government had made rash decisions in the name of appeasing the public above, with the prosecution of failed generals, and it may have appeared to many that this system of government simply did not work.

Caven makes an attempt to bring together other possible reasons for the ultimate failure of democracy (or polity) in Syracuse by providing a stark contrast with Athens, which, with few exceptions (most notably the Sicilian Expedition) was very successful during the fifth century³⁵. The main message is that Athens made the most of democracy because conditions suited it, and despite also discovering the pitfalls of such a government, like demagogy, its benefits mainly outweighed the faults. Syracuse on the other hand only seems to have seen the negative side of democracy – but why?

³³ Sjöqvist (1973) 36-48 discusses this at length, focusing on the Doric colonies as a whole, in particular Syracuse and Gela, but also into the fifth century – 49-60.

³⁴ Thuc. VI.33-41.

³⁵ Caven (1990) 9-15.

It seems the first difference was social, in that the population of Syracuse was divided not only by the quite temporary ‘old’ versus ‘new’ citizen problem, but mainly between the *Gamoroi* and the other citizens, which was far more deep-rooted and had come to a head with the coup of 485. The gap between Gelon’s reinstatement of the *Gamoroi* and the expulsion of Thrasybulus was 19 years, less than a generation, so the troubled past was still a comparatively recent memory. This was made worse by the powerful position in which the *Gamoroi* were left in 466, as mentioned earlier, so class-conflict was still very much on the agenda in fifth-century Syracuse. Caven points out that Athens had had a major advantage in this respect, as not only the whole city, but also most of Greece had united against Persia. The city’s plight as it was occupied by Xerxes’ force was a rallying point for the citizens, and this encouraged an even greater sense of nationhood than had already existed before at Athens, which was a far more stable and established settlement in comparison to Syracuse, especially since Athens’ power was reinforced by its empire later on. Of course Syracuse itself had Himera, and there may have been a *perceived* threat that Syracuse could be put under Carthaginian rule – but the victory always seemed to belong to Gelon himself, rather than to the Syracusans, highlighting the belief that tyrants were more effective militarily than democratic governments. Further comparisons also clarify the *real* differences between the wars against Persia and Carthage, and the main one is the composition of the forces. A good proportion of Gelon’s forces were surely mercenary, and of course there is also the large cavalry force of 5,000 reported by Diodorus, supplied by the wealthier Syracusans³⁶. Contrast this with the fleet of Athenian ships that won at Salamis, which were almost entirely manned by the *thetes*, the poorest of the citizen classes, so that the city simply *had* to recognise the contribution made by the poor, making democracy far more palatable to Athenian tastes. Of course the further contribution made by the Athenian navy in the fifth century is well documented.

Aside from the social factors, the rule of the Deinomenids had also helped fuel this failure by their very memory. The fear of tyranny arising again was certainly felt by the *Gamoroi*, as can be shown by the petalism episode, but it must also have been the case that the *demos* themselves were nervous. As has been said, while in normal cases a tyrant may rise

³⁶ Diod. Sic. XI.21.1. See also the above chapter on mercenaries, 119.

with public aid, the *demos* would have been wary of a new kind of tyrant – those who openly sided *with* the aristocracy rather than against it, and this could be a reason for the fear of tyranny amongst the masses, exploited by the demagogues as the state became more democratic later on, despite the apparent demand for tyranny in the mid-5th century. The Deinomenids' contribution towards the (temporary) downfall of democracy in Syracuse can therefore be shown to be more than simply social factors; they had cast a political shadow over the city that lasted at least until Dionysius' day.

Carthage in the Fifth Century

One of the main circumstances behind the rise to power of Dionysius at the end of the fifth century is the sudden reappearance of Carthage in Greek affairs. As Asheri notes, there is an impression given in our sources that Carthage had withdrawn itself from activity in the Mediterranean following the Himera campaign of 480, perhaps only having influence in the Punic cities of Sicily³⁷. We know that there were still trade links with the Greeks, especially with Acragas³⁸, but the closest we have to Punic activity in our main sources before the Athenian expedition is a conflict between Lilybaeum (the Punic colony) and Segesta over land, but this is all Diodorus actually tells us, apart from the heavy losses on both sides³⁹. Archaeological evidence can be used to shed more light on the matter: for example, there is numismatic evidence that the Elymians, who were for a long time Carthage's allies in Sicily, were being Hellenised in the fifth century⁴⁰, and further evidence may even suggest that Carthage was in a state of poverty during this time⁴¹. This would appear to suggest that Carthage simply wanted to stay out of trouble as a result of their embarrassment at the hands of Gelon, resulting in less activity in the Mediterranean – and therefore we have a straightforward case of lasting Deinomenid influence in the region. But the complete picture is not given in

³⁷ Asheri (1994) 127ff. and also *CAH* IV. See also Hans (1983) on Carthage's ties with the Sicilian cities.

³⁸ See Kraay (1976) 226 on the use of Spanish silver in Acragantine coinage, Jenkins (1974) 24-5 on Carthaginian coins overstruck by Acragas.

³⁹ Diod. Sic. XI.86.2. See *CAH* V 159 n.10.

⁴⁰ Head (1887) 164-6.

⁴¹ Picard and Picard (1968) 87 tell us that the tombs of the fifth century in Carthage were so insignificant that during their excavation it was not even realised that they were tombs at all!

sources such as Diodorus; instead, we find a reference to Carthage under the rule of Hanno in the works of Dio Chrysostom.

Καρχηδονίου δὲ Ἴαννων μὲν ἀντὶ Τυρίων ἐποίησε Λίβυας, καὶ Λιβύην
κατοικεῖν ἀντὶ Φοινίκης
Dio Chrysostom Orat. XXV.7

This gives us an important clue regarding what the Carthaginians were actually doing during this time, and our suspicions are confirmed by a single line of Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus.

Itaque et Mauris bellum inlatum et adversus Numidas pugnatum et Afri
compulsi stipendium urbis conditae Karthaginensibus remittere.
Justin *Epitome* XIX.2.4

Instead of being active in the Mediterranean itself, the Carthaginians looked closer to home, and began to take control of the region of North Africa surrounding Carthage itself, which comprised much of modern Tunisia. Carthage had been a mere tenant in the area for so long, apparently paying tribute to the local Numidians since the city's foundation, but this had now come to an end under Hanno. Activity in Africa is confirmed by archaeological evidence recorded by Picard, in the form of storage jars found in newly acquired lands⁴². The Dio Chrysostom passage itself also tells us that the Carthaginians were carrying on as normal in the Mediterranean, and in fact were getting even *richer* than they had done before. This is confirmed by Thucydides, who records Hermocrates of Syracuse as saying:

δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουλευθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον
πλείστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὁ τε πόλεμος καὶ τᾶλλα εὐπορεῖ.
Thuc. VI.34

During this time the Carthaginians also embarked on one of the more adventurous episodes in their history. In Avienus' *Ora Maritima*, dated to the fourth century AD, there are references to earlier Greek sources mentioning the voyage of Himilco to the British Isles around 450 BC⁴³. This is almost certainly an attempt to get to the source of the tin route, as the metal trade was the most central component of the Carthaginians' activities⁴⁴. A far better documented example of this era of exploration comes in an unusual form, Hanno's *Periplus*, a

⁴² C. Picard (1965) 21-2. G. Ch. Picard (1966) illustrates the probable extent of the Carthaginian conquest of African land in map 2, p.79, although it is estimated as the absolute borders are unknown.

⁴³ Avienus *Ora Maritima* 114-34, 406-15.

Greek version of an originally Punic text, and this is not only an important work because of the content, but also because it is the only substantial piece of Punic literature that has survived to this day, albeit with some changes by the Greek who recorded it⁴⁵. The *Periplus* is king Hanno's own account of his voyage around the West coast of Africa, and although the work itself is controversial given its manner of preservation, it is very interesting indeed, and also can be considered evidence for extensive Carthaginian activity in the second half of the fifth century. There is really no reason to believe that the expedition did not take place, unless the *Periplus* was a complete fake⁴⁶. The Carthaginians would have been perfectly capable of the journey itself, especially when one considers the quite convincing evidence that the Phoenicians had already circumnavigated Africa on the orders of the Pharaoh Necho, around 600 BC⁴⁷. It seems that the main reason for Hanno's expedition was again, apart from the stated reason of a colonial enterprise, the search for metals, in this case gold. This was not a new idea, however, as Herodotus records Carthaginian activity in West Africa before Hanno, but it does provide a strong clue as to why they were so interested in it.

Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τάδε Καρχηδόνιοι, εἶναι τῆς Λιβύης χώρον τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἔξω Ἑρακλέων στηλέων κατοικημένους, ἐς τοὺς ἐπεὰν ἀπίκωνται καὶ ἐξέλωνται τὰ φορτία, θέντες αὐτὰ ἐπεξῆς παρὰ τὴν κυματωγὴν, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰ πλοῖα τύφειν καπνόν· τοὺς δ' ἐπιχωρίους ἰδομένους τὸν καπνὸν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀντὶ τῶν φορτίων χρυσὸν τιθέναι καὶ ἐξαναχωρέειν πρόσω ἀπὸ τῶν φορτίων· τοὺς δὲ Καρχηδονίους ἐκβάντας σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἦν μὲν φαίνηται σφι ἄξιος ὁ χρυσὸς τῶν φορτίων, ἀνελόμενοι ἀπαλλάσσονται, ἦν δὲ μὴ ἄξιος, ἐσβάντες ὀπίσω ἐς τὰ πλοῖα κατέαται, οἱ δὲ προσελθόντες ἄλλον πρὸς ὧν ἔθηκαν χρυσόν, ἐς οὗ ἂν πείθωσι. Ἄδικεῖν δὲ οὐδετέρους· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὺς τοῦ χρυσοῦ ἄπτεσθαι πρὶν ἂν σφι ἀπισωθῆ τῇ ἀξίῃ τῶν φορτίων, οὔτ' ἐκείνους τῶν φορτίων ἄπτεσθαι πρότερον ἢ αὐτοὶ τὸ χρυσίον λάβωσι.

Hdt. IV.196

⁴⁴ Moscati (1968) 181. See Aubet (1987) on the metals trade in the Western Mediterranean, also the above chapter on foreign policy, 85.

⁴⁵ See G.Ch. Picard (1982) 175-80.

⁴⁶ Germain (1957) 205-48, believes the document to be a forgery.

⁴⁷ Hdt. IV.42. What makes this passage so interesting is that while Herodotus is ready to believe this story, he is sceptical about their tale of having the sun to their right, i.e. to the North, while passing the southernmost point of Africa (the circumnavigation was clockwise, starting from the Red Sea). Of course this little addition to the story, which seems to have been added for the sake of completeness by the author despite believing it to be untrue, has turned out to be excitingly accurate and almost confirms the story as true. There is also the additional point that the voyage would have been difficult for the Phoenicians to fake, as there was no Suez Canal, and the only conceivable way in which they could have fooled Necho was by travelling overland across Egypt in secret – very difficult and dangerous considering Egypt's harsh desert environment, and the fact that it was Necho's own kingdom! See Mauny (1955) for the view that no ancient explorer could have travelled further than Cape Juby – or at least made the northward, return trip past that point, and also Mauny (1978) for a general consideration of the failure to make lasting links with West Africa.

This passage is valuable not only because it explains the Phoenicians' interest in Africa beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, but also tells us about how business was done with the Africans themselves, in this case a method known as 'silent barter'⁴⁸. The evidence we have for the second half of the fifth century seems to indicate increased activity in the metals trade, not only meaning increased wealth but also, through the acquisition of tin from Spain and (probably indirectly) Britain, Carthage was producing large amounts of bronze. Could this indicate the production of armour and weapons in Carthage, or is this simply part of the trade in metals discussed earlier?

By the time Carthage attacked cities in Sicily in 410/9, Carthage had a new king in Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who died at Himera, and who was already elderly when he came to the throne, probably between 415 and 410⁴⁹. Hannibal is described by Diodorus as a hater of Greeks, and desperate to atone for the embarrassment to both Carthage and his own family at the hands of Gelon⁵⁰. However, this may simply be an attempt by Diodorus to explain the almost irrational destruction of Himera itself later on, as well as an attempt to blame the Punic Wars with Syracuse ultimately on Carthage⁵¹. Just as the Himera campaign was the result of the actions of the allies of Carthage and Syracuse, it was another conflict between Selinus (now aligned with Syracuse) and Segesta that had started Carthaginian aggressions in Sicily, although it seems Carthage was initially reluctant to be at war with Syracuse itself.

ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὦν μὲν καὶ φύσει μισέλλην, ὁμοῦ δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, ἔσπευδε δι' ἑαυτοῦ τι κατασκευάσαι χρήσιμον τῇ πατρίδι. θεωρῶν οὖν τοὺς Σελινουντίους οὐκ ἀρκουμένους τῇ παραχωρήσει τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμου χώρας, πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλε μετὰ τῶν Αἰγεσταίων πρὸς Συρακοσίους, ἐπιτρέπων αὐτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν τούτων, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενος δικαιοπραγεῖν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ μὴ

⁴⁸ Law (1978) 137. There is also the account of Pseudo-Scylax, *Periplus* 112, which describes the process in greater detail, and includes more on the materials traded and the Africans themselves, but unfortunately there is no mention of gold, or for that matter any metals at all. There is a possibility that the two accounts describe different parts of Western Africa, Ps.-Scylax mentions the island of Cerne, whereas there is no indication of this in Herodotus. Law suggests that the Phoenician informants used by Ps.-Scylax simply didn't want to share too much information on the subject of precious metals – 138-9

⁴⁹ Picard and Picard (1968) 101.

⁵⁰ Diod. Sic. XIII.5-6.

⁵¹ Of course it is likely that Diodorus' own view of the Carthaginians was heavily influenced by contemporary Roman attitudes towards them, and this becomes more apparent in his narrative of Rome's own struggles with the Carthaginians. For example see his account of the Senatorial debate on the proposed treaty with Carthage following the Second Punic War (XXVII.18) which likens the Carthaginians to wild beasts.

βούλεσθαι τοὺς Σελινουντίους διακριθῆναι μὴ συμμαχήσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς Συρακοσίους.

Diod. Sic. XIII.43.6

This passage does indicate confusion over why the Carthaginians invaded; it simply does not make sense to blame the conflict solely on Hannibal's desire for revenge, and then to say that Carthage wanted to avoid conflict with Syracuse. As the details given seem to imply the latter, it seems that maybe the battle of Himera in 480 played less on the minds of the Carthaginians than Diodorus would like to think, although its memory probably still inspired the destruction of Himera itself after Hannibal had dealt with Selinus⁵².

The effects of the Himera campaign on Carthage may not be as straightforward as our sources may want us to think. It is certainly not the case that the Carthaginians had withdrawn from external affairs as a result, as Diodorus seems to imply, as such an action would have had a devastating effect on the city's well-being. Importantly, trade would have continued, not only with West Africa but also with the Greeks themselves, particularly Acragas. Carthage's position as a trading city with only a small amount of agricultural land meant that it had to continue trading, but also had to intervene with force if for instance a trade route was blocked by pirates. It was perhaps the realisation of the city's precarious position that had made it expand its territory in Africa itself, so that it could become more self-sufficient, important in times of crisis. As it turns out, trading activity actually increased amongst the Carthaginians during this time, and efforts were made to expand the trading routes into Northern Europe as well as West Africa. The *direct* effect of Himera on the Carthaginians' Greek policy may not be as clear; efforts seem to have been made to avoid conflict with Syracuse, despite Hannibal's apparent want for revenge, so it may have been the case that the embarrassment of 480 was still a source of fear in Carthage. However, with the defeat of Selinus and destruction of Himera, Carthage was likely to have had its confidence renewed, resulting in the prolonged but mostly inconclusive struggle against Dionysius.

⁵² Diod. Sic. XIII.62.

Mercenaries

The extensive use of mercenaries by Dionysius is well documented, particularly early in his career, but we should not make the mistake of simply assuming that this was a direct legacy of the Deinomenid era, although both the Deinomenids and Dionysius enjoyed a huge amount of success with their professional armies. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, circumstances in Greece itself had changed dramatically during the course of the fifth century; in particular, the lengthy Peloponnesian war had disastrous consequences for many Greeks who had returned to their farms only to find they were useless as a result of neglect⁵³. Further to this, the war had meant that battles were fought differently, mainly because of the need for specialisation allowing a particular army to adapt to circumstances. But as we have also seen in earlier chapters, circumstances were often different in Sicily compared with Greece.

One episode which has been discussed above, involving Tyndarides, is interesting because it seems like a classic case of a popular attempt at tyranny:

Τυνδαρίδης γάρ τις τοὔνομα, θράσους καὶ τόλμης γέμων ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πολλοὺς τῶν πενήτων ἀνελάμβανε, καὶ σωματοποιῶν τούτους ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τυραννίδα ἐτοίμους ἐποίει δορυφόρους.

Diod. Sic. XI.86.4

The appearance of a bodyguard of course harks back to the days of Peisistratos in Athens, and although they are not mercenary but citizen troops, it is a private force employed only by Tyndarides, reminiscent of Hippocrates' own bodyguard in the 490's BC. We can expect that the 'many other' attempts at tyranny that occurred in Syracuse at this time were of a similar nature to this one. The use of a private force was, at least in Sicily, almost established as the best way to gain power, as it was also the same method used by the Deinomenids to maintain it. Hermocrates also used a private force in his attempt to return to Syracuse around 410/9, although this time the force was a mercenary one, and this was still before the end of the Peloponnesian war⁵⁴. It seems that in Sicily at least the use of personal armies was common enough following the fall of the Deinomenids, although this may be due to the political

⁵³ See the mercenaries chapter above, 101-2.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31, Diod. Sic. XIII.63. This particular force was paid for by his friend Pharnabazus, but there is no indication of the nationality of the troops in either source.

circumstances during the aftermath, seen in the frequency of attempted tyrannies, rather than attempted emulation of the tyrants before them⁵⁵.

During Dionysius' reign, a number of circumstances led to his employment of mercenaries, but Parke sees the problems before Dionysius' time as well as during the first part of his reign as the major factors⁵⁶. While the invasions of both Athens and Carthage played their part, Parke also sees the appearance of mercenaries as well as tyrants as a result of the 'disturbed condition' of Sicily, and this is in particular reference to the political situation in Syracuse following the Deinomenids. The appearance of a military-style tyrant of Dionysius' calibre is also a massive factor in itself, but there are other reasons during the course of his reign that will also be discussed.

It seems that when Dionysius was a general early on he had used citizen troops, but had started paying for a professional army after meeting the Laconian Dexippus in 406⁵⁷, paying them out of the proceeds of sold land, previously confiscated at Gela. Soon after this Dionysius was made *strategos autokrator*, and while campaigning at Leontini was given a bodyguard of 600 following an attempt on his life, which then grew to 1,000⁵⁸. It was on Dionysius' return to Syracuse, still in 406, that he set himself up as a military dictator, and based himself on the island of Ortygia.

Probably the most significant episodes are the revolts against Dionysius' rule, the first of which came in 405, involving only the Syracusan cavalry who, seeing that Dionysius had not only set himself up as tyrant on the premise of defeating the Carthaginians, but had also failed, having lost both Acragas and Gela to the enemy, concluded that it was time for Syracuse to be liberated⁵⁹. This was unsuccessful, and those involved were banished or killed, and as it became clearer to the hoplites what was happening in Syracuse, they also rebelled in 404. Joined by the cavalry who had been exiled to Aetna, and also by a Corinthian force, the

⁵⁵ It is also worth noting that there were similar cases of private armies in Central Italy, the best known being that of Attus Clausus, the Sabine leader who moved to Rome with his 5,000 *clientes* in 504 BC (Livy 4.3-4); Cn. Marcius Coriolanus who had joined the Volscians against Rome (Dion. Hal. 7.21.3); and the Fabii clan's own *clientes* and *sodales* (companions) against Veii in 479 (Dion. Hal. 9.15.3). See also Cornell (1995) 143ff.

⁵⁶ Parke (1933) 63.

⁵⁷ Diod. Sic. XIII.93.2.

⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. XIII.96.1ff., *Ar. Pol.* 1286b40.

Syracusans had blockaded Dionysius in Ortygia, in what was the lowest point in the tyrant's career⁶⁰. Dionysius was granted an escape from the island, but simply returned to attack the city, as well as sending Campanian cavalry from a garrison into Syracuse in order to break the siege and take the island themselves. Another 300 mercenaries were also enlisted from the Peloponnese⁶¹. Following this victory, Dionysius paid the Campanians, who had previously served Carthage in the invasion of 410/9, and let them go, being wary of them, while recruiting more Campanians and also more Greeks from the mainland⁶². This was the great turning point in Dionysius' military career. Knowing he could not trust the citizens of Syracuse, whether hoplite or cavalry class, he disarmed them, and there is only one instance in which we know the citizens were re-armed for campaigning; Caven suggests that this passage is in reference to Dionysius' campaigns against the Chalcidian cities to the north of Sicily, although Polyaeus made it clear that the arms were returned when the citizens had finished with them⁶³. The extent to which Dionysius could not trust his own subjects is illustrated by an incident in 392, when the Carthaginians were at nearby Agyrium, a clear threat to Syracuse itself.

Μάγων δ' ἐν πολεμῖα χώρᾳ στρατοπεδεύων, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεῆς ἀεὶ μᾶλλον γινόμενος, οὐ μετρίως ἤλαττοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄγυριν τῆς χώρας ἔμπειροι καθεστῶτες ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις ἐπλεονέκτουσαν καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἀφηροῦντο. λεγόντων δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων διὰ μάχης κρίνειν ὡς τάχιστα τὰ πράγματα, Διονύσιος ἠναντιοῦτο λέγων χωρὶς κινδύνων τῶ χρόνῳ καὶ τῇ σπάνει καταφθαρήσεσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους· ἐφ' οἷς παροργισθέντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι κατέλιπον τὸν Διονύσιον.

Diod. Sic. XIV.96.1-2

This passage shows how little the Syracusans cared for Dionysius by this time, and it was now obvious that the only troops that could be trusted by Dionysius were those who were dependent on him for payment. Although we have been given the impression that the citizens had their armour taken away, it is possible that in operations against the Carthaginians, Dionysius may have considered the threat posed to be significant enough that the Greeks in Sicily would rally behind him. However it seems that even this was not enough to justify tyranny to the Syracusans any more, so they simply deserted him. Parke points out that later in

⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. XIII.112ff., Plut. *Dion* 3.1. Also Caven (1990) 73-4.

⁶⁰ Diod. Sic. XIV.7.6-8.6.

⁶¹ Diod. Sic. XIV.9.1-4, Polyaeus. V.8.2.

⁶² Diod. Sic. XIV.9.8-9, Polybius VII.2. New recruits – Diod. Sic. XIV.10.4, XV.3.

⁶³ Polyaeus. V.2.14. Caven (1990) 86.

his career, Dionysius can hardly be described as a military tyrant any more, as campaigns were rare⁶⁴. In order to explain this, Parke puts forward a possible shortage of money available to the tyrant, as this had happened to him before: for example at one point he is forced to settle his mercenaries at Leontini due to lack of funds⁶⁵. What may also have been a factor was the situation with the citizens, as if Dionysius could not trust them then a shortage of mercenaries would mean even *fewer* troops available for campaigning – assuming some mercenaries were left behind to keep the citizens in check.

It therefore seems that there were other reasons for Dionysius' dependence on mercenaries apart from it simply being fashionable amongst fourth century autocrats⁶⁶, or even it being a phenomenon peculiar to Sicily, a legacy of the Deinomenids. It is however interesting that Dionysius managed to alienate his own subjects in a manner similar to how the Deinomenids alienated the *demos* themselves, although not to such extremes.

Self-representation

This is probably the most difficult aspect of the reign of Dionysius to compare with the Deinomenids, given the lack of certainty and the various strong views expressed, both in ancient and modern writing. There is also a problem in that the attitudes towards tyranny and kingship were subject to change, both over time and space. An individual writer's own personal experience with tyranny, whether positive or negative, may not always be interpreted as being representative of his own society as a whole, and less still of a society which is not his own. In the previous chapter, the point has been made that we cannot know with any certainty whether the Deinomenids officially used the title *basileus*, as the only evidence that can be used to be sure is that produced by the regime itself. This would most naturally come in the form of inscriptions or coinage, but as Oost points out, this was simply not done during the Deinomenids' time, and was not common even in Hellenistic times, where there is far greater

⁶⁴ Parke (1933) 72.

⁶⁵ Diod. Sic. XIV.78. Also at Tauromenium – Polyæn. V.2.1, Diod. Sic. XIV.96, Adranum – Diod. Sic. XIV.37.5.

⁶⁶ See Austin (1994) 540. Aeneas Tacticus even *assumes* that fourth century city-states in Greece would make use of mercenaries, but also that they would maintain a citizen army – *Poliorc.* 10.7, 18-9; 12-3; 22.29.

evidence for kingship⁶⁷. Oost goes on to criticise various scholars who assume the lack of titular use in documentary evidence to mean that the Deinomenids did not use titles, and for dismissing other evidence for kingship such as Pindar, Herodotus and Diodorus. However, there are flaws in Oost's argument, for example his failure to address the possibility of the Deinomenids using the title *tyrannos*, also used by Pindar, Herodotus and Diodorus and said to be interchangeable with *basileus* by Oost himself⁶⁸. Oost also makes the unsafe assumption that because the Deinomenids "commonly used the title of king, some degree of *a priori* likelihood is created that the second tyrant dynasty at Syracuse followed its predecessor's example"⁶⁹. The evidence for Deinomenid kingship is hardly common, as we have seen in the previous chapter, but whether the evidence was more common or simply non-existent it is wrong to simply assume that Dionysius wanted the same for himself as the Deinomenids had.

Evidence for kingship amongst the Dionysian tyrants is perhaps stronger than that for the Deinomenids, although some argue to the contrary and the same old problems are again encountered. For example, Caven uses the lack of titles in inscriptions as positive evidence for the lack of any kind of official title, despite surely being aware of Oost's warning about this kind of evidence, made fourteen years earlier⁷⁰. In Caven's rather short discussion of Dionysius' use of titles, we find the very kind of scholarship that seems to be the subject of Oost's article. There is little by way of discussion of the sources available to us, and it relies almost wholly on the nature of Dionysius' character which Caven has tried to reconstruct. The main point made here is that Dionysius almost certainly did not use an official title in Syracuse, as firstly he would not have wanted to irritate the *demos* and secondly because the pragmatic Dionysius would have not thought it necessary, as it would not add to his real power in the city. Regarding the tyrant's standing amongst other Greeks, Caven again mentions Dionysius' realism, deciding that since both he and the Greeks abroad knew Syracuse was under a military dictatorship, there was no point in convincing them otherwise, together with the lack of

⁶⁷ Oost (1976) 225.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 224-5.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 232.

⁷⁰ Caven (1990) 156.

epigraphic evidence mentioned above⁷¹. This is despite the story of Dionysius' entry at the games at Olympia in 388, covered by Diodorus and said to be such an attempt at gaining Panhellenic acceptance, mentioned by Caven only twelve pages earlier⁷². While we should keep in mind factors such as Dionysius' apparent character, this should not be allowed to overrule any more direct evidence on his use of titles or intended image abroad.

One point that does seem to be accepted by both Oost and Caven is that very early in Dionysius' reign, from around 405, he held the title of *strategos autokrator*⁷³. This was an elected office secured after Dionysius had successfully removed the previous generals, a result of the threat posed by the Carthaginians, but it is strikingly similar to the (unofficial) position held by the Deinomends many years earlier, and in particular it would have been reminiscent of Gelon at Himera. The main question is how long Dionysius held this office for, as although, as a title, it most effectively describes the nature of his reign, i.e. as a military dictator, there is no evidence to suggest it lasted until his death in 368, although it was later used by Dion⁷⁴. As it turns out, the end-date for Dionysius' use of this particular title is dependent on whether and when he started using another, whether it was *basileus*, *archon* or something else.

The most significant evidence for the use of *basileus* is found in a speech of pseudo-Lysias:

ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διώχληκε πόλεις πολλὰς ἐν τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ, Σικελίαν, Ἰταλίαν, Πελοπόννησον, Θετταλίαν, Ἑλλησποντον, Ἰωνίαν, Κύπρον· βασιλέας πολλοὺς κεκολάκευκεν, ᾧ ἂν ξυγγένηται, πλὴν τοῦ Συρακοσίου Διονυσίου. οὗτος δὲ ἢ πάντων εὐτυχέστατός ἐστιν ἢ πλεῖστον γνώμη διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων, ὃς μόνος τῶν συγγενομένων Ἀνδοκίδῃ οὐκ ἐξηπατήθη ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς τοιοῦτου, ὃς τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηδὲν ποιεῖν κακόν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κακόν.

ps.-Lysias *Against Andocides* 6-7

⁷¹ Caven (1990) 156-7.

⁷² This was Dionysius' most significant propaganda exercise, but rather than making the journey to Olympia himself, his brother Thearides was sent along with sacred envoys to carry out sacrifices in Dionysius' name, as well as rhapsodes to sing his praises, magnificent pavilions for display and four-horse chariots for the competitions themselves. However this seems to have been a massive failure in virtually every way, with his own songs ridiculed by the audience, his chariots crashing and the pavilions attacked. Even the sacred envoys were shipwrecked on the return home to Sicily, providing Dionysius' enemies, both present and future, with plenty of material with which to ridicule the tyrant (Diod. Sic. XIV.109). It seems that the orator Lysias may also have played some part in this, speaking publicly against the tyrant, accusing him of being an enemy of Greek liberty, inciting the crowds to attack the pavilion set up as well as to stop the sacred envoys going about their business. Finally Lysias urges the Greeks to come together to liberate the whole of Sicily and depose Dionysius (Lysias 33). Caven (1990) on Dionysius and Olympia – 144-5.

⁷³ Diod. Sic. XIII.94.5-6. Oost (1976) 234, Caven (1990) 156.

⁷⁴ Plut. *Dion* 48.

with Dionysius himself; it may be possible that Syracuse had allied itself with Athens at another time, but it is almost as if Dionysius was somehow unrepresentative of the city itself, and this certainly seems to be the case when we look at the composition of Dionysius' armed forces later on⁸⁰. What seems interesting from the point of view of titular use, is the mention of Dionysius' descendants, which has been interpreted by Oost as strong evidence for kingship⁸¹. While this certainly seems convincing, as it gives the impression of a stable, long-term, and most importantly, constitutional government, it may simply be connected to the last point which suggests that Dionysius was quite unrepresentative of the city itself, and also to the fact that it was simply worth more to the Athenians to be allied to Dionysius himself than with Syracuse.

Other sources may appear to support Oost's theory, in particular Polybius, who recognizes Dionysius, as well as Agathocles, as a king, despite his dislike for tyranny, as well as other minor sources which associate him with various regalia such as diadems and the wearing of purple robes⁸². Another important source is of course Diodorus Siculus, who never refers to Dionysius as *basileus*, but does mention his burial adjacent to the 'royal gates', perhaps suggesting the Deinomenids' own kingship as well as that of Dionysius⁸³. It is clear that Diodorus does not agree with Dionysius' method of rule (again, consistent with Diodorus' attitudes to Thrasybulus, see previous chapter p.194), saying that he had enslaved Sicily, but this comment tells us much more than the historian's dislike for him when taken into context.

οὐ γὰρ δήπουθεν ἀξιῶσαι τις ἂν παραβάλλειν Διονύσιον τῷ παλαιῷ Γέλωνι.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς, μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
Σικελιωτῶν ἠλευθέρωσε τὴν Σικελίαν ἅπασαν, ὁ δ' ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ παραλαβὼν
τὰς πόλεις τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπασῶν κυρίουσ πεποίηκε τοὺς πολεμίους, αὐτὸς
δὲ τὴν πατρίδα καταδεδούλωται.

Diod. Sic. XIV.66.1

This is part of a speech of Theodorus attacking Dionysius in 396/5, which we may reasonably expect to mean that it is mostly fictitious, and an opportunity for Diodorus (or rather

⁸⁰ Caven (1990) proposes that Ortygia itself was the different entity to Syracuse, 156-9, 183-5, and this is also consistent with the fact that Dionysius' mercenaries took up residence with him on the island.

⁸¹ Oost (1976) 234.

⁸² Polybius 15.35.4, which is dismissed by Walbank (1967) 495 and Berve (1967) p.653, to Oost's annoyance. Bato of Sinope, *FGrH* 268 F4 (Livy 24.5.4), again dismissed by Berve (1967) p.653; Duris, *FGrH* 76 F14.

⁸³ Diod. Sic. XV.74.5.

his source – Timaeus?⁸⁴) to express his disapproval. Caven actually attributes the *entire* episode, including the Syracusans' military success (without Dionysius, who was away with his fleet) at their harbour, and the following debate at the assembly, to the invention of Diodorus or a source⁸⁵. At the debate Theodorus proposes the removal of Dionysius from power, as the Syracusans were now clearly capable of defending themselves and there was no need for a militaristic autocrat. It is here, at last, where the question of the Deinomenids' influence on history following their fall can be most directly tackled, as Theodorus contrasts Dionysius with Gelon himself.

Oost uses this episode as further evidence of Dionysius' kingship in Syracuse, saying that the statement 'You cannot compare Dionysius to Gelon' is evidence that comparisons *were* made, perhaps at that time, and that this was what Dionysius wanted⁸⁶. There are serious flaws in this argument, in that we cannot argue that the comparison refers to Dionysius' right to be recognised as a king, because the context refers only to their military achievements and the manner of their rule, not their constitutional position in Syracuse or Sicily. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that Dionysius ever *wanted* to be recognised as *basileus*; this is simply an assumption on Oost's part, based on the idea that *all* politicians are not only hungry for absolute power, but also want public acceptance and constitutional legitimacy to go with it. While this is a nice idea, the assumption made is quite unsafe in itself, and Oost relies on his own readers' probable mistrust in politicians in order to carry his message through.

When this passage is considered more fully, it seems that the best honour that could possibly be bestowed upon a Syracusan autocrat was not being made *basileus*, despite all the debate on whether Dionysius was, was not, or even wanted to be one, but rather comparison with Gelon. While this honour does not actually bear Gelon's name, in the same way as the names Caesar and Augustus were used in the Roman Empire, and even up to modern times in Germany and Russia, it does seem to have been of a similar kind. Gelon was the leader *par excellence* in Sicily, and following Himera, if Diodorus is to be believed, he was not only

⁸⁴ Stroheker (1958) 210 n.98 believes this speech is 'pure Timaeus'.

⁸⁵ Caven (1990) 115-6.

⁸⁶ Oost (1976) 234-5.

granted the title of *basileus* but also *euergetes* and *soter* – benefactor and saviour⁸⁷. Even if Dionysius was accepted as *basileus* in Syracuse and also *archon* of Sicily, the speech of Theodorus makes it clear that he could *never* claim to be its saviour as Gelon was. It does seem to be this that is being alluded to in the text, where Theodorus refers to the freeing of Sicily from the Carthaginians at Himera, and perhaps Oost has misunderstood the *full* meaning of Dionysius' being compared to Gelon. A constitutional office could be held by an unsuitable ruler, just as Hieron and Thrasybulus had apparently inherited the royal position from Gelon, but it was achievements such as Gelon's at Himera which would have provided inspiration in men to try and emulate them, particularly for a military leader such as Dionysius. It was Gelon, above all, that Dionysius would have been compared with, as he had set the benchmark with the Himera campaign.

Conclusion

It seems that of all the ways in which the Pantarids and the Deinomenids had helped shape future events in Sicily in the century following their fall, it was the victory gained by Gelon following Himera which provided the biggest influence, both in the eyes of the Sicilian Greeks and also the Carthaginians. Dionysius' manner of rule, and his ultimate aims, both seem to want to match Gelon's heroics, or perhaps even surpass them by ridding Sicily of the Phoenicians for good, although there is more room for doubt on this particular point. The king of Carthage itself, Hannibal, is believed by Diodorus to have started the wars in Sicily in revenge for his grandfather's defeat and death at Himera. Even future tyrants/kings in Syracuse adopt the names of Deinomenid leaders, such as Hieron II. Of course there were also points of negative influence in Sicily, particularly the revulsion held by many cities, including Syracuse, for tyranny, indicated by developments such as the introduction of *petalism*. However, this issue has turned out to be far more complex than simply anti-tyranny sentiment in general. We have found that this would have been restricted mostly to the *Gamoroi* early on, and the threat of tyranny was ever present, but this was due to the nature of the Deinomenid dynasty, which had left the political situation in much the same state as shortly before Gelon had arrived in

⁸⁷ Diod. Sic. XI.26.6.

Syracuse in 485. Amongst other points in this chapter, we have also learned of how the tyrants of the early fifth century seemed to have anticipated more common happenings in Sicily and even the Greek world much later on, such as the mass employment and mass settlement of mercenaries. We must be careful not to assume in these cases that the Pantarids and Deinomenids actually influenced future decisions, which seem to have been more due to contemporary issues such as mass poverty of soldiers following the end of the Peloponnesian War, the diversification of warfare, and, of course, lots of money available to those who knew where to find it. However it does seem likely, given the *continued* use of mercenaries in Sicily during the fifth century BC, and the future reappearance of mass population movement, that the Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants were the trendsetters.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of this thesis we have considered aspects of the Pantarid and Deinomenid dynasties that have contributed greatly to our understanding of them. On the whole, it has been shown why these two dynasties warrant more scholarly attention than they have been given so far, in particular because there are many points that mark them out as different from other tyrants of the Archaic age in Greece.

Returning to the beginning of this thesis, the aim of the first chapter was to put the story of the tyrants into the context of the sources that inform us. However, our main source, Diodorus Siculus, is highly problematic and it has been necessary to dedicate much space to discussing his work. Perhaps the most important point that has been raised here is that the attitudes that have prevailed in Diodoran studies have perhaps shaped the course of the scholarship more than the *Bibliothèque* itself. Some of those who have tried to solve the question of Diodorus' sources seem to have been more concerned with that historian's reputation than the evidence that was actually available to them, leading them to make dangerous assumptions (without solid grounds) and then circular arguments. It is important for the sake of Diodoran studies that these serious and fundamental methodological flaws are shown up for what they really are, so they do not hold any further influence in the future.

Diodorus' own work is still a problem, of course, but the first chapter has gone some way to finding out how to identify where the historian has gone wrong, both in terms of methodology and of course in how Diodorus' aims in writing have affected his historical accuracy. His use of sources is mostly uncritical, though it seems untrue that Diodorus actually took sections of Ephorus and Timaeus to form his own work, an accusation levelled at him by Laqueur¹. One point that seems to have been arrived at in the course of the first chapter is that the idea of identifying where Diodorus used one source, as opposed to another, is a big problem in itself, but the task of actually identifying which source he is using is, at times, utterly futile. Book Eleven, with which we are concerned for the purposes of this thesis, seems to be one of those times, with no mention of either Ephorus or Timaeus in the book. Only the idea that

¹ See above, 47ff.

Carthage enjoyed an alliance with the Persians can really be attributed to a source, Ephorus, and this in turn defeats the idea that Timaeus was Diodorus' one source for Western affairs. On the other hand, it is not as if Diodoran studies as a whole is just one big unresolvable problem. We have identified points at which the historian is indeed using his own opinion (despite efforts to prove that even his aims were taken from Ephorus' work), and while Diodorus' concern for moral issues does damage the *Bibliothēke's* historical accuracy, we are better equipped to deal with problems in the text with this in mind.

Some effort has also been made here to understand the contributions made by two other historians, Herodotus and Thucydides. While it is the case that coverage of Western Greek history itself is hardly immense from these authors, it is quite unfair to expect otherwise, with the focus of their respective works being largely unconcerned with events in the West. Also, in the case of Herodotus, in trying to discern whether there is bias towards/against tyrants, it seems that while Herodotus was not frightened to use stereotypes, this did not mean that he did not also appreciate that tyrants were individuals, some more deserving of praise than others.

Appreciation of the sources available to us is crucially important to our understanding of the tyrants in Sicily, especially given the problematic nature of the historians involved. Now that we know what sort of agenda Diodorus had in writing his *Bibliothēke*, as well as those of his sources, we are better equipped to understand and tackle the various problems to be encountered when examining what they say about the tyrants.

The main discussion of the tyranny itself started with the second chapter, where their foreign policy was the focus of attention. The first part concentrated on the tyrants' relations with other Greeks, in particular those in Sicily and Italy that were ruled by other tyrants. There seem to be two points on this subject of great significance, the first being the central role of the straits of Messina in the policy making of the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse. Even aside from events that directly involve Zancle, Rhegium or both, such as the intervention of Hieron at Rhegium following the death of Anaxilas, we find episodes such as the foundation of Aetna in 476 that could certainly be interpreted as moves towards regaining the city of Zancle. The Cale Acte enterprise, which was almost certainly an idea of Hippocrates', seems to be further evidence of such a policy. The second main point to emerge from this section is the

interdependence between the tyrants of Gela/Syracuse and Acragas. This does, from time to time, appear explicitly in our sources with numerous examples, most notably Theron's cry for help at Himera in 480, but it is on the occasion of Theron's death that we realise how critical it was for tyrants to be supported by similar allies. The attack on Syracuse by Thrasydaeus, Theron's successor, shows how fragile the alliance between the Deinomenids and the Emmenids was, and this is another possible reason for Hieron's turning his attention to the sons of Anaxilas in Rhegium later in his reign.

As for the tyrants' relations with Carthage, we have come to one very clear conclusion regarding the Himera campaign of 480, that rather than being a result of Carthaginian aggression against the Greeks of Sicily, aiming to annex the island as part of a Carthaginian empire, it was, in fact the aggression of Theron that was the source of the conflict. We can be almost certain that it was Theron's capture of Himera that brought the two main protagonists, Carthage (ally of Terillus, deposed tyrant of Himera) and Gelon (Theron's main ally) into a confrontation that has been distorted into the Western front of the Greeks' struggle against Persia. However, we have also seen in later chapters how this episode caught the imagination of the Greeks in the West, transforming Gelon into an icon, the saviour of Greece, regardless of the true circumstances of his victory at Himera.

The third chapter concentrated on the military aspects of the tyrants' foreign policy and, more precisely, on the use of mercenaries. Again, there are a few points that stand out and show why the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse were unique in the Greek world. The most obvious point is the dependence shown on mercenaries, at least from Gelon's reign onwards, which is clearly indicated by the immense numbers of mercenaries recruited and then settled for payment. At times, this dependence was extreme, and never more so than at the very end of the Deinomenid dynasty, when Thrasybulus was only able to rely on mercenaries for his own safety.

Even more striking than this unusual over-dependence on mercenaries, are the reasons behind it. From an early stage in the tyranny, it was realised that although popular revolts were the best way for an aspiring tyrant to come to power, that was not necessarily the case for a tyrant hoping to maintain it. Instead, possibly from Hippocrates' final years onwards, efforts

were made by the tyrants to ingratiate themselves with the aristocracy of Gela, and as Gelon extended the empire towards Syracuse, the same was done with the aristocracies of various other cities such as Megara Hyblaea. Ultimately, Gelon gained the support of the Syracusan *Gamoroi* by reinstating them following a popular revolt in the city in 485, and with generous funds, was able to recruit mercenary forces instead of relying on the fragile, if even existent, loyalty of the masses. Ingeniously, the mercenaries were settled in Sicily as a permanent and reliable means of payment, ensuring the tyrant's dependence on them would not be compromised by unpredictability in the loyalty stakes. This enabled the tyrants to make use of many thousands of mercenaries during a time when such practice was very rare indeed, and had previously been mainly restricted to bodyguards. This kind of policy played a huge part in destabilising the region following the end of the Deinomenid dynasty, as we have found out in the final chapter, with many cities having to forcibly remove those settled there by the tyrants, but also, unusually, the balance of power was still with the aristocracy following the fall of the tyranny, and the *demos* was still effectively excluded.

The refounding of cities in Sicily, which often involved the settling of mercenaries, is an even more unusual feature of this time in Sicily. There is no real precedent for these events, especially for the refoundation of Catana as Aetna, which stands alone as a virtually unique occurrence because of its sheer ambition and grandeur. It seems that the first incident at Camarina served to raise awareness of the possible advantages of mass-population movement, and the ease of doing so in Sicily as opposed to the many problems that one would confront on the Greek mainland. However, we have also found that of the four examples of 'refoundation' in Sicily, three do not really fit that description at all. Only the refoundation of Catana seems to be carried out with the aim of creating a brand new city, with an identity distinct in virtually every way from the older settlement, the other three being far more like reinforcements to already existing cities.

In the cases of Camarina and Himera there are no known attempts at establishing any new institutions, for example a founder cult, and in neither case is any section of the population removed immediately beforehand, although Himera did suffer from severe under-population due to several incidents in the recent past. Both Camarina and Himera were in strategically

significant locations, and it is likely that they were reinforced in order to counter possible threats from Syracuse and the Carthaginians respectively. Zancle also occupied an extremely important strategic point, both militarily and economically, and perhaps suffered some population loss amongst its established population, in addition to the expulsion of the Samians, but the renaming of the city as Messene/Messana adds an extra dimension to Anaxilas' refoundation. However, there is still no real evidence to suggest it was regarded as a new city, although there was a substantial input of Messenian immigrants. Again, it seems likely that the intention was to reinforce Zancle in order to maintain control in the face of likely aggression from the Deinomenids. Although there were strategic motives for Hieron's refoundation of Catana, likely to be the aforementioned interest in Zancle/Messana, there is also clear evidence to suggest that it was one big propaganda exercise. Hieron wanted to be recognized as something other than a tyrant, and the establishment of his hero-cult in Aetna following his death is clearly indicative of his intention to be recognised as an *oikist*, a title that would stay with him regardless of whether he ruled effectively or not. The Aetna episode may indeed be the only real example of 'refoundation' at this time, but without the precedents of Camarina and Zancle one wonders whether Hieron would have come up with the same idea, or if he did have the idea, whether it would have seemed feasible. Therefore, just as we have found with mercenary recruitment, the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse were simply ahead of their time when it came to the shifting of populations, and this is continued into later Sicilian history by leaders such as Dionysius I.

Just as the subject of refoundations is dominated by the actions of Hieron, the tyrant has also been the subject of much of our evidence for Deinomenid propaganda. Very little survives from Hippocrates and Gelon, but there are very good reasons for this sudden outbreak of propaganda material. Hippocrates and Gelon simply did not need to legitimise their rule: Hippocrates, though perhaps not the most popular man in Gela at the time, brought military successes not only against other Greek cities but also against the Sicels who had been a thorn in the city's side since its foundation. Gelon was even less popular first of all, with his suppression of a popular revolt against Hippocrates' sons, but his victory at Himera transformed him into a hero, and he was known (however inaccurately) as the saviour of the Greeks in

Sicily. With little left to conquer, and living in the shadow of his brother, Hieron was forced to take measures in order to secure his position, and his commissioning of poets went a long way towards achieving this aim. Even though poets had frequently been hired by tyrants before, it seems as if they were recruited by Hieron *specifically* to send a message to his subjects, defending his position in Syracuse, and this was done mainly in conjunction with his actual achievements: the foundation of Aetna, various Olympic and Pythian victories, and his naval victory at Cumae. We have also found a favoured method of legitimisation, this being the description of Hieron's position and achievements, as well as his method of rule, in Homeric terms, even going so far as to imply that Hieron was put in place by Zeus himself, to bring peace and prosperity to his dominion. In other words, Hieron's rule was being assimilated with constitutional monarchy.

On a similar matter, we have also examined the tyrants' use of titles, as well as those used by our sources. Almost surprisingly, given the efforts made by Hieron to justify his position, there are simply no claims on behalf of the tyrants *themselves* to kingship in Gela or Syracuse, or even acknowledgement of their position as ruler, with the exception of Polyzelus' inscription on the base of the Charioteer of Delphi. However, this seems to be a conscious effort to ingratiate themselves with the so-called 'Panhellenic elite' at Olympia and Delphi, who would no doubt have frowned on open displays of power, particularly over fellow Greeks, post-Persian invasion. A different matter altogether is how the tyrants were treated later on, particularly by historians. In fact, the term *basileus* is used fairly consistently by Diodorus to describe the Deinomenids (and only the Deinomenids, not their popular ally, Theron), especially following Himera, the only main exceptions being his description of when Thrasybulus' rule descends into ugliness, where Diodorus' moral duties come into play. Even Herodotus uses the term *basileus* in the story of the Greek embassy to Gelon, but there still seems to be room for doubt over why he uses it. On existing evidence, it seems that the Deinomenids' kingship cannot be proven either way until more evidence comes to light.

The issue of titular use also had a strong impact on the final chapter, as it is an equally contentious subject when considering the Dionysian tyrants. We can probably rule out the theory that 'the Deinomenids used *basileus*, so therefore the Dionysians must also have',

especially as it has not been proven in the case of the Deinomenids, and apart from hints at a hereditary system of power in Syracuse under Dionysius, and also references to kingly regalia, there is no solid evidence suggesting that is the case. While it is uncertain that the Dionysians used any title, aside from the early use of *strategos autokrator*, it seems that the legacy of Gelon, and the likely desire to be associated with him in any way counted for more in Syracuse than constitutional legitimacy.

Considering the battle of Himera was meant to be the greatest achievement by Gelon, or indeed any of the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, it seems to have had surprisingly little effect on activity in Carthage. This is despite the impression we are given by our sources, who maintain that the defeat was so crushing that Carthage withdrew into itself for most of the remainder of the century. On the contrary, we find the territory of Carthage actually expanded during this time, to cover most of modern Tunisia, and of course further exploration in and around Africa. In this case, therefore, the tyrants of Sicily had much *less* impact than has usually been thought. The case of mercenary recruitment may seem similar at first glance when one takes into account the sudden surge in professional forces following the Peloponnesian War. However, two points make this subject worthy of further exploration. The first is that mercenary and bodyguard use actually continues throughout the fifth century, during the democratic age, so it seems likely that the extensive use of mercenaries by the Deinomenids served as some sort of influence after their fall. Secondly, Dionysius himself shows a similar degree of dependency on mercenaries as the Deinomenids. This is especially important as the two dynasties' manner of rule was also very similar: to recap, the Deinomenids and Dionysians were both heavily dependent on the support of the aristocracy rather than of the masses, hence their extensive use of mercenary infantry forces.

The most important legacy of the Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants, however, was their huge impact on the political life of Syracuse itself. This manifested itself in several ways throughout the fifth century BC, for example the strife caused by the mercenaries settled all over Eastern Sicily by the Deinomenids, especially when the populace tried to reclaim their respective cities from those who were settled by the tyrants. However, the most notable feature of the tyrants' legacy was found in Syracuse's confused attempts at trying to ensure that

tyranny did not return. While democracy was installed at Syracuse, at least according to our sources, it seems that the *Gamoroi* actually retained much of their own influence. Measures meant to prevent tyranny recurring, such as petalism, backfired because it harmed the more influential classes to such a degree that it had to be repealed. In general, the attempt at democratic government failed miserably in Syracuse, and much of this was due to the fear of tyranny held by both *Gamoroi* and *demos*.

Overall, the impact that the Pantarid and Deinomenid dynasties had on future events in Sicily cannot be over emphasised, and this is the primary reason why more attention should be given to them. The influence that they maintained in Sicilian, particularly Syracusan, politics over the course of the next century was so great that if it were not for the likes of Hippocrates and Gelon, then the course of Greek history could have been very different – for example the Carthaginians might not have invaded Sicily during the late fifth century BC. Democracy might have had a better chance of surviving in Syracuse had it not been for the empowerment of the *Gamoroi* under the Deinomenids, whereas in other cases tyranny enables the state to switch from aristocratic government to democracy. If the democracy was stable and the Carthaginians did not invade, then Dionysius, the most powerful and influential Greek in the first half of the fourth century, might never even have become tyrant.

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